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From Finland to Ukraine:

*Foreign Policy Sharing Across Time and Space*

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With the annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014, the topic of the Finnish model reemerged in the area of International Relations. Notable experts in the area of International Relations, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, have recommended finlandization as a possible solution for Ukraine in its current conflict. This thesis aims to examine how Finnish experts relate to the Finnish model and its recommendation for other countries, such as Ukraine.

Interviews were conducted with Finnish experts in history and foreign policy. This thesis used these interviews to first determine what kind of an epistemic community exists in Finnish foreign policy. Having determined this, this thesis then analyzed the narratives of the interviewees using the method of narrative analysis to discover how the interviewees narrated the topic of the Finnish model and its applicability outside of Finland.

The analysis of the interviews showed that a strong epistemic community in Finnish foreign policy exists. Furthermore, the data revealed that the narratives used by the interviewees varied only slightly when discussing the Finnish model. When discussing the Finnish model as a possible solution for other countries, the variations in the narratives increased, though, the final results showed that there was a certain amount of consensus, even amongst the diverging narrative groups.

This thesis concluded that an overarching narrative has emerged among the representatives of the epistemic community interviewed in this work. The narrative was supportive of the Finnish model for Finland during the Cold War. The narratives that emerged on the question of whether or not the Finnish model would be a solution for others revealed that the legacy of the Finnish model was not as uniform. However, even though the various narratives that emerged contradicted one another, the final consensus of the interviewees was that no country existing today would be able to find the Finnish model as a solution for themselves.

Keywords:
Finnish Model, Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, Finlandization, Epistemic Communities, Narrative Analysis
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1. Introduction

1.1 Overview

Three years after the start of the Euromaidan revolution, Ukraine has an association agreement with the EU, but it is also embroiled in a war in its eastern provinces, which Russia has aided, after first having annexed the Crimean peninsula.

Due to the conflict in Ukraine, the discussion on the Finnish model has regained prominence. Neutrality for Ukraine through finlandization has been suggested by a few notable political scientists (such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, 2014). However, some Finns have reacted negatively to the idea that finlandization is a policy that Ukraine should be encouraged to take (Taubert, 2014; Nyberg, 2014). Due to the recent reemergence of the idea of the Finnish model, there is very little relevant, modern literature, especially as regards the idea of applying the Finnish model to Ukraine or any other country, with the exception of East Asia.

Over the course of the last decade relations between China and Taiwan have warmed in what is called the “second détente” (Gilley, 2010). In a much referenced article in *Foreign Affairs*, Gilley argued that Taiwan is on the path of finlandization. He contends that this path is in the best interest of Taiwan, China and the United States (Taiwan’s current primary benefactor), and that the Finnish model will lead to the democratization of China and peace in East Asia. (Gilley, 2010.) However, just as Finns critiqued the ‘outsider’ understanding of the Finnish model expressed by Brzezinski, so another Finn, Jyrki Kallio, of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, delivered a strong rebuke of Gilley’s understanding of the Finnish model (Kallio, 2010).

This term ‘finlandization’, although used as a possible solution for some countries (as Brzezinski and Gilley have done), has a negative meaning for some in post-Cold War Finland. Since the Cold War, experts inside of Finland have come to accept the belief that Finland had subjugated itself to the Soviet Union and had been complicit in the Soviet Union’s efforts to use Finland (Browning, 2002, 53-54). On the other hand, there is the term ‘Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line’. The Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line was the name given to the Finnish Cold War foreign policy. According to Max Jakobson, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line was about convincing “the Soviet leadership of Finland’s loyalty in terms of defense, while maintaining its democracy and
developing its economic relations with the West” (Jakobson, 2006, 49). Together these two terms fit under the wider umbrella of the Finnish model. Simply defined, the Finnish model is a model for how a small state relates to a bigger neighbor. This thesis will use the term Finnish model, as it is more wholesome and inclusive when discussing the topic of Finnish foreign policy.

When considering the Finnish model in this research, this thesis theorizes that an epistemic community of foreign policy experts exists in post-Cold War Finland. An epistemic community is a group of experts who can come together to influence policy outcomes for the betterment of society as a whole without any goals of personal enrichment in any form (Haas, 1992, 3; Cross, 2013, 142). This thesis will analyze the narratives created by representatives of the epistemic community collected through interviews. The interviews for this thesis sought to discover what kind of an epistemic community exists, meaning: is the epistemic community strong, weak, or something in between? The interviews also looked to determine how the representatives of the epistemic community narrated the Finnish model and how they narrated the model as a solution for others.

1.2 Hypothesis and Research Questions

This thesis hypothesizes that an epistemic community of Finnish foreign policy experts has formed in post-Cold War Finland. This thesis will test this epistemic community to determine how strong it is, and then discover how the representatives of the epistemic community view the topic of the Finnish model.

To this extent, this thesis attempts to answer three main questions:

1. What kind of an epistemic community of foreign policy experts exists in post-Cold War Finland?

2. How do the members of the epistemic community relate to the Finnish model? What does the epistemic community say? How do they narrate the Finnish model?

3. Would they or would they not recommend this model to other countries?

To answer these questions, this thesis has been divided into the following chapters: Introduction, Background & History, Literature Review on the Theory of Epistemic Communities, Methods and Data Collection, Data Analysis, and
Conclusion. Chapter two will introduce the reader to the history of the Finnish model and its various interpretations. Chapter three will familiarize the reader with the theory of epistemic communities, which is the guiding theory of this thesis. Chapter four outlines the methods for data collection and data analysis in this theory, as well as describing the concerns and issues that appeared over the course of writing this thesis. The data analysis has been divided into two chapters; chapters five and six. Chapter five analyzes the data from the interviews in order to determine what kind of epistemic community exists. Chapter six analyzes the data to determine what narratives have arisen from the members of the epistemic community on the topic of the Finnish model. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the results of this thesis.

1.3 Data and Method

The data for this thesis was collected by conducting interviews with Finnish experts in foreign policy, both from the University of Tampere in Tampere, Finland and the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki, Finland. Overall eight interviews were scheduled and conducted over the time period of April 2016 to June 2016. Several of the interviewees expressed a desire to remain anonymous; therefore, the interviewees have each been assigned a letter (i.e. Interviewee A) to represent them. This research will be qualitative, and as such, the quality rather than the quantity of the interviews will be the priority.

This research will adopt the method of Narrative Analysis in order to determine what kind of narratives the epistemic community has created when discussing the Finnish model. More precisely this thesis will utilize Polkinghorne’s paradigmatic analysis of narratives approach, meaning that this research will not analyze events to construct a narrative, but rather the narratives constructed by the interviewees will be analyzed (Polkinghorne, 1995, 12-13). Analyzing these narratives will reveal if divisions exist in the epistemic community when discussing the topic of the Finnish model, and what kind of divisions exist (i.e. between older and younger members or male and female members).

Chapter four will give further consideration to the methods utilized in this thesis.
1.4 Research Gap

The subject of the Finnish model was chosen, because there appears to be a gap in the research when discussing the Finnish model today. As mentioned above, the Finnish model has reemerged in recent years in discussions in International Relations as a solution for Ukraine (Zbigniew Brzezinski, 2014, Taubert, 2014; Nyberg, 2014).

Although the model has been discussed in the media, little research has been done on the Finnish model’s applicability to today. Moreover, little and less has been done to determine how Finns view the model as a practical solution for other countries in harsh geopolitical climates similar to the one in which Cold War Finland found itself.

By seeking to understand what kind of a Finnish foreign policy epistemic community exists and analyzing its narratives regarding the Finnish model, this thesis can hope to close the current research gap.
2. History and Background

2.1 Introduction

This section of the thesis will review the history and background of the Finnish model by looking at a couple of narratives that have emerged.

Born at the end of World War Two, Finland’s post-war foreign policy was created to defend its independence at a time of great uncertainty. With the emergence of the Cold War, Finnish foreign policy became critical. Finland found itself between the United States and Western Europe and its large eastern neighbor, the Soviet Union. Finland’s aim was to remain a neutral country outside of great power politics; however, its role in WWII and the aftermath of the War left Finland in a tight spot. In 1946, under President Juho Kusti Paasikivi, Finland undertook an effort to solidify its neutrality in the eyes of the great powers. (Jakobson, 2006, 49; Jussila et. al., 1999, 252; Kirby, 1984, 159.) Ten years later, Urho Kekkonen became the Finnish president, and for twenty-five years he maintained and expanded the policy set forth by Paasikivi. This foreign policy line would become known as the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. (Jakobson, 2006, 50-52; Jussila et. al., 1999, 276-281.) However, due to the excesses of Kekkonen’s rule and diminishing freedoms in Finland, criticisms of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line began appearing. (Jakobson, 2006, 52; Jussila et. al., 1999, 323-328.) Critics of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line began referring to Finland’s foreign policy as finlandization (Browning, 2002, 52). This thesis will refer to these two opposing approaches as the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line and finlandization. They frame the thesis’s discussion on Finnish foreign policy and epistemic communities.

Understanding these narratives in the discussion on Finnish Cold War foreign policy will allow this thesis to analyze the perceptions of the Finnish model in Finland today. Figure 1 below gives a pictorial expression of what the Finnish model is, and the two narratives described in this thesis. As is shown, the Finnish model itself is a model that relates to how a small state relates to a larger neighbor. From this, there are the two narratives, both defining the model in a different way. The exception to this is the second text box connected to finlandization. Internationally, particularly among American foreign policy experts, the term finlandization has become synonymous with the Finnish model (Brzezinski, 2014; Gilley, 2010). As the topic has become
popular internationally, it is useful to understand how Finnish experts themselves feel about it, especially as it is discussed as a possible foreign policy for other countries.

This thesis will thusly first take a look at the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line narrative. This narrative is important as it describes the fundamental reasons for the Line. Following this, the thesis will turn to analyzing the finlandization narrative. This section will show the transition of the narrative from that of support for the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line to that of opposition. It also will focus much more on the presidency of Urho Kekkonen, because of the central role of Kekkonen in the finlandization narrative.

2.2 Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line Saved Finland

According to the first narrative, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line was a successful foreign policy that allowed Finland to maintain its independence, territorial integrity, and a great amount of its sovereignty. After the end of Finland’s Continuation War with the Soviet Union in 1944, Finland had to find a new path to maintain its independence and territorial integrity. In 1946, J.K. Paasikivi became president of
Finland and led the country for the next ten years. In this time, he oversaw the start of Finnish neutrality, thanks to the removal of the Russian base at Porkkala (Jakobson, 2006, 49), the safeguarding of Finnish democracy from the Communists (Jussila et al., 1999, 252), in addition, as prime minister before becoming president, Paasikivi had already recognized the need for Finland to take a radically different course “to create lasting good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union” (Kirby, 1984, 159). Paasikivi and his successor Urho Kekkonen pursued this foreign policy line for the better part of 35 years. This section will now show how this foreign policy came to be and played out.

Finnish independence was achieved in 1917 with the collapse of the Russian empire. Following independence, Finland had a short, but bloody, civil war in 1918. The ascendant Bolshevik leadership in the Soviet Union would have hoped for a victory of the Finnish labor movement in the civil war, but because of the victory of the Whites (the side consisting of monarchists and republicans, among others), the Soviet Union instead had to consider the possibility of Finland being used as a staging ground for an invasion of Russia (Apunen and Rytövuori, 1982, 68).

During the interwar period (the period between the Finnish Civil War and the Winter War), the Soviet Union and Finland negotiated territorial settlements. On the one hand, these negotiations were quite broad, including economic and politico-ideological perspectives; on the other hand, the Soviets were quite adamant in their negotiating for territories based on security concerns. For the Soviets, Finland represented a direct threat to the city of Leningrad; therefore, the Soviet Union needed to guarantee the defense of Leningrad on the Karelian Isthmus and in the Baltic Sea. However, Finland did not take these security concerns seriously until later in the negotiating process, and even then, abjectly refused to cede lands to the Soviets. (Apunen, 1977, 20-21; Jakobson, 2006, 27-29.)

Apunen concludes that Paasikivi’s insights into Soviet security considerations “remains both valuable and stimulating” (1977, 30). Apunen shows how Finland’s lack of understanding of its strategic and geographical position in relation to the Soviet Union was a reason for the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939. According to Apunen and Rytövuori, “the starting point of post-war Finnish-Soviet relations is that Finland has acknowledged the existence of a legitimate Soviet security interest (1982, 72). Finland under Paasikivi finally addressed the Soviet Union’s security concerns
through the 1948 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (Apunen, 1977, 29-30).

Max Jakobson praises President Paasikivi’s post-war policies. He argues that Paasikivi’s leadership allowed Finland to maintain its democracy. In other words, Finland “achieved a defensive political victory” (Jakobson, 2006, 47). In addition to winning this victory, Paasikivi also finally achieved Finnish neutrality by overseeing the removal of Soviet troops from the military base at Porkkala (ibid, 49).

Paasikivi’s successor, Urho Kekkonen, maintained Paasikivi’s foreign policy stance. Finland’s position meant that relations with the Soviet Union were primary. Therefore, Kekkonen said that good Finnish-Western relations will come only “as a consequence of good Finno-Soviet relations”. (Apunen and Rytövuori, 1982, 72-73.) This was the basis on which Finnish neutrality was conducted (ibid.). Jakobson argues that Kekkonen’s presidency was more specifically about Finland proving to the Soviet Union that Finland was not a threat to Soviet defensive interests and that Finland would remain loyal to these interests. In the meantime, Kekkonen aimed to “[maintain] [Finland’s] democracy and [develop] its economic relations with the West.” (2006, 49.) Kekkonen was quite successful in this endeavour. During his 26 years in the office of president of Finland, he maintained Finland’s neutrality, and he was able to achieve Finland’s agreement with the EEC. In fact, Finland’s agreement with the EEC is portrayed by Jakobson as a major success by Kekkonen. Had Kekkonen not successfully managed relations with the Soviet Union, Finland would have effectively been placed under the Soviet economy. He was also able to organize the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, which is considered to be one of his best international achievements. (ibid, 50-52.)

