From Representative Democracy to Democratic Representation
Lessons from the Talvivaara controversy
MAIJA MATTILA

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ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
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UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE
MAIJA MATTILA

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I started working on my PhD thesis in 2011. Little did I know, what a journey was ahead. When people ask me whether they should become PhD candidates, I usually reply: Don't! But to be honest, going through the process has made who I am today. The past years have been difficult, but all the same good. I feel moved about all the people who have enabled me to write this dissertation, and they turn out to be quite many.

First, let me thank all the people who agreed to be interviewed for my study. Your input is valuable in better understanding the nature of political representation. I hope this will take further our collective understanding of what democracy is and how representation best serves it.

Professor Tapio Raunio has enabled this dissertation in many ways. It was he whom I called when planning to return to academia for PhD studies in 2011. He was immediately welcoming, which gave me confidence to pursue my plans to write a doctoral dissertation. As my supervisor, he was always prompt in his comments. Most importantly, he took care of the one thing a PhD candidate cannot do without: funding. I was in the right place at the right time to be one of the last recipients of the POLITU (National School of Political Studies) 4-year salaried funding. I do not think I would have gotten the funding without Tapio’s influence. I always felt Tapio was on my side. Thank you.

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Tarja Seppä was recently described by a former colleague of mine as being an angel. This is an apt characterization. I wonder if Tarja understands the impact she has had on so many students and junior scholars at the University of Tampere politics degree program. Her wisdom and warmth took me through some of the most difficult phases of my project, and her presence at the faculty is something I miss the most. Thank you, Tarja.
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I wish my father Jukka Mattila was here to see this day. His all-too-early and sudden death in 2008 has left our family in deep grief. This grief paradoxically seems to gather pace whenever we have something to celebrate, like today. My father was a great person. Together with my mother Asta Mattila, he provided the most stable and loving home anyone can hope for. He always believed in me and my sister, and showed his support in every possible way, most importantly by saying encouraging words. A small piece of his peaceful spirits, goodwill, and confidence has transferred to me, enough for me to comfort myself during hard times. Kiitos isä.

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Tampere, October 19th 2017

_Maija Mattila_
ABSTRACT

This dissertation studies the concept of political representation. Specifically, it examines the connection between representation and democracy. It discusses the shift in theoretical thinking from understanding representation in the context of representative democracies to understanding representation as an idea and process necessary for democracy. This shift is analyzed and developed further by an examination of politics and representational speech during the Talvivaara mine controversy in Finland.

In the standard (traditional) account, elections, responsiveness of elected representatives to citizens, universal suffrage, and equality are understood as characteristic to representative democracies. In this account, normative requirements for democratic representation arise from keeping elected representatives and the represented as close to each other as possible. This requires congruence between the decisions of legislators and the opinions of citizens, responsiveness of the representatives to the represented, and descriptive similarity between the two in terms of socio-demographic characteristics. Representation as such is not held to be democratic unless representation emerges from elections and the closeness between representatives and the represented is realized.

The representative, or constructivist, turn in democratic theory argues otherwise. This turn in theoretical thinking on representation has taken place over the last 20 years or so. Its central observation is that representation is not second-best to direct democracy, but democracy in fact presupposes representation. However, this argument refers neither to the elitist Schumpeterian view of representative democracy nor to the notion that representation would be the only imaginable way of organizing government in large-scale societies. Instead, it views democracy as an idea rather than an institutional form, in which representation allows for communication and symbols through which the represented constituency emerges. In making representative claims (Saward 2006; 2010), both the representative and the represented are constructed. These claims are necessarily selective, aesthetic, and performative. This aesthetic quality of representation makes power visible and invites control over it. According to this view, claims-making should not be
understood as a privilege of the elected, but as open to anyone. Claims make it possible to create and contest portrayals of 'us', and thus sustain democratic politics.

While there have been numerous empirical studies departing from this account, these studies point to different directions in terms of how to bring the theoretical turn into (normative) empirical research. This thesis aims to contribute to this state of affairs by addressing two research questions: (1) What do we study when we study representation after the representative turn? and (2) What makes representation democratic? These questions are addressed by studying representational speech. Representational speech is a broader concept than the representative claim. It refers to anything that can be interpreted as constructing a represented category or presenting someone as a representative. Speech about political representation is also included under the umbrella term of representational speech. The dissertation takes the representative turn further by clarifying, confirming, and defining its assertions.

Based on analysis of previous theoretical accounts, it is argued that representation functions as a precondition for democracy through its indirectness. It invites communication and symbolic action, and makes politics possible. This theoretical account is further examined in the Talvivaara case study.

The case study data consists of 41 interviews with a minister, MPs, local councilors, public officials, civic actors, and Talvivaara representatives. The data also includes participatory observation of demonstrations, citizen assemblies, and a panel discussion, ministerial and administrative statements, parliamentary sources (written questions, budgetary and supplementary budgetary motions, and parliamentary minutes), as well as press releases and YouTube videos by the Stop Talvivaara movement between 2005 and 2015. The case study provides an example of an application of a theory, and is illustrative, or exemplifying, in nature.

The case study shows that studying representation (through representational speech) leads to unraveling institutional terms for political action and to understanding what factors are relevant for gaining legitimacy in a specific context. In the context of the Talvivaara mine, it was paradoxical that locality was required from civic actors as a proof of their legitimacy, whilst actors across the political landscape, both elected and non-elected, viewed the Talvivaara case a national issue. At the same time, representative claims made by civic actors were marginal in their emphasis on the environment, as opposed to the rather vague, reactive, and middle-of-the-road representative claims made by MPs.

While representative claims allow an interpretation of 'us' that sets the stage for immediate decisions, studying representational speech reveals deeper shared
meanings. In the context of Talvivaara, economic arguments were privileged over environmental concerns.

The findings of the dissertation challenge traditional representation research that separates electoral district, the party and the nation as representational foci. The case study shows that local and national interests are political matters. How they are represented and defined depends on political standpoints. Representational speech carries meanings that can be traced back to political (party) standpoints. However, these standpoints are often backed with references to local and national interests rather than party affiliations.

At the same time, representational speech offers a neutral way to speak politically. 'Everybody' is claimed to be represented, but 'everybody's' interests and how these interests are best served depends on the speaker's political standpoints and representations of the issue. The reference to 'everybody' allows communication of political aims and ideologies in ways that can potentially be accepted quite easily. Claiming to represent 'the people' works as a way to 'sell' policy standpoints to the public.

Indeed, representational speech is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, speaking 'representationally' opens space for debates about who 'we' are and what is important to 'us'. On the other, representative claims offer ways to communicate political standpoints in a seemingly neutral way. This requires that audiences be attentive. A politically attentive audience recognizes representative claims and is able to assess whether the portrayal of 'us' is desirable or not. But a politically inattentive audience fails to see that representative claims are necessarily selective and not the final truth about 'us'. If the audience is inattentive, individual representative claims can open space for populism.

The case study confirms Disch's (2011) argument that the institutional positions of would-be representatives need to be included when the representative turn is applied to normative empirical research from a democratic perspective. The study of democratic representation should take into account not simply the plurality of representative claims, but the plurality of the positions from which the representative claims are made. This is why representative claims made by non-elected actors and the relationship of these claims vis-à-vis representative claims made by elected actors are worth studying. Addressing representational speech reveals power relations whose analysis is imperative for scholars of political representation.
Tämä tutkimus pureutuu poliittisen edustuksen käsitteeseen, keskittyen erityisesti edustuksen ja demokratian yhteyteen. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan teoreettisessa ajattelussa tapahtunutta siirtymää siitä, että edustus ymmärretään edustuksellisen demokratian kontekstissa siihen, että edustus ymmärretään ideaksi ja prosessiksi, joka on demokratialle välttämätön. Tätä siirtymää analysoidaan ja kehitetään eteenpäin tarkastelemalla Talvivaaran kaivoksen ympärille kehkeytyneitä poliittista toimintaa ja edustuspuhetta.

Vaaleja, edustajien responsiivisuutta edustettaville, universalia äänioikeutta ja tasa-arvoa pidetään tavallisesti edustuksellisen demokratian tunnusmerkkinä. Tässä katsannossa edustuksen demokraattisuuden katsotaan toteutuvan, kun vaaleilla valitut edustajat pidetään mahdollisimman lähellä heidät auktorisoineita kansalaisia. Tämä läheisyys on tarkoitanut muun muassa sitä, että lainsäätäjien päätöksiltä vaaditaan vastaavuutta kansalaisten mielipiteiden kanssa, että päättäjien pitäisi olla vastaanottavaisia (responsiivisia) kansalaisilta tuleville ärssykteille, ja että kansanedustuslaitos olisi kansan pieniskuva suhteessa erinäisiin sosio-demografisiin piirteisiin. Edustusta sinänsä ei pidetä demokraattisena, ellei se seuraa vaaleista ja ellei yllä kuvailtu läheisyys edustajien ja edustettavien välillä toteudu.

Edustamisväitteet mahdollistavat erilaiset käsitykset 'meistä' ja 'meidän' eduistamme ja näiden käsitysten keskinäisen kamppailun, mikä on välttämätöntä demokraattisen politiikan jatkuvuudelle.


Aiempien teoreettisten keskusteluiden pohjalta tutkimuksessa esitetään, että edustus toimii demokratian ehtona erityisesti siksi, että (1) se on epäsuoraa ja mahdollistaa siten kommunikaation; (2) se mahdollistaa symboliset esitykset edustajasta, edustettavasta ja todellisuudesta, eikä siten ole vain kahdenvälinen suhde; ja (3) se näin ollen mahdollistaa politiikan. Demokratia ei ole mahdollista ilman politiikkaa. Tätä teoreettista näkemystä tarkastellaan edelleen Talvivaaran tapauksen valossa.


Tutkimus osoittaa, että edustuksen (edustuspuheen) tutkiminen johtaa huomaamaan poliittisen toiminnan reunaehdot ja ymmärtämään, mitkä tekijät ovat tärkeitä toimijoiden legitimiteeteille tietyssä kontekstissa. Talvivaaran kaivoksen kontekstissa oli paradoksaalista, että kansalaistoimijoilta edellyttiin paikallisuuutta, vaikka sekä vaaleilla valitut että muut toimijat laajasti arvioivat, että Talvivaara oli kansallinen kysymys. Kansalaistoimijoiden edustamisväitteet näyttäytyivät marginaalisilta korostaessaan ympäristönäkökulmaa. Sen sijaan kansanedustajien
Edustamisväitteet olivat monin paikoin ympäripyöreitä ja reaktiivisia, pyrkien löytämään kultaisen keskitien.

Edustamisväitteet mahdollistivat 'meidän' tulkinnan niin, että tästä tulkinnasta saattoi vetää johtopäätöksiä siitä, mitä tulisi poliittisesti päätättä. Samalla edustamisväitteet paljastivat syvempiä jaettuja merkityksiä, joissa talouteen viittaavat argumentit olivat hegemonisempia kuin ympäristöön viittaavat.

Tutkimuksen tulokset haastavat perinteisen edustustutkimuksen siinä, että perinteinen tutkimus jakaa edustusfokukset vaalipiiriin, koko valtioon ja puolueeseen. Tapauslaadittuna esittää, että paikallisten ja kansallisten intressien määritelmät ovat poliittisia ja ne esitetään tietyllä tavalla riippuen puhujan poliittisista kosoista. Edustuspohjaiseen liittyvät merkityksiä, jotka johdattavat poliittisten (puolue)kantojen äärelle, mutta nämä kannat perustellaan puoluetta useammin viittauksilla paikallisissä tai kansallisissä etuissa.

Samalla edustuspuhe tarjoaa näennäisesti neutraalin tavan puhua poliittisesti. 'Kaikkea' väitetään edustettavan, mutta mitä etuja 'kaikkiin' liitetään, riippuu puhujan poliittisista kosoista ja siitä, miten hän esittää käsitteä olevan poliittisen kysymyksen. Viittaa kuvaa 'kaikkiin' mahdollistuu poliittisten päämäärien ja ideologoiden kommunikointi tavalla, jonka kuulija voi hyväksyä mahdollisesti helposti. Edustamisväitteillä pystyy 'myymään' poliittisia näkökantoja yleisölle.

Edustuspuhe onkin kaksiteräinen miekkak: se toisaalta mahdollistaa demokratiaan tarpeellisen väärtelyn 'meistä' ja 'meidän' edustamme, mutta samalla mahdollistaa poliittisuuden hämärämisen edellä kuvatulla tavalla. Tämä edellyttää yleisöltä taitoa lukea edustamisväitteitä. Valpas yleisö tunnistaa edustamisväitteet ja pystyy arvioimaan niitä kriittisesti. Epävalpas yleisö sen sijaan ei ymmärrä edustamisväitteiden väijäyjämittontää osittaisuutta ja sitä, että mitkään edustamisväite ei ole lopullinen toetus 'meistä'. Epävalpaan yleisön ollessa kyseessä yleisöä edustamisväitteet avaat tilaa populismille.

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1 INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about democratic representation. In our representative democracies, as our political systems are named, questions concerning the quality of democracy are often translated into questions of representation. These include: How well do the members of parliament (MPs) represent? Whom is being represented; whom is not? How well does the decision-making body represent the people in its composition and decisions? It seems that whenever issues of democracy are dealt with, they cannot be addressed without referring to representation. Consequently, the way representation is understood is pivotal in assessing how democratic our representative democracies are.

Notwithstanding the conjunction between representation and democracy, their relationship is uneasy (Pitkin 2004) to say the least. Democracy was a form of government in the ancient Greek city states and democratic procedures were in place long before that in the Middle East (Keane 2009, xvi), whereas representation is usually thought to realize democracy in large-scale modern societies. While in Greek city states people governed themselves directly, in representative democracies people govern themselves indirectly through their representatives. The representatives are authorized and held accountable in elections, and universal suffrage guarantees political equality. A principal–agent relationship between territorially defined constituencies and their representatives forms the basis of legitimate power. Responsiveness – openness of representatives to the represented – is expected from representatives. These elements form the so-called standard account of representative democracy (Urbinati & Warren 2008, 389).

For some, representative democracy is a contradiction in terms. It is commonplace to distinguish between direct or participatory and indirect (liberal) democracy (Held 1987, 4–5; Keane 2009, xv). This distinction echoes the difference between ancient forms of democracy and modern representative democracies. The proponents of direct or participatory democracy see it as an ideal-type, because people are directly present and govern themselves. For them, representative democracy remains necessarily a second-best alternative because the people are governed by their representatives and not by themselves.
Perhaps the most influential proponent of representative democracy was Joseph Schumpeter. He sought for a ‘realistic’ definition of democracy based on empiricism (Held 1987, 165). For him, democracy was simply a political arrangement for arriving at political decisions, as opposed to defining democracy as realization of ‘the general will’. Election was the method, and election presupposed free competition between elites for the popular vote. (Schumpeter 1970, 242, 250–3, 269.) Schumpeter's account had very little if anything to do with ancient democracy. Research that addresses primarily elections and representative institutions takes its bearings from the Schumpeterian account, at least indirectly. Research that addresses people’s direct participation, such as referenda, participatory governance, and democratic innovations, takes its bearings from the ancient direct forms of democracy.

Nevertheless, the ideals of direct democracy are very often used in examining representative institutions. Normative ideals for representation have been drawn foremost from democratic ideals. These ideals stress direct participation and presence of the governed in governing. Presence echoes representation, as representation can be understood as making present something that is not present literally or in fact (Pitkin 1972, 8–9).

From a normative perspective, the following questions have been posed in relation to representative democracies: If all people cannot be present in decision-making, how can as many as possible be represented? How to ensure those who are present listen; that is, are responsive, to those who are not present? Does the representative body resemble the represented in terms of demographic characteristics? Do representatives decide according to what people overall think they should decide? Democratic efforts have hence been about closing the gap between the representative and the represented, and bringing them as close to each other as possible. In political science, a long line of traditional empirical representation research has involved mainly representative institutions and representatives within them, with people understood as constituencies, whether territorially or otherwise defined. Both within academia and in every-day thinking, representation is usually thought of as an institutional property more than as anything else.

This thesis argues that this 'old' (mainstream) research tradition should be reformed to meet a 'new' understanding of what representation is. This is done, firstly, by tracking the development of the 'old' research tradition, particularly in relation to its understanding of democracy and representation. Secondly, a turn in political thinking that has taken place in the past 20 years or so will be followed. This turn is referred to as the 'new' understanding of representation.
It was not until the 1960s that Hanna Pitkin dealt with the concept of representation more explicitly (Pitkin 1972). Political thinkers have since revived the concept in the 2000s (see most notably Ankersmit 2002a, 2002b; Brito Vicira & Runciman 2008; Disch 2011, 2012; Garsten 2009; Hayward 2009; Näström 2006, 2011; Plotke 1997; Pollak et al. 2009; Rehfeld 2006; Saward 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010; Urbinati 2000, 2005, 2006; Warren 2013). These new discussions of representation – and the fact that they take place in the context of democratic theory – are what is called the representative or constructivist turn in this thesis. As understood after the representative turn, representation is a creative process necessary to democracy rather than an institutional arrangement that can at best only approximate ‘real’ democracy.

Representation, according to the understanding after the representative turn, entails an extended perspective to participation, one that includes surveillance and interference by citizens, written ideas, and social actions by movements and political groups. Representation makes political deliberation public and subject to the judgment of all. (Urbinati 2005, 208–9). As it deals with ideological, interpretative, or artificially created similarity between the representative and her electors (ibid, 210), it is this interpretative space that lets democracy in. Democracy, then, does not consist of the closeness of the representative and the represented but of their remoteness from one another.

The remoteness, the non-identity (Plotke 1997, 28) between the representative and the represented, enables interaction that changes the represented from a hard self-evident fact to something elusive. Representations, hence, define what is being represented. The function of representation is not to replace the people’s assembly in agora, but to make democratic politics possible. It is done through embracing the aesthetic gap between the representation and the represented, the gap that enables new and peculiar representations of the political reality. (Ankersmit 2002b, 35–6.) These representations are primarily metaphorical presentations of how a particular piece of the reality should be comprehended. (Ibid, 38.)

The same idea has been captured by stating that presence through ideas and speech is something that representation makes possible (Urbinati 2006, 3). The real force of representation is in that it brings together otherwise scattered individuals, creates the sovereign people (ibid, 5) and thus functions as a precondition for political action. The composition of representation is in this way turned upside down; it is not the readily given people that gets represented, but representation constructs the people, and only then can it function as the people. Thus,
representation is first and foremost a political process rather than a one-to-one relationship (Ankersmit 2002b; Runciman 2009, 27; Urbinati 2006, 5).

It follows that the gaze be shifted from how representation has been institutionalized to the dynamics of representation and, more importantly, to what is done through representation. The underlying assumption is that representation has a constitutive dimension that has effects or consequences (Saward 2010, 4) on both who is deemed a legitimate representative and how communities or groups of people understand themselves. The key is to not focus solely on formal (electoral) representation, roles, and typologies (the 'old'), but to also look at the dynamic nature of representation (the 'new'). Representation is not simply 'there', but is constructed for someone by someone for a (political) reason. (Ibid, 4–9, 13.)

This argument, at its core, unravels the category of 'the represented'. It should not be taken as given, because its nature, views, borders, interests, and priorities are all subject to questioning, and there is no one ready-made characterization. These characterizations, representations, are made by individuals, but also by political parties and corporations in specific contexts. Seeing politicians as makers of representations calls for a more versatile approach to representation research than the 'old' research tradition suggests. (Ibid, 14–7.)

My thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of the nature of political representation by exploring the elements of the representative turn, both theoretically (chapter 2) and through a case study on the Talvivaara mine (chapters 3–5). This exploration leads me to answer the first research question: (1) What do we study when we study representation after the representative turn?

If one looks at the mainstream empirical representation research (the 'old'), it seems quite clear what the study of representation is. As I will explain in detail in the following chapter, it is research on elected representatives, most often Members of Parliament (MPs). Usually, whom is being represented and whether representation is mandated or mandate-free in terms of policy decisions is studied. Socio-demographic similarities and responsiveness are also studied. The categories of both the representative and the represented are given.

At the heart of the representative turn, on the contrary, is the concept of the representative claim (Saward 2006, 2010). Representative claims are claims of who represents whom, how the represented should be understood according to the claimant, and to what audience the claim is directed at. In other words, neither the category of the representative nor the represented is given. Paying attention to such claims helps elucidate the constructedness of representation and brings about
In developing the approach, I will study representational speech throughout the thesis. Representational speech is a broader concept than the representative claim. By this, I mean anything that can be interpreted as constructing a represented category, offering somebody as a representative, or representing reality. I also include speech about political representation under the umbrella term of representational speech. I refer to explicit accounts of what representation means and how it should be understood. In order to find examples of representational speech, I will turn to the case study explored for the thesis. The representational speech that I find by exploring the case will further help me to understand and explain what the study of representation is about in essence.

The shifting focus of representation research raises new questions about the uneasy alliance between representation and democracy. In the mainstream empirical representation research, so far, this uneasiness has been addressed through making sure the people are present in representation as much as possible. This has resulted in normative requirements of closeness between representatives and the represented, whether the closeness has been pictured in terms of the composition of legislatures (descriptive representation) or of the representatives' views and doings vis-à-vis their electorate or other representational foci (opinion congruence). This closeness presumes a fixed category of the represented, but the representative turn denies that as a starting point for representation. Hence, the relationship between representation and democracy needs to be rethought in a way that does not exclude the very essence of representation as something that evokes the represented.

My thesis aims to make a contribution to this rethinking by addressing the second research question: (2) What makes representation democratic? In this venture, my key concept will be space for politics. I take representational speech (representative claims, representations of reality, and connotations attached to the term ‘representation’) to shape the space in which politics takes place. Without politics, there cannot be democracy, and thus space for politics is crucial for democracy. What consequences do the elements of representational speech have for this space? In other words, in what terms can representation be taken to be a precondition for democracy? This contemplation is hoped to take the representative turn further. Again, this question is addressed both in the theoretical and empirical parts of the thesis.

Theory-wise, I will explore the connection between representation and democracy in three phases: by looking at historical developments leading to the
creation of representative democracies, by presenting the connection between representation and democracy in mainstream representation research, and finally by developing my own account of democratic representation based on the representative turn. It will be argued that representation functions as a precondition for democracy through its indirectness, as it invites communication and symbolic action, and makes politics possible. This theoretical account is further examined through and defined with the help of the Talvivaara case study.

Mainstream empirical representation research has so far built on the normative requirement of the closeness, as presented above. The theoretical approach suggested in this thesis is based on existing theoretical accounts questioning the basis of how we understand representation, and further confirmed and defined through the case study. Changing the theoretical premises should further have implications on how empirical research settings are designed. Hence, this thesis builds a bridge between research traditions. The mainstream research tradition has for decades focused on empirical analyses of representation, but empirical research based on the theoretical turn is limited. The representative turn has instead focused primarily on democratic theory. While there have been numerous empirical studies departing from the representative turn, they point to different directions in terms of how to bring the theoretical turn into empirical research. What is more, these two traditions appear as distinct disciplines. Traditional empirical representation research seems at times to be unaware of developments in theory building.

For this reason, the thesis combines a theoretical examination and empirical case study, as they are considered mutually reinforcing in addressing the research questions. The empirical part of my thesis is built on case study methodology. Case study can be understood, among numerous other definitions, as a study of a temporally and spatially determined set of events (Levy 2008, 2), as a “detailed examination of a single case” (Flyvbjerg 2004, 390), or as an investigation of a "contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context" (Yin 2009, 18). Here, my case is representational speech surrounding the Talvivaara mine. It forms the real-life context, or set of events, in which I study the phenomenon of representation by presenting a detailed analysis of the case.

Talvivaara was a mine situated in Sotkamo municipality, Kainuu province in eastern Finland, between 2007 and 2015. It involved political and administrative action locally and nationally mainly because of two dimensions: financial and environmental issues. Firstly, the mine was hoped to bring much-needed economic upliftment for the economically troubled Kainuu region. The state of Finland invested in the mine heavily, and in 2013 became the single biggest shareholder, at
about 16 percent. State ownership was organized through the fully state-owned investing company Solidium Oy. The employment aspects as well as state ownership made the mine a political issue and the Finnish state a relevant actor. In 2014, the mine went bankrupt. In mid-2015, the Finnish state bought the bankrupt estate, after which the mine continued as Terrafame. My study period extends from the beginning of the mine until it was renamed to Terrafame in 2015, concentrating around certain events.

The second dimension involves environmental issues. Throughout its history, neighbors of the mine made environmental observations about dust, odorous emissions, and changes in bodies of water (Talvivaara Mining Company Plc 2012a, 62). For example, in 2011, water usage concerning two nearby lakes was restricted by authorities. The resulting environmental problems gave rise in spring 2012 to a popular movement, *Stop Talvivaara*, which demanded a controlled shutdown of the mine. As some members of parliament had in 2005–6 made budgetary motions for funding infrastructure around the planned mine, from 2010 onward written questions and question hour debates in the parliament for the most part addressed environmental problems.

Why was Talvivaara chosen, then, to be the case for this thesis? The choice was random in the sense that it could have been any other case. I found that the case offered a possibility to study representation in multiple instances, that is, on the administrative and executive level, in the parliamentary setting, and involving civic activism. In that sense, the Talvivaara case presented a cross-section of politics and both elected and non-elected political actors, and their interactions. Because I do not understand representation as simply resulting from elections, I did not want to concentrate on general procedures within any particular institutions. Rather, I wanted to take politics as they emerge unexpectedly and out of anybody’s control, and to see what the ‘new’ theory of representation had to offer in analyzing such a case.

Politically, Talvivaara involved a variety of actors, from grassroots activism to local councilors, municipalities, members of parliament, and ministers. The history of the Talvivaara mine and relevant political and administrative actions vis-à-vis the case are presented in Appendix 1. The appendix presents both major events at the mine as well as those actions by the state and municipalities, Finnish parliament, and *Stop Talvivaara* that are relevant to my study in chronological order. While my examination of the case extends over a long period, two incidents are of particular relevance: the so-called wastewater leakage in November 2012 and the lake Nuasjärvi pipeline issue.
Environmentally, while problems had already started earlier, a decisive turning point for Talvivaara was the wastewater leakage in November 2012. As a result of the leakage (that lasted several days), massive amounts of wastewater spread outside the mine area. The incident was significant particularly from the viewpoint of political action, both by politicians and civic actors, as political action increased remarkably during and after the leakage. It forced inter alia ministers, MPs and local councilors to take a stance on the issue, as well as gave a boost to the newly formed Stop Talvivaara movement. It was also the first time that minister of the environment Ville Niinistö (Greens), since taking the post in spring 2011, was put under the microscope about the events in Talvivaara. Simultaneously, media publicity ballooned and massive coverage continued during the weeks to come.

The environmental problems had repercussions to the company finances and they worsened as a result of the leakage. Talvivaara managed to raise some 260 million euros in a share issue in spring 2013, but regardless the operating subsidiary filed for corporate reorganization in November that year. Bankruptcy followed suit in November 2014, and full state ownership and transformation to Terrafame in 2015. As of October 2017, the listed company (Plc) still continues as Talvivaara Mining Company Plc, but it no longer mines and its shares have practically lost their value.

The lake Nuasjärvi pipeline issue was raised when the Talvivaara company filed for an environmental permit to run excess (purified) wastewater through a pipeline to lake Nuasjärvi in 2014. The application started an administrative process during which authorities gathered statements from for instance municipalities, other authorities, and private citizens. The pipeline case made environmental issues once more central. The environmental permit was granted in April 2015, but with lesser amounts of allowed effluents than the company had applied for. Indeed, both the leakage in November 2012 and the Nuasjärvi pipeline issue bring forth the role of authorities. While the environmental impacts of the mine became politicized, it was in many cases ultimately up to authorities to decide on individual issues, such as allowed amounts of effluents, discharging water or overall environmental permits. I will come back to this point in chapter three.

In order to answer the research questions presented above, questions to the Talvivaara case are posed: What kind of representational speech was there? I will examine the representational speech by ministers, administrative officials, municipalities, actors within municipalities, members of parliament, and civic actors. What representative claims were made, what were they about? What limitations were there for representational speech for each actor category? How did the actors speak
about representation? These questions help to understand the space there was for politics, and to further understand the meaning of representation to democracy.

I will examine the Talvivaara case with the help of both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ traditions. My examination departs from the ‘new’ tradition in that it studies representational speech. Yet, this is done in the light of certain features in the traditional mainstream empirical research. They involve the so-called chain model in analyzing administrative decision-making, as well as representational foci in parliamentary research. In other words, the traditional approach to representation research is taken into account, but its elements are critically assessed with the help of the ‘new’ approach.

The thesis studies diverse phases of the Talvivaara story. For state and municipalities, the analysis is concentrated around November 2012 (wastewater leakage) and the lake Nuasjärvi pipeline issue. For ministers’ speech, the analysis includes statements between spring 2011 and spring 2015, amounting to an electoral term. For the parliament, all parliamentary procedures from founding the mine in mid-2000s until the end of electoral term in April 2015 will be included. As for activism, actions included span from the beginning of the Stop Talvivaara movement in spring 2012 to July 2015, when the mine was bought by the state and transformed to Terrafame.

I use multiple sources of data. These include interviews with a minister, MPs, local councilors, public officials, civic actors, and Talvivaara company representatives. Moreover, the data includes participatory observation of demonstrations, citizen assemblies and a panel discussion, ministerial and administrative statements, parliamentary sources (written questions, budgetary and supplementary budgetary motions, and parliamentary minutes), as well as press releases and YouTube videos by the Stop Talvivaara movement. Appendix 2 explains the data in detail.

I take my study to be an illustrative (Levy 2008, 6–7) or exemplifying (Bryman 2012, 70) case study in that it provides an example of an application of a theory. At the same time, it seeks to deepen our understanding of the theory and its meaning for empirical research. I find this necessary, because the ‘new’ understanding of representation has only started to emerge in empirical research settings and makes its point in different directions, as will be explained in detail on the coming pages. Because I wish my study on the Talvivaara case to inform the theory of democratic representation, it could be categorized as a ‘hypothesis-generating’ case study (Levy 2008, 5). In one sense, however, I find this categorization unfitting, because ‘hypothesis’ as a word refers to quantitative research and to its epistemological
understanding about what theory is (see Flyvbjerg 2004, 390). In my understanding and in this thesis, theory refers to political thinking that does not evolve through setting and testing hypotheses. Yet, what does fit the definition of hypothesis-generating case study is the fact that I seek to establish a dialogue between political thinking (theory) and something that we see in everyday life in practice (see Levy 2008, 5). While a case study does not produce information that can be formally generalized, it does contribute to overall knowledge accumulation (Flyvbjerg 2004, 394).

Indeed, the strength of the case study methodology is that it produces context-dependent information – it has been asked whether in human life there is any other kind of knowledge to begin with (see Flyvbjerg 2004, 391). When I say case study methodology, and not methods, I refer to the search of meanings and reflexivity rather than to any specific form of research that would aim at establishing causal linkages and hypotheses (see Schwartz-Shea & Freitas 2012, 109; cf. George & Bennett 2005, 5).

One might argue that the context of my study is not Talvivaara but Finnish political culture. This is for the most part true. In addition to being a study of the particular case of Talvivaara and a study of representation, this is a study of the Finnish executive, the Finnish parliament, and Finnish activism. So, what is general is that representational speech can take the forms and the term representation can have the connotations the empirical study here suggests, but whether or not they do so in other contexts will be a matter of further empirical enquiry. Indeed, the generalizability of case study refers to generalization vis-à-vis theoretical propositions, not vis-à-vis populations (Bryman 2012, 71; Yin 2009, 15).

The thesis proceeds in the following way. Chapter two lays down the theoretical basis. It outlines the developments and political thinking that led to something that we today call representative democracy. This was done by introducing the idea of democracy to representative institutions that were established after the French and American revolutions in the 18th century. Institutional frames were set, and distinction to direct and representative democracy emerged. The mainstream of representation research in the 20th and 21st centuries has been based on the standard account of representative democracy, and particularly on Hanna Pitkin’s dealings with the concept of representation. The chapter summarizes the main features in this line of research, including the understanding of democracy embedded in it.

The chapter will further introduce a shift in thinking regarding political representation; that is, the representative turn in democratic theory, or constructivist turn. The turn underlines the importance of indirectness to democracy and calls into
question the interpretation that democracy ever was direct. Based on the representative turn, I will offer my own account of democratic representation. I will further sketch the implications on empirical representation research after the representative turn. Despite of the common ground in the representative turn, the empirical and methodological accounts after the representation turn do not form a unitary understanding of representation. Drawing from the theoretical discussion and from some of these accounts, my approach puts emphasis on representative claims both in institutions and civic activism, as well as on the totality of representative claims, contextuality, and symbolic representations.

The subsequent three chapters (3–5) will examine the Talvivaara case. The first of them, chapter three, concentrates on representation in the administrative–politics nexus. It explores the role of ministerial level, regional state authorities, and municipalities in the Talvivaara case. Politics and administration were intertwined in all of these instances, and the chapter examines the relationship between the two. Space for politics within the seemingly administrative functions is searched for by studying representational speech by ministers, administrative officials and local councilors. The chapter uses the delegation chain model as a general frame and asks how well it explains different actors’ positions and mutual relations in the case.

Chapter four examines representation in the Finnish parliament. It uses a rhetorical conception of parliamentarism as an approach, as opposed to understanding parliament foremost as a legislature. This approach allows me to study the speech and texts put forth within the parliament. I am interested in the role the parliament played in the Talvivaara case. What parliamentary procedures were used for putting Talvivaara onto the parliamentary agenda? How was the case represented? What was the representational speech by MPs like? What was the speech function of the parliament, if there was any? Overall, I will discuss the parliament’s role vis-à-vis its institutional context, again drawing from both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ understandings of representation.

The main task of the chapter five will be to build a case for understanding civic activism as representation. Representative claims made by civic actors will be studied: Whom were offered as representatives? How were representatives and the represented portrayed? What was the audience? In order to understand representations by civic activism in the system as a whole, the reception of representative claims by other actors will also be examined. The concluding chapter (6), finally, summarizes the findings regarding the Talvivaara case, discusses their theoretical implications, and summarizes the answers to the overall research questions.
2 THEORY: TOWARD DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION

2.1 Introduction

This chapter establishes the theoretical approach of the thesis. I proceed in three phases, each addressing representation from different perspectives: as an institutional form that developed out of historical events, as something that takes place within the institutional frames, and finally as an idea.

How do the ideas of democracy and representation, to begin with, relate to one another? Through which processes did democracy come to be understood as representative democracy? Representation as an institutional form, 'representative democracy', developed after the revolutions of the 18th century. Both American and French revolutionaries were suspicious about democracy, and what became institutionalized was not so much democracy, but representation. Nonetheless, particularly thinkers emerging from the French Revolution, Thomas Paine and Maximilien Robespierre, introduced democracy to representation. Gradually, representation became to demarcate a new understanding of democratic regimes, in which elections provided the government with necessary legitimacy. Accountability, responsiveness, and equality were the key words of these regimes.

Researchers of representative democracy have been interested in these aspects of representative regimes. These accounts are here seen as the mainstream of representation research, because they share certain largely approved assumptions of what (good) political representation is and how it is best studied or measured. These assumptions build, among other things, on requiring accountability and responsiveness, and sometimes descriptive similarity between representatives and the represented. Accountability refers to institutional arrangements to keep representatives accountable to the represented, most notably to elections (Manin et al. 1999, 9–10). Responsiveness is the substantial acting of representatives for the represented (Esaiasson & Narud 2013, 4). Representatives can be understood as individuals, such as legislators, or as collectives, such as parties. What is common to these accounts is that representation is approached in the electoral context. This long line of research draws heavily on Hanna Pitkin's work, The Concept of
Representation (1972, orig. 1967). Hence the examination of this mainstream research will begin by introducing Pitkin's account of representation.

After introducing Pitkin's idea, I will discuss representation as an essentially democratic idea. This means tracing alternative accounts of representation both within political thinking and in history. I will argue that the indirectness of representation and symbolic representations made mainly in speech are indispensable for politics, and as such indispensable for any democratic politics. From this perspective, it is suggested that representation should be approached not simply as a frame or one-to-one relationship, but as representational speech. This idea differs not only from the 'old', traditional understanding of representation, but also from some of the empirical studies that have taken the representative turn as their baseline. I will explain my own account vis-à-vis these studies. This account will be adopted as the starting point for the empirical inquiry in the subsequent chapters.

2.2 Democracy and Representation: Developments

2.2.1 A short history

We owe our understanding of democracy to a state of affairs we can detect in history. The usual point of reference are Greek city states where demokratia flourished around 450 BCE (see e.g. Dahl 2015, 11; Dunn 2005, 24). However, democracy is of older origin. It has been traced back to the bronze age civilization around 1500–1200 BCE in Peloponnese. There dāmos meant powerless people who had common land and damokoi an official who acted on behalf of the dāmos. Assembly-based democracy had been invented even earlier further east in the area where Syria, Iraq, and Iran are now situated. (Keane 2009, xi.)

Westerners tend to refer to the Greek etymology when defining democracy; rule of the people, demos and kratia combined (Held, 1987, 2; Sartori 1987, 21). Democracy as a political system was in Greek distinguished from monarchy, in which one person made the decisions, and aristocracy, in which a few made the decisions (Mayo 1970, 28). The meaning of democracy is equally searched from the institutional arrangements that were at place in ancient Greece. A distinguishable feature was that the polis was governed by an assembly composed of adult male citizens. However, the origins of this ‘assembly democracy’ dates further back and was to be found all around from Indian subcontinent to the Phoenician empire.
(Keane 2009, xvi). In Greek city states, the differentiation between the rulers and the ruled was not as sharp as today, although the two were by far not the same. (Dahl 2015, 11–2; Sartori 1987, 280–1.)

The story of democracy often travels from Greek city states through the Roman republic, Renaissance Italy, and even Scandinavian forms of local assemblies by Vikings to modern representative democracies following the great revolutions of the 18th century (see e.g. Dahl 2015, 7–25; cf. Keane 2009, 880). Our current understanding of democracy includes the idea of representation, hence the term representative democracy. Like ancient democracy, also this form of democracy can be traced back to historical events and periods of time.

Representation does not derive from political realm etymologically, nor did it exist as a term in the ancient Greek world. The term dates back to a Latin word *repraesentare* that in Rome referred to a sum of money meant for compensating a debt. The noun *repraesentatio* referred to representations of an outside world. In theater, representation meant wearing a mask. (Brito Vieira & Runciman 2008, 6–8.) The term representation was used with a new meaning for the first time by the theologian Tertullian (lived approximately between 155–230) who used it to refer to the son of the holy trinity as the repreasentor of God. Repraesentare denoted an idea that a single entity could be understood to represent the many. The first to attach representation to the idea of authorization was pope Gregorius I (590–640). By the Middle Ages, three understandings of representation had developed: descriptive representation, symbolic representation, and representation as authorization or delegation. (Ibid, 9–10.)

As parliaments started to develop, they were instruments of rather than constraints to royal power. In England in the pre-revolutionary period the king required shires and boroughs to send a delegate to represent the localities in collecting extra taxes. This was considered an undesirable duty, not a privilege. Representation was imposed from above, not from below, and parliament was there to provide consent to the king. (Brito Vieira & Runciman 2008, 15; Pitkin 1972, 3; Pitkin 2004, 337.) The revolution of 1640 and later the Glorious Revolution of 1688 changed this dynamic, making parliament the primary locus of power and the monarch subordinate to it. Since 1688 the parliament had to convene at least once a year to decide on taxation, and the king had to seek the approval of the parliament for legislation and finance. Additionally, certain freedoms were guaranteed, such as the freedom of speech, of the press, and of political association. (Birch 2001, 83.) The English revolutions did not lead to new institutions as such but instead changed the relationship between existing institutions.
The English-speaking world, overall, took democracy to mean the presence of people in government through the House of Commons. People thus participated, and this participation was not understood to be very different from the participation of people in government in ancient Greece. But democracy was not used to depict participation of all, but participation of common people in addition to monarchy and aristocracy. This conception derived from the ancient distinction between monarchy, aristocracy and democracy – the one, the few, the many. (Wood 1992, 93.)

The American revolutionaries of 1776 did not intend to abandon this division, but it was manifested with the institutionalization of governors, upper houses or senates, and houses of representatives. However, in Pennsylvania this theory of 'balanced government' was rejected, as governors and upper houses were taken to imply the existence of monarchical and aristocratic aspects that the revolution was supposed to have abolished. They thus established a single legislative body without a governor or senate. This led to a turmoil that did not settle until the constitution was changed. The upper house was justified through saying that it was not a way to restore aristocracy but that the representation of the people was doubled by it. Bicameralism became explained through division into two legislative branches rather than as an embodiment of social estates. As a result, other elements in the government could now be understood as different representations of the people, including governors and even judges. (Wood 1992, 94–5.)

Nonetheless, the idea that a political body would represent the people was not initially connected to democracy. Democracy, instead, was dismissed as an ancient form of rule that was not possible or even desirable to be realized in the modern states. For Madison, one of the founding fathers of the United States of America, democracy referred to unstable systems unable to protect property rights and individual freedom. Representation was seen as an alternative to democracy. (Budge 2006, 1; Sartori 1987, 288; see Madison 1961, 81.) In France, the central ideas of the revolution of 1789, such as representation, popular sovereignty, nationalism and citizenship, were neither conceived nor presented as democratic. Rather, instability, violence, rule of the mob, and destruction of property were associated with democracy and thus understood in a very negative light. Moreover, *demos*, the people, was not perceived to include everybody, but the poor multitudes, thus having social rather than political meaning. (Hobson 2008, 452–3.)

For these reasons, the French revolution was not about democracy (ibid, 453), but about representation. The French idea of representative government was formulated by Abbé Sieyès, a political theorist and central figure in the revolution. For him, the main goal of the revolution was to establish the rule of the third estate.
Unlike the first and the second estate, the nobility and the clergy respectively, the third estate did not form around privileges but included producers of basic goods, labourers, dealers, merchants, and those in a variety of occupations ranging from artista and scientiata to menial workers. The third estate was the nation, and the nation excluded anybody in a privileged position. These privileged, for Sieyès, did not derive their power from the people but they were concerned with their own private interests, which could not form the basis for the nation. The picture of the nation highlighted productiveness, commonness of laws, general interest, and common representation. The freedom of the third estate derived from freedom based on the rights of citizens, not from privilege. (See Sieyès 1789.)

Representatives of the third estate were to be drawn from amongst itself, so that they would be equipped to “interpret its wishes and defend its interests.” In the Sieyès’ vision there were restrictions to political freedom, as minors, women, tramps, beggars, and non-naturalized foreigners were not included. This was nonetheless not a problem, because those who took interest in public affairs and trained for public office did not have interests other “than that of the rest of the people”. (See ibid.)

Sieyès understood the general will to be the same as the will of the majority when votes were equal. For this reason, votes were not to be counted by orders but by heads. The aim of voting was to “bind all representatives together by a single common will”. Sieyès’ idea echoes the principle of free mandate, not in terms of the source of authorization (voters) but in terms of the orders. The common will would be constituted as a result of individual wills, not as a result of factional wills. (See ibid.)

In France, the nation was regarded as sovereign instead of the people. The National Assembly was to embody the will of the nation, and individual representatives were no longer regarded as delegates of individual interests. They were voices of the nation. (Birch 2001, 80–1.) Yet, for Sieyès, collective will did not exist apart from the representational body that gave it its form, and only through representation did the people become a political subject. This was a deviation from the views of some Parisian revolutionary fractions in whose view the people only existed as direct gatherings on the streets. (Rosanvallon 2013, 191–2.)

In America, prior to the revolution of 1776, representation was understood through the mutual interests between the representative and the represented, not something resulting from elections (that simply took place simultaneously with representation). Hence, deriving authority from the people was not understood as representation, because elected senates and magistrates presumably did not share same interests with the electors. In any event, this understanding was to be changed,
since the Americans resisted the idea that they would be represented in the British House of Commons whether they voted or not, and taxation resulting from this idea. In America, representation hence became to be understood more and more as something emerging from elections, voting itself creating the necessary tie between the representatives and the represented. This idea of representation was prevalent among Americans by the 1780s. All different elements of government, such as the president, state and federal officials, national senators, state senators, governors, and even judges, were henceforth understood as representatives of the people. (Wood 1992, 96–7.)

Yet, unlike in France, the American founding fathers did not use representation as a means to depict or symbolize the will of the newly born nation. The power was distributed not only vertically but also horizontally, and hence the places of power were multiple. Power was not undivided. (Brito Vieira & Runciman 2008, 38.) The federalists insisted that representatives should be chosen based on their virtue, not based on some descriptive similarity with the electorate, which was the option advocated by the anti-federalists. For the federalists, representation was a tool of the government, not simply a way to restrict the government. (Ibid, 40–1; cf. Birch 2001, 75.)

The American and French revolutions thus did not initially entail the idea of democracy, but ideas about republic and representation. According to Christopher Hobson (2008) the first thinkers to explicitly tie representation and democracy together were Thomas Paine and Maximilien Robespierre, both central figures in the French revolution (ibid, 451). Until these writers, democracy was understood as a part of a mixed government, something that would at most complement aristocracy and the king (ibid, 453). Paine, however, contrasted a republic consisting of 'government by election and representation', with monarchy or aristocracy, governed by 'hereditary succession' (ibid, 457). Republic for him was not a form but a principle of government, and the most appropriate form to realize the res-publica, the public good, was a representative system. Further, what led the ancient democracies to fall was the inability to introduce representation. Democracy was for Paine, unlike for his contemporaries, desirable, yet impractical in large polities. In his view, it was possible to remedy this impracticality with the help of representation. This would make democracy compatible with the modern state. Representation would detach democracy from being 'simple democracy', and a representative system would be more rational and practicable than simple democracy. (Ibid, 458–60.)

Maximilien Robespierre was the leader of both the Committee of Public Safety and the Jacobins during the turbulent and violent later years of the French
revolution. He was the first statesman in the modern era to speak in favor of democracy (Hobson 2008, 461) – for which reason democracy earned a bad reputation for decades to come (Sartori 1987, 288). What Robespierre did, however, was that he used the term democracy as a synonym with republic. Republic, at the time, was understood in a positive light, and hence first steps to understand democracy in the positive light as well were taken. The crux of Robespierre's concept of democracy was that it was about neither direct rule, nor direct democracy in Greece. Instead, democracy for him was essentially representative. Representative democracy was about the virtuousness of delegates and sufficient identification between the representatives and the represented. This conception essentially justified the terror Robespierre executed during his reign: demos was limited to the virtuous, and anybody else could be labelled as a threat and thus sent to the guillotine. (Hobson 2008, 462–5.)

In summary, the English, American and French revolutions all had their influence on how representative democracy became understood from the mid-19th century onward. In England, it was a question of power distribution and relations between the parliament and the king, whereas the truer revolutions in America and France introduced representation as a republican idea. This republican idea was about something belonging to everybody, rather than only a part of the people, such as was the case with the idea of the demos in the ancient concept of democracy. The former implies the common good, the latter a political subject. (Sartori 1987, 287.) Nonetheless, the American revolution dissolved the people as a social estate, thus making a distinction between society and the state – unlike before, the people was everywhere (Wood 1992, 97–8). The foundations of representative democracy as an idea, then, were laid by Thomas Paine and Robespierre, both influential thinkers and actors in the French Revolution, as they combined the two concepts. The understanding that people were everywhere later helped their incorporation into a representative system that now had become to be understood democratic.

Gradually, democracy became understood as representative democracy, and elections as the defining factor in it. The distinction between direct or participatory (ancient) democracy and indirect liberal (representative) democracy is commonplace (see Hansen 1991, 1; Held 1987, 4–5; Keane 2009, xv). Advocates of ‘direct’ or ‘participatory’ democracy want to see people participate directly in decision-making, whereas ‘indirect’ or ‘representative’ democracy is about people choosing representatives to decide on their behalf (Keane 2009, xv).

Our understanding of democracy today has been characterized as the ‘standard account of representative democracy’ (Urbinati & Warren 2008, 389). It departs from
two key sources. First, liberal, constitutional regimes were transformed into mass democracies by the introduction of universal franchise. Secondly, the new form of government enabled a balance between ruling elites and democratization of society, political parties taking the place of parliaments as the places of representation. (Ibid; Castiglione & Warren 2006, 1.) From these sources follow four further features that are attached to the meaning of representation in the context of representative democracies:

1. Legitimate power and those who exercise that power are separated by elections that create a principal–agent relationship between territorially defined constituencies and their representatives (Urbinati & Warren 2008, 389).

2. "[E]lectoral representation identifies a space within which the sovereignty of the people is identified with state power" (ibid). Only when people were understood to be represented by their governments it became possible to say that where representative governments rule, people rule (Brito Vieira & Runciman 2008, 5).

3. Responsiveness of elected representatives and political parties to the people is ensured by electoral mechanisms (Urbinati & Warren 2008, 389).

4. Universal suffrage guarantees political equality (ibid). In England, the franchise was extended to almost every adult male citizen in 1867–85. The period also saw a reform of the seat and constituency system and efforts to tackle electoral corruption. (Birch 2001, 84–5.) For the right to vote in France there was a property qualification from 1791 to 1848, and after that the franchise was extended to the entire male population. (Ibid, 81.) Later, as we know, restrictions concerning gender were removed. (For a concise description of the standard view, see Lord & Pollak 2013a, 517–8.)

Election, responsiveness, universal suffrage, and equality have hence so far been the key words of representative democracies. Authorization and accountability are associated with election (Manin et al. 1999, 10), whereas responsiveness can be understood to take place in between elections (see Esaiasson & Narud 2013; Esaiasson et al. 2013; Manin et al. 1999, 9). What constitutes an antithesis for this standard account of representative democracy is the non-representative democracy in ancient Greek cities. As presented above, the crucial difference between ancient
and modern democracies has to do with directness of the former, and indirectness of the latter. Representation, as understood in the context of the standard account, creates a distinction between rulers and the ruled – a distinction that did not feature in the ancient democracies. (See above; Sartori 1987, 280, 283.)

2.2.2 Criticisms of representative democracy

As is rather well known, representative democracy has its critics. Perhaps the most well-known critic was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. For him, democratic forms of government presupposed a small state, unified manners and morals, and equality in terms of fortune and social rank. (Rousseau 1968, 113.) Moreover, democracy through representation was not possible, because will could not be represented. People, for Rousseau, were free only on election day. (Ibid, 141; Bellamy & Kröger 2013, 478.) This criticism, to be sure, was presented before the large-scale founding of representative systems across numerous states in the late 19th and during 20th centuries.

Hannah Arendt was very critical of representative government and explained her criticism in On Revolution (2006) by reference to the way representative governments were established after the American and French revolutions. In both of them unitary representative government was to replace town hall meetings (America) and councils, popular clubs, and sociétés (France). For Arendt, the fight of Jacobins against popular societies took the form of a fight for "a unified public opinion, a 'general will" against public spirit fostered in the popular societies. This was also a fight for the absolute power of the government and rebuttal of federalist principle of division and separation of powers. Popular societies were crushed because they were competing against public power. (Ibid, 237–8.)

For Arendt, the core features of town hall meetings, popular clubs, societies, and councils were spontaneity, self-selection, discussion and exchange of opinions, as well as their distinctness from parties. They were places for people that did not belong to any party. As parties were for execution, not action, the function of parties was opposite to that of councils. Knowing was the privilege of party experts, whereas people were left to simply apply the knowledge, as if they would not have had the capacity to act and form their own opinions. For Arendt, this marked a crucial loss of a space of freedom. (Ibid, 256.) Moreover, parties either preceded revolutions or were founded along the extension of universal suffrage, and thus did not form as a result of revolutions. Hence the party is seen as the provider of popular support for
parliamentary government, in which the people is understood as the supporter (delegator) and the government the actor. (Ibid, 263.)

Arendt was deeply suspicious of representative government and the party system it fostered. Representative government was bad because it re-established the division between the rulers and the ruled, making the people simply selectors of their rulers. The party system was the epitome of factional interest and as such in opposition to discussion and the exchange of opinions by men that were free to participate in popular societies. She directly opposed action and participation to representation, parties being the organs of representation, and councils the organs of action (ibid, 263–4, 265). Even if the party system had evolved to be different, still the distinction between rulers and ruled would have remained as the core feature of the representative government. For Arendt, elections cemented this distinction.

Proponents of direct democracy today construct their account of democracy as an opposition to representation – the problem with representation is its indirectness. Because directness is seen as the decisive element in the 'real' democracy of Athens, representation by definition appears antithetical to it (Hobson 2008, 450). This account has been sustained by for instance Bernard Manin (1997), for whom election is not democratic but aristocratic. This account is backed by the assertion that the Athenian democracy did not know election, as those functions of the polis that were not covered by the assembly (for example magistrates, the Council, nomothetai) were filled by citizens elected by lot. Lot is seen by Manin as an equal method of selection, whereas election necessarily benefits the wealthy and talented. The principle of distinction is for Manin the crucial element in representative government, and it was knowingly instituted by the central figures of American and French revolutions, the founding fathers and Abbé Sieyès, respectively. (Ibid, 8, 23–4, 79.)

As it appears, representation and democracy do not easily go hand in hand, which becomes apparent when the first moments of modern representative democracies are examined through revolutions. Indeed, the relationship between representation and democracy is uneasy (Pitkin 2004). For both Arendt (2006) and Manin (1997), the problem is the distinction between the rulers and the ruled, and for Manin additionally the inequality of election as a selection mechanism for representatives. Arendt stressed spontaneity, self-selection, and discussion and exchange of opinions as preconditions for political action. Freedom was not to be understood as private freedom but public freedom. Without politics understood as public freedom for all, party-dominated representative systems lapsed to mere bureaucratic management. The distinction Arendt made was not just about republic and representation, but also
about politics and bureaucracy. The former belonged to a republic (a desirable form of government), and the latter to representative systems (not desirable).

