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Tangential Modernity

Culture of Higher Education Reform in Pakistan

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
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UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
In the face of difficulties which might have overwhelmed him [Muhammad Ali Jinnah], it was given to him to fulfil the hope foreshadowed in the inspired vision of the great Iqbal by creating for the Muslims of India a homeland where the old glory of Islam could grow afresh into a modern state, worthy of its place in the community of nations.

-- The Times of London (editorial on the death of Pakistan’s founder; September 13, 1948)

I, therefore, demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interests of India and Islam. For Islam an opportunity to... mobilise its laws, its education, its culture and to bring them into close contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times.

-- Allama Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal (address to the Muslim League, 1930)
Preface

Preface and Acknowledgments

As a staff member in the Steering Committee on Higher Education Reform in Pakistan during 2002, I had the opportunity to witness up close a policy reform in the making. I learned much from being part of this unique experience and working with leading figures of higher education policy in Pakistan. Which is why I decided to focus my research on higher education reform when choosing a topic for my MPhil (Licentiate) dissertation in Communication & Cultural Studies at the National College of Arts in Pakistan. It turned out to be an important choice.

I had the ambitious notion of developing an ethnographic analysis of higher education in Pakistan as a complement to the story of reform. As I searched for a way to contextualise this, I discovered that no such cultural history existed and it was natural that my thesis should offer one. The MPhil ended up being a slice of the study I hoped to eventually develop: it was the first culturally sensitive, historical study of higher education reform in Pakistan. I was not satisfied.

For one, the MPhil thesis did not delve deeply enough into the historical context. In large part due to my immersion, I hadn’t appreciated the importance of the modernisation impulse in contemporary reform and throughout history, and I hadn’t realised that this impulse meant more than just being new. So I never really asked the basic question: what does it mean to be ‘modern’ when reforming higher education in Pakistan? I also did not reflect on my observations on the Steering Committee where, again, modernising was central. Finally, my ambitious scope prevented a properly contextualised ethnography on one hand and a reflective history on the other.

Time, academic training and physical distance have allowed me to be more reflective, for which my enrolment at the University of Tampere, Finland for doctoral studies in Social Anthropology was crucial. Consequently, I hope this study addresses the basic question in a better way: more modestly, more theoretically, and integrating my personal observations into the historical context which remains the
key focus. In sum, I offer this study as the context which I believe should have been available when reforming higher education policy in 2002 and beyond.

As with any such project, I have been amply aided and assisted at every turn. Thanks are due to my MPhil advisor, Professor Durre S. Ahmed in Lahore and to my doctoral supervisor, Professor Emerita Ulla M. Vuorela at Tampere. They have freely and continually provided invaluable guidance throughout this study. Without them, this work would never have been possible at all, let alone in the shape it now is. Thanks are due also to the pre-examiners of this study, Dr. Anja Nygren at the University of Helsinki and Professor Fazal Rizvi at the University of Melbourne. Both offered insightful comments which immeasurably enhanced the rigour of the final text. I am also grateful to Professor Pertti Alasuutari at the University of Tampere for advice, assistance, and comments on parts of the work. My thanks to participants of the doctoral seminar in Social Anthropology and The Moderns project team, both at the University of Tampere. And, my apologies to all of the above for the flaws that remain in this work despite their best efforts.

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Personally, I must thank my parents for their encouragement. Separate thanks are due to my children Mekyle, Egor and Sophia for giving me the space to complete this work. Last and most I thank my wife Tania, to whom I have addressed this study and whose support, advice, and faith has been the most important ingredient in my completing this work as part of our life’s journey.
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Questions do not derive their validation from answers in all instances... on the contrary
such uncoupling can open up new continents of doubt, push back the familiar
disciplinary frontiers and stir up a restlessness in settled epistemological outbacks.
(Ranajit Guha 1999: 198)

1.1 Introduction

‘Modernity’ has been deployed as a sine qua non of Pakistan’s existence as a nation-state. Being or becoming ‘modern’ has been placed at the centre of Pakistani policy for over 60 years. As a sign it has come to define the yardstick against which policy change is evaluated, and as such ‘modernity-talk’ lies in many ways at the origin of the country. Jinnah – the founder of Pakistan – and Iqbal, the poet philosopher credited with imagining Pakistan, for instance were unequivocal about the need for the newly independent nation to be, above all, ‘modern.’

Since independence from British colonial rule and partition with India in 1947, institutions in Pakistan have been declared ‘modern’ to gain legitimacy, policies proclaimed ‘modern’ to gain popularity, and cultural norms asserted as ‘modern’ in order to be validated. The urge to be ‘modern’ is often beyond question and beyond reproof. Critics of the measures claim that the same institutions, policies and norms are either not modern enough or too modern. Thus, the domain of ‘modernity’ is one where Pakistani identity is being consistently claimed and contested.

And yet this central desire itself is rarely interrogated. While upholding its value, most parties accept the nature of ‘modernity’ uncritically with hardly any rigorous questioning or problematization. Rarely is there to be found a coherent and fundamental interrogation of what it is to be ‘modern’ in Pakistan. The goal of this thesis is to explore what lies around the corner of ‘modernisation’ talk that drives
agency to such a degree in Pakistan. Nowhere is this clearer than in instances of policy “reform,” the most striking being the recent spate of fast-paced, high-ticket developments in the field of higher education in Pakistan.

The sector underwent a reform process in 2001 led by a high-level Task Force on Improvement in Higher Education, whose report was approved by the President of Pakistan. Following this, a Steering Committee was constituted to develop a plan for implementing the principled recommendations of the earlier Task Force. This Steering Committee worked throughout 2002, and I was recruited as a staff member in the secretariat of the Committee. Although I was not involved in the earlier Task Force, and the Steering Committee was not mandated to produce any new recommendations, I had the opportunity to participate in the policy reform as a Research Associate, partly responsible for managing a secretariat, conducting background research, minuting meetings, as well as preparing drafts of the report and various presentations.

This active participation partly guided my choice of studying higher education reform textually in Pakistan. But it was only after the report of the Steering Committee was finalised in late 2002 that I could read it over to realise how policy rhetoric was both culturally constructed and in turn contributed to constructing cultural perceptions of ‘modernisation.’ The import of critical study of higher education reform policy as an instance of enacting ‘modernity’ came home to me upon reading the final report and thence reflecting on my own participation.

Such a view of higher education reform is far from “merely” personal or rhetorical. Since 2001 successive governments in Pakistan have considered the sector to be significant, and this role is manifest in policy priorities. A vision of higher education as an “engine” for economic and social development has placed the sector close to the top of social spending since 2001, and made it by far the fastest growing social sector in terms of budgetary allocations (resulting in a 270% increase in a few years). In the deficit budget of 2009-10, the Pakistani government allotted almost three times as much to higher education alone as to primary and secondary education
combined – in a country where average adult literacy is still barely 50% – and about the same amount as for the entire health sector. In September 2009, the World Bank lent US$100 million to the Higher Education Commission and soon thereafter the President of Pakistan declared that the budget for higher education would be further enhanced by 20% of GDP over the next five years (Chronicle 2009). This unprecedented momentum can be traced to the 2001 reform report (TFIHE 2002: 1):

Of all the economic growth initiatives of the Government of Pakistan, perhaps none holds more promise and the possibility of large scale and sustainable returns than the effectiveness and expansion of the Higher Education infrastructure in Pakistan... Its value extends well beyond to encompass greater social impact contributing to a just, democratic and enlightened society.

The reform culminated in the establishment of a Higher Education Commission that carried through the same emphasis, for instance recently stating that:

In the modern economy, institutions of Higher Learning are the pillars on which the edifice of a “Knowledge Based Economy” is built. The Higher Education system in a country is inextricably linked to all aspects of the economy as well as the general education system. Considering the entire issue of development in a holistic manner, it thus becomes apparent that Higher Education serves as the engine of change that not only impacts economic development, but also serves to strengthen the entire system of education (HEC 2005: 1).

The Commission’s strategic objectives underline the attention to ‘modernity,’ for example declaring that “we will continue to ensure that curricula are modern, challenging and progressive and designed towards the matrix of the global knowledge society” (Ibid: 17). Again, however, the ‘modern’ nature of goals and concrete steps is assumed as being self-evident, and eclipses the selectivity of those goals. In other words, partly by presenting certain specific goals and actions as ‘modern,’ the Higher Education Commission (HEC) has largely obscured the fact that these are neither self-evident nor universal. Furthermore, the rhetoric conceals that
these steps by the HEC are thoroughly informed – even constructed – by the history of higher education reform in the sub-continent.

In addition to these policy indications, my earlier research into the sector (Qadir 2007) found additional material in analysis of “speech-acts” of the university. In a review of three social science MPhil (Licentiate) theses approved by the leading university of the country (Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad), I found ample evidence of the centrality of the ‘modernising’ impulse. It was, furthermore, evident that the desire discursively obscured some very definite epistemological and cultural themes which begged further investigation that spurred this thesis.

‘Being Modern?’

The impetus for studying higher education policies arises from this ubiquitous mention of ‘modernity’ as both means and end of reform in texts as well as in my experience. The notion of ‘modernity’ is never questioned in these policy texts, but is rather ‘dropped’ in crucial segments, almost like a conclusive argument. There are certainly other such unexplored terms, but ‘modernisation’ appears to be central. What does it stand for or signify? Is it just a reference to “newness,” and if so compared to whom; why is one new alternative somehow more ‘modern’ than another new alternative? The more I reflected on the Steering Committee (2002) and thence the earlier Task Force (2001) report, the deeper these questions grew. I later turned to some of the previous reforms, and found the same emphasis on ‘modernisation’ there along with similar themes. Not least of these was the report of the seminal Commission on National Education (1959) which the Task Force of 2001 referred to. Why did they all mention ‘modernisation’ in this conclusive yet undefined manner? How could they aim at being ‘modern’ by becoming ‘modern’?

This quandary was underlined for me upon reflection on the fierce resistance met by the Steering Committee during the summer and autumn of 2002. Federated faculty unions across the entire country, alone and in partnership with other civic and political groups, protested against various aspects of the implementation plan as
it began to take shape. Some of this was clearly misinformed and based on inaccurate reports. But not all could be as easily dismissed as the Steering Committee eventually did under the rubric of “natural” and politicised protest by faculty who were against “performance-oriented” quality measures or by powerful administrators wary of losing control. Was the protest just either an instance of a culture of resistance to improvement or an outlet of political opposition? Moreover, resistance by highly educated faculty also referred to ‘modernisation.’ How can one account for the fact that much of the rhetoric of this resistance in fact boiled down to some very similar themes as being proposed by the reforms themselves? The resistance to the 2001-02 reform remains to be analysed, and is not the focus of this thesis, but it does underline the need to question ‘modernising’ reforms.

The dilemma is only complicated by the fact that there was no active external influence on the Steering Committee (nor, from what I can gather, on the earlier Task Force) to produce such and such recommendations. Neither government nor outside donors put any pressure on shaping the reports, and there had been no explicit or implicit statement of incentives if the reforms looked a certain way. But then, how could the policy reforms of 2001-02 be so similar to liberalising reforms in other countries and to other sectors in Pakistan? Further, how could the subsequent implementation as it unfolded in the months and years after 2002 be once again at a tangent to the recommendations? And what did this ubiquitous reference to ‘modernisation’ have to do with that? The somewhat distorted implementation of the Task Force recommendations has not been analysed; again, this is not the place for that, but the broad observation does draw attention to the always tangential implementation of ‘modernising’ recommendations. This is not just a matter of texts talking to each other, or of an empty “acting out” of modernisation. The reforms resulted in significant budgetary allocations by successive governments, not to mention a loan by the World Bank, in investments for infrastructure expansion, and in new policy structures and administrative procedures. Modernisation thus appears
to be more than rhetoric; it has a discursive element linking the “word” to the “world,” but it is not immediately obvious how.

My specific concern with the 2001-02 policy reforms in higher education connects to broader scholarly attention on the link between higher education and ‘modernity.’ Gerard Delanty (2005: 530), for instance, points out that “the university can be seen as the paradigmatic institution of the public sphere and of modernity more generally, for some of the major transformations in modernity have been reflected in the changing nature of the university.” Indeed, the perceived centrality of higher education to the ‘modern’ nation-state has also led to the university being a focus of attention for institutional change, increasingly so over the last half-century (Meyer and Ramirez 2000). Such scholarship has relied on a narrative history of institutionalised higher education that centres on the model of a ‘modern’ Western university, exemplified by the University of Berlin, founded in 1810.

However, the specific history of the concept of university in Pakistan remains untold. As I set out initially to conduct an ethnographic study of higher education in Pakistan in the wake of reforms, it became apparent to me that the necessary background and historical context does not exist. This made it difficult not only to undertake ethnographies, but also to make nuanced statements about contemporary trends, for instance regarding the rapid developments in ‘modern’ higher education since 2001. I was forced to ask whether the desire to ‘be modern’ is a new phenomenon of higher education reform in Pakistan or whether it has deeper roots. Is there a history to this urge? If it can be traced to the last major reforms of 1959, is there more to the trend? Does that discursive history inform contemporary higher education reform and, if so, how? While my initial readings into earlier policy texts confirmed the presence of a longer history, it was not clear what the connections were, and I found no such analytical histories to draw upon.

Such longitudinal studies on ‘modern’ expressions go to the heart of what many scholars refer to as “multiple modernities.” A more thorough scan of the term is to be found in chapter two, but briefly there is broad agreement on the recognition of
‘modernity’ as a “historically unprecedented amalgam of new practices and institutional forms (science, technology, industrial production, urbanization), of new ways of living (individualism, secularization, instrumental rationality); and of new forms of malaise (alienation, meaninglessness, a sense of impending social dissolution)” (Taylor 2004: 1). The question is whether such an amalgam is evident in non-Western societies. That is, can a genuinely alternative ‘modernity’ be found in other societies? Many politically relevant questions today concern whether other societies are “compatible” with Western ‘modernisation,’ for instance China and India economically or Islamic societies culturally. Alternatively, do such societies demonstrate their own forms of ‘modernisation?’ Anthropological notions of culture lie at the root of these questions about whether it is useful to examine the world from the perspective of a single, Western ‘modernity’ or from the viewpoint of multiple, even alternative, ‘modernities.’ One clear implication of this concern is about how to manage policy change in such contexts, including in higher education.

Certainly, there is no overarching uniqueness to ‘modern’ higher education in Pakistan. Not only discussions about higher education but other narratives about ‘modernity’ also evoke contests. However, it is worth noting that the location of struggles to determine pathways to ‘modernity’ varies across societies. While scholars of ‘modernity’ such as Charles Taylor (2004) discuss the central importance of political and economic revolutions to defining ‘modernity’ in Western Europe and North America, for instance, this may be less relevant in postcolonial Pakistan. Often vacating the public political sphere, social forces have been contesting visions of ‘modernity’ in institutionalised spheres. In particular, culture (both in “high” artistic and “low” popular expressions) has been a site of vigorous contests: ‘traditional,’ conservative social forces have attacked cultural expressions, while ‘modern’ voices have sought to defend culture as a refuge. Likewise, school education has been a similar site of vigorous conflict, for instance around the “Islamisation” of school curricula (Nayyar and Salim 2003), while the ‘modernisation’ of “traditional” religious seminaries (mad’rassahs) has come to occupy political centre-stage internationally.
1.2 Interrupting Modos: Scope of Enquiry

In this backdrop, the driving motivation of this thesis is to explore what is meant by ‘modernisation’ of higher education in Pakistan as the red thread that holds together a string of reforms. Much of higher education reform in Pakistan has been built on a technical-managerial approach. That is, the focus has been on internal concerns of efficiency, effectiveness and equity. This content-centred approach generally views culture as either extraneous to reforms or as an expression of (‘traditional’) resistance to ‘modernisation’ that must be overcome. The same is more or less true of the historical narration (Isani and Virk 2003) and commentaries on higher education reform.\(^3\) By contrast, this thesis is built on a reversal of this standard assumption. That is, I feel it important to view the successive higher education reforms in Pakistan as essentially cultural in nature, and associated technical-managerial concerns as secondary, in order to engage with the queries listed earlier. I begin with the assumption that it would be analytically useful to enquire what would emerge if we view the thread holding successive reforms together not as the set of concerns about access and quality, but rather as a wish to ‘modernise.’ In other words, the story of higher education reform may be told not as one of increasing access and quality but rather as one of ‘modernity’ unfolding in Pakistan through the institution of higher education, an institution that turns is important for the nation-state.

While studying narratives of higher education in Pakistan, it became obvious to me that such contextual analyses are lacking. The gap becomes all the more significant after even a cursory glance at the successive policy reform efforts. The undeniable misfires of the reforms are not to do with the technical merits of the recommendations (which have all been roughly homogenous), but rather with the always-unquestioned normative background, the vague but ubiquitous imagination of ‘modernity’ and the problematic of so-called “prevailing attitudes of the people.” Thus, the motivation of this thesis is not so much about which reform steps have succeeded or failed and why, but rather why so many reforms have continued to propose more or less the same things with more or less the same caveats.
Objectives and Questions

With this motivation, this thesis has three overarching objectives. First, there is clearly an urgent need to fill a gap in the analytical history of higher education in the country, from the contextual, cultural perspective of an unfolding of ‘modernity.’ Thus, my primary aim in writing this thesis is to offer a longitudinal analysis of the ‘modernisation’ of higher education in Pakistan. This leads almost immediately to a second objective, which is to understand what lies around the corner of ‘modernising’ policy rhetoric in a specific context. My second aim in this thesis is therefore to begin a diachronic unpacking of the term ‘modernity’ in the higher education sector in Pakistan. My intention is to address some of these concerns regarding what it has meant to ‘modernise’ higher education in Pakistan.

In many ways these objectives are engaged with limitation of agency in higher education reform in Pakistan. The general, rational-choice assumption in successive policy efforts has been that each Pakistani government has been largely independent in formulating higher education reform, and where restrictions are evident these are readily traceable to direct, external coercion. I find myself uneasy with both parts of this assumption, especially in light of my own participation in the 2002 follow-up to the Task Force. Thus, rather than seek to explore how independent the reforms have been, and where and how that independence has been robbed, this thesis begins with the assumption that the higher education reform is inevitably constructed by historically informed cultural forces. The story here is not about reforms themselves but about their construction as captured by the goal of ‘modernisation’.

This broadly constructionist approach helps to define three specific questions that this thesis seeks to address. The first is whether, indeed, there is evidence of a guiding rhetoric of ‘modernisation’ in the construction of contemporary higher education reform in Pakistan. That is, while the 2001-02 reform was clearly guided by a goal of making the system more ‘modern,’ is this an isolated instance or a new development? My initial readings, along with a scan of policy efforts in other social sectors, suggested otherwise but, again, it was not clear how far back ‘modern-talk’
went in regard to higher education reform. How long has this urge to ‘modernise’ shaped the sector, or when and how did it become so centrally important for higher education in Pakistan to be ‘modern’? This question is significant to place the 2001 reform and subsequent policy steps in perspective. It also points to possible discursive historical continuities for a better understanding of the sector, while opening space for analysing ruptures in that history as well.

This question becomes more intriguing when it is recalled that the English word, ‘modernity’ has no directly equivalent translation in Urdu, the national language of Pakistan. The noun jadeediat has the same literal meaning but is rarely used in everyday discourse. The adjective form, jadeed, is more common, but its usage is almost synonymous with the more popular nya, which simply means “new.” Neither Urdu term connotes the socio-cultural and analytical baggage that the English ‘modernity’ does today. In fact, the English term itself has a 16th century Latin pedigree and initially referred to modos, or “now.” While subsequent use has varied across the centuries and sectors, it continues to connote a valorisation of the present. Thus, a key concern guiding this thesis, as above, is whether ‘modernising’ higher education in Pakistan today simply refers to making it “new” or “contemporary.” While newness may be valorised in itself, however, it is readily apparent that is far from sufficient to explain the continuity in higher education reforms in Pakistan, not to mention earlier in the Indian subcontinent prior to Pakistani independence in 1947. Thematic consistency in higher education reforms points to more than newness; in most cases there is very little that is new in the recommendations.

A scan of the reforms thus begs the second question: what more is there to the ubiquitous ‘modernity’ than the modos in higher education reform in Pakistan? Is there any consistent cultural thematic underlying the references to the ‘modernisation’ goals of successive higher education reforms in Pakistan? If ‘modernity’ is taken as a reference or rhetoric, then what does this rhetoric stand for, and what are the historical continuities and ruptures therein? This is a more substantial question that the earlier one about evidence of a history of
'modernisation' talk in reforming higher education in what is now Pakistan. Rather, the question seeks to peek beyond rhetorical use to ask whether any more specific and consistent cultural themes are eclipsed by the undefined goal of 'being modern.'

Moving beyond modernity as modos, and reflecting on my own involvement in the reform in 2002, it becomes important to ask how this is linked to developments in other parts of the world. On the one hand, it became evident during 2002 that certain global models of “excellent” universities were in mind when the sector was being reformed to become more ‘modern.’ However, this was balanced by a realisation that such models could not simply be transplanted onto Pakistani soil. It was acknowledged that local “realities” had to be respected and at the normative level there was an expressed need to distinguish ‘modern’ higher education in Pakistan from ‘modern’ higher education in these other reference points. On the other hand, a consistent theme in the resistance to the reform was labelling it as a “Western” or “World Bank” agenda, as is evident from press reports of the time. Considered reflection reveals that this is an oft-employed, populist rhetoric and it was certainly not strictly true for the 2002 Steering Committee or the earlier, 2001 Task Force. However, the consistency with other international development discourses and models cannot but puzzle the analyst. Given the emphasis on “our modernity,” how unique was the ‘modernisation’ advocated by the Task Force in 2001? Can it reliably be scrutinised now as an alternative, Pakistani version of ‘modernity’ and not just mimicry? If so, how can the obvious similarities be explained? This question relates to the scholarly tradition of exploring “multiple modernities” (Nederveen Pieterse 2004). As Charles Taylor asks:

Is there a single phenomenon here, or do we need to speak rather of “multiple modernities”, the plural reflecting the fact that other non-Western cultures have modernized in their own way, and cannot be properly understood if we try to grasp them in a general theory which was originally designed with the Western case in mind? (Taylor 2004: 1)
One of the key implications of this debate centres on whether the Euro-Atlantic conception of a ‘modern’ society is compatible with or relevant to other societies, for instance Muslim cultures or Chinese economies, and so on. While such implications extend beyond this thesis, this study does ask what the responses to the questions imply for the debate on single versus multiple modernities. That is, does modern higher education reform in Pakistan support the idea of multiple modernities?

As a corollary to this set of questions around higher education, similar questions may be asked of other social sectors, especially those central to contemporary international development assistance, such as primary education, basic and public health, the natural environment, access to justice, multiple domains of human rights, micro-financial assistance, and so on. Many of these sectors directly involve Church aid in Pakistan, although the assistance itself might be non-denominational. More significantly, is international development assistance in Pakistan implicitly linked to the problematic notion of secularism through border rhetoric of “modernity” with its history in the colonial milieu? If so, can these influences be traced?

Data

The data used for this study to analyse these questions is primarily a set of four policy documents that have proven over time to be instrumental in reforming and influencing the shape of contemporary higher education in Pakistan. The features and context of each policy are discussed in detail in the next chapter, but a brief introduction is pertinent here.

The starting point is the most recent, high-impact policy reform of 2001-02. This was led by the Task Force on Improvement in Higher Education constituted by President General Parvez Musharraf after his assuming power in a military coup. The Task Force was constituted by President General Musharraf in April 2001, following the launch in Pakistan of the UNESCO/ World Bank Task Force Report in 2000. Under the co-chairmanship of the heads of Pakistan’s two oldest and best regarded private universities, the Task Force comprised a total of 17 members, mostly Vice-
Chancellors/Rectors, Deans and academicians and from leading universities in the country. The report it presented to the President in January 2002 (TFIHE 2002) is the first policy text used as data for this thesis.

The Task Force drew extensively on the recommendations of the highly regarded Commission on National Education (CNE) of 1959. The CNE dedicated the first and longest of 27 chapters in its report to higher education. The Commission’s report has been referred to as the “Magna Carta of Pakistan’s education system” (Saigol 2003: 1) and is widely regarded as having defined the shape of the sector for times to come. The CNE report is the second key policy text used as data to trace the unfolding of ‘modernity’ in higher education in Pakistan.

Analysis of the CNE report such as by Saigol (2003) or by myself separately (Qadir 2009a) reveals how much the Commission was haunted by recent colonialism. British colonial rule, from which Pakistan gained independence in 1947, constituted in many ways the foil against which the Commission formulated its recommendations. The most recent, significant reform by the British of Indian education was the Resolution by Governor General Curzon in 1904. The Resolution was to all intents and purposes the first and last significant policy of the Crown since imperial rule was formally instituted in India in 1858. It was followed by another Resolution in 1913, but this largely served to reinforce and tune the earlier policy actions. The 1904 Resolution was instrumental in institutionalising higher education through regulation of universities across India, and was the first time special attention was focused on Muslims in India, who had only recently come to accept and adopt British education (Tangri 1961). This Resolution constitutes the third key policy text in tracing the history of higher education reform’s constitution in Pakistan.

While the 1904 Resolution was the first formal policy statement of the British Empire on education in India, it was not the first policy on education by the British. Prior to imperial rule, the British had successively imposed regulations on India via the East India Company. This process of enhancing governance role began actively after the British victory in the Battle of Plassey in 1757, when British administrators
began to administer provinces along with commercial activities of the Company. Company rule lasted until 1858 when, after the “Mutiny” of 1857 and Government of India Act (1858), the British government assumed the task of directly administering India in the British Raj. Toward the end of indirect rule, in 1854, the Court of Directors of the East India Company, in collaboration with the Government of Britain’s India Office, launched an Educational Despatch in 1854. The Despatch, in turn, was the first formal statement by the British taking responsibility for instituting and governing ‘modern’ education in India, including tertiary education. The Despatch is the most significant educational policy document of British India, bar none, including for the reason that it established the first three ‘modern’ universities in India. The 1854 Despatch is the final policy text as data for this study.

These four policy reform documents (2002, 1959, 1904, and 1854), each significant in its own way, constitute the primary material for this thesis. These are discussed in their historical context more fully in chapter three. Alongside them, however, the thesis employs a host of significant, secondary documents and materials. These include the documents pertaining to the first Muslim institution of ‘modern’ education, the Muslim Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh founded by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan a noted Muslim social and political reformer. Sayyid Ahmad is recalled officially today in Pakistan as one of the founders of the nation, as his College hosted the Aligarh Educational Movement which, in turn, was the platform to constitute an All-India Muslim League. Also reviewed in this thesis is the first vernacular language college in what is now Pakistan – University of the Punjab – as well as documents relating to institution of English-language medium of higher instruction – principally the infamous Minute by Lord Macaulay in 1835. “Other” voices and texts are included as relevant to the argument.

In addition, the thesis draws on my own experience as a staffer in the Steering Committee on Higher Education (SCHE) in 2002. The SCHE formulated implementation modalities for the earlier Task Force’s recommendations. The SCHE report itself (SCHE 2002) is not used as data here, mostly because it followed the
Task Force recommendations to a great degree, a fact that only confirms the significance of the Task Force report. However, being part of the discussions and drafting of the SCHE report did allow participant insights into decision-making on higher education, which I integrate into the empirical analyses in this thesis.

**Framework: Method and Theory**

In keeping with the objectives of this study, my primary approach to the questions is a longitudinal analysis of ‘modernity’ in higher education reform through a critical reading of these key policy texts. Beginning with contemporary policy steps by the Higher Education Commission I intend to trace these to the latest reform of 2001-02. This text in turn leads to the previous most important policy reform of higher education in Pakistan, that of 1959 and thence back to the Despatch of 1854. There is a sharp dearth of research in English or in Urdu about higher education in pre-colonial Muslim India before 1757, but I also hope to draw on some related literature on Muslim education to place the impact of colonial organisation in perspective. Such a perspective of cultural contextualisation is a second, diachronic approach employed in the thesis. Some of the important related events will be highlighted throughout the reading of key instances of higher education reform in Pakistan and before that in British India. The analysis is presented thematically from “front to back,” from contemporary evidence and policy texts back through the data set. This presentation illustrates some of the key patterns and continuities of construction.

One of the important continuities outlined throughout this thesis is a blurring of the boundary between “endogenous” and “exogenous” influences and authorships of policy. Particularly in 2001-02, in an age of rapid communication and strong external financial influence on Pakistan on the back of a half-century of international “development” discourse, it is very easy to get the impression that the reforms were at least influenced by outside forces. As earlier, I can substantiate first-hand that this was not the case by coercion or even influence in 2002. In fact, the report of the Steering Committee was hardly publicised internationally, and there was little
political need for the government to parade it as a ‘modern’ performance. Geopolitics had already dictated that economically and politically more important events took centre-stage. The same is true for the earlier report of the 2001 Task Force. If anything, the military government of the time lost some much-needed popularity due to heavy opposition from national faculty unions with a strong tradition of democratic elections. And yet, as I have stressed above, the influence is doubtless evident. One of the key features of ‘being modern’ in Pakistani higher education thus appears to be a certain global outlook, a trend discussed in greater detail later.

Therefore, this thesis problematises the relatively common but superficial classification of ‘modernisation’ as “external” or “internal.” Rather, through a longitudinal view, I hope to demonstrate that such a boundary is significantly blurred, and thus asking whether a particular reform effort such as 2001-02 is “internally” or “externally” oriented is not very meaningful. What is considered “internal” has already been significantly informed from the “outside” in a history of construction, and continues to be informed in contemporary times. Moreover, this transnational history is embedded in a context of power, notably colonialism. I thus intend to be sensitive in the analysis to what may be termed “soft” forms of power that continually disturb this border between “endogenous” and “exogenous” while not being obviously coercive.

Sensitivity to “soft” power calls for particular attention to the context of specific reform efforts, for which anthropological understandings of “culture” are useful. I use “culture” in the sense that the philosopher Charles Taylor does: “a language and a set of practices that define specific understandings of personhood, social relations, states of mind/soul, goods and bads, virtues and vices, and the like... a constellation of understandings of person, nature, society and the good” (Taylor 1999: 153-154). This usage here suggests a matrix within which both policy, as an object of analysis, and related actors are embedded. That is, culture is not extraneous to policy but rather central to it, especially in defining normative objectives of that policy. However, a related theoretical assumption also used here is that culture itself should not be
reified to be an immutable agent. Rather, I draw on the anthropological lesson that cultural norms, values, ideals and ideas are socially and historically constructed, and that tracing the construction reveals much about the nature of the present.

Tracing histories is not without methodological concerns. Structurally oriented scholarship that attempted to offer “complete” explanations for contemporary trends in past factors is no longer viable. Rather, I draw on Charles Taylor’s view of historical explanation, summarised in his *Source of the Self* (Taylor 1989: 199-207), to clarify that I am not offering some causal explanations for why ‘modern’ higher education in Pakistan is, after all, modern. On the one hand, historical studies that might do so would doubtless be far more attentive to social, political and economic factors in constructing an explanation than I will be. On the other hand, I do not wish to suggest this work as an “ideal” causal explanation of ‘modernity’ in Pakistani higher education reform, which would likewise have to account for many more intellectual trends than I am gathering here. Quoting Taylor’s response to questions about explanatory stories for the ‘modern’ Western identity: “For the moment I confess to lacking a very clear and plausible diachronic-causal story” (Ibid: 203). Moving beyond Taylor, contemporary theory would suggest that such explanations do not just comprise an unmanageable number of factors, but actually a strictly infinite number, and hence are doomed to failure by their very nature (Derrida 1978: 278-94).

So, if I am not pretending to offer a historical, investigative thriller, where is this work situated? I want to suggest an entirely modest aim here, which does not attempt any explanatory mechanisms at all, but only explanatory descriptions. My overall question is: what does the ubiquitous rhetoric of modernity in Pakistani higher education reform stand for, irrespective of the interlaced factors that went into its construction? An interpretive story discussing the compulsive appeal of ‘modernity’ such as the one Taylor offers for Western civilisation would be fascinating but far richer than my study. I begin only with my personal observation of the demand to be ‘modern’ in Pakistani higher education and ask what it means, what cultural features it stands for: what lies around the corner of ‘modernity-talk’?
Such a cultural view of ‘modernity’ is closely connected with the work of the Canadian philosopher and philosophical anthropologist Charles Taylor. The driving force of Taylor’s approach has been related to a tradition of contextualised hermeneutics (Smith 2004). Among other topics, one of Taylor’s overriding concerns has been an exploration into ‘modernity,’ principally through his work on Modern Social Imaginaries (Taylor 2004). For Taylor, culture is a central, even defining fulcrum, of the trends culminating in what we consider to be ‘modern’ society today, and he specifically advocates a “cultural view of modernity” in contrast to an earlier “a-cultural view” often embodied in discourses of linear “development” from traditional to ‘modern’ (Taylor 1999). In discussing a “cultural view of modernity” Taylor also rests his argument on a longitudinal perspective whereby he problematises ‘modernity’ as a cultural thematic that holds together a coherent history. Furthermore, Taylor relates such a history to the “necessary” question of multiple modernities, which is a theoretical starting point for this thesis as well.

An approach based on culture is also useful for the purposes of this thesis to unpack a troubling observation mentioned above. This is that eight successive higher education reforms have delivered relatively similar technical recommendations along with the fundamental complaint of a culture of resistance to improvement as the primary problem. Not only the Task Force of 2001, but the earlier Commission in 1959 and other efforts have belaboured the point about “prevalent attitudes of people” (TFIHE 2002). However, as anthropologist Marshall Sahlins (1999) notes in the context of Eskimo ‘modernisation,’ “This is not so much the culture of resistance as it is the resistance of culture... cultural subversion is in the nature of intercultural relations”. The matrix of culture subverting ‘modernisation’ efforts as well as cross-border relations is, for me, an important insight into the nature of ’being modern’ in Pakistan, and I discuss this more fully through the thesis.

A more thorough exploration of Charles Taylor’s approach is reserved for chapter two. Here, it is worth emphasising his notion of a “modern social imaginary,” which is a basic concept for this study. Briefly, Taylor posits a “long march of modernity,”
whereby a way of being and interpreting underwent a transformation to the cultural mode we find familiar today and which is expressed in social and institutional forms. For Taylor, this transformation has to do with a change in the “social imaginary… the way people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” (Taylor 2004: 23). Somewhere in between an articulated, theoretical schematic and a diffuse, amorphous “habitus,” the social imaginary captures the “wider grasp on our whole predicament” and is related to anthropological notions of culture.

In tracing the emergence of a modern social imaginary Taylor emphasises the emergence of a modern moral order or rights and obligations that is expressed in the social imaginary. However, as he himself acknowledges, Taylor’s focus is on “Western history, which leaves the variety of today’s alternative modernities untouched” (Ibid: 2). Thus, the French and American revolutions figure as prominent events in the emergence of a social imaginary driving the quintessentially Western ‘modern’ cultural features of a public sphere, the market economy, and a self-governing people. Another very significant feature of Taylor’s scrutiny of ‘modernity’ is the central position he accords to religion as a socio-cultural phenomenon. Not only does he convincingly relate some of the seminal ‘modern’ innovations to transformations in religious worldview, but he also tackles the question of the place and role of religion within ‘modernity’ (Heft 1999). This naturally has a bearing on Muslim-majority Pakistan, where even a casual observer could not miss the centrality of “Islam” in virtually any discourse. In the arena of higher education reform, this may be analysed in the form of a tension between secular ‘modernity’ and Islamic modernity. One perspective on the institutional evolution of this tension in higher education is discussed later, but many aspects of this problematic exceed my scope. However, it does indicate the question of singular vs. multiple modernities. While Charles Taylor points this out, and in fact mentions it as a “necessary” formulation, his analysis by and large does not touch upon non-Western parts of the world.
Taylor also leaves unclear precisely how the cultural features above diffused to “shape the social imaginary of large strata, and then eventually whole societies.” By which processes did this diffusion take place and what shape did the diffusion take? The facticity of these cultural expressions, at least as ideal norms, is hard to deny. Yet, there is no similarly rigorous scrutiny of how they diffused pervasively to construct individual and societal making of meaning. I do not wish to suggest that Charles Taylor implies that the historical process of modernisation is less important. In fact, his notion of “cultural modernity” in contrast to “a-cultural conceptions” suggests that he is sensitive to historicised trajectories (Taylor 1999). However, his tale of the modern social imaginary largely does not attempt to ask this question.

In exploring expressions of ‘modernity’ this study is more sensitive to the historicised construction of multiple modernities. My focus on the institution of higher education emerges from a concern with seeing how modernity in a Pakistani context may be viewed historically, and what cultural features such a view would reveal. Thus this thesis supports the notional utility of a narrative of ‘modernity’ as expressed in a social imaginary but goes further to suggest that the modalities of diffusion have been decisive. In other words, by focusing on an institutionalised social imaginary I find that the history of the long march of ‘modernity’ in a particular national context is not only more readable but also helps in identifying the way in which contemporary agency has been shaped.

What emerges as a decisive moment in this historicised view is the organisation of higher education under colonial rule. This is especially pertinent for the institutionalisation of higher education, which was known for its informality in pre-colonial India. Particularly under Muslim rule before colonisation, but arguably also earlier, informal and relatively unorganised higher education was too diffuse to bring under administrative control such as taxes or criminal procedures. What may be considered a “great replacement” of higher education in India, certainly for Indian Muslims, under colonial rule was precisely such a centrally controlled, institutionalised pattern of distinct corporate bodies. Institutionalisation under
colonisation allowed ‘modernising’ reform and provided the basis for other cultural themes to pervade the sector.  

The lasting cultural and political legacy of colonialism has often been pointed out by anthropologists (Pels 1997), including in the case of racial separation across Africa (Mamdani 1996) and in establishing caste as a defining social feature of Hindu India (Dirks 2001). Much of the continuity in impact draws on some form of “field,” linking colonialism (at least in the British Empire) to contemporary neo-imperialism through social applications of field theory (Go 2008). Scholarship on education has emphasised this link (Tikly 1999; 2004), and has also deployed the notion of “field” for this end. Thus, Rizvi makes the link using the notion of a discursive field: “the range of assumptions that are made implicitly in debating a particular topic or issue, ideas that are presumed, and notions that are simply ruled out of the bounds of possibility” (Rizvi 2004: 162).

However, in keeping with the institutional focus of this enquiry, the emphasis here is on how the environment of colonial rule specifically shaped the “social imaginary” of organisational development. In order to bring this out in sharper relief than more amorphous diffusion of concepts, I have found it useful to work with the notion of a “colonial milieu.” The purpose of this concept is to draw attention to Taylor’s “modern social imaginary” but in an institutionalised context to help understand diffusions of modernity. I am trying to capture with this term, on the one hand, something more analysable (by virtue of being institutionalised) than a “social imaginary” or a “field” and, on the other hand, something of a more significant order of magnitude than formal structuration, such as the specific organisation charts of universities. In the course of the argument I posit the milieu as an institutionalised mechanism that defines the terms of debate – for instance around the medium of instruction in higher education in British India – after whose acceptance the actual debate is relatively sharply delimited – for instance, which texts to place on the syllabus once English is adopted as the primary language of instruction.
Clearly, the notion builds on Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical analyses, for instance of the clinic (Foucault 1975), the prison (Foucault 1979) and even sexuality (Foucault 1980a), all significant institutions. However, I also intend with the term to indicate analyses of transnational linkages among and between institutions, which Foucault had notably neglected. Likewise, much of Foucault’s discussions of the micrological analytics of constructive power imply – as do the concepts of field and imaginary and others within a broad perspective of constructivism – a restriction of agency. Such, indeed, is my primary objective of introducing the term “milieu”: restriction of individual agency for and by institutions. That is, the concept indicates that individual agency is limited by certain conditions of imagining, or horizons, and further that such limitation both affects the engagement of individuals with institutions and, in turn, that these horizons are at least in part constructed by institutions to effect individuals. Such sketches of the “milieu” needs further detailing, which would be a distinct theoretical endeavour.

The period of active colonisation between 1757 and 1947 (first under increasing administrative influence of the East India Company and later directly by the British government) points to the construction of ‘modernity’ and tradition in such a milieu. The colonial milieu directly influenced ‘modernising’ attempts at Muslim higher education in British India but also shaped indirectly the retaliation to British modernity. Briefly, colonialism configured the space of higher education to respond to it, and in turn controlled the response through administrative means, including reform. The colonial milieu, in turn, situated higher education institutions, principally universities, in Pakistan to engage with more or less the same cultural thematic in contemporary globalisation.

Before discussing this cultural thematic in a bit more detail, I should add a brief qualification. Here, and throughout this work, I use British modernity to refer to the cultural expressions of modernisation evident in formal British governance and Imperial policies in India. I certainly don’t wish to contend that these policies, or indeed their cultural linkages in England, are singular or homogenous. As Carey and
Trakulhun (2009) show, there have always been contests around modernity, and at least three different European Enlightenments can be identified. However, even differing colonial opinions such as on the question of English-language medium for higher education in British India, had to crystallise into more or less coherent policy statements. Taken together these, in turn, demonstrate more or less coherent cultural features behind the term ‘modernisation.’

1.3 Agency Limited: the Cultural Constitution of ‘Modern’ Higher Education Reform in Pakistan

The analysis in this thesis of reform policies and related events leading up to contemporary higher education reform in Pakistan supports Charles Taylor’s notion of a “long march of modernity.” That is, there is a clearly identifiable development of the notion of what it means to be ‘modern’ when reforming higher education in what is now Pakistan. This “long march” is traceable to the first ‘modern’ policy for higher education in British India, the Education Despatch of the Court of Directors of the East India Company in 1854, which served to first institutionalise, practically and discursively, a more or less informal sector.

To situate the problematique of this work, in the second chapter I discuss ‘modernity’ in the theoretical context of the thesis. The ‘cultural logic of modernity’ (Swingewood 1998: 137) is a starting point for this examination, emphasising the values-orientation that in many ways drive the political, economic and social trends which are the usual analytic dimensions. This view is useful in underscoring the point that contemporary conceptualisations of ‘modernity’ are inextricably bound up in Enlightenment reason of Europe, centred on Immanuel Kant. It then emerges that what leads to a particular form being classified as ‘modern’ is more substantive than only newness, or *modos* (“the now”). From its historical roots in the Enlightenment, “modernity” has typically referred to a certain set of themes and motifs in artistic styles, technology, economic modes, institutions, practices and thought, evident in Western Europe and the US by and large from the 18th century on. Critiques of this
history of a “long march of modernity” point out its losses (Nederveen Pieterse 2003: 41) and emphasise the question of alternative modernities. Pieterse (2004) reviews this thinking to argue that the call is very real and justified, but the alternatives are “trains that never leave the station” - there is no new destination. More important than theorisation, Pieterse (2004: 15) notes, is the opportunity to start a dialogue between the East and the West on modernities. While Charles Taylor agrees with such a formulation, his analysis never enters the domain of how Western cultural transformation has been projected onto other cultures. His emphasis remains on how modernity has been evoked as a loss of old beliefs. Moderns have come to see that certain old beliefs and claims are false, irrational, and unjustified, and this is especially so about religion. Whichever tradition is picked, a key charge against it by ‘moderns’ is the obscurantism caused by religion. Religion, to paraphrase Sahlins, is something the matter with traditional people.

Such, of course, was not always the case. In the third chapter I briefly review the historical context of higher education reform in Pakistan. The chapter begins, first, with a historical outline of pre-colonial Muslim higher education, which constitutes an important trajectory claimed by Pakistan today. There is much evidence that epistemological and organisational boundedness of this trajectory justifies its consideration as a separate system. Such evidence challenges the still-widely held view that Muslim education merely “adopted” Greek practices in the 8th century before handing them over to Europe in the Middle Ages. The chapter thus discusses formative British colonial influence on the institutionalisation of Muslim higher education in India in the background to introducing the policy reform texts used as data for this study (2001, 1959, 1904 and 1854). I draw attention to evidence of the dramatically different organisation of ‘modern’ British colonial higher education in India from what is known of the earlier Muslim system. Finally, I review the contours of higher education in Pakistan today. In the brief history in this chapter, reform itself appears as a ‘modern’ invention, helping to crystallise new and old in an ongoing discourse of discontinuity.
This is especially interesting in light of the theoretical framework outlined above. On the one hand, ‘modernity’ has clearly been linked – almost inevitably so – to secularism by most scholars and in the general popular imagination; the policy texts listed here support such a reading of ‘being modern’ as being secular. On the other hand, Charles Taylor among others point out the inherent Christian (specifically, Protestant) bias in such a narrative. I intend to use this perspective to illustrate how the construction of secularism in reforming higher education first in British colonial India to become more ‘modern’ was inherently different to that concept as it emerged in the “long march” of Atlantic modernity that Taylor concentrates on.

More broadly, Taylor has been concerned with “the conflict between modern culture and the transcendent” (Taylor 1999: 22) and seeks to preserve a role for religiosity from within modernity. Precisely such an ethic might be said to hold true for the policy texts reforming higher education in Pakistan, although I am not familiar with any consistent analysis in this regard. The general, unquestioned assumption is that it is possible to be both Muslim and ‘modern’ when reforming higher education. This is especially pertinent for Pakistan, which was founded in 1947 on ostensible reasons of religion: a separate homeland for Indian Muslims. While the breadth of this issue exceeds the scope here, I analyse the theme of secularism in ‘modernising’ higher education reform in chapter seven. Briefly, my reading suggests evidence of a ‘modern’ tension between being Islamic and being secular, and I point to one way of analysing its resolution.

This theme draws attention to processes of ‘modernisation.’ These are revealing because ‘modernisation’ can be mis-read as exertion of coercive force which ceased upon de-colonisation in 1947. By contrast, my approach here is that colonial institutionalisation imprinted certain traces on Muslim higher education that continue to shape Pakistani higher education reform without direct coercion or even mimicry. I propose that one reason for this continuity was the construction of tropes, or a turns of speech, to guide reforms.
These tropes are referred to in the thesis as “border rhetoric”, a set of discursive tools that continually reinforce ‘modernising’ reform by establishing a divide that is at once cultural and alterable through culture. One instance of border rhetoric discussed in this thesis is the normative change that occurred at the onset of formal British colonial rule of India: the change in conceiving of social difference on the basis of nature (biological race) to nurture (culture). Such rhetoric almost impels social reform, and continues to do so today. Another instance is the construction of a borderline between inclusion and exclusion from a club of ‘moderns.’ Such border rhetoric was not just colonial governmentality, but has continued into Pakistani higher education policy. While in many cases the substance has changed, the vocabulary of reform has remained the same, thus consistently shaping ‘modernisation’ of higher education.

The use of border rhetoric to equate ‘modernity’ in Pakistani higher education reform with a global outlook is discussed in chapter four, including how that outlook contributes to subverting the endogenous-exogenous boundary through indirect influence. The primary emphasis in this chapter is to understand the processes that led to the Task Force report in Pakistan (TFIHE 2002) to be so similar to ‘modern’ global blueprints, such as proposed by a UNESCO/ World Bank report (TFHES 2000) without any overt influence or involvement. I trace four major thematic convergences underpinning the two reports which indicate how the Pakistani report ended up in the same discourse of ‘modernity’ while being so far removed from cultural resistance. A key normative implication of this is that while ‘modernising’ higher education has inevitably entailed a global outlook, such an outlook is far from being value-neutral. Rather, it has been historically shaped by the steady institutionalisation of higher education in Pakistan leading up to 2001-02, most notably the impulse to make Pakistan globally “competitive.”

Of course, another way to approach this continuity is from the standpoint of ‘globalisation,’ taken as a specific historical phase of planetary relations (Nederveen Pieterse 2008; Scholte 2008) featuring the emergence of new, fluid borders and
cultural hybridity (Nederveen Pieterse 2003). However, this is a complex theoretical
debate which is slightly at a tangent to my focus here since I am not concerned with
conceptualising globalisation as a phenomenon. Therefore, I do not intend to
navigate the definitional issues in this work and will not be making any contribution
to the theoretical exploration of globalisation per se. Rather, I will continue to use
globalisation as a backdrop of increasing supra-territorial relations to highlight the
cultural histories I am concerned with under the rhetoric of ‘modernisation.’ One of
these is the notion of global competitiveness.

Global competitiveness has translated almost uniformly in Pakistani higher
education into a priority on English language as the medium of instruction and,
importantly, theorisation. The question explored by chapter five, thus, is what the
implications of this are, and how English came to be so equated with ‘being modern.’
The question is particularly important in light of the history of language politics in
Pakistan, which even someone with a passing knowledge of the country would be
aware of. It becomes all the more puzzling when literacy statistics reveal that about
half the population is illiterate, and informal estimates suggest that less than a
quarter of these are literate in English. In light of often violent language politics in
the country, this chapter emphasises that the Task Force report in 2001-02 remains
significantly silent about the medium of higher instruction, assuming as “natural”
that it will be English. The contextual history of this ‘modern’ assumption is revealing
in all three historical policy texts: 1959, 1904 and 1854. In chapter five, I indicate some
key facets of the contexts, attending especially to the border rhetoric in each case to
illustrate how tropes constructed by colonial ‘modernising’ reforms as far back as the
early 19th century continue to dominate higher education reform in Pakistan today.

The story of the introduction of English language as a medium of higher education
in the mid-19th century leads to the influence of the utilitarian movement in England.
This connection is traced in chapter six, along with a reading of the continuing legacy
of that movement in Pakistani higher education today. The key is that the
introduction of English as the ‘modern’ language of “quality” in higher education
under reformist colonial rule in the 1830s was not an administrative matter. Rather its origins lay in the changing attitude within England towards India and all things India (Spear 1938). A wave of social reform in early 19\textsuperscript{th} century England was fed by accounts of social and moral degradation among Indian Hindus and Muslims. This wave of reform included the belief that social reform was possible via legislation and education, and that supremacy gave moral authority, indeed duty, to colonisers to reform India. These views were the cornerstone of the utilitarian movement rapidly gaining popularity in England in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century. The imperative to be “useful” was constructed on the back of a declaration that Indians – Hindus and Muslims alike – were, among other things, impractical by nature. This same belief and trope carries through to formal colonial times, in the 1904 Resolution and into independent Pakistan. While the definition of what it means to be “practical” changes – for instance from economic nation-building in 1959 to global individual competitiveness in 2001 – the trope of utility constructed under colonialism remains evident throughout Pakistani higher education reform.

Chapter seven then explores the unusual connection of the utilitarian movement with evangelical missionaries in British India. Again, this unlikely partnership appears to be the key to understanding how secularism came to define ‘modern’ higher education in a manner quite at a tangent to the use of the same word within Europe at the same time. This alliance is best illustrated in the figure of the reformist Charles Grant, who wrote “The true cure of darkness is light... English-language instruction in the study of Newtonian science would presently eradicate the gross superstitions of Hinduism. Into the religious vacuum thus created, it would be easy to insert Christianity” (Grant 1813). As discussed earlier, this formulation led to a tension between secularism and Islam in higher education, a tension that has only intensified over time in Pakistan and is evident, for instance, in some of the outstanding violence in the country today.
I believe that these specific processes in a transnational history of power have led to a condition of ‘modernity’ in Pakistan not “just like the West’s” nor truly alternative in being based on alternative epistemological or ethical principles and theorisation. Rather, it is a modernity that is tangential, or, not quite the same. I explore this implication more fully in chapter eight. This last chapter also sums up the empirical analysis to respond to the three guiding research questions of the study, before suggesting some empirical and theoretical directions to take the study forward in light of the limitations discussed throughout the thesis.

A quick note on formatting before I proceed: it should by now be clear that in problematising the term ‘modernity,’ I will treat it as an ambiguous term whose import is to be unpacked through this analysis. I have been emphasising this by enclosing the term and its derivatives in quotation marks. However, continuing to do so would make for cumbersome reading and so I have dropped the use of quotation marks for the sake of ease of reading, with the hope that this will not distract from my emphasis.
2 MODERNITY: A UNIVERS(AL)ITY PERSPECTIVE

From the beginning, the number one problem of modern social science has been modernity itself... (Charles Taylor 2004: 1)

2.1 Introductory Conceptions of Modernity

A recent commentary states that “modernity constitutes the cultural logic of an urban-based industrial capitalism in which highly differentiated structures – political, economic, cultural – increasingly separate themselves from centralized institutions” (Swingewood 1998: 137). Pakistani experience may contest this, since the urge to be “modern” is prior to and distinct from urbanisation (which even now accounts for less than 40% of the population) and industrialisation (agriculture still contributes the maximum share of economic production in the country). The structures referred to by Swingewood are far from being “highly differentiated” in Pakistan. Melding of political, economic and social spheres, too, is and has been a feature of Pakistan, and may be a global trend. And the separation from centralised institutions is a feature most citizens may not be able to relate to in Pakistan, where political, economic and religious forces increasingly exist in direct relation to a power structure that is becoming more and more centralised. However, “cultural logic” is a key starting point for exploring modernity in a national context, emphasising the values-orientation that in many ways drive the political, economic and social trends which are the usual fields of analysis.

The word “modern” has cultural roots, tracing to modernitus used in the Middle Ages in Western Europe for the argument between Moderns and Ancients in Church reform, and to the Renaissance and its conceptualisation of time and division of history into epochs. The term has since been variously deployed in Western sociological and cultural analyses, from Weber (1948) to Simmel (1950), Adorno and Horkheimer (2002/1947), Habermas (1987), and Giddens (1990), not to mention a wealth of postmodern and poststructuralist works drawing on Foucault (Foucault
1979; 1980b) and Derrida (1978). In almost all cases, however, the implications of the contextual evolution of the term are largely overlooked, with most analyses generalising their European-American results globally, at least implicitly. While the emphases of these and other theorists are distinct, overlapping senses of the term emerge from this contextualised root in Western European history. Swingewood (1998: 140) identifies three categories of modernity in this literature:

“Modernity as a literary-aesthetic concept structured in referential discourse with its object as the “new”… negates the concept of the whole, with analysis focusing on the fragmentary and fleeting nature of reality, on the microcosm and micrological…

“Modernity as a sociological-historical category closely linked with the Enlightenment “project” of science and human progress, in which the growing autonomy of knowledge and culture forms the basis of change…

“Modernity as a structural concept dealing with the transformation of whole societies, ideologies, social structures and culture… confirms the promise of scientific reason to unmask irrational forces and point the way to necessary social change… implies historical awareness… and the ways the past continues to live in the present… emphasises that it is agents and their actions which make history and social change… increased purposiveness, conscious collective action…”

This abbreviated categorisation is useful in underscoring the point that contemporary notions of “modernity” are inextricably bound up with the European Enlightenment, for which Immanuel Kant has been a central figure.14

“Immanuel Kant,” wrote Bertrand Russell, “is generally considered the greatest of modern philosophers” (Russell 1999/1945: 677). While a number of Kant’s works have been at the forefront of European thought, it is his Critique of Pure Reason that shaped much of German Idealism and the Enlightenment. Kant’s primary critique, in brief and rather crudely, is that there exists a fundamental part of our knowledge that is a priori, that is before experience and that cannot be inferred from experience or deduced from logic alone. Extending Cartesian duality of understanding and sense, Kant’s first Critique on Pure Reason retains intellect as fundamentally removed from
reality. In his second Critique of Practical Reason, ethical principles (in particular freedom and duty) remain likewise isolated from action. In order to bridge the gap, Kant’s third Critique declares Judgment as the “mediating element” between epistemology and agency, between pure understanding and practical reason.

Briefly, Kant posits an “aesthetic sensibility” to bridge this gap between principles and action, involving a two-fold manoeuvre. On the one hand this sensibility necessarily presupposes the possibility of universality of judgment, over and above individual preferences. On the other hand, judgment is also essentially singular, to do with a particular object or action. Judgment, for Kant, is the capacity to reason the particular as part of a generality, the sought-after link between individual actions and generic principles. When such judgment is applied to a specific material object it can connect to the wider principles of understanding, resulting in a judgment of, say, beauty. Kant perceives judgment as mediating between the general/ transcendent and the particular/ empirical. In this crucial mediating realm, Kant posits Culture as the keystone. Culture, for Kant, is the “expression in sentiments of reason and high principle” that roots the aesthetic sensibility in a community of opinion at one end, and in a particular work of art, at the other. At the same time, Kant determines Culture as founded on ethical ideals. These key elements of Kant became “canonical” in modern Western thought (Roberts 1988: 9): primacy of reason through the practice of critique, belief in human agency, a reliance on aesthetic judgment to mediate pure and practical reason, and a strong belief in Culture that grounds judgment in ethical agency.

It is worth noting here that Kant’s philosophy did not remain limited to metaphysics. His approach to Culture and aesthetic sensibility found its way through German Idealism into practice in the shape of the University of Berlin, the first modern university, a University of Culture. “Modern” not only because of the enculturing role ascribed to the University but also because his division of the Critiques into Pure Reason (Truth), Practical Reason (Good) and Judgment (Beauty) as faculties of the mind was directly related to the division of the faculties in the
modern university. Our current conception of university faculties of Sciences, Social Sciences, and Arts & Humanities still correspond broadly to this conceptual division.

In his *Conflict of the Faculties*, Kant (1992/1798) explicitly defines how these faculties are to interact and operate in a system of continuous tension. While Kant’s project was primarily intellectual – the determination of metaphysical conditions of human knowledge – the work was projected onto the institution of the university. This brief essay remains central in recent efforts at demonstrating the university in deconstruction, where the boundaries determined by Kant are shown as being always blurred and porous (Derrida et al. 1983; 1992; Kamuf 1997; Derrida 2000).

However, Kant’s idealisation of Culture as the ground of the critical faculty of judgment also proceeds from, and in turn reinforces, his essentialist teleology. Van Gorkom (2008) reminds us that this essentialist teleology allowed Kant to be both cosmopolitan and racist at the same time. While prioritising “universal” Culture, Kant continued to insist on a schema of racial evolution, from red to black to olive-yellow to white, with self-evident biological differences corresponding to mental capacities. Each skin colour, for Kant, had an “inner finality”, a “purposive capacity” with its own “predisposition”, leading to a hierarchy of races. Given the simultaneity of Kant’s role in shaping Enlightenment modernity with British colonial intervention in Indian higher education,15 this teleological outlook becomes significant in determining the manner in which colonial higher education should be examined. Again, I should point out that neither has Immanuel Kant always been regarded as ‘the’ central figure of the Enlightenment, nor was colonial modernity singularly attached to his thought. However, contestations notwithstanding, I believe there is enough coherence in British colonial policies to justify this connection with a seminal Enlightenment figure.

### 2.2 Beyond Modos

It is arguably in his ambiguities – such as between cosmopolitanism and racism – that Kant provides the basis for much of European Enlightenment, leading to two
readily identifiable streams of “modernity”. The first, emphasising instrumental rationality is indelibly associated with what Charles Taylor calls that “historically unprecedented amalgam of new practices and institutional forms (science, technology, industrial production, urbanization), of new ways of living (individualism, secularization, instrumental rationality), and of new forms of malaise (alienation, meaninglessness, a sense of impending social dissolution)” (Taylor 2004: 1). The second, an unending critique of Kant and his foundation of Enlightenment rationality across Europe, began virtually simultaneously with him.

Both streams, and indeed much of contemporary literature on modernity, refer to a sense of break with the past, an elimination of the old, and a revelation in new styles. Nietzsche, the prototype critic of modernity for most later thinkers, identified the break with tradition as the defining feature of modernity, in that sources of values could no longer be based upon appeals to the authority of the past (Peters 2004). The orientation to the future is based on notions of change, progress, experiment, innovation and newness as valuable in itself. For Nietzsche, modernity is built on the myth that it can create its own value endogenously, that it can generate normative orientations out of its own historical force, momentum and trajectory.

However, more is being exalted than mere newness of form. Breaks from the past have been formed and valued highly throughout history and across the world without being classified “modern.” Homer’s *Odysseus* may be considered modern in seeking to break the limits and constraints placed on human agency by nature through the forces of reason, a seminal break from the Greek past. Aristotle’s metaphysics sought to empower humans with reasoning to control mystical natural forces, another break from the Greek past. In Muslim science, Ibn Khaldun’s historiography categorised time into epochs and identified determining factors for the seemingly arbitrary rise and fall of nations, yet another break from tradition. All of these and so many innovations define human history, yet none of these was called “modern” in the contemporary sense of the word. What leads to a particular form being classified as “modern” is, therefore, more substantive than a background trend
of newness. It is, in other words, more than a reference to modos [Latin, “the now”]. From its historical roots in the Enlightenment, “modernity” has typically referred to a certain set of themes and motifs in artistic styles, technology, economic modes, institutions, practices and thought, evident in Western Europe and the US by and large from the 18th century on.

Critiques of Enlightenment modernity have spread laterally across disciplines as well as deeply within disciplines, spawning in turn their own criticisms. These arguments carry on a tradition of thought from Kant marked by Nietzsche, Heidegger, the Frankfurt School, Levinas, Foucault, Lyotard and Derrida, alongside the psychoanalytic tradition from Freud to Jung, Lacan and Žižek, among other fields such as, notably, the literary. The arguments raised by them question modernity from within, forming a framework of distrust of meta-narratives (Lyotard 1984).

