FLORA KURIKKALA

REPRESENTATION OF A CHANGING SELF: AN EU PERFORMANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

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CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................................. 7

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 9

PART I
CHANGING SELVES CHANGING OTHERS:
HOW TO THEORISE IDENTITY IN IR

2. PRAGMATIC PATH FROM COMPATIBLE INTERESTS TO
A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY IDENTITY? ............................................................. 31
   2.1. Question of Change and Transformatory Process
       in Integration Theories ...................................................................................... 34
   2.2. Institutional Identity Formation ................................................................. 42
       2.2.1. Imagining ............................................................................................ 46
       2.2.2. Naming ............................................................................................... 50
       2.2.3. Performance ......................................................................................... 53
       2.2.4. Recognition ......................................................................................... 60
   2.3. The European Union as a Political Self ....................................................... 64
   2.4. EU Action in the Middle East ....................................................................... 72
       2.4.1. Economic Performance ....................................................................... 73
       2.4.2. Political Performance ......................................................................... 78
       2.4.3. EU Representation in the Peace Process ............................................ 87

3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: SIGNIFYING REPRESENTATION ....... 91
   3.1. Concept of Representation ............................................................................. 92
   3.2. Framing a Represented Collective ............................................................... 98
       3.2.1. Institutional Representation .................................................................. 99
       3.2.2. The CFSP Community as a Represented Collective ......................... 106
   3.3. Purposes of Performance ............................................................................... 111
       3.3.1. Iconic Reformation of the Represented .............................................. 113
       3.3.2. Determinate Performance as Indexical
               Representation ..................................................................................... 121
       3.3.3. Representation as Symbolic Action .................................................. 127
   3.4. Underpinnings for Analysis .......................................................................... 132
PART II
ANALYSIS OF AN EU PERFORMANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

4. ON INTERPRETATION: SIGNS WE DEFINE ARE SIGNS
   THAT DEFINE US .................................................................. 139
   4.1. How to Read Action .......................................................... 140
   4.2. Otherness in Interpretation ................................................. 145
   4.3. The Art of Dialogues .......................................................... 149

5. ICONIC PERFORMANCE: REPRESENTING INSTITUTIONAL
   SELF UNDER CONSTRUCTION ............................................... 157
   5.1. Balance of Economic and Political Weight —
        “The EU just pays the bill.” ........................................ 158
   5.2. Access to Information ....................................................... 163
   5.3. Coherence ........................................................................ 169
   5.4. Continuity ........................................................................ 178
   5.5. Visibility — “…always trying to be in the picture.” ............ 183
   5.6. Reputation: EU-Israel Forum ............................................. 188

6. INDEXICAL PERFORMANCE: REPRESENTATION AS
   DETERMINED BY A MANDATE ............................................. 193
   6.1. External Expectations ...................................................... 194
   6.2. Moral Ground .................................................................. 201
   6.3. Impartiality ....................................................................... 205
   6.4. Credibility ........................................................................ 214
   6.5. Effectiveness—“You play to your strengths.” .................... 219

7. SYMBOLIC PERFORMANCE: REPRESENTING SELF-INTERESTS ... 231
   7.1. Security Interests ............................................................. 234
   7.2. Political Interests ............................................................. 237
   7.3. Economic Interests ........................................................... 241
   7.4. Strategic Interests: Superpower in the Making? ............... 245

8. CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 251

REFERENCES ............................................................................ 266
   Note on References .................................................................. 266
   Primary Sources ....................................................................... 267
   Bibliography ........................................................................... 272
“But it follows from our own existence (which is proved by the occurrence of ignorance and error) that everything which is present to us is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves. This does not prevent its being a phenomenon of something without us, just as a rainbow is at once a manifestation both of the sun and of the rain. When we think, then, we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign. Now a sign has, as such, three references: first, it is a sign to some thought which interprets it; second, it is a sign for some object to which in that thought it is equivalent; third, it is a sign, in some respect or quality, which brings it into connection with its object.”

– Charles S. Peirce (CP 5.283)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In an interview I made for this thesis, I was asked whether I know what the only utility of today’s diplomats is. The answer the interviewee gave himself was that “[d]iplomacy is about communication. Nowadays the technology is developed so that it’s easy to maintain the contacts. If the French President wants to reach his Finnish counterpart, he can pick up the phone and call her. The only remaining utility is that we are continuously on the ground and that you cannot replace us by technological innovations.”

Certainly, there are irreplaceable practices. And there are individuals who leave their mark on surroundings as well as on those with whom or in the name of whom they communicate. Before examining the purposes of a particular diplomatic practice, I would like to mention some individuals who have had influence on my research and who have been significant, even irreplaceable to me. Certain ideas of Charles Sanders Peirce have been the major source of inspiration to my research. Yet, besides philosophers and political scientists of past centuries, I acknowledge my intellectual debts to contemporary authors as well as the IR scholars and practitioners with whom I have had pleasure to discuss on various occasions.

First thanks are due to my supervisor, Professor Jyrki Käkönen who made several comments and suggestions that helped me to frame the essentials. His frankness and firm belief in my ability to complete the work have been a great asset both during my graduate studies and later in my doctoral research. For their helpful and competent remarks, I am grateful to Dr. Mika Aaltola, Professor Osmo Apunen, Professor A.J.R. Groom, Dr. Adrian van den Hoven, Dr. Kari Laitinen, and Professor Eric Remacle as well as EIRSS and ECPR summer schools’ participants who read and commented on earlier versions of some chapters or otherwise contributed to the advancement of the thesis. Professor Tuomas Forsberg and Professor Stefano Guzzini read the manuscript in its entirety and their remarks led to significant improvements. Researcher Krista Salo deserves special thanks for her ‘disturbing’ questions and for being a friend with whom to share tears and joy alike.

1 Interview with Moratinos’s political adviser, Christian Jouret, 31 May 2002.
I would like to thank all the interviewees in Europe and the Middle East. The views presented in the study owe much to the insight and information that these individuals generously provided. While doing the analysis I have tried to keep in mind the following advice of an interviewee: “Everyone takes a side. You should not try to be too much on no one’s side. You just have to say what you think.”2 I also thank former colleagues in Finland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs, especially First Secretary Tony Paso, for shedding light on the practical side of international relations.

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The final acknowledgement I wish to make is due to my parents. I am immensely grateful to Kalervo and Tuula whose readiness to always be there for me has been invaluable, their prayers and encouragement equally so.

Contrary to the custom of absolving other people—however influential—of responsibility for the final product, I claim that my family, friends, and colleagues mentioned here (as well as many others) share with me some responsibility for what became my doctoral thesis, since they committed themselves to participating in the process that enabled the work to be done. I am thankful to each one of them for accompanying me on this journey to the fascinating wonderland of International Relations. Remaining deficiencies of the ‘travel report’ are, of course, my own fault however much I would like to blame the significant others.

In Amman, August 2003
Flora Kurikkala

2 Interview with a Portuguese foreign ministry official, 7 May 2002.
The purpose of this thesis is two-fold. First, it aims at participating in the discussion about theorising institutional identity formation. Second, it focuses on micro-level policy making as an important factor both in identity formation of the entity as a whole and with respect to the environment where the action takes place. The first of these two purposes is discussed in terms of four phases that we suggest to be inherent in any process involving collective identity formation. After elaborating the different phases, we concentrate on the third one (performance) and argue that its functions are multifaceted contrary to what could be assumed on the basis of the mainstream of IR literature.

The theoretical framework is inspired by Charles Peirce’s studies on signs, their objects, and interpretations of how a sign relates to an object it is taken to represent. The ‘object’ whose institutional identity formation we study is the European Union (EU) and more precisely its political relation to the conflictual surroundings in the Middle East as it appears in the performance of the Union’s special representative. An impetus for the study came from various expressions of the desire among European politicians to learn to speak with one voice on the global stage and transform the ambitious paper exercises and declaratory policies into substantial joint actions.

For the past couple of years, lively academic discussion has evolved about the identity of the European Union (E.g. Checkel 2000; Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 2001; Marcussen et al. 2001; Rosamond 2000; 2001). Theoretical

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1 The EU has nominated special representatives also to the African Great Lakes region, the Balkans, and Afghanistan. A reason to choose the representation in the Middle East as the case to be studied instead of these other regions is that for Europeans, the Middle East more obviously than any other region, is all but a neutral territory, meaning that many if not all EU member states have national interests at stake there, and therefore the Middle East is a real challenge for the formation of the CFSP. Secondly, as one of the interviewees remarked, the Middle East is the only region where the Union has created a relatively united foreign policy and yet this unity has come to nothing because of the reluctance of some other actors to give the EU a political role (Interview with an Israeli source, 26 May 2002).
stand-takings and positionings have given shape to new schools of thought with their various interpretations and predictions concerning desirable direction, pace, and final goal of the integration (For background, see Cini 2003; McCormick 1999; O’Neill 1996; Shaw and Wiener 1999). At the same time, the logic of the change that is under way at the micro-level has remained in a rather marginal position in the discussion. And yet, policy making on an everyday basis is the core of the change as well as the necessary ground for elaborations and attempts to understand how institutional transformation happens. (Girard 1994) This requires that attention be paid to policy-making processes and multifaceted functions of practical activities.

This kind of point of departure opens a pragmatic view on European integration by focusing on the logic of transformation rather than ideologically driven interpretations of the desirability of one or another pattern of change. Adopting this starting point helps us to escape the political confusion and the desperate need to find our way through the jungle of academic discussion about the finalité politique of European integration, when we realise in Horace’s words that “we are all lost in the woods, the only difference is that we are lost in different directions”2.

Instead of focusing on direction, pace, and final goal, an alternative way to proceed is to concentrate on the practical changes that take place in the political landscape. The approaches that are either explicitly or implicitly fixed on a particular outcome face the problem of not finding their way in an evolving political landscape where different scenarios seem equally plausible. To avoid this trap, we propose an approach for examining the logic of practical change that takes place in the political landscape. Pragmatic focus on what the functions at the micro-level are that influence the transformation process, how truths are created, and how they further affect the external surroundings is therefore claimed here to be a fruitful way to approach the problem of changing policies. (Cf. Bernstein et al. 2000; Merle 1994)

The practical activities that are performed in unfamiliar surroundings need to take into account the broader context even when the focus is on the transformation that takes place within an institutionally walled political landscape. The influential relation of an actor to its surroundings is twodimensional. On the one hand, the actor—in this case the European Union—seeks to influence the course of events and the other actors participating in it. On the other hand, the events as external opportunities for action may be seen to function as an impetus for the actor’s internal processes within its political

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2 Horace happens to be one of the favourite Italian writers of the EU special envoy to the Middle East, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, who is the ‘main character’ in this study. (See Moratinos 2000)
landscape, in this case for the EU integration in the sphere of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In this study the analysed action at micro-level has to do with the European Middle East policies as they appear in the functions of the special envoy whom the EU nominated to represent it in the conflict region.

The above formulation entails a fundamental assumption about the reality of international relations. Namely, essentially immaterial beings such as policies of a state, functions of international organisation, and various modes of interaction that are analytical objects of IR are intersubjective and depend on shared understandings through which they are brought into being. This does not, however, mean that international entities and their interaction as such are not real but that they are real to the extent that they are believed to be real as social facts.

Constructivist understanding holds that collective institutional subjectivities are formed and reformed through engagements in world affairs that have impact on how any particular collective being is assessed. Hence, while institutionalist scholars of international relations are interested in “how institutions matter in shaping the behavior of important actors in world politics” (Martin and Simmons 1998, 729), constructivism focuses on conditions for performance and change. ‘External world’ provides opportunities to establish or affirm an identity through performance but, in the case that performance fails to convince other significant actors or if they see the performance for instance as morally reprehensible, these opportunities may also produce opposite effects and challenge the identity formation process.

**HYPOTHESES OF THE STUDY AND ITS RELATION TO EARLIER RESEARCH**

International relations are a combination of material and social realities and the meanings imposed to them in interactive processes of international actors. While the majority of post-modernists claim that individual and collective subjectivity is completely constituted in and through discursive practices, constructivist approaches emphasise intersubjectivity and the existence of *materia* that both constrains and enables the emergence of possible interpretations about how the reality is. (Wendt 1999, 111-112)³

³ See Zehfuss (2001b) who criticises Wendt’s approach of the lack of means to analyse communication that leads to identity transformation. See also Dunne 1995.
The latter understanding is characteristic of this study on an EU performance in the Middle East, although the perspective that we adopt differs somewhat from Wendt’s ‘rationalist constructivism’. The ontological point of departure here is typical to social constructivism in general:

Constructivism does not deny the existence of a phenomenal world, external to thought. This is the world of brute (mainly natural) facts. It does oppose, and this is something different, that phenomena can constitute themselves as objects of knowledge independently of discursive practices. It does not challenge the possible thought-independent existence of (in particular natural) phenomena, but it challenges their language-independent observation. What counts as a socially meaningful object or event is always the result of an interpretive construction of the world out there.

(Guzzini 2000, 159)

When the focus is on the EU as a third party of a conflict, the main matter of interest naturally then relates to identity, values and interests of this third party. But the setting is complicated by the fact that there is no general theory of the CFSP that could be used as a ready-made framework of research. Or, as Whitman (1998, 5) puts it, “there is no commonly agreed theoretical perspective within which to consider the international role of the Union”.

The evolution of the EU as a whole has been characterised by two major sets of conflicting views about the nature of integration, and also the analyses of the CFSP most often refer to these two dominant paradigms, liberal intergovernmentalism (based largely on neorealist assumptions) and neofunctionalism. They have become popular approaches in explaining and understanding the complexity of various phenomena in and around the European integration. Yet, like any other theoretical framework they both run the risk of simplification. Trying to make sense of present international relations in a changing world is a tremendous challenge and, therefore, the lack of any single, coherent theory of the CFSP is hardly surprising given the old dilemmas and new challenges the Union and its member states face in a post-Cold War world.

It has been presumed that EU’s foreign policy integration may occur either through strategic bargaining or through functional adaptation that involves a learning process where member states are expected to harmonise their action

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plans in the course of communicative processes. On the micro-level of everyday actorness, we can see that various functions of representation are all present in the performances of different foreign policy actors, states and the Union alike. A major difference is that state identity is generally better established and therefore there is no need to justify the being of a particular state as a foreign policy actor in each specific context of performance. This is not (yet) the case with the external relations of the EU—the justification to get involved in high policy matters is to be negotiated time and again until the Union’s international identity is considered as relatively stable and recognisable. Hence, the question is not either strategic bargaining or harmonisation through learning but involves both elements.

According to realism, the primary actor in international relations is the state, acting as a unified entity and pursuing national interests in an anarchical international system characterised by competition and conflict. Realists argue that states use both conflict and co-operation to ensure their security through a balance of power among states. In practice, the emphasis on states and status quo of the system downplays the role of the EU (as well as other interstate and non-state entities) as an actor in international relations, since the Union is seen as a gathering of sovereign states that retain the right to take back the power they have handed over to co-operative bodies any time. (For criticism, see e.g. Sjursen 1999) What is significant in terms of this research is the notion of institutional interests. Unlike in neofunctionalism and other theories critical to the realist stress on interests, interests are here taken as a self-evident—although not exogenously given—aspect that characterises reality of international relations. Realism’s critics have blamed it of falling to a simplistic worldview of sticking to interests of selfish and unco-operative actors as the only major force in shaping the international realm. Yet, interests do matter. They only need to be put in proportion to other essential elements of actorness.

From a realist position, what might constitute EU foreign policy is the sum of member states’ foreign policies. However, the Union’s external relations do not equal the member states’ foreign policies joined together. Nor can different foreign policies of member states per se be regarded as parts of EU foreign policy. In principle, there are three forms of European foreign policy: (i) Union foreign policy—the dimension that first developed as European Political Cooperation (EPC) and, since the European Union was established in Maastricht, constitutes the second pillar of the Union structure, known as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), (ii) Community foreign policy or what is called external relations, including the dimension of economic and trade relations with non-EU states, and (iii) national foreign policies.
White (1999, 38) notices that because of the state-centric focus of foreign policy analysis, it is most often associated with traditional realism. The approach takes states as units determining the system and adds relatively little to the understanding of the EU foreign policy. On the other hand, many researchers agree that the modifying power behind state behaviour in contemporary international relations is the nature of the international system itself either in the sense that systemic imperatives determine the behaviour of the units within the system or that perceptions of collective action (or unwillingness to act) direct the policy making of the units. This kind of system-oriented theory on international relations coincides with ontological assumptions of realism that ignores the change of actorness and the possibility that endogenous images influence actors and their policies. Although neorealism’s theses about interests and the conflictual state of world politics are still viable to some extent, the approach lacks the means to discuss co-operative interaction that may lead to deep changes in actorness. (Kratochwil 1993)

As a theory of institutional evolution, functionalism and its pragmatic successors add an important perspective to the (neo-)realist and other state-centric approaches that fail to deal with dynamics and change. Neofunctionalism states that political unification is possible without identical sets of aims shared by the participants. It is crucial, however, to political integration that there exist a transnational body of beliefs that cannot be explained solely in terms of either an intergovernmental or a supranational approach. In this sense, constructivist tradition has, as White (1999, 55) states, “an important contribution to make to understanding European foreign policy-making” in particular with respect to the process whereby ideas are translated into policy proposals and move on to the policy agenda, but also at the level of institution building and reconstruction. (See also Hansen and Williams 1999; Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 1999)

On many other areas of integration, much research seeks to explain how sovereignty shifts to the supranational level whereas concerning the CFSP the focus, implicitly or explicitly, is often on analysing and explaining the gap between expectations and reality (Hill 1993; Hill 1998; Ginsberg 1999). The EU is far from achieving coherence and continuity in the field of foreign and security policy, but despite the failed expectations and somewhat different reality conceptions among participants, the pressure towards more coordination is intensifying and the importance of developing a credible common foreign policy is increasing.

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5 See Webber and Smith (eds)(2002) for a set of essays with different perspectives on foreign policy.
The elements that constitute the external sources of influence upon the Union are related to its geographical, economic and technological status that, in turn, gives the Union the significance that the member states separately would not have. Measured with political significance, it is clear that potentially the weight of the Union in international relations in general is greater than the weight of any member state alone, given the volume of combined resources. But it has been seen that the Union’s foreign policy making in many practical questions is rather modest and in numerous cases, at least partly due to the paralysing effect of the unanimity principle, probably even less influential than the policy of a single member state, such as France or Germany, would have been, had it taken action alone without first seeking to find a compromise at the EU level. Constant interaction within the complex network of the Union’s institutions and procedures limits the autonomy of individual member states but, on the other hand, especially the smaller member states have through the CFSP broadened their range of foreign policy making.

The other side of the coin is that giving priority to national perspectives may delay or even prevent the strengthening of a European political identity, which would be a necessary even if not sufficient condition for a truly effective CFSP. If identities are constructed by or endogenous to processes of social interaction, as constructivists claim, it is justified to ask whether there is, in the case that social interaction concentrates on defending national perspectives, any chances for a common Union-wide identity formation unless an external actor or situation ‘forces’ the member states to common policy formation. The EU special envoy to the Middle East reminds that

\[\text{Co-operation seems to be the only way to tackle these threats.}\]

(Moratinos 2000; emphasis added)

Co-operation appears as the keyword in ‘crisis foreign policy making’ tackling the external threats, whether these threats are new phenomena, as Moratinos mentions, or more traditional ones such as an armed conflict requiring external actors to assist the conflicting parties to reach a solution by peaceful means.

With respect to the practical case under discussion, it is essential to keep in mind that generally the explicitly defined function of third parties that are represented in a conflict is to support regional stability by participating in
conflict resolution as a mediator or by giving humanitarian and development aid. Usually, academic reviews concentrate on mediation as a project and its effectiveness with regard to the set objectives. They focus either on the resources and interests of the conflicting parties or on identity-based conflict resolution. In both approaches, the third party is taken as a neutral ‘tool’ for the settlement of the dispute. And even when the importance of identity and otherness is acknowledged, it is discussed only in relation to the identity construction of the parties in conflict, not other actors that are ‘voluntarily’ involved in the course of events as third parties. (See e.g. Bercovitch 1996; Bercovitch and Houston 2000; Brown 1996; Nicholson 1992; Rothman and Olson 2001; Väyrynen 1991) Often, the motives for intervention do not appear to require elaboration because the goal of peacemaking legitimates external intervention.

On the other hand, the role of third parties is sometimes examined from the viewpoint that a third party, while participating in conflict mediation, may have self-interests that relate to the actual conflict resolution only indirectly (See Carnevale and Arad 1996; Schmidt 2001). As an example of such interests, we may name economic interests that the conflict threatens to jeopardise. These two viewpoints (third party either as a tool or egoistic intervenor) are traditionally overemphasised at the cost of a third one, namely the function of a chosen policy with respect to the self-image and identity formation of the third party itself. This third function relates to attempts to fill the provided space—to use the opportunity to act—in order to have a practical impetus on the third party’s own institutional identity.6

In the framework of this study, the two ‘taken-for-granted’ viewpoints are regarded as holding to references that do not question the relevance and centrality of the functions of third party representation in actual value-based conflict mediation or safeguarding its interests. Further, it is stressed that besides these two approaches to representation in general or representation of third parties in a conflict mediation and resolution in particular, performance can also be studied from the viewpoint that an event demanding action appears to a potential third party as an opportunity to produce its actorness and, hence, to form, strengthen, or change its own institutional identity.

The actual circumstances—those events that are literally situated in space and time—can be interpreted as opportunities to occupy a position among other actors. They provide actors with a chance to (re-)create the self, to seek recognition for the imagined and named identity. Significance of the other is

6 It should be noted that the theoretical starting point of the study is not in conflict theories even if the analysed case belongs to that sphere. It is quite usual that the conditions that appear as opportunities for foreign policy performance are conflictual and, due to their character, invite or oblige external actors to position themselves.
realised in interaction where an actor is able to situate itself as someone different from the other. Furthermore, the other’s presence is significant because of the quest for recognition from the part of the other can only be expressed in actual contexts. To relate this to the EU identity formation, the external environment can be interpreted as enabling an EU involvement in international affairs by offering opportunities to act (or react), i.e. outbreaks of armed conflicts provide opportunities to exert influence and, simultaneously, to construct identity in relation to the conflictual others and the other third parties that are involved. The role of recogniser as a dimension of otherness means in simple terms that as the EU (or any other actor) expresses its willingness for a renewed identity, it tries to benefit and gain recognition when it succeeds in occupying space among other actors and meeting the expectations that significant others have placed on it.

Besides discussing the visible results (or lack of them) in peace negotiations and reconciliation, and examining the possible self-interests that are served by third party involvement, the analysis of an EU performance in this study aims to enrich the discussion by bringing in the third dimension of representation which focuses on the formation of the represented in relation to an external event. We claim that potentially the action of the EU special envoy has wider consequences than those that have been defined in his mandate as the Union’s objectives in the Middle East. As Ricoeur (1973, 102-103) points out,

a meaningful action is an action the importance of which goes ”beyond” its relevance to its initial situation. [...] An important action, we could say, develops meanings which can be actualized or fulfilled in situations other than the one in which this action occurred. To say the same thing in different words, the meaning of an important event exceeds, overcomes, transcends the social conditions of its production and may be reenacted in new social contexts. Its importance is its durable relevance and, in some cases, its omnitemporal relevance.

The relevance of the special envoy’s action can be said to be not merely in the initial function as defined in the mandate but in its contribution to bringing into being the CFSP due to the idea implicitly connected to activities of any representative that the represented has to exist. In other words, the point of departure for a coherent performance is generally thought to be that the represented exists before its representative. In Peirce’s terms, this would mean that object exists before its ‘representamen’. But often in the construction of social reality the direction is actually the opposite: Sign concretises the idea of the object; representative creates the represented. (See Doty 1993)
Although the EU is regarded as a submitter and the conflict region as a recipient in terms of conflict mediation, the focus of this study will not be only on the real or imagined effects of the Union’s policies on the conflict or the conflicting parties but also back on the Union and the significance of the special representative to the represented entity in its process of self-definition. The self-definition in terms of an external conflict is based on two basic assumptions: First, the EU uses international crises as opportunities to build up its identity by means of representation, and second, the EU’s international self in terms of the CFSP is constructed through coherent and continuous performance in the framework of external opportunities such as international conflicts.

There is no real contradiction between using conflicts (and other crises that ‘need to be solved’) as opportunities to define oneself as a foreign policy actor, on the one hand, and trying to resolve them, on the other hand. Namely, external events are necessary in the formation of the self that seeks to define itself by responding to them. Without conflicts there would be far fewer possibilities to use the external environment to build up a political self. But successful conflict management is the most effective way to strengthen the identity in the capacity of ‘conflict manager’.

The discussion about identity formation in the discipline of the IR was predominantly opened by the constructivist approach. Also this research gets off the ground from the conceptions that are typical to social constructivism: (i) social reality takes shape as a result of interaction, (ii) process and system as well as agency and structure are in a continuous dialogue, and (iii) identity is the foundation for interests, values, and action. (See e.g. Price and Reus-Smit 1998) Identity is thus conceived as the ground for possible values and interests and, in that sense, primary to them although expressions of values and interests further influence identity formation. (Guzzini 2000; Hopf 1998; Risse-Kappen 1995; Ruggie 1998a)

Although the past decade has witnessed an exponential growth of identity literature, the systematic model building that would be able to deal with the question of how the formation actually happens in practical contexts at the micro-level has remained of relatively little account. No agreement or shared understanding has been reached within the approach about how the formation of identity happens nor how identity formation relates to various forms of action that are widely held as general practices in social reality. Research on identity that has gained plenty of room in the present discussions of IR has remained deficient mainly for two reasons. First, it mainly concentrates on studying organic collective identities and thereby largely dismisses the question about the institutional being of international actors (Manners and Whitman...
Second, it lacks clear analytical models that would function as an organising framework within which the formation of collective identities could be empirically studied. As Glarbo (2001, 142) remarks, it is only now that constructivist scholars are “beginning to face up to the difficult task of systematically defining, operationalizing and applying constructivist first order theory to empirical analysis.”

In this study, the representation of an international actor is examined primarily from the perspective of institutional identity formation although the two other aspects of representation—namely those referring to either values or interests—are not set aside but elaborated in relation to an actor’s identity. In the theoretical part of the thesis, the focus will be on considerations that seek to combine a description of dynamics in the institutional identity formation process with a static categorisation of different functions of institutional representation. Then in the empirical illustration the three functions of representation are dealt with as they apply to the contents of the EU special envoy’s various activities in the name of the EU in the Middle East. Thus, the objective is to participate in the current identity discussion by operationalising a constructivist understanding about identity formation and its primacy to the other possible functions of performance that concern either the values or the self-interests of the represented being.

Identity, values and interests form the essence of international actors and therefore it seems worthwhile to begin the study with an elaboration of the circular process where an actor’s identity, values and interests take shape and influence the international environment where the process originates. A theoretical claim to be seen throughout the text is that the actor’s performance is the focal point that both reflects existing identity, values and interests and contributes to reformulations of the essence of actorness. A dynamic and interactive process that is based on existing identities, values and interests further influences how actors perceive themselves and others, what they aim to achieve in various interactive processes, and what kind of beliefs they hold valuable and worth defending.

**Definition of Concepts**

To a large extent, politics is about *representation*. All performances in social reality involve a representational dimension and therefore these two concepts are in the study used interchangeably, depending on whether the emphasis is on an action as an ‘episode’ of a story or a relationship between an agent and
its object. Conceptually, representation involves two separate but not exclusive meanings, one of them being that of acting for as an agent. Individuals and collectives represent certain interests and values, or they are represented by others in the polis. Rightfulness of governance is a basic assumption in a well-established polity where legitimacy of representation is usually not questioned. (See Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung 1998) The other sense refers to representation as an epistemic concept. In community-level interaction these two senses habitually merge. Accordingly, in the political sphere of interaction, the significance of representation can be discussed both as a practice of institutional maintenance and evidence of a polity’s legitimacy both internally and externally. Contrary to relatively constant institutions, representation in an emerging or changing polity is not yet legitimated in a profound manner. Two questions, then, lie at the core of an emerging polity: How does representation come to be, theoretically speaking, if the represented has not yet emerged? And what objectives does representation serve? These questions are further developed below as the research question is formulated but let us take them as its ‘prototype’ for a while.

As we discuss representation it is essential to know what is represented and by what means. In the field of international relations where various actors and their interaction within given structures are the main focus of most studies, ontological assumptions about the essence of the actors direct or even determine the research project. In order to get to the sources of the problem of international relations, we need to focus on what is the essence of international actorness, namely, the identity, values, and interests of the actors. These concepts are elaborated in chapters two and three but it is worthwhile to discuss them briefly here.

According to a common definition, identity means the general idea that an individual has about himself. To put it simply, identity is interpretation of the self or, as Castells (1997, 6) formulates, “people’s source of meaning and experience”. Identity, besides being the source of meaning, is the basis of values. As certain kinds of individuals and collectives we approve or advocate some beliefs, practices and characteristics and disapprove or disparage others. We are aware of good and evil. We appreciate and seek to cultivate virtue while fighting vices. The way we express our values mediates an idea of what kind of people we are. Our identity determines our values.

Institutional identity and interests are also conceptually intertwined since interests are formed on the basis of identity: What I want depends on who I am or for whom I am taken by others. And in turn, interests further influence

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7 See also Giddens (1991, 52) according to whom identity is “something that has to be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities”.
identity formation so that reaching or failing to reach one’s goal shapes objectives and perceptions of oneself in respect to the objectives. Ringmar, among others, has paid attention to the fact that social scientific research mainly concentrates on interests, i.e. what we want, although the foundation of social action is identity, i.e. who we are and would like to be as individuals and collectives (Ringmar 1996, 190)\(^8\). Also in the discipline of IR, the significance of identity remained largely unexamined until the ‘constructivist turn’ of the 1990s. (Checkel 1998; Diez 1996)

To have a common identity does not mean simply that members of a particular collection of actors have similar values and interests. Instead, common identity means that a collective is taken as an entity even when the interests of its members may differ in certain questions. Collective identity may be either organic—such as family, clan, tribe, or nation—or institutional, i.e. administrative construction. When analysing the EU’s potential foreign policy identity, it is the institutional identity that we focus on, not the organic one.

Collective identity is not a ‘once-and-forever’ being but emerges and changes in interactive processes, where the essence of the collective is imagined, named, performed, and recognised (Cf. Frijhoff 1992; Saukkonen 1996). The centrality of performance is stressed in this study although recognition as the external response to performance should neither be underestimated since the ‘other selves’ are needed not only as passive objects of distinction but also as active subjects who accept the claimed identity and interact with the actor under construction as if it already had the claimed identity. Identity, values and interests are not stable constituent parts of what we identify as international actors, nor do these essential features appear as something that could be observed as such in international relations. Identities, values and interests emerge, evolve, weaken, and even disappear in the course of events within the relevant fields of action. They are created, mediated and served through action that is taken in specific contexts. Thus the question arises, how the mediation happens in practice. The Peircean concept of representation offers a valuable tool here.

Representation involves a three-dimensional interpretation process that includes, first of all, the *represented object*, e.g. a collective. Secondly, an interactive process requires other actors as *interpreters* to whom identity, interests and values are made recognisable through representation. Thirdly, an intermediary is needed as a *locus of representation*, without which it would

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8 See also Neumann 1997, 323-324; Rescher 2000, 212-218. According to Neumann, identity and interests cannot be distinguished so clearly, for we are what we want, i.e. we are someone to the extent that we want something.
be impossible to create, mediate and serve one’s identity, interests and values in relations with other actors. The locus of representation could be understood broadly as any recognisable performance in the name of a meaningful entity although in this research it is very specifically confined to the performance of a particular intermediary between the represented entity and the interpreters.

Another three-dimensionality associated with representation is that of different functions of a representing sign or, as Peirce calls it on some occasions, representamen: “that which refers to ground, correlate, and interpretant” (CP 1.557). There are different divisions of signs that Peirce uses, but he holds as the most fundamental trichotomy of signs that of icon, index, and symbol (EW 2: 483-491). Icon, index and symbol refer to different modes of being of a sign’s object depending on whether the interpretation is directed towards imaginary, actually existing or conventional being.

An icon is a sign of a certain quality as a general possibility. An icon’s vagueness provides it with a capacity to absorb diverse interpretations and any sign, that in some respect reminds an interpreter of a particular object, may be interpreted as an icon representing the object. The only feature that connects an icon to a certain object is the icon’s ability to bring the object to the interpreter’s mind. (EW 2: 291) Therefore, an icon may represent also a non-existent object, which in the social reality means that iconic representation has a potential to bring into being an object that it brings to the minds of interpreters as will be discussed in chapter three. In order to be able to refer to a particular object, an icon must be presented in a way which draws the interpreter’s attention to its characteristics that may be said to convey information about the object that it denotes. An interpretation that creates a link between an icon and a particular object gives, however, no assurance that the object that the icon represents is already actualised. Hence, in social reality a representative having iconic function participates in the formation of the represented object.

An index, in turn, functions as a tool that has a direct connection to the phenomenon it represents. It means that there is a factual relation between sign and object, and the relationship is determined by the object. In representations of entities in social reality, indexicality refers to those features that are directly connected to the identity of the represented being. Generally this dimension has to do with values that direct the performance. A symbol, then, has a conventional relation to an object, i.e. a symbol represents the object contractually. A symbol is interpreted in relation to a certain object regardless of the symbol’s characteristics or any possible factual relation of reference. (EW 2: 292) Symbolic meaning is based on an agreement about what the relation of a certain kind of sign to the represented object is in general
terms. By directing interpretation, this agreement allows individual cases that are agreed to be interpreted according to some general terms to serve purposes not included in the agreement.

Conceptions of phenomena in the social reality and its existence as a whole are constructed in the interactive processes where a more or less shared understanding is achieved among participants. An inchoate object presumes primarily iconic representation. In other words, many seemingly identifiable objects in social reality are brought into being through iconic representation. According to Peirce, a sign’s factual or indexical relation can only emerge from a pre-existing object (EW 2: 291). Similarly, symbolic relation presumes the existence of the object but also an agreement about the referential relation between the object and its representative. When the object of the EU special envoy is the bloc’s institutional being as it appears in the context of an international conflict, there would be three possible interpretations depending on whether the special envoy is understood as an icon, an index or a symbol of the Union’s intermediary role. Due to the present indeterminacy of the CFSP, the emphasis will be on the iconic relation.

**RESEARCH QUESTION AND ORGANISATION OF RESEARCH**

The research question consists of two, to some extent overlapping, parts. The idea is to study the *institutional identity formation* as a four-stage process, performance being the central part of it. Following the Peircean trichotomy of ‘representamen’, locus of representation is then scrutinised in more detail so that the focus is on the *functions of representative*. The primary interest of the research is thus on transformation, first, concerning the represented collective and, second, with regard to the extent that the entity can influence its environment through a particular locus of representation. Hence, the thesis is an exercise on how to better operationalise the constructivist claim that identity formation is primary to promoting values and interests in relations with other actors.

One-sidedness is characteristic to interpretations of international relations (Jervis 1998). To get a more comprehensive picture of a particular phenomenon, we approach it from three different angles. The emphasis is on the formative function of representation, i.e. iconicity, although indexical and symbolic functions are discussed as well. The feasibility of the framework is tried by a case where we interpret the EU’s performance in the Middle East as it appears in the action of the EU special envoy who was nominated in 1996 to represent
the Union in the peace process. His functions are assessed on the basis of the above-presented referential relations. The purpose of the empirical illustration is both to clarify the theoretical construction and to show that performance, however narrowly defined, is multidimensional and involves more than is usually comprised in studies of international actorness.

As will be seen in chapter two, the display of identity construction as a function of representation is meant to provide an answer to the rarely asked but essential question of the present identity discussion, namely, how identity is actually constructed in given circumstances. So far the mainly constructivist identity discussion in IR has produced relatively little theorising or modelling that seeks to offer tools to explain at the micro-level through what kind of activities identities of international actors are constructed. In that sense, the purpose here is to provide a model for theorising day-to-day encounters as a stage in identity formation as well as a means used for both virtuous and selfish ends.

The structure of the work is following. Part I (chapters two and three) is the theoretical contribution. Chapter two begins with an overview on theorising the European integration and discusses considerations behind transformation in general and the European integration process in particular to the extent that it is characterised by an emphasis on process dynamics and practical consequences. The ontological starting point that determines the present constructivist discussion in the discipline of International Relations is pragmatic (See e.g. Guzzini 2000; Checkel 2001). International processes construct and reshape the essence of actors that are involved in them. This participation further makes them redefine their values and interests in terms of evolving institutional identity. Capability for continuous learning enables a gradual change in the actors and their relations to one another.

The third chapter is inspired by Peirce’s theory of signs. Concept of representation is here elaborated and the CFSP community defined as a represented collective. Identity formation and its relation to collective values and interests presented in chapter two are placed in the framework inspired by the Peircean sign system. Social reality is impregnated by representation, since it is only through signs that we acquire knowledge of what we perceive as social reality. Human beings both give meanings to social and material realities and become defined in terms of these realities. As international actors largely belong to the sphere of the socially defined, their existence appears through representation. Signs as the locus of interpretable being are therefore a major interest of study as we seek to understand the identities, values and interests of international actors. Hence, in chapters two and three the tools for analysis are developed so that, taken as a whole, the first part of the research aims to
elaborate how representation functions with respect to both the internal and external transformation processes of international actors.

Part II (chapters four to seven) provides the empirical illustration. In the fourth chapter, the theoretical and methodological tools are connected together in order to be able to show what difference representation makes in practice. The focus is shifted to the interconnectedness of semiotics and dialogical hermeneutics that maintains that interpretation does not follow strictly the original intention but is (re-)creative. This ‘fusion’ provides a methodology for analysis based on the categories of iconic, indexical and symbolic representation and, further, on subtler dimensions that reflect the emerging understanding about (i) the special envoy’s significance to the foreign policy profiling of the Union, i.e. its identity formation, (ii) the special envoy’s actual function with respect to the advancement of the peace process, and (iii) how the special envoy might serve the Union’s and its member states’ possible self-interests that are only indirectly linked to a just settlement of the conflict.

The apparent methodological (con-)fusion of semiotic and hermeneutic elements is traceable to the work of a contemporary of Peirce, philosopher J.G. Droysen who expanded Romantic hermeneutics into a historical method. To him, totality of past is present in individual events that are interpretable expressions of what happened and what was done. (Bleicher 1980, 17-18) These expressions are, in Peircean vocabulary, signs that become meaningful in different contexts of interpretation. A researcher studies the expressions, the interpretable signs, by suggesting possible understandings, which the expressions then either confirm or resist. The first-order interpreter of the ‘semiotic triangle’ is not, however, the researcher but any of those actors (or agents representing them) that actually have participated in the process where significance is given to representation.

The scope of studying semiotic representation in the sense that Peirce understood it should include all kinds of representational practices, not only those that strictly follow the linguistic tradition of semantic theorising. “In its broadest sense, what is true and necessary of signs will be of use to any science which employs signs for its particular purpose; and, of course, every science uses signs as a means of investigation into its particular subject” (Liszka 1996, 9). And not only does every science use signs; signs are part of every sphere of our social being. Thus, for instance, it is not merely International Relations as a social scientific discipline where semiotics is applicable. The similar triadic relations of sign, object and interpretant can be found in the practical sphere of international relations where the first-order interpretation takes place.

The organisation of chapters five to seven (the practical application) follows the Peircean division of signs, so that in chapter five the iconic features of the
EU’s performance are elaborated as they appear in the action of the special envoy and his team. As we maintain that the EU’s foreign policy identity is formed in political processes, the question that needs to be answered is how the EU’s identity is produced in day-to-day encounters. Chapter five could thus be regarded as an account of how the EU as a “subject constituted through the address of the Other becomes then a subject capable of addressing others” (Butler 1997, 26). The significance of representation for an internal transformation process is the central question to be examined.

Chapter six focuses on indexical connection between the sign (the special envoy) and his object (the CFSP in terms of the EU’s actorness in the Middle East). The practical achievements and insufficiencies in terms of the peace process are elaborated here. And finally, chapter seven concentrates on the functions that a sign is seen to perform when it is interpreted as a symbol of the object it denotes, meaning in this particular case that the conventional understanding about the action of a third party as a neutral tool allows the EU special envoy to serve self-interests that have no direct link to those purposes that are explicitly described in his mandate and thus would belong to the indexical dimension of his performance.

The primary sources of the case study illustrating the theoretical framework consist mainly of foreign policy officials’ accounts of the significance of the special envoy’s action. An important contribution to the analysis is due to interviews with political and economic advisers of the EU special representative, EU member states’ foreign ministry officials (mainly former and present members of the Council working group for the Middle East), Russian special envoy to the Middle East peace process, and Israeli, Palestinian and Saudi Arabian sources. Non-scheduled structured interviews allowed the interviewees to elaborate on certain points while still ensuring that they covered specific areas of interest. In many cases, the officials spoke on condition of anonymity. Therefore they have been referred to as an official from the respective state. In addition, the research is supplemented with journalistic accounts and other primary source materials including governmental and EU documents. Especially concerning the early stage of the mandate, the study relies primarily on civil servants’ and politicians’ comments and interviews available via Reuters news archives. The interviews as well as the other primary source materials are understood to be excerpts of interpretations to be further interpreted by the researcher.

9 It is worth emphasising here that although references are made throughout the text to the performance of the special envoy, he is not working as a single person but together with political, economic and security advisers who are seconded from member states’ foreign ministries.
Peirce continued to write about signs throughout his life and attached to them a particular importance, which could have been reflected in practical applications of his theory more often than has happened. His view of the triadic relations of representation can be utilised in a wide range of studies on social phenomena beyond the strictly limited scope of the semantic field or studies on meanings of concrete inanimate icons, indices and symbols such as photographs. The Peircean sign system was a major source of inspiration for this study. Yet the idea was not to follow the philosophical bypaths that lead both to inconsistencies and fascinating constructions of Peirce’s thought. What follows is probably a relatively unconventional combination of constructivist study on IR and Peirce’s ideas. Nonetheless the study is deeply rooted in Peirce’s core ideas of how various forms of representation function in the interpretative processes.

Finally, I would like to prime a reader familiar and comfortable with more conventional approaches for the work at hand by the following words of John E. Smith (1965, 92): “[Y]ou have to be prepared for surprises; you have to be tough-minded enough to consider the possibility that things may in fact prove to be very different from the way you have long since decided that they must be”.

PART I

CHANGING SELVES
CHANGING OTHERS:
HOW TO THEORISE IDENTITY
IN IR
2.

PRAGMATIC PATH FROM COMPATIBLE INTERESTS TO A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY IDENTITY?

Some of the fundamental objectives of the CFSP introduced in the Treaty on European Union (TEU, Maastricht Treaty) are “to preserve peace and strengthen international security” and “to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (European Communities 1992). Yet the circumstances on the ground sometimes clearly exceed the Union’s capabilities to act, and the reluctance of the whole international community to get involved may give an excuse for not taking position in terms of the CFSP as happened, for instance, with regard to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Potentially, taking an active stance with regard to opportunities to act in accordance with the CFSP objectives would contribute to creating an international profile for the Union as a political actor. (See e.g. Hill and Wallace 1996; Sjursen 1999) But besides the lack of capabilities and will to get involved, another reason for the lack of a joint Western European actoriness is often incompatible national interests among some EU member states. As long as the principal member states are not willing to authorise the EU to represent their joint positions in foreign policy matters, the Union will not be able to develop a political weight commensurate with its economic strength.

An indicator in analysing the severity and frequency of international conflicts is the fact that since 1993, i.e. after the ratification of the Treaty on European Union, more than forty of them have been categorised as “major armed conflicts”, meaning that each of them has caused a total of more than one thousand casualties (See e.g. SIPRI Yearbook 2000). Conclusions about their possible consequences on the EU and the development of the CFSP cannot, however, be drawn solely on the basis of human loss, even if it is probable that especially the devastating conflicts with human rights abuses have affected CFSP formulations, made the Union try to improve its capabilities to act and,
at the same time, increased expectations about the Union’s international role (Tank 1998, 19). Yet the attention that the Union pays on different conflicts outside its borders varies significantly independent of their severity and therefore one cannot interpret or foresee the EU reaction solely on that basis. A central question seems to be the interests of some of the member states to influence or refrain from influencing the course of events. Often, a factor affecting the EU’s willingness to get involved is the geographic distance of the conflict region and possible security threats or other negative consequences that the escalation or prolonging of the conflict might cause to the Union or some of its member states. Contrary to what could be interpreted from the mainstream theorising of international relations, these kinds of interests are not exogenously given but derive from institutional identity.

In the first sub-section of this chapter we review the mainstream ideas in theorising the European integration, particularly neofunctionalism that seeks to provide an (at least partial) answer to the question of dynamic change in the sphere of international relations. After summarising well-known shortcomings of the mainstream theories, we turn to discuss what a constructivist approach could offer for improving the understanding of international transformation and, in particular, developments that are taking place in European foreign policy making.

The EU member states cannot ignore their different legacies that have shaped their political culture. But they seek to overcome the problem of different values and conflicting interests that hamper their co-operation in relations with the wider world. Their action in the context of the prolonged conflict in the Middle East is an illustrative example both of the desire to find a common view in a very important but sensitive field beyond the economic involvement, and of the Union’s inability to increase its political weight when the interests of one or more member states are at stake. The Council and the Commission have repeatedly emphasised the importance of the Union as the biggest donor for Palestinians and the region as a whole, and claimed its legitimate right to get to the stage of political play. Yet, most of the time, the EU has been careful not to step on US toes.

The Western European entity actively sought a role as an influential third party in the Middle East already when there was no concept of common foreign policy. But especially after the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, the Union has been remarkably eager to contribute to the process only to come time and again to the conclusion that the political weight of the Union has remained marginal when compared to its economic weight or the weight of the United States. The EU has repeatedly expressed its wish to “participate in international arrangements agreed by the parties to guarantee peace […]”,
“use its influence to encourage all the parties to support the peace process unconditionally […]” and “make its contribution to defining the future shape of relations between the regional parties […]” (European Union 1994a). The explicitly stated purpose is to support regional stability by using wider repertoire and intensifying the efforts. Yet an underlying question seems to be about the EU gaining political space among international actors and constructing its political identity through involvement and recognition.

External opportunities provide an actor with the possibility to define itself in the course of its performance. As will be discussed below, beside performance, identity as a coherent idea of who the actor is has three ‘phases’: To come to existence identity has to be imagined, named and recognised (Frijhoff 1992; Saukkonen 1996). The importance of performance is stressed here, for the ‘other selves’ can only ‘react’ in a concrete context where the imagined and named object is situated in place and time through performance. Neither should the significance of recognition be underestimated for ‘other selves’ are needed not only as passive objects of distinction but also as active subjects who may or may not accept the claimed identity and interact with the actor under construction as if it already had the claimed identity (See Ricoeur 1990, 14).

In this chapter we present the logic of identity formation as this kind of four-phase process. Then, after elaborating the European Union’s actorness as a foreign policy self in general, we will focus on the EU’s economic and political performances in the Middle East, and finally on the Union’s representation through the work of the special envoy in the peace process.

The influential relationship between a performing self and the context of performance is reciprocal. The core question in studying change that takes place in conflictual contexts is thus about functions: First, the function of the conflict in the identity formation of an international actor and second, the function of an international actor as a third party in peace process. These functions need to be somehow channelled in practical policy making in order that their potential will be realised in dynamic interaction. The ‘channelling’ further adds a third dimension to the discussion about functions. It is related to such purposes of a particular kind of ‘channelling’ that is only indirectly related to a third party involvement in a conflict. After elaborating the identity formation in this chapter, these three functions will then be discussed in chapter three as different dimensions of a performance.
2.1.

**QUESTION OF CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATORY PROCESS IN INTEGRATION THEORIES**

One of the central features of pragmatism is its emphasis on dynamics, which also characterises this study. The fundamental difference that pragmatism brought to the mainstream philosophical discussion can be summarised in Ayer’s (1968, 15-16) words: “In contrast to philosophers like Plato and Descartes who adopt the standpoint of a pure intelligence in contemplation of eternal verities, the pragmatists put themselves in the position of an enquirer adapting himself to and helping to modify a changing world”.

It was the American philosopher, Charles Peirce, who introduced the term ‘pragmatism’ into philosophical literature. Originating in Peirce’s philosophical considerations, pragmatism—or what Peirce later called pragmaticism—has been defined as the method of reflection, in which the study of philosophy consists. This definition involves the idea that pragmatism “is guided by constantly holding in view its purpose and the purpose of the ideas it analyzes, whether these ends be of the nature and uses of action or of thought” (CP 5.13n; see also Apel 1981; Davidson 1968; Taylor 1966).

Pragmatism as a philosophical approach, according to which action is both prerequisite for and objective of knowledge, assesses the meaning of conceptions and acts on the basis of their practical consequences: “In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception” (CP 5.9). When understood in a broad sense, practical consequences of an intellectual conception refer to a description of action having a particular aim. Thus, *how* the conception causes us to act “cannot refer to the description of mechanical motions that it might cause […] In order to understand pragmatism, […] it is incumbent upon us to inquire what an ultimate aim, capable of being pursued in an indefinitely prolonged course of action, can be” (CP 5.135; see also Bernstein 1965; Smith 1978, 14). This excerpt makes it clear that the question of ultimate aim is not structural but practical. As far as primacy of practice is concerned, a similar attitude is typical to pragmatically oriented approaches in International Relations, and particularly evident in the integration theories to which Mitranian functionalism is an intellectual ancestor.
Pragmatic orientation was the overarching characteristic of Mitranian functionalism that introduced the idea to the IR discussions that form follows function. Functionalism stresses the development of relationships according to the requirements of the function, problem or task to be dealt with. Hence, in a heterogeneous collective, fusion of interests becomes important in order that the dynamics of process and momentum of change are not interrupted by an insuperable conflict of interests.

Functionalism was a predecessor to a supranational paradigm of European integration. Contrary to federalists who adopted a bottom-up model of integration, functionalists opted for a ‘top-down’ model, according to which the integration is fundamentally an endeavour of European political and economic elites. The firm belief in the capabilities of administrative elites to create a functioning supranational system that would benefit both elites and the masses was the ground for their support for a technocratic logic of integration. Among other similarities, neofunctionalism was also in this respect an heir of functionalism as it maintains the idea that integration does not depend initially on mass support.

As David Mitrany was the founding father of European pragmatism in integration discourses of academic circles, among practitioners the position was indisputably held by Jean Monnet who was convinced that adjustment of practical recommendations towards supranationalism needed to reflect current political realities. The emphasis on continuous process instead of a revolutionary ‘over-night’ change of structures into a federal model distinguished Mitrany and Monnet from federalists. The aim of Mitrany and Monnet was to establish the foundations of a functional community—for Mitrany the goal was a global ‘working peace system’ while Monnet’s vision applied to Europe only. (O’Neill 1996)

One very central idea of functionalism that dominated the theoretical integration debates since the 1950s—and, in a less linear sense, of neofunctionalism—is the gradual deepening of integration within certain functionally specified fields (technical spill-over), which would further encourage integration in other fields that are closely linked to those that are integrated in the first place (functional spill-over). Furthermore, political spill-over is expected to happen so that interest groups turn their attention from the national to the regional level. (McCormick 1996, 16-17) As Schuman (1950/2001) put it,

Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. [...] In this way, there will be realized simply and speedily that fusion of interest
Hence, the aim was right from the beginning of European integration to incrementally bridge the gaps between member states by establishing functionally specific structures and policy guidelines that make the member states dependent on each other.

Among functionalists there was an underlying assumption that co-operation in various economic and technical fields would eventually contribute to integration in the political sphere as well. Mitrany’s (1975, 115) idea was that development should proceed naturally, “binding together those interests which are common, where they are common, and to the extent to which they are common”. Mitrany’s assumption of ever increasing interdependence was based on his optimism about the learning process that takes place in the context of positive experiences. He believed that functional dimensions of action determine themselves and nearly automatically lead to the creation of appropriate functional organs and political instruments. The weakness of this approach was clearly the blind faith in technocracy that resulted in underestimating the thoroughly political nature of many complicated problems and the lack of political will to compromise national interests and sovereignty.

Downplaying the abidingly political nature of international relations led functionalism to ignore the role of legitimisation in functional development, i.e. whether it is seen as acceptable to move certain issue areas to the control of supranational organisations and to create co-operative interdependence into the framework of action in various sectors. Mitrany (1975, 113) stressed the trend of organising administrative tasks to follow practical requirements rather than constitutional norms. He saw this as a necessary development not only in the levels of municipal or state governance but also internationally.10

Functionally constituted international organisations were expected to create new dynamics of international relations—or, eventually, global affairs. Mitrany’s ideal was thus a functional integration at the global level but his legacy to theorising regional integration stayed alive especially in subsequent research on neofunctionalism. However, the neofunctionalist understanding of international change differed somewhat from Mitranian account, particularly

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10 Despite the functionalist criticism towards nation-states, the aim of functionalism was not, according to Taylor (1990, 130-131), to abolish governments from the international sphere but to change the framework of action so that the emphasis is on co-operation rather than self-sufficiency and autonomy. The intention of functionalism was thus not to do away with politics but to change its content. It assumed that increasing the contacts would create a basis for strengthening co-operation and in this way harmonise the positions of participants.
in regard to Mitrany’s global focus. Furthermore, neofunctionalism was less concerned with a moral basis and concentrated, instead, on empiricist analysis of the actual integration process in Europe.

Leaving aside a major value-based principle of functionalism concerning the transfer of loyalty from nation-states to functional international organisations, we concentrate here on the procedural logic of integration. Hence, the emphasis is on Mitrany’s (1975) pragmatic argument about integration as a learning process where structures are based on co-operative functions, meaning that the forms or frameworks of interaction follow the learning processes that take place in functional co-operation. What the neofunctionalist explanation maintained of the Mitranian approach to the dynamics of regional integration was the pragmatic core, the idea that form follows function. This means that institution building is a flexible process that advances in terms of human needs that change over time. To apply this idea to the EU’s political performance in a conflictual context, activities in the name of the EU, its representations, seek to respond to the need for a joint action, which the conflict generates. The institutional identity formation then would follow the function of representation.

Following the Mitranian tradition, neofunctionalism maintains this fundamental assumption: Frameworks for co-operation are not to be created overnight on the basis of a comprehensive plan but are constructed via concrete achievements that deepen the solidarity of members. In this sense, the tone of neofunctionalism echoes Mitrany’s pragmatic idea that unity develops from practical co-operation to construction of structures—and not vice versa. The famous formulation of functionalist thesis ‘form follows function’ is based on the common-sense idea that what people do together affects the way they perceive each other and a positive shared experience creates favourable attitudes towards further co-operation among those who experience the joint success. This functionalist route to integration relies on the idea of an intrinsic dynamic according to which the technical and functional process would continue. The change would eventually have an influence on political values and lead to a cognitive change in political elites. The basic principle of this pattern of thought denotes the collective act of settling opinion, fixing belief in a common goal, and joint effort. The question is not necessarily about finding the most rational way of acting but about attaining beliefs. In the case of this study, belief in unity in foreign policy matters is under scrutiny.

Peirce mentions four different ways to stabilise one’s beliefs. Of these methods, the method of authority is worth mentioning here. (See CP 5.379-381) When “the fixation of belief” is carried out on the basis of institutional backing, the question is about collectively acceptable construction of truth. The method of authority provides a firm framework for the fixation of beliefs
in the sphere of social reality where the ‘truths’ are not testable in strict natural scientific terms but where the question is rather about social facts, argumentation and beliefs concerning institutional being and collective identification within it. (See Liu 1997) Peirce’s assumption was that we wish to find ourselves in agreement with one another.11 In the framework of the European Union, the construction of truth within the collective being primarily depends on the agreement of political and economic elites who belong to the epistemic communities in each functional sector of integration.

‘Truths’ in the field of international relations as well as in other spheres of social reality are created on the basis of common agreement. When a collective reaches a common stance with regard to how its members see and interpret certain matters, they have created a truth, the validity of which can further be negotiated with other international actors. Dynamics of change that have been stressed by pragmatists both within the philosophical movement and in special sciences are applicable not only in explaining the changing environment of action but also, and more fundamentally, in understanding the function of action as the prime mover of the change both externally and internally (See e.g. Festenstein 2002).

Mitrany (1975, 128-129) held that “[s]overeignty cannot in fact be transferred effectively through a formula, only through a function.” According to him, we may witness this kind of sharing of sovereignty when e.g. “ten or twenty national authorities, each of which had performed a certain task for itself, can be induced to perform the task jointly [so that] they will to that end quite naturally pool their sovereign authority insofar as the good performance of the task demands it”. The idea of pragmatically oriented approaches to the European integration is thus to emphasise that change needs to be a dynamic and continuous process. The present debate around foreign policy integration includes similar elements to those that were discussed half a century ago. An essential question in this debate is whether it is possible to expand the scope of pragmatically oriented integration to the sensitive realm of foreign policy co-operation, or whether member states are again trying to push integration beyond its ‘natural drive’ for functional unity as they were accused of trying to do in 1950. (Baylis and Smith 2001; Moravcsik 1998; Rosamond 2000)

Among others, Hoffmann (1964) criticised neofunctionalism for its failure to deal with the exogenous context of regional integration, such as the presence of other international actors that have to be taken into account. Neofunctionalists sought to respond to the criticism by developing the so-called externalisation hypothesis. The externalisation hypothesis refers to the need of a collective’s

11 About authority and psychological conditions of human sciences, see Gadamer 1979, 5-10.
members to create common policies with regard to ‘third parties’ that are not directly involved in the integration and thus are not part of the inner circle of the process but who, nevertheless, have influence on the process and are affected by it. Interaction with these ‘significant others’ is what Schmitter (1969), among others, calls externalisation. In principle, externalisation may originate also from external actors if they treat a regional organisation as an entity even when its members are not confident about their unity or are reluctant to hand over their positions of power to supranational organs. But a certain internal sense of togetherness is needed in order for the idea of unity to be ‘sold’ to external actors. Often one important motivation for deepening integration is the willingness to increase the weight of the collective in relation to other international actors.

In the Westphalian state system, high politics has defined distinct state identities, and foreign and security policy is by many seen as the last fortress of traditional state sovereignty. This duality divides political life into domestic and international spheres. (For an outline, see Cini 2003; Mansbach 1989) As the creation of transnational functional networks blurs the political boundaries, the resistance to supranational developments continues to be very firm in many EU member states where political elites are not ready to compromise the national sovereignty that ever deeper supranational integration threatens to erode.

The persistence of strongholds of state sovereignty has led many observers to conclude that greater importance in European integration should be attached to states and the close interaction in Europe should be analysed as a form of intergovernmental co-operation. Intergovernmentalism, to some extent drawn from neorealism’s state-centric assumptions, emerged out of a critique of neo-functionalism. Since the early 1990s, Andrew Moravcsik (1993; 1998) has been the most prominent representative of liberal intergovernmentalism which holds the nation-state as the core element of any international relations and focuses on economic interests and the relative bargaining power of states. Liberal intergovernmentalism may well apply to the kind of high-profile moves that involve interstate negotiations and remain in the pages of history as significant steps. But when it comes to day-to-day policy making and transformation by smaller steps, Moravcsik’s theory lacks the means to analyse and explain it. (See Cini 2003)

Even if supranational orientation does not seem to get a strong foothold in all spheres of European integration, it does not mean that the influence of successful co-operation is blocked to the frontiers of high politics. On the contrary, the similar logic of learning by doing that is present in supranational integration can be claimed to work also in intergovernmental integration (See
Soetendorp 2002). It has potential to bring member states’ political preferences and identities ever closer to each other, thereby providing the collective with a sense of togetherness that strengthens its position with regard to other international actors. Hence, as soon as intergovernmentalists free themselves from their need to hold international actors and their relations as a static state of affairs, it can be argued that the intergovernmentalist paradigm of European integration will regain its viability in describing the contemporary integration process in the sphere of high politics. The learning process in high policy matters can be seen as a gradual shift towards compatible or similar although not necessarily common interests through changes that take place in state identities.

According to those in favour of intergovernmental explanations, the supranational model cannot work when each government, however much lip service it pays to the idea of a common good, actually wants to follow a road of its own, and when the roads the governments propose to travel are so far apart that the statesmen are not willing to trust their travel plans to an agency that may push them into detours they do not want to take towards destinations they do not want to reach.12

From this perspective the central argument seems to be that the European endeavour in the foreign policy sphere is not a common one but, instead, one based on co-operation to the extent that the member states consider it to be profitable to themselves (Moravcsik 1998, 473). Yet, instead of being merely “arenas for acting out power relations”, international institutions have the potential to actively construct “legally enshrined focal points [that] can gain a high degree of legitimacy both internationally and domestically” (Martin and Simmons 1998, 746). Co-operation results in learning processes that gradually make the interests of the participants more compatible also in the sphere of high politics.

Neofunctionalism and regime theory agree that the driving force in the integration process is the estimation of how co-operation best serves the national interests of each member state. (O’Neill 1996, 102-104; see also Adler and Barnett 1996; Tooze 1990) This obviously concerns especially the core issues of traditional state sovereignty, such as foreign policy, where the original motivation for willingness to create co-operative networks is primarily national. Nonetheless, interaction may change perceptions of interests and lead to new interpretations of the possible benefits and disadvantages of further co-

operation. Both external and internal incentives and constraints direct the evolution of interpretations. Negotiations further foster the sense of common interests and reinforce the idea of the EU’s emerging foreign policy identity that does not refer primarily to structural arrangements but to the degree of agreement about goals and means among political elites in EU member states.