Is the contradiction between representation and democracy insurmountable? In the following, I will tackle this question in the context of contemporary approaches to representation, democracy, and representative democracy. I will proceed in two phases. In the first phase the account of representation by Hanna Pitkin, author of the seminal The Concept of Representation (1972) is presented. It is probably the single most referred piece in the field and has functioned as the basis for almost all empirical research on representation in contemporary democratic systems. This phase continues with an outline of ‘mainstream of representation research’, as I have named the research tradition here. In the second phase, both Pitkin's account as well as the mainstream research are critically scrutinized. This scrutiny outlines the main developments in recent democratic theory in terms of representation and its implications on empirical representation research.

2.3 Mainstream Representation Research Today

2.3.1 Representation according to Pitkin

A popular point of reference in both empirical and theoretical representation research is Hanna Pitkin's The Concept of Representation (1972). It is an indisputable classic and has inspired both empirical and theoretical research. To set the table for the examination of the concept, I will start with a summary of Pitkin's work. This summary will serve as background information for what will be said about representation in the following pages.

Pitkin defines representation (not just political representation) as “the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact” (Pitkin 1972, 8–9; emphases original). She notes that this simultaneous being present and not being present is a paradox, and hence a dualism is built into the very essence of the concept of representation.

According to Pitkin, authorization and accountability have been presented as central features in representation by some thinkers. Thomas Hobbes and other advocates of the authorization view stated that representation occurs when somebody with power to act renders this power to somebody else who then is authorized to act on behalf of the other. By giving the power to act to somebody
else, the represented becomes responsible for the representative's actions as if his or her own. Representation cannot be good or bad; it either is or is not. Everything taking place after the authorization and happening within certain limits is considered representation by default. (Ibid, 30–1, 39.) For accountability theorists, by contrast, it is not sufficient (though necessary) that the representative is authorized at the outset of representation. For them, a representative is someone who is held accountable, who is responsible to somebody for his or her actions. For authorization theorists, elections mean the granting of authority, whereas for accountability theorists a person is representative because and as long as he or she is subject to reelection or removal from office in the next election. (Ibid, 55–7.) Authorization and accountability can be understood as frames that initiate and possibly end representation.

What happens within these frames, nevertheless, is another question. Pitkin divides the concept into two by stating that it can be approached either by asking, what the representative does, or what he or she is like (i.e. how he or she has to be) in order to be a representative. She describes the difference between these views with German words vertreten (to act for another) and darstellen (to stand for another). She begins her scrutiny from the latter and names it descriptive or symbolic representation. (Ibid, 59.)

According to Pitkin, it is a common view that a legislature should resemble the represented in its composition. Here representation is seen as standing for something and does not contain any idea of action. The advocates of proportional representation have been most keen to further this view. According to them, without the similarity between legislature and the people, representation does not occur at all. The key for them is the representativeness of the legislature. (Ibid, 60–3.)

Another mode of representation understood as standing for is symbolic representation. In symbolic representation, the resemblance is not important, unlike in descriptive representation. What matters is that the representative somehow symbolizes the represented. Here we come also to inanimate objects such as flag (representing nation) or fish (representing Jesus Christ). The symbols in question do not claim anything about their referents. What creates a symbol as representative are people's attitudes and beliefs that it really symbolizes the thing they believe it to symbolize. Hence, for Pitkin, symbols rest on the emotional, affective, and psychological responses rather than on rationally justified criteria. (Ibid, 99–100.)

To summarize, the formalistic views put emphasis on the institutional mechanisms, such as elections, and descriptive and symbolic representation state something about what the representative should be like. Nonetheless, they fail to tell
anything about the substantive action of representing, let alone about any criteria for good representation. It follows that a view concerning representation as acting for others, or as substantive acting, is needed. (Ibid, 112–5.) Pitkin starts by pointing out that an actor is independent, as opposed to acting for which indicates dependence. Consequently, it is possible to speak about a ‘free agent’, or an agent who acts on behalf of someone else, a ‘mere agent’. As representation entails a dimension of acting for, it contains a dimension of dependence as well. (Ibid, 112, 125–6.)

The level of dependency is probably the most disputed aspect of representation as acting for. Pitkin calls this dispute the mandate–independence controversy. This involves the question as to whether a representative should be instructed and tied with a mandate, or whether he or she is free to act according to his or her discretion (see also Christiano 1996, 213). A mandate theorist considers representative as a mere agent, a delegate, as someone who is subordinated to his or her sender. For an independence theorist, the representative is a free agent, a trustee, an expert who should be left alone to do his or her work. (Ibid, 146–7.) This question is interesting, since the answer, as Pitkin remarks, implies the respondent’s thoughts on the nature of political action, the capacities of the rulers and the ruled, the nature of society and humans, in a word, on metapolitics. (Pitkin 1972, 145, 166–7.)

Pitkin states that there lies a paradox in the controversy: a man cannot be said to be a representative if he constantly acts against the will of the represented. But if he only implements direct orders so that his conduct does not include any action, it cannot be said to be representation in that case either. Consequently, Pitkin argues, representation entails both of these aspects. (Ibid, 151–3.) Indeed, the represented has to be present in the representation, but yet absent. The representative has to be active, but only to the extent that the represented can still be said to be acting through the representative. (Ibid, 154.)

In conclusion, Pitkin holds that the concept of representation entails acting for the best interest of the represented. In Pitkin’s view, the representative has to be responsive to the represented, but at the same time he or she acts independently and his or her actions include discretion and judgment. It is the representative who acts, but the represented has to be understood as capable of independent assessment. As

1 The first independence theorist was Edmund Burke. In his speech to the electors of Bristol (1774) Burke advanced a view that a parliament should be understood as a deliberative promoter of the whole nation’s good rather than as a congress of ambassadors furthering their own districts’ interests. He highlighted that a representative should not sacrifice his reason and judgment to the opinion of his constituents. His view was rather elitist as he deemed that representatives were better equipped to know the interests of their constituents than they were themselves. This has become to be referred to as the Burkean or virtual notion of representation (Mansbridge 2003, 522) and it encompasses the question of instructed or free mandate, or the delegate–trustee controversy, also pondered by Pitkin.
a general rule, there should occur no conflict between the representative and the represented. If a conflict takes place, the reason for it has to be explained. (Ibid, 209–10.)

Thus, Pitkin lands with a manifold understanding of representation. The required level of communication between the represented and the representative depends on how objective the representative considers the interests of the represented to be. If the objectivity is high, little communication is needed. Instead, if the represented is the only person conceived to be able to define his or her interests, active consultation becomes necessary. For this reason, there is no one right answer to the question concerning the delegate–trustee controversy. (Ibid, 210.)

Politics always involves trading and compromises, which makes facts and rational arguments relevant. For Pitkin, this makes representation necessary. Representation is not needed if only scientific facts are used or if a question to be solved is wholly arbitrary and no negotiation and rationalization is required. The mandate orientation presupposes that the representative sticks to the instructions given by the represented: the representative cannot solve disputes with other representatives. Representation understood as acting, in contrast, makes politics possible. (Pitkin 1972, 212–3.)

She further argues that political representation is mainly public and institutional action. It is not any single act and the actions of individual representatives have to be understood in an institutional context. Only in relation to this context does the representative's action constitute representation, if it does constitute it. (Ibid, 224–5.)

### 2.3.2 Mainstream representation research since Pitkin

When searching for meanings given to representation in contemporary empirical research, the typologies summarized by Pitkin lurk here and there. Almost all research on the connection between citizens, elections, and policy-making can be understood under the umbrella term of political representation (Powell 2004, 274). The totality of empirical representation research has been divided into studies that address translating citizens' votes to seats in legislatures, and studies that address the substance of representation (see ibid). While this is one way of categorizing the research, the following will outline the major pioneering studies in the field – and present the basic starting points of the long and deep tradition of mainstream (the 'old') representation research. The ultimate aim is to discuss the common underlying
assumptions in this tradition and to show that they indeed exist, regardless of the variety of studies made.

Pitkin's (1972, orig. 1967) theorectization was preceded by studies by Eulau et al. (1959) and Miller and Stokes (1963). Together with Pitkin, these two studies set the tone for empirical representation research for decades to come. While the study by Eulau et al. clearly preceded Pitkin, Miller and Stokes already referred to Pitkin's account of the mandate–independence controversy in her then unpublished doctoral dissertation (see Miller & Stokes 1963, 45). As the study by Eulau et al. utilized the Burkean notion of representation, as did Pitkin, they too can be seen to share similar points of reference. I deem the long line of empirical representation research to have started around the time these three intertwined pieces were published. While Pitkin operated on the theoretical side of the concept, the studies by Eulau et al. and Miller and Stokes were committed to operationalizing it. Hence, they took their bearings from the sphere of empirical research.

Eulau et al. (1959) considered it useful to divide the Burkean notion further to the focus and style of representation. The focus of representation referred to the what questions; what was being represented? The style of representation comprised of the how questions; is the representative free to rely on his or her own discretion and deliberation with others in making decisions, or should she or he be bound by an instructed mandate? In making this analytical distinction, the writers wanted to stress that it was possible for a representative to represent the electoral district instead of the whole nation (focus) while feeling that she or he had discretion in her or his hands (style). The focus and style were brought together under the term ‘role'. The task for the researcher was set to “eliminate those particular ambiguities in the concept of representation which concern the actions or behavior of representatives, by use of the concept of "role", and to demonstrate the utility of this approach for further research relevant to the theory of representation.” (Eulau et al. 1959, 744.)

In the empirical inquiry by Eulau et al. the role orientation categories were constructed based on representatives’ answers in four American states to an open-ended question, “How would you describe the job of being a legislator—what are the most important things you should do here?” The categories constructed based on the answers were trustee (representative as a free agent, follows his own judgment), delegate (commitment to following instructions of constituents), and politico (flexibility between role orientations according to subject matter). (Ibid, 749–50.) Eulau et al. acknowledged that it was impossible to find a person who would represent all the people in her or his constituency in terms of attitudes and opinions, but nonetheless the constituency might be a reference point for the representative
in her or his representative task. (Ibid, 747.) Thus, the concept of role separated the representative’s understanding of the representative task from the quest for accurate representation in terms of opinions, as the latter was considered impossible. Further, it was noted that different foci needed not be mutually exclusive (ibid, 745).

Eulau et al. (1959) and the role orientation studies taking the tradition further have been non-normative at core in the sense that they have been simply interested in what elected representatives think about their roles – whom they deem to represent and how. The study of Miller and Stokes (1963), by contrast, sought to establish the degree of constituency influence to the work of congress representatives (Miller & Stokes 1963). In their study, the policy positions of representatives were ranked according to their interview responses and roll call votes on three policy issues: social and economic welfare, America’s involvement in foreign affairs, and civil rights. A similar ranking was done of the representatives’ district voters, and these two rankings were then compared. The research hence had a normative starting point.

It was concluded that the American system had elements of the Burkean ideal, instructed-delegate orientation, and responsible party model (see below). According to the study, the political issue at hand defined the style and focus of representation. It was also noted that several district patterns, for instance party competition, influenced the way representatives were linked to their districts. (Ibid, 56.) It was stated that constituencies could control the representatives in two different ways: either by choosing a representative who shared the constituency’s views and thus when acting according to own convictions acted according the constituents’ will. In the other option the congress representative would have a perception of the constituency opinion and would follow that. (Ibid, 50.)

Miller and Stokes, however, noted that representatives had significant difficulties in making a correct judgment of constituency opinion, and they usually had communications with organized interest groups and politically savvy individuals in their districts, so their perceptions of the district were heavily biased. The representative–constituent linkage was seen to be complicated by a number of factors, such as economic interests, local party, the media, nationality organizations, and so forth. The fact that voters were in general poorly informed about national politics was seen as a constraint for them to control their representatives. (Ibid, 54–5.)

Studies that draw on Eulau et al. have addressed role perceptions of representatives (e.g. Gunlicks 1969; Katz 1997; Reingold 2000; Studlar & McAllister 1996), preferences of role perceptions of the represented in terms of their
representatives (e.g. Bengtsson & Wass 2011), and research comparing the perceptions between the representatives and the represented (e.g. Converse & Pierce 1979; Méndes-Lago & Martínez 2002). For example, in Katz (1997), MEPs were asked whether they, in a conflict situation, would follow the instructions of their EP group, their national party, or their own conviction. Esaiasson (2000) asked Nordic representatives to rate the importance of specific interests, namely that of their constituency, party, private citizens, wage-earners, women, youth, pensioners, businessmen, immigrants, farmers, teetotalers, and Christians.

The focus categories used in most of these studies derive from a long history of theories of representation (Esaiasson 2000, 55). Geographical representation, that is, the focus of territorially defined constituency, conceptualizes representatives as persons who express the perspectives of their electoral districts. The liberal theory of representation, on the contrary, takes its bearings from the Burkean notion, and suggests that representatives should represent the whole nation. A third form sees representatives as representing corporative interests in terms of different possible interest groups, such as those listed above by reference to Esaiasson. Finally, the category of representing the party sets off from the so-called responsible party model, in which representatives are seen as advocates of party platforms. (Ibid, 55–6.)

This approach predominates in many ongoing studies. A joint multi-national project, The Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS), asks candidates running for office to evaluate on a scale from one to four how important it is to represent different foci. The foci given are own voters in the constituency, all citizens in the constituency, the party electorate at large, members of a specific social group (for instance the young or elderly people), and the whole country citizenry. The question is included in the core questionnaire for years 2013 to 2018 and the participating countries include 28 European countries and Canada. The idea is to produce comparable data from different countries through the use of the same core questionnaire. (CCS 2015.)

While studies on representative roles draw from Eulau et al’s (1959) work, studies on congruence were initiated by Miller & Stokes (1963). Congruence between citizens’ preferences and policy-makers’ actions has been presented as a central feature in liberal democracies. This has further been attached to the normative quest that electoral competition should ensure legislators do what citizens want them to do. (See Huber & Powell 1994, 291.) Policy representation has been said to be "the single most important aspect of political representation" (Esaiasson 1999, 113) and
"In the long run, congruence between elite and mass on politicized issues should eventually occur" (Holmberg 1997, 279).

Since Miller and Stokes (1963), congruence has been conceptualized as opinion congruence (Mattila & Raunio 2012), policy congruence (Carman 2006; Andeweg 2011), issue agreement (Holmberg 2000, 155), issue congruence (Arnold & Franklin 2012; Holmberg 1997, 271; Louwerse 2012), issue representation (Powell 2004, 289), policy representation (De Sio & Franklin 2012, 1364; Holmberg 1989, 4; Miller 1999, 1), and ideological congruence (Belchior 2010; Golder & Stramski 2010). These terms are roughly the same, although the emphases differ slightly, varying from congruence in terms of individual issues to congruence in terms of ideological dimensions. In terms of ideological congruence, for instance, it has been stated that congruence is well suited to measure representation and that “representation occurs if the elected MPs share the ideological positioning and policy preferences of those citizens who voted for them”. (Belchior 2010, 122.) Additionally, congruence can be understood under the term ‘representativeness’, meaning a normative property between constituency’s opinions and those of its legislators (see Achen 1978, 477). Normatively, following this approach, increasing congruence amounts to increasing, thus better, representation (Andeweg 2011, 39).

In this vein, representation has been understood as aggregation of preferences into a collective opinion (Kuklinski & Segura 1995, 10), as translating individual interests into policies (see Ezrow 2010, 3), as reflecting preferences of voters in election outcomes (Gallagher 2014, 20), and as expression of the views of citizens by elected representatives (Herrera et al. 1992, 186). In other words, because leaders emerge as a result of elections, it becomes meaningful to evaluate “the quality of representation by measuring the extent to which the electoral connection produces a policy connection, usually as reflected in significant agreement between citizens and elected leaders or governing parties on specific issues or a general ideological dimension.” (Manion 1996, 736.) Indeed, the terms interest (see Ferejohn 1986, 8), will (of the people) (see Louwerse 2012, 1251), preference (see Golder & Stramski 2010, 90), and (public) opinion (see Wlezien & Soroka 2012, 1407) are central to studies on representation. Depending on the emphasis each study takes, representation is normatively required to translate one or more of these aspects into policy decisions.

What combines these aspects is the concept of responsiveness. In the following I will elaborate the concept and elements attached to it.
Pitkin was successful in capturing the concept of representation in such a way that empirical researchers since have been able to draw from the multiple aspects she attached to the notion. It has been stated that Pitkin’s notion of representation as acting in a responsive manner has “motivated nearly all empirical work” on representation and that “to most scholars, responsiveness is what representative government is all about”. (Kuklinski & Segura 1995, 4.) It has been noted, among other things, that “[t]he responsiveness of government policy to citizen’s preferences is a central concern in normative democratic theory (Page & Shapiro 1983, 175), and that “[r]epresentative democracy is a delicate system fundamentally built on trust and a fine-tuned balance between political leadership and responsiveness” (Holmberg 1997, 281). It is the decision-makers’ responsiveness to citizens’ wishes and preferences that is taken to make representation democratic (see Powell 2004, 273).

Nonetheless, the question of what responsiveness is exactly is not easy to answer. One suggestion includes four instances of responsiveness: policy responsiveness, service responsiveness, allocation responsiveness, and symbolic responsiveness. Policy responsiveness means congruence between legislators’ policy decisions and constituents’ opinions. Service responsiveness, in turn, refers to services rendered to individuals or groups in the constituency, whereas allocation responsiveness is about gaining benefits for the constituency. Finally, symbolic responsiveness moves on a more symbolic level, creating support and a sense of trust between the representative and the represented. (Eulau & Karps 1977, 241.) On this view, opinion congruence is only one piece in the puzzle, and in order for representatives to be fully responsive, all sorts of communication and action are required.2

Indeed, responsiveness and accountability are not the same. While responsiveness entails certain openness of legislators vis-à-vis their constituents and their demands, accountability can simply refer to institutional arrangements for keeping representatives accountable, most notably through elections. (Manin et al.

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2 Eulau and Karps (1977) are somewhat vague in that they do not specify whether all of these instances of responsiveness need to be met in order for representation to occur, or whether it is simply a matter of choosing which aspect the researcher is interested in. On one hand they say, ”’[t]here are four possible components of responsiveness which, as a whole, constitute representation.” (Ibid, 241.) On the other hand it is stated, ”’[t]here is no intrinsic reason why responsiveness in one component of representation cannot go together with unresponsiveness in another” (ibid, 247). In the former statement representation is exhausted to the concept of responsiveness as understood through the four dimensions, whereas in the latter responsiveness is not normatively required in terms of all the dimensions. It is hence unclear whether the writers talk about the definition of representation or normative requirements for it.
Authorization and accountability, in other words election, creates the frame, but responsiveness takes place within the frame and between elections. It is about the substantial acting for the represented by the representatives. (Esaiasson & Narud 2013, 4.)

Lately, rather than putting emphasis on preferences of the represented and responsiveness to them, responsiveness has been conceptualized as something that is foremost about communication between representatives and the represented. These deliberative and communicative aspects of the representational relationship include demands that citizens make, motivations for these demands and justifications given by representatives for their actions in controversial issues. It does not require a starting point where citizens' preferences would be exogenous (see Kuklinski & Segura 1995) to the political process itself, but allows their preferences to be affected by representatives. In these terms, responsiveness includes a promise for communication, and not simply adaptation in the short term. It is a procedural, not substantive, requirement for representation. (Esaiasson et al. 2013, 20–5.)

Responsiveness understood in terms of individual legislator's actions moves on the micro level of dyadic representation. Dyadic representation refers to the relationship between individual representatives and their constituency. It is distinct from collective representation that refers to collective bodies, such as legislatures or parties, as people’s representatives. (Herrera et al. 1992, 186; Weissberg 1978, 535). The following section presents different approaches that depart either from the dyadic or collective account of representation.

Individuals or collectives as representatives?

A macro conception of representation, contrary to the dyadic representation account, refers to the influence of public opinion to representation. Indeed, for some, public opinion is the heart of representation (see e.g. Ezrow 2010, 4; also Pitkin 1972, 224). Here, contrary to Esaiasson et al’s procedural account of responsiveness, the requirement for responsiveness to public opinion is about the substance of representation. Representation is seen as a dynamic phenomenon, meaning that changes both in public opinion and in policy-making at large take place in time and the relationship between the two is dynamic, that is, changing (Kuklinski & Segura 1995, 14). In other words, researchers are interested in the dynamic changes in public opinion and the effects of the changes on government policies. It is a question of whether or not the directions of public opinion and policy are congruent (Page & Shapiro 1983, 176). Representation is taken to exist when a
change in public preferences results in a change in policy acts. It is about responsiveness of a government to the electorate as a whole, not about individual legislators or parties as representatives. (Stimson et al. 1995, 543; Page & Shapiro 1983, 176.)

Another central dispute is about whether representatives should be taken as individuals or party-collectives (Esaiasson 2000, 51). In the individualist approach, individual legislators are the object of analysis, whereas the party-collectivist approach sees parties as the main representative actors. In other words, the former takes individuals to be such important actors that it is necessary to research their actions, opinions and representative roles, whereas the latter sees individual legislators simply as executors of their party platforms. For advocates of party-collectivist approach it makes little sense to ask individual legislators how they define their task or what their personal opinions on issues are. This distinction springs partly from different theoretical perspectives, and partly from different electoral and political systems. Burke’s legacy, the delegate–trustee controversy, has turned the research focus on individual representatives, whereas turning attention to the role of parties has been offered as a more accurate account particularly with regard of Western European political systems. The individualist approach is usually applied in American studies and the party-collectivist approach in Western European studies. (Ibid; Dalton 1985, 269–70, 278.)

The party-collectivist approach is synonymous with the responsible party model. In the model, members of parliament are supposed to act within and according to party blocks. The relevant constituency is usually not electoral district but party voters. Parties are deemed representative on the precondition that party elite’s opinions and actions coincide with party voters’ opinions. (Dalton 1985, 278, 280–1.)

In normative terms, the responsible party model poses certain criteria for the system. Elections need to produce competition between two or more political parties and parties need to offer alternative policy options. Voters need to be adequately informed so that they can reward or punish parties. In this way, national elections function as opportunities to hold political parties accountable. While in office, members of parliamentary party groups need to act in unison to implement party platform. Hence, parties occupy a central position in controlling the government and parliamentary work, of which voters are aware. (Ibid, 270; Thomassen & Schmitt 1997, 168, 180–1; Schmitt & Thomassen 2000, 319; Thomassen 2013, 23–5.)

The responsible party model reflects the mandate theory of representation insofar as it assumes parties to translate party supporters' opinions into policies. Studies
stressing the influence of territorial constituencies are likewise based on the understanding of representatives as delegates, but in the two the agent varies: in the former it is party, in the latter an individual MP. (Pierce 1999, 9–10.)

The individual approach has been defended even in party-centered Western European systems (see Esaiasson 2000, 51–2). It has been claimed that parties function as an arena for debate in which individual actors play a role. A unified party line does not emerge from the void. Parties also feature a division of labor within them, putting individual actors in positions of varying importance. MPs can additionally function in different capacities not restricted to implementing party policies. (Ibid, 52.) Again, depending on the researcher’s account of representation, either an individualist or collectivist approach can be adopted.

*Social representation*

Apart from roles and congruence, researchers have been interested in social representation. It can also be understood under the term representativeness, although not in relation to opinions but to socio-demographic characteristics (Holmberg 1989, 3). Research on social representation departs from the normative assumption that parliament should be a microcosm of the nation with regard to salient social cleavages, such as class, gender, and region (Gallagher 2014, 24–5; Norris & Franklin 1997, 185). It is closely related to Pitkin’s notion of descriptive representation. Socio-demographic representativeness of a legislature has been considered important because it lends symbolic legitimacy to the legislature, and because it can be seen to influence behavior, priorities, and attitudes within the legislature. (Ibid, 185–6; Narud & Valen 2000, 91.)

Mirroring is important not only in terms of social characteristics, but also in terms of beliefs, values, and opinions. The rationale is that the representatives should not just be like the represented, but also act like the represented would act — a rationale to be found in congruence research. This has been termed the populist view of political representation, as opposed to the liberal theory of democracy. In the liberal theory, representatives are thought of as independent actors in the Burkean spirit. (Narud & Valen 2000, 83–4; Thomassen & Schmitt 1997, 168.) Some commentators, for example, have studied the extent to which increased number of women in legislatures affects its policy outcomes (see Carroll 2001; Celis 2006; Dolan 1997). This links social representation to substantive representation, defined by Pitkin as substantive acting for the represented, as opposed to representation as merely standing for.
The question of the populist versus liberal view of representation dates back to Burke, and was reiterated by Pitkin in the mandate–independence controversy, and has indeed occupied researchers since. Pitkin noted that the whole question of mandate or independence is wrongly put, as in order for representation to occur, the representative cannot simply take direct orders, nor can he or she be totally detached from the represented. She concluded that representation entails both aspects. (Pitkin 1972, 151–4). The two poles of the controversy – taking direct orders or being handed full discretion – have been understood in terms of populism and elitism. On the populist view, no others than citizens themselves are equipped to make decisions that bind themselves, whereas the elitist view is highly prejudiced in terms of the capabilities of citizens to make wise decisions. According to Esaiasson and Heidar, the populist view taken to its extreme “runs counter to the very idea of representative democracy and turns into a plea for direct democracy and popular referenda”. (Esaiasson & Heidar 2000, 9–10.) It has also been stated, “[t]oo much leadership leads to elitism, too much responsiveness leads to populism” (Holmberg 1997, 281).

In spite of the centrality of responsiveness and the wide acceptance of it as the starting point for democratic representation, at the end it entails a slippery slope. The same holds for the conceptualization of representation either as mass-driven or elite driven (Schmitt & Thomassen 2000, 320), or as representation from below versus representation from above. Representation from below refers to following the public opinion, whereas representation from above means that representatives have a decisive role in molding public moods (Esaiasson & Heidar 2000, 9; Andeweg & Thomassen 2005, 511–2). In general, the ideal is that in order for representation to be good, or democratic, it needs to derive from below, from the people. This is reflected in the accounts that define representation as translating public preferences, opinions, interests, or will(s) into policy decisions (see above; Costello et al. 2012, 1227; Lehrer 2012, 1295).

However, researchers have been baffled by the fact that people might not hold stable preferences and that their preferences might be manipulated by organized interest groups or other elites (Page & Shapiro 1983, 175; cf. Esaiasson et al. 2013 above). If people do not know what they want, how could they effectively control their representatives (see Miller & Stokes 1963, 54)? Indeed, control has been seen as a central feature in representation (Achen 1978, 478–9; see e.g. Mitchell 2000, 336) to the degree that it has been stated that congruence between citizens and elites without control is representation by chance and not democratic (see Dalton 1985,
Inversely, findings that voters do hold preferences has been used as an argument for studying citizen perspectives in terms of the roles they wish their representatives to have (see Bengtsson & Wass 2011, 144). There seems to lurk an ideal of the represented as a precondition for ‘genuine’ representation.

A notable exception is Holmberg (1997) who considers representation from below (mass-driven) too idealistic (see also Thomassen 2013, 34) and representation from above (elite-driven) more realistic and at least potentially democratic – if democratic systems feature freedom of speech and free elections. (Ibid, 280–1). Acknowledging the fact that public opinion does not form in a vacuum, outside political context, has led some researchers into considering the way and extent to which the public is responsive to policymakers (see Hakhverdian 2012, 1390; Wlezien & Soroka 2012, 1407). This seems to confuse the definition of responsiveness further and carry it away from its original meaning – that it is about power holders’ responsiveness to citizens, such that citizens are able to control what is being done in their name. Nonetheless, the approach taking into account the shifts in public opinion, as is the case in studies on dynamic representation, seems more realistic in that it does not treat public opinion as static. It just loses its normative function along the way. This raises the question: Will researchers have to choose between, on the one hand, an unrealistic and mythical approach that takes public opinion or general will to exist somewhere readily translatable to policies, or, on the other hand, with a more realistic, non-normative approach that sees public opinion as ever-changing? I will return to this question later in this chapter.

2.3.3 **Empirical representation research and democracy – an evaluation**

As may be seen from the lines above, empirical research on political representation has adopted multiple approaches. The major disputes in the field relate to individualist versus collectivist approaches, to citizens’ preferences as exogenous versus endogenous to the representative process, to representation from above versus from below, to the focus of representation (party or territorial constituency, for example) and to populist versus liberal theory of representation (or democracy). While these disputes relate to the definition of responsiveness, responsiveness as such has seldom been questioned as the bedrock norm for democratic representation (Disch 2011).

The above studies show that representation is something that exists because of elections. Following from that, political science takes legislatures and legislators, and
possibly governments, as the representatives. In empirical studies the connection
between representation, democracy and elections is characterized with the term
representative democracy. As representation is thought to be found outside
democratic regimes as well, what makes representation democratic is the act of
election under the equal principle of one man, one vote. In other words, “[i]n a
democracy, representation presupposes election”. (Lane 2009, 370.) Representation
starts and (potentially) ends in elections (Manin et al. 1999, 16; Pitkin 1972, 234).

According to this account, a system that builds around elections frames the
overall understanding of representation. Authorization by the people is related to
delegation of the people’s power, its sovereignty, to its representatives (Müller et al.
2006, 3). This agency theory, while borrowed from the economic realm, portrays
delegation and accountability as the decisive elements in representative political
systems. Delegation and accountability are understood as essential elements in
representative democracies – their functioning, good or bad, determines the
functioning of the whole democracy. Parliamentary government is there to organize
delegation and accountability in modern democracies. (Strøm 2000, 267; Müller et
al. 2006, 4.)

The sovereignty of ’the people’ is therefore enacted through delegation of power
by citizens to representatives in elections. The representatives (or a parliament as a
collective) further delegates the power to the government (and prime minister), who
in turn authorizes cabinet ministers. Civil servants, occupying the other end of the
chain, get their authorization from the cabinet ministers. In this chain of delegation
voters are the ultimate principals and members of parliament their agents. With
regard to the government the parliament becomes the principal. This logic reaches
the end of the chain where civil servants are the ultimate agents. The chain of
accountability runs in the opposite direction, from civil servants ultimately to
citizens.³ (Curtin 2007, 524–5; Lupia 2006, 34, 36; Müller et al. 2006, 3; Saalfeld 2000,
354; Strøm 2006, 65.)

Representation is further seen as indispensable in large-scale societies where
everybody cannot participate in decision-making all the time (see Mitchell 2000, 337;
Sartori 1987, 283; Strøm 2000, 267). Perhaps it is because of this necessity (and

³ For Pitkin, this is one account within “formalist views of representation,” although rather than to
speak of delegation and accountability she speaks about authorization and accountability. (Pitkin 1972,
43–4, 55–6.) It is noteworthy that delegation and authorization are not the same; delegation entails an
idea of moving something (political power, popular sovereignty) from somebody to someone else,
whereas authorization lacks such implication. Thus, Pitkin does not suggest that in the act of
authorizing there would be something readily transferred, but authorization (in regimes called
representative democracies authorization usually means elections) simply permits an agent to act in
the name of the authorizer.
undesirability) of delegating power that both accountability and responsiveness are thought to be crucial in making representation democratic (see Kitschelt 2000, 845). Accountability and responsiveness are required of elected representatives, of legislators. These requirements are incorporated into the normativity of the agency theory.

The agency theory entails, in the first place, an idea that agents in different links of the chain ought to act according to the interests of the principal. If this is not the case, the chain is taken to malfunction.⁴ (Ferejohn 1986, 8; Geys & Mause 2012, 255; Müller et al. 2006, 19; Strom 2000, 269.) This is a problem with regard to democracy, as it is understood to prevail as long as citizens are able to both select and control their representatives. (Strom 2000, 267; Strom 2006, 55.) Second, the idea is that representatives make decisions on behalf of citizens and in their name (Müller et al. 2006, 19, 21), that delegation turns popular will into decisions (Gailmard & Jenkins 2009, 324; Stimson et al. 1995, 543). Third, the logic of delegation arises from the fact that democratic decision-making in large-scale societies cannot be otherwise organized. This is due to lack of resources (time, for example) and competence. (Strom 2000, 267; Strom 2006, 56–7; Lupia 2006, 33.)

Representation has, in a sense, a dual meaning in the empirical representation research. On the one hand, representation occurs self-evidently as a result of elections, making members of parliaments representatives and voters the represented, while on the other hand, researchers ask questions about whether representatives (genuinely) represent, or whether legislatures are ‘representative’. To illustrate, consider the following expressions:

“Does the European Parliament represent its electorate?” (Marsh & Wessels 1997, 228.)

“The major tendency is for people of middle-class background (in educational and occupational terms) to be overrepresented in parliament, while the lower strata are correspondingly underrepresented.” (Narud & Valen 2000, 102.)

Obviously, both passages refer to the quality of representation, not to a matter of fact produced in elections. Representation connotes at once a certain institutional frame (representation resulting from elections) and normative quality requirements within that frame. The quality can be understood, for instance, through opinion

⁴ The term agency loss is sometimes used to depict the situation where the chain malfunctions. According to this account, agency loss can take place as a result of adverse selection or moral hazard. In the former, citizens elect representatives that are not equipped or willing to act in the best interest of the principal. In the latter, on the other hand, principals are not able to keep the agents honest and diligent. (Müller et al. 2006, 23.)
congruence or descriptive similarity, as discussed earlier in this chapter. This dual meaning of representation is at times evident in Pitkin's dealings with the concept as well: authorization and accountability demarcate the frames of representation, within which representation can be good or bad. Her final definition of the term, representation as substantive acting for the represented, leaves the question open as to whether not acting for the represented makes representation bad or dissolves representation altogether.

At any rate, Powell (2004) summarizes this account in three sentences:

“Democratic representation means that the actions of these policy makers are supposed to be responsive to the wishes of the people”. (Ibid, 273.)

“Democratic representation means that votes for parties should correspond to the seats those parties win in the legislature.” (Ibid, 274.)

“Democratic representation means that citizens' issue preferences should correspond to the positions or behavior of their representatives.” (Ibid.)

What Powell says is not simply a reiteration of what desirable representation is, but he gives to these quality requirements another attribute: democratic. In other words, in order for representation to be democratic, requirements x, y, and z need to be met: responsiveness, transformation of votes into seats, and opinion congruence. Similar accounts that explicitly connect representation to democracy may be found elsewhere as well:

“In addition to clarifying various aspects of how scholars currently conceptualize congruence, we introduce a new conceptualization and measure of congruence that captures a long tradition in democratic theory emphasizing the ideal of having a legislature that accurately reflects the preferences of the citizenry as a whole.” (Golder & Stramski 2010, 90; emphasis added.)

“Classic works on democratic representation define democracy in terms of a systematic opinion–policy link (Dahl 1971; May 1978; Pitkin 1967). According to these authors a polity cannot be called democratic unless a reliable public influence on government action exists.” (Hakhverdian 2012, 1386; emphases added.)

It is not entirely clear which tradition Golder and Stramski exactly refer to, as they have not used references in making their remarks. Out of the three references used by Hakhverdian, it should first be noted that Pitkin (1967/1972) did not offer a theory of democracy but a theory of representation. To present Pitkin as an advocate of “systematic opinion–policy link” is a misrepresentation of her multifaceted work. On the contrary, representation for Pitkin did not mean total correspondence between representatives and the represented, nor was her definition of
representation simply about influence on government action, that is, policy congruence. Instead, she held that in order for representation (not democratic representation) to take place, the representative needs to be able to act independently, yet in a responsive manner to the represented (Pitkin 1972, 209–10). As shown above, responsiveness has since taken on multiple meanings, as opposed to unequivocal influence or congruence.

Second, May’s (1978) article was about the definition of democracy, not about the definition of democratic representation (ibid, 12). Granted, the definition can be read in the context of representative democracy, albeit it is noteworthy that he talks about governance, not government. In that case, however, his definition of democracy lands in contradiction with Pitkin’s definition of representation. For Pitkin representation is making present something which is not present in fact (Pitkin 1972, 8–9); representation does not exist where representatives take direct orders from the represented (ibid, 151–4), and representatives need to be able to act independently. For May (1978, 3), in contrast, “[p]ure or perfect democracy exists where absolutely necessary and perfect correspondence exists between every act of governance and the wishes of every person who is affected”. May’s definition does not leave any room for independence. Hence Hakhverdian cannot make the assertion he makes by referring to both of the scholars.

Hakhverdian’s or Golder and Stramski’s statements are of course not isolated but reiterated in many empirical studies on representation. Sometimes the connection made between representation and democracy is more implicit than here, but is nonetheless there. The words democracy and representation are also often used interchangeably:

“Democracy, it can be argued, does not only require that the decisions that are made reflect the will of the people, but also that the opinions and interests of the people are taken into account in the actions that representatives take.” (Louwerse 2012, 1251.)

In the passage, representation is self-evidently taken to precede democracy, that is, the passage would not make sense, if democracy was understood as something that

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5 In this passage and directly after it May made a distinction between democracy as an ideal-type and democracy that “exists in greater or lesser degree”. He did not argue that democracy would only exist where the condition of perfect correspondence was met, but that democracy could be evaluated as a matter of degree, by assessing as to what degree there is or is not correspondence. Hence regimes could be labelled more or less democratic, and absolute democracy was to be found where perfect correspondence existed. (May 1978, 3–4.) Nonetheless, if Pitkin’s definition of representation is also taken as an ideal-type, that ideal-type does not include total correspondence.
did not first entail election of representatives. This account, of course, has been widely criticized by proponents of direct democracy.

This criticism emerges from understanding the decisive difference of directness and indirectness in ancient and modern democracies, respectively. While democracy was direct in ancient Greek cities, all modern democracies are indirect in nature. In the direct democracy citizens participated directly to the governing of themselves, in exercising power, while indirect democracy is merely about limitation and control of power. In modern democracies, there is a distinction between those who govern and those who are governed, between the state and citizens. In direct democracy of ancient cities, to the contrary, while the rulers and the ruled were not identical, the differentiation between the two did not have any significant meaning. Furthermore, direct democracy is taken to demand for presence and personal participation of citizens and cannot thus build on absence. (Sartori 1987, 280, 283.)

Based on the discussion above, it seems that empirical representation research has for a long time sought for this directness in the representative relationship: something in society, whether understood in terms of interests, will, preferences, or opinions, needs to be translated as directly as possible into policies. The concept of representation put forth in these accounts is about policies, either about policy preferences of representatives, understood primarily as legislators, or actual decisions regarding policies. Following this lead, the democratic value of representation lies in its potential ability to transform peoples’ preferences to public policies. Representation is seen as delegation of power and as a medium to introduce democracy to large-scale societies. On this view, it is responsiveness and closeness between legislator-representatives and the represented that are normatively required.

This general idea is reflected in the varying empirical representation studies that follow the traditional understanding of representation. These I have dealt with so far in the chapter. This is also a paradigm that now appears to be changing in political thought. I now turn to this 'new' understanding of representation within democratic theory.
2.4 The Representative Turn in Democratic Theory

2.4.1 Contents of the representative turn

A new line of thinking in democratic theory has recently emerged, namely the representative turn (Näsström 2011), or the constructivist turn in political representation (Disch 2012). Näsström describes the turn as a "renewed interest in the concept of representation" in her review of four books (Urbinati 2006; Saward 2010; Brito Vieira & Runciman 2008; Shapiro et al. 2009). In her wording,

"[t]heorists have long discussed the role of representation for democracy. Among other things, they have asked what representatives are supposed to represent (i.e. ideas, identities, interests) and how they should do so (i.e. delegate, trustee). But while this discussion typically proceeds on the assumption that there exists a legitimate constitution in the background which renders stability and direction to the analysis in question, the discussion today is of a more fundamental kind. If representative democracy is understood as a constitutional system in which the people expresses its will through general and free elections the core message of the books under consideration can be summarized in three theses: that representation is not just a matter of will, but also a matter of judgment, that it is not just constitutional, but also constitutive, and that representation for these reasons can be non-electoral as well as electoral." (Näsström 2011, 502; emphases original.)

While the books under Näsström's review are key works for the representative turn, the turn includes a number of other writings as well. The contours of the turn are far from clear, and I have here exercised discretion with regard to what to include. In general, I have included writings that operate within the democratic theory and share at least some elements mentioned by Näsström: judgment, constitutive nature of representation, and non-electoral representation. In this regard, the representative turn can be said to have begun with an article by David Plotke (1997) in which he quite directly addresses the relationship between representation and democracy by stating that "Representation is Democracy". All the same, the constitutive aspect of representation is nothing new (see Phillips 1993, 1995, 1998; Seitz 1995; Butler 1999). With this in mind, in what follows I will explain the contents of this renewed line of thinking in detail.

The representative turn takes its bearings from the observation that representative democracy is no longer something that it used to be. Scholars have noted that representation takes place not only in legislatures but also in administration, in civil society by self-appointed representatives, in non-
governmental organizations, and in the global context across borders of nation-states (see Urbinati & Warren 2008, 388; Näsström 2011, 501; Warren 2013, 270). These observations hold that something is happening in societies that is fundamentally changing the way representation is or should be understood.

The 'old' understanding, or the standard account of representative democracy (Urbinati & Warren 2008, 389), emerged from two key ideas. Firstly, liberal, constitutional regimes were transformed into mass democracies by the introduction of universal franchise. Secondly, the new form of government enabled a balance between ruling elites and democratization of society, political parties taking the place of parliaments as the places of representation. (Ibid; Castiglione & Warren 2006, 1.)

The basic question relates to that of the represented, the constituency. When representation is approached from a perspective that understands elections as decisive in initiating representation, territorial constituencies become privileged as the source of authority. At the same time, several issues are extraterritorial, such as immigration, global trade, and the environment. Other issues are non-territorial, such as ethnicity, religion, nationalism, recreation, and professional or gender identity. Residency-based constituencies arbitrarily set residency-based interests to the center of political conversation and make people a demos only in relation to their geographically defined interests and identities. (Urbinati & Warren 2008, 389–90, 396–7.) The 'one man, one vote' principle allows no other considerations in terms of group identities or interests in the context of the electoral system (Williams 1998, 4).

While electoral systems are static in this regard, research has taken note of different groups as the foci of representation. Empirical representation research has been interested in the question as to which groups legislators say they represent (see e.g. Esaiasson 2000), and the representative relationship between a legislator and possible constituencies other than that of his or her electoral district, such as sexual minorities, has been termed surrogate representation (see Mansbridge 2003, 522–3). While electoral systems do set certain frames for representation, mainly in the form of electoral districts and citizenship, representatives in legislatures do not necessarily follow institutional borderlines but determine freely their foci of representation. Representation, and being a representative, then, is formally defined in constitutions and in the law, but plenty of room for acting within those boundaries exists. These approaches are a step forward from the classics of Eulau et al. (1959) and Miller and Stokes (1963) in that they do not take the territorially defined constituencies or nation-states as the only possible foci of representation.
Yet, they still remain in the sphere of forms that representation might take, particularly in the context of elected representative institutions, and seek to define ever new possible typologies to make sense of representative relationships. (Saward 2006, 298.) Both the representatives and the represented are taken as given. The representative turn challenges the view that constituencies would exist apart from the representative process itself – hence constituencies are understood as constituted (see Lord & Pollak 2013a, 519). The thrust of the idea is that what is claimed to be represented is defined with symbols and images in the process of representation. When ready categories are given to representatives to choose from, to tell which categories the representative represents, no room for analyzing the construction of the categories is left. Instead, the question of how the represented is portrayed is disregarded. (Saward 2006, 301.)

The crucial difference between the long line of empirical representation research, based on Pitkin’s notion of responsiveness and springing from Eulau’s et al. (1959) and Miller’s and Stokes’s (1963) studies, and the representative turn is that representation – as understood after the representative turn – is not simply an institutional form but an idea and a process. The concept of the representative claim (Saward 2006; 2010) moves representation understood as policies implemented by elected representatives to politics itself. The representative claims framework suggests that representation is about making public claims of who are or ought to be representatives, who are the represented and how the represented should be understood. As a result, the constitution of people requires simplification, suppression of differences, and choosing some aspects over others as the object of representation. This creates an image of the represented, which is assessed by an audience. The audience can either accept the claim or reject it, thus not every claim is successful in creating representation. (Saward 2006, 302–3; Pollak et al. 2009, 8.) The relevant question is, what consequences does the evoking of representations have. The representations might have consequences on both who is deemed as a legitimate representative and how communities or groups of people understand themselves as a force for political action. (Saward 2010, 9, 26.)

In this account, elected representatives are only one category of would-be representatives – the making of representative claims is open to anybody. A state has, not only a distinct capacity to represent us, but also a distinct capacity to

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6 Formally, an understanding based on representative claim entails "a maker of representations" putting forward a subject, which "stands for an object", which is "related to a referent". In other words, someone claims that 1) you are (part of) this audience, 2) you should accept this construction – this representation – of yourself, and 3) you should accept me as the person for acting and speaking for you. (Saward 2006, 302.)
misrepresent us. To capture ever changing views and to represent them completely is not possible. Thinking that a state represents all in the state requires symbols of unity, and even if they capture something from reality, they are always necessarily selective. Electoral representatives have a captive constituency, meaning that every citizen in a given territory is formally structured to electoral districts. Compared to non-electoral representatives, this lessens the work to be done, since this structural context dictates there are specific interests attached to the constituency. But these are matters of claim-making, not matters of fact. (Saward 2006; 303; Saward 2009, 5–6; Saward 2010, 90, 92, 103.) Elected representatives, by virtue of them having been elected, cannot escape the inevitable partiality of their vision of the represented. Nor should we demand that from them, or normatively privilege them as makers of representations. Saward states that "[a]ll claims to speak for also speak about; all claims that speak about can also be understood, however indirectly, as claims to speak for." (Saward 2010, 49.)

Representation, making present something which is nevertheless not present in fact, is aesthetic and performative (Ankersmit 2002b; Pollak et al. 2009, 13). It is aesthetic and performative in that it is about proposals of how to view reality. It organizes knowledge rather than presents it as it is. In aesthetic representation, the legitimate source of political power lies in representation. Political reality exists only through representation, not before it. This aesthetic quality of political representation makes power visible and invites control over power. (Ankersmit 1996, 39, 48, 55; Ankersmit 2002b, 36.) The represented does not have a meaning free from a political, economic, and cultural context (Pollak et al. 2009, 18; Saward 2008, 94; Saward 2010, 17). Representative claims create meanings, and this is essentially political (Pollak et al. 2009, 19).

So, why would this 'new' conception of representation be any more democratic than the traditional understanding of representative democracy? Is the relationship between representation and democracy no more uneasy? Plotke (1997) argues that representation is intrinsically democratic. He criticizes Pitkin for understanding representation as opposed to presence. According to him, this neglects the relational and abstract elements in political representation. Moreover, representation is not about replacing the represented, but about the agency of both the representative and the represented. His definition of representation is standing for “in a relation of mutual interest”. These mutual interests or preferences are not ready-made but subject to interpretation, and this interpretation is what makes representation democratic. (Plotke 1997, 27–9; Cf. Rehfeld 2006, 1–4; Rehfeld 2011, 631.)
It is the gap between the representative and the represented, the indirectness of representation, that is essential to its potentially democratic quality. This is a view held by, among others, Frank Ankersmit (2002a; 2002b) and Nadia Urbinati (1998; 2000; 2006). For Urbinati, this indirectness is manifested in the form of public speech:

"Speech is a means of mediation that belongs to all citizens, linking and separating them at the same time. Speech interjects individual ability into politics and lifts the veil of unanimity and sameness. It gives meaning to voting, which presumes evaluation and discrimination among articulated options." (Urbinati 2000, 765.)

I suggested earlier that the representative turn takes its bearings from the current political landscape that is different from what it used to be, as the concept of constituency has become more fluid than before (Saward 2010, 109). However, research into the origins of both ancient democracy and representation suggests that it is not simply a question of a changed reality, but also a question of what democracy and representation were about to begin with.

Even the directness of Athenian democracy can be and has been questioned. In the Athenian ekklesia some 6,000 men were present simultaneously (that was the number of people that fitted into the gathering place, the Pnyx I, and later Pnyx II), out of the population of some 25,000–43,000 adult male residents (depending on the time and source) in the fourth century. (Finley 1987, 73; Hansen 1991, 130–2; Hornblower 1992, 13.) Additionally, only a few of them participated actively. Everybody had the right to speak, but few did. Indeed, Athenians have been divided into three categories based on their political activity: to the passive ones, those who never took part in the assembly or volunteered in other state functions; those who participated in the assembly, served in the nomothetai (legislative board) and as jurors but who merely listened and voted; and finally, those who spoke and made initiatives, often referred to as the 'politicians of Athens'. (Hansen 1991, 267–8.) Although there was no formal delegation of sovereign power by citizens, "they nevertheless practiced some form of mediated participation insofar as their assembly was actually run by the orators", as Nadia Urbinati (2000, 764; emphasis original) puts it. The orators could not be taken to speak just for their own behalf, as the assembly was a stage for antagonistic and corporate interests, and in that sense the orators spoke for something or someone. (Ibid.) Hence it is indeed indirectness that brings Athens and modern democracy together (Urbinati 2000, 765).

Moving centuries forward, it has been argued that J. S. Mill was an advocate of proportional representation not because it would perfectly mirror something outside representation, but because proportionality enabled equal presence of different
views and opinions in deliberation. The principle of representative democracy for him did not mean an arithmetic calculation of different interests and fractions in the society and their translation into seats, but it entailed a deliberative dimension. In this regard, he deviated from his father, James Mill, who defined representation as an aggregation of interests, linking them to the search of objective truth. J. S. Mill, on the contrary, combined in his account the principles of equality and liberty, the expressiveness of individuals. Representative government was not a system for people to govern indirectly, but a system where political action had to be subjected to public control and scrutiny. (Urbinati 2000, 769–70, 772.)

Benjamin Constant’s and James Madison’s central thought was that the main function of a representative government was to multiply and challenge claims to represent the people. The aim or rationale of the representative government was not that it would represent the will of the people as a whole, as if it could be found in an election or a poll. Instead, the multiplying of representative claims would make it clear that no one claim could completely represent the people, and thus made centralization of power difficult. (Garsten 2009, 91.) The American and French revolutions deviated from each other in the respect that in America plurality was stressed, while in France it was the National Assembly that was to embody the nation as a whole. However, Sieyès thought that the people would only gain its form through the representative body and that it would only through representation become a political subject (Rosanvallon 2013, 192).

Further, although the genealogies of democracy and representation are separate, the parliamentary forms of representation in Britain since the 17th century indicate that participation and representation were not mutually exclusive in the wake of parliamentarism. Associations, clubs, and unions were participatory, representative institutions that competed with the parliament for the right to speak for the people. Petitions directed at representatives at Westminster repeatedly claimed to speak in the name of the people, unlike the corrupted power holders of Westminster, and signing of petitions included individuals into this collective political action. The boundaries of formal and informal representation were fuzzy, and there was no unitary thinking that parliament would exhaust the voice of the people. The potentially participatory state hence provided multiple representative moments and overlapping institutions, each of which could legitimately claim to represent the audience. (Knights 2009, 35, 38–9, 51, 53.)

While in Athens the important speech function took place in the Assembly, in modern societies it takes place through the media. In Athens, citizens were visible in the Pnyx, whereas in representative democracies the presence is symbolic,
constructed, and constantly fostered. Speech gives shape and structure to the citizen body and the 'general will'. Hence representation is on the same continuum with participation, and not just instrumental in the sense that it would help translate something 'out there in society' into decisions in the legislative body. (Urbinati 2000, 766–7, 774; for the mediated nature of direct democracy, see also Budge 2006.)

Representation as a democratic concept cannot do without speech. Thus, representation cannot be understood as mere delegation of decision-making power, and parliaments cannot be understood simply as legislative bodies (which the Athenian assembly was neither [Hansen 1991, 151–2]). If parliaments are treated as something that should plainly aggregate opinions into decisions, its function as the enabler of democracy becomes overridden. It is not the only locus of representation (and speech), but still it is one of the most central. Putting emphasis on speech does not bracket advocacy as a feature in representation. Representatives interpret public interest from different viewpoints. (Urbinati 2000, 774–5, 778.) Hence,

“[r]epresentation is a comprehensive filtering, refining, and mediating process of political will formation and expression. It models the object, style, and procedures of political competition and action. It helps to depersonalize claims and opinions, which in turn allows citizens to mingle and associate without erasing the partisan spirit essential to free political competition or obscuring the majority/minority divide. Modern democratic society resembles a vast and webbed agora in which, to paraphrase Immanuel Kant, no deed or issue remains unheard, cast away from the peoples’ eye of the mind and judgment. Representation is intrinsic to this world of attention and indirectness. It can never be truly descriptive and mimetic of social segmentations and identities because of its unavoidable inclination to transcend the “here” and “now” and to project instead a “would-be” or “ought-to-be” perspective that translates almost naturally into advocacy.” (Urbinati 2006, 6.)

Here the gap between representation and the represented is not a distortion, incorrectness, or a conflict. Nor is the represented independent from its representation (Ankersmit 2002b, 113–4). Political representation is not needed for an intermediary to assemble the whole nation to make political decisions in the national agora. Rather, political representation produces the conception of political reality, the represented, without which political reality is shapeless. It is representation that allows democratic politics. (Ankersmit 2002a, 115.) Representation allows ‘the people’ to be constructed over and again, and the openness of this never-ending struggle is what makes representation democratic (this is Claude Lefort's view; see Näsström 2006, 329–30, 334).

What is pivotal here is the plurality of representative claims, and deliberation and speech as the sources of that plurality. Saying this means that representation has to
be examined anew, from a perspective that is not confined to accounts taking the representative or the represented as given. In this vein, representation, or representations, portrayals of the represented and the reality, allow space for politics, and politics further (potentially) allow democracy. I hence argue, in the vein of the representative turn, that the essential features in the concept of democratic representation are:

1. Indirectness and communication it invites;
2. Symbolic representations of the representative, the represented, and reality (made in speech and by visual images), rather than a one-to-one relationship; and
3. Politics that representation makes possible, in other words the ability to transcend the here and now and imagine new worlds, as opposed to bureaucratic and administrative ways of thinking.