Phenomenological Situatedness

Critics of Enlightenment modernity may not agree on much, yet the extensive body of scholarship does suggest two underlying and interlinked themes at least implicit in much recent analysis. The first is a foundation in what may broadly be classified “phenomenology,” to be distinguished from scientific realism as “the most coherent philosophical alternative to the project of naturalising consciousness” (Moran 1999: xiv). Phenomenology, emphasising a description of the way things appear and manifest themselves to consciousness, has been referred to as “a movement which, in many ways, typifies the course of European philosophy in the twentieth century” (Ibid: xiii). The school strictly defined as “phenomenological” has its own history, beginning with the neo-Kantian approach of Edmund Husserl, which is not directly relevant here. However, the central motif of the broad set of studies now classified “phenomenological” has acquired a more or less foundational status in most critiques of Enlightenment modernity: the sensitivity to perception of the phenomenon itself devoid of externally imposed categories. This perspectivism is one
basis for the now-current tendency to “distrust meta-narratives” (Lyotard 1984), such as those imposed by colonisers in British India.

The second theme, a corollary of perspectivism, is the importance of the particular. In social analysis, this has meant a sensitivity to culture, as broadly defined by anthropologists. Philosophically, this sensitivity does not emanate from Husserl, who progressively emphasised a Cartesian transcendental ego. Rather his successors and critics, primarily Martin Heidegger, abandoned Husserl’s first, “epistemic road to phenomenology” in favour of a second, “ontological road to phenomenology” (Aspers 2010) that draws heavily on Nietzsche. Heidegger suggested the notion of “thrown-ness,” emphasising that the Self was always already in a state of relations in society. This very state of socialisation, for Heidegger, disqualifies any objective, universal notions of truth based on ratios (adequation), allowing only subjective, contextualised truths based on “unveiling” in a clearing of light and shadow (alétheia).16 While Aspers (2010) points out that intricacies of the “second road to phenomenology” have been less followed by social theorists, the basic situatedness exemplified by Heidegger is visible in most critiques of Enlightenment modernity, specifically in postcolonial analyses. For social theorists, this has meant sensitivity to context and, hence, culture when exploring social phenomena as a challenge to universalism, especially to generalising the West as universal.

**Modernity – Westernity and Alternatives**

There is a driving recognition in critiques of modernity that “modernization has been advancing like a steamroller, erasing cultural and biological diversity in its way, and now not only the gains (rationalization, standardization, control) but also the losses (alienation, disenchantment, displacement) are becoming apparent” (Nederveen Pieterse 2003: 41). One of the key issues in social theory has been the question of alternative or multiple modernities, summed up by Pieterse (2004) thus: “is modernities really modernity plus local franchises, or is something more fundamental at issue?”
Pieterse notes the importance of speaking about “modernity” in the singular, particularly in the conceptual context of “development”, but points out that theorisation of this modernity has changed so significantly that questions must now be asked about its further usage. For instance, if the timeline of modernity can be readily pushed back from the 19th century to the 16th or even the 13th (Abu-Lughod 1989) and capitalist modernity’s origins can be placed anywhere between Western Europe, South Asia and East Asia (Nederveen Pieterse 2004: 2), how can the term continue to be useful? This question is particularly relevant when we note that, “conventional understandings of modernity are steeped in Occidentalism: industrialism, modernity and sociology originate in the same nineteenth century epoch and classical theory is positioned in the tacit framework of western imperialism” (Ibid). Likewise, some (Latour 1993) suggest that “we have never been modern,” since that term indicates a specific cognitive constitution that is only ideal-typical and has never in fact been fully subscribed to. However, such radical framings do not account for the discursive power that the term has, in fact, had in much of non-Western history as being examined here. In fact, much of the rest of the world continues to describe its progress in terms of “multiple modernities.”

Pieterse also extends the question to the call for “multiple modernities”, arguing that the call is very real and justified, but the alternatives are “trains that never leave the station” - there is no new destination. In some cases, even multiple modernities are presented as having been initiated all at the same time, but “within a Western civilizational framework” (Eisenstadt 2000). We remain on the train of modernity, but never leave the station of the West. Appadurai (1996) made the same point: that modernity is not a “monolithic whole” but is unevenly experienced. Much ink has been spilled on the theoretical question of how alternative “alternative modernities” may really be, summarised usefully by Pieterse into two broad perspectives:
Angles on modernity

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<td></td>
<td>Unilinear evolutionism</td>
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<td>Convergence theory</td>
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<td>Historicist</td>
<td>Modernity takes particular forms</td>
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<td>according to historical and initial conditions. Multilinear evolution</td>
<td>Much current sociology</td>
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*(Nederveen Pieterse 2004: 6)*

Parallel to this, Cooper offers four scholarly categories of modernity, as: 1) a powerful claim to singularity in a long and continuing project central to the history of Western Europe and a defining goal for other societies; 2) a bundle of social, ideological, and political phenomena of the West, and an imperial construct of Western origin to sterilise the rich diversity of human experiences; 3) a singular, European experience that can only be limited to Europe, for which the cultural baggage of others makes them ineligible; and 4) one or more of multiple/alternative modernities. These progressively “weak” theorisations are part of a vast and growing literature, adding to confusion about whether modernity is a condition (indelibly linked to capitalism), or a representation of “the end point of a certain narrative of progress, which creates its own starting point [of tradition] as it defines itself by its end point” (Cooper 2005: 126).

Modernity may thus be viewed a set of attributes, or an epoch, or a distinct and continuous period of history, or a package deal dispersed across historical epochs and geographical regions, or an unfolding of related processes over time in artificially imposed timelines. Even within Europe, as Cooper (2005) and Hefner (1998) point out, supposedly uniform universalism is laced with particularities, and “viewing the history of Europe through the frame of modernity obscures the ongoing unresolved
conflicts at the heart of European history and politics” (Ibid: 142). Cooper may well note, “The word modernity is now used to make so many different points that continued deployment of it may contribute more to confusion than clarity” (Ibid: 113).

Be that as it may, the term has played and continues to play an important definitional role in the “development” discourse of many countries, including for higher education in Pakistan. Ignoring the word itself would hardly remove the concern. Much of the “concern” is in fact to do with the possibility of truly alternative modernities, unbound by Western self-histories. Critiques of modernity as Westernity have been important in Pakistan, especially of late.

As both Pieterse and Cooper note, along with other factors leading to this critique of modernity one feature is the criticism of the West by the Rest. “Critique of modernity outside the West seethes with resentment and longing – weaving a tale of an entire vision of change that continues to condemn Africans and Asians to the role of ‘catching up’” (Cooper 2005: 115). However, even in this critique, modernity continues to occupy centre-stage, in a continuing “insistence that modernity be the reference point in a quest for alternatives.” Charles Taylor asks:

Is there a single phenomenon here, or do we need to speak rather of “multiple modernities”, the plural reflecting the fact that other non-Western cultures have modernized in their own way, and cannot be properly understood if we try to grasp them in a general theory which was originally designed with the Western case in mind? (Taylor 2004: 1)

Given that “modernity” can be modernities, the question then becomes, for Pieterse, whether the shift to the plural can mean more for the global South. “New modernities” may be examined on various axes which highlight the difference, but these are not really very different at all, since the point of reference remains a “Western civilizational framework” or “history by analogy” (Mamdani 1996: 9-10). One interesting approach has been bricolage modernity, referring to a mélange of East and West, old and new, indigenous and exogenous (Nederveen Pieterse 2003). A
“fusion” of modernities appears to offer one mode, but upon inspection is too broad to be useful and too obscuring of power relations to be effective for this enquiry.

Rather than point to any one “final” category, Pieterse leaves the issue open, but with strong analytical implications and questions. For instance, if multiple modernities (in the past and in the future) are “new”, then what is “old”? If the “old” Western modernity is on its way out (with the economic rise of India and China), what are the implications for the West? And, if there is a global “swing” back to the East, what will this ultimately mean for the East. More important than any theorisation, Pieterse notes, is the opportunity to start a dialogue now between the East and the West on modernities (Nederveen Pieterse 2004: 15).

In contrast with this sociological and political analysis, but in the same vein, Cooper argues that, whatever the sociological implications, the primary feature of modernity has been its incomplete-ness. As Derrida says for democracy, modernity is always to-come. Cooper notes that the logic of modernity as a singularity can only operate by exclusion, and so what remains heterogeneous plays a “paradoxical but unavoidable role of the ‘constitutive outside’” (Cooper 2005: 117). Seen in this multiple format, modernity becomes just a word for everything that has happened in the past five hundred years (or more): “As modernities proliferate, the capacity to distinguish modernity from anything else is diminished” (Ibid: 129). Even if colonised intellectuals or the “savages” developed alternatives in which technologies were adopted but values were not, the question remains whether these contests were indeed fought on the turf of modernity. As Cooper says, “Multiple modernities are attractive, but it is precisely the singularity and universality of the modern that made it so compelling in a certain historical moment” (Ibid: 130). For Cooper, the need to distinguish between one or another model of modernity/modernities is no longer an analytically useful concept, just as identity and other such concepts have become too broad to be useful or too narrow to be correct.

Rather than attempt to force any theoretical solutions through this impasse, the aim in this study is to be sensitive to the nuances of the question. The broad
approach I adopt here is to recognise that irrespective of how truly alternative “alternative modernities” are, it is important to appreciate the transnationally linked evolution of “modernity-talk”, a transnational linkage bound up with histories of power. That is, while modernity in the singular remains an important point of reference, my attempt here is to explore the question of alternatives which are, necessarily, bound up through phenomenological situatedness to questions of culture in the anthropological sense of the term.

2.3 Modernity and Culture: Social Imaginaries

Cultural Versus A-cultural Modernity

A history of the social theories of modernity is adequately offered by Charles Taylor (2004). Taylor’s review of modernity places culture at the centre, besides leading to his theorisation of the social imaginary, which is critical to my argument. Taylor notes that in the earlier part of the 20th century, a question was posed, mostly by anthropologists, about the nature of modernity assumed by colonialism. Then-current approaches to modernisation saw it as a culture-neutral transformation. This process, akin to a mathematical operation, could be applied to any “traditional” society and out would pop, after much travail no doubt, a “modern” society. This view, as demonstrated by Taylor, dominated the discourse of modernity until beyond World War II, and is still considered the primary, state-sponsored version in most developing nations (Taylor 1999). The ‘operation’, in this view, is based largely on two factors: (1) the rise of instrumental rationality and a particular (Western) notion of empirical ‘science’ and (2) inevitable social forces that must ultimately reach a critical mass to facilitate ‘modernity,’ such as urbanisation, bureaucratic state administration, technology, and so on. Different approaches in this a-cultural view ascribe causality to either of these factors.

For Taylor, whether modernity is viewed as “emancipating” or “entrapping”, the change is evoked as a loss of old beliefs. Moderns are perceived as having “come to
see” that certain old beliefs and claims are false, irrational, and unjustified. The inclination to term “beliefs” as unjustified in the acid test of rationality is a peculiar feature of the modern mind (Ibid: 154). Also, whether modernity is viewed as emerging from instrumental, Enlightenment rationality or the change in social patterns and institutions, these forces and the change itself is attributed to amoral motivations. Facts are distinguished from value, a key cognitive feature of the modern mind (Ibid: 155). A key aspect of this a-cultural view is that people now imagine that humans have always and everywhere viewed themselves as the Western (hu)man does now, and that previously societies were simply waiting for the right combination of factors to propel them into a modernising process. As Taylor points out, this view assumes that the paths of all societies everywhere are bound to converge, and all societies are moving along this same path at different places and paces. This is a view still at the bottom of what is commonly referred to as economic and human development today, a point not mentioned by Taylor. He also does not mention that many critiques of modernity likewise assume a-cultural transformation.

Taylor also presents a critique of this dominant view of modernity, what he terms a cultural theory of modernity. Culture, for Taylor, is “a language and a set of practices that define specific understandings of personhood, social relations, states of mind/soul, goods and bads, virtues and vices, and the like.” Or: “a constellation of understandings of person, nature, society and the good” (Taylor 1999: 153-154).

From this view of culture, Taylor points out two major problems with the dominant, a-cultural view of modernisation: 1) it ignores the fact that the views now held are not universal, i.e. species-specific, but in fact belong to one culture, i.e. the Euro-American West. These views of self, personhood, man’s relation to God and to man, man-in-nature, etc., are one among a constellation of other visions still extant; and 2) it ignores the fact that the old beliefs were not irrational but rational according to different criteria of notions of self, others, time, deity, etc. Viewed in terms of these critiques, Taylor notes that modernity can thus be seen not as a “negation of tradition” but rather as a “transformation of culture” (Ibid: 158). He
argues the same point more generally in his earlier work on *Sources of the Self* (Taylor 1989). Not only is the a-cultural theory incorrect, by any standard, but it is also dangerous. Academically, it impoverishes and distorts the understanding of both the West and the Rest. Politically, it caters to enslaving human desires for certainty and for evaluation. An a-cultural theory affords us the illusion of control of the future by “knowing” it, as well as to judge others and ourselves for having become better or worse for following the path of modernisation.

The fear of a loss of certainty, says Taylor, and the fear of losing the ability to judge others according to a “universal” standard, are hurdles in a more accurate and nuanced approach to modernity: a cultural one. A cultural theory of modernity, for Taylor, would characterise the rational and social transformations issued by the West as the rise of a new culture, and its adoption by other nations no more than projection of cultural power. A cultural theory of modernity would hold “not that we sloughed off a whole lot of unjustified beliefs, leaving an implicit self-understanding which had always been there to operate at last untrammeled. Rather, one constellation of implicit understandings of our relation to God, the cosmos, other humans, and time was replaced by another in a multi-faceted situation” (*Ibid:* 193).

In other words, where an a-cultural theory of modernity would look for the meta-narrative of convergence in divergence, the cultural theory would look for the micro-narratives of divergence in convergence. Instead of a uniform, culture-neutral operation, Taylor argues for a discourse of culturally sensitive alternative modernities. However, there is necessarily some level of convergence if the transformation or process is to be called “modernisation”. That is, an adequate theory of alternative modernities must justify both the alternative and the modernity.

**The Social Imaginary: Horizons of Modernity**

This, Taylor points out, is what people have been doing across the world anyway, and need to do more of: finding “their own” transformations rather than being engulfed by the homogenising wave of Western modernity. The “modernity
transformation” need not, and should not produce the same culture and society everywhere, irrespective of which “traditional” culture is used as input. The development of instrumental rationality, following Descartes and Kant, and the social and institutional changes led to an Atlantic society undergoing a particular transformation leading to ethics of extraction, “liberal” individualism, mobile cosmopolitanism, technology dependence, invulnerability to climate/nature, and “coming to see” the falsehood of all beliefs, religion and metaphysics.

An a-cultural theory of modernity assumes that more or less the same choices are open to all societies on the horizon of modernisation. As Taylor points out, this involves an “ethnocentrism of the present” (Taylor 1999: 186). Furthermore, the separation of fact from value in this view inscribes “value-free” truths, whether in particle physics or in sociology, and limits the choices for all non-Western societies, as well as for alternatives within the West. This value-free notion of truth suppresses recognition of background (tradition and context) in favour of doctrines (modernity and content). Not only do moderns project their backgrounds on to others and their own forebears, “they render this error invisible by repressing all awareness of backgrounds as such” (Ibid: 195).

Important for the argument here is not only that Taylor points out the fallacies and dangers in the dominant view about modernisation as an a-cultural transformation, but also the theoretical framework he employs to do so. For Taylor, an a-cultural theory of modernity occludes the horizons on which societies can make choices, in favour of the choices on one, fixed horizon of Western modernity. These horizons are possible in other cultural views of self, personhood, deity, etc. These views are based on what Taylor terms different “background understandings.” He classifies background understandings into three levels: 1) explicit assumptions formulated into doctrine that is transmitted from generation to generation (correctly or falsely), as in educational curricula and socialisation; 2) what Pierre Bourdieu calls our ‘habitus’ or understandings that could be formulated into doctrine but are not done so, for instance our relationships with specific others in family and outside, the
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constitution of our multiple identities, and so on. This level of habitus is an understanding of the self as an agent with certain powers and an agent moving in certain kinds of social spaces, along with an understanding of how these spaces inhabit time and how they relate to God, the cosmos, etc. The habitus is a pre-epistemic understanding of stability, of how the world is, has been and will continue to be, and is embodied in practice; and 3) an intermediate space between these two, the level of the symbolic. This level is an understanding that is expressed in ritual, in symbols, and in works of art. More explicit than gestures or “appropriate action” of the habitus level, yet less explicit than the level of doctrine, Taylor terms this the level of the “social imaginary.”

A-cultural views, then, inhabit only the first level, doctrines that used to be held and have now been “shed” for being false, irrational and/or unjustified. But changes in the doctrinal level are only superficial, and express choices being made on a fixed horizon. By contrast, a cultural theory of modernity is sensitive to the level of semi-formed social imaginary, which can formulate new horizons and new sets of choices.

**Toward Multiple Modernities**

Taylor’s analysis indicates, but never enters, the domain of how the Western cultural transformation has been projected onto other cultures through power-laden trajectories of history. He also builds on a relatively uniform and homogenous understanding of the West, and a relatively clear distinction between the West and the Rest. These lines are increasingly seen as being blurred today, through transnational processes of migration and exchange that have continued for centuries. In fact, as many scholars have shown and Marshall Sahlins (1999) sums up, most of the world was already a mix of indigenous and exogenous by the time Western anthropologists, theorists or even colonists got there.

For Taylor, new institutions and processes may have different structures, but respond to common functions, hence the dangers of an over-powering Western cultural transformation that can address those same functions in all societies. In this
structuralist approach, Taylor himself may be criticised for occupying a privileged vantage point of meta-critique, seeking to invoke a transformation of cultures as seen from above all cultures, in some sense. However, his theoretical framework is of great interest here for appreciating the wide spread of a-cultural theories of modernity, the dangers and fallacies inherent in that theory, and the approach to critique it.

Analyses such as Taylor’s have been at the heart of the concept of multiple modernities, for which he advocates. In particular, after the 1950s, “most anthropologists rightly rejected the overextended generalisations of modernisation theory... and limited themselves to careful analysis of religion in local context; a few denied the intellectual validity of cross-cultural comparison at all” (Hefner 1998: 84). The distrust of meta-narratives, such as a-cultural modernity, challenged theorisation. However, theory has re-asserted itself, partly in a critique of modernity and partly in a celebration of multiple modernities. This derives in great part from views such as Taylor’s, of modernity relying on a new conception of moral order, which has “become so self-evident to us, that we have trouble seeing it as one possible conception among others” (Taylor 2004: 2).

The interest in multiple modernities, the notion that different cultures can undergo alternative trajectories that may yet be called modernities, is also closely related to a revival in indigenous cultures. As Sahlins notes, ‘Reports of the death of indigenous cultures...have been greatly exaggerated” (Sahlins 1999: i). This phenomenological resurgence in particularism reverses a-cultural “modern” conceptions by pointing out that culture drives technology, the economy, and other social realms, and not the other way around (Sardar 1999). The revival takes this notion a bit further, in positing that it is, in fact, the periphery that drives the centre: agrarian hinterland “feeding” the metropolis and migrant diasporas financing under-developed “home” villages (Sahlins 1999: xix-xx), colonies defining the imperialist self (Memmi 1965), the mad defining the sane (Foucault), bourgeois prosperity in France linked to the colonial slave trade (Nederveen Pieterse 2004), and so on.
This interest reflects an implicit, often explicit, critique of Enlightenment modernity based on instrumental rationality and “inevitable” social patterns and institutions. Sahlins (1999, iii-vi) points out “what is not too enlightening” about Enlightenment Western consciousness and its notions of civilizations. He refers, first, to the “set of defects that make up the history-less character of indigenous cultures – in obvious contrast to the progressiveness of the West… when we change its called progress, but when they do – notably when they adopt some of our progressive things – it’s a kind of cultural adulteration, a loss of their culture.” Second, Sahlins refers to a ‘despondency’ theory as a logical precursor to dependency theory, under which indigenous cultures are assumed to go into shock upon contact with the technological West and settle into a despondency before becoming dependent on them. Third, the Enlightenment view of modernity assumed that everyone would become like the West – if only they had the “capacity”. There is an inevitability and universality to the triumph of Western-style rationality and progress, in other words an a-cultural transformation. Fourth, disciplines such as anthropology involved a “self-redemptive cultural critique… using other societies as an alibi for redressing what has been troubling us lately… It is as if other peoples had constructed their lives for our purposes, in answer to racism, sexism, imperialism, and the other evils of Western society.” These un-enlightened views, notes Sahlins, created a:

“procedure [that] dissolves worlds of cultural diversity into one indeterminate meaning… marked by an inflexible refusal to differentiate… taking the actual cultural content for the mere appearance of a more profound and generic [read, Western] function… and having thus dissolved the historically substantial in the instrumentally universal, we are pleased to believe we have reduced appearance to truth (Sahlins 1999: vi).

However, as Sahlins notes, “contrary to the evolutionary [a-cultural] destiny the West had foreseen for them [especially during colonisation], the so-called savages will neither be all alike nor just like us.” In fact, Sahlins refers to a number of cases documented by anthropologists, most notably the Eskimos, who have “indigenized”
Western modernity. Such stories of adaptation have highlighted the resilience of culture, contrary to earlier notions of “development”. In fact, many of the societies now being “developed” have adopted technologies but retained elements of their culture which prevent the same path of Enlightenment progress and development. Traditional cultures have persisted in spite of modernity and capitalism.

Thus in modern “development,” tradition - being burdened with ‘irrationalities’ - is presented as an obstacle to so-called development. “The indigenous peoples’ culture is something the matter with them” (Sahlins 1999: xi). Culture can thus be seen as a matrix in which a-cultural, universalist, Enlightenment views of development and progress are hermeneutically processed and adapted in light of a given society’s own needs and power dynamics. Whether or not this is commendable, it is a fact whose recognition can lead to more complete understanding of the present moment and its some-times violent dynamics. In fact, “cultural subversion is in the nature of intercultural relations” (Ibid: xv). One of the major shocks to the West recently has been that traditional cultures are neither all compatible with, nor all vulnerable to, global capitalism and its cultural foundations. Lack of “development” is less a matter of the culture of resistance, than the resistance of culture. An African scholar commented that Africa is no longer subjected to the Western model of development for the simple reason that this model is no longer of any worth. As Sahlins sums up, “Finally - enlightenment.”

Culture, in sum, does matter for modernity. It is crucial to development, not as an embodiment of all that needs to change/develop, but rather as a matrix in which developments are processed, adapted, and subverted. This (again, phenomenologically situated) view of cultures as matrices for the interpretation and adaptation of modernity *ala* Europe emphasises the nature of modernity more as a symbol than as a fact. Modernity as a category can and has been manipulated as a symbol for the West and the Rest. In this sense, modernity is supple, not least because it is dependent upon culture, which is itself supple, dynamic, and located in the interstices of consciousness.
For Cooper, also, the most important investigations in anthropology of modernity are not about modernity or modernities, but how the concept is used to make claims. Cooper notes certain pathos in the way the rules of modernity were defined, goals were set, claims were made, and disappointment resulted in the non-Western, colonised world. If modernity was a packaging argument, its critique redefined the package as a “bad” one, and multiple modernities re-packaged the same wine in new bottles, leaving intact Western modernity and proposing alternatives. This packaging, unpacking, and re-packaging has substituted for an analysis of debates, trajectories, actions and processes as they unfolded in history. In fact, he points out that colonialism drew vitally on concepts and trends whose history extends further back than Enlightenment rationality. Narrating this history, for Cooper, is important to identify how problems can be framed and that how they are framed can have consequences. Framing in terms of pre-modern tradition, modernity, and postmodernism may not have led to greater insights into the actual historical trajectories we seek to understand.

These claims on the ground of modernity have been both liberating, as for instance in the case Cooper documents of mine workers’ rights in colonial Africa, and devastating. Kabou, for instance, launches a particularly searing criticism of the use of “modernity” as a representation by corrupt elite in postcolonial Africa to not deliver welfare or social justice. The elite enjoy and promote a culture of blame on colonisation and the neo-colonial/ imperialist plot, and deploy cultural authenticity as an excuse for non-accountability to retain and exercise power. Such an elite, for Kabou, discusses “development” only in order to seek handouts from the West, which are used to further legitimise their power and corruption, and to justify the most retrograde behaviour. As Cooper notes, in a cultural confrontation between a side that keeps uttering “human rights” (universalism) and another “community values” (particularism), the actual issues being faced by people tend to be obscured. It is this slice through the representations of modernity as a social analytic category, and into its deployment for claim-making and including-excluding that can guide an enquiry.
into institutional history. The phenomenologically situated notion of supple modernity draws attention to the rhetoric and cultural values underlying “modernity-talk” in a country such as Pakistan. As with most such enquiries, however, the issues have been defined, especially in a colonial context, by the “starting point” of the modern narrative, the construction of a tradition from which modern emancipation is needed.

2.4 Modernity and Tradition

The construction of “tradition” in order to legitimise a narrative of modernity may be one of the most commonly held theoretical assumptions today: “It is a mainstay in anthropology to suggest that tradition is imagined and invented” (Lukens-Bull 2001). For Chakrabarty, the most dangerous manifestation of a modernity framework, inherent in the modernising project, is the exteriorisation of backwardness. A modernity of Enlightenment, secularism, individualism, and sociological advancement implies a tradition of irrationality, superstition, communalism and statism. In fact, he notes that “liberal” theory is incapable of understanding communal feelings or religious values precisely because they have been exteriorised and the unit of analysis is now the free individual (Chakrabarty 1992). And, “the picture of a changeless or static past is... itself a construction of early-modern European historical or sociological thinking. It has seldom been a non-Western society’s way of describing itself until recent times” (Chakrabarty 2000). As Asad also notes, the construction of the Other’s barbarism was central to the definition of the civilised Western Self (Asad 1973).

Gusfield shows how the Western analytic has been pre-occupied with a linear notion of progress and an artificial line between tradition and modernity as exclusive categories (Gusfield 1967). He breaks through this preoccupation by claiming that tradition and modernity may not be exclusive, and the latter need not weaken the former. In fact, one might add, the movement between tradition and modernity is a
symbolic one, and reveals more about the historiographic and sociological assumptions of the theory than of historical and social reality itself.

In a summary of the debate, Gusfield points out six common fallacies assumed in the tradition-modernity divide. The discourse all typically assumes that traditional societies: 1) have always been static; 2) constitute a consistent body of norms and values; 3) are largely homogenous structures, analysable as units; 4) are wholly or fundamentally subject to displacement by “new” or “modern” societies; 5) are always in conflict with “modern” societies; and, 6) are mutually exclusive when compared with “modern” societies”.

Bridging or shattering the modernity-tradition divide has proven to be a useful analytical exercise in many disciplines. School education, in particular, has emerged as a site for negotiating modernity and tradition, two sides of the same coin for Lukens-Bull (2001). Clifford Geertz (Geertz) had first pointed out that a school system needed to be “religiously satisfying” to Indonesian villagers, like the “traditional” pesantran (akin to a mad’rassah), as well as being “instrumentally functional” to the evolution of a “modern” nation-state. Geertz and others were not optimistic about such an evolution, but Lukens-Bull demonstrates that the traditional Indonesian kyai (headmaster/ principal) have managed to do just that in an adaptive transformation.

Re-imagining a “tradition” was, as expected by anthropologists, a mainstay of this transformation. But Lukens-Bull demonstrates, on the basis of extensive field investigations, that equally it was the re-imagining of “modernity” that enabled a transformation. Many Indonesian schools, led by innovative (and often collectively working) kyai, underwent a four-step process: 1) imagining modernity as dangerous, associating it and globalisation with a loss of traditional Indonesian identity and values; 2) imagining modernity as “malleable” or supple, not just as the trappings of technology and lifestyle but a “frame of thinking” and hence open to insertion of traditional values; 3) reinventing tradition to engage with modernity with a view to that insertion, including a heavy reliance on traditional “mysticism”; and, 4)
integrating modern curricula, pedagogies and subjects into traditional pesantran institutions, as well as creating new institutions and mixed educational systems.

Through developing a hybrid educational system in pesantran, kyai have outwardly supported the national development policies while striving to firmly establish Islamic values as the foundation of public life in Indonesia (Lukens-Bull 2001: 351). Classical texts continue at the pesantran in Arabic, but with many now offering options for studying them in English translation. Even Arabic has been reinvented as a language not only linking to tradition but also to an alternative modernity of a pan-Islamic space. Imagining and re-inventing both tradition and modernity, then, are two sides of the same coin. “Once modernity and tradition have been so imagined, they are susceptible to being (re)invented” (Ibid: 368). The results of the transformation have come about, for Lukens-Bull, because the kyai did not fall into the traps of either imagining tradition to be static and not malleable, as many development practitioners do, or imagining modernity to be uniform and rigid, as many fundamentalists do.20

In this well-documented narrative, higher education emerges as a primary site, a vanguard of modernity and globalisation. Moulding the characters of the youth was agreed upon as a critical entry point into “preserving” Indonesia. What also emerges is that the site where the transformation took place was the “traditional” pesantran, not the “modern” school. In other words, modern schools did not “look back” to invent and integrate a tradition, but rather traditional pesantran “looked ahead” to invent and integrate modernity. Both tradition and modernity had to be reinvented, but the process was conducted from a rooted site of tradition. Even Indonesian “mystic” Sufis, whom the traditional orthodoxy typically rejected, were deployed by many kyai to stage a reinvention of a malleable tradition and a supple modernity.

Perhaps, following from the above, it is better not to think of modernity versus tradition, and to think instead of modernity as a conversation that the West (not strictly geographically defined) had with itself through the Rest.21
Modernity and Religion

The above narrative pinpoints one of the key fault-lines that have emerged in the modernity-tradition divide. Whichever tradition is picked up, a primary charge against it by moderns is the obscurantism caused by religion. Religion, to paraphrase Sahlins, is something the matter with traditional peoples. As Taylor notes, the a-cultural modern conception is that if only these peoples could see, “as we have come to see,” that old beliefs are not justified, are irrational, and are false, they could begin to move forward on the universally convergent path of modernity (Taylor 1999: 155). Even where multiple or alternative modernities are discussed, these are never viewed as incorporating religion, except in locally documented cases such as by Lukens-Bull.

Yet, “they have not all become alike nor all like us” (Sahlins 1999: xii). The biggest critique to singular, rigid notions of modernity is a recognition of the fact that it hasn’t, in fact, come true. And the single biggest indicator of that hard, often unpalatable, fact is the so-called resurgence of religion. Far from the much-publicised cry of the death of God, religion remains a vital source of self-identification and political mobilisation (Yeğenoğlu 2006). Even continental philosophy is open to the charge of being a re-worked Catholicism (Simmons 2008), through an openness to the unapparent (phenomenology), outpouring of responsibility (Levinas), and the move past a detached, speculative, metaphysical God relying on presence (Heidegger and Nietzsche). For Derrida, “The fundamental concepts that often permit us to isolate or to pretend to isolate the political [from the religious]... remain religious, or in any case theologico-political” (Derrida 2002). There is, as Time magazine’s millennium cover story pointed out, an undeniable Return of Religion.

For some, this is not news. Yeğenoğlu (2006) points out that recurring elements in the discourse of European cultural identity inherently and indissociably include a representation of Islam in its Alterity to European (Christian) identity and civilisation. This has been highlighted in the discussion around the possible inclusion of Turkey in the European Union, against which “remnants of Christian discourse... in their secularized versions” still hold a privileged position as a unifying theme of
the construct of “Europe”. Going further, Asad (2002) points out that the very conception of a distinction between “secular” and “religious” is produced by the so-called secular West. In fact, the “return” may only be a re-turn for the West, and not for many societies in which religion continued to occupy privileged positions throughout the West’s turn away.

The West’s re-turn has been evident since the mid-1990s, with the growing recognition of the influence of religious institutions in public politics and culture around the world (Casanova 1994). For Western scholars, “this resurgence ranks as one of the most remarkable events in global politics and culture at the end of the twentieth century, challenging long-held assumptions about the secular nature of modernization and modernity... proponents of secularization were confident that modern religion experiences a privatization and decline... [but] have been baffled by the recent resurgence of Islam, Hinduism and Christianity” (Hefner 1998: 85, 89). Subsequent post-mortems of this resurgence, as Ahmed (2004) notes, are much like the reviews of post-Berlin Wall Soviet Studies, which stated that the capitalist West should not really have been that Surprised about November 1989 after all.

In the context of re-sacralisation, Hefner (1998, 85-6) points out two theories of secularisation common to the modernity project: 1) Western, empirical science and instrumental reason would push back the dark cloak of religion that overcame traditional societies; or, 2) inevitable social transformations, such as mass primary and higher education, urbanization, industrialization, etc. would force religion as a power to wither away. The washing, secularising effect of the fact of modern pluralism had in fact been proposed long before Lyotard’s mistrust of totalising meta-narratives. “Where previously a ‘sacred canopy’ stabilized life experience and provided shared public meanings,” so the theory went, “in modern times the canopy is rent and collective bases of morality and identity are diminished or destroyed” (Ibid: 85).

In both rationalist and sociological accounts, a flat representation is used to give the example of Christianity in the West: a gradual privatisation of the religion, where
it was “domiciled in the sphere of interiority”. Instead, Hefner (Ibid: 89) propounds an “embedded and pluralistic understanding of Christianity in the West” to challenge this assumption and offer a more nuanced understanding of the West’s surprise at the return of the religious. Hefner shows that, in fact, the decline of Christianity as a force in the public spheres of politics and culture was far from uniform and far from rapid. Europe witnessed many rises, declines, resurgences and re-declines in different political contexts. The decline was most pronounced during the 18th century Enlightenment period, but there, too, trends were not uniform between south and north or east and central Europe.

So, “even in the West, modernity is not singular, least of all as regards religious matters.” A comparison between Europe and the United States further sharpens the divides and “underscores that the history of religion in the modern West varies from country to country in a manner that reflects a broad balance of forces in state and society” (Ibid: 87). Secularisation, notes Hefner, has occurred across vast portions of Western public life, but this has been a varied and uneven story, and it did not occur as part of a systemic teleology. Taylor (2007) makes the same point while arguing that privatisation of religion impacts participation in politics and the public sphere.

Just like modernity, ‘secularisation’ is a representation constructed by Enlightened thinkers in the early-modern West as an ideal prototype for all societies. The colonial adventure, it might be said, was an experiment in projecting this prototype.

Hefner points to two trends visible in modernising non-Western societies presently. On the one hand, they formulate conditions to experience the same, self-fulfilling prophecy of a privatisation of religion and its “domestication into the sphere of interiority.” Under this view, by implication, lack of secularisation would be viewed as an aberration that needs to be corrected with appropriate doses of modern development, typically with aid and trade. Societies would then see secularisation as a desirable but impossible goal, sinking into what Sahlins termed “despondency.” An exception to this, now widely accepted, is of Islam. The ability of Islamic civilisations to modernise economically, sociologically and technologically but not intellectually...
or in values has been raised by Gellner (1983; 1992). Gellner’s structuration of Islam allows for a ‘high’, intellectual variety that leads fundamentalism for the sake of power and is resistant to change, and a ‘low’, popular variety that is more malleable and seeks higher returns.

On the other hand, says Hefner, Islam should not be considered an exception, and instead we should recognise a “raging battle” over control of the interpretations of symbols, as well as formal and informal institutions. Material conditions, especially mass literacy, have changed so much since early modern times, notes Hefner, that the binary conceptions of either fundamentalist religion or pluralist secularism no longer hold. Instead, a unifying trend is evident alongside a fragmentary trend. Universalising discourses (such as Arab Islamism) vie for popularity with sub-cultures of diversity, plurality and multiplying religious sects and practices. If this is recognised, says Hefner, the revival of religion can be understood as a function of religious forces reacting to Enlightenment modernity. One of three strategies are evident in the revival of religion, as religious forces: 1) launch a totalising war for society as a whole, necessitating the attempted capture of state power, which in today’s world translates into bureaucratic administration; or, 2) “renounced organic totalism for separatist seclusion,” much as the Essenes did under a Roman onslaught or small sects are presently doing in Islam; or, 3) accepted diversity as a fact of the modern world and reached ‘down’ to populace and away from elite power structures.

2.5 Modernity and Higher Education in the Colonial Milieu

The modern ambivalence toward religion may be said to have been more pronounced during colonisation, even while narratives of secularism were sweeping throughout Europe, including England, in the 19th and 20th centuries. On the one hand, colonisation was typically justified by the degraded backwardness of natives in Asia and Africa, whose “traditional” irrationality stemmed at least in part from a public reliance on religion. On the other hand, colonial secularism was far from being secular in the sense of the term today, rather being thoroughly imbricated with
evangelical expansionism and policy influence. That is, British colonialism was a very specific context for the narrative of modernisation which was related to but distinct from the English or other European modernity of the time.

Colonisation, of course, affected both colonised and coloniser. This effect was as epistemic as it was physical. Colonial governmentality deeply affected the conception of modernity amongst the colonised. Nicholas Dirks (2001) discusses an interesting example to highlight this point in the conceptions of modernity in contemporary India. Dirks notes that social analysis of India, including by Indians, almost invariably discusses the “problem” of caste as the defining feature of Indian social organisation: “Caste – and specifically caste forms of hierarchy, whether valorized or despised – is somehow fundamental to Indian civilization, Indian culture and Indian tradition” (Dirks 2001: 5). However, in a richly documented analysis, Dirks goes on to show that caste is actually a “modern phenomenon, that it is, specifically, the product of an historical encounter between India and Western colonial rule.” While the British did not “invent” caste, it was under British rule that caste became “a single term capable of expressing, organizing and above all ‘systematizing’ India’s diverse forms of social identity, community and organization... In short colonialism made caste what it is today” (Ibid: 5). Dirks concludes by highlighting “the power of the colonial leviathan to produce caste as the measure of all social things” (Ibid: 8).

India is, of course, more than Hindu caste. However, the argument about the “colonial leviathan” can be extended to other communities, especially in their official delineation by the colonial governmental machinery into religious communities in India. In short, it may be posited that the very colonial presence, in its own peculiarly “modern” form, decisively informed analytical conceptions throughout the colonial space, amongst coloniser and colonised alike. Colonisation can be considered a milieu, a constellation of institutions and cultural features that in this sense shaped the rules of engagement, discourse and development, holding “modernity” out as a promise. In terms of the discussion on modernity above, the milieu represents a more institutionalised, and institutionally significant, version of Taylor’s concept of a
“social imaginary”; the colonial milieu is akin to an institutional corollary of a colonial imaginary. In the context of modernity, the colonial milieu becomes the institutional space within which a supple modernity is bent and shaped by the sheer presence of the “colonial leviathan”.

Positing such a milieu facilitates the reading of numerous postcolonial analyses that suggest the continuation of colonial governance in other forms. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s development of field theory, this has been framed in the form of a “discursive field... the range of assumptions that are made implicitly in debating a particular topic or issue; ideas that are presumed, and notions that are simply ruled out of the bounds of possibility” (Rizvi 2004: 152). Rizvi (2004) and Tikly (2001; 2004), for instance, discuss the importance of such assumptions in analysing the development of contemporary education in postcolonial contexts, still decisively shaped by colonial experiences. Likewise, Rizvi and Lingard (2010) explore the global dominance of market-based reforms of education, which they stress are always informed by local subjectivities. Relying on such theorisation within field theory has additional implications and concerns that are not the subject of this study. However, the continuities between contemporary Pakistan and colonial history are undeniable; the subject of this study is to explore the historical underpinnings of these continuities in the case of higher education. For this, supple modernity in the colonial milieu of British India offers a useful analytical framework.

It is clear that no one definition of “modernity” is completely accepted or even relevant to contexts such as Pakistan. My review has only traced the contours of the concept and its history. What is clear is that modernity is not just about the modos, the here-and-now. It delimits, rather, a certain form of epistemology (for instance, instrumental rationality), certain trends in sociology (for instance a standing army, urbanisation, transnational capitalism, and technology-centred production), and certain cultural trends (leading to modernist art and architecture, for instance). The specific constellation of features of modernity has been contested from the outset. Among others, Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge and discursively constructed
subjectivities of “the norm” emerged from such critiques. For Foucault, these discursive practices are not passive imaginations, but rather active agents, “a multiple and mobile field of force relations where far-reaching, but never completely stable effects of domination are produced” (Foucault 1980b). “Micrological” power shapes subjectivities without requiring a concentration of power in any one node. Thus, modernity is a particular constellation brought about by specific configurations of knowledge/power. This theorisation has proved crucial to postcolonial analysis, leading to Edward Said’s (1979) Orientalism as an instance of cultural power.

Culture, while being a domain of contest for Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida and other critics of modernity not reviewed here (for instance those belonging to the Frankfurt School), is one of the most problematic fields of modernity. The review has highlighted this in Taylor’s schematic of species-specific, universal, acultural modernity versus context-specific, particular, cultural modernity. Taylor points out the dominance of the former way of thinking, as well as its incorrectness. This question leads to the heart of the argument here – whether it is possible to talk of “modernity” or “modernity in Pakistan.” The notion of multiple modernities has been briefly reviewed, with Pieterse and Cooper adequately summing up the arguments. Important for both, and for Hefner, is the consideration of modernity in its relation to Westernity. As Sahlins notes, “others” have become neither all alike nor all like “us”. Tracing some un-Enlightened views of modernity, Sahlins also points to the importance of culture as distinction, and of the consequent need to consider modernities rather than modernity.

This series of thought leads to the basic approach adopted in this enquiry: that of a supple modernity, capable of being bent to a particular context, yet transnationally linked in the singular in histories laden with power. How genuinely “alternative” multiple modernities may be is, for this purpose, only secondary to exploring the history in a particular context. So modernity in Pakistan is not entirely Western, nor entirely like in any other postcolonial country (even India) yet it remains undeniably
“modern.” It remains a rhetorical tool for reform as well as a space for contest. The primary objective of this study is to explore what lies beneath that rhetoric.

Such a notion of supple modernity would counter dominant Western narratives, generally considered in the singular, while aligning with critiques such as by Bhabha, Abdou, Appadurai and Chakrabarty. Critical to this manipulation, or subversion, of modernity has been the construction of tradition, noted for instance by Chakrabarty and Asad. In education, too, “modernisation” has come on the back of an imagined tradition, as by Lukens-Bull and Gusfield.

The realm of tradition leads immediately in the review to religion, mostly perceived as a primary “obstacle” to modernisation. Religions, as Sahlins notes, are considered “something the matter with people.” In this widely held view as Taylor sums up, religion’s unjustified “dogma” simply had to be shed for us to “come to see the truth” of Enlightenment modernity. This (now “traditional”!) mode of thinking has dominated social theory too. Religion, however, uncooperatively refused to leave the public sphere, and its resurgence as a public force in the 1990s and beyond came as a Big Surprise, ranked as an undeniable but ‘remarkable’ event in global politics. Hefner has now traced the role of religion in a supposedly secular public space of Western Europe, while Asad (2002) and Yeğenoğlu (2006) point out that religion (especially, Islam) has long been a constitutive Other of the Western imagination and politics. These analyses remain far from Huntington’s Ultimate Step into an apocalyptic theatre of a civilisational clash. However, there is an undeniable import of religion as an integral component of social analyses. The discourse on Islam, in particular, is dominated by debates on Islam and Modernity, with the conjunctive possibly indicating a never-to-be-overcome difference.

At the same time, the consideration of modernity versus tradition generates an important border discourse of inclusion and exclusion. Backward, traditional cultures are thereby excluded from the club of moderns, even while modernity is held out as a promise of inclusion. It is my contention throughout this study that colonial discourse around higher education in British India exemplified precisely such a
border discourse to distinguish coloniser from colonised. What makes it thoroughly “modern,” in the Enlightenment sense of the term, is that the colonial imaginary moved from an impermeable border of race to a porous border of culture. While the former could not be bridged it allowed respect, even admiration, by 18th century Orientalists; while it held out modernity as a realisable promise, it required reform.

The border discourse of culture was supported by a colonial milieu, a set of institutional arrangements that facilitated the enactment of this colonial imaginary. The very active presence of colonisers shaped, in many ways, the field of higher education as it began to institutionalise in 19th British India, partly along religiously delineated lines, to inform subsequent development of higher education in Pakistan. Such a theoretical lens allows greater attention to the manner in which colonial impulses, imaginaries (such as the border discourse and continuous reform), and principles have extended well beyond de-colonisation. That is, besides the forms and structures of contemporary higher education in Pakistan, the norms and principles remain deeply affected by the colonial experience. This, in turn, suggests more attention to transnational linkages, both colonial and contemporary.

Such continuity has been posited by many postcolonial scholars, including in education (Rizvi 2004; Tikly 2004). A substantial contribution in this regard is by Mahmood Mamdani (1996), whose study of citizenship across Africa illustrates the long-lasting “legacy” of colonialism, especially in its racist delineations. In all cases, the transnational perspective acquires a central position. In many ways, the review earlier may be read as suggesting that modernity is in part defined by a global outlook, not least for non-Western countries coming into contact with a politically and militarily ascendant Europe in the 18-19th centuries. An ongoing global outlook certainly emerges as a feature of modernity in Pakistani higher education, whose attempts at “modern” reforms have been more or less guided by globalism, which stemmed under colonisation.
Chapter Three

Higher Education in Pakistan

3 Higher Education In Pakistan

The modern University, it appears from an outpouring of scholarship and policy debate across the world, is in crisis. If, on the one hand, the critiques of the University do not agree on much with regard to the reasons or even nature of the crisis, it is clear, on the other hand, that there is in fact a crisis at hand. This crisis is deemed “fundamental” in the sense that it questions not just a university or a category of universities, but rather the University as an idea. That is to say, the crisis concerns not only what a University in fact is, but also how it relates to society, what functions it can be reasonably expected to perform, and at what cost.

Thus, Bill Readings, for instance, describes a change from a University of Culture – aimed self-consciously at enculturation, for instance through a core curriculum and canons – to a University of Excellence. The latter is presented as an acultural corporate entity celebrating “neutral” quality (Readings 1997). This shift to an acultural mode accompanies a broader, corresponding “radical secularisation” and horizontal legitimation in the moral ordering of modern society, as described by Charles Taylor. William Spanos links the emerging “disinterested pursuit” of a University of Excellence to a deeper, culturally rooted ordering, not an empty, “vacuous” space of objectivity but rather a Foucauldian, normalising, disciplinarity. The “epistemic disturbance” that brought about this shift privileged presence and domination (Spanos 1993). Likewise, Alan Bloom refers to a similar shift with a negative connotation to argue that posthumanism in higher education is creating young minds that are essentially intolerant and illiberal (Bloom 1987).

In all cases, it is difficult to dispute Lyotard’s conception of the University as a leading site which has undergone a dramatic shift in the rejection of meta-narratives which legitimise themselves (Lyotard 1984). This rejection opens a path to deeper interrogation of the identity and boundaries of the University, as well as disciplinarity. Derrida does just this, destroying the illusion of a division between the “inside” and “outside” (Derrida 2000), and opening a space for redefinition of the
University (Derrida 1992) and for teaching (Derrida et al. 1983), while Kamuf emphasises a blurring of Humanities and therefore the Human (Kamuf 1997).

These shifts in the conception of the modern University are more or less cultural and emphasise more or less the state of crisis, whether celebrated or not. Such readings, however, inevitably assume a global model, or blueprint, of what a University actually is and has been. Furthermore, they assume a series of conceptual impacts triggered by largely Atlantic historical events related to economics, politics, society and culture. A critical, transnational look at these readings challenges this assumption in general. While such Atlantic-centred assumptions may be more or less true over the last half century (Meyer and Ramirez 2000; Schofer and Meyer 2005), previous histories and conceptions are entirely disparate. Rather, the genealogy or event histories assumed within such analyses differ radically from histories of higher education in the non-Atlantic world, including in pre-colonial India.

The purpose of this chapter, then, is to trace one such history while bypassing the story of the modern Western University, which has been repeated across the analyses mentioned earlier among others. The intent here is to provide some of the background to the argument that will follow in this thesis. The chapter focuses on outlining the history of Muslim higher education, which constitutes an important trajectory claimed by contemporary Pakistan. At the same time, formative British colonial influence on the institutionalisation of higher education in India is also reviewed. This historical matrix, it will be argued later, is of great importance in determining the manner and specific modality with which contemporary transnational rationalities are adapted to the Pakistan higher education sector. The primary aim is to introduce a cast of characters and events that are called upon in any discussion on higher education in Pakistan. I also attempt to indicate some of the historical continuities in that centre on the colonial introduction of modern higher education and independent Pakistan.

Upon its creation as a nation-state in 1947, Pakistan looked back upon and affirmed two historical trajectories in varying degrees. The first was the inheritance of
190 years of progressive establishment of British colonial rule India. The second was the earlier inheritance of over 750 years of Muslim rule over the region that is now Pakistan. Developments in higher education in both periods are reviewed below, primarily to highlight the differences in conceptions and organisation of institutional higher education, and thus the varying imaginaries evoked.

3.1 Muslim Higher Education

A striking feature of Pakistani self-conception of higher education is the consistent reference to its Muslim origins. This is often maintained by referring, apologetically, to the lost “golden age” of Islam although – as I discuss in chapters seven and eight – this has come to be more and more of a formal statement than a substantive one. However, it remains a forceful refrain in all eight policy reforms of higher education in Pakistan, including the last in 2001-02. This makes it all the more surprising that the reform statements do not indicate how higher education is or should be Islamic. A brief review of Muslim higher education follows here to contextualise this.

The review is not intended to be a complete survey of the literature on Muslim cosmologies (Nasr 1968), on notions of education (Rahman 1984), or on Muslim intellectual history (Sharif 1961; Fakhry 2004). Notably, there are few early treatments of Muslim higher education by Muslims themselves, and the subject was given contemporary recognition by scholars in Europe. Most early European scholarship emphasised a carrier process in which Muslim civilisations imbibed the decaying Hellenic wisdom, especially at the higher level, carried the torch while Europe was embroiled in the “Dark Ages”, and passed it back to Western Europe in the “Middle Ages.” This format emphasised the adoption of Greek philosophy, medicine and even technology by Muslims in the 8th century, and re-transmission – preserved and translated with additions – back to Europe in about the 14th century.

Recent scholarship has shown that this still-widely held view is superficial and inaccurate. Stanton, for instance, demonstrates the rise of higher learning in Islam during the 8th century and its fall from the ‘gold standard’ position in about the 14th century.
century (Stanton 1990). These times, as Stanton demonstrates, are not linked necessarily to the demise of the Hellenic civilisation and rise of continental European power, but rather to the rise and decline of the Islamic civilisations. He also notes that higher learning was not simply “adopted” from the Greeks, but was enjoined upon Muslims by their faith. Stanton draws on a rigorously researched history of early Muslim education across the Middle East (Shalaby 1979), as well as a history of Islamic colleges (Nakosteen 1964).

**Early Arab Islamic Higher Learning**

Higher learning, upon the advent of Islam and its meteoric transnational spread, from 630 to 730 AD, had already moved out of the exclusive hands of the Greeks and their islands. Crucial centres of higher learning were spread across the Middle East, and were mostly in the hands of Jewish, Christian and so-called pagan scholars. The primary centres of higher learning were across what is now Iraq and Iran, in Harran (pagan), Nisibis (Nestorian Christian) and Jundi Shahpur (Sassanian and others). In the 8th century, as a uniquely identifiable Arab Islamic civilisation spread and consolidated its position, the first elementary schools (kutb) focused on the teaching of reading and writing, most often conducted by Christians. For instance, in the Prophet’s tribe of Qur’aysh in Mecca, only 17 individuals were literate at the time of the Revelation of Islam. The first teacher in Mecca was a Christian, as were most early teachers until the middle of the 8th century, since the small but growing literate body of Arab Muslims was increasingly engaged in administration, copying the Qur’an and documenting hadīth [sayings of the Prophet] (Shalaby 1979: 10). As Shalaby shows (Ibid: 23), and Stanton corroborates, it is a contemporary fallacy that these early kutbs were dedicated to Qur’anic teaching. Rather, a separate track of elementary learning in religious studies was added much later, and the two tracks continued separately until the 15th century.

Higher learning was instituted through informal study circles (hal’qās), formed around Shaikhs in mosques in the 8th century. Learned men were appointed under
the theocratic state to administer these circles. This informal group was the beginning of higher education and learning in Islamic civilisations, and continued past the Middle Ages. These hal’qās were of two types: those that specialised in the study of jurisprudence in one of the four major theological-judicial schools (madh’abs), and those that concentrated on religious sciences other than jurisprudence. The latter were centred on the education, interest and expertise of a particular Shaikh, and ranged from Qur’anic exegesis and hadīth to logic, grammar, rhetoric, Arabic literature, medicine, and so on.

In a hal’qā, the Shaikh would read from a book or his own notes, and the student would copy this verbatim. The Shaikh’s additional comments and the student’s own notes on the lecture would be made in the margins (glossing). These notes would then be used by the student to reflect on and discuss the lecture in separate sittings which would take the format of a disputation (munāz’rah): thesis, counter-thesis, arguments for the thesis, objections to the arguments, replies to the arguments, review of arguments for the counter-thesis, replies to and refutation of these, and conclusion. The curriculum of a hal’qā would depend on the Shaikh and although informal and variable it would be typically rigorous and research-based. Drop-outs were more the norm than the exception, and a Shaikh might take pride in how many students he de-moralised (Stanton 1990).

Shalaby has offered a detailed account of the construction, dynamics, and relationships in the mosque hal’qās. Importantly, informality was the key even in state-sponsored institutions. A particular student was not bound to attend one or another session, and many were members of more than one. After a Shaikh was satisfied that a particular student had grasped the notes and could comment upon them, typically after about a decade of instruction, he could grant a permit (ijāza) to the student to form his own hal’qā. This formula of the hal’qā, developed in the 8th century, remains similar today wherever “traditional” Islamic education is current.24

Outside of these formal institutions were informal hal’qās in the homes of philanthropists and scholars, in barbershops, in literary salons and, importantly, in
bookshops. The last, as Shalaby shows, were extremely widespread through the Muslim Middle East, and were typically organised by highly learned men who copied manuscripts by hand, gave tuitions to the children of the rich, and offered advice to government and judges. These bookshops were crucial, early centres of higher education for much of Muslim thought, and continued to remain so until the 16th century. Generally, the private circles, even more informal than the mosque hal’qās, concentrated on philosophy, natural sciences, astronomy, mathematics, etc. These subjects, while acknowledged by the Arab Islamic state, remained outside the state’s formalised institutions. The state was not averse to using the knowledge produced in these private circles, but never formalised or institutionalised them.

Although the mosque hal’qās continued across Islamic countries, more formal institutions were introduced in the form of mosque-colleges under the laws of waqf by Badr, a governor of several provinces in the 10th century. He established 3,000 colleges attached to mosques, each with its own student inn or simple hostel. This innovation was the first time that students and instructors were brought together in a residential setting, and was a format adopted later by European institutions as well. Mosque-colleges remained under the administrative control of mosques, and hence, indirectly, the Caliphate. The private hal’qās continued to flourish outside the pale of the Islamic state, ensuring wide-ranging academic freedom, as it is understood today.

The next major innovation was brought about in the 11th century by the Seljuk Turk Vizier, Nizam-ul-Mulk, who extended the mosque-colleges into mad‘rassahs. Nizam removed the mad‘rassahs from the control of the mosque (and hence, nominally at least, the Caliph), and placed them under direct control of the highest regional administrator of the State, the Sultan. The Sultans at the time were Seljuk Turks, who had kept the titular Caliphs as religious heads, but taken over civil control of the state. After the formation of the first mad‘rassah in 1064 AD in Baghdad, known by Nizam’s name – Nizam’iyah – the format became the standard known across the Muslim world today. It included a residential hall and small teaching rooms, but was removed from the mosque where much of the instructions
still took place. Students were often given a small stipend besides free board and lodging, provided they remained in good standing. Nizam designed the curriculum for the first *mad’rassah* himself under Sha’afi laws, one of the four major *madh’abs*, generally considered orthodox. That curriculum remains in more or less the same format today across the Muslim world under his name. The Vizier replicated the Baghdad *Nizam’iyah* into several thousand institutions, and this trend continued across much of the Muslim world until the middle of the 14th century. As Shalaby points out, Nizam’s innovation changed forever and significantly the nature of higher education from a large number of small, private/civic *hal’qās*, recognised but not patronised by the State, to a smaller number of large, State-sponsored, infrastructure-oriented places. However, a level of informality remained, since “it was fully realised in the Islamic world that the course of study should vary according to the future career of the student” (Shalaby 1979: 23). Despite the structured curriculum and built infrastructure, the institution was less formal than universities as perceived today, with students spending hugely variable times in residence, and with no formal division into levels.

The main exception to the model of the *Nizam’iyah* was in Muslim Andalūs (Spain), which followed the public-interest oriented Maliki *madh’ab*. There, schools of higher learning were never organised by a theocratic state, but depended entirely on patronage by nobles and even the Caliph himself. This model was eventually adopted by southern Europe, particularly Italy, in the Middle Ages for the study of Roman and canon law.

Across the rest of the Muslim world, practical control over the syllabus and curriculum of *mad’rassahs* lay primarily with the *ul’ama*, or recognised scholars, who remained typically conservative to change. Under the *ul’ama*, the curriculum of *mad’rassahs* continued to reject Greek philosophy and natural sciences, and remained focused on the religious sciences. All other thought continued to be pursued in the parallel stream of Muslim higher education of private *hal’qās* by noted intellectuals, many of whom also taught in or led *mad’rassahs*. In about the 10th
century, the *halqās* began to concentrate on the study of *ad’ab*, properly translated as *belles lettres*, or “polite knowledge.” This cultivating element was both complex and multi-disciplinary, and though its immense civilisational value was recognised by the state as a supplement to religious knowledge, it remained strictly private.

These colleges became the primary model for institutional higher education in Western Europe in the Middle Ages, especially as attached to the medieval Church. A thorough-going piece of research by Mehdi Nakosteen traces the influence of these early Arab Islamic institutions on the *forms* of medieval and contemporary colleges in the West. Nakosteen also points out that the mosque and private *halqās* were the conduits of much of the knowledge content adopted by Western Europe. However, Stanton points out that the increasing exclusivity of the *mad‘rassahs* led to stagnation and lack of theoretical innovation by the 14th century, after civil authorities recruited, for the first time in 700 years of Islamic history, salaried *muftīs* to deliver *fatwās* (judicial pronouncements). This political step removed legal theory and theology from an active community of interest, and placed it in the hands of ‘experts.’ Some scholars have pointed out that this move, among others, has diminished the Qur’anic emphasis on *ijtehād*, or consensus of popular opinion.

Institutions in the classical age in Islam can, thus, be seen as less informal (some mosque *halqās* and all *mad‘rassahs*) and more informal (private/civic and most mosque *halqās*). By and large, the former prepared young men for religious and educational roles, or for civil government, and so the financial support and curriculum were restricted to religious sciences and jurisprudence. The latter, equally if not better accepted, prepared its participants mostly for enquiry and, by extension, for private teaching and advice to the community. These existed under private patronage or civic self-help. The *kutbs* still existed in both religious and non-religious formats, but were focused at the elementary level (Shalaby 1979: 219). This rapid review has ignored the arrangement for education, especially higher learning, among women. Shalaby provides only a brief account of girls’ education in *kutbs* and advanced education in private homes. This is a gap in information that needs filling.
Muslim Conceptions of Higher Education

Stanton points out that “at the core of any educational enterprise lies a philosophical attitude toward knowledge and the process of its acquisition” (Stanton 1990: 68). Muslims in the classical or “golden” age believed in the unity of all of Creation, and not only felt compelled to gain more knowledge about it as a path to higher faith, but also felt it ‘repugnant’ to divide knowledge into segments. As Stanton notes, ‘Islamic scholars in the classical age conceived of intellectual specialisation as a kind of abnormality’ (Ibid: 71). If the unity of Creation mirrored the unity of Allah, then dividing that unity into pieces bordered on heresy. The gradation of higher education, instead of disciplinary lines, was more in order of cosmological hierarchies, typically five: the Divine Essence, universal Intellect, angelic substance, psychic manifestations, and the terrestrial world. All visible phenomena were recognised as having a physical/quantitative as well as a symbolic/qualitative aspect. Intellect, contemplation, and intuition were recognised as gifts of Allah for men to move from the first dimension through the next and ultimately toward understanding true Reality. Nature, in this cosmology, could be viewed as a text that conveyed one aspect of the truth, but needed to be ‘read’ and interpreted.

Scientific knowledge, in this conception, related only to the first aspect and was, thus, important mostly to reach the knowledge of symbols and the sacred. An Andalûsian sufi and scholar, Ibn-e-Arabi, for instance said that when one has a powerful intellect, its ultimate function is to show that intellectuality is merely a prelude to something else (Ibid: 183). Muslim conception of higher education moved from observation, at the lowest rung, to intellect, to contemplation, to intuition. As Stanton (Ibid: 197) notes:

Traditional Islamic belief maintained that intuition defined the capacity... that allowed one to cooperate with God’s mystical being and thus learn more about the supernatural world, facilitating an ascent to a higher sphere and to an understanding of the Divine Will. The purpose of knowledge is to lead man to God and to further harmony within the Cosmos.
Stanton likens Islamic conceptions to Neo-Platonist epistemology: a hierarchy of truth extending from the material at the lowest level of Creation to the ideal at the higher. This informed much of the emphasis on and nature of higher learning in early Islam, which resembled some of the Greek practices. For instance, the early Islamic hakīm (learned scholar and healer) was modelled on the Greek polymath, but with a significant difference: causality was not conceived of in the same way because of the difference in faiths. The hakīm tried to cooperate with Allah’s design rather than to presume that he could comprehend it or even control it. This did not detract from the importance of learned men, however, but only enhanced it in medicine as well as all spheres where the learned were called upon to serve and advise. As a medieval scholar, Abu-al-Aswad al-Dinali, said, “Kings govern people and scholars govern kings” (Shalaby 1979: 127).