An analysis of thick images in Finnish foreign policy by Mika Aaltola described how Finland pursued the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. At first, Finnish foreign policy as established by President Paasikivi was designed to take German Realpolitik and apply it to a small power. “The Finnish version of realism stressed that a small power has to come to terms with the legitimate interests of major powers. This meant that, since Finland’s position was marginal, its actions should be careful, modest, and moderate.” (Aaltola, 2010, 266.) The Finns also used historical lessons in their relations with Russia as a framework to keeping peace with the Soviet Union. The Finns should “[anticipate] the situations the Russians would consider critical or unacceptable in their relations with the Finns and thereby [avoid] them in advance”
(Alapuro, 2004, 94). Through the understanding of one’s place in the world is important, Finland did not just sit back idly and let the Soviet Union drive the Finnish car. As quoted above, Kekkonen’s statement that Finland could only have good relations with the West “as a consequence of good Finno-Soviet relations” (Apunen and Rytövuori, 1982, 73) was not in and of itself a denial of Finland’s possibility to pursue non-Soviet relations. Following World War Two, Finnish foreign policy was used as a means of keeping Finland out of harm’s way by staying out of the fray of international conflicts; however, “the purpose was to be active and to find added value in being a small power, to find mobility away from harm’s way” (Aaltola, 2010, 266). Because of this purpose, the interpretation of foreign policy became more active. Finland could try to reshape hard facts. (ibid, 266.)

With a more active interpretation of its foreign policy, Finland was able to be more maneuverable in its relations with the Soviet Union and other international actors (ibid.). In fact, with such maneuverability, President Kekkonen was able to frame Finland as a doctor (ibid, 267). This image of Finland as a doctor went hand in hand with the image of Finland as a bridge-builder. Finland was no longer a mere vassal of the Soviet Union, but rather, a doctor who could heal the problems dividing the East and West. (ibid, 267.) This role between East and West directly served Finland’s foreign policy’s purpose of being active and staying out of harm’s way.

On the domestic front, Paasikivi’s mission seemed to be the maintenance of the rule of law state and the protection of Finland against the People’s Democrats (the communists). Paasikivi laid out in a memorandum his beliefs on how the communists should be incorporated into future governments. He wrote that even if the communists are included in a coalition government, they should not hold the premiership or serve as the ministers of the foreign affairs, interior, trade, or defense ministries. (Jussila, et. al., 1995, 252.) Paasikivi believed that communists in these positions would not serve the interests of Finland, but rather the Soviet Union (ibid.). Annoyed by the lack of faith he had in Finnish ministers, Paasikivi set out to clean Finnish internal politics. Even though “Paasikivi considered it self-evident that Finland had to follow the obligatory line in its relations with the Soviet Union, there was no necessity whatever in his opinion for concessions in internal politics.” (ibid, 252.) This meant that Paasikivi had to undergo the process of cleaning up subversive elements in Finnish society. This included dissolving Valpo (the secret police) and removing Hella Wuolijoki as head of the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation. (Jussila et. al., 1995, 253;
For the most part, the Soviet Union accepted Paasikivi’s directives over internal Finnish matters (Jussila et. al., 1995, 255).

However, Paasikivi’s record on avoiding internal interference was not without blemish. In 1945 and early 1946, under pressure from the Allied Control Commission (headed by the Soviet Union in Helsinki), Paasikivi, as prime minister, pushed laws through the Finnish parliament (the Eduskunta) that would allow Finland to prosecute its war criminals as Finland was required to do under article 13 of the armistice. All men put on trial were found guilty and sentenced to multiple years in prison. (Kirby, 1984, 162-163.) However, in the end, not one of the sentenced men would serve their full prison term because Paasikivi pardoned them soon after (Jussila et. al., 1995, 253).

In 1950, Urho Kekkonen became the prime minister of Finland. Already he was hoping to take advantage of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in order to “strengthen … relations that would lead to cooperation” (ibid, 257). However, Kekkonen’s understanding of the need for cooperation between the Soviet Union and Finland was only acknowledged by his own party and the People’s Democrats (ibid, 260).

Kekkonen was elected to his first term as president of Finland in 1956. In the early years of his reign as Finnish president, Kekkonen faced two seismic crises. The first crisis, the Night Frost Crisis, resulted in the dissolution of the Eduskunta. The second crisis, the Note Crisis, again resulted in the dissolution of the Eduskunta under pressure from the Soviet Union, but it also ensured Kekkonen’s reelection as president. These crises ensured that Kekkonen would remain as Finland’s political master, and that Kekkonen would continue his foreign policy line. (ibid, 276-281.) Following the Note crisis, Kekkonen stated that “Finnish neutrality presupposed four conditions: acknowledgement by foreign powers, their trust in it, the support of the Finnish people, and the Finnish people’s readiness to repel any violations of this neutrality” (ibid, 308).

During his 26 years as president of Finland, Kekkonen made great efforts in foreign policy. Kekkonen had some defeats in his foreign policy ambitions, such as his attempt to create a Nordic nuclear-free zone (ibid, 308-309). However, he also had several successes. When power in the Soviet Union was handed over from Khrushchev to Brezhnev, Kekkonen made sure that the new Soviet authorities maintained the status quo in regards to Finland. As well the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT) were conducted in Helsinki in 1969. These successes along with membership in the EEC and the CSCE (mentioned earlier) were major achievements for Kekkonen. They brought Finland international recognition. (ibid, 309-313.)

2.3 Finlandization Narrative: a Critical Take on the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line

The term finlandization was introduced as a criticism of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. Critics of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line argued that it was a policy of self-subjugation and that Finland’s efforts to assuage the Soviet Union went above and beyond what was necessary for Finland to defend its independence. However, in recent years, the term has come to be used outside of Finland not as a criticism, but as a modern understanding of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. In this research, finlandization will refer to the criticism of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line.

While the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line had a positive connotation in Finland through much of the Cold War, in the 1970’s, the term finlandization came to be the main term that defined Western criticism of Finnish foreign policy. In Finland, the term finlandization was a sign of the West’s misunderstanding of Finland’s foreign policy; however, after the end of the Cold War, the finlandization narrative became dominant. (Aaltola, 2010, 268.)

In an analysis of westernizing narratives in Finnish foreign policy, Christopher Browning describes how new narratives in Finnish foreign policy have taken a new look at Finnish Cold War foreign policy. Overall the Westernizing narrative held that Finland had not “skillfully avoided the pitfalls of Cold War power politics to maintain a position of magnanimous neutrality,” but rather it had “in fact [become] complicit with the propaganda of the Soviet totalitarian empire …” (Browning, 2002, 53-54). In post-Cold War Finland, responsibility for this complicity with the Soviet Union was placed at the feet of President Kekkonen. Particularly, Finns, since the Cold War, view “Kekkonen’s playing of the ‘Moscow Card’ … as having been a euphemism for the legitimization of authoritarian style politics at home.” (ibid, 54.) An example of this is seen in Finland’s agreement with the EEC. Jakobson had chalked this victory up to Kekkonen’s skills, but modern views of the EEC agreement do not agree. Rather, Kekkonen’s ability to extend his presidency four more years in without elections is seen as the reason why the Soviet Union accepted the Finnish EEC agreement. (ibid, 67 note 9.)
With the emergence of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line as Finland’s foreign policy, the Finnish foreign ministry made it its goal to maintain the Line. Because the Soviet Union carefully observed Finnish society’s discourse about the Soviet Union, the foreign ministry saw the need to limit freedom of expression in Finland in order to show the Soviets that there was no risk to Soviet security. (Kullaa, 2012, 72.) Such observations of Finland by the Soviet Union were not limited to analyzing the Finnish discourse on the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet Union was very much observing the whole of the Finnish political atmosphere. A cornerstone of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line was the belief that Finland needed to appease the Soviet Union. Therefore, “Finland stayed out of international organisations when the Soviet Union resisted” (Forsberg and Pesu, 2016, 480).

The Night Frost Crisis in 1958 was a strong indication of the influence that the Soviet Union could exert over Finland. After the elections of 1958, a new Social Democrat-Conservative (the Social Democratic Party [SDP] and the National Coalition Party [NCP]) government was formed. Even before the formation of the new government, the Soviet Union was already warning Finland against just such an alliance. The Soviets did not understand why the Finns would abruptly turn away from the politics of the Agrarian party. (Kullaa, 2012, 159.) Finland’s foreign ministry was pressured by the Soviets to prevent an SDP-NCP government from forming, but was in no position to actually be able to prevent the government from forming (ibid, 160-161). As a result of the growing crisis a war of words began emerging between Finland and the Soviet Union. To prevent the Finnish mood from becoming too hostile to the Soviet Union, Kekkonen began censoring publications that he himself deemed detrimental to Finnish-Soviet relations. (ibid, 164-165.) In the end, Kekkonen forced the resignation of the government, and was promised by a KGB confidante that Soviet relations with Finland would resume, though, the new government would have to be composed of at least two communists. Kekkonen refused to add communists into the new government, but, in the end, the new government, lacking any SDP or NCP ministers, was satisfactory for the Soviets. (ibid, 169-170.)

Three years after the Night Frost Crisis, the Note Crisis emerged. Ostensibly the Note Crisis was initiated by the Soviet Union’s fears of a revanchist West Germany (Maude, 2011, 239). Struggling with a parliament that did not support him, it was believed that Kekkonen may have requested such a note from the Soviet Union (ibid, 237-239). The note, delivered to the Finnish embassy in Moscow, became a
point of crisis because it expressed Soviet fears of West Germany, and, as a result, the Soviets wanted to undergo military consultations with Finland (ibid, 240). Following a meeting with Khrushchev in Novosibirsk, Kekkonen returned home, having triumphantly solved the Note Crisis without military consultations needing to take place between Finland and the Soviet Union. As a result of this success and a section of the note strongly criticizing Kekkonen’s opposition, the strongest opposition to Kekkonen’s reelection bid collapsed and Kekkonen was reelected easily. (ibid, 240-241.)

Following the crises, Kekkonen had reduced the space between the president and parliament and from then on had the power to simply dissolve governments as he saw fit (ibid, 247-248). By doing so, Kekkonen had increased his own power, a power which derived from his relations with the Soviet Union (ibid, 250).

With the narrowing of the space between the power of the president and the power of the parliament, finlandization became “increasingly inter-woven with Kekkonen and his dominance and the consolidation of his hegemony in the Finnish political life (sic)” (Forsberg and Pesu, 2016, 481). The worst aspects of finlandization are associated with Kekkonen’s rule. Kekkonen “conduct[ed] undemocratic measures by exceeding his constitutional powers, working through personalised networks, and concealing relevant information from others as a means of control” (ibid.). The aforementioned extension of his presidency in 1973 is another example of his dominance of Finland’s political landscape, while his exclusion of the National Coalition Party from government for 21 years is an example of the Soviet influence in Finland’s political landscape (ibid.).

By the end of Kekkonen’s final term as president, critics of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line became more vocal. In particular, criticisms of the Line lamented the ban on criticizing the Soviet Union and its society. Moreover, there was a questioning of the idea that it was unpatriotic to questions the president’s views on Soviet relations. (Maude, 2011, 262.) Tuomas Forsberg and Matti Pesu say that it is difficult to say whether the finlandization of Finland was forced or not, and that arguments for one way or the other would be weak. However, they argue that the transfer of power from Kekkonen to Koivisto, the end of finlandization with this transfer of power, and the lack of any strong reaction in Soviet-Finnish relations suggest “an exaggeration of the extent of domestic accommodation.” (Forsberg and Pesu, 2016, 489.)
The acceptance of the finlandization narrative in post-Cold War Finland has led to a general shift in Finnish politics. Post-Cold War policy had to be the antithesis of Cold War policy, both internally and externally. Internally, this meant that Finland had to aim for “more open and transparent politics, support for freedom of expression, and the delinking of the media from the state …” (Browning, 2002, 55). Externally, Finland looked to the West. This meant a new understanding of what these institutions meant and stood for. Following the end of the Cold War, Finns felt as if they had been misled by Kekkonen. Because of this, the desire was to bring Finland into Western institutions, where Finland naturally belonged. (ibid, 55.) In addition to this, the legitimacy of Finnish neutrality was called into question. Those who favored westernizing narratives argued that Western interpretations of the Soviet Union turned out right, therefore, because of this, Finland’s neutrality “was akin to free-riding on the back of Western security institutions …” As a result, understandings of organizations, such as NATO, in Finland turned from negative to positive. (ibid, 55.)

2.4 Conclusion

The discussion on the history of the Finnish Cold War foreign policy line is no simple matter. On the one hand, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line narrative describes Finnish Cold War foreign policy as Finland’s means of survival during the Cold War. The story is told that had Finland acted otherwise it might not have maintained its independence. The more negative aspects of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line were not pretty but had to be done, and Finland did all these things in a Finnish way, not a Soviet way. On the other hand, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line has been criticized following the end of the rule of President Kekkonen. The finlandization narrative emerged in Finland near the end of Kekkonen’s final presidential term. This narrative focused around the persona of Kekkonen himself. Critics of Kekkonen pointed to the excesses of Kekkonen’s rule as evidence of finlandization. They questioned whether Finland needed to go so far in finlandizing itself to the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, this narrative became dominant, and Finland began a move westward.

These two narratives do not live in total isolation from one another. The Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line narrators tend to focus their narrative on the foreign affairs aspects of the Line. The excesses of Kekkonen are not focused on possibly because
they see it as a distraction from the overall success of the Line. The finlandization narrators, who focus on Kekkonen’s excesses, agree that the Line was successful, but because of the restrictions on freedom applied on Finnish society in the name of good Soviet relations, they argue that it was dangerous.

Because the Finnish model has become a recommended solution for the conflict in Ukraine, it is important that the Finnish model is well understood. Understanding these narratives in the discussion on Finnish Cold War foreign policy will allow this thesis to analyze the perceptions of the Finnish model in Finland today and to understand the model itself.
3. Epistemic Communities

3.1 Introduction

The theory of epistemic communities is the idea that groups of experts can come together to influence policy outcomes for the betterment of society as a whole without any goals of personal enrichment in any form (Haas, 1992, 3; Cross, 2013, 142). This thesis centers around the idea that an epistemic community of foreign policy experts exists in Finland, and that this epistemic community has influence on how foreign policy issues are perceived.