If communication is understood as central to the concept of representation, representation can be understood as an idea that creates space for politics. It is public discourse that produces value to democratic politics, both in the ancient and modern world (Urbinati 2006, 5). From this perspective, representation is not second-best to democracy (Castiglione 2012, 518) but it is in fact essential to it (Urbinati 2006, 4).

The key to democratic representation in this framework is the ability to 'read back' the offered representations (Saward 2006, 304). At the same time, in order for the democratic ideals of equal freedom to participate and speak (see e.g. Arendt 2006; Laycock 2004, xi; Phillips 1995; Urbinati 2006) to be realized, the making of representative claims needs to be open to everybody. Hence representative government needs to be clearly distinguished from political representation. (Saward 2009, 3.) Representative government and representative democracy refer to a certain institutional form that results from elections, whereas political representation and democratic representation are about political action that is not confined to any institutional form. This is the central difference between 'old' and 'new' understandings of representation.

Indeed, if representation is defined simply as institutions resulting from elections, democracy can never be anything but a poor accessory to otherwise undemocratic representative government. Elections allow, and even in some cases invite apathy rather than agency from the part of citizens. (Urbinati 2006, 14–5.) On the contrary, if representation is viewed from the perspective that transcends it as a one-to-one relationship (Ankersmit 2002b; Urbinati 2006, 5; Runciman 2009, 27) and instead
scrutinizes it in the context of the society as a whole, one begins to see its value to political participation. Participation is no longer understood narrowly as decision-making and voting, but as deliberation and judgment. Representation hence makes democracy's self-creation and improvement possible. (Urbinati 2006, 16; for a detailed theoretical analysis on the connection between political representation and deliberation, see Rinne 2016.)

This self-creation has to include an ongoing contestation of what the people is (see Näsström 2006, 329–30), thus avoiding attempts to try to define it. Hence, understanding representation as potentially democratic has to do with politics itself, with speech that allows the self-creation. Any research on representation that does not take this into account is destined to fall into the trap of ripping representation off of its very democratic nature by trying to collapse the represented with the representative. These kinds of attempts are bound to lead to either elitist or populist accounts of representation, neither of which can be identified with democracy.⁷

The aggregate view of representation – the view that representative institutions should simply aggregate people’s interests that readily exist outside the institutions and translate them into policies – sidelines the perspective that interests exist in relation to the very institutions that are supposed to translate them. From this it follows that political acts that transform the institutions also transform the interests. If the existing institutions are simply expected to reflect something that exists outside them, they cannot function as vehicles in unraveling and changing structural inequalities. Hence the constructive nature of political institutions need to be duly taken into account. (Hayward 2009, 121, 124.) In this regard, the deliberative functions of institutions that construct interests are not only something that need to be tolerated, but are indeed desirable. Institutions should make power relations open for contradiction and revision (ibid, 129).

So, what would be a correct measurement for democratic representation? It has been suggested that reflexivity would be a more apt 'bedrock norm' for political representation than responsiveness (see Disch 2011). In this account, in order for representation to be democratic it should mobilize objections, either explicit or implicit, from those that are claimed to be represented. Thus, there should not exist

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⁷ A populist conception of democracy stresses that there should be an immediate identity of those that govern and those that are governed. In populism, institutions such as elections and the parliament carry only an instrumental value in realizing the will of the people. (Urbinati 1998, 110–1, 116–7.) Because of this, a populist account of democracy does not allow contestation of the concept of 'the people'. Representation as communication, by contrast, does not only avoid the pitfalls of confusing democracy or democratic representation with populism, but it also rejects those elitist accounts by for instance Schumpeter that are ready to accept apathy as a virtue of ordinary people (see ibid, 114–5).
a body that could or would claim to represent the people conclusively. This suggests political culture should encourage people to contest initiatives coming from formal political institutions, such as the government and political parties. Mass media, advocacy groups, and other opinion shapers would be in a central position in making representative claims plural. (Disch 2011, 111; Garsten 2009, 107.) Disch (ibid) further states that the contestation of formal politics and objections should be regularly and formally taken into account in political institutions.

We now see a clear shift in political thinking concerning (democratic) representation. The key words for the paradigm that have manifested in empirical research since the 1950s are elections, legislatures, interests, preferences, opinions, will, policy, congruence, roles, trustee, delegate, and responsiveness. The paradigm sketched in the wake of what has been termed the representative turn in democratic theory, to the contrary, understands representation through words such as indirectness, communication, speech, interpretation, claim-making, symbolism, constructedness, polity as a whole, politics, and reflexivity. The former is interested in the forms representation takes within certain institutions, and representation is defined as a matter of fact resulting from elections. The latter understands representation as constitutive and potentially creative action that can take place both within and outside institutions, both by elected and non-elected actors.

### 2.4.2 Re-reading Pitkin

Is the representative turn something that contradicts Pitkin? Michael Saward has criticized Pitkin for encouraging the question, what makes the representative representative. The main focus is hence in the representative, not in the represented. This, for Saward, is an unnecessarily restricting point of departure and has led to an assumption that the represented would have clear and stable interests. Saward explains that Pitkin presents the represented as a transparent entity, while in reality its nature, preferences, boundaries, interests, and priorities can almost always be disputed. (Saward 2010, 10, 14–5; see Severs 2010, 416.)

Although Pitkin's notion of responsiveness has been taken as the starting point for much of empirical representation research following the 'old' tradition, in my mind Pitkin's account allows for a different reading as well. In the first place, it can be noted that Pitkin did not understand representation as a dyadic relationship between an individual representative and the represented, but as a systemic property. The crucial measurement of representation in this context is not that opinions of the
represented and decisions of representatives would match, but that individuals would have the possibility to object to what is being done in their name. (Disch 2011, 107; Runciman 2007, 95; see Pitkin 1972, 221–2.) For Pitkin, the systemic property meant that individual legislators function in a context of the whole political system, not isolated (Pitkin 1972, 221, 225): “What makes it representation is not any single action by any one participant, but the overall structure and functioning of the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people” (ibid 221–2). While Pitkin seems to take a step back from a one-to-one understanding of representation, she nonetheless views representation as acting for others in a responsive manner (ibid, 222). The notion of systemic property by Pitkin appears to give latitude for understanding representation from a wider perspective than that of a one-to-one, dyadic, relationship, but she remains stuck in representative institutions. The systemic property appears simply to refer to legislatures and the institutional representative system, in which the legislature as a collective is representative rather than individual legislators.

Second, Pitkin held that representation is about representing unorganized groups and that representing itself participates in the definition of those groups' identities (Disch 2011, 107). Pitkin questioned the assumption that such an unorganized group would have an interest, "let alone a will" (see Pitkin 1972, 215). She also noted that "[t]he national unity that gives localities an interest in the welfare of the whole is not merely presupposed by representation; it is also continually re-created by the representatives' activities." (Ibid, 218.) Disch (2011, 107) names this a mobilization conception of representation, meaning that social cleavages are not simply reflected, but the process of representation participates in creating them. This, in turn, is aesthetic and literary, putting emphasis on the performative aspect of representation. This "figurative moment in the emergence of a democratic constituency" (ibid, 108) entails the same idea Saward (2006; 2010) captured with his concept of the representative claim and Ankersmit (2002b) with his aesthetic representation (Disch 2011, 108).

Let us now remind ourselves about Pitkin's original definition of representation:

“Rather, representation, taken generally, means the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact. Now, to say that something is simultaneously both present and not present is to utter a paradox, and thus a fundamental dualism is built into the meaning of representation.” (Pitkin 1972, 8–9; emphases original.)

Three observations can be made of Pitkin’s account. Firstly, representation enables presence – presence that is usually regarded as a necessary prerequisite for any
democratic decision-making. In this reading representation is not a second-best option, a substitute, for democracy, but rather something that makes democracy possible to begin with (while this might not be the reading Pitkin intended, her account certainly leaves room for it; see Plotke 1997). Second, Pitkin does not put forth any definition of what the represented, the something, is. She thus does not confine representation to electoral contexts where the represented is equated with the electorate, leaving the question open as to what is being represented in representation. Third, the definition leaves open the ways in which the something is made present. For sure, the second and third points are something that Pitkin handled at length in her book. As the examination above shows, Pitkin was not unambiguous about these issues, and depending which excerpts of her book are chosen, the interpretation of what she actually said looks quite different.

Indeed, this re-reading of Pitkin does not suggest that earlier readings would have been false (although they might have unduly privileged some parts of the work over others). Her final definition of representation as representatives' acting for the represented in a responsive manner clearly looks like an account of dyadic representation. Moreover, as she acknowledged the influence of political elites to citizen preferences, she held that this dispute should be somehow normatively curbed. The represented needed to be prior to its representation. (Disch 2011, 108–9; see Pitkin 1972, 140.) Furthermore, particularly towards the end of the book, Pitkin explicitly talked about representation in the context of legislatures and elected representatives. So, what we learn is that Pitkin's account was not an account, but many accounts. Her dealings with the concept of representation give way to numerous aspects and normative assumptions.

2.5 Implications for Empirical Research

What implications does the shift from the traditional account to the representative turn, then, have for empirical representation research? How should representation be researched? There are studies that address the 'new' conception, and their number is growing. However, they are still scattered in that they point to different directions in terms of operationalization. Many of them also tackle with the overall question as to what representation is and what normative requirements should be set in order to consider representation democratic. In this final section, I will summarize the methodological accounts and empirical research that have sought to understand
representation as implied by the representative turn. To conclude, I will present my own approach.

What is common to the studies following the representative turn is the fact that they set off from Michael Saward's representative claim. In this way, Saward's notion seems to have the same function today than Pitkin's account of representation had decades ago. For instance, within the research of substantive representation of women (SRW), the representative turn has been suggested to be taken as the basis for empirical research by shifting away from questions of whether or not women represent women and what difference women make in politics. Instead, the new conceptual framework would include questions that seek to unfold who make claims to act for women and why, where, and how these claims occur. (Celis et al. 2008, 104.)

In this vein, it is not assumed that women would further 'women's interests' or that men would automatically not do so, but the task of the researcher is rather to identify 'critical actors' in the field of women's substantive representation (Celis et al. 2008, 104; Childs & Krook 2009, 126–7). This task will further help to examine the conditions that allow or disallow critical actors to emerge and represent women substantively. (Celis et al. 2008, 104.) The framework requires expanding the examination of SRW from legislative context to the multiple instances in the whole society. Institutions are not seen as stable configurations but dynamic in the sense that what goes on in the society, historically contingently, will reconfigure institutions. Thus, the shift in the framework allows turning to the discursive element in representation and letting the subject of research tell the researcher what is claimed to be represented. This will also allow analyzing the aims and motivations of the claimants. The new framework stresses the importance of researching different phases of political processes to find out about attempts to substantially represent women and the outcomes of these attempts. (Ibid, 105–7.)

The feminist take on representative claims highlights substantive representation as its starting point for research, as presented above. Within the field, the claims paradigm has been criticized for withdrawing attention from questions dealing with what good democratic representation is. As such, it has been accused of being a non-normative approach. As opposed to claiming that something is being done, substantive representation highlights the actual actions for the represented. It has been argued that the paradigm shift overlooks the represented in rebutting its legitimacy to read back the representations made in its name, and that distinguishing substantive representation from more general communication has become harder. The concept of 'substantive claims' has been put forward to better take into account
the substance of representation. In the 'substantive claims' paradigm it is suggested that representative claims should normatively include assertions of policy suggestions rather than just a symbolic picture of the represented. (Severs 2012, 170–4.)

Further, Kröger and Friedrich (2013, 160) in EU studies have categorized the research on representation according to three categories: (1) Approaches that examine the representative relationship and appropriate institutions for expressing it; (2) Making sense of non-electoral actors and establishing their link to democracy (if there is any); and (3) Studies concerning the appropriate governance level of democratic representation, referring to supranational or national, and consequences of the choice.

The first category refers to the traditional account of representation in which representation builds around a principal–agent relationship. As such, it is deemed a rather static notion in which the identity of the represented and the representative is unnecessarily equaled. Kröger and Friedrich note that “[b]y and large, it is now accepted that they need not be identical for representation to be democratic.” To the contrary, communication and action are becoming central in the study of representation, leaving room for conflict, non-identity, judgment and interpretation – conceptualized by Michael Saward (2006, 2010) as claims-making. (Kröger & Friedrich 2013, 161.)

The second point alludes particularly to something that reminds of the critique presented by proponents of deliberative democracy: that there is a democratic deficit in representative institutions, which needs to be addressed through participation (deliberative or direct democracy) or non-electoral representation (representation after the ‘representative turn’). This non-electoral representation has been conceptualized as functional or societal representation (in the context of the EU). (Ibid, 164.)

The third point has been addressed in EU studies as well. The question of the right level of representation arises from the observation that nation-states no longer demarcate the demos as they did before. The dilemma in the EU, then, would be whether or not it is still appropriate to organize representation primarily through member states (to which the European Parliament forms an exception, as it is elected by individual EU citizens). (Ibid, 165.)

While these latter approaches take their bearings from the ‘new’ conception of representation, the applications to empirical study have been multifarious. For instance, it has been argued on a quite general level that a ruling of German Federal Constitutional Court reflects an obsolete understanding of representation in that
representation is understood as something that simply transforms aggregated preferences into seats through the electoral mechanism. Instead, it is suggested that representation should be understood to encompass different instances, units and levels of representation and their interdependences. (Lord & Pollak 2013b, 196).

Moreover, De Wilde (2013) has proposed an approach developed by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (1999; 2010), combining actors, policy positions, and claims in the mass media. It was suggested that the original approach should be complemented to include those who are called to translate claims into policies ('addressees') and those who are portrayed as the represented constituency ('object actors'). (De Wilde 2013, 279). De Wilde combined this method to the claims-making theory, and created a method called "representative claims analysis (RCA)" (ibid, 280). The benefit of this approach, according to him, was the possibility to pin down "real existing" representative claims in the mass media, which in turn could "be used to address remaining ambiguities in the theory of representation" (ibid). The scheme also introduced the analysis of frames, which according to De Wilde corresponded to Saward's cultural code that needs to be followed in making representative claims (ibid, 286–7).

What De Wilde criticized the media content analysis for lacking was the constructive dimension in representative claims-making:

“--- representative claims-making goes beyond voicing policy demands, as representation is about constructing a relationship between an ‘imagined community’ and its representatives as much as it is about efficient policy-formulations; that is, to be represented means to have someone publicly linking him- or herself as champion of a set of ideas or interest belonging to a particular ‘in-group’ (---) with at least basic acceptance of this claim by the mentioned group. Through the act of claiming, this group is both constructed and represented at the same time.” (Ibid, 288.)

To develop the method in relation to empirical representation research, De Wilde argued that the analysis should incorporate the response of the respective constituencies to the claims being made about them. He stressed the need to study citizen perspectives, that is, the receiving of claims. He also suggested that translating claims into policies should be studied in order to unravel how well constructed communities are represented. (Ibid, 289–90). This points somewhat to the direction of the 'substantive claims' paradigm suggested by Severs (2012), albeit taking it one step further by linking claims to actions in policy-making.

To summarize, the above approaches of 'substantive representation of women (SRW)', 'substantive claims-making' and 'representative claims analysis (RCA)' have something in common: they all highlight that the analysis of claims should be
combined to the substance of representation. It is the idea of responsiveness that is taken as the normative guideline in these studies; representation is offered for evaluation in terms of policies and the relationship between representatives and the represented. What distinguishes these accounts from the 'old' paradigm is the fact that the category of the represented is not taken as given.

Indeed, it has been noted that representative claims should not be researched simply by identifying and mapping them. Instead, they should be normatively evaluated vis-à-vis claims by those who are claimed to be represented. There is an ongoing political competition over who has the right to speak for particular groups, and this competition might override the interests of those who are claimed to be spoken for. Hence, it is argued, the representative turn and its plea for the plurality of representative claims should be accompanied by a renewed understanding of responsiveness. On this view, responsiveness refers to the ability of the claimed constituencies to formulate their judgment on the claims made about them, and to the normative right of having this judgment taken into consideration in the wider representative system. (Severs et al. 2013, 434, 447.)

There are also accounts that leave the normative quest for responsiveness aside. Severs et al. (2015) interviewed MPs of the Flemish regional parliament to find out how they conceived the indirectness embraced by the representative turn. The authors made a distinction between 'electoral' and 'constitutive' conceptions of democratic representation, corresponding to the 'old' and 'new' understandings of political representation. The importance of elections and electoral platforms, readily knowable constituencies, trustee–delegate division, citizens' control over the representative process, and accountability were identified as clues of the 'electoral' conception. On the contrary, the 'constitutive' conception entailed the conversational process, the constituted nature of the represented, the artistry of MPs in evoking constituencies, control within the representative process by the people, and deliberative account-giving as decisive elements in how representation was understood.

MPs reflected in the interviews elements from both conceptions. They understood their roles in constituting and mobilizing constituencies, but, at the same time, they emphasized elections as the source of authority and accountability, readily knowable constituencies, and citizens' control over their representational tasks. The writers concluded that proponents of the representative turn might be too optimistic in their belief that indirectness of representation would foster qualities such as speech and discursive account-giving. In other words, the approach adopted by MPs did not lend to an interpretation that the gap between MPs and their constituted
constituencies would allow space for democratic deliberation of good quality. It was suggested that further research on non-electoral representatives' capacity to hold elected representatives accountable was needed.

At the same time, the representative turn has made some scholars suspect the 'new' meaning of representation is stretching the concept too far. In this regard, theorists of representation are accused of seeing representation where it is not to be found (Rubenstein 2014). If instances are falsely identified as representation, it is argued, the way political actions and relationships are seen might be misleading. In other words, we might be looking at the wrong things when making normative judgments. (Ibid, 208, 230.) This account highlights the need for further examination of the concept of political representation.

Indeed, the representative turn seems to leave open quite a few profound questions: Do we know how to differentiate between representative claims and mere claims? (Lord & Pollak 2013a, 521–2.) For instance, in a study by Lord (2013) representative claims in European Parliament debates were understood as justifications given to nearly anything (constructions of social reality, beliefs and proposed legislation), and it was not explained why these claims would be representative claims. Furthermore, the criteria for 'good representation' remain unanswered (Lord & Pollak 2013a, 521–2.). In the same study by Lord (2013), the quality of discussions in the European Parliament were drawn from deliberative democratic theories. In other words, it was the quality of discussion that was deemed crucial for 'good representation' and the connection to the representative claims approach, or theories of representation, remained rather thin. Both of these questions echo the most profound question of all: what is representation (Lord & Pollak 2013a, 521–2)?

While many of the studies above have sought to tie the representative claims approach to the substance of representation, the representative turn raises questions regarding the meaning of symbolic representation. Particularly, (symbolic) speech seems to be understood in many accounts as mere non-action. Nevertheless, Lombardo and Meier (2016) hold that symbolic representation is not 'less' than actual political decisions, but it carries political meanings and consequences. This approach stresses that symbolic and substantive cannot really be separated from one another but they are interconnected (Hatherell 2014).

There are also empirical and methodological accounts that try to overcome the division between representative institutions and 'direct' activity of the civil society. In the context of the EU, it has been questioned whether it is correct to address only EU institutions as representative and civil society as the realm of participation.
(Kohler-Koch 2010, 105). Conversely, civil society organizations could be seen as generating deliberative discourse, communication, and diversity in the public arena. This thinking understands representation as political action rather than simply as representativeness of individual organizations. The study of representation in relation to civil society, then, could include questions such as: What is the diversity of viewpoints offered in the public sphere? What is the quality of deliberative debate that civil society organizations invite? (Ibid, 107–8.) According to this view, civil society is understood to constitute itself in the process of representation (Trenz 2009, 40, 44).

Overall, the empirical and methodological approaches to representation after the representative turn indicate a degree of confusion as to what it really is that is addressed when representation is studied. Is it the connection between representative claims and policy-decisions? How should the claimed constituency be incorporated into the study of representative claims? Is the representative claims approach in essence non-normative? How to address symbolic representation? How to include civil society into the study of representation? My work here seeks to take the ‘new’ understanding of representation further by clarifying and confirming the aspects the forementioned studies have discussed through the Talvivaara case study.

I will do this by taking cues from the representative turn, but without defining representation definitively at this point. The theoretical analysis into the concept led me to take these as relevant features in democratic representation:

1. Indirectness and communication it invites;
2. Symbolic representations of the representative, the represented and reality (made in speech and by visual images), rather than a one-to-one relationship; and
3. Politics that representation makes possible, in other words the ability to transcend the here and now and imagine new worlds, as opposed to bureaucratic and administrative ways of thinking.

From these points can be inferred my approach vis-à-vis the empirical data concerning the Talvivaara case:

1. What kind of communication does the indirectness of representation invite?
2. What symbolic representations are made of the representative, the represented and reality, in speech and by visual images?
3. What kind of politics does representation make possible, and what bureaucratic and administrative ways of thinking were there?

The theoretical, methodological, and empirical accounts discussed here function as general guidelines through which I approach the Talvivaara case. As in other studies after the representative turn, a central concept here is Michael Saward’s representative claim. Formally, following Michael Saward (2010, 36), a representative claim is a claim in which the source of representations puts forward a subject which stands for an object related to a referent and is offered to an audience. In other words, somebody is offered as a representative (subject) of the represented (object), both of which are subject to selection and interpretation.

This definition is not taken literally, but the definition of the representative claims is here wide, so that relevant aspects of representation do not go unnoticed. Here I follow Saward’s (2010, 49) statement that "[a]ll claims to speak for also speak about; all claims that speak about can also be understood, however indirectly, as claims to speak for". Hence, I have included into the analysis statements and images in the data that 1) refer to groups of people; 2) refer to geographical entities; 3) claim what people think, feel, or what their interests are; 4) make claims about the representative, the represented or reality, direct or indirect; and 5) speak about representation. This approach entails all accounts in the data that can be understood as representational speech or symbolic representations.

In analyzing the representational speech and symbolic representations, I will not make a strict distinction between explicit and implicit representative claims. Explicit representative claims in the data were about what people thought or felt. Implicit representative claims can be understood as resulting from the ways the would-be representatives were portrayed. Nonetheless, these were at times hard to distinguish, as the ways actors were portrayed related to what people more widely were claimed to think or feel. Therefore, the overarching principle is that representation is constituted symbolically, both in speech and for instance by visual means such as videos.

At the same time, I have included elements from the 'old' approach to representation, such as the delegation chain model and the traditional representative foci of the party, the constituency, and the nation. This allows me to understand how the 'old' and 'new' understandings intersect, and to speak to scholars from both of these traditions. In this vein, I ask, how does the administrative–politics nexus appear if the chain model is taken as a starting point? What parliamentary procedures were used to propose Talvivaara to the parliamentary agenda, and what role did the
traditional foci of representation play in the work and speech of parliamentarians? What does representation have to do with activism? These questions challenge some of the basic assumptions in traditional representation research.

Simultaneously, the choice of the case study and the way I approach the data reflect a commitment to the basic ideas of the representative turn. Namely, the distinction to ‘direct’ and ‘representative’ democracy is overcome by examining both elected and non-elected political actors, by seeing them both as possible representatives, and by examining their interrelatedness. In doing that, I am looking at the totality of representations in the cross-section of a political system that the Talvivaara case provides. They include representational speech by ministers, administrative officials, local councilors, MPs, and civic actors. Although representational speech is understood necessary for democracy, the case informs us about the constraints of this representational speech. This is a question of space for representational (political) speech and symbolic action, as opposed to understanding politics simply as decision-making and as policies.

Hence, it is argued that the study of representation needs to involve study of symbolic action, understood both as speech in which representative claims are made, and other kind of action, such as gatherings of people on the streets as a symbol of the people (see Butler 2015, 156–7). In this regard, the understanding of symbolic representation in this study is different from Pitkin’s account. While for Pitkin a symbol does not claim anything about its referent, here it is acknowledged that symbols represent the referent in a certain way, and this way has political consequences (Lombardo & Meier 2013, 7–8). Moreover, representative claims (through which symbolic representations are made) are not just claims about the represented or the would-be representatives, but they are also representations of reality (see ibid, 13–4). They are here understood widely as portrayals of events, situations, and people. They might or might not be intended, it is a question of interpretation.

Rather than examining how representative claims are received by those who are the referents in the claims, this research asks how representative claims are acknowledged or rejected by a variety of audiences, especially by those who offer alternative claims. This includes examination of the plurality of representative claims. It is about asking, who are present in the claims and who are absent, and what the representations are like. It is also acknowledged that representational speech is always contextual. It is not about general or abstract roles of political actors, but tied to political actions. These political actions might be, and often are, tied to wider political ideologies. Contextuality is the reason for studying the Talvivaara case; the
case allows proper consideration of the context and its effect on representational speech by a variety of actors.

Rather than to design a specific method that would systematically be followed, the empirical part of the thesis is experimental. It seeks to find the elements outlined here as relevant in democratic representation in the Talvivaara case. Through the questions outlined above, I seek to understand what the study on representation is really about. This is done in order to clarify, confirm, and take further the representative turn. At the same time, the thesis seeks to create a dialogue between the traditional understanding of representation and the representative turn, to build a bridge from representative democracy to democratic representation.
3 REPRESENTATION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE–POLITICS NEXUS CONCERNING TALVIVAARA

3.1 Introduction

The intersection of politics and administration is the focus of this chapter. I will examine the national level executive (ministers), regional state authorities, and municipalities in relation to the Talvivaara case. All of these instances have administrative competence based on the law, whether in the form of administrative guidelines (ministries), environmental permits (regional state authorities), or building permits (municipalities) (see Appendix 1). While at first glance these instances can appear more administrative and less political, particularly in the case of regional state authorities and municipalities, the chapter aims to find politics within those instances.

This task is ultimately connected to the question of democracy. As argued in the chapter two, representation is understood as a precondition for democracy because it invites communication, symbolic representations of the represented, and politics (as opposed to bureaucracy). Representation is hence understood as something that makes space for politics, and in particularly for political speech. The underlying research question is: What kind of space for politics was there in relation to the national executive, regional authorities, and municipalities in the Talvivaara case?

The examination reflects the understanding that mainstream representation research has put forth, particularly in relation to the delegation chain model (agency theory). The agency theory echoes the standard account of representative democracy. It understands representation primarily in the context of electoral politics, and takes representatives (agents) and the represented (principals) as defined in the elections. Normativity in the model grows out of the requirement for directness and the possibility for the represented to hold their representatives accountable.

In this chapter, the agency theory will be examined through a critical lens: How well does the chain model explain different actors' positions and mutual relations in the case? Rather than trying to fit actors and actions tightly to the chain model, the case is approached on its own terms. As forthcoming chapters concentrate on the
beginning of the chain in examining citizen representation and parliamentary representation, this chapter addresses the end of the chain: the executive branch. This includes government actors and administration. A third instance is the municipal level, which is considered in this context due to its administrative functions.

More closely, in search for political space and speech, the chapter will first address the ministerial level. The Ministry’s formal role and actions in the wake of the wastewater leakage of November 2012 are examined. The section will then move to research the representational speech of three ministers, minister of the environment Ville Niinistö (Greens), minister responsible for state ownership steering Heidi Hautala (Greens) and minister of economic affairs Jan Vapaavuori (National Coalition Party), the ministers most closely involved with the Talvivaara case. Public statements and writings between November 2012 and April 2015 by the ministers, as well as an interview in December 2013 with former minister Hautala will be used as data. The section will end with a contemplation about the limits of ministers' jurisdiction and speech by looking at a complaint made of minister Niinistö and its resolution by the chancellor of justice (21 February 2013). Overall research questions are: What representative claims did cabinet members make in their public communications? What explanations can be given to the differences between ministers? What political and juridical limits were there to the ministers’ speech? What are the consequences for democracy?

After the ministerial level, attention will be given to the regional state authority's discretion and encounters between politics and administration in that context. This will be done by analyzing a special environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure relating to an individual Talvivaara issue and a related decision made by the Kainuu ELY Centre. What kind of space for speech was there in this administrative process? The analysis will be complemented by studying regional state administrators' interviews, particularly by paying attention to their understanding of the role they play in decision-making. How did regional state administrators conceive their roles as part of the delegation chain? What consequences did this have to political speech? This section utilizes as data official statements given for the decision about the EIA procedure, obtained in September 2014. As for the administrators’ views about their roles, interviews will be referred to. The interviews with regional state administrators were carried out in November 2013.

The last section on municipalities steps away from the executive on national level and concentrates on the local level. While municipalities are in certain respects authorities and, in the delegation chain language, agents, they are essentially political
collectives. But how does this political dimension interact with the administrative functions of any given municipality? In order to answer this question, further questions are posed: Who or what spoke in the name of municipalities in the Nuasjärvi pipeline matter? The examination is based on official statements given by municipalities and municipal authorities for the Nuasjärvi pipeline issue between December 2014 and January 2015. To further understand the space for political speech within municipalities, eight local councilors were interviewed for their views on representation. What meaning did local councilors attach to the term representation? What kind of representative claims did they make? These interviews were carried out in fall 2013.

The results of all the analysis in different sections will be summarized in the final part of the chapter, the conclusion.

3.2 Ministerial Level: from Administration to Politics

This section analyzes the role of the highest state executive in the Talvivaara case, a ministry and ministers. The time frame for the analysis spans from November 2012 to spring 2015. In November 2012, a massive wastewater leakage took place at the mine. It put minister of the environment Ville Niinistö in an awkward position, as he had to justify why he had not intervened earlier given the environmental problems of Talvivaara. The situation was particularly difficult for him, as he was one of the two Green ministers in the cabinet. The other was minister responsible for state ownership steering Heidi Hautala. She, too, was in a position that put her under the microscope, because the state was at the time the single biggest owner of the mine.

After the wastewater leakage in November 2012, the Talvivaara issue gradually became primarily a financial question, as the environmental problems, problems with the bioheapleaching process and sinking nickel prices threw Talvivaara into financial chaos. It was temporarily resolved with a share issue in April 2013, but ultimately the company filed for bankruptcy in November 2014. After this, it fell to the state, as the state-owned company Terrafame Mining bought the mining business in its entirety. From late 2013 to spring 2015 minister of economic affairs Jan Vapaavuori functioned as the government’s public face on the issue.

8 Although this chapter traces political representation in the context of administration, it should be noted that the municipal level can be understood to entail both administrative functions and functions that include the whole delegation chain from local inhabitants to local councilors through the municipal board to civil servants. Local councilors are considered as political rather than as administrative actors.
Particularly the role of the ministry of the environment and its head, minister Niinistö, will be addressed with regard of the wastewater leakage of November 2012. What role did the ministry and minister take at the time, and how does this role fit into the agency theory’s understanding of the delegation and accountability chain? The question of representation will be further dealt with by analyzing minister Niinistö’s and minister Vapaavuori’s representational speech. Differences between the two will be examined and explanations to them proposed. To elaborate further on the limits of both the ministry’s administrative role and minister Niinistö’s speech, a ruling of a chancellor of justice with regard of Niinistö’s public statements will also be researched.

3.2.1 Ministry’s roles

The Finnish ministry of the environment is responsible for preparing matters for the government and the parliament, consisting of matters concerning communities, built environment, housing, biodiversity and sustainable use of natural resources, as well as environmental protection. Since the government of Juha Sipilä took office after the parliamentary election of 2015, the ministry has been led by the minister of agriculture and the environment. (Ministry of the Environment 2015.) When the Talvivaara water crisis unfolded in November 2012, the ministry was led by then minister of the environment, Ville Niinistö (Greens).

The ministry of the environment directs the Centres for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment (ELY Centres) in the matters listed above. As the Kainuu ELY Centre is responsible for monitoring the Talvivaara mine, the ELY Centre is obliged to follow the rules and guidelines of the ministry. However, "directing" ELY Centres does not mean that the ministry could overrule their decisions. On the contrary, as is later illustrated in this chapter, the ministry cannot interfere with individual issues or decisions, but only give general guidelines. So, what was the role of the ministry in the Talvivaara case?

When visiting the mine during the wastewater leakage in November 2012, minister Niinistö announced the ministry of the environment would appoint two investigators to compile a report on the totality of environmental problems in Talvivaara. The investigators were to examine Talvivaara’s recent environmental problems and to evaluate the actions of both the company and the authorities responsible for monitoring the mine. They were asked to pay particular attention to
the prevention of "recurring environmental problems in the future", as phrased in
the ministry's press release. (Ministry of the Environment 2012a.)

According to the report, operations in Talvivaara had undergone several changes
because of situations unforeseen in the environmental impact assessment (EIA)
procedure, in the application for the environmental permit and the permit decision.
Some permit stipulations had also been violated. It was additionally stated that the
Kainuu ELY Centre had not used all monitoring tools at its disposal, but had settled
for frequent remarks and requests. Only the severest incidents had resulted in filing
a notice to the police by the Kainuu ELY Centre. (Turpeinen & Rainio 2013, 39.)

The report recommended several amendments be made to environmental
legislation. They included recommendations, among others, regarding defective
environmental permit applications and their rejection, the transfer of jurisdiction
from ELY Centres to AVI Agencies in matters concerning administrative
enforcement, the removal of unclear stipulations, and the funding of monitoring
operations by making monitoring chargeable. (Ibid, 42–5.) Other general
recommendations were made about deepening collaboration between permit and
monitoring authorities and about ensuring adequate resources for environmental
administration. (Ibid, 46–7.)

These recommendations were about general improvements that had been
motivated by the events in Talvivaara. Direct activities by the ministry included
setting up a working group consisting of representatives from different ministries,
administrative branches and agencies, and proposing extra budgetary funds for
enhancing expertise with regard to environmental issues within state authorities.
The Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE), an agency functioning under the
administrative branch of the ministry of the environment, also nominated a special
working group for addressing Talvivaara’s most acute problems. (Ministry of the
Environment 2012b.)

In addition, the ministry published frequent press releases. They included press
releases, inter alia, regarding minister Niinistö’s visit to Talvivaara in the wake of the
environmental disaster (Ministry of the Environment 2012b & 2012c), information
about emissions (Finnish Environment Institute 2012a & 2012b; Ministry of the
Environment 2012d), further actions by the minister or ministry (Ministry of the
Environment 2012a), and follow-up information on emissions (Finnish
Environment Institute 2012c). Apparently, responsibilities of informing about the
event were divided so that the Finnish Environment Institute SYKE would release
information about the factual emissions and follow-up information about the
environment, whereas the ministry released information regarding the minister’s actions.

Additionally, the ministry of the environment released a new monitoring guide (Ministry of the Environment 2012e) that ELY Centres should rely on when making decisions regarding environmental monitoring. Although the guide was published on November 7, 2012, it had been prepared long before that and was not specifically in response to the wastewater leakage that had begun in Talvivaara on November 4. Nonetheless, minister Niinistö referred to the newly published guide that took into account situations where environmental problems and breaches were continuous and repetitive when interviewed on the subject of Talvivaara. (Yle 2012a.) In those cases, the new guide would allow the use of administrative enforcement measurements such as forced suspension of operations earlier than had been allowed prior to the Talvivaara case. (Ministry of the Environment 2012b.)

To summarize, as a result of the wastewater leakage of November 2012, the minister and ministry took action in collaborating with other ministries in mitigating problems, ordering a report of the history of Talvivaara and its monitoring, adding funds to environmental monitoring of the mine, and communicating to the public-at-large about the issue. A new monitoring guideline for ELY Centres was also released. Even though the minister and ministry did not have the jurisdiction to resolve individual administrative decisions, such as deciding to use administrative enforcement to suspend operations at the mine – this belonged to the Kainuu ELY Centre – the minister and ministry were able to take general measures to mitigate impacts on the environment and provide guidelines for future reference.

The minister responsible for state ownership steering, Heidi Hautala, was in the background around November 2012, but her public role grew when financial issues started to emerge. State ownership fell into her sphere, and Talvivaara was the most urgent issue. At the time, the state owned a significant share of the mine through its investing company Solidium. The company functioned under the supervision of the minister, but was nonetheless a private enterprise not directly influenced by non-commercial interests.

According to Hautala, the possibilities of the minister to intervene in the Talvivaara case were limited. This was mainly because state ownership was organized through Solidium, which was not directly accountable to the minister. She explained that while Solidium was supposed to be detached from politics, it was fully owned by the state and, as such, could not be detached from a political agenda. For this reason, Solidium had informed the minister responsible for state ownership steering about decisions that might have had public relevance, such as laying off staff.
However, it was merely a matter of informing and collaborating, with the minister playing a limited role in decision-making. (Interview with Heidi Hautala.)

Nevertheless, the question of whether Solidium should invest in the company in the share issue of 2013 was discussed with the minister. Through the decision to increase Solidium's ownership in the company, the minister had indirect leverage. The investment allowed Talvivaara to carry on its operations for a few more months until it filed for financial reorganization. The role of the state gradually grew as the company went bankrupt and mining operations became wholly state-owned. From fall 2013 to spring 2015, minister Jan Vapaavuori was the main government actor. His role will be later elaborated in terms of representational speech. For now, we will turn to the overall organization of regional state administration in environmental issues and look back to the 2009 regional state administration reform.

In public, minister Niinistö criticized the reform that had been implemented during the previous electoral term. This was coupled with criticism toward Centre Party ministers of the previous cabinet, including former minister of the environment Paula Lehtomäki, about the fact that the regional state authority system had been reformed in a way that compromised independent environmental administration.

In the reform, formerly numerous regional agencies with fragmented responsibilities (employment, economic development, environmental protection, etc.) were combined to two major sets of regional agencies: the Centres for Economic Development, Transport, and the Environment (Finnish abbreviation: ELY), and the Regional State Administrative Agencies (Finnish abbreviation: AVI). The reform was initiated in 2007 and completed with legislation9 that came into effect in 2010. (Järvi 2015, 44–5.) Environmental permit-related issues were subsequently vested with four AVI Agencies, and thirteen ELY Centres have responsibilities over environmental and natural resources. The ministry of the environment guides the work of these agencies and centres with regard to environmental issues. (Environment.fi 2013.)

Environmental and water permits were to be under the jurisdiction of the AVI Agencies, and ELY Centres were to be responsible for environmental protection. The environment committee of the parliament noted in its statement in 2009 regarding the reform that it threatened to weaken the formerly strong environmental administration. In the reform, environmental issues, such as environmental permits

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9 The legislation included acts on ELY Centres (Laki elinkeino-, liikenne- ja ympäristövirastoista 897/2009) and AVI Agencies (Laki aluehallintovirastoista 896/2009), alterations to existing laws, and a number of new decrees given by the government.
and monitoring, would be placed in new regional ELY Centres that would also take care of issues regarding livelihoods and transportation. The concern was that these issues would overshadow environmental issues. It was hence stressed in the statement that environmental issues should be kept independent from other responsibilities in the new ELY Centres. A stricter stance was taken by MP Pentti Tiusanen (Left Alliance) who stated in his objection to the statement that independent environmental administration was in jeopardy and that the proposed bill should be rejected. (Environment Committee 2009, 3, 5 & 10.) Indeed, as the national media turned its gaze to the Talvivaara issue in November 2012, the independence of environmental administration was questioned. (Helsingin Sanomat, November 7, 2012; see also Valtiovarainministeriö 2012, 93.)

The alleged failure of the reform was at least indirectly attacked by minister Niinistö, as he complained that it was tough to sit to a table that others had set, and that he himself was doing all there was to be done. (Niinistö 2012.) The criticism was not quite to the point, as the Greens had been in the cabinet when the reform was outlined and agreed.

The chain model explains rather well the general arrangement: the cabinet arranged regional state authorities in a certain way and defined which administrative function was to be under which ministry. Environmental issues were to be overseen by the ministry of the environment. In a word, the cabinet decided about the organization of state administration. As the chain model is meant for analyzing political systems as general frames for politics, it cannot be used for analyzing politics that take place within those frames. It does explain to a certain extent the new monitoring guidelines and extra funding, but setting up working groups or giving statements in the media are more than simply functioning as a part of the chain.

Rather than depicting the minister’s role as a link in a chain, it can be represented as a specific function among other functions played by other actors. The minister did have a certain role in guiding and allocating funds to the administration, but his jurisdiction did not overrule the jurisdiction of the Kainuu ELY Centre in making administrative decisions regarding Talvivaara. A working group was established to address the immediate situation and investigators hired to better understand what had gone wrong in Talvivaara. Neither of these was a pressing concern for the authorities, however. On the contrary, officials from the regional state administration were included in the ministry’s working group. Using a wider representation framework, in which representation is not understood as confined to certain institutional arrangements but something that takes place in re-presentations, in
speech, helps us understand where politics in the case lies. The representational elements in ministers’ speech are examined next.

3.2.2 Representational and non-representational speech of ministers

Many of the press releases published during and after November 2012 contained statements from minister Niinistö. While some of those dealt with actions needed, he also addressed citizens. He said:

“What has happened has been trying to people’s sense of justice. However, different parties have responsibilities stipulated in the law. Environmental breaches have certain legal consequences. For possible environmental damages, residents of the area can file for compensation with the AVI. If a crime is suspected, a notice to the police can be made, as ELY Centre did concerning the large wastewater leakages in spring 2011. Moreover, the decisions of environmental authorities can be appealed in a court of law.” (Ministry of the Environment 2012b.)

“Citizens feel that recurring environmental problems are unbearable. The company and the authorities’ actions have faced criticism. The ministry of the environment wants to thoroughly assess what has been going on in recent years, also as a particular individual question, to ensure that people can again trust the independence and quality of the environmental authorities’ actions.” (Ministry of the Environment 2012c.)

In a television interview Niinistö further stated:

"[i]t is clear from the perspective of the citizens' sense of justice, and from the viewpoint of people in Kainuu that this situation is unbearable. I feel a deep agony for people in Kainuu and for the Finnish nature, this is utterly and completely wrong [---]." (Yle 2012a.)

As opposed to the press releases published by the Finnish Environment Institute SYKE, the ministry's press releases had a clearly personal tone. The minister addressed citizens directly, referring to their sense of justice and even explaining their feelings ("Citizens feel that recurring environmental problems are unbearable"). As such, the minister quite strongly took the position of speaking for the people, giving voice to something that he represented as people's feelings. His interpretation was that people, mostly citizens living in Kainuu, suffered from the situation. In this sense, his statements were in essence political speech rather than speech from an authoritative position, which was the case with the Finnish Environment Institute's releases.
This interpretation finds support if we look at other public statements made by Niinistö around the same time. In blog entries released on the Greens' website, the rhetoric was to a large extent similar but stricter. He inter alia stated "Talvivaara has become the most severe environmental accident in Finland in the 2000s" and "[o]perations that violate environmental legislation and environmental permit criteria repeatedly cannot be allowed in Finland, as Finland takes its environmental responsibilities seriously." (Niinistö 2012.) He reiterated that the repetitive spoiling of nature by one company was unbearable from the perspective of people living in Kainuu and the Finnish environment. He also stated that were he not a minister, he would have been demonstrating for a clean environment with demonstrators. With this statement, he stepped over from his ministerial position to that of a private citizen (or, more precisely, as one of the mine’s critics).10

Minister Niinistö used the representation of betrayed people living in Kainuu as a vehicle to criticize the former administration’s reforms to assure people (not least the Greens’ supporters) that unlawful action by large-scale industry was not tolerated, and to communicate that he would fight for the environment. Had the minister or some other minister in his place, conceptualized citizens living in Kainuu differently, the interpretation of necessary action would have been different.

However, the rhetoric of other ministers relevant to the case made considerably fewer representative claims. Other relevant ministers were minister responsible for state ownership steering at the time Heidi Hautala and minister of economic affairs Jan Vapaavuori, who in early fall 2013 was given the coordination responsibility regarding Talvivaara within the cabinet. There was clearly a shift from treating Talvivaara primarily as an environmental issue to treating it as an economic matter around that time; because of continuing water balance issues and declining nickel prices, the company had fallen into serious financial problems. For this reason, the state became increasingly involved in the company, primarily as an owner of the mine, and Vapaavuori took over public relations responsibilities on the issue.

With regard of the Greens, Niinistö wrote several blog entries (as cited above) on the Greens website, whereas Hautala was clearly less active in this regard. The

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10 In some accounts of representation, a distinction between speaking and acting can be made: the function of a parliament is to discuss, whereas the function of the government is to act. In this account, the speech function is attached to representation, and governing is understood as opposed to representation. (Pitkin 1972, 63–4.) In a sense, Niinistö’s speech can be interpreted as overcoming this distinction, inasmuch as he (as a governing minister) strongly represented – that is, offered his account of – people’s feelings.
number of her entries at the website was zero. In *Helsingin Sanomat*\(^\text{11}\) she commented on the Talvivaara case solely from the perspective of state ownership, wondering whether Solidium was the best way to organize state ownership in general, and accused Talvivaara of bad management (*Helsingin Sanomat, April 17, 2013*). She also explained that the main reason for the state to invest additional funds to Talvivaara in spring 2013 was to ensure proper handling of environmental issues (*Helsingin Sanomat, March 9, 2013*). There was not reference to people, no interpretations of their thoughts or interests.

This was similar with minister Vapaavuori.\(^\text{12}\) Quotes from him in *Helsingin Sanomat* can be best described as technocratic. As minister of economic affairs, he was responsible for negotiating with the company and possible investors about possible financial solutions and managing environmental issues. His interviews were about comments to these issues, and no remarks were made about what people allegedly wanted or needed. In his website, however, the general interest of society (“yhteiskunnan kokonaisetu”) was mentioned in a blog entry on March 18, 2015:

> “It is the government’s job to secure the general interest of society – it is the case with regard of this issue, as it is in many other issues. The government’s position is clear: the best solution should take into account the national economic interest and local economic interests in Kainuu. From an environmental standpoint, mining should continue in a controlled manner.” (Vapaavuori 2015a.)

In a news article on his website Vapaavuori suggested that the totality of all relevant facts was hard to grasp based on information in the media, and that it was the job of the authorities to inform people on them. The minister and the ministry were here understood as part of the administration:

> “It is the job of the authorities to make sure that timely, fact-based information is available regarding the situation at the mine. This is why we want to have dialogue with local parties and people.” (Vapaavuori 2015b, emphasis added.)

The approach of minister Niinistö and the approach of minister Vapaavuori were clearly very different from each other. While Niinistö voiced his concern for people living in Kainuu and claimed to represent their interests, Vapaavuori’s style was more

\(^{11}\) *Helsingin Sanomat* archives include 12 articles between March 2, 2012 and October 29, 2013 featuring Heidi Hautala and Talvivaara.

\(^{12}\) Apart from minister Niinistö, Vapaavuori was a minister that commented Talvivaara the most. Between November 17, 2012 and August 19, 2015 *Helsingin Sanomat* mentioned Vapaavuori in 41 articles concerning Talvivaara, and on his own website 10 articles including blog entries, press releases and news articles were published between November 7, 2013 and April 15, 2015.
indirect. He spoke about the national and local economies, while not referring to the needs of local residents. Vapaavuori instead referred to national interests, which was more abstract and distant. His view was that mining should be continued, and this was justified by alluding this was best for economy and the environment. Particularly the latter passage distinguishes Vapaavuori from Niinistö: Vapaavuori presented his actions as part of administration, whose responsibility was to educate the public about the situation. Niinistö, on the other hand, spoke in the name of citizens.

Hence, we now see that ministers can take different positions in the same chain of delegation: they can position themselves with citizens or with the administration. Positioning oneself with citizens seems more open to counterarguments: the citizens can always step up and challenge the view presented of them. If the position is taken with the administration, however, it can be seen as more technocratic. This is obviously not the case, because professional politicians’ actions (and speech as a special type of action) are bound to be political.

What could explain this difference and what are the implications for democratic thinking? While Niinistö and Hautala were both ministers for the Greens, Niinistö was also the party leader. Assuming this role publicly, he was responsible of much more than just himself as a minister. Hautala and Vapaavuori were not in the same position. Moreover, Hautala and Niinistö disagreed about investing additional funds in Talvivaara in the spring of 2013. Both ministers voiced their stances publically. Perhaps for this reason, the Greens avoided a situation where both would speak in public to the same degree. Niinistö was given the role of party spokesperson, as he was its chair. Hautala was left to speak from her ministerial position and stick to questions relating to state ownership – a subject that can easily be represented as technocratic. Their differing positions were referred to by an MP interviewee that said,

“It is part of their job description to view the matter from different perspectives. These are related to their work and do not necessarily reflect their personal opinions.” (MP 5.)

Thus, there seems to be a wider understanding of the fact that the position each minister has at least partly dictates the role of the respective minister, rather than his or her background in any political party. Ministers are hence representatives of the state, particularly in their area of responsibility.

In contrast to Niinistö, Vapaavuori can be seen as a technocrat trying to find the best possible solution to the situation. Why appeal to people, if what is to be done is clear? Perhaps this reflects more widely an understanding of different policy
sectors: On one hand, environmental issues have found their way to the political agenda only in recent decades. Speaking about them might require more nuanced appeals to citizens. The economy, on the other, is a realm of expert knowledge and 'objective' truths, and hence appealing to people is not similarly necessary.

Environmental issues are crucial to any green party. Green parties face a challenge of bringing them from the margins to mainstream, and making an argument that what is best for the environment is also best for people is one argument that can be used in doing just that. Conversely, a well-functioning economy is often self-evidently taken to be in the interest of the people, and no similar persuasion is needed. Niinistö faced an acute situation that invited to a certain degree emotional and persuasive statements, whereas Vapaavuori took over when the situation was not similarly acute.

Niinistö could also be interpreted as advocating for a view that had hitherto been less popular. That is, if Talvivaara had long been seen as a significant employer, even saviour, in the region, having an opposing view would require conceptualizing the public interest, including the well-being of the environment in relation to it. This interpretation is in line with the theoretical assumption made elsewhere that explicit representative claims are made when they are new, unusual or controversial, whereas claims are left implicit when they take their bearings from widely accepted representational codes or institutions. (Saward 2006, 308.)

What is the connection to democracy, then? If representative claims are understood as necessary to democracy because they allow constructing ‘the people’ over and again in open debate (following Claude Lefort, see Näsström 2006, 329–30, 334), one could conclude that speaking with representative claims is democratic and speaking without them is non-democratic. This is partly true: representative claims do make room for political contestation of how we understand the people and its interests. Speech without representative claims can make speech seem more distant, more technocratic, and harder to contest. It makes political speech seem less political, thus leaving less room for ‘reading back’ (Saward 2006, 303–4), for repudiation.

Nevertheless, speaking without representative claims can hardly be seen as an attempt to stop all discussion, and arguments without them can be contested, even if that would not seem that easy. Furthermore, representative claims, such as “I represent the people” can be populist or even fascist at worst, as they seek to end all discussion of the people (Plotke 1997, 28; Urbinati 1998). Even in these cases, the connection of representative claims to democracy can be established by looking at who is contesting these claims: they can be contested by any one member of
collective that is claimed to be represented, even from outside. Technocratic argumentation, on the other hand, invokes contestation by experts.

If we think of ministers as part of the delegation chain, we can detect a spectrum in their speech: Niinistö appeared closer to the parliamentary end of the spectrum, while Vapaavuori and Hautala positioned themselves closer to the administrative end. Maybe this is an explanation to the fact that Niinistö appeared more prone to criticism than Vapaavuori particularly. For example, a complaint was made to the chancellor of justice about Niinistö’s statements, including remarks that he would have unlawfully interfered with decisions that fell under the jurisdiction of Kainuu ELY Centre. No such complaint was made of Vapaavuori, who in his writings and press releases quite directly spoke out about issues being considered in a court of law at the time.\(^{13}\) The complaint and the chancellor's response is dealt with in detail in the following section.

### 3.2.3 Encounters with the law

The previous section addressed ministers' public speech. It is this speech function and its openness to counterarguments that in the framework of the representative turn can be understood to lend 'democratic-ness' to representation. As a reaction to the more critical voice of Niinistö, three shareholders made a request to the chancellor of justice to determine whether the minister had acted against his official duties in giving the statements he had given publically regarding Talvivaara. (Resolution OKV/681/1/2012.) The fact that a complaint was made speaks to the interpretation that what is being said is important, and hence the limits of speech become relevant for the study of representation. Here the juridical limits for minister's speech are examined.

The statements that were under scrutiny by the chancellor of justice were made in fall 2011 and early 2012 in newspaper articles, blog entries and radio and television interviews. The request included the following statements by the minister (which he in his response to the chancellor did not deny):

\(^{13}\) Vapaavuori wrote: "It is necessary to continue running purified water temporarily in a controlled manner, but this alleviates only the acute situation. To solve the situation in the long run, we need more water purifying capacity and a pipeline, so that purified water can be run to a bigger water body, Vapaavuori states." (Vapaavuori 2015c.) At the time, the issue of whether or not to allow the company build a wastewater pipeline to lake Nuasjärvi was under decision-making at the Vaasa Administrative Court.
“There has been such amateurish fumbling going on in Talvivaara’s environmental impact assessment. This cannot be accepted as a general norm of behavior.” (Ibid, 4.)

“The environmental authority (Kainuu ELY Centre) needs to quickly demand that Talvivaara curb its emissions. They are working on this and we in the ministry supervise their work. It is particularly important to monitor phosphate emissions and salt-levels in bodies of water. --- The environmental authority needs to be strict, Niinistö insists.” (Ibid, 5.)

“The minister of the environment also stated that mining activities can be suspended if environmental damage is not adequately addressed. We should not be naïve and think that rehearsing for years would be acceptable. It is not right that people in Kainuu are forced to be guinea-pigs. The law enables suspending operations. Individual people may file with the regional state authority agency for financial compensation for harm caused by the mine, Niinistö says.” (Ibid.)

The chancellor’s resolution included contemplation of two different aspects. Firstly, it was assessed whether it was appropriate from the minister’s part to make the statements, as they addressed one particular company under the jurisdiction of his ministry. According to his own account, minister Niinistö had sought to participate actively in public discussion about matters in his sector and of concern to citizens. For this part, the chancellor concluded that participation in public discussion fell under the freedom of speech that belonged to everybody, ministers included. (Ibid, 7–8.)