Clearly, the European integration process cannot be defined in terms of a singular dynamic, whether supranational or intergovernmental. The complex interaction within the EU and in its relations with other international actors has contained and is likely to contain for the foreseeable future both of these elements. Political cohesion increases, but the sovereignty of other members is respected. Yet pragmatism in its original sense can still be seen as an overarching principle directing the integration. An implication of new practical arrangements for mutual advantage will be a stronger sense of common purpose, but it is unlikely that we will witness a clear shift from intergovernmentalism to supranationalism in high politics.

The shape, pace and outcomes of the European integration process cannot be plausibly predicted. It follows that the lack of certainty is inclined to maintain the central role of states in high policy matters: Why transfer power to supranational institutions whose future seems so ambivalent? The ambiguity and paradoxes of integration are not, however, all-embracing. The same pragmatic grip that characterised the early texts of Mitrany and other functionalists continues to flow in the present integration discourses that reflect the reality where learning plays a significant part in the transformation processes that are driven by pragmatic considerations rather than ideological preferences or structural integration for its own sake. (Haas 2001; Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996)

In present discussions, neofunctionalism is an undertone for various integration theories, such as regime theory, that claim to shed light on the logic of processes where international change takes place in various political and economic transactions. As O’Neill (1996, 47) reminds, contemporary developments in integration theory are indebted to neofunctionalist attempts to formulate the concepts and means to interpret the logic of community building and changing patterns of collective identity formation. By directing attention to processes where functional co-operation shapes political change, neofunctionalism has given a further impetus to theoretical debates on how collective understandings emerge and how actors’ identities are constructed.13

13 Focusing in particular on Wendt and Ruggie, Sterling-Folker (2000) discusses the functional logic of constructivism and argues that “Wendt has simply rediscovered functionalism” (2000, 107). Although her conclusion may be disputed, it is obvious that pragmatically oriented integration theories have influenced the wide variety of constructivist approaches.
2.2. Institutional Identity Formation

Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 33), following Allen and Smith (1990, 19-22), define presence in terms of imagination, perceptions and expectations so that presence is not merely a notion applicable to actors such as individuals and organisations. But unlike Allen and Smith, Bretherton and Vogler emphasise that presence and actorness are conceptually distinguishable, actorness relating to the capacity to act whereas “presence is a function of being rather than action”. Presence in this sense is thus not directly linked to purposive external action but is a precondition for actorness. In order to be able to act and have an impact on the external environment, one has to exist, to be present. Yet, pragmatically oriented approaches presume that action construes being. Hence, similar to functionalist argument that form is based on and preceded by function, those approaches that focus on identities claim that action or, better, interaction creates and shapes the identities of international subjects that participate in the interactive processes. (E.g. Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 1999; Ringmar 1996; Wendt 1999) This overlap with neofunctionalist premises makes Haas (2001, 29) conclude that “[c]onstructivists can easily subsume NF’s [neofunctionalism’s] concern with political community formation under their more general interest in processes of international co-operation and value integration.”

Actorness means active participation in external affairs. Implicitly, this presupposes that the actor is capable of creating connections to other actors, since a trait of actorness is interactivity. To be constituted and regarded as an actor, one has to be willing and able to express oneself in given circumstances. In a sense, the question is about ‘talking the same language’ with significant others which centrally concerns the positioning of acting selves and thus producing recognisable forms of subjectivity. An interactive character of actorness involves that the actor “acts precisely to the extent that he or she is constituted as an actor” (Butler 1997, 16; see also Banerjee 1998; Monar 1997; on pragmatic constructivism Haas and Haas 2002).

In international relations, the traditional definition of the actor—an interacting collective subject—has equalled to state. The global self-reflection of international actors has therefore been framed by the naturalised assumption of political realism that fully authorised participation in international policy making requires the status given exclusively to states. To defend one’s interests, one is expected to have the internal and external legitimacy that is seen to
belong exclusively to sovereign states. Legitimacy in this context reflects the belief that the form and functions of a given actor are regarded as just by its constituent parts and other actors because it embodies accepted justificatory principles. In practice, the question is about showing that action is concerned with appropriate objectives or follows appropriate patterns.\textsuperscript{14} From an institutional perspective, legitimacy is a condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, or consonance with relevant rules or laws. According to Berger and Luckmann (1966, 93), legitimisation, having a cognitive as well as normative element, “justifies the institutional order by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives” and explains the order “by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated meanings”.\textsuperscript{15}

However, as constructivists emphasise, even the state is a product of the social construction process. Any social actor is in a sense imagined and the action that we study as political scientists is the interaction of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1991). The opening of the black box has led to new definitions of actorness in terms of world politics and linked the discussion to a wider debate on international relations where the following questions are asked: Are states the only actors, or can other entities be dealt with as actors in the international system, too? What would these other actors be and how is their actorness constructed?

Actorness does not equal to a coherent identity that is the foundation of meaning and understanding about the self as a subject capable of reflecting and interpreting. Actorness is closely linked rather to roles that organise functions and do not require distinctive, high-profile identity (Hill 1993). But actorness serves as a bearer of identity by offering surfaces where events and interaction need to be interpreted. Thus, we could say that identity is the form while actorness is the function. Identity organises the meaning while actorness

\textsuperscript{14} See Sending (2002) about normative rationality of action. I have no intention to discuss here the problems related to non-state actors’ legal personality or lack of it, i.e. the problem of actorness and legitimacy in terms of international law. On EU’s legal status, see Cremona 1998; Neuwahl 1998; Wessel 1997. Tietje (1997) presents a view on the consistency and coherence of the CFSP from a legal perspective.

\textsuperscript{15} ‘Objectivated meanings’ refer in the most basic sense to the process of linguistic objectification that is essential for any understanding of social life. As Berger and Luckmann (1966, 60-61) have observed, “[d]espite the objectivity that marks the social world in human experience, it does not thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the human activity that produces it”. The paradox is that people are capable of producing a world that they then experience as something other than a human product. A related theme concerns responsibility in the international system: If a state is the sole legitimate actor, can individuals or organisations be held responsible for certain deeds? (See Lang 1999)
is concerned with organising practical functions. In identity formation, the organisation of meaning is situated in a broader sense of the entity or the whole where the spatio-temporally produced meaning is detached from its natural context and placed in relation to the already existing source of experience that is the basis of choices directing the upcoming intentional action. Ultimately, the question is about producing and reproducing subjectivity, for an experience and its meaning are reflected to understandings about experiencing self.

There are some basic differences between individual and collective identities that need to be taken into account. Unlike individual self, collective self lacks the ‘natural’ elements of being, including indisputable boundaries. Collective being involves an internal negotiation process besides the relation to the external other that also characterises the formation process of individual self. Basically, collective identity as the foundation of meaning for the members of the collective can be seen to be composed of three elements: consciousness, continuity and otherness. (On otherness, see Neumann 1999, 1-37) Consciousness means spatial awareness of the existence of a coherent self. Continuity, then, implies temporal consistency and relative stability of the essential so that characteristics remain even if members change (Cf. Skinner 1989, 102). Existence of the other is needed both as an external object of distinction and a recogniser of the group’s feeling of community.

Traditionally, the meaning of otherness has been that of creating and strengthening the idea of the self as something separate and different from the other, but it can also be understood as difference with oneself in another time (Neumann 1999, Zehfuss 2001b). This kind identification through separation is consciously chosen. As Shapiro (1988, 101-102) says,

> [t]he making of the Other as something foreign is thus not an innocent exercise in differentiation. It is closely linked to how the self is understood. A self construed with a security-related identity leads to the construction of otherness on the axis of threats or lack of threats to that security, while a self identified as one engaged in “crisis management” […] will create modes of otherness on a ruly-versus-unruly axis.

Another function that the other has in the construction of the self is that the identity to come into existence needs to be recognised by others.

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16 To distinguish identity conceptually from role, Castells (1997, 7) defines the latter as organisation of functions while the former means organisation of meaning—‘meaning’ is to be understood here as a social actor’s identification of the purpose of his/its action.
Saukkonen (1996) discusses an idea presented by historian Willem Frijhoff (1992) who regards collective identity formation as a three-phase process. First of these is imagining the existence of a coherent self. The second stage is naming the self, which means that imagined qualities are placed into a whole that has outer borders and internal structure. The third stage is recognition by ‘other selves’ which means that the identity under construction needs to be both accepted and continuously identified by significant others. Yet, this approach may be deemed inadequate when considered in terms of realisation of imagined and named being. In addition to the role of other actors, interactive formation of identity requires active performance by the one whose identity is to be recognised. Performance is the core of any construction of social being. Only what is expressed, i.e. brought into awareness of the other by a performative act, may be recognised.

Since institutions cannot be created instantaneously but are based on internal and external negotiation processes and agreements, institutions are always products of history. They come into being as established patterns of activity that ultimately seem to have a life of their own, separate from the life of those who are acting on behalf of the institutions. This is due to the regularity which is characteristic to any institution and which actually makes them exist. What follows from the institutional demand for regularity is that in order to be able to function in its relations with the ‘world outside’, an institution also presupposes a certain degree of regularity from its surroundings. In this respect, the social reality is institutions that further create institutionalising practices within and between themselves. The picture remains, however, too static and gives an idea of social reality being largely predictable, what it in practice is not. Practices are in flux and long-term developments cannot be predicted despite plans and decisions that people make in order to master the future. This unpredictability (and coincidences, we could say) creates a tension between institutionalisation and irregularity. (On various forms of institutional analysis, see Aspinwall and Schneider 2001)

Not only long-term developments are subject to unpredictability but also events that take place in a shorter period of time are often more or less random due to the interactive character of the social reality. If an individual could act independently of the others and the circumstances, he could be said to be able to carry out his plans without a need to take into consideration the random factors that normally cause changes in his planned patterns of activities. This is not to say that human beings are ‘victims of circumstances’ in any sense but

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17 Haas and Haas (2002) present an idea of pragmatic constructivism that takes foreign policy as an institution instead of focusing on ‘formal institutions’ such as a state or the EU.
it is to say that social reality in general and international affairs in particular are the outcome of no overall plan. Both continuity and unpredictability are features of reality. We seek to recreate frames that make it easier to be prepared for the unforeseen which nevertheless appears as surprising or, at least, difficult to predict. Referring to negotiations to establish an international trade regime, Ruggie (1998a, 21) describes them as “established intersubjective frameworks of meaning that included a shared narrative about the conditions that had made these regimes necessary and what they were intended to accomplish”. This in turn generated a shared interpretation concerning “the appropriateness of future acts that they could not possibly foresee”. This kind of legitimating story-telling and future-oriented organisation of being necessarily takes place in any institutional setting of a collective actor that aims to occupy or maintain a place among other actors.

To make the course of events meaningful is a condition for continuity of interaction. It is more the stories that we tell about events than any pre-existing well-laid plans that give coherence to events. “[C]haos and confusion are not intellectually and psychologically satisfying explanations”, Jervis (1976, 322) reminds, and therefore accidents and chance are rarely considered to be a significant part of social reality as such. Instead they are made significant in terms of a reasonably organised intersubjective reality, in reconstruction of which ability to tell a coherent and plausible story plays an essential part (See e.g. Banerjee 1998, 193-195; Giddens 1991, 54). Yet, without unpredictable events there would be no need to re-imagine and rename actorness. Collective being is told into being in relation to external ‘invitations’ or ‘demands’ to perform which, thereby, provide conditions for recognition.

2.2.1. Imagining

*The problems of the world cannot possibly be solved by sceptics or cynics whose horizons are limited by the obvious realities. We need men who can dream of things that never were.*

– John F. Kennedy

*The empires of the future are the empires of the mind.*

– Winston Churchill
These thoughts expressed on the opposite sides of the Atlantic Ocean adeptly crystallise the significance of imagination in the formation of institutional selves. Imagination is conceptually connected to idea, for an image encloses ‘idea’ or ‘ideal’ as a principle that guides human beings in their modes of action, expectations and aspirations as well as in their attitudes toward themselves and the social reality. (See Morgan 2000) In other words, ‘idea’ is a general notion exhibited, more or less successfully, in human conduct. Assessments of success and failure are related to certain aspirations and expectations about the progress or development of ‘hidden potentialities’ of actors whose action is motivated by the aspirations and expectations. Imagination is the source of social existence but not in the sense that any idea of being would be realised in the same form as it has been imagined. Image is a collection of ideas into a coherent imaginable being that often serves as an idealised picture of what is actually expressed in social reality. Image thus connotes the ‘ought to’ approach as a contrast to what actually ‘is’.

A philosophical point of reference for this kind of approach is to be found in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, where the role of the ‘ideal’ is best understood in terms of the notion of a language game. Wittgenstein did not use ‘language games’ in reference to linguistic practices but rather to ideals, ‘objects of comparison’:

> Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regularization of language—as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air-resistance. The language-games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities. For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison—as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond.

(Wittgenstein 1968, §§130-131)

The idea of a mode of existence in social reality is a language game that serves a methodological purpose in making sense of everyday life. When understood in this way, the language game is not a method to be used by researchers whose task is to describe and interpret the descriptions and interpretations people make of reality in order to organise their interaction, but rather an ahistorical ‘object’ in the description of the actual use of language. Similarly, any social phenomenon can be said to have an ideal being, a theoretical model of ‘how it should work’ in the absence of unforeseen events that break the illusion that the ideal could actually be reached. It is in this sense that Weiler (1999, 240) notes the lack of “systematic analysis of ideals—as distinct from the objectives—of European integration”.
Another meaning that an ideal being of social phenomena has refers to a future state of affairs, the objectives that are thought to be reached by progress\textsuperscript{18}. Ideals as futuristic desired states of affairs do not, however, constitute in themselves a program for realisation of what they regard as worth realising.

In the first sense, ideals are our tools to interpret the social reality that we live in and to define our identity. The second understanding takes an ideal as a goal and even if it does not contain a means to achieve the desired, it provides a schema for which we are willing to mobilise our strength and abilities. Neither of these understandings of ideal being is a clear and coherent picture but generally a vague and changing object of comparison.\textsuperscript{19} Nonetheless, their significance should not be underestimated for their function is fundamental in the construction of social reality. Both of these approaches aim at offering a framework for action. The main difference is that the former holds reality as an undisciplined and, to a certain extent, irrational construction whereas the latter understanding emphasises actors’ potential to progress via rational action that fixes the present actions and events to the ideal, the model towards which rational decisions guide the whole humanity. (On rationality in IR, Kahler 1998; see also Keohane 1989)

An ideal is a social construction, in terms of which (non-ideal) interaction is carried out, understood and interpreted. “The possible worlds of imagination can be made real by action” (Kearney 1988, 120) but conformity of the actual interaction to the ideal should not be dogmatically presupposed.\textsuperscript{20} However, certain concepts and models that are created in order to organise social reality are not only imaginable on the arbitrary level that has no factual connection to

\textsuperscript{18} Progress in international relations could be defined as changes in the pursuit of actors’ interests in ways that further security, welfare and human rights. Adler, Crawford and Donnelly (1991, 2-5) distinguish ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ views of progress in international relations. They see the maximalist position to require substantial positive movement and replacement of the pursuit of national interests with pursuit of human interests. The minimalist conception, in turn, is concerned with “reducing the level and intensity of violent conflict, exploitation, misery, and injustice”. The expectations about the role of international actors are mainly placed on minimalist elements—to amount to less violence, less misery, and less injustice.

\textsuperscript{19} This point can be concretised by considering any abstract expression or conception in social reality: Often we know exactly what it is until we are obliged to explain what it means, and only then we realise that the picture we thought of having about it was not as clear as we assumed.

\textsuperscript{20} Wittgenstein 1968, §81: “logic does not treat of language—or of thought—in the sense in which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most that can be said is that we construct ideal languages”. See also Hilmy 1987, 87.
‘our reality’ but are a part of it in the sense that they construct our collective being by offering a framework for what is possible and desirable, and a foundation into which our actions, events and other elements of social reality can be tied. Thus, an imagined ideal is meaningful even if it does not actualise as such but rather is to be understood as a basis for possibilities. We can imagine a hypothetical language game that makes it possible to have a concept or model in one’s mind even if the model is never fully realised in practice. Social reality does not have to or, more radically, it cannot entirely conform to the ‘ideal’.

As human beings we usually take structures, actors, causes, rules, and so on, for granted as facts of social reality although they are rather reflections of an image that we use in order to organise the events and actions that we try to describe and make sense of—whether as participating actors or observers. This is what Ringmar (1997, 277) also refers to when he says that modelling always means “to model some thing in terms of something else [and this] is emphatically not to talk about ‘real existence’, but instead to talk about one’s own version of it”.21 This ‘something else’ is not to be interpreted as an actually existing object but an ideal being, to which we relate our activities and ‘tell a story’ about reality from our perspective, i.e. as a partial interpretation of how ‘what is actually going on’ relates to how it ‘ought to’ go or what its profound meaning is.

The CFSP, as expressed in the TEU, is to be understood in terms of an idealised model of what is understood by common foreign and security policy. This, of course, involves the question about the extent of integration: How deep is deep enough to be justifiably called ‘common’? Another basic question that arises concerns the content of the terms ‘foreign policy’ and ‘security policy’: If not regarded as external activities of sovereign states, how are they to be defined? And are these concepts compatible with the manner in which they are expressed via actual policy making of the Union?

The creation of the EU’s image as a foreign policy actor is a result of a choice to provide the CFSP with a certain ‘ideal being’. Here we can find a connection to Hill’s argument about the capability–expectations gap. Namely, according to him, the main reason for the capability–expectations gap is that the member states as well as other international actors keep up the image of the EU’s CFSP as a coherent and feasible system, although a full actorness— not to mention foreign policy identity—is still far from realisation (Hill 1993, 318; see also Armor and Taylor 1998; Burgoon 1993). The textual being of the CFSP is usually described as if the ideal could be achieved, and expectations

21 Cf. Wittgenstein 1968 about ‘family resemblances’.
are based on this false assumption about actual capabilities. Yet, as McCarthy (1991, 197-198) reminds, “since political discourse always takes place under less than ideal conditions, it will always be open to dissenters to view any given collective decision as tainted by de facto limitations and thus as not acceptable under ideal conditions.” His position raises the question of whether possibilities constructed at the ideal level can have significance in our practices if we know for sure that they will not actualise. It seems that often the idea of various possibilities is important only so far as we believe in their chances to actualise. On the other hand, which of these possibilities becomes actual depends in many cases on our compromised assessment of the desirability and likelihood of various possibilities. In this sense, institutional developments appear as an outcome of dynamics of the circular process between the free flow of ideas and the pressure to find an agreement on common objectives.

An ideal being is the basis from which a collective will for change arises. Consider an example, that human dignity is an ideal that includes the idea that human rights are respected. The respect is thus an ideal that has not completely actualised, as we know. If the potential world that corresponds to the ideal being would actualise there would be no need for organisations such as Amnesty International or UNHCR. The existence of these organisations, the function of which is, ideally, to minimise the misery in one way or another, refers to the fact that the actualised world is not the one of potential worlds which best corresponds to the ideal being in terms of human dignity. Following a similar pattern, we could ask what would be an ideal arrangement of world affairs like, what ideal foreign policy is like and what kind of imagined being the CFSP reflects. As an attempt to deal with these questions, the EU like any other international actor seeks to frame the imagined by giving it a name.

2.2.2. Naming

According to Palonen (1997, 114), “naming is perhaps the most obvious aspect of the linguistic dimension of the political”. Naming is not merely a category among other kinds of linguistic acts. It is a way of making something identifiable. It is the name that gives shape to an indefinite being that would

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2 If the ideal being of the CFSP is expressed in the TEU as suggested here, we could say that the ideal being of the CFSP is more clearly framed than mere abstract ideas. Nevertheless, it remains vague due to the polysemous and ambiguous character of any linguistic expression, and therefore as an object of comparison it does not determine the EU’s foreign policy making.
be difficult to grasp without a name. Naming creates a connection between an image of an ideal object and its actual expression or representation. In the sphere of international relations, naming is also a way of bringing the imagined political self into awareness of other political entities.

Imagination may restrict understanding of possible modes of being but, in turn, imagination can also be recognised “as the act of responding to a demand for new meaning, the demand of emerging realities to be by being said in new ways” (Kearney 1998, 148). We could claim that potential worlds, meaning possible outcomes of our interaction according to the ideal being, do not exist beyond language. An ideal being as such is an abstract state of mind, and when we talk about it, we create a link between an ideal being and the actualising world by telling a story about potential worlds. These potential worlds are reflections of the abstract ideal that we wish, fear, expect, etc. to come true, to actualise.

In terms of social existence the named object is not discovered but constituted by the act of naming. The idea of words’ constructive power was already present in the Greco-Christian tradition at its very beginning. The same way the divine words were seen to have created the material world, social worlds in turn are created by human interaction largely based on linguistic practices. This does not mean that there should or even could be drawn a sharp distinction between material and social realities. On the contrary, the material and the social are involved in reconstructions of each other in social activities. The material reality is made meaningful by social reality and they both are “continually recreated by [actors] via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors. In and through their activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible” (Giddens 1984, 2; see also Carlsnaes 1992).

This view is adopted and further developed particularly by social constructivist approaches. This kind of sociological perspective on international relations concerns the mutual constitution of agents and structures that makes them inseparable. (See Wendt 1987) Shared knowledge and intersubjective meanings are embedded in social practice, and it is exactly the intersubjective nature of human action that defines social realities, where many ‘real things’

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23 Ricoeur (1986, 217-236), too, links the productive power of language and that of imagination. See also Kearney 1988.

24 Onuf 1989, 39; [the Gospel according to] John 1:1-3 “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made.” (King James translation)
are only facts by human agreement. 25 “It is through reciprocal interaction”, says Wendt (1992, 406), “that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests”. Wendt, while making distinction between modern and postmodern constructivists, says that both of them are interested in how knowledgeable practices constitute subjects (See also Ruggie 1998b). Giving priority to practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another refers to the ‘constructive statement’ that structure has no existence apart from processes and, therefore, “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1992, 394-395). Action and processes are organised by structures which, in turn, are constituted by collective meanings of reality. (See Guzzini 2000; Wendt 1995)

In the context of institutional identity formation, stability is guaranteed by fixing the idealised being in textual form. Textual expression of the self makes it possible that once the identity is recognised it is further interpreted in terms of a stable foundation and seen as a coherent being. This is how “the ‘seeing as’ activated in reading ensures the joining of verbal meaning with imagistic fullness. And this conjunction is no longer something outside language, since it can be reflected as a relationship. ‘Seeing as’ contains a ground, a foundation, this is precisely, resemblance” (Ricoeur 1978, 213) 26.

By naming, abstract reality is fixed to a relatively stable image of the constituent parts of the reality. For example, the Maastricht treaty’s statement that “[a] common foreign and security policy is hereby established” is to be understood as naming. Yet, similar to a reality that is enclosed by naming, concepts to name, define, limit and enable modes of existence in social reality are abstract, too, not only in the sense that their objects are not concretely testable objects in the material world but also because in the practical course of events it is not possible to entirely grasp their imaginative existence in any single event. Hence, human action cannot be thoroughly explained in terms of rational action that conforms to models or concepts even if ideal being has to be considered as the interpretative frame of reality, on which the action is founded. Following this kind of reasoning, constructivists deny the assumption that beliefs are held by individuals. Rather the beliefs are intersubjective and

25 A thorough representation of institutional/social facts is Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality. See also Bruner 1986; Holzner 1968. Emphasising that the construction of reality occurs in a social context, Holzner (1968, 15) points out that “reality constructs are formed in the interpretation and reinterpretation of experience”.

26 Resemblance is here to be understood as a relationship between the imagined being and the naming that is expected to reflect on an emerging identity.
they become social facts. (Manners and Whitman 2003; Ruggie 1998a; Searle 1995)

Neither interaction of participants with various motives, resources, and so on, nor situations in which they interact can be exactly what any of these participants foresaw. To put it simply, interaction necessitates relying on organising principles but, at the same time, other actors, contextual factors and internal constraints make it impossible to predict the course of events, and thus the circumstances prevent the ideal from being fully realised. Yet an image, an idea of a possible and desirable mode of being, is something that makes an actor do something ‘with deliberation’; it is a guiding principle, a line to which one decides to put other lines in proportion, as Wittgenstein says.27 The imaginable framework as such is not, of course, a reason to follow blindly a certain mode of action. Reasons and motives vary in accordance with the situation, but these various reasons, too, have to emerge from somewhere—from a deep understanding about why and how the world is held together, and without this understanding interaction would not be possible at all. To continue with the Wittgensteinian line metaphor, the fact that the new line one draws may sometimes be parallel to a given one, and another time at angle to it, does not depend on the existence or characteristics of the given line but on motivational factors of the one who decides to draw other lines. In social interaction, the process is, of course, much more complicated when there is not just one actor with his guiding lines and motives but a diverse and changing group of participants.

2.2.3. Performance

When there is more than just one imaginable possibility (as most often is the case in social reality) expectations inevitably emerge about what will actualise and how. In other words, how the state of affairs in the world will be made to resemble as closely as possible the ideal that has been framed by naming—given the external and internal constraints. Talking about expectations in this sense differs somewhat from the idea that expectations are learned through

27 Wittgenstein (1968, §§174-175) invites us to ask ourselves how we “draw a line parallel to a given one ‘with deliberation’—and another time, with deliberation, one at an angle to it”, and continues, “while I am being guided everything is quite simple, I notice nothing special; but afterwards, when I ask myself what it was that happened, it seems to have been something indescribable. Afterwards no description satisfies me. It’s as if I couldn’t believe that I merely looked, made such-and-such a face, and drew a line.”
and followed in a settled context of social practices. The action that is seen as a conventional practice in a settled social context is supposed to be stable and predictable, whereas in a changing context where a deed, context or both are seen as unique expressions of an evolving system and no comparison can be made, the ideal is more like something to be defined and reached for in this particular case on the basis of the current presumable possibilities and demands. What is common to these two notions of expectation is that they both refer to an ideal; in the former case the ideal is stable and action that satisfies the expectations seems more like rule-following whereas the latter emerges rather as a response to a particular state of affairs and does not conform to the regularity ideal.

Naming a mode of being is a necessary condition for social existence. In Austin’s vocabulary the question in naming but also in performances is about perlocutionary act by which we do something by saying. At the level of locution or proposition, the core is that a linguistic act has a meaning but no consequences. An illocutionary act in turn refers to what we do in saying.28 In terms of identity, illocutionary force could be understood as a reflection of the ideal, the imagined being, in action. Implementation of any imaginative act according to a general model is an illocutionary act. The definition is somewhat vague for any act may have either deliberate or unintentional consequences and in that case it would be called a perlocutionary act. Austin’s theoretical division works out in simple cases when an act is either meant to express something in terms of a recognisable way of behaving (as the expression ‘I am sorry’ is to be understood as belonging to the category of apologies) or aims at having an effect on a particular state of affairs (as saying ‘I do’ has, in given circumstances, consequences regarding the marital status of the one who uses the expression.) However, when it concerns more complicated and less institutionalised interaction in a relatively undisciplined social reality, the division is not that straightforward, since by an illocutionary (i) act one may be said to do a perlocutionary (p) act —‘by i:ing he p:ed’, e.g. by giving a declaration to condemn violence in Israel and the Territories in October 1996, the EU expressed its understanding of the frustration that the opening of the

28 Austin (1962) distinguishes illocutionary from perlocutionary speech acts: illocutionary speech acts are those that immediately do what they say—acts of doing in saying, whereas perlocutionary speech acts do by saying, meaning that they produce certain effects as their consequences. While illocutionary acts are conventional, perlocutionary acts are consequential. The former are those that are performed by virtue of words and the latter are those that are performed as a consequence of words. For Austin, conventions as well as their social contexts appear to be stable.
Hasmonean tunnel evoked among Palestinians, and thereby positioned itself on their side\textsuperscript{29}. (See Austin 1962; White 1968)

Performance is the central phase to gain space as an actor and, further, to create a coherent identity. Identity construction does not take place merely at an abstract level but in very practical terms. In order to be able to tell about the form and the content of our existence we must situate ourselves, our presence, in time and place. “In order to \textit{be} we must be in the ‘here’ and the ‘now’ since only the here and the now constitute the class of things that are taken to \textit{be}” (Ringmar 1996, 76). It is mainly through active presence that an identity is constructed even though, on the other hand, it should be noted that spatio-temporal absence, too, may reconstruct the idea of how other actors define and recognise the absent one. This kind of reconstruction process presupposes, however, that the absent actor exists in another space or time. For example, concerning the international performance of the United States in Europe after the first World War, it is obvious that the absence that was characteristic of the United States in that particular space and time can only be interpreted in terms of earlier presence, meaning more active performance that shaped its identity during the war and peace negotiations. Now, more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, the United States is the only superpower and many actors are seeking to create or regain a visible and active presence on the world stage. While Russia refers to the political weight of Soviet times, the EU tries to justify its quest for a place among international political actors by repeating the story about imbalance between its economic strength and political weight. (On Russia, see Ambrosio 2001)

Besides the actual strive for a certain kind of actorness and identity formation, the public display of willingness for a greater role is essential also to the production and maintenance of the willingness itself. The quest for actorness and identity cannot be sustained without repetition of the aim. Perception derives from spatial and temporal continuity as ‘told’ by the actor and interpreted by the perceiver(s). The story is not necessarily about actorness in the past but may as well include elements of the potential or desirable future and thereby renew or strengthen the willingness for a certain novel role that further works as an impetus for formation or reformation of identity.

\textsuperscript{29}“The European Union recognizes that the recent incidents were precipitated by frustration and exasperation at the absence of any real progress in the peace process and firmly believes that the absence of such progress is the root of the unrest. It calls on Israel to match its stated commitment to the peace process with concrete actions to fulfil its obligations, as well as to refrain from any action likely to create mistrust about its intentions.” See the declaration text in its entirety, European Union 1996b.
The enabling reproduction of the conditions does not yet mean that they would be taken for granted as institutional facts. The ‘taken-for-grantedness’ process presupposes that intersubjective ideas have authority and legitimacy and evoke trust. (See Onuf 2002; Wendt 1999) Taking this into consideration, performance seems to be crucial to subject formation. The power of a performative act is in the interconnection of signification and enactment, meaning that it is through performance that the imagined becomes signified and simultaneously the claimed or proposed identity is enacted and thus significant others may take a stance with regard to the identity under construction.

Regarding the EU policies in conflict areas beyond its borders, performance is a crucial yet controversial stage in the creation of a plausible external image of the Union. Performance includes capacity to make decisions and implement them. As far as it concerns the EU performance, activities of individual member states do not contribute to the political profile of the Union if the rest of the member states remain indifferent or inactive, or disagree with the active member states and possibly even choose a clearly different course of action.

In the Middle East most if not all of the EU member states have interests to defend. The Middle East peace process has divided the EU member states and even created tensions between them. Contrary to some other international conflicts, there is no atmosphere of indifference among the EU member states with regard to the Middle East due to historical connections, economic and security interests, and various other reasons. Yet the member states seem to be willing to construct a joint EU profile in the region.30 Political weight commensurate with the economic importance is continuously sought after even if it requires that the member states give up some of their national preferences. From the standpoint of identity formation and performance as its central stage, it is important to notice that construction of collective identity presupposes relative coherence in actorness. The lack of cohesion among positions of the EU member states has prevented the Union from creating a plausible unified actorness in this nearby region.

Expectations about the EU’s ‘common conflict policy’ mirror an abstract level, at which the concept of common foreign and security policy is formed and imagined as reflecting an ideal whereas in practice the action is taken within the scope of existing capabilities which inevitably limits the actual coming into existence of the imagined and named being. Thus, theoretically seen, the ‘capability–expectations gap’ is the gap between an abstract concept of foreign policy and a concrete expression of it. It is necessary to stress that

30 See the analysis of iconicity in chapter five, particularly 5.3. and 5.5.
the abstract level ‘exists’ only as an imagined ideal even when it is textualised or otherwise framed by naming that provides the institution or policy with a formal being. Performance, in turn, seeks to fulfil in practice the ‘promise’ of naming.

The emergence of a coherent and relatively stable identity in terms of international relations includes the construction of an institutional framework. But its stability and coherence is up to the ongoing interaction of participants. Institutions may (should the participants so interact) arise, persist, dissolve, or change. Keohane (1988, 383) defines an institution as a “persistent and connected set of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations”, and further, as a general pattern or categorisation of activity or a particular human-constructed arrangement (See also Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). This kind of broad definition includes the meaning that is referred to in the expression ‘institutional being’: An institution is not merely a structure or a set of rules but also the actual content within a structure. Cognitive elements of institutions, for Scott (1995, 39-42), are the rules that constitute the nature of reality and the frames through which meaning is made. Meanings arise in interaction and are maintained and transformed in order to keep up with the ongoing stream of happenings. Of foremost importance among cognitive elements of institution are constitutive rules that define the frameworks for action and create typifications. (See Dessler 1989; Giddens 1979; March and Olsen 1989)

Institutions are subjects that come into existence through their actual functioning in the continuous flow of events. Wright (1954, 7) summarises the institutional life and evolution as follows:

Institutions are made by men as instruments of human purpose, are maintained to promote human policies, are subjected to criticism, and sometimes ended by human action; yet they tend to have life of their own. They tend to become a vested interest of their management or their adherents, and their preservation, survival, and growth tends to become an end in itself. The defensive and expansive tendency of an institution, and the interplay of function, authority, knowledge, and area of operation tends to make institutions develop in both size and integration. […] With the increase of communications among, and of the interdependence of, the people affected by an institution, its functioning

31 Wittgenstein stresses that ‘ideal’ should not be understood as something better or more perfect but simply as something imagined as opposite to that which exists. (Wittgenstein 1968, §81)

32 Wendt (1999, 165) assumes, following Giddens (1979) and Onuf (1989) that norms “vary in their balance of causal and constitutive effects” and therefore cannot be simply categorised as either constitutive or regulative norms.
seems to require an enlargement of the area of its operation, sometimes accomplished by absorption of previously independent institutions and sometimes by the grouping of many institutions under a common supervision or into a federation.

Construction of institutions takes place within an already existing ‘heritage’ and in a sense any change is a phase in a continuous process of reconstruction. Even creating something seemingly new involves an existing basis, which means that all social action exists in continuity with past. Circumstances that are a product of history thus constrain the possibilities of imagining, naming and, particularly, performance. And nevertheless, “[w]hat we humans aspire to is, after all, an important aspect of what makes us what we are: in part we are what we are because of what we claim to be and what we wish to be” (Rescher 2000, 215).

How, then, is it that the capacity to bring some kind of being into existence or make it disappear sometimes ‘seizes the ground’? What is needed for mental stances to become socially real? Bourdieu’s (1991, 223) expression, ‘the act of social magic’, appears useful although it is not traditionally regarded as acceptable in social scientific discourse to simply approve of things that cannot be explained or understood in terms of given theoretical and methodological frameworks. Rationalist accounts of international relations have tended to emphasise the ‘scientific’ models while newer interpretative approaches acknowledge that the complexity of social reality highlights the limitations of the scientific method. It is not possible to thoroughly explain or understand social reality where many things just seem to happen and exist ‘magically’.

Studies of international relations have traditionally either emphasised that action is based on state interests and balance of power (realism) or claimed that the explanatory basis for social interaction is to be found in rational utility calculation and institutional structures (liberalism). (See Rengger 2000) Both modern theoretical perspectives and policy making in practice give primacy to concrete outcomes that are judged in regard to their being in accordance with the defined expectations—whether value-based or egoistic aspirations. These perspectives often ignore other dimensions of performance or diminish them to signify means to manipulate or control the action, ideas or decisions

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33 In natural sciences, too, there are such mysteries, the most complex of them being that of life. It is impossible to define scientifically, what makes a material thing a living one. Scientists may ‘build’ micro-organisms in laboratories but they are not able to give life to these constructions. Similarly to the ‘natural’ power of making something a living object, the “capacity for bringing into existence in an explicit state […] that which, not yet having attained objective and collective existence […] represents a formidable social power” (Bourdieu 1991, 236).
of other actors, as March and Olsen (1989, 6-7) observe. Yet, any performance that has a dimension that sets imagination in motion to produce interpretations that cannot be directly deduced from the established order and expectations has a considerable part to play in social reality. Performance in the name of an entity (i.e. representation of it) during its formation process is primarily to establish the represented self in order that it will be able to respond to internal and external expectations. In this context, it is useful to bear in mind Peirce’s definition of icons:

An icon is a representamen of what it represents and for the mind that interprets it as such, by virtue of its being an immediate image, that is to say by virtue of characters which belong to it in itself as a sensible object, and which it would possess just the same were there no object in nature that it resembled [...].

(CP 4.447)

Iconic power is the power to bring something into social existence, since the existence depends on being known, recognised and accepted. Iconic power may be personified so that a charismatic or authoritative person may have a considerable effect on how people see the world and what they believe. But more generally, iconic power depends on positions that people occupy in the social space. We could, of course, dispute whether or not those who occupy the dominant positions in the social space actually are charismatic persons. Is the Pope John Paul II a charismatic person or does the position as the Pope give him power to condemn contraception or canonise dead fellows? What makes many Japanese consider the emperor a representative of the divine among people even when the state has officially deprived him of the status of

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34 Even if basically rational, interaction is potentially chaotic due to the unpredictability of the outcome of other actors’ conclusions about what is rational and appropriate in given circumstances. Interactive implications make outcomes uncertain. In this context, it is worth noting that according to Habermas (1996, 3-4) “[c]ommunicative reason differs from practical reason first and foremost in that it is no longer ascribed to the individual actor or to a macrossubject at the level of the state or the whole of society. Rather, what makes communicative reason possible is the linguistic medium through which interactions are woven together and forms of life are structured. This rationality is inscribed in the linguistic telos of mutual understanding and forms an ensemble of conditions that both enable and limit”. A basic assumption of Habermas’s concept of communicative reason is that rationality is fundamentally intersubjective and not simply a matter of subjective decision-making or even less objective utility calculation. ‘Subjective decision-making’ has a connotation that it could be a private process without any necessity to take the context and activities of other actors into account. ‘Objective utility calculation’ in turn refers to the probability that anyone in a similar situation would end up with the same decision.
the Son of God? Are the EU special envoys and the High Representative for CFSP supposed to have personal, ‘spiritual’ power in order to bring into existence a common foreign policy identity? In practice, it seems to be only rarely possible to deal separately with dominant position and charismatic personality. They both concern themselves with giving an expression to a framed idea of collective self and representing it within the collective as well as in relation to other institutionalised selves.

### 2.2.4. Recognition

Ringmar (1996) stresses the significance of recognition in collective identity formation. Recognition in the sense of acceptance means that the entity in question and its claimed qualities, i.e. its ‘story’, are accepted as existing or true whereas re-cognition means that the imagined, named and accepted entity expresses adequate continuity and internal coherence in its performances to be identified or interpreted as the same or identical with the entity to which we refer by its given name. This second meaning draws attention to the philosophical foundation of the concept of identity, the core of which is the question of sameness, similarity and identical being.35

The need for recognition reflects the essentially interactive character of the process, for collective identity formation involves more than just the creation of a subjective feeling of togetherness by imagining and naming the collective self. (Cf. Taylor 1992; Fossum 2001) Originally the social psychological approach to construction of the self and the other at the collective level derives from Durkheimian theory where demarcating a group necessarily means that a number of outside groups take shape simultaneously and this process of giving and taking shape is an active and continuous part of each group’s identity formation. This approach is linked to the idea of collective separation from something that ‘we are not’. (Neumann 1999) Yet, the significance of the other in the construction of collective identity is two-dimensional: Besides

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35 About the continuity of identity, see e.g. Bernstein (1985), who compares identity with a play that has its own rhythm independent of players. The origin of the word identity is in ‘identitas’ (Lat.) which refers to ‘sameness’. The Oxford English Dictionary defines identity as “[t]he quality or condition of being the same in substance, composition, nature, properties, or in particular qualities under consideration; absolute or essential sameness; oneness” and further “[t]he sameness of a person or thing at all times or in all circumstances; the condition or fact that a person or thing is itself and not something else; individuality; personality.”
distinguishing the collective self from the other, the existence of otherness is needed in the process of identification also to recognise the identity under construction. In other words, the other has significance not only as a present passive object of distinction but also as an active legitimator in the process of collective identity formation. Among the outside actors those that are taken for ‘significant others’ are expected to recognise us as such an acting entity as we represent ‘our self’ to be. In the construction of our identity, our collective self, the decision about who or what we are has to be made jointly with other actors. A condition for identity formation is that significant others recognise our existence in the form and content that we present it.\(^\text{36}\) Power to define the shared meanings that constitute identities and interests plays a crucial part in the construction of social reality. It is important to notice that power is not simply the resources needed to force others to act one way rather than another but it also has a ‘softer’ meaning as the ability to make others see what we see and want what we want.\(^\text{37}\)

The identification process has no continuity without the other that is needed in order to become and be the self, in some respect different from the other. The ‘self under construction’ needs the other as a recogniser in order that the self become what it claims to be.\(^\text{38}\) As Ringmar (1996, 13) says,

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\(^\text{36}\) Ringmar (1996) discusses the meaning of otherness in the identity formation from the narratological point of view, claiming that the recognition of actorness and identity is essentially based on the actor’s ability to tell a plausible story about oneself and one’s being and to ask the significant others to accept its truthfulness. See also Barnett 1999; Fierke and Wiener 2001; Rescher 2000.

\(^\text{37}\) On power, see e.g. Boulding (1989) who divides power in three categories: constructive, economic and integrative. From a constructivist point of view, a more useful definition of power would be institutional power to construct and reconstruct social modes of being through inclusion and exclusion, legitimisation and authorisation. (Adler 1997, 336) About power as capacity to create or change a social world, see also Keohane and Nye 1977, 54-58; Pellauer 1995; cf. Guzzini 1993. Also Deutsch (1970, 24) defines power broadly as “the ability to make things happen that would not have happened otherwise” but maintains that power consists of power over nature and men.

\(^\text{38}\) In the context of this study, the other could be seen, first of all, as a whole of conflictual relations outside the EU. These occurrences provide the EU with an opportunity for a performance through which it positions itself in world affairs and claims an identity. Another function that the other has in the construction of the self is that the identity to come into existence needs to be recognised by others. In this latter sense, the other is any international actor whom the EU as ‘the self under construction’ regards as a significant other whose recognition it needs.
people alone cannot decide who or what they are, but any such decision is always taken together with others. We need recognition for the persons we take ourselves to be, and only as recognised can we conclusively come to establish an identity. The quest for recognition will consequently come to occupy much of the time of people or groups who are uncertain regarding who they are. We all want to be taken seriously and be treated with respect; we all want to be recognised as the kinds of persons we claim to be. Yet recognition is rarely automatic and before we gain it we are often required to prove that our interpretations of ourselves indeed do fit us.  

Recognition of identity does not happen on sporadic occasions that could be temporally and spatially circumscribed. Rather, it is an interactive long-term ‘negotiation process’. By naming, one gets an opportunity for social existence as a recognised being. The content of this being depends on the ability to establish a practical sense of self and negotiate space among other selves through performance. A good example of this kind of long-term process is the change of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation from something that was regarded as a terrorist organisation into a political entity that became Israel’s negotiation partner in the peace process.

To be addressed one must be recognised. Or, better, to be addressed one must be named; recognition then happens through the act of addressing. Yet, one attains existence not only by virtue of being recognised. A prerequisite for recognition is that one becomes recognisable first. This means that an entity that seeks to be recognised has to be imagined as a whole that has external borders and relative internal coherence. Secondly, ‘recognisability’ presupposes naming as was discussed above. And thirdly, the being of the named entity needs to be expressed via performance. Only then can the claimed identity be recognised or refused recognition.

Butler (1997, 5) claims that it is not only within the possible circuit of recognition that the address constitutes a being but also outside of recognition, i.e. in abjection. Yet, we could argue that any addressing is a sign of recognition even when the claimed identity as such is not recognised. Namely, recognition may be understood more broadly as an act of accepting the social existence of the addressee, whether or not the recognition corresponds to the identity or characteristics that the addressee claims to possess. In any case, the one who

39 See also Barnett 1993.

40 E.g. for certain groups of people in many Arab countries, calling Israel by its name is taboo and therefore other expressions, such as ‘Zionist entity’, are used instead. Yet, whatever the actual name that is used, the act of addressing means that the social existence of the named entity is recognised although not necessary legitimated, i.e. accepted in the presented form. On the need for acceptance, see Saunders 1991, 39-44.
addresses contributes to the social constitution of the one whose identity is to be recognised. Once recognised through addressing, performances of the self are expected to have a certain consistency in order to be identified, re-recognised as the named entity. However,

we do not understand what recognition is in its profoundest nature, if we only see that something that we know already is known again, ie that what is familiar is recognised again. The joy of recognition is rather that more becomes known than is already known. In recognition what we know emerges, as if through an illumination, from all the chance and variable circumstances that condition it and is grasped in its essence. […] The ‘known’ enters into its true being and manifests itself as what it is only when it is recognised. As recognised it is grasped in its essence, detached from its accidental aspects.

(Gadamer 1979, 102-103)

To make recognisable has to do with representation so that the entity seeking recognition is brought into awareness of the significant others. In Peircean terms this process is called iconic representation. Representation may also have other forms. These will be further discussed in chapter three. Recognition, thus, is based on the others’ interpretations. Interpretation of performance involves producing a sign as representation of a particular object. When an interpretation is accepted it means that the object of the sign is recognised as a certain kind of being. The interpreted relation between a sign and its object is the foundation of the sign as representation of the object. When the object is thought to stand in certain relation to the sign, it is the sign that determines the interpretation. The process has a circular character: Performance and recognition lead to re-imagining and re-naming, which modify the performance, and so on.
2.3. The European Union as a Political Self

How identities are constructed cannot be thoroughly grasped in abstract terms (Castells 1997, 10). Identity construction is always a contextually bound process. Hence, the theoretical discussion on institutional identity formation is here tied to the concrete context of the EU’s identity formation in terms of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

There have been various ways of imagining the direction and final form of the European integration as was discussed in chapter 2.1. On 14 December 1973, ‘Document on the European Identity’ was published to enable the member states to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries, their responsibilities and the place that they occupy in world affairs. The document made clear the principle that the Community would act as a single entity seeking to ensure harmonisation of national foreign policies. At the same time it marked the beginning of a policy that reflected ideals of moral responsibility outside the Community. After that the first timid steps were taken in crisis management and a ‘code of conduct’ was adopted regarding South Africa. The Middle East, however, was the first real testing ground of the European Political Cooperation.

Although many significant institutional and instrumental changes have taken place during the past thirty years, a single European voice has rarely been expressed loud and clear. Apart from incompatible national interests and institutional vagueness, a reason for CFSP weakness continues to be a lack of definition of common interests, precise goals, and operational provisions to achieve them (E.g. Schirm 1998, 70; see also Smith 1998, 149-156). Allen (1998, 57) criticises the Amsterdam Treaty by saying that it “eliminated none of the dilemmas at the heart of the CFSP and the very notion of a ‘European’ foreign policy”. Gourlay and Remacle (1998, 90) even presume that the “CFSP is likely to remain limited to some non-vital sectors of cooperation or ‘low intensity’ crisis management in nearby regions. For the foreseeable future the Union will remain largely a civilian power under the security umbrella of the

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41 The reason to consider the presence of national interests and the absence of EU interests separately is that the latter does not automatically follow the former. National interests of different member states may be compatible, or finding a common denominator (such as threat of terrorism or illegal immigration) could lead to a reformulation of national interests. The presence of national interests is thus not a sufficient explanation for the absence of common interests.
US.” (See also Cameron 1998b; Gordon 1997; Grudzinski and van Ham 1999)

Yet the EU has resolutely sought to strengthen its international actorness and create a common political identity. A political objective of the EU explicitly stated in the Amsterdam Treaty is “to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy” (European Union 1997a, Art.B).

The tradition of realism and neorealism in the discipline of International Relations has reserved the label ‘actor’ to state and therefore international actorness has been understood as referring to state identity—to the extent that identity is discussed at all. The EU as an actor is easily compared to a state and regarded as a partially formed or incomplete state.42 Comparisons are also made between national identities and European identity (See Marcussen et al. 2001; A. Smith 1992; Whitman 1998).

European identity—to the extent that such togetherness exists—can be understood and interpreted in the practices through which individuals recognise in themselves a historical, mythical, cultural, religious, linguistic, etc. heritage that makes them feel togetherness with other people who share the heritage with them. The EU’s foreign policy identity as a specific expression of institutional identity, on the contrary, refers to the conscious construction of actorness through the creation of various instruments, frameworks and policy guidelines. An institutional other is needed as an object for distinction and a recogniser. This argument reflects the Gemeinschaft–Gesellschaft43 division that has been characteristic of analyses of pluralistic approaches. As Rosamond (2000, 45-46) observes, Deutch, among others,

relied on the analytical separation of the legal state from the sociological nation. This constituted a direct challenge to orthodox realist conceptions that tended to conflate the ideas of nationhood (identity) and statehood (government) through ideas such as ‘the national interest’. […] The contrary view, that Deutsch did much to develop, is that common identities are the product of intensive transactions and communications.

42 “The European Union is ‘state-like’ but does not formally aspire to statehood. It may have a ‘foreign policy’, but it clearly lacks a monopoly on foreign policy-making in Europe. It thus seems to exist in a conceptual no man’s land.” (Allen 1998, 43)

43 The distinction between Gemeinschaft (community: common loyalties and sense of kinship among the members) and Gesellschaft (society: contractually formed group, based on interests) was first made by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies and later adopted by the pluralist approach to international integration. (See Rosamond 2000, 43-44)
As opposite to the historically constructed communitary feeling of togetherness or ‘organic identity’, institutional identity connotes the future-oriented organisation of meaning that is detached from the everyday life of people and thus remains an affair of the political elite. Wæver (1995, 25) stresses that the EU’s being is primarily political and assesses that in the future the CFSP will serve as the core of the EU’s ‘state identity’.  

Organic identity and institutional identity are conceptually separable and are to be taken as separate objects of research. This study leaves aside the organic community identity and concentrates on the identity formation of an institution, which is traditionally defined as a mechanistic rational entity, opposed to an organic collective. The philosophical roots of the division can be traced back to the late 18th century. At the time the early Romanticists raised a normative question concerning the structure and basis of a state. According to them, a state as a mechanism should be replaced by a state as an organism. By this they meant that a state that has been built from above as a static structure cannot respond to the dynamic needs of the society and, therefore, the institutions of a state should be formed as a response to the organic, dynamic and self-regulating community or nation. Underlying considerations included the French revolution, which was a warning example of what can happen when revolution leaders adopt the idea of mechanism’s primacy over organism. Organic construction of society from below takes, of course, longer time than mechanistic institution building but early Romanticists argued that the latter leads more easily to disastrous consequences.

The pragmatist tradition of EU integration on the contrary holds that the top-down model is not necessarily mechanistic but may as well be a dynamic construction, and emphasises that an institutional formation needs to agree with functional requirements of development (Haas 1968; Keohane and Nye 1977). In this respect neofunctionalism differs from the federalist approach that relies on a mechanistic construction of institutions. Hence, even as an elitist project, the European integration could, according to the pragmatist view, be understood as being based on the principles that take into account the dynamic needs. At the same time, however, this approach sets aside the societal

44 I prefer using the expression institutional identity, for ‘state identity’ refers to the traditional understanding according to which in international relations the state is to be seen as the only relevant actor and the EU as an incomplete construction process aiming to reach the likeness of state. As an example of conceptual equating of state and political actors and, further, of taking the EU as a process of becoming a state-like actor, see Walker 2001. See also Beetham and Lord (1998, 29-30) about political identities in backward referring terms, on the one hand, and as based on an agreed political project, on the other hand. On historical account of the ‘idea of Europe’, see McCormick 1999, 32-40.
dimension of change, which means that the organic and the institutional remain separated. The focus is thus on institutional change and the transformation of actorness in relations with other actors in world affairs.

Traditionally, state has been understood as overlapping to a great extent with what is meant by nation. Hence the notion of nation-state which, however, does not exist in its pure form. The question is not merely structural or conceptual. Nations have a life of their own, not completely dependent on statehood, and cannot therefore be treated merely as organic sources of states. Nations draw on historical myths of shared social, ethnical, territorial, linguistic, etc. experience that are reconstructed mainly by political, social and economic elites but unlike the process of statehood formation, nation formation gives space to an organic or grassroots experience that connects individuals to the collective construction. There is also another basic difference between organic construction of collective being and institutional building of administrative structures and practices: While the former mainly focuses on history, shared experience and ‘naturalness’ of the collective existence throughout history, the latter is future-oriented, stressing a shared project and a rational orientation toward set objectives. (A. Smith 1992) In this sense, Peirce’s notion on the rationality of thought is illuminating. He states that “thought is rational only so far as it recommends itself to a possible future thought. Or in other words the rationality of thought lies in its reference to a possible future” (W 3: 108).

Often national identity is associated with ethnicity, because the basic markers of national consciousness are those that define the uniqueness of a collective by referring to ‘natural’ division, notably language, religion, traditions, shared memories, historical myths and territory (See e.g. Laffan 1996; Smith 1986, 13-16).45 ‘Ethnic’ and ‘civic’ dimensions of collective identity are usually closely interlinked, but their orientation and internal organisation are different. The former is a backward-oriented emotional ‘we feeling’, whereas the latter is a rational, future-oriented problem solving approach that organises meaning by comprising rules of governance. ‘European identity’ would thereby structurally correspond to national identity while the identity of the EU as an administrative institution would correspond to state identity.

Every collective that both looks back to its historical origin of existence and reaches for future objectives by institutional means has a double identity: on the one hand, organic or cultural identity and, on the other hand, institutional or political identity. To combine these two requires that institutional identity

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45 Farrands (1996, 6) remarks that “over time nationalisms may change more than their supporters would easily recognise, for the myth of continuity is very important in all nationalisms”. About mythical foundation of legitimacy, see Obradovic 1996.
formation is a flexible and dynamic process. The European Union seemingly lacks a foundation myth that would serve as a basis for a European identity. An attempt to construct such an organic identity is seen, for instance, in decisions to introduce a common flag and anthem. Also the concept of EU citizenship as well as a Union passport, freedom of movement and residence, an opportunity to vote in local elections in other member states, a single currency, agreement on consular protection outside the EU and even a network of student exchange serve the same purpose: The aim is to provide the Union with the means to tell a story about organic togetherness.

Synthesis of the identifications with an institutional being and organic collective is generally a long and complicated process. Some scholars seem to think that a feeling of national belonging emerges and spreads throughout the entire population within a geographically circumscribed entity when the idea of collective is first created as an administrative unit. Jacquin-Berdal (2000, 56), among others, claims that the development of a relatively institutionalised and centralised administrative entity “may provide a sufficient basis upon which a nation may develop”. He further states that “[i]f feelings of national belonging can indeed stem from political or institutional arrangements, it may therefore not be necessary to appeal to primordial feelings, whether they be rooted in race or ethnicity, to account for secession”. Others are more sceptical about the possibility that feelings of national belonging can stem from administrative arrangements that do not appeal to primordial feelings. Laffan (1996), for instance, contrary to Jacquin-Berdal, asserts that in order to enhance legitimacy and become a genuine political realm, the EU needs to be backed up by a European identity, meaning that institution building is not sufficient grounds for European integration. She does not, however, discuss how this two-fold identity formation would happen in practice.

In any case, the EU affairs are likely to remain the business of a narrow group of political elite for the foreseeable future, and therefore the Union’s external ‘face’ is not that of organic belonging but administrative construction, meaning that the Union is rather identified as a Gesellschaft than as a Gemeinschaft. From this perspective, the Union’s identity is future-oriented and organised around the question of what purposes or ends the Union as an administrative entity serves that could not be met by other means as well. The ability to display and serve these purposes is a condition for the justification and legitimacy of activities at the EU level, but only in the eyes of a narrow political elite. Participation of the general public in political affairs is neither needed nor generally demanded by the public itself (Beetham and Lord 1998, 12). There is no direct relationship between the administrative being of the Union and its citizens. The only connection is an indirect one via politicians and administrative officials of the EU member states. Especially concerning
the Union’s foreign policy, an internal source of foreign policy legitimacy is not in the view of the European public but in the commitment of a restricted elite group of the member states and the Union’s administrative structures, and in the institutional capacity to attain the set goals. This kind of basis for actorness and, further, identity formation explicates the distinction between organic and institutional identities.

Although the emphasis in CFSP studies varies, three basic problems of the CFSP discussed in these studies seem to concern identity, interests and institutions. A problem of interests in a post-Cold War context was the lack of a common threat that would narrow the diversity of foreign policy interests among the EU member states. It remains to be seen how the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the ‘fight against terrorism’ since then will influence the (dis-)unity of the member states foreign policies. A weak institutionalisation, in turn, derives from a number of compromises in negotiations that led to the TEU, and later to the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. The member states are ambitious to play a bigger international role but reluctant to move beyond an intergovernmental framework. (Peterson 1998)

These problems of interests and institutionalisation are closely linked to the difficulties the EU faces in its identity formation. The absence of a shared institutional identity can be considered “the most serious of the obstacles to the development of political legitimacy at the European level” (Beetham and Lord 1998, 33). The problem in developing a political identity at the EU level is not the absence of a feeling of togetherness among European peoples. Rather, the fundamental question concerns political identity and performance: What is needed is the ability to deliver effectively and to undergo a transformation in events of failure. Thus, successful outcomes of substantive policy making shape, in the long term, identity formation, and vice versa.

The agenda of the European Union has for a long time been dominated by the policies of the Economic and Monetary Union, and of the enlargement project. In turn, the deepening of high policy integration has faced difficulties when the Union has not been able to gain legitimacy to the same extent that the integration has advanced. The challenge concerning legitimacy refers both to internal changes in administrative structures and external activities in the sphere of traditional high policy matters. By the Treaty of Maastricht, the idea of a common foreign and security policy increased expectations about the international actorness of the EU but in practice the limitations of the CFSP have been proved in numerous connections. The willingness of the EU member states to ease human suffering—whether by delivering emergency aid to areas struck by natural disasters or minimising damages of armed conflicts—always contends with other, both economic and political, interests as well as heavy bureaucracy that may confine the Union’s possibilities to act in accordance
with the needs of beneficiary regions. An achievement of the Maastricht treaty was, however, that it ‘named’ the EU as a foreign policy being that had been imagined for a long time among European foreign policy elite.

Besides being a function of political will and imagination, and requiring the availability of resources, actoriness reflects external demands and opportunities that open up from the actions of other actors thus creating conditions for becoming a subject (See Ricoeur 1990, 75-79). Thereby, capacity to act derives both from internal capabilities and external opportunities, and the ability to combine these two. Apart from states that the classical realist approach regards as the only actors of the international political system, there are a number of other influential entities such as intergovernmental organisations and transnational business corporations that are considered actors by neofunctionalists and other pluralistic approaches to global political affairs.

If neofunctionalism has played a major part in explaining how technocratically driven change directs the European integration, the contribution of intergovernmentalism is not less significant. It was Hoffmann who stressed the political character of interaction and made a distinction between high and low politics. (See Hoffmann 1995) The structure of the EU’s actoriness is roughly divided in two according to this distinction that was then institutionalised in Maastricht by the three-pillar structure. High politics or ‘political relations’, which means the sphere of foreign and security policy, is still largely seen to belong exclusively to state sovereignty and is accordingly dealt with intergovernmentally whereas external economic relations and other less controversial domains are more willingly handed over to the EU. Therefore, when it comes to economic or related activities, the EU has managed to create an image of a rather coherent and influential international actor, while in high policy matters it has suffered from the lack of legitimacy and capabilities to act. Yet, lack of legitimacy is not only a matter of member states defending their sovereignty and interests. In certain contexts, such as the Middle East, difficulties to get recognition from the ‘significant others’ have also had an impact on the development of EU’s political actoriness and highlighted the imbalance between economic and political domains.

Following Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 6), we could contend that “[t]he relationship between presence, external reaction and EC/EU policy response in the construction of actoriness is inevitably complex and uncertain”. Due to the relative deepness of the integration in the economic sphere, the Community is much more present in global economic affairs than the Union in political

46 E.g. Burton’s concept of ‘world society’ (1972), Rosenau’s ‘micro and macro actors’ (1995) and various notions of ‘mixed actor systems’.
affairs. As presence is directly linked to actorness, perceptions and expectations about EU’s economic actorness are higher than those about its political actorness. There is no question of the EU not being a global actor. The question is rather in what terms and to what extent the EU can be said to have political significance in global affairs when the basis of the global actorness of the EU is primarily economic due to the better established capacity to act and more widely recognised authority in that sphere.

Even in its relations with potential or actual conflict regions, the link usually is primarily economic, in the form of trade sanctions, development and emergency aid and, in post-conflict situations, reconstruction aid. Although the economic domain has been emphasised in the EU’s integration process both in internal and external relations, the EU has not deliberately chosen the role of a paymaster. It has been the ‘natural’ option available to the Union as a result of the bloc’s incoherence in high policy matters and, to a lesser extent, the lack of attractive opportunities to seek for another kind of actorness. Furthermore, as institutions create roles that mutually constrain action, once actors adopt a particular role they usually limit their action in a manner which harmonises mutual expectations. When continuous interaction and expectations get a more stable and predictable form, expectations begin to organise interaction.

Involvement in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace building has traditionally been one of the most difficult questions in international interaction due to the complex and contradictory relations of actors and their interests as well as the question of sovereignty among conflicting parties. Strong and straightforward actorness could be regarded as an asset, for it helps to position the actor in its relations to others. On the basis of this positioning, an actor will be considered legitimate by its constituent parts and other actors. This applies also to third party involvement in political processes over conflict and peace. To be considered legitimate, political authority needs to include the dimension of legality (level of rules) and normative justifiability (level of beliefs), but these two are only minimum preconditions of potential legitimacy. In practice, achieving a position of legitimate authority requires that “positions of authority are confirmed by the express consent or affirmation of appropriate subordinates, and by recognition from other legitimate authorities” (Beetham and Lord 1998, 3; see also Føllesdal 1998).

