Mikhail Zelensky


University of Tampere
International School of Social Sciences
Department of Political Science and International Relations
CBU Programme, International relations
Master’s Thesis
October 2009
Contents

Abstract 2

Introduction 3

Chapter 1. Copenhagen School and Securitization Theory 10
  1.1. Security and energy security 10
  1.2. Constructivism in the theory of International Relations 12
  1.3. Emergence of the Copenhagen School and the theory of securitization 15
  1.4. Regional Security Complex Theory 20
  1.5. Regional Energy Security Communities and Complexes 22

Chapter 2. Speech Act Theory 27
  2.1. The linguistic turn in the theory of IR and the Speech Act Theory as a method 27
  2.2. Foundations of structural linguistics 28
  2.3. Appearance and development of the Speech Act Theory 31
    2.3.1. Locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts 32
    2.3.2. Difficulties in distinguishing between locution, illocution and perlocution in theory and practice 36
  2.4. Copenhagen school and the Speech Act Theory: application and critique 42
  2.5. Securitization grammar and securitizing illocutions as indicators 45

Chapter 3. Building Regional Energy Security Complexes and Communities 47
  3.1. Regional Energy Security Complex 49
    3.1.1. Sweden 49
    3.1.2. Estonia 53
    3.1.3. Latvia 57
    3.1.4. Lithuania 59
    3.1.5. Poland 62
  3.2. Regional Energy Security Community 65
    3.2.1. Finland 65
    3.2.2. Germany 69
    3.2.3. Russia 72

Conclusion 78

List of Primary Sources 80
List of References 85
Abstract
Construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline has recently become a topical issue not only for mass-media, but for academic research as well. Surprisingly, in a world where security is ranked among the top priorities of a state’s and individual’s existence, whether we speak of military, economic or any other type of security, the Nord Stream “affair” is so far regarded as a strictly political venture or in some cases as a grand threat to ecology. Few academic writings have appeared that would analyse the pipeline project more profoundly, with a certain analytical framework and theoretical grounding involved.
My claim is that the best option suitable to find out, what actually Nord Stream project brings into the Baltic Sea Region and what the implications for the regional system of international relations will be, is the Securitization Theory offered by the Copenhagen School. However, theoretical grounds of this research orientation originating from the early 1990s need to be updated for current conditions, when energy security becomes vital. Its main instrument for analysis – the Speech Act Theory – is also underdeveloped in its application to international relations’ studies. Therefore, in the given thesis I attempt to make one step further in the development of the Regional Security Complex Theory produced by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver: applying the Speech Act Theory as an instrument for revealing securitizing moves in speeches of policymakers and other influential persons in the Baltic I attempt to prove that new entities are being created in the region due to the pipeline construction. Namely these are Regional Energy Security Complex and Community. Within each of these entities threat perceptions and grammar of (de)securitization are shared.
Results of my research allow me to argue that Sweden, Poland, Estonia and Lithuania constitute a new Regional Energy Security Complex, while Finland, Germany and Russia build up a Regional Energy Security Community.
Introduction

In the new century we all live in the age of security, whether we like it or not. It does not mean that we live in a society of comfort, where nothing puts lives, health, well-being and future at peril. Quite the contrary, we encounter a great number of threats that did not exist or have not been relevant beforehand. By saying ‘the age of security’ I imply the age marked by security concerns, constant strive to obtain, enhance and maintain a certain level of security. Security perpetuates itself in almost every sphere of our lives, at personal, social, national, global levels. Today, we can speak of military, economic, environmental, social, political and almost any other type of security, including the energy one. The energy security concerns and the investigation of such have rightfully become established as a part of general security research and in my view this development should be seen as an acceptance of energy security as an extremely important and vital area of international relations.

Furthermore, I construe that although it has only recently shifted into the mainstream of the discipline, there is a lot of research material available as energy concerns should be seen as ultimate and ever-present; people have always considered availability and accessibility of different types of energy as an essential condition for their self-preservation. In view of industrialization, and the subsequent industrial society, the topic of energy security has risen to the top of academic and political agenda. However, it has only recently become so topical in the political discourse, namely when the issue of energy security was not anymore perceived as a sheer part of a country’s economy, but as an issue of prior political importance, and sometimes, even of national security. In other words, energy supplies, their availability and stability became gradually politicized and securitized.

Securitization, in turn, not a particular process, but the whole phenomenon, rests upon the two basic notions: intersubjectivity and threat perception, which in a generalization attempt can be combined in one –perception of a threat shared by a community of people. By applying the concept of perception (most importantly – threat perception), I will attempt to show that energy security concerns, or equally concerns of energy insecurity, can be seen as a matter of research largely affected by securitization discourse and securitization practices.

The Theory of Securitization is the domain of the Copenhagen school of the IR theory. Researchers adherent to this particular school of thought noticed first that security is becoming an increasingly wider applied and more important concept. Even more so, it often became an attribute of some processes, measures, events or whatsoever, lending them a new status, turning
them into issue of the highest concern. Thus, only by saying in a right way that an issue should be regarded as a matter of security it is possible to really make it such, regardless of its initial importance, and security is always important.

To further our understanding of this issue area I deem it to be necessary for the Baltic Sea region to be analysed, as it can highlight some insightful facts about the dynamics of the states behaviour under the pressure of energy security concerns. I argue that recently the energy security balance in the Baltic has started to change, because new energy buy / sell relationships are being formed in the region.

In this regard the Nord Stream gas pipeline project appears to be a new and exciting phenomenon for an international relations researcher. It is neither the first pipeline in the world that crosses boarders and connects countries (this is what brings the issue into the field of IR), nor it is the first undersea pipeline. Quite interestingly, so far it is rather an imaginary construct existing only on paper and in people’s minds, because the construction works, except for preparatory have not been started up till now. Yet, one is able to see, if takes a careful look, that it has already changed the energy security balance, because unlike energy balance it is rather something, which is perceived by people in a certain way, not something existent objectively. The key point here is that different societies react in a different way to these alterations in energy relations between the countries. And since currently energy security is becoming if not crucial, then at least as important as military security for some states, a similar reaction, and similar securitization (or desecuritization) debate may well be the reason to unite the countries that manifest similar discourse traits and similar “behaviour” into groups.

As I will argue in the first chapter of the given Master’s thesis, these groups can be called Regional Energy Security Complexes and Communities – a further elaboration of Regional Security Complex Theory invented by the Copenhagen school thinkers. Complexes would be groups of countries of regions that have a common negative threat perception and consequently (actually, it is a two-way dependence between discourse and practice) securitize relevant issues. On the contrary, within a Community there would be no place for securitization, because, for instance, energy dependencies are perceived positively. Within a Regional Energy Security Complex threat perception regarding energy supply, transit, balance, etc. is shared, as is the securitization grammar. It would be an exaggeration to claim that these countries start to speak the same language due to some threats they realize to have in common. However, similar grammar of securitization implies that securitizing moves or securitizing speech acts are carried out / articulated in a resembling manner, sometimes they can even be the same, only translated into a respective language. Therefore, similar grammar of securitization can be an indicator of a
Regional Energy Security Complex being constructed. The lack of such grammar, shared desecuritization or counter-securitization grammar in a number of countries or societies can on the opposite indicate that they belong to a Regional Energy Security Community.

How to recognize and analyse the securitization grammar? A useful and efficient tool is proposed by the same Copenhagen school – it is the Speech Act Theory. To avoid confusion, it makes sense to note that it is not actually a theory when applied in international relations’ studies (it still is a theory in linguistics) – it is used as a method. Borrowed from linguistics it allows to carry out speech analysis revealing certain speech acts that carry securitization load in them, securitizing speech acts. According to the Copenhagen school classics, the latter is only them successful, when a desired effect upon the audience is achieved. However, in the very text securitizing moves can be distinguished – illocutionary speech acts that involve the intention of securitization, but we do not know if they are successful or not.

As follows from what was said, the main hypothesis of the given research is that due to the Nord Stream gas pipeline construction (whether it will be eventually constructed or not) new Regional Energy Security Complex and Community emerge in the Baltic Sea region. There are eight countries most concerned with the pipeline project: Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden, and the initial presupposition is that Russia, Germany and Finland would form a Regional Energy Security Community, while the rest would constitute a Complex.

Thus, the object of my research is the energy security in the Baltic Sea region, while the target is the securitization discourse and securitization practices within the separate countries’ debates.

The goal is to find out if Regional Energy Security Complex and Community do exist, and if yes, what countries of the region do they include. Hence, the following objectives are to be achieved:

- elaborate and develop the concepts of Regional Energy Security Complex and Community;
- elaborate and develop the concept of securitization grammar;
- using the Speech Act Theory method – analyse speeches and statements by leaders, policy-makers and other relevant securitizing actors from the countries concerned in order to either reveal securitizing speech acts (securitization grammar), or on the opposite – find desecuritization or counter-securitization statements;
- analyse, compare, confront and sort the disclosed speech acts in order to prove that certain countries of the region do fall in either RESCommunity, or RESComplex.

The research is novel and topical, because on the one hand, the issues of energy security as such and Nord Stream pipeline construction in particular are urgent and pressing, widely spoken about and to an extent researched. However, as regards the theoretical background, the only modern and relevant framework for security analysis so far is the one suggested by the Copenhagen school. Unfortunately, its “foundation fathers” Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan have stopped in their theoretical investigations at some point, and the theory remains not updated for several years. Copenhagen school approach to securitization, and more precisely – their approach to analyzing how it works and how to study the very process and the effect, is being widely criticized for being dysfunctional, contradictory and underdeveloped. To an extent that is true, but I will not dismiss the framework and the method suggested by the Buzan and Wæver, for they are may still prove to be functional and effective if updated and applied correctly.

Initially energy security is not in the forefront of the Copenhagen school sight, it is told to be only a part of economic security sector in the Regional Security Complex Theory. In a version of the theory further elaborated by the Finnish researcher Mikko Palonkorpi, energy becomes a significant sector of security, even a dominating one and uniting several other sectors. He also moves forward an idea that there are such formations as Regional Energy Security Complexes. I argue with the idea that energy security is something dominating over political, military or economic, but quite apparently in the world of today it should be regarded as an equal security sector in the Regional Security Complex Theory.

My idea that there can be a division in what Regional Energy Security Complexes could be is new. I claim that the negative threat / energy dependency perception and shared securitization creates Regional Energy Security Complexes, while positive perceptions and desecuritization / counter-securitization create Regional Energy Security Communities.

The given Master’s thesis has three chapters: theoretical, methodological and practical. In the first chapter some general thoughts are presented on what is the place of the Copenhagen school in particular and constructivism as a wider phenomenon in the history and in the spectrum of the theory of International Relation. Besides, the theoretical fundaments of the Copenhagen school are considered, as well as the two main “discoveries” made by Buzan, Wæver, De Wilde and other adherents – Securitization Theory and Regional Security Complex Theory. Most importantly, the possible updates to theories suggested by the Copenhagen school are also considered in the first chapter.
The second chapter is completely devoted to the method – the Speech Act Theory. It is a rather complicated tool for an IR researcher to use since it comes from linguistics and disciplines adjacent to it. However, since the IR theory experiences the linguistic turn, as some scholars claim, it is necessary to learn how to apply these borrowed tools correctly and efficiently. Therefore, the second chapter deals with the very foundations of structural linguistics and the Speech Act Theory presented in the works by Ferdinand de Saussure and John Austin, as well as later alterations, additions and complications to the theory, which is still being developed. Finally there are thoughts on how the Speech Act Theory can be applied to security studies within the Copenhagen school framework.

In the third chapter an analysis of speeches, statements, interviews, articles, reports and other textual sources, from which securitization (or desecuritization and counter-securitization) speech acts can be extracted. These materials come from the eight countries of the Baltic Sea region that are mostly affected by and, therefore, mostly concerned with the Nord Stream project. The main languages of these sources are English, Russian and German. Some texts were translated from Polish, Estonian and Swedish (for the latter I am thankful to my colleague Olga Khristoforova).

Regarding the literature I used in my research, first of all I have to notice the key works by the Copenhagen school representatives. The groundbreaking book “Security: a New Framework for Analysis”\(^1\) by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde was published in 1998. It was not the first published issue where the basic ideas of securitization theory were given, but the most comprehensive and well worked-though one. An interesting debate between critics and proponents was observed in the mid-1990s in the well-known international relations’ journals, a debate over securitizations and viability of the new theory.\(^2\)

Especially I have to note Viacheslav Morozov’s guidebook on Securitization Theory\(^3\) – the issue renders a comprehensive insight into the Copenhagen school way of theorizing, and very clearly explains how securitization works and how it is possible.

---

The next key book in the framework of the Copenhagen school research came out in 2003. It’s title – Regions and Powers – and hence the content, brings Buzan and Wæver closer to positivism, because in a very positivist manner they empirically test their theoretic presuppositions in nearly all regions of the world. Despite that their Regional Security Complex Theory, an “invention” with constructivist spirit, appeared to be a new and interesting word in the Theory of Securitization and IR theory in general.

The scholar already mentioned here, Mikko Palonkorpi, has brought new life into the RCST regarding it from the perspective of energy security. Some of his ideas have inspired me to further investigate on how RSCT works and what it lacks, as well as how it could be interpreted in the light of energy security concerns in an appropriate way.

My study of the Speech Act theory is largely based upon the works of the founder of structural linguistics Ferdinand de Saussure, founder of the Speech Act Theory itself John Austin (whose lectures were only published by his students after his death), John Searle, who did much to develop a rather simplistic theory by Austin, Daniel Vanderveken, etc.

A work by Anni Kangas was useful in terms of understanding the pattern of Finnish-Russian relations, and also in comprehending the factors that can be an additional force driving certain countries in or out of a Regional Energy Security Complex or Community.

A research by a Norwegian political analyst Bendik Solum Whist offers a comprehensive an objective insight into political and public debates on Nord Stream all over the Baltic Sea region. The majority of speeches, articles and other textual materials for the practical research in the third chapter were obtained through internet search. The resources that provided most useful information and texts are Nord Stream AG official web-site, sites of presidents of Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Poland, German Chancellor, as well as the sites of Foreign,

---

Environmental and Economic Ministries of the respective countries. Some of materials were retrieved from the leading news agency web-sites.

---

Chapter 1. Copenhagen School and Securitization Theory

What is currently taking place in the Baltic Sea – namely, the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, is most certainly a field of research for any IR scholar, be he or she a neorealist, neoliberal, postmodernist, etc. The standpoint I represent in my master’s thesis research is the one of the Copenhagen school. The choice of this very theoretical platform is based on an understanding that those shifts in the traditional routes of natural gas transportation to European countries that are now taking place undoubtedly raise multiple security concerns in a number of countries and initiate securitization processes. In this chapter the place of the Copenhagen school as a part of constructivist paradigm in the spectrum of IR theory is analysed, as well as its two main inventions that are of key importance for the given research: Securitization Theory and Regional Security Complex Theory. Besides, the notion of energy security is scrutinized.

1.1. Security and energy security

What actually is energy security?

This concept is widely used both in the media and in academic research, but the definitions given are vague and often limited only to the economic aspects of the matter. What is more restricting in the attempts to bring in a comprehensive definition is that it usually concerns the safety of supplies from the customers’ point of view, and here one can further expatiate on economic instability, international terrorism, insufficient investment into the transportation (pipeline) infrastructure and other factors, which can interrupt the supplies. Scholars often forget that not only those who buy the resource want to make the transactions stable, cheap and safe. It is also the supplier that wants to have stable markets and customers (and desirably high prices). Here are two definitions, likely to be the interpretations of what Buzan and Wæver used to claim, provided by Mikko Palonkorpi as an example of insufficient determination of factors and actors concerned.
[...] conventional definition of energy security [...] that of securing adequate energy supplies at reasonable and stable prices in order to sustain economic performance and growth.

[...] energy insecurity as a susceptibility to prolonged supply disruptions and price spikes\(^{14}\)

These definitions do not reflect the great variety of aspects essential to the notion of energy security. In this example the political component, which is in fact becoming increasingly important in the sphere of carbohydrates supplies for the European countries and European Union as a whole, is left alone completely. For instance, propositions to diversify energy supplies was topical in the EU institutions since the early 1990s, but it is after the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict in 2005 that the European officials started to realize the importance of the political factor, which is in turn the very securitization that I will deal with further.

And this is the very place where one can observe the interplay of the political and economical, because the sphere of the political has not died out – it has only become mostly economically oriented\(^{15}\). In this case economical / energy issues are not only the focal point of a single state’s policies, it is the transnational (the level of the EU) political effort that is required at least to attempt to solve the problem common for those states.

Moreover, when direct political instruments are of little use, most states concerned with the problem of energy resources supply, which earlier used to be perceived as purely economical issue, resort to securitization. This can be understood as a purely political tool applying to public relations and mass media in order to render energy, economic or any other problems political and of key importance. Later in this work the examples of how securitization of energy and energy security issues can be shared among several states and thus become a transnational political phenomenon will be provided.

The gas disputes interrupted Russian natural gas deliveries to several EU countries for a short period of time, enough though to highlight the growing dependency of Europe on energy imports, and in particular on imported Russian carbohydrates. Energy security discourse that followed the crisis in Europe has underlined the danger of overdependency on one main energy supplier, namely Russia, for the EU energy security and the possibility that energy could be used as a “political weapon” or at least as a means for exerting pressure by Russia on its Western


\(^{15}\) Ibid.
partners. It is a perfect illustration supporting an argument that the concept of energy security is something much broader than sheer economy implying price and supply stability. In fact, energy security is tightly connected with dependency relationships\textsuperscript{16}, which in turn render the issue political.

Thus, it is almost impossible to come up with a comprehensive definition of energy security, because the notion can be manifold – in any case the researcher has to keep in mind all the factors mentioned above.

\section*{1.2. Constructivism in the theory of International Relations}

Copenhagen school was quite obviously born within the constructivist discourse in the theory of international relations. Now, it is necessary to comprehend, what is the place of Copenhagen school representatives’ within constructivism (or is it probably wider in some respects), and what and where is constructivism itself in the IR theoretical spectrum.

In the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century constructivism became widely recognized as one of the main directions of IR theory, which could probably open new dimensions, new paths of development for the discipline. Liberalism was no longer the main opponent and basic contraposition to realism. Moreover, it is assumed that with the appearance of constructivism, realists and liberals moved closer to each other - today many of them prefer to be referred to as rationalists\textsuperscript{17}.

Contemporary debates within the theory of IR are mostly between rationalism and constructivism, albeit it would be incorrect to assume that there are no contradictions inside the latter. Like rationalists, who profess and keep to quite different theoretical approaches that have few things in common (e.g., neorealism and rational choice theory), constructivists or post-positivists are diverse. Post-structuralists and postmodernists may not share the ideas of “pure” constructivists when it comes to the role of language in the political, ratio of social and linguistic, but they will definitely unite to criticize the postulates of rationalism, such as the

\textsuperscript{16} Palonkorpi, Mikko. Matter over Mind?
possibility of objective knowledge conditioned by the history or objective understanding of the social world together with rational acts regarded as the basis for political analysis.\textsuperscript{18}

There are many possible ways in which constructivism can be classified – it can be “thin” and “thick” (moderate and radical)\textsuperscript{19} or conventional, interpretative and critical\textsuperscript{20}, with many other options not to mention.

