LESSONS FROM JAPAN’S PROLONGED RECESSION

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Lessons From Japan’s prolonged Recession*

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Abstract
Japan’s economy experienced prolonged recession which had never been observed before. This paper focuses on the events in Japan’s economy since 1985, tracing how the asset prices inflated and collapsed, and how the Bank of Japan responded to the deteriorating economy. We will learn from the Japan’s experience that it becomes more difficult for monetary policy to reactivate the economy, once it falls into the deflation. We will conclude that the BOJ should not have ignored the role of money stock by showing the statistical evidence of the relationship between money stock and the economic activity.

Keywords: bubble, deflation, money stock, financial anxiety

Introduction
Japan’s economy experienced prolonged recession which had never been observed before. The recession is characterized by rapid decline in assets prices which substantially accumulated the nonperforming loans. The mounting nonperforming loans, especially in the financial sectors, hampered the normal functions of financial intermediaries and Japan’s economy came to the verge of financial panic.

The financial distress and deflation is rooted in the so-called bubble economy of the latter half of the 1980s when the economy has experienced the expansion of bubbles in assets prices. This article will focus on how the strong economy deteriorated and how the authority, especially the Bank of Japan responded to its deterioration. We will divide the periods we focus on into 2 period, before and after the burst of the bubble and latter will be divided into several periods.

We will conclude that the BOJ should not have ignored the role of money stock by showing the statistical evidence of the relationship between money stock and the economic activity. We will perform Johansen’s cointegration test by taking the financial anxieties into consideration. The lessons form Japan’s prolonged recession and the policy response would be much useful not to repeat the same disaster.

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1 The emergence of the bubble (1985-89)

It was September 1985 when the Minister of Finance and governor of the central bank of G5 countries (United States, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Japan) gathered to Plaza hotel in New York to discuss how to correct the trade imbalance between US and Japan and West Germany, especially how to reduce the huge trade deficit in US. The US had suffered from huge trade deficit, which might be caused by then president Regan’s economic policy, so-called Reganomics characterized by strong dollar and high interest rates. US congress had taken very hard stance to the Japanese increasing trade surplus and threatened with retaliating trade measures.

G5 countries had agreed to concert to depreciate the high dollar in the meeting. The cooperative interest reduction had begun. In 1985, long-term interest rate in US. was 10.8 percent, while that in Japan was 5.8 percent as shown. The difference was 4.7 percent as shown in Figure 2 when the exchange rate was 250s yen per dollar. In August 1986, US’s interest rate was reduced to 7.3 percent while Japan’s rate was 5.2 percent. The difference was reduced to 2.1 percent, which caused the rapid yen’s depreciation from 250s to 150s (see Figure 1). However Japanese current account balance did not decrease in spite of the yen’s appreciation. US government was afraid that the further appreciation of the yen would make the Japanese economy so stagnant and would be counter productive to the US economy. Japanese economy was in the slight recession due to the high yen after Plaza agreement. So US gave the pressure to stimulate the Japan’s domestic demand and to raise the imports.

In the February 1987 Louvre agreement, Japan was demanded to take further easy monetary policy. The Bank of Japan reduced the official discount rate to 2.5 percent, the lowest level in response to the Louvere agreement in February 1987, while US increased the discount rate to 6.0 percent as shown in Figure 3. As a result, the difference between the long-term interest rate in US and that in Japan expanded from 2.2 percent to 4.5 percent which depreciated yen to the normal level, 140s yen.

Money growth had started to rise in 1987 Q1. It grows more than 10 percent from 1987 Q1 through 1990 Q2. It was the beginning of the Japanese bubble. Some feel that the low discount rate might cause the inflation. However market crash had happened in NY in October 1987. G7 countries decided to cooperate to take easy monetary policy to avoid the world depression. As a result, Japan has to keep the low interest rate policy. However the Bundesbank (central bank of West German) raised the discount rate and returned monetary policy to the neutral level (4.5 percent).

The reason why only Japan had to keep the easy monetary policy is as follows. The dollar was still weak to the Japanese yen. It was thought that the dollar would be rapidly depreciated and bond and stock price would substantially decrease and cause the depression in US, if the BOJ raise the discount rate. Then people had thought the BOJ would never take the tight policy and the easy policy would continue for a long time1.

Under the assumption of affluent funds available, Banks were very aggressive and irritated to make a loan. Anybody could get loans very easily from the banks as far as they have lands as collateral because they were believed to keep increasing forever. Large firms could get funds easily by using “equity finances”. So banks had tried to expand the loans to household and small firms

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1 See Suzuki (1993) in more detail.
which had not enough collateral with the expectation of their rise. Even housewives were advised to manage the apartment by borrowing money from the banks.

