Non-traditional security
Mexico and the framing of transnational organized crime by Felipe Calderon
My overall objective in this thesis has been to shed light on non-traditional security issues and their implications. In this specific research project the focus has been on transnational organized crime and particularly on the case of Mexico. By relying on the theoretically flexible framework of Critical theory and on the methodological tools provided by Speech act theory and Critical discourse analysis I have analyzed the framing of transnational organized crime by the Mexican president Felipe Calderon. The primary analytical interest has been the produced social meaning of security and its connection to transnational organized crime. The used research material comprises all the organized crime-related speeches, statements and interviews given by Felipe Calderon in 2010.

The arguments made in this paper are twofold concerning the theoretical debate over the meaning of security as well as the possibility to perceive transnational organized crime as a relevant part of this debate. I have wished to introduce a wider perspective to security and expand the security mindset towards multiple referent objects, more comprehensive conceptualizations and integrative ways of producing security. I have also explained how contemporary transnational organized crime is connected to the asymmetries of globalization and how it affects the security and well-being of collectivities even if it doesn’t appear as an existential threat to states per se. Theoretically speaking these arguments rely on the ideas of the Welsh school, the Copenhagen school and the human security perspective which expand security beyond the concerns over existential survival, militarism and state-centrism.

Throughout the theory chapter I use Critical theory in comparison to the hegemonic traditional theories and in parallel with more specialized conceptualizations that provide their own suggestions for the management of transnational organized crime. The methodological tools are also derived from social constructivism and Critical theory. However, in this regard the notion of securitization as promoted by the Copenhagen school has been replaced by an idea of an intersubjective security framing that perceives utterances not only as performative acts but as elements of discourses which build social meaning. Analytically speaking the focus has thus been on those elements that reflect discursive conventions or transformation in terms of security and transnational organized crime.

Based on the analysis, the social meanings that Felipe Calderon promotes in his discourses represent some kind of ‘a twilight zone’ between conventional state-centric thinking and more collective security-oriented thinking. On an ontological level Calderon clearly acknowledges the relevance of transnational organized crime as a major source of insecurity as well as its connection to the lack of human emancipation. Human security and transnationality are perceived as relevant dimensions of security and become tied to a notion of shared responsibility across multiple sectors and levels of action. From the perspectives of horizontally broader and vertically deeper security Calderon’s argumentation succeeds in gaining the approval of certain foreign state leaders. This in turn increases the impression of intersubjectivity of his discourses. In regard to the provision of security, however, Calderon’s approach is more conventional and state-centric. The rhetorical emphasis is primarily on inter-state cooperation and the role of the private sector remains
unrepresented. Also especially in the national context Calderon builds rather sharp barriers for any alternative representations of reality and underlines the relevance of reactive actions as a necessary addition to proactive initiatives. This action-oriented part of his argumentation represents a more militarized approach but interestingly the involvement of the army is still approved by a great majority of Mexicans.

In sum it could be said that the outcomes of the research are inevitably shaped by the limitations that the nation-state creates for Calderon as a representative of a sovereign-bound entity. Despite the many unconventional aspects, the link between human security, emancipation, national security and transnational organized crime remains somewhat unsolved. It is difficult to say whether the inclusion of human security and emancipation is based on a genuinely normative goal-setting that is oriented towards collective security, whether it stems from the transnational nature of organized crime or serves some justification purposes of the security paradigm. This issue would thus benefit from further research.
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1. Introduction

Annually approximately 450 tons of cocaine are transferred through Central-America first to Mexico and finally to the United States, which is the world’s biggest market area for the drug. Due to its clandestine nature it is hard to estimate the exact income produced in the world’s drug trade but according to the UNODC Executive Director Yuri Fedotov the global cocaine trade alone produces approximately 72 billion dollars per year\(^1\). The profits of narcotics trade are said to be exceeded only by the profits made in the weapon industry whereas all the profits of all organized crime surpass the GDP of many states\(^2\).

In North-America the primary form of transnational organized crime is drug-trade but most organized crime groups are involved also in a variety of other criminal activities. These professional criminals are economically powerful people to the extent that in 2009 Forbes Magazine named Joaquin Guzman, a Mexican drug dealer the 41\(^{st}\) most powerful person in the world\(^3\). The power of professional criminals is not, however, limited to their economic power but comprises of a variety of resources. Added to their economic power, organized crime groups can also possess enormous amounts of intimidation power, which is a major contributing factor for the increase in violence especially in the case of drug trafficking\(^4\).

The social and political consequences caused by organized crime are generally related to the surrounding circumstances and depend for example on the stability of the state in question. While the public safety of most destination countries is not often threatened by organized crime, in the production and transit countries organized crime can pose a real threat to human security by terrorizing civilians and indirectly by deteriorating the functionality of the state as the main guarantor of security.\(^5\) In the worst cases deeply penetrated organized crime can even create alternative authoritative figures that create their own social programs and protection mechanisms, which in turn aim at challenging the state’s territorial control, institutional functionality, political legitimacy and monopoly on violence\(^6\).

\(^{1}\) Reuters 18.10.2010
\(^{3}\) Forbes Magazine 2009.
\(^{4}\) UNODC 18.10.2010
\(^{6}\) Hofmann 2009, 5; Shelley 1999, 35-36.
Considering the magnitude of transnational organized crime and its power resources, it is no wonder that the former Executive Director of UNODC, Antonio Maria Costa has called organized crime groups “a well-armed transnational superpower” that pose a strategic threat to the economic, the political and the military sectors. Even though organized crime is functionally based on economic profit-seeking it is ultimately a complex phenomenon that has the potential to evolve, expand and penetrate societies. From a security perspective it can harm both state and non-state actors and threaten people in spaces that are somewhat immune to the countermeasures of national institutions. This in turn is due to the transnational dimensions that largely define organized crime in the 21st century. However, it is not sustained merely by the logics of global demand and supply but also by the power of non-state actors that is free of the restraining normative obligations which confine state actors.

As a clarifying example of the increased infiltration of organized crime in Mexico, the Committee to Protect Journalists has named Mexico the 9th worst country in the world in terms of impunity related to journalist killings. A reason for this is the eminent presence and intimidation power of organized crime groups who punish journalists of crime-related statements. In this regard the increased societal control of organized crime in Mexico has resulted in arbitrary restrictions concerning for example the freedom of speech. What is even more alarming though is that organized crime has penetrated the state so deeply that its ability to prosecute criminals and execute legislation has weakened and become controlled by external actors.

1.1. Research question and its relevance

The motivation for this thesis stems from a personal interest in non-traditional security issues which are still a marginal research subject in International Relations and in security studies. Unlike terrorism, which is currently the most discussed non-traditional security issue, the security dimension of transnational organized crime is sometimes underestimated or misunderstood. In all of their unpredictability the 9/11 attacks provided a reminder that threats do arise from spatial universes outside statism targetting not states but humans and ways of living instead. The attacks also provided a reminder that there are people who don’t define their identities and interests as

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7 UNODC 17.6.2010.
8 See UNODC 2010, 223.
9 Committee to Protect Journalists 2010, 8, 13.
10 The word non-traditional is equivalent to non-military. The concept can be used as a general security perspective that focuses on non-military security issues as well as an approach to solve security problems in a non-military way.
members of a specific country. Instead their identity is based on alternative loyalties that provide a basis for their understanding of friendship and enemosity.\textsuperscript{11} Terrorism and organized crime have similarities as they are both manifestations of the non-state sphere and among the 6 security clusters that UN regards as future’s security concerns\textsuperscript{12}. However, interestingly organized crime and criminal violence create currently more death and injury than war and terrorism combined\textsuperscript{13}. This reality, that doesn’t include the economic costs and indirect consequences to health, the increase of petty crime and political turmoil, makes organized crime a concrete security concern to many people. However, is our security mindset open for new contextualizations regarding the content of security and organized crime?

My purpose in this thesis is first of all to take a stance in the theoretical debate concerning the very nature of security and look for answers to the following questions. What does security mean and what aspects of human life can it cover? Whose concern can security be and how can it be provided? The idea is to promote a wider and more comprehensive perspective to security without presenting any final conclusions about its content. Secondly in the analysis part I will focus my attention particularly to the case of Mexico and analyse how transnational organized crime has been discursively framed by the country’s political leader Felipe Calderon. The idea is to analyse the constructed social meaning of security per se as well as the relationship between transnational organized crime and security. The intention is to cover three dimensions of social meaning which are ways to perceive, ways to be and ways to act in relation to security. Due to the lack of resources I will focus my attention only on the above named country and on the year 2010. At this point it is clear that the material will guide the analysis but at the same token I hope to enrich the theoretical debate with a more practice-oriented analysis.

To provide a brief explanation why I have chosen to focus my attention on Mexico, I consider Mexico and the North-American drug trade cautionary examples of how contemporary transnational organized crime has affected negatively not only localities but the functionality of states, the stability of an entire region and the security of people and societies alike. In regard to transnational organized crime Mexico is a rather unique case as unlike many other countries plagued by drug-trafficking it wasn’t originally a producer of drugs but merely a transition zone that connected buyers and sellers. Added to this the occurring criminal violence is not linked to a prior

\textsuperscript{11} See Kessler & Dause 2008, 212.
\textsuperscript{12} UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004, 2.
\textsuperscript{13} Human Security Report 2005, 50.
armed conflict as in countries such as Afghanistan and Colombia but has evolved on its own as a by-product of the expanding power of organized crime groups. The reason why I focus my analysis on Felipe Calderon is the increased criminal violence that the country has witnessed during his administration despite the fierce anti-drug and anti-crime policies he has initiated. Also in the past year the problem has gained relatively much publicity and with a new record of 15,273 deaths in 2010 Mexico will most likely remain to withdraw the world’s attention.

My research material will comprise of all the relevant speeches, statement, interviews and policy formulations given by president Felipe Calderon in 2010 that deal with organized crime or transnational organized crime. The selection of this specific material is based particularly on two things. First of all the nexus between organized crime and security is widely discussed in Mexico and compared to countries like Afghanistan and Myanmar where organized crime has reached similar proportions, Mexico has easily accessible archives of consistently produced material that make the implementation of a research project possible in the first place. Another reason for concentrating on national discourses is the fact that most security framing still happens in the national context. The scarcity of relevant international or transnational research material is apparent excluding the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Lastly the reason why I will concentrate merely on the discourses produced by Felipe Calderon is Mexico’s presidential political system that personifies the political leadership relatively more compared to countries with parliamentary systems.