The wider is the range of phenomena that are being regarded not as something outside the theory, a given reality, but taken into account and researched as a result of social construction processes, the “thicker” and more critical this type of constructivism is considered to be. Some scholars adhering to the constructivist background claim that only social norms and rules are constructed, some (like Alexander Wendt and Ted Hopf) involve some more complex categories, e.g. identity, which is, of course, constructed as well. For all constructivists it is common to disagree with rationalist understanding of human nature and social action.

Along with constructivism in wide sense, uniting representatives of a number of philosophical and theoretical schools, there is also a narrower constructivism, the theoretical school attempting to elaborate a logical and comprehensive model describing international relations. The work by Emanuel Adler\textsuperscript{21} published in 1997 has played the key role in determining the place of constructivism in contemporary IR theory and its self-identification. The scholar claimed that these are the interpretations of the material world that change this world and make it influence people’s actions and interaction in this or that way. He also suggests that constructivism is likely to keep to a rather neutral position somewhere in-between rationalists and postmodernists.\textsuperscript{22}

On the one hand, constructivists criticize realists for their structural determinism and liberals – for their methodological individualism.\textsuperscript{23} They believe that the structure, indeed, limits the freedom of individuals’ and collective actors’ actions, but any social structure is the product of people’s activities. Constructivists criticize the existing social structures, revealing the conditions stipulating their creation (construction) and functioning that will provide for overcoming the structural determination of a social action.

\textsuperscript{21} Adler E.. Seizing the Middle Ground.. P. 322.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Morozov V. Teoriya sekyuritizatsii [Securitization Theory]. P. 12.
On the other hand, advocates of constructivism beyond doubt recognize that the world around us is real, and this reality is a fundamental premise for human existence and actions. Unlike postmodernists and poststructuralists, they do not focus primarily on language issues and do not negate the possible study of social reality outside this linguistic dimension, however, they do recognize that the nature of social reality is dualistic: material and ideal.24

And, unlike rationalists, constructivists argue that persistent process of reflecting and interpretation of the surrounding environment by man is the main factor determining the very notion of reality in its factual and normative manifestations.

One of the basic notions of the constructivist theory is intersubjectivity, the notion that replaces the concepts of positivism, such as mentality or social consciousness.25 Constructivism dismisses the idea of collective reason, promoting collective knowledge instead. Intersubjective ideas and notions of the world, or surrounding environment become an objective reality because they are shared by most people.

Efforts made by IR scholars working within the constructivist theory over the recent decades have led to publishing of several groundbreaking theoretical monographs, among which “Rules, Norms and Decisions” by Kratochwil26, “World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations” by Onuf27 and the classical “Social Theory of International Politics” by Wendt28.

Therefore, the theory of securitization should be considered in the context of the general evolution of the IR theory that took place in the end of the twentieth century marked with the shift of focus from “objective” factors and national interests to processes of social construction of the international system and all its elements. In this light the implications of Nord Stream gas pipeline construction appear to be very interesting to explain through the prism of constructivism (namely, the Securitization Theory), because plain worldview of clearly positivist theories does not yield understanding of threats are treated in people’s mind, and how they can unite societies or put them into an opposition.

25 Ibid.
1.3. Emergence of the Copenhagen School and the theory of securitization

As it was already mentioned, securitization theory is one of the most characteristic and consecutive supplements of constructivist theory to international agenda. In turn, the Copenhagen School provides thinking tools with the help of which it is possible to diversify our understanding of energy security.

After the end of the Cold War in international relations studies and in areas related to it a persistent increase of interest to security researches was observed, which was accompanied by broadening of the very notion of security. Today it has become a usual practice to discuss not only conventional, “hard”, i.e. military security, but also its “soft” forms – economic, ecological, migratory, energy and even cultural. Not all scholars, however, share the idea of such reconceptualization of one of the key concepts or categories of international relations. Some argue that the broadened interpretation of security deprives it of its heuristic value.29

Moreover, as it became explicit after the 9/11 events, total security concern leads to the spread of mass hysterias and to introduction of new control procedures, direct and indirect expenditures of which exceed losses and damages caused by terrorist acts. It is known that a citizen of the United States taking one direct flight has only 1 chance in 13 million to perish in a plane crash (regardless of the reasons of the accident: both terrorist acts and technical errors, pilots’ and air communicators’ mistakes are included in this statistics). The same chance to become a catastrophe-victim has an American, who is going to travel 11 miles along the most secure road in the USA (highway in countryside in inner-states). Despite the statistics, aviation security is a more politicized sphere of social life than road traffic. Demonstrative and extremely expensive measures are taken here to control passengers and their luggage, which seems to be not the most efficient way to spend public funds. Interestingly, despite permanent warnings of officials and of some experts, there has been no single attempt to commit a large-scale act of terrorism in the territory of the United States – neither using aircrafts, nor in any different way after September 2001.30

The problem of exaggerated attention of the citizens of developed countries to their security is not something new. As far back as in 1964 John Fowles sadly wrote that people of the Western World virtually pursue a mirage seeking total security: “… It is absolutely safe in the

bank vault, atomic bomb shelter, death is also a safe condition. Security is one of the prison walls of the welfare society; beginning from Pax Romana personal security became a pathologically obsessive European idea.\textsuperscript{31} The absolute security is incompatible with life since all living thing sooner or later dies, so life is always under the threat. However, the illusion of accessibility of the absolute security appears to be an important factor of modern social dynamics.

Not denying the necessity and importance of such discussions a group of scholars, who worked at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) and The Copenhagen University, drew attention to the fact that from the standpoint of political sciences it is much more important to research the character of the public discussion on security issues and not the threats themselves comparing their acuteness. These new ideas, the new way of dealing with security issues won the approval of many scholars worldwide, and in 1996 this theoretical school was first referred to as the Copenhagen school.\textsuperscript{32} The first fundamental publication summarizing what was already said in numerous articles in prominent IR and political theory journals was the collective monograph “Security: A New Framework for Analysis”, published in the year 1998.\textsuperscript{33}

At a glance it may appear that the new approach, offered by the authors of the securitization theory Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, could be labeled as a “broadening” one, for it is claimed that all aspects of social life, not only problems of defense against military threats, can be included in the sphere of security studies. In fact, however, the Copenhagen school transfers the discussion to a higher theoretical level. Copenhagen school researchers do not take part in discussion on threat correlation, instead, they study this discussion in order to find out which threats will be admitted by society as objectively existing, and how priorities of public policy in security sphere will be set. In complete correspondence with constructivist postulates this theoretical direction asserts that a threat becomes a factor influencing political processes in a given society only when the society itself recognizes the threat as such. For example, it is evident that terrorist threat to the United States objectively existed before September the 11\textsuperscript{th}, but only after the acts of terrorism it has become a crucial factor defining the evolution of domestic and foreign policy of the USA. One can as well find innumerable arguments in favour of the

statement that expansion of NATO does not threaten Russia, but the very fact that this expansion is interpreted in Russia as a threat, indicates continuing process of reproduction the image of the West as a geopolitical opponent. Studying social construction of threats thus makes it possible to estimate more precisely the social dynamics inside the society and its relations with the environment.

Not everyone supports the Copenhagen school approach to security issues. It is often accused of rejecting the objective reality of international politics and concentrating excessively on “subjective” factors, implying, first of all, the language, while other points of criticism refer to the denial of positive role of the state in security prevention\textsuperscript{34}, static and “objectivist” understanding of society, etc. Lively discussions frequently occur in professional journals regarding this matter and arguments of supporters of the Copenhagen school\textsuperscript{35} sound at least as persuasive as criticism articulated by its opponents. The best evidence in favour of this approach, however, is the wide application of the securitization theory and respective methodology by researchers working in many adjacent fields.

Copenhagen school interprets security as a political practice, and the use of this concept – as a speech act. The essence of this speech act is in postulating that there is an existential threat to a certain object (referent of security), which is important for a certain audience, and, departing from this statement the speaker insists on emergency measures that could save the referent object.\textsuperscript{36}

In any case we can assume that the issue dealt is indeed a security issue only when several necessary elements are in place. These are the referent object, the audience, existential threat and emergency threat-combating measures. Even if the speaker uses the term “security”, the matter is not about security in fact if one of these elements is lacking. At the same time quite often it happens that a security practice is conducted without the use of respective terminology. This is why the Copenhagen school approach to the language of security is differential, implying that the meaning of every concept, notion or term is defined within the context of its relation to other notions on the complex language system.\textsuperscript{37}

When studying security matters the main goal is not in finding other whether and to what


\textsuperscript{36} Morozov V. Teoriya sekyuritizatsii [Securitization Theory]. P. 16.

\textsuperscript{37} Buzan et al. Security. P. 41.
extent does the threat or usage of the term “security” corresponds to reality, but in studying the self-referential speech practice\textsuperscript{38} – a certain problem becomes a matter of security and security studies not because an objective threat exists, but because this problem is perceived as a threat in the security discourse. It is necessary to note, that the real threats are not rejected, they are only referred to as subject to a different approach. Besides, they are sometimes taken as “facilitating conditions” for securitization.

When dealing with security matters it is necessary to determine the referent object – most often it is the state or the society, country’s economy (economic wellbeing) or the environment (ecological security). One more typical feature is articulation the point of no return – the moment when a threat reaches its apogee and after which salvation of the referent object is impossible whatever emergency measures are taken. Setting this time limit also contributes to reaching out of the ordinary political practice.

Turning either object into the referent of the security discourse is the very process of securitization. It can be regarded as the highest or marginal form of politicization, with no strict dividing line possible to draw between those processes. In general,

“any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure).”\textsuperscript{39}

Copenhagen school distinguishes between securitizing moves and securitization itself. Securitization takes place in case a securitizing speech act turns out successful, i.e. “gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures.”\textsuperscript{40}

In other words, if a speaker succeeds in fixing a certain issue as a problem of security in day-to-day politics, than the securitizing act is a success, and securitization takes place, even if the emergency measures were not sanctioned. Anyway, this issue will be treated as the issue of security every time when brought up in the future, and any conditions that can be presented as an aggravation of the problem will easily stipulate for breaking the conventional boundaries of what is permissible in ordinary political practice.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. P. 23–24.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid. P. 25.
A detailed consideration of the concept of security offered by the Copenhagen school applying the Speech Act Theory allows for a conclusion that security is a practice carried out via a certain number of statements / speech acts, each of those is both stating (locutionary) and performative (illocutionary), and, hence, an indirect speech act.\footnote{Searle J. R. Indirect Speech Acts // Cole P., Morgan J. (eds). Syntax and Semantics. Vol. 3. Speech Acts. New York: Academic Press, 1975. P. 59–82.}

Constative function of these statements is in postulating the existential threat, while the performative – not only in forewarning of the audience about the threats, but first and foremost in call (more often – an implicit call) for departing from common (ordinary) political practices.

It is important to emphasize that the methods used within the Copenhagen school framework are directed towards the assessment of political consequences and not the linguistic features. Successfulness of speech acts is regarded in terms of perlocution, omitting the illocutionary aspects. This means, that the reaction of the audience subject to securitization practice is more important. At the same time, securitizing move itself regarded as a speech act is illocutionary.

However, Copenhagen school thinkers have been severely criticized for the indecisive “middle ground” position, simultaneously giving huge credit to text (in a postmodernist way), and trying to link their theory with the “objective reality” of international relations.\footnote{McSweeney B. Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School // Review of International Studies. 1996. Vol. 22. No. 1. P. 83.} Indeed, Copenhagen school, as it was already stated, does not reject the study of real problems and real threats. They are considered as facilitating conditions to securitizing moves (if the threats are really tangible). At the same time some less tangible issues, as, for example, global warming, are harder to securitize.

In my view, the Copenhagen School authors can also be criticized for insufficient elaboration of this very perlocutionary effect produced on the audience – on the one hand, it is key to the theory of securitization, and on the other hand, Copenhagen school representatives do not suggest any model or framework for studying the effect in a proper way. These flaws and further criticism of securitization theory, and to be more precise – of how Speech Act Theory method is to be applied are scrutinized in the second chapter of this work.

The notion of security provided by speech act does not reject the possibility of the “broadened” interpretation, but does not anyhow urge to it. Every case of securitization should be regarded separately depending on specific conditions. Of course, securitization can often be a result of political manipulations aiming at achievement of certain political results bypassing the
formal procedures, this is why every case should be apriori regarded with a certain degree of prejudice.

The best option would be the maximal narrowing of the sphere where security framework is applied down to the “riverbed” of conventional process of negotiations typical for political sphere. This phenomenon is described as desecuritization. The main idea here is that the normal political procedures, unlike extraordinary measures, are designed to promote the most responsible and effective way of problem-solving.

However, desecuritization can not come as a result of a one-time political action, it can not be carried out by directive. Attitudes to an issue as a matter of security are fixed on the intersubjective level and can not be voluntarily cancelled. Desecuritization is about complex discursive practice implying a conscious refusal to address a certain issue as a matter of security, demonstrating the possibility of solving the issue via ordinary political practices or even excluding it from the political agenda (depoliticization).

1.4. Regional Security Complex Theory

The fundamental book written in 1998 proposed mostly theoretical explanation of the new approach to security studies, being limited by rather simple models and examples of its empirical application. In their book published in 2003, “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security”, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver attempted to operationalize their theory and elaborate a comprehensive concept of international security, which was called by them Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). The book proposes an empirics-oriented survey of security practices dynamics all over the world. The goal of the authors consisted in working out a universal theory and methodology of security studies applicable to all sectors and regions, which certainly required a great work and detailed studying of all more or less significant international conflicts.

RSCT comes from the hypothesis formulated in the previous research – that an optimal starting point for studying security practices is regional level, and only after researching regional processes it is possible to proceed to interregional and global levels. In full harmony with the

---

spirit of constructivist theory regions are defined not as initially given and geographically
determined units, but as a result of interaction between social actors (mainly, but not exclusively,
between states) in the course of which influence distributes and redistributes, as well as friendly
and conflict relations emerge. It is the concentration of attention on the structures and patterns of
friendship and hostility or amity and enmity, which appear and fail as a result of securitization
and desecuritization processes, forms the most typical feature of RSCT. These traits distinguish
it both from neorealism, which mostly concentrates on power distribution, and from geopolitics
characterized by the “friend-enemy” relations model given from the very start.

At the same time, common for RSCT and classic geopolitics is acceptance of defining
role of geographical factor, and this differs RSCT not only form neorealism, but also from
critical geopolitics. If neorealists on the one side prefer considering states as similar elements of
the system, which distinguish from each other only by their power, and territory in critical
geopolitics is studied as social construct, Buzan and Wæver on the other side especially
emphasize the fact that states do not have geographic mobility, and that location of the state in
either concrete geographic surroundings is the crucial premise for defining the spectrum of
possible security practices.

Most threats in contemporary world correspond with geographic proximity to their source
and, therefore, geographic nearness usually causes a more intensive cooperation in security
sphere between the elements of international system. But, finally, security always has a relational
nature: it is cooperation by means of securitization acts that binds states in security complexes
and this tie could be considered only as a unity of geographic dimension and discursive practices
of securitization and desecuritization.

A desire to work out a universally applicable theory and test it on the conflict and
cooperation examples in different regions of the world has made the authors work out a very
complicated terminological apparatus, which in addition makes it possible for them to handle
different cases of deviation from the norm predefined by their theory. Moreover, they insist that
regions do not cross or overlap, which adds theoretical grace but creates additional empirical
troubles. This brings about the necessity of elaborating a sophisticated classification of regions:
they can be standard, centered or fall under the influence of a great power; they also can form in
supercomplex or, on the contrary, demonstrate the absence of their own dynamics, being
unstructured and overlaid. States, in turn, can play the role of regional, great and superpowers, as
well as buffers and insulators. An outcome of these systematization exercises is the world

44 Palonkorpi, Mikko. Matter over Mind?
picture, where almost each region demonstrates a unique set of features and characteristics, and, therefore, universal applicability of the theory is questioned. However, a broad historical material, which this research relies upon, makes it possible for the authors to show how the regions are formed and transformed, how they turn from one category to another, and this makes the use of ultra difficult terminological apparatus by the authors more reasonable.

However, there is still an open question about reasons because of which the security policy in either region evolves in one certain direction from several possible. For instance the authors convincingly demonstrate that the most important driving force in European Security Complex is securitization of the past, which for Europeans is associated with wars and destructions. Return to the past, possibility of a new war between European nation states appears as the main threat to wellbeing of contemporary Europeans, and namely this prompted an unprecedented integration level between European states in the end of the day. At the same time, such interpretation of security in combination with the key importance of economic mechanisms of integration have put a geographic boundary to integration processes, in which Russia and countries to the south of Mediterranean Sea will hardly be included in the foreseeable future. Why does the ghost of wars between France and Germany, which are now a part of very remote history, still remain a driving force of the European integration? Why it was not impossible to include the Cold War into the image of the securitized past? The last option would probably allow including Russia in the European political space.

1.5. Regional Energy Security Communities and Complexes

As it was mentioned above, Buzan and Wæver have elaborated Regional Security Complex theory without due attention to energy factors, binding them with the economic ones instead.

Having thoroughly researched the phenomenon of threats they assumed that most security threats spread only over comparatively short distances, which creates security interdependence within a certain geographical area – presumably a group of regions or states. Securitization of certain economic, political or other issues is valid and relevant for the whole group, and this builds up a Regional Security Complex.
In other words, regional security complexes represent a set of security concerns and successful securitization cases over a certain territory, where security practices of actors constituting the complex are so similar that it becomes difficult to tell security policies of one actor from the ones of another.

There are two basic factors that determine the very fact of RSC existence, as well as their size, shape and level of activity (or say, the level of threat perception). These are dominance of one actor over the certain geographical territory and historical amity/enmity patterns.46

Basing on the ideas of Buzan and Wæver and following the patterns of their theorizing one can easily transfer the same formulas into the sphere of energy security. Such Regional Energy Security Complexes would be formed by energy dependencies of two and more actors / states and perception of this dependency as an existential threat. In economic terms all energy interactions, and hence, threats, are connected with producing, purchasing and transiting energy resources. Following the Copenhagen school logic one can assume that the threats that are caused by energy dependencies are more intense between states (or regions) in close geographical proximity, departing from the idea that it is the geographical nearness, which is the key determining factor for region-building and intra-regional dependencies. However, at the same time a thousand mile long gas pipeline can create an energy dependency (and hence, energy security community or complex) between states that have few tensions due to their relative remoteness from each other.

Regarding securitization, as Buzan and Wæver approach it, it is about issues that are articulated as existential threats to referent objects. In order to create an energy security complex, dependencies, either energy or of any other origin, first have to be publicly articulated as the existential threat. Of course, most of the time a temptation to securitize issues that do not represent such threat is too high, and therefore, this is what usually happens.

