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THE OTHER WITHIN: THE ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN SPEAKING MINORITY IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BALTIC STATES AND RUSSIA

University of Tampere, Finland
Faculty of Social Sciences
Master’s programme in International Relations CBU
Master’s Thesis
May 2009
The research problem of the thesis is the role of the Russian speaking population as the internal other in the relations between the Baltic States and Russia through comparison of all the three situations. The theoretical foundation of the research is the “self – other” dichotomy considered on the fundamental, theoretical and empirical levels that are presented by the positions of Carl Schmitt, Benedict Anderson and Iver Neumann. The analysis of the dichotomy provides the basis for the research of the position of the Russian speaking population as the internal other in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In the thesis the rhetorical methodology is applied to the articles of the national newspapers of the Baltic States published in large editions since May, 2004 in order to outline the rhetorical techniques, interpret them and thus to analyze the perception of the Russian speaking population and Russia in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The role of the factor of the Russian speaking minority in the relations between the Baltic States and Russia is defined through the affirmation of the correlation between the situation over the Russian speaking population and the foreign policy of the country in relation to Russia in the context of the “self - other” dichotomy.

The comparison of the situations over the position of the Russian speaking population and the foreign policy in relation to Russia in the Baltic States enables to state that the Lithuanian case is atypical. The research demonstrates that the negative perception of both objects dominates in Latvia and Estonia while it is not typical of Lithuania. The analysis of the “self – other” dichotomy and the results of the rhetorical analysis of the articles of the newspapers of the Baltic States lead to the conclusion that in Lithuania the positive perception of the Russian speaking minority since it is not the internal other and the absence of the necessity to protect the self corresponds to the domination of the positive presentation of Russia and the positive trends in the foreign policy in relation to it in contrast to Latvia and Estonia. Consequently, the minority plays a particular role in the relations between the Baltic States and Russia.

Inquiry into the case of the Baltic States enables to conclude that the issue of identity influences the foreign policy of a country in a variety of ways.
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4. 1. The Russian Speaking Minority as the Internal Other

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6. Bibliography
1. Introduction

1. 1. Background to the Research Problem

The thematic area of the study is the foreign policy of the Baltic States in terms of their relations with Russia.

This theme is topical at the present time. After the USSR collapse the Baltic States and Russia became the independent countries and that made it necessary to work out their own policy. From the very beginning the Baltic States chose the development of the cooperation with Western countries and the integration into the EU and NATO as its primary goals in the foreign policy. In its turn Russia was interested in the maintenance of its influence in the Baltic region.

Because of the common border between the countries the establishment of the stable relations appeared to be naturally necessary. During the 1990-ies there were a number of the problems to be solved but the westernized the Baltic States orientation and the constant western influence on its policy made the process of the improvement of partnership between the countries more complicated, but the positive results can be outlined. In 2004 the Baltic States became the member of the European Union and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation and that is the key factor of the analysis of the present stage and the prospects of the relations between Russia and the Baltic States.

However, if we compare the relations between Lithuania and Russia and the relations between Russia and Latvia and Estonia the situation in the first case is much more favourable than in two others. But it is interesting to consider the factors that determine the conditions for the development of the relations between Russia and the Baltic Countries.

1. 2. Heuristic Points of Departure

From the very beginning all the Baltic States, i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, followed the closed type of the ethnic community. It means that the internal consolidation was formed through the creation of the image of the external enemy. The Russian Federation played the role of this enemy since in the Baltic Sea States it was identified with the USSR, with this negative past which they are eager to get rid of.

In this regard the political elites of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania popularized the idea of the existence of the military threat from the Russian side. That also gave them the possibility to prove the necessity of their entrance into the EU and NATO in order to provide their security because from their point of view Russia followed the imperial plans to restore its influence in different regions of the continent. That fact was treated as a threat to the security of these states,
but no official statements or programmes of the Russian side stated any imperial goals. In Russia there was no any influential group which called for the use of force in the Baltic States, moreover, the Russian government confirmed their readiness and their striving to develop peaceful cooperation with the countries.

The Russian initiatives aimed at the improvement of the relations with the Baltic States were rejected. For example, the idea to provide the comprehensive guarantees of the security of the Baltic States, which was proposed by Boris Eltsyn in 1997, was turned down. But the analysis of arguments and the materials of the experts of the Baltic States which were used at discussions on the level of non–governmental organizations of the Baltic States and Russia enable to state that the politicians and the political scientists did not consider seriously the existence of the military threat from the Russian side. But they applied this idea in order to receive the support of the Western countries; it was advantageous for them to develop this idea in terms of their political and financial interests.

One of the major issues in the relations between the Baltic States and Russia is the Russian speaking minority. The problem of the noncitizens appeared from the very beginning of independence of the Baltic States. By the moment of their achievement of independence there were 900000 Russians (34% of the whole population in the country) in Latvia, 350000 (9,4%) Russians lived in Lithuania and 480000 Russians (30, 3%) in Estonia. The conclusion is that the situation was the most favourable in Lithuania. In terms of the relations with the Russian Federation Lithuania developed the most fruitful cooperation in comparison with Latvia and Estonia. Thus the question is whether the fact that Russians were presented in Lithuania in the least proportion encouraged the development of the relations with Russia, whether the presence of this ethnic threat, this ethnic enemy in such a small number compared to the situation in the two other Baltic States did not consider the existential threat and thus favoured the conduction of the dialogue between these two countries.

Lithuania immediately adopted the law on citizenship which provided “the zero version” according to which all Russian speaking people were able to choose the country of the citizenship and get its citizenship. All the three countries signed (Estonia with a proviso and Lithuania has already ratified) the Framework convention of the Council of Europe about the national minorities protection. Lithuania is preparing the acts on the national minorities’ rights providing the implementation of the points of the Convention. In Latvia the Act of 1991 did not consider specific rights for the national minorities, besides that the programmes of public integration adopted by Latvia and Estonia in 2000 were worked out without taking into account the proposals of the authoritative social organizations of the Russian speaking minorities.

1 Oznobishchev www-document.
In Latvia and Estonia depriving the majority of the population of the right to be presented in the state institutions through elections leads to the serious tensions in the countries. The two-part society was formed in which having gained the dominative position one ethnic group provides itself with the privileged conditions and discriminates another one. The number of the naturalized Russian speaking population in the countries is not large and the process of the naturalization goes at a slow pace. In Latvia from the very beginning of the naturalization 87435 people have become citizens: in 1995 the number was 984 people, 3016 people in 1996, 2992 in 1997, 4439 in 1998, 12427 in 1999, 14900 in 2000, 10637 in 2001, 9844 in 2002, 10049 in 2003, 16064 in 2004 and in the beginning of 2005 the number was 10686.\(^1\) The press-cutting service of the Estonian government stated that in 2005 7072 people became the citizens of Estonia while in 2004 the number was 6523 people and 3706 people in 2003. According to the data of the staff of the Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs in Estonia since 1992 till 2005 through the process of naturalization 138246 people were admitted to citizenship.\(^2\)

Besides that some kinds of limitations can be found in all the three countries. In particular in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia there is no system of the staff training for the schools for the Russian speaking population. In Latvia and Estonia in the context of the current optimization of the education system the number of these schools is swiftly reducing. Talking about the mass media field the curtailment of the radio- and tele-broadcasting in Russian can be found. In Lithuania the broadcasting in Russian is not formally regulated by law. On June, 6 in 2003 the Constitutional Court of Latvia recognized the limitations on the radio- and tele-casting unconstitutional (25% of broadcast time), the same quotas are adopted in Estonia (10% of broadcast time). In the Baltic States the jaundice in respect of the Russian speaking population can be found in hiring and appointing to the high positions not only in the state institutions but even in the private companies.

In May in 2002 the Baltic States managed to gain their goal – it was decided to affiliate them into NATO and finally Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became the members of the EU and NATO in 2004. The membership in the EU presupposes following its principles and norms in all the spheres including the policy in respect to the minorities. Hence the EU policy should be taken into account.

First of all, it should be outlined that the protection of the fundamental rights of European citizens and third-country residents in the EU has been one of the main features of the European integration from the very beginning. In the area of non-discrimination, Article 12

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1 566 people have received the citizenship www-document.
2 The EU observes the trend of the decrease of the number of the noncitizens in the Baltic States www-document.
(formerly Article 6) of the EC Treaty, in particular, prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality, regardless of whether citizens are nationals of a Member State or not.\(^1\)

The new Article 13 of the EC Treaty, introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, expanded this principle by stipulating that "the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation."\(^2\) In addition to this key article, a number of other anti-discrimination articles are to be found.

In the EU documents discrimination is considered to be an obstacle to the economic and social unity of the EU. Discrimination is reported to be even more unacceptable when it is directed against those who might need help, like the disabled or the elderly. Discrimination interferes with the four fundamental freedoms - particularly the free movement of persons - and constitutes an obstacle to the working of the internal market.

A joint action was adopted by the Council in 1996 to combat racism and xenophobia. Its aim was "to adopt rules to combat racism and xenophobia in order to prevent the perpetrators of such offences from exploiting the fact that racist and xenophobic activities are classified differently in different states by moving from one country to another in order to escape criminal proceedings or avoid serving sentences and thus pursue their activities with impunity."\(^3\)

In 1997 in Vienna the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia was set up in order to study the extent and the development of these phenomena, to analyze their causes and to disseminate examples of good practice. A cooperation agreement between the Monitoring Centre and the Council of Europe was concluded on December 21, 1998. The Monitoring Centre was officially opened on April 6, 2000. On March, 25 in 1998 an action plan against racism was presented by the Commission in order to consolidate the results of 1997 and prepare for the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. This action plan was based on four components: "legislative initiatives to be taken on the basis of Article 13 of the EC Treaty; integrating the fight against racism into Community policies and programmes; developing and exchanging new models in the fight against racism; strengthening information and communication work."\(^4\)

Thanks to the new provisions inserted in the EC Treaty by the Amsterdam Treaty, in November 1999 the Commission managed to provide a comprehensive communication against discrimination accompanied by three legislative proposals aimed to fight against any

\(^1\) Combating discrimination www-document.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Joint action to combat racism and xenophobia www-document.
\(^4\) Action plan against racism www-document.
discrimination on race or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. These two directives and the decision enable the victims of discrimination to sue more easily.

The first directive prohibits any form of discrimination in employment. The areas concerned are access to employment and occupation, promotion, vocational training, employment and working conditions, and membership of certain bodies.\(^1\) The second directive forbids the discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin in such broader areas as employment, education, access to goods and services, social protection and social security, culture, etc. as well as provides the legal protection to those who suffer from discrimination.

The decision establishes a Community programme for six years (2001-06) in order to assist the member states with the elaboration of anti-discrimination policies by exchanging information and effective practices in legislation and other areas. The aim is to pay attention and concentrate on the problems that exist in each member state and to raise awareness among those who could fight against discrimination in Europe. These measures are to support other Community actions which are already functioning for combating discrimination, such as the annual employment guidelines and the national employment plans that form the framework for the Community financial aid. The Community initiative EQUAL, a part of the coordinated employment strategy in the context of structural funds actions for the period 2001-2006, presupposes the fight against all types of exclusion, discrimination and inequality on the labour market and in the work place: equality between men and women, conditions for asylum seekers, the fight against racism.\(^2\)

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was solemnly proclaimed by the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on behalf of the three institutions on the occasion of the Nice Intergovernmental Conference in December 2000\(^3\). The Charter includes seven chapters, the third of which is devoted to equality (Articles 20 to 26). Except for Article 21, which concerns the issue of discrimination in all its aspects (racial, ethnic, religious, etc.), these articles are dedicated to specific categories (children, the elderly, the disabled, etc.). In the context of the launched action plan, the Commission supports the projects which are intended to study discrimination, increase awareness of it, stimulate its prevention or fight against it. It finances ENAR, the European Network Against Racism, which unites about 600 non-governmental organizations which supervise European and national anti-racism programmes.

On the whole it can be stated that the EU strongly supports the idea of fighting discrimination, that is why the Baltic States as the EU members are to adhere all these principles.

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and to act in the conformity with them. However, we can observe that in the Baltic States the restrictions in relation to the Russian speaking minority still takes place. Hence it would be reasonable to analyze the period after the entry of the Baltic States into the EU since the situation is settled, all the negotiations are finished and the EU accepted the scheme of the relation towards the Russian speaking minority in the Baltic States.

However, the most favourable situation takes place in Lithuania in comparison with Latvia and Estonia. First of all, the Russian speaking minority amounts to just 6, 3%\(^1\) of the whole population, while in Estonia it makes 25, 7%\(^2\) and in Latvia this index is 28, 4%\(^3\). Thus taking into account the quantitative index, this group is not so numerous in Lithuania as it is in Latvia and Estonia. Secondly, from the very beginning in Lithuania the zero variant was adopted and thus all the representatives could be admitted to citizenship while in Estonia and Latvia the problem of the mass statelessness is still urgent. Consequently, in Lithuania from the very beginning the representatives of the Russian speaking population became the competent citizens. Thirdly, the Lithuanian legislation is not of so discriminative nature as in Latvia and Estonia where the rights of this minority are infringed in the political, educational and informational spheres.

The Lithuania - Russian relations are much more stable than the relations between Russia and Latvia and Estonia. In 2003 the boundary treaty between Lithuania and Russia was ratified while the boundary treaties between Russia and Latvia and Estonia have not entered into force so far. The economic relations between Russia and the three Baltic States are different. The turnover reflects the level of the relations between the countries. In 2002 the turnover between Russian and Lithuania made up about 2 billion dollars, while with Estonia it amounted to 1 billion dollars and with Latvia it was just 800 million dollars\(^4\).

| Lithuania, exports, imports by country\(^5\)(LTL million) |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| **Union, country**          | **January – December, 2005** |                  |
|                               | **exports**       | **imports**       |
| Total                         | 32807,3           | 42974,6           |
| EU                            | 21458,2           | 25408,5           |
| Russia                        | 3422,8            | 11961,5           |

Thus, the Russian ratio in the Lithuanian exports is 10, 4%, and the ratio in the Lithuanian imports is 27, 8%.

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1. The basic information on Lithuania www-document.
Main partners of Latvia’s foreign trade in 2005¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>thsd lats</td>
<td>ratio, %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exports total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2 150 027</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>203 496</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>180 237</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imports - total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>3 805 258</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>476 550</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>332 034</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Share of countries in Estonia’s exports and imports, December 2005²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups of countries, countries</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>million kroons</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8 437.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-25</td>
<td>6 188.9</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Latvia</td>
<td>761.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Russian Federation</td>
<td>740.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Lithuania</td>
<td>448.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Share of countries in Russia’s exports and imports³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January – April, 2004</th>
<th>May – October, 2004</th>
<th>January – October, 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>turnover</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>import</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>522.5</td>
<td>456.8</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>988.4</td>
<td>854.5</td>
<td>133.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>510.9</td>
<td>471.2</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures presented there reveal that the foreign trade is carried out most actively with Lithuania as compared with Latvia and Estonia.

It is necessary to create a stable basis for the relations between the Baltic States and Russia but it also depends on the aspirations in the countries. More or less stable basis can be found in the relationship between Lithuania and Russia. Lithuania has a positive experience of the cooperation with Russia on the issue of the Kaliningrad region. The Lithuanian Minister of economy and industry Daushkis stated that in 2005 the turnover between the region and the

¹ Main partners of Latvia’s foreign trade in 2005 www-document.
³ Share of countries in Russia’s exports and imports www-document.
country increased and made up 322 million euros while Lithuania’s direct investments into the Kaliningrad region amounted to 201 million euros. Mr Vlasenko, the Minister of Industry in the Kaliningrad region outlined that in the region there were 627 enterprises with the Lithuanian capital. This number makes up about 30% of the enterprises with foreign capital.¹

However, it is not appropriate to overemphasize the level of the relations between Russia and Lithuania. The tendency to foster the cooperation between Lithuania and Russia sometimes faces the opposition in the country. The right parties from time to time state the presence of the threat from the East. In 2003, for example, in Lithuania the procedure of the impeachment of the President R. Paksas was initiated who was accused of developing the connections with Russian criminal groupings. It can be treated as an attempt to restore the thesis about the Russian threat as an instrument of the consolidation in the country. The issue of the transit through Lithuania is also the problematic area in the relations between Lithuania and Russia.

It should also be stated that from the very beginning the main elements of the Lithuanian foreign policy strategy were: the full integration into the European and North-Atlantic political, economic and providing security organizations; the provision and the development of constructive relations with neighbouring countries; positive and mutually beneficial cooperation with democratic and friendly countries; the development of regional collaboration in various fields which are assigned in the primary documents concerning the foreign policy. In the Agreement between the political parties of the Republic of Lithuania on the main foreign policy goals and objectives for 2004 – 2008 it was declared that “while acting in the Euro-Atlantic structures and international organisations, Lithuania should continue to pursue an active foreign policy aimed in particular at broadening and deepening the integration of the member states of the European Union whilst taking due account of the national interests of Lithuania; consolidation of NATO as the main component of the Euro-Atlantic security and as the key instrument in the fight against contemporary threats; broader involvement of NATO, the European Union and other international organisations in securing peace and stability and spreading the democratic values across the world, and ensuring the continuity of the “open door” policy vis-à-vis other countries and regions.”² The three main goals were determined: 1) to foster the transatlantic relations of Lithuania and of the European Union and to strengthen co-operation with the North American states, and in particular with the United States of America; 2) to support further integration within the European Union while taking into account the national interests of Lithuania; 3) to promote and expand regional cooperation and strengthen the position of Lithuania as a centre of interregional cooperation; to initiate and implement new formats of

¹ The forum in Lithuania has helped the Kaliningraders to find common points www-document.
regional cooperation, uniting the states of Northern, Central and Eastern Europe; to support democratic processes in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the countries of the South Caucasus and the Russian Federation, in particular the Kaliningrad region.\(^1\)

On the whole the Lithuanian foreign policy was western-oriented. But if we are to compare the relations between Lithuania and Russia and the relations between Russia and Estonia and Latvia, the conclusion would be that the situation is much more favourable in the first case.

Estonia and Latvia have not showed much interest to take measures in order to develop fruitful cooperation with the Russian Federation. It is significant to notice that in 2003 the Estonian eurosceptics warned the Estonian population that in a few years after Estonia’s entrance into the EU Russians would not need to have visas to go to Estonia.\(^2\) The representatives of Estonia and Latvia are more likely to resolve the issues of the relations with Russia through the EU and not by conducting a dialogue with Russia.

Immediately after the USSR collapse the Baltic countries took the course on the formation of the nation state. This was connected with the striving to establish their own independent states and to escape and to get rid of the past Soviet time. That is why some sort of pressure was put on the Russian speaking minority.

In 2004 the Baltic States became the members of the EU and NATO, consequently, the issue of the existence of the threat from the Russian side lost its sense. However, the ideas of the presence of the threat were transferred from the field of the external security to the sphere of the domestic security. The problem of the ethnic threat was stated and the source of this threat was considered to be the nontitular population, first of all, the Russian speaking minority.

The fact that the relationship between Lithuania and Russia is the most prosperous in comparison with the relations between Russian and Estonia and Latvia can be the foundation of the conclusion about the role of the Russian speaking minority in the decision making process in the Baltic States. In Lithuania the so – called threat in the person of the Russian speaking minority is not so dangerous as in Estonia and Latvia where its percentage is rather high. It can be supposed that since in Lithuania the Russian speaking minority is least presented the conditions for the development of the relations between Lithuania and Russia are the most favourable and positive decisions are more likely to be made.

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1 Agreement between political parties of the Republic of Lithuania on the main foreign goals and objectives of Lithuania for 2004-2008 www-document.
2 Karabeshkin www-document.
On the whole the research problem is to analyze the significance of the Russian speaking minority in the relations between Russia and the Baltic States through the comparison of the three situations.

1. 3. Theoretical Points of Departure

As it was already pointed in the Baltic States Russia was treated as an enemy thus Russian speaking minority was treated the same way. But it is significant to notice that this enemy exists within the country and that makes the situation even more complicated.

In that context it can be found necessary to use the “self – other” dichotomy or its stronger interpretation “friend – enemy” as applied to the analysis of the research problem.

In the 20th century the universal “self – other” dichotomy was used in the different spheres of the humanitarian studies ranging from the existential philosophy to social science.

In philosophy “the self is the idea of a unified being which is the source of an idiosyncratic consciousness. Moreover, this self is the agent responsible for the thoughts and actions of an individual to which they are ascribed.”

As for the term “other” in philosophy it is widely used in the continental philosophy. Lawrence Cahoone explains it as follows: “What appears to be cultural units—human beings, words, meanings, ideas, philosophical systems, social organizations — is maintained in their apparent unity only through an active process of exclusion, opposition, and hierarchization. Other phenomena or units must be represented as foreign or ‘other’ through representing a hierarchical dualism in which the unit is ‘privileged’ or favoured, and the other is devalued in some way”.

The notions of “friend” and “enemy” are also studied in the social science to understand the processes by which societies and groups exclude the others whom they want to subordinate or who do not fit into their society according to their point of view. Edward Said in his book “Orientalism” shows “how this was done by western societies — particularly, England and France — to ‘other’ those people in the “Orient” whom they wanted to control”.

The “self – other” dichotomy plays an important role in the gender studies. Michael Warner suggests that “the modern system of gender would not be possible without a disposition to interpret the difference between genders as the difference between self and other”.

For example, Simone de Beauvoir, a French philologist, the ideologist of the feminist movement, adopted the term “other” to point out how male - dominated culture treats woman as the other in relation to man. De Beauvoir calls the other the minority, the least favoured one and

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1 Philosophy www-document.
2 Cahoone 1996, p. 150.
3 The other www-document.
4 Ibid.
often a woman, when compared to a man because, “a man represents both the positive and the neutral… while woman represents only the negative”\(^1\).

The “self – other” dichotomy is also analyzed in the political studies since ancient times. But when the question is about politics and security the “self – other” dichotomy is likely to become sharper and thus to be presented as the stronger “friend – enemy” dichotomy. For instance, V. Arshinov emphasizes that if the collectivity is understood as the solidarity of people, “united by the necessity to confront the external threat of barbarians, conqueror – nomads, etc., thus this collectivity appears to be closed, self – identified and self – confirmed on the basis of the strong “self – other” dichotomy. The process of self-isolation can get the new quality of self – organization when the “self – other” dichotomy turns into the “friend – enemy” dichotomy.\(^2\)

According to R. Girard, Aeschylus in his tragedy “Eumenides” points that “the political builds upon the channeling of internal violence towards the external world”\(^3\). Aeschylus is considered to assume that the starting point of the political is the “friend – enemy” dichotomy; the political is not the result of human reasoning, but it is predetermined by gods. This interpretation of the political “is rooted in pagan religion and represents an archaic form of a political theology”\(^4\). This logic considers that the solidarity is provided by exclusion that considers the presence of the external enemies and this helps to create the internal peace.

Plato in his book “The Republic” also stated that the political activity should be implemented in the interests of the part of the society or a party (“friends”) in the struggle against the political adversaries (“enemies”).

J. Freund, a French political scientist who continued the tradition of Carl Schmitt in terms of the interpretation of the political through the “friend – enemy” dichotomy, makes the conclusion that “to say about something that it is politics means that this something is polemic. Such notions as ‘republic’, ‘class’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘absolutism’, ‘dictatorship’, ‘neutrality’ and ‘peace’ are inconceivable if no target, to which they are directed and which they aspire to reject or to disprove, is indicated. The struggle does not engender politics but politics considers conflict which may cause a war in the extreme case.”\(^5\)

Nowadays talking about globalization a number of researchers suggest that one of the reactions on this process is the maintenance of the nationalistic or religious conceptions in accordance with the “friend – enemy” dichotomy. Hence the use of these categories still takes place. For example, S. Huntington in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” explains why politics is in the close connection with this dichotomy: “People use

\(^1\) Haslanger www-document.
\(^2\) Arshinov 1999, p. 89.
\(^3\) Girard cit. Palaver www-document.
\(^4\) Palaver www-document.
\(^5\) Gadzhiev www-document.
politics not only to promote their interests but also to determine their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know against whom we are.”

According to Huntington, religion is not the counterbalance to this trend in politics but it represents just its ordinary display. He regards religion as one of the forms of the organized enmity because any religion differentiates believers and non-believers favouring the first group.

The “friend – enemy” dichotomy is thoroughly examined in “The Concept of the Political” by Carl Schmitt. The “friend – enemy” distinction is the fundamental philosophic opposition which is regarded by Carl Schmitt in the area of the political. Hence on the fundamental level “The Concept of the Political” by Carl Schmitt would be analyzed in the thesis since it presents the thorough interpretation of the notions of “friend” and “enemy” - the key elements of this dichotomy.

Analyzing the essence of the political Schmitt picks up the criterion of the political - it is the distinction between friend and enemy.

Carl Schmitt categorically differentiates the political and the economic, the technological and the legal fields and also criticizes liberalism for fogging these distinctions. The political is “essentially autonomous, not in the sense of marking out a new area laterally positioned vis-à-vis others (such as morality, culture, economics, or religion), but as a self-revealing essence not reducible to any one of them but that could operate in all”.

Moral, economic, religious, aesthetic and scientific distinctions and disagreements become political when the opposition is so intense that they ultimately divide adversaries into two groups - friends and enemies. That is why the transition to the political corresponds to the “the intensity of an association or dissociation of human beings whose motives can be religious, national (in the ethnic or cultural sense), economic, or of another kind and can effect at different times different coalitions and separations”. This means that the reasons for and the grounds of opposition are of little importance in the sense of understanding the political: opposition becomes political if regrouping takes place.

The friend - enemy criterion defines a particular form of life in which group identity is valued above physical existence. According to Carl Schmitt the notions of “friend” and “enemy” receive the real meaning because they concern the real possibility of physical killing.

But Schmitt states that “the friend and enemy concepts are to be understood in their concrete and existential sense, not as metaphors or symbols, not mixed and weakened by

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1 Huntington 1996, p. 21.
2 Pels www-document.
3 Schmitt 1976, p. 38.
economic, moral, and other conceptions.”¹ They determine the existence of a people or a state: “For as long as a people exists in a political sphere, this people must, even if only in the most extreme case - and whether this point has been reached has to be decided by it - determine by itself the distinction of friend and enemy. This is the essence of its political existence. When it no longer possesses the capacity or the will to make this distinction, it ceases to exist politically.”²

“Enmity can be actual in the case of a direct conflict, virtual or potential when the necessary measures are taken to safeguard political existence.”³ “An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity.”⁴ Thus war is only the most extreme case of enmity; it does not mean that the political signifies only war and every political deed is a military action or that every nation would be faced with the friend-enemy alternative in relation to every other nation.

