ANNI KANGAS

The Knight, the Beast and the Treasure

A Semeiotic Inquiry into the Finnish Political Imaginary on Russia, 1918–1930s

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Tampere, for public discussion in the Paavo Koli Auditorium, Kanslerinrinne 1, Tampere, on December 14th, 2007, at 12 o’clock.
Acknowledgements

This is an inquiry into the Finnish political imaginary on Russia. It examines the practices of knowledge production on Russia and the Soviet Union during the Finnish interwar period. The point of departure for this endeavour is the recognition that knowledge production is not an act of one’s subjectivity. It involves placing oneself within a tradition of interpretation. In the study at hand, I examine how the Finnish ways of making sense of Russia unfold against the background of previous knowledge and experience which is wider than that of an individual interpreter. Similarly, this piece of research should not be read as an act of my subjectivity only. It is best taken as a fruit of my participation in the activities of certain communities of inquiry.

Over the course of my education, I have had the privilege of being taught by and working with a number of talented and stimulating people. Professor Emeritus Osmo Apunen deserves special thanks for having suggested that there is something worth uncovering in old political cartoons. He pointed out some interesting signposts for this inquiry, but left enough intellectual space for me to be able to say ‘I did it my way.’ I feel greatly indebted to my supervisor, Docent Helena Rytövuori-Apunen, whose in-depth knowledge of the pragmatist research tradition has been invaluable for this study. Since I took part in her graduate programme at the International School of Social Sciences, I have appreciated her enthusiastic and ambitious stance towards knowledge.

For the most part, this study has been financed by the Russia in Flux research programme of the Academy of Finland and its subproject New and Old Russia in the Transition Discourses of Finnish-Russian Relationships. I have also received financial support from the Tampere University Foundation and the Konkordia Foundation. For the past year and a half I have been employed by the IR Masters Programme within the Finnish-Russian Cross-Border University, which not only has provided me with my monthly salary, but has also kept me practically immersed in Finnish-Russian relations.

The scholarly community within the Department of Political Science and International Relations has always been a source of support and stimulation. My dear colleagues, thank you for the good conversations that have sometimes been IR related and often not. Thanks to
you, it has always been nice to come to work. I would like to thank Professor Vilho Harle for many things, particularly for his unconditional faith in us, his younger colleagues. Professor Harle also read the manuscript and provided comments that helped me in finalising it. I am also grateful to Riitta Lehtimäki and Raija Oksanen for their assistance in administrative and technical matters that has contributed to the creation of a comfortable environment for me to focus on research. A part of this work was written while I was working at the Research Centre for Social Sciences, University of Tampere, thus warm thanks in that direction as well.

Professor Roland Bleiker and Professor Niilo Kauppi approved the work for publication. Their supportive and constructive comments were extremely helpful when it came to improving the quality of the initial manuscript. They gave me the inspiration required to finalise this study in good spirit. Moreover, Professors Bleiker and Kauppi gave precious suggestions on how to continue from here.

I am also grateful to Kathryn Rannikko, who corrected and revised my English, and Marita Alanko who kindly prepared this work for publication.

Last but not least, I owe thanks to my friends who have always been there although this work might have at times made me absent-minded. Sami Moisio has been an invaluable companion and collaborator. I want to thank him for being there, for reading parts of the manuscript as well as for the numerous conversations that have helped me sharpen my argument.

I dedicate this work to my mother, Riitta Kangas, who has taught me to value knowledge and learning.

Turku, 12 October 2007

Anni Kangas
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It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct to the other way...

Charles Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities*
1

Introduction

“The relations between Finland and Russia are unique for the reason that they are not always of the same kind but are quite ambiguous. Over here, one hears full-mouthed talk about the Russian hereditary enemy and sees monuments being erected for Russian emperors.”¹ So spoke Väinö Voionmaa, a Finnish parliamentarian in 1919. His words provide a convenient point of departure for introducing the present study. They suggest that the Finnish relationship with Russia is ambiguous but seems to cohere as a continuous flow. Recently, a top-ranking civil servant in the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs also alluded to such a possibility. In a TV interview aired in 2006, on Independence Day, he argued that Finns ought to “observe Russia as Finns and Europeans.”² While I leave inquiries into European political imaginaries for others to pursue, my task in this work is to elaborate on what ‘observing Russia as Finns’ might actually mean. My ultimate task is thus to provide a reconstruction of that element within the Finnish political imaginary on Russia which accounts simultaneously for its ambiguities and regularities.

Voionmaa’s words are also pertinent for the reason that they date from the early years of the epoch of 1918–1930s which this study focuses on. This period of time can be characterised as a formative moment in the Finnish practices of knowledge production on Russia. At the beginning of it, the Old Russian regime had collapsed as a result of two revolutions and was being replaced by Soviet command. Finland became independent after having been an autonomous part of the Russian Empire for more than 100 years,³ and violent civil wars burst out both in Finland and her former metropolitan country. In these developments, old markers of certainty dissolved. The discrepancy between the habitual and the actual opened up a space of cultural and political opportunity and intense political debates cropped up as part of

¹ Voionmaa 1919, 325.
² Torstila 2006.
³ Russia had conquered the mainly Finnish-speaking regions from Sweden in the course of the Napoleonic wars and elevated them in 1809 into a politico-administrative unit called the Grand Duchy of Finland. Prior to this, Finland had been an integral part of the Swedish Kingdom for several centuries. (e.g. Alapuro 2004, 86.)
attempts to seize it.\footnote{Cf. Ringmar 1996, 456.} Given this, 1918–1930s is not just any period of time but can be said to be at the heart of what it means to ‘observe Russia as Finns.’

However, the study at hand has pertinence beyond this particular period and bilateral relationship. It can be read as a more generic analysis of international political dynamics at times of crisis. In characterising political dynamics, I refer to the philosophical tradition of pragmatism which has recently (re)emerged within International Relations (IR) debates.\footnote{E.g. Puchala 1995; Adler 1997; Millennium 2002; Neumann & Heikka 2005; Rytövuori-Apunen 2005; Wagner et al. 2006; Kratochwil 2007.} More specifically, I avail myself to Charles S. Peirce’s writings, which provide a means for systematically analysing the process of resignification which proceeds on the basis of old knowledge and experience in its task of solving the irritation brought about by the unexpected.\footnote{See also Friedrich Kratochwil’s (2007) argument for a pragmatist turn in IR. Kratochwil suggests that pragmatism has a contribution to make in a situation where the traditional epistemological project has failed to secure knowledge in some universally valid and transhistorically established criteria and the relativist ‘anything goes’ solution simultaneously seems unsatisfactory. My argument is that Peirce’s sign theory has a particular contribution to make here.} Given the fact that signs play a crucial role in this process – “thought is of the nature of a sign”\footnote{Peirce CP 5.553. References to Charles S. Peirce’s Collected Papers follow the standard procedure of listing volumes and paragraph number. In the formula “CP v.p.” \textit{v} stands for the volume and \textit{p} for the paragraph number.} – systematic means for analysing the process of resignification can be found in Peirce’s pragmatist sign theory. In this sense, the study participates in a broader movement of using semiotic\footnote{I use Peirce’s preferred term semiosis and its derivatives to emphasise that I am not discussing the sometimes very different concerns of other semiotic approaches.} instruments in examining political phenomena.

Peirce was interested in the ways in which a community strives to re-establish a commonsensical understanding which has been shattered by a momentary emergence of doubt.\footnote{E.g. Peirce CP 5.358–5.387.} Due to this, he makes a suitable companion for an inquiry into instances of political upheaval that involve transformations in the assumptions that have been taken for granted within a political community. The epoch of 1918–1930s presents such a moment in Finnish-Russian relations. Old assumptions related to the Russian neighbourhood had to be reconsidered as the Russian regime dissolved and the old metropolitan country changed not only from a conservative political formation into a revolutionary one, but also from an authority over Finland into an object of its foreign policy. The task of consolidating political authority in this situation was complicated by the traumatic after-image that events connected to Finnish independence left behind. The immediate issuance of Finnish independence was a war where one half of the population waged a war against another. Moreover, the Germans contributed to the victory of the non-socialist, White side and the socialist revolutionaries – the
Reds – cooperated and acquired arms from the Russians. The task of consolidating political authority at home was complicated by the fact that it remained intrinsically intertwined with the question of the international. One decade later, at the beginning of the 1930s, the powerful fascist-type Lapua Movement, which was motivated by the need to carry to the end the unfinished “war of liberation from Russia,” emerged within the White Finland as a response to this dilemma. Due to this, the shift of the 1930s can be regarded as the climax of the epoch which had begun in 1917–1918.

It seems that aesthetic activities – from poetry to painting and political cartoons – flourish at such moments of crisis. In the present work I am particularly interested in the imagistic aspect of these activities and use a stock of some seven hundred political cartoons as research material to get a hold on them. In this sense, the study at hand has a contribution to make in bringing International Relations in touch with the growing interest in the visual and the burgeoning literature on the visual or pictorial turn. This turn has been articulated as a response to the “disjunctured and fragmented culture that we call postmodernism [which is] is best imagined and understood visually.” In these discussions the picture emerges as a central topic of discussion and a problem to be solved.

My feelings toward the suggested pictorial or visual turn remain ambivalent. To the extent that the infatuation with the visual is based on the simple quantitative or superficial argument that our culture uses more images and fewer words, I am not entirely convinced. I am, however, ready to accept the deeper or qualitative argument for the visual turn which is articulated in terms of emancipation from a structure of purely verbal communication sys-

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10 Heeding Juha Siltala’s (1985, 16) example, the notion of White Finland can be understood to have three simultaneous meanings. Firstly, it is a term descriptive of the post-1918 system. Secondly, it is an evaluative term used to assess whether the country was developing to the direction of the ideal set by the ‘war of liberation.’ Thirdly, it designates the group of people who sought to ascertain that the ideals of ‘White Finland’ were realised in Finland.

11 Kyösti Pekonen (1987, 44) identifies the years 1929–1932 as the culmination point of this radical right wing movement.

12 According to Robert Philippe’s (1982, 14) history of political graphics, political art flourishes at moments of crisis, when the established system and its rules of the game are questioned. According to Philippe, this can be taken as an explanation for the fact that political art has been at its liveliest when the modern states have been born, their borders and institutions established.

13 The term image is notoriously ambiguous. As W.J.T. Mitchell (2005, 2) notes, it can denote a variety things ranging from physical objects to mental, imaginary entities and further to dreams, memories, and perceptions. It can also designate a verbal motif, a metaphor or other figure as well as a named quality. This, however, does not present a big problem as Peirce’s sign theory to be introduced later on in this work takes care of such ambiguities; it contains conceptual tools for explicating what is in each case implied with that term.


tems. That is, if images were earlier valued for their capacity to illustrate, they are now given the status of legitimate research material and focus of inquiry.

However, as political cartoons conveniently fuse verbal and visual elements, it is not my point in this present work to claim a special status for the visual (as opposed to the verbal). I do not claim that visual display sets into action contemplation which would be fundamentally different from the ways of thought inspired by the verbal. Instead, I seek to note the importance of the iconic dimension – i.e. likeness, similitude, and analogy – which forms part of both verbal and visual artefacts. Were I to join some turn, I would rather call it the iconic turn. Consider, for instance, the way in which the Russian Bear recently appeared on the pages of *The Economist*: “The Soviet Union is dead and communism long buried. But Mr Putin wants you to know that the Russian bear is back – wearing a snarl with its designer sunglasses.”

Although expressed in words, the passage has a strong iconic aspect to it; it is easy to see the bear in one’s mind’s eye. Most importantly, however, the iconic dimension provides for the possibility of creative imitation (mimesis) of “lessons of history” – i.e. of repertoires of interpretation which are characteristic to knowledge production on Russia. It enables spelling out how the process of resignification does not create a chronologically separate layer but remains indebted to what pre-exists it.

I argue that this iconic aspect offers IR scholars with crucial insights into political dynamics at times of crisis – insights that would be more difficult, if not impossible, to gain by other means. I thus refer to the process of knowledge production with the notion of political imaginary. When characterised in pragmatist terms political imaginary refers to the dynamic process which is geared at coming to terms with present challenges and, in this task, necessarily proceeds on the basis of previous knowledge and experience. Peirce argued that in overcoming doubt and fixing belief, one necessarily begins with the prejudices developed over the years.

For instance, *The Economist*’s Russian Bear forms part of an attempt to make sense of “Putin’s Russia” by way of combining the more archaic thought of Russian aggressiveness and expansiveness with the present condition of Russia’s growing economic affluence and integration to world markets (‘designer sunglasses’.)

In order to operationalise the pragmatist idea of emergence of new knowledge on the basis of “lessons of history,” I work on the cultural semiotician Yuri M. Lotman’s idea that symbols serve a memory function within a culture; they are its “mnemonic mechanisms.” Since symbols have a capacity to store within them relatively long texts from the culture’s past, they are key elements of political imaginary. In analysing how the practices of political

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18 Rytövuori-Apunen 2005, 149.
19 E.g. Peirce CP 2.565; Peirce CP 5.416. This argumentation forms an elemental part of Peirce’s anti-Cartesianism.
20 Lotman 1990, 104.
imaginary unfold meanings embodied in the composite symbols of the cartoons, I make a further use of Peirce’s pragmatist sign theory which encompasses a plethora of sign distinctions – icon, index, and symbol being the most well-known ones. They have been developed for the purpose of getting to grips with the process of resignification, which seeks to alleviate irritation of the new and, in this task, needs to imitate that which precedes it.

To emphasise that this process where new knowledge emerges on the basis of the old is, as the term political imaginary suggests, something political, I work on the proposition that the cartoons are instances of statecrafting. They are occasions where representatives of different political orientations put forth propositions regarding competent political conduct (i.e. statecraft) vis-à-vis the neighbour to the East. The historically contingent meanings that statecraft acquired in these situations may be grasped through an inquiry into how the elements of political imaginary come together in actual situations. Taking this road of inquiry involves resurrecting the notion of statecraft from the depreciation into which critique of state-centrism has cast it and making it analytically powerful by treating it as a speech act where something is done with words or visual signs. I thus suggest that the type of knowledge production which political cartoons exemplify is not disinterested but rather forms part of the political process whereby different political groups seek to seize the space of political opportunity created by the discrepancy between the habitual and the actual. By presenting themselves as capable of managing the new political situation, they try to consolidate themselves as a legitimate political authority.

As a whole, three basic ambitions have been set for this work: First, it is an attempt to elaborate, on the basis of pragmatism, an application for studying political imaginary – a phrase which is frequently evoked but less often systematically examined within International Relations’ discussions. Second, it puts forth a fresh interpretation of Finnish-Russian relationships on this basis, an interpretation which challenges the dominant ‘hatred of Russkies’ interpretation of the interwar period and the accompanying idea of Finnishness being a matter of affirming one’s non-Russianess. Third, it has pertinence beyond the parochial Finnish-Russian case as it joins the more general discussion on knowledge production on Russia – i.e. how Russia and the Soviet Union have over time made an object of intellectual operations practiced upon it from the outside.21

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1.1. Setting the Stage for an Inquiry into Political Imaginary

At issue in the Finnish political imaginary on Russia is the style of thinking and imagining that characterises Finnish ways of coming to terms with Russia. It suggests that despite commonalities with other political imaginaries on Russia, there is something unique to the Finnish case. Inquiry into it is premised on Russia’s special place in Finnish political experience. The Finnish ideology of exceptionalism – that is, talk about the “Finnish paradox” or “Finnish exception” – is largely articulated vis-à-vis Russia. It derives its meaning from a certain intimacy between the two countries. In this way of thinking, Russia is not only geographically adjacent to Finland but is presented as a persistent challenge. It is a “question of life and death” which can be resolved in a variety of ways. In addition to conceiving of Russia as a source of misery, there have been frequent attempts to turn the proximity of Russia into a success story. As the editorial of the biggest Finnish daily, *Helsingin Sanomat*, recently argued, “Russia is the fate of Finland, both for good and for bad.”

One of the outcomes of this work is the claim that in the Finnish political imaginary, Russia emerges as an object within a “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm. It is like the *fortuna* whose wheel can turn either towards good or bad luck depending on the *virtùosity* of the political actor. In addition to “full-mouthed talk about the Russian hereditary enemy” bad *fortuna* may be called to mind, for instance, by characterising Russia as a potential aggressor or a hotbed of social, political and environmental ills. If the “erection of monuments in honour of Russian rulers” is one indication of the good *fortuna* conception, it is quite easy to point out more recent examples of the politics of making good *fortuna* out of the necessity of Russian proximity. Consider, for instance, the Finnish Northern Dimension Initiative, which evoked the physical closeness of Russia to give weight to the Finnish position within the European Union, or think about the discussions on the lucrative business opportunities that developing Russian markets offer for Finnish companies. Recently, the complex interplay of the good and bad *fortuna* conception was brought to the very surface of Finnish political debates as a result of a speech which the Minister of Defence Kari Häkämies delivered in Washington D.C. Evoking the “Machiavellian” theme of not only *fortuna* but also *necessità*, Häkämies ventured that “given our geographical location, the three main security challenges for Finland today are Russia, Russia, Russia.”

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22 *Helsingin Sanomat* 2006.
23 For a recent example, see e.g. Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s speech which alludes to J.K. Paasikivi’s famous slogan “there is nothing we can do about geography”, and continues “this works, of course, also in reverse so that when the Russian economy blooms, Finland is in a good position to benefit from this growth.” (Vanhanen 2006.)
an intense debate on whether Häkämies actually meant that Russia is a threat – i.e. a source of bad *fortuna* – and whether such an interpretation would be out of line with the official foreign policy of the country. The official line was summed up in an argument by President Tarja Halonen, according to whom “Russia is a positive challenge for Finland.” Halonen’s comment is best analysed as a response to this topical political debate which alludes further to the “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm of Finnish political imaginary on Russia.

### 1.1.1. The Chivalric Equation

Since grasping such a profound logic of political life as its thought-paradigm necessitates immersing oneself into its empirical reality, the focus of this work is on argumentation concerning skilled politics in political cartoons published during the epoch of 1918–1930s. They are undergirded by a more all-encompassing structure of signification that has permeated theories, novels, and political accounts that touch upon Russia and Finnish-Russian relationships. The Finnish political imaginary on Russia has an imagery of its own which crops up both in visual and verbal accounts on Russia. It consists of a repertoire of archetypical symbols, or *dramatis personae*, which provide a convenient point of departure for the analysis. In order to have some vocabulary to work with, I have designated these elements as the Knight, the Beast, and the Treasure and refer to their unity with the notion of a chivalric cultural-historical equation or a chivalric language-game. A cultural-historical equation is unlike an allegory with a single meaning since it allows for semantic substitution to the extent that the correlation between its members remains the same. The notion of a language-game suggests that these elements are connected to one another by family resemblances; there is no essential quality that would necessarily be common to them all but they are united by overlapping and criss-crossing similarities. Indeed, model-images that *in one way or another* allude to ideas associated with knighthood, bestiality, and treasure-likeness are remarkably prevalent in the corpus of cartoons. On this basis, it seems legitimate to presuppose that the language-games of chivalry and Finnish-Russian relationships are somehow in contact with one another. The task of this analysis is to dwell upon the ways in which its members undergo semantic substitution and, on that basis, to get a hold of the underpinning thought-paradigm.

Although all the Knights that crop up in the practices of political imaginary do not necessarily appear as mounted warriors and not all the Beasts are always embodied in explicitly
monster-like, in-human features, these designations are neither arbitrary nor necessary – they are conventional. They allude to ways of thinking that have been handed down by tradition. In this capacity, these symbolic figures also function as the culture’s memory. They thus serve to appreciate the pragmatist tenet of new knowledge always emerging on the basis of the old.

The emergence of the knightly archetype from research material is premised on a shared iconicity or similarity in structure between the cartooned flock of virile and courageous male characters and ideas of masculinity, heroism, and bravery related to formally professed cavalrymen during the European Middle Ages. Instead of being arbitrary and unmotivated, the archetypes of the Finnish political imaginary allude in various ways to an established understanding of chivalry which is a result of a real social process. The point here is that ‘observing Russia as Finns’ is not an act of one’s subjectivity but involves placing oneself within a process of tradition which, heeding Hans-Georg Gadamer’s work, can be designated with the term effective history.30

Indeed, there are surprisingly many cartoons that make explicit references to knights, beasts, or treasures. Such surprise in the face of knightly figures has not been insignificant for this work but has provided for what in Charles S. Peirce’s semeiotic theory is designated as the moment of abduction.31 The connotation heavy moment indebted to iconicity has prompted the formation of an initial hypothesis32 that namely the chivalric formula provides access to the Finnish political imaginary on Russia. To adopt a term of Max Black, the chivalric language-game could thus be characterised as “heuristic fiction;” the change of language enables approaching things slightly differently. There is a presumption of isomorphism between the model and its domain of application, which enables perceiving new connections among things.33,34

Hypothesis formation by way of abduction resembles the establishment of a hermeneutical situation, where the interpreter moves between the familiar and the unfamiliar. Hence understood, the chivalric cultural-historical equation parallels what Hans-Georg Gadamer

30 Gadamer 2004, passim; see also Weldes 1999b, 100.
31 Charles S. Peirce characterises abduction as a situation where the reasoner is confronted “with a phenomenon unlike what he would have expected under the circumstances ... looks over its features and notices some remarkable character or relation among them ... so that a theory is suggested which would explain (that is, render necessary) that which is surprising in the phenomena.” (Peirce CP 2.776; emphasis original.)
32 Understood in terms of Peirce’s abduction.
34 Earlier, something similar has been suggested by Osmo Apunen (2001a) and Mika Aaltola (2003, esp. 52–64). Apunen brings to the fore the centrality of the Beauty and the Beast in the “formation of Finnish/Russian national characters.” Aaltola discusses Raphael’s painting St. George and the Dragon in connection to the “memory of Finnish foreign policy” and evokes, in this way, to the pertinence of chivalric imaginary.
in his hermeneutics designates as the fore-projection of meaning. The text of ‘observing Russia as Finns’ presents itself as something unfamiliar. It is something in need of interpretation. Since interpretation necessitates an understanding of the whole of the text before it is possible to grasp a part of it, projection of meaning is a crucial part of interpretation. As soon as some initial meaning starts to emerge from the text, the interpreter projects it onto the text as a whole.

Gadamer argues that the process of understanding involves working out this fore-projection and revising it in terms of what emerges when the interpreter “penetrates into the meaning.” Understanding and interpreting means revising the initial fore-projection. It is a matter of appropriating one’s fore-meanings while remaining prepared for the text to disclose something unexpected. In the present work, the language-game of chivalry is in the role of fore-meanings; the language-game will be appropriated to see how it is actually brought to bear onto the text of ‘observing Russia as Finns’.

The chivalric language-game is not about Knights only. Maurice Keen, who has studied the ethos of knighthood, suggests that the word chivalry “conjures up images in the mind – of the knight fully armed, perhaps with a crusaders red cross sewn upon his surcoat; of martial adventures in strange lands; of castles with tall towers and of the fair women who dwelt in them.” The Beast and the Treasure – which usually appears either in the form of the Maiden or the Castle – are just as important elements of the equation as the Knight. The drawing on the left, which was published in the Kerberos magazine in October 1917, is a perfect illustration of this. It includes the Beast and the Treasure while the Knight is present in it only conceptually.

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36 Gadamer 2004, 269. To accept this as the point of departure is to work against the rule of Cartesian doubt characterised as “accepting nothing as certain that can in any way be doubted” (Gadamer 2004, 273.)
37 Keen 1984, 1.
38 Kerberos, No. 1, October 1917. ‘Saga: Jungfru och Draken eller den unga tecknarens uppgift.’
The formation of the initial hypothesis concerning the presence of the chivalric formula in the Finnish political imaginary on Russia is premised on the dialectic between two textual operations that Paul Ricoeur calls *appropriation* and *distanciation*. They designate a process whereby the text of chivalry decontextualises itself from its immediate social and historical conditions as well as from the limits of ostensive reference\(^\text{39}\). The language-game of chivalry is liberated from the immediate references to the armed cavalymen of the European Middle Ages and it may acquire a new set of references, for instance, in the political imaginary of Finnish-Russian relationships.

It is also worth pointing out that when it comes to the composite elements of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia there is very little uniquely Finnish to them. In addition to the fact that the language-game of chivalry can in no way be claimed to have its origins in the Finnish experience, cartoons frequently borrow elements from other countries and cultures. Indeed, it is not my intention in this work to use the category of ‘Finnishness’ as an explanatory device. Instead, I seek to reconstruct what is regular to the way in which these almost universally available elements are applied locally – i.e. in a spatially and temporally bounded context. At this stage, ‘Finnishness’ of the political imaginary is nothing more than a heuristic device and it is the task of analysis to assign content to it.

1.1.2. *Chivalry and Statecrafting*

I work on the presumption that meanings unfolding from the chivalric language-game are appropriated for the purposes of statecrafting in political cartoons. The point is not to focus on what the agentive state ‘Finland’ does, but rather to examine the ways in which the chivalric formula is put to use in popular argumentation whereby different sections of society seek to consolidate themselves as legitimate political authority.

In this respect, it is interesting to note that the constituent symbols of political imaginary are rarely used to represent Finland as such. Inquiring into the indexical aspects of cartooned symbols reveals that their reference is usually to specific sections of the political community. In virtue of this, they serve to elevate somebody to the position of legitimate political authority and to discredit someone else – usually a political opponent. In this sense, political cartoons are arguments or validity claims concerning skilled conduct of politics; they are intended to be submitted to the critical scrutiny of public discussion. The chivalric language-game provides the regulative ideal for this discussion, i.e. it takes care of the fact that some transfer meaning is possible even in the case of disagreement.

\(^{39}\) Ricoeur 1981, 131–144.
If the proposition that Knights, Treasures, and Beasts provide access to the political imaginary of Finnish-Russian relationships during the epoch of 1918–1930s and further to the thought-paradigm sounds too fantastic, it is possible to designate the three iconic elements in different terms. It is also possible to talk about the roles of the protector, the protectee, and the threat. The Beast brings out the common enemy or political challenge, the Treasure stands for what is held worth protecting in the political community, and the Knight represents the sovereign agency that undertakes political acts in its name. The latter characterisation brings out how the significance of these elements relates to their statecrafting function. They are actualised in order to put forth claims about the competence of specific groupings to act in the name of the political unit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model-image</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Function (within statecrafting)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Knight</td>
<td>protector</td>
<td>sovereign agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Beast</td>
<td>threat</td>
<td>common enemy, political challenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Treasure</td>
<td>protectee</td>
<td>object to be protected, priceless to the community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The notion of statecraft has for long formed part of the corpus of International Relations. However, it has often been critiqued for state-centrism and lack of analytical usefulness. The notion has been condemned to the ‘male’ or ‘high’ end of the distinction which is conventionally drawn between the “‘male’ area of high politics, international security, and statecraft” and the “‘female’ one of domesticity, interpersonal relations and locality.” My attempt in this work is to resurrect the notion of statecraft by examining it in terms of the practice-embedded metaphysics of pragmatism. Hence the designation statecrafting. Firstly, the criticism of state-centricty is countered by arguing that at issue in statecrafting are not deeds of an agentive state but attempts of different groups to consolidate themselves as a legitimate political authority within a political community. Secondly, the concept is rendered analyti-

40 Buck-Morss 2002, 12.
cally powerful by examining it as a speech act; it refers to an act where things are done with words or visual signs.

In traditional formulations, the notion of statecraft refers to the art or skill of conducting state affairs and relations with other states or to the requisite techniques for managing chance in politics. In 1922, the Finnish political scientist K.R. Brotherus defined statecraft as the “art of seeing what goals correspond to the benefit of the state in a situation where ambitions and goals are in a competition both within the state and in its relations with other states. Statecraft refers to the skill of finding the right means in order to meet these ends.” In Harold and Margaret Sprout’s definition dating from 1971, “statecraft embraces all the activities by which statesmen strive to protect cherished values and to attain desired objectives vis-à-vis other nations and/or international organizations.” Kal Holsti, on his part, characterises statecraft as “organized actions governments take to change the external environment in general or the policies and actions of other states in particular to achieve the objectives that have been set by policy makers.” A preliminary answer to what makes something an issue of statecraft can be found in these definitions. Statecraft concerns the survival, sustenance and success of the political community in international relations (note references to external environment in the definitions above). It involves presenting an issue as posing a challenge to the political community as well as a suggesting a way out of it. This is the metaphorical language of statecraft.

When statecraft is further defined as a specific kind of speech act, attention turns to the productive nature of the language of statecraft. A basic point of departure of speech act theory is the distinction between two types of significations – constatives and performatives. The former states something by presenting facts or describing reality (e.g. “it is cold today” or “my name is Anni”). The latter performs an action that not only describes (social) reality but changes things in it. “I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)” and “I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth” are J.L. Austin’s examples of performatives. Constatives convey a meaning and can be interrogated for whether the meaning is true or false. Unlike constatives, performatives convey force. They cannot be judged on their truthfulness but on whether they are effective or ineffective, felicitous or infelicitous. This also applies to political cartoons which, fusing fictional elements with fact, can hardly be inquired for their constative truth.

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42 E.g. Baldwin 1985, 8; George 2005, xxiv.
43 Brotherus 1924.
44 Sprout & Sprout 1971, 135.
45 Holsti 1976, 293.
46 Austin 1975, 5.
47 Austin 1975; Yurchak 2006, 16.
In political cartoons, a statecraft speech act usually comes about when the chivalric equation that includes the political challenge (the Beast), the object to be protected (the Treasure), and the subject invested with the task of doing the protecting (the Knight) is actualised. Two of these elements – the Beast and the Knight – are explicitly present in the drawing above. The Treasure is that to which one can point and say, “it is crucial for the survival and success of the political community” and thereby assign legitimacy to the actions of a wannabe Knight.

What we can consequently study is how the ‘thing’ of statecraft is done in the context of Finnish-Russian relationships. What is designated as the challenge to the survival and success of the political community? What is highlighted as the value to be safeguarded? Who is elevated to the role of the legitimate political actor undertaking deeds in the name of the political community? What are drawn as the contours of the political community? Although statecraft refers to the survival and success of a political community the point here is not to put forth a state-centric claim and argue that “a political community acts to defend itself.” It is to point out how a group, party, movement, or elite makes a claim to act on behalf of the community. This involves focusing on the way in which the meaning of statecraft emerges on the grounds of the coming together of different elements of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia.

In avoiding the state-centricity of language, another key distinction in speech act theory comes in handy: that between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. Locutionary acts refer to the “utterance of certain noises ... with a certain ‘meaning’ ... i.e. with a cer-

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49 *Kerberos*, September 1918. ‘En kämpavisa.’
tain sense and with a certain reference. \(^{53}\) Perlocutionary acts point to the outcomes of the utterance and illocutionary acts simply refer to the performance of an act \textit{in} saying something as opposed to the performance of an act \textit{of} saying something. \(^{54}\) In the study at hand, I work on the presumption that political cartoons are visual illocutions in which arguments about the kind of political conduct that would contribute to the survival and success of the political community are put forth. They are competing political orientations’ stakes of representing themselves as a legitimate political authority. This is the purpose for which the chivalric formula as the primary element of political imaginary is actualised.

If the centrality of illocutionary acts in political imaginaries is accepted, traces of communication – such as political cartoons – must be examined as having been produced by a person with certain intentions. \(^{55}\) This, however, does not mean trying to get at the thoughts and motives of individual actors. The point is not to psychologise but to draw to attention to the fact that the conventional formula does not exhaust the act and that we also need to pay attention to the “actual creative forces that generated the event at the moment it was still being accomplished (when it was still open)” \(^{56}\). That is, at the same time as a statecraft speech act cannot be fully understood simply by attending to its structure, the intention of the speaker does not suffice to make a performative out of utterance. \(^{57}\) In this work, I avail myself of Charles S. Peirce’s sign theory to appreciate the interplay of conventional and creative forces and to disclose how an event which we may designate as a statecraft speech act is actually created in a given context. While the term symbol in Peirce’s sign theory points to the conventionalised structures of meaning, the notion of index is geared to bring out that resignification is not only a matter of ritualised repetition but is necessarily tied to the moment of speaking.

1.2. Statecrafting in the Newly Independent Finland

It is relatively easy to identify the three above presented archetypes in the visual form in the cartoons, but focusing on the iconicity of language discloses that they also turn up in verbal acts of statecrafting. Consider, for instance, the Social Democrat Member of Parliament (MP)
Anton Kotonen’s parliamentary address from the year 1919 in which he critiques the Finnish “iron fist soldiers” and their “bellicose politics of adventure” vis-à-vis Russia. To evaluate the prevalence of the chivalric language-game in discussions on Finnish-Russian relations, I have used verbal sources as additional research material. On the one hand, the point has been to assess whether the chivalric equation is restricted to political cartoons or whether it is dispersed throughout the political imaginary of Finnish-Russian relations. On the other, written materials have assisted me in appreciating the pragmatist maxim and inquiring into the real consequences of the chivalric formula – i.e. into the way in which the semiotic elements of the chivalric language-game are brought into articulation with non-semiotic elements in an attempt to solve a nagging dilemma. Parliamentary documents (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Sessions, valtiopäiväasiantuntijakirjat) have been particularly helpful. With the aid of them, it has been easier to link the drawings to the moment of speaking – i.e. to identify the topical political dilemmas that are being evaluated with recourse to the chivalric language-game and to further appreciate a cartoon’s proposed solution to them.

In this study, I work on the presumption that the key dilemma that prompts the process of resignification relates to distinguishing between good and bad statecraft. I further suggest that this dilemma is linked to the task of establishing political authority in a new political situation where the “unexpected” had shattered the previous authority and thus created a space for political opportunity. Furthermore, the space of political opportunity was characterised by deep uncertainty about the durability of the political unit and skilled politics was argued to be in need in order to lay the foundation for a durable state. Due to this I have characterised the epoch of 1918–1930s as the “Machiavellian moment” of Finnish-Russian relationships. Heeding J.G.A. Pocock’s definition of the term, it is an attempt to summarise the experience of a political unit that confronts its instability in time.

Cartoons are essentially attempts to solve this dilemma. They form part of the debates which evaluate different policies vis-à-vis Russia/the USSR with a view upon whether they contribute to the success and survival of the political unit or cast its durability into jeopardy. Since magazines in which cartoons were published are all more or less intimately related to specific political groupings, drawings can be interpreted as attempts to consolidate these groupings or their representatives in the position of legitimate political authority and to downplay the legitimacy of competing orientations. In this sense they are connected to the task of seizing the space of political opportunity opened up by the collapse of the previous political authority.

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58 Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 29 April 1919, 165–166.
59 Pocock 1975.
Events of the Russian revolutionary year, Finnish independence, and the dreadful civil war that issued from it shattered the previous, two-tiered structure of political authority which Juha Manninen has identified in the 18th century discussions on the Finnish logic of belonging. Over and above the patria, composed of those who had either been born in Finland or regarded themselves as Finns because of their residence, there was a higher source of authority – communis mater patria. It referred to the King as well as to the realm ruled by him. Prior to becoming a Russian Grand Duchy, Finland had been an integral part of the Swedish Kingdom for many centuries. The Finns’ communis mater patria was the Swedish kingdom and the Swedish King the target of loyalty on the upper echelon.60

It has been suggested that when Finland in 1809 became a Russian Grand Duchy – i.e. an autonomous part of the Russian Empire – the place of communis mater patria simply swapped. Instead of the Swedish King, the Russian Emperor became a legitimate source of authority on the upper echelon. Thanks to the two-tiered conception of political authority, a ‘good Finn’ was to able to make a career as a subject of the Empire and – to borrow the telling title of the book by Kristiina Kalleinen – think that “it is the fortune of my patria to belong to Russia.”61 That is, loyalty to the Russian ruler was an important mode of conduct in Finnish-Russian relations. It was argued that since the righteous Russian Emperor had endowed the Finnish political unit with political existence, he had to be treated with respect. National aspirations could only occur without any open challenge towards Russian supremacy.62

With the revolutions of the year 1917, Russian imperial authority over Finland collapsed. Its disintegration left Finland without established instruments for the enforcement of authority: “There were no domestic Finnish troops, the Russian troops stationed in the country were largely paralysed, and the ‘Russified’ Finnish police were widely forced to resign.”63 In this situation, class-based militias began to come together to promote “law and order” both on the bourgeois and the socialist sides. After the declaration of Finnish independence and its recognition by the bolsheviks, the bourgeois government declared its Civil Guards (White Guards) as the government troops and announced that the Workers’ Guards (Red Guards) had to be disarmed. This happened at the end of January 1918. A bloody civil war between the Reds and the Whites burst out as the socialists launched a “defensive revolution.”64 Some three months later, in the spring of 1918, the White government repelled the challenge with

61 Kalleinen 2001; see also Apunen 2001b, 8; Soikkanen 2005, 55–56.
62 Risto Alapuro (2004, 87) notes that in order to maintain political order and the prevailing political relations, the Russian government customarily relied on a co-opted local elite in the minority regions of the Empire. In Finland, this elite was remarkably loyal to Russia. This meant that until the end of 19th century, Finland did not pose any major concerns for the Russian government.
64 Alapuro 2004, 88–89.
the assistance of German troops. According to the most recent estimates, 36,640 peoples died in the war and its aftermath. 65

Paradoxically enough, Finnish independence had been enabled by the revolutionary actions of the fierce opponents of the Russian Emperor, yet Russians were soon being blamed for casting Finnish independence into jeopardy by instigating the Finnish Civil War and participating in it on the Red side. 66 The internal war had revolved around the problem of who has the right to exercise sovereign authority in independent Finland. 67 The winning White side conceptualised the internal war as a “war of liberation” from Russia and accused the Reds of continuing to acquiesce to Russian influence. In their view, it seemed that the two-pronged structure of political authority persisted – communis mater patria and patria had not fused. Moreover, the former metropolitan country had not only changed from an authority over Finnish foreign policy into its object, but also transformed from a conservative empire into a bolshevist regime which promoted world revolution and continued to claim authority over the members of the working class beyond its borders.

Since political authority had been badly shattered in these developments, its consolidation became a burning issue in independent, post-Civil War Finland. This situation can be characterised with the notion of irritation which, in Charles S. Peirce’s pragmatism, refers to moments in which old beliefs and habits of mind no longer succeed in guiding action. 68 It brought about an irruption in the habitual and symbolically sustained course of political life and set off the process of resignification which is in this work referred to with the notion of political imaginary.

The moment of irritation likens what Erik Ringmar refers to with the notion of formative moments. During such moments, the discrepancy between the actual and the potential opens up a space of cultural and political opportunity. Within it, there is room to voice out various and varying purposes due to which the moment can be seized by alternative accounts. 69 Statecrafting illustrates one way of seizing the moment by putting forth arguments about the skilled conduct of politics.

Now, let us keep this in mind and return to Anton Kotonen’s critical treatment of the Knight. It is best analysed as a part of the political debate on whether the raids that some Finns had made across the Eastern border into Russian Karelia, and that were at least partly

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65 Ylikangas 2007, 211. According to Ylikangas, some 5,400 Reds and 3,400 Whites died in the actual battle while 1,400 Whites and 7,400 Reds lost their lives as a result of the so called purification measures that the warring sides conducted in the areas that they controlled. After the war, some 13,500 Reds died in the prison camps. In addition, 3,000 Russian and 500 German citizens were killed.
66 According to Heikki Ylikangas (2007, 218) some 1,000 voluntary Russian troops actually fought on the red side.
68 Peirce CP 5.374–5.375.
motivated by the dream of territorial expansion, actually contributed to the well-being of the Finnish political unit. By pointing out that a proactive (“adventurous”) policy vis-à-vis the Eastern neighbour was likely to put its durability at risk, Kotonen seeks to challenge the entitlement of certain right-wing groups to the position of political authority. In the present work I examine the cartoons as part and parcel of such developments. In them the question over how to characterise Russian/Soviet proximity is intertwined with the question of how to secure the durability of the political unit.

The corpus of cartoons is consistent until the turn of the 1930s which, as a period of aggressive anti-communist agitation which saw the emergence of the fascist-type Lapua Movement, can be taken as the climax of the epoch of 1918–1930s. The right-wing activists interpreted the anti-communist activism of late 1920s and early 1930s as continuity of the unfinished “liberation war” of 1918. It was a reaction intended to solve the dilemma of political authority for good by carrying to the end the uncompleted war against those who, in one way or another, were conceived of as “enemies” of the newly gained independence – i.e. communists, social democrats, and the (Soviet) Russians. In the view of the right-wing activists, the aforementioned groups’ cooperation with the USSR or reluctance to take proactive means to contain Soviet influences in Finland was to blame for the fact that independent Finland remained somehow occupied. The reaction was thus supposed to end all uncertainty concerning legitimate political authority and to fuse communis mater patria and patria seamlessly together.

For practical reasons, the corpus dating from the 1930s is less consistent than that from 1920s. With the recession of the early 1930s and subsequent drop in advertisement revenues many satirical magazines ceased to be published. Those that survived were forced to cut down the number of issues per year and alter the content in a more entertaining and less political direction. Political satire had to yield to other types of humour. The corpus reaches witheringly to the year 1939 when another seizure of meaning can be said to have occurred as a result of the Finnish-Russian Winter War.

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70 We also have to keep in mind the fact that publications of the labour movement were practically banned between the spring 1918 and early 1919. After that, left wing publications were carefully monitored and libel actions were brought against them for “writing against the prevailing system”. In the 1920s, the libel actions mostly concerned publications that were close to the communist movement. (Tikka 2006, 217.)


72 Uino 1991, 345; this is perceptible also in the distribution of research material across the epoch (see also Appendix 1).
1.3. Research Design

I have previously characterised political imaginary as a dynamic process of signification which, in the task of alleviating the irritation thrown up by the unexpected, necessarily proceeds on the basis of the old. Identifying the chivalric equation is, indeed, only a preliminary point of departure for the analysis of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia. Its constituent elements may be thought of as embodiments of previous knowledge and experience, due to which it represents the first, *pre-political level* of the inquiry. The second level provides the pivot for the analysis; the focus here is on the ways in which the identified formula is put to creative use in attempts to deal with the challenge. This can be designated as the *political level* as it involves attempts to put one’s truth at the centre of political life and marginalise the truth of others.\(^{73}\) The third, *post-political scale* of the research design, is an attempt to identify the thought-paradigm that the chivalric figures allude to. The third level is post-political in the sense that there is no possibility of choice; one is forced to operate with the paradigmatic element in order for any transfer of meaning to take place. Simply put, a paradigm is a collection or class of like elements that one has to choose from; one cannot choose the paradigm but can choose from the paradigm. Reconstruction of the paradigmatic element is possible on the basis of variation in the ways in which the chivalric equation is actualised. As an IR scholar, I revert to “Machiavellian” language in order to characterise it and, on the basis of my analysis of political cartoons, suggest that the thought-paradigm of Finnish political imaginary on Russia entails the choice, on the one hand, between conceiving of the Russian neighbourhood as a matter of good or bad *fortuna* and, on the other, regarding active or passive (prudent) *virtù* as the best way of managing it.

**1.3.1. International Political Action as Mimesis**

The division of the research design into three levels follows the triangular logic familiar from Charles Peirce’s semeiotic. It is founded on the thought that the process of signification entails a trinity of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. Thirdness refers to the interpretive aspect of a culture. Secondness asks for some proof in experience – i.e. it calls to mind denotation in the deictic aspect. Firstness refers to the connotation heavy moment which provides the very possibility of mimesis.\(^{74}\)

The notion of mimesis is central to this work’s understanding of political imaginary. At the heart of it lies the thought that human action – including international political action –
is essentially creative imitation of something that pre-exists and that this imitation takes the form of resignification. Heeding Peirce’s semeiotic realism, mimesis can be said to be opposed to the idea that mind-independent reality determines signification. Instead, it presupposes that mind-independent reality exists as a chaotic stream of occurrences which motivates the process of (re)signification. This also applies to the type of action which, in this work, has been designated as ‘observing Russia as Finns.’ Knowledge production on Russia necessitates interpretation which takes the form of creative imitation.

The proposed understanding of action springs from the work of Aristotle who introduces the notion of mimesis as a counterpart to the notion of muthos. While mimesis refers to creative imitation, muthos stands for the form of emplotment with recourse to which creative imitation of action occurs. When understood as a counterpart of muthos, mimesis is anything but an attempt to come up with a naturalistic reproduction of reality. It does not designate a faculty in virtue of which one could claim to have a special relation with the world. By emphasising that meaningful events are not pre-existent to the plot which muthos makes available, mimesis shatters the objectivist claim that history can offer a true representation of events. It reminds us that in as much as mimesis endows political imaginary with a reference to the real world of action (i.e. ‘history’), it also takes care of the fact that history has an imaginary aspect to it.

Mimesis can thus be taken to characterise the type of political action whereby a culturally mediated resource is creatively imitated in a process of (re)signification which has been impelled by a challenge that the world has thrown up. In this capacity, it sits comfortably with the creative habit-concept of pragmatism. It comes to suggest that all human action, notwithstanding proceedings that we call international relations, are caught in the tension between unreflected and creative social acts. Creativity, however, does not refer to an unconstrained production of something new but to accomplishments in concrete situations that call for solutions.

In his characterisation of mimesis, Paul Ricoeur works on Aristotle’s tenet that tragedy is essentially a poetic imitation of human action. It recreates reality with recourse to a fable (muthos) and thus makes reality appear better, higher, and more noble. Similarly, political imaginary involves presenting political actions with recourse to the chivalric equation, which allows bringing them out either in a more favourable or a more deplorable light.

It is worth noting that tragedy is not the only form of emplotment in the cartoons. They also lean on romance, satire, and comedy. According to Hayden White, romance is about a

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75 Ricoeur 1990.
77 Joas 1996, 129.
struggle with a happy end. It is a story of “the ultimate transcendence of man over the world in which he was imprisoned by the Fall.” 79 Satire is the opposite of romance; it is sceptical toward the possibility of a happy end and emphasises, instead, the captivity of man in the world. 80 Comedy and tragedy occupy mediate positions between the extremes of romance and satire. Comedy contains hope as it suggests that man can temporarily come to master the conflicting forces. Tragedy is built on the thought that the conflict between the natural and social forces is ineradicable. 81

All these modes of emplotment form part of the stock of political cartoons dealing with Finnish-Russian relations. From the point of view of the claim that the chivalric language-game supplies the pre-political level to the Finnish political imaginary on Russia, it is noteworthy how meanings unfolding from chivalric language-game seem to persist throughout all these different modes of emplotment.

The cartoon on the left can be examined as a romantic retrospective of the events of the Finnish Civil War. In order to emplot the White victory in the Finnish Civil as a victory of the forces of good over evil, the cartoonist has availed himself of meanings unfolding from the chivalric equation. The drawing displays the White leader P.E. Svinhufvud as an upright figure who is slaying the beast of Bolshevism with his sword.

On this basis, the drawing develops into a favourable presentation whereas Anton Kotonen’s above mentioned account of adventurous “iron fists” as bogus heroes whose actions cast the security of the state in jeopardy illustrates the possibility of putting forth a deplorable presentation with recourse to essentially tragic form of emplotment.

However, in both the romantic and tragic cases the chivalric language-game as the muthos of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia gives meaning to and motivates actions that would otherwise appear as random occurrences. When emplotted in these terms, these

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81 Hall 2006, 181.
actions can be judged against the criteria of skilled statecraft; they can be measured against whether they contribute to the survival and success of the political community.

The notion of emplotment refers to the retelling events with recourse to meanings that unfold from the chivalric language-game. In the case of the cartoon above we may single out, for instance, meanings that have to do with heroism and bravery as well as those of the battle of good vs. evil or human vs. animal. On this basis, the drawing comes to, firstly, present an existential threat to what is valuable in the political community and, secondly, to suggest a way out. This enables representing the White leader P.E. Svinhufvud’s (the Knight) political actions in terms of their contribution to the heroic containment of an existential challenge (the Beast) and the protection of what is held valuable in the society (the Treasure).

1.3.2. Countering Criticism against Mimesis

The notion of mimesis is not a complete stranger to International Relations and related disciplines. However, it is mostly evoked to designate and disprove the naturalist conception of knowledge. Roland Bleiker, in his argument for the aesthetic turn in international political theory, contrasts mimesis with aesthetic forms of representation. He links mimesis with the disciplinary mainstream – with “the prevailing wisdom of IR scholarship” – and argues that the latter “seeks to represent politics as realistically and authentically as possible, aiming to capture the world as-it-really-is.” Add to this Derek Gregory’s Geographical Imaginations: “If the critique of realism has taught us anything, it is surely that the process of representation is constructive not mimetic, that it results in ‘something made,’ a ‘fiction’ in the original sense of the word.”

82 I have availed myself to Paul Ricoeur’s characterisation of emplotment and plots. “To be historical,” Ricoeur (1980, 171) writes, “an event must be more than a singular occurrence: it must be defined in terms of its contribution to the development of a plot.” Furthermore, he distinguishes between two narrative dimensions – a chronological and a non-chronological one. The former is expressed in the expectation of contingencies affecting the story’s development. It gives rise to questions such as “and so? and then? what happened next? what was the outcome? etc.” The latter – the non-chronological dimension – brings to attention the configurational operation, i.e. the fact that the art of narrating consist of more than just adding episodes to one another. “It also constructs meaningful totalities out of scattered events. ... The art of narrating, as well as the corresponding art of following a story, therefore require that we are able to extract a configuration from a succession.” In a manner characteristic to his hermeneutics, Ricoeur does not side with either one of these poles but examines them the dialectic between them. “What is at stake in both the theory of history and the theory of fictional narrative is the connection within the notion of plot between figure and sequence, configuration and succession.”

83 Bleiker 2001, 511.
84 Bleiker 2001, 510.
85 Gregory 1994, 8.
My use of the notion of mimesis differs from Bleiker’s in that I do not understand it as an attempt to make objects of nature and their representations correspond one-to-one. It does not evoke “a slavish form of ontological copying.”86 Mimesis is not an attempt to discover a truth that escapes interpretation but a necessary part of the kind of action which, in coming to terms with the new and unexpected, necessarily proceeds on the basis of previous knowledge and experience. It does not point to the production of signs that refer to something more real, but to the necessity of interpretation that takes the form of creative imitation.87 Unlike Gregory, I propose that appreciating mimesis as creative imitation does not need to lead to the rejection of semiotic realism; what is being mimed in the practices of political imaginary cannot be said to exist only because of these practices.88 In my Ricoeurian inspired treatment, mimesis does not just attempt a copy or redoubling of some pre-existing reality; it refers to the practices of creatively imitating life in action. In this sense, it comes to closely resemble the notion of interpretants in Peirce’s pragmatist sign theory. It is a significant outcome of a sign.89 “Mimetic function,” as Jerome Bruner puts it, “is a very complex form of what C.S. Peirce long ago called an ‘interpretant’, a symbolic schema for mediating between a sign and the ‘world.’”90 This is pertinent for the methodological application of this work which avails itself of Peirce’s sign theory in order to get a hold of the dynamism of political imaginary. In it, I work on the presumption that namely the interpretant mediates between the three levels of political imaginary – the pre-political, political and post-political.

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86 Fleming 1999, 696.
87 Bleiker (2001, 512) understands by the ideal of mimesis “a perfect resemblance between signifier and signified” and argues that it is because of this that it “offers us little political insight”. My argument is that since mimesis is creative imitation, it is the very locus of political insight; by examining mimesis in the context of political imaginary, we may appreciate how past works are fitted for present, political purposes.
88 Polat (1998) and Patomäki (2006) are worth mentioning for IR works that evoke mimesis as something worth taking into account in disciplinary attempts of making sense of the world. Polat leans on Wittgenstein and Derrida in the development of her argument, and although Patomäki also avails himself to Ricoeur, his application of the three moments of mimesis is quite different from the one put forth here (esp. Patomäki 2006, 7.) See also Judith Butler’s (1993) analytically powerful treatment of the term mimesis and its constitutive power. Butler argues that the maintenance of ideals of masculinity and femininity is a matter of miming the heterosexual matrix and sees in the mimetic nature of gender the very possibility of its disruption; “hegemonic heterosexuality,” she argues, “is itself a constant and repeated effort to imitate its own idealizations” (Butler 1993, 125; see also Butler 1996.) Among feminist theorists, Luce Irigaray also discusses the notion of mimesis and places it on the level of strategy allowing one to subvert the social order – “one that reveals through its repetition of ideas.” (See also Bell 1999.) Theodor Adorno (1997) presents art as mimesis and as a strategy; it is a refuge in the midst of rationality. In Horkheimer and Adorno (1989), mimesis is characterised as a natural process of adaptation which is, however, susceptible to control, “for mimesis, the outside world is a model which the inner world must try to conform to.” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1989, 187.)
89 Peirce CP 5.473.
90 Bruner 1990, 46.
Charles S. Peirce's pragmatist sign theory provides suitable methodological tools for disclosing ways in which the movement between the three levels of political imaginary takes place. It has this capacity because of its interest in the processual, the dynamic, and the practice-embedded. This point of departure translates into a refusal to draw dichotomies between the world ‘as it is’ and the world ‘as it is experienced by human beings.’91 The focus shifts to the dynamic process of resignification during the course of which objects of experience emerge.

The triadic sign theory of Peirce has this capacity since it differs from semiotic theories that are founded on the dyadic form of the signifier and the signified.92 Peirce’s semeiotic insight was that thinking does not take place in the dyadic form of representation-object but in the triadic form representamen-object-interpretant. The interpretant is not an equivalent of the signified but refers to the act or process of signification.93 It evokes the experience of intelligibility and comprehension which takes place in a specific context and against the background of the previously known. In virtue of its embedded pragmatism, Peirce’s triadic characterisation of the sign provides powerful tools for analysing political cartoons in terms of statecrafting. As Leroy Searle notes, Peirce’s sign theory is “always concerned with and embedded in a real historical context, aware of consequences, without becoming systematically entangled in linguistic issues that are always indeterminate when considered apart from pragmatists.”94

Such a pragmatically attuned characterisation of the sign lies at the very heart of the Peirceman project, which develops into a vast technical edifice of triads and more triads. Logical categories of monad-dyad-triad are connected with phenomenological categories of Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness. These, in turn, implicate the metaphysical categories of quality-reaction-law, which subsume the semeiotic categories of representamen-object-interpretant which, consequently, develop into new triads out of which the icon-index-symbol is perhaps the most well known.95

From the point of view of an inquiry into political imaginary, the most relevant Peircan distinctions are representamen-object-interpretant and the icon-index-symbol. Let me illustrate the character of the interpretant with a colloquial example: the letter ‘X’ has a physi-

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91 Pihlström 2005, 121. It is worth noting that this does not mean that pragmatism would not be compatible with realist metaphysics, it just emphasises our need to struggle with concrete facts of worldly existence manifest in a diversity of practices and habits of action (ibid.)

92 Ferdinand de Saussure epitomises the dyadic conception of the sign: the sign is defined by an opposition of its two aspects, the signifier and the signified (understood as the differential value in the lexical system). Thus, meaning is not dependent upon extralinguistic entities or mind-independent being, which allows treating semiotic systems as closed systems. (E.g. Ricoeur 1976, 6)

93 In this sense, it resembles what Roland Barthes talks about in terms of second-order meanings (Danesi 2006, 28.)


95 E.g. King 1991, 70.
cal appearance consisting of two intersecting lines. Peirce uses the notion representamen to refer to this physical part of the sign. Literally, the representamen ‘X’ stands for one of the 26 letters of the English alphabet. It is the object of the sign ‘X’. Heeding Peirce’s triadic sign conception, the analysis of semeiosis does not stop here. Disclosing the character of the sign as interpretant one must ask whether the sign ‘X’ is being used as the symbol of an unknown variable, as in mathematics; as a signature of someone incapable of writing his or her name; or as a designation of a sexually explicit movie. These are all interpretants of the sign ‘X’ that have been actualised to serve a particular purpose. Indeed, the sign’s ‘standing for’ relation always involves a mind (or quasi-mind) and hence an ‘intentional set.’ “To mean,” as Paul Ricoeur has it, “is both what the speaker means, i.e. what he intends to say, and what the sentence means, i.e. what the conjunction between the identification function and the predicative function yields.”

Let me illustrate this with an example from the research material. Think of the previously introduced drawing displaying the heroic P.E. Svinhufvud. In the task of interpretation – i.e. in the attempt to carve the aspect of interpretant out of the cartoon – we may treat the heroic figure as the sign and the idea of skilled statecraft or political virtue as its object. To take such a presupposition as the point of departure of interpretation is legitimate given Peirce’s pragmatist insistence that inquiry always starts from practical speech situations. In this case, the practical point of departure is the fact that the drawing is a political cartoon which puts forth an argument about the right kind of conduct in Finnish-Russian relationships. Now, the interpretant in this case would be what the picture evokes in the mind of the interpreter.

Peirce distinguishes between three different kinds of interpretants – immediate, dynamic, and final. When inquiring into political imaginaries, the task is to focus upon the way in which interpretants are produced on these three levels, the very process of signification that Peirce designates as semeiosis. Indeed, the categorisations correspond to the previous characterisation of political imaginary in terms of the three orders of mimesis – pre-political, political

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96 Danesi 2006, 28.
97 Innis 1986, 1.
98 Ricoeur 1976, 12.
99 According to Peirce’s sign theory, the object for which the picture stands can be either a concrete object or a mere idea, even something purely imaginary (Peirce CP 2.230; Nöth 2003, 382). Note also Peirce’s distinction between the immediate and the dynamical object; the former exists within and the latter without the sign; that is, it refers to the “Reality which by some means contrives to determine the sign to its representation.” (Peirce CP 4.536.)
100 E.g. Freadman 2004, 219.
101 Hookway 1992, 123.
and post-political. The immediate interpretant consists of all that is directly expressed by the sign and the dynamical interpretant comprises the direct or actual effect to some interpreter; “it is whatever interpretation any mind actually makes of a sign.” Peirce’s example of a dynamic interpretant is the actual thump of muskets on the ground after the infantry captain had commanded his troops to ‘ground arms.’ In the case of political cartoons, the dynamic interpretant is an actualised sign — such as the recognisable P.E. Svinhufvud in the role of the Knight. The final interpretant refers to a regular or habitual effect that the sign tends to produce in the interpreting mind. It does not point to individual occurrences but to “the way in which every mind would act.” That is, it is efficient in the way of being able to enlist agents in its service. In this sense, it is pertinent for the attempt to get to grips and reconstruct the thought-paradigm of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia.

102 Peirce CP 8.315.
103 Vis-à-vis cartoons, Peirce’s characterisation of genre paintings is illustrative: “Take as an example of a Sign a genre painting. There is usually a lot in such a picture which can only be understood by virtue of acquaintance with customs. The style of the dresses for example, is no part of the significance, i.e. the deliverance, of the painting. It only tells what the subject of it is. Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions. ... But that which the writer aimed to point out to you, presuming you to have all the requisite collateral information, that is to say just the quality of the sympathetic element of the situation, generally a very familiar one - a something you probably never did so clearly realise before - that is the Interpretant of the Sign – its ‘significance.’” (Peirce CP 8.179.)
104 Peirce CP 8.315.
105 E.g. Peirce CP 4.536; Peirce CP 8.315.
106 Peirce CP 8.315.
107 Peirce CP 1.212–1.213.
As the previous diagram above is intended to illustrate, the interpretant exploits the “ground” of the sign – i.e. the relation between the representamen and the object. Peirce suggests that this relationship can be characterised with the help of the notions of icon, index and symbol. Icons refer to a shared character between the representamen and the object. Indices force attention to particular, existential objects. Symbols signify through some law or convention.\textsuperscript{108} Analysing the interpretant thus amounts to grasping the grounds on which a cartoon puts forth its argument of things being just so.

It is worth stressing that the point of this type of exercise is not to classify signs as either icons, indices, or symbols. Any complex sign, such as a character in a political cartoon, is likely to contain elements with different sorts of grounds.\textsuperscript{109} Still, the classificatory scheme is analytically pertinent. By asking what is iconic, indexical, or symbolic in a set of signs under analysis, it is possible to learn interesting things about politics. For instance, the drawing above may be characterised as an icon of virility and bravery, as an index of P.E. Svinhufvud, and as a symbol of proactive foreign policy line. This is the aspect of dynamical interpretant in it. Interested in the meaning of ‘observing Russia as Finns,’ it is possible to preliminarily note that the dynamical interpretant in this case further alludes to the “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm where virtuous political conduct vis-à-vis the Eastern neighbour is judged along the axis of proactive vs. prudent conduct. This may be singled out as its final interpretant. Indeed, analysis of what ‘observing Russia as Finns’ actually means can be undertaken by registering how new interpretants in concrete situations emerge from the constituent elements of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia.

While the iconic level provides for the connotation heavy moment and thus opens up access to the chivalric language-game, inquiry into the indexical aspects of a drawing enables fully appreciating the political level in the process of signification. This level, however, remains intimately interlinked with the preceding one as it needs both history and fiction. The story, so to say, does not lie in the historical events that the cartoons comment but in the form of emplotment that the cartoons rely on comes from elsewhere. In them, identifiable politicians fuse with fantastic figures. Made-up events mix and mingle with authentic occurrences. In other words, chivalric meanings and plots unfolding from the symbols of the Knight, the Treasure, and the Beast are evoked for the purposes of statecrafting in concrete situations.

\textsuperscript{108} E.g. Peirce CP 1.369; see also Rytövuori-Apunen 2005, 166.

\textsuperscript{109} Indeed, Peirce suggests that there are no pure icons or indices; most signs are largely conventional in the form of their mode of representation but are likely to contain elements with iconic and indexical grounds, too. Consider, for instance, such a sign as the floor plan; it is iconic in the sense that there is an isomorphism between the sign and its object (the properties of an apartment) but in order for us to be able to exploit this isomorphism, we need to be familiar with the general practice of using floor plans to communicate the properties of apartments. (Hookway 1992, 124-126.)
situations. Disclosing the concrete event or incident of Finnish-Russian relationships that is evaluated with recourse to these meanings is possible on the basis of attending to indices as deictic indicators that anchor these meanings to the circumstantial reality. With circumstantial reality I have in mind topical events in the Finnish-Russian relationships or occurrences in international relations at large. The index takes care of the fact that initially fictional or non-literal objects can be treated as assertable ones.

The weight assigned to this layer of analysis distinguishes this work’s interpretive exercise from purely structuralist or semiotic approaches to the text. Unlike approaches that would be content to examine the internal laws of the corpus of political cartoons, the approach promulgated in this work involves an attempt to reconstruct the dynamic set of operations by which political imaginary comes to refer outside itself and thereby becomes a part of practical experience. Heeding J.G.A. Pocock’s definition of politics, cartoons – or other instances of political imaginary – can be understood in the context of the “art of dealing with the contingent event.” This argument is in line with pragmatism’s emphasis on our need to struggle with the concrete facts of worldly existence. Sensitivity to radical contingency and chance is characteristic to the pragmatist tradition. Indeed, recognising the precariousness of existence has led the pragmatists to focus on the interplay of habituality and creativity and present it as the means of responding to contingencies. Pocock’s characterisation of politics in terms of contingencies also seems to resonate with the ways of international thought; although regularities and continuities are a characteristic part of the ways in which international politics is conceived, for instance in academic research, the focus of international thought is often concentrated on some disturbing element, such as terrorist attacks.

1.4. Towards the “Machiavellian” Thought-Paradigm

I have argued that the chivalric language-game provides the pre-political level and that statecrafting takes place on the political level, in the practices of political imaginary. Reaching the most fundamental level of inquiry – i.e. the post-political level – necessitates paradigmatic analysis. The thought-paradigm can be reconstructed on the basis of variation that the chival-

111 Freadman 2004, 72.
112 Pocock 1975, 156.
114 See Aaltola 1999; Aaltola 2005, 12. I am here evoking Martin Wight’s (1987, 221) notion ‘international thought’ which designates “speculation about international relations … that we find in the discussions of the man-in-the-street or in popular press.” Wight distinguishes ‘international thought’ from ‘the political philosophy of international relations’ and ‘international theory.’
The notion of thought-paradigms comes from the cultural semiotician Yuri M. Lotman’s work. Lotman’s formulation is of interest for the reason that his idea of model-images as composite elements of paradigms enables appreciating the central role of archetypical elements and iconic aspects of political imaginaries. Lotman studied the Russian writer Pushkin’s poetics and argued that his thought-paradigm is not formed simply by words but by model-images that have a syncretic verbal-visual existence.

This suggestion is significant for a study of political imaginary since it takes issue with the debate over whether complex information is represented in the mind as imagery or prop-

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115 Ricoeur 1976, 3.
116 Ricoeur 1976, 3.
117 Ricoeur 1976, 9.
118 Ricoeur 1976, 9.
119 Ricoeur 1976, 11.
120 Lotman 1990, 83.
ositional knowledge. The syncretic position suggests that when we think of complex action scenarios, we imagine them not unlike comic-strip panels. Model-images play a central role here; they are mnemonic devices – i.e. they have a memory function – that may just as well appear in verbal as in visual form. An entire political argument cannot go into a single model-image but its main scaffold of meaning – the plot – can. This syncretic position is aptly characterised in the words of Michael Kimmel, according to whom “it may make sense to say that the imagistic aspect is precisely that one pertaining to an overall image of the main plot of a narrative [or an argument], while the complexities are understood through propositions attached at various points.” Model-images are mnemonic devices around which the less salient and more contingent elements can crystallize.

When conceived of in this way, the notion of the thought-paradigm takes on representational concreteness which is lacking from parallel terms, such as the logic of the discourse (understood as a unity of meaning or repertoire of interpretation). It parallels Clifford Geertz’s accomplishment of removing the study of culture from the realm of hidden, individual consciousness and making it a matter of publicly available symbols and rituals. Indeed, this inquiry into the political imaginary of Finnish-Russian relations resembles Geertzian thick description of the publicly observable symbolic and ritual practices that structure the possibilities of meaning in a given cultural system. Such an approach is well-suited to questioning the subjectivist position, which works on the proposition that meaning is conferred upon signs by consciousness, and thus ignores the possibility of signs being intrinsically meaningful. That is, specific kinds of plots unfold from them.

As was suggested earlier, ‘observing Russia as Finns’ involves placing oneself within the process of tradition. It is a matter of actualising intrinsically meaningful signs for argumentative purposes. In his semiotics, Yuri Lotman also criticises the subjectivist position and its tendency to view images as “packages of thought” – i.e. to engage in the Romanticist fallacy that the artist or a picture-maker first formulated a thought in her head and then clothed it in an image. Similarly, the political imaginary approach of this work works on the presumption that thinking and imagining is dependent upon the use of inter-subjective signs of which model-images are one example.

121 Lotman 1990, 103.
122 Kimmel 2001, 12.
124 Geertz 1973; see also Swidler 2001, 84–85.
125 Archer 2003, 68.
126 MacIntyre 1980, 63.
127 Lotman 1990, 83.
128 Archer 2003, 68.
A suitable illustration of the way in which signs are intrinsically meaningful is a recent journalistic comment in the Finnish newspaper *Aamulehti*. It actualised the model-image of the Big Bear to comment on the Ukrainian presidential elections: “If Jushchenko’s victory becomes certain, he faces a challenging task. He has to reach an agreement with the big bear – he cannot do anything about geography either.” The journalist did not need to utter the word “Russia.” The intrinsically meaningful model-image of the Big Bear and the plot of Russian might which is embodied in it were sufficient for putting forth his point.

In his pragmatism, C.S. Peirce experiments with the notion of commens or common mind to designate “all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter at the outset in order that the sign in question should fulfil its function.” Hence conceptualised, the thought of a common mind actually comes close to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s characterisation of traditions as something that we belong to before we can appropriate them. Grasping the common mind in the Finnish political imaginary on Russia necessitates paradigmatic analysis. Although the three chivalric model-images in virtue of their iconic sign aspects readily allude to the “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm, reconstructing the paradigmatic element in the Finnish political imaginary on Russia requires attending to variation in the basic terms of the chivalric formula. Proceeding this way, it is possible to attempt a characterisation of the Peircean final interpretant – i.e. the regular or habitual aspect of the political imaginary.

I have already preliminarily suggested that the final interpretant in the Finnish political imaginary on Russia entails a “Machiavellian” choice between conceiving the Russian neighbourhood as a matter of good or bad *fortuna* and between regarding active or passive (prudent) *virtù* as the best way of managing it. The use of inverted commas around the name of this Renaissance thinker is intended to emphasise that I do not treat Niccolò Machiavelli primarily as a historical individual or seek a correct interpretation of his writings. Neither do I avail myself to Machiavelli’s writings with the need to develop a theory of International Relations. Instead, Machiavelli provides for this inquiry some useful vocabulary which helps make it possible to connect political cartoons to the dynamic realm of international political life. This means that more interesting than the question over whether Machiavelli promoted a republic, a monarchy, or a mixture of these, is the way of thought which his writings help disclose.

130 Peirce www-document.
131 See Vajda 2001 for more elaboration on active/passive *virtù* distinction.
132 See Lahtinen (1997) for an interpretation which, leaning on Louis Althusser’s Machiavellianism, suggests a somewhat similar approach to “Machiavellianism.” According to Lahtinen (1997, 14) “[Machiavelli] teaches his reader ... to analyse the specific features of the given political conjuncture”.

**Introduction**
From this angle, “Machiavellian” is a symbolic notion that stands for a certain way of living out international political life – a disciplinary phenomenon due to which Niccolò Machiavelli sometimes appears more “Machiavellian” than he really was. In a similar vein, Michel Foucault approaches Machiavelli as part of a tradition of interpreting political life. He suggests that Machiavelli is a figure that cannot be easily dismissed but “must be encountered and engaged.” This Renaissance figure has not ceased to function as an object of either praise or opposition and rejection. In Foucault’s reading, Machiavelli’s works are an early example of a new type of treatises which burgeoned from the 18th century onwards. He suggests that instead of being ‘advice to the prince,’ they are concerned with the ‘art of government.’ “Though [Machiavelli] is not the one that defined the art of governing, it is through what he wrote that one must search for what the art of governing is.” This is what I have in mind with the notion of the “Machiavellian” language of political dynamics and statecraft – “[it] does not happen to him, but speaks through him.”

In other words, the point is not to disclose what Machiavelli had in mind but what his texts are about, what they have come to mean to us, what they say to us. In the words of Paul Ricoeur, “to understand a text is to follow its movement from sense to reference: from what it says to what it talks about.” One fruitful way of accomplishing this task is to inquire into the types of questions to which Machiavelli’s writings have been consulted for answers. In this respect it is interesting to take note of the fact that in his discussion on “Machiavellianism,” Foucault also considers the reception of Machiavelli in different times and places. He points out that Machiavelli was received positively at the time of the original publication of The Prince in 1513 as well as by his immediate contemporaries. His work also received considerable attention at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, especially in Germany and Italy. Foucault characterises the context of Machiavelli’s rediscovery as one which is “partly Napoleonic and party created by the Revolution.” It gave rise to three types of questions related to, first, conditions in which the ruler’s sovereignty over the state can be maintained; second, the relationship between politics and strategy, or force and rationalisation; and third, conditions under which territorial unity could be restored.

133 Note also Olson & Groom’s (1991, 7) point that “he [Machiavelli] was not as Machiavellian as is often thought.” Machiavellianism is often understood as a belief in the necessity of violence and intrigue in politics, priority of power over ethics and ends over means (Walker 1989, 32.)
135 Foucault 2006, 131.
139 Foucault 2006, 132.
140 Foucault 2006, 132; see also Foucault 2004, 93.
Curiously enough, the context of Machiavelli’s Finnish (re)discovery coincides with the epoch of 1918–1930s. *The Prince* came out in Finnish in 1918, at the very beginning of the period which is designated here as the “Machiavellian moment” and which is characterised by similar questions as the three above outlined dilemmas. It was dominated by a persistent need to identify dangers and suggest a way out of them. “Machiavellianism” thus refers to a way of thought where answers are sought to the dilemma of vulnerability of the political unit. “Machiavelli” is a key to the surety of the territory or the surety of the sovereign who reigns over the territory.141 His name can be easily evoked to articulate the craft – or better, the art – of keeping the principality whose very existence appears uncertain.142

This approach provides a way out from debates over the right way to interpret *The Prince* and *The Discourses* and enables treating the “Machiavellian” understanding of politics in terms of Gadamerian effective history. It suggests that the notions familiar from Machiavelli’s writings form an ineradicable part of the tradition of interpreting international political life. Indeed, my use of the notion “Machiavellian” in this work comes close to Martin Wight’s use of the notions “Hobbesian”, “Grotian”, and “Kantian” in his analysis of the three traditions of International Relations.143 R.B.J. Walker probably has something similar in mind in his argument that “it is Machiavelli who most symbolizes what the tradition of international relations theory is all about. ... [He] gives crucial insights to those seeking to develop a critical perspective on contemporary international relations in particular and political life in general.”144 Heeding this suggestion, using “Machiavellian” terminology to reconstruct the thought-paradigm contributes to the task of disclosing the final interpretant – i.e. the service for which agents are being enlisted in the practices of political imaginary.

If this approach is accepted, then the notion “Machiavellian” can be used to characterise the paradigmatic element or the final interpretant of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia. It stands for a specific way of understanding political life and international relations. In this way of thought, international political life is conceived as the interplay of *virtù* and *fortuna* in an environment which is characterised by uncertainty – i.e. *necessità*. Here, the acceptability of deeds is measured against whether they contribute to the difficult task of maintaining the state. Due to this, the survival and success of one’s political community may emerge as more important than other ends.145 The pertinence of this type of exercise is that it

141 Foucault 2004, 67.
143 Wight 1991.
144 Walker 1989, 29; see e.g. Berlin (1989, 25–39) and Boucher (1998, 90–91) for overviews of various interpretations of Machiavelli’s political opinions.
145 In Isaiah Berlin’s (1989) interpretation, Machiavelli was not as amoral as is often suggested. His originality lies in the fact that instead of working in the spirit of the prevailing Christian morality, which emphasised individual salvation, Machiavelli was an heir of the pagan moral tradition. In it, the morality of deeds was measured against
may help in identifying ways of thinking where a historical problematic has become an ahistorical apology for “the violence of the present.” Indeed, part of my scholarly task in this work is to become aware of the way in which past modes of thinking influence the present and the future – i.e. how they become part of effective history. Possibilities for such hermeneutical reflection will be more elaborately discussed towards the end of this work.

Indeed, although Machiavelli does not always remain the same, the question of surety of the political unit persists. Whereas The Prince can be read as a treatise on the exceptional moment and The Discourses might be better understood as a study of normal times, these moments are united by the dilemma of how to make the state endure. If this characterisation of “Machiavellianism” is accepted, the notions of virtù and fortuna – the interplay of which takes place in the condition of necessità – can be treated as answers to this dilemma. The way in which they come together in a specific situation articulates how the state can be made to endure.

On this basis, I suggest that the epoch from 1918 to the 1930s can be thought of as the “Machiavellian moment” in Finnish-Russian relationships. It is an instance when skilled politics are emphatically argued to be required to lay the foundation for a durable state. Similar understanding of what is “Machiavellian” is also coined by R.B.J. Walker: “[a]fter all, whatever else [Machiavelli] might have written, he did write about the prince (read statesman) in a situation of extreme danger (read international relations).” Curiously enough, Machiavelli’s Prince was first published in Finnish in 1918. It can be characterised as a book devoted to the problems of new states, and the central dilemma motivating it, just like other writings by Machiavelli, is similar to the political condition of the newly independent Finland in the 1920s and 1930s: How to secure the survival of the political unit?