47 For constructivist views on sovereignty, see Doty 1993; Murphy 1996.
48 Beetham and Lord (1998, 4) further state that a negative counterpart for each of these three dimensions of legitimate authority can be conceptually distinguished. Following the above-mentioned order, these negations are illegitimacy, legitimacy deficit and delegitimization.
Concerning external sources of legitimacy, it is a common feature of the contemporary state system that a state derives its legitimacy from recognition by other states. The EU as an emerging collective of different foreign policy actors expects recognition primarily from its member states and other states, especially those whose recognition the Union considers important with regard to its aim to gain space among them on the world stage. It could be argued that, to a certain extent, the legitimacy of the EU in terms of the CFSP depends on the prior legitimacy of its member states and their approval for its activities. Yet legality and normative justifiability as dimensions of legitimacy that are ‘inherited’ from the member states are not enough to explain the Union’s potential in global affairs. Fundamentally, gaining space in external political affairs is up to the EU’s performance.

2.4. EU ACTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

[An interpretation that any mind actually makes of a sign derives its character from the category of Action.

(C.S. Peirce – EW 2: 499)

Being seen as an actor is intrinsic to what the actor is. How we interpret others as individuals and collectives depends, to a great extent, on the way they act or, more precisely, the way their action appears to us in the interactive processes that we participate in. Also at the level of international entities that are involved in political affairs, day-to-day encounters have an impact on the image of the actors, their institutional being, and their capacity to influence each other and the contexts of action. (See Ross 2002) Various contexts, to be understood as courses of events in their entirety, open up a horizon of possible interactions and interpretations, on the one hand, and limit the sphere of the possible, on the other. As possible fields for a performance, these events give international actors an opportunity, or sometimes even oblige them, to act.

Actors have different reasons to get involved. Their intentions are reflected on the ways they choose to act and use tools at their disposal. The function of these tools is generally thought to be directed at reacting to events in order to change their course either for the sake of the other actors and the external environment itself or out of the desire to safeguard or promote one’s own
interests. But also positioning oneself may in itself be a reason to get involved since in social reality what is is only in and through action. In recent years the identity literature in IR has been expanded enormously both by postmodernists and constructivists seeking to “seize the middle ground” between objectivism and relativism (Adler 1997). The importance of identity in international relations has been acknowledged but it seems to be difficult to find a means to study how action finally influences the actor itself and not only the course of events in which it participates. It is well-founded to argue that often actors, even if they know what they are doing, “don’t know what what they do does” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 187), but the same concerns researchers who claim to know what actors are doing but have no means to elaborate what what actors do does.

The said applies also to the action of the European Union in the Middle East. The functions that are presented in the analysis in chapters five to seven are possibilities that, in general terms, any performance entails. Here, the broader framework of the EU’s actorness in the Middle East is presented, but in order to avoid an excess generality, we limit the empirical illustration of EU actorness mainly to the performance of the special representative.

2.4.1. Economic Performance

The EU is first and foremost an economic actor. Its presence on the world stage is overwhelmingly related to trade and economic assistance. The emphasis on economics derives from the Union’s original raison d’être as an entity where tight commercial relations prevent the member states from fighting each other. Over the years, the idea of spreading the sphere of peaceful coexistence beyond the Community’s boundaries has increased expectations about widening the scope of the Union’s activities to high politics. Even if the economic strength has not yet been followed by the development of the EU’s capacity to present itself as a single purposeful and credible actor in the high policy sphere of world affairs, the economic dimension has created a foundation for presence in political terms and thus enabled the development of the Union’s foreign policy actorness.

The Middle East was taken to the EC agenda relatively early. Already in the 1960s, the Community entered into formal treaties for trade and economic co-operation with some states in the Mediterranean region. These arrangements were extended in the 1970s to include Israel and most Arab states in the Middle East. Commercial and economic relations in the framework of Euro-Mediterranean co-operation have been accompanied by political dialogue at
both multilateral and bilateral levels.\textsuperscript{49} It was also in the early 1970s that Community assistance to the Palestinians began, first via the UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East) and a decade later as a direct aid through NGOs. Due to the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War of October 1973, the Middle East became one of the first subjects for discussion on the EPC agenda. On the part of the United States, the 1970s were characterised by a reaffirmed commitment to Israel which has not shaken even during the times of crisis and confrontation in relations between Middle Eastern actors.

The US security assistance program was initiated to counter Soviet influence in the region, but the east-west confrontation has not been the only reason for the US commitment to guarantee the security of Israel (Clarke 1997, 201). If that were the case, the end of the Cold War would have meant closing the money tap. Declaring the continuity of American backing, US government publications affirm that

\begin{quote}
[c]ommitment to Israel’s security and well-being has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Middle East since Israel’s creation in 1948, in which the United States played a key supporting role. Israel and the United States are bound closely by historic and cultural ties as well as by mutual interests. Continuing U.S. economic and security assistance to Israel acknowledges these ties and signals U.S. commitment.

\hfill (US Department of State 2001)
\end{quote}

As the largest non-military aid donor to the region the EU has a considerable power to create a self-image of an altruistic civilian power as opposed to the United States, which emphasises military means and has provided Israel and Egypt with security assistance of more than 3 milliard euros annually since the two signed the peace agreement in 1979.\textsuperscript{50} The EU’s economic contribution to the Palestinians has for a long time been beyond compare. Immediately after the signing of the Oslo accord in September 1993, the EU committed itself to increase economic support to Palestinians by 100 million euros per year for the following five-year period. Half of the commitment consisted of loans given by the European Investment Bank (EIB). Although the World Bank directs the aid, as the biggest contributor the EU has a say in deciding where the aid is focused. Besides co-ordinating regional economic development the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{49} But see Dosenrode and Stubkjær (2002, 146-148) on the importance of the economic dimension of the EU-Middle East relationships, which makes the Union compromise its advocacy of democracy and human rights.
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{50} See Miller (2001) generally on great power influence in war-prone regions.
\end{flushleft}
Union has a central role in the negotiations concerning environment, water resources, and refugees (Hollis 1994, 119, 132; European Commission 2001b).51

The framework created in Oslo enabled the EU to participate in the peace process more effectively than before and gave it an opportunity to occupy a firm position in the formation of a new regional economic order. The EU financed an arrangement for negotiations to start regional development cooperation. Concurrently, the declaration of principles led the EU to modify its orientation so that along with the economic assistance to Palestinians, the Union began to strengthen its economic relations with Israel. Israel saw this as an opportunity to benefit from the ‘political capital’ that flowed to the region (Hollis 1994, 130). Presently the Union is the major trading partner of Israel.

The 1994 European Council in Essen emphasised the privileged partnership with Israel stating that “Israel, on account of its high level of economic development, should enjoy special status in its relations with the European Union on the basis of reciprocity and common interests. In the process regional economic development in the Middle East including in the Palestinian areas, will also be boosted” (European Union 1994b). Yet, even if there clearly was a prospect of mutual benefits in deepening the economic relations between the EU and Israel, a new agreement was concluded only when the EU regarded it as politically appropriate. The association agreement was signed in 1995 but due to the EU’s assessment of the political situation in the Middle East, the ratification of the treaty took five years.

Economic relations between Europe and Israel have always been coloured by political considerations. The EU has made increasing use of its economic relations to pursue political objectives. While the United States and Israel have developed a close political and strategic relationship strengthened by economic support, the EU has had more critical tones in its dialogue with Israel and continuously emphasised rights of Palestinians. (Hollis 1994; Marr 1994) The economic co-operation between the EU and Israel has faced difficulties also due to different interpretations of the Oslo agreement. There have been two major problems troubling EU-Israeli economic relations, both of them concerning the origin of products and directly linked to differences in understanding the principles of the Oslo agreement. The first difference concerns exporting products from Israeli settlements, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the second one involves exporting products that are produced in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The central question is whether

51 The EU pledge was renewed for the same amounts for the years 1999-2003 but actually the EU contribution has far exceeded these amounts.
Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights are part of the State of Israel. (European Commission 1998b)52

To strengthen Mediterranean economic co-operation and safeguard its self-interests in the region, in 1995 the EU initiated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership program that consists of a multilateral and bilateral track. The goal of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to achieve regional integration between the EU and third Mediterranean countries, on the one hand, and between third Mediterranean countries themselves, on the other hand. The so-called South-South dimension has been regarded as essential to the establishment of a Mediterranean free trade area and also as a means to reduce instability characteristic to the region.

In a wider context, the EU’s ever increasing emphasis on the political dimension of EU-Middle East relations since the 1970s can also be interpreted as an endeavour to find a firm and plausible basis for the Union’s political actoriness with regard to the whole region. When Egypt and Israel signed the peace agreement in 1979, the United States played the dominant part while the EC remained a bystander. After the Camp David accords, US aid to Egypt allowed it not only to pull away from the political stance of other Arab states but also to benefit from standing apart from the rest of the Arab world. The political purpose of the US aid to Egypt has been to maintain peace with Israel and to create a link between peace and the development of Egypt’s public infrastructures. Nevertheless, there is wide support for radical Palestinian resistance among Islamic Egyptians as proven by the establishment of a terrorist organisation, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, in Egypt soon after the Camp David accord was signed.

Also in the Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (hereafter called the Territories) radical movements gained ground. The motivation for this was partly ideological and partly driven by a rising national consciousness. The Palestinian nationalist movement is extremely pluralistic, varying from secular groups such as the Palestine People’s Party to radical Islamic factions, the most influential of which are Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFPL, DFPL and some factions of Fatah. The economic misery in the Territories has given a further impetus to the rise of fundamentalism as the radical Islamic movement

52 Since 1975, EC-Israel economic relations were governed by the EC-Israel Co-operation Agreement that established a free trade zone between the EC and Israel. The co-operation agreement was replaced by the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement that was concluded in 1995 and entered into force in 2000. Israel has expressed its willingness to expand the scope of present co-operation, but the EU has conditioned the widening and deepening of links by connecting it with the progress in the peace process. For a detailed analysis of the trade agreement, see Hirsch 1996.
has provided ‘alternative’ contributions to welfare. Hamas and other Islamic groups have delivered social services such as education and health care to the most marginalised segments of society. The religious motivation of the fundamentalist Islamic movement caused it to develop a net of social services parallel to the official one. Through establishing schools, kindergartens and hospitals, Hamas became popular among the poor population that was disappointed with the PLO’s inability to guarantee basic living conditions and social services. The ideology of Hamas involves not only the fight against Israeli occupation but includes as well an element of political rivalry against the PLO that is seen by many as having too soft stance toward Israel. By generating popular support via education and healthcare—accompanied by efficient propaganda machinery—Hamas has been able to challenge the PLO. (Klein 1997; Mishal and Sela 2000)

For its part, the EU has sought to ensure through economic assistance that the Palestinian administration retains its position. But the development aid clearly has a political dimension also in the sense that the EU seeks to profile itself as a powerful actor in the Middle East peace process. Co-operation with the Palestinian Authority (PA) based on economic support can be regarded not only as a significant part of the peace process but also as an asset to the EU to gain political space in the region. The EC’s economic support for the peace process goes beyond 810 million euros per year on average in EC grants and loans of the EIB. This amount consists of direct support to the PA, refugees and regional peace process projects as well as bilateral and regional aid to Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The European Community provides more than half of the international community’s financial support for the Palestinian Authority. (European Commission 2001a)

The relations between the EU and the PA are not, however, completely trouble-free either. A dispute between Arafat and the donors related to financial assistance concerns financial reports, refusal of inspections and lack of detailed programmes for building infrastructure.53 Arafat has been accused of using the PA budget for political purposes. Moreover, while donors wanted to direct money to basic infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and roads, Arafat’s main interest was to spend money for high-profile national projects that served

53 In 2002, Israeli officials presented a document that accuses the Palestinian Authority for financing terrorism and using the budgetary support provided by the EU among others either directly for that purpose or for compensating the budgetary deficit caused by the PA’s support to terrorist activities. (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002a) The EU has denied the allegations saying that “on the basis of the material it has examined, [the EU] has not found any evidence of EU funds being used for purposes other than those agreed between the EU and the PA.” (European Commission 2002a)
the purpose of creating an image of a state-like entity. Partly due to these motivations, the basic needs of the population were not met and the living standards in Gaza, already low as a result of the first *intifada*, decreased between September and November 1993 by 50 per cent. (Klein 1997, 389-390)

It has been acknowledged that without the Union’s support the Palestinian Authority would have collapsed a long time ago. Yet the results of the EU’s massive program of economic assistance have not been encouraging. The assistance has seemed to fail to achieve its original goals. Nevertheless, a conclusion of the Commission in 1998 was that the economic assistance has succeeded in keeping the peace process alive, even if there had been no political progress for the preceding year and a half at the time the report was published (European Commission 1998a).

2.4.2. Political Performance

The EPC was established on 27 October 1970, when the foreign ministers of the EC member states adopted the so-called Davignon Report that was designed to co-ordinate national foreign policies of the member states. The two objectives of this co-operation were (i) to ensure greater mutual understanding with respect to the major issues of international politics by exchanging information and consulting regularly, and (ii) to increase their solidarity by working for a harmonisation of views, concentration of attitudes and joint action when it appears feasible and desirable.

One of the major issues of international politics in the early 1970s was the Middle East. It also proved to be a real testing ground for the ‘harmonisation of views’ and ‘concentration of attitudes’ within the European Community. The 1970s was a crucial period in the shaping of European policy guidelines toward the Middle East. The so-called Schuman paper adopted in 1971 discussed issues such as the international status of Jerusalem, Israeli withdrawal from the Territories, and creation of demilitarised zones. The document lacked substance but was, nevertheless, the beginning of a distinctive collective position on the Middle East. Although the document had some impact on relations between the EC and the Middle Eastern states, its most important consequence was that the position of the Community was strengthened with regard to its individual member states (Greilsammer and Weiler 1984, 132-133). The Venice declaration of 1980, initiated by France, followed the same path and positioned the then-EC of nine members more clearly—both with respect to the conflict and, what was more significant, in terms of internal
co-ordination—when it called for recognition of the Palestinian people’s right for self-determination (European Communities 1980).

The declaration of Venice was a milestone of the EC’s Middle East policy and as such defined the Community’s position with regard to political relations with the Middle East. In Israel it has been interpreted as the “peak of European anti-Israeli policy” (Ahiram and Tovias 1995, 3). The Venice declaration was drafted under French leadership and the personal contribution of President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in formulating it was considerable. His successor, François Mitterrand, criticised the declaration and sought to improve Franco-Israeli relations that were deteriorated by the French-led pro-Palestinian Middle East policy of the EC. In the 1950s and 1960s until the Six-Day War in 1967, France had been Israel’s leading western ally but especially after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the United States filled this role, while France profiled itself as an active supporter of the Palestinian cause. (See Soetendorp 1999)

Already in the first EPC ministerial meeting in Munich in 1970, the first theme on the agenda was the Middle East at the request of France. Two basic reasons for the willingness of France to engage in the Middle East question in the European context were economic interests in the region and an attempt to create a policy different from that of the United States. At the time, the Community was divided over the issue when in particular Germany and the Netherlands, opposing the French view, were inclined to support the Israeli position.

Internal discrepancies were not the only reason that prevented the Community from developing a substantial foreign policy co-operation toward the Middle East. There was also an external constraint. As a result of a US statement that pursuing policies that were incompatible with those of the United States would endanger trans-Atlantic relations, the Venice declaration became considerably less bold than had originally been intended. The declaration was an attempt by the EC member states to get international acceptance for the creation of a ‘Palestinian home land’ and a guarantee for mutually recognised borders. This initiative was rejected by Israel and virtually ignored by the Arab states. At large, the ‘success’ of the EPC regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict was more in development of a common line than in having an impact on policy outcomes in the conflict region.

The US stance toward European attempts to develop a common foreign policy has been ambivalent. On the one hand, Americans have requested Europe to define a political selfhood that external actors could address. The most often cited example of this kind of expectation is probably Kissinger’s demand in 1973 for a telephone number for Europe. But on the other hand, there has been a fear that a strong Europe might produce a global rival in foreign policy
matters where American and European interests do not coincide. (M. Smith 1992; Wallace and Zielonka 1998) The Middle East conflict is one of the longstanding questions on the international agenda and a clear friction can be seen there between the stances across the Atlantic Ocean—on the European shore this concerns particularly France, which has been the most active EU member state pushing for a common foreign policy.

The pro-Palestinian attitude that was adopted in France was somewhat hampered in the 1980s by President Mitterrand’s personal sympathies toward Israel. His view was that an active French role in the Middle East had to be backed by improvement in Franco-Israeli relations. Earlier the official guidelines for French Middle East policy had been drawn on the basis of the following considerations: Access to Middle East oil has to be protected, arms sales to the region should be promoted, and French political influence maintained. Support to Palestinian people was seen as a major factor in protecting French interests in the region on a wider scale. The direct and unconditioned support to Palestinians was opposed by Israel and the United States who considered the French efforts an unnecessary complication of the regional power relations and spheres of influence. (Wood 1993, 21-22)

Under Mitterrand, France adopted a stance that it was not the duty of the EC to impose a solution but instead to encourage negotiations on a step-by-step basis where different tracks of the peace process would result in a comprehensive peace in the long term. The workability of this kind of approach was demonstrated in the Camp David treaty in 1979 and the Israel-Jordan peace accord fourteen years later. However, the Franco-Israeli rapprochement proved to be short-lived: Already by the mid-1980s, the French balancing policy of the early 1980s was changed back to emphasising closer relations with the PLO. Although Mitterrand’s ideas of how to deal with the Middle East were in some respects different from his predecessor’s, he shared Giscard d’Estaing’s view of an independent and active French role in the region. Arafat’s support to the growing French role in the Middle East gave the French government reason to believe that its own status would be enhanced if the PLO achieved a firm and recognised position in the eyes of other significant international actors. (Soetendorp 1999; Wood 1993)

The end of the Cold War was a central factor that made it possible to start serious peace negotiations in the Middle East. As the Soviet empire collapsed Arab governments lost the support that they had profited from for a long time. Another important occurrence that made Arab states soften their stance toward Israel was the trauma of the Persian Gulf War. Iraq, the centre of secular Arab radicalism, was strongly supported by Palestinian leaders when it occupied Kuwait. The mistake of backing Saddam Hussein rebounded on Arafat as Arab
bankers in the Persian Gulf region drew their economic support from the PLO. Another problem that Palestinian political leaders faced concurrently, or even consequently, was that the Palestinian uprising seemed to fade away as the PLO was no longer able to guarantee the economic welfare of those involved in rousing the uprising. In these circumstances, Palestinian leaders were forced to the negotiation table. Israel, in turn, saw Madrid as an opportunity to reduce the costs of occupation and calculated that after the Persian Gulf War it had good chances to dictate the conditions of an agreement.

While joining the western coalition in the Persian Gulf, France undertook a diplomatic effort to link the Gulf crisis with wider regional problems, including the Palestinian issue. Other states involved in the Persian Gulf War opposed the idea. The only ‘supporter’ of the linkage was actually the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein who said he would end his occupation of Kuwait only when Israel ended its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Finally, France gave up its idea of linking Iraqi withdrawal to Israeli withdrawal. It still insisted on holding an international conference, but the French initiative died because of a strong US opposition. The dilemma for the French government in the beginning of the 1990s was the same as the one it had faced a decade earlier: “if it did not participate in US-led actions, it might be excluded from the region” (Wood 1993, 29).

France’s support for the PLO and Arafat remained strong during and after the Persian Gulf War, and despite the EC decision to freeze all contacts with high-level PLO officials, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas met Arafat in April 1991. The meeting was important as an attempt to restore the credibility of Arafat and the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians. The image had been severely damaged by Arafat’s pro-Iraqi statements. Another reason for the meeting was to maintain and even strengthen the idea that France was a necessary link in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Israel rejected the French proposal for an international conference under UN auspices as well as French or European participation in any regional peace negotiations. The EC representative Hans van den Broek had an observer status in the Madrid conference but in practice neither France nor the EC as a whole had a role in the negotiations in 1991 and 1992.

Although the PLO was to be recognised as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the organisation faced serious problems in the early 1990s. First, there were economic problems resulting from the cuts in foreign Arab, mainly Saudi, financial aid due to the PLO support of Saddam Hussein. Second, shaping the first intifada as a pro-PLO popular revolt against Israeli occupation did not result in improvement in the quality of everyday life in the Territories. The failure in finding a solution to the practical social and economic
problems helped generate popular support for Hamas, which was not only a radical alternative to the PLO in the political arena but also an organisation that was, more than the PLO, concerned with responding to the demands in the social and economic sectors.

The most visible dimension of the first intifada was the young men and children throwing stones and demonstrating against occupation. Yet the intifada also had a more ‘prominent’ dimension, for Palestinian leadership saw the uprising as a means to affect the world opinion and justify the official political agenda of intifada that called for an independent Palestinian state. In November 1988, the PLO declared the independence of the state of Palestine with its capital in Jerusalem and called for an international conference to negotiate with Israel on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. The declaration of independence, drafted by Faisal Hussein, called for an independent state of Palestine within the boundaries drawn by the UN proposal in 1947 to establish Arab and Jewish states to the territory west of the Jordan River. The declaration failed to gain wide international recognition but marked the shift in the PLO’s strategy from armed struggle to pursuing a negotiated solution. (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2000, 56; Smith 1996, 297-303; Steinberg 1994, 117-118)

In October 1991, Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian, Lebanese, and Syrian delegations attended peace talks co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union in Madrid to discuss Israeli withdrawal from the Territories on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338 that state the principle of ‘Land for Peace’. This constituted the first comprehensive attempt to reach a just solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1948. Participants of the Madrid Conference placed great expectations on the process assuming that it would lead to lasting peace between Israel and the Arab states, on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians, on the other. However, immediate substantial progress was not achieved. In procedural terms, in turn, the meeting was a success for

54 The independence was recognised by many Arab and Muslim states and the Soviet Union. The PLO’s full diplomatic status was accorded by 70 states, which in practice meant that they accepted its role as an administrative entity of a quasi-state. It remains to be seen whether the states that recognised the independence of a Palestinian state will ‘re-recognise’ it in the case that Israel and the PA will act according to their agreement on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

55 The actual significance of the Soviet Union/Russia as a co-sponsor of the Madrid talks can be debated. As Haass (1996, 61) argues, “Russian cosponsorship of the Madrid peace process is mostly a gesture, while Europeans, whether individually or through the European Union, have little to offer beyond economic assistance”.

82
it enabled the creation of a direct negotiation contact between Israel and the PLO. Besides the Israeli-Palestinian track, the Madrid Conference established three other bilateral negotiation tracks between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states; Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Furthermore, a multilateral track with wide international participation was established, but Syria and Lebanon postponed their participation in the multilateral track in the absence of bilateral peace agreements with Israel. The structure of the multilateral track includes five sectoral working groups on arms control, refugees, water, environment, and regional economic development.

Concerning the multilateral track of the peace process, the EU has been actively involved since the beginning of the process. Besides financing a large number of multilateral activities especially on the issues of refugees and regional economic integration, the EU chairs one of the five working groups (Regional Economic Development Working Group), participates in the one dealing with arms control, and co-organises activities in the three other working groups. (European Commission 1998a)

Since Israel regarded the EC as biased in its relations to the Middle East, it vetoed the participation of the Community and its member states as co-sponsors of the Madrid Conference (Ahiram and Tovias 1995, 4). But Israel-EC relations improved as the new Labour government assumed office in Israel. Soon after the Labour party, headed by Yitzhak Rabin, had won the general election in 1992, a clandestine negotiation channel was opened between Israel and the PLO. As the post-Madrid efforts did not lead to expected results, the Oslo process was seen as a second opportunity to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. An important condition for a fresh start was, of course, Israeli willingness to accept the PLO as a negotiation partner and, correspondingly, the PLO’s readiness to join the process that gave no guarantees of what would be the final and comprehensive solution.

The PLO was at the time of signing the Oslo peace agreement still seen by many Palestinians as an external actor—a status which was not made any easier by the fact that the organisation’s leadership had not ever since the establishment of the PLO resided in the Territories. When Arafat composed the Palestinian Authority according to the guidelines drawn in Oslo, the most powerful positions were given to the PLO leaders coming from outside. This decision further widened the inside-outside gap and made clear the secondary role of the ‘insiders’ (Klein 1997, 387-388). This led Edward Said, among others, to describe the declaration of principles “a pact between Israeli colonialism and Arafat’s dictatorship”56.

The 1991 Madrid Conference and the following steps taken in the peace process raised great hopes of a comprehensive peace in the region. The EC reacted to these efforts by offering economic assistance to the peace process. The Commission emphasises that “[i]n parallel, the Union maintained its supportive complementary political role” (European Commission 1998a)\(^57\), thus aptly describing the position of the EU as a political actor. Namely, its political role was exactly as stated: supportive with regard to the efforts of conflicting parties and complementary to the US political leadership within the limits agreed by the United States and Israel, who have not been very eager to support the EU’s quest for a greater political role in the region.

The enactment of the European Union on 1 November 1993 provided (at least on paper) the Union with both a deepening of internal integration and the creation of new instruments to assert its role on the international scene. It was hoped that combining EPC diplomacy with the machinery of the Community would make the foreign policy co-operation more coherent and strengthen the capacity to act\(^58\). But especially the ‘big five’—France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom—still consider their national interests to be primary with regard to real or imagined EU interests, the importance of which is often emphasised by smaller member states.

An interim agreement, the so called Oslo II, that Israel and the PLO concluded in September 1995, ensured the EU a central role in electoral observation of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) and presidential elections held in January 1996. The EU was responsible for co-ordinating the international electoral observation. The election of the PNC brought a solution to the long-standing dilemma of representation. It weakened the PLO’s position

\(^57\) Although the EU has accepted a role complementary to the United States, the Commission (1998a) acknowledges that this arrangement has worked imperfectly so far and suggests that the organisation of complementary efforts by the United States and the EU should be reviewed and reconsidered by the whole international community without challenging the present role of the US. The question then is whether there is enough space for the both actors ‘on the top’ or would enhancing the EU’s role necessarily mean that the United States would be obliged to share its ‘cake of prestige and power’ with the Union.

\(^58\) Allen and Smith (1998, 54-55) list three interrelated qualities that constitute the basis for the Union’s capacity to act:
– learning capacity in the sense of learning to absorb and adapt to information received, which is crucial especially in times of rapid and unpredictable change;
– carrying capacity as an ability “to cope with the task of generating decisions, and to achieve coordination among decisions taken in different areas of activity”;
and
– mobilisation capacity—“the ability to mobilize appropriate resources for the tasks in question”.

84
as a ‘borderless liberation organisation’ but, at the same time, the voting
behaviour proved that the PA has gained a position as the legitimate
representative of the Palestinians living in the Territories. What was problematic
in the situation was the personal strength of Arafat as a political leader and the
fact that, according to the Oslo agreement, the PLO, and not the Palestinian
Authority, is the Palestinian representative in final negotiations (Usher 1996,
16-17).

Besides the economic assistance it offers, the EU has sought to profile
itself politically. This has mainly been done by means of numerous declarations
after the TEU came into force.59 Particularly, the EU has sought to declare its
position with regard to Israeli settlement activities as well as Palestinian terrorist
attacks and other bursts of violence in the region. Also the advancements and
setbacks of the peace process have been regularly noticed in EU declarations.
Hence, as Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 186) argue, it is not only through the
substantive and ever increasing economic assistance to the Palestinians that
the EU has adopted a position distinct from that of the United States. Political
efforts to create a European stance toward the Middle East have meant a
declaratory policy that is clearly supportive of the Palestinian cause and critical
of Israeli actions. Habitually, the Union includes in the declarations a remark
on its readiness to facilitate talks and implementation of the existing agreements,
and refers to its major contributions to the peace process in the form of economic
aid.

Generally speaking, already reaching an agreement on a declaration among
the member states is sometimes seen as a diplomatic victory of integrity, as
the Venice declaration showed. On other occasions, as in the case of prolonged
and intense violence in Algeria, the absence of declarations has indicated a
profound lack of agreement, since declaratory policy, having no further
obligations to the member states, is seen as a relatively easy way to express
common opinion and proclaim the unity of the Union at the international scene.
In all, declarations often function merely as a means to show to what extent
the positions of the EU member states coincide in any given foreign policy
issue.

Joint action as another CFSP instrument is a considerably more substantial
expression of foreign policy actorness.60 Concerning the Union’s joint actions

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59 Declarations since 1996 can be found in European Union 2002b. See particularly
terms ‘Israel’, ‘Middle East’, ‘Middle East peace process’, ‘Palestinian Authority’,
and ‘Palestinian Territories’ in the cumulative index of each year. See also European
University Institute 2002.

60 For an analysis of joint actions, see Winn and Lord (2001) whose view on traditional
models of foreign policy analysis is critical.
on the Middle East peace process, the first one of 19 April 1994 expressed the Union’s willingness to “participate in international arrangements agreed by the parties”, to “use its influence to encourage all the parties to support the peace process unconditionally”, and to “make its contribution to defining the future shape of relations between the regional parties in the context of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group”. In more practical terms, the joint action defined the EU’s aims as being to “develop its role in the ad hoc Liaison Committee responsible for the coordination of international aid to the Occupied Territories”, to “maintain its leading role in the regional economic development working group (REDWG) and develop its participation in other multilateral working groups”, and to “provide assistance to the creation of a Palestinian Police Force”. It also mentioned the possibility to “participate in the protection of the Palestinian people through a temporary international presence in the Occupied Territories” and stated that, at the request of the parties, the Union would assist in co-ordinating the preparation and observation of the Palestinian elections. (European Union 1994a; see also Barbé and Izquierdo 1997, 129-132)

Two further Joint Actions provided the basis for political and financial involvement in the Palestinian elections’ preparation, observation and co-ordination of international observation by allocating 10 million euros for that purpose and sending at most 300 monitors to observe the election that was held in January 1996. All further joint actions have dealt either with PA training for counter-terrorism or the nomination and mandate of the EU special envoy in the Middle East peace process.

The CFSP is in practice based on a formalised co-operation between the member states’ foreign ministries at various levels. To ensure the exchange of information on CFSP matters between various institutions and the member states, a CFSP telegraphic network known as Coreu traffic is used for issues falling exclusively within Title V of the TEU. Coreus are the secure telegrams exchanged among all member states’ capitals, the Commission and the Council Secretariat. Officially, the daily correspondence takes place in Coreu telexnet, but the unofficial and often undocumented dialogue between member states’ representatives and EU officials seems to be a much more informative and influential communication channel. Member states’ ambassadors to third countries meet regularly to share information about the country or region in question and prepare common positions and joint actions. The ambassadors of the respective EU presidency have a special responsibility for the Union’s representation. For the regions where the Council has nominated special envoys, the envoys share their ideas and analyse situations with the member states’ ambassadors.
2.4.3. EU Representation in the Peace Process

From time to time the discomfort of European political circles with the US policy to exclude the Union from the Middle East talks is expressed in declaratory texts of the General Affairs Council. This happened for instance in autumn 1996 when the EU was excluded from the Washington summit that led to the agreement in January 1997. Some significant changes had taken place in the Oslo framework by the time the Hebron accord was concluded. The new agreement was then renamed Oslo III. (Garfinkle 1997, 14) The primary purpose of the Washington talks was to strengthen the mutual confidence and the parties’ commitment to the ‘letter and spirit’ of the signed agreements, and to give them a realistic picture of each other’s internal limitations of action. A main reason for leaving the EU out of the negotiations was the dislike on the part of Israel and the United States regarding the Union’s willingness to strengthen its political role in the Middle East by means that appeared unbalanced. For instance, after the EU declaration blaming Israel for the newly erupted violence in autumn 1996, the US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, sent the EU a letter that advised the Union to abstain from statements that put the blame solely on one of the conflicting parties.

In its early years, the CFSP was confined to a relatively narrow set of actions on which the member states were able to agree. Against this background, nominations of special envoys to the world’s trouble spots appear as significant attempts to learn to speak with one voice in regions where various member states have traditionally had their national interests at stake. By virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam Art. J.8(5) the Council may appoint a special representative with a “mandate in relation to particular policy issues” whenever it considers an appointment necessary. The role of special envoys is governed by joint actions appointing them and, later, renewing their mandate.

One important aim has been to move beyond ‘declaratory diplomacy’, the most frequent output of which are political statements without any concrete substance or following collective action. Also the political significance of joint actions and other foreign policy initiatives “has often been lost in procedural and structural confusion” (Spence and Spence 1998, 46). Inadequate external visibility and lack of durable effects have been obstacles to establishing a credible CFSP. The decision to appoint a special envoy—presently titled ‘special representative’—to the Middle East was an answer to the need to strengthen the Union’s political performance in the region when there was not yet an agreement to appoint a High Representative of the CFSP with a higher international status.
The original joint action to nominate a special envoy was based on the Council declaration on 1 October 1996 and the General Affairs Council conclusions on 28 October 1996. The text expresses the EU’s readiness to participate in an active manner in promoting the peace process according to European interests in the region. The special meeting of the heads of state and government held in Dublin on 5 October asked the General Affairs Council to consider a mandate for the appointment of an EU envoy to the Middle East. The text adopted in GAC on 28 October 1996 states that “[t]he situation created by the deterioration in the Peace Process has underlined the need for the European Union to contribute actively to advancing the Peace Process, commensurate with its substantial political and economic engagement in the region” (European Union 1996a). The deterioration of the situation implicitly refers to the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as the Prime Minister of Israel in 1996, the tension following the opening of a historic tunnel in the Old City of Jerusalem, and the aggressive settlement policy of Netanyahu’s government.

Miguel Ángel Moratinos who became the Union’s first special envoy to the Middle East peace process had been recently appointed Spanish Ambassador in Israel before his nomination for the special envoy. He has been credited for launching the Barcelona process under Spain’s EU presidency in the second half of 1995 to foster co-operation and development in the Mediterranean region. Ambassador Moratinos was appointed the EU special envoy by Council joint action of 25 November 1996 in order

– to establish and maintain close contact with all the parties to the peace process, other countries of the region, the United States and other interested countries, as well as relevant international organizations, in order to work with them in strengthening the peace process,
– to observe peace negotiations between the parties, and to be ready to offer the European Union’s advice and good offices should the parties request this,
– to contribute where requested to the implementation of international agreements reached between parties, and to engage with them diplomatically in the event of non-compliance with the terms of these agreements,
– to engage constructively with signatories to agreements within the framework of the peace process in order to promote compliance with the basic norms of democracy, including respect for human rights and the rule of law,
– to report to the Council’s bodies on the possibilities for European Union intervention in the peace process, and on the best way of pursuing European Union initiatives and ongoing Middle East peace process-related European Union business including the political aspects of relevant European Union development projects,
– to monitor actions by either side which might prejudice the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.
The joint action further states that

The EU special envoy will be guided by, and report under the authority of the Presidency to the Council on a regular basis, and as the need arises. The tasks of the envoy will be without prejudice to the role of the Commission which will be fully associated in these tasks.

(European Union 1996c)

The Council Joint Action of 14 December 2000 prolonging the appointment of the EU special representative extended the original mandate of the representative to include two new aspects, stating that the mandate shall be to “develop joint cooperation on security issues within the EU-Palestinian Permanent Security Committee set up on 9 April 1998” and to “contribute to a better understanding of the EU’s role among opinion leaders in the region” (European Union 2000). The mission of the special representative is thus both to further the peace process and to increase the influence of the EU in the region.

It has been argued that the major powers involve themselves in mediation or other activities as third parties of conflict for three main reasons: (i) to defuse crises which threaten global stability, (ii) to maintain internal solidarity within alliances, and (iii) to enhance their reputations for diplomatic weight and project influence into new areas (Berridge 1995, 102-103). These reasons can be derived from the values and interests of the major powers. Significant as they are, they leave open the question about actors’ need to define themselves in relation to external events and thereby (re-)construct their identities. The need to define the self with respect to the external environment and the others projects the external contexts of actorness as opportunities to position oneself.

Often in international interaction, we can see a logic of question and answer. If certain work or action is taken as an answer, we need “to discover the interplay of questions to which the work suggests to answer” (Ricoeur 1988, 172). The ‘questions’ generally provided in academic studies in IR have to do with values and interests as in the above study by Berridge (1995). Besides these two options, a third possible question raised up by constructivist and postmodern approaches has to do with identity. To frame the three different sorts of question, we now turn the attention to an elaboration of different types of performances inspired by the Peircean theory of signs, where a sign may be interpreted as an answer to different questions, depending on what the interpreter focuses on.

According to March and Olsen (1989, 13), a solution is “an answer actively looking for a question”. In the analysis of chapters five to seven we interpret the possible questions that the EU has sought to respond to by sending a special envoy to the Middle East. The first question of external representation concerns
the institutional identity of the EU: The representation aims to redefine the sphere of foreign policy in the framework of the European Union so that the EU as an entity will be strengthened and its international political being recognised. Secondly, through representation the EU seeks to contribute to a just solution to the conflict. The third question is about safeguarding EU member states’ interests in the conflict region.
3. **Analytical Framework: Signifying Representation**

In the preceding chapter, the focus was on the transformation process of actorness and the identity of an international entity. In the review of pragmatically orientated integration theories, particularly neofunctionalism, we made some references to the dimensions of interaction to which the constructivist approaches have paid increasing attention in recent years. These approaches consider identities of actors to be central in defining any interaction—and interaction to be the locus for identity formation. We suggested that institutional identity formation could be understood as consisting of four stages: imagining, naming, performance, and recognition. In order that other actors can recognise an imagined and named collective being, the being has to show an ability to act in accordance to the image it wants to communicate to the others. Hence, performance is crucial to the coming-into-being of any entity.

We further discussed the evolution of the EU’s foreign policy actorness in general and the bloc’s economic and political performance in the Middle East. In this overview the idea was to provide the background for understanding the EU’s present aspiration both to contribute to a peaceful solution in the Middle East conflict and to change the other actors’ perceptions of the Union’s institutional identity.

Performance is usually multidimensional in the sense that it has different purposes whether or not all these purposes are made explicit. In neorealist tradition the main focus in explaining states’ involvement in external affairs has been their self-interests that they seek to safeguard. On the other hand, there has also been a tendency—particularly in conflict studies on third party behaviour—to concentrate exclusively on altruistic motivations to improve in one way or another the conditions of the ‘patient’. Consequently, the success or failure of intervention is seen in terms of ‘rehabilitation’ during and after the ‘treatment’ (See e.g. Bercovitch and Houston 2000; Hampson 2001; Kleiboer 1996; Kolb 1994). Both of these views treat the intervening actor as a black box.
The fast-growing identity literature in turn stresses the impact of action on the one who acts and seeks to understand how interaction influences actors themselves. In this chapter we argue that while observing and analysing any performance we can find three dimensions, three types of factors that motivate individuals and collectives to act in one manner rather than another. In categorising these types, we follow the Peicean division of signs (or representatives) into icons, indices and symbols depending on their function. According to this understanding, a performance in a given context consists of representative, represented object and interpreters of the representation.

3.1. Concept of Representation

The Oxford English Dictionary describes representation as “[a]n image, likeness, or reproduction in some manner of a thing”, “action or fact of exhibiting in some visible image or form”, “fact of expressing or denoting by means of a figure or symbol”, or “action of presenting to the mind or imagination,” on the one hand, and “fact of standing for, or in place of, some other thing or person […] substitution of one thing or person for another,” on the other hand.\(^\text{61}\)

Representation is to be understood in this study, first of all, in terms of action in a conflictual environment where external actors as third parties attempt to promote a solution acceptable to the parties in conflict via representative(s) nominated for that purpose.\(^\text{62}\) This everyday usage of the concept

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\(^\text{61}\) For a comprehensive overview of the conceptual history of representation, see Pitkin 1989. See also Moscovici 1984.

\(^\text{62}\) In comparison to mediation, conciliation means to facilitate communication between conflicting parties and to clarify opposing positions, while arbitration is generally judicially based third party involvement (Barston 1997, 215-216). Representation in the sense of mediation derives from ancient Greece, where the role of envoys was basically that of a messenger in bilateral relations. The use of third parties, according to Mosley (1973, 96), was a practice sometimes used in interstate relations. The representatives of third parties were called in as arbiters or mediators in disputes, mainly between Persians and Greeks. Mosley (1973, ix) describes envoys in ancient Greek city-states as follows: “Envoys were men of considerable political weight and experience and acted under the close supervision of the political authorities. […] even when they were designated as envoys with full powers their authority was quite limited.”
‘representation’ indicates the opinion of many being expressed through one so that the one is understood as acting for, or in the place of, the many. Secondly, in epistemic terms, representation refers to the function of signs in the representation of social reality, meaning that various events, ideas and objects can be brought to the awareness of interpreters by another object or agency that is understood as depicting the specific object or its idea, i.e. representation is understood as “action of presenting to the mind or imagination.” The English term ‘representation’ is loaded with different meanings. We draw here a distinction between acting for as an agent (German vertreten) and depicting or standing for (German darstellen) but claim that a sign in Peircean vocabulary includes both senses of the word. (See Iser 1987)

‘Sign’ is the blanket name for the different intermediaries taken as representatives of their objects. 63 A sign represents social reality both in the sense of acting as an embodiment of or substitute for something else and in the sense of presenting reality again in a new way (to re-present). “By ‘characterizing’ the object, the sign allows itself the possibility of being connected to it and, at the same time, reveals a certain sense or connotation in regard to that object” (Liszka 1996, 21). Characteristics of the link between an object and its representative determine whether the sign in question is, in Peirce’s terms, icon, index, or symbol. These three loca of representation are elaborated in this chapter.

Any act or thing can be called a representative on two conditions: First, the representation needs to refer to an object, whether this object is imaginary, actually existing or a conventional being, and second, in order to be

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63 Alston (1964, 51) criticises this kind of definition of signs and seeks ground for his criticism by the following example: “if boulders of a certain kind are a sign of glacial activity, they were a sign of glacial activity before anyone realized this. In fact, they would still be signs of glacial activity, even if no one should ever realize this. [...] That means that the boulders would still be a sign of glacial activity even if they never called glacial activity to mind for anyone” (emphasis in original). But Alston seems to ignore that Peirce, to whom Alston directs his criticism as a representative of ‘general sign theorists’, in his threefold distinction takes into account the possibility that instead of being merely taken as a sign of an object, a sign (namely index) may actually be a sign of an object that it denotes irrespective of whether it actually calls its object to mind for anyone. Sebeok (1994, 48), in turn, agrees with Peirce that “the indexical character of the sign would not be voided if there were no interpretant, but only if its object was removed.” See also Ayer 1968, 133. Interpretative process, however, necessitates the link being created, discovered, or agreed to exist between the sign and its object.
a representative, an act or thing has to be interpreted as such. To combine these two conditions, an act or thing can be taken as representative as it represents something to someone. So basically anything can be a sign of something else in addition to being whatever it is apart from that ‘something else’ that it is taken to represent. But in turn, there are signs that are meaningful only in relation to the object they represent, so that they have no meaning in themselves apart from a particular object.

The two definitions of representation overlap so that a representative in the first sense—as the one ‘speaking’ on behalf of the many—may also be understood as a representative of an idea, event or object that is made meaningful in representation and given significance in interpretation. In Peircean sense, representative is “an object which stands for another so that an experience of the former affords us a knowledge of the latter”. Further, according to Peirce a representative must “like any other object have qualities independent of its meaning. It is only through a knowledge of these that we acquire any information concerning the object it represents.” (W 3: 62) Peirce also states that to stand for means “to be in such a relation to another that for certain purposes it is treated by some mind as if it were that other” (CP 2.273). Yet, given our social constructivist orientation, it has to be emphasised that meanings are not created in individual minds but are intersubjectively construed so that “International Relations consist primarily of social facts, which are facts only by human agreement” (Adler 1997, 323; see also Putnam 1988, 73). Signs are interpreted as representatives of an object jointly with other interpreters in a certain context without which the sign would not have the same meaning or any meaning at all. Hence, contextualisation is both a

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64 Peirce was not interested in the ontological question of whether there is anything that can be known. His entire philosophy focuses on the pragmatic question how things come to be known and how to justify our knowledge of the existing reality. This kind of orientation distinguishes Peircean philosophy of the language-centred schools that argue that there is no reality or external world beyond language or, at least, that representation pertains merely to linguistic signs. As Liszka (1996, 113n2) observes concerning the proposed representation/denotation distinction between the intentionality of linguistic signs and that of all non-linguistic signs, “whatever other merits it might have, there is probably not much textual support for it in Peirce”. “I think”, he continues, “we have to assume that by ‘representation’ Peirce meant in a very general sense a directedness toward objects”. The variety of senses that Peirce associated with representation is expressed in a list of different possible representations, which Peirce concludes in the following passage: “The term representation is here to be understood in a very extended sense, which can be explained by instances better than by a definition” (CP 1.553).
prerequisite for a sign’s meaningfulness and a means to limit the range of possible meanings.

What counts as representation is constrained by circumstances and conventional factors that lead to a common-sense understanding of the existence of a link between the represented and the sign that represents it. A representing sign is thus thought to reveal something essential to the object that it represents due to the characteristics that enable the link to emerge. Different metaphors and symbols are often used to shed light on ideational reality, feelings, thoughts and other objects that cannot be grasped by sensory perception, whereas material facts are taken as existing in reality regardless of whether we consider them to be brought into awareness by representations, even if in practice it is always representation that provides also the material with social meaning. Therefore Ringmar (1996, 37) suggests that “[w]hat an outside observer should study are not material factors, but instead the interpretations given to material factors; the way in which human beings make sense of their world”. Unlike ‘modernist’ constructivists such as Wendt, interpretative constructivists emphasise the centrality of language in the reality formation processes (See e.g. Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989). However, reality formation can be understood as a wider phenomenon that encloses not only spoken and written language but the whole spectrum of human interaction, including extra- and non-linguistic representations of social life.

A central interest of this study, inspired by Peirce’s theorising of representation, is to operationalise the constructivist claim concerning the centrality of identity. The chosen case for empirical illustration presents a representative (special envoy) of a collective being (the EU) as a sign of an object that is the collective’s institutional being. This does not mean, however, that only what is literally called representation in social reality should be taken as representation in the Peircean sense. Instead, any action as an actualised possibility that involves an element of conventionality may be interpreted as a sign of a certain object in social reality.

By maintaining the recognised link to the represented, a sign ceases to be the object of the impressions in itself and shifts the focus of the interpreter to the represented object, which becomes saturated with the impression reflected by the representative. Representation as ‘standing for’ (Darstellung) denotes the semiotic use of the word while the ‘acting for’ dimension (Vertretung) refers to representation as activity where a sign—whether person, event, or anything else—is taken as a delegate or substitute of another object, institution, or collective that his/its action or being conveys in terms of the mandate or properties provided to him/it by the represented.
European integration offers illuminating examples of the ‘dual-use’ of representative signs. Currency, for instance, is at the same time a tool of exchange and a representative of national or Union-wide belonging. Despite the change of the monetary unit from national currencies to euro, the activity, on which money as a tool is based, continues as before. What the change of currencies actually seeks to achieve—besides all the advantages that the common European currency is claimed to bring—is to reconstruct belonging, which is not any more nationally definable but a Union-wide phenomenon. The object of economic belonging is moved from the national level to the Union level (at least theoretically speaking—the practical effects on feelings of belonging remain to be seen). Besides being an instrument of exchange, the euro is thus potentially also a means of European identity construction. In the process of EU-isation, the new currency may have a remarkable function for it affects not only political elites but the general public as well.

The most visible changes may take place in the material realm but effects on the foundations of being, i.e. collective identity, are essential in the development of cognitive and emotional dimensions of politics. At the same time, new institutional instruments create new dimensions of description and give alternative ways to redefine the institutional identity, since the visible changes and the reconstruction of selective frames for institutional identity are interdependent. (See Dyson 2000; Riccardi 1999) If we focus on the character of representation as a neutral instrument we easily end up ignoring the formative function of interpretable sign with respect to the represented object. It is argued here that essentially representation is about (re-)defining the represented, its identity. In practical terms this means that people do not act merely on the basis of their interests as rationalist approaches claim but also, and we could say, primarily, because of the need to define themselves and maintain their image as certain kinds of actors.

In order to be able to choose to act according to a certain interest an actor needs to have a fundamental framework for action. This framework is called identity, which basically means a conception of who the actor is. Ringmar,

65 In an article in Bulletin Quotidien Europe, Ferdinando Riccardi (1999, 3) states that “during long years of progressive EEC construction, and then the EU, Europe was not seen from the outside as a whole entity: the main world interlocutors and the main international institutions continued to only take the individual European countries into consideration. With the advent of the euro, it is Europe as such which, for the first time, is at the front of the stage.” The text goes on to quote the EU Commissioner responsible for Economic and Financial Affairs, Mr. de Silguy, according to whom Europe is, thanks to euro, “taking on an existence again”.

66 Pettman (2000, 55) defines identity as “the sense we have, or the sense attributed to us, of who we are and how we differ from others”.

96
who sees the action based on interests as concerning rational utility calculation, says that we act “not only because there are things we want to have, but also because there are persons we want to be” (Ringmar 1996, 3)\(^7\). In the narrow sense, the notion that human beings are rational means that action can be explained by reference to interests in the sense of gaining utility or minimising loss. However, ‘pure interests’ do not exist in the sense that they would be exogenously given. Their coming into being reflects the identities that people come to occupy. (See Fierke and Wiener 2001, 123-125)

Identities and interests are co-constitutional, meaning that institutional interests are formed on the basis of an identity that they in turn shape. Institutional identity may be influenced by or even created to serve the interests of smaller units that organise the institutional existence, as it often seems to be in the case of the EU where the impetus for further co-operation has been given by the interests of the member states. Yet collective identity requires more than similar, compatible or even shared interests concerning some sporadic matters. Identity formation is a process where collective being is imagined, named, actively performed and recognised by others who interpret the performance. Here the focus is on representation as performance in the name of a collective, primarily but not exclusively for the purpose of identity formation. Downplaying to a certain extent the other functions of representation for the sake of the focus on identity formation is a conscious choice. It serves the more general purpose of the study in seeking to answer the criticism of the ‘rationalist camp’ that constructivist approaches are unable to operationalise their metatheoretical assumptions.

The three central elements of representation have already occurred in the text. These elements or general conditions in representation are sign, object and ‘interpretant’. The relation between object, sign and interpretant is triadic, meaning that it is only in its relation to the other two that any of them has a significance:

A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which

\[\text{Sign} \rightarrow \text{Object} \rightarrow \text{Interpretant}\]

\(67\) Ringmar (1996, 4) further claims that in general people do not engage in games because of possible utility payoffs but, instead, because games give an opportunity to present oneself as someone. Wittgenstein, too, refers to the need to be identified as someone when he raises the following question: “Why do I want to tell him about an intention too, as well as telling him what I did?—Not because the intention was also something which was going on at that time. But because I want to tell him something about myself, which goes beyond what happened at that time” (Wittgenstein 1968, §659).
it stands itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.

(CP 2.274)

Hence, in order to be taken as a representative, a sign necessarily refers to an object and determines an interpretant. Similarly an object, to be recognised as such, needs to be represented by a sign which is interpreted as representative of that particular object. And further, an interpretant has a sense only to the extent that it is determined by a sign that denotes an object. Determination should not be understood as an automatic and causal relation following the model ‘if A then necessarily B’, but rather as a constraining process that leaves some space both for a sign’s creative power and an interpreting mind.

3.2. FRAMING A REPRESENTED COLLECTIVE

In the Peircean sense, the object that a particular sign represents is to be understood very broadly. Namely, according to Peirce (CP 2.232), an object may be

- a single known existing thing or thing believed formerly to have existed or expected to exist, or a collection of such things, or a known quality or relation or fact, which single Object may be a collection, or whole of parts, or it may have some other mode of being, such as some act permitted whose being does not prevent its negation from being equally permitted, or something of a general nature desired, required, or invariably found under certain general circumstances.

In practice, it thus seems that an object could be anything imaginable—the only condition being that it is represented by a sign, for the information that we obtain from an object comes to our awareness via representing signs.68

68 Peirce separates immediate object and dynamical object, and states that signs provide us with information about the immediate object whereas the dynamical object is not immediately present in a representative relation to a sign: “We must distinguish between the Immediate Object,—i.e. the Object as represented in the sign,—and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore), say rather Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of
The relation to a sign is what actually defines an object. A sign always represents its object partially by referring to a certain quality, fact or conventional feature of the object. Representative signs open these features of the object for interpretation. As for the represented and interpreted object of this study, it can be framed as the institutional identity that the EU has or seeks to develop in terms of its Middle East policies as performed by the EU’s special representative Miguel Moratinos. The special envoy is the interpretable sign, and the interpreters are the other actors or their representatives in Middle Eastern affairs.

3.2.1. Institutional Representation

‘Become what you are’: that is the principle behind the performative magic of all acts of institution.

(Bourdieu 1991, 122)

The establishment of an institutional framework is inseparable from the practical sphere of action within the settled framework. In complex institutions it is even physically impossible that each person would interact directly with all the other individuals in institutional activities within the given framework. Thus, it is necessary that some persons become mandated to carry out institutional activities on behalf of the group or part of it. Well-known examples of such mandating are diplomatic corps of states, spokespersons of trade unions, or representatives of non-governmental organisations.

Thompson (1991, 26) distinguishes the establishment of an institutional framework, on the one hand, and the mandating of an individual to speak on behalf of the group, on the other hand, and claims that according to Bourdieu things, the sign cannot express, which it can only indicate and leave the interpreter to find out by collateral experience” (CP 8.314).

Thus the dynamical object is “no mere object of thought, but rather a source of effects; it is a dynamic center which has constraining power over the sign that is to represent it” (Smith 1965, 98; see also EW 2: 477). The dynamical object can be understood as the essence of the represented as a whole, which is taken to exist despite the fact that representation always refers only to a certain feature and is, therefore, necessarily a partial reflection of the nature of the dynamical object: “[I]nsofar as the self is the concern of consciousness, it is precisely that which cannot be conceptually grasped. For the self is, when all is said and done, the mystical, what lies beyond the grip of discoursive thought” (Tong 1995, 512).
political dispossession is this kind of “two-step process of delegation”. Yet, Bourdieu does not separate these two aspects so clearly. Mandating is tightly connected to the creation of the group itself through establishing an institutional framework. The mandatary is part of the framework and his nomination is an element in the process of establishment. As Bourdieu (1991, 106) says, it is through representation that “the representative creates the group which creates him: the spokesperson endowed with the full power to speak and act on behalf of the group […] is the substitute for the group, which exists solely through this procuration”.

In this sense, mandating in Bourdieu’s terms is a mythical phase of institutional coming-into-existence. It is a ‘breath of life’69 to an institutional body of conventions. The institutional framework as an agreed infrastructure is not yet actualised but a named being reflecting and aiming for the ideal being. Mandating may play a significant part in transforming the potential of a framework into actuality.70 A collective actor would not exist in the same form without its delegates. Thus it is not only the collective that creates the delegate but also the other way around. Bourdieu (1991, 106) emphasises that it is through the reciprocal creation of a group and its representative that the group becomes able to act and speak through the representative “like a single person.”

To call someone an envoy or representative means that the person has some qualifications expected of any envoy, including that there is an identifiable entity whose envoy he is, an organisation or a fairly united group of people whom he is nominated to represent. Following this definition, function of representation would be to stand for, or in place of the whole group. According to Barston (1997, 18), however, a function of representation is also to achieve identity in international relations. This means that collective identity is not ‘out there’, ready to be represented but is created via representation. Representation is the way to (re-)construct forms of life when understood as an intermediary between objectified intersubjective being and ideas about it within interpretative frameworks where interpreters make the represented being significant. Hence, as was discussed in the beginning of this chapter, besides acting for a represented, representation is also “action representing to the mind or imagination.”

69 Genesis 2:7 “And the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.” (King James translation)

70 See e.g. Wendt (1992, 413) on the sovereign state as an ongoing accomplishment of practice.
The remaking of reality to be meaningful and interpretable has to include elements that function as media for construction. The circular process involves that social reality where interactivity constructs realm of representation is meaningfully reconstructed by means of representative signs. What is has not emerged simply by a deliberate act of some definable persons whose words have extraordinary power to create the social reality. Rather, the reality as we experience it is always a product of continuous bringing-into-being the imagined possibilities that are a subject of negotiation.

Socially real objects are not as such present in interaction but need to be represented in a manner that is based on and recreates the shared basis for interpretation. The significance of representation is in the ability to mediate meanings and construct meaningful wholes in the mind of interpreters. Here the dual meaning of representation becomes visible: A person representing an entity, a creature of which he is and which, simultaneously, is created by the very act of representation, can be interpreted not merely as a neutral tool that gives a voice to the represented group by mediating its ideas in specific circumstances but also as a representation of a particular social reality, which actualises only to the extent that representation is regarded as a valid expression of what the represented group is all about. The social being is based on representations of ideational phenomena that are “fundamentally social and intersubjective” (Laffey and Weldes 1997, 209).

To speak in the name of someone or something is to bring it into others’ awareness through the performance. Naturally, representation is also about acting in accordance to already established values as well as defending the interests of represented people or entity. But when both actorness and its context are in a state of flux, representation is first and foremost an action through which an identity—the fundamental ground for values and interests that are then defended by means of representation—is constructed and maintained (Bourdieu 1991, 203). It is through a representative or spokesperson that a group comes into existence although, simultaneously, the group creates the representative by nominating and legitimating him. Representation is thus a circular relationship where the spokesperson creates the group that creates him to speak for the group, i.e. to promote values and defend interests of the group whose identity is constructed through representation.

Although the circular construction process of identity, values and interests cannot be fully divided in three, we could say that constructing common identity is about competence and integrity, and values ideally about dedication to the common good and justice, whereas interests concern rational calculation for maximisation of one’s own good. Guarding one’s interests takes place, at least partly, in the framework of commonly established rules and routines, but one
cannot organise the social existence around them since they are created through the very same existence and interaction (See Habermas 1996). Instead, interaction is organised around the construction and interpretation of meanings. (On interpretative approaches, see Neufeld 1993)

A delegate is not merely someone acting on behalf of a group but also, and often primarily, a person who represents an organisation or a group so that the existence of the organisation or the identity of the group at least partly depends on the representative. Such a significant representative of a well-established organisation is, for instance, the Pope as the head of the Catholic church. His institutionalised role is so fundamental in defining the essence of the church that abolishing the papal institution would probably shatter—or at least shake—the foundation of the Catholic church.

Similarly, we may speculate whether the CFSP of the EU will, in the unforeseen future, ‘naturally’ be represented by the High Representative of the CFSP to the extent that the essence of the Union’s foreign policy is best grasped by his performance. If that becomes the case, the EU will function as an exemplar of an international actor that creates a representative whose institutionalising role will reflect back on the actor and outside understanding of it. The same, of course, applies to more specific sectors and issue areas of the Union’s performance that involve representation. People such as Carl Bildt, Lord Carrington, and Lord David Owen who represented the EU in the Balkans in the early 1990s were not only channelling a pre-existing will of the fifteen but they also functioned as signs of the formation of a common foreign policy, although their significance in the latter sense may be disputed. However, they can be considered as ‘test cases’ for the subsequent form of representation that has been put into practice in the African Great Lakes region, the Middle East, South Eastern Europe, and Afghanistan since 1996 when the first special representatives of the EU were nominated. In these four regions, the EU has mandated special envoys to establish close contacts with all parties in conflicts and to make known the EU’s desire to contribute to solving the regional crises and assisting the involved actors in stabilisation processes. By this kind of act of delegation, the EU has sought to strengthen its voice as a single foreign policy actor. Even if the original and explicit meaning of the nominations has been directly related to the idea that the EU is willing to contribute to conflict mediation and resolution, the other side of the picture is at least as significant as the explicitly stated purpose. Namely, by endowing itself with an intermediary role when an opportunity arises, the Union undertakes an act to constitute itself in relation to the opportunity, which in the case of this study is the prolonged conflict in the Middle East.
In the Middle East, a special envoy was first nominated in 1996 for one year. The mandate has been renewed several times since then. One practical reason for renewing the mandate is that the EU member states consider a representative to be a useful tool in dealing with the actors in the region as well as with the third parties of the conflict. A more critical observer might suggest that although the special envoy’s work in the region has brought no major achievements, neither have there been any negative consequences in having an envoy and since the envoy has not done any harm to the image of the Union, there is no reason to put an end to the mandate. Yet, in a closer scrutiny, the latter argument proves to be not exactly accurate since it can be shown that the EU has managed to create contacts and play a part in different projects that were enabled and managed by the special envoy. The critical argument has, however, an allusion to a potential problem that the continuous renewal of the mandate may lead to, namely depriving the representation from contents.

This kind of institutionalisation of a mandate may diminish the contentual importance of representation since institutionalisation establishes stable forms for the function of a representative so that finally his role may be merely ceremonial with regard to solving the problem that he was nominated for, i.e. it may turn out that the representative has no more direct an influence on the actual problem at hand nor on the institutional identity formation. Institutionalisation of a mandate may, of course, indicate that the identity formation process has been successful and the representative’s function has been transformed from the one that is used to construct or change an identity to the one of maintaining the existing identity.71 In Peirce’s terms, a representative may be transformed from an icon (constructing sign) or an index (sign that is directly related to, and dependent on, the explicit object) into a symbol (conventional sign) which then turns into a ceremonial one as it drifts away from the iconic and indexical content.72 The transformation process has taken place, for instance, in the role of Western European royal families.

