ILMARI KORTELAINEN

Interpretation and Analysis

Conceptions of the Philosophical Method in Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
To be presented, with the permission of the Board of the School of Social Sciences and Humanities of the University of Tampere, for public discussion in the Auditorium Pinni B 1096 Kanslerinrinne 1, Tampere, on September 27th, 2013, at 13 o’clock.
“For the comprehension of analysis, it is necessary to investigate the notion of whole and part, a notion which has been wrapped in obscurity – though not without certain more or less valid logical reasons – by the writers who may be roughly called Hegelian”.


” The recourse to analysis, in the sense given to this term by analytic philosophy, is the price to pay for a hermeneutics characterized by the indirect manner of positing the self. By this first feature, hermeneutics proves to be a philosophy of detours: the detour by way of analytic philosophy quite simply seems to me to be the one richest in promises and in results.”


“The ceaseless (and futile!) efforts to "fix" oneself and others fade as it becomes obvious that fixing is simply not the answer to human difficulties. When this happens, a person begins to comprehend the crucial difference between "fixing" and "transforming. - - The organic process of transformation changes everything we do, but it is not a change through our own efforts.”

Joko Beck 2002, “Foreword” In: *Ordinary Mind*, XI.
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Additionally, I would like to say that if any uninitiated reader finds the ideas cultivated in this thesis interesting, I will be a happier philosopher. I hope philosophers and other scientists wishing to consider the nature of our scientific thinking will find this framework interesting. The study on the historical roots of the philosophical method should help to understand the nature of the philosophical thinking behind the scientific approaches. All these people mentioned above, and some of the people I may have forgotten here, have been my teachers in their own ways, I thank you all. Pools of sorrow waves of joy are drifting through my opened mind.

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Tampere, 20th August 2013

Ilmari Kortelainen
Abstract

Contemporary hermeneutic philosophy is concerned with the practice of interpreting social action. Hermeneutics seeks a common ground for the interpretation of the human body and psyche in such interpretative disciplines as psychotherapy, the interpretation of religious texts in theology or the interpretation of a legal text in jurisprudence. The questions of the theory and practice of interpretation are what provides the impetus for my work. With the focus on a more specific problem in my dissertation, namely how to apply conceptual analysis to the methods of interpretation, I have studied how this question was answered in mid-twentieth-century philosophy, especially in the area of hermeneutics. To answer this question I have referred to the idea of interpretation as *translation*, as found in the hermeneutics of Paul Ricœur (1913-2005).

The core idea of Ricœur’s interpretation theory is that the social action or being (for example bodily being) is understood more clearly when translated from one context to another by means of hermeneutic devices. For example, if a bodily experience is the target of interpretation, it can be understood more specifically when the experience is interpreted at the linguistic level, such as bodily metaphors. Thus the idea of the translation in Ricœur’s hermeneutics can refer to the transformation of non-linguistic experience to the linguistic level.

Ricœur explores how humans understand each other. Yet this problem is investigated using heavy linguistic and social methodology. The concept of *translation* is the way to describe this process of understanding. It also describes how two different philosophical (or scientific) fields understand each other. The dissertation concentrates on the methodology from the perspectives of analytic philosophy and hermeneutic philosophy.

Philosophical analysis is often theoretical work in analytic philosophy (or in phenomenology) that breaks down a given philosophical problem into smaller pieces. A more specific type of analysis is transformative analysis, that is, translation from one context to another. The result of analysis in hermeneutic interpretation theory is not mere technical translation, but translation that produces the ‘surplus of meaning’. This means a new living meaning born in the act of interpretation.
The main question is how Ricœur’s interpretation theory uses other fields of philosophy to understand human action and being. Both existential and social questions of the self are approached in Ricœur’s view from the methodological point of view. Ricœur translates the ideas of the continental tradition into the language of the analytic tradition and vice versa. Investigation of the method of translation yields various results for studies on Ricœur and those of contemporary philosophical methodology:

1) My work brings the hermeneutic tradition into the recent historical discussion on the philosophical methods of the twentieth century. This perspective on hermeneutics has not been investigated before. My research focuses on Ricœur’s interdisciplinary method in relation to the other philosophical methods in the twentieth century, namely, the different types of philosophical analysis. Ricœur’s interdisciplinary interpretation theory uses analysis for purposes of interpretation.

2) Language analysis is tied to social communication and dialogue. This is done by pointing out the experience arising from language. The act of transforming the self into the other subject is described from the perspective of our experience and the language that modifies this experience. The meeting of experience and language is described in my work in the meeting of two traditions: The phenomenological approach investigating human experience is merged with the analysis of language use in the Oxford school. In Ricœur’s philosophy the interpretation of linguistic structures is meant to transform the whole network of being of the human: this includes the ways how ambiguous expressions, such as metaphors bring the experience to the level of language. What is crucial here is the idea that while linguistic expression is translated from one linguistic or symbolic whole to another, the experience is also translated to another mode.

3) The concept of translation refers to the ways in which linguistic conflicts, such as metaphors and narratives, conceptualize our bodily being and social action. As an additional result I make an interpretation of Ricœur’s work that emphasizes the idea that metaphors and narratives can change the bodily being. This connection between embodied being and metaphoric language has not been much discussed in Ricœur commentaries.

4) In Ricœur’s work philosophical analysis and interpretive methods work together. This is the way to expand hermeneutics to the investigation of cultural and social targets of investigation.
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Introduction

In the contemporary philosophical debate, the method of interpretation connects different positions, such as hermeneutics, ideology critique, phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The present study concentrates on the theory of interpretation as described by the French philosopher Paul Ricœur (1913-2005) in his corpus. Ricœur’s work relates to the recent discussion in the study of the history of philosophy. His work connects especially to the philosophical method in analytic philosophy and phenomenology, as Ricœur developed his hermeneutical methodology drawing on both traditions. So far, the discussion on the methods of analysis has evinced little about continental philosophy when considered after Edmund Husserl (1859-1938).

Ricœur’s method of interpretation drew on disciplines such as theology, psychology, linguistics, political sciences, history, law, literary criticism, education and also some perspectives from feminist studies. He focused particularly on the role of disciplines approaching the question of self-understanding through language. Ricœur saw hermeneutics as a search for mediated self-understanding through texts and the sociocultural world. In sum, understanding a text is a particular case of the dialogical situation in which one person responds to another person. Importantly for my study this textual dialogue is described by Ricœur as translation. Translation is dialogue between oneself and another. The idea underlying Ricœur’s hermeneutics is that the self is always in an intersubjective dialogue with other people and the objective structures of one’s culture. This is the hermeneutical background assumption for fields of special sciences that strive to interpret human consciousness. In Ricœur’s works this undeniably large theme of interpretation is focused on a certain question of interpretation, most often the interpretation of symbols, metaphors, narratives or of the social action. This means that the translation from oneself to another is transformation through linguistic structures.

1 Debate on the phenomenological and analytic philosophy is a broader context for the discussion on the methods of these philosophical traditions.
Ricœur claims that one can know oneself by interpreting signs of the ‘other’ in cultures, institutions, work, social roles and collectives (such as groups, nations, and cultural traditions). The idea of self-knowledge is problematic in the study of consciousness at least without some way of reflecting this knowledge outside our subjective experience. In this outer reflection, the analysis of language becomes an important part of Ricœur’s method. Hence, the recourse to the analysis of analytic philosophy is a detour Ricœur uses as a part of his theory of interpretation.

1.1 Theses

The issue explored in this study differs from the widely recognized commentaries on Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutics. My work approaches the subject from the perspective of two different traditions, namely those of Anglo-American analytic philosophy and continental philosophy. The latter refers to the rich philosophical tradition developed in continental Europe, and here specifically to Ricœur and his continental colleagues influential to his work. My focus is on the methodological intersection of these two traditions. In this work, the term analytic philosophy includes both the authors of early analytic philosophy and the Oxford School, which Ricœur connects to his work. I deem it important to cross the line between these, since the historical debate on the methods of analysis ignores the highly influential approach of twentieth century hermeneutics. Consequently, the continental tradition can be seen from a different perspective when its methodology is examined from the historical and analytical point of view.

The Ricœur scholar Scott Davidson has recently investigated Ricœur’s method in context with other scientific methodologies. As Davidson notes, Ricœur’s manner of practising philosophy is to juxtapose texts from different authors with differing perspectives on an issue. Davidson’s remarks about Ricœur’s methodology give an introduction for my study, since among Ricœur scholars it is Davidson who discusses most explicitly Ricœur’s interdisciplinary methodology. Through careful study, Ricœur connects seemingly irreconcilable ideas together and builds new conceptual frameworks. This is precisely what Ricœur does with analytic philosophy. As

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4 Ricœur 1989, 33.
5 Davidson 2010, 1.
6 Davidson 2010, 1.
mentioned above, Ricœur translates the ideas of continental tradition into the language of analytic tradition and vice versa. This is his method of interpretation theory: to translate the unknown to a language that is our own. Ricœur deliberately blurs the opposition between analytic philosophy and the continental tradition, as his hermeneutics derived from both Husserl’s pure phenomenology and the ordinary language philosophy of the Oxford school. Hence, the research on Ricœur’s hermeneutics must face the two different sides to his philosophy, that is, interpretation and analysis.

In light of this knowledge on Ricœur scholarship, the research question examined here is: How does Ricœur’s interdisciplinary method from the mid-twentieth century use the conceptual analysis of the early to mid-twentieth century analytic philosophy? In short: how do the conceptual types of analyses integrate with the practice of hermeneutics in Ricœur’s work on interpretation theory from 1970 to the 1990s? I will present in detail these four types of philosophical analyses together with Ricœur’s method, after which I will interpret Ricœur’s method through these classifications.

My research focuses on Ricœur’s interdisciplinary method in relation to the other philosophical methods in the twentieth century, namely, the four types of philosophical analysis. Decompositional analysis means breaking down a complex whole into pieces. Transformative analysis entails the translation of the starting point of the analysis to a form different from that of the ending point. Regressive analysis means that a philosopher goes backwards to the more fundamental premises underlying the conclusion. The connective analysis is the search for conceptual connections in a language. These ways of analysing capture the different sides of philosophical analysis. I introduce the types of philosophical analysis and then carefully interpret the way Ricœur applies some of them in his hermeneutical interpretation of a human being.

My hypothesis regarding analysis and interpretation is that Ricœur’s method presents an alternative to conceptual analysis, which means breaking down the concepts. Yet its idea of interpretation originates from the idea of translating and thus transforming the human’s self into another in various ways. I take Ricœur’s idea of the hermeneutical interpretation being both ontological and linguistic translation from one philosophical framework to another. Ontological here means translating the self through other people and culture, and linguistic translation means contextualizing the meaning of words and sentences. The concept of interpretation in Ricœur’s work clearly differs from some of the “interpretive analyses” in early analytic philosophy, but is influenced by the analytic philosophy
of his own time. The main modes of conceptual analysis that Ricœur combines incorporates into his theory of interpretation are the phenomenological analysis of consciousness and the linguistic analysis of the conceptual connections in the network of language.

On the basis of the historical research on philosophical method, my main thesis is that in twentieth century philosophy Ricœur assimilates the project of phenomenological analysis and the project of the linguistic analysis of ordinary language, and combines them together in the process of hermeneutic interpretation in a completely new way compared to the types of analysis in analytic philosophy. Furthermore, for Ricœur, the interpretation of a self is also the transformation of a subject and her experience on the level of linguistic expressions, such as narrative, symbols and metaphors. The psycholinguistic aspects of language transform the meanings of human experience, and introduce the new interpretation.

This theoretical sampling introduces Ricœur’s dialectical hermeneutics discussed by Don Ihde. The lesson to be learned from Ricœur’s dialectical hermeneutics is that the interpretation of a human being provides important background for the language analysis. In some cases of research the hermeneutic framework changes the way a certain type of analysis is practised. At the same time the interpretation theory needs specific distinction, for example of syntactic, semantic and pragmatic uses, if it needs to research aspects of language.

Decompositional analysis is not applied in his theory in a sense that it is investigated in the research of early analytic philosophy. In sum, Ricœur's hermeneutic methodology includes three types of conceptual analysis: regressive, connective and transformative analysis. These are used again for the purposes of social interpretation:

1) The regressive process “to the things themselves” from early phenomenology is changed to the regressive process of hermeneutical “questioning back” in linguistic meaning sediments. Regressive analysis means going backwards to the more fundamental premises underlying a conclusion.7

2) The analysis of ordinary language in Ricœur’s philosophy is inseparable from the idea of interpreting linguistic conflicts, such as metaphors. The analysis of speech acts is assimilated into Ricœur’s investigation of the living aspects of language, i.e. symbolic expressions.

7 Beaney 2007, 198.
3) Combining the pragmatic analysis of natural language to the regressive analysis of phenomenology is required to guide studies on the human self. The investigation of natural language is put in the context of phenomenological study of experiencing, acting and embodiment. An example of this is that the interpretation and transformation of a self requires translating from the pre-understanding to the textual level as a new metaphor or a narrative.

The main examples of combining the analysis of language with phenomenological and the hermeneutical investigation come from Ricœur’s studies on metaphor. The aspect of narrative identity has been exhaustively studied in Ricœur commentaries, and Ricœur’s studies on metaphor have moreover been well-documented. My study includes also a new perspective on this field by claiming that the same transformation of action in linguistic expression that is present in the idea of a narrative identity can already be found in Ricœur’s writings on metaphor. This combination is present both in his essays and in his book on the subject. Ricœur’s suggestion on the ways in which metaphoric language can transform a social being has been valuable, for example, in the fields of psychotherapy, theology, social psychology, women’s studies and education. Ricœur offers a critical way of conceptualizing the human being, a way that has already become influential in the humanities (or human sciences as he himself calls them). The key reasons for a combined study on the method of interpretation and the methods of analysis are the following:

1) This thesis aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on the different ways of understanding the philosophical methods of the twentieth century and the aims of philosophical analysis. The discussion deals with the philosophical method of analysis and its development in the early and middle periods of the twentieth century. Michael Beaney points out that the hermeneutic tradition has yet to be taken into account in the historical discussion on the philosophical methods of the twentieth century. Beaney refers, for example, to the transformation of phenomenology by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) that has not yet been touched upon. The research on the

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9 In this work I use the terms “humanities” in general referring to the various fields of humanities such as literary criticism, but in the case of hermeneutics and its history I also use the term human sciences, according to Ricœur’s book Hermeneutics and Human Sciences.
10 Beaney 2002, 91.
11 Beaney 2007, 25. He also acknowledges the influence of Sigmund Freud, whose psychoanalysis significantly influenced philosophical methodology. The particular focus is on Freud’s influence on
method of hermeneutics is the missing link in the historical research, which my study will bring into the debate.

2) Moreover, Ricœur’s hermeneutical method also presents an alternative to the other best known hermeneutics of the twentieth century, mainly Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002). Neither of these philosophies was interdisciplinary in the radical way Ricœur practiced hermeneutics. This makes it possible to expand and define the hermeneutical theory of interpretation. The aforementioned study was begun by authors such as Don Ihde (1934-) and Robert P. Crease (1953-). I will examine how hermeneutical methodology enables the use of the dialectical method between the hermeneutical framework and interpretation in special sciences. Ricœur’s style of practising philosophy radically modifies the style of conceptual analysis in relation to the methods of the special sciences. The difference between conceptual analysis and the special sciences is problematized in this hermeneutic dialectic. Here, I will follow Ihde's idea of expanded hermeneutics, the roots of which he believes can be found in Ricœur’s work.

1.2 Preliminary Remarks on the Method of Philosophical Analysis

This study outlines from a historical point of view how a certain conception of practising philosophy changed during the mid-twentieth century and how it continued on from the analytic tradition to another tradition in different guise. Some of the ideas from early analytic philosophy persisted and were assimilated into ordinary language philosophy.

The explicit debate on the different modes of philosophical analysis in the analytic philosophy of the twentieth century has continued at least since the publication of J.O. Urmson’s book Philosophical Analysis in 1956, which ponders on the different ways of practicing philosophical analysis and on the purpose of the analysis.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy. Freud's influence on Ricœur's philosophy is even more straightforward.

Through recent book edited by Michael Beaney *The Analytic Turn. The Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology* (2007) these questions have currently gained a stronger foothold in the field of philosophy. In Finland, there is a strong research tradition on geometrical analysis. Jaakko Hintikka and Unto Remes began their studies on the subject as early as in 1973\(^{13}\). The more recent experts on analysis include Petri Mäenpää, Miira Tuominen and Panu Raatikainen. Leila Haaparanta approaches the subject from the perspective of the phenomenological tradition and the analytical tradition\(^{14}\). My study continues this Finnish and international tradition of researching analysis from another angle, namely Ricœur’s hermeneutics.

Some of the themes in early analytic philosophy and the ordinary language school continued in hermeneutic interpretation. As Amie L. Thomasson argues in the case of phenomenology, hermeneutics also offers a response to the crisis regarding the proper methods in the philosophy of the twentieth century\(^{15}\). However, the answer of Ricœur’s hermeneutics goes further than that of phenomenology or ordinary language philosophers. If the investigation of the historical progress is studied carefully enough, it will expose new philosophical insights. My assumption here is that it will give a clearer way of understanding how the philosophical work proceeds. It proceeds in dialectic with a broader conception of interpretation, and the specific conceptual analysis or analyses of a certain question that crosses between philosophy and the special sciences. Here I will present the necessary background information on the analysis in the analytic philosophy needed in Chapter 3.

“Analysis” (ανάλυσις or análisis) is usually defined as breaking a complex whole into smaller pieces in order to gain a precise understanding of the object. The general definition, however, conceals a long history and several distinguishable uses for the term “analysis”. It has been argued that philosophical analysis in analytic philosophy has its origins in ancient geometry. Its different variations appear in mathematics, logic and in the natural sciences, such as analytic chemistry. These roots hint at the value, but also at the problems inherent in the contemporary concept of analysis.


14 See, for example Haaparanta 2003, 491.

15 Thomasson 2007, 270.
Beaney distinguishes among three types of analyses, decompositional, regressive and transformative\(^\text{16}\). These classifications suit the general mapping of the historical research on the methods of analysis, as well as on other methods of the twentieth century. Classifications similar to Beaney’s have been presented for example by Peter Hacker\(^\text{17}\). When Beaney uses then expression “types of analysis”, he is referring to the fact that all these names can be used to describe a single analytic process.

Decompositional analysis is an historically significant expedient in understanding the concept of analysis. Roughly, it means that a scientist studies a certain subject by enumerating, by breaking the whole into smaller parts. In early modern philosophy, i.e. John Locke’s (1632-28), David Hume’s (1711-1776) and Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804), as well as Wilhelm von Leibniz’s (1646-1716) philosophies, analyses were part of the philosophical practice. Decompositional analysis has a rich history, but in this work I will concentrate on the variations of analysis only at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the field of early analytic philosophy, among the most important pioneers practising decompositional analysis during the twentieth century were Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) or G(eorge) E(dward) Moore (1873 - 1958).

The transformative analysis entails the rephrasing of the starting point of the analysis (“analysandum”) to a form different from that of the ending point (“analysans”). According to Beaney, transformative analysis is the translation of the starting point of an analysis to a more accurate form by means of some “additional thing that changes the object analysed”\(^\text{18}\). By additional element, Beaney is referring to predicate logic in the case of Russell’s transformative analysis, geometry or phenomenological reduction in the case of regressive analysis\(^\text{19}\). Regressive analysis refers to going backwards to the more fundamental level of the premises underlying a conclusion\(^\text{20}\). One example of regressive analysis is the analysis of human consciousness and its structures in phenomenology. The fourth type of analysis listed by Hacker is connective analysis. This fourth type of analysis refers to the search for conceptual connections in natural language\(^\text{21}\). These four modes

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\(^{16}\) Beaney 2002, 54-55.

\(^{17}\) See Hacker 1996, 4.

\(^{18}\) Beaney 2007, 197.

\(^{19}\) See e.g. Haaparanta 1988, 2007. Husserl discusses the comparison between geometry and phenomenology, both of which belong the class of eidetic sciences.

\(^{20}\) Beaney 2007, 198.

\(^{21}\) I prefer to call this simply “connective analysis” rather than “connective elucidation” as Hacker does, since the word elucidation brings to mind the later Wittgenstein’s project, which in my opinion differs from the connective analysis in ordinary language philosophy and in Ricoeur’s philosophy.
of practising philosophy generally encompass the main possibilities of a philosophical discipline in the twentieth century.

In Russell’s case, for example, philosophy is not limited to only one type of analysis. The theme of analysis gained an important position at the beginning of the twentieth century. Analysis has been understood as the definitive character of the tradition. This assumption is problematic, because analysis was already a part of philosophy long before Frege, Russell or Moore, or the early Wittgenstein. Hence, analysis does not suffice to define the analytic philosophy of the twentieth century. In fact, analysis has been a part of philosophy at least since the ages of Socrates, Plato or Aristotle. Nowadays, those counted among the continental philosophers, Ricœur among them, also use analysis as a tool in their philosophies. Different types of analysis have been enumerated in various studies connected to the conceptions of analysis in twentieth century philosophy. This approach yields information on the development of twentieth century analytic philosophy and its origins.

1.3 References

I will limit my examination of the topic under consideration to certain works of Ricœur from the 1970s and 1990s. Ricœur’s philosophical methodology requires the support of a slightly broader perspective than merely one book: Especially in chapters 4, 5.3.1, 5.6 and 5.7 I will focus on Ricœur’s study on metaphor, The Rule of Metaphor (La métaphore vive 1975). In this volume, he makes a detailed analysis of metaphors, thus contributing to the metaphor research. Among the essential references related to this book and its conception of language analysis are also some of his essays from 1969 to 1991. Some of the essays from this time period are among the most important references for this thesis.

I have also consulted essays from four of Ricœur’s article collections; The Conflict of Interpretations (1974) (Le conflit des interprétations. Essais D’herméneutique (1969) I), From

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22 Here he uses the analytic philosophers’, especially Max Black’s and Nelson Goodman’s ideas on metaphor. He also refers to Frege’s distinction between “Sinn” and “Bedeutung”, and applies it to the interpretation of texts. He refers to Russell’s theory of definite descriptions, and to Charles Sanders Peirce’s ideas. Simultaneously, he continues his phenomenological analysis, which leans on the hermeneutical point of view by means of the question on “double meaning” or “multiple meaning in ambiguous expressions”.

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Text to Action (1991) (Du texte à l'action Essais D'hermeneutique (1986)), Hermeneutic and Human Sciences (1989) and Reflection and Imagination (1991), as well as some of his early phenomenological and hermeneutical work and books, such as Symbolism of Evil (1967) (La symbolique du mal (1960)) and Freud and Philosophy (1970) (L'interprétation: Essai sur Freud (1965)). This early phenomenological work is important, because the regressive mode of analysis is compared to it. In his three part work, Time and Narrative (1984-1988) (Temps et récit (1983-1985)), Ricœur continues the idea of interpretation on the level of broader literary texts. Oneself as Another (1992) (Soi-même comme un autre 1990), furthermore, is discussed especially in the fifth chapter, because it offers the most straightforward example of the combination of embodied pre-understanding and linguistic analysis. The ideas concerning translation are taken from Ricœur's On Translation (2006) (Sur la traduction, (2004)). I have selected my examples of early analytic philosophy from Bertrand Russell's important early period texts, such as “On Denoting” (1905), “On Fundamentals” (1905) and Russell’s later work My Philosophical Development (1959) which comments on the question of analysis from the more popular perspectives. I have limited the investigation of Russell’s text to these few, since the area of Russell-scholarship is so specific nowadays, that one scholar investigates usually a very narrow part of Russell’s work. The examples of the Oxford School philosophy and phenomenology are drawn from commentary literature and from my own investigations. I have gained expertise on the field of Oxford School by editing a book on ordinary language philosophy.

My work about philosophical methodology is placed between two research traditions that are phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The research of the encounter of these traditions has been investigated a lot during the past decades. For example Alberto Coffa has written on the subject in his The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station and Hans-Johan Glock in his What is Analytic Philosophy?. Dagfinn Föllesdal, Jitendra Nath Mohanty and Leila Haaparanta have investigated the early analytic philosophy and phenomenology. Above mentioned multidisciplinary Ricœur research edited by Davidson ponders the concept of translation. Domenico Jervolino is another Ricœur scholar, who has commented Ricœur’s later work, and the concept of translation. Don Ihde has written many decades about the dialectical method in Ricœur’s work. In Finland’s first thesis on Ricœur Björn Vikström has studied Ricœur from the theological

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perspective, and ponders the ethical issues in Ricœur’s work. I found this emphasis on the ethical attitude behind his tolerant methodology more important in Ricœur’s methodological writings than often recognized.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

I will begin this thesis by examining the position of Ricœur’s method in hermeneutics (Chapter 2). This presentation also includes the influences that form the background of his methodological views. In Chapter 2.2, I will consider the connection between the analytic tradition and Ricœur’s hermeneutics and pave the way for Chapter 3 that considers the types of analysis. In Chapter 2.3, I will focus on the objections to Ricœur’s assumption that introspection is a non-scientific method. The third chapter is an exposition of the different modes of conceptual and logical analysis at the beginning of the twentieth century. Here I will give a detailed explanation of what the four types of analysis are. These details will serve as a background for the study in Chapters 4 and 5, which delve deeper into the question of phenomenological and hermeneutic method in Ricœur’s philosophy.

In the fourth chapter, I will look at Ricœur’s conception of language, which includes the idea of a language as a text that has a certain form. In this chapter, I introduce Ricœur’s theory of metaphor as a semantic tension between two concepts, and as part of the pragmatic context of a text. In the fifth chapter, I will define the type of philosophical methodology Ihde refers to as “hermeneutic dialectic” in the debate on twentieth century philosophy. Here, I will compare Ricœur’s method with the decompositional, regressive, connective and transformative modes of analysis. In the final chapter, I will present my conclusions, thus drawing all the threads together.
2. Preliminary Considerations on Ricœur’s Method

2.1 Ricœur’s Methodology in an Historical Context

In order to understand Paul Ricœur’s complex philosophy, I find it useful to distinguish between the main influences he assimilates into his methodology. In the context of this study, it is sufficient to make a distinction between only a few of the main effects to get a grip of the central influences, since the variety of topics in Ricœur’s philosophy would lead to an excess of directions. In this section I list the philosophical influences that gave Ricœur’s methodology its characteristics. In Chapter 2.2 I begin to consider the connection between the analytic tradition and Ricœur’s hermeneutics. In 2.3 I focus on Ricœur’s key question of self-understanding. I also show how hermeneutic methodology surrounds this question.

Ricœur’s place in twentieth century philosophy is determined by the two continents he embraced. He worked in the French tradition and in the Anglo-American tradition of analytic philosophy at the same time, the French tradition being the more favoured when his career is studied as a whole. In France, he taught in Strasbourg as a lecturer, at the University of Sorbonne as the Chair of General Philosophy and at the University of Nanterre as an administrator. In the 1970’s and 1980’s he held a chair at the Centre of Phenomenology and Hermeneutics in Paris. One can say that he introduced hermeneutics to the French audience. In France, hermeneutics did not have as powerful a place as it had in the German philosophical tradition. In 1970, he took up a position at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, where he taught from 1970 to 1985.

Throughout his academic career from 1930 until his death in 2005, Ricœur’s philosophy was coloured by various influences. Among these influences were

philosophical schools and theories, such as phenomenology, existentialism, ordinary language philosophy, and action theory. Remarkably, Ricœur also expanded philosophical theory with sciences such as theology, psychoanalysis, linguistics, literary criticism, and then with the social sciences such as law, politics and sociology.

Ricœur took seriously the challenge of presenting philosophy as clearly as possible to different audiences on different continents. He introduced hermeneutic themes of understanding and interpretation to the Anglo-American philosophical audience. Contrary to some celebrated French philosophers, Ricœur’s main way of presenting philosophy was not poetically oriented but aimed to be clear and conventional academic writing. He made a distinction between philosophical and scientific language as opposed to metaphorical language. This meant that metaphors are part of philosophy as they are part of ordinary language, but in scientific and philosophical language metaphorical language should always be explained and interpreted as explicitly as possible. Ricœur’s preoccupation with precise philosophical expression does not mean that his texts are easily accessible. The difficulties with his texts come from the wide range of topics that he brought together as a part of his interpretation theory.

I move on to a brief review of the very historical background that helps to understand from which angle Ricœur’s hermeneutical methodology can be understood, and what role the analysis of language plays in his work. Both contemporary and twentieth century hermeneutics have deeper roots in the history of philosophy. The problem between the self-interpretation and the role of written language already occurs in the history of hermeneutics.

I limit my examination to the hermeneutic roots that are the most important elements in Ricœur’s philosophical methodology. For this propose I use Don Ihde’s presentation on Ricœur’s place in the hermeneutic tradition, and pick up points from Richard Kearney’s texts. I focus on the historical contexts of significance to Ricœur. I will omit many of the historical details since my aim is to grasp the most important parts that concern Ricœur’s philosophical and multidisciplinary method. The point is to grasp the influences that Ricœur assimilates into his methodology of interpretation.

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27 Ricœur 1996, 32-33.
29 Ricœur 2008, 303.
The first influence on Ricœur’s method is theological interpretation. Originally the young Ricœur’s interest in existentialism is related to theology. His teacher Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) was an impressive Christian existentialist in France. Even before the Christian tradition, Plato’s *Cratylus* and Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione* include remarks on language and understanding. Yet, in the works of Plato and Aristotle, the principles of interpretation were not directly stated. The interpretation of the Bible is often seen as the beginning of the hermeneutic technique of text reading. Origen (185-254) and Augustine (354-430) are mentioned as the more precise pioneers of the hermeneutical approach than, for example, was Plato. According to Don Ihde, biblical hermeneutics was distant from philosophy. Origen makes distinctions between the interpretation of words, allegories and spiritual texts. Origen concerned the relationship between language and personal experience.

The theological roots of hermeneutics directed the later development of the hermeneutical movement. Originally, hermeneutics was a method for text interpretation. In the 17th and 18th centuries hermeneutics developed as a method for scientific purposes. Ihde emphasizes Ricœur’s roots in biblically styled hermeneutics in the background of his own hermeneutics. This means that Ricœur draws on the Judaic and early Christian traditions and those of early hermeneutics. Similarly he finds emphasis relating to the historical disciplines of historical criticism from Louis Mink to Hayden White. Nevertheless, Ricœur does not confuse theological discourse with properly philosophical interpretation. He does not so much concentrate on theology but on critical studies on biblical thought.

The question that Ihde points out is whether hermeneutical history implies a monopoly of a certain tradition. In other words: can we have general hermeneutics distinguished from theological problems? This question is crucial for Ricœur’s hermeneutic methodology since for him the key question is the philosophical adaptation of hermeneutics. Contrary to the Christian tradition of hermeneutics, Ricœur assumes that hermeneutics as a philosophy is a separate

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31 See Ricœur 1974, 383.
33 Oesch 2005, 16.
34 Ricœur 1996, 68.
35 Ricœur 1996, 68.
36 Ricœur 1996, 68.
37 Ihde 1996, 66.
38 Ihde 1996, 61.
subject, but that a philosopher should be competent in at least one field of special science. Ricœur himself published continuously on theology in his philosophical writings. His interest focused on exegetic problems of theology, not so much on systematic theology. The question of general hermeneutics versus theological interpretation can however be seen as a methodological question, though historically hermeneutics is clearly separated from theological problems.

The 18\textsuperscript{th} century was epoch-making in the history of hermeneutics, since this is when the question of the author in the text interpretation came into focus. For example, Oesch has pointed out that the 17\textsuperscript{th} century Johann Conrad Dannhauer (1603-1666) was already the originator of a new kind of hermeneutics\textsuperscript{39}. Now the focus is still more on the modern philosophical hermeneutics of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century and its revision in Ricœur’s philosophy. This time period gives the crucial methodological background for Ricœur.

The second aspect in the history of hermeneutics that influenced Ricœur’s methodology developed already in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, but was refined in Wilhelm Dilthey’s (1833-1911) work in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. The idea that hermeneutics could be a separate method for the general theory of interpreting for specific fields of interpretation started to develop at this point. The question of accurate methodology in philosophy became crucial in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century with the birth of natural sciences. This raised the question of the place of the interpretive sciences. The neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) especially made a distinction between scientific facts and historical facts. Hermeneutics now began to be seen as a part of philosophy, not theology. This leads to the idea that behind the specific areas of interpretive sciences, namely juridical interpretation or interpretation of the Bible, more general principles of interpretation can be found. Erna Oesch has pointed out the importance of scientific research at the beginning of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century for the hermeneutical discussion\textsuperscript{40}. The hermeneutics of the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries expanded hermeneutics from its previous religious context to the method that defined the shape of the social or human sciences\textsuperscript{41}. Developing a methodology for social sciences and human sciences is one of the key principles of Ricœur’s philosophy\textsuperscript{42}.

The 18\textsuperscript{th} century theologian and philosopher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834), and the German historian, hermeneutic philosopher,

\textsuperscript{39} Oesch 2005, 18.
\textsuperscript{40} Oesch 2005, 18.
\textsuperscript{41} Ihde 1996, 61.
\textsuperscript{42} Ricœur 1989, 39-40.
psychologist and sociologist Dilthey, are considered the two main figures of modern hermeneutics. The methodology for the human sciences was Dilthey’s concern. Dilthey made an influential distinction between human sciences and natural sciences by means of the idea that human sciences use methods of understanding and natural sciences use methods of explanation. In this perspective, the hermeneutic produces its own method of understanding that is distinct from the methods of natural sciences that are most often methods of explanation. More precisely, Dilthey wrote that unlike understanding, which is a mental process, interpretation can be characterized as a method. Interpretation involves a combination of various mental processes, some of which are shared with scientific method.

According to H.P. Rickman, Dilthey did not see hermeneutics as an exclusive alternative to natural sciences. Instead, he considered that a combination of methods was often needed, since the human mind cannot be comprehended from only one perspective. The same kind of combination of methods is Ricœur’s aim when he presents hermeneutic methodology that proposes reciprocity between explanation and understanding. His idea is crystallized in the following question: Why would hermeneutic and science be separated neatly into different boxes if the combination of these two would help in better understanding a human mind? Yet Ricœur’s concept of “explanation”, as he himself uses it, is in his own theoretical framework merely restricted to the structural explanation that was common to the linguistics models. In other words, the methodology for linguistics and psychology is opened up to human and social sciences.

Ricœur says that the notion of explanation has been displaced in a way that it is not derived from natural sciences but from properly linguistic models. This statement reveals that Ricœur concentrates on the explanation merely in the case of the linguistic studies of his time (both French and Anglo-American research). The new orientation on the problem between explanation and understanding is worth investigation, since today it might be somewhat less contradictory than it was in the 19th century. Nowadays Ricœur’s assumption is shared by many philosophers who study humanistic issues by means of both of these aspects. The interdisciplinary approach to interpretation is precisely what connects Ricœur to

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44 Rickman 1979, 147.  
45 Rickman 1979, 149.  
46 Ricœur 1991b, 43.  
47 Ricœur 1991b, 43.  
48 Ricœur 1991b, 43.
Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Furthermore, this approach makes an important distinction between Ricœur’s contemporaries, the figures of hermeneutic philosophy, Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. With Ricœur they are often described as the hermeneutical masters of the 20th century.

The third aspect, crucial to Ricœur’s methodology is the aim to study the interpretation of human existence. Schleiermacher started to develop hermeneutics as a more general philosophical method. Hermeneutics was meant especially to be a method for the self-understanding of the human being. Self-understanding in this connection meant the study of understanding the human as such, though in Schleiermacher the focus was still more text and history oriented.49 The orientation on history in Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics means the idea that every phenomenon has a history, and that the history of a phenomenon defines that phenomenon and the way we understand it. The modern approach of Schleiermacher introduces the theme of understanding human existence from the point of view of text and historicity. The same question of the historical tradition was a distinctive property of twentieth century philosophy from Heidegger to Ricœur. For Ricœur this theme also means the abovementioned aspect that human existence and its study need to be guided by some methodology50. This is another background assumption that Ricœur assimilates into his philosophical project.

I have already come close to pondering Ricœur’s methodological development in the 20th century. Now I will explore the main methodological influences on Ricœur’s philosophy in the twentieth century. The object of a hermeneutic study has already been changed in Schleiermacher’s and Dilthey’s philosophies. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the hermeneutic took a new direction: the general question of understanding rose to a new level. For Heidegger and Gadamer, the hermeneutic question meant research on the question of being. This captures a number of human ways of being in the world, being in language and one’s orientation towards other people. The background assumption here was to understand the human being holistically through the framework of the text interpretation.

Ricœur considers the same question of being that Heidegger investigated, but he stresses the importance of a detour through multidisciplinary research. This also changes his aims in hermeneutics. On the basis of the ideas described above, in the 1960’s Ricœur made a hermeneutical volte face in his philosophy. He resumed the

philosophical analysis of language and started to focus on specific social debates, such as ideology critique. The hermeneutic turn meant that Ricœur’s hermeneutics engaged increasingly in different schools of philosophy and with sciences. He aims to take these methods of interpretation into account when he builds the understanding of the human being in social surroundings.\(^51\) The question of methodology is tied to the question of self-understanding.

Ricœur’s dialectic method means a discussion between philosophy and some specific branch of human or social sciences. Combining philosophy and a science, a philosopher creates more a precise understanding of the topic under scrutiny. This kind of discussion is part of Ricœur’s hermeneutics from the 1960’s. The theme of the investigation of a subject remained, but the immediacy of the subject as in the \textit{Cogito} of Descartes was questioned by Ricœur\(^52\).

The fourth methodological idea of Ricœur’s is rooted in the phenomenological tradition. Ricœur started his academic career in the late 1930’s. He started to study human experience as such from the phenomenological standpoint. The beginning of Ricœur’s career is characterized by an interest in existentialism and German phenomenology. Ricœur was influenced by his French teacher Marcel and he also published a book on existentialism with Mikel Dufrenne called \textit{Karl Jaspers et la philosophie de l’existence} (1947). Ricœur delved deeply into phenomenology by translating Husserl’s works into French, for example Husserl’s \textit{Ideen I}. He developed his interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology with \textit{Husserl E., Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie} (1967) (\textit{Husserl. An Analysis of His Phenomenology}), and wrote a work on the phenomenology of will called \textit{Philosophie de la volonté. Finitude et Culpabilité. I} (1950) (\textit{Philosophy of the Will}). Another study on the existential phenomenology, \textit{L’homme faillible.} (\textit{Fallible man}) was published in 1960\(^53\). \textit{L’homme faillible} studied the themes of body and conscience within the framework of phenomenology.

The existential question of the subject came from Marcel and was investigated by phenomenological methods. In Ricœur’s case, the phenomenological approach in the 1950’s meant the investigation of the non-cognitive aspects of human being, such as volition, motivation, affection, emotion, the body and action\(^54\). Ricœur describes his method at this time as Husserlian “eidetic analysis”, but he was broadening the way in which Husserl practised eidetic analysis, since

\(^{51}\) See Ihde 1996, 64-65.
\(^{52}\) Ricœur 1996, 16.
\(^{53}\) Ricœur 1996, 14.
\(^{54}\) Madison 1996, 76.
phenomenology was now used for the research of the themes that were part of everyday life, and connected to social aspects. Ricœur’s enlarging of Husserlian eidetic analysis was influenced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1908–1961) *Phenomenology of Perception*, and Ricœur confesses that he thought that his own work on the philosophy of the will could serve as a counterpart for Merleau-Ponty’s work on the philosophy of embodiment. Ricœur’s approach was pressing the action of an embodied agent. Ricœur’s approach to phenomenology come from the motivation to render the conceptual analysis of phenomenology more comprehensible. The young Ricœur assumed that the investigation of human volition and body made phenomenological analysis more concrete than pure eidetic analysis.

Fifthly, the different approaches that Ricœur used in the 1960’s are connected to the discussions in the French philosophical tradition, and to the philosophical environment of the years 1930-1970 in France. This discussion includes phenomenology and its variants, but also the powerful influence of structuralism, and polemics against its conception of language. The year 1970 witnessed a change of paradigm in French philosophy. The critique of existentialism and of all the philosophies of the subject became the mainstream in the philosophical discussion. At the same time, questions of linguistic and social structures became increasingly important. One of the books of substance at that time in the French discussion was Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1857–1913) *Cours de linguistique générale* (1916) (*Course in General Linguistics*). The book made a distinction between language (*langue*) meaning an underlying system of language conventions, that includes grammar for example, and speech (*parole*) that meant the actual spoken language in a speaking situation.

Prior to Ricœur, Merleau-Ponty joined the criticism of structuralism. Ricœur adopts some of Merleau-Ponty’s criticism. Merleau-Ponty’s criticism is that the subject is not seen as a part of the study of language. From the point of view of the phenomenological criticism of structuralism, the speaking subject is an acting embodied subject. This has considerable influence on how the subject expresses herself. According to Ricœur language should be seen from the point of view of the embodied subject, but this idea has to be in contact with linguistic sciences. Some other French philosophers such as Jacques Derrida and Roland Barthes (a structuralist himself before turned to the poststructuralism) developed their own criticisms of structuralism.