Here, I switch to Gazprom’s Nord Stream example. The pipeline is to connect Russian Primorsk and German Greifswald by the year 2012, with a possibility of adjoining links to other countries, for example, Sweden. With the construction of the pipeline one can observe an example of dramatic change: the infrastructure is being reformed in order not to be dependent on other states, which are in turn being deprived of their transit. This illustrates how energy security threats are combated, from the Russian and Gazprom point of view. On the other hand, shifts in natural gas transportation routes seem to prove that without respective leverage for exerting pressure or bargaining (namely transit), the respective countries’ perception of energy security

Palonkorpi, Mikko. Matter over Mind?

23
threat, with 100% dependence on Russian natural gas (keeping in mind though that this is not 100% total energy dependence due to other components of energy sector), increases dramatically.

However, what happens in the Baltic Sea Region’s system of international relations does not correspond to theorizing within a Copenhagen school theorizing pattern in many ways – not creating any considerable threats in Germany and Sweden (at least on the top political level), it quite obviously raises concerns in such countries as Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The issue is being actively politicized and securitized by the officials of these countries, and not only in the sphere of energy, but also in the political and ecological spheres. I let myself believe that energy in fact holds the top position, and the rest is just a matter of public securitization. At the same time it is quite obvious, that Russia, Germany, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands tend not to securitize the pipeline construction issue, although some people in these countries seem to be concerned at least by ecological matters. In other words, the countries mentioned above share desecuritization processes, and, therefore, create some sort of community. In order to distinguish between the Regional Energy Security Complexes and these groups of countries, it would be logical to introduce a new concept here, as binary opposition to the Complexes – Regional Energy Security Communities.

Making a step back to theory, if Regional Energy Security Complexes are formed between two or more states by energy dependencies, a very substantial factor should be taken into account here – whether the dependency is within the Complex (or the Community), or is it an external dependency. The logical problem is that the supplier never securitizes the issue of supplies – of course this actor is interested in stability of supplies to get constant revenues, but the problems, in case there are any, are always solved in a desecuritized way, in form of “just business” dialogue. Therefore, a Regional Energy Security Complex can not involve the supplying country and the recipient country (-ies) that perceive this dependency as a threat. Such Complex can only be constructed among recipient countries that share securitization and are dependant on the same supplier. On the contrary, recipient countries that desecuritize the energy dependency together with the supplier, build up Regional Energy Security Communities, involving the supplier and other recipients dependent on the same supplier and choosing the amity pattern, not perceiving the dependency as a threat.

There are a number of various approaches to interpreting what a Security Community, a term first introduced by Karl Deutsch,47 is, and the harder it gets when speaking of Energy

Security Community, a rather new phenomenon. The idea initially was that the states integrated into a Security Community would share the very sense of community and outside enemies. Speaking in a constructivist way, they would share threat perceptions and securitization processes.

The European Union was supposed to be a good example of a Security Community, but some would already disagree claiming that the EU looses its sense of community having expanded to 27 members. Even if not so, the Union has never had a common Energy Security Community. Every time when some common energy policies were attempted, there were countries that failed to adhere to it, or just silently disagreed.

It is necessary to underline that Regional Energy Security Communities have little in common with the Deutschian security communities and those of Adler and Barnett. They are not so much about the political will of states or societies, it is about threat perceptions that dominate these societies.

Now a couple of words about historical amity and enmity patterns. For instance, a state with stable bilateral relations with another state may not consider even 50% energy dependency on the supplying state as a substantial security threat. In the same time a state with negative relations experience or historically constructed enmity pattern of relations with another state, that is by misfortune its energy resource supplier, most certainly will perceive even 20% dependency as a threat to its energy security, and moreover – to its national security. Although, in real conditions we can observe only a mixture of political and economic components of energy security, it does not reduce the importance of analytical separation of these components, which forms the foundation for the research of energy security complexes. Without analytical separation of these different aspects, energy security would be interpreted as either a market driven urge towards equilibrium between supply and demand of energy resources or completely state driven geopolitical competition for these very resources, transit routes and so forth.

In the Baltic countries the pattern of enmity in terms of relations with Russia has been revived and brought up since the late 1980s, and the same refers to Poland due to constant conflicts between Poles and Russians routed in centuries ago. The situation is being even more worsened by the fact that Russia, be it perceived as an ex-superpower or as an re-emerging superpower, at least in the Baltic Sea region, remains a dominant state there, or one of them. Now, when a pipeline binds two strongest states in the region together – Russia and Germany, it produces real hysteria in the states that are set aside, but still dependent on Russia’s carbohydrates.

---

It is also evident, both in theory and in this case, that energy dependency is politicized or securitized more easily if it is linked to other controversies or conflicts (*enmity*) between states and these enmity perceptions can be regarded as factors which transform this objective economic dependency into a negative energy dependency. Therefore, energy security complexes are likely to follow the already existing frames of security interdependence in the region.

Finland, presumably, represents yet another example of an Energy Security Community with Russia – it’s dependence on Russian energy reaches almost 100% only in natural gas supplies, which is far from being the main resource in Finnish economy. Besides, Finland is wisely following amity pattern in relations with the Eastern neighbour, which renders the interdependency positive.

So, as it was mentioned above, energy dependency is a force that is capable of constructing Regional Energy Security Communities or Complexes, and under which model a certain region will fall depends on a number of variables.
Chapter 2. Speech Act Theory

2.1 The linguistic turn in the theory of IR and the Speech Act Theory as a method.

Some IR scholars believe that the Third Debate has brought “the linguistic turn” into the theory of International relations.\(^{49}\) Such concepts as intersubjectivity, discourse, speech acts, rhetorical and communicative action were not only added to IR students’ active vocabulary, they became the prism, through which many of them now see the world of international relations. And when we do so, we have to keep in mind, that in such a world meaning of words, notions and concepts is not scientific and fixed – they are defined communicatively. If we choose this path, we can now hardly prove our theories empirically against the external reality.\(^{50}\) Our discipline becomes a kind of a language game, and the context and discourse are in the process of constant change and development, and so the conditions under which our assumptions or theories are proven correct are not stable, too. We may not even ever face the correct answer to the question we pose, because it will always be about perceptions, conventions and consensus in those two (based upon people’s intersubjectivity). However, we can attempt to understand how international relations and multiple processes within them and adjacent to them function instead of trying to guess in what it will result in the end.

This is the methodological part of the given research, which aims at providing basic and essential knowledge of the key method developed and applied by the Copenhagen school of IR theory – Speech Act Theory. To avoid possible confusion I should notice that initially and genuinely Speech Act Theory represents a theory, which was elaborated in linguistics and some disciplines adjacent to it, but within the Copenhagen school framework this theory is used as an instrument or method, with the original title maintained though.

As it was mentioned in the first chapter, the securitization theory regards security as a speech practice, and in this sense it could be observed not only as a result of evolution of international relations’ constructivist theory, but also as a particular case of the Speech Act Theory.

---


\(^{50}\) Ibid, P. 52
The very fact of referring the Speech Act Theory to the agenda of the theory of International Relations became possible due to substantial developments that took place in linguistics and adjacent disciplines with the constructivist turn on the edge of 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries. Much later, when constructivism was introduced into the theory of IR, some of its essential methods were as well borrowed from other sciences and disciplines, in our case – linguistics.

2.2. Foundations of structural linguistics

The foundation father of structural linguistics is the Swiss thinker Ferdinand de Saussure. His methodology was a new phenomenon for that time, the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, – differential approach to language and speech, synchronic and diachronic analysis of language, study of signs and their relations to objects (semiotics), relations between the signifier and the signified, etc. Further on these methods were applied in a whole number of disciplines from ethnology to psychoanalysis.

Saussure argued first that the object of our (meaning linguistics) investigation and research is the social project reflected in the brains of each person – namely, the language.\footnote{Saussure F. de. Cours de linguistique generale / Translation into Russian – S. Chistyakova. Yekaterinburg, Ural University Publishing, 1999, P. 31} This is the first and most obvious linkage of the Swiss philosopher with modern constructivists in IR – it is about the notion of \textit{intersubjectivity}, implying that there are some ideas that most individuals in a given society share.

Then Saussure also claims that in spite of the fact that language, be it any particular language of a country or an ethnic group, or the phenomenon of language in general, is at a glance perceived as something phonetic, something that people articulate in order to communicate, the factual study of language in the majority of cases takes place with the written sources. This statement is as well relevant for the given research, because in chapter 3 speeches of politicians and policy-makers will be analyzed in order to reveal and explain the elements of speech acts or securitizing moves, which these speeches may hold. Of course, it is impossible to deal with such a source in it’s original form – oral, because, firstly, it is impossible to be everywhere where a speech is being delivered and so far there are no podcasts and dictaphone records of everything that was said by a politician (while it would be useful in studying speech
acts, because Austin claimed that for certain types of illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts – explained further in this chapter – the intonation and loudness are also important). Secondly, giving credit to Iver B. Neumann who delivered two lectures in the University of Tampere, I can with considerable degree of certainty assume that many political speeches are not the result of one person’s labour and are not oral by origin – they are rather assembled form small written pieces.52

Moreover, today, as the theory of International Relations develops, it is possible to trace back some essential points that may seem new. For instance, Lene Hansen’s development of securitization theory by the path of “visual securitization”53 finds confirmation in the work of Saussure – “most people have their visual impressions clearer and longer than the oral ones. In the end, graphical image overshadows the sound”.54 The statement can refer both to written signs, such as letters and words, and to images.

According to Saussure, the language sign consists of two elements: the notion is the *signified* and the acoustic image is the *signifier*. It is important that both aspects of the sign are of psychic origin and bound with each other by an associative link in our minds. Moreover, most people speaking the same language share these perceptions, and, therefore, this is the point where intersubjectivity appears.

Why is it close to constructivist understanding of intersubjectivity? Because, as both in Saussure and constructivists in political and IR theories, words and persistent expressions that exist within the language are regarded as intersubjective conventions of a special kind, which in turn does not differ much from a number of other persistent social phenomena such as use of money as an instrument of payment and measure of value, tradition to greet each other when meeting, and many others. Besides, what is more important to us here, is that words do not have “objectively correct” meaning, because the limits of notions they signify are determined only by using them in live speech practice. In science, precise meaning and understanding of terms is vitally important, this is why scientists work so much on their terms, sets of definitions and vocabularies, and this is why the scientific meaning of a word can differ considerably from the meaning attributed to this word by average people in everyday life. However, in politics people tend to operate not scientific, but commonly used words and expressions, and to understand them correctly the hearer has to be within the current political discourse.

53 Lene Hansen’s lectures in the University of Tampere, March 2009
54 Saussure, op. cit., P.32
Arbitrariness of the sign is one of the key principles of Saussure’s study. The idea comes in empirically – most words and their phonetics are totally random, even if we try to dig deep in their etymology. It is not the randomness that every speaker can apply to – say, choosing and altering the words while speaking randomly. It is the unmotivated choice that was once fixed in the language, which is also a form of social contract, and then very slowly can evolve. Modern linguists, however, prefer to use the term “conventional”\textsuperscript{55}, thereby underlining, that nobody in talking or writing could change the link between the signifier and the signified by his or her discretion, for it depends on the implicit agreement between all informants (called convention). The idea of arbitrariness of the sign in the language became key to the science of semiotics, although language is not the only system of signs, but it appears to be the most important one.

Saussure deals quite a lot with grammar of language – a description of the current state of language, including morphology and syntax.\textsuperscript{56} I will also require that in my further investigation while analyzing the speeches – because I intend to look for the grammar of speech acts, not for the effect they produce. As a discipline, grammar appeared first in the Ancient Greece, then it was adored by the French linguists more than by anyone else. It used to be based only on logic – as a normative discipline – and it aimed to distinguish between the correct and incorrect language and speech elements. Though the initial viewpoint of grammar studies is quite narrow, now it is possible to make further assumptions and observations. Not necessarily searching for something incorrect, one can compare different types of grammar, be it one language or a set of different languages. In the case of securitization studies we can speak figuratively about the grammar of speech acts in terms of their correctness (do they lack any essential elements that are required to have a functioning illocutionary speech act?) and, what is more important in my study – in terms of being similar in different societies. In other words, there may be no such thing as the language of securitization, for the notion would be too vague, only in grandiloquent style we can say that, for example, the President spoke the language of securitization. However, why not be such thing as the grammar of securitization, which after translation into relevant languages would show, if securitizing speech acts or securitizing moves are similar or the same.

There is one more connection of Ferdinand de Saussure’s work with the contemporary constructivists in the theory of International Relations. It is the Copenhagen school, not the one based in the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, but the one that dealt with structural linguistics as long ago as in 1930-40s. It was founded by Viggo Brøndal and Louis Hjelmslev and was an important “think tank” for developing and studying structuralism, including

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{56} Saussure, op. cit., p. 134
\end{itemize}
structuralism in linguistics, along with the Prague and Geneva schools. In many ways their findings, including working out the concept of glossematics (double duality of the language sign) were inspired by Saussure and grounded upon his basic ideas. It seems that the interest of the linguistic Copenhagen school was even greater focused (than Saussure) on the language as a system, rather than studying separate words and other elements. Moreover, their research concerned the system of relations within the language and scrutinized it more on the level of abstract.57

Based upon what was said about the arbitrariness of language signs, relations between the signifier and the signified, different meanings of words and their different perception on the one hand and intersubjectivity on the other – how do we deal with the word/term/notion of security? Of course, it has a number of versions of scientific definitions (which were considered in the first chapter), but will this knowledge and ability to operate with those definitions contribute to finding out what was meant by a securitizing actor in his or her securitizing move? The answer is most likely to be negative.

This is why the founders of the Copenhagen school were interested that much in the concept of security. It was impossible to leave without notice that the term was being used more and more often within the political, and then – within the public discourse. And, as it turned out, very frequently the word “security” and other security related verbal formulas were used not for describing the situation, but mostly for convincing the audience of the necessity to perceive the state of affairs “correctly” and, correspondingly, and to act in some certain way, which would differ from the established tradition.

2.3. Appearance and development of the Speech Act Theory

Now, let me switch to another great thinker, who was the first to seriously claim that words are more than just words scientifically. It is the British philosopher and linguist John Austin, who in the middle of the 20th century argued that producing some statements, making arguments or simply speaking people not only describe the objective reality – they also act, thereby, probably, changing the reality. First and foremost I will further on refer to his main book published by his student already after he had passed away, in 1962 – the famous “How to Do Things with

Words”. In the current of the story I will skip to other prominent scholars who have devoted their works to studying speech acts: of John Searle, Austin’s student at Oxford University, Daniel Vanderveken, who has a number of collaborative works with Searle, and also has done much independent work to promote further investigation in how speech acts work.

2.3.1. Locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts

In the early 1950s Ludwig Wittgenstein noticed in his book “Philosophical Investigations” that the meaning of a word in language almost completely corresponds to its use. His concept of language-games, where speech acts (referred to rather as language activity, because, I believe, the very term “speech act” was introduced onto the wider theoretical discourse by Austin) inspired a number of philosophers to reflect upon this idea – what is the role of words or statements in our lives, what can be done and achieved through them and how to study them?

One of those was John Austin. The British thinker not only analyzed what and how can be done with words. He created a new terminology and classified various speech acts, thereby opening a huge space for future work on the Speech Act Theory. Ole Wæver’s writings gave me an impression that he was considerably influenced by John Austin’s ideas, and the link between what the former suggested to understand security related issues better and what the latter claimed in regards to how speech acts work, is evident, and I will attempt to prove it in the current of this chapter.

The very title of Austin’s set of lectures – “How to Do Things with Words” – corresponds to the Copenhagen school basic assumptions, for securitizing act, or to say simpler – the very articulation of the word “security”, according to Buzan and Wæver, can cause changes in security conditions, which is nothing less but doing something with words.

John Austin introduced a very substantial classification of what speech acts can be:

- locutionary;
- illocutionary;

---

- perlocutionary.\textsuperscript{61}

However, these three types of speech acts that determined further development of the Speech Act Theory were not key to Austin’s research and not scrutinized well enough (nevertheless, as we will see, the basic understanding of these types of speech acts is almost sufficient for their application in the contemporary securitization theory). The starting point of Austin’s lectures were two other kinds of speech acts: constative and performative.\textsuperscript{62} Constatives are “descriptives”, they do not carry an implicit intention to have something done, in other words, this can be any uttering of a human being loaded with some sense and grammatically correct (understandable). Of course, if a dog would pronounce something indistinguishably similar to “I like you”, it would not render this sound any speech act at all. However, it is more complicated with the two divisions: constative/performative and locutionary/illocutionary/perlocutionary. At first glance it may appear that constative corresponds to locutionary speech act. So, a locutionary act is the very act of “saying something”, and locution is the “full unit of speech”\textsuperscript{63}. However, there is not much difference between the locutionary and illocutionary acts. They even may happen to be exactly the same, at least in the written form, but the sense load may vary considerably. To some extent it will always remain unclear, whether a person who uttered “It is going to rain now” was just describing the current weather conditions, or was he or she warning us – so we would take out an umbrella or run for shelter. In the latter case, warning yields illocution – i.e. a statement that has some force, direction and, probably, intention in it.

Locutionary speech acts were likely to become the basis of the theory, for every speech act is first of all locutionary, if it has sense and reference. Locution, in turn, is preceded by phonetic, phatic and rhetic speech acts\textsuperscript{64}. To be more precise, these are not speech acts yet, because phonetic act is about uttering any noises, and phatic act implies pronouncing separate words or vocables. Only the rhetic act is a speech act, and logically it coincides with locutionary speech act.

John Searle revised one of the elements of his teacher’s triad – namely he transformed locutionary acts into acts of utterance and propositional acts.\textsuperscript{65} This is already more logical and has a firm bridge to illocutions, I will get back to it further on while investigating the illocutionary speech acts.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[61] Austin, op.cit., PP. 94-101
\item[62] Ibid., PP. 3-4.
\item[63] Ibid, P.94.
\item[64] Ibid., P.95
\item[65] Searle J. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. P.24
\end{footnotes}
Thus, constative speech acts correspond to locutionary, while performative include illocutionary and perlocutionary. In general, it is close to truth, but in practice it turns out that sometimes it represents a real problem – to find out what is what. What is even more confusing, is that performative speech acts are performed utterances, and almost in every case Austin refers to every speech act as something that is performed. Therefore, even locutionary speech acts are performative, although initially we regard them as constative. This is also a point, to which the British thinker comes somewhere close to the end of his lectures, as well as some other doubts concerning his newborn theory.