Another implication of this brief glance at Muslim conception of higher education is to indicate the distinction in form from contemporary, Western forms of higher education. One such distinction is in the notions about teachers. In modern Western education, instructors are generally considered only as useful as their primary teaching materials, hence the emphasis on curriculum, syllabus and the ‘canon’. For Muslim higher education, by contrast, it is the teacher who is essential, as may be evident by the early reliance on the persons of Shaikhs rather than their prescribed texts. The noted mystic and scholar, Ibn-e-Arabi, commented that: “People speak the best of what they have learnt, learn the best of what they have written, and write the best of what they have heard. Therefore, if you are seeking knowledge, take it from the man’s lips and thus you will receive selected learning” (Shalaby 1979: 145). As Shalaby sums up, “receiving education from the scholars of the time and not through books alone was considered essential for the student. Some Muslims held it to be a calamity to replace professor with paper” (Ibid: 145).

Obviously, a hierarchy of scholars emerged, mostly by reputation, in which some scholars emphasised (but never exclusively) certain topics. The Persian poet, astronomer and mathematician, Umar Khayyam, prepared a hierarchy of seekers of
truth concomitant with the worldview and cosmological hierarchy above (Stanton 1990: 204): first were theologians, who were satisfied with disputation and “proofs.” Next were philosophers and scientists, who used rational and speculative arguments, but were ultimately entangled in logical methodologies and conundrums. Third were the “learned and credible informants,” who interpreted the Qur’an and shared its message. Fourth, and finally, were the Sufis who relied almost entirely on intuition and “knowledge of the heart.”

Another difference in form is esotericism. Muslim higher education was arguably never intended to be established at a mass level. Thus, the teacher-centred pedagogy helped a teacher identify the strongest and most interested students, who could then be transferred to the next level, typically at his discretion. The indeterminate length of studies is also an indication that students would not “naturally” pass from one level to the next. Just as the level of instruction being imparted at higher levels would increase, for instance along the cosmological hierarchies above, so the nature of instruction would also undergo a change. There is some evidence (Stanton 1990: 199) to suggest that the highest level would not be in writing at all, since it was not intended for popular consumption by the growing number of Muslim literates.

Stanton also indicates the vast difference in conceptions of higher education between Muslims and Western Europeans. A different “imaginary” – in the words of Charles Taylor – was at work along with greatly different orderings of society. These resulted in differing views of disciplinarity, pedagogy, and scholarship, which continued into the 15th and 16th centuries. The review has highlighted, however, that these histories are based largely on Arab sources – there is little, similar information on non-Arab, Muslim higher education, although much similarity can be reasonably expected. Part of the problem in recovering these histories is the layer of reifications by Orientalist historians, a testament to the defining legacy of colonialism.


Pre-colonial Islamic Higher Education in India

Little is known about the nature and scope of higher education in early non-Arab Islamic civilisations, partly because Western historians generally investigated Arab culture as a metaphor for Islam and because non-Western scholars have by and large not launched formal investigations. As such, most knowledge about early Muslim higher education is restricted to the Arab civilisation, even though Muslims were in, say, India by the 8th century. General reviews of Muslim education (Barkatullah 1974), studies of transformation in Islamic education in Indonesia (Lukens-Bull 2001), the history of education in Pakistan and India (Khan 1973), history of modern education in India (Ghosh 2000), indigenous education in early colonial period in the Punjab (Leitner 2002/1883), and transformations in the consciousness of intellectuals in British India (Tangri 1961; Pannikar 2002), are particularly relevant. This material is used in the construction of the argument, below, and will be referred to there. What is interesting to note here is that these systems are all, in one manner or another, related to the history of Arab Muslim higher education, often through the use of Arabic as a medium of instruction at the higher levels, and often through the use of Arabic texts in the curriculum. However, of note is that these texts and media of instructions were never exclusive, and left creative space for the local language of culture and scholarship to flourish alongside, for instance Persian in the Punjab (Leitner 2002/1883). Again, however, most of this understanding is coloured by the fact of colonisation, and more historical investigation is needed to appreciate the nature of non-Arab Muslim higher education, including in South Asia.

There is little documentation of the state of higher education prior to the arrival of the British in India under the East India Company in 1600, primarily because most of the contemporary accounts rely on British data. A number of British classicists, however, have commented on the extent of learning in India, F. W: Thomas’ 1891 statement being exemplary of this view: “There is no country where the love of learning had so early an origin or has exercised so lasting and powerful an influence. From the simple poets of the Vedic age to the Bengali philosopher of the present day
there has been an uninterrupted succession of teachers and scholars” (Ghosh 2000: 6). As this line indicates, British admiration was marked by a strong degree of romanticism typical of orientalists of the time. These commentaries are more indicative of the construction of traditional education to legitimate British modernisation, than of comprehensive accounts of indigenous education.

However, some information can be gleaned from such records. It is apparent that higher education prior to British intervention was disaggregated by religion, and scaled from the more basic and accessible (typically in Persian or local language for Muslims) to the more advanced and esoteric (typically in Arabic for Muslims). It is also apparent that higher education at that time was a more rigorous and demanding enterprise than it is today, students often spending 12 years just to gain basic diplomas in higher learning. From scattered accounts, it is more than likely that the organisation of Muslim higher education in India followed the Arab model. Higher education was at the pinnacle of a pyramid of a decentralised and communal educational system, going down to an extensive network of primary-level village school and home-based tuition (about one elementary school for every 30 boys). It also seems that no need was felt to maintain rigorous statistics.

Some historical material suggests that reforms may have been undertaken during the period of the Delhi Sultanate (about 12th to 16th centuries), itself comprising at least five dynasties. Both the Sultanate and its precursor, the Ghaznavid Dynasty (ca. 10th century to 12th century), developed India as a major Islamic world power, not just militarily but also in terms of social and political organisation, not to mention cultural excellence. Both extensively adapted extant structures (Hindu, Buddhist and Christian) of the sub-continent to Muslim rule. For instance, one of the oldest universities in the world, at Taxila (present-day Pakistan), was retained as an important centre of learning under Muslim rule. While I have not discovered any detailed description of the successive changes at Taxila, given other reforms of the time it is likely that some hermeneutic process was involved, but it is not clear what. It may be reasonable to hypothesise that earlier higher education reforms from
Gandharan to Ghaznavid times, thence to the Delhi Sultanate and further to Mughul rule in what is now Pakistan had traceable impacts on higher education today. While some continuities may be noted in genetic traces, it is more likely that each of these transitions (as well as many within these periods) were substantively, structurally and discursively different from the modern reforms initiated by the British with the Despatch of 1854. Further insights into earlier reforms would help locate the colonial and then Pakistani reforms as specifically ‘modern,’ challenging the ‘natural’ sense of evolution ascribed to changes in the sector today. Furthermore, not only are the substance and rhetoric of pre-colonial higher education reform likely to be different from colonial and Pakistani reform, but so is the hermeneutic process of absorbing local ‘traditions’ and reforming them. However, more research would be needed with separate historical data (such as in travelogues, diaries, etc.) on these periods of Muslim reform of higher education.

This cursory glance tantalises more than it satisfies, and a more comprehensive reckoning of pre-colonial Muslim higher education in India remains an important project to be undertaken. Among other aspects, extant records are mostly limited to British accounts which themselves were restricted to recent Muslim conditions. This was a period of loose control by a disintegrating Mughal Empire. The Empire had begun losing cohesion during the reign (1720-1748) of Muhammad Shah, with successive invasions and loss of administrative controls leading to the ultimate collapse of even a nominal Mughal Empire under Bahadur Shah Zafar (1837-1858) and succession by Victoria I as Empress of India. Thus, the British records cover, at best, only the tail end of an Empire in collapse. Prior to Emperor Muhammad Shah, the Mughal Empire was a formidable political, economic and administrative power in the region from the 16th to 18th centuries. Much of Pakistani imaginings of Muslim “glory” relate to this early and middle periods of the Mughal Empire. However, the Mughal period was far from uniform in its administration (Bose and Jalal 2003), and variations in higher education remain open for investigation.
The Muslim history of India extends before the Mughals (Persianised Central Asian Turks) conquered the region. The first Mughal Emperor, Babur (1526-1530) had established Mughal rule across much of India after a successful military campaign against the capital of the Delhi Sultanate. This Sultanate, the first major Indo-Islamic power, extended from about 1186 to about 1525. It also, however, encompassed varying degrees and areas of control and at least five major dynasties with their own social emphases. There is every likelihood that the nature and organisation of social institutions such as Muslim higher education varied between these dynasties, if not individual rulers and locales. The Delhi Sultanate had been established by military conquest of the earlier, more loosely organised Ghaznavid Dynasty (from about 997 to about 1186) which had promoted Islamic culture and higher learning out of their main capital in what is now Afghanistan (Bosworth 1992). Again, however, there is a need for more information and analysis of the organisation of higher learning under the Delhi Sultanate and Ghaznavid Dynasty.

Even this cursory review highlights the problematic nature of the term “Islamic” higher education as it pertains to what is now Pakistan. While it is likely that pre-colonial Indian Muslim higher education was organised somewhat like Arab higher education, this is only a broad guess. What is clearer is that the notion of a traditional Islamic education is fuzzy at best and misleading at worst. It is well recognised now that tradition is regularly constructed for the purposes of legitimising modernity – this brief recap shows that the construction of “an” Islamic tradition in higher education is no less artificial a construction than tradition in general. While such constructions may be analytically necessary to distinguish features, the point here is that they are an integral part of shaping higher education trajectories in Pakistan today, especially when tradition in higher education comes to be equated with traditionalism, as I discuss later. The lack of information and analysis of pre-colonial Muslim higher education in India also draws attention to the colonial construction of this tradition in Pakistan today.
3.2 **Muslim Colonial History of Higher Education in Pakistan**

The second and more immediate period affirmed by Pakistani history, of progressively direct and comprehensive British colonial rule, is far better documented than the earlier, Muslim rule. Key developments in higher education through the colonial period and into independent Pakistan are reviewed below. Colonial policy history is all the more relevant when considering higher education. Higher education as it is presently organised in Pakistan originated under British colonial rule. The period of active colonisation (first under increasing administrative influence of the East India Company and later directly by the British government) between 1757 and 1947, points to the construction of notions of modernity and tradition in what may be termed a colonial *milieu*. That is, the fact and nature of colonial presence determined to a great extent what was conceptually categorised as either modern or traditional.  

Furthermore, colonial construction of modernity emerged with a special emphasis for Muslims in the sub-continent. The origins of the contemporary structure in Pakistan are often, reasonably so, traced to Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Muslim Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, which also comprised the genesis of a Muslim educational movement in colonial India and contributed to the Pakistan Movement toward the end of colonial rule. Some aspects of the complex role of Sir Sayyid (often regarded as one of the “founding fathers” of Pakistan) will be discussed below, but it is in any case clear that the history of higher education of Pakistan cannot be divorced from its Muslim colonial roots. In fact the importance of both colonial and Muslim history is true of both parallel “systems” of higher education running in the country: the state-directed system (which also guides private interventions) and the extra-state Islamic system (generically termed “mad’rassah”), with its own accountability and accreditation mechanisms. The evolution of parallel systems of higher education in Pakistan today remains to be addressed in detail beyond jeremiads (Hoodbhoy 1991; Talbani 1996). However, the imaginary underpinning both systems emerges as a dialogue from the historical account presented below.
Chapter Three

Higher Education in Pakistan

Higher Education under British Colonial Rule: East India Company Acts and the Governor-General in Council

The constitution of Pakistan’s higher education system under British rule falls under two broad historical periods: progressively enhancing governance by the East India Company from the British victory in the Battle of Plassey (1757) to the unsuccessful Indian “Mutiny” (1857-referred to by most Pakistanis and Indians as War of Independence), and from that time to de-colonisation and Independence (1947).

The British established dominion over what is now Pakistan formally after the “Mutiny” or “Rebellion” in 1857, but their influence in directing the state apparatus, including over education, extended back in varying degrees to the commencement of commercial operations in the mid-17th century. The East India Company (later British East India Company and still later, after a corporate merger, the Honourable East India Company – referred to hereafter simply as “the Company”), an English joint-stock company, had been granted a charter in 1600 by Queen Elizabeth I to commence trading in India and China on behalf of the Crown (Birdwood and Foster 1893). Until the end of the 17th century the Company restricted itself to mostly commerce, although encouraging the spread of missionaries and establishment of missionary schools after a protracted and interesting debate (Khan 1973: 20). It is clear that official British policy remained isolated from local affairs until 1698, when an Act allowed the establishment of charity schools (Ibid).

Gradually, the Company engaged in and won a series of small battles across India and came to assert military power as well as exert administrative power over successively large portions of the sub-continent. Commerce progressively occupied a smaller and smaller portion of the Company’s human resources, as more and more administrative functions were assumed. “Company rule” of India commenced in 1757, after the Nawab of Bengal surrendered his power to the Company following a military loss at the Battle of Plassey. Soon thereafter, in 1765, the Company was granted the right to collect revenue in Bengal and Bihar, and in 1772 it established a capital in Calcutta. The Company appointed its first Governor-General (Warren
Hastings) to become directly involved in governance, and the question of British education was first raised. The debate on British education in India continued through the Company’s withdrawal of support for missionaries (after 1779), and education (especially higher education) continued in its “indigenous” form.

In 1780, with 30 years of service in the Company, the Governor-General of Bengal, Warren Hastings, first encouraged higher learning in Calcutta. This step accompanied the patronisation of mostly classical learning by Orientalist and amateur British scholars such as Judge William Jones. This phase included the first formal case put before the Court of Directors of the East India Company to engage in education, in 1793. Despite hectic efforts, led by the avid social reformer Charles Grant, an informal phase for education, especially higher education, continued until 1813. The informal phase between 1780 and 1813 is relatively well documented (Khan 1973; Ghosh 2000).

In 1813 (following the provisions of a 1773 English law), the Company Charter was renewed by an Act for 20 years and included, for the first time, introduction of British education in India. The 1813 Charter Act’s a relatively ambiguous clause 43 spoke of “revival and improvement of literature and of the encouragement of the learned natives of India” (Ghosh 2000: 18). It has been argued that this inclusion was the result of a deluge of petitions by missionaries for the Company to renew its support to their proselytization in India. Be that as it may, Clause 43 was ultimately interpreted as a license for British Governors and Governor-Generals in India to spread education at the Company’s expense.

It was shortly after the Company’s license was renewed by an Act in 1833 for another 20 years that the famous Minute appeared by Lord Macaulay, Law Member of the Council of Governor-General Bentinck and President of the General Committee of Public Instruction. Various developments then took place, resulting in the rapid spread and control by the British of education, including higher education. This was accelerated during the rule over the British Indian colonies of Governor-General Dalhousie. Events were finally brought under centralised, unitary control by
the Educational Despatch of the Court of Directors of 1854, outlining for the first time “a complete scheme of general education for all India” spread over 100 paragraphs (Ghosh 2000: 74). The phase of rapid spread and introduction of modern education, between the two communiqués of 1813 and 1854 marks a distinct period, dominated by the East India Company (Khan 1973: 77). The Educational Despatch (1854) is a critical document for this period. During this time the British annexed further territory, including the province of Punjab (1849), which is significant for having the oldest university in what is now Pakistan.

Company rule lasted until 1858, when, after the “Rebellion” of 1857 and Government of India Act 1858, the British government assumed the task of directly administering India in the new British Raj. It also entered a new, feverishly active phase of institution of modern education, including higher education, across the colony. In 1904, under Lord Curzon, an Educational Policy (GOI 1904) was instituted for the first time, and in 1913 this was revised to a second Educational Resolution and Policy (GOI 1913). The expansion phase between the Despatch of 1854 and the latter (second and last) Educational Policy of 1913 marks another key period for higher education in British India. At the same time, relevant contextual documentation relates to the Muslim Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh and similar institutions (Mahmood 1895; Metcalf 1989; Lelyveld 1996; Murad 1996).

After 1913 the Empire’s momentum slowed briefly with the first world war. An earlier planned Commission, which was interrupted by the Empire’s war activities, was put together again in 1917 to examine and make recommendations on university education. It drew on newly gathered statistics which included the status of previous reform efforts (Sharp 1918). The Commission’s recommendations were the strongest determinants of the growth of modern higher education after the Resolution and Policy of 1913. The Government of India Act of 1919, meanwhile, introduced a system of “diarchy”, where “departments with less political weight and little funds like education... were transferred to ministers responsible to the Provincial Legislature... and revenue resources were divided between the Centre and the Provinces” (Ghosh
This was followed by a further Committee to examine the impact of broader governance reforms on education, in 1927. At about this time, momentum had already gathered to an un-ignorable level for de-colonisation and self-rule. Mahatma Gandhi, in particular, had proposed a number of self-rule policies, including on education. In the meantime, more focused efforts for the promotion of Muslim education, including higher education, had emerged, centred initially on Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Muslim Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh. While much work has been done on the MAO College and its role in the Muslim educational movement which was one precursor to the Pakistan movement, little attention has been paid to some of the issues bordering that movement and countering Sayyid Ahmed Khan. The growing self-confidence among Indians, including Muslims, resulted in numerous “native” committees and efforts for education. The most notable Muslim review and reform effort at the end of this phase was the Committee established under Kamal Yar Jang Bahadur in 1940. Subsequently, from 1942 onwards, events were more overtly political and centred on administrative de-colonisation, and little was achieved in education until after Pakistan’s Independence in 1947.

Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Muslim Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh

These thematic distortions became evident in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when Muslim colonials (“Natives”) became visibly active in the field of higher education in British India. Prime among these for his impact and renown, and without a doubt, was Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who “remained, for an important period of time, the uncontested intellectual and educational leader of the Muslim community [in British India]” (Khan 1981: 105). Wikipedia adequately summarises the official and popular view that “Sir Syed pioneered modern education for the Muslim community in India.”

Sayyid Ahmad was a complex figure and some of his ambiguous role in the definition of modern higher education will be discussed later. However, his ‘uncontested’ leadership makes him a proto-typical representation of modernisation
as it came to be widely accepted. Sayyid Ahmad’s dominant concern as it sharpened after the uprising of 1857, was to search for a means for Muslims in India to survive and prosper as an identifiable community under British rule. From his treatise on the close relationship between Christianity and Islam to his political statements in favour of Muslim cooperation with British colonisers, Sir Sayyid argued for Muslims in India to learn from Britain’s might and to flourish under their system of governance.

Sayyid Ahmad’s primary emphasis soon became his advocacy for Muslims to acquire modern education and his consequent founding of the Muslim Anglo-Oriental (MAO) College at Aligarh in 1875, later to become the Aligarh University in what is now India. This foundation has been thoroughly reviewed in its political and historical context (Malik 1980; Lelyveld 1996). In brief, the MAO College was founded on Sayyid Ahmad’s analysis that the British, whom he felt could not be confronted after 1857, were more suspicious of Muslims than any of other community in India, and that the community therefore had to avoid antagonising them and to meanwhile strengthen its position under British governance. It is clear that Sayyid Ahmad felt that the primary challenge facing Muslims globally was their intellectual decline coupled with the rise of European power, and that Muslims needed to adapt to this modern world through education.

The MAO College was a realisation of this vision, offering the youth of the Muslim shurafa (nobility) an opportunity to educate themselves along what Sir Sayyid considered modern lines. The emphasis in the college (which included a school) lay on the English language and European texts, natural and applied sciences, and a rounded curriculum modelled loosely on the English boarding schools and universities. An English educationist, Theodore Beck, was invited to become the first Principal of the College at the age of 24, after having just graduated from Cambridge. Sir Sayyid himself summed up his vision before the College was founded: “we aim to turn this MAO College into a University similar to that of Oxford or Cambridge. Like the churches of Oxford and Cambridge, there will be mosques attached to each College.” The vision was supported by the British through grants and patronage,
while Sir Sayyid was acknowledged positively in his continuing position as a jurist (until the foundation of the College), membership in the Viceroy’s Executive Council, knighthood and award of the Order of the Star of India.

The impact of MAO College is hard to understate. Besides attracting a large number of Muslims as students, some of whom became prominent Muslim leaders in British India, the institution became a model for Muslim reformers (Malik 1980). It also provided Sayyid Ahmad with a platform to argue his case for intellectual revival of Muslims as a route to political enhancement within the Empire, and was the site for the All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference in 1886. The Conference became a loose organisation which played a key role in the Aligarh Movement, also founded by Sir Sayyid, to “create an atmosphere of mutual understanding between the British government and the Muslims” and to “persuade Muslims to learn English education” (Ibid). The politics of non-confrontation were instrumental in this movement, which aimed broadly at generating a cultural and intellectual reform through a class of leaders from among Indian Muslims. The Aligarh Movement, in turn, was one of the seeds that led to the creation of an All India Muslim League, at a session of the Conference in 1906 (after Sir Sayyid’s own death in 1898). The League, distinguished from the dominant political forum of the Indian Congress, was itself critical both in the independence from colonial rule in 1947 and as a force for the creation of a separate homeland, Pakistan, for Muslims in South Asia.

Sayyid Ahmad’s influence thus reached beyond the foundation of the MAO College, and marks a dominant trajectory for Muslim higher education in colonial India. By contrast, the parallel trajectory of Muslim higher education in British India also galvanised around Sayyid Ahmad’s politics, philosophy and theology. What these institutionalised and independent reactions (Deoband mad’rassah, Dar’ ul Uloom Nadwat ul Ulama, and independent ‘ulama) all had in common, besides antagonism to Sayyid Ahmad’s project of modernisation, was the role of religion in higher education and, as part of the broader background understanding, the role of religion in organisation of society. The notion of a religious vs. secular vision of higher
education came to be one of the defining points on which the conception of modernity hinged, as shall be discussed later. But the “Other” side of the gradually dominating view of modern higher education for Muslims was perhaps more disjointed in their agendas than unified in their opposition to Sayyid Ahmad. Differences in political stands and visions (for instance for or against a separate homeland for Muslims after independence from the British) marked the various institutions and intellectuals. These included the notion of utility in education and the construction of a *modus vivendi* between traditional Islamic knowledge and modern requirements. These debates, however, are generally not linked to the contemporary importance placed on, structure of, or concerns regarding higher education in Pakistan.

**The Colonial Milieu and Higher Education in Pakistan**

Despite the relatively sparse information on pre-colonial Muslim higher education in India, it appears that the discourse of modernisation became a social force (in the sense of constituting institutions) only after colonisation. It also appears that modern institutions of higher education were organised only during the colonial period, in the colonial milieu, either modelled on European or colonial institutions (as in Sir Sayyid’s vision for MAO College) or in reaction to them (as in the case of *Nadwat ul Ulama* or the *Dar’ ul Ulloom* at Deoband). It becomes relevant to examine what happened in this period of colonisation to create a modernising force that shaped Muslim higher education, and to ask how these events related to previous forms.

The period after 1947 in Pakistan shows a strengthening of the discourse of modernisation in higher education. Successive efforts at policy reform, coupled intrinsically with the many changes in political regimes, appear to emphasise this need to be modern. Therefore, it is important to examine the colonial period not as isolated history but in its impact on the present imaginary in Pakistan. Among other continuities, it is clear that the very defining nature of Muslim-ness has undergone a significant change from pre-colonial times to post-independence Pakistan.
What may be reasonably assumed is that the traditional higher education which stands as a counterpart to modern state- and private-led institutions is as much a contemporary construct as is modernity itself. The history of this construct leads inexorably to colonial intervention, in which aspects of Islamic and Hindu history and culture were highlighted and emphasised to construct both tradition and modernity. The middle chapters of this thesis indicate three such thematic distortions that have affected the manner in which modern higher education is culturally conceived in Pakistan today. The point being made in this thesis is that these distortions flow directly from, or in response to, what may be termed a colonial milieu, a certain rationality of institutionalisation. Such a milieu connotes what Rizvi (2004: 162) has called a “discursive field,” or “the range of assumptions that are made implicitly in debating a particular topic or issue, ideas that are presumed, and notions that are simply ruled out of the bounds of possibility.”

Colonial discursive practice was based on essentialism, initially the superiority of the white race. Literature on the history of this racism is legion, and not immediately germane to this review. However, one important link is Immanuel Kant, the conceiver of the modern University as initiated by the German Idealists, Schilling, Schiller and Humboldt in Berlin. Kant’s approach to the Other, including in his Critique of Practical Reason, is underwritten by his essentialist teleology which allows him to be both cosmopolitan and racist at the same time (van Gorkom 2008: 1). Kant’s teleology includes a schema of racial evolution, from red to black to olive yellow to white, in that order of superiority and mental capacity, indicated by their evident “accomplishments.” Each skin colour, for Kant, has an “inner finality” with its own predispositions. Difference is thus accounted for with reference to teleology as well as origins – the further back a race traces its history, the more fallen is that race today. The hierarchy thus evolved includes “purposiveness,” with Kant assigning the greatest responsibility to the most advanced race, the whites. Kant declared that all races except the whites have varying degrees of barbarism and so it falls to the whites to “culture” them with education. Further, Kant felt that such education had to be
continuous and systemic, in order to prevent the relapse of these races into their natural condition of barbarism. Early colonial education internalised this teleology.

The early history of race and racial discursive practices is long and well-mapped. What is important here is the discursive justification of conquest and of systemic changes in conquered nations on the basis of biological (unvarying) and then cultural (reform-able) essentialism, which was relatively unique to European colonialism. This discursive practice is relevant to institutionalisation of higher education, particularly through the mutation of colonial practices after de-colonisation.

Developments after de-colonisation, for instance in Pakistan, are thus informed by such responses to the colonial milieu. A wealth of postcolonial scholarship on education shows that colonial domination employed forms and structures that are in evidence today under different garbs (1999; 2001; 2004). For anthropologists, too, “the study of colonialism erases the boundaries between anthropology and history or literary studies, and between the postcolonial present and the colonial past” (Pels 1997: 163). As such, it bears repeating that “postcolonialism” does not imply that “colonialism is over”, but rather that the forms of this discursive practice have changed. For instance, Tikly (1999: 611-612) points out that the discursive justification for inequality in the 20th century moved away from colour racism (biological essentialism) to cultural racism (cultural essentialism). In other words, “they” are not developed - not because their colour prevents “them”, but because they are culturally backward/traditional. This places modern education within the project of colonialism, but also attaches importance not on colonisation itself but on discursive domination which can continue sans the form of colonisation.

3.3 Higher Education in Pakistan Today

‘Higher education’ refers in the Pakistani educational system to formal education after Grade 12, equivalent locally to the North American high school or the British Advanced Level. Institutionally, higher education is completed through Colleges or Universities, the primary differences between the two being that Colleges typically do
not engage in any substantive research, typically (though not in every case) do not award their own degrees but instead are affiliated with universities that do, and typically (though not in every case) do not offer MPhil or doctorate degrees. As such, higher education is determined, particularly through examination, admissions and curricula, by universities.

Universities are categorised in various ways, the most general being the distinction between the “public” and “private” universities. The former are understood to be in the public sector and whose existence is financially guaranteed by the Government of Pakistan on the basis of enrolment and not on quality assessment; though “autonomous,” they are subject to relatively uniform legislation and rules of business. The latter are recognised as belonging to the private sector, in that the Government of Pakistan is not responsible for their sustenance, although they are not barred from receiving government support from time to time; while they are chartered by the Government, these universities may form relatively independent rules of business, governance and management. This short-hand description of the categorisation obscures connotations that are associated with the terms “public” and “private.” In most representations, “public” is associated with equity (that is to say financially subsidised), often of low-quality; while “private” is associated with quality (often, greater employability). These separations and connotations are, of course, arbitrary and deployed variously in polemics and discussions, although modern-ness may be easily demonstrated as the centre of both categories. In 2008, there were 66 public universities and 58 private universities (HEC 2010b).31

Despite the absence of historical analyses, the importance of higher education for Pakistan is undisputed. This importance can be, and has been, argued in various ways. The national conference on education in 1947-8, immediately upon Pakistan’s independence from British colonial rule and partition from India, and subsequently the Commission on National Education (CNE 1959) situated higher education as part of the national effort to build on the Muslim Educational Movement from Aligarh, and make Pakistan a “modern nation-state.” UNESCO/ World Bank (TFHES 2000),
the national Task Force on Improvement in Higher Education (TFIHE 2002), and international development agencies consider higher education an imperative for socio-economic development within a knowledge-based global economy. By contrast, some scholars (Rahman 1984) make a case for a recovery of the Islamic intellectual tradition. To the wealth of literature underscoring the criticality of higher education in general, can be added articles in the Pakistani press – including from the university community – representing the importance of higher education in and of itself, as well as for improvement in primary and secondary education.

The representation of higher education’s importance within policy-making, development, academic and revivalist communities, is overwhelming. The socio-economic development argument is the most widely used by the state in Pakistan, and relies on the analysis that the contemporary global economy is a “knowledge-based economy,” wherein institutions of higher learning and research function as generators for development. The UNESCO/World Bank Task Force Report (2000: 92) sums up this view, noting that “higher education will certainly be necessary [if not sufficient] in most countries, if more vibrant development is to take place.” Higher education is, furthermore, linked not just with social and economic benefits of the standard development discourse, but with the educational “continuum.” Pakistan’s Higher Education Commission, the central regulatory body, notes that considering the entire issue of development in a holistic manner, it thus becomes apparent that “Higher Education” serves as the engine of change that not only impacts economic development, but also serves to strengthen the entire system of education. The higher education system produces the teachers that are the most critical component of the entire education system, the graduates who power the “knowledge economy,” and the researchers who unleash the power of Critical Thinking. The products of this system then catalyze the development of new products and processes, an imperative in today’s highly competitive industrial world (HEC 2005: 1).
A number of analyses can be found to substantiate the notion of higher education relevance to economic growth, mostly from examples in Europe. Equally prevalent are global analyses correlating strong higher education with vibrant civil society, cultural growth and public benefit. The examples of India and China are often cited in Pakistan as models of the economic benefits of investing in higher education.

This construction of higher education as an ‘engine of change’ in society has placed the sector at the centre of current development efforts, from which it was largely excluded until 2000. Although higher education, along with all development sector programs in Pakistan, suffered in the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009, the proportion of higher education budgetary allocation has been steadily and rapidly increasing. Between 2000 and 2006, budgetary allocation to higher education had already increased by over 270% (EAD 2009: 164), far outstripping any other development sector. Even in the recent, high deficit budget for the fiscal year 2009-2010 higher education once again received an increase. In this budget, education as a whole received Rs. 31.6 billion (equivalent to €270 million in February 2010) out of which Rs. 23.4 billion (about €200 million) was reserved for tertiary education alone. In addition, the Government allocated another Rs. 22.7 billion (€194 million) for development projects by the Higher Education Commission (Report 2009b). Much, if not all, of the latter is likely to have come from the last of a series of World Bank loans to invest in higher education in Pakistan. In October 2009, Pakistan’s President declared that the budget for higher education would be further enhanced by 20% of the Gross Domestic Product over the next five years (Chronicle 2009). To put this in perspective, the Government allocated Rs. 23.2 billion (about €200 million) for the entire health sector (Report 2009c) in a country with poor health indicators (for instance among the top 10 highest number of maternity-related deaths in the world).

The above figures indicate the primary importance placed on higher education by successive governments in Pakistan since 2001. Much of this momentum has to with visible achievements (primarily the establishment of new universities and enhanced enrolment at all levels) since the 2001-02 higher education reforms.
Chapter Three
Higher Education in Pakistan

Once More, Yet Again... Higher Education Re-forms in Pakistan

The story of higher education in Pakistan is tied to the events that mark it most evidently: eight policy reform efforts, the 2001-02 reforms being only the last of a series of modernisations. While all governments have considered higher education of vital importance, all have likewise agreed on the poor condition in which they find the sector. The first is difficult to reconcile with the second, and makes successive reform efforts all the more remarkable. A brief historical account of the re-forming efforts links them to the broader political history of the country.32

The first Education Conference of 1947 was a direct outcome of Independence and the key role played by the All India Muhammadan Educational Conference and Aligarh Movement of Sir Sayyid, centred on the pivotal Muslim Anglo-Oriental College. It was also shaped by the insistence of the “Father of the Nation” Quaid-e-Azam on inculcating and institutionalising modern education along the lines of MAOC. The four-day Conference established the basic administrative and policy directions to form the education sector in the new nation-state. Among other recommendations, the Conference resolved to recognise Urdu as the ‘lingua franca’ of the country, develop the education system to be ‘inspired by Islamic ideology’, make religious instruction compulsory for Muslims and available for other religious affiliations, and introduce compulsory military training. Not all the recommendations were implemented.

The next major effort, the CNE of 1959, was related to the beginning of Field Marshal President Ayub Khan’s martial law after he overthrew the civilian government in Pakistan in October, 1958. Within three months, he had constituted the CNE, which was accompanied by a host of other political reforms, including drafting of a national Constitution and introduction of local government, all of which were completed by 1961. The Commission emphasised higher education, making this section the first and longest of 27 chapters in its report. It also included references to the importance of higher education throughout other areas, including in adult education, pedagogy, and the arts and cultural heritage (CNE 1959). This significant
reform resulted in the broad structures and directions to be adopted by higher education in the country until 2001, including the proposal for a central University Grants Commission.

The third policy initiative was the New Education Policy of 1970. This was launched less than a year after Ayub Khan handed over martial law administration to General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan in March 1969, after a series of civilian protests. The Policy accompanied a major change of political regime, as well as other political reforms.

Yahya Khan, in turn, handed over power as President to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in December, 1971. This (democratic) regime launched a New Education Policy in 1972, less than one year after coming in power. At the same time, the Bhutto government also announced a host of reforms, including another Constitution and a nuclear program. The 1972 Education policy related itself to the CNE 1959 and led to a new Act for universities and the establishment of a University Grants Commission.

In July, 1977, Bhutto and his cabinet members were arrested in a coup, again following popular unrest, and General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq declared martial law. As Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Zia abrogated the Constitution while at the same time launching a number of reform efforts, which included an extensive program of ‘Islamisation’. Within this, the regime instituted a National Educational Policy in 1979, which remained effective until Zia’s death in 1988.

Subsequently, Benazir Bhutto’s People’s Party won the elections in 1988 and was then deposed in 1990. At that time, one of General Zia’s protégés, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, was elected as Prime Minister. Within months, Sharif had initiated work for another National Educational Policy, which was announced in 1992. After Sharif’s government was also dismissed in 1993, Benazir Bhutto’s People’s Party was re-elected. Again, as in the Bhutto period in power from 1988-90, no major educational or other reforms were initiated. Bhutto was again deposed in 1996, and Sharif’s Muslim League was returned to power in early 1997. Less than one year later,
the Sharif government instituted a number of political reforms, including yet another National Education Policy, 1998-2010.

The time span of the Sharif government’s National Education Policy turned out to be misguided. Mian Sharif’s government was deposed in a military coup in October, 1999, and General Parvez Musharraf assumed power as martial law administrator and “Chief Executive” (denoting administrative power over government as de-facto Prime Minister). In 2000 General Musharraf instituted wide-ranging political reforms, including the re-introduction of local government and new trade and macro-economics. Another Education Policy was also instituted, of which the highlight by far was the reform of higher education under the Task Force from 2001. The Task Force had been initiated about a year from General Musharraf’s assuming power. The reform text began:

Of all the economic growth initiatives of the Government of Pakistan, perhaps none holds more promise and the possibility of large scale and sustainable returns than the effectiveness and expansion of the Higher Education infrastructure in Pakistan… Its value extends well beyond to encompass greater social impact contributing to a just, democratic and enlightened society (TFIHE 2002: 1).

This brief history underscores the largely uncommented links between reform of education and other reforms in “wider” society in Pakistan. These have all been conducted in the backdrop of major changes of political regime (not just change of government in the same constellation), possibly with a view to seeking legitimacy. History underlines the close links that are at least imagined between education and society in Pakistan.

Throughout the reforms the key problems in higher education have been generally classified in terms of quality and access. Pakistan continues to have low enrolment figures. In 2003-04, 423,236 youth aged between 18 and 26 were enrolled at public and private university campuses, out of a population group of 24.9 million (at an enrolment rate of 1.70%) (HEC 2007). While enrolment increased to 521, 473 in 2005-06 (Ibid), this was below the national population growth average of 2.8%, and
the state continues to emphasise access as the primary policy area. To-date, Pakistan is reported to have low tertiary enrolment but the rapid rate of increase (to about 5% in 2008) indicates the strong demand for state-led modern higher education in the country. Likewise, while gender discrepancies have reduced from 63:37 (male: female) in 2001-02 to 58:42 in 2003-04 and continue to drop, access to higher education for women remains another key policy focus.

Aggregate enrolment figures obscure regional discrepancies, with Punjab (the most populous of four provinces) accounting for 24% of total enrolment, Sindh (the second most populous) accounting for 19%, NWFP (the smallest province) accounting for 9%, the federal areas (including the national capital and tribal regions) accounting for 8.5%, Balochistan (the largest province by area but with the least population) accounting for 1%, Azad Jammu & Kashmir (region) accounting for 0.5%, and distance learning accounting for 38% of total enrolment (Ibid). A primary concern of the state, therefore, remains to not only enhance access to higher education (seen as being restricted by dearth of institutions and poverty) but also to remove intra-national and demographic discrepancies.

Quality is the second key area of policy focus, absorbing much attention of the Higher Education Commission since its inception. The Commission’s Quality Assurance Division is committed to encouraging autonomous public and private universities to adopt quality policies and enhancement “cells”, as well as to regulating strictly on plagiarism and faculty qualifications. Standardisation approaches are adopted to determining minimum quality criteria (for instance international review of PhD theses, faculty qualifications and teaching experience and research publications), and while universities are individually responsible to meet these criteria, the Commission monitors and regulates quality.

Much attention has been given to higher education since the establishment of the Higher Education Commission in 2002, largely due to tremendously enhanced budgets since that year. The 2009 Commission budget exceeds the entire primary and secondary educational budget, mostly through a World Bank loan of US$ 100
million (HEC 2007). However, there has been no independent evaluation of the Commission’s work to-date. The focus of its internal reports has been on increasing access, reducing disparities, and enhancing “quality,” all oriented to global standards with no reference to the origins of modern higher education in Pakistan.

3.4 Modern Reforms in Pakistan

These policy areas of concern listed above have been progressively emphasised through the history of Pakistan’s higher education reforms. The most recent were the reforms coordinated by the Task Force on Improvement in Higher Education in 2001, constituting one of the key data for this thesis. The Task Force was constituted by President General Musharraf in April, 2001, following the launch in Pakistan of the UNESCO/World Bank Task Force Report in 2000. Under the co-chairmanship of the heads of Pakistan’s two oldest and best regarded private universities, the Task Force comprised a total of 17 members, mostly Vice-Chancellors/Rectors and Deans from leading universities in the country. The Task Force presented its Report to the President in January 2002 (TFIHE 2002), after which a Steering Committee was established to formulate practical steps to implement the principled and policy recommendations of the Task Force.

The driving motivation behind the Pakistani Task Force was the report of the UNESCO/World Bank Task Force on Higher Education in Society. This global report had emphasised development of “rational” behaviour and a focus on development economics as justifications for attention to higher education. The same emphasis was carried through to the Pakistani Task Force, seeking goals of “enlightenment” and socio-economic “progress.” In this broad-based normative search, the Task Force identified the basic indicators of the poor condition of higher education in Pakistan as access (only 2.6% of the age cohort 17-23 actually enrolled in higher education) and quality (left vague, but by implication with reference to international standards). These problems were traced to inefficiency and lack of state support. The central,
underlying issue was pointed out as one of governance – of each university and of the system of universities as a whole.

In order to reach these conclusions, the Task Force briefly reviewed the seven previous educational policies. The review was effectively a listing of the primary recommendations of each initiative. It highlighted the analysis of the Commission on National Education, 1959, and the fact that “implementation has not matched the many significant recommendations” of this Commission or the other six policy efforts. This unmitigated failure was driven, according to the Task Force, by a shortage of state funding, lack of political will, and a failure to realise the importance of the education sector as a “vital instrument for national development."

Following this brief analysis, the recommendations of the Task Force were primarily governance-related. They included systems to “enable” university autonomy, efficient governance and management, support for quality (again, undefined) and funding. The “enabling” function was envisaged under a new, central HEC- Higher Education Commission, which was formed in late 2002 to replace the earlier University Grants Commission) and a central, accreditation and quality assurance agency (which was never formed separately but rather within HEC). Under “curriculum,” the only recommendation of the Task Force was to institute four-year BA programs to replace the extant 2-year programs (this was achieved by the HEC after much unrest from 2006) and to emphasise broad-based (modelled on US “liberal arts”) undergraduate education.

While the Task Force was clear about the lack of implementation of previous educational policy/ reform recommendations it suffered, more or less, the same outcome. The implementation of its recommendations relied on a subsequent report of a Steering Committee which developed the Task Force principles into policy recommendations during 2002. The effort succeeded in significant new budgetary allocations for higher education, but not in the utilisation scheme outlined in the Steering Committee report. A new Higher Education Commission was formed, but mixed the enabling and regulatory functions deemed institutionally separate by the
Task Force. Four-year BA programs were eventually launched to replace two-year programs, but these continue to be generally longer versions of the latter, i.e. 2+2 years in the same specialisation rather than the envisioned 4-year integrated, broad-based programs. Finally, a new model of legislating Acts for universities was developed, but without the separation of powers between governing boards and Vice-Chancellors that was considered vital by the Task Force.

The distorted implementation of the Task Force recommendations has never been analysed. Nor has any independent review emerged on the subsequent policy initiatives or structure of the Higher Education Commission (HEC). The undeniable mis-firing of this set of policy reforms as well as the previous ones calls for reflection. While some of the outcomes of the reform are discussed throughout this thesis, the purpose here is to show cultural continuity in modernisation, rather than evaluate the performance of the HEC.

In any case, the Task Force recommendations were far from unique. The report itself claimed continuity with the seminal reforms of 1959, led by the Commission on National Education. The Commission on National Education (CNE) was inaugurated by President General Ayub Khan, shortly after his military coup, to review and make recommendations on the educational system. The Commission of 11 members delivered its landmark report of 360 closely typed pages to the President on August 26, 1959, following visits, interviews and meetings across the nation. The Commission report is widely regarded as one of the most exhaustive and dedicated efforts at educational reform in the country, being cited by the Task Force in 2001, and called the “Magna Carta of Pakistan’s educational system” (Saigol 2003: 1). There is no doubt that “the effects of the Ayub era educational policy have persisted beyond his time, and are discernible in contemporary educational discourse in Pakistan” (Ibid: 2). The CNE emphasised the importance of higher education, making it the first and longest of 27 long chapters, while including references to the importance of a strong base of higher education throughout other areas.
In the introduction to its report, the Commission stated a desire to ensure that the educational system became “in form and content, consistent with the hopes and aspirations the country holds for itself” and should be linked with the immediate project of “nation-building.” This emphasis coincides with a global discourse of independent nation-building in the 1950s and ‘60s, adding to my observation that colonialism helped construct rhetoric of reform that tied in closely with subsequent phases of globalisation. For the CNE in 1959 in Pakistan, the policy steps were designed to make higher education “concerned with the formation and development of character as well as with the acquisition of knowledge.” The Commission focused on universities as determinants of higher education nationally, and its recommendations were coherent, consistent, practical, and largely unimplemented. However, the Commission’s vision of higher education remains the determinant view in Pakistan to-date.

I have analysed in greater detail some of the cultural themes implicit in this representation elsewhere (Qadir 2009a). There I had suggested that the leading theme is a notion of higher education as being-in-Pakistan, situated firmly and inextricably within society rather than leading intellectually from some “ivory tower,” and yet in a crucial sense as being on the edge of that same society. That is, on the one hand the university was envisaged as being grounded in the country, the people and in an academic community, but on the other hand it was anticipated as being somewhat outside the problematic, communal, reactionary mass of people. This edgi-ness also included a focus on practicality and economic utility alongside an undefined support for the relative abstraction of a new “nation;” as well as a heroic picture of the faculty and graduates coupled with an insistence on their subservience to the state. Another key concern I had read in the 1959 report was for higher education to contribute to what the Commission viewed as the “urgent” task of nation-building for a newly independent country, which included eclipsing social and cultural differences. The third theme concerned recognition of the normalising function of education, especially of higher education. The concern here was to “build
character” of graduates that would suit a “free people,” ironically mirroring a colonial debate on including morality in educational curricula in British India.

However, in that analysis I had not followed through the cultural implications of these themes. That is, I had not recognised the extent to which the Commission’s overriding concern for nation-building is expressed as a statement of contempt for the bulk of the country’s population. In fact, the primary problem to be overcome, for the Commission, is what the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins (1999) terms a “culture of resistance.” This is aptly captured in the CNE report’s introduction:

As the various nationalist movements, which reflected the natural aspirations of a subject people to be free, gained strength [in the later days of foreign rule], the attitude of the people towards government began to change. This political awakening was followed by a period of unrelenting criticism. Every action of the government, whether intrinsically good or bad, met with a storm of protest. Even those measures that were clearly in the public interest, and there were many, felt the sting of aggressive criticism. Government was viewed as an evil, and non-co-operation became the badge of patriotism... We did not realise then [after independence] that the attitudes and habits of a hundred years cannot be altered by the scratch of a pen on a document of State...

One by one we witnessed the reappearance of the old attitudes of passivity, indiscipline, opportunism and regionalism (CNE 1959: 5-6).

This notion of a “culture of resistance” is a red thread running through modernising reforms of higher education in Pakistan. The Task Force in 2001 likewise considers this to be the defining problem for modernising higher education in Pakistan. What the 2001 Task Force does not recognise is that the other side of this coin is the culture of discipline. It appears in analysis that the moment of reform allows a culture of resistance to be identified and ‘blamed’ while at the same time generating a culture of discipline. Both cultures run parallel, and I hope to show throughout the thesis how discipline is enacted in a ‘soft’ manner through discursive use of modernity.
Here, it may serve to indicate two additional themes in the CNE report. One is the set of overt and implicit references to British colonial education policies. The report avers the “challenges” and “cynical indifference” that the British voiced from a century a half before the CNE, although it is unequivocal about the inherent value of independence and the anticipated “bright future” of the newly independent nation-state. Yet, there is an apparent perplexity as to why the same problems crop up after the end of colonial rule. The CNE is, in a very obvious way, haunted by Empire. However, this haunting is never resolved, and the recommendations continue much of the momentum of colonial policies based on the similar analysis of attitudinal “problems.” The absence-yet-presence of colonisation remains undecidability in the text. While commenting on that earlier, I am more attentive in this study to this undecidability and to the details of the specific cultural themes of continuity. As such, recognition of continuity is an important concern of this thesis, together with possible ruptures.

Another theme is the “Muslim” nature of both the nation-state and the University. At many places, the report evokes the Muslim identity of Pakistan, and hence of its institutions and “culture,” most often with references to the “glorious” heritage of Islam. The University is positioned by the CNE as heir to this heritage. Yet, at no place in the CNE Report’s section on higher education are there any specific references to what, in fact, this heritage is or entails. The normative aims and outlines of the University are imagined in an entirely secular manner, up to and including “moral” normalisation with no reference to Islamic ethics. Philosophy is likewise observed as important in the modern University and the modern nation-state, but no reference is made to how the tradition of Muslim philosophy is to be worked through in Pakistan. The ‘Islamic-ness’ of higher education is also a recurrent theme in the modernisation of the sector, and is discussed later.
The striking developments in Pakistani higher education over the past decade have been, more or less, spearheaded by the Higher Education Commission (HEC), the central regulatory and support agency of the state for higher education in Pakistan. The HEC was constituted in 2002 as a direct outcome of the recommendations of the Task Force on Improvement of Higher Education in Pakistan (TFIHE), convened during 2001. The TFIHE published its report in 2002 (TFIHE 2002), which acknowledged that this reform process was “triggered” by the publication and launching in 2000 of a report by the global Task Force on Higher Education and Society, convened by the United Nations Education, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and The World Bank (TFHES 2000). This latter report, entitled “Higher Education in Developing Countries: Peril and Promise” in turn “encouraged” the Pakistan reforms that produced the report in 2002 entitled “Challenges and Opportunities.” The Pakistan report’s recommendations, including the establishment of the HEC, led immediately and directly to the massive increase in state financing of higher education.

The significance of the steps taken for higher education in Pakistan, led by the HEC and stemming from the recommendations of the 2001 TFIHE, is undeniable. However, these reforms have never been critically analysed. In the lack of such analysis, it is not clear what the impact might be in various dimensions beyond increases in numbers, and specifically where this generous increase in financing might lead. For instance, with the increasing financing and growing control of the HEC over the development of higher education in Pakistan, there has been a convergence across the country over the past eight years. Even without formal evaluations, this is enough time for certain consistencies as well as “blind spots” to be
evident. The basic question of this chapter is to understand where this convergence arises from and what its normative determinants are. Most importantly, the recent reforms and ensuing steps are linked by the HEC to Pakistan’s globalisation and development, but the nature and implications of this linkage are yet to be analysed.

Higher education, like many other “social policy” arenas, is most often analysed with recourse to functional, political-economic and actor-centred theories broadly connoting, respectively, management (aimed largely at efficiency), distribution (aimed largely at equity) and capability (aimed largely at effectiveness). So it is in Pakistan, too, and the bulk of comments upon higher education in the country are situated in this perspective. By contrast, this chapter seeks to understand recent developments from a cultural perspective of globalisation. The key elements in tracing the global convergence are the reports of the global TFHES (2000) and the Pakistan Task Force (TFIHE 2002). I have separately undertaken this analysis (Qadir 2010a) using World Culture Theory, resulting in theoretical insights for that framework. Here, the emphasis is on the empirical findings of a critical reading of global and Pakistani higher education policy reform statements.

I should pause here to clarify again that I do not intend in this work to make any generalised theoretical comment on globalisation per se. Rather, I shall continue to employ the term as a broadly understood backdrop of planetary or supra-territorial relations against which to underline the cultural histories I am concerned with here. My aim is also somewhat different from that of Mahmood Mamdani (2007) in his exploration of the relation between higher education as a public good and as a commercial interest. Mamdani examines neo-liberal reforms at Makerere University in Uganda, begun in the 1990’s under World-Bank sponsorship and continued by the Ugandan government with the “uncritical enthusiasm of a convert” (Ibid: 1). However, the World Bank itself reconsidered its earlier approach of across-the-board commercialisation. This change was heralded in higher education by the Task Force on Higher Education and Society in 1999, which abandoned privatisation as the primary policy suggestion. The tale of global commercialisation of higher education –
in the rampant form at Makerere held up as a model for Africa, or in the limited form advocated by Mamdani – is a different one.

It would doubtless be informative to tell that story, including from a transnational perspective that encompasses Uganda and Pakistan as ‘models’ showcased by the World Bank at different times. However, my aim here is far more modest: to show what the cultural thematic of a global outlook in Pakistani higher education policy entails, and how global influence appropriates and interacts with institutionalised history. While not engaging with market-based reforms, I am closer here to what Rizvi and Lingard (2010) when they discuss the global dominance of neoliberal paradigms of education reform while pointing out that “while similarities in policy shifts occurring in a wide variety of nations are clearly evident, it is also the case that these changes are mediated at the national and local levels by particular historical, political and cultural dynamics” (Ibid: 3).

4.2 UNESCO/World Bank Task Force on Higher Education and Society

Concern for higher education in Pakistan peaked in 2000, when a series of national reforms had been instituted by the new government of President Musharraf, was complemented by a renewal of interest in higher education for economic development globally. In 1999 UNESCO and the World Bank had convened a Task Force on Higher Education and Society led by eminent educationists from 13 countries to examine and give guideline recommendations for higher education in developing countries. Their report, entitled “Higher Education in Developing Countries: Peril and Promise” was launched globally in 2000. Two of the leading members, both from Harvard University USA, were invited to launch the report in Pakistan. The invitation was led by the Pro-Chancellor of one of Pakistan’s leading universities – Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) – a member of the global Task Force.
The report was launched in Pakistan in February 2001 at the Aga Khan University (AKU) in Karachi (Pakistan’s oldest private university and to-date the leading university in health sciences nationally) and at LUMS in Lahore. Following the launches, the Federal Minister of Education established a Task Force on Improvement of Higher Education in Pakistan (TFIHE) in April 2001, co-chaired by the Pro-Chancellor of LUMS and the President of AKU. The Task Force report noted that the World Bank Task Force’s “report [cosponsored by UNESCO]... triggered the process that led to the establishment of this [Pakistan] Task Force, and often served as a guide to its deliberations” (TFIHE 2002: viii, emphasis added), and acknowledged the “stimulus” and “encouragement” of the UNESCO/World Bank Task Force (*Ibid*: viii, xi, xiii, 1, 5). The Pakistan Task Force, comprising 17 eminent educationists and educational administrators) presented its findings and recommendations in January 2002, following which a Steering Committee was formed to develop modalities for implementing the approved recommendations.

The Pakistan TFIHE was self-consciously “triggered” and “stimulated” by the UNESCO/World Bank Task Force, and was launched as a direct outcome of recommendations made by participants at the launches of the global report in Lahore and Karachi in 2001 (TFIHE 2002: xi, xiii). The TFIHE was also financed by the World Bank for its work, which included its own meetings and organisation of consultative seminars across the country (although the 17 members all contributed voluntarily), as well as publication of the report. However, beyond this limited financing, there was no other involvement by the World Bank or by members of the global UNESCO/World Bank Task Force. Neither the World Bank nor UNESCO or any other multilateral agency made any statement of support for the findings of the Pakistan TFIHE or commitment to future financing. As such, the obvious correlation between the contents of the global Task Force and Pakistan TFIHE cannot be explained as more than inspiration. The causality appears limited to “stimulation” and “trigger[ing]” of the process and general “guide to deliberations”. The Pakistan TFIHE report makes no further mention of the influence of the global Task Force.
However, is this the extent to which the global Task Force influenced the Pakistan TFIHE? The global Task Force, notably, did not give any explicit recommendations for governance structures, management procedures, admissions or examination criteria, or other academic affairs. In its own words, the global report “does not offer a universal blueprint for reforming higher education systems, but it does provide a starting point for action”; this was done through clearly delineated “qualities” that higher education systems must evolve in all developing countries in certain focus areas, such as financing, governance, and academic affairs especially in science and technology (TFHES 2000: 11, 14). In exploring these qualities and their translation into the Pakistani higher education sphere later, the next section unpacks this query of connection between the global Task Force and Pakistan TFIHE reform into specific research questions being addressed in this chapter.

Given the obvious, and acknowledged, historical connection between the global and Pakistan Task Forces, it is natural to ask whether the former influenced the latter and, if so, how? On the one hand, the immediate answer to this question is that the causality is limited to “stimulation” of a process, and absorption of principled guidelines that the global Task Force was not the first to articulate (although it may have been the first instance when these were articulated collectively). Furthermore, neither the World Bank nor UNESCO (the convenors of the global Task Force) financed more than the nominal meeting and logistical costs of the Pakistan TFIHE, and made no commitments to future financing of higher education in line with any recommendations. Eventually, no multilateral financing was forthcoming for Pakistani higher education from the World Bank until 2009, seven years after publication. The project document approving this financing of US$100 million makes no mention of either the global (2000) or Pakistan (2001) Task Forces, and hinges instead on the apparent effectiveness and commitment demonstrated by the Higher Education Commission (HEC) – the central regulatory and support body. This support signalled other donors, such as the United States Agency for International
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Development, whose first support to higher education of US$40 million, also in 2009, refers only to the HEC.

On the other hand, the HEC itself was established in 2002 nominally on the recommendation of the Pakistan TFIHE. Its primary mission statement, the Medium Term Development Framework, expresses many (although, crucially, not all) of the principles stated by the 2001 Pakistan Task Force. All in all, from the recent, large, external (multilateral and bilateral) assistance to higher education in Pakistan to the 2001 Task Force, and further back to the 2000 global Task Force, there is a remarkable convergence of principles and approaches.

The question may therefore be asked, first, to what extent is a convergence apparent between the global and Pakistan developments? In other words, what is the thematic nature of convergence between the global and Pakistan Task Forces, as evident in their reports? The focus on “thematic” nature becomes important because the global THES never prescribed formal structures or directly applicable recommendations, but rather principles of action. Second, if direct causality (through interference or financing) is not responsible for apparent convergences, how can this be explained? That is, how should these thematic convergences be explained in the absence of “direct” interference or promise? Finally, what initial implications does such an explanation have for the higher education sector in Pakistan?

4.3 Thematic Convergence

Massification

The first convergence regards what has been termed the “massification” of higher education, or an attention to enhancing tertiary enrolment ratios in national higher education. The global TFHES report (2000) terms this phenomenon “expansion,” and refers to the increase in numbers of students since the 1950s as both a reality to be faced and a reality to be desired. That is, on the one hand, the report considers expansion of higher education (primarily evident in increased numbers of students
demanding higher education) to be a given fact, including in developing countries, part of a (unexplained) “dramatic shift from class to mass” (TFHES 2000: 16). On the other hand, the TFHES report is clear that expansion is also to be desired, since developing countries need “more and better higher education” (Ibid: 9). That is, the starting point for the report is that “although developing countries contain more than 80 percent of the world’s population, they account for just half of its higher education students, and for a far smaller proportion of those with access to high-quality higher education. Overcoming these gaps is a daunting challenge” (Ibid: 91). This double emphasis establishes the first challenge that the report addresses: access to higher education by more and more youth in all countries, irrespective of the country’s unique condition or history. One implication of this emphasis, taken for granted in the TFHES report, is that student enrolment will take place on the basis of “merit” and not existential classification, such as gender, race, ethnicity, religious belonging or even economic status. This emphasis supports independent findings by World Culture theorists on the significant increase in world-wide tertiary enrolment, especially since the 1950s (Schofer and Meyer 2005).

The same emphasis on enhancing access to higher education is clearly evident as the first significant challenge identified in the Pakistan TFIHE (2002) report. This report begins (Ibid: 9) with a situation analysis of tertiary enrolment figures and continues with an understanding that massification of higher education in Pakistan is essential, irrespective of individual classification of students. This emphasis has found its way beyond the reform statement of 2001 into the current Higher Education Commission’s overwhelming emphasis on establishing new universities and encouraging doctoral studies to enhance tertiary enrolment.

**The Knowledge Economy**

The global TFHES (2000) report links the desire for higher tertiary enrolment to the “new reality” of the knowledge revolution: “The economy is changing as knowledge supplants physical capital as the source of present (and future) wealth.
Technology is driving much of this process” (Ibid: 9). This knowledge revolution is described in terms of increase in the rate of scientific publishing and patent applications, and access to information technology. The report relates this revolution to developing country needs by noting that, “Countries that are only weakly connected to the rapidly emerging global knowledge system will find themselves increasingly at a disadvantage” (Ibid: 34). The rationale for greater attention to, and investment in, national higher education is therefore largely (albeit, not exclusively) defined in terms of national economic goals: higher productivity in the contemporary global reality of knowledge-based capital. The global TFHES report claims that these “new realities” are distinct from the “traditional ‘nation-building’ goals” of higher education in most developing countries after de-colonisation (Ibid: 16). These, it suggests, also emphasised economic growth but through raising individual standards of living rather than relying on the inherent value of knowledge capital.

Likewise, the Pakistan TFIHE (2002) report also justifies a call for greater tertiary enrolment, driven by enhanced state financing, with an economic argument that cites the global TFHES report (Ibid: 1). Other “non-economic goals of higher education” are also related as being consistent with the principles that flow from the knowledge-based economic argument. The Pakistan TFIHE report (2002, 1) begins with this argument: “Of all the economic growth initiatives of the Government of Pakistan, perhaps none holds more promise and the possibility of large scale and sustainable returns than effectiveness and expansion of the Higher Education infrastructure in Pakistan.” However, the Pakistan TFIHE then relates the same economic argument from the Commission on National Education (1959), which drew on what the global TFHES termed “traditional nation-building goals”. That is, while the principle of higher education expansion for the Pakistan TFIHE is drawn from the global TFHES, and using its global analysis, the translation is into the same economic argument of national planning used more than 40 years ago as part of an explicit nation-building attempt.37 This is especially evident in the more detailed
recommendations of the TFIHE report, which do not refer to the global knowledge economy or revolution once in discussing the structural changes to be introduced.

**Structure and the System of Higher Education**

Given its global scope, the UNESCO/World Bank TFHES did not prescribe any specific structural features for higher education institutions in developing countries. Instead, the focus was on what was termed “the web of public and private education institutions, governing bodies, and individuals that form a higher education system” (TFHES 2000: 46). The report stressed that academics and policymakers had not adopted a systems perspective when dealing with higher education in the past, making this report unique. The “desirable features of a higher education system” were presented in detail (*Ibid*: 50-2): stratification (separation of higher education institutions that focus on research and those that educate large numbers of students); long-term funding to institutions and diverse resources for the system as a whole; “more intense competition” indicated by faculty mobility; flexibility to “significant external changes” (especially in the labour market); clear institutional performance standards; no political manipulation; linkages with other sectors (primarily industry); and a supportive regulatory structure.