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55 Ricœur 1996, 11.
56 Ihde 1974, xii.
Marxism, too, was well presented and applied into the guise of the structural turn in the 1960’s and 1970’s with the influential Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser (1918–1990), who distinguished between the scientific core of Marxism and humanism. The investigation of society took into account the results of linguistics. The idea of combining social questions with psychoanalysis was also studied in the German tradition of hermeneutics. Ricœur’s hermeneutics can be called critical hermeneutics, since it has ideas similar to those of the critical hermeneutical theory of Karl-Otto Apel (1922–) and Jürgen Habermas (1929–). Ricœur discusses Habermas and Apel’s work, for example Habermas’s parallel between psychoanalysis and ideology-critique. Ricœur is critical of the distinction he perceives in Habermas’s work between hermeneutics and critical social sciences. Ricœur conceives a critical social stage to be a part of hermeneutic philosophy. He also thinks that critical social sciences are always hermeneutical in trying to correct distortions in communication. In this discussion, the grafting of hermeneutics onto phenomenology meant for Ricœur a radical way of using the ideas from phenomenology in the field of social sciences.

The methodological approach, which in part followed and in part renewed the modern hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey meant to Ricœur that the subject does not know itself directly but only through signs. Ricœur stresses the idea that the self-understanding of a subject was mediated by symbols. Ricœur started this study in his *Symbolism of Evil* from 1969. In this book Ricœur describes how the methodological decision concerning the evil will in his phenomenology made him doubt the idea that we could have introspection on the will: this decision made him move on and graft hermeneutics onto phenomenology. At the time of his studies on the evil will Ricœur already touched his recurrent themes of narrative texture, symbolic forms of language and reflection through textual structures. Ricœur continued the research on hermeneutics in his *Freud and philosophy* (1970), which was based on the lectures delivered at Yale University and was influenced by the psychoanalytic investigations of the subject.

His metaphor theory from *The Rule of Metaphor (La métaphore vive* 1975) continues to adopt ideas from other fields such as Oxford ordinary language philosophy, literary criticism, linguistic structuralism and psycholinguistics as a part of philosophy. In these studies, the investigation of multiple meanings in natural language is the focus of attention. The connection of hermeneutics to the philosophy of science is

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58 Ricœur 1996, 18.
59 Ricœur 1991b, 159.
60 Ricœur 1991b, 159.
present in the theme of the fictional re-description of reality. The functioning of metaphor is analogous to the scientific models. At this point, Ricœur increasingly uses Anglo-American philosophy as a part of his methodology. The approach of myths, symbols and metaphors broadened in the three-part book *Time and Narrative* (1983-1985) to the investigation of personal identity.

*Oneself as Another* (1990) made explicit how a human subject can understand herself through narratives. In this book, again, the recourse to analysis in analytic philosophy was needed for an indirect manner of positing the self. This includes the theme of embodiment, also touched on in Ricœur’s early phenomenology. The idea of narrative identity was also used in Ricœur’s work on social sciences. An example of this idea is the transfer of psychoanalytic themes into the field of critical social sciences.

Sixthly, I point out that Ricœur assimilates the analytic tradition and linguistic analysis is one part of his methodology. This topic will be considered more in the next section. All the various topics mentioned above can be seen in the development of Ricœur’s phenomenology and hermeneutics in the 1960’s and 1970’s, and are all tied to his methodology.

To sum up, the main topics of Ricœur’s methodology tied to the historical development of hermeneutics are the following:

1) The theological background of hermeneutics raises the question of general hermeneutics.

2) The rise of natural sciences in 17th century and a compulsion to develop hermeneutic methodology.

3) In Ricœur’s work the question of being was broadened especially for the study of the human’s self-understanding.

4) The influence of the French tradition of philosophy on Ricœur’s philosophy, especially structuralism including many points: a) The critique of all the philosophies of the subject, especially the critique of existentialism and phenomenology was presented in the French tradition. In the case of Ricœur’s philosophy, this critique still means accepting the basic question of self-interpretation. b) The research of a volition and embodiment. c) The questions of linguistic and social structures, and the aim to tie them together.

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63 Ricœur 1992, 17.
Discussion with Marxist ideas was combined with the theme of language studies reaches the phenomenological theme of embodiment. Connecting social questions and linguistic analysis influenced the method of phenomenology opened to the hermeneutical themes.

5) Relation to the analytic tradition helped to form Ricœur’s theory of language. The question is so important in this study that it craves its own chapter.

2.2 Ricœur’s Apprenticeship with Analytic Philosophy

One of Ricœur’s aims is to combine philosophical others with his work on hermeneutics. He wants to melt together a “discipline requiring a new alliance between the analytic tradition and the phenomenological and hermeneutical tradition”64. One of the reasons for adding the analytic tradition is that he considers that the question of subject needs a detour through analytic reflection on the subject65. Another question is whether Ricœur should have delved even deeper into this meltdown, but as the quotation shows, this was his aim. Hence I now move on to the relation between hermeneutics and the analytic tradition. This subchapter concentrates on showing what kind of connections Ricœur builds between his philosophy and analytic philosophy. This section starts my study on the continental-analytic divide through Ricœur’s philosophy, and thereby paving the way for the question of the methodological differences and similarities considered in Chapter 3.

Ricœur assumed taken the role of mediator between two continents when the bridge over analytic philosophy and the continental tradition was built. The building process has benefitted both schools of philosophy, but however the interaction is incomplete. The middle ground of analytic philosophy and hermeneutics is odd for some philosophers, and the effects of hermeneutics on analytic philosophy remain unclear. Nevertheless, the hermeneutic questions are formulated in different times in the analytic tradition, for example in Gilbert Ryle’s

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64 Ricœur 1992, 113.
philosophy of mind, in Donald Davidson’s philosophy of language and understanding, in the work of von Wright and Peter Winch.\textsuperscript{66}

What parts of the extensive tradition of analytic philosophy did Ricœur incorporate into his language theory? Ricœur's philosophy takes ideas from analytic ordinary language philosophy. Ricœur even assimilates some points from the early analytic philosophy of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), Bertrand Russell (1972–1970) and the early Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951)\textsuperscript{67}. In a seminal commentary book The Library of Living Philosophers. The Philosophy of Paul Ricœur (1996), the influence of analytic philosophy has been almost forgotten. Ricœur himself, in his intellectual autobiography included in the book, exposes his intersections with the early and middle periods of analytic philosophy.\textsuperscript{68} Some commentaries support Ricœur's dialogue with analytic philosophy. Mary Gerhart, for example, points out Ricœur's discussion of Frege’s concepts meaning (\textit{Sinn}) and reference (\textit{Bedeutung}). In this discussion, Ricœur's ideas concerned the problem of linguistic reference\textsuperscript{69}.

Ricœur's move from France to the USA in the 1970s hastened the coalescence of hermeneutics and analytic philosophy. It is not exaggeration to claim that it was in the 1970s that analytic philosophy was most influential throughout America\textsuperscript{70}. While lecturing in the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, Ricœur had his first contact with analytic philosophy\textsuperscript{71}. It was the philosophical surrounding where Ricœur would be operating for decades, and he absorbed several ideas from the linguistic analysis of ordinary philosophers such as J.L. Austin, Paul Grice, Gilbert Ryle, and P.F. Strawson\textsuperscript{72}. Ricœur refers in his work to many modern analytic philosophers such as Nelson Goodman and Mary Hesse; his later career also drew influences from American political thinkers, such as John Rawls\textsuperscript{73}. Ricœur translated the works of Frege and J.L. Austin from English into French. He feels


\textsuperscript{67} Ricœur 2008, 382, Index of authors. See for example Ricœur's references to Frege in his major work on the philosophy of language. This gives a hint that Ricœur actually paid attention to these philosophers, and used them as a part of his language theory: “Frege 73-4. 90, 92, 181-2, 217, -20, 298, 336, 341, 351, 364”.

\textsuperscript{68} Ricœur 1996, 32-33.

\textsuperscript{69} Gerhart 1996, 223-224.

\textsuperscript{70} See for example Soames 2006.

\textsuperscript{71} Ricœur 1996, 32.

\textsuperscript{72} Ricœur 2008, 381, Index of authors. See for example references to Blacks work in Riceur's The Rule of Metaphor that are not just minor points but a crucial part of his theory of metaphors: “4,6, 22, 66, 81, 83-90, 94-9, 131, 133, 137, 168-9, 190-1, 193, 195, 197, 208, 236, 240-4, 288, 328, 248, 352”.

more kinship with Austin and Strawson than with formal approaches to language, e.g. Russell, since ordinary language philosophy opens the connection between language and experience, which are the main field of Ricœur’s philosophical and scientific studies74. The effects of the Wittgenstein of *Philosophical Investigations* (1953) are clearly visible in Ricœur’s philosophy of language75. Especially private language argument and the concept of “language games” have also influenced Ricœur’s philosophy76. The focus of this study is on how the analysis of analytic philosophers influenced Ricœur, and his position in relation to the types of analysis.

Analytic method of ordinary language philosophy is one of the methods that Ricœur applies in his work. In the twentieth century philosophy, one line of the philosophy of language arises from Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations*. Some commentators claim that Wittgenstein’s assumption was that linguistic meaning should not be studied from theoretical scientific perspective77. Ricœur acknowledges that his hermeneutics shares ideas from Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* and its framework that sees where language is considered a part of a broader holistic structure78. Still, Ricœur did not accept the Wittgensteinian idea of abandoning linguistic methodology. Ricœur developed this general claim of language use and made it more accurate to the means of his dialectic method. Ricœur uses methodology for his philosophy of language and does not deny the possibility of the discussion between empirical sciences and hermeneutical philosophy79.

The differences between the later Wittgenstein and Ricœur depend on what perspective on to Wittgenstein’s philosophy is accepted80. In my work the relation between ordinary language philosophy and Ricœur is a background for the pondering of analysis and interpretation in Sections 4 and 5. The discussion is part of Ricœur’s dialectical method where the philosophical and phenomenological analysis is in dialogue with human sciences. Ricœur uses various methods of special sciences that are all understood in a relationship to hermeneutical analysis. This dialogue is especially apparent in Ricœur’s *The Rule of Metaphor* subtitled “Multidisciplinary studies of the creation of meaning in language”.

74 See for example Ricœur 2008, 73.
75 See for example Ricœur 1974, 15.
76 Ricœur 1991b, 99.
77 Soames 2003, xiv.
78 Ricœur 1974, 15.
79 See for example Pihlström 2006, 214-215
80 I leave this question outside my study, since I am not Wittgenstein scholar.
The golden age of ordinary language philosophy in Oxford lasted from 1947 to the 1970s. Paul Grice was one of the ordinary language philosophers, but already in the 1960s he started to criticize the way the slogan *meaning is use* was presented by ordinary language philosophers. Grice figured that the meaning of an expression could not be read off the situations in which the sentences are used. Instead, he believed that language use is a product of various interacting systems. His starting point was that philosophers need a systematic theory for language. The impact of the Oxford School were seen in the 1970s and developed in another direction by authors like Ricœur, who also built a theory of language on the basis of the idea that language should be studied from the point of view of the different uses it has in different spheres of speaking. Ricœur is in dialogue with Saussurean linguists, especially Stephen Ullman, and utilizes some aspects of psycholinguistics as well. Analytic philosophy, in particular the philosophy of mind, is also discussed.

In comparison to ordinary language philosophers Ricœur gives much more consideration to the empirical matters presented in linguistics. Furthermore, he was critical of the language oriented conceptual analysis that did not take into account the linguistic imagination that schematizes our experience and bodily being. Ricœur states that philosophy needs theories that investigate different kinds of language uses.

There are traces of the influence of analytic philosophy on Ricœur’s theory, direct and indirect, even before the 1970s. His way of understanding analytic philosophy is tied to a certain period of analytic philosophy, namely the middle period of analytic philosophy. However, Ricœur continued to apply analytic philosophy to his multidisciplinary method until his death in 2005. Clearly, the alliance between the analytic tradition and the hermeneutical tradition is seen in Ricœur’s book *Onself as Another*. In this book the question of the self is tied to the analytic tradition and its methodology:

“These borrowings, which will continue in the second and third subsets, are not arbitrary; they do not result from some will a priori to engage in the reciprocal cross-fertilization of two largely alien traditions; even less do they represent some compulsive ambition to force a marriage between two

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81 Ricœur 2008, 200. Gaston Esnault is one of the psycholinguistics that Ricœur uses. For example, Ricœur uses some parts of the linguistic theories such as Saussure, Noam Chomsky and Harris Zelling.

82 Ricœur 2008, 5.

83 Lanigan 1996, 309.
families of minds who seldom frequent one another. The recourse to analysis, in the sense given to this term by analytic philosophy, is the price to pay for a hermeneutics characterized by the indirect manner of positing the self. By this first feature, hermeneutics proves to be a philosophy of detours: the detour by way of analytic philosophy quite simply seems to me to be the one richest promises and in results."

Ricœur’s philosophical aim is the investigation of the subject's self-understanding. Yet, he thinks that this matter should be approached from the investigation of language, of mind, and of bodily action. The philosophical attitude here is much broader than the mere conceptual analysis of wholes into smaller parts, but this practice is seen as an important part of the holistic and multidisciplinary way of approaching language.

The point in recognizing the connections between two different schools is to show how the dialogue produced new ideas for human and social methodology. I see Ricœur’s theory of metaphor as a paradigmatic example of how the combination of hermeneutics and analysis of analytic philosophy actually produced the philosophical model for the use of the sciences. Ricœur’s theory of language benefitted from the ideas presented in the ordinary language analysis of the Oxford School. Ricœur shows that in spoken language the psychosocial ways of influencing (metaphor, metonymy, analogy, symbol, narrative) are far from unimportant for the theory of language, and that these ways of influencing should not be neglected in the investigation of language. For example, before Max Black, the theme of metaphor was not even properly discussed in analytic philosophy. Nevertheless, Black’s presentation concentrates solely on the linguistic level and does not consider the psychological effects that metaphors have in language use.

The background assumption in the study of psychosocial mechanisms is that symbolic systems influence our ways of approaching reality. Fictions, i.e. symbolic systems such as literary works, films, social media, or virtual reality, remake our reality. It might well be noted that the pace with which this happens has quickened considerably since the days when Ricœur developed his theory about creative imagination; the rhythm has speeded up. Fictions remake our reality by producing imaginary worlds by means of simulating real life in such literal ways that they have become a part of our lives. The technological innovations shape our way of seeing,

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85 Ricœur 2008, 195.
86 Kearney 2004, 35.
hearing, and even touching and being, physically. This way of shaping reality imports a wider understanding of the investigation of language than mere logical models can. Concentrating on the remaking of reality in language theory does not exclude what analytic philosophers present in the theories of reference etc., but stresses the investigation of the fields of language use that have been ignored in the discussion of language in twentieth century philosophy.

Ricœur’s attitude towards the analytic tradition is not rejecting, rather, it assimilates ideas from the tradition. Ricœur’s relation to the analytic tradition has not been so far largely studied. There are many ways to classify the various hermeneutical schools in twentieth century philosophy. Here I will only mention Ricœur’s relationship to analytic hermeneutics. Ricœur’s hermeneutics in relation to analytic hermeneutics is an example of how analytic philosophy and hermeneutics can be combined. For example, Peter Winch and Georg Henrik von Wright are classified as analytic hermeneutics within this study87. Analytic hermeneutics is characterized by the influence of analytic philosophy (especially the later Wittgenstein), and aim to combine scientific explanation with cultural understanding. At the same time for example, von Wright thinks that explanation and understanding can be separated from each other by means of their function in certain sciences88. Ricœur is using the later Wittgenstein in a manner that reminds us of Winch’s way to join social interpretation and Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language89. The focus is on epistemic questions more than the ontology of being. Ricœur proposes a third way in hermeneutics: an alternative to both a merely epistemic orientation in hermeneutics and to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics90. Ricœur is a methodological hermeneutic who prefers the dialogue between philosophical hermeneutics, as well as a critical hermeneutic who develops hermeneutics into the social theory of ideology91.

Considering Ricœur’s relation to analytic philosophy from another angle, it has included perspectives that have become increasingly popular among the analytically

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88 See for example von Wright 1990, 30.
90 Ihde 1996, 64.
91 Apel and Habermas are other examples of critical hermeneutics focusing on epistemic questions of interpretation.
oriented philosophers\textsuperscript{92}. A multidisciplinary way of doing philosophy has become more popular among analytically oriented philosophers only in recent decades, when the question of understanding the other and self-understanding has become a pertinent subject of philosophical study. Nowadays many philosophers use conceptual analysis fluently hand in hand with other sciences\textsuperscript{93}. In Ricœur’s time this was not an obvious starting point in western philosophy. Methodological pluralism however, is just the starting point for the philosophy of Ricœur. It opens up the question of the human psyche acting in a world from the perspective of any scientific or philosophical idea that is valuable for understanding the topic at hand. Not only is he a mere methodological pluralist; Ricœur also turns out to be a pluralist with a philosophical attitude of methodological tolerance.

\subsection*{2.3 Methodology for Self-Understanding}

In Chapter 2.1 I mentioned the themes in twentieth century hermeneutics important for Ricœur. I now move on to the key theme in Ricœur’s philosophy: self-understanding. Don Ihde sees Ricœur at the heart of the discussions concerning self-knowledge\textsuperscript{94}. The question of self-understanding appears in Ricœur’s writing on phenomenology and the ontology of hermeneutics of human existence. I focus on how Ricœur conceives of the question of the self-understanding that is tied to his method for interpretation. The idea of interpreting is also presented as translating oneself to another, a topic I revisit especially in Chapters 4 and 5. This indirect route to Ricœur’s main philosophy of the self is crucial for this concept of transformative translation of the self. Ricœur uses terms such as self-understanding, self-knowledge, and self-consciousness.

Exceptionally for the phenomenological tradition I also use the term “introspection”, because it describes the phenomenon that Ricœur refers to as immediate inner self-knowledge, and because I will use certain aspects of the study on introspection as a counterargument for his hermeneutical assumptions. Introspection here refers to immediate self-knowledge of one’s inner feelings,

\textsuperscript{92} My assumption is that analytic philosophy as a historical school does no longer exists in a strict sense of that school, but still all over the Continent there is a tendency that still uses the methods of analytic philosophy.

\textsuperscript{93} See for example Knobe & Nichols 2008.

\textsuperscript{94} Ihde 1996, 65.
beliefs or assumptions. The hermeneutical view on self-knowledge includes the notion that a mental property is part of an embodied human’s state, and thus feelings, beliefs and assumptions arise from embodiment. My hypothesis is that the question of self-knowledge or introspection creates a connection between Ricœur’s ideas on *Time and Narrative* and *Oneself as Another* and a recent philosophical discussion on introspection, namely philosophers such as Alwin I. Goldman (2006), Nichols and Stich (2003) or the psychological views presented in Hurlburt and Heavey (2001), Schooler, probably even a neuroscientist such as Craig. Ricœur himself had a dialogue (originally recorded on tape, not an academic work) with the neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux (1936—) in their book *What makes us think?* Ricœur and Changeux discuss self-knowledge and the recent ideas of the neuroscience\(^\text{95}\).

I answer the question: Why does Ricœur’s theory of interpretation reject immediate self-knowledge? Partly the emphasis on the intersubjectivity in self-understanding comes from the historical background: Ricœur assumes that after Descrates the subjectivity has been pressed too much in the philosophical discussion. Ricœur points out that consciousness of oneself is always reflected consciousness\(^\text{96}\). In other words the consciousness needs an intersubjective response from texts, cultural institutions or other people to be a consciousness. I present some hypothetical counterarguments from Hurlburt and Heavey (2001), and Schooler to test Ricœur’s theory, and to make explicit the way in which Ricœur’s philosophy is grounded in twentieth century philosophy. The possibility of introspection, claims Goldman, has been a taboo among philosophers although nowadays cognitive scientists support the view of self-monitoring close to the traditional conception of introspection. This section also touches upon how Ricœur’s method separates him from the pure phenomenological method on one hand, and from Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s hermeneutics on the other.

All the hermeneutic methodology that Ricœur elaborates upon is tied to the question of self-understanding. Ricœur’s focus is the investigation of a human subject, but his way of approaching the subject changes when he moves on from the phenomenological study of a subject’s consciousness and its voluntary and involuntary actions to hermeneutical analysis. Subjectivity is studied from an existential, phenomenological and hermeneutical point of view, yet crucial aspects of existentialism and Husserl’s early phenomenology are criticized. Ricœur’s claim is that through interpreting signs of the ‘other’ in cultures, institutions, work, social

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95 Changeux & Ricœur 2002, 10.
96 Ricœur 1996, 36-37.
roles and collectivities (such as groups, nations, and cultural traditions) I can know myself. Ricœur re-conceptualized phenomenology and hermeneutics towards a new area of an understanding of the self in dialogue with other people’s reactions. The question of self-knowledge can be presented in two primary ways: the first assumes immediate self-knowledge, and the second assumes reflective self-knowledge.

First of all, the question of self-understanding is related to the question: “Who am I?” The question in this context concerns how a human ego, what we refer to as “I”, is construed. It concerns the “I”, or “me” that people use in natural language when they use sentences such as “I was shopping at the mall today”, “Me and my wife are divorced”, “I have a headache”, “I have killed an Afghan” or “I am in a social network”. In what ways can one know this “I” that appears and acts in such different contexts? Or more precisely: is the study of immediate experience a valid philosophical and scientific method or not? Early phenomenology gives one answer to this question.

According to Husserl, pure phenomenology presents the unique position that has its own distinctive research object. The phenomenology can be used as a method for revealing the presuppositionless forms of experience. Phenomenology concerns phenomena in a different way from other sciences. Phenomenological attitude differs from the natural attitude that captures for example the ways that science presents the world. On the other hand one could say that Husserl used the method of analysis to purify consciousness or experiences. This is evident in the phenomenological bracketing the outer world and its opinions, assumptions and scientific theories for a moment and trying to uncover consciousness without presuppositions. Husserl calls the suspension or bracketing of the outer world “epoché”.

In the phenomenological process Husserl was analysing the stream of experiences (Erlebnisse): He investigated the shift when one moves from the natural attitude of everyday life and science to the philosophical attitude. Husserl describes the revealing of pure consciousness, which is the end of bracketing the outer world, of the empirical self, and various other assumptions recognized in daily life. For example in Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy 1982 Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen

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97 Husserl 1982, 1.
98 Husserl 1982, 1.
99 See for example Haaparanta 2007, 255.
100 See for example Haaparanta 2007, 260.
101 See for example Haaparanta 2007, 260.
Philosophie 1913) phenomenology is presented as a science of essence that is the cognition of pure essences.\(^\text{102}\)

In Méditations cartésiennes 1931 (The Cartesian Meditations, 1950) Husserl presents that in self-examination we should not accept anything but what is actually given, and what is given immediately\(^\text{103}\). In the epoché, this suspension of the outer world “I with my life, remain untouched in my existential status, regardless of whether or not the world exists and regardless of what my eventual decision concerning its being on non-being might be” \(^\text{104}\). Husserl mentions here the “I” that means the field of ego cogito, the term that Ricœur also calls the “I”. The word epoché itself can be understood either as the process or the place, as Husserl points out.

In the process of epoché the conception of a human being as “I”, is also suspended. Husserl describes his radical suspension of the outer world: “No longer am I the man who, in natural self experience finds himself as a man and who, with the abstractive restriction to the pure contents of “internal” or purely psychological self experience, finds his own “mens sive animus intellectus”\(^\text{105}\); nor am I the separately considered psyche itself. In other words, the conception of the psychic life that Husserl’s time psychology describes is a part of the objective world and is thus suspended as any other part of the cultural world we live in. In this quotation Husserl seems to think that a human being can suspend the “I” and achieve a pure state of consciousness.

Ricœur criticizes this kind of model of consciousness which according to him, is a model from Husserl’s phenomenology Ricœur refers to such texts as The Cartesian Meditations and Ideas. The method of phenomenological reduction is precisely the immediate self-knowledge that Ricœur rejects. The assumptions of pure philosophy and pure consciousness are both misleading from Ricœur’s point of view.

From the beginning Ricœur was critical of the subjectivist side of phenomenology. He separated his philosophical theory from immediate self-awareness as a comment on the methodology of phenomenology. Ricœur argues that the early Husserl of Ideas saw phenomenology as an idealism. By this Ricœur refers to the idea that Husserl believes that knowledge can be autonomous; independent of

\(^{102}\) Husserl 1982, XXII.

\(^{103}\) Husserl 1999, 24.

\(^{104}\) Husserl 1999, 25.

\(^{105}\) Husserl 1999, 25.
culture and the environment. The reduction cannot be complete. The critique of phenomenology includes the idea that we cannot reach a presuppositionless starting point in consciousness, since consciousness is always part of some outer reflection, influence. This critique leaves open what the presuppositionless starting point exactly is. Ricœur rejects what he reads to be an early Husserlian assumption of an ultimate foundation of knowledge that could be achieved by an ‘absolute suspension of presuppositions’. According to one interpretation Husserl thought that such a state could be achieved by means of a ‘transcendental reduction’.

However, as Haaparanta points out, it is not entirely clear whether Husserl meant that pure consciousness could be achieved or whether it could be something that a philosopher ought to strive for106. This refers to the idea that a human could bracket out the temporal and historical context of her experience. The point is not to deny the common sense assumption of a human being for example capable of recognizing her feelings, or even deny the use of this kind of method. From Ricœur’s perspective if people use introspection and believe that this is the way to recognize inner mental states, so be it. Ricœur’s purpose of Ricœur is not to pass judgement on their practice, but merely present how self-knowledge could also be investigated in a more objective manner in philosophy and sciences.

Ricœur’s point is that a human being may in many ways have valuable immediate subjective experience, but at the level of the philosophical and scientific investigation of a subject, immediate observation as a method seems too subjective. The hermeneutical turn can be seen in Ricœur’s philosophy as he becomes increasingly aware of the problems posed by interpreting self-understanding merely as a subject turning to oneself. The argument that Ricœur counts on is that the risk of self-deception is too high in this method. For example, people may have self-invented ill-supported explanatory stories on their mental states.

The another way to approach self-knowledge is Ricœur’s hermeneutical approach in which the question of “I” is related to the question of how the self is mediated through ‘others’: other people, languages and symbolic cultural structures. For Ricœur, interpretation of the self is based on the interpretation of others: a human being always needs a reflective relationship with others in order to understand herself. Hence Ricœur notes that the hermeneutic self is much more than an autonomous subject. From this point of view, Ricœur has found that to say “self” is not to say “I”. The “I” here refers to an autonomous mind that is considered separately, while self is an embodied human being in a contact with social

106 Haaparanta 2007, 260.
surroundings. Ricœur presses the view that subjectivity should be studied through the interpretation of symbolic forms, such as narrative structures, symbols, myths, metaphors, images, texts, and ideologies. According to Richard Kearney, Ricœur criticizes the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey for their romantic epistemology which saw all forms of objective knowledge as a negation of self-understanding. Like Heidegger and Gadamer, Ricœur thinks that self-consciousness is always mediated in a reflective relationship with others, and especially in his early writings the aspect of embodiment is omnipresent in the reflections.

Heidegger and Gadamer sought to describe the general characteristics of a human’s way of understanding. In Heidegger’s philosophy, the problem of understanding is not the question of knowing, but of the way of being. In other words, I must have a general understanding of my surroundings and the way I live in them before I can embark upon more precise interpretation. In Heidegger’s approach, our being is embodied; it is rooted in our actual ways of hearing and connecting to the world. The human’s “being-in-the-world” is Heidegger's starting point. I see the concept of being-in-the-world as a human’s understanding of her social place, embodiment, and its various connections to possible social actions. Ricœur is influenced by Heidegger’s way of studying the human subject as a whole, but also criticises the idea, opting for a different path for his hermeneutics. Heidegger’s way of studying the human subject as a whole remains too general from the point of view of different sciences, and thus hermeneutics needs much more precise ways of investigating.

Ricœur’s focus is on how hermeneutics could serve as a part of the anthropological study of human beings. Ricœur calls Heidegger’s approach to hermeneutics a “short route” because Heidegger abandons the idea that the understanding of being should have a specific aim for knowledge. Ricœur's approach to hermeneutics is to take a longer route. The hermeneutics of the self should absolutely connect with the sciences: a critical attitude towards the study of the human subject can be a part of a scientific explanation and understanding. It is likely that scientific models can help us to reflect upon and understand different ways of being in the world. All fields of science that study human beings can enrich our understanding of how humans interpret reality. The route Ricœur takes is a journey toward understanding ourselves through the perspectives of science. The various scientific fields open up different vistas on our being. There is no reason to limit scientific study to only one way of examining self-understanding. Instead, we can study consciousness while utilizing research done on the brain and the body – in fact, while utilizing all the perspectives of science that explore the mind, body
and their intentionality. Working together with philosophy, the special sciences can produce more precise knowledge on the human mind. This means that hermeneutics can be seen as a part of the scientific research methods of human sciences. Contrary to his predecessors, Ricœur’s statement is that hermeneutics methodologically and scientifically pursues knowledge.

What follows from this type of attitude, this longer route to being, as regards the question of self-understanding? I grasp Ricœur’s search for self-understanding through, for example, the question of embodiment that comprises our bodily being and our consciousness connected to the physical others, as well as our intentionality towards cultural objectivations.

Ricœur’s early phenomenology of the will employed this type of embodiment-emphasizing approach just before he turned towards hermeneutics. The question of embodiment raises the question of motivation in any act said to be freely chosen. Preliminary, I can understand myself as a person who says “I want” (je veux). This understanding also includes the “I can” (je peux) the theme that Ricœur continues. A person understands herself as a bodily being. At this point his method was still eidetic reduction in a Husserlian fashion. While for Merleau-Ponty the embodied perception was the subject of inquiry, for Ricœur the emphasis was on the primacy of a signifying intentionality. In other words, Ricœur concentrates on consciousness through reflection. Intentionality appears at the level of linguistic signs, pictures, and also the non-linguistic signs of culture and science. The reflection of this intentionality appears through these signs, not as a part of the pure analysis of consciousness.

Ricœur’s doubt about immediate self-knowledge belongs to the group of the philosophical doubts of first order statements, such as “I have a pain” or “I have a desire for p”. This can also be called the Cartesian model, which means the process of identifying one’s inner states, affects, pain, emotions or beliefs. Ricœur’s doubt pertains to introspection as a scientific technique: there seems to be no way of proving that introspection is a reliable scientific or philosophical method, no objective criterion for self-knowledge. Richard L. Lanigan points out that for Ricœur, consciousness is mediated through language in intersubjective communication. Language in this model is seen as a mediator between the self and the others and the world. The intentions of human beings in a social action should be understood as functioning like a written text that has become

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107 Pellauer 2007, 15.
autonomous of its author. To sum up, the social intention that a human being has can be grasped when it is compared with the actions of other people: the intersubjectivity of experiences makes objectivity possible.

Considering this from another angle, Ricœur also criticizes the Cartesian Cogito in his long study on *Freud and Philosophy* from a traditional psychoanalytic perspective. The consciousness of one's own inner feelings, beliefs etc. is “false consciousness”. Ricœur refers to the idea that we have three levels of roles constituting a persona: unconscious, preconscious, and conscious. However, for Ricœur the unconscious does not mean only the repressed; unconsciousness is a characteristic of all the complex operations that humans internalize: rules, norms and imperatives that society, especially parental agency, produce. The conclusion that can be drawn from Ricœur is that since we may have unconscious and preconscious mental states that do not immediately appear to us, immediate self-knowledge may not be a very successful path to self-understanding.

From now on it is clear that the human being realizes that she can only interpret herself by interpreting the signs of an external world\(^\text{110}\). What then is the self, if it can only be recognized through signs of an external world? Ricœur admits that there could be a “unitary figure” behind the different ways of reflecting and describing the being. Different existential functions – religious symbols, psychoanalysis, etc. – can reveal to us the different aspects of being, but the structure and status of the thing that is described through different interpretations are left open: “But this coherent figure of the being which we ourselves are, in which rival interpretations are implanted is given nowhere but in this dialectic of interpretations”. Thus, Ricœur denies that introspection in the sense that humans could have immediate access to mental states. The need for ultimate certitude of our inner mental subjectivity is denied.

The argument for this claim is that the subject can notice herself when she reflects her inner mental state against something: in some cases this reflection takes place in language. The human who is trying to understand her inner beliefs needs a standard for knowing whether her assumption of her mental state is correct or incorrect.

In accordance with Ricœur’s point, immediate self-understanding has been criticized in a multitude of philosophical and psychological studies from different perspectives. The legitimacy of introspection as a method of psychological science

\(^{110}\) Ricœur 1996, 37.
has been challenged. Another important claim of these critiques is shared by Ricœur: introspection is private, and objective science needs objective methods that are in one way or another intersubjective\textsuperscript{111}. Even if introspection is possible for humans, it cannot be a proper scientific method. Yet Ricœur’s Freudian critique of introspection leaves unresolved whether we could have immediate introspection that is not false consciousness. According to Ricœur, the “I” cannot be known without reflection, and the philosophical study of the “I” requires reflection with sciences that explore the mind, consciousness, bodily being and language\textsuperscript{112}.

The mediation of a human’s self through the outer world is presented in two ways in Ricœur’s theory of interpretation:

a) Ricœur describes how the self is mediated through culture and its symbolic structures\textsuperscript{113}. By this he means that the human being constantly reflects herself, from different positions. As I see it, for Ricœur, language is only one, and not a fundamental, aspect that should be taken into account when studying human experience. Ricœur emphasized in the 1970s the importance of the study of language, but ultimately, the meanings of language are also tied to experience and embodiment: “These equally valid interpretations remain language games until it is shown that each interpretation is grounded in a particular existential function” \textsuperscript{114}. For example in the psychoanalytic situation, the patient slowly learns through the other, the analyst.

b) A crucial part of Ricœur’s method is that of investigating the self through other sciences. When the self is mediated by means of language, Ricœur relies on linguistics; when the self is mediated by a pictorial framework, he uses psycholinguistics and philosophy of mind. The self is also reflected in psychoanalysis. At the level of social research, the self is reflected in theories of ideology and in utopia.

\textsuperscript{111} Lanigan 1996, 316.
\textsuperscript{112} Ricœur 1996, 48-49.
\textsuperscript{113} Kearney 2004, 2.
\textsuperscript{114} Ricœur 1974, 22.
2.4 A Critical Remark on Ricœur’s Methodology for Self-Understanding

In Ricœur’s theory of interpretation, different methodologies of sciences describe the experience of “being self”. This scientific dialectic is important because Ricœur considers the understanding of the self the fundamental question of humanistic and social research. Ricœur conceives that “I” is an embodied subject that uses language for narrating and reassembling language into a coherent whole. Yet Ricœur’s idea is not similar to the concept of self-consciousness in psychology. What is crucial for Ricœur is the perspective of the historicity of the “I”; the idea that “I am” a finite person operating in the world among and in relation to other people and certain surroundings. Ricœur strongly emphasizes the symbolical meditation on which the person is constructed. Immediate self-understanding seems almost impossible from Ricœur’s perspective.

I make a critical remark on Ricœur’s position with regard to the methodology of self-understanding. I try to illustrate Ricœur’s idea of self-reflection using clarifications and counterarguments. My argument for why the following points relate fundamentally to the investigation of Ricœur’s method for self-interpretation is the following: Simply presenting Ricœur’s framework of self-understanding would not provide a means to resolving how the self can be studied. Merely appealing to the philosophy of language will not at any rate solve the problem of immediate self-introspection at any rate. Furthermore, the unreliability of immediate self-knowledge is challenged by certain empirical psychological experiments that consider the very same question of self-knowledge. Hence, I will next present arguments against Ricœur’s assumptions in his theory of interpretation.

The following counterarguments serve as examples of how Ricœur’s theory can be developed via dialogue. Counterarguments can be constructed from the contemporary literature on introspection. Firstly, it should be made clear what immediate self-knowledge can mean in the context of Ricœur’s philosophy of understanding. The concept of introspection is valuable in defining self-knowledge in Ricœur’s theory but the hermeneutical perspective also means that self-knowledge cannot be restricted to mental properties.

Self-knowledge could be 1) reporting on one’s inner thoughts 2) reporting on the process of self-observation. Furthermore, especially in the case of Ricœur’s philosophy: 3) reporting the self-observation of bodily reactions.
This kind of perspective has been noted in the neuroscientist A.D. Craig’s distinction between *interoception* and introspection. Interoception refers to the physical condition of the entire body while introspection is a further response to these sensations.\(^\text{115}\) Both of these hermeneutical views and Craig’s view differ from the most traditional way of understanding introspection as a purely mental activity. This manifold way of understanding self-knowledge of the self should also be taken into account and separated in Ricœur’s philosophy since he criticizes the immediacy of the self.

The second point is to interpret Ricœur’s views rather than to criticize them: Ricœur took the position that cultural and natural exploration of the self should go hand in hand. This characterizes Ricœur’s approach to the self: hermeneutics should more often take into consideration empirical options with regard to human consciousness. Hermeneutics can be seen as an alternative to an unnecessarily narrow way of looking at human cognitive function and mental aspects, which are tied to embodiment and to other people. Ricœur points out that this kind of scientific perspective does not make a distinction between an explanation of a closed system and understanding, but that they are bound together. We can go as far as to say that the dialectic between hermeneutics and the social sciences that use empirical methods is the focus of Ricœur’s dialectical method, and that Ricœur also accepts the idea that the act of interpretation is necessary in any science, including the natural sciences, such as chemistry or biology. This is what, for example, Don Ihde refers to as the project of expanding hermeneutics. Ihde claims that Ricœur has played a role in expanding the field of hermeneutics to include the problems of the precise scientific study of language and perception\(^\text{116}\). This broadens hermeneutic methodology in a dialectical relationship with the sciences.

The third criticism of Ricœur’s method for self-understanding is that immediate self-knowledge can indeed be the object of psychological research. The way people practise introspection can be tested: The background assumption in this kind of tests is that people may practice introspection when they are aware of their mental states, if the conscious state in which they are experiencing thought is accompanied by higher-order consciousness. The assumption is that to be conscious is to be accompanied by a higher-order state that can reflect the consciousness\(^\text{117}\). The principle is that introspection can be directed only at conscious states. What is unconscious cannot be the object of introspection, since it is hidden from the subject herself. This would fit Ricœur’s framework since these conscious states are

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\(^{115}\) Craig 2003, 502.

\(^{116}\) Ihde 1996, 69.

reflected, though not in as broad a manner as Ricœur explains. Nevertheless, Ricœur does not accept the possibility of introspection for these conscious states of consciousness, either118.

I turn to support the method of introspection and the view that we can identify present mental states by means of recognition: a person can recognize a certain sensory state, and then use introspection and either redeployment or translation to produce the content. The counterargument has been presented in Hurlburt’s and Heavey’s psychological descriptive experience sampling (DES).119 I use this sampling only as a short example that provides the required counterargument to Ricœur’s theory. The experiment challenges Ricœur’s intersubjective interpretation of self-knowledge. I will now explain how Ricœur’s theoretical assumption with regard to the dialectical relation to the special sciences can be tested. The claim Hurlburt and Heavey draw from their experiments is that attention is required in the case of introspection: when a human being is aware of the state of her mind, she can elicit these self-ascriptions. Here the object of immediate self-knowledge is a certain point of experience, or a certain feeling. The experiment was as follows:

“DES uses a beeper to cue subjects, at random times, to pay immediate attention to their ongoing experience at the moment they heard the beep. They then jot down in a notebook the characteristic of that sampled moment in an in depth interview. Those interviews ask only one question (although it is phrased in a wide variety of ways): “What was occurring in your experience at the moment of the beep”120.

Above, Hurlburt and Heavey state that the unconscious aspects of the subjects' thoughts are revealed through this technique: a person might have certain feelings without being aware of them. A participant in DES named Donald, for example, had frequent angry thoughts about his children. These thoughts are not unconscious in the Freudian sense, just something that the subject is not aware of. Also, these thoughts are not unconscious in the Freudian sense as they are freely available – Donald simply had not noticed the existence of those “angry-toward-children” experiences. Before the experiment, Donald had had no knowledge of any attitude of this kind.121 The beeps that the subjects heard focused their

118 Madison 1996, 76-77.
119 Hulburt and Heavey 2001, VIII.
120 Hurlburt and Heavey 2001, 400.
121 Hurlburt and Heavey 2001, 403.
attention. Thus introspective self-knowledge cannot occur without the guidance of attention.

Similar experiments have been carried out by Jonathan Schooler and his colleagues: in their experiments, participants read passages of text and were asked to indicate every occasion upon which they caught their minds wandering. The result was that participants were often caught zoning out while reading, but that they were unaware that they were zoning out just prior to the probes. In this case of text-reading, introspection required attention as well\(^\text{122}\).

Doubts may arise as to whether Ricœur’s concept of introspection is the same as that the test cases above describe. Introspection in Ricœur’s philosophy is a concept that captures the possibility of being immediately aware of our mind states. Ricœur’s intersubjective interpretation of self-knowledge is certainly a part of the broader aspects in the philosophy of language. Hurlburts and Heavey’s theories try to test this lineage in philosophy and linguistics. Therefore Hurlburt’s and Heavey’s and Schooler’s test cases speak about the same act of introspection that Ricœur criticizes. Hence, at least these specific results do not support Ricœur’s assumption of the impossibility of immediate inner knowledge. This immediate knowledge may, for example, be the thought that a person is not much aware of but can immediately notice an action when she pays attention.

Goldman proposes that the “organ” of introspection is attention. In his framework attention is analogous to the sense perception\(^\text{123}\). He shares the idea of Nichols and Stich that the theory for the direct introspection as monitoring inner processes can be developed. This monitoring is the system or process that identifies current mental states by inner recognition.\(^\text{124}\) Yet there are restrictions on what can be monitored. In the case of conscious/unconscious states Goldman makes a similar assumption to Ricœur that not all our beliefs, desires and the like can be monitored\(^\text{125}\). The assumption here is that people have a temptation to self-deception. People often have unconscious or covert beliefs and desires, and these are not available for introspection. Hence only the conscious and activated states can be monitored. In his theory Goldman counts on neuroscience, and the idea that introspective states could be recognized in neurological test\(^\text{126}\).