The characterisation of the epoch under scrutiny here as the “Machiavellian moment” is premised on the assumption that it is a “time like no other” – i.e. that the key dilemmas and solutions of other epochs’ are different. A characterisation of the uniqueness of the epoch under scrutiny in this work can also be found in a speech which Urho Kekkonen – the to-
be-president of Finland – delivered in Stockholm, Sweden in 1943. Kekkonen argues that independence is the condition *sine qua non* of Finnish politics. In a retrospective analysis of the epoch under scrutiny in the present work, he ventures that “while the goal of the foreign policy of each and every state is to protect the independence of one’s own country, a state in a position of Finland’s had a specific duty to diligently focus attention on this issue.”

Something to this extent is also expressed in the words of the Rector of the University of Helsinki, Edwin Linkomies who, writing in 1958, posits that a rupture with the previous epoch has taken place: “until recently the national idea was still the guiding star for the majority of students. ... Now that these goals have been reached and the passion has subsided, there seems to be nothing to replace it. Guaranteeing freedom and independence are still considered to be primary elements but they are somehow too obvious preconditions for the worthwhile existence of the Finns, they do not suffice to satisfy the demand for a fundamental outlook on life.”

If this idea about the post-1918 epoch as the “Machiavellian moment” is accepted, it makes sense to interpret knowledge production on Russia as a set of responses to the question over how to make the state durable. In other words, it legitimises characterising the key irritation in terms of vulnerability and treating political cartoons in terms of statecrafting where hypotheses about a way out of this dilemma are put forth.

### 1.5. Relation to Previous Research

This pragmatically attuned inquiry into the Finnish political imaginary on Russia, from 1918 to the 1930s, provides an alternative to previous research which has largely been conducted within the framework of ‘hatred of Russkies.’ One motivation for this study is, indeed, to question the assumption that the ‘hatred of Russkies’ thesis – which is implicitly and explicitly reproduced in academic and colloquial writing – would in a satisfactory way provide the key to understanding Finnish-Russian relations during the interwar period. If ‘hatred’ is argued to account for the uniformities in Finnish conduct vis-à-vis Russia during the epoch of 1918–1930s, ‘observing Russia as Finns’ turns into a by-product, or an expression of an emotional state of intense aversion, instead of a form of knowledge production and political argumentation. It thus loses the character of practice.

Contending Matti Klinge, the ‘hatred of Russkies’ thesis can be characterised with the help of the following three theses: First, the Russians as a people are despicable both because of their ethnic attributes and the Russian expansiveness that threatened Finland. Second, a

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negative stance vis-à-vis Russians is archaic; Russians have always been conceived of as the archenemies of the Finns. Third, the antagonism between the Finns and the Russians is not based on reasoning but on intuition.\textsuperscript{154}

Klinge contests the view that such 'hatred' of Russia and Russians would actually be archaic and chooses, instead, to examine ‘hatred of Russkies’ as a “construction projected to the past” which suited the interests of certain circumstances and certain circles. He suggests that ‘hatred’ was motivated by ideological rather than national reasons. It was stimulated by the events of 1917–1918 and, instead of (Soviet) Russia or Russians, was actually directed against the communists. Connecting the contingent political concerns to something that was supposedly more archaic provided a convenient way of legitimising the ideological task of containing communism.\textsuperscript{155}

Outi Karemaa has disputed Klinge's argument that the 'hatred of Russkies' was primarily motivated by ideological concerns and suggests instead that the phenomenon was essentially ethnic.\textsuperscript{156} Her argument is premised on the view that although the attributes given to Russia and the Soviet Union have varied, variation is secondary to the enduring logic of identity formation that makes Russia Other to the Finnish Self. Karemaa suggests that 'hatred of Russkies' was motivated by the need to come up with a stable Finnish identity. In this sense, her approach fits neatly among conceptualisations of identity and difference promoted by recent theoretical reflections on the necessity of an Other for the operation of national identity. These works have essentially concluded that identity functions primarily through what it excludes.\textsuperscript{157}

The pragmatically attuned political imaginary approach of this work is closer to Klinge's than Karemaa's work. Indeed, Klinge's characterisation of 'hatred of Russkies' can be thought of pragmatically; in that case it emerges as a response to something unexpected. However, pragmatism would downplay the rational actor postulate which seems to form part of Klinge's claim that 'hatred of Russkies' was invented and projected onto the past in order to serve the present purpose of combating communism. Instead, it would be interested in how this new form of knowledge emerged on the basis of earlier knowledge and experience – i.e. on the basis of previously available interpretations of enmity/amity between things ‘Finnish’ and ‘Russian.’

In order to bring out the uniqueness of the pragmatist conception, at this point it suffices to mention that among different ways of conceiving of action, both Klinge's and Karemaa's accounts of 'hatred of Russkies' seem to operate with what Erkki Kilpinen designates as a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[154] Klinge 1972, 60.
\item[155] Klinge 1972, 58.
\item[156] Karemaa 1998.
\item[157] See e.g. Dalby 1988; Campbell 1992; Neumann 1999; Sharp 2000.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
“minimalistic notion of action.”\(^{158}\) It truncates a complex action-process into a purely mental phenomenon – be they Klinge’s reasons or Karemaa’s passions. Hence portrayed, action becomes nothing more than “bodily execution of mind’s dicta.”\(^{159}\) To the extent that it emphasises that ‘hatred’ was motivated by a need to come up with a stable identity, the account of international political action can be said to verge towards functionalist or neo-functionalist conceptions. Mental factors still play a decisive role but they are conceived of as a function of broader normative purposes such as social cohesion. Indeed, pragmatist critique can be extended to apply on approaches that examine Finnish-Russian relations within the framework of identity claims, juxtapose the Finnish Self to the Russian Other, and consequently argue that Finnishness is a function of non-Russian-ness.\(^{160}\) Consider, for instance, Pertti Joenniemi’s description of Finnish identity as something expressible only against the threatening images of Russia, images “that dichotomize and by so doing push Russia into the zone of irrational, impulsive, emotionally-guided – and thus dangerous. Russia is made that contrast through which the real essence and ideal subjectivity of Finland are still expressed.”\(^{161}\)

This dominant way of conceiving of Finnish-Russian relations is built on the somewhat facile gesture of demonstrating the dependence of Finnish identity on the exclusion of the Russian Other.\(^{162}\) It is not as problematic because of the underlying presumption that the image of the antagonist can be found in virtually all realms of social interaction, as it is for the fact that the practice of fixing Russia as Other to the Finnish Self too easily blocks the road of inquiry. A pragmatist suggestion is that even if alterity or enmity may be accepted as a persistent feature of the human condition or as the constitutive principle of the political,\(^{163}\) analyti-

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158 Kilpinen 2000, 18.
159 Kilpinen 2000, 18.
160 See also Patomäki (1998, 124) for a critique of approaches that define identity in negative terms only and an argument that “purely negative creature – one that exists only in virtue of what it is not – is as incredible a figure as is a world without emptiness, absence, negativity, and difference.”
162 This approach is more or less explicitly present in the following accounts of Finnish-Russian relationships: Luostarinen 1986, 1989; Karemaa 1998, 2004 & 2006; Harle & Moisio 2000; Wunsch 2004. For illustrations, see Harle & Moisio’s (2000, 56) argument according to which “Finnish identity has been formed by saying out loud what Finns are not, they are not Russians” and Christopher S. Browning’s recent contribution (2004) which identifies “the desire to occupy the Western position” as the general trend of Finnish identity politics since the turn of the 20th century and claims that Westernness “is basically understood as not being Russian (Eastern). ... Finland’s natural identity is premised on leaving something behind. And that something is Russia” (ibid., 2, 5, 12; see also Browning 2002.) Kari Immonen (1987, esp. 69) must also be cited among the scholars who have taken into account the ambiguity of Finnish-Russian relations and argued against discussing about something as general as “the Finns’ attitude toward Russia and Russians.” In the place of it Immonen talks about a great variety in attitudes.
163 See Prozorov (2007, 81, 87) for a discussion on enmity in Carl Schmitt’s work and its relevance for international relations. In this interpretation, the ever-present possibility of conflict which arises out of the existence of difference characteristic to the pluralistic structure it international relations renders enmity the constitutive principle of the political.
cal effort should be directed at its concrete, historically contingent realisations in political acts – i.e. with an eye on “the absence of both essence and necessity to any empirical form of enmity.”\footnote{Prozorov 2007, 97.} Fixing ‘Russia’ as Other to the ‘Finnish’ Self often means that the more rewarding question over the respect and capacity in which something Russian may emerge as the Beast that challenges the preservation of the Treasure is not interrogated and the argument about legitimate authority that the Knight puts forth is dismissed. Consequently, political stakes that are involved in acts of Othering are ignored and the ways in which ‘the enemy has a thousand faces/facets’\footnote{This is to paraphrase the title of Vilho Harle’s (2000) book The Enemy with a Thousand Faces.} is left without the examination that it merits.

The pragmatist view on international political action seeks to join the bodily and mental or social structure and individual agency. It places the actor within an overarching process of resignification which is geared at solving an irritation caused by the unexpected and, in doing this, necessarily proceeds on the basis of the previously known and experienced – i.e. on the basis of the structurally available.\footnote{Kilpinen 2000, 18.} In this work, I have chosen to designate this overarching process of resignification with the notion of political imaginary. Taking such a broadly pragmatist road of inquiry does not necessarily lead to refuting the possibility that there was ‘hatred of Russkies’ in Finland during the epoch, but instead necessitates revisiting the ontological status of such an argument – i.e. posing the \textit{how} question. It leads us to contest the possibility that such a pathological condition as the Finns’ collective hatred of Russia(ns) could account for Finnish-Russian relationships during the interwar period and to turn attention to the practices of political imaginary that the language-game of ‘hatred’ may \textit{somehow} form part of.

Examining Finnish-Russian relationships within the framework of political imaginary, for which the chivalric language-game supplies the pre-political level, is a step in this direction. It enables discussing in positive terms a set of issues which have conventionally been coined in negative terms. That is, Finnish knowledge production – designated here as ‘observing Russia as Finns’ – comes out as something else than an affirmation of one’s non-Russianness. At the same time as this approach proposes a different view on the topic, it saves the phenomenon by pointing out ways in which the ‘hatred of Russkies’ – understood in terms of Klinge’s three theses – does, at certain moments, crystallize as a compelling reality. This approach recognises that the possibility of framing the Other as an enemy and existential threat is generated by an ethos of survival which, at least to an extent, is characteristic of Finnish-Russian relationships during the epoch under scrutiny here. It is one possible effect of the “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm. However, due to its refusal to fix the reference of the Other empirically to (Soviet)
Russia, the suggested approach is capable of accounting not only for the fact that in Finland, one hears “full-mouthed talk about the Russian archenemy” but also for the other side of the coin – i.e. for “monuments erected in honour of Russian emperors.”

If this point of departure is accepted, debates over whether the Russian neighbourhood is a matter of hatred, enmity, or identity start to make sense as argumentative retellings of the plot of skilful statecraft that issues from the “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm. All traditions are partly constituted by a continuous argument over their correct interpretation. Similarly, debates over the correct interpretation of the significance of Russian proximity are constitutive to ‘observing Russia as Finns,’ which involves placing oneself within the process of tradition. In this outlook, the ‘hatred of Russkies’ approach is problematic partly for the sense of consensus which it presupposes:

[During] 1917–1923 a pronounced change vis-à-vis Russians took place in Finland. At that time was born ... a racist hatred of Russians and a downright cult of racial hatred which was generally accepted in the Finnish publicity.

Whereas ‘hatred of Russkies’ or ‘Finnishness as non-Russianness’ may be suitable categories of practice (i.e. they form part of the rhetorical structure of statecrafting) they do not fare all that well as categories of analysis. If this is not taken into account research too easily ends up conflating the political and the politological. Making use of Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper’s compelling critique of the use of the notion of identity, I argue that we should avoid unintentionally reproducing and reinforcing equations such as ‘hatred of Russkies’ by uncritically adopting categories of practice as categories of analysis. Statecrafting provides a more fruitful category of analysis since it helps in locating ‘hatred of Russkies’ as a part of the dynamics of the political field.

167 MacIntyre 1980, 63; Rorty 2000, 25. MacIntyre’s argument develops into a critique of the Kuhnian inspired incommensurability thesis which relies on a Cartesian presumption that everything can be put into doubt simultaneously and makes transition from one paradigm to another one a radical move and presupposes total discontinuity (see esp. MacIntyre 1980, 64). To view of different interpretations and issuing debates in terms of argumentative retelling is to reject such incommensurability. (For a similar suggestion which is, nevertheless, articulated in terms of possible commensurability of different theoretical points of departure, see Aalto et al. 2006, 95. The study itself seems to deal not with theories but opinions – or “attitudinal groups” as the authors have it (ibid. 85).
There is no denying of the fact that political aggressiveness was prevalent in the Finland of the 1920s and 1930s,\textsuperscript{170} that ethnic hatred against Russians was evoked,\textsuperscript{171} or that Russia was referred to as Finland’s hereditary enemy.\textsuperscript{172} However, such characterisations were mostly promoted by the right-wing activists and different portrayals of the Russian neighbourhood also cropped up in political debates.\textsuperscript{173} Despite an almost complete consensus over the goal of attempting to secure the success and survival of the newly born political unit, there were divisions among the Finns over the best strategy to adopt in relations with the former metropolitan country. As the thesis of the formative moment suggests, the events of the years 1917–1918 resulted in intense debates concerning different \textit{moda vivendi} that could possibly be adopted in Finnish-Russian relationships. It seems legitimate to hypothesise that had such a collective condition which the thesis of ‘hatred of Russkies’ presumes prevailed in the Finnish society, the debates would have been less lively. In the analytical section of this work I examine these debates in detail. For now, it suffices to consider the following passage which was issued in a publication of a right-wing activist group:

\begin{quote}
Take a look around. Is not our country full of traders, Ephialtes who have sold and are selling their small, wretched country to the blood enemy? Tens of thousands of our communists are living from the gold of the East; they go around crouching on errands of the Russkie and wait for a night dark enough for selling the blood of their compatriots to the enemies of the blood. ... Tens of thousands of our people are kissing the Russkies. They would sell their land to the Muscovite at any moment, without asking anything in return. They are more loyal than dogs, and the hated smell of a Russian attracts them like a carcass attracts a jackal.\textsuperscript{174}
\end{quote}

The passage is interesting for the fact that in addition to evoking themes with the help of which both Klinge and Karemaa characterise ‘hatred of Russkies,’ it also contains references to an alternative strategy in Finnish relations with Soviet Russia. The passage avails itself of meanings available in the chivalric language-game as it characterises the Finnish Communists as traders – i.e. as treacherous and uncommitted Anti-Knights. It may thus be appreci-

\textsuperscript{170} Here, I have in mind, for instance, the military plans of intervening into St. Petersburg and invading Eastern Karelia during the first years of independence as well as the Lapua Movement of early 1930s.

\textsuperscript{171} The Academic Karelia Society’s publication \textit{Herää Suomi} from 1923 evokes such features as the “barbarity of the Russian folk psyche,” “racial characteristics inherited in blood,” “lustfulness,” “fertility,” and “filth” in its characterisation of Russians.

\textsuperscript{172} The writings of the activist Elias Simelius/Simojoki (1942) can be consulted for a flagrant illustration of this but it is also possible to find examples of this way of thinking in the writings of other political groupings.

\textsuperscript{173} For a similar argument, see Haimila 1996 & Vihavainen 2004, 263.

\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Herää Suomi} 1923, 13; see also Klinge 1972, 61–62.
ated as an instance of statecrafting. The text was written as an argument against an alternative way of relating to the Eastern neighbour than what was promoted by the right-wing activists. If this point of departure is accepted, elements of the ‘hatred of Russkies’ interpretation that it contains may be best appreciated as competing responses to the dilemma over how to maintain the political community. As a contemporary source had it, “[hatred] of Russkies is the key to the preservation of Finnish independence.” 175 It is evoked as an antidote to the “love of Russkies,” “loyalty toward Russia,” “adoration of the Russkies’ rouble,” “slackness,” and “traitorousness.” 176 Indeed, in addition to “full-mouthed talk of the hereditary enemy” the quotation above is directed against the possibility that loyalty previously manifested in the act of “erecting monuments to the Russian emperors” would again become the prevailing modus vivendi in Finnish-Soviet relationships. Simultaneously, the passage is a claim by a political group to act on behalf of the community, to become a legitimate political authority, and to put their truth at the centre of political life.

1.6. Political Imaginary à la Pragmatism

In formulating an alternative to previous research on Finnish-Russian relations, dominated by the ‘hatred of Russkies’ or the ‘Finnishness as non-Russianness’ interpretations, I lean on the pragmatist way of inquiry. That is, I characterise political imaginary with the help of notions that issue from the pragmatist theory of social and political action. The terms habituality and creativity play a key role here.

Political imaginary has become a frequent notion in the writings of IR scholars. 177 It would, however, benefit from a more systematic and coherent characterisation. My proposition is that systematicity and coherence can be achieved by approaching political imaginary in terms of the pragmatist sign theory. 178 Political imaginary provides a fruitful environment wherein to elaborate the implications of pragmatism for IR. To do this it to discuss political imaginary in terms that might find applicability in contexts beyond Finnish-Russian relationships. I thus suggest that Peirce’s pragmatism and the accompanying sign theory have great potential for the study of political dynamics. This applies particularly to moments of political crises that involve transformation in the established assumptions of a political community.

175 Herää Suomi 1923, 5.
176 Herää Suomi 1923, 5, 6, 13, 18.
177 E.g. Doucet 2005; Weldes 1999b.
178 See also Kratochwil 2007.
1.6.1. Political Imaginary and International Relations

A pragmatist inquiry into political imaginary provides a key site for posing questions about the way in which the social and the individual intertwine in actual political processes. In this capacity, it serves to contest Martin Hollis and Steve Smith’s famous claim that International Relations will eternally be made up of “two stories” – an “internalist account” of individual hermeneutics and an “externalist account” of structural properties – and that these stories can be told in tandem but never merged.\(^{179}\) That is, the term practice, which is central to pragmatism, can be taken to combine the idea of the unity of meaning with the moment that can transform it.

However, before embarking on a more detailed characterisation of political imaginary in pragmatist terms, it is worth making a brief excursion into the ways in which the term has been utilised in IR and the social sciences at large. This is pertinent given the fact that political imaginary and related concepts have become a staple diet of International Relations vocabulary.

Jutta Weldes has employed the notion of a security imaginary in her study of the construction of the US national interest. Weldes uses the term to designate a “structure of well-established meanings and social relations out of which representations of the world of international relations are created.”\(^{180}\) In Weldes’s characterisation, security imaginary is “the cultural raw materials out of which representations of states, of relations among states, and of the international system are constructed.”\(^{181}\)

Charles Taylor, for his part, characterises social imaginary as an inarticulate understanding within which particular features of the world emerge in the sense that they do. Taylor’s imaginary does not refer to sets of ideas but “to what enables, through making sense of, the practices of a society.”\(^{182}\) It seeks to capture the ways in which contemporaries imagine the societies they inhabit and to shed light not that much on the ‘real’ itself as to the conditions of possibility of the ‘real.’\(^{183}\)

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179 Hollis & Smith 1990. Pragmatism contributes to the realisation that the extreme positions of either all agents or all structures are both untenable and that there is a need for mediate positions (Wagner et. al. 2006, 6.) Furthermore, it is possible to claim that such mediate positions would be readily available in a pragmatist focus on how unmade primary reality, which as such is nothing for us, is turned into a pragmatically meaningful reality in practices of political imaginary (Pihlström 2005, 113.) The pragmatist solution to the agent-structure problem is thus to focus on actual processes rather than to invent new social entities.

180 Weldes 1999, 10.
181 Weldes 1999, 10.
183 Taylor 2004, 6.
To the extent that they emphasise actual practices of sense-making rather than their background conditions, both Welde's and Taylor's approaches resonate with this work's characterisation of political imaginary. It is, however, worth stressing that in my pragmatist reading, the term political imaginary does not refer to any structure of meaning but to the set of practices – i.e. acts of resignification – that seek to solve the challenges that the world throws up on the basis of previously available repertoires of interpretation and may actually end up transforming their unity.

Indeed, political imaginary is a more all-encompassing and more dynamic concept than the immediate background understanding that we refer to in order to make sense of particular practices. Nevertheless, it bears a certain familiarity with the way the idea of the background and similar concepts have been widely evoked in contemporary philosophy and sociology of knowledge in order to articulate the inarticulate preconditions for speech and intentional communication. Common to political imaginary, background, and related concepts such as Foucault’s epistemes, Wittgenstein’s forms of life, Polanyi’s tacit knowledge, Ryle’s knowing how as opposed to knowing that, or Goffman’s frames of everyday reference, is that they all refer to an understanding of the whole situation within which the features of the world show up in the way that they do.

When this outlook is accepted, it is no longer warranted to conceive of political dilemmas as determined by developments and events anterior and exterior to the practices of political imaginary. Analytical interest shifts to the actual practices of resignification which seek to solve the irritation that the world throws up with recourse to a readily available form repertoire of interpretation. In the present work, the hypothesis of the chivalric language-game presents an attempt to articulate the form of problematisation which is characteristic to ‘observing Russia as Finns.’

Helena Rytövuori-Apunen has convincingly tried to articulate how the pragmatist emphasis on practices actually differs from the simple idea that the definition of a problem is contingent on its linguistic representation. Whereas this thought has after the “linguistic turn” become generally accepted, the consequent emphasis on discourse and social construction has usually led to the celebration of either the interpreting subject or community of interpreters thus replicating the Cartesian dichotomy of the knowing subject and naturalised epistemology. This dichotomy lives on, for instance, in Iver B. Neumann’s “practice turn” which he presents as a complement to the “linguistic turn” and characterises as a move which seeks to “shift attention ‘down’ from conscious ideas and values ... to the physical and the

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184 See e.g. John Searle’s (1983, 141–159) discussion on the preconditions for the functioning of intentional states.
186 Understood in the Peircean sense as an initial abduction.
187 Rytövuori-Apunen 2005, 166.
habitual, and also ‘up’ from ideas located in the individual consciousness to the impersonal arena of ‘discourse.’ The notions ‘up’ and ‘down’ allude to the intellectualist dualism that replicates Western philosophy’s classical bifurcation between thought (or theory) and action (or practice). Thought remains attached to the transcendent domain beyond mutability, contingency, and temporality whereas practice deals with the lower levels of reality. Continuing to uphold this distinction is to overlook James Dewey’s witty comment according to which the separation of thought and action, or soul and habit suits the interests of those who want to establish a monopoly of social power. “The dualism enables them to do the thinking and planning, while others remain the docile, even if awkward, instruments of execution.”

If the anti-dualistic core of the pragmatist way of inquiry is accepted, practice and discourse are not set against one another – or at least they are not conceptualised as hierarchically distinct levels of reality. Discourse, as Rytövuori-Apunen suggests, can be viewed as a unity or repertoire of interpretation and practice as the moment that can transform it.

1.6.2. Continuity and Discontinuity

Characterising political imaginary with the help of pragmatism basically involves accepting three tenets. Firstly, political imaginary refers to the dynamic process whereby actors attempt to solve an irritation which something unexpected has brought about. Old habits of thought no longer function but have to undergo modification. Secondly, this process necessarily unfolds on the basis of old knowledge and experience. Thirdly, it is essentially a process of resignification due to which Charles S. Peirce’s pragmatist sign theory provides potent tools for its analysis.

These three points have been pertinent for the design of the research setting of this work. I have set out from the proposition that the events of the years 1917–1918 presented a moment of irritation for the Finnish political imaginary on Russia. Habits of thought formed during the epoch of autonomy had to be modified and new ways of ‘observing’ the political formation to the East that was also undergoing drastic political transformations needed to be coined. A discrepancy between the actual and the potential opened up. This motivated the process of resignification that the cartoons are instances of. Furthermore, this discrepancy created a space for political opportunity which different political actors tried to seize and which was thus filled with lively political debates.

188 Neumann & Heikka 2005, 12; see also Neumann 2002 and Swidler 2001, 84.
189 Colapietro 1992. For the persistence of basis and superstructure models in social theorizing, see also Butler 1996, 40 & Kilpinen 2000, 17.
190 Dewey 1929, 72.
191 Rytövuori-Apunen 2005, 172n29; see also Pihlström 2005, 121.
In order to capitalise the thought that knowledge production, which is intent on solving a present challenge, necessarily proceeds on the basis of the old, I have suggested that the practices of political imaginary presuppose an inarticulate understanding of political life. I refer to such inarticulate understanding with the notion of thought-paradigm and further propose, in this section, that when it comes to the actual practices of international relations, the mode of being of the thought-paradigm is habituality. It exists in as a generalised repertoire of conduct and interpretation which individual human beings have internalised in the course of experiencing similar situations in the past and that they consequently reproduce. This shared and internalised repertoire of interpretation is something that the participants of even the most heated debate need to share in order for any transfer of meaning to be possible.

It is worth emphasising that pragmatism does not reify social forms but, with the help of the habit notion, suggests that structural and cultural factors ultimately emerge from people and are only efficacious through them. Consequently, a pragmatically attuned characterisation of political imaginary does not pit collective against individual but turns to inquire how these aspects of political action are intertwined in actual political practices. Pragmatism's habit conception thus provides a fruitful site for identifying a structural context for individual actions and simultaneously appreciating the role of personal powers and intentionality.

In order to operationalise this thought in actual research, I have reverted to Yuri M. Lotman's characterisation of symbols as mnemonic mechanisms of a culture. I now go on to suggest that these elements, available on the surface of meaning, further allude to the thought-paradigm as a habitually available repertoire of interpretation. While Finnish Russia-watchers have internalised this repertoire by participating in the “game” of ‘observing Russia as Finns,’ it is possible for an analyst to read meanings unfolding from it from the practice of the “game,” and thus make conclusions related to the underpinning repertoire of interpretation. Furthermore, examining how archetypical symbols of political imaginary are manipulated so as to provide solutions to specific situations enables putting forth a reconstruction of the thought-paradigm. In this work, I have made an attempt to do so with

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192 Peirce CP 5.297; see also Patomäki 1991, 60.
193 Archer 2003, 2.
194 The suggestion actually comes close to the sociologist Margaret Archer’s (2003) claim that in order not to conflate structures and agency on the same ontological level, cultural systems and social structures need to be analytically separated and kept constant. This methodological trick enables elucidating the interplay between structure and agency. Indeed, what I refer to as political imaginary closely resembles Archer’s “practices of the life-world” that produce and transform cultural systems and social structures.
the help of the “Machiavellian” language of political dynamics – i.e. the complex interplay of virtù, fortuna, and necessita.

To work in this way is to value continuity as well as its relationship to discontinuity. While the memory function of symbols alludes to continuity, discontinuity is, simultaneously, presupposed in the treatment of political imaginary as something that the Finnish ‘observers’ of Russia were capable of manipulating for their purposes by both reproducing and transforming it.

In his pragmatism, Peirce remains committed to continuity and argues that “all that exist is continuous”196 or that “all things have the tendency to take habits.”197 Peirce’s pragmatism is, indeed, underpinned by a presumption of a social order or a civilisation in continuum which is “the pulp itself of the matter which is manipulated by semeiosis.”198 The term manipulation suggests that continuity is not the entire picture. It may be taken to point to the thoroughly anti-foundationalist character of Peirce’s pragmatism. That is, knowledge – even though continuous – does not rest upon fixed foundations.199 Peirce emphasises that “what opens our eyes to the significance of [the doctrine of continuity] is fallibilism.”200

Pragmatists have presented fallibilism as an alternative to foundationalism. At the heart of pragmatism’s “thoroughgoing fallibilism” lies the thought that although we must always begin with prejudgements or internalised habits and – given that we have to act in the world – cannot call everything into doubt at once, there is no belief that should not be subject to correction, further interpretation, and criticism.201 One consequence of fallibilism is that habit modification, which arises as a result of irritation of the unexpected, is in a key role in Peirce’s semeiosis and, consequently, in political imaginary conceived of as a semiotic production of new interpretants.202 Instead of the sameness of content, it makes sense to look into political imaginaries for the mechanism of transformation.203

196 Peirce CP 1.172.
197 Peirce CP 1.409.
198 Eco 1984, 45.
200 Peirce CP 1.172.
201 Bernstein 1991, 327.
202 E.g. Peirce CP 5.476–5.479. This does not mean that political imaginary would involve something that is not a part of regular day-to-day social life but only becomes relevant at “hot” moments of social disruption. On the contrary, at issue in it something which is so familiar that we tend to ignore it unless it becomes dysfunctional – i.e. fails to provide answers to the dilemmas that the world throws up.
My suggestion that Peirce’s sign theory provides potent tools for analysing political imaginary is indebted to the fact that the sign distinctions that it spells out can be thought of as one possible way of characterising the functioning of that very mechanism. Continuity is a necessary result of the sign’s triadic nature. Sign aspects, however, are geared for an inquiry into how the sign – as a mechanism of change – is made to refer to new parts of the world. Indeed, Peirce’s pragmatist theory of signs is focused on the way in which interpreters are “always and necessarily open to further interpretation, determination, and critical correction.” In this capacity, it is well suited for managing the thought that the failure of foundationalism and the endorsement of fallibilism need not result in scepticism, nihilism, or relativism.

1.6.3. Habituality and Creativity

Heeding the pragmatist appreciation of both continuity and discontinuity, political imaginary is best thought of as a process which revolves around the poles of habituality and creativity. Habits account for orderliness and continuity in politics. William James probably had this feature of habits in mind when he characterised them as “the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent.” Similarly, Peirce argued that one can only begin from a state where one is “laden with an immense mass of cognition already formed.” The habit notion is essentially an attempt to capture in one word the thought of the conservative or life sustaining elements of the society. In distinction from other alternatives, it serves to emphasise that these elements have been internalised by individual agents. Peirce gives a somewhat formulaic characterisation of how the internalisation of habits takes place: “a habit arises, when, having had the sensation of performing a certain act, m, on several occasions a, b, c, we come to do it upon every occurrence of the general event, l, of which a, b and c are

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204 Bernstein 1991, 327.
206 To talk about political imaginary in terms of habitual practices is to promulgate a distinct social ontology which sees the social as a field of embodied and interwoven practices that cohere around the habit concept. To weigh practices is, on the one hand, to seek to free activity from the grasp of determining social structures and systems. On the other it is to question the status of individual actions as key building blocks of social phenomena. (Cf. Schatzki 2000, 10, 12.)
208 Peirce CP 5.416.
special cases.” When this thought is applied in the study of political imaginary, it comes to suggest that “lessons of history” – to use a term famously coined by the grand old man of Finnish foreign policy, J.K. Paasikivi – have been internalised in the Finnish political imaginary on Russia in the form of habitually available repertoires of interpretation.

The habit notion thus calls to mind customary modes of activity, patterns of thought, or dispositions to respond in a pre-arranged manner to the challenges that the world throws up. They provide models of action that incline, but do not determine, the social subject to act in some conformity with the demands of the social field. Indeed, creativity provides for the possibility that the space of political opportunity opened up by the discrepancy between the habitual and the actual may be seized in a variety of ways.

Let me give a practical illustration from the research material of the present work. I have taken the aspect of intentionality and personal powers into account by examining political cartoons in the framework of statecrafting. I have thought of them as attempts to seize the space of political opportunity by putting one’s truth at the centre of political life and marginalise others. I have suggested that it is impossible to understand a statecraft speech act simply by attending to its conventional structure and proposed that one also has to pay attention to the actual creative forces at play. The Social Democrat MP Anton Kotonen’s argumentation which evoked chivalric meanings to criticise interventions promoted by certain right-wing groups represents one possible way of creatively actualising the habitually available repertoire of interpretation. Due to the fact that he stretches the chivalric language-game for his purposes, Kotonen emerges as a political entrepreneur comparable to what Quentin Skinner designates as “innovating ideologists” – i.e. a group of people who assign new meanings to old concepts and thus question the legitimacy of their opponents’ way of using these very concepts.

In Peirce’s sign theory, the notion of index is geared at characterising signs that bear within themselves traces of genuine existential connection with the surrounding reality. Inquiring into what is indexical in a given sign enables appreciating the way in which it is made to refer to new parts of the world. In the context of this work this means that although the Knight might most easily call to mind the right-wing activists, meanings unfolding from

209 Peirce CP 5.297.
211 Miller 1996, 72; see also Butler 1996, 33.
213 Skinner 1988a, 103.
214 Peirce CP 2.283.
the chivalric language-game may be actualised to put forth arguments that are related to the capability of other political orientations to assume the status of legitimate authority and undertake political acts in the name of the political unit. Due to this, chivalry vis-à-vis the Eastern neighbour may not be a matter of such pro-active conduct as making interventions across the Eastern border but it may just as well stand for prudence and restraint. However, what persists throughout these actualisations is the habit of judging competent politics vis-à-vis Russia along the axis of impetuousness vs. prudence. It provides a continuous element to the Finnish political imaginary on Russia.

Taking the creative dimension of political imaginary into account saves political imaginary from sinking into “a necrology of meaningless discourses.” It emphasises the character of political imaginary as a living tradition and also brings to the fore the important role of intentionality. Furthermore, it enables appreciating political struggles and debates – something that has been presumed in designating the Ricoeurian level of mimesis, as the political level. Simultaneously, it facilitates getting to grips with the transformative capacity of power.

This means that creativity also takes care of the fact that although political imaginary is forced to operate on the basis of earlier knowledge and experience and cannot ignore the “lessons of history,” it can constitute a potential site for what Judith Butler designates as “subversive resignification.” Change is possible since mimesis can be expropriated to counter the workings of authorised ways of thinking. Since mimesis is creative imitation, it endows the conventional formula with a capacity to be used in unanticipated ways. Resignification becomes possible by claiming entitlement to terms like the Knight, the Beast, and the Treasure – i.e. by compelling a critical perspective on who has legitimate authority to act in the name of the political community, what threatens it, and what actually is worth safeguarding in this very community. Mimesis may thus be evoked to cast a critical eye on the established ways of ‘observing Russia as Finns.’

217 Butler 1997, 41.
219 Cf. Butler 1997, 41; Bell 1999, 137.
1.7. Intentional Communication in Political Cartoons

In addition to the themes of anti-foundationalism, fallibilism, and sensitivity to contingency, one characteristic theme of the pragmatist ethos is the social character of the self and the consequent appreciation of critical communities of inquiry.\footnote{Bernstein 1991, 328.} Although Peirce initially had in mind scientific communities, the thought of critical communities can be harnessed for the purpose of characterising what it means to ‘observe Russia as Finns.’ That is, Finnish knowledge production on Russia can be thought of as participation in the activities of a critical community of inquiry which is at the same time dependent on shared social practices and is critical toward suggestions put forth on their basis. The proposition above, that political imaginary is a form of practice which revolves around the habitual and the creative poles, is closely connected to this claim. Habituality refers to the way in which the regulative ideal of the community becomes internalised in individual human beings and thus makes it possible for ‘observing Russia as Finns’ to cohere as a continuous flow. For its part, creativity refers to the capacity of purposive agents to manipulate the habitually available meanings in order to craft hypotheses that – when subjected to public critical discussion – would become accepted as stable parts of political imaginaries.

Political cartoons published in satirical magazines provide a fruitful site for approaching such critical discussion in empirical terms. There are at least two reasons for this. For one thing, satirical magazines were remarkably popular during the early years of the Finnish interwar period.\footnote{Uino 1991, 315–345.} Practically all political orientations had a magazine which functioned as an outlet for their views. Secondly, cartoons usually participated in debates going on in the parliament or deliberated on other public forums such as newspapers. Cartoons thus bring to the fore the critical element of the community which ‘observes Russia as Finns.’ If this approach is accepted, the drawings that make up the research material of this work can be examined as comments on competing foreign policy lines vis-à-vis Russia and the Soviet Union. They critically assess the suitability of specific policies vis-à-vis the Eastern neighbour. Simultaneously, they were drawn to mock opponents and praise those close to the publication. This connects them closely to statecrafting.\footnote{This claim actually comes close to Kari Immonen’s (1987, 29) argument that there were several groups in the Finland of the 1920s and 1930s that tried to gain monopoly over the right to define what is “true, good and right”. Immonen argues that deciding who has a legitimate right to talk about the Russia and the Soviet Union and Russians was an elemental part of these attempts.}
The analytical section of this work is devoted to describing in empirical terms how the cartoonists availed themselves to the habitually available chivalric formula for the purposes of statecrafting. At this point, it is possible to appreciate the argumentativeness of cartoons by noting that each satirical magazine that supplied research material for this work is more or less closely connected to a specific political orientation. Some magazines identified themselves explicitly with a political party and occasionally magazines also became arenas for internal party disputes.223

Most publications announced that they were reluctant to obey party lines but it is still possible to identify them with certain political orientations. A convenient illustration of this is the Swedish-language publication Fyren (or Nya Fyren) which announced that it was antagonistic to party politics. Still, it followed the ideological lines of conservatism and Swedish-minded nationalism. The publication declared that it was opposed, for instance, to Finnish-minded nationalism, socialism, Judaism and democratic political life.224 In post-civil war conditions its conservatism translated, for instance, into antipathies towards Germany; in a row within the Finnish army between the German-minded Jaegers and officers who had received their military training in Tsarist Russia, Fyren took the side of the latter.225 In the early 1920s the magazine changed its name to Blinkfyren and, in 1933, characterised as its mission continuing “the fight of pure reason, honest word, and well-aimed strikes’ for ... White Finland.”226 In practical terms this came to mean anti-communism and anti-bolshevism, support for the fascist-type Lapua Movement and, towards the end of the decade, also Nazi sympathies.227

In addition to Fyren and its offspring, the corpus contains material from three other Swedish-language magazines – Hovnarren, Kerberos and Garm. Hovnarren’s (1917–1924) profile was anti-bolshevist and anti-socialist; it declared being opposed both to “Moscow’s communist servants” and “True Finnish [äktfinska] students”. During the Russian Civil War it promoted Finnish involvement in attempts to overthrow the bolshevik regime.229 On the pages of Hovnarren, Civil Guard soldiers frequently appear as Knights capable of dealing with the Eastern challenge that now took the form of bolshevism.230 In contradistinction to the other Swedish language publications, Kerberos had a liberal profile. It also came

224 E.g. Fyren, No. 5–8, 1919. ‘Arffi enden;’ see also Fyren, Summer Issue 1921.
225 Fyren, No. 11–12, 1919; Uino 1991, 323.
226 Blinkfyren, No. 3–4, 1933; see also Blinkfyren, No. 7–8, 1936. ‘Gränsvaktens jultankar.’
228 Blinkfyren, julnummer 1928. ‘Det förblödande lejonet.’
229 E.g. Hovnarren, No. 20, 1919. ‘Judenitsch.’
230 E.g. Hovnarren, No. 9, 1919. ‘Sankt Skyddskär och bolschevikdraken.’

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out in a Finnish-language version in 1917–1918 and attracted the cultural elite from both language groups.\footnote{Uino 1991, 341.} Political polemics was not the sole priority of Kerberos as the magazine also had artistic ambitions. When it came to evaluating relations with the Eastern neighbour, the magazine clearly endorsed anti-bolshevik and anti-socialist views.\footnote{E.g. Kerberos, No. 3, ‘Mörka makter.’} It also promoted a monarchy as the best means of containing (Soviet) Russian influences in Finland.\footnote{E.g. Kerberos, Kungsnummer, 1918. ‘För Dagen;’ Uino 1991, 341.} When the publication of Kerberos was discontinued in the early 1920s, Garm appeared as its successor. Its profile, however, developed in quite different directions; liberalism had to yield to conservatism and Swedish-language nationalism.\footnote{Uino 1991, 342.} Similarly to Fyren, Garm identified as its opponents the extreme left and Finnish-minded nationalism, particularly in the form of True Finnishness. It warmly welcomed the Lapua Movement’s extreme right-wing reaction. Simultaneously with being concerned over the position of the Swedish language and Swedish culture in Finland, it did not promote as good statecraft cooperation with Sweden in foreign policy matters. The reason for this was that Garm was ideologically opposed to the Swedish socialists in power at the time and their defensive foreign policy line.\footnote{E.g. Garm, No. 3. ‘Vargar i Norden;’ Garm, No. 13–14, 1935. ‘Badliv vid Östersjön;’ Uino 1991, 332.}

Tuulispää was a Finnish-language bourgeois magazine that characterised itself as “a representative of pure humour and satire above party politics;” it admitted having a political agenda but described it as “completely non-partisan.”\footnote{Tuulispää, No. 47–50. ‘Vuonna 1922.’} However, it claimed that is was the only publication that had “succeeded in resolving the differences between the National Coalition Party and the National Progress Party.”\footnote{Tuulispää, No. 1–3. ‘Ohjelmamme.’} In practical terms this meant that these two parties’ foreign policy lines were rarely made an object of Tuulispää’s criticism.\footnote{Uino 1991, 322.} On the bourgeois front, Matti Meikäläinen was a rare example of a satirical magazine that explicitly identified itself with a political party. When relaunched in 1927, after having been “killed by the hand of a Russkie”\footnote{Matti Meikäläinen, No. 1, 1927.} in the Russification operations of 1899, it described as its mission to combat “red nonsense, Swedish ruthlessness and the selfish weakness of those parties that did not side with the National Coalition Party in big questions of patriotism and Finnishness!”\footnote{Matti Meikäläinen, No. 1, 1927.} In post-Civil War Finland, the Ampiainen magazine was also linked to the National Coalition Party although it did not explicitly announce its allegiance to it. Ampiainen targeted its criticism against bolshevism, Soviet Russia, Swedish-minded nationalism, and the prohibi-
When it came to foreign policy, it condemned as bad statecraft, for instance, the republican mode of government and the Entente orientation that had replaced the brief German orientation in late 1918.

The labour movement’s magazine Kurikka was the most widely read satirical magazine during the 1920s and 1930s. While Fyren and Tuulispää came out in some 3,000–4,000 exemplars, Kurikka reached a circulation of some 20,000 copies. The most obvious target of its criticism was the bourgeoisie. Prior to the civil war it singled out as its opponents “capitalists, gentlemen, and the bourgeoisie.” After the war, which led to a split in the Finnish Old Labour, Kurikka sided with the social democrats and, in 1923, was subsumed directly under the control of the Social Democratic Party. The communists got a fair share of the magazine’s criticism.

Correspondingly, the social democrats were criticised for being pawns of the bourgeoisie in the communist satirical magazines Paukku (1921–1923) and Tuisku (1924–1930). Tuisku initially sided with the left of the Social Democratic Party but in 1925 it became an outlet for the views of the Finnish communists. Its agenda was based on the idea of class struggle, which can also be seen in the statecraft speech acts put forth on its pages; the representatives of the bourgeoisie, clergy, army or the voluntary Civil Guards are blamed for the lack of political virtù. Although class struggle is the key validity claim in Paukku’s and Tuisku’s argumentation, it is possible to argue that the “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm also provides the final interpretant for their arguments. When it came to relations with the Eastern neighbour, Tuisku saw in it a model to be emulated rather than a force to be contained – i.e. identified it as good fortuna and promoted pro-active measures of maintaining relations with it.

The magazines’ political orientations are summarised in the table below. It is worth stressing that it is not intended as an explanatory device but may come in handy in characterising the aspect of intentional communication in cartoons and their relatedness to the question of statecrafting. Heeding John Dewey’s advice to political scientists, the actual point of this work is to focus less on reasons and causes and more on what happens and how it happens.

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242 E.g. Ampiainen, No. 16. ‘Kun Entente puuhaa Suomesta tasavaltaa’ & ‘Herra Ampiaisen kanta.’
244 Uino 1991, 327.
246 E.g. Kurikka, No. 11. ‘Suomalainen kommunisti Moskovassa.’
249 E.g. Tuisku, No. 20–21, 1925. ‘Katsaus vuoteen 1925.’
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magazine</th>
<th>Declared orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ampiainen</td>
<td>Linked to the National Coalition Party; against bolshevism, Soviet Russia, Swedish-language nationalism and the prohibition act. Published in Finnish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fyren (Blinkfyren, Nya Fyren)</td>
<td>Swedish-minded nationalism, conservatism, anti-Germanism (early years of independence), Nazi sympathies (later). Published in Swedish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garm</td>
<td>Conservatism, Swedish-language nationalism against the True Finns and socialism, supporter of the right-wing Lapua Movement. Published in Swedish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hovnarren</td>
<td>Anti-socialism, anti-bolshevism; admiration of Civil Guards. Published in Swedish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerberos</td>
<td>Liberalism, read by the cultural elite, anti-socialism and anti-bolshevism. Published in both Swedish and in Finnish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurikka</td>
<td>Organ of the Labour movement/Social Democratic Party, opposed to capitalism, the bourgeoisie, communism. Published in Finnish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matti Meikäläinen</td>
<td>Organ of the National Coalition Party, patriotism and Finnishness. Published in Finnish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paukku</td>
<td>Communists’ organ; opposed to the bourgeoisie, clergy, army and the voluntary Civil Guards, Soviet Russia/Union as a model to be emulated. Published in Finnish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuisku</td>
<td>Left-wing Social Democrats’/Communists’ organ; opposed to the bourgeoisie, clergy, army and the voluntary Civil Guards, Soviet Russia/Union as a model to be emulated. Published in Finnish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuulispää</td>
<td>Balancing between the National Coalition Party and the National Progressive Party. Published in Finnish.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.8. Chapter Outline

In addition to this introductory chapter, this book has seven chapters and an epilogue each of which approaches Finnish political imaginary on Russia from a slightly different perspective. Still, the structure of the study is defined and held together by the general idea of attempting to seize the movement between the three levels of political imaginary. Chapter Two introduces the logic of analysis; I turn to hermeneutics in order to spell out the interpretative procedure which makes the movement between the pre-political, political, and post-political scales of political imaginary possible. Chapter Three elaborates on the contribution of non-literal research materials, such as political cartoons, for the task of gaining knowledge and understanding international relations. In it, I argue that our understanding of political facts should be broadened and avail myself to Peirce’s pragmatist sign theory for a methodological tool that enables saying something that is on target when the question of the truthfulness of fictitious research materials arises. Chapters Four to Six are dedicated to the actual analytical task which is organised around the key dramatis personae of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia. The Maiden – as an example of Treasures – is dealt with in Chapter Four, the Knight in Chapter Five, and the Beast in Chapter Six. Chapter Seven revisits the theme of statecraft to give content to the proposition that the tradition of interpreting Finnish-Russian relationships can only be recovered in argumentatively retelling the key plot – i.e. the plot of statecraft. In it, I lay out the “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm – the post-political component of the political imaginary. The final Chapter Eight presents the Conclusions and Contributions of the present research. In the Epilogue I turn to hypothetically discuss how the thought-paradigm, sketched on the basis of the analysis of the epoch of 1918–1930s, and contemporary discussions on post-communist Russia are isomorphic even if they are not identical.
Logic of Analysis

Structure without life is dead.
But life without structure is un-seen.¹

In the previous chapter I suggested that it is possible to distinguish three levels within the totality of the political imaginary: pre-political, political, and post-political. I further proposed that the articulation of the levels of inquiry abides by Peirce’s universal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.

In this chapter I seek to explicate the interpretive procedure which enables these interrelated and intertwined layers to emerge from the research material. That is, I spell out the hermeneutical logic of analysis which enables distinguishing these three layers of political imaginary in the actual research material. This involves approaching the cartoons as a movement between what Paul Ricoeur in his hermeneutics characterises as naïve interpretation, structural interpretation, and historical-critical interpretation.² It also raises the question of the relation between history and International Relations; what does it mean to be a knower of historical things; how can an initially foreign-appearing text be made one’s own?

This hermeneutic approach is well in line with Peirce’s pragmatic sign theory. The point of departure for the three-pronged analytical operation is that cartoon characters that mediate between the different layers of political imaginary are understood to be signs in the semiotic sense. As the basic logic of semiotics was elaborately discussed in the previous chapter, suffice it here to mention that Hippocrates, the founder of Western medical science, used the term semiotics to indicate the study of symptoms. He thought of medical symptoms as signs that stand for physical conditions and disorders and argued that the task of medical diagnosis is to discover what these symptoms as signs stand for. The task of the medical practitioner was

¹ John Cage, Lecture on Nothing.
² Ricoeur 1976.
to decipher the connection between the specific signs and the more general conditions that they suggested.³

Hermeneutics aims at something similar. It is interested in how something that once was foreign can be made one’s own. In this capacity, it has a contribution to make in what in recent IR scholarship has been talked about as the ‘historiographical turn,’⁴ ‘historical turn,’⁵ or ‘historical return.’⁶ Much of hermeneutics is, indeed, devoted to reflections on the status of interpretations that actualise the meaning of a historical text for the present reader. Whereas some earlier versions of hermeneutics identified the meaning of a historical text with the original intention of the author – i.e. sought to “understand the author as well and even better than he understands himself”⁷ – recent, post-Heideggerian versions of hermeneutics are interested in the way or direction of thought which the text opens up.⁸

Semeiotic inquiry consists of roughly the same procedure. Signs that crop up in political cartoons are thought of as symptoms of the more general condition of ‘observing Russia as Finns.’ Consequently, the task of analysis is to relate the physical form of a sign to a way of thought connected to it. In this sense, semeiotic inquiry is an exercise in reverse rhetoric; it consists of not only illuminating specific communicative practices but, perhaps more importantly, also of shedding light on the more general conditions that have given rise to these practices.⁹ In his hermeneutics, Ricoeur suggests that getting to grips with such a general way of thought is possible following an interpretive exercise which moves between the naïve, structural, and critical levels of inquiry.¹⁰

Indeed, these three steps articulate the analytical operation with the help of which one may work one’s way through the three layers of political imaginary – although these layers remain intimately interrelated in the actual practices of political imaginary. The naïve, structural, and critical moments of interpretation do not stand one-to-one with the three levels of political imaginary but rather mediate between them. Naïve interpretation enables recognising the three dominant model-images of political imaginary, structural interpretation consists of pointing out how the chivalric language-game makes sense in the corpus at large. Historical-critical interpretation, for its part, is a matter of examining variation in this structural element in order to reconstruct the thought-paradigm on the post-political level.
2.1. Naïve Interpretation

Naïve or surface interpretation designates the analytical operation which is aimed at getting a general sense of the whole of the text. It involves making guesses about the whole in relation to which parts of the text might make sense. In the present work, guesses have been made on the basis of recognising the dominant model-images from among the wealth of the research material. I have designated these prevalent elements as the Knight, the Treasure, and the Beast. Connected to Peirce’s notion of Firstness, they articulate what one grasps first, i.e. they refer to the phenomenological layer of experience. The naïvety of this interpretive procedure means that the qualities of knighthood, beastliness and treasure-likeness are immediately available on the surface of signs. Recognising, for instance, the qualities of knight-ness – such as bravery, politeness, manliness – does not necessitate familiarity with the conventions of the interpretive aspect of the culture nor with the events that they comment.¹¹

Naïve interpretation works on the signs’ iconic aspects. Attention turns to the quality which simulates some character of its object.¹² At this surface stage of interpretation the ideal or immanent sense of the pictorial discourse is more important than the references it makes to particular things or events.¹³ Naïve interpretation may, for instance, work on the fact that a cartoon character is either doing something or appears capable of doing specific things.¹⁴ These qualities, which outline the plot-space¹⁵ of the figure, serve to disclose the character’s plot-possibility and an insight – “it must be a knight!” – emerges out of an initial surprise or puzzlement in the face of a stock of male figures that, in one way or another, allude to the idea of chivalry. The following drawing explicated how various male figures that have their references in different parts of the world – from the Finnish labour movement to the country’s armed forces, and from Russian Whites to Finnish conservatives – are recognised for their potential knight-ness.

¹² Peirce CP 4.531.
¹³ E.g. Lotman 1990, 54–62. Note also Ricoeur’s (e.g. 1976, 19) discussion on the dialectic of sense and reference in which he leans on Gottlob Frege.
¹⁴ Peirce links abductive and perceptual judgements. He affirms that instinct is simply a way to affirm that perceptual judgements are abductive. That is, he frequently refers to the ways in which abductive thinking is shaped or informed by the instinctual, and refers to perception as “the highest perfection” of the abductive faculty. (Mullins 2002, 201–203.)
¹⁵ For the notion of the plot-space, see Lotman 1990, 157.
The attribute ‘naïve’ is not intended as a derogatory term. This connotation-heavy moment of interpretation is necessary for the totality of interpretation since it gives rise to inference by abduction. In addition to allowing for the identification of the model-images of the Knight, the Treasure, and the Beast, this abductive moment enables creation of a model for further interpretation. Ricoeur suggests that since the author’s intention remains beyond our reach, “the first act of understanding must take the form of a guess.”16 In a similar vein, C.S. Peirce characterises the moment of abduction as an inferential step of guessing that involves the adaptation of an explanatory hypothesis. Abduction consists of “studying facts and devising a theory to explain them.”17 The general form of this operation of adopting an explanatory hypothesis is this:

The surprising fact C is observed;  
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,  
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.18

Surprise is, indeed, an elemental part of the inferential moment of abduction. It entails recognising that there is no appropriate explanation or rule in the store of previous knowledge (e.g. the ‘hatred of Russkies’ interpretation), which incites the search for a new explanation. In the

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16 Ricoeur 1976, 75. “His [the author’s] intention is often unknown to us, sometimes redundant, sometimes useless, and sometimes even harmful as regards the interpretation of the verbal meaning of his work” (Ricoeur 1976, 76).
17 Peirce CP 5.145.
18 Peirce CP 5.189.
present work, initial surprise in the face of numerous virtuous, bestial, or treasure-like figures provided for the suggestion that the chivalric model-images would enable getting to grips with what ‘observing Russia as Finns’ might actually mean. However, interpretation does not stop with this insight. It is followed by structural interpretation, which turns to examine how the chivalric language-game into which the prevalent model-images organise themselves actually works in the totality of the text of political cartoons.

2.2. Structural Interpretation

Structural interpretation mediates between surface interpretation and critical interpretation. It presents a necessary stage between naïve and critical interpretation and involves approaching the text with the help of the model of interpretation which was suggested by the abductive moment of the naïve interpretation. Attention turns not only to whether but, more importantly, to how this basic rule is actualised in the cartoon material. In this sense, structural interpretation has a validating function; “If there are no rules for making good guesses, there are methods for validating those guesses we do make.” It is, however, worth emphasising that unlike in versions of positivism, the validating function of structural interpretation does not involve testing the suggested model against some mind-independent real world but – in the spirit of pragmatism – against human practices which are geared at coming to terms with the unexpected on the basis of previous knowledge and experience.

If model-images are identified on the basis of conjunction (some sort of iconic knighthood), disjunction provides the key to Lotmanian cultural-historical equations or Wittgensteinian language-games. In the context of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia this implies that the Treasure as the second member of the equation can be distinguished from the Knight in virtue of being, for instance, private rather than public, feminine rather than masculine, vulnerable rather than adamant, an object of action rather than its subject, etc. The third member, the Beast, can be told apart from the Knight by the distinctive features

19 Ricoeur 1976, 87.
20 The notion of rule that I have in mind has to with the typification of human behaviour. A rule stating that we must stop at red traffic lights and go at green creates a behavioural pattern. But such patterning is a matter of agents following those rules rather than causal behaviour. In short, the presence of rules typifies human behaviour. The implications of this recognition for the research task can be further illustrated with reference to games and their rules. Given the rules of chess, it is impossible to foresee the moves of any player, that she or he will play according to the rules, or bother to play at all. Given a move, however, it is possible to reconstruct it in terms of the rules of the game of chess. (Liszka 1989, 6.)
21 Ricoeur 1976, 76.
22 See also Hansen 2005.
of animality, vulgarity, hostilenes, etc.23 It is worth noting that the statecrafting function, which the chivalric language-game assumes in the cartoon material, avails itself of these structural differences.

Not all cartoons actualise the chivalric formula completely, but the pattern emerges when enough points from several cartoons are put together. As such, the Knight-Treasure-Beast, or the protector-protectee-threat formula remains something of an ideal-type. A scattered example from the research materials might not always be in complete concordance with it. Indeed, disclosing the structure common to the corpus of cartoons necessitates an intertextual analysis; one needs to pay attention to the way in which a particular cartoon echoes with other cartoons or other political documents.24

However, political imaginary as a form of semeiosis cannot be understood simply in terms of the play of differences within a network of signs. It is not exhausted by the structural moment of interpretation which is content to examine the play of signs within a closed and autonomous system of internal dependencies. In order to understand political imaginary, it has to be examined with view upon human beings’ struggle with the concrete facts of worldly existence – i.e. with what the world, characterised by contingency and chance, conjures.25 Understanding and explaining the Finnish political imaginary on Russia also necessitates asking what the reference of these structural elements of political imaginary are. The notion of index familiar from Peirce’s sign theory is geared at dealing with the problem of reference. Unlike icons, indices represent their objects by virtue of real connections. “Index fulfils its function of representamen by virtue of a character which it could not have if its object

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24 See also Schellekens 2006, 245.
25 Such an interpretation of pragmatistic metaphysics can be found in Pihlström 2005.
did not exist.”26 Indices ‘tame’ the referential ambiguity of the language-game. Interpretation avails itself of the indexical aspects of signs in its attempt to recognise the purposes for which the Knight, the Beast, and the Treasure are actualised. This step is significant with view on the wider hermeneutical task of making the initially foreign cartooned text one’s own; examining the variation that the basic structural element assumes as it is actualised in a plurality of situations is a necessary step on the way to critical interpretation.

2.3. Historical-Critical Interpretation

In historical-critical interpretation focus shifts on the variation which the chivalric language-game undergoes when it is made use of in purposeful political argumentation. As Paul Ricoeur puts it, the interest of this deep phase of interpretation is not on what anyone has in mind but on what the text is about; “to understand a text is to follow its movement from sense to reference: from what it says to what it talks about.”27 In other words, when structural interpretation yields for historical-critical interpretation, the text becomes thought of “as an injunction to think in a certain manner.”28 In the present work, I suggest that the cartooned text at hand is an invitation to think of Finnish-Russian relationships in the “Machiavellian” way.

For this purpose, it is interesting to note that the model-image of the Knight, for instance, has formed part of the political imaginary of Finnish-Russian relationships both during the period of autonomy and independence. It has been fitted for present purposes when conceptions of legitimate political authority have shifted. In 1830s, the symbol of the heroic knight appeared on the flag that Emperor Nikolai I handed to the Finnish battalion (Kaartinpataljoona) as a token of the Emperor’s gratitude for the “excellent courage and eagerness” that the battalion had displayed in oppressing the Polish rebellion.29 In this historical situation, the Knight stood for the soldiers of Kaartinpataljoona who had participated in suppressing rebellion in another minority region of the Russian Empire. On a more fundamental level of the political imaginary, the way in which the Knight was actualised joined up with the way of thought whereby displays of loyalty towards the Russian ruler presents the best way of managing Finnish relations with Russia – i.e. counts as political virtù.

With the year 1918, the knightly model-images did not disappear from the repertoire of the dramatis personae of Finnish-Russian relationships, but were taken to use in argumenta-

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26 Peirce CP 5.73.
27 Ricoeur 1976, 87–88; italics AK.
29 Jussila 1979, 29.
tive retellings so that they suited the present political purposes. The Knight no longer functioned as an index of a battalion loyal to the Russian Emperor, but this archetypical symbol now came to be identified with the Finnish Whites, with the Russian Whites, with the Civil Guard movement, as well as with the Finnish labour movement. These are different indexical functions that the symbol of the Knight assumed within the practices of political imaginary. Still, meanings unfolding from the more archaic chivalric language-game continued to provide the background for arguments that sought to associate virtù with the actions and aspirations of specific political groups and, in this way, to bring them out as legitimate political authorities. In the new situation, the Knight was evoked less to spell out loyalty for Russia and came increasingly to designate other strategies of managing Finnish-Russian relations.

With its focus on the way in which the structural element of political imaginary is actualised in changing situations, historical-critical interpretation paves the way for the possibility of sketching the thought-paradigm of Finnish political imaginary on Russia. Unlike syntagmatic analysis, which is concerned with what happens in the text, paradigmatic analysis reveals what actually enables people to make sense of the text. In this sense it is a step toward the ‘about what’ of the text. Indeed, although the chivalric equation readily alludes to the paradigmatic element of political imaginary, reconstructing the “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm has necessitated a detour via structural interpretation.

The paradigm is a culturally available resource that may remain hidden from the audience that only grasps the syntagm issuing from it. When putting forth a message or an argument, one chooses from among the items of a paradigm and then combines them so as to ignite a particular kind of meaning. A colloquial example might do here. Selecting an outfit – i.e. a syntagmatic ensemble – involves choosing something from the paradigm of upper body garments, something from that of lower body garments, something from footwear, etc. Meaning – the effect of the outfit – is depended upon the way in which these elements are combined. For instance, the meaning of the combination of sandals and a T-shirt is ‘casual’ while high heels combined with an evening gown yield a much more ‘formal’ or ‘festive’ effect. Since the meaning of these combinations is dependent on cultural codes that can be exploited for the purposes of intentional communication, someone wishing to give a more extravagant impression may, of course, combine sandals with an evening gown.

All items within a paradigm have the same function but they fulfil it differently. Think, for instance, of the various actualisations of the model-image of the Knight. They share the function of putting forth a claim about virtùous political conduct. This necessarily involves selection from among possible ways of conceiving of virtù. Knights may, for instance, crop up as answers to the question over whether it is virtùous to passionately defend one’s cause or to take cautious steps. The diagram below illustrates how the thought-paradigm of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia starts to emerge from such a variation.
Unlike the ‘hatred of Russkies’ interpretation would easily suggest, it is not always the Knight of Finland who is pitting his courage against the Russian Beast. Movement between the naïve, structural, and historical-critical layers of interpretation discloses that knightness is usually evoked as an attribute of specific strategies of managing the Russian proximity. If this proposition is accepted, the fact that in some contexts the heroic figure of the Knight may appear on the Russian side and that there also are Finnish Beasts in the corpus starts to make sense. The Knight stands for a political agency capable of dealing with the challenges to the survival and success of the political community. But neither the challenge nor the solution to it remain the same throughout the corpus. The task of interpretation is to disclose what, in topical terms, emerges as an existential threat to the political community. When it comes to fulfilling the hermeneutical task of uncovering what the cartooned text talks about, it is possible to suggest that it is less about Finnish attitudes vis-à-vis (Soviet) Russia and more about the way of thought which can be articulated with recourse to the “Machiavellian” idea of politics as a dynamic interplay of virtù and fortuna in an environment characterised by necessità.

30 E.g. Fyren, No. 9–12, 1920. ‘Riddare – och desertörez.’
2.4. History: From Lessons and Laboratories to Games

Approaching a cartooned text from the past in the manner described above raises the question about the role of history within IR. Indeed, the work at hand can be read as a contribution to what has recently been taken up as a historical turn within International Relations.

Nick Vaughan-Williams has connected this turn to the ‘problem of history’ which, according to him, has recently surfaced in IR. The problematic thing about history seems to be the impossibility of ascertaining that we got interpretation one hundred percent ‘right.’ This way of thinking is premised on the traditional epistemological project’s presumption that given good and sufficient data, our scholarly accounts and ‘that which actually happened’ would meet one-to-one. We are thought to be removed from the past but with effort it is possible to make our interpretations match the ‘past out there.’ Had I taken such a road of inquiry in this work, I would have ended up lamenting how the temporal distance of some 90 years impedes my capacity to interpret past events. Instead, I have taken another line of inquiry, one where the relation between history and its interpretation is thought of in terms of game-playing.

Conventionally, history has been thought of as providing lessons or a laboratory to IR. In the case of the laboratory metaphor, bygone events are thought of as a site for the formulation of general laws. For the case of lessons, the past is appreciated for its capacity to repudiate such generalisations. In both cases, the image of IR as a science motivated by the quest for certitude persists as does the thought of history as something that stands apart form its potential knowers. They are both corollaries of the traditional epistemological project’s way of conceiving of knowledge; i.e. motivated by a search for an unproblematic and transhistorical Archimedean point that allows for an incontestable “view from nowhere.”

When IR’s relationship to history is conceptualised with recourse to these metaphors, it is easy to dismiss that the peculiarity of historical events is that the concepts that we use to describe them are constitutive of those very events. One may fail to recognise that historical

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31 E.g. Vaughan-Williams 2005, 117.
32 Kratochwil 2007, 3.
33 E.g. Wright 1955, 87; see also Bueno de Mesquita 1996, 53; Kratochwil 2006, 7.
34 With the notion ‘Archimedean point’ I have in mind the Cartesian quest for firm foundations of knowing. In his Meditations, Descartes ruminates over the false beliefs that he had entertained in his youth and, to correct this situation, introduces his desire to establish a firm and permanent foundation for knowing. In this purpose he presents the figure of Archimedes who “in order that he may draw the terrestrial globe out of its place, and transport it elsewhere, demanded only that one point should be fixed and immovable; in the same way I shall have the right to conceive high hopes if I am happy enough to discover one thing only which is certain and indubitable.” (Descartes Meditations cit. Bernstein 1983, 16.)
events are unlike purely physical events. In order to become appreciated as events in the first place, they need to be included in some chronicle, eyewitness report, or narrative – i.e. made sense of with recourse to meanings unfolding from some traditionally available repertoire of interpretation. In a pragmatist formulation, the unexpected is made sense of with recourse to past knowledge and experience. In hermeneutics, Hans-Georg Gadamer captures the same thought in his suggestion that the past comes to play an efficacious role in our interpretations through traditions; hence the famous notion of effective history or historically effected consciousness (Wirkungsgeschichte).36 Traditions of interpretation take care of the fact that there is an intimate connection with past events and us, aspiring to gain knowledge of them.

If this constitutive role of meanings is accepted, then we also have to accept that we can never ‘test’ our interpretations against the ‘real world.’ We can only ‘test’ against other interpretations.37 Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, and the above described three step analytical procedure to knowledge, is built on such a presumption. He suggests that what the author of a cartoon actually had in mind is usually beyond our reach – his or her intention is “often unknown to us, sometimes redundant, sometimes useless, and sometimes even harmful as regards the interpretation of the verbal meaning of his work.”38 Neither can we hope to understand to the full the historical situation which the author and the audience shared. Instead, we can hope to come to know the way of thought which the text opens up, disclose a possible way of looking at things.39 “This is something that the historical-critical moment of interpretation aims at grasping.

Taking this road on inquiry involves rejecting the image of science as the quest for certitude. Instead, it is suggested that interpretation is comparable to playing a game. Gadamer argues that when knowing is conceptualised in terms of game-playing, the subject-object dichotomy is smoothed out. This argument is actually similar to Peirce’s triangulation of the sign. When conceived in terms of play, understanding involves transcending subjectivity. Individual subjectivity is given over to a set of rules; the play is not confronted as an object but is participated as an event the character of which the player seeks to disclose (what is this all about?). Thus, in seeking to disclose the character of play, one is inquiring into the mode of being of play. To reach this end, one is forced to step outside the Archimedean point of

36 Gadamer 2004. At issue here is escaping the Enlightenment’s conception of tradition as a purely dogmatic force that is opposed to reason. However, Gadamer’s point is not to present tradition as an unquestioned source of truth as does the Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment which simply inverts the antithesis and proffers mythos over logos. Instead, being conscious of being effected by history requires a trained sensitivity – “a reflective relation to tradition … which much be cultivated.” (Scheibler 1999, 12.)
37 Kratochwil 2007, 3.
38 Ricoeur 1976, 76.
39 Ricoeur 1976, 92.
knowing and become caught up in the activity of the play itself.\textsuperscript{40} In the present work, I have tried to follow this thought by giving myself over to the language-game of chivalry and playing with the meanings that unfold from it. In the historical-critical moment of interpretation I have tried to distance myself from this involvement by articulating the ‘about what’ of the play in the “Machiavellian” language of International Relations.

The above said resonates with themes that have been brought up in the context of the so-called IR fourth debate, which is essentially a debate on the need to cherish second-order considerations in IR.\textsuperscript{41} However, belongingness to traditions as a precondition and point of departure of knowledge production on international relations has seldom been problematised in IR. Reading works of IR one may easily get an impression that the discipline is all about attempts to objectify and control proceedings called international relations.\textsuperscript{42} In a familiar view, abstractions called ‘states’ interact in an environment called the ‘international system’ and an International Relations scholar observes this interaction from a detached position of knowing, from their Archimedean point.

When knowledge production is conceived of in terms of playing a game, it becomes possible to claim that the whole ‘problem of history’ is actually premised on a misunderstanding of our mode of being-in-the-world. It does not take into account that “we [e.g. researchers] are not standing outside [the tradition] and are hence unable to have objective knowledge of it.”\textsuperscript{43} To conceive of history as effective history and as something which is not removed from those aspiring to know it is to put forth a powerful alternative to the model that has fastened our attention on the (im)possibility of the subject to know the presumably objective. In other words, to emphasise the play-likeness of knowledge production in International Relations is to contribute to the thought that the problem which history poses for IR is not a problem that could be resolved. It is an issue that IR analysts are continuously engaged with.\textsuperscript{44} This means nothing more or less than recognising that – as innovative as they are –

\textsuperscript{40} Gadamer 2004, 103; see also Bernstein 1983, 122.
\textsuperscript{41} Milja Kurki and Colin Wight (2006, 20) characterise the fourth debate with the help of a set of conceptual pairs that pertain to the question of how we gain knowledge: understanding vs. explaining, positivism vs. post-positivism, or rationalism vs. reflectivism.
\textsuperscript{42} The words of J. David Singer (1961, 79) provide an illustration: “Obviously, we would demand that [the model] offers a highly accurate description of the phenomena under consideration. Therefore the scheme must present as complete and undistorted a picture of the phenomena as is possible; it must correlate with objective reality and coincide with our empirical referents to the highest possible degree.” Singer moves on to discuss that it is extremely difficult to come up with accurate representation of a complex and wide-ranging phenomena but taking his example from cartography and comparing the Mercator projection with the polar gnomonic projection moves on to suggest that although “[n]either offers … a wholly accurate presentation, yet each is true enough to reality to be quite useful for certain specific purposes.”
\textsuperscript{43} Gadamer 2004, 301.
\textsuperscript{44} Vaughan-Williams (2005, 118) suggests that the work of Jacques Derrida can do basically the same trick.
our analyses are also reappropriations of meanings that traditions make available for us. They involve both the transcendence and appropriation of traditionally available repertoires of interpreting international relations. Conceptualising interpretation as movement between the naïve, structural, and historical-critical moments of interpretation presents one possible way of characterising interpretation in these terms; it is a play of distance and proximity.

Insofar as interpretation is approached in these terms, as playing a game, then the attitude of a ‘Spielman’ might be a more fruitful one for the task of grasping what it means to ‘observe Russia as Finns’ than that of a ‘Scientist.’ Heeding these thoughts, the criteria for the scientificness of a discipline is not that it follows some exogenously given scientific model but that it takes into account the inescapable historicity of our thinking and, on that basis, turns to reflect on the limits and possibilities that historicity actually imposes on knowing. This is the critical function of hermeneutics.

Underpinning this critical function there is the post-Heideggerian argument that recognising the power of tradition is a matter of adopting a new attitude, one geared at destroying its artificial domination. As Heidegger notes, such destruction is not intended to be violently negative; it does not seek to “bury the past in nullity.” It tries to be positive in the sense of, first, discovering the possibilities of that tradition and, on that basis, keeping the tradition within its limits. In the process of interpretation, the interpreter’s relation to the tradition can undergo transformation. The present work can be taken as example of such positive destruction. It is an attempt to recognise the power of a certain tradition of interpretation in ‘observing Russia as Finns’ so as to be able to limit its hold.

46 See also Ricoeur 1976, 89.
3

Broadening and Deepening the Notion of Political Fact

Ever since I wrote my first short story, people have asked if what I wrote ‘was true.’ Though my replies sometimes satisfy their curiosity, I am left each time, no matter how sincere my answer, with a nagging sense of having said something that’s not quite on target.¹

Political cartoons present a challenge to a scholarly inquiry in International Relations since their truthfulness – like Vargas Llosa’s short stories – evades easy answers. Why, indeed, should a scholar in International Relations be interested in old political cartoons and caricatures – dated drawings where recognisable politicians appear side by side with imaginary characters and real political events mix and mingle with scenes that never took place? What do knights and dragons or maidens and castles have to do with the world of International Relations? Why bother with a genre that by its very definition seeks to distort and misrepresent?² Should the depictions of Finnish-Russian relations in political cartoons be taken as true or not?

In this chapter I shall ponder on the status of such unconventional sources as IR research materials and, on that basis, explicate their suitability for an inquiry into the political imaginary of Finnish-Russian relationships. In addition, I shall present some methodological tools with which to “get on target” when the question “true or not” arises. The tools are found in Charles S. Peirce’s pragmatist sign theory, which was preliminarily introduced in the previous chapters. This discussion also presents an occasion to further explicate what I have in mind in characterising this work’s approach to political imaginary as broadly pragmatist or pragmatically attuned. In short, the task of this chapter is to turn to the practice-embedded metaphysics of pragmatism in order to broaden and deepen the understanding of political facts that the discipline of international relations has traditionally worked with.³ In this sense, the task is also to rethink what the objects of IR knowledge are.

¹ Vargas Llosa 1984.
² Etymologically the word “caricature” originates is the Italian verb caricatura which means overloading, charging (e.g. George 1959, 11; Roy 1974, 9.)
³ For the thought that there is a need to ‘broaden and deepen’ something in the discipline of IR, see Kurki (2006) for a discussion conducted in the context of the concept of the cause.
To examine the question of political factuality in pragmatist terms is not to judge a conception along the axis of factuality vs. fictionality, true vs. false or real vs. unreal. It is, rather, to turn attention to the various kinds of practical consequences that result from the approval of a way of thought which the fictional alludes to.4 This effort forms part of a more general interest in how the unexpected is encountered on the basis of previous knowledge and experience. In this sense, pragmatist understanding of political factuality comes close to the speech act theory and its interest in how things are done with words or other kinds of signs.5

My argument is that non-literal and fictional materials, such as political cartoons, are worth studying since they – despite the surface appearance of lightness and humorousness – often convey serious speech acts. In the words of John Searle, “almost any important work of fiction conveys a ‘message’ or ‘messages’ which are conveyed by the text but are not in the text.”6 I further suggest that Charles S. Peirce’s triadic sign theory comes in handy for the task of getting from ‘what is in the text’ to ‘what is conveyed by the text’ and, most importantly, to ‘how this is done.’7 At the heart of this movement lies the pragmatist character of Peirce’s sign theory. As noted in the previous chapters, it presupposes that signs act in the world through their interpreters and focuses its attention on how interpreters actually emerge in the process of human beings’ practical engagement with the world.