For instance, in the last lecture of the book “How to do things with words” there is an attempt to analyse and compare (or, probably, confront) all the dimensions of speech acts, as regarded in all previous lectures. So, what he distinguishes is:

- a locutionary meaning (sense and reference);
- an illocutionary force;
- happiness / unhappiness dimension;
- truth / falsehood dimension.\(^{66}\)

Some of this in a different degree refers to locutionary acts, some – to illocutionary. Truth / falsehood dimension was the starting point to study constative speech acts, and this is their key characteristic: acts are true if they tell about things as they are in the real worlds and false if it is about lie. However, it does not matter much in the study of speech acts, whether what was said corresponds to reality. It is more important, how it was said, by whom, in what conditions, who was the hearer and did the hearer believe in what was heard. A locutionary meaning is something that is essential and integral to all speech acts, otherwise they would not constitute relevant speech acts at all, being only primitive senseless utterances that are not worth studying. Happiness / unhappiness dimension is something more relevant to further studying of the Speech Act Theory. Austin started with happiness / unhappiness or felicity / infelicity together with developing the notion of performative speech acts – what happens if something that should have been done through a speech act is not done? A familiar example – if a priest speaks a couple to be husband and wife, but the marriage still fails, say, because the bride changes her mind in the last moment. What is then the speech act uttered by the priest? It did not differ literally from what he said at the previous wedding, but this time the effect of the speech act did not occur. Or is it the same when it is not the priest who speaks the couple to be husband and wife, but a person who has no legal or Church right to do so? These are all cases of unhappy / infelicitous

\(^{66}\) Austin, op.cit., P.147
(how Austin calls them) speech acts, and the cause of “unhappiness” is in the failure to fulfill all necessary conditions that a certain speech act requires. These conditions, concerning the speaker’s and the hearer’s (hearers’) behaviour and other secondary circumstances, in which a speech act is pronounced, are listed and thoroughly analysed by John Austin on pages 10-26 of his set of lectures. What is the most important thing he comes to in concerning the reasons and premises of felicity or infelicity of a certain speech act is the *procedure*. For our reading of speech acts – even as modern as the Copenhagen school reading – the procedure is something that is vital for the successfulness of a speech act, and for the study of speech acts, if we take the side of observers.

The formula of what is needed to render a speech act successful by Austin is rather vague, and it the same time all basic points of the idea are there:

> There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, the procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances.  

Procedure is extremely important for my research in two ways. Firstly, it is the procedure in Austin’s understanding, a certain formula describing all necessary elements for a speech act to be successful, or, probably for a speech act of a certain kind (e.g. perlocutionary) to correspond to its title. In other words, this is a procedure of constituting or assembling a speech act in a right way, and I will require it when analyzing the speeches in the Copenhagen school way – because securitizing speech act or securitizing move, according to the CS scholars, is a speech act assembled in compliance with a certain formula, which means it has procedure in the fundament.

Secondly, procedure is an external variable to a securitizing speech act, or to be precise, the ordinary political procedure. It is the key challenge of the securitizing actor to break the conventional procedure with his or her speech act and to make people act not according to the procedure, but according to the state of emergency.

Successfulness of the speech act depends on the correctness of procedure: so, the act of marriage contraction supposes proposition of certain expressions in certain sequence by authorized person, though the violation of sequence or abuse of authority could make the marriage invalid. Successfulness of the speech act depends on accompanying circumstances such as sincerity of speaker, possibility to finish procedure in given conditions and so on. Both failure and unsuccessfulness of performative lead to the fact, that acts, planned by speaker, are not conducted. It is necessary to point out that frequently no distinction is made between successfulness and felicity of speech act in empirical attachments to this theory, because in

---

67 Austin, op.cit., P.26  
68 Ibid. P. 25
practice it is quite difficult to differentiate them. Usually the word “successfulness” is used as a common term.

In addition to this basic triad of locution / illocution / perlocution John Austin had a “subtheory” of constative / performative speech acts. Unfortunately, it was underdeveloped by the author and in that time sidelined by the main triad. However, over the last twenty years or so a growing interest among the Speech Act Theory researchers to performative speech acts and the notion of performativity has been observed.

Vanderveken and Searle also pay more attention to performative speech acts in general. They claim that performative speech acts are “primarily a declaration by the speaker that he is performing at the moment of utterance the illocutionary act named by the performative verb”. Analysing how performatives function, John Searle uses the example of declarations (declarative illocutionary speech acts). He assumes that in illocutionary acts the very intention to perform an action in a suitable context is enough to perform that action.

2.3.2. Difficulties in distinguishing between locution, illocution and perlocution in theory and practice

In order to get closer to the concepts that I will require further in this work, the more philosophical questions should be put aside for some time, while the more specific issues – namely illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts and their conditions and consequences should be brought into the foreground.

So, I have decided not to consider the two Austin concepts (or ideas on how to divide speech acts) at one time, and rather leave the constative and locutionary speech acts behind. I will deal with illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts (keeping in mind that they are both performative, of course), according to Austin and with remarks from more recent works by Speech Act Theory researchers.

70 Vanderveken, op.cit., P. 7
First John Austin introduced illocutionary speech acts (before the whole theory was arranged) just in order to indicate something that distinguishes performative sentences from constative ones. He noticed that performative statements have some power in them, which was described as illocutionary force a bit later by the author of the concept. Probably, this was the very turning point where Austin came to realize that the constative / performative division is way too simple to describe the variety of speech acts. In fact, the new division, if it was left as it was created – three constituent parts with vague descriptions – they would hardly form a new theory, but with the extending and deepening remarks by Austin himself and his critics and followers we now may sink in the variety of speech acts and their subdivisions. And again, it should be pointed out very clearly what are the most significant and fundamental of them, what are their distinctive features (because we surely might need to tell one from another in our research works) and which of them would be relevant for some particular research when Speech Act Theory is chosen as a method.

So, when John Austin discovered the acts of illocution he suggested that this is a sort of developed form of locution that has some force because, unlike in the case of locution, through illocution people are able to give orders and directions, answer questions, advice and promise, etc. – options are numerous. Thus, illocution is the first phase when it comes to “doing things with words”, an “act in saying something as opposed to act of saying something”\textsuperscript{72}, which is illocution as opposed to simple locution.

Austin realized that illocutions are much more than a feature of performative acts, and it is rather a fundament for the whole new theory. However, after a brief discussion on the importance of illocution the linguist attempts to explain all three main types of speech acts altogether, which is the sign of argumentation weakness. Indeed, the examples given to illustrate the difference between the three are discouraging. For instance, the phrase “Shoot her!” is presented as an act of locution, in a descriptive way: “He said to me ‘Shoot her!’ meaning by ‘shoot’ shoot and referring by ‘her’ to her\textsuperscript{73}. Indeed, it would be strange if by ‘her’ he would refer to ‘him’. More academically, there is no logic in trying to dub a speech act locutionary if all elements of it correspond to objective reality. In a postmodernist way one could claim that this is not even possible.

What comes next is even stranger – an act of illocution would be such: “He urged me (ordered, advised, etc.) to shoot her”. Perlocution would be then “He made me (got me to) shoot her”. I strongly believe that all three statements are absolutely equal from the viewpoint of the

\textsuperscript{72} Austin, op.cit., P.99
\textsuperscript{73} This and the following examples taken from Austin, op.cit. PP.101-102
Speech Act Theory. We may call it locution now, pushing the possible force load and effect of the statement aside, because in all the cases somebody simply describes the situation, without even addressing someone.

It appears obvious from the definitions given by Austin himself that “Shoot her!” would be a perlocutionary act, while “She knows too much, it’s better to shoot her” could be both illocutionary and perlocutionary, depending on what the criminal pronouncing this phrase expects from his partners – was it an implicit order, or just thinking to himself. In this story a good example of locution would be “The finger pulled the trigger, the gun fired, the woman was shot”.

Therefore, the main mistake that Austin makes is paying too much attention to verbs that work in a certain phrase. As it was mentioned, he even had tables of verbs suitable for locutions, illocutions and perlocutions – for instance, ‘said’, ‘argued’ and ‘convinced’ respectively. And again, saying “he convinced me” is nothing more than a locutionary act reporting about the successful act of perlocution that took place in the past.

Moreover, Austin created a subdivision of illocutionary speech acts by their force. It was reasonable due to numerous difficulties that arose while trying to limit the boundaries of what exactly are illocutions. What was not that sensible – making this gradation dependent on words, namely certain verbs that correspond to, or even, beget a certain type of illocution.

Among those he marked out:

- verdictive;
- exercitive;
- commissive;
- behabitive;
- expositive.\(^74\)

Following Austin’s explanations, verdictives are about giving an estimation or assessment, exercitives are about exercising one’s powers (“I appoint X to be the Federal Judge”), commissives are about promises or intentions (thereby the speaker becomes committed to do something that was promised), behabitives refer to typical events in social communication – congratulating, expressing condolences and many other, and expositives are about people fitting their statements in the discourse, they usually start with parenthesis.

\(^74\) Austin, op.cit., P. 150
Then Austin gives numerous examples of certain words, mainly verbs, that would help us define a certain type of illocution – for verdictive these are acquit, convict, place, grade, assess, locate, diagnose, etc.\textsuperscript{75}

So, I believe, that in doing so – choosing certain words that would serve to determine the certain type of the speech act, or certain types of illocutions, rather than considering procedure, context and felicity conditions, Austin was wrong. Interestingly, Searle did not get much farther in distinguishing between the forces of illocution – he only named them differently: assertive, declaratory, commissive, directive and expressive.\textsuperscript{76} The difference is also that Searle referred to these categories not as forces of illocution, but as illocutionary points that speakers achieve when articulating a respective illocutionary speech act. He also admitted that there are certain verbs that correspond to certain types of illocution. Assertive point is reached when the speech act represents the state of thing in reality, declaratory points – when things are done just by the act of saying so (the King’s order), commissives are similar to Austin’s classification, directive points are about making the hearer do something, and expressive points – when attitudes and opinions are expressed.

I doubt whether such classification is needed at all – not in linguistics, but in the Speech Act Theory applied to International Relations – but there is one more interesting addition to it made by John Searle. He suggested that the five illocutionary points correspond to four “directions of fit” between things and words\textsuperscript{77}. In this framework, assertions and predictions are words-to-things directed, promises and threats (commissive) and requests and commands (directive) have the things-to-words fit direction, direction of declaratory utterances is double and direction of expressive utterances is empty.

In their collaborative research devoted to illocutions\textsuperscript{78}, Vanderveken and Searle analysed the forces of illocution in a different way. Austin only listed the five of them, while the mentioned authors deconstructed the illocutionary forces into several constituting parts: sincerity conditions, illocutionary point (see above), mode of achievement and degree of strength. Hence it follows that there are five fundamental forces with an illocutionary point: the force of assertion, the one of commitment to a future action, the one of a linguistic attempt to make someone act, and another two forces – of declaration and of expression. Quite interestingly, these forces can be modified by a more limited mode of achievement, they can be weaker or stronger, or even vary depending on conditions.

\textsuperscript{75}Austin, op.cit., P.151
\textsuperscript{76}Searle, Speech Acts, P.31
\textsuperscript{77}Vanderveken, op.cit., P.7.
\textsuperscript{78}Searle, J. and Vanderveken, D. Foundations of illocutionary logic. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University, 1985
As it was already mentioned, Austin’s great concern was about speech acts’ happiness / unhappiness or felicity / infelicity conditions. However, the British linguist claimed that an infelicitous speech act (regardless of its type) is a failed act. In other conditions, when a procedure is violated, or, for example, an irrelevant person pronounces the speech act, for which he or she has no right to, the speech act becomes infelicitous (=failed).

But what if a person who is not a priest will carry out a marriage making everybody believe that he has the right to do it? Or, more simply, what if a promise is given, the hearer of the promising illocutionary speech act regarded it as valid and truthful, but in the end the promise was not kept? Searle and Vanderveken noticed the discrepancy. They argued that illocutionary speech acts can be successful, although defective – when a promise is not kept. Unsuccessful speech acts are when nobody even believed that a person was going to keep the promise, so he or she did not even have the chance to become committed to the obligation.

On the other hand, according to Vanderveken and Searle, and this is likely to be close to reality, an “illocutionary act can be successful or not depending on what is happening in the world”79.

The criterion of successfulness of a speech act is also used by the Copenhagen school thinkers, because in terms of securitization it does not matter in most cases whether the statement (a securitizing move) was true or false, sincere or insincere, and whether it will find proof in the future – it is about making people believe it and start acting correspondingly.

The distinction between the locutionary and illocutionary, and, especially between the illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts both in theory and in practice seems to be hard to grasp. Austin himself on some twenty pages attempts to draw demarcation lines between them, not quite successfully though. The principle idea is about the consequences: locutionary speech acts do not produce any, neither they beget illocution or perlocution as their consequence. Illocution and perlocution are rather an addition or a superstructure to the former – in sense, reference, force, direction and so on. However, in the end the author states that locutionary and illocutionary speech acts are mere abstractions, and in reality every speech act is both.80

When it comes to drawing a line between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary speech acts is even more apparent and slippery, especially in Austin’s explanations. He make sit clear that both of these speech act types are distinct from locutionary ones by consequences. At first glance it may appear that consequences are the privilege of perlocutionary acts – because they

---

79 Vanderveken, op.cit., P. 11.
80 Austin, op.cit., P. 146
imply the effect on the audience, which is the main consequences. However, Austin argues that this is not fairly true: perlocution produces consequences, while illocution is connected with consequences (bound with them).\(^8\) Again, this statement is questionable logically – do we bind illocutionary acts with consequences of some other events or acts – and then why? – or do we bind them with consequences that have something to do with our illocutionary acts, and hence are still somehow produced by them. The effect of the illocution would be that someone perceives our certain illocutionary speech act as a warning, if it is a warning, as the speaker intends it to be. Otherwise, the act is “unhappy”, because the illocution is not understood or perceived correctly.

In the variant proposed by John Searle one can see more clearly, form what are illocutionary speech acts constituted. Searle believes fair enough that illocutions are people’s main way of communication and conversations are primarily built from illocutionary speech acts. Those acts in turn are made up by two elements: force (as in Austin) and proposition (Searle’s locutionary element). So, in a very logical upgrade to Austin’s theory we see that every illocutionary speech acts corresponds to the F(P) formula\(^8\), illocutionary force and proposition. For example, phrases “Come to my place tomorrow, please!” and “You will come to my place tomorrow”, which in their sense are almost synonymous, in terms of proposition are the same, but in terms of their force they differ. On the other hand phrases “Do you speak English?” and “Are you John Smith?” are similar in force but have different propositions.

In turn, perlocution, considered by John Austin separately, is about producing some effect on the audience / the hearer. The consequence, which is the most important thing for perlocution, should be produced by it in a direct way: successful (“felicitous”) perlocution means that the hearer or the audience is convinced or persuaded by the speaker, and hence, starts doing what was requested or ordered. Otherwise, if the perlocution is not understood or perceived correctly, it fails, which renders it “infelicitous” (the same as with illocutions). One more feature of perlocutionary speech acts is that they quite often work with assistance of some extra-linguistic factors, so that the speaker not only emphasizes his or her resoluteness to do what is promised and to make everyone do as suggested not only by intonation and loudness, but also with additional physical action. A good example for this would be the notorious Khurschev’s speech at the UN General Assembly, when he was not only shouting and intimidating “the West”, but also pulled of his shoe and started to hit it against the tribune.

\(^8\) Austin, op.cit., PP. 116-117
\(^8\) Searle in Vanderveken, op.cit., P. 5.
Not to be that literal, perlocution is also more about the external factors, such as the real state of affairs (troops re-dislocation or ecological break-down, which can be not about perceptions, but about obvious facts – satellite photographs, figures of the scientific reports, etc.), authority and charisma of the speaker and the power of the country / institution that stands behind the speaker, readiness of the audience to believe in what was said, and many others.\(^{83}\)

Nevertheless once more in the given examples Austin claims “He did \(X\) by saying \(Y\)”\(^{84}\) to be a perlocutionary act, making the same mistake. In fact, it appears quite logical to assume that the effect produced on the audience can not be visible in the very phrase, which contains the perlocutionary speech act. In a statement only the intention to produce such an effect can be revealed, but the effect itself has to be studied separately. What is interesting, this is also one of the commonly noticed weaknesses of the Copenhagen school – not enough attention paid to studying the perlocutionary effect.

### 2.4. Copenhagen school and the Speech Act Theory: application and critique

Significance of the Speech Act Theory for social sciences lays first of all in the point, that it is an instrument of studying the language as a mean of political and social action. In politics, especially world politics, actions are mostly conducted through words, whether it is a friendship agreement or an order for troops to pass the border of neighboring country. That is why detailed theory, that combines linguistic and social aspects of communication, turns out quite useful while studying many political processes and events. As the Copenhagen schools’ experience demonstrates, its application to security studies is especially interesting and efficient, unfortunately, this experience in nor abundant, neither flawless.

Most of the basic points on how the Copenhagen school deals with Speech Act Theory as a method were given in the first chapter. There is not much that the foundation fathers of the Copenhagen school say on concrete application of the method they claim to be the best suitable for security practices’ analysis – the Speech Act Theory. Again, the most important thing for a speech act to become a securitizing move is having a whole set of elements included: the referent object, the audience, existential threat and emergency threat-combating measures, the

---

\(^{83}\) Some of the factors in Buzan et al, Security.  
\(^{84}\) Similar on page 107, Austin, op.cit.
point of no return – these are the linguistic-grammatical essentials of a securitizing speech act. However, in everyday practice it appears to be not an easy task to find securitizing speech acts with all elements in place – and still, they work. It is explained by the differential approach of the Copenhagen school representatives to language (perhaps, rooted in Saussure’s ideas?) – as we already mentioned, modern language of political discourse (and public discourse, too) is not fixed, and every time every concept, notion or term is to be defined within the current context.

According to Buzan and Wæver, security is a practice conducted through a number of statements (speech acts). In some cases these speech acts can even be constative – when a threat is objective and the speaker only describes it. However, most securitizing speech acts have an integral intention to influence the audience, and, therefore, express assessments (often biased), concerns, assumptions and predictions, which renders these speech acts performative and illocutionary. Moreover, in these securitizing speech acts there are often calls to change the situation and to act breaking the conventional norm or procedure, which transfers the speech acts to perlocutionary, because what is important here is the reaction of the audience.

Actually, the methods used within the Copenhagen school framework are directed towards the assessment of political consequences and not the linguistic features. As proclaimed by the CS scholars, it is the perlocutionary effect – the political consequence that matters and shows that securitization works. However, we have to remember that the securitizing move itself remains an illocutionary speech act.

The most well-known contemporary critic and at the same time – the scholar willing to give progress to the Copenhagen school ideas is Thierry Balzacq. His critique of how securitization works and how it should be studied is rooted in the Speech Act Theory. Moreover, his argument is that the Copenhagen school methods should be drawn farther away from studying speech acts because securitization is rather something that takes place within discourse and pragmatic practices. The Belgian professor quotes the basic assumptions of how a securitizing act should be carried out from the “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” book, which is that a securitization is only possible when the players follow the rule of creating an act of securitization (internal, linguistic-grammatical element – already mentioned in this paragraph) and the speaker holds a position relevant for making such statements (external and contextual element). It is essential to notice that what Buzan, Waver and De Wilde do claim here - “The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of

---

the particular procedure invoked\textsuperscript{86} – very much correlates with what Austin suggested as one of the key felicity conditions.

