Collective understanding of small state security in the post-Cold War era

Case study on how the shared understanding of security evolved in the Caribbean Community

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Abstract

The debate over the concept of security is often discussed in terms of the dominant and hegemonic states in the field of security studies, international relations and conflict research. Yet, majority of the states in the world are medium or small in their physical sizes and capabilities. The focus of this research, however, is in the security understanding of the very small states located in the Caribbean, in the backyard of the global superpower U.S.A. The former colonies of the European powers became independent in the middle of the Cold War and have then looked for ways to preserve their independence in the changing global arena. The larger debate over realist and liberal thought over why states cooperate and how the states can maximise the security for their citizens is the bigger context in which this study belongs to.

By doing a case study on the Caribbean Community and why it has developed its common security strategy and shared threat perceptions as late as 2013, this thesis acknowledges the four-phases of the Caribbean security understanding identified by Jessica Byron. It expands these distinct phases and further argues that there is a new, fifth phase of security understanding in the Caribbean that can be distinguished. By utilising existing research and analysing documents released by individual states, intergovernmental organisations and other sources, this thesis is looking to discover answer to the central research question: what led to the deepening of security cooperation within the Caribbean Community. The hypothesis then is that the small size and limited capabilities have contributed to the appearance of new security concerns which have overtaken the traditional understanding of security.
After having identified distinct features in different stages of security understanding in the Caribbean, the thesis identifies a fifth phase in Caribbean security understanding and the results point out that the process of integration and increasing cooperation in CARICOM is driven both by the internal need due to lack of domestic capabilities but also by the active promotion of external powers who have their own vested interests in doing so.

**Key words**
Caribbean, CARICOM, security studies, international relations, national security, realism, liberalism, securitisation, case study, document analysis, integration, cooperation
Acknowledgements

Writing this thesis was an interesting process, it began as a curious interest in the Caribbean region, which was very unfamiliar area to me mystified by stories of pirates and modern day paradise islands. My interest however began to grow the more I read about it as I became amazed by the ability of Caribbean states to survive in the modern world and I began to widen my understanding. For succeeding in my studies and completing this thesis I owe my gratitude firstly to the Tampere Peace Research Institute for allowing me adequate academic liberties to follow my interests, and to the University of West Indies for widening my understanding in a whole new range of issues and not the least in the Caribbean studies.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental organisation</td>
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<td>SIDS</td>
<td>Small Island Developing States</td>
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<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Southern Command</td>
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<td>CALP</td>
<td>Caribbean Anti Money Laundering Programme</td>
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<td>CARIBPOL</td>
<td>Caribbean police Service</td>
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<td>CCJ</td>
<td>Caribbean Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ECS</td>
<td>Eastern Caribbean States</td>
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<td>CARDIN</td>
<td>Caribbean Drug Information Network</td>
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<td>ACS</td>
<td>Association of Caribbean States</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNASUR</td>
<td>Union of South American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CELAC</td>
<td>Community of Latin American and Caribbean States</td>
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<td>ACS</td>
<td>Association of Caribbean States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALBA</td>
<td>Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas</td>
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<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
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<td>CBSI</td>
<td>Caribbean Basin Security Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMPACS</td>
<td>CARICOM Implementing Agency for Crime and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
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<td>OECS</td>
<td>Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Regional Security System</td>
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction

In the field of international relations questions concerning national security are often discussed in terms of the big and the powerful thus leaving the small and weak to attend the international arena in the terms of the big and hegemonic states. How the small independent Caribbean states understand security and how that concept has developed to date is somewhat different from the understanding of the United States or from the former colonial power United Kingdom’s and has been far less studied, especially so in the western fields of international relations, security or peace studies. While the asymmetry between the economic and military power between the hegemonic power, the U.S.A and the small Caribbean states has been vital for the development of the Caribbean understanding of security, it is also important to recognise the Caribbean as the westernmost point of the European Union making it the focal point in the competition of influence between the EU and the U.S.A. In addition to that, the other extra-regional powers have had, and still do have interests in the region as well. The end of the Cold War, the declining U.S.A hegemony and evolving understanding over the meaning of security, have influenced the Caribbean states along with the rest of the world. Even though the critical security concepts such as human, environmental, economical, and cybersecurity along with many other forms of security are important, the state is still a dominant actor in the international arena and thus the provider and guarantee of security.

The current state of international relations can be argued to be a one of increasing insecurity ever since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Recently there has been a new rise of neorealism, or even hostile nationalism, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Central African Republic, Libya and Syria are creating tremors all over the world; the refugees seen as undermining the values of, what were thought to be, stable European states, not to mention the British decision to leave the European Union and the election of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States. This leads to the observation that very little attention is given to the liberal project that has been taking place in the Caribbean, where the small Caribbean states are faced with a multiplicity of threats and have opted to follow the example of European Union and deepen their integration to new level by introducing security as the fourth pillar of the Caribbean Community.
The geographical location of the Caribbean, makes it an interesting region to study as it faces South America to the south, Latin America to the west and the U.S.A. coastline in the North, while to the east it faces Atlantic Ocean which separates the Caribbean from the former colonial powers in Europe. In addition to this, the small size of the Caribbean states and their sovereign rights in the international arena make it interesting from the Finnish perspective as well. Finland, and Finnish people, together with the other Nordic countries, often consider themselves as small countries and have also developed a peaceful and stable region. Peaceful coexistence remains as one of the greatest challenges in the international relations from the peace studies perspective and this highlights the importance of studying regions that have had success in this.

Comprehending what is meant by the Caribbean is also important as it defines which countries are included in the study. Serbín (1998) has noted three definitions of Caribbean used in academia and foreign policy debates; while some include the continental countries such as Mexico and Venezuela and Colombia to be part of it; others define it to contain only the islands between Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea. Further, defining the Caribbean is further complicated by the territories of the U.S.A, France, Netherlands and U.K. that are in the region and would bean that they are Caribbean states as well. However, in this study I am focusing on the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), consisting of 15 member states and 5 associate territories, with the combined population of 16 million. The larger context of the Greater Caribbean region with the combined population of 250 million people is important and is also considered in the discussion. The CARICOM was established in 1973 with the treaty of Chaguaramas for three purposes: to further economic integration in form of regional common market; to promote functional cooperation in sectors such as culture, education, labour and tourism, of which the University of West Indies is an example; and to coordinate foreign and defence policies. (CARICOM, 1973; Viera-Tirado, 2004.)

The Caribbean island states gained their independency after the Second World War and have then not had the first-hand and collective experience of war that has been the dominant driver for integration in Europe for example and this has influenced their understanding of security. During the colonial era and in the early years of independency, the security of Caribbean island states was guaranteed by the former colonial powers as well as the superpowers’ in the interest of preserving
the status quo between the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R. during their Cold War rivalry. The security understanding of the Caribbean national security has developed in a hemisphere where international conflict has been minimal when compared to the rest of the world, the U.S.A and Cuba bigotry and the rivalry between Dominican Republic and Haiti being exceptions, and it has been declared as a “zone of peace” by the OAS already in 1979 (Baranyi & Dosman, 1990) and in January 29th 2014, CELAC renewed their “commitment to consolidate Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace, in which differences between nations are peacefully settled through dialogue and negotiations or other means, fully consistent with International Law” (CELAC, 2014) The small size of the Caribbean island states and the lack of interstate war in the region has affected their security conception and the neighbouring countries have often been taken as a lesser threat, for example than a foreign super-power intervention.

The treaty of Chaguaramas was revised in 2001 but it was not until 2006 when the CARICOM adopted security as its fourth pillar. This led to the development of the Common Crime and Security Strategy
in 2013 and even further to the Caribbean Strategic Plan in 2014 (IMPACS, 2013; CARICOM, 2014). The recent institutionalization of security governance in the region however challenges the traditional understanding of sovereignty, a concept which has been highly respected in the region due to the existential debate over their rights to exist ever since their independence.

1.1 Previous literature on state cooperation

1.1.1 Realism and Liberalism

In the interwar period, a great debate developed among the European scholars representing the realist and idealist theories, which led to the discovery of the liberal theory. The idealists believed that nation states could coexist peacefully and cooperate, for example in the form of the League of Nations, and thus ultimately overcome the need for war. The Second World War, however, proved them wrong and the new realist thinkers, such as Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Carr, among others, developed a theory which sees cooperation to be based on interest, rather than ideology. Morgenthau, for example argues that politics and international society are based on the human nature and rational thinking and assumes that the foreign policy actions of a state are based on the interest of gaining power. The concept of power contains “anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man”. (1966, p. 9) Realists see states as units operating in anarchical environment and thus the first and foremost priority is the survival of the state. To do this state must pursue power, traditionally measured in terms of military means but also includes factors such as geography, natural resources, industrial capacity and population. (Morgenthau, 1966, pp. 106-144) Dunne and Schmit (2011) have recognised three core elements of realism: Statism, Survival, and Self-help. Statism refers to the eternal role of the state as the legitimate actor in the international arena, where survival is the priority. The self-help principle arises from the need to be able to survive, and assumption that states can ultimately rely only on themselves to provide security. Realists see regional organisations and alliances as a way in which states try to survive the anarchical international arena (Viera-Tirado, 2004). Grieco has more critical view and he argues that for realists “international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests” (1988, p. 485). The evolving world order however has forced even the realists to re-examine some of their principles to respond to the needs and threats of modern world.
From the neo-realist perspective, the independence and survival in the international arena are the main interest of states and therefore any success of regional trade agreement is dependent on these security considerations. International regionalism is then caused by attempts to improve the bargaining position of states against the hegemonic position of another state. For example, in response to increasing bargaining power of European states due to European integration, the U.S. created NAFTA, and correspondingly East Asian nations have created their own blocks. (Viera-Tirado, 2004.)

In response, the neoliberal approach highlights the opportunities that increasing interaction brings upon. “The establishment of regional institution is just a way to maximize the benefits coming from market exchanges” (Viera-Tirado, 2004, p. 28). Neorealist scholar Steven Lamy separates relative and absolute gains following the argument made by Grieco already in 1988. Lamy argues that “states are interested in increasing their power and influence (absolute gains) ...states are also concerned with how much power and influence other states might achieve (relative gains) in any cooperative endeavour” (2011, p. 119). Originally Grieco argued that states are as worried on how much their partners are gaining from the cooperation as they are on possibility of cheating, and that if the partner state achieves greater gains and satisfactorily complies the joint agreement, the other state might exist the partnership” because the partner is achieving relatively greater gains” (Grieco, 1988, p. 487).

Idealism, developed in inter-war era Europe, in return shares realisms’ view that the world is in an anarchical state, but disagree with realists on its permanency. Instead, liberalism has a belief in progress, the rule of law and in the idea of a just order, democracy and peace. Where realism believes that each state is a potential enemy to another, liberals see this as self-fulfilling prophecy and argue that this can be avoided by the Kantian ‘Cosmopolitan law’ where international organisation is set out to control states behaviour. They also believe that the threat of undemocratic regimes, imperialism and war can be overcome by increasing collective security, commerce and world governance. (Dunne, 2011; Russett, 2013.) The liberal theory has produced a liberal peace theory, which is grounded on the international respect for individual rights, shared commercial interests added with constitutional restraint (Doyle, 2005). Moravcsik’s argument, that instead of freely pursuing their interests in the international arena, states are constrained by the interests of other states supports this (Moravcsik, 1997.) The carrying idea of liberal thought then is the aim of achieving a world, which is not in an anarchical condition but in peace and order. The very distinctive character of
liberal internationalism is arguably that relies on the ethics and moral of humans, compared to neoliberalism, which in turn relies mostly on a cold mathematical rationality.

1.1.2 Regionalization and Integration

During the previous century, despite the realist doubt on state on state cooperation, regionalization has become an inherent feature of international relations. Regionalization processes have produced interdependencies and often include the deepening perceptions of common interests and identity. As a part of the process, a wide range of agreements with a mixture of contents has been made between states and a distinction can be made between cooperation and integration processes (Best & Christiansen, 2011, p. 430) Increasing regional projects leads to the challenge of definitions. While Hurrell identifies that the term “regionalization” can be used to refer “to the growth of societal integration within a region and... the often undirected processes of social and economic interaction” (Hurrell, 1995, p. 39), Jules argues that one needs to distinguish between de jure state-driven “regionalism” and de facto market-driven “regionalization” (Jules, 2015, p. 38). Regionalism, according to another definition is “the conscious bringing together of different states and societies underpinned by perceived need to pool resources and face external challenges collectively” (Bishop et al 2016, p. 3). Regionalism as defined by Schultz et al, is “the body of ideas, values and concrete objectives that are aimed at creating maintaining or modifying the provision of security and wealth, peace and development within a region: the urge by any set of actors to reorganise along particular regional space” (Quoted in Viera-Tirado, 2004, p. 16) The debate over these definitions is related to the question over why states do cooperate and weather integration is due to conscious project and is led by someone, or whether it is an unconscious product of social interaction. This leads to the next theoretical debate.

The theories over why states cooperate are multiple but the dominant debate is over realism, liberalism, internationalization and whether cooperation between states can or cannot be sustainable. In a deeper level, it is necessary to consider the nature of integration, Tiilikainen and Palosaari (2007, p. 11) identify two approaches: firstly, the cooperation between sovereign states; and secondly a process of forming a new state like actor. The process in Europe leading to the evolvement of European Union as semi-independent foreign policy actor is an example for the later, whereas the African Union is an example of the cooperation between sovereign states. Taking this into an account when
studying CARICOM is important in the light of the latest strategic plan, which notes the need for common identity, that is a big step towards creating a new state like actor. However, the long-awaited sovereignty is a matter of prestige for the Caribbean nations and is therefore conflicting with the idea of new state. The integration in the Caribbean and Europe are not completely new ideas and theoretical discussion has developed to explain it.