3.1. What is a Political Fact?

The wit and fancy of political cartoons seems to fit poorly with the traditional metaphysics of IR, which has conceived of the world in terms of a two-world view of the ‘cave’ of international relations which is exposed by the ‘sunlight’ of IR theory. Connected to such metaphysics is Martin Hollis and Steve Smith’s argument regarding the two stories view to international relations; Hollis and Smith famously argue that the discipline of International Relations will eternally be made up of two accounts – one seeking to explain and the other to understand.8 It might be for these reasons that non-literal products, such as cartoons or other products of popular culture, have not fared that well among the usual IR research materials that comprise state documents, statistical data, political speeches, declarations, diplomatic procedures, and other sources of knowledge that IR scholars have grown accustomed to interrogate for their

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4 E.g. Peirce CP 5.9.
5 I am here alluding to the speech act theory as elucidated by J.L. Austin (1975) in his How to Do Things with Words.
6 Searle 1975, 332.
7 For connections between the sign act theory and Peirce’s pragmatism, see e.g. Brock 1982.
8 Hollis & Smith 1990, 1.
sincerity, authenticity, and truthfulness. It seems, indeed, that the program of the Enlightenment – characterised by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer as “the disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy” – has had a firm hold on the discipline of International Relations.

But it is possible to imagine the realm of international relations differently. This effort involves an attempt to understand international relations in terms of metaphorical expressions other than those that have succeeded in establishing themselves as concepts of IR and/or social theory. One possible way of doing this is to focus on the way in which the symbol of the Knight or the Beast is “cut off from its natural practical associations and can therefore be easily included in the modelling associations of the human consciousness.” That is, meanings unfolding from the chivalric model-image are utilised for the purposes of making sense of events in international relations.

This not only encourages broadening the stock of IR research materials towards less conventional sources, but also prompts interrogating typical IR research materials for images and narratives rather than merely documentation. To appropriate the words of Costas Constantinou, the point is to come up with “theoretically playful – but plausible – narrative[s] through which to reread and revise the picture of world politics.” The chivalric language-game that this study works with can be taken as an attempt in that direction.

In order for such an alternative realm to emerge, it is requisite that we do not simply dismiss as fiction the fact that international relations is often enacted by non-literal figures. They augment the population of the actual world by implanting within it imaginary beings who we customarily call characters or types. Dostoyevsky once suggested that such types are hardly ever encountered in the real world but are “more real than real life itself” as they roam among us in a diluted form.

Garry Wills has spelled out how his claim that politics could be studied with the help of one such cultural type – the hero of Westerns or John Wayne – caused anxiety in his colleagues:

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9 For examples that use – or promote the use of – non-strictly-factual for research materials, see e.g. Wedes 1999a, 2001 & 2003; Bleiker 2001, 2003; Lacy 2001; Weber 1999, 2001; Odysseos 2001a; Holden 2003. It is also possible to point out some earlier examples: in his International Theory: The Three Traditions, Martin Wight (1991) refers to several literary sources and, at some point, claims that judging the actions of statesmen comes close to literary criticism.

10 Horkheimer & Adorno 1989, 3; see also Odysseos 2001a, 709.

11 Lotman 1990, 54.


13 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Idiot; see also Cohn 1999, 16.
Why him? When I began this project three years ago, that was the question most often asked when anyone learned of it. I had received no such queries when I said I was writing about Richard Nixon or Ronald Reagan. They, after all, held political office, and depended upon a political electorate. People cast votes for them. They just bought tickets for John Wayne’s movies. Yet, it is a very narrow definition of politics that would deny John Wayne’s political importance. The proof of that is Richard Nixon’s appeal to Wayne’s movie *Chisum* when he wanted to explain his own views on law and order. Nixon had policies, but beneath those policies were the values Wayne exemplified.\(^{14}\)

In the present work, I refer to the Knight, the Beast and the Treasure as examples of types roaming within the realm of international relations. However, instead of thinking of them as embodiments of values, I examine them for the repertoires of interpretation that they serve as reservoirs for.

Heeding Dostoyevsky’s suggestion, it is possible to conceptualise this pre-political level as something real. Indeed, Dostoyevsky’s passage can be interpreted as making an analytical distinction between the levels of political factuality – pre-political and political (‘real life itself’). In Peirce’s pragmatist sign theory these levels or aspects are designated with the metaphysical categories of Firstness and Secondness. In addition to this, Peirce talks about Thirdness which brings the First and the Second into contact with one another. It refers to the typical or habitual as the interpretive aspect of culture.\(^{15}\)

These imaginary beings – i.e. figures that define things in terms that are appropriate to other things – augment the population of the world in the sense suggested by François Dagognet’s notion of *iconic augmentation*, which he intended as a countermove to the above mentioned two world picture of Plato. The notion of iconic augmentation closely resembles the notion of mimesis as metaphoric imitation of not the events as such, but also of their logical structure and meaning.\(^{16}\) For Dagognet, iconic augmentation refers to the artist’s strategy of reconstructing reality on the basis of an optical alphabet that is at the same time limited and dense – i.e. mutually constraining and enabling.\(^{17}\) The Beasts, the Knights, and the Treasures of political cartoons can be thought of in these terms. They belong to the alphabet of international relations which is actualised in concrete situations to come to terms with challenges that the world throws up. Appreciating such non-literal elements in efforts to know

\(^{15}\) Peirce CP 8.328.
\(^{16}\) Cf. Alker 1996, 298.
\(^{17}\) Dagognet cit. Ricoeur 1990, 80–81.
international relations may help increase our vision of political facts which easily becomes impoverished and diluted in the ongoingsness of everyday affairs.

If the level of non-literal figures constitutes one level of political factuality, it is useful to develop these points further by making a distinction between ‘configurations’ and ‘fictions.’ The word configuration is something of a synonym for the political level – i.e. Ricoeur’s mimesis or Peirce’s Secondness. The configurative level of political factuality thus refers to the outcome of the process whereby the pre-political or prefigurative level is actualised to serve a present purpose such as a topical political dilemma. Since political cartoons characteristically fuse fiction with fact, they are better understood as configurations than as purely fictional accounts. If this approach is accepted, the word fiction may be used as an antonym to historical narratives’ claims to constitute true narratives. Consequently, the word configuration can be reserved for speech acts that do not primarily bring into play the problems of reference and truth – i.e. that do not even attempt to settle the duel between fact and fiction in the traditional sense but accept their interplay as a part and parcel of political practices.18

The cartoon on the right is fictional in the sense that there is no pile of old papers containing references to Trotsky having murdered some beautiful, young lady. That is, examined as a characterisation of a certain Lev Trotsky, the constellation seems to be fictional; it does not correlate one-to-one with historical facts. On the level of configuration it gains another truth status. “The literal reference must collapse so that the heuristic fiction can work its rede-scription of reality.”19 The apparently fictional sign composed of the figures of the Beast and the Treasure may be appreciated as a dynamical interpretant of the overthrow of the Tsarist regime by the Bolsheviks which is well documented in historical records.

That is, an unidentifiable young lady as the Treasure stands for the Old Russia (note the text Ryssland on her headband) and Trotsky, with his knife, for the new Bolshevik regime. On this basis, the picture may be appreciated as a visual attempt to solve the political dilemma which the Russian revolution as something unexpected created. It is a political fact also in the sense that through its final interpretant the sign further alludes to the Machiavellian thought-

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18 Cf. Ricoeur 1990, 12.
19 Ricoeur 1991a, 68.
paradigm of Finnish political imaginary on Russia – i.e. it forms part of a larger effort of judging whether the Russian neighbourhood is a matter of good or bad fortuna.

3.2. Non-Literalness in International Relations

Non-literal research materials, among them political cartoons, have for a long time been an overlooked source of knowledge in International Relations. This is surprising given the fact that the kind of abstractive reasoning that IR also leans on is seldom purely literal but largely metaphorical and imaginative. The use of non-literal – if not contrary-to-fact – notions is a persistent feature of attempts to make sense of the proceedings called international relations. The colloquial practice of referring to states as if they were acting individuals and the disciplinary state-as-agent debate are cases in point. A closer look reveals that non-literal figures have an established place in political thought. Examples abound from Machiavelli’s centaur and Hobbes’s behemoth to Montesquieu’s troglodytes and Burke’s ghosts and goblins.20 There also seems to be something non-literal to Raymond Aron’s soldier and diplomat who “live and symbolise” international relations.21 They are Dostoyevskian types that roam in the realm of international relations; they embody habitually available repertoires of interpretation which are actualised for the purposes of coming to terms with the challenges that the world conjures up.

However, despite an apparent oversight, I cannot claim to be the first IR scholar to emphasise the interplay of figurative and configurative in bringing into play the question of political factuality in international relations. During the past two decades, the questioning of the dominant IR research programmes has paved the way for alternative accounts of international relations. The desire to know International Relations has been complemented with the desire to know how we know it.22 It has become widely accepted that “even the more descriptively oriented genres such as historical accounts can be shown ... to have plots. All stories and accounts, no matter how much their style might protest innocence, contain a mythical level – that is, they have a job to do, a perspective to promote, a kind of world to affirm or deny.”23 It is possible to formulate this thought in pragmatist terms; IR’s attention has started to shift

21 Aron argues that “Inter-state relations are expressed in by specific actions, those of individuals whom I shall call symbolic, the diplomat and the soldier. ... The ambassador in the exercise of his duties, is the political unit in whose name he speaks; the soldier on the battlefield is the political unit in whose name he kills opposite number. ... The ambassador and the soldier live and symbolise international relations.” (Aron 1967, 5; italics original.)
22 I am here paraphrasing Frye 1984, 12.
23 Shapiro 1984, 2; see also Alker 1996, 270.
towards the way in which the world receives an ontological structure though human practice-embedded categorisation. Indeed, pragmatism would treat any structured reality as humanly categorised and suggest that such structure has arisen as a response to specific needs.24

As part of these developments, figurative and configurative dimensions of international relations have started to receive the attention they deserve. Even the metaphors of the disciplinary jargon that we have grown accustomed to – e.g. ‘the state’, ‘national interest’, ‘anarchy’, ‘hierarchy’ or ‘balance of power’ – have been recognised for what they are, not detached descriptions of a reality ‘out there’ but part and parcel of the political imaginary of international relations. Nevertheless, the question over how exactly such an intertext of international relations and non-literary works emerges has been left for vague interpretations. Oftentimes it is simply claimed that the works of popular or mass culture somehow reflect what goes on in the sphere of international political life.25 Given pragmatism’s focus on the ways in which non-semiotic and semiotic spheres are brought into articulation with one another, it has a contribution to make here. That is, it contains potent tools with which to spell out how non-literal products actually come to play a role in the constitution of the political world.26

Questions geared at broadening the disciplinary understanding of political facts have cropped up during the last decade in a growing genre of works devoted to exploring the relationship between international relations and popular culture. It has been recognised that international relations should be studied beyond the statements of the political elites and that popular culture provides a valuable site for this. In a recent contribution, Iver Neumann and Daniel Nexon distinguish four different ways of approaching the interface between popular culture and international relations: popular culture as politics, a mirror, data, and as a constitutive force. When popular culture is understood as politics, it is thought of as a cause or, alternatively, an effect of political processes. Propaganda is a good example of this. As a mirror, popular culture is conceived to illustrate and reflect political themes and assumptions. When thought of as data, artefacts of popular culture are treated as evidence of ongoing political processes or dominant ideas, norms, identities, beliefs, etc. When popular culture is examined as something constitutive of international relations, the distinction between first and second order representations is relaxed and the “founding stories” that are common to both these planes are investigated.27

25 For an illustration, see e.g. the insightful volume of articles on the connections between science fiction (SF) and IR edited by Jutta Weldes (2003) that, however, contains little on how such an intertext between IR and SF comes about.
One of the pioneers in broadening IR’s understanding of political facts is Hayward Alker. Instead of popular culture, Alker has disclosed how social scientific research paradigms and theoretical traditions, despite interest in describing the world in a detached manner, reveal mythopoetic or moral-ideological elements which are conceptually embedded in their “models of men and women.”28 These poetic aspects can be disclosed by staying alert to the ways in which Marxists and Malthusians – “like all other great story tellers” – try to find not only uncovered historical facts but also consistency to them. Recognising that the realm of international relations is imbued with both fictitious and factual elements, Alker seeks to disclose the prefigurative level of IR; he shows that major societal and historical texts are essentially stories that follow certain narrative patterns and contain mythical figures such as dragons, princesses, and heroes... Consider, for instance, Thucydides’s classical study of the Peloponnesian War which, in Alker’s reading, turns out to be less an objective historical account than a morality play in which unforgiving gods seek to punish Athens for her moral hubris.29

In a similar vein, Roland Bleiker has argued that despite being presented in a scientifically detached manner, IR discussions are “in essence no different from what people have done for time immemorial: they gathered around the fire and told stories of the great deeds, great triumphs, and great defeats of their heroes.”30 Echoing the “aesthetic turn” of International Relations, Bleiker has made a further suggestion that insights derived from other knowledge practices could offer such insights into politics that conventionally sanctioned approaches might miss. With the former, Bleiker refers to “philosophical, historic, poetic, visual, [and] acoustic” practices. With the latter he has in mind the reduction “of knowledge to reason and reason to a set of rigid social scientific conventions.”31 Both these efforts seem to be geared at transgressing the strict division of fact and fiction within the discipline of International Relations. In pragmatist terms, they can be thought of as efforts to spell out that knowledge production in international relations proceeds on the grounds of previous knowledge and experience and that the mode in which this experience is available for acts of resignification escapes the dichotomy of fiction and fact.

In addition to Alker and Bleiker, scholars such as David Campbell, Stephen Chan, Erik Ringmar, and Michael Shapiro are worth mentioning for having suggested that studying materials that we are not used to interrogating for truthfulness and factuality such as fairy tales, prosaics, stories, or art may help us come to grips with the proceedings known as inter-

28 Alker 1987, 270.
29 Alker 1987, 270.
31 Bleiker 2003, 418.
national relations. In a recent contribution to disciplinary discussions, Cerwyn Moore has joined this group by promoting the fruitfulness of the works of imagination in identifying some of the cultural and symbolic forces that condition violence.

The debates initiated by the above-mentioned authors are significant for having paved the way for questioning what the object of IR knowledge actually is and what it could be. As a contribution to this discussion, Bleiker has argued that the “central question a reader must ask of a work on International Relations that relies on literature is not whether the conclusions are true. Far more important is whether or not it is able to present old dilemmas in a new light.” According to Bleiker, uncoveries are more important than discoveries. The former implies “an excavation from underneath layers of ossified or never problematized knowledge” while the latter involves attempts to find “a new, previously untouched fact.”

I take Bleiker’s words to suggest that the figurative dimensions of international relations are worth uncovering and agree with him on the importance of making uncoveries rather than discoveries. But I would not go as far as to claim that a work on IR that relies on non-literal research materials cannot be assessed on its truthfulness. Shared ways of making sense of the world are facts about the given society and, just like other facts, real and are amenable to inquiry. My suggestion thus is that instead of throwing the baby of factuality out with the bathwater, we might try to broaden and deepen our understanding of what actually constitutes a political fact. Indeed, in their apology for the use of fictional research materials, Sami Moisio and Vilho Harle claim that ‘political facts’ are too often understood in a narrow sense. Just because non-literal research materials do not claim to represent reality directly, we cannot say that they do not refer at all. Bleiker might actually have had something similar in mind in his argument that the point of literary engagements with political realities “is not to ‘bend it like Bakhtin’, … but to bend as required to engage the political puzzle that needs to be understood.” In the present work I suggest that Peirce’s pragmatist sign theory can assist

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32 Campbell (1992) works on a presumption that foreign policy operates through discourses of danger and threat. It does not refer to objective conditions ‘out there’ but is better understood as a boundary-producing practice rendering certain events and objects foreign and thus securing the identity of those outside. Among other things, Chan (e.g. 2005) has worked at the intersection of literature and political science/IR and Ringmar (1996) argues that man is a “story-telling animal” and suggests that stories insert the present into a plot and render it meaningful.

33 Moore 2006.

34 Bleiker 2003, 421.

35 Direct quotations are from Mattern (2005a, 4); Bleiker 2003, 421.

36 See also Ringmar 1996, 71.

37 Moisio & Harle 2002, 65. Moisio and Harle’s (2002, 64) argument is a reply to a criticism against their use of the novels of the Finnish author Ilkka Remes for research materials. They argue that these extremely popular works of literature are significant research material since their “geopolitical logic seems convincing to the Finnish reader.” They can be analyzed to access the “national truth, belief system, or governing discourse.”

us in the task of engaging political puzzles that unfold in non-literal research materials. More specifically, it comes in handy for the purpose of formulating an alternative to the ‘hatred of Russkies’ interpretation – an alternative which, in my view, serves to better appreciate the political puzzles of the period.

Turning to cartoons, literature, or other non-literal research materials does not mean that International Relations’ scholarship should be assimilated with literary criticism or cultural studies. Instead, as IR scholars we ought to better investigate the insights that non-literal research materials offer into politics but avoid conceptualising the relationship in terms of yet another two-world picture – i.e. the cave of political puzzles enlightened by insights from the realm of culture. Such juxtaposition can be avoided by focusing on the process of semiotic emergence, which in tied to both semiotic and non-semiotic registers. That is, on the practices of political imaginary (I am here thinking of practice as a moment which, invested with intentionality can transform the culturally available unity of meaning.)³⁹ In this work, I try to accomplish that task by way of conducting an inquiry into political imaginary understood as semeiotic production of new interpretants. This is in line with a pragmatist character of the inquiry into political imaginary: its focus is on the ways in which the primary reality – which exists as an unmade, chaotic stream of occurrences – is turned into a pragmatically meaningful reality in the process of signification.⁴⁰

3.3. Broadening: Speech Act Theory

Political cartoons present one possible site for examining in empirical terms how the notion of political fact can be broadened and deepened. They are well suited for this task since they characteristically fuse fictional characters with topical events and are intentional in the sense of forming part of concrete political debates of their day.

The type of challenge that cartoons pose has previously been tackled in speech act theory. In his famous book *How to Do Things with Words*, J.L. Austin takes as his point of departure the recognition that contrary to logical positivist assumptions, in some cases, to utter a sentence is not that much to describe states of affairs, as to actively do things.⁴¹ Examining political cartoons as instances of statecrafting is premised on this point of departure. The distinction between constative and performative aspects of language use can be geared at developing this point further. Austin’s argument is that if language is only examined in its constative

41 Austin 1975, 6.
aspect – i.e. is thought to be involved in making true or false statements – its performative aspects become easily ignored. But if language – or any other sign system for that matter – is viewed in terms of speech acts, it discloses a significant structure of implication.

In his article *The Logical Status of Fiction* John Searle makes a use of speech act theory to discuss the truth status of fictional works. He suggests that an attempt to do something with the words uttered is actually implicit in every utterance. Because of such a point of departure, Searle’s analysis can be mobilised for the purpose of getting out of the two world view of international relations and broadening one’s understanding of political facts. At the heart of this contestation there lies the notion of an *illocutionary act* – i.e. an utterance that accomplishes something. On the basis of this distinction, Searle contests the view that newspaper accounts contain one class of illocutionary acts (e.g. statements, assertions, descriptions, explanations) and fictional materials another (e.g. stories, poems, plays, cartoons...). Heeding this suggestion, it would also be foolish to assume that the author of non-literal materials (such as a political cartoonist) has her own repertoire of illocutionary acts. Instead, it becomes possible to adopt the position that political cartoons are an instance of a more encompassing statecraft speech act which means that a similar speech act could be put out through a variety of media. Concomitantly, I would like to stress that the study at hand should not be considered as a study of political cartoons but a study of statecrafting. Its primary interest does not lie with the cartoons but on the way in which political facts emerge in the process of semeiosis (i.e. political imaginary). Cartoons present only one – although fruitful – site for such an inquiry.

One of the peculiarities of fictional or non-literal discourse is that it suspends the normal requirements between language and reality. The conventions of non-literal discourse enable the utterer to use signs with their literal meaning without committing herself to the literal meaning of those words. The previous drawing displaying Trotsky committing a murder is an example of this.

John Searle’s suggestion can also be extended to contest the presently fashionable infatuation with visual materials in IR and the Social Sciences more broadly. This interest has been motivated by the “visual turn” which has been articulated as a response to the thought that special “forces” are at work in contemporary visual culture. In this work I take another road

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42 Austin 1975; see also Adams & Searle 1986, 834.
43 J.L. Austin’s famous example is the illocution ‘I now pronounce you a husband and a wife’, which accomplishes something in that it presumably changes something in the world.
44 Searle 1975, 323.
45 Searle 1975, 324.
46 Searle 1975, 326.
47 For an illustrative example, see e.g. Campbell & Shapiro 2007 and the special issue of the journal *Security Dialogue* (2007). For basic parameters of visual culture approach and the “visual turn”, see e.g. Mirzoeff (1999, 2002.)
of inquiry when it comes to the status of the visual as an object of knowledge. Instead of treating it as a “new contested terrain,” I assume that the visual includes similar illocutions as, for instance, verbal or acoustic materials. I do, however, emphasise the importance of the iconic dimension in semeiosis but suggest that the visual does not have a monopoly on iconicity; it pertains equally to other types of research materials – i.e. the verbal may also be inquired for its iconic dimensions. However, the special fruitfulness of political cartoons – or other visual data – derives from the fact that the iconic dimension may be more easily available for interpretation in them.

Characterising political factuality in these terms begets a question, on the one hand, over the mechanisms by which the conventions that suspend literal meanings are actually invoked and, on the other, over the role of the iconic in semeiosis. Charles S. Peirce’s sign theory which was briefly presented in the previous chapter provides methodological tools for both of these tasks. It is underpinned by a pragmatist maxim which suggests that in order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception we ought to consider the practical consequences that would result from its approval. Instead of judging the conception under consideration along the axis of true vs. false or visual vs. verbal we should focus on its local applicability and the kinds of effects that it acquires in the particular situations in which it is actualised to make sense of the unexpected.

In the same spirit as it refuses to draw any dichotomies between the ‘world as it is’ and the ‘world as it is represented by human beings,’ Peirce’s pragmatist sign theory does not contain any special treatment of visual signs. It is premised on the view that iconic, indexical and symbolic sign aspects pertain equally to visual and verbal signs. Peirce’s sign theory contains tools with which to explicate how signs – literal or non-literal, verbal or visual – may be used in certain situations to solve problems that the world throws up, i.e. to ‘do things.’ It liberates us from Vargas Llosa’s dilemma introduced at the beginning of this chapter and provides analytical distinctions that allow us to say something that is on target when the question of the truthfulness arises. Instead of forcing us to ponder whether a certain proposition is true or not, it bestows us with the means of indicating how a proposition counts as a political fact. In this way, pragmatist sign theory contributes to the deepening of our understanding of political facts.

One of the most significant contributions of Peirce is his conception of scientific epistemology as the study of the logic of signs. In this conception, inquiring how one knows is just as important as asking what one knows. Because of such points of departure, it can contribute significantly to second order considerations within the discipline of IR – i.e. it can add to

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48 Campbell & Shapiro 2007, 132.
49 E.g. Peirce CP 5.9; see also Freadman 2004, 77.
the desire to know international relations the desire to know the way in which we know it. The idea of second order considerations is connected to the thought that we live in "second-hand" worlds, as C. Wright Mills argues. This may be taken to mean that the previous knowledge and experience that is embodied in the mnemonic symbols of political imaginary is not exhausted by individual experience and knowledge, but rather that "they are aware of much more than they have personally experienced. ... Their images of the world, and of themselves, are given to them by crowds of witnesses they have never met and shall never meet." That is, much of what one knows is conditioned even if not determined by the habitual ways of thought where the "lessons of history" are condensed in the form of generalised repertoires of interpretation. Inquiring into how one knows – e.g. into 'observing Russia as Finns' – can, consequently, be done by examining the process of resignification where such habitually available repertoires are actualised to make sense of the unfolding events.

3.4. Deepening: Semeiotic Realism

Peirce’s pragmatism presumes that the human condition of being in the world involves signs that are linked, on the one hand, to each other in an endless series of mental dialogue called semeiosis and, on the other, to an external reality defined as that which is as it is apart from any thought about it. That is, Peirce’s semeiotic realism is premised on the view that there might well be a “world in itself,” and a “world as represented” but it refuses to draw any principled dichotomies between them. In the spirit of its thoroughgoing anti-dualism, it promotes inquires into how signs in their mediating role bring these two realms into articulation and how new signs (interpretants) emerge in these practices.

Semeiotic realism takes an important role in my attempt to reach beyond the fact vs. fiction fetish and demonstrate that the complex realities of international relations might be better understood with the help of an epistemological attitude that takes non-literal IR figures just as seriously as it takes identifiable statesmen, diplomats, and soldiers. On its basis, I attempt to contribute to the point of view according to which the mythic, the fictional, and the non-literal offer just as pre-eminent a perspective on international political life as do the allegedly scientific and rational narratives. This does not mean discarding reason altogether, but instead viewing it as one among many human faculties.
The point to pursue is that, when conceived of pragmatically, non-literal or fictional objects can be thought of as hypotheses or suggestions formulated on the basis of previous knowledge and geared at solving practical problems. They are results of abductions that need to be, in the spirit of thoroughgoing fallibilism, constantly subjugated to further interpretation and criticism.54

Joseph Ransdell notes that a sign, for Peirce, is “that through which the world manifests itself.”55 The question over how exactly this manifestation takes place can be resolved in two ways: with recourse to either realism or nominalism. Even if Peirce’s preliminary answer to the question was nominalistic, the bulk of his work is dedicated to a search for a pragmatist realism. Indeed, Peirce’s pragmatist philosophy is better understood as taking issue with the realism vs. nominalism contention than with the philosophical debate between realism and idealism. Peirce was dissatisfied by the use of science to promote nominalism – i.e. individualism, sensationalism and materialism – and advocated a conception of science that would be realistic in its emphasis on the general and the social.56 Hence his emphasis on continuity. The pertinence of this argument for our attempt to deepen the notion of political fact is that even though it might be possible to dismiss an individual occurrence as untrue in some sense, the question of its political factuality settles differently when examined on the level of the general and the social.

Indeed, Peirce objected to the practice of making single individuals absolute judges of truth and promoted the “cable” as a suitable metaphor of reasoning since it brings to mind multiform argumentation, conversation, and debating.57 In his work, the society takes the form of conversation. Peirce mostly talks about the scientific community but his insights can be extended to other types of communities of inquiry – such as the community of ‘observing Russia as Finns.’58 As Anne Freadman notes, the sign hypothesis as an elemental part of Peirce’s pragmatist semeiotic ought to be understood in connection with such truth seeking as conversation. It involves putting forth hypotheses that, in one’s view, are worth recognition and acceptance and subjecting them to critical evaluation. Statecrafting, which is an attempt to put one’s hypothesis of skilled political conduct at the centre of political life, provides one fruitful site for an inquiry into such multiform argumentation.

54 Cf. Freadman 2004, 72; see also Bernstein 1991, 327.
56 Scheffler 1974, 18.
57 Bernstein 1991, 327.
58 Cf. Pardales & Girord 2006.
3.5. Objects of Active Historical Experience

One of the realms that we are accustomed to inquire for (political) factuality is history. The word history may be taken to denote ‘that which actually happened;’ or on the other hand, it may stand for ‘our accounts of these events.’ Objectivist accounts work on the naïvely realistic presumption that, given good and sufficient primary sources, these two realms would merge. They attest to what Karl Popper talked about as “fallacy of inductivism” – i.e. a view that mere aggregations of facts provide their own explanations. Taking objectivism in the strong sense of the word suggests that the truthfulness of the sentence ‘the cat is on the mat’ is dependent on whether there actually is a cat on the mat.

True to its pragmatist character, Peirce’s sign theory departs from striving at objectivism in the strong sense of the word. It does not locate facts in the mind-independent, non-semiotic realm but takes as its “full fact” a concrete situation where an intentional human agent is practically involved in the world. On this basis it emphasises that it is impossible to abstract objects from the practices of human agents. Indeed, the whole pragmatist project can be understood as a counterargument to “vicious abstractionism” which refers to the still dominant tendency of Western metaphysics to reduce originally rich phenomena to naked suggestions.

However, the point of pragmatism is not to deny the possibility of objectivity altogether but to situate it. This is done in the spirit of radical contingency and chance which are characteristic of the pragmatist project. According to it, contingency and chance are pervasive and unavoidable features of the universe. Habits and chance are in a continuous interplay and people respond to contingencies on the basis of developing complex dispositions and critical habits. If this point of departure is accepted, objects are best conceived as “beings that throw themselves in the path of our activities, often in an unforeseen and even unwelcomed way.” The term object can thus be taken to point to the contingent element in human agents’ involvement in the world – i.e. to those unexpected things that the world throws up. The fecundity of conceiving objects in terms of contingencies is that it enables the appreciation of politics as a specific type of activity. Heeding J.G.A. Pocock’s suggestion, politics can be

59 For the prevalence of this view, see e.g. Hidemi Suganami’s (2007, 33) recent argument that “practicing historians appear committed to the view that their collective aim is, on the basis of available evidence, to reconstruct the past as it actually was (or to approximate to that goal as far as possible).”
60 van Oort 1998, 444.
64 Colapietro 1992.
viewed as the “art of dealing with the contingent event.”\textsuperscript{65} In the analytical section of this work, I treat political cartoons in these terms; they are examined as attempts to come to terms with political contingencies by way of putting forth hypotheses about how an irritating situation could be solved.

It results from this that, in line with the practice-embedded metaphysics of pragmatism, the objects that this approach is avails itself to are not best characterised in terms of sets of properties; they are occasions and results of active, historical experience.\textsuperscript{66} Taking the process of active historical experience as the focus of inquiry means focusing on the ways in which (cartooned) signs generate ever new combinations in varying historical situations. Hence the characterisation of political imaginary as a process of semeiosis involving the incessant production of new interpretants in situations of political contingency.

3.6. From Tokens to Archetypes and Back

Peirce’s sign model is well-suited for the type of inquiry that I am calling after since it differs from the view that reduces a sign to the sign-object dyad. It puts forth a counterargument to the interpretation according to which the characterisation of a sign ‘as something that stands for something else’ can be, in a satisfactory way, interpreted in terms of a relationship between a sign and its object. On this basis it also problematises the thought that ‘what actually happened’ and ‘our accounts of these events’ would merge given proper sources. Peirce’s triadic sign theory – undergirded by semeiotic realism – points to a way of practicing research that is based on the principle whereby non-literal or fictional does not mean unreal or arbitrary. It suggests that taking non-literal configurations or works of fiction seriously is anything but naïve. Instead, it would be naïve to treat any sign as a direct image of its object.\textsuperscript{67}

Unlike naïve realism that leans on a dyadic relational theory and presupposes that the perceiver may in an ideal situation directly perceive the object, semeiotic realism presupposes that reality is always articulated within a specific frame of reference. In Peirce’s account of the sign, the theory of ‘gaps’ gives way to a theory of ‘grounds.’ Working on triadic relations, it does not separate sign systems (semeiotic) and reality (non-semantic) but seeks to bring out the ways in which sign systems, human action, and the world are inseparably united in

\textsuperscript{65} Pocock 1975, 156. 
\textsuperscript{66} Eco 1976, 1465. 
\textsuperscript{67} This thought forms an elemental part of Peirce’s criticism of the Cartesian framework. He was strictly opposed to the view that that language and signs are an external disguise for thought or that we could break out the miasma of our language or systems of signs and have direct intuitive knowledge of objects. This last point Peirce took to be the heart of Cartesianism and the central dogma of modern philosophy. (Bernstein 1971, 5–6.)
the triadic sign. This means nothing more or less than disclosing the grounds on which a given (set of) sign(s) puts forth its hypothesis of things being just so – i.e. pointing out ways in which the mind-independent reality and its semiotic representations are brought into articulation.

The table below introduces the basic trichotomies around which Peirce’s general theory of signs gravitates. It also initially suggests how they can be utilised in disclosing the political facts of political cartoons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A sign ...</th>
<th>Firstness</th>
<th>Secondness</th>
<th>Thirdness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in itself (presentative)</td>
<td>qualisign (appearance)</td>
<td>sinsign (being once only)</td>
<td>legisign (lawlikeness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in relation to object (representative)</td>
<td>icon (similarity or resemblance)</td>
<td>index (causality)</td>
<td>symbol (convention or habitual rule)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in relation to interpretant (interpretative)</td>
<td>rhyme (qualitative possibility)</td>
<td>dicisign (actual existent)</td>
<td>argument (sign of law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The cartoon stands for</td>
<td>blank form of proposition (e.g. chivalric equation)</td>
<td>proposition</td>
<td>logic of reasoning, habit of thought</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Peirce’s theory of signs is hesitant to designate pure icons, indices, or symbols and develops into ten classes of signs with numerous subdivisions. Nevertheless, the table above, may in its simplicity and economicity come in handy for assisting us in getting “tolerably accurate ideas” of how political facts emerge in the cartoon material.

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69 Parmentier 1994, 23.
70 Elaborated on the basis of Liszka 1996, 34-35; see also Seulamo & Seulamo 1992.
71 Peirce CP 2.254–2.264.
72 "No sign perhaps, can perfectly realize any one of these types [namely, icon, index, symbol]. They are like chemical elements, which the very laws of chemical reaction prohibit us from obtaining in absolute purity, but to the purification of which we can so far approximate as to get tolerably accurate ideas of their nature, and which present
Such a way of using Peirce’s sign theory finds support in Vincent Colapietro’s writings. On one occasion Colapietro argues that Peirce’s categorial scheme “functions ... much like the periodic table functions to direct investigation of the most basic elements.” In another moment, Colapietro quite poetically proposes that the scheme is best viewed as a “lantern ... by which inquirers may illuminate their footsteps, especially when exploring unfamiliar territory.” In line with this suggestion, Peirce’s classification of sign aspects can be thought of as a lantern with which to disclose how political facts actually emerge in the practices of political imaginary.

Although the basic distinctions of Peirce’s sign theory have been briefly introduced in the preceding chapters, it makes sense to revisit them with the task of broadening and deepening the notion of political facts. The point of departure for Peirce’s sign theory is that all conceptions can be reduced to the phenomenological categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. While Thirdness (symbolic) refers to the interpretive aspect of culture and Secondness (deictic) to denotative proof in experience, Firstness captures the ideational aspect or the moment of connotation-heavy perception and, in this capacity, also provides the possibility for hypothesis-formation by way of abduction. Another basic distinction of Peirce’s semiotics relates to the character of signs in themselves (presentative). In addition to qualisigns that are of the nature of appearance, he talks about tokens or sinsigns (sin = being once only) and sign types or legisigns (legi = lawlikeness). The former designates actually occurring sign instances and the latter general regularities which stipulate a systematic linkage between form and meaning.

In fact, it is possible to distinguish two senses to the Peircean notion of the sign. First, it designates the whole semeiotic triad (in which case the corners of this triad can be designated as representamen-object-interpretant). Second, it refers to that element of the semeiotic

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73 Colapietro 2006, 7.
74 Colapietro 2001, 201.
75 Rytövuori-Apunen 2005, 166.
76 Peirce’s famous illustration of the distinction between tokens and types is the English word ‘the.’ There are about fifteen the’s on a page – i.e. 15 tokens. Conceived as a type, however, there is but one ‘the’ in the English language. (Peirce CP 4.537.)
77 Parmentier 2002, 294. Richard Parmentier (2002, 294) notes that this distinction actually carries with it the distinction between nominalism and idealism which Western metaphysics has long debated. Some argue with Plato that the truer reality lies in the permanent realm of sign types (Platonic ideas or forms) while others insist with Aristotle that only concrete entities are worth paying attention at when discussing the signifying element of semiotic relations.
triad which mediates between an object and an interpretant – i.e. to the representamen.\textsuperscript{78} If understood in the latter capacity, the sign or representamen can be a mere physical vehicle or designator of a concept, such as sound of a voice or the traces from the pen of the cartoonist on the paper. In the former capacity, the sign is a concept.\textsuperscript{79} The difference in the two ways of conceiving of the sign can be rendered analytically useful. It suggests that a sign can be at the same time both a representamen and a concept. If this view is accepted, an individual cartoon character may be taken to provide a singular symbol (sinsign or token) as well as a conceptual instance (legisign or type) which alludes to the more general way of thought.

The distinction between tokens and types is pertinent for the task of appreciating non-literal research materials in the study of international relations. The data of IR scholars – be they political cartoons, speeches, newspaper clippings – are sign tokens, i.e. what has actually been said, pictured, or written. In this capacity, they may have varying truth statuses. Nevertheless, the cross-contextual regularities that analyses aim at are sign types.\textsuperscript{80} The cartoon material that this study works on is composed of sinsigns but the way in which these signs issuing from the chivalric equation further allude to the “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm of Finnish-Russian relationships is a sign of law (legisigns). Indeed, thought-paradigms are one example of cross-contextual regularities as sign types.

Uncovering the actual meaning of ‘observing Russia as Finns’ – the task set for this work – is a matter of seizing the movement between these sign aspects. On the level of Secondness (i.e. experienced, empirical reality) it is somewhat irrelevant to determine whether a particular sign is a sinsign or an instance of a legisign’s application – i.e. its replica. All replicas are sinsigns but not all sinsigns (such as peculiar occurrences) are replicas.\textsuperscript{81}

Social and political life involves the creation of replicas out of sinsigns. Peculiar occurrences may thus become habitually repeated and thus established as stable parts of political imaginaries – i.e. “lessons of history” may be habitualised as repertoires of interpretation. Indeed, this is how the turning of non-semiotic primary reality into a humanly significant, semiotic reality possessing some structure occurs.\textsuperscript{82} Besides individual occurrences, one level of political factuality can be found in the lawfulness or sense of regularity in the way in which meaning or significance is assigned to contingent events.

If the qualisign-sinsign-legisign trichotomy refers to the sign’s presentative capacity, icon-index-symbol categorisation touches upon its representative character – i.e. seeks to unravel

\textsuperscript{78} E.g. Peirce CP 1.480.
\textsuperscript{79} Wiley 1994, 143.
\textsuperscript{80} Parmentier 2002, 294.
\textsuperscript{81} Peirce CP 2.246.
\textsuperscript{82} See also Philström 2005, 114.
the ‘standing for’ relation. When a sign refers to its object simply because it happens to resemble it, it is an icon. But since icons do not profess to represent anything, they do not have any external meaning. A different order of signs is significant for the way in which it is connected to its objects – i.e. indices that retain a genuine existential connection with the surrounding reality. The Third order of signs consists of symbols. These depend on a conventional or habitualised rule; a symbol is a sign “because it is used and understood as such.” That is, the sign will be more or less certainly interpreted as denoting the object in consequence of some habit of thought.

3.7. Sign Theory as a Lantern: Uncovering ‘A Friend in Need…’

In order to demonstrate in practical terms how it is possible to uncover political facts in non-literal research material with the help of the above presented sign distinctions, let us turn to a cartoon entitled ‘A Friend in Need is a Friend Indeed’ (Kun hätä on suurin, niin apu on lähin) published in the satirical magazine Tuulispää in November 1919.

The drawing is evidently non-literal – i.e. its author would be unlikely to commit himself to the literal truth of the constellation. He would probably not insist that a sequence of events, where a young lady with a sword and a lion by her side is watching a snake devour a male character clad in a military uniform, has actually taken place.

If we, however, do not block the road of inquiry by stopping at the non-literalness of the configuration, but instead avail ourselves to Peirce’s sign theory to disclose political facts that it contains, we may learn interesting things about Finnish-Russian relationships and Finnish ways of ‘observing Russia.’

83 Innis 1986, 1.
84 Peirce CP 2.283.
85 Peirce CP 2.307; Peirce CP 8.119; Misak 2004, 9.
86 Peirce CP 4.531.
87 Tuulispää, No. 46, 14 November 1919. ‘Kun hätä on suurin, niin apu on lähin.’
While the short analysis presented below is meant as an example only, it illustrates how the notions of political facts that IR works with could be both deepened and broadened. It shows how drawing a political cartoon may actually amount to doing something, or how in drawing something one is doing something, and how by drawing something one does something.88 The cartoon is not interesting for its capacity to redescribe reality – and should not be analysed as true or false; instead, it is worth examining for the way in which it produces effects and creates political facts in that reality.89 This basic point of speech act theory can also be coined in pragmatist terms: the cartoon is best analysed as an instance of a process of resignification which is intended at solving a topical irritation and which, for these purposes, modifies old beliefs. Furthermore, the new interpretant signs that issue in these practices have consequences as they are acted upon.90

In the case of the drawing above, the thing done has to do with statecrafting. Since semiosis ought to be examined in terms of intentional human agents’ practical involvement in the world, it is legitimate to take as the point of departure that the drawing is a statecraft speech act putting forth a hypothesis about how to solve the dilemma of the vulnerability of the newly independent political community. Depending on how successful the speech act is, it may produce beliefs about how to secure its survival – i.e. what counts as skilled statecraft in Finnish-Russian relations. This belief may consequently be acted upon. It is for this task that the drawing actualises meanings unfolding from the chivalric equation with the Knight, the Treasure, and the Beast.

Intertwined with their statecrafting function, the young female and the lion are symbolic signs that stand for the Finnish nation and state in specific respects. They have this capacity simply because there is, in the Finnish political imaginary, such a conventional rule. At the same time they are indices because they compel attention to these specific political formations – the Maiden points to the Finnish nation and the Lion to the Finnish state and its institutions while the male character devoured by the snake singles out Russian Whites. The snake is a traditional symbol of evil, and knowledge of the historical context and the ongoing civil war in Russia enables treating it as a representamen of the Russian Bolsheviks. That is, on the level of Secondness, the joint sign of the snake and the male character stands for the Russian Civil War. Iconic dimensions are significant for grasping the meaning of this configuration. Were the Maiden realised as an endangered figure or the Lion as an aggressive one, the configuration would transmit quite different ideas about Russian proximity.

88 Cf. Austin 1975, 94–120.
89 Yurchak 2006, 76.
90 See also Brock (1981) for an argument that Peirce had a theory of speech acts.
In order to further appreciate how political facts emerge in the process of semeiosis, we may introduce yet another trichotomy. It deals with a sign’s relation to its interpretant. This involves characterising the set of signs either as a rheme, a dicisign/dicent sign, or an argument. The trichotomy corresponds to the perhaps more familiar division between a term, a proposition, and an argument. Peirce characterises a rheme as any sign that is not true or false. By exciting an icon in thought or imagination, it provides the “blank form” out of which a proposition can be recomposed. A proposition, correspondingly, is a dicent symbol or dicisign. Occurring at the level of Secondness, it indicates the object denoted – i.e. the subject of the proposition – and thus conveys definite information. Unlike a rheme, a dicent sign can be either true or false. It has two parts: one indicates the object meant and the other “represents representamen by exciting an icon of its quality.” Although it can be expressed in a variety of ways, a proposition cannot be fictional in the sense of depending upon what character somebody attributed to it, but instead it necessarily relates to “blind secondness” which has a real being independently of its representation as such. The argument, for its part, is a conclusion which does not leave the interpretant to be determined by the person to whom the symbol is addressed.

Working in this way, we may single out as the proposition of the cartoon above that the battle between the Russian Whites and the Bolsheviks is a battle between the elements (the bestial snake) and culture (the general). The former part of the sentence indicates the object meant and the latter excites an icon of quality. The proposition thus embodies a form of reasoning which points out the connection between the premisses and the conclusion. As to the conclusion of this drawing, its argument may be said to relate to the virtuosity of Finnish (non)involvement in the Russian Civil War: ‘The Russian Civil War is a battle between the elements and culture, it is beneficial for the survival of the political community not to get involved in it.’ What, on the pre-political level is expressed with recourse to the chivalric model-images (e.g. legisigns), concurs, on the disciplinary post-political level, with a somewhat “Machiavellian” conception of the dynamics of political life.

To reiterate, the chivalric cultural-historical equation or language game is rhematic – it is a blank form, a qualitative possibility that intentional actors may actualise for communicative and argumentative purposes and that can be grasped in its argumentative retellings which also bring into play intentionality. Heeding Alasdair MacIntyre’s suggestion, inquiry
into such argumentative retellings is geared at recovering a traditional element in the Finnish ways of ‘observing Russia.’ I have preliminarily suggested that the “Machiavellian” vocabulary of political dynamics can be utilised for the purposes of reconstructing this paradigm. For instance, the basic form of reasoning that links the premises and conclusions in the cartooned argument above can be carved out with recourse to the interpretative habit that reads the significance of events in Russia in terms of the “Machiavellian” notions of *fortune* and *virtù*. That is, the basic plot that gets argumentatively retold in actual speech acts relates to choosing what counts as *virtù* capable of managing the bad *fortuna* or preserving the good *fortuna* stemming from Russian proximity. Although an individual cartoon is only a replica of such more general arguments, the identified habit is a political fact in the sense that it underlines that what is said, drawn, written, or done about Russia follows some distinct and intellectually knowable lines. In this sense, it takes us closer to the task set for this work – articulating what it means to ‘observe Russia as Finns.’

The next three chapters provide a detailed analysis of statecrafting in Finnish-Russian relationships during the epoch of 1918–1930s. In these chapters, I avail myself of the above introduced sign apparatus to disclose in a detailed manner how political facts emerge on the basis of previous knowledge and as responses to contingent political dilemmas. Instead of seeking to merge that ‘which actually happened’ with ‘our accounts of these events’ my interest lies with the practices of active historical experience. This means that the focus of inquiry is on the ways in which (cartooned) signs generate ever new combinations in varying historical situations. The analysis is organised around the key figures of the chivalric equation. This also means that they look into statecrafting from slightly different perspectives. The first analytical chapter – The Maiden – turns to examine the ways in which the archetypical female figure as the Treasure is actualised to articulate the sense of irritation relating to the new political situation. The following chapter – The Knight – is focussed on claims concerning the kind of political conduct that would provide a way out of the problematic situation. Following this, the chapter entitled The Beast turns to examine ways in which meanings unfolding from the bestial symbol are used to characterise challenges to the political unit.
“Blonde hair, blue eyes, a fluttering dress and a figure as slender as a young birch tree. Who is she?” asks the Finnish Foreign Ministry’s website, and answers: “The answer is familiar to all Finns, but not to foreigners. She is the Finnish Maiden, the visual symbol of the nation and a key to the heart of Finnishness.” Indeed, the symbol of the young woman makes up an elemental part of the Finnish political imaginary. She is also an essential component of the chivalric language-game which is composed of “the knight fully armed, ... of martial adventures in strange lands; of castles with tall towers and of the fair women who dwelt in them.”

That is, besides castles and homes – which will be examined in the subsequent chapters – this feminine symbol frequently enacts the role of the Treasure in the cartoons.

In addition to being a “key to the heart of Finnishness,” the Maiden is also a key to the political imaginary on Russia during the epoch of 1918–1930s. The female symbol forcefully articulates the sense of irritation caused by the dramatic political changes of 1917 and 1918. This irritation, as has been suggested previously, brings to the fore the character of the epoch as the “Machiavellian moment” of Finnish-Russian relations. It relates to the task of ensuring the durability of the newly independent political community in a challenging situation where the old markers of certainty had dissolved. The feminine symbol supplies considerable dramatic and rhetorical force to the practices of political imaginary which, in such a situation, were geared at establishing the balance of belief. She has this capacity since she serves to, firstly, articulate what is problematic in the given situation and, secondly, to call forth heroic Knights capable of dealing with the present challenge. Working on this assumption, my task in this chapter is to examine the process of resignification for which the Maiden provides the embodiment of earlier knowledge and experience that becomes actualised for the purposes of solving the topical irritation.

In its conventional form, the symbol of the Maiden stands for the idealised shape of a political community. It may thus be easily actualised to call to mind what is required from a durable political unit. As an element of statecraft speech acts, the symbol represents what the
heroic Knight ought to be protecting from malevolent, intrusive forces. It is that to which one can point and say, “It is crucial for the survival and success of the political community.”\(^3\) The symbol of the Maiden thus replicates the traditional thought that although the defence of the nation is a masculine affair, the female body plays a central role in its political imaginary. In this sense, a gender game intersects with the chivalric language-game. It makes available for political argumentation a set of meanings conventionally associated with the category of women or femininity. Gender is detached from actual male and female bodies and takes the part of a more all-encompassing structure of signification.\(^4\)

In addition to evoking qualities related to the desired kind of a political community and its ideals, the symbol of the Maiden embodies another plot-possibility. In this plot, ideal qualities become lost as a result of external forces or internal weaknesses. Hanna Pitkin argues that the duality which is related to the category of women can also be found in Machiavelli’s account of politics. He characterised women as “beautiful, desirable as possessions, potentially the sources of the greatest pleasure for men. Women are simultaneously both virginal and passionate or chaste and potentially capable of sexual abandon.”\(^5\)

Given such a background, different female figures are well-geared for enacting the role of the Treasure in the chivalric language-game. They function as the object of someone’s quest that someone else can either give or withhold.\(^6\) If the Maiden is the epitome of the ideals of a political community, the corpus also contains a variety of Anti-Maidens who personify a political community that has lost or is about lose its ideals. The Fallen Woman is the most explicit example of these figures that are actualised to call to mind the characteristics of a non-durable political community.

\[\text{The cartoon on the left, dating from the mid-1930s, makes use of the plot of the loss of female virtues to criticise the treatment of Germany in the League of Nations. It does so to send a message about the exploitation of Germany by the European great powers, i.e. the Beasts of this configuration.}\]

\(^3\) Cf. Buzan et al. 1998, 36.
\(^4\) For gender games, see Fierke 1999.
\(^5\) Pitkin 1984, 110.
\(^6\) Ricoeur 1980, 175.
\(^7\) Blinkfyrén, No. 1–2, 1935. ‘Makternas moraliska tryck.’
This drawing is illustrative of the fact that although the geographical shape of the Finnish territory is often referred to as the reason for treating the country as a woman, having a female character as the country’s national symbol is nothing unique. Unknown territories have traditionally been feminised; they have been pictured as virgin terrains ready to be “inseminated” by the “seeds” of the colonisers’ and the explorers’ civilisation. The Roman Empire established the practice of representing conquered territories with female figures and the French tradition referred to classical female figures to evoke such idealistic characteristics as justice, liberty, and equality. Indeed, the employment of female allegory to symbolise a variety of political attributes and abstract concepts is said to date back to antiquity. This testifies to the fact that for the practices of political imaginary, the abstract sense of a sign is often more important than references to non-semiotic facts. The previously described dual plot-space can be said to undergird both the Roman and the French example; on the one hand, the Maiden functions as the representamen of ideal characteristics and, on the other, symbolises vulnerability and the subsequent possibility of conquest.

The cultural history of the Maiden of Finland fits this pattern of thought. The symbol emerged as the personification of the Finnish political community in 1781 when the country was still a part of the Swedish Kingdom. It has consequently been used for both purposes – to designate the condition of being conquered and to express the idealised values of the political community. During the period of the attempted Russification of the autonomous Finland at the end of the 19th century the condition of being dominated and exploited was frequently expressed by picturing an innocent young lady being raped by a bearded Russian chauvinist clad in traditional peasant outfit (muzhik) or being attacked by the Eagle of Russian bureaucracy.

For an inquiry into political imaginary, images of women that crop up in political cartoons are of interest primarily for the way in which they relate the thematic of men and

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8 Valenius 2004, 124.
9 Warner 1996, 18–37; also Apunen 2001a, 17.
10 Shafer 2002, 82.
11 According to Aimo Reitala (1983, 19–20), the first pictorial representation of the Maiden appeared in 1781, on the medal designed to commemorate the visit of the Swedish King Gustav III to Finland.
12 Russification refers to a set of events that were connected to the rise of pan-Slavism in Russia towards the end of 19th century. In the mid-1880s Russian and Finnish leaders’ views concerning the legal status of Finland within the multinational empire began to diverge. The policies of Russification were intended to bring Finnish laws in line with the legislation of the Empire. The first concrete step was the integration of the Finnish Post with the Russian postal system in 1890 and the February manifesto in 1899 marked the official beginning of the period of Russification. (E.g. Soikkanen 1983, 64–65.).
women to questions of international politics. In this work I am particularly interested in the way in which they do so in relation to the question of statecraft in Finnish-Russian relations. Heeding the logic of speech acts, cartoons are examined for their performative rather than constative characteristics; they are studied to find out how things are actually done with signs. In statecraft speech acts ideas related to femininity may, for instance, be evoked to express the contrast between the natural world associated with women and the political world of men, which is the product of human artifice, or to juxtapose the uncontrollable and the controllable. The feminine symbol may be called to mind to bring out the vices or virtues related to responsiveness to external influence or to contrast servility and subservience with self-reliance and independence.

I have organised the following analysis according to the iconic facets of various female figures in the corpus of cartoons. I treat them all as variations of the basic Maiden thematic, and suggest that the iconic features are significant in the sense that they outline the plot-space of the character – i.e. largely determine what kinds of political facts can emerge from them. I first examine how compliant female figures, Submissive Maidens, form part of political argumentation. From here I turn to the assertive, active and self-sufficient female figures and then to their fallen, corrupt counterparts. Finally, I study the ways in which the characters that I have designated as the Flirtatious Femme and the Endangered Maiden appear in acts of political imaginary. I am thus interested in how different conventional possibilities of meaning unfolding from the Maiden as a composite element of the chivalric language-game are actualised for communicative purposes in concrete situations that ask for solutions.

4.1. Judging Submissiveness

During the early years of independent statehood, the key challenge for Finnish politics related to the rupture of previous political authority and the ensuing need to lay the basis for a durable state. This challenge was intimately intertwined with the question of Soviet Russian proximity. Finland had been a constituent part of the Russian Empire for over 100 years. Finnish independence had been enabled by the demise of its autocracy and was followed by the Civil War with Russian involvement. Furthermore, a civil war also burst out in the former metropolitan country and thus further complicated the task of ‘fixing beliefs’ on Russia.

In its capacity to call to mind the ideals of independence and freedom as well as the thematic of conquest, the Maiden was suitable for considering a situation in which independence had been acquired but not necessarily consolidated. That is, the female symbol was well-groomed for expressing the concerns of the Finnish “Machiavellian moment,” which is why it crops up frequently in the research material and can also be thought of as key to the epoch’s political imaginary on Russia.
In early 1918, the conservative *Fyren* magazine, which was published in Swedish, actualised the archetypical Maiden in a configuration which redescribes the transfer of political authority from Imperial Russia to independent Finland as a coronation scene. The drawing is essentially a celebration of Finland’s independent position. However, it brings out the problematic character of the present situation. Its point is to elaborate on the perplexing situation where, in the words of a contemporary writer, Finland had “gained freedom from Russia with the help of Russians.”

Although “faith in anything good coming to us from the East had vanished,” independence had been practically given to Finland by the Bolshevik Russians. *Fyren’s* drawing refers to the Finnish tradition of loyal conservatism vis-à-vis Russia to make sense of this situation. The loyalist way of thought is embodied in the constituent symbols of the constellation – the submissive, obedient female figure and her dominant Russian counterpart. The drawing can also be read as a statecraft speech act; it enumerates independence of the political unit as the Treasure and takes issue with the thought of whether submitting oneself to authority is the best way of making it last.

Loyal conservatism evokes the ideas of J.V. Snellman, a philosopher of the Finnish national movement, according to whom “submit[ting] to the external force imposed by history,” rather than “struggling to annihilation,” was the best way for a small nation to secure its future. In the drawing above, the relationship between the Maiden as the representative of Finland and her Russian counterpart is evidently paternalistic. In this sense the two-tiered pattern of authority, whereby the multinational Russian Empire is thought to provide the *communis mater patria* for the Finns, lives on in the cartoon.

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14 *Nya Fyren*, New Years Issue 1918 (extract).
15 Aho 1918, 54 (diary entry 29 January 1918.)
16 Hjelt 1919, 28.
17 Snellman 1998, 147.
18 The thought of there being a two-pronged pattern of loyalty and belonging had been introduced by Finnish proto- and 19th century nationalists in order to legitimise the Swedish and Russian monarchies’ vertical power over Finland (e.g. Korhonen 1963, 191-207; Jussila 1979, 17; Klinge 1997; Manninen 2000; Apunen 2001a.)
However, the configuration’s point is to contest the Snellmanian tradition of conceptualising what counts as skilled statecraft in Finnish-Russian relations. It makes creative use of the habitually available form of reasoning to suggest that the Russian act of granting Finland its independent status was a malevolent move. The drawing proposes that – appearances notwithstanding – the Treasure given to the Finns by the Bolsheviks was not really a worthy object of the quest.

Lenin’s clothing makes this interpretation available to us by suggesting that if one scratches Lenin, underneath one will find a representative of Russian imperial tendencies. The ermine cape with its royal connotations calls to mind the Russian Emperor. Moreover, underneath the royal cape there is the familiar outfit of a Russian peasant man (muzhik) which was likely to ring a bell with the contemporary audience. These signs function like Lotmanian “memonic symbols” where long episodes of cultural experience have been condensed. During the years of Russification, the symbol of a bearded muzhik clad in a traditional peasant outfit had appeared in Finnish cartoons as a symbol of the Great Russian chauvinism which was held responsible for the oppressive policies of Russian administration. Actualising it as an interpretant of the Bolsheviks’ act of granting independence to Finland was a convenient way of calling to mind the possibility that Bolshevik Russia would try to reconquer Finland. The proposition of the drawing is thus that the Bolshevik decision to give Finland an independent status was as a cunning move intended to ensure Finland’s future integration into the Soviet Empire.

Although the Maiden of the drawing appears as a paragon of the female virtues of chastity and obedience, her vice is that she is malleable in the hands of the ill-willing ruler. Instead

19 See also the National Coalition Party MP Paavo Virkkunen’s analysis according to which “the leaders of the Russian revolution were not fully truthful when they acknowledged our independence; they only meant that Finland would become a ‘social democratic republic’ … By denying the existence and legitimacy of a large majority of the Finnish people they wanted to set up a red tyranny and a branch of the Russian revolutionary movement.”</p>

<sup>19</sup> See also the National Coalition Party MP Paavo Virkkunen’s analysis according to which “the leaders of the Russian revolution were not fully truthful when they acknowledged our independence; they only meant that Finland would become a ‘social democratic republic’ … By denying the existence and legitimacy of a large majority of the Finnish people they wanted to set up a red tyranny and a branch of the Russian revolutionary movement.” Waldemar Bergroth from the same party argued that as a small nation, Finland can only preserve its independence by allying with some great power – “if Finland now becomes a monarchy, it means that we walk out from Germany, jump into the arms of the Entente, fall into chaos and under the Russian tyranny again.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1917, 7 August 1918, 1821, 1840.)

<sup>20</sup> E.g. Lotman 1990, 110.

<sup>21</sup> For policies of Russification, see Polvinen 1995.

<sup>22</sup> For a similar view, see also Santeri Alkio’s (1922, 50) argument that “from our experience thus far we know that there is no party in Russia, no matter what the colour, that would not regard the Finnish independence with deep bitterness and would not think of reconquering the country. If Russia once again becomes a great power, destroying Finland will be one of its primary goals.”
of holding up the sword — the traditional symbol of sovereign power\textsuperscript{23} — on the pedestal next to her, the Maiden has joined her hands in prayer. This yields an interpretation that hope and anticipation, rather than proactiveness and open conflict, form the basis for Finnish-Russian relationships. Such a form of reasoning combines the bad fortuna conception of Soviet Russian neighbourhood with the thought of virtù as something else than subsmissiveness. It suggests that with the possibility of a Russian attempt at reconquest in view, the policy of submitting oneself to the will of the more powerful neighbour is far from good statecraft.

When the cartoon was published, Finland had just become an independent state after having been an autonomous Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire for more than 100 years. Unlike other minority nationalities in the Russian Empire, Finland had been a separate political entity. Having been a part of the Swedish Kingdom for centuries, it remained “Western” or “Scandinavian” by institutions and structures (e.g. the Lutheran religion, four-chamber Diet, developed local administration, extensive peasant landownership.)\textsuperscript{24} That is, the bond with the multinational Empire was provided by the Russian ruler instead of by a common language, religion, or culture.

This has been designated as the “personal factor in the political tradition of Finnish-Russian relations.” It is manifest in the habitual discussion on whether Russia, from the Finnish point of view, is ruled by a good or a bad emperor.\textsuperscript{25} Political cartoons resorted to the symbol of the crown to evoke this vertical relationship of political authority.\textsuperscript{26} In the satirical magazine \textit{Ampiainen}, the gaining of independence in 1917 as a result of the disintegration of Russian autocracy was expressed in terms of the removal of the crown by a revolutionary bayonet.\textsuperscript{27}

Similarly the previous coronation scene includes four signs that stand for alternatives to the thought that the relationship between Finland and Russia is

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\textsuperscript{23} Foucault 1990, 136.
\textsuperscript{24} E.g. Alapuro 2004, 87.
\textsuperscript{25} Apunen 1984, 21. See also Sami Moisio’s analysis of the discussion on the “Russian threat” which, according to Moisio, is motivated by the question whether Russia in the post-Putin period will be ruled by a good or a bad Tsar (Moisio 2007).
\textsuperscript{26} Apunen 2001a.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ampiainen}, No. 1, 12 January 1918. ‘Vuosi 1917.’
\end{flushright}
mediated by personal factors. They suggest modes other than self-surrender as the means of protecting the Treasure of independence. The book of law, the sword and the lion shield form a joint sign standing for the policy of constitutionalism, which had been promoted by the mostly Swedish-speaking liberals in their struggle for the preservation of Finnish autonomy against Russian chauvinist tendencies at the end of the 19th century.\(^{28}\) The liberals worked on the view that the law was stronger than the will of the Russian Emperor or government and stressed the might of the right in politics.

From its part, the symbol of the rifles brings into the configuration the activist\(^ {29}\) and their policies – i.e. it calls to mind the promotion of proactiveness, vigorous resistance, if not open conflict, with Russia. As symbols of assertive Russian policy, these items stand in paradigmatic opposition to the plot of self-surrender which unfolds from the model-image of the Submissive Maiden.

During the epoch under scrutiny in this work, the tension between assertive and submissive policies vis-à-vis Russia dominates debates on how to render the newborn state durable and prosperous. The “spirit of the time of autonomy,” which the Submissive Maiden may be taken as a personification of, is frequently juxtaposed with “the time of national self-responsibility” and “sense of mastership.”\(^ {30}\) Consider, for instance, a redescription of the events leading to Finnish independence which appeared in the book Suur-Suomen Koulu published by

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\(^{28}\) Belief in the law as the mediator in Finnish-Russian encounters developed as a reaction to the rising Russian nationalism in 1880s. The Russian government imposed measures which were interpreted to violate the integrity of Finland’s autonomous status. Some Finns thought that the best way to defend oneself was to resort to the force of argumentation grounded on a thorough study of the constitutional history of Finland. Political problems were judged in the framework of legal principles and norms. Moral and judicial arguments were thought to be more powerful than the use of power and violence. (Rommi 1964, 343.)

\(^{29}\) Cf. Lauri Hyytömäki’s distinction of the Finnish activism to three phases: The first took shape during the Russo-Japanese war and the founding of the clandestine Finnish Active Resistance Party which was targeted against the Tsarist power and copied its methods from the underground revolutionary parties in Russia. The second phase of activism developed soon after the outbreak of the WW I. The activists of this phase had as their objective the separation of Finland from Russian through a military uprising and German assistance and the movement gave rise to the Jaeger as well as Civil Guard movements. The third phase of activism, which Hyytömäki refers to as post-activism (jälkiaktivismi), took shape in independent Finland and was intended at securing Finland against Soviet Russia, assisting other Fenno-Ugric peoples, and protecting the social order against leftist revolution. The phase of post-activism is markedly rightist because the connections with the labor movement had been shattered as a result of the Finnish civil war. Hyytömäki argues that it is difficult to locate post-activism with any specific group but features of such phenomena can be found in the Jaeger circles, Civil Guards, and non-governmental organisations as well as in business life and state service. (Hyytömäki 1958a, 277–278; see also Ahti 1987, 10.) Osmo Jussila (2007, 181–182) has challenged the interpretation according to which pre-independence activism actually had independence as its target. He insists that it primarily worked toward the restoration of the autonomous status.

\(^{30}\) Jyväskylän Seminaarin Karjala-Seura 1930, 5, 8.
an activist group in 1930. “The Finnish people,” the book has it, “have developed into a free individual of history that takes part in world events.” The passage brings the moment of gaining independence out not as a fruit of loyalty but as an outcome of a process of maturation which ended the centuries long period of political paternalism, sense of dependency, and obedience. Here, the ideal quality of a political unit is identified not only in survival but also in active participation in world events; ‘she’ not only reacts but acts.

The right-wing activists, however, were concerned with the fact that not all Finns had properly internalised this goal. This troubled the authors of the cited book. In his retrospective emplotment of the events leading up to independence, the right-wing politician Lauri Santamäki condemns the revolutionary zeal which had “breathed new life to the spirit of autonomy.” Santamäki identifies as a false Treasure the type of independence which could have been acquired with Russian consent. According to him, the “Kerenskian sun of freedom [had] blinded many Finns from seeing the truth.” Reference to Alexandr Kerensky – the Prime Minister of the Russian interim government which had dissolved the Finnish Diet in the summer 1917 after it had passed a bill increasing the powers of the Diet – suggests that the unpleasant truth here relates to the possibility of Russian opposition to Finnish independence. To bring out the kind of previous experience embodied in the figure of Kerensky, we may cite a libellous poem that is said to have been popular during the epoch. It tells a tale about Kerensky’s imperial ambitions in terms of his attempt to bake a big loaf of bread where Poland would be the flour, Estonia the yeast, and Ukraine the sugar. Finland would be needed for salt: “Kerensky baked a saltless dough/ he wanted Finland to be the salt/ Oh, oh Kerensky, your wish is futile/ Finland is already free from Russian power.”

Santamäki works on a similar form of reasoning and argues that the conception of the Russian neighbourhood as a possibility or a source of good fortuna was problematic for the creation of a durable state; yet, some Finns insisted on seeing the “newborn Russia” as a friend and protector and forgot that “a Russkie is always a Russkie.” Indeed in materials dating from the epoch, “real liberation,” which was still thought to be accomplished, often enacts the role of the Treasure. In his memoirs, the activist politician Edward Hjelt also makes a distinction between “internal freedom,” which the Bolsheviks offered, and “real liberation:

31 Jyväskylän Seminaarin Karjala-Seura 1930, 5.
32 Paasivirta 1984, 52–100.
33 Haapala & Vuorisalo www-document.
34 Santamäki 1930, 119.
“then [in 1917] ... we were offered from the east inner freedom but not real liberation!” In these accounts, the Treasure is identified in the type of freedom which could only be acquired against Russian consent.

It is quite easy to find in the research materials statecraft speech acts which are motivated by the view that the communis mater patria and patria had not properly fused, due to which the dilemma over legitimate political authority remained unsolved. The symbol of the Maiden forms a characteristic part of the processes of signification intended to solve this irritation. Due to previous knowledge embodied in this symbol, she is handily available to suggest that the bond of dependency with Russia had not yet been completely severed and the process of escaping Russian paternalism has not been carried to its consummation. As another activist politician Elias Simojoki noted in 1922, “the spirit of autonomy,” or the "mental life of a slave” still had a hold of the Finns. “Contentment with smallness and poverty” was criticised by contrasting it to “the will to life and exertion of a sovereign people.”

Now let us return briefly to the previous coronation scene. In it, the dilemma which the Maiden expresses – i.e. the difficulty of making the political unit durable – is intertwined with the question of the form of government. Instead of the crown, Lenin is enthroning the Maiden with a bonnet phrygian – a traditional symbol of republican freedom which has its origins in the experience of the French revolution. Replacement of the crown in the coronation scene by the bonnet may be taken as an example of semantic innovation which produces a meaning-effect on the level of acts of (pictorial) language. Taking it into account allows us to grasp the configuration’s historical meaning – i.e. understand the way in which previous knowledge and experience has been modified for present, argumentative purposes. The proposition of the cartoon is that the republican form of government is something that Lenin imposes on Finland and that it makes the country susceptible to his will. It suggests that republicanism works against the durability of the independent political community. Similarly, the following drawing, published in Fyren already in May 1917, reverts to the bonnet phrygian to depict in chaotic terms the emergence of independent states from the Russian Empire.

35 Hjelt 1919, 28.
36 Simojoki 1942, 33.
37 Jyväskylän Seminarin Karjala-Seura 1930, 5.
38 E.g. Agulhon 1979; Shafer 2002, 83.
39 Ricoeur 1990, ix–x.
40 Fyren, Frihets & Pingstnummer, 1917.
In contrast, the monarchical form of government may be represented as a tool for containing the influence of Russia over Finland. As Senator Paasikivi later the same year argued, unless Finland adopts the monarchist system of government, "it cannot remain as an independent nation but sooner or later falls into the feet of Russia again."\(^{41}\) Here, monarchy is assigned the role of keeper of the Treasure; it is expected to make independent Finland impervious to Russian authority.

The labour movement’s Kurikka\(^{42}\) realised the emergence of Finland as an independent state in somewhat opposite terms. The drawing below suggests that the doctrine of the self-determination of nations which Lenin and the bolsheviks had evoked when granting independence, was well in line with Finnish aspirations. The form of reasoning whereby a cooperative relationship with Russia(ns) automatically amounts to submission is absent from the configuration.

To transmit another type of thought, the Maiden is not placed in a vertical but in a horizontal relationship with the representative of Russia, which suggests that the relationship is based on equality. Contrary to the previous illustrations, the acquisition of the Treasure of independent statehood is emplotted in terms of the Maiden’s maturing to an equal position with her former pater. This thought is explicitly spelled out in the caption of the drawing which reads "it’s tough to watch over a grown-up

\(^{41}\) Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1917, 7 August 1918, 1818; see also Vares 1998, 77; Ylönen 2001, 153.

\(^{42}\) Kurikka, 15 January 1918. ‘A iso flikuski paha holhomas...’
lass.” The thought of previous Russian paternalism forms part of the drawing but its form of emplotment suggests that the bolsheviks’ act of granting independence to Finland should not be interpreted as a cunning move intended at sooner or later stealing the Treasure away. It is an outcome of a natural process of development. The argument of the configuration is that Finnish and Russian interests can be complementary if not common. It presents continuity to the tradition of interpretation according to which autonomous position within the Russian Empire provided ideal conditions for qualities required from an independent political unit to develop. It may thus be said to be underpinned by the good fortuna conception of Russian neighbourhood.

The drawing was published by the labour movement’s satirical magazine Kurikka in early 1918, just days before the Civil War burst out in the newly independent country. After the War and the Whites’ victory, the Old Labour Party divided into the Social Democratic and Communist Parties. The nation remained in many respects split between the Reds and the Whites, but when it came to relations with the former metropolitan country, the social democrats tried to display a loyal attitude towards the new republic. They argued that they shared the same Treasure with the victors of the Civil War – i.e. an independent Finnish state free from foreign domination. That is, in order to become appreciated as “legitimate citizens” of the post-Civil War White Finland, the social democrats had to renounce allegiance to communism and condemn domestic communists for their compliance with Soviet Russia. This involved readjusting the view that the Russian neighbourhood could, in some form, be a matter of good fortuna for Finland. The idea of the benevolence of the Eastern neighbour lived on with the Finnish communists who consistently voiced loyalty to its present regime and promoted the adoption of socialism à la USSR in Finland. They held the Soviet system as the Treasure worth striving for. An illustration of this way of thought can be found, for instance, in the communists’ satirical magazine Paukku where the Finnish workers’ reaction

43 E.g. Palmgren 1948; see also Chapter 7 of the present work for more elaboration.
44 Heeding Juha Siltala’s (1985, 16) example, the notion of White Finland can be understood to have three simultaneous meanings. Firstly, it is a term descriptive of the post-1918 system. Secondly, it is an evaluative term used to assess whether the country was developing to the direction of the ideal set by the “war of liberation.” Thirdly, the notion designates the group of people who sought to ascertain that the ideals of White Finland were realized in Finland.
45 See also MP Ryömä’s argument that refers to Russia as the Finnish communists’ motherland and argues that the communists were trying to sabotage the social democrats’ efforts at integration among the working class after the Civil War (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1923, Vol. 1, 19 October 1923, 762–763.) See also Siltala 1985, 492. Vesa Vares (1991, 49) argues that despite efforts to display the social democrats as loyal and legitimate citizens of the independent, bourgeois state, a certain measure of ‘radicalism’ lived on in the party. Indeed, writings expressing solidarity for Soviet Russia were published in the Suomen Sosialidemokraatti newspaper – even to the extent of arguing that in case of Finnish-Soviet conflict, the workers would not go to the front and if they did, they would side with the Soviets.
to the fifth anniversary of Soviet Russia was described in the following words: “The proletariat of the whole world uncovered its heads; that day, it honoured the celebrating forerunner country of the proletariat and its brave people.”

Here, the proximity of Soviet Russia emerges as a positive factor due to the fact that the Eastern neighbour is in the avant-garde of political developments and thus provides a model to be emulated.

In March 1922 the genuflecting figure re-appeared on the pages of the labour movement’s Kurikka. The familiar constellation, with a vertical relationship between the Maiden and her pater, is adjusted so as to serve as an interpretant of the Finnish communists’ stance vis-à-vis Soviet Russia and to bring it out as servility.

In historical terms, the drawing is related to accusations concerning a secret circular letter in which the communist leaders had urged the Finnish workers to steal from their employers in order to materially support the Soviet Russian regime. The letter came to publicity at about the same time as the cartoon was published. At the heart of it, there lies the question of where the allegiance of the Finnish worker lay.

Now, the image of a submissive Finn in front of Lenin – the “Red Emperor” – was actualised to function as part of an argument that condemned the communists for acquiescing to the will of the Soviet Union. It is secondary to the development of the argument of the drawing whether the figure is actually a woman or not; the genuflecting figure easily calls to mind the theme of conquest familiar from the chivalric

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47 Paukku, No. 12, November 1922. ‘Viisi vuotta.’
48 Kurikka, No. 11, 18 March 1922. ‘Suomalainen kommunisti Moskovassa.’
49 See MP Lauri Ingman’s reference to the letter which came to publicity through the newspaper Suomen Sosialidemokraatti (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1923, 13 March 1923, 379.) The caption of the cartoon also makes reference to the circular letter: “Here would be some small things from Finland... The secret circular letter arrived so late that booty snatchers had time to collect all the better things...”
language-game. When emplotted in these terms, belief in common interests across the border comes to be condemned as subjugation.

This configuration is a perfect illustration of the way in which Peircean rhemes function as hypotheses within the political imaginary.\(^{50}\) It shows how political facts emerge in the coming together of semiotic and non-semiotic elements of political imaginary. If the cultural-historical equation – the “blank form”\(^ {51}\) – with the Maiden and her pater as the Beast had during the period of autonomy been actualised to mock the Fennomans for submissive policies vis-à-vis Russia, it was now applied to criticise the communists’ bad statecraft. Placing Lenin in the symbolic role of the Emperor and the Finnish communists in that of the Submissive Maiden provided a handy way of condemning cooperation with the USSR and thus distinguishing the social democrats from the communists.

However, in order to sustain some ideological integrity, the social democrats did not deny socialism altogether but characterised Soviet Russia as a perversion rather than the paragon of the socialist creed. Depicting Lenin as a corrupt figure with a spiky spectre in his hand and luxurious Cuban cigars by his side serves to suggest that Soviet Russia had turned into just as decadent and backward a political unit as the Imperial Russia had been. In contradistinction to Paukku, which saw on the Eastern side of the border a model to be emulated, Kurikka’s drawing suggests that there was very little worth striving for there.