In formative moments of institutional life the significance of this kind of ceremonial role is rather minimal. The formative moment means the phase in

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71 Formally organised systems of action are usually created through administrative and legal processes and decisions while traditional interaction is primarily based on habitualised, and in a sense ‘naturalised’ ways to perform. Yet, naturalisation is not exclusively a phenomenon of traditional interaction but takes place in formally organised institutions as well.

72 As Peirce (EW 2: 10) summarises, “[s]ymbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, particularly from likeness or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of likenesses and symbols”.
institutional identity construction when the ideal being is transformed into a possible world and that possible world comes into being through actual performance in the name of the imagined entity. (See Bourdieu 1991; Ringmar 1996) A collective identity once constructed through institutional coming-into-existence is ‘kept alive’ by normalisation of representation so that the group no longer questions the validity or legitimacy of representation but is ready to substitute itself ‘without a second thought’.

The existence of a collective identity is related to the capability of substituting oneself, ‘talking with one voice’ not only in the sense of being able to find a compromise that satisfies all the members of the group but also as legitimating someone to speak on behalf of the group.73 Normalisation of this kind of representation may happen in the course of the process of making oneself needed74. Both the mandatary and the collective that the mandatary represents need to make themselves needed, the mandatary with regard to the collective whose creation he is, and the collective with regard to external opportunities and international actors that are supposed to recognise the collective’s new or renewed institutional identity that is brought to their awareness by the representative. Concerning the EU’s role in the Middle East peace process, it may be argued that the need for the Union’s political presence is mainly created by its economic contributions that make it seem an indispensable actor in the peace process.

Normalisation of representation involves implicitly that representatives are regarded as necessary for the social interaction to continue without major

73 ‘Group’ does not necessarily refer to a permanent and constant entity consisting of members who could be straightforwardly defined. In some studies it may be understood as an abstract feeling of togetherness at various levels, phases and sectors of interaction. Yet, in this study, the meaning of group is best understood as a CFSP community. Traditionally the term ‘epistemic community’ refers to the specialists in a certain field who are not directly involved in policy making but rather offer their knowledge to politicians who are thought to be able to make more accurate decisions thanks to this knowledge. (See Haas 1992) However, concerning foreign policy as a field of specialisation, the epistemic community includes not only technocratic professionals or specialists in the academic sense but also high officials in the ministries of foreign affairs and the politicians who are involved in handling foreign policy issues. Regarding foreign or global politics as a discipline where an epistemic community influences policies, the difference from the fields that require more technical and less politicised knowledge is thus remarkable. To avoid any possible confusion regarding the term, when people closely involved in dealing with issues within the EU’s second pillar are discussed in this study, the concept ‘CFSP community’ is used.

74 See chapters 5.1. and 6.5.
eruptions. Necessity here refers to the ideal being—in this context to an ideal of institutional life with respect to a particular sector of interaction. We could, for instance, claim that assuming continuity and coherence are necessary features of identity, a representative that can contribute to the continuity and coherence of a certain entity has a part to play in the formation and maintenance of its institutional identity, and therefore can justify his position with regard to the represented group on this basis although the primary or at least the most straightforward meaning of representation would be different, related to his function with regard to an external context of action.

Actorness of a collective is usually expressed by chosen or elected representatives who serve as a visible sign of the collective’s being. Coherent visibility is needed in order to produce belief in the unity among those who consider unity as being important for the capacity to act according to their compatible interests, which are a result of various processes whereby the identity of that particular collective is constructed. Thus, there seems to be a circular relationship between visibility via representation as a necessary condition for coherent identity and compatible interests that are required to exist to a certain extent before anyone can be named to represent the collective. Representatives do not just passively reflect and perpetuate the existing preferences and habitualised patterns of action. They also shape values and create new objectives in the dialogue with representatives of other collectives. Power of constituting and institutionalising follows the logic of delegation, according to which the representative’s power to create the group is received from the group. As Bourdieu (1991, 250) defines, a representative or spokesperson is “the person who, speaking about a group, speaking on behalf of a group, surreptitiously posits the existence of the group in question, institutes the group”.75

A collective or institution usually delegates someone to represent it by a legally binding act of nomination. The relationship is further strengthened and legitimacy of the representative manifested by using the delegate as the institution’s mouthpiece and by referring to his statements and action as an expression of the common will or shared understanding of the represented group even when the common will or shared understanding has not been coherent enough to be articulated prior to the particular action or statement of the representative. Therefore, someone speaking on behalf of a group may actually create the stance of the group on an issue in hand by his very

75 The relation of representation and legitimisation at the international level follows a similar circular pattern, for an agreed meaning of legitimacy is needed as a basis for system of representation, yet it is through the action of representatives that the legitimacy of an international actor is gained and strengthened.
performance and thus contribute to the self-image and external image of the group as a unified actor that holds a certain opinion on a specific issue. However, if the opinions within the group differ significantly from the expressed one or if the representative’s performance contradicts the interests of some members of the group, the performance may actually cause confrontation and make the differences more visible than they would have been without the representative’s performance.

Another and probably simpler means for a delegate to articulate his position as a voice of the represented entity is to refer to the ‘factual position’ of the group while giving official statements. For instance, the report of Javier Solana to the Göteborg European Council on 15 June 2001 on the situation in the Middle East stresses that the EU should play its part “in efforts to secure a credible strategy for returning to the peace” and “stand ready to use all the instruments at [the Union’s] disposal to support those efforts” (Solana 2001). This kind of reference to the represented entity also has an impact on the external image of the community by crystallising the no matter how divergent views of a heterogeneous group into a single seemingly coherent statement that does not specify the position of the collective nor the practical steps to be taken. A durable impact on external image naturally requires that the actual policy making be interpreted as compatible with the stated position.

Peirce believed that reality is interconnected with thought—although not any particular thought of a definable thinker but thought in general, so that thought upon which reality depends belongs to a community of thinkers or knowledgeable people. In matters of social reality, the number of ‘knowledgeable people’ may sometimes be relatively limited. As for the EU’s foreign policies, the CFSP community can be taken as such a group. Reality of international relations does not exist independently of the schemes of description. It is brought into existence through shared interpretations and acts of the ‘knowledgeable people’. As Merrell (1997, 216) formulates it,

> [r]ather than ‘reality’ lying ‘out there’ in wait of our penetrating perceptual exploration on it, the world is understood in terms of our imposing our conceptual schemes on it. We make a world, our world, that is one of the myriad possibilities that could otherwise have been our world instead of the one that is.

### 3.2.2. The CFSP Community as a Represented Collective

Representation that (re-/de-)constructs groups in institutional terms is fundamental in social reality since only when it is represented and recognised...
may a group promote common values and defend interests and act to transform the environment in accordance with its values and interests. Therefore, when defining the group whose identity we are talking about, it is important to pay attention to what kind of a group it is that seeks to become visible and recognisable by mandating.

Collective identification as a represented entity does not necessarily encompass everyone who could in principle be thought to be identifiable in terms of an institutional framework of the collective. That institutions function at various levels means that they involve multiple representations: Representatives may mandate someone to represent themselves or the whole group of people represented in the first place by them. In national parliaments, for instance, this policy is illustrated in the work of various parliamentary committees where the members of parliament as primary or ‘first-order’ representatives choose among themselves people to represent the ideas of their political parties in different committees. Generally the proportions of members in committees reflect proportions of the parties in the parliament so that the composition of membership in parliamentary committees and working groups ensures that the views that members of parliament are elected to represent in parliament will gain approximately the same weight in committees and working groups.

The composition gets more complicated when the representatives of representatives are nominated from outside of the group of ‘first-order representatives’. The question then arises whether the ‘second-order representatives’ have legitimacy in the eyes of the members of the whole group who are represented by the first-order representatives. Furthermore, in the context of identity formation it can be debated to what extent the second-order representation could be used as a tool to bring into existence the whole group as an entity and not just the group of first-order representatives. These question would, however, be relevant in institutional identity formation only in exceptional circumstances, for generally the public is not expected to be actively involved in the construction of an institutional self. (Pettman 2000; see also Slater 1982)

When describing the relationship between a represented group and its representative, Bourdieu (1991, 203) states that the representative as the dominant always exists whereas the group or the dominated exist only as far as they “avail themselves of instruments of representation”. As regards the CFSP, the ‘foreign policy elite’ could be seen as the dominant, whereas the Union-wide group of dominated does not really exist since the information and foreign policy identity construction remains at the elite level and the ‘masses’ do not avail themselves of instruments of representation. (See Hansen
A CFSP identity is not formed among the general public, especially not when it comes to the functions of special envoys that hardly any European outside the CFSP community is aware of—or even interested in. In principle, foreign policy representation in ‘business-as-usual’ is exclusively a phenomenon of elite circles, and only attracts the attention of a wider public when national interests held as essential are at stake, or when the question is about a remarkable political reorientation.

Mandataries give a voice and visible presence to the phenomena that they represent. But at the same time the representation brings the ‘masses’ away from the actual policy making of a particular institution. The more complex the institution, the more it functions on the basis of indirect representation and, thus, the more the broadest and the most numerous group of the represented (i.e. the masses) alienates itself from the actual policy making and even loses its capability to influence the nomination of representatives. Institutional identity thus becomes the identity of the knowledgeable collective. In European integration, this is not exclusively a phenomenon related to the Union’s external relations. With regard to EU finance ministry officials, EU central bankers and Ecofin as the policy making forum of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), it has been observed that “[t]his closed, privileged transnational policy community of core executive actors has not just retained but also reinforced its identity with the process of EMU” (Dyson 2000, 656; see also Marcussen 1999).

A basic question in the development of the EMU as well as other sectors of European integration concerns the process of signification through representation in both senses discussed in the first part of this chapter: one acting for another/others, and the action of presenting to the imagination. Representation is always linked to the represented one which is made significant or understood as such within a certain context and among those who are in the position to be able and willing to interpret the process of signification (Lose 2001; Risse 2000). Hence, the collective represented by the EU’s special envoy to the Middle East is not Europeans or EU citizens but, instead, the small community of politicians, foreign policy officials in the member states and in the EU institutions, and the academic community specialising in the CFSP. This CFSP community is the ‘materialised being’ of the EU’s foreign policy identity in the making.

Systems of signification are “fundamentally distinguishable according to whether they are produced and thereby appropriated by the group as a whole or, on the contrary, produced by a body of specialists and, more precisely, by a relatively autonomous field of production and circulation” (Bourdieu 1991, 168). Supposing the latter is the case in most sectors of European integration,
it could be asked whether the general public has remained indifferent to the institutional construction of the EU or whether it is rather that the system of professional producers of the schemes of thought excludes the general public in the member states. In either case, the division between the political elite that participates in the development process and the ‘masses’ who do not is also a dividing line with regard to construction of Union-wide identity. The lack of public commitment to conventional institution building further reflects on the inability to transform the instrumental and institutional integration, i.e. construction of Gesellschaft, into a feeling of togetherness among national publics, i.e. development of Gemeinschaft (Slater 1982).

To “ordinary people”, world affairs usually remain a “distant show”, as Pettman (2000, 50) notices and continues: “It is “high” politics, done by people we will never meet, from parts of the world where we will never go, about problems of security and strategy we will never comprehend.” That is naturally the perspective of the general public not involved in the policy making process (See Sinnott 2000). The elite, on the contrary, is usually very conscious of its position as the leading community that shares a common belief system. They tend to maintain and strengthen the feeling of belonging through a policy discourse that excludes the general public, and through action that has a circular enabling structure between the elite position and their action (Lose 2001; Weldes 1996). In short, identity construction in terms of the CFSP is about the Union’s institutional identity and sense of belonging among those who are actively involved in the identity formation, although in their terms the question would rather be about shared values among people, common interests, responding to external expectations, and so on.

Social interaction determines both what we are and what we want—not only as individuals but also as collectives that are constructed as such in interaction. Integrative processes seek to create and identify shared preferences that could not be identified without a shared understanding about who ‘we’ are as an entity. Political will-formation depends on identity construction, for an expression of political will derives from interests which are necessarily interests of someone and thus presuppose and reflect an identity. Or, as Ricoeur (1970, 46) says, “[r]eflection is the appropriation of our effort to exist and of our desire to be, through the works which bear witness to that effort and desire”. Preferences are determined within an interpretative framework inherent to actors’ identities, the relatively stable understandings about the self that cover each interactive situation. It is in these interactive processes that identities and interests become institutionalised although not in the sense that it would be impossible to transform them.
Two central characteristics of social reality are permanence and transformation in the long term and stability and flexibility in the short term. Conceptually they seem to exclude each other. But what makes them merge into each other is that permanence and stability, on the one hand, and transformation and flexibility, on the other hand, cover different dimensions of social being. Emphasis on stability and permanence is necessary for creation of a coherent narrative, i.e. telling a plausible story, the plot of which consists in elements which seemingly remain the same in some respect, while flexibility and transformation are the essence of the story—the reason to ‘tell a story instead of taking a picture’, so to say. This is related to a fundamental need of a collective to be identified as a group that is able to manage change without losing the idea of collective self. (Cf. Ricoeur 1990, 167-180) Orientations influenced by the realist tradition of IR have tended to neglect change which then became a major interest of the constructivist turn.

Telling a story involves interpretation, the ability to see things as meaningful, and this requires first seeing oneself as someone. Seeing oneself as someone whose being remains relatively stable in changing circumstances is essential to the production of self-representations that respond to varying circumstances and interaction with the others. Representations of self are further interpreted by ‘the self’ and other significant selves separately and together. Interpretation of self by ‘the self’ is strongly related to his/its intentionality while interpretation of ‘the self’ by others is determined by effectual dimension of representation. Following Peirce’s (EW 2: 478) definitions of ‘interpretants’, intersubjectively constituted interpretation could be called communicational interpretation. (See also Risse 2000; Zehfuss 2001b) Regarding collective institutional self, communicational interpretation takes place both within the entity and in its relations with external surroundings.

The essence of a collective subject, its identity, is framed by an institutional setting. In practice social reality is to be understood as a continuous circle of identity forming interaction and institutionalisation. In order for the process to have momentum, a certain amount of ideational consensus is needed among the elite. Often consensus is created in relation to a shared problem or an event in the external environment that requires a solution or opinion to be formed as a pattern-setting model. In world affairs, the most compelling ‘opportunities’ to act are violent conflicts, such as the one in the Middle East. Representation is a tool not only to influence the external state of affairs but also to transform the acting self and interpretations about it. The relation of the self (object) and its representative (sign) consists, according to Peirce, of three dimensions. What follows is an application of these dimensions to the sphere of world affairs.
3.3. PURPOSES OF PERFORMANCE

An interpretative relationship is triadic; in addition to object and sign there needs to be an ‘interpretant’. Eco (1976, 68) stresses that ‘interpretant’ is not interpreter but “that which guarantees the validity of the sign”. Yet, an interpretant logically requires an interpreter: Even if it is understood as the definition of the representamen, the interpretant needs to be located, for the definition of representamen is only meaningful as it is understood by someone, the someone being its interpreter in the capacity of either ‘sender’ or ‘addressee’ of the sign.

Peirce (EW 2: 291-292) defines three functions of signs in relation to their objects as follows:

An *Icon* is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Object actually exists or not. […]

An *Index* is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that object. […]

A *Symbol* is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually as association of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object.

The three modes of sign are not mutually exclusive. It is therefore possible that a sign has iconic, indexical and symbolic relation to the represented object. The thricotomy of iconicity, indexicality and symbolicity exists in

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Eco (1976, 178) criticises Peirce’s best-known and most fundamental (See CP 2.275) trichotomy of signs (icons, indices and symbols) for postulating “the presence of the referent as a discriminating parameter” and claims that “notions such as ‘icon’ or ‘index’ are all-purpose, practical devices just as are the notions of ‘sign’ or ‘thing’.” But regardless of the fact that Peirce did not identify something as a mere symbol or as a mere icon, the sign categories that he introduced shed light on conceptually separable functions of representation. A triangular continuum does not dilute the basic principle of the sign system. Therefore, although Peirce often referred to symbols as if they meant unambiguously what they are designed or agreed to mean, he did not claim that such a mode of sign is in any sense a normal or norm-like representative of object. A ‘pure symbol’ is more like an ultimate point in the conventional corner of the sign triangle. (See the triangle of signs divided into ten classes in EW 2: 491) Boundaries between iconic, indexical and symbolic representations are somewhat vague in many cases, but they serve well the purpose of clarifying representative relations of social being since these relations, too, escape clearly identifiable boundaries of definitions.
representamen-object relations and describes, theoretically speaking without interpretation, the dyadic relation between representamen and object (See Thellefsen 2001). Yet, already the observation that a sign contains iconic, indexical or symbolic features is to interpret the sign-object relation. Representation and interpretation are, in practice, inseparable.

A sign refers to an object that can be intermediated into a shared or, as Peirce calls it, communicational interpretation of ‘utterer’ and ‘beholder’. While index and symbol represent an already established object, the iconic relation is based on some qualities of the icon that resemble the object’s assumed qualities; this resemblance evokes an interpretation of the represented object and, thereby, participates in establishing the object.77

The process of creating intersubjective meanings involves interpretations by ‘utterer’, ‘beholder’, and these two together. An interpretant is something determined by a sign, which is a medium between its object and the interpretant.78 An interpretant of a sign is its significance (EW 2: 494) or simply the interpretation (EW 2: 496) of that sign. When we talk about significance and interpretation, the question arises of the significance to whom and whose interpretation we mean. The relation between interpretant and sign is an open one in the sense that any interpretant is one of many possible capable of describing what a sign communicates of its object. This is why a sign–object relation can have various modes and a sign may be interpreted as referring to many different objects. To a certain extent, the preferred interpretation can thus be said to be indeterminate, i.e. it is in the power of the interpreter—be that the ‘utterer’, the ‘beholder’, or these two together—to define the referential relation.79

In Peirce’s view there are two separate but complementary and interactive worlds, the mental world and the one of external objects. This view reflects the idea that, on the one hand, fiction as something created by our imagination

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77 National anthems, for instance, can be taken as icons that function as an embodiment of a nation. As Sondermann (1997, 128) says, “[t]he nation comes into existence through these particular acts – it ‘is’ only in such activities.” Yet the concept of nation does not depend on any particular act or other embodiment.

78 “The Sign creates something in the Mind of the Interpreter, which something, in that it has been so created by the Sign, has been, in a mediate and relative way, also created by the Object of the Sign, although the Object is essentially other than the Sign. And this creature of the Sign is called the Interpretant.” (EW 2: 493)

79 “The object denoted by any sign whatever is more or less indeterminate. This indeterminacy is different from ambiguity. A sign is ambiguous if it is doubtful what it is applicable to and what it is inapplicable to, but the indeterminacy here spoken of merely consists in its being applicable to more than one possible object.” (W 3: 84)
(or mental world) and, on the other hand, reality (or external objects) as being the same regardless of what we may think of it are two different, clearly separable worlds or spheres of being: “The distinction between a reality and a fiction is plain enough. [...] The distinction between the external and the internal is also plain” (W 3: 49). His understanding excludes a third sphere, which sociologically oriented approaches of IR refer to as the social reality. Yet he assumes the existence of social reality when he describes the communicational interpretant. This dimension of reality cannot be explained solely in terms of the two other dimensions. It is something else than their fusion.

In social reality meanings are mediated through representation that can serve different functions. As will be discussed below, indexical representation, for instance, is taken to mean any action that appears to follow its predetermined purpose. An index is thus any sign functioning in actual circumstances without carrying any additional content apart from the predetermined purpose or factual reference to the represented object. The iconic element of representation, in turn, entails the possibility for the imaginable that has not (yet) been actualised. And the symbolic dimension denotes conventionality of social existence in the sense that we agree to call and treat a certain type of performance in a certain way even if we have reason to dispute whether the performance in a strict sense corresponds to the label given to it. The following subchapters elaborate these three dimensions of representation and their appearance in the realm of international relations.

### 3.3.1. Iconic Reformation of the Represented

Consequentiality, which is characteristic to purposeful action, involves change. As for representation, change may concern the represented object and the others’ perceptions of it, the environment of the object, or the other actors that participate in the course of events where interpretation takes place. As for the represented object, change can be said to occur through the redefinition of its identity, values and interests. This process is here labelled iconic representation. Ricoeur (1976, 42) describes iconicity as the “re-writing of reality” (See also Ricoeur 1978, 187-191). In this context, the question is about re-writing a self and its being in social reality.

Peirce (CP 5.225-233) discusses the notion of self—closely related to what is here understood to be identity—as reflecting knowledge of oneself. Self-consciousness is thus different from general consciousness that denotes a (re-)cognition of an object as represented. Self-consciousness is both a feeling
of subjective conditions of consciousness and the recognition of our private selves. Peirce asks how we know of our existence—whether it is through a special intuitive faculty or determined by previous cognitions. He uses an example of child’s development to affirm that it is through actual evidence in concrete circumstances that a child “becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a self in which this ignorance can inhere” (CP 5.233). Becoming aware requires the existence of the external, i.e. objects, circumstances, events, and other people that are separable and, to a certain extent, independent of the self. The self is thus relational: There would be no self without others.

The impetus for reconstruction of being derives from an internal quest for identity, external expectations, and opportunities to demonstrate the potential within one’s being, i.e. that the claimed identity is a valid description of who the self is. Potential means simply what is possible to a certain being or actor. Thus, for instance, a seed is potentially a tree and fire has potential to burn. Potential is always in relation to actual, whether in the material world or social reality. Moreover, there is a mediating stage between the material and social worlds in the sense that the material often has a social meaning. A stone, for instance, has potential to become a statue in the hands of a talented sculptor, but the whole process of sculpturing as well as the final product would be meaningless without an intersubjective conception of art in general, and sculpture in particular. Primarily, the potential is not a model of or proposal for the ideal in the Platonic sense but rather it supplies interaction with imaginative expressions that are presented in naming. In other words, the potential introduces assumptions concerning what is and is not possible.

Interaction consists of interplays between the potential and the realised self and the potential and the realised other. These processes always involve assumptions and expectations. Expectations serve as ‘frames’ that shape interpersonal interactions but given the complexity of social reality and the dissimilarity of actors, norms of ‘generality’ and ‘appropriacy’ cannot be the only basis for expectations. What needs to be taken into account is the experience of the performances of a particular actor, or the real or fictitious image that the actor creates of itself as a participant in the social interaction.

In this study, the conflict in the Middle East is seen as a context which provides the external actors with an opportunity to position themselves in performances, to show that they are. In Peirce’s (CP 5.257) words the question would be about cognisability of third parties in conflict: “cognizability (in its widest sense) and being are not merely metaphysically the same, but are synonymous terms”. Hence, only what is cognisable, is.
When an EU special envoy is interpreted as a sign and the object of the special envoy is the EU’s being as a foreign policy actor interacting in a conflict region, there would be three possible interpretations depending on whether the special envoy is understood as an icon, index or symbol of the Union’s intermediary function with respect to the other involved actors. Iconic representation is the most fundamental of these three since it invites interpreters to see the object that is coming into being as if it had already taken the represented mode of existence. It is due to this logic of representation that “at any point in time and place of a historical process, institutional or social facts may be socially constructed by collective understandings of the physical and the social world that are subject to authoritative (political) selection processes and thus to evolutionary change” (Adler 1997, 339).

In order to be able to refer to a particular object, an icon must draw interpreters’ attention to its characteristics which may be interpreted as conveying information about the object that it denotes. An interpretation that creates a link between an icon and a particular object gives, however, no assurance that any such object as the icon represents has already been actualised. “An icon is a sign which would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its object had no existence” (CP 2.304). Imagining the existence of a phenomenon in social reality needs to be made known to the significant others in order that a recognition may take place. A representative’s function as an icon is therefore like a suggestion to the others to recognise what is represented.

An icon does not depend on a pre-existing object but refers to its idea by virtue of characteristics of its own. The ideal of represented reality is understood as potentiality, to which perceptions are put in proportion (EW 2: 4-10).80

80 Concerning the reference of a sign not only to a concrete definable object but to the ideal being of experienced reality, Ricoeur has ideas similar to those of Peirce’s (See Vikström 2000, 96-97).

Saying that in order for a sign to be an icon of the object it denotes it has to have the same properties as the object is to misunderstand the idea of iconic representation. Eco, for instance, approaches the question of iconic representation purely from the physical realm, thus neglecting the social imagination that constructs social reality by bringing potentiality into being and linking it to actual elements of social existence and the conventional being that has been shaped prior to the present iconic reconstruction. (See Eco 1976, 191-195) He argues that the true and complete icon of Queen Elizabeth is not a portrait painted of her but the Queen herself. It is, however, rather misleading to say that there may be a sign that could be taken as a complete icon of its object. Concerning a portrait, it is in any case rather an index (up to knowing and recognising the object in the representative sign) or a symbol (up to a convention stating that object X is what is represented
Iconicity could thus be described as the basic form of reconstruction. An icon, although representing the signified characteristics without conveying any information about the actual existence of the object that it denotes, creates a linkage between itself and its object by directing the attention of an interpreter to see the object as if it had an identifiable being a priori its iconic representation. This kind of an act of bringing into existence the named thing is what Bourdieu (1991, 223) calls “the act of social magic.” Iconic representation of an entity does not take place in a vacuum but in relation to actually existing institutional forms of the entity and within a conventional and historical framework that is ‘already there’. (See EW 2: 10; Cf. Risse-Kappen 1994) ‘The act of social magic’ thus does not start from nothing even when it seems to be based on total deconstruction of preceding modes of being.

Peirce held that the world of signs is everywhere and “the content of consciousness, the entire phenomenal manifestation of mind, is a sign” (CP 5.313) not only in a strictly semantic sense but to the extent that the

sign which man uses is the man himself. For as the fact that every thought is a
taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought, proves
that man is a sign; so, that every thought is an external sign, proves that man is
an external sign. That is to say, the man and the external sign are identical.
(CP 5.314)

Hence, through identification of man as a sign, Peirce assumed that every appearance participates in the being of others and emphasises the active spontaneity of interacting signs in a continuous flow of interactions. (See also
CP 5.421; CP 5.484)

By conceiving man himself as a thought-sign, Peirce makes it clear that
the signs that communicate information about objects are not restricted to
language. He thus pulls away from the egocentric conception of the self as

by sign n) than an icon. Hence, what in religious vocabulary is called ‘icon’ should
actually in this context be defined as symbol. It is not an icon in the Peircean sense,
since it does not ‘automatically’ create the image of the object that it denotes, nor
is it an index, for it lacks an actual, testable relation to the object. A Buddhist monk
in the Far East, for instance, would hardly find a ‘natural connection’ between a
picture of the Virgin Mary and a text from the Gospel according to Luke. Rather
the picture would be a symbol of the Christian belief system, of Roman Catholic
or Orthodox tradition to worship saints. Indexically, it would denote the mythical
origin of these traditions.

81 We could think, for instance, of revolution or reformation as examples of such
changes that seem to be thorough but, nevertheless, leave some institutional elements
or basic assumptions untouched.
will. Indeed, he emphasises the necessity of the other in being the self. It follows that individual identity can only be guaranteed when a ‘self’ lets himself be used as a sign, meaning both a sign of what is characteristic to ‘his kind of selves’ and what is particular in the specific self, which makes him distinguishable from other selves. To the extent that man is used as a kind of sign, he signifies a broader object of interpretation.

Peirce’s anti-Cartesian posture holds that a self can never stand alone. It must relate to otherness. In the practical case discussed in this study, the other is both internal, as it appears in the relations between the EU member states and the institutions of the Union, and external, meaning the other international actors that are involved in the political process of the Middle East conflict (See Soetendorp 1999, 93-113). As such they are ‘other selves’ who also need otherness to become what they are and to maintain their selfhood. Individual and collective selves do not exist as separate entities. A self is always already socialised since its socialisation is a process that takes place in a context that is already there when the self comes into being or changes. The self is thus embedded in its environment where it interacts with other selves and where it is represented as a certain kind of being so that “its actual being cannot be detached from its representation and that in the representation the unity and identity of a structure emerge” (Gadamer 1979, 109).

Worldviews are grounded on identities that function as the basis for beliefs about conditions but also as tools for interpretations of events. The common wisdom according to which what you see depends on where you stand has to do with identity, for identity is the ground on which we stand. Identity is the relatively solid basis of values and interests that are formed with regard to contexts and ‘other selves’ involved in interaction. Interpretation of any given situation varies from actor to actor, as do their situation-related interests since their identities are embedded differently—although not separately from each other—in processes in which they are involved. To argue that identities as the basis of interests are embedded ‘not separately’ means that identities are always constructed intersubjectively. This “vast network of interconnected subjects” appears as a “multitude of timed and spaced situations which define the living environments of individuals [or any other subjects] who are, also, distributed in space and time” (Holzner 1968, 80). Thus, any institution is to be understood as an achievement resulting from the process of stabilisation of the fluent interactive practice, and an actor’s institutional being as the source of meaning that is reflected in the actor’s values and interests and, further, in its stances on various events where it is in contact with other actors.

Otherness is a means to define the self since the self exists only in interactions with other selves. Even if an icon is the primary representative of
its object’s self as it refers to various possibilities of the self’s qualities, it is not sufficient in establishing the self, for the coming into being is necessarily related to external opportunities to position oneself. Opportunities only appear as actualised events where the possibilities of the self also need to actualise. When the others approve of the claimed selfhood, it is possible to rely on recognition that then allows the self to broaden the repertoire of performance and still remain identifiably the same.

Regarding reconstruction of interacting selves it follows that, as Ringman (1996, 13) says, “people alone cannot decide who or what they are, but any such decision is always taken together with others. We need recognition for the persons we take ourselves to be, and only as recognised can we conclusively come to establish an identity.” To be recognised as some kind of a person, community or institution requires that one is represented as such. Representation in this sense, as iconic mediation, means ‘to claim to be’. We hardly expect, however, that anything (meaning any kind of role, actorness or personality) will be accepted by significant others whose recognition we need in order to become what we claim to be. This consideration speaks for the remark discussed above, namely, that even a process that seems to be based on a complete deconstruction or ‘nothingness’ has to have a horizon of comparison, in relation to which the search for a new identity can be interpreted.

According to Wendt (1992, 398) “each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another and which constitute the structure of the social world” (Cf. Tetlock and Goldgeier 2000). Performative power of representation organises social relations and (re-)creates the represented in relations with other actors. Conventional establishment of an institutional and instrumental framework for interaction is tightly connected to institutional identity construction processes where an object is represented as if it had actual existence prior to the representation. While being embedded in some kind of existing reality and conventional being, iconic representation reconstructs that reality by bringing into being new interpretations of an object and thus contributing to the formation of the object. (See Ricoeur 1984, 57)

A representative/mandatary receives the right to act in the name of the group, on behalf of it as a recognised representative so that he has legitimacy to act in his capacity as a delegate. But the mandate agreed upon by the group does not yet guarantee that other groups of people, other collective actors, who do not belong to that particular represented group would accept the mandating or even the institutional framework, within which the mandatary is meant to represent the group. To be able to interact with these other actors the mandatary has to be recognised by them as a representative, which involves
that the group identity he is representing needs to be recognised, too. The representative has to have legitimacy both in the eyes of those represented and those with whom he is supposed to interact.

The real is “inseparable from how it resides in our modes of representation” (Shapiro 1988, 8). Representation of the imagined and named entity takes place in a public sphere where the performance of a representative of the entity is contextualised and its plausibility scrutinised (See Stern and Henderson 1993, 16-20). The process of claiming an identity and getting it recognised advances in practice by means of narrative. Claiming to be someone is to tell a story about oneself as an actor situated in time and space. ‘This is how I act’ narrative implicitly carries an idea of ‘this is who I am’. A story does not merely describe the state of affairs; it also creates and orders social reality by suggesting that other actors/beholders see the object of the story the way it is told to be in interaction.

Construction of our social reality thus depends on the stories we tell as representatives of particular visions of the world and about ourselves in that world. The impossibility to verify these stories provides other actors with an important role in constructing reality since usually they are not obliged to recognise our stories as valid descriptions of what we represent and who we are (See Taylor 1992). According to Ringmar (1996, 185), there are three options when the story that we tell about ourselves is not recognised by others. First, we could abandon our story and ‘cease to exist’. The second option is to accept the story told by others about who we should take ourselves to be.82 Thirdly, we could seek to convince others that our story is true and valid. The third option is what iconic representation is about as it persuades the interpreters to see the object as it is represented.

When it comes to a represented collective that is not (yet) as such complete and thus recognisable, an icon is needed to create an image of a collective selfhood that is constructed around an expression of unity, which is then mediated by the icon that reminds interpreters of the possibility of collective identity for this particular—although still inchoate—object. The object’s quality is thus expressed in icons that represent the object. But since it is possible to recognise only actualised possibilities, the represented qualities become visible merely in actual reactions to an event or phenomenon such as the presence of a violent conflict that turns the attention of interpreters to the qualities of the represented self.

The being of the denoted object is manifested in events that are bound to a particular time and space. Since our observation in practice is limited to actual events, representatives appear to us as denoting their objects only

82 See also Howarth (2002) about adapting one’s identity to how the others present it.
‘occasionally’. Yet, as interpreters we have the capacity to recognise on these occasions something that goes beyond spatio-temporally limited expressions of existence. What is not a part of the empirical reality and therefore ‘goes beyond’ it is, on the one hand, the qualities of representative sign reminding interpreters of the object’s potential and, on the other hand, the conventional framework that makes certain signs intelligible due to an agreement among interpreters that a certain kind of sign is taken to represent a particular object.

We can experience something as an entity due to the imaginary connection that we as interpreters create between its various representations even when we are not able to define how the representations of the different elements of the entity contribute to the whole (See Foucault 1970). Interpretation, when it refers to an attempt to understand the iconic representation of an object, is to be taken as a process by which disclosure of new states of affairs provides interpreters with an opportunity to have an intelligible relation to an object ‘under construction’. Social reality as a whole is in a constant state of flux where old states of affairs disappear and new ones appear. Without a capacity to interpret the emerging being, the world of our social existence would be nothing but an unintelligible collection of sporadic appearances or, alternatively, deemed to be a static construction where all structures, rules, and positions remain unchangeable.

Thus for an object to be, it is necessarily represented by a sign that can be held as an icon of the object. Only an iconically represented object can also be represented indexically and symbolically, since the latter two require that the represented already either exists or has both an existentially and a conventionally representable being whereas the only condition for iconicity is the ability of interpreters to see in a sign the characteristics that bring to their mind the possibility of a certain object.

It can be claimed as Hookway (1992, 133) does that Peirce “thinks that only iconic representations can be used to discover new facts about their objects”. As for social reality, it is arguable, of course, whether the question is about discovering facts or rather creating them and familiarising oneself with social facts created by others, since icons do not reflect any objective, one and only possible reality ‘out there’. Potential objects can be represented in the manner that “they can be made the subject of a predication conceived as if it were ‘true,’ hence they are constituted in some way or other” (Merrell 1997, 105). Instead of being mirrors of the world, signs participate in the process of reality construction that happens through interpretations. Social facts are established in interactive processes and the worlds, however they appear to us, are worlds of our making, fashioned rather than discovered.
3.3.2. Determinate Performance as Indexical Representation

Unlike iconic reference, the relation of an object to its index is not indeterminate. Indexical representation of a city in a map, for example, is concrete enough to be recognised as denoting the particular city. In social reality, facts are usually not so clearly identifiable and verifiable as in this example, but the basic idea is the same: The represented and the representative may be in a relation where the representative describes the reality well enough to say that it is possible to learn about reality through its representative sign. In social reality, of course, it is rarely possible to ‘go and see’ the represented (be it e.g. religion or international organisation) as someone could visit a city represented in a map.

Indexical sphere refers to social reality so that a feature or dimension of reality is understood as being present via the sign it determines. The city map example gives an accurate although simplified picture of indexical representation. It does not, however, explain how the city became constructed the way it did. It only mediates the present state of affairs. Another kind of a ‘map’ is needed as a guideline for construction. Namely, the structure of a city is usually based on a city plan that determines it. Therefore we could say that it is the city plan that functions as a framework for construction of the city that it denotes. To put it simply, both of the maps could be regarded as ‘signs’ of a city; the one described in the first example is an indexical representation of the city while the latter one precedes the actual city construction and thereby can be understood as a sign that more or less directly participates in the construction of reality. This kind of representation is iconic.

In one way or another, a sign is connected to events that are understood as real even when representation does not merely reflect a reality but (re-)creates the signified reality. To place the said into the context of the reality of international relations, its continuous coming into being happens in the interaction of actors (and ever increasingly, it seems, of actors that lack the characteristics traditionally considered to belong to legitimate international actors) whose policy making in the conduct of international affairs is handed over to agents who both position the entity that they represent and seek to influence the external environment in accordance with the collective will of the entity.

Any factual reference in social reality provides an occasion to make comparisons to other events, acts and objects encompassing some similar characteristics. As we make judgements of similarity and difference, the necessary ground is that of qualities which are the only possible basis to
recognise what kind of ‘real things’ we are dealing with. When we treat one factual thing as a sign of another, we already make judgements in order to categorise the represented object of reality. Hence, we need to have an understanding about the qualities of the object. Unless we have previous practical experience of the object, it is the present sign that actually provides us with an original interpretation of the object that it brings into our awareness. Iconicity is the elementary feature of any spatio-temporally constrained representation:

In so far as the Index is affected by the Object, it necessarily has some Quality in common with the Object, and it is in respect to these that it refers to the Object. It does, therefore, involve a sort of Icon [...].

(CP 2.248)

Iconicity creates an image of an object that the sign brings into awareness for interpreters, and that might, without the particular sign, remain an unknown or unactualised ‘possibility that was’. Hence, “what is, was a possibility that became actual for someone in some ephemeral ‘here-now.’ What is not, nonetheless, is that without which what is, could not have become; yet it remains as a motivating force for what otherwise would have become” (Merrell 1997, 27).

Social facts are established as real within communities of actors, and the meaning of something conceived as real cannot be completely separated from the imaginary, for what is taken as real is only real from the perspective of those who agree to interpret it as such and have authority to make others accept the interpretation. Representations of reality determine how the reality is to us, i.e. how we perceive our reality. (Howarth 2002) Belief in the existence of a reality means that we think of some things as real and others as unreal. 84

83 For instance, the American administration created an image about Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as an actor that is not just like any other authoritarian regime but a dangerous member in the ‘Axis of Evil’. The most important sign that influenced the categorisation and American ‘interaction’ with Iraq was the (assumed) presence of weapons of mass destruction in the country.

84 In Peirce’s terminology, the real usually refers to factual existence of things in the form in which they are (re-)cognisable. Reality, in turn, can only be grasped within a sphere that encloses rules, conventions and habits according to which the actually existing real things and their interaction are organised. But on the other hand, on some occasions Peirce’s definition of real seems rather blurred—presumably because of the necessary inclusion of iconicity in any indexicality—as can be seen in the following quotation: “It is perfectly true that all white things have whiteness in them, for that is only saying, in another form of words, that all white things are white; but since it is true that real things possess whiteness, whiteness is real” (CP 8.14).
Empirical means help us to discover reality to a certain extent but in the long run we are forced to admit that a lot if not most of what in our judgement is real is not based on our own empirical verification. Instead, to a great extent, we leave the real and true to be determined by authorities that tell us how reality is. Different competing and equally legitimate assumptions and theories are developed on the basis of a certain set of observations and further used to interpret reality. The paradigm formed by our community constrains our interpretations of reality. Knowing always involves interpretation and, therefore, what we call objective knowing is necessarily intersubjective.

How interpreters approach the interpretable is often determined by the idea that the original purpose of the performance is that which the represented claims it to be, because it is ‘naturally’ present as an existing fact “which the rough and tumble of life renders most familiarly prominent. We are continually bumping against hard fact” (CP 1.324). The function of a representative in this sense is analysed and interpreted in terms of its indexical relation to the object within a spatio-temporal context. Yet, actual contexts of action “are constitutive of the way the world presents itself to the subject and by the same token they help to constitute the subject himself” (Winch 1987, 22). Hence, the interactive character of reality shapes the possibilities for our conceptions of the interacting self and social reality as a whole. And this interactivity and potential for change invites interpreters to turn to ‘read’ the change not only in the environment but also in the represented self. After all, a particular self needs to have definable characteristics that then appear in factual and conventional representations.

Similarly to individuals, an international entity recognises itself as a certain kind of actor only in the contextualised interaction with the international others. It is through interaction that actors become aware of their specific characteristics (Bleicher 1980, 9). Actorness is necessarily connected to normative ideas, which derive from identity and are to be regarded as the most fundamental motivation for expressions of oneself in relation to external environments. Values are generally accepted as an adequate explanation of action or inaction. But when the expressed values contradict with those of the interpreter, the focus is shifted to the identity: What kind of a being is the basis for these values?

The factual representation refers to the taken-for-granted sphere of being that is so naturally there and so obvious that we sometimes fail to ask what the other significant purposes of the particular representation are. Events that for different reasons seem to demand reaction and compel us either to act or, at least, to actively deny actorness, produce experience of what kind of values
When purpose-adoption takes place on this ground within certain circumstances that compel to act, the aim is defined in terms of justice, i.e. what is considered as a just state of affairs at the end of the day and how one can contribute to the achievement of the desirable state of affairs.

By values we do not mean simply the framework within which we organise our wants and preferences but the moral basis of action, although it is true that values also in the latter sense have an impact on the organisation of our interests. The reference to morals has more to do with justice than with the utilitarian understanding of “the greatest good of the greatest number” (E.g. Rescher 2000, 192). Hence, taken pragmatically, the purpose of value-based action is to reach a just solution. Our assessment of values derives from the idea of who we are so that fundamentally values are based on identities.

Values direct our actions when conducting affairs. Appropriateness of values and normative rationality of a chosen way of performing are tried in the interactive process that takes place in those circumstances that compel us to act. Actors have to be bound by certain norms to be able to interact. Norms do not exist independently but derive from the ideal being that is constantly evaluated and modified by participation in the reconstruction of institutional facts. Normative systems that include both values and norms introduce prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimensions into social life. Norms define legitimate means to pursue valued ends, specifying how things should be done, whereas values, undoubtedly depending on the existing social context, are conceptions of justice or fairness. Alongside imposing constraints on social interaction, normative rules that frame values also empower and enable social action—they confer rights as well as responsibilities. (See Lefever 1972)

Concerning the practical case of the Middle East as the context of action, the conflict gives the external actors an opportunity to act in accordance with their values by committing to defuse a crisis that potentially threatens global, or at least regional, stability. Concerning values, the purpose of performance is thus related to factual achievements in the course of the peace process. The aim is to find a just solution. In this sense, values belong to the Peircean category of existence, for they ‘react’ directly to the events in the environment.

To understand the concept of a human action we need to understand the possibilities of descriptions in social and moral terms; we need to recognize, in other words, the relevance and applicability of reasons that operate, not only in the privacy of one’s study, but also in the social arena where persons take

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85 Peirce however questions the view according to which there is no “experience of effort, prescinded from the idea of purpose”. He maintains that “in sustained effort we soon let the purpose drop out of view,” so that a purpose is not always in view when the effort is cognised. (CP 8.330)
account of each other in doing what they do and are guided in their thought and action by an intricate network of moral and social considerations.

(Melden 1961, 180)

In pragmatic theorising, the significance of values is stressed, since truth is studied through the given set of values. Values are based on identity, which is the relatively stable framework of being and action. Having values thus means that ‘the self’ is able to have a broad and apparently unconditional perspective on what is just and, therefore, desirable. The function of values in interaction is related to rational deliberation about moral matters. In Rescher’s (2000, 213) terms morality is about “the ontological duty of self-realisation”, which means that every reason-endowed actor is obliged to use its potentialities for good. Not that obligation is included in the roles that we take but it is “an ex conditione obligation [...]; it inheres in what one is rather than in what one has undertaken”. (See also Gadamer 1979, 30-32)

Hence, saying or doing may make a difference not only in the existence of the one who says and does but also in the course of events in the present environment that has made the actor engage, and even in the being of other actors. The impact on the self is due to the iconic character of performance which allows the others as interpreters of the performance to participate in the process of identity formation of the represented self, while the influence on the environment or circumstances refers to value-based or, in Peircean terms, indexical performance. As far as the environment is seen to consist of the relations of the other actors with one another, the change concerns the redefinition of their identities, values and interests as these appear in their performances. From the perspective of the represented self, the purpose of performance based on moral considerations is thus directed to the change in the circumstances, while the third possible purpose of performance, which we call the symbolic one, aims at influencing the others’ attitudes with regard to the preferences of the represented one in order that the represented is able to protect or promote its interests which the circumstances might threaten.

Peirce thus calls a sign that tells something about an existing object of reality an index. Without the existing object the sign could not contain the information that it does in actual contexts where we interpret it. Peirce gives an example of a photograph being in indexical relation to its object. He states that as photographs are in certain respects exactly like the objects they represent, we should take them as indices of their objects. “This resemblance”, he says, “is due to the photographs having been produced under such circumstances that they were physically forced to correspond point by point to nature” (EW 2: 6). As the empirical part of this study deals with a person as a representative of a community’s policy and therefore as a sign of it, we could draw a
conclusion that in order to be a sign in the indexical sense—determined by the particular policy guidelines—the representative must depend on the policy to the extent that without it his performance would be meaningless.

Actions are based on the particular character of the actor or, in general terms, the qualities of an object. Indexical representation of an object involves the presence of an iconic connection as iconicity tells about the qualities of the object. Indexical representation, in turn, is a reflection of an existing object in a certain spatio-temporally definable context. There is, however, a difference between a commitment to a particular kind of action and being a certain kind of person or collective. Sporadic actions without continuity or coherence do not give any firm idea of an actor’s identity. For instance, a state that is not generally regarded as a great power in world affairs may play a decisive part in some historical events, as Norway did in 1993 with respect to the Middle East peace process (See Hill 2003).

What we mean by a great power is a political entity that has an undeniable role in world affairs continuously and throughout the world so that it is not obliged to fight to get its voice heard each time it has something to say. A great power thus has a quality which is known to be there whether or not it is actively involved in dealing with a particular matter in world affairs. It is thus the quality rather than any particular action that is the most fundamental element in selfhood. Although naturally the action is usually expected to reflect the claimed or known qualities.

When the existence of an object is established through recognition, the focus can be shifted to practical, factual purposes of performance. In social reality this has to do primarily with values. In addition to the need to define ourselves, what directs our external activities are our values and interests. The core of value-based action is that it ‘seeketh not her own’. The desired goals are thus set for the general good. In the context of an international conflict this means that the primary function of a third party performance is to find a solution acceptable to the conflicting parties.

In social life in general, success and failure are defined in terms of desired goals. In collective action, then, participants normally define their success as achieving collective goals. This standpoint emphasises the practical, identifiable achievements while ignoring the significance of a ‘mere’ formation of collective goals and the attempts to reach them as a represented entity. As regards the outline of this study, the difference between the points of departure refers to representative’s possible success and failure with respect to conflict regulation, on the one hand, and constructing collective identity through participation in conflict regulation, on the other hand. The former denotes an indexical performance while the latter concerns representative’s iconic function.
In indexical terms, the function of the special envoy as a representative of a third party in conflict can be approached from the viewpoint of promoting the disputants’ desire to achieve the best possible solution. In this study, this kind of function is understood as an action determined by the envoy’s mandate, which derives from the broader foreign policy guidelines of the Union. Determinate action is about the factual relationship between what an international actor states its representative is doing and what he actually does, i.e. the extent to which the action is determined by value considerations of the mandate text.

### 3.3.3. Representation as Symbolic Action

Indexical use of the representative stresses substantive outcomes or factual relation to the determining object and ignores the significance of constitutive reasoning as well as symbolic action in interactive processes of social reality. In political philosophy, the only purpose of symbols is sometimes seen as “curtains that obscure the real politics” (March and Olsen 1989, 48).86

Symbols are used to communicate a general agreement about the meanings attached to certain expressions. The term symbol originates in a Greek term symbolon, a duplicate that was used to identify the other part of two compatible pieces of an object. Later on, symbol became an abstract term which now signifies any object that serves as a means to recognise another object that can be interpreted as an elementary part of it. For instance, words represent certain things that they describe and are, in this sense, symbols of reality.87 Similarly, concrete objects may be agreed to symbolise or illustrate abstract reality.

In ordinary language, any object that conveys an image is usually described as a symbol of that image. However, not all signs that represent objects of social reality are symbols. As was elaborated in preceding subchapters, there are other types of signs that either bring an object to the interpreter’s mind due to the sign’s own qualities (icons) or refer to a matter of fact that determines

86 Eco (1990, 8) juxtaposes two definitions of symbols, the one of Goethe’s which is in tune with idealistic philosophy, according to which symbols are ambivalent signifiers of indeterminate objects, and the other one, a sense developed and used by logicians and mathematicians defining symbols as a law or precise convention. See also Elias 1991.

87 Language, understood in semiotic terms, belongs to the category of symbols (Alston 1964, 59). In practice, the way language is used in representing and reconstructing reality shows that it is impossible to draw a straightforward line between the symbolic sphere of language and its use in reconstruction of social reality.
the sign (indices). Unlike icon that may contribute to the formation of reality, index and symbol refer to, and are determined by, something pre-existing. But while index’ relation to its object is factual, symbol’s relation to its object exists on the basis of an agreement. Symbolic representation encompasses an indexical one which, in turn, includes an iconic representation:

A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object. […] Now that which is general has its being in the instances which it will determine. […] The Symbol will indirectly, through the association or other law, be affected by those instances; and thus the Symbol will involve a sort of Index […].

(CP 2.249)

The inclusiveness makes it possible for an element of vagueness to be found in a symbolic representation. Ricoeur, whose definition of symbol coincides with the Peircean one, says that symbol is “any structure of signification in which a direct, primary, literal meaning designates, in addition, another meaning which is indirect, secondary, and figurative and which can be apprehended only through the first” (Ricoeur 1980, 245). He thus understands the sense of symbol to be broader than the traditional symbol-as-analogy sense, but narrower than the all-embracing definition of symbol as any sign or apprehension that somehow represents reality.88

To make significant is to define, discover or agree that a certain thing or event is to be understood and interpreted in terms of an object within some contextual factors which make the interpretable meaningful. When a thing or an event is made meaningful by means of a conventional link to another object, it is symbolically represented, for a prerequisite for symbol is a common recognised ground that creates a bond between symbol’s object and people who agree to take the symbol as a sign of that particular object. Symbolic relation is both conventional and arbitrary. These two do not exclude each other. Rather, conventionality is required because of arbitrariness, without which there would be no need for a convention.

88 Besides the extent of what is to be called symbolic representation, Ricoeur’s definition brings to mind the Peircean one also when it comes to the primacy of factual—or in Peirce’s terms, indexical—reference over the symbolic one. Namely according to Peirce, a symbol is a general sign that refers to an object that is also of a general nature, but “that which is general has its being in the instances which it will determine” (EW 2: 292), meaning that the being of a law can only be remarked in actual instances where it applies. Thus we only see an indirect, secondary, and figurative meaning through the actual instances where a direct, primary, and literal meaning appears.
If the representative relation were a natural one, it would be taken for granted as such without a need to agree upon or adopt the use of a symbol as a representative of a certain object. Thus every cultural or social representation that is conventional, i.e. symbolic, has necessarily an arbitrary, iconic foundation which becomes meaningful through the convention. This arbitrary foundation derives from the iconicity of any sign, for iconicity is necessary to the interpretation process and the whole composition of representation. Without a prior iconicity there could be neither indexical nor symbolic representations. Index involves an icon (CP 2.248), and “every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities” (CP 5.119).

The conventional nature of symbolicity involves the idea that interpretation is guided by the conditions that make the symbol meaningful in the given context. The conditions are a combination of iconicity and indexicality, on the one hand, and mutual understanding about what a certain kind of representation means in general, on the other hand. Whatever event, action or object becomes a meaningful part of our life or our certain affairs as a community does so because we make it that, and renew and maintain it by repeatedly using the sign in the agreed sense. But as we accept a certain sign as a representative of the object, our joint agreement involves that the sign may be ‘used’ to other purposes without the sign losing its indexical meaning.

Conventionality means that without an agreement among interpreters of a representative’s reference to a particular object, it would not be taken as such. The symbolic sign-object relation is thoroughly dependent on a convention that establishes the relation. What this has to do with institutional interests of the represented entity is that convention creates the space needed for serving one’s interests with regard to the circumstances that either threaten the interests or may be used in advancing them. When we agree that a performance is to be interpreted in terms of its influence on the circumstances that ‘demand’ action, we simultaneously give our approval that within these conditions also other considerations may be included.

There are occasions when, for one or another reason, it is not advantageous to proclaim the egoistic interests that are at stake as one gets involved in an interactive process. The welcome by the others is understandably warmer if the moral ground and wish for just solution is emphasised instead of egoistic aspirations. Yet, in social interaction it is generally acknowledged that self-interests sometimes dictate the conditions of performance. This is where conventionality enters the scene of representation.

While action in the indexical sense is directed to fulfil the explicitly stated value-driven purpose, symbolic action serves preferences that are not based on a conception of justice but instead use the existing relationship to satisfy
one’s own aspirations regardless of whether these motivations are compatible with the definition and agreed purpose of the action in question—be it conflict mediation, peacekeeping, development aid, disarmament, trade sanctions, or cultural exchange programs.

Wendt (1999, 240) defines self-interest as “a belief about how to meet one’s needs – a subjective interest – that is characterized by a purely instrumental attitude toward the Other: the Other is an object to be picked up, used, and/or discarded for reasons having solely to do with an actor’s individual gratification.” He reminds, however, that “self-interest does not mean being oblivious to the Other’s interests. Taking the Other’s interests into account […] is essential to anticipating his behavior and thus in an interdependent world to gratifying the Self.” But he also acknowledges that whether motivations are altruistic, purely egoistic or mixed is “notoriously difficult to measure”.

There are relations that are based on close interconnectedness of values and interests, such as trade negotiations between actors that identify themselves as liberal market economies (identity), hold free trade as an important principle to promote (value) and expect their trade relations to contribute to their own economic growth (self-interest). Hence, the conceptual distinction between indexical and symbolic representations does not need to mean that values and interests contradict each other, even if in some cases (including the empirical illustration of this study) there is a clear difference between the two dimensions of representation.

Formation of a self, its identity, values and interests, takes place through iconic representation that is based on constitutive reasoning (See Berejikian and Dryzek 2000). An icon refers to its object as if the object was already there, identifiable and complete. In practice, the logic of iconic representation usually remains inconspicuous due to a strong emphasis on a symbolic representation of social reality. The latter involves that an entity or collective to be represented has to exist a priori its representation. Therefore, it seems that bringing-into-existence is often thought to take place in a representational vacuum so that the object will not be represented until it is a ready once-and-for-all creature.

In theorising international relations this kind of thinking has been typical to (neo-)realist orientation and newer approaches influenced by it, particularly neoliberal institutionalism. What is common to these approaches is that they take interests as an exogenously given and primary motivation for action without paying attention to the fact that having self-interests presumes the existence of the self. Construction of identities is, as Hall (1993, 51) remarks, “necessarily prior to more obvious conceptions of interests: a “we” needs to be established before its interests can be articulated.”
Once the collective self is established, the values and interests spring forth from its identity as an actor that conforms to certain norms and institutionalised practices. When the identity is well established there is no need to renegotiate position with respect to other actors each time the collective chooses to interact with the other selves. Hence, representations do not concentrate any longer on establishing and maintaining the image of the self but rather seek to contribute to a change in external states of affairs that do not correspond to values and interests that the represented entity holds important.

In terms of conflict mediation, symbolic function would mean that a potential third party has, for example, threatened interests or aspirations concerning its international position. The strive for a third party performance would then imply that the actor believes its performance would contribute to safeguarding the threatened interests or strengthening its international position. Therefore, a previously relatively passive international actor may offer assistance to conflicting parties by inviting the parties in conflict to have a peace conference organised by that particular actor, or the foreign minister of a third party may shuttle in a conflict region for the purpose of bringing the conflicting views closer together. Although these acts may actually reduce the tension and even lead to an agreement between conflicting parties, in many cases there are economic, political and strategic interests of the third party that are served by manifestations of willingness to help. A highly visible participation in external affairs may also contribute to the internal matters of the third party itself by influencing, for instance, the public support for political parties, the profile of certain politicians in the proximity of general elections, or the justification of structural changes in an organisation. (See Kleiboer 1996; Touval and Zartman 1985)

Similarly to values, institutional interests are based on identity and they develop within the framework of being as the external environment demands or allows the actor to react to various events. Yet, in interest-based action the motivation is not moral considerations but egoistic aspirations. If the question of values is in the first place about ‘what is to be deemed preferable,’ interests are to be approached from the perspective of ‘what I prefer’ (Cf. Rescher 2000, 178). In both cases the reference is to purposive adequacy. Yet there is a fundamental difference in emphasis. In the former case, action is guided by normative considerations so that a performance, at least in principle, seeks to contribute to establishing a just state of affairs. The latter, in turn, is essentially grounded on the protection of one’s own interests that the present circumstances, if unaltered, might threaten. It is self-evident that professed moral ground is not necessarily the primary motivation for certain performances. Instead the most important impetus to act may come from
egoistic preferences and aspirations. These two are not, of course, completely exclusive. Actually values are the necessary basis for organising our interests. Without values it would be impossible to have any order of preferences, which is especially important in the circumstances where one’s interests are not compatible.

3.4. UNDERPINNINGS FOR ANALYSIS

“In mathematics, to say a sign has no meaning is to say that the meaning is not included in the hypothesis. In the case of concrete values, by contrast, a hypothesis can be opened and meaning (an interpretation, translation) put in” (Merrell 1997, 239). To summarise the ‘inclusion of the meaning’ in the hypothesis inspired by Peirce’s argumentation, we can draw together the analytical framework of the study as follows:

Coherence, continuity, efficiency, and effectiveness may be achieved to a certain extent through establishment of administrative structures. Yet, to be able to function consistently in contexts that require more unity than is provided by administrative and judicial framework, a collective needs to develop a common institutional identity. In practice the identity formation happens through a four-phase process. A collective being and its qualities are imagined and named by those who are participating in its formation in the first place. The imagined being is then brought into the awareness of the significant others through performances where the collective self under construction is represented. In the final phase of a successful identity formation process, the significant others recognise the represented self.

Performance in the name of an entity is framed by its institutional being and, at the same time, participates in the construction of it jointly with significant others whose recognition it needs for the renewed identity. Interaction is the locus of interpretation where a collective is represented by its mandataries whose performances are interpreted by other collectives and their representatives who participate in the interactive processes.

When it comes to representatives, or signs, in relation to institutional being as their object, the same representative or seemingly similar representatives can serve diverse purposes. The theoretical division into icons, indices, and symbols necessarily simplifies institutional reality by making it resemble a static subject for categorisation. Nevertheless, the division into the three classes of signs shows quite clearly how an institutional being directs interpretations
and is organised by representation. For example, the EU’s role as the biggest donor of economic aid to the Palestinians can be interpreted not merely as an indication of the EU’s utilitarian essence, which is discussed in chapter six, but also as denoting the willingness for a unitary profile, as is presented in chapter five, and a manifestation of the EU’s economic and political interests in the region, as is seen in chapter seven.

Iconic representation as a sign of possibility does not presume a pre-existing object nor a factual or conventional relation between a sign and its object. In iconic representation the sign establishes a relation to an imaginary object, which in this case is the EU’s represented foreign policy self, its identity that is constructed in performances, such as involvement in conflict mediation. Iconic representation brings into being the self that is interpreted through the nomination and work of the special envoy as if the self existed prior to its representation. The EU special envoy has a very specific and important function that has the potential to be even more effective than the performance of the High Representative of the CFSP in terms of the EU’s foreign policy identity formation within the CFSP community, since the latter representation remains at a more general level and therefore perhaps is short of the content—even if the ‘international ranking’ of the High Representative is higher than that of a special envoy.

In the sense that identity formation is discussed here, the question is not about conscious manipulation of constituent parts of the represented entity or significant others but about interaction through which an entity acquires identity in the process of imagining, naming, performance and recognition. In the empirical illustration the EU performance is primarily analysed as it is represented by the special envoy, although the wider context is also taken into account.

Indexical representation denotes the Union’s willingness to facilitate conflict resolution and peace building. This type of representation takes for granted the existence of a coherent and consistent represented self and its determination to help the conflicting parties reach an agreement. At the same time, it marginalises the significance of the egoistic preferences of the represented third party as well as the idea that representation could actually create the represented. What is expressed in the mandate of the EU special envoy is the frame for indexical representation: The idea of nominating an envoy is that he will function as an intermediary who is invited or at least accepted by the conflicting parties to facilitate the conflict resolution.

Action by third parties may thus be based on the idea of the actor’s moral obligation to take part. This kind of action belongs to the category of indexical representation, since the main incentive directly concerns the values that
contribute to willingness for a successful conflict mediation. Nevertheless, when studying the motives for action we may also discover a need to (re-)define the self-image and strengthen its correspondence to internal and external expectations.

In the symbolic sense, representation serves primarily self-interests not directly linked to a just resolution to conflict. When the action of the EU’s special envoy is regarded as symbolic, it means that there is a shared understanding of what the role of a special envoy generally involves, and that the conditions of this assumption are fulfilled so that the entity that is represented by the envoy is to be taken as a collective and the envoy’s action corresponds to his mandate. A precondition for symbolic representation is that the represented is a relatively unified entity that has a common identity as the basis of its shared values and interests. It is arguable to what extent the EU as a foreign policy entity can be symbolically represented at present or whether a symbolic representation is, instead, applicable only to individual EU member states as separate but co-operating entities.