Thanks to the integration process which has been taking place especially within Europe after the Second World War leading to the institution of European Union as we know it nowadays, there is a wide field of literature on integration studies and especially focusing on the foreign policy issues as EU has developed common foreign and security policies. While studying the European integration process, Tiilikainen has recognized trans-actionalism, new functionalism and intergovernmentalism based on realism as the core theoretical foundations for increasing integration. (Tiilikainen, 2007). Knight and Persaud identify transactionalism to be emerging from Karl Deutch’s works; according to them, “the phenomenon of political unification at the international level is comparable to what would be observed at the national level during the birth of nation states” (Knight & Persaud, 2001, p. 48). They also note that the school sees multiple steps in the process, developing functional links such as trade and migration between communities, the functional links then cause transactions leading to ‘trans community networks’ which eventually leads to “assimilation of peoples and their integration into larger whole” (Knight & Persaud, 2001, pp. 48-49).

In turn, neofunctionalism is based on Ernst Haas work “the Uniting of Europe” (Haas, 1958) , and this school argues that forming of institutions leads to a community and that continuing integration is more rewarding than defecting from the unification process. Knight and Persaud argue that “inherent in integration efforts is an expansive logic, which operates under appropriate conditions to extend continually the range of activities under international jurisdiction” (2001, p. 49). With regards to the Caribbean these conditions may include a fear of further U.S.A dominance and hence a need to integrate as a form of buffer. Knight and Persaud also argue that once the integration process has begun there is no alternative options viable. (Knight & Persaud, 2001, pp. 48-49) Some evidence in the Caribbean context can be seen in the evolvement of inter Caribbean cooperation from the West Indian Federation to the Caribbean Free Trade Association and finally towards the CARICOM and its increasing institutionalisation.
Historical linkages of the Caribbean states to Africa and other former colonial countries make it important to take note on the South-South aspect of Caribbean Integration movement. Michelle Morais de Sá Silva has recognized three phases in the evolution of South-South cooperation since the World War II. Firstly, the ‘self-reliance and political strengthening’ during cold war decolonization struggles (1949-79), secondly the ‘demobilization’ during the neoliberal counter offensive from the west (1980-1998) and thirdly the latest South-South cooperation as ‘best practice transfer’. Additionally, she points out that whilst cooperation is a voluntary process, transfer may entail both voluntary and coercive processes (Jules & Morais de Sá e Silva, 2008, p. 58). Knight and Persaud conclude that future appearance of the indigenous Caribbean security governance is likely due to “the history of the region and the impact of global forces that have been pushing states into regional trading blogs” (2001, p. 50). While much of the integration and regionalism literature is based on the economical projects, and to the change brought upon the global markets by the end of Cold War, some attention is also given to the security cooperation.

1.2 Security Theory

The question of security is related the question what and who is the subject of security is part of the debate between realism and liberalism. This section will present the discourse over what is security from the perspective of security studies, defining security in the necessary accuracy for the study is important as well as discussing the relevancy of modern broad security threats to the Caribbean states.

The traditional Security approach emphasises the importance of traditional military understanding of security and the power commodities that can be used by states to secure themselves. Griffith calls this as ‘diplomatic-strategic conception of security’ that takes the assumption that there are external hostile and violent threat that are seen in military form. (Griffith, 1990, p. 10) The idea of national security, defined in militarized terms, largely dominated the security studies during the Cold War era. This thinking was based on the realist theory (see Morgenthau, 1966). Others have later argued (Buzan, 1991; Byron, 1997; Knight & Persaud, 2001; Griffith, 1998, 2004) that the utility of this understanding has decreased in the aftermath of the Cold War. John Baylis argues that integration projects, such as the one in Europe, undermine the classical political order, while at the same time
fragmentation of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has created problems with boundaries, minorities. There is then an argument to be made that “ethno-national groups, rather than states should become the centre of attention for security analysts.” (Baylis, 2011, p. 233) This is undermining the priority of a state as the subject of security and it could be argued that this is particularly for the small state understanding of security. The increased destructive capabilities and the nuclear deterrence during great power rivalry seems to have given space for other understandings of security. This has enabled the small Caribbean states to adopt more critical understanding of security while maintaining some aspects of traditional approach.

1.3 Critical security theory

The whole concept of security has been under scrutiny from the 1980’s and especially after the Cold War. The critical security studies have become more significant as they question what is security, and who is to be secured. The 21st century challenges, which modern states are faced with, come in many forms and are often intertwined with each other by nature. Richard Bloomfield states that “new security threats are, as often as not, the results of decisions taken by non-state actors, the threatening activities are transnational, that is, they cross boarders, but may be difficult for the state to control” (1998, p. 122). Barry Buzan has noted the continuing debate between the traditionalist, widening and critical approaches to security studies. The traditionalists argue on behalf of the military security while the widening approach is beginning to take into account in some new threat aspects such as economic and environmental the traditional subject of security, state. The critical approaches then include number of different approaches such as feminists, poststructuralist, and critical theory. The main contribution of the critical approaches is to question the subject of security. (Buzan, 1997; Baylis, 2011)

A concept of ‘securitization’ has been developed by the Copenhagen school of security studies upholding a constructivist approach and presented in 19981, and it is important for the study as it will be relevant from the aspect of security studies but also on the view point of foreign policy analysis as securitization influences the policy actions. It questions how different threats are constructed in

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public discussion and how they are prioritized. Making something a matter of national security, thus securitizing the issue, it gains special focus and often becomes subject to different legislation and gives authorities greater powers and extraordinary measures beyond normal. (Williams, 2003; Ibek, 2015). After the end of Cold War and the collapse of super power rivalry the focus of security in the Caribbean states changed responsively. The Washington constructed threat of communism fell giving space for new constructs, Richard Bloomfield (1998, p. 121) notes that in the Caribbean the “transformation of the security debate obeys two fundamental changes in the international situation: the end of the Cold War and the economical and psychological effects of the technological revolution”. This is supported by the Byron’s recognition that “in the post-Cold War era, there has been widespread recognition of the need to redefine security and to reassess the principal sources of threat to international community, states and individuals” (1997, p. 54), this highlights the change in the understanding of security.

1.4 Security today

The subject of security has changed from state centric, to include international community as well as the individual and the sources of threats may be other than just hostile states. Harlan Koff, for example, defines security “as protection from harm” and differentiates “hard security” “as protection from coercion-based threats” and “soft security” “as protection against non-coercion-based threats”. (2016, pp. 2-3) He also defines environmental security as the ”protection from environmental dangers, the lack/depletion of strategic resources and conflict over these resources” and human security as “protection of human dignity” which is a combination of both hard and soft security measures (Koff, 2016, p. 3). Others have suggested an approach which would take into account military, political, ecological and the ethnic protracted social conflict aspects leading to the “multi-dimensional approach”. (Griffith, 1990, p. 12.) The change in the security debate has led to the situation where “concerns about regional security have shifted from strategic-military issues to police and intelligence matters” (Serbin, 1998, p. 63). Rothstein’s theory, presented by Griffith, focuses on third world countries and according to him their security challenges are related to problems of development and that the common features among the two are influenced by threat perceptions, resource constraints and legitimacy. (Griffith, 1990, p. 12) These changes are framing the study, as the regional security in the Caribbean, is consisting of small, developing and heterogeneous group of states which contain different levels of different threats when compared to many other regions in
the world. How different matters have been prioritised and securitized through different times is discussed in chapter three.

1.5 The research question and its relevancy

The focus of this research is in the external dimension of security of small Caribbean states, the development of shared understanding of external security and therefore the internal domestic socioeconomic aspects of individual countries, though they are interacting with the external threats, are not of primary concern. Crime and economic inequality are a matter of great concern to many Caribbean states and their impact has been studied before\(^2\), instead the focus is on the threats formed by external forces. To understand the drivers of security integration in the Caribbean today, one must begin by looking at history to see what has been done before and how the understanding of security has changed through the colonial era, and the age of neo-imperialism of the U.S.A, and dawning of the independency of the Caribbean, U.S. hegemony through the Cold War, unipolar moment after the Cold War and through the dawn of the new millennium. The Caribbean has been often considered as one of the most democratic and peaceful region in the world and studying such a region could provide new understandings that are much needed in the modern world.

Jessica Byron (1997) has identified four phases in the security integration between 1960s and 1990s among the Eastern Caribbean States. However, from the 1990s there has been a significant move for greater cooperation in the security sector within the whole CARICOM. It has been unclear what is driving the need for security cooperation between the small Caribbean states today, whether the integration movement is indeed internal to the Caribbean region and is driven by local needs, or is it externally driven by the needs and demands of foreign powers. In this study, I will expand the Jessica Byron’s recognition of four phases and argue that there is a new distinct phase to be identified in security development of the Caribbean. To describe the phenomenon of security cooperation it is necessary ask, how and why do these states cooperate, and how the rationale behind the cooperation has evolved. Jessica Byron has identified four phases in the Eastern Caribbean States security

cooperation and this thesis has expanded that to the CARICOM context and identified a new and distinct phase which can to be added to Jessica Byron’s work. The dominant assumption in the field is that the increase in security cooperation in the Caribbean Community is due to the increase of transnational crime, but it is unclear to what extend this is also due to the involvement of the traditional security providers, the old colonial hosts and the U.S.A. in the region.

The research question is then shaped as follows: What has led to the deepening of the CARICOM security cooperation? The hypothesis is that the due to small military capabilities small Caribbean states have succeeded in developing common security perception that has displaced the traditional military security.

The secondary aim of the research is to identify a new and distinct phase of security integration happening in the Caribbean.

1.6 The Structure of the thesis

The purpose of this case study is to describe the process of increasing security cooperation in the Caribbean Community ultimately leading to the addition of security as the fourth pillar of the community and to understand what led to the change from a ‘go alone’ approach towards increasing cooperation. The first introduced the reader to the topic, theoretical debates over security, regionalization and why and how states cooperate, and the concept of security itself and the research question of this study. The second chapter explains the approach and methodology used in this study while the chapter three then moves to chronologically reveal the development of security cooperation within the Caribbean since the 1960s when the islands began to gain their independencies. Jessica Byron’s recognition of different phases in eastern Caribbean security cooperation comes relevant here and I take her notion and expand it to the entire CARICOM context. The aim in chapter three is to identify the dominant threats, and actors in the four phases. The following, fourth chapter will then provide evidence to support the hypothesis that there is a fifth phase to be identified and discuss the development of CARICOM security integration in the 2000s. The final discussions will conclude the findings, summarise the study and identify new research areas that could be of interest in the future.
2. Chapter 2: Methodology

This thesis is seeking to discover what led to the appearance of security as the fourth pillar of the CARICOM. There are however very limited number of regional organisations with that level of integration existing, which makes comparative studies difficult. The development of EU Common Security and Defence Policy could provide one, it is however placed against very different historical background making comparisons challenging. To answer my research question, I have chosen to do a case study on the development of security discourse in the Caribbean. A major advantage of using a case study on a topic such as this, as Eckstein argues, is that case studies are most valuable at the stage at which theories are tested, and this is particularly true in the macro political level (Eckstein, 2009). In general, a case study explores a certain case or phenomena through investigating multiple sources of information and then produces narrative describing the case and involves intimate familiarity with that case. (Paterson, 2010; Cresswell, 2007, pp. 73-77) To answer to my research question I will use the within case study to compare the discourse over security at different periods. Benefit of this, more specifically is that the “aim of within case analysis in in-depth understanding and description of the phenomenon under study” (Paterson, 2010, p. 971). Thus, doing a case study is justified in this case as it can be seen not only as a methodology but as a strategy, as well as the final product of the study.

To some extend I will also utilise historical methods, which are often used inside history departments to understand how a certain phenomenon developed in historical context and in the field of social studies, a single country is the most common unit of analysis, while some select sub regions within a country, but also supra entities such as the European Union (Lange, 2014). My focus in this study will be on the supra entity level, as the focus is on the CARICOM, and to lesser extend the Regional Security System but also in state level considerations. The discourse will utilise causal narrative as it “is an excellent method for analysing complex processes and concepts, as it allows detail and a more holistic analysis that considers multiple factors as well as their interactions and sequencing. It is particularly suitable for exploratory studies and is capable of providing considerable insight into causal mechanisms.” (Lange, 2014, p. 45)
By using a case study approach, I will discuss how the discourse between realism and liberalism has affected the development of security in the Caribbean. I will argue that both theories have had their impact on the Caribbean. Additionally, the theory of securitization discussed earlier, becomes relevant here. Despite that the theory was only presented in 1998, it can be applied back into history as well. How different threats have been prioritised and how the threats to the national securities of the Caribbean states has changed.

2.1. Research Material

While researching this topic I completed a student exchange program at the University of West Indies in Cave Hill campus at Barbados, and a dive master internship in the British Virgin Islands in Autumn 2016. These experiences gave me some deeper understanding of the Caribbean way of life and every day aspects of security in the region. However, this thesis is not based on anthropological approaches, but the impact of having lived in the region is still considered. Instead, this thesis is largely based on document analysis, and the documents in this case include: records, maps, minutes of meetings, journals, annual reports, articles, policies, legal documents, intergovernmental organisation’s resolutions, news articles and speeches.