### 4.2. Independent Being

The model-image of the Assertive Maiden provides an antitype to the submissive female figures in cartoons. In virtue of the iconic sign features of this character, she is easily distinguished from the bowing and genuflecting characters. In contradistinction, she resembles the active and aggressive young women with bonnets phrygien on their heads who, during the French revolutionary period, were used to evoke complete freedom and political activism.\(^ {52}\)

Against this background, the Assertive Maiden serves to characterise Finland as a self-confident political unit and to distinguish the present from the past political condition. She is actualised to articulate the changeover from autonomy to independent statehood.

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51 E.g. Peirce CP 2.272.
52 Agulhon 1979, 60; Shafer 2002, 83.
For the labour movement’s Kurikka, the model-image of the Assertive Maiden provided a convenient means to redescribe the emergence of Finland as an independent state from the Russian Empire. In the legend of the cartoon the Maiden is designated as a “suffragette,” which brings her out as an empowered character that resolutely follows her own will. In the textual extract accompanying the drawing, the present political condition is distinguished from the previous condition of being a “small and timid girl.”

Against this background, this Civil War configuration transmits the view that the bolsheviks’ act of granting an independent status to Finland was a progressive move and thus very different from the regressive policies of the Russian Empire. If we interpret the polar bear as a representamen of Bolshevik Russia, it seems legitimate to argue that in this work there is no relation of domination between Finland and Russia. Neither does the bear emerge as a threatening Beast. On the contrary, the potentially aggressive animal is carrying the Maiden, which suggests that it contributes to her project. The drawing is essentially a proposition in favour of the view that cooperation with the Eastern neighbour would contribute to the good of the Finnish political unit. It hence resonates with the form of reasoning which has later been exemplified, for instance, by the socialist thinker Raul Palmgren according to whom the inner development and progress of Finland was only possible in cooperation with its great eastern neighbour.

On the pages of the conservative, Swedish language Fyren, the Russian neighbourhood was characterised differently. All the three components of the chivalric equation are potentially present in the picture. The Maiden is the likely protectée, the muzhik with a whip in the background the threat. In the absence of the Knight, we might expect the older, maternal female figure – Svea Mamma – to act as the protector.

Here, the Maiden does not stand for Finland in its entirety, but rather the cartoonist has manipulated the sign’s indexical dimensions so as to issue an argument that relates to Swedish

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53 Kurikka, No. 5, 1 March 1918. ‘Itsenäinen Suomineito.’
54 Palmgren 1948, 15–16.
55 Nya Fyren, No. 5–8, 1918. ‘Ett brutet löfte och ett sviket hopp. (Det svenska finlands sång till moder Svea våren 1918).’
Finland. The bearskin on the Maiden’s shoulders has Scandinavian connotations, which sets the character apart from the female figure that usually appears in the Finnish national gown. She does not stand for Finland in its entirety but has her reference in those sections that carried on the so-called Svecoman legacy. On this basis, the drawing develops into a comment on the ambivalent position of Finland between two competing traditions of political authority, two contesting imperial traditions and cultural legacies – Swedish and Russian. The nagaïka whip in the hand of the muzhik evokes the archaic idea of Russian autocracy and oppressive power. It imports the possibility of imperial domination into the configuration and suggests that force and violence lie at the heart of the Finnish-Russian relationship. In contradistinction, the sophisticated – even aristocratic – appearance of Svea Mamma grounds Swedish claims of political authority on a different theme, on the force of culture and civilization.

However, the cartoon is intended as a criticism of Swedish policy vis-à-vis Finland, particularly Swedish Finland. The assertiveness of the Maiden is significant in this respect. It brings her out as a self-sufficient character and serves, on this basis, to suggest that relying on the promises of others is not good statecraft. This interpretation is confirmed by the title of the drawing which reads “broken hope and betrayed promise.” The poem that accompanies the drawing makes is all the more evident that it is motivated by a sense of disappointment with regard to the Swedish indifference and lack of assistance in Finnish political developments during the turbulent years 1917–1918. It also signals an end to the dream of Finland’s reunification with Sweden.

57 The poem, written by Rafael Lindqvist, tells a story of a young girl (Finland) who was separated from her mother (Sweden) as a result of her marriage with Ivan from the East. The mother, nevertheless, promises that the mother and the daughter would soon be together again. This never happens. Once the girl gets a possibility to meet her mother again, the mother does not recognize her.
The idea of unreliable promises also forms part of the drawing on the right. It is quite easy to identify two components of the chivalric equation in it: the Assertive Maiden as the personification of Finland and the Beast – a gigantic and dirty-handed representative of Soviet Russia. The configuration is a comment on the Tartu Peace Treaty between Finland and Soviet Russia which was signed on 14 October 1920, just one week before the cartoon was published.

The image of a determined female figure with a weapon at her side provided a convenient component for the bourgeois Tuulispää magazine to put forth an argument against the treaty which some rightist circles referred to as the “treaty of shame” (häpeärauha). This attribute served to juxtapose it with such chivalric quality as honour. The critics, indeed, characterised the acceptance of the terms of the treaty as acquiescence to somebody else’s will, pliability, and lack of will – i.e. as submission. Such political conduct was argued to contradict the ideals of independent, White Finland.

The Assertive Maiden articulates an alternative to this type of conduct. Her white armband serves to fix the reference of the female figure to White Finland while the assertive facet “excites an icon of its quality.” Although she does not oppose the peace treaty – “peace, alright” she says in the caption – she maintains a certain distance to him. Instead of genuflecting in front of, leaning towards, falling for, or flirting with the Soviet Beast, she refuses to shake hands with him. Similarly, the caption of the cartoon – “you will only get my sincere handshake after you have changed your ways” – expresses deep distrust of the Soviet neighbour. The neighbourhood of Soviet Russia is articulated in bad fortuna terms but instead of proactive containment, prudent conduct is suggested as the best way of managing it.

58 Tuulispää, No. 43, 22 October 1920. ‘Rauha.’
59 See also the conservatives’ K. N. Rantakari’s comment on the treaty: “With view upon moral values, a peace with the Bolsheviks feels dubious. ... Even a thought of it depresses and makes one ashamed” (cit. Vares 1991, 27.)
60 See e.g. the National Coalition Party MP Kaarlo Holma’s address at the Parliament (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 30 October 1919, 1344.)
61 Peirce CP 5.76.
The configuration may also be interpreted against the traditional practice of symbolising Finnish-Russian relations in terms of bridge building – a practice dating from the epoch of autonomy. The symbolic image of the bridge was then evoked to suggest that there exists a harmony of interests between Finland and Russia. It related to the form of reasoning according to which Russian proximity is a matter of good fortuna for Finland. The opponents evoked the same simile to voice criticism against the policy of concessions. They suggested that given the symbolic bridge between Finland and Russia, Finland was left unprotected against Russian interests and unguarded against its bad fortuna.62 Against this background, the previous configuration emerges as a message about a break with the past. Instead of the bridge, a barbed wire runs along the Finnish-Russian border. This enforces the drawing’s message that skilled statecraft was a matter of keeping distance to the Eastern neighbour.

4.3. Dangerous Trap of Friendship

The Maiden’s encounter with some male figure often functions as a catalyst for the unfolding of the plot where the Treasure becomes lost. The form of emplotment usually is that some initially charming figure turns out, on a closer inspection, to be the Beast rather than the Knight. The conventional background for the unfolding of such plots is captured by Choderlos de Laclos in his novel Dangerous Liaisons – a story about virtues and the loss of them:

Every woman who consents to receive a man without principles into her company finishes by becoming his victim. ... Every mother is at least imprudent who allows someone other than herself to have her daughter’s confidence. Young people of both sexes could learn here that the friendship that people of bad principles appear to accord them so easily is nothing other than a dangerous trap, just as fatal to their happiness as to their virtue.63

This passage captures the thought of close contacts and friendship leading to the loss of the virtues embodied in the female figure – i.e. turning the Maiden into a Fallen Woman. Similarly, the next cartoon, issued in Tuulispää in April 1920 plays with the idea of the Fall.64

62 Ylönen 2001, 81. For the image of “bridgebuilding” in Finnish-Russian relations, see also Rommi 1964, 344.
63 Pierre Choderlos de Laclos, Dangerous Liaisons.
64 Tuulispää, No.16, 16 April 1920. ‘Rauhanpuu keskellä paratiisia.’
The development of the plot takes place in the terms set by the Biblical plot of seduction. The female figure of the drawing calls to mind Eve – the paradigmatic Fallen Woman – whom the serpent seduces to bite the apple and who becomes held responsible for breaking the rules of the divine Arcadia. Such previous knowledge, transmitted by traditions of interpretation, may thus be said to be embodied within the constituent symbols of the drawing.

In topical terms, Eve of this configuration stands for Finland engaged in peace negotiations with the Soviet government. She emerges as an argument on the same set of events as the Assertive Maiden above. In contradistinction to her, however, the Maiden of this configuration is not prudent in her dealings with the Soviet Russian Beast. She does not refuse contact with him but seems to consent to receive him into her company. Although it would be possible to evoke nakedness to call to mind such idealised qualities as innocence and purity, this is not the case here; the nakedness of the female figure amounts to vulnerability. In an attempt to bring the cooperative policy out as bad statecraft, the Maiden is depicted as a naïve and clumsy character.

By calling to mind the Biblical plot, the drawing brings the independent position of Finland out as a paradise-like condition that, however, is threatened by the Fall. The paradise thematic is explicitly called to mind with the peaceful coexistence of the tiger and rabbit in the background. This configuration is a convenient illustration of the way in which political facts emerge when semiotic and non-semiotic elements are brought into articulation with one another. Topical political events are made sense of against the background of previous knowledge embodied in symbols. Casting the Finnish political community in these terms – as a naïve female figure about to turn into a Fallen Woman – provided an efficient way of sending out a warning that the ideals of an independent, durable state were being threatened by the present developments in Finnish-Russian relations.

In virtue of its indexical sign features, the serpentine Beast of this configuration stands for Lenin and, via him, for the present Soviet regime. Actualising the traditional symbol of evil and treachery to personify Lenin provided an efficient way of suggesting that the Soviet

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65 See also the Bible, Gen. 3:22.
contribution to the peace negotiations was malevolent and untrustworthy. The fact that the peace offer is symbolised by the legendary apple suggests that it presents a dangerous trap. Should Finland accept it, her fate would be comparable to Eve’s biting the apple and introducing evil into the world. Finland would follow the fate of Estonia which the Soviet serpent is strangling with its tail.\textsuperscript{66} That is, the Treasure of the independent status would be lost. On this basis, the drawing develops into an argument which elevates non-compliance with Soviet suggestions to the position of good statecraft.

Throughout the corpus the Fallen Woman continues to provide an antitype to idealised Maidens. Consider, for instance, the words of the politician Eirik Hornborg written in 1930 to criticise the right-wing Lapua Movement’s disregard for law. For the persuasive powers of his argument, Hornborg sets in opposition the Fallen Woman and the Assertive Maiden: “A majestic woman with a sword is transformed into a giggling fool that one can buy, who pliantly falls into the arms of the most powerful and the most presumptuous.”\textsuperscript{67} Unlike those feminine figures that evoke what is desired, morally valued and worth defending in the nation, the Fallen Woman brings out the political community’s corrupt facet. But on its own this figure is only a Peircean rheme – i.e. a blank form in the face of which we need to “open [our] eyes and describe what [we] see.”\textsuperscript{68} This means nothing more or less than submitting the result of abduction to Peirce’s pragmatic maxim and asking what the real consequences of the sign are – i.e. examining signs \textit{in actu}.\textsuperscript{69} There are, indeed, various possible ways to actualise the fallen facet of the female form. In the case of Hornborg’s words above, fallenness is connected to disregard for the law and legal principles, as well as to responsiveness to the use of force; on its part, Tuulispää’s drawing reverted to the fallen image to condemn willingness to cooperate with the Soviet regime.

With a view to the real consequences of this feminine sign within the practices of the political imaginary, it is interesting to note that images of the Fallen Women are remarkably widespread in the corpus during the epoch, particularly during the years immediately following the Civil War. They seem to be particularly well-geared for cropping up in processes of signification intended to solve the irritation which was caused by the irruption of the previous political authority and the emergence of competing sources of authority. In this situation, the idea of the nation’s dividedness was projected on women, or more pertinently, on what

\textsuperscript{66} For an explicit formulation of such doubts, see e.g. the Agrarian Party’s MP Juutilainen’s argument voiced out at the parliament when the peace treaty was discussed. According to Juutilainen “Russia will sooner or later render effective the map of the year 1914 again.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1920, 28 October 1920, 1062.)

\textsuperscript{67} Hornborg 1930.

\textsuperscript{68} Peirce CP 5.37.

\textsuperscript{69} Freadman 2004, 72.
femininity is capable of conveying in political rhetoric. What is more, the symbol of the Fallen Woman was suitable for suggesting that contact with “malevolent males” was to blame for the weakness. She served to articulate the persistent feeling that even though the Civil War was over, the problem which had caused it persisted. At the heart of these constellations lies the thought that defences of the political unit against the forces of bad fortuna are not good, certain, and durable.70

The wanton appearance of the female figure on the right allows us to identify her as a member in the category of Fallen Women.71 This interpretation is available in the iconic sign aspects that set the stage for the consequent development of the plot of seduction and subsequent fall. This implies that the deplorable state of the political unit is a result of internal passions; it is not to be blamed solely on external pressures. The female figure in the drawing offers herself up to conquest and mastery. This sets the cartoon apart from those drawings that date from the period of autonomy and describe Finnish-Russian encounters in terms of intimidation, attack, and rape.72 Here, the argument is that the political unit – or some sections of it – have voluntarily acquiesced to foreign domination.

At first sight, the drawing may be interpreted as a romantic scene. How does it develop into a statecraft speech act condemning Finnish-Russian contacts? The drawing actualises for argumentative purposes the idea of conquest which is so conveniently available in the plot-space of the Maiden. Due to the fact that the counterpart of the fallen figure is clad as a soldier, the drawing can be interpreted as sending out a message that despite formal independence, Finland was prone to remain to some extent occupied. The clothing of the female figure contains a hint as to the extent to which this was the case. This Fallen Woman is set apart from the Maiden who, clad either in the Finnish national gown or in the Svecoman bearskin, refers to the non-socialist sections of the society. Lack of any nationalist insignia may be taken as a reference to the Finnish socialists who – true to their internationalist creed – opposed nationalistic markers which they condemned

70 Cf. Machiavelli 2003, 79.
71 Ampiainen, December 1917/ January 1918. ‘Vuosi 1917.’
72 See e.g. Valenius 2004, 149–163.
as chauvinistic. That is the female figure functions as an index of this specific section within the Finnish political unit.

On the level of Thirdness or ways of thought, the Fallen Woman brings to the fore the fact that in post-Civil War Finland, two axes – non-socialist vs. socialists and reliability vs. fickleness – were intertwined in a way which enabled the division of people into two classes: those fully secured and those under permanent suspicion. The plot of Fall conveniently embodied in the Maiden was suitable for articulating this irritation. It suggests that national unity, which would mean erasing Russian/Soviet influences from Finland and rendering the political unit impenetrable, remained unrealised. The undercurrent of meaning is, indeed, quite “Machiavellian.” It implies that only by skilfully containing bad fortuna can the Treasure of the durability and prosperity of the political community be secured.

In political cartoons, a singular woman’s lack of resistance is transmuted from a personal to a political event. Easily seduced, the Fallen Woman becomes the figurehead of the political unit’s lack of resistance and a looming doom. She serves to articulate a form of reasoning where the strength of a political unit is measured by the strength of its weakest link – locus minoris resistentiae. Correspondingly, chastity is valued as a sign of resistance and unity. Against this background, the Maiden develops into a measure of the strength and durability of the metaphorical political body. Conversely, lack of chastity translates into the thought of responsiveness to external influences.

Resonances to this way of thinking can be found in the characterisation that the Agrarian leader Santeri Alkio gave of the social democrats and the communists. It is a statecraft speech act in the sense that these words can be interpreted as a counterargument against the form of reasoning which brings Finnish-Soviet Russian contacts out in a favourable light – as something contributing to the well-being of the Finnish political community. It points out the Socialists’ incapability of keeping the Treasure:

Although there is a lot of honest and patriotic folk in the social democrats, the socialist world view includes a powerful dose of ingredients that disparage and discard national values and that make the representatives of this ideology permanently unreliable when it comes to defending the fatherland and national freedom. Close to these are the completely fatherlandless communists whose policy has as its most important

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73 Reitala 1983, 114.
74 Cf. Siltala 1985, 33.
75 Machiavelli 2003, 79–81.
76 The president-to-be Urho Kekkonen (1980, 6) referred to this Latin formulation of the slogan in an article ‘The People’s Will of Resistance’ (Kansan vastarintatahto) published after the Finnish-Soviet Winter War to hallow the unity that the Finns displayed in the war. (Speech delivered originally 7 December 1943).
77 Pitkin 1984, 117.
objective cooperation with the communist government to destroy the independence of Finland.  

The passage illustrates the mode of thought whereby bad fortuna emerges from within the nation. The scene for it to unfold is set by the fickleness of social democrats and communists but external reasons play a crucial role as instigators. This mode of thinking is prevalent in the epoch's political imaginary; (Soviet) Russia is frequently held responsible for instigating such conduct that contradicts “national values”, which makes it an enemy of lasting and stable political order.

To express such views, the instigator of the Fallen Woman is, in the cartoon material, often clad in a Russian military outfit. In the previous illustration the seducer wore a Russian military uniform while the fur hat in the illustration on the left makes it easy to identify him as a Russian Cossack, a character which embodies cultural memory from imperial times when the Cossacks were a feared means of imposing Russian autocracy over the subject territories.

The drawing was published in the Tuulispää magazine which balanced being the mouthpiece of both the conservative National Coalition Party and the more liberal, centrist National Progressive Party. The title of the cartoon – of which the illustration is an extract – links the drawing with the Finnish Civil War. By evoking the more archaic cultural memory of the Cossacks to comment on it, the configuration comes to describe the Finnish Civil War in terms of an attempted conquest. The Maiden’s hug with the Cossack suggests that the Russian involvement in the Finnish Civil War on the side of the Reds was an attempt to re-establish the Russian imperial embrace of Finland. A similar thought of continuity is verbally evoked in the words which the writer Juhani Aho inscribed in his diary just a few days after the Civil War broke out: “new Tsarism will soon inflate the ‘tovarich’ and he will act just like before. There was no need to conquer Finland again because she was already in a conquered state and nothing had changed.”

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78 Alkio 1922, 51.
79 See also R. B. J. Walker’s (1993, 40) reading of Machiavelli’s Prince.
81 E.g. Ozick 2004.
82 Uino 1991, 322.
83 Aho 1918, 18 (diary entry 27 January 1918).
The Tuulispää magazine’s cartoon featuring the Cossack and the Maiden also includes another couple. A German soldier in his Stahlhelmet is shown in an embrace with a couple of female figures – Finnish, as established by the caption. The cartoonist has actualised the Fallen Woman thematic to put forth a witty comment related to the German assistance in the Finnish Civil War and the brief German orientation of Finnish foreign policy after it.

These feminine symbols are evoked for persuasive powers in an ironic argument that sees continuity between the imperial past and the short German orientation which was promoted by conservative political leaders largely as a means of protection against Russian imperialism and the revolutionary designs of the bolsheviks. They argued that the Knight capable of safeguarding the ideal qualities of the Maiden could be found in Germany. However, when the chivalric formula is organised around the model-image of the Fallen Woman, cooperation with Germany is cast in a sinister light. The German orientation starts to look like a continuity of imperial domination and Finland’s traditional position as a constituent part of some Empire. It hints towards the possibility that political cooperation with Germany would not be entirely beneficial for Finland but would rather put the country in a position where it could be easily exploited.

Although the non-socialists quite univocally hallowed the Germans for their heroism in the “liberation” of Helsinki from the Red troops, and any criticism of this form of cooperation was limited to small circles that promoted cooperation with the Entente, the possibility of becoming an object of exploitation also cropped up in the parliamentary discussion over the peace deal and the trade and shipping agreements with Germany at the end of May 1918. Johan Lagerlöf, a representative of the National Coalition Party, argued that even though the peace deal was necessary, the agreements included paragraphs that were harmful for Finland; they enabled “German big business” to exploit Finland for its own benefits. These deals were also argued to make Finland a “German satellite.” When emplotted with recourse to the Fallen Woman and the meanings unfolding from her, displaying gratitude toward the “liberators” does not come out as good statecraft; it contributes to making the political unit an object of exploitation.

84 Their Finnishness is ascertained by the caption of the cartoon: “The Miraculous Years of the Finnish Woman.”
86 Virrankoski 2001, 756.
The plan to elect a German Prince for the King of Finland was also interpreted as an act of surrender. In June 1918, when the issue was discussed at the parliament, the Agrarians’ representative Pykälä condemned the idea of a German King by referring to the present vigour of the Finns. In the present situation, he suggested, there was no need to “bow to the South and to the West and say that here we are, come and govern us. Now, if ever, we ought to have confidence and faith in ourselves.”

In a similar vein, Antti Rentola from the same party condemned a monarchy with a German King by identifying a continuity between the previous condition of being conquered and the most enthusiastic monarchists’ past political conduct. “A decade and a half ago,” he suggests, “[they] bowed towards the East and spun those bonds, spiritually and psychological available canals, along which the Eastern terror flowed into Finland.” In Rentola’s argumentation, monarchy with a German King would again contribute to making the Finnish political unit vulnerable to external influence and susceptible to foreign authority.

The *Fyren* magazine’s drawing, shown above, actualised the image of the Maiden turned corrupt to transmit the thought that the plans for a German King would imply continuity of the political condition under which Finland found herself during the imperial domination of Russia.

The drawing is in an interesting intertextual relationship with Eetu Isto’s famous painting *Hyökkäys* dating from 1899. The original painting displays the Maiden and the book of law under attack from the double headed of Eagle of Russia – the Beast of the configuration. In this capacity it also illustrates the centrality of mimetic activity in political imaginary. *Fyren’s* cartoon is thus an evident interpretant of earlier works fitted for present

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89 *Fyren*, Nro. 9–12, 1918. 'Mycket fritt efter Isto,' for the anti-German profile of *Fyren*, see Uino 1991, 323.
purposes. It mimics them for the purposes of intentional communication and, on this basis, issues a new interpretation of reality.

In a way evocative of the creativity of political imaginary – i.e. of its capacity to refer to new parts of the world – the bestial eagle of the previous cartoon does not refer to the Russian bureaucracy. Instead, it functions as an index of Germany. Similarly to Isto’s eagle, however, it embodies the thought of the bestiality of external political authority. While the subject of the proposition changes, the “icon of its quality” remains the same. That is, the basic idea remains the same.

In the cartoon, the structural position of the pure and innocent Maiden is occupied by the German minded regent (vaationhoitaja) P. E. Svinhufvud. Like the Maiden he is clad in the white gown but iconic sign features set him apart from the eulogised female figure. They get a different plot going. Instead of trying to protect the book of law, Svinhufvud is handing this traditional Finnish asset against foreign oppression to the Beast. This renders Svinhufvud a corrupt figure which, to a large extent, resembles the Fallen Woman who willingly enters a “dangerous liaison.” Against such a background, the configuration can be interpreted as a statecraft speech act; it accuses Svinhufvud and his supporters of promoting policies that would cast the Treasure of the independent position into jeopardy.

In contradistinction, those in favour of a monarchy with a German prince did not bring intimate relations with Germany out as something conducive to the Fall. Instead, they suggested that cooperation with Germany was the best available way to render the independent state durable. Support for this argument was sought from the German involvement in the Finnish Civil War, particularly from the “liberation” of the capital Helsinki from the Red rule. The writer Juhani Aho describes the arrival of German troops in Helsinki on 13 April 1918 in the following words:

They are all robust and agreeable men. Everyone acts in a solemn and civilised manner – like officers. What a difference between them and the Russian soldiers! Here we have the ‘West’! Clean and shaven. No sign of fatigue. ... Preserve their dignity even when chewing a sandwich. They must be quite hungry but still eat slowly and discreetly. It is evident that they are a first class folk. ... A world-conquering race.  

Aho characterises German soldiers with recourse to the qualities unfolding from the figure of the Knight. Furthermore, these chivalric qualities – culturedness, cleanliness, tirelessness, dignity, etc. – are attached to the notion of the West. This connects in an interesting way with

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90 Peirce CP 5.76.
91 Aho 1918 III, 208–209 (diary entry 13 April 1918.)
discussions over whether entertaining intimate relations with the West best enables keeping
the Treasure – a form of argumentation which more recently cropped up in the debates over
Finland’s EU membership\(^{92}\) and is presently being used in discussions over the membership
of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

At issue in these speech acts is creating a differentiation between a partner whose ‘touch’
transforms the Maiden into a Fallen Woman and another one who contributes to the pro-
tection of her idealised qualities. To return to the interwar epoch, if the presence of Russian
troops had only recently been interpreted to symbolise the position of the Finnish political
unit as a subjugated part of a bigger power, no similar interpretation comes out of the pres-
ence of German troops here.

As the year 1918 advanced and memories of the German-assisted “liberation” faded, also
the initially Germanophilic Young Finns grew more and more sceptical towards Germany
and started to promote a policy of neutrality in foreign affairs.\(^{93}\) The Social Democrat Väinö
Voionmaa came to associate the German orientation with an attempted conquest\(^{94}\) and in
1922, even the right-wing activists’ Elias Simojoki deplored the “Slavic and Germanic bur-
den of slavery” and a “drop of the slave’s blood that still circulates in Finnish veins.”\(^{95}\) All
these examples refer to the plot of conquest which the model-
image of the Fallen Woman
is well-geared for expressing.
To make the political point,
the slave-like, dependent, and
corrupted qualities unfolding
from the symbol of the Fallen
Woman are contrasted with
how the eulogised Maiden
should be.

Illustrative of symbols’ capacity to refer to new parts of the world in changing situa-
tions, the Fallen Woman as an embodiment of susceptibleness is depicted in the drawing
above running toward the representative of Great Britain.\(^{96}\) It comments on the situation in

\(^{92}\) Moisio 2003.
\(^{93}\) E.g. Paasivirta 1957, 331–332.
\(^{94}\) For verbal examples that evoke the plot of conquest to refer to the German orientation of Finnish foreign
policy, see e.g. Santeri Alkio’s comment in the Ilkka newspaper (11 May 1918) also Voionmaa (1919, 14): “Our
geographical positioning does us great favours. Our country is far enough from Germany to remain free from its
heaviest pressure, even in the case that the German period of conquest had become longer.”
\(^{95}\) Simojoki 1942 (1922), 33.
which Finland, after the defeat of Germany in the autumn of 1918, not only opted for the republican mode of government but also the country’s foreign policy orientation momentarily shifted towards the Entente that had emerged victorious from the First World War. The subject of the cartooned proposition is cooperation with Great Britain and, by connecting it to the Fallen Woman thematic, the drawing comes to suggest that such cooperation would contribute to making the independent Finland vulnerable. The military vehicle insinuates what is at issue in this vulnerability; it may be taken to imply that cooperation with Great Britain might get Finland involved in the Entente’s war efforts against the Bolsheviks.\(^{97}\)

The communists’ \textit{Tuisku} made use of the Fallen Woman some ten years later, in 1928, to retrospectively redescribe the events of 1918.\(^ {98}\) The grotesque female figure that the cartoonist has actualised resembles closely the Suometar-Mamma which had appeared in the Swedish faction’s, the labour movement’s and the Young Finns magazines \textit{Fyren}, \textit{Kurikka}, and \textit{Velikulta} during the epoch of autonomy mostly to criticise the Fennoman Old Finns and their policies of appeasement and conciliation \textit{vis-à-vis} the Russian authorities.\(^ {99}\)

The setting with the decadent female figure handing the Finnish flag to the representative of imperial Germany provides a convenient way of countering accusations according to which the Finnish communists were acting like traders. Political opponents suggested that their close cooperation with the Soviet Union jeopardised the Finnish political unit.

The point of \textit{Tuisku}’s drawing is to reconsider who had actually acted in a traitor-like manner. The Maiden, as an embodiment of meanings related to moral questions, was well suited for this task. When evaluated with recourse to the model-image of the Fallen Woman and the connected plot of decline and destruction, the Finnish non-socialists’ cooperation with Germany in 1918 comes out as something detrimental to the well-being of the political unit. Tables are turned and the ‘friendship’ of Germany is argued to have presented a dangerous trap that the non-socialists were nevertheless ready to accept. To emphasise this point, the Fallen Woman is depicted

\(^{97}\) For an account of such fears, see e.g. Korhonen 1966, 32–33.
\(^{98}\) \textit{Tuisku}, Easter Issue, 31 March 1928. ‘Kokomustien isänmaallisuus.’
handing the Finnish flag to the representative of Germany, as if giving away her independent position.

This configuration is actually a rare example of the Fallen Woman wearing the national gown. The gown is a symbol which here functions as an index of the bourgeoisie, and in the bourgeois dominated political publicity of White Finland fallenness was usually ascribed as a characteristic of the political left. Here, however, corruptness and decadence are connected to the White Finland. On this basis, the drawing develops into a powerful counterargument against the claim that the communists’ lack of resistance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union jeopardised the self-preservation of the republic. In addition to this specific drawing, the Tuisku magazine contains other examples where the patriotism of the bourgeoisie is questioned by personifying this political orientation with the figure of the Fallen Woman.100

4.4. From Moral Confusion to Victimisation

The fallen model-image may also be evoked as a warning that left unguarded, virtuous qualities may become lost. The Fallen Woman is a plot-gene101 – sort of a model – for the unfolding of the plot of victimisation. She calls to mind the way of thought according to which a woman, as Choderlos de Laclos suggests, “easily finishes by becoming a victim.” As a constituent element of that plot, the Maiden – or, more pertinently, the idea of maidenness – presents a challenge to the rulers of the state, and serves to articulate in specific terms the irritation that the subsequent process of semeiosis is an attempt to solve. In other words, she makes available for political argumentation the Machiavellian thought that “women have been causes of much ruin, and have done great harm to those who govern a city, and have caused many divisions in them.”102

The feminine symbol indeed provides a familiar means for characterising situations of political crisis. There is nothing unique in the fact that in the Finnish political imaginary on Russia the imagery of the decay of public virtue is employed to put forth arguments suggestive of the looming doom of the political unit.103 Michel Foucault has famously stressed that the disciplining of the bodies of individual subjects is connected to attempts to discipline of the wider body politic. And, as Iver B. Neumann in his magisterial study of the place of Russia

100 See also, Tuisku, 25 February 1928. ‘Isänmaallisen toiminnan vuoksi vainotut;’ Tuisku, 1 July 1928. “Isänmaallisten pulma.”
101 Lotman 1990, 67.
102 Machiavelli 1996, 273 (III: 26.)
103 See e.g. J. G. A. Pocock’s (1989) analysis of Edward Gibbon’s The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.
in European identity formation notes, there is a small step from this way of thought to the representation of one human collective by another.\textsuperscript{104}

In the corpus of cartoons, the Fallen Woman articulates one of the key dilemmas of the newly independent Finland. It suggests that the freedom and well-being of the political unit were being jeopardised not only by external forces, but first and foremost by the ability of the external force to make the political unit vulnerable from within. In this capacity, she came in handy for attempts to deal with the rupture of political authority and the perceived lack of unity within, which I have outlined as the key irritation of the epoch and have also suggested that the question of the (Soviet) Russian neighbourhood was intimately intertwined with it. In other words, the feminine model-image was well-suited for articulating the political dilemma associated with the sense of the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ being intertwined. Meanings unfolding from her suggest that the ‘inside’ had not succeeded in consolidating itself as the exclusive source of legitimate political authority. The imageries of human bodies were particularly well suited for this task since the body, as Mary Douglas has suggested, works as an apt representamen of any bounded system. This way of thinking of politics has long roots as it goes back to the way in which the physical body of the sovereign became the symbol of his political power over the state.\textsuperscript{105} The female body, as has been argued, does this in a specific way.

The thematic of adultery unfolding from the Fallen Woman model-image provided a powerful rhetorical trope for condemning on moral grounds political conduct motivated by attachment to what was now supposed to be ‘outside.’ Emotional attachment to something foreign served to suggest that the boundaries of the system were not fully secured.

At first, there seems to be nothing condemnable in the elegant couple cuddling on the park bench in the picture on the left. However, the sign of abandoned children imports a critical element into it supplying the drawing with dramatic rather than romantic force.\textsuperscript{106}

In this capacity, the configuration comes to capture the fear that the Treasure-like qualities of the now independent Finland – symbolised by the elegant clothing of

\textsuperscript{104} Neumann 1999, 70–71.
\textsuperscript{105} Douglas 2000; see also Kantorowicz 1997.
\textsuperscript{106} Ampiainen, No. 3–4, 28 February 1920. ‘Pimeitten päivien ajalta.’
the female figure – were nothing but a thin surface crust constantly threatened by a volcanic eruption.\footnote{The thought of civilisation as a crust was expressed by Reverend Andrew Mearns in a famous pamphlet ‘The Bitter Cry of Outcast London’ published in 1883. In it, Mearns produces a somewhat similar imagery: ‘seething in the very centre of our great cities, concealed by the thinnest crust of civilization and decency, is a vast mass of moral corruption, of heart-breaking misery and absolute godlessness, and that scarcely anything has been done to take into this awful slough the only influences that can purify or remove it.’ (Mearns 1883.)}

Here, the Fallen Woman is a mother who has abandoned those that she is expected to look after. As such she provides a convenient means for putting forth an argument about the dangers associated with cooperation between Finland and Russia. Identification of the configuration’s male figure as a representative of Russia turns on his costume; the corruptive lover is clad in a Russian marine’s uniform – a familiar sign of the Russian autocracy on the streets of Finland during the epoch of autonomy.

When Finnish-Russian contacts are commented on with recourse to the perversion of the ideal of a happy family, the sense of duty becomes juxtaposed with conduct motivated by passions. Domestic principles of obligation are evoked to deliver a moral lesson about the fatal consequences of a situation whereby the Finnish political unit does not constitute the exclusive object of allegiance.\footnote{Another, flagrant illustration of the sense of moral condemnation linked to Finnish-Russian affairs can be found in the diary of the activist Martti Haavio (1991, 192); he referred to women with Russian lovers with a doubly pejorative term “the Russkies’ whores” (ryssän huorat).} With view upon the task of disclosing not only what the text says but, more importantly, what it is about, it is interesting to note that this cartooned configuration may be taken to chastise not only Finnish-Russian relationships but also to condemn the good *fortuna* conception of Russian neighbourhood – i.e. a conception that has faith in the benefits of Finnish-Russian contacts at its heart.

Reference to moral principles as the basis of politics is, indeed, something characteristic of the political imaginary of post-Civil War Finland.\footnote{Juhani Paasivirta (1968a, 72) notes that the historical experience from the period of Russification and the “mentality of judicial battles” left behind a heritage of judging politics and political practices on moral grounds. Also, E. H. Carr in his *The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939* notes that during the interwar period, morality provided a convenient tool for those who wanted to critique the status quo. This way of conceiving of international morality is also coined in the first draft of the League of Nations, Article 1: “The same standards of honour and ethics shall prevail internationally and in affairs of nations as in other matters. The agreement or a promise of a power shall be inviolate.” (Carr 1968, 153.)} In the speech delivered at the bourgeois Finnish Party’s (Suomalainen Puolue) party conference in early June 1918, Paavo Virkkunen noted that “this rebellion [the Civil War] has to an unexpected extent revealed confusion in terms of decency, lack of social understanding and first and foremost a penchant to subject oneself to all sorts of temptations that emerge from aside.”\footnote{Virkkunen 1918.} Similarly, in a book published in 1919, the Agrarian leader Santeri Alkio presented a somewhat “Machiavellian”...
argument which can be taken to suggest that taming *fortuna* was a prerogative for the preservation of the political community. He did this by evoking the need to “master the wild passions and elements.” Still in 1925, the bourgeois Prime Minister Lauri Ingman reminisced over the “moral debauchery” that the Russian military personnel had caused during the epoch of autonomy and the Civil War. Keeping in mind that in order to grasp the meaning of an utterance, it has to be situated within the context in which it was fashioned, it may be argued that Ingman evoked the incidents some seven years back as an interpretant of the contemporary communist threat. More archaic experience was thus called to mind to suggest that the political unit was not fully secured and now the Finnish youth were susceptible to the propagation of Bolshevism:

> The Russian military personnel placed among us destroyed in many ways the morale of the people. Especially during the Russian revolutions and in the rebellion afterwards, moral concepts tended to become confused. Since there have been attempts to diligently spread and plant bolshevism especially among the wide circles of youth. This presents the most deplorable lack of morality.

Throughout the interwar epoch the thematic of morality continues to be evoked to comment on the vulnerability of the Finnish political unit. Moral standards provide a powerful interpellant of subjectivity; with them, a global ideological conflict becomes inscribed in terms of individual conduct. Poor individual morality is compared to a lack of resistance and high morals are said to be required in order to ensure the maintenance of the state. Morality plays, indeed, provided good material for statecraft speech acts. Casting political opponents as immoral figures conveniently brought them out as incompetent political actors.

In December 1934 the *Garm* magazine actualised the Fallen Woman for a comment on the Swedish author Moa Martinson’s visit to Moscow. The textual information that accompanies the drawing suggests that Martinson had participated in a writers’ conference. Impressed of the Soviet way of life, she had written a series of articles admiring the achievements of the Soviet system to the Swedish press.

111 Alkio 1919, 54.
112 Ingman 1925, 99 (speech delivered 12 May 1925).
113 *Garm*, 5 December 1934. ‘I Paulines Fotspår.’
This sparked a comment from the conservative Swedish language satirical magazine *Garm*. In order to bring Martinson’s admiration of the USSR out as something detrimental, it reverted to the Fallen Woman imagery. The drawing characterises Moa Martinson as an undignified, light-minded woman who is being sexually exploited by a Soviet *muzhik* Beyond Moa Martinson’s case, the drawing may be read as a more general condemnation of the view that the Soviet Union was an ideal society. There is something in the drawing to specifically challenge this view. The abundance inside is contrasted to the three hungry faces behind the window. This may be taken to suggest that what Moa Martison’s experienced of the Soviet society was a mere scene setting, and that the reality was altogether different.

4.5. Impenetrable Body Politic

The female body provides a familiar trope for expressing ideas related to containment, which is a familiar trope in political rhetoric. The symbol of a contained body alludes to political control whereas a penetrated one may be taken to suggest the loss of control. Think of the images of Britannica literally cuirassed with a breastplate, helmet, and shield to assure the impregnability of the nation against intrusion from the outside. If a contained body sends messages related to the durability of the state, a penetrated or easily penetrable body suggests that the durability of the political unit is in jeopardy.

The idea of penetrability which is expressed by the simile of a pregnant female body also forms part of Machiavelli’s analysis of political life. Contemplating on the fate of Rome, he condemned the “new families” – i.e. families of mixed ethnicity – for the reason that they exemplified the danger of “foreign growth” inside the body politic. As a result of the liberalism of the Romans, so many “new men” were born that the administration grew uncertain and decided to contain them, “Quntius Fabius … put all these new men from whom disorder

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114 E.g. Warner 1996.
derived under four tribes, so that by being shut in small spaces they could not corrupt all Rome.”

In the 1918–1930s’ Finnish political imaginary on Russia, the thought of insufficient resistance caused by the permeability of national borders is frequently intertwined with the idea of biological reproduction. This serves to suggest that despite technical independence, the influence of Russia persisted within the independent Finland.

Russian ‘seeds’ – comparable to the Machiavellian embryos of “new men” – were argued to be metaphorically planted on the Finnish soil. Unwillingness of certain sections to resist everything Russian meant that Finnish independence remained, to some extent, an unaccomplished affair. There was “foreign growth” within what was now supposed to be purely Finnish and this was interpreted as a sign of weakness. However, rather than as expressions of the Finns’ aversion of Russia and Russians, these configurations ought to be examined as counterarguments to the fact that some sections of the society continued to keep up good and intimate relations with the Eastern neighbour. If this proposition is accepted, it makes sense to make a further claim that, in the Ricoeurian sense, the Fallen Woman is about the dynamic relation between the good and bad fortuna conceptions of the Russian or Soviet neighbourhood.

Still, the idea that independence remained unfulfilled until connections with Russian elements were severed is widespread in contemporary materials. To transmit this thought, the gaining of independence may, for instance, be emplotted in terms of “the removal of reckless Russian troops [which] was vital for the independence of the country.” This ties in with the thought that entry and possession – be that sexual, intellectual or political – amounts to mastery. In the drawing above the military outfit of the male figure serves to fix as the subject of this proposition the possibility of (Soviet) Russian military rule over Finland. This interpretation is confirmed by the poem which accompanies the drawing. It suggests that despite the Russian decision to grant Finland its independence, the Eastern neighbour

115 Machiavelli 1996, 309–310 (III: 49.)
116 Hjelt 1919, 74.
117 See also Larry Wolff’s (1994) discussion on how the notions of entry and possession made a part of the Enlightenment’s invention of Eastern Europe.
118 Tuulispää, No. 47–50, 13 December 1918. ‘Vuosikatsaus’ (extract).
was committed to reconquering Finland. It wanted to take over Finnish “fields and forests” and “destroy the honour of Finnish maidens.” In short, Russian-approved independence was “a gift of Ephialtes.”

In several instances, the plots of permeability of borders and reproduction are connected with the familiar framework of interpretation which suggests that Russian/Soviet political conduct can be explained by the persistent tradition of Russian expansiveness. In a way of evocative of the “Machiavellian” notion of necessità – i.e. what one is forced to start with – it calls to mind the geographical position of Finland as the neighbour of such an inherently expansive political unit. The thematic of reproduction, and the way in which it is connected with women, provided a familiar trope for these purposes. In addition to drawings, written materials from the interwar period also include various references to the belief that Russians are an easily multiplying breed; they are described as being fond of sex and fertile.119 Consider, for instance, the story of “the extra wife of a svoboda-celebrating tovarich” which was published in the satirical magazine Ampiainen:

Wherever he [tovarich] shows up, he first acquires one or two ‘extra-wives’ because he is, if the judging ability of the Finnish woman can be trusted, a first-class lover. ... The svoboda-celebrating tovarich has made excellent conquests among the women here... Now we just have to keep an eye on when the façade of the skirt of his extra-wife starts to rise up... 120

Svoboda is the Russian word for freedom. In the newly independent Finland the word gained a wider, symbolic meaning. It came to store up the experience of the revolutionary year 1917 during which Russian troops and the Finnish Socialists – both stirred by the Russian revolution – looted around the Finnish capital. In this context, the notion of svoboda came to mean spontaneity, chaos, lawlessness, and violence.121

In the Germanophilic right-wing Activist publicity, svoboda was connected to uncontrollability claimed to be a racial attribute of the Slavic people and diametrically opposed to the kind of firmness that was embodied in Germany:

119 In his study of representations of Russia, Iver B. Neumann (1999, 70) notes that this way of representing Russians dates back to the 16th century; indeed, the poem of George Turberville from 1587 resonates with the Finnish ways of thought on Russia: “Perhaps the muzhik hath a gay and gallant wife/ To serve his beastly lust, yet he will lead a bowgard’s life.” (Cit. Neumann 1999, 70.)
120 Ampiainen, No. 21, 1917.
121 Haapala 1995, 221.
It seems to me that we need a different kind of freedom than the one that the Russian svoboda can offer us. It has to be built on a firm Germanic ground that is not dependent on Slavic surges of emotion.\textsuperscript{122}

These acts of political imaginary are attempts to disvalue a freedom that would have been acquired with the assistance or consent of the Russians. They are comments on Russian contributions to the events that led to the demise of the Tsarist Empire and, consequently, to Finnish independence and the Civil War. The Russian word svoboda literally means freedom but when it is characterised with recourse to meanings unfolding from the Fallen Woman, freedom becomes characterised as a False Treasure.

In May 1918, the Tuulis-pää magazine published the drawing on the right which features a set of pregnant female figures. It was designed to comment on the Finnish Senate’s order which called all citizens of Russia and the Baltic provinces to leave the Finnish territory.\textsuperscript{123} The drawing suggests that despite the departure of some 20,000 Russians from the country, the boundaries – symbolised by the weeping women – are not impregnable. The women remain emotionally attached to the Russian elements. On the level of political argumentation this may be taken to suggest that the bonds that bind Finland to its former metropolitan country had not been severed.\textsuperscript{124} When articulated with the help of the Fallen Woman thematic, longing for Russia comes out as a sign of the weakness of the political unit.

Although this way of thinking is particularly prevalent in the corpus immediately after the independence and the Civil War, it also continues to crop up at later dates. In a book issued in 1930, Professor Lauri Pihkala argues that “Russia is a danger to all its neighbours” and explicitly links the sense of danger to the theme of reproduction: “A Russkie breeds easily. ‘It is easy for God to create Russians,’ Suvorov is told to have said. ... [His] instincts

\textsuperscript{122} Hjelt 1919, 41.
\textsuperscript{123} Soviet Russian government hesitated in pulling its troops out of Finland because it feared that Germany would attack to St. Petersburg via Finland (Ylikangas 2007, 213).
\textsuperscript{124} Tuulis-pää No. 5–10, 17 May 1918. ‘Moni neitonen Suomen nyt ikävöi...’
are relentlessly expansive, he craves for land as long as he meets the sea.”

The idea of easy breeding intertwines with the idea of the inherently Russian urge for territorial expansion. This makes the neighbourhood of Russia a matter of bad fortuna. Realising the Maiden as a Fallen Woman provided a convenient way of suggesting that the Finnish political unit was unguarded against such attempts and of calling forth Knights capable of managing it.

4.6. Eastern Contamination

One of the consequences of the loss of control, reckless conduct and the lack of moral restraint is contamination. The trope of a diseased body is a convenient interpretant sign for calling to mind the problematic consequences of lack of resistance. It provides a rhetorically powerful element for statecraft speech acts. Placing foreign figures in the structural position of the agents of contagion – i.e. displaying them as Beasts – is an efficient means of putting forth arguments against the desirability of such contacts. Indeed, at issue in the cartoons displaying diseased bodies is not individual health but the metaphorical health of the political community. They serve to suggest that in its present form, the political unit is not Treasure-like, or is at the very least about to lose its ideal characteristics. That is, the diseased body articulates the irritating political problem that requires a solution.

In these accounts, the nation is not imagined as an aggregation of individuals but as a holistic social organism to which its various parts are subordinated. Due to this, what begins most intimately – in the private travails of individual flesh – may end in the devastation of the whole political community. Consequently, a moral burden related to the survival of the community is placed on individual shoulders. Individual desires, passions, and interests are condemned and an emphasis is put on collective self-discipline, order and control.

The model-image of a wounded, parasite-stricken, or otherwise marked female figure provides a persistent thematic to the political imaginary on Russia throughout the epoch. Most frequently, however, it is evoked to make sense of the events of the Finnish Civil War and the involvement of Russia in it. When described with recourse to this particular model-image, the internal war becomes emplotted as an outcome of a contagion spreading from the

125 Jyväskylän Seminaarin Karjala-Seura 1930, 12.
127 E.g. Alkio (1919, 79, 82) “personal benefits, cravings, and hobbies are the general guiding principle nowadays. ... Sexual passions are the besetting sin of our epoch. But I know people who have started an ardent war against their desires and won. ... Passions can be conquered, they can be restrained to their natural confines. ... It is self-discipline. ... Sometimes, when one examines the national Finnish life in its great features, one may detect in it lack of willpower in suspicious amounts. And yet, willpower is not more difficult to develop than physical power.”
outside. Simultaneously, the possibility of the conflict having been motivated, for instance, by unequal social conditions at home is silenced. This is put explicitly by the Swedish People’s Party MP Procopé, according to whom “the most important reason for the Red fury was not the social conditions or defects in the society but the contagion from Russia.” In a similar vein, the Agrarian leader Santeri Alkio evoked the image of a dangerously contaminated body in a verbal account in 1919. He suggested that the “supernatural cruelty” and “the mental life of a murderer” that the Finnish social democrats displayed during the Civil War were caused by “the spread of a mental plague from Russia. Yes, the plague of revolution.” A particular kind of a political fact emerges when the events of the Civil War are described in these terms. The attempted revolution as an effort to change the political situation at home starts to look like an external attack on a vulnerable political unit.

There is nothing explicitly Russian in the configuration on the left. The question of Russian neighbourhood is, nevertheless, present in it. The caption of the drawing reads: “the Harvest of ‘Svaboda’ ... Domestic ‘Svaboda.’” In this way, it fixes Russian involvement in Finnish affairs as the subject of the proposition which has disease as its theme. The term svoboda takes care of establishing this connection. The Eastern neighbour is placed in the structural position of the agent of contagion. Similarly with the previous illustration, this configuration also plays with the thought of whether Russian assisted freedom could actually contribute to the durability of the Finnish political unit.

When svoboda is described as an agent of contagion, the answer is obviously no. The proposition that comes out from the configuration is that contact with Russians may constitute an existential threat against the Finnish political unit. It may make it sick and, eventually, end up draining it of life-force. The drawing is a statecraft speech act in the sense that in addition to pointing out the challenge to the metaphorical health of the political unit, it suggests a way out. Indeed, the simile of a rigorous female with the fine-toothed comb – a traditional symbol of cleanliness – in her hand is well geared for transmitting thoughts about skilled statecraft. It serves to suggest that rigorous political conduct and firm control were required in order to make the country viable for the future.

129 Alkio 1919, 68.
130 Ampiainen, No. 20, 5 October 1918. ’Svabodan elonkorjuu... kotoinen elonkorjuu.’
Simultaneously, it serves to characterise as bad statecraft less vigorous measures and conciliatory policies.

The imagery of the diseased body politic crops us most frequently in cartoons published immediately after the Civil War. It seems that they are well-suited for contemplating the topical dilemma caused by the rupture of the old political authority and Russian contribution in it. That is, independence had been acquired with the help of Russian bolsheviks who started to promote world revolution and were involved in the Finnish Civil War on the side of the Reds that eventually lost the war. To make sense of this irritation, Russia is in several instances identified as the source of contamination for a variety of diseases. The writer Juhani Aho, for instance, blames Russian contamination for “becoming unruly, madness ... going crazy, ... fever that sparks even in the most sound organism as a result of external instigation, ... poisoning, hypnosis, intoxication.”

The thought of contamination worked against the idea that the Civil War resulted from the fact that there were injustices within the Finnish society that the Red revolutionaries wanted to correct. Instead, it served to project the blame onto Russia. Characterising social struggle as a foreign disease served to drain it of all legitimacy. Illustrative of this way of thinking is a poem which the Tiulispää magazine published in December 1918 and which characterises the Civil War as a “plague” and “diarrhoea” spreading to Finland from the East and from “the murky waters of the river Neva.”

Although recourse to the imagery of the diseased body politic is most widespread in the cartoon material dating from the first years of independence, similar emplotments can be identified on subsequent occasions. In a book published in 1930, Lauri Santamäki characterises the Civil War as an event where “fraternising with Russians” led to “transmission of filth to the Finnish national body” and “tied Finland more firmly to Russia.” The point of this passage is that friendly relations with Russians contributed to the vulnerability of the political unit and thus worked against its independence. Identifying the Treasure and pointing out a challenge against it, this verbal passage thus follows the logic of statecraft speech acts.

Disease imagery seems to enact a double move in the practices of political imaginary. First, it uncovers a threat and points out a challenge to the body politic – i.e. it “creates a sense of dis-ease over future conditions.” Second, it provides a therapeutic discourse by pointing

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131 Aho 1918, 30 (diary entry 28 January 1918).
132 Juhani Aho [1918, 30 (diary entry 28 January 1918)] also touches upon this question in the above-mentioned diary excerpt – “there arouses a soulsearching question, is this just rioting, madness and Russian contamination or were the defects really so big that removing them with normal means was so impossible that there just was no other possibility to reach more tolerable conditions?”
133 Tiulispää, No. 47–50, 13 December 1918. ’Vuosikatsaus.’
134 Santamäki 1930, 119.
out a cure or vaccination against the debilitating condition.\textsuperscript{136} In the research material, this ‘healing process’ frequently has as its declared goal the restoration of law and order, which can be singled out as one specific way of actualising the Treasure. Law and order come out as that to which one can point and say “it is crucial for the survival and success of the political community.”\textsuperscript{137} Indeed, the ‘health of the public realm’ may be even described as the highest law – “\textit{salus rei publicae – suprema lex},” as Rafael Erich articulated it.\textsuperscript{138} In 1922, the Agrarian politician Santeri Alkio singled out obeying “correct moral ideals” as the best way to “reach the ideal of purity” which would “prevent the people from falling into disgrace.”\textsuperscript{139} It is worth noting how meanings unfolding from the chivalric language-game – e.g. honour and morality – form part of these statecraft speech acts.

In the early 1920s the process of purification was extended to the Finnish army which, akin to the body politic, was described as being infected by Russian elements. Contaminated elements were identified in the ‘officers of the Tsar’ (\textit{tsaaarinupseerit}), and the right wing activists’ Elmo E. Kaila spoke eagerly in favour of removing such “un-national” elements from the military and characterised this undertaking as “another liberation war.”\textsuperscript{140} The Agrarians’ Santeri Alkio also perceived a danger in the officers of the Tsar and wrote about them along lines that resemble Machiavelli’s account of the “new men from whom disorder derived.”\textsuperscript{141} In his account the officers, who had received their training in the armed forces of imperial Russia, sometimes had Russian wives, and who often spoke Russian at home, represented the “penetration of alien Russian spirit” and “an aching rot to be uprooted” from the national body.\textsuperscript{142} The possibility that something Russian continued to represent an object of attachment or source of authority for a part of the population was thus singled out as something problematic.

\textsuperscript{136} Sharp 2000, 99.
\textsuperscript{137} Cf. Buzan et al. 1998, 36.
\textsuperscript{138} Erich 1917, 6.
\textsuperscript{139} Alkio 1922, 73.
\textsuperscript{140} Kaila cit. Karemaa 1998, 149.
\textsuperscript{141} Machiavelli 1996, 309–310 (III: 49.)
\textsuperscript{142} Alkio 1920.
4.7. The Maiden Meets the Knight

The Fallen Woman dominates the practices of political imaginary during the first years of independence; meanings unfolding from her are actualised to come to terms and to present solutions to the irritation caused by the present political situation. Even though she appears less frequently towards the 1930s, conceptions concerning skilled statecraft continue to be articulated against the idea of vulnerability that the fallen figure expresses. Despite a relative consensus over the source of ‘dis-ease,’ there is conflict over the suitable therapy. To illustrate, reflective of the political centre’s conciliatory line, Santeri Alkio evoked the idea of fallenness to argue that in order to avoid another political conflict, a new understanding of the society and its fellow citizens would have to be formulated. “So that no human being is left wandering alone, on his own, so that he becomes bitter, falls, and becomes the enemy of the society.” Here, national unity is singled out as the Treasure whose survival is crucial for the survival of the political unit.

However, the political right and the right-wing activists particularly characterised the centre’s conciliatory line as laxness in the face of the looming threat and suggested that only the exercise of tough discipline could make the political unit less vulnerable. Illustrative of this is the way in which an article published in the activists’ Suomalainen Suomi magazine in 1932 calls for self-discipline and argues that “armour of the will” is needed to guard the nation against “false instincts.” It suggests that by leading a disciplined life and suffocating his or her own desires, an individual citizen could become an embodiment of the “idea of the state” (valtakunta-ajatus). The idea of being cuirassed links the expression to the chivalric language-game and to the figure of the Knight to be examined more in detail in subsequent chapters.

The Fallen Woman is also linked to the chivalric grid through her function of establishing a setting for the chevalier to demonstrate his “grandeur, courage, sobriety, and strength.” This way of conceptualising political life can also be found in Machiavelli’s writings. In them, women are frequently depicted as a danger to the state’s well-being not only because of their vulnerability, but also because they are invested with other men’s sense of honour. When it comes to the Finnish political imaginary on Russia, a similar thought can be found, for instance, in the words that the activist poet P. Mustapää published in 1930: “If a Russkie grates your sister, mother or wife; if your fatherland is threatened by slavery; if the high values

143 Alkio 1922, 64.
144 Leinonen 1932, 7, 11.
146 Pitkin 1984, 118.
of your nation and humankind are in danger, hit unhesitatingly, hit by might and main." They reference to the Fallen Woman – i.e. set of women being exploited by Russians – serves to assign legitimacy to proactive rather than prudent action vis-à-vis the Eastern neighbour. It brings it out as good statecraft.

In his magisterial study of heroism, Joseph Campbell makes a similar point. He argues that the hero is a personage of exceptional gifts but that in order to bring these gifts out, the world in which the potential hero lives has to be depicted as suffering from a symbolical deficiency. "In fairy tales this may be as slight as the lack of a certain golden ring, whereas in apocalyptic vision the physical and spiritual life of the whole earth can be presented as fallen, or on the point of falling, into ruin." In the political imaginary of Finnish-Russian relationships it is often the figure of the Fallen Woman that fulfills this function. Given the conventional background of meanings associated with femininity, she is well suited for articulating the irritation related to the present political situation. That is, the female image serves to suggest that in some sense the newly independent political unit was not Treasure-like and something had to be done. Such a thought was verbally expressed by Santeri Alkio who argued that "a new epoch will start, when the heroic mind discovers for itself deeds worth undertaking in the battle against those sins that the criminal tidal wave of the World War pushed here." Had Alkio wanted to express this visually, the Fallen Woman would have been available in the political imaginary to express the idea of the political unit that had "sinned." Furthermore, the Knight would have provided a suitable visual expression for the "heroic mind".

4.8. The Flirtatious Femme

If the Fallen Woman expresses dangers related to cooperation with foreign elements, the corpus also contains a set of female figures that comment on the possible benefits of cooperative politics. Let us designate this group of Maidens with the notion of the Flirtatious Femme. They bring to the fore the calculative aspects of international cooperation. Calculativeness distinguishes this figure from her Fallen counterpart that acts on the basis of passions, i.e. something uncontrollable. The Flirtatious Femme works on the thought – also available in the gender game – that femininity

147 Mustapää 1930, 312.
148 Campbell 1968, 37.
149 Alkio 1919, 59.
does not necessarily signify frailty before masculine wiles and blandishments. The female figure may also be a calculating character, one seeking an ideal partner in order to guarantee her own well-being.

In political rhetoric, these possibilities of meaning unfolding from the Maiden may be actualised to discuss the traditional dilemma of Finnish foreign policy – to ally or not to ally and where to find the most suitable partner? It is in this capacity that the Femme makes part of argumentation over the best way to guarantee the survival of the political unit amidst rival claims for political cooperation. It is interesting also to take a note of the way in which the Flirtatious Femme recently cropped up in a commentary on Finnish political conduct before the bolshevik revolution and the gaining of independence. The historian Henrik Meinander actualised her in his argument that without the Bolshevik Revolution and the birth of the Soviet Union, there would not have been an independent Finland. And if the Whites had conquered the bolsheviks, the Finnish independence would have been very short. “The Finland that constantly flirted with the West would have been way too near to St. Petersburg to be given an independent status.”

It is in virtue of her calculativeness that the Flirtatious Femme differs from the Fallen Woman whose openness to foreigner influences necessarily has bad consequences. In contradistinction to the Submissive Maiden that provides another means for expressing dangers related to contacts with other political units, the Flirtatious Femme crops up in arguments playing with the thought that “splendid isolation” does not necessarily count as good statecraft.\footnote{Meinander 2003.}

The challenge of finding a cooperative relationship that would not contradict the Treasure of newly acquired independence was acute in the newly independent country after the Civil War. The Flirtatious Femme can be examined as an answer to this dilemma. Something similar was explicitly expressed in a quotation from the right wing activist politician Erik Grotenfelt dating from the spring of 1918. It suggests that only by actively seeking an alliance with Germany would Finland be able to secure its survival:

A people cannot isolate itself from the others. At least not a small state with a mission in world history. It has to aspire at an alliance with that power bloc which has similar interests with it. ... It becomes clear from what has been said about the relations between Finland and Germany during the World War that if Finland wants to

\footnote{See e.g. the National Coalition Party MP Théodor Hémon’s critique of the policy of splendid isolation: “When it comes to foreign policy, do we want to live in some sort of splendid isolation, separated from other white peoples. It might so happen that this isolation will turn out to be anything but splendid and will finally lead our country to the greatest dangers.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 30 October 1919, 1371).}
remain an independent state, it has to join the Central European alliance. Otherwise the Finns fail the task of being a vanguard; they pull destruction upon themselves. Just like the Finnish Red Guard did. Otherwise have the sacred victims of the war of liberation been worthless.\footnote{Grotenfelt 1918, 4.}

After Germany fell, potential partners were sought elsewhere. In November 1919\footnote{Ampiainen, No. 22, 8 November 1919. ‘Suomi ryssäläisten intressien ympäröimänä.’} the \textit{Ampiainen} magazine closely connected to the National Coalition Party issued a drawing where the Flirtatious Femme is coquetting amidst a set of competing partners.

The rival suitors around the female figure function as indices that refer to different historical Russias. On the left there are Trotsky and Tchicherin who represent Bolshevik Russia while the characters on the right – General Judenitsh and another unidentified general – stand for White Russia. Here, the chivalric equation is actualised for the purpose of evaluating the challenge that the on-going Russian Civil War posed for skilled statecraft in Finland.

The suitors are interpretant signs of the suggestions of cooperation that both the Bolsheviks and the Russian Whites had made to the Finns. The palm leaf in the hand of the kneeling Bolshevik stands for the Soviet government’s peace offer whereas the sign of the Russian Whites on their knees points to the fact that simultaneously the Whites were asking for assistance in interventions to the Bolshevik-ruled St. Petersburg.\footnote{See e.g. the National Coalition Party MP Kaarlo Holma’s address at the parliament which makes reference to requests of help by both General Judenitsh and Admiral Koltskhak (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 30 October 1919, 1342.)}

The symbols of the gallows and the church in the background are crucial for the development of the actual argument of the drawing. With their help, the blank form of proposition turns into a statecraft speech act intended at contesting the political competence of those who promoted either peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks or assistance to the Russian Whites in their operations. Suspicion towards the right intentions of the White suitors is
expressed with the symbol of the Orthodox Church in the background. It calls to mind the White Russians’ creed “Russia, one and indivisible” and the accompanying tradition of referring to Russia as the Third Rome – a political conception which is firmly tied to imperialistic and expansive policies. The cartooned configuration may thus be treated as a response to concerns over the White Russians’ refusal to issue any guarantees for Finnish independence, even in the case of cooperation. The Bolsheviks are not faring any better as potential partners. The gallows behind them as well as the knife in the hand of Trotsky evoke terror and death. On this basis, the configuration develops into a proposition that cooperation with either the Bolsheviks or the White Russians would jeopardise the durability of the Finnish political unit. This interpretation would also be available in the iconic sign aspects. These ragged, worn-out figures are easily distinguished from how the Knight should look like.

By early 1920, the Whites had been defeated and the Bolsheviks had secured their position as the rulers of Russia. The Flirtatious Femme reappeared on the cover of Ampiainen to make sense of the new situation. It was now fitted for the purpose of evaluating the new direction of Finnish foreign policy – i.e. the Border States policy (reunavaltiopolitiikka) – which was suggested as the best way of securing the independence of Finland and a set of other states that had emerged as independent from the Russian Empire.

To bring out this policy vis-à-vis Soviet Russia as skilled statecraft, the representatives of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland were pictured as attractive, polite, and refined suitors, as Knights. In virtue of such iconic features, these figures are distinguished from the competing, jealous suitor in the background who

156 See e.g. the Agrarian Party MP Vilkku Joukahainen’s address at the Parliament (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 30 October 1919, 1343.) See also Polvinen 1987, II, 155.
157 See e.g. the National Coalition Party MP Theodor Homén’s speech at the Parliament evoking the Fall: “Bolshevism equals forestalling all productive work and destroying cultural achievements accumulated during centuries, which means that peace with Bolsheviks would be anything but return to peaceful work.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 30 October 1919, 1371)
158 Ampiainen, No. 2, 31 January 1920. ‘Suomertaren kosijat.’
represents Bolshevik Russia. On this basis, the drawing develops into a comment on the fact that Bolshevik Russia had expressed discontent with the Border States’ plans. As a ragged and hostile-appearing figure, he calls to mind the qualities of the Beast. Similarly with the previous cartoon, the symbol of the church specifies what in the Bolsheviks was thought to jeopardise the Treasure of independent existence. It is an embodiment of previous knowledge and experience which in its actualised form comes to suggests that the Soviet regime was the heir of the imperialist policies of the Russian Empire.

In 1933 the Flirtatious Femme reappeared in the corpus of cartoon characters. This time, she was pictured coquetting in front of a Soviet Commissar. The female character has been actualised to comment on recent developments in Finnish-Russian relationships. The early 1930s was a period of growing activism of the Soviet Union in world politics. The USSR consolidated itself as a non-transient factor in world politics, and the Finnish foreign policy adopted a less conflictual stance vis-à-vis its eastern neighbour. In 1932, an agreement on non-aggression and the peaceful settlement of disputes was signed between the countries. In a retrospective analysis, the president-to-be Urho Kekkonen designated this as a turning point in Finnish-Russian relations. According to him, it signalled a departure from the earlier approach which had generally been unsympathetic and suspicious. Garm’s Flirtatious Femme can be interpreted as an interpretant sign of this new, more responsive Eastern policy line.

The title of the cartoon, Shy Lover or Knight Soviet and Beautiful Finland, links the drawing explicitly to the chivalric language-game. While Finland is brought out as the Beauty to be protected, the Soviet Union enacts the role of an aspiring Knight. The Garm magazine, however, was obviously suspicious towards Soviet intentions. To transmit the thought that instead of protective cooperation, the Soviet Russians actually had in mind conquering and dominating Finland, the Soviet

159 Korhonen 1966, 52–53.
160 Characteristic of political debates on the Border States policy is the view that since Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have Russia – or “former Russia” – as their common enemy, they also have common interests, or “common joys and miseries” (Agrarian Party MP Mikko Piitulainen, Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 30 October 1919, 1365.) For a more general discussion on the Border States policy, see also Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1922, 9 May 1922, 2765–2806 and Korhonen 1966, 52–53.
161 Garm, No. 24, 15 December 1933. ‘Den blyge älskaren eller riddare Sovjet och skön Suomi.’
162 E.g. Salokangas 1987b, 656.
163 Kekkonen 1980 (speech delivered 7 December 1943).
Commissar is depicted as a *muzhik* in disguise. Despite his sincere gestures, underneath the Commissar’s uniform there is the familiar Russian peasant’s outfit which embodies cultural memory from the period of Russification and serves as a reminder of Russian chauvinism and oppressive policies. On this basis, the drawing develops into a proposition which condemns as bad statecraft increasing cooperation with Soviet Russia.

At the heart of the Flirtatious Femme lies the question whether alliance building presents the best way to contribute to the durability of the political unit or whether it is best to rely on oneself. A similar symbolic constellation can be identified in written materials. Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti might have had the Flirtatious Femme and her suitors in mind when he argued that a small power located next to a big one cannot trust military force to promote its interests and defend its independence. It must guarantee its security by conducting foreign policy in harmony with suitable partners. For Holsti, the policy of finding suitable partners was prerogative over the use of military force or the threat of retaliation as the *ultima ratio* of the country’s foreign policy.164

The Fallen Woman and the Flirtatious Femme stand in a paradigmatic relationship with one another and thus establish a junction at which the merits of collaborative policies are conveyed. They articulate a problem captured in Henry Kissinger’s argument that collaboration is a policy which “places a peculiar strain on the domestic principles of obligation for it can never be legitimized by its real motives. ... In such a period the knave and the hero, the traitor and the statesman are distinguished, not by their acts but by their motives. ... Collaboration can be carried out successfully only by a social organism of great cohesiveness and high morale.”165 Given the rupture of political authority in independent, post-Civil War Finland telling the traitor apart from the hero was an important yet challenging task. In pictorial political debates, the difference between the Flirtatious Femme and the Fallen Woman was harnessed for the purposes of articulating the difference between the type of collaboration that cast the Treasure in jeopardy and one that could contribute to its success and survival. It provided the possibility of judging between bad and good statecraft.

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164 Holsti 1963, 162. See also Timo Soikkanen’s argument that since the year 1919 the most important mission of Finnish foreign policy was to seek defensive support from foreign powers to supplement the country’s own, insufficient defensive capabilities. This is what Soikkanen designates as “defensive politics of collaboration” (Soikkanen 1983, 10.)

165 Kissinger 1964, 20; see also Jakobson 1980; Vihavainen 1991, 12.
The drawing on the left makes use of the fine distinction between flirtatiousness and fallenness to make an argument on Finland’s relations with Great Britain. Although the female figure personifying Finland might at first sight appear plain flirtatious, there is something in the drawing to condemn her and to suggest that she is, actually, a Fallen Woman.

The poem attached to the drawing links this configuration explicitly to the chivalric language-game; it characterises the “merry old England” as “a good knight” and as “the guardian of Western culture.” However, the treatment of these chivalric meanings is ironic. In the actual drawing John Bull, the personification of Britain, is brought out as a chubby, elderly male sitting on piles of money. This is what attracts the Finnish female figure to him, which also serves to suggest that the social organism that she characterises is not one of high morale. Even though it is customary that female allegories represent abstract concepts rather than mortal individuals, there is something in the configuration above to attach the ascribed quality to specific sections of the Finnish society; on the pages of *Garm*, the skull-cap of the Flirtatious Femme functions as an index of the Finnish speaking sections of the society. On this basis, the drawing develops into an argument that condemns certain policy preferences as bad statecraft.

4.9. Between Scylla and Charybdis

In contradistinction to the resoluteness of the Assertive Maiden or the calculativeness of the Flirtatious Femme, the Endangered Maiden is a personification of helplessness and destitution. Similarly with the Fallen Woman, the model-image brings forth the thought that the Treasure is in jeopardy. It articulates a political challenge but does so in slightly different terms than other female figures in the corpus. A key difference is that unlike the Fallen Woman, the Endangered Maiden expresses the kind of political challenge that originates from external

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166 *Garm*, No. 17, 15 May 1933. ‘Välkommen John Bull!’
167 E.g. Shafer 2002, 82.
168 See also Ylönen (2001, 161–162) for an argument that in political cartoons, the symbol of a boy coiffed with the skull-cap expressed the split between Finnish and Swedish speaking Finlands.
forces rather than internal vulnerability. She is thus well geared for articulating the thought that Finnish-Russian relations are being conducted in a challenging environment.

The *Hovnarren*¹⁶⁹ magazine actualised an endangered female figure in a cartoon published in the spring of 1918. The configuration with the Maiden and two aggressors is essentially a comment on recent developments in Finnish-Russian relationships. The flag that the Maiden is carrying helps specify independent statehood as the subject of this proposition. It is the Treasure that is being threatened from two directions.

The caption explicitly links the configuration to the plot of bestiality, which forms an integral part of the chivalric language-game. It does so by naming the male figures of the drawing Scylla and Charybdis after the legend of two ogres. This Homerian legend of the ogres that inhabit a narrow strait and devour passing sailors¹⁷⁰ was available in wider cultural memory for characterising the contemporary political condition. If one succeeds in avoiding one danger, another one is just around the corner – *när man undslipper Scylla, råkar man ut för Charybdis*. In this capacity, the drawing evokes the idea of the “Machiavellian moment” – i.e. it establishes a situation in which securing self-preservation is desperately difficult.¹⁷¹

To carve out the historical meaning of the configuration, it is possible to identify the Scylla and Charybdis of this constellation as the *muzhik* and the Red Russkie (*punaryssä*). This links the possibilities of meaning opened up by the legend to two forms of Finnish-Russian contacts. The former calls to mind Imperial Russia and the latter the Finnish socialists who cooperated with the Russian Bolsheviks during the Civil War.¹⁷² The chain in the hand of the former and the guns in the hands of the latter specify the types of menace associated with these forms of cooperation. They suggest that the Finns in 1918 found themselves in a position where they were forced to choose between Russian captivity and revolutionary violence.

In the next drawing,¹⁷³ issued in *Tuulispää* in the summer of 1918, the malevolent forces endangering the Maiden are embodied in the figure of the Russian Eagle. Similarly with the

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¹⁶⁹ *Hovnarren*, No. 2–5, 18 May 1918. ‘När man undslipper Scylla, råkar man ut för Charybdis.’
¹⁷¹ Cf. Pitkin 1984, 166.
¹⁷² The brim hat and the bayonet are familiar symbols of “Red Russkies” in the iconography of the epoch.
drawing featuring Svinhufvud as the Fallen Woman, this drawing also mimics Eetu Isto’s painting *Attack (Hyökkäys)* painted in 1899. This was a time of troubles in the Finnish Grand Duchy’s relationship with its metropolitan country. Heeding Lotman’s thought of symbols as mnemonic mechanisms, such cultural memory can be said to be embodied in the constituent symbols of the drawing.

In the original painting, the double-headed hybrid animal attacking the Maiden who holds the book of law up as a shield stood for the Russian administration’s policies that threatened to curtail the autonomous status of Finland. In the 1918 version of *Attack*, the basic plot of the fight of the good and the pure against the dark and the evil remains, but the Eagle has undergone some interesting semantic substitution. It has been fitted for present purposes. The iconic level remains the same but the subject changes. Taking this into account enables disclosing how the cartoon develops into what we can call a political fact. For this purpose, it is possible to identify the two heads of the hybrid animal as Oskari Tokoi and Akilles Manner. The symbol of the Eagle thus functions as an index of these prominent members of the Red Guard. Utilising the symbol embodying the cultural memory of repression as an interpretant of the actions of the Reds provides a rhetorically powerful way of bringing their efforts out as something perilous for Finnish self-preservation and, consequently, stripping them of political legitimacy.

The cartoon has a second frame to it. It comments on the White victory in the Civil War by evoking another iconic painting – Ragnhild Sellén’s postcard *The Eagle Leaves Finland (Kotka jättää Suomen)* from 1906. The landscape forms an elemental part of this cartooned argument, which depicts the defeat of the Reds as a victory of the forces of light over darkness. The desperate situation where political lives are led in

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174 Belief in the law as the prime guarantee of Finnish independence frequently crops up in written materials; e.g. Santeri Alkio (1919, 44): “When a Finnish citizen living through the present difficulties searches for an outlet for her citizenship, the restoration and implementation of respect for law is one of her primary civic duties. In the law, she must see the guarantee of the centuries’ long existence of her fatherland and the precondition for the freedom of her ancestors.”
harsh conditions has dissolved with the dawn. The Treasure has been secured and the bestial bird flies towards Moscow.

The second frame thus presents a solution to the political dilemma outlined in the previous frame. At the same time, as the drawing posits a break with the previous political condition, it brings out, in a condensed form, how the task of consolidating political authority and maintaining the state remained inescapably intertwined with the dilemma of (Soviet) Russian proximity. It suggests that the established order could only be maintained by ousting from the political community those elements that continued to harbour common projects with Russians – i.e. people cast as “non-nationals” or “those without fatherland.” It is essentially a counterargument against the form of reasoning that saw the Eastern neighbour as a source of good fortuna and promoted cooperation with it on that basis.