The systems approach naturally enables a ‘birds’ eye view’ of higher education within national state boundaries. It also encourages an emphasis on governance, “the formal and informal arrangements that allow higher education institutions to make decisions and take action... [including] relations between individual institutions and their supervisors” (*Ibid*: 59). The TFHES laid out principles for good governance, leading to management, the “tools for achieving good governance”. These management structures (*Ibid*: 64-7) included powers to faculty representative councils (Senates); independent governing councils to “act as a buffer between a higher education institution and the external bodies to which the institution is accountable, such as the state”; “transparent, logical and well-understood set of rules for budgeting and accounting”; a “plethora of data” for decision-making; merit-based,
peer-reviewed procedures for faculty appointment and promotion; “long-term (faculty appointment) contracts, though not necessarily indefinite ones”; faculty engagement in external markets; external monitoring by visiting committees; and institutional charters that define the university missions. The conclusion of the section pointed out that “good governance promotes educational quality”, and that the principles and management tools outlined could enhance quality “across a wide variety of situations” (Ibid: 68).

This same emphasis on structure and governance within (broadly) a systems perspective is striking within the Pakistan TFIHE report, whose first substantial section is “The System of Higher Education” (TFIHE 2002: 9-11). After a year-long consultative process (involving its own meetings and consultations with more than 400 stakeholders), the Pakistan Task Force listed the following “most prominent amongst the issues identified” in the higher education system in the country: “ineffective governance and management structures and practices; inefficient use of available resources; inadequate funding; poor recruitment practices and inadequate development of faculty and staff; inadequate support for research; politicization; and strong scepticism about the realisation of reforms” (Ibid: xiii). Leaving aside the last (addressed separately in sub-section iv, below), the list is almost a direct reversal of the global TFHES listing of the “desirable features of a higher education system”. Among other features, the primary attention to governance and management structures is notable, with this being the lead recommendation to enhance quality: “to improve the performance of universities substantially... the Task Force concentrated its attention on systems that would enable efficient governance” (Ibid: 19; and throughout the section 19-25). The key features recommended for improved governance and management, mirroring precisely the global Task Force, were: independent governing boards; executive and academic councils with faculty representation; merit-based (but not peer-reviewed) faculty appointment and promotion procedures; time-bound appointments of faculty renewable upon performance evaluation; and clear university mission statements. These
recommendations were subsequently formalised by the follow-up Steering Committee on Higher Education (2002) in a Model University Ordinance to (re)charter universities, a move actively resisted by university faculty representative bodies but nonetheless implemented by the newly formed, central Higher Education Commission. In addition, with a systems-focus on structure, the TFIHE proposed:

a central body is needed primarily for supporting the improvement of the quality of academic programmes in both public and private sector institutions... a component of a network of independently governed and managed institutions that provides diversity of expertise and promotes synergy and efficient utilization of the country’s resources for education and research (Ibid: 26).

The proposed Higher Education Commission (HEC) would be different from the then-extant University Grants Commission in supporting quality enhancement and providing planning and accreditation services. This “enabling” legal and regulatory structure again mirrored the recommendation of the global TFHES for “desirable features” of good governance, where attention had been devoted to “active oversight by the state” to ensure an “effective system of higher education” (TFHES 2000: 53).

The Pakistan Task Force’s detailed description of the HEC (TFIHE 2002: 26-30) followed the global TFHES’ principles for an autonomous “buffer mechanism” that could counter destructive political interference in higher education institutions. Such “political interference” was commented upon by both Task Forces as a leading concern of higher education in developing countries, requiring countering mechanisms to ensure “professionalization”, a feature of the global model of rationality highlighted by World Culture theorists (Meyer and Ramirez 2000; Boli 2005; Ramirez 2006).

Culture of Resistance

There has been a concern about political interference on campuses since the Commission on National Education (1959). That Commission’s report was cited by the 2001 TFIHE as having identified most of the generic problems with contemporary
higher education in the country. The 1959 Commission’s key apprehension was the prevalent attitude of the population of the newly independent nation, “the attitudes of a subject people rather than of free men”. It diagnosed this problem as relating to colonial history, which on the one hand fostered indifference and passivity, and on the other hand led to automatic resistance of all steps by the (colonial) government:

every action of government, whether intrinsically good or bad, met with a storm of protest. Even those measures that were clearly in the public interest, and there were many, felt the sting of aggressive criticism. Government was viewed as an evil, and non-co-operation became the badge of patriotism. Passivity... was transformed into a weapon of resistance... As a consequence we were left with... a lack of acceptance of a recognised authority in public life’ (CNE 1959: 5-6).

This same belief, that actions of government may be “intrinsically good or bad” but are resisted by people for unprofessional reasons, was voiced by the 2001 Pakistan Task Force: “seemingly unreasonable resistance to change is a natural phenomenon and ours can be classified as a normal experience” (TFIHE 2002: xi). Reviewing past educational policies, it noted that, “If some of the reasonable policy recommendations had been implemented with the requisite earnestness, the situation of higher education in Pakistan would have improved and evolved over time” (implying that the earlier recommendations were not implemented and the sector has not “evolved”) (Ibid: 4). Further on there is a statement of “fact that many of the generic faults were identified more than 40 years ago [in 1959]” (Ibid: 16). The concern was that “many of the attitudes mentioned [in a long quotation from the CNE 1959] are strongly manifest today... the central importance of attitudes that condition the performance of individuals” (Ibid: 40). This conclusion at the end of the TFIHE report, coming after a three-para direct quote from the CNE report (1959) remains unexplored yet obviously critical. Even earlier, the TFIHE laid out the concern in the analysis of problems with higher education in Pakistan, as: “strong scepticism about the realisation of reform” (Ibid: xiii). The fundamental problem,
therefore, was one of a culture of resistance – to reforms in general and to professionalising reforms in particular.

This concern in the TFIHE (2001) is an echo of a similar issue raised by the global TFHES, where a key issue is the “chaotic and unplanned” evolution of higher education in developing countries generically (TFHES 2000: 11). The report detailed issues of poor governance, including political interference and activism, along with lack of accountability, leading to the conclusion that, “Higher education institutions inevitably reflect the societies in which they operate” (Ibid: 63). Given the poor state of governance, not to mention the long list of quality defects, that the global report listed, this appears to be a particularly uncomplimentary, perhaps pejorative, picture of developing societies. Again, the issue appears to be one of a culture of resistance in developing countries – to excellence in quality and professionalism.

4.4 Around the Corner of the Global Outlook

These findings relate the Pakistan 2001 reforms to the earlier 2000 statement by the global Task Force of UNESCO & World Bank through thematic convergences: focus on massification, justifying higher education with recourse to the economy, structure and systems of higher education, and a concern about entrenched culture of resistance to reforms. These are also evident after the TFIHE report’s approval, in the subsequent report of the Steering Committee (SCHE 2002) and in the eight years of actions by the Higher Education Commission constituted in 2002. Primarily, these emphases are to be found in the way higher education is analysed. However, the convergence has implications which are seldom analysed. George Thomas suggests that these concerns are indicative of a normative, global model of “rationality”:

Consciousness of an injustice or tragedy that demands the action of people and states and even corporations throughout the world means that there is a global cognitive schema by which such judgments are made, a moral order by which obligations are felt and claims are made… we thus see a consciousness of a world characterized by moral, cultural schema (Thomas 2009: 117).
Moral, Cultural Schema

What might some of these norms, or “moral, cultural schema” be in the case of higher education reform in Pakistan? Space in this chapter restricts a fuller description, but an initial reading might identify some of these norms from the convergences noted above. For instance, implicit in the feature of massification is a desire to make existential classifications irrelevant, such as gender, ethnicity and religious beliefs. One of the implications of this rational desire has been to secularise higher education in Pakistan to make it religiously-neutral and hence accessible to (theoretically) all, irrespective of the political history of Pakistan. This has been an attempt consistently pursued since colonial policy first officially introduced modern higher education in the form it exists today in what is now Pakistan. However, the secularisation of higher education concomitant with massification has not been a straightforward enactment, as evident by the escalating extremism on campuses and in the Pakistan academia.

A second norm is implicit in the justification of higher education by recourse to economic arguments, whether in the “traditional nation-building” mode of national economic planning or in the face of “new realities” of the inherent capital-accumulation ability in the knowledge economy. This is that advanced education must have a demonstrable utility; that is, it must have a purpose that is readily detectable in economic terms. The Pakistan TFIHE began with the vision that “higher education is considered critical for the achievement of economic progress” and connected its reform statement to the “economic growth initiatives of the Government of Pakistan” (TFIHE 2002: xi, 1). The justification for investment in higher education was related as the “promise and the possibility of large scale and sustainable returns”.\(^39\) The TFIHE report (2002) echoes a similar vision of the Commission on National Education (1959), with its emphasis on “development” as the motif for nation-building. That report, however, emphasised the “national character” as being the central feature justifying investment in higher education – the need to create the ‘good’ citizen to build a ‘strong’ nation.\(^40\) More importantly, this
utilitarian emphasis is visible as the primary motif throughout the global TFHES (2000) report, whose analysis indicates the “reality” of the knowledge economy as the primary justification for attention to and investment in higher education for the purpose of national development.41

A third and related norm is the orientation of higher education to global competitiveness. While the earlier (1959) CNE had interpreted this desire in terms of national character befitting a newly independent nation, the TFIHE (2002) related this norm to global economic competitiveness. Thus, for instance, when describing the poor quality of higher education in the country, the report notes that graduates are ill prepared to “participate effectively in... the competitive global economy”, a task presented as demanding even more quality than for competition nation-wide. Global competitiveness is also the notion prescribed by the TFHES (2000) in its underlining the knowledge economy and the need for developing countries to participate effectively by recognising the “new realities”.

One aspect of this competitiveness, notable by its absence, is the not-quite stated assumption of English as the medium of instruction. The TFIHE report never mentions the issue of medium of instruction. However, the emphasis on economic utility and global competitiveness, coupled with the absence of a clear recommendation on the medium of instruction, leaves little room for speculation. The fact that the Task Force did not report on this issue through all its deliberations is as telling as if it had made a statement, since the issue of medium of instruction has been at the heart of long-standing debates and polemics in Pakistani education (Rahman 1996), beginning with the language movement that at least in part led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1972 from its earlier identity as East Pakistan. The Task Force report was never translated into the national language Urdu or other, prevalent, regional languages. The same was more explicitly true for the Commission on National Education (1959), which drew on past colonial policies that held English to be self-evidently a more productive and richer language of education. More to the point here, the global TFHES also never once mentions the question of medium of
instruction in the “developing countries” that constitute over 80% of the world’s population. Again, however, the insistence on global competitiveness and communications technology leaves little question about the value placed on English as the medium of instruction.

These three norms – secularism, utilitarian justification for higher education, and English for global competitiveness – may be said to constitute part of the cognitive schema that drives the convergence between the Pakistan (2002) and UNESCO/World Bank (2000) recommendations. As is evident in this preliminary analysis, many of these norms have longer historical trajectories – they are related, even if not directly, to British colonial policy in what is now Pakistan.

*Colonialism and Postcoloniality*

These norms are all intimately and inescapably related to Pakistan’s colonial history in connection with higher education. This is all the more true for converging “problems” that appear to have persistent histories, being mentioned not only by the 1959 Commission (only 12 years after independence) but also by the key educational policy of the British Empire in India in 1904. Just as the CNE in 1959 noted that people have “unreasonably” resisted reforms by the colonial government only for the sake of resistance, likewise the TFIHE (2002) cited this report and ended its recommendations with the same complaint. It should be noted that higher education, as it existed in Pakistan from independence to-date, is organised in almost precisely the form that it was initiated by the colonists officially from 1854 and formalised from 1904. The convergence in the 2000’s then tentatively indicates a similar convergence pre-Independence (1947).

Such thematic connections draw further attention to common contemporary analytic assumptions that “the past cannot directly affect the present” (Martin 2003: 18). While arguing for consideration of the “*totality of the current situation*”, the above analysis indicates that past experience and construction *do* act, in some sense, as filters through which global models of rationality are “diffused” into national
arenas. In other words, the present may not be over-determined by the past, but neither is it independent of it.

The almost seamless continuity appears to be one consequence of the institutionalisation of higher education, including for Muslims, in colonial British India. The very fact of institutionalisation – primarily by constructing benchmarks and tropes – allowed higher education to transition to a global space relatively readily, partly by establishing an outward looking impulse. Continuity from the colonial milieu to the global draws attention to the fuzzy nature of policy documents. The texts are clearly not intended for only for domestic actors but neither are they only hypocritical enactment for external audiences, as they have served performative ends. Thus, under colonial rule the texts appear to speak to the British government and the English people, whose attitude to India from the 19th century centred on social and cultural reform. At the same time, the policies radically altered the existing system of higher education and oriented the entire “native” population to its dictates. Likewise, in Pakistan the 2001-02 reform signalled the modern intention of the military government, but also deeply impacted the country’s priorities. The global outlook in modern higher education thus extends to an international focus partly by blurring the boundary between endogenous and exogenous.

Linking colonial enterprises with contemporary society is not new. In education too, the argument has been made that contemporary global structures and forms of education mirror, in many respects, colonial policies (Tikly 2001). However, the local themes and implications of such a connection have not been considered before.

**Ritual Enactment and Decoupling**

The primary finding, then, is that the report of the Pakistan Task Force on Improvement in Higher Education (2002) may be usefully seen as an enactment of the global model of rationality outlined by the UNESCO & World Bank Task Force on Higher Education and Society (2000). Not just did the latter “trigger” and “stimulate” the process of significant Pakistan higher education reforms, but it
informed those reforms in meaningful ways through normative themes that became evident in the features of the Pakistan reform. The process of the TFIHE, itself, could be considered as ritual enactment, having meaning not only for internal reform purposes but also to demonstrate the “rationality” of a new, military government. The normative convergences are also not new, being traceable at least to the 1959 Commission on National Education, itself convened within months of the first military coup in the country, 12 years after independence.

This perspective allows a view on the continuously re-forming education sector in Pakistan. Each reform accompanied either a change of government (1970, 1992 and 1998) or a change of regime, i.e. political configuration (1947, 1959, 1972, 1977 and 2001). While a political science perspective might suggest viewing these reforms as means of seeking legitimacy internally, some globalisation perspectives (such as World Culture Theory) suggest that they be viewed rather as means of seeking legitimacy externally. That is, internal legitimation of a new government or regime might be only a limited perspective (and one which could be counter-analysed), and a fuller picture may emerge by considering the reforms as efforts by new governments or regimes to demonstrate their “global rationality” – a ticket to acceptability in the community of nations. The event constituted by a reform draws attention to the demonstration of rationality, and in that sense is ritual behaviour. What the above analysis indicates is a mechanism through which the ritual is enacted: from global principles to national principles (deeply but implicitly informed by the past) to national actions supported, in turn, by the global community.

The nation-state in Pakistan acquires a central role here as the site where global models are enacted. That is, it is porous to external, cultural influences on the one hand, but empowered to (en)act within boundaries on the other hand. This model is supported by the analysis of the Pakistan higher education reform of 2001. Not only did the Pakistan state (en)act the global model of rationality, but it also evolved an institution rooted in the nation-state to continue that process of enactment: the Higher Education Commission (HEC). Over the past eight years, the HEC has gained
more and more control over tertiary education in the country (for instance through radically enhanced budgets, establishment of new institutions, and transfer of control of some institutions previously affiliated with the Ministry of Education to the HEC). Ongoing actions on the principles of the 2001 reforms (for instance through recommendations on university governance, legislation and faculty promotion) may thus also be seen as enactments of a global model through an increasingly strengthened body of the nation-state (the HEC is accountable through its Chairman of the Board of Governors directly to the Prime Minister).

Far from withering away, as some theorists would have it, the nation-state is being progressively strengthened in the case of higher education in Pakistan, even as it becomes more porous to external models of rationality. The never-ending litany of policy implementation failures (such as listed in detail by the TFIHE) can also be viewed in this perspective. Here, “What we cannot require of a world-cultural element is the conventional... demand that, to be considered truly global, it must be ‘found everywhere’... the many elements of world culture are global in their conceptualization but they are hardly everywhere in a literal sense” (Boli 2005: 386). What is important, then, is that the intention is truly global not that the institutions become so. It is precisely this feature of intentionality that allows policy statements to be useful data for analysing from this perspective.

This approach goes to the core of what may be considered “sovereignty” and “agency” of and within a nation-state, which there is no space here to expand on. However, a feature of this curtailing of agency is that “both the claims [made internationally] and the policies [made nationally] are frequently inconsistent with practice. Decoupling is endemic because nation-states are modelled on an external culture that cannot simply be imported wholesale as a fully functioning system” (Meyer et al. 1997: 154). That is, the purpose of claims and policies is, prima facie, not to be implemented but to ritually enact global models of rationality. The claims and policies, briefly, are enough unto themselves.
Resistance of Culture

Finally, the perspectives of ritualised enactment and decoupling bring attention back to the culture of resistance lamented at length by the 1959 Commission and resignedly by the 2001 Task Force in Pakistan. Both mentioned the willingness of faculty, staff, students and administrators for reform as a prerequisite for the sector to “improve and evolve over time”, yet both pointed out that this has been the single biggest hurdle in that improvement. For the CNE this was primarily a result of people’s left-over attitudes from subjection to colonial rule. For the TFIHE, the problem was the same in addition to “scepticism” about reform, failure of previous efforts and entrenched attitudes against professionalism (TFIHE 2002: xiii, 4, 13, 40).

A reversal of this statement, as suggested by Marshall Sahlins (1999), puts the problem in perspective. In other words, the issue may not be a culture of resistance but rather a “resistance of culture”. That is, if the ritualised enactment of global models of rationality builds on external moral, cultural schema (however implicitly), then the localised resistance to those models (evident in decoupling and vocal resistance by the communities being ‘reformed’) may be viewed usefully as internal reaction by a cultural matrix. In this light, the seeping extremism in university campuses and other evident cultural trends are part of the decoupling that is, seemingly paradoxically, indicative of global enactment. A scan of the highly critical press reports surrounding the work of the 2002 follow-up Steering Committee supports this, although there is no space here for a detailed reading.44

4.5 Future Pasts: Historical Construction of the Outside

The global policy statement on higher education by UNESCO and the World Bank did “trigger” the process of Pakistan reforms but did not directly shape it. A more nuanced understanding of causality is called for, in terms of indirect influence shaped by historical experience.45 There are obvious implications for analysing and understanding higher education developments in Pakistan in the context of globalisation. The Pakistan developments, sparked by the 2001 reforms rapidly
increased tertiary enrolment similar to global increases since the 1950's that “transcend anything imagined in an earlier period” (Schofer and Meyer 2005: 917). Furthermore, the expansion is by and large de-linked from economic development, unlike standard propositions of economic theory and even the global TFHES (2000: 34-35). This was also a finding in quantitative comparative analyses of World Culture (Schofer and Meyer 2005: 916), and is all the more remarkable in view of overwhelming poverty and poor economic performance of Pakistan. It would be reasonable, thus, to expect further increases in tertiary enrolment ratios, irrespective of economic growth. The expansion will probably continue to remove disparity, for instance gender or regional gaps, as “inequalities... are increasingly difficult to legitimate” (Ibid: 917).

In a global perspective, the diminishing of national differences and the studious consideration of diversity also implies a convergence in the substance of higher education world-wide. At one level, we may expect a continuing secularising of educational content by the state (accompanied, naturally, by a resistance of culture). Likewise, we may expect a continuing justification of higher education for (global) economic utility leading to evermore emphasis on technology and implicit support for English as a medium of instruction. At another level, ritual enactment supports the development of a global knowledge elite that is culturally more closely linked across national borders than citizens of the same country divided by borders of higher education: “The modern world is knit together by elites schooled in a cosmopolitan world culture than in their own local ones, and linked more tightly to each other than to their own populations... such people are linked by a (mostly) common cultural frame” (Schofer and Meyer 2005: 917). Again, continuing attention to higher education would only strengthen this trend.

The discussion above also indicates that universities (especially re-formed universities) may be important sites which are, by their very formation, closely linked and responsive to global developments and rationality. This would also be expected through other phenomenological approaches to the knowledge-brokering function of
these institutions. However, unlike more classical approaches that would expect such brokering structures to limit access to “elites”, this analysis projects the expansion of such sites throughout the nation-state to enact global models of rationality even at the expense of classical power relations (Meyer and Ramirez 2000: 121-122). The role of Pakistani universities as global receptor/enactment sites remains to be examined.

If global enactment for external legitimation has been a factor in the case of Pakistani higher education (as opposed to, say, health reforms), this further strengthens the role of universities in globalisation analyses, while drawing attention to policy statements. Policies may have “symbolic capital” in and of themselves beyond any value they hold for a given national sector and beyond the implementation or otherwise that follows. This is so for the case of the Pakistan TFIHE, many of whose central recommendations succumbed to the same fate that they listed for previous reform efforts. Furthermore, the notion of policies having “symbolic value” draws attention to “exploring policy outcomes that transcend stated goals” (Barrett and Tsui 1999). The growing homogeneity of policies aside, the point is the “explanatory power of policy adoption as a signal for funding” (Ibid: 214). While Barrett and Tsui (1999) demonstrate this adequately for population policies, the massive international support to Pakistan makes the same case for higher education. In the case of Pakistan, therefore, much of the resistance to reforms may have had a point in linking them to global “agendas”, although the precise nature of the linkage as enactment may have been missed.

In many ways, being modern in Pakistani higher education policy connotes a cosmopolitan outlook. The 2001 TFIHE reform is ample evidence of a global outlook, and actions by the HEC since then only support this. However, such an outlook is far from being value-neutral and is far from being new. On the one hand, it is thematically specific and hence determined by very specific normative impulses that can be said to constitute a global model of rationality. The 2001 Pakistan Task Force emphasises themes that were very explicit in the 1999 global Task Force: massification, conception of a knowledge economy, focus on structures within a
system of institutions, and assumption of a culture of resistance to modernising reforms. On the other hand, what is considered the “outside” in a global outlook is already not fully “outside” for Pakistan any more. By virtue of British colonial institutionalisation, by 2001 the system and the policy approach had already been deeply informed by the “outside,” and it appears the system is now geared to iterations under the same outlook. Thus, while the teleology and terminology change, the orientation of the national system to a transnational arena remains.

Historical construction of the global outlook is evident by the mechanisms through which global TFHES principles (such as international competitiveness in the knowledge economy) are translated into national principles (such as economic utility for national growth) and eventually into actions (in an implicit assumption that economic utility and international competitiveness require English language education). In other words, Pakistan’s colonial past is significant in shaping how the global principles are translated into national action. Thus, contemporary higher education reform policy texts may be seen as border documents, as being instances of what I term “border rhetoric” to mediate constructions of the exogenous and the endogenous. However, the historical trajectory is crucial to determining how this border is translated into action, or which “externalities” are internalised and how.

Likewise, the normative, moral schema which eventually emerged in Pakistan may be traced directly to colonial policies of the formation of higher education. Thematic continuity begs the question of similarity between impacts of globalisation and colonialism. One of the aims in this chapter has been to demonstrate that such similarity should be looked for not in direct exertion of power (in which the two are obviously different) but rather in indirect shaping of rationalities, or the creation of a milieu within which certain policy actions acquire rational meaningfulness. One immediate implication of this historical filtering in Pakistan has been to equate English-language instruction with a global, and hence modern, outlook, traced in the next chapter.
Chapter Five

Good Subjects: (The) English and the Vernacular

The aim of this chapter, and the next two, is to outline the instilling of some of the cultural features that have come to underlie the expression of modernity in Pakistan as it relates to higher education. Specifically, this chapter explores the language question in higher education in Pakistan, tracing contemporary notions of the medium of higher education to their formation during colonial institutionalisation of the sector. It is not surprising that the British introduced the now widespread perception - indeed perceived normalcy - of English as the preferred medium of advanced education. However, the continuation of that impulse beyond decolonisation is not at all inevitable. In particular the identification of Urdu with the Indian Muslim League’s movement for Independence, Urdu’s conflation with a “Muhammadan” identity by the British earlier, and the intense language politics throughout Pakistani history, make it important to enquire why English remained the ‘natural’ medium for advanced education. It is all the more surprising in view of the extent of Urdu-language primary and secondary schooling across Pakistan, a remnant of successful British Orientalist policies.

Official rhetoric in Pakistan, from the nation’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah to the important reforms of 1959 consistently advocated Urdu to replace English as the medium of instruction at all levels. However this rhetoric and its practice have been ambivalent at best. The situation continued as such to the point where the reforms of 2001 never even considered the language issue. The Higher Education Commission’s actions since then have marginalised the issue of medium of higher education to an extent where it is no longer a viable policy question. The primary purpose of this chapter is to investigate how this situation arose, with English being considered the default language of modernity for higher education well beyond decolonisation.

The chapter begins with an analysis of the most recent reform policy statement (TFIHE 2002) with regard to question of English as medium of education, then discusses the issue in the 1959 reforms (CNE 1959) which institutionally shaped the
sector. I then move back to the first formal British Imperial Educational Policy (GOI 1904), and then the first statement by the British Crown accepting the duty to educate the “natives” of British India (1854). A brief excursus into the foundation of Pakistan’s oldest university – Punjab University – in the context of the language debate serves to highlight the case in point. First, however, a brief introduction may set the necessary context of the importance of the “language issue” in contemporary Pakistani education.

5.1 Language Politics in Pakistan

It has been pointed out that “language has acted as an important marker of identity and source of political mobilisation in South Asia” (Talbot 1998: 25). True to form, the matter of language of administration in Pakistani has been a dispute since Independence in 1947. Tariq Rahman, a leading scholar of language and politics in Pakistan traces the concerns surrounding language in the conflicts around Bengali (1948-52), Sindhi (1970-2), Seraiki (since 1970), and even the vernacular of the “dominant” ethnicity of Punjabis against the “national language” of Urdu and against English (1996; 1997; 1999). However, the dominant question for education policy has been regarding the use of English or Urdu as the official medium of instruction at all levels of education. In the early days of nation-building, the official policy was unequivocal about the modern requirement of a single national language for administration and education. Muhammad Ali Jinnah – commonly referred to as the Quaid-e-Azam (Great Leader) or Father of the Nation – epitomised this in a 1948 speech in Dhaka in the wake of language protests:

Let me make it clear to you that the State language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. Without one State language, no nation can remain tied solidly together and function.

The same official sentiment was voiced by Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, responding to a motion in the Constituent Assembly in 1948 for the declaration of Bengali as a second official language of Pakistan: “It is necessary for a
nation to have one language and that language can only be Urdu and no other language” (Talbot 1998: 26). In fact, Urdu was a minority language in the country, used as the first language by only nine percent of Pakistan’s population as late as 1981 (Population Census survey, in Talbot, 26) and by less than four percent in 1951 (Population Census, in Oldenburg 1985, 716, fn.17). What was at issue was not the practicality of communication but clearly the new nation’s identity as a modern entity, united by a single language. The vernacular languages, besides being considered “backward” and unsuited to international competitiveness, were also not smoothly distributed among the new administrative provinces: Punjabi was spoken in the most populated province of Punjab, but so were Seraiki, Potohari and even Pushto, not to mention the many different dialects. Sindhi mixed with Balochi and Urdu (mostly among migrants from India) within Sindh, while Balochistan was split between Baloch- and Pushto-speakers, with a minority of Persian speakers. The NWFP had a long-standing divide between Potohari- and Pushto-speakers, but also included many speakers of Persian and Darri (the common language of Afghanistan), as well as distinct language groups among tribes in the northern mountains.

Practically and administratively, a modern – and, hence, internationally competitive nation – was perceived as needing a common language, for which Urdu was a ready choice as an identity of Muslims in the separatist movement leading up to independence from Britain and India (Rahman 1996; Talbot 1998).

The official nomination of Urdu was contested by ethno-nationalist political groups, notably in Bengal (then East Pakistan) and Sindh. However, in practice, the vernaculars never entered the debate on medium of higher education, and even for primary education Sindhi was the only contender amongst a sixth of the population. Rather, the actual conflict emerged between Urdu and the default administrative language of English. Rahman (1997) shows how the Urdu-English controversy spread over educational, administrative and ethno-nationalist politics from 1948 onward. Despite numerous ostensible demonstrations of support for Urdu as the national language to unite the new, ethnically and linguistically diverse nation, in practice the
country’s administrators have retained English as the primary language in Pakistan today. Rahman’s analysis is based on a theory of class-based conflict in a ruling-elite framework (*Ibid*: 180), which cannot explain all the facts. Still, the facts remain evident: despite active lobbying, including by a pro-Urdu religious right, English has continued to dominate the educational and administrative landscape of Pakistan. Consequently, over the years not only has a slightly contemptuous attitude emerged toward Urdu instruction and popular media, but a strong perception now also exists to divide “English-medium” from “Urdu-medium” education.

Part of this may be explained by Rahman’s interpretation of the English language’s ability to open doors of practical success (primarily careers, especially stable ones in the armed and civil services), when most “instruction in English is given in elitist schools” (Rahman 1997: 202). Still, the question of why this has remained so over 60 years of Pakistan’s independent history, remains open. Given the many other, sweeping social and political changes in Pakistan, why could Urdu not replace English (even staying within an elite-rule theory framework) over two generations? Furthermore, the language controversy in education has focused primarily on the primary and secondary levels, with considerable elementary education being proposed and now being imparted in Urdu. However, at the higher levels, the pole position of English has remained almost exclusively unquestioned. In a time of increasing global connectedness, this has been traced by some as the imposition of English as a tool for imposition of hegemonic power (Abbas 1993).

**Figures of Speech**

The perceptive divide between Urdu and English is well captured by a survey of students’ attitudes to English and Urdu (Mansoor 1992). The respondents overwhelmingly (more than 90%) rated “the English speaking community higher than the Urdu speaking community on the following traits: happy, modern, successful, open, independent, high standard of living, attractive, impressive, bright future” (*Ibid*: 92). Similarly, overwhelmingly more students wanted to study English
as a subject (more than 90%) and use English as a medium of instruction (more than 80%). These general perceptions among school and college students are substantiated by a brief statistical overview, below.

In the 1960s, three universities in Pakistan introduced the option of taking graduate (Bachelor) examinations in Urdu, an option that was increasingly exercised until the 1990’s, after which English again became the medium of choice. Rahman (1997, 187-8, fn. 8) documents a rapid increase (in some cases, tripling) of students appearing for B.A. exams in the social sciences in Urdu between 1964 and 1967. However he also points out that the “best” students did not opt for these subjects in the first place, choosing science and administration subjects instead which were only offered in English. This observation remains valid, and the introduction of an option to take a B.A. exam in Urdu did not lead to the “gradual replacement” of English foreseen in the wake of independence. Rahman (1997) and Mansoor (1992) have analysed this as suggesting that all students aspire to study in English but pragmatically use Urdu for better expressing themselves in social sciences. This trend has strengthened since the 1990s, with the more widespread availability of English schooling and the greater incidence of Pakistanis seeking higher education overseas.

Since the reform of 2000’s, the pole position of English is refracted in multiple statistics. “English language Teaching Reforms” is the only mention of a language on the HEC’s website.49 Likewise, since 2002 the HEC has coordinated revision of curricula of 102 major subjects offered in Pakistani universities.50 All of the revised curricula appear on the HEC website in English. Urdu curricula are barely referred to: for instance there is no mention of the Urdu curricula in the Sociology and Education degrees, two majors very often taken in Urdu. The respective syllabi contain almost no texts in Urdu except those dedicated to Pakistan or Islam.

Similarly, a scan of the PhD dissertations approved in the last 40 years in Pakistan show that the overwhelming number has been submitted in English. Among its other reforms, the HEC has begun digitising PhD dissertations approved in the country in its Pakistan Research Repository; three thousand are now available for free online
The language distribution is telling. In the category of “Engineering and Technology”, all of the 129 theses are in English. In the category of “Physics” all 130 are in English. In the category of “Mathematics” all 56 are in English. In “Fine Arts” only one thesis is available: in English. In the general category of “Arts and Humanities” 89 theses are available of which 72% are in English, 22% are in Urdu and 3% are in Arabic. In the general category of “Social Sciences” 277 theses are deposited. Of these, 70% are in English, 16% are in Urdu, 9% in Arabic, and 5% in Sindhi language. Within these categories, overall, 84% of 682 theses were approved in English. Although a more thorough content analysis would be required to assess this, it is apparent that the Urdu and other language theses are dedicated to specifically “local” subjects and histories, while the generic is left to English. This is substantiated by the fact that within the separate category of “Languages and Literatures”, about half of the 282 theses are in Urdu and other regional languages (plus Arabic).

Given the change in the structure of primary and secondary education towards Urdu, not to mention the intense language politics in Pakistan, this continuing (arguably growing) emphasis and value attached to English-medium higher education begs investigation. Working backward, the first stop is at the defining reforms of the Task Force on Higher Education, 2001-02.

5.2 Symbolic Violence of the Silent

As above, the 2001 reform statement (TFIHE 2002) remained silent on the matter of medium of higher education. This is remarkable given the political salience of the language “issue” in Pakistan, which even those with a passing familiarity of the country’s history would recognise. The meetings of the TFIHE-Task Force on Improvement in Higher Education were conducted and minuted in English. All inputs received from members, consultants and others (TFIHE 2002: 41) were in English. The report was published only in English and produced its citations and quotes also exclusively in English.
My own participation as a staff member in the Steering Committee (constituted to prepare an implementation plan for the TFIHE recommendations) confirmed this. There was never any question in the SCHE deliberations about the medium of higher education being English. Again, all presentations made to universities across the country were in English, meetings were conducted and records maintained in English, laws and policies were reviewed in English, and inputs were sought from a great many faculty members all in English. On reflection now, it is apparent that it was considered “natural” that not only higher education but all efforts to re-form it must be in English. Of course, the SCHE was only tasked to prepare an implementation plan for previously approved recommendations of the Task Force report, which itself never considered Urdu or any other language as relevant for higher education in Pakistan.

Thus, the TFIHE report’s overview of problems in the Pakistani higher education sector (Ibid: 1-4, 9-18) makes no mention of the question of language of instruction or research. While the TFIHE report extensively refers to the current validity of the findings and conclusions of the CNE-Commission on National Education (1959), there is no note of that Commission’s reference to Urdu education. The CNE had conceded ground to Urdu for school education, possibly given the emerging ethno-nationalist political landscape of the time (Rahman 1997: 186-187), and discussed the gradual evolution of advanced education in Urdu but with an ongoing emphasis on English. This reflexivity, however, is not apparent in the TFIHE report. The fundamental concerns of the TFIHE remain on efficiency and effectiveness of higher education toward “excellence” and “quality”, with no mention of the tortured history of language of education in the country. In the places where such mention might be expected – sections on “Colleges” (Ibid: 33), where much teaching is still conducted in Urdu, and on “Curriculum Related Matters” (Ibid: 34-5) – there is, likewise, no mention of medium. The only paragraph where a mention or Urdu is found is in a review of the National Education Policy of 1979 (Ibid: 4), whose introduction of Urdu medium, especially in schools, is analysed as having “in effect led to the operation of
two different systems of education in the country, one for the elite and another for the rest of the country.”

The TFIHE report makes constant references to the report of the Commission on National Education (CNE 1959), pointing out that “many of the generic faults were identified more than 40 years ago” and concluding its own report with almost a page-long direct quote from the 1959 report (TFIHE 2002: 40). The reliance on the CNE report is well-founded: that report formulated the recommendations that mostly determined the structural form in which higher education is found in Pakistan today, and has been referred to as the “Magna Carta of Pakistan’s educational system” (Saigol 2003: 1). In fact, the TFIHE echoes to a large extent the approach adopted by the CNE in 1959 to the medium of higher education issue: silence.

The CNE’s silence was even more remarkable given that the language movement in East Pakistan had just ended its most violent period but continued to threaten the unity of the country, while ethno-nationalist groups in what is now Pakistan were beginning to organise around language politics. In this backdrop, the CNE did concede some ground to the question of medium of instruction, but restricted this to primary and secondary schooling. Urdu was declared the medium of instruction for public (Government-funded and managed) schools (CNE 1959: 286-288), while support was continued for a “permanent place” for English-medium schooling. More to the point, the language of higher education was unquestionably reserved as English. The Commission’s report resulted in student protests, in reaction to which another Commission was formed within five years. This second Commission’s report (CSPW 1966) strengthened the defence of English as a medium of education, and furthermore criticised the move by three universities in the 1960s to also allow B.A. examinations to be taken in Urdu language (CSPW 1966: 114). Both the 1966 Commission and the earlier, formative, CNE of 1959 took the official position that Urdu should eventually replace English at all levels of education, but that this had to be done gradually with a “dispassionate judgment”.

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In this context, the 1959 CNE’s silence on the medium of higher education is indicative of a widespread societal impulse for English language instruction. While compromises in official rhetoric and for primary education had to be made, the driving motivation of the CNE was to have Pakistan emerge as a “respected member of the comity of nations”. I have elsewhere (Qadir 2009a) analysed the CNE’s recommendations for higher education, with its thematic undertones of nation-building by “being-in-Pakistan” and normalising the citizenry through “moral uplift”. Most importantly, the CNE report was clearly haunted by the British Empire, tracing all ills of higher education to the attitudes of a “subject” nation not yet cognisant of its place as a “free and independent people”. This observation, echoing through to the TFIHE concluding quote in 2002, coincides with the fact that higher education structures reflect the forms instituted by the British. This leads to the inevitable suggestion that not only the structures but also the cultural conceptions of higher education were definitively shaped by British inception, including the equation of English with modern. To appreciate this, it is important to trace the history of higher education in English, marked first of all by the policy 55 years before the CNE.

5.3 Good Subjects: English and the Modern Indian

In 1904, the British Government issued “the first comprehensive document on Indian education policy ever issued by the Government of India since... 1854” (Ghosh 2000: 122). This Resolution of the Governor General in Council (GOI 1904) extensively reviewed the state of education in India before presenting detailed principles and implementation guidelines to organise primary, secondary and tertiary education in the colony. The context of the Resolution is interesting in itself and deserving of closer study than has been awarded it.

The 1904 Resolution argued strongly for the use of vernaculars to educate children at the primary level, in fact not allowing the introduction of English at all until a child was fully conversant in the vernacular for educational purposes. English was introduced as a taught language only after progress had been made at the primary
level. In secondary schools, the medium was to be shifted to English, but with a continuing focus on the study of vernaculars. A 1901-2 survey had found that English was hardly taught at the elementary (lower primary) level, introduced at the secondary level, and taught more than any other subject at the higher secondary level (Tangri 1961: 370-371). The exposure to Western subjects increased dramatically in higher secondary school, while English was compulsory at the tertiary level and the medium of instruction in practically all subjects (Ibid: 372).

One commonly identified reason for this policy is the popular agitation immediately preceding 1904, when Viceroy Curzon proposed a university reform to combat dropping quality standards with stricter Government controls (Ghosh 2000: 119-120). However, such agitation had been quelled in the past, and ultimately most of the recommendations made it through some two years later in the Resolution in any case. The Resolution was also a continuation of the 1854 approach, and as such did not present anything very new with regard to the medium of instruction. No question was raised about the medium being English for advanced education.

The university education section (GOI 1904: 28-31) built on recommendations of the earlier Indian Universities Commission of 1902 - the cause of “agitation” – and emphasised structural amendments to the organisation of universities. The major touchstone was to incorporate recent changes in the University of London, which was a model for Indian universities and so “could not fail to react upon the corresponding institutions in India” (Ibid: 28). The University of London had begun teaching itself as well as examining students being taught in affiliated colleges, and this formed a key recommendation of the 1904 Resolution. Another detailed recommendation was the expansion of and financial aid to “Chief’s Colleges” for the (mostly feudal) elite to enable their families to receive an education up to the tertiary level on the English public school model. However, the definitive set of recommendations concerned institutionalisation of tighter Government controls on university examination, instruction, appointments and governance in order to preserve and enhance quality.
In order to better appreciate this Resolution, it is important to recognise its principled objectives. The motivation of the Resolution was explicitly laid out as enabling a general “diffusion” of “European sciences and literatures” for the development of a “civilised community”. This ‘civilising’ mission of the British in no way contradicted the ‘extract and govern’ aims of the Empire at the turn of the century: self-governance in the form of (relatively independent) Dominion or Free status was far from being conceived let alone be the driving political force it was two decades later (Reed 1930). So the Resolution proceeded in much the same way that the Educational Despatch had 50 years earlier. In fact, it referred to that Despatch in its very opening sentence, pointing out that in the Despatch the Court of Directors of the East India Company had “emphatically declared that the type of education which they desired to see extended in India was that which had for its object the diffusion of the arts, science, philosophy, and literature of Europe; in short, of European knowledge” (GOI 1904: 1). The diffusion model adopted in the 1904 Resolution was a two-pronged approach described in the 1854 Despatch: awareness of “European knowledge” among the masses through primary education in vernacular languages, and higher understanding and utilisation of this knowledge through tertiary education in English, with secondary education constituting the bridge.

The medium of education thus constituted a critical element of the principles and goals underlying the 1904 Resolution. Briefly, the goal of a “civilised community” was thought to be achievable only by “European knowledge”; this could best be done by establishing a top-down filtration with English education at the tertiary levels along with a bottom-up awareness with European knowledge translated into vernaculars for lower education. In the process, the original languages of advanced education in India prior to 1757 – Persian and Arabic for Muslims, and Sanskrit for Hindus – were dropped altogether with the attacks summarised in the 1904 Resolution and elsewhere. In the matter of educational content, the Policies of 1904 and 1913 made absolutely no apology for, and give no alternative to, adopting whole-sale for the colonies the same nature and classification of knowledge (dominantly) normal in
Western Europe. The titles and content of subjects were to be European, and the preferred medium of instruction at the secondary (mostly) and tertiary (exclusively) levels was to be English.

The Resolution’s review of the condition of advanced education in India as the British found it in 1757, and as still existed in some parts of the country, was uncomplimentary. By and large, the Resolution reflected a picture of a relatively stagnant and backward system in an often immoral society (GOI 1904: 2-3). This sorry condition of advanced education “naturally” led to a “necessity of public support for Western education” (Ibid: 3). An indicator, for instance, was that “examinations, as now understood, are believed to have been unknown as an instrument of general education in ancient India” (Ibid: 11). The Resolution proceeded to extol the British Government’s “system of public instruction, the influence of which extends in varying degrees to every part of India, and is upon the whole powerful for good” (Ibid: 5). That is why, the Resolution claimed, “It is almost universally admitted that substantial benefits have been conferred upon the people themselves by the advance which has been made in Indian education within the last fifty years” (Ibid: 6). At one level, the Resolution aimed at uplifting and civilising the Natives, for instance by “correct[ing] some of the inherent defects of the Indian intellect” (Ibid: 19). At the higher stages, this civilising mission was possible only through the medium of English.

At another level, and partly as a corollary to educating a “civilised community” in India, the 1904 Resolution considered it unquestionable that Indians had to be loyal subjects of British rule. Loyalty was for the Indians’ own development as much as for ease of governance by the colonists. Furthermore, it was assumed largely without question that loyalty to the Crown could best be inculcated through education, especially through higher education. For this reason, again, English was considered the essential medium of exposure to “European knowledge”.52

The adoption of English as a ‘good’ subject to create ‘good subjects’ was far from new in 1904.53 In fact, the Resolution drew on the findings of an 1882 education
commission and the controversial (hence uncited) 1902 universities commission to stem a decline in university quality which had arisen partly due to the replacement of English in some university systems. More importantly, both the 1902 and 1882 commissions as well as the 1904 Resolution echoed the 1854 policy’s vision of education in Indian society. In many ways, Viceroy and Governor-General Curzon’s approach was to re-install the principles of the 1854 policy without the agitation caused by his proposals in 1902 (Ghosh 2000: 120). The 1904 Resolution made this clear in its opening:

Education in India, in the modern sense of the word, may be said to date from the year 1854, when the Court of Directors, in a memorable dispatch, accepted the systematic promotion of general education as one of the duties of the State (GOI 1904: 1).

The 1854 Despatch, then, is arguably the more formative policy document defining English as the medium of higher education in India, leading directly to the uncritical stance adopted by the Task Force in Pakistan a century and a half later. Before discussing this document, however, a brief excursus may help to appreciate the context in which the introduction of a vernacular medium became associated with a (potential or actual) decline in quality of university education. This was the case of the chartering in 1882 of the Punjab University, Pakistan’s oldest university and still one of the more important institutions in the country.

5.4 Excursus: The University of the Punjab, the Vernacular and Quality

The significant event between the Educational Despatch of 1854 and the Resolution of 1904 was the War for Independence in 1857. This war, culminating in establishment of the British Raj, included not only military engagements but also a decisive shift in the context of intellectual opinion among the British and the Indians, especially Indian Muslims. The leading reformer of Muslim education, Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan, was especially impacted by the war. In a booklet published in 1859, *Asbab-e-Baghawat-e-Hind*, Sir Sayyid analysed the causes of the war, blaming the
East India Company for aggressive expansionism. It is apparently at this time that Sir Sayyid formulated his opinion (which he retained till his death in 1898) that Muslim rule had declined in the region because of the superior technology and science of the British, who would hence dominate for a long time to come. The only way for the Muslims, he felt, was to adapt their lost intellectual heritage as “good subjects” of British rule. It is also at this time that Sir Sayyid developed a passionate resolve for modern education as the pathway for the Muslim revival.\(^{55}\)

The same period also saw parallel trends in Muslim higher education in India. Independent intellectuals like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as well as institutional reformers like Allama Shibli Naumani were also deeply affected by the war but formed opinions contrary to Sir Sayyid’s. Both agreed with the latter that education was important but demanded, to varying degrees, that this education be formulated more on Islamic lines than by adopting British norms. At the same time, a number of ‘ulama reacted to the Raj by establishing “traditional” institutions of higher education, the most notable one being the Dar’ul Uloom at Deoband established in 1860 (Metcalf 1989). However, an analysis of this strand of development in higher education in India, and its interface with ‘official’ Government-supported higher education, extends beyond the present scope. The aim here is to focus on the debate around the use of English as a medium of instruction in Indian higher education, which was only the case for ‘official’ higher education. This debate was not whether cultural allegiance was owed to Britain in order to be modern – that was assumed – but whether such allegiance could be effective without English as a medium.

**Colonised Enough? The Allygurh Association**

The move to prove to the colonisers that the Indian Natives were, indeed, capable of appreciating the “vast material and moral benefits” of European higher education began with a memorial in August 1867 to the Viceroy and Governor General of India in Council from the British Indian Association of the North-Western Provinces, based at ‘Allygurh’ (Naik 1963: 21-28). The memorial was co-signed by 10 members of
the Association, including “Syud Ahmud”, and advocated for the British Government of India to establish a system of public education of the highest class, in which the arts, sciences and other branches of literature may be taught in the vernacular, and that degrees conferred on students in various disciplines in English be likewise conferred on students who successfully pass in the same subjects in the vernacular. The introduction to the memorial appropriately framed the argument’s tone:

We confess that many of the arts and sciences, now prevalent in Asiatic countries whose history and subject-matter are embodied in the works of our most celebrated authors of old, and which have descended to us in their pristine condition, unchanged and un-improved, are founded on principles which the modern advancement of knowledge has proved to be false and erroneous... Hence it is an undisputable fact that a study of those sciences and those languages, which are only prevalent in Asia, is wholly insufficient for the advancement of our knowledge or the enlightenment of our minds, while it is no less certain a fact that to obtain these advantages there is no better way than to study the English language, and through it to gain access to the richest treasures of modern thought and knowledge. And it is for these reasons that we all agree in considering that the Government policy connected with the introduction and diffusion of the English language into this country has been well conceived and should be steadily carried out (Naik 1963: 21-22).

From this apologetic beginning the note proceeded to argue the case for spreading European sciences and literature among the “great majority ... [which] has received no enlightenment at all”. In order to do this, and hence bring “change for the better in the ideas and morals of the people”, the case was then made for translating major works of Europe into vernacular – which is “not a difficult task” – thus diffusing them widely, including through higher education, for “the removal of the mists of error and ignorance from the minds of its [India's] inhabitants.” The memorial was explicit in pointing out that the introduction of English was necessary to replace the “study of oriental languages with their effete arts and sciences”, but argued for also translating great European works and disseminating them through education, since “we aim at
nothing else than the universal spread of European enlightenment throughout all India”. This highlights one instance of the double rhetoric of “knowledge sharing” in a colonial context, when inclusion is complemented by exclusion.

However, the proposal devalued the ‘good’ language: English. The Home Secretary of the Government of India rejected the appeal (Naik 1963: 29-32), but encouraged the subjects to develop such models on their own in preparation for the time when Government could support them. In his response the Secretary cited the 1854 Despatch, and pointed out that

it was stated [in the Despatch] that a knowledge of English… ‘will always be essential to those Natives of India who aspire to a high order of Education’… the object of University education is not merely or principally to secure a knowledge of certain specified books, but to prepare and fit the mind for the pursuit of knowledge in the wide sphere of European science and literature, and for some time to come this can probably be carried on by Natives of India only through the medium of the English language.

Compromise: The Lahore University College

Sir Sayyid did not refer to his signature on this letter subsequently. In fact, he spent the rest of his professional life advocating passionately for the use of English as a medium of higher instruction. However, the missive was capitalised upon by a momentum in the Punjab, of which the British Lieutenant-Governor was a key part. Building on the memorial from the ‘Allygurh Association’ and the Government of India’s response, the Punjab Government submitted a petition (Naik 1963: 32-39) to establish a University at Lahore that would serve the:

strong desire ... on the part of a large number of the Chiefs, Nobles, and educated classes of this Province for the establishment of a system of education which shall give greater encouragement to the communication of knowledge through the medium of the Vernacular, to the development of a Vernacular literature, and to the study of Oriental classics ... thorough acquaintance with the Vernacular shall be made a necessary condition for any degree, fellowship, or other honour.
The Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab’s letter was accompanied by the initiative of collecting almost a hundred thousand Rupees for this institution. The central Government of India shot back a length reply, politely but firmly rejecting the proposal with numerous reasons (Naik 1963: 39-44). Among other points, the Government of India pointed out that neither is the study of modern sciences and literature in the vernacular “possible”, nor are there enough materials or examiners, nor enough students enrolled. Referring to the oldest university of India to which Punjab colleges submitted their students for examination, the central Government pointed out that “the system of the Calcutta University is in some degree founded on the assumption that true knowledge, in its higher branches, can only be imparted to the people of India through the English language, and that the only literature that has any real value is that of Europe.”

But the Punjab Government persisted. Letters were exchanged over the next two years between the Secretaries of Punjab and India (which indicate that this may have also been an element in a political tussle between Punjab and the Centre, involving the Lieutenant-Governor and the Governor General respectively). Finally, a compromise was reached, with the Government of India sanctioning a Lahore University College which could subsequently, if it demonstrated success, be transformed into a full-fledged University. However, in an 1869 letter to the Secretary Government of Punjab, the Secretary to the central Government of India stated that:

It is also understood that the study of English shall not only form one of the most prominent features of the teaching in any of the schools or colleges which may be connected with the proposed institution, but that both teaching and examinations in subjects which cannot with advantage be carried on in the vernacular shall be conducted in English (Naik 1963: 55-58).

The compromise was to the extent that some subjects could be taught in the vernacular but “nothing should be taught which should interfere with instruction in sound principles of mental and physical sciences, ... teaching which is to be afforded through the medium of the Vernacular languages shall be free even from the patent
errors which prevail in ancient and in modern Vernacular literary and scientific works.” In a subsequent letter, the Lieutenant-Governor made it clear that “the large infusion of English officials interested in educational subjects will preserve the University from relapsing into those Oriental systems of teaching and modes of thought which would be prejudicial to the interests of high education” (Naik 1963: 203). The point of the vernacular medium, then, was partly to do with greater diffusion of European knowledge, but also with engendering loyalty to the Crown, which the Punjab Government considered more possible through the vernacular. Thus in disputing the English medium, the Punjab Government pointed out that the University of Calcutta was not really doing a good job in loyalising, rather producing “discontented and disloyal members of the community”, which the Punjab University would change. The aim for both remained the same: “the enlistment on the side of liberalism and intelligence of the whole interests and sympathies of the people.”

Eventually, after another flurry of letters (and presumably meetings), the Lahore University College was transformed into the Punjab University, chartered in 1882. The University did provide degrees in the vernacular. And, as the central Government had warned, it remained long mired in serious questions as to its capability. Thus, during the protracted debate of upgrading the Punjab University College to a University of the Punjab, Edward Clive Bayley, Secretary to the Government of India (with 15 years in the educational Department and six years as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calcutta), presented a strong note of dissent in March 1877 to the proposed upgrading (Naik 1963: 219-224). Bayley not only condemned the growing provincial autonomy as a threat to the rule of Great Britain in India, but also situated higher education as a key component of the centralised control of the Empire:

I venture, therefore, to express a hope that if this [Punjab] University be established, it will be compelled to give some new name to its grades, and will not be allowed to put into circulation coin, which I will not call base, but which for some time to come will be heavily alloyed, stamped with the same mint-mark as that issued by the Calcutta University (Naik 1963: 222).
Chapter Five

Good Subjects: (The) English and the Vernacular

The relative artificiality of the English-vernacular debate is worth noting here. To contrast with English, the “vernacular” for Muslims was often prescribed as Urdu. However, as above, even after Pakistan’s independence as a separate homeland for Muslims, less than four percent of the population spoke Urdu as their first language in 1951. The identification of Urdu with ‘the vernacular’ for Muslims was exposed by a famous British educationist and administrator in India, Professor G. W. Leitner. Leitner pointed out that “although Persian had been taught for ages in the Punjab to a large number of pupils... Urdu was a subject of study for Europeans than Natives, to whom it was said rather to come incidentally through Persian” (Leitner 2002/1883: ii).

Putting the matter in historical perspective:

Urdu, which we imported, did not boast of a single school on our advent... [Urdu’s study] as a separate language, is contrary to the law of its natural development in this province [Punjab], where many may yet be found, even in obscure villages, who can understand, if they cannot speak, classical Persian, but where rarely even a Government schoolmaster can be met who can perfectly explain the Urdu text-books of the Education Department (Leitner 2002/1883: 46).

Leitner’s views, based on historical study, were not current in the Education Department. His leading involvement for Oriental education in Lahore and his advocacy for the classics in Persian may have influenced the Punjab University’s vernacular-medium degree when it was chartered in 1882. However, classical Orientalists (as below) were on the wane, and the Punjab University’s credentials were continuously challenged on the very grounds of it employing “the vernacular”.

Members of the British Government’s hierarchy were not the only ones to deprecate the nature and standing of the Punjab University. Almost from its beginning it was criticised as not maintaining the standard of higher education, of undertaking no modern research and harming rather than helping the cause of higher education in India by relying on the vernacular. The most significant example of protest came from Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan, who had been leading the front for
introduction of modern higher education among Muslims (who also dominated the student body in the Lahore University College). Despite his long efforts for establishing a university for the North-Western Provinces in his home town of Allahabad (where the famous MAO College was situated), his uncharacteristically angry letter in February 1885 to the Government (Naik 1963: 367-374) termed the proposed university plan “rather dangerous” and “mislead[ing]”. Commenting on the proposed Allahabad University being modelled on Punjab University, he protested:

I am sorry to say that Government has not perhaps fully realized the strength of the feelings of the natives in thinking that the Government does not like to see them make progress in the study of European sciences and literature…. The Punjab University is not even reckoned as one of any importance. Therefore, if we are to have a university like that of the Punjab, then I am sorry to say that I shall not agree … On the other hand I should be very glad, indeed, if we have a purely English university for our Provinces.

Sir Sayyid’s passionate arguments for English-medium higher education mirrored those of other Muslim reformers and intellectuals, since “by the 1870’s… the Muslims who till this time had remained aloof or passively hostile to the British and the missionaries now turned to active cooperation with the British and opposition to the incipient forces of secular nationalism and neo-Hinduism” (Tangri 1961: 368). The University of Allahabad was eventually chartered in 1887, and did focus on English medium degrees. Sayyid Ahmed’s, and others’, objection to Punjab University stemmed from more than its inability to “uphold standards”, which in any case could not be defined for the new vernacular medium. The core objection was that higher teaching in English opened the doors to ‘Culture’ for natives in a manner that the diffusion of European literatures in the vernacular could never do. The extant, but diminishing, British encouragement of oriental studies and vernacular education (which Sir Sayyid himself had proposed in the 1867 memorial) was perceived as a deterrent to the true advancement of Indians.

The Punjab University proved – in its institution and the responses evoked from central Government and ‘good subjects’ such as Sayyid Ahmed – that the purpose of
Higher education was to ease the diffusion of colonial culture in India. That this was possible in the 19th century only in the “good subject” of English became obvious. At issue in the vernacular-English debate in Government-supported higher education, it bears repeating, was never educational content – it was taken for granted that European sciences and literatures were modern and “true”, and hence needed to be diffused. Rather, what was at issue was whether there existed enough capacity among Indians to translate English into local languages and transmit European knowledge.

As this case shows, the issue of English and the vernacular was far from being settled in the late 19th century, and had become associated with “quality” in a specific manner. It is in the context of this debate that the 1904 Resolution’s association of quality with English may be viewed. The case also highlights the point that the debate surrounding the use of English was not a linguistic or technical one. Instead, the communications bear out that the use of English language for higher education in colonial India was a policy matter regarding cultural diffusion. That is, the use of English as a medium of instruction was premised on cultural superiority of “European sciences and literatures” and aimed on the one hand to extract graduates from local knowledge systems and on the other hand to immerse them in English culture. This aim was political, targeting acceptance of colonial rule by the British. Precisely this objective of engendering loyalty to British rule through enculturation by higher education was the thrust of the significant 1854 Educational Despatch.

5.5 In the Beginning was the Word: the Despatch of 1854

The Educational Despatch of the East India Company in 1854 was a seminal document. Its significance has led over the years to a close study of the content, context, and even detailed process of preparation: (Moore 1965); (Mayhew 1926; Spear 1938; Khan 1973; Ghosh 2000) to name only some of the leading accounts). It is valid to state that “the importance of ‘Wood’s Education Despatch’ to India has never been questioned” (Moore 1965: 70). Even subsequent, “cardinal events” in South Asian politics, leading to decolonisation, are traced back to “that day [viz. July 12,
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1854] when the higher educational system of India was based on the English language” (Reed 1930: 361). Moore (1965) recounts the remarkable story of the drafting of the Despatch under Sir Charles Wood, then President of the (parliamentary) Board of Control for India. Despite numerous influences, notably by the leading missionary Dr. Duff and Thomas Baring (later Lord Northbrook, Viceroy to India), the Despatch was most of all the work of Wood himself. However, it began its life, in keeping with current procedure, as a draft penned by a clerk in the East India Company’s Correspondence Department, an individual who most likely had never visited India (Moore 1965: 72).

The reason for preparing the Despatch was civilisational, as in its introduction:

“It is one of our most sacred duties, to be the means, as far as in us lies, of conferring upon the natives of India those vast moral and material blessings which flow from the general diffusion of useful knowledge, and which may, under Providence, derive from her connexion with England... This knowledge will teach the natives of India the marvellous results of the employment of labour and capital, rouse them to emulate us... confer upon them all the advantages which accompany the healthy rise of wealth and commerce (Paragraphs 3-4).

The practical aspects of governance were not overlooked in a Despatch by the Directors of the East India Company: “to supply you [the Company] with servants whose probity you may with increased confidence commit offices of trust... secure to us a large and more certain supply of many articles necessary for our manufacturers and extensively consumed by all classes of our population as well as an almost inexhaustible demand for the produce of British labour.”

The diffusion theory was the principle to achieve these magical goals of civilisational and economic benefits to Indians and British alike from the same educational system. As the Despatch itself stated, the goals would be achieved by “that general diffusion of European knowledge which is the main object of education in India.” This goal, and its implications, was unequivocal and undisputed. The Despatch had, for the first time since the East India Company began operations in
India in the mid-17\textsuperscript{th} century, accepted government responsibility for the promotion and encouragement of education in India. The content was to be unreservedly European, except for a knowledge of the traditional systems of laws and for “historian and antiquarian” purposes. The Despatch had no intention to destroy the Oriental (classical – Arabic, Persian and Sanskrit – and vernacular – local) institutions. Rather, they were to be prepared for translation of European sciences and literatures, while at the same time a network of English-medium institutions of higher education would be spread across the country to act as receptor sites for European culture.

While departments of public instruction were established along with stricter controls and grants-in-aid for primary and secondary education, it was for higher education that the Despatch was truly revolutionary. For the first time, acting on recommendations of previous Councils and practices encouraged by past Governors, the Despatch envisaged a growing network of Government-supported and managed universities across India. Three universities were initially sanctioned – in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras – and provision left for more if sufficient colleges would be affiliated with them. The universities were to be modelled on the newly chartered University of London “as being best adapted to the wants of India”. At the time, the University of London (chartered in 1836) was a purely examining and affiliating body, with students being taught at University College and King’s College.\textsuperscript{57} The proposed universities in India would likewise examine students (only in English for the bulk of subjects except for Chairs in vernaculars and classics). In January 1857 the Acts of Incorporation for three universities were passed, allowing them to examine students instructed in any affiliated college anywhere in India. That year 219 students passed the matriculation examinations of the universities, but the momentum generated by the Despatch was formidable. 25 years later, in 1882, 7 249 candidates appeared for the examinations, and the number of affiliated colleges had risen from 27 in 1857 to 72 in 1882 (Ghosh 2000: 87-88). The overwhelming demand was for English-language subjects, and eventually vernacular language subjects were dropped altogether aside from the Punjab. The Despatch had already made this clear, noting that:
We have declared that our object is to extend European knowledge throughout all classes of the people. We have shown that this object must be effected by means of the English language in the higher branches of institution (Sharp and Richey 1922: 392).