\(^{122}\) Goldman 2006, 243.
\(^{123}\) Goldman 2006, 244.
\(^{124}\) Goldman 2006, 246.
\(^{125}\) Goldman 2006, 245.
\(^{126}\) According to Goldman introspection is understood as a perception like process, with some amount of input properties. Neural properties could be this kind of causal inputs to the introspection process.
Obviously there are problems regarding how the results of Hurlburt and Heavy, for example, should be interpreted. I am not yet convinced of the basis of these studies. The thoughts uncovered with DES technique may have already been conscious prior to their subjects directing attention at them. Still, here the experiments function as possible counterarguments to Ricœur’s theoretical presuppositions. They show that his fundamental assumptions may go too far when the all modes of immediate self-knowledge are denied. Even though introspection cannot be the immediate method of philosophy or science, the introspective experience can be studied scientifically (neuroscientific perspective offered by Goldman is one branch of this), and this may reveal some aspects of our immediate self-knowledge. This counterargument places Ricœur’s philosophy into the recent discussion concerning self-understanding in special sciences.

A counterargument for the above criticism of Ricœur is the idea that a reflecting conscious is already required in these experiments, as well. A person must practise attention in order to practice introspection in a more objective manner. Such a state of awareness assumes that the first order consciousness, the state of thinking a certain thought, must be accompanied with a higher-order thought.

Do we not already have a primitive mode of reflection? The introspective thought must have a reflection to some outer testimony. In the experiment described above, the beep of the DES studies is that very outer sign, the cultural context for the reflection. The value of the abovementioned studies for examining Ricœur’s framework is that his way of describing the cultural signs that we need to understand ourselves is shown to be very restricted. The outer mediation required here does not necessarily have to be as broad as “culture”, “social role” or “institution”. What a human needs for the reflective mind is but one simple sign, and simple rules for using it in an experimental situation.

I subscribe to Ricœur’s idea of the longer route that inquires into the self by taking into account the variety of the research on subjectivity of different sciences. There is no reason to assume only two black and white options for the study of the human self - that science either cannot answer the most important of questions or that it will resolve the problem of consciousness. Instead, the search for the self mediated by special sciences can help us to understand how our self is constructed through different stories and different ways of describing reality. Ricœur’s theory

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This approach claims that when people make differences and classify sensations, this classification rests on what happens in different classes of neural cells that are activated in the VMpo system.

127 Goldman 2006, 245.
of a narrative self has opened up both: new theoretical ways of researching the self and a way of asking the existential question “Who am I?” For example, his theory of metaphor opens up similar paths for psychotherapy, social psychology, and a theoretical basis for multidisciplinary metaphor theories. Ricœur’s point is that hermeneutical understanding of the self helps to understand how the scientific results of the study of the mind are also scientific models that describe us in a more holistic manner. This brings us to a definition of Ricœur’s aims: the self is studied at the level of human and social sciences; the question of a subject’s self is put under the scrutiny of different interpretative techniques so that some aspects of a person’s action can be revealed: in the end, Ricœur opens up new ways of thinking about our being.

Now I have given a short introduction of the main roots, influences and comparisons with which Ricœur’s model of philosophy is contrasted. I have also tried to make explicit how the phenomenological method is replaced by the hermeneutic investigation of the self that uses different scientific aspects as the route to human understanding. Furthermore, I have taken a critical look at Ricœur’s model of understanding the self through cultural signs. Ihde points out that Ricœur has a way of confronting hermeneutical disputes that goes much further than many other hermeneutics have gone when he reads the self through special sciences. The theme of hermeneutical methodology is a key to understanding Ricœur’s way of doing philosophy: a method that is often called hermeneutic dialectic.

Ricœur’s dialectic approach gives a new framework for the conceptual analysis practised in philosophy. The method of philosophy is applied together with various perspectives of the methods of special sciences. In addition Ricœur’s dialectic way of practising philosophy is a new way to practice philosophy among many hermeneutics. Heidegger and Gadamer think that understanding is more fundamental than explanation in natural sciences. Ricœur’s wants to overcome these dichotomies, and fuse them together.

In the subtext of my introductory section lies the question of the relation between conceptual analysis and multidisciplinary methodology. The dialectic in Ricœur’s philosophy means that phenomenological and conceptual analysis is taken back to the most concrete level possible, to a close dialogue with sciences, such as linguistics, social psychology, psychology or literary theory. Ricœur’s method is the cocktail of various different methods together that interact with phenomenological

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128 Heidegger 1988, 16.
and hermeneutical standpoints such as the hermeneutic circle. His main hermeneutic method is circular hermeneutic dialectic where a phenomenology is played with the methods of other sciences and the analysis of analytic philosophy\textsuperscript{129}. Now let us now turn to consider Ricœur’s hermeneutic method within conceptual analysis, phenomenological analysis and linguistic analysis.

\textsuperscript{129} Ihde 1996, 64.
3. Different Modes of Conceptual Analysis

3.1 Four Types of Philosophical Analysis

The project of analytic philosophy is often described by means of its method of analysis. Peter Hacker and Michael Beaney classify different types of analysis. Hacker’s, Hans-Johann Glock’s, or Beaney’s descriptions and classifications of analysis do not tell enough about the analysis that some continental philosophers practise when they use analysis as a part of their methodology. In Beaney’s book, Leila Haaparanta searches for the process of phenomenological analysis and Amie L. Thomasson discusses conceptual analysis in phenomenology and in the ordinary language tradition. Beaney points out that obviously not all the conceptions of analysis are discussed in the book.

Hence, I see a gap in the study of the methods of twentieth century philosophy that should be filled with the influential ideas of hermeneutic theory of interpretation. Therefore, the question of the methodology of hermeneutics, influenced by analytic philosophy, remains as part of the research on the twentieth century methods. Chapter 3 focuses on the role of conceptual analysis in philosophical methodology. This section introduces the contemporary discussion on the different types of analysis in the twentieth century. The explication is needed for the sake of Chapters 4 and 5 of this work. In these chapters, I study how Ricœur’s dialectic method fits into the discussion on other methods of analysis and in what respects it differs from the methods of analysis. I will begin with a description of the method of analysis in the analytic tradition.

The analysis of certain analytic philosophers is one of the methods that Ricœur utilizes in his theory of language use. His aim is to graft linguistic analysis onto phenomenology. Ricœur thinks that the “whole problem of text-interpretation could be renewed by the recognition of its roots in the functioning of ordinary

\[130\] Thomasson 2007, 7.
\[131\] Beaney 2007, 7.
language itself”. The old hermeneutical methodology of interpretation is refreshed with the analysis of Oxford School ordinary language philosophy. The analysis of language is important to Ricœur, but his method can be seen clearly when it is put in the context of the other three types of analysis, particularly transformative and regressive analysis.

I emphasize the aspect that transformative analysis is translation from one linguistic context to another. This translation changes the translated object of analysis. Ricœur's conception of translating the linguistic context is broader than mere linguistic translation, it also concerns the translation of experience. In Ricœur’s words, translation is “interpretation of any meaningful whole within the same speech community”. Before going into the details of types of analysis, I look at some of the recent approaches to the nature of the analytic tradition.

There are as many characterizations of analytic philosophy as there are researchers writing about it. Some formulations of the tradition are simply descriptions of the nature of the whole tradition, with sentences describing this activity typically beginning with: ‘Analytic philosophy is…’; ‘Analytic philosophers do’. Generalizations like these cannot fully cover the entire field of analytic philosophy. Others state that there is no distinctive method, but a particular style. I will take one example of the recent definitions of analytic philosophy that tries to capture some general elements of the tradition. This description is more or less a way of pointing out a particular style, and one of the ways to analyse analytic philosophy.

According to Scott Soames, the tendencies that characterize analytic philosophy are ideals of clarity, rigor and argumentation. Soames's presentation of the historical details has been criticized by many authors who study the history of analytic philosophy, but his general viewpoint on the issue still catches the spirit or attitude of analytic philosophy. In his controversial book on the main ideas of analytic philosophy, Soames points out that the analytic tradition aims at truth and knowledge as opposed to moral or spiritual improvement. However, it provides grand encompassing systems that present, for example, a programme for the theory of meaning.

Soames claims that argumentation is a method for approaching the truth: A philosopher offers clear principles and rigorous arguments for the point of view.

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132 Ricœur 2008, 322.
133 Ricœur 2006, 11.
134 Glock 2008, 18.
135 Soames 2003, xiii. See more on this discussion in Haaparanta 2003, 501.
being advanced\textsuperscript{136}. According to Soames, the underlying assumption in the tradition is the so-called “piecemeal approach”, which refers to the idea that philosophical results can be approached by studying small scale philosophical issues.\textsuperscript{137} Soames admits this is not the whole story behind analytic philosophy or the various theorists in this field, but he also praises this approach that studies problems piece by piece. This piecemeal approach is called decompositional analysis by various authors studying the history of analytic philosophy\textsuperscript{138}. Soames does not concentrate on the question of the method of analysis itself, and its different variations, but focuses his study on the central philosophical developments\textsuperscript{139}. I agree with this general description. We can rightly say that the nature of methods used under the headings of rigor, clarity and argumentation is one of the key themes in the analysis of analytic philosophy. Surely, this description of analytic philosophy is so general and vague that it is also applicable to many other philosophical schools. Certainly the spirit of rigor, clarity and argumentation is something that Ricoeur applies to his own philosophical approach, and is thus one of the elements in his hermeneutical theory.

I will introduce some more historically oriented ideas on this issue, such as those of Beaney, Hacker and Glock. I share the same starting point with these theorists: There are various types of analysis in analytic philosophy. The classifications of these types capture some of the important aspects of the tradition, and its aims. In the historical research of twentieth century philosophy there have been different ways to enumerate the different philosophical analyses, or modes of analysis. This is one way to sort out methodological approaches in twentieth century philosophy. The distinction I make is based on Beaney’s and Hacker’s way of describing different modes of analysis in the twentieth century. Different conceptions of analysis are considered in Beaney’s article “Decompositions and Transformations: The Conceptions of Analysis in the Early Analytic and Phenomenological Traditions”\textsuperscript{140}. Beaney presents the following three modes of analysis that are also the basis of my research: 1) decompositional, 2) regressive and 3) transformative or interpretive mode. Peter Hacker (idea originally from P.F. Strawson) discusses the

\textsuperscript{136} See, for example: Haaparanta 2003, 493. See also Glock, Hans-Johan 2008. Føllesdal, for example, proposes in his \textit{Rise of Analytic Philosophy} (1997) that the crucial features of analytic philosophy are the requirement for argument and justification, and the alternation between general connections and details.

\textsuperscript{137} Soames 2003, xiv.

\textsuperscript{138} See, for example, Griffin 2007, 76.

\textsuperscript{139} Soames 2003, xviii.

type of analysis that replaces regressive analysis, 4) connective analysis of an ordinary language philosophy.\textsuperscript{141}

To summarize the core ideas of these methods of analysis enumerated by Beaney and Hacker; decomposition means splitting the whole (i.e. a sentence, a proposition or a judgment) into parts. Regressive analysis is going backwards to a more fundamental level of the premises behind the conclusion.\textsuperscript{142} Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is one example of regressive analysis. It focuses on the analysis of our pure consciousness. In this analysis, the outer world and many outer commitments of everyday thought are bracketed.

According to Beaney, transformative analysis means translating the starting point of an analysis into a more accurate form by means of some kind of “additional thing that changes the object analysed”\textsuperscript{143}. With this additional element, Beaney is referring to predicate logic in the case of Russell’s transformative analysis\textsuperscript{144}. Hacker adds to Beaney’s types of analysis connective analysis. Connective analysis means the description of conceptual connections, compatibilities and incompatibilities\textsuperscript{145}. The purpose of this analysis or elucidation is to achieve philosophical clarification.

When we study the twentieth century further, these modes of analysis acquires more and more variations, they become mixed, and some new modes of analysis appear. These types of analysis can be labelled both ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ divide. The mixing of these traditions has also produced new methodological approaches. However, the problem with these different methods is that we need to make clear which ones can be counted as modes of analysis and which ones cannot.

My suggestion for this remaining question is to introduce, on the basis of Ricœur’s philosophy, a fifth method that mixes with the analysis, yet is itself a philosophical method that differs from pure conceptual or logical analysis typical of early analytic

\textsuperscript{141} I prefer to merely call it connective analysis rather than connective elucidation as Hacker calls it, since the word elucidation brings to mind the later Wittgenstein’s project, which in my view differs from the connective analysis in ordinary language philosophy and in Ricœur’s philosophy.

\textsuperscript{142} Beaney 2007, 198.

\textsuperscript{143} Beaney 2007, 197.

\textsuperscript{144} See Haaparanta 2007, 264. See also Haaparanta 1988, 92. Haaparanta illustrates how Husserl discusses the comparison between geometry and phenomenology. These both belong to the class of eidetic sciences.

\textsuperscript{145} Hacker 2007, 129
philosophy and early phenomenology. I follow Don Ihde’s notion and call this method *dialectic hermeneutics*.

Dialectic hermeneutics especially has influences from transformative analysis, which includes the idea of *translation* from one linguistic context to another. Ricœur’s dialectical hermeneutics can be described, as Richard Kearney and Scott Davidson propose, as philosophy that translates rival positions from one language to another.

From this perspective of translation transformative analysis meets the interpretation in hermeneutics. To sum up, we have five different methodologies, some of which will be defined and studied further in this thesis:

1) decompositional analysis
2) transformative analysis
3) regressive analysis
4) connective analysis
5) dialectical hermeneutics

My addition to Hacker’s and Beaney’s list of the types of analysis is the method of Ricœur’s hermeneutical philosophy that uses types of analysis practised in the phenomenological and analytic tradition. These classifications help to capture the wide scale of methods that Ricœur utilizes in his philosophy. The wide scope of Ricœur’s methodology changes the way philosophy is actually practised: It tries to be at once a detailed analysis, but also takes a holistic perspective on language, communication, action and embodiment.

The spirit of Ricœur’s philosophy has more to it than argumentation and a rigorous piecemeal approach that Soames sees crucial in analytic philosophy. Ricœur’s methodological background, the starting point of his philosophy, is to assimilate methods of different philosophical traditions, and in this way produce new ideas. To Ricœur, analysis in phenomenology and ordinary language analysis are crucial ways of practising conceptual analysis. This is why regressive and connective analysis are considered in more detail in Chapter 5 and mentioned only briefly here.

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146 See, for example, Ihde 1996, 64.
147 Kearney 2006, xv.
148 See, for example, Ricœur 1974, 63. Ricœur uses terms such as “the path of analysis, the decomposition into smaller units”. He also addresses reductive analysis when he speaks about “the reduction of simple element”. He does not use the terms “connective analysis”.

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In the following section, I explain the meaning of analysis in traditional analytic philosophy that is still often regarded as decompositional analysis. The most familiar mode of analysis is the decomposition of a whole into its smaller constituent parts.

### 3.1.1 Decompositional Analysis

Analysis is usually defined as identifying or breaking a complex object into parts in order to gain a better understanding of the complex. Whenever the word “analysis” in philosophy is defined, the nouns “splitting” or “enumeration” are commonly used, as well. To Russell and Moore the identification of analysis means the identification of a mind-independent whole and part. These pioneers of analysis assumed that the mind-independent entity, named proposition, consists of constituent parts and can be broken down into more fundamental parts. One of the commentators on the history of analytic philosophy, Ray Monk, gives the following definition for decompositional analysis in analytic philosophy and defines this notion of decomposition of Russell and Moore to be the nucleus of analytic philosophy. The following description aptly captures the spirit of investigation that highlights decompositional analysis as the landmark of the tradition:

> At the centre of the notion of analysis that Russell inherited from Moore’s famous paper, ‘The Nature of Judgement’ was the idea of a complex that invited us to identify its component parts. It is this notion of a complex – and the concomitant notion that to understand a complex is to analyze it, to break it down into the simples that compose it – that lies at the heart of analytic philosophy\(^{149}\).

The quotation above from Monk defines the conception of the method of philosophy that is the conceptual analysis of a complex. The first important concept in this definition of decompositional analysis is the complex whole. The complex whole can be either a sentence or a proposition. Accordingly, in the early analytic philosophy of Russell a sentence is a linguistic whole and a proposition is a complex entity in the world. This definition also shows how the analytic process is

\(^{149}\) Monk 1996, 12.
described; on the one hand as an identification of the parts a complex is composed of, and on the other hand as a process of breaking down the complex. As Monk states in the second sentence, to analyse is to break down the components, and by this he means that this should happen at a conceptual level. In other words, Monk holds that the conceptual splitting of certain conceptual parts forms the heart of analytic philosophy – a phenomenon better known as breaking down a complex whole.

For the sake of my own study on the hermeneutic method, I highlight the difference between the way the process of decomposition is practised in philosophy and in other sciences. The expression “break down” can either mean the actual breaking down of an object or a complex object, let us say an atom, or a skeleton, but this does not apply, for example, to the early analytic philosophers. The object of Russell’s analysis was neither linguistic (at least not primarily), nor material, nor a concept inside a mind, but an external and mind-independent whole and part. Yet neither was the object of analysis the same as in special sciences like chemistry, for example. Decompositional analysis is not an experimental practice of a scientist the same way a chemical analysis is, but rather a thinking process of a philosopher who has studied the practice of analysis and comprehends it.

Let us hold on to the idea of conceptual analysis and its variations for a moment so as to obtain a clearer picture of what the analytic philosopher is doing when conducting an analysis. I lay out the core of decompositional analysis that could also be called conceptual analysis, and is often in an evaluative manner called ‘armchair philosophy’. Since different philosophers describe the process of conceptual analysis in different manners, I now review the most typical ways of presenting the process of analysis. It is worth noticing that these questions have been drawn from Russell’s texts from 1900 to 1918.

Russell’s analysis is practised in a context similar to mathematics or logic. Russell likens the method of his philosophy to science both clear and mindful of detail: “It is this method which has inspired analytic realism, and it is the only method, if I am not mistaken, with which philosophy will succeed in obtaining results as solid as those obtained in science”.

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150 MPD, 222.
151 Griffin 2007, 76.
152 AR, 92. The original text reads: “C’est cette méthode qui inspire le réalisme analytique, et par laquelle seule, si je ne me trompe, la philosophie réussira à obtenir des résultats aussi solides que le sont les resultats de la science.”
“Réalisme analytique”. It reveals that this method was analogous with some methods of chemistry, but differed in the way in which it was implemented. How then does this sound method proceed in the actual practice of a philosopher?

During the process of conceptual analysis, a philosopher asks basic questions concerning the whole and the part. She assumes that the whole consists of parts, and that these parts are put together in a certain way. The following list of questions asked by a philosopher as part of her decompositional analysis is based on Russell’s early thoughts on decompositional analysis and his model:

1. Of which elements does a whole consist? What are its essential components?
2. How are these elements combined?
   2.1 The problem of the unity of the constituent parts includes the following question: Does the philosopher intend a plain enumeration of the parts or the idea that separates the part and the whole? If one enumerates all the parts, has the decomposition then been exhaustive?
3. The philosopher needs to make an assumption on whether or not there is a certain endpoint to an analysis or not.¹⁵³
   3.1 Another question related to the endpoint of analysis; if the analysis is infinite, is the whole infinite as well, or do we then have infinite simples? Do concepts involve further concepts?

Russellian conceptual analysis raises the question: Can a philosopher keep pure conceptual analysis separate from the human and empirical sciences? If the philosopher sides with special sciences this will include the idea that empirical science can actually test some philosophical hypotheses.

So far I have presented the definitions of decompositional analysis by some researchers whose field of study is the history of analytic philosophy. Next, I want to point out the problems that assail conceptual analysis. According to Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols, the aim of decompositional analysis is to reach greater levels of precision. Like Monk above, Knobe and Nichols take the view that though there are several modes of analysis, decomposition yields the most crucial mode of philosophical and conceptual analysis.¹⁵⁴ Knobe and Nichols describe scientific decision making concerning conceptual analysis from a more general point of view. They want to point out that there is a possibility of error, and there

¹⁵³ PoM, 143.
is always a way to renew a given conceptual analysis\textsuperscript{155}. It seems that this traditional conception of analysis that Knobe and Nichols are speaking about is reminiscent of the traditional form of definition, which, strictly speaking, is different from the traditional decompositional analysis described above. Knobes’ and Nichols’ conceptual renovating reminds us of Plato’s dialogues such as \textit{Theaetetus}, in which the definition of knowledge is modified\textsuperscript{156}. In this search the final result is left open, but the dialogue gives various definitions for knowledge\textsuperscript{157}. This manner of definition is borrowed from Plato to hermeneutics. Thus, it has influenced a philosophical methodology very different from decompositional analysis. Here the definition is drawn from the different kinds of test cases, while decomposition is the investigation of certain parts of a whole.

Analysis and definition are different things, and the meaning of a concept and conceptual analysis should be characterized more than Knobe and Nichols do: With Russellian analysis, for example, analysis should end at the acquaintance with all the parts of the analysed whole. This is a demanding task. A too demanding task, I would say, since it is based on naive realism, an assumption that all the parts must have a concrete existence in the world. This assumption does not fit the ways in which a human being conceives of a world and its objects.

Nevertheless, this is one of the implications of making a distinction between an analysis and a nominal definition. In the case of a definition, a philosopher need not be acquainted with the constituents. The colour red can be defined by its wavelength. Still, you would not say that you have analysed the colour red, and that you are acquainted with a red patch of colour.

To be more precise, Knobe and Nichols are talking about nominal definition. Anyhow, they present the process of conceptual analysis in the following manner: The philosopher hopes to arrive at a more definitive analysis of the concepts. The philosopher tries out several possible scenarios by means of this model of analysis. She wants to define a concept, for example, a war. The philosopher then presents

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{155} On the other hand, it is not hard to see that the same argument goes for Russellian realist analysis. According to Russell, there is no contradiction in his assumption that analysis is conceptual, but the parts and wholes are real: Logical analysis is not dependent on mind, yet it is real in the sense that it is dependent only upon the nature of the object. The assumptions that Russell makes in his metaphysics seem to be as unreliable as the conceptions of a nominal definition. Russell's metaphysics is compatible with his logic, and that there is no reason to assume that his logic would automatically produce the right picture of the world. Many features in Russell's logic can be explained by his metaphysical views. The fact that Russell's metaphysics changes in his later writings would be a good reason to assume that Russell's metaphysics shares the same position as conceptual analysis.
\item \textsuperscript{156} Plato 1979, 291.
\item \textsuperscript{157} Plato 1979, 271.
\end{itemize}
her definition of a war, and following that, tests her ideas with an audience where someone will notice that there is an example that does not fit the definition of war.\textsuperscript{158} For example, one can find differences between peacekeeping, peace enforcement and war. Finally, the philosopher makes some adjustments to her definition.

The trouble with Knobe and Nichol's criticism on classical conceptual analysis is that they make a straw man of traditional conceptual analysis. Their view is somewhat different from what conceptual analysis meant for the early analytic philosophers. Knobe and Nichols concentrate more on certain philosophical problems rather than the actual processes of analysis. These critical voices arguing for the analysis of analytic philosophy describe decompositional analysis loosely, but do not pay enough attention to what the analytic philosophers actually do and claim in their texts, and what different arguments the early analytic philosophers might have had, and what sort of intuitions or arguments they used as their bases for conceptual analysis\textsuperscript{159}.

To understand the process of analysis more deeply and rightly from the historical perspective, I also must give more examples of conceptual analysis. Thus, in the next section, I present an example of transformative analysis, namely, Russell's paradigm of analytic philosophy.

\subsection*{3.1.2 Transformative Analysis}

The decompositional mode of analysis remained, in different ways, within the Russellian mode of analysis. It was an important factor in Moore's analysis of concepts. At the same time, Russell's development of a theory of definite descriptions broadened the concept of analysis in analytic philosophy. This new mode of philosophical analysis is a transformative mode of analysis localized by Beaney also, for example, in Frege's work.

The definition of transformation in Russell's philosophy includes various aspects. In this section I will consider the definition of transformation that concentrates on

\textsuperscript{158} Knobe and Nichols 2008, 4.
\textsuperscript{159} In many other respects the project of Knobe and Nichols offers new insights into philosophy.
the general philosophical aims behind the idea, especially on the idea of translation in transformation. The idea of translating from a certain linguistic framework to another, has its roots in Russell’ theory of definite descriptions. This feature of translating from one context of language to another is crucial in Ricœur’s interpretation theory. The transformative method of analysis is the focus of this chapter, because its role is important in the development of the method of analytic philosophy and especially because it resonates with Ricœur’s theory of interpretation as translation.

The new modes of analysis and cooperation between conceptual analysis and the results of special sciences (which can include empirical analysis) can only be understood if we know the mode that Ricœur wanted to apply, reject and renew. Michael Beaney suggests that “-- it is the role played by interpretive or transformative analysis that is distinctive to analytic philosophy, or at least of one central strand in analytic philosophy, and that it was the interpretive mode of analysis that came of age in early twentieth century philosophy”. If we take this stand, we have to emphasize the historical features that characterize the transformation with each philosopher. The Russellian transformation is in accordance with the general definition of transformative analysis defined by Beaney: The starting point is translated into something different. Yet, it is not only conceptual analysis but a more formal approach to a given philosophical or scientific problem. Later on, Russell turned his method of analysis from logic and mathematics to different areas of philosophy; the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science, and especially metaphysics.

I cannot stress enough that the idea of translating the original sentence or proposition to another form is a distinctive characteristic of Russellian and Fregean transformative analysis. Furthermore, this idea of translating the sentence and thus transforming it into another mode was very influential later in the development of analytic philosophy, for example in Carnap’s and Quine’s philosophies. The transformation is understood here as translation from one language or symbolic context to another. This is the case even when the sentence of an ordinary language is transformed into a logical form.

It was understood by Russell and others explicitly as translation from one language to a more exact ideal language. Later on Russell voiced his reservations on whether the ideal language (or logically perfect language) was very useful for the purposes

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160 Ricœur 2007, 11.
161 Beaney 2007, 198-199.
162 See, for example, Hacker 1996, 73.
of language use in daily life\textsuperscript{163}. It is worth noting that the translation from one language to another can be processed without any assumption that the language on which the translation is done, would be an ideal language. The idea of translation is the main feature of this act of analysis.

Yet, the idea of translation (without the assumption of an ideal language) is the link that connects transformative analysis and hermeneutics\textsuperscript{164}. The transformation could be translation from experience, for example dream symbolism, to the language of our everyday experience. Susanne Langer points out that even the animal mentality is built up on a primitive semantic\textsuperscript{165}. Hence the idea of translation can be seen as a broad way of conceiving our understanding through signs.

In Russell scholarship, it can be clearly seen that transformative analysis is connected to more fundamental logical questions\textsuperscript{166}. The main idea is to explain how the problematic proposition or sentence can be transformed into another form\textsuperscript{167}. Here I have listed the different aspects of Russell’s transformative analysis:

1) There is a distinction between grammatical form and logical form
2) The aim is to avoid being misled by grammatical form. The translation of a problematic proposition or sentence.
3) Translation: The starting point of analysis differs from the endpoint.
   3.1) The structure and order of a starting point and endpoint are different.
4) A definite description (incomplete symbol) does not have an isolated meaning. Whenever the structure is changed, the order is changed.
5) Analysis uses tools that make the translation process easier.
6) Analysis should give the philosopher new results.

\textsuperscript{163} See, PL, 58-59.
\textsuperscript{164} Ricoeur 2007, 17.
\textsuperscript{165} Langer 1974, 30.
\textsuperscript{166} Solving Russell’s paradox was the main thread of Russell’s philosophy for a long period of time: Firstly, in 1901, Russell discovered the paradox that now bears his name. He developed the simple theory of types in 1903. Secondly, after discovering the paradox, Russell was concentrating profoundly on an elimination of the sources of the paradoxes plaguing the foundations of logic and consideration of possible resolutions. This long period includes different answers to different paradoxes. The idea that transformation concerns mainly problematic propositions occurred already in 1905, but the idea of analysis solving the paradox is at its height in \textit{Principia Mathematica} (1910).
\textsuperscript{167} Landini 1998, 201. Gregory Landini has discussed in more depth the different types of paradoxes that Russell had between this period.
Next I consider these aspects of Russellian transformative analysis. This gives the definition for another main mode of analysis. The presentation helps us see the fundamental differences between transformative analysis and interpretation in Ricœur’s theory of interpretation. This presentation reveals that translation is essential for hermeneutic transformation.

3.1.2.1 The Distinction between Grammatical Form and Logical Form

Beaney proposes that Russell’s transformative method of analysis has been presented as a shift from a linguistic to logical form. This useful notion of transformative analysis does, however, neglect some aspects of the Russellian transformation of definite (or indefinite) descriptions. Nevertheless, it makes possible the idea that transformative analysis is aimed especially at the idealization of natural language. The transformative method could be seen as a way to study language and develop modern semantics. Especially in his later works, Russell himself often uses language as an example of transformation, though this was not his original aim.

However, in Russell’s article On Denoting (1905) (from now on referred to as OD) and in his manuscript On Fundamentals (1905) (from now on referred to as OF) the definition of transformation should be seen as translating contradictions and other “puzzling” propositions. The distinction between grammatical form and logical form produces the change in the way the analysis of language is seen in analytic philosophy. The theme of translating language into another kind of language remains in the tradition of analytic philosophy for a long time, from Russell to Carnap, even though the idea of translation is assigned radically different meanings in the different branches of analytic philosophy.

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168 Russell himself did not speak about “transformation”. See, for example, Beaney 2007, 199-200. See also Hylton 2005, 205.
169 MPD, 117.
3.1.2.2 Misleading Grammatical Form

In most of Russell’s examples in OD and OF, the starting point of analysis is something that is somehow unclear, puzzling, or paradoxical – or seems to be. When presenting the problems for the theory of denoting in OD, Russell emphasizes how a logical theory needs to deal with “as many puzzles as possible”.

The process of transformation can be seen from this angle as well: Analysis is changing the inexact or vague starting point into something more clear. According to Russell, philosophical testing plays an equally important role in philosophy as do experiments in physical science. The question of solving the paradox can already be seen here, broadening to a question of analysis that concerns something problematic. Analysis, sometimes called interpretation, often elimination, or transformation by Beaney and Hylton, is needed whenever something puzzling is presented. Russell’s transformation is needed when a philosophical puzzle is presented in the restricted context of a proposition or sentence.

Hylton thinks we have to apply the theory of definite description in all the cases when we doubt the soundness of the propositions we have\textsuperscript{170}. Russell’s transformative analysis is always applied when a proposition is problematic in any way. For Russell’s logical theory, the paradoxical propositions are the most crucial aim of analysis, and with his linguistic notions, linguistic or semantic confusions play an even greater part in analysis. The idea of translating is also present in the process of solving a paradox. The misleading natural language is translated into the more precise ideal language.

However, not all the starting points of analysis are paradoxical, according to Russell: There exist other types of propositions. In 1905 Russell discussed at least three kinds of problematic propositions. One way or another they can mislead the philosopher: 1) Contradiction between the propositions \textit{The King of France is bald} and \textit{The King of France is not bald} (OD). 2) Paradoxical proposition: the liar paradox (OF): If the sentence \textit{the statement I am now making is false} is true, it is false. 3) Ambiguous proposition: indefinite description \(x \text{ is a man} \) (OD).\textsuperscript{171}. This way, we have two problematic phrases, 1) and 3), that can be analysed. In OF, the problem of paradoxical expressions occurs in the form of the liar paradox: Here, Russell

\textsuperscript{170} Hylton 2005, 207.
\textsuperscript{171} OD, 415.
discusses a paradoxical proposition that leads to a contradiction. On the basis of these starting points of analysis, there is usually a problematic proposition, or a couple of propositions. I separate the fourth and fifth cases of propositions for analysis that obviously can be starting points of analysis as well. The fourth case is “normal” univocal proposition, not usually an object of analysis because it does not appear to be problematic. Univocal proposition: the new president of the USA in 2009 studied in Harvard. Antinomy is tricky; it cannot be solved. Thus, the problematic propositions can be of the following kinds:

1) Paradoxical proposition that leads to a contradiction: The liar paradox.
2) Two contradictory propositions: The King of France is bald and the King of France is not bald.
3) Indefinite and in this sense ambiguous proposition or expression: A woman or a man.
4) Antinomy: A thesis contradicts an antithesis, and thus the equally rational but contradictory results cannot be solved.

In OD, Russell stresses the importance of puzzles and paradoxes by mentioning contradictions, puzzles and the law of contradiction several times. First, when he says:

This is in itself a difficult view; but the chief objection is that such objects, admittedly, are apt to infringe the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that the existent present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is round and also not round; etc. But this is intolerable; and if any theory can be found to avoid this result, it is surely to be preferred.

In Russell’s analysis, the translation is tied to the solving of a paradox or contradiction. Russell is trying to present the phrase without contradiction.

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172 OF, 401/75.
173 I separate the starting point of analysis into four different categories. First of these starting points is the logical problem of Russell’s analysis in the period between 1903 and 1910: the paradoxical proposition. A paradox is a claim that leads to a contradiction. Here, paradox and contradiction differ from each other; contradiction has two propositions that contradict each other. The liar paradox is the following: (S) This sentence is false. If S is true, then S is false. The liar paradox is not explicitly true or false; it leads to a circular situation. In OF, Russell refers to the liar paradox of Epimedes as “the statement I am now making is false.” Three other of these distinctions are based on the different
When Russell avoids these paradoxical or otherwise misleading forms, the process of analysis becomes more interesting for the uses of other fields; when analysis is seen as a transformation, the starting point is reformulated, and usually some techniques are used in this process of transformation. To sum up, translation from one language to another language can be seen as clearing up the confusion.

3.1.2.3 Translation: The Starting Point of an Analysis Differs from the Endpoint

Translation is surely one way of speaking about interpretation: a certain expression is interpreted in terms of a new framework. The idea that connects transformation in early analytic philosophy and interpretation in hermeneutics is translation from one linguistic context to another. Transformative analysis captures the idea that the starting point of an analysis is translated into a different form particularly well.\textsuperscript{174} We may transform the subject into familiar concepts that we already know how to deal with\textsuperscript{175}. Hacker notes the importance of the idea of transformation: “The analysis of such propositions is to be done by the transformation of the original sentence into a sentence from which the incomplete symbol has been eliminated”.

Yet there may be different kinds of transformations: Transformation does not always have to mean elimination. Something can also be added in the problem of transformation. It can also add something to the analysis. In Russell’s case, the quantifiers are the tools that are needed for logical analysis. Quantifiers are something extra added to the original sentence, and at the same time they are tools for the transformation. Then, predicate logic – variables, existential, and universal quantifiers – is applied to the original proposition or sentence.

Beaney uses “interpretation” as a synonymous term for transformation in early analytic philosophy. This obviously differs from how interpretation is understood in hermeneutics. Still, it captures many of the elements appearing in hermeneutic interpretation. The transformation of a starting point into another form can also be

\textsuperscript{174} Beaney 2007, 197.
\textsuperscript{175} Beaney 2007, 197.
found in hermeneutics. Furthermore, the idea that it is not only language, but our experience that is translated into another form arises in the concept of transformation, which is investigated in the history of analytic philosophy. The phenomenological experience is changed into another form when a past experience meets with a new experience.

### 3.1.2.4 The Context for an Incomplete Symbol

The question of linguistic translation has its roots in this idea of context. This is the way that the translation of a sentence and some of its parts to another context begin to be part of analytic philosophy. Giving a new context, a new framework, for the words and sentences makes the change. The translation from one symbolism into another transforms the object investigated. What is crucial in transformative analysis is how to apply this idea that concerns mainly linguistic and symbolic translation to the translation of one’s own experience to somebody else’s experience.

At many points Ricœur refers to the idea of contextuality, by referring to Frege’s idea about the context of a sentence. Frege’s idea about the context of a sentence was in detail slightly different from the Russelian idea of the incomplete symbol in the context. But the main idea, that a part of a sentence is defined from the point of view of the sentence context, was the same.

An incomplete symbol is connected to the theme of transformative analysis in various ways. Transformation in Russell’s philosophical analysis was developed when an incomplete symbol became part of Russell’s analysis. The development of transformation in analysis relates to the main topics of analytic philosophy: 1) An incomplete symbol goes along with the notion of a contextual definition. 2) It is also the first concept which is treated explicitly on the level of both language and logic. An incomplete symbol is a concept that is at the same time a definite description on the level of linguistic expression and a logical concept for the classes.

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176 Ricœur 2008, 74.
177 Hacker 1996, 11. For example, Hacker emphasizes that the elimination of an incomplete symbol is an important feature of transformation. Hylton also takes the view that when Russell was showing that there need be no classes, he was presenting the eliminative analysis of an incomplete symbol.
Hylton describes analysis as a sort of elimination where the definite description *The King of France* is analysed away. This means the elimination of an incomplete symbol: The definite description *The King of France* or indefinite description *a man* are examples of an incomplete symbol. An incomplete symbol has no meaning in isolation. This means that the incomplete symbol does not stand for anything without the context of a sentence or a proposition. The concept of the incomplete symbol developed after OD, and analysis had to deal with context, language, and the elimination of classes. According to Hylton, the idea of analysis as elimination is not explicitly contained in OD, but follows from the conception of analysis that OD introduces. Concerning the methods of philosophy, we can say that Russellian transformation presents one manner of applying the philosophical methodology of the 20th century: Applying contextuality in certain situations, i.e. with paradoxical expressions or propositions or classes. Ricoeur borrows this general description from early analytic philosophy, and uses it for his own purposes.

### 3.1.2.5 Tools for Translation

Russell’s transformation is connected with quantificational logic, a useful tool for translation. In OD, transformation defines certain constituents of the whole in context. This transformation is expressed by the idea that propositions can be presented in new forms by the quantifier symbols, which for Russell bound different variables together. Some constituents of the whole proposition can be understood by contextualizing them by specifying whether they are some or all. Russell connects the idea of quantifiers to the problem how everything, nothing, and something are supposed to be understood in a proposition.

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178 Beaney 2007, 199-200.
179 Before *On Denoting* (OD), Russell assumed that in analysis all parts of a proposition had to have a correspondent to some object. The conception of decompositional analysis presumed that in analysis we have entities which are ostensibly mentioned. In Russell's transformative analysis in 1905 this was not the only way to understand entities, because Russell assumed that we have incomplete symbols. Incomplete symbols do not refer to any object that could be ostensibly mentioned. Except for the symbol for the incomplete symbol, that is *(ιx)φ* : This symbol can obviously be ostensibly mentioned, but there is no assumption of any ontological entity which could be pointed out, and then saying that "this is an incomplete symbol".
182 OD, 314.
1) In the example Winnipeg Jets plays a match in the year 2008, the incomplete symbol would be $x$ such that $x$ is Winnipeg Jets. The variable $x$ has a predicate plays a match in the year 2008. Context is both formal in the sense of symbolic logic and linguistic in the sense of natural language.

These tools for translation are somewhat different in the phenomenological and hermeneutical arena. Beaney mentions the idea of translation as a rephrasal that avoids the problems generated by the linguistic surface, but does not rely on the metaphysical structure behind linguistic structure. This kind of translation seeks the tools that do not lead to a certain result. An example of such vaguer principles of interpretation can be, for example, the narratological techniques of reading narrative in literary sciences. In the case of phenomenology reduction could be understood as a tool that translates human experience.

3.1.2.6 Achieving New Results in Analysis

Both pioneers of analytic philosophy, Russell and Moore, assumed that philosophical analysis yields new results. This was the idea behind drawing scientific spirit from mathematics into philosophical methodology\(^{183}\). Even later on, this view has emerged in analytic philosophy: Some have assumed that the logic of Frege and Russell would enable philosophers to find a method for philosophy, and that this way philosophy would achieve the status of a science\(^{184}\). The problem is, what exactly can a “new result” refer to when we talk about conceptual analysis conducted from an armchair?

One way to answer this is to concentrate on the new logical forms, or more widely, on the new ways of expressing sentences in ideal technical models. From this point of view, new results are new translations of problematic sentences. In Russell's scenario, the logical form already exists in the world: In this sense, transformation is not really telling us anything new. Importantly, however, linguistic form and logical form may differ from each other: Thus, philosophers can still get new results in the sense that they become aware of the correct logical form. The “new result” for the philosopher who uses philosophical analysis can be the revelation that she gets when she knows how to put the paradox in order. The purpose of

\(^{183}\) Soames 2003, 94.
transformative analysis can be seen to be to acquire knowledge and understanding of familiar facts, not so much to acquire knowledge of new facts\textsuperscript{185}.

3.1.3 Regressive Analysis

Phenomenological analysis can be understood as regressive analysis mentioned by Beaney. According to Madison, phenomenological analysis is also the method of analysis that Ricœur elaborates in his hermeneutics\textsuperscript{186}. Decompositional, and in most cases transformative analysis, as well as regressive analysis, are forms of working back to something more fundamental\textsuperscript{187}. Regressive analysis is more precisely working back to principles, premises, and causes by means of which something can be derived or explained. According to Michael Beaney regressive method of analysis was highly influential in ancient Greek geometry as well as in Russell’s work and phenomenology\textsuperscript{188}.

One can see this kind of regressive method in Husserl’s phenomenological reduction. The early Husserl’s reduction focuses on the examination of the contingent flow of the experiential given. Husserl analyses the structure of experience as clearly as possible. According to Haaparanta’s interpretation, Husserl used the method of analysis for purifying consciousness or experiences\textsuperscript{189}. For him, phenomenological analysis is the analysis of the stream of experiences (Erlebnisse)\textsuperscript{190}.