The Endangered Maiden reappeared on the pages of satirical magazines in the summer of 1935. With the vivid cultural memory invested in it, the character was well geared for expressing fears that the growing military build-up in Northern Europe aroused. Endangeredness as the spirit of the times was also well captured in Reinhold Svento’s article published in the social democrats’ newspaper Suomen Sosialidemokraatti in July 1935: “the greater the presence of the great powers’ naval forces in the vicinity of a small country, the more dangerous its international position.” Indeed, during the summer and autumn of 1935, Germany’s expansion towards the North became a topic of political debates. In June, Germany and Great Britain had concluded a naval agreement that was interpreted not only as guaranteeing peace between them on the seas but also as leading to German dominance in the Baltic Sea Region. Due to their poor defences, Nordic countries were seen as being an easy catch for expansive politics. This prompted the Finnish parliament to debate about the need to increase the country’s military budget.

The satirical magazine Garm commented on these discussions in a drawing which is wittily entitled Beach Life on the Baltic. In virtue of its title, the drawing contrasts the lightness of being associated with vacations and life on the beach with the graveness of the developments in great power politics in the region.

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175 Alapuro 2004, 90.
176 Svento 1935.
178 Garm, No. 13–14, 20 July 1935. ‘Badliv vid Östersjön.’
In addition to the Finnish Maiden and the aggressive male figure, which stands for the USSR, present in it are the representatives of Sweden, France, and Germany. While the former two are personified by the allegoric images of Svea Mamma and Marianne, an identifiable person stands for the latter. Since the subject of this piece of conversation is actually the army, the Knight can be said to be present in the configuration in absentia. In virtue of this, the configuration develops into a statecraft speech act evaluating proposed policies with regard to their contribution to the maintenance of the state.

In order to grasp the political point of the picture – i.e. how it actually contributes to this topical political debates – it is important to recognise that despite growing concerns about the aims of Adolf Hitler, Germany does not function as the Beast in this configuration. In virtue of its iconic sign qualities, the gigantic Soviet soldier turns out to be the bestial figure of this configuration. He brutally bangs the head of a small baby (Lithuania) with a hammer. Hitler is actualised as a harmless little boy who carries the swastika symbol on his swimming trunks. By describing topical events with recourse to these archetypical characters and actualising the Soviet Union rather than Germany as the Beast, Garm brings the new German naval programme out as something innocuous.179

It seems that in Garm’s view, the German presence in the Baltic Sea does not amount to an existential threat. Due to this, its treatment of the Endangered Maiden remains somewhat satirical. It represents a departure from the representation of something valuable being threatened. Unlike previously examined female figures with a dramatic aura, the cry-baby like character is not likely to convince the viewer of the urgency of the protective task. Turning attention to the indexical dimensions of the screaming baby-like female figure enables being still more specific about what kinds of political facts emerge from the drawing. On the head of the satirical Endangered Maiden there is a skull cap which, on the pages of a Swedish language publication, conveniently serves to identify her with the Finnish speaking sections of society. In parliamentary discussions, it was the Finnish speaking bourgeoisie who argued for the need to increase military expenses, whereas the Swedish People’s Party and the Social Democrats were opposed to them.180 Indeed, the drawing is geared to reducing the political legitimacy of those sections that interpreted the military build-up in the Baltic Sea as something worrisome. It is a statecraft speech act also in the sense that it invites readers to reconsider whom to treat as the Beast.

4.10. Wrapping up the Maiden

The Maiden frequently crops up in the practices of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia during the epoch 1918–1930s, which legitimises treating her as a key to the epoch’s political imaginary. This is the case particularly during the early years of the period. The reason for this is that, given the conventional background of employing female allegories to symbolise a variety of political attributes, she conveniently articulates both the emergence of an independent political unit and the sense of irritation related to the subsequent political situation: Finland had become independent largely as a by-product of the WW I. The fragility of this ‘unhistoric’ polity – i.e. a political unit that had thus far only existed as a constituent element of a larger polity – was aggravated by the bloody Civil War that shattered national unity. The sense of puzzlement was enhanced by the fact that Soviet Russia, which had participated in the Finnish Civil War and emerged victorious from the Russian Civil War, began to consolidate itself and to openly propagate world revolution. In this situation, old beliefs relating to the Russian neighbourhood no longer functioned but had to be modified.

In this chapter, I have examined political cartoons featuring the Maiden as instantiations of the process of resignification which was geared at alleviating the irritation caused by this political crisis. I have worked on the pragmatist thought that this process necessarily took place against the background of previous political experience which the Maiden, among other symbols, embodies.

In the task of solving the topical challenge, the Maiden’s encounters with different male figures provided convenient material for commenting on the political unit’s responsiveness to foreign influence. They served to “distinguish the knave from the hero” and to judge whether the social organism is actually one of “great cohesiveness and high morale” – i.e. whether it can successfully carry out collaboration. Such encounters were well suited for pondering what constitutes good statecraft in the situation where previous political authority had collapsed and the political unit had to find new ways of being. Indeed, the prevalence of female figures in the corpus seems to affirm the view that the question of the character of the Russian or Soviet neighbourhood was intertwined with the dilemma of re-establishing political authority at home. In the corpus, feminine figures are actualised to present arguments on whether the policies promoted by different political orientations would point a way out of the situation in which something priceless was under threat.

Since the basic plots of submissiveness, assertiveness, contamination, calculativeness, and the Fall are nothing but blank forms of proposition (or rhemes), the analytical task has

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181 Kissinger 1964, 20; see also Jakobson 1980; Vihavainen 1991, 12.
182 See e.g. Peirce CP 2.272.
been to inquire into the variations that they undergo when actualised for the purposes of political argumentation. On this basis, it has then been possible to take a step towards sketching the thought-paradigm of Finnish-Russian relations. This means asking, in the Ricoeurian spirit, what the cartooned text is about.

The analysis has disclosed that the different ways of actualising the Maiden for the purposes of political argumentation make sense with regard to the paradigmatic choice between the good and bad fortuna conceptions of the (Soviet) Russian neighbourhood. For instance, the Submissive Maiden and the Fallen Woman capture two very different ways of evaluating events in Finnish-Russian relations, but in both cases these events emerge as challenges to the survival of the political entity. They articulate the thought that the (Soviet) Russian neighbourhood is essentially a matter of bad fortuna. They do so by suggesting that responsiveness to Russia/Soviet Union is prone to lead to the loss of the Treasure. The opposite interpretation, where the Russian or Soviet proximity is a matter of good fortuna, is also present; in the bourgeois dominated publicity of White Finland, however, it mostly forms a target of criticism. The table below summarises how this basic distinction unfolds in concrete terms in political cartoons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bad Fortuna</th>
<th>Good Fortuna</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Russia/the USSR is the heir of Russian imperialism</td>
<td>• Finnish independence is a gift from Russia/the USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russia/the USSR is an inherently expansive political unit</td>
<td>• The Finnish political unit can best develop in harmony with its Eastern neighbour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Finnish-Russian relations are based on domination and submission</td>
<td>• Finland can benefit by accommodating to Russian/Soviet interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Autocracy and oppression is a characteristically Russian approach vis-à-vis its neighbours</td>
<td>• Russia/the USSR is a model society and a progressive political unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russia/the USSR is a realm of decadence and regress</td>
<td>• Finnish-Soviet relationships are based on equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russian/Soviet suggestions for cooperation are malevolent</td>
<td>• Russian rulers (&quot;good Tsars&quot;) have traditionally been benevolent towards Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russia/the USSR instigates disorder and violence in Finland</td>
<td>• Russia/the USSR is a nest of world revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russia/the USSR is a nest of world revolution</td>
<td>• Russia/the USSR tries to benefit from Finnish vulnerabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russia/the USSR tries to benefit from Finnish vulnerabilities</td>
<td>• Russia/the USSR is a threat to Finnish national unity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Knight: Presenting the Solution

In addition to the Maiden examined in the previous chapter, the figure of Knight provides another key to understanding the Finnish political imaginary on Russia during the period 1918–1930s. If the Maiden is frequently actualised to articulate what was thought to be challenging in the topical political situation, the Knight crops up to present a means for managing this challenge. The symbol of the chevalier has this capacity since the chivalric ideals have persisted as an important implicit element of cultural history from the Middle Ages to the present day. Appearing in the synchrony of a text – in a piece of cartoon or in colloquial conversation – the heroic figures unfold plots that are to do with the virtues of politeness, bravery, devotion, rejection of treachery, and denunciation of the corruption of the outside world. The Knight, indeed, serves as a convenient plot-gene for accounts that are concerned with such issues as skill in arms, self-mastery, obedience, achievement of a given end, promotion of some great cause, and battle against the powers of evil.¹

The corpus also contains a variety of Lions that enact the role of Animal Knights. That is, their iconic features outline an essentially similar plot-space as do the Human Knights, which means that similar plots unfold from them. The Lion is the heraldic animal of Finland appearing, for instance, in the country’s coat of arms. It is common to begin its story by pondering on why precisely this exotic animal was chosen for the symbol of Finland. There, indeed, seems to be something paradoxical to this choice. On these latitudes, the Golden Animal can only be encountered in the zoo. However, the habit of personifying – or rather animalising – Finland with the Lion is a perfect illustration of the fact that in the practices of political imaginary, the abstract sense or ideality of a sign is often more important than its references to specific things or events. This also applies on the Human Knight. The chivalric meanings available in these symbols are more significant than the presence of their actual referent objects.

¹ Chevalier & Gheerbrant 1996, 574.
The Lion works as an embodiment of fierceness and bravery – the qualities in virtue of which it is widely acknowledged as the “King of Animals.” Despite its animality, the Lion also personifies masculinity and knightly virtues. When it comes to the Finnish political imaginary, the Lion is typically depicted next to the Maiden; he is expected to protect this Treasure from the potentially intrusive Beasts. In addition, the symbol of the sword frequently appears in these constellations emphasising the connection of these figures with the chivalric language-game.

In virtue of its conventional background, knightly figures – human or animal – are handily available for arguments that seek to condemn certain policies and commend others. On the political level, they form an elemental part of statecraft speech acts that are geared at elevating certain political groupings to the position of political authority. While the Lion as the Animal Knight is usually actualised to comment on the policies that official Finland was pursuing, the Human Knight rarely stands for the state as such. It is actualised to display a specific individual or a group as capable of securing the durability of the state. These are instances of the chivalric symbol operating as a Peircean index; it picks out and denotes some existent individual, thing, or fact as the Knight. Indeed, casting certain lines of action with knightly figures and others with their antitypes – Anti-Knights – provides a powerful rhetorical strategy for political debates. An actualised Knight is an answer to the question over who can lay legitimate claim to act in the name of the political collective and whose strategy vis-à-vis Russia or the Soviet Union qualifies as skilled statecraft.

If the Maiden conveniently articulated the sense of irritation related to the radically new kind of political situation in which the independent Finland found itself, the prevalence of the chivalric model-image in the corpus of cartoons may be taken as an expression of the ethos of heroism that characterises the Finnish political imaginary on Russia. While it brings forth the newly independent nation’s sense of optimism and greatness it also serves as a constant reminder of its vulnerability – of the need to be alert and guard the Treasures against the Beasts residing without or within the political unit.

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3 E.g. Peirce CP 2.249; 2.283; 2.293.
5.1. Unpatriotic Deeds of the Anti-Knight

The illustration on the right, issued just days before a civil war burst out in the newly independent Finland, includes all the three model-images that compose the chivalric equation. In the background there is a familiar set of female figures which stand for the nation; as that to which one can point and say “it is crucial for the survival and success of the political community,” they set the scene for the plot of protection to unfold.

The male character in the middle is the potential Knight. According to the chivalric language-game, he is expected to fulfil the task of protecting the women from a foreign man clad in a sailor’s outfit. The sailor, as an intrusive male, is the Beast in potentiality – he evokes the conventional thought that external forces are a danger against the political unit.

The second frame of the cartoon, however, reveals that the potential Knight is actually a negation of the chivalric virtues. By examining the grounds on which the cartoon presents its argument, we learn that he turns out to be an Anti-Knight rather than a Knight. In the vocabulary of Vladimir Propp, we may say that this dramatis persona turns out to be a false hero. He does not complete the protective task expected from him but rather hands the women over to the Russian sailor in exchange for weapons and bayonets. As a bogus hero or a traitor he fails in the stereotypically masculine task of the defence of the nation.

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4 Ampiainen, December 1917. 'Toveri ja tovarich yhteistyössä.'
6 Even if one interprets the drawing so that the Finnish male figure is offering the ladies to the foreign man, the logic of the argument persists. The horizon of expectation is that the male figure should fulfil the heroic function of protecting women.
7 E.g. Keen 1984.
8 Propp 1958, 76.
Inquiring further into the grounds of the drawing, we may consult the caption of the cartoon. In it, the Anti-Knight and the sailor are designated as a “comrade” and a “tovarich.” These are terms functioning as indices that point to the inter-national socialist ideology. The key idea underpinning the sense of solidarity and belonging between the two men is not belongingness to the same nation but to the class. The chivalric model is actualised for the purposes of putting forth a comment on the condemnability of such a way of thought and action.

More specifically, the point of the cartoon is to deplore the fact that class-based solidarity is stronger than the loyalty to the nation represented by two female figures. The chivalric cultural-historical equation as an embodiment of the ideas of loyalty and devotion provides a convenient means for the bourgeois magazine to describe contemporary events in these terms and, on that basis, to condemn the actions of Finnish socialists for bad statecraft. The configuration suggests that the Treasure is left unguarded because of the lack of patriotic commitment – not because of the threat of aggression from a foreign army.

The interpretation is sustained by knowledge of contemporary events. Soon after the revolution broke out in Russia, the sailors of the Imperial Russian Baltic Sea Fleet positioned in Finland had decided to side with the bolsheviks. During the revolutionary year, Finnish socialists and Russian sailors found a common cord and supported one another’s demands such as implementation of the law on an eight-hour working day, distribution of bread, reduction of unemployment, etc.10 In the bourgeois publicity, these efforts were frequently characterised as Russian sailors’ and soldiers’ attempt to ‘contaminate’ Finnish workers with the plague of revolution.11

It is noteworthy that these events emerged as political problems when evaluated with recourse to the meanings unfolding from the knightly equation and against the idea of loyalty which is a constituent part of chivalry. The conception according to which Russian and Finnish interests may be compatible forms part of the configuration as a target of its criticism. Nevertheless, the source of bad fortuna is not identified with Russianness in general but with the possibility of a violent revolt that dispenses with the old order and inaugurates a new one.

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9 “Comrade: ‘Listen, tovarich, we shall leave our women, wives, daughters, sisters, and brides at your disposal.’ Tovarich: ‘A vot, comrade, it is svoboda now and it does not taste like anything without guns. In return, we will loan you some old rifles. Anyway, they won’t be needed on the front.”

10 Lehén 1967, 58.

Curiously enough, the socialists also referred to a willingness to cooperate with the Russians in order to condemn the bourgeois policies as something detrimental to the durability of the political unit. The social democrats’ “We Demand” manifesto, published in a labour movement’s newspapers on 1 March 1917, had reproached Finnish elite parties (herraspuolueet) for trying to find in “Russian oppressors” an ally in its battle against the Finnish working class. The manifesto describes the dissolution of the Finnish parliament with the Social Democratic Party’s majority in the summer 1917 as a joint effort of the Russian provisional government and the Finnish bourgeoisie: “When the Russian government got down to prevent the meetings of our lawful parliament, the Finnish spirits of repression were also behind those bayonets”. In this speech act, the Treasure is identified as the “independent political position” or “freedom of Finland.” The Beast is not found in ‘Finland’ or ‘Russia’ but in the joint efforts of the Finnish elite and the Russian provisional government whereas the Knight – the political agent capable of safeguarding the Treasure – is spotted in the actions of the labour movement.

It is not an ephemeral phenomenon in the practices of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia that the language-game of chivalry is actualised in these terms. An essentially similar argument can be re-identified on subsequent occasions. On several occasions, the socialists’ joint efforts with their Russian counterparts are described as conducive to bad fortuna. In 1922, the Agrarian leader Santeri Alkio interpreted the Finnish Civil War as an outcome of the “lack of patriotism that is characteristic of international socialism” and argued that the most important choice was that between “the Finnish and the international.” This mode of thinking is characteristic of the entire epoch; internationalisation then was viewed in quite different terms than today. In 1933 the magazine Suomalainen Suomi issued a warning against a variety of international creeds – “Marxism, non-Marxism, Russian-mindedness, Scandinavianism, and Germanism” – that aimed at “displacing our national and cultural independence for the benefit of foreign interests and ways of thinking.” These ways of thinking, the article argues, represent a continuity to the thought that since the workers have no fatherland, Russia must be their native country.

In these examples the contrast between ‘national’ and ‘non-national,’ or ‘Finnish’ and ‘Russian,’ is in an interesting way intertwined with the contrast between ‘own’ and ‘alien.’ In this capacity, they allude to the political dilemma which the Maiden so conveniently articulated; they take issue with the political crisis that resulted from the demise of the old, imperial source of autocracy and the resulting ‘need’ to make the independent Finnish political unit.

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12 ‘We Demand manifesto’ (Me vaadimme) as reproduced in Lehén 1967, 70.
13 Alkio 1922, 39, 77.
14 Suomalainen Suomi 1933, 143.
the main source of authority in the independent country. The Knight points a way out of this dilemma, which means that virtuosity is frequently articulated in the framework of patriotic commitment and loyalty towards one’s own nation. Correspondingly, Russian elements may emerge as Beasts not because of their Russianness but for what they present – i.e. a competing source of shared interests and an alternative target of loyalty, solidarity, and commitment.

These configurations take issue with the question of influence in international relations. In order to develop this point further, it is possible to distinguish between two different types of influence – authority and control. Authority refers to the type of influence that exists in legitimate relationships; those over whom influence is exercised acknowledge the authority of those wielding influence over them. In contrast, control may be taken to refer to such relationships where those being influenced have lost all autonomy.16 In the previous drawings, the persistence of Russian influence over Finland is not depicted as a matter of control (e.g. continuity of imperial domination) but argued to issue from the acknowledgment of a source of authority beyond one’s own borders.17

For bourgeois publicity, the figure of the Anti-Knight provided a handy way of criticising those who were not considered sufficiently committed to the cause of the nation. The working class was argued to be particularly susceptible to competing claims of authority. In the cartoon on the left, its representative is positioned in the midst of the battle between the forces of light and dark.18 The drawing represents the epic moment of the Fall; we are left wondering whether the still heroic and upright male figure will eventually succumb to revolutionary instigation.

Connection to foreign elements is supplied by the bayonet and the brim hat that are familiar symbols of revolutionary socialism in the epoch’s political imaginary. The contemporaries were likely to associ-

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18 Kerberos, No. 3, December 1917. ‘Mörka makter.’
ate bayonets with the influence of Russia. During the civil war, the writer Juhani Aho contemplated on what solidarity in the relations between Finnish socialists and Russian workers meant and came up with the following answer: “I guess that ‘solidarity’ should be understood as ‘assistance in weapons.’” However, at issue in the drawing is not Russianness in general. In this argumentative retelling of the chivalric plot by the non-socialist satirical magazine Kerberos, it is the character of Russia as the realm of revolution that renders its neighbourhood a matter of bad fortuna. A virile worker with a hammer in his hand appears as a knightly figure but the possibility of him turning into the Anti-Knight is present in the configuration as a threatening possibility.

The bayonet – the symbolic weapon of instigation – appears frequently both in the corpus of cartoons and in written sources dating from the post-Civil War period. Consider, for instance, the characterisation of the Finnish Reds as “bayonet socialists” (pistinsosialisti) which verbally conflates socialism and Russian guns. That bayonets were conceived of as Russian guns is made explicit in Kerberos’s configuration above. In it, the connection is explicitly created with the sign ‘made in Russia’ which hangs from the weapon of a Finnish male character. In historical terms, the drawing relates to a topical debate over the form of government to be adopted in independent Finland. It is quite easy to identify the larger of the two male figures as a proponent of the republican form of government. Besides the fact that he has pierced the crown – the symbol of monarchy – with his lance, his bark shoes have a peasant connotation. This serves to associate the character with the Finnish speaking Agrarians that together with the Young Finns formed

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19 See also Hjelt’s (1919, 92) description of the events of the Civil War: “The peaceful population of this country had to undertake an almost superhuman task of defending themselves, the legal order, and the freedom of the country against the minority of the worst elements of the country that the Russian armed forces had equipped with arms.”
20 For a characterisation of Kerberos’s political profile, see Uino 1991, 341.
21 E.g. Aho 1918, 8 (diary entry 27 January 1918).
22 Kerberos, Kungsnummer, September 1918. ‘För Dagen.’
the core of the republican group in the parliament and dissociate him from those sections of the society that favoured monarchy.\textsuperscript{23}

The drawing is a statecraft speech act in the sense that the contention between monarchism and republicanism\textsuperscript{24} is related to the question over the creation of a durable state. This is evident from the fact that the configuration’s supporter of republicanism is brought out as an anti-chivalric character. This is interpretation is available in the iconic sign features of the figure; we learn it from the fact that he appears as a ragged and unshaven creature with a hat over his eyes. Instead of using his lance – the symbol of chivalric bravery – to ward off enemies, he has used his powers to set the resilience of the state in jeopardy. From the point of view of the present work, it is interesting to inquire into how this question of domestic politics relates to another question, to the significance of the Russian neighbourhood for the newly independent Finnish state.

The ‘made in Russia’ sign hanging from the bayonet of the smaller male figure is in a key role in this respect. The point of the cartoon is to argue that the the republican form of government set the state in jeopardy by paving the way for, rather than containing Russian influences in Finland. In this way, it articulates the irritation that the cartoon as an act resignification attempts to solve. Something similar was explicitly expressed by the Swedish People’s Party’s Furuhjelm who, in a parliamentary debate over the mode of government, argued that because of the continuous danger from the East, it was the duty of Finland to protect itself by adopting a strong government with a monarch in the saddle. Only in this way would the country become “free from the inside and secure from the outside.”\textsuperscript{25}

To transmit this point visually, the smaller male figure following in the footsteps of the anti-heroic supporter of a republican form of government is deprived of the knightly qualities of virility, masculinity, and heroism. Such an actualisation is motivated by the events of the Finnish Civil War, and the drawing thus sustains the argument that Russians were to be held responsible for having instigated the Finnish Reds to rebel. It was not only the arms as the instrument of the revolution but the revolution more generally that was imported to Finland from Russia.

Analogously with the pierced crown, the shield of law is made dysfunctional by the actions of the Anti-Knight. Given the political memories embodied in this symbol, this serves to suggest that republicanism would prepare the ground for unfortunate events; it would make Finland unguarded against Russian intentions. The shield of law embodies cultural memory from the period of the attempted Russification of the autonomous Grand Duchy.

\textsuperscript{23} E.g. Virrankoski 2001, 757.
\textsuperscript{24} With republicanism I have in mind nothing more or less than adherence to a republican form of government.
The idea of constitutional legalism had then become loaded with positive connotations as the Finnish asset in containing Russian influences. Legalism was the Young Finns' and Swedish Party's tool in defending Finnish constitutional rights whereas the Old Finns promoted adaptation to changing circumstances. Underpinning this distinction there is the juxtaposition between pro-active and prudent policies vis-à-vis the Eastern neighbour.

The cartooned configuration comes to suggest that the republican form of government would leave the political unit unguarded against malevolent intentions and thus hinder the creation of a durable state. While the contention over the mode of government was verbally characterised as a “question of life and death,” in the drawing, the idea of being endangered is visually transmitted by the drops of blood dripping from the weapon of the Anti-Knight. As a statecraft speech act the drawing serves to suggest that the socialists did not deserve any position of political authority since the political conduct that they promoted would lead to the destruction of the vulnerable political unit.

Another such a written account, which connects the question of the mode of government to the question of state survival, can be found in the writings of Erik Grotenfelt who places monarchy on the side of such chivalric ideals as freedom and prosperity and the republican mode of government on that of lost freedom, slavery, and the Fall:

There is a fierce battle going on in our country between the friends of the fatherland and the friends of the Entente concerning the direction of the Finnish future. ... Just like the Reds, who also were friends of the Entente, the haters of Germany are now trying to make a mess out of a clear case by fixing the people's attention on an issue which supposedly involves domestic politics but which, at the same time, is decisive for the future of Finland – i.e. will Finland be a free country or a slave. The question is whether Finland will be a monarchy or a republic.

The connection between republicanism and slavery was also evoked on the pages of the Ampiainen magazine, which was closely connected to the National Coalition Party and thus promoted monarchy. The international dimensions of the battle over the Finnish mode of government are described in a configuration where the representatives of the Entente are dragging the supporters of the republican mode of government to the polls. In addition to

27 See Korhonen (1963, 17–23) for a discussion on the role of the liberal thought of law and legalism being “the tower of strength” in Finnish-Russian relationships during the period of autonomy.
29 Grotenfelt 1918, 4.
30 Uino 1991, 331.
the leaders of the Social Democratic, Agrarian and National Progressive Parties that are identified by their names, the constellation includes the familiar joint sign of a Finnish “bayonet socialist” and a Russian seaman and, on this basis, points to the losers of the Finnish Civil War.

There is no Knight in this configuration but the Finnish politicians, whom one would expect to fulfil the task of securing the durability of the political unit, are depicted as anti-chivalric characters – i.e. as slave-like figures. Instead of heroically pursuing the interests of Finland, they are puppets to the will of the Entente. The model-image of a Russian *muzhik* with a bomb and a gun at the forefront is the Beast of this configuration. By evoking chaos and violence, he imports into it the thought of bad *fortuna*. This was a handy way of suggesting that the republican mode of government would subject Finland unsecured to the kinds of misfortunes that were thought to come from the Russian direction and that are specified by the familiar peasant clothing of the *muzhik*. The clothing calls to mind the chauvinistic and imperialistic elements within the Russian bureaucracy that were, during the epoch of autonomy, accused of willing to integrate the Grand Duchy of Finland firmly within the Russian Empire.

The Swedish speaking conservatives’ *Fyren* actualised the Lion – i.e. the Knight in animal form – to comment on the weakening effects of the republican mode of government. On the head of the Lion sits a *bonnet phrygien*, the familiar symbol of republicanism. The animal figure, which denotes the new political status of Finland as a sovereign republic, is brought out as an impotent character;  

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31 *Ampiainen*, No. 16, 10 August 1918. ‘Kun Entente puuhaa Suomesta tasavaltaa.’
32 *Fyren*, No. 28–30, 1919. ‘Diplomatiska formaliteter.’
it emerges as the Anti-Knight. This suggests that the republican status jeopardized the political unit by making it a pawn of big power politics.

The drawing includes references to the malevolent political forces against whom the newly independent republic was argued to be impotent. They can be thought of as the Beasts of this configuration. This interpretation is grounded in the iconic and indexical sign features of the drawings’ two male characters. John Bull – present by virtue of a boot only – represents England or Great Britain. He is violating the Lion by stepping on his tail. The tovarich Bolshevik in the background is trying to bend the animal to his will by dragging it towards a door with the sign “peace proposal” over it. Both these scenes suggest that something detrimental to the Finnish state is taking place.

In order to appreciate the drawing as a statecraft speech act, we may turn our attention to the figure of the Maiden. In the caption, the Maiden lets the Lion know that she is preparing him for the “diplomatic formalities that come with sovereign statehood.” Her actions, however, involve combing the Lion’s hair over his eyes so that the animal becomes half blindfolded. The female figure that actively contributes to the sorry state of the Lion does not represent the Finnish nation in its entirety but stands for specific sections.33 Dressed in the Finnish national gown and old fashioned bark shoes, the character calls to mind the traditional opposition of the Fennomans and the Svecomans. On the pages of the conservative, Swedish language magazine *Fyren*, such clothing served to distinguish the character from the Svecoman legacy, which could have been represented by the figure of a young female with a bearskin thrown on her shoulders. It rendered available for the present attempt of irritation alleviation a previous way of thought, dating from the end of the 19th century, when the Maiden in a national gown had appeared in Swedish language satirical magazines to critique the Old Finns and their policy of compliance vis-à-vis Russia.34 Such previous experience, and the political memory of compliant politics, is thus present in the drawing; this attempt to solve the present irritation takes place on its basis.

Actualised in 1919, such previous experience was conveniently available to criticise the republican minded, centrist politicians who had assumed power after the failure of the monarchical project.35 They favoured cooperation with the Entente and were not opposed to

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33 The Swedish minded nationalist movement did not approve of the Maiden in a national gown; they perceived that it was connected with the Finnish-nationalist or Fennoman movement and only used the character in order to mock the Fennomans. To distinguish themselves from this Finnish brand of nationalism, the Svecomans started to avail themselves of the symbol of the Maiden dressed in a bearskin. In distinction to the national gown with Finnish associations, bearskin connoted Scandinavian mythology and the constitutionalist tradition. (Reitala 1983, 109.)

34 E.g. Alapuro 1973, 21; for a more detailed account of the row between the Fennomans and the Svecomans – and the role of bark shoes in it – see Ylönen 2001, 53.

35 It is worth pointing out that most Old Finns actually came to support monarchy. Promoters of the republican mode of governance were found in the centrist parties and the political left. (E.g. Vares 1998, passim.)
entering peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks. In this argumentative retelling of the traditional plot of Finnish-Russian relationships, adopting such a compliant policy line vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, as well as the Entente, meant subjecting the state to bad fortuna and casting the independent position in jeopardy. With a view to sketching the thought-paradigm of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia, it is worthwhile to point out that the contention between active and passive virtù in managing fortuna underpins the constellation. In the caption of the cartoon the Maiden orders the impotent, but potentially virile, Lion to “be peaceful” and think of what is happening “as part of the diplomatic formalities that come with sovereign statehood. Imagine, you got a royal cage in London and an honourary seat in the Tartu conference. And a red ribbon around your neck...”

5.2. The Knight on the Russian side

A plot which characterises foreign policy along the axis of chivalric heroism vs. cowardice is remarkably widespread in the corpus. Early in 1920, the Fyren magazine evoked the knightly model-image in its comment on the Finnish government’s decision to not get involved in the Russian Civil War and the planned “pre-emptive strike” against the Bolshevik ruled St. Petersburg.

The caption of the cartoon explicitly avails itself to chivalric imagery as it refers to “the knight and deserters.” This time, the archaic model of knightly conduct was actualised for the persuasive powers of an argument that was intended to critique official Finnish foreign policy for its spinelessness, and to suggest that that there would be wider implications to the Finnish government’s decision. Non-involvement, the configuration suggests, does not qualify as good statecraft.

36 Fyren, No 9–10, 1920. ‘Riddare och desertörer eller mänsklighetens sista front bröts.’
Given that statecraft revolves around the question of prosperity vs. fall, failure in fulfilling knightly duties paves the way for a cataclysmic scenario which is articulated in the caption of the cartoon as “the collapse of the last front of humanity.” The notion of humanity is deployed as the referent of this project, which gives specific momentum to the argument of the cartoon. It is an attempt to remove the charge of self-interest by designating the entire humankind as the Treasure that Knight at hand is capable of protecting. The cartoon thus presents an attempt to seize the concept of humanity in order to deny entitlement to it from one’s opponent.

An inquiry into the grounds of this drawing – i.e. its iconic and indexical aspects – reveals that Russian Whites figure as embodiments of knightliness whereas anti-heroism is a Finnish attribute. The White Russian Generals stand heroic on the cliff while the Maiden of Finland is hiding from the battle together with a cowardly Russian deserter. Similarly with the previous drawing, the clothing of the Maiden serves to exclude some sections of society from the scope of its criticism and direct the condemnation at the ruling factions of Finland who were willing to negotiate a peace with the Bolsheviks and were reluctant to take part in raids against the bolshevik ruled city of St. Petersburg.37 As part of these developments, General Mannerheim, who had lost the presidential election in the summer 1919, wrote a letter to President Ståhlberg in November 1919 insisting that the fate of St. Petersburg was in the hands of Finland. However, Ståhlberg did not credit this suggestion for heroism but condemned it for adventurism.38 Here too, the argument turns on the contention between two different ways of conceiving virtù; one sees it in impetuous or pro-active action and the other in restraint and prudent behaviour.

It is also worth noting that the fault line between ‘culture’ and ‘elements’39 does not run along the Finnish-Russian boundary. Neither can the aspect of threat be identified simply with Russia or the Soviet Union. Instead, the drawing suggests that the Russian Whites stand for civilised and heroic conduct while the ruling factions of Finland, alongside Russian runaways and Bolsheviks, are on the side of the forces of the dark. In this conservative, Swedish language magazine, which supported Finnish intervention to the Russian Civil War, virtuous political conduct means participation in the restoration of aristocratic Russia which would enable protecting the established social order from the revolutionary forces of bolshevism. The configuration may thus also be appreciated as an argumentative retelling of the concep-

39 Here, I have in mind the binary model of culture vs. elements that the cultural semiotician Yuri Lotman (1990, 193) has identified as a recurrent feature in cultural history; the notion of culture stands for human efforts at acculturation and order whereas the notion of elements refers to the forces of the nature, or to that which is uncontrollable.
tion which revolves around the belief that the neighbourhood of a particular kind of Russia is beneficial for the Finns – i.e. its good fortuna conception is selective.

During the first years of Finnish independence, the civil war reigned in Russia and one of the most nagging dilemmas of Finnish-Russian relations was the difficulty of deciding who actually ruled the old metropolitan country. Both good and bad fortuna conceptions of the Russian neighbourhood thus cropped up in political debates, and it would be a gross simplification to suggest a shared stance vis-à-vis the former metropolitan country. There is no consensus over the meaning of Russian neighbourhood for Finland due to which debates over good statecraft are lively.

The configuration above is not the only example whereby the symbol of the Knight is evoked for an argument supporting the victory and restoration of Old Russia. Plots that cast the Russian Empire or the Russian Whites in the role of the vanguard which protects culture, civilisation, and reason against the forces of chaos, brutality, and barbarism are not difficult to find. In a commentary published in Fyren in 1921, the vanguard task is explicitly assigned to the Russian Empire “that for hundreds of years stood as an unfa]tering bulwark on the border between Europe and Asia, protected with its body the Christian civilisation against the barbarism of the East.” The grounds for this way of thinking is provided by the selective Russophilia which had been relatively widespread among the circles of European conservatives during the 18th and 19th centuries. It is selective in the sense that it values the Emperor and the strong state whereas the Russian people are left with less attention or are simply identified with the forces of chaos and barbarism. In the drawing above, the military uniform of the Knight functions as an index which links chivalric features to the Russian Whites and excludes the common people from their scope.

The above cited written passage from Fyren avails itself of this conventional form of reasoning to put forth an essentially anti-Bolshevik proposition. Such a proposition emerges from the coming together of all three members of the chivalric formula: the autocratic Russian Empire is in the structural position of the Knight, the Beast is identified in Eastern barbarism, while civilisation figures as the Treasure.

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40 See, for instance, the Social Democrat Väinö Voionmaa’s (1919, 344) comment regarding the “unnaturalness” of the bolshevik rule; he argued that due to it, the regime would soon collapse. The Swedish People’s Party MP Ragnar Furuhjelm’s suggested that “it has again and again been predicted that Soviet Russia can no longer endure. ... The Soviet regime stands at the verge of its collapse.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1920, 1 December 1920, 1561.)

41 Fyren, No. 8–9, 1921. ’Vem har mördat Ryslands tsarer?’

42 Immonen 1987, 46–48. Immonen points out that such conservative or “etatistisch” Russophilia can be found, for instance, in 18th century Sweden, Germany of the 1830s and 1840s, and in France in the 1890s.
An illustration that accompanies the text specifies the character of the Beast. He is recognisable as the bolshevik leader Lev Trotsky, who is stabbing to death the vulnerable Maiden with the textual label Russia (Ryssland) on her headband. As an interpretant of the Russian revolution and its events, the drawing avails itself to the convention of examining Russia as a liminal case in the Asia vs. Europe, body vs. mind or nature vs. civilisation dichotomy. On this basis, it attempts to solve the irritating situation where, in the words of the historian Matti Klinge, “[a]cross the border there was no longer the St. Petersburg of aristocratic light-mindedness but the communist and Asiatic Moscow, the Sovietland of cruelty and misery.”

It is also worth taking into account that the stereotypical Jewishness of Trotsky is the literally caricatured component in the cartoon. In virtue of this, it may also be interpreted as a comment on the alleged Jewish conspiracy which was held responsible for the assassination of the Tsarist family and the defeat of Old Russia. By evoking the legendary opposition of the vulnerable beauty and the repulsive beast for its comment on the new regime in Russia and by fixing the indexical dimensions of the Beast not only to Bolshevism but also to Judaism, the drawing develops into an argument that is not only anti-bolshevik but also anti-semitic.

Throughout this work I work on the thought that the chivalric equation functions as an embodiment of previous knowledge and experience and that the new necessarily builds on it. However, I simultaneous stress that the equation or language-game is capable of accommodating semantic substitution, which makes it suitable for political debates where a variety of political points of view are put forth. This supports the claim that traditions of thought can best be recovered by examining argumentative retellings of plots that unfold from their representative model-images. Turning attention from the Swedish conservatives Fyren to the Finnish bourgeoisie’s Tuulispää is one way of doing this.

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43 Neumann 1990, 80.
44 Klinge 1980, 54.
45 The term caricature derives from the Italian word caricare which means to load or charge (Encyclopædia Britannica Premium Service).
46 A classic in this genre is Robert Wilton’s The Last Days of the Romanovs, published in 1920.
47 For Fyren’s anti-semitism and conservativism, see Uino 1991, 324. For Finnish anti-semitism during the epoch, see Hanski 2006.
Contrary to the Swedish speaking conservatives’ *Fyren*, the *Tuulispää* magazine assigned the Russian Whites an antiheroic role in its comment on Finnish involvement in the Russian Civil War. Instead of heroism, the representative of the Russian Whites, sitting lazily in a rocking chair suggests spinelessness and slothfulness. The caption designates the sluggish figure as a “Russian refugee” and thus makes it possible to identify him with the Russian elite that had fled the events of the Russian Civil War to Finland.

The contrast between the aged and crippled Russian male and the three gallant Knights can be taken as an ironic rendition of the idea of an aristocrat and his servants. The point of the drawing is to ridicule and cast the Russian Whites’ demands for help in an unfavourable light. In the caption, the Russian Anti-Knight begs the Americans, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Finns, and Estonians to destroy bolshevism so that he himself may “lay down in peace.”

Whereas for *Fyren’s* conservatives the neighbourhood of an aristocratic Russia – “the guardian of the Christian civilisation against the barbarism of the East” – was potentially a matter of good *fortuna*, the Finnish right-wing activists worked on the thought that the Russian neighbourhood is essentially a source of bad *fortuna*. They were suspicious of the intentions of the Russian Whites and availethemselves to the chivalric language-game to contest the view that assisting Russian Whites would be an act of political *virtù* contributing to the success and survival of the political community. Instead of promoting cooperation with Russians, they argued that survival could only be ascertained by firmly containing (Soviet) Russian influences and breaking the bonds that united Finland with its former metropolitan country. It is also worth noting that whereas the more abstract term of civilisation (as opposed to barbarism) was the treasure of the Swedish-speaking conservatives, the Finnish speaking activists emphasised as *Treasure* the independent position of Finland, free from harmful foreign influences.

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48 *Tuulispää*, No. 17–18, 2 May 1919. ‘Vieraalla maalla.’

49 See also MP Juutilainen’s parliamentary address questioning the presence in Finland of some “30–40,000 military trained Russians ... that might be planning ... a bigger expedition to Russia and might drag us into it. Because of this General Judenish with his troops has to be ousted from the country without delay. That would prove that we are, indeed, a strong country that protects itself against Russian contamination.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 29 April 1919, 201.)
A few months later, in November 1919, Tuulispää returned to the challenge that the Russian Civil War posed to Finland. The drawing below avails itself of the familiar constellation of the Lion guarding the Maiden to comment on the Finnish government’s announcement that it would not support any involvement in Russia’s internal affairs. The government refused to assist the Russian Whites in their struggle against the Bolsheviks. In addition to the Lion and his protégée, the configuration includes the Beast, who is actualised to function as an interpretant of the Russian Civil War waged between the bolsheviks and the Whites.

The thought of bestiality is available for interpretation in the symbol of the serpent which, in virtue of its indexical terms, is made to stand for bolshevism whereas the Russian Whites enact the role of the victim of the Beast. Notable about this actualisation is that the Beast does not seem to threaten the Maiden, but rather the battle between the elements and culture takes place firmly on the Eastern side of the Finnish-Russian border.

This instance of resignification is an attempt to solve the irritation which was caused by the sudden sense of separation from the Russian realm. Instead of the virtù of the Lion, the Treasure is being protected by the sturdy boundary marker evoking the new position of independent statehood. The configuration with an inactive Lion can thus be said to embody what in political debates of the time was referred to as the “peaceful neutrality” of Finland.

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50 Tuulispää, No. 46, 14 November 1919. ‘Kun hätä on suurin, niin apu on lähin.’
51 For the parliamentary debate on the issue, see Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 30 October 1919, 1328–1391, esp. Prime Minister Vennola’s address according to which the best way for Finland to contribute to the “struggle against Bolshevism” was to “keep its own area free from them;” he did not support getting involved in this struggle on the Russian territory (ibid., 1330-1331.) See also Polvinen 1987, 299, 304.
52 Vennola argued that it would have been unwise for the Finns to act so that the “Russian national feeling would be hurt or there would be any reason to think that Finland constitutes a threat to Russia.” (Ibid. 1331.) A different view was put forth by the National Coalition Party MP Holma according to whom Finland had not done enough to help White Russia (ibid. 1341–1345.) In Tuomo Polvinen’s retrospective interpretation, the Finns remained passive on the issue of making interventions to Russia because “the dangers and risks associated with intervening in Russian affairs were instinctively feared.” (Polvinen 1987, 300.)
and juxtaposed to “active pursuits.” As a statecraft speech act, it presents the moment choosing between two paradigmatically opposed approaches to the question of how to secure the durability of the state – active involvement and prudent restraint. On this basis, it comes to suggest that keeping away from the “tangled affairs in Russia” was the best way of maintaining the state.

In May 1919, the Ampiainen magazine had realised a similar configuration in its comment on the vices and virtues of getting involved in the Russian Civil War. The function of the boundary marker is fulfilled by the symbol of the river which – as a feature of actual physical geography – adds a connotation of naturalness to the political condition of independence and may thus also be taken to symbolise the break with the recent past of Finland being a constituent part of the Russian Empire.

The Lion of Ampiainen observes events in the former metropolitan country alert but inert. He is an apt embodiment of the policy which, in contemporary debates, was characterised as being “cautious but alert” vis-à-vis events in Russia. That is, the Lion contributes to the discussion over how to manage the Russian proximity.

While some bourgeois groups, among them Fyren’s conservatives, supported involvement in the Russian Civil War, the suspicious argued that once the Russian Whites had gained power, they would immediately try to re-conquer Finland. In order to transmit this thought, Ampiainen has reverted to the symbol of the eagle – the archaic symbol of the Russian imperial tradition. It was conveniently available in the political memory for the cartoonist to express the thought that making a Finnish contribution to the restoration of Imperial Russia would be a perilous political move. This message is strengthened by the fact that in the

54 The National Progress Party’s MP Oskari Mantere’s address to the Parliament (ibid. 1372).
55 Ampiainen, No. 10, 24 May 1919. ‘Venäläiset isänmaanystävät yhteistyössä.’
56 Agrarian Party MP Aron Pitkänen used these words to characterise the policy of non-involvement; he promoted it against the “warmongering” that would be comparable to “a national and political suicide.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 30 October 1919, 1353–1354.)
57 See the Agrarian Party MP Joukahainen’s argument that the political right, which was promoting interventions, was being lured to “an unforeseeable fate” and that the “Tsarist Russia,” whose descendants the Russian Whites were, had “never kept its promises.” (Ibid, 1348.)
The caption of the cartoon the Bolshevik moles honour the Finnish independence – “run free you beautiful, independent Lion” – while the Eagle protests against it.\footnote{The caption of the cartoon supports this interpretation: “Bolshevik moles: ‘Ah di krasnoe tsort, tsuhni lion, run free, independent’ – Rossija eagles: ‘Gospodin Jevropa, do you hear me, protest, protest...’” [this passage is somewhat impossible to translate as the original is a strange mixture of Finnish and Russian, the translation is thus a strange mixture of English and Russian.]} If the intentions of the Russian Whites were viewed with suspicion, the bolsheviks were not considered ideal partners either. Despite regime change, the idea that not much good can result from the Russian neighbourhood persists through the configurations commenting on the Russian Civil War. Tuulispaä employs the mythological symbol of evil and cunningness – the serpent – to represent the bolsheviks, while Ampiainen resorts to underground moles to personify them. In the latter configuration the gallows and the Orthodox Church call to mind the tendency of Russian history to unfold in tragic terms; the former stands for death and destruction and the latter – evocative of the tradition of the Third Rome – for imperial domination. The bad fortune conception of the Russian neighbourhood persists throughout these configurations and the political debate revolves around whether impetuousness or restraint would represent the optimal way of managing these events.

5.3. The Knights of White Finland

The practice of depicting identifiable politicians discharging the task of knighthood is an example of the way in which political cartoons blur the distinction between the factual and the fictive and may help to broaden our understanding of political facts. In the cartoon material, the role of the Knight is often enacted by the former head of the Finnish Diet and the White leader Pehr Evind Svinhufvud. In a book published towards the end of the epoch, he is explicitly characterised as “the central heroic figure” in the realisation of Finland’s independence.\footnote{See also Räikkönen (1936, 8, 10): “The chain of events ... in which [P. E. Svinhufvud] played the leading role, makes him a notable figure also in the history of Europe, for in blocking the path of Red Russia farther into Europe, the heroic victors of the Finnish War of Independence influenced the course of European history.”}

Meanings unfolding from the chivalric language-game are also perceptible in the characterisation that Juhani Aho jotted down in his diary at the very beginning of the researched period: “Honour to Svinhufvud: for once the purest honesty and determination in the head of a country. ... He is the moral backbone of the people and that is what we need for now. If only we had had such an unwavering man to put against Bobrikoff. And such a united front.”\footnote{Aho 1918, 77 (diary entry 30 January 1918).} While Bobrikoff – the feared Governor-General of Finland in the late 1900s – enacts the role of the Beast, P. E. Svinhufvud is depicted as the embodiment of political
He emerges as the personification of unwaveringness needed to maintain the newly independent political unit.

In the cartoon frame on the left Svinhufvud is explicitly portrayed as the Knight. He appears as a virile figure holding his sword of bravery up high to slay the threatening Beast. The Treasure is not present in the drawing in explicit terms. However, the cartoon mimics Akseli Gallén-Kallela’s famous painting Defence of Sampo (Sammon puolustus) which is an illustration of a scene from the Finnish national epic Kalevala.

In the legend, the heroic Väinämöinen and the evil Louhi are engaged in a battle over the Sampo which, similarly with the Holy Grail in the Romance of Lancelot, is a mythical vessel with magical powers. It is the horn of plenty that – following a battle over it – endows its owner with richness, happiness, and fulfilment.62

The Beast that Svinhufvud, as the drawing’s Knight, tries to conquer is realised as another identifiable politician. Riding on the bestial bird there is a set of socialist politicians and members of the revolutionary government of the Finnish Red Guard. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that on the political level (Peircean Secondness), the battle between the archetypical Knight and the Beast points to the experience of the Finnish Civil War, its antagonism between the Whites and the Reds, and the persistent fear of revolution that the war left behind.

The interesting thing here is that the culturally mediated model is actualised with reference to the ideology of White Finland. The fault line thus runs within the Finnish nation, not along state borders.63 Despite its domestic focus, the positioning of Gylling, Manner, Tokoi, and Valpas-Hänninen on the bestial Eagle identified as Kuusinen contains a reference to the former metropolitan country. In this sense, the configuration develops into a comment

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61 Tuulispää, No. 21, 24 May 1918. ‘Sammon ryöstö.’
62 For the Sampo myth, see Haavio 1967.
63 For excellent discussion on the problematic of inside and outside in post-Civil War Finland, see Alapuro 1994.
on what counts as skilled statecraft in Finnish-Russian relations. It suggests that forces detrimental to a prosperous society emanate from Russia and calls after virtùosity capable of containing them. The configuration presents an attempt to “normalise” the Beast – i.e. to contain within territorial or state boundaries a doctrine that had no respect for such boundaries.64

To further appreciate the character of political cartoons as interpretants of earlier works, we may note that Akseli Gallén-Kallela prepared the original painting for the Finnish pavilion at the World Exhibition in Paris in 1900. This was a time of troubles in Finnish-Russian relations, and in the minds of the contemporary audience the bestial bird with the claws of an eagle was likely to be associated with Russian autocracy – with its double-headed eagle.

The model-image of the Eagle had made a composite part of constitutionalist argumentation against the repressive measures of Russian administration during the period of Russification. It was thus habitually associated with oppression and autocracy.65 In post-Civil War Finland, reference to the model-images vested with more archaic cultural memory provided a convenient way of putting forth powerful political arguments. The old antagonism from the period of Russification was projected onto the Red leaders who, it was argued, were planning to establish socialist rule over Finland. When viewed in the framework of statecrafting, where the survival and success of the political unit are at stake, the socialists’ demands for social change became easily silenced.

Associating with a foreign threat those who opposed the basic values of the White Republic served to cast them outside the political community. These “unpatriotic elements” became assimilated with the forces of chaos that the Knights of White Finland were fighting in order to safeguard the order within. Representing political opponents with the help of the Beast provided a convenient means for this purpose.66 The bestial model-image functioned as a fitting premise for an argument that had as its conclusion the thought that cooperation with Russians was detrimental to the durability of the political community.

Susan Buck-Morss has convincingly argued that in the Western imaginary, the bolshevik revolution of 1917 signified an absolute threat since it challenged the idea of control over space as the determinant of sovereignty and rendered the notion of national defence problematic. Buck-Morss’s argument seems to make sense in the context of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia. Domestic tension was projected on Russia in order to “normalise” the enemy and to view opposition to the bourgeois political order as an aggression by a foreign nation.67 Although this way of imagining the neighbourhood of Russia had its roots in the

65 E.g. Konttinen 2001, 284.
66 For a similar interpretation, see Siltala 1985, 499.
Finnish Civil War, it provides a continuing undercurrent to the political imaginary throughout the epoch.

Consider, for instance, the illustration below which Matti Meikäläinen issued in the autumn of 1930 to comment, with an approving tone, the violent actions of the Lapua Movement – a right wing reaction of late 1920s and early 1930s. The gigantic male with the text “the Law of Lapua” on his sweater stands for the movement’s demands for action and its disrespect for state laws which were characterised as too weak to preserve Finland from the “red peril.” Although some anti-communist measures had been taken, the communists seemed to be gaining strength and had acquired more seats in the 1929 parliamentary elections. They openly promoted the adoption of the Soviet type of socialism in Finland and when Finnish and Soviet interests seemed to conflict, took the side of the latter. To transmit the thought that the extra-legal measures of the Lapua Movement were indispensable for guaranteeing the survival of the political entity, the powerful male figure evicting the communist elements from the country is actualised as an interpretant of the idea of virtuous political behaviour. In contrast to the other male figures in the configuration, he is an icon of determination and bravery.

The automobile by the border of the Soviet Union stands for the movement’s infamous tactic of muilutus – i.e. the practice of kidnapping a communist, a social democrat, or a moderate non-socialists and driving them to the Soviet border to deliver an outright message about exclusion from the political community. This also emphasises that the Lapua Movement is not best understood as simply anti-communist.

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68 Matti Meikäläinen, 30 August 1930. ‘Kysymys perillisille.’
69 Risto Alapuro (2004, 91) connects the events in Finland to developments elsewhere in Europe; he characterises the Lapua Movement as the “Finnish variant of fascism.” Vesa Vares (1991, 99) contests this view and argues that instead of being fascist, the Movement was conservative; according to him, it represents the traditional peasant culture’s reaction against the changing world.
70 The Lapua Movement demanded new anti-communist legislation but the proposal was voted on the table until the new parliament in November 1930 accepted the “communist laws” or “the Republic’s protection law” which curtailed the freedom of the press and the freedom of assembly. (Proceedings of the II Parliamentary Session 1930, 11 November 1930, 222–229.)
71 E.g. Vares 1991, 78–79.
72 Siltala 1985, 68–119.
We should also take into account how it was motivated by the larger question of solving the irritation which had resulted from the independent political status of Finland combined with the memories of the Civil War and the neighbourhood of a consolidating Soviet Union. Hence viewed, the Lapua Movement was one answer to the question of the best way of maintaining the state in a changing political situation. It presented an attempt to bring to an end the unfinished “war of liberation” of 1918.\(^{73}\)

Indeed, the previous configuration involves not only a conflict between the communist and the non-communist ideologies, or a conflict between the Finnish and Soviet states but also between two different modes of relating to the Eastern neighbour – one premised on compatible if not common interests with the Eastern neighbour and the other geared at actively containing its influences. This becomes evident from the way in which the chivalric formula is actualised. Knightly qualities are assigned to the figure that simultaneously with evicting the communists from the country also gets rid of the Soviet elements. Conversely, the representative of prudent means is brought out as the Anti-Knight. Positioned in the background with a finger in his mouth, the fourth male figure of the drawing embodies an alternative to the policy of active containment. In historical terms, the figure stands for the Social Democrats’ suggestion that education rather than violence was the best means of dealing with the challenges of the present political situation. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that in the armpit of the anti-chivalric figure, there is a folder with the inscription “instructions for enlightening” (valistusohjeet) written on it.\(^{74}\) On this basis, the configuration puts forth an argument that sees political virtù in proactive measures for containing Soviet influences in Finland and comments critically both on the policies of common interests and prudent conduct vis-à-vis Soviet Russia.

A few years earlier, in September 1927, Matti Meikäläinen had actualised the Lion to comment on concerns related to the formation in December 1926 of a social democratic minority.

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\(^{73}\) E.g. Siltala 1985; Vares 1991, 84, 88–89.

\(^{74}\) See also the Social Democrat MP Anna Haverinen’s address at the Parliament (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1930, 17 February 1930, 228–229.)
government that ruled with the support of the Swedish People’s Party and the communists.75

This was the first time since the Civil War that the Social Democrats had attained governmental responsibility. The cartoonist has availed himself of the image of the chivalric animal deprived of its defining qualities to suggest that such a situation was harmful for the maintenance of the Finnish state. To transmit this thought, the Lion is displayed as incapable of fulfilling the guardian task. It is chained, being pulled around, and being violated by the representatives of three different political forces.

The drawing mimics the idea of bull fights where the animal is irritated to the point that it is highly dangerous and ready to attack. In this configuration, the Lion has taken the place of the bull. The three male figures who attempt to irritate it stand for the National Coalition Party’s political opponents as well as for the Soviet Union. The Eastern neighbour is present in the drawing in the form of a dark rider or a Cossack which, functioning like a Lotmanian symbol, calls to mind the instruments of Russian power in Finland during the period of autonomy.

Earlier in the same year, Matti Meikäläinen had called the epoch of autonomy and policies of Russification to mind with recourse to the verbal expression “the spirit of Bobrikov”76 which “hustles [huseeraa] again in Finland.”77 Similarly to the above configuration, the point was to issue a warning about the growing influence of foreign or – or “unpatriotic” (epäkansal-linen) – forces in Finnish politics. For a magazine that promoted “Finnish Finland” and was strongly opposed to both socialism and the use of the Swedish language in Finland, the alliance of the two “unpatriotic” forces in the parliament amounted to an impotence which was comparable to the period of Russification when the Russian Empire tightened its grip on the Grand Duchy. Indeed, for Matti Meikäläinen, keeping intact the dichotomy between ‘own’ and ‘alien’ provided the way of out the political dilemma of vulnerability. The magazine described its mission in the following way: “to end in Finland the bilingual merry-making [halipompe] of the socialists and the Vikings.” With the help of this information, the three figures teasing the Lion may be interpreted to stand for the socialists, the Swedish People’s Party and the “spirit of Bobrikoff;” they called to mind the thought that like the policies of Russification at the end of the 19th century, the present political developments undermined the independent position of the Finnish state.

75 Matti Meikäläinen, No. 9, September 1927. ‘Milloin valveutuu leijona?’
76 Bobrikoff was the Governor-General of Finland from 1898 until his assassination in 1904. He was considered the personification of the policies of Russification intended to bind Finland more tightly to the Empire and to integrate it into the structures of the Russian Empire. The promotion of Russian language and Orthodox religion was supposed to result in the country becoming ‘Russified.’ (E.g. Polvinen 1995.)
77 Matti Meikäläinen, No. 1, May 1927.
Although the Lion is depicted in a pitiful condition, the possibility of active guardianship is also present in the configuration. Evoking the plot of awakening, the legend of the drawing asks “when will the lion awaken?” Against this basis, it emerges as a statecraft speech act positing a need for the active use of *virtù* against “alien” forces.

5.4. Cowardice vs. Heroism

Post-Civil War Finland was deeply divided: fault lines ran between the political right and the left, between Finland and (Soviet) Russia; within the non-socialist camp the heroic “liberators” were distinguished from the “slackers.” The notion of “slackers” referred to those who favoured the policy of conciliation with the socialists and, when it came to the Russian/Soviet neighbourhood, did not promote pro-active or aggressive measures in containing its influences.\(^\text{78}\) Despite its victory in the Civil War, the political right had not succeeded in seizing power after the failure of the monarchical project. Instead of a strong central government, the ruling, centrist factions favoured a republican constitutional settlement, a parliamentary system of government, and social reforms to heal the wounds of the Civil War.

The right-wing activists interpreted these developments as a sign of weakness.\(^\text{79}\) When the chivalric language-game was actualised to make sense of this situation, the policy of conciliation was brought out as inability to resist the ‘elements.’ The model-image of the Anti-Knight frequently appeared in cartoons to criticise the ruling factions for the laxness of their policies and, on that basis, for bad statecraft.

In January 1921, the Anti-Knight model-image cropped up on the pages of *Hovnarren*.\(^\text{80}\) The configuration depicts a Finnish soldier captivated by a serpent, a familiar symbol of evil in the Christian tradition. In it, Satan is frequently represented with “dragon-like features and his limbs … entwined with snakes.”\(^\text{81}\) It is, indeed, easy to appreciate this drawing as an interpretant that makes use of earlier works to solve a present challenge. The familiar formula with the model-images of the Knight, the Beast, and the Treasure is actualised to transmit the thought that the signing of the Tartu Peace treaty was a dangerous trap, particularly since it meant making significant concessions to the initial demands with which Finland had entered the negotiations.\(^\text{82}\)

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78 The years 1919–1922 are a period of centrist rather rightist politics (e.g. Jääskeläinen 1964, 9–29).
80 *Hovnarren*, No. 2, 31 January 1921. Stå stark...
82 See MP Setälä’s (National Coalition Party) critical remarks that questioned “whether the peace treaty is of such quality that it guarantees the Finnish independence and lawful freedom” and the same party’s MP Homen's argu-
The drawing reflects the fact that the reception of the Tartu Peace Treaty was mixed. The Social Democrats and the National Progress Party, together with some representatives of the National Coalition Party and the Agrarian Party, supported its ratification, whereas some right-wingers condemned it as a humiliation; this was the case especially on the radical right.\(^{83}\) The drawing is best examined as an argument which contributes to this debate.

The image of an inactive male character prohibited from using his weapon serves as a powerful rhetorical means for condemning the peace treaty. Contrasted with the ideal of the virile and active Knight, the image of a soldier captured by the serpentine Beast serves to put forth a powerful critique against the passivating effects of the official foreign policy.\(^{84}\)

The potential hero appears either ignorant of his destiny or deluded by false considerations. This is the iconic level in the drawing which, in the first place, avails for interpretation meanings that unfold from the chivalric language-game. The configuration suggests that the Finnish politicians were being lured to accept something that would have disastrous consequences. The dark landscape contributes to the thought that Finnish-Soviet relations take place in hostile surroundings and that their management demands strength and courage lacking from the ruling factions.

\(^{83}\) E.g. Hentilä 1999, 139.

\(^{84}\) For a verbal formulation of essentially the same thought, see the Swedish People’s Party’s Ernst Estlander’s argument that since the regime change in the summer 1919, the government has followed a deplorable policy line and that the peace proposal was nothing but a “fountain of discordance, disagreement, and weakness.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1920, 28 October 1920, 1050.) Contrast this, for instance, to the centrist National Progress Party’s Vennola’s promotion of a prudent policy line and his critique of “unwise defiance which would form a constant bone to pick between Finland and Russia.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1920, 1 December 1920, 1542.) See also Korhonen 1966, 35.
The chivalric language-game is not a fixed interpretation but makes available a set of meanings that can be actualised in a variety of ways. It is thus interesting to examine how the Social Democrats’ Kurikka actualised the Lion for the purposes of criticizing the policy of territorial demands.\(^85\) The drawing was published in July 1920 – i.e. before the Finns were forced to modify their demands, which included the Petsamo area and a referendum on the self-determination of East Karelia (Itä-Karjala).\(^86\)

Kurikka’s Lion appears neither helpless nor heroic but rather just plain aggressive. On this basis the drawing featuring it develops into a powerful critique of what has been called “Finnish midget imperialism.”\(^87\) It brings the demands out as simple greed; “these are mine” the Lion shouts in the caption. This is in line with the Social Democrats’ policy of promoting prudence and peaceful relations with Soviet Russia.\(^88\) A similar thought was verbally coined by their representative Laherma: “no matter how much the views of the labour movement differ as to how to realise a socialist society in this world, they are unified in that claws have to be kept off Russia.”\(^89\)

The Social Democrats had suggested that the Finns should start accommodating their demands to the growing strength of Soviet Russia that had entered the negotiations civil war ridden. This would have involved giving up the demands on East Karelia in order to guar-

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85 Kurikka, 15 July 1920. ‘Suomen Leijona Tarton Rauhanneuvotteluissa: Nämä ovat minun.’
86 See the National Coalition Party MP Homén’s parliamentary address from October 1920. In it he insists that making Eastern Karelia a part of Finland ought to be an integral part of the peace treaty. (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1920, 28 October 1920, 1061.)
87 Palmgren 1948, 52. See also the Social Democrat MP Keto’s argument that some groupings approached the Russian neighbourhood in aggressive terms, which had only succeeded in securing the commercial interests of certain Finnish timber companies; MP Pöyhönen argued that its was mainly “our imperialists” that were opposed to the Tartu Peace Treaty (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1920, 28 October 1920, 1053 & Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 1 December 1919, 1524.)
88 See also MP Keto’s argument that “the peace that is now being offered to us is an honourable peace, it is favourable to our country, ... From the point of view of our country, this kind of foreign policy represents the only sensible possibility. We are a small nation, we are a small country. The country with which we have now made a peace is strong and mighty. Our country is forced to keep an eye on that the lifeline of this country does not become jeopardised.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1920, 28 October 1920, 1053.)
89 Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1920, 28 October 1920, 1069. The Social Democrats approved of the incorporation of Petsamo into Finland but critiqued the demands for annexing Eastern Karelia which was thought to be “organically indispensable for Russia.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1920, 1 December 1920, 1549.)
antee a hold on Petsamo. In the summer of 1920 some sections of the government together with the activists were reluctant to concede to the Social Democrats’ suggestions. The row was, in the end, resolved by President Ståhlberg: Finland acquiesced to the Soviet demands; Petsamo was given to Finland; and Finland agreed to cede the municipalities of Repola and Porajärvi to Soviet Russia.90

The Lion in an aggressive form was well geared to criticise the sense of “greatness” characteristic of Finnish politics during the early 1920s. It functions as a warning against ambitious demands in relations with Soviet Russia and rather promotes adapting to the neighbourhood of this great power. One may thus argue that these actualisations are underpinned by the paradigmatic choice between virtù as impetuousness and virtù as prudent restraint.

In March 1926, the communists’ Tuisku availed itself of the plot where the Lion loses its chivalric character as a result of aggressiveness. The drawing is a comment on a topical discussion on the need to renew the Finnish coat of arms.91

It is a statecraft speech in the sense that it discredits the Finnish state for having failed in the task of maintaining the state. Instead of themes of survival and success, the symbolic animal is connected to the thematic of death and devastation. These themes are available for interpretation in the motifs of skulls and bones as well as in those of chains and whips.

However, the configuration is more specific in its message. It includes references to the authorities that were to be blamed for bad statecraft. The cross hanging from the neck of the Lion calls to mind the church, the cap connects the animal to the army and the hand cuffs to law enforcement. The question of the Soviet neighbourhood does not make an explicit part of the drawing but the nagaïka whip, a familiar symbol of Russian autocracy, may be taken to contain a reference to the Eastern direction and to a subjugated political condition of the epoch of autonomy.

The Anti-Knight frequently appears in the corpus of cartoons to criticise official Finland for lack of stamina. It conveniently expresses a sense of discrepancy between what the activists of White Finland thought was needed to maintain the state and its present condition. The burning desire to defend the country and the energetic squad’s readiness to strike is fre-

91 Tuisku, No. 5, 6 March 1926. ‘Vaakuna.’
quently juxtaposed with passivity. Such laxness is quite poetically condemned in a verse that an activist writer P. Mustapää (Martti Haavio) published in 1928. Through its references to “arms of steel” and the “sword,” the poem explicitly evokes meanings which unfold from the chivalric language-game:

> The Finnish people is a passive people. It thinks that the charm of life is meant for others, not for it. / Its poets sing the hymn of being happy with a small size / and its writers are at home in the kingdom of stillness and Oblomovs. / Its arms are made of steel and are capable of swinging the sword, and its legs are agile – and the fastest in the world – but it does not trust them but smiles timidly: the others are better than us.\(^\text{93}\)

The activists of the right-wing, Finnish-nationalist Academic Karelia Society suggested that passivity actually endangered the survival of the Finnish political unit. In line with the hypothesis regarding the years 1918–1930s as the “Machiavellian moment”, they argued that the slackness of the Finnish people was the same as if one had “undersigned one’s own death penalty.”\(^\text{94}\)

On the pages of *Fyren*, the “new system” was critiqued with recourse to the image of a passive Lion.\(^\text{95}\) Both the bad and good *fortuna* conceptions of the Russian neighbourhood are present in the drawing. The visual configuration with a lifeless female figure and her powerless guardian is evidently on the negative side; it is an articulation of political malaise. However, the configuration is accompanied by an article that looks back at the imperial epoch with a sense of nostalgia. “During the epoch of autonomy,” the article argues, “Finland was able to devote itself to spiritual and material improvement under the protection of the great and powerful state.” It evokes the traditional “Pax Russica” interpretation of Russian proximity, which provides the background against which criticism against the contemporary situation is voiced out. From the point of view of this work it is interesting to note that the configuration cannot be taken simply as evidence

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93 Mustapää 1928, 50.
94 *Herää Suomi* 1923, 18: “It is clear that if our people continues the present slackness and some it continue to act as traitors, it has undersigned its own death penalty. ... The Finnish nation is the vanguard of the whole civilised humanity, and it looks like its guardian fires are not burning properly.”
95 *Fyren*, No. 12–16, 1921. “Det nya "systemet."”
of Finnish anti-Russian sentiments; the difference in ways of relating to pre- and post-revolutionary Russia has to be taken into account. As an instance of selective Russophilia/-phobia, it is a perfect example of the fact that political imaginary is best appreciated in terms of argumentative retellings of habitually available plots. The plots that unfold from the chivalric symbols have been fitted for the present purposes. In this case, the purpose for which the passive Lion has been fitted relates to the conservative profile of Fyren and its appreciation of aristocratic Russia.

However, the Social Democrats’ Väinö Voionmaa also evoked an image of passivity and inactiveness in a statecraft speech act in which he condemned, in a rather “Machiavellian” tone, those who had no faith in the “new greatness of Finland.” According to Voionmaa, his fellow citizens did not realise that “the biggest danger lies in their inactiveness and their standing still and that at the end excessive caution deprives a people of all vigour and self-respect.” However, in contradistinction to those who with activeness meant territorial expansion, Voionmaa had in mind securing the survival of the Finnish nation by different means. In his characterisation of statecraft he refers to Friedrich List according to whom there are among the peoples of the world “giants” and “midgets,” and that the point of politics is not only to render the small and weak great and powerful but first and foremost to stabilise their existence and future.

Frequently, the impotence and powerlessness of the present political condition – typically expressed with the help of images of sleeping Lions – is juxtaposed to the possibility of another “national awakening.” This notion embodies cultural memory of the first “national awakening,” which took place in the mid-19th century when Finland was a constituent part of the Russian Empire. It made an elemental part of the ideology of the Finnish nationalist movement which emphasised the separate existence of the Finnish cultural and political unit within the multinational empire. This ideology, as Matti Klinge notes, contained both conservative and radical tendencies; the former emphasised loyalty to the Emperor while the latter included references to the possibility of breaking free from the bonds of the empire.

During the first years of independent statehood the plot of awakening was re-evoked as an answer to the dilemmas that a perceived lack of integration inside and a continuous sense of being threatened from the outside brought about. Consider, for instance the way in

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96 Voionmaa 1919, 19.
97 Voionmaa 1919, 21–23.
99 See also Alapuro (1973, 99) for the transformation of the discourse of awakening which formed part of the ideology of the Finnish nationalist movement during the period of autonomy. In the independent state, the claims for awakening were first and foremost reactions to dilemmas caused by the perceived lack of integration and sense of threat.
which a Finnish Civil Guard movement magazine verbally actualised the model-image of the sleeping Lion in 1924 to critique the lenient attitude that the government displayed vis-à-vis the communists at home: “The Lion sleeps. But it will awaken. Consules! Put off – or try at least to put – from upon your people the communist-bolshevist shame and its bloody threat with all available means. If not, the people themselves will do it.”

This passage avails itself of meanings unfolding from the chivalric language game in the sense that it describes “awakening” as a chivalric act of honour. It is a statecraft speech act in the sense that it takes up the elimination of Finnish communists – i.e. the link to the political system across the border – as a means of securing a separate existence.

In 1928, another sleeping Lion appeared on the pages of Blinkfyren. The drawing is intended as a critique against recent developments in Finnish politics. As a perversion of the conventional model-image of the Guardian Lion, it serves to suggest that there is something rotten in the Finnish state.

Reference to Finnish-Russian relationships can be found in textual information that accompanies the drawing. This talks about the traditional role of the Lion as a guardian of the Finnish nation against the Beast of the East – its “vultures of tyranny and the blood-red eagle.” However, this is not the main point: by evoking the desperate appearing Lion, it actualises memories from the epoch of autonomy in order to criticise political opponents.

Textual information specifies the grounds on which the cartoon emerges as a political argument. The forces undermining the potency of the Lion are identified as “red moles and Moscow’s communist servants.” The target of its criticism is at those who harboured good relations with the Soviet Union and regarded Moscow as a source of legitimate political authority. However, in the conservative, Swedish language magazine’s argumentative retelling of this plot, bad statecraft was not only to be blamed on those displaying loyalty to the Soviet Union but also on “true Finnish students, prohibition act bandits, and the armed forces.” The curious thing here is that reference is made to the Soviet Union, but the fault line between inside and outside does not run along the Finnish-Soviet border. The question of the

100 Keski-Suomen Suojeluskuntalainen, No. 6, 1924 cit. Siltala 1985, 46.
101 Blinkfyren, Christmas Issue 1928. ‘Det förblödande lejonet.’
Soviet neighbourhood is intertwined with the domestic battle between the old, elitist order and those challenging its very premises.

In addition to the plot of sleeping, the political condition of the pre-independence period is frequently described as a condition of being chained. In a book published in 1919, the Agrarian politician Santeri Alkio referred to the Russian revolution as a suitable moment for “breaking those violence based, artificial bonds with which a foreign power has delimited our national life, pressured and prevented us.” A somewhat similar emplotment crops up visually in the Hoivannren magazine’s pictorial depiction of the event of independence. In the drawing published in January 1918, the Lion of Finland is being set free from captivity by the Russian muzhik, the personification of chauvinist policies. The fact that the former oppressor – the muzhik – is depicted setting the Lion free attests to the fact that there was, indeed, something irritating to the Finnish independence. It seemed that old ways of conceptualising Russian proximity no longer functioned in a situation where Finland had “gained freedom from Russia with the help of Russians.”

Illustrative of the pragmatist tenet that irritation brought about by the unexpected is solved on the basis of the old, images of captured Lions remained as a persistent element in the political imaginary of Finnish-Russian relationships despite independence from Russia. For one thing, the image of a captured Lion inhibited from fulfilling its guardian task was well-geared for pictorial attempts at making sense of the Finnish Civil War. It served to suggest that despite formal independence, Finland remained to some extent occupied.

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102 E.g. Voionmaa 1919, 191.
103 Alkio 1919, 16.
104 Hoivannren, No. 1, 18 January 1918. ’Nyårgåvan.’
105 Aho 1918, 54 (diary entry 29 January 1918.)
An illustration of this is a drawing published in the *Ampiainen* magazine in the spring of 1918. The iconic qualities of the animal call to mind the state’s incapability of discharging the protective task. The argument, however, is powerful against the background provided by the thought of how the chivalric Lion should be – i.e. valiant and courageous.

Indeed, the configuration can be fruitfully examined with the help of meanings that the chivalric equation renders available for interpretation. It is an actualisation of the supposedly chivalric Lion and three malevolent human Beasts. As a statecraft speech act, the former functions as the sovereign agent while the latter present the challenge against it. On this basis, the drawing sends a message about the incapacity of official Finland, captured by revolutionary forces, to secure the survival and success of the state. These chivalric elements are actualised as interpretants of the position the Finnish state was in after the dissolution of the Russian autocracy which left the country without official means of coercion. The police were considered Russified, and forced to resign, and the revolution paralysed Russian troops that had earlier upheld order in the country. In this situation, class-based militias – both bourgeois and socialist – sought arms and started to organise themselves. These developments led to the outbreak of civil war in independent Finland in the spring of 1918.

The three bestial figures stand for an outcome of these developments; the joint efforts of Finnish Reds and Russian seamen bewildered by the revolution at home. The nagaïka whip in the hand of the Russian seaman stands for Russian autocracy. It serves to suggest that with a Red victory in the Civil War, Russian domination over Finland would have continued. This mode of rule is contrasted against law and legality. In the poem that accompanies the drawing the White victory in the Civil War is emplotted as the “Lion marching on the road of law.” The final interpretant of the cartoon evokes the choice between two political possibilities; one making the state incapable of fulfilling its guardian function and the other enabling it.

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106 *Ampiainen*, No. 2–11, 8 June 1918. ‘Punaryssät ratsasti’
107 E.g. Alapuro 2004, 88–89.
functions as an index of the Finland that had ratified the treaty.

More specifically, however, the target of the configuration's criticism are the business circles – i.e. the “Finnish industry and finances” – who were seeking to profit from the transition trade between Soviet Russia and Germany which the treaty enabled. The configuration with the Impotent Lion at its center is best appreciated as a speech act condemning the businessmen’s profit-seeking actions as bad statecraft – i.e. as deeds that cast the prospects of the nation’s survival in jeopardy. The good fortuna conception according to which at least some sections of Finnish society would be able to benefit from the Russian neighbourhood is present in the configuration as a topic of criticism. Simultaneously it emphasises that virtuous conduct with regard to the Eastern neighbour demands self-sacrifice rather than pursuit of personal profits.

5.5. Securing the Home Front

In the cartoon featuring the captivated Finnish soldier and the evil serpent, the symbol of an unattended home in the background added to the persuasive powers of the argument, according to which the passive Finnish state was failing in the task of safeguarding what is

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108 Fyren, No. 1-4, 1921. 'Fredsförklaringen.'
109 According to the caption of the cartoon, “Finnish industry and finances are German vassals” and adds that “Helsinki will become a harbour for the Bolsheviks’ trade with Germany comparable to Revel (Tallinn)."
valuable in society. In it, the symbol of the home fulfils the structural position of the Treasure and, in this capacity, serves to elicit that the configuration is, indeed, a statecraft speech act.