Potential third parties of a conflict may have economic or strategic interests to participate in conflict management, or their internal affairs are thought to be positively influenced by a high-profile action. As for traditional foreign policy actors, the latter supposition is often particularly clear in the proximity of an election when involvement may even serve unofficially as part of an election campaign. In this sense the primary reason for getting involved is not for the sake of the conflicting parties but rather that the involvement is seen as necessary or advantageous with respect to the third party’s self-interests.

In many cases, it is up to an interpreter’s point of view whether a sign is seen as an icon, index or symbol—similar to the famous picture where one can see three faces: one of an old woman, another of an old man, and the third one of a young woman, depending on where the observer focuses and whether he is able to discern the three gestalts. Yet, it is not possible to see all three at the same time.

Concerning the functions of the EU special envoy, the representation can be interpreted either as iconic, indexical, or symbolic, although it has to be emphasised that the latter two functions do not mean that there necessarily is an existing foreign policy identity of the Union but rather that the indexical and symbolic functions are based on a renewable agreement of the member states to construct such an identity and act as if it was coming into being. This is the basis for the indexical function in the sense that the member states redefine on a regular basis their position with regard to the conflict, and for the symbolic one because in order to represent self-interests there has to be a shared ground for understanding what the ‘self’ is as an object that the special envoy represents.
As performance is the central focus of this study, and as the idea of performance in terms of iconic representation is to bring into existence the represented that is thought to exist prior to representation, the sentence of Bourdieu (1991, 122) about ‘becoming what one is’ adeptly summarises the principle of change that is a determining characteristic of institutions: “Become what you are”: that is the principle behind the performative magic of all acts of institution.” Changing social reality is fundamentally iconic. The analytical framework formulated in this chapter will be used to analyse the functions of a special envoy who (i) defines the EU foreign policy identity that is about to come into being, (ii) acts in the framework of the fixed mandate in order to facilitate the conflict resolution, and (iii) serves self-interests that the Union’s member states have in their interactions with the conflict region. The process of ‘becoming what the EU is in terms of its CFSP’ is what will be examined in the study by means of dialogical hermeneutics.
PART II

ANALYSIS OF AN EU PERFORMANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
4. **On Interpretation: Signs We Define Are Signs That Define Us**

In this chapter some of the key concepts of the study—representation, performance, identity, interests, and values—are considered as elements of the interpretative process. Interpretation of meaning was understood already among the early Romanticists as involving an idea of experience. Performance is such an experience both to the performing self and to the other with whom the self is interacting. (Cf. Stern and Henderson 1993, 9-14) When performance is understood in terms of representation in the name of a collective self, the representative appears as intermediary between the self and the other. The significance of experience is in the demand inherent to experience to find an explanation, reason or purpose. As Peirce (CP 8.330) says, “[e]xperience generally is what the course of life has compelled me to think”.

The focus of this study is on the practical effects of representation both on the represented self and on the other that interprets the representation and reacts to it as well as to the surroundings where the action takes place. The pragmatist approach presented in chapter two is here combined with the interpretative processes that take place in the interaction of an ‘international self’ with significant others. These interpretative processes shape the actors as well as the environment of performance. Pragmatic orientation can be taken as “an indication of the ways in which existing realities may be changed” (James 1910, 53). In pragmatic judgement, an action that has no practical consequences is meaningless. Hence, the central question concerns the practical consequences of action:

To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare.

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89 There are significant differences between Peirce’s approach favouring scientific objectivism and that of James’s focusing on the subjective sphere of practical influence. Nonetheless, the core of pragmatism, for Peirce and James alike, was that our beliefs about reality are directly connected to how we act.
Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.

(James 1910, 46-47)

4.1. HOW TO READ ACTION

A self-evident but often neglected aspect of social actorness concerns the comprehensiveness of approach when it comes to purposes of actorness. Generally, the focus is exclusively either on values or interests, as was discussed above. In this study, the EU’s foreign policy actorness is dealt with not only in terms of values and interests of the Union and its member states but also as concerns institutional identity formation that is the ground from which both values and interests arise. These different elements to which the purpose may be projected are analysed as they appear in the functions of the EU special envoy in the Middle East peace process. His functions reflect the various purposes of the EU’s actorness in circumstances that encourage or provoke the Union to act.

The idea of ‘purpose’ is implicitly present in the concept of function that involves the idea of practical consequences. Purposiveness of action is realised in a spatio-temporal context where interaction between the self and the others takes place. In the process, the self’s performance is interpreted by the others whose reaction is determined by the assessment concerning the performance’s meaning. Here we come into contact with the pragmatic basis of performance. Besides being a philosophical enterprise to uncover the logic of truthfulness, pragmatism offers a ground to be applied to theories of language and action that help us to articulate the various functions of human performances. Pragmatist studies thus elaborate the use of chosen means in order to achieve desired ends.

In the Peircean sense, the true meaning of a concept appears in its use. When we characterise an existing thing in terms of a general concept, our understanding of the object can be figured on the basis of how we treat it in practice. “It is all a matter of practical ramifications: To be what we call an “X” is to be treated Xly by us” (Rescher 2000, 9; cf. CP 5.9). The object’s meaning can be reflected to any kind of representation, not only the linguistic one in its strict sense. This is actually what Ricoeur (1973; 1984; 1988) has in mind when he argues that there is a close analogy between features of text and
those of action, and therefore social scientific research could adopt the methodology of text-interpretation.

We speak of marking events. Are not there ‘marks’ on time, the kind of thing which calls for a reading, rather than for a hearing? [...] How could an event be printed on something temporal? Social time, however, is not only something which flies; it is also the place of durable effects, of persisting patterns. An action leaves a ‘trace’, it makes its ‘mark’ when it contributes to the emergence of such patterns which become the documents of human action.

(Ricoeur 1981, 205-206)

Ricoeur sought to create a general interpretation theory where the environment of interpretation is expanded from texts to the interpretation of any sign that can be examined in the same way as texts. According to Ricoeur, all of human existence is a readable text. Hence, the analogy adopted here between representative as a readable sign standing for a certain meaning or idea, on the one hand, and as a human being performing in the name of a given collective, on the other, seems also to Ricoeur a justifiable and even recommendable starting point for interpretation.

Ricoeur’s understanding of action as text sheds light on the idea of how we can approach action as interpreters: The text or any interpretable activity directs interpretation and provides the represented world or object with meanings. This is to say that the text as a particular kind of representative of an object has various purposes. If we think of a text in its general narrow sense of written expression, it may be informative, entertaining, educative, and so on. These functions are not exclusive. Hence an informative text may be entertaining as well, or even amusing, whether or not that was the original intention of the author. A reasonable text necessarily has a purpose intended by the author, but it may also have other functions. Whether the text finally serves the original purpose can, of course, be disputed. Sometimes it can be clearly seen that the text does not fulfil the intention of the author while in other cases it is difficult to grasp the original intention and it would be difficult

90 Also Hollis and Smith (1991, 409) maintain that “[p]ractices and the medium of their reproduction are not unobservable”. This understanding allows us to examine the social world from within instead of committing ourselves to external observation of causes and effects characteristic mainly to the natural sciences. See also Reagan 1995.

91 “Si nous arrivions à comprendre que l’existence humaine tout entière est un texte à lire, nous serions au seuil de cette herméneutique générale par laquelle j’ai essayé de définir la tâche de la philosophie prochaine”. Ricoeur, Paul (1964) ‘Le langage de la foi’, Bulletin du Centre Protestant d’Études, 16(4-5):17-31 (as quoted in Vikström 2000, 90).
to judge what is ‘the true meaning’ of a text. “[S]everal interpretations may be possible and legitimate” (Zehfuss 2001a, 69), and therefore it is necessary to go back to the pragmatic roots according to which the ‘truth’ appears in the actual functions and consequences of the text. The plurivocity of texts enables different interpretations of same events (See Ricoeur 1976).

Also texts as taken in the broader sense as any interpretable element of human action are designed for certain purposes. Similarly, they have functions that may be either intentional or unintentional from the perspective of the ‘author’. And, likewise, their original intention may be difficult to find:

In the same way that a text is detached from its author, an action is detached from its agent and develops consequences of its own. This autonomisation of human action constitutes the social dimension of action. An action is a social phenomenon not only because it is done by several agents in such a way that the role of each of them cannot be distinguished from the role of the others, but also because our deeds escape us and have effects which we did not intend. (Ricoeur 1981, 206)

The element of uncertainty thus means that interpretation is not about going directly back to the original intention of the author. (Cf. Fay 1987) Rather, the question is about the practical consequences for which the text seems to function from the perspective of interpreters.

According to Merrell (1997, 29), signs cannot be genuine without being interpreted, since it is only through the process of interpretation that signs “become charged with meaning”. He further claims that in order for a sign to be known, “the knower must have some inclination in terms of what it would be for the sign to remain unknown”. An object, action or event may refer to another object, action or event without interpreters knowing it. But in practice the referring object, action or event only becomes a sign of the other object as the interpreters create, discover, or agree on a link between the ‘what has now become a sign’ and the ‘what has therefore become its object’. In this act of signification, the functions of the object with respect to the sign and vice versa come to the fore and direct the interpretation. When the sign is understood in terms of a performance in the name of a collective as in the case of the EU’s representation in the Middle East, the practical consequences of performance can be interpreted in the framework of the Peircean sign system. The performing agent is taken as ‘representamen’ that may have a three-fold relation to its object, which is the represented entity in a particular context of action. The three functions relate to iconicity, indexicality and symbolicity of performance.

As was discussed above, the tradition of studies on social activity, and international relations in particular, has largely concentrated on two of the
functions of representation: First, representation is usually seen as a performance that complies with the factual common-sense understanding of representation or explicitly stated purpose based on values, i.e. the intention of the ‘author’ as he expresses it. Secondly, representation may be understood as a practice that marginalises the purpose that is understood as factual and, instead, serves other purposes that can be connected to the factual purpose ‘merely’ conventionally. This latter function of representation thus points primarily to a referential relationship that has been agreed to exist but remains undeclared in the practical representational activities. We may assume that the said concerns not only written texts but also many other practices in social reality where an activity can either ‘naturally’ serve a defined purpose or have another function that is usually seen as secondary in a ‘dual-use’ of action. Yet as has been discussed earlier in the work, these two categories are not sufficient to cover the whole spectrum of intentions and practical consequences of purposeful action in general or representation of a collective self in an external conflict in particular.

The Peircean division of signs provides us with a feasible categorisation that also takes into account the aims or results of action that do not conform to the patterns of factual (indexical) or conventional (symbolic) relations but refer to the potential of the object in an iconic relationship. However, one function does not exclude the other. The logic of representation in human action functions in a manner which combines the three. A representative to be able to include all the three elements has to contain a balanced picture of what his/its functions are as a neutral intermediary of meanings between object and interpreters, what he/it is as an active participant in constructing the represented object, and what other intentions the performance carries.

When the focus is on an existing collective as an object of representation, the representative is considered a more or less neutral expression of a ‘real object’ that would exist apart from any particular representation. In this case, the representation of a collective stresses the existence of the represented collective as a performing object, on the one hand, and other collectives as interpreters (i.e. those to whom the collective is represented), on the other hand, and marginalises the possibility that an intermediary may have influence on interpretations about the nature of the represented.

In turn, as we focus on the active role of the representative, it appears that interpretations reflect the image created by the representative, no matter what the represented object is in itself—if it is anything at all. And due to powerful representation, interpreters may sometimes refuse to acknowledge that the emperor has no clothes (even when they do not see them) because the tailor says he has. Images have a considerable social power to construct things that
we do not see except through their representations. This is especially true in social reality that largely exists in acts and practices. Interpretation is an essential element in the being of the interpreted object.

As is the case with elements of discourse, such as words, sentences, metaphors, and so on, any representative sign is characteristically polysemic. This polysemy enables analysis of a sign to be carried out from different perspectives. What distinguishes the hermeneutic approach from structural analysis in this sense is that the latter perceives the difference to be due to contextual factors that exclude certain interpretations as inapplicable to the defined conditions. This thereby fixes the meaning to the structural conditions. Meanwhile the former does not rely on contextual fixity of meaning but allows different interpretations within a given context and emphasises the multidimensional character of a text (in the broad sense).

This multidimensionality can aptly be presented in the framework of the Peircean theory of signs, where the function of a single representative in its particular performance can be approached from three different angles. The categorisation is not straightforward and exclusive but rather indicative so that the consequences of iconic representation are primarily seen in how the represented self is taken, while indexical representation mainly influences the environment and relations of external others with one another, and symbolic one influences the conduct of ‘other selves’ with respect to the will of the represented.

As identity is the basis for values and interests, iconic performance concerns primarily identity formation within which redefinition of values and interests takes place. Indexical performance, in turn, relates to factual or explicitly declared functions of representation that usually involve the notion of values. Our values direct our action with regard to certain problems that in our assessment need to be solved or eliminated. Further, the presence of a problem urges us to evaluate whether it threatens our interests. Such a performance of a representative, the most important purpose of which is to safeguard the self-interests of the represented entity, is essentially symbolic. (See Gadamer 1979, 65)

An object needs to be communicated in performances that take place in actual contexts. In terms of the situated activities of knowledgeable international actors, a representative is both a means to influence the external environment and other actors in accordance with the values and interests of the participating actor, and a medium that encourages interpreters to accept the being of the represented as it appears in the representation. The former refers to consequentiality in the context of performance while the latter entails the possibility to present the object of performance as a meaningful whole.
All actors are positioned relationally and all social interaction is situated interaction. To say that social relations concern the positioning of actors in situated interaction includes the literal understanding of what happens in spatio-temporally framed events. However, the positioning is not restricted to this—rather its emphasis is on understanding the formation of selves that takes place within a ‘social space’ of meanings. The interaction has a circular character in the sense that values and interests direct the way a particular actor participates in a process, and the process, in turn, has an influence on the realisation of the actor’s potential and contributes to the reconstruction of its identity which is the basis for the values and interests that direct its action. In order to follow the pattern of change within and around an actor, we need to understand the logic of performance or, as Giddens (1984, 298) formulates the task, “we have to try to see how the practices followed in a given range of contexts are embedded in wider reaches of time and space”.

4.2. OTHERNESS IN INTERPRETATION

In all action there is a need to take the external into account so that characteristic to any situated representation is the presence of ego and non-ego. Peirce introduces the idea of ego and non-ego as two necessary component of any action. Otherness is an elementary feature of existence: “Although in all direct experience of reaction, an ego, a something within, is one member of the pair, yet we attribute reactions to objects outside of us” (CP 7.534). The meaning of reality, as we perceive it, exists in its influence on us and our action (James 1910, 48). But otherness is relevant only to the extent that it has some practical bearings on the self and its action. Therefore what is further needed for an interpretation to take place is a common ground of understanding. Schleiermacher, who is credited with a psychological standpoint, associated hermeneutics with rhetoric and dialectic. Before him there had been, on the one hand, exegesis of sacred texts and, on the other hand, philology of classical texts. The conclusion of Schleiermacher was that interpretation presupposes a knowledge that can be derived only from an understanding of the subject to be interpreted92. (Bleicher 1980) This idea had an impact on the thoughts of

92 ‘Knowledge’ means here a general structure of thinking which allows one to understand the thoughts of other human beings, and not a knowledge of a specific context where the subject of interpretation has come into being.
Boeckh, among others. He based his distinction between understanding and making understandable on ideas about endless approximation through interpretation. (Boeckh 1886/1966) Also Hirsch’s theory of validity in interpretation reflects the idea of a common ground of author and interpreter, which allows the latter to find the ‘true and original meaning’ of the text. His theory results in the defence of one meaning as more probable than another, and rests upon the assumption that objective meanings of texts, at least probably, exist. (Hirsch 1967, 17, 173-180) On the other hand, Hirsch (1967, 206) stresses that there can be no method of correct interpretation although criticism serves as an instrument of validation. He acknowledges that interpretation involves a choice by the interpreter. “It is a weakness in many descriptions of the interpretive process”, he says, “that this act of choice is disregarded and the process described as though the object of interpretation were somehow determined by the ontological status of texts themselves” (Hirsch 1967, 24; see also Hirsch 1976).

Besides Hirsch, some other hermeneuticists such as Betti (1962) and Rosen (1987) seem to maintain that objective or right understanding can be uncovered by returning to the intention of the author or, at least, that the interpretation must be based upon a proper understanding of what it means to be a certain kind of text. According to Rosen (1987, 171), there are two ways to prove consistency. The formal way refers to formalising the interpretation. This would actually mean a shift from hermeneutics to mathematics and the assimilation of a specific interpretation to a general form of interpretation. The other way to prove consistency, appropriate to informal or humanistic texts, is to explain a text in a natural language and let the other readers assess the comprehensiveness and coherence of the given interpretation. However, this would mean that the reader-interpreter is merely stating his own interpretation, not proving its coherence.

Another widely approved understanding about the aims of interpretation holds, in turn, that to read is to conjoin a new discourse to the discourse of the text. Hence an interpretation of texts should not be mixed up with an attempt to understand the author and discover his intention. The only fundamental assumption is that the interpretable text is intelligible. Ricoeur, among others, finds the requirement of objectivity very problematic and maintains that it is not possible to end up with a right understanding. His view is that “to understand a text is not to rejoin the author” (Ricoeur 1981, 210). Since a text may confirm many different interpretations, the ‘right’ or ‘probable’ understanding cannot be discovered by returning to the supposed intention of the author. Ricoeur (1981, 212) comes to the conclusion that “[i]t is always possible to relate the same sentence in different ways to this or that sentence considered as the
A specific kind of onesidedness is implied in the act of reading. This onesidedness confirms the guess character of interpretation.” He emphasises the dialogical nature of interpretation (Ricoeur 1976, 23). Hence, instead of pursuing the ideal of objectivity in interpretation, the author should be taken as a ‘partner’ in interpretative dialogue. (See Arbib and Hesse 1986, 176-185) This kind of dialogical approach bridges the two fields of interpretation that in Schleiermacherian tradition have been deemed strictly separated and mutually exclusive so that to consider the common language is to forget the writer, whereas to understand an individual author is to forget the common language.

In the dialogical approach, establishing theoretically the universal validity of interpretation, which Dilthey claims to be the function of hermeneutics, is deemed to be beyond reach since the meaning of a text for its reader is always something other than the subjective intentions of its author. Furthermore, not only the text but interpretation as well is contextual, and these contexts of writing and reading rarely coincide completely. Aiming for an ‘objective interpretation’ is oriented toward the inner life of the author, whereas dialogical interpretation takes place through exploration of interconnections. Instead of showing that a conclusion is true, the aim is to provide an interpretation that is possible in the light of what is known. In the absence of the author, interpretation is necessarily uncertain. Yet, even if it may always be argued for or against any interpretation, texts and human action in general remain within limited fields of possible interpretative constructions. This constrained field is the space within which we come to find as true or real something said or done by means of reflection, meaning a dialogue between the text and ourselves as its interpreters.

The interpreter’s focus is on representation reflecting an ego that presents itself through the text in an interactive process. There are different understandings about what is the core of the circularity in interpretative relationships. It may be taken as the relationship between structure and action, a whole and its parts, practice and interpretation, or individual and universal. Or, as in Kisiel’s (1985, 7) definition, the hermeneutic circle is “the intrinsically circular structure of a temporal existence whose future projects are necessarily determined and guided by past presuppositions”. When this circularity is approached from the perspective of agents participating in the interpretative process, the hermeneutic circle is a relationship between interpreted ego and interpreting non-ego. (Cf. Haas and Haas 2002)

There is no reality out there submitting itself to passive agents. What we interpret is not the ‘reality as such’ but interpretable representations of egos.
With the exception of knowledge, in the present instant, of the contents of consciousness in that instant (the existence of which knowledge is open to doubt) all our thought and knowledge is by signs. A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object. (CP 8.332)

Without an interpretation, signs as representatives of certain objects would not be understood as denoting these given objects. A sign signifies an object not in itself but always to someone. The idea of one thing denoting another incorporates the idea of one thing being interpreted as a sign of another. In certain cases, a sign may not necessarily be understood as such by anyone but as for indexical reference it would nevertheless be connected to a particular object. As was discussed in chapter three, the existence of such a relationship between a sign and its object does not depend on interpretation in such a way that it would disappear or come into existence in the process of interpretation. Icons and symbols, in turn, are expressions of an object only when they are interpreted as signs, i.e. interpretation creates the linkage between an icon and its object in the process of (re-)constructing the object while the symbolic relationship is based on an agreement. What is common to all three categories of signs is that a sign “would not be a sign unless it were capable of being interpreted, or understood in a certain way” (Hookway 1992, 32). It depends, thus, on the properties of a thing whether or not it is possible to be interpreted as a sign of another thing. However, the final approval or disapproval of the representational link between two things depends on thoughts that serve as interpretants for a possible sign, whether the thought is the original intention of the ‘utterer’, a ‘reaction’ of an interpreter, or a combination of these two. Peirce’s terms ‘intentional’, ‘effectual’, and ‘communicational’ describe aptly the three different interpretants:

There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the interpreter; and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place. (EW 2: 478)

Intentional and effectual interpretants cannot separately cover the essence of the represented object. The communicational interpretant is needed to make interactivity meaningful. As Peirce (CP 3.621) confirms, “[t]he universe must
be well known and mutually known to be known and agreed to exist, in some sense, between speaker and hearer, between the mind as appealing to its own further consideration and the mind so appealed to, or there can be no communication, or ‘common ground’ at all”. Interpretation is thus concerned with a reality as we (ego and non-ego) see it and as far as we are able to agree on what we see.

Gadamer emphasised that the focus of hermeneutics is how agreement or shared understanding is achieved among interpreters about our shared living-world and our experience of it. This agreement is a fusion of the horizons of author and interpreter—or utterer and beholder, in Peirce’s terms. (See Gadamer 1979, 337) This fusion of horizons is what Peirce would call communicational interpretation. For the sake of clarity we could call this agreement between a represented actor and an interpreting actor ‘the first-order fusion of horizons’ to distinguish it from the fusion that takes place in the process where researcher is interpreter, the non-ego, and this ‘already fused’ relation of international actors is where the interpretable object, the ego appears. What results from the latter dialogue could be called ‘the second-order fusion of horizons’.

4.3. THE ART OF DIALOGUES

The fusions of horizons occupy a central position in analyses of dialogical hermeneutics. The first-order fusion is about the interactive processes that take place in any social event: In order to interact, it is necessary for actors (or agents acting in the name of a group or collective) to find a certain degree of mutual understanding about the nature of their interaction. In a dialogue, the performance of one actor is interpreted by another, and vice versa. The interpretation follows the three-dimensional system of categories where a performance both establishes the actor as identifiable and represents its values and self-interests in the context of action.

The second-order fusion of horizons is about the interpretation of interpretation where, on the one hand, the communicational interpretation of ‘utterer’ and ‘beholder’ presents the ego and, on the other hand, the interpretative framework of researcher participates in the dialogue as the non-ego. Hence, with respect to the practical case of this study, the non-ego, the interpreting subject, is, first of all, any significant international actor that needs to position itself in relation to the ‘emerging self’ which is the EU as represented by the
special envoy. This results in the first-order fusion of horizons. Secondly, when a researcher positions her-/himself as an interpreting subject, the fusion of horizons concerns the horizon of communicational interpretation of ‘utterer’ and ‘beholder’ and the horizon of the researcher.

Social sciences cannot be based on mere observation, for meaningful action is an intersubjective phenomenon and there are always two levels of interpretation: those of observation and action proper. Thus, interpretation “is not merely a concern of science, but is obviously part of the total human experience of the world” (Gadamer 1979, xi). Also Giddens’s concept of the double hermeneutic emphasises that the meaning of action is not limited to the actor himself or other actors in a particular context but comprises the significance given to it by observers. He defines double hermeneutic as the “intersection of two frames of meaning as a logically necessary part of social science, the meaningful social world as constituted by lay actors and the metalanguages invented by social scientists” (Giddens 1984, 374). Burke (1954, 35) also claims that it is never reality but only an interpretation of reality that we deal with. The object of interpretative and understanding knowledge cannot be introduced in an objectifying fashion. Knowing is to know through communicative experience.

Hence, the dual fusion of horizons in interaction characterises the interpretation in this study: First, a dialogue between experiencing participants as ‘egos’ and ‘non-egos’ enables them to achieve an agreement about the reality that they share and shape by their interaction. In world affairs and other spheres of social being alike, meaningful action is an intersubjective phenomenon that takes place in “the social context within which identities and interests of both actor and acting observer, are formed” (Guzzini 2000, 149; see also Arbib and Hesse 1986, 180; Neufeld 1993). Secondly, the focus is on communicative intersection between the dialogical reality of the EU’s CFSP with regard to the Middle East and the researcher as an interpreter of this reality where different functions of the EU special representative occupy a central position. There is thus the level of (inter-)action proper and the level of observation where we interpret an already interpreted social reality.

Ricoeur, similar to Heidegger and Gadamer, considers hermeneutics to concern the understanding of being and the relations between beings. He defines hermeneutics as “the theory of the operations of understanding in their relation to the interpretation of texts” (Ricoeur 1981, 43). Between interpretation and understanding there is a dialectic relation, for interpretation is both a precondition for and a consequence of understanding. To put it simply,

93 See Schutz 1962, particularly pp. 3-47 (‘On the Methodology of the Social Sciences’).
interpretation is not an attempt to understand but to understand better (Bourdieu 1980, 53; Helenius 1990, 64, 69). At the same time it should be noticed that considering interpretation a precondition of understanding means that understanding includes contextual elements, interests and experience-based assumptions, and therefore there is no pure or objective understanding of social reality (Bourdieu 1980, 233-244). What hermeneutics has to offer is a method to show how an event can be interpreted: “We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena” (Wittgenstein 1968, §90). Interpretation of social reality is not objective or subjective but rather intersubjective. The possibilities of phenomena need to be approved by other interpreters.

The imagined is a private reality where the other has no access. In order that there can be a dialogical relation with respect to the imagined, it has to be named. Naming that makes the imagined identifiable contains the possibility for a relationship. That is exactly the pragmatistic meaning of a name. (CP 6.516) Realities depend on thought: “Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object.” (CP 5.438) Hence, the pragmatic core in the context of the study can be summarised as follows: Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the EU’s special representative to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object of the study.

The studied representative is defined in terms of the possible effects that may have practical bearings on (i) how the represented object is seen, (ii) how the represented object seeks to change the environment of action toward a just state of affairs, and (iii) how the representative causes interpreters to act in accordance with the self-interests of the represented object. In studying these practical bearings, the question is not about describing mechanical motions that a sign causes but, instead, interpreting the change in reality as a consequence of change in perceptions brought about by the representing sign in the course of the interpretation process.

Interpretation within a set framework takes place when interpreters let the subject matter address them. The framework for interpretation originates from the interpreter although the impetus for the use of an interpretative framework has to arise from the text itself. Meanwhile the analysed subject matter as the content of interpretation emanates from the author of the text or, in this study, from a foreign policy sector of the EU’s institutional being to the extent that it is funnelled via the special envoy’s performance. In the analysis, the subject
matter thus either resists or confirms the categorisation and directs the interpreter’s attention to subtler divisions within the rough categorisation of functions. This understanding is typical to hermeneutic philosophy in general and has been particularly emphasised in the dialogical hermeneutics of Gadamer and Ricoeur. The dialogue follows the logic of an interview that provides the interpreted text or action with the possibility to widen or reorganise its meanings. This is what Gadamer means by the speculative character of interpretation that is not restricted to any specific pre-existing methodological model but has to take into consideration the “belongingness between subject and object” (Gadamer 1979, 414-419). The final approval or disapproval for a proposed interpretation is given by the interpretable.

Ricoeur uses the Peircean triadic relationship of sign, object and interpreter when he discusses the possibility of objective interpretation. While emphasising the need for an overarching fusion of horizons, Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation stresses the respect to text as the object of interpretation so that interpreter follows text rather than vice versa. The question is thus about appropriation of meaning, not recreation or objectification of it. Yet, he acknowledges that there is no return to the original meaning of the author. Instead, interpretation is fundamentally dialogical. Ricoeur (1976, 23) argues that dialectical polarities “allow us to anticipate that the concepts of intention and dialogue are not to be excluded from hermeneutics, but instead are to be released from the onesidedness of a non-dialectical concept of discourse”. Interpretation can rarely be justified by means of logic of empirical verification. It is rather based on logic of qualitative probability. Ricoeur (1976, 78) clarifies this point of departure by stating that “[t]o show that an interpretation is more probable in the light of what we know is something other than showing that a conclusion is true”. The basic idea of this approach is that the interpretable ‘material’ either approves or disapproves of a proposed interpretation. Reaching an agreement between author and interpreter means that a communicational relationship is established and the horizons of the two fuse into one.

The dialogical approach to hermeneutics maintains that there is no canon or pre-existing method that specifies in advance how interpretation should proceed. Instead, a meaning is projected onto the text, which either confirms or resists that meaning. The interpretative relation is thus not monological or dialectical but a dialogue between text and interpreter. It involves a fusion of horizons, which presupposes the openness of both text and interpreter. (Gadamer 1979) The request for fusion of horizons does not apply only to the relationship between a researcher as the interpreter and the text or action that (s)he studies (second-order fusion) but also to the interaction of the self and the other within a sphere of action proper (first-order fusion) that is then interpreted by researchers.
To be able to understand the changing reality of international relations, it is not enough to grasp the essence of an actor’s static being in a given moment. What is needed is a focus on the context that allows a certain practice to emerge and change the existing institutional or ideational framework, for new definitions of institutional self are created in complex contexts of historical, political, social, and economic co-existence.

The themes that are present in the analysed material of this study, the interviews, official documents, and speeches dealing with the functions of the special envoy, are divided into categories of iconicity, indexicality and symbolicity. All this information is taken as excerpts of a text about the EU’s foreign policy actorness. (See Ricoeur 1973; 1981, 197-218; Reagan 1995) In the first-order fusion of horizons, the text is understood in terms of the special envoy’s performance which other international actors react to. The EU seeks to act in the Middle East through a particular kind of performance that is interpreted by other international actors in the first place.

If interpretation is, as Ricoeur (1980, 245) says, “the work of thought which consists in deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of meaning implied in the literal meaning”, we could summarise the analytical framework of the study in the following way:

The apparent meaning of the EU’s foreign policy actorness as it is seen in the special envoy’s performance with regard to the Middle East is the Union’s purpose as a third party which seeks to influence the course of the conflict. Its involvement in this sense is defined in the mandate of the special representative and relates directly to the intention to defuse the crisis. This function of the special envoy is called indexical performance.

Symbolic performance is to be understood as the ‘hidden’ meanings that are attached to the performance of the representative without having a direct connection to the ‘literal meaning’ of the EU special envoy’s performance, i.e. to the meaning as expressed in his mandate. To the extent that the representative’s function has symbolic significance, it is found in relation to the Union’s or its member states’ various self-interests that are not primarily directed at the efforts to assist the conflicting parties in finding a just non-military solution. References to these interests might include, for instance, economic and strategic considerations. As was discussed in chapters two and three, until recently academic interpretations of various performances have been mainly restricted to these two functions: ‘apparent’ (indexical) and ‘hidden’ (symbolic) ones. Also Ricoeur’s definition of an action’s possible interpretations is limited to these two possible meanings. Yet there is also a third function, the ‘constructive’ one.
At this point we come to the intersection of the identity formation as a four-phase process discussed in chapter two and the representation as a performance as presented in chapter three. Performance, according to the understanding discussed earlier in this study, is the third phase of the identity formation process. But performance is not regarded merely as a necessary stage of identity formation. It is a broad concept that refers to any purposeful human action that contains a subject and a certain internal coherence. Any representation is understood to be a performance that may denote the represented iconically, indexically and symbolically.

Iconicity is the basic condition for indexical and symbolic representations since it contributes to bringing into being what is then represented also indexically and symbolically. In other words, iconic representation contributes to the identity formation of the represented entity by organising the performance around a personified existence of the represented. Performance, when taken in its iconic sense, is the key to gaining space as an actor and, further, to (re-)construct a coherent identity. Identity formation takes place in very practical terms. In order to be able to tell about the form and the content of one’s being it is necessary to situate oneself, one’s presence, in time and place. This is what the EU is doing via its representative in the Middle East: The Union’s foreign policy being is iconically constructed and strengthened in the process, in which the ‘apparent’ function of the special envoy is to contribute to the conflict resolution and peace building. The ‘hidden’ function, in turn, is to participate in safeguarding the interests of the EU or its member states which see the conflict as a threat to themselves or a hindrance to advocating their vested interests (See Rocard 1998).

A starting point in the analysis is that we recognise the plurivocality of social reality. This plurivocality means that there are various possible interpretations. The Peircean division of signs is here used as the categorisation that organises the possible interpretations of a performance. The analysis in chapters five to seven follows the division into iconic, indexical and symbolic dimensions. A logical order, as presented by Peirce, is to start with iconic representation and then proceed to indexical and symbolic representations. The emphasis throughout the study is on the first one of these partly due to the fact that the academic discussion concerns overwhelmingly the latter two and therefore there is a need to balance the picture. But secondly, and more importantly, it is claimed here that iconic representation is the necessary foundation for the other two. Hence, in order to be able to elaborate the indexical and symbolic dimensions it is worth making the effort to comprehend the iconic one. Interpretations of the indexical and symbolic representations are then presented in order to contrast them with the iconic representation and to clarify the
position of the iconic representation in relation to these two. The subtler divisions within each chapter follow the various meanings that arise from the analysed material, the ‘excerpts of the text’ discussing functions of the special envoy. The purpose of the analysis is to illustrate the theoretical framework presented in chapters two and three by discussing in very practical terms the multifaceted potential that representation has in the sphere of international relations, particularly as it appears in a performance in the name of the EU’s foreign policy being.
5.

ICONIC PERFORMANCE: REPRESENTING INSTITUTIONAL SELF UNDER CONSTRUCTION\textsuperscript{94}

For potential third parties, the prolonged conflict in the Middle East is an opportunity to profile themselves as credible international actors. The lack of a functioning common foreign policy excluded the European Community as an entity from the political process for a long time but the integration in high policy matters since the Single European Act has gradually strengthened the sense that the Union is developing into a full-bodied international actor. Yet a political space for the EU’s actorness in the Middle East has been difficult to acquire. The fundamental character of the EU is still that of an economic actor, even if occasionally the United States has lowered its mediation profile thus opening a door for the EU to join the political dialogue (Reuters 17Jul1997; Soetendorp 2002).\textsuperscript{95}

The EU as a foreign policy actor is composed of member states that have different interests and, to a certain extent, different values. The institutional identity formation of the EU does not occur in an interest-free sphere but involves the components that are already there. Identity is contextual both in the sense that its transformation does not happen in a value and interest vacuum, and in the sense of always being a self in relation to others (See Zehfuss 2001b). It is important to notice that even while discussing the iconic function of representation the existing interests cannot be contested. The self-interests, when mentioned in chapters five and six, always refer to the interests of the EU member states as they exist prior to and during the Union’s identity formation process. In turn, chapter seven deals with four sets of interests that

\textsuperscript{94} The primary sources—interviews and texts from news archives—are in chapters five to seven analysed in a thorough manner so that all references to different functions of representation are discussed. Concerning the interviews this means that no substantial issues brought up by the interviewees are left unelaborated.

\textsuperscript{95} Also an interview with a Finnish foreign ministry official, 15 February 2001. Two Finnish sources were interviewed. In footnotes they are separated by the dates of interview.
still are mainly seen as the self-interests of individual member states but have potential to become ‘self-interests of the EU’ once (or if) the EU reaches the point in external relations when the Union is considered a unitary foreign policy actor rather than a bloc of 15 or more states that co-operate on the basis of the lowest common denominator—except when a compromise is not found and each member chooses to act according to its interests.

It is thus not only certain external actors who are to be blamed for the Union’s existential difficulties. Internal heterogeneity also troubles the bloc’s international political performances. A former member of the European Commission, Hans van den Broek (1996, 25) has strongly criticised the existing patterns of action among member states by stating that different achievements do not hide the fact that in handling serious political crises, especially those involving armed conflict, the Union has rarely acted as one; we often speak with different voices, giving different answers to the same questions. [...] Unless common action becomes the normal reaction of the Union when faced with an external challenge, the Union will continue to serve rather as a paymaster than as a peacemaker.

In order for a united actorness to truly become a norm rather than an exception, a significant development in the Union’s institutional identity is needed. As for the performance in the Middle East, the special envoy—in his capacity of an icon—seeks to strengthen the united actorness and thus contribute to the reformation of a European institutional self in foreign policy matters.

5.1. **Balance of Economic and Political Weight** — “The EU just pays the bill.”

The EU has based claims for the right to get its voice heard in the political process particularly on the fact that it is the biggest contributor to the peace process in economic terms. The EU is not willing anymore to be just the payer but seeks to have a role as a player as well. As Moratinos said: “We supply 53 percent of total international aid to the Palestinians. [...] We have to convert this understanding about the economic role of the European Union and put it in a much more political framework.” (Reuters 26Mar1997) Putting aid in a political framework may sound like an innocent reorientation of economic relations in order to achieve greater efficiency and better results in the region
receiving assistance. But another possible interpretation that has been introduced in this particular context is that the EU seeks to buy a political position, meaning that the economic aid is displayed as if it were an admission fee to the negotiation table. In this sense, the repetition of the fact that there is an imbalance between the Union’s economic and political actorness creates an atmosphere favourable to a reformation of the EU’s international identity.

At the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg on 28-29 October 1996, an informal document by Commissioner Manuel Marin highlighted the scope of the Union’s economic aid to the region. At the time, this aid was twice that of the United States. The document observed that the EU is “systematically excluded from the most important negotiations” and “is not a co-sponsor of the peace process”, while Russia, “without the least financial contribution, appears to be an international sponsor of the process”. (Reuters 30Oct1996a) The Commissioner’s document adeptly grasps the essence of the Union’s discomfort with the long-standing situation: The ‘ticket’ that the EU has bought to enter is not accepted, whereas Russia is admitted, due to the status of ex-super power, even without an economic contribution comparable to that of the EU. Also among IR scholars there are some who would readily accord the Union a more significant political role in the Middle East on the grounds of its economic strength (See e.g. Hollis 1997).

One of the central aims of the nomination of Ambassador Miguel Ángel Moratinos for the position of the EU Middle East envoy was to raise the Union’s political profile to better correspond to its economic commitment. As the Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring commented in the Middle East and North Africa Conference held in Cairo in November 1996, “the recent appointment of Ambassador Moratinos as special EU envoy to the Middle East underlines our determination to ensure that the EU’s involvement in the peace process should correspond with our long standing engagement in the region.” (Reuters 19Nov1996) A similar tone could be heard in the statements of some European foreign ministry officials interviewed for this study: “The EU’s role has for a long time been that of the payer. Israel takes the advantage of an EU contribution. […] The EU just pays the bill without having any political role.”

Israelis have traditionally viewed European assistance to the Palestinian Authority as political capital that contributes to the stability of the Territories. But the overt position of Israeli governments almost without exception has been that Europeans should not try to interfere in political dialogue.97 From

96 Interview with a Portuguese foreign ministry official, 7 May 2002.
97 Shimon Peres was known as a Europhile during his premierships, and his attitude temporarily influenced the official Israeli view to be more positive toward the EU’s political role in the region.
the Israeli point of view, as long as the EU does not treat the conflicting parties evenhandedly, the political lead is better left to the United States alone. The division of labour between Americans and Europeans should, according to Israelis, remain unchanged.

On numerous occasions, EU officials have emphasised the need for diplomatic weight equal to the Union’s economic contribution. Similar expectations can be found in the statements of some external actors.\textsuperscript{98} In this sense, giving is a way of possessing. The EU has sought, through its role as the ‘paymaster’ of the peace process, to create an obligation to be taken seriously as a political player as well. The quest for political being needs to be responded to by the others actively involved in the process, meaning primarily the conflicting parties and the United States.\textsuperscript{99} Especially those receiving the EU assistance are naturally in favour of a broader EU engagement and gladly recognise the political actoriness of the Union.\textsuperscript{100} Hence, besides Europeans, Arabs in general and especially the Palestinians encourage the EU to get actively involved in the political process. They consider it profitable to have in the process a western view ‘balancing’ the American position.\textsuperscript{101} From this perspective it is not surprising that Americans have had doubts about Moratinos’s activities, as an interviewee remarked. According to this foreign ministry official, Moratinos has affirmed that his intention is not to engage in solo ventures or to be disloyal to Americans even if they are not always aware of the content of discussions and may receive misleading information from secondary sources.\textsuperscript{102}


\textsuperscript{99} “We need recognition for the persons we take ourselves to be, and only as recognised can we conclusively come to establish an identity.” (Ringmar 1996, 13)

\textsuperscript{100} Cf. Aaltola (1999) on an ‘obligation’ that the United States and South Korea have placed on North Korea by means of humanitarian assistance. Aaltola (1999, 372-373) argues that the “tension between different but coexisting aspects of gift-giving—humanitarianism and self-interest—can be purposefully de-emphasised and distorted, allowing for crafty false appearances that can be used for a desired purpose because of the perceived goodness and morality attached to disinterested acts. […] the public image that emphasises charity and altruism is often only a facade for a complicated totality that is anything but void of political content.” See also Lepgold and Shambaugh 2002; MacFarlane and Weiss 2000.

\textsuperscript{101} Interview with the Head of the Palestinian delegation to an EU member state, 29 April 2002.

\textsuperscript{102} Interview with a Finnish foreign ministry official, 30 November 2000.
Within the 15-nation bloc, it has been particularly France that urges the Union to seek “to play a greater role in the Middle East peace process, where it is already the chief financial backer” (Reuters 28Oct1996a). The repeated references to the imbalance create a condition for interpretation that is based on imagining the object of representation in traditional terms as a complete international actor that should be taken into account also within the political sphere. The exclusion is presented as unnatural and unjust: Even Russia, whose economic actorness in the region is weaker than that of the EU’s, participates in political dialogue. It follows that giving the Union—and, more concretely, Moratinos as the bloc’s regional representative—a place at the negotiation table would normalise the situation. This would be a concrete approval of Union’s emerging political being on behalf of the significant others.

By spring 2001, Moratinos had already assessed that the EU is more deeply involved in dealing with the crisis than before and stated that “we’re not playing only on the economic side, but we’re also playing a political role” (Reuters 19Apr2001). The sense of being accepted as a political player was further strengthened by the initiative to establish a co-ordination procedure, so-called Quartet, of the United States, the EU, Russia, and the United Nations. An Israeli interviewee described the reasoning behind the Quartet in the following way:

It was Solana who invented the Quartet to create an ‘American-European initiative.’ It’s actually American initiative but to have this kind of a broad basis has influence on public opinion. There are the US, the EU, Russia, and the UN. Russia is in fact a non-player. It has no capacity. And the UN is a non-player. The UN is too biased. But for the EU this is a good chance to have a joint initiative in which Americans are the major player and the EU shares the ideas. This gives the EU a possibility to be there and to stay in the process as a political player even when people will be replaced. Solana is worth his salary: He’s putting the EU on the map as an active player.103

Depending on the perspective, it may also be concluded that Moratinos “is the one who puts the EU on the map in the peace process.”104 In any case, one point where Israeli and European sources agree to a large extent is that in the Quartet, Russia and the UN are non-players.105

103 Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002. Three Israeli sources were interviewed. In footnotes they are separated by the dates of interview.
104 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
105 Interviews with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002, and an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.
Whether the EU should accept certain limitations in its role is a matter where Israeli views collide with European ones, whereas the Arab side would be eager to see a comprehensive EU actorness, including in the political sphere. Through being politically active in external relations, the Union seeks to demonstrate that it has a functioning foreign policy being. The idea is that what the EU does tells about what it is. Motion, as Gadamer (1976, 13) reminds, is “a very special determination of being”. Even if motion or act “is not a predicate of what is moved, not a condition in which some existent being finds itself”, it is, however, an opportunity to influence the interpretation of the significant others whose recognition the ‘moving self’ needs in order to become what it claims to be.

Nonetheless, a strong performance in a particular sector is not a predicate of the comprehensive strength of the actor. Instead of being a condition for comprehensiveness, a performance in one sector, such as external economic relations, is a very special determination of international being that, theoretically speaking, does not as such justify claims to acquire space for performance in other sectors. Therefore, political motion is needed to create an ‘effectual’ interpretation corresponding to the ‘intentional’ interpretation of the EU’s political being. However, in practice the economic field has been for the EU a stage for forming political actorness. Its character planning largely happens within the economic sector where the strength has already been proved (Cf. Thompson 1991, 26). But the slowness of development of the EU’s political self has led to searching for ways to express the political being more directly. Nomination of special envoys to various conflict regions has been one way of bringing the EU’s political potential to the awareness of significant others. Successful representation can be expected to lead to changes in how the others view the EU’s political self.

The EU’s quest for a larger diplomatic role in the Middle East through the nomination of Moratinos can be seen in the light of the imbalance between economic and political spaces that the EU occupies in the region. Also in some of the interviews this was presented as a reason for appointing the special envoy, who would serve as a balancing factor and contribute to the political profile of the Union.106 But despite the obvious intention to balance the EU’s actorness by appointing a special envoy, the mandate text lacks any evidence of this sort of consideration. The mandate does not even mention the EU’s role as the biggest donor.

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In the original mandate text, Moratinos’ role and authority was not very precisely defined and yet his economic adviser was convinced that “Moratinos was from the beginning a real actor. And as such he was often on his own.” The discussion about different arrangements has continued for years concerning, for instance, the fact that Moratinos’s team reports both to the member states and the team of the High Representative Javier Solana, which may not always be the most practical way of providing information.\textsuperscript{107} This is an important question given that an icon, in order to influence the interpretation of ‘beholders,’ should be able to mediate a relatively unambiguous image of the represented.

5.2. Access to Information

Adequate information is a precondition for any purposeful action. This was taken into account already in the original formulation of Moratinos’s mandate, according to which the special envoy seeks to establish close contacts both with the conflicting parties and third parties—especially the United States. Hence, a task of the envoy was defined as creating links to other international actors and finding out their stances on various issues. Besides gathering information from the region, another function of the special envoy as an information channel is to report to the Council’s working group for the Middle East, the presidency, and the General Affairs Council. He also gives briefings to the member states’ heads of mission in the region, particularly in Tel Aviv where the special envoy’s office is located. The idea, as stated in the description of the mandate, is to inform the EU member states about the opportunities to intervene in the process and to pursue the Union’s initiatives.

Ensuring the continuity and adequacy of up-to-date information is an important function of representation. Information that the CFSP community gets from the special envoy’s team can be used to reorient the Union’s Middle East policies. Through accurate focus, the EU is believed to be able to contribute efficiently to the conditions in the Territories and even the process as a whole. Secondly, the information can be used to assess the potential threats that the conflict poses to the Union’s or its member states’ interests. The most fundamental function of information gathering is, however, neither

\textsuperscript{107} Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
reorientation of value-driven action (indexicality) nor safeguarding the member states’ interests (symbolicity). Namely, shared information is needed in seeking a communicative consensus to form a joint stance, which further contributes to the formation of an institutional identity that is the ground for value- and interest-based action.\textsuperscript{108} The special envoy as a medium between the conflict region and the EU co-ordinates the information and participates in the stance formation of the CFSP community.

As was presented in chapter three, the CFSP is an elite phenomenon, special envoys being part of it. Information sharing in the communicative process leads to an agreement within the foreign policy elite, which means a gradual integration of socialised members of the exclusive CFSP community. Integration will hardly be complete at the level of tactics or in sectors where national interests remain strong.\textsuperscript{109} Strategic considerations, in turn, may slowly become compatible, if not common, when all the members of the CFSP community share the same information and gradually develop views and responses based on that information.

Interaction is often ambiguous not only when it comes to gains and losses but also with regard to actors’ reasons to act in a certain way. Most of the time actors in world affairs do not have thorough information or adequate capabilities and time to analyse the information that is available. The time dimension gets a great emphasis in crises, to which it is often characteristic to escalate suddenly, be difficult to predict, and produce contradictory information about what is going on and why. An accurate description of such situations is usually impossible to give, but a need to define the situation quickly is often seen as a prerequisite for (re-)action and, therefore, an actor who is able to give confidently a consistent picture has good chances of convincing other actors that his interpretation is truthful and can be used as a solid ground for future decisions.

Sharing information with others is an essential feature in social learning both at individual and collective levels. Through social learning even actors


\textsuperscript{109} National interests of the United Kingdom and France seem to be particularly strong in the Middle East. Germany is an exception among big member states in the sense that its value-based considerations still seem to overshadow national self-interests. It is probable, however, that over the years Germany seeks to shake away the burden of guilt by adapting itself to the general policy guidelines of the EU that are, mainly thanks to France, considerably more critical of Israel.
seeking to maximise utility acquire new preferences and socialisation occurs in their interaction to the extent that they may develop joint actoriness. (Checkel 2001) A collective identity is not a once-and-for-all construction but develops in the course of interaction that shapes visions of the world. The said concerns also the EU and its member states’ views on the Middle East conflict. The possibility that Moratinos has actually brought the member states’ positions closer to one another was mentioned in some interviews. An Italian official remarked that “Moratinos has been for a long time in the field and he has got the first hand information. So to a certain extent, he has the capacity to influence our opinion formation.”110 His French colleague also observed that the “[p]ositions of the member states are much closer now. Berlin declaration was a good example of that. […] Moratinos had an important role in this. We tend to find now agreement on the content of the possible solution. On tactics there are, of course, sometimes disagreements between the member states.”111 On the other hand, the fact that Moratinos’s position lacks political weight was mentioned as a factor that diminishes his opportunities to influence the member states’ divergent positions. In this respect, Solana’s higher political status gives him the means to better influence the member states.

Referring to both Moratinos’s and Solana’s teams, the head of the delegation of the European Commission in Lebanon, Patrick Renauld has said that “these delegations come to the Middle East to be informed and try to build a common attitude and it’s through the information that we get on the spot that we will be able to speak together with our colleagues in Brussels and build a common approach to this thing” (Reuters 28Jan2002). According to the Austrian interviewee, in turn, the presence of Moratinos and the information he has provided have not had a great significance to the harmonisation of the member states’ stances,112 and this is what one would also conclude by observing the individual performances of the fifteen in the Middle East. On the other hand, however, firm common statements such as Berlin declaration would not have been possible without certain rapprochement in member states’ positions.

The effects of shared information on the CFSP community to co-ordinate and harmonise divergent national views and to ensure continuity of the Union’s Middle East policies may thus be debated. But what was acknowledged by nearly all European interviewees was the basic idea that the kind of

110 Interview with an Italian foreign ministry official, 8 May 2002. About the influence of the CFSP in general on opinion formation in individual member states, see Glarbo 2001.

111 Interview with a French foreign ministry official, 10 May 2002.

112 E-mail interview with an Austrian foreign ministry official, 16 May 2002.
representation that Moratinos was nominated for is a useful channel to acquire information and distribute it among the CFSP community. As a senior Irish foreign ministry official stated, “there was a need for a permanent representation. Small countries, like Ireland, are dependent on the common organs or institutes that provide information. According to a recent listing, Ireland is one of the most globalised countries in the world, but it has very limited resources to maintain relations worldwide.”

In the interviews, the bigger member states were generally assessed to be less dependent on the special representative in getting information and visibility, a noticeable exception being the Portuguese interviewee who claimed that the idea that small member states somehow need information from Moratinos is a joke, because all the needed information can be provided by the embassy in Tel Aviv and national representation in Ramallah. But as the Palestinian interviewee remarked, Moratinos has access to levels that ambassadors do not have. Hence, better access to information is a clear advantage of having a special envoy in the conflict region.

Strong presidencies such as France are evidently less dependent on the Council Secretariat that prepares papers and reports for the presidency. The big EU member states have a comprehensive web of embassies with relatively numerous staff and they get up-to-date information from the region through their own diplomatic representations. Small countries, in turn, give more space to Moratinos and his team. And yet, to be big does not equal being aware of everything that is going on. As the Irish interviewee remarked, despite the information gathering capacity of the French and the British, they missed the point when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. The French interviewee agreed that “Moratinos is the only one who participates in the negotiations on the EU’s behalf. […] So, also the bigger member states have to rely on Moratinos’s information.”

The member states’ officials seemed to be generally content with the information provided by Moratinos’s reports on the general course of events in the region but, on the other hand, there was some dissatisfaction concerning the frequency of his occasional reports that are delivered to the three different levels in the Council, i.e. the working group, the Political Committee, and the

113 Interview with an Irish foreign ministry official, 14 January 2002.
114 Interview with a Portuguese foreign ministry official, 7 May 2002.
115 E-mail interview with the Head of the Palestinian delegation to an EU member state, 23 June 2002.
116 Interview with an Irish foreign ministry official, 14 January 2002.
117 Interview with a French foreign ministry official, 10 May 2002.
Moratinos’s ability to maintain contacts with conflicting parties and gather information were not questioned although different opinions were expressed about his usefulness in the EU’s Middle East policy making. There was also some criticism concerning communication with the presidency. A Finnish official argued that the member state holding presidency is not always aware of Moratinos’s moves, although the idea is that the special envoy works under the presidency. If the presidency and the Council do not manage to co-ordinate emphatically the work of special envoys, the Council working groups appear as tools of special envoys rather than vice versa, i.e. contrary to the original purpose of nominations.

From the Portuguese perspective, the advantage of having a special representative is limited to maintaining the connections that Moratinos and his team have managed to create in the conflict region. The nomination of Solana for the position of the High Representative has changed the composition so that “without intifada there would be no raison d’être for Moratinos” and “in the future, we don’t need a special envoy in the Middle East.” Hence, according to this interpretation, Moratinos’s duty was to fill in the gap of representation until Solana was nominated and the Union’s visibility at a higher level guaranteed. Yet, it is quite clear as Moratinos’s economic adviser remarked that without a special envoy and his team on the ground “Solana can’t deal with details because he deals with the whole world. He can’t have time and resources enough to be all the time updated of every detail about what is going on in the Middle East.”

Moratinos’s advisers stressed the importance of knowing people on the ground and having daily contacts with people all over the region. Their view confirms the claim of Ross (2002, 77) that “[d]irect, face-to-face contact has no substitute.” Palestinians also hold as valuable the connections that Moratinos has managed to create and maintain. The British interviewee recognised that “Moratinos has access and ability to create relationships and to encourage the parties. He is not being identified with certain member states.

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118 Interview with an Irish foreign ministry official, 14 January 2002.
119 Interview with a Finnish foreign ministry official, 30 November 2000.
120 Interview with a Portuguese foreign ministry official, 7 May 2002.
121 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002. A French foreign ministry official expressed a similar opinion; interview 10 May 2002.
122 Interviews with Moratinos’s political adviser, Christian Jouret, 31 May 2002 and economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
123 Interview with the Head of the Palestinian delegation to an EU member state, 29 April 2002.
Therefore he’s been able to step over certain obstacles and pick up information when nobody else was doing that.”\textsuperscript{124} Also in the Austrian foreign ministry, the information provided by Moratinos and his team on the ground was appreciated.\textsuperscript{125}

On the other hand, Israelis feel that as a field person Moratinos is sometimes “detached from the broader political picture”.\textsuperscript{126} Especially indiscretion in certain sensitive issue has sometimes put the performance of Moratinos in a negative light. One such incident took place in spring 2002 when Chairman Yasser Arafat was under siege in Ramallah. At Moratinos’s recommendation Solana and Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Piquet decided that it would be advantageous to have a face-to-face discussion with Arafat during their visit to the region. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon did not, however, allow them to meet Arafat. It followed that Solana and Piquet cancelled their scheduled meeting with Sharon—again on Moratinos’s recommendation. The Palestinian interviewee interpreted the incident as a “humiliation to the dignity of the delegation”\textsuperscript{127} while from the Israeli perspective it was nothing but Moratinos’s error of judgement, a failure to take into account the broader context.\textsuperscript{128}

Despite some disagreements among the interviewed EU member state officials, it was generally acknowledged that receiving information is important for policy making, and information gathering is one of Moratinos’s central tasks as was declared already in the original text of his mandate. However, in the mandate text the explicit use of the information would be to advance the peace process, not to strengthen the international identity of the Union. But maintaining contacts and exchanging information serves also the iconic purpose of representation. Whether at the ambassadorial or more political level, Union-wide representation in the Middle East was considered necessary by most people, for establishing relations with Israeli and Palestinian negotiators is a precondition for political actorness in the region. The European interviewees in general seemed to agree on the point that an important element of Moratinos’s performance has been to create and maintain contacts as well as to gather information. In this sense, he conforms to Fisher’s (1990, 237) definition, according to which ambassadors, envoys and attachés are “transmitters of

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\textsuperscript{124} Interview with a British foreign ministry official, 27 January 2002.
\textsuperscript{125} E-mail interview with an Austrian foreign ministry official, 16 May 2002.
\textsuperscript{126} Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.
\textsuperscript{127} Interview with the Head of the Palestinian delegation to an EU member state, 29 April 2002.
\textsuperscript{128} Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.
messages”. For what purposes and how effectively the information is then used is another question. As long as the focus is merely on reporting to the EU on the developments in the process and the stances of the conflicting parties, the decision makers in the conflict region are taken as objects of information rather than subjects of communication. The communicative element requires that there is a communicative subject also on the European side. (On communication, see Gudykunst 1990) How the special envoy is able to influence the formation process of the ‘communicating European subject’ by contributing to the coherence and continuity of the Union’s actorness will be discussed in the following two subchapters.

5.3.

**COHERENCE** 129

The informal Commission document presented at the Luxembourg General Affairs Council in October 1996 points to the need “to get all the Member States to make a firmer commitment not to stray from a policy of common action, strengthened by previous, systematic consultations” and goes on to criticise the state of the Union’s foreign policy: “to put roughly, the Union lacks firmness, does not react quickly, is not coherent and cannot do what it says”. (Reuters 30Oct1996a) Against this background, it is easy to understand that the EU was eager to create a new instrument to act in a more co-ordinated manner in the Middle East. The appointment was to “help increase the coherence and efficiency of Europe’s action,” as the French foreign ministry spokesman, Jacques Rummelhardt, said. (Reuters 29Oct1996b)

Among the fifteen, France is often seen as the most individualistic actor on the world stage. At the same time, it is France that is the leading proponent of a common European foreign policy. Instead of keeping just a façade of European unity, France has insisted on translating the ambitious paper exercises into a substantial unity among the EU member states. The French ambition to strengthen the joint political actorness in the Middle East is partly due to the irritation that “the United States has made much of the running, leaving the EU to act as bankroller.” French Foreign Minister, Herve de Charette, saw the

129 Cf. chapter 2.2. where we state that “collective identity as the foundation of meaning for the members of the collective can be seen to be composed of three elements: consciousness, continuity and otherness.”

169
appointment of the special envoy as underlining the EU commitment to the Middle East. He declared that “[i]t is good news for Europe, it is good news for the Middle East and, I hope, it is good news for peace”. His German counterpart Klaus Kinkel was more down-to-earth in his assessment of the bloc’s capabilities to make a difference in the region. “Germany believes that Europe should not overestimate its role. It should coordinate closely with the United States,” Kinkel said. (Reuters 28Oct1996b)

When beginning his work as the Middle East envoy, Moratinos envisioned the work delegated to him in the following way: “I imagine my mandate will be to try to contribute as one European voice to bringing the positions of the parties closer together and to try to contribute to the negotiations staying on course and concluding happily.” (Reuters 28Oct1996c) Even if the emphasis of his statement was on the concrete results in terms of the peace negotiations, it is clear that without an effort to raise a united European voice there would be not much chance for Europeans to contribute as one to the course of the process. Thus the underlying aim is to show that the EU actually is a united front and has a common voice in Middle East policies.

The formulation of Moratinos’s mandate carefully avoids mentioning the EU’s quest for a role as a mediator in the bilateral negotiations. But the mandate does not exclude the possibility that in the near future the bloc might seek to intervene in bilateral talks. The text is obviously a compromise between the French ambition to offer an alternative to the US mediating role and the German position that the United States is the leading third party with whom the fifteen should work in close collaboration. The Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring among others has emphasised that the representative’s mandate is complementary to the role played by the United States (Reuters 29Oct1996a). These statements reflect the lack of coherence in the European stances and implicitly denote the idea that a relatively coherent institutional identity is expected to be founded before a true contribution can be made through a representative.

The three most significant formers of the bloc’s Middle East policy besides the Commission, i.e. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, ensured the continuation of their full-weight participation also during Moratinos’s term of office. The close circle around the Spanish special envoy consisted for a long time of three main advisers: a French political adviser, a German economic adviser, and a British security adviser. Not only does the composition reflect the position of certain member states within the Union but it also clearly indicates the sectors of national importance. France is the single most important member state in drafting the EU’s political guidelines for the Middle East, while Germany’s position as the economic motor of the Union authorised it as
the guardian of the economic dimension in the team of the Middle East envoy. The United Kingdom, then, is the Union’s bridge to the United States and Israel. The security dimension is constantly present in the conflict, and choosing a British security adviser with appropriate background made it easier for Israelis to accept the idea of a limited European presence beyond the economic sphere. As the identity formation involves continuous negotiations with the significant others, it is understandable that the demands of the big member states as well as sensitivities for the conflicting parties are taken into account to a certain extent.

An interviewee characterised Moratinos as an “intermediary between big countries”. His analysis was that the EU member states “have different approaches because of different interests and history and ambitions. And Mr Moratinos can bridge these differences. […] he functions as someone combining the different perspectives.” The special envoy’s economic adviser confirmed that “Moratinos’s task has been to try to find a unified position between the member states.” The composition of the team is not accidental but echoes the state-level relations. The colonial background of France and the UK in the Middle East makes them ‘natural’ participants in the closest circle, while Spain’s longstanding visibility in the peace process and the Mediterranean region as a whole has prepared the ground for its firm position among the EU member states. Despite the fact that Germany also has national interests in the Middle East, its approach differs from other big EU member states. Germany carries the guilt of the Holocaust and, for the time being, considers it necessary to maintain a strong foothold in the formation of the EU’s Middle East policy that would look considerably more pro-Arab without the German contribution.