There are however some problems which may have influenced the study since, as Hurworth lists, documents may be misleading, unclear, not detailed, inappropriate selections may be made, documents that are available may be unrepresentative and the comprehending the why and how the documents were originally produced (Hurworth, 2003). The choice to use existing documents is due to their availability and accessibility for the author trough open channels and the library accesses of the Universities of Tampere and West Indies. Differing from the original research plan, a decision was made not to commit myself to interviews. The professionals and academics relevant for this study, were preoccupied with their own tasks and not available without extensive traveling, interviews were excluded from the data collection methods. Separation to primary and secondary sources needs also be clarified, primary sources are in this case used to refer to texts “written by the people directly involved and at the time contemporary with the period being investigated” as defined by Finnegan. (Finnegan, 2006) This however in my case also includes official documents by governments and INGO’s. Secondary sources then are the documents interpreting and referring to the primary sources.
The main disadvantage of using these methods in this case study, however, is the challenge of universalising the results. To what extend the findings of this thesis can be generalised to other cases is disputable. Much of this is due to the uniqueness of modern regionalisation processes and to the specificity of the case studied. Some aspects are common with other integration projects but many of the challenges faced by the small Caribbean island states make this study unique in its own setting. The decision was made to focus on the external threats and therefore discussion over internal socio-economic and political conditions and threats rising from within is limited in this thesis.
3. Chapter: Caribbean Security

3.1. Background

The West Indies were colonialized relatively early, already in the 15th and 16th centuries, and the European colonisers nearly exterminated the local inhabitants known as Caribs and Taíno Arawaks partly by forced labour and partly by introducing new diseases to the region. The few survivors mixed with the slaves brought by the colonizers as the extinction of the local population led to a shortage of labour force which in turn increased the slave trade to the region (Viera-Tirado, 2004, pp. 146-147). However, as the colonialism spread through the world, especially to the far East and Africa, the significance of West indies colonies declined particularly for the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands making space for the U.S to become the dominant power in the region. Especially in the first decades of the 20th century the American economic interest in the Latin America and the Caribbean grew introducing a new phenomenon: “as the economic interests of U.S. business extended into these regions, so too did their stake in political stability. When that stability appeared tenuous and investments were in jeopardy, the U.S. government was not hesitant to deploy gunboats and marines to protect them” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 12). This was a result of the Monroe doctrine dated back to 1823, which was aimed on decreasing the influence of European powers and prevent them from recolonising the western hemisphere. There was a fear among the American people that that the economic crisis in Latin America in early 1900s would launch European recolonization as the British, German and Italian gunboats had already blockaded the ports of economically defaulting Venezuela in 1902. (U.S. National Archives & Records Administration, 2017) President Roosevelt stated in the Corollary of December 1904 that in case any state in the Americas would default on their debts or refuse to fulfil their obligations to international creditors “in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence to the exercise of international police power” (Roosevelt, 1904). This role of international police would later result in several interventions for other reasons as well.

The role of Caribbean islands was firstly to act as a bridge head for the European powers on their way to conquer the rest of the Americas, then as the ‘vortex of the Americas,’ as the Cuban writer Jóse Márti called it, the bridge between the North and South America, highlighting their strategically
important location. The proximity of the Latin America is important for the Caribbean states’ security as well. The example of Latin American states meeting in the Congress of Panama in 1826 under Simón Bolivar “for a purpose of forming a confederation and providing mutual defence against attacks (particularly by Spain)” (Finne More & Jurkovich, 2014, p. 364) The sovereign equality of states is an idea which can be tracked to the ‘International Conference of American States’ held in the US in 1888, more than to Europe. The notable difference, however is the late independency of the Caribbean. The Latin American countries gained their independencies in the early 19th century, beginning with Mexico 1810, whereas the Caribbean island states, with the exemption of Haiti in 1804, only became independent from 1960’s onwards. However, the idea of sovereignty and equality is deeply rooted in the Caribbean and the early independency of the continental Caribbean inspired the island states. Unlike the Latin American states, during the colonial period, the island states in the Caribbean were highly separated from each other to support the divide and rule method used by the European colonial powers and this has made the ideology of ‘pan-caribbeanism’ a weak one even to date, as each state continues to safeguard its national sovereignty jealously from each other’s. Especially the colonies of the British empire had very little to do with each other as during the colonial era, they were run by governors who had to run all their interactions with the other colonies through the colonial office in London. To what extend the isolation of Caribbean states has affected on the stability of their democracy and governance which differs from the Latin American countries is unclear.

The idea of creating Caribbean federations arise in the 20th century while the Colonial powers focused to what they considered more economically and strategically important colonies in Asia and Africa. It was thought at the time by the colonial powers, that the small islands should be united to create larger more economically sustainable entities that can defend themselves. This idea of federalisation was also seen in the French attempts to create federations in Western and Central Africa. In the British Caribbean, two units were created: The Windward Islands Federation, which only lasted from 1879 to 1883; and the Leeward Islands Federation which lasted much longer, from 1871 to 1958. The later was followed by the British West Indian Federation from 1958 to 1962. (Baird, 2011, p. 19) Oostinde and Klinkers however note that “these island economies, with their limited local markets, a narrow range of economic activities and without natural resources were competitive rather than complementary and thus remained largely insular” (2003, p. 21). This ultimately led to the
collapse of the federation as the Caribbean countries led by Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago choose to leave the federation and become independent individually in 1962. Some claim that this was due to the prevailing ‘colonial nature’ of the West Indian Federation which was heavily sponsored by the British. (Viera-Tirado, 2004, p. 229) However, many newly independent states in the area where the West Indian Federation previously stood, and soon formed the Caribbean Free Trade Association CARIFTA in 1967, to continue the intention to create greater economical block. Following this, in 1973 the first treaty of Chaguaramas officially announced the creation of the Caribbean Community, CARICOM. Some institutions, such as the secretariat and Caribbean development bank established in the CARIFTA context were inherited to the CARICOM. This in in coherence with the neofunctionalism presented earlier.

Table 1 CARICOM Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>CARICOM membership</th>
<th>Former Colony of</th>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>CARICOM membership</th>
<th>Former Colony of</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>St Kits and Nevis</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>St Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>France</td>
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Table 2 CARICOM associate states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Associate Members</th>
<th>Year Accepted</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anguilla</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks and Caicos Islands</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Virgin Islands</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cayman Islands</td>
<td>2002</td>
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</table>
In the early independent years of the Caribbean island states, the old European Colonial powers and the U.S.A were often responsible for the external security of the small islands. Therefore, there was a little need for any deeper security cooperation among the islands until the end of Cold War. This was then followed by a period of global U.S.A. hegemony leading to today’s increasing multi-polarity of the world and to the proliferation of international violence to non-state actors and globalization of economy, leading to a situation where the attention of the powerful states and former colonial hosts is now shifting from one conflict to another. Today, 13 of the 15 member states of CARICOM are Anglophone, with latest members, Suriname being a Dutch speaking and Haiti being a Francophone country. (Luxner, 1999) The community has a combined population of, approximately 13.3 million people and a gross domestic product of $28.198 billion making it, in economic terms, the smallest regional integration group in the western hemisphere. Combining these factors with the strong historical ties of the member states to the U.K, France and the Netherlands, the political and economic security environment is particularly challenging for the CARICOM countries. (Sandberg, Seale, & Taylor, 2006)

The fading interest of the former colonial hosts, geopolitical changes, the beginning of the war against terror, and the economic rise of the BRICS\(^3\) countries has had its impact in the Caribbean as well as elsewhere in the world. Indeed, it has been argued that the greatest change in Latin America and the Caribbean since the Cold War, then is the emergence of Brazil as an increasingly influential power. (Bishop, Clegg, & Rosemarijn, 2017, p. 2) For the small states in the Caribbean all of this has meant that they have, and are increasingly looking for closer cooperation among themselves as a source of security. One of the significant marks for this was in 2013, when CARICOM adopted its first Common Crime and Security Policy. This is to some extent following the example laid out by the EU in the Maastricht Treaty already in 1993, but nonetheless the first common security policy marks the dawning of deeper integration among the CARICOM members.

\(^3\) Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
3.2. Development of Caribbean Security: Four Phases of Security

The Caribbean states are defined by their physical location, at the crossing of tectonic plates they have a tendency of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, they are also on the path of hurricanes and other severe weather conditions due to the oceanic currents. This dimension of physical location has however had different meanings at different times, the weather patterns are changing as well due to climate change and this has impacted the security understanding. Jessica Byron distinguishes four phases of security consciousness development in the Regional Security System formed by the Eastern Caribbean states and Barbados (Byron, 1997). In the section below, I will take the four phases recognized by Byron and expand her work by identifying the characteristics and dominant threats of these phases and extend the argument to the CARICOM wide context. In general, how the different matters have become threats and how some aspects have been securitized in different times has varied and there appears to be a move from the early liberal thinking in the Caribbean during the first phase towards more realist security paradigm in the second and third phase. Fourth phase will again diffuse the security perceptions of these two approaches.

3.2.1. Phase I: A New hope of international law (1960-1973)

The first phase is the dawning of independency following the withdrawal of colonial European powers, especially Great Britain. From the security perspective, from 1960s to 1970s the focus was on the small size and the internal viability of state economically and politically. The focus was more internally orientated as especially in multi-island states; the risk of secession was imminent and very little thought was given to external threats (Byron, 1997). Barry Bartman’s article ‘meeting the needs of microstate security’ (2002) discusses how the small states can meet the vital requirements set by the anarchical international arena and defend their independence and maintain their legal personality. He argues that during the 19th and 20th centuries the state was defined by its power to make war by claiming that “if a state lost its power to make war, it lost its sovereignty” (2002, p. 362). This meant that the small states, which often lack military capabilities, are acutely vulnerable not only to other states but also to threats from other sources. The principle of ‘self-help’ came upon in the 20th century confirming the requirement for states to maintain a capability to defend its sovereignty and this was also set in the international obligations set out by intergovernmental organisations such as the League of Nations, for example Liechtenstein was declined entry to the League of Nations on the basis that it had no army. Similar questions have been raised later based on the Charter of the United
Nations which requires states to contribute to international peace and security. (Bartmann, 2002)

All though, this argument can be countered by claiming, as that by not having an army small states are contributing more to peace than big states with their massive military capabilities. In the Caribbean, many of the new states saw no need to establish military institutions in the first place. Barbados, for example had no military institutions at the time of independence and according to the view of Earl Barrow, the prime minister at the time, in the age of nuclear weapons no country could ever claim to be able to militarily secure themselves and saw that Barbados had no significant external threats therefore decided not to establish any military forces. Later under his rule, the Coast Guard was established in 1974, but mainly to police the Barbadian economic zone. (Bishop, 2002, p. 78)

Cedric Grant (2006) writes about the principle of non-intervention, which is formalized in the Article 2.7 of the Charter of the United Nations, in which it says that “nothing contained in the present Charter should authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...” He argues that due to the geopolitical location of Caribbean countries in the sphere of U.S. influence, they adopted the state centric approach which insisted on non-interference and non-intervention early on. Some reasons behind this may include the attempted US sponsored invasion of Cuba in the Bay of Pigs in 1961. In, 1966 The first prime minister of Barbados put this policy in to words in the United Nations General Assembly:

“We have no quarrels to pursue and we particularly insist that we do not regard any member state as our natural opponent. We shall not involve ourselves in sterile ideological wrangling because we are exponents not of the diplomacy of power but of the diplomacy of peace and prosperity. We will not regard any great power as necessarily right in a given dispute unless we are convinced of this, yet at the same time we will not view the great powers with perennial suspicion merely on account of their size, their wealth, or their nuclear potential. We are friends of all, satellites of none.” (Foreign Ministry of Barbados, 2017.)

The Caribbean nations are signatories to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known as the Rio Pact of 1947, in which the contracting parties agree to refrain from threatening or using force in handling international relations and the third article clearly states:

“The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the
exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. “ (OAS, 1947.)

In the early years of their independency, the Caribbean states relied on the international institutions and governance as suggested by the liberal theory and trusted their national security and sovereignty to be secured by international law and collective security arrangements. This differs from the view of the U.S.A which had under President Kennedy attempted an invasion to Cuba in 1961 to counter the 1959 revolution and had become involved in Vietnam.

The growth in the number of sovereign states appeared at the same time as the awakening of communist movements in the Americas, (Guatemala 1954, Colombia 1957, Venezuela 1958, and Cuba 1959) and therefore the U.S. security policy in the 1960s “was formulated to prevent another Cuba from developing in the Caribbean “ (Bradley, 2004, p. 19), and this policy carried on until the end of Cold War. However, there were also other reasons for the growing U.S. interests in the region. A RAND corporation’s study from 1983, lists that increased U.S. interest were caused by several factors. The discovery of new oil fields in the region, and that 40% of US crude oil and 56% of refined petroleum imports originated from Caribbean countries not being the smallest. Also, the growing trade made the region strategically increasingly important, between 1960 and 1979 the U.S. imports increased 218% and exports 251%. Immigration became security interest for the U.S in the 20th century, in the Caribbean rapid population growth and young age structure in the region combined with slow economic growth is caused population pressures leading to increasing immigration, both legal and illegal. The increasing Cuban military power supported by the U.S.S.R left Mexico and Venezuela unable to project balanced military power to the region. Rand Corporation recognised the Cuban influence on U.S policy as Cuba was also seen as a base from where the Soviet power was projected to the region. Somewhat surprisingly, the U.S. military presence declined at the same time, it plummeted from 25,000 personnel in 1968 to 15,688 in 1981. Responsively the financial U.S security assistance dropped from 37million in 1968 to 665,00 in 1980. (Stodder & McCarthy, 1983) Bradley has also identified controlling immigration as a us security concern from the 1960s onwards but she also recognises the aspect that as the U.S. immigration officials welcomed skilled workers, it caused a ‘brain drain’, the loss of highly, and expensively, educated persons, in the Caribbean countries (Bradley, 2004, pp. 53-58). This highlights the adversarial but also intertwined nature of security between the U.S. and the Caribbean countries.
Bradley notes that during the 1960s the use and cultivation of marijuana appeared in the Caribbean on a big scale. However, the roots of marijuana date back to the 1830s is a part of the sociocultural Caribbean lifestyle making it difficult for the governments to control it. Also, it provided financially tempting possibilities for some social groups. (Bradley, 2004, p. 88) The appearance of drug trade coexists with the wakening of tourism sector in the Caribbean and the expansion of legal trade with the U.S. again bringing out the difficulty of separating different security interests from each other.