Secondly, it was assessed whether the minister had tried to improperly influence authorities in the administrative branch of the ministry of the environment (ibid, 9). In this regard, the chancellor stated that the rule of law was of relevance in deciding the matter. Although, according to the chancellor, there was a stipulation that required courts of law to be independent, there was no such stipulation in relation to administrative authorities. Nonetheless, it was stated that administrative agencies at lower levels of the government should be organized so they could make decisions independently with adequate financial and other resources. Their independence was also equaled with the trust that enabled officials themselves, stakeholders in administrative matters, and the wider public to trust that administrative decisions are reached without undue outside influence (ibid, 9–10). The ministry is supposed to monitor and guide administrative agencies under its jurisdiction through fund allocation, action and financial plans, and by setting general guidelines, but in individual cases the minister or the ministry are not responsible (ibid, 10). With regard of this second aspect, the chancellor concluded that minister Niinistö had not tried to influence individual decisions. The minister’s statements were taken as being directed to the public, not to the ELY Centre (ibid, 11).
As a conclusion and based on freedom of speech on the one hand and independence of authorities on the other, the minister was found not to have sought to influence inappropriately the relevant authorities. The decision, however, reflected the minister's problematic position. It was stated that even if the minister did not intend his utterances to influence the decision-making of independent authorities, the public could interpret them as such. Moreover, it was stated that some of the minister’s statements could be understood as attempts to influence independent authorities’ decisions. For that reason, the minister was urged to be cautious and particularly moderate in making such statements in the future. (Ibid, 12.)

This decision by the chancellor of justice was later referred to by the minister himself, who stated he could not interfere with the authorities' decisions. (Yle 2012a.) His power was restricted to giving general administrative instructions. Not much could be done while the situation was ongoing in terms of limiting the company’s operations. Nonetheless, an interviewee mentioned that ministries have the right to lay down regulations. Through that means, it would have been possible to restrict the company. (Official 3.)

Overall, the criteria for legally limiting a minister's speech had to do with speaking about an individual company and interfering with its decision-making. Here the agency theory's analytical limitations become evident, as the agency theory clashes with another (democratic) principle: the rule of law. For sure, the delegation chain model as a description of political systems does not expect politicians to disregard the rule of law. The agency theory only falls into trouble when other requirements are attached to it, such as transforming 'the public will' into decisions. In these accounts, the proposed understanding of representation is not confined to institutional considerations but used as a normative starting point in researching, for example, politicians' actions. These issues speak to the substance of politics, not just its organization into institutions.

This dichotomy in political philosophy is nothing new. In fact, whether democracy should be understood as rules confined to a restricted area of the political system or more widely understood as normative principles is a question that has largely occupied the post-war Euro-American scholarly debate. The former represents a liberal line of thinking starting from Locke and focuses on democracy’s instrumental aspect, whereas the latter draws from Rousseau in its understanding of democracy as having value in itself. Joseph Schumpeter (e.g. 1970) can be taken to follow the former path, as can the agency theory, and advocates of participatory democracy (e.g. Pateman 1970) the latter. In the liberal tradition, the rule of law is
stressed over democracy as the 'will of the people', as it stresses individual liberal rights over public will. (Hoffrén 1998, 120–1.)

3.3 Politics of Administration

We will now turn to examining the regional state authority’s role in the case. A particular role was played by the Kainuu ELY Centre, which was responsible for monitoring the mine. It was alleged that the ELY Centre would not have been sufficiently strict with its monitoring. In addition, the regional state administration reform was criticized, as presented above. Here, rather than to determine whether the allegations were pertinent or not, a specific detail in the ELY Centre’s actions is studied: a decision not to organize an environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure regarding the so-called wastewater pipeline to lake Nuasjärvi.

Environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedures allow for the participation of the public in administrative decision-making. In some cases, it is at the discretion of authorities to decide whether to make an administrative decision-making process subject to the EIA procedure or not. This was the case with the Nuasjärvi pipeline issue. What space was there for open communication and speech in the issue? This section sheds light on some aspects of the state authorities’ discretion and points out that not all decisions can be returned to the seemingly neutral considerations based on the law. Moreover, this analysis will be coupled with regional state officials' speech about their tasks as part of the delegation chain. What interpretations can be given to their speech from the democratic perspective?

This subchapter starts with a presentation of the EIA procedure and its history in Finland to give an idea of its status and meaning in environmental decision-making in general. The following section will address the actual decision the ELY Centre made regarding the pipeline issue. Finally, to understand further the positions of individual officials, the results of their interviews are considered in the last section.

3.3.1 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure in Finland

The EIA system was introduced in Finland in 1981 through a committee nomination by the ministry of the interior. The committee was set to compile a national proposition for assessing and anticipating environmental impacts of important construction and development projects and for developing assessment methods. The committee report, titled ”Environmental Impact Assessment”
("Ympäristövaikutusten arviointi"), was the first Finnish written document to comprehensively address the environmental impact assessment system. (Hokkanen 2007, 127.) A central feature in the report was that of increasing the public’s direct influence in project planning from an early stage. According to the report, the EIA should be an integral part of planning systems and widely applied. It was also proposed that hearings would be introduced in addition to an already existing right to appeal. The idea was that all those affected by a project would have an opportunity to participate and voice their opinions already when a project was being planned. This was to include not just individuals, but also associations and organizations. (Ibid, 128–9.)

It was not until a decade later that the EIA became a question of legislation. After lengthy negotiations in the coalition government and more effective handling in parliament, the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure (468/1994) came into force in September 1994. The participatory aim of the act was stated in the first section, as it stipulated that the aim was to further the assessment of environmental impacts and the consistent consideration of this impact in planning and decision-making, while increasing the information available to citizens and their opportunities to participate. The act includes stipulations of hearings in two different phases, both on the assessment program (to be given as the assessment procedure starts) and on the assessment report (to be compiled as a result of the procedure)(Sections 8a & 11).

The right to participate in the procedure is with the developer and the coordinating authority, other authorities and those parties whose circumstances or interests may be affected by the project, and corporations and foundations whose field of activity may be affected by the project (Section 2 paragraph 7). The participation rights are thus defined rather widely. Not only those having immediate connections to any given project are welcome to participate, but also those individuals whose circumstances might be at stake and those foundations that operate in the field, for instance environmental organizations. It has been estimated that as such the legislation reflects interactive understanding of planning and deliberative democracy (Hokkanen 2007, 151).

The EIA procedure needs to be carried out for projects and alterations that may have significant adverse environmental impact due to the special features of Finland’s nature and environment. (Section 4, Paragraph 1.) A list of different types of projects that have to be exposed to the procedure is provided in the Decree on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure (713/2006). Mining (under certain terms regarding the scale) is such a project that the EIA procedure needs to be
applied to. The list is long in terms of other projects as well. However, in individual projects about material alterations to completed projects, it is the ELY Centre that decides whether to apply the EIA procedure. (Act on Environmental Assessment Procedure 468/1994, Sections 4 & 6.)

In summary, the EIA procedure allows interventions by the public into administrative decision-making processes. In a way, 'direct' participation intersects the delegation chain in a point that is the furthest away from the beginning of the chain, citizens. Yet, as in some cases the opening of the decision-making process to the EIA procedure depends on authorities, the EIA is in these cases a controlled form of participation rather than independent from political and administrative decision-makers. In all cases, the EIA procedure is administered by authorities. In that sense, it does not represent a case for representation as a vehicle for democratic action, because it is not really about imagining new ways of thinking and doing. Nonetheless, it does guarantee a certain amount of openness, and for this reason utilizing the EIA as much as possible is a minimum requirement for democracy. The following section sheds light onto a decision taken by the Kainuu ELY Centre and presents its repercussions to democracy.

### 3.3.2 Discretion of the regional state authority ELY

Building a wastewater pipeline to lake Nuasjärvi from the mine was such an alteration that required the Kainuu ELY Centre to decide on applying the EIA procedure. The bankrupt Talvivaara estate applied for a permit to build a wastewater pipeline to Juurikkalahti Bay in lake Nuasjärvi in October 2014, and again after adjustments to the application in December 2014. These applications were submitted to the Northern Finland Regional State Administrative Agency (AVI), whereas the decision about the EIA procedure was to be made by the Kainuu ELY Centre prior to these applications. According to the application, the purpose of the pipeline was to ensure a controlled discharge of purified water into the environment in order to continue mining in the coming years. The application included a mixing zone in which the amount of certain metals would be permitted to exceed normative environmental quality limits. (AVI Northern Finland 2014, 1.) At large, the pipeline was about trying to manage the water balance situation at the mine by discharging wastewater through the pipeline to the lake.

The Kainuu ELY Centre decided that the EIA procedure was not necessary for building the pipeline. The decision was obtained in September 2014. According to
the decision, building the pipeline was not so big a change that it would have lawfully required the procedure. The ELY Centre noted that citizens would have the chance to give statements on the issue later, when the environmental permit was being decided. (Kainuu ELY Centre 2014, 9.)

For the decision, the ELY Centre sought statements from the city of Kajaani, municipality of Sotkamo, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE), National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL), Finnish Food Safety Authority (Evira), the office for environmental health of the Kainuu Social and Health Care Joint Authority (Kainuu SOTE), the fish authority of the Kainuu ELY, and Natural Resources Institute Finland (Luonnonvarakeskus Luke – RKTL at the time). Five of these instances were in favor of the EIA procedure, whereas the only authority not recommending it was the fish authority of the Kainuu ELY. (See Kainuu ELY Centre 2014, 5–7.) The National Institute for Health and Welfare later stated that because the EIA was not organized, not all the necessary information had been obtained. For the institute, the EIA procedure would have generated better information in order to assess more effectively the project. (National Institute for Health and Welfare 2014, 1). The city of Kajaani stated that it had recommended EIA procedure, as not conducting it would result in a too-narrow focus on effluents and contamination. According to the city, the EIA procedure would have been useful due to the size of the project, its location, magnitude of impact, duration, and the number of people influenced. (City of Kajaani 2015.) Other statements did not take a direct stance on the EIA issue, but some did voice their concerns about the effluents (Kainuu ELY Centre 2014, 5–7).

The above-mentioned authorities’ actions are bound by law, most notably the Administrative Procedure Act (434/2003). The act lays down fundamental principles of good administration (Part II) in for instance stipulating that the authorities’ competence is derived solely from the law and that the actions of authorities need to be impartial and proportionate to the objective (Section 6). This is the wider frame within which any authority functions in Finland. Each authority has specific functions determined by the law and further by municipal or state stipulations, such as decrees and administrative rules. While the overall framework can make administrative actions look technocratic, there is space for independent discretion. In the consideration and decision-making regarding the EIA for the wastewater pipeline, the Kainuu ELY Centre decided against recommendations from other authorities. It was legally possible, as the decision-making power in the issue lay with the Centre.
The decision-making in the Nuasjärvi pipeline issue reflects the regional state authority's position in the chain of delegation. It had and continues to have independent discretion. In this sense, it does not form any particular extension to the acting national executive, as was pointed out also in the previous section regarding ministers' discretion. From the democratic viewpoint, it is relevant that the ELY Centre decided not to open the process to the EIA procedure. In statements by other authorities, notably by the National Institute for Health and Welfare and by the city of Kajaani, new information and widening the scope were seen as beneficial outcomes of the EIA. Here we come to the definition of the issue: how an issue and its impacts are represented – narrow or wide – is important. In administrative decisions, authorities function as gatekeepers for public participation.

3.3.3 Politics and administration: speech of regional officials

In analyzing the way the regional state officials framed their work, they too understood it as administration defined by the law. Here the analysis is based on interviews of two ELY officials, the focus being particularly on the wastewater leakage of November 2012. The lake Nuasjärvi pipeline issue had not yet emerged and thus the interviews did not include that topic.

The perspective of one official interviewed was that a number of events had taken place in Talvivaara, events that had occurred without warning and thus caused a special need for monitoring. The amount of work was highlighted and explained that the authorities had readily intervened in reported problems. This was backed with a report compiled by the ministry of the environment, hence stressing that these were not just the interviewee’s own words but that it had been noted by others as well. (Official 1.) This account can be seen against the backdrop that the regional state authority Kainuu ELY particularly had received criticism from different directions, not least in public, for not reacting timely to problems and for allowing the company to continue contaminating the environment (see e.g. Helsingin Sanomat, 28 March 2012; Helsingin Sanomat, 26 October 2012; Pietikäinen & Hassi 2012).

As the role of the actor was in the interviewee's speech reserved for the authorities, they were nevertheless bound by laws and ministerial guidelines. What gave authorities extra discretion, nonetheless, was a "surprising, unforeseen and unexpected" event (words of the interviewee), which was exactly how the water balance issue in the mine was characterized by the interviewee. (Official 1.) At the same time, it was concretely referred to the much-criticized decision by Kainuu ELY
that allowed the company to release wastewater into the environment. The characterization of the situation as surprising gave the authorities the right to make the decision.

The sphere of politics was constituted as something outside the ELY Centre and actions of politicians as oriented towards publicity and general issues. Talvivaara was also mentioned to be a politically sensitive issue and the attention paid to it after the "accident", referring to the wastewater leakage in November 2012, was "political". (Official 2.) It was mentioned that the fact that politicians were interested in the issue had activated citizens and that it seemed that nearly every Finn had an opinion of the case. As to the pressure posed by the situation, nevertheless, it was stated that the role of a civil servant was protected in the sense that the own responsibility was clearly defined. (Official 2.) In answering a question about whether the minister of the environment had interfered too much in ELY's actions, the interviewee replied, "politicians are politicians and everyone has issues that are particularly close to them." (Official 2.) The reply was continued by saying that they as civil servants were mainly in contact with the officials of the ministry, but the fact that the minister of the environment was from the Greens clearly did play a role.

Overall, the perspective of the regional state authorities followed quite rigidly the rule of law: their job was to follow the law, and to take responsibility of the tasks assigned to them in the law. In this sense, their position was set at the institutional level, and this position was actively pursued. Their thinking reflected a wider understanding of what the rule of law meant in actual decision-making. Nonetheless, although politics was considered a realm outside their lawful duties, the one aspect affecting their work was ministerial guidelines. They can be seen within the frame of the rule of law, as they are administrative guidelines.

However, a more direct link to the national executive was the statement that who was the minister was important. Nevertheless, this was said on a very general level and its meaning negated in relation to administrative decision-making. Similarly, all publicity and public outcry was disregarded as anything that could or should affect any functions of civil servants. For the officials, it seemed impossible to comprehend any accusations directed at them in public, as they were only fulfilling the task ascribed to them in the law.

The next section will further examine functions often described as administrative. This is done by taking a closer look at the dual role of municipalities as political and administrative actors, and the intersections of these two roles in the Talvivaara case.
3.4 Municipalities: Politics behind Administration

3.4.1 Municipalities and their self-government

Municipalities have a dual role in the Finnish political system: they are simultaneously political gatherings of people living in a defined area within the state, and administrators empowered to make certain administrative decisions. In Finland, municipalities have self-government safeguarded in the constitution section 121. This means that a local council elected by municipal inhabitants exercises decision-making power in its own territory. Municipalities have a relatively broad spectrum of functions prescribed to them in the law. Those include, among others, health care and social welfare services, childcare, elementary and vocational education, environmental protection, environmental health care, town and country planning, issuing of minor environmental permits, and waste management. While the municipality through its autonomy has discretion in terms of how, for example, health care is organized, it cannot opt out from its obligations as most of them are defined in the law as subjective rights of citizens. (Heuru et al. 2011, 50–1.) In general, municipalities have the duty to advance their residents' well-being and further sustainable development in their territories (Local Government Act 365/1995, Section 1, Paragraph 3).

Hence, municipalities provide environmental protection and environmental health care services to their residents. In some cases, the provision of these services has been delegated to joint municipal authorities comprising of several municipalities in a specific region. This is the case in the provinces surrounding Talvivaara, where the municipality of Sotkamo is part of the Kainuu Social and Health Care Joint Authority (Kainuu Sote after the Finnish abbreviation) and municipalities to the south of Talvivaara are part of the North Savo Joint Municipal Authority (Ylä-Savon Sote). Environmental health care services include for instance monitoring natural water bodies in the area and ensuring safety of using them. In Finland, natural waters are widely used for swimming, sauna bathing, and dishwashing in summer cottages, and even as drinking water in some wild areas.

The basic organization of municipal decision-making is stipulated in the law. According to it, each municipality must have a municipal board, a council, an auditing committee, an auditor and a municipal manager or mayor. It is noteworthy that Finnish municipal managers are office holders that often have a background in administration, and are not political actors in the same way as board, council, and
committee chairs, for example. Moreover, municipalities can have a varying number of committees for functions stipulated in the law or other permanent functions. They are installed and nominated by the council. A distinction between municipal organs and municipal authorities can be made: organs include the council, board, committees, and possible sub-committees and boards. They always consist of several people. Authorities, on the contrary, are persons or collectives assigned with duties stipulated in the law. A municipality hence entails this dual function. (Heuru et al. 2011, 215–6.)

The municipal council is the only organ in the municipality that is elected directly by residents. Municipal board, including the board chair, is elected by the council. Competence between these two organs is similar to that of between a parliament and a government: the council decides on the most significant, strategic issues, whereas the board functions as the executive. The council may also nominate a number of committees, sub-committees and working groups. Although it is optional, in practice all municipalities have committees. (Ibid, 216–21.) For example, the municipality of Sotkamo has an election committee, an auditing committee, a school committee, and a committee for environmental and technical services.

The same principle of proportionality is included in the Local Government Act regarding local councils as is in the constitution regarding the parliament. That is, the number of local councilors is proportional to the number of inhabitants in the municipality (Section 10), although municipalities are not divided into geographical or other electoral districts. Moreover, the act has similar stipulations with respect to the roles of individual local councilors, stating that elected officials "must promote the best interests of the municipality and its residents and act with dignity in their position of trust in a manner befitting the task" (Local Government Act 365/1995, Section 32, Paragraph 2). In other words, the law makes the interests of all a guiding imperative. The law does not establish any specific representative role other than the one resulting from elections and the above stipulation.

Parties have a role to play in local government. Unlike in national politics, in local government elections it was not until the 1960s that national parties started to have an interest in local politics. In 1972, the law was changed so that also parties and not just constituency associations could nominate election candidates, and in the Election Act (714/1998) the right to nominate candidates was vested first in parties and secondly in constituency associations. The parties’ power in local politics is to

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14 This holds true for every other city, town and municipality apart from Tampere and Helsinki.
15 The association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (Kuntaliitto) goes as far as to claim that "[t]he municipal council expresses the will of the residents". (Kuntaliitto 2015.)
be seen in the fact that nation-wide issues and national parties’ chairpersons play a
decisive role in local elections. (Heuru et al. 2011, 70.) Moreover, in the council
procedure local council groups formed by councilors are usually party-affiliated, if
independent councilors and groups formed by them are left aside. Party-affiliated
local councilors are also obligated to pay so-called party tax of their allowances to
their respective parties (Ibid, 75). However, it has been noted that both
internationally and in Finland the party influence in local politics has started to
diminish as a result of increase in the number of independent constituency
associations as candidate nominators, and of general decline in party membership.
(Ibid, 73.)

With regard to Talvivaara, municipalities do not have decision-making
competences in issues other than building permits. Instead, they may provide
statements as stakeholders to the relevant AVI Agencies and ELY Centres. AVI
Agencies may receive hundreds of reclamations, statements and written opinions
from different stakeholders regarding each decision they make. As a general rule,
people whose rights or interests may be affected by any given decision have the right
to give statements (Administrative Procedure Act 434/2003, Section 11;
Environmental Protection Act 527/2014, Section 43). In the Talvivaara case, these
stakeholders included people living in the mine’s impact area and those whose work
might be affected by the decision, for example fishers. The right to give statements
is equally with public authorities responsible for general interest, for instance
municipalities in the area.

This section will examine statements made by municipalities and municipal
authorities in the Talvivaara area to AVI Northern Finland regarding the Nuasjärvi
wastewater pipeline issue. Who within the municipalities were responsible for giving
them? The pipeline issue was a matter that came under the decision-making of AVI
Northern Finland, as Talvivaara needed an environmental permit for building a
pipeline from the mine area to lake Nuasjärvi. The issue was under decision-making
at the AVI Agency between October 23, 2014 and April 24, 2015. Statements, notes
and opinions were accepted between December 8, 2014 and January 19, 2015 (AVI
Northern Finland 2014). During that time, the Agency received altogether 14
statements from administrative instances, and 481 notes and opinions from private
citizens and their joint ventures (AVI Northern Finland 2015, 88–108 & Attachment
6).
3.4.2 Municipalities as speakers for others

As previously indicated, municipalities are the responsible decision-makers only for building permits. Instead, they may provide statements as stakeholders to the relevant AVI Agencies and ELY Centres. Within municipalities, who exactly give these statements varies. In some municipalities, the statement might be decided upon by the municipal manager alone, whereas in other cases it is the municipal board or a committee giving the statement. It is possible that several different bodies or even individuals can make statements in the name of the municipality. In the Nuasjärvi pipeline issue, for example, the city council as well as permit division of the environmental and technical services committee of Kajaani gave separate statements. Similarly, in Sotkamo the municipal board had a statement, but a separate statement was issued by the town planner. Furthermore, municipalities of Vaala, Muhos, and Utajärvi had a joint statement signed by respective municipal managers alone.

The voice of individual municipalities can thus be represented in multiple ways. Interestingly, elements of the statements by Vaala, Muhos, and Utajärvi were similar in their phrasing to the statement proposed by the Sotkamo municipality’s municipal manager. In Sotkamo, the initial statement was rephrased by the municipal board to be more critical than the proposal. The statement by the three mayors and the proposal by the municipal mayor of Sotkamo to the municipal board of Sotkamo was as follows:

"We insist the Talvivaara bureau (State of Finland) and the Talvivaara mining company estate resolve primarily the water balance and water treatment issues in the mining area by utilizing all possible technological solutions. Building the pipeline cannot be the only option for purifying water and managing the water balance."

(Municipalities of Vaala, Utajärvi & Muhos 2015; emphases added.)

This was the final formulation in the statement of the three fore mentioned municipalities, whereas the municipal board of Sotkamo decided to delete the words "primarily" and "the only" (in English this would additionally require the article "an"), thus making the statement for this part decisively more critical. In the municipal manager’s original proposal it was also demanded that a "positive and sustainable" solution should be found for the issue, which the board altered to include simply the word "sustainable", leaving "positive" out. (Sotkamo municipality 2015.)

As the statement by the three municipalities was signed by municipal managers alone, they spoke for the entire municipalities. Here the idea of municipality was less that of a gathering of people, and more that of an actor in singular. This singular
actor was an administrative instance that had certain responsibilities assigned to it in the law. Environmental health protection is one of those responsibilities. In this capacity, municipalities are similar actors as state authorities, such as ELY Centres and AVI Agencies. It is a matter of legislation which tasks are assigned to which authority. But for each type of authority, municipalities on the one hand and state authorities on the other, the source of (democratic) legitimacy is different. With regard to municipalities, their legitimacy arises from their residents in elections and passes through municipal councils, boards, and committees. The legitimacy of regional state authorities does not stem from local elections, but comes from the state. In this sense, from the local perspective, municipal power appears to be 'from below', whereas regional state power is 'from above'.

If the opinion of a municipality is understood in the singular, representation does not appear very democratic. In the case of Sotkamo, however, the opinion was formed collectively in the municipal board, and opinion-formation thus included deliberation. This appears more democratic, although the outcome is the same: one statement in each case. Can either of these statements be taken to represent the municipality as a whole? The answer is yes and no. Yes in the sense that municipal managers and municipal boards are formally authorized with the right to give statements in the name of the municipality. But no in the sense that these statements are not the only statements submitted, since other actors within municipalities also give statements. This holds true not only in terms of municipal committees, divisions and office holders, but also individual residents living in these municipalities, provided that permits under review might affect their rights or interests.

A crucial difference, however, is that municipalities speak as the guardians of general interest, whereas individuals speak as guardians of their private interests. Yet, the voice of each municipality was not singular, as different instances within municipalities’ administration gave statements. So, in addition to the statements of the municipality of Sotkamo and municipality of Kajaani, statements were also given by the environmental protection authority of Sotkamo, environmental protection authority of Kajaani, health protection authority of Kainuu SOTE (joint municipal authority including the cities of Sotkamo and Kajaani), and town planning authority of Sotkamo. In these cases, municipalities, even their administrative functions, had many voices, and their statements can arguably be taken as perspectives rather than as the opinion of any given municipality. But each instance gave their statement in certain capacities, and a statement by an individual municipal authority, for instance environmental protection authority, is not a statement of the whole municipality. Rather, it is a statement of that particular office holder.
Here the position out of which statements are given is of direct relevance. The positions represent something, whether it be a larger group of people (municipality) or special type of expertise. Municipal board has a special, official, privilege to speak in the name of the municipality, but the same privilege is with municipal managers. Hence, when statements are signed by municipal managers they represent the municipality, albeit the process that have led to these statements is less deliberative than is the case with statements that have been agreed upon in the municipal board. As the example of Sotkamo shows, the modifications to the statement proposed by the municipal manager were small, but they were significant.

The topic is further elaborated in the following section that studies the representational speech of municipal councilors. How did local councilors speak about representation? What representative claims did they make? What connotations do these claims carry for democratic representation?

3.4.3 Representational speech by Sotkamo local councilors

To understand further the internal decision-making of Finnish municipalities, eight local councilors were interviewed about their positions vis-à-vis the Talvivaara case, their council group’s positions, the role of them personally, and the role of a local council in a case like Talvivaara. Seven of the interviewees were councilors in the local council of Sotkamo municipality, all of them being chairs either of their council groups or in leading positions in the council or its committees. One of the eight councilors was interviewed as the chair of the environment committee of the Joint Municipal Authority of Ylä-Savon Sote. Thus, certain positions were assumed to the interviewees at the outset; they were not random local councilors.

It should be noted that the interviews were not public. Hence, they cannot be interpreted as political action, and the representative claims cannot be understood straightforwardly as ways to persuade the public. Yet, the interviews did have an audience – me. For that reason, the replies can be taken to represent accounts that the interviewees deemed socially acceptable in explaining their positions. The councilors were also aware that through my thesis a (potentially) wider audience would be reached.

The councilors were asked directly whom or what they deemed themselves to represent in relation to the Talvivaara issue. In their replies, municipal councilors reiterated the juxtaposition between their professional responsibilities and environmental stewardship. For those who did that, there seemed to be a stronger
urge to reconcile the two. Representation was presented as a ‘common’ perspective, albeit that perspective was in some replies attached to other people rather than presented as own opinions:

“I consider myself a representative of those who live here and try to improve region. For me the welfare of the environment is one of those things and economic welfare another. I think these two perspectives should be reconciled. We should be able to utilize the natural environment, as long as it is done according to nature’s own conditions. But it should not be destroyed. That is my perspective.” (Local Councilor 8.)

“I feel I represent the ordinary Sotkamo taxpayer, somebody concerned about the environment, but also concerned about jobs and the viability of this municipality.” (Local Councilor 5.)

The positions were represented as such that everybody could approve of them. It is not necessarily that the councilors would not have spoken honestly, but that the term representation was taken as a possibility to speak for all, represent oneself as the representative of all, and to represent that ‘all’ in a non-conflicting manner.

Indeed, being a representative of all living in Sotkamo was a common theme in the answers given to the direct question regarding representation. In relation to that theme, many of the respondents highlighted the fact that he or she lived, was born, and/or had his or her family dating back for generations in the municipality or in the region. It was stated that Sotkamo should be a good place to live in the future (Local Councilor 2), and representing all in the municipality was presented as a fact by referring to the Local Government Act (365/1995) stipulating that those in positions of trust were obliged to promote the good of all:

"A municipal councilor should represent all the inhabitants of Sotkamo, from zero to hundred years old, everybody. One's values need to be based on the Local Government Act that states a person elected to a position of trust should promote what is best for the local inhabitants." (Local Councilor 7.)

Another councilor initially stated that he represented small business owners and those who had encountered hardship. Nonetheless, he stated that through being impartial he represented everybody. Also his family background as Sotkamo inhabitants dating back generations was mentioned as a justification for representing the people of Sotkamo. Additionally, he contemplated the question of representation through his own background as a small business owner and through his voters:

"I am confident that in those over 400 voters there are entrepreneurs, workers, people out of work, people from every group [...]." (Local Councilor 6.)
Thus, the representation of all was argued through alluding to those that had voted for the councilor. In this way, representation was linked to the institution of elections. Obviously, however, the councilor had no way of knowing who exactly had voted for him, so referring to the diversity of voters was a rhetorical choice to highlight the representation of all. In asking another councilor of whether she represented those that had voted for her, the reply was that she did not know who had voted for her, and thus the question was irrelevant. She stated that people who had voted for her had similar values with her, but that it was impossible to be of totally the same opinion in every matter with other people.

While the former of these two was willing to list his voters and the latter was not, what was similar to the both and implicit in their statements of representation was that their very existence as representatives brought different people together. Otherwise, it would have been impossible for different people from different walks of life to have voted for the same person, despite not having the same opinion as the representative on every single issue. Here the basic idea of the representative claim is epitomized; a successful claimant, in this case a candidate that had managed to secure enough vote to get him or her elected, brought otherwise scattered people together to support something. Based on the interviews in this study that ‘something’ appeared rather vague, as something that a fairly large amount of people could relate to, as something that was hard to contradict because of its vagueness. Simultaneously that ability to present a successful representative claim was proved in the action of elections, and functioned as a source of legitimacy for the councilors once elected.

In addition to the references made to own geographical background, the personal background was pointed to in terms of other issues, as well. Those included utterances such as:

"As a wage earner myself, jobs are of course important [---]." (Local Councilor 3.)

"I advocate entrepreneurship, I am a part-time entrepreneur myself [---]." (Local Councilor 2.)

A third councilor said that his wise father had urged him not to get involved in politics, no matter what other things he would do. The reason for him to having got involved was his now-adult children whose lives he wanted to make better. Here, then, the term representation induced claims warranted by personal experience. In the latter case the councilor spoke for future generations, as had done an MP in being critical of the mine and putting the nature above the jobs (see chapter 4), but his stand was the opposite. The future generations were hence appealed to from opposite sides, thus indicating the ways representations could be made to serve any
purposes. Invoking personal experiences gave an impression of honest, down-to-earth politicians, as opposed to somebody not familiar with the issues on which he or she decides.

Yet, some local councilors spoke more explicitly of their political parties. Nonetheless, it was not in the sense that they would have explained their standpoints to be derived from party decisions, but rather their personal viewpoints and party affiliations were intertwined:

"I do not represent anything else but, like my party states, jobs need to be safeguarded. I work on behalf of workers, because I know the pain and agony of how expensive housing is. People count on having jobs." (Local Councilor 1.)

When asked about what or whom another councilor deemed himself to represent, he divided the answer into three: being a Sotkamo resident and ensuring that Sotkamo should be a good place to live in the future, praising entrepreneurship – a focus of the National Coalition Party – and finally being a Christian. In this way, in both of these cases, personal opinions on issues and representation were mixed: representation was presented as something based on personal perspectives and values, rather than presenting it as a representation of, for instance, specific groups of people. Moreover, party affiliations were explained with reference to values rather than the other way around.

Groups were indicated too, however, in the answers dealing with a question of whom the respondents deemed not to represent. Here the question was formulated in a way that already implied a connection between representation and groups of people. Perhaps consequently, then, the reply in many cases was that the respondent did represent all, except, in some cases, not those whom she or he deemed more or less extreme. Depending on the interviewee, those were conceptualized as nature conservationists (Local Councilor 1), Talvivaara and its shareholders (Local Councilor 5), the rich (Local Councilor 4) and environmental radicalism (Local Councilor 8). Thus, the groups or things excluded from representation were represented as something in the margins, whereas the focus of representation was presented as the happy medium.

The analysis suggests that representation is a loaded concept that evokes a need to persuade audiences that the speaker represents all. Nevertheless, that 'all' was not all in the sense that it would have encompassed all possible perspectives and opinions, but it was in relation to what the speaker wanted to represent as applying to everybody, as 'common' sense. This was done through being vague enough, so that for an opponent it would have been hard to tackle with what had been said.
While, simultaneously, some groups of people were explicitly excluded from representation, those groups were presented as being in the margins, while the representative him or herself struck the happy medium. Moreover, same techniques were in use regardless of the actual position that the speaker might have had in relation to the issue at hand.

Representational speech of the councilors was hence quite general in nature, despite of the fact that the matter discussed was not general. This perhaps highlights the fact that a local council is a strategic organ; it does not execute. As such it seems to have primarily a symbolic function – symbolic in the sense that it seeks to persuade and invite people to share certain views of itself and assure that the speaker really is a representative of all (like-minded). The function of the council is thus not simply that of deciding, but also, and importantly, that of voicing concerns and opinions in a way that interprets them according to speaker’s own viewpoints. This is a task quite distant from any administrative functions of a municipality. Conversely, issuing building permits, for example, can be seen as an administrative task, and essentially non-political.

Where politics is to be found in municipalities is thus not the individual issues, such as building permits, but in the debates of the council. Consequently, there seems to be two sides to being a municipal councilor according to themselves: there is politics, which is potentially ugly politicking, and then there are non-political decisions. Representation clearly invites statements that are on the “political” side of the spectrum, which do not have anything to do with making any actual decisions. Yet, representational speech is used to explain politics in a non-confrontational manner.

3.5 Conclusion

In the beginning of this chapter, I presented several research questions in relation to the administrative–politics nexus. I was particularly interested in finding the space for politics in administrative processes, and argued that this space is what makes representation democratic. I was further interested in the agency theory’s ability to provide a useful frame for analyzing politics and democracy.

16 An interviewee replied to a question regarding a committee’s political groups as follows: ”I do not think that the issues we decide are political. I have not noticed that anybody would have politicked with anything. All issues have been dealt with as strictly matters of fact.” (Local Councilor 8)
Based on the analyses, two levels should be distinguished from each other: institutional arrangements and political actions. The chain of delegation describes the institutional framework in which the executive and state authorities function. The same chain is to be found in local government that forms a chain from the local council through municipal board to municipal administration. The executive is in its place because of elections and cabinet/board nomination, and both regional state and local authorities work in the legal framework set by the parliament.

I argue that using the agency theory as a descriptive and normative starting point for assessing political systems and their institutional arrangements works fine. However, analyzing political action within this framework requires an understanding of representation that I have presented in this thesis. This account helps in distinguishing openness of political speech from transferring public moods into decisions as normative requirements for democratic representation. The former potentially carries democratic value; the latter does not. This has important implications not only within the academia, but also for the everyday understanding of democracy. It challenges us to think more closely about what democracy means in ongoing political debates and decision-making.

In this chapter, it meant looking into the speech of ministers, regional state officials, and local councilors. For the ministers' part, I concluded representative claims made speech more open to counterarguments, whereas speaking without them seemed more technocratic. A technocratic way of speaking invites special type of expertise in making counterarguments. This is relevant from democracy's perspective, as leaving politics for experts is hardly democratic – what counts as expertise is a political question in itself.

At the same time, it is necessary to examine the strategies of representational speech and not to elevate it to democratic speech. Representative claims always remain claims. They are not facts. One aspect is to look at who speaks for whom. Municipalities, for example, are vested with the right to speak for 'general' interests, whereas individuals are bound to be representatives of private interests – this is true in terms of official procedures, not necessarily in public speech (this aspect is addressed in the chapter on activism, chapter 5). In this respect, it is of relevance whether an individual or a collective gives statements in the name of, for instance, municipalities. When statements are debated collectively, they add politics to the administrative process. The plurality of statements is also beneficial, as it escapes the illusion that a municipality's voice would be unitary.

As for regional state officials, their speech did not leave room for politics in decision-making. This is in line with the rule of law, and as such the correct way of
perceiving authorities’ role in the delegation chain. Yet, as the decision on not to organize the EIA procedure shows, authorities do have discretion, and different authorities might land with different decisions in same issues. While this discretion might not (or should not) include politics as understood by the officials, it does include politics as definitions. These definitions entail accounts of how to represent issues at hand and who are stakeholders. The law defines these to a certain extent, but some discretion is left to authorities as well. I do not mean to say that the Kainuu ELY should have decided otherwise, I am not qualified to assess legal issues. What I do say, based on statements made by other authorities, is that definitions and representations carry political meanings.

Moreover, the councilor interviews indicate that representation is a loaded term that invites certain kinds of statements. In the councilors’ speech, one feature emerged over others: the assurance that the councilor was impartial and working for the general interest. In all cases this assurance was coupled with certain understanding of what people’s interests were, and these understandings reflected each councilor’s political background. The representational speech was also general in the sense that it had very little to do with any actual decisions that were made in the municipality, such as building permits. This observation is important in relation to the traditional mainstream representation research: when politicians in surveys state that they represent this or that group, the answers might foremost speak about generally approved ways to represent. What representing a group actually means is left outside the examination, because attention is not paid to the different representations of those groups.

A challenge in the new representation paradigm remains: is it so that politics is only to be found in speech and not in actual decisions? Some scholars have had difficulties operationalizing the representative turn without referring to actual policy decisions. Here the distinction of representation as an institutional arrangement and representation as an idea becomes useful. It is important to pay attention to chains of delegation and accountability, and to make sure that jurisdictions are properly set and followed. Yet, if politics is simply understood as policy-making, we are not well equipped to see how the body politic comes into being. Representative claims function as warrants for policy standpoints and decisions, as we could see in minister Niinistö’s case. How people are represented has implications to what should be done. I will come back to this point in the final conclusion. For now, I will turn to examining representational speech by Finnish Members of Parliament.
4 PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION IN THE TALVIVAARA CONTROVERSY

4.1 Parliament as the Epitome of Institutional Representation

4.1.1 Parliamentarism as speech

In the institutional environment, parliaments are the places for representation, particularly as opposed to the role of the executive. In the Finnish language, the term Member of Parliament (MP) literally means ‘representative of the people’. French and American revolutions introduced parliaments (Assemblée Nationale and House of Representatives, respectively) as the bodies for the representation of common people. For this reason, interest in representation research is often directed toward parliaments and parliamentarians.

Parliamentarism can be and is understood quite differently in different research traditions. In the approach that places importance on systemic and institutional features, it is understood as a special type of system in which parliament plays a ruling role vis-à-vis other actors, most notably the executive (see e.g. Sartori 1997, 101; Damgaard 1992, 12–4). In this account, parliamentarism is a synonym for parliamentary systems or parliamentary government (see e.g. Lijphart 1992, 1; Rasch 2011, 41–2; Damgaard 1992, 13). The latter stresses the relationship between a parliament and a government, whereas research on parliamentary democracy includes the relationship between parliamentarians and their electors (Persson & Wiberg 2011, 20; Strøm & Bergman 2011, 5–6). Parliament, overall, is equated with legislature (see e.g. Persson & Wiberg 2011, 10; Damgaard 1992, 11–2). This account is compatible with the mainstream research on representative democracy.

Another account puts speech into the core of the study on parliamentarism (see most notably Palonen 2012a, 236), thus taking a step away from understanding parliamentarism simply in institutional terms. Palonen (ibid, 236–7) explains why understanding rhetoric as a central feature in parliamentarism is important: to oppose rhetoric has long been an element in authoritarian and anti-political thinking. Placing importance in parliamentary rhetoric thus means defending politics – politics
that is not about ready-made facts that can be found somewhere, nor about the 'right' accounts of what is to be done. In contrast, speaking allows different perspectives to be voiced, arguing for and against, and evaluating these varying perspectives and arguments. Studying parliamentary rhetoric hence means paying attention to the issues parliamentarians choose to speak about or remain silent, to examining which topics are proposed to the agenda, and what questions are posed. (Ibid, 238–9; Palonen 2011, 42; Palonen 2012b, 51.) This rhetorical conception of parliamentarism allows for understanding representation as has been suggested by the representative (constructivist) turn.

In the parliamentary system approach, the opposition between government and parliament is often understood to form within the parliament with regard of government and opposition parties (see Persson & Wiberg 2011, 19). It is indeed true the party whip does pose a variety of constraints on individual parliamentarians and that public deliberation, in the golden age of party democracy, was subjected to the juxtaposition between government and opposition parties and their mutual power relations understood through the shares each of them held in the parliament. This led to increasing of government parties' power to the detriment of an independent parliament.17 (Pekonen 2011, 35–6.) Nonetheless, the rhetorical conception of parliamentarism seeks to examine the independence of parliament. It has been claimed that modern parliaments relentlessly seek to open new horizons of action and that they are not mere rubber stamps of government decisions. Rather,

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17 Manin distinguishes parliamentarism, party democracy and 'audience' democracy from each other as ideal types of representative government. They can exist simultaneously and be mixed, but depending on time and place, only one of them dominates in turn. (Manin 1997, 202.) In this sense, they can be seen as historical phases. Parliamentarism, for him, dates back to the early days of parliaments and to the principle around which parliaments were institutionalized. Representation is thought to realize through deliberation that takes place in the parliament. Representatives are not delegates of their voters, but trustees who are allowed and expected to form independent judgments based on arguments presented in the parliament. In a party democracy, the primary actor is the party and representatives are judged in the party context. Representatives are less free to act and vote according to their personal preferences and expected to act in line with the party. Hence, the role of public deliberation in plenary sessions is thought to be of less significance. In parliamentarism, the central place for speech is the public session, whereas in party democracy discussions and negotiations happen within and between parties. (Pekonen 2011, 31, 33–4; Manin 1997, 203–6, 211, 216–17.) In audience democracy, the relationship between elected representatives and electors is mediated through TV, radio, newspapers, and other media. There is no personal link, nor do weakened political parties function as mediators. Unlike in party democracy, voting is not an expression of belonging to a certain socio-economical stratum, but voting decisions are volatile. Trust to a candidate and/or representative once more becomes of significance, and representatives are freer than in party democracy in forming their relationships between the electorate and the party. They are active in identifying political tendencies in their electorate, and the electorate is thus left more to respond and less to express to these stimuli. Hence the name, audience democracy. (Ibid, 220–3.)
parliament controls actions of ministers and authorities by debating about them publically which further restricts their possibilities to act as if a parliament did not exist. (See Palonen 1997, 272.)

In effect, one does not need to adopt the rhetorical conception of parliamentarism in order to put weight on the fact that parliamentarians play a role in shaping public moods. Best and Cotta (2000, 7–8) have noted that

"[t]he elected members of parliament are the primary channel through which society, with its variety of conflicting values, needs, interests, identities, resources, demands, makes itself felt in the institutional arena of democracy. Therefore their individual and collective features are at least to some extent the reflection of society and of its changing structure. Yet, as the best studies of political representation have demonstrated, they cannot be viewed *sic et simpliciter* as a linear extension of societal structures of power and of social lines of conflict into the political arena. Representation is never a purely passive process of translation of society into politics. In fact, it is also a much more active process through which societal elements are 'politicized' and thus in fact changed. The political actors of representation (be they individual leaders or organized groups such as parties) are to be considered as a relatively independent variable which shapes the political expressions of society (and to some extent society itself). In particular, it is quite clear that the enormous societal changes which have taken place during the age of democratization have been not only reflected, but also filtered, selected and interpreted, absorbed or dramatized, and generally transformed by the processes of representation." (Emphasis original.)

This order of things, the fact that representative process molds the society, puzzled Schumpeter. He concluded that because the general will, volonté générale, is not genuine but manufactured, it destroys any attempts to define democracy as something that realizes it (Schumpeter 1970, 251–2, 263). This is not something that many would disagree today, not least amongst scholars contributing to the representative turn. A decisive difference between Schumpeter and these scholars, however, is that Schumpeter takes a rather cynical view to politicians' actions. For him, "effective political argument almost inevitably implies the attempt to twist existing volitional premises into a particular shape and not merely the attempt to implement them or to help the citizen to make up his mind" (ibid, 264). Thus, politicians' arguments are "servants of political intent" (ibid), and the objective of flattering the masses is simply that of crushing political opponents (ibid, 268). Elsewhere Schumpeter states that "[i]f a parliament represents the people at all, it must do so in another sense which we have still to discover" (ibid, 248).

In a sense, this plea was answered by the representative turn. Its main argument is that representation precedes the represented, but unlike for Schumpeter, this does
not make it undemocratic, at least not by definition.\textsuperscript{18} Representation and deliberation in the parliament are not understood as contradictory, but representatives are elected to deliberate and decide about issues on the parliamentary agenda. (Palonen 2012a, 18.)

Departing from the rhetorical conception of parliamentarism, this chapter addresses speech and texts in the Finnish parliament relating to the Talvivaara case. During the study period, Talvivaara was not a legislative issue and an MP interviewee stated after the interview that Talvivaara was really not a business of the parliament, but it was up to the authorities to act. Yet, quite tellingly, from the beginning of 2005 until the end of electoral term in spring 2015, Talvivaara was addressed as a topic during the parliamentary question hours six times.\textsuperscript{19} Moreover, the same time span saw seven written questions to the government compiled by individual MPs that addressed Talvivaara directly,\textsuperscript{20} and a number of other written questions where Talvivaara was mentioned.\textsuperscript{21} Other motions, notably budgetary and supplementary budgetary motions, were compiled particularly in the period that preceded Talvivaara’s construction from 2005–2006.\textsuperscript{22}

This is obviously quite much for an issue that is "not a business of the parliament". It is hence interesting to study, to what degree the Finnish parliament was simply a body that reacted to government’s proposals without any real independent role (see Wiberg 2014, 169), or a body with a deliberative function and having own initiative (see Palonen 2012a, 236; Palonen 2012b, 50–1; Soininen & Turkka 2008, 10) in the Talvivaara case.

At first instance in section 4.2., I will explore these questions: What role did the parliament play in the Talvivaara case? This role is studied through parliamentary procedures that were used by MPs: written questions, budgetary and supplementary budgetary motions, and question hour debates between 2005 and April 2015. In this respect, the role of MPs in general is not examined, but rather the role of the parliament and parliamentarians within that particular institution. What

\textsuperscript{18} While some advocates of the representative turn suggest that representation is democracy (Plotke 1997), some are more skeptical. E.g. Rehfeld (2006, 2) claims that representation can be democratic but it is not necessarily so, and Mansbridge (2003, 520) warns against manipulative relationship between representatives and the represented.


parliamentary procedures were used for putting Talvivaara onto the parliamentary agenda? What was spoken about, how was the case represented? Who was active in initiating procedures about Talvivaara? This last issue includes questions that concern familiar foci: party affiliations, electoral districts, and committee memberships of the MPs involved in Talvivaara-related procedures. Was there collaboration between and across party lines? How did government–opposition distinction appear in motions and in plenary debates – was it foremost quarreling between government and opposition parties, or between parliamentarians and ministers? These questions are addressed in order to understand the overall role and functioning of the parliament. This examination contextualizes the further study on representative claims by MPs.

The representative claims will be studied in the following section, 4.3. What representative claims did MPs make? What was the function of these representative claims? Budgetary and supplementary budgetary motions did not include representative claims, but all written questions and question hour debates that addressed Talvivaara between 2005 and April 2015 are included in the data.

To complement the analysis, a legislative issue of the new mining act proposal (HE 273/2009) and a plenary discussion where it was debated on February 4, 2010 (PTK 3/2010) is also examined. The debate is included in the analysis to broaden the perspective of parliamentary text and speech from that of written questions and question hour debates, both of which are non-legislative matters. What role did representative claims play in the debate? Talvivaara itself is and has not been a legislative issue, and hence there has not been parliamentary debates that would have addressed it as such. The mining act is thematically closest matter to Talvivaara, and the preliminary debate was held at a time when Talvivaara had already emerged as a political issue. The debate on the mining act also helps the reader to understand the overall standing of mining in Finland at the time. Hereby the analysis of representative claims consists of both non-legislative and legislative issues.

The final section, 4.4., will take the analysis further by examining how MPs spoke about representation in interviews. The interviews of 15 members of parliament were conducted in April, May, and June 2013 in Helsinki. What connotations did the term ‘representation’ evoke in MPs? How were the foci of traditional representation research, most notably geographical background, party affiliations and national interest, spoken about? What interests were asserted to people? All these questions further elaborate the interconnectedness of representation and political speech.

The underlying question in the chapter is: How did representation appear in the MPs’ speech and texts? How was the case itself represented? How did the MPs
represent themselves as representatives? How was the representee represented? What was the speech function of the parliament, if there was any? A previous study (Pekonen 2011) has suggested that parliamentarism as speech does not materialize in an ideal way at the Finnish parliament, because speech is understood by MPs foremost as campaign speech and election rhetoric, and not as speech that aims at persuading other representatives. The study used MPs' interviews as data in mapping the deliberative function of the parliament and parliamentarians. In this regard, it was studied how MPs presented deliberation in the public plenary and in committee work (which is closed to the public). Deliberation in these instances was analyzed by contemplating the role of parliamentary party groups and government–opposition distinction to the possibilities of MPs to deliberate in the parliament. The parliament was found to be subordinate to the government through party system, and hence it did not form a necessary space for speech. (Ibid, 218–24.) These are the themes addressed in this chapter.

To understand the institutional context within which Finnish MPs function, before going to the actual analysis, the context is briefly explained with reference to the constitution and electoral system in the following section. This part looks at obligations laid to MPs in the constitution, as well as both explicit and implicit understandings of representation in the institutional organization of the Finnish parliament.

4.1.2 Institutional context of Finnish Members of Parliament

The unicameral parliament of Finland consists of 200 MPs, one of whom is elected from the Ahvenanmaa (Åland) autonomous region. The Finnish word for member of parliament is literally “representative of the people”, and MPs are called representatives both in the constitution and in everyday language. However, the constitution states:

”The powers of the State of Finland are vested in the People, who are represented by the Parliament.” (Constitution of Finland 731/1999, Section 2)

Other than naming MPs as representatives and using that name throughout the constitution, nothing is said about individual representatives' duties vis-à-vis their constituents. The people is represented by the parliament, not by individual MPs. To the contrary, what is said about the representatives’ role in general is that a
"Representative is obliged to follow justice and truth in his or her office. He or she shall abide by the Constitution and no other orders are binding on him or her". (Constitution of Finland 731/1999, Section 29.)

Hence, an MP as a representative is a part of a collective, the parliament, and as a part of it, he or she has the obligation to follow the justice and truth. The constitution, further, enlists the rights of a representative, those including parliamentary immunity and freedom of speech, among others. What the constitution particularly instructs is how to perform parliamentary activity, but those stipulations do not refer to individual parliamentarians. Instead, they lay down principles concerning parliamentary sessions and their organization, committees of the parliament, election of parliamentary organs, preparation of matters, and so forth.

An indirect reference to representation is to be found in the section 25 of the constitution. It orders that for "the parliamentary elections, the country shall be divided, on the basis of the number of Finnish citizens, into at least twelve and at most eighteen constituencies". While it is not directly stated, from the allusion to the number of citizens it can be inferred that constituencies refer to geographical entities, electoral districts, inhabiting those certain number of citizens. Thus, a principle of proportional representation is contained in the stipulation – the electoral mandates of MPs come from their respective electoral districts.

In parliamentary elections as of 2015, Finland was divided into 13 electoral districts, equivalent to the constituencies mentioned in the constitution. (Election Act 714/1998, Section 5; incl. Amendment on April 12, 2013/271.) As presented above, the number of MPs elected from each district is proportional to the number of citizens living in that district, in the 2015 parliamentary elections the number of MPs elected from each district ranging from seven (electoral district of Lapland) to 35 (electoral district of Uusimaa) (Government Decree 935/2014). Candidates are nominated either by political parties or constituency associations,23 and each party or association can nominate at most 14 candidates or, in case the number of MPs elected from the district is more than 14, at most the number of MPs elected from the district (Ministry of Justice 2015). In October 2015, there were 10 registered

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23 Parties can form electoral alliances and constituency associations can form joint lists with each other respectively. In these cases, each electoral alliance and joint list can nominate the same number of candidates than individual political parties that have not formed electoral alliances. (Election Act 714/1998, Sections 108 and 109.) For clarity, henceforth what I write about party-lists in terms of counting the votes applies also to constituency associations, electoral alliances and joint lists.
parties in Finland, eight of which had won parliamentary seats in the 2015 election and three of them were represented in the government.

While the constitution does not tie MPs to parliamentary party groups explicitly, it does so implicitly in stating, "the groups represented in the Parliament negotiate on the political programme and composition of the Government" (Constitution of Finland, Section 6, Paragraph 2). An obvious connection to parties is established already in parliamentary elections where parties are the foremost candidate nominators, a business which is largely conducted by party organizations and bodies. Nonetheless, this nomination is conducted by party districts, not by national leaderships. The law requires party districts to organize primaries to select candidates, but the requirement can be avoided if the number of nominees is no more than the number that each party is allowed to select as candidates (Sundberg 2002, 79). In either case, the local party organization is of central importance in candidate nomination. As the parties' district organizations are free to organize the nomination process, the national party leaderships have very little power in it (ibid, 79; Raunio 2005, 483–4). For this reason, local and regional issues can potentially become salient in the nomination process.

In the actual election, the Finnish electoral system utilizes the d'Hondt method in allocating seats based on the vote. It is a proportional system where votes are cast to individual candidates on party-lists within each electoral district. The number of votes each party-list gets is the sum of the votes for individual candidates on that list. In principal, each party-list gets the number of seats that their proportion of the vote entitles them to. For example, let us assume that we have an electoral district of 10 MPs, and five parties within that district have won votes as follows: Party A gets 30 %, Party B 30 %, Party C 20 %, Party D 10 % and Party E 10 % of the vote (total 100 %). Hence, Parties A and B will each get three seats, Party C will get two seats and Parties D and E will each get one seat from the given district. In practice, the count is seldom this simple, and disproportionality is greatest in small electoral districts, whereas proportionality is biggest in large electoral districts (Sundberg 2002, 90). Because of this, the effective election threshold is often so high in constituencies with low district magnitude that small parties find it hard to be successful (ibid, 88).