However, in order to determine the efficacy of any Finnish epistemic community, one must understand exactly what the theory of epistemic communities entails. This thesis plans to do just that by first addressing the special edition of *International Organization* edited by Peter Haas, in which the theory of epistemic communities is thoroughly defined and established. This edition of *International Organization* was seminal in the study of epistemic communities, and one cannot study the theory without first studying this work. Of course, this work was followed by criticisms of the theory as it was defined by Haas. These criticisms must be addressed in order to see how the theory has developed and grown. Key to the aspect of growth in this theory is Mai’a K. Davis Cross’s works on epistemic communities. Cross in her works broadened the scope and understanding of what an epistemic community is. Her works are as essential to the study of epistemic communities as Haas’s, and therefore, it is crucial to understand how she has contributed to the theory.

Finally, this thesis will take a look at epistemic communities in the context of domestic politics. The literature on epistemic communities is overwhelmingly focused on the transnational and international applications of the theory, so it is important to see how epistemic community theory holds up in the domestic context, especially since this thesis will analyze a domestic epistemic community.

3.2 Epistemic Communities

John Gerard Ruggie devised his definition of epistemic communities from Michel Foucault’s term ‘episteme’. An episteme being, as defined by Foucault,
“knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility…” 

Ruggie took the term “to refer to a dominant way of looking at social reality, a set of shared symbols and references, mutual expectations and a mutual predictability of intention.” (Ruggie, 1975, 569-570.) Ruggie seemed interested in how epistemic communities were becoming more internationalized; however, his understanding of epistemic communities was much more abstract compared to more recent understandings. According to Ruggie, an epistemic community is used by a state for simply making collective responses in given situations (ibid, 570). Ruggie’s understanding of epistemic community was an early understanding of the phenomenon; however, a more in-depth study of epistemic communities appeared in 1992 in a special edition of the journal *International Organizations* edited by Peter Haas.

This special edition of *International Organizations* was a breakthrough in the study of the theory of epistemic communities. It was a large volume of works dedicated to studying, understanding, and explaining the role and use of epistemic communities. In the introduction article, appropriately titled as “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”, Haas defines an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (1992, 3). Moreover, an epistemic community has four common characteristics shared by its members (even when an epistemic community is made up of members from various disciplines and backgrounds): the members have:

1. a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members;
2. shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes;
3. shared notions of validity- that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and
4. a common policy enterprise-that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional
competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence. (ibid.)

These four characteristics have become the pillars of the theory of epistemic community. As will be shown later in this paper, among supporters and critics of this theory, these four pillars of epistemic community are respected and seem almost immutable thus far.

The emergence of epistemic communities became obvious in the middle of the twentieth century as countries’ bureaucracies began growing, and thusly, relying on technical expertise to understand the changing world (ibid, 7-11). However, such technical expertise typically comes about as a result of uncertainty of a given event or phenomenon and its level of complexity, especially in a time of crisis or shock (ibid, 12-15). As a relatively new theory, Adler and Haas wrote that “epistemic communities are not in the business of controlling societies; what they control is international problems. Their approach is instrumental, and their life is limited to the time and space defined by the problem and its solutions” (1992, 371).

Distinguishing between an epistemic community and other groups can be a task. Haas makes clear that an epistemic community is not a group that can be simply relegated to the realm of the sciences, but rather an epistemic community can consist of members from many disciplines and professions with the prerequisite that they “have a sufficiently strong claim to a body of knowledge…” (Haas, 1992, 16). Even politicians can be involved in epistemic communities as will be shown later in this paper by a review of Patrik Marier’s case study of Swedish pension reform. The professionalism and level of expertise of an epistemic community is what gives it access to the political system, which in turn legitimizes the efforts of the epistemic community (ibid, 17). Given that an epistemic community can have a diverse membership, it runs the risk that it may appear as a different group (i.e. an interest group) or, even, that a different group may appear as an epistemic community. However, Haas’s characteristics of an epistemic community can be applied as a test to determine the nature of a group (i.e. is it an epistemic community or a special interest group?). Haas even lays out the differences in a simple chart, which has been copied below in figure 2.

In figure 2, it can be seen that in order for a group to be considered an epistemic community, it must first share causal and principled beliefs, what Haas also
calls analytical and normative beliefs (ibid, 18), and it must have a consensual knowledge base and shared interests.

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<th>Causal beliefs</th>
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<td><strong>Shared</strong></td>
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<th>Knowledge base</th>
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<td><strong>Consensual</strong></td>
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Figure 2. Distinguishing epistemic communities from other groups (Haas, 1992, 18)

Therefore, if one of these pieces is missing, then the group ceases to be an epistemic community, and becomes something different. For example, a group of researchers who share causal beliefs but not principled beliefs should be considered to be a professional group, while a group with shared principled beliefs but not causal beliefs should be considered to be an interest group or social movement.

Another important factor to remember when investigating an epistemic community is that an epistemic community may be domestic or transnational, and that its members can meet in a variety of ways at regular or irregular times. Haas contends that transnational epistemic communities are stronger than domestic ones, because a transnational epistemic community has a larger diffusion area. (1992, 17.)

One aspect of Haas’s understanding of epistemic communities that is theoretically important is that “reality is socially constructed” (ibid, 21). If it is given that knowledge itself is socially constructed, then there can be no objective claims on knowledge (ibid.). Haas does not dispute this idea. Instead he points to an alternative
idea that consensual knowledge is formed over time and verified through validity tests (ibid, 23). This is the form of knowledge that epistemic communities form, and those that are able to voice their knowledge will have influence in the public and political spheres (ibid.). Thusly, if consensual knowledge is what epistemic communities form, then they must rely on validity tests (Haas’s third characteristic of epistemic community) in order to confirm their knowledge (ibid.).

Finally, the aim of an epistemic community is to transfer its knowledge on. Meaning that its members’ combined expertise has been put together “presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence (Haas, 1992, 3)”; and therefore, the logical aim of the epistemic community would be to influence policy coordination. Haas reckons that when an epistemic community’s consensual knowledge gains recognition by policy makers, then a level of policy coordination can begin (ibid, 29-30). Following this, Adler and Haas hypothesize that the level of mobilization and ability to gain influence by an epistemic community within its own country, increases the chance that the country will then use its power in support of the epistemic community’s ideals and practices, therefore, aiding in the epistemic community’s international institutionalization (Adler and Haas, 1992, 371-372).

Policy coordination is a significant part of the work of epistemic communities. However, once policy coordination is achieved, “this path-dependent evolutionary model implies that the effects of epistemic involvement are not easily reversed” (ibid, 372-373). Epistemic communities play an important role in policy coordination through the steps of policy evolution, which are policy innovation, policy diffusion, policy selection and policy persistence (ibid, 373). Epistemic communities aid in policy innovation in three ways: they “[frame] the range of political controversy surrounding an issue, [define] state interests, and [set] standards” (ibid, 375).

After an epistemic community has influenced policy innovation, the new policy can then be diffused. Conferences and publications are just two ways in which an epistemic community can diffuse its ideas transnationally, even if an epistemic community is only nationally oriented (ibid, 378). Through the diffusion of ideas, epistemic communities play a role in policy coordination. Adler and Haas have drawn four conclusions from their research on epistemic communities that demonstrate the importance of policy diffusion for an epistemic community. Firstly, an epistemic community’s ability to diffuse its ideas nationally is important, but if it acquires power in just one country (or in just one international body), then its power is
dependent on the country’s (or body’s) international influence; therefore, an epistemic community that can diffuse its ideas transnationally, can thus influence international policy coordination. Secondly, similar to the first conclusion, an epistemic community’s embeddedness in a country’s regulatory agencies allows the epistemic community to influence the setting of standards and policy development of that country; however, the diffusion of its ideas transnationally would, again, allow it to influence international policy coordination. Thirdly, an epistemic community that gains power or embeddedness in a major/strong state or institution (according to its strength and role in negotiations on a specific issue) will have greater influence over international policy, than an epistemic community which gains power in a minor/weak state or institution. (ibid, 379-380). One could think of these first three conclusions as a parasite/host metaphor. An epistemic community that is unable to diffuse its ideas transnationally is beholden to the influence of its host. (The host being the country or institution that the epistemic community holds influence in.) The fourth conclusion is more about the composition of the epistemic community itself. The size of the epistemic community does not reflect its ability to influence on international policy coordination. In fact, epistemic communities enshrine the idea of quality over quantity. The size of the epistemic community (meaning the number of members) is not as important as the level of expertise of each member of the epistemic community (Adler and Haas, 1992, 380). For example, an epistemic community which consists of ten environmental studies professors proposing a solution for the safe disposal of nuclear waste will probably find that their ideas diffuse more easily than an epistemic community of 100 bachelor’s students.

The next step in policy evolution is policy selection. This is the point at which political bodies take the policy ideas of epistemic communities and turn them into reality. However, policy selection is not as easy as it may seem. An epistemic community is bound by political realities. In a best case scenario for an epistemic community, decision makers are unfamiliar with a given problem, and therefore, the epistemic community can shape the issue and characterize the interests of the decision makers. In contrast, when decision makers have knowledge of a problem, they can then select an epistemic community that aligns with their own views of the problem giving influence to that epistemic community. However, in such a circumstance, the epistemic community will not have the ability to shape the interest of decision makers, but rather it will have to justify and promote its ideas, which align with the
decision makers’ (ibid, 381). As well, the decision makers are more likely to give influence to epistemic communities which lie in the mainstream. Epistemic communities that lie outside the mainstream or that tend to be more radical are often impeded in their attempts to influence decision makers (ibid, 381-382).

The final step in policy evolution is policy persistence. This is the point at which the effects of epistemic involvement are no longer easily reversed (ibid, 372-373). An epistemic community arrives to this point through continuous effort and socialization. As its ideas become institutionalized, they run the chance of becoming orthodoxy (ibid, 384). However, the epistemic community must retain its consensus in order to maintain its influence (ibid.). Once “an epistemic community loses its consensus, its authority is diminished and decision makers tend to pay less attention to its advice” (ibid, 385).

Haas, in his special edition of International Organization, was able to define and solidify the theory of epistemic communities. This edition of IO became the seminal work for the study of epistemic communities and has provided researchers a foundation for task of discovering and examining epistemic communities.

3.3 Criticisms of Epistemic Communities

Although the epistemic community edition of International Organization was seminal in the study of epistemic communities, it was not without its detractors. From the critics of epistemic community theory, there have emerged approximately four main critiques. First, it has been argued that Haas’s work gives supremacy to epistemic communities over other groups. Second, Dave Toke argues that Haas needs to move from a positivist approach to a post-positivist social constructivist approach. Third, most of the critics of epistemic community theory argue that there is no clear explanation of how epistemic communities influence governments any more than other groups. Finally, James K. Sebenius criticizes the theory for lacking a theory of bargaining that would explain how epistemic communities work with other groups in order to create winning coalitions.

One critic of Haas’s explanation of epistemic communities was Dave Toke. Toke argues that Haas holds a positivist position which over exaggerates the effects of epistemic communities. He believes that special interest groups are at the least equal to epistemic communities in their ability to shape norms (Toke, 1999, 99). In fact,
Toke argues that it is possible for a special interest group to be even more effective than an epistemic community, thus showing that Haas over exaggerates the effects of epistemic communities (ibid, 100-101).

Toke maintains that “Haas’s work implies that epistemic communities are, because of their validity tests and commitment to apparent scientific truth, in a better position to judge environmental policy than environmental groups” (ibid, 101). Toke argues against this, stating that his evidence has shown that issues are normative and socially constructed; therefore, special interests groups are just as capable as epistemic communities to make normative judgements (ibid.). According to Toke, “there is an acceptance of a broadly positivist position concerning the role of scientists as the legitimate bearers of truth…” (ibid.). However, Toke believes this to be completely unjustified and argues that it is time to move to a post-positivist position (ibid.). He concludes that moving to a social constructivist position “will lead us to a model of environmental policy that allows us to fully analyse the importance of various interest groups in shaping outcomes” (ibid.).

The very next year, Claire Dunlop wrote a response to Toke’s criticism of Haas. In her criticism, Dunlop critiqued Toke’s critique of Haas and critiqued Haas as well.

One of Toke’s biggest critiques of Haas’s work was that Haas gave too much value to epistemic communities over other special interest groups. However, Dunlop counters this argument by stating that Haas was attempting to fill a gap in major International Relations theory by moving “beyond the existing structure/agency binary … rather than attempting to establish a hegemonic position for epistemic communities over environmental groups” (Dunlop, 2000, 139).

Dunlop also critiques Toke’s understanding of Haas’s works. She argues that what Toke sees as a positivist approach is vastly overstated (ibid, 137, 139-140). In fact, Dunlop found that Haas’s approach is in line with social constructivists, and that Haas’s lack of coverage on positivism was another point against Toke’s accusation of Haas’s positivist approach (ibid, 139-140).

However, Dunlop and Toke’s views do converge, when they criticize Haas for his weakness in explaining how epistemic communities and other special interest groups co-exist (ibid, 140-141). Dunlop argues that the uncertainty of an epistemic community’s political power contributes to this question of how epistemic communities and special interest groups co-exist (ibid, 141). Because epistemic
communities need to cooperate with decision makers there is a risk that their “‘consensual knowledge’ may overstate the influence these expert enclaves alone can have” (ibid.). To rectify this problem, Dunlop says that Haas’s four characteristics (quoted earlier in section II) must be “problematized and their importance relative to each other elucidated” (ibid, 142). Dunlop concludes that more has to be done to test the characteristics of an epistemic community in order to know whether some characteristics can be more important than others, and how this affects competition between epistemic communities and other groups (ibid, 142). Such an effort can be referred to as a theory of competition (Cross, 2011, 24).

Ronald Krebs also sees a limit to the potential influence of epistemic communities not residing within government. He argues that their technical expertise may dominate decision making in government, but beyond such technical knowledge epistemic community theory does not explain “how state leaders acquire their information about basic issues in international relations.” (Krebs, 2001, 225-226.)