Despite many positive assessments, not everyone has been pleased with choosing a Spaniard as the special envoy. A senior Northern European official complained half a year after Moratinos’s nomination that “[y]ou cannot but help getting the view that a Spanish mafia is at work in the EU’s Mediterranean policy – but this reflects the fact that they take it very seriously and lobby furiously to get their people into jobs”. (Reuters 28Apr1997) Also an interviewee argued that “the Spanish feel that they are a kind of ‘owners of the Middle East’” and “[w]hat comes to the role of Moratinos, the EU member states are not united behind him.” Another official confirmed that the strong Spanish presence is not to everyone’s taste. He said that Moratinos has sought to broaden the mandate through his action in practice. For example, his

130 Interview with a Portuguese foreign ministry official, 7 May 2002.
131 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
132 Interview with an Irish foreign ministry official, 14 January 2002.
performance in security co-operation angered the British during their presidency in the first half of 1998. On the other hand, the interviewee assumed that the reserve on the part of the UK may have been due to the fact that the British ex-ambassador to Amman was also a candidate for the position of special envoy. Thus there has been certain extra friction in the relationship between the British and Moratinos.133

Contrary to many other observers, the Secretary-General of the Palestinian Council of Ministers, Ahmad Abd al-Rahman, saw already in early 1997 an existing “European voice and consensus” in Middle East policies (Reuters 18Mar1997a). The Palestinian view is a textbook example of the following observation of Jervis (1976, 329): “actors will tend to perceive the behavior of subordinates and agents of the other side (e.g. ambassadors, low-level officials) as carrying out the other’s official policy. Actors underestimate the degree and frequency of violations of the spirit and letter of instructions.” Or lack of instructions, we could add. However, the fact that Moratinos’s team is coherent and able to formulate initiatives or ease tension in an acute confrontation between the parties does not yet tell much about the coherence of the Union, even if it does give the impression of a relatively coherent actorness.

Almost concurrently with the statement of Ahmad Abd al-Rahman, Reuters observed that “EU efforts are handicapped by squabbles among member states over how much political muscle they need to flex to nudge Israel and its Arab neighbours towards a final peace. France has been most outspoken on the need to carve out deeper regional influence.” (Reuters 26Mar1997) By that time, Moratinos’s emphasis had also shifted from the concrete results in the conflict region to the need to define a unified European stance: “My idea is to come from what has been perceived as European cacophony with what I can qualify as a European symphony.” He considered the fact that both de Charette and Kinkel had asked him to brief them before they started their trips to the Middle East as a proof that “the mechanism is working perfectly”. (Reuters 26Mar1997)

The better co-ordination and shared information among member states did not, however, lead directly to a strong and unified EU contribution to advancing the peace process. Instead, the influence of Moratinos’s performance has primarily been inward-oriented. As an interviewee expressed it, “[t]he existence of the mission is achievement in itself.”134 Even if the idea of Moratinos’s function as an opinion leader was brought up in one interview,135

133 Interview with a Finnish foreign ministry official, 30 November 2000.
134 Interview with Moratinos’s political adviser, Christian Jouret, 31 May 2002.
135 Interview with an Italian foreign ministry official, 8 May 2002.
the general sense of the special envoy’s influence was probably best grasped in a sentence by the British interviewee: “The practical considerations on Moratinos’s nomination have been a mixture of ‘doesn’t do any harm’ and gains at the beginning.”136 The gains were mainly related to the visibility of the Union as an entity, although the presence of Moratinos also enabled the Union to complement American efforts that led to the signing of the Hebron Protocol in January 1997.137

The continuing US domination of the peace process has often been a source of frustration for the Europeans who seek to balance their economic stakes with greater political influence. One reason for the failure to increase the political weight has undoubtedly been the lack of visibility of EU action, partly due to the Union’s inability to attract media attention, but a much more important reason for the continuation of imbalance between economic and political spheres is the lack of coherence and the poor co-ordination of policies both between the member states and within the institutional framework. The nomination of a special envoy was thought to make it easier to overcome interinstitutional and interstate rivalry and lack of co-ordination.

Despite the obvious difficulties, a British official characterised Moratinos as “the catalyst for the coherence”.138 This concerns not only the fact that through him all the member states get the same up-to-date information to form an opinion but also the ideas about what questions the Union should focus on, meaning that Moratinos can advise the member states to pay attention to certain issues, such as Palestinian refugees, the importance and urgency of which he sees due to the first hand information his team gets on the ground. This kind of agenda setting can further contribute to the strengthening of the joint EU actorness to the extent that the special envoy manages to activate the potential that the Union has for dealing with the issues that the bloc’s representative has asked the member states to pay attention to.

The need to engage at the Union level and on a daily basis was emphasised in some interviews. The coherence of member states’ Middle East policies is expected to be ensured through Moratinos’s team also due to the fact that he is dependent on the resources provided by the member states. As was mentioned above, the staff of his team is seconded from member states’ foreign ministries,

137 This agreement is further discussed in chapter six. The agreement provided for the partial redeployment of Israeli troops from Hebron and a timetable for future redeployments in the West Bank. Moratinos’s work behind the scenes and his letter of assurances to Arafat in the name of the EU persuaded Arafat to sign the agreement. See e.g. Peters 2000.
which can be interpreted either as an engagement of member states to the common endeavour or a need to control the doings of Moratinos. The British interviewee emphasised the former, saying that seconding skilled foreign ministry officials to the EU is a proof that individual member states are committed to a common foreign policy in the Middle East. Yet the existence of the latter element can be discovered when the composition of the team is considered.

The creation of this common foreign policy tool has not diminished the French fascination with highlighting the national input. For example, in 1998, two different proposals were discussed simultaneously within the EU, one drafted by the French and Egyptians and the other one by Moratinos. Regardless of how this looked to individual EU member states, not to mention outside actors, European officials maintained that “[t]here is no need to put up a competing process […] What we need to avoid at all costs is a diplomatic vacuum.” (Reuters 01Oct1998)

Yet a motivating factor behind the French initiative clearly was that France is in a deep disagreement with the United States and some ‘less pro-Palestinian’ member states of the EU. France does not try to hide its dislike of what it considers the Americans’ unconditional support for Israel. A characterisation of France’s position in another member state was that France

is very enthusiastic in its policies but very pro-Arab. It has historical interests in the Arab world. Chirac said in his election campaign that Europe needs to have a more balanced picture of the Middle East so that the Israeli interests are also taken into account, but that was just talk. In the long term, there will hardly be any changes in his or French stance.140

French President Jacques Chirac presented his stance in a very expressive manner in autumn 1996 during his visit to Israel and the Territories. He used the occasion to publicly criticise the Israeli government while the EU troika simultaneously conducted quieter diplomacy in the region.

Another incident in the Middle East demonstrated that lack of coherence is not merely an interinstitutional or interstate matter. In many cases the rivalry is visible also within a single member state. States like Finland141 and France where the strong presidency has traditionally problematised the power relations between the head of state and the head of government are especially vulnerable in this respect. During the cohabitation in France, there was friction between the socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and the Gaullist Chirac. The tension burst out in incidents such as the one in February 2000 when Jospin during his

139 Interview with a British foreign ministry official, 27 January 2002.
140 Interview with a Portuguese foreign ministry official, 7 May 2002.
visit to the Middle East declared that France condemns all terrorist attacks, including those of Hizbollah. According to Chirac this statement was in apparent contradiction to French foreign policy. (Reuters 29Feb2000) The enduring inter- and intrastate tensions are a major obstacle to the formulation of coherent external policies at the Union level. Organisational problems are also present in relations between the foreign ministries of the EU member states that have research units to gather information and develop ideas but do not co-operate with each other142.

While the Quai d’Orsay seeks to give a shape to European Middle East policies, the British government is as firmly as ever with the United States. Nonetheless, the British interviewee asserted that British policies are in line with the CFSP endeavour in the Middle East: “It is unfair to say that the UK doesn’t conform to the EU policies or that it’s following more the United States. At the beginning there was a concern the [special envoy’s] role wouldn’t be properly defined but if that was the case we wouldn’t have seconded two people to his office.”143 But whatever the official statements are, it goes almost without saying that in practice the United Kingdom rather conforms to the US stances than the French-led European cacophony.144 For Moratinos, the political distance between the big member states has meant that he has to balance between the different positions. An interviewee described Moratinos’s tricky situation in the following way: “He tries to avoid confrontation with the UK and the US. If not, he would be ignored by the UK, and we can’t ignore the UK in turn.”145

141 The new constitution was adopted in Finland in March 2000. It weakened the position of the president in foreign policy matters but it still states that the “foreign policy of Finland is directed by the President of the Republic in co-operation with the Government” (Ministry of Justice Finland 2000). Finland and France are the only EU member states where ‘double representation’ is a standard in the European Council meetings.

142 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.

143 Interview with a British foreign ministry official, 27 January 2002.

144 An Israeli analysis describes the independent French policies as “confusing – if not downright infuriating – for those who are happy to be supportive of American efforts or of the more modestly-conceived Moratinos mission. While some would argue that it was precisely this sort of independent French activism that helped motivate the EU to appoint Moratinos, and that impels the US and the EU to pursue their efforts with greater energy, it is nevertheless seen as disruptive by both Jerusalem and Washington.” (Alpher 2000, 201)

145 Interview with a Portuguese foreign ministry official, 7 May 2002.
Germany is still deeply encumbered by its past. Even if the government held up arms sales as Israel reoccupied Palestinian cities and towns in the spring of 2002, it could not have accepted the suspension of the EU’s preferential trade accord with Israel as was suggested by some other member states and a narrow majority of the European parliament in April 2002. The “well-known reasons” for Germany’s exceptional Middle East policies were mentioned also in some interviews.\footnote{146} The Middle East is a particularly delicate issue in Germany, where history would make it difficult to conform to a European Middle East policy having a visibly French touch.

Of the other member states, Silvio Berlusconi’s Italy has sought to be in tune with President George W. Bush while Greece has sought to contribute to the creation of a European view. The warm relations between Turkey and Israel have been a concern to Greece whose Deputy Foreign Minister Yannis Kranidiotis said Greece believed that the Turkish-Israeli agreement to hold joint military exercises “changes the balance in the area and undermines peace and stability” (Reuters 15Jul1997). Some small countries like Belgium, Finland and Ireland, in turn, do not seek to profile themselves as overtly active individual states. They were even said to feel that they owe something to Europe and therefore work hard to “pay back and show credibility or be trustworthy in the eyes of big member states”\footnote{147}.

To achieve a common stance in particular foreign policy issues, not to mention the EU’s development into a unified body in external appearances, is not an easy task. Moratinos’s political adviser, Christian Jouret, described the dilemma in the following way:

When you are in London or Rome or Paris or Berlin, you don’t see the Middle East how it is. In these conditions, when you have to take a common position or formulate an initiative you have to reduce the expectations to deliver something.

And further,

\[ \text{When Europe makes a declaration, for example, about Jenin, Germany can’t always agree for obvious reasons. The UK and France have their strong national positions on certain issues. When you deal with the Middle East - - when you} \]

\footnote{146} E.g. interview with a Portuguese foreign ministry official, 7 May 2002. I assume that it might have also been due to these ‘well-known reasons’ that all three German foreign ministry officials who I contacted to request an interview refused or ignored the request. There were no similar difficulties in arranging any of the other interviews.

\footnote{147} Interview with an Irish foreign ministry official, 14 January 2002.
want to criticise Lebanon, a French diplomat tries to convince you that it’s not the way you see it. That it’s much more complicated and you need to have a historical understanding, and all that. That it’s so fragile and complicated political system, and so on. You can be sure.148

The lack of coherence among the fifteen makes people in the Middle East, and especially in Israel, sceptical about what the EU can do outside of its economic functions. Or, as the late Yitzhak Rabin had asked some European politicians, “Why should we Israelis trust you when even your own house is not in order?”149 From the Israeli perspective, the coherence of the Union lies primarily in the functions of the Commission and those of the General Affairs Council and Solana in political questions, not so much in the work of Moratinos and his team. Nonetheless, Israel seems to appreciate the work of Moratinos’s team of field persons, especially the security adviser Alastair Crooke.150

Looking from the Middle East, the incoherence of the EU member states’ foreign policies often appears so that “[t]hey agree on general guidelines but not on details”151. It is mainly the declaratory policy that gives an image of a relative coherence. In practice, the member states still largely seem to act on their own,152 and there are clear differences between the EU presidencies153. And yet, on various occasions, it has been emphasised that in the Middle East more than anywhere the EU is seeking to create a common foreign policy. In some assessments the Union was also seen to be relatively unitary in the Middle East in comparison with other regions where the EU tries to speak with one voice.154 Yet there are clear difficulties in finding an agreement among member states that have very different approaches and national interests at stake. The impact of these differences on the common foreign policy identity is undeniable.

Not only is there tension in relations between the member states but also between the EU institutions. As Moratinos’s political adviser put it, “[w]e have ‘border problems’ in the EU—not concerning physical borders but borders of representation between Solana and Patten. It is difficult to define where the

148 Interview with Moratinos’s political adviser, Christian Jouret, 31 May 2002.
149 Interview with an Israeli source, 26 May 2002.
150 Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.
151 Interview with a senior official in the GCC, 23 January 2002
152 Interview with Prince Saud bin Abdullah bin Abdul Rahman, Head of the Department for Palestine Affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, 21 January 2002.
153 Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.
154 E.g. interview with an Israeli source, 26 May 2002.
‘Green Line’ in their relation is, where the external relations end and the CFSP begins.”¹⁵⁵ The economic adviser of the special envoy paid attention to the same problem and blamed the member states for not being willing to find a solution to interinstitutional stalemates: “It’s difficult to find an agreement when the member states want to keep them apart. It’s the old ‘divide and rule’ principle.”¹⁵⁶ The Commission’s relations with Israel have long been inflamed, whereas Moratinos has worked to make the Union show more flexibility. (Reuters 23Jul1998) But the flexibility of an incoherent actor is not likely to increase its influence, a fact that Moratinos has also recognised. He has concluded that “we have to take into account also that we have certain position, like have been expressed by the European Council and we have to stick to that” (Reuters 21Jan1999; see also Pernice and Thym 2002).

Some similar, although maybe less serious, ‘border problems’ can be seen in the co-operation of Moratinos’s team and Solana’s bureau, especially when it comes to sharing information.¹⁵⁷ From an Israeli perspective, the EU’s institutional difficulties are rather a reason to applaud than regret: “Moratinos, Solana, Patten—they are all continuously there. The EU position is not very positive towards Israel. Sometimes they are puzzled, confused, disagree, which is not a negative aspect from our point of view because it’s not really Israel who takes the EU as the most important actor.”¹⁵⁸ In iconic terms, representation gives shape to collective awareness by making objects of representation accessible but the multiple representation evidently confuses the image of a collective actor when the representatives are not able to find a unitary position. Further, insufficient coherence in collective identity handicaps practical policy making.

5.4.
CONTINUITY

Besides the impact on coherence, the nomination of Moratinos was expected to bring a sense of continuity to the Union’s political actoriness in the region

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Moratinos’s political adviser, Christian Jouret, 31 May 2002. Also interview with a French foreign ministry official, 10 May 2002.
¹⁵⁶ Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
¹⁵⁷ Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
¹⁵⁸ Interview with an Israeli source, May 2002.
and thereby contribute to the Union’s identity formation: “Nomination of Mr Moratinos meant continuous engagement at the EU level. […] The function is ‘filling in the gaps’ between interests of the European ministers but also provide more continuous approach of the EU.”159 The change of presidency every six month has caused the Union’s approach to intergovernmental affairs to change twice a year. Before the modification of external representation, it was the responsibility of the member state holding the presidency to oversee the CFSP and act as the mouthpiece of the Union on the global stage. Co-ordinating member states’ positions at international conferences and negotiations was also regarded as a duty of the presidency. (See Bonvicini 1998, 67-68)

The fifteen member states differ in size, international experience, views, visions, prestige, administrative capacity, necessary resources in terms of information provided, and so on,160 but regardless of the national capacities, six months in office is hardly ever enough to make a profound impact on the general direction of EU policies. The complex machinery is slow and resistant to sudden changes. In addition, the partial overlap in the Commission’s and the Council’s responsibilities makes it difficult to change direction in CFSP matters due to the continuity that the ‘external affairs’ in the Commission’s guidance has. (Cameron 1998a) Nevertheless, the rotation guarantees a balance between small and big member states and provides an opportunity to bring issues of national interests to the top of the EU agenda.

Despite the advantages that the rotating presidency brings, it also means short-range policy making due to the fact that different presidencies have different interests to promote. This lack of perseverance has frustrated partners in the Middle East. Hence, both the team of Moratinos and some member state officials emphasised that “Moratinos’s task has been to overcome the inconsistency and provide continuity for the EU involvement.”161 One interviewee remarked that “[i]t is actually only Moratinos who is continuously present.”162 Also Israelis, who generally view European attempts to seize political space with certain suspicion, agreed on this point. An Israeli source

159 Interview with a British foreign ministry official, 27 January 2002.
160 Ireland, for example, lacks an intelligence-gathering system and a pool of foreign policy experts and it has, therefore, been joked that its most useful role in international relations lies in occupying the seat between Iraq and Israel at international gatherings. However, Ireland won widespread respect for its presidency in the first half of 1990.
161 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002. See also Moratinos’s personal view in Reuters 03Jun1999.
162 Interview with a French foreign ministry official, 10 May 2002.
expressed the opinion that “it doesn’t matter what the presidency is when it’s about the people in the field. [...] who you deal with gives the impression of how the policy is.”

Continuity is important not only because of its impact on the practical results in terms of the external opportunity to act but also with regard to how the represented actor itself as well as the other participants see the acting self. The question is about creating a relatively stable image of the self. The place where the construction of the self is situated is not merely an identifiable frame of time and space but includes references to past experiences, human relations, attitudes, and so on. These contextual factors are “constitutive of the way the world presents itself to the subject and by the same token they help to constitute the subject himself” (Winch 1987, 22). Continuity is an elementary feature of collective institutional identity, without which it would be impossible to understand the essence of the institutional being:

When we reason about a continuum – about time or a continuous process – we use existential quantifiers to pick out parts of the continuum and we reason about the relational properties of the elements that we refer to. So to speak, we find a relational structure in the continuum and that provides a focus of our reasoning. However, no one relational structure captures the nature of the continuum […] The relational structures we reason about are, in a sense, determined by the nature of the continuum we are reasoning about, but they do not exhaust its character.

(Hookway 1992, 178)

Various operative forms of the Union, such as working groups, committees, meetings at different levels, and summits, can be seen as a means to co-ordinate and combine different ‘excerpts’ of the Union’s being and different ways of telling the existence story of a common foreign policy. The often repeated aspiration of the Union is to ‘speak with one voice’ in its external relations that are seen to be significant in terms of anticipated effects. This idea translates to the strengthening of togetherness, meaning the sense of having (and willingness to have) a common past, common present, and common fate. The co-ordination procedures furthermore strengthen the commitment to a particular vision of things. A common vision of things is a basic requirement for actors with different identities and interests to be able to agree on how and what kind of a story they are telling together.

163 Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002. See also Girard 1994.
164 See Ringmar 1996, 72. According to him, we obtain a whole vocabulary for talking about certain things when we commit ourselves to a particular vision of those things. See also March and Olsen 1989, 127.
The narrative construction of self emphasises intentionality in the sense that “the link between intention and execution is always rendered in narrative form. […] We tell ourselves what kind of a person we were/are/will be; what kind of a situation we were/are/will be in; and what such people as ourselves are likely to do under these particular circumstances” (Ringmar 1996, 73). Coherence of the story is of particular importance during the process of identity formation where a fixed form of being is still lacking. As was discussed in chapter two, the basic conditions for having identity are consciousness (meaning awareness of existence of a coherent self), continuity, and otherness. Continuity makes the present appear as meaningful from the historical perspective and provides a means to establish guidelines for future actorness.

Narration means creating a meaningful whole of what has been and what has happened, and linking it to the present as well as possible future events. This, however, is not merely a description of past events but also the active reconstruction of these events from the narrator’s present position. Stories about social reality often enclose the future as well so far as it is thought to be possible to predict and manage events-to-come. This is an elementary feature of stories about the reality of international relations, be they reports, conventions, agreements, decisions, or anything alike as long as they can be identified as episodes that take into account some past events and the current state of affairs, on the basis of which they give guidelines for the preferred way of thinking and acting in given circumstances. Yet, despite the narrative element that even declarations entail, they have difficulties in creating a sense of active participation. Rather than shaping actively the environment, declarations and statements usually are reactions to compelling external events.165

One of the iconic functions of the special envoy can be seen in his capability to present the Union’s actorness as a continuum instead of a collection of six-month terms or sporadic reactions to circumstances that demand to be noticed. Contrary to declaratory policy, the presence of the special envoy enables relatively stable guidelines to be formed. This makes it potentially easier to maintain an idea of a coherent being behind the representative. As representative is supposed to refer to an object that is already there, continuation of representation implicitly denotes that the represented object also has continuity

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165 Consider, for instance, the presidency declaration on behalf of the EU on 20 April 2002 (European Union 2002c), where the Union “urgently calls for”, “stresses”, “calls upon all parties”, “warns”, and “repeats the need for concerted and sustained international action” as a reaction to the tense situation in the Territories without managing however to decide on any practical act to ease the tension.
and, therefore, can have an identity on the conditions that it is relatively coherent and can be distinguished from what it is not, i.e. the other. Ringmar (1996, 75) reminds that “actors exist only in the narratives they tell about themselves or that are told about them. […] stories are governed by narratological, not ontological, requirements.” Hence, for the EU as an international actor, it is important to have a relatively consistent story of its Middle East policies. Continuous representation was established through the nomination of the special envoy. His presence was expected to give the Union a continuity that is a condition for institutional identity to emerge.

In practice, acting subjects as representatives or expressions of their institutional background are constructed in the process of interaction. Represented collective subjects are provided with an institutional identity in that interactive process which is made significant by representatives who, by their performance, create a narrative about the institutional being. This circular construction process both creates conditions for a certain interpretation and is kept going thanks to the interpretation favourable to the coming-into-being of the renewed identity. But in this process, “[t]he fate of the storytellers is affected by the credibility of their stories in front of critical audience” (Banerjee 1998, 193).

It can be debated whether or not the presence of a special envoy is able to maintain a political profile that would have an enduring effect on interpretations by the other international actors with whom the EU interacts through its representative. In any case, in the view of a Finnish interviewee among others, a purpose of the nomination was to guarantee the continuity of the Union’s activities in the region. Even after Solana was nominated in Sharm el-Sheikh to represent the EU’s views on observation and prevention of confrontations, the role of Moratinos’s team remained strong because it took a relatively long time for Solana’s team to become operational.166 The political status of High Representative is higher than that of special envoys whose performances are geographically constrained. On the other hand, it can be said that the intensity of contacts that special envoys maintain is high compared to the work of the High Representative whose field of action is the whole world. Consequently, the sense of continuity in the field depends to a large extent on the performances of special envoys.

166 Interview with a Finnish foreign ministry official, 30 November 2000.
Soon after the Hebron agreement in 1997, the then Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, said:

Even in the worst crises, Europe no longer adopts a radical line, but rather we maintain a dialogue, including with the special envoy, [Miguel] Moratinos in Israel. This is very important. […] Second, Europe understands and accepts the principle that too many cooks spoil the broth and that there is one chief cook, the United States, as far as attempts to help, or mediate when necessary, go. Therefore the fact that Europe is coordinating its positions not only with us or with the Arabs, but also with the United States, is good for Israel. Those are the two changes which, in my opinion, have brought about a more balanced European stance and mark the abandonment of its traditional megaphone policy, in which European officials would step up to the microphone and voice what were generally one-sided statements against Israel.

(Reuters 14Apr1997)

However, interviews with some Israeli sources in the midst of the second intifada indicated that Netanyahu’s estimation about the EU’s readiness to settle for a secondary position was misplaced, at least when it comes to the ‘downs’ of the EU-Israeli relation that, according to an interviewee, reflects the ups and downs of the peace process. The EU seeks to establish a firm political position for which Israel clearly is on the alert. During the ‘ups’ of the peace process, the Israeli stance has been less articulate, for at those times the EU has not had a reason to express as provoking opinions as during setbacks and increased confrontation in the region. For the visibility of the Union, the periods of violence are most advantageous because they create an opportunity for it to profile itself as an actor and thereby (re-)construct foreign policy identity. More peaceful periods, in turn, do not give a reason to intensify direct political involvement. Instead, they provide favourable conditions for increasing economic co-operation and development aid, invigorating cultural relations, and establishing inter-societal relations at different levels.

The EU special representative to the Middle East peace process was appointed at the time of unrest after the Hasmonean tunnel was opened in the Old City of Jerusalem. Especially President Chirac was advocating for EU representation in the Middle East. During the nomination process in 1996, the idea of appointing a political figure was presented but no unanimity was reached

167 Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.
and therefore it was decided that the representation would be given to someone of a lower status. Despite higher ambitions in France, French Foreign Minister de Charette indicated that the Council’s decision was a “good omen for the Common Foreign and Security Policy” (Reuters 29Oct1996e).

Deciding on a foreign policy tool that is continuously in the field representing the Union was an important step forward in terms of the Union’s visibility in the region. Representation implicitly denotes that what is represented exists. As institutional life is expressed through representation, all institutions have some iconicity in their foundation thus relying on the circular relation where a locus of representation is established to give an impression of an existing subject of representation. The deepness of impact on interpreters has to do with the strength of representation. It is justified to argue that, logically, the appointment of a political figure would have contributed to the EU’s greater visibility and, consequently, it would have had potential for a deeper impact on how the significant actors perceive the EU as a foreign policy actor. There was not, however, enough political will within the Union to make such a decision at the time: A weak object of representation could not agree on a strong representation.

Visibility means both being taken into consideration among political elites and grabbing attention in major media. As for Israeli and Palestinian media, there is a clear difference in communications. On the Israeli side, the EU’s strive for political presence is largely ignored. The same can be said about European media. Contrary to European and Israeli media where Moratinos is less present, Palestinian media pay a lot of attention to the work of Moratinos. Following the positive feelings among Palestinian leadership about the European Union, the Palestinian media readily recognise the EU’s political role in the region and report comprehensively about meetings, negotiations, and Moratinos’s initiatives thus guaranteeing the Union’s visibility in the Territories.

Generally speaking, the interviewed Israeli sources emphasised the visibility and political weight that the EU has been trying to get by engaging in the peace process which, in these terms, appears as an opportunity to create or strengthen the CFSP irrespective of whether or not there are real successes in terms of conflict resolution. As one interviewee formulated it,

I can’t say if [Moratinos] played a major role or not but at least he credited himself with some of the initiatives. But you know, when there are so many

168 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
169 E-mail interview with the Head of the Palestinian delegation to an EU member state, 23 June 2002.
cooks in the *cuisine* you can’t really know. I’m not saying that he hasn’t had any achievements but it’s difficult to say. In any case, he’s been always trying to be in the picture.  

Also many of the European foreign ministry officials mentioned the visibility that the EU gets thanks to Moratinos. Only one European interviewee stressed that the role of Moratinos is not that of a spokesman—that is to a large extent something for the presidency. And yet, this interviewee, too, held it important that the special envoy is a person who is comfortable with the media.  

Other Europeans, in turn, emphasised the impact of having a special envoy on the EU’s visibility. As an Italian official, who considered Moratinos an answer to Kissinger’s request in 1973 for a telephone number for Europe, put it, “it was seen important that the EU has Mr Peace Process of its own. The question is about visibility.”  

In general, most of the interviewees seemed to agree that “[i]t is important to present a common face to the world.”  

In an interview the nomination of Moratinos was interpreted to be “an expression of the general wish to play more visible role in the Middle East Peace Process. […] Mr. Moratinos has, inspite of great difficulties, contributed to a greater visibility and permanent presence of the EU on the ground.”  

Hence, besides giving a sense of continuity, the special envoy is seen to give the Union access to the main stage. Coherence and continuity are necessary constituents of identity. In the lack of visibility, however, the significant others would not be put under pressure to express their opinion about the self under construction. Already a year after Moratinos was nominated, Luxembourgian Foreign Minister, Jacques Poos, believed the special envoy’s growing role was to increase the EU’s “visibility in the process together with American efforts.” Poos further saw willingness on the American side to take the EU into account in its attempt to relaunch the peace process (Reuters 06Oct1997; see also Soetendorp 1999).  

After being neglected for a long time, the EU is now advancing in its aim to get a stronger foothold in the US-led discussions—largely thanks to the establishing of the Quartet. From the Israeli perspective the EU’s foreign policy in the Middle East is assessed to be more unitary than in any other region. Yet

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170 Interview with an Israeli source, 26 May 2002.  
171 Interview with a British foreign ministry official, 27 January 2002.  
172 Interview with an Italian foreign ministry official, 8 May 2002.  
174 E-mail interview with an Austrian foreign ministry official, 16 May 2002.
this does not mean that the Middle East has wide open doors for the EU to join the political dialogue. On the contrary, as an Israeli interviewee said,

[y]ou are relatively united with regard to the Middle East but there’s then the only common foreign policy problem: we don’t let you play a role here. […] It seems that we are supposed to help the EU to improve its CFSP, to make it greater - - but this has become obstacle rather than bridge.175

The willingness to create a European Middle East policy that is different from the American guidelines has had an impact on the EU’s largely declaratory foreign policy. Hence, already the Venice declaration of 1980, which remained for a long time the cornerstone of the EC’s position with respect to the Middle East, can be interpreted not only on the basis of its content as such but also in terms of the Community’s intention to profile a western Middle East policy distinct from the US pro-Israeli approach. But a difficulty with such a profiling is that it conflicts with the views of some significant others whose recognition the EU needs.

In practice, the recognition means a favourable response to the Union’s visibility. As long as Israel and, to a certain extent, the United States are unwilling to give the EU a place at the negotiation table, the Union remains a political non-actor in the region when it comes to substantial high policy questions. By disregarding the EU’s quest to be seen—which Moratinos’s nomination has considerably reinforced—Israel is able to confine the growth of the EU’s political strength in the Middle East. Hence, visibility as such does not automatically mean that the quest for a certain kind of actorness will be recognised. But visibility ensures that other actors cannot completely ignore the represented.

Visibility or presence, as was discussed in chapter two, is a necessary but not sufficient precondition of actorness. The EU’s economic presence and actorness were not sufficient to provide a space in the political dialogue. The appointment of the special envoy made the EU ‘politically present’ by giving the fifteen a common face in the region: “In establishing personal contacts, Moratinos’s mission has been successful. We have a face and this can be counted as an achievement as such.”176 The decision to appoint a special representative was not enough to immediately give the Union a seat at the negotiation table, but the agreement between the foreign ministers of the fifteen was seen as a reinforcement for the fragile CFSP. Even without any significant breakthroughs

175 Interview with an Israeli source, 26 May 2002.
176 Interview with Moratinos’s political adviser, Christian Jouret, 31 May 2002; see also Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 33.
in the conflict, a representative of an outside actor considered that Moratinos “has managed to assert the EU’s presence by shuttling around in the region. […] Moratinos’s team is effective in securing the presence.” 177 Another interviewee even emphasised the lack of substance that clearly has not had a negative impact on how the EU’s presence is perceived in the region: “When we talk about Moratinos’s role we mean that he has brought visibility to the Union. So we are talking about visibility, not substance or initiatives.” 178

An Israeli source remarked that at a certain point the special envoy lost momentum, and without the nomination of Solana “the special envoy would either have been replaced by another person or the whole post of special envoy would have ceased to exist.” The nomination of Solana changed the role of Moratinos to be more specifically a field person; to do the field work for Solana. 179 A similar view was expressed by some Europeans. A Finnish foreign ministry official assessed that the fact that it took a relatively long time for Solana’s team to become operational meant in practice that, contrary to some assumptions, Moratinos’s team in the field maintained its position even after Solana’s successful debut in Sharm el-Sheikh in October 2000. 180 The sense of success may also be interpreted in relation to the fact that “Solana was chosen because of the good relations with the US” 181, not necessarily because of Moratinos’s failure to achieve the goals set in his mandate.

The apparent optimism in the aftermath of Sharm el-Sheikh was coloured by considerations that the lack of precise framework and a timetable for further negotiations would deteriorate the possibilities for success. The Freudian slip of Chirac in Sharm el-Sheikh gave a hint of what to expect: “both sides have agreed to issue public statements equivocally calling for an end to violence.” After Sharm el-Sheikh, Palestinians moved on from demonstrations to military strikes both in the Territories and on the Israeli side of the Green Line. The Israeli government responded by closures, detentions, and demolition of the homes of suspected terrorists. Referring to the complete destruction of the peace process after the beginning of the second Palestinian uprising and to the possible advantages that still could be seen in having a special envoy in the region, Moratinos’s Russian counterpart concluded that “[t]here can be successes even without a concrete agreement.” 182 The successes obviously are

177 Interview with Russian special envoy, Andrey Vdovin, 31 May 2002.
178 Interview with a Portuguese foreign ministry official, 7 May 2002.
179 Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.
180 Interview with a Finnish foreign ministry official, 30 November 2000.
181 Interview with an Israeli source, 26 May 2002.
182 Interview with Russian special envoy, Andrey Vdovin, 31 May 2002.
to be defined not in relation to steps toward peaceful settlement of the conflict but rather in terms of a broader context of world politics and the position of different international actors in it. (See Jørgensen 1998)

In general, the significance of permanent representatives for conflict resolution is seen in their ability to conduct low-profile negotiations without eye-catching entrances. In this sense, the shuttling of American, European, Russian, and UN envoys in the region refers rather to visibility than quiet but effective diplomacy. An Israeli source concluded with a critical tone that “[i]t’s not only that you’re working but also showing everyone that you’re doing so. It’s unusual for the EU to work in a practical way without having your fingerprints on result.”\(^{183}\) From this perspective, the focus of the EU representation presently seems to be not on conflict mediation per se but rather getting a more prominent political profile through participating in the political dialogue.

5.6.

**REPUTATION: EU-ISRAEL FORUM**

The Israeli perception of the EU and its quest for a greater political role in the Middle East has been overwhelmingly negative, or suspicious to say the least. This concerns both policy makers and public opinion. As an interviewee noted, “[t]he best way to describe the attitude of Israeli public towards the EU is through two words: doubt and suspicion.”\(^{184}\) From the perspective of Israeli foreign ministry, the general attitude of people is not problematic, but from the European perspective the doubt and suspicion present in Israeli society is a factor constraining the EU’s political space in the region. To change the Israeli attitude into one more receptive to the EU’s actorness, Moratinos launched an idea of a forum where difficult issues and differences of opinion could be discussed.

One interviewee described the relationship between Israel and the EU being like an intense marriage with its ups and downs.\(^{185}\) The continuation of the Palestinian uprising has cooled off the EU-Israeli relationship and increased the need for an open dialogue but, at the same time, made it more troublesome to bring difficult issues to the table. Israel’s mistrust closes the doors on the EU, which takes its frustration out in the form of declaratory policy critical to

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183 Interview with an Israeli source, 10 May 2002.
184 Interview with an Israeli source, 26 May 2002.
185 Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.
Israel. The vicious circle is complete when Israeli politicians get from the EU this kind of ‘confirmation’ for their perception that the EU is biased and lacks a thorough comprehension of the situation. Palestinians have made similar observations about the EU-Israeli relations: “After the second intifada broke out, there has been a lot of criticism to Israeli policies by the EU, which naturally affected the EU-Israeli relation. […] The EU’s criticism is reflected to Moratinos’s work and meetings with Israel. When the EU criticises there is no welcome.”

Already before the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada, EU officials had concluded that what is needed is a systematic investment in changing the Israeli attitude. The major new initiative was to improve the Union’s image with the Israeli public and, consequently, make the atmosphere more receptive to the EU’s political performance. In a Reuters’ interview, an EU official explained that the EU-Israel Forum would work to correct the Israeli assumption that the EU is pro-Arab and pro-terrorist and to “dispel negative myths” about the EU. He went on to say that “[w]e need to reinforce the line that the EU views Israel as a technical, social and historic partner”. (Reuters 03Aug1999)

Also the fact that the EU lacks political teeth and is therefore inclined to use the economic tools increases the tension in the EU-Israeli relationship. For instance, the EU provoked a storm of protests when in 1999 it threatened to exclude Israel from participation in a five-year research and development programme. Israeli officials complained that the bloc makes politically motivated decisions in various ‘non-political’ fields such as scientific co-operation and trade relations, thereby undermining the Union’s claim to be willing to work as an honest broker in peace negotiations. (Reuters 03Aug1999)

David Bar-Ilan, Netanyahu’s adviser during his term as Israeli Prime Minister, was particularly direct in his criticism of the EU:

We in general feel that the Europeans could have a very positive influence on the Palestinian [National] Authority [PNA], mostly by setting an example of democracy, of transparency, of the kind of openness that exists in Europe. And instead, we see constantly the threat against Israel and taking Palestinian position almost blindly. This is not the sort of thing that can conduce to greater involvement by the European countries in the affairs of the Middle East, and I think that is a shame.

(Reuters 12Feb1999)

To polish the EU reputation in Israeli eyes, Moratinos initiated the forum that holds two major conferences per year. It became operational in April

186 Interview with the Head of the Palestinian delegation to an EU member state, 29 April 2002.
The forum’s present executive secretary, Shlomo Gur, was preceded by Uzi Arad, a former chief in the Israeli security service Mossad and an important adviser to Netanyahu. A reason why Moratinos wanted to have Arad involved in the EU-Israeli co-operation was that until the past few years, Europeans have largely concentrated on co-operation with leftist people in Israel. Choosing Arad was expected to influence the right wing of the political spectrum, since he is an important figure on the right and is considered to be relatively pro-European.

During the formation of the Forum, Denmark and Sweden expressed their suspicions concerning the intelligence background of Arad, and Germany requested an open announcement for the post, but finally Moratinos’s proposal was accepted. The decision was made during the Finnish presidency in the second half of 1999 and an interviewee confirmed that even the presidency “had no say in the nomination”. To ensure that the Forum functions the way it was designed to do, the brainchild of Moratinos was realised in the form the special envoy preferred. Not only in Europe but in Israel as well there was a debate about choosing Arad for the position of executive secretary. Two central arguments were that the person should be someone from the foreign ministry and that he should be from the Labour Party because the executive secretary was chosen when Ehud Barak was the Israeli Prime Minister.

In the interview, Moratinos’s economic adviser explained that the EU-Israel Forum was identified “because of the wrong perceptions of the EU in Israel.” He further remarked that “[n]ow we have realised that if we want to influence Israel, it is to a large extent up to the Israeli public opinion which, at the moment, is pretty much on the right. So, it was good to have a rightist executive secretary.” The official view in Europe is that “[i]t’s wrong to say that the Union is biased” and the EU-Israel Forum was established in order to change the Israeli perception. Israelis, however, see the Forum’s original purpose differently. According to an Israeli interviewee, “[a]t the beginning, the idea was to surmount the misunderstandings and difficulties in EU-Israeli relations. Only later its function became to project a better image of the European Union. Now this latter function is the most important one.” The former purpose might have been nothing but a way to sell the idea to Israelis.

187 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
188 Interview with an Israeli source, 26 May 2002.
189 Interview with an Israeli source, 26 May 2002.
190 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
191 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
192 Interview with an Israeli source, 26 May 2002.
as, contrary to the Israeli view, for Europeans the explicit purpose of having the Forum was from the beginning to project a better image of the EU. Whatever the purpose, it soon became evident that the Forum “was played down in practice. It has had no impact on anything.” Moratinos then wanted to reinvigorate the Forum and that was the basis for choosing Gur.” Contrary to Arad, Shlomo Gur is leftist. An interviewee characterised him as being strongly associated with far-leftist Yossi Beilin, the former Minister of Justice. Hence, compared to the first executive secretary, Gur is a more ‘natural choice’ to Moratinos who himself is a “very visibly socialist”.193

Moratinos’s idea was to sponsor a range of activities designed to highlight the positive sides of the EU-Israeli relationship. But up until now, the Forum has had no visible effects on EU-Israeli relations. An Israeli source elaborated reasons for that and said

> [t]he main idea of the forum was that of improving the image, but my personal opinion is that they are going all wrong about it. They organise meetings and VIP occasions in porch locations in Israel and Europe. That doesn’t increase the mutual understanding. If they invited a youth movement or other groups of young people to visit a city in Europe, if there were schools co-operating with schools in Europe, sports clubs, and so on, that would contribute to the improvement of - - It would be cultural co-operation which, eventually, would influence the political agenda, too. But if you invite professors, civil servants, politicians—this has no impact on the societies at large and the images.194

Hence, according to him, the change should originate at the societal level instead of among foreign policy elites. However, as for institutional identity, the contacts of elites are much more important if the aim is to find a mutual understanding about institutional being of the represented selves. (See chapter 3.2.2.)

Another Israeli source, who analysed the possible changes in European Middle East policy and Israeli policy vis-à-vis Europe since the 1970s, concluded that in the long term the policies have remained largely the same. An indication of the significance of the EU to Israel is that Israel’s European policy is mainly defined by the foreign minister, while policies toward the United States are dominated by the prime minister. This indicates that relations with the United States are held to be much more important, given the power of the prime minister in Israel.195

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193 Interview with an Israeli source, 26 May 2002.
194 Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002. See also Fisher 1990; Merritt 1972.
195 Interview with an Israeli source, 26 May 2002.
Moratinos’s attempt to create an atmosphere favourable to the EU’s political actorness in the Middle East through the EU-Israel forum has not brought visibly positive results. Although there have been some successful mediation efforts, the lasting effects in terms of Euro-Israeli confidence have remained modest. According to a European interviewee, “Mr. Moratinos has certainly contributed to build confidence between the EU and Israel, although he was—as unfortunately to be expected—not able to correct the wrong Israeli perception that the EU is biased”.196 To the EU this is problematic, for Israeli recognition is needed in the European process of identification as a political self. This has to do with the fact that a mediator cannot invite himself but has to be invited. As long as the EU does not manage to get Israeli legitimisation for its political actorness, it is practically excluded from the inner circle of negotiations.

In chapter two the view was presented that identity formation requires recognition by significant others. The others interpret the performance of the self under construction and through the interpretation they contribute to the general understanding of the self, the object of interpretation. A sign that realises the selfhood of the object is an important constituent part of the self. Interpretation of EU performance hence involves producing a sign as a ‘representamen’ of the Union’s foreign policy actorness. Until now there is no extensive overlap between the European and Israeli interpretations of EU’s foreign policy self, which means that the suggested interpretation is not accepted by this significant other. Therefore, as long as the EU seeks to persuade Israel to accept its comprehensive international identity via foreign policy performances in the Middle East without changing its stance to be more favourable to Israel, the Israeli conclusion is that “[w]e’ve got a problem with Europe, that’s clear.”197

196 E-mail interview with an Austrian foreign ministry official, 16 May 2002.
197 Interview with an Israeli source, 26 May 2002.
6.

**INDEXICAL PERFORMANCE: REPRESENTATION AS DETERMINED BY A MANDATE**

Often policy making is assessed in terms of success and failure. This is particularly evident in events where the goal is unambiguously defined and the outcomes of action comparable to the set objectives. Yet, concepts such as good and evil, justice and injustice, or fairness and unfairness are also present in arguments to explain, defend, or justify a chosen course of action or inaction as well as in the evaluation of outcomes. (Cf. Bonanate 1995, 6-8) Interfering in the internal matters of another actor or the interaction of others is a clear example of such a situation where value-based arguments are joined to action that is assessed in terms of success and failure. In the theoretical outline of this study, this orientation of performance is defined in terms of indexicality.

The conflict in the Middle East is this type of context of action where external actors that seek to be taken as third parties maintain that armed conflict is evil and stabilisation of the situation would be good, and that certain kinds of solutions would bring peace and justice. Hence, a major argument in terms of conflict resolution concerns what is to be deemed preferable. Also the mandate text of the EU special envoy echoes the value-based principles as it states that the special envoy is nominated “to engage constructively with signatories to agreements within the framework of the peace process in order to promote compliance with the basic norms of democracy, including respect for human rights and the rule of law” (European Union 1996c). Deeming the outcomes as successes or failures reflects the value judgements, i.e. underlying assumptions about preferable development and outcomes. How an international actor gets involved in a course of events and defines the preferable outcomes depends on its institutional identity and, further, on the assumptions and expectations that derive from its identity. The European special representative to the conflict region is a channel for putting into practice the value-based considerations that the EU presents or that the member states with divergent foreign policy identities are able to agree on.
6.1. **EXTERNAL EXPECTATIONS**

Burgoon (1993, 31) defines the nature of expectations from the social psychological perspective as an enduring pattern of anticipated behaviour, which either is “grounded in societal norms for what is typical and appropriate” or incorporates “knowledge of an individual actor’s unique interaction style, which may differ from the social norms”. Expectations are, according to Mortensen (1997, 27), necessarily present in all interaction: “One cannot not assume.” Expectations serve as ‘frames’ that shape interpersonal and intergroup interactions although complex webs of interaction make it difficult to define a pattern of action that would, in given circumstances, meet all the expectations since usually there are no completely unambiguous and thoroughly agreed norms for what is typical, general, and appropriate. Furthermore, the more complex the interaction webs are, the more there is differentiation and the less there is stability, which would be needed in order that the norms of ‘generality’ and ‘appropriacy’ can be formed.

The said means that neither these norms nor the experience of a particular actor performing in a certain way can be the only basis for expectations, especially when the circumstances keep on changing and actors are dissimilar to the extent that their ways of acting are not comparable. A third basis for expectations could be the image that an actor creates of itself as a participant in the social interaction. Concerning the expectations about the EU’s action in the context of international conflicts, there is no historical evidence of the Union’s foreign policy actorness to which one could refer as a ground for expectations. Further, as a new kind of international actor, the EU does not fit into the traditional understanding of individual states being the only actors in global politics. Expectations thus arise mainly from assessments about the EU’s institutional potential and its economic actorness.198

Idealistically, one might think that procedural changes always lead to internal efficiency and further to external effectiveness, which in turn

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198 Jervis (1970, 8-9) opposes the view that there is no other way to create a desired image than by giving proof that the image is accurate and, thus, earning the reputation. He argues that the link between action and images is rather vague for action in general is so ambiguous that it hardly provides any kind of sign of a general pattern or a mode of behavior according to which other actors could predict future actions.
strengthens internal confidence and external credibility. There is, however, a remarkable gap between the Union’s material, institutional and other resources that constitute the basis for the Union’s capabilities to act, and the expectations placed on the EU. The bloc is unable to meet the expectations placed on it as an international actor and, accordingly, either the Union is obliged to make efforts to broaden the scope of actorness or the expectations have to be lowered in order to get the capabilities–expectations gap narrowed. (See Hill 1998)

The lack of capabilities is apparent when it comes to implementing foreign policy and representing the Union on the international scene. As the bloc’s inability to find a convincing and effective way of intervening in the Yugoslav conflict became evident, the Community was criticised as engaging in a purely verbal and rhetorical conduct without any real significance. This criticism, of course, is based on expectations that the EU should be able to intervene in an international crisis—at least within a certain geographical area. Expectations for a strengthened capacity for external action do not derive only from an internal quest for stronger actorness. Other states and entities are, explicitly or implicitly, putting forward demands on the Union to improve its international performance.

Expectations concerning the Union’s international position reflect the general circumstances—what the wide playing field seems to make possible—but in practice the contextual factors limit the seizure of the playing field, i.e. the actualisation of the possible. Actual situations and actualised possibilities further shape both the field of action and the identity of the actor so that the relevance of action goes beyond the instant when it takes place (See Ricoeur 1973, 102-103). In external expectations the question is about recognition: The more comprehensive role an actor is expected to take, the more readily it will be recognised if and when it fulfils the expectations. As a recognised participant in a given interactive process, an actor need not renegotiate the space for actorness each time it wishes to act. Recognition allows the actor to focus on the question at hand instead of the construction of its international image, and makes it easier to have a real impact on other actors and the given environment of interaction. As for the EU’s political space in the Middle East, there are some important actors that are rather reluctant to recognise the Union’s political self in the region.

In the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and European Political Co-operation as its predecessor, external circumstances have frequently become a stimulus for the institutionalisation of performances. To say it in a critical tone, as Hill and Wallace (1996, 13) do, “each humbling failure” seems to lead “to modest but cumulative improvements in commitment
The weakness of the EU’s supposedly common foreign policy is realised only when it is placed in the context of referential relations, namely its economic significance in world affairs, on the one hand, and the foreign policies of traditional foreign policy actors, on the other hand. It is in respect to these objects of comparison that the expectations for the EU’s foreign policy arise. The functioning of the EU’s unique foreign policy machinery is cumbersome but the Union’s institutional capabilities to act have the potential to increase its political weight. Empowering the EU as a foreign policy actor would, however, presuppose that the member states are willing to limit or redefine their sovereignty.

As was seen in chapter 5.3., it is not very probable that the EU member states will have the political will to develop such a coherence in foreign affairs that they would be truly able to speak with one voice on difficult issues, such as the Middle East conflict, that involve national interests. Agents that function as signs of the evolving coherence may have a certain impact on the external image of the Union but the individual performances of the member states easily shift the focus back to the national level. There are neither unitary actors nor one coherent audience to be taken into account and, therefore, the manipulation of images is difficult. This is even more true because of the tendency to interpret new information to conform to prevailing views and existing images. Further, the external expectations are largely based on the external actors’ assessments of what kind of actor-ness would be preferable for them. For some, a strong political Union would be a desirable communication partner while others—in the Middle East context the United States and Israel in particular—expect the fifteen to settle for a role of primarily economic actor.

The United States observed the appointment of the EU special envoy and his action with some doubts. The US ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, expressed this stand by saying that “[w]e do not have a veto over anybody’s involvement nor do we seek to exercise one…But I think that in terms of the negotiations themselves, to have more than one facilitator can immensely complicate the situation”. Indyk further stated that “[w]e (the U.S.) are in a position to play a facilitating role. We do so at the invitation of the parties, not because we insist on being there but because they want us to be…And when

199 The capability–expectations gap, even if not always as visible as today, existed already in the ‘70s after the introduction of European Political Co-operation in 1970, and has been demonstrated on various occasions, e.g. in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq war, Bosnian war, Albania, and even the Middle East peace process although co-ordination of European policy toward the Middle East has mainly been seen as one of the most successful areas for EPC.
they don’t want us to be there we won’t.” (Reuters 30Oct1996b) He left it to be read between the lines that, in his view, the EU should do the same; to leave it to the conflicting parties to decide whom they welcome to play the part of a facilitator. Indyk’s statement reflects the US reservations at large about what Americans have interpreted as the EU’s insistence on being there.

Hence, on the other side of the Atlantic, expectations about the CFSP in general and the role of the EU special representative to the Middle East have not been particularly high. At the beginning there was a fear of co-ordination problems and the EU’s willingness to step on the toes of the United States but in many respects the coexistence and even co-operation in certain questions has proven better than expected. As an American diplomat verified, the United States is

looking increasingly to the European Union as a global partner, and when the Union speaks with one voice, given its financial resources, [it] can have an important impact in a lot of regions […] The problem is that the union’s foreign-policy mechanism, dependent on getting a consensus among 15 countries, isn’t always coherent or timely.

(Quoted in Echikson 1997, 6)

This does not mean, however, that the Middle East is one of the regions where the Americans would be eager to see the EU have a greater political impact.

Israelis, in turn, have from the beginning repeatedly criticised the mission entrusted to Moratinos. According to a spokesman for Israeli Foreign Minister Levy, the EU’s decision to seek to influence the process through appointing the special envoy “undermines one of the basic principles of the peace conference launched in October 1991 in Madrid”. He further said that agreeing to a European envoy would mean that Israel “will not be able to refuse an envoy from Japan or another from China, for example, which could transform the talks into international negotiations.” (Reuters 30Oct1996a) Yet Israel considered the appointment of Mr Moratinos a victory for Israel’s stand against the EU’s original intention to appoint someone with a higher political profile. The lower profile was assumed to mean a more modest role in the process. The political weight of the representative has an influence not only on the formation of the institutional identity of the Union or a particular sector of it as was discussed in chapter five but, in indexical terms, also on the place that the EU manages to occupy at the negotiation table and, thereby, on the EU’s long-term impact on the conflict management.

A clear example of Israel’s unwillingness to acknowledge the EU’s status as a political actor in the Middle East was the Wye River negotiations in October 1998. The fact that Israel denied Moratinos’s, and thus the EU’s, access to the
negotiation table at the Wye talks was naturally humiliating to the biggest donor desiring to play a more prominent mediatory role. Often the negative attitude of Israelis toward European interference is skilfully wrapped in diplomatic language although in certain instances, the dislike is relatively open. An example of the latter way of expressing the stance was a statement by the Director General of Israel’s foreign ministry, Eytan Bentzur, who was asked to assess the relative weight of the European mediation versus the US mediation. He answered that “there is no European mediation as such. We do not perceive the European moves and efforts as mediation. For us, the United States is the primary, decisive element, and we see Europe as an element that can be instrumental without detracting even an iota from the decisive US role in promoting the process.” (Reuters 06May1997b)

The reserves of the United States and Israel contradict the enthusiasm of Palestinians and other regional Arab actors. Arab states in general are eager to see a bigger role for the EU in the Middle East, and not merely as an economic actor, or complementary and secondary to the US role. Their expectations partly derive from the correspondence of their economic interests with the EU member states’ interests which will be further discussed in chapter seven. The external expectations for a bigger role were one of the factors leading to the nomination of the EU special envoy in the Middle East. Especially Palestinians have received Moratinos with open arms, not least because of the economic support from the EU.

During the process leading to nomination of the special envoy, it was already taken into account that the expectations of Arab parties and Israel did not coincide. The crisis in 1996 convinced Europeans that the special envoy should be as neutral as possible in order to avoid the unnecessary collision between the conflicting parties over the EU’s actoriness. As an interviewee formulated it, “[a]t the time of Netanyahu, situation was deteriorating. So, there was a need of a person who would be involved to both Israelis and Palestinians.” Hence, it was decided that, contrary to some suggestions, the special envoy would not have a high political profile but would, instead, work at the level of ambassador.

Secondly, the question of the special envoy’s nationality was important. Evidently, Israelis would not have been willing to co-operate with a French envoy due to the bad reputation of France as a biased intervenor that lacks sensitivity, whereas looking from the Arab side, nominating a German to the

200 Interview with a senior official in the GCC, 23 January 2002.
201 E-mail interview with the Head of Palestinian delegation to an EU member state, 23 June 2002.
position would have meant that the EU envoy would have carried the burden of the Holocaust with him. Further, the United Kingdom was supposedly considered to be too close to the United States to spearhead the Union’s independent and united Middle East policy. Among the big five, there were then only two ‘candidate countries’ left: Italy and Spain. Spain had an advantage over Italy, for an Italian had been nominated to the position of the EU special envoy to the African Great Lakes Region earlier the same year as the first of the EU special envoys. Furthermore, the traditional visibility of Spain in the Middle East peace process made the nomination of a Spaniard look like a natural choice.

Hence, the nomination reflected the EU’s attempt to present itself as a neutral, objective third party in the Middle East. Israeli attitude toward the EU’s political involvement has been seen in Europe as annoying or, at least, unco-operative. As a European interviewee said, “Israelis have a complicated way to deal with things. [...] and sometimes it’s like talking to a wall”, 203 In turn, the readiness of Palestinians and other Arabs to invite the EU to have a stronger foothold in high politics is understandable in the light that the Union presents a view that is largely different from that of the United States. Hence there are two if not opposing at least dissimilar western stances. The regional Arab actors expect the EU to balance the position of the United States that they regard as siding with Israel: “The United States is clearly taking sides and therefore we regard it as unfair. The US is biased. Maybe the EU could be fairer, as the Jewish lobby doesn’t seem to be so strong there,” said an Arab official. 204

While Israelis and Americans would like to see the EU accept a role mainly constrained to economic actorness, the Palestinian Authority is asking the EU to take a more active political role. 205 Neither economic actorness nor a formal diplomatic presence is consider adequate, even if for the European Union the fact that it has a permanent body of representation in high policy matters may be a real achievement as such. From the perspective of Palestinians and surrounding Arab countries, a lack of concrete results means that the EU is not fulfilling the expectations placed on it (E.g. Reuters 16Mar2001).

There is pressure to have a record in high policy matters and therefore the Union emphasises, whenever possible, its commitment to fulfilling the external expectations that coincide with its own political aspirations. The Berlin declaration, for instance, was an opportunity for Moratinos to position the EU

203 Interview with an Irish foreign ministry official, 14 January 2002.
204 Interview with a senior official in the GCC, 23 January 2002.
205 Interview with the Head of the Palestinian delegation to an EU member state, 29 April 2002.
with regard to the conflict and to show serious political actorness which could be expected to contribute to a just solution of the conflict. Moratinos, who was the principal author of the text, said that “[t]he declaration is a strong commitment from the European Union to the Middle East peace process and was well received in the Arab world”. He was convinced that “Europe does not only have an economic role to play in this region but also a political one.” (Reuters 09Apr1999)

An interviewee remarked that originally the reason for nominating special envoys was a real desire to have an impact on the course of affairs and to find a possible solution although, on the other hand, in the background there naturally was a need to get a ‘record’ that the EU has done something. Yet, often at the early stage of action or inaction there is a certain irresolution—a sense of not knowing what to do, the interviewee said. And if one of the parties is not willing to co-operate, the EU is irresolute. The variety of devices of the United States is more comprehensive than that of the EU. Nonetheless, the EU is going towards more intensive co-operation that increases its possibilities to have an impact, he added.206

The interviewee further pondered that the role of special envoys would be divested of its original purpose in case it were institutionalised. However, this tendency is, in his view, typical in political democracies. A sense of powerlessness begins to colour policy making which leads to searching for a formal doing with less emphasis on the content so that it can be said that something has been done. The interviewee mentioned declarations and ministerial statements as examples of such formal doings that, in practice, make no difference. He further asked rhetorically whether it is always necessary to do something; whether quasi-action is better than inaction. In any case, the big member states of the Union feel that they are forced to take a stance and they expect the small members to do the same.207

Even if inaction and quasi-action are both ineffective with regard to the actual event that functions as the context, there is a fundamental difference between them: While inaction shows the lack of capabilities or willingness to act, quasi-action seeks to prove that the actor recognises its moral responsibility to act and has the necessary means and political will to get involved. The presence of external expectations creates a demand for action. Although it is naturally expected that the action bring some concrete results, quasi-action functions as a face-saving operation to show that the actor is willing to respond to the expectations.

207 Interview with a Finnish foreign ministry official, 15 February 2001.
External expectations for an active European performance seem to play a decisive role in the EU’s decisions to act. Which tools are used depends however not only on the desire to have an impact on the conflict but also on the political will to intervene. Since statements and declarations are seen as the easiest way to show activity without really getting involved at the level of policy making, they are the usual way to react to external events. The great number of declarations compared to the use of the Union’s other foreign policy tools reflects the general feeling within the CFSP community that even quasi-action is better than inaction when the Union is unable to find a common stance for any deeper involvement. External expectations are generally thought to increase the pressure to act. But in practice, there often are opposing pressures depending on the assessments of the conflicting parties and their allies’ or supporters’ concerning how advantageous the involvement of an external actor would be.

6.2. MORAL GROUND

Also internally, the pressures to get involved may be contradictory as the views on what is good and just vary. Moreover, the sense of moral duty is not universally applicable even if theoretically speaking the idea is accepted that a certain position imposes positional duties on those occupying the position. (See Simmons 1981; Winch 1972) Morals is a controversial term when talking about politics. Especially for those who perceive international relations as an anarchic self-help system, the tools to deal with morality are lacking. If relations between international actors are interpreted to be analogous to the homo homini lupus model, the central themes are coercive power and state’s survival, which leaves little space for moral considerations unless national interests are taken for moral duty, as Morgenthau (1952, 38) suggests.

Morality in world affairs is here understood in terms of justice but not in accordance with the utilitarian understanding of the greatest good for the greatest number. Concerning values, the purpose of performance is thus related to factual achievements in changing an unjust state of affairs. The aim of ethical action is to find a just solution although some scholars prefer talking about ethics in terms of national interests so that “the function of morality is to clarify and civilize conceptions of national interests” (Schlesinger 1972, 35). The approaches that focus on maximisation of interests find it troublesome to deal with ethical questions that indisputably occupy plenty of space on the
agenda of international actors, particularly when it comes to crisis foreign policy making as opposed to routine foreign policy making (See Webber and Smith 2002, 68-69).

Interference in the internal affairs of an actor is generally justified under labels such as ‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘fight against terrorism’. As according to the classical view the utmost task of external policy is to maintain peace and security, action taken to prevent destabilisation from occurring is taken as justified or even as an obligation so that “the degree of responsibility is commensurate with the capacity to act” (Lefever 1972, 13). The international community is often suggested to have a moral duty to act, as Brown (2001, 87) notes. Whether it is protecting human rights or coming to the aid of famine victims, the international community is expected to respond. The question of whether to get involved purely because of moral considerations becomes more acute for instance in occasions when there is evidence or serious doubt about human rights abuses in the context of an armed conflict that does not pose a threat to potential external intervenors. To clarify the dilemma of intervention, Schlesinger (1996, 150) borrows the famous statement of Lorenzo Dow: “You will be damned if you do—and you will be damned if you don’t.”