The election of individual candidates within the party-lists depends on their personal number of votes. The lists are open, that is, voters determine the order of candidates on the lists in casting the vote, instead of the party (or constituency association) putting candidates in order prior to elections. Hence, the voter writes the number of the chosen candidate, and nothing else, to the ballot. First, the votes are counted for party-lists that the elected candidates represent. These are converted
to seats for each party-list as explained above. The seats of each party-list will be
given to the candidates who best fared in the election. That is, the three candidates
gaining the most votes within Party A will get the three seats allotted to Party A, and
the seats are allotted similarly within all other parties gaining seats. The number of
personal votes determines the ranking order of candidates within the party-list, but
not across party-lists. The method can both in theory and in practice result in
situations where a highly popular candidate is not elected if the party in the electoral
district is otherwise not popular, whereas a candidate with a modest number of
personal votes can get elected if the party-list as a whole is well supported.24

Because of the importance of personal votes in the final result, the competition
between candidates from the same party can sometimes get rather heated – the
competition is not just between political parties. What makes Finland an even more
candidate-centered system is the fact that many candidates invest their own money
to their personal campaigns. Moreover, many candidates and MPs are also local
councilors and/or they have functions in local or regional party branches, facts that
add to the overall salience of the geographical background of MPs. (Raunio 2005,
484–5.)

Despite of the logic that builds around district and candidate factors in the
candidate nomination and electoral systems, the Finnish parliament is usually not
held to be a collection of individual and detached MPs but a central arena for party
functions and discipline. The Finnish parliament’s functioning is largely determined
by the government. Thus, according to some researchers it does not have a political
agenda, but it rather reacts to the government, usually simply by accepting
governmental acts and budgets with marginal modifications. (Wiberg 2014, 169.)
Nevertheless, through analyzing the representational speech of MPs this thesis sheds
light on how the different dimensions of parliamentary work, parties, constituencies,
the constitution, and representational positions, are combined.

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24 The most famous case is the result of Tarja Cronberg in the parliamentary election in 2007. She was
a candidate nominated by the Greens in the electoral district of North Karelia. She got the second
highest number of personal votes (7804) and second highest share of votes in the district (9.4 percent),
but was despite of that not elected. This was due to the fact that the share of votes won by the Greens
in the district overall, 11.7 percent, was not enough for the Greens to win any seats in the district that
had only six seats to share between party-lists. The electoral system was later reformed so that the
smallest electoral districts in the eastern and southeastern Finland were combined, in order to reduce
the effective election threshold. This was of some help to the problem of disproportionality, but it did
not abolish the problem altogether.
4.2 Parliamentary Procedures and Agenda

4.2.1 What are parliamentary procedures

This section presents an overview of parliamentary procedures and their use by MPs in the Talvivaara case. What role did the parliament take? What parliamentary procedures were used and by whom? By borrowing from the traditional mainstream research on representation, I will pay special attention to MPs' committee memberships, geographical backgrounds, party affiliations, and positions in the opposition–government dimension. I take these categories as the frames and context for representative claims that will be analyzed later in the chapter.

Written questions and motions are ways for MPs to make their personal voices heard, in addition to plenary debates. As the constitution ensures priority for government initiatives in parliamentary procedures, budgetary, legislative and petitionary motions make it possible for individual MPs to initiate handling of issues in writing. Budgetary motions are suggestions either to the state’s annual budget or to the supplementary budget. With legislative motions MPs can propose that new legislation be acted, either by proposing a whole new act or proposing amending or repealing of an act in force. Further, with petitionary motions MPs propose that drafting of a bill or other measures be taken by the government. As will be illustrated later, MPs compiled written questions and budgetary motions regarding Talvivaara, but no legislative or petitionary motions were made.

Plenary sessions are public speech situations. In addition to bill handlings, question hour is an established form of debate at the Finnish parliament. It always takes place on Thursday afternoon and is broadcast live on national television. It is an important occasion for MPs to challenge government ministers on their actions by posing questions about any current issues. The issues are not decided upon but simply debated. (Eduskunta 2015.) As these events are public in a very immediate fashion, they are particularly crucial speech situations for both the MPs and ministers. While they include short questions prepared beforehand, the debate that follows is improvised, putting the rhetorical skills of MPs to the test (Pekonen 2011, 69). With the public nature of the event and the fact that nothing is decided, performativeness is an essential element of the question hour (see Soininen & Turkka 2008, 11).

MPs can also put forward motions for debate to initiate a discussion in the plenary about a current issue, apart from question hours. Both government proposals and
MPs' motions are first addressed in a relevant committee, and then processed in the plenary. With regard of petitionary motions and motions for debate, the speaker's council decides about their further handling. No initiatives for discussion were made about Talvivaara. Talvivaara was debated about during six question hours between 2012 and April 2015, however.

4.2.2 Written questions

Between 2005 and April 2015, seven written questions were compiled by MPs regarding Talvivaara (KK 280/2010, KK 625/2010, KK 1230/2010, KK 313/2012, KK 284/2013, KK 1009/2013, KK 856/2014). No written questions were made prior to 2010. All the questions were about environmental issues, whether it was emissions to bodies of water, ground or air, technical solutions, overall problems of the mine, compensation for damages, or uranium extraction. Table 1 lists these written questions and their signatories.

Four of these seven written questions were compiled by more or less ‘local’ MPs (KK 1009/2013, KK 284/2013, KK 313/2012, KK 625/2010). They included MPs Eero Suutari (National Coalition Party), Seppo Kääriäinen (Centre Party), Merja Kyllönen (Left Alliance), and Raimo Piirainen (SDP). Questions first signed by MP Pentti Tiusanen (Left Alliance) (KK 280/2010, KK 1230/2010) can be understood from the standpoint that he was a long-standing member of the environment committee (1995–2011), including a long period as its chair (1996–2007) and vice-chairperson (2007–2011). His electoral district was Kymä, thus not any of the two closest to Talvivaara (Oulu and North Savo). His other written question was signed by seven other MPs (KK 280/2010), a group that seems to have been gathered around the environment committee and his fellow party members. The second signatory after Tiusanen was Susanna Huovinen (SDP), chair of the environment committee at the time, and the signatories include two other members of the committee (Timo Juurikkala, Greens, and Tarja Tallqvist, Christian Democrats). Three of the other signatories were members of the Left Alliance parliamentary party group (Markus Mustajärvi, Jyrki Yrttiaho, and Merja Kyllönen), Kyllönen was also from the electoral district of Oulu, as was Erkki Pulliainen (Greens), the last signatory not yet listed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Signed by, party, electoral district</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KK 280/2010</td>
<td>Apr 9, 2010</td>
<td>Emissions of the Talvivaara gypsum pond</td>
<td>Left Alliance: Pentti Tiusanen, Kymi, SDP: Susanna Huovinen, Central Finland, Greens: Timo Juurikka, Uusimaa; Erkki Pulliainen, Oulu Left Alliance: Merja Kylönen, Oulu; Jyrki Yrttiaho, Varsinais-Suomi; Markus Mustajärvi, Lapland Christian Democrats: Tarja Tallqvist, Uusimaa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KK 625/2010</td>
<td>Jul 1, 2010</td>
<td>Environmental impacts of the Talvivaara mine and informing residents in the nearby area</td>
<td>Left Alliance: Merja Kylönen, Oulu; SDP: Raimo Piirainen, Oulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KK 1230/2010</td>
<td>Feb 10, 2011</td>
<td>Agreement to sell uranium by the Talvivaara Mining Company Plc</td>
<td>Left Alliance: Pentti Tiusanen, Kymi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KK 313/2012</td>
<td>Apr 20, 2012</td>
<td>Emissions of the Talvivaara mine</td>
<td>Centre Party: Seppo Kääriäinen, North Savo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KK 284/2013</td>
<td>Apr 10, 2013</td>
<td>Solving of the problems of the Talvivaara mine</td>
<td>Centre Party: Seppo Kääriäinen, North Savo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KK 1009/2013</td>
<td>Nov 6, 2013</td>
<td>Review of the situation at the Talvivaara mine</td>
<td>National Coalition Party: Eero Suutari, Oulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KK 856/2014</td>
<td>Nov 7, 2014</td>
<td>Compensation for environmental damages caused by Talvivaara to private persons and ensuring environmental safety in the area amidst the mine’s financial problems</td>
<td>The Finns: Arja Juvonen, Uusimaa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of altogether 15 written question signatories, 14 were either members in committees that handled Talvivaara-related issues, came from electoral districts next to Talvivaara, or were fellow party members to first signatories. In some cases, these roles intersected. At the same time, nevertheless, out of the 15 signatories as many as 12 were opposition party MPs. The written question as a means for MPs to function as messengers thus appeared as particularly reserved for the opposition party MPs, which lessened the parliamentary function and increased the party political dimension. At the same time the link to committee memberships and electoral districts of the signatory MPs does put weight on the logic that arises from
the parliament and not just party political power relations. Hence written questions were a tool for the MPs to boost their profile based on all these aspects: they appeared as representatives of their electoral districts, committees, and opposition parties. These roles might not have been simultaneously or equally stressed, as in some questions MPs appeared primarily as representatives of the electoral district, whereas sometimes they spoke more like experts on certain issues.

### 4.2.3 Budgetary and supplementary budgetary motions

From the beginning of 2005 until the end of an electoral term in April 2015, six budgetary or supplementary budgetary motions addressed the Talvivaara case (TAA 782/2005; TAA 436/2006; TAA 1026/2006; TAA 1149/2006; LTA 82/2006; LTA 196/2014 – See Table 2). Five of the motions were made in 2005–2006 and they were practically identical (motions can be repeated simultaneously with different signatories or in different years by the same or different signatories). They all suggested adding funds to the state budget to build infrastructure for the then planned mine. They highlighted the importance of the mining project for the region's employment that hitherto had suffered from high unemployment.

The latest supplementary budgetary motion, LTA 196/2014, differed from the earlier motions not just in content, but also in terms of argumentation and signatories. It directly criticized ministers Ville Niinistö and Heidi Hautala for failing in the Talvivaara issue and blamed them for the environmental catastrophe. The motion suggested that the state would invest €10 million to build a purification plant for the mine. This was to be done instead of building the wastewater discharge pipeline. Quite unusually, the parliamentary party group stated that the AVI Agency should not issue a permit for the pipeline, hence stepping to the territory of administrative decisions. The motion deviated from the others also in the respect that it was signed by 33 out of 39 members of the Finns parliamentary party group. No MPs from other parliamentary party groups participated.
Table 2. Budgetary and supplementary budgetary motions about Talvivaara between 1/2005 and 4/2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Signatories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TAA 782/2005</td>
<td>Sep 26, 2005</td>
<td>Appropriation allocation for starting the Talvivaara mining project in Sotkamo (EUR 20,000,000)</td>
<td>National Coalition Party: Lyly Rajala, Oulu Left Alliance: Anne Huotari, Oulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAA 436/2006</td>
<td>Sep 22, 2006</td>
<td>Appropriation allocation for planning a railway for the Talvivaara mining project (EUR 500,000)</td>
<td>Centre Party: Rauno Kettunen, North Savo; Eero Reijonen, North Karelia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAA 1026/2006</td>
<td>Sep 22, 2006</td>
<td>Appropriation allocation for starting the Talvivaara mining project in Sotkamo (EUR 20,000,000)</td>
<td>National Coalition Party: Lyly Rajala, Oulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAA 1149/2006</td>
<td>Sep 22, 2006</td>
<td>Appropriation allocation for planning a railway for the Talvivaara mining project (EUR 500,000)</td>
<td>Centre Party: Markku Rossi, North Savo; Antti Rantakangas, Oulu; Eero Länsä, North Savo; Kyösti Karjula, Oulu; Tapani Tölli, Oulu; Jari Leppä, South Savo SDP: Tuula Väätäinen, North Savo; Reijo Lahtinen, Central Finland; Lauri Kähkönen, North Karelia National Coalition Party: Arto Satonen, Pirkanmaa Left Alliance: Anne Huotari, Oulu; Iivo Polvi, North Savo; Veijo Puhjo, Satakunta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTA 82/2006</td>
<td>May 23, 2006</td>
<td>Appropriation allocation for planning a railway for the Talvivaara mining project (EUR 100,000)</td>
<td>Left Alliance: Anne Huotari, Oulu; Minna Sirnö, Pirkanmaa; Iivo Polvi, North Savo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTA 196/2014</td>
<td>Feb 17, 2015</td>
<td>Appropriation allocation for building a purification plant for process waters of Talvivaara (EUR 10,000,000)</td>
<td>The Finns: Pentti Kettunen, Oulu + 32 other MPs of The Finns' parliamentary group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of these budgetary and supplementary budgetary motions were first signed by MPs from around Talvivaara. In some cases, MPs from the opposite sides of the political spectrum joined together in making the motions (see TAA 782/2005 and TAA 1149/2006). A geographical dimension was thus emblematic to them, but that was not the only dimension as other MPs from other electoral districts signed as
well. Particularly in relation to LTA 196/2014 the motion was a vehicle for an opposition party to criticize the government, and there were also other cases where motions were signed by members of a single parliamentary group (TAA 436/2006 and LTA 82/2006).

4.2.4 Question hour debates

Moreover, Talvivaara was addressed during six question hours. Four out of the six Talvivaara topics on the question hours were about the environmental problems of the mine (SKT 116/2012, SKT 28/2013, SKT 153/2014, SKT 175/2014). One of the topics was about financial and the processual problems of the mine and its consequences for the Finnish metallurgical industry at large (SKT 124/2013). One question hour was in its entirety dedicated to the bankruptcy of the mine (SKT 111/2014). Table 3 summarizes the question hour debates on Talvivaara.

Two of the questions were initiated by MP Pentti Kettunen (The Finns, electoral district of Oulu), two by MP Raimo Piirainen (SDP, electoral district of Oulu), one by MP Jari Myllykoski (Left Alliance, electoral district of Satakunta), and one by MP Johanna Sumuvuori (Greens, electoral district of Helsinki). With regard of Kettunen and Piirainen, a link to Kainuu province can be drawn based on their geographical background. A similar link should not to be made in relation to Myllykoski and Sumuvuori, as their electoral districts had nothing directly to do with the mine or issues of Kainuu.

Members of parliament took the floor 46 times in these six debates, ministers' statements excluded. In quantitative terms, the floor was taken (or given) the most by (to) MP Pentti Kettunen (The Finns, electoral district of Oulu, 6 times), MP Raimo Piirainen (SDP, electoral district of Oulu, 5 times), MP Martti Korhonen (Left Alliance, electoral district of Oulu, 5 times). As Kettunen and Piirainen were initiators two times each, it seems that Talvivaara as a non-legislative matter invited especially those from the electoral district of Oulu to be active. While Martti Korhonen was from the same district, he was also chair of the environment committee that on a few occasions added Talvivaara to its agenda. 22 out of 46 speeches were held by MPs elected in the electoral district of Oulu. It can hence be stated that the Talvivaara discussions at question hours were not just initiated but also debated to a large extent by MPs of the electoral district where Talvivaara was situated.
Table 3. Question hour topics about Talvivaara between 1/2005 and 4/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Presenter/Party/ Electoral District</th>
<th>Other debators (MPs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Centre Party: Kimmo Tiilikainen, Kymi; Mauri Pekkarinen, Central Finland</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National Coalition Party: Eero Suutari, Oulu</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SDP: Susanna Huovinen, Central Finland</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greens: Tuija Brax, Uusimaa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKT 28/2013</td>
<td>Mar 14, 2013</td>
<td>Uranium concentration of a nearby pond</td>
<td>Raimo Piirainen, SDP, Oulu</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Centre Party: Timo V. Korhonen, Oulu</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Left Alliance: Martti Korhonen, Oulu</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greens: Satu Haapanen, Oulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKT 111/2014</td>
<td>Nov 6, 2014</td>
<td>Bankruptcy of Talvivaara</td>
<td>Pentti Kettunen, The Finns, Oulu</td>
<td>The Finns: Jari Lindström, Kymi; Martti Mölsä, Pirkanmaa; Kaj Turunen, South Savo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Centre Party: Timo V. Korhonen, Oulu</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Juha Sipilä, Oulu; Mauri Pekkarinen, Central Finland; Antti Rantakangas, Oulu</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National Coalition Party: Eero Suutari, Oulu</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Marjo Matikainen-Kallström, Uusimaa; Left Alliance: Martti Korhonen, Oulu</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greens: Ville Niinistö, Varsinais-Suomi; Tuija Brax, Uusimaa</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SDP: Raimo Piirainen, Oulu; Jouni Backman, South Savo</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Christian Democrats: Sari Palm, Kymi</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Swedish People’s Party: Stefan Wallin, Varsinais-Suomi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKT 153/2014</td>
<td>Jan 29, 2015</td>
<td>Treatment of wastewaters of Talvivaara</td>
<td>Johanna Sumuvuori, Greens, Helsinki</td>
<td>Left Alliance: Martti Korhonen, Oulu</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Finns: Pentti Kettunen, Oulu</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>SDP: Raimo Piirainen, Oulu</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
While this was the case, other MPs took the floor as well. 27 of the speeches were held by opposition party MPs (The Finns and Centre Party, and for the three last question hour debates also Left Alliance and the Greens, as they had left the coalition government in June 2014 and September 2014, respectively). 19 speeches were given by government party representatives. The speeches were weighted toward opposition parties, but not entirely. This weighting, in general, is done by the speaker who is responsible for giving the floor to debators, as well as choosing the order of questions to be asked. Albeit these are decisions of an individual, the speaker, they can be understood to reflect an institutional understanding of the question hour: in this case it was parliamentary par excellence, but not without any connotations of party government.

The role of the speaker is emphasized in cases where there are many who would like to take the floor. In other words, concerning debates that only included one, two or a few debaters, it is probable that all those who wanted the floor also got it. The lists of discussants in these debates thus quite probably are lists of those who wanted the floor – others did not. In larger debates, particularly in the one Talvivaara’s bankruptcy (SKT 111/2014), the power of the speaker was larger. In this debate, all parliamentary parties were represented by at least one MP, even one from the Swedish People's Party whose MPs had nothing to say in the other debates. As the floor was quite evenly distributed between parties, it seems that party membership was (one of) the primary bases that guided the distribution.

Nevertheless, the party affiliations and government–opposition positions were invariably present at the speeches. In SKT 116/2012 MP Pentti Kettunen (The Finns, electoral district of Oulu) criticized the government directly:

"[T]he government and responsible ministers have been too quiet on this matter and responsibility has been rolled over to the local ELY Centre. This issue is of a scale that the government and ministers cannot hide behind regional authorities."

In the discussion, the government was also criticized by opposition party MP Kimmo Tiilikainen (Centre Party) for having closed down a natural resources council. A loaded speech was additionally given by MP Susanna Huovinen (SDP). Her party at the time was in the government, but she nonetheless criticized Niinistö (Greens) quite harshly and particularly for the fact that the previous government, in which SDP was not but the Greens was, had made a regional government reform that allegedly had weakened regional environment administration (see subsection 3.2.1). On the other hand, the government was also posed questions by opposition party MPs that were not about criticizing the government as such (by MPs Pirkko
Ruohonen-Lerner, The Finns; Mauri Pekkarinen, Centre Party; Jari Lindström, The Finns) and posed questions by government party MPs (MP Martti Korhonen, Left Alliance) that did criticize the government. Thus, based on this discussion the party government approach was present but not in everything that was stated – it was not a dominant element in the discussion.

In the other major question hour debate about Talvivaara in November 2013, which was about the Talvivaara bankruptcy, SKT 111/2014, this element was even less present. The discussion proceeded in a remarkably conciliatory and like-minded atmosphere. The government was thanked by opposition party MPs (among others Timo V. Korhonen, Mauri Pekkarinen and Juha Sipilä of the Centre Party; Jari Lindström, Kaj Turunen and Pentti Kettunen of The Finns; Tuija Brax of the Greens; and Paavo Arhinmäki of the Left Alliance) for its actions before and after the bankruptcy of Talvivaara. Some criticism was posed as well, but it was relatively mild and did not break the overall consensual nature of the discussion. It was not constituted around government–opposition division, and hence question hours in general cannot be regarded simply as something that would build around that logic. This is not to say that this dynamic was totally absent – it was not for instance in SKT 153/2014 – but it was not a primary factor in these question hours.

4.2.5 Summary

In summary, while the mid-2000s saw budgetary motions regarding a railway to Talvivaara, written questions emerged from 2010 onward and they all addressed environmental issues. The first Talvivaara debate took place in the question hour in 2012. All the question hour debates were about the environmental or financial problems of the mine. The sequence of budgetary motions, written questions and finally question hour debates indicate the importance of Talvivaara in the parliament’s agenda. The Talvivaara case first saw several similar budgetary motions, the compiling of which requires a relatively small amount of work. Written questions started to emerge a few years later, but they demanded more effort in terms of background work from the parts of individual MPs. Finally, question hour debates starting in 2012 indicate that the Talvivaara issue was worth the television time.

Moreover, the topics indicate that Talvivaara was first presented as important with regards to employment (budgetary motions in the mid-2000s), then as an environmental issue (from 2010 onward in written questions), and finally as a
combination of an environmental and financial problem (from 2012 in question hour debates). In this sense, the initiatives seemed rather reactionary to outside events.

Further, MPs from around Talvivaara had a decisive role in initiating the budgetary motions, written questions, and question hour debates. Four out of seven written questions, and all budgetary and supplementary budgetary motions were first signed by MPs from around the Talvivaara area. In four out of six question hour debates the initial question was posed by a ‘local’ MP, while 22 out of 46 speeches were held by MPs from the electoral district of Oulu. The three most frequent debaters were from the same electoral district.

All in all, the most visible dimension in these initiatives was locality. The web of actors additionally included MPs that could be traced to same committees and parties than first signatories. Not everything could be interpreted as having been motivated by the opposition–government division, but this division was to be seen in some cases.

With regard of budgetary and supplementary budgetary motions in general, they are very often disregarded in the actual budgets. During the electoral term of 2003–2007, 5,144 budgetary and supplementary motions were made, out of which 0.8 percent were accepted. Respective numbers for the term 2007–2011 were 4,782 and 0.6 percent. (Pajala 2013, 26.) Out of motions signed by more than half of all the MPs fewer than 10 percent were accepted between 1989 and 2010. (Pajala 2011, 156.) It is also customary that old or rejected motions are reintroduced (Pajala 2013, 31), as was the case here with some motions.

Clearly, the budgetary motions have other functions than being the basis for governmental decision-making. It has been estimated that they are a means for the MPs to speak to their local electorate, and function as political advertisements. This interpretation is backed by the fact that many of the motions are made during the year before elections, which was also the case in four out of six budgetary motions referred to here. They are also a means to bring issues into public discussion and to the political agenda, and indeed some do bear fruit after years of relentless trying. (Pajala 2011, 157.)

As for written questions and question hour debates, they are not matters to be decided upon to begin with. While motions, both budgetary motions and written questions, are not as immediately scrutinized by the audience as the weekly broadcasted question hour debates, they leave public traces of MP activities. In the Talvivaara case, MPs from around Talvivaara had a decisive role in parliamentary procedures.
4.3 Representative Claims in Parliamentary Procedures

This section is a collection of representative claims that were made in the parliamentary procedures concerning Talvivaara between 2005 and April 2015 (written questions and question hour debates). Representative claims found from these sources were divided into three different categories that are presented in sections 4.3.1. to 4.3.3. What function did the representative claims have?

In order to include a legislative matter, debate over a proposed mining bill (HE 273/2009) that took place on February 4, 2010, will be analyzed in section 4.3.4. The representative claims found in the debate were largely tied to geographical entities and groups of people.

4.3.1 Allusions to groups of people

In their speeches and initiatives, MPs directly referred to certain groups of people and spoke for them. People were mentioned by their occupation or other similar denominators. The following includes such representative claims:

"Tourism entrepreneurs have for decades advertised Finland as the land of the thousand lakes. [...] And if we think about the Talvivaara area and the bodies of water nearby, there are a lot of residences and summer cottages - the value of which are going to sink owing to this catastrophe. I hence ask the responsible minister: has it been considered how these citizens and entrepreneurs are compensated for the fact that their possessions have lost a big share of their value?" (Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, The Finns, electoral district of Uusimaa, Question hour debate SKT 116/2012.)

"Also residents by bodies of water and shore owners are about to suffer huge losses." (Pentti Kettunen, The Finns, electoral district of Oulu, Question hour debate SKT 111/2014.)

“Talvivaara’s environmental footprint has been painful for the residents and cottagers of the area.” (Arja Juvonen, The Finns, electoral district of Uusimaa, Written question KK 856/2014.)

The groups that were mentioned were entrepreneurs, residents and landowners, workers and their families, investors, and people that were in general worried about the environment. More precisely, people were represented through different roles that they had in relation to Talvivaara. An impression was created with these passages that the MPs wanted to explain Talvivaara’s problems and ultimately the bankruptcy in concrete terms through explaining what it meant for people in all these different
roles. This was not just done in relation to ‘them’, people, but also by putting the MP in the same position as people in MP Haapanen’s statement:

"Those of us who live along the Oulujoki River are naturally worried about the quality of our drinking water." (Satu Haapanen, Greens, electoral district of Oulu, Question hour debate SKT 124/2013.)

In looking at the debates more closely, it can be detected that even though the forms of the representative claims appear similar, each of them had slightly differing connotations. MP Brax (Greens) concentrated on speaking about clean water and the environment:

"But for the concerned people – landowners, cottage shores and of course those who in general are worried about the state of water and the environment – it is very important that money is directed to the old paragraph at the Ministry of Justice to provide information and a promise to people who have suffered from environmental damage that these things will be investigated and legal help will be made available to them [---]." (Tuija Brax, Greens, electoral district of Uusimaa, Question hour debate SKT 111/2014.)

MP Martti Korhonen (Left Alliance), chair of the environment committee, started out with referring to workers but then moved to reminding of the importance of the environment:

"This day is very sad for many different reasons, but foremost for workers, subcontractors, their families. Then there is the perspective of the environment that needs to be under control." (Martti Korhonen, Left Alliance, electoral district of Oulu, Question hour debate SKT 111/2014.)

MP Eero Suutari (National Coalition Party), to the contrary, was worried not just about workers, but also investors, which is generally more typical of a right-wing MP than a leftist MP. The same MP also referred to two municipalities by name, Sotkamo and Kajaani; Sotkamo being his own home municipality:

"In the bankruptcy of the subsidiary, directly 700 Kainuu residents lose their jobs, mainly in Sotkamo and Kajaani, but also in other municipalities in Kainuu. Hundreds of cooperative companies will lose their money, and 70,000 investors in Finland will lose their money. Despite of its difficulties, Talvivaara has been important for the Kainuu region’s economy and has reduced unemployment." (Eero Suutari, National Coalition Party, electoral district of Oulu, Question hour debate SKT 111/2014.)

MPs hence made choices on, firstly, which groups to refer to, and, secondly, how to represent these groups. For their argumentation, it was relevant whether the Talvivaara issue was represented as an unemployment problem, as an environmental
problem, or as a problem for investors. Through these choices the MPs presented themselves as speakers for these groups.

4.3.2 References to geographical entities

In their speeches and in written initiatives, MPs frequently referred to geographical entities of different scale. The referred entities were in many cases related to the MPs’ home municipalities, areas and regions. The following passages exemplify this point:

"We here in the parliament need to stand particularly for Kainuu’s environment, but also for its residents and jobs." (Eero Suutari, National Coalition Party, electoral district of Oulu, Question hour debate SKT 116/2012.)

"This is of course a terrible day for Kainuu, and in the worst case the ramifications of the bankruptcy for the whole province are really dismal." (Timo V. Korhonen, Centre Party, electoral district of Oulu, Question hour debate SKT 111/2014.)

"The bankruptcy is a huge blow to the already high unemployment in Kainuu." (Raimo Piirainen, SDP, electoral district of Oulu, Question hour debate SKT 111/2014.)

Yet, Sotkamo (municipality) and Kainuu (province) were also referred to by MPs coming from other electoral districts:

"This is of course a very sad day for Sotkamo and Kainuu, a big mental blow, and I have to thank the government for clearly sending the message to Kainuu that both people and the environment will be taken care of." (Paavo Arhinmäki, Left Alliance, electoral district of Helsinki, Question hour debate SKT 111/2014.)

These citations included interpretations of what each speaker held important for the region: the environment, work, economy. MPs represented themselves as speakers for the region, and particularly for the MPs coming from the electoral district of Oulu this appeared a natural way of speaking. They appeared as the representatives of their electoral districts and as interpreters of the problems created by Talvivaara for the region.

However, some referred other electoral districts than Oulu. These districts had seemingly nothing to do with Talvivaara, but the connection was made in the speeches:

"I myself come from a region where in recent years there has been this kind of state of massive shock: high unemployment, cuts in jobs and the end of work. [---] When
such a thing happens in a region, it requires also mental resources and energy, and raises a lot of questions with regard of people’s wellbeing.” (Sari Palm, Christian Democrats, electoral district of Kymi, Question hour debate SKT 111/2014.)

"When the shipyard in Turku was recently in jeopardy, not only the loss of jobs and the end of traditional shipbuilding, but also the breakdown of a concentration of know-how, sea cluster, was feared.” (Stefan Wallin, Swedish People’s Party, electoral district of Varsinais-Suomi, Question hour debate SKT 111/2014.)

The latter citation from Stefan Wallin’s speech was the only speech held by a Swedish People’s Party’s MP. The former passage was from a speech by Sari Palm, the only MP of the Christian Democrats to take part in the question hour debate. Neither of these parties had MPs from the electoral district of Oulu. For MPs of that electoral district Talvivaara offered a way to present oneself as a representative of the region. Yet the same debate offered ways for other MPs also to draw connections to their electoral districts that in practice had nothing to do with Talvivaara.

It can therefore be concluded that referrals to MP’s own regions were rather popular. Through them, MPs presented themselves as representatives of those regions. It is also plausible to think that parliamentary party groups assigned those coming from the region around Talvivaara to participate in the discussion in order to raise their profiles. In this way, the parliament’s institutional arrangement became manifest in MPs’ speeches; their mandates come from geographically defined electoral districts that need to be taken into account in MP speech. At the same time, referrals to regions always included different political emphases.

Yet, regions were not the only referral points in terms of geographical entities. In some speeches, the significance of the Talvivaara issue was extended to the whole of Finland:

"The company has a huge industrial significance, as the minister stated, both to the region and to the whole Finland.” (Timo V. Korhonen, Centre Party, electoral district of Oulu, Question hour debate SKT 124/2013.)

"This was a sad day not just for the Kainuu province, its business owners and workers, but also for Finland, as mining industry is something that the future of Finland has been thought to build on [---]." (Antti Rantakangas, Centre Party, electoral district of Oulu, Question hour debate SKT 111/2014.)

"This is a question of a national treasure, meaning our nature and the environment – no more, no less." (Martti Korhonen, Left Alliance, electoral district of Oulu, Question hour debate SKT 153/2014.)

All these MPs were again from the electoral district of Oulu. As was the case with the first category where particular groups of people were referred to, here the
allusion to the whole Finland was accompanied with suggestions of how the issue should be understood in itself. As for the two first MPs, both of the Centre Party, the significance of the case was tied to the understanding that mining business was crucial for the success of Finland. In the third statement by Martti Korhonen, chair of the environment committee and MP of the Left Alliance, the significance was related to nature. These statements hold a link to another institutional context, to the constitutional stipulation that the parliament represents the whole people, not just individual electoral districts.

### 4.3.3 Telling what people think or how they are

Apart from alluding to groups of people and geographical entities, MPs directly stated what people thought, did, or how they were. They quite clearly bore a connotation that people were spoken for. Here are examples of this kind of argumentation:

"Citizens and many of us politicians have begun to think there has been enough reports, enough working groups." (Susanna Huovinen, SDP, electoral district of Central Finland, Question hour debate SKT 116/2012.)

"Strong, diligent and resilient people live in Kainuu. For all the people living there I want to thank the members of the cabinet, ministers, for this encouraging hour that we have had the chance to listen to, to listen what the government has planned for people in Kainuu in this very severe situation we stand before." (Pentti Kettunen, The Finns, electoral district of Oulu, Question hour debate SKT 111/2014.)

"Talvivaara has again made people talk in Kainuu, and particularly about the construction of the discharge pipeline from the mine to Nuasjärvi Lake. Citizens do not believe – even though it has been assured – that these discharge waters would be purified, clean. This has made different citizen movements very active." (Raimo Piirainen, SDP, electoral district of Oulu, Question hour debate SKT 175/2014.)

The latter two statements were made by MPs that themselves were from Kainuu, and thus took it upon themselves to speak on behalf of people in the province. However, the former was a general reference to what people think. In the latter passages the MPs clearly took the role of speaking from a local position to the national executive and in that sense the proposed representation was quite explicit and strongly tied to the geographical dimension of the MPs' roles. But as the first passage suggests, references to people can be made without a reference to geography, in which case they can be used as a legitimation to what was otherwise said. Hence statements about how people think or feel functioned as political arguments.
What is noteworthy in these statements is that they were directed from the people, with MPs as mediators, to the executive. This is particularly evident in relation to Pentti Kettunen’s speech, as he explicitly spoke on behalf of people to the government. Very similar representative claims were made in three written questions:

“The sad situation is being contemplated in several citizen meetings. Their message to decision-makers is clear: Do something.” (Seppo Kääriäinen, Centre Party, electoral district of North Savo, Written question KK 313/2012.)

“This spring a sulfur storage unit burned in Talvivaara, which set off a general alarm in the whole mine area. People were unable to get information anywhere about what was going on, despite contacting the mine. This brought about a lot of concern and uncertainty, also insecurity of whether or not it is safe to live in the nearby area, if these sort of things happen. People do not know how to deal with different grits and smells.” (Merja Kyllönen, Left Alliance, and Raimo Piirainen, SDP, both from the electoral district of Oulu, Written question KK 625/2010.)

“Mining was once positively anticipated in Kainuu and Savo. [...] Citizens in Kainuu, Savo and elsewhere are asking: are the emissions, leakages and other accidents ever going to end? Almost bottomless patience has been and is being demanded from people in tolerating the sad events of Talvivaara. The citizens’ trust in Talvivaara mine functioning as intended has staggered, lessened and ran out. In addition to losing their trust, people by bodies of water feel unsafe. [...] Waiting is not an option anymore, this is how people think in Kainuu, North Ostrobothnia and Savo.” (Seppo Kääriäinen, Centre Party, electoral district of North Savo, Written question KK 284/2013.)

The last excerpt was almost poetic in interpreting and intermediating people’s feelings. This intermediating seemed to be the function of almost all the written questions; MPs wanted to tell the executive what people felt and what they needed. The written questions thus presented MPs as messengers of the people to the executive – this is also the institutional function of written questions. Furthermore, as written questions are documented and public, MPs could be understood to speak also to a wider audience through them.

At large, what was in common to all of the representative claims analyzed above was the fact that in making them the MPs positioned themselves as interpreters of the situation, as well as of people’s, regions’ and Finland’s moods and interests. In doing that they spoke from (the) people to the executive, and thus fulfilled the expected role that they played as parliamentarians. In light of this data, the MPs’ speeches and written initiatives were about making this direction clear – it was not for instance about convincing people about the MPs’ know-how or righteous actions of their party, nor about making government–opposition party divisions explicit, but
about publically establishing the ground of MPs as representatives of (the) people. At the same time, they included more or less an interpretation of how to (re)present the people. Representative claims in this context offered MPs ways to present the interpretations and different emphases neutrally, as objectively true reflections of the interests and thoughts of the people.

In addition to understanding representative claims as ways to further a political agenda, our gaze can additionally turn to what is being done with them. In line with the scrutiny of question hour, budgetary motion, and written question topics, the representative claims also seemed reactionary. MPs often took different aspects into account in their speeches, most notably those of the economy and the environment (although with varying emphases). Their representative claims did not seem very independent, but they more appeared as following what perhaps was deemed culturally acceptable. This does not present a very positive image of Finnish MPs as engines for discussions of how ‘we the people’ and our interests and values should be understood.

### 4.3.4 Mining Act proposal in the parliament

In 2009, a new mining act was proposed to the parliament (Government proposal HE 273/2009) and in 2011 it was accepted (Mining Act 621/2011). The preliminary debate in a plenary session took place on February 4, 2010 (Parliamentary minutes PTK 3/2010). This section analyses the preliminary debate from the perspective of representational speech. The analysis is directed at understanding the overall flow of the debate and hence at understanding what role representative claims played in political argumentation.

At the time, the government proposing the act was led by prime minister Matti Vanhanen of the Centre Party. The minister presenting the proposal was Mauri Pekkarinen of the same party. Other political parties in the government were National Coalition Party, the Greens, and Swedish People’s Party. The dividing line between the government and opposition was visible in the discussion to a certain degree, but not always very clearly (parties in the opposition at the time were SDP, The Finns, Christian Democrats, and Left Alliance). In general, the proposal was welcomed by MPs in government and the opposition. Altogether 19 MPs took part
in the discussion. Eight were from the regions most affected by mining and ten from the committees most salient to the issue. These were the commerce committee, giving the decisive report to the plenary, and the environment committee, compiling a statement for the commerce committee report. Most of the MPs, eight, were from SDP, whereas other parties had mobilized substantially fewer MPs: the National Coalition Party had four, the Centre Party three, the Greens two, and Left Alliance and the Finns one each. No MPs from the Swedish People’s Party or Christian Democrats took the floor.

Conclusions of why precisely these MPs took the floor can be drawn based on committee and party affiliations, and on the electoral districts of the MPs, at least to a certain degree. Committee chairs from both of the two relevant committees were present and took the floor, which could be expected. The two committees were otherwise relatively well represented, but by far not all of the conversationalists were members of those particular committees. It can be assumed that some took part in the discussion as representatives of their parties, for example in cases where there was just one party representative, some as chairpersons of the given committees, some as regional representatives, and some in the capacity of mixed roles of the aforementioned groups. There were also a few participants who did not fall into any of these categories.

Less arguments referring to certain areas or people living in certain areas were made in the beginning of the discussion and more towards the end. At first, the discussion concentrated on specific aspects and points of the proposed act. Nonetheless, those aspects and points were discussed with references made to groups of people. Topics included the need to have mines for reasons related to employment particularly in northern and eastern Finland, the right level of compensations for landowners, and a debate about stressing the need to leave some of the mineral reserves for the future generations, as opposed to luring as many multinational companies as possible to extract minerals and take profits elsewhere. While those involved in the discussion were from all around Finland, references to northern and eastern Finland, the parts of the country allegedly most affected by mining, were made by MPs coming from those regions. These comprised of the following statements:

"The proposed act strongly affects the northernmost region of Finland. There are ongoing mining projects in Lapland and it needs to be possible to extract mineral..."
deposits in the future. Lapland forms nearly one-third of Finland’s surface area, it is vast and sparsely populated. Mining industry carries an immense importance to the province, and for the whole of Finland it is a question of keeping the country inhabited.” (MP Ulla Karvo, National Coalition Party, electoral district of Lapland.)

“[mines] bring jobs to places where jobs are scarce. The most important mining projects are now in Lapland, Kainuu, and eastern Finland. Of course, there are projects also elsewhere in Finland.” (MP Hannu Hoskonen, Centre Party, electoral district of North Karelia.)

“Based on the knowledge we now have, existing or planned mining projects will employ people of the province, and what's best: in different parts of the province, hundreds if not thousands of people.” (MP Janne Seurujärvi, Centre Party, electoral district of Lapland.)

“In many projects concerning areas of sparse settlement in Finland we have found that many projects aimed at industrialization have been confronted with endless reclamations and appeals, and as a result the projects have stalled for years.” (MP Hannu Hoskonen, Centre Party, electoral district of North Karelia.)

“Mining creates jobs mainly in areas that otherwise offer poor employment opportunities, such as Northern Ostrobothnia, Kainuu, Lapland, South Karelia, Southern Ostrobothnia and North Savo.” (MP Jouko Laxell, National Coalition Party, electoral district of Varsinais-Suomi.)

All but one of the six passages above were from speeches of MPs from the areas about which they spoke. The Mining Act proposal was framed regionally as important for several provinces, particularly for those in northern and eastern Finland. Despite of the similarity in their overall rhetoric connecting the proposed act to these regions, each of them had a particular take on the issue. Social Democratic MP Kari Rajamäki advocated state ownership, whereas the Centre Party MP Hannu Hoskonen saw oversized bureaucracy as a critical problem for the mining industry. Employment and the need for jobs, particularly in these areas, were widely used as arguments for the mining industry in general, hence the interests of the regions mentioned. Provinces were represented as such. MP Ulla Karvo pivoted from representing the interests of northern Finland to equating its interests to those of the entire country. Later in the discussion, an MP from the Pirkanmaa electoral district made a connection from the proposed bill to his province:

“[In addition, we have a lot of mining know-how relating to machines, also in the province where I come from [---]]” (MP Arto Satonen, National Coalition Party, electoral district of Pirkanmaa.)
This further illustrates the point (also made in section 4.4.2.) that MPs tend to draw a link between any given issue and their background regions, provinces and electoral districts. If these links are compared to the question hour debates analyzed in chapter 4.4., it is interesting that here regions, not particular groups of people, were drawn attention to. The regions' interests were also quite straightforwardly framed as gaining more jobs, whereas a few year later people's right to clean water and an unspoiled environment were part of the agenda because of the events in Talvivaara. This suggests that representative claims are not just any claims from different political positions, but that they can change over time. As such, a general change of tone can be detected. What happened here from the bill proposal and budgetary motions to question hour debates and written questions a few years later was that the interests of Kainuu province or eastern or northern Finland were no longer claimed in unison to be jobs. Again, MP speech did not appear very independent, but rather reactionary.

What was the dividing line between government and opposition in the discussion? The biggest party in the opposition, the Social Democratic Party, was the most active in the discussion. Some MPs from the SDP made critical remarks about the proposed bill overall, but the one representative of the Finns taking part in the discussion, also member of an opposition party, took a positive stand to the act. Furthermore, the MPs of the SDP were not overly negative and, in fact, from the speeches alone it was for the most part impossible to infer whether the speaker was a representative of one of the parties in government or in opposition. It cannot be concluded that the speeches would have been motivated simply by the will of the opposition party MPs to denigrate the proposal, nor by the government party MPs to praise it.

Rather, after some general remarks of the benefits or downsides of the bill the speeches often moved to questions or remarks concerning specific details. The most debated issue was the transition period for mechanical gold mining in Lemmenjoki National Park in Lapland. The government proposition suggested a period of eight years before mechanical gold mining in the area would be banned. In the debate, MPs of Centre Party, the Finns, and National Coalition Party expressed their wishes that the transition period should be longer, whereas MPs of the Greens and Left

26 See also for instance a question hour debate concerning the involvement of local people in environmental impact assessment procedures of uranium projects on February 23, 2006 (SKT 7/2006). There MPs Antti Kaikkonen (Centre Party, electoral district of Uusimaa) explained that people in eastern Uusimaa were restless and even panicking (presumably relating to a planned uranium mine) and MP Timo Soini (The Finns, electoral district of Uusimaa) made a remark of an alleged decrease in house prices in the municipality of Pukkila in Uusimaa.
Alliance thought that the period should be shorter than proposed. The following passages are from the discussion:

”The proposed act has evoked concerns particularly among gold miners. The concern is understandable: for many this is a question of livelihood, and the proposal is taking their livelihoods away. Environmental protection is at the bottom of this. In Lapland, there are already enough of protected areas and the possibilities to have this traditional livelihood are reducing in the name of environmental protection. The most problematic aspect is that the 8-year transition period [...] is too short.” (Ulla Karvo, National Coalition Party, electoral district of Lapland.)

”I want to concentrate on a single small issue that is regionally very important: gold mining and particularly mechanical gold mining affects my home municipality Inari in a special way.” (Janne Seurujärvi, Centre Party, electoral district of Lapland.)

While in the first of these two passages MP Ulla Karvo took the role of speaking for the gold miners and their livelihoods, the scope in the passage by MP Janne Seurujärvi was wider. He equated the interests of gold miners with the interests of his home municipality and stated that the question was regionally very important. MP Karvo rather framed the lobbying for gold miners as a question of freedom to engage in commercial activity. The partisan character of Seurujärvi’s assertion was made visible by the minister in his reply, as well as in a comment by a fellow MP:

”It may be worthwhile to know in this hall that Samis, who practice their livelihoods in the area, think that it [mechanical gold mining] should be stopped right now. Further, it is good for you to know that the Regional Council of Lapland does not support permanent rights for gold mining. They think that the transition period should be longer in years. Not even the Regional Council of Lapland, the guardian of the province’s interests, says that the mechanical gold mining should go on forever.” (Mauri Pekkarinen, Minister of Trade and Industry, Centre Party.)

”Representative Seurujärvi, if you read the pages 175–6 in the government proposal, the government that you support, you’ll find a comprehensive account of the problems relating to the gold mining in Lemmenjoki National Park, to that heavy mechanical mining. It is also stated that 10,000 people visit the park annually who are not gold panners or miners but other people. Surely, we need to support the future of Lapland, and for me ecologically executed tourism is the business of the future.” (MP Pentti Tiusanen, Left Alliance, electoral district of Kymi.)

In the first passage, the minister of trade and industry firstly brought down the claim that the interests of the gold miners would be the same as interests of all in the region by claiming that the indigenous Sami people wanted the mining to stop then and there. Second, he presented an alternative representative for the region, the Regional Council of Lapland, thus dismantling MP Seurujärvi as the representative of it. It is
noteworthy that in the discussion the only time Samis were mentioned it was by the minister as presented above, and by an MP speaking strongly for gold miners and stating in passing that he was not speaking for the Samis as that would have been speaking against his better knowledge. In the second passage, a passage by the then vice-chairperson of the environment committee Pentti Tiusanen, a reference was made to the harm caused by mechanical gold mining to the environment. His argumentation proceeded to include other people in those whose interests were allegedly at stake.

This dynamic of representational speech poses another question, that of the so-called foci of representation. Does concentrating on small parts of the proposal and stressing the meaning of the proposal to a geographically defined area and/or region mean that the geographical focus of representation goes above other possible foci, such as the nation or the party? First, the Mining Act was not necessarily an act that would have contradicted regional and national interests. Both the parliamentary debate over the Mining Act reform and the Talvivaara issue suggest interests were not straightforward, regardless of whether they were regional or national. Second, as representational speech is an essential way of speaking politically, a successful politician would know how to tie the speech of regional and national interests to the goals of a given party. The following passage illustrates this kind of rhetoric par excellence:

"[I]t is both regionally and nationally important that we exploit these natural resources, but the control of raw materials have to be organized through state ownership and based on national interest." (MP Kari Rajamäki, SDP, electoral district of North Savo.)

The Mining Act, such as acts and laws in general, apply to the whole country. In the case of this act, nonetheless, its significance for certain areas was larger than to others. It does not mean that the interests of different regions conflict, so aligning regional and national interests was plausible. Moreover, as presented above, the ways regional interests were interpreted and represented were in connection to the speaker’s party-affiliation.

Further, in the discussion concerning the gold mining transition period the gold miners were spoken for by not just MPs from the electoral district in question but also by MPs from elsewhere:

"Local people, and I am not saying anything about the Samis, because I might not know what I’m talking about, but those people that I met there, that I visited, everybody thought that let them [the mechanical gold miners] mine until the end." (MP Tero Rönni, SDP, electoral district of Pirkanmaa.)
"The mining act reform is in my mind good. However, restricting mechanical gold mining in Lemmenjoki I hold as a negative feature. The gold miners of the area will feel wronged if mechanical mining is prohibited even partly based on environmental justifications, when mining elsewhere in Lapland is allowed." (MP Pentti Oinonen, The Finns, electoral district of North Savo.)

In the discussion, a pair of references to future generations were also made, apart from the Lemmenjoki issue, and going back to the entire bill proposal:

"To summarize, I think what will bother me for days after this evening is that our generation is so greedy." (MP Erkki Pulliainen, Greens, electoral district of Oulu.)

"Is it so that we want to deprive future generations of something that should be preserved for them?" (MP Esa Lahtela, SDP, electoral district of North Karelia.)

Not all representative claims had a direct link between MPs and the people entitled to vote for them. This emphasizes the fact that representative claims offer ways to argue for certain positions and they are not necessarily ways to speak to specific audiences. This form of argumentation potentially appeals to anybody thinking in a certain way, not so much to any group defined by socio-demographic or other similar attributes. What they do simultaneously is map all groups relevant in the discussion (gold miners, future generations) thus leaving some groups out, sometimes even explicitly (Sami). This mapping might not require that much interpretation of interests, which was the case with gold miners, whereas other categories allow a wide range of interpretation of what the interests actually are. This was the case with future generations. These representations join the public discourse in constructing our collective understanding of regions, nations, people, and so forth.

The fact that the transition period for gold miners was eventually extended to 15 years instead of eight in the parliamentary committee work (see report of the commerce committee, TaVM 49/2010, Section 182 on page 23) and in the final bill indicates it is probably not a coincidence it was a primary focus. As the minister was confronted publically in the issue by his colleagues in the same party, it seems the issue was left for the parliament to decide by the government. From the viewpoint of parliamentarism, this is interesting: it does not look very strong, if the only thing the parliament can in its debate change is a minuscule issue in the entirety of the proposed bill.

To summarize, representational speech in this case took the gold miners under the wings of many MPs, while simultaneously excluding other groups, most notably the Sami. The popular discourse was effective in presenting gold miner interests as central to the case. Their perspective was also associated with the wider interests of
the region, even Lapland, as it was insinuated by MP Karvo that restricting the transition period for mechanical gold mining was an example of environmental protection gone too far in Lapland.

At the same time, nonetheless, it was acknowledged by MP Rönni that he could not speak for the Sami. This made the otherwise implicit choice of whom to speak for explicit. Depending on this choice, the conclusion of what to do politically looks very different: whether to ban mechanical gold mining right now or whether to claim for extension to the transition period. However, there is no evidence that representative claims would be effective in those terms; political goals can also be chosen first, and only after that groups of people appealed to. Most issues probably require combining the two so that political goals match with the interests of certain groups of people, intentionally or unintentionally, and those goals need to be 'sold' to everybody. This 'selling' is done with the help of rhetoric, including representative claims. In the Lemmenjoki gold mining case, however, a clearly defined, rather small group of people was directly spoken for and the group's interests were clearly to be seen for everybody. The representative claims were hence selective regarding whom to represent, and not in relation to what to present as the group's interests.

This type of rhetoric could be challenged, and was challenged by the minister, by referring to other groups in the area and pointing out that other representatives, such as the regional council, was of a different opinion. This brought the political aspect of the whole debate to the fore: questions of representation – whom to represent, whom to present as the representative, how to understand the interests of the represented – are in essence political, not matters of fact.

4.4 Representation in MPs' Speech: Interviews

The rest of this chapter addresses the question of representation based on interviews with members of parliament. The section is more about meanings given to the term representation than representative claims. For representative claims, it is emblematic that they are done publically, in front of an audience. Interviews cannot be conducted in such a situation – although the interviewer can be understood as an audience. Hence the speech in interviews moved somewhere in between public and private. As the analysis will show, this has connotations that representation as term cannot be detached from representative claims. The overall research questions in this section are: What connotations did the term ‘representation’ evoke in MPs? How were the foci of traditional representation research, most notably geographical
background, party affiliations, and national interests, spoken about? What interests were articulated?

4.4.1 Representing personal convictions through familiar foci

One of the central questions in the interviews was, What or whom, in terms of people or values or perspectives, do you represent in relation to the Talvivaara issue? The most popular point of reference made by the respondents was their geographical background, that of representing northern or eastern Finland and people living there, even though the question was in no way inclined to that direction.

From the replies citing geography, a few things could be inferred. Firstly, the idea of representing northern or eastern Finland was in many cases combined to personal political goals and value judgments that were very vaguely defined. In a pair of the replies the MPs implied that the main issue for the survival of those regions were jobs, as a straight rhetorical line was drawn from representing northern or eastern Finland to the need for jobs. In another passage, reflecting the political stand of that MP, a link was made between being concerned for the environment and representing northern Finland. The following passages illustrate this point:

"I am strongly associated as a representative of the people of northern Finland in the parliament as well, and as a representative of their livelihoods. Hence, in my thinking jobs as a source of vitality are very important." (MP 3.)

"I represent those people who voted for me and elected me as an MP, and it is, of course, foremost a question of jobs." (MP 4.)

"I do not particularly represent any specific group of people, but a general concern for northern nature [---]. This situation is terrible and for sure a common concern for all in the region. If I should pick one thing I represent, it would be northern Finland." (MP 5.)

In the first of these passages, the speaker represented himself as a representative of northern Finland within the parliament, thus highlighting that this was how he was deemed by others and not only something that he himself felt. While the interviewee of the second excerpt did not make direct reference to geography, he nonetheless implied geographical dimension by reference to voters – the group of which is defined by geographical boundaries of electoral districts. Referring to geography, thus, potentially worked as a way to represent the MP as tightly linked to the source of authority, those that had voted for the given MP.
In this respect, the third passage differed from the two earlier passages in that it did not refer to people but to nature. While geography was explicitly present (northern nature, northern Finland), no connection to the electorate was made. Geography-related arguments were used in two different ways: either as an assurance that the electorate was duly taken into account in decision-making, thus fortifying the speaker’s position as a representative, or as a value-related argument to communicate about what was important to the speaker as a decision-maker (in this case, ‘nature’).

The fact that jobs and nature were often referred to in interviews reflected Talvivaara’s overall situation at the time interviews were conducted in spring and summer 2013. As indicated, with the help of budgetary and supplementary budgetary motions of the mid-2000s, founding Talvivaara was politically desirable because of the jobs it would create in the region. Later the question of the environment became more and more central, partly also because continuing environmental hazards posed the question of the price for those jobs.