The stock prices and land prices had rapidly increased from 1988 through 1989 as shown in Figure 5 and 6, which could not be explained by the fundamentals. The increasing of assets prices did not respond to the first rise of the discount rate in May 1988 from 2.5 to 3.25 percent and the second rise in January 1989 from 3.25 to 3.75 percent at all. The bullish expectation had dispelled the negative effects on the asset prices. The asset prices kept increasing.

2 Prolonged recession after the burst of the bubble

2-1 The burst of the bubble (1990-93)

The BOJ implemented the third rise of discount rate from 3.75 to 4.25 percent in December 1989. The market was still bullish. However the market had begun to change, when the new governor, Mieno had showed very strong stance to the bullish economy by fourth rise of discount rate from 4.25 to 5.25 percent. The governor Mieno had implemented the fifth rise of discount rate to 6.0 percent to avoid the home made inflation caused by the Gulf War in August 1990. The government also placed a ceiling on the total amount of financing availed for real estate purchase. The burst of the bubble had begun at last. Money stock (M2+CD) rapidly declined. It recorded negative year on year growth in mid–1992 as shown in Figure 4. After hitting a record high of 38,915 yen at the end of 1989, the stock price rapidly began to decline. In August 1992, stock price dipped below 15,000 yen, a 63 percent plunge from peak level (see Figure 5). Land prices began to fail after hitting a peak in September 1990 and still keep falling now as shown in Figure 6.

In response to the asset price decline, the BOJ reduced the discount rate six times from July 1991 to February 1993. The discount rate was ultimately reduced from 6.0 percent to 2.5 percent (see Figure 3). The government also implemented the fiscal stimulus by spending a total of 29.9 trillion yen in two years from 1992 to 1993. Those policy measures seemed to succeed in recovering the economy.

2-2 Modest Economic Recovery (1994-96)

In 1994, the economy showed signs of a recovery because of the stimulus policies. However there remained some adverse factors.

1. Firms were obliged to continue the adjustment of their balance sheet damaged by the decline of assets price.
2. Land prices still kept decreasing
3. Hyogo Bank failed in 1995. It was the first bank listed on the Tokyo stock Exchanges.
4. The highly appreciated yen hampered the export industries. Yen reached at record high level of 79.75 yen per dollar on April 19, 1995.
5. The great earthquake attacked Kansai districts and seriously damaged its economy in 1995.
6. Prices especially whole sale prices continued to decline and increased the deflationary pressure.

New governor Mieno was called a “Heisei no Onihei”, who had strongly fought against the gangs as a leader of police officers in the Edo period more than 200 years ago.

Under these conditions, the BOJ continued to decline the discount rate from 1.75 to 0.5 percent successively as shown Figure 3. The government also increased the fiscal expenditures. The Ministry of Finance had issued a report entitled “Reorganizing the Japanese Financial system (kinyu shisutemu no kinoukaifuku nituite)” in June 1995, in which they showed diehard attitude to tackle with the NPLs problems by officially disclosing the magnitude of bad loans totaled 40 trillion yen (about 4 percent of the loans held by depository institutions).

Further more MOF had strongly pledged the complete deposit guarantee by March 2001, the reform of the Deposit Insurance Corporation and Prompt Corrective Act. As a results, several symptoms appeared to indicate the economic recovery.

1. Bank lending began to increase which had rapidly decreased after the burst of the bubble (see Figure 8).
2. Stock prices gradually increased in the latter half of 1995 and reached at 20,000 yen in September 1995 (see Figure 5).
3. The long –term interest rate began to increase with the expectation of the recovery.

Every body thought that the financial problem was under control and the recession had come to end at last.

2-3 Serious recession (1997-98)

The prime minister Hashimoto, who convinced the recovery of the Japanese economy, implemented the measures to reconstruct the Japanese finance. He was afraid that fiscal condition would get worse and worse with the coming of aging society in Japan. He decided to increase the consumption tax from 3 to 5 percent and abolish a special income tax cut in April 1997, which amount to a tax increase of 9 trillion yen. Unfortunately to the Japanese economy, the East Asian economic crises had occurred in July 1997. The fiscal contraction compounded by Asian crisis decreased the aggregate demand.