1.2. Structure of the thesis

Throughout this thesis my intention is to exemplify how the changes in our security environment, especially since the end of Cold War, have affected the theoretical debate and practical approaches to security. My argument is that these changes have required us to develop a broader security mindset and move towards a more interdisciplinary direction. This in turn has required us to dissolve those disciplinary specific limitations that security has traditionally had. I shall quote James Rosenau to better explain what I mean:

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14 See SIPRI yearbook 2010.
16 See UNODC 2000.
“The dynamics of globalization are such that narrow specializations will have to make way to broader inquiries”.\textsuperscript{17}

Rosenau’s example applies well to security studies and it encourages us to acknowledge new actors, adopt new ways of being, speaking and doing as these are inherently built into the dynamics of the contemporary world. As perceived by Rosenau, security as a dimension of life and as a sub-field of International Relations is very much affected by unforeseen phenomena.

The theoretical foundation of this thesis, which is based on Critical theory, promotes a comprehensive and inclusive perspective to security and is used to stretch the limits of political imagination in regard to security and transnational organized crime. This means that by using traditional theories as a comparison Critical theory will exemplify how political and security relevance are not inherent features that some issues possess and others don’t. Rather they are aspects and conscious choices to observe issues from certain perspectives. Security relevance is thus built in specific contexts in relation to the surrounding environment.\textsuperscript{18} It is related to ‘framing’ that uses security perspective to define issues in a specific way. The word ‘frame’ will be better explained later on but to give a brief explanation of the concept it means such selective perception of events that emphasizes and ignores certain aspects of reality. This perception is then used in communication to intentionally promote specific problem definitions, moral evaluations and to mobilize recommendations.\textsuperscript{19}

It is clear that Critical theory, or Critical Security Studies as it is also called, is not the only viable option for studying transnational organized crime. The issue could also be approached from a different perspective using globalization studies, transnationalism or IPE as a theoretical basis. However, I am hoping to adopt an inclusive perspective to security and stay open to any helpful insights suggested by other theoretical frameworks as well. Methodologically my research will be based on an integrative approach that combines Speech act theory and Critical discourse analysis. The analysis will be done by redirecting the concept of intentional securitization towards a more flexible and intersubjective definition of security framing which is then approached with the help of Critical discourse analysis.

\textsuperscript{17} Rosenau 2006, 63.
\textsuperscript{18} See Palonen 1993.
\textsuperscript{19} Entman 1993, 52.
1.3. Previous research and the conceptualization of organized crime

There is still a rather small group of scholars who have studied organized crime particularly from a security perspective regardless that its relevance among other non-traditional security issues has been acknowledged by several post-Cold War security theorists. Some of the most prominent scholars who have studied the dimensions and implications of organized crime are Svante Cornell and Louise Shelley. They have examined for example the relevance of organized crime in contemporary warfare as well as the pressures that transnational organized crime creates for nation-states. Added to this Louise Shelley has also studied corruption and organized crime particularly in the case of Mexico paying specific attention to its transnational aspects. Other contributors for the development of a more interdisciplinary approach have been Phil Williams, Roy Godson, Peter Andreas, Nikos Passas and Niklas Svanström. Despite their differences in the primary areas of interest, they all have analysed for example the impact of organized crime on international security as well as the transnational features of organized crime caused by globalization. Most of the above named scholars have also taken a stance in the debate concerning the relationship between nation-states and organized crime and the weakening of state authority in relation to sovereignty-free non-state actors. The most concrete studies concerning organized crime in contemporary Mexico are perhaps Hal Brands’ study called Mexico’s Narcoinsurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy and Katharina Hofmann’s briefing paper from 2009. All of the above named scholars have been a great source of information and inspiration during this research process.

1.3.1. Conceptualizing organized crime

As a criminological concept organized crime means economically motivated and professionally performed activity that aims at making profit by illegal means, often by selling and buying illegal substances or products or by conducting other illegal activities. It is maintained both by the lucrativity of economic opportunities as well as the asymmetries between national authorities to criminalize activities and effectively enforce these laws. Reasons for national inability, however, can be based either on the internal weakness of the state and/or on the transnational nature of organized crime in which case national control mechanisms are insufficient.

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20 See e.g. Laitinen 1999.
Organized crime is both the cause and a result of human insecurity, underdevelopment and poverty\textsuperscript{26}. Participation in organized crime can start as a survival strategy for poor and unemployed but it can also be the primary cause for stagnant development and public insecurity. Organized crime weakens social cohesion by using direct violence, intimidation and corruption as the primary means of controlling competition, the media and the authorities. It also affects the society through side-effects by causing addictions, related petty crime and by spreading disease such as AIDS.\textsuperscript{27}

Added to the above named factors organized crime can pose a threat to the state in a more traditional sense particularly in cases where it is characterized by a high level of violence. In the most extreme cases organized crime groups may even be able to challenge the state’s territorial control, its legitimate monopoly on violence and its role as the main provider of safety for citizens causing a conflict-like situation to occur.\textsuperscript{28}

Organized crime has traditionally been a matter of internal safety and a responsibility of the state’s law-enforcement sector. It has belonged to the sphere of domestic politics in the same way as the well-being of individuals. In other words organized crime, especially from the point of view of strong states, hasn’t been an interest of International Relations\textsuperscript{29}. It is, however, difficult to categorize organized crime only in law-enforcement terms as it has several asymmetrical dimensions. It doesn’t pose a straightforward military threat to states, it cannot be fully categorized by using concepts such as internal and external and it is generally caused and maintained by non-state actors.\textsuperscript{30} Regardless of its ambiguous nature it does, however, have security implications especially in our contemporary and interconnected world, where the boundaries between interests, identities, securities and insecurities are constantly blurring and becoming less apparent.

Organized crime threatens economic and political development by creating “states-within-states”, it increases violence and general sense of insecurity and it uses corruption to minimize risks and weaken the legitimacy of state institutions. Ultimately it can also blur the difference between political and criminal by politizing criminal enterprises and by criminalizing political groups.\textsuperscript{31} Due to its multidimensional and asymmetrical nature organized crime can generally be best fought proactively. I argue that the reason for this is the ambiguous risk potential that organized crime

\textsuperscript{26} UNODC 18.10.2010
\textsuperscript{27} See e.g. World Drug Report 2009, 57.
\textsuperscript{28} See Picarelli 2008, 462-466.
\textsuperscript{29} See Svanström 2007, 24.
\textsuperscript{30} See e.g. Godson & Williams 327; Friman & Andreas 1999.
\textsuperscript{31} See Galeotti 2001.
internally possesses which lacks many of the predictable features of symmetrical security concerns. So far this risk potential has actualized as recognizable existential threats only at the national and regional levels but this doesn’t mean that transnational organized crime couldn’t have global implications. Thus it is the future and not the past that should determine our present attitudes and framing in terms of security. However, as Fen Osler Hampson has argued, people tend to discount future risks with higher probabilities compared to imminent risks even if the expected risk is lower.

As a thematic plot running through the paper I argue that the complexity of organized crime requires us to approach it from an interdisciplinary perspective and to have some basic understanding of at least economics, security studies, human rights and criminology. Also, instead of focusing on one specific or multiple but separate referent objects I suggest that the issue is approached from a point of view of a so called ‘security cluster’. This implies that we don’t let our perspective become restricted by excessive categorizations of security providers and referent objects but instead analyse how subjects and objects contribute to each other’s meaning.

In order to fully understand the multidimensional security implications of especially transnational organized crime I will later anchor my arguments to the notions of collective and human securities. In its normativitity and criticality human security is able to take into account the interconnectedness of people under one umbrella category. I shall perceive this as a valuable addition to Critical theory that facilitates its applicability in practice.

1.3.2. Transnational organized crime and the new spheres of authority

A sufficient understanding of contemporary organized crime requires conceptual redefinitions that acknowledge its transnational dimensions and its connections to globalization. Due to its increasing transnationality organized crime is first of all a form of resistance against legal globalization but simultaneously responsible for the illegal side of the global economy. Functionally speaking transnational organized crime means possession of operational capacity across state borders, which is based on trading commodities, that are defined illegal at least in one of the countries where the transactions take place. However, transnational organized crime can also mean organized crime that

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32 See Beck 1992, 34.
33 Hampson 2008, 239.
34 Fierke 2007, 46.
36 See Mittelman & Johnston 2000.
takes place in one country but is planned or controlled abroad or which affects other countries through spill-over effects.\textsuperscript{37} It is not thus only the scope of the transactions that make it transnational but also the consequences. Transnational organized crime follows the patterns of global legal trade and especially in the case of drug trade it prospers because of the demand that mainly western countries create\textsuperscript{38}. It operates regardless of borders but partially because of the opportunities related to national prohibitions and regulations\textsuperscript{39}. Transnational organized crime is very much a negative by-product of globalization or a representation of its ‘uncivil society’. It reflects the negative aspects of technological development, market economy, free movement and our interconnectedness.\textsuperscript{40} Added to this its operations are increasingly facilitated by the existence of economic free trade areas such as NAFTA and EU\textsuperscript{41}.

The pervasiveness of transnational organized crime is generally underestimated in places where its role is minor. However, in states such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar and Mexico it has posed a multidimensional security problem. All of these countries are major production and/or transit countries for drugs but what is often underestimated is the impact of globally created incentives that allow organized crime to grow and become more powerful, pervasive and paralizing.\textsuperscript{42} For example according to Reuters more than 29 000 people have lost their lives in Mexico since 2006 in the so called ‘drug war’\textsuperscript{43} between the state and the drug cartels.\textsuperscript{44} The contribution of United States shouldn’t, however, be ignored. Without the demand for drugs created in the United States the organized crime syndicates in North-America would be lacking a major lucrative incentive. To explain the reciprocity of globalization and transnational organized crime in more detail, it is argued that the latter is fed by asymmetries which are based on previously unknown reference groups introduced by globalization. In other words globalization creates and intensifies demand for such commodities whose consumption, buying or selling is impossible through legal trade. This asymmetry between demand and supply then causes deprivation which creates opportunities for illegal markets.\textsuperscript{45} Added to this there is also another transnational aspect of organized crime that should be taken into account. In the case of drug-trafficking that is oriented towards the United States, such Central-American states as Guatemala and Honduras are also witnessing increasing

\textsuperscript{37} UNDOC - TOCTA 2010, 25.  
\textsuperscript{39} Serrano 2002, 14-15.  
\textsuperscript{40} See Newman 2001, 245-246.  
\textsuperscript{41} See Andreas 2002, 47-48.  
\textsuperscript{42} See World Drug Report 2009.  
\textsuperscript{43} Drug War is a term used by Reuters.  
\textsuperscript{44} Reuters Oct 6, 2010.  
\textsuperscript{45} Passas 1998, 34.
violence and cocaine passing. This implies that organized crime groups that originate in Mexico have infiltrated into other surrounding states where the rule of law and institutional stability to tackle the problem are much weaker than in Mexico.\textsuperscript{46} 

As a complex but yet asymmetrical phenomenon transnational organized crime has strong connections to the risk society as presented by Ulrich Beck:

\begin{quote}
"Risk may be defined as a systemic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself. Risks, as opposed to older dangers, are consequences which relate to the threatening force of modernization and to its globalization of doubt."\textsuperscript{47}
\end{quote}

Due to its ambiguity transnational organized crime might indeed be more of a security risk than an apparent danger such as war. As a constantly evolving phenomenon it lacks fixed frames and thus its implications and regional variations emerge and depend largely on its interaction with other global phenomena.