Beaney notes that what Russell calls analysis Husserl calls reduction\textsuperscript{191}. According to this view, in Husserl’s case, transcendental reduction brackets the natural world, and all that is immediately given to us, and eidetic reduction attempts to isolate the pure essences involved in what is immediately given to us. Haaparanta also evices a similar notion: analogically to geometrical analysis, phenomenological analysis means taking a step back to see how experience is structured\textsuperscript{192}. This is more or

\textsuperscript{185} See Hacker 1996, 73.
\textsuperscript{186} Madison 1996, 76.
\textsuperscript{187} Beaney 2007, 197.
\textsuperscript{188} Beaney 2007, 198.
\textsuperscript{189} Haaparanta 2007, 255.
\textsuperscript{190} Haaparanta 2007, 260.
\textsuperscript{191} Beaney 2007, 208.
\textsuperscript{192} Haaparanta 2007, 266. See also Haaparanta 1988, 92.
less analogous with the purpose of phenomenological analysis in its early stage. For example, in the phenomenological suspension of the natural human Ego, the psychical life is reduced to phenomenological experience\textsuperscript{193}. This is the assumption underlying regressive analysis, and hence reduction – which I here call regressive analysis – is tied to an idea of pure philosophy.

In Ricœur’s work, phenomenological methodology is replaced by hermeneutic methodology, which recognizes the various detours through language and reflection. This method is mentioned here since in Ricœur’s philosophy ordinary language philosophers analysis and phenomenological analysis are combined\textsuperscript{194}. I will discuss this subject further in Chapter 4.

3.1.4 Connective Analysis

The connective analysis of linguistic connections is the link between Ricœur’s hermeneutic methodology and ordinary language philosophy. The linguistic translation in Ricœur’s hermeneutics is supported by ordinary language analysis. I confine myself to describing the main idea of this type of analysis, that is connective analysis. I give a more explicit example of connective analysis when I focus on Ricœur’s method in Chapter 5. Ricœur also uses a method similar to ordinary language philosophy. In Chapter 5, I present an example of Ricœur's way of using this mode of analysis in his hermeneutics. I now briefly explain what connective analysis is. I start by making a distinction between two main ways of philosophical analysis of language:

1) Above I mentioned transformative analysis, which aims to transform the original linguistic form to a certain correct form that is expressed in the symbols of logical language.

2) By contrast, connective analysis concentrates on clarifying and analysing natural language. Connective analysis offers a description of the use of a

\textsuperscript{193} Husserl 1999, 26.
\textsuperscript{194} Ricœur 1989, 102.
linguistic expression and its connections to other expressions\textsuperscript{195}. Natural language is analysed on the surface of language, not reduced to ideal forms. The philosophers of the Oxford ordinary language school, such as Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976), J.L Austin (1911-1960), and Peter Frederik Strawson (1919 – 2006), described the ordinary uses of philosophically problematic words and contrasted these with the philosophical uses\textsuperscript{196}. The philosophical problems did not arise from ordinary language as such, but from misunderstanding the philosophical theories\textsuperscript{197}.

The clarification in connective analysis differs from the clarification of decompositional, transformative and regressive analysis, which I have described above. Transformative analysis was developed alongside decompositional analysis and came into the focus of analytic philosophy. Connective analysis is, for the most part, an opposite way of practising philosophy from early Russelian decomposition\textsuperscript{198}. Connective analysis was another paradigm in the history of analytic philosophy that was developed from the ashes of decomposition, partly by rejecting this mode of analysis, and partly by absorbing influences and ideas from it, mainly from Moore’s decompositional style of analysis\textsuperscript{199}. The younger generation of The University of Cambridge (e.g. Susan Stebbing, Richard Bevan Braithwaite, Max Black, and Norman Malcolm) studied Moore’s lectures, and began interpreting Moore’s way of conducting philosophical analyses\textsuperscript{200}.

Connective analysis also rejects many of the characteristics found in the transformative analysis of early analytic philosophy. Connective analysis does not expect a certain result at the end point of an analysis. The following explanation by Hacker of connective analysis as a conceptual analysis reveals its roots in Moorean analysis\textsuperscript{201}:

‘Conceptual analysis’ thus conceived amounted, roughly speaking, to giving a description, for specific philosophical purposes, of the use of a linguistic expression and of its rule-governed connections with other expressions by way of implication, exclusion, presupposition and so on (As noted

\textsuperscript{195} See for example Hacker 1996, 8. Hacker uses both terms, \textit{conceptual analysis} and \textit{connective analysis}.

\textsuperscript{196} Glock 2008, 42.

\textsuperscript{197} Glock 2008, 43.

\textsuperscript{198} Hacker 1996, 75.

\textsuperscript{199} Kortelainen 2013, 17.

\textsuperscript{200} Hacker 1996, 75.

\textsuperscript{201} Hacker 1996, 8.
Strawsonian name ‘connective analysis’, or connective elucidation’ may better convey this method of philosophy).\(^{202}\)

According to Hacker, connective analysis is non-reductive analysis in the sense that it does not try to reduce linguistic expression to ideal logical forms. It is the description of the conceptual connections, compatibilities and incompatibilities in language. The purpose of this method is to attain philosophical clarification\(^{203}\). According to this view, philosophical problems do not require artificial terms and constructions for the idioms of natural language.

One element of connective analysis is simply the philosophers’ need for greater self-consciousness about our use of language. This is a characteristic that fits many of the other modes of analysis, as well\(^{204}\). The idea that a philosopher has to clarify paradoxical expressions is included in both Moore’s and Russell’s early philosophy. The demand for explicitness also formed the model for the ordinary language philosophers, as well as being aware of language in its different uses.

Perhaps the need to clarify misleading language was one application of the general need for the clarification of paradoxes and complex expressions. Language may be misleading and ambiguous: The general need for clarity was one of the reasons why the early analytic philosophers adopted the idea that a philosopher must clarify language. Nevertheless, the general need for clarity was not the prime reason for the clarification of language. The idea of clarity was not a consequence of the move in 1905 that stressed the importance of language. Rather, the need for clarity was exemplified with the aim of clarifying natural language through analysis\(^{205}\).

Connective analysis does not mean a translation into a certain structure or form\(^{206}\). Yet connective analysis was common in the approach of the transformative method as it emphasizes the idea of clearing up confusion, and preventing the misconstruction of language. The idea of translation and the connective analysis of language can be combined if there is no assumption about the certain logical form behind the translation. Then the translation has the same idea as it has in Ricœur’s work: translation is interpretation of a certain linguistic context in another. In this

\(^{202}\) Hacker 1996, 8.

\(^{203}\) Hacker 2007, 129.

\(^{204}\) On the ideal of clarity in analytic tradition and phenomenology, see, for example, Haaparanta 2003, 501.

\(^{205}\) See for example Austin 1990, 39-40.

\(^{206}\) See for example Kortelainen & Järvenkylä 2013, 17.
case translation is merely rephrasing the linguistic form in another linguistic form, and it does not contain any idea about the right logical or other symbolic structure behind the linguistic structure. It is translation from one context to another inside the natural language. Hacker describes Gilbert Ryle’s method in the following way:

Philosophical problems are generated by type-confusions (or category mistakes – a phrase he did not use in the lecture, but which is, as it were, omnipresent in the background). These involve misattributing to ideas or concepts logical powers which are appropriate only to ideas or concepts which belong to a different type of category. This results in absurdity and paradox.207

The idea of clearing up logical confusion is transferred to the idea of clearing up linguistic confusion: In transformative analysis, a philosopher changes the object of research to categories of another kind. Paradoxes are dissolved by presenting them in different types. In a different philosophical framework, ordinary language analysis focuses on “category errors” on the level of language. The idea of solving the paradoxes was not abandoned in the connective analysis practised by ordinary language philosophers in various ways. These ideas that developed in transformative analysis are part of connective analysis: concentration on language, aiming to clarify language, and clarification of paradoxical expressions were crucial for the connective analysis of ordinary language. I now formulate the main points of the exchange between two types of analysis, transformative and connective. Some ideas of transformative analysis were transferred to linguistic analysis.

1) Clearing up confusion
2) Avoiding misconceptions
3) Giving new context for certain parts of a whole

In translation we provide a new context for certain parts of an analysed whole. In translation the clearing up of confusion and avoiding misconceptions is transferred into a question of meaning in the use of everyday language. According to Caton, ordinary language meant everyday speech rather than simply a certain type of language shared by a certain group208. When natural language is analysed, the focus of different spheres of language must be taken into account. It is possible to make

207 Hacker 1996, 149.
208 Caton 1970, vi.
a difference between ordinary language and technical languages. By technical languages Caton means the language that is used only within a certain community.

Connective analysis can be practised only when a philosopher is aware of the different spheres (discourses) of language. Connective analysis should take into account some of the social and psychological aspects that influence the uses of language, even when the strong model of language interpretation acts as the starting point of a connective analysis.

As I will demonstrate, the ideas of connective analysis were in some respects important for hermeneutical analysis when it concerned language. Characteristics of ordinary language philosophy and its analysis are part of Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation that dealt with the ambiguous ways of using language. Ricœur thinks that “what happens in the far more intricate cases of text-interpretation and what constitutes the key problem of hermeneutics is already foreshadowed in the interpretive process as it occurs in ordinary language”. These aspects are utilized in Ricœur’s method when he again applies his own version of connective analysis to hermeneutics.

I have taken a long road from decompositional analysis through transformations, regressive analysis, and connective analysis to the new methods of philosophy presented in Ricœur’s dialectic hermeneutics. In the next chapter, I focus on the hermeneutical aspects of philosophical methodology.

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208 Caton 1970, vi.
4. Ricœur’s Interpretation Theory and Language

4.1 Types of Philosophical Analysis and Ricœur’s Interpretation Theory

Before approaching the question of the hermeneutical theory and the use it makes of methods I define in 4.2 the conception of text in Ricœur’s method necessary for the further study on his conception of language and in 4.4 I describe the objects of Ricœur’s interpretation that are multiple meanings of the ambiguous expressions of natural language.

Now, the abovementioned characteristics of transformative and connective analyses are included in Ricœur’s interpretation theory. I refer here especially to a linguistic paradox in the analysis of a natural language and the context principle of sentences. Again I emphasize the theme of translating one context of language to another as a paradigm of interpretation in Ricœur’s hermeneutics. The theme of translating arises in Ricœur’s hermeneutics from linguistic conflicts. When a person notices a linguistic conflict in the text she has to transform it into something more understandable. The presentation 4.5 again is needed to understand how the interpretation theory of hermeneutics develops with the investigation of symbols, metaphors and narratives.

As an example, I focus on reading Ricœur’s essays concerning his methodology “Existence and Hermeneutics” (1965), and “The Problem of Double Meaning” from his book The Conflict of Interpretations which was located at a crucial point of his career in 1969 after his studies on voluntary and involuntary actions, and before the linguistic research of metaphors that combines hermeneutics, linguistic theories and linguistic analysis of ordinary language philosophy. Ricœur taught in the Divinity School of the University of Chicago from 1970 to 1985 and this had an

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210 Ricœur 2007, 11.
influence on his hermeneutical approach. A collection of his articles from the 1970s to 1987 Reflection and Imagination (1991) helps to capture his ideas concerning the methodology that works between experience and language. More explicit ideas concerning translation and interpretation are taken from Ricœur’s late work On Translation (Sur la traduction), originally published in French in 2004.

These books are a useful place to start the investigation on the hermeneutical analysis, because they came out in the middle of Ricœur’s career right between his phenomenology of embodiment and his works on narrative identity. The essays in these books include many of Ricœur’s main claims that touch his methodological demarcations. I will refer to his semantic and linguistic investigations after these essays, from his book The Rule of Metaphor (La Métaphore vive (1975)). Before I proceed, I will explain the crucial concepts of hermeneutics that are those of text and discourse. The different concepts of language, text and discourse are articulated slightly differently in some of Ricœur’s work, but I will present them as clearly as possible without violating Ricœur’s way of doing philosophy. Generally in Ricœur’s work language is understood as in Saussure, who presents two different sides of language: its living use in a speaking situation, and the language system, as seen in grammar.

### 4.2 The Conception of Text

For Ricœur, a text is a discussion that is fixed by writing. With this statement, Ricœur wants to point out that when we are investigating the linguistic acts, we should not forget that a text has origins in actual speech situations. In other words, spoken language influences the written form of language. Ricœur’s position on written text is that writing was initially a form of speech, because it still includes traces of speech. Yet, for Ricœur these traces are only read from the text, not from the real author’s intentions.

This living moment of speech is called a “discourse”. The definition of the concept of discourse differs in the works of different authors. Ricœur uses the concept of discourse to describe the situation in speech and communication. However, this is not all Ricœur gets out of the concept of discourse. Speech is always located in a
certain place, situation, and produced by a human being whose speech is the production of his embodied acting. Both of these aspects, discourse and its modification into a text have to be taken into account when linguistic expressions are investigated\textsuperscript{213}.

Ricœur bases his idea of discourse on the difference between language as a system and language as speech.\textsuperscript{214} Ferdinand de Saussure made a distinction between “langue” and “parole”. The language system refers to all the habits and customs that language users have.\textsuperscript{215} On the basis of a language system, a speaker of a language produces speech.

For Saussure, the whole of language is entirely modified by speech, that is, the private act of speaking and the social language system. There is no language system without private speech expressions, and no private speech expressions without the language system. According to Saussure, living speech is modified to the language system.\textsuperscript{216} Private speech is something that is tied to time and something that disappears along with the speech situation\textsuperscript{217}. What is essential for Saussure is that the language system is compared to the living speech at the time.

Ricœur claims that a language system has its own structure. The speech that is reformulated as text also has a structure distinct from the structure of the language system (for example: grammar). The idea of the language system was the focus of linguistic structuralism. Linguistic structuralism was the dominant linguistic theory in France in Ricœur’s time. The main tenet of linguistic structuralism was that separated from speaking subjects, language is understood as a system of signs\textsuperscript{218}.

\textsuperscript{213} See for example: Kusch, Martin & Hintikka, Jaakko (1988): \textit{Kieli ja maailma}. Oulu: Pohjoinen. An interesting question is, whether Ricœur’s philosophy of language relates to Jaakko Hintikka’s conceptions of “language as a universal medium” and “language as calculus”. Hintikka’s distinction is generalization of two ways of looking at logic, and later on a generalization of two ways of looking at language. In the calculus view it is possible to describe the relation between language and the world outside: language can be a tool and it can be re-interpreted and replaced. In the conception of language as a universal medium we cannot express the relation between language and world. One could claim that Ricœur’s philosophy of language can be read from both of these perspectives. Ricœur’s eclectism seems to take influences from both of these views on language. I don’t plea for this distinction, since it is problematic in Ricœur’s philosophy, as it is a generalization of the working of language.

\textsuperscript{214} Ricœur 1989, 10-11.
\textsuperscript{215} Saussure 1983, 14.
\textsuperscript{216} Saussure 1983, 9.
\textsuperscript{217} Saussure 1983, 19.
\textsuperscript{218} Ricœur 1974, 31.
Ricœur criticizes Saussure’s claims and French structuralism after that. From Ricœur’s perspective Saussure’s theory of language attaches excessive importance to the language system. Therefore, he points out that not all aspects of linguistic expression can be reduced to the language system. He stresses the importance of speech. Ricœur’s criticism of French structuralism stresses that not all linguistic phenomena can be reduced to the investigation of linguistic structure. The conception of discourse is important for Ricœur since he considers it to be something that is speech, but that is also non-private. For Ricœur, discourse precedes the language system: the discourse is primary in comparison to the language system. This means that the situation in which the discourse is born should not be cut out of the investigation of language since remnants of the speech situation are always discernible from the text.

If discourse is only understood at a certain moment in time, it cannot be recognized again, and thus understood as the object of research. Then discourse would not be very different from Saussure’s parole. For language to be the object of research, it should be structured. Discourse is a social structure in a certain speech situation … and can be modified to become a text. Discourse modified into a text has its own kind of structure that is different from the structure of the language system.

The discourse structure is based on the intentionality of language. The human ability to mean or intend can be seen in the intentionality of languages. Text can be investigated in a sensible way when we understand that language always has a connection to a certain social framework. We assume that text conveys a message. In a text there are hints that help us to recognize the acts presented in a speech situation, such as beliefs the speaker held at a moment x in a speech context y.

From structuralism Ricœur takes the idea that the text has its own intention, i.e. an intention different from that of its author. This structuralist influence is clearly seen in his work, yet he does not accept the whole structuralist program. In Ricœur’s theory text is actually treated as a wordly and authorless object only for a moment. The structuralist model assumes that there is no-one, not one author, who is...

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219 Ricœur 1976, 9.
220 See for example Derrida 2011, 2-3. The criticism of structuralism is shared by many poststructuralist authors, famously by such a French author as Jacques Derrida who worked as an assistant of Ricœur.
221 Ricœur 1976, 10.
222 Ricœur 1991b, 465.
224 Ricœur 1976, 11.
225 Ricœur 1976, 18.
creating meanings ‘behind’ the text. In this kind of structuralist view the text is explained in terms of its internal relations. The only way to these intentions is what is said in the text. There is no back door for the interpretation of the writer’s real and authentic intentions. That experience is gone and cannot be found again. The language creates the system that is separated from speaking subjects. The leaning on structuralism was a well developed and remarkable part of Ricœur’s theory and made a clear difference to the romantic hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey.

Ricœur gets influence from structuralism (and from the anglosaxon new criticism). Focusing on the explanatory side of the language research it is possible, in the framework of Ricœur’s theory, that the text can be investigated as a language system as linguistics investigates it. Yet, there are many ways to read the text, but the structural model is not enough when we ponder the text as communication. The act of reading does not take into account the way the text’s refers to the surrounding world. Ricœur brings his ideas much further than structuralism.

Discourse can be investigated since it includes hints of expressions in the speaker and reader. The speaker’s intention can be seen, for example, through the use of the personal pronoun “I” or in expressions such as adverbs “now”, “today”, “tomorrow” and “here”, or in the definitions of a place such as “in the spring”, “behind you” or “on my left side”. Ricœur thinks that such linguistic hints refer back to the speaker’s intended meaning.

A more common way to understand the speaker’s intention would be a situation in which communication affects the words and sentences a person is using: If in a speaking situation a person is speaking to a child, her way of using language has usually a somewhat different tone than when she is speaking, for example, to a priest. In the case of a child, an adult person uses short sentences, maybe just words, and to point to the things. She would not use the same manners as she uses when she reports her sins to the priest. On the other hand, there may be many similarities between speaking to or giving orders to a child or an animal. The meaning of an expression calls the speaking situation to mind. In other words, these remnants of the speaking situation refer back to a certain moment in which a

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226 Ricœur 1991b, 51.
228 Ricœur 1991b, 56.
speaking, breathing, suffering, acting, embodied, socially interactive human being presented her views.

The conception of language of a philosopher should at all times include the idea that his acting embodied existence affects the spoken and written text. Languages differ from each other in the context of different cultures, and thus the influence of an embodied action on a language may be present in different languages in different ways. Ultimately some influence of the bodily being can be read from different languages.

Speaking is something produced in our body, especially in speech organs, in our brains, in the movement of our diaphragm. Speaking is essentially a bodily action. It is formed when we breathe, and when our vocal chords form the words. Furthermore, our posture gives a certain tone to our voice, the feelings, and thoughts and schemas we have of ourselves. Our actions are often connected to the language we use.

A human being can describe what she is doing, or she can actually do things with words, for example when a priest baptizes a child. In sum, Ricœur’s theory highlights that the study of language may seem to us more separate from the body and its actions and reflects, more structural than it actually is. For example, in a discussion situation a person has many non-linguistic activities in play: she may exaggerate the way she moves or looks at something above her. The place where she is communicating, and the people whom she communicates with, create the space, atmosphere, the feelings and the impressions. Such bodily actions, also influence how the language is structured as a text. Yet, it cannot be presumed that these actions are always strictly bodily; there may be many other kinds of influences in the actions as well.

Ricœur describes human language as an action by means of the concepts of discourse and text. While discourse is a living speech moment that has a certain structure, the text is the structure of this discourse that is committed to paper or any other cultural manifestation. The investigation of discourse couples language strongly with the social world. Discourse is a social speech situation with blurred outlines. In this theory the living speech moment is emphasized. The interpreted texts have a connection to actual action. The perspective from which a person sees things influences the way she sees the object and how she describes it in a speech.

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230 The vocal chords do not form words, they only vibrate. Words (vowels and consonants) are formed by speech organs – tongue, teeth, hard palate, soft palate, lips.
situation. In a speech situation, she can use her hands, fingers, shoulders, head or she may move her whole body and its position when she explains the point or expresses feelings. The surroundings and the point in time in a certain speech situation influence how she later documents her experience in written form. The whole body is in action while we speak. Some of these feelings, bodily movements, and sounds can be read as remnants in the written text. These remnants are seldom drawn from the speech situation in obvious ways. Yet, if she has been speaking to a wider audience, let’s say in a political meeting, the speech is often directed to many people, and her way of writing has the same tone as her speech had. Again, if the speaking situation has been aggressive and loud, she may use more exclamation marks in her text. This kind of understanding of the relations between human life and texts which we read and produce, gives the basic idea of what philosophers, such as Ricœur, mean by discourse as living\textsuperscript{231}.

Ricœur presented his way of theorizing on language in the 1970’s. Later, discourse theory as a part of language theory has been criticized as well. I present some critical comments on the criticism of Ricœur’s philosophy. Ricœur’s theory is not safe from the problems of this criticism: It is too broad, not detailed enough, and it does not give enough examples of restricted discourses or the uses of the aspects of language it is investigating. It is also based too much on Ricœur’s and other theorists’ own folk psychological intuitions. The relationship between Ricœur’s early writing on embodied action and his text and discourse theory should also be considered more broadly in his middle and later periods. Yet Ricœur’s conception of discourse and text is a starting point for the more comprehensible theory that could be tested from the positions of other branches of science\textsuperscript{232}. The division between the model of the natural sciences and humanistic sciences does not play a role here\textsuperscript{233}. The study of linguistics that studies the language empirically is as valuable as humanistic theories on language. In some cases, this expanding of Ricœur’s hermeneutics could be tested from the empirical point of view as well. Ricœur does indeed refer to the empirical point of view of his contemporaries in linguistics\textsuperscript{234}.

Ricœur relies heavily on the idea of the intentionality of a text: his theory includes the danger that the living speech is not captured in all textual presentations. How can I be sure that the things I read in the text are remnants from the actual speech

\textsuperscript{231} Ricœur 1986, 184.
\textsuperscript{232} Ricœur 1989, 53.
\textsuperscript{233} Ricœur 1989, 53.
\textsuperscript{234} Ricœur 2008, 101.
moment? Furthermore, the action of an investigated person may not be as rational, intentional or meaningful as Ricœur’s theory of the living speech moment assumes. For example, Panu Raatikainen argues that in some areas of the hermeneutic tradition the assumption that a human being is always rational in her actions is often highlighted too much. In Ricœur’s case this means that the person who acts in a speech situation is assumed to mean something, and trying to communicate the message to another person or to several people. His action and live discourse has certain rules that can be seen and read from the text. A problem here is that the deepest reasons for a person’s actions are not always recognized or known to the person herself.

For example, a schizophrenic person may have different ways to express her states of mind than a psychiatrist. Hence the assumption that a subject can understand her own intentions ignores the unconscious causes that for example a schizophrenic person may have behind her actions. There are many problems in Ricœur's broad concept of text, but in his hermeneutics, this way of conceiving subjectivity is precisely rejected in his conception of text. Ricœur claims that “- - text frees itself from the tutelage of mental intention - -”. Texts give us possible ways of orienting ourselves in the world, and this orientation is not based on something behind the language, or merely projecting subjective experience to the text. Ricœur prefers to say that the orientation that a human being has to the world, (this means her intersubjectivity, and belonging to the world) is a general guide to interpretation. The following question can be posed: how reliable and objective is the standard Ricœurian concept of text? The answer to this comes from the simple plea to the intersubjectivity.

By the term ‘intention’ Ricœur does not mean what the speaker ‘really meant’. He does not mean that we could find exactly the same meaning from the text, but that the interpreter can by means of his own understanding trace the probable meaning that is understandable for the broader sampling of a social group. Intentionality does not refer to the speaker, but to the text, that is always interpreted according to a certain interpretative framework in an actual speaking situation, hence, it is intentional. This is the meaning that a person interprets once again. The basis for intentionality of language arises from the assumption that the producer and interpreter of the text experience the world in the same way. The intersubjectivity

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237 Ricœur 1989, 178.
238 Ricœur 1976, 30.
239 Oesch 1994, 75.
of our experience guarantees that there are shared ways of interpreting and reliving the experience through the text. This is also the reason for the claim that discourse does not have only one private meaning to a speaker.

According to Ricœur, when the interpreter interprets the text, the being-in-the-world is opened up in front of the text.240 In other words, the reader understands the meaning of a text by understanding how the text is in relation to the world. He understands on what “side” of reality the text is located. According to Ricœur, the language of a text refers to the world and not to the ideal meanings241. The intention that the reader infers from the text makes the discourse a coherent whole.

Ricœur sees intentionality from the point of view of the living human in a world. He refers to Husserl’s concept “Lebenswelt” and to Heidegger’s idea of being-in-the-world (“In-der-Welt-Sein”). The concept is, as they usually are, not precise, but I will mention some of the definitions of the concept that will shed light on what Ricœur means by it. The world is not only or primarily the natural world or the material nature of biology or chemistry. The world is present in our being. The world modifies our being.242 The world means mundane thinking in all its connections to the surroundings and culture. In language use and in texts people articulate this being in the world. ‘The living experience’, since it is changing and transforming all the time, is not lasting. Still, Ricœur points out, what is constant gets its expression in our effort to discern the world linguistically and temporally243. This is the way in which discourse is something that is lasting. In discourse our way of discerning and perceiving the world is perspetuated.

I have opened up the meaning of the way Ricœur deals with the concept of discourse. The abovementioned idea of discourse may not be completely satisfactory. The problematic assumption that the interpreter and speaker just happen to have the same kind of meanings of the world is not sufficient for scientific investigation. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the human being that is interpreted is rational in her actions244. Rationality here refers to the property of a human being who fulfils the minor idea that every person’s actions are embedded as a system of other beliefs and actions. These beliefs and actions are assumed to have some meaning and purpose.

240 Ricœur 1991a, 114.
242 Kemp 1996, 44.
243 Ricœur 1989, 146-147.
244 Raatikainen 2004, 127.
Maybe there is still one way to proceed in an interpretation if we do not wish to give up and say that the interpretation of a cultural meaning is totally subjective, and there is nothing we can do to establish objective criteria for the interpretation in the human sciences. Ricœur’s assumption of the rationality of the object of interpretation could be changed into a weaker version. Ricœur could say that there are different stages in an interpretation: the different principles in different parts of an interpretation. I perceive hints of this kind of modification in Ricœur’s way of presenting the hermeneutic circle. I will go through this process in detail in Section 5.2. However, Ricœur suggests a theory that takes influences from the linguistics of his own time.245 The creativity of language tests the limits of the language system when new expressions are invented.

I now continue with Ricœur’s way of coping with the interpretation of human action. The distinctive property of rational action is that it is meaningful interaction between agents. Action has its own rules, as different linguistic acts have rules. For example, raising a hand in the classroom is a certain kind of action that is guided by rules learned in childhood.

According to Ricœur, the interpretation of a written work becomes “a particular case of understanding the external signs of an inner mental life”.246 This means that there are many ways to reach one’s inner mental life through external signs. The interpretation of ‘putting oneself in somebody else’s shoes’ is the broad field of interpretation, and is analogue with textual interpretation. It is not only understanding oneself through somebody else’s experience (or signs of this experience) in the sense of projecting, but a very living experience that helps to understand other people’s reactions.247 Thus, the conception of text can be understood as the structured presentation of speech, but in each case these structured monuments do not have to be only written in the letters of a natural language. He reads these written texts as particular cases of self-interpretation and understanding of the world.

Interpretation is the act of understanding a text or a cultural entity of meanings. A text does not only mean letters and words on paper. Instead, a text can be understood, according to Ricœur, as “outside” or “objective” that helps human

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246 Ricœur 1991b, 51.
247 See also Ricœur 2008, 303. Already in The Rule of Metaphor, (originally in French La métaphore vive that could be roughly translated as Living metaphor) occurs the idea that the living language, for example the use of metaphors, reflects the lived experience.
beings to understand themselves and the world. This kind of objective cultural entity of meanings, Ricœur says, are works and institutions. By “works”, he means a work of art, let us say, a literary work. By institutions, he means, for example, a social group constituted by a certain linguistic milieu. Interpretation has an object of research that is a text or a cultural entity of meanings. The totality of meanings is constituted by parts that are signs or symbolic expressions. In the analysis of hermeneutics, the reader of a text or an interpreter of a cultural whole of meanings is analysing natural language structured as a text. This kind of technique can be practised, for example, in the case of interpreting social action. The idea that a text works as an “outside” or “objective” measuring stick is connected with the idea that speech has a certain structure different from the structure of the language system.

A general argument for the hermeneutical approach of language is to say that the underlying assumption of hermeneutics is the investigation of the interpretation process, because most of the social and conscious decisions are based on choosing a certain interpretation, and often also on presenting it in a language. Still, in the conception of texts, this may seem too broad a concept for many.

Before simply rejecting the project of Ricœur’s hermeneutics and its broad conception of a text, it is necessary to understand the object of this kind of research. The aim is to present the common ground for the different branches of human sciences and social sciences, a common space where the different interpretation acts can meet. The understanding of oneself through the other is the main theme for Ricœur’s theory of interpretation. When one reads herself through the other, the focus is on acting and the embodied human being. The hermeneutical way of reading texts means taking into consideration a certain culture, tradition and way of thinking. People’s minds are not separate substances. The consciousness is studied by various acts of interpretation in different fields of culture. The underlying assumption of hermeneutics is that the interpretation is always between parts of text and texts as a whole. The understanding improves or in many cases may improve when the parts of a text force the reader or interpreter

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248 Ricœur 1991b, 63.
249 Ricœur 1986, 183.
250 I use the word “consciousness” here, thought it might be wrong for the hermeneutical point of view, because the act of interpretation in hermeneutics is at the same time experience in our mind and body. In my opinion "consciousness" captures the idea what is happening when the interpreter interprets.
to pay attention to the textual whole which directs the way the parts are understood.

For Ricœur, “text” is a response to the dichotomy between explanation and understanding. In the 1970s, when Ricœur was writing his work, there were two different ways to describe human action: either to explain in the manner of the natural scientist, or to interpret it in the manner of the historian. Nowadays these descriptions are still considered and their relationship is still a philosophical question. The concept of text according to Ricœur renews the notions of explanation and interpretation. Ricœur argues that the common ground for the various human sciences and social sciences cannot only be the explanation of the natural sciences or understanding and interpretation of the human sciences, but could be in the field where both of them can work together. For Ricœur, the human mind is the region of psychological individualities, into which each mental life can transpose itself. Understanding is such transference into another consciousness. Human science is possible only if the knowledge of other individuals is possible. Interpretation is a reproduction of our inner life. Mere introspection appears to be either a very rare or an impossible idea in Ricœur’s model where all our thoughts are mediated through signs and manifestations of our culture.

One may doubt that Ricœur goes too far in his obsession with the idea that self-understanding must be mediated through signs, and hence his theory has ignored the idea of psychological acts of the mind. The question remains whether the intuitions of the hermeneutic tradition can give us reliable support for the methodology of studies on the mind. The positive side of Ricœur’s theory is that it includes the possibility that hermeneutic assumptions can also be in a dialogue with more precise results that concern text reading and its psychological mechanisms.

The description of the conception of text gives us the basis of the hermeneutical method that Ricœur proposes. Its main claim is to overcome the dichotomy between pure philosophical understanding and combine it with interpretation. Hermeneutic studies seek to understand a certain part of a text by reading it in its context and through our own experience of the world.

In his later work Ricœur describes this act of understanding as translating the outer meaning into our own experience. The idea of translating a certain part of text

251 Ricœur 1986, 200.
252 Ricœur 1989, 150.
253 Ricœur 1989, 150.
254 Kearney 2004, xviii.
into our own experience is a concrete way to understand what happens in the interpretation process. Before going to this act of translation in Chapter 5 I still have to further explain the relationship between action and language.

4.3 Discourse and Action

When Ricœur speaks about the human’s actions in the world, he speaks about the actions of an embodied subject. Hence the theory that concerns human action includes notes on human embodied action. The text as discourse from this point of view is not all dry play of words, but the flesh, the whole bloodstream and the rhythm of our breath is influenced and even re-conceptualized in a process of interpretation. The way the embodied pre-linguistic is localized at a semantic level of text and narrative is aptly presented in the following paragraph:

It is upon this pre-linguistic relation between my flesh localized by the self and a world accessible or inaccessible to the “I can” that a semantics of action is finally to be constructed which will not lose its way in the endless exchange of language games²⁵⁵.

An interpretation is the redesign of our inner life through texts. This inner life is not separated from our embodiment. Ricœur’s idea is that our mental and embodied life is transferred to the level of observable signs which manifest the mental life²⁵⁶. By interpreting the way we use language, we can approach the problems posed by the mind. Only the manifestations of language and the pragmatic context can give us hints of peoples states of mind. Through text, people can (which covers, again I want to stress, the technology, and other cultural manifestations) ‘read’ or interpret the aims of the author, and in this process she comes to situate herself in the place of the author: interpretation aims at the reproduction of lived, embodied action.

The embodied action is something that is made linguistic²⁵⁷. The experience of the bodily being is something that is seen in discourse and modified as a text. Also, the hints of this embodiment can be recognized from the cultural texts that we are

²⁵⁵ Ricœur 1992, 325.
²⁵⁶ Ricœur 1991b, 49.
²⁵⁷ Ricœur 1992, 325.
interpreting. As I read this, language has, if not always, in many cases the origins of an embodied human being who is acting in the world.

Arguments for this interpretation can be taken, for example, from Ihde’s interpretation and from Ricœur’s later work, for example from in his *Oneself as Another*. Ricœur does revert to the theme of embodiment in his later writings on narrative identity. However, his conception of the imagined variations of possible action and embodiment possibilities, and the revisiting of the topic in his later writings on narrative identity is proof that the theme of embodied experience is the pre-understanding behind the text, before the linguistic expression of the embodied experience. As stated above, the experience behind the text cannot be reached from the interpreter’s point of view, but from the point of view of human actions.

In *Oneself as Another*, Ricœur states that the question of embodiment is crucial to the theory of consciousness, since the self finds its anchor in its own body. Ricœur uses Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between two concepts, “flesh” and “body”. In this study, I follow use of the concept of “body” from English translations of Ricœur’s work.

For Ricœur flesh refers to the inner sensation of our own bodily being. Flesh is most originally mine and of all things which are the closest. Body, meanwhile, signifies that my flesh is made part of the world. When flesh appears as a body among other bodies and in relation to them, it is called ‘body’.

The flesh that is pre-understanding, and hence pre-linguistic, is transformed to the linguistic level, for example, as linguistic expression such as “I can “ or “I want”. These linguistic expressions, which bring flesh to the intersubjective level of our body among other bodies and the world, are not just linguistic or textual. In many respects, these linguistic expressions can actually shape and guide our being. The expression that we can see someone staring at us from behind conceptualizes the bodily feeling that other bodies surround us. In another connection Ricœur claims that our bodily actions are reshaped by means of fiction.

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261 In French Ricœur uses the words “corps/corps propre.
262 Ricœur 1992, 324.
263 Ricœur 1992, 326.
I therefore emphasize that there is a connection between the understanding of embodied action and the linguistic analysis in Ricœur’s later work. Hints at this idea can be found in Ricœur’s earlier work: Ricœur considered the problem of embodied action in his early phenomenological study *Philosophy of the Will* (Philosophie de la volonté. Finitude et Culpabilité I). (1950). In *Freud and Philosophy* he points out that in philosophical tradition, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and De Waelhens (1911-1981) came closest to the Freudian idea of the unconscious.

This perspective of embodiment is left in the shadow of his analysis on action in Ricœur studies. In Chapter 2.1, I noticed that Ricœur thought that his work on the philosophy of the will could be a counterpart to Merleau-Ponty’s work on the philosophy of embodiment. Ricœur’s emphasis is more on the human action than embodiment, but the theme of embodiment is the underlying assumption, often explicitly stated, in this philosophy of the acting body. Merleau-Ponty’s ideas arise in Ricœur’s work with the question of the unsaid experience that is expressed in poetic language. Merleau-Ponty’s ideas were present in Ricœur’s early work and in his analysis of language that became part of his philosophy, especially in his work on metaphor.

The above description of how action and discourse are joined together is an indication of how Ricœur’s approach to self-experience conjoins with the semantic analysis of a sentence. Briefly, an analysis of language helps to connect the semantic analysis of a sentence to the expressions of our experience. Next I explain how Ricœur comprehends the semantic analysis through certain aspects of language.

### 4.4 Interpretation of Multiple Meanings

In Chapter 3, I pointed out that the connective analysis of paradoxes is different from paradoxes in early analytic philosophy. The analyses of ordinary language philosophers such as Ryle include the idea from early analytic philosophy of solving a paradox or a problematic proposition. A similar remark applies to the case of Ricœur’s hermeneutical analysis which works on the level of texts, and is interested in multiple meaning in natural language, such as metaphors.

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264 Ricœur 1996, 11.
265 Ryle 2000, 8.
Ricœur uses Ryle’s idea of a category mistake when he describes his semantic theory on metaphorical statements. Metaphor can also be seen as a certain kind of category mistake. The metaphor here is an unusual application, which deliberately makes the wrong application. In the simplest metaphors there are two different concepts, and one concept is described through another. One of these concepts belongs to a certain category, and another belongs to another, often semantically different category. For example, calling a man or a woman a calculator is a simple example of the mistake since in ordinary language humans are not literally calculators.

Contradictions in natural language are seen as a place where humans can change their interpretation since these contradictions are semantically ambiguous. This area of investigation is applied in Ricœur’s philosophy to different areas, mainly to metaphors, literary texts and religious symbolism, and to the expressions of utopia and ideology. Most importantly for the methodological aims that I presented earlier, the linguistic analysis of sentences and texts is the way to self-understanding; symbols and metaphors as much as narratives are ways of building our self-knowledge, the way of knowing and reflecting our thoughts.

In Ricœur’s case the idea of the investigation of multiple meanings is traced back to his studies in psychoanalysis. Yet Ricœur’s point is to take some of the main ideas of psychoanalysis and to develop them within the hermeneutical theory of interpretation. For Ricœur, only therapeutic success can prove that unconsciousness is not merely an invention of psychoanalysts. He criticizes the mixed discourse of psychoanalysis which prevents it from swinging towards the linguistic approach. The way he understands the investigation of consciousness is through linguistic representations of the world. He notes that these different ways of describing reality, such as metaphors, symbols and stories can give the human being cognitively different models of reality. It really matters what kind of stories we tell to ourselves and others.

The idea of problematic expressions is one of the areas of investigation for the hermeneutic analysis of language. Multiple meaning is the primary starting point for an interpretation of a sentence. Ricœur’s method is to interpret signs, sentences and works. Ricœur defines his own focus in the interpretation theory in various ways. He gives the same definition to the act of interpretation as he gave to the symbol:

266 Ricœur 2008, 235.
268 Ricœur 1991b, 66.
Interpretation, we will say, is the work of thought which consists in deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of meaning implied in the literal meaning. - - 269.

The quotation, originally published in 1969, shows that from early on, Ricœur sticks to the idea that interpretation has to do with multiple meanings in language. The quotation above states that interpretation has to do with language, that is, expressions written or oral. Ricœur emphasizes the investigation of language as concretely as possible. This means understanding the actual speech acts of actual human beings, not searching for an ideal model of language. Furthermore, these speech acts are situated in a certain social context, and in Ricœur’s case some of these restricted social contexts are investigated.

Yet, interestingly enough, the quotation makes a distinction between two levels. Firstly, there is the apparent meaning and the meaning behind this apparent meaning. To get from the surface of the language to the hidden meaning, interpretation is needed. Roughly, Ricœur’s idea of interpretation suggests the conception of language which has linguistic surface meaning and a meaning beneath the surface. This hidden meaning refers to the idea that the sentence or a longer linguistic expression is something different after interpretation: the hidden meaning must be interpreted from the surface of language. I understand that the meaning behind the surface can be just a new meaning found by interpretation or a pre-understanding that is knowledge of our body, and our often non-linguistic experience.

For example, we might express someone’s bodily or emotional state by saying that “She is flying”. A literal interpretation of this would be that you are actually on a plane. A more sophisticated interpretation would be to guess that a person is non-realistic and does not really know what she is doing or that she is having a period of good bodily feelings etc.

The way to understand this non-linguistic experience follows the abovementioned idea of text. The interpretation of a new meaning is drawn from the intersubjective perspective. The general idea of how interpretation proceeds is still far away from the idea presented in early analytic philosophy of linguistic surface meaning, which

269 Ricœur 1974, 13.
is interpreted as another kind of structure\textsuperscript{270}. The aim of interpretation and the nature of a hidden meaning behind the surface of language are very different. To illustrate the position assimilated to the analytic tradition on the hidden meaning behind the surface of a language, I will take another example of Ricœur’s definitions of the aims of linguistic analysis. Soon after the quotation above Ricœur continues:

This enumeration of the modalities of symbolic expression calls for a criteriology as its complement, a criteriology which would have the task of determining the semantic constitution of related forms such as metaphor, allegory and simile\textsuperscript{271}.