Human rights, human dignity and other references to the sanctity of individuals are habitually presented in the international arena as inalienable principles. Also issues such as good governance, democracy, liberty, and equality are discussed in various fora where political dialogue takes place. To a certain extent, values define the parameters of policy choice in world politics even if their importance as a standard for conducting foreign policy is often subordinated to self-interests of potential intervenors. Hence, even if value-based considerations of a democratic state would suggest, for example, that relations to an authoritarian regime be arranged in a manner which supports its democratisation process, the economic or security interests of the democratic state may overshadow the idea of the moral duties and responsibilities that fall to democracies in the international community. (MacFarlane and Weiss 2000)

To respond to ethical reasoning about what ends to choose and what means to use in pursuit of those ends follows the logic of appropriacy. As March and Olsen (1998, 951) note, “[a]ppropriateness need not attend to consequences, but it involves cognitive and ethical dimensions, targets, and aspirations. As a cognitive matter, appropriate action is action that is essential to a particular conception of self. As an ethical matter, appropriate action is action that is

208 Consider, for instance, the debate on the responsibility of the international community during and after the genocide in Rwanda. See Goose and Smyth 1994; Hara 1997; Human Rights Watch 1995; Leitenberg 1994; Suhrke and Jones 2000.
virtuous.” (See also Sending 2002) Now, what is taken as appropriate is fundamentally an issue that has to do with identity, because what you hold as appropriate, preferable and just tells about who you are. This cannot happen first so that your judgements about what ought to be done constructs your identity but vice versa.

Who, then, is a moral actor in international relations? Traditionally it was a state to the extent that morality was discussed at all. (See Erskine 2001, 67) In any case, actoriness was understood exclusively in terms of state behaviour. Since the early 1970s when the European Community began to develop active Middle East policy, there has been a need to find a definition of what kind of foreign policy actor the EC, and later the EU, has been, is and will be. Discussion about the EU’s institutional identity has reflected the explorations on how to put into practice the ideals of moral responsibility outside the Union. This approach is in contradiction to the traditional views, which emphasise power politics. Instead, it reflects the civilian power dimension of international actoriness. (See Stavridis 2001) In the Middle East, the member states of the EC/EU have for the past decades presented the bloc as a civilian power that seeks to balance its economic strength with political weight in order to fully use its potential for good.

In the preceding subchapter, the external expectations were presented as a reason to get involved in a process where a solution is searched for to a conflictual relationship. Now, we could say that morals has to do with an actor’s internal expectations. When an actor seeks to work as a third party in conflict mediation, the impetus for political actoriness may derive from its general position in world affairs where it believes it is entitled to a position of a ‘world police’ or ‘world judge’ on the basis of its record in human rights, general welfare, good governance, and so on. Hence, it feels obliged to share its knowledge and expertise with morally inferior countries or regions, or conflicting parties that do not manage to settle their disputes by peaceful means without external interference. The internal obligation is of particular importance when we take into account that social reality leans on shared understandings of it or, in Ringmar’s (1996, 90) words, there are “some stories which we cannot stop telling without ceasing to be the kinds of actors we take ourselves to be”.

As for the EU’s role in the Middle East, various parties in the Arab world and Europe have expressed the opinion that the EU has moral authority to participate in the peace process.209 This understanding derives both from the post-WW II record of Western Europe in observing the principles of

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209 Interview with an Italian foreign ministry official, 8 May 2002.
constitutional state and from the colonial background of some member states that still serves as a ground for claims of having deeper knowledge of the region than some other member states or the United States have. Yasser Arafat, among others, referred to the moral ground of action as he argued that the EU has a role to play in the Middle East “at all levels, economic, political, security, social and moral” (Reuters 23Dec1997a).

Certain moral authority was granted to the EU also by an Israeli source who expressed the opinion that the EU has something to offer as a model to the Middle Eastern actors to which it offers substantial financial backing. He stressed that “[t]he support to the peace process is needed. […] it also has to do with ideals, democracy and good governance and equality. It’s the EU that keeps up investing and having co-operation to approach these ideals.”

The focus of this comment is on the internal matters of the Arab parties of the conflict. It is widely agreed that “European contributions towards comprehensive democratisation processes of the Middle Eastern and North African countries in its human and social development as well as institutional dimension would have a pacifying effect on the region.” (Behrendt 2000, 13)

But when it comes to objectives in terms of the political dialogue related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, European contributions are not highly appreciated on the Israeli side.

The European history of the 20th century and its member states’ different relations to the Middle Eastern actors may also be seen from a perspective that questions the moral authority of the EU and explains the EU’s involvement in the process as being based on the feeling of moral responsibility. This view rests, at least partly, on the claim that the whole mess that we witness today in the Middle East originated in the inability of the colonial powers to create a firm basis for order and stability as well as in the genocide and other crimes against humanity that took place in Europe during the second World War.

From the perspective of a historical “responsibility in creating the problem”211, also the nomination of Moratinos could, according to a member of the CFSP community, be interpreted as an attempt to show that the Union is willing to carry the responsibility that ‘naturally’ falls to it: “Moratinos was nominated, first of all, in order to show our interest and […] to be satisfied with our conscience—to show that we, Europeans, are actually doing something.”212 For Palestinians the EU decision to send an envoy to the Middle East was a proof of the bloc’s firm aspiration to contribute to the process as a

210 Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.
211 Interview with a Portuguese foreign ministry official, 7 May 2002.
212 Interview with a Portuguese foreign ministry official, 7 May 2002.
political actor so that a just and durable solution could be reached. Israelis, in turn, are not wholeheartedly welcoming European participation but maintain instead that it is possible to see the EU’s action in the Middle East as being “motivated by economic greed,” and blame Europeans for “placing short-term economic aggrandisement above morality and strategic common sense” (Alpher 2000, 203).

Willingness to intervene may rest on the sense of moral responsibility. This kind of purely altruistic action is perhaps rare in world affairs, but it should not be completely neglected. Our values are not merely the framework of what we prefer, i.e. our needs and wants, but it also serves as the ground for putting into practice the generally preferable, i.e. what is to be taken as just. In the context of a violent conflict, this means a solution that is balanced and impartial, and that both or all protagonists are able to agree on. Even if in rationalist camp(s) it is a widely held belief that responsible action means legally or morally correct action (Harmon 1995, 4), it should be remembered that justice does not exist as an objective formula where figures could be added in order to ‘count’ a just solution. In conflictual relations one’s justice is generally another’s injustice, and the external parties assess the situation from their value bases which reflect their institutional identities. It follows that the indexical representation of an international entity reflects its iconically construed being.

6.3.

**IMPARTIALITY**

*M*ediator impartiality is crucial for disputants’ confidence in the mediator, which, in turn, is a necessary condition for his gaining acceptability, which, in turn, is essential for mediation success to come about.

(Kleiboer 1996, 369)

For a long time, the Venice declaration remained the cornerstone of the EC’s stance toward the Middle East conflict. Its significance was not so much in its real effects on the conflict itself as in its call for having a role in the process. The Venice declaration signalled distinctly for the first time the Community’s

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213 Interview with the Head of the Palestinian delegation to an EU member state, 29 April 2002.
ambition to create an independent and unitary political role in world affairs. Furthermore, it was the first time that the EC took a stand to support the Palestinian cause. The declaration made it clear that there are two different positions in the western world toward the settlement of the conflict, one of them being the US stance supporting Israel and the other the European one in a disagreement with the American position. From Israel’s point of view the statement was naturally disappointing although it did not lead to any practical consequences with regard to the conflict. For the EC, the lack of practical results was at the time a secondary question since already the fact that the EC managed to create a common stance on such an important foreign policy issue was seen by the EC member states as a major achievement. In other words, the significance was understood in iconic terms, while the indexical function remained secondary.

The Venice declaration has been condemned as premature primarily for two reasons: The Community’s member states did not have political will for a continuous and coherent Middle East policy, and the terrorist background of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation was still in too recent history to be ignored so that the PLO could have been associated with the negotiations as a full partner as the EC called for. After the Venice declaration it took more than a decade to formally agree on the Union’s common foreign policy and even longer to put it into practice even moderately. But all along, the EU has sought to present a western view different from the US policy on the Middle East. EU declarations have reflected the general European attitude that Palestinians are the underdog, if not completely innocent at least powerless when facing prolonged occupation, economic deprivation and Israel’s excessive use of force (See Peters 2000).

According to a Finnish interviewee, in the past Israel has also used terrorism to reach its objectives and now that it has the upper hand it condemns terrorism. Israel either has to accept Palestinians as an equal partner or suppress them; domination cannot continue for ever, he said and went on to argue that it would have been easier to advance in solving the problem if the United States would not have interfered during the Cold War and given Israel such strong security guarantees that Israel no longer considers it necessary to find a quick and fair solution. The interviewee compared the situation with the one between Finland and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the second World War: Had Finland gotten similar security guarantees from the United States, it could have left the Karelia question open without caring about the possible Soviet reactions. The statement reflects the general feeling in Europe that Israel has the upper hand in the conflict and, due to the US backing, is not even

interested in finding a solution.215 Yet the concessions that Israel was ready to make in Wye River, Sharm el-Sheikh, and Taba prove this perception mistaken.

The EU’s concern with regional stability is linked to the economic aspects and to the potential threat of migration pressure and the spreading of terrorism, whereas the United States links regional stability primarily to the security of Israel. A key factor explaining the difference in EU and US orientations is Europe’s proximity to the Arab world. Other explanations for dissimilar attitudes can be found in historical, cultural and religious backgrounds. For instance, North American Evangelical Christianity has traditionally been more tolerant toward its historical roots than European Catholicism, and even pro-Zionist so that the US Middle East policies have been imbued with the ideological closeness of the United States and Israel while Western and Southern Europe has sought to downplay the ideological link and, in that sense, take a ‘neutral’ position. Simultaneously, Europe’s geographical closeness, security concerns, and economic interests in the Middle East have led the EU to emphasise the significance of good relations to the Arab world and made Israel suspicious about the apparent bias of the EU or some of its member states towards the Arabs.216

The nomination of the EU special envoy actualised half a year after the violent confrontation in Southern Lebanon and Northern Israel. The continuous terrorist action of Hizbollah in the Israeli-Lebanese border region led to the Israeli operation Grapes of Wrath where, beside Hizbollah fighters, many Lebanese civilians died of Israeli attempts to eliminate terrorists. The civilian casualties were largely due to the Hizbollah strategy to attack from or near civilian settlements. The confrontation was followed by European diplomatic intervention in Lebanon. In spring 1996 before the Israeli election, a series of Palestinian suicide attacks also took place in Israel. The violence and insecurity created a favourable atmosphere for the electoral victory of Netanyahu who promised to place security on the top of the agenda.

215 The stance of interviewed members of the CFSP community seems to confirm Rieff’s (1999) remark that instead of avoiding taking sides external actors usually take the side of selected victims while still claiming neutrality.

216 These ideas were discussed particularly in an interview with a Finnish foreign ministry official, 15 February 2001. In the most general sense ‘bias’ means that a potential mediator has something at stake in conflict and, hence, it has self-interests that motivate its involvement in conflict. It is quite usual that these interests match better those of one conflicting party than the other which naturally results in closeness to one side of the conflict. See e.g. Carnevale and Arad 1996. The EU member states’ interests will be elaborated in chapter seven as elements of symbolic representation.
The changes in the atmosphere appeared to the EU as an attractive opportunity to get involved in the political dialogue in the region, especially after the first PA election had been successfully organised under the European surveillance in January 1996. It was decided that the first EU special envoy to the Middle East would report to Brussels and help the conflicting parties to find a solution acceptable to both of them. Moratinos’s mandate was broad enough for testing the teeth of the new foreign policy tool but simultaneously reminded the EU of the need to take into account the wishes of the parties when offering “advice and good offices” (European Union 1996c). Indexically, in terms of the EU’s good will and moral authority, the special envoy was expected to contribute to the resolution of the conflict or, in the first place, to easing the tension between the regional actors.

An obstacle to the EU’s fulfilling itself politically was, and still is, that Israel has repeatedly expressed its doubts about Europeans’ impartiality, especially in the context of French interventions. For instance, as President Chirac visited Israel and the Territories in October 1996, the welcome by Palestinian leadership was enthusiastic whereas Israeli officials were clearly uneasy with Chirac’s performance and his call for a greater European involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Also the way he in the Old City of Jerusalem demonstratively pushed aside the Israeli security guards trying to restrain the crowd of Palestinians from coming too close to him was seen by many Israelis almost as a political pronouncement (See e.g. Alpher 2000; Hollis 1997).

The point of departure for Moratinos’s mission as a go-between was not an easy one taking into consideration the European policy making earlier the same year. Especially Chirac’s action was viewed negatively in Israel but British Prime Minister John Major, too, was very articulate while defining his position in a letter he sent in June 1996 to Netanyahu who was recently elected Israeli Prime Minister. Also the declaration of Florence in June 1996 was perceived as a negative signal in Israel. From this background, it is not astonishing that Israeli reactions to the nomination of a European Middle East envoy were rejective. Also the practically unconditional financial support to the Palestinians has indicated the EU’s policy preferences while, at the same time, the economic co-operation with Israel has been politicised as was seen during the ratification process of the EU-Israeli trade agreement. The politicisation of the trade agreement made Israeli criticism focus specifically on the European Commission, although the Council has not avoided being negatively viewed either.

In Israeli assessment, Solana as the representative of the CFSP is not as biased as the Commission and Christopher Patten as the Commission’s ‘face’
to the Middle East.  

In turn, without exception, Arab interviewees argued that the United States has double standards and is biased in its relations with the Middle East. They said they expect the European Union to balance the western perspective although the opinion was also expressed that the Union has no common foreign policy but is, instead, a collection of member states with different preferences. A Saudi interviewee even described the Union as “an assistant of the Americans”.

The different preferences bring some tension and mistrust not only to the EU’s relations with other actors but also the EU’s internal relations both among the member states and between the Council and the Commission. The working group level is not a good forum for policy making, said an interviewee who noted that when the presidency is closely involved in a particular region as France is in Africa, for instance, it is not neutral and is, therefore, a poor formulator of common policy no matter how thorough its knowledge of the region or issue. Taking into consideration that the Council’s working groups function under the direction of the presidency, it is not rare that agenda and initiatives reflect the preferences of the presidency.

In internal processes, it seems obvious that national interests play a role in the EU’s foreign policy making. Yet, when it comes to the Union’s external relations, EU positions are presented as if neutrality and impartiality were unquestionably characteristic to the bloc in all its activities. In the Middle East, the need to emphasise the EU’s impartiality is continuously present because of the Israeli arguments that the EU is biased and, therefore, not an acceptable partner in political dialogue. The EU feels obliged to convince Israelis (and maybe Europeans as well) that what counts most in the Union’s Middle East policies is the moral ground and not self-interests, and that the largely onesided criticism should not be taken as bias. As Moratinos’s adviser said, “we are critical of Israeli practices, of course. [...] It is a matter of maturity between partners to listen to the critical voices as well [...] It is not anti-Israeli bias if we are critical.”

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217 Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.
218 Interview with a senior official in the GCC, 23 January 2002.
222 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002. See Austin (1968) for a philosophical overview of ways to defend one’s position either through justification or excuse. Instead of admitting the rightfulness of accusations and presenting an excuse, the EU seeks to convince other participants of its evenhandedness thus justifying the position it takes.
At some point, the repeated denial appears as a collective defence mechanism. In order to find an exit to the stalemate, a better way might be to face the problem and analyse the possibilities for a more balanced approach or to acknowledge that what counts more than impartiality is the need to counterbalance the American position, as Alpher (2000) suggests. Only one European interviewee took the stand that the problem is not only in how Israel perceives the EU. He argued that Israelis have a good reason to ignore the EU: “They say we are on Arabs’ side. And that’s true—we are” with the exceptions of Germany and the United Kingdom.223

The nomination of a special envoy to the Middle East peace process meant a significant activation of the EU’s Middle East policy. It gave the Union the visibility that it has sought after but, simultaneously, institutionalisation of the political activeness froze the negative image that Israel has of the EU, since Moratinos’s performance as an index of EU member states’ agreement on European foreign policy making has been interpreted in Israel as highlighting the European sympathies to Palestinians. The Palestinian side agrees that “Moratinos has sympathy for Palestinians. And that is something that Israelis don’t see positively.”224 Also some Europeans have been critical to the Moratinos’s way of acting in the name of the EU. An interviewee claimed that Moratinos is getting ‘good friends’ in the region, especially among Syrians with whom he has worked intensively—he tends to adopt Syria’s position, to ‘go native’. According to this foreign ministry official, Syrians as well have been wondering about Moratinos’s active shuttling in particular in Syria and asking him what he has to offer, or whether the purpose is only to interrogate.225

An Israeli interviewee compared the action of Moratinos and Solana, and described Solana as being “very cautious in what and how he does. Miguel Moratinos, in turn, shows sympathy to one side in a very expressive manner”. The interviewee gave an example of how Moratinos has been photographed kissing and hugging Arafat after their meeting for which Israel had given a strong message to be delivered to Arafat by Moratinos. According to the interviewee, “nothing positive has come out of these meetings from Israeli point of view. […] it shouldn’t affect what you do if you like or dislike someone. And it seems that sometimes that may have been the case.”226

223 Interview with a Portuguese foreign ministry official, 7 May 2002.
224 Interview with the Head of the Palestinian delegation to an EU member state, 29 April 2002.
225 Interview with a Finnish foreign ministry official, 30 November 2000.
226 “[T]he information that we got from the meetings between Arafat and Moratinos was that Moratinos had sent a strict message to Arafat. But what we see in the photos taken in or after their meetings—it doesn’t give an idea of an atmosphere
leads to this kind of interpretations makes Israelis suspicious not only of the EU as an international actor but also personally of the performance of Moratinos who in their view “pleases the ear he talks to”\textsuperscript{227}. The problem has been acknowledged also by some Europeans although from the European perspective his action is said to be “understandable taking into consideration the circumstances on the ground”\textsuperscript{228}.

Before the nomination of the High Representative, Moratinos’s function was relatively unambiguous as ‘Mr Peace Process’ of the EU. The Hebron Protocol of January 1997 was the first example of how the special envoy could have an influence on the Palestinians and the process as a whole. After the successful negotiations, Moratinos wanted to emphasise that “[t]he Europeans are ready to give any political support to all sides, including the Syrians and Israelis, so that we are an impartial mediator” ( Reuters 07Feb1997). Israeli officials considered this as a promise of evenhandedness but a few months later they were “disappointed with the [statement annexed to the Amsterdam conclusions], saying that it is unbalanced and that it contradicts promises relayed to Israel by […] Moratinos” ( Reuters 20Jun1997; see also European Union 1997b). Later the same year, Israelis got a new reason to criticise the EU special envoy, when Moratinos condemned Israeli sanctions against the Palestinians as he shuttled between Jerusalem and Gaza ( Reuters 05Aug1997). A couple of days earlier a Palestinian suicide bomber had killed 16 Israeli civilians (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002b).\textsuperscript{229} More recently, incidents such as Moratinos’s recommendation to Solana and Piquet to cancel the meeting with Sharon after the Israelis had denied their access to Ramallah to meet Arafat meant to Israelis that “Moratinos burnt himself”\textsuperscript{230}. Nevertheless, the negative perceptions have not prevented Israelis from using Moratinos’s ‘good offices’ when he is regarded useful. What is an advantage from the Israeli perspective in having Moratinos is that “he is always available. And that’s important when there is no other solution than to involve someone from outside.”\textsuperscript{231}

where hard issues have been discussed and strict messages sent. They are like best friends! Kissing and hugging and holding hands.” ( Interview with an Israeli source, 10 May 2002) The same occasion was discussed in the interview with another Israeli source, 22 May 2002.

\textsuperscript{227} Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.

\textsuperscript{228} The view was presented on the condition that it will be off the record.

\textsuperscript{229} Border closures are used as a collective punishment for Palestinians after suicide attacks or when there is violent confrontation between Palestinians and Israelis.

\textsuperscript{230} Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.

\textsuperscript{231} Interview with an Israeli source, 10 May 2002.
Further, one of the incidents that to many Israelis proved the bias of the European stand—and Moratinos’s stand as the representative of the EU—was what happened in the aftermath of the Israeli Operation Defensive Shield in Jenin. According to an Israeli source,

Moratinos blamed Israel of the deconstruction and killings even before going there. [...] there were a lot of explosions and destruction also caused by the Palestinians and only Israel was accused. Then some people like those in the Human Rights Watch and some European parliamentarists went to see the place and they were horrified. They are people who don’t really have personal experience of war. [...] Unlike them, Moratinos knows the situation and therefore it was surprising to us how harsh his criticism was.232

An interviewed Palestinian source confirmed the Israeli statement, although Palestinians naturally received the EU’s stand with positive feelings. The Palestinian interviewee described Moratinos as “a close friend of the Palestinian people and its leadership” and continued that Israelis “wanted to limit this role to be only an economical role and not a political role, taken into consideration that the EU stand was pro Palestinian as the Israelis remarked for many times.”233 During the interview the Palestinian senior official claimed that a lot of corpses of Palestinian civilians were taken out of Jenin by Israeli trucks and buried in mass graves in the Jordan Valley.234 In Europe, this kind of false accusation was swallowed in media and by politicians alike. Also the UN envoy to the Middle East, Terje Roed-Larsen hastened to condemn Israel, saying that “Israel has lost all moral ground in this conflict.” (Reuters 19Apr2002)

Similarly to the interviewed Palestinian official, an adviser to Yasser Arafat, Nabil Abu Rudaynah, has taken a very positive stance on the EU policies in the Middle East:

[T]he special EU envoy Moratinos arrived in Gaza today, carrying new ideas. He was asked to relay these ideas by the EU Presidency. He will make dynamic moves in the next few days. He reviewed with President Abu Ammar some of these ideas which were well received. As you are well aware, the European stand is in full harmony with Arab issues in general, and with the Palestinian cause in particular, especially with regard to the occupied Arab city of Jerusalem. We should recall that the draft UN Security Council resolution against which

232 Interview with an Israeli source, 10 May 2002.
233 E-mail interview with the Head of the Palestinian delegation to an EU member state, 23 June 2002.
234 Interview with the Head of the Palestinian delegation to an EU member state, 29 April 2002.
the Americans used their veto right was worded by the European states. This is a significant development in Palestinian-European relations that reflects a real and full support for Palestinian negotiators.

(Reuters 18Mar1997b)

Notwithstanding the Arab welcome of European intervention, it is held as important within the CFSP community that European efforts are not taken as attempts to replace the United States in the political dialogue. For instance, Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo affirmed soon after the nomination of the special envoy that the EU’s role in the region was not separate but complementary to that of the United States (Reuters 21Feb1997). Moratinos himself has also expressed his support of the view that the European role should be complementary to the US efforts in the Middle East, but not in the sense that the Americans would take care of the political process while the Europeans would deal with economic questions. Moratinos clarified the European position by saying that to challenge the United States over its dominant position “would be a vain exercise which is not part, in any case, of Europe’s intentions. My conviction is that we must help Washington in its Middle East enterprise. The question therefore is not to oppose the efforts of the United States, but to help them grow in the right direction.” (Reuters 19Feb2000, emphasis added) Moratinos’s understanding of the complementarity is probably not completely acceptable to Washington and Jerusalem where the US efforts are not seen as something to be straightened up. Besides, an attempt to ‘teach’ the Americans where they have ‘grown wrong’ in their Middle East policies easily freezes the setting so that the EU cannot avoid being taken as a balancing factor that puts the weight on the Palestinian side in order to counter the US weight on the Israeli side. This is exactly what van Mierlo saw the EU should get out of: “We should avoid that the Americans played a role to the benefit of the Israelis and Europe only back the Palestinians” (Reuters 18Feb1997).

When the second Palestinian uprising had lasted roughly a year, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer noted that in Europe “we often underestimate the fact that the question of Israel’s existence is not just theoretical. Israel cannot permit a defeat even for two days. Then this state will no longer exist. […] The security factor therefore plays an existential role for Israel” (Reuters 06Nov2001). To prove that the EU has sensitivity also to Israeli concerns, the EU Foreign Ministers demanded for the first time on 10 December 2001 that Arafat declare in Arabic an end to the violent uprising against Israel, and dismantle “Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad’s terrorist networks” whose attacks, according to Moratinos, have undermined the Palestinian leadership. Moratinos
told Europeans “hope that these terrorist networks will be eliminated as soon as possible”. (European Union 2001; Reuters 22Dec2001)

Potentially, a special envoy could be used to increase mutual understanding between the EU and the parties in conflict, and correct misperceptions of the EU’s position, if there are any, but Moratinos has hardly shaken the Israeli conviction that it “cannot trust the EU as an honest broker” (Reuters 26Mar1997). If the “mediator impartiality is […] essential for mediation success to come about” as Kleiboer (1996, 369) argues, one reason for the lack of EU-led breakthroughs in the process may be that the EU performance has not convinced Israel of Union impartiality. But Carnevale and Arad (1996), on the contrary, claim that partial mediators can succeed regardless of their bias, and maintain that to persuade protagonists a biased mediator can use carrots and sticks to achieve a settlement. But it seems that in the Middle East, the EU has no carrots and sticks to use to have a significant impact on the conflicting parties. This lack of means has to do with credibility deficiency.

6.4. CREDIBILITY

The question of credibility is about whether the EU is to be trusted as a political community. (See Hansen and Williams 1999, 245) References to the EU’s credibility and Moratinos reflecting it were marginal in public discussion as well as in the interviews made for this thesis. Scepticism is probably the most accurate term to describe both European and Israeli views in this respect. The Arab sources did not mention the EU’s lack of certain elements or tools that traditional international actorness of states requires. Instead, they emphasised that the EU needs to be more active in the political process without specifying the means to create a space for active participation.235

A credibility problem that the Union acknowledges is related to the lack of military power: “For Israelis this means—and even for Arabs—that the EU is not a credible power. Here power means physical force”.236 An overall view presented in the interviews was that the ‘security talk’ in the context of the Middle East is very visibly characterised by the traditional understanding that power to maintain international security has to do with military might. This

235 Interviews with a senior official in the GCC, 23 January 2002, and the Head of the Palestinian delegation to an EU member state, 29 April 2002.

236 Interview with Moratinos’s political adviser, Christian Jouret, 31 May 2002.
means that in order to be powerful an actor needs to give a plausible image that it is able to achieve its goals by threatening to use armed force. This was a view to be expected from Middle Eastern sources but also some European officials felt that credibility in foreign policies has to do with armed force.\textsuperscript{237} In practice it seemed, however, that the question was not so much about credibility as such but about the fact that conflicting parties swear by military might and an actor that lacks this dimension is not taken seriously. This creates a condition where even an actor that counts on non-military power is forced to play by the rules of those emphasising physical force.

The debate on the EU’s future as a political entity has evolved around the question of whether the EU should transform into the likeness of a traditional foreign policy actor and eventually forsake the civilian power actorness that has characterised the Union until today. The emphasis on military power is in sharp contrast to the civilian power approach that François Duchêne applied to the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1970s. The concept ‘civilian power’ can be summarised as an international actor that influences the international system by using economic, financial and political means instead of military power, and promotes the ideals of democracy, human rights and economic growth through co-operative use of non-military means. Usually, the civilian nature of the EU is stressed when the Union’s international actorness is discussed. And yet, when it comes to developing a credible foreign policy, the civilian nature is seen as an obstacle that the EU has to overcome. (See Hill 1990; Stavridis 2001) An observer has described the balance between the stress on the civilian nature and the aim to develop a military being by saying that

\[\text{t}he\ \text{flurry}\ \text{of}\ \text{recent}\ \text{talks}\ \text{reflects}\ \text{growing}\ \text{frustration}\ \text{amongst}\ \text{European}\ \text{diplomats}\ \text{and}\ \text{politicians}\ \text{that}\ \text{even}\ \text{though}\ \text{the}\ \text{EU}\ \text{is}\ \text{the}\ \text{largest}\ \text{aid}\ \text{donor}\ \text{by}\ \text{far}\ \text{to}\ \text{the}\ \text{region},\ \text{it}\ \text{has}\ \text{shown}\ \text{little}\ \text{ability}\ \text{to}\ \text{influence}\ \text{events}\ \text{there}\ \text{politically}.}\ \text{[…]}\ \text{Even}\ \text{after}\ \text{a}\ \text{year}\ \text{of}\ \text{greater}\ \text{political}\ \text{involvement}\ \text{through}\ \text{its}\ \text{special}\ \text{envoy,}\ \text{the}\ \text{Union}\ \text{is}\ \text{still}\ \text{widely}\ \text{seen}\ \text{as}\ \text{a}\ \text{toothless}\ \text{operator.}\ \text{Moratinos}\ \text{has}\ \text{repeatedly}\ \text{warned}\ \text{that}\ \text{the}\ \text{EU}\ \text{must}\ \text{“translate}\ \text{visibility}\ \text{into}\ \text{credibility”.}}\ \text{(Reuters 20Nov1997)}}\]

Credibility deficiency practically limits the actor’s possibilities to persuade the conflicting parties to come to the negotiation table and, eventually, commit themselves to an agreement. If an external actor lacks credibility, its

\textsuperscript{237} E.g. interview with Moratinos’s political adviser, Christian Jouret, 31 May 2002. On the other hand, Moratinos’s economic adviser said in the interview (8 May 2002) that Moratinos has brought the needed credibility to the EU, hence emphasising the view that a civilian power can be credible actor.
representatives are unable to give guarantees that parties in conflict often need in order to make sure that the adversary fulfils its obligations. Guarantees of third parties may also be needed to secure one’s position on the homefront of the political battlefield, where losing face would mean political (or even physical) death. The importance of this kind of guarantee is understood also within the CFSP community that Reuters reported as having agreed “to allow the Spanish diplomat a free hand to try to discover whether there is any hope of a solution […] without either of the two sides losing face” (Reuters 11Jun1997).

The special envoy has delivered a number of proposals but a shortcoming of the EU initiatives is that they tend to remain within the framework defined by the Palestinian Authority. A debated issue during the second intifada has been the reformation of the PA which Israelis and Americans have demanded. Europeans, in turn, have waited for the Palestinians to take initiative before questioning the international legitimacy of the corrupted and malfunctioning leadership that is elected for an indeterminate time. An Israeli source formulated the Europeans’ hesitation in the following way:

Now there are voices in Europe that say that there’s a need for a reform in the Palestinian Authority but that’s only after we have begun to hear these voices also within the PA itself. It’s not good to continue the process like this and keep up the authority without touching the core of the problem. The EU may prolong it for a while but after a long period without a change, the result will be even worse.

In addition to material and institutional capabilities, the credibility of the third party is based on the firm belief held by the conflicting parties that the external actor will avoid one-sided charges even if its position is known to be partial. The EU has on numerous occasions experienced that an international actor without an established global position and strong foothold in a regional political process will face strong criticism when it officially states its position that is difficult to interpret as balanced and evenhanded. An example of such criticism was the Israeli reaction after the EU statement that was issued following the Luxembourg summit in December 1997. The Israeli criticism was directed to Moratinos who had given an impression that the EU would be willing to take Israeli concerns into account in its Middle East policies:

238 Arafat finally agreed to appoint Mahmoud Abbas as prime minister in April 2003 and accepted the new government presented by Abbas who is a longtime advocate of peace with Israel.

239 Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.
This statement was received in Israel with surprise and disappointment, because it contradicted all the soothing messages relayed by Moratinos to Israel on the issue. In a discussion at the Foreign Ministry, senior officials sharply criticized Moratinos’s performance and his unreliability. The officials said that his mission should be re-evaluated to see whether he is benefiting Israel. […] Jerusalem accuses Moratinos of a pro-Palestinian bias, exaggerated reports and a tendency to compete against the US initiative and equate his position to that of Dennis Ross.

(Reuters 23Dec1997b)

A similar lack of credibility has been characteristic to Israeli interpretations with respect to the European efforts to relaunch the negotiations on the Syrian track. While Moratinos was convinced of a “serious and deep commitment by Syria to the peace process with Israel”, and interpreted as Israelis being “rather encouraged” by his words, the official Israeli stand throughout Moratinos’s term in office has been more or less in tune with Danny Naveh, the former Secretary General to Prime Minister Netanyahu, who declared that “we place little hope in the European efforts” to obtain a resumption of peace talks between Israel and Syria (Reuters 06May1997a). Even on the Palestinian side the optimism of Moratinos is not always echoed. The situation on the ground does not give much reason for optimism and contrasts sharply with the special envoy’s upbeat mood.

When it comes to credibility at a personal level, among Israeli interviewees, Moratinos’s British security adviser Alastair Crooke was viewed as the single most credible member of the special envoy’s team. While Moratinos faced some criticism about saying one thing and doing something else, Crooke was defined as “very competent person” who is “able to deal with problems”. He was seconded to the EU “to help the Palestinians to control radical groups responsible for suicide bombings and other attacks on Israelis”. In Israel his appointment was taken as a signal that “the EU, despite its sympathies for the Palestinian cause, is solid on security issues.” It was further observed that “EU officials describe him as a counter-terrorism expert, although his Foreign Office biography refers to him only as a diplomat and gives no indication of a security background.” (Reuters 28Mar1998) The message that the EU wanted to send through the appointment of Crooke was well perceived in Israel where his background in MI6 gave some extra credibility to the work of Moratinos’s team.241 Yet the qualified team with extensive Middle East expertise has not been able to overcome the basic credibility problem, which has to do with the

240 Interviews with Israeli sources, 10 and 22 May 2002.
241 Interview with an Israeli source, 10 May 2002.
EU’s institutional identity as a whole, not only Mr Peace Process and his advisers.

The EU is presently unable to convince some of the significant others of its political credibility. It is not, however, the only international actor struggling with the credibility problem. Russia and the United Nations face difficulties in terms of their actorness in the Middle East. For Russia, the end of the Cold War necessitated a reassessment of its role on the global stage and its relations to regional actors in the Middle East. The problems that the UN faces are different: Despite being a forum of global representation, it is not automatically viewed as a legitimate actor in the eyes of the protagonists. In the General Assembly where all the member states are present, the majority consists of more or less authoritarian regimes with poor human rights record and characterised by a lack of transparency and accountability. The rightfulness of resolutions agreed on in this kind of forum is sometimes questionable. In the Security Council in turn the five great powers, winners of WW II, still enjoy the exclusive privilege of being in the position to block any decision or resolution.

The willingness of various international actors to get involved in the negotiations over the future of the Middle East led to the development of a new form of co-operation among the central third parties. An idea behind the new mechanism called Quartet is to make the whole of international involvement more coherent and more influential. According to the Russian special envoy, “one of the failures of Camp David was that there was no international coverage to promote the settlement.” The Quartet is expected to prevent a repetition of this failure. Moratinos’s political adviser described the Quartet as being avant-garde of third party mechanisms. In the Middle East, the Quartet is represented by the special envoys of the EU (Moratinos), Russia (Vdovin) and the UN (Roed-Larsen), while the United States is sometimes represented by an ambassador or general counsellor instead of a special envoy.

Moratinos’s political adviser, according to whom the Quartet “is a direct product of the intifada,” described it as a go-between and a lobby system. Its advantage is that it has no heavy structure: “It can be called together even within an hour to meet when there is an urgent issue to discuss. […] there is no more need to send messages to capitals and wait for their approval for everything. The Quartet is a meeting institution where we can present ideas now without commitment.” Also the Russian representative said he has high

242 Interview with Russian special envoy, Andrey Vdovin, 31 May 2002.
243 Interview with Moratinos’s political adviser, Christian Jouret, 31 May 2002.
244 Interview with Moratinos’s political adviser, Christian Jouret, 31 May 2002.
expectations about the Quartet, and referred to the actions that the Quartet members have already taken jointly. The Quartet has, for instance, sent joint demarches, and suggested Arafat to combat terrorism and reform the Palestinian Authority.\textsuperscript{245} But despite the ostensible equality among the four, from the European perspective Russia and the UN alike are merely “a ceremonial part of the picture”.\textsuperscript{246} Moratinos, however, officially maintains that Russians have a role to play, and is willing to “work jointly with them to rescue the peace process” (Reuters 21 May 1997).

A Quartet meeting was held at the political level in New York in September 2002. There the Quartet members issued a balanced communiqué outlining a three-phase plan to achieve the final settlement. (United Nations 2002) It remains to be seen whether the plan will be realised. In any case, the political weight of the United States is needed in each phase. Despite minor successes, the individual performances of the EU, Russia, and the UN have proved to be toothless without US backing.

6.5.

EFFECTIVENESS—“YOU PLAY TO YOUR STRENGTHS.”

To the extent that the special envoy is taken as an embodiment of the EU Middle East policy and the EU as a community consisting of the political elite of the Union and its member states, the political existence of the Union in the Middle East is tightly connected to the performance of the special envoy. The nomination of the High Representative has naturally complicated the setting but still it is the special envoy who works on the ground with concrete issues and maintains face-to-face contacts with the regional actors on an everyday basis. ‘Mr CFSP’ who is considered the embodiment of the CFSP globally lacks the concreteness of the work that special envos take care of. The function of the High Representative is not adequate, if continuous presence on the ground and concrete achievements are expected. (Cf. Peterson and Sjursen 1998)

In indexical terms, the core of third party performance is to assist the conflicting parties in finding a mutually acceptable solution to their dispute. A great variety of mediating efforts in prolonged, destructive conflicts has been the research subject for countless academic studies, where the focus is usually

\textsuperscript{245} Interview with Russian special envoy, Andrey Vdovin, 31 May 2002.
\textsuperscript{246} Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
on the effectiveness of different third party involvements in various circumstances. Mediators vary from major powers to unofficial intermediaries, and their roles from ‘fire-fighters’ to long-term problem-solving facilitators. But even powerful intermediaries are sometimes unable to impose a settlement whether through an intensive involvement in the negotiations or by means of sanctions and the threat of using military power.

Third party involvement is particularly problematic when one or more of the parties in conflict are reluctant to accept the ‘advice and good offices’ of a potential third party as is the case in the EU’s involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One reason for the nomination of an EU special envoy in the Middle East was to overcome the ambivalence of the EU-Israeli relations or, as the revised mandate text says, to “contribute to a better understanding of the EU’s role among opinion leaders in the region” (European Union 2000).

Soon after being nominated to the post of the Middle East envoy, Moratinos explained that rather than pushing a French bid for an EU seat at the negotiation table he would work as a political go-between and co-ordinate the EU-financed projects: “I believe one sits around the negotiation table only when one is invited to do so by all the parties. […] the role of the Union is not so much to sit at a table as to transmit political messages and show one’s economic and financial availability”, said Moratinos (Reuters 29Oct1996b).

After working for a couple of months as the EU special envoy in the Middle East peace process, Moratinos stressed that “the crisis facing the peace process requires actions and not just recommendations.” (Reuters 31Mar1997) One chronic problem in EU actorness has been exactly the gap between words and deeds. Despite a number of declarations, the Union has been unable to position itself as a truly influential political actor. According to a British interviewee, it is because of the ambivalent EU-Israeli relation that it is difficult to achieve successes on the Palestinian track.

Some characteristics of the practice to send envoys do not seem to change with time. As Mosley (1973, 5) says, already in ancient Greece, the political fortune of envoys usually depended on the position of the ‘receiving’ state with regard to the state that the envoy was sent to represent. The same phenomenon can be seen in the Middle East of our days. There are many projects and forms of co-operation that Moratinos has initiated. Yet the record

247 About different mediator roles and their combinations in the Middle East, see e.g. Kriesberg 2001.


249 Interviews with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002, and an Israeli source, 10 May 2002.
on practical long-term results of significance for which the EU could be credited is relatively modest even if in Moratinos’s office these issues are highlighted\textsuperscript{250}. Jervis (1976, 348) holds it as natural that actors often overestimate the success of their influence. According to him, there are two factors that explain the overestimation of achievement:

First, such a perception gratifies the ego. The person has mattered; he has been efficacious; he is able to shape his environment. […] Second, and more important, the actor is familiar with his own efforts to influence the other but knows much less about other factors that might have been at work. […] In the absense of strong evidence to the contrary, the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was influential.

The CFSP community seems to be well aware both of its successes and insufficiencies in the Middle East. An obvious success at the beginning of Moratinos’s term in office was the Hebron agreement in January 1997. The Hebron Protocol was signed on 17 January 1997 defining the Israeli withdrawal from the city. Beside the letter of assurance from the United States, another letter reinforcing the agreement was handed over by the EU. The role of the EU special representative was remarkable although the EU was initially excluded from the negotiations in autumn 1996. Moratinos’s own view was that the European letter of assurances was decisive for the breakthrough (Reuters 07Feb1997). The letter of assurances was to show that the EU is willing to use its diplomatic weight to ensure that the agreement will be fully implemented. This was seen as the first actual success achieved in the Middle East through the post of special envoy.

A Finnish interviewee pointed out that it is central to the action of special envoys that they are convincing. Credibility is not only a value in itself but a means to get results in terms of negotiations. According to the official, the utility of the action depends on how well the envoy manages to deliver ideas. Moratinos has worked as a special envoy a long enough time to have a strong background for effective action.\textsuperscript{251} But already a couple of months after the Hebron Protocol, Moratinos proposed and negotiated with Israelis and Palestinians a ‘code of conduct’ in order to establish mutually acceptable guiding principles for further peace talks. (Reuters 08Apr1997) The proposal had a strong backing in the EU Parliament and the Council of Ministers but the new crisis following the Israeli decision to found a new settlement, Har Homa, prevented the signing of the ‘code of conduct’.

\textsuperscript{250} Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
\textsuperscript{251} Interview with a Finnish foreign ministry official, 15 February 2001.
A step forward in EU-Israeli relations was taken in the form of EU-Israeli dialogue on the Palestinian economy. The dialogue was established in June 1997 to exchange views in four joint working groups dealing with various aspects of the Palestinian economy. It was defined that the dialogue aims to “assist the implementation of the economic protocols between Israel and the Palestinians”. In practice, the dialogue contributed, for instance, to the opening of the Gaza airport and easing restrictions on the movement of Palestinian people and goods. (European Union 2002a) The Gaza airport was mainly financed by the EU and was considered both as a sign of Palestinian national institutionalisation and as a means to control the movement of people and goods relatively independently from Israel. But soon after the beginning of the second intifada, the airport was closed and in December 2001, Israeli bombardment damaged its speedway. This was explained to be a part of the Israeli counter-action against the latest Palestinian suicide attacks. Later on, the airport was almost completely destroyed along with other important elements of the Palestinian infrastructure.

In July 1997, Moratinos again sought to assist Israelis and Palestinians to get over a deadlock in their interaction and to establish a code of conduct to “prevent any rise in tension on the ground and reassure each other of the other’s intentions”. The European interpretation was that the result was welcomed by the parties involved and that the EU had “entered the Middle-Eastern diplomatic scene through the main door”. (Reuters 24Jul1997) Israelis disagreed, saying that this was not the right time for European initiatives. In Israeli television it was reported that the “US mediator Dennis Ross relayed a message to Moratinos in which he says that Moratinos’ involvement is not contributing to and is even delaying the US and Egyptian efforts to mediate between the two sides.” (Reuters 28Jul1997) The CFSP community was, however, convinced of the positive impact that a code of conduct would have on the stalemate. The EU Foreign Ministers adopted in Luxembourg on 6 October 1997 a code of conduct hoping that the conflicting parties would consult with each other prior to making any decision that might affect the final outcome of the talks. Economic co-operation, facilitation of movement of people and goods, and dialogue between civil societies were also emphasised as a means to create a climate of confidence. (Reuters 08Oct1997)

Despite the international efforts to ease the tension, the dispute of spring 1997 led to a long impasse in the peace process. The Wye River Memorandum of 23 October 1998 finally renewed the negotiations. The EU was marginalised in the Wye River talks that were carried through under the auspices of the United States. But after the agreement was reached, the EU assistance was welcomed again. According to Moratinos’s economic adviser, Palestinians
agreed to fulfil in the Wye agreement “certain security obligations that they had no means to fulfil. They were not able to do that so we needed to help them.” Already six months earlier, the EU had established the Joint EU-Palestinian Security Committee, initiated and chaired by the special envoy.\textsuperscript{252} Yet, external assistance on certain issues such as counter-terrorism has no expected effects as long as the PA lacks the political will to tackle the problem. Burchard clarified the PA’s stance on Palestinian terrorist organisations, saying that

\begin{quote}
[t]hey were not willing to crack down all the infrastructure of these organisations. Sometimes it is difficult to determine who are terrorists and who are not. A massive cracking down of the structures would have caused a civil war in the Palestinian Territories. So it had to be approached from the perspective like what is the terrorism that is hindering the Palestinian state to be established.\textsuperscript{253}
\end{quote}

After signing the Wye River Memorandum, Israelis released 250 Palestinian prisoners. Also the opening of the international airport in the Gaza Strip was taken as a positive sign in Europe. The role of the EU special envoy in terms of the Wye agreement was defined as “a channel for the EU to ensure that the Israelis and Palestinians effectively apply the October 23 accords.” (Reuters 14Nov1998) Moratinos stressed the importance of a common European approach, saying that “we want to have a common position in order to facilitate and to assist the parties. I think the EU has the same responsibility not to take any decision that could undermine or could jeopardize the talks and the negotiations process. That is going to be the parameters of our decision.” (Reuters 21Jan1999)

The next eye-catching EU move was the Berlin declaration in June 1999. The declaration was drafted by Moratinos, who saw it as essential for the Palestinians’ decision to postpone the declaration of independence. The importance of Berlin declaration was emphasised both in Europe and Israel. According to an Israeli interviewee, “the EU has been one or two steps fore Israel all along. Europe always said we have to negotiate and have a Palestinian

\textsuperscript{252} Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.

One of Moratinos’s early brainchildren was an Israeli-Palestinian security committee. His idea was that thanks to this joint committee, Palestinians and Israelis would be able to “work together to prevent terrorism and violence” (Reuters 06Aug1997). The idea was rejected, however, and the next year, in 1998, the Joint EU-Palestinian Security Committee was established. It was initiated by the special envoy as a framework for providing training and expertise for the Palestinian Authority (European Union 2002a).

\textsuperscript{253} Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
state. [...] In general, it is good to have this mechanism of declarations because it’s a mechanism that pulls everyone uphill.” And yet, even if the mechanism as such is considered effective in certain questions, it is always with certain reservations in Israel because the EU is seen to side with the Arabs.

As the Wye River agreement was only partially implemented, new negotiations of the terms were deemed necessary. The renewed agreement was reached in Sharm el-Sheikh on 4 September 1999, but the Palestinian Authority was not willing to sign the agreement unless the letters of assurance were received from both the United States and the European Union. After the parties had signed the agreement, an event for the support of the peace process was organised in the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York. The ‘Partners for Peace’ gathering proposed by the EU special envoy involved most regional and international key actors in the peace process.

In May 2000, there was again a critical moment in Israeli-Palestinian dialogue around the 52nd anniversary of the day that Israel was founded. Among Palestinians, the day is called nakba, literally the day of catastrophe. Violent demonstrations burst out that day in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Two people died and tens were wounded in the exchange of fire of Israeli and Palestinian security forces. The continuation of violence made Ehud Barak call an end to peace talks in Stockholm. New negotiations without EU participation were then held at Camp David in July 2000 but no concrete results were achieved in these talks dominated by the United States. Clinton’s press conference following the failed talks laid most of the blame for the failure on Arafat.

254 Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.

255 Also on the multilateral track there was some hope for a renewal of the negotiations. The multilateral track of the peace process had gotten blocked in 1996. Following the success in Sharm el-Sheikh, Russia called for re-launching of the multilateral negotiations in Moscow. In February 2000, the Ministerial Steering Group started a review of the past developments and setbacks of the multilateral track. The EU special envoy had since the beginning of his mandate paid special attention to the Syrian and Lebanese tracks and demonstrated the EU’s willingness to take into account the complexity of the peace process as a whole. After the Israeli withdrawal from the Southern Lebanon, the special envoy has had close contacts with NGOs, UNRWA and UNIFIL as well as Lebanese civil society to reaffirm the EU’s position in the process of Southern Lebanon’s re-integration. The shuttling diplomacy of Moratinos and his team has provided a channel to exchange views between the regional parties, to ease tensions, and to explore new ideas for the advancement of the dialogue.

256 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002. See also Shain and Bristman 2002.
Internationally it was assumed that it was largely due to frustration caused by the failures in negotiations and the prolonged impasse in the peace process that the second *intifada* broke out at the end of September in 2000: “Among Palestinians there was a question whether the freedom is just a lie. And they were getting frustrated of the slowness of the political agenda,” explained a European interviewee.²⁵⁷ What can be concluded from the primary sources of this study is that Europeans do not seem willing to consider the possibility that the *intifada* was orchestrated by the PA right from the beginning. Moratinos’s economic adviser said that “[t]here’s Israeli allegation about the preparations of the uprising on the Palestinian side, but I don’t think that’s true. Arafat and the Palestinian administration can, of course, be blamed for not doing enough.” Yet, some Fatah officials among others have told about the systematic planning of the uprising and Marwan Barghouti is credited with being its key organiser.²⁵⁸

In October 2000, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met with President Clinton in Paris and Sharm el-Sheikh. Unlike the EU and the UN, Russia was not invited to the ‘crisis conference’ at Sharm el-Sheikh. The conflicting parties agreed to put an end to the violence but did not manage to implement the agreement. The circle of increasingly fierce violence inflamed in November 2000 when car bombs and suicide bombings became a central characteristic of the Palestinian uprising. Israeli forces entered Palestinian cities and villages to retaliate the terrorist attacks and arrest the suspects, which further infuriated the Palestinian extremists. The vicious circle of revenge also radicalised public opinion on both sides.

In December 2000, the Israeli government was ready to accept Clinton’s peace proposal as the framework for negotiations, but Palestinians regarded it as siding with Israel and rejected it as the basis for future talks. A fresh start was taken in Taba in January 2001. This was Clinton’s last attempt to crown his second term as the US President. Both sides made considerable concessions in central issues but at the end of January, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak broke off the negotiations until after the prime ministerial elections on 6 February. Ariel Sharon’s landslide victory then froze the peace talks. In Taba, the EU was the only depositer of the negotiations, on the basis of which Moratinos prepared a non-paper that systematically discussed the issues that had been agreed on in Taba. This plan that was considered an extensive basis

²⁵⁷ Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
²⁵⁸ Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002. A Palestinian Minister, Imad Faluji, contradicted Burchard’s claim, saying that the violent uprising was “planned since Chairman [Yasir] Arafat’s return from Camp David” (as quoted in Schenker 2001). See also Berman 2001; Lahoud 2001.
for any future negotiations was later on leaked to Israeli press by Palestinian negotiators.259

Many international actors took Sharon’s re-entrance at the forefront of the day-to-day policy making as a serious drawback in a situation when there had been some hope that it might be possible to find a negotiated solution. The Bush administration remained for a relatively long time reluctant to resume the active mediating role of the United States in the Middle East, which made it easier for Europeans to step in. (See Stein 2002) In April 2001, the EU brokered in Athens the first high level meeting between Israelis and Palestinians after the Israeli elections, but practically nothing was achieved in this meeting. The same month, the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee report (so called Mitchell report) was published. For the part of the EU, the background work was done by Moratinos’s team although it was the High Representative Solana who nominally participated in the committee.260

According to an interviewee, Moratinos’s activities in general are characterised by “his aim to deal with long term problems and to get to the final status talks.”261 But the beginning of the uprising had an impact on the role of Moratinos’s team that since then has made several interventions, especially on antiterrorism activity.262 The deteriorating situation has pushed the long-term proposals to the background and forced the international actors to focus on confining bursts of violence. As a member of the CFSP community stated, Moratinos’s “[f]unction as a ‘fire-fighter’ has become quite important”263. In this respect, Israelis appreciate especially the work done by Moratinos’s security adviser Alastair Crooke. His intelligence background gives him needed insight to handle complicated security issues. He was, for instance, dealing with the settlement of shootings from the Palestinian village Beit Jala to the Jewish neighbourhood of Gilo in the southern part of Jerusalem in summer 2000. Crooke served as an independent information source to the EU in the incident where the conflicting parties had different stories about the course of events.264 The confrontation started as Palestinians placed Tanzim265

259 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
260 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
261 Interview with an Irish foreign ministry official, 14 January 2002.
262 Interview with an Israeli source, 26 May 2002.
263 Interview with a British foreign ministry official, 27 January 2002.
264 Interview with an Israeli source, 10 May 2002. See also MacAskill 2002.
265 Officially, Tanzim is a youth organisation of Arafat’s Fatah movement. But as a matter of fact, it acts as a paramilitary group whose members have been at the forefront of violent demonstrations, attacks on Israeli civilians and clashes with
people in the Christian neighbourhood of Beit Jala that had not been involved in the uprising before. Tanzim fighters started to shoot from Beit Jala to Gilo thereby provoking Israelis to retaliate and getting the local Christian Arabs involved in the fighting. Initially, Israel was against international intervention there, and even when they agreed on an external intervention they required the observers to be Americans, not Europeans. Moratinos’s team brokered a cease-fire deal and convinced Israelis that as Hamas and other militant groups are present, it would be dangerous for Americans to enter the village due to the militants’ hatred not only of Israelis but of Americans as well. Hence, Italian, Spanish, French, and British observers were sent in and shootings ceased.266 Further, the deal to end the siege of the Nativity Church in May 2002 was mediated by Moratinos’s team and the Palestinian fighters were received in EU member states. The siege and agreement to end it attracted wide media attention that placed the EU in the spotlight. (Reuters 09May2002)

The EU sought to play a role also in the question of Palestinian prisoners who were sentenced for terrorist activities. Israel accused the PA of having revolving doors in the prisons and therefore international observation was deemed necessary. As Moratinos’s adviser said: “We don’t know if Arafat is serious and we need to ensure that these people are not released.”267 Due to the EU’s internal co-ordination problems and lack of budget for providing prison guards, the Union missed this opportunity for a performance which, besides easing the tension between Israelis and Palestinians, could have had a positive impact on the image that regional actors have of the EU. Instead, American and British guards were sent to take care of the surveillance in Palestinian prisons. This case highlighted “the weaknesses of a policy shaped by the lowest common denominator”:268 When communication between the Council and the Commission is troublesome, decision making processes are slow, and the institutions have different preferences, it is not easy to react in a quick and efficient manner on acute stalemates, the solving of which requires not only good will but also financial and other resources.

Despite some successes in the security sector, the emphasis of the EU’s activities in the region is still indisputably economic. The circle of violence

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266 Interview with Moratinos’s political adviser, Christian Jouret, 31 May 2002. See also Reuters 30Aug2001.

267 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.

has caused tremendous economic losses in the Territories. In Israel, the main economic losses have been due to a sharp decrease in the number of foreign tourists visiting the country, while in the Territories the closures of borders to Israel have hindered the Palestinian workers from traveling freely between their homes in the Territories and work places on the Israeli side of the Green Line. As the Palestinian economy is highly dependent on the Israeli one, this has meant in practice that unemployment has increased dramatically: In early 2000, the average unemployment rate in the Territories was about ten percent. In March 2002, the unemployment in Gaza and the West Bank had risen up to 36 and 26 percent respectively. (World Bank 2002b) Especially in Gaza, where most of the Palestinian population live in shuck villages without running water or electricity, the ever increasing poverty offers a fertile ground for political extremism and terrorism. In this sense, the economic assistance given to Palestinians by the EU and other donors may also be seen as “assistance for Israel’s security”\(^{269}\).

Besides the most visible part of the peace process, meaning open negotiations and agreements, there is also the day-to-day conduct of dialogue and the preparatory side that rarely hits the headlines but is an essential element of the peace process and in the relations between the EU and the regional parties.\(^{270}\) In addition to what has already been discussed in this chapter, the EU special representative has established two informal EU task forces to assist Israel and the Palestinians on water and refugee issues. Further, since summer 1999 there has been a high level task force composed of American and European personalities who oversee the reform of Palestinian public institutions. (European Union 2002a)

In addition to official contacts at different levels, people-to-people co-operation between Israelis and Palestinians used to be active. It has mainly consisted of disconnected forms of interaction and is in a constant state of flux.\(^{271}\) The ups and downs in the peace process easily influence the forms of co-operation that lack firmly established structures and external financing. As for Moratinos’s work, one positive aspect has been his active stance in people-to-people co-operation,\(^{272}\) but after the second Palestinian uprising began, the

\(^{269}\) Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
\(^{270}\) See Ross 2002. Also Moratinos’s political adviser stressed the importance of day-to-day contacts (interview 31 May 2002).
\(^{271}\) Interview with a Finnish foreign ministry official, 30 November 2000.
\(^{272}\) Interview with an Irish foreign ministry official, 14 January 2002.
Palestinian administration started drawing its support from all people-to-people projects, which led to freezing this type of co-operation.273

Israelis appreciate the silent diplomacy that, generally speaking, “is not very natural to the EU”. According to an interviewee, Moratinos “avoids the kind of megaphone diplomacy that is quite typical to the EU in general.” But he continued that “[r]ecently Moratinos has been less active but more visible.” It was speculated whether it was only because “[l]ately there’s been no much role for quiet diplomacy”, or whether this had to do with “his ambition to find a new post”.274 In any case, the visibility refers to the fact that performance also has functions not directly related to actual results in the peace process, as was discussed in chapter five.

A difficulty in the performance that produces a lot of initiatives without being able to persuade the conflicting parties to work jointly to reach an agreement and implement it is, as an interviewee said, that “in a region like the Middle East, ideas are all old-fashioned. It’s not easy to find a new and fresh view. Or to avoid being ‘a lover of some position’.”275 To sum up, there have been numerous incidents where Moratinos’s team has been of use, but in the Israeli assessment, there have been no major breakthroughs thanks to his activities.276 A European official concluded in a realistic manner: “You play to your strengths.”277 When the circumstances on the ground make people assess that “the whole thing is out of control”,278 it is not surprising that the EU, most of the time acting on the basis of the lowest common denominator and searching to build a coherent institutional identity, is not able to have a long-term impact on the conflict.

273 Interview with the Head of the Palestinian delegation to an EU member state, 29 April 2002.
274 Interview with an Israeli source, 10 May 2002. Marc Otte was appointed on 17 July 2003 to succeed Moratinos to the office of the special representative.
275 Interview with a Portuguese foreign ministry official, 7 May 2002.
276 Interview with an Israeli source, 10 May 2002.
277 Interview with a British foreign ministry official, 27 January 2002.
278 Interview with an Irish foreign ministry official, 14 January 2002.
SYMBOLIC PERFORMANCE: REPRESENTING SELF-INTERESTS

“Most of the time, people are interested more in rewards than in sacrifices” says Deutsch and continues, “[o]ne of the fundamental truths about politics is that much of it occurs in the pursuit of the interests of particular individuals or groups” (Deutsch 1970, 10). Lewis (1996) confirms that “while evenhandedness is a desirable quality in agencies of law enforcement, it is irrelevant to the policies of a power pursuing its interests as defined by its leadership. If evenhandedness means treating all alike, it is a manifestly suicidal policy for any government, American or other, to pursue.” It is particularly the rationalist tradition that emphasises the importance of interests in policy making. In the discipline of International Relations, a focus on interests has characterised approaches from realism and its later variant neorealism to liberalism and neoliberal institutionalism. The explanatory power of interests has been taken as a self-evident, exogenously given point of departure by some theories, while others have sought to justify the primacy of interests with respect to identity that has been brought ever increasingly into IR discussions by post-modern and sociologically oriented approaches. From the perspective of rational analysis, the premise is that you are something to the extent that you want something, meaning that it is only through expressing one’s interests that one can be identified as someone, as a rational being.

To put it simply, in approaches emphasising interests, rational action means that people have goals that they attempt to achieve within the freedom of movement that they have. Besides limitations in physical capabilities, the constraints of circumstances have to do with the logic of anarchy. Further, rational choice theories assume that people choose the best means that they believe will make them attain their goals. So defined, rational action is goal directed. In practice, goals and interests defining them are not, however, exogenously given. Instead, “any concept we may have of our own self-interest is partially determined by normative ideas about what we are entitled to” (Frost 1996, 2). Interests derive from an actor’s identity within which normatively preferred goals, too, are defined. Besides values and altruistic assessment about
what is to be deemed appropriate and preferable, interests—i.e. ‘what I prefer’—are connected to the idea of ‘who I am’. Or, as Ringmar (1996, 79-80) formulates, “[w]hat we want we can only want as that character which appears in a story we tell about ourselves and which we address to an audience” and thus “interests are properties of communication between individuals; things that people construct as they seek to explain themselves to themselves as well as to others.”

Also in studies of ‘crisis foreign policy making’, self-interests are sometimes taken as a significant factor influencing the behaviour of international actors. In the field of conflict research this means that not only conflicting parties but also those who get involved as mediators or facilitators are guided by their self-interests. As Kleiboer (1996, 370) states, “in international politics, peacemaking is often intertwined with less altruistic self-interests of mediators.” In action motivated by interests the question is about the symbolic connection to the declared reason while the main purpose of action is elsewhere, namely in safeguarding or promoting self-interests.

Symbolicity means that there is a conventional understanding or agreement among interpreters about what the referential relation between a sign and its object is like. It is the agreement that frames interpretations of symbolic sign-object relations. What this has to do with the institutional interests of the represented entity is that by establishing the frames convention creates the space needed for serving one’s interests in the circumstances that either threaten the self-interests or may be used in advancing them. When we acknowledge the need to act for valued ends (indexicality) and agree that a performance is to be understood as an expression of a certain type of activity (such as conflict mediation) and interpreted in terms of its influence on the circumstances that ‘demand’ action (e.g. the primary focus of conflict mediation is understood to be assisting the conflicting parties to reach an agreement), we simultaneously make it possible for the represented entity to include in its agent’s performance other considerations that cannot be directly derived from the quest for a just solution.