Transnational organized crime represents the same kind of transnational agency as multinational corporations or organizations. However, structurally they are often based on looser horizontal networks than any formal transnational entities. According to Thomas Risse all transnational agency can be divided into two depending on the motivations of the collectivity. The first group, INGO’s, are based on promoting ‘common good’. Corporations and transnational organized crime groups in turn are driven by instrumental motivations and their own organizational interests.\textsuperscript{48} The main challenge concerning their management arises thus from the fact that unlike national governments who have legal and political obligations, transnational actors such as organized crime groups are sovereignty-free actors and unbound by normative restrictions. In the so called new spheres of authority that globalization has created authority is characterized by diversification of authority among several actors. In this setting transnational actors are likely to have more control over the course of events than sovereignty-bound national entities. The ability of states to function and react to threats caused by non-state actors is thus limited by the same factor that makes them equal among each other; sovereignty and authority in a specific territory.\textsuperscript{49} In this regard transnational organized crime poses a multidimensional security risk but so far the responses to it have been based either on mere law-enforcement, on national strategies or on military cooperation.

\textsuperscript{46} UNODC – TOCTA 2010, 240. 
\textsuperscript{47} Beck 1992, 21. 
\textsuperscript{48} Risse 2002, 255-256. 
\textsuperscript{49} See Rosenau 2006, 43.
A sustainably successful approach, however, requires multilateral and comprehensive cooperation between state and non-state sectors on multiple levels of action.\textsuperscript{50}

2. Security in International Relations

On a very basic level people might agree that security implies at least the protection of those core values that are necessary for an object’s existential survival. In many ways security thus means the postponing or avoidance of death.\textsuperscript{51} However, the political content of security is much more complex than what first meets the eye and is under constant debate. Security in International Relations has multiple meanings depending on who is defining it, whose security is under review and what are the limitations of political imagination in a particular situation.\textsuperscript{52} For example according to realists and neorealists, the so called traditional theorists, security is equivalent to existential survival but according to more critical theorists security refers to something beyond mere breathing.\textsuperscript{53}

The so called traditional thinkers in International Relations claim that the meaning of security is fixed, independent of contextual circumstances and refer only to specific attributes such as state sovereignty and military protection. The supporters of the so called new security\textsuperscript{54} in turn argue that the content of security is ultimately contingent and responsive to the changing world. According to these latter thinkers, which base their ideas largely on social constructivism, all definitions of security are dependant on theoretical presumptions and choices which inevitably guide all understanding of security including how it can be studied. Whereas the traditional approaches claim that security is absolute the new thinkers perceive it as a value-loaded concept that simply can’t be defined universally. For them security is rather characterized by relativity and intersubjectivity which means that its quality, quantity and circumstances can vary.\textsuperscript{55} This newer perspective, which emphasizes theory-dependancy and categorizes security as an aspect of the social reality allows us to study a variety of contributing factors that are seen to affect the process in which security gets its specific meaning. Some of these factors, which traditional theorists see irrelevant, are for example interaction, communication and normativity. Added to the permanency-contingency debate

\textsuperscript{50} Godson & Williams 1998, 321-329.  
\textsuperscript{51} Huysmans 2006, 52.  
\textsuperscript{52} See Dalby 1997.  
\textsuperscript{53} See Booth 2005, 22-23.  
\textsuperscript{54} Here new security refers especially to critical, postmodern and feminist orientations. See Laitinen 1999, 95.  
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid 1999, 110.
traditional and new schools of thought also disagree on the role of structures in relation to actors. The promoters of wider security suggest that all social structures that institutionalize the content of hegemonic security discourses are intersubjectively constructed and maintained. Traditional thinkers in turn see security structures as permanent features.\textsuperscript{56} The real life implications from this are that unlike traditional thinkers the newer schools of thought see that different representations of reality reflect specific priorities in terms of values, interests, legitimate referent objects and so on. Thus the content of security is not predetermined but depends on those who have the right, the ability or the power to contribute to security framing.

\textbf{2.1. Traditional theories revisited}

The so called traditional theories which can also be called the hegemonic security theories define security as the control of external military insecurities meaning national preparation, prevention and engagement in war\textsuperscript{57}. According to realists and neorealists International Relations is thus characterized by statism which means that questions of international security are revolved around nation-states that transcend all other agents and represent the correct referent objects, the definers as well as the providers of security. In their military orientation these statist theories are quite unilaterally interested in the strategic aspects of security. This implies that the safety of individuals remains a synonym to their citizenship. Added to this according to the traditional theories the correct ways to gain new information about the relatively stable attributes of security are positivism and empirical research. In a way security is thus seen as a field of observable facts just like the material world.\textsuperscript{58} However, through the lenses of traditional theories the meaning of security appears inherently narrow as it becomes defined mainly by the military insecurities the states should fight against.

It seems excessively simplified to measure security by equalizing it to existential survival as security outside the military sector actualizes not only as negative freedom from something but also as positive freedom to use one’s potential, live as one chooses, make choices and pursue life goals.\textsuperscript{59} A more comprehensive perspective to security is thus inevitably connected to some normative objectives or to a larger process of emancipation as some critical theorists would call it\textsuperscript{60}.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid 1999, 69.
\textsuperscript{57} Walt 1991, 212.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid 1991, 222.
\textsuperscript{59} Booth 2005, 22-23.
\textsuperscript{60} See Wyn Jones 1999; Booth 2005.
However, the relationship between security and freedom is somewhat paradoxical as it can be both reciprocal and exclusive. On an individual level negative freedom from harm forms often a precondition for any actualization of positive freedom. On a societal level this reflects the idea of positive peace and the absence of any structural obstacles that would prevent emancipation\(^61\). In a way increased emancipation as improved opportunities can also mean enhanced sense of security. In excessive amounts freedom and security can, however, challenge each other’s existence. In a heterogeneous world absolute freedom on a societal or global level is almost impossible as it would most likely result in uncontrollable anarchy. Absolute security in the form of an order would, however, limit our freedoms to non-existent and make security an intrinsic value concerning the safety of specific someones as defined by those who have the power to do so.\(^62\) The interconnectedness and balance between freedom and security are eminent parts of most security debates but traditional theorists limit this conversation only to interstate relations. It is, however, important to keep these two aspects in mind also when analyzing non-traditional and asymmetrical security issues. Arguments on freedom and security carry inevitable implications of whose security is prioritized and how the security of a specific referent object correlates with the freedom or sense of insecurity of others.

Due to the narrowness of their methodological and theoretical presumptions it is obvious that transnational organized crime cannot be studied with the help of traditional theories. Realism and neorealism are simply insufficient approaches when it comes to understanding and effectively managing non-traditional security issues.\(^63\) A reason for this is that non-traditional security issues don’t fit into the categorical framework of traditional theories. Phenomenon such as transnational organized crime cannot simply become framed as ‘a security threat’ because it lacks the necessary characteristics that relevant security issues should have. For traditional theorists the state is the only valid referent object and the military sector is the only sphere where sources of insecurities can arise from. In sum the inbuilt prerequisite of traditional theories is that only issues that pose a threat to the survival of a state can gain ‘a threat status’.\(^64\)

Critical theorists and supporters of human security argue that the imbalance between a realistic framework and the existence of non-traditional security issues such as transnational organized crime is ultimately based on the inflexibility of the traditional theories to respond to changes in the

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\(^{61}\) See Galtung 1964, 2.  
\(^{63}\) Svanström 2007, 2.  
\(^{64}\) See Buzan, Waever & Wilde 1998.
security environment. However, according to them we shouldn’t ignore issues that threaten the survival or well-being of alternative referent objects even if they are not existential threats to states per se. Due to the vast implications of transnational organized crime it appears evident that we have to acknowledge the possibility of organized crime having security relevance. As the UN High-level panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has stated, the contemporary security environment is increasingly defined by common security comprising of both human security and the security of states. In this contextual environment transnational organized crime is one of the six clusters of threats that the world should be concerned about.

2.2. Social constructivism and Critical theory

Poststructuralism, Constructivism and Critical theory all wish to challenge the inflexible, predetermined content of security as promoted by traditional theories. All of the above named theories share a common ontological foundation based on social constructivism and an idea of human agency that is capable of learning, evolving and affecting the lifespan of societal and power structures either by maintaining or transforming them. The difference between traditional and constructivist theories is based on the fundamental disagreement about the ontology of security and how security can be studied. According to social constructivism and all theories derived from it security is a dimension of social reality and thus it lacks the natural laws of the material world. For this reason the relations between different actors in International Relations are not fixed, predetermined or based on permanent anarchy. Social constructivism has a special interest in building reciprocity into the relationships between structures and actors by denying that structures could always predetermine how actors behave. Social constructivism is therefore an ideational way of conceptualizing the world. It suggests that the material reality becomes meaningful mainly through linguistic representations of reality that constitute identities and interests in a specific way.