Under the deflationary conditions, the financial panic had occurred. Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, one of Japan’s city banks (largest twenty banks), and Yamaichi Securities Company, one of Japan’s four largest security company, failed in November 1997. The Failure of both big financial institutes sent the signs that the government gave up the “too big to fail” policy. People thought no financial institutes were immune from failures. Rumors about the other banks’ failure had spread out through Japan. The stock prices of many financial institutes sharply declined and “Japan premium” in the international money market jumped by around 100 basis points. Japanese banks were obliged to pay the additional basis points for raising funds in oversea financial markets. The premium is calculated as the difference between the quoted rates of TIBOR in the Tokyo offshore market and LIBOR in the London offshore market. International credit-rating agency (such as Moody’s) graded down Japanese bonds issued not only by financial institutions but also by government.

In response to the serious situation, the government decided to provide a 30 trillion yen funds by issuing bonds. The government was not willing to inject the public funds into the problem banks by considering the negative sentiments of the congress and public at first. However the financial panic was so severe that neither the congress nor the public strongly opposed to inject the public funds to

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assist the problem banks. The 30 trillion yen was divided into the following two categories. 13 trillion yen was prepared for the enforcement of the Deposit Insurance System, while the remaining 17 trillion yen was intended for the capital injection of the problem financial institutes.

The government actually injected 1.8 trillion yen to 21 large banks to raise their capital ratio in March 1998. However as Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (2000) suggested, it had no significant effect on the banks because it was lax. It was a waste of public funds, when Long-Term Credit Bank and Nippon Credit Bank had failed in 1998 after the injection of public fund. 7.5 trillion yen was again injected in March in 1999. The implementation was quite deferent from the former injection. Banks were strongly required to submit detailed and meaningful restructuring plan\textsuperscript{5}.

The government hesitated to quickly resolve the nonperforming loans and bank problems which weekend financial institute and caused long recession. The government officially announced in late 1995 that nonperforming loan totaled 38 trillion yen, 4 percent of outstanding all loans. In 1998, nonperforming loan increased at 73.1 trillion yen, 12 percent of all loans or 10 percent of GDP. All efforts by the government and private banks to decrease nonperforming loans did not succeed in reducing them at all because of the severe deflationary pressure.

The Japanese economy was thus caught in a vicious circle, so called deflationary spiral indicated in Irving Fisher (1933). (Too tight policy)— Decline in asset prices—Deterioration of balance sheet (Increase in debt burden on borrowers) – Decline in Investment and Consumption—Decline in employment and wage—Deflation.

GDP recorded negative growth for 5 consecutive quarters from the 1997 Q4 onward (for the first time since the start of GDP statistics in 1955).

2-4 Expansionary Policy (1999-)

In response to the serious situation, The government decided to take a expansionary fiscal policy.
1. Special tax reduction (2 trillion yen)
2. Economic stimulus package (totally 16 trillion yen)
3. Revision of the Financial Structure Reform (temporarily freezing)
4. Public funds was increased from 30 to 60 trillion yen in October 1998, based on the Financial Reconstruction Law and the Financial Function Early Strengthening Law
5. Injection of public funds to major financial institutes (7.5 trillion yen)

The BOJ adopted further easy monetary policy by reducing the uncollateralized overnight call rate to 0.25 percent in 1998. The BOJ also took the so called zero interest policy by reducing it to virtually zero percent (0.01 percent) in February 1999 as shown in Figure 11. Further the BOJ adopted the untraditional monetary policy, so-called quantity easy policy by putting the bank reserve on its target (see Figure 12). They committed to keep the new policy until the CPI registers stably either zero percent year on year or an increase and to increase in the outright purchase of long-term government bonds, in case they consider the increase necessary for providing liquidity smoothly. Now they conduct money market operations, aiming at the outstanding balance of current accounts held at the Bank at around 30 to 35 trillion yen (5.20, 2005). Owing to these expansionary policies, the financial panic seems to settle down. However Japanese economy remains still stagnant.

\textsuperscript{5} See Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (2000) p.66 in more detail.
3 Evaluation of BOJ’s policy

We now focus on the evaluation of the BOJ’s monetary policy response in the prolonged recession. We try to examine whether the BOJ took the appropriate easy policy to prevent the long-lasting recession. First we check the behavior of the Marshallian k, i.e., the ratio of money stock to nominal GDP. We need to compare its movement with the trend line in order to evaluate the size of magnitude of easy policy (see Figure 14). The trend line is computed over the period from 1980 to 2005. Marshallian k started to exceed the trend line from 1997, when the BOJ began to take much easier policy following the Louvre agreement. It gradually declined after reached at peak in 1990. It began to decline less than the trend line and bottomed out in 1997. It started again to increase and exceed the trend line in 2001, when the BOJ implemented the radical quantity easy policy.