During the first phase CARIFTA was transformed to CARICOM, which however suffered from internal differences. When the bigger CARICOM countries saw that it was beneficial to commit themselves to bilateral agreements instead of collective bargaining, they took advantage of it causing damage to the group. Additionally, defining the Caribbean was debated among the regional leaders, for example the Eric Williams, a prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, excluded Latin America and south America from the Caribbean while Jamaican approach highlighted the need for close relationship with Latin America due to their geopolitical affinity. (Viera-Tirado, 2004)

At the first phase, the newly independent Caribbean states searched their place in the international arena. Increasing trade and the appearance of tourism facilitated the growth of drug trade in the region and linked the Caribbean security to the global financial institutions. The Caribbean understanding of security at the time was driven by the need for recognition of their sovereignty, non-existence of external threats, and the battle over ideologies embodied in the Cold War rivalry between the U.S and the U.S.S.R. From the first stage, Caribbean states had high respect of sovereignty and looked for the increasing international governance embodied in the UN and OAS to provide collective defence against possible aggressors indicating for more liberal internationalist thought to be dominant among the Caribbean leaders. At the time the U.S. leadership however were more leaning towards realism and feared the domino like spread of communism.

3.2.2. Phase II: Realism strikes back (1973-1982)

The second phase began in the 1970s when the security understanding evolved rapidly influenced by the attempted coup in Dominica (1978), intercepted mercenary invasion of Barbados (1978) and
the coup in Grenada (1979). The evolving understanding of external threats led to the emergence of the Regional Security System (RSS) which was “intended to cover a whole range of contingencies, including natural disasters and coast guard operations. However, in this phase the participating governments were concerned primarily with domestic instability and with mercenaries.” (Byron, 1997, p. 56) The change in security understanding during the second phase can be seen clearly in the case of Barbados, which established its national defence forces in 1979. Three main factors can be identified leading to this change; Firstly, Barbados among three other Caribbean countries established diplomatic relations with Cuba, which the U.S. did not see favourably. In October 6th, 1976, an Air Cubana Airlines jet exploded soon after it departed from Barbados killing everyone on board. This was done by the anti-Castro operatives which had ties with the CIA linking the U.S.A in the case. Secondly, the rumours of intended invasion were discovered already in 1976 and thirdly, the coup in Grenada. (Bishop, 2002.) The coup in Grenada was mounted by only forty-five members of the Marxist New jewel movement, and it demonstrated how vulnerable the small states were, reviving the idea of regional security cooperation which had become frozen. At the same time the disagreement over the Falkland Islands escalated. The impact of the Falkland’s War in 1982 brought the small state security as well as the security of the Commonwealth to the front of international security debate. At the same time, Venezuela threateningly mobilized its troops to the Guyanese border. Guyana successfully protested in the international arenas such as the UN Security Council and within the Non-aligned movement that forced Venezuela to withdraw and thus embarrassed. Venezuela demobilized its troops and conflict was then avoided. (Bartmann, 2002) The tensions, however, prevailed and would appear again in later stage.

The freeze in the CARICOM integration at this period is embodied in the fact that from 1975 to 1982 the CARICOM heads of states did not meet. (Viera-Tirado, 2004, p. 244) However, the sub regional organisation OECS became increasingly active as the Grenada coup, Falklands War and increasing militarization of drug trafficking highlighted their vulnerabilities. The end of second phase then saw the move for sub-regional security alliances and the Regional Security System (RSS) of the Eastern Caribbean States is the significant one in the Caribbean context. The establishing members of the RSS were four members of the OECS, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines together with Barbados as they in 1982 wrote a memorandum of understanding (MOU) promising to provide for “mutual assistance on request”. The RSS was a hybrid organisation
and entailed both military and police units with the intention was to provide rapid response capability for traditional security concerns. (Baird, 2011) The Memorandum of understanding was a mutual defence against external aggression or international coup attempts. (Bryan, 1998) The purpose of the RSS was to act as a deterrence and a trip wire for foreign support, it acknowledged its limitations by stating that

“The RSS does not pretend to have the capacity to deter or defeat any large scale foreign aggression against any of its members. Should such an attack take place a substantial outside support would be essential” (RSS Staff, 1986).

While the member states, soon after the establishment of RSS after facing severe financial limitations, fell behind on payments, external support from Canada, UK, and the U.S. became essential. (Griffith, 1992)

Somewhat surprisingly, the second phase began to see the rise of realists who viewed security through the traditional military security paradigm and the erosion of non-interventionist approach among the small Caribbean states. The realist idea for the need for the small states to become capable to defend themselves, leading to the establishment of military instalments in many Caribbean states, rose from the impotence of international governance in defending small states during the earlier years with the increasing trend of using proxy wars for the game between the superpower rivalry. The second phase revealed difficulty of collective efforts in the CARICOM context and many states preferred the ‘go-alone’ approach in their security and economic development while the Eastern Caribbean states increasingly opted for collective security. Having discouraged the international interventions planned to Grenada and Dominica after the 1979 Coup d’états the CARICOM upheld its tradition for state sovereignty and respect for the non-interference principle. All this would however change in the next phase.

3.2.3. Phase III: Return of collective security (1982-1990)

According to Byron, the third phase reflects the qualitative change in security climate in the 1980’s following the 1983 counter coup in Grenada and the following intervention by the U.S. and Caribbean allies. From the US$ 100,000 in 1982, the US military assistance to OECS countries rose to US$ 5.6 million in 1985 and this caused increase in the degree of militarization. In the latter half of 1980s there was some confusion among the RSS members concerning the level of military infrastructure
that was required. By 1987 Barbados and Antigua were only ones maintaining military forces while the others had paramilitary units in the police force and coast guards. In the 1980s the world’s economic and political structures began a significant rearrangement due to new production and communication technologies, and this even the developed nations began to seek ways for increasing their position. The way forward was the emergence of regional trading and political block and the idea of shared sovereignty, embodied first with the establishment of European Community’s Single Market launched in 1986. (Byron, 1997)

At the same time the U.S. understanding of the threats presented by Caribbean begin changing. Ronald Reagan’s speech at the OAS in February 24th, 1982, made it clear that the U.S would be using both financial and military means to boost up Caribbean and Latin American countries resilience against communism and the reason for this, in his own words was that:

“The Caribbean region is a vital strategic and commercial artery for the United States. Nearly half of our trade, two-thirds of our imported oil, and over half of our imported strategic minerals pass through the Panama Canal or the Gulf of Mexico. Make no mistake: The well-being and security of our neighbours in this region are in our own vital interest.” (Reagan, 1982)

Reagan introduced the Caribbean Basin Initiative, a new U.S. foreign policy tool, which in fact was a series of bilateral agreements with regional governments. Later followed by the increasing security assistance the CBI and other alternatives nearly became an ideological approach promoting liberal capitalism in the region. The international security environment also evolved, the 70s and 80s saw the appearance of economic warfare methods such as trade embargos to destabilise ‘unacceptable governments’ such as the left leaning government of Michael Manley in Jamaica, as well as covert operations by the CIA and MI5 to influence elections in places such as Guyana. The U.S security policy had become increasingly militarised against drug trafficking and the Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA, was created in 1973. The first multilateral anti-drug operation in the Caribbean took place in 1982 when ‘Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos Islands’ occurred. These operations were committed by the security forces of the U.S.A, U.K, Bahamian and Turks and Caicos Islands. (Bradley, 2004) It had become clear that communism was no longer the only threat but that it had become intertwined with other issues leading to growing immigration which became a new threat. This became evident in the reporting of New York Times (1980): “among many U.S officials, there is a fear of the phenomenon spreading and causing a swelling of army of the jobless or oppressed from other Caribbean Island seeking to follow in the wake of Cubans and Haitians” (Gosko, 1980).
Communism however remained as a perceived threat by the U.S.A and the largest military build-up in the U.S history happened during 1980-1985 (Salmon, 1997). In the Caribbean, the heads of the CARICOM member states collectively expressed their fears over the effects which great power rivalry and its increasing militarisation had in the region in the Ocho Rios Declaration in 1982. They called for a respect for the non-interference and non-intervention principles as well as declared their belief on the vitality of deepening the regional integration. According to the declaration the member states agreed to “Assert our commitment to the maintenance of absolute respect for defined borders, and demarcated and traditional lines of jurisdiction of States of the Region”. (CARICOM, 1982) The unity of CARICOM states however soon broke away as the Maurice Bishop’s revolutionary government in Grenada began befriending itself with Cuba and the Soviet Union, challenging the U.S. hegemony in the region and dividing the Caribbean states on separate camps.

Soon after the U.S. intelligence reports showed, that the Cubans were building an airfield in Grenada, another coup took place in October 1983. Bishop was murdered in October 19th, 1983 during the coup and the country fell to a chaos. Worried about the possible spread of civil chaos, the RSS took the initiative and invited the U.S. to help with the intervention. (Viera-Tirado, 2004.) The formal OECS request was received by the U.S. in October 23rd citing:

“the current anarchic conditions, the serious violations of human rights and bloodshed that have occurred and the consequent unprecedented threat to the peace and security of the region created by the vacuum of authority in Grenada” (U.S. Department of Defence, 1983.) Following this request, a multinational military intervention by the U.S and six Caribbean nations took place in October 25th. The joint forces toppled the resistance within three days and found out five secret military agreements, three of which were with the Soviet Union, one with North Korea and one with Cuba together with 900 nationals of Cuba, Soviet Union, North Korea, Libya, East Germany and Bulgaria. (U.S. Department of Defence, 1983) International response however was against the intervention, the UNSC voted in favour of a resolution denouncing the invasion with 11 in favour, 3 abstentions and 1 against, being the only member of the UNSCR opposing the resolution the U.S. veto prevented it from passing. (Baird, 2011, p. 110) Following the intervention, the U.S. established annual operation ‘Tradewinds exercise’ in 1984, which brings together the security services of the commonwealth Caribbean countries to train with the U.S. military in hope of facilitating further operations and enhancing the local capabilities.
The coup d’état against Maurice Bishop divided the CARICOM as Barbados, Jamaica, Antigua and the OECS supported military action, while Bahamas, Belize, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago opposed military action and preferred to settle with sanctions. The difference over the intervention in Grenada launched internal crisis in the CARICOM itself and it became under threat of dissolving. The relationships with Cuba and differences in one China policy added fuel to the differences and Viera-Trieda notes the “even though CARICOM members still had the goal of promoting regionalisation, their differences alone political and ideological lines were evident. It showed that regionalization could not be sustained just by sharing the same language, historical background and political institutions. “(Viera-Tirado, 2004, p. 246.)

During the third phase the Caribbean security scene radically moved towards an increasingly militarised one indicating dominance of realist thinking. The U.S.A radically militarised its anti-drug approach and the Regional Security System was established between the Eastern Caribbean States and Barbados creating the first collective security alliance within the region. The Caribbean states also saw the spill-over of revolutionary movements from Grenada as a potential threat to the stability of all the Caribbean states and some of them acted in behalf of collective security for the first time in a direct manner. However, the intervention in Grenada undermined the tradition of non-intervention and sovereignty of the small states. The fact that the intervention was done without UN consent and would have been condemned by it if it was not for the veto right of the U.S.A are against the liberal thought and indicate towards realist thinking taking place in the Caribbean. The internal division within the CARICOM disabled any attempts to extend the RSS from becoming a region-wide alliance. During the 3rd phase the Caribbean states collective security began evolving and the fact that the smallest states decided to establish the RSS shows that they perceived to be having similar threats with each other. The collective security did not however expand to the whole CARICOM.

3.2.4. Phase IV: New security understanding awakens (1990-2001)

The fourth phase beginning in early 1990s, is characterized by decreasing militarization. Between 1985 and 1994 the military spending in the Caribbean fell by over 60% and the focus of training in security institutions increasingly moved towards disaster preparedness, maritime policing and counter narcotics operations. (Byron, 1997, pp. 56-57.) The development of the fourth phase follows
Barry Buzan’s 1991 definition of security as “freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival but it also reasonably includes substantial concerns about the conditions of existence” (Buzan, 1991, pp. 432-433). The fourth phase is characterised by uncertainty as there are links to both realist and liberal theories.

The traditional approach to security gained more attention in 1990 with the Iraqi occupation and U.S. led coalition liberation of Kuwait, which proved “the inefficacy of conventional military options for very small states” (Baird, 2011, p. 76). This highlights the existence of both realist and liberal thinking at the time. Also, it was in the 1990s when the RSS military option was to be used in the CARICOM context. In 1990, the RSS forces were deployed after the attempted coup ‘d’état in Trinidad and Tobago. The coup attempt was instigated by just over 100 members of the Muslimeen youth group and succeeded in taking over the parliament and holding the government officials as hostages. (Baird, 2011, p. 78) The attempt highlights not only the effect of radical Islam in the region but also the significance of integration in the gun trade within in the region. The 115 rifles used in the coup attempt were bought legally in the U.S.A and then smuggled to Trinidad and Tobago to be used in the Coup. (Baird, 2011, p. 131) The aftermath of this continued to the annual conference of the CARICOM countries in 1990, where the conclusion statement revealed that a multitude of arrangements for mutual security assistance had been in the table but none had been taken in to action. There was however an agreement to review the existing arrangements, and to find out if they could be extended to provide security to all the CARICOM members. Grant notes that much “like the previous efforts, the CARICOM wide security arrangement did not eventuate.” (Grant, 2006, pp. 71-78) In fact, even the RSS was dissolved in mid 1994 when the MOU was not renewed. It was argued that this was due to the significant economic challenges at the time making it difficult to form collective understandings of security. The RSS was re-established with a treaty in 1996 making it a permanent organisation. (Knight & Persaud, 2001; Byran, 2011)

During the 1980s the U.S. was prepared to make concessions to the Caribbean countries to contain the threat of Cuba, however, as the 1993 CARICOM Summit ratified the unconditional rapprochement towards Cuba, which the U.S. strongly criticised and this diminished the ability of Caribbean countries to play the Cuban Card to get security assistance. To prevent the relationship with the
U.S.A from deteriorating any further, the CARICOM rejected the Cuban application to officially join the community in 1996 and again in 1998. (Viera-Tirado, 2004, pp. 258-259) The continuation of the realist approach of the U.S.A. is demonstrated in speech of Vice-President of the U.S. Al-Gore’s speech in the first meeting of the Defence Ministers of the Americas in Virginia 1995. Despite Al-Gore’s affiliation with climate change and new threat perceptions, the speech emphasises the importance of democracy in the region, common history of the Americas as colonized countries, and the economic interdependency but places the territorial integrity as the most vital security interest of the region. He calls for collective security cooperation by asking:

“Can we develop a framework for hemispheric security that will assure the integrity of our borders, reduce the potential for conflict, increase cooperation and develop means for the fair and speedy resolution of problems? These are the questions that are being addressed, and I think the answer is yes. And let us begin by acknowledging the eternal and most fundamental issue of national security, the defense of our borders.” (U.S. Department of Defence, 1995)

The defence ministerial became a yearly event for the American states to discuss security related issues. The Caribbean states however looked to develop new security understandings which were contesting the traditional approach of the U.S. presented above. This can be seen in the statement of Minister Henderson of Antigua and Barbuda, in the third meeting of Ministers of Defence of the Americas in 1998:

“Security can no longer be achieved by merely building walls or forts. The very large and the very small states of this hemisphere have found that security, in an age of globalization, is rather complex. Security includes the traditional-notions of yesteryear, but today, security must now be extended, in the case of the small-island state, to encompass several non-traditional aspects. Natural disasters, for example, pose a greater threat to our security than does the loss of national territory to an enemy. Particularly injurious to our security is the peril posed by global warming. The emission of more than 30 billion tons of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the earth’s atmosphere, each year, undermine our security and our well-being. Most harmful are the ferocious summer storms and hurricanes which form in the Atlantic, fuel their fury with the ocean’s warm waters, and which come ashore to destroy. Their frequency and their, ferocity are, we believe, an expression of the global warming phenomenon.” (OAS, 1998)
The Barbadian representative Lionel Nurse agreed and further called for a redefinition of security by saying that:

“The delegation of Barbados believes that special attention should be accorded to the vulnerability of small island States and small economies resulting from natural disasters and threats ...... from human action, such as drug-trafficking, terrorism and illegal arms transfers. This issue, with its far-reaching implications, is vital importance to the Government of Barbados and is in keeping with the necessity for the organization to redefine the definition of security to accord to new realities as part of a process of revitalization.” (OAS, 1998)

These statements point towards evolving understanding of the security concept and some disagreements with the U.S. understanding exemplified in the statement of Vice President Al-Gore. The OAS, in the turn of the millennium, sent out a questionnaire for the new understandings of security and these findings are further discussed in the following chapter as the responses point towards a new approach.

The renewed CARICOM fear of nuclear and other hazardous materials became evident when they in 1992, declared their decision to sponsor an UN resolution aiming to forbid any shipment of plutonium, other radioactive or hazardous material in the Caribbean Sea, testing of nuclear devices and called for the Caribbean Sea to be declared nuclear free zone. (CARICOM, 1992) The resolution did not pass and the heads of Caribbean states condemned the continuing shipping of nuclear waste through Caribbean again in 1999 by denouncing Japan, France and the U.K for their shipments and the U.S. for allowing them to use Panama channel for these purposes.

“The Heads express their outrage at the increasing frequency and volume of the hazardous materials being shipped and the fact that the Caribbean Sea has now become the preferred transit route, in spite of repeated protests by States in and bordering on the Caribbean Sea. Heads of Government therefore appeal to the United States, with its responsibility for the passage of vessels through the Panama Canal, to use its authority to prohibit the shipment of hazardous nuclear materials via that route and into the Caribbean. They likewise reiterate their appeal to the Governments of France, Japan and the United Kingdom to desist from this dangerous misuse of the Caribbean Sea.” (CARICOM, 1999)
While there is a significant unity among the Caribbean countries over the threat formed by possible nuclear disasters there are some internal differences. A study done in 1990 by Ivelaw Griffith, found out that there are many similarities on the threat perceptions of regional Caribbean leaders, but that there are also significant disagreements. His findings point out that the divergence is greatest in military and political aspects while there is notable convergence in the economic area. Another study done in 2002 at the U.S. Army Staff College named ‘Caribbean Regional Security: The challenges to Creating Formal Military Relationships in the English-Speaking Caribbean’, found that “in the Caribbean, there is neither agreement on a regional threat perception, nor is there the capacity to coerce or use military force if such is required. In addition, countries continue to be focused on their own interests” (Bishop, 2002).

The traditional sovereignty principle became again under threat in 1994 in Haiti, where following the fall of Duvalier dynasty in 1987, the country fell to chaos, and three coups took place between 1987-1990. In late 1990 a new president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was elected only to be ousted in 1991. Three years later in 1994, a multilateral military intervention of 20 countries, led by France and the U.S intervened and reinstated Aristide to power. (Murphey, 2000; Kreps, 2007) This time the actions were authorised by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 which recognised that the “situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to peace and security in the region” and authorised intervention under the Charter VII (UNSC, 1994). Jamaica, Belize, Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados contributed together 266 personnel to the multinational force of 6,000 which was authorised to stay in the country. The significant point, stressed by acting U.S secretary of State Talbot who held press conference before the intervention took place, was that the CARICOM unanimously endorsed the action (U.S. Department of State, 1994). More than 25,000 military personnel supported by two aircraft carriers and air support were planned to take part in the intervention and the U.S. provided the clear majority of these. However, the Haitian military command capitulated in time to avoid the bloodshed and intervention ended up with peaceful transition of power back to Aristide. (U.S. Department of State, 2017) Kreps (2007) has concluded that despite its political multilateral nature, the intervention was largely unilaterally executed by the U.S. in their own security interests as the migration flows began growing. This is supporting Falk’s (1995) earlier findings that in the early 1990s

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4 see annex 2, threat perceptions in the Caribbean in 1990
trend of real politic defined by the Russia’s engagements with its ‘near abroad’ and military actions of France in the Francophone Africa were precedents to the U.S. intervention to Haiti, which sees the fusion of geopolitics and UN peacekeeping. After the intervention, an UN peacekeeping mission UNMIH stayed in Haiti until 1996 and it was the first of a kind containing a CARICOM contingent. Haiti is argued to be the first model for the modern liberal intervention type, as it was sent to restore democracy and its arguable success is often left in the shadow of Rwanda and Somalia which took place in the same year (Hall, Hall & Sang, 2006).

The fourth phase saw huge changes in the global environment as the Cold War ended, hopes of new liberal peace faded when Iraq invaded Kuwait, and new wars appeared in Europe and Africa. The fourth phase also is a one of uncertainty. There were elements pointing towards greater international governance and the strengthening of international norms but there was also unilateral big power interventions proofing the existence of realist thinking. In the Caribbean, increased drug trafficking and gun violence challenge the states internally. The intervention in Haiti to restore democratically elected leader was in support of the long respect for democracy but at the same time highlighted the renewed interest of U.S. in the stability of the region and its readiness to act on behalf of it. The new security challenges, environmental, human, and vulnerability became priorities. During the 4th phase the importance of cooperation was recognised and the first-time CARICOM contributed a shared contingent to an UN peacekeeping mission. However, as there, despite all of this, was no consensus among the Caribbean states on the threats, their levels or how to handle them, collective security did not yet become reality in CARICOM level.
4. Phase V: The last option (2001-2014)

“If peace does not mean freedom from war, then security should not mean protection from military aggression. Redefining peace and stability to include life-enhancing qualities and conditions requires us to redefine security to include protection from influences that threaten these life-enhancing qualities. Arguably most significant challenges confronting the small island states of the Caribbean at this time are the process of globalisation and emergence of trade liberalization” (Ambassador Michael King of Barbados in the fourth Conference of ministers of defence of the Americas in Manaus, Brazil 2000, Quoted in Dennis et al, 2001, p. 52.)

After having examined the four phases of security in the Caribbean identified by Jessica Byron, I will now discuss the latest events and changes in Caribbean understanding of security. The aim of this chapter is to provide adequate evidence to identify a new, distinct phase to be added to Byron’s findings. The Caribbean states are organised following the Westminster system, and the prime minister is the predominant leader, due to the small size, the prime minister is often responsible for security and is effectively holding both the prime ministers and defence minister’s positions. Bishop argues that this has significantly influenced the development of security in the region as “a country’s defence and security policy can in actuality be determined based on the perceptions of single predominant individual” he then continues to argue that this is has led to shortage of common understanding of security "since other than crime, there is very little or no public debate or input in defence and security issues”. (Bishop, 2002, p. 78) The possibility of single person to direct national security agenda in the Caribbean is however changing, increasing digitalisation provides new opportunities for transparency and open policy formulation making securitization more difficult. The sections below will discuss Caribbean Security from many aspects and finally present evidence for the appearance of shared understanding of security in the region and increase of liberal institutionalism.

4.1. What is security in the Caribbean context today
Holls has studied the environmental aspect of the Caribbean security and has acknowledged that: “the Caribbean Region has weathered a long history of re-occurring disasters. Natural hazards such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes and communicable diseases, have torn economies apart, wiped away communities, and isolated towns and villages. Risk levels in the Caribbean remain high. The increasing intensity and frequency of weather-related hazards form global warming, rising urban density and economic, political and social related vulnerabilities, create a potent mix that needs to be seriously addressed to ensure a safer future.” (Holls, 2014, p. 122) Studies have found out that the destructive power of cyclones and tropical storms has grown and if the sea temperatures continue to rise, the frequency of high intensity storms will rise as well (Freedman, 2013; GFDL, 2017) and this will bring the climate change to the forefront of the security discourse in the Caribbean.

The cooperation in this sector officially begun with the establishment of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency in 1991, as a way of organising collective responses to regional disaster management (CDEMA, 2017). This was deepened in in 1994, when Barbados hosted the Global Conference on Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States that resulted to the Barbados Programme of Action, which focused on adaptation to climate change impacts. The Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre was established in 2005 to coordinate Caribbean Regions responses to climate change (CCCCC, 2017). The CARICOM Declaration for Climate Action recognised the climate change and highlighted the special case of the Small Island Developing States and claims:

“that extreme weather and slow onset events and their adverse impacts including sea-level rise, coastal erosion, coral bleaching, flooding, ocean acidification, sea temperature rise, mangrove degradation, inundation and salinisation of coastal agricultural soils and residential areas, related to climate change, are fundamental threats to the sustainable development of low-lying Caribbean countries and island territories.”

It further recognises:

“already with global warming of less than one degree Celsius, SIDS including Caribbean countries, as well as Guyana and Suriname, are experiencing more intense storms, droughts, extreme weather events, accelerating sea-level rise and other life-threatening impacts.” (CARICOM, 2015.)

Climate change may endanger the livelihoods of Caribbean societies for example by decreasing the attractiveness of tourism and decreasing marine sources of nutrition. These could lead to decreasing
incomes and increasing unemployment, crime and eventually internal destabilisation. The Caribbean nations have recognised climate change as a possible threat and are increasing cooperation to face it.

For others, the security in the Caribbean is influenced by trade liberalization and legacy of structural adjustment programs, poverty and income inequality, crime and cuts on social service (Dennis, Layme, & King, 2001) and Antony Bryan has found that “there is widespread official and public perception in the region that economic vulnerability is at the core of Caribbean insecurity.” (Bryan, 1998, p. 35) Supporting the priority of economic aspect, Andres Serbin argues that “in a market economy power is at the hands of those who define credit: how it can be created and in what amounts, who can have access to it and under what conditions” (1998, p. 57). However, he also recognizes that the “new security agenda assigns priority to matters like control of drug tragic and migration, the environment and consolidation of democracy” (Serbin, 1998, p. 63). According to him in the new security agenda concerns have shifted from strategic military issues towards police and intelligence matters. On the 7th of June 1999, the OAS adopted the resolution 1640 known as the “Special Security Concerns of Small Island States”, and it states clearly how complex the new millennial understanding of security is by reaffirming that for the small island states

“security is multidimensional in scope and application and encompasses, inter alia, the military-political aspects traditionally associated with the security of states; the protection and preservation of the state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; freedom from external military attack and coercion; freedom from external interference by states or by non-state agents in its internal political affairs; protection from environmental conditions and ecological disasters which could imperil its viability; the link between trade, economic development, and security; and the ability to maintain and protect democratic institutions which ensure domestic tranquillity“ (OAS, 1999).

To combine the new island state understanding of security with the bigger picture on the whole hemisphere, the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security sent out a questionnaire to member states titled “New Approaches to Hemispheric Security”. The third question directly asks, “What does your government consider to be the risks, threats and challenges to security faced by the Hemisphere?” (Permanent Council of the Organisation of American States, 2001) The response of Dominican Republic to the 2000 OAS questionnaire notes that there are differences on member states
approaches to security based on territorial size, economic development, population density, geographic location and military structures. From the Dominican Republic’s perspective:

“The main risks, threats, and challenges to security at present are known as ‘new threats’.

Some of these are listed below:

- Drug trafficking and consumption, and money laundering
- Terrorism
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Stockpiling of weapons
- Environmental degradation
- Uncontrolled population growth
- Illegal immigration
- Extreme poverty, with its attendant lack of health care and education
- Natural disasters:
  - Earthquakes
  - Hurricanes
  - Floods
- Social discrimination”

(Permanent Mission of the Dominican Republic to the OAS, 2001)

The response of the RSS member states response to the questionnaire reflects much of the Dominican understanding but also notices the “asymmetrical power relations and the temptation to disregard international law” as a challenge to hemispheric security (The permament Mission of Antigua and Barbuda to the OAS, 2002) highlighting the realist fear of cheating in international cooperation. The response by the United States recognises a need for wider definition of security as “too narrow a definition of security will leave us unprepared to deal with the unique concerns of smaller states.” (The Permanent Representative of the United States of America to OAS, 2002) On the other hand, the U.S. return to the third question highlights the threat of traditional state-centred threats and refers to extra regional states as well as border disputes within the region. The U.S. response also recognizes transnational threats, such as non-state actors related to terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime. The non-traditional threats include “fragility of democratic governance, human rights abuses, environmental disasters and degradation, economic instability, corruption, diseases such as HIV/AIDS and extreme poverty.” (The Permanent Representative of the United States of America to OAS, 2002) The notable difference is that the Caribbean states have did not recognise war as a principle threat to the hemispheric security pointing to growing trust in international governance and obedience of international law unlike the U.S. response which follows the realist theory and recognises interstate war as a threat.
Cope and Mora have noted four trends in the Caribbean affecting Caribbean Security since the 1990’s; increasing state weakness, increasing transnational security challenges, ineffective cooperation between countries and decreasing dependency from Washington (Cope & Mora, 2009), however, these trends are artificial and symptoms of each other’s and thus deeply intertwined and difficult to separate from another as will become clear when these I will be discussed further in the following sections.