It can be further asked whether a politician can ever present him or herself not representing his or her voters, although that representational focus can be accompanied by other foci such as ‘the nation as a whole’ or the ‘world at large’, or any value judgment. This question was addressed to an MP that was not from electoral districts close to Talvivaara but from the electoral district of Helsinki. The reply was:

"When I went to Talvivaara right after the big leakage, I got a lot of mail thanking me for that. I have to say that my voters have thought it very important that I went there. [...] It was clearly significant to people, luckily we haven’t had many environmental catastrophes of this scale.” (MP 12.)

Doing something that was not directly related to the electoral district as such was nonetheless presented as something that the voters of this particular MP would accept and even embrace. This was accompanied by justifications for their own actions starting with the words ”as an MP of the Greens …”. It is possible for MPs to combine different elements in a coherent way, without having to contradict their own voters, the party, or issues relating to the whole (of Finland). The MP later mentioned that none of the Green League founders in the 1980s were from Koijärvi where environmental activism took place, thus equating her actions to those in the heart of the Green League’s history.28 What was stressed, then, was not any direct

28 The Koijärvi case is largely considered the event that led to the founding of the party and the election of the first two Green MPs to the parliament in 1987.
contact between voters and the MP but rather something that resembles Mansbridge’s selection model of representation. Voters vote for a candidate that they believe to have similar values and goals with, and once elected MPs do not need to establish a direct link to their constituents but are left to do their jobs with great discretion. (Mansbridge 2009.) At this point, the selection model comes close to the agency theory and to what was presented in the previous chapter: institutions are organized in a certain way, but from this organization no direct link can be drawn to how representation within that framework is understood or presented.

Despite of the centrality of parties, or rather party-based organization of MPs’ parliamentary work (see Wiberg 2014, 169), in the MP interviews the party was virtually non-existent when asked directly about representation. Only two out of the 15 MP interviewees made any kind of reference to their respective parties. One of them, the only MP interviewed from elsewhere than electoral districts nearby Talvivaara, said that it was not unheard-of for an environmental party MP to participate in a demonstration that had taken place to criticize the actions of the Talvivaara mining company. Thus, she offered the party as background information for the fact that she had participated in the demonstration. (MP 12.)

Another MP stated that her work was guided foremost by values, those being “rather traditional social democratic values” in terms of equality and safeguarding jobs. (MP 13.) Thus, in both of those cases the party organization was not referred to as the source of decisions or standpoints as such, but rather as something meant to explain values, personal convictions, and standpoints. At the same time, the accounts could be seen as explanations for why the MPs were members of the respective parties to begin with. Here personal convictions and party memberships were not contradicted, but they were presented as a coherent set of motivations for actions and perspectives. The party, the constituency, and the entirety were not set against each other but rather presented as mutually reinforcing.

Nonetheless, in stating that she represented within her party a pro-European orientation more than other social democrats, it was understood that one party could accommodate a number of perspectives. There is nothing surprising in the fact that an MP would say something like that. What it signifies, though, is that political parties in the context of representation can be understood in at least two different ways: as an entity based on certain shared values or perspectives, and as an organization within which different people represent different emphases that more or less compete with each other. In the MP interview, the party was understood as a combination of the two.
The fact that party was so seldom mentioned and when mentioned, it was presented not as a platform for power struggles but rather as an ideological home for the MPs, suggests that representation as an idea was detached from some of the realities that affect the work of MPs. The role of the MP was consistent with the overall picture that the examination of question hour debates, written questions, motions, and a legislative plenary discussion created: amidst of power politics MPs presented themselves as individuals that in many ways promoted their goals – goals that were not defined by political parties but typically stemmed instead from their geographical background. The party was there but it was kept in the background.

What could be further read from the passages that included answers to the question about representation were connotations of the term ‘representation’. The question seemed to evoke in some a need to deny any possible inappropriate affiliations. This was the case in the following passages:

“I do not feel that I would represent any particular interest group, but I rather have a northern Finnish perspective.” (MP 13.)

“On the Talvivaara issue I do not consider myself to be on any side. I do not consider myself an environmental activist, although I like moving around in nature and I particularly appreciate an unpolluted environment. But I am not an advocate for the mining industry either. But I can say that I am for northern Finland, and one big opportunity for northern Finland lies in mining, provided it is under terms that restricts the environmental impacts.” (MP 2.)

“I represent independence; I do not have any affiliations to Talvivaara, just like the majority of people probably don’t. I do not own shares. I start from the point that things need to be taken care of. Just as I take care of my business in my personal life, the business [in Talvivaara] needs to be responsible as well.” (MP 9.)

In all of these cases, the term representation was understood by interviewees as referring to groups of people, which was also the case in the three passages above. In addition to this particular connotation of the term representation, these MPs wanted to highlight themselves as individually thinking representatives of the general good. In that sense, the answers represented the MPs’ tasks as independent of any other factional interests as well, not only independent from party affiliations.

Yet, in some cases, as was the case above regarding the contradiction between jobs and the nature, some did present themselves as concentrating on some particular things. This was the case with the following reply:

“Well, many of my wishes are based on the experience that I have gained from being an entrepreneur and involved in business associations. Entrepreneurship and creating jobs is the most important thing for me.” (MP 15.)
While the MP here took a position that would tell someone familiar with Finnish politics something about the respondent’s party affiliation (the moderate right-wing National Coalition Party that presents itself as the representative of entrepreneurs), what the MP implied was a certain understanding of what was in the best interests of people – creating jobs by entrepreneurship. In fact, this was true for all the answers given; the MPs presented their perspectives as the interests of people. These were some other answers given to the direct question about representation:

“I obviously represent the future of Kainuu.” (MP 6.)

“Geographically speaking, I am from eastern Finland and relate strongly to that region and its special character. In that way, I represent eastern Finland, being from eastern Finland, but I also represent values according to which the relationship between man and nature needs to be in balance.” (MP 7.)

“I feel that I represent the region, the electoral district of Oulu. Although [Talvivaara] is in the Kainuu part of the district, my job is to listen and see the issue from multiple perspectives.” (MP 1.)

“Of course, all of us MPs are here to further the interests of Finland and Finnish industries, but at the same time and equally we are for individual citizens and the environment. I do not know any MP that would not be upset about the fact that this kind of a problem has come about in Finland.” (MP 10.)

“If I need to categorize this somehow, I strongly feel that I represent future generations, it is them that lose the most. It is not a question of categorizing people into parties or urban or rural or good or bad. We are all losing here.” (MP 11.)

The reason for asking about representation in a specific context, the Talvivaara case, was to avoid abstract and general replies. Still, the answers were precisely that. What conclusions could then be drawn from this in terms of representation? Representation was presented by the MPs more as an idea than anything else. At the same time, speaking ‘representationally’ allowed them to speak about their personal convictions – not the everyday life and politicking of a parliamentarian. It included ideas of what the role of the MP in the case and in general was, what the relationship of an MP was (supposed to be) in relation to the party, possible factions, the electoral district and the future, and what could be deemed as the interests of whatever was claimed to be represented. What was represented was the MP personally, and those representations corresponded with the definition of the constitution: “A Representative is obliged to follow justice and truth in his or her office. He or she shall abide by the Constitution and no other orders are binding on him or her”. (Section 29.) Consequently, the MPs’ accounts came full circle back to what had been
said about their roles elsewhere, and as such, they should not be treated as individual testimonies detached from the normative expectations of the constitution.

4.4.2 Asserting interests to people

One way to study representative claims is to examine the use of the pronoun 'we'. Regarding representation, the use of 'we' allows makers of representative claims to align themselves with a larger group of people, while simultaneously explaining what 'we' is about. Here the strategies for doing this are analyzed.

In the data, in some occasions ‘we’ (and its different forms) was used to delineate an entity as opposed to something else. Usually the ‘we’ in these cases referred to either an area in Finland (north or east) or to Finland as a whole. From the representational perspective, these utterances had at least three implications. Firstly, they presented value judgments of what was beneficial or important to ‘all of us.’ Secondly, in using the pronoun ‘we’ the representative and the represented were collapsed under the same set of preferences, hence representing ‘my’ preferences as the same as those of the represented. Thirdly, they presented ‘our’ situation in relation to somebody or something else. Consider the following passages:

"We drink the water of Oulujoki, the sources of which are in Talvivaara as the Oulujoki body of water starts from there, so when people have contacted me they have been worried about our basic living conditions.” (MP 15.)

"Now that this most recent incident has happened, I seriously started to hope it does not ruin our groundwater.” (MP 4.)

In these two passages, the emphasis was on the shared problem, the possible pollution of drinking water. In delineating the speaker as one of the possibly affected, it stressed that the problem was not just theirs who the speaker represented as an MP, but that the speaker too had a stake in the matter. In this way, it was communicated that what the people were worried about was taken seriously by the MP. It also implied the MP’s affiliation to the area, thus representing the speakers as representatives, rather than looking the issue or the area from the outside.

While the pollution of groundwater (and thus drinking water) and being concerned about it does not require much persuasion in order to invite others to share the view, in the following excerpts more controversial issues were counted under ‘our’ preferences:
"In Oulu, peat is very important to us, we have two large peat power plants and it [peat] employs hundreds if not thousands of people.” (MP 15.)

"If we speak about the mining boom in Finland, Talvivaara is of course not a very good example in terms of environmental issues [---], but the good that has come out of this is that we do have prospects for new mines in northern and eastern Finland.” (MP 8.)

Here again the ‘we’ was placed into geographically defined areas, either Oulu (a city in northern Finland) or northeastern Finland. Because of the controversial nature of the issues mentioned, peat as a source of energy and mining, the ‘we’ carried with it a more persuasive bearing. It invited the listener to share the views that peat and mining were important to the region, and that their importance was in general shared with people living in the area.

In voicing a more critical stance to Talvivaara, a Green MP stated that jobs were important to ‘us’:

"As a person from northern Finland I see jobs important to us and Talvivaara has harmed the mining reputation of Finland.” (MP 5.)

She thus overcame the juxtaposition between jobs and the nature, as she elsewhere explained that she had been critical about the Talvivaara mine even before the major and very apparent problems emerged. From this perspective she, too, made an interpretation of what was important to ‘us’ (jobs), but her political goal was different. It was more critical towards the problems, speaking for a more environmental perspective: “This is an opportunity to start a discussion about how we appreciate our nature and the natural resources that we have here…”. This exemplifies the point that some concerns can be represented as shared by all (of us), thus aligning the speaker with the represented and their alleged concerns, but at the same time these assertions can be used to further very different political goals. Representational speech here simultaneously represented the interests of the represented in a way that connected those represented interests to her own political goals. All this was done in a wider framework in which certain assertions seemed more acceptable than others. In the interviews, jobs were raised above all other issues and even statements about the importance of the environment needed to take this into account. The MPs’ representative claims, from this perspective, thus did not seem very diverse.

Whom were the interviewees speaking to in these passages, what was the audience? It can be argued that both the represented and those outside the represented were addressed. In stating what was important to ‘us in Oulu’ or to ‘us
in northeastern Finland,’ the speaker educated the interviewer who was not part of the ‘us’. Nevertheless, through the interviewer the door was open for other listeners as well. Those listeners were not all outsiders, including also people from the areas under discussion. Claims thus could be understood as persuading both others and the ones spoken about. They attached certain interests to a group of people, and in this case, the suggested interests were spoken for through geography-related arguments. Thus, the geographically determined constituency was represented as the decisive dimension in representation.

Is the emphasis on geographical constituencies something MPs can choose from among equal options? Is it simply a question of choosing one focus over other possible foci? MPs are authorized by territorially defined electoral districts. This authorization is binding; they cannot disregard the constituency from which their mandates derive. It does not necessarily mean that the territorially defined constituency would override other possible foci of representation, such as party positions or own convictions, but whatever the political goals of MPs are, they need to be justified in relation to respective electoral districts. Representational speech is thus again restricted by the institutional setting in which the MPs function.

Nonetheless, geographically defined electoral districts were not the only reference points. The ‘we’ was used to denote the whole nation as well:

“Mining is our future. Finland’s reputation is of a country that takes care of environmental matters. This international reputation involves big values. Big national values. [...] We can never know when we are confronted with this perspective in the international market.” (MP 7.)

Here the benefits of mining were extended from the Talvivaara region to the whole of Finland. Having a good ‘mining reputation’ was presented as important to everybody in Finland, thus giving the impression that the interviewee represented the whole nation, not just his electoral district. Another interpretation would be that whatever his electoral district’s benefits, they were primarily in the way the whole of Finland understood them. The claim not only related to district interests, but also Finnish interests, and what should be central in defining those interests. The interviewee thus represented himself as the representative of national interests, and not just instead of representing regional interests but also the interests of a larger entity such as Europe or the world. The ‘we’ was the nation, not humankind.

What could be interpreted as a larger entity was voiced in another MP’s interview:

“Everything we lose in terms of nature and in endangering the balance between the human, animals, and the environment, each and every person is deprived. At least this is how I perceive it.” (MP 11.)
Here the balance of the human and the nature was presented as a desirable goal, but not in terms of the interests of a specific region or even the country, but rather in terms of everybody, the humankind. It was more of a value statement, but still incorporating the idea that with the referral to ‘we’ the speaker represented himself as the representative of humankind.

Three different levels of representative claims could thus be distinguished from the MPs’ interviews: regional, national and universal. The foremost interests attached to the regional level were jobs. MPs representing different viewpoints in relation to Talvivaara or mining in general both used jobs as an argument. But mining was also presented to be in the national interests of Finland, thus presenting having industrial jobs in the mining areas as the interest of the whole of the country. The universal level, then, became closer to value judgments of what was good for the humankind, rather than attaching the interests to any specific regional or national area. Further research might reveal whether there is a correlation between the level of the reference point and abstractness of assertions. In this small data the most concrete issue, jobs, were referred to with regard of the smallest area, whereas a slightly more abstract issue, mining in general, was attached to the national level. Finally, the most abstract issue of the future of the humankind was not about these geographical entities in the sense their interests would be separate from the overall wellbeing of the world.

Above the use of the pronoun ‘we’ was presented as a way for speakers to align his or her views with a larger group, be it regional, national, or universal, and command authority as a representative in relation to that group. Using ‘we’, nonetheless, was not the only way to assert certain interests or attributes to groups of people. That was also done by simply telling what people’s interests were, what people were thinking or how they were thinking. Consider the passages below:

“[---] The negative media coverage gives a distorted image of what people think, I mean in a way that the majority of people would think badly of Talvivaara. Clearly people are very concerned about these environmental problems. But I am quite sure that most of them, I mean a significant share of them, see that it [Talvivaara] is extremely important to the region, that the problems need to be fixed so that the company can produce value.” (MP 8.)

“If we think about Talvivaara, the citizens don't have so many different opinions. The only thing that matters is the personal interest, meaning that if you have a personal interest, the opinions may be a little conflicting, say if you are a shareholder or a contractor working there. But no one has ever come to me and said that I would be wrong in writing in the paper the way I have written. Not once.” (MP 9.)

“Let us say that people have found it extremely unjust and somehow senseless that the ministry of the environment has not been able to prevent or stop the situation. And to me, too, it appears as an issue that shatters my sense of justice. How have we
been able to pass such an administration where we are without tools to act when the environment is being destroyed? It is an issue that raises a lot of questions and emotions in people.” (MP 12.)

Here the MPs did not simply state what they themselves thought but also articulated popular sentiments. How those popular sentiments were depicted was again in relation to the standpoint of each MP. Particularly the first two passages underlined the position that the MP had taken aligned with the general population, whereas the third was somewhat less clear about whether she was speaking about specific people or people in general. The MP in the first passage was most daring in this regard, questioning the overall impression created by certain type of media coverage, and negating that impression by giving his own account instead. The excerpts indicate that MPs were willing to make these kinds of assessments of the popular mood in their capacity as representatives in the political system. They were hence not just passive receivers of different stimuli. In voicing these stimuli, they made their own interpretations – from a certain position.

4.5 Conclusion

The Finnish parliament is often treated as a manifestation of party politics and ruled by the government. However, the analysis of parliamentary procedures related to Talvivaara and the mining act proposal paints a different picture. The fact that MPs used parliamentary procedures to address Talvivaara suggests the Finnish parliament has other functions than that of legislating. These functions were about MPs speaking for the people, about interpreting the Talvivaara issue. The direction of speech from (local) people to the executive was apparent in all the plenary debates and motions. Issues were made more concrete with references to regions and different groups of people. The regions were usually those where MPs themselves had been elected. References to them were made even if the issue at hand was directly not about that given region. The parliamentary platform was a specific place for MPs to assert to the audience that they genuinely represented their electoral districts.

The procedures included party affiliations, government–opposition division, committee memberships, and electoral districts as explanatory elements in why certain MPs were active in the case. Electoral districts were the most salient in this regard. Based on this it can be concluded that parliamentary work is not just about party politics, but MPs do play individual roles in the parliament. Yet these roles are to a large extent determined by the overall institutional setting, in which MPs get
their mandates from certain electoral districts and are assigned to different committees.

Representative claims were also connected to political standpoints. They included interpretation of the people, of whether to see them as workers, entrepreneurs, landowners, or affected by and worried about environmental pollution. At the same time, while some groups were present in discussions or motions, others were not—notably the Sami. Based on which groups were selected as the object of representation and how these groups were interpreted resulted in quite different suggestions of what was to be done politically. Representative claims were thus intertwined with politics itself; they were not just claims about the people, but claims also about preferable policies. They were an essential way of speaking politically. Yet, representative claims offered a way to present political standpoints as seemingly neutral interests.

In this regard, it is perhaps somewhat worrying that one theme arose over others: jobs. While in the mid-2000s, the question of creating jobs in eastern and northern Finland was the main rationale in budgetary and supplementary motions and in debates in 2010 concerning the proposed mining act, the question of the environment became more important toward the end of the study period. MP statements thus seemed to follow ’the truth’ of each time in a rather reactionary way. As such, representative claims can be understood as culturally bound. In our culture and during this time period concrete interests of specific geographical entities were prevalent, whereas more abstract interests of abstract groups of people, most notably future generations, were left to the minority of representative claims. Nonetheless, geography was not solely used for referring to certain interests, but it was also used as an argument for certain kind of value judgments. Representative claims were thus both about interests and wider political arguments based on values.

It is noteworthy that representation as a term was treated by many MPs as ’loaded’. Connotations were made about inappropriate interest group affiliations and their undesirability. Against this backdrop, it could be concluded that because geographical background was much more frequently referred to by MPs both in their plenary speeches and in interviews than party affiliation, geographical background as a legitimation for actions was seen as more appropriate.

In fact, all statements by MPs, both publically and in interviews, reflected ideas of what was somehow appropriate. The normative framework laid for MPs in the constitution and by the electoral system, most importantly with regard to electoral districts, was in many ways manifested and strengthened in the MPs’ speech. It can be concluded that MPs’ speech is largely determined by both cultural expectations

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and institutional setting. This raises the question whether researching the representational roles of MPs apart from this framework is sensible. The analysis here shows that traditional categories used in representation research – party, constituency, the country as a whole – can be and are rhetorically intertwined. This blend is used to speak politically, but in ways that consider the wider framework. Unlike as is sometimes suggested, this form of speech is not neutral. It determines whom are present, whom are not, and what the overall understanding of any issue at hand is. At the same time, avenues for researchers to address these questions critically are opened.
5 ACTIVISM AS REPRESENTATION: STOP TALVIVAARA

5.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses civic activism from the perspective of political representation. As such, it deviates from accounts conceptualizing civic activism as a 'direct' form of democracy. Overcoming the divide between direct and representative accounts of democracy with regard of citizen participation is not as such new. Stephan (2004) has argued that citizens could be seen as representatives. In his account, the property of being a representative can be attributed to civic activists because their organization into groups is in some respects similar than organization of (established) national interest groups (ibid, 121). National interest groups are thus taken as instances of representation by definition. In this regard, citizens act for others, which, for Stephan, is a sign of representation. The crucial difference between representation and non-representation for the author lies in the interests citizens advance. In the case of personal interests, activism is not representation. But if interests of a wider group of people are furthered, citizen activism makes a case for representation. (Ibid, 130.) In Pitkin's terms, citizen activists act for others, and are hence representatives. The value of citizen participation for representation, according to Stephan, is that it has an aggregative function, and can hence further the overall governance of a society (ibid, 125).

Stephan’s view is somewhat similar to that of Weldon's (2011). For Weldon, social movements have the ability to represent disadvantaged groups so that their interests are potentially taken into account in policy-making. In this account, the representation of, for example, women or minorities supplements electoral representation. For Weldon, this representation might even be more effective than descriptive representation of these groups in elected bodies (ibid, 27–8).

Despite deviating from the traditional representation research in understanding civic activism as representation, Stephan and Weldon deviate from the 'new' understanding of political representation as well. For Weldon (2011, 2, 4), social movements precede representation; without the necessary mobilization by social movements there would be nothing to represent. The value of social movements,
and their representation, is understood vis-à-vis their impact on actual policies (ibid, 7). The understanding of representation relies on the pre-existence of group identities (Weldon 2011) and interests (Stephan 2004). Particularly for Weldon, it is assumed that non-electoral representation encompasses groups that are not (effectively) present in decision-making.

Weldon (2011, 18) contemplates the legitimacy of social movements as representatives by pointing to the fact that they are not always elected. Hence, a formal link between representatives and the represented is missing. For Weldon, this is not necessarily a problem, as citizen representatives can give account of their actions by explaining and justifying them (ibid, 21). As social movements are voluntary, people can always leave them if they are not happy with the accounts given (2011, 28).

Following the representative turn, I seek to land with an account of civic activism as representation and thus to supplement these accounts. In doing that, I refer to the notion of representative claim and the aspects it includes. In line with this approach, I ask, relating to civic activism: Whom were offered as representatives? How were these representatives portrayed? Whom and what were claimed to be represented? How were they represented? To whom were these representations offered; that is, who was the audience?

Activism can be seen as a form of assembly through which an alternative portrayal of 'the people' was brought forward. The question is, what was this portrayal like, and what portrayals did it challenge? The chapter will additionally examine the meaning of support for a civic movement. Did it play a role in Talvivaara activism? If so, what was this role? Finally, meanings given to representation by civic actors will be touched upon.

By activism, I refer to one specific popular movement, the Stop Talvivaara movement. The study period extends from the beginning of the movement in spring 2012 to July 2015, shortly after which the mine operations were sold to the state. During the period, Stop Talvivaara was by far the most upfront and active group critics of the mine, which campaigned for years for the shutdown of the mine. It actively criticized the handling of environmental issues by the company, the monitoring (or lack thereof) by the Kainuu ELY Centre, and the fact that the state spent hundreds of millions of euros on the mine over the years. While the movement did not encompass all criticism and activism against the mine, its manifold activities, from monitoring the environment, broadcasting of videos and circulating of a petition to large-scale demonstrations presents the most convincing and visible case for
studying Talvivaara activism. Moreover, for these reasons it is an excellent case for studying representation.

The data consists of 90 videos published on the Stop Talvivaara YouTube channel, of 119 press releases published on the Stop Talvivaara website (www.stoptalvivaara.org), of eleven interviews conducted with civic actors, of observation in public assemblies and demonstrations, and of the petition to shut down the Talvivaara mine.

The interviews were carried out in Helsinki, Iisalmi, Sotkamo, and Tampere between December 2012 and November 2013. The eleven interviewees were all selected based on their appearance in the media. It should be noted that not all of them identified themselves with the Stop Talvivaara movement directly, but they did share the overall goal of the movement. The assemblies took place in Iisalmi on December 8, 2012, in Helsinki on March 7, 2013, and in Tampere on September 10, 2013. They were organized by the Stop Talvivaara movement and were open to the public. The demonstrations took place in Helsinki on November 14, 2012, and on March 8, 2013, and in Tampere on September 12, 2013.

The chapter begins with an overview of the Stop Talvivaara activism (5.2.). This section describes the overall goal and core activities of the movement. The analysis is divided into five subsequent sections. The first of them (5.3.) addresses the part of the representative claim that has to do with the representative. Who were offered as representatives, and what qualities were relevant to them? The next section (5.4.) then looks at the object of the claims, the represented. It asks, whom and what were claimed to be represented? As these two sections are about representative claims understood to be symbolic and often implicit, section 5.5. discusses meanings explicitly given to representation in the interviews of civic actors. Section 5.6. asks, whom was addressed with the representative claims? What was the audience? The political nature of representative claims will be taken further in the last section before the conclusion (5.7.). The section presents how the Stop Talvivaara movement was represented by MPs, authorities, industry representatives, and local councilors. The remaining section (5.8.) is dedicated to concluding remarks.
5.2 Overview of the Stop Talvivaara Activism

In this section, I describe the Stop Talvivaara movement and related activism. The focus is on the overall appearance rather than on any individual or explicit claims. This overall picture is based on the totality of Stop Talvivaara press releases, YouTube videos, an online petition, and events, as well as interviews.

The Stop Talvivaara movement was founded on the notion of ‘popular’. The first press release, published on March 30, 2012, laid down its basic principles as a popular movement. The press release was titled as “Popular movement demands shutdown of Talvivaara mine” (Kansalaisliike vaatii Talvivaaran kaivoksen sulkemista) and read in its entirety as follows:

“The Stop Talvivaara movement has published a petition at adressit.com website, demanding the shutdown of the Talvivaara mine.

– The Finland of thousands of lakes and rivers should not be a developing country where corporate giants destroy the environment and people’s health, says Virpi Virolainen, one of the signatories of the petition.

– We now need a popular movement for all those living on the shores of Vuoksi and Oulujoki.

Stop Talvivaara did not exhaust all activism around the mine during the study period. For example, a local association Iisalmen Luonnon Ystävät (‘Friends of the Environment in Iisalmi’) had a section dedicated for Talvivaara on their website (Iisalmen Luonnon Ystävät ry). The association is a member of the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation (FANC, Finnish abbreviation SLL) that reported widely on Talvivaara. The magazine Suomen Luonto (‘Finnish Nature’) also reported on Talvivaara, for which freelance writer Juha Kauppinen was awarded in 2012 with the Lumilapio award. In addition, Greenpeace was active, both at the location and in the media. These organizations aside, popular movement-like initiatives included in February 2016 at least three Facebook communities: Talvivaara on suljettava (‘Talvivaara needs to be closed’), Sano EI Talvivaaralle (‘Say NO to Talvivaara’), and Talvivaara horjuu, annettaan sen kaatua (‘Talvivaara staggers, let’s let it fall’). As of February 16, 2016, they had 1,567, 1,051 and 209 ‘likes’, respectively. There was also a pro Talvivaara Facebook site (‘Talvivaaran puolest’) with 19 'likes'. Further, on November 9, 2012, the youth and student organization of the Finnish Greens organized a demonstration trip to Kajaani from cities in southern Finland to demand shutdown of the mine. Overall, there was a variety of activism both within and outside registered environmental associations. The Stop Talvivaara movement was exceptional, however, for several reasons. First, it allowed analysis of a movement rather than an association. Environmental associations are about environmental issues in general, whereas the Stop Talvivaara movement was about the Talvivaara mine specifically. Second, while there was other movement-like activism, nothing came even close to the Stop Talvivaara activism in their actions and visibility in the media. The Stop Talvivaara movement was large-scale, organizing field trips to contaminated areas, publishing press releases and videos more or less continuously for years, arranging demonstrations all over Finland, and to providing a face for criticism of Talvivaara in the media. For these reasons, it is a more sensible object of study with regard of activism and representation than formal associations or scattered, small and short-lived initiatives.
We have a sempiternal right to these waters without chemical and uranium emissions of Talvivaara. The petition to shut down Talvivaara will be open until the end of next summer. We hope the petition will be part of building a new popular movement. All signatories are invited to join common action. We are dealing with a massive fight for justice, and we cannot afford to lose it.”

The petition has been open for online signing continuously since March 29, 2012, and formed the backbone of the movement in its demand for revoking the mining license and shutting down the mine. The demands were backed by assertions that the mine had exceeded estimated and permitted levels of emissions, and that it had seriously harmed the Oulujoki and Vuoksi waterways on both sides of the mine. It was further stated that uranium was extracted without having been mentioned in the original environmental permit application, and that the mine put workers' and the surrounding areas residents' health at risk. Moreover, it was said that the mine required large amounts of chemicals despite the ecological effects of the processing technique called 'bioheapleaching', and finally that the mine threatened tourism both in the wild areas and in the whole country. (Vesistöjen puolesta – Stop Talvivaara.)

The number of signatories grew steadily from a few hundred in early April to some 4,500 by the beginning of November 2012. As the wastewater leakage took place during the first half of November that year, the number of signatories jumped to some 18,000 between November 6 and 16. The petition has since gathered signatories steadily, amounting to 65,661 as of October 15, 2017.

The next public act in the media by the movement was publishing a video on the new Stop Talvivaara YouTube channel on May 7, 2012, titled "Kuinka uraanikaivos saapui Kainuuseen?" This was the first video published by the movement. The video showed demonstrators gathered outside the company's general meeting on April 26, 2012, in Sotkamo to oppose the mine. In the demonstration and the video, a petition was handed over to the company representatives.

So, the publication of the online petition can be understood as decisive in initiating the movement in spring 2012. The movement's hybrid nature was well reflected in the answers given in the interviews by some of the civic actors to a question about the start of the movement. Civic actor 1 stated that the movement was initiated in March 2012 when a demonstration outside the company's annual general meeting took place. However, there was no general meeting in March, but on April 26. Civic actor 4, for his part, said that the movement was initiated after a

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30 This original film was later released under an English title "How did uranium mine come to Kainuu region of Finland?" and with English subtitles on May 15, 2012. Hence, in YouTube there are two videos about the same event, one in Finnish and another in English, published eight days apart from each other.
public hearing organized by the Regional State Administrative Agency (AVI) in April in Sotkamo. Apparently, he was referring to a hearing on April 3, 2012.

Obviously, movements do not have specific founding dates due to their very nature as movements, and the exact date is irrelevant. What is relevant is the public nature of the movement – without seeking publicity and the ability to gather people around the cause it would not be a movement. Its start can be linked to the first public actions: publication of the online petition on March 29, 2012, the first press release on March 30, 2012, first demonstration on April 26, 2012, and publication of the first video on May 7, 2012.

In interviews, moreover, it was emphasized that Stop Talvivaara was a movement, not a registered association (Civic actor 1; Civic actor 9). It was explained that a different kind of tactic was needed in order to be successful. It was said that Stop Talvivaara was a symbol under which anybody who shared the goal could act. (Civic actor 1.) Moreover, it was explained that people in different parts of Finland were willing to organize events, and that the movement could function simultaneously in multiple places (Civic actor 2; Civic actor 3).

In addition to the petition, the website at www.stoptalvivaara.org, a YouTube video channel Stop Talvivaara, and a variety of events such as demonstrations, formed the core of the Talvivaara activism. All are discussed below.

During the study period, the Stop Talvivaara website was a collection of press releases by the movement, a continually self-updating news stream of Talvivaara related news and articles in other media, links to YouTube videos (described as short films), and real-time charts indicating pH levels and electric conductivity in two rivers near the mine. The site amounted to general criticism against mines in Finland, although this element was decisively smaller in the website than elements relating to Talvivaara. As a whole, the Stop Talvivaara website was a comprehensive collection of all possible information concerning the mine from the civic actors’ perspective.

From March 2012 until the end of July 2015, there were in total 119 press releases on the Stop Talvivaara website. Major part of the press releases reported more or less technical issues about emissions. They were coupled with varied demands for curbing the emissions, shutting down the mine, criticizing the company, and appeals mainly to authorities to take better action in monitoring the mine. The releases included titles such as “An unauthorized uranium mine in the Talvivaara mine area” (Luvaton uraanikaivos Talvivaaran kaivosalueella, November 8, 2012), “Fish dying north of Talvivaara” (Kalakuolemia Talvivaaran pohjoispuolella, November 23, 2012), and “Is Talvivaara hiding the problems of bioheapleaching?” (Piilotteleeko Talvivaara
biokasaliuotuksen ongelmia? January 16, 2013). The representative claims of the press releases will be analyzed later in the chapter.

The *Stop Talvivaara* YouTube channel consisted of 90 videos by the end of July 2015. Recurring themes in the videos were activists moving around in areas surrounding the mine, collecting ground and water specimens, and occasionally speaking to the camera. A significant part of the videos included 'citizen observations' in the environment around the mine or otherwise footage from the environment, 33 videos out of the 90. There were also videos of speeches held by the company representatives, politicians and private people in public events and meetings.

Almost all the 90 videos were filmed and/or edited by Hannu Hyvönen and it was indicated that their production was part of a 'Tavlivaara documentary project'. Together they formed a narrative of severe environmental contamination around the mine that manifested itself in visibly detectable dead frogs, birds, muddy water and odd-colored muddy ground. This contamination was coupled with pictures of civic activism, and people taking part in events organized by authorities and the company. The videos additionally featured demonstrations, and people meeting politicians and company representatives. There was also footage of uncontaminated beautiful nature with ordinary people talking of what nature meant to them.

A timeline of events organized by *Stop Talvivaara* during the study period can be constructed based on press releases, videos, appearance in other media, and based on my attendance of events. At least the following can be included in the list of events that the *Stop Talvivaara* organized or was centrally involved in organizing:

- Demonstration at the Talvivaara general meeting on April 26, 2012 (YouTube video: *Stop Talvivaara – Kuinka Uraanikaivos saapui Kainuuseen?* May 7, 2012.)


- Public assembly in Iisalmi on December 8, 2012 (I observed the assembly.)

- Public seminar in Helsinki on March 7, 2013 (press release: *Tavlivaara-aibeinen seminaari & lehdistötilaisuus torstaina 7.3. ravintola Gloria, Helsinki, 7.3.2013*, March 6, 2013; I observed the event.)
- Demonstration in Helsinki on March 8, 2013 (*Helsingin Sanomat*, March 9, 2013.)

- Public seminar and workshop about mining in Finland in Tampere on September 10–11, 2013 (I observed the event.)

- Demonstration outside the Euromining trade fair in Tampere on September 11, 2013 (I observed the event.)

- Demonstration ('For peace and the environment') on October 24, 2014 (YouTube video: *Rauhan ja ympäristön puolestä – kulkue 24.10.2014*, October 29, 2014) – According to *Helsingin Sanomat* (October 23, 2014) this demonstration was organized by the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation (FANC/SLL). It included different environmental and peace organizations, and for instance *Stop Talvivaara*.

- Demonstration during parliamentary election campaigning in Helsinki in April 2015 (YouTube video: *Purkuputkia vai puhdistamoita?* April 18, 2015.)

The demonstrations in Helsinki in November 2012 and in March 2013 were widely documented by national news media (see e.g. *Helsingin Sanomat*, November 15, 2012; *Helsingin Sanomat*, March 9, 2013; Yle 2012b; Yle 2012c; Yle 2013a). It can be explained by the fact that the first demonstration was rather big, around 1,000 people attended, as the wastewater leakage at the mine was ongoing. The demonstration in March 2013 was organized concurrently with the company's extraordinary general meeting in Helsinki. The main issue of the meeting, the additional share issue, was of great interest to the media. Some 100 people attended the demonstration. In other words, the attention by the media to the issues surrounding Talvivaara was significant at both points in time. The smaller demonstration in Tampere was also notified in the media (see Yle 2013b), but on a decisively smaller scale. No records can be found outside the movement's own records (YouTube video: *How did uranium mine come to Kainuu region of Finland*, May 15, 2012), about the demonstration in April 2012. A small demonstration in April 2015 generated a radio interview of the leading figure, Hannu Hyvönen, which was documented by the movement in their YouTube video (*Jos vääryys vallan saapi – uhrataanko periferia kaivoksille*, April 17, 2015).

The demonstrations were the most visible forms of action by the movement, as they were reported by the media at large. Roughly, other activities can be divided into encounters with the company representatives, authorities and politicians, and to
'citizen observation' of the environment around the mine. All this was made public by the movement itself rather than by for instance news media. The encounters included the following occasions:

*Encounters with the company*

Participation in a neighborhood meeting organized by the company in Kajaani in November 2012 (YouTube videos published on November 29, 2012: *Maitotilallisen vetoomus; Uranium gambler; Kalastajan terveisia; Pahan kierre; Natusen paljastus.)*

- Meeting with the company representatives on the Ylä-Lumijärvi lake ice to discuss emissions in February 2013 (YouTube video: *Kairoskeskustelua Ylä-Lumijärven jäällä*, August 19, 2014.)

- Meeting with CEO Pekka Perä at an open doors event at Talvivaara on March 15, 2013 (YouTube video: *Minne katosi Talvivaara uraani?* March 15, 2013.)

- Participation as an audience in a public panel discussion at the Euromining trade fair on September 12, 2013; CEO Pekka Perä was a panelist (I observed the event.)

*Encounters with authorities*

Participation in a public hearing organized by the Northern Finland AVI Agency in October 2012 (YouTube videos published between October 20–25, 2012: *Sulfaatit; Metsäballitus; Rikoslavullus; Adressi aville; Kupari; Kananen; Flöjt; Rikastämista; Vesitase; Kaanteisosmoosi.)*

- Handing over the petition to the Kainuu ELY Centre officials on November 9, 2012, at a demonstration. In addition, the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation, the Greens, and Greenpeace participated in the demonstration. (YouTube video: *Adressi elykeskukselle*, November 11, 2012.)

- Handing over their notifications and complaints at the AVI Agency on January 21, 2015 (YouTube video: *Muistuttajat - kansalaiset Aluehallintovirastossa*, January 21, 2015.)
Encounters with politicians

- A meeting with MPs at the Finnish parliament alongside other anti-mining movements on October 23, 2014 (YouTube video: Lähetystö -kaivosvaltuskunta Eduskunnassa, October 30, 2014.)

- Handing over the petition to prime minister Alexander Stubb at the Talvivaara gate on November 17, 2014 (YouTube video: Stop Talvivaara-adressi Stubbille, November 17, 2014.)

- Meeting with minister of economic affairs Jan Vapaavuori and officials at the ministry of employment and the economy on March 30, 2015 (YouTube videos published on April 9, 2015: Vapaavuori ja vastuuttomat vallanpitäjät; Kuka vastaa talvivaarasta?)

- Public event to meet minister Jan Vapaavuori and officials in Kajaani on April 10, 2015 (YouTube video: Vanhoja syntejä ja uusia rötöksiä, April 13, 2015.)

The types of events listed above – demonstrations and encounters – together with 'citizen observation' formed the core of Stop Talvivaara activism. The Stop Talvivaara website, the videos, and different events formed the first instance of symbolic representation of the movement. Through them, anybody could form an idea of the Stop Talvivaara movement. While the actors in and around Stop Talvivaara described the movement as hybrid and being able to be in multiple places simultaneously, its primary activities were built around one actor, Hannu Hyvönen. He was behind almost all the videos and events. For this reason, the movement appeared more unitary than dispersed.
5.3 Representatives: Who and Why?

This section is about the part of the representative claim that addressed the representative. Who was offered as the representative? What was relevant in those that were offered as representatives?

5.3.1 Citizen-activists of Stop Talvivaara

Firstly, Stop Talvivaara referred to those civic actors that appeared in its videos and press releases simply as ‘citizens’. The following passages from press releases exemplify this point:

“The company blames the specimen collector citizens for having disrupted mandatory specimen collecting by the company. [...] The company demands citizens not go on the frozen lake with their ice drills. Director-General Kari Pääkkönen of Kainuu Ely Centre agreed with the company and called for citizen specimen collectors to stay out of the area.” (Press release: Häiritsivätkö aktivistit Talvivaaran velvoitetarkkailua? February 1, 2013.)

The press release title asked: “Did activists disturb mandatory observation by Talvivaara?” The term ‘activist’ was used interchangeably with the term ‘citizen.’ In another press release, three men were named as citizen observers, all of which were referred to in other press releases:

“Citizen observers Pekka Rönkkö, Reino Rönkkö and Hannu Hyvönen noticed yesterday on April 25 that the ditch for water management of Ylä-Lumijärvi lake was leaking.” (Press release: Ylä-Lumijärven saasteen norman vuotaminen pysäytettyä, April 26, 2013.)

“The consultants hired by the company are like the fox minding the geese, says documentarist Hannu Hyvönen who filmed the citizen observation trip. [...] Stop Talvivaara took sediment specimens on the trip.” (Press release: Konsultti kaiosyhtiön etujen vartijana, July 18, 2013.)

The latter press release was related to a video, showing Reino Rönkkö, Pekka Rönkkö (apparently) and Hannu Hyvönen taking specimens (video: Talvivaaran saasteet – puhdistus vai puhallus? July 17, 2013). The press release called the trip a ‘citizen observation trip’, and stated that 'Stop Talvivaara' had taken specimens. In other words, the term citizen was used as a synonym to both activist – as in the earlier passage – and Stop Talvivaara. Thus, the position that the Stop Talvivaara actors took was the position of citizens. Similarly, a press release was titled "Citizen specimen
taking continued" (Kansalaisten näytteidenotto jatkui, January 10, 2014), featuring two videos (Missä on raja? –kansalaiskatselmus, January 4, 2014; Lumijoki vibreän sävyissä, January 10, 2014). In the former video, three people were filmed taking specimens, including Hannu Hyvönen, and in the latter, three persons, including again Reino Rönkkö and Hannu Hyvönen.

At times, the movement advocated on behalf of local inhabitants:

“A representative of the Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (Tukes) told by phone that citizens and advocacy groups were not allowed on the inspection visit. Apparently, there is no open communication with local inhabitants and citizens from the Tukes’s side. According to Tukes, questions can be submitted in writing. In this way, citizens’ right to receive information has been prevented.” (Press release: Talvivaara ja Tukes eivät halunneet kansalaisten osallistuvan tarkastuskäyntiin, November 19, 2012.)

Earlier the movement had pleaded to get a delegation of three persons at an inspection visit by Tukes and Kainuu ELY Centre at the mine (see press release Voidaanko Talvivaaran kaivoksen metallitehdas käynnistää uudelleen? November 18, 2012). All have appeared in many Stop Talvivaara communications and were active participants in the movement. Again, these actors were simply called citizens. The conclusion made in the press release was that since these three individuals were not allowed to attend the inspection, citizens in general were denied this information. In other words, the movement actors were presented as representatives of local inhabitants and citizens.

In another passage, Hannu Hyvönen was referred to as 'a representative of the citizen forum':

“Open debate was not allowed – a representative of the citizen forum was thrown out of the Euromining conference” (Title of a press release: Avointa keskustelua ei sallittu – kansalaisfoorumin edustaja heitettiin ulos Euromining-konferenssista, September 12, 2013.)

This press release was about a panel discussion at the Euromining trade fair in Tampere in September 2013. In the panel discussion, social responsibility of mines was debated, and one of the discussants was CEO Pekka Perä of the Talvivaara company. Here it remained unclear, what exactly was the 'citizen forum'. Again, because this particular individual was not allowed to speak, it was represented as preventing citizens in general from speaking.
In other press releases it remained unclear, who exactly were ‘citizen observers’. These press releases included the following passages:

“Based on citizen observation, there are visibly detectable layers of dregs formed in the Lumijoki river bottom as a result of the gypsum pond leakage of last November.”
(Press release: Talvivaara-aktivistit perestivat seurantaleirin — näyteidenottoa kansalaisvoimin juoksutsusban alla, February 20, 2013.)

“Pekka Rönkkö told that citizens will continue taking specimens from waterbodies.”
(Press release: Talvivaara-aktivistit perestivat seurantaleirin — näyteidenottoa kansalaisvoimin juoksutsusban alla, February 20, 2013.)

“In the sediment of the November leakage, citizens have found eight metals that have gone unlicensed and unmonitored.” (Press release: Talvivaaran uudet juoksutukset entistä vaarallisempia, April 24, 2013.)

A press release distinguished between active members of Stop Talvivaara and other citizens, however:

“A group of six, including active members of the Stop Talvivaara movement as well as citizens concerned about the environment, went to Ylä-Lumijärvi lake on Saturday, August 9, 2014, to take water and sediment specimens.” (Press release: Ensimmäiset sakot näyteiden ottajille, September 5, 2014.)

This latter passage was a deviation from the former passages, which did not differentiate between citizens and (active) participants in the Stop Talvivaara movement. The Stop Talvivaara actors were represented foremost as citizens. Indeed, in defending their right to observe and film the mine surroundings, Stop Talvivaara appealed to the so-called everyman’s right. It is a right of every citizen to access forests and nature areas, even when they are privately owned. The ministry of the interior had given a decree in which a large area surrounding Talvivaara was excluded from this right of access (Sisäministeriön asetus liikkumis- ja oleskelurajoituksesta 1104/2013, December 19, 2013). The movement argued that ‘citizen observation’ in the now banned area had revealed environmental problems that otherwise would not have come into daylight:

“After the November gypsum pond leakage, the company downplayed the size of the affected area. The scale was only uncovered as a result of visits to the grounds by Stop Talvivaara and citizen observation. […] To better the situation, citizen observation and specimen taking should not be prevented. Instead, fences and warning signs should be put in place to prevent people from entering these areas, says Hyvönen who has filmed inside the mine area several times.” (Press release: Jokamiehen oikeuksien loukkaamiselle ei perusteita, December 20, 2013.)
The ‘citizen observation’, referred to the observation carried out by actors related to the symbol of Stop Talvivaara. In referring to actors as citizens, they were presented as alternative actors to authorities, the company, and political decision-makers.

Indeed, what many videos by the movement portrayed was a dialogue between ‘the people’ and decision-makers, whether they were authorities, company representatives, or politicians. For example, in a public hearing several videos portrayed officials of the AVI Agency and company representatives as opposed to people taking part in the hearing as an audience (see videos of the hearing, published between October 20–25, 2012: Sulfaatit; Metsähallitus; Rikosvastuu; Adressi aville; Kapari; Kananen; Flöjt; Rikastamista; Vesitase; Kaanteisosmoosi). The setting was reinforced by showing a statement by individual participants in each video. The statements included questions and claims officials and company representatives at the front of the auditorium were requested to answer. Speeches by audience members contradicted both the information given by the authorities – there was, for example, an argument about the definition of uranium extraction – and by company representatives. Stakeholder speeches included a rather angry account of a nearby inhabitant of the harm the mine had caused to its surroundings. There was also a lengthy and composed account given by Metsähallitus (the Finnish forest authority responsible for state-owned forests) of the harm done to bodies of water around the mine.

Another set of videos pitted angry citizens up against the company after the wastewater leakage of November 2012 (see videos from a neighborhood meeting organized by the company, published on November 29, 2012: Maitotilallisen vetoomus; Uranium gambler; Kalastajan terveisia; Pahan kierre; Natusen paljastus). In these videos, the atmosphere was portrayed as particularly heated.

A third event portrayed in several videos was a demonstration organized in Helsinki in the fall 2014. The videos had been edited so that there was a video of the demonstration march and another video featuring speeches by demonstrators. The demonstration was for peace and the environment in general, Stop Talvivaara being only one participant. Additionally, there were individual videos of commentaries by parliamentary party group representatives on the stairs of the Parliament House. (See videos published on October 29, 2014: Rauhan ja ympäristön puolesta – JP Väisänen; Rauhan ja ympäristön puolest – kulku 24.10.2014; Rauhan ja ympäristön puolest – Kimmo Tiilikainen; Rauhan ja ympäristön puolest – Paavo Arhinmäki; Rauhan ja ympäristön puolest – Ville Niinistö; Rauhan ja ympäristön puolest – Jyrki Yrjio; Rauhan ja ympäristön puolest – kaivosliikkeiden tervehdys.) Similar videos had been published from other demonstrations as well. They portrayed the mass of demonstrators and speeches...
given both by demonstrators and politicians or officials in front of the crowd (see e.g. videos Talvivaara demonstration in Helsinki 2012, December 7, 2013; Adressi elykeskukselle, November 11, 2012).

Other instances featuring similar settings included handing a petition to the then prime minister Alexander Stubb at the Talvivaara gate (video: Stop Talvivaara-adressi Stubbille, November 17, 2014), meeting with the minister of economic affairs Jan Vapaavuori (video: Vapaavori ja vastuuttomat vallanpitäjät, April 9, 2015), and delivering notifications to the AVI Agency (video: Muistuttajat – kansalaiset Aluehallintovirastossa, January 21, 2015). These instances, however, were not open to the public.

These latter videos are examples of events that would not have been public, had the videos of them not been published. In the videos, and in various other videos, the representation of ‘the people’ was constructed by allusion to ‘citizens’ or ‘popular’ verbally. The visual image of people taking part in the activities worked as an implicit representative claim. The individuals shown in the videos possibly did not identify themselves with the movement. Nonetheless, in presenting them in the videos, the movement took them over, and made them representatives of ‘the public opinion’. But how were these citizens portrayed? What was relevant in describing them?

5.3.2 Relevant features of the representatives

In some cases, the professions or hometowns of actors were referred to in press releases:

“Professional fisher Raimo Tervonen spoke about his observations in the area that the mine had affected. – There is no more need for fishing restrictions in Kivijärvi lake, as fish have already fled the lake downstream. Now the same is happening in the northern part of Laakajärvi lake. In addition to observing emissions, we should be talking about stopping this ever expanding pollution and repairing the damage.” (Press release: Aktivistit levittivät varoituskylttejä maastoon, June 24, 2013.)

“Reino Rönkkö, a leisure-time fisher from Sonkajärvi, approached minister of economic affairs Jan Vapaavuori. – Everybody can see that the company has grossly damaged the environment from the beginning. Yet operations are allowed to continue. The citizens’ trust in the impartiality of the monitoring system is at stake.” (Press release: Stop Talvivaara varoittaa kansalaisten oikeustajun murtumisesta, July 15, 2013.)
"As a representative of endangered primary production, Raili Eskelinen, a milk producer from Vieremä, spoke in the demonstration." (Press release: Kaivoshuumista tulossa vaaliteema, October 30, 2014.)

Moreover, a video was titled, "Fisher's Greetings" (Kalastajan terveisia, November 29, 2012). In the video, a speech of a person in a public event organized by the company was shown. The event took place in the aftermath of the November 2012 wastewater leakage, and company representatives were there to answer people's questions. The speaker introduced himself to be from "Jormaskylän jakokunta"31 and the greetings he had to the company leadership were about metal dumping in lake Jormasjärvi north of the mine. Another video from the same event was titled "Dairy Farmer's Plea" (Maitotilallisen vetoomus, November 29, 2012). In the video, an audience member, indicated to be a dairy farmer from Vieremä, confronted the company representatives.

A third video, titled as "The delegation – mine commission at the Parliament", showed a 'delegation' meeting five MPs at the Finnish Parliament on October 23, 2014. The delegation represented “mining movements” (video: Lähetystö – Kaivosvaltuuskunta Eduskunnassa, October 30, 2014). In the video, picture and audio were accompanied with tagged texts indicating the participants' names, hometowns, occupations and titles. According to these tags, a pastor and summer resident from Kaavi (a municipality in eastern Finland), the general manager of the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation (FANC/SLL) Kainuu district organization, a municipal councilor from Kuusamo (situated in north-east of Finland), the leader of the Lapland Mine Forum from Kemi, a biochemist as an expert of the mining movements, a dairy farmer from Vieremä (a municipality in eastern Finland), entrepreneur from Kaavi, a representative of the North Karelia nature conservation district (of FANC/SLL) and a documentarist from the Stop Talvivaara movement were present.

Indeed, in the videos people were often presented with tags, either visual or spoken. The professional fisher was presented as such in multiple videos and press releases (see video Terveisiä lobbareille, November 14, 2013; press releases

31 The speaker used an outdated term "jakokunta", whereas the up-to-date term would have been "osakaskunta". The term does not translate easily to English, as it denotes a distinctly Finnish form of joint ownership. "Osakaskunta" is a unit that owns a shared area, usually a water area such as a lake. People become members in units of joint ownership through owning land in the area, for example a piece of land on a lake shore. Thus lake ownership, in singular, is shared among those owning land around the lake. The "osakaskunta" usually forms an equivalent fishing joint ownership that has certain responsibilities in relation to fish stocks in the water area it administers. The public right of access guarantees access of people to water areas, so the joint ownerships do not designate private ownership as such.
Further tags in the videos and press releases were 'biochemist' (see press releases Muistuttajat tyrmäsivät Talvivaaran purkuputken, January 21, 2015; Kaivoskritikot koolla: Paskalapio-palkinto biokemisti Jari Natuselle, October 24, 2014; video Purkuputkia vai pudistamoita? April 18, 2015), lawyer (see videos Vapaavuori ja vastuuttomat vallanpitäjät, April 9, 2015; Vanhoja rötöksiä ja uusia syntejä, April 13, 2015), ‘doctoral candidate’ (see video Vanhoja syntejä ja uusia rötöksiä, April 13, 2015), and ‘parliamentary election candidate’ (see video Vanhoja syntejä ja uusia rötöksiä, April 13, 2015). Additionally, the primus motor of the movement, Hannu Hyvönen, was usually tagged with 'documentarist' (see e.g. video Jos vääryys vallan saapi – ubrataanko periferia kaivoksille, April 17, 2015; press releases Stop Talvivaara vetoaa sisäministeri Päivi Räsäseen, November 10, 2012; Voidaanko Talvivaaran kaivoksen metallitehdas käynnistää uudelleen? November 18, 2012; Konsultti kaivosyhtiön etujen vartijana, July 18, 2013; Ensimmäiset sakot näytteiden ottajille, September 5, 2014; Muistuttajat tyrmäsivät Talvivaaran purkuputken, January 21, 2015; Kainun Ely unohti taas savolaiset, March 3, 2015).

Whether or not it was the intention of the video makers or press release writers to point out these positions, the impression was that the people in the videos and press releases were worried about mining in the capacity they were presented; as fishers, as a pastor, as an entrepreneur, as a dairy farmer, and so forth.