Next we try to examine the BOJ’s policy by using the McCallum rule (McCallum, 1988). McCallum rule is an adaptive policy formula with a target of monetary base. With this rule, monetary base growth rate changes in response to deviation of the nominal GDP growth rate from a desired target value that grows at a specified rate. Okada and Iida (2004) compared the movement of actual monetary base growth with that of adequate monetary base growth based on the McCallum policy reaction rule as shown in Figure 7. According to their results, adequate monetary growth rate derived from the McCallum policy rule remained less than actual monetary growth in the bubble period from the half of 1980s. On the contrary, the adequate base growth has been consistently exceeding the actual base growth indicating that the volume of monetary base has remained insufficient since 1991. The results suggest that monetary policy was too easy in the latter half of 1980s and too tight since 1991 and do not respond properly to the external shock which affected the Japanese economy.

We now turn on the behavior of the money stock which remains stagnant despite of the BOJ’s efforts to increase it. As Mori, Shiratuka, and Taguchi (2001) indicate, the reason of the stagnant of money stock seems to be related with drastic change in firms’ borrowing behavior and financial institutions’ lending behavior since the bursting of the bubble. Firms substantially increased their liability in the bubble period with the bullish expectation. However they turned to intensify to reduce the liability under the deflationary pressure.

On the contrary financial institutions decreased their capital to deal with nonperforming loans, have to reduce the lending to keep their own capital ratio at adequate level. They have to contract their lending as shown in Figure 8, because they are compelled to raise the capital/assets ratio to meet the international standard imposed by Bank for international Settlement, so-called capital adequacy standard. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) indicated that the informational asymmetry between borrowers and lenders create market imperfection by generating agency costs. According to their theory, the decline in assets prices lowered the collateral values and raised agency costs, which contributed to the decline of bank loans.

As Tankan Survey shows in Figure 9, financial institutions adopted a stringent attitude toward lending to firms especially to small and medium-sized firms. This survey asks firms their view of the lending attitude of financial institutes. The lending attitude was the most stringent in 1998. DI can be calculated by the difference (percentage) between the firms perceive “accommodative” and the firms perceive “severe”. Accommodative means firms perceive that financial institutions are

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6 The base growth rule was computed under the assumption that target rate of nominal GDP is 5 percent (3 percent real GDP growth and 2 percent inflation). See Okada and Iida (2004) in more detail.
willing to satisfy their credit request, while severe means firms perceive that financial institution are reluctant to lend.

Thus, we conclude that both reduction in firms’ excess liability and financial institutions’ nonperforming loans’ problem contributed to the credit decline as shown in Figure 8. The decline of loan rapidly decreases the money multiplier as shown in Figure 13, which contribute to offset the BOJ’s efforts to increase money stock. Thus, the decline of loans cause that of deposit and, by extension, money stock. The stagnant of money growth can be thought as key factor to make the economy so stagnant for a long time.

4 The relationship between money and economic activity

We examine whether or not there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between the money stock and economic activity in Japan. We focus on the relationship between three variables; the real money stock, real GDP, and the opportunity cost measured as the difference between the interest rates on the money stock and that on other financial assets. If a long-run equilibrium relationship exists between the real money stock, real GDP, and the opportunity cost, we could say that money demand rises in line with increase in real GDP or decline in the opportunity cost. The system model is described by the VECM in the following:

\[
\Delta r_m(t) = c_{m0} + a_m ect(t-1) + \sum_{i=1}^k c_m^i \Delta r_m(t-i) + \sum_{i=1}^k d_m^i \Delta y(t-i) + \sum_{i=1}^k e_m^i \Delta r(t-i) + \varepsilon_m(t) 
\]

(1)

\[
\Delta y(t) = c_{y0} + a_y ect(t-1) + \sum_{i=1}^k c_y^i \Delta r_m(t-i) + \sum_{i=1}^k d_y^i \Delta y(t-i) + \sum_{i=1}^k e_y^i \Delta r(t-i) + \varepsilon_y(t) 
\]

(2)

\[
\Delta r(t) = c_{r0} + a_r ect(t-1) + \sum_{i=1}^k c_r^i \Delta r_m(t-i) + \sum_{i=1}^k d_r^i \Delta y(t-i) + \sum_{i=1}^k e_r^i \Delta r(t-i) + \varepsilon_r(t) 
\]

(3)

\[
ect(t) = rm(t) + \beta_3 y(t) + \beta_3 r(t) + \text{const.} 
\]

(4)

where

- \( rm(t) \) is real money stock
- \( y(t) \) is real GDP
- \( r(t) \) is opportunity cost
- \( ect(t) \) is an error correction term

Our results of cointegration test are as follows as shown in Table 1.