This definition “determining the semantic constitution of related forms” combines elements of sentence semantics and broader contexts. The focus of interpretation is on operations of the linguistic surface, one of which is multiple meaning. Multiple meaning refer to expressions that appear to cause conflict in the reader’s understanding. The conflict here may just mean that somehow the symbol generates interpretation. It forces the reader to pose a question. What is the exact meaning of this symbol or what is it used for?

‘Multiple meaning’ is the concept that Ricœur uses at some point as a synonym for double meaning\textsuperscript{272}. To make it explicit, in one sense, this gives two possible ideas of ambiguous expressions. In the case of ‘double meaning’, there are two interpretations of a sentence: the literal and the hidden meaning for the same sentence.

The first of the options is an immediate way to understand the double meaning as a surface of language and the hidden meaning that really is meant by the expression. This hidden meaning could be understood as a simplified, univocal and unanalysed endpoint of analysis. Such an option would not differ much from the interpretive analysis presented by early analytic philosophy. Yet Ricœur does not mean this kind of analysis, because he believes that at a certain moment of interpretation we have several possible interpretations, and even after a certain

\textsuperscript{270} See for example Beaney 2007, 200.
\textsuperscript{271} Ricœur 1974, 13-14.
\textsuperscript{272} Ricœur 1974, 12.
expression is fixed, it can be used again in natural language. Ricœur explicitly rejects the idea of a certain single form beneath the linguistic surface.

The second option to understand the concept of “multiple meaning” is to say that the conflict on the level of literal meaning forces us to give several other interpretations of some sentences, not only the literal and the hidden meaning. Then we have a literal meaning $L$ of sentence $A$ and several interpretations $I_1, I_2, I_3$ etc. If this is the core of what Ricœur means by multiple meaning, it remains unclear where the interpretation ends up being a certain interpretation. In Ricœur’s theory, interpretation can be considered having reached its endpoint, but the meaning of a sentence or the meaning of a text is open in such a way, that when we start to interpret it from another perspective, we get yet another interpretation. When $I_2$, for example, is accepted by the social group as the correct interpretation of sentence $A$ in respect of certain criteria, it can be interpreted again later on, and then we have interpretations $I_1', I_2', I_3'$.

I make frequent use of the expression ‘multiple meaning’, because usually the interpretation of the literal meaning to the hidden meaning can produce several possible interpretations and hence several possible meanings. The hidden meaning is grasped when the literal meaning does not lead to a comprehensible interpretation. Nevertheless, the number of possible interpretations is not infinite. In the case of Ricœur, these interpretations are guided by the rules people use in the interpretation of a text structure. Hence, the number of possible interpretations is not infinite, but guided by these rules. For example, the interpretation of a certain item in the Finnish law can have two or three different interpretations in different situations, but obviously not infinitely many. (For me it appears that at one moment a common reader or interpreter of a certain expression does not usually have very many possible interpretations at a time at his disposal, but only a couple. However, this is my primitive intuition, and at this point I have no deeper argument for it.)

Because the interpretation of multiple meanings works in certain contexts, Ricœur also uses the concept of ‘multiple meaning’ not only at the level of a sentence, but also at the level of a text. As noted in 4.2, this is the crucial point of Ricœur’s conception of text and language. In most cases the parts of the whole, the signs and symbolic expressions are interpreted in the wider context of a text.

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273 Ricœur 1974, 71.
The multiplicity of meanings in natural language concerns the sentence meaning and the text meaning. If we look at actual texts written for different purposes, it is plain to see that one text has several meanings. One text can have an historical meaning, a religious meaning and a meaning as a legal text. Political and historical metaphors that use landscape and the travel lexicon such as walls, bridges, maps, roadmaps may have military or religious uses in military or religious interpretations. For example, in political language, the metaphor ‘roadmap for peace’ is often used. This is the reason why Ricœur concentrates on the question of multiple meanings of ambiguous expressions.274

Contrary to the viewpoint of Russelian analysis, the hermeneutical method does not stick to the assumption that we can find only one correct logical form or univocal scientific result.275. One suggestion for the core of analysis in analytic philosophy is to say that the analytic philosopher uses the analysis for purifying language or linguistic expressions.276 This idea has sometimes been presented as the background assumption of early analytic philosophy. My assumption is that even when idealizing language, philosophers must pay attention to the ambiguity of words, sentences and texts. This point is recognized by Max Black and Donald Davidson. Ricœur’s view suggests a theory of language that abandons the ideal logical language as an explanation for the workings of language. What does he offer instead of purifying language?

According to Ricœur, the starting point for the investigation of language is that language is neither systematic nor completely non-systematic. He lists the aspects of language that undeniably leave language to the mercy of social forces, which are non-systematic characteristics of the language system: The appearances of new cultural objects in the field of naming; political and cultural domination by a linguistic group, by a social class, or by a cultural milieu.277

In sum, we cannot have any noteworthy interpretation which does not lean on the habitual ways of understanding used in different cultures. This claim includes the idea of translation from the hermeneutical point of view. According to Ricœur the outer translation from one culture to another is echoed in ‘inner translation’, which

274 Ricœur 1974, 28.
275 Whether or not Russell himself had this kind of narrow scientific conception, we can broadly call this assumption ‘Russelian’, since it is often applied to his theory. Russell made a precise distinction between a “proposition” and “its right logical form”. In OD Russell’s analysis concerns propositions that can have a verbal expression as well (OD, 416). At the beginning of OD, the starting point of analysis is presented to be an unclear, definite, or ambiguous proposition (OD, 415).
276 Haaparanta 2007, 257.
means that we understand ourselves through others. These ways of understanding are myths, allegories, analogies, metaphors, and symbols. The abovementioned cultural ways of understanding a language should be taken into account when considering the analysis of language. I give an example of symbol and metaphor as cultural ways of understanding language that utilizes multiple meaning in language.

4.5 Symbols and Metaphors as Examples of Multiple Meanings

Ricœur presents an example of how the symbolism of guilty conscience expresses itself in the symbolism of a stain. In the cultural whole of the Gnostic tradition, the concept of evil is seen as physical reality which affects humans from the outside. In this tradition, evil is external: it can be a body, a thing or a world. Sin can be seen as Jeremiah sees it, in the spots of the leopard. The abstract concept of ‘sin’ is presented as something concrete. In his study on the symbolisms of evil, Ricœur shows how human experience is interpreted through symbolic fictions. The Adamic myth of the original sin is one manifestation of the Fall. Without this myth, Ricœur believes, understanding would remain concealed. This kind of myth is a way to understand our immediate experience, which otherwise would remain closed. Evil can be symbolized and externalized in the expression ‘axis of evil’ or by speaking about the “evil eye”. Symbols are open in their interpretation in the sense that they can have multiple meanings. A more specific investigation of the different meanings that symbols represent needs linguistic analysis of the sentence to guide.

Symbolic expressions that express something more than a literal meaning are, in many cases, linguistically mediated. Ricœur assumes that the analysis of language is an instrument that is needed in interpretation. Language is not the fundamental aim of interpretation. In Ricœur’s interpretation, language mediates human experience and the world to the interpreter. Interpretation is between the non-

278 Kearney 2004, xviii.
279 Ricœur 1974, 4.
280 Ricœur 1974, 18.
281 Ricœur 1974, 282.
282 Ricœur 1974, 284.
283 Ricœur 1974, 73.
linguistic and the linguistic\textsuperscript{284}. The sentence is the first meaningful component in language and therefore the starting point for the investigation of multiple meaning. The precise investigation of a sentence and its context is one reason that leads Ricœur to use linguistic analysis from the analytic tradition as a part of his hermeneutics. Ricœur himself commits to the difference between semiotics and semantics. Here for Ricœur, semiotics concerns a single sign. Practising semiotics presupposes decomposing the language into separable parts. Semiotics studies the parts of the language system, for example syntactic rules\textsuperscript{285}. For Ricœur semiotics has a specific, limited meaning. Semiotics investigates only signs. Since language is an unstable structure in which individual words seem to lose and acquire meanings, the investigation of meaning cannot be only semiotic\textsuperscript{286}.

For this claim Ricœur evinces an argument from linguistics: the lexical code goes beyond the capacity of individual memory\textsuperscript{287}. Thus the mastering of various meanings cannot be achieved only by learning each word by heart. This would be impossible for the capacity of human memory.

Instead, semantics, and now especially the idea of context in language, concentrates on the meaning of a sentence. Words have meaning inasmuch as a sentence has meaning. Ricœur claims that the core of this idea is common to his philosophy and to Russell’s theory of definite descriptions: “only within discourse does a generic term take on a singularizing function”\textsuperscript{288}. This so-called ‘context principle’ can be read afterwards in Russell’s “On Denoting”, yet it was not actually his idea for the philosophy of language at the time\textsuperscript{289}. The concept of contextuality in Ricœur’s hermeneutics concerns natural language. Actually, in Ricœur’s hands the view is that words have no meaning before they are used either as the logical subjects of a proposition or as predicates: they either identify an individual or express the properties of a certain individual.\textsuperscript{290} The context of a sentence becomes especially pressing in the case of symbolic expressions.

What Ricœur calls ‘symbolic expression’ is a metaphor and is produced in a sentence but not only by one word\textsuperscript{291}. The context dictates the meaning of metaphor. Ricœur connects the idea of the context of a sentence to the

\textsuperscript{284} Ricœur 1974, 66.
\textsuperscript{285} Ricœur 1991b, 66.
\textsuperscript{286} Ricœur 1974, 127.
\textsuperscript{287} Ricœur 1974, 126.
\textsuperscript{288} Ricœur 2008, 72.
\textsuperscript{289} OD, 416-417.
\textsuperscript{290} Ricœur 1991b, 69.
\textsuperscript{291} Ricœur 2008, 125-126.
phenomenon of polysemy in a word. The characteristic of language which appears at the level of sentence, is the polysemy of words. Polysemy means that words in natural language have more than one meaning. Polysemy signifies that in natural languages the same word can have different meanings according to the contexts in which it occurs. Polysemy makes possible the symbolic words and expressions that have a ‘metaphorical structure’. Metaphorical structure means two concepts that interact with each other in a new way. Polysemic and its use of words opens Ricœur’s interpretation theory for ordinary language analysis.

Interpretation starts from the multiple expressions in a language which present several different possible meanings to the reader or interpreter and in this situation no single meaning can be recognized. For Ricœur, the core idea of interpretation on a large scale is the following: Symbol, metaphor, allegory, simile etc. are the mediating level of Ricœur’s interpretive analysis. This means that the linguistic analysis of expressions, such as metaphors, is needed in interpreting. Interpretation makes use of linguistic analysis so as to reach its target, human ways of shaping reality. To correctly understand this approach, the function of ambiguous expressions should be seen in way they often produce new interpretation. Nevertheless, the idea is not to claim that conflicts in language are always signs of a conflict in the mind. For instance, in many cases people make mistakes in language use, and this is not invariably evidence of the situation in the world.

Ambiguous expressions may force us to decide which different concepts are used in a certain context, and how the concepts are linked to each other. In various cases of interpretation, we have more than one framework, for instance, in the case of religious interpretation; in the examples of the symbolic expressions of evil above in the Adam myth. The analysis of biblical symbols is widely studied, also in Ricœur’s work. In the Adam myth, evil is already there that attracts man. In this myth, the woman is presented as a figure of frailty and the man as the figure of evil decision. The interpretations of such myths are specifically symbolic. The text itself includes symbols that direct the reader to find the meaningful new message of the text.

Religious symbols are good examples of linguistic expressions where interpretation in many cases can also be left open. Biblical symbols can be read from different

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292 Ricœur 1991b, 70.
293 Ricœur 2008, 115.
294 Ricœur 1974, 14.
295 See for example Vikström, 2000.
perspectives at different times. A good example of this has been the interpretation of the Bible in the case of female priests and female bishops in the Lutheran Church of Finland. Ricœur’s main theme, conflict of interpretation, is presented in these discussions where the past and the future meet. These old myths, including various and long used symbols can be changed, transformed, interpreted again, even to mean something totally different from before.

If we continue with Christian symbols, we can take “Judas” as the symbol for betrayal or even for evil. Yet even in early times there were Gnostic texts, eventually not included in the Bible, that present a different interpretation of the purpose of Judas in the Holy Bible. The Gospel of Judas is an old Gnostic text that documents conversations between Judas Iscariot and Jesus Christ. This Gnostic gospel offers an unusual interpretation of Judas. Judas, although the symbol of betrayal, had no choice since Jesus was going to crucified. Actually, according to the Gospel of Judas, he was an important disciple of Jesus, who sacrificed Himself. Judas’ action was in obedience to a direct command from Jesus Himself. This kind of mythology puts the meaning of “Judas” in a different light: Judas took on his responsibility, the curse of betraying Jesus, and worked in this sense in the same way as Jesus Himself: Judas sacrificed himself for a noble purpose. From this context, “Judas” as the symbol of betrayal seems to be a misleading symbol. Judas could be the symbol of a man who assumes the mask of betrayal on purpose.

The method that Ricœur offers takes into account the complexity of human speech. The analysis of multiple meaning is important because language highlights the workings of the mind. For instance, in many cases a metaphor is invented when there is no expression for a certain phenomenon. The lack of a term can produce new linguistic expressions. This is how the idea of calling the object at the end of the cord connected to the computer “a mouse” began. Multiple meanings in a language may be symptoms of conflicts of consciousness – obviously, not all of them are. The investigation of ambiguous expressions does not mean that other aspects of the workings of natural language should be left aside. This is just something that is too often missing from the philosophical theories of language (at least it was in the 1970s when Ricœur presented his ideas), and Ricœur stresses this side of language. Next, I will refer to an example of the general field and the starting point of the analysis, where the analysis of multiple meaning is needed.

The concept of univocal meaning appears to be too narrow a way to analyse self-understanding and social action. In the case of legal text, for example, there can be situations when the law ‘has to be interpreted’ in two or more different ways. When a new law is presented in the Finnish legal system, it may be in contradiction
with the Constitution of Finland. The same goes for the interpretation of human actions and behaviour. In this case, ordinary language appears to be almost as ambiguous as a metaphorical sentence in some other case of interpretation.

The previous example offers an indication as to what the emphasis on multiple meaning is all about. In short, multiple meaning is the place where the human perspective and interpretation are reconsidered, changed, and where new information is presented. It is a powerful tool for all teaching, reading, manipulation and decision-making. It is a place where self-interpretation can start. Another place where it can start is metaphorical expression. Let us consider this example of multiple meaning in natural language since Ricœur himself puts so much effort into it.

According to Ricœur, metaphor especially is a clear case of this kind of multiple meaning. Metaphor produces tension between two concepts. The metaphor has two concepts. In the metaphor, ‘the prime minister is a bear’; the concept ‘a bear’ describes the other concept ‘the prime minister’.

Ricœur takes the view that the idea of conjoining text interpretation, for example the rhetoric of metaphor, symbol etc. with the investigation of the human psyche is the right path for hermeneutical methodology. Ricœur thinks that the analysis of language should take into account the power of language to represent human experience. His theory of metaphor is one example of this path. Metaphoric language redescribes reality and being in a new way. I want to present some arguments for this perspective on metaphor and the claim that I started with: that contradictions on the level of natural language are seen as a place where humans can change their interpretation since these contradictions are semantically ambiguous and leave the meaning unresolved.

The best argument for this approach works on the practical level of interpretation: For example, the psychologist Richard R. Kopp has argued that metaphors are a common way for clients in psychotherapy to express problems in a new way in therapeutic sessions. A client may express mixed, unclear, denied, unconscious

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296 Ricœur 1989, 179.
297 Ricœur, 1974, 72.
298 Ricœur 1974, 168.
feelings, thoughts and beliefs through metaphors. Metaphorical language represents the clients images of self and self-other relations. At the same time the therapist can help the client to express herself in a better way by suggesting metaphors. Ricœur’s holistic idea on how metaphorical language, as well as narratives, can actually change the emotional and even bodily reactions and action is something that could be developed for therapeutic purposes.

This view also poses the question for the analysis practised in early analytic philosophy, and thereafter. At what are the theories and analyses of logical forms aiming, if they forget how language is inevitably tied to experience and human consciousness? At the same time there may be counterarguments for metaphor studies that recognize the danger of private language when the problem of metaphor is studied. The problem of private language in the sense that the language in question is private to one speaker is well recognized in Ricœur’s method. The psychological aspects of metaphor are tied to the idea that they still have to be intersubjective, and are tied to the spoken language and its structures. Can a language theory work if it does not also match humans’ ways of producing and changing their views and opening new opportunities to understand their relations with self and others? This is the key to Ricœur’s method that combines semantic analysis and the holistic framework of the hermeneutic circle.

Ricœur’s aim is to do away with the restriction of reference to scientific statements. This aim significantly changes the talk of reference significantly. Indeed, according to Ricœur, the theory of language has to develop in contact with the empirical investigation of linguistics, but at the same time it should pay more attention to the psycholinguistic ways in which language actually focuses our attention, makes people change their opinions and redescribes reality. The aims of the ordinary language analyses of hermeneutics are adjusted to the conflicts in natural language and in the textual framework. Again, the aim of interpretation is changed in Ricœur’s hermeneutical method. Analysis is used as a part of hermeneutics in a different way than in ordinary language philosophy in the 1950s.

According to Ricœur, in metaphors interpretation creates tension between the literal meaning (the way language is normally used in everyday language), and the metaphorical way of presenting the reality. Metaphor expresses a poetic schema

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301 I use here the word “client” since I consider that it matches better with the therapeutic situation than, for example, the clinical word “patient”.
302 Kopp 1995, xiii.
303 Ricœur 2008, 221.
304 Ricœur 2008, 5-6.
that is often contradictory to reality. According to Ricœur, the metaphorical expression is “paradoxical” in the sense that it includes two claims about being at the same time. Metaphorical expression contains the literal claim “is not” and the metaphorical claim “is”.\(^{305}\)

I would renew and specify Ricœur’s assumption on the workings of metaphor in the following way: Some metaphors produce a tension in the interpretation of a sentence. Tension means that the interpreter does not know how certain concepts are meant to be united, and the tension is between two ways of interpreting the metaphorical expression. So far Ricœur would concur with me. Yet some metaphorical expressions simply do not produce any tension.

In this respect, details of Ricœur’s philosophical intuitions concerning the linguistic analysis of metaphorical expression should be challenged and tested empirically to show how exactly people react when they hear different kinds of metaphors.\(^{306}\) This is also a broader experimental challenge for Ricœur’s method. I have just followed how Ricœur’s linguistic analysis works because in my opinion the direction of his methodology includes various arguments that work. One of them is his investigation and explanation of metaphors as cognitive weapons, and another could be using metaphors in a therapeutic situation to change the viewpoint of a client.

In this section I have explained how Ricœur’s way to practise philosophy is tied to the ideas of text and multiple meaning, and Ricœur takes ambiguous language as the target of analysis. The crucial question, when I start to read the hermeneutical method through the definitions of analysis, is to ask about the role of different ways of analysing in interpretation theory. In the fifth chapter I delve deeper into the question of how interpretation theory in hermeneutics is understood as translation. Next, I revert to the question of how Ricœur uses his dialectical way of mixing philosophical methods.

\(^{305}\) Ricoluer 2008, 255.

\(^{306}\) For example Scott Mio and Katz 1996 give some ideas for more systematic applications of the metaphor theory in social sciences.
5. Ricœur’s Hermeneutic Dialectic

In Chapter 3 of this work, I presented different ways of practising conceptual analysis in analytic philosophy in the twentieth century. In addition to these philosophical methods, I now introduce the key dialectic method in Ricœur's philosophy. In Chapter 5, I explore the method of hermeneutical interpretation among the other methods of analysis in the twentieth century. I utilize the definitions of decompositional, regressive, transformative and connective analyses when searching for the core of Ricœur's hermeneutical method for self-understanding.

The idea that traverses through interpretation theory in hermeneutics and the transformative method of analysis is the translation of a meaningful whole from one context to another. This translation is meant to clarify a meaningful whole that has been interpreted. We will investigate this general idea from different sides in the forthcoming chapters.

In the following chapters, I present examples of the dialectical method in crucial places in Ricœur’s philosophy, in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s and explain what this model for practising philosophy offers to philosophy and other sciences. In 5.1 I take a quick look at the difference between transformative analysis and interpretation in hermeneutics. In 5.2.1, I explain the concept explicated by Ihde, “the hermeneutic dialectic”. This illustrates how the theory of interpretation and the methods of special sciences can function together. In a hermeneutic circle, the theory of interpretation and the interpretative methods of special sciences complement each other. In 5.3 I explain in more detail the connection between the hermeneutic circle and Ricœur's method.

In 5.4, I ponder upon the relationship between Ricœur’s hermeneutics and decompositional analysis, in 5.5, I delve deeper into the regressive analysis in hermeneutics. Later in 5.6, I expound the connective analysis in Ricœur’s method,

and how it makes possible the dialogue between pure armchair analysis and textual exegesis in the humanities. Finally, in 5.7 and 5.7.1, I move on to describe the concept of transformation and translation in hermeneutics.

In Ricœur’s hermeneutics the idea of translation is mixed with linguistic connective analysis and the phenomenological method. My hypothesis is that the description of the hermeneutical method through the conceptions of analysis gives new insight into the investigation on Ricœur’s philosophy as well as the applications of hermeneutic methods to other sciences.

5.1 Interpretation in Analytic Philosophy and in Ricœur’s Hermeneutics

The key question for the methodology of hermeneutics is interpretation as transformation. I start by questioning how this idea was developed, and Ricœur’s role in developing the theory of interpretation that transforms the starting point of interpretation. The transformation of analytic philosophy is changed to another philosophical framework.

As noted earlier, there are similarities between early analytic philosophy and early phenomenology. Some of the contemporary researchers of the history of philosophical analysis, such as Beaney, Haaparanta and Hacker, touch upon the methods of early phenomenology, especially Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological analysis308. They point out similarities between the early phenomenological method of Husserl and Russell’s early analytic philosophy309.

I use the same categorization as the authors mentioned above, but my study goes further into the history of philosophy. This helps to understand the middle period of the 20th century and to see whether Ricœur’s philosophical method fits with some of the types of analysis. I consider that the different roles of transformative analysis become clearer in the different philosophical surroundings of analytic philosophy and hermeneutics.

308 See Beaney 2007, 196-216.
309 Haaparanta 2007, 267. See also Beaney 2007, 208. See also for example Mohanty 1976, 19-23.
The conception of transformation of the self through symbolic expressions found in Ricœur was already pondered in the work of philosophers who can be counted as Anglo-American philosophers. Some other figures of Ricœur’s time present ideas on how exactly schematizing, the simulation of fiction, works. Susanne Langer, for example, discusses the symbolic transformation of experiences. Langer draws the idea of symbolic transformation, for example, from Carnap\textsuperscript{310}. For Carnap the contextual definition and transformation of structural relations were part of his analysis, richer than mere decomposition\textsuperscript{311}.

In my work it has been stressed that the idea of symbolic transformation is clearly seen for example, when reading about the place of metaphor in analytic philosophy. Surely Max Black opened the discussion on metaphor, but the idea of metaphor as a cognitive schema that changes our experience is rooted, for example, in Marcus Hester’s, Langer’s and Ricœur’s work. The influence of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy on Black, Langer, Hester and Ricœur is crucial, yet Wittgenstein did not say much about fictive uses of language, such as metaphor\textsuperscript{312}.

Some of the core ideas common to analytic philosophy and early phenomenology are reformulated and used for different purposes in Ricœur’s hermeneutics. The ideas that were similar in early analytic philosophy and in Husserl’s early phenomenology (e.g. Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen) do not count when Husserl’s method in Ricœur’s hermeneutics is changed. The reason for this change comes from the different use of the methods of early phenomenology and analytic philosophy in Ricœur’s hermeneutics. Ricœur himself refers to this by saying that the hermeneutical approach changes the phenomenological approach\textsuperscript{313}. This historical development from early analytic philosophy can be also seen in the background when the two different meanings of transformative analysis are recognized.

At the same time, however, some ideas presented in analytic philosophy and the interpretive mode of analysis persist in the new hermeneutical surroundings. For example, the transformation of the self through cultural symbolism that is highlighted in Ricœur’s work has its roots in the phenomenology of Husserl (e.g.  

\textsuperscript{310} Langer 1974, 27.  
\textsuperscript{311} Beaney2007, 211.  
\textsuperscript{312} Wittgenstein 2001, 165. Wittgenstein comes close to the question of metaphor when he ponders the interpretation of pictures.  
\textsuperscript{313} Ricœur 2008,17.
The concept of linguistic interpretation was tied to a different kind of methodology in the analytic philosophy of Ricœur’s time and in Ricœur’s hermeneutics. The interpretation of cultural symbolism was seen as a part of interpreting and thus transforming one’s experience.

Hence I propose that there are two main ways of understanding the concept of interpretation that are radically different from one another. The first conception of interpretation, transformative analysis (i.e. “the interpretive analysis”), was named by Beaney, among others. I have highlighted that this transformative analysis contained the idea of symbolic translation from one context of a meaningful whole to another.

The second was defined by Don Ihde as “a hermeneutic dialectic” when he explained the history of hermeneutics. Ricœur’s method of interpretation is also described by himself, Kearney, Jervolino and Davidson, as a translation in which self understanding takes place when the experience of the other is translated again into our own experience. I see the hermeneutical interpretation theory as a strategy to combine linguistic analysis with the practice of interpretation. Ricœur’s method is a combination of detailed methods of analysis and a holistic framework of social interpretation. This kind of broad framework is common in scientific investigations when the research question has its roots in two or more sciences. The idea is to translate certain philosophical or scientific ideas to the language of another science. For the purposes of a very detailed analysis in a smaller area, however, this sort of starting point for a study does not seem convincing.

I motivate Ricœur’s interpretation theory by emphasizing that its model for scientific research is often a necessary alternative to the analysis that only breaks down a too narrowly defined whole into its fundamental parts. This model of analysis is called decompositional analysis. Decompositional analysis can be conceptual analysis, but it is not transformative analysis. Decompositional analysis does not change the form (for example logical form) or translate the ideas in a new way. Instead, transformative analysis is something that gives a new environment, a new context, and thus translates the linguistic expression or the human subject through linguistic expressions. This feature of translation needs more clarification.

What crucially makes a difference between the transformation in Ricœur’s philosophy and in analytic philosophy is the concept of ‘the surplus of meaning’.

314 See for example Ricœur 1992, 54. Here Ricœur refers to the chapter “Fifth Cartesian Mediation” in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations.
315 Ihde 1998, 82.
The aspect of openness of translation includes the fact that translation does not lead to the original meaning but produces the richness in language. Thus, the transformation is not just technical translation to another kind of mode, but creates new living meaning. This concept of “the surplus of meaning” presses the creativity that each translation produces: after each translation meanings are richer.

What is common to transformation in analytic philosophy and in hermeneutics is the translation from one context to another. Beaney speaks about paraphrastic transformation that highlights the interpretation without any kind of reductive aspects to a certain structure. For example, in Carnap’s transformative analysis things of one kind (concepts) are used to define or construct other kinds (numbers in Carnaps case)\(^\text{316}\). This kind of paraphrasing occurs in the translation that a hermeneutic practises, yet the object of analysis is not numbers. Ricœur described this method of interpretation as the translation of any meaningful whole from one context to another context in a speech community\(^\text{317}\). Translation includes the idea that something foreign, external to ourselves, is absorbed into our own understanding\(^\text{318}\).

Now I have characterized some main ideas that connect Ricœur’s interpretation theory to analytic methods. The way Ricœur applies the methods of analysis is the same as he uses for any scientific methods as a part of his philosophical journey. In Ricœur’s hermeneutical theory, the types of analysis as well as the results and ideas of other sciences are as good as any other idea that helps to interpret the object studied. Ricœur’s interpretation theory provides a general framework for interpretive methods in special sciences. In this scenario, a hermeneutist introduces interpretation theory, and combines it and tests it with the methods of other sciences. This also means that the Riceurian interpretation theory settles in the right place when the investigation concerns the relationship between theory and practice. In the following chapters, the way in which hermeneutic theory uses the different types of analysis is made clearer. Next, the use of interpretive methodology is explained.

\(^{317}\) Ricœur 2007, 11.
\(^{318}\) Ricœur 2007, 4.
5.2 Interpretation Theory

Above I started to ponder Beaney’s interpretive analysis in contact with hermeneutics. In this chapter I first define the relationship between hermeneutical theory and the interpretive methods in interpretive sciences. Following that, in 5.2.1, I go deeper into this dialogue by giving an account of Ricœur’s philosophical method called “hermeneutic dialectic”. This core method contains the interplay between interpretation theory in hermeneutics and interpretive methods in special sciences.

I have stressed the fact that Ricœur’s method itself is also characterized as translation, since in his methodology Ricœur translates one philosophical view or theory into the language of another philosophical or scientific theory. What Ihde calls ‘hermeneutic methodology’ is an approach that sees the hermeneutical principles in relation to the methods of other disciplines. Often this relation needs simple translation, so that two different traditions can, for example, meet and communicate with each other. Making a distinction between hermeneutical interpretation and the types of analysis that it uses should help to recognize what Ricœur’s aim is when he presents his interpretation theory he applies to the problem of self-knowledge.

In hermeneutics interpretation is practised in a specific sense that is different from transformative analysis in early analytic philosophy. How and why is transformation so different in hermeneutics and in analytic philosophy, as clear as it initially seems to be? One way to study this question is to ascertain what is interpretation theory in Ricœur’s philosophy. This brings us back to the question of interpretation as translation from one language into another and interpretation as translation in hermeneutics.

When investigating hermeneutical theory, a distinction must be made between hermeneutical interpretation theory and concrete interpretive methods in the different fields of interpretive sciences. This reveals the philosophical core that Ricœur offers for the interpretive action in the different fields. This distinction is merely a conceptual difference, not a concrete interpretation situation. The argument for this claim is that hermeneutic interpretation is always present in each specific interpretive act in a special science. The hermeneutic act of interpretation

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319 Ihde 1996, 64.
is present for example in a psychoanalyst’s interpretation of a patient’s traumas as much as the act of interpretation is present in a laboratory or in a courtroom.

Hermeneutic theory is tied to its history, and to the fields it is applied to. It consists of a set of hermeneutic ideas modified by different authors of the tradition, such as Dilthey or Heidegger. In Ricœur’s case, this theory modified by tradition is used in self-interpretation. It appears from Ricœur’s work that the relationship between theory and practice is obvious in various fields of interpretive sciences: When it comes to the philosophy of language, Ricœur holds that the interpretation theory that concerns language takes into account the methodology and discoveries of modern linguistics. Ricœur’s theory of discourse is applied to the questions of a text and narrativity in the theory of literature. Also, Ricœur applies his method to the concept of action in sociology and political science.

William Schaweiker notes that Ricœur’s philosophy typically offers a “methodological aid to theological reflection, say in his account of narrative, his construal of the arc of interpretation, his work on biblical thinking, or his powerful reflections on human fault, evil and hope.” Ricœur’s interpretation theory uses as many examples of the actual interpretive methods as possible.

I see the purpose of Ricœur’s interpretation theory in the following way: The idea is that the uses of these interpretative methods are often special cases that must be studied in detail within the context of specific sciences. Ricœur’s underlying assumption here is that the theory of interpretation is not useful if it is not applicable to the fields of concrete interpretation. What is phenomenological in Ricœur’s phenomenological hermeneutics is the approach that tries to capture the essence of an investigated phenomenon on the basis of one well-chosen example. Yet Ricœur himself often uses many well-chosen examples. Kearney summarizes Ricœur’s idea of theory and practice in a more hermetic manner by saying that the Ricœurian enterprise of philosophy “must seek to bring together the utopian ‘horizon of expectation’ with our actual field of experience.” In this sense, I would call Ricœur’s hermeneutic approach a skill that a hermeneutic can develop and master. The reason for this approach is that the only philosophical or phenomenological armchair analysis remains in some cases too narrow, and is

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321 Ricœur 1991b, 442.
322 Ricœur 1991b, 442.
323 Schaweiker 2010, 45.
324 See Kakkuri-Knuuttila 2000, 16-17.
325 Lanigan 1996, 313.
often based on philosophical intuitions. For Ricœur, the pure phenomenology of Husserl represented this kind of narrow philosophical analysis for the investigation of human experience.

The hermeneutic method proposed by Ricœur could be listed as a new type of method that shows the limitations of the philosophical armchair analysis considering only logical forms of ideal language. Ricœur offers one alternative for highly theoretical armchair philosophy, different than the four other modes of philosophical inquiry, better defined than the different types of analysis considered in section three.

Ricœur's way of practising hermeneutics differs from the canon of the history of hermeneutics. In Chapter 2.1, I made it clear that in Dilthey’s hermeneutics interpretation involves a combination of various mental processes, some of which are shared with the scientific method. The influence of Heidegger and Gadamer is apparent in many respects: The idea of dialectic hermeneutics is a close relative to Gadamer's "fusion of horizons". Ricœur takes this idea and uses it as his philosophical view that is open to new influences. He writes as follows:

Another index of the dialectic of participation and distanciation is provided by the concept of the fusion of horizons (Horizontverschmelzung) (WM 289ff., 356, 375, TM 273ff., 337, 358). - - We owe to Gadamer this very fruitful idea, that is, the intersection of their views on the distant and open. Once again the element of distanciation within the near, the far and the open is presupposed.

In this quotation, Ricœur tries to communicate, roughly, the idea that when two ways of understanding meet, something new emerges. What he calls distanciation is the act of making our subjective experience distant while reading a text. The dialectic is to present something as distant and then understanding a text when the experience is applied to the text.

In his philosophy, Ricœur's own hermeneutic theory is in the distance when he becomes acquainted with methods of other sciences. He then applies this knowledge to the hermeneutic theory. The hermeneutic theory is renewed in this

327 Rickman 1979, 147.
manner again and again in contact with actual interpretive examples, and its ideas are brought to each interpretive framework of each special science. This distanciation needs as its counterpart the idea of application. The ideas can be applied again when they have been at a distance for a while.

Interpretation theory in twentieth century hermeneutics, as seen in Heidegger or Gadamer, does not often go into the details of how the interpretive methods in the special sciences, such as linguistics, sociology or psychoanalysis, are actually practised. Yet they do important interpretive work in theology. With these hermeneutics that do not pay attention to the special methods of sciences, a hermeneutic philosopher can build an interpretation theory without presenting concrete methods on the basis of this theory. Ricœur’s hermeneutical work moves in another direction – his aim is to have an encounter with the interpretive disciplines. In this sense, Ricœur’s hermeneutics comes closer to the methodological hermeneutics presented by Dilthey 328.

Ricœur explains the term “interpretation theory”, for example, in his book “Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning” 329. In this work, he clearly thinks that interpretation theory relates to how the semantics of words and sentences are dominated by the human act of signifying 330. He calls this “a dialectic between event and meaning” 331. Interpretation theory connects the theory of action and the philosophy of language. This immediate merging of methods of different fields sets interpretation theory apart from Gadamerian hermeneutics.

I have now explained only the general idea behind the distinction between interpretation and methods. I now define this interaction by referring to some commentators. I also consider Ricœur's views against the background of different theories of action.

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329 See, for example Ricœur 1976, 25.
330 Ricœur 1976, 12.
331 Ricœur 1976, 8.
5.2.1 Hermeneutic dialectic

As pointed out above, when Ricœur's method is traced back in the history of twentieth century philosophy, we find it was dubbed *hermeneutic dialectic*. This name, coined by Don Ihde, highlights the fact that Ricœur's method is a continuous dialogue, not merely an analysis seeking definitions in the form of decompositional analysis. With the term *hermeneutic dialectic* Ihde emphasizes Ricœur's way of attacking contemporary problems of self-understanding and social critique.

The background assumption for Ricœur is that the conception of interpretation in philosophy should be ‘concrete’ in the sense that it communicates with the sciences that investigate the socio-cultural world. Ihde concedes that in the dialectic, the starting point for philosophical investigation is that “any single perspective approach will always remain insufficient to penetrate the insights needed, and particularly to such topics as self-understanding or human action.” The process of philosophical inquiry itself is a dialectical process that does not have a certain starting point, but the topic investigated is taken under consideration.

The hermeneutic dialectic is also described by the concept of translation. Kearney highlights the aspects of Ricœur's method which in the end come close to what Ihde captures by his definition of hermeneutic dialectic. Ricœur's method of interpretation is in this picture understood as translation, and this implies that good translation involves crucially openness to the other.

The idea of transformation in hermeneutics can be seen as a top category that includes all the more specific transformations in sciences and in transformative analysis. A hermeneutic tries to capture the most general rules and norms of understanding. Hence the transformation that is part of Ricœur's hermeneutics serves as a superstructure to the more specific transformation, for example, the Russellian translation from one language to another. This idea is seen when the idea of transformation in hermeneutics is applied to interpretation in other disciplines.

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332 Ihde 1996, 64.
333 Ricœur 1974, 4. See also Thompson 1989, 23.
334 Ihde 1996, 64.
335 Kearney 2006, 151.
Fairly recently, Scott Davidson published a work on Ricœur’s contact with other disciplines. Davidson aptly notes the problems and possibilities of interdisciplinary studies suggested by Ricœur’s philosophy. Davidson claims that the interdisciplinary scholar serves two masters and has to convince two audiences – her own, and that of the other fields. The interdisciplinary scholar transfers ideas from one discipline to another. Davidson emphasizes that Ricœur’s work is not so much philosophy of language, but philosophy through language.

Davidson also considers that the abovementioned Kearney’s aspect of translating one meaningful whole of linguistic signs or symbolism into another is one of the paradigms of Ricœur’s philosophy. When symbols and text are the keys for interpretation, the translation from philosophy to another discipline is a paradigm for the interdisciplinary work. Hermeneutic dialectic is, from this point of view, translation from one discipline (some of its structures, concepts and rules) to another. This translation serves to present the ideas of a certain science in the form of another discipline.

Reverting to transformative analysis, in the case of transformation from one language to a certain logical form, the translation is more technical. Yet the idea that the translation proceeds from one meaningful system of signs to another is the same. In Ricœur’s philosophy this aspect is stressed when he notes that all actual translations from one language to another involve a dialogue between the self and the other. Therefore the translation has two aspects: from one meaningful entity of signs to another, and its specific meaning of transfer between different members of the same linguistic community. From this point of view Ricœur claims that translation is the paradigm of hermeneutics. In the 1970’s and 1980’s he emphasized the slogan that a text is a paradigm of hermeneutics. As Kearney notes, the idea that translation is the key method of hermeneutics continues this idea. In addition to the frameworks presented by the commentators, I distinguish two different things in dialectical hermeneutics, although in Ricœur’s methodology they are tied together.

Firstly, for Ricœur, the mere philosophical attitude means that a philosopher needs to be interdisciplinary to develop a working philosophical theory. The philosophy includes the attitude that different ideas are heard and the philosopher

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336 Davidson 2010, 5.
337 Davidson 2010, 5.
338 Davidson 2010, 3.
339 Kearney 2004, xviii.
tries to understand (translate the object studied into his own language) these different voices. Behind any methodology, a philosopher’s interpretation should have a humble attitude towards any studied problem in any special science. A methodological aim for knowledge goes hand in hand with a subservient attitude. I see this aspect as an important ethical starting point tied to Ricoeur’s thoughts on the methodology of interpretation. Ricoeur describes this dialectical character of his thinking in the following way:

- - I am merely embellishing on the dialectical character that Don Ihde so strongly emphasizes in my undertaking. This character concerns not only my relationship to every thought that I examine, or friend and foe alike, nor even my respect for irreducibly conflictual situations on the plane of fundamental interpretations, from The Conflict of Interpretations to Time and Narrative, but essentially the tension between the short path of a direct ontology and the long path of a reflection for which the opaqueness of the “I am” requires the innumerable detours of mediation.

The dialectic considered by Ihde, Kearney and Davidson above is also described as a discussion between the self and the other, as Ricoeur points out in the quotation above. The “I am” in the last sentence of the quotation means the investigation of the self that refers to the cogito, to Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”, which in Ricoeur’s approach can be found only through reflection of the cultural manifestations in the world. The hermeneutic standpoint reflects upon the question of the extent to which the methodology of textual interpretation can serve as a paradigm for interpretation and understanding in human sciences. Again, this claim means that to understand the selfhood, we have to translate the outer meaningful whole of signs to our own view of the world.

Secondly, this means reflection on the special sciences. As noted in Chapter two, this “other” in Ricoeur’s philosophy can signify the sciences that investigate the human from psychological and social perspectives. Yet this approach does not exhaust every question that might be raised about selfhood.

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341 See for example Vikström 2000, 27-28. This is a point that Björn Vikström has emphasized in his work on Ricoeur.
342 Ricoeur 1996, 73. Italicsations in the quotation are Ricoeur’s.
343 Ricoeur 1989, 197.
Importantly the quotation above reveals one of the background assumptions of this dialectic. Hermeneutic dialectic also includes or implies the more general ethical idea in Ricœur’s work. The dialectical approach is to listen to and interpret different kinds of ideas without hesitating to pass judgement. Every thought can be valuable, and the knowledge or the wisdom is not rebuilt alone, but together with other thinkers, authors and people. Yet this aspect is not the heart of my study, it is one part of Ricœur’s approach in which an existential and an ethical attitude meets argumentative analysis.

Ricœur uses the term “dialectic” in various contexts, yet it is mainly restricted to the communication between the special sciences and philosophy. These special sciences and the interpretive methods used in them form a set of clear examples of an actual interpretation. Arguably, the general act of interpretation is part of practically any science. In each science, there are humans who interpret a certain object of investigation, as well as certain methods.