The biggest difference between constructivist, poststructuralist and critical theories concerns the wider security agenda of Critical theory as well as the connection between security and human emancipation. Most critical thinkers claim that any information regarding societies, including

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65 See Wyn Jones 1999, 125.
66 UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004, 52.
68 See Adler 2001; Wendt 1999.
security, needs to have an emancipatory dimension\textsuperscript{70}. This means shifting the focus of security towards its empowering and enabling aspects instead of concentrating on mere harm prevention. Richard Wyn Jones, who is one of the keenest supporters of the emancipatory project defines Critical theory in a very goal-oriented way:

"If all theory is for someone and for some purpose [...]... then critical security studies is for the "voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless," and its purpose is their emancipation."\textsuperscript{71}

Critical theory doesn’t, however, form a homogeneous school of thought concentrated solely on examining emancipation. It consists of a variety of thinkers who share a common interest in approaching security from outside the prevailing social arrangements and a vision of improving societies and human life. This generally leads critical theorists to question the hegemonic security discourses and statism.\textsuperscript{72} The relevance of Critical theory cannot, however, be entirely understood unless we acknowledge that even its basic understanding of International Relations is different from the one presented by traditional theories. For CSS\textsuperscript{73} International Relations is not solely a field of strategic problem-solving but as Ken Booth calls it “a global moral science”\textsuperscript{74}. It sees security as something that is linked to our common vulnerabilities rather than connected to people’s nationality or citizenship rights. At the same time it wishes to encourage new ways of conceptualizing and responding to problems by exploring the possibilities to change existing structures and social facts, however, without ignoring the structural frames that our reality entails.\textsuperscript{75} In practice this implies the mobilization of those bottom-up voices that speak for the human consequences caused by the prevailing order, policies and institutions\textsuperscript{76}. Critical theory also wishes to bring attention to any inequalities caused by the existing structures and to the inclusions and exclusions that are inherent to state-membership. The intention of all this is to initiate conversation about the possibility to expand security rights, duties and obligations outside the traditional political communities\textsuperscript{77}. In terms of these cosmopolitan ideas CSS is interested in the universality of human morality, which in itself is a very Kantian approach. The roots of especially so called Frankfurt School, which is an earlier branch of CSS, are indeed Kantian and also carry a loose Marxian legacy\textsuperscript{78}.

\textsuperscript{70} Linklater 1996, 281.
\textsuperscript{71} Wyn Jones 1999, 159.
\textsuperscript{72} See Booth 2005; Wyn Jones 1999.
\textsuperscript{73} CSS is a commonly used abbreviation which refers to Critical Security Studies.
\textsuperscript{74} Booth 1994, 16-18.
\textsuperscript{75} See Laitinen 1999, 188, 194.
\textsuperscript{76} Wyn Jones 1999, 160-166; Also Cox 2001, 50.
\textsuperscript{77} Linkater 1996, 286-288.
\textsuperscript{78} Brown 2001, 194-195.
The amount of international armed conflicts has steadily decreased ever since the beginning of the 1990’s which has shifted the interest of some scholars towards non-traditional security issues. This appears as a logical move considering for example that criminal violence is now more widespread than any political violence and the implications of organized crime exceed the impact of the actual conflict in many unstable regions. According to Oliver Kessler and Christopher Daase, it might thus be more suitable to talk about management of risks than avoidance of threats as non-traditional security issues can seldom be completely removed. At the same token they argue that instead of security dilemmas the contemporary security environment is better characterized by uncertainties and security paradoxes. This means that due to the complexity of most non-traditional threats security practices can simultaneously decrease and increase the sense of insecurity. A major reason for this is the outdated institutionalization that keeps most legislation, enforcement and common initiatives tied to national decision-making. Critical theory agrees with this notion stating that old-fashioned problem-solving is generally inadequate to solve transnational security issues. Prior to explaining how the different critical schools have contributed to the development of Critical theory I will go through some commonalities shared by all critical theorists in order to give a more profound introductory to their thinking.

2.2.1. Deepening the spectrum of referent objects and security agents

One of the clearest distinguishing features of CSS is its broader, deeper and often focused perspective on security. First of all critical theorists argue that states should not be perceived as the only or even the most important referent objects in the contemporary security environment but alternative referent objects and their interests should also be taken into account or even prioritized. In regard to these alternative referent objects Critical theory emphasizes especially the importance of individuals, human security and societies. This same kind of shift in observational priorities applies also to the provision of security. CSS disagrees with the traditional notion that states could be the most relevant actors when it comes to managing non-military security concerns. The practical implications of these two presumptions are that decision-making and security analysis

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80 SIPRI Yearbook 2010.
81 Kessler & Daase 2008, 211-212.
84 See Booth 2005; Wyn Jones 1999.
86 See Huysmans 2006; Booth 2005.
87 See Kessler & Daase 2008, 214.
become shifted towards a non-statist perspective. In other words security discourses and practices are evaluated based on how well they promote the safety of non-statist referent objects such as humans and individuals. This deeper or extended perspective to security provides an important foundation for criticism against statism emphasizing that the state can also be the very source of insecurity for individuals.\(^{88}\) In this regard I would like to add that ‘a source of insecurity’ should be understood in a comprehensive way covering the direct threats posed by states as well as the indirect contribution of states in maintaining other sources of insecurities. There is, however, disagreement among critical thinkers regarding the permanence and priority of alternative referent objects\(^{89}\). According to critical theorists, individual safety is independent and thus it can but is not necessarily equal to state security\(^{90}\). This said, the intention is not to replace the state or claim that states don’t make a difference in promoting human welfare. The safety of the state is still relevant but the legitimacy of its sovereignty and authority is evaluated in relation to how well it performs its functions and obligations towards individuals.\(^{91}\)

The practice-oriented contribution of some scholars such as Mats Berdal and Monica Serrano has further supported the critical project by emphasizing that states are often unable to control insecurities related to the operations of the non-statist spaces. In this regard Berdal and Serrano remind that the private sector plays an ever greater role both in creating and controlling security problems in the contemporary security environment\(^{92}\). This insight deepens the concept of security below and beyond the nation-state and among other things shifts the security of humans from the national security frame into a matter of International Relations. Simultaneously the rights and responsibilities related to providing and being objects of security become dispersed among a larger group of agents.

### 2.2.2. Broadening the sphere of issue areas

The third building block of CSS, broader security, means stretching the limitations of political imagination concerning those issues that can be claimed to have security relevance. Broadening security complements the critical project by expanding the content of security away from the military sector and harm prevention towards a more multidimensional understanding of human

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\(^{90}\) Newman 2010, 79.

\(^{91}\) See Booth 2005.

\(^{92}\) See Berdal & Serrano 2002, 205.
well-being. Alternative sources of insecurities, as suggested by a branch of CSS called the Copenhagen School, are economic, military, societal, environmental and political sectors. According to the Copenhagen School these sectors reflect differentiated forms of interaction with a wide range of functional actors but are ultimately dimensions of the same entity. What this means is that insecurities or fears related to one sector can and do spill over to other sectors creating interconnected and indirect security consequences for several referent objects. The purpose of this sector-model provided by the Copenhagen School is to facilitate the analysis of a whole by dividing security into smaller units. In order to understand how the different sectors relate to each other it is thus important to ultimately bring the sectoral analyses together.

Broadening is a crucial element of critical thinking as it allows scholars to examine security issues that have extensive implications on human life but which may not be security concerns in the traditional sense. However, it is important to remember that mere broadening can also happen in the traditional framework which means that security goals and solutions to problems are ultimately derived state-centrically. Thus mere broadening is not enough unless security thinking is also accompanied by a deeper understanding of how security should be provided and what it should ultimately strive for.

2.2.3. From security dilemmas towards a more comprehensive understanding

Critical theory has paid a great deal of attention to new identities, interests and social hierarchies that have been ignored by traditional theories. It has also accentuated the relevance of those actors and structures that use economic rather than political or military power for institutionalizing relationships. Economic power is a major part of globalization and a relevant aspect of International Political Economy. It is a borderless force that glues localities and globalities together making our lives interconnected in non-territorial spaces, blurring physical boundaries between internal and external and simultaneously creating integration and fragmentation. It is also used in ways that create intense pressures above and below the nation-state and require sovereign-bound entities to adapt. In a changed environment it is precisely global economy that is challenging the functionality of state policies and traditional hierarchies by increasingly determining the haves and

have-nots of the contemporary era. However, as mentioned earlier the impact of economic power is not limited to its legal forms. Nikos Passas describes the impact of globalization in the following way:

“It creates or dramatically broadens awareness of pre-existing economic asymmetries, whose criminogenic potential is now activated.”98

Poverty, deprivation and lack of opportunities in the legal global economy can thus be equally damaging starting points as tyranny and conflict. In other words the cause of insecurity in non-statist spheres is not necessarily based on political or military forms of oppression but can also result from lack of emancipation.99

The potential of especially non-traditional security issues reaching anyone anywhere creates expectations to match security related decision-making with some more cosmopolitan norms.100 This in turn requires rethinking of what such political concepts as community and practices mean101. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams have formulated three possible definitions of the relationship between individuals and the state in relation to security. The first option perceives individual as an alternative for the state implying that the state can stop being the primary provider of safety for individuals. The second and most extreme option in turn perceives the security of individuals in direct conflict with the security of the state to the extent that the state becomes the very reason for human insecurity. The third and most suitable option for any practical but still critical endeavours prioritizes humankind over the state as the primary reference object. This argument shares many of the same assumptions as the shortly introduced human security perspective. In short it suggests that national security alone is an inadequate concept to determine whether or not humans feel safe.102 However, it should be mentioned that the idea promoted by Krause and Williams is based on a more collective idea of security than that of human security perspective. Humankind can potentially consist of multiple referent objects including the state under one concept whereas human security is more focused on the security of humans and individuals.

98 Passas 1998, 34.
99 See Booth 2005, 111.
102 Krause & Williams 1997, 44-46.
In terms of its ontological and epistemological presumptions Critical theory is very much vis-à-vis realism. It is ultimately a bottom-up approach to a field that appears contingent by nature and whose content is affected by choices and values. Realism in turn is a top-down approach to a specialty field of predetermined facts. Critical theorists are comfortable with acknowledging the role of non-state actors in security studies which in itself justifies an inherently unconventional research topic such as transnational organized crime. They are also deeply interested in questioning any social facts in terms of categorizing and responding to security threats. The purpose of all this is to promote broader understanding and more comprehensive responses to security than the ones offered by traditional theories. The traditional theorists support the idea of controlling insecurities by attacking the threat and removing it but this might not be the best way to tackle issues such as transnational organized crime. Due to their asymmetrical nature non-traditional issues require a proactive approach that limits primarily the vulnerabilities of all applicable referent objects to these issues.