**Macaulay: The Context of 1854**

Despite its inaccurately self-congratulatory and triumphal tone, the 1854 Despatch was “the climax in the history of education... what goes before leads up to it; what follows flows from it” (James 1911: 37). In many ways, the Despatch’s position articulated a compromise on the English-vernacular debate that had begun before it, a view summarised by an American missionary in 1853 to state that:

the vernacular languages of India contain but little science or literature of any value; and something more than these languages is required for mental discipline and practical knowledge, in the course of education... [however] a knowledge of the English language was an indispensable qualification, and so there has been a constantly increasing demand for English education (Allen 1854: 271, 274).

The context of the Despatch has been analysed, but in the backdrop of the deployment of English language for universities it is worth reviewing here the oft-drawn connection between it and the educational order passed by Governor-General William Bentinck in March 1835. While some have examined the 1854 Despatch as a reversal of the earlier 1835 order (Ghosh 2000: 78), this is certainly not true for the case of English language in higher education. In fact, the 1835 order first heralded the new regime of British education in India via English, a regime that was culminated in the 1854 Despatch. Before that, “From 1780 to 1835, the British government in India had followed the [unwritten] education policy inaugurated by Warren Hastings... [which encouraged] Eastern scholarship” (Cutts 1953: 832).

The 1835 order itself was a complex affair, having as much to do with British politics at home and in India, as with the person of Bentinck (Spear 1938). Irrespective of the fascinating intricacies of how the order came to be issued, it is generally recognised that it built on the much-cited Minute submitted at the
Governor-General’s request by Lord Macaulay, Law Member of the Council of India and President of the General Committee on Public Instruction (Cutts 1953: 824). In fact, Governor-General Bentinck’s only comment on the fiery document was, “I give my entire concurrence to the sentiments expressed in this Minute” (Sharp 1920: 117); Bentinck may have been urged by his imminent departure from India and need to put his mark on an obviously winning case (Evans 2002: 272). Macaulay’s Minute, written in 1835, “represented the final and successful attack upon Hastings’ educational policy [for Oriental learning]” (Cutts 1953: 833). While the Minute is well worth reading in its entirety (Sharp 1920: 107-117) for its “sweeping condemnation of Oriental learning, and its disregard for Indian tradition and culture” (Spear 1938: 78), the following extended quote from the 10-page long document may suffice here:

All parties seem to be agreed on one point, that the dialects spoken among the natives of this part of India contain neither literary nor scientific information, and are moreover so poor and rude that, until they are enriched from some other quarter, it will not be easy to translate any valuable work into them … when we pass from works of imagination to works in which facts are recorded and general principles investigated, the superiority of the Europeans becomes absolutely immeasurable. It is, I believe, no exaggeration to say that all the historical information which has been collected from all the books written in the Sanscrit language is less valuable than what may be found in the most paltry abridgments used at preparatory schools in India …

The question now before us is simply whether … we shall teach languages in which, by universal confession, there are no books on any subject which deserve to be compared to our own, whether … we shall teach systems [of science] which, by universal confession, wherever they differ from Europe differ for the worse, and whether… we shall countenance, at the public expense, medical doctrines which would disgrace an English farrier, astronomy which would move laughter in girls at an English boarding school, history abounding with kings thirty feet high and reigns thirty thousand years long, and geography made of seas of treacle and seas of butter (Sharp 1920: 109-111).
The rhetorical tone by Macaulay – besides implying once again the double colonial rhetoric of inclusion and exclusion – was no doubt due in large part to the charged atmosphere in which he delivered his Minute, in “the heat of conflict” (Cutts 1953: 853) within the General Committee regarding Government support for Oriental versus English education. The Minute is still generally considered a “landmark of English educational policy in India... [and] caused the necessary victory of Western over Eastern knowledge” (Spear 1938: 78). Macaulay’s decisive contribution is best placed in the historical context of the General Committee on Public Instruction, which had emerged as a battle ground between the last supporters of Oriental learning and the “modernists”; his rather arbitrary and clear-cut divisions reflect the indecision of the Committee at an impasse between the two camps. However, it is fair to say, as Spear (1938: 85) has, that Macaulay’s Minute “was the shot signalled the advance, but not the shot that decided it. It provided an ideological banner for the new policy, but it was not that policy itself.” In fact, the battle for Government support of Oriental scholarship had already been lost two years ago, when Bentinck in 1833 declared English the official language of communication between the people of India and government (Cutts 1953: 851; Evans 2002: 269). As a senior educational administrator put it 90 years after the Minute:

Macaulay by his eloquence and wealth of superlatives has often been made solely responsible for cutting off Indian education from the roots of national life. Let it be remembered here that he was not the prime mover, that his intervention was late and that the forces which he represented would probably have been successful without his singularly tactless and blundering championship (Mayhew 1926: 12-13).

Mayhew may not have been a traditional orientalist but was trying to put Macaulay’s contribution in context. There has been considerable academic debate about the weight of Macaulay and his Minute on Indian educational policy, with opinions ranging from “seminal impact” to diametrically opposed views of “virtually no impact” (Evans 2002: 261). However, there is complete unanimity of opinion that the 1835 Minute signalled a drastic change from Warren Hastings’ conciliatory policy
of improvement of Oriental learning. Thus, despite compromises made by Governor-General Bentinck, his Resolution of the same year “signalled a significant shift in language policy in that the teaching of English would henceforth be the principal objective of public education” (Evans 2002: 273).

Lest there be any confusion regarding the “Orientalist” opposition to Bentinck, it should be mentioned that these were broadly the subject of Edward Said’s critique (Said 1979). Thus, even this “classicist” camp fully admitted and supported the demand for English teaching, as well as the obvious superiority of Western sciences – perhaps even literatures – over Eastern. As Macaulay summarised, “The intrinsic superiority of the Western literature is indeed fully admitted by those members of the committee who support the oriental plan of education” (Sharp 1920: 109). In the arguments of their most passionate leader in the General Committee, H. T. Prinseps, they also had no doubts about the “moral and material” upliftment of Indians under British rule. They were also convinced about the significance of higher education as a vehicle for translating the benefits to India (but perhaps anticipated more than most others the cultural benefits that might accrue to England in a reverse relationship).

Finally, the “classicists” were equally certain as the “modernists” that better educated natives would ease the governance of India for the benefit of all, and that this was the primary target of education, especially advanced education. The point of dispute regarded the value to be attached to English education, and the speed and methods by which it was to be introduced. For the classicists, the pace suggested by Macaulay was counterproductive when he demanded that the Government “at once stop the printing of Arabic and Sanscrit books... abolish the Madrassa and the Sanscrit College at Calcutta... no stipends shall be given to any students who may hereafter repair thither” (Sharp 1920: 116). Led by their champion, H. T. Prinseps in 1835, they argued that if English learning were adopted too early “all Indians, no matter how learned, would be reduced to the alphabet and spelling book” (Cutts 1953: 853). Immediately after the change in policy was announced publicly, another leader of the “classicists”, H. H. Wilson, summed up the case by suggesting that the
diffusion of Western knowledge, clearly of value in governance, would be better accomplished through “the agency of the traditional learned classes, who possessed the time, interest and ability to appreciate the great works of English” (Evans 2002: 273). The argument against Macaulay was a practical one: India would become impossible to govern (an interesting aspect of this counter-attack, the deployment of utilitarian arguments for oriental scholarship championed by John Stuart Mill, will be discussed in the next chapter).

With agreement on the importance of higher education for governing India, Macaulay was able to rely on more than an indignation at “public money” being wasted (through scholarships for studying Oriental languages) on “a dead loss to the cause of truth... bounty-money paid to raise up champions of error”, on “printing [Arabic and Sanscrit] books which are of less value that the paper on which they are printed was while it was blank”, in short, on “absurd history, absurd metaphysics, absurd physics, absurd theology”. Rather, in light of the practicality counter-argument, Macaulay could also launch a utilitarian call for governance “to secure the co-operation of the native public”, an argument which both “modernists” and “classicists” would find appealing:

In one point I fully agree with the gentlemen to whose general views I am opposed. I feel with them that it is impossible for us, with our limited means, to attempt to educate the body of the people. We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern – a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect (Sharp 1920: 116).

Thus Macaulay, drawing inherently on the support in many quarters of public opinion in England including in the British Government of India, based his argument essentially on the “intrinsic superiority” of the English language, the observation that “a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia”(Sharp 1920: 109). However, he could also count on the argument of governance by loyalty, an argument for which education was well suited.
Macaulay’s Modernism: His-story

This brief background highlights the point that single events and policies – such as the Despatch of 1854, the 1835 order issued by Bentinck, or the decisive nail by Macaulay in the Orientalist coffin – were indicative rather than causative of popular sentiments. The change between Governor-General Warren Hastings’ support for oriental learning in the 1780’s and the Despatch of 1854 was not one of policy alone, but rather, as Spear (1938: 91) put it, “a change in fundamental ideas, and, in consequence, of their [British] attitude to India.” The British attitude of wonder, admixed with interest, last exemplified by Hastings, was replaced by the early 19th century by an attitude of disdain, itself heralded by the social reformist Governor-General Lord Cornwallis, who proclaimed “Every native of Hindustan I verily believe is corrupt”. By the time Macaulay submitted his Minute, the “overwhelming majority of witnesses [before a House Committee convened in 1835] argued that the British curriculum taught in the English language was vital to the reduction in the cost of governing India, to the elevation of Indian moral and intellectual standards, to the safety of British rule” (Cutts 1953: 830). The orientalist classicists had already lost the battle by the beginning of the 19th century, and the 1854 Despatch only cemented attitudes that were institutionalised in the universities thereafter.

A detailed discourse analysis of the 1854 Despatch, Macaulay’s Minute and related arguments and counter-arguments is insightful in itself (Spear 1938; Cutts 1953; Evans 2002). It is immediately obvious, however, that rhetorical devices were used to conflate “being modern” with use of the English language, most especially for higher education, from the early 19th century on when the sector began to be institutionalised. Developments at the University of London at the same time were mirrored in India. The “tide of English thought habits developed for two generations or more” (Cutts 1953: 853) was reflected in British educational policies in India as part of this modernising discourse. The English language in the “long march of modernity” in India is epitomised by the reading of history then in vogue.
Macaulay was far from being a spokesman for the British Government in India, let alone of all English people, and, as above, many of his arguments were so rhetorical precisely because of the need to make a convincing case in the face of “classicist” opposition. However, his 1835 Minute can be reasonably contextualised as leading a charge, as “the shot that signalled the advance” of modernists. Combined with the historical success of his case in defining the institutional environment of higher education in colonial India, subsequently followed through in Pakistan, Macaulay’s arguments indicate the broad direction in which higher education developed.

In this backdrop, it is interesting to scan Macaulay’s justification by history for the early and rapid introduction of English language in education, especially in higher education, in India. Macaulay had been trained in the classics and English literature at Cambridge (where he also wrote poetry) and then called to the bar (certified for legal practice), before making a quick entry into politics. By his own admission, he had “no knowledge of either Sanscrit or Arabic” but had “done what [he] could to form a correct estimate of their value” by reading translations of Indian works and conversing with orientalists (Sharp 1920: 109). Having had no training in Indian or other history, beyond school education, Macaulay yet felt justified in drawing on two lessons of world history (Sharp 1920: 111-112) in his argument. The first was “the great revival of letters among the Western nations at the close of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century.” For Macaulay, at that time, “everything that was worth reading was contained in the writing of the ancient Greeks and Romans,” and the English ancestors wisely decided to publish and teach new Greek and Latin texts, based on ancient learning. Had the English ancestors stuck with the “chronicles in Anglo-Saxon and romances in Norman French”, England may not have become “what she now is”. In brief, it was the recognition of new languages as superior, and adopting them in education, that led to England’s dominance three centuries later.

Macaulay’s second case was of Russia, “a nation which had previously [in 1700] been in a state as barbarous as that in which our ancestors were before the Crusades”. The meteoric rise of Russia out of “ignorance” and into a “place among civilised
communities... pressing close on France and Britain in the career of improvement” arose, states Macaulay, by rejecting the “national prejudices”. It was achieved by “teaching him [the Russian citizen] those foreign languages in which the greatest mass of information had been laid up, and thus putting all that information within his reach.” In brief, “the languages of western Europe civilised Russia.”

These readings of history were briefly, and rather listlessly, challenged by the “classicists” (Sharp 1920: 118). However, the banner had been provided, and the ensuing tide utilised the argument to full effect, beginning with Bentinck’s order and followed by the 1854 Despatch, albeit not with the gusto prescribed by Macaulay. The case was made for the value of the new, the value of modernity, and thereby of the value of (the) English. This equation was most effectively epitomised by Dr. Alexander Duff, a leading British missionary from the 1830’s to the 1850’s:

The mind, in grasping the import of new terms, is perpetually brought into contact with new ideas, and new truths, of which these terms are symbols... so that by the time the English language has been mastered, the student is ten-fold less the child of pantheism, idolatry, and superstition than before (Paton 1923: 66).

Dr. Duff –whose “substantial influence” (Moore 1965: 79) in the 1854 Despatch will be discussed over the next two chapters – thus blended utilitarian arguments with undeniably moral and religious ones that set the tone for modern higher education in India. The new was to be valued in and of itself, because it was new, and hence so was (were the) English.

5.6 **(The) Modern English in India**

There is by now a general academic currency of the estimation that Macaulay’s 1835 Minute, significant though it was as an advancing “shot”, did not form but rather reflected the incipient weight of English opinion and British policy in India. This opinion itself was formed neither by the Minute nor only of a convinced superiority of the English language. Rather, as the above reading of the Minute shows, the opinion was normative in nature.
It is useful to briefly review these normative assumptions evident in the readings above of Macaulay’s 1835 Minute, especially those which are clearly evident among his opponents – the classicists still supporting oriental learning – as well as refracted in the subsequent, formative policies: the 1854 Despatch and the 1904 Resolution in British India, and the 1959 Commission on National Education and the 2001 Task Force in Pakistan. As the above readings demonstrate, the search for “universal” storylines here is a non-starter. If anything, this brief review of the value of English language shows how many twists and turns were involved, how much contention and conflict was unpredictable amongst any given group, and how little all of this had to do with the typically analysed structural factors of economics and society.

These “structural” factors do not help explain the evident value attached to modern higher education in Pakistan today in its equation with quality and with English language instruction. Nor, given the language politics in Pakistan, do these factors explain the continuation of this equation after decolonisation. They also cannot explain why the East India Company initiated, let alone continued, an intensive educational policy when it was already in a financial crisis; nor why the British Government pursued this policy for 90 years even when it was obvious to all that the policy was leading to decolonisation.

For instance, in 1833, the East India Company’s Charter (renewed every 20 years by decree) was almost not passed because the Company was in financial crisis: a debt of £4 million spurred by high costs of the Burmese Wars and increases in civil and military expenses (Adams and Adams 1971: 166). It has been argued that this fact resulted in a weakening of the largely “classicist”-leaning Company. However, it does not explain why the Charter was eventually passed due to the winning case made, in a fiery speech to the House of Commons by the young Macaulay, on the basis of higher education and equal opportunity for all Indians:

What is power worth if it is founded on vice, on ignorance, and on misery...? We are free, we are civilised, to little purpose, if we grudge to any portion of the human race an equal measure of freedom and civilisation. Are we to keep the people of India ignorant
in order that we may keep them submissive? Or do we think we can give them knowledge without awakening ambition?\textsuperscript{60}

Economics also do not explain why the Charter was not only renewed in 1833, but also included a much greater role of the Government than ever before with far greater outlays; after 1833, “the Company’s role and power was destroyed... [it] remained only as a screen between the British government and the British people” (Adams and Adams 1971: 166). In fact, the Company had been in severe financial crisis since the previous Charter renewal of 1813, and had even been at the point of bankruptcy in 1773 when only a Government loan saved it (although it came with ever-increasing involvement since then). After 1833, the Government took on a losing corporation and ran it further into the ground. What was decisive was the “tide of opinions”, both among Indians and British within India and among the English at home. Likewise, in the 1831-2 hearings around the renewal, a district collector in Madras Presidency, John Sullivan, testified before Macaulay’s Minute to “a very marked partiality to the English language [and] a great wish to learn” it among Indian officials “[who] acquire it with more facility than we do their language” (Frykenberg 1986: 49-50). By the 1830’s there was already a “clamour” for English higher education where it had not been initiated, especially among the influential classes of Hindus (Ibid: 53). It is clear that the introduction of the English language was, ultimately, the result of a “tide of English thought habits developed for two generations or more” by 1835 (Cutts 1953: 853). This tide reflected the “long march of modernity” in Western Europe, which was refracted in the colonial space... tangentially.

The argument by Macaulay in 1835 or by Duff later clearly has little to do with socio-economic factors, and everything to do with the civilising mission that came to define British presence in India, what was later to become known as “the white man’s burden.” It was the civilising mission of the British in India that the classicist supporters of oriental education in the 1830’s could not resist, that was fixed permanently in the 1854 Despatch and the 1904 Resolution. It is the same civilising mission of the Government that is evident in the 1959 CNE and the 2001 TFIHE.
Chapter Five

Good Subjects: (The) English and the Vernacular

The paternalistic attitude of the British government in India, appropriately reflecting the firm change in general English opinion to India and all things Indian by the 1830’s, led ultimately to the rapid institutionalisation of English language higher education there (despite some setbacks, reviewed in the next chapter). Furthermore, it led almost directly to the equation of modern higher education with English language in Pakistan. However, this formation by civilisation in British India had related aspects. The principle for Macaulay was the diffusion of European knowledge, for which the English language was a natural medium. This same principle was held by the “classicists”, who likewise had not doubts about the superiority of Western sciences and even literatures. If the aim was to civilise, then Western knowledge was the natural channel, and the debate in the 1830’s was only regarding the value of a rapid introduction of English to serve this channel. The 1854 Despatch made this principle of diffusion of European knowledge amply clear and 50 years later, by 1904, it was naturally assumed by the British Government as well as by “good subjects” such as Sir Sayyid. Another 55 years later, by the time the CNE reported in independent Pakistan in 1959, there was no doubt that there was only the slightest question about the medium of school education, but none at all for the higher levels where European knowledge had to be imparted in order to be modern, build the nation and compete internationally. A further 42 years on, the TFIHE in 2001 never raised the question, while the actions of the Higher Education Commission in Pakistan since 2002 have cemented this equation.

The English language was thus well-suited to the civilising mission, if for no other reason than its being a modern carrier of European knowledge, which was obviously “advanced” and thus to be valued. The language channel was expressly utilised after the 1830’s in the institution of higher education. Thus, the Despatch set the policy for the British in India by claiming that the ultimate objective of education was to extend European knowledge, and that “this object must be effected by means of the English language in the higher branches of institution, and by that of the vernacular languages of India to the great mass of people” (Sharp and Richey 1922: 392). The
importance of higher education in civilising, and hence “modernising” British India was refracted into Pakistan, with the 1959 CNE devoting its longest chapter to higher education and then the 2001 Task Force devoting itself solely to universities.

For the British in the 1830’s, however, the importance of higher education was manifold, not only for the extension of European knowledge. The purpose was ease of governance by engendering loyalty among Indians for British rule. This argument was hard to refute for the “classicists” and was elaborated in 1854. It is most evident in the debate around the establishment of the Punjab University in the 1880s. It is also seen haunting the CNE report of 1959, whose diagnosis of the single biggest challenge facing Pakistani higher education was the attitude of disloyalty among teachers, parents and students to any government. The fact that the 2001 Task Force draws so heavily on the CNE reflects the continuation of a “problem” of loyalty.

Finally, we find further clues in the arguments used by Macaulay, as well as his opponents – the orientalists – in 1835. We find the same arguments in use in the Despatch of 1854, and in the 1904 Resolution. Moreover, we find the same points being deployed by the formative, 1959 Commission on National Education in Pakistan, refracted in the 2001 Task Force and thence into the contemporary steps being undertaken by the Higher Education Commission. The thread underlying these is “utility”. Reliance on utilitarian arguments underlies Macaulay’s 1835 case that useful knowledge is, by definition, modern knowledge which can be best obtained in English. However, Macaulay’s rhetoric was a “singularly tactless and blundering championship” of an already won cause (Mayhew 1926: 12-13). The same underpinning justification is to be found in all the policy documents mentioned since, besides, importantly, in the testimonies and narratives of Indians demanding European advanced education: ”good subjects” like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Hindu intellectual, Ram Mohun Roy. Of course “utility” is a catchword with different meanings to different groups. How the “utilitarian” argument played out in British India and subsequently in Pakistan is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter Five  

Good Subjects: (The) English and the Vernacular

Spear (1938: 90) may have exaggerated but was largely accurate in stating that “until the [eighteen] twenties... Indian and European lived side by side in two mentally different worlds”. After the 1830’s, the perception of English-language higher education as modern shaped the engagement between British and Indian. The impacts of this change are described from an early despair of ever introducing English fully in India (Allen 1854) to success in instituting a high-quality English-medium and low-quality vernacular-medium (Aftab 1985). However, the 1830’s attitudes led to a new class of English-speaking professionals who were “divided by a wall of literary pride and supposedly useful knowledge from the rest of the people” (Ibid: 98). This divide is obvious in Pakistan although many, like the 2001 Task Force, insist on viewing the higher education system as an undifferentiated whole.

The English language debate for higher education in 1830’s British India also routinely conflated “vernacular” with the classical languages of Indian higher education: Arabic and Persian for Muslims and Sanskrit for Hindus. As G. W. Leitner (2002/1883) had pointed out, the vernacular, including Urdu, was rarely used for higher education before British intervention in India. Even in institutions where such languages were retained after 1835, due to pressure and the compromise settlement by Governor-General Auckland in 1839, their value in the system regularly diminished until the 1904 Resolution declared retaining them for “antiquarian” reasons. It is now widely agreed that the 1830’s change to English-medium higher education in India resulted in the “depression but not the destruction of Oriental learning” (Spear 1938: 97). However, behind that agreement lies the largely unstated conclusion that what was destroyed was local theorisation, primarily in the classical, religious languages of India. The utilitarian thrust also encouraged a practical outlook on education, led by commerce and government service, a feature that extends to this day. The quality of “thinking”, however, was reserved for (the) English, especially by the English in India. This was an ultimately utilitarian case, both in the objective and in the means, and is reviewed in the following chapter.
6 Utility and the Ideal: The Chrestomathic University

The value attached to English language higher education in Pakistan was traced above to specific constructions of modernity in colonial formations of the sector, especially in the early to mid-19th centuries. The origins, cemented in the 1830’s, lay in changing attitudes in England, both within that country and towards British India. In particular, the arguments deployed for equating English language with modern and high-value – as well as those used by opponents of rapid change – bore traces of utilitarian pressure in England. It was at this time that Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism as a philosophy of social reform was gaining currency, while John Stuart Mill, the son of his friend, was beginning to exert influence on British policy. The aim of this chapter is to trace whether and how utilitarianism impacted imperial formation and Pakistani development of higher education.

As in the previous chapter, a beginning is made with the second part of this question, i.e. by examining more closely whether and in what manner the modern Pakistani University today demonstrates utilitarian principles. It becomes rapidly obvious that utilitarian arguments do indeed define and legitimate, predominantly so, modern Pakistani higher education. However, this utilitarianism is of a specific nature, not an intangible worldview. The chapter traces presences of this utilitarianism in the 2001 Task Force reforms as well as the landmark 1959 Commission on National Education. As expected, this latter points directly to similar arguments used in the late colonial period, evident in the 1904 Resolution on education, which itself was shaped by the decisive 1854 Despatch. Just as for the English language debate, however, the 1854 Despatch only officially sealed a battle already won in the 1830’s: that of utilitarianism as the defining outlook for higher education in British India.
The notion of “utilitarianism” needs to be outlined somewhat before moving further. It refers here to the philosophical principles and practice outlined by Bentham and Mill in 19th century England, summarised later (section 6.4). The aim is not to question whether higher education should have any use at all, as Robert Young (1996) rhetorically asks in his article, *The Idea of a Chrestomathic University*. Advanced education may through all time and in all manners be identified with some or other ends. Craig Calhoun (2006) points out that in some ways the university was always oriented to usefulness by the very fact of belonging to the public sphere. However, he goes on to note that the meaning of this belonging drastically changed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with increasingly more privatised contributions to and from the modern university. He refers to this “structural transformation” wherein private applications are increasingly short-term and economically oriented, that is “instrumentalist” (Calhoun 2006: 13, 16). In this context, the notion of utilitarianism draws attention to utility as consequentialism specifically based on maximising welfare for the greatest number of people. This is also not to restrict “use” to short or medium-term economic gains, as is often the case in much of Pakistani commentary today. Instead, the notion inherently comprises an element of debate in the definition of welfare.

It was such a debate that Jeremy Bentham initiated with his 1815 publication of *Chrestomathia*, the word being derived from Greek and explained as meaning “conducive to learning” (Bentham 1815: 1). This under-researched text initiated a debate on modern values in higher education in England, coupled with sweeping legislative social reform. Is such debate evident today in utilitarian justifications of higher education in Pakistan, and was it evident in British India? What is the nature of “utility” in the formation of the modern University? Should utilitarianism be the exclusive or even predominant source of definition and legitimacy of higher education? This chapter attempts to address these questions for a deeper understanding of the nature and historical construction of modern higher education in Pakistan. A brief comparison with similar debates, precisely around higher
education, in England and in British India in the 19th century offers useful insights to these questions. Again, my aim is not to question or suggest amending vocabularies, but rather to examine what lies beyond the corner, what the vocabularies indicate, where they originated, and they imply. Notably, as in the case of English language education, utilitarianism itself is directly related to another significant movement, also from England, which this analysis leads to in the next chapter.

6.1 Modern Utility in the Pakistani University

It is no surprise that contemporary discourses of higher education in Pakistan draw on its economic utility. Contemporary representations of higher education’s socio-economic importance encompass policy-making, development and donor communities nationally, and build on the notion of tertiary teaching and research institutions as generators for economic development. Thus, the central regulatory agency in Pakistan, the HEC- Higher Education Commission, notes in its leading policy document, the Medium-Term Development Framework, that:

Considering the entire issue of development in a holistic manner, it thus becomes apparent that “Higher Education” serves as the engine of change that not only impacts economic development, but also serves to strengthen the entire system of education. The higher education system produces... the graduates who power the “knowledge economy,” and the researchers who unleash the power of Critical Thinking. The products of this system then catalyze the development of new products and processes, an imperative in today’s highly competitive industrial world (HEC 2005: 1).

This summary of a larger discourse has been, at least nominally, responsible for remarkable, steady increases in financial allocations to higher education – including by international donors – since the HEC was constituted in August 2002. The quantitative results are likewise impressive, as reviewed earlier. However, the precise nature of the argument that succeeded in generating this momentum has left its mark on the sector’s development over the last eight years. In other words, what precisely is meant by higher education “impact[ing] economic development” is
revealed in the details of the progress made. A brief review of the disaggregated statistics behind the rapid development provides some perspective, with a skewed emphasis visible on the “natural”, “physical” and “applied” sciences, at the cost of social sciences and the arts and humanities.

**Number Games**

Besides channelling state funds to universities for ongoing operations (termed “recurring grants”), the HEC also distributes project funds for specific purposes (called “development grants”). The former is relatively formulaic with typically little annual change, while the latter lies entirely at HEC’s discretion, and both are typically of the same order of magnitude. Thus, for instance, the HEC distributed PKR 10.86Bn (€99M) in recurring and PKR 8.40Bn (€77M) in development grants in fiscal year 2007-08 (HEC 2009a: 175). Amongst other descriptions of supporting “development” in higher education, the HEC also reports allocation of development funds by “Relevance to National Economy, Regional Needs and Socio Economic Development” in its annual report (HEC 2009a: 169-174). Under this listing (not all the development funds, but only those deemed relevant to the heading) the HEC reported allocating a total of PKR 12.8Bn (€117M) to 144 projects between 2002 and 2008. Of this considerable sum, PKR 61M (€0.6M) or 0.5% was allotted to two projects for the support of social sciences. The bulk, i.e. 99.5%, was allocated to the support of mostly engineering and applied sciences, but also to the “physical” sciences, as opposed to “social” sciences. No project funding is listed for the arts and humanities. It is quite apparent what the HEC considers relevant to the “national economy, regional needs and socio economic development”: science.

This is not a question of nomenclature alone. In fact, the HEC’s progress since 2002 indicates a strong bias towards science and technology, always justified by relevance to the national economy. For instance, among other initiatives, the HEC developed a programme jointly with the British Council (UK) to support links between Pakistani and British universities. Between 2003 and 2007 (HEC 2009a: 161-
162), 50 linkages were financially supported. 33 of these were in the physical and applied sciences, 17 out of 50 in the social sciences, and one in the arts and humanities. Likewise, in its constant encouragement to Pakistani universities for developing links with universities overseas, the HEC supported 25 linkages between 2002 and 2008 (HEC 2009a: 163). Of these 25, 19 were in the physical sciences and engineering, five in the social sciences, and one in the arts and humanities. Other important developments included the sizeable “Pak-US Joint Academic and Research Programme” (Ibid: 164-6), which supported 31 research-based projects undertaken in collaboration between Pakistani and US-based institutions (amounts undisclosed). Of these, 30 were related to applied sciences, engineering and physical sciences, one to social sciences, none to the arts and humanities.

A major achievement of the HEC has been to significantly enhance tertiary enrolment, especially for MPhil (equivalent to Licentiate) and PhD degrees. Total tertiary enrolment has indeed jumped from over 186,000 in 2001-02 to over 435,000 in 2007-08 (and continues to rise sharply), an increase of more than 133%. At the most advanced level, PhD, for example, Pakistani institutions had awarded 3,229 doctorates from 1947 until 2002; in just the next seven years, between 2003 and 2009, a total of 3,026 new doctorates were awarded (HEC 2010a: 8). Again, however, this rapid increase is not evenly distributed. Aggregate figures show that the most number of doctorates were awarded in the social sciences (727) in the last seven-year period, between 2003 and 2009, and that the doctorates awarded in the arts and humanities in only seven years are still more than half the number awarded over the previous 55 years (1947-2002). The HEC uses this as an argument to invest more in engineering and business education, which are the two fields with the lowest number of doctorates awarded: “more concentrated efforts are required in this area of specialization [engineering and business] as technology transfer is a key issue in modern economies” (HEC 2010a: 8, emphasis added).

However, a contrary trend is evident when the varying time scales and the base points (in each discipline) are considered. Thus, in all, only 6% less doctorates were
awarded in seven years (2003-09) than in the previous 55 years (1947-2002) across Pakistan. This negative six percent (-6%) difference is actually constituted by a 524% increase in engineering and technology, a 414% increase in business doctorates, a 32% increase in agriculture and veterinary science doctorates, and a 9% increase in biological and medical science doctorates – all “applied” sciences. By contrast, social science doctorates show a drop of -18% while doctorates in the arts and humanities dropped by -44%. Interestingly, “physical” sciences also show a drop of -12%. Thus, the increase in absolute numbers of doctorates in all disciplines skews the comparison: in reality, some disciplines are growing much faster than others. Put another way, if we consider an average seven-year period from between 1947 and 2002, and the new period of 2003-09, the number of doctorates awarded in the latter (contemporary) period is 650% more than for an average seven-year period in the previous 55 years of Pakistani history. However, by far the greatest increase (almost 5 000%) is in engineering and technology doctorates, the next in business education, then in agriculture and veterinary sciences, next in medical sciences, and then in the “physical” sciences. In this comparative perspective, social science doctorates have the second-lowest increase in 2003-09. As expected, doctorates in the arts and humanities have the lowest comparative increase (under 350%).

The HEC initiative of new universities has clearly resulted in massive increases in enrolment and number of degrees awarded, as evident in the case of doctorates above. However, the rising tide has not lifted all boats equally - far from it. This is also evident from the structure of the second mechanism used by HEC to enhance enrolment: that of awarding scholarships. Overall, the agency distributed 3 409 scholarships between 2003 and 2008 for MPhil/PhD studies (HEC 2009b: 3). However, again, the distribution was highly skewed: the arts and humanities together accounted for 231 scholarships (7%), the social sciences for 421 scholarships (12%), physical sciences for 1 393 (41%), and applied sciences for 1 364 (40%).

The HEC also initiated a highly popular programme to award 800 scholarships for PhD studies in universities overseas (HEC 2009b: 6). The programme aimed at
completion of PhD’s from “the top Asian and European countries including China, Austria, France, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands and New Zealand. Ten percent seats are reserved for technological advanced countries like USA, UK and Canada etc.” No definition of either category (“top” or “technological”) is provided, but in fact the final list is precisely as mentioned above, with the addition of Australia. In addition to the special consideration of “technological advanced countries”, the actual distribution of scholarships is again revealing: 2% to the arts and humanities, 11% to the social sciences, 41% to the physical and “life” sciences, and 46% to engineering, technology and business education. Another scholarship programme for MPhil/ PhD in overseas universities (HEC 2009b: 7-8) had awarded, by 2009, over 1 300 out of 2 000 planned scholarships for study in “advanced countries” (with no, nominal or special tuition fees under agreement with HEC). Of these, the arts and humanities together account for 26 scholarships (2%), while the social science received 107 awards (8%). By contrast, 345 scholarships were distributed for the physical sciences (26%) and 858 scholarships (64%) for applied sciences.

One possible interpretation of these figures is a “demand” for the physical/natural and applied sciences. This may be true perceptively (since admission standards are generally higher for these disciplines than for, say, the arts and humanities) but is not revealed in the figures. Regardless of what subjects students initially want to study in university, the final distribution is relatively even. In fact, in 2004-05, “Overall, the enrolment is highest (both male and female) in Social Sciences at Bachelors, Masters, MPhil and PhD level” (HEC 2009b: 109). The actual numbers are misleading due to categorisation overlaps, but the broad conclusion remains valid. Therefore, if roughly the same number of students is distributed among the social sciences, physical sciences, applied sciences and (somewhat less) in the arts and humanities, the HEC’s evident favouritism for physical and applied sciences begs the question.

Given a relatively even distribution of enrolment amongst disciplines, it is not clear why the HEC would recommend for civil awards from the state 17 individuals of whom only two belonged to the social sciences and 15 to the natural/physical and
applied sciences (HEC 2009b: 54). Similarly, the agency instituted a well-endowed, prestigious (annual) HEC Distinguished National Professorship, conferred upon 33 individuals between January 2004 and May 2007 (HEC 2009a: 158-160); five of these were for faculty in the social sciences and none in the arts and humanities.

Finally, it may be pointed out that the HEC is far from being alone in the obviously high value attached to science and technology as an outcome of justifying higher education by its economic utility. The phenomenon is society-wide, as evident in the active agreement by successive governments to HEC actions as well as from scanning media reports. In the academic community, also, HEC can point with some justification to outputs distributed amongst disciplines, for instance research publications. Thus, in 2007-08, less than 2% of the research publications produced by faculty in recognised journals came from the arts and humanities together, 4% came from all the social sciences combined, 39% came from the applied sciences, and 55% from the physical/natural sciences (HEC 2009b: 4). All of the top 25 research disciplines in the country between 2002 and 2008 (as reflected by publications in “recognised” journals) were natural/physical and applied sciences; none of the top 25 research areas included any fields of the social sciences or the arts and humanities (HEC 2009a: 168). This may have something to do with the “National Research Programme for Universities” of the HEC, which provided financial support to 154 research projects in national universities (public and private) by 2009 (HEC 2009b: 71). Of these, 7 belonged to social science disciplines (less than 5%), 71 projects (46%) to applied sciences, and 76 projects (49%) to “basic” (i.e. natural/physical) and biological sciences. No research projects were supported in the arts and humanities.

**Number Aims**

The purpose of this discussion is two-fold. First, it indicates the extent (in financial terms) of the HEC’s impact on higher education in Pakistan since 2002, and therefore the extent of its bias towards “natural” and “applied” sciences at the cost of social sciences and, most of all, the arts and humanities. Since contemporary policy
discourse continues to argue for further investment in higher education, based precisely on aggregate numbers, the disaggregated trends are important to recognise. Second, the excursus suggests that the remarkable progress made by the HEC is neither value-neutral nor even-handed. Rather, the numbers above indicate a syllogism at work: investment in higher education is important because of its economic utility; economic benefit is to be gained (most of all) from the “applied” and “natural” sciences; therefore, investment is to be directed most of all to these subjects, if necessary at the cost of the social sciences and arts and humanities.

Underlying each step in this syllogism, thus expressed, is a clearly normative set of assumptions. Thus, the “knowledge economy”, the “modern economy” and the like are terms deployed for automatic attention to the “natural” and “applied” sciences, especially in engineering and technology in “today’s highly competitive industrial world.” What makes these assumptions revealing is that they are taken as self-evident, with no need for further justification or demonstration. The fact that the economic “utility” of higher education, first, and technology second, need not be proven only serves to highlight the normative nature of these assumptions.

In fact, a growing body of academic literature is pointing out that the correlative link never actually existed. Situated in the World Society theoretical framework, this research is showing that:

...the much-heralded ‘knowledge society’ is more important and realistic as a set of assumptions and cultural claims than it is as an actual depiction of a mundane social order. Only a very few countries could even plausibly be described as possessing a ‘knowledge economy.’ And even in these... links between the university and the role system prove surprisingly weak... Yet the myth of the ‘knowledge society’ is very much at the heart of the university’s centrality in the postnational and increasingly global world (Meyer et al. 2007: 200).

The ”rationalisation” of universities by their economic utility is a global argument whose evidential roots are not as clear as their currency would suggest, and behind which relatively unsubstantiated normative assumptions may be identified (Ramirez
Likewise in Pakistan, there has been no clear evidence offered to-date of the link between highly educated “natural” and “applied” scientists and national economic growth, let alone contradictory emphases on “competitive industrial world” (production-based) and “knowledge economy” (exchange-based). Regardless of the evidence, the emphasis on economic utility via technology remains outstanding and (largely) unquestioned. At the same time, it is inevitably linked to English, as the ‘practical’ language of globally oriented higher education. Thus, the science and technology focus is relatively easy to integrate with the use of modern English. The purpose of this chapter is to trace the development of this normative assumption resulting in the justification of higher education by its economic utility, on the one hand, and linking that utility to the “natural” and “applied” sciences, on the other. The first case is the most recent 2001 Task Force that constituted the HEC.

6.2 The Effectiveness Imperative in Higher Education Reform

Economy and Internationalisation: Task Force 2001

The Task Force appeared to be more balanced in its discussion of the utility and nature of higher education than the HEC eventually became. In a brief comment on “Curriculum Related Matters” (TFIHE 2002: 35), the Task Force “felt that early specialization through segregation of students into Arts and Science streams from Grade 8 in schools was detrimental to general education”. In this one paragraph, the Task Force recommended introduction of “general education” at the higher secondary school level as well as for college and university. No further details are offered in the report, but it may be hypothesised that this recommendation links to the non-economic aspects of higher education listed in the report’s introduction: “contributing to a just, democratic and enlightened society... the inculcation of values of tolerance, responsibility, enterprise, creativity and public duty. These require... a common base in core subjects” (Ibid: 1). These indications may be understood as a support for “liberal” education at the undergraduate level, which is what the global
Task Force on Higher Education and Society had recommended. In that report, a chapter was dedicated to general or liberal education, which was defined as “a curriculum [or part of a curriculum] aimed at imparting general knowledge and developing general intellectual capacities in contrast to a professional, vocational or technical curriculum” (Ibid: 83). Given the Pakistan Task Force’s inspiration from the global TFHES, it may be assumed that this definition is what was being referred to.

However, the context of the recommendations needs greater attention. The two sentences in the introduction referring to the broad, non-economic goals are actually part of the first section of the report entitled “1.0 Economic Importance of Higher Education” (Ibid: 1). This introduction section begins by noting that, “Of all the economic growth initiatives of the Government of Pakistan, perhaps none holds more promise and the possibility of large scale and sustainable returns than effectiveness and expansion of the Higher Education infrastructure in Pakistan.” Likewise, the phrase urging for a “common base in core subjects” ends with “an emphasis on practicality and relevance” (Ibid: 1). The next section, “Effectiveness of Higher Education in Pakistan” states that “it is not surprising, therefore, that students in publicly funded institutions get an education of mediocre quality which does not prepare them to participate effectively in the economic, political, and social life of the country, leave alone the competitive global economy” (Ibid: 2, emphasis added). Reviewing past policies, the Task Force comments that:

Expansion in the field of education should have been guided and planned in relation to the needs of the country for skilled human resource. However, since the planners have never been able to estimate the country’s needs, the institutions of higher education have had no guidance for defining goals (Ibid: 3).

Again, citing the global TFHES report, the Pakistan report goes on to emphasise the importance of “education sector as a vital instrument for national development... supporting economic development” (Ibid: 4). Commenting on the situation of higher education, later, the report describes a shift already underway from Arts to Sciences,
as part of the Government’s response to “a dearth of expertise in science and technology” (Ibid: 11).

The two, brief references to non-economic arguments to invest in higher education are not explained or discussed in any detail. On the one hand, the broader “values” are embedded in strictly utilitarian arguments of career and national economic development. On the other hand, the brief argument for general education is also ultimately utilitarian, since the call for general education – couched in the imperative of “practicality and relevance” – is supported by global integration arguments. That is, general education is needed “in order to prepare students for critical and moral reasoning, effective communication, and self-directed life-long learning... [to] encourage good citizenship, adaptability, and innovation, facilitating the continuing renewal of economic and social structures relevant to a fast-changing world” (Ibid: 35). In other words, general education is viewed as providing graduates with the skills needed to adapt to modern economies and hence make successful careers nationally and, increasingly, internationally. The emphasis remains on the effectiveness of the system of higher education.

The motif of effectiveness of the higher education system runs through the Pakistan Task Force report, and in many senses defines the key objective of the proposed reform. This motif fits the framework of the report, which is aimed at systemic improvement. “Effectiveness” defines the Task Force’s overwhelming emphasis on management and governance, both of the entire system of universities (through the proposed HEC) and of each individual university (through structural adjustments). Clearly, the “effectiveness” is intended for “national development”, which should define the “goals” for higher education. These goals are primarily economic. While the Task Force assumes that quality education will automatically lead to graduates better prepared to cope with modern economies, the focus remains on systemic effectiveness.

A key component of this systemic effectiveness for the Task Force was global integration, its second justification for higher education investment and reform. The
Task Force report abounds with references to the “fast-changing world” and the need to adapt to flexible, modern economies. The understanding is evidently that graduates are not prepared to contribute to the national economy and development, but this is relatively a simpler task than coping with the more “competitive global economy” (Ibid: 2). This is cast precisely in the terms of the global TFHES (2000) in the preface of the Pakistan report: “Today, as the world becomes increasingly interconnected, higher education is considered critical for the achievement of economic progress, political stability, and peace” (TFIHE 2002: xi). No description or implication of this interconnectedness is provided throughout the Pakistan Task Force report, although the quotes and references to the global TFHES report indicate that the framework is one of a global “knowledge economy”. Thus, in the Executive Summary of the Pakistan report, it is noted that “the pressing need to benefit from the new knowledge-based economy has placed an unprecedented premium on higher education” (Ibid: xiii). What is noteworthy in these few, brief statements is the implicit understanding that higher education in some manner connects Pakistan to the “increasingly interconnected” world, and that effective higher education does so effectively. Neither the mechanism of connection nor the benefits are expanded upon, but rather remain assumed throughout the report.

This assumed understanding offers two implicit answers to the question: what is higher education’s effectiveness for? In brief, the effectiveness is for national economic development and integration in the global economy. The modernising of higher education is thus justified by the Task Force as being useful to these ends. The Task Force’s ambiguous yet definite emphasis on utility is far from unique to higher education reform. My participation in the follow-up Steering Committee (preparing a plan to implement the TFIHE recommendations) confirms that utilitarian goals of higher education are considered “natural.” However, it was only upon subsequent reflection that I appreciated how limited the definition of “utility” was, and how closely it related to naturalised assumptions about modernising Pakistan. There was constant discussion in the SCHE about the impracticality of current higher
education, about global economic competitiveness of firms and individuals, and some about national economic development in a globalised age, but no analysis of how the reforms to modernise the sector would connect to these goals, and no reflexivity about where this normalised conception came from. It was as if the reforms were goals in themselves, and calling them “practical” and globally “competitive” merely justified them. Active resistance to the SCHE reforms could thus be relatively easily labelled a culture of impracticality and introversion.

**Nation-Building after Empire: Commission on National Education, 1959**

Neither of the imperatives for effectiveness – national development or global integration – was new when the Task Force published its report in 2002. Both factors were justified in the report, briefly, as having been “identified” more than 40 years ago, i.e. by the Commission on National Education in 1959. The report of this earlier Commission (CNE 1959), as discussed in previous chapters, was formative in the development of Pakistan’s higher education system, besides being a point of reference for the later Task Force in 2001 and subsequent actions by the Higher Education Commission. Despite this importance, there is only one critical analysis of the Commission (Saigol 2003), which focuses on the context of “nation-building”.

The practicality of higher education for nation-building was, indeed, the primary emphasis of the CNE in 1959. Other reforms initiated by the new military government of General Ayub Khan likewise emphasised nation-building as a key goal of social policy. The CNE’s own introduction to its report made this explicit, aimed at defining recommendations for the educational system “consistent with the country’s self-image; that it should be, in form and content, consistent with the hopes and aspirations the country holds for itself,” linked inextricably with the immediate project of “nation-building” (CNE 1959: 5). However, this political imperative is akin to a coverall, obscuring the details of what precisely is intended by “nation-building”.

The primary problem diagnosed by the Commission for higher education was, as earlier, culture. More accurately, it was a problem of a culture of resistance which the
nation had evolved under colonial rule. For the CNE, little cultural and attitudinal shift had occurred upon Pakistan’s independence in 1947: the nation (especially government officers, including university faculty) was at once dependent on the government and, at the same time, predisposed to resist it. This, the Commission reported, had disastrous effects for what was urgently needed upon independence: processes of self-determination. The Commission’s analysis of, and recommendations for, higher education in particular were thus cast in the light of effectiveness toward self-determination and thence nation-building.

As I have analysed elsewhere (Qadir 2009a) this goal definition for Pakistan as a newly independent nation-state resulted in particular emphases within the CNE report. These included, foremost, a certain sense of being-in-Pakistan, with higher education grounded firmly within national society (superseding communitarianism), contribution to the national economy, embeddedness in a community of scholars to provide a “wholesome environment”, and configuration of universities within a constellation of institutions of higher education centrally managed by a University Grants Commission. The sense of nation-building, thus, constituted a modern identity of the university situated within these interlacing networks. At the same time, another emphasis within the 1959 report was on the normalising aspect of higher education, i.e. its utility in transforming a “backward” and “obstructionist” society one graduate at a time.

This utility itself was to be achieved by the third emphasis, that of creating the “whole” graduate, an individual completely educated in a “broad-based” manner. The detailed outline of graduate curriculum stressed that “in both pass and honours courses the first year should include general courses in the humanities and social sciences for science students, natural sciences for arts students, and the English language for all” (CNE 1959: 20). Such an education would ensure that “we go on producing philosophers, for example, whose chief business would be to reflect and to think across the artificial barriers between subjects and disciplines. We shall always need our philosophers and poets, even as we need our physicists and
mathematicians” (Ibid: 22). This complete curriculum outline was accompanied in the report by an overwhelming emphasis on “character development”, which President Ayub Khan had underlined when convening the Commission (Ibid: 1): “Hence the emphasis we have laid on the character building aspect of education” (Ibid: 12). This evocation of morality and its relation with the discourse of specifically Islamic values, which notionally provided a justification for the very existence of Pakistan, constitutes a fascinating (and largely unresolved) complex, but extends beyond the scope of this study. Here, it is enough to note that the expectation of a “broad-based education” proved in the event to be overly optimistic. Curricula remained restricted, and became more so over time, to the point that the Task Force recommended broadening the educational base in 2001, and contemporary trends under the HEC grew heavily tilted.

In 1959 the CNE also included aspects of effectiveness for national economic development and global integration, as developed with greater emphasis by the Task Force in 2001. However, these were framed within the overarching aspiration of “nation-building”. National economic development was a key goal of the proposed system, but only to the extent that such development would, in some way, build the nation and lead to “progress”. The key task for the universities, thus, was based on “the fundamental role that education must play in the programmes of social and economic improvement... [so that universities may] exercise their influence in the development of a progressive nation” (Ibid: 9-10). Global integration, too, was emphasised, but not for its own sake or in the economic realm but more as the country’s “self-image” in the “community of nations”. The latter focused on “attitudes appropriate to a free and independent nation” and was cultural in nature.

For the CNE in 1959, then, higher education was already perceived as being highly utilitarian, but not for the purposes of economic development and global integration per se – as for the later Task Force. Rather these elements were subsumed, at a par with other features, under the cultural rubric of nation-building. In this regard, the analysis of the problems that the Commission set out to rectify was also cultural.
Thus, “We have become convinced that all of our education problems and, in fact, all of our national problems are inseparably entwined in a web of attitudes and values that is inappropriate to an independent people and incompatible with progress and national development” (Ibid: 10). In short, the problem was one of a culture of resistance, as indicated in the introduction to the report:

[During colonial rule] every action of the government, whether intrinsically good or bad, was met with a storm of protest. Even those measures that were clearly in the public interest, and there were many, felt the sting of aggressive criticism. Government was viewed as an evil, and non-co-operation became the badge of patriotism... We did not realise then [after independence] that the attitudes and habits of a hundred years cannot be altered by the scratch of a pen on a document of State... One by one we witnessed the reappearance of the old attitudes of passivity, indiscipline, opportunism and regionalism (CNE 1959: 3).

The culture of resistance was traced by the CNE directly to colonial rule throughout its report, in “the pattern of attitudes and values current in our society... [that has] thwarted all our efforts at nation-building” (Ibid: 5). The Commission declared that “education in Pakistan has its roots in this period [of foreign rule] of the history of the sub-continent.” It then sought throughout its report to replace the colonial conception of utility (“the system created then was designed to produce government servants” (Ibid: 5)) with a national conception of utility (to serve “nation-building” for a free and independent nation). In proposing a new defining utility - progress of the nation - the Commission criticised both the colonists perspective of educational utility to “operate the State” and the subject people’s acceptance of that utility. In both cases, the CNE was, in brief, haunted by Empire

Much of the utilitarian justification for higher education did indeed have its roots in the British Raj’s University. In fact, neither the CNE in 1959 nor the later Task Force in 2001 ever drew on anything other than British colonial or global theories of education, and those too of a decidedly Enlightenment bent whose origins are to be found in 19th century England. Despite the rhetoric of “Islamic values” and
“aspirations of the people” in 1959, or the values of “tolerance, responsibility, enterprise, creativity, and public duty” in 2001, no indigenous theorists were referred to, no differing conceptions evoked, no alternatives discussed to national developmental utility. So much for ‘alternative modernities’. It is, inevitably, to the British that we must look for the origin of utilitarian arguments defining higher education in contemporary Pakistan.

6.3 Colonial Utility: The British Raj Chrestomathic University, 1854-1904

Career and Colony in 1904

The definition of higher education by its utility peaked under colonial rule with the 1904 Resolution. That document for the first time laid out the need and plans for a network of technical, vocational and professional colleges and universities across British India, with an emphasis on agriculture and industry. The rationale behind this was interesting: the Resolution suggested that quality of higher education directed by the five universities in India was being negatively impacted by the system of basing government appointments on qualifications, academic attainments and conduct of candidates while at university. In other words, the Resolution posited that Indians had begun to perceive higher education as a “ticket” to government service, with the stability, social standing, career mobility, high remuneration and perquisites associated with a government position. There was general acceptance in India at the turn of the century that higher education quality was declining and needed to be “reformed” to better meet the growing demands of Indians (Ghosh 2000: 135). In reviewing the situation, the 1904 Resolution pointed out that:

A variety of causes, some historical and some social, have combined to bring about the result that in India, far more than in England, the majority of students who frequent the higher schools and the Universities are there for the purpose of qualifying themselves to earn an independent livelihood; that Government service is regarded by the
educated classes as the most assured, the most dignified, and the most attractive of all careers; and that the desire on the part of most students to realize these manifold advantages as soon and as cheaply as possible tends to prevent both schools and colleges from filling their proper position as places of liberal education (GOI 1904: 8).

As a result, the Resolution noted, Indians had begun to protest when positions were not attained by dint of academic qualification. Naturally, government positions did not grow as rapidly as the number of highly qualified Indians; while the Resolution credited the British Government with increases in enrolments, it implied that the policy of massification had been a victim of its own success. The consequent unrest was seen as problematic because Indians had begun to expect government jobs after investing in higher education.

While mentioning the need for “liberal” education, the 1904 proposal was equally utilitarian: it suggested that additional employment channels were required to employ the growing supply of highly qualified Indians. It is here that the utilitarian emphasis on education was most pronounced. The Government’s argument was that the primary purpose of higher education was better career opportunities than Indians would otherwise have. While government service was becoming rapidly saturated, other sectors were simultaneously promoted by the call for modernisation and “development” through highly qualified personnel: technical (GOI 1904: 33-34), industry and crafts (Ibid: 36-8), commerce (Ibid: 38-9), and agriculture (Ibid: 39-41) and so on. The Resolution did not, in fact, suggest that these skills were to be deployed solely or even mainly for export to England, but rather that the national development and uplift project in India itself created a demand for such education. The 1904 Resolution thus established scholarships for technical education, while also proposing for the first time an “Imperial Agricultural College”, (which ultimately was established, but not by that name).

By 1904, then, the British Government in India had developed firm plans for a system of higher education defined primarily by its utility. The successful implementation of that Resolution can be testified to by the rapid increases in
institutions and enrolment, and the review of the sector 55 years later by the Commission on National Education in Pakistan (1959). However, the utility that defined the system in 1904 and thereafter was not in the abstract: it emphasised technology, science, commerce and industry (including agriculture), a focus which remains evident today. Underlying this focus was the implicit assumption that Western education would naturally lead to utilitarian benefit. The Resolution noted in its conclusion that:

The system of education thus extended makes provision in varying degrees... to satisfy the aspirations of students in the domains of learning, and research; it supplies the Government with a succession of upright and intelligent public servants; it trains workers in every branch of commercial enterprise that has made good its footing in India; it attempts to develop the resources of the country and to stimulate and improve indigenous arts and industries; it offers to all classes of society a training suited to their position in life; and for these ends it is organised on lines which admit of indefinite expansion as the demand for education grows and public funds or private liberality afford a large measure of support (GOI 1904: 50-51).

This statement encapsulates the utilitarian approach of the 1904 Resolution: higher education was a three-fold panacea: for individual Indian career hopes whether in the coveted government service or in other sectors, for national “development” through modernisation and improvement of all sectors, and for colonial governance through trained officials. It is no surprise that the definition of higher education in this manner stamped its mark on the nature of teaching and administration in the respective institutions. Research was undervalued from this perspective, and hence dwindled in institutions, and teaching became more and more directed toward examinations, since success in exams was crucial to opening doors of opportunity which a highly educated Indian expected to walk through.

This three-fold normative, utilitarian definition of higher education in 1904 was backed by substantive policy reform steps. For instance, the system of examinations was to continue being modernised, since “examinations, as now understood, are
believed to have been unknown as an instrument of general education in ancient India” (Ibid: 11). The emphasis of reform remained on pedagogy, which needed reform to suit the utilitarian goals in contrast to the past, indigenous, pedagogies, since “both systems, the Muhammadan no less than the Hindu, assigned a disproportionate importance to the training of memory” and of specialisation in “metaphysical refinements and in fine-spun commentaries on the meaning of the texts which they had learnt by heart” (Ibid: 2). The Muslim tradition of higher education in India was especially criticised since the “courses of study are too purely literary in character” (Ibid: 7). The British Government’s task, then, was posited as correcting this “inherent defects” in traditional higher education in order to make the system individually, nationally and colonially useful. These defects were perceived as natural amongst Indians: “The Government of India look with favour upon the extension of such teaching... as calculated to correct some of the inherent defects of the Indian intellect, to discourage exclusive reliance on the memory, and to develop a capacity for reasoning” (Ibid: 19). The modern higher education, emphasising usefulness for all, was placed at the forefront of the change needed, since “the influence of the improved Universities may be felt throughout the educational system of the country’ (Ibid: 31).

Much of the 1904 Resolution’s arguments – not to mention subsequent success – were based on the vocal Indian demand for Western higher education, the “necessity of public support for Western education” (Ibid: 3). In fact, this popular demand was widespread among both British loyalists and Indian nationalists. This much-commented upon Native demand is often traced to the introduction of English as the official language of commerce, courts and administration in the 1830s. Before this, under Mughal rule, the lingua franca within the sub-continent was divided largely along religious and class lines: handing down Muslim religious traditions in Arabic and cultural in Persian, with Hindus transmitting in Sanskrit. Persian was most often – but not exclusively – used for the courts and royal administration as well as for some commercial dealings with officials, while businessmen often employed local
vernaculars since they had to deal with uneducated consumers. Most lower class individuals typically relied exclusively on local vernaculars. By the late 19th century, the official use of English in all public spheres meant that a “rapid spread of [Western] higher education was particularly demanded by Indian nationalists” as a path to individual and national uplift (Tangri 1961: 369).

As recently summarised, “the expansion of English education during this period [last half of the 19th century] reflected the strong demand for English in the principal urban centres of British India... [springing] from an awareness that a smattering of English opened up the prospect of employment in the lower rungs of government or European-controlled commercial organisations” (Evans 2002: 277). Despite British Government claims in 1904, there is now general recognition that this interest in higher education had more to do with the utilitarian ends of the language than with the content of a Western education (McCully 1940). Others noted as early as the 1850s that the demand for English language education in India was primarily career-oriented and that therefore the supply of “educated talent is increasing faster than the demand” (Allen 1854: 274).

However, these structural analyses do not explain why the initial impulse came to transform and define modern higher education in India with specific utilitarian arguments, viz. those of individual careers, national uplift, and colonial governance. The British may have continued to govern largely in the way Mughals did, with a minimum of interference in public and civic life and never imposing a defining purpose or code for tertiary or other education. For this initial impulse, some have pointed to British attitudes of governance. For instance, it has been noted that the British never developed permanent colonial settlements, preferring to continuously transfer officers within their Empire; a common language and widely similar models of education were thus aids to their peculiar form of modern governance in the Imperial space (Allen 1854). Others have pointed to the refusal of most British to learn any Indian language beyond a trivial smattering as a cause for introducing English into administration, commerce, the courts and domestic use (Spear 1938).
Such explanations, too, are only partial for two reasons. First, British policy explanations and statements do not substantiate them. The arguments used by the British to introduce English language and to define higher education by its utilitarian functions were not based on convenience but on ideals: that is, they were projected, defended and implemented as the “right” things to do, although there was no obvious reason for this. In fact, this approach cost the British increasing amount of expenses – for instance through the grant-in-aid system for schools and expansion of universities and colleges – which made India a growing economic drain on the Empire in the 19th century. This belies a relatively simplistic approach to colonial governance merely for extraction and profit.

Second, there was a strong Indian nationalist movement throughout the latter half of the 19th century which grew immeasurably in the early 20th century. The political character of this movement opposed and resisted virtually all actions of the colonial government, sometimes even garnering support from British loyalist Indians. It was precisely this attitude of a ‘culture of resistance’ that the Commission on National Education bemoaned in Pakistan in 1959. This attitude, growing throughout the 20th century, it argues against a wholesale adoption of English language or utilitarian views by Indian nationalists as well as the subsequent nation of Pakistan. There is ample evidence that “English [education] came more and more to be a desideratum for an educated man” (Spear 1938: 90), a mark of distinction and rationality. The internalisation of these normative views of higher education – for instance its three-fold utilitarian function – by Indians generally across the board, and over a period of time, points to the creation of a milieu within which these norms were considered rational by all. In other words, neither structural nor (related) governance arguments explain why this milieu was created in such an effective and lasting manner to make the Native demand so popular. For this, again, we must turn to the sweeping changes wrought in 1854 by the Despatch of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, just three years prior to full governance in India by the British Empire.
The Practical Character in 1854

The impact of the 1854 Despatch has been noted earlier for the case of the institution of English language higher education in India. The Despatch was the signal that officially confirmed the change of attitude introduced in 1835 (discussed in the next section). This was a “change in fundamental ideas, and, in consequence, of [British] attitude to India” (Spear 1938: 91). From a largely prevalent, officially condoned, attitude of wonder and appreciation admixed with greed (exemplified by the late 18th century administration of Warren Hastings), the 1854 Despatch marked a time of “criticism and disdain” towards India and all things Indian. Change and reform were being stressed in the English House of Commons as well as by administrators in India, taking strength from Lord Cornwallis’ famous statement that, “Every Indian I verily believe is corrupt” (Ibid). It was partly this reformist impulse that led to the British Crown taking over governance in India from the Company after the War of 1857.