Most of the positions mentioned carry certain implications. Fishers can be taken to be experts on life in lakes and rivers. As a guardian of the parish, pastor has a representative function; an interviewee told that some of her relatives had resigned from church membership because their pastor had actively opposed the Talvivaara mine in public (Councilor 1). The entrepreneur, moreover, carried a representative function as the representative of other firms in the region affected by mining. This manifested mining as something threatening other sources of livelihood. The tag 'dairy farmer' or 'milk producer' had this same function, adding to it the argument, also outspokenly, that food safety was at stake if mining was to let take over large areas of Finland. Other positions indicated in the videos and press releases, to the contrary, evoked an idea of expertise. This was the case with 'biochemist' and 'doctoral candidate', and perhaps to a certain degree with 'lawyer' as well.
In addition to these positions, the locality of actors played a role in the argumentation. Usually the locality was referred to in a way that implicitly made the opinion of 'us', the locals, seem coherent:

“The company is currently suspected of feloniously damaging of the environment. To us living in the region where the mine functions there is no room for doubt. What has happened is visibly detectable.” (Press release: *Avoin kirje Pokka Haavistolle*, October 23, 2013.)

“– We, the locals, have not been heard at all. We do not consider the ban legitimate, says Reino Rönkkö, a leisure time fisher from Sonkajärvi, who has been an active participant in citizen observation.” (Press release: *Jokamiehien oikeuksien loukkaamiselle ei perusteita*, December 20, 2013.)

“– We depart from the interpretation that the mine is an invader in our home region and we have the right to observe its operations and repercussions. We hope to get freedom to act both from the police and the mining company, says Hannu Hyvönen.” (Press release: *Jokamiehien oikeuksien loukkaamiselle ei perusteita*, December 20, 2013.)

In the above passages, a claim was made that those acting in the movement or toward the same goal were from the region where Talvivaara operated. In the first passage, it was implied that everybody in the region would share the same opinion on the visible detectability of the harm caused to the environment. The two other passages stressed the right of local people to their living environment, as opposed to moving restrictions around the mine given by the ministry of the interior in a decree. In both of them, the legitimacy of the decree was questioned and the legitimacy of locals to act despite the decree was backed by their status as locals. The representation of the state authority was hence rejected, and the movement as the representative was offered instead.

Nevertheless, one press release made the disagreement within locals apparent:

“Minister of Employment Lauri Ihalainen, when visiting Sotkamo, was glad about the Christmas Peace afforded to [mine] workers. But the visit did not increase everybody's peace. – The Christmas Peace of us who live by bodies of water, fishers, and tourism entrepreneurs do not seem to move cabinet members, criticized professional fisher Raimo Tervonen. – Why do state authorities relate to us who have suffered as if we did not exist?” (Press release: *Onko Talvivaara laillista kaivostoimintaa, pääministeri Stubb?*, November 17, 2014.)

Here the mineworkers, on one hand, and people living by the bodies of water, fishers, and tourism entrepreneurs, on the other, were put up against each other. This argumentation can be understood against the backdrop that much of the speech around Talvivaara throughout its history was built on the tension between jobs and
the environment. Yet this press release was the only instance where this contradiction was amplified in the movement's communications. As will be demonstrated later in this chapter, the movement tried to resolve this contradiction by putting forth the argument that continuing mining operations was not in the best interest of anybody, including workers.

The locality of actors was made further apparent for instance in the video Lähetystö - kaivosvaltiuskunta Eduskunnassa (October 30, 2014). The local image became strengthened through implications made in the statements of the participants, as in the following passages:

"I am from Savo and we feel that we were betrayed on this mining issue…” (Hannu Hyvönen, tagged as "Documentarist, Stop Talvivaara movement")

"It’s clear to us in Savo that the environment has been ruined…” (Hannu Hyvönen)

"As a countryside person I bring greetings from the Luikonlahti lakeshore…” (Kirsti Toikka, tagged as "Entrepreneur, Kaavi")

Particularly the two first excerpts show a transition made by the speaker from simply claiming that something was wrong to claiming that other people, and not just any other people but the local people, thought that as well. In talking about 'us' he pointed to all people living in Savo (a province), the real fortification to the argument coming from the assertion that he was from the region. The third passage above rather pointed to the 'commonness' of the speaker, and to a significantly smaller area, 'Luikonlahti lakeshore'. Luikonlahti is a small lake in Savo and most probably not a lake that somebody unfamiliar with the region would know. Mentioning it, thus, did not carry with it a shared meaning of where exactly she was from, but rather functioned as deep connection to the locality.

Indeed, the 'ordinariness' of civic actors was an argument in opposing the mine. In a video, an actor in the movement explained that a "police officer in uniform" had signed the petition to shut down the mine (video: Stop Talvivaara-adressi Stubbille, November 17, 2014). In another video, a person meeting minister of economic affairs with a delegation to discuss critically about mining presented herself as a "local councilor, chief shop steward, citizen and a mother of two, grandmother and wife of a leisure-time fisher" (video: Vapaavuori ja vastuuttomat vallanpitäjät, April 9, 2015). In interviews, the ordinariness was also mentioned:

"[---] [T]here is some big shot that has given the impression of the Stop Talvivaara movement that we are nearly criminals. We are perfectly normal citizens from all walks of life, but it somehow feels that we would not be, although we operate within law, and we are side to side from different occupations." (Civic actor 7.)
"As for the activity of Stop Talvivaara, many seem to think that we are some sort of hangers-on. But we are perfectly ordinary people, normal working people, although many conceive us as street dwellers." (Civic actor 10.)

To summarize, the aspects brought forth were certain (professional) positions, locality, and the ordinariness of those appearing in the videos and press releases. All of these functioned as (implicit) justifications for considering these individuals as representatives of people living in the mining region. They functioned as proofs of authenticity (see Saward 2009). Presenting someone as a fisher or being from Savo implicitly carried a representative claim that others in the same profession or from the same region would share the statements made in the videos and press releases. Otherwise, these attributes would have been useless. These implicit claims could also be understood as a counterpoint to the company and other decision-makers: they were not locals, nor ordinary, nor in a position in which they would have to suffer from the harm caused by the company.

5.4 The Represented: Whom and What Were Claimed to be Represented?

The above section examined the representative aspect of representative claims – of whom to consider as representatives and why. In this section I will move on to the aspect of representative claims that addresses the represented. One way to approach this question is to look at whom was spoken for. In this regard, local people were a significant group. Secondly, citizens in general were spoken for. The notion ‘stakeholder’ was critically approached by the movement, and its meaning expanded. The movement also made an effort to represent the ‘general interest' in a novel way. Interestingly, workers and investors were also spoken for, although they might not have been the most obvious groups to represent.

5.4.1 Speaking for and claiming to represent locals

Many representative claims by the Stop Talvivaara movement concerned what local people or people in the wider region (allegedly) affected by mining thought or felt:

“Who believes Talvivaara’s explanations anymore? A strict NO from (the) nearby inhabitants” (Title of a press release: Kuka enää uskoo Talvivaara-selityksiä? Jyrkkä EI lähialueen ihmisiltä, November 28, 2012.)
“People living in Savo are profoundly offended by the fact that the province was not asked a single word about founding the mine. […] The topmost feeling in Kainuu is disillusionment. We were promised a mine where bacteria would do the dissolving and emissions outside the mine would not exist.” (Press release: Stop Talvivaaran joulupaketti, December 21, 2012.)

“Local inhabitants are worried not only about springtime flooding, but also about the company’s plans to run 3.8 cubic meters of sulphate containing wastewater to the Oulujoki and Vuoksi waterbodies.” (Press release: Häättilanne Talvivaaran vuotojen osalta jatkuu. Sedimenttinäytteet osoittavat: Ylä-Lumijärvi paboin saastunut, February 8, 2013.)

”It has become clear everywhere in the Kainuu region that people are afraid.” (Said by Kirsti Toikka in the video Lähetystö - kaivosvaltuuskunta Eduskunnassa, October 30, 2014.)

Combined with the fact that locality was an important aspect in how the actors were represented, these claims appeared as claims made by locals about locals to (non-local) decision-makers. The movement in a way passed on a message. Depending on the interpretation, all local inhabitants or some local inhabitants were spoken for – the Finnish language does not allow a definitive answer to this question. While in the above passages the group of 'local inhabitants' was left unspecified, in the following passages the represented group was clearly defined:

“Mika and Lasse Flöjt handed in a statement signed by over 80 people. The signatures were collected in municipalities around Oulujoki river during the 'For clean waters' tour. The stance is clear. – No wastewater pipeline to Nuas lake in the Oulujoki waterway.” (Press release: Muistuttajat tyrmäsivät Talvivaaran purkuputken, January 21, 2015.)

“There are petition signatories from Sotkamo and the Oulujoki river-trail that will possibly suffer harm in the future argue that wastewater pipeline and continuing emissions are unreasonable. Likely sufferers will be shore inhabitants, leisure-time cabin owners, as well as other livelihoods, such as tourism, fishing and farming.” (Press release: Tiedote Talvivaara-tapauksesta, March 30, 2015.)

Unlike the unspecified claims, here the claimant clearly indicates who supported the cause: those who had signed the statement or the petition. The representative action was not only about claiming, but also about drafting a statement or a petition, and gathering people to support it. The representative action was taken further by publishing the press releases that made known to the wider public that there indeed were people who opposed the company’s plans to build a wastewater pipeline. The claim moved in a more unspecified direction in naming (all) shore inhabitants, cabin owners, tourism, fishing, and farming as harm sufferers. Moreover, as the information about the number of signatories was published in a Stop Talvivaara press
release, it worked as an argument for the movement's overall aim to have the mine shut down – although that might have not been the aim of the signatories, or intended by the movement.

5.4.2 Extending the category of stakeholders

Although Stop Talvivaara spoke as and for locals, a major part of its argumentation was built around extending the category of stakeholders. At first instance, this meant extending the administrative term 'stakeholder' from those living in the mine's impact area in Kainuu province to those south of the mine in Savo province:

“The applicant limited the area that would be affected to Kainuu, and hence authorities and citizens of North Savo were sidelined in the founding application process.” (Press release: Virheellisin tiedoin saatu lupa päivitettävä, October 9, 2012.)

“The Kainuu ELY Centre sidelined people living in Savo in the EIA procedure when the mine was being founded, as it was believed and made believe that impacts would show in Kainuu province. This was a big mistake. The biggest amount of impacts and emissions have come to the Savo side of the watershed and has spread and is spreading a long way to bodies of water in Savo.” (Press release: Kainuun Ely unohti taas savolaiset, March 3, 2015.)

With these statements, the movement took the role of a representative of people living in Savo. However, the core argument was built around rejecting the administrative definition of stakeholder, and instead extending it to the public at large. For example, in a statement delivered to the Northern Finland AVI Agency, the movement argued why its opinion should be taken into account:

“Stop Talvivaara is a non-registered popular movement for lakes and rivers. The movement consists of individuals as well as environmental activists working in associations across Finland. The extent of environmental harm caused by Talvivaara mine is unprecedented. The mine was established based on faulty information, and without citizen hearings and opportunities for citizens to influence the outcome of a matter related to their living environment. Vuoksi and Oulujoki waterways are national treasures, and their use for recreation and pleasure is not confined to inhabitants of the area defined by the applicant. We, the signatories, are also stakeholders and thus entitled to state our opinion in the matter.” (Press release: Mielipide PSAVI:lle, August 24, 2012.)

The argument of extending the notion of stakeholder from nearby inhabitants to a larger (unspecified) group of people was present in other press releases as well:
"We depart in this statement from the observation that those who suffer harm are not only those that own property on the lake shore. When lakes and rivers are destroyed, all Finns lose, and particularly the people of the region." (Press release: *Muistuttajat tyrnäsivät Talvivaaran purkuputken*, January 21, 2015.)

"It is good to recognize that all people in the region are stakeholders in matters concerning the damaging of the environment." (Press release: *Rikostutkinnan rajauksesta kantelu oikeuskanslerille*, February 6, 2015.)

Here the mine was not thought of as an issue that would have simply affected the mine surroundings. Instead, the question was presented as something that all Finns and particularly those living in the region around the mine had a stake in.

5.4.3 Representing citizens and the general interest

Citizens were referred to in numerous press releases. They were represented as lacking information, as worried about the justice system, as worried about bodies of water, as wanting to see the mine shut down, and as not trusting the government:


“It would be good if the highest decision-makers would share (the) citizens’ worries about the functioning of the justice system in the Talvivaara case.” (Press release: *Stop Talvivaara varoittaa kansalaisten oikeustajun murtumisesta*, July 15, 2013.)

“Citizens concerned about bodies of water plead to minister of the interior Päivi Räsänen to report on actions taken together with safety authorities.” (Press release: *Vetoomus sisäministerille*, April 12, 2013.)

“The Stop Talvivaara movement explains citizen feedback shows confusion and frustration. – People ask, justifiably, why Joe the plumber is monitored for his wastewater load, but a publicly listed company is allowed to spoil entire rivers and lakes - Hannu Hyvönen on the feedback from ordinary people living in the region.” (Press release: *Talvivaara ei ratkea ajopunoteoriailla;* July 3, 2013.)

In the first two passages, it is unclear which citizens were referred to: some or all citizens? It is quite clear that at least some citizens wanted information and at least some citizens were worried about the effectiveness of the justice system. Moreover, it is clear that these worries were something that *Stop Talvivaara* represented. In the third passage citizens were defined to be those that were worried about bodies of water. Further, in the fourth passage the movement again ‘passed on’ a message
‘from the field’, taking the position of a representative of ‘Joe the plumber’, as opposed to the company.

On two occasions the movement made bolder claims:

“[M]ining policies of the current government are against the general interest of Finns. The current government does not enjoy the confidence of the people.” (Press release: Stop Talvivaara vaatii Solidiumin irtaantumista Talvivaarasta ja kaivoksen sulkemista, March 7, 2013.)

“The majority of citizens have for years wanted to see the mine shut down. That would have been the right decision from a tax viewpoint, as well as the environment.” (Press release: Talvivaaran tarina – kuka huijaa ja ketä, July 27, 2015.)

The unspecified referral to ‘citizens’ in other press releases was in these two passages substituted with claims about what the people and the majority of citizens thought. The position as the representative of the people was taken more firmly, as distrust to the government was declared. The message was that continuing mining operations was not supported by the people. In another press release, it was alleged that the state no longer looked out for the best interest of its citizens:

“Human and material suffering caused by the catastrophe in the waterways has been sidelined. Blinded by the mining boom, it does not seem to be in the state's interest to take care of citizens' safety, the safety of the environment, or people's rights to their way of life. This defensive fight is about to fall on the shoulders of citizens.” (Press release: Talvivaara ja pohjoinen kaivosboom kansainvälisessä valossa, November 29, 2013.)

This argumentation rather well explains the position of the movement: the state had failed its representative task, and hence it was responsibility of citizens to take over the representative task themselves. The following two passages further illustrate this point:

“Applications by Talvivaara to run wastewater [outside the mine area] and pleas by the ELY Centre to the administrative court are an arrogant insult against environmental legislation, the justice system, citizens and waterways that can be described as a national treasure.” (Press release: Kainuun ELY-keskuksen ja kaivosyhtiön piittaamattomuus vesien tilasta on röyhkeyden hnippu, April 15, 2013.)

“It is hard to imagine that in Finland a cabinet member would sign a decree preventing citizens from safeguarding their own environment.” (Press release: Ensimmäiset sakot näyteiden ottajille, September 5, 2014.)

In taking over the representative task, the claim to represent the general interest was central. In some press releases, the company was blamed for concealing issues,
whereas in other press releases the legitimacy of state authorities was called into question, particularly the legitimacy of the Kainuu ELY Centre:

“There are no grounds for continuing mine operations. Keeping up appearances neither serves the best interests of citizens nor the state.” (Press release: *Talvivaaran juoksutukset: vesistömallinnus pettää siinä missä yhtiö ja valvojakin*, April 22, 2013.)

“When Talvivaara concealed the enriching of uranium and storing it in a gypsum pond, the company seized the government's power. It is a gross deception and avoidance of nuclear law stipulations. It is a crime against democracy, as by concealing the uranium issue the company prevented public debate on whether or not to allow uranium enriching mines to operate in Finland.” (Press release: *Talvivaaran rikostutkintaa tulee jatkaa*, September 25, 2014.)

“After the chancellor of justice’s decision, it is hard to reason why charges have not already been filed against the ELY Centre. In the Stop Talvivaara movement, as well as in citizen comments heard in the field, it is hoped that chancellor of justice Jonkka understands the case’s severity from the viewpoint of the public interest and understands that there are profound grounds for indictment.” (Press release: *Kainuun ELY-keskuksen toiminnassa aihetta syytteen nostamiseen*, March 3, 2014.)

“We challenge you, decision-makers responsible for Talvivaara, to justify the environmental and societal reasons for the pipeline and runs of Talvivaara. Experts involved in the government's project and know about its environmental, economic and social impacts are also hoped to explain the project to citizens. [---] Your participation is hoped for, because it is evident that the current arrangements regarding the issue are not in line with the general interest of society.” (Press release: *Tiedote Talvivaara-tapauksesta*, March 30, 2015.)

The general interest was at times represented as the taxpayer’s interest:

“The longer mine operations are tried to continue, the bigger becomes the final invoice for taxpayers and the environment.” (Press release: *Avoin kirje Heidi Hautalalle ja Soliduimin hallitukselle*, January 22, 2013.)

“We hold that taxpayer and state money should no longer be invested in continuing this operation. [---] Shutdown costs and environmental damages will be expensive, but continuing operations will create even more damage and costs for the society.” (Press release: *Avoin kirje Pekka Haavistolle*, October 23, 2013.)

“Each year of continuing operations will result in more damage, the cost of which will ultimately fall on the state and taxpayers.” (Press release: *Stop Talvivaara vaatii kaitoksen alastoson aloittamista*, November 7, 2013.)

“The Stop Talvivaara movement believes continuing mining operations is the worst case scenario. It would not lessen the taxpayer burden, but would increase it.” (Press release: *Ympäristötäydon kustannukset eivät vähene tekemällä mitä vahinkoa*, November 15, 2013.)
“Continuing mining operations does not rescue Kainuu, but destroys it. The longer its operations continue, the bigger the bill for taxpayers becomes.” (Press release: 50000 nimeä alasajoa vaativassa adressissa, November 13, 2014.)

The speech of the general interest and of taxpayers can be understood in the context of the overall discussion around Talvivaara at the time. While the environmental problems had been acknowledged by all actors, and the minister of economic affairs Jan Vapaavuori had stated that continued mining was best from the viewpoint of the ‘general interest of society’ (see Vapaavuori 2015a). The movement’s argument was a reply to this kind of argumentation. It can also be understood as an account of how the general interest was defined, and how it was best served. Moreover, by appealing to the general interest and taxpayers, the movement appeared not as the representative of (narrow) local interests, but for society.

Further, perhaps surprisingly, the movement spoke for workers and investors as well. It was claimed that rummaging and salvaging uranium found in the mine area was neither in the best interest of people living in the affected area, nor mineworkers, nor future generations (see press release: Talvivaara ja pohjoinen kaivosboomissa kansainvälistessä valossa, November 29, 2013). It was additionally stated that workers had not been duly warned about the risks of being exposed to uranium (see press releases: Talvivaaran rikostutkintaa tulee jatkaa, September 25, 2014; Rikostutkinnan rajautuksesta kantelu oikeuskanvillerille, February 6, 2015). As for investors, it was stated they were not informed about problems related to nuclear production, about uranium making its way into the gypsum ponds, and about the fact that the company would enrich uranium (see press releases Avoin kirje Pekka Haavistolle, October 23, 2013; Talvivaaran uraanintuotannossa epäselvyyttä, November 20, 2013; Untiskirje, April 29, 2015).

The public debate around the mine largely grew out of a supposed opposition between jobs and the environment. By speaking on behalf of workers, the movement gave an impression these two views were not opposed to each other. It was again a question of redefining the best interest of workers, of representing their interests differently than they had been represented by MPs, for example. With references to investors, the movement appeared as the representative of their interests as well. As the speech about the general interest and taxpayers worked as a way to appear as a representative of the society in general, the representative claims about workers and investors worked as a way to avoid being labelled simply as a representative of nature conservationists.

Overall, the movement sought to represent locals, citizens at large, and even some special groups. The key was to represent the general interest, as well as the interests
of these special groups, differently from what had been done by others. In doing that, the movement negated the representation offered by those functioning in official institutions, such as authorities. In other words, it doubted the 'official truth' and gave its interpretation instead.

Nonetheless, the movement did not always present its representation as superior to those of other actors. Particularly at the beginning of the study period, in 2012 and early 2013, the movement represented the company as the sole malefactor, as opposed to the media, politicians, authorities, and citizens alike. It was stated, for example, that the media should be admitted to an inspection visit, and that backup ponds were not shown to minister Niinistö nor to the media (see press release Stop Talvivaara vetoaa sisäministeri Päivi Räsäseen, November 10, 2012). It was also stated that citizens and authorities were not given the chance to decide whether or not to allow starting a uranium mine in Finland, because the company concealed the fact that its mining operations would extract uranium in addition to other metals (see press release: Mielipide PSAVI:lle, August 24, 2012). In a way, the movement took on the role of speaking on behalf of a number of actors:

“When the mine was founded, it was kept secret from all stakeholders, including the state, government, parliament, licensing authorities, monitoring authorities, advocacy groups, nearby residents, and the media, that bioheapleaching enriches uranium and that this uranium winds up at the bottom of the gypsum pond.” (Press release: Talvivaara ei ratkea ajopunteoralla, July 3, 2013.)

With these statements, the movement aligned politicians, authorities, and the media with citizens. Their function was to represent the citizens, and deceiving them was deceiving the citizens at large. Hence, the media, authorities, the state, and so forth, were taken to represent the citizens. At the same time, nonetheless, the criticism was directed to these actors, increasingly toward the end of the study period (see e.g. press releases Kainuun ELY-keskuksen ja kaivosyhtiön piittaamattomuus vesien tilasta on röyhkeyden huippu, April 15, 2013; Kansalaisryhmältä tutkintapyyntö Kainuun Ely-keskuksen toimista, February 10, 2015; Kantelu Valtiontalouden tarkastusvirastolle – Miksi valtio ostaa sika säkissä Talvivaarassa? February 26, 2015; Miksi media vaikeni kaivoskritikoiden kirjelmän? April 14, 2015; Stop Talvivaara vaatii Ely-keskukselta toimia, April 16, 2015). The representative linkage between these actors and citizens was thus negated and claimed that the citizens’ best interest was (no longer) served. The movement was instead offered as the representative, as presented earlier.
5.5 Meanings Given to Representation by Civic Actors

As I have shown above, the public communications by the *Stop Talvivaara* movement entailed more or less implicit representative claims. How did the actors themselves perceive representation? The eleven civic actor interviewees were asked whom or what they deemed themselves to represent.

The replies varied from an unspecified group of people such as 'the citizens' to those who explained to represent simply themselves and no other. The groups of people mentioned were people living in Savo ("I feel strongly that I represent in this movement the people of Savo" – Civic actor 1), farmers and entrepreneurs in tourism (Civic actor 7), and people who had suffered harm on the Vuoksi side of the waterbody (Civic actor 11). From these replies, it became clear that the word 'represent' carried a meaning that referred to people. These answers also reflected an idea that the interviewees were involved in the movement as somebody. These responses were about individuals' relationships to the movement rather than the movement's relationship to something else, such as the state, politicians, or authorities.

The idea of representing just oneself was attached to the idea that the movement could not take responsibility of all the actions of those involved with the movement:

“I don't represent... I feel that the *Stop Talvivaara* movement is a free popular movement and everybody represents just him or herself. I mean, I can write a letter and send it in the name of the *Stop Talvivaara* movement, but it is nothing more than that. It does not mean that I represent the movement. We are not organized, we are not a registered association or anything like that. We are a free movement. [---] In this way, everyone is responsible for him or herself and we do not need to account for anything that individuals decide to do, for example.” (Civic actor 9).

To a question of what the movement represented, the same interviewee said the movement represented the "rather wide view" that the Talvivaara mine was disastrous and that it should be slowly shut down: "In that regard we are of the same opinion." The idea of representation as something that referred to views rather than people was present in other replies as well:

Q: “Do you feel you represent a wider value system, a group of people, or anything like that?” A: “Well, I strongly advocate nature conservation, individual rights, and alike. Every citizen should have the right to clean air, and to a peaceful and habitable environment.” (Civic actor 5.)

“I do not represent anything else except… it is just for the environment what we do. "(Civic actor 6.)
“This is not a question of Talvivaara, but a question of Finland and the future of Finland.” (Civic actor 4.)

Here the interviewees put forth interpretations of what was valuable and worth the trouble. Their actions were presented as looking out for the environment, and as looking out for people's wellbeing as a whole.

The language of representation was intertwined with political speech itself. It was a way to present something as important and hence to suggest what was to be done. As the replies above, also in other replies larger value systems were referred to. An interviewee, having first started her reply by referring to groups of people, continued to explain that she represented the state of affairs her grandfather had died for in the war and as the owner of his farm she felt that, as a Finn, she had to defend “what was ours” (Civic actor 7). Another interviewee approached the question by explaining what kind of environmental activism had taken place elsewhere in the world. He continued that he understood economic issues involved ethical choices about how social relationships and relationships between people and the environment are created in economic interactions (Civic actor 3). The question of representation invoked a rather broad contemplation of large issues relating to what was valued and how the world (and Finland) was viewed.

Some replies, moreover, explained representation in relation to each situation at hand or to the situation at large. An interviewee told that he had been a representative of a registered environmental association in a working group convened by the company. He had realized that he was the only member in the group who was not an administrative official or representative of the company. As the only "environmental person" he took it upon himself to represent not only people living in Kainuu but even workers of the Talvivaara company (Civic actor 4).

Another interviewee, when asked whether he felt he gave a voice to a larger group of people, said that he indeed did. He explained that people in Kainuu were in general not keen to speak out, and that they would speak in their own circles but not in front of politicians or other notables (Civic actor 5). A third interviewee said that Stop Talvivaara represented citizens (Civic actor 2), hence putting the movement as the representative of citizens up against other actors involved in the case. In the first two cases, representation was contemplated as something that emerged because of a given situation, and the latter case took the whole Talvivaara issue as a starting point in explaining representation.

I take all of these above answers to reflect what it meant to represent. They reflected the meanings given to representation in the context of civic activism. These meanings included the following aspects:
1. Representation as representing groups of people, such as occupational groups or people living in a certain area or region.

2. Representation as acting in the name of a movement, and vice versa: individuals in a movement did not represent anybody but themselves, because everybody was accountable only to him or herself.

3. Representation as an idea of a shared point of view.

4. Representation as something that outlined what was valuable and worthwhile in a wider political sense.

5. Representation as a relational concept, growing out of a specific or a general context.

The above is a summary of the meanings representation was given when it was discussed explicitly. The elements of representing locality and certain special (occupational) groups (point 1) were present both in the explicit accounts and in the representative claims analyzed earlier in this chapter. The points 3 and 4 in the above listing can be understood in the context of representing the general interest rather than specific interests. The second point, however, relates to representing civic activism as direct rather than as representative action. It reflects the common understanding of representation as something related to formal institutions and organizations.

Overall, the replies of interviewees to the question of representation should not be confused with actual representative claims. Representative claims are understood as symbolic action taking place publicly. Here, instead, the actors replied to the question. In any event, the replies help in understanding the difference between how activism appeared (or was made to appear), and how actors themselves perceived their roles. Representative claims do not presuppose intentionality.

Further, the amount of support the movement had was also discussed with the interviewees. The question of support included an understanding of representation as the few acting for the many. If representation did play a role, one would think having support would be important. Was it?

An interviewee started by laying down the numbers of the so-called media desk of the movement, some 30 to 40 people. He continued that the YouTube channel had about 130 subscribers, the videos over 100,000 downloads, the online petition
25,000 signatures, and the demonstration of November 2012 almost 3,000 participants at its peak. He also said that people in Kainuu were not keen on demonstrating publically, but that people would come to him and say that they agreed with what he did and encouraged him to continue. Having support was explained to be crucial, as otherwise the movement could not function, he said. He additionally stated that people understood and approved activism as long as it was about taking specimens and filming. However, illegal action and sabotage would not be tolerated. It was hence meaningful to keep activities at an approvable level. (Civic actor 4.)

Other actors, too, stressed the amount of support they had received and were receiving nationwide and even from abroad for their cause. When asked about the number of people that were active in the movement, some of the replies moved quickly from saying that a few dozen subscribed to the media desk to outlining the numbers that had backed the movement’s initiatives: 20,000 (Civic actor 1) to 30,000 (Civic actor 2) signatures in the petition demanding controlled shut-down of the mine, and 60,000 (Civic actor 1) to 100,000 (Civic actor 4) downloads of the Stop Talvivaara channel videos from YouTube.32 Civic actor 2 noted that not all of these people had been active in the sense they would have engaged beyond a few clicks or writing a few lines online. But the point was about the support for the movement rather than the actual number of actors – a division that at least these interviewees wanted to make. Civic actor 2 also noted that one of the actors in the movement had resulted in third place in the ”Person from Kainuu of the Year” voting, continuing that

”support might not be all that small. In Savo, there are events that a hundred or two hundred people attend, local events, village events. And in Iisalmi also, it is easy to fill the venues.” (Civic actor 2.)

The assertions of public support played on several dimensions. Firstly, as was the case in the above passage, the amount of local support was highlighted.

Secondly, stressing of local support was accompanied with allusions to support that crossed both regional and national borders.

”Those who are for the environment are found all over Finland.” (Civic actor 6.)

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32 The number each interviewee gave depended on the point of time that the interview took place. The interviews were carried out between December 2012 and August 2013. The number of both signatures and downloads had increased between the different interviews.
Q: "This inner circle, if you’re about thirty people, are all of you from the area surrounding Talvivaara?" A: "No, from all around the country. This is national. But of course, the main group is in North Savo and Kainuu [...]" (Civic actor 1.)

Q: "Do you feel that the Stop Talvivaara movement is supported in Kainuu, in North Savo and then in the whole of Finland? Or how would you evaluate it?" A: Yes, yes, I feel it’s… Q: "Both locally and more broadly?" A: "Both regionally and in the whole country. We get support even from abroad." (Civic actor 9.)

The third aspect can be described as the quality of support for lack of a better term.

"For the main part [people involved are] old, middle-aged, over middle age. So, this is by no means a movement of young anarchists.” (Civic actor 1.)

"[---] [W]e had here in Helsinki a demonstration of a thousand people, and in the other one there were about 200 people. It requires a lot of effort to take a train from North Savo down here. There were farmers who need to take care of their cows; people have jobs and other things [to do]. But there is a significant group of active people that come all the way to Helsinki to demonstrate.” (Civic actor 2.)

This so-called quality of support pointed to the diversity of people: they did not represent a narrow ideology (anarchism), nor were they of a narrow age group. It was highlighted that people attended demonstrations despite of all other commitments and long distances. These assertions indicate that it played a role for the interviewees to demonstrate that the movement had received support.

Nonetheless, in a video passage the lack of participants in a demonstration was regretted (video: jos vääryys vallan saapi – ubrataanko periferia kaivoksille? April 17, 2015.) The video showed an interview of civic actor Hannu Hyvönen by a radio reporter. In the interview, the reporter asked about the reception of the movement in the Helsinki metropolitan area. Hyvönen answered that 50,000 had signed the petition for the shutdown of the mine. He added that when people were spoken to privately, everybody was for the shutdown. He was sorry that so few had attended the demonstration, and wondered whether people in the metropolitan area were ready to sacrifice the periphery. In another video about the same event, Hyvönen noticed that attendance in the demonstration was very low. He further stated that there were fewer people in each demonstration. (Video: Purkuputkia vai puhdistamoita? April 18, 2015.)

The passages above and these videos show a tension between stressing the support and then having to cope with lesser attendance. The former video can be interpreted as an attempt to persuade a larger audience to support the cause. In the video, the media was blamed for not raising awareness of the Talvivaara issue. In the latter video, it was explained that people had gotten tired. Quite rightly, it cannot be
induced from the support or lack thereof at a specific point of time that the goal of activity would as such be right or false. Yet, this section indicates that support did play a role for the actors, as it was meaningful for them to refer to the figures and to the diversity of supporters.

5.6 Audience

Whom did the Stop Talvivaara movement address? Explicitly, minister of the interior and ministers responsible for state ownership steering were approached with open letters. In the letters, the ministers were for instance asked to authorize building of a dam outside the mine area (see press release Stop Talvivaara vetoaa sisäministeri Päivi Räsäseen, November 10, 2012), to not to invest any more state funds to the mine (see press releases Avoin kirje Heidi Hautalalle ja Solidiumin hallitukselle, January 22, 2013; Avoin kirje Pekka Haavistolle, October 23, 2013), and to prevent emissions outside the mine area (see press release Vetoon sisäministerille: kaivospitiirin ulkopuolella toimivalta ja velvollisuus on valtolla, April 12, 2013). Additionally, the then prime minister Alexander Stubb was addressed with a question of whether or not it was his opinion that operations in Talvivaara were legal (see press release Onko Talvivaara laillista kaivostoimintaa, pääministeri Stubb? November 17, 2014).

Moreover, many of these open letters and other press releases were directed to authorities and other state-related actors, such as Solidium and ministry of the environment (see e.g. press releases Mielipide PSAVI:lle, August 24, 2012; Stop Talvivaara vaatii Solidiumin irtaantumista Talvivaarasta ja kaivoksen sulkeutumista, March 7, 2013; Avoin kirje Kainuun ELY:lle, Säteilyturvakeskukselle ja Ympäristöministeriölle Talvivaaran jätteenuoksutuksista, March 28, 2013). The movement further urged the police to investigate alleged environmental crimes (see press releases Stop Talvivaara liike pyytää poliisilta virka-apua, February 18, 2013; Polisitutkinta ja toimiva puhdistus yhä kiireellisempiä, May 22, 2013; Talvivaaran rikostutkintaa tulee jatkaa, September 25, 2014), and criticized a university for its professors’ statements (see press release Avoin kirje Aalto-yliopistolle, November 13, 2012). Furthermore, the videos showed meetings, discussions, and debates with politicians, authorities, and company representatives (see videos Adressi aville, October 21, 2012; Uranium Gambler, December 25, 2012; Lähetystö – kaivosvaltuuskunta Eduskunnassa, October 30, 2014; Stop Talvivaara-adressi Stubbille, November 17, 2014; Vapaavuori ja vastunnomat vallanpitäjät, April 9, 2015).
Overall, it is clear the movement sought to address decision-makers, particularly authorities and politicians. While these actors were explicitly and directly addressed, they were also spoken about indirectly (see press releases Pääministeri Katainen ei ymmärrä tilanteen vakavuutta, November 16, 2012; Vapaavuori oikeassa Solidiumin arvostelussa, November 19, 2013). This was true also in relation to allusions to the media, politicians and authorities above; writing critically about these instances can be understood as messages to them.

Indeed, regarding these instances, it is hard to differentiate between ‘speaking about’ and ‘speaking to’. While these instances were addressed, they were simultaneously criticized. At times, as presented in the previous section, the media, politicians, and authorities were even spoken for. The representative claims included (often implicit) claims that the authorities and the media were not to be trusted. A shadow was cast over the mainstream media by claiming, particularly toward the end of the study period, that the media had not wanted to pass on information produced by the movement (see e.g. press releases Miksi media vaikeni kaivoskritiikoiden kirjelmän? April 14, 2015; Uutiskirje, April 29, 2015; Talvivaaran tarina – kuka huijaa ja ketä, July 27, 2015; video Vanhoja syntejä ja uusia rötöksiä, April 13, 2015). These messages were directed to the media, to get the media to write critically about Talvivaara (see video Jos väärys vallan saapi – urataanko periferia kaivoksille, April 17, 2015).

What is crucial in interpreting all these statements listed above is that they were made publically. Everything, including face-to-face meetings with politicians, was made public through videos and press releases. The statements might have been explicitly addressed to the addressees, but implicitly they were aimed to the public. The publicity made most of the movement’s activities mediated, although meeting with for instance politicians could as such be understood as direct activity.

The mediated nature of activities was particularly interesting from the viewpoint of representation, when the movement published videos and press releases of public events. They included events not organized by the movement but by authorities or the company (see e.g. videos Uranium Gambler, December 25, 2013; Mining dialogue by Finnish way, September 12, 2013; Minne katosi Talvivaaran uraani, March 15, 2013; and Kaanteisosmoosi, October 25, 2012). In these videos, Stop Talvivaara offered its representation of what had happened in these events. The representative claims analyzed in this chapter played a central role in these representations. People in these events attended directly, but their attendance was mediated along with the videos and press releases.
Moreover, the movement sought to reach an international audience. All together eight videos were aimed at a non-Finnish speaking audience through naming the videos in English, with English presentation texts alongside the videos, and/or with English subtitles. These videos included footage of the mine area and of the affected areas around the mine, with activists in some of them taking ground and water specimens. The English videos also included material from demonstrations. (See videos How did uranium mine come to Kainuu region of Finland? May 15, 2012; Talvivaara’s gypsum waste pond leaking, November 6, 2012; Talvivaaran olemattomat varoaltaat – Talvivaara’s non-existent back-up bonds, November 8, 2012; Talvivaara back-up pond – the safety barrier which have not been wanted to show to media, November 11, 2012; Stalkers in the Zone – What is happening at Talvivaara, November 27, 2012; Talvivaara demonstration in Helsinki 2012, December 7, 2013; Uranium Gambler, December 25, 2013; Martikanvaara, January 4, 2014). One press release was written in French (see La mine Talvivaara: un aperçu, [no date]).

The role of publicity was well understood and outspoken by the interviewees. An interviewee said that politicians could only become aware of the situation because of a public awakening (Civic actor 4). According to another interviewee, politicians could not be expected to understand what was going on, if the media was unable to maintain discussion (Civic actor 1). A third civic actor said that perhaps the public discussion that they had generated would result in a change of legislation after some time, even years (Civic actor 5).

While locals and Finns were spoken for, the movement simultaneously invited these people to join:

“Northern Finland AVI Agency (a.k.a. PSAVI) organizes citizen hearings on Thursday and on Friday for people from Vuoksi body of water area. Many participants are hoped to join. The movement hands a petition in an open meeting on Thursday, October 11, in the auditorium of the Vuokatti training center.” (Press release: Virheellisin tiedoin saatu lupa päivitettävä, October 9, 2012.)

“This situation, in which the mining boom threatens bodies of water and living environments across the country, cries for more than a rebellion. An uprising for lakes and rivers is needed, said Hannu Hyvönen of the Stop Talvivaara movement to the activists of the mining camp.” (Press release: Aktivistit levittivät varoituskylttejä maastoon, June 24, 2013.)

“The Stop Talvivaara movement invites people on Thursday to join demonstrations against the Talvivaara pipeline and mining policies.” (Press release: Miksi media vaikeni kairoskritikoiden kirjelmän? Talvivaaran kaupasta on voitava keskustella, April 14, 2015.)

“It is now time for citizens to organize their own independent media. You have the media power. Let the message move on”. (Press release: Untiskirje, April 29, 2015.)
From the democratic perspective, the public nature of the movement's actions and willingness to invite people to join are important. Because of this, their representative claims had a foundation – not necessarily because the majority or even a major part of people were *de facto* represented, but because it offered an arena for debate at their events (for example, in citizen assemblies in Iisalmi on December 8, 2012, in Helsinki on March 7, 2013, and in Tampere on September 10; and in demonstrations in Helsinki on November 14, 2012 and on March 8, 2013, and in Tampere on September 12, 2013). This arena made it possible for citizens to voice their opinions and concerns. It was by far not the only public arena, as the company also organized neighborhood meetings, and politicians were at times available in public events. However, the movement transformed these direct events into mediated political message. In so doing, it both used the image of the people and addressed them at the same time. The movement transformed public assemblies into fuel for political action.

5.7 Activism According to Others

Since the message of *Stop Talvivaara* was directed to the public, how did other actors represent the movement? In this section, I will address accounts of MPs, an industry representative, state and municipal officials, as well as local councilors.

In interviews for this research, MPs were asked about their views on *Stop Talvivaara*’s activism. Overall, the MPs did not present very pronounced stands towards the movement. For example, an MP said that it was quite understandable that such a movement had emerged, but that she doubted that everybody in Kainuu would share its opinions (MP 1). Another MP stated that Talvivaara was not a local but a national question. For that reason, it was clear that people “who were concerned about environmental issues, to whom the environment was very important, those who wanted to produce everything organically, and live even in an ascetic manner” would sign the *Stop Talvivaara* petition (MP 10). Nevertheless, some MPs were prone to interpret and represent the movement from their own political viewpoints:

"My stand toward them is positive. They represent the fury, disappointment, and anger that people living in the region feel. I think it is good that a popular movement exists and they bring forth a clear message." (MP 5.)

"All these sorts of movements have a meaning, and I am sure that representatives of the *Stop Talvivaara* movement are committed to their cause. But I think that only a
fraction of people living in Kainuu see the situation in Talvivaara similarly to them.” (MP 8.)

Moreover, some of the MPs referred to locality as the source of legitimacy. In speaking about activism relating to the Talvivaara case they were inclined to represent it as something not originating from local actors, and in that way presenting it as lacking legitimacy. The following statements were made by the MPs:

”[I]t is a bit like opposing the Vuotos reservoir, the activists probably come from elsewhere and the movement originated from outside. The starting point might be correct, but if it takes on a life of its own, it is no longer proportionate. [...] The actions of environmental activists are always national. I make a comparison to the Vuotos case again: they all came from one house, the resident of which came from elsewhere, and the activists ended up being from elsewhere as well.” (MP 2.)

"Q: Do you have a perception of whether people in Stop Talvivaara are from Kainuu and North Savo regions, or whether they come from other regions as well? A: No I do not, I have to rely on the media on this question. Usually these movements are more likely from Bulevardi [a street in the capital Helsinki] than local. This is the case with the Sami issue and with many others, as the activist group does not necessarily live or have never even visited the locality.” (MP 15.)

"Q: Do you have a perception of whether or not people in the movement are mainly from Kainuu province? A: No, they are from all around Finland. For example, the leader, was it Hannu Hyvönen, he is not from Kainuu but from North Savo. Q: Is it relevant that he is not from Kainuu? A: Well, the key difference is that the impact of the Talvivaara mine do not reach [Hyvönen's home village]. He has some other motivations. [...] It is easy in Esplanadi park [in Helsinki] to clap hands together and say that the Talvivaara mine has to be shut down, and afterwards go to Kappeli [a restaurant in Helsinki] for a punch. These things are not that simple.” (MP 9.)

Common to these MPs was that they in general presented mining as an important industry for Finland’s economic periphery. The latter MP was quite critical about the emissions produced by Talvivaara and stated that local inhabitants and those who owned leisure-time cabins in the area had a stake in the issue. But in his speech, too, authenticity of actors was attached to locality and to autonomous organization of local critics. In this way, they repudiated any representative linkage between Stop Talvivaara and those that, according to the MPs, could have legitimate reason to be critical of the mine. Unlike for some of the actors in the movement, the fact that support was shown from elsewhere was used as a means to delegitimize the movement.

Similar claims were made publically by Sotkamo Silver CEO Timo Lindborg at the Euromining 2013 mining trade fair in September 2013. He stated that just a few
years ago mining companies were warmly welcomed in the Finnish countryside. Yet, ever since a big mining company made reservations near the Helsinki area to search for uranium, critical standpoints took over. He concluded, “this culture of objection” had come to Finland from Sweden. Moreover, he stated that certain organizations objected to mining simply out of the pleasure of objection, and that this objection was “international business”. He implied that favorable feelings in the countryside represented the ‘real’ opinion towards mining in Finland. These feelings, according to him, were corrupted only when people in Helsinki, the capital, were confronted with mining in their backyards. (Euromining 2013 Panel Discussion.)

Both in the statements of the three last mentioned MPs, as well as in the statement of Lindborg, the authenticity of Stop Talvivaara was questioned. This was based on the allegedly non-local nature of the movement. The strategy was to break the connection between actors of the movement and those the movement claimed to represent, particularly locals. Another strategy was to label actors in the movement and other critics of the mine as nature conservationists. Yet, representing locals was just one aspect in the Stop Talvivaara rhetoric. Extending the category of stakeholders, speaking for citizens at large, and representing the general interest were equally important in the Stop Talvivaara communications. With these representative claims, the movement actively sought to change its image as a group of environmental activists. The argumentation against the movement indicate that representative claims have a role to play in political argumentation. They served to legitimize or delegitimize civic activity.

Further, the issue of locality was also taken up by a state official in an interview. He estimated the Talvivaara case was a hotter topic in southern Finland than in the nearby region, reasoning that this was because of "modern-day media interest" and the opportunity to discuss issues on social media. The media was indirectly criticized for having increased the administrative work as they, among others, had asked for administrative information that the authorities were obligated to provide. These requests for information had come from other parts of Finland rather than from the surrounding region, according to the official. However, he did say that the ELY Centre had received citizen notifications of negative impacts from the mine neighborhood. (Official 1.) A municipal official in Sotkamo also stated that the Stop Talvivaara activism had no local support, and that the movement actors came from elsewhere (Official 4). For this part, the interviewees used similar argumentation than the three MPs and CEO Lindborg in appealing to locality as a basis for actors’ legitimacy.
When the state official was explicitly asked about the Stop Talvivaara movement, the reply was that it was excellent to have this kind of citizen monitoring and that monitoring in general happened in collaboration with civil society. However, the interviewee doubted the measurements carried out by the movement and reserved for activists the role of informant rather than actor:

"Well, let's say that civic movements are perhaps not supposed to carry out measurements. An observation that there is a disturbance or that something is not in order is very much enough for a supervisor." (Official 1.)

Moreover, the interviewee stated that citizens had multiple instances to influence administrative decision-making. These instances included public hearings regarding permits to search for ore, mining permits and environmental impact assessment procedures. All permits, such as the environmental permit, and decisions regarding changes in permits, were subject to appeal. This was also mentioned as a point of influence for citizens. Moreover, according to the interviewee, receiving notifications of observations was also possible. (Official 1.) Another official of the Kainuu ELY took the Stop Talvivaara movement to be one of the Centre's "customer groups" whose notifications had been handled in the same way as other notifications. (Official 2.) From this perspective, the concerns of citizens were heard sporadically, and whether they had organized themselves collectively or not was irrelevant.

As for relations between the movement and authorities, their logics of action were different. The movement's activity was directed to the publicity, to the public at large, with an aim to generate political debate. The authorities' role, to the contrary, was to fulfill a task assigned to them in the law. Based on the analysis here, this is the difference between political and administrative action.

A municipal official from Savo noted that Stop Talvivaara had not sought to influence administrative decisions. He further argued that the movement was aware of the differing roles of authorities and activism, and that he appreciated the movement for having raised issues for public debate. It was impossible for authorities to spend as much time in the field as citizens. Thus, it was useful for authorities to receive information gathered by citizens. This official shared the movement’s opinion that monitoring by the Kainuu ELY Centre had not been as effective as it should have been. (Official 3.) Hence his representation of the movement and its role was different from that of state officials. Additionally, he did not call into question the locality of criticism toward the mine. He stated that practically all feedback that he had got from locals was critical toward the mine.
Indeed, while CEO Lindborg of Sotkamo Silver questioned the locality of mine
criticism, the local criticism was familiar with the representatives of Talvivaara. They
said in interviews that public meetings with locals in Kainuu were nowadays less
heated than meetings with locals from Savo. This was because of the company at
first concentrated solely to interaction with locals in Kainuu, and directed their
attention to Savo only later. The specimen measurements carried out by Stop
Talvivaara were not questioned as such, but it was insinuated that they might not have
been executed according to proper standards. (Talvivaara representative 1;
Talvivaara representative 2.) The information distributed by Stop Talvivaara was
represented as ‘one-sided’, and as sometimes being blown out of proportion
(Talvivaara representative 2). Moreover, media publicity was presented as biased
against Talvivaara (Talvivaara representatives 1 & 2).

Both of the interviewees referred to a survey on attitudes of people living in
Kainuu toward Talvivaara, ordered by the company in 2012. In the survey, 68
percent of respondents agreed or somewhat agreed with the proposition that “The
Talvivaara mine is overall a positive thing for Kainuu”. 21 percent disagreed or
somewhat disagreed with the proposition. 59 percent of respondents thought that
the mine decisively threatened the living environment in Kainuu. Yet, 74 percent
also believed that the mine operations could be so developed that it would not cause
significant harm for the environment in the future. (Talvivaara Mining Company Plc
2012b). The Talvivaara representatives were well aware that critical viewpoints did
exist in Kainuu at the time of the interview. The popularity of Stop Talvivaara among
locals was not commented on.

Regarding local councilors in Sotkamo, Stop Talvivaara was represented in ways
that could be traced back to the councilors’ own standpoints toward the Talvivaara
issue. Local councilor 3 estimated there were many who opposed the mine, but that
Stop Talvivaara had received much more visibility in the media than those that were
worried about the jobs. Another councilor said, when speaking about the movement,
that freedom of speech was important, but that he could not represent dishonest
people (Local Councilor 2). A third councilor said that had the movement support
in Kainuu, more people would have shown it in a public meeting organized in
Sotkamo (Local Councilor 4).

One councilor was particularly outspoken. She stated the Stop Talvivaara
movement had been too critical and that the company should be allowed to do its
work in peace. Simultaneously she described the mine critics as "viherpiipertäjät",
green nature conservationists, that were in the minority, coming from southern
Finland, being “kids of dandies”, people who had nothing else to do. Thus, she took
a position of a representative of common local people, as opposed to marginal non-local people who did not understand the needs and interests of people in Kainuu. (Local Councilor 1.)

Nonetheless, one councilor appeared alongside the Stop Talviara actors. YouTube videos show that he participated in handing a petition to minister Vapaavuori, both in a meeting at the ministry, and in a public meeting in Kajaani (see respective videos: Vapaavuori ja vastuuttomat vallanpitäjät, April 9, 2015; Vanhoja syntejä ja uusia rööksiä, April 13, 2015).

Overall, the representations of Stop Talviara activism by these actors seem to have depended on the MPs’, officials’ and local councilors’ own standpoints vis-à-vis the Talviara issue. If the interviewee was overall favorable toward the mine, the activism was more easily labelled either as representing a minority or not representing locals. The local support of Stop Talviara civic actors was called into question by an industry representative, CEO Lindborg of Sotkamo Silver. In all of these groups, whether MPs, local councilors, or authorities, there were individuals who presented the movement as lacking in local support. In all of these groups, there were also replies that saw activism growing from local dissatisfaction. These replies indicate that representative claims, and counterclaims, were used politically; it was meaningful to present the movement either as representing locals or not representing locals. The only deviation to this pattern was the replies by Talviara representatives. It appears that they did not have room for politics regarding the issue, because they knew criticism toward the mine in the region existed.

5.8 Conclusion

The analysis suggests that civic activism, usually depicted as the epitome of direct democracy, deploys imagery and rhetoric more common to representation. This was evident in relation to the different aspects of the representative claim: in relation to the representative, the represented, and the audience. Actors were portrayed as citizens in videos and press releases. Their authenticity was based on locality, ordinariness, and positions, such as entrepreneur, dairy farmer, and fisher. Locals, citizens at large, and even workers of the mine and investors were spoken for. In doing that, the movement sought to extend the category of stakeholders and represent both the 'general interest' and particular interests of these groups in a way that differed from other representations of them. Representative claims were intertwined with political aspirations. Saward's (2010, 49) observation that "[a]ll
claims to speak for also speak about; all claims that speak about can also be understood, however indirectly, as claims to speak for" was demonstrated.

Hence, in Saward's (ibid) terms, locals, citizens in general, workers, and investors were actual constituencies that could recognize themselves in the claims. Their interests, as well as the 'general interest', were implicated. Moreover, these groups could also be understood as the actual audience, because the claims were made publically. While the outspoken audience were those that for instance open letters were addressed to, the publicity made the claims available for everybody. The publicity, furthermore, made actions mediated. While Stop Talvivaara gathered people to open events, these events became represented in a certain way to the wider audience through edited videos and press releases. Representations of the events were given.

The accounts of other actors regarding the Stop Talvivaara movement indicate that representative claims carry political weight. Those MPs, authorities, industry representatives, and local councilors who were sympathetic to the Talvivaara mine were prone to represent the movement as non-local and hence non-authentic. Instead, those who were critical of the mine saw the activism representing a wider dissatisfaction found in the region. Moreover, it was meaningful for the most active actors of the movement to highlight that a wider audience shared their goals.

This research was not about the public reception of the activism. Some hints about it did exist, however. The most direct signs of support were the signatures in the petition and people attending demonstrations under the Stop Talvivaara symbol. Additionally, Talvivaara ordered surveys about people's attitudes toward Talvivaara in Kainuu both in 2012 and in 2013. The results show that 68 percent held Talvivaara as an overall positive thing for Kainuu in 2011, while in 2013 the respective number had sunk to 54 percent (Talvivaara Mining Company Plc 2013e). Another study shows that, out of four Finnish provinces, in Kainuu authorities were the least trusted in monitoring mines. This was suspected by the researchers to be because of Talvivaara. (Jartti et al. 2012, 53.) Yet, this study shows that attendance fluctuated significantly at different points of time. Events taking place at the mine and media publicity had an effect on this. Moreover, civic attendance and public criticism do not happen in a vacuum, but in social interaction. Stop Talvivaara was a factor in creating it, not a mere reflection of it. In other words, the constituency of critical citizens was created, at least partly, by Stop Talvivaara in its representations.

To say that the representative claims made by the movement would have exaggerated the support is premature. This was only the case in the two occasions in which the majority and the people were claimed to be spoken for. Instead, when
'citizens' were referred to, at least some citizens' thoughts were represented correctly. Indeed, there were citizens who were worried and did want to see the mine shut down. If not anybody else, at least those who had signed the petition and attended demonstrations. Nor was it inappropriate from the activists' side to refer to themselves as citizens; that is what they were. With no additional powers, they had to rely on their right to act as citizens. In portraying the movement’s actors as citizens and speaking for citizens, the movement took over the representative task from elected politicians and authorities. They occupied the space of citizens in order to present an alternative representation of the Talvivaara issue.