Since the special sciences have several interpretative methods, we can ultimately only define very general principles of interpretation common to them all. In the context of the philosophy of science, Ricœur modifies his conception of the dialectic between explanation in the natural sciences and understanding in the human sciences. Dilthey's dichotomy between explanation and understanding is visible, according to Ricœur, in Anglo-American philosophy. This dichotomy is also present in the philosophical discussions that differentiate the cause and motive of human action. In the following chapters I explain how Ricœur wants to overcome both these dichotomies.

5.2.1.1 Hermeneutic Dialectic of Explanation and Understanding

Ricœur’s ideas of the relationship between philosophy and science do not correspond to the general picture of hermeneutics, since he rejects the dualism, drawn from Dilthey, between explanation and understanding. Ricœur states that “- - the polarity between explanation and understanding in reading must not be treated in dualistic terms, but as a complex and highly mediated dialectic.” The model that Ricœur criticizes assumes that explanation concerns natural sciences and understanding concerns human sciences.

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345 Lanigan 1996, 304.
346 Ricœur 1976, 74.
Ricœur is a methodological pluralist who considers that explanation and understanding work within all sciences. Methodological pluralism is vital when the aim of science is to be multidisciplinary. For example, in fields such as educational studies, social sciences or psychology, (also e.g. in the field called social psychiatry studied, for example, at the University of Tampere), the dichotomy between explanation and understanding is often unclear, since the starting point for this science is to combine the methods of understanding and explanation.

However, in Ricœur’s hands this dialectic of explanation and understanding does not, in most cases, relate to Dilthey’s original question. Ricœur himself says that “[T]he notion of explanation has since been displaced, so that it derives no longer from natural sciences but from properly linguistic models”347. Here, Ricœur is referring to the way how, and the time when the French structuralists used the term “explanation”348. Yet in some other connections where Ricœur comments more explicitly on the Anglo-American discussion, he clearly speaks about explanation in connection with natural sciences349. Thus Ricœur speaks about explanation merely as linguistic explanation, but still he does not exclude explanation in the context of natural sciences. Obviously the concept of explanation in natural sciences can mean very many things in connection to different sciences. According to Ricœur, this dichotomy is untenable. He states that “- - understanding will be a naïve grasping of the meaning of the text as a whole. The second time, comprehension will be a sophisticated mode of understanding, supported by explanatory procedures”350. Here, for example, he speaks about the understanding of linguistic phenomena and explanations afforded done by structural models.

Ricœur uses the term “dialectic”, particularly to describe how language use and human actions are connected. He thinks that the same dialectic of explanation and understanding appears in the scientific study of language. Ricœur himself is somewhat ambiguous when it comes to his comment on the dialectic between explanation and understanding. First he speaks about interpretation in a narrower sense: Interpretation is understood as the understanding of a text. Then the meaning of the term “interpretation” is understood more inclusively. According to Ricœur “- - the term “interpretation” may be applied, not to a particular case of understanding, that of the written expressions of life, but to the whole process that encompasses explanation and understanding.”. Interpretation is understood as a

347 Ricœur 1989, 145.
348 Ricœur 1976, 86.
349 See, for example, Reagan 1996, 339.
350 Ricœur 1976, 74.
description of the whole process from explanation to understanding. I understand this to mean that interpretation is a more general theoretical framework that is always present when a scientist explains and understands a certain object of her investigation. This description could be seen as a description of any scientist, whether she be a natural scientist or a social scientist.

Ricoeur’s object of investigation is human action. This human phenomenon for Ricoeur is situated between causality, which needs explanation, and motivation, requiring pure understanding. In a Kantian manner Ricoeur considers that nature and culture need to be studied hand in hand.351 When he describes the core of any scientific process, he describes the interpretation of an action of a scientist. Human action here is distinguished from behaviour in that it is interpreted in a comprehensive way by its agents. Action is also oriented towards other people. As noted earlier, in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, human action is interpreted through the same principles that are used in the interpretation of texts.352

According to Lanigan, what Ricoeur understands to be the objective structure of the human sciences is also open to empirical investigation353. In principle, this conception of interpretation could also be present in the process in which a natural scientist explains and understands her object of investigation. Yet Ricoeur himself does not explain this point carefully enough. His interpretation theory concentrates more on understanding human actions than explaining this action from the perspective of natural sciences. Ricoeur does not, for example, explain human action from the point of view of different mental states activated in a certain situation of a social action. The role of an agent and the connection between action and language in Ricoeur’s work needs some contextualization to the theories of action in general. It suffices here to note that Ricoeur’s dialectical hermeneutics include different perspectives on the event and action.

In philosophical theories of action, especially in the work on practical rationality, there are several identifiable ways of explaining human action, and Ricoeur’s way to handle this question of action touches many of them. I list some of these views, and then explain how Ricoeur’s ideas fit in:

In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Elijah Millgram lists the most crucial ways to study action: 1) The Calculative View of Action concentrates on the inference patterns of the structure of actions. This view emphasizes that the actions are not

351 Lanigan 1996, 304.
caused by a person’s psychological states. This means that there is a reason to do something, a reason whose force is: this is a step toward the termination point of my action. 2) The Authorship View of Action assumes that action is authored; action is in one way or another guided by some author. Actions are attributed to agents. 3) The Practive View of Actions highlights that the agent has a generic role in the generic game (the analog of ‘player,’ in chess or baseball). These practices specify standards and reasons, and so ‘practical reason’ turns out to be a practice status as well. 4) The View of Evaluation as Essential to Action presses the intentional action: Intentional action by requiring, that agents endorse their actions at the time they are initiated. This includes the idea that the reasons for action are drawn from two mutually exclusive classes of psychological states, desires and beliefs, where beliefs are understood to have no properly evaluative content.\textsuperscript{354} 

In Ricœur’s way of speaking about action the semantics and human actions are connected to the agent. The agent’s actions are read through semantics. Ricœur pondered between different ways of speaking about action, and he ponders the possibilities of the agentless semantics of action\textsuperscript{355}. He refers to two ways of approaching the problem: Ricœur considers that the speech of cause and of event and motivation and action are two different ways of speaking about what is behind some action/event. Yet, Ricœur criticises those theories that see the actions as agentless, and in which any reference to an agent is suppressed\textsuperscript{356}. Clearly the abovementioned Calculative View of Action is the target of criticism.

Finally, Ricœur presents a view that has characteristics of the 2) The Authorship View and the idea of 4) Evaluation as Essential to Action. The agent and her purposes are seen through language. Intention is something that distinguishes action from other events\textsuperscript{357}. Every action involves an initiative of the agent in the world\textsuperscript{358}. Thus Ricœur claims that every action is both purposive and related to other actions. The bodily acting of the agent is highlighted in Ricœur’s view on action\textsuperscript{359}. I want add to this that Ricœur’s view on action includes the basic existential and ontological question of selfhood. For example Pellauer stresses that Ricœur’s theory of action is motivated by the question “who?”, “who did this?”.

\textsuperscript{355} Ricœur 1992, 85.
\textsuperscript{356} Ricœur 1992, 95.
\textsuperscript{357} Ricœur 1992, 75.
\textsuperscript{358} Ricœur 1992, 109.
\textsuperscript{359} Pellauer 2007, 93.
The answer is that there is the author of an action who has a personal identity\textsuperscript{360}\textsuperscript{2}. The starting point is that the action can be seen as an event, but that at the same time there is always a person who commits an action.

Thus the statement that I referred to above, that bodily human action is interpreted through the same principles that are used in the interpretation of texts, includes various ideas: Ricœur refers to the same kind of model that is described in 3) The Practice View of Action, when he speaks about placing the action in the context of norms and the rules of interpretation\textsuperscript{361}. Yet the role of the agent is a part of this, in the sense that the intention of an agent produces the action.

Although Ricœur refers to the cases of cause and effect, his way of describing the concept of hermeneutic dialectic does not go very deeply into the question of causal explanation in natural sciences. Ricœur concentrates on the question of how the theory of hermeneutics faces the different cases of interpretation. Each field of interpretation is a test case for this general philosophical theory of interpretation. The conception of dialectic is a model for the human sciences that try to understand their target, to observe external facts, and to submit hypotheses to empirical verification.

The reason for this intolerance toward the above-mentioned distinction (often inferred from Dilthey’s work) is that interpretation is something that precedes the actual scientific process. Ricœur does not give an answer to how well explanation and understanding work together, but does point out that both of these methods need interpretation. This interpretation takes the interpretation of an action as its starting point. Human sciences presuppose the interpretation of an object of investigation in any case even when they use explanatory devices\textsuperscript{362}. It is an attitude of a scientist, whether she notices it herself or not. Even though the scientist may produce the closed system of a human action, for example, in a laboratory, the system still needs the spheres of interpretation. The scientist in a laboratory isolates the system and creates the initial conditions. She may explain the object of investigation with the empirical results. Surely she also understands and draws some conclusions that are not purely explanatory.

Nonetheless, Ricœur points out, these acts of explanation and understanding already assume the interpretation of the objects of science\textsuperscript{363}. Interpretation is a

\textsuperscript{360} Pellauer 2007, 91.
\textsuperscript{361} Ricœur 1992, 64.
\textsuperscript{362} Raatikainen 2004, 87.
\textsuperscript{363} Ricœur 1976, 74.
framework that is based on the intersubjective experience. In Ricœur’s hermeneutics, this intersubjective experience must be recognized when any scientific work is accomplished. This is precisely where the scientist needs groundwork of an interpretation. She can re-establish objective knowledge in a specific explanation on the basis of this pre-objective knowledge that is guaranteed by the intersubjectivity of our experience that is expressed in a language and organized as a text.

I have already pointed out that according to Ricœur, the methods of textual understanding serve as the methods of humanities and social sciences. I read Ricœur here in the following way: The principles of interpretation used in text interpretation are something that needs to be taken into account even before a scientist has started to explain or to understand. These principles are a part of any scientific interpretation act. For example, the interpretation of chronic pain in chronic pain patients is a framework that is based on the intersubjective experience that of the scientific community. The clinical study of the mental states of depressed chronic pain patients needs an interpretive starting point of the basic concepts of depression, a framework of interpretation about the use and nature of these concepts. It is better for the investigation that these interpretive assumptions are clearly seen by the readers of this investigation.

Another aspect of traversing the dichotomy between explanation and understanding that Ricœur points out is that philosophers have forgotten that the human body is simultaneously both an object and a conscious entity capable of taking responsibility. Reagan states that Ricœur criticizes those philosophers who have forgotten the human body is simultaneously an object among other objects and the mode of existence being capable of taking charge of himself. Here the influence of Merleau-Ponty is clear. Ricœur thinks that the human phenomenon is situated between a causality that requires explanation and a motivation requiring purely rational understanding. If causality here is understood as the causality of modern natural sciences, he seems to think that the explanation also refers directly to the methods of natural sciences. The isolated closed system of science needs to be decoded in the context of action and put into motion. This is the reason why Ricœur’s conception of causation is tied to his conception of a bodily being.

Ricœur’s philosophy contains two different ideas of causality, namely, the physical and the intentional order. This idea is influenced by the Kantian idea that a human

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lives in two worlds: the world of nature and that of morality that concerns human freedom. Since Ricœur's framework of explanation seems in many cases to refer to linguistics, it seems that ultimately his overcoming the dichotomy between explanation and understanding connects to how the human sciences see the human being’s physical and intentional acts. Again, in this sense his conception of causality does not really explain how the original question of overcoming the explanation and understanding occurs in the conception of a text. The only way to grasp this idea is to say that the interpretation of an action with the principles of text interpretation is always a part of scientific explanation or understanding. Ricœur assumes that the principles of textual interpretation are such fundamentally intersubjective assumptions that these principles need to be taken into account in any interpretive method.

The dialectic is an ongoing interaction between the hermeneutical theory and the results and ideas of other sciences, as well as the different types of analysis. Ihde puts this idea in other words: Ricœur’s strategy is to develop the interaction between phenomenology (this means Ricœur’s version of phenomenology, considered as hermeneutic phenomenology) and a framework or a result of some other field than philosophy. The dialectic can be seen between a phenomenological analysis and the results of other fields. Ihde’s presentation of the hermeneutic dialectic has also been pointed out by other Ricœur’s commentators. Next, I present some examples of how the general theory of interpretation uses some methods of special sciences in Ricœur’s philosophy.

### 5.2.1.2 Reinterpretation of Unconscious as an Example of Hermeneutic Dialectic

I offer a short example of how the dialectic appears in the middle period of Ricœur’s philosophy, between 1960 and 1970. For example, in Ricœur’s *The Voluntary and the Involuntary* and *Freud and Philosophy*, Ricœur aimed at creating a dialectic between the methods of phenomenology and psychoanalysis. It is noteworthy that dialectic hermeneutics in Ricœur’s philosophy changes from his early writings on phenomenology and Freud to his later studies on the narration of

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369 See, for example, Davidson 2010, 2.
personhood. Here, I follow Karl Simms and Richard Kearney’s presentations on Ricœur’s writing on psychoanalysis.

Ricœur’s viewpoint on psychoanalysis is motivated by his hermeneutic interpretation theory. He thinks that self-awareness needs “a deeper therapy from the other”\(^{370}\). This means that his project of hermeneutics that needs an objective criterion for self-understanding can use psychoanalysis as a means to achieve self-understanding. Ihde remarks that in Ricœur’s psychoanalytic position in his *Freud and Philosophy* the subject needs objective guidance, with which she “slowly and painfully learns through another”\(^{371}\). Ricœur also criticizes to Freudian psychoanalysis, and tries to introduce some new ideas from the hermeneutic point of view.

Ricœur’s way of reading Freud through philosophical lenses is a serious attempt at finding hermeneutical principles from this therapeutic form of science. It questions early phenomenological analysis and what Ricœur reads to be Husserl’s neutral attitude towards époche\(^{372}\). Yet it also criticizes the Freudian concept of the unconscious, and examines it through phenomenology and hermeneutics. His way of dealing with psychoanalysis differs in many respects from that of some of his French colleagues (such as Derrida or Gillez and Deleuze), who often introduce psychoanalytic language into the literary way of expression. From the philosophical perspective, Ricœur pays attention to questions of meaning in dreams, symptoms and culture\(^{373}\). In this respect, Ricœur’s way of dealing with psychoanalysis arises from a motivation different from that of many of his French colleagues. The idea that “I” needs reflexivity with objectivist strategies as its counterpart also means that without these objectivist strategies, the phenomenological method includes a temptation for self-deception.

A subject under psychoanalysis no longer tries to understand himself through introspection, but becomes dependent on the external interpretation of an analyst\(^{374}\). I would add to these remarks that Ricœur’s objectivist strategies also serves as a critique of solipsism. A solipsist might think that existence primarily means her existence and her mental states. Ricœur’s interpretation of psychoanalysis highlights that the analyst forces a person to reflect these mental states on the outer world and other people. He draws more on the later Husserl,
even on the *Crisis in European Sciences*. In such cases, the hermeneutic process is needed to explain the unsaid.

Kearney points out that psychoanalytic methods fulfil Ricœur’s idea of an interpretation as avoiding self-deception and revealing new interpretations. Ricœur states that a psychoanalytic method is a form of ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’\(^{375}\). This means that according to Ricœur, along with Marx and Nietzsche, Freud was the master of revealing the falsifying potential of images\(^{376}\). Ricœur notes that Freud’s theory on neurosis is based on his method of dream analysis\(^{377}\). As Freud himself points out, he discovered a certain kind of method of dream interpretation when he was practising psychoanalytic studies among certain psychopathological structures, for example hysterical phobias, obsessive ideas\(^{378}\). From the perspective of the hermeneutical theory of interpretation, the method of psychoanalysis shows how images conceal or reveal meaning. Ricœur, for example, addresses the idea that dream images can serve as a mask or disclose meanings. Kearney says that the method of psychoanalysis “works as a means of detecting the censoring function of dream images”. The idea of this method is to ‘disclose the variety of elaborate procedures which interpose between apparent and latent meaning’\(^{379}\).

The contact of phenomenology with psychoanalysis can be seen in the investigation of an act of epochê or the phenomenological reduction. The reduction is an act in which the natural attitude is bracketed. Immediate knowledge is suspended. The everyday certainty of the correct state of things a person has before the phenomenological bracketing is similar to the state a person is in before she undergoes psychoanalysis. The phenomenological process fractures this “natural phenomenological attitude”. In the same way consciousness is wounded in psychoanalytic therapy.\(^{380}\) From this point of view the psychoanalytic method can be seen as a reduction of those things that an unreflecting consciousness takes for granted.

This suspicion of psychoanalysis has its counterpart in affirmation. Suspicion reveals how images disguise our private or collective past. Affirmation means that images can also open up new dimensions of meaning.\(^{381}\) This meaning in Ricœur’s
version of phenomenology is linguistic meaning that opens up imagination. The language that creates new images and creative imagination opens up new dimensions of meaning. Simms, for example, points out that the contact between the phenomenological method and psychoanalysis is their views on language.\textsuperscript{382}

One example of the affirmation of images could be the correspondence between the image of one’s dream and a literal event in the past. A person may change her attitude towards a certain moment of a traumatic situation in the past by changing the images describing it. Here, Ricœur conjoined the analysis of linguistic symbols with the psychoanalytic procedure. Kearney summarizes the view of Ricœur’s hermeneutics on psychoanalysis as follows:

And an additional reminder which hermeneutics receives from psychoanalysis is that the images of the unconscious are charged with multiple associations which are irreducible to the level of a one-to-one conceptual correspondence. They provoke rational interpretation; but the rational interpretation can never exhaust them.

This quotation includes the idea that the hidden meanings of the unconscious are ascribed rational criteria, but variations of interpretation remain open. Freud emphasized that it makes a difference when “there is one more psychical activity at work than in the most attentive self-observation.”\textsuperscript{383} In psychoanalysis, the unconscious only becomes comprehensible through the mediation of an analyst. Yet the rational interpretation cannot empty the unconscious of all its meanings. Here, Ricœur’s critique concerns the nature of the unconscious: unconsciousness is not intentional. Freud’s theory consists of the idea that the subject’s intentions are effects caused by hidden desires.\textsuperscript{384} Freud’s method of dream analysis includes the idea that a dream has a purpose that can be explained to have been caused by something else.\textsuperscript{385}

However, according to Ricœur the unconscious is not something that thinks, perceives or remembers. These acts must come from the level of an analyst. There is the unconscious, but we could not say, as Ricœur would attribute to Freud, that the unconscious is an independent real entity separated from superseding or

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{382} Simms 2010, 202.
\textsuperscript{383} Freud 1978, 101.
\textsuperscript{384} Simms 2010, 196.
\textsuperscript{385} Simms 2010, 197.
\end{flushleft}
encompassing consciousness. The subconscious is a psychoanalyst's interpretation of the symbols in dreams. Contrary to Freud, Ricœur does not accept the idea that meaning was already given in unconsciousness. “- -desires expressed in waking language… are only desires as conceived by the psychoanalyst or by the subject himself as he adopts them.”

The phenomenological perspective hints at the idea that the unconscious is a bodily phenomenon. Ricœur says “that the mode of being of the body, neither representation in me or thing outside of me, is the ontic model for any conceivable unconscious.” Here Ricœur emphasizes the idea that an embodied experience is brought to the level of language. The acting embodied being is brought to the level of language, for example when the agent of an action is asked. The question “who is acting?” necessitates the name of the author, whereas when the motives of an embodied action are elicited the action is an open-ended process. For Ricœur, this perspective of embodiment is clearly stated in many points of his philosophy in accordance with bodily movement, the meaning that is caught up within a body’s meaningful behaviour.

Now I have briefly explained how the method of phenomenological reduction and the method of psychoanalysis meet in the hermeneutics of suspicion. The hermeneutic interpretation of a hidden meaning and the conflicts of interpretations are used in the research, critique and even development of the method of psychoanalysis. This method, and some of its main background assumptions, have also been criticized from the hermeneutic point of view. Such of methodological comparisons led Ricœur to study more the symbolic ways of using language, the multiple meanings at the level of linguistics.

This type of hermeneutic dialectic can be found in Ricoeur’s work only when the focus is not on the effects of psychoanalysis and the method of interpretation is being studied through language and analytic philosophy. In 1975, the dialectical position is taken further in the linguistic studies central to the development of Ricœur’s work, namely in The Rule of Metaphor (La métaphore vive, 1975), where Ricœur emphasizes the metaphorical structures of language which, according to him, work between the unsaid experience and a linguistic expression that is a modification of that experience. During that period, he draws on the idea of an

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386 Simms 2010, 199.
387 Ricœur 1970, 389
388 Ricœur 1970, 382.
390 See for example Pellauer 200, 97.
event that displaces linguistic structuralism from the critical studies of biblical thought.\textsuperscript{391} I stress that the relationship between experience and language is present in Ricœur’s philosophy from his studies on symbolism and metaphor to his studies on narration. The experience is modified in a human being’s creative and linguistic imagination. The creative imagination is often created by the linguistic usages of metaphors. The experience is sketched in the imagination and applied to reality. Ricœur takes the idea of an unconscious that has bodily aspects as well, changes it into the idea that the pre-understanding of an embodied action is reflected at the level of language. I have already given some examples of this linguistic interpretation in Chapter 4 and present more examples of this dialectic when I investigate connective analysis.

5.2.1.3 Critical Remarks on Dialectical Hermeneutics

So far these characterizations of Ricœur’s interpretation theory and its way of applying methods of special sciences, left some questions open, and also leave space for criticism. I will point out some of the problems and consider possible solutions here, and continue on with some of them in the following sub-chapters.

The first criticism of Ricœur’s open starting point for philosophy would be that in this way, we end up doing nothing but merely presenting broad armchair scenarios of the “so-and-so”. Surely Ricœur’s aim is to show how self-understanding is achieved dialectically through others, like an analyst in psychoanalysis. In a scientific approach, this means that the human being and her social being can be explained by combining different interpretive investigations that all aim at the explanation of a subject from various perspectives. Pellauer, for example, points out that Ricœur’s hermeneutics does not include the physiological basis of selfhood in natural sciences\textsuperscript{392}. Yet the bigger picture of self-understanding is connected to the reactions that occur in our body\textsuperscript{393}.

In Ricœur’s philosophy, the above-mentioned assumed claim of empty tolerance in his dialectic is not the aim. When hermeneutical understanding is not enough and leaves the question open, the explanatory view of a special science is used as a tool

\textsuperscript{391} Ihde 1998, 84.
\textsuperscript{392} Pellauer 2007, 91.
\textsuperscript{393} Ricœur 1970, 382.
for understanding. This is what happens in Ricœur’s study on Freud. The process of building scientific knowledge proceeds in a hermeneutic circle to advance closer to the more explicit scientific model of the topic under examination. Science and philosophy both investigate the human being through cultural symbols and narratives, etc. Freud’s analysis reveals the idea of how the narratives and symbols bring to light ideas from the unconscious. At the same time, the Freudian conception of the unconscious is criticized. The intersubjective nature of psychoanalysis is in contradiction to the idea that the unconscious is intentional.

This does not mean that we cannot have subjective insights into our own feelings, states of mind, etc., but the status of these feelings and states of mind, as well as the criteria for them, stem from outside of our own experience. Human beings’ experiences are mediated through language, and through non-linguistic signs and symbols, through stories, through works of art as the expressions of a subject. The variety is vast, and natural language does not in every case have a function in the mediation.

The second critique of Ricœur’s standpoint is mentioned above: There is no guarantee that the person being interpreted is rational in her actions. As pointed out in Chapter 4, rationality for Ricœur refers to the property of a human being who fulfils the minor idea that every person’s actions are embedded as a system of other beliefs and actions. These beliefs and actions are assumed to have some meaning and purpose. The distinctive property of rational action is that it is meaningful interaction between agents. For example, with Ricœur’s way of interpreting psychoanalysis and unconsciousness, the agent does not have to be rational in any particular way, but instead, the interpretation of bodily reactions is created in dialogue between the analyst and the person being analysed.

For Ricœur, rationality is the object of an ongoing interpretation process. This would lead to the idea of the different states of interpretation. Ricœur does point out that there are different stages in an interpretation. There are different principles in different parts of an interpretation.

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394 Ricœur 1996, 113-114.
396 Ricœur 1976, 74.
397 I see indication of this kind of modification in Ricœur’s way of presenting the hermeneutic circle. I will discuss this process in detail in Chapter 5.
Ricœur points out the importance of probability and a method for confirming a hermeneutic guess in the process of interpretation. Hermeneutics shows that interpretation is more probable in light of knowledge that supports a guess rather than shows the conclusion to be true. Results confirming the hermeneutic guess may be from other sciences, and they may also be the hypotheses of an empirical science. If there are different principles upon which the interpreter leans in her interpretation, the assumption of rationality is still in danger. One can answer this by pointing out that when interpreting a social action, one should not assume a very straightforward or strict conception of what people base their interpretations on.

Relying on the empirical sciences does not save the reliability of the interpretation, either. Often the objective aim of interpretation does not mean the proofs of the natural sciences, nor are they an abandoned option. Ricœur does indeed refer to the empirical results of linguistics and psychology. Yet the objectivity of Ricœur’s own research relies on the intersubjective experience that is expressed in the linguistic structures of texts. The actual interpretations in the fields of interpretive sciences guarantee the objective criteria in this framework. The analysis of linguistic situations constitutes Ricœur’s project of linguistic analysis, also practised in ordinary language philosophy.

The analysis of natural language is the starting point for his hermeneutical analysis, yet it is not only in the linguistic processes that Ricœur operates, but the linguistic processes are also understood as psycholinguistic processes. An obvious shortcoming of Ricœur’s approach is that in some parts it claims to study explanatory sciences, but is more or less focused on fields of study that are based on the hermeneutic tradition, or on theories of other fields without much empirical knowledge. Again, the problem with intuition in hermeneutic tradition is of the same kind for Ricœur as it is for analytic philosophy. The hermeneutic tradition may be the result of a long period of testing experiences in reading, but even so, it is intuition. One example of intuition modified in the hermeneutic tradition is the idea of using some hermeneutical principles, such as the hermeneutical circle, as ‘instruments’ in the actual interpretation.

A third criticism of dialectical hermeneutics questions the most important hermeneutic principles, such as the hermeneutic circle. What if the hermeneutic

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398 Ricœur 1976, 78.
399 See Ricœur 1974, 31.
400 See, for example, Ricœur 2008, 200.
401 Ricœur 1989, 151.
intuition based on the tradition itself is wrong? What if it does not describe the process of reading or the process of human understanding the way that these processes actually happen? This criticism contains the assumption that a researcher can, one way or another, figure out some of the specific workings of the human brain and how it is reflected in the body in a manner that is not taken into account in the hermeneutic tradition.

A counterargument for the hermeneutic approach is to challenge the basis of textual exegesis and hermeneutic principles. Where does the intuition concerning text reading come from? It is derived from the tradition that is based on the actual reading experiences of certain philosophers at certain times. Philosophers are trained to draw fine distinctions, as in conceptual or phenomenological analysis, but should we first experiment on what actually happens when people are reading a text? In the next chapter, I will explain how Ricœur’s hermeneutic circle tries to describe what happens in the reading process, and furthermore, in the process of reading cultural artefacts considered as texts. This takes us further towards the basics of the textual methods that transform our being.

5.3 The Hermeneutic Circle and Hermeneutic Arc

One core idea of hermeneutics is the theoretical principle – not yet theory or method – called the hermeneutical circle. The theme of the hermeneutic circle is the fundamental principle of hermeneutics. The hermeneutic circle need not be any kind of scientific method. It is merely a description or suggestion of how our understanding develops in a continuous circle: To simplify: We understand a part of a text by means of its whole, and the whole by means of its parts. Yet, in Ricœur’s work the interplay between whole and parts is presented in a more complicated manner: as the dialogue between experience and language, and the new understanding emerging from the dialogue of these two.

In Ricœur’s work the hermeneutic circle is used to describe different kinds of interpretive processes. In this work I make a distinction between the two main ways Ricœur uses the concept: “The hermeneutic circle” and the “hermeneutic

\[402\] The nature of a scientific method is a matter of definition, and the definitions of this vary between different fields. I have already restricted my view on the methods of analysis, although in some cases I take my examples from other fields than those used by Ricœur.
Here the hermeneutic circle describes the infinite interpretation process. The term “hermeneutic arc” stresses that interpretation mediates the human from the fixed world of a text and to the living experience. The hermeneutic arc is used to describe the dialogue between two opposite scientific methods, interpretation and explanation. The reader is moving from the existential understanding to explanation and again to understanding.

The tradition of hermeneutic practice provides the argument for the functioning of the hermeneutic circle. This means that past philosophers, such as Dilthey, made some key observations on the successful understanding of texts and assumed that this is generally the way texts are understood. To sum up, the hermeneutic circle is a basic theoretical idea about interpreting that captures the reading act and its influence on our way of grasping meaning in the world. Hermeneutic arc is a more specific term that describes Ricœur’s theory of the interplay between interpretation and explanation.

In his work Interpretation Theory: Discourse and Surplus of Meaning from 1976, Ricœur presents the dialectic as a shift from understanding to explanation and from explanation to comprehension. The process was already considered in chapter 5.2.1.1. The following brief description shows how explanation and understanding work in the linguistic study. This dialectic of explanation and understanding is a cumulative holistic process. This means that these two ways of describing a certain object of a certain science go hand in hand when the understanding and explanation concern linguistic situations. According to Ricœur, in the case of linguistic expressions, for example, the hermeneutic arc is a process in which an event is in dialogue with the meaning. The event is captured in utterance. In this process of dialectic, a work of discourse, defined in chapter 4 of this study, is more than a sequence of sentences. In other words, the investigation of language takes into account how the sentences are build upon the events and actions.

I still emphasize that this dialectic in Interpretation Theory and The Rule of Metaphor mainly concerns Ricœur’s theory of text and linguistics. Yet the aim of his interpretation theory in his other works is to combine linguistics, the theory of action and the phenomenological viewpoints. As far as I can see, Ricœur does not give exact ideas for actually combining explanation in natural sciences and understanding in the human and social sciences. I therefore move on to consider

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403 Ricœur 1976, 74.
404 Ricœur 1976, 76.
405 Ricœur 1976, 74.
this dialectic in a narrow sense that is closer to Ricœur’s own studies in special sciences. Briefly, the process goes as follows:

1) Understanding is a naïve grasping of the meanings of the text as a whole. At the first stage of interpretation, guessing plays a role. An interpreter/reader does not, at least in most cases, know the author’s intention, and hence she has to guess it (this does not mean the author’s real intention, but an assumption that the interpreter make about them). At this stage, the semantic analysis of a text and symbols is what a philosopher does.  

2) Explanatory procedures help to make the understanding more precise. In Ricœur’s case, the structural explanation of linguistics functions as the explanatory device.

3) The comprehension after explanation is a sophisticated mode of understanding. It is the place where a naïve grasping of the meanings (1) and explanatory devices (2) meet. Ricœur calls this third stage “appropriation.” This appropriation is a term that focuses on the process of hermeneutic arc instead of just infinite hermeneutic circle. The interpretation is not just technical mingling with whole and parts, but it is a bridge from the text’s meaning to the lived experience. “Hermeneutic arc” stresses the idea that the meeting of a text and our experience makes the living experience.

The process of guessing and validation is described according to the principles of the hermeneutic circle, as the interaction between the whole and its parts. The standpoint of the hermeneutic dialectic is that interpretation is an ongoing process in which no single perspective can tell us the truth. The way the hermeneutic circle describes the situation is that the interpretative position is ongoing and infinite. The process of the investigation of a certain object of research remains insufficient. In the hermeneutic circle, the methods of other sciences broaden self-understanding.

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406 Ricœur 1976, 75.
408 Ricœur 1989, 182.
409 Ricœur 1976, 79.
410 Kearney 2004, 5.
In the hermeneutic circle the interaction may be between the phenomenological analysis of the self and psychoanalysis, linguistic models and ideology critique. This introduces general hermeneutical theory. By this I mean the idea that is modified from the hermeneutics armchair that is merely a philosophical assumption built through conceptual analysis or in this case the assumption on the nature of the hermeneutic tradition. According to Ricœur, in this process a scientist or a philosopher searches for a probable interpretation. This interpretation survives, since it is more probable than others. For example, it may be Ricœur’s theory of how metaphors function as a tension between two concepts: When interpreting a metaphor, the reader searches for connections between the properties of these concepts. The hermeneutic has her own ideas and questions, and she starts to develop them through reading other theories of sciences Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4, Y5. As indicated at the end of Chapter 4, Ricœur’s hermeneutic theory of metaphor, for example, can be challenged by the idea that there is no tension between the concepts in a metaphor but instead, metaphors are understood immediately. All these different methods are read as carefully as possible and attempts are made to understand them correctly in their historical contexts. Then all the other methods of special sciences, or more precisely, some aspects of these methods are incorporated into the hermeneutic theory.

The meaning can be left open, but still the interpretation for example of a certain metaphor has this arc of interpretation. It is moving from the starting point to the endpoint. I now explain this idea of ‘the hermeneutic arc’ more concretely as it will be discussed again in connection with transformative analysis in 5.7.1. I will now describe the stages or different aspects of our understanding as they are presented in Ricœur’s version of the hermeneutic circle that he calls the hermeneutic arc. The interaction between mimesis 1-3 is not mere dialogue between part and whole. This interaction in circle can be also described as hermeneutic arc, since it ends in the application and thus the interpretation transforms the experience. The stages are the following:

1 Pre-understanding (mimesis1)
2 Text (mimesis2)
3 Application (mimesis3)

I will explain what these stages of the hermeneutic circle mean and how the stages are tied together: 1) The pre-understanding refers to the feelings, emotions, the

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411 Ricœur 1976, 79.
embodiment, and all the aspects of our being not yet conceptualized or reflected in a symbolic state, unclear thought, pictures, the involuntary reactions of our body, or imagination that is not yet brought to the objective level. According to Ricœur, pre-understanding lacks form, structure and meaning. It refers to what is already understood before entering the textual level. Again, I stress that the concept of the unconscious does not differ significantly from Ricœur’s way of speaking about pre-understanding. Ricœur mentions some guidelines, already part of the interpreter’s world when she enters the world of fiction. This yields a description of the pre-understanding (mimesis1) in Ricœur’s philosophy. The idea here is that the activity of emplotment constitutes the imitation of action.

The first trait of pre-understanding is a) the knowing of how to do something constitutes a repertory common to the writer and her reader, the network of possible forthcoming actions: project and intention, motive and reason, circumstance, obstacle and occasion, agent and capacity to do something, interaction, adversary and helper, conflict and cooperation, success and failure, happiness and misfortune. The second trait of pre-understanding is b) what is it about doing something, being able to do something, and knowing how to do something, that makes possible and perhaps even calls for the transposition into fiction. Human action is always articulated through signs, rules and norms. The possibility that a human action can happen always assumes the pre-understanding that symbols mark something in the action. Ricœur gives an example of a rite that ties together a structured set of conventions. A gesture of the hand, say, counts as a benediction or a salutation. The third trait of the order of action is that c) the order of action has temporal characteristics. Ricœur admits that temporality is something that emerges in mimesis2, on the textual and linguistic level of the process. In pre-understanding, we still have an assumption that the action can be put into a form of a narrative, even though the narration has not yet happened.

Next, I introduce mimesis2, the textual level of the hermeneutic circle. Mimesis2 means that the action is presented as a form of plot, a narrative. Ricœur calls the fiction described by text the “world of the text”. The concept describes how the reader dives into the imaginary world of fiction. This text creates the redescription of reality. In the act of interpretation the world of the reader and the world of the text can meet each other. The narrative has a beginning, a mid-point, and an end. It creates a quasi-world of action through the activity of emplotment. It is not meant as a replica of action, but the schema for action. The idea that language structured as a plot produces imaginative schemas for the interpreter is the key to this stage.

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412 Ricœur 1991b, 141.
Emplotment is an operation where a story is drawn from various events or incidents. Such an event must be more than a singular occurrence. Again, a story must be more than an enumeration of events. Otherwise it cannot be organized as an intelligible whole. Emplotment also mediates temporality: it has a beginning, middle and end. It is an act of twining the incidents together.

“The world of the text” is Ricœur’s way to describe how the text refers to reality. Here the concept of a “reference” must still be read in a bit different meaning from the one in which it is used in analytic philosophy that concentrates on logic. Yet, Ricœur has different opinions on the subject in the different periods of his philosophy. The concept “The world of the text” was used in Ricœur’s The Rule of the Metaphor. Pellauer thinks that “what makes the text meaningful in the first place, giving it both sense and reference, is what Ricœur calls the world of the text.”

According to Ricœur the reference of a metaphor is a split reference. By this he means that the fiction creates the imaginary closed world, but that this imaginary is something that the reader uses to understand the world. However, a text creates its own kind of textual imaginary. In this idea of split reference Ricœur still builds on French structuralism: on the one hand he criticises the idea that the language is a closed system that does not have reference to reality. On the other, he sees that the new way of seeing is build on this imaginary closure of the world, but that this epoché of the real world is not permanent, but a way to open up new meaning dimensions. The conflict that a text can produce, the conflict that is crucial in metaphorical sentence is the way that makes the split reference possible.

One could see the concept of “the world of the text” problematic from the analytical point of view. Ricœur does not pay much attention to the discussion on reference in philosophy, after he starts to use the concept “world of the text”. The whole question of the reference of language is simply vanished, when the idea of the joining of the world of a reader and the world of the text is present. The perspective on the language changes, when Ricœur starts to describe the psychosocial ways language affects our view on the world. Here Ricœur’s eclecticism meets its most crucial problems. The question, how language influences the perspective on the world, is answered from the different theories that don’t discuss with each other.

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414 Pellauer 2007, 61.
So far I have explained how Ricœur’s theory discusses the relationship between the interpreter’s experience and a text structured as a story. Next I explain in detail how the story is something that a person applies to her own experience. Mimesis3 means the application of a textual emplotment (story) and its structure to our experience: The understanding that we had of the world beforehand, the pre-understanding, and the more structured knowledge meet the textual level. Mimesis3 is an intersection of the world of a reader and the world of a text415. The text is not seen here as its own separate world, but as a way of re-describing our being. Texts produce imaginative variations for action. Ricœur describes the third stage of the hermeneutic circle in the words of Nelson Goodman’s *Languages of Art*: The works of literature make and remake our world of action. Here again, the theme of dialectic between the interpreter’s experience and the text’s structures comes to the fore.

The story that is an intelligible whole at the textual level of mimesis 2 is transformed in the world of the reader. Here the idea of transformation is explicitly present in Ricœur’s hermeneutics. Transformation refers to the transformation from the textual structure to the human experience. Thus the theme of transformation concerns here the transformation of an experience: the symbols form the structure that makes it possible to create a possible version of a self, and transformation occurs when the old self and the new self meet each other and mingle. Ricœur describes this hermeneutic circle between an interpreter and a text in a very accurate way in the following interview. In the next paragraph he notices the transformative nature of the hermeneutic circle in manner that he explains it as follows:

It is certainly one of the two functions of the practice of reading to reveal a dimension, a structure, a potential, which are ignored, inhibited, or obscured. But I would not want to separate this activity, as indicated by the Heideggerian term *revelation*, from the transformative nature of reading. When a reader applies a text to himself, as it is the case in literature, he recognizes himself in certain possibilities of existence – according to the model offered by a hero, or a character – but, at the same time, he is transformed; the becoming other in the act of reading is as important as is the recognition of self. Here we should undoubtedly use the concept of application, or Verwendung, as proposed by Gadamer when he distinguishes between the

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415 Ricœur 1991b, 148.
art of understanding, the art of explaining, and the art of application (ars applicandi).\textsuperscript{416}

Here, Ricœur explicitly presents the nature of hermeneutical interpretation in a hermeneutic circle. Interpretation is an ongoing process of transforming the starting point of the interpretation. The idea of transformation is found in the interpretive act, in which the subject is changed through linguistic structures. The organization of a story forms the organization of a personal identity.

As noted, technically this general definition resembles the definition of the transformative mode of analysis in analytic philosophy, described by Beaney, but in the end the focus is very different. The application in a hermeneutic circle is an ongoing “dialectic between the world of the text and the world of the reader”\textsuperscript{417}. The paragraph also says that the interpretation opens up certain new “possibilities of existence”. The transformation is linguistic translation, but the aim of it is the transformation of our experience in the world.

5.3.1 An Example of a Hermeneutic Circle

The process of reading connects all these three stages with the ongoing circle of interpretation, in which the reader/interpreter moves from the pre-understanding to the text and from the text to the mediation between the experience and a text.\textsuperscript{418} In the hermeneutic circle, the pre-understanding enters language through textual structure, and then the textual structure of emplotment re-describes the reality to the interpreter\textsuperscript{419}. Ricœur claims that fiction makes us recognize at least two narrative voices: that of the protagonist and that of the narrator. Both of them can be imagined with the creative imagination\textsuperscript{420}. I now give an example of the process

\textsuperscript{416} Ricœur 1991b, 492.
\textsuperscript{417} Ricœur 1991b, 492.
\textsuperscript{418} Ricœur 1991b, 152.
\textsuperscript{419} Goldman 2006, 288. Again, we can see how this hermeneutic theme is changed into another kind of language of contemporary philosophy, when Goldman speaks about simulation of the fiction in imagination. In a similar way to Ricœur, Shaun Nichols, for example, connects the simulative aspect of imagination to fiction. This approach with different theorists may include the simulation of the characters feelings, or the denial that a reader simulates them: Empirical studies support the assumption that character simulation is a usual way of understanding fiction.
\textsuperscript{420} Ricœur 1991b, 259.
of a hermeneutic circle. The example is partly based on the multidisciplinary article on the application and problems of the application of a hermeneutic theory to the literary theory\textsuperscript{421}.