Carl Schmitt defines the existential quality of war in precisely defensive terms: “If physical destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential threat to one’s own way of life, then it cannot be justified.”⁵ He states that the political is independent as it can neither be founded on any other antithesis or a mixture of other antitheses and it cannot be traced to them. Therefore, the question is on what the solidarity of the group should be based. The answer is the shared identity, the homogeneity of the group. Thus the logical deduction is that the rational justification for waging war is the self-defense of the collectivity. The homogeneity that defines the group may well have its origins in a shared religion or a shared set of moral values, but politically that is not of import. Moral, economic and even religious matters are the things about which one can argue while identity appears to be a fact, some kind of agreed or shared commitment. The conclusion is that a people exists politically when it sets up an independent political unity and for the sake of this unity opposes itself to other kinds of unity.

As for the term “enemy” Schmitt emphasizes that it is characterized by some alienation; it is some otherness. He states that “the enemy is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in general. He is also not the private adversary whom one hates. An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy.”⁶ The enemy is not a symbol or abstraction; it is the reality which makes everything political.

As one of the criteria of the political the notion of “friend” has its formal, almost technical meaning. Since Carl Schmitt considers that the public enemy is conceptually distinct

² Ibid, p. 49.
³ Freund www-document.
⁴ Schmitt, op. cit., p. 28.
⁵ Ibid., p. 49.
⁶ Ibid, p. 28.
from the private enemy, whom one hates, consequently, the public friend is distinct from the private friend, whom one loves. Schmitt points that enemy cannot be imagined without the notion of friendship in which people are brought into collectivities.

On the whole, the interpretation of the notions of “friend” and “enemy” by Schmitt is considered to be significant in terms of understanding the image of the Russian speaking minority in the Baltic States. In the texts of the articles from the mass media of the Baltic States there can be outlined such words as “enemy”, “enmity”, etc.¹ That is why it can be stated that Russia and the Russian speaking minority are treated as an enemy within the Baltic States, the policy of the Russian government is seen as hostile in relation to the Baltic States. Hence the direct analogy with Carl Schmitt’s concept can be stressed.

In terms of the “self – other” distinction “Imagined communities” by Benedict Anderson would be examined. It concerns this distinction on the level of theory of nation state that is why it is reasonable to pay attention to this book as the Baltic countries are the independent countries and they adhere to the concept of nation state for constructing their own states.

His main point is that a nation is an imagined community. Anderson proposes the following definition of nation: “it is an imagined political community that is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”² According to Anderson, there are three aspects defining nations: limited boundaries, imagined sovereignty and imagining nation as a community. It is imagined because members will never know most of their compatriots, yet in the minds of each person the image of their communion lives. It is limited because it has its boundaries (though elastic boundaries) beyond which lies other nations. It is sovereign because it came to maturity at a stage of human history when freedom was a rare and precious ideal. And it is imagined as a community because it is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. The feeling of brotherhood (being part of the same nation) has been the power which has mobilized millions of people to fight in wars “for their country”.³

In this book he states that nationality, national identity and nationalism are cultural artifacts the creation of which towards the end of the XVIII century was the spontaneous distillation of a complex crossing of discrete historical forces; but that, once created, they became modular, capable of being transplanted to a great variety of social spheres, to merge and be merged with a variety of political and ideological constellations.

Nationalism has to be understood not in relation to self - consciously held political ideologies, but the large cultural systems that preceded it. Nationalism developed at the period of

¹ “…consistent enemies of Latvia and the executers of the hostile policy of Russian imperialism towards Latvian state” (News report. Latviyas avize, 6 June 2005), “…the society completely permeated with the spirit of chauvinism a nd militarism (in relation to Russia) (News report. Bernardinai, 28 March 2006), etc.

² Anderson, op. cit., p. 6.

³ Theories of nationalism www-document.
time when three other cultural conceptions were loosing their importance. First of all, the changes in the religious community took place. Nationality represented a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning. The coherence of religion decreased after the Middle Ages because of the effects of the explorations of the non-European world and the slow decline of the sacred language itself. The older communities lost their confidence in the unique sacredness of their languages (the idea that a particular script language offered privileged access to ontological truth), and thus lost their belief in the views about admission to membership in the religious community.

Secondly, there were changes in the dynastic realm. In the earlier interpretation states were determined through centers, borders were vague and sovereignties faded with one another. But in the XVII century the automatic legitimacy of the sacral monarchy started to turn down and people began to doubt the belief that society was naturally organized around high centers.

Thirdly, there was the conception of time according to which cosmology and history were indistinguishable. In the Middle Ages time was thought to be “simultaneous”. The view of time is close to the term “messianic time” (by W. Benjamin) which assumes the simultaneity of the past and the future in the momentary contemporary. This conception is not appropriate in relation to the origins of nationalism. The alternative is the idea of “homogeneous, empty time”, which presumes that simultaneity is cross to time and it is defined as the time coincidence and measured with the help of watch and calendar.¹ The idea of a sociological organism moving through homogenous, empty time is the exact analogue of the idea of the nation, which is also understood as a community moving gradually through history. These three changes resulted in the search for a new way of connecting fraternity, power, and time together.

The preceding aspects formed the conditions for a new form of cultural consciousness. This consciousness took the form of nationalism because of the half-fortuitous, but explosive connection between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), the technology of printing and the fatality of human linguistic diversity.

Capitalism was particularly important since the extension of the book market contributed to the revolutionary vernacularization² of languages. Three extraneous factors gave additional impetus to this: a transform in the character of Latin; the influence of the Reformation, which caused the mass production of Bibles and the spread of particular vernaculars as the tools of administrative centralization.

² The act or process of making vernacular, or the state of being made vernacular. Vernacular - belonging to the country of one's birth; one's own by birth or nature; native; indigenous; now used chiefly of language; as, English is our vernacular language.
Print languages formed the basis for the national consciousness in three ways: they created the unified space of exchange and communication; they gave a new fixity to the language and they created the languages which were different from the older administrative vernaculars.¹

Nevertheless, the development of contemporary nation states is not isomorphic with the fixed reach of particular print languages, it is also significant to take into account the appearance of the political entities on the world stage.

The start of the age of nationalism in Europe corresponded to the end of the era of successful national liberation movements in the Americas. These new nationalisms were dissimilar in two respects: 1) national print languages were of central ideological and political importance, and 2) it was possible for the nation to use the existing models set forth by the Creole pioneers. Vernacular print capitalism was significant for the formation of class, especially the bourgeoisie. Previously unity was formed on the basis of kinship and personal loyalties. However, the bourgeoisie achieved the solidarity on the imaginary basis by means of the print capitalism. They did not know each other but they started to think about others like themselves through printing. When the European nobility got to know about the events of the Americas through printing, the imagined realities of nation states turned out to be the models for Europe.

Starting from the middle of the XIX century the official nationalism developed in Europe. It was the answer of the power groups endangered by the exclusion from the popular imagined communities (e.g., Russia, England and Japan). It was the way of combining naturalization with the preservation of dynastic power. The model of the official nationalism was also followed by states with no serious power pretensions, but their ruling classes felt threatened by the worldwide spread of nationally imagined communities (e.g., Siam, Hungary).

The last wave of nationalism presupposed the change of the colonial state into the nation state that was supported by such three factors as the increase in physical mobility, increasing bureaucratization and the spread of modern education.

It was the reaction on the new global imperialism which became possible because of the success of the industrial capitalism. The paradox of the official nationalism consists of the fact that it brought the idea of “national history” into the consciousness of the colonized. In addition, this last wave arose in the period of world history when the nation became an international norm and when it became possible to “model” the national identity in a more complex way than before.

National identity is considered to be natural in the sense that it contains something that is not considered to be chosen (like gender, skin color and parentage). It involves a feeling of fatality embedded in history. However, it should not be regarded as the source of racism and

¹ Anderson, op. cit., p. 44-45.
anti-semitism. Racism erases national identity by reducing the adversary to his/her biological physiognomy. Nationalism considers in terms of the historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations the origins of which lie outside of history.\(^1\) The dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than those of nation. Racism and anti-semitism usually operate within the national borders and they are more likely to give reason for the domestic repressions.

Such revolutions as those that took place in Vietnam, Kampuchea, and China, are contemporary reflections of nationalism, but this nationalism is the heir of the historical changes that happened during two centuries. Nationalism has undergone the process of modulation and adaptation, because of various eras, political regimes, economies and social structures. As a result, the “imagined community” has penetrated into every contemporary society.

The institutions of power strongly shaped the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion. The census formed identities imagined by the classifying mind of the colonial state. The essence of the census presupposes that everyone has one and only one definite place. The work of the map was based on the resumptive classification. The historical maps were intended to illustrate the origins of particular territorial units. Map was also a sign that was immediately identifiable and visible everywhere and that created a powerful emblem for the anticolonial nationalism. The museum enabled the state to become the guardian of traditions, and this power was enforced by the infinite reproducibility of the symbols of tradition.

These are the main points of Anderson’s conception presented in “Imagined Communities”.

Another theorist of nationalism is Ernest Gellner who sees nationalism as an ideology and as a feeling of the individuals.\(^2\) According to him, states and intellectuals mobilize campaigns of assimilation through public education and the culture industries. Nationalism occurred in the modern period because industrial societies, unlike agrarian ones, needed homogenous languages and cultures in order to work efficiently.

In terms of the contextual analysis of the “friend – enemy” dichotomy “The Uses of the Other” by Iver Neumann would be analyzed. While Schmitt examines the very notions of “friend” and “enemy” and Anderson applies it to the level of the theory of nation state, Neumann reviews this distinction on the level of the empirical analysis taking the form of research of historical development of the dichotomy in the European context. He regards “the East” as the other for Europe.

First of all, the author presents different points of view on the notions of “self” and “other” and picks out four approaches to the term “other”; these are the ethnographic, the

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1 Anderson, op. cit., p. 149.
2 Theories of nationalism www-document.
psychological, the Continental philosophical paths and “the Eastern excursion”. Then he goes to
the interpretation of the term “other” in International Relations and Political Philosophy and
emphasizes the approaches of such researchers as Todorov, Shapiro, Levinas, Wendt and others.
The conclusion on this issue made by Neumann is that the theory of International Relations
examining the question can take into account a wide range of literature on the formation of the
collective identity. He states that “it is a pervasive theme of this literature and the formation of
the self is inextricably intertwined with the formation of its others and the failure to regard the
others in their own right must necessarily have repercussions for the formation of the self”\(^1\). The
author also points that studying the relations between two countries it is necessary to pay
attention to the fact that at the same time these states are trying to maintain their own collective
identities. On the basis of the presented material he concludes that no collective identity can be
privileged since both self and other are not only mutually constitutive but they are necessarily
unbounded; the self and the other merge into one another.

Neumann emphasizes two main tendencies concerning the interpretation of the self and
the other: dialectical and dialogical. The first one considers that the self and the other were seen
to unite into a new entity as a part of the progressive flow of reason, while about forty years ago
there was a shift towards the dialogical interpretation according to which the relations between
the self and the other do not suppose the presence of such a goal or such development. The
collective identity considers integration and exclusion and for Neumann the question is not about
the fact that exclusion takes place but the fact how it takes place. Thus if the price of successful
integration is the active othering, he says that the price seems to be too high. On the whole the
analysis of the “self – other” dichotomy enables to understand better who the actors are, how
they were constituted and how they preserve themselves.

Then in this book Neumann analyzes the issue of the “self – other” distinction in different
contexts: how different collective identities are presented.

He starts with the case of Turkey as one of the other that was used in the formation of the
European identity. The current representations of Turkey consider the presence of the
backwashes of the past representations, for example, it can be traced in the question of its
entrance into the EU. On the basis of the analysis of the representation of Turkey Neumann
emphasizes that since the European identity is closely connected with the presence of the other,
this other will be constitutive of Europe and this fact influences the European representations of
this other. The conclusion is that the recognition of the existence of the other might remove the
obstacle to the development of the relations between European and non-European countries.

\(^1\) Neumann 1999, p. 35.
As it was stated after WW II the Soviet Union played the role of the constitutive other in the European discourse. Hence Neumann devoted the third chapter to the representations of another important other in terms of the formation of the European identity, i.e. Russia. This issue is significant for the research for it considers the image of Russia in Europe and in the research the representation of Russians in the Baltic States is to be elaborated.

Neumann starts with the XVI-XVII centuries with Muscovy and develops the representation of Russia in Europe up to the post-Cold war period. He picks out 5 periods: 1) XVI-XVII centuries – Muscovy, 2) XVIII century – Tsar Europe in the north, 3) XIX century – Tsar Europe in the east, 4) Interwar period – the Soviet Russia, 5) The Cold War – the Soviet Union.

Having analyzed the image of Russia during these periods in Europe the author makes the conclusion that today the representations of Russia are more connected with its future than with its past. Russia is likely to be treated as a learner that takes over European political and economic experience. The events which take place in Russia are regarded as the process of the replacement of the unsuccessful strategy of modernization by the strategy which is more successful. But Neumann also emphasizes an interesting fact that the European policy is more likely to be directed at a certain political leader but not at the reforming system. The main representation of Russia as a learner considers that Russia becomes more European and less differs from Europe.

Neumann also states that there are also other representations of Russia. For example, in 1989 the Estonian politician Tiit Maade said that “the Russian people was untamed and wild and tended to spread like a blob over all the territory they could find.”1 After the USSR collapse other politicians of the Baltic States adhered to the similar point of view. This representation of the Russian people still takes place: the civilized Baltic peoples are senior to the uncivilized Russian people. This point is important for understanding the image of Russian people in the Baltic States.

**The specificity of Russia as the other for Europe is that it does not correspond to the European system but it is its important integral part.** Russia is also a specific case because during 500 years it has been always treated as the country which has just become civilized, has just begun to participate in the European politics and has just become a part of Europe. Thus the metaphor that is often used in the European discussion of Russian policy and economy is that of transition. Consequently, the specification of Russia as the other is that it is always seen as the country being in some stage of transition to Europeanization. Another interesting point is whether the otherness of Russia is emphasized in order to enforce the integration of the European Self.

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Then Neumann analyzes the creation of regions in terms of the distinction between self and other and takes the examples of the Central and Northern Europe. He outlines that the politics of identity leads to the dissociation from other groups, from the others. Neumann emphasizes that this dissociation is often implemented through the position of moral superiority (barbarian vs. civilized; authoritarian vs. democratic) or through the ethnicity.

In the sixth and seventh chapters Neumann analyzes the formation of the identity on the national level and presents the situation over the Russian and Bashkir cases. In the first case Neumann considers how the representation of Europe as the other is used as the method of struggle for political leadership which is conducted by two self – representations of the Russian self: westernizers and nationalists. In the second case he examines how the representations of Russians and Tatars are internal and at the same time external others for the Bashkir self.

The theme that draws the material together is how “the East” is used as a sign of otherness at all-European, regional, and national levels. This book suggests that “Easternness” is regarded as a marker in contemporary discourses about Russia, Turkey, Central and Northern Europe, and Bashkortostan, among others.

The book presupposes the analysis of how the various identities subsumed under the category of “the East” have been crucial for the formation of the European identity since Europe began to gain political significance. Neumann's work is significant for several reasons, especially the variety of source materials and the wide range of studies. “Uses of the Other” expands the understanding of identity formation in general and the formation of the European identity, in particular.

For Europe Russia is not the absolute other, it is more likely to be “close other”. The position of the Russian speaking minority in the Baltic States is supposed to be the microscopical copy of the role of Russia for Europe.

All the three concepts by Schmitt, Anderson and Neumann are interconnected and form thorough picture of “self” and “other”. Schmitt presents the very fundamental concepts, Anderson presents the level of nation state and Neumann shows the European context but all of them outline that for the formation of “self” there is the necessity of opposition, the necessity to create “other” in order to get unity based on self-identification. Since from the very beginning of independency the Baltic States adhere to the concept of nation state based on the opposition the “self – other” dichotomy or its stronger “friend – enemy” form can be used to explain the relation towards the Russian speaking minority in the Baltic States. The problem is that the enemy which is considered to be excluded is within the country; that situation is dangerous because in terms of the nation state it may result in destabilization. Hence the research problem is considered to be the role of the internal other in the relations between Russia and Lithuania.
using Lithuania as a special case. That is why the dichotomy is of great relevance in the research.

1.4. Relation of the Study to Previous Research

The research problem is to analyze the significance of the Russian speaking minority factor as the internal other in the relations between Lithuania and Russia using Lithuania as a special case.

As for the existing studies it is necessary to notice that the question is studied and covered in the context of the relations between the Baltic States and Russia.

The policy with regard to Russia is treated as the common strategy of the Baltic States. From the very beginning there were strong ties between the Baltic States. There was the dynamic development of the cooperation in the field of the provision of national security and military projects including such issues as the fight against the organized crime, illegal drug turnover and illegal migration. Along with this problem there was an active exchange of information between custom authorities, border services and other institutions of the Baltic States. The collaboration between Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia gave them the opportunity to reduce expenses and to implement with fewer costs the military reform and modernize army according to NATO standards. That was very important for all the three countries. All the Baltic States had the common goals: the integration into Europe through the entry into the EU and NATO and to escape the common Soviet past. All of them carried out the strong course towards the entry into the EU supposing that in such a way they would provide the economic prosperity and the state security.

That is why there is the tendency to describe the common political course of the Baltic States, but the relationship between Lithuania and Russia has its own features and thus it may be considered to make difference between the political lines of the Baltic States. Hence the research of this problem is considered to be important. The issue is relevant since the research would take into account the differences between the Baltic States and would not regard the relations between the Baltic States and Russia as some kind of common strategy.

It is very significant to analyze the situation around the Russian speaking minority in the context of the foreign policy of Lithuania as well as of Estonia and Latvia. The feature is that the Russian speaking minority is not so numerous in Lithuania as in other Baltic States, besides that the “zero” variant was adopted there.

Moreover, the previous studies did not pay special attention to the minority factor as the influential one for the relations between the Baltic States and Russia. It is more likely to examine
the political, economic, cultural and social factors. Furthermore, the previous studies analyzed the problems in the relations between the Baltic States and Russia in terms of their western orientation and the national interests while this research considers the analysis of the fundamental level of the problem. It would analyze the minority factor taking into account that the Russian speaking minority can be treated as the internal other.

Consequently, the question is the factor of the internal other in the Lithuanian foreign policy through making the comparison with Estonia and Latvia.

1.5. The Empirical Scope of the Study and the Identification of Primary Sources

The study is considered to follow the strict structure of the systematic, coherent and sufficient stages of analysis.

To study the situation around the research problem it is significant to take into account the sources of the theories, documents as well as the analytical literature: books, articles of newspapers and journals - on the issue of the “self – other” dichotomy, the relations between the Baltic States and Russia and the position of the Russian speaking minority in them.

As for the primary resources, they are considered to be the articles from the mass media of the Baltic States. But it should be pointed out that the period that is analyzed begins from May, 2004 – the entry of the Baltic States into the EU and NATO. That is why the publication date of the articles will be within the designated period. The newspapers used for the analysis must be not regional or local, but national, they must be published in large editions and must not presuppose a particular political position. These are the criteria of the choice of the newspapers. In that context the articles from “Postimees”, “Eesti Paevaleht”, “Diena”, “Latvijas Avīze”, “Chas”, “Delfi”, “Lietuvas zinios” “Lietuvos Rytas”, etc. will be examined. The analytical reviews on Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia would also be analyzed since they include the information about the domestic and foreign policy of the countries and the relations between Russia and the Baltic States taken from the mass media of the Baltic States.

1.6. Methodological Orientation

The rhetorical methodology is used in the research.

Rhetoric is one of the oldest philological sciences and it was established in the IV century B.C. in Greece. Rhetoric (from Greek ρήτωρ, rhētōr, “orator”) is the art or technique of persuasion, but even at that time its main content was the theory of argumentation.¹

In Western culture rhetoric is one of the three original liberal arts or tivium, the other members of which are dialectic and gramar. In ancient and medieval times, grammar was

¹ Volkov www-document.
focused on the use of the correct language through the study and criticism of literary models, dialectic concerned itself with the test and invention of new knowledge through the process of question and answer, and rhetoric emphasized the issue of persuasion in public and political settings such as assemblies and courts of law.

The concept of rhetoric has been changed a lot during its 2500-year history. Today rhetoric is defined more broadly as the art or practice of persuasion through any symbolic system, but especially language. Rhetoric studies the specific aspect of the verbal creation, namely argumentation. Rhetoric examines any work of philology in which the argumentation can be pointed out. On the whole, rhetoric, as the art of persuasion, is still significant in contemporary public life.

One of the founders of new rhetoric is Chaim Perelman who was the head of the Brussels school of new rhetoric that was formed in the 1950-ies.

Perelman provides different techniques of presentation that are applied to establish presence and communion. He states that these techniques have been elaborated to such a point that their study can constitute the whole material of rhetoric, but he treats them in a substantially different way from how they were regarded in the traditional rhetoric. He does not analyze the techniques of presentation focusing on their stylistic aspect and presents the thorough consideration of the techniques of presentation as they function to argue and to support the achievement of communion, presence and adherence.

Perelman considers that the style or form of the argument can not be alienated from its content. For the speaker argumentation includes the choice of data and techniques of presentation to insure presence and communion. For the listener it presupposes the choices among a number of interpretations that could be applied to the speaker’s information. Thus the research of argumentation should involve the study of human language and the matter of interpretation. As Perelman states, “the study of argumentation compels us to take into account not only the choice of data but also the way in which they are interpreted, the meaning attributed to them”\(^1\).

There is the connection between the speaker’s presentational techniques and the listener’s interpretive options. A speaker’s presentational techniques might be intended to stress a particular interpretation from among other possible interpretations on the part of the listener. This is achieved through the choice of certain techniques to establish the existence of the favoured interpretation.

The success or the failure of argumentation depends on the fact whether the speaker is successful in selecting the techniques that help to achieve presence or communion or not.

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\(^1\) Perelman - Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, p. 120.
Perelman presents different techniques of argumentation, the two main categories of which are called association and dissociation.

Argumentation by the process of association allows for the transference to the conclusion that corresponds to the premises, while argumentation in the form of dissociation strives for separating elements which the language or the recognized tradition have previously tied together. Techniques of association seek to establish the connection between the starting point and the thesis. Perelman demonstrates such types of the arguments by the process of association as quasi-logical arguments, arguments based on the structure of reality, and arguments establishing the structure of reality.

Quasi-logical arguments are similar to formal logic and much of their persuasive force is actually achieved because of their similarity to logic. Since people are prone to recognize the statements based on logic, this type of argument seems to be particularly persuasive. However, they differ from formal logic because they seek audience adherence rather than demonstration.

Then Perelman observes the arguments based on the structure of reality. These arguments presuppose the use of the arguments which apply to relation of succession or coexistence. Perelman considers that these are two different ways of structuring reality. Arguments based on relations of succession presuppose the relationship between phenomena on the same level, such as cause and effect, while arguments based on relations of coexistence involve the relationship between phenomena on different levels, such as act and essence.

The second type of the arguments based on the structure of reality involves the arguments which apply to relation of coexistence. These arguments involve the relationships among phenomena on different levels, for example the relationship between a person and an act. The relationship between a person and an act is less direct than the relationship between cause and effect, which are on the same level. Arguments which apply to relation of coexistence are based on the connection that unites a person and his actions. These arguments establish the relation between the essence and the act.

The following categories include the arguments establishing the structure of reality. These arguments can be of two types: 1) argumentation by example, illustration, and model and 2) argumentation by analogy.

Argumentation by example consists of using examples in order to form a generalization. Argumentation by example serves to establish a prediction or a rule, while argumentation by illustration serves simply to illustrate that rule. Argumentation by model is aimed at the presentation of the specific case which is to be imitated.

The second broad category of arguments establishing the structure of reality consists of argumentation by analogy and metaphor. An analogy is an argument that attempts to gain
adherence about the relationship that exists in one pair (called the “theme” of the analogy) because of its similarity to the relationship that exists in another pair (called the “phoros” of the analogy).\textsuperscript{1} A metaphor which is also important for the argumentation is a condensed analogy, in which the theme and phoros are combined.

If quasi-logical arguments, arguments based on the structure of reality, and arguments establishing the structure of reality are created through the process of association, other arguments are formed through the process of dissociation. Argumentation by the process of dissociation takes place when one idea is split into two in order to avoid incompatibility.

The significance of Perelman's work is that he drew up the coherent theory of argumentation. To achieve audience adherence the speakers start with points of agreement that can be related to the nature of the real (facts, truths and presumptions) or can concern the nature of the preferable (values, hierarchies, and loci of the preferred). A rhetor should try to transfer the agreement accorded with the starting points to the thesis that may be contingent or controversial. This can be achieved through attempting to establish presence and secure communion with the audience.

In the research the goal is also to analyze the articles of the newspapers of the Baltic States in order to point out the rhetorical techniques applied in them and to interpret their usage with the purpose to understand the perception of the Russian speaking population and Russia in the Baltic States.

\textbf{1.7. Methodical Application}

The rhetorical methodology will help to determine the attitude towards Russia and the Russian speaking minority in the Baltic States since it is presupposed in the designated research problem.

In the texts the use of particular rhetorical techniques enables to examine the situation.

The perception of the Russian speaking population and Russia in the Baltic States is to be analyzed through the emphasis on the rhetorical techniques applied in the articles of the newspapers of the Baltic States published since May, 2004.

There can be picked out the use of such words as “enemy”, “enmity”, “uncivilized”, etc. and according to this there can be made the conclusion that Russia and the Russian speaking minority are seen as a threat, as an enemy in these countries\textsuperscript{2}. The Russian speaking population is

\textsuperscript{1} Perelman - Olbrechts-Tyteca, op. cit., p. 388.
\textsuperscript{2} "Putin is just a steward of the gas tube while its real owners are the G7 members to whom Russia sucked up as a defective eighth member" (News report. Bernardinai, 6 April 2006, p. 3), “Russian bear frightens the civilized community so far” (News report. Ihuleht, 18 May 2005, p. 5); “not a correct state” (in relation to Russia) (News report. Pyarnu Postimees, 25 May 2005. p.3), “…the only moral and respectable position is supporting Great Russian strives. For us it is real hell.” (News report. Respublika, 19 April 2006, p. 4), “If Kremlin officials unexpectedly for themselves decide to function rationally,… Fortunalely, they are not able to be rational” (News report. Eesti Paevaleht, 10 February 2006, p. 6), etc.
considered to be a kind of barrier or threat and it is considered to be aloof. In the Baltic States in relation to Russia the same metaphors which were presented in the book by Iver Neumann can be pointed out. In Europe it was “the Great Bear” and in the Baltic States Russia is also associated with bear. The parallel between the representation of Russia in Europe and its representation in the Baltic States can be emphasized. This image is used to accentuate the difference between Russia and Europe and in this case it is the difference between Russia and the Baltic countries. Russia is considered to be uncivilized. Any agreement with Russian policy is treated as horror since it is regarded as a threat.