Another critique of Haas’s work on epistemic communities focuses on how epistemic communities actually turn their policy projects into policy when faced with competition from other groups. Dunlop, while suggesting how Haas’s theory’s problem with other groups could be improved, cited James K. Sebenius’s article in the special edition of International Organization. Dunlop agreed with Sebenius’s conclusion that in order for epistemic communities to gain influence, they must ‘bargain’ and make ‘winning coalitions’ with other actors in the policy making process. (Dunlop, 2000, 141-142; Sebenius, 1992, 326, 352.)

Sebenius argues that Haas’s theory of how epistemic communities influence policy making is wholly incomplete. Haas, according to Sebenius, misses the importance of epistemic communities strategically interacting with other groups and working to ensure their preferred policy outcome. Key to this is the shared beliefs of the actors. (Sebenius, 1992, 356.) “More generally, the translation of epistemic consensus into actual measures of policy coordination - that is to say the ultimate influence of the epistemic community - occurs through bargaining” (ibid, 357). However, Sebenius sees no theory of bargaining within the theory of epistemic communities. In fact, he states that Haas’s view on this matter is again “incomplete and misleading” (ibid.). He views the combination of consensual knowledge and bureaucratic power as a way to produce outcomes (ibid.). Ronald
Sebenius’s core criticism of Haas’s epistemic community theory is that Haas’s explanation of epistemic communities fails to explain explicitly how epistemic communities’ shared beliefs affect policy outcome (ibid.). As mentioned earlier, Sebenius's conclusion is that for an epistemic community’s shared beliefs to affect policy outcomes, the epistemic community must bargain with competing groups and form winning coalitions (ibid, 357-359). Ronald Krebs criticizes epistemic communities in a similar fashion. Krebs argued that even when military officers in America and Europe have formed something similar to an epistemic community, the truth remains that each one competes to control the agenda. (Krebs, 2001, 225.) Because of this, Krebs states that the persuasive power of an epistemic community is a rarer phenomenon than a predictable one (ibid.).

According to Sebenius, when looking at an epistemic community as a de facto natural coalition, it is possible to hypothesize how they expand into winning coalitions. They would have “to be more influential in step with several factors: the greater their extent and depth, the stronger their cohesiveness, the more consistent their beliefs, the more resonant their policy project with outside scientific and popular opinion, the more opportune their bureaucratic placement, and the weaker their actual and potential opponents.” (Sebenius, 1992, 360.) Such an epistemic community would then have to negotiate its way to a winning coalition. Sebenius outlines five devices which an epistemic community can use to create a winning coalition:

“First, to the extent that an epistemic community shapes perceptions of interests, it affects the psychological yardstick by which potential agreements as well as alternatives to negotiated agreement are measured … Second, to the extent that valuable new agreements are invented, the perceived conflict of interest may decrease still further … Third, if an epistemic community can cause issues to be linked in a manner that worsens the opponents' alternatives to agreement with its proposed policy project, this will shift the disagreement point and improve the chances that the community's project is accepted … Fourth, an epistemic community may advantageously affect the perceived zone of possible agreement to the extent that issues are framed and potential solutions or agreements are made salient in a way favorable to the community's policy project. Fifth, binding commitments to preferred outcomes may be possible” (ibid, 361).

This section of the paper has covered the criticisms of Haas’s epistemic community theory and shown how the theory’s critics have suggested it might be improved. As is the case for all theories, criticism unearths faults and underdeveloped
aspects of the theory, and it is a crucial part of the development of a theory. Next this paper will see how epistemic community theory has addressed these criticisms and developed over time.

3.4 Cross’s Suggestions to Correct Criticisms

Twenty years after this seminal edition of *International Organization*, Mai’a K. Davis Cross revisited the theory of epistemic communities. She argues that the theory of epistemic communities has not developed much since this edition of *International Organization*. In fact, with time Cross believes that the theory has become marginalized. Too often research has focused on scientists and technicians as the members of epistemic communities, and, according to Cross, this has limited epistemic communities. (Cross, 2013, 137-138.) Therefore, Cross has set out to reconceptualize the theory of epistemic communities.

Cross sets out to show that an epistemic community’s membership is not the driving force behind its persuasiveness, but rather its “internal cohesion and professionalism” drive its ability to persuade (ibid, 147). She “hypothesizes that if an epistemic community is not internally cohesive, then it is less likely to be as persuasive as one that is” (ibid.). In her work, Cross “identified four innovations [to the theory of epistemic community], which address: (1) the variation in internal cohesion within epistemic communities and the central importance of professionalism; (2) the role of uncertainty in understanding epistemic community influence; (3) the relationship between epistemic communities and governments; and (4) the nature of knowledge” (ibid, 147-148).

When thinking of an epistemic community, it is easy to think of it in a simple binary way: either it exists or it does not. However, Cross argues that this is not the case. In fact, epistemic communities can exist at different degrees of being. Compared to other epistemic communities or actors an epistemic community may find itself in a stronger or weaker position. (ibid, 148.)

External factors, such as competing epistemic communities and actors, threats, and costs, can affect an epistemic community’s ability to influence decision makers (ibid.). Given the external factors, an epistemic community must be strong in order to exert influence. Cross argues that an epistemic community’s level of internal coherence is a significant factor in determining its strength, along with its possession
of recognized experts (ibid.). Cross “argues that socialisation, relationships, and persuasive processes within the epistemic community are even more important in ultimately determining its strength or weakness (ibid, 148-149).

Cross supports Haas’s position that epistemic communities should be viewed from a constructivist point of view. However, she devotes rather little time to the importance of constructivism. She believes that epistemic communities’ shaping of knowledge and interests are inherently socially constructed (ibid, 149), but, in her opinion, professionalism is the key to an epistemic community’s ability to share its policy projects (ibid.).

Cross disagrees with Haas’s belief that validity tests are central to an epistemic community’s claim to knowledge. Because Cross believes that professionalism is central to the makeup of an epistemic community, she argues that shared causal beliefs and common policy enterprises are the most important characteristics of an epistemic community (Cross, 2011, 25). Primarily, Cross points to shared causal beliefs as the most significant characteristic of an epistemic community because it “reflects the long-term analytical capabilities of a profession” (ibid, 25-26).

To explain how professionalism exists in epistemic communities, Cross defines four variables that apply to an epistemic community’s professions. These variables are important because they both show the professionalism in an epistemic community and that professionalism can be measured on a “strong-weak continuum” instead of “having a specific sufficiency minimum” (Cross, 2013, 150).

The first variable is selection and training. This variable addresses how an epistemic community is formed. The competitiveness of selection ensures that an epistemic community’s experts are at a high level in their professions. Then, if the individuals of an epistemic community have undergone a precise training, they are more likely to be recognized as experts and to have a strong cohesion amongst themselves. (ibid, 150.) As well, when the standards of selection and training are consistent in a transnational epistemic community, the community is likely to be more cohesive (ibid.).

The second variable is meeting frequency and quality. Cross hypothesizes here that the quality and frequency of meetings directly affects an epistemic community’s cohesiveness. By meeting frequently, the members of an epistemic community “build strong ties, strengthen shared professional norms, and cultivate a common culture” (ibid.). Small group meetings give the epistemic community an added layer of
cohesion by allowing “socialisation and the development of a common culture” (ibid.).

The third variable is shared professional norms. The shared professional norms of an epistemic community center around its “protocol, procedure, and standards of consensus-building” (ibid.). Even upon disagreements, the professional norms of an epistemic community give it a foundation on which they can eventually come to consensus or compromise (ibid.).

The fourth and final variable is common culture. Common culture is the glue that holds together an epistemic community. According to Cross, it is “the sense of purpose, identity, symbolism, and heritage within the community” (ibid.).

Each of these four variables, as mentioned above, can be measured on a strong-weak continuum. An epistemic community that leans towards the strong end of the continuum on each variable will be more cohesive than one that leans to the weaker end. This may go some way to explaining the influence and persuasiveness of an epistemic community, but more research would have to be done to find out (ibid., 151).

Building on the innovation of internal cohesion and professionalism, Cross turned to her second innovation: uncertainty. Haas has mentioned the impact of uncertainty on epistemic communities before. Haas stated that it is often “a crisis or shock” that makes a government or institution turn to an epistemic community (Haas, 1992, 14). However, Cross argues that this is not the case at all. She argues that uncertainty is a constant in international relations. Cross agrees that uncertainty opens up a gap in policy making for epistemic communities, but she does not believe the degree of uncertainty has a strong meaningful impact on an epistemic community’s influence. (Cross, 2013, 151-152.) Meaning that the uncertainty following a shock or crisis, which may seem very strong, will not necessarily increase an epistemic community’s impact. Rather, Cross argues, an existing epistemic community that has proven to be internally cohesive will continue being influential even as new issues demand their attention (ibid, 152). In fact, Cross says that “in order to even have a legitimate voice at the table when a crisis strikes, an actor may have already had to establish itself beforehand as one to be listened to” (ibid.).

However, even in conditions of certainty, epistemic communities may still be able to practice their influence. The emergence of new evidence/information, the reaching of consensus on previously contested knowledge, or the changing of
contextual factors may all be cause for epistemic communities to influence policy making on issues that are considered as certain. Because of this, Cross argues that a wider understanding of uncertainty is necessary in order to be able to consider the full extent of epistemic community activity in situations of uncertainty and even certainty (ibid, 153).

Cross’s third innovation addresses the relationship between epistemic communities and governments. Cross states that a frequent critique of epistemic communities is that they “have little substantive influence over politics, particularly in the most important or basic areas of international relations decision-making” (ibid.). Cross refutes this critique by arguing that in fact, epistemic communities often work with governments in a plethora of ways. For instance, epistemic communities that work with international organizations will work and have contact with governments around the world (ibid.). Moreover, while maintaining autonomy, epistemic communities can often be located within governments themselves. Furthermore, governments may unwittingly, by calling on experts for advice, be the ones who bring together the experts that will go on to form an epistemic community. (ibid, 153.)

When epistemic communities are working with/in governments, it can be difficult to tell them apart from a bureaucratic group. However, Cross in a couple of publications has recommended a few investigative questions that one can use to determine whether a group is an epistemic community or not:

Is a particular committee more than the sum of its parts? Does it produce outcomes that go beyond the expectations of its formal functions? Did the committee’s members possess a high level of expertise before taking up their institutional positions? Did they perhaps even know each other or work with each other in previous settings? Might they, as a collective, wield influence by virtue of their expertise and high status even without the existence of the committee? Do they share training or educational experiences? Do its members meet often outside of work and informally? Do they share a particular culture and professional norms that are independent of their formal function? (Cross, 2011, 16; Cross, 2013, 154.)

Cross says that not all these questions need to be answered in the affirmative to indicate an epistemic community (Cross, 2013, 154); however, it is clear that these questions do line up with Cross’s four variables of professionalism outlined above. Cross critically points out that “a group of experts may come together for many reasons, but it becomes an epistemic community at the initiative of its members”
Such epistemic communities will have no problem gaining access to decision makers, and therefore, their policy initiatives have a greater chance to be heard (ibid.).

The fourth and final innovation presented by Cross is moving epistemic communities beyond scientific knowledge. Cross argues that the assumption that epistemic communities are exclusively “scientific or technical groups” is incorrect (ibid.). In fact, Cross states that members of non-scientific epistemic communities can claim authoritative knowledge just as any scientific epistemic communities. Non-scientific epistemic communities even have the four characteristics of an epistemic community as defined by Haas. Cross’s belief is that “professionalism, rather than science, is the glue that holds epistemic communities together, facilitates consensus, and enables persuasion.” (ibid, 155.)

To prove her argument, Cross then lays out three examples of effective epistemic communities based on professionalism, rather than science. In summary, these three epistemic communities included European generals and admirals, whose consensus has led to such policy innovations as the ‘Long-Term Vision for European Defense Capability and Capacity Needs’; diplomats, who may work together for greater outward results rather than their own specific national interests; and religious leaders, who use a shared interpretation of religious texts to mediate conflicts and social tensions (ibid, 155-158). A key aspect of these epistemic communities is that they, like their scientific counterparts, are not comprised of an entire profession, but rather are comprised of members of a profession with “shared professional norms and expertise … [and who] seek collective policy goals as a result of these qualities” (ibid, 156). Therefore, the entire military structures of the European militaries do not comprise an epistemic community because many members lack the shared professional norms and expertise needed to be considered an epistemic community, rather just the highest level members of the militaries are able to form an epistemic community. In addition to this, the rank of the members of the epistemic communities in the three examples is significant. Their positions give “legitimacy, authority, and influence [to] their shared authoritative claim[s] to knowledge” (ibid, 158).

However, Cross makes it clear that the knowledge that an epistemic community produces is not the most important reason for why an epistemic community’s ideas are chosen, but instead, the most important reason for the choosing of an epistemic community’s ideas is that the community’s knowledge is socially
recognized, even if the knowledge is unproven (ibid.). According to Cross, social recognition is at the base of an epistemic community’s influence (ibid.).

3.5 Epistemic Communities in the Domestic Realm

While much of the literature on epistemic communities focuses on transnational and international communities, there does exist an argument that epistemic communities can exist on the domestic level as well. Looking at two, rather different, case studies, it is possible to see that epistemic communities do indeed have a place in domestic decision making. First, there is Craig W. Thomas’s (1997) paper on how epistemic communities can encourage interagency cooperation within the United States, and then there is Patrik Marier’s (2008) paper on how politicians can form epistemic communities.

Thomas’s main goal in his paper is to discover why resource management agencies in the Pacific Northwest began to cooperate with each other at the highest levels (Thomas, 1997, 235-236). Throughout the paper, Thomas emphasized and explained how these agencies are more keen to maintain their autonomy rather than work with another agency which might compromise its own independence (ibid, 228-229). However, when looking at the activity of the various agencies involved, Thomas noticed that the most active participants (whose agencies were not run by ecologists) were those that at the time had entered into a period of uncertainty. In 1991, a court decision halted logging operations by the Forest Service because of its violation of environmental laws. This in turn opened the eyes of other agencies to the need for their agencies to find a solution for protecting the environment in their jurisdictions. (ibid, 240-241.) As a result a council was formed in which the agencies worked out solutions for better cooperation in protecting the environment. This council created a platform for discussion at which solutions provided by an epistemic community of ecologists could be presented. (ibid, 238-239.)