1. A long-run equilibrium relationship between real money stock, real GDP, and the opportunity cost can be found in the sample period before late 1997.

2. However, the long-run equilibrium relationship can no longer be detected in the sample period expanded beyond late 1997, when financial anxieties over the Japanese financial system emerged.

The reason why the relationship between the money stock and economic activity has been unstable seems to be related to the financial anxiety rapidly increased after the sudden collapse of big financial institutes in 1997. The financial anxieties drastically increased the precautionary demand by both firms and household.
We need to comprise a new variable to explain the rise of precautionary demand for money after 1997. The new variable has to capture the psychological change of people due to the financial anxieties. We used the Corporate Financial Position Diffusion Index issued quarterly by Bank of Japan known as Tankan in order to qualify the unobservable variable.

We formulate the model as follows\(^7\).

\[
\Delta DI_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta rate_t - \beta_2 \Delta rate_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t
\]  

(5)

where \(DI_t\) is the diffusion index for the financial position, \(rate_t\) is the interest rates on loans and \(\varepsilon_t\) is an error term, which shows the influence of irregular or unexpected factors other than interest rates on loan. The financial anxieties can be captured as the variance of this error term\(^1\).

We here introduce TARCH (Threshold Autoregressive conditional Heteroscedasticity) or Threshold ARCH model for the error term \(\varepsilon_t\) with asymmetric variance property\(^8\).

The TARCH model with asymmetric variance property for the conditional variance of the innovations is

\[
h_t^2 = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \varepsilon_{t-1}^2 + \beta_1 h_{t-1}^2 + \gamma \varepsilon_{t-1} I_{t-1}
\]  

(6)

Where \(I_{t-1} = 1\) if \(\varepsilon_{t-1} < 0\)

\(= 0\) otherwise

In this model, for TARCH effect, the asymmetry term \(\gamma > 0\) and the condition for non-negativity will be \(\alpha_0 \geq 0, \alpha_1 \geq 0, \beta \geq 0\) and \(\alpha_1 + \gamma \geq 0\). The conditional variance \(h_t^2\) is subject to an impact \(\alpha_1\) from good news (\(\varepsilon_{t-1} \geq 0\)), while an impact (\(\alpha_1 + \gamma\)) from bad news (\(\varepsilon_{t-1} < 0\)). This kind of asymmetric property corresponds to the situation such that the psychological change of people due to the financial anxieties increases the precautionary demand and that an easy financial position does not rise the precautionary demand.

**Table 2 Estimation of TARCH model (1976Q3-2005Q1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z-Statistic</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\beta_0)</td>
<td>0.053084</td>
<td>0.236598</td>
<td>0.224364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\beta_1)</td>
<td>-0.000344</td>
<td>0.008962</td>
<td>-0.038433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\beta_2)</td>
<td>-0.026407</td>
<td>0.009873</td>
<td>-2.674603</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variance Equation

| \(\alpha_0\)  | 1.240864   | 0.879154    | 1.411429| 0.1581  |
| \(\alpha_1\)  | 0.058104   | 0.117175    | 0.495876| 0.6200  |
| \(\gamma\)    | 0.256846   | 0.145875    | 1.760722| 0.0783  |
| \(\beta\)     | 0.573227   | 0.196519    | 2.916904| 0.0035  |

\(^7\) The original model was used by Kimura and Fujita (1999). However their model has some problems coming from the naive application of time series data in such way that \(DI_t\) is regressed by \(rate_t\) and \(rate_{t-1}\). So we use here the modified growth rate model. See in detail J. Rahman, S. Miyagawa, and Y. Morita (2005). We checked the time series property of \(DI\) and \(rate\) by KPSS and PP test. The results showed that both of \(DI\) and \(rate\) are integrated of order one, \(I(1)\).

\(^8\) This model should be called GJR model in a strict meaning.
Estimation results are shown in Table 2. The sign of all parameters seem to be reasonable in economic sense. Since a rise of $DI_t$ implies easy financial position and a rise of $\Delta rate_t$ means that of interest rate, $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ should take a negative value. The parameter $\gamma$ of $\sigma^2_{t-1} I_{t-1}$ takes a positive value and hence the conditional variance is shown to exhibit asymmetric property, though the significance levels of some parameters are not sufficient. Figure 16 depicts the behavior of $h^2_t$ as a variable of financial anxieties$^9$.

Anxieties variable DV$_t$ is seen to rise at first from 1992 to 1994 (the first financial anxiety in Japan), when small credit unions and cooperative failed because of an increase in the nonprofit loan caused by the rapid decline of stock and land price after the bust of the bubble. As we already discussed, the Japanese economy began to show the modest recovery in late 1995, when real GDP began to increase and the official estimation of NPLs decreased$^{10}$. As a result the financial anxieties had been dispelled in 1995.