The example is drawn from Don Delillo’s post-modern historical novel \textit{Underworld}, in which several fragmentary bits of stories are joined together. This example is a good test case for Ricœur’s theory, since it violates the techniques of a modern novel, something that Ricœur often uses in his examples when building his theory of interpretation with the methods of literary critique. The following extract from a novel is just one example of how literary theory builds the imaginative world. It probably shows how a small part of a novel can exemplify the core ideas of Ricœur’s work.

In this case, the world of fiction is the Polo Grounds Baseball Stadium in New York, in 1951. In this stadium, a championship match between two local teams, the Giants and the Dodgers, is taking place. The world of the text is the stadium’s grandstand, in which there is a black boy called Cotter. He has come to the match without a ticket. Another black person comes into the stand. He is selling nuts to the spectators. Cotter sees another black boy, and becomes afraid that because of his colour he will be associated with this lower class, a black nut seller. The audience of white people surrounds Cotter, and he feels ashamed:

Peanut vendor’s coming through again, a coin-catching wiz about eighteen, black and rangy. People know him from games past and innings gone and they quicken up and dig for change. They’re calling out for peanuts, 	extit{hey, here, bag}, and tossing coins with thumb flicks and discus arcs and the vendor’s hands seem to inhale the flying metal. He is magnet-skinned, circus-catching dimes on the wing and then sailing peanut bags into people’s chests. It’s a thrill-a-minute show but Cotter feels an obscure danger here. The guy is making him visible, shaming him in his prowler’s den. Isn’t it strange how their common color jumps the space between them? Nobody saw Cotter until the vendor appeared, black rays phasing from his hands. One popular Negro and crowd pleaser. One shifty kid trying not to be noticed.\textsuperscript{422}

\textsuperscript{421} Kortelainen & Simola 2012, 65.
\textsuperscript{422} DeLillo 1997, 20.

The Polo Grounds Baseball Stadium is the home surround of the white, middle class people. In these surroundings designed as amusement for the white middle
class in the Fifties, the black boy stands out with his different socio-economic background, his skin colour, his embodiment, his way of acting and moving. The fictive presentation forms the stage onto which the reader can project her own opinions, feelings and attitudes. First of all, the reader imagines the baseball stadium and the crowd in the auditorium. Then she reflects her own insights about the entertainment culture of the United States into this text. She can identify with the fictional character's experience of being different.

Here, mimesis1 is readers pre-understanding of embodied acting, of being in a certain place, in this case the grandstand of a sports venue. Although the reader may not have personal experience of being a coloured person among white people, she has experience of being an outsider among other people and being ashamed. Being of a different colour in this passage is also connected to being a member of the lower class among members of the middle class.

Mimesis 2 in this context is the picture that the reader draws from the actual text. Mimesis2 means the textual level in the hermeneutic circle in which happens the transfer from pre-understanding to linguistic expression. In this paragraph, mimesis2 means that the action is presented in the form of a short narrative. Mimesis3 is the process in which the reading experience activates the pre-understanding of the reader. In Mimesis3, the reader simulates her own feelings and experiences through the text. The feeling of being different by your colour or class is verbalized in a metaphoric description: “He is magnet-skinned, circus-catching dimes on the wing - -”. It is as if the black boy has this job of catching coins from the upper class because he has a certain skin colour. The metaphor of the magnet skin links the socio-economic status with the feeling of being different, as if he himself was turning into metal. This is just one example of how experience, that is at the same time cultural and embodied, is transformed to the level of language. Whether this description produces mimesis3 is left open here. When it comes to post-modern literature, the ongoing experience of a hermeneutic circle can also be left open.

Whether Ricoeur’s method of interpretation described through the hermeneutic circle is regressive, connective or interpretive will be considered next. Since I have described how hermeneutics relates to the multiplicity of meaning, which here refers to the several possible meanings that the interpretation can produce, it is time to compare this aim with interpretive analysis as defined by Beaney, and connective analysis as defined by Hacker. These two modes have to be compared in succession because the hermeneutic methodology borrows characteristics from both these types of analysis. Yet the role of decompositional analysis of language is
far less clear in the Ricœurian process of interpretation than in that of regressive or transformative analysis. I move on to the decompositional analysis in relation to the Ricœurian method. It is time to see how Ricœur’s dialectic with the different types of analysis actually work.

5.4 Ricœur’s Conception of Decompositional Analysis

Ricœur’s conception of analysis also has its roots in the concept presented in the linguistic analysis of his time. The decomposition that he refers to is based on the concept of decomposition in French structuralism and thus does not primarily mean the decompositional analysis I discussed earlier. However, Ricœur probably did not completely disregard this type of decomposition in the logical analysis and the possibility of exploiting it in linguistics. Ricœur’s use of decomposition in some of his essays is lax in this way.

It is likely that hermeneutic analysis cannot only be conceptual analysis in the sense of decomposing a whole, a sentence or a proposition. Yet the question of the relationship between a part and a whole is the primary question in hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is not decompositional in the same sense as early analytic philosophy, for example, in Russell’s approach to metaphysical analysis described in the third section of this dissertation. It is still worthwhile to see what Ricœur has said about decompositional analysis.

Ricœur himself presents his view on the most traditional mode of analysis, decompositional analysis423. In the article “The Problem of Double Meaning as Hermeneutic Problem and as Semantic Problem” which concerns multiple meaning (originally published in French in 1969), Ricœur uses terms that are familiar from early analytic philosophy: “atomic constitution”, “the decomposition of smaller units”, “the elimination of a fundamental function of a symbolism”, and stresses the importance of the interpretation of the intention in language424:

Broadly speaking, I want to show that the change of scale of the problem causes the appearance of the atomic constitution which alone permits a

423 Ricœur 1974, 63.
424 Ricœur 1974, 63.
scientific treatment of the problem; the path of analysis, the decomposition into smaller units, is the very path of science, as one sees in the use of the analytic process in automatic translation. In turn, I would also like to show that the reduction to simple elements sanctions the elimination of a fundamental function of symbolism which can appear only at the higher level of manifestation and which places symbolism in relation with reality, with experience, with the world, with existence (I am intentionally leaving the choice open among these terms). In short, I would like to establish that the way of analysis and the way of synthesis do not coincide, are not equivalent: by way of analysis one discovers the elements of signification, which no longer have any relation to the things said; by way of synthesis is revealed the function of signification, which is to say and finally show\textsuperscript{425}.

This presentation is connected to the different levels of language analysis: words, semantics of a sentence and a hermeneutical investigation of a text. Ricœur refers only to studies on linguistics done in France during his lifetime. Yet the same manner of speaking appears in Ricœur’s article “Existence et herméneutique” originally published in 1965. In this article, the subject of criticism and study is more explicit “... the theories of metalevel which would hope to remake existing languages according to an ideal model.”\textsuperscript{426}. In the longer passage above, Ricœur continues with the idea that both aspects are needed in a philosophical methodology for analysis and synthesis, but that decompositional analysis in its crudest sense loses the relation to things said. Ricœur loosely describes the method of analysis which he calls “decomposition”. He seems to think that decomposition is the most obvious mode of analysis practised in science. He also recognizes a type of analysis which he calls “reduction to simple elements”.\textsuperscript{427}

Earlier in the study, I characterized this mode of analysis as a regressive mode of analysis that involves working back to the meaning sediments\textsuperscript{428}. What Ricœur means by decomposition here is that he takes into account the interpretation of a sign, and practises analysis at this level of single signs as well. Decomposition can still be different from regressive analysis, since the working back to the meaning sediment means sometimes different things in these types of analysis. In the case of regressive analysis the analysis is for example going backwards from the conclusion to the background assumptions. Already here, the basic ideas of his hermeneutical

\textsuperscript{425} Ricœur 1974, 63.
\textsuperscript{426} Ricœur 1974, 15.
\textsuperscript{427} Ricœur 1974, 63.
\textsuperscript{428} Beaney 2007, 197.
theory invoke the distinctions presented in structuralism. The exact analysis of language is part of Ricœur’s philosophical theory, but it is carried out through an analysis different from decomposition.

What Ricœur himself is doing when he says “in turn”, to decompositional or pure phenomenological or conceptual regressive analysis is, according to him, “synthesis”, which reveals the function of signification. As often happens, the way a philosopher describes her method is not the way in which she actually practises philosophy. Next, I show that while Ricœur rejects the early Husserl’s (or what he reads to be the early Husserl’s analysis) phenomenological analysis, he uses the regressive process of “questioning back” meaning sediments of a text in hermeneutics. This regressive analysis with connective analysis is what Ricœur is doing at the level of mimesis, that is, in his investigation of textual structures.

5.5 Dialectical Hermeneutics and Regressive Analysis

Ricœur’s method continues to live with the theme of self-knowledge of Husserl’s phenomenology, but Ricœur changes the phenomenological research on consciousness to the phenomenological and hermeneutical analysis of human action. Early on, phenomenological analysis was favoured by Ricœur. It was the standpoint from which the other methods were considered. Later on, his doubts with regard to pure phenomenology began to grow.

Before going further into regressive analysis in Ricœur’s phenomenological hermeneutics, I still take a look at the first way of speaking about regressive analysis that is pure phenomenological regressive analysis “to the things themselves” and its variation in Ricœur’s Freedom and Nature. More developed hermeneutical analysis will be discussed after this in connection with connective and transformative forms of analysis.

The theme of phenomenological reductions is more perplexed than it seems at the first sight. The idea of phenomenological reduction developed during Husserl’s philosophy. Husserl draws upon different versions of reduction. For example, transcendental reduction moves to the transcendental realm and transforms

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429 Ricœur 1974, 63.
empirical consciousness to pure (or transcendental) consciousness. Eidetic reduction penetrates to essence in contrast to the empirical object.

Regressive analysis in phenomenology can be understood as the pure process of analysis “to the things themselves”, which means that the object is understood without the influences of the outer world, in its own essence. The difference between pure phenomenology and Ricoeur’s way of using (or, one could say, Ricoeur’s way of piggybacking) phenomenology becomes evident when comparing the regressive method in phenomenology and in Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics, as he himself sometimes calls his approach. Yet, in Husserl’s later works such as Cartesian Meditations and Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, the phenomenological method is much closer to Ricoeur’s application of phenomenology. The new formations of phenomenology, such as the theme of intersubjectivity were highlighted in Cartesian Meditations.431

The hermeneutic process could be seen as the process of “questioning back”. According to Ihde, phenomenology is getting back to the things themselves while hermeneutics is “unlayering meaning sediments”.432 In early hermeneutics, these meaning sediments were remnants from texts, but in Ricoeur, this unlayering relates extensively to his conception of a ‘text’ that includes different kind of objects, such as cultural artefacts, institutions, other people’s actions, etc. In this description by Ihde, the idea of joining the analysis of phenomenological experience through the linguistic structures is presented. The regressive method concerns the structures of experience, which in this case means the experience of one's own embodied action.

Interpreted broadly, Ricoeur’s work includes both the aspects of embodiment and the embodied action as important examples of his phenomenology and his hermeneutics. I would say that Ricoeur’s early work on phenomenology until his Freud and Philosophy deals with embodied action; after this his perspective becomes more focused on the action and language. The question of embodied action is tied to the question of philosophical method: in methodology a philosopher takes into account human actions. Hermeneutic processes are relegated to the human sciences.

Ricoeur’s book Freedom and Nature still uses eidetic phenomenology in the manner of early phenomenology, but it concentrates on grasping the essence of the voluntary and involuntary actions of our body through psychology. Hence, Freedom

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431 Husserl 1999, 89.
and Nature is a borderline case between the phenomenological regressive process of analysis and the hermeneutic regressive process of analysis. In the case of Ricœur’s work, we could also say that there are as many ways of applying eidetic phenomenology to the objects of investigation as there are objects of investigation. Thus we have three different ways of practising regressive analysis:

1) The regressive process “to the things themselves” in early phenomenology.
2) The regressive process that recognizes embodied action.
3) The regressive process of hermeneutical “questioning back” in meaning sediments.

Examples of the above-mentioned regressive processes would be the following:

1 The process is going back to our most fundamental act of paying attention. We can go to the things in themselves in our experience and try to think of the way our attention is focusing on a certain object, let’s say a tree. Probably we notice that our attention is wandering, but then we try to think of this object (tree) as itself, and try to capture its essence. Is its essence the humming in the leaves or its nature of the joining of wood and leaves or the ability to be flexible in the wind so it won’t crash down? What about the similarity and connections between the trees? This kind of reduction liberates us from the presuppositions that conceptual framework often produces.

2 An example of a pure phenomenological description of an embodied action is the analysis of voluntary and involuntary movements in our body. The connection between our voluntary way of moving a leg and an involuntary reflex of a leg when the knee is hit with a small hammer (in the sense of a doctor testing the reflex on the leg, not in the sense of causing damage to the leg as punishment by Corleone’s mafia) is the application of what Ricœur says about the voluntary actions. We can simply observe the involuntary and voluntary actions in an embodiment that does not consist of actual moving, and take a person’s breathing as an example. A person can breathe consciously by paying attention to the diaphragm expanding and contracting, or just breathe normally. This type of phenomenological examination includes questions such as: ‘Why is a bodily action, say the act of praying or the act of jogging, affected by my consciousness?’

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433 See, for example, Ricœur 1970, 382. Ricœur’s later work that considers embodiment concentrates mainly on action and movement. Yet, I want to stress that the question of an embodied being in the same sense as Merleau-Ponty speaks about it is clearly seen in Ricœur’s early phenomenology and can still be found in his work on Freud.
The regressive process of questioning back concerns the symbolic and narrative structures, aspects of our being that differ from seeing or embodiment. The regressive process of questioning back could be seen, for example, in a film that we are seeing for the first time. Let’s say the film *There will be blood*, that has the final scene in which the man who has amassed a fortune in the oil business starts to collapse in his greed. It is likely that we ‘read’ the film on the basis of other films we have seen and on the basis of our experience of the world. The final scene of *There will be blood* could be compared to the final scene of *Scarface*, in which the immigrant amasses a fortune in the drug business, eventually succumbing to greed. We also reflect the plot against our own lives and our own greed. We assume that a film has a plot and that it contains characters that have certain needs or aims in the story. Through our meaning segments from other films, we “read” this film and try to interpret and understand its meaning. The same kind of reading happens in certain social situations when we interpret the situation on the basis of a similar situation.

The question of using metaphors in a textual context serves here as another more specified example of the meaning sediment. The metaphors used in a text can be listed, and it can be seen that the metaphors are interconnected. One way of using metaphors is to give one root metaphor, to apply it and to continue with its different permutations. Metaphor as a meaning sediment can be interpreted as a certain way of reading, as a certain position of the subject that is interpreted through the subject herself. Some intersubjective experiences that are not explicitly verbalized or formed in a language can be brought into focus by means of metaphoric expressions. For example, we can find various ideological ways of exerting influence in the political metaphors that express the same political statement.

I have given three short examples of these different ways of practising regressive analysis. These examples make it clear that phenomenological analysis in its early stage does not have to be seen as totally different from the hermeneutic method in its description of the process of analysis. Ricœur’s regressive analysis differs from the regressive analysis of early phenomenology since the object of Ricœur’s analysis is broader. Ricœur presents in different parts of his philosophy different variations of how regressive analysis is applied to the humanities and social sciences. Ricœur’s says that phenomenology is not an alternative method of investigation instead he believes phenomenology deals with the possibility of social sciences and

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434 Ricœur 1977, 146.
humanities since it tries to delineate their object. The object of investigation itself changes the phenomenological approach, whether the object is pure experience, embodied being, embodied action, or the reflection of our experience in symbolic and narrative expressions.

5.6 Ricœur’s Connective Analysis

Ricœur’s hermeneutics uses connective analysis. The distinction between the transformative mode of analysis and connective analysis signifies that the target of analysis is not the logical form behind linguistic expression, but the ways in which language can be understood to present concepts and their (non-logical) relations or connections to each other.

I will explain how the interpretation of conflicts goes together with the idea of connective analysis presented by Hacker. Ricœur’s version of connective analysis aims at a dialogue with actual texts. Ricœur stresses that speech acts are motivated in actual communication situations. In the analysis of speech acts, Ricœur emphasizes that discourse is addressed to someone. Ricœur sees this aspect of our language use as a part of a very fundamental experience of being together, having a dialogue, in which some parts of experience remain private but some will be communicated to other people.

Ricœur believes that combining the linguistic analysis of ordinary language philosophy with the phenomenological and hermeneutical framework would renew all of these aspects. Furthermore, hermeneutical interpretation gains a more explicit method when combined with the analysis of ordinary language. Ricœur does not accept all the ideas of ordinary language philosophers, but uses connective analysis for the purposes of hermeneutics. The background assumption here is that natural language is a concrete object of interpretation, since it is shared by the language users in a society.

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435 Ricœur 1977, 146.
436 Ricœur 1976, 14.
437 Ricœur 1976, 115.
439 Ricœur 2008, 83-84.
When Ricœur started to teach in North America, he absorbed ideas from analytic philosophy and rooted the semantic and pragmatic analysis of language in his way of reading phenomenology. Such theoretical discoveries paved the way for the development of Austin’s and Searle’s ideas on ordinary language. Pellauer tells us that Ricœur also recognized that the mere analysis of analytic philosophy prevented the philosophical questions that were important to Ricœur. Ricœur developed his idea that human action and linguistic action had to be analysed together. Ricœur’s point was to introduce ways of transferring linguistic analysis back to where language is actually produced, i.e. in embodied action; this is how he started to combine the phenomenological method with connective analysis. Ricœur thought that a philosopher has to keep in mind that natural language is formed within such a framework of experience and action. The influence of experience and action must be taken into account even when constructing a theory on the logical form behind language.

In Ricœur’s view, the philosophical theory of interpretation has to take into account the actual interpretive acts, the actual ways of practising interpretation. This also means the more theoretical methods and themes considered in analytic philosophy of language, for example the question of linguistic reference, the question of different acts of language, and the semiotic, semantic and pragmatic distinctions. This is why his theory of interpretation is tied to the various analyses used in analytic philosophy.

The analysis of ordinary language in Ricœur’s philosophy is welded together with the idea of interpreting linguistic conflicts. He argues that the key problem in hermeneutics is foreshadowed in the interpretive process as it occurs in ordinary language. By this he means that textual interpretation has its roots in the way ordinary language functions. Ordinary language gives the form and structure that remain as the story structure of a text. That is to say, a language is shaped in a certain situation in a certain framework, with certain speakers. This situation and the terms of this condition form the basic structure of a text.

In Ricœur’s opinion, the hermeneutical theory of language is made clearer by referring to the distinctions found in the analytic philosophy of language, such as Austin’s speech acts. In this research, the interpretation theory of hermeneutics is tied to linguistic action. For example, speech acts are used to clarify the

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440 Pellauer 2007, 43.
441 Ricœur 1989, 147.
442 Ricœur 2008, 351.
443 Ricœur 1989, 134.
interpretation process: 1) the locutionary act is the act of saying; 2) the illocutionary act or force is what people do when saying something; 3) the perlocutionary act is what people bring about by the fact that they say something. For example, if I would like you to close the door, I do three things. First, I relate the action predicate (to close) to the variables (you, the door). This is the locutionary act of saying. Second, I use this act as the force of asking you. I choose to request, rather than, for example, blame, punish or promise. Ricœur uses this core of the speech act theory when he explains his ideas on the linguistic intentionality.

Ricœur asks how an event is “surpassed” in the meaning. In other words, how does an event become language, text and symbols that we can use to trace the actual event which created the symbolic expression? The linguistic meaning can be identified from the text, since it has an illocutionary force. In Ricœur's philosophy of language this force focuses on the predicative structure of an action sentence. This structure is something that can be re-identified. An action sentence can be identified by its specific predicate (the action) and its variables (the agent and the object). This is just one example of how Ricœur uses the analysis of ordinary language philosophy as a tool for explaining his ideas on language.

Let us, once again, go through how the method of the analysis of ordinary language is characterized in the history of analytic philosophy. This way it will be easier to see what aspects of ordinary language analysis Ricœur applies to his hermeneutical theory. Peter Hacker proposes the following definition of Moorean conceptual analysis, which was the base of the connective analysis of language: “Connective analysis, or elucidation is a non-reductive description of conceptual connections, compatibilities and incompatibilities, arrayed for the purposes of philosophical clarification.”. Hacker also describes this mode of analysis as giving “a description for specific philosophical purposes, of the use of a linguistic expression and of its rule governed connections with other expressions.”. This idea of finding compatibilities and incompatibilities is part of Ricœur’s linguistic analysis. The connections between linguistic expressions are related to conceptual connections. Ricœur himself describes his first encounter with connective analysis in the following way:

Austin 1990, 98.
Ricœur 2008, 73.
Hacker 2007, 128-129.
Hacker 2007, 128-129.
my teaching in Canadian universities and then in the United States (beginning in 1970, I regularly taught for several weeks each academic year at the University of Chicago) had placed me in contact with analytical philosophy, considered the unconditional rival of phenomenology and hermeneutics. Far from treating it as an enemy, I found it to provide the complement of a logical semantics serving to strengthen the linguistic semantics belonging to my conception of discourse. It was mainly in the philosophy of ordinary language that I found the most reliable support. In particular, the distinction between pragmatics and semantics opened the way for the fruitful analysis, begun by Austin and pursued by Searle, of speech acts, which I had no difficulty in relating to my views on the act of utterance and the involvement of the utterer, an arena in which the fate of the speaking subject unfolded. Now it happened that within the vast field of English-language semantics and logical pragmatics, a province of discourse had acquired its autonomy, namely the semantics and pragmatics of action-sentences. I began to integrate some of these analyses of action theory, in the Anglo Saxon sense of the term, into my hermeneutics of human action in course given at Louvain in 1971, hence even before completing the exploration of semantic innovation in *The Rule of Metaphor.*

Above, Ricœur presents several affiliates with analytic philosophy. It illustrates how the pragmatic understanding of language developed in the French tradition and in the Anglo-American tradition. The idea of speech acts was modified from the perspective of the theory of an acting human being in a communicative framework. In the end, we need a detailed example to understand how Ricœur’s hermeneutics uses connective analysis.

A simplified example of the analysis of a metaphorical process shows how the connective analysis of language works for Ricœur. It also shows that the connective analysis of language is tied to the interpretation process. This kind of connective analysis is mainly based on the intuitions we get from metaphors. I now present an example of the intuitions that I assume people have about certain metaphorical expressions.

If the interpretation theory presents itself as a clear and distinct method of analysis, we should recognize it from the interpretation of an ambiguous expression, such as a metaphor. I list these stages of the interpretation of metaphor and then focus on

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449 Ricœur 1996, 32-33.
the stage of linguistic analysis to see what happens when the process of linguistic interpretation is laid out and presented step by step. We can easily see that in this interpretation process the basic hermeneutical dialectic takes place between experience and the language that manifests the experience.

Firstly, an interpreter recognizes the metaphor. She is probably reading a newspaper or a law text or a scientific text, or hears it in an everyday situation. All her understanding and the whole history of her experiences, feelings, touches, etc. is a part of her. However, not all of these experiences will be activated at the same time. The language affects this human being and the recognition of a new metaphor may activate certain experiences. The realization of a metaphor leads to the second stage in the process of understanding.

Secondly, she tries to understand the meaning of the text, and thus changes the meaning of the concepts that the metaphor combines together. Ricœur sees the structure of metaphorical expression as paradoxical. An interpreter tries to find similarities, in spite of a contradiction. The similarity of the two concepts has to be found, and thus needs an act of interpretation. Finding a similarity in spite of linguistic conflict is a good example of the “description of conceptual connections, compatibilities and incompatibilities”. I claim that this finding of compatibilities in spite of conflict is one of the most explicit examples of Ricœur’s connective analysis of language.

Here is the argument for my claim: The connective analysis of ordinary language was the description of compatibilities and incompatibilities between linguistic concepts. This may mean concepts that are connected to words, or it may mean that these words themselves are understood as concepts. In the case of Ricœur’s analysis of linguistic expression, it is precisely this kind of deciphering of the connections between concepts that is an essential part of the meaning of a word. This meaning is not clear-cut, or fixed to a certain object. Ricœur describes quite explicitly how there is a conception of ordinary language in his analysis:

On the other hand, this semantics enters into a fruitful dialogue with the doctrines arising from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical investigations and from the analysis of ordinary language in the Anglo-Saxon countries. - - I see this

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450 Ricœur 2008, 196.
general hermeneutics as a contribution to the grand philosophy of language which we lack today\textsuperscript{451}.

According to Hacker, connective analysis is “a description for specific philosophical purposes, of the use of a linguistic expression and of its rule-governed connections with other expressions - -”. Are there such rule-governed connections with other expressions? Ricœur states that metaphor is important for the method of interpretation, because it breaks the rules of ordinary language. Thus language is rule-governed, and the interpretation of symbolic expressions with multiple meanings is crucial for interpretation, because it opens up the possibility of numerous interpretations:

- - metaphor consists in speaking of one thing in terms of another that resembles it. It is tempting to say that metaphor is a planned category mistake. - - The idea of category mistake brings us close to our goal. Can one not say that the strategy of language at work in metaphor consists in obliterating the logical and established frontiers of language, in order to bring to light new resemblances the previous classification kept us from seeing\textsuperscript{452}?

At this stage, the one who is interpreting the metaphor produces the imaginative schemas of the linguistic expression. This is Ricœur’s way of renewing the connective analysis of ordinary language: To support his idea of the interpretation of a metaphor, he investigates the imagination which arises from language. The ability of language to present imaginary schemas is drawn from phenomenology and psycholinguistics.

Thirdly, an interpreter picks one of these interpretations as the meaning of the metaphor. In other words, she applies the imaginary schema she has created to her understanding of the world. This interpretation of metaphor is in Ricœur’s hermeneutics the same kind of process as interpreting stories; both of these interpretive processes work in the hermeneutic circle.

According to Ricœur, logical absurdity produces the meaning of metaphor. I do not agree with Ricœur's assumption about the surplus of meaning, because there is

\textsuperscript{451} Ricœur 1974, 15.
\textsuperscript{452} Ricœur 2008, 197.
much more variation in metaphorical expressions than what Ricœur's claim reveals. Not all metaphors need to have tension. Many of them are recognized as metaphorical expressions, but meaning is understood without deep interpretative moments. With many metaphors, the process of interpretation can develop as follows: First, the reader recognizes the conflict in the linguistic expression. Suddenly, she notices that in the text there is something that strikes her as odd. What happens in the consciousness of this human being? Probably she has to think for only a moment, and then quite soon she thinks she knows the meaning of the metaphor that says so-and-so. For example, it could be the metaphor “the prime minister of Finland is a bear”. “Yeah, right”, she says aloud to her friend: “the prime minister of Finland certainly is a bear”. In other words, the conflict does not occur to the reader at all, or then it is so fast a reaction that it is not really conscious or the work of interpretation. Many expressions, still conceived of as metaphors, do not puzzle us very much. The act of interpretation no longer belongs to the metaphor. Yet in Ricœur’s approach, the metaphor is not only linguistic, but it is a conceptual change in our consciousness. Nevertheless, there are many metaphors in science, philosophy and poetry that need to be dealt with more carefully. They crave interpretation. In philosophy, the interpretation of metaphors signifies that by means of metaphor we are opening up philosophical ideas, some of which are crucial claims, sophisticated and labyrinthine. Philosophical metaphors of this kind are not immediately clear to the interpreter. They need to be explained and opened.

In my opinion, especially in the case of poetic metaphors there lies a danger that we cannot arrive at an univocal interpretation of the purpose of these expressions. The process of interpretation remains more or less in the multiple phase and hence remains incomplete. This means that the metaphor remains as an open mystery to the reader. Ricœur is mostly interested in metaphors that stimulate the reader into finding some interpretation for them. His dissection concerns expressions that produce more thinking, that is expressions that force us to interpret them, and the concepts the metaphors express. Yet this does not mean that the meaning of metaphor is eternally fixed: On Ricœur's view spoken language changes and develops when people coin words to be used in different connections.

In most cases, metaphorical expressions produce some interpretations. The number of interpretations cannot be infinite in the sense that any interpretation will suit the audience. The hermeneutical principles navigate and give us hints at how this kind of interpretation suits the “metaphor” x is y, in the ways z1, z2, z3 and z4, but not in f6.
The conflict described above may also occur non-linguistically or in a fairly blurred line between linguistic and non-linguistic expressions. By this, I refer to symbols which may, in a concrete way, be linguistic or non-linguistic. Expression of this kind prompts the following question: How should we interpret this linguistic expression? The third stage of interpreting a metaphor brings me to the question of the whole interpretation process, and how the hermeneutic circle ends with the meeting of the narrative and the embodied aspects of a human being.

I have now presented some arguments for my claim that Ricœur’s hermeneutics applies the connective linguistic method for its own purposes. Furthermore, before this in 5.3, I pointed out that it criticizes the Russellian type of decompositional analysis. Decompositional analysis in its crudest sense cannot be the only aspect of philosophical theory if it wants to interact with the special sciences.

Next I will elaborate on more ideas that Ricœur acquires from analytic ordinary language philosophy for his own methodology. These two aspects join phenomenological analysis (regressive analysis) to connective analysis. After that I present some criticism of his conceptions of language. In the final chapters I explain how Ricœur joins the aspects of phenomenology and analysis of language to the transformative interpretation theory of his hermeneutics.

5.6.1 Connective Analysis and Regressive Analysis

Ricœur stresses that the actual moments of speech need to be investigated before the working theory of language and its reference can be presented as a philosophical theory. Ricœur points out that theory of language has to take account multiple meanings and also the psychosocial ways of exerting. In the research of these psychosocial ways of exerting the analysis of language is joined to the regressive analysis of our experience. The phenomenological analysis of consciousness reveals the ways that language schematizes our attention, even our perception. Now I will explain how these two ways analyse are connected with each other and with the interpretation theory of hermeneutics.

When Ricœur himself speaks about “psycholinguistics” in his metaphor theory, he actually mainly describes the phenomenological analysis of experience by means of
linguistic analysis. This means that Ricœur analyses speech acts and thereby phenomenological experience. Speech acts allow one to anchor psychological elements to language, such as beliefs, desires and feelings.

The underlying assumption on which Ricœur’s theory of language is based is that the human mind is guided by symbolic representations more than by mere sensations. In the act of understanding, the objects of the world serve as these symbolic representations. The investigation of multiple meanings and metaphor is directed by his idea of investigating both the language and the operations of the mind at the same time.

Ricœur's theory also assumes that in natural language almost all language games intersect with the metaphorical use of language. Ricœur focuses on the investigation of the fictional uses of language, since it is a feature of language that cannot be ignored in the different language games. He focuses his attention on how these modes influence the human consciousness and action. The crucial idea of combining the phenomenological analysis of experience and connective analysis emerges in the analysis of a metaphor.

The idea of multiple meanings in language has been studied in ordinary language philosophy, which uses the method of connective analysis. For example, Max Black studied metaphorical language and presented new ideas on the semantics of a metaphor. Ricœur uses the semantic analysis of a metaphor as a part of his metaphor theory. Yet Ricœur reaches for the psychosocial roots of the analysis of metaphor. In this kind of investigation phenomenological regressive analysis is combined with ordinary language analysis.

Detailed example of phenomenological and linguistic analysis together emerges when Ricœur uses Husserl’s epoché in his metaphor theory. Ricœur describes, with the help of Marcus Hester, how Husserl’s epoché (suspension of ordinary experience) works during the moment when a metaphorical expression is understood through imagination. This interpretation process is phenomenological in the sense that the poetic language suspends the ordinary way of thinking, it puts us face to face with the phenomenon it describes in an authentic way. Here the idea of regressive analysis appears clearly in Ricœur’s work. This way metaphor

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453 See, for example, 2008, 200.
454 Ricœur 2008, 73.
455 Langer 1974, 28.
456 Ricœur 2008, 184.
focuses our attention on the object that the metaphorical expression describes. Ricœur writes as follows:

Now with the image comes the fundamental moment of ‘suspension,’ of *epoché*, Husserl’s notion borrowed by Hester and applied to the non-referential interplay of imagery in poetic strategy. The abolition of reference, which belongs to the achievement of poetic sense, is thus par excellence the work of *epoché* that makes the iconic functioning of sense and of sensa possible - -.

This paragraph reveals that Ricœur connects the abolition of linguistic reference to the experience of imagining. Language produces imagination that creates the simulation of a certain fictive element. Ricœur explains the connection between language and images differently from some ordinary language philosophers.

Ryle takes for granted the images seen by our mind’s eye, suggesting that they are portraits or replicas. Ricœur thinks that this way of understanding imagination is problematic, since people tend to invent and discover the world through imagination. Imagination is rooted our in experience in a more creative way. Linguistic imagination is precisely the way a human being reflects her own world. Ricœur thinks that this way of understanding imagination is problematic, since people tend to invent and discover the world through imagination. Imagination is rooted our in experience in a more creative way. Linguistic imagination is precisely the way a human being reflects her own world. Linguistic imagination refers to the idea that the creative language fuses senses and creates ways of blending images together.

Instead of trusting copy images, Ricœur suggests that language use itself produces creative imagination. The use of language opens up the possible, imaginative worlds within the realm of our experience. In other words, the expressions of language can produce combinations of the ideas and images that are not mere copies of the real world. Our imagination makes it possible to think of fictive entities, e.g., centaurs, zombies or aliens, or, metaphorically speaking, forces us to see real entities from fictive perspectives. The metaphor of Finland’s former prime minister Paavo Lipponen as a bear, for example, makes us see this political figure and his actions as if he were the king of the forest. Again, the metaphor of Lipponen as “a wounded bear shot in the leg” continues the metaphor and changes the connotation it creates to the reader. It creates the impression of the falling king of the forest. In this sense, Ricœur's conception of language concentrates on only

457 Ricœur 1991b, 120-121.
one of the fields of language use and leaves aside, for example, the question of the relationship between language and logic.

Many structuralist scholars assumed that poetic language creates its own world of fiction. No doubt, metaphorical language has a poetic function, meaning its indirect way of communicating meanings. Yet in Ricœur’s hermeneutics, this linguistic imagination is not left at the level of ‘suspension’, of *epoché*, but this suspension makes it possible to schematize our previous conceptions, our previous ways of seeing objects in the world. The regressive analysis of phenomenology to the things themselves is just one part of the hermeneutic process of interpretation. A metaphor creates new ways of seeing things.

The core idea that through fictive language we can simulate other people’s feelings, emotions and attitudes in our creative imagination is clearly presented. Creative language helps to re-figure the world of action⁴⁵⁹. This is how Ricœur’s concept of the interlocutionary act goes further than the ordinary language philosophers’ model for semantics and pragmatics. Interlocutionary act refers to the speech act that is intended as dialogue with another person. I come to this concept in 5.7. Ricœur wants to concentrate on the point of how fictive language recreates many aspects of being and experiencing. This insight cuts across the analysis of fictional experience that Langer constantly refers to. Ricœur refers particularly to Langer’s way of reading poetic language as something presenting an experience of virtual life⁴⁶⁰.

As I mentioned, Ricœur touches on the question of reference, but does not see it as a separate subject of study, and stresses that the theory of reference is not separate from the different social discussions where language use is actualized. His way of using the word “reference” may appear too loose, since it describes the way that the symbolic structures form our attention, body and feelings. In the end he changes this concept of reference to the concept of refiguration in his theory on narrativity. By this concept of refiguration the phenomenological aspects become more into light. The experience is studied through phenomenological regressive analysis that causes us to suspend the experience. After the suspension of regressive analysis starts the redescription of the experience⁴⁶¹. Thus, the theory of speech acts is tied to the phenomenological notions of our embodied action.

⁴⁶⁰ See, for example, Ricœur 2008, 209.
⁴⁶¹ See for example Ricœur 2008, 164.
Ordinary language analysis does not take the roots of language into account, the place where the human being starts to speak. In other words, the focus is on the human capability to form linguistic expressions consciously, simultaneously with something in our pre-understanding gaining expression in speech. From the historical point of view, bringing up the idea of how linguistic analysis can reveal the re-description of our experience was one of the innovations in Ricoeur's metaphor theory. The starting point of Ricoeur's language theory, which he calls the *semantics of desire*, is that meanings in language are connected with the living action in the world, especially in social action with other people.

Ricoeur emphasizes that, like Wittgenstein, he is exploring certain fields of language games\(^{462}\). His phenomenologically oriented version of ordinary language philosophy concerns the touching points of the conceptual analysis (speculative discourse) and the poetic, fictional or metaphoric uses of language. He borrows the term that Wittgenstein uses as well to describe the poetic language game.

According to Ricoeur, poetic language is a way of ‘seeing as’. This means that a metaphor, for example, presents a certain fictive claim as if it were true. This produces a new way of seeing a certain object from the perspective of this certain metaphor. As I have pointed out, fictional language, according to Ricoeur, transforms a person's being.

In sum, the merging of phenomenology and analysis of language is one way to approach the transformation occurring in fictive redescription of an object. Yet now the whole enterprise of hermeneutic dialectic may start to feel like an extremely large combination of the various methods. The reader of this work may begin to feel perplexed. This is a good time to check whether there is something wrong in Ricoeur’s conception of connective analysis and language.

\(^{462}\) The way Wittgenstein considers language differs from Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation. Ricoeur wants to build a hermeneutical theory that is in contact with the actual methods of the different disciplines. Wittgenstein's way of practising philosophy is, according to some interpretations, in contradiction with this. Ricoeur sees a difference between the different ways of using language, that is different discourses, such as scientific, religious, poetic, etc. Ricoeur considers, for example, that it is important to recognize the discontinuity between the philosophers' speculative discourse and the poetic uses of language.
The first critical remark is that Ricœur's way of handling natural language is that in some of his texts the sphere of ordinary language receives almost the same kind of idealization as did logical language in Russell.

As Ricœur points out, the sphere of natural language is mixed with fictive language. However, the sphere of natural language is also mixed with scientific language. Ricœur considers that we have different spheres of language that intersect and interact with each other and in this sense his theory does not fall into the trap of ‘idealizing’ ordinary language. Yet in some points he idealizes ordinary language. His perspective on metaphor and narrative theories sometimes emphasizes the fictive force of language so much that the fact that we still have many stable, non-fictive uses of language might be forgotten.

The problem of idealising language in his theory may be that language does not resemble a living organism as much as Ricœur would like to see it do through his metaphorical lenses. Natural language is combined with the Wittgensteinian language games that are fairly stable in their way of referring to the world. One could claim that not all spheres of language change all the time.

A second criticism of Ricœur’s theory is that Ricœur's field of linguistic investigation does not include scientific language, since he finds that the scientific discourse does not have a major function in real interpersonal dialogue, which is his field of study. By this he means that scientific methods of verification are not part of ordinary language philosophy. Ricœur's claim of documentation and verification not having a big role in ordinary language is for the most part fairly accurate, but surely the terminology of science permeates everyday speech. Scientific ways of perceiving can be seen in the uses of ordinary language, although they may not be its primary force. Ricœur focuses on natural language that includes the communication of experience - the way experience is tied to language. In this research, all the different disciplines can help in providing a richer picture of the use of language.

However, Ricœur criticizes ordinary language philosophy, arguing that ordinary communication cannot be the only or the most interesting realm of philosophical investigation. Instead, Ricœur himself concentrates closely on the aspect of

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463 Ricœur 1991b, 490.
language that causes human beings to develop their self-understanding.\textsuperscript{464} This includes fictive uses of language and all the symbolic approaches in which meaning can be changed. For Ricœur, this third realm of language is something between scientific and ordinary language discourses.

Besides ordinary language philosophy, Ricœur often mentions the main ideas of the later Wittgenstein of \textit{Philosophical Investigations} as a background to his work\textsuperscript{465}. Wittgenstein’s ideas on language also come in for criticism from Ricœur and the commentators Ricœur uses in his work. One of these critical points is that the later Wittgenstein considered the use of natural language, but ignored many other ways of using language. Wittgenstein notably did not say much about metaphorical way of using language. Yet it is another question whether Wittgenstein’s work was philosophical “theory” at all. Hacker explains that in the later Wittgenstein’s work, the nature of philosophy differs from the empirical sciences in the sense that there is no ever-growing corpus of philosophical knowledge\textsuperscript{466}.

Thirdly the role of decomposition is unclear in Ricœur’s work. Ricœur emphasizes Humbolt’s idea that in language we have the infinite use of finite means. In other words, we have a fairly restricted number of words and rules in language, yet infinite means to express these ideas.\textsuperscript{467} Since we have a finite number of words and rules for them, it is plausible that the new meanings of sentences are reduced to the meaning of words. Moreover, language theory still has to take account of descriptive sentences. Metaphorical sentences do not need truth or falsity as their reference, but still we have descriptive sentences in natural language that can be assessed as true or false.

Since Ricœur accepts the infinite means for finite set of words and rules, he, rightly, emphasizes the creativity of language. As noted in 5.4, Ricœur accepts that compositionality is a part of language theory at the level of semiotics. He also considers that compositionality with restricted rules produces creativity in language. Ricœur accepts the idea that compositionality and the semantics of a sentence work in different arenas\textsuperscript{468}. The idea that language is a system of signs is one possible of characterization. Ricœur discovers that “As these units belong to different orders, semiotics and semantics hold sway over different arenas and take

\textsuperscript{464} Ricœur 1991b, 490.
\textsuperscript{465} Ricœur 1974, 15.
\textsuperscript{466} Hacker 1996, 110. According to one interpretation, philosophy in the later Wittgenstein's philosophy may assume a therapeutic role. Again, Ricœur's way of dealing with Freud is to read psychoanalysis through the eyes of a philosopher, not to claim that philosophy itself is a therapeutic method.
\textsuperscript{467} Ricœur 2008, 63.
\textsuperscript{468} Ricœur 2008, 69.
restricted meanings\textsuperscript{469}. Ultimately, Ricœur’s multidisciplinary methodology makes it possible for the different methods of linguistic research to study sentences compositionally, and for other linguistic methods to study the more extensive linguistic arenas, such as discourse\textsuperscript{470}. However, the question of the relationship between these two remains unanswered. I will now turn to another, more specific problem in Ricœur’s theory on fictive language.