Thomas concluded that epistemic communities can be found at the domestic level. Though when applied to relations between public agencies, he states that Haas’s theory of international cooperation and policy coordination cannot be imported word for word (ibid, 242). Like Haas, however, Thomas believes that an epistemic community can only become effective after an initial shock or crisis forces public
officials to consider the knowledge-based authority of an epistemic community (ibid, 243).

Thomas’s study came close to broaching the idea that public officials themselves could form an epistemic community, however only a few of the heads of the agencies involved in his study could have been considered knowledge-based experts (ibid, 237-238). Patrik Marier’s paper, on the other hand, broaches this very topic at the root.

Marier aims in his paper to show how politicians can come together to form an epistemic community. He uses an example of a parliamentary committee in Sweden from the 1990s, which was tasked with pension reform.

Marier explains that politicians have a leg up on the scientific community when it comes to political knowledge. This is crucial if a policy project is to become law. However, he warns that not all politicians can be considered experts, and therefore, eligible to be included in an epistemic community: first, a politician is least likely to be considered an expert on a problem, if the problem is very technical; second, a politician must have relevant experience and knowledge in a policy area. (Marier, 2008, 518-519.) Marier identifies committees as the place where epistemic communities of politicians will likely grow because of the potential expertise of the politicians involved and their willingness to turn to experts (ibid, 520). In the end, Marier used Haas’s four characteristics of an epistemic community has a heuristic model to find out if the Swedish committee on pension reform constituted an epistemic community or not (ibid, 522). Through an analysis of the four characteristics, Marier showed how the committee of politicians had acted as an epistemic community and successfully created a politically viable pension reform plan (ibid, 529).

Marier’s work showed how politicians can put aside their political viewpoints and instead use their expertise to gain consensus on policy projects. In the study of epistemic communities, this work gives strong proof of the role of politicians in epistemic communities.

3.6 Conclusion

The study of epistemic communities is valuable for understanding the role that knowledge-based networks play in the fields of domestic, transnational, and
international politics. Although, it is most frequently applied to transnational and international politics, it still has applications at the domestic level.

This section has attempted to inform the reader of the core theoretical design of the theory of epistemic community. The special edition of *International Organization* edited by Peter Haas is the seminal work on epistemic community theory. It is the foundation on which following publications on the theory have based their own research.

However, with time, criticisms of the theory emerged and had to be addressed. Critics argued that Haas did not properly explain how epistemic communities work with or compete against other actors in the process of policy innovation. Nor did Haas address how, specifically, epistemic communities work with decision makers. The critics themselves offered suggestions on how the theory could be improved to make it clearer and more viable.

Recently, in the early 2010’s, Mai’a K. Davis Cross published a couple of works that revisited the theory of epistemic communities. In her works, Cross showed how the theory of epistemic communities could be improved. She offered four new innovations to the theory that addressed both the criticisms of Haas’s work and her own perceptions of the shortcomings of the theory that had emerged over the twenty years between Haas’s edition of *International Organization* and her own works. While it is popular in International Relations to add the suffix neo- to theories which have evolved and changed over time (e.g. neoliberalism, neorealism), Cross’s works do not quite result in a neo-epistemic community theory. Rather, her works offered a revision of the theory, and therefore, her works have created what one can call a revised-epistemic community theory.

However, all these major works seemed to avoid the domestic applications of epistemic community theory. Craig Thomas and Patrik Marier’s works were useful in showing how the theory can be applied in a domestic setting. Thomas’s work showed a more technical application of how the theory can be applied, while Marier’s showed how it can be applied in a political setting.

When looking at an epistemic community of Finnish foreign policy experts, it is important to understand all the above literature. Haas’s work provides the foundation on which the whole theory stands. When analyzing a Finnish epistemic community, it is crucial to be able to identify Haas’s four characteristics of an epistemic community. These characteristics demonstrate whether an epistemic
community exists. However, Cross’s innovations create a continuum on which it is possible to understand how cohesive an epistemic community is and how strong or weak it may be. These core works on epistemic communities allow for a comprehensive understanding of what kind of epistemic community of Finnish foreign policy experts exists, and how it works.

The aim of this thesis is to discover how an epistemic community of foreign policy experts has formed in Post-Cold War Finland. In particular it will explore how the epistemic community relates to the conflict in Ukraine, and analyze the response of this epistemic community to the conflict. How members of a foreign policy epistemic community narrate the Finnish model is important to this research. If the epistemic community is strong, then the narratives produced by its members should be more persuasive (according to Cross as mentioned in section 3.4). However, on the other hand, if the epistemic community is weak, then the narratives formed by the members have a smaller chance of being persuasive.
4. Methods and Data

4.1 Narrative Analysis

In this thesis, the main method of analyzing data will be paradigmatic narrative analysis as presented by Donald E. Polkinghorne. Polkinghorne states that “narrative is the type of discourse composition that draws together diverse events, happenings, and actions of human lives into thematically unified goal-directed processes” (1995, 5). Narrative descriptions, according to Polkinghorne, present human lives and their actions as a part of the many moving pieces that shape the world (ibid.).

Since this thesis will be using narrative analysis as a method, it is important to understand the method, and therefore one must understand what a narrative is in qualitative research. Polkinghorne defines narrative in qualitative research in two ways: narrative as prosaic discourse and narrative as story. A narrative in a prosaic discourse is “any text that consists of complete sentences linked into a coherent and integrated statement (ibid, 6).” This definition has been expanded to also include forms of natural discourse and speech. (ibid, 6.) The other definition, narrative as story, restricts narrative to the story discourse type. The story discourse type is unique because the individual actions and events in the narrative are pieced together by a plot. In other words, a story is an emplotted narrative, a narrative with a plot. (ibid, 6.)

Furthermore, two types of reasoning can be used in the understanding of narratives. One is paradigmatic cognition, and the other is narrative cognition (ibid, 9). Paradigmatic cognition is a form of knowledge that classifies (ibid.). A person will analyze something, in this case a narrative, and try to place it into a category. According to Polkinghorne, the categorization of things gives order to experiences, and this ability to give order to experiences is the essence of paradigmatic thought (ibid, 10). Narrative cognition, on the other hand, is concerned with “understanding human action” (ibid, 11). Put simply, in order to understand human action, narrative cognition takes the events, actions, learnings of a person and/or a group of people and puts them into temporal context. By doing so, the events, actions, and learnings are turned into emplotted stories through which knowledge is found. (ibid, 11.)
Using the two types of cognition, paradigmatic and narrative, Polkinghorne found two important types of narrative inquiry. He calls the form of narrative inquiry that uses paradigmatic cognition, analysis of narratives, and the form that uses narrative cognition, narrative analysis. (ibid, 12.) These forms of inquiry are quite similar to the cognitions themselves. Paradigmatic analysis of narratives is concerned with collecting narratives as data, and then analyzing the narratives looking for “common themes or conceptual manifestations (ibid, 13)...” Finding common themes or concepts can be done in two ways: one, by searching the data for previously theorized concepts; and two, “by developing the concepts from the data” itself (ibid, 13). Narrative analysis is concerned with producing stories. The researcher must take the data points and configure them into a coherent plot. The result of such an emplotment is a story. Through this story, the researcher has created a retrospective explanation of events. (ibid, 15-16.)

An example may be a helpful way of understanding these two different types of narrative inquiry. Erik Ringmar (2006) has written a quite detailed paper on narratives involved in the War in Iraq. Therefore, the Iraq War would make a good example for explaining the two types of narrative inquiry.

In his paper, Ringmar analyzed the narratives that had formed around the War in Iraq. By analyzing the narratives, he was able to divide the various narratives into four types: romance, satire, tragedy, and comedy. Ringmar’s paper is an excellent example of paradigmatic narrative analysis (analysis of narratives). First, he took existing narratives as his data, and then he analyzed them. Upon completion of his analysis, Ringmar was able to divide his data into four categories. The categories were the four narrative types mentioned above. In this case, Ringmar was looking at categories previously theorized by the ancient Greeks and seeing how his data fit into those categories. (Ringmar, 2006.)

Ringmar, however, was not limited to a paradigmatic narrative analysis. If, instead of collecting narratives as his data, he had located specific important events relating to the Iraq War, and then written about how these events culminated in the lead up to the war, then he would have been conducting a narrative analysis using narrative cognition.

Another discussion of narrative analysis involves the question of how political narratives relate to political reality. Shaul R. Shenhav attempted to enlighten this field of research by describing how “narrative and narrative tools in the study of politics
Shenhav argued that narrative is the product of perspective; meaning that when one chooses to describe a particular event rather than another event, the described event is told from a viewpoint (ibid, 248). However, Shenhav asks how these narratives, when there can be so many, can accurately represent reality. He identifies two approaches that try to show how narrative represents reality: the first - that reality is chronologically ordered like a narrative is, and the second - that humans narrate reality in order to understand it (ibid, 249-250).

These two approaches, according to Shenhav, rely on one’s values rather than methodology. “The decision hinges on whether one believes that certain narratives can be more ‘real’ … than others (ibid, 250).” Shenhav indicates four basic values for how one might view the relationship between narrative and reality.

1. No representational ability: This view assumes that the narrative pattern with all its components cannot represent any aspect of “political reality.”
2. Capacity for episodic representation: According to this view, narrative is potentially capable of representing discrete episodes and events, but not the chronological sequence or any uniformity suggested by it…
3. Capacity for chronological representation: According to this view, the chronology of narratives can mirror sequences of events in “political reality,” but it cannot represent the causal relationships between them.
4. Capacity for full representation: This view assumes that narratives are capable of fully representing a “political reality.” (ibid, 250-251.)

Shenhav then analyzes how these basic views connect to his “three elements of narrative” (events, characters, and background; events in sequence; and causality) in narrative. He shows how the connection between these basic views and elements of narrative can be utilized by researchers with a diverse range of perspectives. (ibid, 251-253.)

In order to solve the question of how narratives represent political reality, Shenhav explains consensual paradigms. According to Shenhav, a “consensual paradigm of political reality [is] revealed when elements of discourse on a certain
subject become a recurring theme in a critical mass of political texts (ibid, 255).” Once these consensual paradigms are identified, they can be considered to be ‘political reality.’ Thus these paradigms can be applied to related narratives to determine if they faithfully represent ‘political reality.’ (ibid, 255.)

Shenhav’s approach to narrative analysis, although useful, is focused on determining how narratives represent reality, while this thesis hopes to analyze narratives for their content. Therefore, in the case of this thesis, Polkinghorne’s paradigmatic narrative analysis approach will be used. Narratives will be collected through interviews, after which the author of this thesis will analyze the narratives and sort them into categories. Similar to how Ringmar used previously theorized categorization of narrative types formed by the Greeks, the author of this thesis will use categories of narrative types formed by researchers of Cold War foreign policy. By categorizing the narratives, the author can then analyze the relationship between the different categories and the narratives contained within. For instance, it would be interesting to discover if one category of narrative is more favored by men than women or vice versa.

4.2 Interviews

The recent popularity of the Finnish model tends to come from foreign policy experts and researchers from abroad rather than Finland. One of the purposes of this thesis is to discover how Finnish foreign policy experts and researchers relate to the topic of the Finnish model, and how they narrate this particular topic. However, research on Finnish foreign policy by Finnish experts and researchers is quite limited in the English Language, particularly concerning the Finnish model. Therefore, it was decided that the best way to extract these narratives was through interviews. By collecting interviews from Finnish foreign policy experts and researchers in Finland, this thesis can then use these interviews to discover the various narratives that may have appeared among the interviewees. Therefore, it is important to explain what interviews are and how the interviews were collected and conducted for use in this thesis.

Interviewing is a method which utilizes conversations in order to ascertain the stories of a person’s life in their own words (Kvale, 2007, 1). More scientifically put,
the interaction between interviewer and interviewee constructs knowledge based on the interview (ibid.).

Interviews all on their own can be a research method; however, the interview method can also be used in combination with other methods, such as narrative analysis (ibid, 6-7). Qualitative methods using linguistics, such as narrative analysis, have become quite important in “obtaining knowledge of the social world.” Given this and the fact that interviews can construct knowledge, it is clear that interviews as a research method should go hand and hand with qualitative research methods. (ibid, 7.)

One type of interview commonly used is the semi-structured interview. A semi-structured interview is something between an open conversation and a questionnaire. The semi-structured interview can even seem similar to a conversation, but the semi-structured interview has a purpose and technique by which the interview is conducted. (ibid, 11.) When conducting a semi-structured interview, the researcher should have a script, which at the least outlines the topics which will be discussed during the interview, and at the most contains a list of questions to be asked during the interview. Particularly in the latter case, while preparing the interview script, it is up to the researcher to decide how strictly he or she will stick to the questions in the script. (ibid, 56-57.)

Finally, when one conducts an interview, one must always be aware of the ethical issues that might arise in the process. According to the “Ethical Principles of Research in the Humanities and Social and Behavioural Sciences and Proposals for Ethical Review” (2009, 3), the interviews in this thesis will not need to undergo any ethical review, because they do not meet the criteria laid out by the National Advisory Board on Research Ethics. The author also needs to make clear with each interviewee that the results of this interview may be published in the thesis, and therefore it is up to the interviewee whether they want to be cited using their real name or a pseudonym (ibid, 13). The author should also remember to remind the interviewee that the interviewee him/herself can at any time cut the interview short (ibid, 5-6). Although, this last condition may not be so relevant for the types of interviews that this research will conduct, it is however wise to observe it in any case, because the interviewee has the right to know it. Finally, it is important that the author represents the interviewees’ words as faithfully as possible when conducting the final analysis.
4.3 Data Collection

Narratives for this thesis were gathered by conducting interviews, for, as mentioned above, interviews are an excellent way of collecting narratives. The interviews were conducted with several Finnish foreign policy experts; from the University of Tampere in Tampere, Finland and Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki, Finland. In order to first decide who to interview, the author met with his academic supervisor at the University of Tampere. From this meeting, a list of around ten names was formed. The names that formed the list were chosen based on their relation to the research in this thesis. The researchers chosen were interested in the fields of Finnish foreign policy, Russian foreign policy, and/or Finnish political history. The author then composed and sent invitation emails to each person on the list. A couple never responded, and only one declined the invitation due to personal reasons, though he offered a couple of names to add to the list of possible interviewees. The rest of the invitations were accepted, and meetings were arranged. After this, the hope was that the interviews would snowball, meaning that one interviewee would recommend another person to also be interviewed, and so on; however, disappointingly this did not happen as expected, it is explained why below. In the end, eight interviews were collected and used for analyzing narratives. In accordance with the wishes of a few of the interviewees, the anonymity of all of the interviewees will be preserved in this thesis.