Images of homes, houses, and castles are important elements of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia throughout the entire epoch. They actualise in particular terms the idea of the Treasure to be protected by heroic deeds. In the configuration below, the image of a shattered window provides a convenient means for expressing the fears of the disruption of economic and political stability. These fears are embodied in the joint efforts of the Finnish Red Guard and revolutionary Russians. The contrast between the comforts of home and the darkness and dangers of the world outside give momentum to the argument. This is how the contrast between inside and outside is brought into play in the drawing.

Actualising the symbol of home, and its components like windows or doors, as the Treasure was a convenient way of suggesting that the sense of threat was inherently linked to the question of an established social order and property rights. The threat or challenge that is hereby articulated is not territorial in a traditional sense, which also means that national defence does not come out as the primary means for containing the hostile influences. As a matter of fact, these configurations challenge the possibility of conceptualising Finnish-Russian relationships neatly in terms of enmity between two national units. More forcefully, they suggest a challenge to the established social order. The basic tension in these configurations is between conservatism and radicalism or between those committed to the status quo and those dedicated to its overthrow.

Something to this extent is present in the image of a violently shattered door that was published in the bourgeois magazine *Ampiainen* in October 1918. The caption of the cartoon, *The Socialist Society*, indicates that the door is actualised to function as an interpretant of the actions of the political opponents of *Ampiainen*. The symbol of a violently crushed door provides a convenient means for stripping legitimacy of the socialists’

110 Tuulispää, No. 5–20, 17 May 1918. ‘Suomen vallankumousveisu.’
111 *Ampiainen*, No. 20, 5 October 1918. ‘Sosialistinen yhteiskunta.’
demands for social change. It enables scripting the Civil War as a battle where the largely middle class based White Guards defended the interests of the bourgeoisie, the land owners, and the industrialists against the revolutionary aims of the labour movement.112

Private property as an institution is premised on the mutual recognition and acceptance of property rights. The image of a broken door is well suited for expressing ideas related to the lack of such recognition. In historical terms, the drawing can be interpreted as a response to the irritation caused by the communists’ actions. In the 1918 party programme of the Finnish Communist Party (SKP) it was explicitly stated that the aim of the party was to destroy the bourgeois state, hand all the power to the working class and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. This was also said to involve the forced acquisition of all property and land. Even if the party programme as such may not have been familiar to the bourgeoisie, this mode of thinking could have easily been found on the pages of left-wing newspapers.113

The sense of danger was aggravated by the fact that until the autumn of 1920, Finnish society was in an “interim state.” Some 80,000 members of the Red Guard were imprisoned as political detainees, and a large number of former Red Guard members and other “politically unreliable citizens” were thought to still be hiding from the authorities.114 The threat of revolution seemed to persist in the newly independent nation. This thought is explicitly expressed in a report which hard line Civil Guard activists produced in April 1919: “The secret preparations of ‘our Reds’ are becoming more and more widespread and gain more support week after week. … something awful is about to happen.”115

The liberation of the Red prisoners added to the sense of uncertainty, and meanings available in the chivalric equation were actualised to make sense of it. In July 1919 Hovnarren116

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112 For a verbal formulation of the thought that the Reds aimed at a redistribution of property, see the Swedish People’s Party MP Hjalmar Procopé’s parliamentary address: “to acquire the property of the Finnish bourgeoisie and peasantry, that is the innermost goal of this movement. … All the power will go to the proletariat and the ownership of the land will be taken away from the big and small landowners equally.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 23 July 1919, 1075.)

114 Tikka 2006, 25, 30.
116 Hovnarren, No. 12–13, 24 July 1919. ‘Bolschevikerna och vi.’
brought to mind the inability to resist the forces of bad fortuna. The drawing is a comment on the parliamentary discussion on granting amnesty to those who remained imprisoned for the sake of their participation in the 1918 “Red Rebellion.”

Representatives of the centrist government argued that granting amnesty was an act of good statecraft; integration of the Reds into the Finnish society was indispensable for the purposes of national consolidation. On the political right, however, amnesty met strong opposition; it was argued to jeopardise the survival of the Finnish state. To transmit this thought, leniency with respect to the domestic Reds is, in the drawing above, argued to leave the door open for the Russian Beast. The soldier as the representative of the Finnish state is brought out in anti-chivalric terms. Instead of being alert and valiant, he is so absorbed in reading a newspaper that he completely ignores the two malevolent male figures. The weak door that is about to give in to the weight of the muzhik suggests that the border between independent Finland and its former metropolitan country remained permeable and unsecured. On this basis, the configuration develops into an argument that granting pardon to the Reds would open the door for the Russian efforts of re-conquering Finland. To emphasise this idea, the representative of Soviet Russia is clad in traditional Russian peasant clothing which is laden with political memory from the period of Russification. It was then used to represent the Russian chauvinists who were held responsible for attempts at eliminating the special, autonomous status of the Finnish Grand Duchy and fusing it seamlessly into the multinational empire.

The Bolshevik Revolution, Finnish independence, and the Civil War were moments of irritation that forcefully contributed to the creation of the discourse on internal enemies. Images of a male figure hiding with bombs, weapons and a brim hat, figure prominently in post-Civil War cartoons. They usually represent the Finnish Reds, bringing them out as a persistent underground threat and equating the claims of the left with the foreign threat of Bolshevist Russia.

118 See the Swedish People’s Party MP Hjalmar Procopé’s argument according to which Finland will become a Soviet republic and it will be united to the Russian Soviet republic.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 23 July 1919, 1075.)
119 E.g. Immonen 1987; Valenius 2004; for policies of Russification, see Polvinen 1995.
Clandestine, malevolent figures – exemplified by the character hiding under the chair in the previous drawing and the one on the right\textsuperscript{120} – were well suited for suggesting that despite the White victory in the Civil War, the threat of revolution persisted and was intrinsically connected to Russia. In a parliamentary address in the spring of 1919, the Swedish People’s Party’s Hjalmar Procopé expressed this idea in verbal terms by arguing that “it is a fact that bombs are being delivered from Russia.”\textsuperscript{121}

In written materials these “clandestine elements” are often designated with the derogatory term “Red Russkie” (punaryssa), which explicitly equates Finnish Reds with the threat of Soviet Russia\textsuperscript{122}.

In the 1922 parliamentary elections, the communist got 27 seats out of 200.\textsuperscript{123} This was interpreted as a sign of the fact that the durability of the independent, bourgeois state was not fully secured. Although the communists’ political support was too meagre to amount to a real threat of revolutionary uprising, their open adulation of the Soviet system upheld this way of imagining the significance of Soviet Russia’s neighbourhood for independent Finland.\textsuperscript{124}

During the first months of 1923, discussion concerning the liberation of political prisoners started again. A motion of censure demanding amnesty for political prisoners was presented to the government both by the Social Democrats and the Finnish Socialist Workers’ Party.

\textsuperscript{120} Hovnarren, No. 5–6, 20 March 1919. ‘Eget hem’ (extract).
\textsuperscript{121} Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 23 July 1919, 1075. See also the National Coalition Party’s A.H. Virkunen’s argument that “the revolt is being prepared again” and that “the coming to light of all those plans has disclosed the Red terror, which is raising its head in all its nakedness;” and the Social Democrat MP Edvard Helle’s critical address concerning claims that the “spirit of the revolt” was still strong in the country. Helle characterises the news concerning the discovery of clandestine bombs and weapons as intentional provocation. (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 11 April 1919, 55; 29 April 1919, 205.)
\textsuperscript{122} The Finnish word ryssä, Russkie has a pejorative connotation. Interestingly enough it was a matter of political debate whether it is politically correct to use the word to designate Russians. In a debate in the Parliament, MP Wuorimaa argued that “representative Wuolijoki regretted my use of the word Russkie [ryssä] to refer to the Russkies: But is Representative Wuolijoki unaware of the fact that, for instance, the Swedes call the Russkies ryssar, the English the Russian, the Germans die Russen and that the Russies themselves call themselves russkij.” MP Wuolijoki: “I am pleased to hear that Representative Wuorimaa has used the notion Russkie [ryssä] ... whereas we others, according to the Finnish language, call them Russians [venäläisiksi] and that he means nothing bad.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919; 29 April 1919, 208.) See also Hyvämäki 1971, 78.
\textsuperscript{123} In addition to the 27 seats of the communist Finnish (Socialist) Workers Party, the National Coalition Party got 35 seats, Swedish People’s Party 25, Agrarian Party 45, National Progressive Party 15, Social Democratic Party 53 (Vares 1991, 41.)
\textsuperscript{124} See also Vares 1991, 45.
This fed fears of a relapse into revolution.\textsuperscript{125} The symbol of the house occupied the spot of the Treasure in \textit{Tuulispää}'s\textsuperscript{126} interpretation of these events. It served to suggest that the Finnish social order (\textit{Suomen yhteiskuntarakennus}) was threatened by the ‘elements,’ by the ‘fire’ of revolution.

The Beast of this configuration is identified as an “agent of Moscow” (\textit{Moskovan asiamies}); this ragged figure is sticking his behind out and using leftist newspapers as a fire-lighter for rebellion and revolution (\textit{vallankumousta}).\textsuperscript{127}

Actualising the Beast as a worn-out figure characterises the external threat in a specific way; it is not a matter of overwhelming power and use of explicit force but rather of underground instigation. The neighbourhood of the Soviet Union, the configuration postulates, is a matter of bad \textit{fortuna} for Finland because it presents a clandestine challenge to the established social order.

The point of the drawing is to critique the Finnish communists for their incapability of telling the Beast apart from the Knight. The male figure representing the Finnish communist newspapers is horrified by the policeman and designates this guardian of the social order as \textit{ohrana} – the secret service of the Russian Emperor that had spread fear among the Finns during the toughest years of the Finnish autonomy. In the heated parliamentary discussion on the motion, the Finnish Socialist Workers’ Party MP Heikki Mäkinen also identified the Beast in the “bourgeois state” of Finland, which he critiqued for sustaining the “class state” with the help of “the Civil Guard, \textit{ohrana}, regressive corps of officers, obedient army of policemen etc.”\textsuperscript{128} It is easy to appreciate the configuration above as an answer to the dilemma that Mäkinen’s words also touch upon; it ironically replicates the political left’s way of problematising these events. Simultaneously, it brings to bear on two competing ways of conceptualising

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{125} For an illustrative discussion, see Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1923, 13 March 1923, 314–407. See also Jutikkala 1964, 32.
\item \textsuperscript{126} \textit{Tuulispää}, No. 3, 19 January 1923. ‘Suomen bolshevikit hädissään.’
\item \textsuperscript{127} See also the National Coalition Party’s Lauri Ingman’s address to the Parliament which blames the Finnish Communist Party operating from Moscow as well as the communist newspapers (esp. \textit{Suomen Työmies}) for “having tried to systematically to poison morally our working population … [and] sowing distrust and bitterness.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1923, 13 March 1923, 318.)
\item \textsuperscript{128} Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1923, 13 March 1923, 394.
\end{itemize}
challenge to the durability of the state – “one based on a political imaginary of irreconcilably antagonistic, warring classes; the other based on a political imaginary of mutually exclusive, potentially hostile nation-states.”  

The Social Democrats’ Kurikka evoked the image of a house on fire to put forth a somewhat different interpretation of Finnish-Russian relationships. In post-Civil War Finland the social democrats adopted a loyal attitude toward the new republic particularly in matters concerning relations with the former metropolitan country. However, the idea of the primary conflict existing between antagonistic classes rather than nation-states, remains a crucial part of their political argumentation. Historical context for the below actualisation is provided by the developments in the Russian region of Eastern Karelia.

Towards the end of the year 1921, an armed revolt against local Soviet authorities broke out in this region that formed part of the dreams for a Greater Finland but that Finland no longer officially aspired to occupy. These events became known as the “Eastern Karelian people’s uprising.” As the rebels requested assistance from Finland, Estonia and Poland, the government refused to involve itself in the matter but approved of the recruitment of a force of some 500 volunteers to be sent across the border in November 1921. In the Finnish bourgeois publicity the uprising was interpreted as being motivated by despair, and money was collected to support the rebellions. The left, however, made another interpretation of them and condemned the actions of the Finnish right for irresponsible and negligent conduct which was prone to have tragic consequences. For its part, the Soviet government conceived these developments as its internal problem and sent three

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130 Kurikka, No. 2, 14 January 1922. “Pro Karelia” eli karjalaisten asema kansannousuissa.’
131 Selén 1987, 130; Hentilä 1999, 139.
132 Helsingin Sanomat (1921a) argues that the main reason for the unrest is despair and the disillusionment. See also Turun Sanomat (1921a).
133 E.g. Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1921, Vol. 3, 4 April 1922, 2458–2461.
notes to the Finnish government blaming it for meddling in its internal affairs, instigating the rebellions, furnishing the rebels with weapons and sending troops of Finnish officers across the border.\footnote{E.g.\textit{Helsingin Sanomat} 1921b; \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} 1921c; \textit{Turun Sanomat} 1921b.}

\textit{Kurikka’s} drawing on the previous page resorts to meanings available in the knightly formula to describe these developments. It is, indeed, possible to identify the model-images of the Knight, the Treasure, and the Beast in the drawing. Twisting the terms of chivalry provided a handy way to display the Finnish involvement in the uprising in bad light – i.e. to characterise it as bad statecraft. The configuration may, indeed, be treated as an answer to the question over whether activist involvement was to be regarded as virtuous political conduct or not.

In virtue of his brutal appearance, the Civil Guard soldier in whom one might expect to find the Knight is far removed from the qualities commonly associated with the brave guardian of the Treasure.\footnote{According to Väinö Tanner, namely the Civil Guard movement was to blame for its involvement in Russian affairs; “it has been possible to make the observation that almost all the youngsters that have left for Karelia have been in Civil Guard outfits.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1921, 29 December 1921, 1639.)} He is pictured setting a house in fire and thus jeopardizing the Karelian people.\footnote{In topical terms, the people running out of their home stand for the Karelian refugees who fled to Finland as a result of the uprising and whose fate presently formed a topic of political debates (e.g. Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1921, Vol. 3, 4 April 1922, 2458–2463.)} Instead of a plot of protection, he calls to mind the plot of destruction. The message that comes out from this actualisation is that the Finnish right wing activists were not acting altruistically but instead used the uprising as a pretext for selfishly furthering their plans for the creation of the Greater Finland.\footnote{For an argument that certain right-wing circles used the uprising as a pretext for furthering the cause of Greater Finland and that such a policy was prone to have a tragic end, see the Social Democrat MP Laukkonen’s and MP Puro’s speeches at the Parliament (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1921, Vol. 3, 4 April 1922, 2458–2461.) Cf. Vares 1991, 33.} This thought is bolstered by the fact that the bestial soldier is accompanied by another brutal figure, a Russian \textit{muzhik} in his chemise – a familiar symbol of Russian imperialism and chauvinism. This associates the Finns’ interventions with oppressive and imperialist policies and, in virtue of this, drains them of all \textit{virtù}.

In the Finnish Parliament, the activists’ efforts were interpreted in similar terms. In December 1921 the Social Democrats’ Väinö Tanner put forth a motion of censure which demanded to know whether the Finnish government was aware of such “illicit humanitarian action to help the people of East Karelia” and issued a warning against all “adventurous policies” in the Russian direction. According to Tanner, the rebellion in Karelia was strictly an internal affair for Russia, and Finland had no right whatsoever to intervene in it.\footnote{Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1921, 29 December 1921, 1627, 1631, 1637. See also Jääskeläinen 1962b, 92–93; Korhonen 1966, 54–55.}
Both Tanner’s speech and the cartoon configuration have the strategy of activism vis-à-vis Russia as their prime target of criticism. When evaluated in anti-chivalric terms, these measures emerge as something problematic with regard to the goal of securing the survival and success of the political unit. It seems legitimate to interpret this discussion within the framework of statecraft speech acts – i.e. as a part of debates revolving around the possibility of an existential negation. An explicit illustration of such possibility can be found, for instance, in the editorial of *Helsingin Sanomat* which cites the Soviet newspaper *Pravda*’s argument that the present developments will “‘open to question’ the present legal status of Finland – that is, the existence of the Finnish state.” However, in his argumentation, Tanner refutes the interpretation that the neighbourhood of Russia as such would be a matter of bad fortuna and an existential threat for Finland, and suggests instead that the issue ought to be treated “as if across our eastern border there were England, France, or some other state and not the Soviet Russia.” In other words, he seeks to conceive of Finnish-Russian relations within the framework of normalcy.

5.6. Politics in Harsh Surroundings

Harsh surroundings provide a persistent component to the Finnish political imaginary on Russia during the epoch of 1918–1930s. It is linked to the motif of the ‘difficult task,’ which is a prerequisite for the acquisition of the Treasure and has spun the heroic deeds throughout time across the world. In the “Machiavellian” way of conceptualising the dynamics of political life, the notion of necessity (*necessità*) is isomorphic with this motif. From the point of view of this work’s research task of contemplating what it means to ‘observe Russia as Finns,’ it is interesting to note that in the political imaginary of Finnish-Russian relations, the problem of necessity is explicitly linked to the Russian proximity. Consider, for instance, the characterisation of Finland by the activist politician Elias Simojoki in February 1923:

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139 See also Social Democrat MP Keto’s address which treats involvement in the rebellion as “the most unwise policy ... [as a result of which] Russia will for long observe Finnish Russian policies with suspicion.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1921, 29 December 1921, 1653.)

140 *Helsingin Sanomat* 1921d.

141 “After the peace treaty of Tartu, Finland lives in friendly relations with the Soviet Russia. ... In other words, we have to treat this question as if across our eastern border there were England, France, or some other state and not the Soviet Russia.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1921, 29 December 1921, 1639–1640.)

142 Campbell 1968, 344.
History has placed our people on a frosty and frozen soil, planted next to a gigantic blood enemy, given a bark bread to the hand, a tool for removing stones from the field to another and said: ‘Procreate and fill the earth!’

The drawing on the left evokes the thought of harsh surroundings for its comment on the topical parliamentary discussion over the need to solidify the Finnish territorial defences. If the dark horizon does not do the trick of evoking the idea of danger, the figure of a Soviet moloch contributes to the sense of threat and serves to suggest that exceptional prowess and virtù – i.e. qualities of the Knight – are needed in order to maintain the state in the difficult conditions. By inquiring into the grounds of the sign we also learn that such qualities are to be found in the army.

Indeed, the Knight of this configuration is the Finnish soldier who, in virtue of iconic sign features, is set apart from the tail-suit-clad male characters representing the three Scandinavian countries – Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. The soldier of the drawing is an embodiment of such chivalric qualities as bravery and alertness, while his Scandinavian counterparts appear lazy and chubby. Historical context for this configuration is provided by the Danish and Swedish governments’ decisions to diminish armed forces which led to a political debate over whether Finland could follow their lead. The position of this configuration, obviously, is that such a move would not qualify as good statecraft but would instead cast the Finnish political unit in danger. It suggests that while the other Nordic countries may be able to afford such a luxury, Finnish-Russian relations are conducted in surroundings that neces-

143 Simojoki 1942, 41.
144 Tuulispää, No. 51–52, 18 December 1924. ‘Miksi Suomen on oltava valmiina, vaikka Skandinavia nukkuu?’ For the discussion, see Jutikkala 1964, 38
145 See the Prime Minister Lauri Ingman’s (National Coalition Party) address to the Parliament in which he critiques the “sleight of hand” in which Swedish and Danish examples are used as examples to promote diminishing Finnish national defences. See also the Social Democrat MP Martti Puitinrin’s speech according to which “the question of general peace-lovingness ... has been speeded up by the Danish Labour government’s decision to destroy the defence establishment in its present form.” Puitinrin took the view that although peace-lovingness was something characteristic to the labour movement, a Finnish socialist had to take a different view to it: “we have been thrown into a totally different and more dangerous spot on the globe than the Danes. One must take into account the fact that Denmark has an established independence. It seems not to have any as dangerous neighbours as we perhaps have.” (Proceedings of the II Parliamentary Session 1924, 9 December 1924, 1470, 1480.)
situate military preparedness. This is explicitly expressed in the caption of the cartoon – “why does Finland have to be alert although Scandinavia sleeps?”

The idea of Finnish exceptionalism – a belief that Finland differs drastically from other nations because of its unique position as a neighbour to Russia – is, indeed, prevalent in the corpus. This way of imagining also seems to form part of more recent Finnish political imaginaries. Consider, for instance, a prominent Finnish sociologist’s account of the peculiarly Finnish characteristics of “strength of mind and self-control ... which can be made understandable by the centuries’ long need for precaution vis-à-vis Russia and the Soviet Union.”

The analysis seems to associate Russia and the Soviet Union with the symbolic figure of for\textit{tuna} familiar from the “Machiavellian” account of the dynamics of political life – i.e. with the source of contingencies which call for a virtuoso capable of turning it into good fortune.

In this capacity, the plot of exceptionalism yields considerable rhetorical power for various kinds of arguments; it can be harnessed to support quite different policy lines vis-à-vis Russia.

In the research material, Finnish exceptionalism is frequently evoked by describing Finland as “the shield of the West against the East.” In fact, the previous cartoon is not the only instance where claims about the Finns’ special place in the world provide a convenient background for the type of argumentation which by calling to mind the image of the Knight – i.e. qualities of heroism and audaciousness – promotes increases in the military budget. Consider, for instance, the words of P. Mustapää (Martti Haavio) from 1930:

... there can be no peace movement in this country. ... If the neighbour was a civilised country, no matter which one, we might be able to wander in peace on our roads, fields, streets and in our rooms. ... But our neighbour is not a civilised country but a country of unexpected events, of mysteries, wild and crazy passions, enormous Russia where nobody makes peace but war, nobody sharpens ploughshares but swords. ... Let us remain calm. At the same time, we must cherish our army so that it is always ready. If we feast on dreams of world peace, a window might get broken and a fire-spitting

\footnote{146 Vesa Vares (1991, 51) argues that while autonomous Finland had been pacifistic and relied on the force of civilisation and culture as the shield against dangers, the newly independent country became infatuated with its armed forces – military virtues became an important part of the official credo of white Finland. This might well be the case, but there is no complete consensus; in political debates, the question over whether to increase or decrease the military budget crops up from time to time.}

\footnote{147 Alapuro 1993, 13.}

\footnote{148 For a somewhat similar interpretation of Machiavelli’s \textit{virtù} and \textit{fortuna}, See Pocock 1975, 161.}

\footnote{149 Santamäki 1930, 122.}
tank might against the night sky. In this country, one must dream of peace with a gun under one’s pillow.\(^{150}\)

Emplotments that verge on heroism and chivalry are frequently contrasted with egoistic, cowardly, and untrustworthy conduct – characteristics that in the above drawing were embodied in the human figures representing the three Scandinavian countries. This way of imagining international politics is also well reflected in the words of the Agrarian politician Santeri Alkio: “none of the European great powers will reveal its weapons for the sake of us. For that reason, we must ourselves always remain alert.”\(^ {151}\) There is something “Machiavellian” to this thought – it suggests that the best way of safeguarding the survival of the political entity in the vicinity of Russia is to rely on one’s own virtù; the virtù of others is unreliable and might suddenly turn against oneself\(^ {152}\).

In a similar vein, the Social Democrats’ Väinö Voionmaa evoked the model-image of ‘harsh surroundings’ in 1919 to hallow the newly gained Finnish independence: notable about these poetic words is the way in which they associate the idea of harsh surroundings to foreign rule.

Our state is a tree that has grown in relentless tempest. It has had to plant its roots firmly on the soil of its own terrain, and cultivate its trunk from tenacious ingredients. In the feet of endless wars and under the rule of foreign powers our state has continuously grown and hardened. ... At the end, the Finnish elements have conquered all the others.\(^ {153}\)

In the previous drawing many stock ingredients of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia are intertwined. The vanguard plot unfolds from the knightly image of the Finnish soldier. The “Machiavellian” model-images of necessity, virtù, and fortuna come together in the underlying mode of reasoning which suggests that due to the country’s geographical position (necessità), and the heroic qualities of its inhabitants (virtù), taming fortuna has been Finland’s historical mission in the world.

A similar mode of imagining can be found in written materials. In the book entitled *When Finland Blocked the March Route of Red Russia Into Western Europe*, published in

\(^{150}\) Mustapää 1930, 306–308.

\(^{151}\) Alkio 1922, 50.


\(^{153}\) Voionmaa 1919, 343.
1936, 154 “Finland’s fight for independence” is described in heroic terms – as “one of the most remarkable incidents in world history, comparable in the heroic quality of many of its phases only to events in the history of ancient Greece.” 155 What is interesting about this configuration is the way in which it claims that the “enormous sacrifices” were undertaken in the interests of universal order, on behalf of a universal morality of what is right. Against this background the Finnish Civil War – or the “War of Independence” – emerges as something decisive in the political history of Western Europe.

Meanings unfolding from the chivalric language-game have a key role in these arguments. Consider, for instance, the following passage from the above mentioned book: “For in the Finnish War of Independence the Finnish people were not only defending, at the cost of enormous sacrifices, the sanctity of their hearths and their independence, but blocking in a series of fierce battles the march route of Red Russia into West Europe, and were thus instrumental in checking the spreading of a general Red conflagration.” 157 Soviet Russia emerges as the Beast that is threatening Western Europe in its entirety, due to which the exercise of active virtù as a means of containing its spread gains momentum. Indeed, when intertwined with the plot of spread and conflagration, the vanguard plot provides a powerful rhetorical device for legitimising belligerent policies. Simultaneously, it endows the argument with a sense of self-righteousness – the Beast is depicted as opposing not ‘us’ in particular, but the very moral order that the heroic Knight in a self-sacrificing manner defends.

The plot of harsh surroundings often combines with the plot of exceptional sufferings that the Finns have had to live through. 158 The activist politician Edvard Hjelt actualised it in an article written in 1918. The passage is actually a citation from an Austrian newspaper Neue Freie Presse, but the fact that Hjelt copied it to his memoirs testifies to the fact that it resonates with his political imaginary: “After severe sufferings have the inhabitants of Finland – Swedes and Finns – who have had to tolerate decades of torture acquired their right of independence by fighting.” 159 Notable here is the way in which the plot of sufferings is connected to the figure of the Knight who has had to show exceptional courage in order to become the heroic figure that he now is. In this capacity, it is in line with the “Machiavellian” idea that necessity elicits virtù – those political units thrive that are “pushed on to action by

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154 The book is an abridged English version of the activist politician Erkki Räikkönen’s book Seinäsuomed ja itsenäisyys-seuntaat.
155 Räikkönen 1936, 3.
156 Räikkönen 1936, 17.
157 Räikkönen 1936, 17.
158 See also Väinö Voionmaa’s argument (1919, 11) which characterises the Finnish position as one of standing at an abyss: “With a double fear we feel that our own fatherland is standing by an abyss, that the existence of our own state is in doubt.”
159 Hjelt 1919.
energy or necessity.”¹⁶⁰ In his analysis of political life Machiavelli contrasts “sterile sites” with “fertile sites”. The former are personified by a non-nurturing mother and likened to necessity. But virtue is made out of necessity by suggesting that such sterile conditions force men into early autonomy and thus foster their virtù. In contrast, a fertile site tends to make “men lazy and unfit for all vigorous [virtuoso] activity.”¹⁶¹

Similarly, in Hjelt’s interpretation, independent Finland has succeeded in making virtue out of necessity: “A country which is heroic, gutsy, and receptive to all forms of progress is worthy of freedom and joins as an independent state the family of European nations.”¹⁶² In addition to the fact that these meanings unfold from the chivalric formula, they further allude to a way of thought where skilful political action is judged along the axis of impetuosity vs. prudence. This may, indeed, be singled out as the final interpretant of these passages.

If the harsh environment in which Finnish-Russian relations are conducted requires the qualities of the Knight, characterising certain policy choices with anti-chivalric attributes wields considerable rhetorical power for political argumentation.

In February 1919, the image of an impotent Lion cropped up on the pages of Tuulis-pää to comment on the consequences of the Russian proximity.¹⁶³ Russian refugees who had fled the chaos and havoc of the Russian Civil War were fleeing to Finland and thus challenged the newly independent state’s sense of separation from Russia. The image of a flock of rats defying the natural obstacle of the river and the man-made obstacle of barbed wire was actualised to stand for the fact that after the Finnish state restricted the influx, the Russians found other clandestine routes to enter the country.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Machiavelli 1996, 7–10 (I: 1); Pitkin 1984, 244–245.
¹⁶² Hjelt 1919, 87. Note also Lauri Santanäki’s argument that “the history of the Finnish people is a history of great sufferings and losses. It is a tale of the exertions of a small people in extremely difficult external circumstances. It ... is a tale of such force and endurance, talent and working capacity that a people to whom it belongs can rely on its own skills and capacities.”
¹⁶³ Tuulis-pää, No. 6, 7 February 1919. ‘Välikysymykset eduskunnassa.’
¹⁶⁴ Haimila 1996, 82; see Nevalainen 1999 for an elaborate historical account on Russian refugees in Finland. Nevalainen (1999, 16–17) argues that at the end of the year 1918, there were some 3,000 Russian citizens in Finland who had fled from the country after the revolution. By the end of the year 1919 their number had risen to 5,000.
Unlike the knightly Lion, this Lion appears timid and scared. Instead of protecting the Maiden – the task that he is expected to undertake – he seeks protection on her shoulders. The drawing relates to the Agrarian’s Santeri Alkio’s motion of censure concerning the presence of Russians in Finland. The Impotent Lion provided a convenient means for suggesting that the government’s policy with regard to the Russian refugees jeopardised the well being of the Finnish political unit. This message is strengthened by the loaf of bread in the lap of the Maiden. It represents the famine which, at the time, plagued both Finland and Russia and further emphasises the incompatibility of the Finns’ and Russian refugees’ interests.

The rats were, indeed, well-suited for expressing the new type of threat that was associated with the proximity of Russia. If the Bear, the Eagle, and the Cossack evoke either the might of Russia or its instrumental power, the Rats call to mind a different kind of challenge. These parasitical animals produce an image of danger emanating from the weak, civil war ridden Russia. Instead of calling to mind overwhelming force, autocracy, or conquest, they invoke an apocalyptic plot of contagion, destruction, and decay – i.e. specific kinds of political facts emerge from them.

In this context, it is interesting to point to Sergei Medvedev’s interpretation according to which the construction of the Finnish state and national consciousness was an attempt to distinguish oneself from the bordering entropy. Medvedev claims that the “architects” of Finnish identity in the 19th century were not simply building it as an antithesis to Russian imperial rule, but rather as an opposition to chthonic forces of chaos. “[For] a small community bordering on the vast and insuperable Eurasian space (and for centuries being an administrative part of it), the only way to survive was to try and dissociate itself from it; in an attempt to break out of space, Finland came up with a structured and delineated territory.”

In Medvedev’s analysis the Finnish state was therefore always preoccupied with its territory and borders. “It was and essentially remains a state par excellence.” The configuration under analysis here is basically an argument about the failure of such attempts. Rats as the Beasts of the cartoon defy the fence of barbed wire separating the territory from entropy and highlight the fact that Finnish-Russian relations unfold in harsh surroundings due to which

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165 According to Alkio, it made no difference whether someone was a member of the bourgeoisie or a bolshevik; as Russians they were automatically a threat to the Finnish survival. The aim of those entering Finland as refugees, Alkio suggested, was to bring Finland back into a union with Russia. Given this, he argued against letting Russian refugees into the country and criticised the government for its incapacity to contain bad fortuna. Prime Minister Lauri Ingman had a different view to the refugee problem; on the basis of selective Russophobia/-philia, he made a distinction between the bolsheviks and the representatives of “civilised Russia” and on that basis argued against Alkio’s anti-Russianness. (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1918, 17 January 1919, esp. 380–318, 384–386.)

166 Medvedev 1998, 5.

their management requires exceptional strength. There is, indeed, something uncontrollable pertaining to the pack of parasitic animals; like an unrestrained mass of water, their influx defies any obstacle separating Finland from Russia.\textsuperscript{168} When the refugee problem is made sense of with recourse to this configuration, the humanitarian discourse is easily silenced and the problem is turned into a statecraft speech act that revolves around the question of the survival of the state. This way of thought is quite explicitly summed up by Santeri Alkio who argued that the government’s “humanity and humaneness” were inappropriate for dealing with “\textit{this issue} [which] we have to approach as a question of pure realpolitik.”\textsuperscript{169}

The initial sense of forward-thrusting optimism and omnipotence relating to the territorialisation of the independent position was captured on the cover of the bourgeois \textit{Tuulispää’s “liberation issue.”}\textsuperscript{170} The drawing is an attempt to make sense of the new political situation by depicting a heroic and mighty Finnish soldier evicting a tiny Russian figure from the Finnish territory, towards the “Land of the Russkies” (Ryssänmaa). The \textit{Stahlhelmet} on the bicycle rack may be interpreted as a reminder of the German contribution to the “liberation.”\textsuperscript{171} Here too, the landscape makes an integral part of the argument. The sense of optimism is intensified by the fact that the wind also seems to be on the side of the Finns; it blows from the West to the East.

The Social Democrats’ Väinö Voionmaa, however, viewed the sense of almightiness with a critical eye. His criticism is interesting since it contains a different way of representing \textit{virtù} in Finnish-Russian relations. In a book issued in 1919 Voionmaa suggests that “the recently shy and restricted sights of our people now courageously extend beyond the borders of Finland and the long oppressed country senses a swelling strength in its veins. ... In the imagination of some citizens, the country has all of a sudden become a military power if not a great

\textsuperscript{168} MP Tekla Hultin evoked a similar motif when she argued that “the subjects of Russia are flooding into the country.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1918, 17 January 1919, 389.)

\textsuperscript{169} Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1918, 17 January 1919, 388; emphasis original.

\textsuperscript{170} \textit{Tuulispää}, No. 5–20, 17 March 1918. ‘Ryssänmaa.’

\textsuperscript{171} There are three commonly shared names for the war of 1918. The defeated, particularly the social democrats, preferred the notion ‘civil war’ (\textit{kansalaiskota}), the communists and the left wing socialists designated it as a ‘class war’ (\textit{luokkasota}), while the victors talked about the ‘liberation war’ (\textit{vapaussota}). (E.g. Alapuro 2004, 89.) The choice of the term and interpretation is evidently a political choice.
power. Charles XII with his long sword has again started to flail among us.” Voionmaa actualises the meanings available in the chivalric formula for the purposes of argumentatively challenging the sense of optimism and greatness that is exemplified by the previous drawing. He suggests that “blade political boasting and bragging,” is not the best method of securing the survival and success of the political unit but is prone to lead to devastation. He finds virtù in prudent restraint rather than impetuous conduct.

The cartoon below was published in the Swedish speaking conservatives’ *Garm* in the winter of 1936. The Finnish-Russian border region is pictured as a harsh environment by displaying it as an area where wild beasts roam around freely. The wolves furnished with (presumably) red stars represent the Soviet Union and are in the structural position of the Beast. Wandering across the Finnish border towards Scandinavia they actualise the thought of threat as Soviet expansionism. The sturdy Finnish male with widespread legs and a weapon in his hand is an embodiment of heroic masculinity and, in this quality, emerges as a potential Knight.

The drawing is a comment on the Finnish government’s announcement in early December 1935 that the country followed a non-aligned policy with a Nordic orientation. Its point is to critique the chosen policy line. For these purposes, the potential Nordic allies of Finland are depicted as figures incapable of undertaking any knightly deeds. Norway is represented by a tired old man peacefully smoking his pipe while Sweden is personified by a young lady immersed in observing her beauty in the mirror. On this basis, the cartoon puts

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172 Voionmaa 1919, 17, 317.
173 *Garm*, No. 3, 1 February 1936. ‘Vargar i Norden.’
174 See esp. the Prime Minister Kivimäki’s address in the parliament on 5 December 1935; he argues that “since the interests of Finland first and foremost demand the preservation of neutrality, it is natural that Finland orientates itself to the Scandinavian direction to which our country is connected in virtue of its geography, history, economic policy, culture and a similar world view that has developed out of them. ... Among the key tasks of the Finnish foreign policy is to cooperate with the Scandinavian countries in order to guarantee the shared neutrality.” The parliamentary debate that issued does not contain any views radically challenging the Scandinavian orientation although some MPs stress the importance of national rather than Nordic solutions. (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1935, 5 December 1935, 2509–2526, esp. 2514.) See also Korhonen 1971, 131; Soikkanen 1983, 77–97.
forth an argument that the chosen policy leaves the Nordic countries unguarded against the Eastern Beast.

The choice between the German and the Nordic orientations was one of the key dilemmas of Finnish foreign policy in the mid-1930s and, given the Garm magazine’s sympathies towards the German regime, it may seem legitimate to consider the previous configuration as a response to it. The Soviet Union was suspicious of Finnish intentions; Soviet doubts were quite poetically expressed in an article that was published in the Soviet newspaper Pravda in September 1935: “German mermaids crop up from the pale waves of the Baltic Sea and whisper to the enchanted Finns that the task of their country is to shock the world and save it from bolshevism.”175 In the face of such doubts, Nordic non-alignment was intended to be interpreted as an act of taking distance from Germany.176 Parliamentary parties and public discussion generally approved of the Nordic orientation, but right wing radicals were suspicious of whether Swedish society would be able to “stop the spread of the Marxist poison” and promoted the “Southern orientation” in its “widest sense.”177

Towards the end of the 1930s political and military tension in Northern Europe grew. At the turn of the year 1936 to 1937, the image of a heroic, upright soldier positioned in harsh surroundings cropped up on the pages of Blinkfyren to make sense of it. The thought of the Soviet neighbourhood as bad fortuna is transmitted by depicting the horizon to the east enveloped in dark colours.

The configuration follows the structure of statecraft speech acts although the Knight is alone present in it. It is accompanied by a poem which brings out its character as an encounter between the heroic Knight and his bestial opponent: “I am standing on guard on the border against the East/ I see wolf’s eyes glowing in the brink of the forest...”178 On this basis, the configuration promotes the necessity for hero-deeds and proactive measures in Finnish-Russian relationships. Turning attention again to the poem enables specifying the point that it makes; by characterising the Nordic orientation in terms of “angel-like voices” and “the psalms of freedom” and contrasting them

176 Wåståjerna 1962, 201; Korhonen 1971, 130.
177 Soikkanen 1983, 93; see also Wåståjerna 1962, 199.
178 Blinkfyren, No. 7–8, Christmas Issue 1936. Gränsvaktens jultankar.
with “the shield of Germany that protects the freedom of Finland” the drawing develops into a criticism against reliance on Nordic cooperation. Furthermore, by linking the Nordic orientation with feminine features and wishful thinking and the German to stern protection it comes to suggest that only an alliance with Germany would enable securing Finnish survival in harsh surroundings.

5.7. Know Thy Heroes

Besides the juxtaposition between the socialists and the non-socialists, there ran another dividing line within post-Civil War Finland; in political discussions the heroic activists were frequently contrasted to “slackers” within the non-socialist camp, i.e. those incapable of imposing form upon the contingencies of fortuna. In the bourgeois publicity, various Anti-Knights were actualised to transmit thought related to the disappointment with which the activists of White Finland viewed the independent state. They claimed that the independent country did not respond to the dreams entertained during the period of Russification and the Civil War. The country was described as an unfinished project; this was a convenient way of uplifting active measures intended at carrying the project to its end. The failure of the monarchical project in 1919, the adoption of the republican form of government, and the consequent failure to establish ‘firm governmental power’ were described as signs of weakness that rendered the political unit’s durability questionable.179

In the right wing sources, official Finland is frequently depicted as unable to undertake any heroic deeds, and the task of sustaining the nation against internal and external shocks is assigned to the Civil Guards.180 In these statecraft speech acts the indexical aspect of the Knight is fixed on these voluntary, paramilitary troops that identified themselves explicitly with White Finland and numbered some 80–100,000 men. On several occasions, qualities unfolding from the image of the Knight are actualised in order to qualitatively compare the Civil Guards with the Finnish army. The following configuration is expressive of the way in which Civil Guard soldiers were brought out as knightly guarantors of national existence; they were depicted as self-sacrificing defenders of homes (eget hem) against malevolent, clandestine forces associated with the Eastern neighbour.181

179 Klinge 1964, 134; Siltala 1985, 35; Vares 1991, 51.
180 The Civil Guards were first founded to assist the police after the general strike in 1905 and they served as the backbone of the White Army – or as “government troops” – during the Civil War. In the summer of 1918 they formed the local units of the White Army and were made its reserve in the autumn of 1918. (E.g. Selén 2001; Tikka 2006, 31.)
181 Siltala 1985, 497.
The activist politician Elmo Kaila’s letter to a fellow activist exemplifies this mode of conceiving of the dynamics of political life: “The future of Finland cannot and must not be left in the hands of the government since the parliament can, sooner or later, be half red inside and compliant outside. ... Those citizens whose achievement the independence of Finland is, must take action to guarantee that their achievements will not disappear in the hands of the Reds and the liberals.”

From the point of view of the task of sketching the thought-paradigm of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia on the basis of keeping an eye on variation in the way in which the chivalric formula is actualised, it is interesting to note that in this drawing, compliance is identified as a source of danger and pro-active measures identified as heroism.

The communists’ satirical magazine *Tuisku* had a different view to heroism. It did not identify Knights in the Finnish Civil Guard movement, but instead depicted it as a malicious force provoking Finnish peasants to violence. The Civil Guard movement is blamed for instigating the bestial in the peasant and turning him into an existential threat against his compatriots.

The drawing was issued in December 1928 – at the time of the first major anti-communist agitations in the Finnish Ostrobothnia region. It is best understood as a response to an article issued in the bourgeois Kokoomus party’s *Uusi Suomi* newspaper which, reflective of the religious and agrarian features of Finnish patriotism, argued that the commemorative monument of the independence of Finland should display an Ostrobothnian religiously devoted man. *Tuisku* was critical of such sacralisation of the ‘heroes’ of the Civil War. The configuration sug-

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183 *Tuisku*, No. 23, 15 December 1928. ‘Eräs ehdotus itsenäisyyden patsaaksi.’
184 See also Pekonen 1987, 45.
gests that the proposed monument was a perversion of heroism and virtuosity. On this basis it develops into a powerful critique of the violent legacy of the 1918 Civil War and its alleged Knights. Instead of depicting the Civil Guard as a force capable of upholding the life of the society, they are brought out as a destructive force. In this capacity, the drawing illustrates how political imaginary may also be harnessed for the purposes of subversive resignification.

One of the most obvious ways of actualising the chivalric equation and of bringing out the Knight is to represent the Beast as a serpentine creature – a snake, hydra, or dragon. The image of a heroic man challenging a repulsive reptile is rich in associations and calls to mind the widespread legend of St. George – the tale of a young man sacrificing himself in the battle against evil.

When called upon to create an image of the heroism of the Civil Guard, the legendary battle between St. George and the dragon was conveniently available in cultural history for that purpose. In May 1919, Hovnarren actualised it in a form which easily calls to mind the ancient legend. In other words, the drawing is an actualised interpretant of the legend of St. George and the Dragon; it has been geared for present purposes by fixing the indexical dimensions of these signs on something topical.

The configuration is best taken as an answer to the topical dilemma which the ongoing Russian Civil War posed to the newly independent Finland. This interpretation is supported by the caption of the cartoon which specifies that the Beast against whom the hero pits his courage stands for bolshevism. On this basis, the drawing comes to suggest that the Civil Guard were capable of securing the survival of the political unit by preventing the spread of bolshevik ideology in Finland. Similar configurations are prevalent in the corpus and, in some instances, the heads of the hydra are identified not only with bolshevism but also with Russian cities. A special symbolic role is played by the city of St. Petersburg, which was then located only some 23 kilometres from

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185 In Latin *draco* signifies both dragon and snake (Hall 1974, 285).
186 *Hovnarren*, No. 9, 1 May 1919. ‘Sankt Skyddskår och bolshevikdraken.’
187 See also Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 30 October 1919, 1342.
the Finnish border. It thus intertwines with the thought that Finnish-Russian relations are played out in harsh surroundings.

The Social Democrats’ Voionmaa also argued that as long as the metropolis of St. Petersburg exists, Finland’s relationship with Russia will remain the touchstone of Finnish independence:

One has to always keep in mind that St. Petersburg is located only some 23 kilometres from the Border River [Rajajoki]. The weight of the future Russia – in all cases, a great and mighty Russia, our neighbour – is concentrated in the immediate proximity of our country. Its weight will always cause political anxiety in Finland and be a very tiring military strain unless we succeed in removing the burning cinders from between Finland and Russia.

Voionmaa’s suggestion as to how to manage the bad fortuna and turn it into a good one is quite different from the ‘decisive strike’ which the Civil Guard activists promoted. He does not see pro-active or activist measures as skilled statecraft but suggests that the League of Nations, Finnish neutrality, or a legal deal with Russia – i.e. prudent actions – would be the best way to remove the danger. It may thus be taken to illustrate the choice between pro-active and prudent conduct as a final interpretant in the Finnish political imaginary on Russia.

In a newspaper article published in the summer of 1919, the right-wing activist politician Bertel Gripenberg described the city of St. Petersburg as the “head of the serpent” and the “nest of the red contagion.” He suggested that the city on the river Neva posed an eternal threat to Finland. Gripenberg argued that with black autocracy defeated, red despotism now stretched its “hands of a polyp” towards Finland from there. Evoking the proximity of the threatening Beast was an efficient way of promoting Finnish intervention to the Russian Civil War. It contributed to the thought that the use of active virtù was needed and thus served the purpose of drafting candidates to the courage-demanding role of the Knight: “with a vigorous strike we can ascertain our security for decades. ... We can, if we have the will. We can, if we dare.” It is worth noting that in this mode of reasoning, the Beast does not

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188 See also Georg Schauman’s motion of censure from May 1919 according to which the Finnish troops were planning on intervening and conquering St. Petersburg (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 20 May 1919, 449.)

189 Voionmaa 1919, 345.

190 Voionmaa 1919, 345.


192 See also Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 30 October 1919, 1328–1391

stand for the ideology of bolshevism only. It is not selective in the sense that Russia is more generally brought out as a source of bad *fortuna*. The conflict is not only ideological but also national. Furthermore, when it comes to deciding which type of political conduct provides the best means of managing *fortuna*, Gripenberg promotes pro-active measures.

The *Hovnarren* magazine promoted Finnish involvement in the Russian Civil War on the lead of General Carl Gustav Mannerheim, the leader of the White Army during the Finnish Civil War. In order to critique the government’s inactive stance on the issue, President Ståhlberg is in the drawing on the right placed in the structural position of the Anti-Knight. This interpretation is available for us in the iconic sign features of the drawing: Ståhlberg watches the drowning of the White General Judenitsh from aside, with a finger to his mouth.

Unlike the right-wing conservatives who were aligned around General Mannerheim and promoted cooperation with selected groups of Russians as good state-craft, most right-wing activists as well as the representatives of the Agrarian and the Progressive Parties based their argumentation on “colour blind anti-Russianness.” They were just as sceptical towards the intentions of the White Russians – or the “monarchist Russkies” (monarkistiryssät) – as the bolsheviks: “We have to treat all Russians with equality, let them fight with one another if they have the nerve and the energy.” Unlike the Swedish-speaking conservatives with their selective Russophobia/-philia, the activists argued that liberating St. Petersburg from the bolshevik rule would only benefit the Russian Whites who would soon seek to re-establish the Russian Empire. Following this mode of thought, military raids

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194 *Hovnarren*, No. 20, 15 November 1919. ‘Judenitsch.’
195 See also the Agrarian MP Santeri Alkio’s speech in the parliament; he puts forth the thought that “here, we are not allowed to tolerate Russian monarchist any more than Russian bolsheviks because they all, unanimously, think that the period of Finnish slavery under Russian domination should continue” and the same party’s Antti Juutilainen’s criticism that the Finnish approach towards Russians was not consistent: “general conception among the Finnish people is that a Russian is a Russian no matter whether he is a bolshevik or a supporter of the Tsar.” (*Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919*; 11 April 1919, 57; 29 April 1919, 201.) See also Vares 1990, 23.
197 See the Social Democrat MP Jaakko Keto’s argument against the policy of conquest which is based on the view that Finnish Russian policies need to be conducted so that the country can safeguard its independence also in the future “when the imperialists take the reigns in Russia and when there is, behind these attempts, a greater power
to Eastern Karelia gained more support in the Finnish parliament than the planned intervention to St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{198}

The epoch’s great power Great Britain was, however, reluctant vis-à-vis Finnish plans of making interventions across the border. To critique this position, Tuulispää’s drawing brought Great Britain out as an anti-heroic figure. The illustration on the left, which was issued in mid-May 1919, can be thought of as a manipulation of the legend of St. George and the plot of heroism which unfolds from it. Instead of the Knight heroically encountering the Beast, it shows a Scotsman leisurely smoking his pipe, standing on the tail of a two-headed hydra whose heads are designated as Moscow and St. Petersburg.

The policy of non-intervention which the social democrats’ promoted in domestic debates by making reference to the British advice,\textsuperscript{199} is verbally characterised as “standing on the tail of the serpent” and compared to the desperateness of “struggling with the wind” which “threatens with devastation.”\textsuperscript{200} That is, the policy is evaluated as bad statecraft. With a view upon sketching the thought-paradigm as the final interpretant of political imaginary, it is interesting to point out that an elemental part of this configuration is the contrast between active and inactive virtù. This is explicitly spelled out in the second frame of the cartoon.

In it, an active and virile soldier of White Finland is bludgeoning a Bolshevik on the head with a mallet. The drawing mimics the game where the player should strike at an anvil with maximum force in order to make the thermometer rise as high as possible. Through this reference, the illustration comes to promote the use of force as the best means of dealing with the threat of bolshevism, here symbolised by the bestial symbol of the many-headed serpent.

\textsuperscript{198} For a discussion on the dangers inherent in attempts of conquering St. Petersburg, See Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 11 April 1919, 74. See also Rasila 1980, 110.

\textsuperscript{199} See the Social Democrat MP Laherma’s reference to the British advice of not making any military endeavours into Russia, Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 11 April 1929, 51. See also Polvinen 1987, 188.

\textsuperscript{200} Tuulispää, No. 20, 13 May 1919. ‘Bolshevikkäärme.’ The caption reads: “Let us confess that the purpose of military excursions to Russia is the conquest of St. Petersburg and Moscow. St. Petersburg and Moscow are the two heads of the Bolshevik snake. To stand on the tail of the snake in a hope that one can then kill it is more desperate than whipping the wind. It threatens with devastation.”
In this capacity, the drawing emerges as an answer to the topical political question over whether Finnish military squads – official or voluntary – should be sent across the border, or whether more peaceful measures such as “song festivals and food aid”\(^{201}\) should be favoured in dealing with the “Karelian question”. The choice between prudent and belligerent policies is thus at the very heart of the drawing. In contrast to the anti-chivalric behaviour of the Scotsman, a pro-active Finnish soldier with a white armband is uplifted to the role of the Knight. Interested in how the legend of the serpent-slaying knight is related to the extra-linguistic world, we may point out yet another criterion of actualisation between the traditional plot and the drawing: the configuration promotes the policy of territorial expansion as an elemental part of good statecraft.

The Knight’s actions disclose the dream of establishing a Greater Finland of Fenno-Ugric peoples.\(^{202}\) It is formed as an opposite to the plot of devastation and the end of everything which unfolds from the model-image of the inactive and feeble Anti-Knight. That is, national greatness can be singled out as the Treasure of this configuration. In a similar vein, the activist politician and political scientist Y.O. Ruutu linked the health and strength of the political unit to its capacity to expand; he juxtaposed expansion with the image of a “paralysed man who can only use one foot, one arm, one eye or one ear.”\(^{203}\) In the drawing under examination, the thermometer figures as an icon of growth and the signs “Finland,” “Estonia,” “Aunus,” and “Kola Peninsula” serve as indices for the pieces of territory that were within the scope of expansive territorial policy. It is worth pointing out that in the cartoon which stands for the policy of non-intervention, Finland is represented by a fenced square of territory – an icon of limitedness, restrictedness, and unnaturalness.

\(^{201}\) Social Democrat MP Wäinö Wuolijoki, Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 11 April 1919, 63.
\(^{202}\) See the Agrarian Party MP Alkio’s argument presented during the debate on Finnish interventions across the border: “the Finnish concept of the state \(\text{valtioaate}\) includes the thought that Viena Karelia and Aunus Karelia have to be united with Finland and this has been said many times during these years. And I am declaring it again on this spot.” See also the Social Democrat Wäinö Wuolijoki’s argument according to which “with the peoples of Finland, at least the Finnish \{speaking\} people, there is no difference of opinion about the fact that the Karelians of Russia should belong to Finland.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 11 April 1919, 57, 63, 67.)
\(^{203}\) Ruutu cit. Suomalaisia ajatuksia 1930, 316.
5.8. (Un)natural Borders

The thematic of naturalness of the Finnish-Russian border is a persistent one in the political imaginary of the epoch. In addition to the fact that classical geopolitical theories were in vogue during the epoch, acquiring safe and easily defensible state borders – i.e. borders that would ease the task of maintaining the state – was among the key dilemmas of Finnish foreign policy vis-à-vis Soviet Russia. In 1919 Väinö Voionmaa characterised the present border between Finland and Russia as “a frontier line cut into the forest. It circulates randomly on lands and territories and hardly anywhere follows any natural watersheds or even rivers.” Referring to the German geopolitician Ratzel’s distinction between “racial borders” and “state borders,” Voionmaa further argued that as an “unnatural state border” the Finnish-Russian border is “subject to dangers and transformations.” Here, the character of the border is singled out as a factor contributing to the vulnerability of the state.

Although Voionmaa depicts the present border between Finland and Russia as prone to open the door to the forces of bad fortuna, he argues that now that Finland had become a “responsible nation” among other nations, the issue should be approached with caution. In his view, modesty rather than muscle presented the right way of dealing with the challenge that the Russian proximity presented. It is interesting to note that the words of Voionmaa allude to the paradigmatic opposition between proactive and prudent political conduct as a means of managing the challenge caused by the location of Finland on a “dangerous zone” between the East and the West.

However, the simile of ‘unnatural borders’ was also evoked to promote pro-active policy of outright expansion. In the right-wing activist politician Elias Simojoki’s speech, annexationism forms a part of a statecraft speech act that has as its point the need to secure the survival of the state. The speech is emplotted in terms of Finnish self-preservation but it also makes reference to the vanguard plot which gives more momentum to Finnish decisions:

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204 Rudolf Kjellen’s famous Stormakterna was published in 1905 and its Finnish translation came out in 1914-1918; see also Soikkanen 1991.
206 Voionmaa 1919, 52.
207 Voionmaa 1919, 56, 59.
208 Voionmaa 1919, 372.
209 Voionmaa (1919, 63) argues that “There is, between the geographically clear cut areas of Europe a great, multiethnic and multinational middle zone ... that reaches all the way to Finland and that for long historical periods has been – as it still is – a meeting point for Eastern and Western forces, a shore for peaceful surges and territory for armed fights. This ‘dangerous zone’ partly explains ... why the tornadoes of world politics have so often crossed over Finland.”
At issue here is making our fatherland a great power. We know that we are entitled to that. We know that we are entitled to that piece of land where our tribe lives. We know that we have a duty to become a great power, because otherwise we cannot fulfil our task – to be a shield of Western countries against the East. With the present borders we cannot even preserve our independence; if we stick to them, the Russkie will soon march over the tombs of our freedom towards the West.210

The passage avails itself of the notions of the East and the West to transmit its message. It works on the thought that political danger in the form of chaos and unruliness – or Medvedev’s “chthonic forces” – can be found in the East whereas the West is the realm of order and civilisation.211 Simojoki has harnessed such culturally available knowledge for argumentative purposes. Identifying the Beast with the East gives momentum to the argument which tries to assign legitimacy to the policy of territorial expansion. It suggests that only after becoming a “great power,” would Finland be able to fulfil the role of the Knight and protect the Treasure of Western freedom against the expansive tendencies of the East. In several examples, the geographic location of Finland between the East and the West is evoked to suggest that special skills or specific measures are needed for the conduct of politics.

The persistence of such geopolitical imageries is also reflected in the fact that the image of a fenced square of territory provides a prevalent element to the epoch’s political imaginary. It cropped up on the pages of the Tuulispää magazine in the autumn of 1918.212 Here, it forms part of contemplations on how the shift in Finnish foreign policy from a German to British orientation would affect the goals of territorial expansion and state survival.

The former ally Germany had supported the project of annexing Eastern Karelia213 but since the new ally Great Britain was more cautious, it was brought out

210 Simojoki 1942 (1923), 43.
211 See Larry Wolff’s (1994) magisterial study Inventing Eastern Europe for an elaborate discussion on how the Enlightenment invested the notions of the East and the West with cultural significance. Prior to the Enlightenment, Wolff suggests, the North was thought of as the realm of barbarism whereas the South signified civilisation.
212 Tuulispää, Autumn Issue, Vol. 16, 1918.
in similar terms as in the previous configuration – as an inactive male character with a finger to his mouth. Political legitimacy is not sought only by contrasting chivalric qualities to the Anti-Knight. The symbol of the Treasure is also significant in this respect. It is enacted by the epic symbol of the apple tree representing the possibility that somewhere there is a paradise-like condition for human beings to lead their lives.\(^{214}\) The symbol of the tree is a plot-gene for such a thought and thus well geared for functioning as a legitimating device in political argumentation which relates to the ideals and aspirations of the political community. In this case, the indexical aspects of the symbol fix this dream to the areas across the Finnish-Russian border and to the of a Greater Finland. That is, the Treasure is identified in national greatness.

_Tiisku_ magazine, which functioned as an outlet for the views of Finnish communists,\(^ {215}\) also evoked the theme of the tree of life but did so for purposes quite different from the promotion of territorial expansion.\(^ {216}\) In the drawing on the left, the Treasure is located on the eastern side of the border to imply that there is something worth striving for there. That is, the tree of life as the Treasure does not motivate territorial expansion.

In _Tiisku’s_ actualisation of the archaic model-image, the tree of life is placed on the Eastern side of the Finnish-Russian border in order to put forth the thought that the Soviet Union was an ideal kind of society. The skyline of Moscow in the background serves to fix the reference of this constellation to the Soviet Union. The good _fortuna_ conception of the Soviet neighbourhood lies at the heart of the configuration. It suggests that the proximity of the Soviet Union may, in some sense, be beneficial for the Finnish political unit. The drawing thus alludes to the paradigmatic choice between conceiving of the Soviet neighbourhood as good rather than bad _fortuna_.

Historical context for the unfolding of this way of thought is provided by the Finnish authorities’ refusal to issue passports to Finnish labour movement activists and their families wishing to migrate to the Soviet Union.\(^ {217}\) The malevolent male figure keeping people away from their dream stands for the authorities in the Finnish passport office (_passitoimisto_) who were given the right to deny passports upon consideration. That is, he can be identified as the

\(^{214}\) E.g. Campbell 1968, 41.
\(^{216}\) _Tiisku_, No. 20–21, 15 December 1925. ‘Katsaus vuoteen 1925.’
\(^{217}\) See also Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1925, 30 March 1925, 892–911 & Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1926, 10 December 1926, 1670.
Beast of this actualisation. Indeed, the subject of this configuration is not conflict between Finland and the Soviet Union but rather a disagreement between two competing strategies for relating to the Eastern neighbour: one that aims at maximizing Soviet influences in Finland and another that argues for the need to contain them.

Similar imagery was evoked on the pages of the bourgeois Matti Meikäläinen in the summer of 1930 to put forth a very different argument. The logic of the argument was that if the communists considered the Soviet Union as their dream society, they were more than welcome to leave the country. The alternative strategy of containing Soviet influences is thus uplifted to the position of good statecraft.

Historical context for this actualisation is provided by the activities of the anti-communist Lapua Movement and its policy of transporting to the Finnish-Russian border those members of society that, from its point of view, presented a danger for the durability of the political unit. This group contained not only those openly adulating the Soviet system but also all those not endorsing the view that the strategy of active containment of Soviet influences was prerogative in order to make the state durable.

Representing the Soviet society as a mere scene-setting provides another counterargument to the way of thought that displays the Soviet Union as a paradise-like realm and its neighbourhood as a matter of good fortuna.

Depicting the achievements of the competing social system as false and worthless – as an Anti-Treasure and something not worth striving for – provides a powerful rhetorical means for managing the persistent fear of rev-

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218 Matti Meikäläinen, No. 27, 5 July 1930. ‘Vapaakyntejä rajalle.’
219 Kerberos, No. 12, December 1920. ‘Mottagning i Moskva (vad magister Westerlund såg och inte såg).’
olution that the proximity of an openly expansive and revolutionary political system posed to Finnish political life. Admiration of the Soviet system – thinking of it as a "role model" – was argued to constitute a challenge to the success and survival of the Finnish political unit and taking distance from it to be an act of good statecraft.

5.9. Own vs. Alien

As Lotman argued, symbols mediate between the synchrony of a text and a culture’s memory. In symbolic accounts, events of Finnish-Russian relations are endowed with more significance than they would have as mere contingent events occurring at a synchronic level. The task of this interpretative exercise is to point out creative powers in the workings of political imaginary which has its roots in a culture’s political memory but simultaneously correlates symbols with the context in which they appear.

With its roots in meanings associated with virtuous qualities, the model-image of the heroic Knight was well geared for expressing the society’s Swedish speaking section’s concerns relating to the new political situation. The drawing on the right comments on a heated debate over the language and nationality paragraphs of the new constitution to be adopted in the independent country. The measures that were suggested for guaranteeing the role of the Swedish language in Finland met harsh criticism on the part of Finnish speakers.

The drawing is a counterargument to this. Despite its domestic focus, it is intimately linked to the question of statecraft in Finnish-Russian relations. It puts forth a suggestion that during the time when Finland was a constituent part of the multinational Russian Empire, namely the

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220 For an explicit articulation of the danger that admiration of the Soviet system caused, see Agrarian Party’s MP’s Tilda Löthman’s speech in the parliament: “If it was possible to plant in our youth an admiration of the customs and ideas of that foreign country which the communists regard as their role model, it would be so grave an accident that it is hardly possible to encounter a graver one.” (Proceedings of the II Parliamentary Session 1929, 3 December 1929, 1223.)

221 "Fyren", No. 5–8, 1919. ‘Arffienden’ (extract). For a political debate concerning the language paragraphs, see the Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1918, 24 February 1919, 754–770. See also Klinge 1964, 130; Hämäläinen 1985, 70–90.
force of Swedish culture (Svensk kultur) functioned as the shield protecting Finland against the chauvinist and expansive policies of the Russian nationalists – here represented by the Goliath-like Beast with the club of nationalism in his hand.

Similar ways of actualising archaic elements of political imaginary can be identified in materials that characterise Swedish Finns in chivalric terms, describe them as the paragon of military virtues, and set them in contrast to the “unruly and phlegmatic” Finnish Finns.222 Something to that extent is expressed in the previous configuration by depicting the representative of Swedish Finland as a heroic figure who is capable of encountering the Russian Beast in virtue of being equipped with such symbols of chivalry as a sword and a shield. In contrast, the representative of Finnish Finland – i.e. a Finnish peasant with a scull-cap (patalakki)223 – stands behind his back and passively smokes his pipe. He is deprived of all chivalric qualities and is associated with passivity and backwardness. The drawing avails itself of a more archaic habit of thought which places the fault line between the culturally laden notions of East and West on the Finnish territory. It works on the thought of there being “two Finlands” – the coastal areas inhabited by the Swedish speaking people were thought to be modern, industrializing and connected to Europe. In contrast to it, the inland were seen as backward, uncivilised, and wild.224

On their part, the promoters of Finnish culture associated Swedish culture and language with the imperial domination that had earlier been identified with both Russia and Sweden.225 In their view, the Knight was to be found in the Finnish-speaking peasant. Illustrative of this are the words of Santeri Alkio, the leader of the Agrarian party who in 1922 argued that while “racial repugnance” against the Swedes has become diluted in the Finnish cultural elite, it has remained intense in the Finnish peasant: “If the peasant starts to … befriend with the gentlemanly type that represents the old power of Swedishness then his family, tribe, and nation give up something that they should protect and treasure as the heritage of history.”226 Threatening in the Swedish “gentlemanly type” was that, vis-à-vis the Finnish peasant, he

223 See also Ylönen (2001, 161–162) for an argument that in political cartoons, the symbol of a boy coiffed with the skull-cap expressed the split between Finnish and Swedish speaking Finlands.
224 Klinge 1982, 63–86.
225 See the Social Democrat MP Jonas Laherma’s argument in the Parliament according to which the “Swedish power brought here new doctrines and customs, brought up a class of military, nobility, and bureaucracy that century after century oppressed and exploited both Finnish and Swedish speaking sections of this country. … And when the new time came … the Swedish class of power … sold itself for a slave to the Eastern conqueror, served it loyally in Russian but made the Finnish speakers dance in Swedish according to its will.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 27 May 1919, 583.)
226 Alkio 1922, 19; italics original.
stood for “eternal pursuits of power”\textsuperscript{227} that contrasted with the somewhat “Machiavellian” dream of establishing a political unit free of foreign domination.

In Alkio’s argumentation, it is the “truly patriotic way of thinking” that distinguishes the peasant from both socialists and the bourgeoisie. The peasant embodies what is unique to Finland while the latter two – although very different – are argued to be on the side of un-Finnishness, the foreign, and the alien. The socialists relied on an international creed and partly promoted cooperation with (Soviet) Russia while the bourgeoisie – especially the Swedish-speakers – had “practically lost their patriotic character.”\textsuperscript{228} Beyond the domestic focus of this argumentation, the question of the Russian neighbourhood is intimately intertwined in it. Alkio argues that in contradistinction to “the bourgeois culture [that] bows now to the West and now to the East, the peasants stand as stable and self-conscious protectors of the national culture.”\textsuperscript{229} In this argumentative retelling of the chivalric language game, the peasant personifies the strategy of non-compliance vis-à-vis Russia and thus qualifies for the role of the virtùous Knight.

It is, indeed, quite easy to recognise the Knight in Alkio’s description of the Finnish peasant; he typifies the peasant with recourse to such iconic qualities as “nobility,” “gallantry,” and “self-sacrifice.”\textsuperscript{230} The model-image of the Knight can thus be said to shine through the verbal expression level. The activists of the Academic Karelia Society also suggested that in contradistinction to the inactiveness of the ‘official Finland,’ the peasant exhibited virtùosity capable of taming fortuna: “the fatherland was in jeopardy and about to drown in the speeches of the parliament – but the sign of survival was all of a sudden given by the austere and silent peasant.”\textsuperscript{231} These are all examples of statecraft speech acts where political legitimacy is sought by identifying an existential threat and elevating some section of the society into the role of the agent capable of managing it. The Swedish language Fyren does so on the grounds of identifying the Beast in Russian nationalism and the Knight in the Swedish culture. It characterises the Finnish peasant as the Anti-Knight incapable of undertaking any heroic tasks while the Finnish nationalists suggest that the Knight is namely to be found in the Finnish peasant.

\textsuperscript{227} Alkio 1922, 19–20.  
\textsuperscript{228} Alkio 1922, 45.  
\textsuperscript{229} Alkio 1922, 15.  
\textsuperscript{230} Alkio 1922, 38.  
\textsuperscript{231} Haavio 1929, 240–241.
5.10. Virtuous Voter and That Man

The capacity of the chivalric formula to tolerate semantic substitution and to refer to new parts of the world endows it with a capacity to appear in different types of argumentative retellings. Urging people to vote is one of the uses for which the chivalric equation is well suited. Against the background provided by the thought of chivalry, voting for a specific party may be brought out as a deed comparable to the heroism that St. George displayed when he saved the city of Selena by slaying the wily dragon with his sword of bravery.

In December 1928, Matti Meikäläinen, an organ of the National Coalition Party, actualised the knightly formula just days before municipal elections. No serpent or sword is present in the cartoon, but the constellation of the Beast, the Knight, and the Treasure is present in the drawing. Just like in the famous legend of St. George, the latter is symbolised both by the virginal female figure (the Maiden) and the skyline of the polis (the Castle.) Historical context for the configuration where the Maiden warns the potential Knight of the proximity of the Beast is provided by the growing activism and radicalisation of Finnish communists towards the end of the 1920s.

Indeed, the Beast of this configuration represents the communists who, according to the drawing, were threatening with destruction the political order of White Finland which is here symbolised by the melting skyline of Helsinki. With the upcoming elections, the role of the Knight is assigned to those voters who would vote against the communists.

232 See Prime Minister Kallio’s reference to “the communists’ increasingly presumptious apperances” (proceedings of the II Parliamentary Session 1929, 3 December 1929, 1195.) See also Siltala 1985, 47; Vares 1991, 85. The Communist Party had been banned in Finland after the 1918 civil war. The leadership of the party lived in exile in Moscow but its dummy parties participated in Finnish elections – from 1922 to 1929 The Finnish (Socialist) Workers’ Party and the Socialist Workers’ and Smallholders’ electoral organization participated in elections with decent results. For instance, in the 1924 parliamentary elections the latter gained 23 seats out of 200. (Hakalehto 1964, 113; Siltala 1985, 42.)
The configuration revolves around the thematic of the devastated city which is familiar from cataclysmic accounts. The melting skyline of the *polis* is combined with the representational device of distorted perspective which renders the Beast gigantic in relation to the Maiden. It seems that the forces of bad fortuna are gaining an upper hand over political order. This adds to the persuasive powers of the cartoon’s argument which is to advise people to turn out at the polls and vote for the bourgeois parties. From our point of view, the interesting thing is the way in which the question of the Russian neighbourhood forms an elemental part of this configuration. The caption of the cartoon – “the troll of the East” (*idän peikko*) – explicitly establishes a link between the Finnish communists and the Eastern neighbour. It brings out the thought that even if the Finnish communists did not, for the time being, seem strong enough to launch a revolution, behind them there loomed the more massive threat of the Soviet Union and the world revolution that it promoted. In this capacity it was also argued to constitute an existential threat against the Finnish political unit and established social order. The drawing also joins up with the persistent characterisation of the Soviet Union as an agent of instigation. This thought may be transmitted, for instance, by describing it as an eruptive “volcano” – the proximity of which not only made the danger of communism acute in Finland but also called for an agent capable of and willing to exercise his *virtù*.

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233 Matti Meikäläinen, No. 23, 1 December 1928. *‘Idän peikko.’* The illustration is accompanied by a poem which links it explicitly to the up-coming elections.

234 See also *Helsingin Sanomat* 1930; the editorial discusses whether a bourgeois front against the political left would actually be virtuous. As a centrist paper *Helsingin Sanomat* condemned such divisive politics and recommended instead steps toward national unity. This meant, for instance, cooperation with the Social Democrats. The question of the Soviet neighbourhood formed part of this argumentation, too. Those promoting the joint efforts of the bourgeois parties had taken “the miserable conditions of Soviet Russia” up as an example of a country where the bourgeois front had been eliminated. In that sense, the Soviet Beast was looming in the background.

235 See also MP Vennola’s characterisation of communism as “an extremely unpleasant birth present that Finland got from Russia ... it has continued to exist as a troll that has threatened the life of the nation.” (Proceedings of the II Parliamentary Session 1929, 3 December 1929, 1204.) See also Siltala 1985, 33; Väres 1991, 85.

236 “I am ready to understand that in those civilised nations that are further away from the volcano than we are... the stance towards the communists does not need to be much more than a sad sneer and a shrug. ... But when it comes to those nations that are placed right at the feet of this volcano, none of them has been able to take such an ignorant and passive posture vis-à-vis the communists’ underground activities [*nyyräntyö*] as we have.” (MP Lohi, Proceedings of the II Parliamentary Session 1929, 3 December 1929, 1199.)
In these accounts, the potential Knight appears in civilian clothing rather than in a military uniform – as a civilian-knight. On this basis, it puts the moral burden of knightlike conduct on the shoulders of every citizen. The Social Democratic Party’s Kurikka magazine also actualised the chivalric equation to urge its voters to turn out at the polls.

It is worth noting that in an argumentative retelling of the basic plot of Finnish-Russian relations by this social democratic magazine, the Beast splits into two: destructive forces to be contained by taking heroic actions at the polls are identified both in capitalism and in communism, and the role of the Knight is enacted by the “fat-skinned Finnish worker.”

The cartoon also brings out the fact that the internal and external were intimately intertwined in the political imaginary of interwar Finland. In the previous configuration, the headgear worn spells this out. Although the cartoon is a comment on such a domestic event as elections, the budyonovka hat – an index of the Soviet army – links communism explicitly to the possibility of military aggression by the Soviets while the stereotypical facial features of the head of capitalism serve to associate it with Judaism. The model-image of a Jewish man in a top hat tells a complex story about world capitalism and the extension of its networks to Finland. Beyond this cartoon, images of wealthy Jews that occupy the structural position of the Beast are widespread in the corpus beyond this argument. They are particularly prevalent in the Swedish language magazine Fyren which was known for its anti-Semitic views.

The drawing above, issued in Fyren in 1921, is illustrative of the mode of thinking that intertwines Judaism with apocalyptic plots. There is no Knight in the drawing which displays Lev Trotsky as a bestial figure occupying the Kremlin and thus transmits the thought that

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237 Kurikka, No. 39–40, 2 October 1930. ‘Rasvanahkaisen työmichent rohkaisea lähestyvissä vaaleissa.’
238 Uino 1991, 324.
239 Fyren, Summer Issue 1921.
there was a Jewish conspiracy behind the Russian revolution. Here, the Soviet Russian neighbour-
hood is explicitly identified as a matter of bad fortuna; the Jews are argued to use Russia as a bridgehead for conquering the world.

The Civil War had split the Finnish left into two – those recognised as legitimate citizens of the White Finland and those under permanent suspicion. To escape the latter identification, the social democrats adopted a policy of loyalty toward the new republic, particularly when it came to relations with the former metropolitan country. That is, independent Finland was acknowledged as a legitimate political authority. This move was intended to differentiate the social democrats from the communists who remained loyal to the Soviet Union, promoted Soviet style socialism, and openly entertained the thought of the Soviet proximity as a matter of good fortuna. With the radicalisation of the Finnish communists towards the end of the 1920s, the social democrats explicitly denounced the extreme left and announced that their task was to defend the Finnish society against bad fortuna emanating from both the left and the right. Doing this involved taking a critical stance towards both the right’s and the extreme left’s claims of skilful statecraft.

As an illustration of this, we may examine the cartoon which Kurikka published in the spring of 1930. It actualises two knightly model-images for a comment on the controversy which had been raised by the visit of the actor Aarne Orjatsalo to the city of Joensuu. Simultaneously, the drawing is an apt illustration of the way in which contingent events gain wider significance when articulated with the help of meanings that unfold from the chivalric equation.

Orjatsalo had been a member of the Red Guard during the civil war and remained a devout socialist after it. His visit to Joensuu had stirred a reader of the local newspaper to identify the Beast in him. The reader submitted a commentary to the paper comparing Orjatsalo to the “red dragon” and argued that a man capable of taming the beast is badly needed.