The argument that Balzacq makes is fair enough – the framework offered by the Copenhagen school is too narrow, it is about a formal procedure with numerous conditions of felicity that require to be satisfied. Instead, he suggests that securitization is not limited to a certain speech act containing a set of must-have variables, it is “a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural, disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction.”\textsuperscript{87} Then the Belgian scholar quotes Austin with his four felicity conditions that have to be fulfilled for an illocutionary speech act to be felicitous and connects it with securitizing speech acts of the Copenhagen school, which are as well mostly illocutionary. Such theoretical substantiation yield reductionism, for it is a perfect situation that rarely occurs in reality, when all these conditions are satisfied. Here, we have to agree with Balzacq in his logic, but to make it clear – Ole Wæver in several of his works admitted that the approach to language should be differential and, hence, the formula of a securitizing speech act can be not that strict. But indeed, it is a disadvantage of the Copenhagen school that the weaknesses that Buzan, Wæver and other adherents acknowledge and even know how to remedy them, are not articulated well enough in their works. So, we are left here with some space for the thoughts of our own on how to apply the Speech Act Theory to securitizing acts and what should be considered such. A very sound argument is that although appealing to the audience as the key element of successful securitization, the framework of the CS studies sidelines the audience (the perlocutionary effect) stating once more that security is a self-referential practice, which is rather an illocutionary act.

To sum up, Balzacq’s greatest desire is to view security wider than a speech act, as in canonical Copenhagen school works. He perceives it as a pragmatic act, which includes all three main type of speech acts and two levels of analysis: the level of an act and the one of an agent. Pragmatic act of security is context-dependent, audience-centered and its dynamics is power-laden.\textsuperscript{88} Indeed, the idea of securitization being something more than a speech act lies on the surface. It seems logical to stretch the securitization process in time and space, meaning that it may start long before a speaker comes articulating the securitizing act, being born within the discourse, and that the securitizing actor (the speaker) can be not one person, it even can be the system and so on. In the end, it is all more or less discussion on the agent-structure relations, and

\textsuperscript{86} Buzan et al. Security. P. 32
\textsuperscript{87} Balzacq, op.cit., P. 173
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid. P. 179
here it is almost as complex and rhetoric as the chicken-egg dilemma. Strangely, the agent-structure dilemma does not come up in Balzacq’s writings.

2.5. Securitization grammar and securitizing illocutions as indicators

What is important here is that I am not going to choose sides. I may agree that there is a piece of mind in claiming that securitization is not in the very speech act, and that it is not the illocution that is important, for perlocution shows whether a securitizing move was successful. However, I believe that for the sake of my research I need not expatiate much on how securitization works, as long as it works. And since I have taken form the start that there is such thing as securitization, here I only have to look for the traces of it. The hypothesis of the research is that Regional Energy Security Complexes and Communities can be built by the force of energy dependency. There is a set of variables that influence the outcome – whether it will be a Complex with dependencies perceived negatively, or a Community with positive dependency perception. The idea is that securitization (and desecuritization) processes that occur in the countries burdened with these energy dependencies can indicate, whether certain states do form an Energy Security Complex or Community or not. It is about the grammar of securitization that the elite (and securitizing actors usually belong to it) of these countries share. We can hardly speak about the language of securitization, because it would be too grandiloquent, but why not speak of the grammar of securitization, which after translation from relevant languages will indicate, if securitizing speech acts or securitizing moves are similar or the same.

Thus, I abandon the study of perlocutionary effect, because there is no need to know whether a securitizing act was successful in this particular research. What I will seek to find is the attempt of securitization (illocutionary securitizing speech act) that should be the same in countries that perceive energy dependency from Russia negatively and, hence, their opposing position to the Nord Stream gas pipeline construction, or desecuritizing speech acts that should be the same in countries who do not perceive such dependency as a threat and, therefore, from a Community. Unfortunately, there is no sample or pattern of what a desecuritizing speech act could be. On the other hand, the criteria suggested by the Copenhagen school to determine what is due securitizing speech act are as well not easy to satisfy. As it was mentioned, the assessment of a due securitizing move with all five elements in it and all internal and external felicity conditions is way too strict, and in real speeches even a half of those would be enough to
understand clearly that it was a securitization attempt. Rather there are hints that are not mentioned in the Copenhagen School authors’ works that will indicate in the text of the speech that this or that sentence is likely to be the securitization. This issue will be dealt with in the next chapter.
Chapter 3.

Building Regional Energy Security Complexes and Communities

Soon after Gazprom’s plan to build a trans-Baltic underwater natural gas pipeline has been announced, countries of the region started to express their concerns about it. Such a pipeline would mean that several countries that up till now receive benefits from Russian gas transit would be deprived of this privilege. Along with economic losses it would imply that the gas supplier obtains additional leverage in bargaining in political terms – shift of the transit route renders the energy dependency one-way.

Yet another objective concern is that on the seabed of the Baltic Sea there are numerous chemical weapons’ burials left from the times of the World War II. The new pipeline has a chance of hitting these burials, and the implications can be disastrous. In reality, the risk appears to be close to zero, if all preparations are carried out professionally and with caution, but the question is – how the degree of risk is perceived and / or interpreted in the countries of the region. One more concern is connected with ecology and ecosystems of the Baltic Sea – the pipeline might harm colonies of fish and birds because construction can ruin their places of spawning and rest.

Over the time the discourse of the pipeline construction became relatively stable with proclaimed articulated positions of separate countries more or less fixed. This allows for a securitization study with a plea for success.

In the given chapter speeches of political elites’ representatives and policy-makers of the Baltic Sea Region countries will be presented and analysed. The main goal is to reveal the elements of securitization in these speeches according to the framework suggested in the methodological chapter. To notice once more, it may not be the very fact of securitization, which is being articulated through a speech act and, therefore, becomes reality. The issue may be securitized long before it is articulated. It may be in the structure of the ministry of foreign affairs or other institute that prepares a speech – the latent securitization that has already occurred within the political discourse. Or, we may on contrary believe that, for instance, the President of Latvia is an independent agent whose deep profound political insights allow him to securitize the issue of the pipeline construction, for he might be the first or the only person in the country who understands all the dangerous implications and calls for other people in the country to act respectively. Neither we have to look for the perlocutionary effect of securitizing speech acts, because firstly, it would require working out a new separate methodology, and, secondly, it
could hardly contribute anything into understanding, whether the Regional Energy Security Communities and Complexes are constructed or not. It is more about these countries being within the discourse of securitization than about taking certain measures and reacting to the calls for action. Sometimes the possibilities of action are restricted, but it does not narrow the extent to which securitization is shared in a given society or within the political and economic elite of the country.

Another important thing is whose speeches are to be considered? There are two essential points here. First, not every speech can be regarded as a securitizing move because it may lack one of the key felicity conditions – if somebody interviews a young man in the centre of Berlin, and then the interview gets published in the internet, and all elements like existential threat, emergency measures, referent object and so on are in place, it is still not a securitizing speech act, because the position of the speaker is wrong (irrelevant) and he does not posses enough “force” to carry out a securitizing move. So, we need speeches and statements by the top rank policy-makers or policy advisors, whose opinion is highly valued when it comes to making political decisions. However, and this is the second point, it rarely occurs that the president, the prime-minister, ministers of foreign affairs, economy, environment, defense, etc. and top political analysts altogether securitize a certain issue. As a rule, in one country there are two to five top persons who actively bring up “the burning issue” all the time with elements of securitization in their speech acts. In one case it can be the president and the minister of foreign affairs, in other – only the minister of environment and the political analyst. The same refers to desecuritization – country leaders in a similar way may require solving the problem within the ordinary political procedure, or even depoliticize the issue down to “business as usual”.

For speech analysis eight countries of the Baltic Sea Region have been chosen that are likely to be affected most by the Nord Stream gas pipeline construction: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, Finland, Germany and Russia. According to the initial hypothesis of the given research, the first five should form a Regional Energy Security Complex, the last three – a Community. Consequently, the revealed grammar of securitization should coincide or be similar in the first five countries, and the grammar of desecuritization – in the last three.
3.1. Regional Energy Security Complex

3.1.1. Sweden

The order of countries for speech analysis is chosen randomly. Let us begin with Sweden.

Initially it was planned that Sweden would obtain an adjoining link of the Nord Stream pipeline by the year 2012-2013.\(^89\) So far there is no sign that the plan will be brought to life. However, the possibility of such link gave room for confusion – my original hypothesis was that Sweden is going to join the “desecuritized” Community of Russia, Finland and Germany. On contrary, as it turned out, the Swedish discourse became increasingly anti-pipeline over a couple of years. Perhaps the reason for that is the Soviet-time enmity pattern (see chapter 1): Swedish political elite can hardly expect something good from the Russian side since the Cold War began (to be fair, there were reasons – the Soviet submarine with nuclear weapons on board that stuck on the Swedish shore, aircrafts shot down, and so forth) and these threat perceptions are too firm to be altered in some 20 years.

The person who is likely to be most concerned with the Nord Stream pipeline construction in Sweden is the Minister of Environment Andreas Carlgren. The information is based both on ministerial reports and his own speeches.

In a report issued on 31\(^{st}\) of October 2007 there are some elements of securitization.\(^90\) The point of report is that the Swedish government has to approve the documents presented by the Nord Stream AG in order to fix the route of the pipeline. However, as it is pointed out, there should be some alternatives presented to the current project, because the route in the Swedish Economic Zone close to the isle of Gotland is dangerous: if left as it is the pipeline will harm fragile ecosystems of the microregion. However, the elements securitization via speech act are relatively weak here. These are “negative impact on the vulnerable ecology of the Baltic Sea”, “environmental problems and threats to the Baltic Sea ecosystem” and “need to thoroughly investigate the project before the final decision is made by the government”.\(^91\)

At a glance it may appear that securitization lacks here, if we take these statements separately from the context, because they are logical and do make sense. However, we have to remember that there are a number of ecological threats to the Baltic Sea ecosystem that are not being disputed so actively (are oil tankers safer than the pipeline, not speaking about chemical and agricultural wastes and cities’ waste waters?). Besides, the pipeline appears to be first of all

---

89 Such information was available at Nord Stream AG official web-site: http://www.nord-stream.com/en/the-pipeline/pipeline-route.html, now it is not.
90 Regeringen vill att alternativa sträckningar för gasledningen presenteras (The Government Promotes Alternatives Pipeline Routes), http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/9655/a/91304, last access 15.04.2009
91 Ibid.
an economic case. Ecological risks are secured enough – there are huge investments in technology, and it is not the first underwater pipeline in the world. To add to the case – the longest underwater gas pipeline (approximately 1,200 km) is being constructed in relevant proximity to the Baltic Sea region – the Langedøle pipeline connecting Norway and the United Kingdom under the North Sea.\(^\text{92}\), and the issue is nowhere near to being securitized. In the case of Sweden and Nord Stream, the Swedish authorities increasingly tend to negotiate the pipeline construction as an issue of ecology and environment (implicitly political), although the initial presupposition is that this is a business project. Another thing is that even before the ecological research has been conducted, the claims about ecological harm articulated by the Swedish Ministry of Environment representatives were already in place.

In another report published two months later Andreas Carlgren calls to “do everything possible to protect the environment with the help of Swedish or international legislation”.\(^\text{93}\) On the one hand this is an appeal to the procedure – Carlgren does not want to cross the limits of what is permissible within the conventional political process, but the fact that he states readiness to do “everything possible” is indicating a negative perception of the issue, otherwise a politician would say “all necessary” or “all that is required”. An appeal to the international legislation also shows concern – it is an implicit claim that Swedish legislation alone may not be able to cope with the “problem”, so it is a step towards breaking the conventional procedure.

A very curious speech by Mr. Carlgren was delivered at special parliamentary debates devotes to the pipeline construction and possible routes.\(^\text{94}\) In this speech the minister himself does not attempt to carry out securitizing moves, but gives direct quotes of what the previous minister, Mona Sahlin, currently in the oppositional Social Democratic Labour Party, used to say about the Nord Stream pipeline and what she says being not in the office. In 2005 she claimed that the Ministry has “positive attitudes towards the pipeline construction <…> and we will give our full support to the project”\(^\text{95}\). However, in 2007 she said that it was “high time for the government to stigmatize the Russo-German pipeline project in the Baltic”.\(^\text{96}\) In this polemic Carlgren noticed that although no single representative of the current Swedish government supported the idea of the pipeline, it is unacceptable to make such statements before the results

\(^{92}\) http://www.metoc.co.uk/casestudies/oilgas/056_1_Langedol%20Pipeline.pdf, last access 11.05.2009
\(^{93}\) Ansökningar om gasledning genom Östersjön har kommit till regeringen (Application for Pipeline Construction under the Baltic Sea Came to the Government), http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/9900/a/95117, last access 15.04.2009
\(^{94}\) Tal av miljöminister Andreas Carlgren vid riksdagens särskilda debatt om gasledning i Östersjön, http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/8580/a/95026, last access 15.04.2009
\(^{95}\) Ibid.
\(^{96}\) Ibid.
of the ecological research are ready. So, we have to admit that here Mr. Carlgren rather desecuritizes the issue.

In yet another interview Carlgren was quite objective: “The information that we have today indicated that the pipeline is projected to be passing through areas considered environmentally problematic and risky - where there are both mines and chemical waste and weapons” and “The information we have received from the company gives the impression that a more eastern path for the pipe would give better potential to avoid environmental problems”. Thus, Andreas Carlgren seems to be really concerned with the environmental threats, and in spite of the fact the he may view the actions of Nord Stream AG associated with Russia through the prism of historical enmity, his activeness can only to a small extent be regarded as securitizing moves.

The Ministry of Environment is not the only institution in Sweden concerned with the pipeline construction and its implications on the regions ecology. A professional diplomat, former ambassador of Sweden to a number of countries including Finland, Krister Wahlbäck securitizes the issue as follows:

The Russo-German pipeline … will become an immediate threat to the Baltic Sea … Whilst laying the pipeline, the Russo-German consortium will stir up poisonous bottom sediments and … they will have to remove all kinds of remnants that has been laying quietly at the bottom since the Second World War, remnants that are filled with lethal substances: thousands of undetonated mines, great amounts of dumped munitions and chemical weapons. In other words: All the things that the environmental experts are telling us not to do, [Nord Stream] will be doing, and thereby create an immediate threat to the Baltic Sea.

This is the rare case when almost all elements of canonical Copenhagen school securitizing illocutionary speech act are in place: an existential threat and it’s description (a persuasion with significant exaggeration), referential object of security – the Baltic Sea as a whole, implicit information on what can be done (reference to experts telling not to do exactly what Nord Stream is going to do), point of no return – when the construction is started. Besides, within the political elite of Sweden, the speaker – Mr. Wahlbäck – is someone experienced, whose opinion is highly valued.

---

97 Tal av miljöminister Andreas Carlgren vid riksdagens särskilda debatt om gasledning i Östersjön.
Robert L. Larsson, a security analyst at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, also tends to be more anti-Russian and anti-Nord Stream. His reports and articles are widely published in the Internet and, supposedly, Swedish security and defense policies in this sphere are to an extent grounded on the analyst’s works. In his mind, the negative implications, that the Nord Stream pipeline is fraught with, are manifold. In his reports there are numerous examples of almost perfect illocutionary securitizing acts. “Nord Stream is primarily being driven by Russian commercial and political interests”\textsuperscript{100} and “first and foremost is a political project”\textsuperscript{101} – these statements serve as direct indicators of the issue being brought up to the level of security through the level of the political. Another example: “Even the slightest risk of having supplies cut for political or other reasons by definition moves the project into the security realm also for the EU”\textsuperscript{102}. This is also a substantiation of the threat along with statements like “the political development of Russia and its foreign policy is highly unpredictable.”\textsuperscript{103}

In colours Mr. Larsson explains how the pipeline will affect the European Union (in his reports the EU and its energy provision and well-being in general are the most frequently mentioned referent object of security): “(Russia’s) strategic interest <…> goes against the priorities of several EU-members and might affect the EU negatively”, the pipeline will “will undermine the EU’s ability to act as a unified entity”, while Russia will “use energy supplies as a foreign policy lever” in relations with the EU countries.\textsuperscript{104}

The analyst also explains what and how should be done in order to resist this pernicious influence. First of all, since “Russia has strong ambitions of again becoming a great power and uses all available means in its endeavours, it is pivotal that the EU and its members assess the Nord Stream project in this light and act accordingly.”\textsuperscript{105} Moreover, the EU should thoroughly assess the very necessity of the Nord Stream pipeline, the possibility of alternatives, transparency and financial issues, etc.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Larsson. Security Implications.
\textsuperscript{104} All three citations - Ibid.
\textsuperscript{105} Larsson. Security Implications.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
Another security claim articulated by Larsson concerns possible espionage activities: “the riser and pipeline could be used as sensor platforms and by that serve intelligence purposes and give Russia a competitive intelligence edge in the Baltic Sea area.”

3.1.2. Estonia.

It is stated clearly in the paper prepared for the discussion devoted to the Nord Stream project in the European Parliament that Estonia’s reasons for opposing the pipeline are environmental and political; it is also stated that asking for the most safe routes in terms of ecology, at the same time Estonian government refuses to grant a permit for the respective research in its territorial waters.

Estonian debate on the Nord Stream pipeline seems to be largely grounded upon the same threat perceptions as in the case of Sweden, i.e. to an extent copied from the Swedish debate. Based upon the initial opposition to anything that would come from the Russian side, neither Estonian leaders and political analysts, nor mass media and publicity went deep into analyzing, what is actually wrong about Nord Stream. A push for securitization was made when Finland asked for a more southern route in order to avoid objective difficulties connected with the sea bottom peculiarities: the Estonian seabed is more even and sandy than the Finnish one, so the risk of any breakdown or construction mistake is lower. Probably this is why some elements of securitization grammar were borrowed from the Swedish debate. Or, even be it the ideas of Estonian people and decision-makers, they appear to be quite similar to what was and is being articulated in Sweden concerning the pipe.

Estonian President, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, appears to be one of the most active speakers when it comes to Nord Stream and energy security related issues. However, a pure securitizing speech act is almost impossible to catch in his speeches. The Estonian leader wants to be cautious and objective in his arguments: “The Nord Stream’s concept of an alternative location for the gas pipeline in Estonian waters is too preliminary for a proper opinion to be expressed;
we need to wait for the environmental studies."\textsuperscript{110} Then comes the statement that somehow brings the status of the Baltic Sea higher than ordinary without any substantial ground for that: “… it is clear that the special condition and status of the Baltic Sea cannot be compared to any other maritime area where gas pipelines have been built to date.”\textsuperscript{111}

Mr. Ilves attempts to support his position with economic arguments, the origin of data remains unexplained though: "Nord Stream is evidently not needed, because in four or five years Russia will no longer be a gas exporter. With its rapidly thinning reserves of gas, Russia won't even be able to meet its own domestic demand. Or are we to suppose that Russia will export its gas and leave its own people without energy?"\textsuperscript{112}

At the same time the President is referring to conventional legislation, which Gazprom violates: “Even if Microsoft violates the competition laws of the EU, then what is left to say when gas extraction and supply is the monopoly of one company?”\textsuperscript{113} Let alone the fact that natural gas extraction in this case is by no means subject to European legislation, Mr. Ilves does not securitize the issue here. It is just a statement within the already existing securitization discourse articulated in order to keep the threat perception high – any monopoly is implicitly associated with economic threat.