The interviews used in this thesis were conducted in a semi-structured way. Before meeting with the interviewees, the author wrote out a script that contained several questions. The questions were designed to elicit long, thoughtful responses. The author decided before conducting the interviews that he would try to stick to the script as closely as possible, but he recognized that follow up questions and questions of clarification would be hard to avoid, therefore, a degree of flexibility was allowed into the conducting of interviews. The interview was structured not unlike the funnel-shaped interview described by Kvale (2007, 57). Similar to a funnel-shaped interview, the script structure for these interviews starts with broad questions and gradually winds down to the heart of the subject. Firstly, the interviews began by ascertaining the credentials and background information of the interviewees. This included such information as age, position, and previous research.
Next, the interview turned to the topic of epistemic communities. As mentioned in the section of this thesis on epistemic communities, epistemic community theory is the theory that knowledge based networks of experts form in various policy areas in order to influence policy making for the common good. One of the research questions of this thesis is what kind of an epistemic community of foreign policy experts formed in post-Cold War Finland. To this end, interviews have played a vital role. Because the author of this thesis does not speak Finnish, discovering the nature of any epistemic community in Finland would have been difficult, when only looking to written sources; therefore, interviews enabled the author to meet with Finnish foreign policy experts in person and pose questions to them that might reveal an epistemic community. From the interviews, the author was then able to assess the particular nature of the epistemic community (i.e. the strength or weakness of the community).

This section of the interview was the most funnel-esque. Here a few questions were asked to determine the interviewees’ relative position in a possible epistemic community. These questions involved asking the interviewee about their activities as a researcher (i.e. participation in conferences and seminars), regularity of formal and informal discussions with colleagues, who their colleagues are (i.e. other researchers, politicians, etc.), and so on (see app., questions 2-4).

After this, the next topic in the interview was the Finnish model. This was the most precise section, as what the interviewees said here became the author’s narrative data. This section included questions 5, 6, and 7 (see app.).

Finally, in a final effort to get a sense of the cohesiveness of any epistemic community that might exist and in hopes of finding more interviewees, the author asked the interviewees how many people do they think agree/disagree with them, and who those people would be (see app., question 9).

4.4 Issues and Concerns

Collecting the data was not without its problems and challenges. While conducting the interviews and after some reflection, three problems became clear.

The first problem that became clear was that the order of the questions from the interview script were not ideal. After a few interviews it became clear that the author had to move one of the questions from the beginning of the interview to a time
later in the process. After tweaking the order a bit, the order of the questions became much smoother, and made the interviews decidedly easier. The final organization of the questions can be found in Appendix one at the end of this thesis.

The second problem was more significant than the first. In this problem there were a few smaller ones. The question itself as written in the script is “How many do you think agree/disagree with you? Who are they?” (see app., question 9.) Upon reflection, it is clear that the question was quite vague. At first, the author asked the question as it was written in the script, but the responses were often completely unexpected and unrelated to what he thought he was asking. The author was hoping to elicit an answer about the interviewee’s overall opinion of the Finnish model and all the intrigue surrounding it, however, he found that sometimes the interviewees understood the question to be about the previous question (Given the current situation in Ukraine, how would you solve the conflict? [question 8] ). To resolve this, the author rephrased the question to ask instead how many people the interviewee thought would agree/disagree with their opinions and assessments of the Finnish model. This rephrasing of the question did mostly help clear up the problem, though not entirely. However, there was still another problem within this question: the second part of the question asking “Who are they?” The author felt that it was clear that he meant who exactly are they, but it was very clear by the results of the interviews that this was not clear at all. Because of this, the hopes of the author to find more interviewees through a process of snowballing were dashed.

This led to the question of the third problem: was there a language barrier? This was not such a problem as it was a possible risk. The interviewees were all Finns, who spoke English as a second language. Before the interview, the researcher had no way of knowing at what level the interviewees spoke English. However, in the end each interviewee had an excellent command of the English language. So then this begs the question: why was the final question so difficult? The author concludes that most likely he had taken for granted what he knew he was asking in his head for what the interviewees understood.
5. Evaluating the Epistemic Community

After compiling the data from the interviews, the first thing that must be looked at is what kind of epistemic community exists. By “what kind of epistemic community exists”, this thesis means to ask where the epistemic community exists on a strong-weak continuum. In the theory chapter of this thesis, several understandings of what an epistemic community is were covered. Predominantly, chapter three focused on the theories of epistemic community as devised by Peter Haas and Mai’a K. Davis Cross. This thesis holds these two theoreticians’ works to be the seminal works on epistemic communities, and therefore, they will be used as the guides in helping this thesis determine the nature of this epistemic community.

As mentioned in the theory chapter, Haas’s four characteristics of an epistemic community are a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared notions of validity, and a common policy enterprise.

Haas used these four characteristics to show whether an epistemic community did, or did not, exist. However, Haas put the greatest emphasis on the third characteristic, shared notions of validity (1992, 23). In contrast, Cross believes that shared causal beliefs and common policy enterprise are the most important (2011, 25). This is because Cross believes that internal cohesion and professionalism are at the core of an epistemic community’s ability to persuade (2013, 147).

First, it must be recognized that Haas’s four characteristics of an epistemic community are the foundation for testing what comprises an epistemic community. Therefore, it would be wise to see if the data in this thesis shares Haas’s four characteristics.

1. Shared set of normative and principled beliefs: The interviewees in this thesis were all Finns. As academics and Finns, it can be tenuously expected that they share normative and principled beliefs.

2. Shared causal beliefs: From the interviews, during the discussion on Finnish Cold War foreign policy, it could be seen that the interviewees shared similar causal beliefs that allowed them to approach the subject of Finnish Cold War foreign policy in similar ways. Although this does not guarantee that they share causal beliefs on Finnish foreign policy in general, it is a good indicator.
3. Shared notions of validity: Though it is never explicitly stated in the data, the fact that the interviewees of this thesis were all academics means that it can be likely assumed that their notions of validity lie in the realm of peer-reviewed publications.

4. Common policy enterprise: The interviewees in this thesis all have done research on the topic of the Finnish foreign policy. From the data it could be seen that each one has done research that has aimed to understand and explain Finnish foreign policy. Their participation in conferences, seminars, and government panels on the topic of Finnish foreign policy shows that they each have an interest in the betterment of Finnish foreign policy.

From this it can be seen that the characteristics of an epistemic community exist amongst the interviewees; however, it is now important to look at how strong this epistemic community is. To do this, one should then turn to Cross’s four variables. These variables are important because they measure the cohesion and professionalism of an epistemic community; as mentioned above, cohesion and professionalism are important in understanding the effectiveness of an epistemic community. The four variables are selection and training, meeting frequency and quality, shared professional norms, and common culture. Each of these variables can be measured on a strong-weak continuum, and by understanding where this epistemic community lies on this continuum, the cohesiveness and professionalism of the epistemic community can be understood.

Selection and training: From the data it appears that the members of this epistemic community were not competitively selected. Cross argued that the competitiveness of selection ensures that an epistemic community’s members are at a high level in their profession (Cross, 2013, 150). By this, competitively selected means that an epistemic community may have strict requirements for selecting its members, looking to accept those who are most capable and qualified rather than those who may not yet be considered experts. As regards this epistemic community, the interviewees were at different levels in their training. Some were doctoral students, and some were researchers with well-known names in Finnish foreign policy already. It appears that the epistemic community has formed with the minimum requirement for acceptance being an academic interest in Finnish foreign policy.
matters. Judging this variable by ‘selection’ alone would render this epistemic community as weak; judging it by ‘training’ is a bit more complicated.

Although doctoral students would not pose as likely candidates for the title of expert, oftentimes (and in the case of this data, always) they conduct their research with the guidance of and under the supervision of an expert. Therefore, judging by ‘training’ alone, it may be said that this epistemic community could rank higher on the strong-weak continuum. Although the members of this epistemic community are highly trained, the fact that there is no rigorous selection criteria weakens the very cohesiveness of this community; therefore, this thesis would rank this variable as weak on the strong-weak continuum.

Meeting frequency and quality: Of the four variables, ‘meeting frequency and quality’ is probably one of the easier variables to analyze. Meetings may consist of both formal gatherings (i.e. conferences and seminars) and informal gatherings (i.e. meetings at cafes and social dinners). From the data, it is clear that all of the interviewees regularly participated in formal gatherings on the topic of Finnish foreign policy with the exception of one. In the case of the exception, this researcher was more focused on matters of Russian foreign and security policy; however, the topic of how Russian foreign policy affects Finnish foreign policy has come up in formal discussions. Therefore, at least to a certain extent, it can be said that this researcher also has participated in formal discussions on Finnish foreign policy, though indirectly. Again, they all said that they regularly discuss Finnish foreign policy in informal settings rather frequently with one exception. In this case, the researcher stated that Finnish foreign policy was not a frequent topic in his/her place of work, so he/she was limited in his informal discussion of Finnish foreign policy. The quality of these meetings can of course vary. At formal gatherings, a high quality meeting would most likely consist of multiple experts with a high level of discussion on the topic of Finnish foreign policy. Because of the formality, one can assume that such meetings may not occur overly frequently. This may be because such meetings can typically happen only on an annual basis (such as conferences), or because expert points of view may not be in demand at any given time (such as with seminars). Informal gatherings can be harder to analyze. The primary reason for meeting may not have been to talk about Finnish foreign policy, but it occurred anyways, and in such a case, how does one measure the quality of such meetings? In the case of evaluating these meetings then, one might give a higher value to the quality of formal gatherings.
over their frequency and a higher value to the frequency of informal gatherings over their quality. Consequently, this thesis would give this variable a strong rating. From the interviews it was determined that the quality of the formal gatherings by the interviewees was quite high and even, from a few, quite frequent. The informal meetings were very frequent, and some of the interviewees even expressed a strong interest in discussing Finnish foreign policy.

**Shared professional norms:** The fact that all of the interviewees come from academia, it can be expected that they share professional norms. For instance, they share a notion of validity that allows them to have well-informed debates and discussions on topics of Finnish foreign policy. As a result, this variable would lie on the strong end of the continuum.

**Common culture:** The ‘common culture’ variable is likely the strongest variable in this epistemic community. As has been said before, all of the interviewees were from Finland and were Finns. They share a national culture, identity and heritage; “Finland is a homogenous country, ethnically, culturally, also socially…” (Interviewee B). Each was selected to be interviewed because of their work involving Finnish foreign policy. All in all they have “the sense of purpose, identity, symbolism, and heritage…” (2013, 150) which Cross attributes to ‘common culture’. Given this, this epistemic community’s ‘common culture’ would sit on the strong end of the continuum.

Looking at these variables, it is possible to conclude that this epistemic lies somewhere between medium and strong. That is what this analysis shows. However, this thesis would like to point out one problem from this analysis. That is that this analysis for all intents and purposes shows a relatively strong epistemic community on paper, but in reality it is not so clear if this epistemic community is truly cohesive, and therefore, strong. As mentioned in the Methods chapter, this thesis was unable to successfully use the final question of the interview to find more interviewees. Future research may be able to elicit more names from the interviewees and discover whether names begin to be repeated by the various interviewees. By doing so one could further understand how cohesive the epistemic community may be. However, for now, it is difficult to definitively argue that this epistemic community is strong.

In conclusion, this thesis would argue that this epistemic community is a professional community, and if the interviewees are more tight-knit than could be determined by the interviews, then it could be classified as a strong, cohesive
community as well. However, more research should be done into this topic in order to determine more clearly what kind of epistemic community exists. This thesis hopes that the data given here can be used as a stepping stone to finding more conclusive results in the future.
6. Narrative Analysis of Finnish Foreign Policy

6.1 Introduction

The overall aim of this research was to discover how an epistemic community of foreign policy experts had formed in Post-Cold War Finland. In particular this thesis wanted to explore how the representatives of the epistemic community related to the conflict in Ukraine and analyze the response of these representatives to the conflict. This research wanted to discover if they worked in support of or against the idea of the Finnish Model, particularly by identifying the overarching narratives used by the representatives of the epistemic community.

In the previous section of this thesis, data from the interviews were analyzed and it was concluded that a medium-strong epistemic community in Finnish foreign policy exists. The confirmation of the strength of the epistemic community allows the thesis to now proceed to the next step in the data analysis. That is, the thesis will now turn in this section to determining how the representatives of the epistemic community, who have been interviewed, narrate the Finnish model. First, the overarching narrative about the Finnish model will be determined, and from there the thesis will breakdown the slight differences in how the narratives were emplotted by the various interviewees: i.e. how they narrated the finer points of the model. Second, the thesis will analyze how the interviewees related to the Finnish model and how they see it as a solution for other countries in similar situations as Cold War Finland.

6.2 Narrative on the Finnish model

6.2.1 Overarching Narrative

The interviewees interviewed for this thesis represented different generations. The youngest participants were born after the end of the presidency of Kekkonen and around the end of the Cold War, and the oldest participants would have been born right around the beginning of the presidency of Paasikivi. Given this vast age range, it was expected that at least two overarching narratives would be found; however, an analysis of the data showed that amongst all eight interviewees, one overarching
narrative appeared. That narrative is this: The Finnish model was a successful Endeavour that allowed Finland to stay out of a great power conflict while maintaining relations with both the East and the West.

To determine this narrative, the thesis analyzed the responses of the interviewees to questions 4-7 (questions relating to Finnish Cold War foreign policy; see app.) from the interviews. By analyzing how the eight interviewees emplotted their stories, the thesis was able to understand the overarching narrative that they were producing. For instance, several keywords/phrases and patterns appeared in the various interviewees’ stories that highlighted the plots.