The caption of the cartoon – “That

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240 See MP Väinö Hakkila’s (SDP) argument that “blind groping towards dictatorship” is just as evident on the political right as it is on the left.” See also Siltala 1985, 56–57; Vares 1991, 84–85.
241 Kurikka, No. 41, Spring 1930. “Se mies” = odotusta Karjalassa päin eli taistelu ”punaisa lohikäärmettä” vastaan.
242 The cartoon is accompanied by the legend: “Us, the readers of ‘Karjalainen, are only waiting for that man who will take the reigns in his hands in this country and will strike the Red dragon across the muzzle. That time is not far away.”
Man” – links the drawing to another topical debate concerning the need for a strong man, a virtuous actor, in Finnish politics. That is, it is connected to the mode of thought according to which both the country’s geographical location and the post-independence condition required the qualities of the Knight. Only some months before the configuration above came out, the Activists’ magazine Suomen Heimo had published an anti-communist issue that ended with the question: “Where is that man or those men? In the parliament or outside?” This discussion makes use of meanings unfolding from the chivalric cultural-historical equation, and Kurikka’s cartoonist evidently made note of it. In his retelling of these events, the function of the Knight’s shield is enacted by the bourgeois newspaper Karjalainen – i.e. it ironically comments on idea that the bourgeois ideology provided protection against the Beast of the East.

5.11. Wrapping up the Knight

Occupying the structural position of the protector within the totality of the chivalric cultural-historical equation, the Knight provides a key to evaluating different policy lines with view a upon the standards of statecraft – i.e. in regard to how well they contribute to the durability of the state. In the political imaginary of the newly independent nation, the chivalric model-image provides a convenient springboard for martial imagery and heroic discourse. But this is not the whole story: the Knight embodies a dual plot-space. Although it easily serves to bolster the sanctity and pathos of struggle, knightly conduct may also be characterised in terms of moderation and consideration. This is not an insignificant point since the choice between impetuous and restricted conduct vis-à-vis Russia or the Soviet Union can be said to provide a key paradigmatic opposition to the political imaginary of Finnish-Russian relationships. It is its final interpretant. The chivalric text, in the Ricoeurian sense, is about making that choice.

Indeed, during the era analysed in this work, political debating takes place between the right-wing activists promoting vigorous measures to contain Russian influences over the newly independent Finland and those endorsing a more prudent policy line. The knightly model-image with a dual plot-space conveniently spells out the form of problematisation

243 Suomen Heimo, October-November 1929, p. 221–223.
244 See also the Social Democrat MP Hakkila’s critique of the right wingers’ “childish talk of a man that accomplishes what the parliament and the government are unable to accomplish.” (Proceedings of the II Parliamentary Session 1929, 3 December 1929, 1220.)
underpinning these debates. At issue in them is identifying what kind of conduct vis-à-vis Russia counts as virtuous and who, consequently, can be credited for being capable of securing the survival of the political unit.

The plots that issue from the model-image of the Knight are, in the Peircean sense, rheumatic. They are blank forms of propositions to be filled by proper names. The analysis of the chivalric equation was intended to spell out the ways in which messages are crafted on the basis of them. The point has been to disclose variety in the meanings that virtuousity gains in changing circumstances – it may be a matter of making military interventions or attempting territorial expansions into Soviet Russia, assisting White Russians, voting for specific parties, participating in violent anti-communist measures, refusing involvement in Russian affairs, etc.

The table below presents an attempt to collect these findings together. As a step towards the task of formulating the thought-paradigm of Finnish-Russian relationships, it represents different articulations of virtuous conduct vis-à-vis Russia or the Soviet Union in the cartoon material involving the Knight. These articulations are classified on the basis of the paradigmatic choice between impetuousness and prudent restraint in characterising virtuous political conduct.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impetuousness</th>
<th>Restraint</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Participating actively in efforts to destroy the Soviet power</td>
<td>• Refusing involvement in Russian/Soviet affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supporting the restoration of Old Russia</td>
<td>• Condemning adventurous politics vis-à-vis (Soviet) Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rendering Finland ‘great’ by means of territorial expansion (Greater Finland)</td>
<td>• Accommodating to the proximity and interests of (Soviet) Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Taking harsh measures with regard to domestic Reds</td>
<td>• Supporting peaceful relations between Finland and (Soviet) Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Legitimising violent measures in containing Russian/Soviet influences</td>
<td>• Focusing on enlightenment and education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Building strong governmental power at home (incl. monarchy)</td>
<td>• Contesting the need to expand the Finnish military budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Relying on oneself</td>
<td>• Integrating domestic Reds into White Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Looking for a powerful ally</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increasing military alertness</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Celebrating the voluntary Civil Guards</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Resisting Russian/Soviet “charm offences”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prioritising public interests over private opportunism (self-sacrifice)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Removing reminders of the common past with Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

245 E.g. Peirce CP 2.272.
The Beast
Specifying the Challenge

The Beast is as significant an element in the chivalric language-game as are the Knight and the Treasure. Within its totality, the semeiotic function of the bestial model-image is to identify an existential threat and, on that basis, to set the scene for heroic acts which bring the Knight out as the embodiment of chivalric virtues. It is, indeed, characteristic of the chivalric political imaginary that the Treasure lies beyond a plain upon which predators roam, and that the way to fulfillment demands the overcoming of certain dangers. Against this conventional background the bestial model-image can conveniently capture the idea that the act of identifying the enemy is the defining act of sovereignty. This thought has been presented by Susan Buck-Morss as follows: “the threat of a common enemy ... constitute[s] the state not merely as a legal entity but as a sovereign entity, the legitimate embodiment of the collective will with the power to wage war in its name.” In other words, the Beast enables the Knight to step up and to present himself as a legitimate sovereign agent undertaking political acts in the name of the political unit.

However, the Beasts of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia rarely find their slayers simply in the Finnish state. Because of its capacity to function as a plot-gene both for apocalyptic scenarios and hero-deeds, the model-image of the Beast provides convenient symbolic material for political argumentation that takes the form of statecrafting. It frequently forms part of debates where competing Eastern policies are evaluated with a view upon their contribution to the survival and success of the political unit. Indeed, the Beast does not supply a fixed way of interpretation. It would be something of a simplification to argue that in the Finnish political imaginary, 'Russia' equals the Beast and that 'Finland' is the sovereign agent capable of dealing with it. Instead of taking that line of inquiry, this exercise seeks to disclose

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1 Cf. Lotman 1990, 259. Yuri Lotman’s example comes from his reading of the Russian redaction of a Greek epic poem *The Exploit of Devgeny*. He noted that everything in this tragedy – the bride, the battle, the wedding – are converted into signs of chivalric honour and have no value in themselves. “The bride is valued not in herself but because of the difficulty of obtaining her and she has no value without that difficulty.”

the political puzzle that motivates the actualisation of the bestial model-image as the interpretant of Russia in some respect or capacity. Certain policies vis-à-vis Russia or the Soviet Union may be condemned as bad statecraft by depicting their proponents as unheroic, naïve figures who sit comfortably in the lap of the Soviet Beast. Other policies may be applauded as good statecraft by portraying those harbouring them as competent bear slayers.

Indeed, the Beast may appear both in human and in animal form. Even in the former case, the Human Beast is by its iconic qualities animalistic, brutal or elemental. This enables telling the Beast apart from the Knight who calls to mind the human effort of distinguishing oneself from the chaotic and barbarian. In its human form the Beast often takes the appearance of a giant whereas a bear is a paradigmatic example of an animal beast. The Bear – *ursa major* – provides an archaic means for transmitting thoughts related to animalistic and brutal features in Russia or Russians; according to a legend, the roots of this practice go back to the visit of a large and bearded Russian ambassador in the Court of Elisabeth I in the 16th century which motivated Shakespeare to put into the mouth of his Macbeth a passage about the “rugged Russian bear.” In addition to the king of the forest, the Animal Beast in the cartoons frequently takes the form of an eagle or a serpent although other animals – such as the monkey – may also be actualised to transmit ideas related to bestiality.

The Bear is perhaps the most prevalent bestial model-image in the corpus. In contrast to the Eagle which is the traditional symbol of Russian statism and is usually made to represent the instrumental power of its bureaucracy, the Bear symbolises another kind of power – the potential might of Russia and its people. It is possible to argue that if the Eagle represents Russia in the sense of the Weberian *Herrschaft*, the Bear is the embodiment of Russian *Macht*. When actualised for the purposes of political argumentation it serves to suggest that one is likely to find a powerful adversary in Russia. The Bear may also be actualised as a victim. In line with Greek mythology, this model-image of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia embodies a dual plot-space – it is both a potential aggressor and a sufferer. As a symbol of elemental forces, it is at the same time susceptible to evolutionary progress and awesome regressions.

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3 I am here alluding to C. S. Peirce’s definition of the sign or representamen as “something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity” (Peirce CP 2.228.)
4 Anderson 1958, 97; Neumann 1999, 80.
5 Immonen 1987, 83.
6 The serpent and the eagle have been analyzed in the context of other model-images due to which this chapter concentrates on analysing the symbolic figures of the bear and the human beast. For an actualisation where a monkey appears as the Beast, see Kerberos, No. 9, September 1919. ‘Ententen och vi.’
7 See also Werness 2004, 33.
On the basis of the iconic sign qualities of different bear figures in the corpus I have singled out three facets to this model-image – the Aggressive Bear, the Friendly Bear, and the Puppet Bear. The contrast in their iconic dimensions betokens different ways of conceptualising the character of (Soviet) Russian might. The aggressive set of images expresses the belligerent and potent power of a Russia/Soviet Union which is capable of acts of prowess. The Friendly Bear stands for the charm or benevolence of Russia; it may, for instance, call to mind the kind of attraction which in contemporary International Relations is popularly termed “soft power” – i.e. the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than by coercive military means or explicit economic incentives.9 The Puppet Bear evokes the thought of the Bear as a sufferer in order to transmit thoughts related to the misery of the Russian people in the hands of its present administration.

6.1. The Russian People and the Soviet Power

In the spring of 1922 Ampainen, the satirical mouthpiece of the National Coalition Party, issued a drawing which contains both the Human Beast and the Bear.10 The drawing makes use of the plot of the Bear as a potential sufferer in order to put forth an argument related to recent developments in Finland’s former metropolitan country. The Bear is engaged in a trial of strength with a Russian muzhik whose iconic sign dimensions (violent gestures and harsh expressions) suggest that he is, indeed, an actualisation of the Human Beast.

The drawing plays with the thought that the might of the Bear can be tamed and exploited as happens in circuses and zoos where one can see bears dancing and doing tricks.11 In its capacity to call to mind a rich set of associations related to the king of the forest and his battle with human beings, the plot of the mighty animal turned helpless pawn provides a convenient means for expressing ideas related to the plight of the Russian people in the hands of the present Soviet administration.

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9 Nye & Owens 1996; Mattern 2005b.
10 Ampainen, No. 8–9, 29 April 1922. ‘Lenin to the bear of Russia: “Try to move your legs at a little bit quicker. Otherwise they, in Genoa, get to their minds that you are sick and tired of my government.”’
The actualisation of the Bear in these terms is motivated by topical developments in Soviet Russia and world politics. That is, the conventionally available thought of Russia as a realm of oppression is made to function as an interpretant of a topical situation. Approximately at the same time as the cartoon was published, the Finnish parliament discussed, for instance, the adoption of a new course in Soviet policy called the NEP (New Economic Policy), the Communist Party’s attempt to consolidate its authority throughout the USSR, as well as a nation-wide peasant insurgency which had sparked protests and motivated Russians to seek refuge in Finland. Simultaneously, Finnish newspapers wrote about the Foreign Commissar Chicherin’s announcement that he would seek other states’ recognition of the sovereign position and economic basis of the Soviet system at the Genoa conference. In sum, the topical dilemma that the drawing comments on relates to the consolidation of the Soviet regime as the successor of the Russian Empire.

The outfit of the male figure is a mnemonic symbol that embodies knowledge of the brutality and roughness of the previous regime, Imperial Russia. As has been noted, during the period of the attempted Russification of Finland it was customary for political cartoons to evoke a peasant man’s chemise as a sign of the chauvinist Russian administration that demanded tighter integration of the Finnish Grand Duchy to the metropolitan country. In addition to functioning as a symbol of the oppressiveness of the Russian administration, the male figure also functions as an index. The facial features of Lenin serve to link these qualities to the present Soviet regime. On these grounds, the configuration sends out a message that the new Soviet regime presents continuity of the Russian tradition of authoritarianism – i.e. that in Russia the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, state and society is bound to be characterised by repression. It is on this basis that the configuration fulfils its statecraft speech act function of specifying the Soviet regime rather than the Russian people as the Beast. Simultaneously, it leaves open the possibility that relations between ordinary Finns and Russians may be non-conflictual.

The previous cartoon, indeed, makes a distinction between the Russian rulers and the people that they rule. It thus replicates the widespread thought of the Russian people as a slave-like object of exploitation, which is prevalent also in the more archaic European political imaginaries on Russia.

12 See e.g. Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1921, Vol. 3, 4 April 1922, 2458-2463; also Smith 2002.
13 E.g. Ilkka 1922.
14 Immonen 1987; Apunen 2001a; Valenius 2004.
15 For an illustration, see e.g. Pipes 2005, 1–26.
Similarly to the previous cartoon, the drawing on the left plays with the thought of who is actually the Beast. It was drawn to comment on the fifth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1922 and can thus be interpreted as an evaluation of the direction to which the Eastern neighbour was developing. Although the Russian people (Venäjän kansa) is gigantic and thus potentially aggressive, it is imprisoned by the figure that stands for the Soviet government (neuvostohallitus) as well as by communism which has replaced the term “tsarism” on the stone attached to the leg of the gigantic male figure.

A somewhat similar argument about the Soviet policies’ detrimental effect on the Russian people was published in Garm in 1933. In historical terms, this configuration evaluates the success of the first five year plan. It actualises the juxtaposition between the exploited and the exploiter for that purpose. When the first five year term came to an end in 1932, its pronounced goal of increasing the might of the Soviet Union by overcoming the country’s relative backwardness remained unattained.

Because of the duality of the Bear’s plot-space – i.e. its capacity to be both an aggressor and a victim – the animal was well suited to function as an interpretant of this situation.

17 Tuulispää, No. 44, 10 November 1922. ‘Kommunismin viisivuotisriemujuhla Venäjällä.’
18 See also Tuulispää, No. 30, 30 July 1920. ‘Venäjän Kansan vapaus;’ Tuulispää, No. 41, 21 October 1921. ‘Venäjän avustus.’
19 Garm, No. 10, 15 May 1933. ‘Offret.’
20 E.g. Korthonen 1971, 17.
In the cartooned description of recent events in the USSR, the potentially mighty Bear is portrayed as the victim of the present Soviet policies here represented by the symbol of a trap with the inscription “five year fiasco.” Unlike in the previous configuration, the ruler and the ruled, or the Human Beast and his victim are embodied in the same figure. Not only does the drawing avail itself of the humanlike feature of bears standing upright but the humanness of the Bear is also emphasised by the fact that the animal wears boots and a Soviet commissar’s cap. This configuration does not make as strong a distinction between the Russian people and the country’s ruling regime as the previous ones, and the Bear may thus be taken to represent both the aggressive Soviet administration and the Russian people as its victim.

6.2. The Mighty Eastern Neighbour

In contradistinction to the Puppet Bear which actualises the plot-possibility of the Bear as victim and sufferer, the aggressive facet of the Bear brings a more sinister side out of the king of the forest. It stands for the intrusive and brutal power that human beings have to struggle with in their ambitions. The Aggressive Bear actualises for argumentative purposes the plot of the struggle between culture and elements or progress and regression which are both available in the figure of the bestial Bear. Indeed, the Aggressive Bear is frequently depicted in the company of a potential Knight who – in opposition to nature, the elements and wild freedom – personifies culture, reason, authority and ordered human life.

In August 1920 the Swedish-language satirical magazine *Hovnarren* issued a cartoon displaying the Aggressive Bear in the company of four human figures. If the Puppet Bear sent a message about the uncertainties related to the durability of the Soviet regime and its political prowess, the drawing with the Aggressive Bear

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21 This interpretation is inspired by James H. Billington’s (1970, 21–22) account of the role of the Bear in the popular Russian imagination.
23 *Hovnarren*, No. 15, 18 August 1920. ‘Entente-sorger.’
evaluates the dilemma that the growing might of the Eastern neighbour and the consolidation of Soviet power posed for Finnish foreign policy. In such an actualisation of the chivalric formula for the purposes of statecrafting, the Bear represents the strengthening might of Soviet Russia and suggest, on that basis, that the durability of the Finnish political unit was in jeopardy. Pointing out the proximity of the Beast served as a convenient way of calling forth potential Knights.

The figure of a German soldier lying lifeless on the ground specifies the character of this dilemma in historical terms. It stands for the defeat of Finland’s former ally and sends an outright message that Germany would no longer qualify as the Knight. This implies that it would no longer count as good statecraft to look for a protector in that direction. In a way evocative of today’s discussions on Finland’s “security deficit,” the cartoon comes to suggest that there is no one to turn to for protection against the growing might of the Eastern neighbour. The Finnish soldier – the Knight of this constellation – is left alone to contain the Russian bad fortuna. He is forced to rely on his own virtù. The configuration may thus be interpreted with reference to the plot of being left alone to deal with the challenges that arise from the geopolitical environment, a familiar storyline in Finnish foreign policy discussions.

The configuration criticises trusting the Allies for the protection of Finland’s independent status. It suggests that relying on them would be an instance of bad statecraft. To drive home this point, the British and French Prime Ministers David Lloyd George and Alexandre Millerand are brought out as Anti-Knights. In virtue of iconic sign features, they call to mind such antichivalric qualities as untrustworthiness and selfish greed. The actualisation of the chivalric model on these grounds is motivated by topical events; tempted by the trading opportunities in Russia, Great Britain had quit operations against the bolsheviks and removed its military forces from Northern Russia in order to build better relations with the Soviet government. When these occurrences are described with recourse to the model-image of the mighty Beast and two Anti-Knights, they come out as something worrisome with regard to the maintenance of the Finnish political unit. The victors of the First World War are so absorbed in enjoying the fruits of their success that they ignore the threatening scene unfolding behind their backs.

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24 The discussion basically revolves around the claim that Finland suffers from a security deficit due to its lack of security guarantees from international alliances and a counterclaim that military alignment would actually decrease Finnish security. (see e.g. Helsingin Sanomat 2005).

25 For an analysis of how the plot of being left alone cropped up in the ‘geopolitical struggle for Finland’s membership in the EU’, see Moisio 2003, esp. 214–219.

26 Holsti 1963, 110–111.
In the bourgeois Tuulispää magazine’s configuration published in June of the same year, the Aggressive Bear appears to put forth a somewhat similar point about the selfishness of British policy. There is no Knight in this configuration but rather John Bull – the personification of England – enacts the role of an anti-chivalric character. Similarly to the previous configuration, the sign’s iconic features – i.e. qualities and gestures – call to mind selfishness instead of heroic self-sacrifice. Sitting securely high up in a tree, John Bull seeks to tame the Aggressive Bear by throwing Poland into its jaw.27

The configuration describes with recourse to the model-images of the Beast and the Anti-Knight a set of events related to the war between Poland and the Soviet Union.28 Although the baby that John Bull throws into the mouth of the Aggressive Bear to keep him satisfied personified Poland, the caption of the cartoon – Destiny of Small Nations – is indicative of the fact that the drawing develops into a more encompassing argument about the character of the Russian neighbourhood as bad fortuna for any bordering minor states. Hence conceived, the image of a voracious Beast evokes the possibility that the interests of Soviet Russia vis-à-vis Finland are not only strategic and defensive but expansionist and offensive. It confirms Bolshevik Russia as a belligerent state that is not only ideologically expansive but also potentially aggressive in a military sense.29

27 This anti-chivalric interpretation is sustained by the legend of the drawing – “let him chew on that so that my colonies may rest in peace for a while.”
28 Tuulispää, No. 11, 11 June 1920. *Pienten kansain kohtalot.*
29 See also Klinge 2003, 122 and a debate between Matti Klinge and Jukka Tarkka that issued from Tarkka’s review of the given book. Tarkka criticised Klinge for adopting the view that Russia’s interests on the Finnish direction are defensive and omitting altogether the “ideologically imperial spirit of the Soviet Union” and the aggressive Soviet military doctrine. (Tarkka 2003.)
In the labour movement magazine Kurikka’s depiction on the right, the idea of Russian expansiveness is expressed with the symbol of the Orthodox Church. The Church functions as a mnemonic symbol that embodies within it long stories from the culture’s past; the story of the Orthodox Church has to do with the legend of Moscow as the Third Rome, the heir of the imperial legacy of Constantinople, and a messianic power capable of salvaging the whole world.31

The workers’ hats on the heads of the three bestial Bears are illustrative of the character of political cartoons as interpretants of earlier works that have been modified so as to suit present purposes. They evoke the capacity of symbols of political imaginary to refer to new parts of the world. In this actualisation, the archaic mechanism of signification persists but the world salvaging creed refers to revolutionary socialism rather than Russian Orthodoxy. Indeed, the juxtaposition of working class Bears with an aristocratic appearing Polishman suggests that the Russo-Polish conflict is not that much a conflict between two nations as it is a clash between two classes.32

The chivalric equation – composed of the threatening Beast, the fully armed Knight, and castles with tall towers with fair women dwelling in them – alludes clearly through this configuration. In line with Kurikka’s political profile, it has been used to effect an ironic interpretation of the unfolding events. The configuration does not include the figure of the heroic protector but Poland is represented by an aspiring Knight – a tiny male figure who tries to scare the elements off by shooting into the air with a pop gun (korkkipyssy).
The configuration is best understood as a counterargument to the Finnish bourgeoisie’s willingness to see in Poland a potential bear-slayer and a conqueror of Soviet power. In May the right-wing newspaper *Uusi Suomi* had published an article arguing that “Poland possesses all the possibilities and means to destroy the Soviet power” and that its fight “signifies a turn in the long war against the bolsheviks.”

The Social Democrat MP Petter Huttunen commented on the article in a parliamentary debate and argued that it testifies to the Finnish bourgeoisie’s desire to see the Soviet government collapse so that peace negotiations could be started with a White or a “Koltshakian” government.

From the point of view of this work’s attempt to sketch the thought-paradigm underpinning the Finnish political imaginary on Russia, it is interesting to point out that MP Huttunen makes a distinction between two Russias – Soviet and White – and, via the phrase “Koltshakian”, defines the latter as a source of bad *fortuna*. Indeed, the term Koltshak functions here as a mnemonic mechanism which recalls the events immediately following the Finnish Civil War, when Admiral Koltshak had been reluctant to recognise Finnish independence and, thus, the experience of being part of the Russian Empire.

On this basis the drawing develops into a speech act which condemns as bad statecraft any attempts to undertake hero deeds against the more powerful eastern neighbour. It promotes accommodation to the proximity and interests of the more powerful Soviet Russia as the best available means of maintaining the political unit. Indeed, in contemporary materials the social democrats often take credit for having blocked the bourgeoisie’s belligerent policies and having thus saved the political unit from destruction.

At this point, it is possible to point out a connection between the drawing and the suggested “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm. In the previous actualisations of the chivalric language-game, the *virtù* needed to deal with the threatening Beast is characterised along the axis ranging from proactive zeal and passion to prudent and cautious conduct.

This also applies to the next drawing which, in August 1920, appeared on the pages of *Tuulispää*. The drawing revolves around the figure of the Impotent Lion who is actualised to put forth criticism against the capacity of the Finnish foreign policy to deal with the Beast. The golden animal is depicted as a perplexed figure unable to discharge his guardian task. The expectedly valiant animal has turned his back on the frightening scene where the Bear of Bolshevism is about to devour the two rabbits who represent Poland and Karelia.

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36 See also MP Keto Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1920, Vol. 1, 29 May 1920, 672.
37 *Tuulispää*, No. 31, 6 August 1920. ‘Rauhan vuonna 1920.’
The Aggressive Bear functions as an interpretant of the present political conduct of Bolshevik Russia. It suggests that the proximity of a violently expansive political unit is a matter of bad *fortuna* for the neighbouring states. It would, however, be something of a simplification to interpret the drawing as an expression of the Finns’ ‘hatred of Russkies.’ The target of the cartoon’s criticism is domestic. In face of a situation that would have called for the exercising of active *virtù* on the Eastern front, the Lion is engaged in a petty dogfight over the Åland Islands with a small dachshund who personifies Sweden.

The drawing is motivated by the Finnish government’s refusal to take any active measures in the Eastern Karelian question and the decision to subjugate the matter to the League of Nations to decide. Such a policy of prudent caution vis-à-vis the Eastern neighbour was critiqued by radical right-wingers who suggested that politically and militarily more assertive measures would be needed to take care of the interests of the nation. Among these interests, the demand to acquire Eastern Karelia and to make Finland “great” was a key position.  

Notable about this permutation of the chivalric formula is that it presents in a condensed form two competing ways of conceiving of virtuous conduct in Finnish-Russian relations and international relations more broadly. One conceptualises interactions between nations in terms of “state of nature” imagery and thus promotes the use of vigorous force as a necessary means of securing one’s survival. The other harbours a strong belief in conversation, consensus and international agreements, which the League of Nations – referred to in the caption of the cartoon – exemplifies.

In 1926, another configuration revolving around the thematic of the bestial Bear and the heroic bear-slayer appeared on the pages of *Tuulispää*. The drawing had originally come out in a Swedish newspaper but the fact that it was published in the Finnish bourgeois magazine...

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38 E.g. Paasivirta 1968b, 76.
39 “The League of Nations: ‘How to begin one’s work in this zoo. When another corner is peaceful, there is a battle going on in another.’”
40 *Tuulispää*, No. 4, 28 January 1926. ‘Pohjoisman turvallisuus (Göteborgs Handels och Sjöfarts Tidningin mukaan).’
testifies to the fact that it somehow resonated with the Finnish political imaginary. In this case, the battle between the mighty Beast and the heroic Knight is actualised for the rhetorical purposes of critiquing the “spinelessness” of Swedish foreign policy.

The configuration avails itself of meanings unfolding from the chivalric language-game in order to juxtapose the two male figures of the drawing – the Finnish Knight and the Swedish gentleman as the cowardly Anti-Knight. In virtue of this it also refers to the paradigmatic opposition between impetuousness and prudent policies. The two figures are also set apart from one another on the basis of clothing. This establishes another binary opposition at the heart of the drawing. Its hero is a simple peasant man with a skull cap and bark shoes. Equipped with a lance of bravery, he sets out to encounter the Aggressive Bear on his own while the Anti-Knight, in a tail-coat and a top-hat, is hiding behind the very Treasure that he is expected to protect. For once, different clothing may be taken to refer to the different positions of Sweden and Finland in the political map of Europe – the first more central and the other more peripheral. In local terms, it may also be taken to point towards the fact that within Finland the peasants’ protest against the rich and corrupted urban elites also involved elevating agrarian folks to the role of heroes capable of containing the alleged Eastern threat.

Such an actualisation of the archetypical bear slaying hero and his antitype is motivated by a topical discussion on the terms of collective security – i.e. on whether an attack against one, counts as an attack against all. The tale of the Beast and the Knight is argumentatively retold in these terms. A few years earlier, in 1923, the Swedish foreign minister Hederstjerna had had to resign after having suggested that Sweden would have an obligation to protect Finnish independence in the case of a Soviet attack. The speech was argued to conflict with the Swedish policy of neutrality. This was a shock for those Finns who had envisaged that a Knight able and willing to protect the durability of the state could be found in a Finnish-Swedish security alliance. More topically, the Swedish government had in 1925 decided to cut down expenses of the

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41 See e.g. Gibson (1996, 57) for the argument that the lance is a conventional attribute of the cardinal virtue of bravery (Fortitudo).
43 Ingman 1925, 125; Selén 1987, 135.
army and thus reduce its alertness. This motivated the cartoonist to actualise an antitheroic figure as the interpretant of the present Swedish policy. In Finnish debates, these events were taken to mean that Sweden was not committed to Finnish defence and also to suggest that it was easy for the Swedes to reduce military expenditures when it could rely on Finland to act as a buffer against the East.

In the configuration above, the shield which is not erect but lies useless on the ground points toward this thought.

The configuration just analysed is not the only instance where the “cowardice” of Swedish foreign policy is criticised with recourse to meanings issuing from the chivalric equation. In 1919, the social democrat Väinö Voionmaa availed himself to them in a witty argument claiming that the image of Sweden as the “great warrior nation” had lost its pertinence: “The great and historical warring nation of the North has, in the eyes of Finnish knife fighters started to look more like a haberdasher [kauppasaksa] than a hero.”

In 1930, Lauri Santamäki argued that “the Finnish liberation war, as well as the whole movement for independence can be taken as evidence of how incompetent and unwilling Sweden is to support Finland when things get serious and how short-sighted its policies ‘in the eastern direction’ still are.” The point of such retellings of the chivalric plot is to bring reliance on the Swedish policy of prudent neutrality out as bad statecraft.

Correspondingly, pointing out the lack of the virtue of courageousness in others provided a convenient means for promoting activism at home. In 1930, a drawing with the Aggressive Bear and the Knight cropped up in the Blinkfyren magazine. The configuration mimics the badge of the Lapua Movement – an extreme right-wing group or “Finnish variant of fascism” which emerged towards the end of 1920s as a response

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44 Selén 1987, 135. See also Proceedings of the II Parliamentary Session 1924, 9 December 1924, 1470, 1480.
45 Voionmaa 1919, 184.
46 Santamäki 1930, 120–121. See also the Agrarian Party’s Aron Pitkänen’s argument that “the neutrality which Sweden displayed during the Finnish Civil War quite naturally evoked feelings of bitterness in us” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 30 October 1919, 1352.)
47 Blinkfyren, No. 6–7, 1930. ‘Stignande sol och slocknande stjärnor.’
48 Alapuro 2004, 91. A similar interpretation of the Lapua Movement can be found in a poem written by the poet Uuno Kailas and published in 1932: “That black-winged spirit of the times/ has flown here, borne on southern winds,/ and clad itself in more familiar guise,/ a peasant’s jacket on its shoulders lies./ If power should come its way, or laws fall to its fist,/ it would be time to sing: my countrymen, good night!” (cit. and translated Kirby 1979, 83.) For a view that contests the connection between the Lapua Movement and fascism, see Vares 1991.
to the growing activism on the political left and had as its declared task the eradication of communism in Finland.49

It is relatively easy to identify two key members of the knightly cultural-historical equation in the drawing. The Bear functions as the interpretant of Soviet bestiality; it is fitted for present purposes with the help of a Soviet military hat budynovka which is placed on the head of the animal. The Knight, on its part, is actualised as a male figure with Lappish boots. In a similar vein, the Knight’s lance of fortitude is replaced by a club. Given that the right wing radicalism of the late 1920s and early 1930s had rural life at its centre, it makes sense to treat both these signs as indices of a typical Ostrobothnian peasant and link the idea of chivalric heroism to the ‘men of Lapua.’50 Representatives of this radical right-wing movement are contrasted with the essentially anti-chivalric male figures representing Finnish politicians who are afraid of “Moscow’s Finnish slaves.” In line with the political profile of Blinkfyren, the drawing also contains an antisemitic element; several Anti-Knights are identified as Jews.

The proactive doctrine of the Lapua Movement was motivated by a sense of paradox – although the Supreme Court had banned the Communist Party from operating in Finland and large numbers of left-wingers had been arrested and imprisoned, communists remained active and were even represented in the country’s law-making organ, the parliament.51 Although the Finnish non-socialists generally condemned the communists’ activities, reactions were not unified. The political centre demanded prudence, moderation and respect for laws, while the political right was more resolute and called for the use of impetuous measures as the best way of dealing with the Soviet proximity.52 In their eyes, the government’s response appeared weak and vacillating.53

The political point of the previous drawing, which was published in a magazine sympathetic to the Lapua Movement,54 was to seek legitimacy to the proactive measures of the Movement by suggesting that namely they were capable of containing the communist

49 See e.g. the Prime Minister Kallio’s reference to the “swelling and insolent appearances of the communists that has excited the minds of the people.” (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1929, 3 December 1929, 1195.) See also Hyvämäki 1964, 147.
50 See also Kosonen 2000, 245.
51 Hyvämäki 1964, 147.
53 While some Swedish-speakers – e.g. Blinkfyren’s circles – sided with Lapua’s anti-communist creed, the Swedish-speaking majority despised the movement’s doctrine of True Finnishness (aitosomalaisuus, äktfinskhet) and anti-legalistic measures. (Hyvämäki 1964, 163; Kirby 1979, 86; Vares 1991, 84–97.
54 Note also the editorial of Blinkfyren which is entitled ‘Finlands ledande svenska press och Lappo-rörelsen: kort-synt opportunism eller politisk förföljelseman? ’ The article criticises the Swedish language press in Finland for masking the Lapua Movement’s anti-communism as an expression of anti-Swedish True Finnishness. According to Blinkfyren, Lapua Movement was not anti-Swedish but had a potential for uniting the country against the common enemy of communism (Blinkfyren, No. 6–7, 1930.)
threat and thus contributing to the maintenance of the political unit. In order to transmit this thought, the cartoonist has drawn the male figure significantly larger than the Beast. As the men of Lapua were placed in a structural position of the Knight, they came out as an exceptional group of individuals endowed with virtù which was required not only to tame the Soviet Beast but also to accomplish the post-revolutionary quest for national unity – i.e. settle the dilemma of legitimate political authority for good.55

Important in this respect is the budyonovka military cap which, placed on the head of the Bear, functions as an index of the Soviet army.56 It contributes to “normalising” the threat of international communism by creating a conceptual linkage between domestic opposition to the non-socialist social order and aggression by a foreign army. It suggests that at issue in this “battle” against communism were not only political power relations in Finland but an attempt to avoid foreign invasion. A poem which accompanies this drawing explicitly spells out the thought that the violent actions of the Lapua Movement were targeted at containing the influence of Soviet bad fortuna in Finland and that succeeding in this endeavour was a matter of nothing less than honour: “as long as Moscow’s Finnish slaves,/ have seats in the Finnish parliament,/ ... so long ... is our honour a matter of farce.” The passage promotes pro-active measures in containing Russian influences in Finland yet simultaneously includes as a target of its criticism another mode of managing relations with Russia. ‘Finns as slaves of Moscow’ calls to mind a responsiveness to the Soviet Union which would lead to Finland becoming subjugated to Soviet interests and influences.

The thought of responsiveness to Russian or Soviet influences now persisting in the form of domestic communists also motivated the initial right wing reaction against the meeting of communist youth in the Ostrobothnian village of Lapua in November 1929, which gave birth and its name to the movement. Commenting on these events in his diary President L.K. Relander wrote that the “local White population [had been] angered by the red-shirted and red-scarfed communist youth – they were even sporting Soviet Russian emblems.”57

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55 In the parliamentary debate on the Lapua Movement, the Finnish communists are constantly being portrayed as the “henchmen of Moscow” and, because of this, their growing activism is portrayed as a threat against the survival of the Finnish state and its national unity. See esp. the National Coalition Party MP Erkki Paavolainen’s argumentation that the threat of communism – “a movement which on the orders of Moscow aims at state treason and coup d’etat” – has not been taken seriously enough. (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1929, 3 December 1929, 1200, 1202.)

56 This manipulation of the badge is curious for the reason that the Bear was the symbolic animal of the might of the Lapua Movement. In the original badge, the heroic male figure is depicted riding on the Bear like the Knight rides on his horse.

57 Relander cit. Kirby 1979, 83.
Similar analyses of the political situation of the late 1920s can be found in parliamentary
documents, and it is also possible to find counterarguments. This supports the idea that a
political tradition or what the text, in the Ricoeurian sense, is about can only be disclosed
by analysing it argumentative retellings. In December 1929, William Tanner of the Socialist
Workers’ and Smallholders’ Party identified in the events of the Civil War a background for
right wing violence. He, however, did not identify in the ‘men of Lapua’ a heroic vigilante
who, by taking law in his own hands, secures the success and survival of the political com-
community. Instead, Tanner suggests that apocalyptic scenarios may unfold from the proactive
measures that the Lapua Movement promoted. In a contrary vein, the National Coalition
Party MP Arvi Ahmavaara defended violent measures on the grounds that the time was ripe
for putting an end to 10 years’ “foolery with what our people have held most sacred and val-
uable throughout centuries. ... The cup of patience of the [Finnish] people is overflowing.”
Ahmavaara’s argument is related to the fact that the victors of the Civil War viewed inde-
pendent Finland as an uncompleted creation. In their statecraft speech acts they ventured
that due to a continuing responsiveness to the East, the ideals of the White Republic and
achievements of the Civil War were in constant jeopardy and the durability of the state in
need of constant protection.

The Lapua Movement was dissolved in 1932 after an attempted coup d’état and a more
conciliatory line aimed at recovering national integrity came to prevail. In an article entitled
‘National Self-Discipline,’ published in 1932, the movement is critiqued for falsely evoking
chivalric meanings: “Especially the youth ... desperately tries to find something with which
to prove its manliness. ... It sees, because it wants to see, a hero in persons whose deeds, inten-
tions, and words lack a rational and acceptable basis.” Against the background provided by
the chivalric language-game, these words emerge as a powerful means of stripping the aura of
virtuosity of a movement which was promoting pro-active even violent measures as virtùous
action. They seek to deny the entitlement of the Lapua Movement to the position of political
authority.

In contradistinction to the cartoons that praised extra-parliamentary movements or vol-
utary groupings for their capacity to display exceptional courage, the article pays respect to
the self-discipline and respect for laws of a political unit. Only at moments when destruction
seems to threaten the nation would it be acceptable for a minority to step up and assume
responsibility in its hands. “But then, a rigid and virtuous [siveellinen] basis for action, a cor-
rect sense of historical circumstances, an extreme sense of responsibility and unfaltering sense

58 Proceedings of the II Parliamentary Session 1929, 3 December 1929, 1235, 1226–1227.
59 E.g. Siltala 1985, 39.
60 Suomalainen Suomi 1932, 10.
of righteousness are demanded from these forces.” It seems, indeed, that the paradigmatic choice between two ways of conceptualising virtuous action – actively impetuous vs. prudently restrained – previous the final interpretant for this way of thought.

The difficulty of recognising the real Knight also puzzled the Finnish communists. The Tuisku magazine made use of anti-heroic imagery to ridicule the Lapua Movement’s aspiring Knights – represented in the drawing below by the priest, the peasant, the policeman, and the soldier – i.e. representatives of forces that in the communist publicity were designated as “the conservers of the society.” The symbols of the church and the factory in the background of the picture further strengthen the message of Finnish society being divided into two camps with conflicting aims – one conservative and the other reformist if not radical.

It is possible to identify the components of the chivalric thought-paradigm in the drawing. The Beast is actualised in the form of the socialist labour movement on a May Day march. However, this is not something that we can learn from the iconic sign aspects of the marchers, but instead we need to consult the way in which the “conservers” are behaving toward them in order to arrive at that interpretation. There is thus an ironic aspect to the configuration and, by taking that into account, it is possible to learn to appreciate the political pun that the “bestiality” of the marchers discloses. The intended meaning is concealed or contradicted by the literal meaning.

Although the socialist marchers appear quite peaceful, the aspiring Knights of the conservative forces act towards them as if they constituted a major threat. They are cowardly hiding behind a gigantic lock which may be taken as a reference to the organisation called Finland’s Lock (Suomen Lukko)

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61 Suomalainen Suomi 1932, 9.
62 Tuisku, No. 8–9, 1 May 1930. ‘Alkaa pelottaa...’
63 E.g. Työväenjärjestöjen Tiedonantaja 1929. For the sake of curiosity, it is interesting to point out that the priest and the peasant (kulak) were persistent elements in the Bolshevik demonology (Bonnell 1999).
64 Irony, as Encyclopaedia Britannica explicates, arises from an awareness of contrast between what is and what ought to be. (Encyclopaedia Britannica Premium Service www-document.)
founded in March 1930 to block communism from Finland. In its ironic style, the caption of the cartoon links the communists explicitly to the theme of existential threat: “This society will not persist any longer if these people are allowed to rampage with their flags like that.” An ironic treatment of the chivalric language-game and the apocalyptic plot unfolding from it provided a convenient means for putting forth the thought that the conservatives were overreacting. Furthermore, the caption of the drawing – “Yes, celebrating May Day is a dictate from Moscow and that’s why we have to prevent it. Otherwise we’ll be sentenced to doom” – evokes thoughts that such oversensitiveness was related to the neighbourhood of Russia.

These interpretations seem to make sense vis-à-vis the claim that the events of 1917–1918 shattered the two-tiered logic of belonging – patria and communis mater patria – and that these two scales were supposed to converge in independent Finland. The Finnish political unit was expected to become the sole object of loyalty and commitment. The task, in other words, was to solve the “Machiavellian” dilemma of becoming an independent, separate self that is free of foreign domination. In the previous chapter I argued that it makes sense to interpret political cartoons in the wake of the 1920s with a view upon such a conjuncture. They are attempts to solve this dilemma by way of resignification.

That is, the Beast is frequently actualised to express political concerns caused by the non-convergence of state borders and the borders of the political community. In the corpus, the coexistence of alternative sources of authority is no less significant a challenge for the survival of the political unit than the possibility of external aggression. It is argued to weaken the defences of the political form of life due to which the images of Fallen Women proliferate and the figure of the Knight as the personification of commitment and devotion can emerge as a solution to it. As an illustration, we may also cite the frequent practice of designating Russia as the mother country (emämaa) of Finnish communists. The wake of the 1930s represents something of a climax to these developments. It is with view upon such a conjuncture that the events of the late 1920s–early 1930s can be legitimately characterised as the “second phase of the Civil War” or “the post-revolutionary quest for national integration.” At issue during them was not only the containment of external aggression but also an attempt to fuse

\footnote{Siltala 1985, 338–391. The textual passage “Lapuan Lukko” suggests a connection between the Suomen Lukko movement and the Lapua Movement. This may be taken to allude to the fact that although initially intended as a law abiding organisation as opposed to the extra-legal profile of the Lapua Movement, it soon became difficult to tell the two apart (Siltala 1985, 339.)}

\footnote{For a formulation of this dilemma, see e.g. Pitkin 1984, 7.}

\footnote{Kirby 1979, 84; Alapuro 2004, 91.}
patria and communis mater patria seamlessly together as a means of making the political unit durable.

6.3. Russian Charm Offenses

The Friendly Bear provides an alternative to the Aggressive Bear. In view of the assertion above, it is interesting to note that this model-image is frequently actualised to function as an interpretant of Soviet attempts to provide an object of loyalty and commitment for the Finns. Instead of coercion or expansion by force, it calls to mind seduction and soft power.\(^69\) It does not evoke power as strength but brings it forth as accepted influence.\(^70\) In the Friendly Bear we encounter another tamed, playful Bear. However, unlike the Puppet Bear, this animal is not a pathetic creature, it remains disconcerting due to the potential of exercising overwhelming strength which is embodied in its plot-space. In this capacity, the Friendly Bear is well-geared for articulating a set of key issues in Finnish-Russian relationships during the epoch under scrutiny here. It brings us back to the problem of non-coincidence between the borders of patria and communis mater patria and the resultant “Machiavellian” dilemma of becoming an independent, separate self that is free from foreign domination.\(^71\)

In March 1921, the Social Democrat Kurikka magazine issued a cartoon that features the Friendly Bear peaking out from within a shack with the sign Hotel Patria on the roof.\(^72\) In this capacity, it sends an outright message about the continuing influence of Russia within the Finnish patria. Indeed, with its capacity to call to mind the thematic of playfulness and human-animal cooperation, the model-image of the Friendly Bear was suitable for transmitting ideas related to the Finns wilful responsiveness to Soviet Russia. That is, it

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\(^69\) The notion of soft power referring to the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion has emerged as an important part of IR scholarly thinking in recent years (see esp. Mattern 2005b).

\(^70\) See also Brown 2001, 91.

\(^71\) For a formulation of this dilemma, see e.g. Pitkin 1984, 7.

\(^72\) Kurikka, No. 9, 5 March 1921. 'Vaikea tilanne.'
includes the possibility that the neighbourhood of Russia or the USSR is not a matter of bad but good fortuna for Finland.

The drawing is motivated by topical developments in Finnish-Russian relationships. At the same time as the Russian government was eager to intensify commercial operations with Finland and had sent a trade delegation, it blamed Finland for aggressiveness on issues regarding the ceded areas of Repola and Porajärvi and involvement in rebellions in the Russian naval base of Kronstadt. From the Russian point of view a double-standard was at play in Finnish policies vis-à-vis its former metropolitan country. On the one hand, the Finns practiced cooperation and, on the other, promoted conflict. The configuration above describes this setting with recourse to chivalric model-images.

It is noteworthy that the structural position of the potential tamer of fortuna splits into two, which renders the configuration an argument related to the two competing modes of relating to Russia. That is, compliance and impetuousness are set in opposition as alternative understandings of what it means to be virtuous with regard to Russia. The figure of the capitalist with his top-hat functions as an actualised interpretant of the first and the joint model-image composed of the soldier and the Lion of the latter.

The armband discloses that in indexical terms the soldier refers to the White victors of the Civil War whose zeal remained alive in the independent Finland and now took the form of interventions across the Eastern border in the hope of returning the ceded areas and thereby creating the Greater Finland. The fact that white Finland, now ruled by centrist factions, was opposed to these plans is evoked by depicting the joint sign composed of the soldier and the lion as a combination of outright aggressiveness and constraint. In contradistinction, the capitalist with a sack of sauerkraut calls to mind the vice of opportunism connected to private interests. The bowing gestures of the character are associated with humbleness and servility. They call to mind another character familiar from the cultural-history of Finnish-Russian relationships – i.e. the “bowing Fennoman” who was mocked by political opponents for compliance with regard to Russia during the period of autonomy.

73 E.g. Korhonen 1966, 50.
74 Karsh (1986, 267) identifies the two alternative courses to the Finnish national strategy (later known as Paasikivi-Kekkonen line) – the positive and the negative one. Whereas the positive course is manifest in continuing attempts to convince (Soviet) Russia of Finland’s goodwill, the negative component is realised in right-wing activism and the build-up of military power.
75 The multinational empire had offered lucrative opportunities for people wishing to make a career or gain money. In addition to the figure of the “bowing Fennoman,” the performative term of notion “taking the road to St. Petersburg” was used by adversaries to mock politicians and businessmen who “played the Russia card” in order to further their personal or political interests. Jussila 1979, 11: 250–252; Salokorpi 1988, esp. 16–17. Osmo Jussila (1979, 11) notes that the plot of “taking the road to St. Petersburg” took on different variations in changing political circumstances; it was initially coined to ridicule the Finnish peasants who had turned to the Emperor in the hope of
The point of the cartoon is to critique both of these strategies vis-à-vis Russia as bad statecraft. Neither one of them qualifies as virtù that is capable of turning the Soviet neighbourhood into good fortuna. This is explicitly stated by the figure of the man from the street who, in the bottom right corner of cartoon, observes the unfolding political scene and shouts out ‘God Bless.’

Critique of opportunism embodied in the figure of the capitalist is not restricted to this labour movement magazine, but the “bowing fennoman” provided a persistent component to the political imaginary of Finnish-Russian relationships during the first decades of independent statehood. In 1937, he cropped up in the Ikka newspaper, the mouthpiece of the Agrarian party, in a configuration criticising “the businessmen and the right-wingers of the 1930s” who were “offspring of the bowing fennomans.” In 1930, he made a re-appearance in the book Suur-Suomen koulu published by a right-wing activist group. The book contrasts “wide circles of businessmen” who display loyalty towards Russia in order to benefit from Russian military purchases with the activists who embody the ideals of “civilised youth and the country folks’ [maalaisväestö] healthy political instinct” and had taken “the right road ... one’s own road.” Here, responsiveness to and willingness to cooperate with Russia or the USSR is condemned on the basis that it is motivated by selfishness. In all these examples, the paradigmatic opposition underpinning the political point relates to the juxtaposition of selfish compliance and self-sacrificing defiance. It distinguishes the Anti-Knight from the Knight, or a businessman from an activist.

In August 1922 the communists’ satirical magazine Paukku actualised the chivalric equation but did it for quite different purposes from the previous example. It brought the Bear out as a friendly figure in order to contest the dominant conception of the USSR as a brutal and bestial political unit.

The familiar formula with the Knight and the Beast is actualised

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76 Pseudonym Tompan Tuomo (i.e. Urho Kittilä) cit. Salokorpi 1988, 24.
77 Jyväskylän Seminaarin Karjala-Seura 1930, 115.
78 Paukku, August 1922. ‘Musta-Itä – Valkoinen-Länsi.’
for a comment on the treatment of Germany, the man in the cage, on the one hand by France
and on the other by Soviet Russia. Germany, experiencing economic hardship, had applied
for a postponement of reparation payments from the Reparations Commission which had
been set up after the First World War to govern the reparations that the Entente demanded
from the loser of the war. France’s response to the request was negative. This inspired the car-
toonist to bring the non-semiotic and semiotic elements of political imaginary in articulation
with one another in a subversive way. Conventionally, the Knight is the embodiment of such
noble qualities as heroism, protectiveness, bravery, etc. The Bear functions as the brutal and
animalistic Beast.79 The innovation of the cartoonist is that he has manipulated this structure
of expectation so that the male character with the knightly gear representing France is actu-
ally behaving bestially whereas the Russian bear – fixed to the Soviet regime by the cap on his
head – displays humane qualities. The point of the drawing is to contest the view prevalent
in the bourgeois dominated publicity of White Finland that Soviet Russia was a source of
bad fortuna, not only for Finland but humankind more generally. Beyond this political level,
which can be treated as a response to a contingent challenge, the “Machiavellian” thought-
paradigm revolving around the notions of virtù and fortuna shines through the immediate
expression level of the drawing being its final interpretant.

In September 1926, the Friendly Bear made a reappearance on the pages of Kurikka,
the mouthpiece of the Social Democrats.80 The configuration evaluates with recourse to this
model-image the enthusiasm of right-wing activists to get rid of everything that reminded
them of the status of Finland as a con-
stituent member of the Russian Empire.
The bucket of tar hanging on the wheel-
barrows serves as a reminder of perhaps
the most famous such incident – the
tarring of the Orthodox Resvoi chapel
in Helsinki in the spring of 1919.81

Given the fact that establishing
the Finnish nation as the sole source of
authority and target of loyalty was the
dream of the right-wingers, the Friendly
Bear as the sign of Russian attractiveness
had to be packed in the wheelbarrow

79 See also Alker 1996, 274.
80 Kurikka, No. 36, 4 September 1926. ‘Itsenäisyysliitto ja Aleksanteri II.’
81 E.g. Karemä 1998, 143.
with a set of other symbols that evoked the possibility of harmonious relations and common interests between Russia and Finland – i.e. the statue of the Emperor and the palm leaf as a symbol of peace. It is possible to appreciate the drawing as a statecraft speech act by noting that it treats ironically the activist policy of trying to guarantee the survival and success of the Finnish political community by widening the abyss between Finland and Russia, which also meant containing Russian or Soviet influences in the country.

*Garm*³² actualised the Friendly Bear to issue a warning on the charm offences that the Soviet Union was performing on the international scene.³³ In this configuration dating from the summer of 1934, the cartoonist has availed himself to the Friendly Bear model-image for an interpretant of the recent willingness of the USSR to enter the League of Nations, an organisation which it had previously condemned as an instrument of imperialism, and now wanted to transform into an organisation of collective security against fascist aggression.³⁴

The Friendly Bear first calls to mind the playful, tamed animal that amuses people in zoos and circuses or comforts children in the form of a Teddy Bear. It testifies to the fact that the Bear may also be actualised to transmit thoughts related to the character of the Russian/Soviet neighbourhood as good *fortuna*. This configuration points to such a possibility, but this is not the whole story. In order to drive home his political point, the cartoonist has exploited the dual plot-possibility embodied in the Friendly Bear as a combination of playfulness and potential threat.³⁵ The latter plot unfolds from the sickle and the hammer that the Bear hides in his lap. They call to mind the character of the Soviet Union as the realm of socialism and world revolution. When redescribed in these terms, the Soviet suggestion to transform the League of Nations into an anti-fascist organisation comes out in a bad light; it starts to look like an attempt to spread its social political system across the world.

³² Uino 1991, 333.
³³ *Garm*, No. 11-12, 15 June 1934. ‘Den Fransk-Ryska Kurtisen.’
³⁴ E.g. Korhonen 1971, 94.
³⁵ E.g. Werness 2004, 33.
Although published in a Finnish magazine, the cartoon is not a comment on Finnish statecraft. Its pun is directed against France, which is here personified in the conventional female form as Marianne. If the iconic sign features are not sufficient for transmitting the sense of condemnation of French responsiveness to Soviet initiatives, the caption of the cartoon which designates Marianne as a “courtesan” takes care of it and adds moral overtones to the drawing. Similarly with the model-images of the Finnish Fallen Women, the configuration develops into an argument that has insufficient defences against the threat of the Soviet Union as its point.

6.4. Beware of the Human Beast

In addition to the animal beasts – the Bear, the Eagle, or the Serpent – the idea of existential threat may also be transmitted by human figures. In this task, a human being is usually depicted as a gigantic or otherwise inhumane character which renders it possible to identify him as the Beast. The figure may be placed on the side of the elements rather than culture. In the configuration on the left, it is not only the size of the gigantic human figure that enables the identification of him as the Beast of this statecraft speech act, but other iconic features such as the character’s rugged appearance and his threatening gestures bolster the interpretation that the male figure is actualised as the interpretant sign of the malevolence of Soviet policies vis-à-vis Finland. Furthermore, his bestiality is emphasised by the symbol of the “evil eye” – a traditional symbol of bad intentions.86

The configuration was published in the National Coalition Party’s satirical magazine Ampiainen in October 1923.87 Historical context for it was provided by a set of events that had caused tension in Finnish-Soviet relationships in the autumn of 1923. In September, a Soviet civil servant had been murdered in a village nearby the Finnish border and Finnish border guards were blamed for having assisted the murderer. Russian reaction to these events was harsh but, in the Finnish interpretation, disproportionate. It was interpreted as a more general warning that the Soviets would not take lightly any aggressions on the part of the Finns.88

87 Ampiainen, No. 21, 20 October 1923. “Ryssä: Äsh, sormiani syyhyttää...”
The configuration with a tiny Finnish soldier and a gruesome Russian giant about to crush the soldier with his hand provided a convenient means for expressing concerns related to this situation. The familiar chemise that the Beast is clad in serves to specify the character of these concerns; embodied in it is the story of Russian imperial ‘tendencies’ which further suggests that the threat against the independent statehood of Finland is existential. Russia would try to reconquer Finland, it suggests and thus replicates the thought of the Russian neighbourhood as a matter of bad fortuna.

As to the question of virtù, there is no Knight present in the configuration. The soldier that we might expect to fulfil such a function does not display the characteristics of bravery and zeal, but instead sits comfortably in the lap of the Soviet giant and is unaware of the threat looming over and above his head. The uniform of the Anti-Knight indicates that this statecraft speech act relates to the on-going parliamentary discussions over how much money the ‘new-born’ Finnish army would be allocated in the following year’s state budget. The National Coalition Party’s representative J.A. Mannermaa spoke in favour of making sacrifices in order to strengthen the army and argued that “defence nihilism” was against the “national interest” of Finland. Indeed, the trusting relationship that prevails between the configuration’s representatives of Finland and Russia may be interpreted to stand for the policy of decreasing the military budget which the left promoted and which is here condemned as bad statecraft prone to lead to the destruction of independent statehood.

In October 1920 Kurikka had published a drawing with the gigantic Russian Human Beast and his child-like allies to retrospectively critique the Finnish right-wingers who had been planning on assisting the Whites in the Russian Civil War. This time, subservience vis-à-vis the neighbour to the East is not blamed on the communists but on the Finnish right-wing activists.

The historical context is specified in the caption of the cartoon which identifies the gigantic Beast as General Wrangler.

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and his dependents as Finland and other Border States. When redescribed in these terms, the plans of the Finnish right-wingers to take part in the Russian Civil War do not come out as an act of heroic virtù but as conduct conducive to bad fortuna. The outfit of the Beast serves to specify the character of ill luck. General Wrangel is not clad in the Russian Whites’ military uniform but in the Russian peasant man’s chemise customarily connected to attempts to fuse Finland seamlessly into the Russian Empire. This argumentative retelling suggests not only that the Finnish right-wingers were not making independent decisions but it also posits that if the Russian Whites had won, Finns – together with other nations that had become independent as a result of the disintegration of the Russian autocracy – would have again become subjects of the paternalistic policies of Russia. Participating in raids against the Bolshevik ruled city of St. Petersburg would not have promoted the Finnish cause but rather endangered the durability of the state. The cartoon is thus another example of the selective character of ‘observing Russia as Finns’ – whether Russia is conceived of as a source of good or bad fortuna depends on which Russia is actually being observed.

The capacity of cultural-historical equations to undergo semantic substitution and to refer to different parts of the world is evident from the way in which the familiar scene was again actualised in Kurikka of the Social Democrats in autumn of 1929. Just like in the previous configurations, displaying trust towards the Eastern neighbour – here again depicted with the performative movements of sitting in the lap of the Soviet Beast – comes out as bad statecraft. However, whilst the “defence nihilistic policies” of the social democrats were the target of criticism in one of the illustrations above, this time it is the social democrats who are putting forth a critique against the communists’ bad statecraft.

Both the present and previous two illustrations evoke the opposites of manliness and childhood in order to condemn trusting relations

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90 Kurikka, No. 20, 31 October 1920. ‘Porvari Valko-Venäjästä.’
91 Kurikka, No. 36, 7 September 1929. ‘Ammattijärjestön suhteet itään.’
between Finns and Russians as bad statecraft. In the drawing depicting Wrangler and the Borders States, the former is designated as a father and the latter as his children. In the drawing on the previous page, childlikeness is emphasised by the baby bibs around the necks of the two lap-sitters. On this basis, the configuration comes to suggest that if childlikeness together with related attributes such as dependency and naïveté is associated with a lack of virtù, qualities geared at sustaining the state must be found in manliness, independence, and maturity – i.e. in meanings familiarly unfolding from the figure of the Knight. This is, indeed, a very “Machiavellian” analysis of the dynamics of political life. As Hannah Pitkin argues, Machiavelli frequently distinguishes the “real man” – a virtuous actor – from children, the epitome of dependency.\footnote{92 E.g. Pitkin 1984, 49.}

In order to disclose the historical context for such an actualisation of the familiar cultural-historical equation, we may take note of the fact that in the lap of the Beast there sits the communists’ Isak Heikka, who was elected as the new chairman of the Finnish Trade Union (Suomen Ammattijärjestö) after the social democrats’ and the communists’ battle which caused the social democrats to leave the organisation. Thus, to be precise, at issue in this statecraft speech act is not the survival of the Finnish state but another political form of life, i.e. the trade union. Condemning the leaders of the new organisation as “puppets of Moscow”\footnote{93 See also Upton 1970, 95–105.} – a message which is bolstered with the motif of a marionette in Heikka’s hand – was a powerful way to drain of legitimacy the actions of this political agent.

The fact that more archaic possibilities of meaning were actualised namely in this way is related to the fact that already in the 1920s, and increasingly towards the end of the epoch, the social democrats tried to display themselves as loyalists of independent Finland when it came to relations with the Soviet Union. In order to become accepted as legitimate citizens of White Finland, they had to accommodate their policies to the rupture where patria and communis mater patria were to be fused. This involved denouncing Soviet Russia or the USSR, or its political system, as a target of loyalty and administration – i.e. as another communis mater patria. At the same time, however, views expressing admiration of the Soviet system were published in the Suomen Sosialidemokraatti newspaper. This sparked criticism in the bourgeois circles. Differentiating oneself from the communists and arguing that it was the latter who regarded Soviet Russia as their mother country provided a convenient means for dealing with this dilemma.\footnote{94 See also the Social Democrat MP Ryömä’s speech in the parliament in October 1923 referring to Russia as the communists’ motherland and arguing that the communists were trying to sabotage the social democrats’ efforts at integration among the working class after the Civil War (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1923, Vol. I, 19 October 1923, 762–763.) Also Siltala 1985, 492; Vesa Vares 1991, 49.}
Besides this drawing, presenting Finnish-Russian relations as a battle between two partners of unequal size is something characteristic of the 1920s and 1930s. Such representative practice conveniently brings out the character of the epoch as the “Machiavellian” moment in Finnish-Russian relations – i.e. a situation in which securing success and survival is increasingly difficult. Pointing out the difference in the sizes of Finland and Russia provided a convenient means for calling to mind such a situation. Consider, for example, a passage from a book written by the Agrarian party leader Santeri Alkio, published in 1919, which poses the problem of securing the survival of the political unit as the obvious historical task and which explicitly evokes the figure of the Beast for that purpose:

Just like a cat plays with a mouse, so has the Russkie played with Finland. For centuries. Sometimes it has made lethal and bloody wounds with its claws. Sometimes it has set free just a little bit in order to evoke hope in life and to remind, with another grasp of the beast, of the omnipresence of the national moment of death.\textsuperscript{95}

In a similar vein, the social democrat Väinö Voionmaa described the relationship between Finland and Russia in terms of a disparity and, interestingly, linked this fact to the difficulty of national self-preservation:

[of] small and big, poor and rich, sparsely populated and mighty. ... The relationship of the small and the big, already overwhelming for Finland, is becoming more and more like a union of a mouse and a lion. ... As the political might of Russia grows and the political centre of gravity moves towards Eastern Europe, the national independence of Finland has for decades wavered on the verge of doom.\textsuperscript{96}

However, the model-image of the Russian giant is not something unique to the Finnish political imaginary. In the wider European political imaginaries Russian expansiveness has been evoked by depicting Russia as a landlocked giant constantly looking for more living space and access to the sea.\textsuperscript{97} Heeding Yuri Lotman’s treatment of symbols as reservoirs of lengthy texts from the culture’s past, the model-image of the gigantic Human Beast can be examined as a reservoir and a plot-gene\textsuperscript{98} which, in virtue of this conventional background, unfolds in stories that have to do with the expansiveness and imperial tendencies of Russia.

\textsuperscript{95} Alkio 1919, 61.
\textsuperscript{96} Voionmaa 1919, 322–323.
\textsuperscript{97} Immonen 1987, 38–46.
\textsuperscript{98} Lotman 1990, 67.
In addition to knowledge related to Russia’s expansiveness, drawings often allude to stories familiar from the Bible. One such legend is the tale of gigantic Goliath and tiny but heroic David. The tale provides a convenient background for the purposes of making a virtue out of necessity – i.e. heroism out of a small size.

In November 1919, Tuulispää magazine published a cartoon with the title *Here is Goliath but where is David?* The idea of Goliath’s gigantic monstrosity functions as an interpretant of the actions of the Soviet Red Army which was led by Lev Trotsky – the cheerful man in the rucksack. Historical context for the drawing is provided by Finland’s official decision not to assist the Russian Whites in interventions to the bolshevik-ruled city of St. Petersburg.100 That is, it redescribes the same set of events as the configuration which features General Wrangler and his ‘dependents.’ But the message that comes out from this configuration is very different, indeed. By describing the bolsheviks as the Human Beast and by evoking the tale of the heroic David, the cartoon posits that assisting the Russian Whites would have been an occasion for Finland to undertake hero-deeds and thus to prove its character as the Knight. In this sense, the drawing sustains the view that the fate of the bolsheviks was in the hands of the Finns.101

The Human Beast was again actualised in *Fyren* in the spring of 1920 to comment on the beginning of peace negotiations between Soviet Russia and Finland. The caption of the cartoon reads “toast for peace” (*fredsbägaren*).102 Depicting Lenin, the Finns’ counterpart in

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99 *Tuulispää*, No. 45, 1 November 1919. ”Tässä on Goliat, mutta missä on David?”
100 For more discussion on the topic, see e.g. Georg Schauman’s motion of censure from May 1919; according to it the Finnish troops were planning on intervening and conquering St. Petersburg (Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1919, 20 May 1919, 449.) The possibility was formally dropped in July 1919, it but cropped up again in late autumn and early winter when the White Russians were making progress in Northwestern Russia. However, since Admiral Kolchak refused to recognise Finnish independence, the issue was again dropped by the government. (E.g. Virrankoski 2001, 769–770.)
101 See e.g. Virrankoski 2001, 770.
102 *Fyren*, No. 5–6, 1920. ‘Fredsbägaren.’
peace negotiations, as a bestial, Janus faced creature was a convenient way to contest the sincerity of the proposal. It suggests that although the Soviets were now showing a friendly face, their true intentions were malevolent. In the place of a toast in the hand of Lenin there is the motif of a skull – a conventional symbol of death – which sends a powerful message that negotiating an agreement with the Soviets would lead to death and devastation, and thus count as anything but an act of good statecraft.

The Swedish People’s Party was, indeed, sceptical towards starting negotiations with the Soviets. In parliamentary discussions its representative Ernst Estlander argued that “peace with Russia would not benefit our country for long, but would bring about many dangers. Agreement with Soviet Russia does not mean security in relations with the East now or in the future.” In Estlander’s vision, peace with the Soviets would strengthen the position of those groups that were either “enemies of the state and the society” or just wanted to promote Russian influences within Finland.103 In this way of conceptualising the neighbourhood of Soviet Russia, the virtù needed to make the state endure is found in non-accommodation to Soviet demands. Suspicion against Russian revolutionary developments was also expressed in Edvard Hjelt’s characterisation of Russia as a realm where “the black sister ... always walks in the footsteps of the red one.”104 It suggests that beneath the Soviet commissar’s costume one would soon find a representative of autocratic Russia. Indeed, in the configuration above the joint sign of gallows and dead human beings stand for the way of thought which sees in the ‘tendency’ to evolve into autocracy and to take on despotic forms.

6.5. Apocalyptic Realm

In January 1919,105 the bourgeois Tuulispää magazine had issued another cartoon where the structural position of the Human Beast was filled by a male figure recognisable as Lenin.

104 Hjelt 1919, 40.
105 Tuulispää, No. 4, 24 January 1919. ‘Kiusaja.’
The young boy with the sign “1919” represents the ‘new-born’ Finnish society. As a symbol of innocence and new beginnings he stands for the possibility of breaking with the recent past of Civil War, conflict, and bloodshed which are here symbolised by the old man peaking from the bottom right corner of the picture with the sign “1918” on his chest. The bestiality of Lenin concerns the fact that he is trying to prevent the possibility of a new beginning. Actually, he is attempting to instigate the young boy into another revolution. The cartoon puts forth a warning against the possibility of these developments. The thought that the revolutionary bolshevik system represented nothing worth striving for is transmitted by showing Russia as an apocalyptic realm of killings and hangings.

In this sense, the configuration is also a statecraft speech act; it presents the moment of choice between a policy that leads to devastation and one that would enable sustaining the well-being of the political community. At the heart of this choice, the cartoon depicts, is (non-)responsiveness to Soviet attempts at influence.

Configurations that depict Soviet Russia or the Soviet Union as an apocalyptic realm and thus as something that is far from being Treasure-like are, indeed, widespread in the corpus throughout the epoch. In the autumn of 1921 Ampiainen\textsuperscript{106} issued a drawing where another Human Beast identifiable by his facial features as Lenin governs over a tragic realm of famine, death and devastation.

The caption of the cartoon \textit{In the Paradise of the East} links the configuration to the theme of the paradise. However, its ironic treatment of this thematic

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{106} Ampiainen, No. 18, 3 September 1921. ‘Idän paratiisissa.’
\end{flushright}
suggests that it is actually a counterargument to the claims glorifying the Soviet political and social system. In a crucial role in this respect is the nagaïka whip, the familiar symbol of Russian autocracy, which Lenin as the Human Beast holds in his hand. This suggests that instead of being a paradise-like realm for human fulfilment, the Soviet system was closer to hell.107

6.6. Wrapping up the Beast

The Beast contains invaluable clues for the task of grasping what it means to 'observe Russia as Finns.' One reason for this is that it conveniently embodies the idea of common enemy, articulates a sense of danger to the political collective, and sets the scene for the enactment of hero deeds. That is, as a key element of the chivalric language-game, the model-image of the Beast provides a convenient background for intentional and instrumental communication, which has in this work been approached in terms of statecraft speech acts. The analysis has disclosed a variety of events that were brought out as dilemmatic by redescribing them with recourse to the model-image of the Beast.

Just like the other composite members of the chivalric thought-paradigm, the Bear has a variety of facets. This traditional symbol of Russian might crops up in research material in an aggressive form – as the Aggressive Bear – to evaluate specific events so that the Russia or Soviet Union – in one way or another – comes out as an existential threat to the durability of the Finnish political unit. It expresses in historical terms the view that the mighty Eastern neighbour poses a challenge for the survival of the young Finnish state. This challenge may be actualised, for instance, in terms of territorial expansiveness and inherent imperialism, ideological extension, military aggressiveness as well as autocratic developments.

When actualised in these terms, the bestial model-image serves to sustain and support activist policies and to characterise them as skilled statecraft. The Russian/Soviet neighbourhood emerges as something to be contained. This easily transpires to downplay both the policies of prudence and cooperation in Finnish-Russian relations.

The Puppet Bear and the Friendly Bear provide alternatives to the Aggressive Bear. In virtue of the difference in their iconic sign qualities, these characters have a different plot-space. In the corpus of cartoons, the former actualises the plot of the Bear as a sufferer as it is used to express ideas related to the mistreatment of the Russian people in the hands of the present regime or evoked to belittle the potential of the Soviet Union to actually pose a challenge to the durability of the Finnish state. Simultaneously, it suggests that relations between the Finnish and Russian people should be evaluated separately from the relations with Russian/

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107 See also Ampiainen, No. 10, 13 May 1922. 'Kyllä routa porsaat...’
Soviet regime. On its part, the Friendly Bear embodies the possibility of the Russian or Soviet neighbourhood as good *fortuna*. Conceptualising the Russian neighbourhood as a source of good *fortuna* for Finland may mean, for instance, characterising the country across the Eastern border as an object of economic interests, a model of ideal society, an enabler of political developments at home, or a peaceful player in world politics.

In more critical accounts, the Friendly Bear is evoked to suggest that Russian attempts to uphold the good *fortuna* conception in Finland were inherently malevolent. Given its versatile plot-space as both a potential comforter and aggressor, the Friendly Bear also serves to downplay the sincerity of Soviet/Russian “charm offences” and to bring its neighbourhood out as a matter of bad *fortuna*. With a view upon identifying the final interpretant of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia, it is noteworthy that what seems to persist throughout these versatile actualisations of previous knowledge and experience is the habit of evaluating Russian proximity along the axis of good vs. bad *fortuna*.

In addition to the Bear, the structural position of the Beast is, in several cases, fulfilled by a human figure. Most often, a mythical moloch is actualised to spell out the contrast in size between Russia and Finland. On the one hand, the model-image serves as a means for bringing out political dilemmas associated with disparities between small states and great powers in international relations. By bringing Russia out as a belligerent or untrustworthy political unit and by characterising Finnish-Russian relationships in terms of domination and dependency, it provides a convenient node for challenging the good *fortuna* conception of the Russian neighbourhood and for suggesting alternative strategies for dealing with the might of Russia. However, by tying in with the Biblical plot of the tiny David's heroic battle against the mighty Goliath, it also functions as a key node for calling forth heroic deeds.

The analysis thus far has primarily involved movement between the pre-political and the political levels – i.e. it has concentrated on how the chivalric language-game is configured in the context of concrete events and incidents. The consequent task is to move these considerations more explicitly towards the post-political level and to consider the final interpretant of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia. As a step towards fulfilling the research task of sketching the thought-paradigm of Finnish-Russian relationships with recourse to the vocabulary of “Machiavellian” political dynamics, and the basic plot that revolves around the notions of *fortuna* and *virtù*, I have summarised the actualisations uncovered in the analysis of the Beast in the table below. This has been done with a view upon how the neighbourhood of Russia or the Soviet Union comes out as a matter of either good or bad *fortuna*. 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bad Fortuna</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Russia/the USSR poses a threat against Finland’s independent position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russian/Soviet interests in the Finnish direction are offensive and expansionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• When the time is ripe, Russia/the USSR will try to destroy the independence of Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russia/the USSR poses a challenge to the Finnish form of life and cultural traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russia/the USSR aims at spreading the Soviet social order across the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russian/Soviet politics have a tendency to develop towards autocracy and repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russian/Soviet suggestions for cooperation are untrustworthy and malevolent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russia/the USSR is a source of competing claims of solidarity and belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russian/Soviet influence in Finland jeopardises the quest for national unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russian and Finnish oppressors may join forces against Finnish people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good Fortuna</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Russia/the USSR presents lucrative business opportunities for the Finnish business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Accommodation to the Russian/Soviet neighbourhood enables political and economic developments in Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The interests of Finnish and Russian working classes are compatible if not common</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The interests of Finnish and Russian bourgeoisie are compatible if not common</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Russian Empire is the guardian of civilisation against the forces of chaos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Soviet political system provides a model for an ideal society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Relations between ordinary Finns and Russians are peaceful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russian/Soviet interests in the Finnish direction are strategic rather than offensive</td>
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</table>
Throughout this work I have argued that an inquiry into the political imaginary of Finnish-Russian relationships can be undertaken by analysing political cartoons as a collection of argumentative retellings of a traditionally available language-game. On the basis of my analysis of the corpus of some 700 political cartoons, I have argued that the language game can be articulated with recourse to its dominant model-images – the Knight, the Beast, and the Treasure; hence the designation chivalric language-game. Within its totality, it is the function of the Knight to enact the role of the guardian of the Treasure against the Beast that threatens its very existence. I have worked on the proposition that the equation provides a structure of preunderstanding for the Finnish political imaginary on Russia and have sought to inquire how this proposition is actualised for the purposes of political argumentation. These two levels of inquiry have presented the moments of naïve and structural interpretation.

In the ensuing pages, I move towards the historical-critical moment of interpretation as outlined in the chapter on the logic of analysis. I turn my analytical gaze on the variation that the chivalric structural element undergoes when actualised for argumentative purposes. The final goal is to come up with a reconstruction of the thought-paradigm of Finnish political imaginary on Russia. I attempt to grasp the element which remains constant throughout argumentative and thus partly conflicting retellings of the chivalric plot. In the spirit of Ricoeurian critical interpretation, I revert to the “Machiavellian” language of political dynamics to articulate the thought-paradigm. Ricoeur suggests that the hermeneutics of tradition can and must contain a critical moment and that one way of assuming a critical stance toward tradition is to approach it in a language different from that which the tradition explicitly uses.

Reconstructing the thought-paradigm has necessitated a detour via the political level where the chivalric meanings have been actualised for the purposes of statecrafting. The point has been to move toward a deeper or critical appreciation of the initial claim that “Russia is the fate of Finland, both in good and in bad.” Working in this way it has become possible to
connect this random claim to a more general way of thought where ambiguous – even dangerous – political conditions can be mitigated by skilful political action. This way of thinking resonates with the “Machiavellian” approach to political dynamics; the Russian neighbourhood emerges as a matter of managing fortuna the wheel of which can turn either toward good or bad luck depending on the virtù of the political actor.