The Foreign Minister of Estonia Urmas Paet also expressed his position (with an indication that this is the standpoint of the whole country) concerning Nord Stream: "We decided long ago that we would say 'no' to this construction <…> There have never been disagreements on this issue in Estonia - we will never allow the construction of this pipeline in our economic waters in any case."\textsuperscript{114} In another statement he is being less critical, but again exaggeratedly refers to the environmental problem: “For us with Nord Stream there is one big problem or question mark and it is environmental one. Because actually we don’t understand why the Nord Stream company never didn’t analyse or research a real alternative and a real alternative should be on the mainland because the Baltic Sea is a very fragile sea environment. It is not a deep sea – it is maximum 80 metres -- and one-fifth of the sea is dead already.”\textsuperscript{115} It can be considered as an implicit threat – “dead already” presupposes that in case the developments will progress in the direction they do now, it will die out completely. However, it is hard to claim that Mr. Paet

\textsuperscript{110} Report on the meeting of Mr. Ilves with the German Foreign Minister Mr. Steinmeier / official web-site of the President of Estonia http://www.president.ee/en/duties/press_releases.php?gid=96733, 13 July 2007, last access 8.04.2009
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{112} Estonia says "no" to Nord Stream pipeline construction
\textsuperscript{114} Estonia says "no" to Nord Stream pipeline construction
securitizes the pipeline construction himself, he is rather in the already established discourse of
securitization, once again affirming it.

Ex-Member of the European Parliament from Estonia Andres Tarand also became
famous for criticizing the pipeline project. Ideas that are expressed in his articles and interviews
are very similar to ones of the Swedish analyst Robert Larsson. He refers to Nord Stream as a
political matter and a tool used in Russia’s “gasified foreign policy” in order to “foster enmity
between the old and the new EU members” and “to exert pressure on the countries that formerly
were under Russia’s authority”.116 These are the same possible implications of the pipeline listed
by the Swedes. In the same article the Estonian politician accuses Tarja Halonen of “not noticing
the political aspect of the matter”.117 Moreover, the securitizing speech act is the very title of one
of Mr. Tarand’s articles in Eesti Postimees – “About the Gas Pipe in Our Sea”.118 It is nothing
but a call to regard Nord Stream as an intrusion into “our”, private space, which is obviously
intended to cause the burst of indignation in the heart of every Estonian reading the article.

Environmental aspects are analysed thoroughly and colourfully: “Beyond doubt all this
filth will get into the Baltic fish, which Finns now eat only by the special permit of Brussels
because of high level of dioxins in it. <…> I hope that journalists will write articles about
dioxins, fish and babies suffering in mothers’ wombs”.119 A statement like this most certainly
includes elements that the Copenhagen school considers to be essential for a securitizing move.
Publicly relishing the grave implications of the threat came true – this is, probably, the hint that
shows us a certain intention to contribute to perlocutionary effect of securitization. Of course, it
means that the issue has been securitized before and the public is aware of the “existential
threat”, which is here the country’s ecology as a whole and the health of its children.

In an interview given to Eesti Postimees Mr. Tarand also claims that the construction of
the pipeline is “to some extent a matter of honour for Putin”.120 This sentence first of all brings
the issue of Nord Stream to the level of political, or even more – to the level of personal political
interests, which can hardly be regarded as normal practice within the political tradition of the
European Union. Secondly, this may be an account for “allergic” reaction in Estonia and a
number of other states when it comes to what and how the former Russian president wants to do
in Europe.

116 Tarand. A. O gazovoy trube v nashem more [About the Gas Pipe in Our Sea], 5 May 2009, available at
http://rus.postimees.ee/?id=115087, last access 15.05.2009
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Andres Tarand’s interview to Eesti Postimees on 2 April 2009, available at: http://rus.postimees.ee/?id=102326,
This brings us to the next formal threat mentioned in the debate – the military and espionage one. It is after Putin’s televised speech on 25th October 2006 that some states, including first and foremost Sweden and Estonia, started to securitize the issue of Russia’s military activities on the Baltic even more than they did before.\(^{121}\) Apparently, the speech was directed at local Russian audience to convince them that the Baltic fleet is strong and capable of solving any problems in the Baltic Sea, but the message was perceived in other countries as a direct menace. Estonians will not have to oppose a raiser platform in their economic zone, but they still believe that Russian soldiers and submarines will be everywhere in the Baltic guarding the pipe and spying at the same time.\(^{122}\) However, in terms of securitization, it appears that Vladimir Putin was the one to articulate a securitizing move this time. Estonian intelligence service has even published a report in which it warns against Russian spies who are lobbying the Nord Stream project among the political elite of Estonia and other European countries.\(^{123}\)

To sum up the Estonian debate I can once again cite Andres Tarand, who in the mentioned interview answering the question about what does Estonia have against the pipeline if the environmental problems are settled, quite frankly said: “Estonia has only its memories against <…> Our approach has a historical tint, and may be we see the devil there where he is not.”\(^{124}\) Thus, according to articles and speeches available in the Internet, Estonian securitization debate on Nord Stream is very similar to the Swedish one, for as we see the threat perceptions in the fields of military and ecological are to a great extent the same as they are in the Swedish society. Historical enmity pattern (see Chapter 1) prevails in Estonian attitudes towards Russia, which also greatly contributes to threat construction. Even though Estonians understand that their claims are void except for some environmental issues, but in what is articulated by the country’s politicians it is clear that they want to securitize the Nord Stream construction in every possible way.

It is not a negative point for my research – whatever the real facts and true reasons within and beyond the Estonian debate may be, what is necessary here is to find that the securitization grammar is similar in the countries of the presumable Regional Energy Security Complex, and so far, form Sweden’s and Estonia’s example, I can claim that it is.

\(^{121}\) Whist, B.S. Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline, P. 34
\(^{124}\) Andres Tarand’s interview to Eesti Postimees
3.1.3. Latvia

Compared to other countries of the region Latvian debate on the possible pipeline construction has been relatively silent. The country has been looking for possible alternatives in terms of energy supply and transit, presumably using its existing reservoir facilities.

Several top policy-makers of the Latvian Republic have expressed their position regarding Nord Stream publicly. President Valdis Zatlers, for example, has been interviewed by the liberal Russian radio station “Ekho Moskvy” (“Echo of Moscow”) and answered a number of questions about the Latvian point of view regarding the Nord Stream gas pipeline. The main issues of concern, according to Mr. Zatlers words, were environmental and economic (and economical). “We highly treasure ecology. We are thinking of what can happen to ammunitions, which lie on the bottom. <…> We believe that the ecological assessment should be very, very thorough”. The President also noticed that “there is no water exchange [in the Baltic Sea], it is really a lake”. As for the economic interests and concerns, Mr. Zatlers said: “Of course we should see if it is beneficial or not. Since it is a Russian-German project, Latvia has no economic benefit from it.” In the President’s statements there are certain elements of securitization through the “ecological path”, but on the other hand they can be regarded as objective concerns, because it is also mentioned that Latvia is hoping for a quality ecological research and will not anyhow hamper Russia’s plans if the construction of the pipeline is proved to be safe. As a rule securitizing actors do not restrict themselves to one field of arguments and try to involve as much possible negative consequences as they can – environmental, political, economic, etc. In this case it is not so.

On contrary, in economic terms Mr. Zatlers spoke with some elements of desecuritising speech acts. He gave reference to long-term contracts with Gazprom (the existing one – till 2017 and the draft one – till 2030), and noticed that although “a political stereotype exists that there is dependency on Russian gas, the possibility of ruptures or cut offs… in fact for the 20 years Latvia has never seen this”. Here, the dependency is not perceived as a threat and the reference to long-term relations implies stability, and, therefore, a certain degree of security of supplies. Valdis Zatlers based his arguments upon a claim that Latvia is “an open economy. We

---

125 Interview to Ekho Moskvy, available at: http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/585616-echo/, last access 5.05.2009.
126 Latvia to pitch Nord Stream alternative, available at: http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article176161.ece, last access 4.05.2009
127 Interview to Ekho Moskvy
128 Ibid.
always have economy on the first place and politics on the second”. This is a manifestation of the very pragmatic approach that guides the real political and economic decisions of the countries authorities and, as a consequence, does not allow the country go deep into the securitization discourse, which may appear counter-productive economically.

The only point when Latvian President showed that he is also to some extent within the securitization debate was when he answered if Latvia wanted to have the pipeline route overland, not undersea, he only said “It is safer”, not mentioning the opportunity of financial benefits for his country, which would be not of lesser significance than apparent environment-friendly attitude.

In general Valdis Zatlers appeared to represent an open and flexible position, unlike his counterparts from other Baltic states. At the same time Latvians do not leave hope that an alternative overland route will be chosen for the pipeline, which as they believe would be more reasonable both ecologically and economically.

Another Latvian politician Andris Berzinsh, who chairs the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Latvian Seim, mentioning some essential concerns (impact on fishery, ship traffic, etc.), rather desecuritizes the pipeline project than securitizes it: “If somebody tells me that the pipeline will become an instrument, using which somebody will dictate someone any political terms, such statements fail to withstand any critique.” So, this is a kind of speech act that directly refutes the elements of suggested securitization, we may consider it a desecuritizing speech act.

Similar opinion is expressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Maris Riekstins: “In natural gas we have managed to develop very good co-operation [with Russia]. We don't have a single case which might be seen to show bad will in this particular field.”

Summing up the Latvian debate, quite surprisingly I have to admit that not a single pure securitizing move was found in the speeches of the country’s politicians. Historically sharing enmity patterns with other Baltic states in relations with Russia, Latvians now tend to be more pragmatic in what they do and say. The current state of Latvian energy security discourse questions the hypothesis that the country joins the new Regional Energy Security Complex in the Baltic.

129 Interview to Ekho Mosky.
130 Ibid.
3.1.4. Lithuania

Lithuania is one of the countries that openly oppose the Nord Stream project. Anti-pipeline debate in the country has been active since the agreement between Russia and Germany was signed in 2005. Except for common environmental concerns, Lithuania has real problems in its energy balance due to the forthcoming shutdown of the Ignalina nuclear power plant, which the EU legislation demands. The stoppage of the first reactor already caused a substantive growth of energy dependency figures, from approximately 45% in 2003 to 64% in 2006.\(^{133}\) The figure is to soar up to almost 100% when the power plant is closed completely for several years – the new power plant is only in project so far. Remembering what was said in the first chapter about dependency perception as a threat in case of historic enmity pattern, it does not come as a surprise that Lithuanians are so much concerned with the Russia-led pipeline project that bypasses Lithuania.

Perhaps, the most noticeable speaker securitizing Nord Stream is the former President – Valdas Adamkus. For instance, meeting with the Speaker of the Finnish Parliament Sauli Niinistö he noticed that “the latest data collected by Lithuanian experts studying the degree of contamination of maritime ecosystem showed that the pipeline laying works would have unpredictable impact on the environment of the whole region.”\(^{134}\) It is clearly a securitizing speech act, although not complete, but similar to those articulated by Swedish and Estonian politicians. Again, the referent object of security is the whole Baltic Sea region. Here is another fragment of the President’s speech, which is close to a perfect securitizing move:

The Baltic Sea region is among the most vulnerable in the context of climate change, while the inland Baltic Sea is seriously threatened by large-scale infrastructure projects such as the Nord Stream and rapidly increasing oil tanker traffic. We cannot allow the Baltic Sea to become a “new Bosphorus”; with large amounts of dumped chemical munitions any incident at sea may result in an ecological disaster, causing irreparable damage to the entire region. It is important to ensure the highest possible standards of environmental protection against any off-shore and on-shore economic activity.\(^{135}\)

---


\(^{134}\) President Adamkus discussed important Baltic and Eastern European issues with Finnish Prime Minister and MPs / Official web-site of the President of Lithuania, http://www.president.lt/en/activities/press_releases/president_adamkus_discussed_important_baltic_and_eastern_european_issues_with_finnish_prime_minister_and_mps.html; last access 2.05.2009

In this statement, the threat is named and addressed concretely, a reference to analogous notorious example is made, the referent object again is the whole region, and such words as “disaster” and “irreparable damage” indicate the grave end we will all face in case emergence measures are not taken – “environmental protection against any … economic activity”.

Besides, Mr. Adamkus claims that “[Lithuania’s] dependence on a single external natural gas supplier <…> [is] among the many reasons for a possible crisis.”

Here are some other typical statements by Valdas Adamkus, that are being repeated by him with minor alterations. In regards to the environment he said that the pipeline construction “would definitely cause a re-suspension of bottom sediments and release tremendous amounts of hazardous carcinogenic compounds which would spread much wider than indicated in the pipeline construction report.” In connection to this Mr. Adamkus suggested: “It is also greatly important that non-governmental organizations, scientists, international organizations, such as HELCOM, become engaged in the process, making a transparent, critical and responsible assessment of all consequences”. These statements point out the mistrust to research carried out by the partners of Nord Stream AG, which is a kind of conventional procedure, and, therefore, total engagement and “critical assessment” of the project is a call to neglect it and do something more.

In political terms the President notices that “unfortunately the Nord Stream project has already de facto divided the Baltic Sea Rim countries”. However, he stills believes that cooperation of the Baltic States in energy and security policy. Recalling the proposal of Valdis Zatlers to build an on-land pipeline, Mr. Adamkus said he was hoping that “the Baltic Sea countries would show unity in fighting the environmentally hazardous pipeline route. <…> Lithuania has always proposed to discuss alternative on-land projects such as the Amber pipeline, which would be less dangerous and which would offer more solidarity.” Here, the call to “fight the hazardous pipeline route” is a very solid securitizing move.

The Lithuanian president is sure that such kind of cooperation is possible not only among the Baltic States, but also with Sweden (logically) and with Finland (surprisingly, because it is known that Finland approves of the Nord Stream project in general): “Lithuania and Finland must work together with other Baltic countries in a very responsible manner, in order to assess

136 “The Baltic States in a Changing Europe: Our New Roles and Responsibilities”.
137 All quotations in the passage from Mr. Adamkus’s speech at the Baltic Sea Round Table, Helsinki, 23 April 2008, available at: http://www.president.lt/en/activities/press_releases/major_industrial_projects_maycause_irrevocable_damage_the_president_said_in_the_baltic_sea_round_table.html, last access 4.05.2009.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
the threat of the pipeline for the ecosystem of the whole Baltic Sea region" and "It is very important today that the European Union stands united and talks about common energy diversification projects that are important for all EU Member States." In this particular case it is the EU’s unity that comes as a referent object of security. Therefore, Lithuanian grammar of securitization (meaning the shifts in the referent object) can be versatile.

To add something on the classic pattern of Lithuanian-Russian relations, especially in the sphere of energy security, the statement follows by the Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius: “The closure of the Druzhba pipeline, which was used to provide oil to the refinery in Mozeike, and the closure which was made on political basis from Russian side simply because we sold the refinery not to a Russian company, but to a Polish company, of course it does not improve our feeling of trust towards Russia.” This is not a securitizing move, but the opinion expressed supplements with what was already said about the threat perception in conditions of a prevailing enmity pattern in interstate relations.

Former speaker of the Lithuanian Parliament and currently a member of the European Parliament Vitautas Landsbergis mentioned solidarity with Latvia in regards to Nord Stream and recalled the proposal for an alternative on-land route: “Valdis Zatlers suggests to get real, refuse from politicization, pressure and orientate for Russian and European business. Zatlers’s statement pleases me, it demonstrates that Baltic unity is possible.” This is an apparent agreement with the desecuritizing speech act, but in his further expressions the MP totally refutes the idea. He calls for another improved environmental impact research, because the one conducted by Nord Stream AG is “disbursed and made by order”, “they paid 100 million euro for it, no doubt that the response would be positive.” He also claimed that the alternative of an on-land pipeline was an old and proven alternative, but Russia would prefer to bypass “the unfriendly states.” By saying so, the Lithuanian politician proved that he is not able to depart from the enmity pattern. Moreover, he implicitly demands emergency measures claiming that the research conducted in conventional framework is a fake.

---

142 Lithuanian Prime Minister's interview to Euronews, 4 December 2008, available at: http://www.euronews.net/2008/12/04/andrius-kubilius-lithuanian-prime-minister/, last access 5.05.2009
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
Thus, in general, Lithuanian energy security debate appeared to be openly securitizing. It operates securitization grammar similar to the one of the Swedish and Estonian debates, and the utterances of politicians are sometimes more explicit with a share of aggression, probably due to real problems that the country is facing and is going to face in the nearest future, and to persistent enmity pattern in the discourse of Russian-Lithuanian relations.

3.1.5. Poland

Poland’s voice of criticism regarding the Nord Stream project has been and still is especially loud. The debate has been extremely active since 2005, and it is difficult to say what is the main reason for that. Poland’s dependence on energy supplies in much lower than the one of the Baltic States, and even Sweden and Finland: as of 2006 it did not exceed 20% of the total energy balance. However, in foreign policy the Poles always tend to be cautious when it comes to some initiatives proposed by either Russia, or Germany. In case they plan something together, it is a “clinical” case for Polish politicians, and very possibly, for ordinary people, too. This is grounded in history, and the Polish enmity perception, especially towards Russia does have reasons in the past.

The first very demonstrative example of how Nord Stream is being securitized in Poland involving a historic reference is the statement by Radek Sikorski, who then in 2006 was Defense Minister and currently is the Minister of Foreign Affairs: “Poland has a particular sensitivity to corridors and deals above its head. That was the Locarno tradition, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop tradition. That was the 20th century. We don’t want any repetition of that.” Another statement by Sikorski was as follows: “The Russian ambassador to Belarus said last week when the Baltic pipeline is built, Gazprom will be able to cut off Belarus without cutting off Germany. That means Poland too.” These are not pure securitizing speech acts in the classic Copenhagen school view, but in fact the securitizing illocutionary and perlocutionary force of the utterance is immense. One has to have a political courage to compare current economic affairs with probably

---

147 Sikorski’s speech at the Transatlantic Conference in Brussels, 30 April 2006, as translated in “The Nord Stream Gas Pipeline Project and Its Strategic Implications.” A briefing note by Cameron Fraser, Brussels, European Parliament, December 2007, P. 3
NB: the article also refers to Sikorski’s comparison of the current deal with the 1939 pact.
the most evil period in the world history, but the threat association should work out perfectly. To some extent a phrase like this renders both the threat and the referent object of security universal.

Besides, there was an open letter published in media including the Financial Times authored by Radek Sikorski, Maciej Oleś-Szczytowski and Jacek Rostowski (the last two are scholars and political analysts). It is so undiplomatic and enmity and threat-perception filled, that it is worth being presented here in several fragments:

The most outrageous attempt by Mr Putin to divide and damage the EU, it would be an economic and geopolitical disaster for the Union.