Fourthly, I take a closer critical look at Ricœur ‘s connective analysis of multiple meaning. I have already touched on the theme of metaphors in Chapter 4, and now I will shed light on Ricœur’s connective analysis on the basis of this knowledge. This further example of Ricœur’s connective analysis of multiple meanings in metaphorical language offers a clear case of how experience is analysed at the level of language, and thus the dialectic between the hermeneutic ideas and linguistic analysis is opened up.

Finding compatibilities and incompatibilities between the concepts that are linked to certain linguistic expressions is precisely the aim of the metaphorical process. The interpretation of a metaphor means making the right connections between concepts. In this sense, Ricœur’s language analysis uses a certain kind of connective analysis. It is an analysis that seeks conflict situations and analyses the compatibilities and incompatibilities from this angle. Such conflicts are important, because they focus our attention and force us to reconsider the text. A conflict in a text often suggests a certain interpretation. A conflict can be the turning point for the reader’s interpretation.

Metaphor combines two concepts that were previously not semantically close to each other. I therefore take the theme of metaphor in Ricœur’s linguistic analysis as an example of the conflict of interpretation. Before the actual example, however, I will briefly explain the basis for the analysis of metaphor: For example, “fork”, “spoon” and “knife” are semantically close to each other, because they have close and similar uses. “Bear” and “prime minister” or “courtroom” and “war zone” are semantically distant from one another, but still we can express the metaphor “the courtroom had become a war zone”. Hence, a metaphor is a sentence that connects two concepts that have some properties that are similar and some that are dissimilar. It is a schema for focusing on the properties of an object of interpretation.

\textsuperscript{469} Ricœur 2008, 69.
\textsuperscript{470} Ricœur 2008, 69.
Ricœur’s hermeneutics is not just plainly the research on linguistic structures. Language and its expressions mediate between our thoughts and reality. When speaking about Ricœur’s hermeneutics, the investigation goes through language, but that is not the aim of an interpretation: Ricœur claims that metaphorical expressions and stories, for example, affect the way we see the world: the way we can describe and re-describe the reality. In the theory of language and the way we use it, we have to take account of linguistically problematic expressions, i.e., expressions of multiple meaning, in a different manner.

A metaphor is the crucial point in the discourse, because it focuses the reader’s/interpreter’s attention on the meaning and references in a text. Especially in metaphor, there is, according to Ricœur and many other metaphor theorists, tension between (at least) two semantic fields. The words “fork” and “knife” belong to the same semantic field. “Bear” and “the prime minister of Finland” belong to different semantic fields. The reason why this is an acceptable claim is based on the assumption that a certain semantic field is constructed around a certain clearly distinguishable speech situation, or discourse. A good metaphor usually needs two or more concepts distant enough from one another, that is, from their different semantic fields.

Ricœur also recognizes that conflicts in language can also disappear when a metaphor is used sufficiently many times. A concept “dead metaphor” describes how a metaphor has lost the original tension of its meaning, because of its repetition in the culture. The concepts of living and dead metaphors are ways to recognize how metaphors create new interpretations. This means that metaphors create new conceptual connections in our thinking. Some new metaphors create the new perspective and make new conceptual connections. They are living metaphors, to which Ricœur borrows the French name of his book La métaphore vivante. When a metaphor becomes more common it can lose its ability to be living and wake up the reader to find new interpretations. Yet Ricœur sees that the dead metaphor can be enlivened again.

Ricœur considers the idea of dead metaphor carefully and critically. He makes some restrictions to the way he himself uses the word “metaphor”. Here is the place where Ricœur’s philosophy meets Derridas’ ideas, though I hold the interpretation that in the more general level these two philosophers differ from each other in many respects. The dead metaphor surely is something that can be

471 Derridas philosophy is suggests the idea that the philosophical discourse is mixed a lot with metaphorical language. Ricœur himself present different view. Anyone who reads Ricœur’s philosophical texts can find that he mixes different theories together, but his expression is not
made living again, when the original conceptual connections are brought to the awareness of a reader or interpreter again. For example the old metaphor of Finland as a maiden can be made living again when it is used in the context of NATO-discussion. Maiden of Finland is proposed again to be the resisting bride of NATO. The conflict or tension that metaphor can produce in reader’s minds can disappear when the expression is used sufficiently many times. Yet, the theme of a dead metaphor is not the reason why I see that Ricœur’s conception of metaphor has problems.

I do not completely agree with Ricœur’s assumption of the working of metaphor, because in some situations and in certain discussions there may be well-functioning metaphors without concepts from different semantic fields: “Fork is knife” in a context of using a fork for cutting something does not sound like poetic masterpiece, but it is still a surprising metaphor. “A man is a man to his fellow man”, might be a cleverer metaphor if it were seen as a variant of the old metaphor “homo homini lupus” (a man is a wolf to his fellow men). Some of these expressions are not yet dead metaphors. The living metaphors just don’t produce tension in the reader’s mind: the interpretation process of a metaphor can be explained in another way than simply appealing to some kind of tension between words.

Ricœur’s analysis should not be called ‘transformative analysis’ in the sense that it transforms language into an artificial language, or a fixed univocal endpoint that cannot be further analysed. I have shown how Ricœurs method fits the connective type of analysis. Yet the characterization of transformative analysis is something we have to investigate before we can entirely see where hermeneutical analysis fits among the variations of analysis.

5.7 Transformation in Interlocutionary Act

The idea of transformation means translation of other’s experiences to our own experience. Language and symbolic presentation have a central role in this process of translating and modifying human’s experience in the world.

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poetical. His way of presenting philosophy differs in this respect from Derrida’s. Ricœur presses that philosophical discourse is theory, and that metaphors can only enlighten the theory, but these two are two different things.
I have explained that the innovation in Ricœur’s work is combining language analysis with phenomenological analysis of experience. Furthermore, he broadens this theme of connective analysis to the interpretation in hermeneutics. This means that linguistic analysis can be used in the interpretation of various modes of action in the social world. The connective analysis of language and transformation in hermeneutics go hand in hand.

Ricœur stresses the distinction between pragmatics and semantics as a crucial part of his theory of language use. Semantics was necessary to give meaning to individual words in a sentence. Sentences are always understood as a part of a broader textual context that has its roots in actual speaking situations. Ricœur uses the concept of pragmatics as the way in which the meanings of words and sentences are understood as parts of events in a certain situation and a certain place.

Ricœur dates the idea of a context of sentence as far back as Frege. Contextualization was crucial for Russell’s and Frege’s transformative analysis. The idea of a context of sentence is also crucial in the linguistic and symbolic transformation of Ricœur’s interpretation theory. The translation proceeds from one meaningful context of symbolism, to another. The idea of context I mentioned in Chapter 3 in connection with the definition of transformative analysis in early analytic philosophy is now also extended to the level of discourses.

Ricœur assimilated the analysis of speech acts into a certain field of language use, namely, his investigation of the living aspects of language, i.e. symbolic expressions. Symbolic expressions are a part of language and they change the conceptual connections in language. Semantic innovation (mentioned in the quotation above in 5.6.) refers to the conceptual change in language which, for example, a metaphorical sentence can catalyse. This conceptual change in language is described by ordinary language analysis.

Austin’s theory of language use is part of the theories claiming that the meaning of an expression is how that expression is used. Ricœur accepts the idea that the speaker presents the sentence with a degree of varying linguistic force. In other words, ordinary linguistic philosophers, and Ricœur, argue that the speaker has a particular purpose when producing an utterance, for example a question, a prohibition or a warning. In generating an illocutionary act, one makes a promise,

472 Ricœur 2008, 74.
473 Ricœur 1978, 144.
gives an order or submits a statement. According to Ricœur, the idea of the analysis of speech acts in ordinary language philosophy should be contextualized by the idea of dialogue. I now explain the relation of illocutionary act to the locutionary act in discourse and revert thereafter to the “interlocutionary”.

What happens in the context of discourse, according to Ricœur, is that an illocutionary act is transformed into an locutionary act. The illocutionary force of the speakers meaning, what a person does when she says something, can be traced from the text’s actual utterance of the text even when the actual moment of uttering has passed. In an illocutionary act one can make an ironic promise “I promise, that since I haven’t met you, I will never leave you”, and the irony (the linguistic force) is still read from the locutionary act expressed in the text.

The example of an idea of an utterance that preserves the semantic innovation (mentioned at the end of the quotation at the end of 5.6) represents an expression that is both an event and a meaning. This signifies that discourse occurs as an event in a certain situation and place, but it is understood as a meaning. This is what Ricœur calls the dialectic of an event and a meaning. The idea of a meaning that can be an event and a meaning at the same time comes to fruition in polysemic language in speaking situations. The language is polysemic in a speaking situation when a word has several meanings. The speaking situation is open to different interpretations (but, not infinitely many).

Ricœur’s paradigmatic example of semantic innovation is the metaphorical way of using language, along with other expressions that can have multiple meaning. For now, it is enough to give a short example of semantic innovation that is presented in journalistic language and may be interpreted as metaphorical language or literal language:

Making the invisible visible, bringing the margins to the centre, rendering the trivial important, putting the spotlight on women as competent actors, understanding women as subjects in their own right rather than objects for men – all continue to be elements of feminist research.
Here the metaphorical expressions in a context create a meaning that refers to a real situation. Women’s situation in society and the feminist research that tries to enhance that situation, is described by the expressions “making the invisible visible” and “putting the spotlight on women as competent actors”. The sentence “putting the spotlight on women as competent actors” is a living expression that has a relation to real situation on society. In the text above its linguistic force is transformed to the locutionary act. Still the text has the illocutionary power and it may produce semantic innovation for the reader/interpreter.

For Ricœur, a semantic event must be something that can be repeatable. The repetition in this text is characterized by the use of the same root metaphor expressed in a different manner, thus the meaning of a metaphor is made explicit for the readers of the text. The majority of metaphors relate to the slight/light distinction, like, for example, “making the invisible visible”. The metaphor of “making the invisible visible” is a root metaphor under which networks of metaphors can be organized. At the same time, the metaphorical expressions are descriptions that remain in the moment that produced these metaphors. What then is the act of translation here?

The interlocutionary signifies that the origin of a sentence is the framework of any communication. This brings in the idea that speech acts are understood in a discussion between two people. A person utters a sentence in a certain environment, and this environment of a sentence offers it a role in the communication and interaction between people. From Ricœur’s perspective, sentences are considered a part of physical affection, as well as a part of a moment. The different types of sentences are classified by means of their function in a speech situation. With this idea of the interlocutionary, Ricœur wants to express that the semantics of language can transform and translate the experience from person to person. The context of a certain speech situation can be the place where the translation is processed. Even if the speech situation is changed to dialogue between a reader and a text, communication in the sense of the interlocutionary may take place, since the aim to express a certain message to another is readable from the text.

This idea of translating other’s experiences into ones own flowerishes in Ricœur’s later theory of narrative identity in Oneself as Another, cited in the chapter. The connective analysis can reveal how a first-hand experience is made intersubjective in a communication situation. In this sense the interlocutory means that a person

480 Ricœur 2008, 244.
uses language and symbolic expressions to simulate and recreate another person’s experience. This simulation takes place through fictive and metaphorical uses of language. The simulation takes place through fictive sentences, because they produce the place for the different interpretations and the opportunity for the transformation of a meaning. This is the reason why Ricœur has to combine hermeneutic philosophy of communication with the analysis of ordinary language. The extensive field in which ordinary language is used intersects constantly with the ways poetic and fictive language is used.

This idea of interlocutionary of language and experience is expressed in the conception of translation. Ricœur’s theory of interpretation includes philosophy as translation and the philosophy of translation. The methodological part concerns philosophy as translation. Ricœur’s aim was to translate the hidden meaning of the expressions, and through reflection these expressions were a part of cultural symbolism. Kearney mentions two main paradigms of translation in Ricœur’s philosophy: the first is linguistic translation and the second one is ontological translation.

The first concerns on how words relate to meaning and how they are translated from language to another. This is the way ordinary language philosophers and Ricœur with them analyse sentences. Here he presents the idea of translating ideas from one context to another. Ontological translation has been described in my work already; it means the translation from one’s self to the perspective of another. This ontological translation is what the concept of an interlocutionary act is aiming at. As I read Ricœur’s theory of interpretation, these two aspects of transformation which translate, are tied together and work together. This is the merging of connective linguistic analysis and transformative analysis.

As an example of an interlocutionary act I continue the example above. What happens when the meaning of an event is translated from one person to another? When a man named John hears the expressions such as “putting the spotlight on women as competent actors” or “moving acting women aside in the shadows”, he tries to work out the meaning of these expressions. Fictive use makes him ponder between different possibilities for meaning and translate these linguistic expressions into his own way of using and receiving language. He may try to understand the expression to claim that he himself is in the spotlight all the time. Or John may concentrate on the experience of a woman who is not in the spotlight. In any case John translates this metaphor into his own experience, he is

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481 Kearney 2006, xii.
not just translating the new expression into the language he is used to speaking and hearing. He is also hearing or reading a sentence in a certain environment. These surroundings of a sentence offer it a role in the communication and action between John and the text or the human who is expressing this idea. John may experience semantic innovation, and understand through it the perspective of these expressions. The experience that is expressed is translated into John’s own language and his own experience. I suggest that precisely this process of translation the interlocutionary act occurs. This translation can transform his way of understanding the role of women in society.

I have now considered how the analysis of intelowutionary acts of language works as a transformation in hermeneutics. In the last chapter I explain more how linguistic analysis works with the hermeneutic theory of metaphor.

5.7.1 The Transformation of Self in Metaphors

I explained above how the idea of transformation works with symbolic expressions. In this process the translation from one meaningful whole to another, the experience of oneself, is transformed. In Oneself as Another, Ricœur states that understanding the self and the actions requires a new alliance between the analytic tradition and the phenomenological and hermeneutical traditions. I cannot describe here the entire enterprise that Ricœur presents in his book, but I strive to explain some ideas of it, and how these ideas are already part of his theory of metaphor. The main idea that Ricœur introduces is that the analysis of language is “the indirect manner of positing the self”. This manner of positing the self and actions is transformation through the plot and other structures of a story. Metaphor has this same ability to open up new ways of being, and thus transform and translate actual ways of acting.

Transformative analysis can be understood as a method of ‘translation’ from one language into another. For Beaney, transformative analysis is ‘rephrasing’, which aims to transform what it is we are dissolving. The aim of this analysis was to analyse the starting point of analysis (analysandum) to a certain end point of

482 Ricœur1992, 113
483 Ricœur1992, 17.
484 Beaney 2007, 198.
analysis (analysans) that would be the univocal meaning. For example, for Russell, there was one certain right logical form that was the end point of this analysis. Ricœur, on the other hand, considers his own analysis of expressions that express multiple meanings to be opposed to these theories “which would hope to remake existing languages according to ideal models”\textsuperscript{485}.

As an example of these ideal models for philosophy, Ricœur primarily looks to Husserl’s early method: The idea of transformation of language to a certain logical form is abandoned. This establishes that Ricœur’s method is actually, in this sense, opposed to Beaney’s definition of transformative analysis. As in the examples of Russellian transformative analysis, Ricœur does not think that the philosophical method leads to a certain ideal model of a language, but rather competes with the different perspectives, with different sciences.

There are various theories about the linguistic analysis of analytic philosophy, and the theme appears in a new guise in Ricœur’s methodology. Beaney refers to an idea in linguistic philosophy which is also present throughout this source in Ricœur’s philosophy, namely the idea of aiming at a greater self-consciousness in our use of language and its potential for leading us astray\textsuperscript{486}. Ricœur’s suggestion includes this notion, but goes even further. From his perspective, language and its various ways of influence transform the human embodied action and self.

Hence the semantic and pragmatic analysis of language is needed to guide studies on the human self. In this light, greater self-consciousness about language relates to the aspects of personal identity. I shall not discuss further the philosophy of personhood presented in Ricœur’s work, especially in his \textit{Oneself as Another}. Instead, I confine myself to mentioning a few points of reference. These points help to outline the aim of the Ricœurian transformation of the self.

The general idea of transformation is part of Ricœur’s perspective on the hermeneutic circle (described above in Section 5.3), since it describes the transformation of an experience into the objective level of language\textsuperscript{487}. Here, this transformation is conceptualized as translating one meaningful whole (which may be linguistic or symbolic) into another\textsuperscript{488}. It is the same process as a textual translation from our own perspective into the perspective of others. As I have pointed out and as is recognized, for example, by Scott Davidson, Ricœur believes

\textsuperscript{485} Ricœur 1974, 15.
\textsuperscript{486} Beaney 2007, 4.
\textsuperscript{487} See for example Haaparanta 2007, 264.
\textsuperscript{488} Davidson 2010, 3.
that translating one idea into another means that translation is inherent in all understanding. Ricœur points out in the chapter “The Paradigm of Translation” of the book On Translation (2004) that translation is present in all actions of understanding. This applies to texts, as well as other text-like products, such as actions and cultural artefacts.

Furthermore Richard Kearney makes the claim that the act of translation from oneself to another is a central feature of Ricœur’s work, yet he made it explicit in his later work. According to Kearney the act of translation was how Ricœur performed his philosophical practice. I have highlighted that the concept of translation presents how symbolic transformation is at the same time the transformation of a person’s experience.

Thus the hermeneutic circle as a description of scientific understanding is the dialectic between scientists or philosophers, a guess that is made precise by a theoretical knowledge from linguistics and psychology. The question of transformation in this dialectic refers back to Ricœur’s three modes of reading the hermeneutic circle, mentioned several times in earlier chapters:

1. The pre-understanding (Mimesis1)
2. The text (Mimesis2) (narratives and metaphors)
3. The application (Mimesis3)

These stages of the understanding process can each be connected to their own analyses. To simplify this idea, I present the following examples of how different analyses work in cooperation with different parts of Ricœur’s hermeneutics:

1) The pre-understanding of our embodiment and especially embodied action can be captured by regressive phenomenological analysis, where language does not yet have a significant role. According to Ricœur, people can also be understood as bodies outside the linguistic constraint. The investigation of an embodied action may be in the form of assumptions made by a phenomenologist investigating what is happening in her body and in which ways her bodily being is in contact with the acts of her mind. This kind of

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489 Davidson 2010, 2.
490 Davidson 2010, 2.
491 Kearney 2007, 5.
phenomenological study on embodiment as the root of personhood is what Ricœur studies in his early philosophy.\footnote{Pellauer 2007, 14.}

2) Textual presentation of metaphoric sentences and texts is often considered through conceptual connections between sentences and the textual whole. Here the methods of linguistics can be applied. Ricœur uses expressions such as ‘analysis of language’ or ‘the task of linguistic analysis’, ‘comprehensive analysis of symbolic structures’.\footnote{See for example Ricœur 1974.} He has a tolerant view of using the terms of analytic philosophy. The comprehensive analysis of symbolic structures has a function in Ricœur’s philosophy. Ricœur discusses ‘the analysis of language’ which refers to concentration on the level of language and to the aim of reading linguistic structures from natural language. This is, among other things, what Ricœur does in his analysis of language, structuralism and metaphor theory.

3) Finally, the interpretation of a being and the self requires an understanding of how the pre-understanding of unconsciousness and bodily action can be formulated as a narrative or as a new kind of conceptual connection in a metaphor. This is what Ricœur studies in the last part of his metaphor theory and in his theory of narrative identity.\footnote{Ricœur 2008, 321-322.}

Analyses 1 and 2 mentioned above are discussed in Sections 5.5 and 5.6. The idea that Mimesis1 has changed into Mimesis 2 means that an experience has been transformed to the linguistic or symbolic level. For example, an experience of becoming completely exhausted can be presented in the metaphor ‘he dropped’. The third stage of the hermeneutic circle, called ‘application’, is still somewhat unclear. I will try to clarify this concept by means of the idea of ‘symbolic transformation’.

We can compare Ricœur’s process of interpretation to the definitions Beaney gives of transformative analysis. At a general level, interpretation, even in hermeneutics, has interpretive analysis as its general aim. Ricœur’s linguistic analysis has two different tasks: The enumeration of symbolic forms and the definition of their
semantic structure. Once again, by symbolic forms Ricœur means a metaphor, a symbol, an allegory or a similarity.

The first task, the enumeration, could be seen as a connective linguistic analysis of these symbolic forms. It recognizes the symbolic form and the conceptual connections of linguistic expressions. The second task is to interpret structures, to translate them and to redefine them. This refers to the way a person applies a text, a text-like cultural product or a narrative as part of her understanding. Here Ricœur comes close to the function of Mimesis 3, called the ‘application’ of language to our experience. He uses the terms ‘appropriation’ and ‘application’ interchangeably of the same process. Ricœur describes this application (or appropriation) of Mimesis 3 the following way:

The interpretation is complete when the reading releases something like an event, an event of discourse, an event in the present time. As appropriation, the interpretation becomes an event. Appropriation is thus a dialectical concept: the counterpart of the timeless distanciation implied by any literary or textual criticism of an anti-historical character.

The concept “distanciation” means that a text places the meaning at a distance from the reader/interpreter. It changes the meaning a text has for us into something other when compared with our conceptions at a certain time. Ricœur sees ‘distanciation’ as the phenomenological epoché, where the normal understanding, so-called ‘common sense understanding of the world’, is bracketed. Then, appropriation or application are counterparts of this distanciation: In appropriation, the distant meaning is made part of our own. This appropriation concerns the way in which a text is addressed to someone. Appropriation, furthermore, means that a reader makes the text her own. Simply, it refers to the moment when a human being understands and takes influences from a text. It describes what happens in our minds when the process of understanding is under way.

Interpretation is an event in itself since it changes the way a person schematizes the possible action. The process of interpretation is the transformation of an

\[\text{496 Ricœur 1974, 13.}\]
\[\text{497 Ricœur 1974, 14.}\]
\[\text{498 Ricœur 1989, 185.}\]
\[\text{499 Ricœur 1996, 36.}\]
experience through language, texts symbolism. When the world of pre-understanding is brought onto the textual level, a new understanding of experience is created. This combining of prior knowledge and these new conceptual connections is what occurs in Mimesis 3 of the hermeneutic circle (application or appropriation). The theoretical presentation above on this issue might remain unclear unless exemplified. The final stage of the interpretation process can be clarified through an understanding of metaphors.

Metaphoric language is an example of the understanding process. In metaphorical language, interpretation becomes an event when the metaphor presents new options. This does not mean only new ways of seeing things but also that the metaphor as a schema changes the ways human beings act. According to Ricœur, “poetical textures - - are no less heuristic than fictions in narrative form”500. This signifies also that “poetic language brings to language a pre-objective world in which we find ourselves already rooted, but in which we also project our innermost possibilities”501. The whole being of a person is transformed through fictive expressions, such as metaphors and narratives502. The new imaginative variations, new possibilities, are understood through metaphorical transformation.

This experience, which makes the distanciation, as noted in the longer quotation above, implies that language makes a person reflect her way of being. After reflecting what a metaphor means, the application of the new metaphor as a part of the person's understanding takes place. Since this application concerns different ways of experiencing, it can mean the way metaphorical language helps a human being to re-conceptualise her being. Likewise, it can help to re-conceptualise her ways of acting in the world.

Ricœur himself considered the idea of combining the research of narrative identity and acting in Oneself as Another. I suggest that this is how Ricœur’s early phenomenological study on the body can be understood from the point of view of his theory of fiction, such as narration and metaphor. The starting point of his studies on metaphor and narration was that fiction presents a new possible way of being and acting. According to this, we can say that these new imaginative variations change the way a person feels and conceptualises her action.

In Ricœur’s Oneself as Another linguistic analysis is used as a starting point for the analysis of personhood by means of analysing how the expression “I” occurs in a

500 Ricœur 2008, 305.
502 Ricœur 1984 xi.
semantic context. Ricœur presents the correlation between ‘the self’ and ‘other than self’. This means that the intersubjectivity of language makes a person's experiences objective. Furthermore, the analytic theory of action contains the ideas that Ricœur uses in his analysis of narrative identity.

I furthermore claim that indications of this transformation can be read in Ricœur’s writing on metaphor. The semantic transformation of a self in language is already present in Ricœur’s writings on metaphor. This opens up the idea that the understanding of metaphors can be seen as the actual transformation of a self. Or we can say that the understanding of metaphors opens up one aspect of the self insofar as narratives build people the story of their lives. I do not claim that this is the entire story of our consciousness. It is one aspect of how a human being schematizes her objects of interpretation, herself and other people. Metaphorical expression can focus, create new fields of seeing and feeling, planning our bodily actions.

We can find confirmation for the claim that the understanding of the self through action can be read from metaphor, when reading Ricœur’s book *Oneself as Another*. Hence, I interpret Ricœur’s writings on metaphor through his writings on personal identity. The hermeneutic theory of transforming the self and linguistic analysis produce a new way of understanding a human being.

In other words, following the idea presented in the previous chapters, transformation concerns the translation of one meaningful whole to the other. The linguistic, textual, symbolic structures are translated to another context of human experience. The translation can happen, as in the previous chapter, between two people. The translation can also be the translation from the cultural symbol or text to our own experience.

My following example of the transformation of a self in metaphors is slightly hypothetical, since it goes further than Ricœur in either *Oneself as Another* or in *The Rule of the Metaphor*. Yet, by combining the perspectives of transformation and language we produce a valuable viewpoint on philosophical and psychological practices.

Finally, a concrete example, in which the phenomenological analysis of our being, or our embodied existence, is connected to linguistic analysis, could be a

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503 Ricœur 1992, 46.
504 Ricœur 1992, 16.
therapeutic situation or other kind of interaction between two people. In such a situation, a therapist gives the patient tools to reinterpreting herself, her own experience and reactions to and through linguistic expression. On the basis of Ricœur’s philosophy and on the basis of actual therapeutic situations in which metaphor is often used, I give an actual example of how Ricœur’s theory is put into practice. This is a practical example of the transformative analysis according to Ricœur’s hermeneutic philosophy.

The situation of presenting new imaginative variations of transformation can be introduced in a therapeutic situation. This so-called “metaphor therapy” can be applied to a therapy situation\(^505\). Metaphor therapy offers new ideas for methods in psychotherapy. Yet the prospect of combining psychotherapy and the use of metaphors is a theme that is common in another field of therapy\(^506\). For example, Richard Kopp writes in the Ricœurian spirit that therapists use metaphors and change the metaphors of their clients. Kopp also recognizes how metaphors create imagination that can transform the client’s way of understanding in an actual therapeutic situation\(^507\). In a process where a person understands herself through fictive presentation, the understanding of a person can transform. The mere new metaphor of a certain life situation can open up a new way of dealing with an experience, a problem, a trauma, a puzzling life situation.

Ricœur’s holistic idea of how metaphoric language, as well as narratives, can actually transform a human could be developed in the therapeutic situation. Some evidence of this approach can be found, for example, at the end of Ricœur’s Oneself as Another. In his work, Ricœur presents the same kind of analysis of ontology and action as he discusses in The Rule of Metaphor. In this study, Ricœur emphasized the idea, taken from Aristotle, that language presents reality in action through metaphoric expressions. This same notion is present in his theory of narrative. As he says in Oneself as Another, “- - narrative theory finds one of its major justifications in the role it plays as a middle ground between the descriptive viewpoint on action - -”.

As I noted above, the pre-linguistic pre-understanding of embodied action can be turned into the objective world of language and other bodies. The pre-linguistic being of flesh can be transformed into intersubjective language by expressions that reflect the action\(^508\). From this point of view, the theory that combines the

\(^{505}\) See, for example, Kopp 1995, 6.
\(^{506}\) See, for example, Siegel 2010, 233.
\(^{507}\) Kopp 1995, xiii-xiv.
\(^{508}\) Ricœur 1992, 325.
understanding of a bodily being with linguistic narratives can be drawn from Ricœur’s studies on embodiment and linguistic analysis. As noted, the kind of concrete transformation I presented above goes slightly further than Ricœur, but is a hypothetical example of the real, concrete situations where Ricœur’s hermeneutic circle and his method of hermeneutic dialectic can be applied.

Thus, we have the following three stages in our hermeneutical analysis: First, the starting point of our analysis, namely, expressions with multiple meanings. Second, we have the process of analysis in which we ponder the compatibilities and incompatibilities of certain concepts. And third, we have the end point of analysis: A certain interpretation of multiple meanings, or a few possibilities for an interpretation.

I call Ricœur’s interpretation of multiple meanings ‘the method of interpretation’, which has characteristics of connective analysis, but which is simultaneously the interpretation of an experience, a synthesis that schematizes new ways of being and acting. Yet this idea in its wide application opens up the connection between philosophy and the actual fields of interpretation. Self-understanding works in a hermeneutic circle, in which the new ways of being, new ways of seeing and acting can be opened up.
6. Concluding Remarks

In recent decades Ricœur’s work has become widely used in the special sciences. This development forces us to investigate his philosophical method that is applied in the special sciences, especially those that concern practical interpretation of social action. It is needed to open his historically new suggestions for the interpretive disciplines, as well as some problems of his philosophical project. Scott Davidson claims that his book (published in 2010) takes the first steps in thematizing Ricœur’s interdisciplinary method. Davidson characterizes how Ricœur proceeds by juxtaposing the ideas of different authors in his interdisciplinary hermeneutic.

Ricœur’s interdisciplinary method is based on the interaction between philosophical conceptual analysis and the hermeneutical interpretation. My focus has been on the methodological intersection of the philosophical analysis that has been used as a part of the practice of hermeneutics. In this work, the term analytic philosophy includes both the authors of early analytic philosophy and the Oxford School, which Ricœur connects to his work.

I have taken further steps in this investigation, steps that are unknown and even odd for most Ricœur researchers. An odd part for many Ricœur scholars has been the investigation of the intersection of Anglo-American analytic philosophy and continental philosophy. I concentrated on one of these intersections of a hermeneutic interpretation theory and the various methods of analysis and interpretation. Yet this line of study reminds of Ricœur’s way of reading philosophy. His philosophical attitude combined to his method is radical openness to new ideas with being both patient and sincere in developing them. Ricœur’s dialectical hermeneutics does not close philosophical questions inside the philosophical roundtable discussions. The focus of my study has been on how the analysis of analytic philosophers influenced Ricœur, and on what is his position to the types of analysis.

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509 Davidson 2010, 1.
Ricœur’s philosophical practice is in contact with different types of philosophical analyses. I have argued that the question of Ricœur’s interdisciplinary interpretation theory should be seen as a part of the debate which captures the analysis of language and the method of phenomenological analysis in the twentieth century. In “Introduction” I noted that the hermeneutic framework changes the way a certain type of analysis is practised. Let us now come to my conclusion.

Interpretation theory includes the idea of translation that has both linguistic and ontological functions. The first concerns how words relate to meaning and how they are translated from one language to another.\textsuperscript{510} Ontological translation means translation from a human’s self to the perspective of another. In Ricœur’s theory of interpretation these aspects of transformation which translates work together.

In his new opening Ricœur seeks to show how to graft the analysis of language onto the phenomenological study of experience. In other words, Ricœur tried to make hermeneutics more explicit by taking ordinary language analysis as one of its methods of analysis. Yet the analysis of language is put in the context of human action, which contains the idea that in the investigation of human consciousness embodied action has a great value. Here the idea that pre-understanding is embodied, and can be expressed in the linguistic acts.

Ricœur’s interdisciplinary method changes the analysis that is used for the purposes of interpretation. The language analysis is tied to the social communication. This combination of analysis and communication Ricœur calls “interlocutionary”. Phenomenology is needed for the study of experience that arises from the use of fictive language.

I have stressed that the concept of transformation as translation describes the idea that linguistic or symbolic structures change human experience. This is how linguistic analysis and phenomenological analysis meet. Let us at the end recall how I came to this merging of with hermeneutical interpretation theory with regressive, connective and transformative analyses.

I noted in Chapter 3 that the tendencies that characterize analytic philosophy are the ideals of clarity, rigor and argumentation. Ricœur’s idea is somewhat controversial: it offers the opportunity to combine interpretation theory and interpretive methods. My suggestion on the basis of Ricœur’s philosophy was to

\begin{footnote}{Kearney 2006, xii.}\end{footnote}
introduce a fifth way of practising philosophy. This hermeneutic theory intersects with the analysis of language and experience, yet is itself a philosophical method that differs from pure conceptual analysis. I presented five different methodologies:

1) decompositional analysis
2) transformative analysis
3) regressive analysis
4) connective analysis
5) hermeneutic dialectic

The wide scope of Ricœur’s methodology changes the way philosophy is actually practised. It tries at once to be a detailed analysis and to delve deeper into the specific interpretive methods such as psychoanalysis or linguistics, but also takes a holistic perspective on language, communication and embodied action. Ricœur’s methodological background, the starting point of his philosophy, is to assimilate methods from different philosophical traditions, and so to produce new ideas. For Ricœur, analysis in phenomenology and in ordinary language helps hermeneutic methodology.\footnote{See, for example, Ricœur 1974, 63. Ricœur uses terms such as “the path of analysis, the decomposition into smaller units”. He also notices the reductive analysis when he speaks about” the reduction of simple element”. He does not use the terms connective analysis of an ordinary language analysis.}

In Chapter 2, I put Ricœur’s interpretation theory into the historical context of the tradition of hermeneutics. I described how Ricœur followed the ideal of modern hermeneutics of the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries that expanded hermeneutics from its religious context to the method that defined the shape of the social or human sciences\footnote{Ihde 1996, 61.}. Ricœur renewed Dilthey’s ideas. I pointed out that this combination of methods was important, since the mind cannot be comprehended only from one perspective, for example only the philosophical point of view.\footnote{Rickman 1979, 149.} The same kind of combination of methods was Ricœur’s aim, I pointed out that creating hermeneutic methodology for social sciences and human sciences was one of the key principles of Ricœur’s philosophy.

Furthermore, I especially showed how Ricœur’s philosophy started a dialogue with analytic philosophers. Chapter 2.2 paved the way for Chapter 3 that considering...
the types of analysis. In 2.3 I focused on Ricœur’s key question of self-understanding. I focused on how the hermeneutic methodology surrounds this question. In the end of the chapter described Ricœur’s starting point for the study of the self that became important in Chapters 4 and 5. I also gave counterarguments for Ricœur’s basic assumption concerning reflection through symbols. This showed how his philosophical method is tied to the idea of dialectic between subjectivity and objectivity. This idea is enlarged on as the whole philosophical idea in which hermeneutical theory is in dialogue with methods of special sciences. Yet in my critical notions this idea of the reflective mind can be also questioned.

The Chapter 3 “Different Modes of Conceptual Analysis” introduced the four different methods of analysis introduced in the discussion on the history of twentieth century philosophy. This framework of the methods of analysis gave ideas for the hermeneutic theory that uses mainly three methods of analysis. As an example of analysis in analytic philosophy, I studied Russell’s conception of analysis. This investigation revealed the answers concerning analysis in early analytic philosophy. The ideas behind decomposition are connected with the intuition that correct logic gives us correct metaphysics. However, the usefulness of decompositional analysis in the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind is restricted, and needs other modes of analysis for its support. By contrast, Russell’s transformative and translating analysis is a method for solving problematic propositions or sentences. The purpose of transformative analysis can be seen to be to acquire knowledge and understand knowledge of familiar facts, not so much to acquire knowledge of new facts ⁵¹⁴.

In a Chapter 4, I started to contextualize Ricœur’s method on the types of philosophical method. I grasped the deeper understanding of Ricœur’s conception of language as a text, and examples of his textual analysis in the case of his metaphor theory, and examples from his writings on symbols. These detours gave me a good chance to show how Ricœur’s reflective philosophy combines the method of language analysis to the hermeneutical theory.

In Chapter 5 I argued that Ricœur’s interdisciplinary method puts the project of philosophical analysis in a new framework. As I claimed in Chapter 5.5 and 5.6 it changes both: the phenomenological reduction as analysis and the connective analysis of an ordinary language philosophy. Furthermore, in Chapter 5.4 I see his approach as a criticism of some traditional modes of philosophical analysis, namely

⁵¹⁴ See Hacker 1996, 73.
decompositional analysis. The critical path mainly concerns the one-sidedness of decompositional analysis. Phenomenological regressive analysis is needed in the analysis of texts that include linguistic expressions in natural language. Then how did Ricœur’s interdisciplinary method work with the four types of analysis? In 5.7, I observed that Ricœur’s writing on narrativity and metaphor reveals the conceptual core of how an acting being gains expression in a language. A central role in this analysis is to show how embodied action is expressed in language, and how this changes human experience. Metaphor theory is an example of how the conceptual analysis of metaphors in dialogue with sciences produces new philosophical frameworks that can again be applied to sciences and other fields of society. Ricœur even suggests that metaphoric language can transform a social being.

In Ricœur’s case the hermeneutic circle (and hermeneutic arc) is also a way to describe the understanding process of a philosopher or a scientist. I pointed out that Ricœur also understands the hermeneutic circle as scientific enquiry. In other words, the hermeneutic circle can describe how scientific knowledge develops. The different approaches of specific areas of interpretation are meant to reflect the self in the manner of human sciences or, when necessary, of natural sciences515.

Furthermore, I hold that his methodological starting point for philosophy can give methodological starting points for scientific study in the fields that try to connect the research of human experience of embodied action and linguistic framework. Especially I see the importance of his ideas when the practice and theory behind psychology, psychoanalysis and other fields of therapy are taken further by combining traditional linguistic therapy and embodied practices. His ideas on the linguistic analysis remind already what social psychology, literary theory and educational studies apply in the studies concerning narrative identity. Ricœur’s model for philosophical methodology is especially needed in the case of the philosophy of mind, action and body, all studied from the question of self-knowledge. The dialectical position includes the basic structure of the scientific research that goes by relying on and developing a core of philosophical practice that could be characterized as conceptual analysis or phenomenological analysis. What Ricœur has to contribute to the question between methods of natural and human sciences is to show that in both of these fields textual interpretation understood as symbolic ‘translation’ is something underlying all scientific research.

Now that I have outlined how my work proceeds, I sum up the core results: However, it is analysis, in dialogue with the human sciences, and develops its ideas together with them.

1) My research focuses on Ricœur’s interdisciplinary method in relation to the other philosophical methods in the twentieth century, especially, the different types of philosophical analysis. This perspective on hermeneutics has not been investigated before. Ricœur’s interdisciplinary interpretation theory uses analysis for purposes of interpretation. My work brings the hermeneutic tradition into the recent historical discussion on the philosophical methods of the twentieth century. Ricœur’s theory of interpretation radically modifies the style of philosophical analysis in relation to the methods of the special sciences. Philosophical analysis and interpretive methods work together in this hermeneutic dialectic.

2) Ricœur’s methodology gives a new framework for the analysis in the following manner: Language analysis is linked to social communication. This is done by pointing out the experience arising from language. The mingling of experience and language is described in my work in the meeting of two traditions: The phenomenological approach investigating human experience is merged with the analysis of language use in the Oxford school. The important aspects of analysis in analytic philosophy are applied in hermeneutics. Some ideas came through phenomenological analysis. This aspect is merged with connective analysis on the hermeneutical approach. The interpretation of linguistic structures is meant to transform the whole network of being of the human: this includes the ways how ambiguous expressions, such as symbols and metaphors bring the experience to the level of language. What was crucial here was the idea that while linguistic expression is translated from one linguistic or symbolic whole to another, the experience is also translated to another mode.

3) My work takes bodily metaphors as an example. As a side an additional result I make an interpretation of Ricœur’s work that emphasizes the idea that metaphors and narratives can change the bodily being.

4) In Ricœur’s work philosophical analysis and interpretive methods work together. This is the way to expand hermeneutics to the investigation of cultural and social targets of investigation.
Ricœur is often eclectic in the ideas he takes from different scientists, not all of them philosophers. Yet many of the ideas he incorporates into his philosophy are not the results of empirical science, but something that is useful to build and test a theoretical framework. This makes the difference between Ricœur’s approach, and both early analytic philosophy and the early Husserl. This does not mean that Ricœur meets the challenge of the empirical tests of philosophical analysis. The special instrument offered by human sciences is a series of specific ways to practise interpretation in a given field of science. The multidisciplinary study, and the acceptance of both the regressive phenomenological method and linguistic analysis produce new ideas for the investigation of fictive expressions, especially metaphors.

Finally, I stress that I do not name Ricœur’s philosophical standpoint only eclecticism as it has sometimes been characterized. Rather, it is an open intellectual response dealing with issues relevant to disciplines concerned with human issues. This refers to the investigation of mind, body language and social reality. Is this, ultimately, too large and unclear a focus of investigation? Yet, surely, it is as much needed when philosophy wants to have something to say on this world that we live in.

The analysis of analytic philosophy is certainly a brake that is needed when the theory of hermeneutics starts to accelerate excessively to the unknown paths of embodied action and interaction. Ricœur uses this brake wisely, and his work is an example for any philosopher who wishes to present theories concerning the human being and action. These problems have to be studied one at a time, not forgetting how, for example, the use of language is bound to the human experience of the world. Ricœur’s undeniably broad framework should be understood as the fundamental starting point for detailed studies on mind and body together, and how language emerges from this combination. Interpretation theory sets the baseline for each phenomenon studied specific interpretive methods.
REFERENCES

Works by Paul Ricoeur


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**Works by Other Authors**