Nonetheless, approaching the activism as representation should not be confused with an assertion that it would have been democratic as such. The ‘democratic-ness’ can be traced to two elements. Firstly, actors acted as citizens, using their democratic rights. This point does not relate to representation. The second point does: Stop Talvivaara activism was public. In addition to adding arguments to the overall public debate, it actively invited people to join and spoke for inclusion of people. Based on the petition, the representative claims were accepted at least by some in the claimed constituency. The movement offered portrayals that were not present to the same extent elsewhere. The political agenda and authenticity of established authorization processes were shaken. (For the 'democratic test' of representation adapted in here, see Conclusion and Saward 2009, 16–18, 22.) Hence representation by the movement added to the overall political system (representation as a property of the political system, see Conclusion and Pitkin 1972, 221–222).

Some elements in the activism could further be examined from the Arendtian perspective that highlights public freedom and speech as democratic (republican) ideals. This aspect relates to those instances where civic actors organized or participated in public events. This stresses Urbinati’s (2000, 767) point that in modern societies public speech, in which the citizen body acquires its form, is mediated, symbolic, constructed, and continually fostered. The videos and press releases functioned as symbolic and mediated constructions, without which 'the people' would not have been able to emerge as a political actor. Had citizens simply been participants in administrative processes, they could not have functioned as a political force.

Yet, the movement could not, and movements in general cannot, escape the fact that it is ultimately movement actors who make the movement appear the way it does. It was evident in the case of Stop Talvivaara that those actually engaged in organizing events, filming and editing videos, and publishing press releases was a very small group of people. Sometimes more people attended field trips for specimen
collecting. The movement appeared at its strongest in the most popular demonstrations and through the petition. The level of activism diminished from the movement center toward the outskirts. People in the outskirts were represented by the center in a certain way, and they depended on the center in terms of activities. Yet, the center also depended on the support from the outer rings. Unlike elected politicians, activism needs these layers of participation in order to be successful. The tie between the center and outskirts is symbolically constructed by showing masses of people supporting the cause in demonstrations, by tagging ’ordinary’ people in videos, by referring to ’citizens’ in press releases, and by visually pitting ’the people' against politicians, authorities and company representatives.

Portraying certain people as representatives is not to say that their position as such would have been intentionally built as such. Video editors and press release writers obviously need to make conscious choices of what to include, what to leave out, how to portray people and events, and what to publish and what not to begin with. These are necessary choices for anybody. Stripping these choices of any intentionality would be rather naive, as it would equate intentionality with complete strategic action. It is important to understand that this kind of representation is inevitable, as no movement is organized by every single person who is somehow involved in it. A few determine the objectives, course and style of action, and many follow. Representation, when understood in this symbolic way, is part of any movement.
I set myself to answer two research questions: (1) What do we study when we study representation after the representative turn? and (2) What makes representation democratic?

The overall task of the thesis was to build a bridge between the 'old' and 'new' approaches to political representation. This was done by developing a theoretical account of democratic representation, and then by studying the dynamics of representation in the Talvivaara case. Representational speech was at the heart of the empirical study. In this conclusion, I present the main empirical observations and sketch answers to the posed theoretical questions.

In my study, I made a theoretical distinction between representation as an institutional arrangement, a one-to-one relationship between representatives and the represented, and an idea. I argued that representation as an idea allows building a political subject and as such functions as a prerequisite for democratic politics. In my account, representation was understood through indirectness, speech, symbolic action, and politics, all of which are crucial in creating space for democratic politics. I was interested in the dynamic nature of representation rather than in representation as an institutional form, but at the same time acknowledging institutions and the traditional way of understanding representation. Following Saward (2010, 4–9, 13), I wanted to see how representation was constructed in the Talvivaara case. The question was researched in terms of ministers, administration, local politics, parliament, and civic activism.

Firstly, studying representational speech led to unraveling institutional and other terms for political action. Elected and executive actors, such as ministers, administrative officials, and MPs functioned in a certain frame that put them to certain positions. Ministers were expected to represent the ‘general interest’, administrative officials were expected to follow the law, local councilors were expected to represent everybody in the municipality, and MPs were expected to represent both locality and the nation. These expectations grew out of institutional settings and the overall political system, as defined for instance in legislation. All elected actors and administrative officials echoed these expectations in their representational speech.
Each actor category had space for politics, but it was conditioned differently. For ministers, the juridical frame limited them, although the minister of the environment seemed to have a narrower space compared to the minister of economic affairs. The minister of the environment was unable to present his account of Talvivaara without being accused of seeking to influence unduly administrative decision-making. MPs’ space for politics was conditioned by the institutional frame, most notably the electoral system in which electoral districts were decisive in mandating MPs. Party affiliations and committee memberships could additionally explain MP actions. The parliament and MPs fulfilled their expected roles as counterparts for the executive. Space for political action even lay in administrative decision-making, although it was usually understood simply as implementing legislation. Overall, the study of representation as an idea could not escape the representative system in which different actors have different duties based on their positions in the political system.

While MPs played a role in offering portrayals of the people and their interests, they fell short in functioning as engines for genuinely new ideas in their reactivity. This was perhaps a side effect of the overall Finnish political system and the fact it is not parliament's responsibility to take initiatives. While parliaments can be seen as epitomes of institutional representation, the Finnish parliament did not appear in this case as the epitome of democratic representation as understood after the representative turn. It did have a speech function, which was important, but it was not used to the fullest. In this regard, Stop Talvivaara’s activism was important. The movement not only attended public hearings organized by authorities or simply contacted politicians directly, but also generated publicity through frequent press releases and YouTube videos. The civic actors were free to make their own interpretations of the case. They challenged other actors as representatives of the people. The study confirms Urbinati’s view about civic activism as mediated. The body of the people was at times visible on the streets in the form of demonstrations (following Butler and Rosanvallon), but more often it was made visible through press releases and videos.

Civic actors did not have similar institutional positions as ministers, local councilors, and MPs, as they were not elected, and thus they had to construct their positions as representatives. This was the constraint presented by the institutional environment. The construction was done by speaking of the activists as citizens and stressing the importance of ‘citizen observation’ in generating and distributing information to the public. Representation was a factor in their activities; had citizens simply been objects of administrative procedures, such as EIA hearings, they would not have been able to emerge as a political force. Through representation, they
formed a political subject able to contradict the accounts of elected actors. This point highlights the importance of understanding civic activism as representation rather than as individuals acting ‘directly’. It also highlights the importance of studying citizen participation on its own terms, rather than seeing citizens simply as a starting point for the delegation chain. As a deviation from previous studies on civic activism as representation, particularly by Weldon (2011) and to certain degree Montanaro (2012), here the aim of Stop Talvivaara was not to represent a minority or a disadvantaged group. Instead, it presented itself as a representative of the same group that was already institutionally represented by elected MPs, namely people living in Savo and Kainuu, and Finns in general. It was hence not about supplementing existing institutional representation, but about replacing its portrayal of the people and its interests.

The movement faced objections from politicians and administrative authorities, who presented it as non-local to imply it was not authentic. Indeed, the theme of locality appeared in many instances throughout the study. It was locality that was made necessary for actors' legitimacy, most notably for local councilors, MPs, and civic actors. Local councilors referred to their backgrounds in Sotkamo, MPs frequently made references to their electoral districts and home regions, and the imagery put forth by civic actors used locality to lend legitimacy to the movement. Turned the other way around, the alleged lack of locality served as a way to delegitimize the movement by some other actors. Locality was accompanied with assertions to personal backgrounds, mostly in terms of occupations.

In the activists’ case, the part of representative claims that addressed the representative was in tight connection to the part that addressed the represented. The ordinariness and locality of ‘citizen activists’ was relevant, because they were offered as representatives of the ordinary and the local. MPs, for their part, could not be offered as ordinary, but locality was an important factor.

This leads to an important and well-known (see Mansbridge 1999) question: Who has the right to speak for whom? Who has the right to offer interpretations, representations, of issues and of people’s interests? At times, there are administrative answers to these questions – the law stipulates who are to be considered stakeholders and who, resulting from the definition, have the right to give statements in a matter. But the question itself is political. In this case, locality lent special legitimacy. Researching representational speech led to understanding what factors were relevant for gaining legitimacy in a specific context.

Despite of the centrality of locality, Stop Talvivaara repeatedly sought to expand the stakeholder category by claiming that Talvivaara was a national issue concerning
everybody. The movement challenged anybody representing the interests of Kainuu and Finland differently from them by claiming that they were the authentic representatives of locals, citizens at large, and the national interest. This strategy worked as a way to open discussion about what was the national interest, as opposed to the ‘general interest’ offered by institutional actors, most notably by minister Vapaavuori. Some civic actors also highlighted that the movement had both local and national support. As MPs referred to locality frequently, they, too, often extended the argument to the whole nation.

This challenges traditional representation research that has separated electoral district and the nation as representational foci. It is unclear, what it means to say that an MP represents his or her constituency or the nation. It is likewise hard to see how this choice, in a conflict situation, could be made abstractly without reference to any actual policy issue. It is difficult to separate these categories from one another because, as we have seen here, local interests can be, and in most cases were, extended to national interests.

A further challenge presented to traditional approach is the fact that 'local' and 'national' interests are political matters. How they are represented and defined depends on political standpoints. In my interviews, some elected office holders were more willing to list their voters, whereas others noted it was impossible to know who the voters were. The latter is obviously true, and speaking of one’s own voters necessarily involves interpretation of who they are and what their relevant features and interests are.

While these interpretations are political, few MP and local councilor interviewees explicitly referred to their party affiliations as explanatory factors for their standpoints. As we know from other research, political party in many ways frames actual decision-making in the parliament and nowadays also locally in Finland. It seems that not referring to party had to do more with what was deemed a legitimate justification for decisions than with what decisions were actually based on. This is not to say that decisions would be dictated by the party, but simply that party as a political frame of reference quite self-evidently has to do with what standpoints politicians have in individual issues. As my study indicates, representational speech did carry meanings that could be traced back to political (party) standpoints, but these standpoints were often backed with assertions to local and national interests. This further confuses the distinction of the traditional foci of constituency, nation, and party.

*Studying representation revealed that whatever was offered as people’s interests, either local or national, was political.* Thus, the basic observation of the representative turn that
representation is intertwined with politics became confirmed. People’s interests could equally be represented as pro-mining or anti-mining. There was no unitary standpoint amongst local councilors, MPs, nor ministers. Representing was thus not a neutral task, but included politics by presenting whom was to be represented and how the represented was to be understood.

Nonetheless, representative claims functioned as ways to present political standpoints as if they were neutral. Many MPs and local councilors stressed that they represented impartially ‘everybody’. In the case of MPs, the most frequent point of reference when asked about representation was a geographical entity (northern Finland or Kainuu). For local councilors, the point of reference was often the inhabitants of Sotkamo. It was stressed that both jobs and the environment were important for people living in the region and the municipality. Asking about representation further opened space for the interviewees to explain their overall convictions and political goals. When combined with the assertion that everybody was being represented, *representational speech offered a seemingly neutral way to speak politically*. Everybody ‘was represented’, but what interests ‘everybody’ had and how these interests were best served, depended on the interviewee’s political standpoints and representation of the case. The reference to everybody allowed communication of political aims and ideologies in ways that could potentially be accepted quite easily.

Throughout Talvivaara’s history, the state invested in the company, both when it was still running as a private business and when it was bought by the state. These were decisions that had to be legitimized publically. Representative claims played a role in legitimization, as representing people in need of livelihoods in eastern Finland functioned as a justification for keeping the mine running. An alternative claim, presented by *Stop Talvivaara*, was that the mine was a threat for other livelihoods, in addition to ruining the environment, and hence the mine should be shut down. **Claiming to represent people worked as a way ‘sell’ policy standpoints to the public.**

The *Stop Talvivaara* movement was freer to redefine people’s interests than MPs, for example. While MPs in their speech referred to diverse groups and defined interests of Kainuu and Finland from their political standpoints, their representative claims were vaguer than those of the movement. The movement had a clear goal, to have the mine shut down, whereas MPs rhetorically positioned themselves to the middle, embracing diverse groups and viewpoints with only minor differing emphases. If they did take a stronger standpoint (in which they, for instance, stated that criticism against the mine was widespread), they nonetheless did not take a strong standpoint vis-à-vis actual decisions.
Further, the allusions to the represented were in connection to the overall representation of the case. Whether Talvivaara was represented foremost as an environmental catastrophe that affected people living by affected bodies of water implied different solutions than representing it foremost through workers and unemployment in eastern Finland. As the analysis here suggests, different actors did not only hold policy positions vis-à-vis the Talvivaara case, but in talking about the case they simultaneously implied what was important to ‘us’ as people. This way of talking has more profound repercussions than individual policy decisions, as they direct overall political landscape. This landscape has further implications to what policy decisions are regarded as possible. As stated in chapter 3, had the represented been conceptualized differently, the conclusion of actions needed would have looked decisively different. The prevailing interpretation of ‘us’ sets the stage for actual decisions.

However, the setting of the stage is not detached from the institutional positions of each actor. The search for the middle ground, vagueness, and reactiveness in MP speech points to the fact that MPs did not function as engines for change. They had diverse emphases, but they simply seemed to echo what they represented as the general opinion. On the contrary, in the case of ministers, particularly minister of the environment Ville Niinistö and minister of economic affairs Jan Vapaavuori, representative claims (in Niinistö's case direct claims and in Vapaavuori's case allusions to the general interest of society) did have consequences to what their actions were. While Niinistö was bound by the ruling of the chancellor of justice, he did take steps to tighten ministerial guidelines. To define Saward's contextual understanding of representative claims, it should be noted they are not conditioned only by the cultural, but also by the institutional context.

As for the cultural context, in the Talvivaara case, economic arguments and arguments relating to people’s livelihoods seemed privileged over environmental arguments. In ministers’ speech, using representative claims seemed to open space for counterarguments, whereas speaking without them seemed more technocratic and as such harder to contradict. I suggested this difference between minister of the environment and minister of economic affairs respectively was due to the subject matters they were speaking about. Speaking for the environment required more persuasion than speaking about economic issues. A complaint to the chancellor of justice was made of the minister of the environment, and not of the minister of economic affairs. By this fact, I suggested that the space for speech for each politician was not the same. There was wider space for speech on economic issues than environmental issues; wider space for technocratic speech than representational speech.
This is not to say that environmental issues would conflict with worker interests or economic viewpoints. Some actors tried to unravel this contradiction. For example, minister Hautala said publically that environmental issues had to be taken care of for business to be profitable. By alluding to taxpayers, Stop Talvivaara also argued from the general interest perspective that Talvivaara was no longer feasible. Yet, this contradiction was present in the overall debate, and each actor had to argue in that frame. Thus, examining representation led to unraveling deeper shared meanings.

The importance of occupational groups was one of the shared meanings. Local councilors, MPs, and civic actors alike alluded to diverse groups. While in all actor groups there were people who spoke more strongly for the environment than some other actors, they, too, used arguments relating to people’s livelihoods. Arguments referring to people’s livelihoods seemed prevalent, whereas arguments about the environment had to clear space by redefining people’s interests. Particularly the groups of workers and entrepreneurs were represented by elected actors in a positive light, whereas environmental activism was by some explicitly denied as a representational focus or represented as belonging to the margins. Hence the shared meanings were in connection to privileged ways of speaking. Studying representation unmasked which arguments were privileged and which were not.

However, a privileged position to speak and a privileged argument should be distinguished from each other. The legitimacy of civic actors in the accounts of others depended on their locality. For civic actors, speaking from a local position was privileged compared to speaking from a non-local position. Nonetheless, even though locality was important in gaining legitimacy for civic actors, their locality did not give them the privilege to redefine the general interest of society. The privileged position to define the general interest was reserved for the national executive. This further highlights the asymmetry between differing institutional positions.

The requirement for the locality of civic actors was paradoxical. Stop Talvivaara’s central argument was that the category of stakeholder should be extended and that the issue was relevant to anybody concerned about the affected bodies of water. Many MPs shared the view that Talvivaara was a national issue, whether it was such in relation to the pollution of bodies of water or the relevance of mining in Finland. The fact that minister of the environment and minister of economic affairs were involved, and the allusion to the general interest of society made by minister Vapaavuori points to the fact that the issue was not taken by any actors as simply local or regional. Considering this rather wide agreement on the national nature of the Talvivaara issue, it is quite paradoxical that only local civic actors were viewed as legitimate.
This raises questions relating to power relations. Let us assume that Stop Talvivaara would have been unquestionably local and that nobody doubted its locality. If this was the case, how could a local movement claim to represent anything else but a local perspective? It seems difficult. At the same time, Stop Talvivaara’s activism shows that the question of who has a say is political. To widen the administrative category of stakeholder would mean movements like Stop Talvivaara would have a say. But this was not suggested by any MPs or ministers. The elected representatives reserved the right to represent the general interest to themselves. This was done at the same time as they acknowledged the national character of the issue. For civic actors to acquire the same right seemed structurally difficult. Overall, then, in Finland, actors in elected positions seem more privileged than civic actors when it comes to defining ‘the people’ and their best interests.

Another difficulty related to the fact that the activism was labelled as environmental activism and as such belonging to the margins. Even a high-positioned actor, such as the minister of the environment, appeared marginalized, as his standpoint was not mainstream. In this case, the economic argument was privileged over the environmental argument. Hence, it is not simply a question of an institutional position, but the represented political standpoint has to act in unison with a privileged issue. Previous studies on citizen representatives have conceptualized citizen representation as representation of marginalized or disadvantaged groups (see notably Weldon 2011). Stop Talvivaara’s activism was not like that, because the representation of geographical entities (electoral districts and Finland) is encoded in legislation and hence in existing institutions. Stop Talvivaara did not claim to represent a marginalized group in terms of descriptive characteristics, but in terms of their views. I therefore suggest that studies on citizen representatives should include the question of marginalized viewpoints, not just marginalized groups, into the analysis.

In summary, studying representation led to answering the following questions: What institutional and other terms are there for political action? What underlying, deeper shared meanings are there in the society? How do these meanings condition political argumentation? How are political standpoints legitimated? Which ways of speaking are privileged, which are non-privileged? Which issues are taken as self-evident parts in political debate, which issues have to clear space more than others? Who is privileged, who is not? Who has more room for political action, who less? How are political aims and ideologies ‘sold’ to people? How does representational speech condition actual policy choices? Answers to these questions imply many things relevant to political analysis. Here my case study presents a challenge to Rubenstein’s
account according to which the representative turn threatens to unduly exchange questions of power to questions of representation. When looking at the Talvivaara case through a 'representative lens', power relations were revealed.

From this, it follows that putting representation into abstract categories such as style and focus can have detrimental effects on our ability to understand the role representational speech plays in politics. Representation is a loaded concept. How it is loaded depends on the context, and researching representation in its context gives us a deeper understanding of politics, as representational speech is deeply intertwined with politics. Here I deem Hatherell’s (2014) ‘repertoires of representation’ to be a useful concept. It highlights the interrelatedness of symbolic and substantive representation and delineates the idea that representational speech sets the stage for policy choices. Seeing representation as conditioning policy choices further opens our eyes to the overall political culture and the role institutions play in them.

This has further implications for the study of democracy. As representational speech opens space for debate about what ‘we’ are like and what is in our interests, representational speech seems indispensable for democracy. For speech to be democratic, it needs to be political and not administrative. It needs to be open to alternatives rather than close imaginary worlds. Representational speech potentially does this. This is what the representative turn teaches us. At the same time, representational speech allows debates to go deeper than individual policy issues.

Nonetheless, representational speech is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, speaking ‘representationally’ opens space for debates about who ‘we’ are and what is important to ‘us’. Individual policy issues can also be debated (for example, whether to invest state funds to Talvivaara), but representational speech allows more fundamental questions to transcend the immediate (for example, is mining being beneficial overall for us). Representative claims invite dispute, whereas political speech without them seems technocratic and make politics seem an area requiring expertise. On the other hand, representative claims offer ways to communicate political standpoints in a seemingly neutral way. In my case study, ‘everybody’s’ interests were referred to as if it was clear that any solutions offered in conjunction with the representative claims served those interests. Can these two claims be reconciled?

In my mind, they can, but the question is context-dependent. A politically attentive audience recognizes representative claims and is able to assess whether the portrayal of ‘us’ is desirable or not. An attentive audience is also able to see the connection between representative claims and policy options that claims potentially allow and do not allow. But a politically inattentive audience fails to see that
representative claims are necessarily selective and not the final truth about ‘us’. If the audience is inattentive, individual representative claims can open space for populism (see Urbinati 1998). For representative claims to serve democracy, there need to be multiple claims from different perspectives, none of which is hegemonic. Only one hegemonic representative claim is totalitarian. If there are no representative claims, society becomes the captive of bureaucracy, where no room for politics exists.

Stop Talvivaara’s activism had a democratic function in that it questioned the right of elected representatives to represent exclusively the general interest. Following Disch’s reflexivity, it offered portrayals of people’s interests and challenged the portrayals presented by elected representatives. By bringing an alternative interpretation of what was in people’s interests – shutting down the mine – the movement added to the overall number of representative claims. It made the political landscape more diverse than it would have been without the movement. It is hard to estimate how much the movement influenced the overall levels of publicity and politicians’ standpoints on the Talvivaara case. Nonetheless, had there not been a movement, a clearly critical voice would have been missing from the overall voices surrounding the issue. This point speaks particularly to the reactivity and vagueness of representative claims made by MPs. MPs being reactive, from this perspective, means that the impetus for change has to come from elsewhere. If civil society is able to present alternative representative claims, MPs have the chance to echo these claims in their speech.

But scholars have been concerned as to how to evaluate whether representative claims are legitimate to begin with. For instance, if we adapt Michael Saward’s criteria for legitimate non-electoral representative claims (see Saward 2009, 16–20), we see that representative claims made by the movement were not part of a formal delegation chain (the ‘connecting’ criteria, see ibid, 16–7). In other words, the Stop Talvivaara actors were not elected. This is not where the movement’s legitimacy lay. But if we accept that making representative claims needs to be open to everybody, we cannot really require that election precedes representative claims.

The second criteria presented by Saward is the ‘confirming’ criteria, whereby a representative claim can be accepted legitimate if the claimed constituency confirms it (ibid, 18). In light of the Talvivaara case, this criterion is ambiguous. It seems to presuppose a constituency and sidelines Saward’s own notion that representative claims are both constitutive and necessarily selective. By claiming to represent the interests of fishers, dairy farmers, and entrepreneurs, Stop Talvivaara was as selective as any other in making representative claims. At least the fishers, dairy farmers, and entrepreneurs visible in videos held that shutting down the mine was in their
interests. Whether it was in the interests of others in same occupations is debatable. In any case, Saward's 'confirming' criterion appears to fall back on the account of representation in which representation is understood as a one-to-one relationship between the representative and the represented. In this account, the legitimacy arises from the quality of that relationship and from the fact that somebody in the category of the represented can confirm the representative claim.

Saward's third criteria seems to be more apt in evaluating the Talvivaara case. The idea in the 'untaintedness' criteria is that representative claims can be accepted as legitimate if they are detached from the state (ibid, 19–20). As a non-governmental actor, Stop Talvivaara was able to voice concerns more strongly than elected actors. But herein lies the problem: in the Talvivaara case, the civic movement added to the overall representative claims, but there is no reason why in another case a civic movement could advocate for a totalitarian or fascist understanding of 'us'. Robespierre justified the terror he executed with an understanding of the demos that consisted of merely the 'virtuous'. Hence, the concern of scholars over the substance of representative claims, or the connection between representatives and the claimed constituency, is understandable. Here the limitations of the case study methodology become apparent, as no clear answer to this concern can be given based on the Talvivaara case.

A very tentative answer, based solely on theoretical inference, would take clues from certain democratic ideals and the presence of them in representative claims. We can approach democracy by looking into the criteria that different scholars have given it. They include participation (Arendt 2006; Christiano 1996; Dahl 1998, 37–8), equality (Dahl 1998, 37–8, Phillips 1995, Christiano 1996), inclusion (Young 2000), presence (Phillips 1995), public freedom (Arendt 1960), and individual rights (Birch 1993). If representative claims go against any of these criteria, they are not democratic. For example, if a representative claim presents a dictator as representative of ‘the people’ and ‘the people’ is presented to be the white population, the claim is undemocratic in its exclusiveness. If a representative claim represents the rights of the rich to own the poor as slaves, the claim is undemocratic because it seeks to limit the freedom of the poor and is unequal. These representative claims do not add any value to the overall public discourse because they seek to expand the rights of some at the expense of the rights of others. Failure to meet these democratic ideals would make representative claims meaningless or even detrimental to democracy.

The overall challenge for understanding as to what makes representation democratic lies in the diversity of factors impacting representation. In the standard
account of representation, the democratic-ness of representatives grows out of elections and the closeness between representatives and the represented. This closeness could be conceptualized as responsiveness, a descriptive similarity between the representatives and the represented, opinion congruence between the two, and so forth. The representative turn has been accused of a lack of normativity in terms of representative claims (most notably by Severs 2010, 2012). Saward himself developed the criteria for assessing the legitimacy of representative claims by non-elected would-be representatives. His account is confined to the sphere of non-electoral representative claims, however. Disch's (2011) emphasis on reflexivity, on the contrary, stresses the plurality of representative claims made both by elected and non-elected would-be representatives. My examination of the Talvivaara case followed Disch's account, as I was interested in the number and plurality of the claims.

My case study confirms Disch's account that when the representative turn is applied to empirical research, normative elements have to include evaluation of the institutional positions of would-be representatives. Given the tendency of MPs to balance between diverse viewpoints, and the vagueness, and reactivity of their representative claims, it seems that representative claims made by non-elected actors are needed. This is the way to challenge existing power structures and institutions built on them. **Democratic representation is not simply a question of the plurality of representative claims, but also a question of the plurality of the positions from which the representative claims are made. For the polity to be democratic, then, the existence of multiple representative claims is not enough, if they are all made by elected actors.**

As for Saward's 'confirming' criteria, it entails a risk: if only representative claims accepted by the claimed constituency are deemed legitimate, representative claims would seem to have a totalizing effect. They would perhaps reflect current moods more or less accurately, but would fail in giving voice to for-the-time-being marginal viewpoints. Moreover, *Stop Talvivaara* conceptualized itself as a representative of a group already represented institutionally. At the heart of its activism was the representative claim that it was in the people's interest to have the mine shut down. If we remain true to the representative turn's essence that representation precedes constituency, we have to accept the existence of representative claims that nobody seems to support, because they are the building blocks of a democratic polity. This does not mean we should accept political decisions based on them, but that we should accept them as a part of the totality of multiple representative claims. They might sow the seeds for reconfiguring positions taken within institutions. Perhaps the majority of people living in Kainuu and Savo did not agree with *Stop Talvivaara* that shutting down the
mine was in their best interest. Yet, with their representative claims the movement created space for further discussion about what was in people’s interests and how those interests should be understood.

Understanding democratic political representation as suggested here does not take away the pitfalls of representative government criticized by Arendt and Manin. It is true that the representative system makes a distinction of rulers and the ruled, and that power lies with rulers. Based on the examination of the Talvivaara case, this power imbalance is not only embedded in the institutional setup, but is reflected in the difficulty of the marginal views of non-elected representatives in finding their way to the mainstream. For Arendt, the establishment of representative institutions fostered a unified public opinion, to the detriment of the public spirit fostered in the townhall meetings, clubs, and societies of civil society. This, for Arendt, was unrepublican. To compare, the need to balance multiple viewpoints in relation to Talvivaara in the parliament followed the logic of finding a unified common ground. It is hence unlikely that challenging viewpoints would emerge from within the parliament. This is another reason for researchers to be interested in the representative claims made by non-elected actors, and the relationship of these claims vis-à-vis representative claims made by elected actors.

To conclude, let us once more return to Pitkin. For her, representation is not needed in matters of scientific fact. Nor is it needed if a question to be solved is wholly arbitrary and no negotiation and rationalization is required. This account speaks to the importance of communication in understanding political representation. The representative turn is built on this account, and it is easy to agree with. For Pitkin, this political aspect of representation seems to move on the level of immediate political decisions. I argue it should be understood on the deeper level as well. This deeper level relates to the underlying configuration of institutions, power imbalances, and shared meanings. Representational speech reflects these. Researchers of political representation and wider audience should be aware of these connotations of the concept.
The Talvivaara Mining Company Plc was incorporated in 2003 and in 2004 it bought mining concessions from Outokumpu Plc. In May 2007, the company was listed on the London stock exchange, resulting in EUR 302 million in investments (Talvivaara Mining Company Plc 2007, 8) and allowing the building of the factory. The first batches of nickel were delivered to buyers in 2009. The mine was situated in Sotkamo municipality, Kainuu province. It produced primarily nickel, as well as zinc, copper, and cobalt as by-products. (Talvivaara Mining Company Plc 2012a, 5.) Uranium was found in small levels, but the final environmental permit for its extraction and processing was not given until after the mine was sold to the state in August 2015 and renamed Terrafame. The company was also listed on Nasdaq OMX Helsinki.

Talvivaara was an open-pit mine that used bioheapleaching techniques to extract minerals – a technique that was used for the first time to extract nickel at northern latitudes. Overall expectations for production prognosis at the time of setting up the mine, particularly in 2007, were very positive. This was because of a peak in worldwide nickel prices in May 2007, the price going over a record-breaking 50,000 US dollars per tonne. In its peak, it was estimated that the factory could produce annually 50,000 tonnes of nickel (Talvivaara Mining Company Plc 2012a, 4).

The region around the mine, Kainuu province, is marked with an unfavorable ratio between those in work and those unemployed or outside the workforce, such as the retired and children. Additionally, the number of people living in the province is expected to decline from roughly 81,000 inhabitants in 2010 to about 64,000 inhabitants in 2040. This is in line with many other rural areas in Finland, where the number of people is expected to decline, while urban areas mainly in southern and western Finland continue to grow. The population of Kainuu is expected to decrease the most out of all Finland’s provinces. (Tilastokeskus 2013.)

This situation forms the basis for the fact that Talvivaara, the biggest nickel mine in Europe, was warmly welcomed to the region. The mine was hoped to bring much-needed economic improvement to the surrounding regions. Its success at the beginning was accompanied by the success story of the founder Pekka Perä, who had bought the deposits and rights to mine in 2004, when Outokumpu Plc made a decision to withdraw from nickel production. In return, Outokumpu Plc gained an
option for 20 percent of shares, and the option was realized at the time of the global nickel price peak in May 2007 (Talvivaara Mining Company Plc 2007, 47).

Later that year, the process was referred to as 'the Kainuu miracle', and it was reported in the media that the mine had attracted already retired people back to work (Helsingin Sanomat, October 28, 2007). The hopeful atmosphere was also reflected in a speech given by the then-minister of the environment Paula Lehtomäki (Centre Party) at the laying of the mine’s foundation stone in August 2007. Having Kainuu as her home region, she stated that the Talvivaara mine was like switching on a new light for 'the people of Kainuu'. She emphasized that Talvivaara had wide-ranging and long-running effects not only to the Kainuu region, but to the whole of eastern Finland. She additionally addressed to critics of the project by highlighting the strict environmental permit process and future follow-up in terms of environmental issues. (Lehtomäki 2007.) At the time, critical voices were sparse but existing. They consisted mainly of those who had to move away from the area or whose earlier calm and nature-centered environment had changed rapidly due to the construction of the mine (Helsingin Sanomat, October 28, 2007).

The fact that Talvivaara was largely owned by private households throughout its history further strengthened its image as the saviour of Kainuu. In 2009, 33.8 percent of the shareholders were private households, and their share of ownership grew to 61.5 percent by February 2014. At the time of the bankruptcy in November 2014, the fifty largest owners owned only about one-third of all shares, a fact that highlights the fragmentation of ownership. Since spring 2013, the single biggest shareholder with a share of about 16 percent was Solidium Oy, a limited liability company fully owned by the Finnish state. Until then, the biggest owner had been Pekka Perä, the founder and CEO of the company.

Soon after the first production and deliveries around 2008–9 people in the surrounding area started to make environmental observations, concerning mainly dark dust, odorous emissions, and changes in water bodies (Talvivaara Mining Company Plc 2012a, 62). In 2011, authorities gave recommendations for water usage concerning two nearby lakes, in principle restricting usage of lake water in saunas. Later, the recommendation was extended to cover three more lakes and two rivers, ranging to use of fish, as well (ibid, 40)(later the restrictions were removed). Following this, the publicity of the mine changed from positive to negative, it concerning almost solely environmental problems. In November 2011, Helsingin Sanomat, the main Finnish daily newspaper, wrote in its editorial that the Talvivaara mine did not have the right to harm lakes and rivers (Helsingin Sanomat, November 10, 2011). This marked a turning point in the national media publicity, as the editorial
took a critical stance towards emission figures reported by the company, and the allegedly dismissive attitude of CEO Perä. The editorial nevertheless balanced its criticisms between the importance of the 450 jobs created by the mine and environmental issues.

A decisive turning point in Talvivaara’s public image from good to bad was the wastewater leakage from a broken gypsum pond into the surrounding environment in November 2012. Because of the leakage, about one million cubic meters of acid water with metals and sulphate flowed into basins that also served as security basins for the mine area. Some 236,000 cubic meters of wastewater from the pond spread to the north and south of the mine. The company was forced, according to its own words, to run massive amounts of metal-containing and acid waters to bodies of water outside the mine area. (Talvivaara Mining Company Plc 2012a, 36, 38.) The leakage was followed by a process of neutralizing the nearest bodies of water by lime and caustic soda, which was spread with the help of trucks and helicopters (ibid, 36). This attracted attention when pictures of helicopters dropping neutralizing material into the wilderness were published.

The incident is significant particularly from the viewpoint of political action, both by politicians and civic actors, as political action seriously took off during and after the leakage. It forced inter alia ministers, MPs, and local councilors to take a stance in the issue, as well as marked a boost for the newly formed Stop Talvivaara movement aiming to shut down the mine. Simultaneously, media publicity ballooned and massive coverage continued in the weeks to come, during which Helsingin Sanomat created a section in the paper called ‘Talvivaara effluent leakage’ (Talvivaaran jätevuoto), and between 7–10 November, again on 13, between 15–18, and 20 November 2012 the newspaper published daily an entire page of articles on Talvivaara. Additionally, in the days in between and later in November, Talvivaara remained a news topic almost daily. In December that year, Helsingin Sanomat published Talvivaara-related stories in ten issues. The numbers can be compared to those of 2011, when Helsingin Sanomat wrote on Talvivaara in 15 articles during the entire year. This kind of attention was exceptional, since only the most newsworthy events with widespread effects receive coverage of this scale.

While resulting in extremely negative publicity, the environmental challenges affected the company’s finances. The company’s consolidated financial statements show that the loss in 2012 amounted to EUR (103.9) millions, compared to the loss of (5.2) million in 2011. The poor result was explained by a lower nickel price, the water balance situation, the gypsum-pond wastewater leakage, and low product deliveries. (Talvivaara Mining Company Plc 2012a, 72.) To address the situation,
Talvivaara raised EUR 261 million in a share issue in April 2013 (Talvivaara Mining Company Plc 2013a, 2), thus diluting the previous ownership. As a result, the state of Finland became the single biggest owner through Solidium, owning some 16 percent of the shares. After the share issue, CEO Perä assured investors that the funds raised would secure the functioning of the mine for the years to come (Helsingin Sanomat, March 9, 2013).

In November 2013, only seven months after the share issue, the worst-case scenarios started to emerge in the company's interim report for January–September 2013. While mining operations were said to have continued at record levels, net sales for the three first quarters of 2013 were EUR 65 million, and there was an operating loss of EUR (73.1) million. Losses exceeded net sales due to the decline in the price of nickel and the prolonged effects of excess water in the mine. (Talvivaara Mining Company Plc 2013b.) The company filed for corporate reorganization on November 15, 2013. The reorganization commenced on 29 November (Talvivaara Mining Company Plc 2013c), followed by corporate reorganization of the operating subsidiary Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd on 17 December 2013 (Talvivaara Mining Company Plc 2013d). The operating subsidiary, which went bankrupt in November 2014, was bought in August 2015 by the Finnish state. The mine subsequently continued its functions as the fully state-owned Terrafame. As of October 2017, the listed company (Plc) still continues as Talvivaara Mining Company Plc, but it no longer mines and its shares have practically lost their value.

The wastewater leakage in November 2012 marked a turning point not only in media publicity, but also in political action. While there had been environmental incidents already before, including wastewater leakages, the massive leakage in November 2012 provided the momentum for civic activists to put meaningful pressure on the company, the monitoring authorities and politicians. It was the first time that minister of the environment Ville Niinistö (Greens), since taking the post in spring 2011, was put under the microscope about events in Talvivaara. Following the leakage Talvivaara was a constant topic in the news, first mainly for environmental issues and starting from spring 2013 increasingly for financial reasons.

Because Talvivaara had serious financial problems, the state had to decide whether or not to continue investing into the company. Civic actors argued that investing more was throwing away taxpayers’ money, while the minister responsible for state ownership steering Heidi Hautala (Greens) said that investing was a prerequisite for making the mine environmentally more sustainable (Helsingin Sanomat, March 9, 2013). The issue of using state money has since become a hotly debated issue.
The lake Nuasjärvi pipeline issue was raised when the Talvivaara company filed for an environmental permit to run excess (purified) wastewater through a pipeline to lake Nuasjärvi in 2014 (see AVI Northern Finland 2014). The application started an administrative process during which authorities gathered statements from for instance municipalities, other authorities, and private citizens. The pipeline issue made environmental issues central once again. The environmental permit was granted in April 2015, but with lesser amounts of allowed effluents than the company had applied for (AVI Northern Finland 2015).

As a rule, the Regional State Administrative Agencies (AVI Agencies after the Finnish abbreviation) make decisions regarding environmental permits, whereas the Centres for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment (ELY Centres after the Finnish abbreviation) are responsible for monitoring mines. In Talvivaara’s case, the relevant AVI Agency was the AVI for Northern Finland, and the relevant ELY Centre the Kainuu ELY. Decisions by regional state authorities, such as ELY and AVI, can be appealed in the Vaasa Administrative Court (VHO), and decisions by VHO can be appealed in the Supreme Administrative Court (KHO). Licenses to extract uranium must be obtained from the Finnish government. It was obtained in March 2012 (Talvivaara Mining Company Plc 2012a, 46), but KHO returned the license to the government for reprocessing. In general, decisions are not valid until all instances of the court have made their decisions, or the time for appeal has closed without any appeals.

Jurisdiction over environmental permits and their monitoring largely lies with state authorities and courts. In terms of building permits, the municipality of Sotkamo was the sole decision-maker. Thus issuing of permits had a local dimension. Town plans are decided upon in the municipality’s local council. Building permits need to be obtained for new buildings as well as for significant alterations or extensions to existing buildings. (Land Use and Building Act 132/1999, Sections 52 & 125.) They are issued by municipalities’ building control authorities, which in Sotkamo is the environment and technical services committee. Through the variety of permits, Talvivaara (and other mines) connects to the public decision-making and the overall political system.

The following table presents a selection of events of the company and related actions and events of the Finnish state and municipalities, the parliament, and the Stop Talvivaara movement in chronological order.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Talvivaara Mining Company Plc is incorporated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2004 | February: Buying of mining concessions from Outokumpu Plc by Talvivaara  
        End of the year: First bioheapleaching trial |
| 2005 | Environmental Impact Assessment Programme (EIA)  
        Budgetary motion for building infrastructure around the planned mine |
| 2006 | Three budgetary motions and a supplementary budgetary motion for building infrastructure (railway) around the planned mine |
| 2007 | Talvivaara receives environmental permit  
        May: Listing of Talvivaara to the London Stock Exchange  
        Speech by the minister of the environment Paula Lehtomäki  
        Stop Talvivaara |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2007 cont.</th>
<th>August: Laying of the mine's foundation stone, construction starts</th>
<th>(Centre Party) at the laying of the foundation stone</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>April: First metal sulfide production</td>
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<td></td>
<td>First wastewater leakage at the mine</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>End of the year: First delivery of nickel batches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 remarks over the year by authorities to the company related to water issues</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Listing to Nasdaq OMX Helsinki</td>
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<td></td>
<td>19 remarks by authorities to the company, most of them relating to dust</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<td>------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| 2010 | March: Second wastewater leakage at the mine  
April: Application to the government of Finland for extraction of uranium  
Over the year: nine remarks by authorities to the company |
|      | Beginning of 2010: Regional state authority reform comes into effect: ELY Centres to be responsible for environmental monitoring and AVI Agencies for environmental permits |
|      | April 9: Written question about emissions of the gypsum pond  
July 1: Written question about environmental impacts of the mine |
| 2011 | Recommendations by authorities to restrict the use of lake water in sauna bathing and the use of fish of two nearby lakes  
Ville Niinistö (Greens) becomes minister of the environment  
Heidi Hautala (Greens) becomes minister responsible for state ownership steering |
<p>|      | February 10: Written question about a uranium sales agreement of Talvivaara |
| 2012 | January: Talvivaara opens the blog Paikan päällä ('On the Spot') to improve environmental communication with local residents |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Death of an employee at the mine due to hydrogen sulfide fume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Dead birds found in a water pond at the mine area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>License to extract uranium by the ministry of employment and the economy granted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 3</td>
<td>Public hearing organized by the Northern Finland AVI Agency in Sotkamo relating to an environmental permit procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 8–9 and 11–12</td>
<td>Public hearing organized by the Northern Finland AVI Agency in Sotkamo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 4–12</td>
<td>Gypsum pond leakage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-November</td>
<td>Pekka Perä returns as CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 7</td>
<td>New guide for ELY Centres regarding environmental monitoring by the ministry of the environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 8</td>
<td>Question hour debate about the environmental problems of the mine</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 14</td>
<td>Demonstration in Helsinki to oppose the mine, seven YouTube videos about the event released later</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 29</td>
<td>Online petition demanding shutdown of the mine opened at addressit.com.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 30</td>
<td>First press release: &quot;Popular movement demands shutdown of the Talviivaara mine&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 26</td>
<td>Demonstration outside the company’s annual general meeting in Sotkamo</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 7</td>
<td>First YouTube video on the Stop Talviivaara YouTube channel: &quot;How did uranium mine come to Kainuu region of Finland&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Taking part in a public hearing organized by the Northern Finland AVI Agency in Sotkamo, 10 YouTube videos about the event released later</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>November 8: Minister Niinistö visits Talvivaara</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over the year: 3 remarks by authorities to the company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>February 12: Kainuu ELY Centre permits Talvivaara to discharge 1.8 million m³ of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 8</td>
<td>Extraordinary general meeting of the company to decide about an additional share issue</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>State of Finland invests tens of millions into Talvivaara and becomes the single biggest owner of the company with its 16.7 percent of the shares.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 12</td>
<td>CEO Pekka Perä participates in a public panel discussion about mines' social responsibility at the Euromining trade fair in Tampere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Heidi Hautala resigns (for reasons not related to Talvivaara)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall</td>
<td>Minister of economic affairs Jan Vapaavuori starts to appear as the government's face in Talvivaara issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 6</td>
<td>Written question about the situation at the Talvivaara mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 7</td>
<td>Question hour debate about the problems at the mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Charges against Hannu Hyvönen are dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 7</td>
<td>Public seminar in Helsinki about the events in Talvivaara organized by the movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 8</td>
<td>Demonstration in Helsinki to oppose the Finnish state's involvement in the share issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 10–12</td>
<td>Tampere: Public seminar and workshop about mining in Finland - A small demonstration outside the Euromining trade fair - Participation of activists as audience in the public panel discussion at the fair</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013 cont.</td>
<td>November 29</td>
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<td>2014</td>
<td>July</td>
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<td>September 22</td>
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<td>October 24</td>
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<td>November 6</td>
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<td>September 2</td>
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<td>October 23</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December 8, 2014 – January 19, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November 6</td>
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<td></td>
<td>November 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>CEO of Solidium Kari Järvinen becomes member of the Talvivaara executive board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Transfer of mining business from the bankruptcy estate of Talvivaara Sotkamo to Terrafame Oy is completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Actors to the AVI Northern Finland regarding the Nuasjärvi pipeline issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Northern Finland AVI Agency permits Talvivaara to build the wastewater pipeline to lake Nuasjärvi, but with reduced amounts of discharge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>29: Question hour debate about treatment of wastewaters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>19: Question hour debate about wastewaters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2. DATA OVERVIEW

Interviews

In total, 41 interviews were carried out, including one with a former minister, fifteen Members of Parliament, eight local councilors, four public officials, eleven civic activists, and two representatives of the Talvivaara Mining Company Plc. The interviews took place between December 2012 and December 2013 in Helsinki, Tampere, Sotkamo, Iisalmi, and Kajaani in Finland. Rather than collecting a representative sample of each group of interviewees, the aim was to summon various perspectives to the case. Hence, representational speech regarding this one political case was mapped. The interviews included elected and non-elected actors, appointed office holders, political decision-makers, and politicians from the area, and representatives of the company. These diverse backgrounds were designed to give an inclusive sample of different possible sources to draw from in terms of representational speech. The interviewees were chosen according to the following principles:

Minister

The minister interviewed was responsible for ownership steering. The interview was carried out in December 2013.

Members of Parliament

Fifteen MPs were interviewed. The choice of MP interviewees was made according to the MPs' geographical backgrounds. All MPs from the area nearby the mine were interviewed, including all MPs from the municipalities of Iisalmi, Kajaani, and Sotkamo. Their number was six. Requests for interviews were also sent to all other 12 MPs of the electoral district of Oulu, the district where Talvivaara is located. Eight of them replied and were interviewed. An MP from the electoral district of Helsinki was interviewed due to her public activity in relation to the case. The interviews took place in Helsinki in April, May and June in 2013.
Local councilors

Of the eight local councilors interviewed seven were councilors in the municipality of Sotkamo. Talvivaara is located at the border of Sotkamo and Kajaani municipalities, on the Sotkamo side. Councilors were either chairs of their respective councilor groups and/or held leading positions in the municipal board, the council, or the environment committee. One of the municipal councilors was interviewed as a member of the environment committee of the North Savo Joint Municipal Authority (Ylä-Savon SOTE). The interviewees were selected according to the positions they held in municipal decision-making processes. These interviews were carried out in August 2013 in Sotkamo and in November 2013 in Iisalmi.

Public officials

As for public officials, two of the four officials interviewed held positions at the Kainuu Centre for the Economic Development, Transport and the Environment (Kainuu ELY Centre). It is a state authority responsible for monitoring compliance of companies to their environmental permit terms in the Centre’s geographically determined jurisdiction, including Talvivaara. From the municipal side, a municipal official of the Ylä-Savon SOTE was interviewed, as well a high-ranking official of Sotkamo municipality. The public official interviews took place in August 2013 in Sotkamo and in November 2013 in Kajaani and Iisalmi.

Civic actors

The eleven civic actors were selected based on their appearance in the media. In many cases they were in the media because they were from areas close to the mine. Only three of the eleven interviewees had no material connection to the region. The rest had a connection to the closest-by area or lived in the greater region around the mine. All had been active in either organizing or participating in assemblies and demonstrations observed for this study, or taken action against the mine in public statements or by appealing to authorities. The first of the civic actor interviews took place in Iisalmi in December 2012 and the last in Helsinki in November 2013. Interviews were additionally made in Tampere, Sotkamo, and Iisalmi.
Finally, two representatives of the Talvivaara Mining Company Plc were interviewed as the mine in Sotkamo was visited in August 2013. They, too, were selected based on their positions in the company, the other was the company communications manager and the other chief sustainable officer.

Each group had interviews designed for that specific group. For MPs one set of questions was prepared, another for local councilors, and a third for civic activists. The minister was asked specific questions, as were public officials, and company representatives. Exceptions nevertheless applied and questions were modified according to each interviewee. In that regard, it was determined whether the public official interviewed was a state or municipal official, whether a local councilor held special positions as for instance chair of the council, the municipal board, or a committee, what committee memberships each MP held, and so forth.

In the beginning of each interview it was stressed that the interview should take a form of a discussion rather than be just about answering to questions. For each the theme of the research was also explained and it was said that any thoughts that addressed issues of representation and/or democracy could be discussed freely. The aim was to create a discussion about Talvivaara in a context of democracy and representation. The interviews were hence very much 'conversations with a purpose' and could be categorized as semi-structured (Wellington & Szczerbinski 2007, 81, 84). All interviews were recorded.

By and large, the interviews included questions of the interviewee’s relation to the Talvivaara case, in terms of both the concrete relation and what the interviewee’s thoughts of the current situation was. The interviewees were also asked to reflect whether there had been a change in their thinking about the mine. Common to all interviews were questions regarding the relation of interviewees to other actors involved in the case. MPs and local councilors were asked about contacts they had had with people in general, and civic activists about their ways to influence political actors. Those with party affiliations were asked to describe their relations to the respective party’s standpoints and reflect their own role within the party relating to the issue. All of the interviewees were asked whether they felt they represented specific values, ideas, or groups of people.
Participatory observation

Three citizen assemblies, three demonstrations, and a panel discussion were observed.

The assemblies took place in Iisalmi on December 8, 2012, in Helsinki on March 7, 2013, and in Tampere on September 10, 2013. They were organized by the Stop Talvivaara movement and open to the public. The two former mentioned were about the Talvivaara mine alone and included expert talks on the mine-related environmental issues. The latter was on mining in Finland in general, thus adopting a wider perspective as mining something that threatened the northern and eastern parts of Finland.

The demonstrations took place in Helsinki on November, 14, 2012, and on March 8, 2013, and in Tampere on September 12, 2013. The first, observed through the media, was organized during the large gypsum pond wastewater leakage and attracted, according to media sources (Helsingin Sanomat, November 15, 2012), around 1,000 people to demonstrate on the streets of Helsinki. The second, on March 2013 in Helsinki, was organized in unison with the citizen assembly on the previous day and simultaneously with the general meeting of the Talvivaara Mining Company Plc, taking place at the Finlandia Hall in Helsinki. The meeting was organized to decide on whether there would be a share issue to collect funds for the mine to be able to function in the future. These plans, and particularly the state’s plans to take part in the share issue, were objected by the demonstrators. The demonstration involved some dozens of people. The last of the three demonstrations observed, in Tampere, was organized outside Euromining 2013, a trade fair for mining professionals and industries. As opposed to the demonstrations in Helsinki, this demonstration only attracted the very core actors in the Stop Talvivaara movement, thus involving only some twenty demonstrators.

The panel discussion took place at the Euromining trade fair on September 12, 2013. It was open to the public and had as participants CEO Pekka Perä of the Talvivaara Mining Company Plc, visiting professor of journalism Elina Grundström (University of Tampere), CEO of Sotkamo Silver Timo Lindborg, conservation chief of the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation (FANC/SLL) Jouni Nissinen, and chair of Gaia Group Oy Pasi Rinne. The topic of the discussion was social responsibility of mines, and it was organized by a consulting firm Tekir.
Ministerial and administrative statements

The selection of data regarding the executive was guided by two major events around the mine: the wastewater leakage in November 2012 and the Nuasjärvi pipeline issue in 2014–2015. The following data was used:

- Press releases by the ministry of the environment and the Finnish Environment Institute SYKE at the wake of the wastewater leakage between November 7 and 28, 2012 (seven press releases).

- Blog entries at the Greens' website regarding Talvivaara between November 5 and 14, 2012 (seven entries)

- Broadcast Ylen aamu on November 14, 2012 (Yle 2012a)

- Statements given by administrative authorities to the Kainuu ELY Centre regarding the decision about the environment impact assessment procedure for the lake Nuasjärvi pipeline issue in September 2014

- Statements given by municipalities and municipal actors to the AVI Northern Finland regarding the decision about the lake Nuasjärvi pipeline between December 8, 2014 and January 19, 2015

The following additional data was used:

- Statements in newspapers by ministers Heidi Hautala (in *Helsingin Sanomat* between March 2, 2012 and October 29, 2013) and Jan Vapaavuori (in *Helsingin Sanomat* between November 18, 2012 and August 19, 2015).

- Statements by minister Jan Vapaavuori on his website between November 7, 2013 and April 15, 2015

- Resolution by the chancellor of justice (OKV/681/1/2012)

Parliamentary sources

All written questions, budgetary and supplementary budgetary motions, and question hour debates regarding Talvivaara between 2005 and April 2015 were included in the
data. Additionally, the plenary debate (parliamentary minutes PTK 3/2010) concerning the government proposal for a new mining act (HE 273/2009) was included.

Civic actor sources

Between March 2012 and the end of July 2015, *Stop Talvivaara* published 119 press releases and 90 YouTube videos. All are included in the analysis.
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Official 2, November 14, 2013, Kajaani
Official 3, November 14, 2013, Iisalmi
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KK 849/2012 Kirjallinen kysymys: Kaivosveron käyttöönotto (Martti Korhonen /vas)

KK 897/2012 Kirjallinen kysymys: Valtonta- ja korvausvastuun parantaminen Talvivaaran kaltaisten onnettomuksien varalta (Arja Juvonen /ps)

 KK 1041/2012. Kirjallinen kysymys: Kaivoslupien jäädyttäminen lainsäädännön uudistamisen ajaksi (Johanna Karimäki /vihr)

KK 137/2013. Kirjallinen kysymys: Suomen kaivosstoiminnan tuottojen kohdistuminen ja ympäristövahinkojen minimointi (Vesa-Matti Sarakkala /ps)

KK 284/2013. Kirjallinen kysymys: Talvivaaran kaivoksen ongelmiin ratkaiseminen (Seppo Kääriäinen /kesk). Written question: Solving of the problems of the Talvivaara mine (Seppo Kääriäinen /Centre Party).

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KK 388/2013. Kirjallinen kysymys: Kyopyriihen leikkauspäätösten vaikutus säteilyturvallisuuteen (James Hirvisaari /ps)

KK 1009/2013 Kirjallinen kysymys: Talvivaaran kaivoksen tilannearvio (Eero Suutari /kok).
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