4.2. Increasing cooperation at the regional level

There are several regional security governance arrangements existing today, due to their variations in focus areas they can be separated in to three groupings as Krichner and Dominiguez have done. The organizations in the first group favour the traditional balance of power-approach. Whereas in the second group organisations have less intense level of internal threat and for whom consequently the security dilemma is ameliorated despite a pervasive logic of balance of power within the group. The third group have no security dilemma within the group and the source of threats is mostly external. The AU, ECOWAS and SADC are in the first grouping, while OAS, CARICOM and OSCE are part of the second grouping. NATO and EU represent the last group. (Krichner & Dominguez, 2014, pp. 174-175) However, CARICOM is somewhat special case because security is by nature more transnational than internal due to the transnational ties with the US and other American states, and some European states.

“In the global security environment today, and that of the foreseeable future, small states that lack capacity and act on their own are likely to be marginalized or fall victim to international and domestic terrorism transnational organized crime or criminal gangs. The international security environment is complex and in continuous change. The Caribbean region today, as in the past, is a host to many internal and external actors, both state and non-state, each with its own distinct agenda. The critical issue is not whether Caribbean states should cooperate, but rather in what manner.” (Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center Paper 46, 2011, p. 4)

By 2017 some regional security institutions have been introduced in the Caribbean and there appears to be an increasing demand for such institutions and this will be discussed next. It must be noted that regional security in the Caribbean is affected by the ineffective cooperation between countries despite rhetoric’s and official statements from governments and sub regional institutions.
Heterogeneous threat perceptions, differences in governance structures, democratization and liberalisation undermined the efforts which took place after the Cold War to build a hemispheric security governance. After the cold war “some observers were optimistic about prospects for regional peace and security in the Western Hemisphere, believing that economic interdependence, regional integration and democratization would produce a hemispheric ‘Kantian’ peace.” (Tikunas, 2013) Goal of uniting under the OAS security governance, has been replaced by efforts to build sub regional security institutions like the Brazil led UNASUR, Venezuelan Bolivarian Alliance ALBA, and the Caribbean Community CARICOM due to the growing ideological divide among the Hemispheric countries (Tikunas, 2013; Cope & Mora, 2009; Byran, 2011).

Table 3 Regional organisations in the Caribbean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Dominant Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Economic, Political,</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>U. S, Brazil,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Economic, Political, Security</td>
<td>15+5</td>
<td>Jamaica, T&amp;T, Barbados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CELAC</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Economic, Political</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Venezuela, Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNASUR</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Economic, Political</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBA</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Economic, Political, Security</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Venezuela, Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Barbados, U. S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Political, Economic</td>
<td>25+7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The appearance of competing alliances has led to the Cope’s and Mora’s fourth trend; the decreasing dependency on Washington. (Cope & Mora, 2009) Rising regional organisations are providing sense of security to the Latin American and Caribbean countries (Tikunas, 2013) to a state that Council of Foreign report states “the era of the United States as the dominant influence in Latin America is over” (Council of Foreign Relations, 2008). Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez sought to oppose the US by developing relationships with countries that oppose the status quo and US hegemony, namely with Russia, China, Iran and Cuba. (Tikunas, 2013) Between the Caribbean Community and the US there have been sensitive disputes over what constitutes as security. During the Cold War, the U.S
was prepared to radically violate the political and territorial sovereignty of Caribbean and Latin American countries if it felt it was in their national interest for example in Nicaragua in the 1970s, Cuba in 1959, Panama in 1989 and Grenada 1983.

Due to some extent, the decreasing dependency on the U.S. military is mutual, as the Caribbean countries can no longer play the Cuban Card as they did in the 1970s and 1980s as an argument for military assistance from the U.S. (Byran, 2011, p. 12) Cope and Mora point out that the U.S has neglected its interests by not giving the Latin America and Caribbean adequate attention. They argue that this is due to that ‘region contains no conventional threats to the United States’” (Cope & Mora, 2009, p. 65). There are however significant and sophisticated non-traditional threats to the US in the Caribbean. In 2001 Knight and Persaud have identified that for the US, the main security issues are preventing flow of narcotics, illegal immigrants and illegal money from the Caribbean into the United States.” (Knight & Persaud) Until late 1990s the U.S. preferred large overseas facilities, often in form of air force bases with landing strips, after the handover of Panama Channel, and US withdrawal from Howard Air base in 1999 there has been a shift towards small facilities and in the greater Latin American context these bases are known as ‘Forward Operation Locations’ or ‘Cooperative Security Locations’ (COHA, 2009).

The diplomatic distancing between the U.S. and Caribbean countries is however not completely new, and appeared already in the 1990s. Firstly there was a strong blame game for the financial constraints set for the Caribbean states in the structural adjustment programmes by the financial institutions such as the IMF and WTO which are dominated by the U.S., in the 1990s. In 1997, there was serious disagreements between the U.S. and some Caribbean in forming of the Ship rider agreement that allows U.S. authorities to pursue suspected drug traffickers to their territorial waters. An example of this disagreement can be seen in the prime minister of Barbados, Owen Arthur’s statement:

“There are those who have argued that sovereignty does not matter, that we are incapable of providing for our own defences against the advances of the drug barons, and that we should surrender our defences on this sphere to the tender mercies of those more capable than ourselves to provide our defence. This was the very doctrine—The Brezhnev Doctrine-
that led to the subjugation of Eastern Europe on the grounds that the could not provide for their own defence”. (Allen, 1997)

Even the RSS has seen the decline with the U.S. engagement and relying heavily on U.S. financing it has faced severe budget constraints. The EU estimates that the RSS operates with only 40-50% of the approved annual budget due to non-payment of dues by the participating countries. More lately, there has however been some renewed interactions with the U.S. In 2009 Washington initiated process to gain access to more than seven military facilities in Colombia and Council of Hemispheric Affairs has noticed that the American military presence in the Caribbean basin has “been steadily expanding, justified domestically as necessary measure to combat ballooning drug production and terrorist movements. There are still U.S. military bases in El Salvador, Honduras, Curacao and Aruba, Cuba, Antigua and Barbuda and in the Bahamas where NATO’s Naval Forces Sensor and Weapon Accuracy Check Site program is active. (COHA, 2009) While the official reason for these bases is to combat drug trafficking, they also serve dual purpose to keep the left leaning governments in Cuba and Venezuela in order.

The EU has, to some extent, however increased its involvement and is supporting both national and sub regional programmes. In 2014, it for example allocated €5,6million for St Kits and Nevis safety and security sector in aiming to enhance institutional capacities in preventing and detecting crimes. And in Barbados EU provided €1,2 million for acquiring technical forensics equipment’s. EUs Instrument for Stability has also allocated €3 million for implementing SEACOP III programme lasting 36 months and additional 2,5 million for RSS and Trinidad and Tobago to address the regional aspects of illicit trafficking. (Council of the European Union, 2014) Other example is the Global Crisis Response Support Programme, which focused on strengthening crisis response and early warning capacities as well as inter agency cooperation which run from 2015 to 2017 and was financed by the EU with 2.6 million Euros. (CARICOM, 2017) The individual EU countries are also doing bilateral arrangements, for example in January 2017, the Netherlands announced its interest in increasing its cooperation with CARICOM in climate change, disaster risk management and security areas among others. (CARICOM Secretariat, 2017) This is a reflection that the Dutch Armed Forces are still officially responsible for guaranteeing security in the Caribbean part of the Kingdom of Netherlands and maintains over 500 military personnel in the Caribbean. Their official tasks range from protecting the borders and maintaining international rule of law to combating violent, and drug related crime and
assisting local police. (Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 2017) The connections with Europe mean that any event in the continent is reflected in the Caribbean. In 2015, after the terrorist attacks in Paris, the state of emergency declared by France was expanded to include the French Caribbean territories Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique, St Martin and St Barths. (Caribbean News Now!, 2015)

4.3. Military security

Insecurities in Caribbean are sourced to many sources, but traditional military thinking is still important in the region as there are undecided border disputes for example between Dominica and Haiti, Venezuela and Guyana, Nicaragua and Colombia, additionally the Cold War era special status of Cuba in international arena is still vulnerable and undecided despite the recent relaxation of the U.S.A, the interventions in Grenada and Haiti all make the traditional military security still relevant for the Caribbean region. (Desch, Domínguez, & Serbin, 1998, pp. 2-3) The return of big power politics in Europe, embodied in the military stand-off over Ukraine, have also appeared in the Caribbean. Russia has increased its activities in the region and in 2014 the defence minister Sergei Shoigu stated: "Under the prevailing circumstances we need to ensure a military presence in the western Atlantic and eastern Pacific oceans, the waters of the Caribbean basin and the Gulf of Mexico." (BBC, 2014) He also announced that Russia is looking to open new military bases in Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua. This is part of Russia’s attempts to challenge NATO and the fact that Caribbean Sea lanes have been vital for NATO supply routes and especially during the Cold War as becomes clear from the 1982, U.S. DoD statement:

“in war time, half of NATO’s supplies would transit by sea from Gulf ports through Florida Straits and onward to Europe. Much of the petroleum shipments and important reinforcements destined for US forces in Europe would also sail from Gulf Port. The Security of our maritime operations in the Caribbean, hence is critical to the security of the Atlantic Alliance.”

(Schoultz, 1987, p. 203)

The Caribbean Council, a non-profit think-tank, argued that Russia’s presence in the Caribbean is now stronger than ever since the end of the Cold War, they see Russia’s intention to regain long term military presence in the Caribbean Basin as an attempt by President Putin to erode the U.S. leadership in the region. (The Caribbean Council, 2015)As NATO is winding down its operations in Afghanistan and refocusing on Europe and Middle-East the supply routes might again become of
strategic interest. A demonstration of NATO’s prevailing interest in the region can be seen in the deployments Canadian destroyers to operation Caribbe, and Exercise Unitas in 2010’s. In 2013 alone the Canadian vessels intercepted 5,080 kilograms of cocaine before it entered U.S. from where some of it was ultimately targeted for Canadian markets. In addition to NATO countries, such as Canada, US, France, Netherlands and the UK’s participation in maritime operations in the region, NATO also signed an Agreement on Security Information with Colombia in 2013 setting out bases for future defence cooperation. (NATO Association of Canada, 2014) The competition over influence over security and military matters has increased in the Caribbean from the 1990s during which the strategic importance of Caribbean seemed to vanquish. Presence of military alliance such as NATO, which survived its existential debate after the Cold War ended and the predominant threat, Soviet Union, disappeared, can serve as an example for the Caribbean countries as a reasonably successful security cooperation model as NATO has been able to adopt to the new security setting and renew itself to face new threats.

The links between external powers and the Caribbean have also been understood in terms of cooperation with the external powers, this is demonstrated for example with the ‘operation Tradewinds’, established already in 1984. The exercise is still upheld yearly and in 2016 it had expanded to include 13 CARICOM countries, U.S, Canada, France and U.K military personnel. The focus of the exercise has also moved increasingly towards enhancing regional cooperation in providing disaster response and humanitarian assistance from solely military security operations. (Now Grenada, 2016)

The big power rivalry and competition over influence is not the only geopolitical threat to the region; boundary disputes, land or sea, form a traditional security threat to the Caribbean. In terms of international law, land boarders can be seen to be simpler, as they require mutual recognition as the international boarders can be de jure, treaty based; or de facto, mutually accepted reality on the ground. Whereas the maritime boarders are more difficult as they are done unilateral declarations. Only where the boundaries overlap with another state is it necessary to create bilateral agreement. Additionally, land borders often go back decades or even centuries in history whereas maritime borders begun radically expanding after the second world war. Disputes over borders are maintained at diplomatic level, where for example mutual governance or mutually exclusive area over the disputed territory is established. Milefsky has recognised that even these disputes can turn to violent “when the border populations fall prey to popular violence, armed incidents, criminal or illegal activities.”
(Milefsky, 2004) Traditionally the Caribbean states have opted for a peaceful boundary relations, and this is particularly true among the dependencies which have the highest ration of settled boundaries to political entity. (Milefsky, 2004, p. 83) Despite this trend of seeking peaceful solutions there are still several border disputes left in the Caribbean basin as demonstrated by the map 2. The Caribbean states themselves however do not see war and interstate war as a threat and the Havana Declaration of CELAC proclaimed the Caribbean as a zone of peace (CELAC, 2014).

![Map 2, Border Disputes in the Caribbean (Atlas Caraibe, 2017)](image)

Sometimes the traditional threats become tangled with new threats, and borders may become contested all despite the existing agreements. This was the case in 2008, when Colombian bombers fly across the border to Ecuador to bomb a camp, killing FARC’s second in command Luis Edgar Devia Silva, known as Raul Reyes. His body was retrieved after the bombing by Colombian soldiers. This is an example that confirms Milefsky’s theory mentioned earlier. Infuriated by these actions, Ecuador broke off diplomatic ties with Colombia and began assembling troops to the Colombian border. Colombia accused Ecuador for supporting the rebel movement, and Ecuador state denied this in the following statement:
“The government of Ecuador energetically rejects these accusations which cynically add to the hostile attitude shown in the recent violation of our sovereignty” (Reuters, 2008).