However, the economy sharply declined in 1997 when Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto had declared the rise of the consumption tax from 3 to 5 percent and the end of temporary income tax cut. Major Japanese financial institutions had failed in November 1997 (the second financial anxiety in Japan). Japan Premium, which is the additional rate Japanese banks have to pay for raising funds in the international money market, jumped by around 100 basis points. Financial anxieties spread out through the country. People’s anxieties tremendously increased, as indicated in the rise of DV in 1998.

Then DV rapidly decrease after 1999. As we already discussed, the Bank of Japan had adopted an aggressive monetary easing policy and the Japanese government also decided to inject the public fund to the banking sector; the amounts are 1.8 trillion yen in 1998, 7.8 trillion yen in 1999. Both efforts of the BOJ and the government had succeeded in dispelling the financial anxiety. Thus, DV rapidly decrease after 1999.

The results of the cointegration test taking the financial anxiety into consideration are also shown in Table 1. We performed the Johansen’s cointegration test in the same model as equations (1)-(4) by taking into account a new variable $DV_t$ of financial anxieties. However we cannot directly

$^9$ Mathematically speaking in Eqs.(5) and (6), the shock $\epsilon(t-1)$ at (t-1)-period affects the increase of $h^2(t)$ in the next step at t-period. However, in the real economy, companies react to a big shock within the same period (t-1). Therefore, hereafter in our analysis, $h^2(t)$ is shifted by one-step, that is, the financial anxieties variable denoted by $DV(t)$ is defined by $DV(t) = h^2(t + 1)$.

$^{10}$ Hutchison and McDill (1999) also estimated the financial crisis by using the probit model and got the similar results as ours. Their results indicate that the likelihood of a banking problem sharply rose in 1991, reached at a peak in 1992, and sharply declined after 1993, while it was very small (bellow 10 percent) until 1990. The following Figure is taken exactly as in Hutchison and McDill (1999).
contain a new variable into Eq. (4) because anxieties variable denoted by $DV_t (=c_1 h_{t+1} + c_2 h_{t+1}^2)$ is stationary. We regard the above $DV_t$ as precautionary demand caused by the financial anxieties and define a new money adjusted by precautionary demand:

$$ rm_{new}(t) = rm(t) - DV(t) $$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

The estimation procedure to find out the optimal parameters $c_1$ and $c_2$ of $DV_t (=c_1 h_{t+1} + c_2 h_{t+1}^2)$ is shown in Appendix. Our results suggest that there still exists a long-run equilibrium relationship among adjusted money, real GDP and opportunity cost, though the equilibrium relationship has been broken down in the model ignoring the financial anxiety.

### Table 1 Results of Cointegration Tests

(1) 1980Q1 to 1997Q4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample period</th>
<th>Johansen’s Cointegration Test</th>
<th>Parameter estimated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80/1Q - 97/4Q</td>
<td>Maximum Eigenvalue Test Trace Test</td>
<td>$\beta_y$ $\beta_r$ $\alpha_m$ $\alpha_y$ $\alpha_r$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Anxiety</td>
<td>19.6528**  (21.132) 33.2316***  (29.797)</td>
<td>-1.5777  (0.0374) 0.0259  (0.0055) -0.0170  (0.0425) 0.0747  (0.0414) -7.1550  (1.7843)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Anxiety</td>
<td>22.1170**  (21.132) 38.7857***  (29.797)</td>
<td>-1.5791  (0.0348) 0.0185  (0.0055) -0.0165  (0.0805) 0.1296  (0.0406) -5.5670  (1.7733)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) 1980Q1 to 2000Q3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample period</th>
<th>Johansen’s Cointegration Test</th>
<th>Parameter estimated</th>
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<td>Maximum Eigenvalue Test Trace Test</td>
<td>$\beta_y$ $\beta_r$ $\alpha_m$ $\alpha_y$ $\alpha_r$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Anxiety</td>
<td>15.1762  (21.132) 26.4932  (29.797)</td>
<td>-1.5330  (0.1436) 0.0828  (0.0230) -0.0109  (0.0106) 0.0048  (0.0112) -1.8737  (0.4983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Anxiety</td>
<td>18.9276*  (21.132) 32.6801**  (29.797)</td>
<td>-1.6447  (0.0497) 0.0318  (0.0085) -0.0074  (0.0544) 0.0635  (0.0275) -4.6240  (01.2424)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ***, ** and * indicate rejection of null hypothesis at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level

### Conclusion

The lessons from the prolonged Japan’s depression could be summarized as follows.