Principal mediators actively suggest and promote various initiatives, sometimes even coercing and pressuring the conflicting parties to agree. Governments as third parties often have significant stakes in conflict and therefore may spend remarkable resources to find a solution that is both acceptable to the parties in conflict and advantageous to the third party itself. Morgenthau, who paid attention to the relativity of justice, claimed that “[a]ll of us look at the world and judge it from the vantage point of our interests” (Morgenthau 1963/1970, 64).
As for the EU’s performance in the Middle East, it is clear that there are selfish motives for getting involved. To what extent we can say that these interests concern the EU as a united actor is a complicated issue. We have claimed in chapter three that in order to have interests an actor needs to have an identity. The interviews made for the study reflected the present lack of institutional identity at the EU level. Largely, ‘European interests’ are still the interests of the member states as far as they are compatible. They become ‘interests of the EU’ by the development of joint endeavours to safeguard and promote these interests. Assuming that the EU were a truly coherent and functioning foreign policy actor, the interests that are discussed in this chapter could be served through joint performance. But in the absence of the sense of a strong collective self, some parts of the following discussion remain hypothetical when it comes to the Union as a whole and focus instead on EU member states’ interests that could be safeguarded or promoted through a foreign policy performance within the institutional framework of the Union.

It is undeniable that the EU member states have important interests in the Middle East and are therefore willing to get involved in the political process. Also representatives of Arab states and organisations often express the wish that the EU would play a greater role in the peace process. This kind of broadening of its role would, according to Secretary General of the Arab League, Dr Abdel Meguid, be “in line with [EU’s] weight on the international domain and the volume of European interest in the Middle East”. (Reuters 02Apr1997) But the EU action is ‘hampered’ by the fact that Israel neglects the EU that it regards as biased because Europeans rather concentrate on safeguarding their self-interests than trying to formulate a just stance279.

Touval and Zartman, who emphasise that “mediators are no less motivated by self-interest than by humanitarian impulses” (1985, 8), make a distinction between defensive and expansionist interests. In defensive interests the question is about safeguarding or restoring the balance that exists or has existed, while expansionist interests seek to increase influence and power. Sometimes it may be difficult to straightforwardly separate the two. Yet a rough division can be made between protection and extension so that a third party either seeks to limit damage to itself or use the conflict resolution as a means to “win the gratitude of one party” and further “increase its influence by making its involvement essential for any negotiations between the two adversaries” (Touval and Zartman 1985, 8-9).

Wendt (1999, 235-237) identifies the four basic interests of states as physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem (See also George and Keohane 1980). These dimensions are present in the following

279 Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.
Part of the analysis where we discuss how security, political, economic, and strategic interests may appear in the collective representation of the EU. On the basis of the primary sources, it can be argued that it is possible to find all the four types of interests in the representation of the EU in the Middle East, even if the representation as such is too weak to safeguard the interests, and member states’ national preferences are usually prioritised over attempts to find a common denominator at the Union level.

### 7.1. Security Interests

Waltz (1979), among some other realists and neorealists, identified survival as the only national interest of states. Even if we do not agree with this claim, it is obvious that survival or security is fundamental for other interests. Physical and ontological security are at the top of the list of material needs of individuals. These needs cannot be deduced to the interests of international actors, but it is justified to argue that the interests that have directly to do with existence are the most significant for all kinds of individual and collective actors and in close connection to the identity of the actor (Wendt 1999, 131). Burke (1954, 37) clarifies the centrality of interest to survive by giving the following example:

> It is not hard to imagine that if a grasshopper could speak he would be much more readily interested in what you had to tell him about “Birds That Eat Grasshoppers” than in a more scholarly and better presented talk on “Mating Habits of the Australian Auk.” The factor of interest plays a large part in the business of communication.

We can agree on this, although what is more fundamental than interests as such is the individual or collective identity. So, the fact that a grasshopper might be interested in certain birds has to do with its identity or nature as grasshopper and the nature of the birds as ‘life threatening enemies’ from the grasshopper’s perspective. Hence, what we hold as essential for our existence has to do with the ontological question about our existence. Even the most fundamental interests are based on identity.

Moving to the sphere of world affairs, the traditional view of political realism holds that a prerequisite for security is the possession of adequate military means to defend oneself and one’s allies against an external threat and, if needed, to have a plausible threat against potential aggressors. Security,
when defined from this perspective, is characteristically ‘hard security’ that can be assured only in terms of military power over military threats caused by other states. It follows that civilian actors, such as multinational corporations, NGOs, or the European Union, are excluded from security discourses unless they develop military structures of their own. The power or influence of such non-state or interstate actors would furthermore be “conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states”, as Bull (1982, 151) argues. But as we have seen, during the past decade civilian actors have developed capabilities to influence each other and states as well by means that do not require the military backing of states. Not only non-state actors but also states are increasingly characterised by non-military power—even in security discourses. As the Cold War ended, the military-based concept of security lost its position as a comprehensive definition of security. (See Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998; Huysmans 1998; Stavridis 2001)

Formally, the EC member states adopted the wide concept of security in 1987 by expressing in the Single European Act (SEA, art.30.6a) their readiness “to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security.” Closer co-operation on security-related questions was seen as a means to develop the Community’s foreign policy identity. During the past decade, the meanings of ‘foreign’ and ‘security’ have undergone a conceptual change and the emergence of new actors has affected the direction and speed of the change. In the European context, those participating in the construction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU tend to see the process as leaps toward continental security, peace and welfare with possible influence on the wider world as well. The idea of a secure continent has been a driving force in the process that gradually leads to an ever wider and deeper sphere of democratic peace. The extension of the security concept encompasses the kinds of areas, like environment, migration, international crime, or global market, that are not taken as dimensions of security when the concept is understood as referring to national or state security habitually defended by military means. Also the actualised threat of religiously motivated terrorism has increased the awareness of European security interests that need to be safeguarded.

Besides movement of goods and money, also movement of persons brings the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean Arab states concretely in touch with Western Europe. The EU member states have already substantial numbers of immigrants of Middle Eastern origin. Besides the threat of terrorism and the closeness of unstable Arab states, possible unrest among the Muslim population in Europe is a factor that potentially undermines EU security (Marr 1994). An Israeli interviewee remarked that “there is always a price attached to criticising Arab world and Europe is not ready to pay the price. It is about the threat of
terrorism—attacks might take place in Europe. Secondly, there is a danger of internal instability.” The fact that the number of Muslims in Europe is rapidly growing means also that in the near future there will be a significant domestic Muslim lobby in some key European countries and this factor is already taken into account in European foreign policies. In order to safeguard European security interests, the CFSP community, including the special envoy, has adopted a stance that avoids disturbing the fragile balance of the EU’s security interests and Arab states’ call for acceptance in the western world.

Furthermore, there is a noticeable difference between European and American points of view as for the potential emergence of an Islamic great power: “Europe is neither excessively worried about the emergence of a Middle Eastern great power (as is the US), nor close to generating a long-range strategy for solving transnational “spill-over” threats by getting involved in the Middle East.” (Wæver and Buzan 2000, 88) Contrary to the American policy of interference, it seems that the EU’s strategy concerning Middle Eastern threats is non-involvement and an accommodating attitude. While Americans act to make sure that security threats are eliminated, Europeans seek to ‘behave nicely’ in order not to exasperate the potential sources of security threats.

In this sense, the question in EU relations with the Middle East is about respect for fear that criticising Arab parties of the conflict might cause a reaction that would become a threat to the security interests of the EU member states. In EU-Israeli relations, in turn, these kinds of security considerations are unnecessary. The fact that Israel is a stable democracy and could not be considered as a potential source of international terrorism makes it from the EU perspective a ‘secure’ external actor. At the same time, the shared human rights principles load EU-Israeli relations with a tension that is considerably less visible if not completely absent in the Union’s relations with non-democratic international actors. This means that Israel is expected to respect the western norms, while non-democratic actors in the Middle East are rather considered as subjects that are not yet developed to the level where similar behaviour can be expected. (See Dosenrode and Stubkjær 2002)

In a discussion about the nomination of Ambassador Moratinos to represent the EU in the Middle East, French Foreign Minister de Charette noticed that “[i]f there is a return to violence, to terrorism, that will have a direct effect on Europe.” (Reuters 28Oct1996b) The stability of the Middle East is of vital interest to the EU member states—especially to those in the geographic proximity and those having a large Arab and/or Muslim minority. Although not all member states share the sense of vulnerability, a performance in the name of the Union contributes to the image of individual member states. In

280 Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.
symbolic terms, the EU special envoy’s performance, even if not very strong and visible, adds to the perceptions that regional actors in the Middle East have of the Union member states and how they interact with them. Thus, potentially, getting involved in conflict mediation through a special envoy’s performance may contribute to safeguarding EU member states’ security interests, since a conventional relation between a sign and a represented object allows for ‘misusing’ the sign.

For the CFSP community, the task of the special representative, as for the security considerations, is to contribute to the mutual respect and understanding.281 The idea of vulnerability plays an important part in the EU’s relations with the unstable nearby regions such as the Mediterranean region and the Middle East. Economic assistance and co-operation is the most significant channel to influence the region but other means that could be used to safeguard member states’ interests should not be forgotten either even if their concrete results may be disputable. A shared objective of different means is to create a secure and stable international environment, beginning from the close neighbourhood. As Jean Breteche, representative of the European Commission in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, said: “We want to have a region, in which peace and prosperity prevail, in the Mediterranean Basin next to Europe” (Reuters 29Jan2002).

7.2. POLITICAL INTERESTS

Wendt’s (1999, 235) reference to autonomy as one of the four interests that “must somehow be addressed if states are to reproduce themselves” is here understood to comprise the political interests of an international actor. According to Wendt’s definition, all organisations “have an interest in autonomy, since without it they will be constrained in their ability to meet internal demands or respond to contingencies in the environment”. Autonomy has to do with freedom to maneuver with respect to the actor’s internal composition and external contexts of action.

France has been very active in creating ‘European Middle East policy’ even if for de Charette it seemed that “France has acted quite passively […] It was not a normal situation. We decided that things could not continue like that because we have interests.” But his German counterpart Kinkel warned “against

281 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
overstating our capacity,” biting off more than the EU could chew. (Reuters 26Mar1997) As the fifteen decided to bolster the Union’s participation in the Middle East peace process by appointing Moratinos, de Charette emphasised that it is crucial for the EU to take a serious role in the nearby region. (Reuters 28Oct1996b)

It is again arguable whether we can say that the EU can be taken as such a foreign policy actor that is interpreted as an entity having common political interests rather than being a collection of separate units with their individual interests. As long as there is no common stance among the big member states nor willingness for an increased interdependence in high politics, it is problematic to talk about the political interests of the EU in the Middle East. However, to the extent that the member states have political will to increase the coherence of their external performances, we can assume that the sense of having common political interests will develop among the CFSP community.

First, the emergence of political interests of the EU is related to the development of the CFSP at the expense of the positions that individual member states hold today. In order to profile itself as a foreign policy actor, the Union needs to demonstrate its capacity for such an actoriness. This is the iconic function of any political representation of the Union. Among other acts, nomination of special representatives to conflict spots in different parts of the world is an attempt to give an impression of coherent and continuous actoriness as was presented in chapter five. But simultaneously, it is a means to strengthen the autonomy of the EU with regard to the member states in the sense that the special envoys’ statements and acts in the name of the EU are not negotiated and agreed beforehand on a case-by-case basis among the member states. Moratinos is convinced that

Europe is much more than the sum of its 15 ambitions - French, Spanish, English, Swedish, German etc. It is an ensemble of a higher nature which is slowly finding its coherence, acquiring its own momentum, aspiring to propose to the world, and to its neighbors especially, a democratic, non-violent, cooperative and mutual vision. For that, it is animated by an ambition of a political nature.

(Reuters 19Feb2000)

Second, the political autonomy of the EU and its member states with regard to external actors is, among other means, demonstrated through representation that in some regions or issue areas may contradict the views of certain significant others, in particular the United States. However, as Wendt (1999, 235-236) reminds, “autonomy is always a matter of degree and can be traded away when the benefits of dependence outweigh the costs.” In a complex web
of relations, (inter-)dependence is rather a rule than an exception. The benefits are a matter of subjective considerations and cannot be measured and weighted in an objective manner. This is true also in the relations between the EU member states and external others. The possible gains in terms of political autonomy are difficult to assess as it comes to interference in the Middle East conflict through the post of the special envoy, but theoretically the symbolic relation between the representative and the represented would allow the sign to be used for purposes that ‘exceed’ the convention.

In public discussion inside the Union, the pro-Arab stand of France is rarely criticised, whereas Germany has many times heard that it should be ashamed of still being ashamed of the Holocaust to the extent that German policy with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is saturated with shame. (Reuters 04Sep2001) Moratinos, although being relatively moderate on a European scale, has managed to offend Israeli foreign ministry officials by touching German-Israeli relations. In autumn 1999, a conference was organised at the University of Brandeis in Germany where Moratinos presented the view that the German policy towards Israel “is dictated by the shame Germany is feeling because of the Holocaust” and that Germans should “manifest their power in the Middle East” (Reuters 26Oct1999).

Germany may be a unique case in relations with the Middle East, but it is by no means the only EU member state that has had a problematic past in relations with Israel. For example, normalisation of Israeli–Spanish relations took place only in 1987. France and the United Kingdom, in turn, have a special place in the formation of the present Middle East as they were the two imperial powers that drew the map of the region after the collapse of the Ottoman empire. Partly due to their historical involvement in the region, France and the UK have been at the forefront of the EU’s foreign policy making there. During the 1950s and 1960s, France was an important partner to Israel, not least because it was Israel’s primary source of arms supplies until the Six-Day War in 1967 which then froze Franco-Israeli relations for a quarter of a century. By the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the United States had become the main supporter of Israel, while for the UK and France the priority was already to maintain good relations with the oil-producing Gulf states.

At the EU level, political dialogues are ‘annexed’ to economic co-operation. The CFSP is interpreted as an attempt to balance the Community’s economic strength with greater political influence in world affairs and to ‘frame’ politically the activities within low politics spreading to difference fields. As the Maastricht treaty defined, the European Council “shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union” when implementing the CFSP on the basis of the Union’s general guidelines (European Communities 1992, art.
J.8(2)). Moratinos commented on this endeavour and development of the CFSP by saying that

[i]f we deem that co-operation and dialogue are essential in the international arena, that economic co-operation and free trade must go alongside political and cultural exchanges - as we proposed in the Barcelona declaration - if we consider that peace and international stability are indispensable, we must conclude that a common foreign and security policy is necessary.

(Reuters 03Jun1999)

In Barcelona, it was agreed “to conduct a strengthened political dialogue at regular intervals, based on observance of essential principles of international law, and reaffirm a number of common objectives in matters of internal and external stability” (European Union 1995). The Barcelona declaration was in principle formulated within the European Union, leaving to the Mediterranean partners not much more than the decision to sign it. Even if the most visible elements of the declaration are economic—including the aim to establish the Mediterranean free trade area by the year 2010—the political dimension has not been neglected either. The association agreements concluded between the EU and the Mediterranean partners have established political dialogues.

The Union’s political dimension and autonomy with regard to significant external others is further emphasised by its actively taking a stand on those issues in which the member states have been able to find a compromise. Often this has meant declaratory policy that lacks substance. Joint actions on the Middle East peace process, including the nomination of the special envoy, have however added to the political weight of the Union. After holding the post of special envoy for well over three years, Moratinos said that “the creation of the position of special envoy represented an important step forward in the politicization of European action and perception. One had to go further, and to institutionalize a structure defining foreign policy” (Reuters 19Feb2000).

Combining the well-established economic dimension to the politicisation of action in the Middle East has demanded considerably more than mere statements of the EU’s collective political existence. The politicisation has not only created the potential for tension between EU institutions but also met strong resistance in Israel. During the course of the second intifada, the Palestinian infrastructure has been largely destroyed. In Europe, talk about European tax-payers’ wasted money has sharpened the criticism of Israeli action in the Territories: “It is, after all, our tax-payers’ money that has been used to assist the Palestinians to construct the infrastructure”, said Moratinos’s economic adviser, who continued that “now most of the infrastructure has been destroyed and Israel recontrols everything.”

282 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
Israeli investigations have uncovered links between the Palestinian administration and organisations responsible for terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians.\textsuperscript{283} The evidence that the PA, financed by the EU, economically supports the militant groups has placed the EU assistance in a peculiar light. It is naturally in the EU’s interests to deny that ‘our tax-payers’ money’ might have been used for purposes that do not stand up to close scrutiny: “The money that the Union has invested to the PA would be considered as bad investment. Patten would need to explain to the Parliament where all the money has gone. And that would be the end of the political career of many Europeans. That explains the conflict of interests.”\textsuperscript{284}

7.3. \textbf{ECONOMIC INTERESTS}

Evidently there are also other explanatory factors behind the conflict of interests. EU foreign policy in general relies heavily on socio-economic factors. For a long time, trade has been a politically loaded issue in EC/EU relations with the Middle East. The most significant component in the economic relations is oil. When the oil crisis in 1973 shaked economies in the western world, the then nine members of the European Community faced difficult times, too. The oil-producing Arab countries together with other OPEC members drastically reduced oil supplies and their embargo resulted in world oil prices rising steeply. The EEC decided to negotiate arrangements with the Arabs independently from the United States—and against its will. Further, due to the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War of October 1973, the Middle East had become one of the first areas for discussion within the EPC. Basically the EC member states wanted to secure their petroleum supplies at what they regarded as a reasonable price, while the Arab countries wanted European diplomatic support in their campaign for Palestinian rights—and against Israel.

\textsuperscript{283} For instance, Arafat authorised a payment to the leader of the Abayat clan that controls the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Bethlehem at time when Israel requested that he be arrested on murder charges. The brigade, responsible for a number of suicide attacks, is part of Arafat’s Fatah organisation. (Reuters 23May2002) See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2002a) for the report on Arafat’s claimed terrorism connections. See also Israel Defence Forces 2002.

\textsuperscript{284} Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002. See also Mortensen 1997, 162-163.
For the past three decades, oil has played a significant part in European policy making. The net imports from the Persian Gulf have not increased since the early 1990s but European dependence on Gulf oil is still considerable, amounting to 3,240 million barrels per day in 2000—more than 40% of total imports. Algeria and Libya included, the Europeans receive more than two thirds of their oil from Arab states. For a comparison, less than one fifth of the net oil imports of the United States originate in the Persian Gulf countries and even if the imports from the Gulf region have been slightly increasing, more than half of all American oil imports are from countries that are not OPEC members. (Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Government 2002a and 2002b)

The relationship of dependence between certain oil-producing states and the United States is structurally different from their relationship with the EU. As a Finnish official remarked, Saudi Arabia and Algeria, among others, are dependent on the incomes they get by selling oil to the United States. The game is played by American rules because it is not necessary to the United States to import oil from the Middle East, argued the interviewee.\(^\text{285}\) Since the EU depends on the energy resources of the Arab countries, the relationship of dependence is, if not completely reversed, at least a relationship of interdependence, as the Mediterranean region and the Middle East, in turn, need European markets and investments for the economic well-being and growth.

According to an Israeli source, the most important reason for the EU to get involved in the political dialogue in the context of the conflict is that Europeans “have big interest to Arab world.”\(^\text{286}\) Wendt (1999, 236) defines economic interests as referring to “the maintenance of the mode of production in a society” or “economic growth”. For the European economic well-being, the relations with the Arab world are considerably more important than those with Israel. A European interviewee confirmed that although the EU has historical bonds to both parties—Germany to Israel and France to Arab states—the potential for co-operation is with Arab states: the EU exports foodstuffs and imports oil\(^\text{287}\). During the British EU presidency, Robin Cook presented the European view on trade and peace connections in the following way: “We are also interested in insuring that we strengthen our trade and economic ties within the framework of peace and mutual trust” (Reuters 18Mar1998a).

In the context of the nomination process of the EU special envoy to the Middle East peace process, Spanish Foreign Minister Abel Matutes stated that

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\(^{285}\) Interview with a Finnish foreign ministry official, 15 February 2001.

\(^{286}\) Interview with an Israeli source, 10 May 2002.

\(^{287}\) Interview with a Finnish foreign ministry official, 15 February 2001.
the “vital interests” of the EU member states in the Middle East are intimately related to the peace process, for in case the process were destroyed Europe would have to bear the cost: “fundamentalist terrorism, an increase in the price of petroleum and additional aid to countries in the region”. (Reuters 29Oct1996d) European economic interests thus reflect considerations about the reactions that derailing of the peace process would provoke in the Territories and the oil-producing Arab states. As all the factors that Matutes mentioned are also related to the stability and development of the Arab states, it is of little wonder that the Union’s stance has for a long time been favourable to the Arab side. Also the performance of the special envoy, although it explicitly focuses on assisting the conflicting parties to find a solution, includes considerations that belong to the sphere of symbolism: By stating the EU’s position with regard to the conflict, his performance seeks to increase the mutual trust with the important economic partners in the region.

The physical closeness and dependence on Gulf oil make the EU ensure a positive image primarily in the eyes of Arab partners, whereas the US position is in this respect more clearly that of an outsider. The threat of terrorism excluded, the United States does not face the same threats and opportunities that the EU finds nearly on its back porch. The following Reuters’ observation from the year 1997 on Spanish dependence on energy resources applies to Europe as a whole: “The oil industry is tying Spain to Libya, Egypt and other producers, just as gas has created new links with Algeria. The wider political and economic consequences of this can be expected to colour Spanish foreign policy well into the next century” (Reuters 28Apr1997). This dependence and the presence of the EU member states’ economic interests have contributed to the atmosphere of mistrust in Israel. Although cautiously welcoming the EU’s efforts to ease tension in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, many Israelis fear that Europeans’ “main aim is to ingratiate themselves with oil-producing Arab states” (Reuters 24Oct2001).

Similar to its Arab neighbours, Israel needs European markets and investments for its economic well-being and growth. The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner, with Israeli imports exceeding its exports to the Union by more than 50%. In 2001 trade with the EU represented 29,4% of total Israeli exports and 36,2% of total Israeli imports. The trade balance is highly favourable to Europe and therefore economic sanctions against Israel, which have been demanded both in Europe and Arab states, would not only be extremely difficult for Israel to bear but also disastrous to the Palestinian economy dependent on Israel and therefore counterproductive for the EU, even if the volume of trade with Israel is not of particular importance on a European scale—the Israeli share of EU exports and imports being 1,5 and
0.9 percent respectively in 2001. (European Commission 2002b) Nevertheless, the economic relationship is the only noteworthy tool that the Union has in its possession to pressure Israel with, and the tool is not in Solana’s or Moratinos’s but Patten’s hands.

EU-Israeli relations faced a crisis in 1995, when the EU for the first time tried to use its bilateral economic relations to pressure Israel in the political process. The EU-Israeli association agreement was signed in 1995 but the EU delayed the ratification for five years. The agreement finally entered into force in June 2000, aiming to promote the integration of Israel’s economy into the European economy together with other Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries. Despite decided European attempts to contribute to the integration of Israel into the rest of the Middle East, the process has been cumbersome. And a remote possibility of the realisation of the former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres’s vision about a close co-operation from the Maghreb to Yemen has contracted nearly to non-existent by the outbreak of the second intifada that has influenced Israeli relations with all Arab states.

An issue reflecting the tension in EU-Israeli relations was related to the scientific co-operation in the framework of the European research and development program. In a discussion with Moratinos, Israel’s ambassador to the EU, Harry Kney-Tal questioned the EU policy by saying that “[w]e are told that this is a manifestation of frustration with the peace process, but what is Europe trying to achieve? Is Europe trying to punish the scientific community?” (Reuters 04Feb1999)

Another theme of low politics that links bilateral EU-Israeli relations to the stalemate in the peace process is the dispute over items produced and manufactured in the Territories. The dispute is said to reveal EU division concerning the Middle East policies at large. It reflects “disagreements among some of its larger members over whether the EU should assume a more assertive posture over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. […] For Israeli settlement products to lose their preferential access, the agreement of a majority of EU foreign ministers is not sufficient: consensus is needed.”288 The strongest reservations have been expressed by Germany and the United Kingdom. The dispute over ‘Made in Israel’-labelled products produced in the Territories has troubled not only relations between EU member states but naturally even more so EU-Israeli relations. In 1998, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said that the Israeli government does not “have any obligations to keep Palestinian employment at higher levels if the European Union forces Israeli unemployment (to rise)” and went on to argue that his government has been “very, very liberal, the

most liberal government in Israel’s history, in opening up our markets to Palestinian workers. I hope the European Union doesn’t force us to reconsider that policy” (Reuters 19May1998). This stance put before the EU a real dilemma: If the Union continues to boycott Israeli products, it will indirectly contribute to the rising unemployment among Palestinians but, on the other hand, allowing the settlement products into European markets would indicate that the EU accepts the Israeli settlement policy. The EU’s principles thus contradict the conditions on the ground.

Yet, regardless of the EU’s policy of punishment, the Palestinian economy is in a crisis. It has suffered tremendously from the border closures and the damages caused to its infrastructure during the uprising. The number of annual closure days that in 1999 was merely 16 days, rose to 210 days in 2001. World Bank (2002b, 7) remarks that “[v]ery limited statistical information on the Palestinian economy precludes in-depth quantitative analysis of the impact of the restrictions on movements of goods and people and the destruction of physical capital. But all indicators up to end-March 2002 indicate a strong recession of the Palestinian economy since September 2000.” World Bank further notes that “a very large share (compared to other countries) of the Palestinian population before the crisis was clustered just above the poverty line, and fell below with the crisis.” This partly explains the dramatic increase in the share of the population below the poverty line from 20% in 1999 to 44% in 2001. (World Bank 2002b, 8; see also World Bank 2002a; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2002)

The continuation of violence and the deterioration of living standards make religious fundamentalism appear an attractive alternative to a large number of people living in the Territories. European economic interests are not directly affected by the recession in the Territories but wider economic and political consequences reflect the climate in the region in general, and the EU cannot escape these consequences. Therefore it is essential to act in a manner which does not risk the stakes in the broader game having security, political, economic, and strategic dimensions.

7.4.

STRATEGIC INTERESTS: SUPERPOWER IN THE MAKING?

Before the present knowledge of the form and size of the earth was developed, the ‘world atlas’ usually placed Jerusalem in the centre of the world because it
was located close to the middle of the known world of antiquity. In the Middle Ages, strong religious beliefs further influenced the outlook of world maps so that Jerusalem was deliberately placed at the ‘navel’ of the world and at the intersection of three known continents. For centuries Jerusalem has been first and foremost the focus of religious beliefs of Jews, Christians and Muslims, but also political sentiments have been fastened on it. European crusaders, for instance, fought for nearly two hundred years to control the city.

As we look at the contemporary religious and political world atlas, we may still draw the same conclusion: Even if our understanding of the geographic form and size of the earth does not correspond to the ideas of the Middle Ages, Jerusalem and its surroundings can, in political and religious terms, still be regarded as the ‘world’s navel’. Its centrality makes it a significant factor in the strategic considerations of great powers. These strategic considerations are related to collective self-esteem, “a group’s need to feel good about itself, for respect or status. […] A key factor is whether collective self-images are positive or negative, which will depend in part on relationships to significant Others” (Wendt 1999, 236). In their ‘most realistic’ form, strategic interests were about the balance of power during the Cold War. After the collapse of communism, the United States’ dominant position has remained unchallenged for well over a decade already, although a vivid discussion about other possible world orders has evolved especially among the critics of American unilateranism. (See e.g. Chomsky 1994)

During the Cold War and especially in the Reagan era, Israel was a central component in the US-Soviet confrontation in the Middle East. The possibilities for the EC to get involved in the region were marginal, first because the international strategic composition did not leave any space for European action in the Middle East between the maneuvers of the two superpowers, and secondly, because of the immaturity of the EC’s external relations beyond the economic sphere. Also the seemingly insuperable differences between member states’ national policies have prevented the EU from finding a common tone. A slow change seems to be taking place particularly in Germany which had earlier been unwilling to join France in its pro-Arab policy making. A certain hesitation between sticking to national values and interests and raising a truly common European voice can be observed. But the latter option has become ever more attractive during the past decade in the EU’s external relations in general, and with respect to the Middle East in particular.

The political weakness of the EU as an international actor was widely criticised during and after the wars in the former Yugoslavia, which proved the Union to be incapable of managing conflicts in its backyard. American intervention in the Balkans through NATO first in Bosnia in 1995 and then in
Kosovo in 1999 were seen as a manifestation of the EU’s weakness on the international stage and also as a proof of the hegemonic position of the United States. The events in the Balkans gave a new impetus for the EU’s military capacity building which is thought to guarantee it a more appreciated status if not globally at least regionally. After the Balkans, the only major nearby conflict region is the Middle East. An interviewee rhetorically asked: “Where’s the playground? It can’t be the Basques. That’s excluded, and so is Latin America and Southeast Asia that are distant. Eventually there are two possibilities: the Balkans and the Middle East. The Middle East is the natural playground for the EU after the Balkans”289.

During the confrontation that took place in Jerusalem and the Territories in autumn 1996 after Israeli authorities had decided to open another entrance to the ancient Hasmonean tunnel in the Old City of Jerusalem, Reuters described the mood in Europe:

The latest crisis in the Middle East has provided European countries with an opportunity to grab a long sought-after diplomatic role in peace negotiations dominated by Washington. […] All agree that there is a danger to Europe from renewed violence in the Middle East, but the motivations of the European countries to become involved are mixed. Some see a chance to exercise diplomatic leadership as the United States struggles, while others are just keen to see their interests served.

(Reuters 29Oct1996c)

It was in the midst of these considerations that Miguel Moratinos was nominated EU special envoy to the Middle East peace process. Although the nomination was an unanimous decision, there was a considerable gap between those who preferred a low-profile role and the others, especially France, who desired the new representative to have an impact on the Union’s international status. For France, the Middle East is a field in which to profile itself as a western actor different from the United States and even a competitor to it. In the words of an interviewee, “some European countries are doing their utmost to compete with the US and would be happy to see the US go away.”290 Also the nomination of Moratinos was by some European foreign ministry officials interpreted as an attempt “to balance the American view.”291

The fact that the Americans have not managed to bring the positions of the conflicting parties closer together has been, from the Brussels perspective, an opportunity to enter the stage: “If Washington’s envoy stumbles during his

289 Interview with an Israeli source, 10 May 2002.
290 Interview with an Israeli source, 26 May 2002.
291 Interview with a Portuguese foreign ministry official, 7 May 2002.
crisis mission to salvage crumbling Israeli-PLO peace moves, the door may open for the European Union to capitalise on its regional ambitions.” (Reuters 26Mar1997) The same concerns Moscow’s ambitions. According to foreign policy analysts in Russia, “U.S.-French rivalry in the region, the worry among Arab leaders that Washington is too pro-Israeli, and the general faltering of the process meant the time was right time for Russia to return to the scene”. (Reuters 29Oct1996c) Russia is convinced of having “discreet but appreciated role”292. But for Europeans and Israelis, Russia’s role is but “a non-player”293 or “a ceremonial part of the picture”294.

The European Union, although a heavier player in the Middle East than Russia, also lacks teeth and political weight that would be sufficient to have a firm position in the political dialogue. The means that the EU is able to use to exert its influence are mainly economic. This is problematic to the EU, since the traditional realism is deeply rooted in the mindsets of Middle Eastern actors who consider that “[i]t is because of the nature of the CFSP that the EU has no political tools to play a role. A player to be effective needs to be able to threaten and execute the threat. There has to be military capability to play a role.”295 Moratinos, too, elaborated on the EU’s inability to influence events and said that this is “[b]ecause it does not muster enough military resources for its ambitions, and because it does not express itself through established, permanent and well-honed institutions. In the Middle East and elsewhere, the military argument is not vain, and we all know the importance of armed forces and deterrence.” (Reuters 19Feb2000)

Besides economic tools the EU has hardly any other means with which to put pressure on the conflicting parties. And even using the economic tool is a controversial issue as was seen in the debate on Israeli products that have been produced or manufactured in the Territories. Also the delay in the ratification process of the association agreement with Israel highlighted disagreements between and even within the member states and proved how difficult it is to try to distinguish between safeguarding the neutrality of economic relations and the desire to exert influence, when economics is the only credible channel by which to influence the parties in conflict.

Moratinos, despite his statements in favour of developing military capacity, has been one of those who would prefer diplomatic means to be used in a constructive spirit instead of onesidedly putting pressure on Israel—to use

292 Interview with Russian special envoy, Andrey Vdovin, 31 May 2002.
293 Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.
294 Interview with Moratinos’s economic adviser, Matthias Burchard, 8 May 2002.
295 Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.
“incentives” instead of “levers”, as he said during the crisis in spring 1997. Moratinos further explained his position: “When I began my mission I said that it is my task to reduce pressure in the Middle East: Both the Israelis and Palestinians have enough in- and outside pressure.” (FBIS-WEU-97-101) The years without progress and the destruction of the peace process during the past couple of years has, however, brought a more critical tone into Moratinos’s performance. This has led Israelis to consider him as siding with Palestinians to the extent that, according to an interviewee, Moratinos has “burnt himself”\textsuperscript{296}.

An EU official commented on the dilemma that the bloc faces in its relations to Israel by saying, “If we talk tough we are accused of being anti-Israel, if not anti-semitic. If we adopt a softly-softly approach, we are regarded as a walkover” (Reuters 18Mar1998b). The EU is not likely to get over its ‘existential crisis’ any time soon. As long as the bloc wavers between its civilian power approach and developing plausible common military capabilities, the strategic interests of certain member states will not be served through EU structures. To use a special representative as a symbol for the purpose of securing strategic interests does not seem an effective tool, at least not before the Union is able to develop a credible high policy actorness including military capabilities. And even then a higher political status is needed for a representative to be taken seriously. Presently it seems that the EU is not ready to transform into another ‘world police’ next to the United States, which continues to play a dominant role in world affairs. The position of the one who can support and join the ‘world police’ in certain times and criticise and distance itself from it in other times appears as a much more attractive option in the time of new security threats. And even if political will for a militarised actorness could be reached, another question is how reasonable it would be to use milliards of euros for developing the European capacity for independent global action when the adequate capacity already exists in the framework of NATO.

Naturally, the European CFSP community, including Moratinos, urges the Union to get actively involved in political affairs wherever European interests are at stake. As Moratinos said about the EU’s role in the Middle East: “We should try to influence the terms of the talks in a way that a sustainable peace is attained and that European interests are well protected” (Reuters 03Aug1999). An analysis in Jerusalem Post on EU member states’ interests in the region stated that “[s]ome, such as France and Italy, place primary emphasis on commercial ties with the Arab world (arms sales and other contracts and, of course, access to oil), as well as on prestige and pursuit of an international role” (Reuters 11Jun2001). As long as it is not possible to serve these interests through the EU, the big member states evidently choose to act within national

\textsuperscript{296} Interview with an Israeli source, 22 May 2002.
frameworks even when this means a tension in relation to a broader European view in the making.

Military power is still taken as the single most important dimension of a heavyweight global actorness. The EU’s development into a military entity will not be realised in the near future as the Union is preoccupied with the eastern enlargement and reform of the institutional framework. Furthermore, the member states are unwilling to allow their national interests to come entirely under the EU umbrella. According to Jouret, Moratinos’s political adviser, the EU’s position has improved compared to what it was in Madrid, for instance. He agreed, however, with the Israeli sources on the significance of physical force: “I can’t say that the EU has real foreign policy even now. Europe is not a real partner when it’s about the international security.” The question is not so much about the practical use of the military force but rather respect or status among significant others. As Freedman (1998, 778) argues, “the extent to which political influence can be derived from military power depends on how this power is viewed by others.”

It remains to be seen whether the EU will ever develop into a truly unitary political being with an embedded collective identity where shared values and common interests are based. Identities of Western European states are continuously in process, as Wendt (1992, 418) remarks, even if their self-interests seem to be resistant to change. The change in security, political, economic, and strategic interests takes place through change in institutional identities, which is not a matter of a declaration or a treaty but a long-term process which mainly happens through performances at the micro-level.

297 It is, however, unlikely that the eastern enlargement will marginalise the Middle East on the EU’s agenda. Tovias (2001, 385) foresees “the creation of an informal lobby inside the EU pushing for the elevation of the Eastern Mediterranean as a zone of strategic interest for the EU.”

298 Interview with Moratinos’s political adviser, Christian Jouret, 31 May 2002.
8.

CONCLUSION

“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”

“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.”

– Lewis Carroll

This research has presented three different interpretations of a single phenomenon, both as complementary perspectives within a theoretical model and as concerns a real life phenomenon. None of these interpretations is complete and exclusive in itself. Rather, social reality is characterised by plurivocality that allows, even requires, different interpretations that enable us to understand better the complexity of performances and their purposes. Hence, instead of presenting conclusive results of observation from one perspective, the focus throughout the text has been coloured by the awareness of partiality which does not, however, mean that any particular perspective is wrong, only incomplete.

Generally speaking, any chosen interpretation excludes other approaches thus confining the ‘meaning potential’. The discipline of International Relations is no exception in this sense: Certain paradigms have been taken as valid frames for interpretation while others have been dismissed. The theoretical mainstream has presented the ‘right’ tools for studying phenomena in world affairs while policy-oriented views have developed the means to explain the past and predict future events within the paradigmatic frames of interpretation. Reality has been seen as one and objective. Yet what is real is dependent on our collective interpretation of it, which means that it is because the social reality is thought to exist, spoken into being, and represented and approved in

299 “Samtidigt innebär den efterföljande tolkningen en begränsning av liknelsens meningspotential, men det hår är enligt Ricoeur ett faktum vid varje tolkning: att tolka innebär att aktivera endast en del av textens förråd av mening, medan andra betydelsemöjligheter väljs bort.” (Vikström 2000, 207)
interaction that it now exists the way we ‘see’ it. It is characteristic to discursive processes and interaction in general that they reorganise the world. Indeed, it is well-founded to claim that a mere discussion about the nature of a situation already changes its nature (Yarbrough 1996, 346). Hence, instead of talking about objectivity, this study has focused on the intersubjective character of international reality that is continuously shaping and shaped by human action. Not only the conditions of action but actorness itself is socially constructed. Desire to be is the primary although often subconscious motivation of action. This desire is expressed in being able to do something: “Instead of associating being with things and inertia one should point out that being signifies an act, for to exist is to act” (Bien 1995, 298).

O’Neill (1996, 130) argues that “old paradigms do not travel easily in an unfamiliar political landscape”. Yet, this does not mean that the theoretical constructions of past decades should be entirely abandoned but rather placed in the context where they do not occupy the position of exclusively valid interpretation frames. The stress on self-interests has traditionally neglected the self and concentrated on interests as if the latter existed without the former. The constructivist approach has shifted the focus so that the question of identity now receives attention as the foundation of interests and values. Interests and values are social constructs based on identities, which are also shaped by and shaping the context of action. Being a result of social construction processes does not, however, make identities any less real.

Elaborating identity merely as a general idea of being would be a vain exercise, for all of what can be known and said about identity appears in contexts at various levels and in different spheres of interaction. We presented the Peircean sign theory as a useful framework for attempts to theorise and interpret actorness, and to better operationalise a major constructivist claim concerning the primacy of identity even in the kind of action that seems to reflect values or interests as if they were exogenously given. This framework makes it possible to approach in a systematic manner an international being and its performances on the world stage.

Peirce held that knowledge is acquired through interpretation of signs. Objects of representation are mediated to interpreters by signs. The observation of signs is the means to understand various features in our surroundings. The natural world of causal relations is revealed through object-sign relations where the object determines the sign and leaves no space for the interpreter to influence the representational relationship. In social reality, on the contrary, interpretation plays a notable part and even indexical relations are established on social, not natural facts.
In social reality indexical relation is best understood in terms of values, since assessment of values is based on identities as existing objects that determine values. Values then direct our action in the conduct of affairs. Appropriateness of performance is scrutinised in the interaction that we participate in within those circumstances that compel us to act. Value-based action is a means of self-realisation: If we continuously and deliberately choose to act against our claimed values, we cease to be the kind of people we claim to be.

Besides indexical connection, Peirce’s sign theory offers two other forms of sign-object relations: iconic and symbolic ones. A sign that is in iconic relation to a represented object is not physically connected to the object but contains features that from the interpreter’s perspective resemble an object that the sign is taken to represent. Whether such an object actually already exists prior to the representation is not a central concern in iconic relationship. The main idea in being an icon is that the sign evokes a certain interpretation in the mind of the interpreter.

The indeterminacy of the connection between the icon and its apparent object allows new interpretations and understandings to emerge. As the social reality largely relies on interpretative processes, the presence of icons enables the change of realities. While indexical features of a sign depend on the object that it denotes, iconic features bring an object to the mind of the interpreter not because of a factual connection to the object but because the features evoke a certain image in the interpreting mind by directing the attention of the interpreter to recognise a certain kind of object being represented by the sign.

Symbolic representation is the third possible type of relation between sign and its object. Symbolic features are conventional, which means that a relation between a sign and object is agreed upon and interpretations of the sign are thereafter based on the agreement. The conventional nature of symbolicity involves the idea that interpretation is guided, on the one hand, by iconicity and indexicality and, on the other hand, by a shared understanding about what it means in general to be a certain kind of representation. These are the conditions that make a symbol meaningful in the given context. In practice the agreement allows the symbol to be used for other purposes besides those determined by the object. Therefore, in social reality symbolic action may serve purposes that are not based on value considerations determined by the identity of the acting self. A representative’s relations with the other may be used to satisfy self-interests regardless of whether they are compatible with the agreed purpose based on value considerations.

In the Peircean sense, symbolic features are not constrained to the linguistic realm. An entire performance can be interpreted as a symbol of an acting self.
This kind of comprehensiveness applies to iconicity and indexicality as well, so that it is possible to interpret a performance as an icon of the being that the representation supposedly denotes. Those effects that the representation and interpretations of it have on the represented being belong to the sphere of iconicity that allows the interpreters to create an imaginary connection between an idea of a represented entity and the actual performance in the name of it. And further, interpretation may concentrate on indexical elements of the performance thus bringing forward the factual effect on the environment through the particular representation.

These theoretical considerations were placed in the realm of international relations where iconicity, indexicality and symbolicity can be recognised in various performances of international actors and agents functioning in their name. Different functions of representatives reflect the presence of the three different spheres of being, even if a pure categorisation is next to impossible to make in practice. For instance, as for an intermediary role in an international conflict, symbolic function is usually bound to indexical representation. When a sign–object relation is based on an agreement, the sign is used and understood as referring to that particular object. This allows the function of a sign that is labelled ‘intermediary’ to be directed somewhere else and not merely to the actual conflict mediation, although the conventional understanding leaves the function of mediation unquestioned and does not undermine the indexical content of the intermediary’s performance.

Besides self-interests, values are often presented as a major reason to interfere in external affairs. Purely altruistic motivation may be rare but attracts, nevertheless, a lot of attention in the studies of world affairs. Similarly to other international actors that get involved in a given course of events, the EU’s activities with respect to international armed conflicts are often analysed and evaluated mainly on the basis of concrete achievements in conflict resolution, peace building and ‘after-care’. What easily remains aside is the idea that already forming a collective goal and working together to achieve it could count as success. This is not only a matter of mechanical construction of institutional and instrumental capabilities but requires also institutional identity formation as an entity. As March and Olsen (1989, 48-52) have pointed out, students of international relations tend to exaggerate the significance of explicit substantive results or lack of them and underestimate other kinds of contributions that political processes make, even if it was the ‘iconic significance’ of these processes and not their substantive consequences which actually could be counted as success. Judgement of success and failure is thus usually based on expectations of visible results although participants often
seem to care as much for the right to participate as for the fact of participation; participants recall features of the process more easily and vividly than they do its outcomes; heated argument leads to decision without concern about its implementation; information relevant to a decision is requested but not considered; authority is demanded but not exercised.

(March and Olsen 1989, 48)

Institutional identity as the central focus of the study was discussed in the context of EU integration in the sphere of high politics. The integration process that is fluid rather than mechanical is characterised by an aim at a policy coherence that would create enough order to avoid total chaos but involve cooperation only to the extent that is assessed to be mutually advantageous. The development of the European Union as this kind of hybrid system entails rapprochement of national interests. Intensive interaction between the member states may, in time, lead to increasing coherence in the sphere of high policies, which may further develop into fullweight unitary actorness. A state-like outcome of this development is not very probable as the eastern enlargement occupies the Union for the foreseeable future and the views of the ‘big five’ are not easily changeable. But the willingness to have an international weight comparable to the United States is anything but absent in the EU’s *visions d’avenir*.

What the EU is at the moment as a foreign policy actor has been elaborated in countless academic studies. A large number of these CFSP studies have concentrated on practical impacts of policy making (or the lack of them) in a particular issue or region outside the Union. Besides this dimension, more attention has lately been paid to the EU’s identity formation in the context of external opportunities to act. This study has sought to combine these two with an additional aspect of symbolic function. The third aspect refers to the self-interests of the EU and its member states, which play an important part in the Union’s performances and assessments concerning the possible risks and advantages of getting involved. The identity discussion presented in this study derives from constructivist approach and maintains that identity is the necessary basis for pursuing values and self-interests. Hence, the need to take into account the role of self-interests in international affairs is acknowledged but the emphasis is on the fact that self-interests and values alike are based on an actor’s identity.

Given the centrality of actors’ identities in the motivations and conduct of world affairs, we opened the discussion by elaborating the development of institutional identity of a collective actor. The first phase is *imagining*, which in the context of the EU’s CFSP means that ideas or visions of the unitary foreign policy actorness of the Union are presented among those involved in
foreign policy making within the Union. The second phase is naming, which is understood as fixing a presented vision. Considering the diversity and ambiguity of possible visions that are still present in the discussions about the EU’s future as a foreign policy actor, it is possible to claim that the vagueness of naming has made the Union a “partner with a troubled personality” (Neuwahl 1998).

Thirdly—and this is what was the primary focus of the study—performances are needed to present the self under construction to other selves who then either recognise or ignore the presented identity—and this, namely recognition, is the fourth and final phase in the identity formation process. We create our identities in the stories we tell about ourselves, but we constantly depend on the recognition granted by other actors. This process of performance and recognition is a fundamental condition for our existence and the development of notions of values and self-interests.

This research presented an EU performance in the Middle East as a particular case of representation. The action of special representative Miguel Ángel Moratinos and his team was interpreted by members of the CFSP community as well as a number of outside actors, including the parties in conflict. In the course of interpreting these interpretations we found that a representation of an international self under construction echoes different motivations and may have multifaceted effects. The theoretical frame in which to categorise this diversity of functions was inspired by Peirce who elaborated in detail different relations between objects and their representatives. Peirce stressed that iconicity is the necessary element of all representation. Indexical and symbolic representations are constructed on an iconic basis.

It is difficult to make precise assessments of the significance of the EU special envoy to the Middle East peace process. Some general conclusions can be drawn, however. The analysed material indicated quite straightforwardly that the special envoy has a three-fold function. First of all, he is needed to reform the Union’s foreign policy being in relation to a particular context of

300 A comic-strip Tiger presents the problem of identifying by naming in a fascinating manner:
– I have an identity crisis, says Julian.
– What does it mean?, wonders Tiger.
– I don’t know who I am, Julian explains.
– Ask your Mom to sew a name tag on the front of your shirt, suggest Tiger.

The idea in the suggestion is that by giving a name we grasp the essence of identity. The political identity of the European Union has been named in the Maastricht treaty and then renamed in various contexts. Yet naming as such is not enough to provide the named with a content of being. Performance is needed to demonstrate in practice that the named entity is ‘worth the name’.
actoriness. Second, potentially he has an opportunity to influence the course of affairs in the given context. And third, when the EU or its member states have self-interests to safeguard, a special envoy is believed to function as a guardian of these interests. The three functions were elaborated in terms of Peircean categories of signs: icon, index, and symbol, respectively.

In longstanding conflicts, collective identifications of the parties in conflict are framed by the conflict and reconstructed in the course of the conflict. Yet it is not merely the conflicting parties that may identify themselves through the conflict. Different actors that carry out diverse intermediary activities to settle the conflict are also influenced by the conflictual surroundings. The conflict demands third parties to position themselves in relation to the conflict.

As for the EU, the first priority of the CFSP usually is to maintain consensus at all costs and perform jointly to the extent that compromises allow. One ‘playing field’ in which to show the capability to act is that of international conflicts, and the EU is trying to use this opportunity even if it does not have a clear, consistent conflict policy. The lack of a common policy mirrors the different interests of the big member states which strongly direct the action (or retaining from action) in various international conflicts. In the Middle East, it is particularly evident that differences in British, French and German national preferences often handicap the Union as an entity.

It can hardly be argued that European institutional identity construction is based on identifiable ‘pan-European’ or EU interests. On the contrary, common interests are gradually formulated in the identity construction process. Thus, rather than widely analysed and discussed weak institutions, the fundamental defect seems to be the lack of common identity even if it is true that institutions’ workability and plausibility suffered somewhat from the compromising character of the negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty. As there is no effective machinery for harmonising EU member states’ foreign policies, different tools are continuously ‘tested’ to find an efficient way to bring the conflicting views closer to each other. As was discussed in chapter five, an important reason to appoint a special envoy to the Middle East peace process was that he was expected to function as an information channel and facilitator in finding compromises among the member states.

Another function of a special envoy in terms of iconic performance can be seen in his potential to organise the EU performance around a personified existence of the CFSP. This kind of personification further came to facilitate the interactivity between conflicting parties and the EU as well as between the Union and other third parties. The creation of a direct communicative link simplifies the image of a complex and bureaucratic organisation, thus enabling the recognition of a collective identity that is iconically presented through the
special envoy’s performance. Other practical bearings of having a representative on the ground are related to continuity and visibility of the Union’s actorness. Even if the EU’s action with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has shown its capabilities to be seriously restricted, there is a tendency among the EU member states to emphasise the possibility of progress and the potential that the EU possesses as an international actor. Furthermore, the member states constantly stress the imbalance between the Union’s economic and political positions, which is inclined to strengthen the image of the Union as having both capabilities and willingness for a more comprehensive performance. The Union contributes to external expectations about its foreign policy identity by repeating its desire to reach a political weight comparable to its economic importance in international relations.

The expectations about balancing the EU’s role ‘force’ the Union to a stronger actorness but, at the same time, both the internal and external constraints result in failures and reduced credibility. Whether the EU is to be trusted as a political community has most fundamentally to do with the ideas of what an international actor is. In the Middle East, where credibility and international actorness are understood largely in terms of military power, the Union faces a real credibility problem that cannot be solved by sending diplomats to the conflict region. This dilemma that goes into the core of the Union’s institutional identity could hardly be overcome without developing into military power. To get a foothold in the political process, the EU should abandon its civilian nature. It is questionable, however, whether this would be expedient in the long run.

Besides the need for a collective self-identification, the involvement of third parties in a political dialogue in conflictual contexts is motivated by the sense of a moral obligation and responsibility, which was the focus of chapter six. It is not possible to measure the impact of moral considerations on the willingness to get involved but it cannot be ignored. According to the special representative’s mandate, the explicit purpose of the involvement is to contribute to the settlement of the conflict. Values have a role to play in attempts to end an armed conflict. By defining the purpose of the special envoy’s action as being related to the pacification of the conflict region, his mandate established an indexical relationship between the represented object and himself as its sign. His indexical performance was directed to a change in the environment of the performance, but this does not mean that the EU or any other third party merely objectively seeks a just solution. Assessments are always intersubjective and include elements that most fundamentally have to do with the actor’s identity.
Even if impartiality is generally regarded as an asset in third party performance, it does not mean that evenhandedness is a sufficient or even necessary condition for successful mediation efforts. Instead, what seems to be more significant is the capacity and willingness to use carrots and sticks to persuade the conflicting parties. The EU’s lack of these means results in a discouraging record in delivering. European claims for impartiality amount to suspicion on the Israeli side when it is obvious that the EU is all but impartial, like any other third party that has or seeks to have a role to play in the political process in the Middle East.

In the midst of the second Palestinian uprising, creating a way to proceed toward peace is a challenge to each of the parties involved. Since September 2000, the performances of institutional representatives of third parties have been largely confined to those trying to limit the damage. Given the Union’s institutional restrictions, Moratinos’s team has been relatively successful in these terms even if it has not been able to contribute to significant breakthroughs in recent years. The main achievements are related to acute crises such as the siege of the Nativity Church in Bethlehem or the exchange of fire between Beit Jala and Gilo. External actors have also sought to continue the dialogue in different working groups and encouraged the parties in conflict to maintain contacts at the civil society level.

The EU still lacks a firm identity as a geopolitical entity and, consequently, joint global interests. Behrendt (2000, 24) defines the EU as “an institutionalised decision-making process in which different groups, institutions, and individuals try to pursue their own interests.” This definition may somewhat downplay the developing unity of the EU’s actorness in the international arena, particularly in the economic sphere. In the realm of foreign policies the EU is still searching for its selfhood. Various tools are used to position the collective self in foreign policies and to have an impact on surroundings beyond the bloc’s borders. The weak sense of being a political entity means, however, that the common foreign policy is shaped by the lowest common denominator. What is generally decisive are still the interests of member states, at least when it comes to the ‘big five’ that have important self-interests to safeguard in their foreign relations almost worldwide.

In addition to iconic and indexical functions, Moratinos’s performance also applies to symbolic function, which in this study referred to the actor’s threatened interests or aspirations concerning international status. The strive for a third party performance in the symbolic sense means that the actor seeks to safeguard threatened interests or strengthen its position with respect to significant others. The Middle East is a challenging playground for the EU, since the member states’ views have traditionally been remarkably different.
from each other concerning the region and conflict. It is arguable to what extent a special envoy or even a representative with a higher political status can contribute to the unification of member states’ interests, but at least Moratinos functioned, as an interviewee phrased it, as a “catalyst for the coherence”301 thus making it easier to find a common denominator and vision. The Berlin declaration was a clear example of this.

The various European interests in the Middle East were discussed in chapter seven. The special representative’s function in serving these interests is limited to those over which member states’ views do not collide. Naturally the pacification of Arab-Israeli relations as such would best serve the European security interests. More widely, security threats such as terrorism and internal unrest mainly have to do with the Arab side and therefore positioning the EU in a manner which is sensitive to the preferences of the Arab world contributes to the security of the Union member states. The economic interests of the EU member states are strongly linked to trade with oil-producing Arab states and arms sales to a number of regional actors. Also with regard to these interests Moratinos’s function has been to ensure that the EU’s position is presented so that important trade relations do not suffer due to the European stand on the Arab-Israeli dialogue.

As for political and strategic interests, the need for freedom to maneuver and respect or status is best served when the significant others recognise the self and give it space to act. Serving these interests is obviously more effective through a permanent body of representation than by means of random statements and other reactions that are easier for the significant others to ignore. The desire of some member states to develop the Union into a superpower requires active participation in the world’s conflict spots of strategic importance. A representative with a relatively low political profile can only have a minor role in this respect.

Generally speaking, an outside actor may see itself as a major longterm beneficiary of regional stability. Yet, it is not only for reasons of security, economic relations and normalisation of the conflict region’s international being that third parties assume that joining the reconstruction and reconciliation process would be highly profitable. The question is also about the reputation of third parties that continuously seek to maintain or construct their own being in the world. Especially for an international being under construction, external events appear as opportunities to demonstrate an imagined and named institutional identity that requires recognition by the significant others. The essence of international reality depends on agreement among participants. What is is because it is collectively believed to be. This is the fundamental

301 Interview with a British foreign ministry official, 27 January 2002.
difference between social facts and natural, or brute, facts. While natural facts are what they are apart from any shared belief about their truthfulness, social facts are produced by virtue of all relevant actors agreeing that they exist.

Performances on international stages have an impact on how the performing actor is viewed by the others. As for the European Union, it has not yet managed to create an unambiguous political being that would have the monopoly on foreign policy-making in Europe. The CFSP does not cover all areas of foreign and security policy as the Maastricht Treaty states it would. Nor does it receive active and unreserved support from its present member states “in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity” (J.1(4)), for the member states have shown reluctance to extend the competence of the Community institutions to foreign and security policy, a central sphere of their external activities. The coming few years with tremendous changes in the Union’s composition and institutional structures are unlikely to increase the bloc’s coherence and sense of continuity in high politics. The enlargement of the Union in 2004 will unavoidably have an impact on the development of the common foreign policy. It hardly marginalises the Eastern Mediterranean on the EU’s agenda, but an enlarged EU will probably face more difficulties in trying to define common stances with respect to the nearby region.

At large, the institutional framework of the Union is as confusing and spread out as ever and clearly in need of better co-ordination. This reflects the disagreements within the Union on substantial questions. As Burghardt (1997, 331) says, the problem with the principle of speaking with a single voice when dealing with the outside world goes beyond mere presentation. It addresses rather a problem of substance. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s question ‘Who speaks for Europe?’ that he asked during stormy transatlantic negotiations in 1973 still lacks a satisfactory answer despite the progress that has been made in decision making procedures. More than procedures and formal representation, the most fundamental difficulty is in the member states’ lack of will to work for a common foreign policy at the expense of national preferences. It would not matter so much who speaks if all had the same message to tell.

The practical results of the early years of the CFSP were a disappointment to those who expected the TEU to resolve or at least tone down disagreements on the scope and depth of the foreign policy. Hence, it was seen as necessary to set up agents that perform in the name of the EU in the field of foreign policy. The special envoys who were sent to represent the Union in various conflict spots around the world have sought to give the Union a single voice despite the differences in member states’ national positions and to present the Union as capable of identifying and implementing a coherent set of common objectives.
No doubt an individual or a small group of people is able to change the world—for better or worse. But what often makes the difference is the position that they occupy. The political status of an institution’s representative is of importance when considering the impact on the external image of the institution. Hence, the nomination of the High Representative was a significant step in terms of elevating the Union’s political profile. The present discussion on whether the EU should have a president reflects the French drive for a distinct EU profile in high politics but is rejected out of hand among many other members, particularly the smaller ones that are afraid of the possibility that such a political figure would strengthen the dominant position of France and Germany. Yet character planning of an international institution is easier from an honoured, visible position. Usually a successful performance is a combination of dominant position and charismatic personality, whether success is understood in terms of the institutional identity formation of the represented collective, external problem or task that is sought to respond to, or defending interests that the problem might jeopardise.

It is difficult to distinguish the actual achievements of the Middle East envoy from the developments that would have taken place had the EU not had such a foreign policy tool. Assessments vary considerably even among the foreign ministry officials of the EU member states and even more so when Arab and Israeli views are compared. Those in favour of the EU’s deeper involvement are remarkably like-minded when it comes to the potential that the EU has in representatives. At large, it can be concluded that Moratinos’s team has managed to add to the coherence and continuity of the EU’s image in the Middle East. They have also been indispensable in maintaining the day-to-day contacts among the Quartet partners. But what can be determined on the basis of Moratinos’s more than six years in office is that the profile of the special envoy is not high enough to persuade all significant others to provide more space for the Union’s political actoress.

The aggravation of the conflict has been discouraging to all involved actors, not only the EU, and has shown the limits of possibilities of external intervention. Since the beginning of the second Palestinian uprising, successes in terms of conflict mediation have been characterised rather as fire-fighting than comprehensive breakthroughs in major subjects of dispute: refugees, Jerusalem, borders, water, and settlements. When it comes to the self-interests of third parties and the EU member states in particular, interests related to security tend to suffer from the drawbacks in the peace process. In turn, those interests that have more distinctly to do with the image of the Union reflect the expectations that are in proportion to the challenge that the bloc faces in attempts to increase its influence, and not so much to the need to limit the
damage that the conflict may cause to the EU. Strategic interests are typically expansionist and their promotion requires an external opportunity for performance, whereas economic interests fall between the two extremes of defensive and expansionist interests. On the one hand, a wrong diplomatic move might jeopardise the EU’s relations with oil-producing Arab states, while the peaceful coexistence of Israel and its neighbours would mean that the EU is not obliged to choose sides. Hence, the question is of protecting the existing advantageous position. On the other hand, however, the prolonged conflict and related tensions in the whole region are undoubtedly vital to the global arms industry, including the European one. Resolution of armed conflicts would be disastrous to the arms industry when peoples would ‘beat their swords into ploughshares’.

Altogether, the importance of conflictual surroundings is most fundamentally related to the positioning of the self in relation to the conflict and other involved significant actors. Representation of an international actor under construction enables the represented to address the others and demand their recognition. Iconicity creates a possibility for a change in interpretations concerning the represented and, eventually, for a change in the being of the represented. The represented never appears in a vacuum free from interpretation and agreement. Hence, values and interests are already there reflecting the identity that exists prior to the re-presentation. A certain amount of collectiveness was needed in order for the EU member states to agree on a joint representative, who is expected to function both as an index of what the represented already is and symbolically with respect to the instrumental use of the conflict for what the member states hold as worth achieving. But he also contributes to changing the pre-existing collectiveness.

In theoretical terms, the research has thus examined institutional identity formation in world affairs and the functions of a representative in relation to (i) the represented, (ii) a problem, question or task that demands or allows external intervention, and (iii) self-interests that are promoted or safeguarded in interaction with significant others within the provided space. Practically speaking, this analysis has interpreted the interpretations concerning a performance of the EU which seeks to pursue politics in the Middle East as one body. Sometimes it is difficult to assess how strongly diplomats and politicians actually believe in what they say on behalf of the institution they are representing. And even when deeds seem to contradict words, it is not always clear whether the sincere intentions are actually expressed through speech and it is only the difficult conditions on the ground that prevent the intentions from being fully realised. A member of the CFSP community, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, stated that “[t]o pursue politics in
the Middle East requires optimism, faith in God, and a lot of realism” (Reuters 06Nov2001). Research on actors pursuing politics in the Middle East may require some optimism, too, but certainly realism. And faith in God.
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References take the form that indicates volume and paragraph number, e.g. 5.283 refers to paragraph 283 in volume 5.


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