The application of the rhetorical methodology is also useful in order to outline the differences of the images of the Russian speaking population and Russia in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Hence the rhetoric methodology will be appropriate for the analysis of the articles to single out the issues related to the research and to analyze them properly.

1. 8. Interpretation of Research Results

The point is to analyze how the existing theories function in the field of the research problem and to make the conclusions about the theory in the context of the analysis.

The type of the logic of the research will be top-down. First of all, it will include the analysis of the approaches to the “self– other” dichotomy on the three levels and the application of the conceptions to the analysis of the relations between the Baltic States and Russia in the comparison. Thus it will be examined how the theory functions in the field of the Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian foreign policy towards Russia taking into account the issue of the Russian speaking minority which is considered to be the other within the country. Functioning of the theory in the field of the treatment of the Russian speaking minority as well as the influence of this approach on the foreign policy of the countries are to be analyzed.

The question is functioning of the internal other as the destabilizing factor for the identity. Hence the hypothesis considers that the internal other is more dangerous than the external other because the former undermines identity while the latter consolidates it. Identity influences the actions, thus it can be supposed that the more stable identity is the more friendly the policy is.

1. 9. Scholarly Contribution of the Study

On the whole the main issue is to analyze the significance of the Russian speaking minority (as the internal other) in the relations between the Baltic States and Russia through the comparison of the three situations.
In terms of theory in the research the synthesis of conceptions concerning the “self-other” dichotomy will be applied. On the fundamental level for the interpretations of the very elements of the dichotomy in terms of politics the concept of Carl Schmitt would be used, the second level presupposes the adaptation of the dichotomy to the theory of the nation state presented by Benedict Anderson since the Baltic countries are the independent nation states. On the third level the research by Iver Neumann taking the form of the examination of the historical development of the “self – other” dichotomy will be applied because it provides the empirical level of the analysis.

The methodological contribution is that the rhetorical methodology will be used for the analysis of the foreign policy. It will enable to determine the role of the Russian speaking minority as the internal other in the foreign policy of the Baltic States.

As regards the empirical contribution it should be stated that the applied approach is not traditional but political and philosophical that is presented by the “self-other” dichotomy. Earlier the analyses paid attention to the legal aspect of the issue and they were superficial by nature, but this research is to get to the fundamental level as it is designated in the research problem – with the help of the rhetorical methodology to analyze the role of the internal other in the relations between the Baltic States and Russia.
2. The “Self-Other” Dichotomy

The position of the Russian speaking population in the Baltic States is analyzed in the context of the distinction between “self” and “other” since it can be characterized as a particular group in these countries.

The study presupposes the theoretical analysis of the “self-other” dichotomy on three levels.

The first level is ontological and it provides the analysis of “The Concept of the Political” by Carl Schmitt which presents the fundamental characteristics of the very notions of “friend” and “enemy”. These terms appear as the foundation of the criterion of the political, namely, of the “friend-enemy” distinction. This interpretation is necessary to determine the essence of the notions of “friend” and “enemy” in terms of the possibility of their application to the situation over the Russian speaking population in the Baltic States.

The second level presupposes the analysis of the “self-other” dichotomy on the level of the political theory of the nation state. Thus the book “Imagined communities” by Benedict Anderson is presented since Anderson analyses the “self-other” distinction on the level of the nation state. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are the nation states and from the very achievement of their independence they have followed the concept of the nation state and emphasized the issue of nationality.

The third level is empirical and it turns to the historical research. The book “Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation” by Iver Neumann is taken into consideration in which he analyzes the historical development of the “self-other” dichotomy in the European context. He presents different representations of Russia in Europe from the XVI-XVII centuries up to the Cold-War period. The Baltic States are European countries and, moreover, now they are the members of the European Union and adhere to the common European position.

These three levels of analysis are applied to determine the position of the Russian speaking population in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and to define whether this group is associated with the image of the internal other in every Baltic State.

2. 1. The Fundamental Interpretation of the Notions of “Friend” and “Enemy”

Carl Schmitt presents his interpretation of the notions of “friend” and “enemy” in his work “The Concept of the Political”.

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Analyzing “The Concept of the Political” Leo Strauss stressed that “the political is a basic characteristic of human life…In this sense, politics is destiny; therefore man cannot escape from the political.”

However, Schmitt, as Strauss points, avoids an exhaustive definition of the political. It is not his aim to find the definition of the political, but considering the essence of the political Schmitt draws up the criterion of the political - it is the distinction between friend and enemy the understanding of the essence of which is significant in the context of the research problem.

There is a point of view that the notion of “enemy” is the main element of the political while the notion of “friend” has just a semantic meaning. For example, “Sartori recognizes, the friend-enemy distinction is asymmetric in the sense that its characterizing element is enemy, not friend. Friend is not an active element”\(^2\). It is just a consequence and it is determined by the relation between “us” and enemy. But Chantal Mouffe stresses that “because of the way this thesis is generally interpreted, Schmitt is often taken to task for neglecting the ‘friend’ side of his friend-enemy opposition. In his remarks, however, we can find many indications of how this grouping should be envisaged.”\(^3\) Thus, nonetheless, in Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political both terms are important for the whole theory as well as for the understanding of each other.

Carl Schmitt emphasizes the autonomy of the political. D. Pels draws a parallel between Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt on this point. He states that both Arendt and Schmitt categorically differentiates the political and the economic, the technological and the legal fields and also criticizes liberalism for fogging these distinctions. The political is “essentially autonomous, not in the sense of marking out a new area laterally positioned vis-à-vis others (such as morality, culture, economics, or religion), but as a self-revealing essence not reducible to any one of them but that could operate in all”\(^4\). Consequently, the distinction between friend and enemy is specifically political and it cannot be mixed up with economic competition or the differences of points of views. Moreover, it is impossible to appeal to morality when it has been decided to fight against the enemy. However, moral, economic, religious, aesthetic and scientific distinctions and disagreements become political when the opposition is so intense that they ultimately divide adversaries into two groups - friends and enemies. That is why the transition to the political corresponds to the “the intensity of an association or dissociation of human beings whose motives can be religious, national (in the ethnic or cultural sense), economic, or of another kind and can effect at different times different coalitions and separations”\(^5\). Thus it can be pointed out that the very distinction between friend and enemy is important while the motives

\(^1\) Strauss 1976, p. 92.  
\(^2\) Harle 2000, p. 137.  
\(^3\) Mouffe 1999, p. 47.  
\(^4\) Pels www-document.  
\(^5\) Schmitt, op. cit., p. 38.
of the dissociation do not play any role. The “friend - enemy” distinction indicates the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation but the very notions of friend and enemy are to be treated in their concrete and existential sense and not as metaphors or symbols, not mixed and weakened by economic, moral and other conceptions. On this point Charles Frye states that “Schmitt’s drive to purify the political had in fact led him so far as to leave us without a subject or an object of politics”\(^1\). The most important motive was ideological since, from Frye’s point of view, Schmitt sought to purge the concept of the political of all foreign elements because he wanted to free the head of the state from all limitations on his authority and advocated the authoritarian regime.

Schmitt differentiates the private and the political enmity and stresses that his categories of friend and enemy can be applied only to the sphere of the political and thus only to the public sphere. In other words Schmitt presents the public friend and the public enemy and “in this sense, Schmitt subscribes to Plato’s distinction between private (ekhtros) and public (polemios) enemies”\(^2\). “The enemy [as he states] is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in general. He is also not the private adversary whom one hates. An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy.”\(^3\) Carl Schmitt points two factors which separate private enmity and political: first of all, enemy is a confronting collectivity of people and, secondly, it confronts publicly. Since the public enemy is conceptually distinct from the private enemy, whom one hates, consequently, the public friend is distinct from the private friend, whom one loves. The political relations are formed between collectivities, but not individuals. Schmitt discusses certain passages in the Gospel, from Saint Matthew or Saint Luke, often cited for the approval of the doctrine of political peace which convinces of love for enemies. This love does not extend to members of another political community only to those of one’s own, brothers or neighbours, with whom there is the direct contact even though there may be personal hatred. The Gospel can be used in favour of pacifism or a political doctrine of peace only at the expense of distorting the meaning of the words. The Gospel refers only to the private enemy, but not the public enemy.

The parallel with the position of Arendt can be drawn again since “she argues that political action is analogous to artistic performances, such as dance, and not to solitary arts, such as sculpture. On her account, both dance and political activity aim at a revelation of the actor that is simply impossible in the absence of an audience containing a multiplicity of perspectives and

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1 Frye 1966, p. 821.
2 Ojakangas 2004, p. 65.
3 Schmitt, op. cit., p. 28.
judges.” Consequently, from her point of view, the political action is actually public and thus the similarity with Schmitt can be seen.

For Carl Schmitt the friend and the enemy are public and thus the distinction between them presupposes a particular form of life in the collectivity. At all times people “have organized as friends within a particular community (tribe, polis, empire, state) and tried to preserve their identity against the threats of those who might want to destroy it”\(^2\). “As long as a people exists in a political sphere, this people must, even if only in the most extreme case - and whether this point has been reached has to be decided by it - determine by itself the distinction of friend and enemy. This is the essence of its political existence. When it no longer possesses the capacity or the will to make this distinction, it ceases to exist politically.”\(^3\) Thus a people exists politically when it sets up an independent political unity and for the sake of this unity opposes itself to other kinds of unity. The distinction between friend and enemy considers the appearance of the collectivity in the political terms, the appearance of the particular form of life in this collectivity and, consequently, the opposition of this collectivity to other group(s) since the enemy is characterized by some alienation; it is some otherness. The important point is “the group’s contention of its ‘sameness’ and ‘identity’ against the ‘otherness’ of a different group: it is the common feeling of ‘sameness’ based on race, ethnicity, common history, culture, or language, which for Schmitt forges the members of the group into the ‘oneness’ of a ‘people’ – that constitutes the political quality of a group.”\(^4\) Nevertheless, there is no priori criterion either for the enemy or for the friend in Schmitt’s theory. “The enemy is anyone who is concretely disclosed, at the miraculous moment of revealing, as the other and hence, as a real threat to our existence. Respectively, friends are all those who share the feeling of threat, those who are shaken by the otherness of the other, and whose collectivity identity depends on its threat.”\(^5\)

According to Schmitt, it is the very moment of identification which discloses the enemy and constitutes the field of the political: “The high points of politics are simultaneously the moments, in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy?”\(^6\). Moreover, when people identify the enemy they identify themselves as the enemy of the enemy and it is the precondition of “existential affinity” and independent identity\(^7\). The point is to make the division between those who belong to a people and thus have the same rights and those who cannot have the same rights in the sphere of the political because they are not the part of the people. “Schmitt stresses that even in modern democratic states where the universal equality is established there is

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1 Norris 1998, p. 70.
2 Freund www-document.
3 Schmitt, op. cit., p. 49.
4 Preuss 1999, p. 156.
5 Ojakangas, op. cit., p. 66.
7 Ojakangas, op. cit., p. 78.
a particular group who are subject to the exclusion and thus no absolute equality exists”\(^1\). He also emphasizes that in these states the equality of the citizens is accompanied by paying attention to the issue of national homogeneity and the border between those who belong to the state and those who do not belong to it. Moreover, as Vilho Harle states, it is also possible that within the state the domestic enemy can exist, that is “any group which seriously threatens domestic peace or the existence of the state”\(^2\). The state must be able to intervene in any sphere of society and to take any measures to prevent the disintegration of the state. In that case the potentiality of the war within the state complements the potentiality of the war between the states. However, it is called into question whether the distinction between friend and enemy can be applied to both domestic and international scenes. Schmitt supposes two exceptional situations corresponding to both scenes – civil war and national war. But Frye considers that Schmitt’s concept can be applied only to the domestic scene since “in fact most of the states of the modern world have been characterized domestically most of the time by a condition of law and order, and because the condition of law and order is only in its rudimentary stages on the international scene, it would seem that the two conditions are essentially dissimilar - not similar as Schmitt assumed”\(^3\). Hence the condition of war between states is not an exceptional and Carl Schmitt’s concept cannot be applied to the international scene. Harle holds the opposite opinion. He states that “the political is not possible within the state; it is possible only between the states”\(^4\). Thus, as Harle concludes, Schmitt’s definition of the political can be applied only to the international politics because there is no politics within the state. As for the civil war, from his point of view, in it the state does not exist because by eliminating the civil war the state eliminates the political within itself.\(^5\)

This part of the concept of the political is controversial. Mouffe emphasizes that the statement that the condition of the existence of “us” is the existence of “them” is not sufficient. She states that it is necessary to put attention to the connections that unite the elements of the collectivity since between them different forms of unity can be established. But “this is not what Schmitt believes, since in his view unity can exist only on the mode of identity.”\(^6\) Moreover, she agrees that a people should be created politically but she does not agree it should lead us to the refutation of the possibility of any form of pluralism in the political entity. “In fact Schmitt faces us with the false dilemma: the unity of the people exists and it requires taking out of any division or antagonism beyond the boundaries of the people or particular forms of division within the

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1 Mouffe 2004, p. 143.  
2 Harle, op. cit., p. 143.  
3 Frye, op. cit., p. 828.  
4 Harle, op. cit., p. 136.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Mouffe 1999, p. 47.
people are recognized legitimate but this results in the form of pluralism negating the political unity and the very existence of the people.”¹ This point derives from the understanding of the political unity since for Schmitt the identity of the collectivity should exist as taken for granted. Schmitt, as Mouffe states, fears the loss of common premises and consequent destruction of the political unity which he sees as inherent to pluralism while Mouffe agrees that there is such danger she considers that it cannot be the reason to reject all forms of pluralism. Thus she proposes to deny Schmitt’s dilemma and “to imagine in a different way what Schmitt refers to as ‘homogeneity’, to envisage a form of commonality strong enough to institute a ‘demos’ but nevertheless compatible with certain forms of pluralism: religious, moral and cultural pluralism, as well as a pluralism of political parties”². This is considered by Mouffe to be the task of Schmittian criticism. P. Caldwell is more categorical in his assessment and he points out that “the statement that if a people lacks the will to maintain the political it is a weak people which will disappear from the world sounds like Nazi propaganda about the survival of the race”³. On that point Joseph Bendersky states that the “reference to a people and a race, inserted to accommodate the Nazis, stands in sharp contradiction to Schmitt’s political and legal writings in which racial thought had no place and made no sense”⁴.

Carl Schmitt also states that the group identity is valued above physical existence. According to him the notions of “friend” and “enemy” receive their real meaning because they consider the real possibility of physical killing. Carl Schmitt writes: “In case of need, the political entity must demand the sacrifice of life”⁵. Something is strong enough to lead individuals to allow taking their lives for the sake of the collectivity. Moreover, individuals agree to recognize this right of the state to demand the sacrifice of their lives legitimate. It is the matter of identity once again. The threat to human life does not make anyone political, but serves only as a reminder of their commitment and of the fact that their way of life is valued above their life. The conclusion is that for Schmitt the essence of politics is a homogenous form of identity that presupposes the superiority over private physical life and presupposes the possibility of a particular form of conflict. “Enmity can be actual in the case of a direct conflict, virtual or potential when the necessary measures are taken to safeguard political existence”⁶. Thus war is only the most extreme case of enmity; “war is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics. But as an ever present possibility it is a leading presupposition which determines a specifically political behaviour. Killing at war is merely the borderline of politics,

¹ Mouffe 2004, p. 151.
² Mouffe 1999, p. 50.
⁴ Bendersky 1987, p. 32.
⁵ Schmitt, op. cit., p. 71.
⁶ Freund www-document.
and war is a borderline concept which belongs to the sphere of the political but it is not included in it.”¹ It belongs to it since the real possibility of war and killing constitutes the political but it is not included for “the political does not reside in the battle itself”². The criterion of the friend-enemy distinction in no way implies that one particular nation must forever be the friend or enemy of another specific nation or that state of neutrality is not possible or could not be politically reasonable. The neutrality concept is subject to the ultimate presupposition of a real possibility of a friend - enemy grouping.³ However, this point of the theory raises a lot of disputes concerning the intentions and the real position of Carl Schmitt.

On one hand, the researchers state that the result of Schmitt’s arguments is the glorification of violence and war. This is proved by the fact that the political for Carl Schmitt is a matter of conflict and war and the true criterion of the political is the enemy. The decision, who the political friends are, is made only defining the enemy, and friends are appreciated because they allow to achieve success in the war. According to this interpretation, the hated other is necessary to create the solidarity of the homogeneous entity. Richard Wolin concludes that “in The Concept of the Political, it is clear as noonday that politics stands in the service of heteronomous, nonpolitical powers: namely, the powers of war”⁴. He stresses that even the autonomy of the political is sacrificed on the altar of war. John McCormick also treats negatively Schmitt’s point on the war and the possibility of killing. However, he supposes that it can be explained by the fact that Schmitt “seeks to make war’s outbreak all the more unlikely domestically, and its prosecution more easily facilitated abroad”⁵. Stephen Holmes points out rigidly concerning that part of the theory that Schmitt is “a theorist who consciously embraced evil and whose writings cannot be studied without moral revulsion and intellectual distress”⁶. Mouffe considers that Schmitt does not accept any other alternative to the distinction between friend and enemy and proposes that Schmitt’s antagonism should be transformed into agonism. Agonism presupposes that there is an enemy, but this is a legitimate enemy with whom there is a common ground and agonism “attempts to avoid a frontal struggle between enemies”⁷. Norris presents the typical characterization of the concept of the political as follows: “The bellicose nihilism this suggests is often seen as a causal factor in Carl Schmitt's own active participation in the Nazi movement in the 1930 - ies. His political theory, it is alleged, is opportunistic, with only one consistent commitment - to the irrational.”⁸ The irrationalism of Schmitt’s theory is also

¹ Ojakangas, op. cit., p. 71.
² Schmitt, op. cit., p. 37.
³ Ibid., p. 34.
⁵ McCormick 1994, p. 626.
⁷ Mouffe 1999, p. 4.
⁸ Norris, op. cit., p. 69.
emphasized by Frye who states in terms of the issue of war and death that there is nothing leading rationally to the use of these cases. From his point of view, Schmitt cannot “justify his specific choice of death and war. In Schmitt’s work the use of the extreme situation is fundamentally an irrational device with a rational purpose” – he has an ideal community in mind, namely, an authoritarian state.

On the other hand, the researchers consider that the glorification of war and violence was not the purpose of Carl Schmitt. Norris states that Schmitt’s “attempt to characterize politics in terms of friendship and enmity is both more complicated and more interesting than his critics suggest.” On his opinion, Schmitt’s provocative formulations of the distinction between friend and enemy should not lead to the conclusion that he reduces politics to the function of war. Schmitt's theoretical position requires a prior substantive commitment to the relations of friendship and the social solidarity. Moreover, Schmitt himself emphasizes that his concept of the political does not mean that it signifies only war and every political deed is a military action or that every nation would be faced with the friend-enemy alternative in relation to every other nation. Ojakangas stresses that for Schmitt “war is not the aim or the purpose or even the content of politics”, but it is just the most extreme case the possibility of which is significant. Gary Ulmen holds the same opinion and supposes that “if one reads what Schmitt actually writes, it is clear that he is neither promoting war nor enmity”. The main point is the distinction itself but not enmity or war. Richard Bellamy and Peter Baehr also emphasize such trend that “Schmitt’s thesis has sometimes been misrepresented as a typically glorification of power that identifies politics with war and even advocates war as good in itself”. They state that Schmitt goes so far that he even denies the mere existed normative justification for killing as justified. Carl Schmitt defines the existential quality of war in precisely defensive terms: “If physical destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential threat to one's own way of life, then it cannot be justified”. He outlines that it is even senseless to conduct war for just religious, moral, juristic or economic reasons. “War must be motivated by an existential –objective – threat – threat to one’s way of life”. Thus the logical conclusion is that the rational justification for waging war is the self-defense of the collectivity. Louiza Odysseos states that “it is the collectivity’s continued survival that justifies, ‘by mere existence’, the possibility of physical killing”. The presence of the enemy accentuates the fact that the political entity has a responsibility to survive. Leo Strauss

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1 Frye, op. cit., p. 827.
2 Norris, op. cit., p. 69.
3 Ojakangas, op. cit., p. 72.
4 Ulmen 1987, p. 189.
5 Bellamy – Baehr 1993, p. 172.
6 Schmitt, op. cit., p. 49.
7 Harle, op. cit., p. 138.
also pays much attention to the issue of the self-preservation and notes that “self-preservation and the striving after peace for the sake of self-preservation are ‘necessary’, because man fears death with inescapable necessity”. However, Leo Strauss concludes on the concept of the political that in the absence of an independent moral affirmation of the political “the affirmation of the political is the affirmation of fighting as such, wholly irrespective of what is being fought for”. Thus the self-preservation of the collectivity is emphasized by the analysts of the theory.

Another point of view is that Carl Schmitt should be regarded as a political theologian. Heinrich Meier sees Schmitt as a political theologian and notes that “Schmitt’s doctrine is at a heart theology, in which not argumentation but faith is what demands total obedience to the collective.” From his point of view, Carl Schmitt rejects the political philosophy in the name of the political theology which underlies his work. Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde agrees with Meier and supposes that political theology is the key to the interpretation of the theory of Schmitt. “Theologically formulated, this could be the vouching for divine truth in the struggle with the forces of antichrist and his kingdom”. Mark Lilla also follows the tradition of understanding the concept of the political as the political theology and calls it “politics of theological despair”.

There can be outlined the group of the authors who consider that the concept of the political is something unique and does not correspond to any traditions. Michael Marder emphasizes the peculiarity of the theory of Schmitt and calls it “a non-dogmatic construction of political theory” which he considers to be “the most crucial ‘challenge’ of Carl Schmitt.” Even Frye states that Schmitt repudiated the very substance and form of tradition, of history, indeed, of life itself and broke with the tradition that can be estimated as the recognition of the unique features. Paul Hirst notes that Carl Schmitt’s “thinking is not governed by any dogmatic political alternative, it exhibits a peculiar objectivity”. Harle agrees that “Schmitt’s thought represents a case – if a rather unique case – among the thousand faces of the Enemy”.

This part of the theory of Carl Schmitt provoked most of versions concerning his intentions and his real position but the disputes still take place and no single point of view can be outlined. The point regarding the possibility of war and the possibility of killing is of importance in terms of the whole concept. Carl Schmitt considers that life will lack its meaning if it does not presuppose the commitments put above the mere physical existence.

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1 Odysseos, op. cit., p. 414.
2 Strauss, op. cit., p. 102.
4 Caldwell, op. cit., p. 361.
5 Bockenforde, op. cit., p. 86.
9 Harle, op. cit., p. 135.
“Schmitt’s fear that the world will develop into something like Huxley’s Brave New World1 is connected to his criticism of liberalism’s inability to demand sacrifices.”2 This fear can be traced in his rejection of a world-state. What would remain in this state is neither politics nor state, it is just culture, civilization, economics, morality, law, art, entertainment, etc. Leo Strauss states that this is a “world of entertainment, a world of fun…freed from politics”3 that Carl Schmitt really dislikes because it would not be serious. In his criticism Schmitt indirectly points the proposal of sacrificial politics to prevent the approach of such a state: “A completely pacified globe would be a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world without politics. It is conceivable that such a world might contain many very interesting antitheses and contrasts, competitions and intrigues of every kind, but there would not be a meaningful antithesis whereby men could be required to sacrifice life, authorized to shed blood, and kill other human beings.”4

Carl Schmitt also presents his view on Hegel in “The Concept of the Political”: “Hegel has advanced a definition of the enemy which has in general been evaded by modern philosophers. The enemy is a negated otherness. But this negation is mutual and this mutuality of negations has its own concrete existence, as a relation between enemies.”5 Hegel also states that war is a fundamental possibility of political life because the state is vis-à-vis other states as an individual and this individuality essentially considers negation. “Hence even if a number of states make themselves into a family, this group as an individual must engender an opposite and create an enemy.”6 That is why the similarities between these two positions are clear. However, where Hegel’s commitment to the opinion that reason must be actual leads him to glorify the actual conduct of war, Carl Schmitt does not praise war as such. For Hegel the modern state is the highest form of ethical life and the sacrifices it demands are the part of this life while for Schmitt war is a political matter in essence: if there really are enemies in the existential sense,

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1 Brave New World is a 1932 dystopian novel by Aldous Huxley, set in London in the 26th century. The novel anticipates developments in reproductive technology, eugenics and hypnopædia that combine to change society. The world it describes could in fact also be a utopia, albeit an ironic one: Humanity is carefree, healthy, and technologically advanced. Warfare and poverty have been eliminated, all races are equal, and everyone is permanently happy. The irony is, however, that all of these things have been achieved by eliminating many things — family, cultural diversity, art, literature, religion and philosophy.

Brave New World is Huxley's most famous and enduring novel. The title comes from Miranda's speech in Shakespeare's The Tempest, Act V, Scene I:

"O wonder!
   How many goodly creatures are there here!
   How beauteous mankind is!
   O brave new world,
      That has such people in't!"

3 Strauss, op. cit., p. 98.
4 Schmitt, op. cit., p. 35.
5 Ibid., p. 63.
6 Norris, op. cit., p. 75.
thus it is justified, but only politically, to contend them physically. As for the attempt to end war because of its immorality, it may have inverse effect and produce the war to end all wars. Carl Schmitt stresses that this could well produce a form of warfare that is “ unusually intense and inhuman because, by transcending the limits of the political framework, it simultaneously degrades the enemy into moral and other categories and is forced to make of him a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed”\footnote{Schmitt, op. cit., p. 36.}. That is regarded as the inhuman war which is unjustifiable.

On the whole, the interpretation of the notions of “friend” and “enemy” by Carl Schmitt enables to understand the position of the Russian speaking minority in the Baltic States. The Russian speaking minority presents a particular group and the question is whether the direct analogy with Carl Schmitt’s concept should be drawn and whether the “ friend – enemy” distinction is typical of the political communities of the Baltic States.