1. The BOJ targeted the nominal exchange rate in the monetary policy. It tried to manipulate the nominal exchange rate to correct the current account imbalance between Japan and US
which was originally caused by structural imbalance between domestic savings and investment. They should have been more independent.

2. The BOJ did not realize the scare of deflation. The BOJ kept the position that monetary policy should be used neither to raise the stock price nor to save the financial institutes even after the burst of the bubble. Such BOJ’s stance provided very negative effects on the financial institutions and stock prices. At the early stage of the recession, the BOJ thought that some downward pressure on prices was what has been referred to as “good deflation,” resulting from technical change and the increase of cheap products from China and deregulation in Japan’ rigid service sector. It was often said at the time that Tokyo is the most expensive city.

3. Even after the burst of the bubble, the “myth of ever-rising land price” survived, which made policy makers and banks too optimistic in the sense that they expected the land price and economy to recover so soon. That would be one reason why BOJ’ policy was too late and too timid. Deflation has raised the debt burden on the borrowers substantially.

4. Monetary conditions should have been eased quickly and more aggressively. The BOJ officials often says that monetary conditions were already extremely low which might hamper the effort of both firms and banks to adjust their damaged balance sheet. Further low interest policy was thought to incur the moral hazard. This policy stance reminds us of the US. Federal Reserve in the Great Depression in 1930s.

5. The government was reluctant to disclose the nonperforming loan statistics. They thought those problem would be rapidly improved once the anticipated recovery occurred. They took the forbearance policy. They published NPLs of only the then 21 major banks in 1992, and published the statistics for each of banks in 1993. The regional banks only started to disclose in 1994, The statistics were widely admitted as underestimated by the flexible definition of nonperforming loans.

6. Both the BOJ and the government had lacked in adequate prudential policy. Thus, they have to take “buying time” policy, to gain time to make the adequate policy and construct the safety net.

7. They should have paid attention to the behavior of money stock. Both inflation and deflation are monetary phenomenon in the long-run. Money stock is still important as a information variable. The BOJ have to pay close attention to its behavior. Inflation targeting policy might be necessary if money stock remains stagnant.

References


Figure 1 Exchange Rate, yen/dollar

(source) Bank of Japan

Figure 2 Long-term Interest Rate Difference, US and Japan (1985-89)

(source) Bank of Japan
Figure 3  Official Discount Rate  

(source) Bank of Japan

Figure 4  Money Growth Rate (year on year )

(source) Bank of Japan
Figure 5 Stock Price (Nikkei 225)

(source) Tokyo Stock Exchange

Figure 6 Land Price (year on year)

(source) Japan Real Estate Institute, 6 Large Urban Areas, average (residential, commercial, and industrial)
Figure 7 Adequate and Actual Growth Rate

Figure 8 Bank Loan Growth Rate (year on year)

(source) Okada and Iida (2004)

(source) Bank of Japan
Figure 9 Lending Attitude of Financial Institutions, DI

(source) Bank of Japan, TANKAN
Figure 10 Inflation Rate (GDP deflator)

Figure 11 Call Rate

(source) Bank of Japan
Figure 12 Bank Reserve

Figure 13 Money Multiplier

(source) Bank of Japan
Figure 14 Marshallian K

Figure 15 Relation Between Real Money and Real GDP (1981-2001)
Figure 16 Financial Anxieties

Second financial anxiety

First financial anxiety
Appendix

Since financial anxieties $h(t)$ and $h^2(t)$ are stationary, we cannot directly contain the variable $h(t)$ and $h^2(t)$ in the cointegration relationship in Eq.(4). In order to overcome this difficulty, we introduce the following assumption:

**[Assumption]** Denoting financial anxieties $DV1(t)$ and $DV2(t)$ and precautionary demand $DV(t)$ respectively as

$$DV1(t) \equiv h(t+1) \quad \text{and} \quad DV2(t) \equiv h^2(t+1)$$

**Precautionary Demand** $DV(t) \equiv c_1DV1(t) + c_2DV2(t)$, \hspace{1cm} (A-1)

money is adjusted by precautionary demand:

$$rm_{new}(t) \equiv rm(t) - DV(t). \quad \hspace{1cm} (A-2)$$

**Remark:** Precautionary demand can be defined in a more general form of

$$\tilde{c}_1DV(t) + \tilde{c}_2DV(t-1) + \cdots$$ \hspace{1cm} For simplicity of calculation, we only adopt the simultaneous term in Eq.(A-1).