### 2.2.4. The Welsh School

As noticed, CSS cannot be summarized very easily. Some scholars even inside CSS have asked if the only thing common to critical theorists is what they stand against as they don’t provide an unambiguous research agenda despite the normative orientation. However, I argue that CSS is more than its critique against realism. Fundamentally it wishes to challenge the presumptions of conservative thinking that naturalize certain ways to perceive and provide security. The most relevant input of the so called Welsh School is in its strong emphasis on emancipation which is derived from the ideas of the Frankfurt School. Without going into details concerning the lifespan of the Frankfurt School its intellectuals were amongst the first ones to connect security to the liberation of humans and to the improvement of life. They also adopted a constructivist and more interpretative approach to analyzing security and other aspects of social reality. However, unlike the Welsh School, the Frankfurt School derived emancipation from inside statism referring to technological development and to the domination of nature as well as to the aspects of production and economic equality.

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103 See Laitinen 1999, 194.
104 See Huysmans 2006, 55.
105 See Cox 2001, 45.
According to Richard Wyn Jones and Ken Booth, who are two major contributors in the Welsh School, security and emancipation are interrelated concepts. This means that security is an important element that can reflect the actualization or more often be a contributing factor in a bigger process of emancipation. Emancipation itself means therefore something similar to positive freedom. It means increasing human potential, the amount of available opportunities in life as well as improving people’s general well-being. Consequently anything and everything that causes pain, hunger, fear or poverty to humans can be considered potential threats.\(^{109}\) Ken Booth connects emancipation very strongly to advocating human rights and freeing people from structural oppression. Booth’s priority is particularly the emancipation of individuals as according to him individuals and ideally humankind can be the only natural referent objects in a world that is in a continuous change and mainly human-made. For Booth emancipation appears thus as a predetermined normative purpose that all security framing and analysis should focus on. In this regard the one element that makes Critical theory meaningful is not what it stands against but what it stands for.\(^{110}\) However, Booth wants to deny any suggestions that emancipatory goals could justify practices that don’t promote security per se. Emancipation shouldn’t thus be based on selfishness that causes harm or insecurity to others.\(^{111}\) In sum the pursuit of positive freedom can’t be in conflict with someone else’s negative freedom and shouldn’t deprive the life, food, shelter, health or livelihood of another person\(^{112}\).

As neither Wyn Jones nor Booth sees emancipation as a fixed concept we inevitably face some questions concerning the relativity and context-relatedness of emancipation. Is there emancipation that can’t be morally acceptable and how can we evaluate the legitimacy of emancipatory demands? Heyward Alker has come up with an insightful clarification concerning this relationship by reminding of the importance of cultural sensitivity in evaluating emancipation.\(^{113}\) Despite some normative guidelines emancipation doesn’t have a simple universal definition and interpreting the legitimacy of emancipatory demands should thus be guided by a contextual evaluation concerning multiple aspects such as power relations, identities and conflicting interests. Also, equally important to understanding where emancipation exists is to understand where it doesn’t exist. It is not only a goal as presented by Booth or Wyn Jones but its absence might also explain why some issues that lack prior security relevance become later framed as security concerns. For example, according to

\(^{109}\) Ibid 1999, 119, 126.
\(^{110}\) Booth 2005.
\(^{111}\) Ibid 2005, 182-183.
\(^{112}\) See Acharya & Acharya.
\(^{113}\) Alker 2005, 208.
Katharina Hofmann the level of organized crime is closely related to the low level of material well-being and to the failure of the economic system.\textsuperscript{114}

Organized crime can make individuals feel insecure despite their apparent emancipation and traditional security as citizens. At the same time it can become a way to pursue emancipation regardless of traditional insecurity. Generally speaking any legal opportunities for emancipation should correlate negatively with an increased level of criminal violence. This in turn will most likely weaken the public’s trust towards the state’s ability to protect the citizens.\textsuperscript{115} In a way the failure of the state to provide security and emancipation thus strengthens organized crime and increases insecurity. However, simultaneously the very existence of organized crime further weakens the state’s ability to promote well-being. In a state where politics and economy are increasingly determined by the power of professional criminals the channels through which people can pursue emancipation can become controlled by alternative authorities. Also the norms that guide people’s pursuit of positive freedom can become subject to involuntary modifications by organized crime groups.\textsuperscript{116}

In order to further discuss the complex connections between emancipation, security and insecurity I will provide a short example of the relationship between terrorism and organized crime as interrelated and asymmetrical security issues. Firstly, if we think about the justified causes for emancipatory demands, a mere categorical choice such as a freedom fighter can change connotations and desired associations in regard to terrorism. As an alternative wording, a freedom fighter reflects empathy and acceptance towards actions someone else would label as terrorism. Based on this premise the actions might become justified because of the insecurity and deprivation experienced by someone that the agents identify themselves with.\textsuperscript{117} In this regard and due to its political nature terrorism has more inherent potential than organized crime to become understood in emancipatory terms. However, regardless of their differences, the division between these two phenomena is not as clear-cut as it used to be. Their simultaneous emergence and the blurring of economically and politically motivated groups make it ever more difficult to conceptualize organized crime and terrorism in exclusive terms. In other words blurring of group boundaries implies also mixed motivations and challenges in determining where political ends and economic

\textsuperscript{114} See Hofmann 2009, 7.
\textsuperscript{116} Calderon 2010.
\textsuperscript{117} See Smith 2005, 54-55.
begins.\textsuperscript{118} As an example it is not uncommon for political and crime groups become intertwined in the following ways; resistance groups can get their financing either from organized crime groups or by participating in criminal activities themselves. Simultaneously some organized crime groups may adopt political agendas and become more of a hybrid phenomenon. Added to these in some cases the outlived political purposes and a desire to maintain organizational capacity can turn resistance groups into more or less criminal organizations.\textsuperscript{119} Considering the complex possibilities regarding the connections between terrorism and organized crime and the increased power resources of organized crime groups it seems increasinly important to evaluate emancipatory demands, security and insecurity in their situational contexts.

2.2.5. The Copenhagen School

Copenhagen School has provided some valuable input into the critical debate by introducing an applicable method for analyzing the security formation process. In their most widely known published work called “Security, A New Framework for Analysis” the school introduces not only the earlier mentioned 5-sector model and a horizontally broader agenda for security but also a loose theoretical-methodological tool called securitization for analyzing the social formation of security.\textsuperscript{120} In the Copenhagen School literature securitization means the conscious articulation of threats. To explain this in more detail, according to the Copenhagen School the content of security is based on an intentional and actor-based process of uttering that elevates (=securitizes) issues into the field of security. In other words securitization refers to a particular kind of framing with the use of security terminology that transforms already politicized concerns into a greater sphere of emergency as existential security threats. Thus securitization is ultimately interested in the core values of a political community, in the relevant existential threats to that community and in the necessary emergency measures needed for eliminating these threats. It mobilizes people, justifies exceptional security practices and affects the way security is collectively perceived.\textsuperscript{121}

In the Copenhagen school literature the meaning of security is derived extensively through language which produces reality. However, according to Buzan, Waever and Wilde securitization should be a right of few meaning that only specific actors, generally people with power and authority, can securitize or “speak security”. The idea behind securitization is that security equals emergency

\textsuperscript{118} See e.g SIPRI Yearbook 2010.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid 2007, 207-227.
\textsuperscript{120} See Buzan, Waever & Wilde 1998.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid 1998, 24.
which can only be caused by an existential threat. This is because the Copenhagen school wants to maintain security as a field of extraordinary concerns.\textsuperscript{122} The ultimate goal for Copenhagen School is returning issues into the sphere of normal politics by \textit{desecuritizing} them\textsuperscript{123}. Buzan, Waever and Wilde justify this goal by arguing that otherwise a wider security agenda might lead to excessive securitization which will increase the relative costs of securitization and create unnecessary fears. Their reference point in regard to these negative implications is the state, interstate relations and the state capacity.\textsuperscript{124} My response to their argument is that desecuritization appears desirable in cases where securitization equals militarization but by desecuritizing issues powerful actors run the risk of ignoring concerns which might have minor relevance to the majority but major security relevance to a minority.

In contemporary security environment it seems inappropriate to exclude a majority of people outside securitization as unnecessary fears at a state level might still be legitimate sources of insecurities at the societal, regional or individual levels. According to Buzan, Waever and Wilde securitization can occur as a response to real-life events but it can also be institutionalized which means that the content of security is based on relatively ‘taken for granted assumptions’\textsuperscript{125}. The problem with institutionalized securitization from the Welsh School’s perspective is, however, that it represents such structural stagnation that Critical theory ultimately claims to criticize. If we consider the security formation process stable and fixed, the elements of intersubjectivity and negotiation are hardly apparent. Based on the pursuit of normativity introduced by the Welsh School securitization should thus be regarded as an aspect of a wider security formation process that reflects multiple normative goals and is open for further discussion.\textsuperscript{126} The argument here is that the security relevance of certain issues especially from a human security perspective is not determined merely by intentional securitization but by wider discursive debates.\textsuperscript{127}

In terms of the Copenhagen School’s 5-sector model it should be clarified how this can be applied to such non-traditional security issues as organized crime. According to the Copenhagen School illegal trade reflects the dark side of capitalism and therefore it is a relevant security concern in the economic sector of security. Due to the obscurity of economic security and its spill-over effects, however, the amount of referent objects affected by economic insecurities is generally big and thus

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid 1998.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid 1998, 26-29.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid 1998, 208-209.
\textsuperscript{125} See Ibid 1998, 27.
\textsuperscript{126} See Huysmans 2006.
\textsuperscript{127} See Henriksson & Rhinard 2009.
economic insecurities can initiate survival worries also in other sectors of security. For this reason the impact of illegal trade could be strongest not in the economic but interestingly in the sociopolitical and military sectors. In terms of organized crime the motivation for posing a direct military threat against a state would be to guarantee organisational survival and the desire to weaken the state’s capacity to regulate or interfere in illegal trade. In this regard the ideas of the Copenhagen School have similarities with those presented earlier by Thomas Risse and James Mittelman.

In their radically constructivist approach the Copenhagen School denies the possibility that security could be interested in the issues of well-being or that it could have any meaning independent of the securitization process. Instead Buzan, Waever and Wilde clearly state that: "Security is a quality actors inject into issues by securitizing them [...]..." Mainly because of their narrow perspective to securitization this argument separates the authors from the Kantian normativity promoted by the Welsh School. In other words the Copenhagen School denies that security issues could have implications other than those uttered by the securitizing actors. They also give priority to regional security complexes claiming that security interdependence is usually dependent on the proximity of states which means that global security interdependence is fairly uncommon. In regard to political instability and military conflicts, it is true that the spill-over effects are usually felt most intensively in the areas that locate geographically closest. However, if we think about security issues that arise from non-statist spaces and are as multidimensional as transnational organized crime, the consequences can be felt far away from the epicentre and also with delay.