The OAS took a stand on the issue as it escalated and conflict appeared imminent. OAS resolution 930 reminds of the charter of the OAS which recognises the sovereignty of each state, and identified that the Colombian “act constitutes a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ecuador and of principles of international law;” (OAS, 2008) Venezuela, led by President Hugo Chávez pledged support to Ecuador in any circumstances also mobilised its armed forces sending 10 tank battalions towards the border while mobilising the air force and navy at the same time, and pledged with full scale war, should Colombia execute similar actions within Venezuelan territory. (Romero, 2008) (CNN, 2008) The 2008 stand-off, between the regionally powerful and significant Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, shows that in the wider Caribbean traditional military security aspect is still important. This event also increased the interest of CARICOM countries to speed up the security cooperation and seek shelter from the collective defences pointing to internally driven need.

From more objective point of view, another perspective to security in the 5th phase can be understood in terms of the location at the Caribbean Sea, making the aspect of maritime security is vital for the island states. In addition to this, man made threats combined with the location at the Caribbean Sea means that the aspect of maritime security is vital for the island states. World Bank report identifies several aspects of modern maritime security:

“There are currently a number of threats that directly affect international maritime security. It may be said that most major of these are (A) transnational organised crime including the illicit traffic in narcotics, arms and weapons, and persons; (b) Terrorism; and (c) piracy and armed robbery at sea. Likewise, the major indirect or aggravating factors may be identified as (biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, and their precursors, and (B) municipal laws and procedures in relation to company incorporation and ship registration” (Moseley, 2009, p. 11).

The geopolitical location of Caribbean is noted by Griffith who identifies three aspects that are important: possession of strategic materials, location on vital sea lanes of communication and security networks (Griffith, 1998). The Caribbean produces oil, most importantly in Venezuela, which the 5th largest oil producer in the world, and Trinidad and Tobago within the CARICOM. Some diamonds,
manganese and nickel, and bauxite in Jamaica. The significance of CARICOM as U.S. trading partner is exemplified by the fact that 32% of the aluminium ore used in the U.S. in 2014 was from Jamaica. (Observatory for Economic Complexity, 2014) Possession of these strategic materials may be a temptation for another state to initiate conflict over. Secondly the location of Panama Channel, connecting Pacific and Atlantic Oceans means that ships must go through the Caribbean waters on their way and this has various impacts on the Caribbean. Not only does many countries have interest on preserving the freedom of the seas in the region, but the number of ships passing through increases the risk of collision or another kind of accident. For example, the nuclear waste from the UK and France is shipped through the Caribbean and there have been fears that these shipments might become targeted by terrorists. (Milefsky, 2004; Knight, 2004) These fears have not been completely drawn from nothing, the 2008 Colombian raid in Ecuador, revealed that FARC had obtained 9 kilograms of depleted Uranium stolen from undiscovered source. In addition to this, in 2009 an employee of Argentinian oil drilling company stole canister of Caesium 137, a nuclear substance, and demanded ransoms for it. (COHA, 2010) On top of this, the rising hemispheric power Brazil, is developing a nuclear submarine. (World Nuclear Association, 2017.)

4.4. Geonarcotics

Geonarcotics, a concept that explains the multiple aspects of the narcotics phenomenon. The definition given to it by Griffith is worth quoting in length here:

“it posits, first that the phenomenon is multidimensional, with four main problem areas (drug production, consumption-abuse, trafficking, and money laundering); second that these give rise to actual and potential threats to the security of states around the world; and third that the drug operations and the activities they spawn precipitate both conflict and cooperation among various state and nonstate actors in the international system. Over and above this, the term captures three factors besides drugs: geography, power and politics.” (Griffith, 1998, p. 56)

Some of the Caribbean countries are consisting of several islands (for example, Bahamas consists of seven hundred islands and combined Virgin Islands comprise some hundred islands) making them easy to enter and exit without being detected. Another geographical factor is the physical proximity to South America which is a major drug supplier and to north America, which has a major demand for drugs. (Griffith, 2004, p. 32)
Thirdly it must be noted that the European Union does not end on Irish or British mainland cost, it extends to the Caribbean; as French Guiana, Guadeloupe and Martinique are departments of France, Anguilla, Bermuda, The British Virgin Islands, The Cayman Islands, Montserrat and Turks and Caicos Islands are yet British dependencies while Bonaire, Curacao, Saba and St Maarten are part of the Netherlands. There are then existing transport, customs and immigration connections between Europe and Caribbean thus opening it to the second large demand area for drugs. (Griffith, 1998) This has been also realised by the Caribbean states, as becomes clear in the statement of the Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago Ramesh Maharaj, already in 1996:

“Let me state emphatically that the greatest threat to our sovereignty comes from the drug lords. These are international criminals who have no respect for sovereignty or boundary lines. They do not stop at our borders or anyone else’s borders with their poison. The truth is that they cannot carry on their deadly trade without violating our borders and sovereignty. If the United States of America, the most powerful nation in the world, cannot fight the drug barons alone, how can we? Drug traffickers are international criminals and can be defeated only with international cooperation.” (Quoted in Bearsworth, 2000, p. 201.)

The 2007 estimate is that 240 metric tons of cocaine went through CARICOM countries in its way to the U.S and Europe. The increased stepping down of Mexican drug cartels has decreased the drugs transported via land routes and increased the shipping through Caribbean waters. (CITS, 2011) U.S. Southern Command statistics claimed in 2013 that 80% of drugs destined to the U.S come from the Caribbean waters (Sánchez-Azura, 2013).

4.5. Prevailing vulnerability

“Given the vulnerabilities of Caribbean states (viz. small, relatively weak states), to the negative fallout of globalisation and globalism process, and to the increasing pressures from the region’s and global hegemonic power, Caribbean leaders have no choice but to seek out and work within broad regional and global multilateral institutions in pursuit of their policies and goals. Such institutions provide at least some insulation from the onslaught of real and serious threats to the Caribbean states’ sovereignty and to the human security of its peoples.” (Knight, 2004, p. 435.)

Griffith recognises two types of vulnerability: firstly, subjective that is how other states see another state, for example a state is may be perceived to be weak, for example for having a population too
From the restrictions caused by small size and limited resources rises the fourth trend noted by Cope and Mora is the decreasing sovereignty, which combined with ineffective governance in all levels of society and inequality leading to Weak states. Many central American and Caribbean states have difficulties delivering basic services, criminal violence and corruption are in many countries increasing, and Cope and Mora argue that increasing migration and rise of populism combined with decreasing support for democratic rule indicate that Latin American and Caribbean Nations are losing faith in the ability to democratic governments to meet expectation. The increase of “transnational security challenges”, as Cope and Mora present, is related to the ineffectiveness of the governments to control their marine and land territories allowing space for criminal organisations traffic illegal drugs, weapons, people, money and intellectual property. (Cope & Mora, 2009.)

4.6. Terrorism, 9/11
The CARICOM issued the Nassau Declaration on International Terrorism on 12th of October condemning the September 11th attacks in the U. S, but appeared more concerned about the economic impact on the region than an actual attack on the U.S.

“We are painfully aware of the disruption caused to the global economy by the events of 11 September. We are concerned that the attacks developments have been especially devastating to our tourism, aviation, financial services and agricultural sectors, which are the major sources of GDP, foreign exchange earnings and to the employment in the countries of our Region. “

(CARICOM, 2001)

The impact of Paris attacks of 2015 was already discussed earlier, highlighting the way in which events in the continental Europe have immediate impact to the Caribbean security. To what extend
terrorism can be separated from gun violence performed by gangs and other criminal organisations can be debated. However, in the Caribbean context, the terrorist threat rises from their affiliation to the U.S. There are fears that terrorists can move material and personnel using the same route as drug traffickers and that Caribbean could become collateral damage, such as in the case of possible attack on nuclear waste shipments or other hazardous material that is shipped through the region as discussed in the earlier section.

4.7. Haiti all over again

It took ten years for the international community to realise that the leader which was restored to power by international intervention in 1994, had not managed to restore democracy or stability to Haiti. In February 2004, insurgents controlled much of the northern part of the country and in the 29th of February, President Aristide resigned “under intense pressure from the United States and the threat of an invasion of the capital by armed insurgents”. (Polgreen & Weiner, 2004.) At the same day the UNSCR 1529, much like the resolution 940 in 1994, constituted that situation in Haiti was a threat to international peace and security. Multinational Interim Force was again authorised followed by the establishment of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti with the resolution 1542 in April. In January 2010, an 7.0-magnitude earthquake devastated Haiti killing more than 220,000 people and levelling the capital city. MINUSTAH was reinforced and mandate extended to support the recovery and to maintain some security in the country. (UN, 2017.) CARICOM saw the removal of Aristide from power as illegal action and protested the intervention. They claimed that the US and France had been involved in the insurgency which led to the removal of Aristide from power. The intervention and the trusteeship that followed has been argued to be neo-colonial and Caribbean countries saw the intervention as a U.S involvement in the domestic politics of a sovereign state (Edozie, 2008). The statement of Arthur Owen, The Prime Minister of Barbados brings up the opposition for the actions which led to Aristide’s fall:

“In analysing the events of February 29th and their aftermath, it is important to deal in a balanced way with all of the complex factors which had a bearing on the crisis. CARICOM’s role should not be to serve as an apologist for Mr. Aristide and the excesses of his leadership, but neither should be condoned nor in anyway support the resort to unconstitutional means to remove a duly elected leader from office. The judgement on the performance of any leader should be made by the electorate at the ballot box, not by insurrection and the resort to force.” (Arthur, 2004)
He continues to talk about the CARICOM led diplomatic process which had been taking place at the same time and had been discarded by the US and France. He concluded that “all of our membership felt a bitter sense of disappointment and betrayal”. (Arthur, 2004) Following the international partners disregard of the CARICOM’s preference in Haiti in 2004, there has been a significant move to build resiliency and regional capacity to attend issues without any external interventions.

4.8. The appearance of CARICOM security sector

“Evidently, CARICOM wants to develop a regional security regime that would include the active participation of the United States, but which the United States would not dominate.

“(Knight & Persaud, 2001, p. 31.)

“It has to be acknowledged at the outset that the integration movement in the Caribbean and the individual countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) now have to grapple with challenges which either did not exist or are now more severe than anticipated when the movement was established in 1973.” (Arthur, 2014)

In July 2001, the conference of heads of government of the Caribbean community agreed on establishing a Regional Task Force on Crime and Security, after admitting that the new forms of crime and violence pose threats to the regions stability. The task force reported back and identified illegal drugs, illegal firearms, corruption, rising crime against persons and property, criminal deportees, growing lawlessness, poverty and inequity and terrorism as the principal security threats to the region. The report also recommended deepening the regional cooperation and establishing new institutional frame for it. (RTFCS, 2002) The member states endorsed the report and in 2006 the CARICOM agreed to establish management structure for the crime and security agenda including Council of Ministers with responsibility for national Security and law Enforcement (CONSLE) and an implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) with a primary responsibility for implementing the regional crime and security agenda. (CARICOM, 2006). However, the biggest landmark of Caribbean security integration was in 2007, when the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community in the 18th inter-sessional meeting declared security as the fourth pillar of the community. (CARICOM, 2007) This was a culmination of a long process. Already in 1990 at the time of
Jamaat al Muslimeen insurrection in Trinidad and Tobago, prime minister of Barbados Erskine Sandiford called for:

”... the expansion and consolidation of the Regional Security System (RSS) in the Eastern Caribbean to include as many CARICOM states as possible. I would urge that the RSS be invested with the authority and resources to deal with all aspects of regional security including the interdiction of drug trafficking, surveillance of our coastal zones, mutual assistance in the event of natural disasters as well as threats to constitutional democracy from criminals, terrorists, mercenaries and other enemies of democracy... The Preservation of law and order and national security contribute to growth and development through the promotion of stability. We must therefore expand our integration efforts to include the area of regional security.” (Graner, 2016)

The World Cricket World Cup (CWC) was arranged in 2007 simultaneously in 9 independent countries and this demanded significant cooperative efforts such as creating a single visa for tourists and providing security for the events. The Liaison office, later known as Regional Crime and Security Strategy Central Coordinating Unit (RCSS-CCU) with its two sub agencies, the Join Regional Communications Centre (JRCC) and the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC) were formed to support security in this event. These agencies were highly successful and they were made permanent parts of IMPACS at the same conference which recognised security as the fourth pillar of CARICOM. (CARICOM, 2017) The success of CWC can be argued to have been the driver for the security cooperation, as the deputy prime minister of Barbados, who chaired the Cricket World Cup Committee stated that:

“Sometimes you need catalysts to bring about transformation in society. There is no doubt in my mind that the challenges of trying to keep the region secure during Cricket World Cup will come to be regarded as one of the major catalysts in the integration movement of the region.” (Grenade, 2007, p. 12)

The prime minister Patrick Manning of Trinidad and Tobago endorser this statement in the opening statement at the fourth meeting of CONSLE:

“Cricket World Cup must not be regarded as an event that has come and gone in terms of the security of the Region. Rather, it should be regarded only as the catalyst that drove us into
“taking the urgent action which in fact has long been necessary for the continued survival of our Region” (Manning, 2007)

Inspired by the success of CWC, the fifth meeting of CONSLE mandated IMPACS to develop a regional crime and security strategy and in 2013, IMPACS came out with the first ‘CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy’ which cemented the shared vision for security in the region. The strategy ties together economic prospects of the Caribbean integration process with the developing of shared threat perceptions:

“Security is the single most important responsibility of the State. Peace and prosperity, freedom and liberty all depend on security. Security is therefore a core developmental goal. It also provides the foundation for other developmental goals. Investment, trade, economic development and growth depend on the protection of life and property. The CARICOM Single Market and Economy can only develop and prosper in a secure environment.” (IMPACS, 2013.)