The pipeline was initiated by Gerhard Schröder, Chancellor Merkel's predecessor, with no consultation with Germany's EU partners.

Economically, Nordstream is absurd. Its cost (estimates up to €12bn are quoted, but there is no official figure) would be three to five times that of doubling up existing land links.

Geopolitically, Nordstream secures for Russia not just increased EU subservience in energy. Russia gains the ability to decouple old and new members by differentially turning off the tap, as done to Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine and more recently to Estonia and Lithuania. For this principal reason Poland, Estonia and Lithuania are vehemently opposed

If indeed Mr Putin hopes that in energy matters he can still divide and rule, the best way to show him his error is to scrap Nordstream and enact explicit energy solidarity within the EU.149

Italics are not original – the emphasis is made by me in order to indicate the pure elements of securitizing speech acts. To make a general assessment, this letter is rather a one huge securitizing act with the referent object (the EU) and existential threats to it mentioned in the beginning, their essence and concrete examples in the middle part, and the demanded action, which breaks the notion of what is permissible within the normal political procedure – in the end.

Minister of Economy Waldemar Pawlak expresses the same standpoint as the one of Radek Sikorski: “Poland disapproves of the opinions stated in the report”150, - he said referring to the environmental impact research paper presented by Nord Stream AG to the governments of the countries concerned. He added that “implementation of such a project is fraught with serious ecological implications for the Baltic Sea.”151 This is nothing new in terms of securitizing speech

---

149 Open letter by Radek Sikorski, Maciej Oleś-Szczytowski and Jacek Rostowski. “Nord Stream is a Geopolitical Disaster for the EU”, available at: http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2007/05/nordstream_is_a_geopolitical_d.htm, last access 30.04.2009
151 Ibid.
acts, the same formula and the same referent objects as in most cases in the Swedish and Estonian debates.

On the position of the Minister of Economy Pawlak’s predecessor was Piotr Wozniak, who as well famously securitized the issue of the pipeline construction. He said that Nord Stream “implies a whole set of threats for Poland: ecological, energy related and military-strategic.”\footnote{W Senacie o zagrożeniach ekologicznych Bałtyku [Discussion in the Senate on Ecological Threats to the Baltic], 28 May 2007, available at: http://www.mg.gov.pl/Wiadomosci/Archiwum/Rok+2007/senat+zagrozenia+baltyku.htm, last access 30.04.2009} He was also strict about the implementation of the project in the Polish Exclusive Economic Zone – if all requirements under Espoo convention and Polish law are not completely fulfilled, “the construction of the gas pipeline will not commence.”\footnote{Polish interests and Nord Stream gas pipeline construction, available at: http://www.mg.gov.pl/English/News/gas+and+petroleum2.htm, last access 29.04.2009} This is not clearly a securitizing act, rather a warning directed at Nord Stream AG managers, and, perhaps a wider audience to show that Poland is determined to keep to its strict position. However, in this case there is no call for departing from ordinary practice and resorting to some emergency measures. One point, which is interesting here, is that the mentioned sea shelf territories near the isle of Bornholm are a grey zone of unresolved border disputes with Denmark. Therefore, it is not only about Polish, but also about Danish legislation.

Recently, the Polish position was once more reaffirmed by the Senate Speaker Bogdan Borusevich, who stated that “Poland insists on the urgency of ecological risks connected with realization of the pipeline construction”\footnote{Pozitsiya Polshi po povodu Nord Stream ne izmenilas’ [Poland’s Position Regarding Nord Stream Did Not Change], Borusevich’s statement at a conference in Saint Petersburg, 24 April 2009, available at: http://www.regnum.ru/news/1156005.html, last access 1.05.2009}, the completed ecological research notwithstanding.

To sum up the Polish debate on Nord Stream, one can with certain confidence claim that it is the most aggressive one in separate opinions uttered and words used to express the Polish discontent and resentment, and as active and saturated as the Lithuanian one. It seems that the key reason for that is the idea expressed by Mr. Sikorski with the reference to Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, because it is really how most Poles see it – the threat perception is extremely high, in spite of the fact that the de facto energy dependence of Poland is relatively small. To support the argument – along with standard environmental concerns, many securitizing act were “dedicated” personally to Putin and to political situation in Russia in general, it is something that is mostly “developed” in the Polish energy security discourse compared to the others.

The Polish grammar of securitization proves to be the most evident one, more so – it is exemplary in terms of showing what a securitizing move in a speech act should be.
3.2. Regional Energy Security Community.

3.2.1. Finland.

Why is the hypothesis such that Finland finds itself in a presumable Regional Energy Security Community together with Russia and Germany? The answer is not clear: there are many possible options. First, it is because Finland was the first country to negotiate the possible undersea pipeline project with Russia as early as in 1995. Second, it is the “chosen” amity pattern in relations with Russia. Third, which is a negative interpretation of the previous argument, is a new stage of “Finlandization” – the Finns are simply afraid to contradict the large Eastern neighbour. Fourth, it is Finland’s relatively low dependence on Russian natural gas.

The main speaker articulating the Finnish position on Nord Stream is the President Tarja Halonen. Here, for example, is the fragment of one of her speeches on the topic:

The Nord Stream gas pipeline being planned from Russia to Greifswald in Germany has been met with mixed emotions in the Baltic Sea countries. Finland considers the project a way of improving energy security in Europe. The pipeline in itself is a safe way of conveying gas, but we want — and indeed our legislation requires — that all environmental factors involved in the project will be carefully studied. When Finland decides on whether to allow the use of her sea areas, the decisions will be based on environmental factors.

In this statement the issue of energy security is being addressed in direct words, and at a glance, the element of desecuritization is the very phrase about the project “improving energy security”. However, logically it is not desecuritization: it would be such only if the issue was addressed as a non-security, and sometimes a non-politics matter. In this case, it is only about refuting the arguments of the project opponents, which is still much if we remember about the EU membership, common policies and historical friendship and cooperation of the Baltic Sea rim countries. Besides, there is a reference to the conventional procedure, which is perceived as obligatory – “legislation requires…environmental factors carefully studied.” Tarja Halonen denies the opponents’ arguments one by one: providing security instead of political leverage, a safe way of gas transport instead of a disastrous venture, and pragmatic environmental concern instead of “nothing is to be built in this fragile environment” hysteria. Indeed, Finland has environmental concerns, but the idea to move the route of the pipeline to the South (to Estonian

---

EEZ) was rather a pragmatic proposal, because the sea bottom is more even and sandy there, so the construction risks are minimized.

It is important to notice that since Estonia refused to have the pipeline constructed in its exclusive economic zone, now the Finns are to approve the construction in theirs. Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen said that Finland is to finish with environmental studies by the end of June 2009 and consider the issue of construction in the Finnish EEZ in the State Council in September – October 2009.\(^{156}\) The Prime Minister himself said: “We need a new gas pipeline between Russian and Central Europe [...]. At the same time it constitutes a part of our strategic partnership with Russia – this is the most important argument [...]. I do not understand what these security concerns could really be.”\(^{157}\) This statement looks more like a desecuritizing speech act, hence the claim that there should be no security concerns.

In another interview to the same newspaper Mr. Vanhanen assured that “Finnish firms do not plan to be involved in the Nord Stream project; not regarding this, Finland is hoping that the implementation of the project will not harm the environment.”\(^{158}\) So, in different statements by the Finnish politicians, the attitude towards the project in general varies from positive to neutral.

Almost all Finish politicians were reported to claim that Finland is not interested in the talks about political dimension of the Nord Stream project, it is more about the economic importance and viability, which Finland assess positively, and the only concerns are environmental, which are to be solved.\(^{159}\) Unfortunately, not reading in Finnish I was unable to find more exact speech acts involving desecuritizing elements.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Stubb also stated the Finnish position as follows: “I say we need Nabucco, I say we need South Stream and I say that at the end of the day we might also need Nord Stream [...]. Politically we are not blocking it. Our approach to Nord Stream is a positive one.”\(^{160}\) It is an evident “downshifting” of the issue from the level of political (and, securitized) to the level of economic. Another desecuritizing move was: “Seventy-five percent of the Russian energy market is in Europe, so who is more dependent on who?”\(^{161}\)

---


\(^{160}\) Europe “might need” Nord Stream, says Stubb. 9 February 2009, available at: http://www.neurope.eu/articles/92600.php, last access 18.05.2009

\(^{161}\) Ibid.
The intention was to prove that those who promote the debate about Europe becoming increasingly (threateningly) dependent on one supplier simply do not want to see the other side of the coin – why would Russia cut off and blackmail the countries that “feed” it having to alternative option? However, Stubb proves that he is not pro-Russian, just objective and pragmatic. Regarding the Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis he suggested that it “should provide impetus for a common European energy policy. I’m not talking about determining energy sources but it should be our next big project.”162

Not everyone in Finland supports the position of the top policy-makers. For instance, Heidi Hautala, a member of the Finnish Parliament, is not that optimistic. She believes Nord Stream lacks several essential things to be implemented in the Finnish EEZ:

Finland has always taken an active position on Nord Stream. Therefore it did not close its eyes to all the shortcomings of the project. The shortcomings are as follows: The underwater topography in the Gulf is not simple. But in addition to this, Russia needs to ratify the Espoo Convention. Without such ratification there is no reliable framework within which environmental questions can be discussed. I asked our environment minister about this. He replied that in Finland it is not customary to link together two unrelated questions. In my view, this is an unacceptable answer.163

It appears to be very indicative, what was said by the MP. It means that security concerns for lower-profile politicians in Finland may be more important, and Rusia’s unwillingness to act in accordance with the legal procedure common in the Baltic in what concern ecology (the Espoo convention) should be the reason for blocking the pipeline. However, the opinion is not shared by the higher-level policymakers. Thus, they act driven by some additional motives. What could it be?

Here, we move to a very interesting riddle – if the environmental concerns have real grounds, or at least it is perceived so in the Finnish society, why then top rank politicians say that the issue should be dealt with, implicitly showing green light to the project, whatever additional problems may appear? Why do they neglect the warning from Sweden about Russia spying Finnish military and any other activities in the sea and on land through the pipeline?

The answer, if there is one, should be looked for in the history of Finnish-Russian relation. Starting with the status of the Grand Duchy within the Russian Empire, which lasted from 1809 to 1917, not forgetting the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line and up till the current status of relations under the presidencies of Ahtissari and Halonen – what were policies, relations and

---

162 Europe “might need” Nord Stream, says Stubb.
attitudes? Anni Kangas believes that all the time the pattern of relations with Russia, from the Finnish point of view, was built up on the dominant type of public debate or attitude towards the Eastern neighbour. Involving the “Machiavelli thought paradigm”, there were four possible options depending on how Russia was perceived – as “good or bad fortuna”, and how cautious or active the Finns would choose to behave. These “strategies of Finnish-Russian statecraft” were: activism (a combination of a bad fortuna perception and proactive behaviour), prudence (bad fortuna and cautiousness), normalcy (good fortuna and cautiousness) and loyalty (good fortuna, proactive).\textsuperscript{164} Finland rarely resorted to activism in the current of history, mostly it was from the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century until the end of World War II. In more or less contemporary history Finland would always choose from the other three options, and most explicitly it was loyalty under Paasikivi and Kekkonen. It is difficult to judge, what choice is dominant for Finland today, for some groups in the Finnish society it can be even activism (e.g., calls for joining NATO), but in the general public debate very few strongly critical articles or expressions assessing and judging the Russian policies can appear (unless the critique is positive and constructive), and over a time nothing has been done in practice that would contradict Russian interests.

Another probable answer is a negative interpretation of what was mentioned above. Choosing the path of loyalty (or just the path of non-criticism) to the powerful neighbouring country, Finnish politicians themselves welcome back the notorious phenomenon of Finlandisation. Tapani Vaahtoranta, Programme Director in the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, voices concern with this political trend:

If you look at the public debate in Finland about Russia, more of our debate has started to resemble the debate we had during the Cold War. This Finlandisation approach, I think, has come back. And we are much more careful when we discuss Russia now than just some years ago. As I said, when we discuss the pipeline, we only discuss the environmental issues.\textsuperscript{165}

Kadri Liik, Director of the Estonian International Centre for Defense Studies in Estonia, appears to be more critical:

Finland has a strong self-censorship. Their relation with Russia is not a healthy one. They do not discuss the issues that have to do with Russia. This is Finlandisation, and that is getting stronger now. … And of course, from our [Estonian] point of view, this is just sad to see. It is supposed to be a free country, but it is not free in its expressions and thoughts.\textsuperscript{166}

\textsuperscript{165} Interview with Tapani Vaahtoranta as cited in Whist, “Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline”, P. 36
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid, P. 37
Here, I would argue that impact of these trends both in political decisions and in social debate is over-exaggerated. The fact is that, unlike some of its Baltic counterparts, Finland knows how to be diplomatic and how to benefit is situations where it is possible. It is necessary to note that within the Finnish debate the word “Finlandisation” is rare, mostly it is used to sharpen the critique by those discontent with the Finnish policies since the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line up till now. As a country, Finland has proven to be good at risk assessment and economic management, especially since and after it has coped with the 1991 crisis. Therefore, what Finnish politicians now show in their speeches regarding Nord Stream is a well thought-through policy line, and although there are few clearly securitizing or desecuritizing speech acts, the general trend is not to allow any securitization or politicization at all.

### 3.2.2. Germany

Germany has obvious reasons to do everything possible to have the Russian natural gas delivered in a due volume and without disruptions, and also to have these supplies secured in a long-term perspective. One has to remember, that Germany is a great power that rests upon the economic successes, it is the leading EU economy, and №3 economy in the world. Over the last 64 years Germany has persistently avoided military and explicitly political ways of “solving problems”, rather preferring to resort to economic negotiations and economic levers. Energy supply in a country that is deprived of substantial energy resources by nature is a key element needed to maintain the powerful economy. Thus, energy security comes in the forefront of all possible security types for Germany (see Chapter 1). Since the country has decided to gradually diminish the ratio of nuclear power in the energy balance, presumably down to zero in some distant year, and the “green” renewable sources of energy will not be able to input enough in the foreseeable future, natural gas becomes a necessary alternative for the German economy. This is why Germany has always lobbied the undersea gas pipeline from Russia, which is the only way to connect these two countries without mediators. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder has stroke a deal with Vladimir Putin on the pipeline construction in 2005, and soon after his term in office ended, ex-Chancellor was offered a position in the supervisory board of Nord Stream AG, which he accepted, and thereby made himself object to severe critique.\(^\text{167}\) However, Angela Merkel did

---

not bring in any alterations to the German energy security policy line, including the Nord Stream project.

Currently, the key speaker in Germany in terms of the Nord Stream pipeline promotion, and, perhaps, desecuritization, is the Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel. Many times she directly promoted and lobbied the project. Speaking about all three pipeline projects (answering to the Czech PM Mirek Topolanek, who attempted to promote only the rivaling Nabucco), Mrs. Merkel said that the EU should give its “full support”168 to the Nord Stream project, not forgetting the other pipelines: “It is very important that these projects are politically desired and supported by all EU nations.”169 The claim to provide equal conditions for all pipeline projects in Europe was repeated by Angela Merkel several times.170 This implies that the German Chancellor demands the realization of the conventional procedure in every case, the political pressure and stereotypes notwithstanding, which is partially an element of desecuritization.

Moreover, the Kanzlerin does not ever hesitate to underline that the Nord Stream pipeline is interesting and profitable for Germany: she interprets the possibility of having a new pipeline system as a good “growth opportunity” and she hopes that “Nord Stream will be ready no later than South Stream – best would be to finish it earlier – and that the schedule will be kept to. We are working on this politically every time in our visits.”171

Mrs. Merkel also assures the audience that the German position remains unchanged through all negotiations and in spite of numerous securitizing acts articulated by the leaders of the Baltic Sea states, Sweden and Poland. After negotiating with Prime Minister Putin in January this year she stated: “As for the Nord Stream project, nothing has changed for us here. We are determined to continue with the project implementation stage by stage.”172

Indeed Germany values Nord Stream as an essential project that has to be implemented, and any statement or action from any side definitely irritates the Germans, especially if some doubts come from the Russian side. For instance, when after negotiating with Matti Vanhanen Vladimir Putin said that Moscow can choose another option and build plants for producing

---

168 Europe Split Over Energy Security, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,604277,00.html, last access 13.05.2009
170 Merkel prizvala Yevrosoyuz podderzhat’ Nord Stream [Merkel Called the EU to Support Nord Stream], available at: http://rus.postimees.ee/?id=75840, last access 14.05.2009
liquified gas instead of laying the undersea pipeline, in Germany it was perceived the statement as a certain threat. The reaction was immediate – coordinator of Russian-German partnership in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs Andreas Schockenhoff said that the option suggested by Putin was an “unacceptable alternative”\textsuperscript{173}, because overloading the sea with heavy tankers would be irresponsible. He also underlined “there is no need in making urgent decisions on Nord Stream, as well as no reasons for threatening with construction cease.”\textsuperscript{174}

In this context, although the ex-Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder is the person concerned, or perhaps even the interested party, his statements come within the mainstream of German polemics regarding the Nord Stream project. Criticism directed at Schroeder’s personality is explained quite simply – despite the shared understanding in Germany (or at least among the political and economic elites) that the new gas pipeline is a necessary project, democracy, transparency and impartiality is something that is praised very high in the European Union, while Schroeder’s appointment to a well-paid position in Nord Stream AG giver room for reasonable suspicions. Therefore, the ex-Chancellor has to persistently deny all accusations, and he usually does it with a good portion of irony. Answering to the nickname given to him in Germany – Gasprom-Kanzler – he noticed that “Nord Stream is not only Gazprom’s project, it is a common European project. If I would work for an American enterprise, they would crown me with laurels. For working with Russian firms you only get criticized.”\textsuperscript{175} Here, Mr. Schroeder attempts to remove prejudice against Russia, and at the same time move the very project “away” from Russia, for he understands clearly that the very word “Russian” is a facilitating condition for an increased threat perception for average Europeans.

As for the pipeline project itself, Mr. Schroeder claims that “Nord Stream is not going to deprive anyone of anything, but it gives such a sustainability of gas supply for Europe that was never precedent before.”\textsuperscript{176}

In general the German debate on Nord Stream appears to be totally pragmatic, with few elements of desecuritization, because to an extent the issue of gas supply is also securitized in Germany, meaning the sustainability of the supply. So, speech acts by German politicians rather

\textsuperscript{173} Zayavleniye Putina po Nord Stream v Berline vosprinyali kak politicheskoye davleniye [Putin’s Statement on Nord Stream Perceived as a Political Pressure in Berlin], available at: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3791062,00.html, last access 15.05.2009
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{176} Press-conference of Putin and Schroeder after their meeting devoted to Nord Stream, available at: http://runet.lt/world/9460-g.shreder-nord-strim-daet-ustojjchivost.html, last access 17.05.2009
tend to disapprove of the statements presenting Russia and dependence on Russian gas as a threat, as well as other real and imaginary threats posed by the pipeline construction.