2.3. Human security perspective

Labeling things as security concerns mobilizes people, opinions and common resources. Security is thus considered a field of priorities that outweigh the issues of the daily politics. As a conceptual framework human security was first introduced by the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report in 1994. The report stated the goals and the content of a more practical approach to security which prioritizes human security over national or global security. According to this report human security is fundamentally a universal concern and based on some commonly

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129 See e.g. Ibid 1998, 53-54; Svanström 2007.  
130 Buzan, Waever, Wilde 1998, 204.  
132 Booth 2005, 23.
shared security issues whose consequences travel regardless of borders. Human security and insecurity are thus interconnected and shared experiences by everyone. Human security alone is not an adequate theoretical framework for analysis because is not a theory per se but an approach supported by theories. It has similarities with the earlier introduced Critical theory as it is fundamentally a non-militaristic approach that prefers preventative rather than interventionist methods. In its broader definition it is also concerned about human development and the existence of opportunities. According to the UNDP human security and human development are inherently interconnected concepts and the empowerment of people is at the core of human security. In this nexus the state has a contributing role but ultimately human development and human security depend on larger participatory solidarity and shared responsibility which start at the individual level. This approach that focuses on the actions, consequences, rights and responsibilities of humans per se is non-statist and integrative not only in terms of referent objects but also in terms of solutions. Based on the presumptions presented by the human security perspective it can be argued that any security issues that are produced by non-state actors and which are in conflict with the basic rights of non-statist referent objects cannot be managed successfully without the participation of transnational and private actors.

The UN Human Development Report divides human security into seven categories which are; economic-, food-, health-, environmental-, personal-, community- and political securities. In regard to the connection between human security and transnational organized crime it should be noted that this is not a linear relationship but the borders between causes and consequences are somewhat difficult to define. As mentioned earlier organized crime and its transnational forms can be major sources of insecurity for humans but on the other hand the lack of human security can also appear as an incentive for criminal involvement. This latter notion applies for example to different aspects of economic insecurity such as unemployment, underemployment and low wages. All of these aspects were at least partially present in Mexico in the 1990’s when organized crime groups started gaining relatively more power. NAFTA agreement increased the official cross-border trade but it also empowered people involved in organized crime who were now able to infiltrate better into the legal economy and gain possessions in privatized businesses.

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133 UNDP 1994, 22.  
134 See e.g Ibid 1994; Newman 2010.  
135 UNDP is a commonly used abbreviation of United Nations Development Program.  
137 Shelley 2001, 218.
Other relevant categories of human security for understanding the implications of organized crime are personal security and indirectly also political security. Personal security is most closely connected to individuals as it focuses on the issues that individuals fear in the everyday life. Due to this privacy aspect it is not necessarily a major area of interest in security studies. However, as the case of Mexico demonstrates, attacks against civilians have in some circumstances become a central part of intimidation and revenge strategies and a major element in defining the relations between the public, organized crime groups and authorities. As an example, a recent seizure of 135 tons of marijuana in Mexico was followed by several fatal attacks against civilians and according to some organized crime groups these actions were motivated by revenge against the authorities.\(^\text{138}\) Due to the increased use of terror and intimidation there is thus a paradoxical triangle between the state, the civilians and the organized crime groups where any attempts to improve regional, state or human security can potentially cause counteractions that increase insecurity of the same or different referent objects\(^\text{139}\).

As for political security the biggest concern in Mexico concerns corruption and the deterioration of rule of law especially in terms of the police. As a result the country’s score on the corruption perception index has deteriorated several years in a row.\(^\text{140}\) This indirect involvement of the public sector in organized crime implies that human security per se as well as the collective security of the people and the state are threatened not only by criminals but also by the extensive corruption and the incapacity of the state to control the use of public authority.

### 2.3.1. Critical human security perspective

The UNDP report states two dimensions of human security which are freedom from fear and freedom from want. The former concept is more closely linked to traditional security and to the human costs of armed conflicts. The latter concept in turn reflects a broader understanding of human security meaning that any disrupting issues in the daily life can be considered security threats. Whereas the narrow concept sees human security through the lenses of negative freedom the broad concept expands security almost indefinitely. However, for theoretical reasons neither one of these perspectives should be given exclusive primacy but both of them should be given equal

\(^\text{138}\) El Universal 27.10.2010
\(^\text{139}\) See Kessler and Daase 2008.
\(^\text{140}\) Transparency International 2010.
One definition of security as perceived from the critical human security perspective is based upon a threshold and it goes as follows:

“[..]... threats are regarded as security challenges when they reach a certain threshold of human impact, whatever the source.”  

This definition gives valuable insight into evaluating the timing when issues become framed as security concerns for example on the national agenda. Especially in the case of asymmetrical security issues, is it the human impact that guides security framing or is the threat designation determined by the impact of issues on the national security? A crucial argument made by supporters of critical human security is that the collective security in the national context as well as international order rest not only on the sovereignty of states but also on individuals’ sense of security.

Focusing on human security inevitably prioritizes specific values that predetermine the content or at least the normative direction of security studies. However, at this point I want to refrain from perceiving human security as the only viable referent object. I want to leave the eternal questions of security open for debate and limit the observation to praxis. In this regard I argue that if applied together with Critical theory the critical human security perspective can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of why transnational organized crime could gain security relevance in specific contexts. Human security is a critical response to the pressures created by globalization, to the changes in our security environment and to the emergence of powerful non-state actors. It is also a counterhegemonic voice against national security that takes into account the limited capacity of states to provide security in terms of non-traditional security issues and non-statist referent objects. It suggests that the focus of security studies should be directed towards greater normativity that takes into account an expanded human well-being. However, human well-being shouldn’t be understood in either-or terms but as an inclusive concept that has collective security dimensions across levels and which takes into account our roles as individuals, citizens and humans per se.

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142 Newman 2010, 83.
144 See Hampson 2008, 232.
Some might claim that human security perspective lacks any critical aspect as in ideal circumstances it is willing to adjust to the existing power structures and institutions. Human security perspective acknowledges the instrumental role of states in allocating resources and formulating policy responses. From a truly critical point of view there is a danger that the same structures that possibly cause human insecurity cannot be effectively used for the opposite purpose\(^\text{146}\). However, as a defensive argument the inclusion of the state is done by using human security as the normative principle which ultimately determines the legitimacy of security claims and suggested practices. State sovereignty is thus considered conditional and dependent not only on territorial independence but also on the state’s performance as a guarantor of human security\(^\text{147}\).

In order to justify a transnational research topic whose framing will be studied and analysed in the national context I rely on the merging of Critical theory and critical human security perspective. In this regard I claim that state security and human security are not necessarily conflicted but can also be interconnected and perceived in a collective way. In other words the prioritization of human security doesn’t necessarily require an exclusive trade-off between the state and the individual but in some cases their securities can be analysed in parallel. Functional state institutions are important tools in improving human security and as weakness of state institutions is tightly linked to corruption and underdevelopment, it is crucial that state-capacity is not underestimated when searching solutions to non-traditional security problems\(^\text{148}\).

3. Methodology

As mentioned, Critical theory wishes to challenge any ahistorical or fixed meanings of security. This means that security is not seen as a field of facts but constructed by discourses reflecting selected priorities and hierarchical values. Quoting Ken Booth’s variation of Alexander Wendt’s famous statement: “Security is what we make it”\(^\text{149}\). As the above named quotation reveals, according to Critical theory security is fundamentally a contingent concept that is open to argumentation and reconstruction\(^\text{150}\). In other words security continuously renews itself by reproducing, maintaining and breaking down social arrangements, which are based on previous

\(^{146}\) Newman 2010, 88.
\(^{147}\) See e.g. Ibid 2010; UNDP 1994
\(^{148}\) See e.g. Ibid 2001, 2010; UNDP 1994.
\(^{149}\) Buzan 1994, 15.
\(^{150}\) See e.g. Wyn Jones 1999, 110.
representations of reality, that all serve specific purposes and interests.\textsuperscript{151} This means that no threats, practices or meanings of security are permanent in a way that they couldn’t be questioned by others. In regard to transnational organized crime this implies that despite its internal risk potential which stems from the very reasons it exists, the categorization of transnational organized crime as a threat depends on its context-specific interpretation and subjective perceptions that become actualized through security framing.\textsuperscript{152} As seen through the constructivist lenses, security appears as loaded with values and with an obvious normative dimension. For this reason it should be studied primarily through interpretative and qualitative research methods.\textsuperscript{153}

According to securitization theory security is constructed through the application of successful speech acts that determine the content of security by defining existential threats and by articulating how these threats should be taken care of\textsuperscript{154}. The limitations of imagination for what is possible in terms of political community, security and appropriate practices are thus created in speech acts which not only describe but also produce reality. The basic principle of securitization can be summed up as “by uttering things people do things”\textsuperscript{155}. This means that speech acts not only provide representations of the reality but they also produce consequential effects that help to reproduce the uttered content. Utterances welcome compatible responses in the form of speech, actions or both making the successfulness of utterances partially dependant on their actual effects.\textsuperscript{156}

The methodological pillars used in the following analysis are largely based on speech acts as an approach to discourses. What this means is that instead of relying merely on Speech act theory, which will be introduced in the following chapter, I will construct a discourse analytical approach to studying speech acts not only as functional elements but as elements that affect and become affected by cultural and sociological influences. From a critical point of view this means analysing not only the performative aspects of speech acts but also the social meanings they promote as units of discourses.\textsuperscript{157} After all the relevance and coherence of utterances depend largely on wider discursive factors. In this regard speech acts should be considered statements in wider thematic debates or conversations.

\textsuperscript{151} Linklater 1996, 279.
\textsuperscript{152} See Eriksson & Rhinard 2009, 245.
\textsuperscript{153} See e.g. Krause & Williams 1997.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid 1998, 32; Austin 1962, 12-13.
\textsuperscript{156} See Austin 1962, 116.
\textsuperscript{157} Schiffrin 1994.
3.1. Speech act theory

The methodological tool suggested by the Copenhagen school for analyzing securitization is Speech act theory. It provides the guidelines for interpreting how issues become linguistically elevated as threats, how they move from the sphere of normal politics into the sphere of emergency politics and how the images of existential threats provide a foundation for the justification of extraordinary measures.\(^{158}\) In terms of securitization Speech act theory analyses the intentional use of language that is directed to certain audiences for an approval, which in turn is important in order for the securitization process to be considered successful.\(^{159}\)

According to John Austin, language has a tendency to be both descriptive and performative and often both at the same time. Speakers may suggest for example obligations, rights and commitments by promising, declaring, ordering and requesting things intentionally or unconsciously by using direct or indirect sentences\(^{160}\). Austin divides language roughly into three categories which are locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts. Here locutionary acts represent the mere structural features of language (form) and the material content of the utterance. Locutionary aspects represent the frames of speech acts whereas illocutionary acts include the speaker’s intentions, hereby making the used language performative and meaningful. In reality these two categories generally overlap and complement each other as it is uncommon to speak without any kind of intention\(^{161}\).