The first level of the analysis, i.e. Schmitt’s concept, contains the ontological constructions. It only provides the interpretation of the very fundamental notions which constitute the “ self- other” dichotomy. It presupposes to be the basic level presenting the ontological coordinates, while the second level, on which the analysis will be conducted in the next part, will provide the analysis of the “ self- other” dichotomy on the level of the political theory of the nation state.

2. 2. The “Self-Other” Distinction on the Level of the Political Theory of the Nation State

“ Imagined communities” by Benedict Anderson is analyzed since it is of interest of the research problem. While Schmitt presents the fundamental understanding of the dichotomy, Anderson concerns the “ self – other” distinction in relation to the nation state.

In this book he states that nationality, national identity and nationalism are cultural artifacts the creation of which up to the end of the XVIII century was the spontaneous distillation of a complex crossing of discrete historical forces; but that, once created, they became modular, capable of being transplanted to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a variety of political and ideological constellations. Theorists of nationalism have faced with three paradoxes: 1) The objective modernity of nations in historians’ opinion vs. their subjective antiquity in nationalists’ point of view, 2) The formal universality of nationality as a socio-cultural concept (each person is able, can and must have nationality along with gender) vs. the particularity of its concrete manifestations (for example, Greek nationality is unique by
definition) and 3) The political power of nationalism vs. its philosophical poverty.¹ That leads to the fact that in terms of nationalism the outstanding thinkers like Marx, Weber, or Hobbes cannot be picked out. To some extent the problem is that Nationalism is regarded with the capital letter and that is why it is classified as an ideology. Anderson considers that it will be more reasonable to use the term “nationalism” along with such notions as “blood relationship” or “religion” than with such terms as “liberalism” or “fascism”. In that case it would not be treated as an ideology.

In “Imagined Communities” Benedict Anderson provides the definition of nation: “it is an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”² It is imagined because the members of the community will never know most of their compatriots, yet in the minds of each person the image of their communion lives. He presents the example of Javanese villagers who always know that they are connected with people they have never seen and their bonds are imagined. Moreover, in their language there is no word which would correspond to the term “society” so far. “All communities larger than primordial villages [in Anderson’s point of view] are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/ genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.”³ It is limited because it has its boundaries (if elastic boundaries) beyond which other nations lie. No nation imagines itself as adjoining to the whole humanity. It is imagined as sovereign because it came to maturity at a stage of human history when freedom was a nation’s dream and the emblem of this freedom was the sovereign state. Finally it is imagined as a community because it is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. However, Brian Axel suggests that “this explanation provides very little as to what exactly happens ‘in the mind’ of the imagining subject, or how the process of imagining may be distinguished from other processes.”⁴

Anderson points out that, historically, nationalism replaces religion that played an important role. Thus nationalism has to be understood not in relation to self - consciously held political ideologies, but the large cultural systems that preceded it. Nationalism arose at the period of time when the importance of three other cultural conceptions was decreasing.

Firstly, there were changes in the religious community. Nationality represented a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning. At first “the sacred silent languages were the media through which the great global communities of the past were imagined”⁵ and the relations between the literati and their societies played a role along with the sacred script. But the coherence of religion declined after the late Middle Ages. It was connected with two factors. The first one is the effect of the explorations of the non-European world which

¹ Anderson, op. cit., p. 5.
² Ibid., p. 6.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Axel 2003, p. 112.
expanded the cultural and the geographic horizon and enabled to get to know about other forms of human life. Concerning that point Anderson emphasizes the appearance of the seeds of the territorialization of faith which foreshadows the language of many nationalists (“our” nation is “the best”).¹ The second factor is the gradual decline of the sacred language itself. The older communities lost confidence in the unique sacredness of their languages (the idea that a particular script language offered privileged access to ontological truth), and thus lost confidence in their ideas about admission to membership in the religious community. The hegemony of Latin was doomed and it showed the trend that the sacred communities integrated by old sacred languages were gradually fragmented and territorialized.

Michel Bouchard challenges this first point since he considers that “though Anderson proposes the sacred languages and sacred communities characterized the medieval period, he spends little time examining the linguistic theory of Europe and, like most theorists of nationalism, focuses on Western Europe when trying to understand the origins of national consciousness and nationhood”². He stresses that the medieval history of Eastern Europe demonstrates that there was no sacred language until the modern period and that it was the Orthodox Church that facilitated the emergence of nationhood in various parts of Eastern Europe. The spread of Orthodoxy contributed to the appearance of new literary languages and the consolidation of the ethnic communities into what modern national communities would turn. Bouchard emphasizes the case of Russia and states that throughout a long history “the Orthodox Church continued to do what Orthodox Churches had always done: translated biblical texts in order to facilitate conversion. Through its activities, the Orthodox Church recognized existing ethnic differences and encouraged the emergence of national identities throughout Russia.”³

Brian Axel also points out that “the imagination of Imagined Communities relies upon the presuppositions of western metaphysics”⁴. Moreover, he states that although this imagination is presented by Anderson as the universal quality constitutive of all communities, it privileges just some kinds of communities and just certain subjects. These authors form the group that considers that Anderson’s theory is based just on the analysis of Western Europe and does not correspond to the state of affairs in other parts of the world. In contrast to this point of view Rod Benson outlines that “Anderson’s historical reach is impressive and his thesis is thoroughly documented and cogently argued”.⁵ Anthony D. Smith agrees with Benson and states that “Anderson’s theory was a healthy antidote to the Eurocentrism characteristic of much of the literature on the

¹ Anderson, op. cit., p. 17.
³ Ibid., p. 21.
⁴ Axel, op. cit., p. 120.
⁵ Benson 1992, p. 645.
Thus he adheres to the tradition to emphasize the fact that Anderson provides the examples and analyzes the history of not only European countries and America, but also from the Eastern part of the world, consequently, his examples refer to the different parts of the world.

Secondly, there were changes in the dynastic realm. In the earlier interpretation states were defined by centers, borders were blurred and sovereignties faded into one another. However, in the XVII century the automatic legitimacy of the sacral monarchy began to decline. “In 1649, Charles Stuart was beheaded in the first of the modern world’s revolutions, and during the 1650-ies one of the most important European states was ruled by a plebeian Protector rather than a king.” People began to doubt the belief that society was naturally organized around high centers.

Thirdly, there was the conception of time in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable. In the Middle Ages, time was thought to be “simultaneous”. This idea of simultaneity seems to be inappropriate today. The perception of time is close to the term “messianic time” (by Walter Benjamin) which presupposes the simultaneity of the past and the future in the momentary contemporary. From that point of view the word “meanwhile” loses its sense. This conception is not likely to be used in terms of the origins of nationalism. The alternative is the idea of “homogeneous, empty time”, which “presumes that simultaneity is cross to time and it is defined as the time coincidence and measured with the help of watch and calendar.” Two forms of imagining first appeared in Europe in the XVIII century, namely the novel and the newspaper. “Anderson hypothesizes that novels and newspapers provided the technical means for ‘re-presenting’ a kind of imagined community that is the nation.” Partha Chatterjee suggests that Anderson applies these formulations “to show the material possibilities of large anonymous socialities being formed by the simultaneous experience of reading the daily newspapers or of following the private lives of popular fictional characters.” However, the idea of a sociological organism moving through homogenous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community moving steadily through history. For example, the ordinary American will never meet and will never know the names of all of his compatriots. He does not know what they do at this or that moment but he is definitely aware of their constant anonymous simultaneous activity. “Made possible by difference the nation homogenizes time and space, draws borders, historicizes itself as the continuous arc of identity.” Marc Redfield stresses that imagination becomes an unstable figure that tropes

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1 Smith 2001, p. 137.
3 Ibid., p. 24.
4 Redfield 1999, p. 62.
5 Chatterjee 1999, p. 131.
6 Redfield, op. cit., p. 66.
anonymity as identity and difference as homogeneity. Jonathan Culler puts into question Anderson’s point but does not repudiate it and states that “what is not clear is how far novels and newspapers do indeed lead to imagining a national community of readers”¹. He explains that few newspapers in the period of nation-building are sufficiently dominant to constitute in themselves a national voice or their readers as national community. Moreover, if it is easy to imagine that the readers of a newspaper are united as a community by the shared daily ritual of reading the same text at the same time, it is very difficult to do the same in relation to the readers of a novel. However, Culler points out that nothing matters if the argument depends upon the fact that community of readers of a novel or newspaper is the model for the imagined community of nation, but it does matter if the national community is believed to be imagined by those simultaneously reading a newspaper.

However, all the aforesaid three changes lead to the search for a new way of linking fraternity, power, and time together.

The preceding elements set the conditions for a new form of cultural consciousness. Print capitalism made it possible for more and more people to think about themselves and to relate themselves to others.² “With print-capitalism the privileged script languages of the ancient and medieval world gave way to publishing in a selected and constructed vernacular that made it possible for rapidly growing number of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways.”³

Capitalism was especially important because the expansion of the book market contributed to the revolutionary vernacularization of languages. Three extraneous factors gave further impetus to this. The first and the least important factor in Anderson’s opinion is the change in the character of Latin. It removed from everyday life and became an arcane. The second factor is the impact of the Reformation, the success of which was to a great extent provided by print-capitalism and which led to the mass production of Bibles. The third one is the spread of particular vernaculars as instruments of administrative centralization. The birth of the administrative vernaculars is regarded by Anderson as the independent factor in the erosion of the sacred imagined community. The negative sense of these factors is their contribution to the dethronement of Latin. But “what, in positive sense, made the new communities imaginable was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human

² Anderson, op. cit., p. 36.
³ Encyclopedia of Nationalism, p. 356.
linguistic diversity". Moreover, capitalism created mechanically reproduced print-languages which could be distributed through the market.

Print-languages laid the foundation for national consciousness in three ways: they created the unified space of exchange and communication; they gave a new fixity to the language and they created the languages which were different from the older administrative vernaculars. ¹ The results were really significant. The speakers of the huge variety of Frenches or Englishes became able to understand each other via print and paper. The new fixity of language helped to build the image of antiquity that was central to the subjective idea of the nation. The new forms of the languages-of-power were closer to each print-languages and dominated their final forms.

However, the concrete formation of contemporary nation states is not isomorphic with the determinate reach of particular print languages; it is also necessary to pay attention to the emergence of political entities on the world stage.

The failure of the Spanish-American attempts to generate a permanent nationalism reflects both the general level of the development of capitalism and technology in the late XVIII century and the “local backwardness” of Spanish capitalism and technology compared to the administrative size of the empire². The protestant English-speaking people of the north were much more favourably situated for realizing the idea of “America”.

The end of the era of successful national liberation movements in the Americas coincided with the beginning of the age of nationalism in Europe. These “new nationalisms” were different in two aspects: 1) national print-languages were of central ideological and political importance, and 2) it was possible for the nation to use the existing models set forth by the predecessors. Vernacular print capitalism is important for the class formation, particularly the bourgeoisie. Earlier solidarity was the product of kinship and personal loyalties. “‘French’ nobles could assist ‘English’ monarchs, not on the basis of shared language or culture, but of shared kinsmen and friendships.”³ The bourgeoisies, however, were the first classes that gained the solidarity on the imaginary basis with the help of the print capitalism. They did not know each other because of marriage or proper transactions, but they began to visualize others like themselves through printing. The nobilities, landed gentries, professionals, and men of the market were the potential consumers of the philological revolution. Much depended on the relations between the masses and the advocates of nationalism. However, with the spread of literacy it became easier to get the public support. As soon as the events of the Americas reached the European nobility through printing, the imagined realities of nation states became the models for Europe.

⁴ Anderson, op. cit., p. 42.
¹ Ibid., p. 44-45.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid., p. 77.
From the late XVIII century the need for the narrative of identity appeared. “The nation is not merely a concept but a narrative that allows the imagined community to conceive of itself as sharing common historical journey.”¹ Nations, however, have no clear identifiable births, and their deaths, if they ever happen, are never natural. Thus the alternative is to write the biography of the nation “up-time” but the feature is that to serve the narrative purpose all the deaths must be remembered/forgotten as “our own”.²

From the middle of the XIX century the official nationalism developed in Europe. It was the response of the power groups threatened by the exclusion from the popular imagined communities (e.g., Russia, England and Japan). “The philological-lexicographic revolution and the rise of intra-European nationalist movements, themselves the products, not only of capitalism, but of the elephantiasis of the dynastic states, created increasing cultural, and therefore political, difficulties for many dynasts.”³ The legitimacy of the ruling of many dynasties was not connected with nationness. The dynasties settled on certain print-vernaculars as languages-of-state. The lexicographic revolution in Europe created and gradually expanded the idea that languages were the personal property of quite specific groups – their daily speakers and readers and that “these groups, imagined as communities, were entitled to their autonomous place in a fraternity of equals”⁴. Since all dynasts were using some vernacular as language-of-state and the national idea was becoming more and more prestigious in Europe there was the tendency in Euro-Mediterranean monarchies to move towards the national identification. For example, Romanovs discovered that they were Great Russians, Hanoverians that they were English, etc.

Anderson points that the naturalizations of European dynasties led to the appearance of the official nationalism. It was the means of combining naturalization with the retention of dynastic power. “The key to situating ‘official nationalism’ – willed merger of nation and dynastic empire – is to remember that it developed after, and in reaction to, the popular national movements proliferating in Europe since the 1820-ies.”⁵ The dynasties determined more and more themselves in national terms but it was also necessary that the model should have been understood imperially since the dynasties tended to expand their power outside Europe. The model of the official nationalism was also followed by the states with no serious power pretensions since their ruling classes felt threatened by the world-wide spread of nationally imagined communities. For example, the Thai king Wachirawut dramatized himself as the Thai first nationalist. He followed the model of official nationalism and took such measures as

¹ Benson, op. cit., p. 644.
³ Ibid., p. 83.
⁴ Ibid., p. 84.
⁵ Ibid., p. 86.
compulsory state-controlled primary education, state-organized propaganda, official rewriting of history aimed at the affirmation of the identity of dynasty and nation. The official nationalism was the response to the appearance of popular linguistic nationalisms and to the threat to the ruling groups of the exclusion from or marginalization in popular imagined communities. However, in almost every case the official nationalism revealed the discrepancy between nation and dynastic realm.

WW I put an end for the dynasticism and “by 1922, Habsburgs, Romanovs and Ottomans were gone”. At that time the nation state became a legitimate international norm. After WW II the new states had their own feature, however, they followed the previous models and a lot of these nations used European languages-of-state. “If they resembled the ‘American’ model in this respect, they took from linguistic European nationalism its populism and from official nationalism its Russifying policy-orientation because Americans and Europeans had lived through complex historical experiences which were now everywhere modularly imagined, and because the European languages-of-state they employed were the legacy of imperialist official nationalism.”

Thus the nation-building policies of these new states could be regarded as both a popular nationalist enthusiasm and systematic implanting through the mass media, educational system, administrative regulations and other means. The mixture of popular and official nationalism was also connected with such features related to European imperialism as the arbitrariness of frontiers and bilingual intelligentsias. The intelligentsias played a central role in terms of the development of nationalism in the colonial states and it was connected with its bilingualism and literacy. “Print-literacy made possible the imagined community floating in homogenous empty time and bilingualism meant access, through the European languages of state, to modern Western culture in the broadest sense, and, in particular, to the models of nationalism, nationness, and nation state.”

Anderson stresses that it is a mistake to consider languages in the way that certain nationalist ideologues treat them as the emblems of nationness while the most important thing about the language is that it enables to generate imagined communities and build particular solidarities. Thus there is no difference whether English is used in Australia or Portuguese is used in Brazil. Language is regarded not as an instrument of exclusion and it is print-language that invents nationalism but not a particular language itself. “The nation’s material base is language but language appears here as what Jacque Derrida calls a tele-technics.”

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1 Anderson, op. cit., p. 113.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 116.
4 Redfield, op. cit., p. 64.
question is whether the administrative and educational systems can provide the diffusion of bilingualism.

The nationalisms of the XX century showed that it is possible to create print allies by means of communication technology. They were modular by nature since they mixed the features of the popular nationalism (elections, party organizations and cultural celebrations), official nationalism (civil and military educational systems) and the citizen-republican idea of the Americas. The idea of nation was closely related to print-language and nationness was inseparable from the political perception while nations could be imagined without linguistic commonality.

The last wave of nationalism was facilitated by three factors: 1) the increase in physical mobility, 2) increasing bureaucratization and 3) the spread of modern education. It was the response to the new global imperialism which became possible because of the achievements of the industrial capitalism. In addition, this last wave developed in the period of the world history when the nation became an international norm and when it became possible to model national identity in a more complex way than before.

National identity is considered to be natural in the sense that it contains something that is not chosen (much like gender, skin color and parentage). It has an aura of fatality embedded in history. Seen as both a historical fatality and as community imagined through language, the nation presents itself as both open and closed. However, it is a mistake to consider that racism and anti-semitism derive from nationalism and that thus fascism is the most appropriate episode to tell about nationalism. It is not, however, the source of racism and anti-semitism. Racism erases national identity by reducing the adversary to his/her biological physiognomy. Nationalism applies the terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins which lie outside history. “Niggers are thanks to the invisible tar brush, forever, niggers; Jews, the seed of Abraham, forever, Jews, no matter what passports they carry or what languages they speak and read.”

The dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation. Racism and anti-semitism usually do not go beyond the national borders but act within them and they are more likely to justify the domestic repressions.

Anderson states that revolutions, such as those in Vietnam, Kampuchea, and China, are contemporary reflections of nationalism, but this nationalism is the heir of the historical changes that took place during two centuries. Nationalism has undergone the process of modulation and adaptation, according to different eras, political regimes, economies and social structures. As a result, the “imagined community” has spread out to every conceivable contemporary society.

1 Anderson, op. cit., p. 149.
The institutions of power – the census, the map, and the museum – “profoundly shaped the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion – the nature of the human beings it ruled, the geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of its ancestry”\(^1\). The census created “identities” imagined by the classifying mind of the colonial state. The fiction of the census is that everyone has one and only one definite place. Some authors stress that the novel and the census can be used to construct a minority in the community. Culler agrees with that point but he also emphasizes that Anderson “does not treat the novel as an intrinsically benign and democratic form”\(^2\).

The map worked on the basis of the resumptive classification. The historical maps were designed to demonstrate the origins of specific and tightly bounded territorial units. Hence a kind of political-biographical narrative of the realm appeared sometimes with the historical depth and this narrative was adopted by nation states. The map-as-logo served as a sign which was instantly recognizable and visible everywhere and penetrated deeply into the popular imagination it formed a powerful emblem for the anticolonial nationalism. The museum allowed the state to appear as the guardian of traditions, and this power was enhanced by the infinite reproducibility of the symbols of tradition.

Everything in imagining the nation should serve one purpose – to correspond to the expression “our own” and to form this commonality among the members of the nation.

It is appropriate to apply the points of that analysis on the level of the political theory of the nation state to the reality of the Baltic countries since they are the independent countries and they adhere to the concept of nation state for constructing their own states.

On the second level the analysis presents the interpretation of the “self-other” dichotomy in terms of the political theory of the nation state. The third level will concern the empirical side of the subject-matter thus it will provide the research taking the form of the analysis of the historical development of the “self-other” dichotomy in the context of Europe.

2. 3. The “Self-Other” Distinction

on the Empirical Level of the Analysis

Schmitt’s work provides the fundamental interpretation of the very dichotomy between self and other, Anderson’s book applies it to the nation state and the book “Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation” by Iver Neumann presents the empirical analysis of the “self-other” dichotomy and concerns this distinction on the European level.

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1 Anderson, op. cit., p. 164.
2 Culler, op. cit., p. 24.
At the beginning analyzing the various positions concerning the notions of “self” and “other” Neumann states that “it is a pervasive theme of the literature and the formation of the self is inextricably intertwined with the formation of its others and the failure to regard the others in their own right must necessarily have repercussions for the formation of the self”\(^1\). Neumann also stresses that studying the relations between two countries it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that at the same time these states are trying to maintain their own collective identities. On the basis of the presented material he concludes that no collective identity can be privileged since both self and other are not only mutually constitutive but they are necessarily unbounded; the self and the other merge into one another.

Iver Neumann considers that the representation of the other has always been a crucial point in terms of the European formation of identity. In relation to that issue the role of Russia as the other for Europe is significant. Thus Neumann analyzes historically the representations of Russia in Europe. This issue is significant for the research for it considers the image of Russia in Europe and in the research the representation of Russians in the Baltic States is elaborated.

Neumann starts with the XVI-XVII centuries, with Muscovy, and develops the representation of Russia in Europe up to the post-Cold war period. He picks out 5 periods: 1) XVI-XVII centuries – Muscovy, 2) XVIII century – Tsarist Europe in the north, 3) XIX century – Tsarist Europe in the east, 4) Interwar period – the Soviet Russia, 5) The Cold War – the Soviet Union.

In relation to Muscovy Neumann states that at that period the contacts between Novgorod and Kievan Rus as well as between them and the political entities which were located to the west of them were active and in the late medieval period particular ideas about Russia were formed in Europe. The institutionalization of the relations between Europeans and Russians coincided with the spread of the Renaissance in all Muscovy and with the Age of Discovery. European ideas about Russia demonstrated that Russians were treated as the liminar (border) case of the European identity. Although Enea Silvio Piccolomini, who went on to become Pope Pius II counted Russians as Europeans because of their Christianity, this was a contested point throughout the period.\(^2\) For example, at the beginning of the XVI century Rabelais called Russians as unbelievers. The doubts on the point were connected with two aspects: 1) the firsthand knowledge of Holy Scriptures that Russians were supposed to lack because of the low level of literacy and 2) the heretic doctrines and practices. Another important point was the fact that Muscovy developed the ties with non-Christian peoples. Thus naming Russians as Scythians, Tatars or Kalmucks refers to the European representation of Russia as “Asian” and “barbarian” at that time. Besides Christianity the issues of civility and regime types were also

\(^1\) Neumann 1999, p. 35.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 67.
central. It was considered that in all three aspects Russians were found wanting and hence the barbarian and uncivilized character of Russians was emphasized.

Russian bodily practices shocked the foreigners. For example, “in 1646 Adam Olearius deplored the fact that references to bodily practices permeated Russian speech: ‘The Russians are in general a very quarrelsome people who assail each other like dogs, with fierce, harsh words…”’¹ Neumann emphasizes that the role of the bodily practices was significant in terms of the representations of Russia at that time and Russia was presented as the other also by means of the description of its bodily practices. It may be considered as the back of the interest to Russian type of regime which was presented as the despotism.

On the whole Europeans regarded Russians as barbarians, however, the proximity to the heretic barbarians treated as the threat to their status of the civilized Christians could sometimes create the context which was favourable for the formation of the ideas about Russians as the civilized people. Such characterization of Russians can be met in Sigismund von Herberstein’s “Notes upon Russia” in 1549 which was seen in Europe as the main paper about Russia. Herberstein supposed that Moscow was situated in Asia but, nonetheless, the civility was not dependent on the geographical position and there were no various civilizations at that time. The only distinction was between the civilized and uncivilized world. However, at that point in the work of Herberstein there is a contradiction. He writes that “beyond the rivers Petchora and Stzuchogora there are various innumerable races, who are called by the one common name of Samoed, which implies, ‘men who eat one another’…These races do not come to Moscow, for they are savage, and avoid communion with other people, and civilized society.”² Herberstein states that it is possible to find the civilized society in Moscow, but in another part of his work he describes a person whose name was Dimitry Danielovich as a barbarian.

Michael Harbsmeier concludes that in the period of the Renaissance there was the change in the religious cosmology based on two axes: “Us-Them” (Christianity versus Islam) and “ancient Christians versus modern Christians”. The first axis remains but the second one was replaced by the axis based on the presence or the absence of education. Harbsmeier states that at that time no attempt was made to include Russia into Europe resting upon the criteria of the level of culture.³

At that time the Christianity was the dominating marker of identity and “Christendom world” competed with the notion “Europe” having the same meaning and the differentiation of the political and religious field was crucial. The turn from the presentation of European selves as

¹ Neumann 1999, p. 70.
³ Neumann 1999, p. 72.
belonging to Christendom to the European selves in terms of rising states was connected with this fact. In terms of Russia “despotic Christian ruler” was the common notion about Russia.

Another important but marginalized topic concerning Russia was the idea about Russian expansion. Dieter Groh holds Hubertus Langeutus to have been the first to worry about Russian expansion since in his letter to John Calvin he wrote about Russia that “if there is a principality in Europe that will grow it is this one”\(^1\). However, the alliance against Russia was not a typical European practice at that time.

On the whole in XVI-XVII centuries Russia was treated as the other in relation to Europe in terms of religion, civility and regime that were the dominant characterizing features at that time. The attempts to make Russia closer to European identity were based on the feeling of the threat from the Russian side.

The accession of Peter the Great provoked the process of active re-presentation which resulted in the appearance of the new European ideas about Russia which dominated in the European discourse about Russia until the Napoleonic Wars.

The accession of Peter the Great was treated in two ways. The first way presupposed that because of his behaviour he was treated as a barbarian. It was justified, however, by the fact that he wanted to change himself and to learn from the European experience. This idea was then transferred from the tsar to his state. The second way considered that Europeans hoped that Russia under Peter the Great, which was becoming more and more powerful Baltic country and thus the part of the European system of states, could become an important ally in the struggle against Turkey. Consequently, the name “Russia” and the power Russia were “brought into the political constellation of Europe as an ally against ‘the Turk’”\(^2\).

Leibniz’s mediations on Russia considered two significant points. Firstly, under the ruling of the educated despot Russia could become the conduit for European enlightened heritage and, secondly, it could be risked to be contaminated by European decadence and this might decrease its ability to reinvigorate that heritage. Groh concludes from this that Leibniz was the first to include Russia into political constellation of Europe. It must be stressed, however, that this happened as a part of a universalizing thrust.\(^3\) Neumann outlines that Leibniz was interested not to treat Russia in relation to its otherness but to subsume it under the European Same.

The dominating metaphor about Russia as the actor and as the learner in the European system of states appeared at that time and it is still significant in the European representations of Russia. It is the metaphor in relation to the foundation of St. Petersburg by Peter the Great, namely, “window on the West”.

\(^1\) Neumann 1999, p. 73.
\(^2\) Hall 2001, p. 103.
\(^3\) Neumann 1999, 75.
The Great Northern War, as Neumann emphasizes, made the balance of power with the center in the Baltic Sea as the principal issue of the European discussions and connected it with the idea of the common European balance. Thus the role of Russia increased on the European scene. As soon as Russia became a dominating power in the “North”, the immediate representation of the European coordinates began that led to the opposition between East and West which is still significant. The Russian dominance in the Baltic Sea was not treated as the direct threat to Europe but it was believed that this threat became real. “Here is an embryonic representation of ‘the barbarian at the gate’”\(^1\).