The whole of the overarching narrative can be broken down into two parts: the first, the success of the Finnish model, and the second, the avoidance of great power conflict while maintaining relations with both the East and the West. When looking at how the interviewees emplot the first part of the narrative a few patterns appear. Not all of the interviewees agree on the recommendation of the Finnish model for other countries (more on this later), but even amongst those interviewees, a pattern appeared where the interviewees all said something along the lines of: Finland’s situation during the Cold War was unique and difficult, if not impossible, to recreate. Interviewee D, who was perhaps the most opposed to the Finnish model of all the interviewees, said, “The Finns … rather stress the particularity of Finland, and stress … universal applicability of certain international norms. … Thinking about other countries in Europe, in Russia’s neighborhood, it’s very difficult to build up and to maintain this kind of neutrality that Finland had.” Although, s/he doesn’t declare the Finnish model as an outright success, s/he implies that it worked for Finland, though it may not work for others. On the other side, some of the interviewees felt that the Finnish model was successful outright. Only Interviewee B said so in as many words, but Interviewee A also implied the model as a success,

...Finnish model was example of peaceful coexistence… The idea was that … Finland takes into account the so-called legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union … in the neighborhood of Leningrad. Kekkonen argued that Finland’s neutrality is based on its willingness to pursue neutral policies. … That was the basic idea of the Finnish model: being part of the West, using the policy of neutrality as an active element for promoting useful ideas for the international community and interests that at the same time served Finland’s own security. I still regards it as valuable and useful.
The second part of the narrative, the avoidance of great power conflict while maintaining relations with both the East and the West, was defined by the use of several keywords by the interviewees. Five particularly strong keywords and phrases used or implied by the interviewees were: ‘peaceful coexistence’, ‘great power confrontations’, ‘peacekeeping’, ‘balancing act’ and ‘room for maneuver’. By analyzing the use of these keywords and phrases, the thesis was able to determine that a major part of the overarching narrative on the Finnish model was the importance of Finland being able to stay out of the Cold War (great power conflicts) and having room to maneuver (balancing act, room for maneuver). Interviewee D said that one plus of the Finnish model for Finland was that it was a “very idea of neutrality that you stay outside great power conflicts. Finland managed to use this neutrality actively also to make its own proposals and to take the initiative.” Interviewee B similarly stated in response to question 5 (‘How do you view the Finnish Cold War foreign policy?’; see app.) that “Military non-alignment is always a working solution to stay out of great power confrontations… It's a good line of policy to pursue.” To question 7 (‘What in your mind are the pluses and minuses of the [Finnish model]?’), s/he said, Finland could also develop on that basis, Finland could participate in European and Global affairs. So it was a success in terms of foreign policy. [Finland] sort of had a larger environment than [it] would have otherwise been in because [it] was in an advantageous position. It was something which gave [Finland] a unique position and a good profile internationally. It proved to be good for the sake of [Finnish] and European security.

6.2.2 Categorization: Survival, Appeasement, Balance

Although the interviewees share an overarching narrative, they don’t all share similar views to the Finnish model itself. Three main categories appeared when analyzing the interviewees’ narratives. These categories don’t imply that the interviewee’s find themselves at loggerheads with one another, simply these categories focus in on the differences that appeared in interviewees’ narratives. The three categories that appeared were: survival, appeasement, and balance.

Though one might initially define survival as living through an extraordinarily difficult situation, the thesis would also add success to the definition. Surviving is succeeding. That is the idea of the first category. Interviewees A and B can both be placed in this category as they were the only two who narrated the Finnish model in
this particular way. Particular among them was the emphasis on the merits of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line.

... The core idea of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line: To have good relations with neighbors. When Paasikivi was president his main focus was for Soviet-Finnish relations. After the war that was the main task, to try to build some confidence and restart some good relations, and so on. Kekkonen during his presidency had different priorities. He had to reopen the gates towards the West... The main idea for both [presidents] was that the Soviet Union can be a good neighbor in a way that Finland has to cultivate these good neighborly relations, which at the same time allows Finland to be a part of the West ... The pluses [of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line] were that Finland, even during difficult times …, was able to maintain its own Line, and be part of the West... The Soviet leaders did not like this emphasis in Finland on neutrality, the [FCMA] should be the cornerstone of Finnish foreign policy… Finland strongly argued that, because Finland is pursuing a policy of neutrality it can play a useful and constructive role in the European affairs and the United Nations… (Interviewee A)

I think [the policy] was quite successful in many ways. It has not been credited enough. It was what Finland could do in such a difficult situation. (Interviewee B)

Both interviewees also emphasized the misunderstanding inherent in the term ‘finlandization’.

As goes to finlandization: Finland’s decision makers and most academic people didn't like that term at all, because it was invented in Germany as a kind of offense… It was introduced by some West German conservatives, columnists, politicians … against Ostpolitik. Ostpolitik in their perception was kind of an expression of weakness towards the Soviet Union. Finland is so weak … [it] has to be submissive to Soviet pressures… Now, more experts in Finland than elsewhere agree that Finland was finlandized… [Finland] under Soviet pressure had to make concessions even in its domestic internal policies… my feeling is that in the present Finnish debate, these examples [of domestic influence, censorship] are exaggerated, not as frequent or bad as was claimed. (Interviewee A)

[Finlandization] was a tool used for internal policies within Germany… [finlandization] was an unhappy term and we should not use it. (Interviewee B)

Whereas the interviewees in the survival category focused on the successes of the Finnish model, the interviewees in the appeasement category focused on the appeasement of Russia and maintaining good neighborly relations. Interviewee C put it very bluntly when s/he said that “the aim is to keep Russia from coming [to Finland].” For the appeasers this was (and for some still is) the most crucial aspect of the Finnish model. Interviewee F argued that by building these relations with Russia Finland was able to create some form of trust and cooperation and positive
relationship. Moreover, Interviewee H, a researcher at the University of Tampere, argued that this more relaxed position for Finland during the late 1950’s created the room where the finlandization phenomenon could happen because there cannot be any finlandization if you have any room to appease. And you could argue that appeasement is something the small states cannot do, because they do not have the leverage to really appease [the great powers].

Although these two categories are separate, they were not free from some overlap. Interviewee A stated that good relations with the Soviet Union was a core principle of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, but it was only a passing statement when defining the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. On the other hand, Interviewee E argued as well that the maintaining of contact with Russia was a core thing for Finns. However, s/he differed from Interviewee A in that s/he stated that “in order to survive, the relations need to be managed”. Although, from what has been seen above from Interviewee A, Interviewee E’s ideas may not differ much from Interviewee A’s, the narrative is still slightly different, and therefore Interviewee E was categorized as appeasement rather than survival.

Finally, there is the category of balance. When analyzing this category, the thesis was stuck between making it a subcategory of appeasement or an individual category all its own. In the end it was decided to make it a separate category. The key difference between this category and the category of appeasement is that the category of balance focuses on the balancing act that Finland played during the Cold War between the East and West. Both Interviewee D and Interviewee G argued that the Finnish model was a balancing act, “Finland was walking a very fine line in trying to have friendly relations with the Soviet Union but avoiding dependence, and then also using the possibilities that then opened up to build closer ties with Europe and with the West (Interviewee D).” For Interviewee G it was “trying to create your own space and living conditions for your trade, financial, military, political, security”.

6.3 Finnish Model for Others

Each interview for this thesis was segmented into three parts. The first part sought to determine what kind of an epistemic community on Finnish foreign policy existed, and the second part was able to collect the interviewees’ narratives on the
Finnish model. The third and final part of the interviews aimed to collect the interviewees’ narratives on the applicability of the Finnish model for other countries in a similar situation as Cold War Finland. This section will analyze these narratives. The Finnish model has been made relevant again with the suggestion of ‘finlandization’ for Ukraine by international foreign policy experts such as Zbigniew Brzezinski (Brzezinski, 2014). Therefore, the topic of ‘finlandization’ for Ukraine appeared as an excellent catalyst to understanding how the interviewees viewed the Finnish model as a model for others. However, it was discovered in the interviews that a few of the interviewees believed that the model was a satisfactory model for states in a similar situation to Finland, but they did not agree, either totally or partially, that it was a solution for Ukraine. Because of this, this section will take the opposite approach of the last section. In the last section, the overarching narrative was determined first and then broken down. This section will do the opposite by first categorizing the individual narratives presented by the interviewees, and then determining the overarching narrative(s). Finally the thesis will search for any patterns that exist among the various demographics of the interviewees to determine if there are any dividing lines that help shape the narratives.

6.3.1 Categorization

When categorizing the narratives in this section, it is important to remember that what is being asked is ‘would the interviewees or would they not recommend this model to other countries?’. Keeping that in mind, the two main categories would appear to be ‘for’ and ‘against’. When viewing these two categories, it is important to remember that nothing is ever black and white. Some of the interviewees may have been generally for recommending the Finnish model to other countries in similar situations, but when confronted with examples (such as Ukraine), they would argue that the situation in the example country does not fit that of Finland’s situation well enough. Therefore, it would be good to subdivide the ‘for’ category into the subcategories of ‘totally’ and ‘hypothetically’.

It is best to first look at the ‘against’ category. The author was able to place three interviewees in this category: interviewees C, D, and E. Interviewees C and D both clearly rejected the recommending of the Finnish model to other countries.
I wouldn’t recommend [it]. In a way I like the idea of trying to be neutral and play the mediator between big states, not being a member of military organizations. There were cases when being nonaligned was helpful for [Finland]... But the need and room for traditional peacekeeping there isn't that much anymore [sic]... Tools for nonalignment are decreasing in politics. (Interviewee C).

Interviewee D agreed with Interviewee C’s general idea that the times have changed,

No, I don't see it as an ideal solution. Thinking about other countries in Europe, in Russia's neighborhood, it's very difficult to build up and to maintain this kind of neutrality that Finland had. That's why actually most small states in Europe have chosen integration as their basic foreign policy strategy and not neutrality. Neutrality has almost disappeared. You can't call EU member states neutral, so you have Switzerland left basically. The calculation of the small countries has been that they can secure their security and their sovereignty better by integrating with the European and Western organizations. And it also has to do with Globalization.

Interviewee E, unlike the other two, was less clear. In response to question 6 (Is it a satisfactory policy for a state in a similar situation to Finland?), Interviewee E said, “At least it’s not a model for Ukraine.” However, Interviewee E’s answers to later questions reveal a bit more about how s/he views the Finnish model: “… I do not know if it was because of the model, or just a lucky chance that [Finland] survived (question 7). … No, the model wouldn't even work for Finland today probably. The system in Russia has changed so much [since Soviet times] (question 8ai).” Although, this thesis cannot make the assumption that Interviewee E is totally opposed to the model for every country in a similar situation to Finland (for instance, countries caught between two power blocs excluding Russia), it can draw the conclusion from these answers that Interviewee E is certainly skeptical about the Finnish model being applied today. Therefore, Interviewee E can be put in the ‘against’ category with Interviewees C and D.

Whereas those in the ‘against’ category seemed rather sure of their answers, those in the ‘for’ category were not as clear. As mentioned above, it was decided that it was best to subdivide the ‘for’ category into the ‘for-totally’ subdivision and the ‘for-hypothetically’ subdivision.

It must be admitted that the word ‘hypothetically’ is misleading. At no point do the interviewees in this subdivision ever say that they are for the Finnish model in a hypothetical sense. Rather, both interviewees A and B, the two ‘for-hypothetically’ interviewees, said yes when asked if the Finnish model was a satisfactory policy for a
state in a similar situation to Finland. The reason this subdivision was created was because, even though they believe it is a satisfactory policy for a state in a similar situation to Finland, the interviewees did not believe it was an option for Ukraine and neither answered question 8aiii on whether there are any other states they would recommend it to. Of course, perhaps they do not believe there is another state that would fit the bill so to say at this given time in history. In any case, the thesis named this subdivision because of the interviewees’ support of the Finnish model for others, but a lack of examples for whom it might work. “Yes, it depends on the context of course. As a peace researcher I would recommend a line of policy which doesn’t increase confrontations, and doesn't invite more military persons in your neighborhood… In most situations. (Interviewee B)”

The ‘for-totally’ subdivision also is named in a misleading way. Simply put, this subdivision was named as such in order to contrast it to the ‘for-hypothetical’ subdivision. Interviewees F and G, whom the author has concluded belong in this category, both said yes when asked if the Finnish model was a satisfactory one for others, just as Interviewees A and B. However, Interviewees F and G vary from A and B by their more ‘optimistic’ points of view for Ukraine. By this I mean that instead of highlighting the difference between Ukraine today and Cold War Finland as Interviewees A and B did, Interviewees F and G argued that there were aspects of the Finnish model that Ukraine could utilize for itself. “To the extent that Ukraine would be neutral and accommodate some of the key interests that Russia has, and perhaps have some sort of self-censorship… That might be helpful in terms of solving parts of the crisis. (Interviewee F)” “There has been the kind of similar situation that Cold War Finland probably had, that it has tried to build up relations to different directions. (Interviewee G)” Although Interviewees F and G were more optimistic about the possibilities of the Finnish model for Ukraine, they still came back to the same conclusions that Interviewees A and B made: Ukraine is completely different from Finland.

Therefore, two things are clear: 1.) The two subdivisions of the ‘for’ category are not independent categories, and 2.) none of the interviewees, A-G, argued totally for the Finnish model. However, interviewee H, who has not been discussed thus far in this section, played the wildcard role. Interviewee H did not answer whether s/he though the Finnish model was a satisfactory one for others during the interview, and therefore, this thesis could not place him/her as either ‘for’ or ‘against’. However,
Interviewee H did provide some very useful answers to questions about the Finnish model as a solution for Ukraine and other countries.

When asked if the Finnish model would be a solution for Ukraine, Interviewee H argued that

No, the Finnish model cannot be a solution (for Ukraine) … The Finnish model isn't really something that you can apply to Ukraine. It has to be something different. finlandization might be an ideal type that tries to somehow explain the overall process of adaptation towards really tricky situations you have, and trying to manage asymmetric power relations from the perspective of the great power order.

However, when asked if a kind of Finnish model 2.0 could be applied to Ukraine, like Interviewees F and G, Interviewee H found some ways in which Ukraine could follow the model:

In that sense [of managing an asymmetric relationship], yeah. Try to find some general aspects… Finland was kind of a really unique phenomenon… Some lessons that might be applicable. For example, you have to do quite a lot of work as a small state to create even a small amount of latitude within these contexts. You might need to do some two-faced political moves. You can't only have good relations between the states leaders, but also you have to create some kind of initiatives, at the lower diplomatic levels, that constantly creates the ties towards the West.