Compared to the other two categories, perlocutionary acts can’t necessarily be defined by the content of utterance itself. They refer to the mobilizing effects, consequences and realizations that speech acts and non-verbal gestures may cause in the listeners. While illocutionary acts may affect behaviour by saying something, perlocutionary acts affect us in a more unexpected way in saying something.\(^{162}\) Perlocutionary acts is yet another categorization introduced by Austin and they explain how our feelings, fears and thoughts are being affected, reaffirmed and transformed as recipients of speech acts. If accompanied by illocutionary acts perlocutionary acts don’t necessarily change the immediate response people have to utterances but on cognitive and subconscious levels

\(^{159}\) Ibid 1998, 25.  
\(^{160}\) Austin 1962, 32-33.  
\(^{161}\) Ibid 1962, 98-99.  
\(^{162}\) Ibid 1962, 103-110.
they direct the way we process and feel about the presented information. Perlocutionary acts are very much connected to our previous understanding, our beliefs and assumptions of the world. Thus according to Austin in order for perlocutionary acts to be effective they should follow some recognizable conventions.163

John Searle has further classified illocutionary acts into assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations. All of the above named categorizations offer either representations of the world, try to increase the credibility of the presented claims or persuade the audience to adopt the presented beliefs and act accordingly. Searle has also further developed Austin’s idea of performative illocutionary acts and added an indirect speech act into the categorization. This implies that some speech acts serve both a directly uttered purpose as well as an implicit non-verbal purpose that is based on background discourses and commonly shared information.164 In regard to indirect illocutionary acts, sentences can provide an indirect but understandable interaction between two participants without the interpreted meaning coinciding with the literal meaning of the utterance. These kinds of speech acts that possess dual meanings and multiple nuances are very common for political communication as they facilitate the distribution of rejecting and requesting. They are also one area of interest in the upcoming analysis.

3.1.1. Shifting the methodological focus towards discourses

According to securitization theory, primacy in ‘speaking security’ is given to deciding which objects have a legitimate right to survival instead of considering the legitimacy of the securitizing actors themselves165. For this reason securitization alone appears too narrow of an approach for my critical research project. Consequently Speech act theory as the study of mere argumentation doesn’t suffice in terms of understanding the phenomena that lead to a specific kind of framing or the differences between representations that make some appear more convincing than others. In other words I have chosen to use Critical discourse analysis as the primary method but I want to emphasize that the valuable input of Speech act theory and the performative aspects of utterances will also be taken into account. The reasons for this methodological shift are twofold; first of all I want to stay loyal to the presumptions of Critical theory as presented by the Welsh school and regard security as something that can be both negotiated as well as goal-oriented. Also following in

163 Ibid 1962, 119-120.
164 Searle 1979, 178.
the footsteps of Deborah Schiffrin I argue that the mere text-context relationships and intentional utterances are not enough to explain the perlocutionary and unintentional structures that affect and become affected by them. 166 Critical discourse analysis is capable of better analysing not only the actions that utterances produce but also the meanings they promote when analysed together. Speech act theory argues all utterances are interpreted locally in relation to prior and following speech acts but what it lacks is interest in those global contexts or general frameworks of understanding that also guide our contextual interpretation. 167

In order to clarify my point further I have chosen to separate securitization as seen by the Copenhagen school from security framing even though some scholars perceive these two concepts as synonyms. 168 I agree with the Copenhagen school on the socially constructed nature of security but I want to replace the securitization process as harm prevention with a more intersubjective approach that includes normative goal-setting without taking strong control over communication as given. By control I mean that security should be open for contribution by a variety of participants and not limited by hegemonic assumptions that predetermine which issues have or have not security relevance. In other words a high level of control regarding the rules and content of communication makes the relationship between speakers and listeners appear unilinear whereas a low level of control emphasizes reciprocity between participants. In the latter circumstances the relative contribution of different actors gains relatively more importance. 169

Added to the above mentioned aspects many scholars implicate that communication behind all signifying is very complex and thus we shouldn’t ignore the role of visual representations and images in either supporting or weakening political argumentation and representations of reality 170. Different media can provide a powerful channel for competing discourses but also create their own interpretations of reality. In this regard securitization lacks understanding of the multiple ways speech acts resonate among different audiences and how security issues get further communicated outside the intentional argumentation of specific actors 171. The so called audiences participate in the security framing process at least in most democratic environments and interpret the perlocutionary meanings of utterances based not only on the content itself but also on their own background information, beliefs and value systems.

166 Schiffrin 1994, 356.
170 See Williams 2003, 526-527.
171 See e.g. McDonald 2008.
Language can either change or maintain cultural perceptions and legitimize or challenge the use of political power but according to Critical discourse analysis this all happens intersubjectively through a continuous articulation and negotiation. Even though utterances are not unilinear but can consist of multiple moves they are still only elements of bigger entities; discourses that ultimately produce our social reality. By taking into account the normative challenges set by human security perspective, the emancipatory project of the Welsh school and the obvious changes in our security environment it seems logical to prioritize Critical discourse analysis, which pays more attention to intertextuality and interdiscursivity in formulating content for security. At the same token I argue that due to the complexity of non-traditional security issues it is not only boundaries between referent objects that have become blurred but also the boundaries of political discourses and disciplinary-specific framing. In regard to non-traditional and asymmetrical security issues the lack of apparent clues concerning the borders of good and bad, friends and enemies, ins and outs makes the security framing process more complex compared to symmetrical and more straightforward threats.

I argue that one of the relevant analytical differences between Speech act theory and Critical discourse analysis concerns particularly consent and legitimacy. I quote Norman Fairclough in order to make the difference between the two concepts clearer:

“[...]… while the former may be achieved by persuasive means of any sort (i.e., just rhetorically), the latter requires argumentation which is dialectically sound [...]”

I claim that in order for security framing to reach for example long-term mobilization effects it needs to achieve more than acceptance. In other words communication ought to be characterized by a relatively high level of resonance that can be maintained. What separates legitimacy from consent is then the normative agreement on the presented premised compared to their mere acceptance.

Critical discourse analysis is a suitable method for analysing not only the obvious representations that constitute a specific kind of hegemonic discourse but also the alternative voices and discourses that possibly overlap, merge into and/or conflict with the hegemonic discourse. It allows us to study how we produce and transform social identities, relationships and meanings through

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172 See Fairclough 2010.
174 Ibid 2010, 452.
Discourses and how representations of reality become reproduced in language, actions and in institutional practices. Thus the focus of the analysis is on how the meaning of security gets negotiated through spatially and temporally contingent communication rather than articulated in momentary speech acts.

3.2. Critical discourse analysis

Discourses are social practices that stem from intersubjective communication and are based on fairly flexible language units. Functionally they are closely related to recognition work regarding specific thematic conversations. What this means is that we signify things based on how we recognize them with respect to our background information. We identify objects as ‘someones’ participating in certain activities, doing ‘something’ in a way that seems logical and characteristic of them. This identification happens by interpreting not only verbal communication but also the non-verbal support structures that reproduce discourses and identities. However, a representation of an object can sometimes be in conflict with how we have commonly perceived it and in these circumstances existing discourses become subject to transformations. Discourses are thus widely affected not only by their internal changes but also by other surrounding discourses and events. Discourses can be overlapping, they can arise as hybrids from previously separate discourses and their content may also change. They maintain and are being maintained by social practices and institutions but simultaneously they offer a locus for structural transformations.

Critical discourse analysis is inherently normative social research. Its normativity is based on the notion of some desirable values such as equality, tolerance and justice whose presence or absence in discourses become primary interests of analysis. In a way the goal setting of Critical discourse analysis is very similar to that of the Welsh school. Critical discourse analysis takes a stance in regard to the presented value hierarchies in discourses and interprets the promoted ideologies, suggested strategies and used rhetorics in a critical way. By condemning discursive representations that appear unsustainable it also attempts to provide more comprehensive explanations and suggest more easily justified representations. Critical discourse analysis is ‘critical’ particularly in terms

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177 Gee 2005, 26-29.
180 See Ibid 2010, 7-9, 368.
of revealing how discourses maintain, legitimize and challenge power relations and dominance\textsuperscript{181}. The role and function of power relations is analysed especially in terms of hegemonic discourses which are directly connected to the prevailing power structures. Another way to put it is to state that Critical discourse analysis studies such macrolevel aspects as power and ideology that create a specific social order which in turn becomes constructed in a microlevel communication through language. It is therefore interested in revealing how these situational moments become discourses that contribute back to the prevailing social structures\textsuperscript{182}.

As non-traditional security issues form the very core of my research I find it useful to bring up Fairclough’s observation of global space-time and how the discourses of globalism affect for example national discourse production. According to Fairclough the timeless global sphere is impacting the temporally and spatially bound national discourses in a similar way as the previously mentioned global pressures are affecting national structures. In other words the discourses in the national frame have become subordinated to the presented realities of the global discourses. It is generally the national frame where global descriptions of how the world works become materialized and applied in practice. For this reason the increased responsiveness of national discourses into global discourses should be taken into account when conducting any kind of discourse analysis\textsuperscript{183}. At the same token it should be noted that discourses that generally locate between social structures and individual texts can also connect disciplines together. Anyone who is interested in using discourse analysis as a methodological tool should therefore stay open to a transdisciplinary approach. In the best case this cooperation can develop both disciplines and their theories\textsuperscript{184}.

3.2.1. Constitutive tasks of discourses

Discourses are used to signify objects by giving them meaning or value so they become reference points in our reality\textsuperscript{185}. By signifying issues and people we divide the world into categories that can be separated from each other. In regard to security this means that all recognizable content related to security including referent objects, security providers, practices, sources of insecurity and so on are based on discourses and on those insitutional structures that maintain them. The ontological structure that defines security as something different from for example technology is also based on

\textsuperscript{181} van Dijk 2003, 353.
\textsuperscript{182} See Ibid 2003, 354.
\textsuperscript{183} See Fairclough 2010, 287-297.
\textsuperscript{184} See Ibid 2010.
\textsuperscript{185} Gee 2005, 11, 98.
the ongoing process of discourse formation that frames issues under ‘the security category’ instead of ‘the technology category’. Due to power aspects, the mobilizing effects and policy implications related to significance are, however, defined by those who are capable of reaching a hegemonic position with their argumentation and whose priorities gain some institutional support.