The reformist Despatch of 1854, in this light, for the first time recognised a moral duty of the British Government to civilise India and Indians, at whatever cost and administrative procedure was necessary. The point here is that this was based on the utility of utility. In other words, the primary, stated objective of the entire educational scheme outlined in the 1854 Despatch was founded on the need to introduce “useful knowledge” to India. Partly for rhetorical purposes the Despatch produced a review of existing Indian education (both indigenous and generous, Orientalist British) as being for the most part useless, a theme carried through to the 1904 Resolution and into Pakistan via the CNE (1959) and the Task Force (2002). Thus, the opening paragraphs of the Despatch state that:

It is one of our most sacred duties to be the means, as far as in us lies, of conferring upon the natives of India those vast moral and material blessings which flow from the general diffusion of useful knowledge, and which India may, under Providence, derive from her connexion with England... This knowledge will teach the natives of India the marvellous results of the employment of labour and capital, rouse them to emulate us
in the development of the vast resources of their country, guide them in their efforts, and gradually, but certainly, confer upon them all the advantages which accompany the healthy increase of wealth and commerce; and at the same time secure to us a large and more certain supply of many articles necessary for our manufacturers and extensively consumed by all classes of our population as well as an almost inexhaustible demand for the produce of British labour” (emphasis added).

The usefulness of knowledge, combined with the description of benefits that education should yield in India point unreservedly to a utilitarian argument for the sector. The same argument sustains throughout the Despatch, including in the organisation of higher education on the model of the University of London, which Robert Young recently termed the “chrestomathic” university. The (disputed) author and advocate of the Despatch, Sir Charles Wood, emphasised this aspect of his scheme, pointing out to the House of Commons in a speech in August 1854, after the Despatch had been despatched, that “by far the greatest defect of the education given in India is its want of a practical character” (Moore 1965: 80). The Despatch justified its reformist claims for utility mostly by criticising both indigenous Hindu and Muslim systems of education, especially higher education, as well as previous British schemes – somewhat unfairly, as complained by the previous Governor-General of India, Lord Dalhousie (Ghosh 2000: 81-82).

Another strand of the 1854 Despatch’s argument for utility was massification, again stemming from a utilitarian vision. The reference to “all classes of our population” in the introduction was mirrored in the aim of enhancing access to (Western) education in India. The argument was that higher education, in particular, had previously been restricted to some circles, classes and castes of “educated gentlemen” who were essentially unemployable. Therefore, Wood wanted to “provide a path from the lowest school to the highest, and ultimately into technical and professional careers” (Moore 1965: 81). From 1854 on, “the object of education was to spread European knowledge among all classes of people… to make the educated more useful members of society” (Tangri 1961: 386, emphasis added). The reformed
(democratised) higher education sector would provide individual career mobility opportunities to all Indians, which could not but result in a forward thrust of Indian society. Massification/democratisation and utility, then, were first officially conjoined for higher education in the 1854 Despatch.

This utilitarian vision of higher education flew sharply in the face of the previous British Government top-down approach, what has often been termed the “filtration” policy. Despite its reformist claims, the 1854 Despatch was not alone in this shift but rather officially sanctioned a spirit of the times, the battle having been largely won by utilitarian advocates of massification of higher education in India. For instance, by the 1850’s the distant Madras presidency had already undergone a rather acrimonious administrative war over the vision of the nascent Madras University. One of the University’s founders and its first president, George Norton, along with the Governor of Madras and other supporters “dreamed of bringing higher learning to the ‘respectable elements’ of Madras society” (Frykenberg 1986: 55). As Norton put it, “Light must touch the mountain tops before it pierces to the depths” (Arbuthnot 1855: 47), and as the University’s Board confirmed, this meant aiming at “the mutual improvement of the upper classes of Native Communities, who [have] the leisure and means to pursue the higher branches of study in European literature, science, and philosophy, as well as Native learning and languages.”

As Frykenberg shows, this attitude – approved by Governor Elphinstone – was radically reversed under the next Governor, the Marquis of Tweeddale, after 1842. His quote in a report to London is unequivocal: “If India is to be educated by these means, neither you nor I will see much advancement in our day. If you were to nominate three Gentlemen who have been accustomed to the system of practical education in England and Scotland, you might have a chance of succeeding; but making the Natives rehearse Shakespeare... seems to me absurd [emphasis added].” This practical emphasis was repeated over the years, emphasising “solid, moral and thinking minds, which... are the only foundation of real social progress, and of a vigorous national intellect” (Arbuthnot 1855: 73). Governor Tweeddale’s efforts were
rewarded with huge numbers of students enrolling in the practically oriented grammar school attached to the university, prompting him to express satisfaction that “a sound practical system of education [was] established and received by the Native community.” Norton’s and other filtration advocates’ protests went unheeded when they claimed that “inundation of the lower orders [means] nothing less than the overthrow of the institution” and that the university should be “entirely and solely directed to the education of the higher orders” (Frykenberg 1986: 58). Not just Tweeddale, but the entire administrative machinery of the Empire quelled the “classicists” to install massified, practical education as a norm.

The case of Madras University was one of many signals that a change in attitude had already come about by the time the 1854 Despatch was sanctioned as policy. Higher education occupied a singular place in this shift. For the classicist filtration policy advocates, universities and colleges offered graduates to include in circles of comfort and civilised governance; for the ultimately dominant utilitarians, higher education offered all the keys to power: for the British to maintain the Empire with a steady supply of Indian civil servants, for upper class Indians to (re)gain as much as they could under colonisation, and for lower class Indians to climb up the social ladder. By the 1850’s higher education had already been installed as the erstwhile site for a philosophical clash and a focus for power. This instillation had taken place by the time Macaulay wrote his Minute in 1835, and had as much to do with the growing popularity of utilitarianism in England as with British colonial modalities in India.

6.4  **London Calling: Utility in England and India in the 1830’s**

The link between utilitarian governance in British India and utilitarianism in 19th century England has been made before. As early as 1854, commentators had been bringing a utilitarian analysis to India, linking the widespread Indian demand for English language to a desire for employment (Allen 1854). Most such analyses refer back to the debate between the anglicists (proponents of English language education in India) and the orientalists (advocates of Hindi, Persian or vernacular education) in
the 1830’s. There is also widespread recognition by now that the change brought about by Governor-General Bentinck’s order in 1835, fed by Lord Macaulay’s Minute the same year, later confirmed in the Despatch of 1854, was not essentially one of policy “but a change in fundamental ideas, and, in consequence, of [British] attitude to India” (Spear 1938: 91). In fact, Macaulay’s much-cited Minute is no longer considered solely or even mostly responsible for the character of higher education as it subsequently developed in British India, although debate still continues as to its precise impact (Spear 1938; Cutts 1953; Evans 2002). Rather, the “fundamental ideas” in England at the time can be directly credited with the change in British attitude and hence policy, including for education.

What exactly were these changes in “ideas”? One trend was of paramount importance, the rise and rise of utilitarianism from Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) to John Stuart Mill (1806-73), associated as it was with the evolution of parliamentary democracy and rule of law in England at the time. These developments are part of a social history of ideas, which is a vast and complex field in itself that I do not propose entering here. The transnational connections and their impacts of the social history of ideas, also, have their own methodological and substantive rigours which, again, I do not attempt to adopt here. Rather, my purpose here is relatively limited: to point out four outstanding themes in the process of deployment of utilitarianism for higher education development in British India in the 1830’s, as they emerge from the materials I have reviewed. These themes are outlined briefly below, following a quick scan of the major arguments of utilitarianism as a philosophical outlook.

**Utilitarianism: Key Principles**

Summarily, as expressed by Mill in *Utilitarianism*, “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (Mill 1863: 13). This statement summarises a philosophy that has had a long and contested history, and has accreted much that
was not discussed by its founders, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill in 18th - 19th century England. Without accounting for the legionary variety in this history, the following five characteristics of the philosophy may be identified for the purpose here (Mill 1863; Glover 1990; Scarre 1996; Bailey 1997; Shaw 1999). First, utilitarianism is based on the goal of welfare, often defined either in terms of pleasure or in terms of happiness. Second, the philosophy is consequentialist, in that it evaluates on the basis of expected outcomes. This marks a fundamental distinction from other forms of moral philosophies, notably deontological (which, broadly speaking, judges actions on the basis of their adherence to rules largely irrespective of their expected outcome), for example as in Kant’s insistence that duty be done for its own sake or as in contemporary conceptions of natural rights to be respected regardless of expected welfare. Third, utilitarianism generally insists that welfare, or the good, may be aggregated; that is, individual welfare may be summed up to societal welfare and vice-versa. Fourth, the philosophy aims at maximising utility, or the good. In many cases the theory is deployed for explanation of actions and social patterns by assuming that these can be explained in these terms. Fifth, and finally, utilitarianism is inherently universalist, aiming at producing the maximum amount of welfare for the greatest number of individuals (whether, analogously, as a ‘sum’ or an ‘average’).

Put in these terms, it is clear, firstly, that the philosophy’s popularity in 19th century England was intimately related to the ongoing ‘Enlightenment’, with is emerging views on the public sphere and public participation in politics through parliamentary democracy, to the evolving notion of human rights, and so on. That is, utilitarianism grew as an acceptable philosophy on which to base and justify social and political actions in a particular context in England. Naturally, that context was unique to England at the time, somewhat less so to the British Isles (with the growing involvement and role of Scottish Enlightenment), and much less so (in varying degrees and manners) to various other parts of the British Empire. Thus, while the above principles may appear to be universally applicable – and, indeed, I show were so applied to higher education development in British India – the conditions of that
application differed radically and significantly. It is not new to point out that the history of thought – in this case utilitarianism – is related to the historical context of that thought. However, the specific implications of this accepted notion in the case of higher education in British India have received less attention that I believe they deserve for a better understanding of the contemporary sector.

Secondly, it is equally clear that utilitarians (have) never completely framed their arguments in absolute terms. That is, “Utilitarian theorists agree that the good is utility, though they differ in their accounts of what utility is” (Scarre 1996: 10). In other words, individual philosophers and social reformers may define utility in one or another way at one or another time, but the guiding principles remain those outlined above. That is, a debate in the public sphere in England can, more or less, be identified for any given social issue contested on utilitarian grounds. In other words, the development of utilitarianism in England meant that specific definitions of utility were contested, not to mention the active presence of competing outlooks. The example of the formation of the University of London in 1836, reviewed later, offers an instructive example of the debate surrounding Bentham’s ideals.

For now, it is important to note that on the fact of it, a utilitarian conception of higher education differed radically from existing schemes in India before the 19th century. The nascent Western system was largely classicist and orientalist in nature, led by the 1770’s formation of the Calcutta Mad’rassah by Governor Warren Hastings and other institutes. To a greater extent, the prevalent indigenous systems, broadly categorised (perhaps inaccurately so by the British) as Muslim and Hindu, were founded on entirely variant approaches. To the best of my knowledge, no comparative analysis exists of the differences in, say, the late 18th century between Muslim, Hindu and British conceptions of higher education. However, the brief review of Muslim higher education earlier indicates that such an analysis would yield some glaring differences. In this context, the application of utilitarian, normative principles to re-form Indian higher education practice in the 1830’s was predictably not quite the same as the application of these principles within England.
Iteration: Making Higher Education Useful in British India in the 1830’s

It is relatively straightforward to demonstrate that the official policy supporting higher education in British India in the 1830’s followed these utilitarian principles. Macaulay’s Minute (Sharp 1920: 107-117) and Bentinck’s order of 1835 laid the official foundations of utilitarian organisation of higher education which Wood’s Despatch confirmed in 1854. An approach of maximising welfare – viz. basing arguments on accumulating the ‘good’ of happiness – and consequentialism are common throughout the 1830’s discourse. Thus, for instance, arguing against the classicist advocacy of maintaining the then-present system (of promoting vernacular and Indian classical education), Macaulay asks in his Minute:

We found a sanitarium on a spot which we suppose to be healthy. Do we thereby pledge ourselves to keep a sanitarium there if the result should not answer our expectations? We commence the erection of a pier. Is it a violation of the public faith to stop the words, if we afterwards see reason to believe that the building will be useless?... To talk of a Government pledging itself to teach certain languages and certain sciences, though those languages may become useless, though those sciences may be exploded, seems to me quite unmeaning (Sharp 1920: 108).

Such examples of obvious public ‘good’ and collective usefulness abound in the discourse, not only in Macaulay’s Minute (public works, small pox inoculations, geographical accuracy) but in related discussions such as the brief response by his rival, the classicist H. T. Prinseps. Besides such rhetorical devices, Macaulay makes his foundation of utilitarianism obvious throughout the seminal Minute, for instance asking (Ibid: 109), “We have a fund to be employed as Government shall direct for the intellectual improvement of the people of this country [India]. The simple question is, what is the most useful way of employing it?” Supporting, again, consequentialism as an argument of English, Macaulay points out that the language is already spoken by the ruling class. It is spoken by the higher class of natives at the seats of Government. It is likely to become the language of commerce throughout the East... we
shall see the strongest reason to think that, of all foreign tongues, the English tongue is that which would be the most useful to our native subjects (Ibid: 110, emphasis added).

A clinching argument used by Macaulay for English is that while the Government has to pay significant stipends to Indians studying classical Arabic or Sanscrit in colleges, by contrast students studying in English are quite capable of paying for these studies themselves (Ibid: 112). Stressing the point, Macaulay points out that:

The children who learn their letters and a little elementary arithmetic from the village schoolmaster are not paid by him. He is paid for teaching them. Why then is it necessary to pay people to learn Sanscrit and Arabic? Evidently because it is universally felt that the Sanscrit and Arabic are languages the knowledge of which does not compensate for the trouble of acquiring them. On all such subjects the state of the market is the decisive test (Ibid: 113, emphasis added).

The same argument is used by Macaulay in ridiculing one of many petitions from Indians educated in Arabic and Sanscrit with Government stipends seeking some Government employment, however meagre. Macaulay points out, again, “Surely, we might with some advantage have saved the cost of making these persons useless and miserable” (Ibid: 113). He also notes that it is precisely such elements – educated Indians unemployable by dint of having received a ‘classical’ Indian education – that create ferment against British rule for want of practical employment. The consequentialist argument for the market as a test is also used by Macaulay for offering free choice to Indians to study in either Arabic or Sanscrit colleges or in English language colleges, all funded by Government: “people should be left to make their own choice between the rival systems of education without being bribed by us to learn what they have no desire to know” (Ibid: 116). In the same way, Macaulay spends some time discussing the poor state of some 23,000 books printed by the Government in Arabic and Sanscrit, which “find no purchasers... [and] fill the libraries or rather the lumber-rooms of this body.” In three years, the Committee of Public Instruction spend 60,000 Rupees on printing books in Arabic and Sanscrit, which yielded sales of less than 1,000 Rupees, while the sale of seven to eight
thousand English volumes resulted in a profit of 20 percent (Ibid: 114). These individual examples of employment, stipends and books sales, also demonstrate the aggregative nature of Macaulay’s utilitarian argument – the utility accrued by an individual was expected to translate automatically and obviously to Indian society, and thence to the British Empire. It was, also, amply universalist, in that the distribution effect of utility was assumed. Thus, (useful) higher education had to be massified for maximum access, but only cautiously and with care (Ibid: 116).

The use of a classical versus practical dynamic is notable. Macaulay had essentially arrived into this polarised debate in 1834; he did not develop it since “the decision to promote English education had been taken well before the Minute’s composition. Macaulay’s purpose was essentially to justify the policy which had already been agreed upon” (Evans 2002: 269). He did, however, close the debate on language, at least for higher education, with his Minute confirmed by William Bentinck and later made policy by Charles Wood in 1854. The argument that succeeded, eventually, was one which H. T. Prinseps and other classicists could not counter, that of utility. Macaulay constructed two undeniable “truths” about indigenous Indian higher education. The first was that the many vernacular languages of India were inapplicable, languages “barren of any useful knowledge” (Ibid: 115). In fact, this was accepted by his opponents in the language debate, the classicists, for:

All parties seem to be agreed on one point, that the dialects commonly spoken among the natives of this part of India contain neither literary not scientific information, and are moreover so poor and rude that, until they are enriched from some other quarter, it will not be easy to translate any valuable work into them. It seems to be admitted on all sides that the intellectual improvement of those classes of the people who have the means pursuing higher studies can at present be effected only be means of some language not vernacular amongst them (Ibid: 109).

Macaulay’s case was for English to “improve” the Indians, while the classicists argued for Sanskrit for Hindus and Arabic and Persian for Muslims. Thus, one key part of the argument was that traditional, local languages of India were inherently
flawed besides producing useless knowledge. The second part was that “Eastern” classical languages were also only admired for their achievements in poetry. Besides not being able to stand up to the poetry of Europe, this was also an entirely useless achievement for Macaulay, for when the issue came to “facts” and “general principles investigated”, in “every branch of physical or moral philosophy” the comparison went in favour of English. In Persian, Arabic and Sanskrit:

... by universal confession, there are no books on any subject which deserve to be compared to our own... [there are] systems which, by universal confession, wherever they differ from those of Europe differ for the worse... medical doctrines which would disgrace an English farrier, astronomy which would move laughter in girls at an English boarding school... (*Ibid:* 110-1)

Thus, the vernacular, local knowledge was discarded as being patently false, while the alternative imports of Arabic and Persian or the indigenous, classical Sanskrit was constructed as not only false but also useless. What is at issue here is neither the veracity of Macaulay’s argument nor his rhetorical deployment, but rather that this double construction was considered universally acceptable as statement of fact and as a basis for sound argumentation. Even Macaulay’s opponents, the classicists led by Prinseps in the Committee (*Sharp 1920: 117-120*), did not deny any of these accusations, but only insisted that the pace of introduction of English should be more considered and that classical indigenous training continue to be supported for equally utilitarian reasons of governance. The public debate that ensued (mostly in England) after Bentinck had passed his order was reflected in the compromise Minute issued by the next Governor General, Lord Auckland in 1839. Auckland considered that “money as much as principles lay at the heart of the controversy” and ensured that “sufficient funds were made available to both Oriental and English studies” (*Evans 2002: 274*). These and other moves from the 1830’s through the 1850’s until Wood’s Despatch have been reviewed as following an essentially utilitarian basis (*Ibid:* 264). By the time the 1854 Despatch was issued, English language was widely recognised as being more suited to useful, practical learning.
The link between utilitarian philosophy and higher education in colonial India was evident in a series of social reforms begun in the 1820’s and accelerated under Bentinck in the 1830’s. Western-educated Hindus (and, to a lesser extent Muslims, cf. Tangri 1961) were at the forefront of campaigns to reform Indian social life, from the elimination of Sati (broadly, widow immolation) amongst Bengali Hindus in 1829 and ritual strangling of travellers in 1837, to the legalisation of widow marriage in 1856 and right of low caste Hindu women to dress above the waist in 1859. While all of these, among others, were legal reforms initiated by British Government officials, they were actively informed, supported and disseminated by Indians who were themselves highly educated or were strong proponents of Western education, such as the famous Ram Mohan Roy. All of these social reforms, coupled with ongoing governance reforms giving more and more “voice” to Indians in councils (while the Company gave way to British colonial rule in 1857) may be readily traced to public debates led by utilitarians in England.

**Not Quite the Same: Translation and Tangentiality**

The rise and rise of utilitarianism in public debates in England through the 19\textsuperscript{th} century is evident. Just to cite one example, Robert Young describes how the assertion of state power over the church in 1854 resulted in utilitarian reforms of the “ecclesiastical” universities of Oxford and Cambridge (Young 1996: 294). The role of religion in higher teaching was a matter of constant debate through the earlier 19\textsuperscript{th} century in England, until the founding of the University of London in 1826 as “the first English university designed to teach useful knowledge” (Ibid: 299). The University of London, being the model for universities in British India since Wood’s Despatch of 1854, is an interesting example set in the backdrop of a tussle between secular utilitarians and religious classicists in England, as well as a re-negotiation of powers between church and state.

Young (1996) describes this tussle beginning with the 1809 attack by Sydney Smith on classical education, who wrote that “nothing would so much tend to bring
classical literature within proper bounds as a steady and invariable appeal to utility in our appretiation [sic] of human knowledge.”75 The ensuing debate was defined in terms of a utilitarian versus literary higher education, the latter typically associated with religious affiliations and classical learning. Into the charged debate entered the University of London, a “godless” university where religion was not even taught, founded upon the “reasoned argument of the utilitarians that a university should teach useful knowledge” (Ibid: 299). The University of London’s “radical ethos of science and practicality” (Ibid: 304) was hotly debated and contested. A typical attack on the “commercial spirit” of the new useful knowledge was by Samuel T. Coleridge in a speech to Parliament in 1829: (Young 1996, 317-8 (Young 1996: 317-318).

... a permanent, nationalized, learned order, a national clerisy or church, is an essential element of a rightly constituted nation without which it wants the best security alike for its permanence and its progression; for which neither tract societies nor conventicles, nor Lancasterian schools, nor mechanics’ institutions, nor lecture-bazaars under the absurd name of universities [i.e. London], nor all of these collectively, can be a substitute... they are empirical specifics for morbid symptoms that help to feed and continue the disease.

But you wish for general illumination... You begin, therefore, with the attempt to popularize science: but you will only effect its plebification. It is folly to think of making all, or the many, philosophers, or even men of science and systematic knowledge.

This, and similar arguments, are well documented by Robert Young, who analyses them as ascribing a “surplus value” to “useless knowledge” (literary, classical education) which “without teaching [the graduate] the peculiar business of any one office or calling,... enables him to act his part in each of them with better grace and more elevated carriage.”76 Similar discussions converged around the unsuccessful 1852 establishment of the Catholic University of Dublin along the lines of Oxford and Cambridge. Needless to mention, the classical arguments eventually failed; they constituted a swan song of classicists as even Oxford and Cambridge underwent reforms from 1854 on, opening admission up to previously excluded groups and
gradually secularising content. These developments went hand in hand with political
change, with the government increasingly belonging to a dissenting middle class.

The co-incidence of these debates in England and the radical change in higher
education from 1835 through 1854 and beyond in British India is striking. At one level,
the imperial entanglement of the debate in England was obvious: many of the
original shareholders of the University of London were administrators and
businessmen in India, with vocal support for social change based on up-to-date,
useful, practical, secular, scientific teaching. Even the classicist (position defined
both the aim of a university (pursuit of ecclesiastical truth and refinement) and its
scope with increasingly imperial metaphors, drawing on the example of ancient
Rome as a model for wielding power over all nations (Young 1996: 308-309).

However, the very existence and terms of the English debate indicate the
tangential nature of translation to British Indian space in higher education. In brief,
no such debate was generated in the public sphere, nor was any evidence of such a
debate amongst Indians themselves recorded. As earlier, such debate as existed was
between Anglicists and Orientalists, i.e. on the use of English alone or English with
Arabic, Persian and Sanskrit for higher education. However, none of the advocates
for once believed either that the indigenous languages of India had anything to offer
for higher education, or that English was not “better” for that purpose than the
classical, religious languages. The only discussion was around the pace of
introduction of English and this was a discussion already settled by the time the
rhetoric flared in 1835: “By 1830 the Directors... were already pressing the Government
towards the use of the English language and the concept of education as the
acquisition of useful knowledge” (Spear 1938: 84). The need for higher education
based on utilitarian principles was never in question, as even the “classicists” had the
utility of governance (through a top-down filtration policy) as their primary concern.

This is best exemplified with the position taken by the key proponent of
utilitarianism in mid- 19th century England, John Stuart Mill, who was employed at
the East India Company in 1854 and drafted political correspondence (Moore 1965: 71-
Mill’s views on the need for English intervention in India were doubtless influenced by those of his father, James Mill, an ardent supporter Jeremy Bentham employed at the India House (Spear 1938: 91). The senior Mill’s three-volume 1818 epic *The History of British India*, amply laid out the utilitarian views on India: “Static, degraded and unenterprising, there was no hope for India but by an infusion of Western ideas and knowledge” (*Ibid: 93*). Indigenous education, especially at the higher levels, was so infused with “false” religion that it could not stand up to reason and practicality, and hence had to be entirely abandoned. His son, John Stuart Mill, maintained that the primary objective in higher instruction should always by “useful knowledge” as opposed to “Hindu knowledge” (Cutts 1953: 824-825). John Stuart Mill never advocated for the rapid or gradual spread of English as a medium of instruction, in fact questioning whether a common language would result in more loyal subjects by citing the troublesome case of Ireland. Rather, his point in 1824 was that “with respect to the sciences, it is worse than useless to employ persons either to teach or to learn them in the state in which they are found in Oriental books... The great end should not have been to teach Hindu learning but useful learning” (*Ibid: 825*), making the same point again with reference to Muslim education in 1826 (Evans 2002: 264). Mill championed the “classicist” orientalist position in a Despatch drafted in 1836 following the debate after Macaulay’s Minute, but this Despatch was never sent, losing ground to the compromise settlement by Auckland.

While Mill himself never argued for English, it was clear throughout his discourse that European knowledge was the highest form of “useful learning” and thus that English was arguably the best language to transfer that learning. Irrespective of the debates underway within England and the university reforms there, the translation into imperial space was unilateral. Utilitarianism was the undisputed principle of test, whether for massification and abandoning the “filtration policy” of higher education, or for establishing a complete system of higher education in English for European knowledge. Not only was this so among the British administrators, but it was also thus translated, by and large, in the Indian discourse in popular newspapers,
pamphlets and activism. Furthermore, the utilitarianism principle was not mere economics, although the rising costs of wars and maintaining English civilian and military officers in British India encouraged economising measures by training and then hiring many Indian civil servants at low salaries and a few Englishmen at high salaries. Rather, utilitarianism was a principle in itself, even when it resulted in much higher costs (for instance by establishing widespread grant-in-aid to schools).

The utilitarian principle was evident across the board – for instance among Anglicists and Orientalists alike in the Committee on Public Instruction. The translation to imperial space of British India accompanied the environment severely restricted terms debate between English and Indians. The existence and nature of British imperialism in India were not open to discussion, only the mechanisms of implementation could be influenced and informed. As a result the differentiated system within 19th century England, in which utilitarian arguments such as for the University of London, never existed in a policy space within British India. Prominent Indian efforts for higher education are likewise marked by high conformism to utilitarian principles, as by Ram Mohan Roy, and subsequently Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who demanded the teaching of English language as well as English knowledge as the only means for the revival of Indian culture.

A component of sustaining these principles was, as earlier, the construction of a certain view about indigenous Indian higher education as “traditional” and hence “useless”. Mill himself never bothered to examine indigenous forms and content of higher education before passing judgment, and neither did Macaulay. For that matter, the “classicist” Orientalists also encouraged largely antiquarian investigation into religious legal codes (subsequently deployed for imperial governance, such as tenancy control), linguistics (often to trace a common ancestry with Europeans to give antique legitimacy to the latter) and social history (very quickly turning into imperial anthropology used for ethnicity-based governance). For all, “traditional” in the form of indigenous (often in the vernacular languages but also for the “classical” languages of Arabic, Persian and Sanskrit) was unambiguously useless. Macaulay's
1835 rhetorical examples of “seas of treacle and seas of butter” were never contested. Macaulay related useless knowledge to inaccurate knowledge, “false history, false astronomy, false medicine” (Sharp 1920: 109). In this way, traditional was useless because it was false, while – by explicit and implicit rhetorical contrast – modern was useful because it was true or scientifically demonstrable.

Finally, the unilateral translation into a space devoid of alternative arguments or theorisation, based as it was on a sweeping condemnation of “traditional” learning, was deeply imbricated with a sense of social reform. Bentham’s original advocacy for utilitarianism as a guiding principle was founded in large part on the demonstration that people’s behaviour could be transformed by legislation, and this was applied nowhere with as much zeal as in British Indian education. The expected results of utilitarian higher education, from a never-ending supply of government recruits to industry and commerce more closely aligned with the British Empire’s needs were amply listed first by Macaulay in 1835 and then by Wood in the 1854 Despatch.

In England, at the same time, the discussion on classical, literary versus useful education also touched on the moral dimension, but was cast, as Young (1996) shows in terms of usefulness. The approach of maximising aggregatable welfare for the greatest number of people in British India, by contrast, led to intensive legislation-based social reforms. It was precisely this series of reforms, initiated as early as the 1810’s by Lord Cornwallis, which constituted the “civilising mission” of the colonists. It rested on the undeniable need for “moral uplift” of Indians, “sunk in the mists of ignorance”. The 1854 Despatch had termed education the “sacred duty” of the British Government in India, and justified its proposed intervention of useful knowledge not just for material benefit but for “moral blessings”. Macaulay, too, relied on the arguments of morality in his 1835 Minute. Earlier, Lord Cornwallis’ statement that “every native of Hindustan I verily believe is corrupt” had set the tone for the attitude of disdain and criticism toward Indians. In the 1820’s various public reports had begun to emerge referring to Indians, especially peasants, as “half-civilized” and “demi-barbarous”, and other “ignorance and immorality” (Spear 1938: 93). It was
relatively easy to emerge into the discourse with a perspective of “condemnation of everything Indian. Hinduism was superstitious, Islam was profligate, the classical literatures were immoral, and both systems were the work of the Evil One” (Spear 1938: 92). Similar arguments were used by another leading proponent of utilitarian principles in Indian higher education, Charles Trevelyan, who condemned orientalist colleges and whose persistence may well have been the key to utilitarianism success before Macaulay’s Minute (Evans 2002: 267).

Utilitarianism was, thus, admixed with a healthy dose of the “white man’s burden” to comprise the “civilising mission” of the colonists. Such argumentation was generally acceptable and, again, never contested. However, in this translation from theorising social welfare in England to implementing social reform in India, the moral argument received a strong mix of Evangelism. This influence – along with some of its implications – is briefly reviewed in the next chapter, with the important roles played in the 1830s and on by Charles Grant and Alexander Duff. There is still an academic debate as to whether English Utilitarian pressure (Evans 2002) or the English Evangelical movement (Cutts 1953) had the greater and more prior influence on Macaulay’s Minute and the British policy for higher education in India. By the 1830’s both were certainly evident, but the details of the connections reveal some interesting implications, reviewed later.

One example of this morality-based utilitarianism was the discussion around moral education within colleges in India. The leading missionary, Alexander Duff, advocated the introduction of Bible classes in the 1854 Despatch to Sir Charles Wood. In Madras Presidency, Tweeddale – the Governor who had stalled the classicist development of Madras University – announced a plan in 1846 to introduce Bible classes. His argument was that this “is the only means I know of giving to the Natives a practical knowledge of the sources from whence arise all those high qualities which they admire so much in the character of those whom Providence has placed to rule over them” (Frykenberg 1986: 59). The plan was never implemented, but the theme remained prominent until 1904 and beyond, including in 1959 (Qadir 2009a).
The basis in moral arguments for the “responsibility” of the British Government in India to correct the “immorality” of Indians, Hindus and Muslims alike, was an add-on to the utilitarian principles of Bentham and Mill. In India, the utilitarian advocates found a ground where they could ably deploy the social reformist agenda only theorised within England. The motivations were not merely fiscal or governance-related, or even driven by native demand, but rather ideal. The pursuit of utilitarian higher education, most effectively through European knowledge in the English language, as shown by Spear (1938) and others, was in part moved by humanitarian motives. The fervour, intensity and almost single-mindedness with which these motives were pursued by, for instance, Macaulay, Trevelyan and Grant, not to mention some of the Governors like Bentinck and Tweeddale, proves their sincerity. Advocates of utilitarianism remained undaunted in the face of arguments of mutiny, autonomy or even independence being demanded by Indians due to such principled education (Spear 1938: 97). The eventual movement for self-rule and independence in India in the 1940’s was, indeed, a direct result of the modern, English education instituted by Macaulay and others (Reed 1930; McCully 1940). This reading suggests that “enlightened humanism” went hand-in-hand with utilitarian ideals of colonial policy planners of higher education in the 1830’s. Utilitarianism appears to have been a key, normative, aspect of the colonial “civilisation mission.”

The introduction, spread and eventual rationalisation of utilitarian principles for higher education in British India may thus be traced back to early and mid-19th century developments in England, as could be expected. However, the adoption was far from straight-forward or the same as in England, which need not have been expected. In many ways, utilitarianism defined the higher education system, for instance cutting across the English-vernacular debate, but in other ways it was transposed to colonial space in a unilateral manner, linked entirely with “moral uplift” in a way that was unique to British India. Many of the core principles of utilitarianism as a philosophy, such as secularism, were, in short, lost in translation. As discussed, the translation was deeply influenced by evangelical pressure, perhaps
more in the sector of education than any other in British India. It is this linkage that
the next chapter traces forward from the 1830’s through 1854 and 1904 to the re-
formations of higher education in Pakistan in 1959, 2001 and beyond.

6.5 Colonial Utility

The purpose of this chapter has been to document and review the nature of
utilitarianism predominately defining contemporary higher education in Pakistan.
The justification and development of higher education since the TFIHE 2001-02
reforms has been primarily in utilitarian terms, translated as an overwhelming
emphasis on science and technology with an implicit assumption of English-language
instruction of European/Atlantic content. Such is the nature of contemporary
perspectives of modernity in higher education in Pakistan. Of course, the 2001
reforms cannot be held entirely to account for this trend. Part of it is global, as
evident by the similar emphasis in the earlier Task Force on Higher Education and
Society (TFHES 2000) and by similar trends in many other countries over the last
decade. Likewise, part of the contemporary trend in Pakistan may doubtless be
traced to a local political dynamic, especially the specific individuals at the helm of
contemporary reforms. But the main emphasis in this chapter has been to trace this
utilitarian emphasis in Pakistani higher education back to at least the Commission
on National Education (1959). The ‘new’ globalisation in Pakistan today appears to be
not so ‘new’ after all. The same utility focus, driven by very a similar imperative of
systemic effectiveness is evident in the 1904 reforms in British India.

It is worth collecting, here, some of the tropes that have been repeatedly deployed
to justify normative utilitarianism in higher education from British India through
contemporary Pakistan. These include “nation-building” (especially during the 20th
century), “development” (from 1904 till today, described successively as national,
economic and human), various descriptors of the “true” nature of the economy
(production, knowledge, etc.), “effectiveness”, and “global integration.” It is striking
how familiar these terms are in contemporary Pakistan, given their evolution in a
colonial context in British India. The evidence presented here suggests that the use of these tropes for “managing” societies is a topic worth investigating, although it extends beyond the scope of this study. Likewise, the ongoing evolution of utility – from colonial governance to civilisation to national development to global economic integration – may well be read in the above texts as a story of global capitalism, a reading supported by various scholars. Such analyses would require more specialised focus and my intention here is, far more modestly, to present the texts while indicating possibilities for future analysis.

Indeed, comparable imperatives defined higher education formation another half-century ago, for instance in the 1904 Resolution of the British Government of India, when individual career needs of Indians were linked to governance and commercial needs of the British Empire. Just as the Task Force did almost exactly a century later, so in 1904 the British Government extolled the virtues of practical education in the form technical and vocational training. These needs, it bears repeating, were not oriented only to the economic health of England through trade, but were justified for national “development”. The Resolution constructed a narrative of “useless” and overly “literary” indigenous higher education, especially among Muslims, to build its case on “certain characteristic defects of the Indian intellect: the development of the memory out of all proportion to the other faculties of the mind, the incapacity to observe and appreciate facts, and the taste for metaphysical and technical distinctions” (GOI 1904: 29). The Resolution also drew on a vocal, heavy popular Indian demand for “practical”, European higher education. Muslims, inspired and led by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan in the late 19th century, were at the forefront of this demand. Sir Sayyid’s persistent, active and successful demand was one example among many. Such demands, crafted as they were on the same terms as British higher education policy making in India determined, can best be explained by the creation of a colonial ‘milieu’ by the British. Thus, whether loyalists (such Sir Sayyid in the late 19th century) asked for more European education or dissidents (such as his
former colleague Shibli Nu’mani) asked for less, both by and large aimed at the practicality of higher education to attract supporters and subscribers.

The establishment of this utilitarian ‘milieu’ may be reliably traced back to the seminal Despatch of the Court of Directors of the East India Company (1854), just prior to formal British Government rule after the War of 1857. The Despatch’s emphasis on the practical character of higher education was implemented by modelling subsequent higher education in British India on the Chrestomathic model of the University of London. The focus on usefulness, combined with massification (“for all classes”), tied in neatly with current notions of utilitarianism: maximising welfare for the greatest number. However, the Despatch, again, did not formulate this approach but rather epitomised a “general change in attitude” amongst the English and especially British administrators and lawmakers. Related developments, such as in Madras, confirm that the change in attitude preceded and superseded the change in policy, including from the top-down “filtration” policy of higher education for upper-class Natives to enhancing opportunities for access by all classes of Indians.

**Lost in Translation: Utilitarianism, Missions and Causality**

As may be expected, these changes in attitudes stemmed from developments in early to mid-19th century England. As Spear (1938: 83) points out, “It is to England rather than to India that we must look for the decisive change over in Indian educational policy. The change in the attitude to Indian education was only part of a general change in English ideas about India which took place in the first thirty years of the nineteenth century.” These changes included not only political and social upheavals, but also changes in thought, with Bentham’s and Mill’s utilitarianism gaining ever more currency. As the last section above indicates, the key principles of utilitarianism – welfarist, consequentialist, aggregative, maximising, and universal/distributive – were all at play in the re-formation of higher education in British India from the 1830’s to the 1850’s. Macaulay’s Minute exemplified, but did not initiate, these principles.
However, crucially, the translation was disturbed, or rather tangential to parallel developments in England at the same time. Neither the extent nor the depth of debate around the same topic – higher education – in England was reproduced in British Indian space. Furthermore, the overwhelming emphasis on “civilising” through “moral uplift” was a new entrant, not just to British Government policy in India but also to England. This link was ultimately related to the vocal Evangelical pressure growing in England at the time, but which found its best application in imperial space in India. It relied, for the most part, on a rhetorical construction of tradition as useless, inaccurate and imbricated with false religion, to be contrasted with modern as practical, accurate and tied with scientific research. Such tangentiality points again to the fact that the application of utilitarianism, at least for higher education development in British India, was not in the abstract or theoretical, but was highly specific and contextualised. This context was not just about extension of British power in India – although that was a key part, as demonstrated by the arguments of the “classicist” orientalists in the 1830’s – but was also based on ideals and norms. These last were thoroughly intertwined with religion through the Evangelical movement within England and in British India.

This last point adds a twist to the story of utilitarianism in British Indian higher education formation in the early to mid-19th century. Modernity was equated by Macaulay, Bentinck and others with English language instruction and European content on the grounds of being both “new” and (therefore?) “useful”. It was this argument that carried through to the 1904 Resolution and beyond. But this reasoning was also thoroughly imbricated with notions of morality, colonial responsibility and the “civilising mission.” Thus, while the utilitarian modernity underway in England resulted in the famous, ever-increasing separation of church and state within higher education (resisted to nought by the Romantics and Idealists, aligned with conservatives), the same trends produced an opposite effect in British India. Here, the modern utilitarians (generally younger individuals like Macaulay and Trevelyan in the 1830’s) employed moral arguments linked closely to evangelism, while the
“classicist” orientalists (generally more mature individuals like H. T. Prinseps in 1835) argued against moral content of higher education and against evangelical involvement. The former argued for massification and universal access for the utility of individual careers leading to national development in India; the latter largely argued for restricted access to higher education by Indian elite for utility of imperial governance. It is this twist, a modern alliance with evangelism opposed to a “classicist” alliance with secularism, which is the subject of the next chapter.

The course of tracing expressions of modernity in contemporary Pakistani higher education thus lead inevitably to themes in colonial formations of the sector in British India, from the English-vernacular debate through tangential applications of utilitarianism to missionary evangelism. It is worth repeating here the danger of a structuralist trap, identified by contemporary postcolonial writers (Pannikar 2002), of viewing all Indian agency only as reaction in the light of somehow more originary British action. However, this is a limited perspective which relies only on a view of direct causality. If, instead, causality of agency is considered more indirectly, through for instance Charles Taylor’s notion of the long march of modernity producing “modern social imaginaries”, causality may be viewed more indirectly. Indian agency need not be a direct reaction to British actions (as the tangential case of utilitarian application demonstrates), but rather agency shaped within a colonial milieu. The historical tracing, furthermore, elicits evidence of how this milieu has deeply affected not only later colonial policy (such as the 1904 Resolution) but also subsequent reforms in independent Pakistan, from 1959 to 2001 and beyond.
7 ISLAM AND THE SECULAR

The true cure of darkness is light... English-language instruction in Newtonian science would eradicate the gross superstitions of Hinduism. Into the religious vacuum thus created, it would be easy to insert Christianity. (Charles Grant 1813: 76)

The enquiry into cultural themes underlying the historical construction of modernity in Pakistani higher education has led inexorably to the impetus of evangelical imperialism in early 19th century British India. This impetus arose as a marked shift from early colonial governance, and aligned with other modernising attempts in the colonial space of British India. The alliance between modern, practical, Anglicists and evangelical missionaries was more or less unique to this colonial space, and proved to be decisive in shaping the higher education structure that eventually emerged with the Despatch in 1854. The aim of this chapter is to review this evangelical impetus and its implications for Muslim higher education institutionalisation, beginning with the formative debate in the early 19th century and moving on to missionary influence in subsequent colonial policy-making. This specific influence is not automatically recognised, although of course the significant presence of missionaries in British India has been much discussed. However, much of the analytic tends to overlook policy influence, preferring to position missionaries more as independent actors, often in conflict with Crown and Company, which of course they were at times.

In fact, the question of evangelical influence on education policy-making fades away in most analyses entirely by the time the 1904 Resolution and its institutionalisation impact is discussed. Any question of religion, especially of Islam in the context of evangelicism, then appears mostly independently from this institutionalisation trajectory. By contrast, I intend to underscore here precisely this linkage, both direct policy influence by evangelical missionaries as well as indirect shaping of a colonial milieu within which Muslim modernity in higher education emerged in imperial India. Both influences, I argue, are seminal to understanding the
parallel institutionalisations of Muslim modernity in British India, and thereby to
informing modern higher education in Pakistan. I therefore briefly review some
contemporary implications of the themes emerging from this analysis. However, the
final step – tracing the genetics of ‘secular’ modernity in contemporary higher
education – remains beyond the scope of this study.

7.1 Missionary Utility: Evangelicism and Higher Education in
the 1830’s

The imposition of English language as an official medium of higher education in
British India by Governor General William Bentinck in 1835 has been traced in the
previous chapters to Lord Macaulay’s Minute of the same year. However, that Minute
itself has been noted not as a source of change, but rather an indication of it. The
momentum for change from a classicist, vernacular, top-down model of higher
education to a modern, English-language, massified one originated, primarily, in the
change at that time in English attitudes to India. This change coincided (in a
relationship not examined in this thesis) to the rise of utilitarianism as a driving
outlook in British imperial policy. The utilitarians constituted a strong, vocal and
largely identifiable group of advocates during the 1830’s, a critical period in the
formation of higher education in British India. However, the same utilitarian
principles – albeit, applied differently – were in play by opponents to this group. The
commonality of utilitarianism as a criterion for educational policy-making, and the
distortion of this policy making between the English and British Indian spaces, was
commented upon earlier. One of the important indicators of this distortion from
discourse on higher education in England to that in British India, was the largely
unitary translation. Another was the addition of missionary evangelicism in the
latter. The modern utilitarians, it may be recalled, allied with fervent proselytizers,
more or less against traditionalist utilitarians allied with scholarly pluralism and an
abiding (Orientalist) respect for the Hindu religion in particular. Both, however, were
largely unanimous in condemning the religion of the previous rulers of much of India, Islam.

The missionary aspect of this alliance, as mentioned earlier, has been more commented upon than the globalising and utilitarian perspectives underlying modern higher education formation in British India. However, what emerges from this reading is that there is more to missionary education in British India than isolated proselytization, as is often portrayed; rather, it is indelibly linked to utilitarian pressure in establishing English as the language (and content) of higher education in British India, and thereby to implicit notions of what constitutes modern higher education. In this context, it is worth reviewing the highlights of evangelical pressure in the backdrop to Macaulay’s Minute of 1835.

For a long time, English missionaries in India played a cat-and-mouse game with a vacillating East India Company and the British Government. Missionaries were first allowed to establish charity schools in India almost a century after the first Company Charter was granted in 1600. Between the Charter renewal in 1698 and the British victory at Plassey, that granted administrative control to the Company over three provinces, in 1757, the only progress in English education in India was by the missionaries (Khan 1973: 22). Company officials had been generally opposed to missionary proselytization, allowing only charitable education and health work. The battle of Plassey marked a renewal of the debate on missionary engagement in India, and the Company withdrew active support of missionary work in 1780. A subsequent uprising surrounding proselytization – termed the “Vellore Rebellion” – in 1807 raised a further red flag, and the Company officially banned missionaries in India. It was not until 1813 that missionaries were allowed to resume work in India. During these hiatuses, missionaries did not disband their work altogether, especially charitable schools and hospitals, but rather managed them from areas where British presence was rare, or in bordering Portuguese colonies, where missionaries had been consistently supported (Cutts 1953: 844).
The withdrawing of Company support in 1780 and official renewal of support in 1813 were both linked to important developments in education, including higher education, in India. In 1780, responding to a petition by Muslims in Bengal, Governor Warren Hastings sanctioned the establishment of a Calcutta Mad’rassah for higher education in Arabic. Hastings got support for this initiative from the East India Company on the grounds that it would prepare qualified graduates for administrative jobs in the bureaucracy and lower criminal courts of the Bengal Presidency, both still mostly populated by Muslims (Khan 1973: 30). Thus, while the Company began to discourage missionaries, and hence missionary education, in the same year it approved official support for higher education for the first time in India. Ironically, this support came in part due to decades-long, active advocacy by missionaries to promote Western education in India. By the end of the 18th century, there was widespread acceptance of the responsibility of the British to promote education in India but an often-heated debate about whether that support should materialise under missionary or Company auspices. In 1793, a proposal by Wilberforce and Grant to allow missionaries in India again was rejected (Adams and Adams 1971: 161).

By 1813, when the Company Charter was renewed, the debate produced a compromise settlement. Resolution 13 of the Charter again allowed missionaries to proselytise and educate in India, while Resolution 43 allowed the Company to encourage and establish education in the colony. Again, the acceptance of education as a responsibility of the British Government through the East India Company was in large part due to the evangelical lobby, which articulated the majority view in the House of Commons that Indians should be officially given “authentic learning and a knowledge of ‘true religion’,” a view with which the House of Lords concurred unanimously in 1812 (Cutts 1953: 844). While questions arose immediately about the medium of instruction to be promoted (missionaries arguing for vernacular primary and English higher education), all were agreed that “useful learning” must be encouraged. Shortly thereafter, English classes were introduced into the Calcutta Mad’rassah as well (Khan 1973: 144).
Besides this agreement on a utilitarian basis for higher education, in particular, there has been less comment on the inextricable influence of the evangelical lobby in England on British policy in India. That is, missionary evangelists did not only establish largely independent churches, hospices and educational institutions, as is often assumed, but rather deeply influenced the forms and content of British Government policy in India. As before, this pressure and influence had more to do with attitudes of the English in England than the British in India. Public attitudes in England towards India had already moved, by the 1820’s, from Orientalist wonder to critical condemnation and the call for reform (Spear 1938: 91). Evangelical lobbying was a major source of this shift, especially in reform of India and Indians through education, and “evangelical agitation and pressure for more than half a century before 1835 formed the basic background of Macaulay’s Minute and Bentinck’s action” (Cutts 1953: 824). Whether as an outcome of the war against Napoleonic France (Ibid: 840), or due to unexplored links between utilitarian modernisation and Protestant evangelicism in the early 19th century, a growing evangelical lobby stimulated missionary societies in England and across the British colonial space. The link between the evangelical movement and English parliament was personified by the active presence in both of Charles Grant, a zealous advocate of British encouragement of education in India. By 1835, an environment existed in which the official encouragement and the utilitarian nature of higher learning were largely unquestioned. As will be discussed below, however, evangelical pressure had more originary and greater influence on the norms, substance and forms of early modern formation of higher education than the utilitarians.

“False Knowledge, False Religion”: Evangelical Imperialism in 19th Century

English evangelical influence on British imperial policy became evident in the 1830’s, marked once again by Lord Macaulay’s 1835 Minute and Governor-General Bentinck’s Order the same year. Macaulay’s Minute did not only advocate in the strongest terms for declaring English the official language of instruction, especially at
secondary and higher levels, across India immediately. It also relied on hard-to-contest utilitarian arguments. But these utilitarian arguments were strongly associated with a “moral” responsibility of the British Government. Again, this moral responsibility was far from secular; rather, the Minute had deeply religious undertones and was even explicit about religion in places. Thus, Macaulay’s condemnation of indigenous education, especially vernacular and classical language higher education, rested in large part on the case that:

It is confessed that a language is barren of useful knowledge. We are to teach it because it is fruitful of monstrous superstitions. We are to teach false history, false astronomy, false medicine, because we find them in company with a false religion... can we reasonably or decently bribe men, out of the revenues of the State, to waste their youth in learning how they are to purify themselves after touching an ass or what texts of the Vedas they are to repeat to expiate the crime of killing a goat? (Sharp 1920: 115)

The rhetorical use of selective examples is notable even in this short quote, and the Minute is suffused with such rhetorical support for Macaulay’s case. Later I discuss this along with similar instances of colonial “border rhetoric,” or the use of specific rhetorical tools and tropes to construct boundaries of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion that may (must) then be transcended.  

The utilitarian call for “useful learning,” and patronising “sound philosophy and true history” (Ibid: 110) was thus implicitly (and often explicitly) linked to useless learning and false knowledge by implicating the latter with “false religion.” Such statements belie Macaulay’s claim to secularism, for the “Government in India to be not only tolerant but neutral on all religious questions... neutrality which ought, as we all agree, to be sacredly preserved” (Ibid: 115). His scathing attack on false knowledge in association with false religion over-shadowed this, in order to be “reconcilable with reason, with morality.”

This deep condemnation of “oriental” knowledge was aimed largely at Hinduism, whom the classicists were most often supporting in their advocacy for vernacular education in the 1830’s, but was applied equally to Islam. Macaulay’s Minute built on
a growing momentum of “condemnation of everything Indian” (Spear 1938: 92). The change in English attitudes to India that Macaulay channelled (not created) was not just against the uselessness of indigenous knowledge systems. Rather, this uselessness itself was perceived as founded on “false religion,” a connotation that did not originate with Macaulay. In fact, Macaulay only articulated in British policy what was already becoming a widespread English attitude which held that “Hinduism was superstitious and idolatrous, Islam was profligate, the classical literatures were immoral, and both systems were the work of the Evil One” (Ibid: 92).

Much of Macaulay’s rhetoric has been traced to the influence of Charles Grant, a neighbour and long-time friend of Macaulay’s father in England. Over the years, a stream of scholars (Spear 1938; Cutts 1953; Adams and Adams 1971; Khan 1973; Evans 2002) have demonstrated the strength of this influence, with disagreement only on its relative strength vis-à-vis the utilitarian movement. On a time-scale, however, it is difficult to dispute the argument that “utilitarian pressure as developed was a derivative of earlier evangelical pressure” (Cutts 1953: 826). This is often personified in the figure of Charles Grant, whose copiously documented advocacy for modern English education in India was backed by equally obvious “humanitarian” and evangelical arguments. What has been less noted is that Grant’s and then Macaulay’s utilitarian arguments united with the evangelical case in an alliance that was so strongly visible only in British India, not within England itself.\(^8\)

The utilitarian emphasis on social reform through legislation and education was largely based on environmentalism: “Change the environment and you change the man.”\(^8\) In the case of Grant and Macaulay, for British Indian higher education, this was complemented by another syllogism: “Indian environment was all bad because it was based on Hinduism, a ‘false religion’” (Cutts 1953: 836). “The true cure of darkness,” Grant maintained in many writings, “is the introduction of light.” The argument is simple in its formulation: indigenous knowledge was false because it was built on false religion; it therefore had to be replaced with “true” knowledge, which was built on true religion; the same true religion would lead automatically to
additional social reforms for the “suppression of inhuman practices like infanticide and *suttee*” (Spear 1938: 92).

The relatively disinterested “humanitarian” motives are notable and difficult to explain away for supporters of a theory of pure governance-and-extract colonialism. Moral responsibility of the colonists, often at high financial cost, suffused the growing calls for social reform. For the ‘moderns’ in the 1830’s, these motives went hand-in-hand with utilitarian arguments and were, furthermore, inextricably linked with an evangelical agenda. This is a slightly different point from that often made with regard to the “white man’s burden” or the colonists’ “civilising mission,” as the latter view typically relies on a religiously neutral agenda of the colonists. By contrast, I am emphasising here the specific interlacing of utilitarian and evangelical agendas with “humanitarian” motivations, which underlines ideological interests typically overlooked by proponents of the “civilising mission” thesis.

The confluence of English language, utilitarian legitimation of higher education, and moral responsibility was also visible in the early 19th century in common causes between the ‘moderns’ and the clergy. British responsibility for Indian education in the 1813 Charter was a direct result of work by Grant and other Protestant missionaries, to whom “goes much of the credit for persuading Parliament to accept responsibility for promoting the education and welfare of Indians” (Tangri 1961: 377).

In 1813 the first Bishop in India was appointed to Calcutta, after the missionaries had been granted approval to resume their work. The first official comment made by the first Bishop of Calcutta, Thomas F. Middleton, in 1814 was that “education comprehends a great deal; more especially if we can induce the natives to learn English. In learning and reading English, they will inevitably learn to think, and when the power of thinking is pretty generally diffused, the cause [of conversion] will be gained” (Cutts 1953: 847). Middleton was instrumental in founding Bishop’s College in Calcutta in 1818 for Christian youth, which soon began to enrol Hindus and Muslims for instruction in English and useful knowledge.
Middleton’s successor, Bishop Herber, was even more vocal and presided over the Church in India at a time when the oriental-English debates were peaking. One of his first tasks upon arriving in Calcutta in 1823 was to inspect the missionary schools in Bengal. He expressed his pleasure in a letter to friends in England, narrating a journey across India from Calcutta to Bombay:

They [the people of Calcutta] seem to be fully sensible to the advantages conferred by writing, arithmetic, and above all by a knowledge of English. The wealthy natives now affect to have their houses decorated with Corinthian pillars, and filled with English furniture. They drive the best horses and the most dashing carriages in Calcutta. Many of them speak English fluently and are tolerably read in English literature; and the children of one of our friends I saw one day dressed in jackets and trowsers [sic] with round hats, shoes, and stockings.

I am sure they ought to be encouraged and assisted as far as possible in the disposition which they now evince, in this part of the country at least, to acquire a knowledge of our language and laws, and to imitate our habits and example (Cutts 1953: 849).

This obvious statement of intent of English education is more notable coming from a Bishop administering the diocese of Calcutta. Its secular tone stands in contrast to other writings and speeches by Herber, especially in his scathing attacks on Government-supported Arabic and Sanskrit Colleges, more so the latter. The connection between evangelicism and imperialism reached its peak in the 1830’s with Herber, who announced in an 1824 sermon that “it has pleased the Almighty that the nation to which we ourselves belong is a great, a valiant and an understanding nation; it has pleased Him to give us an empire on which the sun never sets.”

Such pronouncements supported the case of Charles Grant and his colleagues in Parliament. He urged the Bishop of Calcutta, in an 1817 letter, to be like an army general leading his Christian soldiers for “early attention to the moral state of the many millions of benighted heathens placed by the dispensation of divine Providence under British rule, particularly in British India” (Cutts 1953: 847). Primarily through Grant’s efforts, British educational policy in India in the early 19th
century was dominated by evangelical imperialism even more than by utilitarian perspectives. Grant used his influence with the Court of Directors of the East India Company, for instance, to push Governor-General Moira to fully implement Resolution 43 of the 1813 Charter, encouraging the diffusion of useful knowledge among Indians. Although Moira never pushed the agenda of English language as much as utilitarian Anglicists wanted, he did subscribe to the moral responsibility of colonial governors, establishing missionary schools and even planning for missionaries to supply village schools with “little manuals containing religious sentiments and moral maxims” in order to prepare them for eventual conversion to Christianity. Similarly, Grant was influential in appointing evangelical ministers to the East India Company (Ghosh 2000: 16).

Again, Charles Grant may be better seen as reflecting a sentiment of the times, for he personally never advocated such measures by Lord Moira. However, the policy imagination had been moved, and found ample fuel in growing pressure in England for evangelical responsibilities of the British across their empire. Thus, in their comments on a 1792 proposal by Grant, the Board of Control noted that introduction of a European system of education would lead to the removal of many abuses from which the people were suffering due to “their false system of beliefs and a total want of right instruction.” No better example of this view, coming to dominate English attitudes to India, can be found than by the evangelical utilitarian Sir Charles Trevelyan (brother-in-law to Lord Macaulay and Governor of Madras):

The Arabian or Muhammadan system is based on the exercise of power and the indulgence of passion. Pride, ambition, the love of rule, and of sensual enjoyment, are called in to the aid of religion. The earth is the inheritance of the faithful: all besides are infidel usurpers, with whom no measures are to be kept, except what policy may require. Universal dominion belongs to the Muhammadans by divine right. Their religion obliges them to establish their predominance by the sword; and those who refuse to conform are to be kept in a state of slavish subjection. The Hindu system, although less fierce and aggressive than the Muhammadan, is still more exclusive: all
who are not Hindus are impure outcasts, fit only for the most degraded employments; and, of course, utterly disqualified for the duties of Government, which are reserved for the Military, under the guidance of the priestly caste... Happily for us, those principles exist in their full force only in books written in difficult languages, and in the minds of a few learned men; and they are very faintly reflected in the feelings and opinions of the body of the people. But what will be thought of that plan of national education which would revive them and make them popular; would be perpetually reminding the Muhammadans that we are infidel usurpers of some of the fairest realms of the Faithful; and the Hindus, that we are unclean beasts, with whom it is a sin and shame to have any friendly discourse. Our bitterest enemies could not desire more than that we should propagate systems of learning which excite the strongest feelings of human nature against ourselves (Trevelyan 1838).

Such reformist sentiments also found fuel in “the strong demand for English in the principal urban centres of British India” (Evans 2002: 277) and the demands of Indian nationalists (Tangri 1961: 369). New educational institutions began to pop up across British India in the 1820’s and 30’s, supported by native Indian and English philanthropists and activists. As has been noted, “Many of these Hindu-supported English-language schools were founded as the direct result of Christian missionary emphasis upon English-language instructions” (Cutts 1953: 826). The much-cited Hindu nationalist, Ram Mohan Roy, not only helped establish and endow English-language schools and colleges, but also advocated with the British Government to promote European learning and even launched severe criticisms on the Government for supporting useless Sanskrit studies. Roy collaborated with Englishman David Hare to raise private funds to found a Hindu college in Calcutta which, by the time it was converted to the Presidency College in 1855, had produced generations of social reformers to collaborate with the British (Tangri 1961: 375). Meanwhile, new missionary schools were opened in the 1830’s in south India, in Madras, where “incentives were so strong that despite a number a number of conversions, which
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caused protests and occasional mass withdrawals of Hindu students, classes soon filled up again. Applicants were always waiting to get in” (Frykenberg 1986: 54).

Muslims had largely “remained aloof or passively hostile to the British and their missionaries”, and hence to English education (Tangri 1961: 368). This was soon to change, following the 1857 take-over by the British imperial Government. The modernising reformist Sayyid Ahmad Khan took the lead and is recalled to this day in Pakistan as the founder of modern education for Muslims in the subcontinent. However, the late entry of Muslims into the missionary-led agenda for useful, European education in English had only allowed the latter to be further developed and easier to model. The adoption of this model dominated the educational landscape in the latter half of the 19th century in India, and is worth reviewing before discussing the case of Muslims.

7.2 ‘Secular’ Higher Education, 1854 through 1904

The landmark Despatch of Court of Directors of the East India Company in 1854 defined the structure of education in British India. This is especially true of higher education, as the primary levels continued to be reformed and took on substantively new forms after Indian and Pakistani independence in 1947, while higher education changed little. The Despatch did not distinguish explicitly between Hindu and Muslim educational plans, but it followed the same track as Lord Macaulay had done in his 1835 Minute. That is, it affirmed secular education while condemning indigenous systems of education classified as Hindu and Muslim. In the same tenor, the Despatch combined a massified vision of “useful” education with a moral responsibility of the colonisers.

The condemnation of indigenous systems of higher education had already been established with Lord Macaulay’s scathing criticism representing a growing sentiment among English administrators and legislators. The Despatch reaffirmed this with the sentiment that existing, religiously defined, systems of higher education needed to be complemented with modern European knowledge and structures. As
the main author Sir Charles Wood noted in a letter to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal in July 1854, this was in order to “provide a path from the lowest school to the highest, and ultimately into technical and professional careers” (Moore 1965: 81). The education to be imparted henceforth would be the “improved arts, sciences, and literature of Europe” since the “eastern systems abound with grievous errors.” Indigenous systems of education, including of higher education, would not be abolished – as Lord Macaulay had demanded 20 years ago – but would be complemented by modern institutions, with the market determining future prospects. Likewise, the moral responsibility of the colonisers for implementing a structure of higher education was already accepted. This responsibility is most clear in the Despatch’s opening paragraphs:

“It is one of our most sacred duties to be the means, as far as in us lies, of conferring upon the natives of India those vast moral and material blessings which flow from the general diffusion of useful knowledge, and which India may, under Providence, derive from her connexion with England... to raise the moral character of those who partake of its advantages.