We shall consider the system model of new variables $(rm_{new}(t), y(t), r(t))$ which is just the same as that in Eqs.(1) to (4) with the variable $rm(t)$ replaced by a new one $rm_{new}(t)$. Notice that, from Eq.(A-2), $\Delta rm_{new}(t) \equiv \Delta rm(t) - \Delta DV(t)$.

Equation(1) for $\Delta rm_{new}(t)$ can be described by using $rm(t)$ and $DV(t)$.

$$\Delta rm(t) = c_{m0} + \Delta DV(t) + \alpha_m ect(t-1)$$

$$+ \sum_{i=1}^{k} c_i^m (\Delta rm(t-i) - \Delta DV(t-i)) + \sum_{i=1}^{k} d_i^m \Delta y(t-i) + \sum_{i=1}^{k} e_i^m \Delta r(t-i) + e_m(t)$$

$$= c_{m0} + (c_1 \Delta DV1(t) + c_2 \Delta DV2(t)) + \alpha_m ect(t-1)$$

$$+ \sum_{i=1}^{k} c_i^m \Delta (rm(t-i) - c_1DV1(t-i) - c_2DV2(t-i))$$

$$+ \cdots + e_m(t) \quad \hspace{1cm} (A-3)$$

where an error correction term is calculated for the set of variables

$$\left( (rm(t) - DV(t)), y(t), r(t) \right)$$

**[Estimation of $c_1$ and $c_2$]**

**[Case-I](no cointegration)** If cointegration property does not hold, then Eq.(A-3) without $ect(t-1)$ can be estimated as nonlinear estimation problem by gmm (generalized method of moment) and estimated $c_1$ and $c_2$ produce a new money variable $rm_{new}(t)$ from Eq.(A-2).
If there holds cointegration property, then the following algorithm is applied to find out the parameter $c_1$ and $c_2$.

(i) Set initial values of $c_1$ and $c_2$ as the estimated values in [case-1].

(ii) Calculate a new variable $\tilde{r}m_{new}(t) \equiv rm(t) - DV(t)$.

(iii) Calculate VECM and an error correction term $ect(t-1)$ for variables $(\tilde{r}m_{new}(t), y(t), r(t))$ in Eqs.(1) to (4).

(iv) Insert $ect(t-1)$ into Eq.(A-3) and estimate $c_1$ and $c_2$ along with the procedure of [case-1].

(v) Using the estimated $c_1$ and $c_2$ obtained in the above (iv), go to the procedure (ii) and iterate (ii) to (iv) till estimated $c_1$ and $c_2$ converge to some constants.

The above procedures of estimation are carried out in the interval (1980q1, 2002q1) and the estimated results for $c_1$ and $c_2$ in Eq.(A-1) are given below:

\[
DV(t) \equiv c_1DV1(t) + c_2DV2(t) = 0.081054DV1(t) - 0.00759DV2(t)
\]

Hence, Eq.(A-2) is given by

\[
rm_{new}(t) \equiv rm(t) - DV(t) = rm(t) - (0.081054DV1(t) - 0.007591DV2(t))
\]

**VECM with financial anxieties**

After deciding the parameters $c_1$ and $c_2$, the system model in Eqs.(1) to (4) is rewritten with new adjusted variable $rm_{new}(t)$:

\[
\Delta rm_{new}(t) = c_{m0} + \alpha_{m}ect(t-1) + \sum_{i=1}^{k}c_{i}^{m}\Delta rm_{new}(t-i) + \sum_{i=1}^{k}d_{i}^{m}\Delta y(t-i) + \sum_{i=1}^{k}e_{i}^{m}\Delta r(t-i) + e_{m}(t) \tag{A-4}
\]

\[
\Delta y(t) = c_{y0} + \alpha_{y}ect(t-1) + \sum_{i=1}^{k}c_{i}^{y}\Delta rm_{new}(t-i) + \sum_{i=1}^{k}d_{i}^{y}\Delta y(t-i) + \sum_{i=1}^{k}e_{i}^{y}\Delta r(t-i) + e_{y}(t) \tag{A-5}
\]

\[
\Delta r(t) = c_{r0} + \alpha_{r}ect(t-1) + \sum_{i=1}^{k}c_{i}^{r}\Delta rm_{new}(t-i) + \sum_{i=1}^{k}d_{i}^{r}\Delta y(t-i) + \sum_{i=1}^{k}e_{i}^{r}\Delta r(t-i) + e_{r}(t), \tag{A-6}
\]

where $ect(t)$ is an error correction term defined by

\[
ect(t) = rm_{new}(t) + \beta_{y}y(t) + \beta_{r}r(t) + const. \tag{A-7}
\]