For Montesquieu, nonetheless, as Neumann states, the most important social factor was climate and since Russian climate was similar to European he considered that Russia belonged to Europe. Moreover, Montesquieu supposed that the climate was so favourable for learning process that the learner was simply doomed to have a success.

The whole period can be characterized by the widespread re-presentation about the Europeanness of Russians. Neumann presents Gotthilff Werner’s words in 1753: “The inhabitants of these parts were until recently quite untamed, barbarian and of slavik temper, yet they have now become more civilized and have adopted the mores of the other Europeans”\(^2\). But the idea that Russia is involving into the European civilization has the downside – the idea that Russia appeared as a part of the Asian civilization.

The doubt about the ability of Russia to get rid of the status of the barbarian state was connected with the peculiarity of the behaviour of Russian people. Peter Meller stressed that Russians represented body and nature while Europeans represented mind and civilization. From that point the metaphor “Great Bear” in relation to Russia was applied and it still takes place in the European discourse. In that terms Rousseau pointed that “Russia will never be civilized, because it was civilized too soon. Peter saw that his people was barbarous, but he did not see that it was not ripe for civilization: he wanted to civilize it when it needed only hardening. His first wish was to make Germans or Englishmen, when he ought to have been making Russians.”\(^3\)

Johann Herder supposed that in Russia the cultural levels were not even, that meant that on the borders there were savage people, on the plain there were half-civilized people and then the civilized seashore went. He considered that the heart of Russia was between Europe and Asia and that Russia was the land of future which could bring the good to the whole humanity. Herder stressed that Russia was the world unto itself and thus tried to understand Russia in terms of its peculiarity as the ambivalent culture.

\(^1\) Neumann 1999, p. 76.
\(^2\) Werner cit. Neumann 1999, p. 79.
\(^3\) Rousseau cit. Neumann 1999, p. 82.
The theme of particularism appeared at the time when the new representations about races were applied to Russia in the second half of the XVIII century. For example, “in 1776 Ferdinando Galiani took on the climate theory in no uncertain terms, and proposed instead that everything is about race. The first and most noble races originate of course from Northern Asia. Russians stand out in this regard, and this is why they have advanced more in the course of 50 years than have the Portuguese in the course of 500.”¹ In that sense Russia stood at the top of the racial hierarchy. The basis for that was the geographical and hence biological proximity to the race which would be called Aryan.

On the whole in the XVIII century the representation of Russia as the power the supremacy of which in the “North” enabled it to play a significant role in the European policy dominated. In 1778 Burke said about Russia that “this newcomer among the great nations stood supreme between Europe and Asia, and looks as if she intended to dictate both. We see in her a great but still growing empire.”²

The XIX century was characterized by the change of the different representations of Russia.

After the Napoleonic Wars Russia was recognized as a great power. At that time Russia, Britain, Austria and Prussia established the Quadruple Alliance against France and Russia still played an important role in the European policy. Europeans always took into account the interests of Russia, and its possibilities in the wars with Turkey and Persia were the influential factors in terms of the assessment of Russian power and purposes. The question of the threat from Russia was not allowed to dominate fully in the European discourse since Russia was not the only country that was considered to be a threat. This point was also applied to Germany, France and Britain.

The strategic discourse, as Neumann states, was focused on the “Eastern issue”. The influence of the wars that Russia waged on the European representation about it could be illustrated by the example of the war between Russia and Turkey in 1828-1829. “Two quotations from The Times, of 22 April 1828 and 16 October 1829 respectively, show the vacillations involved: England has nothing whatever to apprehend from the power of Russia. We have seen enough of the issue of the most vigorous attempts at universal empire ever to dread them from any quarter…The more Russia adds to the superficial extent of her territory, the more she increases her weakness, and brings upon herself the certainty of falling asunder, or breaking into pieces… When were the relative positions of one power with each and all of the surrounding states so fearfully changed to their detriment as in this instance?…may it not be affirmed that twenty years ago the empire of Russia was not half European, and that while we write, Europe is

¹ Neumann 1999, p. 85.
The question about the rivalry between Russia and Turkey was considered as the key in terms of the European balance of power.

Russia was included into Europe, however, this inclusion was quite controversial. Firstly, the tendency to regard Russia not only as the power but as “the barbarian at the gate” remained and, secondly, there was the strive for the reformulation of the European concept of the balance of power in such a way that belonging to Europe which was guaranteed by the inclusion of Russia to the system of balance of power could be relativized. During the whole XIX century “coupled with the persistent severity of its autocracy, the despotic tsarist regime was seen as ‘the barbarian at the gate’”; this issue was strengthened by the emphasis on the Islamic and hence “Asian” minorities within Russia and this point stressed the Asian nature of Russia.

Neumann states that it was supposed that Russia should be kept outside Europe and it was possible to do that by the extension of the system of balance of power and hence by inclusion of America into the system. Here is the basis of the idea that Europe is located between America and Russia and that the European policy should take this into account. When it was started to treat the balance of power from not intra-European but from Eurocentric position, the point, that the inclusion of a state into the balance of power presupposed the Europeanness of that state, lost its sense. Consequently, after the XIX century the inclusion into the system of the balance of power did not consider the inclusion into Europe. Thus in the XIX century Russia was presented as the ambivalent entity on the European border which could be associated with both Europe and China.

The representations of Russia also depended on the political struggle within Europe. For example, the conservatives were not likely to criticize Russia. For Joseph de Maistre, “who was the king of Sardinia’s representative in St. Petersburg from 1803 to 1817, Russia was the one power that could help Europe to find its way back to its own proper self – that is, to the self of the ancient regime”. But the condition was that Russia should become a Catholic state, at first. However, as J. de Maistre supposed, even without Catholicism Russian people was characterized by the inner wisdom and the lack of rationality. As for the liberals, they were likely not only to criticize Russia as the reactionary country but also to explain why Russia lagged behind Europe since they considered that the successful experience of their countries enabled them to do so. M. P. D., whose example Neumann provides, wrote that the lag of Russia was the result of the absence of the middle class. This was an interesting point since it presupposed the concrete proposition on what should be done in the space which others treated just as the undifferentiated

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1 Neumann 1999, p. 87-88.
2 Ibid., p. 89.
3 Hall, op. cit., p. 103.
4 Neumann 1999, p. 93.
mass of the disfranchised subjects of the tsar or as the mass divided by the considerable class differences. Thus Russia was presented as ambivalent not only because from the chronological position it was in the period of transition from barbarism to civilization but also because it harboured spatially the whole process in all its unevenness. These ideas about the absence of the middle class and the broad gap between the elite and the rest population, which are still the fundamental points in terms of the modern representation of Russia as the learner, were popular at the beginning of the XIX century. “Conservative representations of Russia stressed that, as a shard of a broken Europe, Russia could be held up as a mirror in which Europe could find its back to itself. Liberal representations stressed that Russia was on its way to becoming more of the European Same”.

The period of the radical social changes in Europe that coincided with the period of the military failures of Russia modified the European representations of Russia. At that time as well as nowadays there were people who emphasized the danger of the attempts to create from Russia the antagonistic other, which were dictated by the feeling of the fragility of the imagined European self.

During the interwar period the Soviet Russia appeared and the relation towards it as the political revolutionary threat was strengthened by discussions about the military threat. Moreover, the character of Russia as a revolutionary power and hence the political threat, its exterritorial presence through the communist movement made this country an unusual enemy for the European countries.

Neumann emphasizes that, when in 1921 the Third International (the Comintern) required the absolute loyalty from its numerous departments and the split of the labour movement happened in Europe, the issue of the representations of the Soviet Russia emerged again. In that sense Neumann provides three examples of the representations of Russia at that time. The first approach was racist and according to it all the Slavs were excluded from humanity. The second version presupposed that Russia was the land of future. “In 1923 the League of Nations’ high commissioner for refugees, Fridtjof Nansen, himself a nationalist and a royalist, wrote that for him, “it seems likely that Russia will one day not only deliver Europe materially, but also furnish its spiritual renewal”. The third example was related to the socialist economics. The theoreticians pointed that socialism would win over capitalism but they advocated the capitalistic economy on the normative bases.

On the whole during the interwar period Russia was included into Europe, except for the Nazi discourse, but it was considered to be the errant part.

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1 Neumann 1999, p. 96.
2 Ibid., p. 100.
As for the Cold War period, “the dominant representations of the Soviet Russia were coloured by the perception of Russia as both political and military threat to Europe”. The point about the military threat from Russia was so widespread that this representation was used and it is still used to determine the historical period - the Cold War. The other, as Neumann states, “inscribed itself in the temporal dimension of the European self’s identity by giving a name to a period of European history”. Indeed, the Soviet initiative to cease the Cold War was made under the logo of the necessity to unite the Soviet Union with Europe.

At that time the Soviet Union was treated in two ways, as Neumann considers. The dominating version presupposed that the USSR was “the Asian/barbarian power that used the WW II to attack Europe”.

This position was also popular in the academic literature. In a number of books about the formation of Europe it was stated that Russia was the Asian country. Gonzague de Reynold stressed that the European measurement could not be applied to Russia and that there was the fundamental antithesis between Europe and Russia. He considered that Europe was sedentary and thus civilized and Russia was nomadic and hence barbarian. Here the representation of Russia as “the barbarian at the gate” takes place again. This representation was very popular in relation to Russia during the whole XX century and in 1980-ies it appeared in the discourse about the Central Europe. The Central Europe was regarded as the captured West, namely, the West occupied by Russians. The European civilization was considered to be beset by the Soviet barbarians and the main feature because of which Russians were associated with barbarians was the political and economic system. However, there were those who stated that the Soviet model presented the model of the modernization which was the only alternative to the Western model.

The second version presupposed that the USSR was not only the liberator of Europe, but even the model that Europe should be guided by. This is the representation of Russia as the land of future.

During the Cold War the policy of the Soviet Union contributed to the strengthening of its representation as the military and political threat but in the end of this period this representation was not typical.

On the whole whether Russia had a positive or a negative representation it was the state that was not included in Europe at that time.

Having analyzed the image of Russia during these periods in Europe Neumann concludes that nowadays the representations of Russia are more connected with its future than with its past.

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1 Hall, op. cit., p. 103.
2 Neumann 1999, p. 102.
3 Ibid.
“Russia is often seen as a learner of European economic and political practices.”\(^1\) Europe prefers to “integrate and consolidate its own self by accentuating the alterity of Russia, so that it is depicted as a perpetual pupil and learner”\(^2\). The political power in Russia is associated with the concrete persons, like Mikhail Gorbachev or Boris Yeltsyn but not with the institutions. Thus the European policy is mostly directed at the approval or disapproval of the concrete leader but not the system. The events which take place in Russia are regarded as the process of the replacement of the unsuccessful strategy of modernization by the strategy which is more successful. But Neumann also emphasizes an interesting fact that European policy is more likely to be directed at a certain political leader but not at the reforming system.

Neumann also states that there are also other representations of Russia. For example, in 1989 the Estonian politician Tiit Maade said that “the Russian people were untamed and wild and tended to spread like a blob over all the territory they could find”\(^3\). During and immediately after the USSR collapse other politicians of the Baltic States adhered to the similar point of view. Even now this representation is still, as one Lithuanian ambassador stated, the common “folk wisdom” in the Baltic States. The use of the racist language by Tiit Maade, who states that the civilized Baltic peoples are senior to the uncivilized Russian people, is the modern reflection of the representations of Russia that dominated in the European discourse. This also proves the fact that the analysis of this book on the historic representations of Russia in Europe would provide the possibility to analyze the modern image of Russia in the Baltic States since their position is based on the common European discourse.

The main representation of Russia as a learner considers that Russia becomes more European and less differs from Europe. The specificity of Russia as the other for Europe is that it does not correspond to the European system but it is its important integral part. Russia is also a specific case because during 500 years it has been always treated as the country which has just become civilized, has just begun to participate in the European politics and has just become a part of Europe. Thus the metaphor which is often used in the European discussion of Russian policy and economy is that of transition. Consequently, the specification of Russia as the other is that it is always seen as the country being in some stage of transition to Europeanization.

Another interesting point is whether the otherness of Russia is emphasized in order to enforce the integration of the European self. The exclusion is a significant point in terms of the integration thus it is necessary to stress the otherness of Russia to form the European self and the European identity. The question is just “who will be included in integration and identified as belonging to the ‘West’ and who would be excluded from it and identified as belonging to the

\(^1\) Neumann 1999, p. 107.  
\(^3\) Neumann 1999, p. 107.
‘East’”. As Brian Graham stresses, “Neumann’s case remains on the assumption that identity requires difference and that this variance is transformed into otherness as an act of achieving and then securing that collectivity”\(^2\). Thus, on Graham’s opinion, it is the self and not the very representations of the other that constitutes the problematic area. Rodney Hall agrees with this opinion and states that “these narratives representing the other are counternarratives of the self. If the other is a ‘barbarian’, then we must be ‘civilized’; if the other is ‘backward’, ‘despotical’, or a ‘laggard’, then we are ‘modern’, ‘liberal’, and ‘progressive’; if the other is ‘Asiatic’ and ‘Eastern’, then we are ‘European’ and ‘Western’”\(^3\). Larry Wolff adheres to the same position and considers in terms of Russia that “it is thus with reference to Russia that Europe itself has been constituted”\(^4\). Thus the purpose is to create and to maintain the self by establishing the other.

However, regardless of the territorial form, the title, the representation, Russia has always been the main border companion of Europe. For Europe Russia is not the absolute other, it is more likely to be close other. The position of the Russian speaking minority in the Baltic States is supposed to be the microscopical copy of the role of Russia for Europe and the image of Russia in Europe, to some extent, reflects the representation of Russia in the Baltic States.

On the whole all the three concepts correspond to three levels of the analysis. The first level on which Carl Schmitt’s theory is accentuated presupposes the fundamental understanding of the “self-other” dichotomy and presents its ontological basis. The second level presents the analysis of the dichotomy in terms of the political theory of the nation state which is elaborated in Benedict Anderson’s concept. The third level is empirical and on it the analysis takes the form of the research of the historical development of the “self-other” dichotomy in the European context which presupposes the presentation of the research by Iver Neumann. The analysis on all the three levels provides the thorough understanding of that dichotomy and forms the basis for the analysis of the position of the Russian speaking minority in the Baltic States. The theoretical analysis enables to explore the role of the Russian speaking population as the internal other in every Baltic State.

All the three levels show how significant is the “self-other” dichotomy for the nation state. It is common point that the opposition to the “other” provides the basis for self-identification and thus for the formation of collective identity. Schmitt, Anderson and Neumann outline that nation states for their political existence need to determine its “self” and protect it as the basis of collectiveness and in that case the “other” characterized by alienation enables to reveal this collective identity and is the tool for self-preservation.

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1 Harle, op. cit., p. 2.
2 Graham, op. cit., p. 112.
3 Hall, op. cit., p. 104.
On the basis of the analysis of the sources the question will be whether the Russian speaking minority can be treated as the internal other that provides the collective identity in the Baltic States and then whether there is the connection between the danger of the presence of this internal other and the foreign policy of the Baltic States in relation to Russia.
3. The Analysis of the Position of the Russian Speaking Population and the Representation of Russia in the Baltic States

In this chapter the analysis of the sources with the use of the rhetorical methodology will be hold. The rhetoric in the articles of the newspapers of the Baltic States published since May, 2004 is considered.

The national newspapers published in large editions that do not presuppose a particular political position will be taken.

The mentioned period is taken into account since in May, 2004 the Baltic States entered the EU and thus the problem of the Russian speaking minority in them should have been resolved. The negotiations on that problem were finished and the EU has accepted the scheme of the policy of the Baltic States in relation to this group. In fact the problem has not been positively resolved and this issue is still urgent in the Baltic States and it is still important in terms of the Baltic-Russian relations. Consequently, this period is of interest because the entrance of the Baltic States into the EU formed a new context for the problematic area but did not deprive it of the significance.

The rhetoric of the articles of the newspapers is considered because they present the social rhetoric. It is the mass media that reflect the situation over the identity and the consolidation of the political community which is of interest of the research.

In the reviewed articles the rhetorical techniques are to be outlined and analyzed to explore the situation over the position of the Russian speaking minority in the Baltic States and their foreign policy in relation to Russia.

3.1. The Rhetorical Methodology

Rhetoric is one of the oldest philological sciences and it was established in the IV century B.C. in Greece. Rhetoric (from Greek ρήτωρ, rhētôr, “orator”) is the art or technique of persuasion, but even at that time its main content was the theory of argumentation.¹

Rhetoric is one of the three original liberal arts or trivium (the other members are dialectic and grammar) in Western culture. In ancient and medieval times, grammar concerned itself with the correct language use through the study and criticism of literary models, dialectic concerned itself with the testing and invention of new knowledge through the process of questioning and

¹ Volkov www-document.
answering, and rhetoric concerned itself with the persuasion in public and political settings such as assemblies and courts of law.

In the system of linguistic education rhetoric follows grammar. But grammar and rhetoric are different in terms of methodology. Grammar and linguistics presuppose that using this or that language all people should know its unity while rhetoric considers that every creator of the speech should be individual and should inform about something new. Thus the main principle of rhetoric is the ban on the absence of new information in some message.¹

Grammar and rhetoric are connected through stylistics which is regarded as the area of the correctness of speech and its attractiveness. The main categories on which rhetoric relies can be presented by Quintilianus’s scheme and by Aristotle’s scheme. Quintilianus’s scheme considers three points: invention, disposition and performance. This scheme is the method of the preparation of verbal speech and it is indifferent towards the content of the speech. Ethos, pathos and logos are the three categories of Aristotle’s scheme. According to the antique tradition ethos is the conditions and agreements under which reality is allowed to the rhetorician and which touch upon time, action, terms, prevision of speech and speed. The receiver of the speech offers these conditions to the creator of the speech. Pathos is the intention of the speech and it presupposes the addition of the new information to the speech, thus pathos is what the speech is created for. Logos is defined as verbosity and the implementation of intention through words, it is treated as emotions.

Rhetoric examines not only verbal speech, but all kinds of speech. Rhetoric can be divided into three groups: general, particular and thematic rhetoric. General rhetoric studies ethos, pathos and logos, particular rhetoric explores a specific type of speech in connection with the stylistics of this type of speech (particular philology) and thematic rhetoric is intended to investigate the rules of the combination of different types of philology in the framework of one topic.

Another classification of rhetoric presupposes the existence of two groups: theoretical rhetoric and practical rhetoric². With the help of the deductive method the theoretical rhetoric examines the rules of speech which then are verified by the facts of history and rhetoric practice. As for the practical rhetoric, it studies the rule of the benefit of speech which is proved by practice and which is determined by the cases of successful and unsuccessful speech.

The concept of rhetoric has been changed a lot during its 2500-year history. Today rhetoric is described more broadly as the art or practice of persuasion through any symbolic system, but especially language. There are a number of types of the works of philology, and rhetoric studies the specific aspect of the verbal creation, namely argumentation. Rhetoric

¹ Ritorika www-document.
² Ibid.
examines any work of philology in which the argumentation can be pointed out. On the whole, rhetoric, as the art of persuasion, continues to play an important function in contemporary public life.

The scientists still address to rhetoric even though it was ignored and criticized till recently and rhetoric is getting a new form in the research of structural linguistics. The modern presentation of rhetoric is not just the revival of the traditional ideas and methods but it is the new comprehension of its main point and its possibilities. The example of such comprehension is the opinion of French poet and theorist of literature Paul Valéry who defined rhetoric as 1) speech modification of the assimilated language; 2) the science about linguistic deviations and 3) the art of verbal substitutions (shortening with adding) aimed at optimization of speech.1

Neorhetoric or new rhetoric is being built up on the border linguistics, theory of literature, logics and philosophy. In France the development of new rhetoric is associated with the work of Roland Barthes2 and the most advanced area is metarhetoric which is aimed at the theory of rhetoric and the interpretation of its notions. In the USA the most developed area is rhetoric criticism and rhetoric methodology. In Italy neorhetoric is evolved in the framework of literary criticism. In Belgium two types of new rhetoric can be outlined: 1) argumentative rhetoric (Perelman) and 2) general rhetoric (Group Mu – Dubois, Edeline, Klinkenberg, Minguet, Pire and Trinon – called by two first letters of the Greek form of metaphor which they consider to be the most significant figure of rhetoric. In the works of the Group Mu – “General Rhetoric” and “Rhetoric of Poetry” – rhetoric is regarded as the discipline which studies the devices of speech performance that characterize the literary discourse among other discourses.

The appearance of new rhetoric led to the appearance of two meanings of the term “rhetoric”: 1) narrow sense – the comprehensive discipline that studies oratory, 2) wide sense – the object of rhetoric is any type of the speech communication that is examined in terms of the accomplishment of the influence, which is determined beforehand, on the receiver of the message.3 In that sense rhetoric is the science of persuading communication. At present times there is the third point of view according to which rhetoric is the science of the production of statements (Umberto Eco, the modern Italian specialist in the field of semantics).

One of the founders of new rhetoric is Chaim Perelman who was the head of the Brussels school of new rhetoric that was formed in the 1950-ies. The theory of argumentation appeared as a result of the split of the tradition of Cartesian mind. The new method differs from the method of political, philosophic and social argumentation based on the model taken from deductive and

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1 Panov www-document.
2 Roland Barthes (November 12, 1915 – March 25, 1980) was a French literary critic, literary and social theorist, philosopher, and semiotician. Barthes’ work extended over many fields and he influenced the development of schools of theory including structuralism, semiology, existentialism, Marxism and post-structuralism.
3 Panov www-document.
experimental sciences. The division between new rhetoric and Cartesian tradition presupposes the revival of the ancient rhetoric and Greek dialectics, the art to convince, to discuss and to solve difficult problems. Perelman aspires to restore this tradition.

In that sense rhetoric is not just a method of propaganda, but it shows that human being presupposes not only such two oppositions as emotions and cold conclusion. Along with the rational human being there is a judicious human being. New rhetoric is aimed at emphasizing the importance of reason that was typical of the opinion of the philosophers of the Ancient Greece, especially Aristotle. To solve the problem it is necessary to provide the analysis of the structure, functions and limits of the persuading discourse. This analysis demonstrates that the area of the convincing does not coincide with either the absolute rational or the absolute irrational. Determining various structures of argumentation Perelman drew his attention to a wide range of possible discourses and techniques of reasoning in the humanities, the political disputes, the speech of lawyer and the judicial opinion.

Perelman presents different techniques of presentation that are used to establish presence and communion. He states that these techniques have been developed to the point that their study can form the whole material of rhetoric, but he treats them in a substantially different way from how they were viewed in the traditional rhetoric. He does not consider the techniques of presentation from their stylistic aspect and offers an in-depth consideration of the techniques of presentation as they function to argue and to assist in the achievement of communion, presence and adherence.

Perelman supposes that the style or form of the argument cannot be separated from its content. For the speaker argumentation engages the choice of data and techniques of presentation to insure presence and communion. For the listener it involves choices among a range of interpretations that might be applied to the speaker’s data. Thus the study of argumentation should take into account the study of human language and the matter of interpretation. In Perelman's words, “the study of argumentation compels us to take into account not only the choice of data but also the way in which they are interpreted, the meaning attributed to them”.

The speaker’s presentational techniques and the listener’s interpretive choices are interconnected. A speaker’s presentational techniques may be aimed at securing a particular interpretation from among several potential interpretations on the part of the listener. This is made through the choice of certain techniques to establish the existence of the favoured interpretation. Repetition (anaphora, repeating the first words of sentence in a succeeding sentence; also conduplicatio and adjectio) is useful for reinforcing the adherence of the audience, and keeping the argument present in the minds of the audience. Onomatopoeia creates the link of

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1 Reale – Antiseri www-document.
2 Perelman - Olbrechts-Tyteca, op. cit., p. 120.
presence between the word and the referent. **Interpretatio**, a kind of repetition by explaining one term using another, is another kind of repetition.\(^1\) **Amplification** is better than repetition, it is the oratorical development of a theme.

**Qualifiers** – adjectives, adverbs, etc. – should be seen as the carefully chosen vehicles of interpretation. Qualification by putting something in a class often is accomplished by associating and dissociating concepts with “and” or “or”.

**Prolepsis or anticipation** considers that knowing that a certain word would have been inappropriate one explains that they have chosen a different word. **Reprehensio** shows that you have chosen a word that, while appropriate, is a kind of “awful truth”. **Correctio** shows that one is carefully considering what they are saying, even while they say it (this is like synonymy). All these strategies help to justify the chosen qualifiers. **Cliché** is shorthand that helps build adherence and communion with the audience, but if the audience recognizes cliché as such a device, there is a break and the power of the cliché is lost. **Periphrasis** is a kind of paraphrase of a term (my mother's husband = my father); **synecdoche** and **metonymy** emphasize a particular characteristic (mortals = men, claws = crab); **allusion** refers to something known outside the presentation at hand.\(^2\)

Argumentation may succeed or fail depending on whether or not the speaker is successful in choosing techniques that achieve presence or communion. Perelman presents different techniques of argumentation. Two main categories of techniques are called association and dissociation.

**Association** is aimed at bringing together separate elements and establishing unity between them, while **dissociation** strives for separating elements which are treated as forming a whole or at least a unified group. Techniques of association seek to establish the connection between the starting point and the thesis. Perelman shows how association is provided by quasi-logical arguments, arguments based on the structure of reality, and arguments that attempt to establish the structure of reality.

**Quasi-logical arguments** are similar to formal logic and much of their persuasive force is actually achieved because of their similarity to logic. Since people are prone to accept the claims based on logic, this type of argument seems to be particularly persuasive. However, they differ from formal logic because they seek audience adherence rather than demonstration. Incompatibility in argumentation occurs when we find ourselves faced with the position that appears to be in conflict with the previous one. The position is strengthened when one can claim that their logic and reasoning is better than the opponent’s. One can show that the opponent is inconsistent or puts forth incompatible premises or conclusions or he contradicts himself. The

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\(^1\) Perelman - Olbrechts-Tyteca, op. cit., p. 176.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 173.
response is that one's accuser is trying to turn the discussion into a formal system, which makes him either a fanatic or a skeptic about the discussion at hand; the discussion at hand admits incompatibility but only in a limited way. In that context quasi-logical arguments are acceptable. “One of the essential techniques of the quasi-logical argumentation is the identifying of various elements, and the most characteristic method of complete identification consists in using definitions.”¹ Nomination is a general approach that is aimed to provide some definition of the element. Besides that comparisons, where several objects are concerned to be assessed through the relations to each other, also play an important role in terms of quasi-logical argumentation since they are supposed to be a statement of fact while the relations determined by them are often just a claim of a speaker.