The system devised by the “Magna Carta” Despatch has been reviewed widely, especially in its abandoning government-run schools in favour of grants-in-aid, the establishment of English as the language for higher and vernacular for primary education, the establishment of universities across British India, and the practical, Western character of the education to be promoted. Most of these accounts stress the secularism of the Despatch (Chatterjee 1973; Ghosh 2000), as it did not propose any missionary activities or evangelical content in Government-sponsored education. Bible classes were allowed in schools, but only on demand, and higher education was to be “religiously neutral” and aimed at being useful.

However, the context of the Despatch belied its claims to secularism. At one level the undisputed condemnation of indigenous higher education classified as Hindu and Muslim implied a criticism of the religions more subtle than the attack 20 years earlier on “false religions”. At another level, the Despatch advocated the “general
diffusion of European knowledge which is the main object of education in India” which implied English literature as well as sciences. The content of higher education was to be entirely English, except for the few Chairs in “classical” languages in the proposed universities. This content was to be combined with an emphasis on “moral” education which was, again, based on English texts.

Also, as some scholars have pointed out (Tangri 1961), the withdrawal of Government from directly operating schools was significant. While the proposed universities were directly controlled by Government through the offices of the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor, the schools were envisaged as being tied to Government only through grants and inspection. Where schools did not exist, Government would establish them and then gradually withdraw direct involvement in favour of local operation. However, this immediately opened up the door to evangelical missionaries, whose private endeavours far outweighed those of any other group supporting primary education. While the Despatch aimed at “private” efforts by Indians themselves, the sheer number of missionary schools could not but lend its character to the new initiatives.

Already during the 19th century, the numbers of Indian Christians increased more rapidly than those of any other community and this community was “far ahead of Hindus and Muslims in literacy and the difference is greater in the case of literacy in English” (Tangri 1961: 379). In fact, at “each higher stage of education, Muslim and low-caste Hindu student numbers fell off comparatively more rapidly [than Christian numbers]... Exposure to Western ideas was a monotonic function of the level of high school and college education” (Ibid: 382). The mixed history of missionary evangelism had consequences for education: “Christianity was both a cause and a product of this social process [of demand for Western education]” (Ibid: 390). The strong lobby in England, the Evangelical Group, influenced policy through the 1854 Despatch as well.
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Missionary Influence in 1854

A largely overlooked context to the 1854 Despatch was the status of the Evangelical Group. As earlier, this group was instrumental in shaping the debate and determining the future of Indian higher education in the early part of the 19th century. Charles Grant, one of its leaders, had not only influenced Lord Macaulay but had succeeded in appointing several evangelicals to Church positions in India before his death in 1823 (Cutts 1953: 848). He was succeeded in his evangelical agenda by Dr. Alexander Duff, who became the missionaries’ leading representative from the 1830’s on. Duff, a Scotch missionary, was already influential when Governor-General Bentinck passed his Order in 1835, following Macaulay’s Minute. During the heated debate preceding Macaulay’s Minute, in the Calcutta Review newspaper Duff had publicly called Islam and Hinduism “two of the mightiest anti-Christian systems that ever scourged the earth or shed a baleful influence upon the immortal destinies of man” (Spear 1938: 92). Duff was far from being alone and the rhetoric leading up to 1835 evinced similar statements from other Evangelical leaders at the time.85

The Evangelical position was not merely one of condemnation of the “heathenish” Indian condition, Muslim no less than Hindu, but of the possibility and indeed need for social reform, for which education was central. It was with this conviction that Grant called for a plan of English education as a prelude to a general conversion to Christianity, especially at the higher levels since missionaries continued to spread their message through primary schools in the vernacular.

Dr. Duff picked up the same call: “English education would let in the light of reason”, and conversion could not but follow (Spear 1938: 92). His influence was felt most strongly in the 1854 Despatch. Moore (1965: 77-80) outlines the influence Duff had on successive drafts of the Despatch by Charles Wood. The latter not only consulted Duff but also corresponded with him on the matter of education in British India, and the “substantial influence of Duff’s memorandum is undeniable” in the final Despatch (Ibid: 79). In this one memorandum, a detailed eight-part comment on the first of three drafts of the Despatch, Duff outlined the Evangelical position on
education in India, and Wood appears to have accepted most of the substantive and normative components. To combat the “endless erroneous systems” prevalent in India, Duff advocated imparting “improved European knowledge only,” the lead principle of the Despatch. Wood himself noted on a second draft: “Imparting the improved science and philosophy of Europe. Oriental science not worthy these days” (Ibid: 78). On the issue of medium of instruction, the Despatch expands Duff’s recommendation of a bilingual system, using some of the same phrasing. Among other directly applied recommendations, such as the grant-in-aid and inspection system for schools, Duff also suggested instituting universities in India with chairs in classical and vernacular languages. Some of Duff’s suggestions did not make it through successive drafts, such as compulsory Bible classes in schools, but too many did for his influence to be ignored.

Again, Dr. Duff was not isolated in his recommendations. He represented a strong pressure group, the Evangelical lobby in England, for whom Christianity was coupled with modern, useful, English-language education quite naturally. Their alliance with the utilitarian group for British India ran counter to their politics within England itself, where in the 19th century saw a tussle between the Anglican church and the state over control of education. Murphy (1968) discusses the long history of this tussle, in which the mid-19th century was a period of heightened conflict with the state only supporting education of non-Anglican children. Higher education, at that same time, was also undergoing an upheaval. None of these debates made it into the British Indian policy space for education, especially higher education, where a predominantly utilitarian legitimation for universities was universally accepted and the Evangelical aim of reform was undisputed. The linked aim of conversion was not explicit in policy-making, but the above section has attempted to show that it was inextricably bound up in the context of policy-making. The policy of half a century later shows that is so.
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Backdrop to 1904

In the half century between 1854 and 1904, much progress had been made for higher education in British India. The three universities chartered in 1857 – Calcutta, Bombay and Madras – affiliated increasing numbers of colleges across the country but focused on the Presidency they were a part of. While the universities were chartered independently and were expected to evolve autonomously, in the event they developed “on almost identical lines” (Naik 1963: xxix): exclusive use of English as medium of instruction, exclusive emphasis on Western sciences and literatures, and growing neglect of classical and vernacular languages despite the provisions in the 1854 Despatch. Detailed official correspondences and statements for this period have been usefully collated (Naik 1963), but refer largely to territorial and structural debates with a focus on Hindu and Sanskrit.

However, three themes relevant to the argument here emerge from this correspondence. First, as the popularity of vernacular and classical (Arabic, Sanskrit and Persian) higher education successively waned, a reaction began to set in after about 1870. Some Indian nationalists began to advocate more attention to vernacular higher education in order to spread Enlightenment ideals wider and incidentally also create new employment opportunities in a shrinking market. Other support came from English administrators and educationists, especially to boost teaching in and of classical languages. The two converged to establish the vernacular University College at Lahore (1869) and then the University of the Punjab (1882). Various arguments were used by the English classicist administrators, including ease of governance and appeasing Indian nobility. An often-deployed argument relevant here is represented in the 1885, 13-page letter by Dr. G. Thibaut, Principal of Benares College on the proposed Allahabad University. Thibaut summarised a prevailing view that:

I cannot consider a Hindu truly educated if he has not fought out to some extent in his own mind the battle between the old and the new culture, and has deliberately inclined towards the side of the latter. To enable him to do so, a mere English education is altogether insufficient; for it leaves its owner in the dark as to how much or how little
the thought of his Hindu forefathers had effected. A not unfrequent attitude of mind, in the case of Hindus who have gone through a purely English education, is that while they fully acknowledge and are fairly able to judge of the advantages of European knowledge, there still remains lurking in their minds a more or less definite belief or suspicion that the wisdom of their own Indian ancestors was something greatly superior to the specious and useful, but rather shallow, learning of Europe (Naik 1963: 413).

This note brings up one of the first entries, following on the Theosophy movement, that Western education is “useful” but somehow “shallow”, which became important for revivalists later, as reviewed in the next section. It also underscores the racial connections of knowledge that most classicist Orientalists held to be self-evident. While the modern Anglicists developed a discourse around class division, the classicist Orientalists in India continued to build their discourse broadly around racial divisions. The former opened the possibility, even necessity, of social reform, while the latter discursively closed that possibility by implying permanence. This is only a schematic analytic, but it points to new implications for understanding the Evangelical movement’s alliance with English education advocates.

The second theme emerging from the correspondence leading up to 1904 is the absolute insistence within policy documents of the British secular approach to education, especially higher education. Universities were intended to be strictly non-denominational, and even the provision for studying and teaching classical languages could not be used for religion. In re-affirming the Despatch after the War of 1857 – following which the British Government took over Indian administration from the Company – the Queen’s Proclamation reassured Indians of England’s policy of non-interference in religious matters. This was in part because British analysis had concluded that Indian perceptions of religious discrimination and British support to missionaries for conversion were some of the causes of the 1857 War (termed a Mutiny or Revolt by the British). This official policy was maintained throughout the correspondence leading up to 1904. Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s initiative of the first modern educational institution for Muslims could not be chartered as a “University”
because he insisted upon the term “Muhammadan” in the title; he eventually settled for the institution to be called a College and not grant its own higher degrees.

However, the British Government continued to support missionaries, including for education, in line with the 1813 Charter renewal. The correspondence from 1854 through 1904 shows ample evidence of strong, possibly growing, Evangelical influence on policy, including determination of curricula and syllabi for the universities. The Government’s 1854 proposal of exclusive grant-in-aid system for primary education had failed, and the Government continued to operate elementary schools which “competed” with missionary initiatives, which hence became doubly active. In England, the Evangelical group, boosted by the successive wins in the case for English-language higher education in India, formed a General Council of Education in India, which lobbied directly with senior legislators and administrators. At the same time, conversion was proceeding apace, especially among lower caste Hindus and tribal populations of all religions (Tangri 1961: 379).

Finally, a factor leading up to the 1904 Resolution was the late entry of Muslims into the higher education system in India. By the 1870s, Muslims “who till this time had remained aloof or passively hostile to the British and missionaries now turned to active cooperation with the British and opposition to the incipient forces of secular nationalism and neo-Hinduism” (Tangri 1961: 368). British policy-making had politically defined but largely ignored Muslims as a community, assuming natural opposition because of Mughal rule being displaced by the English. The 1857 War was largely attributed to Muslim reactionaries and the resounding victory of British forces, followed by direct imperial rule replacing the East India Company, led to a common perception that Muslims had no choice but to cooperate with the British.

This was the tone of the influential essay *Asbab-e-Baghavat-e-Hind* (Causes of the Indian Revolt) by the intellectual leader and social reformer, Sayyid Ahmad Khan. For Sayyid Ahmad, and for a growing body of Muslim elite, it was self-evident that Muslims were, indeed, a definable community and that community was suffering a loss of civilisation globally and in India due to a lack of attention to education. Unless
Muslims could educate themselves on modern lines, they could not compete economically, technologically or militarily with any force, whether European or Hindu. Politically, this vision was tied to the realisation that Muslims, as a bounded community, needed to engage in imperial India for better representation and more enabling policies, such as educational subsidies, job quotas, production loans, and the like. Official recognition that Muslims were now taking part in governance was recognised in discussions leading up to 1904. For instance, Viceroy Lord Curzon (who promulgated the 1904 Resolution) formed a six-member Indian Universities Commission in 1902 which included only one Indian: a Muslim – although protest led to appointment of a seventh, Hindu member (Ghosh 2000: 118).

These three themes, revival of Indian classics by Indians and British, a secular policy in a context of evangelicism, and engagement by Muslims in imperial India, mark the period between 1854 and 1904 for the purposes here. Another trend was the rise and rise of highly educated unemployed Indians. With higher education holding out the promise of jobs, security and social status, more and more Indian men aspired to and completed it, but the supply of jobs could not keep pace. In 1877, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal remarked that “even with these examples [of dismal melancholy of highly educated unemployed] before their eyes, hundreds, perhaps thousands of young men persist in embarking on the same course which can lead only to the same sad ending” (Ghosh 2000: 105). By 1901, Governor-General Curzon was talking about the “swarms” of educated youth in India and fearing that “Indian universities will ere long develop into nurseries of discontented characters and stunted brains” (Ibid: 110).

**Institutionalisation: 1904**

It was in this context that the Resolution on Education was passed by Curzon in 1904. This “first comprehensive document on Indian education policy” since the 1854 Despatch built explicitly on the earlier policy document (Ghosh 2000: 122). The Resolution reviewed the state of education in India since 1854, pointing out that “the
system of education thus extended [in 1854] makes provision in varying degrees for all forms of intellectual activity that appeal to a civilised community” (GOI 1904). The review was coloured by Curzon’s attempt to appease Indian outcry since his vision of “sweeping reform” was publicly leaked two years earlier. However, even in its final shape, it represented a collection of the most influential opinions on Indian higher education: complimenting the British Government’s growing institutional spread while highlighting “quality” gaps from a utilitarian perspective. The primary concern was to tune the higher education system to serving national “development” needs beyond Government service, for instance through technical and professional institutions suited to the economy (Ibid: 32-8).

This renewal of interest was justified by a recap of arguments for British intervention in Indian higher education. Global integration was one justification – largely through economic contribution to the British imperial market – which again brought home the need for English instruction, bolstered by undeniable Indian demand. Utilitarian justifications for higher education remained paramount, as they had done in debates since 1854. However, in the first official instance since Macaulay’s sweeping condemnation 70 years earlier, the 1904 Resolution also made no attempts to disguise its religious critique of India.

The content of higher education emphasised by the 1904 Resolution was technical and scientific in nature. Behind this emphasis lay the assumption that where indigenous models of higher education still existed they were “useless” and “literary” in nature. Furthermore, since the “character” of Indian minds had certain defects, the ongoing spread of “scientific” higher education was essential in the project of modernity. In the 1904 Resolution, these “defects” were traced undeniably to indigenous higher education being attached with religious knowledge. Thus, the systems of ‘great antiquity’ existing in India were found to be ‘closely bound up with their religious institutions [of Hindus and Muslims, both]’ (GOI 1904: 1). In the case of Muslim higher education, “Schools were attached to mosques and shrines and supported by State grants in cash or land, or by private liberality” (Ibid: 2). Even
pedagogical emphasis on memory was deemed religious in nature: “one of the commentaries on the Rig Veda lays down in minute detail the routine to be followed in committing a text-book to memory”, while in the Muslim system not only was memory unduly emphasised but “the courses of study are too purely literary in character” (Ibid: 1, 7). Between 1904 and the next Resolution in 1913, Muslims were the focus of enrolment, although “in the matter of higher education [as opposed to primary] their numbers remain well below that proportion” (GOI 1913: 42).

At the same time, British policy continued a secular claim, for instance stressing that “it is the settled policy of Government to abstain from interfering with the religious instruction given in aided schools” (GOI 1904: 24). 1904 thus marks an institutionalisation of secular policy claims coupled with condemnation of the “Indian intellect” as well as the religious character of indigenous higher education. The Resolution did not introduce anything very new, but its promulgation in a time of growing Indian nationalism centred on education underscores its importance for institutionalisation of higher education. The policy served as a guideline for re-defining modern education in India: it made evident what was and was not to be considered in principle worthy of Government support. This is exemplified by the conclusion of the next policy of 1913 with a call by the Governor-General of India, who “appeals with confidence to wealthy citizens throughout India to give of their abundance to education...there is a wide field and a noble opportunity for the exercise on modern lines of that charity and benevolence for which India has been renowned from ancient times” (GOI 1913: 47, emphasis added).

### 7.3 Secular Muslim Higher Education: Beyond 1904

What kind of implications did the 1904 Resolution, and its follow-up in 1913, have on Muslim higher education? The previous chapters and the discussion above indicate that the 1904 Resolution did not add very much to the tone and content of higher education policy making in British India since 1854. However, it did provide an impulse for the institutional shape of higher education to be directly supported and
indirectly promoted by the British Government of India. In other words, it offers a guideline for the normalisation of higher education, especially for Muslims who had recently begun taking more interest.

This growing interest was primarily reflected in increasing institutionalisation of Muslim higher education in imperial India. Until the 1870’s, Muslim engagement had remained limited to weak participation in the three general universities at Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, all three in traditionally Hindu-majority areas. However, in 1869 the University College was established at Lahore, to become chartered as the first vernacular language university in 1882. More significantly, the Muslim-Anglo Oriental (MAO) College was established by the intellectual leader Sayyid Ahmad Khan in 1875. The 1904 Resolution took note of these developments and encouraged them by providing for further institutional support for Muslims, including a Chief’s College to educate young Muslim noblemen on English lines. It has been well argued that this inclusion of Muslims in British policy making for Indian higher education stemmed from a growing Muslim political consciousness and revival that was embodied in the MAO College (Lelyveld 1996). Earlier, Sayyid Ahmad started a movement among Muslims to actively participate in the emerging higher education system in British India as a route to regaining “lost glory”. Among numerous efforts, such as publishing a scientific magazine and initiating a literary circle, Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s most significant initiative was to establish the Aligarh College.

The MAO College constituted a seminal institutional moment in the history of Muslim political organisation in British India, not only offering the first site dedicated to Muslim education, but also becoming the home ground for a Muslim movement known as the All-India Muhammadan Educational conference. It was at one of the conventions of the latter that the All-India Muslim League was first formed in 1906 in Dhaka, becoming the single most important political voice for the creation of Pakistan. While MAO’s founder, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, was instrumental in such Muslim political revival and rehabilitation his abiding interest remained in modern education for Muslims. His efforts were recognised and rewarded by the
British, with successively important posts in education and the courts, followed by appointment to the Indian Legislative Council in 1878 and then a knighthood in 1888. Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor-General in India visited the College in 1901 and praised it highly, calling its mission of “sovereign importance” (Raleigh 1906: 474). At the same time, the College itself was unambiguous about its intentions of fitting into British imperial visions of India. At the inauguration ceremony of the College in 1877, the founders presented an address to the chief guest, Viceroy Lord Lytton, declaring that “British Rule in India is the most wonderful phenomenon the world has ever seen.” The College’s aims were to “make the Muslims of India worthy and useful subjects of the British Crown; to inspire them with loyalty which flows... from a sincere appreciation of the benevolence of a good government” (Sharma 2009: 17).

The political and educational vision of MAO – still cited today as the leading institution in what is now termed the Pakistan Movement – was backed by Sayyid Ahmad’s own theological argument. In other words, the institutionalisation promoted by the British in India following 1904 drew heavily on the institutional impetus of the MAO College, with its concomitant educational, political and theological vision. A detailed analysis of this inter-linked vision is beyond the scope of this study, but it is worth highlighting some key features in comparison with other, simultaneous educational movements by Muslim reformers of the time.\(^8\)

**Parallel ‘Modernities’**

Among Sayyid Ahmad’s achievements at MAO was to collect Muslim social, political and intellectual leaders on a single platform the College at Aligarh, a feat not even achieved by the vernacular language initiative surrounding the University College of Lahore, which had been driven largely by English administrators. However, despite the widespread support (intellectual, political and financial) Sayyid Ahmad generated, the MAO College was not the sole centre of development for Muslims engaging in higher education in British India. Earlier, in 1866, a group of religious scholars [‘ulama] had established a mad‘rassah at Deoband, partly as a
reaction to growing Muslim interest in English education and partly as a centre of Islamic revival in India in opposition to British imperialism (Metcalf 1989). The mad‘rassah advocated, broadly, a return to “traditional” Islamic higher education and a rejection of English content and pedagogical “innovations”. The Deoband school emerged over time as a leading force for conservative Islam in India, influencing similar groups in Pakistan. The Encyclopaedia Britannica summarises its approach, more or less accurately, thus: “The theological position of Deoband has always been heavily influenced by the 18th-century Muslim reformer Shāh Walī Allāh and the early 19th-century Indian Wahhābiyah, giving it a very puritanical and orthodox outlook”. This outlook is now popularly termed “Deobandi”, in opposition to more culturally rooted, inclusive “Barelvi” Islamic practice in India and Pakistan. The school began, and continued, with the established 17th century curriculum, Dars-e-Nizami, and emphatically refused any European content. The scholars and faculty rejected participation in the India Legislative Council, and were vehemently opposed to the formation of the All-India Muslim League in 1906 and subsequently the call by Muhammad Ali Jinnah for a separate nation for Muslims after de-colonisation (Talbot 1998; Jaffrelot 2004: 224). While other smaller mad‘rassahs existed, and were being reformed by the British (Zaman 1999), a number of independent intellectuals like Abul Kalam Azad also opposed Sayyid Ahmad’s vision.

Of course, Sayyid Ahmad’s Aligarh movement and MAO College challenged such educational and political philosophies. However, further challenges emerged closer to home, in the form of Allama Shibli Nu‘mani. Nu‘mani, given a classical Islamic education on rationalist lines, joined Sayyid Ahmad with great ambivalence to teach Arabic and Persian at MAO. However, his differences with the forceful founder soon widened and he left the College a decade after joining, in 1893, although he did not officially resign his position until after Sayyid Ahmad’s death in 1898. Nu‘mani established the Dar’ ul Uloom [House of Learning] Nadwat in opposition to the vision of MAO, seeking a greater infusion of classical Islamic thought, especially his reworking of kalām [discourse], into Muslim intellectual and political revival in
India. However, he also opposed the more conservative Deoband mad’rassah, which he termed reactionary and backward. Eventually, Nu’mani was chased out of the *Dar’ ul Uloom* he helped form by a religious orthodoxy aligning itself with Deoband.

This spectrum of Muslim consciousness in British India leading up to the 1904 Resolution covered three distinct educational agendas. For Sayyid Ahmad and the MAO, the agenda was clearly one of adoption of European education, both content and style, and thus Muslim integration into a modern world as equals. For the mad’rassah at Deoband, equally clearly, education was a content and institutional trajectory for revitalisation of traditional Islam and a chance to reject English intervention and Indian “appeasers”. For Nu’mani and the early *Nadwat*, the balance between the two was subtle and relied on classically trained Muslims who could engage with ruling powers on the latter’s terms. Consequently, the curricula at the three institutions varied, from a “European” content and pedagogy at one extreme, to a defiantly classical one at the other, with an ongoing hermeneutic in the third.

These educational philosophies were deeply linked to political positioning in 19th century India, building on growing Muslim self-identity as a community and their recognition of a civilisational loss. For Sayyid Ahmad, Muslims had no choice but to relate to the imperial government as best they could. This required becoming “fit” to be “good subjects” and thereby gain concessions from the British, who could not be expected to leave in the foreseeable future. For the Deoband mad’rassah this position was unacceptable, and they chose to continue opposing imperialism and refusing to engage with British governance. The split was most obvious around the termination of the Ottoman Caliphate centred in Turkey. As long as the British had been collaborating with the Ottomans, Muslims in India could safely identify with a pan-Islamic vision coupled with a strongly Indian identity. However, toward the end of the 19th century, when the British began to manifest opposition to the Ottomans, tensions developed in India (Murad 1996: 91). Sayyid Ahmad was quick to take a position: “We Muslims living in India are the subjects of the British Government... it is our religious duty to be well-wishing and loyal to the British Government. [The
Ottoman Sultan] neither is, nor can be, a Caliph over us according to *shariāh* [Islamic law] or religion. If he has any right to caliphate, then it is confined to his own country and to the Muslim living under his sway".  

Naturally, Deoband took the opposite political position, arguing that British hostility toward the Ottomans proved their malintent toward Muslims in general. Deoband moved progressively on these lines to develop the position over time that the primary political identification of Muslims should be to Islam, and only secondarily to a country or government they happen to be subject to. Nu’mani agreed with Sayyid Ahmad, although his writings tended to waver between support for the increasingly beleaguered Caliphate and Indian nationalism (Murad 1996: 92-94). However, the politics that emerged, partly from the issue of loyalty for the Caliphate, split Indian Muslims into three camps. The first, typified by Sayyid Ahmad, argued for the formation of an Indian Muslim League, more Muslim representation in British Indian decision-making, and more rights via vigorous social reform through modernisation by European methods. The second, typified by Deoband, attempted to revitalise Islamic identity in opposition to the British. The third, typified by Nu’mani, argued for engaging in Indian politics by aligning with Hindus and demanding more from the British collectively as Indians. Nu’mani himself remained opposed to the formation of a Muslim League in India, calling it a “masquerade”, a “spurious, useless thing”, a “collection of political thespians… [engaged in] children’s play”, and lampooned Sayyid Ahmad’s vision of Muslim empowerment by “BA and jobs” (Murad 1996: 105).

While these political positions determined educational philosophies on the one hand, they also drew upon and reinforced entrenched theological positions on the other. Sayyid Ahmad himself had a distinguished record as a theologian, evolving new principles of *tafsīr* [commentary on the Qur’an], which contrasted wildly with orthodoxy. For instance, Sayyid Ahmad maintained that the word of God (Qur’an) and work of God (nature) must be in harmony to avoid self-evident flaws. In the case of apparent conflicts, Sayyid Ahmad maintained that the work of God must prevail,
since observation could not be wrong while interpretation of the Qur’an could be humanly flawed. In this manner he advocated Muslim support for science as an understanding of the work of God, a position that remains popular in Pakistan today. Deoband could hardly have taken a more opposing view, developing extended critiques of the amorality of European science, relying evermore on authoritarian judgments by religious “experts” and evoking a lost “golden” age of classical Islam. Meanwhile, Nu’mani expounded a new theology to mediate between the two positions, arguing – broadly – that science and technology could not conflict with religion given the two entirely different, almost exclusive, realms of the two domains. However, he strongly criticised the trespasses of science into supra-scientific matters, which he said led to the Inquisitions in Europe that found no parallel in Islamic history (Murad 1996: 6). Nu’mani took this further to advocate religious sciences, in his revisionist kalām, over European philosophy, casting doubts on the certainty and finality of scientific and philosophical reasoning. His primary argument remained consistently that science, especially European science and technology, was a sub-set of reason; Islam was a reasonable religion but not a scientific one. This theology died a natural political death with Nu’mani’s unceremonious exit from Nadwat, until higher education in Pakistan today typically exhibits a debate largely between the two extremes, represented by the orthodox mad‘rassah on the one hand and “moderns” on the other (Hoodbhoy 1991; Talbani 1996).

The 1904 Resolution served, above all, to institutionalise “normal” higher education in British India, and some thematic implications are outlined next.

7.4 Norms and Forms of Islam in Higher Education in Pakistan
The institutionalisation of late colonial cultural themes in the 1904 Resolution had an immediate impact on Muslim politics in British India. Discussions around the Resolution, as well as the succeeding one in 1913, served to gather Muslim intellectual, social and political leaders around the platform of education, including higher education. The growing importance of MAO College in Aligarh even after
Sayyid Ahmad’s death in 1898 spurred this momentum. At one level, many more Muslim colleges were established in the early 20th century, all more or less drawing on inspiration from MAO. At another level, the “issue” of Muslim education came under close examination by informal and formally established groups. At the same time, Indian nationalist sentiments were on the rise, and there was open talk about self-government for Indians in India. A British administrator in 1930 pointed out to a gathering of foreign affairs specialist that the spirit behind Indian nationalism “is an intense, a passionate, a general craving for the equal stature of India amongst the peoples of the world” (Reed 1930: 357). He traced this to:

the day when the higher educational system of India was based on the English language... It is that above everything else in India... this basic force, born of our own literature, nurtured in the study of our own institutions, encouraged by our own example, that there is throughout the whole of India today... this intense movement (Ibid: 351-2, 360).

Of course, the awareness of European-style education’s links with demands for Indian self-government were not as shocking as the administrator made out, even in the late 19th century. However, this sets the context within which a “passionate” Indian demand for higher education built from banal utility of jobs and economy to ideological utility of self-government. Muslims as a political community, recognised this fully by the mid-20th century, and the leadership of the All-India Muslim League continued to emphasise education. The charismatic leader of the League, and subsequent founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, soon instituted a number of committees to review the “Muslim situation” in all fields in this backdrop of Indian separatism. In 1940, shortly after the notion of Pakistan had already been floated as a separate nation for Muslims of India after de-colonisation, Jinnah convened a Muslim Education Committee under the hand-picked chairmanship of Kamal Yar Jung Bahadur. The Committee generated tremendous momentum, working over a period of two years, interviewing people across the length and breadth of India, and reviewing all manner of historical and contemporary records. It may be seen as a
prototype in structure, modalities and even tone for subsequent educational reform committees in Pakistan, including the 1959 CNE and the 2001 Task Force.

The much-anticipated results of the Committee were released in an unpublished report in 1942 (Bahadur 1942), recommending on all aspects of education suitable to “the special needs and requirements of the Muslims and helpful to the preservation of the distinctive features of their culture and social order” (Ibid: 1). The review, findings and recommendations of the Committee are interesting in how they are positioned in the backdrop of growing “Pakistan-talk”. Briefly, the Committee’s report built on an analysis of structural discrimination by the British against Muslims in India, in favour of Hindus. One of the important results for the Committee was the gradual occluding of Persian, Arabic, and Islamic history and philosophy from all 18 universities across India by this time. Without stating this, the Committee recognised the Muslim-Islamic dichotomy, reinforcing the finding from the analysis earlier as well as implicitly reaffirming the notion of a colonial milieu, posited above, which decisively shaped pathways. Despite the complaints and emphasis on Muslims as a politically distinct community in India, the report also works only in the framework of a *modus vivendi* between Islam and Western modernity.

In addition to supporting the thematic analysis of the previous section, the Committee’s 1942 report may also be seen as an adoption of the great replacement referred to above: that of the primary social difference between Indians and English being cultural rather than racial. While this opened up the possibility of social reform, it also allowed “lack of development” to be effectively blamed on hindrance by one or another political community. In other words, the “natural” state of development of the Muslim community could be viewed as having been blocked, by the Hindus, by the British, even by recalcitrant Muslims themselves. This may be first formal instance in British Indian history, at the very cusp of Pakistani independence in 1947, when the poor state of higher education is attributed to what Marshall Sahlins called a “culture of resistance”. That is, “progress” is viewed culturally as modernity, and therefore lack of “progress” too is seen as cultural. In the case of the
1942 Muslim Education Committee report, the hindrance to “progress” is laid squarely with British governors and Hindu nationalists.

1959 to 2002: For Form’s Sake

It is in this perspective that I have discussed earlier the seminal 1959 Commission on National Education in Pakistan. Here, too, modernisation is seen as culturally rooted, as is its hindrance. However, while the 1942 report unequivocally blamed the British and Hindus, the 1959 CNE blamed newly independent Pakistanis for this hindrance. From 1942 to 1959, the actors changed but the problem remained thematically the same: the culture of resistance to modernity. I have reviewed some of the outstanding themes of the 1959 CNE elsewhere, including the underlying notions of normalisation by education, being-in-Pakistan, and character development (Qadir 2009a). Here, it is worth pointing out only the continuity of thinking about the culturally hindered possibility of modernity. Or, as Marshall Sahlins wrote about Western modernisation of “developing” countries: “The indigenous people’s culture is something the matter with them” (Sahlins 1999: xi).

The 1959 CNE report goes to great lengths to detail the precise “problem” posed by the local culture of resistance to modernisation: “the prevailing attitudes of society would impede change” (CNE 1959: 9). In elaborating the “matter with them”, the CNE report implicitly re-emphasises the specific cultural themes I have highlighted earlier: the decisive presence of British colonialism in constituting a milieu within which Muslim modernity was to be realised, the consistent reference to a *modus vivendi* between Islamic values and Western knowledge, and the inherent dichotomy of modern/secular – traditional/religious. At the same time, the CNE report never develops the *modus vivendi* being sought. While detailed curricular and extra-curricular outlines are presented in the chapter on higher education, the precise nature of an Islamic modernity in Pakistan is never spelled out. The reader is left with a vague sense of what actually is Islamic and why this is or is not modern. Modern higher education appears to be intended for Muslims but is not necessarily
Islamic in the sense of drawing on Islamic theology or even educational philosophy. Instead, the CNE scheme is only modern as secular. This is compounded by the implication that the culture of resistance is traditionalist partly because it is Islamic.

The 2002 Task Force report, in turn, draws heavily on the 1959 CNE. The 1959 report is considered as more than an inspiration in 2002. Rather, it comes to be viewed as having spelled out the essential steps to modernisation which subsequently suffered from “not [being] supported sufficiently by funds and political will” (TFIHE 2002: 49). The most striking adoption in 2002 from the 1959 report is the implicit assumption of the culture of resistance. As the Task Force report in 2002 mentions in its very last paragraph:

It must be said that many of the attitudes mentioned above [in an extended quote from the 1959 CNE report] are strongly manifest today. If the status of higher education is to change, the strategies for implementing the recommendations of the Task Force should take into consideration the central importance of attitudes that condition the performance of individuals and, in aggregate, their institutions (TFIHE 2002: 40).

Culture is again seen both as a source of resistance to modernisation and as the very basis for the possibility of modernisation. Thus, it recommends a new vision for the reformed higher education system that proposes to “produce enlightened citizens with strong moral and ethical values that build a tolerant and pluralistic society rooted in the culture of Pakistan” (TFIHE 2002: xiv). However, this vision statement is only listed in the Executive Summary of the report, not even reproduced, let alone discussed, anywhere in the main body of the text. While in 1959 the CNE discussed overarching values and morals, while proceeding to actual recommendations regarding the governance structure of universities, the 2002 Task Force report does not even offer culturally rooted or normative principles. The principles of recommendations (Ibid: 19) relate only to efficiency and quality. In some way, it appears that it was necessary to mention cultural rooting of modernity in 1959 but no longer in 2002. Likewise, it appears necessary to reaffirm the Islamic character of
modernity in 1959 but no longer required in 2002. Over time, the secular nature of modernity appears to have crystallised in Pakistan.  

Along with the global outlook, English medium and “practicality” of higher education, this crystallisation of modernity as (tangentially) secular only came home to me personally upon reflection on my participation as a staffer in the Steering Committee on Higher Education in 2002. The SCHE was tasked with developing an implementation plan for the Task Force recommendations, which it did in the form of a detailed report presented to and approved by the President of Pakistan in October 2002. Neither the presentation by the Committee to the federal cabinet, nor the complete, final report mentioned Islam or the Islamic nature of higher education in any depth, beyond again subscribing to the “Islamic” nature of Pakistan. By contrast, the emphasis on modernisation in the Steering Committee meant that public-sector “mainstream” universities were occasionally contrasted in discussions with “traditional” seminaries or mad’rassahs as paths not to follow. The detailed structural proposals for universities, faculty recruitment and promotion plans, “quality” enhancement, and so on, referred only to “best practice” models, typically in the United States or, occasionally, Europe, never to contemporary or historical Islamic higher education. This lack of reflexivity is all the more striking coming only months after the events of September 11, 2001, which increasingly shaped politics in Pakistan in the global war on terror. As attention of the world shifted to mad’rassahs, and the question of “Islam versus modernity” began to be raised in the domestic and foreign media, the SCHE ignored both the events and the questions.

My purpose here is not to advocate for or against the role of Islam in shaping higher education in Pakistan, nor to discuss the self-evident linkages between extremist violence and many mad’rassahs in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Rather, it is to draw on my personal experience to highlight two points emerging from the earlier analysis. First, that “mainstream” public sector university reform has largely ignored both religious education and religious institutions in the effort to be modern. This has had certainly one disastrous consequence of abdicating the sphere of Islam in
higher education, which has obvious appeal to the social imaginary of the bulk of the country’s population, to “traditionalist” forces drawing more or less inspiration, in turn, from the tangential institution of Deoband. Second, much of the present moment can be better appreciated by closely reviewing the history of this parallel construction in the colonial milieu of modernity. Thus, not only may many mad’rassahs in Pakistan be sources of conservative (tending to violent) ideologies, but the tangential nature of modern secularism and its inherent linkage with colonial Christianity means that similar trends may be found in “mainstream” institutions such as public universities. Furthermore, modern reforms such as in 2001-02 only serve to strengthen such linkages and artificial divides by their lack of reflexivity.

This brief overview underscores two features in line with the analysis in the preceding sections. First, while the claim for an Islamic modernity remains common to Muslim higher education reform efforts since colonial times, the claim has lost more and more detail and hence meaning. In other words, it becomes less and less evident what precisely the claim means as it progressively moves up ontological levels towards (arguably) lip service. It becomes a matter of form to claim “culturally rooted” modernisation, but this is never translated in curricula, pedagogies, institutional structures, and so on. Second, the cultural basis for modernity remains an implicit assumption just as, more importantly, does the cultural basis for the resistance to modernisation. The ‘culture of resistance’ is progressively viewed as more and more of a “problem.” The possibility of a resistance of culture, of grounded acts of subversion to inherently alien technologies, is never considered.

What does this imply for the nature of Islamic and secular thought in conceptions of modernity in Pakistani higher education? If the genetic imprints of globalism, English language and utilitarianism are traceable from their colonial inscription through to contemporary Pakistan, does the same not hold for what is in many ways the source of these cultural themes, i.e. secular evangelical imperialism? What has this meant for conceptions of Islam and modernity in higher education in the country, both normatively and practically in structures and forms?
These questions have an immediate bearing on both the development of higher education in Pakistan as well as political concerns in the country. However, these questions themselves lie beyond the scope of this study, primarily for methodological reasons. It is clear from the preceding section that conceptions of Islam in the context of modernity are implicit from 1959 and especially beyond 2002. The policy reports themselves, therefore, do not support analysis of what they are, essentially, silent about. At the same time, data readily available from the Higher Education Commission (such as referred to for English and utilitarianism) equally does not support such analysis. Further investigation may benefit from closer and more detailed examination of curricula and pedagogies, as well as more ethnographic data in the form of extended interviews and participant observation. Equally importantly, the environment for research into these questions has altered drastically since 2002. It has become all the more important, yet all the more challenging, to examine such questions as posed here for “traditional” Islamic seminaries and their own pathways of modernisation. These and related trajectories are discussed in the next chapter.
8  **CONCLUSION: A CULTURE OF MODERNITY**

One has to dispense with the constituent subject, and to get rid of the subject itself... to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. (Michel Foucault 1980, 117)

8.1  **Culture and Modernity**

Building on earlier research (Qadir 2007) and my participation in the Steering Committee on Higher Education in Pakistan (2002), I had embarked on the present study with two overarching objectives. First, I felt an urgent need to fill a gap in the analytical history of higher education reform in Pakistan. All too often, policy reform – including higher education reform – is contextualised and analysed solely in contemporary and teleological terms, and from a techno-managerial (scientific realist) perspective.\(^{100}\) However, in thinking through the many issues arising from earlier reforms, I felt strongly that such terms and perspectives are so limited as to be debilitating. They occlude a significant burden of history and its contribution to the cultural context which shapes normative ends and assumptions of reforms. Unfortunately, no such historicised cultural analyses of higher education reform in Pakistan existed. In this regard, analysis of the significant impact of colonialism on Muslim higher education in India is especially lacking, partly leading (I believe) to ignoring this impact in the contemporary moment. Thus, I set out to sketch such a history, partly to provide a ground for my own future plans for more detailed ethnographic explorations around the topic.

Second, it had begun to be increasingly clear to me that successive higher education reforms, not to mention contemporary analytical perspectives, had all been labouring under the assumption of modernisation. To be modern appeared as an existential imperative across most social reforms in Pakistan, certainly within higher education. This made it all the more curious why there was barely any discussion of what the term, in fact, meant or was perceived to mean. My conceptual
objective was thus to understand the thematic underlying this coverall term. I hoped to problematise what it meant to be modern in Pakistan, a concern far larger in scope than is outlined with regard to higher education in this study.

On the way, I hoped to contribute to the long-standing academic discussion on modernity vs. modernities, that is, the possibility (or otherwise) of multiple (genuinely alternative) modernities. A preoccupation with modernity cannot but lead to this theoretical literature, with some of the leading positions discussed in chapter two. However, rather than engage entirely theoretically with the concepts alone, I hoped that a more or less thorough exploration of the term within the context of Pakistani higher education reform would lead to theoretical insights.

In many respects, these objectives are theoretically concerned with the limitation of individual agency, or the constitutions of the Pakistani subject seeking higher education reform, as guided by Michel Foucault’s statement above. More concretely, I was concerned with understanding how the 2001 reforms (continued by the 2002 SCHE, of which I was a part) were not all that independent as they claimed, after all. Rather than see the reform effort as a more or less independent agent, I have tried to understand through this thesis how it was in fact a more or less constructed agent; how the effort not only constructed the future of higher education in Pakistan but was, in turn, constructed by its past and present context. However, while much attention to limitations of agency turn to contemporary mechanics of power, I have been equally concerned with highlighting the burden of the past, or the histories of power that also restrict agency.101

This, broadly constructivist, perspective led me through Charles Taylor’s approach to modernity as a “social imaginary” (Taylor 1999; 2004). In light of Taylor’s framework, I was able to formulate specific questions to pose to the longitudinal data of higher education reform policies. That is, first, whether a “long march of modernity” is indeed evident in higher education through moments of reform in Pakistan and, if so, how “long” is it? The review of policies offers outstanding evidence that there is, indeed, a readily distinguishable and consistent long march of
modernity in Pakistani higher education reform. Furthermore, it is clear that this extends thematically back to British colonial times, when the approach to modernisation was constructed within higher education with the Educational Despatch of the Court of Directors of the East India Company in 1854. However, many of the seeds of this modernity were sown by the early 19th century, exemplified by Lord Macaulay’s Minute of 1835, when English attitudes toward India and all things Indian changed decisively (albeit schematically) from Orientalist respect to disdain and an impulse for social reform.

The second question related to the thematic of modernity in Pakistani higher education reform. In other words, is modern something beyond just modos, the new? My review has highlighted the valorisation of newness as a readily identifiable discursive feature, again since the early 19th century. In some cases, for instance the medium of instruction for Muslim higher education, the very newness of the English language in the 19th century became a primary argument for its adoption. However, this valorisation has also appeared mostly as a discursive tool, what I have termed here “border rhetoric,” constructing a normative old-new binary to legitimate policy steps in higher education. Reform is in some sense an archetypal moment, allowing a division between the old and the new to be established and then assigned normative poles as, respectively, “traditional” and “modern” in order to justify policy change.

But there is also some substantive thematic consistency beyond mere newness. My readings of higher education policy reforms have identified four specific cultural themes that resound consistently since the modernisation path in early 19th century British India. The first is a globality of outlook, the construction of positionality in the community of nations that encourages comparison and model adoption as a subtle form of power. The second is an insistence on the use of English as a medium of instruction and, more importantly, of theorisation, partly as a feature of “being global.” The third is a predominant justification of higher education improvement by appeal to utilitarian arguments, pointing increasingly to objectives of national and individual economic competitiveness in a global economy. The fourth, finally, is an
insistence on higher education being secular while continuing to be Islamic, a tension that I show has resulted in a bifurcated national system in Pakistan.

These themes are more or less cultural, and their explication has relied on a specific perspective of culture as the ground of difference. I attempted to show how the conception of social difference changed from the basic ground of biology (race) to culture, and therefore from permanence to reform. Particularly in the early 19th century, this change in English attitude was cemented in moments of higher education reform. It became possible, indeed desirable, at that time not just to be modern, but to become modern. As a flip side, the same change also came to mean that the resistance to reform was also culture. In other words, the key problem became one of a resistance to culture, a development I will discuss below.

In the backdrop of such grounding in culture, the third question I posed was a more theoretical one: what implications does this analysis have for the academic debate on modernity vs. modernities? Does the case of Pakistani higher education reform demonstrate an instance of truly alternative modernity (primarily, alternative to Europe)? Without attempting a theoretical response, my empirical findings indicate a fuzzy answer: yes, something different is meant by ‘being modern’ in Pakistan than is meant by ‘being modern’ in, say, England, at least for higher education; but no, it’s not all that different by now. More precisely, the power-laden history of the introduction of a path of modernisation in higher education reform for Muslims in British India significantly determined the shape of what it means to be modern in Pakistan. However, the latter meaning has been sharply distorted from the development of modern consciousness within England itself. My key finding, unsurprisingly, has been that the colonial context of introduction of modern higher education in British India, especially for Muslims, was a significant determining factor. I find the term “tangential modernity” to be apt in describing the inevitable Pakistani linkage with modernity in Western Europe, specifically England, coupled with inescapable differences.
These differences are most pronounced in the equation of modernity with ‘secularism.’ It is here that the notion of a colonial milieu becomes helpful in analysing the significance of what Nicholas Dirks and others have called the “colonial leviathan” (Dirks 2001: 8). It has been my argument that the very presence of Britain as a colonising power in India decisively shaped the peculiar nature of secularism as a normative end of higher education reform, especially for Muslim communities. One of the readily traceable results has been a steady increase in the use of the term “Islamic” to distinguish Pakistani modernity coupled with a declining sense of what that term actually means, specifically how “Islamic” is different from Muslim-majority. As I discuss later, ascribing this agential role to colonial power is often seen in contemporary postcolonial scholarship as an invalid robbing of “native” agency. My aim here, however, is not to make a decisive theoretical argument, but to attempt to describe what I see to be inescapable historicised correlations. Therefore, rather than attempt to valorise and then search for an alternative modernity that is truly alternative, I have chosen the term “tangential” to describe outstanding transnational correlations in a history of power.

In the remainder of this chapter I discuss these findings from earlier chapters, beginning with the last point about the peculiar nature of secularism in higher education reform. In evoking this history I intend to set out what I believe is a largely neglected context of the introduction of modernity as a normative end of higher education through what may be termed a “great replacement” of Muslim higher education in pre-colonial India. The following section then presents a summary of the argument leading to the notion of “tangential modernity,” as sketched above.

8.2 The Great Replacement

In the previous chapters, I have attempted to trace the institutional imprint of colonial higher education policy on the construction of modernity in British India and, thence, Pakistan. These traces are evident in Pakistani higher education today, where being modern is equated – inter-relatedly – with a global outlook, the English
language, practicality, and ‘secularism.’ All four thematic features mark a significant change from the manner in which higher education, especially among Muslims, was organised in the sub-continent prior to British intervention. While far more information is needed on that prior organisation, a broad, thematic replacement may be identified. This replacement has in many ways determined the development of the form (structure), content (curriculum, pedagogy) and normative imaginary of Pakistani higher education today, and is summed up thematically below.

**Institutionalisation**

British higher education policy in general, and the 1904 Resolution in particular, served above all to institutionalise ‘normal’ higher education in British India. This institutionalisation itself marked a great replacement of “traditional” higher education, certainly for Muslims in India. Muslim higher education was essentially informal: teachers were generally not salaried, no diplomas or degrees were awarded but instead students received an *ijāza* (permit) allowing them to teach the knowledge they had learned. There were few prescribed books; rather, students relied on committing classic texts to memory and then using their principles to develop arguments to deal with contemporary problems. While schooling had been partially institutionalised and formalised in the Delhi Sultanate (mostly 13th century), generally in the form of mad’rassahs and some salaried teachers, these did not cater to any elite class of intellectuals or engender allegiance to either Sultans or other powers. Despite the general lack of information on pre-colonial Muslim higher education in India, some interesting features of this glimpse into traditional education are visible, such as the enhanced opportunities for women to access education informally, and absence of the structured class conflict evident in medieval Europe. But the most significant point was that this mechanism of delivery, even when partially institutionalised, was not removed from society, and thus knowledge was not separated from practice. Theory-practice integration in Muslim traditions has been commented upon (Progler 2004), including the setting of the *mad’rassah* in
the mosque – which may be why “academic and non-academic spheres mixed so harmoniously” – and the pedagogy that emphasised recitation (of Qur’an, hadith, and tafsīr) for internalising basic principles to live a better life. Technical learning occurred within the practice of the particular profession and was not separated out as “schooling.” Furthermore, the method emphasised argumentation and debate.

The institutionalisation of higher education marked by the 1904 Resolution indicated a sharp turn away from this societal integration towards formally recognisable corporate bodies, or universities, for higher education, where education was largely isolated from the social life of students, who “learned” by theorising. Besides this separation, the formal institutionalisation of modern higher education encouraged homogenisation and uniformity in curriculum, pedagogy and examination. There is no evidence of such regulated uniformity in pre-colonial Muslim higher education in India, although well-documented evidence of classical Arabic higher education suggests an active celebration of diversity (Shalaby 1979; Stanton 1990). Formalised uniformity in colonial higher education policy may be part of a trend towards an emerging modern governmentality in Europe in the 19th century, but the rhetoric in the colonial space was notably different from that in, say, England itself.

In British India, uniformity was expressed primarily structurally (governance and management structures of new universities and colleges), a theme that has continued through the present, and in content (curriculum, pedagogy, division of disciplines, and so on). However, it was also cultural in the sense of being normative. Thus, there are indications that modern higher education began to be conceived of in a different manner from pre-colonial organisation, that it played a different role in society, and that it gained different symbolic value (for instance in becoming “civilised” citizens). The change from earlier Muslim conceptions of higher education is noticeable. Thus, "modern" higher education in Pakistan does not sit well with the earlier ranking of knowledge with the highest being that of the "heart," and with contemplation and intuition being considered at least as important faculties as that of the intellect.103
An emphasis on massification is another obvious change. By the time Lord Curzon approved the 1904 Resolution on education, a distinct change had taken place from pre-colonial Muslim higher education, whereby the newly formalised, modern institutions would now aim at enrolling the maximum number of students for graduation. Earlier Muslim higher education was never intended for the majority, let alone for all. Modern higher education, however, was intended to serve any and all sections of Indian society, indicating a sea-change in the social imaginary. The emphasis on massification of the higher education system only intensified through the Pakistani higher education reforms, until by 2001 the leading and primary concern became enhancing national enrolment rates. Colonial insistence continues through to contemporary, global insistence on a massified higher education system.

Institutionalisation of a separate higher education system – as distinct from the theory-practice mix generally among pre-colonial Muslims in India – also enabled the system to be uniformly determined by utility as a primary motivation. Utilitarianism in the British colonial space may be distinguished from the same movement within England itself. In India, colonial governmentality led directly to utility as a separate function of the now separated institution of a university. Massification is thus a part of the utilitarian principle, whereby national economic benefits are only possible with a critical mass of subjects who are highly educated in particular fields. The same emphasis continues through to Pakistani insistence on economic development today.

Finally, the formation of institutionalised higher education in early 19th century British India also allowed, for the first time, the institutions to be reformed. It may be, in line with postmodern thought, that the definition of modern higher education is only possible once a division is made between ‘old’ and ‘new.’ In the case of institutions, this boundary is often enacted through re-form, which itself is only possible after formation. A recognisable, homogenous, distinct, public (hence modern) institution such as the university can be readily re-formed to enact the boundary between tradition and modernity. In many ways, my analysis suggests that what is most modern about reform is re-form itself. The pace of successive reforms in
Pakistan indicates the manner in which this enactment of modernity has been transferred to the postcolonial space. During colonisation, higher education content (curricula), pedagogical methods and institutional structures were all brought into play to classify modern as secular and ‘traditional’ as ‘religious,’ MAO being the obvious Muslim example of the former and Deoband being the obvious Muslim example of the latter. The 1904 Resolution surveyed the country and unhesitantly termed indigenous Muslim education flawed because of being “closely bound up with their religious institutions... attached to mosques and shrines” (GOI 1904), even though classical Islamic higher education by then hardly existed (which was the very case for orthodox ‘ulama founding Deoband). The next 1913 Resolution reiterated the same condemnation, adding that “traditional” religious scholars such as the “Molvi” were on the verge of extinction and that their knowledge had to be “preserved” through a “modern Institute for Oriental Studies” (GOI 1913).

Institutionalisation of higher education thus led to corporatized interdependence (away from societal integration), homogeneity (away from diversity), massification (away from selection), identification with practicality (away from integrated theory-practice), and continuous re-form, besides the changes in goals and curricula. In general, these features coincide with an institutional perspective on higher education (Meyer and Ramirez 2000; Meyer et al. 2007), which views the success of higher education as a key institution of the nation-state outstripping the many failures of the university as an organisation, especially in contemporary times. That is, the modern university is primarily a self-referential, subject-creating institution whose key function has been to legitimate the space of the nation-state, propped up by Enlightenment ideals (for instance of progress and justice) and their reliance on “expert” knowledge. From this perspective, the successive institutionalisation of higher education in colonial India has been fed by and in turn fed into the establishment of a colonial milieu, or an institutionalised space. Institutionalisation served, among other ends, as a bridge to establishing the global milieu, a function facilitated by common tropes and yardsticks.
Much of the replacement was structural, and there is by now wide recognition of colonial continuities in structures of higher education in Pakistan today. However, my point throughout this study has been that the replacement under colonialism was also cultural, in the sense of being normative. This normative rupture from earlier conceptions, and continuity with the colonial “modern” replacement, is less recognised in Pakistan today. The implications of a cultural change extend beyond the question of structure, and they are most evident in the conception of higher education in Pakistan as being (somehow) “Islamic.”

**Muslim but not Islamic**

Many of the cultural imprints of the “colonial leviathan” on Pakistani higher education are traceable to the influence of the evangelical movement in 19th century British India. The equation of modern with secular was constructed at that time as a feature of colonial governmentality, but the term secular was not deployed in the colonial space in the same way that it was in Europe at the same time or since.

The construction of a modern/secular – traditional/religious divide may seem obvious now. However, the story of its construction emphasises some points. What the British called secular in Indian governance was anything but, in the sense the term is applied today. Not only was the polity governed on religiously divided lines, but after the mid-19th century, official sanction of missionaries encouraged converts for whom consistent efforts were made to provide educational, teacher training and other facilities (Tangri 1961). At the same time, the persistent rejection of religiously grounded (Hindu or Muslim) education meant that there was an active discouragement of local religion rather than the professed neutrality. The roots of secular imperial educational policy lay in the 19th century evangelical fervour discussed earlier, which foresaw ‘modern,’ English education as a trajectory to conversion. Finally, little attention has been paid to epistemological arguments, akin to Weber’s “Protestant ethic of capitalism”, that would relate secular European higher education to Christian roots and epistemologies.\(^{105}\)
The growing strength of missionaries on British higher education policy in India, and their alliance with early 19th century modernising, anglicist reformers, deeply affected the rhetoric around ‘secularism.’ What eventually emerged by the late 19th century, especially among socially marginalised Indian Muslims, was an institutionalisation of modern higher education delivered on religious communitarian lines but pre-occupied with European content and pedagogy. Modern higher education emerged as clearly Muslim but not clearly Islamic.

Politically, the very fact of colonial intervention in higher education inextricably bound up debates on higher education content, pedagogy and institutionalisation with political visions and positions of Muslims in India. The relatively late entry of Muslims into imperially conducted higher education compared with Hindus and the growing community of Christian converts (Tangri 1961), coupled with the general ascription of the 1857 War to Muslim discontent, meant that Muslim institutionalisation of higher education entered a politically charged field. Various efforts were likewise shaped by political positions in that broader field. Such a reading raises the notion of a colonial milieu, or institutionalised field, that decisively shaped Muslim institutional interventions. The 1904 Resolution, in particular, but also the 1854 Despatch served to constrain Indian agency (albeit, not direct it) and shape political positions in relation to the colonisers/imperialists. Educational development, especially higher education institutionalisation among Muslims, was thus shaped by the very presence of colonial promotion of a certain form, even if the Government did not take particular sides.

One specific instance of this shaping was the replacement in higher education discourse of reference to Islam by reference to Muslims. Muslims constituted a politically recognisable community in the 1904 Resolution, which they did not earlier in 1854. The 1904 classification on religious lines was coupled with a condemnation of “Muslim” indigenous higher education in India, and an imperial recognition of Muslim economic, employment and other needs. However, the secular character of British policymaking could not accept Islamic bases for determining educational
content, pedagogy or institutionalisation. Thus, even Sayyid Ahmad Khan's “modern”, European-style College at Aligarh was not allowed to be chartered as a university because of its denominational name and enrolment. Likewise, Muslim political positions relied unreservedly and without debate on an identifiable (in principle) Muslim community whose rights had to be promoted and protected, but the particulars of Islam in these positions were relatively un-debated. By default within the colonial milieu, the only reference to and reliance on specifically Islamic arguments was made by orthodox “authorities”, as in the case of Deoband, as the *modus vivendi* approach exemplified by Shibli Nu’mani lost ground.

The implications of this replacement are far-reaching, and extend beyond higher education in contemporary Pakistan. This may be the core of the common criticism by some conservative constituencies of modern being ‘Western,’ although I have tried to show that historical data does not bear out this equation. Rather, the rhetoric of modern in Pakistan has turned out to be non-Western, not quite the same as in Europe, a point I will discuss in the next section.

For most Muslim higher education, modern was clearly equated with the politically identified community of Muslims, but was distinctly not Islamic in the way that Deoband became. Again, further research is needed on the particular curricula and syllabi employed (for instance in Aligarh College), but some aspects of the emergent Muslim-Islamic distinction may be hypothesised. The reliance on a global outlook (on connecting and comparing with the “best in the world”) and “practical,” English-language content was significant. By the time the 1904 Resolution was passed English had become firmly rooted as the language of communication of higher education and, thus, as the language of theorising. In other words, English became the generic language, to the extent that by 1959 the Pakistani Commission on National Education was convinced that modern higher education could not only be imparted through English while Urdu would have to be “developed” by translation of English materials. By the time the 2001 reforms were conducted, the Task Force on Improvement of Higher Education did not even raise the question of language of
higher education. Since then, the Higher Education Commission reforms reveal, indeed, that English is by and large the language of generic theorising. By contrast, Urdu is reserved for more particular empirical studies, typically focussed on Pakistan and Islam. In the process of British modernisation, the earlier classical languages of advanced education and research, namely Persian and Arabic, were entirely dropped. Most vernacular or classical language works in Pakistan now are either translations of European content or built exclusively on European theorisation or, alternatively, addressing entirely local, particular issues.

Likewise, the nature of theological argumentation in higher education itself underwent a drastic change in the great replacement of the 19th century, one which has gone relatively unmapped in history-writing. As earlier, the theological debates surrounding Muslim higher education were intimately linked to political positions and hence decisively determined by the fact of imperial rule in India. It has been argued that the question of whether faith and reason can co-exist has been at the core of Muslim intellectual history in India in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Murad 1996). Most Muslims were preoccupied with “saving their religion from the relentless encroachment of modern thought by finding a modus vivendi between the two” (Ibid: 2). From the last renowned classical Indian scholar of Islam, Shāh Walī Allāh (d. 1762) to the iconic philosopher-poet claimed by Pakistan, Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938), much of Muslim intellectual history can be read from this standpoint. Sayyid Ahmad and Shibli Nu’mani, not to mention the founders of Deoband mad’rassah, were all explicitly preoccupied with developing theologies to chart political and educational courses for Muslims in the context of British modernity.

The precise nature of changes in theological argumentation is a subject of separate study. However, its implications for Muslim higher education in India were severe. The most significant of these for this study is that education could no longer be justified, legitimatised, or explicitly guided by reference to religion alone, but rather with reference to Islam in connection with modernity. Even in connection with higher education for Muslims, Islam could not be a sole reference point. The
orthodox Deoband mad'rassah, no less than MAO College or the early Nadwat, wrote its own history and justified its own institutional existence as well as structure in terms of Islamic revival in the context of hostile modernity. In many ways, the affirmation of the secular emphasis in the 1904 Resolution responded to and further shaped this dynamic, with institutions like the MAO College using it to promote “neutral” studies of science and technology, Deoband using secularism as an argument to revive classical Islamic education, and the early Nadwat developing a nuanced theology to discover a middle road.

It was partly through such theological argumentation backgrounded by politics that religion was brought into play in the field of colonial higher education. The 1904 Resolution crystallised what the 1854 Despatch had assumed and what Lord Macaulay and the evangelical, utilitarian, Anglicist, ‘moderns’ had argued in the 1840’s: that culture and not race was the determining factor in educational policy making. This notable shift in colonial governmentality of the 19th century had become a natural assumption by 1904: social difference was determined on the basis of culture rather than race, nurture rather than nature. The condemnation of “false religion” and “false knowledge” in India, Hinduism no less than Islam, was only possible because the view of difference between the English and the Indians was cultural, including religion, and not biological. The terms of debate on teleology thus moved away from inevitability (racial predestination) to possibility. Utilitarian emphasis on social and legislative reform was possible because of this shift in the inherent assumption of self-evident difference from biology to culture. Clearly, education, including higher education, had a key role to play in the civilising mission of late 19th and early 20th century imperialism, built on reform. Equally self-evidently, the traditional-modern distinction played well to this shift, emphasising the historical ‘fault’ of Indian Muslims and Hindus for being ‘behind’ Europeans. Religious was ‘backward’ and could be re-formed to be modern, and hence secular.

The great replacement of Muslim higher education with ‘modern,’ colonial interventions can thus be traced by and large to the early- to mid 19th century British
India. The institutionalisation of higher education generated not only its own rhetoric of ‘modernity,’ for instance through reform to enact the ‘modern-traditional’ dichotomy, but also decisively shaped the nature of Muslim higher education. The notion of a colonial milieu – a certain social imaginary fed by and in turn feeding into institutional development – has been helpful in tracing some of the effects of institutionalisation. While tracing these consequences of institutional development of higher education for Pakistan, I have only been able to indicate some cultural themes and further historical research is clearly required to outline this replacement in greater detail. Even the preliminary sketch, however, leads back to the notion of supple modernity discussed in chapter two. That is, ‘being modern,’ at least for the higher education sector in Pakistan, means something in between the two rhetorical poles: on the one hand, it is certainly modernity in its linkage with post-Enlightenment English modernity; on the other hand, it is not quite the same – there are too many crucial differences due to its emergence in a colonial milieu. This in-betweenness may be read as tangential modernity, which I discuss next.