In this sense, it is not insignificant that Machiavelli’s Prince particularly has been read as a treatise about the ruler’s ability to keep his principality, as an articulation of a certain savoir faire. This can be taken to legitimise the connection which was assumed to exist between the “Machiavellian” political vocabulary and statecrafting. I have characterised statecrafting as a set of practices which involve presenting oneself or one’s political orientation as worthy of being treated as a sovereign political agent. These practices, as Michel Foucault in his interpretation of Machiavelli suggests, can be seen to entail treating not just the territory but also its inhabitants as a particular kind of object. That is, in addition to the savoir faire of the Prince, statecrafting contains recommendations concerning the “right disposition of things” – i.e. the state of affairs which would contribute to making the political unit durable against external shocks, its internal or external political rivals. Indeed, the Knights, the Fallen Women, or the Impotent Lions that populate the political cartoons are best examined in this light. They articulate what must be controlled in order to keep the territory, how the population is to be managed to the end of preserving the newly independent political unit.

I suggest that the thought-paradigm of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia is outlined by two Machiavellian axes – the axis of virtù and the axis of fortuna. The first represents choosing which kind of conduct actually qualifies as virtuous. The axis stretches from impetuous to prudent action, from boldness to caution or from active to passive exercise of virtù. The second axis articulates how Russian proximity is characterised. It spells out whether the closeness of Russia or the Soviet Union is conceived as a source of good or bad luck – i.e. whether its neighbourhood is brought our as a positive or a negative challenge. Given that the thought of geographical closeness with Russia as something challenging persists throughout variation that this permits, necessità, which is the third key notion in the “Machiavellian” language of political dynamics, can be taken to be the linchpin of the whole thought-paradigm. It is reminiscent of J.K. Paasikivi’s famous slogan, “there is nothing we can do about geography” and find an expression, for instance, in the claim that “relationship with the Soviet Union will

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2 Foucault 2006, 133.
5 Foucault 2004, 95.
always be a key question of Finnish foreign policy.” 6 Necessità provides the momentum for igniting virtù into action as well as forcing the masses into the virtuous action that is required under such circumstances. 7 In this sense, it supplies a determinate element for the contingent interplay of virtù and fortuna. If this proposition is accepted, the thought-paradigm underpinning the Finnish political imaginary on Russia can be presented in the form of the diagram below.

To argue that the presented two-by-two articulates the paradigmatic element to the political imaginary is to suggest that when putting forth a message or an argument, one is forced to choose from among its items and then combine them so as to ignite a particular kind of meaning. Meaning is dependent upon the way in which these paradigmatic elements are put together. However, although one can freely choose from within the paradigm, one cannot choose it. This is how the paradigm can be said to provide the post-political scale to the totality of political imaginary.

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6 Tarkka 1983, 65. Tarkka continues: “When it comes to the political system, state philosophy, history and size, [the Soviet Union] is so unlike Finland that some features of its politics necessarily differ from what Finnish individuals and the Finnish state think is right.”

7 Cf. Meinecke 1965, 2; Boucher 1998, 137.
Differently to approaches that seek to identify persistent ‘lines’ to Finnish ways of conceptualising the Russian neighbourhood, the above presented paradigm is an attempt to articulate the background that remains constant through such conceptualisations. In this sense, the thought-paradigm is comparable to what C.S. Peirce refers to as the commons of common ground; it gets participants in a dialogue or debate to understand each others’ utterances without necessarily agreeing on them. If an argument does not resonate with it, it might not appear reliable or convincing. In this sense, the thought-paradigm is like the writer Jorge Luis Borges’s example which quotes a certain – perhaps imaginary – Chinese encyclopaedia in which it is written that:

animals are divided into: a) belonging to the Emperor, b) embalmed, c) tame, d) sucking pigs, e) sirens, f) fabulous, g) stray dogs, h) included in the present classification, i) frenzied, j) innumerable, k) drawn with very fine camelhair brush, l) et cetera, m) having just broken the water pitcher, n) that from a long way off look like flies.

This enigmatic-appearing passage can be read as an attempt to articulate what ‘observing the world as Chinese’ might mean. At the same time as it demonstrates the exotic charm of another system of thought, it reveals the limitation of our own – “the impossibility of thinking that.” There is no common ground in our imaginary for the meeting of, say, embalmed and camelhair drawn animals. It seems, however, that the common mind in Finnish discussions on Russia – popular, political, or scholarly – can be reconstructed with recourse to the “Machiavellian” language of political dynamics. Unlike Borges’s Chinese encyclopaedia, meanings unfolding from the “Machiavellian” encyclopaedia do not cause uneasiness when brought into articulation with the practices of ‘observing Russia as Finns.’

Once the paradigmatic element in the Finnish political imaginary on Russia has been outlined, it can be further developed to identify different strategies that either merit the mention of skilful statecraft or are deprived of that status. With the help of the sketched paradigm, I have identified four strategies vis-à-vis Russia and the Soviet Union in the research
material: loyalty, activism, prudence, and normalcy. It is worth stressing that the notion of strategy does not here refer to a plan which has been consciously devised to attain a specific goal, but to a “general way of organizing action” or a “mode of thought” which may enable attaining a variety of different goals. Hence understood, strategies of action bear an intimate connection to habits as the key element in the pragmatist research tradition.

The presented strategies are effects of meaning that combinations of paradigmatic elements into syntagmatic ensembles yield in the political imaginary of Finnish-Russian relationships. They are essentially answers to the question of how to manage the Russian/Soviet neighbourhood in a way which benefits the Finnish political unit – i.e. guarantees its success and survival.

The Strategies of Finnish–Russian/Soviet Statecraft

13 Swidler 1986, 277.
7.1. Strategies of Statecrafting

In the previous framework, I have designated as *loyalty, activism, prudence, and normalcy* the effects of meaning which come out from the “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm. In Peircean terms, these strategies are forms of reasoning that it has been possible to extract from the actual statecrafting that takes place in the cartoons. ¹⁵ They are something of ideal types and in real political life they may be intertwined or exist in a more or less diluted form.¹⁶ Still, the presented strategies are analytically useful. They summarise elements that were presented in the form of charts at the end of each analytical chapter. The two-by-two should, indeed, be thought of as a fusion of the charts where the actualisations of each chivalric model-image were classified either along the axis of *fortuna* (horizontally) or *virtù* (vertically).

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¹⁵ E.g. Peirce CP 5.340.
¹⁶ During the early years of independent statehood, the activist and the loyalist modes of reasoning were intertwined in the arguments that promoted active cooperation with the White Russians and simultaneously suggested zealous containment of the Bolsheviks. Think, also, of the passive and active resistance of the late 19ᵗʰ century (e.g. Apunen 1983, 8); both operated on the basis of the bad *fortuna* conception but their characterisations of active *virtù* differed.
The diagram on the previous page is intended to illustrate that if one chooses impetuousness from the axis of virtù and combines it with the thought that Russian neighbourhood is a matter of bad fortuna, the effect of meaning that one gets is the strategy of activism. This approach leans on the belief that Russian or Soviet aims in the Finnish direction are in conflict with Finnish interests if not outright malevolent. It thus joins the bad fortuna conception of the Russian neighbourhood with the promotion of zealous containment of Russian/Soviet influences. ‘Full-mouthered talk about the Russian hereditary enemy’ makes sense vis-à-vis such a way of thinking. Besides containment, the strategy of activism can be found in the research material also in the form of the proposition that since Soviet Russia would sooner or later attempt to destroy Finnish independence, it would be virtùous to take active measures to destroy the Soviet power across the border.

The strategy of loyalty is a combination of the conception that the Russian neighbourhood is a matter of good fortuna with the conception of virtù as impetuousness. Its effect of meaning is that Russian/Soviet intentions in the Finnish direction are not offensive or malevolent. Consequently, Finnish and Russian interests are argued to be compatible and complementary, if not common. As to the question of how to act, this strategy brings forth regular, continued and even impassioned attempts to convince Russia/the Soviet Union of the goodwill of Finns. ‘Erection of monuments in honour of Russian rulers’ is one actualisation of this strategy.

Before turning attention to the two remaining strategies – prudence and normalcy – let us examine how the strategies of loyalty and activism have cropped up in interpretations and analyses of Finnish-Russian relationships. Since the analysis of cartoon material has demonstrated in detail the ways in which these conceptions combine and crop up as strategies during the epoch of 1918–1930s, the task now is to examine the extent to which the “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm can be held accountable for continuity in Finnish political imaginary on Russia. For that end, I turn attention not only to the cartoon material but also to a set of scholarly analyses of Finnish-Russian relations put forth throughout the decades, and try to bring them into discussion with my analysis of the political imaginary of the interwar epoch. That is, I seek to broaden the scope of Finnish knowledge production on Russia both temporally and genre-wise. This is done in order to see how the plot that revolves around the thought-paradigm outlined by the axis of virtù and fortuna is replicated in interpretations of Finnish-Russian relations that touch not only upon the interwar period but extend from the period of autonomy towards the present day. Although reconstructing the long-term thought-paradigm of Finnish-Russian relations would require more space and time than we have at our disposal, this exercise is warranted in the sense of being motivated by the pragmatist presumption that knowledge – just like everything that exists – is continuous.17

17 Peirce CP 1.172.

THE “MACHIAVELLIAN” THOUGHT-PARADIGM 267
7.1.1. Loyalty

The strategy of loyalty forms elemental part of interpretations of Finnish-Russian relationships during the period of autonomy when Finland was a Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire. According to this mode of thinking, displaying loyalty towards the Russian Emperor was the best means of managing the intimate relationship with Russia. It had awarded the Finns with more than 100 years of peace and economic prosperity. It is argued that when Finland after some 600 years of Swedish rule became part of the Russian Empire in 1809 as a result of the Napoleonic wars, it received favourable treatment from the Russians. Emperor Alexander I guaranteed Finland its autonomous existence on the basis of institutions which had been established during the rule of Sweden and raised the Finnish people in stature “among the nations of Europe.”

In this mode of reasoning, the shift of political status and allegiance rewarded Finns with an enhanced political position while retaining the assets acquired during the Swedish rule, such as the Lutheran religion, a constitutional monarchy, and freedom of the peasantry, as well as civil and criminal law. The Grand Duchy also acquired its own central bank, introduced its own currency, built railways and canals, developed industries and multiplied its foreign trade. The basic logic of this argument is that had Finland remained a part of the Kingdom of Sweden, these developments would not have happened and the country would have remained a poor and neglected area or an arena for warfare between Sweden and Russia.

As part of this interpretation, it is also frequently suggested that the period of autonomy provided possibilities for the Finnish national movement to develop and challenge the privileged position that the Swedish-speaking minority was enjoying in the country. By emphasising that Finland received different treatment from the Swedish and Russian Empires, it is implied that proximity to Russia can be beneficial for the Finnish political unit. This interpretation is underpinned by a presumption that with the right kind of conduct, the Russian neighbourhood emerges as good fortuna from the Finnish point of view.

Such a “Pax Russica” interpretation of Finnish-Russian relationships during the epoch of autonomy has persisted as a habitually available element in the Finnish political imaginary; it crops up from time to time and is essentially captured in the title of Kristiina Kalleinen’s book “It is the fortune of my patria to belong to Russia” (“Isänmaani onni on kuulua Venäjälle”). The title is a direct quotation from the writings of the “Russian-minded” civil servant and poli-

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18 E.g. Klinge 1997, 16–19, 24–25; Palmgren 1948. There are competing interpretations as to what the Emperor actually meant, for an overview, see Soikkanen 2005.
19 E.g. Palmgren 1948, 21; see also Meinander 2003.
21 E.g. Palmgren, 1948; Apunen 1984, esp. 20–25; Meinander 2006, 93.
tician Lars Gabriel von Haartman for whom the Russian Empire offered rewarding career opportunities during the first half of the 19th century. Besides the benefits – e.g. career or business opportunities – that the Russian Empire offered for individuals, mostly members of the elite, it is oftentimes suggested that the country as a whole profited from being a constituent part of a multinational empire. This interpretation persists, for instance, in a recent document issued by the Finnish Parliament: “The country was able to prosper and create a national identity under the great power’s umbrella and in part with its funds.”

Another dimension in the strategy of loyalty relates to the question of virtù – i.e. characterisation of the type of conduct which would enable managing the proximity of Russia to the benefit of Finns. During the period of autonomy, virtù as impetuousness, combined with the good fortuna conception, came to mean active efforts at keeping the general public content with Russia as well as displays of gratitude and solidarity towards Russia and its ruler. As part of this story, it has been suggested that the autonomous status of Finland was not achieved by Finnish actions, but rather bestowed upon or given to its people by the Emperor. The beneficial political position that the Finns had acquired was a fruit of behaving loyally and showing gratitude to the ruler. In this mode of thought, loyalty toward the Emperor paid off in terms of benefits, freedom of action, and peacefulness. According to this logic of reasoning, any challenges to Russian security and prestige had to be avoided and liberal currents of thought shielded; they come out as lousy statecraft as they would be likely to lead to confrontations with the rulers of Russia.

From the point of view of the suggestion that the “Machiavellian” though-paradigm underpins the Finnish political imaginary on Russia, it is worth noting that the possibility of the proximity of Russia turning into bad fortuna as a result of the wrong kind of conduct is present in this mode of thought as a possibility. In this sense, necessità can be held as the linchpin of the entire thought-paradigm.

In a well known interpretation dating from 1948, Finnish socialist Raoul Palmgren evokes the “Pax Russica” interpretation in his characterisation of the epoch of autonomy as something advantageous for the Finnish political unit. Palmgren argues that “the enormous inner development [of Finland] … is only possible … in loyal connection to the great Russia which is, still, the Russia of Holy Alliance, the ‘gendarme of Europe.’” However, under its arms

23 Tulevaisuusvaliokunta 2007, 56.
24 Lars Gabriel von Haartman's letter cited above continues, “and I will fight now as well as in the future against all … measures that are targeted at shaking the general public's trust and loyalty towards Russia” (von Haartman 6 July 1855 cit. Kalleinen 2002, www-document.)
(\textit{pax russica}) and within the circuit of its economic opportunities, our material and spiritual growth is possible."²⁷ This passage forms part of Palmgren’s effort not only to describe the epoch of autonomy but to distinguish two persistent ‘lines’ in Finnish-Russian relationships. He designates these as the national line and the anti-Russian line. The former can be said to be sustained by the good \textit{fortuna} and the latter by the bad \textit{fortuna} characterisation of the Russian neighbourhood. Palmgren argues that the national – i.e. loyalist – line runs from the early 19th century through to the the revolutionary socialists of the 20th century. Characteristic of it is the thought that Finnish progress is only possible by loyally submitting to some greater political unit.²⁸ Putting forth such an interpretation in late 1940s, Palmgren’s point was obviously to prepare ground for a greater appreciation of Finnish-Soviet contacts. Indeed, for the most part of the independent statehood of Finland, loyalty vis-à-vis the Eastern neighbour has been identified with the socialists or the communists who promoted policies that “in everything crucial took into account the interests of the Soviet Union.”²⁹

In his analysis of Finnish-Russian relationships dating from 1963, Keijo Korhonen suggests that it is possible to distinguish two competing ways of conceptualising the Russian neighbourhood in Finnish political debates. He designates these as the Western and the Realist-Finnish line. While the Realist-Finnish line can be said to include the good \textit{fortuna} conception of the Russian neighbourhood, characteristic to what Korhonen designates as the Western line is the thought that proximity to Russia is a negative factor; it views of the Russian neighbourhood with fear and suspicion. Korhonen points out that the Pax Russica interpretation does not take care of the whole period of autonomy as the negative interpretation cropped up, for instance, in the work of A.I. Arwidsson (1820s), the Scandinavists and liberals (1850s and 1860s), the Swedish-minded (end of the 19th century) and the constitutionalists of early 20th century.³⁰

In interpretations of Finnish-Russian relations during the period of Russian unification policy after the 1890s, the strategy of loyalty has usually been associated with the so-called Fennoman movement or the Old Finns. They controlled the Senate after 1882 and were thus responsible for governing the Grand Duchy. The Old Finns were challenged on their views on skilful statecraft by the liberal Young Finns and the Swedish Party. When it came to characterising \textit{virtù}, the former remained dedicated to the present political system and argued that accommodation to the changing circumstances in Finnish-Russian relations provided the best way of securing the survival and success of the political community. The latter adopted a legalistic policy defending Finnish constitutional rights. Arguing in the activist

²⁷ Palmgren 1948, 15–16.
²⁸ Palmgren 1948.
²⁹ Rusi 2003, 33.
³⁰ Korhonen 1963, passim.
more they contended that vigorous strengthening of the constitutional and representative apparatus presented the best means of containing excessive Russian influences over Finland.\textsuperscript{31} The good \textit{fortuna} interpretation of Russian proximity was challenged by a more sinister analysis of Russian intentions vis-à-vis Finland. Simultaneously, political \textit{virtù} became identified in the active defence of Finnish rights – i.e. proactive and impetuous measures.

This interpretation of Finnish-Russian relations challenges the conception that the beneficial treatment that the Finnish Grand Duchy received was a fruit of the sincere benevolence of Russia. Instead, it is suggested that the primary Russian intention vis-à-vis Finland has been to selfishly preserve its imperial interest. In this interpretation, which works on the basis of the bad \textit{fortuna} conception, the Finns’ received favourable treatment in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century simply because it happened to suit Russian imperial designs. Pacifying the newly conquered country made sense with a view to the fact that the Russian army was needed elsewhere to contain Napoleon’s forces and harsh measures would have resulted in a guerrilla war in the north-west. The argument is bolstered by pointing out that after the Napoleonic wars, the Finns lost their special status, and Finland was subordinated to similar imperial rule as the other subjects of the Empire. The Diet was not convened until some 50 years later when another moment of Russian weakness, the Crimean War, led to improvements in the status of Finland. To prove that betterments to the Finnish position correlated with moments of Russian weakness, it may also be mentioned that as Russia had gathered its forces, it launched the policies of Russification intended to make Finland an integral part of the Russian Empire and these measures were relaxed only during another moment of Russian weakness, the Russo-Japanese War of 1905–1906.\textsuperscript{32}

In the research material of this work, dating from the first two decades of independent statehood, the strategy of loyalty is mostly present as a target of criticism. This makes sense vis-à-vis the claim that consolidation of political authority and fusing the \textit{communis mater patria} and \textit{patria} was the key political challenge during the epoch. Illustrative of a critical stance are cartoons of the type where there is the outfit of the Russian \textit{muzhik} below the clothing of a friendly appearing Lenin. However, in a few instances this strategy is promoted as skilled statecraft capable of managing the Russian/Soviet proximity for the benefit of the Finnish political unit. It must also be pointed out that while the loyalism of the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries was essentially a conservative mode of thought, in the post-1917 political imaginary this strategy is mostly associated with the revolutionary forces and their adulation of the Soviet system. It would thus be misleading to view of the “Pax Sovietica” approach as a simple continuation of the loyal conservatism of the period of autonomy. In the “Pax Sovie-

\textsuperscript{32} Apunen 1984, 20–21.
etica” interpretation which promoted increased contacts between Finland and the Soviet Union, it was the common class struggle that made the interests of Finnish Communists and the Soviets compatible, if not common. However, from the point of view of the present research, it is interesting to point out that a common ground for both loyal conservatism and communist adulation can be found in the “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm and the interplay of *fortuna* and *virtù* in an environment characterised by *necessità*.

Still, during the very first years of the epoch under scrutiny in this work the strategy of loyalty was also promoted by conservative sections of Finnish society. It is possible to find suggestions that the Finns should actively support White Russians in their attempts to crush the bolshevik forces, which can be interpreted as an actualisation of the loyalist form of reasoning. However, the good *fortuna* conception that forms part of these analyses of the Russian neighbourhood is selective – i.e. it is argued to only apply in the proximity of an aristocratic Russia. In contradistinction, the neighbourhood of Bolshevik Russia is interpreted within the bad *fortuna* framework; it is suggested that exercise of active *virtù* is badly needed in order to contain such an existential threat. Good statecraft vis-à-vis Bolshevik Russia is articulated with recourse to the activist form of reasoning and motivated by the presumption of joint interests between Russian Whites and Finnish elites.

We may also take note of the fact that in some examples from the interwar period, the emergence of Finland as a sovereign state is emplotted as a sincere act by which Lenin gave the country its independent status. It may be further suggested that this required reciprocation in the form of gratefulness and faithfulness. The analysis is somewhat identical with the mode of reasoning which was applied to analyses of the acquisition of an autonomous status within the Russian Empire; a favourable political status is interpreted to be a result of the benevolence and sincerity of the Russian ruler.

In critical accounts, the strategy of loyalty gains a pejorative tone. The strategy of vigorously pursuing good relations with Russia and the Soviet Union and adapting oneself to its interests is characterised as servility which risks the durability of the political unit. For instance, the policy of so-called Finlandisation may, in retrospective accounts, be described as being on one’s knees (*olla rähmällään*). Such anti-chivalric characterisation obviously serves to suggest that the policy of actively pursuing good relations with the Eastern neighbour was far from good statecraft. It did not contribute to the prospects of survival but cast the well-being of the state in jeopardy. In his analysis of Finlandisation Timo Vihavainen, for instance, argues that while the Eastern policies of J.K. Paasikivi after the WW II were based on the bad *fortuna* conception of the Soviet neighbourhood, the Finlandisation of the 1970s

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33 E.g. Kurikka, 15 January 1918. ‘A iso flikusi paha holhomas...’
is distinguished from it in the sense that the danger was not acknowledged but “the politics of cajoling” were thought to result in personal and group benefits.\footnote{Vihavainen 1991, 33.}

In the cartooned research material of this work, the willingness of certain businessmen to cooperate with Soviet Russians in order to benefit from the Eastern neighbour economically comes out as a risky form of humbleness. Similarly, Lenin’s act of granting Finland its independence may be depicted as a cunning move intended to ensure Finland’s future integration into the Soviet Empire. With a view to our interest in how political facts actually emerge in the coming together of semiotic and non-semiotic elements, it is interesting to point out how the interpretation of the very same set of events with recourse to the bad \textit{fortuna} conception alters their character. In the political publicity of White Finland during 1918–1930s, the strategy of loyalty towards (Soviet) Russia rarely merits the mention of skilful statecraft. Indeed, the bad \textit{fortuna} conception of the Russian/Soviet neighbourhood is something characteristic to the epoch. The suspicion and distrust that it engenders may, however, be resolved by two different strategies – impetuousness or prudence. The former promotes the use of active \textit{virtù} – i.e. impetuous and proactive measures – while the latter values the restricted or passive type.

7.1.2. Activism

The strategy of activism is prevalent in the research material throughout the entire epoch of 1918–1930s. It calls to mind what Kalervo Siikala has retrospectively designated as the “national romantic years of the Finnish youth.” During it, the country “was proud and expansive, endorsed blind faith in itself, was convinced of the greatness of its historical mission but also self-destructive and defiant.”\footnote{Siikala 1960, 7.} The notion of activism that I have in mind here is not limited to the so-called activists of the independence movement and White Finland, but applies to a more general way of organising action in terms that combine the bad \textit{fortuna} conception with the promotion of active \textit{virtù} in its characterisation of competent politics vis-à-vis (Soviet) Russia. Indeed, the conservatives’ policy of promoting interventions to the bolshevik-ruled city of St. Petersburg can also be interpreted as an instance of this form of reasoning. Its characterisation of good statecraft combines the thought of the neighbourhood of the bolshevik-ruled Russia as bad \textit{fortuna} with the promotion of pro-active measures of containing it. Similarly, propositions that call for increases in the Finnish military budget on the grounds of the country’s special geographical location actualise such a form of reasoning. The Lapua Movement of the late 1920s and early 1930s can also be interpreted
in these terms; it tried to establish itself as a legitimate political authority by proposing that the neighbourhood of the Soviet Union was a matter of bad *fortuna* due to which the use of active, even extra-legal measures of containing Soviet influences in Finland were required to secure the survival of the independent political unit.

It was already suggested that this mode of conceptualising the significance of Russian neighbourhood made a crucial part of interpretations of the time of troubles that began in Finnish-Russian relationships in 1890s. It was coined as a response to the Russification project which was intended to integrate the Grand Duchy more firmly into the metropolitan country. Tensions were aggravated by the constitutional contention of 1899–1905 which, from the Finnish point of view, meant destruction of national institutions and assimilation of the country into the Russian Empire. In activist interpretations of these events, the forces of bad *fortuna* are identified in the chauvinists within the Russian bureaucracy who had become increasingly critical toward the Finnish system of constitutional government and wanted to reduce the special benefits that the Grand Duchy was enjoying. In the activist mode of thought, the intentions of the Russian government in the Finnish direction were interpreted as anything but limited; they were thought of as being geared at bringing about Russian supremacy in Finland. This interpretation is underpinned by the conception whereby the Russian neighbourhood is a matter of bad *fortuna*; Russian aims are argued to conflict with the goal of Finnish self-preservation and are said to be geared at destroying Finland’s existence as an autonomous political entity.\(^{37}\) In this mode of thought, Russia may also be characterised as an inherently expansive unit.\(^{38}\)

When the forces of bad *fortuna* were identified with the Russian bureaucracy,\(^ {39}\) the exercise of active *virtù* took the form of a programme of civil disobedience which was designed to counter the Russian policy of repression. While the loyal conservatives advocated accommodation to changed circumstances, appeasement of Russian power, and endorsed beliefs in the benevolence of Russian policy makers, the activists of the constitutionalist orientation – represented by the liberal Young Finns and the Swedish Party – interpreted the policies of Russification as a threat against the autonomous existence of the Finnish political unit and insisted that active *virtù* in the form of fierce resistance should be exercised on the basis of legal rights.\(^ {40}\) Active resistance also took place outside the framework of legality, and was

\(^{37}\) E.g. Soikkanen 1984, 65.

\(^{38}\) E.g. Pentilä 1992, 48.

\(^{39}\) It is worth emphasising the fact that although activism at later dates took colour blind anti-Russian forms, the promoters of active resistance at the end of the 19th century cooperated with the Russian revolutionaries (e.g. Apunen 1983, 8).

exemplified by the murder of the General Governor Bobrikoff by the young Eugen Schauman in 1904.\textsuperscript{41}

During the epoch under scrutiny in this work, the strategy of activism is actualised so as to suggest, on one hand, the active containment of bolshevism and the Soviet Union that overtly or covertly advocated revolutionary changes in neighbouring countries. At issue in these anti-bolshevik or anti-Soviet views is the fear of the emergence of a competing source of authority that part of the Finnish population would voluntarily accept. That is, Soviet Russia emerges as a source of bad fortuna due to its capacity to challenge the survival and prosperity of the Finnish political unit by offering an alternative target of political authority. On the other hand, ideological contention was connected to the idea of the eternal imperial tendencies of Russia – to its policy of divide et impera\textsuperscript{42} that now manifested itself in the form of bolsheviks. Thirdly, active containment was evoked as a strategy of holding back Russianness in general. Here, it seems legitimate to talk about more general anti-Russianness and characterise the mode of relationships not only as an ideological but also as a national or ethnic conflict. In addition to measures such as interventions across the eastern border, activism vis-à-vis Soviet Russia also came to mean promoting the avowal of the ‘gulf’ that separated Finland from its Soviet neighbour. One way of practicing active virtù was sounding out possible allies capable of strengthening the Finnish hand in expected future confrontations with the Eastern neighbour. The extra-legal measures of the Lapua Movement illustrate another.

An interesting case is provided by the type of activism which the “active, peace-seeking foreign policy” of Urho Kekkonen and his presidency represents.\textsuperscript{43} When characterising it, the attribute of activeness\textsuperscript{44} is connected to policies which, in the above presented framework, might also merit the qualification of prudence; they are aimed at keeping content or appeasing the potentially aggressive Eastern neighbour. The prudent activism of ‘Finnish neutrality’ since the 1960s included active – even impetuous – efforts of keeping up “good and trusting relations,” not only with the Eastern neighbour but also with the West.\textsuperscript{45} It was motivated by impetuous efforts of transcending the potential of great power conflict. However, in contradistinction to most other forms of activism, it is not premised on the containment of the Soviet Union or Russia but on cooperation with it. If the activism of the First Republic (1918–1944) involved presenting Finland as the “vanguard of the West against the

\textsuperscript{41} Polvinen 1985, 319–333.
\textsuperscript{42} For such a reference, see e.g. the Swedish People’s Party MP Furuhjelm, Proceedings of the II Parliamentary Session 1917, Vol. 2, 13 June 1918, 1308.
\textsuperscript{43} Penttilä 1992, 54.
\textsuperscript{44} E.g. Mottolà 1983, 37.
\textsuperscript{45} The growing activism of Finnish foreign policy was not restricted to the country’s Eastern policies but also formed part of Finnish activities, for instance, in the UN, peace keeping operations, disarmament and development policies (Apunen 1977, 230–245).
threat of the East,” there occurred a change towards characterising the position of the country as “a connecting link and mediator.”

In this sense, Kekkonen’s policy proposals, according to which there is no alternative to the pursuit of active policies and that have also been characterised as loyalist can be thought of as an ideological innovation; they are not just another variation of habitually available modes of thinking of relations between Finland and Russia/the Soviet Union but, to some extent, transform it. His “active, peace-seeking foreign policy” continues on the path trodden by Snellman and Paasikivi – hence the designation Paasikivi-Kekkonen line – yet the explicitly active element in it is something new. It differs from the loyalty of the epoch of autonomy in that it is premised on the bad rather than the good conception of the Russian neighbourhood: it is unlike earlier forms of right wing activism in that instead of promoting active containment of Russia and the Soviets as virtù, it promotes active cooperation. That is, in order to grasp Kekkonen’s active Eastern policy, it might be fruitful to add a third axis to the above sketched thought-paradigm – one reaching from containment to cooperation.

It is worth emphasising that although critical accounts evaluate this policy as bad statecraft, they also stick to the above outlined way of thought. Activeness is characterised with terms such as adulation, servility, adulatory anticipation, and blandishment – "behind it, there was an illusion that the one complimenting the clothes of the naked emperor would be awarded as long as he took care of the fact that the emperor saw and recognised the person doing the complementing.” Such characterisations serve to divest this strategy of all virtùosity.

Interestingly enough, the strategy of activism reappears in interpretations of Finnish political conduct vis-à-vis its Eastern neighbour in the post-Cold War situation. It has been suggested that once it became evident that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist, Russia re-emerged as a vocal threat to the existence and well-being of the Finnish political unit. The force of bad fortuna was usually identified in the possibility of refugee flows and pollution, as well as in political or economic instability. Containing Russian influences over Finland by thinning them out to the official level was suggested as the best means of managing the proximity of the new type of Russia. Furthermore, proactive measures of politically and militarily

46 Pekonen 1987, 43.
48 E.g. Penttilä 1992, 52. According to Penttilä’s interpretation (1992, 58), Kekkonen was loyal to the Kremlin, not to the USSR.
49 For another argument about Kekkonen as an ideological innovator, see also Patomäki 1991.
distancing Finland and Russia from one another and approaching the “West” were suggested, among these the acquisition of fighter jets compatible with US and NATO military planning.52 These meagre steps towards alliance-building have been interpreted in similar terms as the newly independent state’s attempts of taking distance from the former metropolitan country by way of now seeking support from Germany, now the Border States, and now from the Nordic countries.53

7.1.3. Prudence

Given that loyalty is somewhat marginalised in the statecrafting that takes place in the political publicity of White Finland during the epoch of 1918–1930s, the promotion of active containment of the Russian bad fortuna is most often juxtaposed with the strategy that, in the analytical field above, was designated with the notion prudence. The most vocal political debates take place between these two strategies. From the axis of fortuna the strategy of prudence chooses ‘bad’ – i.e. leans on the belief that there does or might exist a conflict between Finnish and Russian interests. However, this form of reasoning can be identified with propositions according to which the Russian/Soviet bad fortuna is limited and can thus be mitigated with prudent conduct. This problem is restricted to situations in which the Eastern neighbour is trying to take care of the security interests of a big power; that is, legitimate Russian/Soviet security interests are distinguished from the imperialist tendencies of a great power. This thought is often connected with names such as J.V. Snellman, J.R. Danielson-Kalmari, and J.K. Paasikivi – as well as with Urho Kekkonen. Despite differences, they all can be cited for having suggested that although Russian/Soviet conduct might occasionally appear malevolent from the Finnish point of view, space for political manoeuvring is best sought through the avoidance of open conflict.54 In this mode of reasoning, virtù does not represent the promotion of open confrontation to resolve conflicting interests. Instead, cautious and prudent political action merits the qualification of virtùous political conduct.

During the epoch under scrutiny in this work, the main contention is between impetuous and cautious conduct which present competing solutions to how to manage the generally held conception that (Soviet) Russian proximity is a matter of bad fortuna. In his retrospective account, Kalervo Siikala points out these two conflicting approaches by suggesting that the prevalence of “hot-headed Finnish national romanticism” brought the political suggestions of those possessing “mature patience and political experience” out as submissiveness

52 Käkönen 1993, 37.
and humbleness. For instance, propositions related to the readiness to negotiate a peace treaty with the bolsheviks, refusing to treat hard-handedly domestic elements associated with the Eastern neighbour, or to intervene in one way or another in the domestic affairs of Soviet Russia can be singled out as actualisations of the prudent form of reasoning.

The point of this exercise is not to lump individual people into the boxes that the two-by-two yields but to sketch the argumentative background which assigns legitimacy to the arguments of individual human beings and makes them understandable to the wider audience. In this sense, the present work can be thought of as an exercise in reverse rhetoric. Due to this, certain individuals might sit somewhat comfortably in several ‘boxes.’

The words of J.K. Paasikivi – the “founding father” of Finland’s post-1944 foreign policy – can be held as illustrative of the way in which the policy of prudence vis-à-vis Russia has been manifest in the post-WW II environment. Paasikivi’s Independence Day speech from 1944 explicitly actualises the thought-paradigm in terms that combine the bad fortuna conception with prudent patience as virtù: “relations with the big eastern neighbour Soviet Union dominate our entire foreign policy. That is the real problem of our foreign policy, a problem that we have to find a solution to and that the future of our nation depends on. I believe that it is in the interests of our nation to conduct our future foreign policy so that it is not set against the Soviet Union.”

Indeed, the famous Paasikivi-Kekkonen line of the post-WW II Finnish foreign policy has often been interpreted as an epitome of the strategy of prudence; it has been characterised in terms that combine the bad fortuna conception with the promotion of prudent policies as the virtùous means of managing it. “Officially, here was a friend, but there was no illusion of its unscrupulous character.” In this interpretation, the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty between Finland and the USSR dating from 1948 comes out less as an expression of genuine friendship and more as a means of guaranteeing Finnish independence in a challenging environment. To this end, it has been characterised as “limited accommodation” and set apart from “servility, humble-mindedness, and pliantness.”

Similarly with the other strategies, the policy of prudence also has precedents in Finnish political thought during the period of autonomy. A famous characterisation comes from the philosopher of the national movement, J.V. Snellman who, in an article with the telling title ‘War or Peace for Finland’ (Krig eller fred för Finland), written after the Polish rebellion

55 Siikala 1960, 7.
60 Vihavainen 1991, 37.
against Russia in 1863, issued a warning against the propagation of anti-Russian views in Finland. “People”, he argued, “have the right to submit to the external force imposed by history in order to secure [their] future. It is only savage tribes that one sees struggle right down to [their own] annihilation.”61 In retrospective accounts, Snellman’s words have been interpreted as an argument that Finns had better refrain from criticising Russia since harsh words would not help the Poles, but would instead break the trusting relationship between Finland and the Empire and draw the country into great power political tensions.62 While Snellman’s words can be connected to the strategy of loyalty vis-à-vis the Russian ruler,63 they can also be thought of as replicating the pattern of thought whereby cautious and patient political conduct merits the mention of good statecraft; prudent conduct is argued to present the best way of securing the success and survival of the political community. In this sense, interpretations of Snellman’s Russian policy constitute something of a borderline case between the strategies of prudence and loyalty.

More recently, the policy of prudence has made an appearance in discussions related to the integration of Finland into Western economic and political structures. In discussions on trade and integration policies during the Cold War, prudent measures were known as the policy of “wait and see;” they were connected to the question of Soviet proximity in the sense that entering the European integration process was argued to make Finland susceptible to international conflicts played out between the blocs.64 It was claimed that cautiously waiting and seeing what was going to happen was the best way of maintaining the challenging environment. In a way reminiscent of the interwar period, this characterisation reappeared in early 2000, largely as a criticism of the ‘passive’ EU policies of Finland, and was opposed to the pro-active policy of “anticipate and act” during the late 1990s, which also meant taking distance from the USSR/Russia.65

Frequently, the prudent “policy of keeping invisible”66 has unfolded in the context of normative argumentation against power politics – i.e. between what colloquial usage refers to as idealism and realism or discusses in terms of universal morality as opposed to narrow national interest.67 Matti Klinge finds continuity to the prudent mode of thought in Finnish-Russian relations: “in 1862 Snellman mocked those who acted in international politics as if at issue in them were a smart inference in front of a court, Yrjö-Koskinen belittled those who in

61 Snellman 1998, 147; see also Siikala 1960, 18; Alapuro 2004, 87.
62 E.g. Siikala 1960, 18
63 Penttilä 1992, 22.
64 Hakovirta 1975, 407; Rehn 2003, 230; see also Patomäki 1991, 81.
65 Rehn 2003, 229.
66 E.g. Apunen 1983, 3.
the political situation of 1900 thought that they were promoting the cause of absolute right, and Paasikivi taught that the Kremlin is no District Court.” In an article dating from 1983, Jukka Tarkka evokes this way of thought as he criticises the “politics of morality” on the basis that “trust in the might of the right” combined with disregard to the fact that “the Soviet Union is a great power” has led Finland to great difficulties. More recently, the prudent stance of refusing to take a clear normative stance on issues that might upset Russia has been critiqued from the activist point of view, for instance, in connection to developments that led to the independence of the Baltic States in early 1990s. In this interpretation which brings tradition to bear on the post-Soviet situation, “Finland [had] displayed that it no longer needed to march toward greater freedom via Moscow, ... [but] the old tradition of conciliation had not been given up altogether.”

7.1.4. Normalcy

The analysis of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia during the interwar period, and the discussion on its continuities throughout the decades, has disclosed that the hypothetical strategy of normalcy – which presumes that the proximity of Russia and the Soviet Union is on the side of good rather than bad fortuna and does not perceive there to be any need for an exercise of boldness in the conduct of Finnish-Russian relationships – is virtually non-existent. One of the few examples where the strategy of normalcy or normalisation underpins analyses of Finnish-Russian relations is the Social Democrat MP Väinö Tanner’s comment on the Tartu Peace Treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union: “After the peace treaty ... Finland lives in friendly relations with the Soviet Russia. ... In other words, we have to treat this question as if across our eastern border there were England, France, or some other state and not Soviet Russia.”

However, the fact that Tanner specifically calls for normalcy in Finnish-Russian relationships may be taken to suggest that such a quality is lacking in the Finnish political imaginary on its Eastern neighbour. The neighbourhood of Russia is not discussed as if there was just any country on the other side of the Eastern border. This affirms the character of the Finnish-Russian relationship as a special relation. ‘Observing Russia as Finns’ is a matter of interpreting the Russian neighbourhood in terms that usually call for some kind of special treatment.

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68 Klinge 1980, 146.
72 Proceedings of the Parliamentary Session 1921, 29 December 1921, 1639–1640.
Russian or Soviet proximity emerges as a matter of *necessità* that requires management by a virtuous actor.

The outlined “Machiavellian” paradigm presents one attempt of reconstructing this unique element which enables the Finnish political imaginary on its Eastern neighbour to cohere as a continuous flow. Although I have been interested in how it accounts for continuities in Finnish-Russian relations, it is worth emphasising, however, that the thought-paradigm is best thought of as a mechanism of transformation. It would be somewhat misleading to look into it for the sameness of content across epochs.\(^\text{73}\)

\(^{73}\) See also Rytövuori-Apunen 2007, 2.
8

Conclusions and Contributions

8.1. So What Does it Mean to Observe Russia as Finns?

The work at hand has set out to inquire what ‘observing Russia as Finns’ actually means. I have refused to explain the peculiarities of Finnish knowledge production on Russia with the help of a predetermined category of ‘Finnishness.’ Instead, I have suggested that ‘observing Russia as Finns’ is a matter of participating in the practices of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia. I have characterised political imaginary in pragmatist terms as a dynamic process of knowledge production where actors seek to come to terms with the unexpected on the basis of previous experience. In a situation of political crisis, they are forced to lean on habitual repertoires of interpretation where the ‘lessons of history’ – to use a term of J.K. Paasikivi – have been stored up. A political crisis causes “irritation of doubt”\(^1\) as the old beliefs and habits of mind no longer seem to be fit with the world. This begets a struggle to “fix belief”\(^2\) – i.e. prompt a process of resignification. To this end, I have characterised resignification as a dynamic process where new interpretants emerge. Availing myself of C.S. Peirce’s triadic sign conception, I have defined the interpretant as a new sign that emerges between the representamen and its object in the process of interpretation.

In the present work some 700 Finnish political cartoons on Russia, published during the epoch of 1918–1930s, have been examined as instances of the process of resignification where new interpretants emerge. Heeding Yuri M. Lotman’s cultural semiotics’ idea that traditions of interpretation are embodied in symbolic signs, I have suggested that namely the archetypical symbols that proliferate in political cartoons can be examined for the ‘lessons of history’ stored up in them. I have further proposed that Peirce’s pragmatist sign theory provides potent tools for spelling out how such archetypical symbols are, in a situation of political crisis, actualised to refer to new parts of the world.

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1 Peirce CP 5.374–5.375.
2 Peirce CP 5.358–5.387.
I have argued that if this view to action is accepted, it also makes sense to attempt a fresh interpretation of the meaning of ‘observing Russia as Finns.’ One of my goals has been to escape the interpretation that Finnish-Russian relations during the interwar period can be, in a satisfactory way, accounted for with the help of the ‘hatred of Russkies’ tenet. In a related spirit, I have also tried to avoid the simple conclusion that ‘Finnishness’ is a matter of affirming one’s ‘non-Russianness.’ Instead, I have suggested that even if one can find expressions of racial hatred in the research materials, and even if distinctions between what is Finnish and what is Russian or Soviet are made, this is not the whole story. Due to this it makes sense to focus on the actual practices of political imaginary that the language-games of hatred and identity may somehow form part of. Moreover, the ‘hatred of Russkies’ and ‘Finnishness as non-Russianness’ propositions are incapable of accounting for the ambiguity of Finnish-Russian relations; they do not fare well with the fact that at the same time as “one hears full-mouthed talk about the Russian hereditary enemy,” one also “sees monuments being erected for the Russian emperors.”\(^3\) The pragmatist political imaginary approach is better geared at that task.

Taking this road of inquiry has not, however, enabled me to completely dispense with the notions of enmity and confrontation. I have worked on the presumption that the Finnish political imaginary on Russia can be articulated with the help of three oft-appearing chivalric model-images – the common enemy (the Beast), the political collective (the Treasure), and the sovereign agency that undertakes acts in the name of the collective (the Knight).\(^4\) Nevertheless, I have suggested that fixing these elements to any empirical form of enmity – such as the Beast to ‘Russia’ – prior to the analysis is likely to block the road of inquiry.\(^5\) In order to keep that road open, I have characterised the chivalric language game as a pre-political level in the totality of political imaginary and focused on its concrete, historically contingent actualisations in statecraft speech acts. With the notion of statecrafting I have wanted to designate active political argumentation and debating intended at putting one’s truth at the centre of political life.\(^6\) Political cartoons participate in debates where representatives of different political orientations wrestle with each other to impose their views on competent politics vis-à-vis Russia or the Soviet Union. In this sense, they are an attempt to seize the

\(^3\) Voionmaa 1919, 325.


\(^5\) In the spirit of thoroughgoing fallibilism, Peirce was adamantly opposed to “blocking the road of inquiry;” this basically means that even though our interpretive efforts must begin with internalised habits and prejudgements, there is no belief that should not be subjected critical evaluation and correction. (Peirce CP 1.153, 1.156, 6.273, Bernstein 1991, 327.)

\(^6\) Moisio 2003, 9.
space of political opportunity which has been opened up by the discrepancy between the habitual and the actual.7

By appreciating the aspect of argumentation, I have wanted to bring into the picture the transformative capacity of power which, if not lacking, is at least underspecified in Peirce’s pragmatism. However, although Peirce was mostly interested in scientific communities, he did emphasise that knowledge production in general takes place within a community which is simultaneously dependent on shared social practices and critical is towards what is put forth on their basis. Fixation of belief is an outcome of struggles within critical communities, and these struggles are comparable to what takes place within the political arena.8 In the present work, I have examined political cartoons as stakes in such struggles; they are hypotheses of what would count as competent politics or critical evaluations of the suggestions of others. Still, specifying the place of power – one of the key concepts of political science and international relations – in studies informed by Peirce’s pragmatism would offer a rewarding theme for further research.

Keeping an analytical eye on the variation that the basic terms of the chivalric language game undergo when put to intentional use in political debates, has enabled me to reconstruct the thought-paradigm of the Finnish political imaginary on Russia. In this task, I have reverted to the “Machiavellian” language of political dynamics. I have suggested that this post-political element, which stands for the interplay of virtù and fortuna in an environment of necessità, provides a habitually available repertoire of interpretations for the Finnish political imaginary on Russia. Namely it enables ‘observing Russia as Finns’ to “cohere as a continuous flow of conduct.”9 In this way of thought, the idea of the Russian/Soviet neighbourhood as a matter of necessità requiring management persists even through the most heated political debates. At issue in these debates is whether the proximity of Russia is a matter of good or bad fortuna and whether prudent or impetuous conduct merits the qualification of virtù in managing it.

Although the three chivalric elements readily allude to the paradigm in virtue of their iconic qualities, the paradigm remains inarticulate if left on its own. Grasping the paradigmatic element of political imaginary has necessitated not only taking a detour via the political level but also articulating it in another, “Machiavellian” language.

I have also argued that the years from 1918 through to the 1930s constitute something of a “Machiavellian moment” in Finnish-Russian relationships – a moment during which the political entity encounters its instability in time.10 Although this interpretation can be

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8 Bernstein 1991, 328.
9 Giddens 1979, 55.
10 Cf. Pocock 1975.
read from the way in which all the chivalric model-images are actualised, I have examined the model-image of the Maiden as a vocal expression of the moment of irritation. The fallen and endangered female images articulate in specific terms the vulnerability of the newly independent political unit. They supply dramatic force to the practices of political imaginary as they serve to call forth the Knight – i.e. an agent capable of securing the Treasure in the looming presence of the Beast. I have suggested that the main reason for the sense of vulnerability is the rupture in political authority which resulted from the collapse of the Russian autocracy and which was soon met with the dreadful experience of the Finnish Civil War. Simultaneously, the Eastern neighbour underwent a civil war and transformed from a conservative empire into a Socialist power promoting world revolution.

The political agenda of the Finnish “Machiavellian moment” can thus be understood as an attempt to consolidate a political authority that would be capable of managing the situation and making the newly independent political unit durable against the chaotic-appearing external environment. At the heart of this task is the question of responsiveness to Russia which, just moments ago, had been an authority over Finnish foreign policy and had now been turned into its object. I have characterised the years 1929–1932 as the climax of the epoch which began in 1917–1918 and was characterised by “Machiavellian” considerations. The right-wing reaction at the turn of the 1930s is best examined as an attempt to put forth a forceful answer to the dilemma of continued responsiveness vis-à-vis the Eastern neighbour.

On the basis of examining the dynamic interplay of virtù and fortuna in the cartoons, I have distinguished four competing strategies concerning competent politics vis-à-vis the Eastern neighbour: activism, loyalty, prudence, and normalcy. The analysis has suggested that during the epoch of 1918–1930s, the most heated political debating takes place between the strategies of activism and prudence. Given the characterisation of political cartoons as an arena for struggles, where political agents wrestle with each other to impose their views on the skilled management of Russian/Soviet proximity, it is interesting to note that the most frequently cartoons touch upon the authorities’ incapacity or unwillingness to deal with the bad fortuna of Russia/the Soviet Union or, correspondingly, deny the virtùosity of the proactive mode of conducting politics by characterising it with such anti-chivalric attributes as adventurousness or hot-headedness. The strategy of loyalty which hints at the form of reasoning whereby the Finnish political unit could benefit significantly from intimate connections with Russia is marginalised; only in a few instances is it suggested as a true political alternative. As an object of criticism it is, however, forcefully present in the Finnish political imaginary on Russia during the interwar period. Notwithstanding the early years’ conservative attempts to promote cooperation with the Russian Whites, as heirs to the Russian Empire, loyalty is identified either with the communists or presented as a reminder of the undesirable political condition of the past. The strategy of normalcy is virtually non-existent, which can be taken
to testify to the view that from the perspective of ‘observing Russia as Finns,’ the question of Russia is somehow exceptional. Its neighbourhood requires constant management.

Although the research materials of this work date from the epoch that reaches from the gaining of independence and the Civil War to the 1930s, this work is not exclusively about that period of time. Heeding the pragmatist insistence that “all that exist is continuous,”¹¹ I have also experimented with how the reconstructed “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm fared as a mechanism of continuity in the Finnish political imaginary on Russia and the Soviet Union in the longer term. Indeed, it seems that the “Machiavellian” elements persist in the Finnish ways of producing knowledge on Russia across the decades. It would offer a rewarding theme for further research to take a systematic look into what kinds of transformations the thought-paradigm of Finnish-Russian relations undergo when actualised to make sense of unexpected situations.

8.2. Habitual Creativity and Creative Habituality

Besides the somewhat parochial Finnish-Russian case, the study at hand can also be read as a contribution to the suggested “pragmatist turn” in International Relations.¹² This “turn” is premised on the thought that the pragmatist way of doing research bears significant potential for the study of political phenomena. On the basis of the present study, I would like to suggest that pragmatism is particularly well suited for analysing such moments of political change where the habitually available assumptions of a political community are challenged and undergo transformation. Applying a broad pragmatist framework, the present study has made contributions in at least four areas of research.

First, I have suggested that our disciplinary understanding of political facts should be both deepened and broadened. In broadening the notion of political fact, I have set out from the speech act theory and its insights into how things are done with words or other signs. This has put me on a path where inquiries begin from acting rather than from static ‘things’ or ‘reasons.’¹³ The dynamic notion of statecrafting also makes sense in this respect. In deepening it, I have turned to semeiotic realism which refuses to draw any dichotomies between the ‘world as it is’ and the ‘world as it is represented;’ instead, it sets out to examine how objects of

¹¹ Peirce CP 1.172.
¹³ Kratochwil 2007, 11. Just like the modern science of mechanics does not attempt to explain physical movement but is about movement, human and social sciences – such as IR – ought to be about human action, i.e. “begin from the assumption that some kind of action is taking place.” (Kilpinen 2000, 177–181; see also Peirce CP 5.400; Gronow 2006, 99.)
knowledge actually emerge in the course of active historical experience (i.e. semeiosis). Due to this, semeiotic realism sits uncomfortably with the traditional epistemological project’s tendency to polarise language into the extremes of science vs. narrative, fact vs. fiction or subjectivity vs. objectivity.

One of the contributions of this work is, therefore, that pragmatism in general, and Peirce’s sign theory in particular, provide tools with which it is possible to surmount the traditional epistemological project’s search for universally valid and trans-historical criteria without making everything relative. The pragmatist alternative to the claim that truth is a property of the ‘world out there’ is that truth is a property of assertions about the world. Furthermore, it suggests that accepting that truth remains relative to some frame of reference does not make it arbitrary or contrary to reason as both the traditional epistemological project and versions of relativism might imply.\(^1\) The need to worry about warranting our knowledge claims is still there.\(^2\)

Working in this spirit, the analytical section of the present work has been dedicated to spelling out ways in which initially fictional-appearing configurations featuring knights and monsters, and maidens and castles, blur the familiar distinctions between fact and fiction when they crop up in the type of action which political imaginary illustrates. When examined as results of active historical experience they are very much true. I have presented Charles S. Peirce’s sign theory as a systematic set of tools for dealing with the nagging question of truthfulness. It contains a plethora of distinctions with the help of which it is possible to warrant knowledge claims without blocking the road of inquiry by insisting that something either is or is not (a corollary of which is the claim that something must be either fact or fiction.) In this capacity, it provides means for appreciating the fact that traditions of interpretation are not arbitrary but instead results of real social and political processes; Similarly, it enables taking into account the way in which non-semeiotic events and phenomena, which exist in their aspect of mind-independent being, emerge as political dilemmas when brought into articulation with the semeiotic elements of political imaginary.

Second, pragmatism’s input to the discussion on international political action is that saying ‘yes’ to habituality does not necessarily imply saying ‘no’ to consciousness and rationality.\(^3\) Another contribution of the present work, thus, is that the pragmatist research tradition, which is built around the reflective habit concept, can be developed to challenge to the IR ‘habit’ of conceiving agency as either being driven by cold purposive calculation or motivated by passion blinded to reason. Indeed, the opposition of reason and passion – of “innocuous

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\(^1\) Kratochwil 2007, 2–3.

\(^2\) See also Kratochwil 2007.

\(^3\) See also Rytövuori-Apunen 2005, 166.
interests and harmful passions” – has been a persistent heaven and hell idea in the domain of IR thought. In classical accounts, passions were thought to prompt people to be evil and interests to save them from wickedness. In a similar vein, recent contributions have juxtaposed interest-driven, or “rational,” explanations to value-driven or “irrational” ones. Consider, for instance, Robert Gilpin’s words below which are intended to characterise political realism’s “faith in reason and science” that explicitly juxtapose reason and rational control of the world to passion and ignorance:

Embedded in most social sciences and in the study of international relations is the belief that through science and reason the human race can gain control over its destiny. Through the advancement of knowledge, humanity can learn to master the blind forces and construct a science of peace.

The dichotomy can also be said to live on in the “practice turn,” which Iver B. Neumann has recently presented as a complement to the “linguistic turn;” he has characterised this turn as a move which seeks to “shift attention ‘down’ from conscious ideas and values ... to the physical and the habitual, and also ‘up’ from ideas located in the individual consciousness to the impersonal arena of ‘discourse.’” Indeed, the metaphorical notions of ‘up’ and ‘down’ can be read as evidence of the persistence of an intellectualist dualism that replicates the Western philosophy’s classical bifurcation between thought (or theory) and action (or practice) within the discipline of International Relations. Theory remains attached to the transcendent domain beyond mutability, contingency, and temporality while practice is thought to deal with the lower levels of reality. To enforce the subordination of practice to theory, of crafts to contemplation is to ignore the anti-dualistic core of the pragmatistic way of thinking which treats thinking and acting as unity.

Unlike the received wisdom of the social sciences, pragmatism does not set the habit concept against reason. From its perspective, the view that action is governed by rational interests is flawed in the same respect as the view that it is determined by “blind forces” such

17 Sen 1997, ix.
18 Katzenstein 1990, 21.
20 Neumann & Heikka 2005, 12; see also Neumann 2002 and Swidler 2001, 84.
21 Colapietro 1992. For the persistence of basis and superstructure models in social theorizing, see also Butler 1996, 40 & Kilpinen 2000, 17.
22 See e.g. Zygmunt Bauman’s claim that “most people – most of us – follow most of the time the habitual and the routine; we behave today the way we behaved yesterday and as the people around us go behaving. As long as no one and nothing stops us from doing ‘the usual,’ we may go on like this without end.” (Bauman cit. Kilpinen 2000, 16.).
23 Kilpinen 2000, 15.
as passion or hatred. Both work on the presumption that action – rational or irrational, arbitrary or culturally sanctioned – is in some sense predetermined before it actually takes place. They place excessive emphasis on “unit acts” and thus fail to conceive of international political action as part of longer sequence.24

In the present work, this capacity of action has been appreciated by way of focusing on the process of resignification; I examined the dynamic set of practices, whereby the habitually available repertoires of interpretation are actualised and transformed in the course of active historical experience. Heeding the pragmatist refusal to draw dichotomies between reasons and habits, these practices have been thought to involve political agents whose control over themselves is largely a matter of being able to modify their habits.25 As Peirce has it, “a rational person ... not merely has habits, but also can exert a measure of self-control over his future actions.”26 Self-control is exercised by means of habit-modification.27 Although responses to the challenges that the world throws up are solved with recourse to habitually available patterns of thought, inference is deliberate, self-controlled, and necessarily creative.28 That is, supposing that even though action must necessarily begin with internalised habits does not lead to the disproval of reason; it continues to be appreciated as one among many human faculties. The agents of pragmatism are rational in that sense of the word which refers to the self-correcting capacity of knowledge.29

It is on the basis of such a pragmatist characterisation of action that I have tried to challenge the thought that the meaning of ‘observing Russia as Finns’ can be exhausted by the ‘hatred of Russkies’ interpretation – defined as a “downright cult of racial hatred of Russians”30 – and its corollaries. It also makes sense to suggest on this basis that pragmatism and Peirce’s triadic model of sign action bear significant potential for analysing moments of political crisis and transformation. Interested in how novel situations are made sense of with recourse to past experience, present purpose, and self-control,31 it contains tools for spelling out how new knowledge actually emerges on the basis of previous knowledge and experience in practices of political imaginary.

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24 Katzenstein 1990, 21; for an excellent critique of culturalist accounts, see Swidler 1986.
25 Peirce CP 5.487.
26 Peirce CP 5.418.
27 Peirce CP 5.487.
28 Peirce CP 5.108; see also Joas 1996.
30 Karemaa 2004, 229.
31 Peirce CP 5.538.
8.3. The Question of History in IR

History has played a central role in this work, the research material of which consists of a stock of some 70–90 years old political cartoons. Because of this, the work can also be read as a contribution to what in recent IR scholarship has been talked about as the ‘historiographical turn,’32 ‘historical turn,’33 or ‘historical return.’34 There is no point in promoting yet another disciplinary turn to the field of IR which “must be spinning in dizzy circles due to the number of turns that it has experienced in recent years.”35 However, the suggested turns have paved the way for greater appreciation of the inescapable historicity of knowledge production in International Relations.36 They have served to problematise the position of the scholar as the knower of historical things.

In the present work I have wanted to give history its due weight without characterising it as something that could simply be ‘brought back in’ to disciplinary considerations. The point has not been to turn to history in the vain hope that imports from other fields or disciplines would solve issues that remain unsolved in IR.37 Instead, I have wanted to treat history as an inevitable part of all efforts of understanding. William Faulkner probably had something similar in mind when he argued that “the past is never dead; it is not even past.”38 In a similar vein, one of my points in the present work has been to challenge the familiar thought of history as something that is removed from us.

To back up this suggestion I turned to hermeneutics, a field where the possibilities for making something initially foreign one’s own have been elaborated. In hermeneutics, temporal dissociation between the interpreter and the text is not thought of as a problem. Instead, the play of distance and proximity in interpretation is turned into an epistemological instrument. In the section devoted to the logic of interpretation this instrument was characterised in terms of movement between the naïve, structural, and critical moments of interpretation. What brings us into an intimate contact with the past is the tradition (of interpretation); we, as well as the past, belong to it. As Hans-Georg Gadamer famously coins it, “we belong to tra-

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32 Bell 2001, 123-125.
33 Teschke 2003, 1-2.
34 Hobden 2001, 56. For recent opening on the upsurge of history in IR, see also Vaughan-Williams 2005; Kratochwil 2006.
35 Bell 2001, 124.
36 Historicity is distinct from historicism – an attitude that denies any objective meaning and conceives of meaning as relative to its time. Historicity takes into account the possibility that although meanings emerge in time, there may be something intransient to them. (Tonetti 2005, 47.) It can be understood as a countermove against the reverberations in the disciplinary corpus of the behaviouralist revolution of the 1950s and 1960s that lifted (ahistorical) structure and space at the centre of attention (Cf. Vaughan-Williams 2005, 115, 118; see also Bell 2001, 124.)
38 William Faulker, Requiem for a Nun.
ditions before they belong to us.”39 This is actually a relieving suggestion: No matter how hard we try, what the author of a cartoon had in mind remains usually beyond our reach – his or her original intention is “often unknown to us, sometimes redundant, sometimes useless, and sometimes even harmful as regards the interpretation of the verbal meaning of his work.”40 What we consequently can hope to finally understand in a text is not the authors’ initial intention nor the historical situation which the author and the audience shared but the way of thought which the text opens up.41

The hermeneutical approach to knowing closely resembles pragmatism in its claim that all interpretation is governed by a tradition process. When pragmatism speaks of earlier knowledge and experience, hermeneutics speaks of traditions (of interpretation). The relevance of this recognition for the interpretation of past texts is that we do not encounter them as strangers but already have some familiarity with them at our disposal when we set out to interpret them.42 In the present work, I have experimented how the initially foreign-appearing cartooned text became familiar when it was approached with the help of the familiar figures making up the chivalric language-game and how this interpretation further yielded the “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm where the horizons of the interpreter as an IR scholar and the cartooned text fused.43 The role of “Machiavelli” was to provide the language with the help of which it seemed appropriate to articulate the ideality of the text which provides the site for the fusion of horizons.44

The work at hand can thus be read as an alternative to two dominant approaches to history within the discipline of International Relations – one treats it as a ‘laboratory’ for formulating interpretations and the other sees it as a ‘set of lessons’ against which our interpretations can be tested.45 Both continue to conceive of history as something that is removed from us and that can be consulted in the vain hope of solving problems that remain unsolved in IR. Instead of taking this line of inquiry, I have worked on the thought that traditions of interpretation establish intimate contact with the past that we seek to know. If this approach is accepted, the metaphor of the ‘game’ comes to provide a more suitable metaphor than ‘laboratory’ or ‘lessons’ for conceptualising the interpretive procedure of making one’s own what initially appears foreign.

40 Ricoeur 1976, 76.
41 Ricoeur 1976, 92.
43 Writing about the fusion of horizons I have in mind Hans-Georg Gadamer’s (2004) idea of the fusion of horizons where the world horizons of the reader and author combine.
44 Cf. Ricoeur 1976, 93.
45 Bueno de Mesquita 1996, 53; see also Kangas 2007.
When interpretation is thought of as a game, history ceases to appear as an ‘object’ that we as ‘subjects’ could get either right or wrong. It emerges as a continuity of meaning that one may identify across epochs only by participating in it, by playing along. In the present work, I played along the chivalric language-game as I interpreted the cartooned text from the past and sought to articulate what it is all about – i.e. tried to identify what Gadamer refers to as the mode of being of play and Ricoeur discusses as the direction of thought that the text opens up.46

Emphasising the play-likeness of knowledge production in International Relations is also to suggest that the problem of history which, according to some recent contributions, has become acute in IR is not a problem that can actually be resolved.47 History is an issue that IR analysts are continuously engaged with.48 This means nothing more or less than recognising that – as innovative as they are – our analyses are also reappropriations or reconstructions of the meanings that traditions make available for us.49

Nevertheless, the suggested approach to the possibility of making the initially foreign-appearing familiar bears a critical function. As Vincent Colapietro notes, to the extent that interpretation succeeds in taking a reflective stance toward its own conditions of knowing, it merits the characterisation critical.50 Such a reflective stance can be adopted by, first, becoming aware of the inescapable historicity of our thinking and, on that basis, turning to reflect on the limits and possibilities that this imposes on knowing. Historical dependency needs to be thematised in order to limit it.51 Reconstructing the mode of being of the play of ‘observing Russia as Finns’ in the “Machiavellian” language has been a step in this direction. In the absence of a language with which to articulate it, the “Machiavellian” thought-paradigm of Finnish-Russian relations may persist in our analyses and interpretations of Russia without our necessarily noticing it. Although we may make a conscious use of its constituent model-images, it effects for the most part behind our backs. The point with this type of an exercise is not to “bury the past in nullity,”52 but to discover the possibilities of the tradition of interpretation and, on that basis, to keep the tradition within its limits.53 The “Machiavellian” articulation presented at the end of this work provides one possible way of recognising the power of tradition so as to limit its hold on us and on our ‘observations on Russia.’

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46 Gadamer 2004, 103; Ricoeur 1976, 92.
47 E.g. Vaughan-Williams 2005, 117.
48 Vaughan-Williams (2005, 118) suggests that the work of Jacques Derrida can do basically the same trick in IR.
The presented approach to Finnish-Russian relationships involves recognising that our acts of making sense of and producing knowledge on Russia are inscribed in the symbolic order of its political imaginary, and yet at the same time it points out a possibility of miming it creatively, in an alternative way. As an interface of the habitual and creative elements of thought, political imaginary does not really “doom us ... to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice.” Its creative expropriability supplies possibilities for subversive resignification. The conventional can be used in unanticipated ways. Communal belonging – exemplified here by ‘observing Russia as Finns’ – is a matter of participating in the practices Finnish political imaginary on Russia. It can also take the form of critical engagement with the repertoires of interpretation handed down by tradition. At the same time as this suggests that belonging – ‘Finnishness’ – can take place outside of essentialist and exclusionary determinations such as ethnicity, language, religion, and nationality, it points to the possibility that creative imitation may involve critique and resistance towards the habitually available possibilities of interpretation. Mimesis is not a matter of acquiescence but of argumentative retelling. Even if we accept that notions such as chivalry and heroism are indebted to the idea of restraining and containing the threatening beast, the bestial element is not fixed to any empirical Others. That is, ‘observing Russia as Finns’ does not necessarily need to take place through the relational framework of hatred and enmity. And there is room to question what being chivalric could actually mean in international relations.

55 See also Butler 1997, 41.
The world has apparently changed a lot since the interwar epoch. These days, the snarling Bear crops up in the European political imaginaries on Russia wearing designer sunglasses to express the integration of post-communist Russia into world markets. Still there is continuity to the ways in which we continue to ‘observe Russia.’ Although it is sometimes difficult to say what is, at the end, peculiarly Finnish in these practices of knowledge production, I have in the present work been primarily interested in the Finnish political imaginary on Russia. If it seemed legitimate to characterise the interwar epoch as the “Machiavellian” moment of Finnish-Russian relationships – i.e. as a moment during which the vulnerability of the political entity lies at the heart of politics – it must be admitted that the situation at the beginning of the 21st century is in many ways different. “Finland survived,” as the chapter title of a recent book by the well-known political analyst and a former Finnish diplomat Max Jakobson reads. It is, indeed, likely that the question of survival no longer provides the key to understanding Finnish-Russian relationships which are increasingly being conducted in the universalising framework of EU standards and competitive market economy. However, even though contemporary ways of making sense of the proximity of Russia arise from a world experience that is, in many senses, different from that of the interwar period, practices of political imaginary take on partly similar or at least isomorphic forms.

The newly independent Finland’s ways of making sense of Russia were oriented towards a break with what preceded it yet disclosed a certain regularity and repetition with the epoch of autonomy. So do the contemporary, ways which unfold in the political context where Finland is a member of the European Union and Russia has undergone many transformations. Indeed, it is not too difficult to identify model-images in the political debates of the early 21st century that are similar to those of the interwar period. The Knights, Beasts, and Treasures have not gone anywhere. Although the debates at the political level touch upon quite different topics, the pre-political level to the Finnish political imaginary on Russia seems to have

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1 The Economist 2007.
2 Jakobson 2006.
remained similar – at least to some extent. These composite elements of political imaginary are now put to quite different uses in arguments concerning, say, the democratic development of the post-communist Russia or the Finnish membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; still, familiar ways of thought resound in these argumentative retellings of habitually available plots. Despite the fact that it no longer feels legitimate to claim that making the state durable in the face of external or internal shocks is the key dilemma motivating statecrafting, it would be interesting to take a systematic look at how the ‘old’ is actually present in the ‘new.’

Carrying out this task would require more space and time than I have at my disposal here. In this epilogue I can, however, take the liberty to hypothetically discuss ways in which the thought-paradigm sketched on the basis of the epoch of 1918–1930s shimmers through the surface level of contemporary discussions on Russia and Finnish-Russian relationships. This shall be done by way of a tour through three scattered events that have recently sparked debate about the character of the Finnish-Russian relationship.

Let me start from a festive occasion in the early summer of 2006 when the centennial of the Finnish parliament was celebrated. At that occasion, the Chair of the Green League’s parliamentary faction Heidi Hautala voiced out scathing criticism of the state of Russian democracy, which angered the Social Democrat Speaker of the Parliament Paavo Lipponen. From the point of view of this work, more interesting than the row between these two political figures is the interpretation which Suvi-Anne Siimes of the Left Alliance made of it. She argued that Lipponen’s critique against Hautala only makes sense in the context of the Finnish “tradition of political subservience” vis-à-vis Russia. She interpreted the exchange between Hautala and Lipponen as a conflict between two traditionally competing strategies towards Russia. She took Hautala’s words as an illustration of contemporary activism unfolding under the conditions of normative principles, such as human rights standards, and treated the words of Lipponen as an illustration of the policy of prudent accommodation which suggests that in Finnish-Russian relations one should proceed on the basis of concrete interest and historical situations, not “lofty” principles. The fact that more archaic repertoires of interpretation provided the basis for Siimes’s attempt to make sense of the new thus speaks in favour of a certain continuity in Finnish political imaginaries on Russia.

A second stop on the journey of pondering continuity in the Finnish ways of ‘observing Russia’ is provided by a recent discussion on Russia and Finnish-Russian relationships which took place on the pages of *Helsingin Sanomat*, the largest daily newspaper in Finland, in the spring of 2006. The discussion had the quality of Finnish observations on Russia as its topic.

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3 Siimes 2006.
It was initiated by a researcher who argued that at present the Finnish discussion on Russia is “insignificant” and “unrealistic.” Although it was geared at change, the discussion activated traditional ways of thinking of Finnish-Russian relations. Here too, the more archaic can be said to somehow “glimmer through” the verbal expression level of the debate. The symbolic figures that cropped up in the discussion – ‘market optimists’ and ‘those fearful of Russia’ – can thus be taken to serve as a bridge between the traditional ways of thought in Finnish-Russian relations and an attempt to start observing Russia in a new way.

The figure of the ‘market optimist’ replicates the view of the Russian neighbourhood as a source of good _fortuna_; it conveniently brings out the fact that in early 21st century the idea of the Russian neighbourhood as a positive challenge is most frequently actualised in terms of the economic benefits that the growing Russian markets can offer for Finnish companies. The context for the articulation of the good _fortuna_ conception has thus changed; it is now provided by a certain marketplace model of the world. Of course, other ways of actualising the thought of benefits from the Russian neighbourhood also form part of the Finnish political debates. An illustration of this is the speech by Jyrki Katainen, the chairman of the National Coalition Party, from early spring 2007: “The importance of Russia for Finland grows all the time. The area of St. Petersburg is of particular importance for us. It is the node of economic interaction as well as political, societal, and cultural cooperation.” This way of conceiving of the neighbourhood of the city by the river Neva is in contradistinction with the thought of St. Petersburg as a source of troubles for Finland – as the home of “all the awful things that hide in the murky waters of the Neva.”

When juxtaposed with the ‘market optimists,’ the figure of ‘those fearful of Russia’ can be said to allude in a somewhat critical tone to the strategy of prudent restraint. It may call to mind the combination of the bad _fortuna_ conception and the interpretation of _virtù_ as carefulness and cautiousness vis-à-vis the potentially aggressive Eastern neighbour.

How about the strategy of activism that has the bad _fortuna_ conception and the promotion of impetuous political action to contain Russian influences at its heart? Notwithstanding human rights activism, which is exemplified by Heidi Hautala’s observations of Russia, is this strategy lacking from contemporary practices of knowledge production on Russia?

The following words that comment on the above mentioned discussion on the quality of contemporary Finnish observations on Russia can also be read as an interpretant of the traditional strategy of activism: “The so called market optimists ... might be wrong. It does

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5 Lotman 1990, 102.
6 Haukkala 2006; Hakalehto 2006; Pennanen 2006.
7 E.g. Agnew 2005.
8 Katainen 2007.
not automatically follow from the growing prosperity of Russia that the country’s political culture takes a turn in a positive direction. ... If authoritarianism in Russia hardens, the Western neighbours of Russia have to come up with long term solutions for safeguarding their political cultures.”

The contention between the good and bad fortuna conceptions forms part of this passage; it is a counterargument to the good fortuna conception articulated in the context of the market place model of the world. Simultaneously as it operates on the basis of previous knowledge and experience, it identifies the politics of actively seeking the means of containing the Russian bad fortuna in such contemporary possibilities as participation in the EU defence integration, EU constitution, EU energy policies, and in Transatlantic security cooperation – i.e. in the politics of “anchoring Finland firmly to the West.” It removes ‘market optimists’ and ‘Russia fearers’ from the position of legitimate political authority by suggesting that their policies might leave the Treasure, identified as “Western political culture,” unguarded from the Beast of “Russian authoritarianism.”

The third stop on our journey is in the discussion that cropped up on the pages of Finnish journals and newspapers as I am finalising the present study and as the 90th anniversary of Finnish independence, celebrated on the 6 December 2007, draws near. The topic of this discussion is the year 1809 when Finland ceased to be a part of the Kingdom of Sweden and became a Russian Grand Duchy. How should it be interpreted? “Russia won, Sweden lost. But was the shift of the master from Sweden to Russia a victory or a defeat for Finland?” Commentators of history as different as Professor Emeritus Päiviö Tommila and the businessman Björn Wahlroos, have suggested that the year 1809 should be thought of as a victory for Finland. The logic of reasoning is familiar: Finland benefited from its autonomous position within the Russia Empire so that the independence of 1917 became possible. “Had Sweden won, we might still be Swedish.” If we heed the Ricoeurian suggestion and follow this discussion from what it says to what it talks about, it is possible to make the claim that it talks about characterising Russian proximity either in terms of good or bad fortuna. But more forcefully than that, it talks about political virtù which is exemplified by the figure of Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt, the Chair of the Committee of Finnish affairs in St. Petersburg and which is argued to be required in turning the wheel of fortuna to the direction of good. This meant making the Treasure of autonomous and then independent statehood possible.

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10 Heikka 2006
11 Heikka 2006.
12 In addition to the traditions of Finnish political imaginary on Russia, this way of though also resonates with the conservative strand in Western Sovietology; it has emphasised the unreformable character of the Soviet system (e.g. Brzezinski 1990) and the age-old autocratic tradition of Russian political culture which, as Richard Pipes (2005) has recently suggested, lives on in Putin’s presidency.
13 Helsingin Sanomat 2007.
14 Helsingin Sanomat 2007.
possibility of intimate connections with Russia developing into bad *fortuna* thus loom in the background; in the interpretation of Björn Wahlroos, the biggest achievement of Armfelt was that Finland was not Russified.  

Having taken a walk through these scattered instances of Finnish observations on Russia, I cannot claim to have come up with a representative articulation of its political imaginary. By pointing out certain connections that contemporary ways of thought bear with the past, I have simply wanted to bring to the fore the fact that history is an inseparable part of attempts to understand international relations. It is present in the form of repertoires of interpretation that embody previous knowledge and experience. Our observations concerning Russia and Finnish-Russian relationships are bound to occur against the background of such previous involvement. Due to this, past debates do not appear completely foreign to the present observer of Russia, but instead bear a certain familiarity. Similarly, although they arise from a different world experience, present discussions somehow make sense from the perspective of the past. In this epilogue I have only illustratively pointed out some possible connections between the political imaginary of 1918–1930s and the Finnish political imaginary *en longue durée*. It would be interesting to conduct a systematic analysis of the ways in which the more archaic elements crop up in the practices of knowledge production on post-communist Russia and examine the kinds of ideological innovations that have occurred as the habitual elements of political imaginary have been creatively appropriated in unexpected situations.

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## Appendix

### The Distribution of Research Material by Magazines and Years

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