After quasi-logical arguments Perelman examines arguments based on the structure of reality. These arguments are based on relations of succession and coexistence. Perelman considers that these are two different ways of structuring reality. Arguments which apply to relations of succession envisage the relationship between phenomena on the same level, such as cause and effect, while arguments which apply to relations of coexistence involve the relationship between phenomena on different levels, such as act and essence.

An example of the arguments that apply to relations of succession is the pragmatic argument, which exemplifies argumentation relevant to consequences. Such an argument “permits the evaluation of an act or an event in terms of its favourable or unfavourable consequences”². To produce a good reason for an action using the pragmatic argument, a speaker would argue that the action will lead to good consequences.

The second type of the argumentation based on the structure of reality involves relations of coexistence. These arguments presuppose the relationship among phenomena on different levels, such as the relationship between a person and an act. The relationship between a person and an act is less direct than the relationship between cause and effect, which are on the same level. Arguments that apply to relations of coexistence are based on the connection that unites a person and his actions and a group and the individuals who form it. This type of arguments also establishes the relationship between the essence and the act.

Argument from authority is an example of the arguments that apply to relations of coexistence that depends on the relations between a person and an act. This argument “uses the opinions of a person or a group of persons as a means of proof in support of a thesis”³ and states that some suggestion should be accepted because it is accepted by important and well-qualified

² Ibid., p. 266.
³ Ibid., p. 305.
people. Perelman points that argument from authority is suitable only in the absence of better types of arguments.

Associations of succession and coexistence are arguments founded on the structure of reality while the following categories embrace *arguments establishing the structure of reality*. These arguments may be subdivided into two groups: 1) argumentation by example, illustration, and model and 2) argumentation by analogy and metaphor.

*Argumentation by example* consists of using examples to create a generalization. It takes for granted the existence of regularities among cases, and a rhetor aims at convincing an audience of those regularities. Besides moving from a particular case to a general statement, argument by example can be used to move from particular cases to other particular cases.

It is necessary to distinguish an example and an illustration. “Whereas an example is designed to establish a rule the role of illustration is to strengthen the adherence to a known and accepted rule”. Argumentation by example serves to establish a prediction or a rule, while *argumentation by illustration* serves simply to illustrate that rule. Thus illustration is used to clarify the rule that has been established through the example.

*Argumentation by model* aspires to the presentation of the specific case which is to be imitated. Argumentation by anti-model can also be used and such argument presupposes showing examples not to be imitated but to be avoided.

The second broad category of arguments establishing the structure of reality includes *argumentation by analogy and metaphor*. An analogy is an argument that attempts to gain adherence about the relationship that exists in one pair (called the “theme” of the analogy) because of its resemblance to the relationship that exists in another pair (called the “phoros” of the analogy). A metaphor that is also important for the argumentation is a condensed analogy, in which the theme and phoros are combined.

While quasi-logical arguments, arguments based on the structure of reality, and arguments establishing the structure of reality are created through the process of association, other arguments are formed by the process of dissociation. *Argumentation by the process of dissociation* takes place when one idea is split into two in order to avoid incompatibility. The construction of the argument based on the process of dissociation includes the presentation of the philosophical pairs, “term I” and “term II”. Term I corresponds to appearance, while term II corresponds to reality. “In relation to term I, term II is both normative and explanatory. After the dissociation has been made, term II makes it possible to disqualify the various aspects under which term I is presented.” It makes it possible to distinguish the appearances which are just

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1 Perelman - Olbrechts-Tyteca, op. cit., p. 357.
2 Ibid, p. 388.
3 Ibid., p. 416.
appearances and the appearances which represent reality. *Kant’s argument* is the specific version of dissociation and it presupposes that something apparent is stated as corresponding to reality.

Perelman’s contribution to rhetorical studies is that he worked out the coherent theory of argumentation. To secure audience adherence the speakers start with points of agreement. Some starting points such as facts, truths and presumptions are related to the nature of the real, while other starting points, for example, values, hierarchies, and loci of the preferred, concern the nature of the preferable. A rhetor should try to transfer the agreement in accordance with the starting points to the thesis that may be contingent or controversial. This can be achieved through attempting to establish presence and secure communion with the audience. Perelman discusses a range of techniques designed to accomplish these argumentative goals. Three techniques of argumentation - quasi-logical arguments, arguments based on the structure of reality and arguments establishing the structure of reality - involve the creation of the connection between the starting points of the argument and the speaker’s thesis. The technique of dissociation presupposes dividing concepts that otherwise would produce the conclusion that is incompatible with the speaker's thesis.

In the articles of the newspapers of the Baltic States the rhetorical techniques are to be examined to observe the position of the Russian speaking minority in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and the representation of Russia in them.

The articles are divided into three general groups depending on the country – the articles from Estonian newspapers, Latvian newspapers and Lithuanian newspapers. These general groups are subdivided into two subgroups. The first subgroup includes the articles concerning the position of the Russian speaking minority and the second group includes the articles concerning Russia and its policy.

### 3.2. The Analysis of the Position of the Russian Speaking Population and the Image of Russia in Estonia

The aim is to examine the position of the Russian speaking population and the representation of Russia in Estonia on the basis of the rhetorical analysis of two subgroups of the articles published in Estonian newspapers since May, 2004.

The object of the first subgroup of articles is the Russian speaking minority.

The Estonian newspaper “Postimees” on May 4, 2004 published the article the main idea of which was to present the public opinion on the issue of Estonian entrance into NATO and the change in the feeling of security of the population. In this article it was stated that “36% of the population think that the entrance of Estonia into NATO reduced the threat of the attack of
Russia. 34% consider that the level of the threat is the same. At the same time 19% suppose that the threat from the Russian side has become even stronger. 55% of respondents answered that the sense of confidence in the freedom and security of Estonia increased. 8% of respondents hold the opposite opinion. The titular population is more optimistic about the entrance of Estonia to NATO. Most of the Russian speaking population said that their sense of confidence in the freedom and security of Estonia reduced or they could not answer anything.”¹ The argumentation by the process of dissociation is presented there since the population is divided into the titular population and the Russian speaking population. Thus it can be considered that the Russian speaking population is separated from the rest of the Estonian population. Moreover, the argumentation by the process of association in the form of an argument establishing the structure of reality, namely, the analogy can be also outlined there. The parallel is drawn between the threat from Russian side and the sense of confidence in the freedom and security of Estonia. These issues were presented as the main questions concerning Estonian entrance into NATO. The very fact that the Estonian population is asked about whether the threat from the Russian side increased or reduced demonstrates that the Estonian population considers that this threat exists.

Another article was published on May 6, 2004 in Estonian newspaper “Pih’yarannik” and was devoted to the differences of the interpretation of the history between Estonians and the Russian speaking population. It was said: “it is obvious that the Russian speaking population treats the Red Army as the emancipatory force that chased away German occupiers. Estonians hold absolutely another opinion. In 1941 one occupation just replaced another one and the consistent expulsion of Germans from Estonia was no other than the ordinary change of occupation.”² The argumentation by the process of dissociation is used in regard to the Russian speaking population since the lines were drawn between the positions of the Russian speaking population and Estonians on the role of the Red Army. Estonians emphasize their opposition towards the Russian speaking population and their point of view on the history of Estonia with the help of the argument by analogy. The Russian speaking population treats the Red Army as the emancipatory force while Estonians regard the same force as the occupiers. The point is that the very same force is regarded as the positive and at the same time negative fact of the history in the very same country. It is important that the groups that adhere to this or that position are homogenous and they are based on the principle of nationality.

The historical issue can also be traced in the article published in “Eesti Paevaleht” on September 6, 2004. It was devoted to the removal of the monument in the Estonian town called Lihula that was raised in honour of Estonians who were the members of the SS formations and

¹ Postimees, 4 May 2004, p.3.
² Pih’yarannik, 6 May 2004, p.5.
were on Germany’s side in WW II. It was pointed that “out of 501 respondents 58% of Estonians stated that the decision of the government to dismantle the monument raised in Lihula was ‘certainly’ or ‘most likely wrong’. 29% of Estonians supported dismantling. 64% of the Russian speaking population approved of the decision of the government.” The dissociation should be stressed in the article because the Russian speaking population is presented as a separate group of the Estonian political community. Besides that Estonians emphasize again their opposition towards the Russian speaking population in terms of their view on the history of Estonia through the argument by analogy. The representatives of the Russian speaking population do not support the praise of the soldiers who advocated the fascist Germany while Estonians treat the actions of the Soviet soldiers as the occupation. It is necessary to outline that again the groups that follow this or that position are formed on the basis of nationality.

The issue of the problems of the communication and the cultural differences between Estonians and the representatives of the Russian speaking population was raised in the article which was published in “Delfi” on June 9, 2004. It was stated that “each Estonian has learned not to note the text in Russian near the text on Estonian. As soon as Estonians see the Russian text their mind rejects it automatically. As a result of this linguistic ignorance we have reached the situation when we do not communicate with each other anywhere. There is no common Estonian people and cultural space.” The argument which applies to relations of succession, namely the pragmatic argument is used in the article. The connection between the act and its consequences is presented since it is said that the linguistic ignorance that takes place in Estonia has led to the situation when Estonians do not communicate with each other and, moreover, when “there is no common Estonian people and cultural space”. The dissociation is contained within the last sentence. It affirms itself that the Estonian political society is not homogeneous and consolidated and it is divided into groups that are outlined on the basis of the language they use. Since the minds of Estonians reject the texts in Russian it is possible to conclude that the dissociation exists between Estonians and the Russian speaking population.

In the article published in “SL Ohtuleht” on April 1, 2005 that commented the results of the football match between the Russian and Estonian football teams it was said that “at the stadium the picture was oppressive since about a half of the viewers supported the guests [the Russian team]. These were Russians from Estonia. At heart they are still for Russia.” The argument establishing the structure of reality, namely the argumentation by example is used in the article. The particular case is the match between the Russian and the Estonian teams when the Russian speaking population living in Estonia supported not Estonian but Russian team like

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1 Eesti Paevaleht, 9 September 2004, p. 4.
2 Delfi, 9 June 2004, p. 6.
3 SL Ohtuleht, 1 April 2005, p.3.
all Russian citizens. This particular case enables to prove the point that in Estonia the Russian speaking population advocates Russia and does not advocate Estonia.

In “Postimees” the article published on September 5, 2006 was devoted to the organized manifestation of Estonians that would be directed against non-Estonians. It was said in it that “on Toompea at 5 o’clock there will be the mass manifestation where Estonians who care about the future of the country and who think that Estonians should be the hosts on their territory will participate.” The dissociation is drawn between Estonians and the rest population of Estonia. The participators of the demonstration are defined as those who care about the future of the country and those who suppose that Estonians should be the hosts on their territory. As for the first characteristic, it is clear that the majority, if not all, Estonians care about the future of their country while the second characteristic is rather controversial, but their combination presupposes that for those who care about the future of their country it is important that it is Estonians who should be the hosts on their territory. Another point is that only Estonians can take part in the manifestation (it is obvious since it is the manifestation organized by the nationalists) thus only Estonians care about the future of Estonia. The point that people who consider that Estonians should be the hosts on their territory will participate in it shows that Estonians do not regard themselves as the hosts in Estonia. Taking into consideration the fact, that about 30% of the population are Russians, enables to suppose that it is the Russian speaking population who impedes Estonians to be the hosts in Estonia.

The analysis of the articles of the first sub-group, the object of which is the Russian speaking population, shows that the typical rhetorical techniques used in them are dissociation, the argumentation by analogy and by example, the pragmatic argument and definition.

The dominating rhetorical techniques are dissociation and analogy. It demonstrates that with the help of dissociation the Estonian society is described as not united and the Russian speaking population is presented as a separate group in the Estonian political society. The analogy enables to show the differences between Estonians and the Russian speaking population that confirms the absence of the unity in the society.

The rhetorical techniques used in the articles provides the characterization of the Russian speaking population as a separate group treated as a kind of barrier that hinders Estonians from being the hosts in their country and associated with the population of Russia.

The object of the second sub-group of the articles is Russia and its policy.

The article of “Postimees” which was published on November 6, 2004 was devoted to the issue of the economic cooperation between Estonia and Russia and the increase of the Russian investments into the Estonian economy. In particular it was mentioned that “being afraid of the
Russian bear, till recently Estonia ran headlong from the Eastern neighbour.”¹ First of all, the *nomination* in relation to Russia is presented by the traditional metaphor “Russian bear”. Secondly, the whole *metaphor* “being afraid, Estonia ran headlong from the Eastern neighbour” and the *qualifier* “headlong” is of interest. This metaphor tells that Russia is treated as a threat and that Estonia aims to keep from this threat posed by Russia rather that to develop a dialogue and cooperation with Russia.

The issue of “the Russia bear” can also be traced in the article published in “SL Ohtuleht” on May 18, 2005 which was devoted to the situation over the Russian borders. It was said in the article that “not so a long time ago Russia was in the absurd position with its borders: the state had the territories de-facto but in most cases they were not de-jure. Russia has existed for many years in that form, figuratively speaking, it was the state without borders – the state did not cease to exist, but Russian bear as the heritage of the WW II and the collapsed USSR still frightens the civilized community.”² The *nomination* “Russia was the state without borders” is used in the article. This nomination is based on the legal points that Russia did not have some borders de-jure and thus it is a reasonable assumption. But it is interesting to notice that there is no agreement on the border currently in force between Estonia and Russia, consequently, Estonia is in the same “absurd position”. Russia is defined again by the *metaphor* “Russian bear”. Bear is associated with something awkward, large, strong and redoubtable. In that case it is redoubtable towards the civilized community. The *dissociation* between civilized and uncivilized communities is drawn, moreover, Russia frightens the civilized community hence it belongs to the uncivilized community. On the whole Russia is presented as the uncivilized state which poses a threat to the civilized countries.

In Estonia other definitions in relation to Russia can be outlined. In particular in “Delfi” the article concerning the future of Russia after the elections of the president, which will take place in 2008, was published. In this article it was stated: “The present Russia is a growing monster and the world has never seen such monster in the history. This monster will straighten its shoulders in 2008 after the presidential elections and then we will see what monster will creep out of the gates of the Kremlin. The policy that it will conduct will be absolutely aggressive with the use of extortions, the politically motivated disappearance of people and assassinations. Moreover, it will take place not only in Russia, but also in other countries.”³ Russia is *defined* by the metaphors “monster” and “beast” and its future policy is defined as extortions, the disappearance of people and assassinations. The *qualifier* used in terms of the characterization of Russian policy is “absolutely aggressive”. The negative characterization – adjective “aggressive”

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¹ Postimees, 6 November 2004, p. 3.
² SL Ohtuleht, 18 May 2005, p. 5.
³ Delfi, 27 January 2007, p. 4.
is applied along with the adverb “absolutely” that demonstrates its complete and doubtless form. Moreover, it is stated that this policy would presuppose making such actions not only in Russia but also in other countries. Thus this “monster” will conduct the aggressive policy not only within the country but it would also pose a threat to other countries. On the whole the unfavourable image of Russia is presented in the article.

In the article of Estonian newspaper “Postimees” entitled “Landsbergis frightens Europe with Moscow”¹ the topic of the construction of Russia-German gas pipeline and its political context is presented. The audience is Europe and the purpose of all the techniques is to convince the audience of the truth of the statements. The Baltic States stand as the third side in the opposition “Russia – Western Europe” which they consider to exist. Moreover, they present themselves as the third side which holds higher position than the audience, i.e. Western Europe. This can be seen through the use of the technique of dissociation and the criterion here is the historical experience: “We, new democratic states of Eastern Europe, know from the history that every diplomatic step of Russia presupposes its imperialistic ambitions”². The Baltic States delimit themselves to other countries that do not have such historical experience. Furthermore, the position of weakness is turned into the position of strength since this historical experience which in fact was negative is considered to enable the Baltic States to judge Russia and its policy and to make their assumptions absolutely true. The use of metaphor and nomination shows that the quasi-logical arguments and the arguments establishing the structure of reality are applied along with the argumentation by dissociation.

In the article with the use of nomination Russia-German gas pipeline is treated as a “powerful weapon to manipulate the EU”³. Thus the Baltic States warn Western Europe about the danger from the Russian side. Moreover, it is stated that this gas pipeline will lead to “the fatal dependence on Russia.”⁴ The qualifier “fatal” should be outlined since it means that any relations with Russia lead to the establishment of the dependence on it and this dependence is fatal, i.e. it provokes the downfall.

The use of nomination provides the characterization of Russia. In the article Russia is nominated as “the protective construction for the new elite of the former KGB (State Security Committee) that is based on oil and gas”⁵. This definition can help to determine the characteristics of the modern Russia in the view of the Baltic States. First of all, it is important to notice the pair “new – former”. This is Kant’s argument according to which what is obvious and what is presented in Russia – “new” - is actually the continuation of the “old”. “New” is treated

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² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid.
as veiled “old”. It means that in Russia everything is organized as before, as in the Soviet Union. But from the point of view of the Baltic States the maintenance of the Soviet traditions is obscured that is why Russia is “the protective construction for the elite”. It is difficult to imagine a firm construction the base of which is oil and gas but analyzing the metaphor it is possible to make the conclusion that oil and gas are the basis of Russia and the main instruments of Russian policy.

The sentence “Is it possible to believe in the fact that in the motherland of Red terrorism, where in the Soviet times the uncountable set of crimes was committed that left bloody traces everywhere from Lithuania to Caucasus, can help to extirpate international terrorism”\(^1\) is interesting in terms of using rhetorical techniques.

First of all, it should be outlined that this is a rhetorical question which is aimed at making the answer that Russia cannot help to extirpate international terrorism more obvious. Russia is nominated as the motherland of Red terrorism with the purpose to show that Russia is not able to stop international terrorism because it is the source of terrorism itself. The use of the technique of dissociation helps to mark out Russia as a specific part of the Soviet Union. Although Russia was one of the republics of the Soviet Union along with the Baltic States, with presenting it as “the motherland of Red terrorism, where in the Soviet times the uncountable set of crimes was committed that left bloody traces everywhere from Lithuania to Caucasus” it is marked out. The metaphors “the motherland where the uncountable set of crimes was committed” and “the uncountable set of crimes that left bloody traces everywhere from Lithuania to Caucasus” are also interesting there since they characterize the policy of Russia when it was a part of the Soviet Union. Its actions are treated as crimes but in fact this was the policy the implementation of which was not recognized as a crime.

It can be stated that in the assessment of the Baltic States Russia is associated with the Soviet Union and the Soviet traditions that are considered to be negative.

“The dependence on Russia even if its face is Gerhard Schröder will lead us to the abyss.”\(^2\) By means of nomination Gerhard Schröder is presented as “its face” but the question is whether he is the face of Russia or the face of dependence. Schröder cannot be the face of Russia because he is not even a citizen of Russia. But why Schröder is presented as the symbol or the face of the dependence? If he is the face of the dependence because he is the head of the project then this expression “the face of the dependence” is the metonymy. If he is the face in terms of symbolizing a particular political course which is considered here antagonistically then this expression “the face of the dependence” stands as metaphor. Another question is who is we (“us”). In the article it was stated that the dependence on Russia is dangerous for Western

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\(^1\) Postimees, 17 December 2005, p. 6.
\(^2\) Ibid.
Europe but in this sentence it is more likely that the Baltic States are talking about themselves. Thus this *dissociation* demonstrates that the Baltic States are worried more about themselves than about Western Europe.

The strategic plan of Russia presupposes that “President Putin and his administration will not need to concern about Western Europe, if they would decide to press the post-communist neighbours.” It means that Russia aspires to remove Western Europe so that it will be able to press the Baltic States. The original idea of the article is presented here: the Baltic States tremble for their existence and for the stability of their countries but the source of the threat is supposed to be Russia. That is why they think that it is important to avoid the rapprochement between Russia and Western Europe.

In the article of “Postimees” which was devoted to the same issue it was stated that “it was Gerhard Schröder who was the main initiator of the project at the cost of 4 billion euros. He conducted it as the head of Germany with the same cynicism as when in the sake of his private victory on the elections he inspired the anti-American hysteria in Germany or opened his arms to Russian President Vladimir Putin without caring a damn on the tragedy in Chechnya or increasing autocracy of the Kremlin. It can be stated without exaggeration that now Schröder will get a salary in Kremlin. This is a new style of the behaviour of both Kremlin and the leadership of the states of “Old Europe”. If Germany and the rest Europe consider it normal, it is time to toll.” The *illustration* is used in the article. The accepted point is that Schröder’s actions should be criticized. Thus three illustrations are used to characterize Schröder negatively. The *analogy* is drawn between three events united by the figure of Gerhard Schröder: conducting a project, inspiring the anti-American hysteria in Germany and opening arms to Russian President Vladimir Putin. All the three events are estimated as the negative facts. It can be traced through the using of such qualifiers as “with the same cynicism” and “without caring a damn on the tragedy or autocracy”. Hence Estonia supposes that it is unfavourable if any European country would conduct a project with Russia, inspire anti-American moods and develop fruitful relations with Russia. The sentence “If Germany and the rest Europe consider it normal, it is time to toll”, where the *metaphor* “it is time to toll” is used, emphasizes this position since it is stressed there that it is not normal to develop fruitful relations with Russia. The *dissociation* is applied in the context of the division between “New” and “Old” Europe, the Baltic States belong to “New Europe”, that is why they estimate the anti-American moods as adverse (while the whole Europe and Germany, in particular, estimate them positively) but they attempt to present the negative attitude towards Russia as the position of the whole “New Europe” to make this statement more convincing. Another important point is distortion which is presented as truth by the use of such

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2 Postimees, 10 December 2005, p. 4.
The modifier as “without exaggeration”: it can be stated without exaggeration that now Schröder will get a salary in Kremlin. This specifying part makes the whole sentence false. He will get a salary not in Kremlin but in Gasprom. Thus the literary irony is presented here. The author knows and understands everything but he deliberately distorts and exaggerates the facts. On the whole Estonia tries to convince that it is adverse to develop relations with Russia since its regime is autocracy and it conducts the tragic war in Chechnya.

The analysis of the articles of the second sub-group, the object of which is Russia, shows that the typical rhetorical techniques used in them are dissociation, the argumentation by analogy, by metaphor, by example and by illustration, definition, metonymy and the use of different qualifiers.

The dominating rhetorical techniques are the arguments by dissociation and metaphor, nomination and the use of different qualifiers. It presupposes that with the help of the dissociation Estonia outlines the civilized democratic world and the uncivilized non-democratic world and relates Russia to the second group. The nomination as well as metaphors and qualifiers enable to provide the concrete characteristics of Russia and its policy.

The rhetorical techniques used in the articles provide the presentation of Russia as an aggressive non-democratic state associated with the USSR and its political course which poses a threat to Estonia and the civilized world as a whole.

On the whole in terms of two sub-groups of the articles of the Estonian newspapers all types of the arguments are presented – argumentation by the process of association - quasi-logical, arguments based on the structure of reality and arguments establishing the structure of reality – and argumentation by the process of dissociation. Their application allows characterizing the objects of the sub-groups, namely the Russian speaking population and Russia.

In Estonia the characterization of the image of the Russian speaking population coincides with the characterization of Russia and its policy. The representation of both objects is quite negative.

3. 3. The Analysis of the Position of the Russian Speaking Population and the Image of Russia in Latvia

The purpose is to observe the position of the Russian speaking population and the image of Russia in Latvia on the basis of the rhetorical analysis of two subgroups of the articles published in Latvian newspapers since May, 2004.

The object of the first subgroup of articles is the Russian speaking minority.
In Latvian newspaper “Chas” on December 20, 2005 the position towards the Russian speaking population was presented in figures: “42% of Latvians think that the high number of Russian speaking people poses a threat to the existence of the Latvian language and culture. Only 12% of people have the negative experience of the communication with the representatives of the other ethnic group. 55% of Latvian respondents consider that Latvians respect the democratic principles more than Russian speaking people do. Talking about observing of the interests of the Russian speaking population 47% of Latvian respondents answered that they are taken into consideration more than they should be taken. Only one third of the questioned Latvians agree that the Russian speaking population is loyal to the state.”

The argumentation is fortified by figures that make the position more convincing. The dissociation between Latvian speaking and Russian speaking population is traced in the article. Latvians are expected to express their opinion on the position of the Russian speaking population in Latvia thus the presented point enable to characterize the relation of Latvians toward this group. On the whole it is interesting that the Russian speaking population does not just pose a threat to the Latvian language and culture, but it poses a threat to their existence. Thus the threat that is personified by the Russian speaking population is considered to be existential. Another point is that “Latvians respect the democratic principles more than Russian speaking people do”. Consequently, in terms of democracy Latvians put themselves on a higher position than Russian speaking people. The majority of Latvians think that the interests of the Russian speaking population are taken into consideration more than they should be taken. This fact demonstrates that Latvians do not agree with the statements about the violation of the rights of this group in their country or they do not suppose that this group deserves the observation of their interests. Moreover, most of Latvians hold the opinion that the Russian speaking population poses a threat not only to the Latvian language and culture but also it poses a threat to the state since it is not loyal to it. On the whole the Russian speaking population is emphasized as a separate group of the population the actions of which are supposed to be dangerous and unfavourable.

The issue of the existential threat from the side of the Russian speaking population was also developed in the article of Latvian newspaper “Vesti Segodnya”. It was stated in it: “Just think over, 40% of Latvian population are Russian speaking! In Riga Latvians are even the minority! How can we live further in such a way? In such condition the Latvian people cannot develop normally. Taking into account especially the fact that a part of the Russian speaking population is unfriendly towards Latvians and Latvia as such…Our demographic situation is awful. Latvians are dying out. For all sides the most favourable solution is the repatriation of the Russian speaking non-citizens.”