The Crime and Security Strategy identified threats to the region in four levels they are presented in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Tier I, Immediate Significant Threats</th>
<th>Tier II, Substantial Threats</th>
<th>Tier III, Significant Potential Risks</th>
<th>Tier IV, Future Risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>High-probability, High-impact, clear and present dangers</td>
<td>Likely and relatively High-impact but lesser threat than tier I</td>
<td>High-impact, but low probability</td>
<td>Transnational, future risks where probability and impact is unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Threats</td>
<td>Transnational organised Crime, Trafficking of Illicit drugs and illegal guns, Gangs and Organised Crime, Cyber Crime, Financial Crimes, Corruption</td>
<td>Human Trafficking and Smuggling, Natural Disasters, Public Disorder Crimes</td>
<td>Attacks on Critical Infrastructure, Terrorism</td>
<td>Climate Change, Pandemics, Migratory Pressure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is notable in the new Caribbean understanding of modern threats is that, despite that there are ongoing border disputes in the region, interstate war, and the traditional military security as viewed by realism in general is absent. The prime source of insecurity appears to be the non-state actors. Another significant point is the identification of Cyber Crime as tier 1 threat. To large extend
it could be concluded that its rise is due to the high levels of offshore banking and its dependency on modern technologies.

Following the first Crime and Security Strategy, in 2014 CARICOM adopted even wider plan, named ‘The Caribbean Community Strategic Plan for 2015-2019’ (2014), in its Thirty-Fifth Regular Meeting held in Antigua and Barbuda. The plan includes extensive section on security and it identifies eight areas of focus: deepening crime prevention initiatives and programmes; facilitating justice reform; pursuing functional cooperative security engagements to tackle and manage shared risks and threats; enhancing human resource capabilities; strengthening regional security systems; strengthening CARICOM borders; and Enhancing maritime and airspace awareness. The plan also identifies HIV and other diseases, ‘gender-related’ issues like inequality and violence against women, poverty, drug abuse as social issues, whereas crime and insecurity are named as the principal threats to security, as well as obstacles to social and economic development. Other major threats are climate change and natural disasters. The plan endorses the discussion over climate change mentioned here earlier. The plan notices the increased exposure to these events and argues that “natural disaster management is therefore of critical importance to the Region”, it further describes climate change as ‘existential threat to small-island and low lying coastal states” which the CARICOM states are. (CARICOM, 2014, p. 42)

The fifth phase has seen the awake of CARICOM common security strategy, increasing involvement of extra hemispheric powers and realisation of new security threats, not the least climate change. Forcing the democratically elected president in Haiti to step down the international partners however distanced themselves from the Caribbean states which began increasingly to look for each other as sources of security. The significant push for deeper cooperation came from the positive experience gained organising the Cricket World Cup in 2007, which created trust on collective capabilities. As the treats are increasingly admitted being transnational the Caribbean states have obtained a transnational approach against them. The need for this cooperation is however not purely internal, external powers, led by the U.S and the EU have seen increasing Caribbean integration in the security sector as an effective tool to enhance their own security interests.
5. Results and Conclusions

5.1. Results

“CARICOM faces a multiplicity of risks from increasing number of sources in an era where an interconnected world has created great opportunities but also new vulnerabilities and threats that could seriously impact the region’s stability and socio-economic development. The risks to CARICOM states are increasingly numerous and complex.” (IMPACS, 2013, p. 23)

The table 5 gathers some characteristics of the 5 phases of security identified in this discussion. Certain trends, like the concept of vulnerability, carry on from one phase to another while others like climate change appear in some but not others. Similarly, the changes in global environment have impact on the Caribbean security and the five phases are reflections of the political security environment at the time. The understanding of Caribbean security is reflecting a global setting in certain time in history. Links to the former colonies, U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere and its regional and extra regional challengers have all influenced the concept. Becoming independent in the middle of the Cold War and being under the threat of nuclear war made the Caribbean states soon recognise the limitations of their size. No military deterrence would be credible against external threats and therefor protection was searched from the International law and multilateral institutions such as the UN and OAS. This was the first stage of independent security thinking in the Caribbean. From here, there was however realisation of the possible threats caused by non-state actors, either on their own or acting as a big power proxies leading to the increasing militarisation and return to traditional self-help thinking and Barbados, for example, established its own military forces. The third phase emphasises the increased tensions between Cuba and the US but also sees the culmination of militarisation in the form of military intervention to Grenada. The intervention would have been condemned in the UN without the U.S. veto and this highlights the erosion of the principles like non-intervention and sovereignty, which were long defended by the Caribbean states.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Climate Change</th>
<th>Illegal trafficking of drugs</th>
<th>War</th>
<th>Terrorism</th>
<th>Extra regional powers</th>
<th>US involvement</th>
<th>Regional Coopera- tion</th>
<th>Distinct events</th>
<th>Global Security</th>
<th>Dominant Charac- ters:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Withdrawing of Euro- pean powers</td>
<td>Money</td>
<td>Economic Carifta, Establishing CARICOM</td>
<td>Cuban Missile Crisis, Independent Caribbean countries,</td>
<td>Realism, Great power rivalry</td>
<td>I-Phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Cold War rivalry, Economic cooperation with Europe</td>
<td>Containing communism and isolating Cuba. Increasing military involvement</td>
<td>CARICOM economic cooperation, voting bloc in the UN and other arenas, Establishment of RSS</td>
<td>Air Cubana terrorist attack, coup attempts in the Caribbean</td>
<td>Realism, Great power rivalry</td>
<td>II-Phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Decreasing interest of former colonial powers</td>
<td>Interventionism, Containment policy,</td>
<td>Internal debates in CARICOM, diverse approaches to one China, Deployments of RSS</td>
<td>Grenada deployment,</td>
<td>Decreasing realism, Foreign interventions,</td>
<td>III-Phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>End of CW rivalry, decreasing strategic value. Increase of non-traditional threats. Rise of Brazil and China,</td>
<td>Withdrawal from the region, militarisation of anti-drug activities,</td>
<td>Several organisations, Deepening political and economic integration of CARICOM, RTCS,</td>
<td>End of Cold War, Liberal interventionism, Liberating Kuwait, dissolution of Yugoslavia, Coup attempt in Trinidad and Tobago.</td>
<td>Liberalism, new security approaches, confusion</td>
<td>IV-Phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Several competing powers, Rise of EU as foreign policy actor (CSDP), competition over influence, China, Russia, EU, Brazil</td>
<td>Opening of Cuba, drug trafficking and immigration, closing of borders, return to realism</td>
<td>Security 4th pillar of CARICOM, IMPACS, several other regional organisations,</td>
<td>9/11, Iraq, Afghanistan, New rise of Russia, US hegemony challenged, Brexit, Trump, Cricket World Cup</td>
<td>Terrorism, Climate change, rise of realism,</td>
<td>V-Phase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Characteristics of the 5 stages of security
From the increased militarisation in the 1980s, the Caribbean states moved to the fourth stage of security understanding, defined by confusion, as the Cold War came to an end, and new threats became higher priorities. Climate change and increasing erosion of social fabric and the prevailing vulnerability has brought the global trend of regionalisation intensively to the Caribbean. New blocks were formed and new forms of cooperation was searched. However, within the CARICOM context, the security remained absent from the integration agenda, which focused on economic integration until the fifth phase started. In the fifth phase CARICOM countries came together and recognised the need of their cooperation. Security became one of the official pillars of CARICOM and ultimately the shared understanding of security became reality in the form of CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy in 2013. The security landscape in the Caribbean after the appearance of the Common Crime and Security Strategy in 2013, will be defined by the success of their cooperative security arrangements. Collectively the small states have a viable change to get their voices heard in the international forums and to promote peaceful and law obeying international society.

5.2. Conclusion

“The concept of security for the small island states of the Hemisphere is multidimensional in scope, involving state and nonstate actors, and includes political, economic, social, and natural components. The small island states have concluded that among the threats to their security are illegal drug trafficking, the illegal trade in arms, increasing levels of crime and corruption, environmental and economic vulnerability, particularly in relation to trade, susceptibility to natural disasters, transportation of nuclear waste, and increased levels of poverty.” (OAS, 1998)

This study as examined the question over how the understanding of security has developed in the CARICOM member states using a case study approach and by analysing variety of documents and existing literature. The focus was on the external threats thus excluding the threats to the state rising from internal economic and political conditions. It took up the Jessica Byron’s identification of four phases of security understanding among the OECS countries and argued that it can be expanded to the whole CARICOM context as well. This was then discussed and Byron’s phases were extended to length.
The significance of former colonial countries in the Caribbean periphery decreased significantly after the decolonisation in 1960s and 70s, and it did even more so after the Cold War ended. However, I argue that the notion of developing ‘small island states security’ has become again increasingly important. This argument led to confirming the hypothesis identifying a new, 5th phase of Caribbean security understanding, which I claim started in the late 1990s. Identifying a new stage of security in the Caribbean thinking came clear while trying to find out the answer to the original research question: what led to the deepening of CARICOM security cooperation.

The understanding of security in the Caribbean has changed from the self-help and go-alone approaches first initiated in the early independence years to comprehend the shared and common challenges faced. The positive experiences from the success of RSS and the security arrangements during the Cricket World Cup demonstrated the Caribbean leaders the benefits of collective actions. Faced with increasingly transnational challenges such as illicit trafficking of goods and people, climate change, migration and natural disasters the Caribbean states have accepted the limitations set to them by their small size and look to gain from collective security as sharing resources and knowledge benefits all. The hypothesis was that lack of military capabilities due to small sizes of the Caribbean nations the development of critical security concerns has displaced traditional military security in the Caribbean context and there is evidence to support this. Caribbean states lack the resources to maintain military forces purely for deterrence purposes against unknown enemy, especially when the example from Kuwait and Grenada proved them to be of little use against larger enemy. It is reality that CARICOM has developed a new security framework for the sub region. However, the Caribbean countries are heavily indebted and rely on the bigger powers in and outside the region to support them. The RSS relies on U.S. to finance it and this points to the direction that the increasing security integration among the OECS members is forced upon them by external powers. On the other hand, the small size sets many demands for cooperation and pooling and sharing resources. Need for security has increased as the threats have become transnational and facilitated by the modern technology have impacts despite large distances as seen in the case of Cold War rivalry, invasion of Kuwait, 9/11, and Paris attacks. The Caribbean states have increased their cooperation due to the harsh reality of modern world, they have recognized that they lack the capabilities to survive the challenges, they have and this supports the idea that integration and security cooperation among CARICOM countries is indeed internally driven. External powers such as the U.S. and the EU are providing additional rewards for regional cooperation as they see this as a cost-
effective way to attend their own interests and the Caribbean countries stand to gain from this if they stand as one. The reason for new security concerns in the Caribbean is not purely domestic but is also sponsored by the external powers.

5.3. Reflections
It is hard to imagine doing research in a region without having visited it, and I feel like the exchange period I had in 2016 was extremely helpful when completing this thesis as it provided first hand experience on the everyday life in the region. The use of within case study as a method of choice in this case opened the evolution of security from the Caribbean perspective. To some extent, interviewing some long-term politicians and experts could have provided more in-depth knowledge on the matter. Also, more original documents and white papers of the Caribbean states would have been interesting sources for this study, but as they were not available due to slow digitalisation in the small Caribbean states, they were left out. There was however the existing research done on some of the matters discussed in this thesis and the available documents proved to be adequate.

5.4. Recommendations for further research
Caribbean integration processes pre-date those of the European Union, and it can be argued that in many ways the CARICOM was ahead of the EU in the 1980s. However, the deepening of integration, particularly in the security and collective defence areas as well as the economic integration such as introducing single currency area, of the EU has overtaken the CARICOM. The EU now has a Common Security and Defence Policy, Treaty on mutual assistance, but it is still short from the NATO’s Article 5-type collective defence. The many similarities in institutional structures and in the challenges which the CARICOM and EU share, would make an interesting comparative study, this was however was not possible within the aims of this thesis.

Additionally, studying why the CARICOM countries have not followed the example of Costa Rica, and demilitarised their states to save resources and better allocate them for policing and other social security sectors. The defence forces of Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago now have counter narcotics operations added to their national defence tasks but to what extend the military structures are nowadays relevant can be questioned.
The impact of decriminalising marijuana in the U.S and some European states is yet uncertain. Some evidence has been sighted pointing towards re-arranging the transportation cycle so that marijuana grown in the U.S. is transported to the former origin countries where it remains illegal. To what extend the continental transport route for Cocaine from south America to the northern America is being closed by the state enforcing its authority in Mexico, and the peace process in Colombia is likewise unclear. It could lead to increasing pressures for criminals to seek other shipment routes thus increasing the challenge of the small Caribbean countries to counter these actors.
Bibliography


Annexes:

*Annex 1 RSS mobilisations (According to RSS website, (RSS, 2017)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>The Grenada Intervention Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Hurricane Hugo in Antigua, St Kitts and Nevis and Montserrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Aftermath of attempted coup in Trinidad and Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>St Kitts and Nevis, Internal security (Prison uprising)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Hurricanes Lois and Marilyn in Antigua and St Kitts and Nevis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Hurricane George in St Kitts and Nevis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>St Vincent and the Grenadines, Operation WEEDETER (eradication of cannabis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>St Lucia, Operation of Bordelais (transfer of prisoners to a new prison)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Barbados, Operation Restore Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Cricket World Cup 07 in RSS member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Haiti, Operation Restore Peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2 Threat perceptions in the Caribbean 1990 (Griffith I. L., 1990, p. 37)

Table 2.2

Security Perceptions in the Caribbean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECURITY DIMENSION</th>
<th>THREAT AREA</th>
<th>THREAT INTENSITY</th>
<th>CONVERGENCE/DIVERGENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>HI Convergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Lo divergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. intervention</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>HI convergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cuban intervention</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Lo divergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuelan intervention</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>HI convergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mercenary action</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>HI convergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Factionalism</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low Divergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. destabilization</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low convergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuelan hegemony</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>HI convergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cuban destabilization</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Lo divergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very HI convergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very HI Convergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign debt</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>HI convergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Econ system failure</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>HI convergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brain drain</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>HI convergence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HI = High
Lo = Low

Note: Threat intensity indicators are based on "sense of concern" expressed by interviewees and in official statements. Convergence/divergence indicators reflect proportion of total interviewees and official expressions about the area of threat.

Source: Compiled by author based on interviews and documentary sources.