Furthermore, in response to a question of whether the Finnish model could be a model for some other country, Interviewee H offered Armenia as a possible state that could take the Finnish model.

Somehow you can see it in Armenian foreign policy. They have tried to keep good relations with Russia, within a region that with many other states who have taken a rather contrasting stance towards Russia. At the same time they have tried to keep an open dialogue with the European Union.

(Interviewee H)

Likely, based off his/her answers, Interviewee H could also be included in the ‘for’ category. Although his/her answers might seem like they would place him/her in the ‘for-totally’ subdivision, this thesis would rather put Interviewee H in the ‘for-hypothetically’ subdivision, simply because Interviewee H never answered whether the Finnish model is a satisfactory policy for others or not. Later, Interviewee H approaches the idea of the Finnish model for Ukraine in a very hypothetical sense, and when discussing Armenia, s/he answers the question from the point of view of an observer rather than a commenter.
6.3.2 Narratives

The narratives that appeared when looking at the third section of the interviews (questions 6-8a(iii)) seem to be identical to the categories themselves. The author found that when looking at the data from the two categories two narratives emerged:

1. The Finnish model is a satisfactory policy for a state in a similar situation to Finland,
2. The Finnish model is not a satisfactory policy for a state in a similar situation to Finland.

Narrative 1 clearly lines up with the ‘for’ category, and narrative 2 - with the ‘against’ category. These narratives are important because they help one understand how the representatives of the epistemic community relate to the Finnish model today, and how they see the model as an international solution.

The first narrative includes both subdivisions of the ‘for’ category: Interviewees A, B, F, G, and possibly H. These interviewees, to greater or lesser degrees, agreed with the idea that the Finnish model would be suitable for other countries.

The second narrative includes those represented in the ‘against’ category: Interviewees C, D, and E. These three interviewees agreed that the Finnish model was not suitable for other countries.

6.3.3 Ukraine

As mentioned above, Ukraine was used as a catalyst to understand how the interviewees viewed the Finnish model given a specific, topical example. Section 6.3.1 in many ways has already shown how the interviewees narrate the Finnish model as a solution for Ukraine (particularly the ‘for’ category); however, some nuances remain.

To begin with, the interviewees in the ‘against’ category, who shared narrative 2 (above), each offered slightly different narratives to oppose the Finnish model for Ukraine. Interviewee C, similar to Interviewees A, B, F, and G, argued that Ukraine is a “different geographical, cultural, historical case. (Interviewee C)”
Interviewee D on the other hand, who was one of the most opposed to the idea of the Finnish model overall, argued that integration with the West would be the best solution for Ukraine. S/he stated that if one wants to use the Finnish model for Ukraine, then

The model of Finland as Finland is today would be a model. Finland is in the EU but not in NATO. But I do not think that's acceptable for Russia. … And, of course, there are many problems with this model, Ukraine is not ready for EU membership, and the EU is not willing to enlarge… That in theory might look like a good solution for everyone, to have this Ukrainian position similar to Finland in the sense of combining European integration with good relationship [sic] to Russia. So in that sense I could see it as a model, and maybe in a longer term perspective. But not the Finnish model from the Cold War era. (Interviewee D)

As mentioned earlier, Interviewee E does not believe that the Finnish model is “a model for Ukraine.” S/he argues that the Russian system is entirely different from the Soviet one, and therefore, even Finland would not be able to follow its own Cold War foreign policy. Worse yet, “the Russian system is inside the Ukraine’s political system. (Interviewee E)”

For each of these interviewees the individual narratives arguing against the Finnish model for Ukraine were different, but the overarching narrative was the same: The Finnish model is not a solution for Ukraine.

In the case of the rest of the interviewees, it is good to break them down by their subdivisions: ‘for-totally’ and ‘for-hypothetically’. Although much has already been said about how the ‘for’ category interviewees narrated the Finnish model as it relates to Ukraine in section 6.3.1, it is still important to look at how they specifically narrate the Finnish model as it relates to Ukraine.

The ‘for-hypothetically’ interviewees, A and B, were quite clear in their opposition to the Finnish model for Ukraine. Interviewee B particularly opposed the notion, saying, “The background is different; the situation is different.” S/he emphasizes the homogeneity of Finland versus the sharp diversity of Ukraine. Interviewee A similarly argues that the heterogeneity of Ukrainian society makes it too different from Finland. Instead of the Finnish model (model, a word that both interviewees A and B did not like, both preferring terms such as approach, line, solution), Interviewee A rather recommended the Åland approach, the idea that a country should take the interests of even small minorities into account.
It is not only in recent two or three years that this cleavage between east and west Ukraine has taken place. Eastern Ukrainians, the rebels, and Russia supporting them are right in their view that Eastern Ukraine should have some kind of special position or federal solution. But that is definitely up to Ukraine and the Ukrainians to decide… Ukraine, the government, is right in its approach to the European Union that it wants to develop its cooperation with the West, and at the same time it should take the views of the East Ukrainians which may differ from those of West Ukrainian [sic] and Kiev in a just way… (Interviewee A)

The interviewees in the ‘for-totally’ subdivision differed from the ‘for-hypothetically’ subdivision, again as mentioned above, only slightly. Both interviewees, F and G, reached the same conclusion about Ukraine as Interviewees A and B: that the situation in Ukraine is different from that of Cold War Finland. However, the difference between the two subdivisions lies in the idea that Interviewees F and G believe to some extent that Ukraine could adopt the Finnish model for itself. “To the extent that Ukraine would be neutral and accommodate some of the key interests that Russia has, and perhaps have some sort of self-censorship. That might be helpful in terms of solving parts of the crisis. (Interviewee F)” Interviewee G sees the Finnish model for Ukraine as a much more complex process than it was for Finland,

...[for] the country to keep united would require a very open, serious public discussion on the social relations, political relations, economic relations… The social, political divisions [in Ukraine today] are a lot deeper than they were in Cold War Finland… It is a lot more complex [for Ukraine].

Interviewee H also lined up quite strongly with the ‘for-hypothetically’ interviewees. However, this thesis will not go into Interviewee H’s views on Ukraine, since it has already covered them in section 6.3.1.

Additionally, Question 8aiii asked the interviewees whether they saw the Finnish model as a model for any other countries besides Ukraine in hopes that the interviewees who narrated for the Finnish model would give more examples of places they thought the Finnish model might apply. Unfortunately, many of the interviewees were not able to or simply did not want to answer this question. Taiwan was brought up as an example, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, but many, most, said that they did not have enough knowledge of the situation in Taiwan to give an informed opinion. Interviewee C gave a noncommittal response when asked about Taiwan
saying, “Might be. Being a neutral country, if you truly manage to [be neutral]. [For Taiwan], it might be a worthy goal, but a difficult one.”

The only interviewee who did offer an example was Interviewee H. He commented on research that offered Armenia as a possible country that could adapt the Finnish model for its purposes. As mentioned in section 6.3.1, Interviewee H sees the Finnish model, at least partially, in Armenian foreign policy, but s/he sees the Finnish model occurring slightly differently in Armenia from Finland. “The idea is maybe different from finlandization that finlandization in many ways was based on this really forced process…, but in this Armenian case it is suggested as a kind of policy that you can just implement into action without the tensions around. But there is this analogical connection. (Interviewee H)”

6.4 Conclusion

When looking at the results of the data it is easy to see that two narratives persist: 1.) The Finnish model worked for Finland, and 2.) The Finnish model is unlikely to work for any country at the present.

The representatives of the epistemic community showed a certain “macro” consensus in how they narrated the Finnish model. In the first place, the overarching narration of the Finnish model was held by all of the interviewees. In the second place, although the interviewees answered question 6 in very different ways, the overall consensus was that the Finnish model would not likely be suitable for any existing countries.

Finally when looking at the data to see if any demographic patterns emerged, this thesis found that when narrating the Finnish model in section 6.2, the representatives of the epistemic community could possibly split by age. The older interviewees could be categorized differently from the younger ones when narrating the Finnish model (this thesis will not identify which categories they belong to, so as to protect their anonymity). Additionally, this thesis did not find any evidence that gender played any distinctive role in determining how the interviewees narrated the Finnish model.

This thesis also looked for demographic patterns that may have emerged amongst the interviewees when they were narrating the Finnish model for others in section 6.3. Unlike the demographic situation in 6.2, section 6.3 had a much murkier
picture. The interviewees shared no obvious demographic patterns with their respective narratives and categories. Just as in section 6.2, age may play a role in how Finns narrate the Finnish model as a solution for others; however, in this section it could not be said conclusively that age was a factor. Gender as well seemed to play no obvious role. This thesis would argue that further interviews with additional interviewees may reveal hidden demographic patterns. This thesis would recommend looking into the possibility that geography could be a factor, though, it could still yet be something completely different.
7. Conclusions

This thesis aimed to discover what kind of an epistemic community of foreign policy experts had formed in post-Cold War Finland. Having determined this, the thesis then examined how the representatives of this epistemic community interviewed for this thesis narrated the Finnish model and its applicability to states in a similar situation to Cold War Finland.

The thesis found that a possibly strong epistemic community of Finnish foreign policy experts had formed in post-Cold War Finland. The representatives of this epistemic community all shared Haas’s four characteristics: a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared notions of validity, and common policy enterprise. Moreover, when analyzing the strength of the epistemic community against Cross’s four variables, the results showed that the epistemic community existed somewhere between the medium-strong area of Cross’s weak-strong continuum. However, the thesis concluded that it was difficult to determine how strong the epistemic community actually was due to difficulties in obtaining certain answers in the interviews.

The next step in this thesis was to determine how the representatives of the epistemic community narrated the Finnish model, the Finnish model being the Finnish foreign policy during the Cold War. From the interviews, it was determined that one overarching narrative had developed amongst the interviewees: The Finnish model was a successful endeavour that allowed Finland to stay out of a great power conflict while maintaining relations with both the East and the West. Although a singular overarching narrative appeared, the thesis found that the interviewees could be categorized into three main categories, depending on what aspects of the narrative they particularly emphasized. These categories were survival, appeasement, and balance. Even though the interviewees differed slightly on how they perceived the Finnish model, the overall narrative remained true.

Differences began to emerge between the representatives of the epistemic community when their responses on whether or not they would recommend the Finnish model to other countries were analyzed. The representatives of the epistemic community were almost evenly split when it came to recommending the Finnish model to others. For those who were ‘for’ recommending, there was a further split
between those who recommend it ‘totally’ and those who recommended it ‘hypothetically’. The ‘for-hypothetically’ representatives of the epistemic community both believed that the Finnish model would be a good solution for other countries; however, they unequivocally argued against it for Ukraine, and they did not present any other existing countries that might be able to benefit from the Finnish model. The ‘for-totally’ representatives differed from the ‘for-hypothetically’ representatives only in that they saw some potential for Ukraine to adapt certain aspects of the Finnish model. In the end the ‘for’ category representatives shared a simple common narrative: The Finnish model is a satisfactory policy for a state in a similar situation to Finland.

Those in the ‘against’ category clearly disagreed with those in the ‘for’ category. The ‘against’ representatives did not believe that the Finnish model would be a suitable model for another country. Although, they did not appear to show consensus in their reasons for disagreeing with the idea of the Finnish model being a suitable model for Ukraine, they also shared a simple common narrative: The Finnish model is not a satisfactory policy for a state in a similar situation to Finland.

Surprisingly, even though the representatives of the epistemic community diverged in their views on recommending the Finnish model, a consensus did seem to emerge, albeit unintentionally, that the Finnish model would not likely be suitable for any existing countries.

The broad conclusions of this thesis show three things. First, a strong epistemic community of Finnish foreign policy experts exists in Finland. This epistemic community has the potential to be very professional, strong and cohesive, and to discover if the epistemic community reaches its full potential, more research will need to be done. Second, the representatives of this epistemic community, interviewed for this thesis, have found consensus in how they narrate the Finnish model. Across the various demographics of the representatives, the narrative regarding the Finnish model held. Third, the representatives of the epistemic community diverge on whether or not they would recommend the Finnish model to others, but from the data, it appears that it is unlikely that they would find any existing countries for whom they would recommend the model, particularly countries that find themselves between Europe and Russia.

This thesis has created a foundation for future researchers interested in Finnish Cold War foreign policy to dive into the subject. It would be highly recommended for
someone to take this research and to expand on it; particularly to discover how strong and cohesive this epistemic community is in practice, and to delve deeper into the topic of the Finnish model.
Primary Sources:
The primary sources in this thesis were a collection of eight interviews from the University of Tampere in Tampere, Finland and the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki, Finland. The interviewees elected to maintain their anonymity; therefore, the interviewees for this thesis were cited throughout the thesis as Interviewees A-H.

Secondary Sources:


Appendix

1. Could I get some general information from you? What is your age, position, etc.?
2. Do you currently or have you ever participated in any kind of event formal or informal, at which the topic of discussion was Finnish foreign policy?
   a. When?
   b. In what kind of environment do or did the events take place? e.g. an academic conference, a collection of published works, government advisory meeting, informal discussions.
   c. How frequently do or did such events take place?
3. (If they participated in any such events) Who do or did you most frequently participate with in these events?
   a. What fields do your colleagues tend to work in? Are they all academics, or are some experts in other fields? i.e. government employees, politicians.
4. It seems to me that Finnish model is quite topical right now internationally. What do you think about that?
5. How do you view the Finnish Cold War foreign policy?
   a. How would you define the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, finlandization, neutrality?
6. Is it a satisfactory policy for a state in a similar situation to Finland?
7. What, in your opinion, are the pluses and minuses of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, finlandization, neutrality?
8. Given the current situation in Ukraine, how would you solve the conflict?
   a. Would the Finnish model be a solution?
      i. Would you recommend that Ukraine follow the Finnish model as closely as possible to the model that Finland created, or would you recommend, let’s say, a Finnish model 2.0?
      ii. How would a Finnish model 2.0 look in Ukraine?
      iii. Do you see it as a solution for any other states faced with different situations?
9. How many do you think agree/disagree with you? Who are they?