1 Chas, 20 December 2005, p. 3.
2 Vesti Segodnya, 22 April 2005, p. 5.
between Latvians and the Russian speaking population can be traced. The first two sentences are *exclamations* that emphasize the indignation about the position of the Russian speaking population. The third sentence contains the *rhetorical question* “How can we live further in such a way?” which presupposes the answer: we cannot live further in such a way. All these three sentences are likely to be some kind of slogans or appeals for change. All of them are intended to convince Latvian people that they should not be satisfied with the current situation and should be against the Russian speaking population. The rest sentences except for the last sentence are subject to this purpose. The *qualifier* “unfriendly” in relation to the Russian speaking population is also important in these terms. As for the last sentence, it is put in the end since the audience (which is supposed to be Latvians), when it will come to this sentence, is supposed to be convinced in the fact that the Russian speaking population poses a threat to them. The Russian speaking population is even the existential threat since because of them Latvians are dying out. Latvians are presented as the endangered nation but in fact it is not obvious. As a result “for all sides the most favourable solution” is supposed to be “the repatriation of the Russian speaking non-citizens”. All the previous sentences lead to that point and the strong arguments were necessary for making such an audacious conclusion since the repatriation is a radical method. Another point is that this method is presented as the most favourable for all sides. It is used for strengthening the argumentation, but how can it be so? Those Russian speaking people who live in Latvia chose this country and they are not likely to desire to leave it. Thus the *exaggeration* is typical of the article (Latvians are dying out… For all sides the most favourable solution is the repatriation of the Russian speaking non-citizens). On the whole the Russian speaking population is presented as a dangerous group of people that it is better to get rid of.

In Latvian newspaper “*Latvijas Avize*” the article published on September 24, 2005 was devoted to the characterization of the Russian speaking population where it was reported that “Latvian Russians are too aloof from the state where they live, - they watch Russian television channels, support Russian football team, regard Putin as their President but not Vike-Freiberga and dream secretly about the reestablishment of the Soviet Union.”¹ This is *argumentation by illustration* using which Latvian newspaper characterizes the Russian speaking population. By illustration it tries to convince that this population is aloof from Latvia. Four aspects are emphasized: 1) watching Russian television channels, 2) supporting Russian football team, 3) regarding Putin as their President and 4) dreaming secretly about the reestablishment of the Soviet Union. That means that the Russian speaking population is associated with the population of Russia since the first three aspects are typical of the behaviour of Russian people. There is the contradiction concerning the last aspect which can be observed with the use of the *qualifier*

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“secretly”: if the Russian speaking population dreams secretly about the reestablishment of the Soviet Union, how Latvia got to know that they dream about it. It is more likely that this is the assumption of Latvia concerning Russia and Russian population which is extended to the Russian speaking population in Latvia. On the whole the Russian speaking population in Latvia is separated from the rest population and is associated with Russian citizens. It is presented as the state (which is more likely to be Russia) within the state.

In the article of “Vesti Segodnya” the position of the Russian Minister of foreign affairs concerning the elections in Latvia was commented. It was stated that “Lavrov criticized toughly the unavailability of OSCE to organize the full mission to observe the forthcoming elections in Latvia on October, 7 on which hundreds of thousands representatives of the Russian speaking population will not have the right to vote. Lavrov’s statement is considered to be the answer of Russia as a permanent member of Security Council to the attempts of our President to gain the post of the Secretary General of the UN.”1 The nomination is used in the article: “Lavrov’s statement is considered to be the answer of Russia as a permanent member of Security Council to the attempts of our President to gain the post of the Secretary General of the UN”. The quasi-logical argument is presented in the article. At first sight this is a logic argument since logic makes the argument more convincing but if it is analyzed the incompatibility can be observed. If the above mentioned Lavrov’s statement is the answer of Russia to the attempts of Latvian President to get the position of the Secretary General then the question should be: how does Russia estimate these attempts. But the answer is that Russia “criticized toughly the unavailability of OSCE to organize the full mission to observe the forthcoming elections in Latvia on October, 7 on which hundreds of thousands representatives of the Russian speaking population will not have a right to vote”. Thus the themes of the question and the theme of the answer do not coincide but the Latvian side uses this statement to show that Russia does not approve of these attempts referring to the topical question of the Russian speaking population even though there was no word of these attempts. As for the statement, the pragmatic argument is presented there although it is not explicit. Lavrov criticized the unavailability of OSCE to organize the full mission to observe the forthcoming elections in Latvia on October, 7 on which hundred thousands representatives of the Russian speaking population will not have a right to vote. There are no obvious effect relations. The emphasize on the mention, that hundreds of thousands representatives of the Russian speaking population will not have a right to vote, presupposes that this very fact raises concern of the Russian side. The forthcoming elections in Latvia are characterized by the defining relative clause which reflects the position of the Russian speaking population. The dissociation is drawn between this group and the rest population of

1 Vesti Segodnya, 23 September 2006, p. 3.
Latvia, moreover, it is put in the position of the group of the lower level which does not possess the full rights.

The analysis of the articles of the first sub-group, the object of which is the Russian speaking population, shows that the typical rhetorical techniques used in them are dissociation, the argumentation by illustration, the pragmatic argument, the use of various qualifiers, the quasi-logical argument and definition.

The dominating rhetorical technique is dissociation. It provides the possibility to show that the Latvian society is not consolidated and the Russian speaking population is treated as a separate group in the Latvian political society.

The rhetorical techniques used in the articles enable to characterize the Russian speaking population as a separate differing group considered as the existential threat to Latvians and their nation state and associated with the population of Russia.

The object of the second sub-group of the articles is Russia and its policy.

The traditional nomination in relation to Russia - “bear”- is also presented in Latvia. In newspaper “Neatkarigas Rita Avize” the article was devoted to the Latvian decision to ban the telebridge between Latvia and Russia aimed at the discussion between the Latvian population and President Putin. It was outlined that “it was the hostility towards Russians that was the motive of this decision. The official who banned the telebridge with the President of Russia Putin can feel a real hero. Like a little dachshund that bit the heel of the bear in the cage of the zoo. Unfortunately, it did not seem to the crowd pitiful and funny; this decision was welcomed.”\(^1\)

Russia is characterized by the metaphor “bear” thus by the image associated with a threat, maybe, that is why it is put in the cage of the zoo. It is not likely that it is appropriate to treat this image as positive, moreover, the hostility towards Russians that is the motive of the actions of the officials is emphasized in the very article. Moreover, the officials who express this hostility explicitly are defined as real heroes. But in fact with the use of comparison the irony can be traced in the article if we look at the description of the heroic deed - “like a little dachshund that bit the heel of the bear in the cage of the zoo”. That shows that Latvia is defined as “a little dachshund that “bites” Russia on the quiet. The significant point is that such anti-Russian actions determined by the hostility towards Russians are welcomed by the Latvian political society. It means that in Latvia the anti-Russian moods take place both on the level of the officials and on the level of the political society.

In the article of “Latvijas Avize” published on June 9, 2005 the nomination “monster” in relation to Russia, that is also presented in the articles of Estonian newspapers, can be emphasized. It was stated there in relation to the future of Russia: “Such monster as

\(^1\) Neatkarigas Rita Avize, 28 September 2005, p. 4.
multinational and multiracial Russia cannot exist eternally. For example, in the 1970-ies nobody thought that the USSR would collapse.”¹ In the article Russia is defined as a “monster” the image of which is associated with something ugly and dangerous. Moreover, Latvia like Estonia takes the responsibility to determine the future of Russia which they describe quite gloomily. It is interesting that the analogy is drawn between the current situation in Russia and the situation of the 1970-ies in the USSR. As it is known the USSR collapsed in 1991, consequently, Latvia supposes that in about 20 years the collapse of Russia must take place. Thus the negative image of Russia as a threat dominates in the article.

The frightening representation of Russia is affirmed in the article of “Chas” where the main point is that “to all appearances, Russia and Russians function as ‘frightful enemy’”. The negative nomination “enemy” in terms of Russia is reinforced by the qualifier “frightful”. It is interesting to notice that both Russia and Russians living on the territory of Russia as well as making up the significant part of the Latvian population are treated as the “enemy”. They are put on the same position. On the whole Russia defined as the “frightful enemy” poses a threat to Latvia with which cannot be the cooperation but should be confrontation.

The attitude towards Russia can be also traced in the article published in “Vesti Segodnya” on June 12, 2006. It was said in it: “It is the devil’s work! – it is likely that the Prime minister would use this expression soon to explain his hasty consent to visit the 10th Economic forum in St Petersburg. In any case the intention of Kaltivitis to go to the motherland of Putin tomorrow provoked the outbreak of the criticism in the Latvian mass media. In fact Kaltivitis’ step does not correspond to the general rules of the behaviour of the political elite in relation to Russia. It is especially obvious not long before the elections of the parliament since it may be that the electorate would suspect of the implicit sympathy for hated Russia. Thus for Kaltivitis it is a real blunder.”³ It is significant that the sympathy for Russia and the strive for making the positive step towards Russia is defined as a blunder which does not correspond to the general rules of the foreign policy in relation to Russia. Consequently, in Latvia the foreign policy in relation to Russia is determined to be negative. Moreover, in regard to Russia such qualifier as “hated” is used. It demonstrates that the hostility towards Russia dominates in Latvia. The fact that the negative attitude of the Latvian officials towards Russia “is especially obvious not long before the elections of the parliament since it may be that the electorate would suspect of the implicit sympathy for hated Russia” shows that the sympathy to Russia is not welcomed not only by the officials but also by the society. Thus the hostility towards Russia can be traced both on the level of the officials and on the level of the political community. On the whole in Latvia the

¹ Latvijas Avize, 9 June 2005, p. 6.
² Chas, 14 January 2006, p. 2.
negative image of Russia as the hated state takes place and the positive policy in relation to Russia is supposed to be unacceptable.

In Latvian newspaper “Diena” the topic of the article published on May 2, 2004 was the relations between Latvia, Estonia and Russia. In this article it was stated that “it is obvious that in the relations with Estonia and Latvia Russia can sing its old slow song after our entrance to the EU. Russia did not write us off completely, that is why unreasonable and great accusations would be heard in the future. Russia knows very well what means the principle ‘divide and rule’. Russia like a knife will be there when in NATO or the EU some shadow of disagreements will appear especially if they would touch upon Latvia and Estonia.”

The metaphor “Russia can sing its old slow song in the relations with Estonia and Latvia” can be outlined there. It is remarkable that among the Baltic States only Estonia and Latvia are mentioned, thus Russia wants to achieve its old purposes only with regard to Estonia and Latvia. The question is what this old song is. According to the statement that “Russia did not write us off completely”, it can be supposed that Estonia and Latvia consider that Russia still regard Estonia and Latvia as its own parts. Consequently, this “old song” presupposes that Russia continues to pursue the policy of the Soviet Union. With the use of the metaphor Russia is still associated with the Soviet Union which as it was stated before is regarded as the occupier. The comparison “Russia like a knife” is also an interesting technique. The comparison with knife demonstrates that Russia is associated with something dangerous and sharp.

Analyzing the representation of Russia it is significant to outline the article of “Latvijas Avize” where it is stated that “Latvia is absolutely not the country the level of democracy of which Russia should worry about… For our neighbours it is again much easier to find fault with others, than to be faultless ourselves.” The use of the proverb “it is much easier to find fault with other, than to be faultless ourselves” shows that in Latvia as in the case of Estonia Russia is presented as undemocratic state and, moreover, that the violations of the democratic principles are much more serious in Russia than in the Baltic States.

The analysis of the articles of the second sub-group, the object of which is Russia, demonstrates that the typical rhetorical techniques applied in them are definition, comparison, the argumentation by analogy and by metaphor, and the use of different qualifiers.

The dominating rhetorical techniques are the arguments by metaphor, definition and the use of different qualifiers. Nomination is used to provide some definition of Russia while metaphor and qualifiers enable to emphasize the features of Russia and its policy.

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1 Diena, 2 May 2004, p. 3.
2 Latvijas Avize, 8 August 2006, p. 5.
The rhetorical techniques used in the articles presuppose the establishment of the image of Russia as the undemocratic country associated with the USSR and its policy and as the powerful state that poses a threat to Latvia and the whole world.

On the whole in regard to two sub-groups of the articles of Latvian newspapers all types of the arguments can be outlined – argumentation by the process of association - quasi-logical, arguments based on the structure of reality and arguments establishing the structure of reality – and argumentation by the process of dissociation. Their application enables to characterize the objects of the sub-groups, namely the Russian speaking population and Russia.

In Latvia the presentation of the image of the Russian speaking population coincides with the representation of Russia and its policy. The perception of both objects is quite negative.

3.4. The Analysis of the Position of the Russian Speaking Population and the Image of Russia in Lithuania

The purpose is to observe the position of the Russian speaking population and the image of Russia in Lithuania on the basis of the rhetorical analysis of two subgroups of the articles published in Lithuanian newspapers since May, 2004.

The object of the first subgroup of articles is the Russian speaking minority.

The article published in “Respublika” on October 15, 2004 was devoted to the comparison of the attitudes towards Russia and the USA in the Baltic States. In that context the issue of the position of the Russian speaking population in the Baltic States was touched upon and it was stated that “Russians who went to Lithuania after the Soviet occupation are integrated into the society. Russia hurls fewer reproaches at Lithuania than at Estonia and Latvia.”\(^1\) The definition of the Russian speaking population as the group integrated into the Lithuanian society shows that there is no dissociation on the basis of nationality in Lithuania and, moreover, this dissociation is rejected by the Lithuanian society. Thus the Russian speaking population is not outlined as a separate group and the differences between its representatives and the rest population are not emphasized. The comparison of the situations over the position of the Russian speaking population in the Baltic States in terms of the reproaches on this point from the Russian side demonstrates that the situation is more favourable in Lithuania than in Estonia and Latvia.

The comparison of the situations over the Russian speaking population in the three Baltic States can also be outlined in another article of “Respublika” published on March 12, 2007. It was stated there that “in 1991 Lithuania was the only of the Baltic states that granted citizenship to absolutely all people who lived on the territory of the country. But Latvia and Estonia, where

\(^1\) Respublika, 15 October 2004, p. 3.
the national minorities make up a greater part of the population, left the limitations – the examination on the language, the history, the bases of the Constitution, etc.”\(^1\) The comparison shows that in Lithuania the position of the Russian speaking population can be characterized most positively, at least, in regard to the issue of the citizenship and thus the possibilities to exercise the rights of the competent citizens.

In this article it was also said that “in present Lithuania Russians have all the conditions for the cultural activity in order to educate their rising generation”\(^2\). The Russian speaking population is nominated as a group that has “all the conditions for the cultural activity in order to educate their rising generation”. It demonstrates that Russians are provided with the possibility to educate their children without any barriers. The word “all” is of interest there. It presupposes the affirmation of the absolute integration of the Russian speaking population and the absence of the dissociation of the Lithuanian society.

The issue of the Russian language as well as the question of the television programmes in Russian on the Lithuanian national channels were presented in the article of “Lietuvos zinios” published on November 13, 2004. It was stated in the article that “in the middle of 1990-ies the national Lithuanian channels did not provide many Russian television programmes and films. Nowadays in the programmes of the Lithuanian channels there are more and more Russian telecasts and serials. It does not surprise anybody. The language is not an obstacle.”\(^3\) The argumentation by the process of association in the form of an argument establishing the structure of reality, namely, the analogy can be outlined there. The parallel is drawn between the situations over the television programmes on the Lithuanian channels in the middle of 1990-ies and the current situation. The analogy shows that the current situation is much more favourable in terms of the position of the Russian speaking population in comparison with the 1990-ies. The programmes in Russian have become more available on the national channels. Moreover, argumentation which applies to relations of succession can be marked out. It is said that the current situation “does not surprise somebody” since “the language is not an obstacle”. Consequently, the use of the native language, namely, the Russian language, is not considered to be a problem in Lithuania. On the whole the rhetorical techniques demonstrate that now the dissociation on the basis of the language is not typical of Lithuania.

In the article of “ELTA” published on March 7, 2006 the quantitative indices were presented in terms of the situation over the knowledge of the Russian language in Lithuania. It was stated that “according to the poll conducted in 2006 by «TNS Opinion & Social» on request of the European Commission (Eurobarometr poll), the majority of the Lithuanian population

\(^1\) Ryaklaitis. Respublika, 12 March 2007, p. 4.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Lietuvos zinios, 13 November 2004, p. 4.
knows the Russian language along with the native language. 79% of the Lithuanian residents can speak Russian and 26% can speak English.”¹ The use of the figures makes the argumentation more convincing. Taking into account the fact that according to the data of the Ministry of the foreign affairs the Russian speaking population amounts to 6, 3% of the population, the situation over the knowledge of the Russian language demonstrates that the Lithuanian population pays special attention to learning the very Russian language. Thus the dissociation in the Lithuanian community does not take place. The Russian speaking population is integrated into the general composition and, moreover, Lithuanians are interested in accustoming to the culture and the language of this minority.

The issue of the Russian language was also discussed in the article of “ELTA” published earlier in 2005. It was mentioned there that “the Russian language, at least as the instrument of business is vitally important for Lithuania”². The qualifier “vitally important” characterizes the knowledge of the Russian language as the significant aspect in Lithuania that affirms the importance of the Russian language in the country and the absence of the dissociation in terms of the Russian speaking population on the basis of nationality and language.

The analysis of the articles of the first sub-group, the object of which is the Russian speaking population, demonstrates that the typical rhetorical techniques used in them are the argumentation by analogy, comparison and figures, the argumentation which applies to relations of succession and the use of various qualifiers.

All the above mentioned rhetorical techniques belong to the group of the arguments by the process of association that are aimed at bringing together separate elements and establishing unity between them. It presupposes that the dissociation is not typical of the Lithuanian political community and thus it can be treated as unified. The comparison and analogy are intended to pick out the example of Lithuania as the most favourable in terms of the situation over the Russian speaking population in the Baltic States.

The rhetorical techniques used in the articles enable to characterize the Russian speaking population as an integrated part of the Lithuanian society and as its constituent part that is not marked out as a separate aloof group and not considered as the existential threat to Lithuanians and the nation state.

The object of the second sub-group of the articles is Russia and its policy.

The article of “Lietuvos Rytas” published on July 15, 2004 was devoted to the different aspects of the relations between Lithuania and Russia and their characterization as a whole. It was mentioned in it that “the role of Russia is significant [for Lithuania], it is the most important economic partner and this is not the dangerous factor. Russia is the potential market for the

¹ ELTA, 17 March 2006, p. 3.
² ELTA, 24 November 2005, p. 5.
Lithuanian product with which it may be difficult for Lithuania to come to the EU market. Lithuania needs Russian oil and gas. And if we also recall that the transit to Kaliningrad passes through Lithuania then it will be obvious that it has the ideal conditions for the useful cooperation with Russia. Lithuania will do it regardless of the fact who will be its president.”

The argumentation by illustration is used in the article. The accepted point is that “the role of Russia is significant” and that Lithuania “has the ideal conditions for the useful cooperation with Russia. This point is proved by four positions: 1) Russia is the most important economic partner; 2) Russia is the potential market for the Lithuanian product; 3) Lithuania needs Russian oil and gas and 4) the transit to Kaliningrad passes through Lithuania. These four illustrations show that for Lithuania it is significant to cooperate with Russia and not to clash. First two positions presuppose the nomination of Russia that can be characterized only positively. The qualifiers “significant”, “most important”, “ideal”, “useful” that are applied in regard to Russia and its relations with Lithuania are all of the favourable nature. Moreover, the last sentence demonstrates that this characterization is typical of not only the current situation, but also the future that emphasizes the constant significance of the cooperation with Russia. Moreover, this fact is not considered as a threat. On the whole Lithuania characterizes positively the relations with Russia; it realizes their importance and stresses the intention to continue to cooperate on the mutually beneficial basis and in the friendly atmosphere. Russia is defined as the most significant economic partner and the threat from the Russian side is rejected. Thus Russia is treated as a partner the cooperation with which is described as useful for the country.

The presence of the threat from the Russian side is also rejected in the article of “Karstas komentaras” published in 2006: “In Lithuania during the last 5 - 7 years there is no problem of Russophobia. There are just the problems of the feigned Russophobia boosted by some politicians but the society does not treat them as really existing.”

The negative and the qualifiers are of interest in the article. The negative is used in terms of the existence of the problem of Russophobia in Lithuania and in relation to the attitude of the society to this problem as not really existing. The very Russophobia is defined as “feigned” and “boosted by some politicians”. The application of such qualifiers also demonstrates that Russophobia does not exist and even if it is stated as problem it is still not real but feigned. Thus the negative attitude towards Russia is rejected and, moreover, the futility of the attempts of some political forces to provoke it. The fact that “the society does not treat [the problems of Russophobia] as really existing” displays that in the Lithuanian society the stable perception of Russia is formed and it is not connected with the negativeness and the threat.

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1 Lietuvos Rytas, 15 July 2004, p. 3.
The characterization of the relations between Lithuania and Russia is presented in the article of “Delfi” published on July 7, 2006. It was stated in it: “The representatives of the Ministry of foreign affairs are prone to assess the relations with neighbouring Russia as consistently developing. This position is based on the arguments according to which the important agreements on the cooperation and other issues between Lithuania and the Russian Federation are signed.”¹ The qualifier “consistently developing” is used to determine the nature of the relations between Lithuania and Russia. This qualifier is not negative and it shows that in these relations the stable basis can be outlined. The argument which applies to relations of succession can also be outlined in the article. It is said that the relations can be assessed as “consistently developing” since “important agreements on the cooperation and other issues between Lithuania and the Russian Federation are signed”. On the whole the relations between Lithuania and Russia are characterized in the positive tone.

The above mentioned issue was discussed in another article published in October, 2006 where it was stated: “In their [diplomats’] speeches as well as in the speeches of the current head of the international committee of the Seimas Justinas Karosas the words that are flattering to Russia can be constantly heard. Vaitekunas was the first who talked about the ‘Russian heart’ that should be won. Advocating the interests of Russians he opposed sharply the introduction of the expensive visas by Brussels in relation to the citizens of Russia and other third countries. Last week Prime Minister Kirkilas also talked about the normal and constructive relations with Russia.”² The argumentation by illustration is applied in the article. The point is that in the speeches of the diplomats “the words that are flattering to Russia can be constantly heard”. Two illustrations affirm this point: 1) the words of Vaitekunas who was the first who talked about “the Russian heart” that should be won and who advocating the interests of Russians opposed sharply the introduction of the expensive visas by Brussels in relation to the citizens of Russia, 2) the words of Kirkilas who talked about the normal and constructive relations with Russia. The illustrations show that Lithuania advocates the Russian interests and its policy is aimed at the development of the positive relations with Russia. The metaphor “the Russian heart” is used in terms of Russia. In contrast to the traditional metaphor “the Russian bear” the metaphor “the Russian heart” is of the positive nature. Moreover, it is stated that this “Russian heart” “should be won” thus Lithuania intends to take steps to develop the good-neighbour relations with Russia. The qualifiers “normal” and “constructive” used in terms of the relations between Lithuania and Russia are also of the positive nature. On the whole the rhetorical techniques applied in the article demonstrate that the image of Russia is positive and the policy in relation to

² It is necessary to talk to Russia in a civilized manner www-document.
it is intended to develop the fruitful cooperation taking into account the interests of Russia and its citizens.

The analysis of the articles of the second sub-group, the object of which is Russia, shows that the typical rhetorical techniques used in them are the argumentation by illustration and by metaphor, nomination, the argumentation that applies the relations of succession and the use of various qualifiers.

The dominating rhetorical techniques are the arguments by illustration, nomination and the use of different qualifiers. The nomination as well as metaphors and qualifiers enable to provide the characterization of Russia and the relations between Lithuania and Russia. They demonstrate that these relations are favourable and the image of Russia is positive.

The rhetorical techniques used in the articles provide the positive presentation of Russia as the country that does not present a threat to Lithuania and the characterization of the relations between Lithuania and Russia as the developing fruitful cooperation.

On the whole in terms of two sub-groups of the articles of Lithuanian newspapers just one type of the arguments is presented, that is the argumentation by the process of association - quasi-logical, arguments based on the structure of reality and arguments establishing the structure of reality. Their application allows characterizing the objects of the sub-groups, namely the Russian speaking population and Russia.

In Lithuania the characterization of the image of the Russian speaking population coincides with the characterization of Russia and its relations with Lithuania. The representation of both objects is quite positive.

The comparison of the results of the rhetorical analysis of the articles of the newspapers of the Baltic States enables to state that the similarity can be outlined between Estonia and Latvia while the case of Lithuania can be marked out as atypical.

In terms of the Russian speaking population in Estonia and Latvia the Russian speaking population is regarded as a separate and aloof group that poses a threat to their nations and to their nation states and it is associated with the population of Russia. In Lithuania such representation of the Russian speaking population is not typical. In this country it is characterized as a group that is integrated into the society.

In regard of Russia in Estonia and Latvia Russia is associated with the Soviet Union, with its traditions and its political priorities. Russia is considered to be undemocratic dangerous state which is supposed to be a threat to the countries. In Lithuania the positive representation of Russia can be outlined and the relations between Lithuania and Russia are considered to be the mutually beneficial and significant cooperation.
As for the correlation between the representation of the Russian speaking population and Russia, it can be emphasized in all the three Baltic States. However, if in Estonia and Latvia the correlation consists in the fact that the images of both objects are not of positive nature, in Lithuania it presupposes that the images of both objects are quite favourable.

It is necessary to notice that the results are not absolute; it means that the representations of the Russian speaking population and Russia are not absolutely positive in Lithuania and that they are not absolutely negative in Latvia and Estonia. The aim is to determine the dominating trend and thus the dominating images are presented in the analysis. Lithuania is the specific case because of the comparison with Latvia and Estonia and the results are connected with this fact. In Lithuania it is also possible to find out the negative representations of the Russian speaking population and Russia. For example, in Lithuania it was said that “many Lithuanians fever from the thought that the fortune of Lithuania can be in the hands of the businessman of Russian origin.” The metaphor “Lithuanians fever from the thought” is remarkable there. Lithuanians are afraid even to think about the fact that the representatives of the Russian speaking population can get a strong position in the government. Thus to some extent Lithuanians treat this group suspiciously. In terms of Russia in Lithuania in “Respublika” it was reported that “Russian propagandistic machinery of the Kremlin began to function as hard as it can. Russian mass media suddenly started to lash hysterically Lithuania and to extend lies…Russia began to behave like an elephant in a china shop.” The metaphor in the form of the idiomatic expression “Russia behaves like an elephant in a china shop” is remarkable in the sentence. It means that Lithuania supposes that expressing its own point of view Russia pokes its nose into other people's affairs and it interferes in Lithuanian affairs while it cannot do it. Another interesting metaphor is “Russian mass media lash hysterically Lithuania”. The word “lash” presupposes that Russian mass media toughly criticize Lithuania while the qualifier “hysterically” adds the ironic tone. It can be stated that in case of the disagreements the only way Russia behaves is tough critics of the other side since it does not have any other methods. Consequently, it is also possible to outline the negative tone in relation to Russia and the Russian speaking minority but the research is aimed at the analysis of the dominating representation.