Before doing so, it is worth underlining the analytical space opened up by postulating an in-betweenness or ambivalence. I may suggest here that it is precisely the fuzziness between Muslim and Islamic higher education that has allowed a complete political spectrum to enter the arena of higher education in Pakistan. I would further hypothesise that the historicised analysis of this gap is a potentially useful way to examine how and why power has been (subtly and overtly) exerted on Pakistani campuses to selectively define “Islamicness.”

### 8.3 Tangentiality

Reform-ability thus emerges as one of the key tropes of the colonial milieu in British India from the 19th century on: a distinct shift from a broadly static, biologically-centred notion of social difference to dynamic, culturally-centred one, a shift that is readily identifiable as modern. Formal institutionalisation of modern higher education was a significant aspect of this shift, and the great replacement that
occurred during colonialism in British India was a determining force for the shape of higher education to come subsequently in Pakistan. This investigation thus supports Nicholas Dirks’ (2001) and others’ notion of a “colonial leviathan,” a governmental giant that shaped indigenous agency.

Such a conceptualisation is more or less anathema to contemporary poststructuralist, postcolonial scholarship, which has retaliated against an “impact-response” framework that restricts all native agency to imperial actions and intents. In the case of British Indian education and intellectual history, Pannikar (2002) exemplifies the point that most histories miss much in the structuralist search for an impact-response story of “Western impulses and Indian reactions,” especially the social transformation already underway irrespective of colonisation. However, the material reviewed here belies such a celebration of Indian agency. Rather, my analysis suggests that while British colonialism may not have been directly responsible for all developments in higher education of Indian Muslims, it is indeed traceable as a determining influence.

On the one hand many significant Indian Muslim developments in higher education were not directed by British colonisers. The MAO College at Aligarh may have been officially encouraged but the initiative remained primarily that of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and a group of committed supporters. The mad‘rassah at Deoband was founded almost solely in opposition to British colonial policy steps and conformity by certain Muslims, such as Sayyid Ahmad. On the other hand, both of these (no less than the Nadwat ul Ulama established by Shibli Nu‘mani) were entirely devoted to encountering the challenge of “being modern” posed by the British in so many words. That is, by basing themselves on the grounds of “modernity” (whether to become modern, or to oppose modernity, or to find a way in between) the institutions adopted a certain cultural thematic that influenced their trajectories, and this thematic is directly traceable to colonial policies. Besides this implicit or subtle form of power in shaping the field and rhetoric of higher education decision-making, of course the British colonists had much direct influence as well, for instance in
encouraging (even instituting) or hindering (even banning) certain institutions. The first Muslim higher education institution recognisable as a “modern” university, the Mad’rassah at Calcutta, was founded by Governor-General Hastings in the late 18th century, while vernacular language higher education sought by some Muslim reformists in India was consistently banned until the institution of the Punjab University in the late 19th century. That is, even if some initiatives by Indian Muslims may be considered entirely local in origin, they are all identifiable as engagements with “modernity” in a colonial milieu and the response, in most cases, was managed directly by colonial governance. I have suggested that colonial influence cannot be ignored in the institution of modernity amongst Indian Muslims and so in Pakistan.

My primary argument throughout this study has been, simply put, that this shaping of Muslim Indian responses in higher education within a colonial milieu – an institutionalised imaginary – led to an internalisation of modernity that is readily distinguishable from the simultaneous emergence of modernity within Europe, specifically England, itself. In other words, what Charles Taylor (2004) refers to as “the long march of modernity” is indeed evident in British India, but this march is fundamentally at a tangent to a similar march across much of Europe. Modernity for British Indian Muslims was in some sense displaced from modernity within England.

My second argument has been that much of this displacement is visible through the tropes deployed in modernising British Indian higher education, the most obvious being a border rhetoric of inclusion as well as, simultaneously, exclusion of British Indian Muslims from a ‘club of moderns.’ This trope itself was only sustainable once the modern notion of social difference was internalised as being centred on culture. That is, from about the 19th century on it became generally acceptable and desirable to become modern, not just to be modern. This change was intimately linked to the emergence within England and in British colonial space of the utilitarian movement at the tail end of the 19th century. This change in attitude led readily – via utilitarian reform arguments – to an ascription of blame on the ‘non-moderns’: it was their fault for not becoming ‘modern,’ for not adapting to the new,
irrespective of whether the new came in the guise of foreign rule imposed by military force. It became possible, indeed necessary, to identify the traditional with traditionalism, and thus complain about a culture of resistance to modernisation.

My third argument implicit in the hermeneutic method has been that the emergence of a ‘tangential modernity’ in British Indian Muslim higher education in the 19th century had directly traceable consequences for the development of higher education in Pakistan. There are clear continuities between the colonial and new global orders. However, as expected, there are also important ruptures, and a better appreciation of both is required to make interventions in the improvement of higher education in Pakistan today, and possibly other social sectors.

I believe such a perspective has significant implications. Should the reform of higher education in Pakistan have a global outlook; should it employ an increasingly global language; should it be practical; should it be secular? Undoubtedly, the TFIHE reform of 2001 could make ample justification for all these features. However, text did not do so. Neither did the follow-up reform of 2002 by the Steering Committee, where I was a staff member and found that none of these themes were discussed in historical context. Rather, the themes have been assumed as “natural” under the label of modern, thus being transposed un-reflexively with their historical baggage.

In the history of this baggage – these themes described by more or less the same terms – I have further suggested that the continuous transposition is not just of the themes, but of their specific introduction in context of coloniality. Globality and practicality of higher education as promoted by the British government meant very different things in the context of higher education in England than they did in the context of British India. The use of English as a medium of instruction and theorisation and the notion of secularism, of course, were entirely different. The transposition of the culture of modern higher education to British colonial space in India from the mid-19th century and then the uptake by Muslims in the late 19th century was displaced from the “same” culture in England. Furthermore, I have proposed that the introduction of these themes under colonial rule in British India
established an institutionalised colonial milieu that facilitated ready translation to contemporary space of globalisation. That is, the same displaced themes, described by the same terms, and continually enacted with the same border rhetoric could be readily deployed in Pakistan in 2001 and beyond. I discuss this displacement in the next section, describing it collectively as ‘tangential modernity.’ Metaphorically, ‘tangentiality’ refers to a line touching but deviating from another line or curve, typically indicating the gradient of the latter. However, rather than a one-time branching, I suggest a fixed displacement: modernity in Pakistan is always at a tangent to Atlantic modernity, in whatever aspect – a continuous tangent.

**Displacement: Not Quite the Same**

In the early 19th century it became possible for Muslims in British India to become modern in and through higher education, among other channels. The modernity that emerged in the late 19th century, however, was distinctly shaped by colonial governmentality. Modernity was established as an identified goal, called as such, and was inevitably linked to the modernity of the colonisers. While reformers such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan embraced this, many did not, such as the founders of the Deoband madressah. Still others, such as Shibli Nu‘mani, struggled to find a way in between what came to be perceived as two extremes. In all cases, however, the goal of modernity used England as a reference point, whether to celebrate or to vilify, in what Mahmood Mamdani calls “history by analogy” (Mamdani 1996).

This analogy is obvious in the development of globalism, or a cosmopolitan global outlook within higher education reform. To be modern quickly came to mean, among other things, to look outward, to define national boundaries but then to transcend them in finding the ‘best’ way forward. However, while British global cosmopolitanism entailed colonialism, Indians could only look to England without entertaining imperial desires. The question of reverse imperialism never arose seriously (no doubt in part because of the perceived military disadvantage), but neither was imperial dominance over other territories allowed. Furthermore, English
Chapter Eight

Conclusion: A Culture of modernity

Attitudes towards the English nation and people had been changing in the 19th century to lead to reforms, such as the institution of the University of London or female enrolment in higher education institutions. However, the same did not happen within the colonial space, where Indian conceptions of the Indian nation and Indian people were never the issue, only changing British conceptions were. The resulting displacement meant that the University of London remained as a point of reference for Indian higher education all the way from the Despatch of 1854 to the Resolution of 1904 and beyond to the Pakistani Commission of 1959. It was only by the time of the Task Force in 2001 that that point of reference was abandoned for a new one: the global UNESCO/World Bank Task Force and related efforts.

Part of the consequences of modernity as globalism became the reliance on English language while ‘looking outward.’ English emerged as the ‘proper’ medium of higher education, not just for pedagogy but more importantly for theorising. The colonial construction of the modern-traditional divide along linguistic lines, successively cemented after Thomas Macaulay’s 1835 Minute, was only reinforced by Muslim Indian response: overtly traditional institutions reacted politically to British rule and adopted the British definition of ‘traditional’ languages, Urdu, Arabic and Persian. In the process, the languages genuinely spoken most by Indians, called the “vernacular” (broadly, the provincial and regional languages of Pakistan today) were entirely abandoned for higher education. The new institutionalisation never developed these languages, even as Urdu, Arabic and Persian (spoken by a minority in the sub-continent) were classified as traditional and hence un-modernisable. Needless to say, the adoption of English as a medium of instruction and of thought led to a significant displacement in the construction of modernity subsequently for Pakistan. As may be expected, local theorisation building on local thought never developed. English quickly became, and continues to remain, the language of generic theorising, with Arabic, Urdu and Persian mostly relegated to religious and cultural specifics, and the vernaculars largely disappearing. More and more, the “classical”
and, more so, the “vernaculars” became languages to think about rather than languages to think with.

It is possible to assume that the medium of theorising should not have significantly affected the nature of theorising, but recent linguistic and cultural studies explorations make this an increasingly difficult assumption to maintain. Moreover, genuinely independent theorising (“alternative modernity”) would minimally require substantial translations of “traditional” thought which were never undertaken in Pakistan. At the same time, the celebration of the new meant that “traditional” (thought and language) became associated with traditionalism, and hence readily condemnable by ‘moderns.’ The reaction emerged in the form of a non-Anglicised religious orthodoxy, which proceeded to build on roots in Arabic language and thought, much of it belonging to the Arabian Peninsula.109

However modern or ‘traditional,’ higher education in British India after the mid-19th century and subsequently in Pakistan uniformly adopted the principle of practicality. The imperative to be “useful” may have diffused all the more readily because there was less debate on it than around language. In any case, being modern came indisputably to be mean being “practical,” in the utilitarian sense of the term. Jeremy Bentham’s “chrestomathic” university became the norm, for ‘traditionalists’ no less than for ‘moderns.’ Again, however, the utilitarian movement in England encompassed much more than strict determination of practicality of higher education, and was linked to a period of social reform within the nation. However, the utilitarian turn in Indian higher education may be better viewed as an expression of changing British conceptions about India. It may be fair to say that utilitarianism never came to occupy such a primary and determining force as a principle of higher education in England as it did in British India. Indian Muslims, in particular, adapted to this principle very quickly, driven by rhetoric of material (and military) backwardness. I have attempted to trace the lop-sided manner in which this motivation of “practicality” has been translated in Pakistan’s higher education. Utility
has come to mean national economic development and financial competitiveness, if necessary at the expense of individual and societal non-economic utility.

In all these cases the modern transformation, or the ‘great replacement,’ in British Indian Muslim higher education saw a reaction in the form of religious orthodoxy. Often, this is viewed as a classical political response, the binary opposite to idealised modernity. However, my analysis suggests that this is not an accurate representation. Rather, not only was the reaction a response to the very presence of the “colonial leviathan” (such as the 1860s formation of Deoband as a reaction to British higher education policies and politics) but it was also shaped by it. In many ways, the construction of ‘traditional’ adapted much of what was ‘modern,’ and in the process was significantly altered.

Thus, ‘traditional’ higher education developed a global outlook (generally associated with the pan-Islamism emerging toward the end of the Ottoman Empire) and recognised practicality as a driving principle (quickly moving to science and engineering as the most popular subjects). The primary difference came in rejecting English as a language of instruction and of thought. However, I have indicated earlier how the very presence of colonial power shaped this development, including theological argumentation. The result has been a significant displacement in the sense in which Islam is deployed within higher education institutions in Pakistan. Perhaps most importantly, it is no longer clear for objective enquirers how “Islamic” the stated Islamic higher education is. While I have not examined religious orthodox seminaries in this study, this observation certainly appears to hold true for other public and private universities in Pakistan, as it does for higher education reform statements. Islam has gradually moved to the level of norm, without it being clear how it affects substance and content. The distinction is between Muslim and Islamic; it is now possible to be modern in Pakistan while being the former but largely ignoring the latter.

These displacements, which may be summed up in the term “tangential modernity,” have come to define being modern in Pakistani higher education. I have
tried to show how they determine what the reforms of Pakistani higher education assume when they successively try to modernise the sector. Given the determining presence of colonial power in early to mid 19th century British India, and the wide-ranging modernising reforms instituted then, I would further propose that similar constructions of tangential modernity underlie numerous other sector reforms, particularly those related to public management. Equally, such a forceful determination need not be restricted to the ex-colonial state of Pakistan, although the intersection of British coloniality and South Asian Islam is unique. Similar, tangential constructions of modernity are doubtless significant for other ex-colonial nations, as Nicholas Dirks demonstrates with the “problem of caste” in modern India, or Mahmood Mamdani does for the notion of “citizenship” is post-apartheid Africa. Whether similar thematic distortions have been maintained in these, and other, distinct cases, and what determines the variations, are questions for future research. In all these cases, however, it appears that the manner in which tangential modernity is constructed is remarkably similar in at least the British colonial space. My review has underscored the importance of governmentality expressed through ambivalent rhetoric in this construction, as I believe analyses in other instances do as well. In the next section I summarise one such significant theme, of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion, in what may be termed “border rhetoric.”

**Border Rhetoric and the Resistance of Culture**

Some glimpses thus emerge of the great replacement of Muslim higher education in 19th century British India to put it on a path to modernity. The colonial milieu – an institutionalised social imaginary – was instrumental in this replacement, and colonial higher education policy reforms and debates reveal the manner in which this was done. The process of modernisation is revealing and significant because, first, it is often mis-read as a mere exertion of force which ceased upon de-colonisation in 1947. By contrast, my argument has been that the great replacement imprinted certain traces on Muslim higher education in the sub-continent which subsequently
shaped Pakistani higher education reform without direct coercion or even overt mimicry. That is, not only was modernity socially constructed, but it was socially constructed in a history of power which resulted in some very specific themes that carried through. Second, the process is significant because it is not obvious why this tangential path to modernity was, after all, so deeply internalised. There was no reason, for instance, that English continue to be almost universally equated with modern quality in higher education (Mansoor 1992) and indeed some other ex-colonial contexts demonstrate this. Likewise, there is no obvious reason why, upon de-colonisation, practicality as a utilitarian ideal for economic “development” would be so completely adopted in Pakistani higher education.

These imprints of colonial modernity have sustained well past Pakistan’s independence. My readings of the policy statements and some debates surrounding them indicate the importance of rhetoric in this process of modernisation, which was not simply a matter of colonial imposition of policies but of rapid adaptation by, for instance, Muslims in India. The colonial government could not, and did not, predict the outcomes of its policies in terms of three distinct pathways to modernising Muslim education, exemplified by the MAO College at Aligarh, the Deoband mad’rassah and the Nadwat ul Ulama. Furthermore, one of the reasons for the sustainability of the new norms was the construction of a trope, or a turn of speech, of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion that continued to drive reforms.

I have already suggested that what may be most modern about higher education reform in Pakistan is the fact of reform itself, allowing a constructing and reinforcing enactment of the new-old divide. Part of what lies beneath this enactment is the very notion of reform-ability, a teleology that encourages a conception of improvement through structural change. This reform-ability, the notion that improvement is possible and necessary, in turn hinged in 19th century British India on the cultural turn. From earlier, static conceptions of social difference based on unalterable biology (as exemplified by Kantian enlightenment and the classicist orientalists in India), the great replacement built on a new trend within England:
dynamic conceptions of social difference based on alterable culture. This finding confirms what other, macro-phenomenological theorists such as those developing World Culture Theory have suggested:

Society is instrumentalized as a modifiable vehicle for salvation (later, progress and justice) (Bellah 1964; Thomas and Meyer 1984), but in the Western tradition it is the cultural project that is sacred, not some specific control structure in itself. (Meyer and Jepperson 2000)

Culture, as “a language and a set of practices that define specific understandings of personhood, social relations, states of mind/soul, goods and bads, virtues and vices, and the like” (Taylor 1999), thus becomes the phenomenological field of both difference and change. That is, casting social difference in terms of culture allowed the English, specifically the British Indian Government, to establish reform as a defining feature of “becoming modern.” In this light, the constant references to Indian culture and social norms in British policies become informative. Indians have a culture of rote memorising, hence higher education reform is needed to encourage “independent” thinking; Indians have a culture of attaching educational institutions to religious ones, hence reform is needed to separate them; and so on. Generally, Indian society is ridden by caste discrimination and despotic governance, hence reform through higher education is needed to bring equality and good governance.

Thus, particular tropes, or turns of speech, are deployed that reinforce the direction of modernising reform by establishing a divide that is at once cultural and alterable through culture. One of these tropes highlighted in the earlier chapters is utilitarian “effectiveness.” By deploying this as a yardstick for modernisation, higher education reform policy in British India held out the promise of inclusion in the club of moderns while using the yardstick to exclude institutions that were “ineffective” on normative lines. The trope of effectiveness mutated into “nation-building” and, soon, into “development” in post-Independence Pakistan. Thus the 1959 Commission and, to a large extent, the 2001 Task Force internalised the tropes of nation-building and development as measures of modernisation, without considering the particular
histories of their emergence in a colonial milieu. This trope is linked to the utilitarian movement in England and, tangentially, in British Indian higher education policy.

The common tropes of effectiveness, nation-building and development in Pakistani higher education thus have their genesis in English attitudes toward British India, an attitude that underwent a significant change at the turn of the 19th century. They established what may be termed ‘border rhetoric’ within higher education reform policy, discursive tools for establishing and reinforcing a new-old divide coupled with an implicit imperative to transcend that divide. My argument is that such border rhetoric is not only a mechanism of colonial governmentality. Rather, it has carried through with the same form into post-independence Pakistan higher education policy. Thus, the 1959 Commission and the 2001 Task Force both deploy similar border rhetoric for largely similar goals. The tropes established in the 19th century, cemented with the 1854 Despatch as the first official British Indian Government policy for education, thus determined a joint vocabulary through which higher education could be governed. The same vocabulary, the same yardsticks of “improvement” then come to be deployed in Pakistan, in the earlier reforms (1959) focusing on “nation-building” and national economic development and in the later reforms (2001) emphasising effectiveness and global economic competitiveness. While in many cases the substance may have changed, the vocabulary has remained the same, thus consistently shaping modernisation of higher education.

Another example of the tropes used to construct border rhetoric is in the 1835 Minute by Macaulay. As discussed with regard to the English language debate and the association of religious with traditional with traditionalist, Macaulay’s Minute may be read as an indicator of a change in colonial attitudes rather than a harbinger of new attitudes. While a comprehensive discourse analysis of the Minute does not – to the best of my knowledge – exist, Macaulay’s rhetoric was defined by being a “singularly tactless and blundering championship” of an already won cause (Mayhew 1926: 12-13). Macaulay’s selective and misleading use of examples combined with direct ridicule of Hindu and Muslim religious education to construct, primarily, a
division between Indian-vernacular/classicist-traditionalist and British-English language-modern. Irrespective of different positions to the Minute over time and across the political spectrum, the division was by and large internalised for higher education reform, right through to Pakistan. The delineation of borders, in the utilitarian spirit, was principally aimed at implying that these borders could be transcended... through “modernisation.”

Macaulay’s Minute and the case of the English language is only instance of the British utilitarian notion of Indian reform-ability at the beginning of the 19th century. All the cultural themes analysed in earlier chapters as constituting “modernity” in higher education reform may likewise be seen as being built on border rhetoric of their own. At root, I have suggested, is the essential border defining social difference between the English and the Indian. The institution of modernity within higher education in British India – including for Muslims – coincided with a change in this border from race to culture, coupled with an insistence that this border can, indeed must, be transcended.

I would therefore hypothesise that most social reform texts of this time, not just for higher education, would be complicit in rhetorically constructing this border. That is, it is more than likely that similar tropes are to be found in other sectors considered important to Pakistan’s “progress,” in (broadly termed) the social sphere (school education, health, welfare, and so on), in the economic sphere (industrialisation, service economy, and the like), and the political sphere (democratisation, voter education, political party development, etc.). While such convergences have not been the focus here, the finding of such border rhetoric seems broad enough as to intuitively apply to these other sectors, and might constitute a worthwhile enquiry.112

No doubt, if such convergences were to be explored they would hinge on the most significant indicator of deployment of border rhetoric that has appeared in this study: the conceptualisation of culture as the ground of difference and re-form. In the case of higher education in British India and then in Pakistan, this conceptualisation has
resulted in a specific problematic addressed by virtually all major reforms: the culture of resistance. From the 1854 Despatch through the 1904 Resolution, the colonial government was insistent on the ‘traditionalism’ prevalent amongst Indians as the source of the problem to be addressed by higher education reform. On the one hand, this implies that culture is conceived of as important for marking social difference and reforming India, as earlier. On the other hand, this means that the perceived lack of progress in reforms can be safely ascribed to the same culture. ‘Traditionalism’ comes to mean not just the traditional but opposition to the new or, in other words, a culture of resistance.

In terms of transition to post-independence Pakistan, this is the most significant continuity from colonial Muslim India. The early Commission on National Education in 1959 – only 12 years after independence – under the military government of Ayub Khan very clearly stated this as the primary issue facing higher education:

... the state of mind that had come to pervade all areas of our national life. They are the attitudes of a subject people rather than of free men... the cynicism, lethargy, opportunism, suspicion, dishonesty and indifference that have characterized the outlook of so many of our people and officials in the past (CNE 1959).

The problem for the early Pakistani government is clearly one of a culture of resistance, a culture whereby “even those measures that were clearly in the public interest [under British colonial rule], and there were many, felt the sting of aggressive criticism” (Ibid: 5). The later Task Force (2001) was less emphatic about the culture of resistance being the predominant problem. However, the conclusion to the report makes it clear that this, indeed, is what the Task Force perceives. The report ends with a long citation from the 1959 Commission report (including the above quote), which leads to the final statement:

If the status of higher education is to change, the strategies for implementing the recommendations of the Task Force should take into consideration the central importance of attitudes that condition the performance of individuals and, in aggregate, their institutions (TFIHE 2002).
In other words, while technical problems of governance and so on may have technical solutions, the fundamental “problem” of attitudes of people (in and out of the university system) has no such solutions. If the reforms “fail,” it is because the culture of resistance overcomes the culture of modernisation. However, as anthropologist Marshall Sahlins (1999) notes in the context of Eskimo modernisation, “This is not so much the culture of resistance as it is the resistance of culture... cultural subversion is in the nature of intercultural relations”. While culture replaced biology as the ground of difference and change in the colonial milieu in British India, the active agency of the cultural matrix remained unrecognised then, as it does now.

**Ellipsis: Colonialism and Postcoloniality**

The resistance of culture constitutes one of the primary continuities in higher education policy from British Indian Muslims to Pakistanis. Furthermore, the refusal of governmentality to acknowledge active cultural expression (or “cultural subversion”) has also remained constant and, I would propose, extends beyond higher education policy reform. Some expressions of blindness to, and resistance of, culture lie in the history of “development” failures in Pakistan, most notably the areas of human rights and the environment. Arguably the most striking expression is the growing phenomenon of religiously motivated violence.

This strong continuity builds, again, on the notion of a tangential modernity that I proposed in an earlier section of this chapter. Within higher education, tangential modernity is evident in the thematic continuities between Pakistani policy reforms and their genesis in the colonial milieu. I have traced what appear to be the most significant of these themes in the earlier chapters: a global outlook or international competitiveness, English language instruction and theorisation, utilitarianism as a defining feature, and skewed ‘secularism.’ The tangential nature of modernity is all the more evident in the relative blindness to colonial origins of contemporary themes. One of the reasons for such lack of acknowledgment is the obvious fact of...
de-colonisation: Pakistani higher education policy is, indeed, independent in the sense of no longer being directed by an external, directly governing power.

However, I have attempted to demonstrate that the continuity into the present era of globalisation hinges on the tools and yardsticks of reform, expressed in key tropes. In other words, what is consistent from British Indian higher education policy for Muslims and for Pakistanis is a (tangentially) modern social imaginary, or what it means to be modern. Interestingly, the very presence of continuous popular resistance of culture (the reason in many cases for development “failures”) points to the normative continuity of tangential modernisation from “above,” as it were. Yet more formulated and theoretically grounded critiques seldom link the “failures” to historical pathways by way of the social imaginary.

There has been some recognition of such continuity in education between colonial and post-colonial contexts in general (Tikly 2001; Rizvi 2004). I have tried here to show what form that continuity might appear in, and some of its consequences in the specific case of Pakistan. However, there has been even less recognition of the ruptures. The material reviewed for this study (primarily, policy reform statements) is not adequate to make a complete statement on the ruptures between the colonial milieu and the contemporary Pakistani imaginary in higher education. Still, one striking observation is on the conception of religion, specifically Islam, in relation to higher education. The “great replacement” of Muslim higher education in 19th century British India entailed, among other things, a change in the way Islam engaged with institutional higher education. The British emphasis on secularism and the very presence of the colonial leviathan entailed a marked and notable shift in the way Muslim higher education remained or became Islamic. This involved a change in theological approaches, which came to be dominated by learning from, opposing, or finding a modus vivendi with European modernity.

Within higher education, the rupture is most evident in terms of the mention of Islam in the discourse on higher education reform. In 1854 and 1904, higher education reform was persistently couched in terms of secular aims, irrespective of
religious belonging. To be modern in higher education in many ways inherently meant to be blind to religious belongings. Of course, this secularism was anything but secular in the sense the word is used today, drawing often overtly on Christian literature, norms and principles, while denying inclusion of any other religious references or thought. However, the foundation of Pakistan in 1947, ostensibly on religious grounds, entailed an inclusion of Islam in the discourse of higher education. The first reforms of 1947, building on the Aligarh Movement, involved detailed discussion by the All Pakistan Education Conference on how to incorporate Islam in education, including at the university level. By 1959, the Commission on National Education had removed this mention to the level of principles. By the time the Task Force on Improvement in Higher Education released its report in 2002, the mention of Islam had become entirely abstract, with no indication of how it may be operationalised. In fact, the repeated emphasis on global integration and economic utility in the Task Force report made the abstract principle of Islamic-ness entirely vague. Over time, Islam has come more and more to be a normative descriptive term for higher education, even while it becomes less and less clear how “mainstream” higher education is actually Islamic and not just composed of Muslims.

This has emerged as the most striking instance of rupture between colonial higher education policy and contemporary Pakistani policy in a global context. Another case is that of utilitarianism. As discussed in chapter six, utility has continually remained a predominant descriptor of higher education and policy-making has had to proceed within the ambit of directly perceivable utility. However, the nature of “utility” has ruptured from, broadly, colonial times to the contemporary phase of globalisation. The continuity is that any aim of higher education reform must be defined in demonstrably utilitarian terms in order to be legitimate. But the rupture is that what counts as “utilitarian” has changed over time. Earlier colonial higher education policy (as in 1854) built predominantly on utility as social reform and metropolitan (mostly British) economic ends. Later colonial policy (1904) and early independent Pakistani policy (1959) shifted the discursive grounds to “nation-building” and national
economic development as the key utility. Still later, contemporary higher education policy (2001 and beyond) emphasises individual and organisation-level global competitiveness as the primary utility.

This rupture corresponds, broadly, with Julian Go’s comparison of colonial and neo-imperial fields, in which he contrasts the two schematically delineated models of national imposition with consequently varying strategic outcomes (Go 2008). The variation in definition of utility may be termed “second-order” in that it complies with continuous field rules but differs in strategies. This is, of course, significant and results in different aims, objectives and hence structures. However, the purpose of this study has been to indicate the grounds of sameness and difference over time, rather than explore the details of variation, significant though they may be.

That there are grounds of sameness is what I have showed in this work. We can in fact discern a “long march of modernity” in Pakistani higher education reform. However, in prioritising the rhetoric of ‘modernity,’ this march has over time obscured what it actually now means to modernise Pakistani higher education. It turns out that it means more than just making education neutrally contemporary; rather, it covers a specific cultural thematic of having a global outlook, of thinking in English, of being practical, and of being secular. In this respect, the march into the future is shaped in no small way by the march of the past. This work has helped me to see this by taking a distance from my own involvement in that march of modernity. I hope it serves to guide others seeking to modernise Pakistan.
In this respect, this study builds further on initial explorations of modernity in Pakistan in the realms of masculinity (Ahmed 1994), economics (Banuri 1987) and sovereignty (Jalal 2001).

The protests have not been documented in detail, and this is not the place for that. Suffice it to mention here that reactions emerged as rhetorical categorisations (against “neo-liberalism,” etc.) as well as against specific steps, such as amending the chartering acts of universities to cut the size of chartered decision-making bodies, etc.

Although there is one exceptional analysis of the CNE in context of nation-building (Saigol 2003).

I should emphasise here that the intention is not to criticise church-related development assistance; far from it. Rather, I want to pose the question of how international development assistance to Pakistan in general relates to the problematic notion of secularism in view of the complex history of power in the colonial milieu.

In practical terms, this means that I will not account for ‘modern’ Hindu higher education in developing the storyline of higher education reform in Pakistan. It would be implausible in the extreme to suggest that Hindu cultural politics had no impact on Muslim ‘modernity’ in higher education in colonial India. A more complete work would require telling the Hindu story – if there is one story to tell – along with the one told in this work. However, I would suggest that, first, institutionalised policy influence remained primarily with the British under colonialism. It is this documented influence that pervades contemporary Pakistan not Hindu modernity. Second, accounting for this factor would not change the outcomes description that I provide in this study, while doubtless providing more “colour,” further detail and greater intricacy.

A good introduction to Charles Taylor is by Abbey (2004). His philosophical work is collected in Taylor (1985a; b). Taylor’s work is classified by the Library of Congress under the heading of “Philosophical Anthropology.” He refers to his own work with this term also (Taylor 1997: ix).

I may add here an intersection with other theorists of ‘modernity’ belonging to the diffuse field of “science studies.” In particular, Bruno Latour’s (1993) We Have Never Been Modern is closely related to the idea of multiple modernities. However, Latour defines modernity specifically in terms of a “Constitution” that cognitively divides the real from the political and the discursive, on the one hand, and the intersecting networks of hybridity that link these together, on the other. Latour then situates his group above these divides, examining both the “purifying” aspect of modernity that only continually divides these categories and the “hybrid” aspect that only examines the intersections. It is in this sense that he suggests we have never fully subscribed to this cognitive division and that, hence, “Modernity has never begun. There has never been a modern world” (Ibid: 47). Clearly, my emphasis here is different, as I focus on the institutional rhetoric of modernisation.

Here, as throughout this study, “institutionalism” is used in its social theory sense. That is, while including formal organisations as corporate bodies, “institution” encompasses a well-established, predictable and structured pattern of relationships as an irreducible component of culture.

Others also point out that colonial discursive practice in education moved from essentialism on the basis of racial superiority but to essentialism on the basis of cultural superiority which led to modernising reform (Tikly 1999: 611-612).
UNDP 2009 Human Development report offers a net literacy rate of 54.2%, while the Government of Pakistan Economic Survey 2010 claims 57.0%, both for 2008-09. Either figure comprises heavy disparities in gender, demographic and regional distribution. The definition used by both was developed by the 1998 Population Census: “a literate person has been defined as one who can read a newspaper and write a simple letter in any language.”

No formal study of English language literacy in Pakistan has been found for this research. A 2000 British Council report suggests that 16 million individuals have skills of English as a “second-language” (Graddol 2000/ 1997: 11).

For a description of centralisation in the Armed Forces, for example, see Agha (2007).

Although Carey and Trakalhun (2009) point out that even within Europe the Enlightenment was not homogenous - emerging from Scotland, France and Germany – the cultural package comprising instrumental rationality was largely uniform and rooted in the Critiques of Kant.

Kant’s seminal Critique of Pure Reason was first published in 1781. The same year, Governor-General Warren Hastings inaugurated the Calcutta Madrassa, the first university officially established by the British colonisers in India. Kant published his third Critique of Judgment in 1790, the same year that the infamous evangelical utilitarian Charles Grant returned to London, after serving in British India, to spearhead a highly successful campaign for social reform and practical missionary education in the colony (see chapters six and seven, later) (Ghosh 2000: 13). The timing is noteworthy, emphasising how early British colonial initiatives for higher education in India were inevitably linked with the ongoing Enlightenment across Europe, and suggesting how those ideas were translated into the imperial space.

The philosophical distinction (Krell 1993/1977) is not directly germane here, beyond emphasising the sensitivity to context. I have built on this distinction in an analysis of MPhil (Licentiate) theses of Pakistan’s premier public-sector university (Qadir 2007).

This point connotes similar critiques of social theorising where, among others, Dipesh Chakrabarty (1992) argues that even much of postcolonial scholarship is bound up with European self-narratives of history. Likewise, Mahmood Mamdani (1996) points out trends of “history by analogy” to the West, where analogous writing substitutes for genuine theory despite being inappropriate, unrepresentative and incomplete.

See, for instance, Jonah Blank (2001)


See also Bruce Lawrence (1989).

As Ashis Nandy (1983) points out, it may be more useful to think of the West in the mind rather than West as a geographical, or even economic, category. I have developed this point in a separate paper examining critiques of Orientalism (Qadir 2010b), which is not the focus here. We should also note here the difference between British colonisation in the Americas and in India.

This is a relatively common argument today championed by, among others, Charles Taylor in his (2007) A Secular Age. However, Taylor’s argument is more complex, making Hefner’s earlier thesis...
adequate for the purpose here. A number of other sources could be cited here on the res-sacralisation of social life, including in Europe. For a recent bibliography, see McLennan (2007).

23 I am conscious that this appears to ascribe overwhelming agency to the coloniser at the seeming expense of the colonised, an implication that has been rightly criticised by recent postcolonial scholarship, summed up by Pannikar (2002). Pannikar summarises contemporary critiques by pointing out the fallacy of an impact-response narrative of British actions and Indians re-actions in colonial history. While this may be so, the fact of institutional and cultural continuities is hard to deny. Pannikar’s, and others’, critiques may have normative value in the academy, but I feel they tend to reify native agency to an extent not borne out by the contemporary condition in postcolonial countries. I have discussed some of these issues in a separate paper (Qadir 2010b), but I believe the topic deserves more focused theoretical attention than it has received.

24 Despite recent attention to mad’rassahs in Pakistan, I view these “traditional” institutions here as being outside the (public sector) mainstream. As outlined in the first chapter, the focus of this study is on governmental policy reforms of higher education that have targeted only “mainstream” universities, which largely address the needs and aspirations of the majority of Pakistanis.

25 The “golden” or classical age of Islam is generally considered as lasting from the mid-eighth century – when the Abbasid Muslim Empire was established with Baghdad as its capital – till about the mid-13th century – when the Mongols invaded Baghdad, killed the Caliph and ended the Abbasid Caliphate. However, the “golden” age includes not just the regions governed by the Abbasids, but also under other Muslim rule during this time, such as the Fatimids in North Africa (especially Egypt; AD 909 - 1171) and the Umayyad Caliphate of Andalus/Cordoba (Iberian peninsula; AD 756 - 1031).

26 Based on British surveys of education in the 1820s. The surveys found no evidence of organised schooling for girls besides home-based tuition which could not be enumerated (Ghosh 2000: 8).

27 Additional inquiry is needed to determine whether and how Muslim higher learning was informed by the ancient seat of higher learning in the Gandhara Empire, at Taxila. This long-lasting Empire (6th century BC to 10th century AD) was especially renowned for its learning, and the university (attached to a monastery) at Jaulian is certainly one of the oldest (if not the oldest) known formal centres of higher learning (possibly dating back to the 7th century BC – “Taxila”, Columbia Encyclopedia, 2001). While there may be a semantic debate as to whether Jaulian could be considered a university, there is evidence that it attracted scholars from around the world, produced graduates and research, and advised the kings of the Empire. The university diminished in importance as the Empire waned after the 7th century AD, but remained a key institution until the 10th century AD. In keeping with trends in other sectors, it is likely that the Ghaznavids did not destroy this ancient seat of learning but rather drew on its traditions to establish their systems of Muslim higher education. However, such a hypothesis would need to be investigated. The current revival of the ancient Buddhist Nalanda University under Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen parallels this debate on modernity and tradition.

28 This is well-recognised in postcolonial studies, summarised for instance by Pannikar (2002).

29 Article written in 1872 and re-printed in the Aligarh Institute Gazette in April 1911.

30 One interesting feature is, as some have pointed out, is the ambiguous nature of whiteness – its symbolic purity as well as its symbolic terror – mirrors the historical conjunction of slave narratives with white dominance. The complex symbolism of the colour white in Melville’s novel Moby Dick,
for example, is informative in this context. The use of biology to account for difference is simultaneous with such narratives, as many accounts attest (Stauffer 2004; Fruscione 2008).

“Universities” include degree-awarding institutions, which are not chartered as universities but can award their own degrees with internal controls. With a total population of about 170 million in 2009, this corresponds to about 1.3 million individuals to each higher education institution. By contrast, a country like Finland (often considered to have the world’s “best” educational system) has 13 major universities in a population of about 5.3 million, or about 0.4 million individuals to each institution. Colleges in Pakistan and polytechnic colleges in Finland are excluded in this.

32 While individual references are not provided, the dates and facts in this section may be readily validated in cursory examinations of political changes in 60 years of Pakistan’s history.

33 The possible connection of education with political legitimacy in Pakistan remains to be explored. It is evident, for instance, that new health policies have not been introduced as frequently or in consonance with major political reforms. It is also notable that the Pakistan People’s Party-led governments (1988-90, 1993-96, and coalition leaders in 2008-date) have not initiated new higher education policies since Zulfiqar Bhutto in 1972, that the Pakistan Muslim League has done so every time in government, and that all military dictators have done so invariably at the beginning of their rule. Is education important for political legitimacy in Pakistan, and if so why is it more important than, say, health? Why are some powers more prone to seeking legitimation through education than others? These are questions which may have some bearing on the imagination of education as well as of political legitimacy in Pakistan, but remain open. Rees (1994) addresses some of these in the context of higher education in India and Kenya, noting that strong states (such as in Europe) can afford to pursue policies that are less popular but more beneficial in long-term institutionalisation, while weak states seek legitimacy through higher education qua modernisation, emphasising access. I have separately suggested that the facts may be better understood in terms of legitimacy being sought externally within the community of “civilised nations” rather than internally, where it is less politically relevant (Qadir 2010a).

34 WCT is a growing body of sociological literature on globalisation, including on education (Meyer and Ramirez 2000; Ramirez 2006).

35 The story of establishment of the HEC in parallel with the functioning of the Steering Committee on Higher Education, tasked to develop implementation modalities for the earlier Task Force, remains to be written, and may provide additional data for the questions being raised here as well as general analyses of Pakistani governance in the social sectors.

36 I employ the term “massification” drawing on its use in literature on higher education that emphasises universal access as a key goal for a national system. With this usage I intend to draw attention to the historicised introduction of this goal among Muslims in India under colonial rule. Without attempting to denigrate the goal itself, I do seek thereby to problematise it by underlining the fact that this goal is neither historically “natural” nor uniform. C.f.: (Teichler 1998) For a comment on recent reforms beyond massification, see: (Gumport et al. 1997)

37 The CNE was explicitly aimed at nation-building: “the need for a reorganization and reorientation of the existing educational system so as to evolve a national system” (CNE 1959, 1). Its arguments for higher education, as such, were broader than those of the 2001 TFIHE, and described economic development as only of the routes to building a modern nation under martial law. For more on the significance of this Commission and some of its themes, see Saigol (2003).
The TFHES (2000: 47) did mention the system’s openness to external influence, for instance international donors and foreign universities, but without attaching any weightage to these in comparison with the more numerous internal factors and always within a national framework.

While the TFIHE (2002: 1) report goes on to mention that the value of higher education “is not limited only to economic development”, this remains the primary justification and the only followed through in the situation analysis and recommendations.

The CNE (1959) has not been widely critically reviewed, despite its “Magna Carta” significance for higher education in Pakistan, the notable exception being Saigol (2003) who related its work to the nation-building attempts by the early martial law administrator Ayub Khan. I have presented a brief analysis of the cultural implications of the recommendations of the CNE separately (Qadir 2009a).

One of the features not examined here is the attention to “natural” and “applied” sciences and technology (as opposed to humanities and social sciences) concomitant with an emphasis on economic utility. This has, in fact, been a point of criticism for the HEC.

Interestingly, there is only one instance where language is referred to in the TFHES report: Bangladeshi parents and employers demanding strong English language training as part of a new higher education initiative (TFHES 2000: 85-86).

A useful discussion of agency as actorhood in the context of enactment of rationality can be found separately (Meyer and Jepperson 2000).

The reforms were widely criticised in the press, led by the representative provincial and federal associations of teaching staff. Press comments and statements were coupled with demonstrations against the reforms. News reports throughout March to December 2002 in widely read English and Urdu language dailies are worth reviewing in this respect.

This point can be made independently by drawing on field theoretic applications of World Culture Theory (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006) or, in turn, by Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of historically informed “symbolic capital”. Such theoretical framing of the same data allows somewhat different theoretical insights to emerge.

For instance, while the Higher Education Commission was constituted with the same name as proposed by the TFIHE, many of its proposed functions of support were dropped in favour of control functions of regulation. Also, the key recommendation for the HEC was to have an independent, voluntary Board of Governors to hold its management accountable and act as a “buffer” to avoid regulatory capture by government. However, in the event, the HEC Board is a professional, fully paid one, with a Chairman holding executive powers and accountable directly to the Prime Minister. The implications of this, and other, tilts from the blueprint recommendations remain unexplored.

The most striking display of the volatility of the language issue was the movement in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in February 1952, when over 30,000 people (mostly students at Dhaka University) gathered to renew a demand for admitting Bengali as an official language of administration along with Urdu. Police actions during the protest resulted in the deaths of at least a dozen students over two days, following which the Language Movement gathered further momentum. After two years of consistent protests and agitation, in 1954 the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan recognised Bengali as the second official language of the country through a constitutional amendment. The Language
Movement and the violence surrounding it had a significant impact on subsequent politics, partly leading to the creation of Bangladesh, not to mention seriously casting doubts on the “two-nation theory” that led to the creation of Pakistan itself (Oldenburg 1985). February 21 is still commemorated as “Language Martyrs’ Day” in Bangladesh. Similar protests have surrounded other regional languages (vernaculars) and politics, including for educational policy.

48 Speech delivered on March 21, 1948 at a civic reception in Dhaka (Ali Jinnah 1948), pg. 86.


50 http://www.hec.gov.pk/InsideHEC/Divisions/AECA/CurriculumRevision/Pages/ApprovedCurriculum.aspx, last accessed July 29, 2010. “Natural” and “applied” science subjects outnumber social science and, to a greater degree, humanities subjects: of the 102 subjects, the major degrees of Philosophy and Persian have not been revised even once, while many engineering and technology curricula have been revised more than once.


52 The equation of “English” with “European” is an interesting one, worthy of separate longitudinal study, especially in light of conflict and imperial competition between Great Britain and European nations, including France.

53 Native American scholars and activists Yvonne Dion-Buffalo and John Mohawk point out three options before a race subjected to a Western civilisation: ‘They can become “good subjects” of the discourse, accepting the rules of law and morals without much question; they can be “bad subjects” arguing that they have been subjected to alien rules but revolting only within the precepts of those rules; or they can be “non-subjects”, acting and thinking around discourses far removed from and unintelligible to the West;’ in (Churchill 2002: 1).

54 This section draws on material also presented in a separate paper (Qadir 2009b). However, that earlier analysis was not linked to the cultural thematic that it is the focus of this work, and further engaged with somewhat different historical context.

55 For a comprehensive analysis of the formation, early years and vision of the famous Muslim Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, which was also the home of the Muslim Educational Conference of India and the seed for the Muslim League and hence the creation of Pakistan see (Lelyveld 1996).

56 Leitner was Doctor of Oriental Learning at the University of the Punjab and an Officer on Special Duty with the Education Commission. He was the first Principal of Lahore Government College and played an instrumental role in establishing the Chief’s College in Lahore, now one of the premier schools in the country as Aitchison College. In England, Leitner had been Professor of Arabic and Muhammadan Law at King’s College in London.

57 It was only in 1898 that the University of London began to supervise teaching and academic affairs, as well as organising research, in response to criticisms at home. One year later, Lord Curzon became Viceroy of India and began preparing his Minute on university education, finalised in 1901 and passed with amendments in as the Resolution of 1904. As above, the primary thrust of the Resolution’s proposals for universities was to incorporate teaching and research.

58 It is notable that the Kalevala, considered to be the first compiled Finnish national epic, was first published in the same year, contributing in large part to the emerging sense of Finnish national identity. This may point to a transnational rationality of nationhood in early 19th century.
Notes


61 A fuller description of what has been considered “Western knowledge” over time requires a closer, longitudinal examination of the curricula than undertaken here. Analysis would doubtless identify numerous conflicts and contests rather than the singular meaning ascribed in colonial policies. However, broadly for the purposes here, it may be considered as the division of disciplines then prevalent in the modern University of London (by and large continuing to-date) as well as subject matter drawn from the European (especially British) Enlightenment: Newtonian science, European political theory, English literature and utilitarian philosophy.

62 The statistics provided in this section are from published HEC reports, mostly available for download from the HEC website. The statistical analyses (both percentages/ratios and commentary) are mine, except where stated otherwise. I take this opportunity to again acknowledge the unique initiative of HEC in making these figures available in the public domain, a radical step in Pakistan. However, my analysis is based entirely on these statistics with no cross-referencing validation.

63 Here and throughout PKR refers to Pakistan Rupees, M to millions, and Bn to billions. Unless mentioned otherwise exchange to Euros is at contemporary rate, more for comparative perspective rather than accuracy, at €1 = PKR 110.0. Sums are rounded off to the nearest integer.

64 One project, entitled “Support to Sustainable Development Study Centre”, amounting to PKR 10M (€0.1M) has been excluded from this count, as this centre focuses on environmental science and climate change rather than socio-economic development. However, even if this case is included, the argument remains unchanged.

65 “Physical” sciences refer to what are also known as the “natural” sciences, for instance mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, geology, etc. “Applied” sciences refer to fields involving the application of physical sciences, such as engineering, information technology, medicine and allied professions, etc. Social sciences refer to the same as generally understood, for instance sociology, political sciences, anthropology, etc. Arts and humanities refer to both practicing arts (fine arts, theatre, etc.) as well as theorisation (such as art history, cultural studies), and literature and languages. These definitions are developed and utilised by the HEC.

66 Discounting distance-learning enrolment.

67 Discounting honorary degrees awarded.

68 “Applied sciences” here refer to Agriculture and Veterinary Sciences, Biological and Medical Sciences, Engineering and Technology, and Business Education.

69 In Pakistani universities the graduates produced reflect external factors (such as admission) rather than faculty achievement, as students have little to no elective choice. This situation is now changing but only slowly. However, research is entirely at faculty discretion, since no faculty is obliged to conduct or publish research. Only with the new “Tenure Track” system is research a factor in performance assessment: by the end of 2008, 458 faculty out of a total of 15 099 (i.e. 3%) had opted for this track, which raises salaries significantly while introducing performance-based reviews. The bulk of university faculty continued to choose existing packages with considerably lower salaries, no performance-based reviews, and no obligation for research.
In Pakistani government high schools, students select an Arts or Science stream for matriculation, as early as grade 9. After matriculating (grade 10), they further specialise in some options among Arts, and general science, engineering or medicine within Science for graduating from grade 12, before proceeding to college or university for a bachelor’s degree. While nominally students “select” their stream, in practice the Science stream has far higher standards of admission in grade 9, due to greater demand, resulting in greater selectivity. Most students who fail to get admitted in the Science stream fall back into the Arts. Once the specialisation is made, an Arts student typically cannot transfer to Sciences in grade 12, and is therefore restricted from Science in college as well.

It should be noted that this is not specific to either Pakistan or early 20th century British India. Technological agriculture and industrialisation were common pathways to modernity in other, unrelated contexts, for instance in the Soviet Union.

“The Opening of the Madras University,” Annual Reports of the Madras University (Madras, 1842); in (Frykenberg 1986: 55).

Tweeddale to Lord Fitzgerald: February 23, 1843; in (Frykenberg 1986: 56).

More recent utility theorists, such as John Rawls for instance, have posited notions of primary goods vs. secondary goods to distinguish between utility needs that all humans are expected to have as opposed to those which depend on particular social settings. I offer this as an example to emphasise (possibly superfluously) the fact that utilitarianism is nowhere near such a sketchy framework as I have necessarily outlined here.


Edward Said’s (1979) Orientalism sets the foundation for such insights into colonialism. I have, in a separate context, demonstrated how some of the now-often admired orientalists were in fact an integral part of Orientalist machinery of colonialism (Qadir 201b).

This point has been made more generally and in a somewhat different manner – entanglement of governance and civilisation missions among British colonists – by others (Fischer-Tiné and Mann 2004). However, I have separately maintained that this “enlightened humanism”, used by many to justify colonialism and criticise Edward Said’s (1979) argument in Orientalism, was not what we consider humanism today. Without digressing here, it is worth noting that much of Enlightenment built on Kant’s cosmopolitan idealism which was overtly and expressly racist. What the “Enlightened” colonials such as the utilitarians may have relied on was, perhaps, more of a notion of a “common but differentiated humanity” with requisite demands for equity. In other words, the transition to equality in what Charles Taylor calls the “the modern social imaginary” was not yet complete in early 19th century England (Qadir 2010b).

As with ‘modern,’ I would like to continue using ‘secular’ within quotation marks to emphasise its historicised construction. However, again, for clarity of reading I will drop the quotation marks with the expectation that this emphasis will remain with the reader.

To the best of my knowledge, despite the wealth of scholarship on the Minute, there has been no discourse analysis of Macaulay’s text. While my subsequent indication of “border rhetoric” suggests a framework for such an analysis, actually conducting it extends beyond the scope and focus of this
study. I am grateful to Professor Ulla M. Vuorela for pointing out this theme and the associated question of identifying colonial tropes.

81 Of course, it is worth noting that the issue of conversion was not as relevant in England itself as it was in the British colonies, including in India. However, the evangelicals did have a local agenda (for instance moral education within England itself, retaining schools under Church administration, defending theologically based higher education as at Oxford and Cambridge, and so on) and this was more often than not at loggerheads with the rising utilitarian movement. Certainly, the active alliance visible in the educational agenda for the colonies was not evident within England.

82 “Environmentalism” refers here to the social environment, including social structures such as education and legislation, not the natural environment as most often understood today.

83 In this case, too, “Ashis Nandy, Lata Mani and Romila Thapar interpret [the rise in suttee between 1815 and 1818] as a genuine increase in cases caused mainly by the transformation of society induced by the beginning of colonial rule” (Fischer-Tiné and Mann 2004: 77).

84 I am caricaturising the “civilising mission” thesis here for the sake of argument. Most contemporary postcolonial scholarship has abandoned a wholehearted support for the “white man’s burden” argument, but some continues to maintain that “disinterested humanitarianism” was an important factor in British colonial decision-making in India. For a more nuanced discussion of the civilising, trusteeship mission see (Fischer-Tiné and Mann 2004).

85 Spear (1938, 92) cites Henry Martyn as writing in his journal after visiting a Hindu temple that he “shivered at being in the neighbourhood of hell”; William Carey wrote in a private letter that Hindus were “literally sunk into the dregs of vice.”

86 For instance, Pramoda Das Mittra, Honorary Magistrate in Benares, Letter to Governor of North-Western Provinces and Oudh, 9 March 1885; in (J.P. Naik, Selections from Educational Records of the Government of India, 1963, 392-5).

87 While much Orientalist scholarship distinguished between races of the subcontinent and within Europe and traced their connections, I refer here to the more loose categories deployed in colonial higher education policy documents. Here, “Indian” was consistently used as a racial category for “brown” (ignoring, for instance, sharp discrepancies between the north-western and south-eastern peoples), while “European” was almost invariably used as a distinct racial category for “white” (equating the category with “English” and ignoring, for instance, sharp discrepancies within Europe). The purpose of the racial trope within policy documents appears not to have been biological accuracy or consistency but to develop a border between the two races.

88 A considerable body of work exists on the evolution of social and political thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, a national iconic figure for contemporary Pakistan. Cf. Hafeez A. Malik, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muslim Modernization in India and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), besides the various Urdu-language analyses and compilations of writings of Sir Sayyid. A concise and informed introduction to Sir Sayyid and his seminal institution, the Muslim-Anglo Oriental College, is provided by Lelyveld (1996).

89 Such an analysis has not been conducted, no doubt partly because of complexity. However, the importance of such a story cannot be overstated, given the pole position Sayyid Ahmad and MAO College occupy in the contemporary Pakistani imaginary and implicit understanding of modernity.
The purely schematic, and hence only broadly accurate, nature of these distinctions must be emphasised, despite their popular and, increasingly, political deployment.

Comparatively little independent work exists on Shibli Nu’mani, possibly due to his being ostracised by both “modernists” led by Sayyid Ahmad and the religious orthodoxy in British India led by Deoband. One exploration is by Mehr Murad Afroz (Murad 1996). The Dar’ul Musannifin [House of Writers] established by Nu’mani in his late life has published numerous compilations of his writings, as well as members’ analyses, in Urdu: http://shibliacademy.org [accessed October 2010].

Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Ākhirī Mazāmīn [Final Essays] (Lahore, 1898); in (Murad 1996: 91).

More recently, it may be recalled that the Taliban identified themselves as “Deobandi” in their brief rule in Afghanistan (Metcalf). They claim ideological inspiration from the mad’rassah, including pan-Islamism, although some have pointed out that conflating the mad’rassah with contemporary Taliban actions is conceptually flawed, given the very different contexts in the mid-19th century and today. The Deoband mad’rassah has distanced itself since 2008 from the violent activities claimed by the Taliban network in Pakistan and Afghanistan, for instance at an “Anti-Terrorism Conference” organised at its premises in February 2008, where religious leaders from across India gathered to denounce violence in the name of Islam (PTI 2008); (Report 2009a).

Again, my study has largely ignored “traditional” Islamic mad’rassahs, both in their present form and during colonisation. It is evident from the inspirational role of Deoband since the 1860s and from recent events in Pakistan that these are immensely important institutions. However, it also appears that they are far from static institutions of Islamic conservatism; rather, the notion of a mad’rassah and Islamic education may have undergone a tangentially modern transformation during colonisation, just as the “mainstream” institutions did. How did this change? What was the nature of the transformation, in terms of organisational structure, course structure, curricula, etc.? Although the basic curriculum of mad’rassahs in Pakistan today follows the 13th century Dars-e-Nizami, there have been changes as well. My analysis suggests that there have been changes in the imaginary of religious education, not least because of apparent changes in the nature of theological argumentation and perceived role of religion in the public sphere since colonisation. Barbara Metcalf’s (1989) history of Deoband links the mad’rassah to Islamic revivalism in late 19th century British India, but does not follow-through the impact into contemporary times, especially in Pakistan. Furthermore, my analysis suggests that such a dichotomised picture may not be as useful as exploring the interface between modernity in “official” British colonial higher education and in seminaries in India. By suggesting that this schematic boundary is porous and blurred, I am proposing a more open investigation into the cultural history of seminaries as themselves tangentially modern and erected on or in close dialogue with the cultural thematic of the modern colonial milieu. Clearly, such a proposal has implications beyond higher education alone.

Much has been written about the “trusteeship” view of coloniality. Well before the 1854 Despatch, Governor-General Lord Munro said after the East India Company Charter’s renewal of 1813 that “We must not dream of perpetual possession, but must apply ourselves to bring the natives into a state that will admit of their governing themselves in a manner that may be beneficial to our own interest as well as their own and that of the rest of the world, and to take the glory of achievement and the sense of having done our duty for the chief reward of our exertions” (Khan


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Munro represented the views of classicist Orientalists, including his predecessor Governor-General Warren Hastings. This view is to be widely found throughout much of the history of British colonialism of India.

The Committee was partly instituted to respond to the proposed Vidya Mandir Bill, proposed by Hindu legislators for the re-organisation of Indian education in the wake of a sweeping social movement for “national schools” led by Mohatma Gandhi. The Kamal Yar Jung Committee criticised the Bill roundly, but went far beyond this to make its own recommendations, and so may be validly viewed as an independent committee beyond merely a response to the Bill.

It should be noted that while the Task Force report was published in 2002, the meetings and work were conducted in 2001. Neither the meetings nor the report bear any evidence of the global significance of the events and aftermath of September 11, 2001. Neither does the follow-up report produced in 2002-03 by the Steering Committee on Higher Education, which developed an implementation plan for the Task Force recommendations.

I am conscious of the implications of this point, but the material reviewed in this thesis does not support any extension of this argument. On the one hand, I believe recent events across “mainstream” university campuses in Pakistan supports the case for exploring “extremism” in these universities and, indeed, in much of mainstream, mediated culture in the country. I have explored this in some policy studies (Qadir and Ahmed 2008a; 2008b), including with reference to counter-terrorism strategies in the country (Qadir and Ahmed 2010). A report on views of leading political commentators in the country also confirms this view (Qadir et al. 2010). These reports present contemporary policy analyses that exceed the scope of this work. As I discuss in the next chapter, further scholarship is needed to confront this issue in greater depth.

One of the few historical reviews of Pakistani higher education policies is a strong example of this perspective (Isani and Virk 2003).

It is worth mentioning here that analyses of institutional isomorphism, for instance through “coercion, imitation or norms” in transnational contexts are more or less independent of historical analysis. Even such contemporaneous analyses do not exist for Pakistani higher education.

Here, as throughout this study, “institutionalism” is used in a social theory sense. While including formal organisations as corporate bodies, “institution” encompasses a well-established, predictable and structured pattern of relationships as an irreducible component of culture.

My aim here is not to exotify the normative distinctions which are only schematically sketched here, but to try and outline the significance of a systemic, cultural change which has been more or less occluded in the normalising process of “modernisation” of higher education in Pakistan.

I employ the term “massification” drawing on its use in literature that emphasises universal access as a goal for a national system. With this usage I intend to draw attention to the historicised introduction of this goal among colonised Indian Muslims. Without criticising the goal, I do seek to problematise it by underlining the fact that it is neither historically “natural” nor uniform (Teichler 1998). For a comment on recent reforms beyond massification see (Gumport et al. 1997)

I am cognisant of the breadth and depth of implications of this suggestion. The historical material leaves no doubt that such a connection needs to be traced more fully, but neither the scope of this study nor the data used here allow the connection to be followed through. A similar argument has been made separately using the notion of Christianism as distinct from Christianity (Ahmed 2010).
Although, the recent re-emergence of Arabic in Pakistan should be noted. This is a complex phenomenon deserving more study than it has received, tied up with both domestic political history and geopolitical trends. “Arabization” of Pakistan is well commented on (Ghoshal 2010). However, such reviews often do not address post-9/11 trends in higher education in particular, or conceptual theorising in general, with the notable exception of Tariq Rahman (1999; 2004).

I stress again that additional material is required to substantiate this. However, the analysis here and general familiarity with higher education in Pakistan allow me to suggest this proposition.

The parallel with a shift in the discipline of anthropology from biological orientation to social (and cultural) orientation is notable.

I do not intend a search for an “original” past somehow more locally “grounded” than Arabic or English thought. Such a past may not exist except for rhetorical purposes of mobilisation. Rather, I refer to an absence of explicit and self-conscious negotiation between exogenous and endogenous, the hermeneutic process whereby the external becomes internal. The material reviewed in this study is inadequate to follow this argument through more fully, as I will discuss in the last section.

This study has not reviewed religious seminaries. I may hypothesise here that while reliance on Arabic in religious seminaries distinguishes their modernity from other institutions, this distinction breaks down at the level of social imaginary. The organising principles of mad’rassahs may be modern in the same tangential manner that much of “mainstream” higher education is. Despite the linguistic difference, religious orthodoxy may be as modern as their mainstream counterparts.

Indeed, all social reforms in Pakistan may be critiqued from this perspective of being opportunities to establish or amend this divide. I believe such critical readings, for instance of the eight policy reforms of Pakistani higher education, would be instructive.

Not to mention convergence with other countries’ development plans. A cross-national comparison would reveal interesting convergence on such tropes as homogenous development.

It is notable that this, precisely, is what happened in 2002. The Steering Committee on Higher Education, tasked to develop implementation modalities for the Task Force recommendations, met with fierce and vocal resistance, primarily from the university faculty. Many of the recommendations could not be implemented, while those that were implemented by the subsequent Higher Education Commission were introduced without fanfare. This resistance begs further investigation including to better understand the dynamic of border rhetoric and the manner in which modernity tangentially filters through such resistance in any case.

The parallels are evident for further exploration. By “failure” I refer primarily to what has been called “growth without development” in Pakistan (Easterly 2001). Despite significant economic growth, “social indicators like infant mortality and female primary and secondary enrolment are among the worst in the world... Pakistan is also more corrupt, more politically unstable and violent, less respectful of human rights, and less democratic than the benchmark for its level of income” (Ibid: 3). There is little theorisation about cultural resistance to development in Pakistan.
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