3.2.3. Russia

Russian political debate on the Nord Stream project has been extensively foreign-political, because firstly, the Russian population in average is not that politicized and interested in environmental implications of the pipeline in the Baltic Sea, and, secondly, the main target of the debate was to convince the European audience, and especially the policy-makers in the project’s safety and profitability.

Therefore, the most of the speeches by Medvedev, Putin and other top politicians is taken directly from negotiations and press-conferences with their European counterparts. Besides, these are answers from the Russian side to excessive critique that can not be left without comments, for example the spying devices’ speculations.

First, I would refer to the same press-conference where Vladimir Putin shared his view on Nord Stream together with Gerhard Schroeder. The idea is that between them there was no single point of contradiction, and the way they speak about the pipeline in the framework of all-European gas supply system is absolutely the same. “Deficit of energy in Europe will be increasing. Thus, we have to calmly explain our position and work on the implementation of this important European project [which is] in many European countries’ interest, first of all, Germany, of course, which becomes not only the consumer, but also the key energy transiting country.”

Grounds for cooperation in the energy sphere Mr. Putin finds in history: “It is namely by Russia and Germany that European system of gas supply was established in order to provide the German economy with the Soviet natural gas.” However, today “it became clear for European consumers, especially the German ones, that with the appearance of transit countries new threats have appeared.” In addition Mr. Putin once again marked that Nord Stream is not a Russo-German project, because “Two German, one Russian and one Dutch company take part in it. Presumably gas will be supplied to the pipe from Stockman gas field as well, where Gazprom, the French Total and Norwegian Statoil operate. Not only Germany, but also other European

177 Press-conference of Putin and Schroeder after their meeting devoted to Nord Stream
countries will receive this gas. <…> so, this is a multilateral European project."\(^{179}\) Dismissing the threat speculation, the Russian Prime Minister emphasized that:

With implementation of the project Russia does not harm anyone, we are not taking anything away from anybody. There are already existing routes through the territory of transit countries. We are not closing them. Moreover, all countries that have long-term contracts with us concluded on the market basis will get gas in full volume from what was ordered. Russia has never failed to deliver it - I want to stress it – never.\(^{180}\)

Again in this statement, just as in statements by Tarja Halonen and Angela Merkel, the threats and concerns mentioned in the anti-Nord Stream debate in countries around the Baltic are refuted and denied one by one. However, there is obviously a bit of pressure from the “power” position – a pressure to make other countries cooperate with Russia closer, because – implicitly – those who do not may have problems in the future.

This is probably the mistake that is very often made by the Russian speakers, because statements like this only give impetus for further securitization of the project in the Baltic States, Sweden and Poland. One example is Putin’s televised speech where he proposed addressing the Nord Stream related issues with the help of navy: “The Baltic Fleet also has the task of ensuring our economic interests in the Baltic Sea.<…> And of course we are going to involve and use the opportunities offered by the navy to resolve environmental, economic, and technical problems.”\(^{181}\) As I already mentioned, the speech was directed rather at Russian audience in order to show the growing power of Russian fleet, but those who translated the televised speech in Estonia and Sweden successfully used the quotation for securitization purposes.

Russian ambassador to Sweden Alexander Kadakin has made the same mistake answering the “espionage through Nord Stream” speculations:

…some are claiming that the service platform ... will be some kind of spy central directed against Sweden. I cannot understand what kind of an idiot would claim this in reports to Swedish superior officials. It may very well be Swedish technicians and engineers that will be working on the platform.<…> why would we need a spy central on a platform in the Baltic Sea when we already today ...have the possibility to read the license plate on every car in Stockholm using satellites in outer space?\(^{182}\)

It is amazing, how a professional diplomat can fail the intended desecuritization and produce a totally “allergic” reaction of the Swedish public and media instead. Not taking

---

\(^{179}\) Ibid.

\(^{180}\) Putin: Nord Stream nuzhen ne toliko Rossii i Germanii.

\(^{181}\) As translated in: Whist, B.S. Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline, P. 34

seriously the argument of “reading from satellite” – whether it is possible or not – dismissing one threat the ambassador immediately created another one, at the same time rendering his previous statement perceived as false.

At the same time the Russian Prime Minister shows a flexible position at bilateral negotiations. For instance after speaking with Matti Vanhanen, Vladimir Putin stated that Nord Stream AG is “ready to implement any route that will be more favourable for the Finnish partners, be it North to Gogland or South to Gogland (Suursaari in Finnish).” He also noticed that the project participants “Have made everything that was required. The question, it seems, is only in the will of our European partners … whether to have our cheap gas, or not to have it getting it liquefied through mediators.” In this case once more on the one hand, flexibility and readiness for cooperation is demonstrated, while on the other hand an additional threat is created through the harsh tone in describing the partners’ behaviour and options they might get in the end.

In the current of cooperation and negotiation with its partners like Finland, Russia’s position gets gradually gets closer to what the partners want. For instance, aide to the Russian President Sergey Prikhodko assured the press after the Russian-Finnish negotiations that when particular issue concerning the pipeline construction in the Finnish EEZ will be dealt with, “an emphasis will be made on compliance with the strictest ecological requirements.”

In some speeches and statements by Russian politicians, there is a certain intention to desecuritize and depoliticize the issue. Of course, they never use the word desecuritization since it is more from the academic discourse, but as we know from Buzan and Waever, depoliticization already includes the occurred desecuritization. The statement by the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov goes as follows:

Our wish is that the issues of the further development of energy cooperation in Europe would be considered in as depoliticized a way as possible. We are now witnessing attempts to politicize the Nord Stream project, which Russia has always supported as a project that would increase energy security in Europe.

The same attempt of “direct” desecuritization was carried out by President Putin in an interview given to a German newspaper in 2006:

183 Uchastniki proyekta Nord Stream gotovy korrektirovat’ marshrut [Participants of the Nord Stream project are ready to alter the route], 3 June 2009, available at: http://www.rian.ru/business/20090603/173166268.html, last access 7.06.2009.
184 Ibid.
I do not understand that, it is politicized artificially. Some persons are trying to heat up the issue in order to gain from it politically. These people are either provocateurs or very stupid. However, it is an objective fact that when we have a common pipeline system, we are equally dependent on each other.\footnote{SZ-Interview mit Wladimir Putin [Interview with Vladimir Putin]. Südliche Zeitung. 10 October 2006, available at: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ausland/artikel/274/88186, last access: 25.05.2009}

Putin’s successor on the presidential post Dmitri Medvedev keeps to the same line. He also attempted to desecuritize the Nord Stream pipeline a number of times, but in a more implicit manner with arguments that should have been positively perceived in Europe. Mr. Medvedev stated that Russia considers the project to be “absolutely beneficial for Europe as a whole and for separate states in particular”, adding that Russia is “determined to promote it.”\footnote{Press-conference after Finnish-Russian negotiations, 20 April 2009, Helsinki, available at the official web-site of the President of Russia: http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2009/04/215246.shtml} Concerning the issue of energy security, Dmitri Medvedev said that “it is projects like this one that create the framework [structure/skeleton] of energy security in Europe. Having a bigger number of gas supply routes enhance this security, not reduce it.”\footnote{Ibid.} Similar ideas were expressed by the President a number of times, for instance at an energy conference in Moscow he said, referring to European energy security enhancement: “…one pipe is good, several are anyways better.”\footnote{Speech at International conference on the issue of gas supply to Europe, Moscow, 17 January 2009, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2009/01/211831.shtml}

The President, whose educational background is law faculty, suggested that a stricter and better worked through juridical framework should support such projects.\footnote{Speech held by Medvedev in the University of Helsinki on the 21\textsuperscript{a} of April 2009, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2009/04/215266.shtml, last access: 24.05.2009} This is a clear reference to conventional procedure and to its strengthening in order not to allow for attempts to get over the boundaries of everyday political and legal practice.

Regarding the environmental concerns Mr. Medvedev affirmed that “projects like Nord Stream should be grounded upon a thorough ecological examination, for it all concerns our common Baltic Sea, and here we are going to act synchronously.”\footnote{Press-conference after Finnish-Russian negotiations, 20 April 2009}

Summing up the Russian position and how Russian policy-makers attempt to fight politicization and securitization of Nord Stream, I would like to present an all-embracing statement by Dmitri Medvedev:

This is a commercial project, … it is of extreme importance for Europe and it is not directed against anyone. This is a unifying, non-political, commercially-justified project. <…> It would be better not to politicize the commercial project aiming to
provide energy security to Europe as a whole, not to try to substitute it by some other ideas.  

Generally, in all the speeches by Russia’s political leaders the attitude towards Nord Stream and the problems it faces are more or less the same and even articulated in same words. Moreover, the Nord Stream debate in Russia is similar to those in Finland and Germany. In all three cases there are few desecuritizing moves, because the issue is still being dealt with as a matter of energy security. What the politicians from the presumable Regional Energy Security Community do in common – they deny and refute the opponents’ arguments one after another. However, and this is very important, the desecuritizing and depoliticizing attempts are mostly direct – these are calls not to politicize the issue, which is commercial, while the rest of “desecuritizing moves” are rather anti-securitization, because the speech acts do not downshift the issue from security and political matter to the level of economical or environmental. Instead, the issue is still referred to as the matter of security, but not as a threat to it, or a security reduction factor, but as something that provides and enhances energy security. So, if in the debates persistent within the Regional Energy Security Complex there is a perception that Nord Stream reduces and undermines the European energy security, and such are the securitizing speech acts, on contrary within the Regional Energy Security Community debate the issue is more frequently not desecuritized, but counter- or anti-securitized. It is difficult to find a logically and academically correct term for the phenomenon, so I will not treat it as the official hypothesis, but I will surely claim that this trend in the speech acts within the Community is to a great extent shared.

As we’ve seen from concrete examples of speech acts, the rhetoric concerning Nord Stream in Sweden, Poland, Estonia and Lithuania is more or less the same. Different countries have different accents in it – military for Sweden, political and environmental for Poland and Estonia, political and economic for Lithuania, but in general they coincide in not only in the “spheres” of securitization (military, political, environmental aspects and implications of the commercial project), but in the very securitization grammar. Perhaps, there is a certain securitization force, which varies from speech act to speech act, and in average – from country to country. In Sweden the securitization may not be as “strong” as in Lithuania and Poland, Swedish politicians tend to be more cautious and objective in what they say. However, in some cases not knowing the authorship of a certain statement securitizing Nord Stream, it is absolutely impossible to tell from which of the four countries this statement comes, but to guess.

Surprisingly, Latvia fell out of the presumable Regional Energy Security Complex. It appeared that, as it was proclaimed by Valdis Zatlers, economic pragmatic concerns for Latvia are on the first place, while politics withdraws before the benefit / loss debate.

Hence, a question – what is the factor that can make a country part of a Security Complex or exclude it from one, except for objective energy dependency and its perception? The probable answer is that statecraft can modify the way the country “behaves” with enmity patterns unchanged. So, according to the scheme suggested by Anni Kangas, that I referred to speaking of Finnish-Russian relations in this chapter, with the new leadership Latvia has altered its position towards Russia from something like “activism” to something like “prudence” – although historically Russia is perceived as a massive threat, as well as everything coming from the East, the new statecraft and behaviour model silences the anti-Russian debate leaving more space for political and economic benefit. A vice versa process is taking place, for instance, in Poland, where dependence on Russian energy supplies is relatively low, but the enmity pattern is cultivated, especially when it come to Russian-German deals.

As for the Regional Energy Security Community, the debates in all three countries, Russia, Finland and Germany appear to be similar. However, one can reasonably notice that for Russia and Germany in the case of Nord Stream this debate is profit driven, and, therefore, biased and artificial, while Finland abstains from criticism due to its “Finlandized” position. Although in the case of Nord Stream debate the positions of the three countries appeared to be similar, as well as the “grammar” of speech acts that were used, there is not enough evidence to dismiss the idea mentioned. The best way to find the answer would be to take a number of other case studies except for Nord Stream in the sphere of energy security and see if the positions and the way they are articulated remains shared among these three countries. In the case of Nord Stream, I claim that they do represent a Regional Energy Security Community.
Conclusion

After the research is finalized I can claim with a great deal of certainty that the Nord Stream project is, indeed, not just a pipeline. It is not known for sure, whether it will be eventually built or not (I believe that it will), but the impact of the project on the system of international relations in the Baltic Sea region is already immense.

Having worked out a version of Regional Security Complex Theory of my own, I claim that due to Nord Stream a new Regional Energy Security Complex and a new Regional Energy Security Community are being constructed in the Baltic Sea region. In order to prove this I have analysed a number of speeches and other textual materials containing illocutionary speech acts. As discussed in chapter two, illocutionary speech acts are the only relevant object for analysis here, because although securitization works through perlocutionary effect on the audience achieved, the feasible research task was to reveal securitizing (or opposite to it) moves, and thereby understand, whether common grammar of securitization is used in the Complex debate and grammar opposite to it – within the Community debate.

It turned out that on the one hand, similar grammar of securitization persists in the debates on Nord Stream in Sweden, Poland, Lithuania and Estonia, which renders them a Regional Energy Security Complex, while on the other hand, the debates in Russia, Germany and Finland also proved to be alike, which brings these countries into the Regional Energy Security Community. Latvia falls out of the model due to probable reasons explained in the end of the third chapter. However, this exception only reaffirms the rule.

I admit that the trends in the debates within the Community are not as evident and reasoned by the same logic, as it is in the case of the Complex. The problem I faced was the insufficient elaboration of the notion signifying the de-, anti- or counter-securitization (as I refer to them in the text of the thesis) debate and practices (certain speech acts). It is quite evident that in the case of Nord Stream politicians from Finland, Russia and Germany articulate approximately the same speech acts, but these are not desecuritizing speech act except for the few. Desecuritization is about downshifting the status of the issue of concern from security level to political, and desirably even lower – making the issue non-political (depoliticization). In the case of the given Community, most often via speech acts the issue of the pipeline construction remains at the level of security, but unlike those discontent with Nord Stream, proponents of the project claim that it rather secures energy supplies to Europe, strengthens the structure of the EU’s energy security, and so on and so forth. As for the environmental and political concerns,
the supporters of the project simply deny the arguments of the countries concerned with the possible construction as irrelevant, imaginary, biased, ungrounded, etc. So, such tendency in the discourse requires further investigation – whether it does function not only in the case of Nord Stream, and if yes, then how to name it to be correct in academic terms.

My claim is that in the case study of Nord Stream, the model works as suggested, and Sweden, Poland, Estonia and Lithuania do belong to a newly emerged Regional Energy Security Complex with shared energy threat perception, while Russia, Finland and Germany constitute a Regional Energy Security Community, within which perception of the burning energy issues is also shared, and this is reflected in the political and public debates of those countries.
List of Primary Sources

- Ansökningar om gasledning genom Östersjön har kommit till regeringen (Application for Pipeline Construction under the Baltic Sea Came to the Government), http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/9900/a/95117, last access 15.04.2009


- Eesti Postimees:
  - Andres Tarand’s interview to Eesti Postimees on 2 April 2009, available at: http://rus.postimees.ee/?id=102326,
  - Merkel prizvala Yevrosoyuz podderzhat' Nord Stream [Merkel Called the EU to Support Nord Stream], available at: http://rus.postimees.ee/?id=75840, last access 14.05.2009
  - Tarand. A. O gazovoy trube v nashem more [About the Gas Pipe in Our Sea], 5 May 2009, available at http://rus.postimees.ee/?id=115087, last access 15.05.2009


- Europe Split Over Energy Security, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,604277,00.html, last access 13.05.2009


Langeled pipeline information. http://www.metoc.co.uk/casestudies/oilgas/056_1_Langeled%20Pipeline.pdf, last access 11.05.2009


Latvia to pitch Nord Stream alternative, available at: http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article176161.ece, last access 4.05.2009

Lithuanian Prime Minister's interview to Euronews, 4 December 2008, available at: http://www.euronews.net/2008/12/04/andrius-kubilius-lithuanian-prime-minister/, last access 5.05.2009


Ministry of Economy of Poland:


Official web-site of the President of Lithuania:

- President Adamkus discussed important Baltic and Eastern European issues with Finnish Prime Minister and MPs / Official web-site of the President of Lithuania, http://www.president.lt/en/activities/press_releases/president_adamkus_discussed_important_baltic_and_eastern_european_issues_with_finnish_prime_minister_and_mps.html, last access 2.05.2009

Official web-site of the President of Russia:


Open letter by Radek Sikorski, Maciej Olex-Szczytowski and Jacek Rostowski. “Nord Stream is a Geopolitical Disaster for the EU”, available at: http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2007/05/nordstream_is_a_geopolitical_d.htm, last access 30.04.2009


Press-conference of Putin and Schroeder after their meeting devoted to Nord Stream, available at: http://runet.lt/world/9460-g.shreder-nord-strim-daet-ustojchivost.html, last access 17.05.2009

• Regeringen vill att alternativa sträckningar för gasledningen presenteras (The Government Promotes Alternatives Pipeline Routes), http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/9655/a/91304, last access 15.04.2009


• Rosbalt News Agency:

• Sikorski’s speech at the Transatlantic Conference in Brussels, 30 April 2006, as translated in “The Nord Stream Gas Pipeline Project and Its Strategic Implications.” A briefing note by Cameron Fraser, Brussels, European Parliament, December 2007, P. 3


• SZ-Interview mit Wladimir Putin [Interview with Vladimir Putin]. Süddeutsche Zeitung. 10 October 2006, available at: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ausland/artikel/274/88186, last access: 25.05.2009

• Tal av miljöminister Andreas Carlgren vid riksdagens särskilda debatt om gasledning i Östersjön, http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/8580/a/95026, last access 15.04.2009


• “The Baltic States in a Changing Europe: Our New Roles and Responsibilities”, a speech by Valdas Adamkus at the Ceremony of Conferment of Honorary Doctoral Degree at


- Uchastniki proyekta Nord Stream gotovy korrektirovat’ marshrut [Participants of the Nord Stream project are ready to alter the route], 3 June 2009, available at: http://www.rian.ru/business/20090603/173166268.html, last access 7.06.2009.

- Vahtoranta, Tapani. Interview as cited in Whist, “Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline”

- Vanhanen, Matti. Interview to Eesti Päevaleht, 14 September 2007, as translated in “The Nord Stream Gas Pipeline Project and Its Strategic Implications.” A briefing note by Cameron Fraser, Brussels, European Parliament


- Zayavleniye Putina po Nord Stream v Berline vosprinyali kak politicheskoye davleniye [Putin’s Statement on Nord Stream Perceived as a Political Pressure in Berlin], available at: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3791062,00.html, last access 15.05.2009
List of References


Kangas A. The Knight, the Beast and the Treasure: A Semeiotic Inquiry into the Finnish Political Imaginary on Russia, 1918–1930s. Tampere: Tampere University Press, 2007, available for download at: acta.uta.fi/pdf/978-951-44-7157-5.pdf, last access 30.05.2009


Stritzel H. Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond // European Journal of International Relations 2007; 13; P. 357-383


Vuori J. Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders // European Journal of International Relations 2008; 14; P. 65-99