Similarly, in Latvia and Estonia the positive representations of the Russian speaking population and Russia can be outlined but the prevailing images of the two objects as the results of the analysis presuppose are negative. In Estonia in “Postimees” it was stated that “in Estonia the abyss between the titular population and the Russian speaking minority is not so large as it is assumed. Moreover, Estonia is the only state on the post-Soviet space where blood has not been

1 Sugardas.lt, 16 June 2004, p. 5.
2 Lietuvos rytas, 21 September 2005, p. 4.
shed because of the national conflicts.”¹ The use of the metaphor “the abyss between the titular population and the Russian speaking minority is not so large as it is assumed” presupposes the rejection of the fact that the problems of the Russian speaking population are not so acute as it is thought. The argument which applies to relations of succession can also be outlined in the article. It is stated that the abyss is not so large since, for example, “Estonia is the only state on the post-Soviet space where blood has not been shed because of the national conflicts”. It means that the situation in Estonia is not so sharp since in other countries even the open conflicts took place between the titular and the Russian speaking population while it is not typical of Estonia. In regard to Russia it was stated in Estonia that “in contrast to the Estonian politicians the people consider that we could have been more pliant and could have not forgotten about our economic interests.”² The qualifier “more pliant” considers that it is necessary for the Estonian people not to have a conflict with Russia. The implicit argument which applies to relations of succession can also be stressed. It is supposed to be important for the people to be more pliant with Russia since it is in Estonia’s economic interests.

In Latvia in terms of the Russian speaking population it was stated, for example, that “the official status of the Russian language is also in the interests of the titular nation. The maintenance of the good knowledge of the Russian language would allow the future generations of Latvians to have the direct access to the great Russian culture. The economic interaction would also benefit significantly since the Latvian business mostly speaks Russian.”³ The argument which applies to relations of succession is used in the article. It is said that “the official status of the Russian language is also in the interests of the titular nation” since “it would allow the future generations of Latvians to have the direct access to the great Russian culture and since the Latvian business mostly speaks Russian”. The qualifier “great” used in relation to the Russian culture presupposes that the Latvian society shows interest not only to the Russian language, but also to the Russian culture. In regard to Russia in “Latvijas Avize” it was pointed out that “it is difficult to imagine what else Latvia can do in order to win Russia’s favour. On May, 9 in Moscow the President was glad at the salute in honour of Victory Day. In Iceland the Prime minister swam in the same geyser with the head of the Russian Government. Patriarchy of Moscow and all Russia Alexkiy II and the former president Boris Eltsyn were warmly welcomed in Latvia. This year no Russian spy was detained.”⁴ The argumentation by illustration is applied in the article. The assumed point is that Latvia wants “to win Russia’s favour” and does its best

³ Telegraf, 23 August 2006, p. 3.
to achieve it. All the next sentences are the illustrations of the Latvian attempts “to win Russia’s favour”.

But the analysis of the dominating representations of the Russian speaking population and Russia in the Baltic States and the comparison of the situations show that in Lithuania the positive perception of both objects prevails while in Latvia and Estonia the negative representations dominate.

On the whole in all the three aspects, i.e. the representation of the Russian speaking population, the perception of Russia and the correlation between these two images, the example of Lithuania stands out against a background of Estonia and Latvia in a positive sense.
4. The Role of the Russian Speaking Minority as the Internal Other in the Relations Between the Baltic States and Russia

The results of the rhetorical analysis of the articles of the newspapers of the Baltic States in terms of such two objects as the Russian speaking population and Russia can be formulated as a statement that in Lithuania the perception of these objects is the most positive in comparison with two other Baltic States, i.e. Estonia and Latvia. The example of Lithuania can be regarded as a special case since it is atypical for the Baltic States. In Latvia and Estonia the negative representation of the Russian speaking population and Russia prevails while in Lithuania it is not so.

The common point for all the three Baltic States is that the correlation between the representations of the two above mentioned objects can be observed. But if in Latvia and Estonia the correlation presupposes that both objects are treated quite negatively, in Lithuania it presupposes that both objects are treated more positively.

The question is why the Lithuanian case differs from the Latvian and Estonian situations. For that purpose it is necessary to analyze the fundamental basis of the problem, namely, the presence of the internal other using the results of the rhetorical analysis.

4. 1. The Russian Speaking Minority as the Internal Other

In Estonia the Russian speaking population makes up 25, 7% of the whole population while Estonians amount to 68, 5%. The figures show that the Russian speaking population presents a significant part of the Estonian society.

The rhetorical analysis of the articles of the Estonian newspapers demonstrates that the explicit dissociation on the basis of nationality takes place in Estonia. The Estonian society is divided into the confronting groups, namely Estonians and the Russian speaking population. According to Carl Schmitt, “the enemy is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in general. He is also not the private adversary whom one hates. An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy.” As it was pointed out previously, Carl Schmitt outlines two factors that distinguish the political enmity: first of all, enemy must be a confronting collectivity of people and, secondly, it must confront publicly. The fact, that in the Estonian political community the Russian speaking population is marked out as a separate and aloof group, means

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1 Schmitt, op. cit., p. 28.
that it is considered to be the enemy since it is opposed publicly to the rest of the Estonian population. It is also proved by the fact that the organized manifestations against the Russian speaking population take place in Estonia.

Moreover, the numerous Russian speaking population is considered to be a kind of barrier that hinders Estonians from being the hosts in their country. But a people exists politically only when it sets up an independent political unity and for the sake of this unity opposes itself to other kinds of unity. The distinction between friend and enemy considers the appearance of the collectivity in the political terms,¹ the appearance of the particular form of life in this collectivity and, consequently, the opposition of this collectivity to other group(s) since the enemy is characterized by some alienation; it is some otherness. This point enables to state that for the sake of the political existence the Russian speaking population is opposed to Estonians since it is characterized through the discourse of the printing materials by otherness.

It is interesting to notice that Benedict Anderson supposes that from the very beginning of the formation of the nations the solidarity of the nation was gained on the imaginary basis with the help of the print capitalism. People did not know each other because of marriage or proper transactions, but they began to visualize others like themselves through printing. Since through printing it is stated that Estonians want to be the hosts in their territory, Estonia should be treated as the nation state. Moreover, the dissociation between Estonians and the Russian speaking population is drawn in terms of the historical issue. “The Russian speaking population treats the Red Army as the emancipatory force that chased away German occupiers. Estonians hold absolutely another opinion. In 1941 one occupation just replaced another one and the consistent expulsion of Germans from Estonia was no other than the ordinary change of occupation.”² The Estonian common idea is the occupation by the Soviet Union. But for the nation the historical issue is crucial since “the nation is not merely a concept but a narrative that allows the imagined community to conceive of itself as sharing common historical journey.”³ This proves that in the Estonian political community the question of the nation and its preservation is very significant thus the numerous Russian speaking population impedes Estonians to implement their national ideas and, poses a threat to the existence of their nation state.

Since the group’s contention of its sameness and identity is achieved through the opposition to the otherness of a different group and since “it is the common feeling of ‘sameness’ based on race, ethnicity, common history, culture, or language, which for Schmitt

¹ Schmitt, op. cit., p. 51.
² Pih’yarannik, 6 May 2004, p. 5.
³ Benson, op. cit., p. 644.
forges the members of the group into the ‘oneness’ of a ‘people’ and constitutes the political quality of a group.”1 In Estonia the Russian speaking population plays the role of this other.

Iver Neumann states an important point in this regard that “the formation of the self is inextricably intertwined with the formation of its others and the failure to regard the others must necessarily have repercussions for the formation of the self.”2 It presupposes that the other is necessary in order to form and to consolidate the self as in Neumann’s research the otherness of Russia is stressed in order to enforce the integration of the European Self. As Brian Graham emphasizes, “Neumann’s case remains on the assumption that identity requires difference and that this variance is transformed into otherness as an act of achieving and then securing that collectivity.”3 It means that if there is the necessity to secure the self then the most appropriate method is to focus on the other. As the rhetorical analysis of the articles of Estonian newspapers shows in Estonia there is the necessity to protect its self, its friends, i.e. its unity, homogeneity, its existence as a nation state and, consequently, it is achieved through the emphasis on the other in the person of the Russian speaking population. The parallel between the situation when Russia is the other for Europe and the situation when the Russian speaking population is the other for Estonians can be drawn.

The feature of the position of the Russian speaking population as the other is that it is the internal other, the internal enemy. Consequently, in Estonia the point is to provide the division between those who belong to a people and thus have the same rights and those who cannot have the same rights in the sphere of the political because they are not the part of the people. Thus the position of the Russian speaking population as the internal other leads to the discrimination of its rights from the side of the Estonian authorities. This can be proved by the numerous attempts of the Estonian officials to remove the representatives of the Russian speaking minority from the Estonian political life as well as the Russian language and the Russian culture. “Schmitt stresses that even in modern democratic states where the universal equality is established there is a particular group who are subject to the exclusion and thus no absolute equality exists.”4 He also emphasizes that in these states the equality of the citizens is accompanied by paying attention to the issue of national homogeneity and the border between those who belong to the state and those who do not belong to it. This point proves that since the strong division between the Russian speaking population and the rest Estonian population exists and the national issue is crucial then the Russian speaking population holds the position of the internal other and is subject to discrimination.

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1 Preuss, op. cit., p. 156.
2 Neumann 1999, p. 35.
3 Graham, op. cit., p. 112.
4 Mouffe 2004, p. 143.
In Latvia the situation in terms of the position of the Russian speaking population and its representation is similar to the situation in Estonia. The Russian speaking population makes up a significant part of the Latvian society, namely, 28.4% of the whole population while Latvians amount to just 58.9%. It means that the Latvian case is even more complicated than the Estonian one since the Russian speaking population presents a real substantial opposition to Latvians, at least in terms of the numerical value.

As the rhetorical analysis of the articles of Latvian newspapers shows the dissociation is also typical of the Latvian society. The Latvian society is divided into the groups and the basis of the division is nationality. Since “the distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation,”\(^1\) it is explainable that in Latvia the Russian speaking population is considered as not just a separate and aloof group but it is even associated with the separate state within Latvia. Then the presence of the confrontation between two similar collectivities can be observed, moreover, since it can be observed through the mass media then it is the public confrontation. These are two factors that demonstrate the existence of the “friend – enemy” division in the Latvian society and the numerous Russian speaking population presents this enemy.

It is an important point that even an existential threat to Latvians from the side of the Russian speaking population is stressed. “The political enemy is existentially something different and alien so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.”\(^2\) It is emphasized in Latvia that in such condition the Latvian people cannot develop normally: Latvians are dying out;\(^3\) the high number of Russian speaking people poses a threat to the existence of the Latvian language and culture and the Russian speaking population is not loyal to the state\(^4\). This shows that the Russian speaking population is treated as a threat to the existence of the Latvian language and culture, to the Latvian state and the very Latvian nation. It means that the Russian speaking population poses the existential threat and the fact that in Latvia “for all sides the most favourable solution is the repatriation of the Russian speaking non-citizens”\(^5\) shows that in Latvia there is the intention to get rid of the source of this existential threat, of this enemy. On the whole for the sake of the political existence the Russian speaking population is opposed to Latvians since it is characterized through the discourse of the printing materials not only by otherness but even by the position of the existential threat.

Latvia is also considered to be the nation state. The Latvian people is united by the idea of the Soviet occupation while it is not typical of the Russian speaking minority. Thus the

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\(^2\) Ibid., p. 27.
\(^3\) Vesti Segodnya, 22 April 2005, p. 5.
\(^4\) Chas, 20 December 2005, p. 3.
\(^5\) Vesti Segodnya, 22 April 2005, p. 5.
presence of such a numerous group that does not share the commitments of the Latvian people can not but hinder the development of Latvia as the nation state that can be traced through the rhetorical analysis of the articles of Latvian newspapers that are considered to be the basis for the imagination of the nation. The opposition between the Russian speaking population and Latvians created by means of the dissociation and analogy and its perception as the existential threat proves this fact.

Another important point is that because of the presence of the numerous Russian speaking population it is necessary for Latvia to create the other in order to enforce the position of the Latvian nation. The exclusion of the Russian speaking minority helps to form and to consolidate the Latvian sameness and identity. That is why the Russian speaking population plays the role of this other in Latvia, to be specific, the internal other. The separation between those who are the competent members of the Latvian society and those who are not and the examples of discrimination are connected with the position of the Russian speaking population as the internal other and the necessity to form the Latvian self.

As the rhetorical analysis of the articles of Latvian newspapers demonstrates in the Latvian political community there is the necessity to protect its self, its friends, i.e. its unity, homogeneity, its existence as a nation state and, therefore, it is achieved through the focus on the other in the person of the Russian speaking population. The similarity between the situation when Russia is the other for Europe and the situation when the Russian speaking population is the other for Latvians can be drawn again.

In Lithuania the Russian speaking minority amounts to just 6.3% of the whole population and Lithuanians make up 83.5%. This fact shows that Lithuanians form the absolute majority of the population and there is no other group that can present the opposition to them.

Moreover, as the rhetorical analysis of the articles of Lithuanian newspapers shows there is no dissociation in relation to the Russian speaking population on the basis of nationality or language in the Lithuanian society. The importance of the Russian culture and the Russian language not only for Russians but also for Lithuanians presupposes that the Russian speaking population is not characterized by some otherness. The Lithuanian society is considered to be united and the Russian speaking population is treated as its integrated part. The fact, that in the Lithuanian society there is no opposition between Lithuanians and the representatives of the Russian speaking population, means that the very existential division into such groups as “friend” and “enemy” or “self” and “other” does not exist within the Lithuanian political community.

Consequently, there is no necessity to present the Russian speaking population as a threat or a barrier for the development of the nation and the nation state. The rhetorical analysis of
Lithuanian newspapers displays that in Lithuania the Russian speaking population is not outlined as a separate group, the differences between its representatives and the rest population are not emphasized and there is no association of the Russian speaking population with the source of some threat. Since, as Benedict Anderson stresses, printing lays the foundation for the national consciousness\textsuperscript{1} the Lithuanian national consciousness is not connected with the presence of the opposing national group presenting the other.

In Lithuania there is no necessity to protect its self, its friends, i.e. the unity of the society and the nation state, through the accent on the other. As Neumann points “Europe emphasizes the otherness of Russia in order to integrate the European Self”\textsuperscript{2} but since the rhetorical analysis of the articles of Lithuanian newspapers shows that the Lithuanian society is integrated and united and the dissociation is not typical of it then there is no point in emphasizing the otherness of the Russian speaking population. Thus in Lithuania the Russian speaking population is the constituent part of the Lithuanian society and it is not represented as the internal other.

The comparison of the situations illustrates that the Lithuanian situation should be treated as a specific case. If in Latvia and Estonia the Russian speaking population is the internal other in Lithuania it is not so. First of all, in Lithuania the number of the Russian speaking population is the least, secondly, the dissociation and the division of the society on the basis of nationality is not typical of Lithuania while it is the feature of Latvia and Estonia and, thirdly, the negative perception of the Russian speaking population does not prevail in Lithuania but in Latvia and Estonia such perception dominates in the society. On the whole the state of the society influences the existence of the “self – other” dichotomy: if in Latvia and Estonia the Russian speaking population is numerous and the differentiation is stressed between Latvians and Russians and Estonians and Russians then the Russian speaking population is treated as the internal other and if in Lithuania the Russian speaking population is not so numerous and the differentiation is not emphasized then the Russian speaking population is not regarded as the internal other.

\textbf{4. 2. The Role of the Internal Other in the Foreign Policy of the Baltic States in Relation to Russia}

The Lithuanian case is also atypical in terms of the representation of Russia. In Latvia and Estonia the negative representation of Russia prevails while the Lithuanian representation of Russia stands out against a background of Estonia and Latvia in the positive sense.

\textsuperscript{1}Anderson, op. cit., p. 44-45.
\textsuperscript{2}Neumann 1999, p. 110.
In Latvia and Estonia Russia is treated as the undemocratic and uncivilized country that poses a threat to these countries and the world as a whole. This image of Russia corresponds with the historical representation of Russia in Europe that is profoundly analyzed by Iver Neumann in his book “Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation”.

In the XVI - XVII centuries the barbarian and uncivilized character of Russians was emphasized and even in the XX century the dominant representations of the Soviet Russia were coloured by the perception of Russia as both political and military threat to Europe” and as “the Asian/barbarian power that used the WW II to attack Europe”. The use of the traditional metaphor “Russian bear” in relation to Russia in Latvia and Estonia proves the domination of the traditional representation of Russia in them. In Estonia Russia is also defined by such metaphors as “monster” and “beast” and in Latvia it is also nominated as a “monster” and an “enemy”. In Estonia the Russian future policy is defined as extortions, the disappearance of people and assassinations. On the whole the common point in terms of the dominating perception of Russia in Latvia and Estonia can be formulated as follows: the negative image of Russia as the hated state takes place and the positive policy in relation to Russia is supposed to be unacceptable.

In comparison with Latvia and Estonia in Lithuania the image of Russia is more positive. The application of the traditional metaphor “bear” or such nominations as “monster”, “beast” or “enemy” is not typical of Lithuania. In relation to Russia the metaphor “Russian heart” is used and, moreover, the representation of Russia as a threat is rejected since it is stated that “in Lithuania during the last 5 - 7 years there is no problem of Russophobia”. In Lithuania in regard to Russia such qualifiers as “significant”, “most important”, “ideal” and “useful” are applied according to the results of the rhetorical analysis of the articles of the newspapers. It shows that the favourable characterization of Russia prevails in Lithuania.

The relations between Lithuania and Russia are characterized as “consistently developing”, “normal and constructive”. The comparison of the relations between Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Russia also demonstrates that in the Lithuanian case they can be characterized by the presence of the most positive trends. In 2003 the boundary treaty between Lithuania and Russia was ratified while the similar treaties between the other two Baltic States and Russia have not entered into force so far. In the relations between Lithuania and Russia the issue of the Russian speaking population is not urgent but it is sharp in the relations between Latvia, Estonia and Russia. The comparison of the economic relations also shows that they are the most fruitful between Lithuania and Russia. For Lithuania Russia is the most significant

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1 Hall, op. cit., p. 103.
2 Neumann 1999, p. 102.
3 Orehovas, op. cit., p. 6.
4 Pankaustas, op. cit., p. 7.
5 It is necessary to talk to Russia in a civilized manner www-document.
economic partner, at least, taking into account the indexes of import and export while for Latvia and Estonia in regard to export from the country Russia rates fourth in the list of the most important partners and in terms of import from Russia Russia takes the third place. The Lithuanian foreign policy is more likely to be characterized by the cooperation with Russia while the cooperation between Estonia, Latvia and Russia is complicated by a number of problems.

In the relations between Lithuania and Russia some controversial issues can also be outlined. First of all, it is the interpretation of the historical events that is common for all the three Baltic States. Lithuania treats the events of WW II and its history until the achievement of the independence as the Soviet occupation while Russia considers it as the liberation from the fascist forces. The second example is the issue of transit that is not resolved between Lithuania and Russia. The decision adopted in 2002 is valid now according to which beginning on 1 July 2003, Kaliningraders are required to obtain “facilitated transit documents” from the Lithuanian consulate to travel across Lithuania, and they must present actual Russian foreign-travel passports to obtain those documents by 2004. But the entrance of Lithuania into the Schengen zone may complicate the situation since Kaliningraders may be required to obtain the Schengen visas. The example of the sale of petroleum refinery Mazeikiu Nafta may be pointed out when the strife took place between the Polish company PKN Orlen and Russian companies LUKOIL and TNK-VR. In the end the Polish company won and Lithuania decided not to sell the petroleum refinery to any Russian company as a matter of principle that was fixed in its National Economic Strategy in 2006. The fact that the Lithuanian President Roland Paksas was impeached in 2003, because he was suspected of the ties with the representatives of the Russian criminal groupings, can also be mentioned in that context. But all these examples are private by nature and they do not challenge the general positive characterization since the focus is made on the comparison of the three Baltic States and the use of Lithuania as a special case.

On the whole the correlation between the representation of the Russian speaking population and the image of Russia demonstrates the correlation of the presence of the internal other and the orientation of the foreign policy of the country in relation to Russia. The perception of the Russian speaking population and the perception of Russia are intertwined and this is also proved not only by the fact that the result of the rhetorical analysis of the articles of the newspapers of the Baltic States is the correlation between them but also by the fact that in the course of conducting the analysis the association of the Russian speaking population with Russia and its citizens could be observed directly. The presence of the internal other determines the necessity to protect the self, namely, the nation and the nation state. This fact explains the negative representation of the Russian speaking population. But the fact, that the Russian speaking population, i.e. the internal other, is associated with Russia, relates these phenomena
and their images with each other. The negative image of Russia inevitably influences the foreign policy of the country in relation to it.

Thus the presence of the internal other in the person of the Russian speaking population corresponds to the domination of the negative representation of Russia and, consequently, the negative trends in the foreign policy of the country in relation to Russia. It is evidently traced in the case of Latvia and Estonia. In Lithuania the Russian speaking population is not the internal other and therefore the association with Russia does not take place, and this fact implies that the perception of Russia is not so negative in comparison with Estonia and Latvia and the relations between Lithuania and Russia are the most favourable.

As a result Lithuania stands out against a background of Latvia and Estonia: under the conditions of the presence of the internal other in the person of the Russian speaking population the Latvian and Estonian foreign policy in relation to Russia is characterized by the predominance of the negative trends and under the conditions of the absence of the internal other in the person of the Russian speaking population the Lithuanian foreign policy in relation to Russia is more likely to be characterized by the positive trends.

On the whole the comparison of the situations of the three Baltic States, namely, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, enables to state that the Russian speaking minority plays a particular role in the relations between the Baltic States and Russia.
5. Conclusion

From the very moment of the achievement of independence by the Baltic States, i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the problem of the Russian speaking population has been one of the most important in the relations between the Baltic States and Russia. The entrance of the Baltic States into the European Union formed a new context for that problem that presupposed its positive settlement. But this issue did not loose its sense. Moreover, the ideas of the presence of the threat were transferred from the field of the external security to the sphere of the domestic security. Thus the problem of the ethnic threat was stated and the source of this threat was considered to be the Russian speaking minority. Recently the Bronze soldier riots brought the issue to the surface of discussion. The comparison of the Baltic States shows that the case of Lithuania is specific in two aspects: firstly, in Lithuania the Russian speaking population is presented in the least proportion and, secondly, the relations between Lithuania and Russia are the most positive. Thus the research of the issue of the role of the Russian speaking population in the foreign policy of the Baltic States in relation to Russia after the entrance of the Baltic States into the EU was of interest.

The research problem was stated as the role of the internal other in the relations between the Baltic States and Russia through the comparison of the three situations. Thus the purpose of the research was to define the role of the Russian speaking minority in the relations between the Baltic States and Russia through the affirmation of the correlation between the situation over the Russian speaking population and the foreign policy of the country in relation to Russia in the context of the “self– other” dichotomy.

Consequently, as the theoretical foundation for the research the “self – other” dichotomy was applied. The analysis of the present dichotomy on the three levels: ontological, theoretical and empirical, at the heart of which the concepts of Carl Schmitt, Benedict Anderson and Iver Neumann lie, respectively, enabled to form the thorough understanding of the constituent parts of the dichotomy and the nature of the relations between them. The rhetorical analysis was applied as the methodological orientation and the articles of the national newspapers of the Baltic States were subject to the rhetorical analysis. The articles were divided into two groups, the objects of which were the Russian speaking population and Russia, respectively, since the correlation between them was supposed to be confirmed.

1. Taking into account the theoretical foundation the rhetorical analysis of the articles of the newspapers of the Baltic States allowed to elaborate the specific features for the definition of the group as the internal other. The group should be characterized as the internal other, firstly, if
in the political community of the country the dissociation of the society and its division into the opposing groups takes place, secondly, if the otherness of this group is emphasized and it is presented as aloof and not integrated into the society and, thirdly, if the negative representation of this group as a threat to the development and, moreover, to the existence of the nation and the nation state prevails. On the whole that means that if the division into such groups as “self” and “other” exists in the society and that if there is the necessity to protect the self, i.e. its unity and its collectivity, then this group should be analytically regarded as the internal other.

The rhetorical analysis of the articles of the newspapers of the Baltic States showed that in Latvia and Estonia the position of the Russian speaking population correspond to the characterization of the group as the internal other while in Lithuania it does not correspond to it. Thus the Russian speaking population is treated as the internal other in Latvia and Estonia while in Lithuania it is not.

2. Drawing the parallels between the image of the Russian speaking population and the representation of Russia in the Baltic States the research led to the conclusion that the correlation between them can be stated. Thus in Latvia and Estonia the negative perception of the Russian speaking minority corresponds to the negative image of Russia. Against a background of them in Lithuania the positive representation of the Russian speaking population correlates with the domination of the positive perception of Russia. Consequently, the correlation between the presence of the internal other in the person of the Russian speaking population and the negative trends in the foreign policy of the country in relation to Russia can be affirmed in Latvia and Estonia and, therefore, the correlation between the absence of the internal other in the person of the Russian speaking population and the positive trends in the foreign policy of the country in relation to Russia can be traced in Lithuania.

These results demonstrate that under the conditions of the presence of the numerous group presenting the internal other there is the necessity to protect the self through the opposition of the self and the other. But if this group is associated with some country or, to be more specific, the citizens of this country, then the representations of this group and the country with which it is associated are inevitably interconnected. The negative perception of this group since it is the internal other would correspond to the negative perception of the country. Consequently, because of the negative perception of the country the foreign policy in relation to it would be characterized by the negative trends. These are the cases of Latvia and Estonia. The absence of the negative perception of the group since it is not the internal other and the absence of the necessity to protect the self correlates with the domination of the positive image of the country and, therefore, the positive trends in the foreign policy in relation to this country. That is
the Lithuanian case. The Lithuanian case is the specific one since it stands out against a background of Latvia and Estonia.

3. On the whole the result of the research can be formulated as follows: the Russian speaking minority regarded from the position of the internal other can be treated as one of the factors influencing the foreign policy of the Baltic States in relation to Russia.

The experience of the Baltic States enables to suppose that the state of the political community of the country in particular the presence of the internal other plays a specific role in the development of its foreign policy. It presupposes that the more stable the identity is the more friendly the policy is.
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