According to James Gee we also use language in the form of discourses to build identities for ourselves and for others. In other words the same discursive methods that are used for constructing representations can also be used for building relationships between participants. Identities guide our thinking in social situations by providing information about identity based social roles, responsibilities and relationships between actors. They also guide our interpretation when it comes to discursive signifying and responding to the promoted representations of reality. Generally all communicational relationships disperse and reflect given subject positions, roles and identities but according to Fairclough all actors should be able to participate in reformulating the rules of these relationships. However, if we take into account the imbalance of power in most social situations it becomes obvious that this potential doesn’t actualize in an equal manner in all subject positions. The ability to reformulate relationships depends largely on the limits of imagination set by the first constitutive feature. In other words the definition of the content of security also determines who can talk about security and in which way. Consequently different ontological standpoints about the meaning of security result also in different perceptions of appropriate forms of action and interaction.

Another relevant aspect of discourses that is related to the purposes of identities is politics. This means the enormous amount of power that language has when it comes to distributing social goods. All framing of issues has inevitable implications on how blame, responsibility and rights get distributed in a society. However, in democratic environments politics is extensively dependant on the successfullness of factualization because in order for the suggested distribution to appear legitimate it has to be based on arguments that can gain a high truth-value. Distribution of goods thus inevitably reveals the priorities and preferences of those who are producing the discourse. In regard to hegemonic discourses this political function is closely tied to identities and ideologies that reflect existing power relations.

188 Ibid 2005, 12; Also Fairclough 1992, 64-65.
Situational and verbal contexts that guide the interpretation of representations form another constitutive task of discourses. A situation-specific context refers to the social situation that surrounds a statement within a certain discourse. A verbal context on the other hand means the position of a specific utterance among other preceding and following utterances. In regard to the situation-specific context the idea is that in order to understand what the real meaning of the words is we have to understand the context in which they are used, who are the participants and what might be the purpose of the statement in that particular situation and in relation to alternative discourses. In this way we are approaching the idea of indirect illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Situation-specific context has indeed similarities with indirect speech acts, multiple nuances and with Austin’s remark on conventions as ways to produce understandable utterances.

Ideology and hegemony are present in all political communication as discourses constantly compete over achieving the most taken for granted and hegemonic position among different representations. According to Fairclough all discursive practices produce, reproduce, institutionalize and transform existing hegemonies that concern not only discursive rules and content but also social and power relations. In terms of ideology his argument is that ideology per se lives in and spreads through discursive practices. In many ways ideologies are therefore similar to presumptions; they help to construct limited representations of social reality with the intention to support existing power relations. Also quoting Fairclough: “It has a material existence in the practices of institutions.”

Ideology becomes intertwined with hegemony by setting goals, boundaries and societal priorities. It also offers a contentual repertoire that guides discourse interpretation by explaining “what is and what should be” in terms of value hierarchies, desires, fears, norms and so on. Ideology determines the limits of power, freedom and responsibility by setting up rules and regulations for institutions and by determining how social good should be distributed. In regard to security, ideology is thus a powerful medium for determining for example the legitimacy of security claims and whose security should be protected, by whom, how and against what. However, just like any other aspects of discourses they are open to critique and can be transformed in discursive events either entirely or partially into a configuration of ideologies. The latter is a valuable insight as it implies that the problematic nature of different social practices concerning specific genres can potentially be solved...
through compromises by combining different discursive conventions into hybrids. This configuration of ideologies suggests that divisions between social practices aren’t necessarily based on confrontation but genres can also be transformed in a more integrative manner.

Most discourses are based on some implicit propositions that the audience is assumed to understand and take for granted. From this perspective issues can become framed threats over an extended period of time or become institutionalized and taken for granted without repetitious framing. Discourses are not, however, homogeneous but can provide a variety of representations of reality and even contradictory evaluations of the same objects. The outcome of speaking security thus inevitably reflects choices about what is considered the right identity or the right interests worth protecting. These choices generally result in dividing people into us and them. In the Critical discourse analysis terminology these divisions take us back to the first constitutive task of discourses which were categorizations. These available discourse models help us label objects and situate them into different categories by comparing objects to each other in order to make sense of the world. In order for framing to maintain legitimacy and have long-term mobilizing effects, however, these divisions have to resonate with the beliefs and values of some of those who participate in the framing process.

When we examine representations of reality we might face seemingly conflicting discourses that suggest different practices and measures but which ultimately rely on the same ontological assumptions. Thus as Jef Huysmans puts it: “Staging alternative practices does not necessarily challenge a dominant construction”. It is important to remember that the power of hegemony is pervasive and even alternative voices are somewhat affected by hegemonic discourses. Even if alternative discourses question the very premises of the hegemonic standpoint they still arise as dialogical statements with respect to the dominant perception. According to Huysmans securitization entails a paradoxical possibility that ‘speaking security’ contributes to further securitization and into the expansion of security as a specialty field. I agree that the the same risk applies also to wider security framing. Despite the fact that I perceive security in more intersubjective terms, the hegemonic discourses can still control communication through rules and conventions and determine semi-permanent restrictions for security framing. For this reason it is

194 See McDonald 2010, 576.
197 Huysmans 2006, 51.
important to focus the analysis not only on the provided representations but also on the possible implications of these representations and on alternative discourses of the same issues.

3.2.2. Recontextualisation and intertextuality

Recontextualisation and intertextuality are connected to the dynamics between hegemonic and alternative discourses. Due to their relevance in understanding discursive conventions and transformations I find it important to introduce these two concepts in more detail. To explain the meaning of recontextualisation better it means a process where external discourses become internalised into the observed discourse to serve a specific purpose. This phenomenon is generally linked to an organisational change and therefore it can potentially transform conventional strategies related to discourses and social practices. The actualization of such change, however, requires operationalisation in the form of new ways of acting and interacting.\textsuperscript{199} This operationalisation is not nevertheless limited to mere mobilizing effects but the transformation of discourses can also become a changing force in terms of identities. In this regard discourses as ways of representing, genres as ways of acting and styles as ways of being are interconnected and affect each other.\textsuperscript{200} Yet the effectiveness of recontextualization is often determined by its compatibility with the purposes of the internal hegemonic discourse\textsuperscript{201}.

Intertextuality is another important aspect in understanding the dynamics of discourses and the purpose of multiple voices in discourse formation. Intertextuality suggests that all texts and statements are to some extent both responses to prior statements as well as anticipating estimates of future statements and potential criticism.\textsuperscript{202} In other words intertextuality positions an individual statement, text or speech into the stream of ongoing communication and shows where it stands in relation to previous, following and alternative discourses. Intertextuality is heterogeneity of texts that can reflect diversity and contradictory elements but it can also be used for strategic purposes.\textsuperscript{203} Thus it is ultimately up to the producer of the text to choose how much intertextuality will be used and in which ways alternative voices will be presented. Quotations are direct and the most faitful ways to incorporate other voices in discursive events whereas referring and criticizing are more

\textsuperscript{199} See Fairclough 2010, 368-369.
\textsuperscript{200} See Ibid 2010, 74, 370.
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid 2010, 368.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid 1992, 102-104.
indirect, responsive ways to use intertextuality.\textsuperscript{204} Intertextuality can therefore ultimately serve several purposes from increasing reciprocity among participants to legitimizing one’s own argumentation.

According to Fairclough, elements such as discourse representation, presupposition, negation, metadiscourse and irony are tightly connected to the use of intertextuality. By discourse representation Fairclough means the aspects of intertextuality that enable agents to choose how and which parts of previous discourses will be used. Some representations focus merely on forwarding the message of a previous discourse by strictly quoting the exact words of the speaker whereas others selectively expand the use of intertextuality for example into the context, style and tones of voices.\textsuperscript{205} By presuppositions Fairclough refers to such previously presented discourses and statements that the speaker takes for granted without directly quoting or referring to any prior discourses. In Critical discourse analysis the role of presuppositions is limited as the meaning of objects isn’t derived from the beliefs or assumptions of an individual actor. Speech act theory, however, might perceive presuppositions in a different way as something that along with the designation of existential threats provides a foundation for the whole securitization process.

To briefly summarize Fairclough’s remaining three elements related to intertextuality; negation refers to such statements that wish to deny or challenge something previously claimed. Negations don’t necessarily mean negative clauses per se but they are intertextual responses with the attempt to deny the underlying presuppositions behind some previously presented statements.\textsuperscript{206} Metadiscourses on the other hand refer to speaker’s intentions to distance him/herself from a discourse in order to reformulate some modalities that have been presented earlier.\textsuperscript{207} This usually suggests that the speaker wishes to control the level of factualization concerning presented representations and limit the amount of subjectivity related to the discourse. The last one, irony is maybe the most well-known of all the intertextual elements. It refers to inherently intertextual situations where the meaning of a comment or response to something previously said is determined by the situational context instead of the actual words themselves.\textsuperscript{208} The contextual meaning is therefore drastically different and almost opposite to the literal meaning of the words.

\textsuperscript{204} See Ibid 2010.
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid 1992, 118-119.
\textsuperscript{206} See Fairclough 1992, 122.
\textsuperscript{207} See Ibid 1992, 122.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid 1992, 121-123.
3.2.3. A practical framework for the analysis

Depending on the genre, which refers to domain specific ways of producing, processing and distributing text, we come across with divergent discourses and different styles of speaking. As an example the meaning of security in our private life seems often different from the meaning of security in the public discourses because we are dealing with two totally different social languages that are based on separate grammars. The role of language and the way we use it in specific situations thus varies drastically. People use different varieties of language depending on where, why and who they are communicating with. In this regard social languages reflect our specific roles in different social and contextual situations.

As for analysing discourses the focus in terms of textual aspects is usually on words and clauses and on how the different parts of a text as an entity signify objects and build social identities, meanings and relationships. However, it is obvious that all these linguistic tools are generally used in a strategic way to build convincing representations. From a linguistic perspective Critical discourse analysis can pay attention to vocabulary and diction in order to analyse how metaphors and synonyms are being used to reduce ambivalence and to guide interpretation into a specific direction. Another area of interest can be alternative wordings that carry different political and ideological significance. These factors give insight into how differently people can conceptualize objects even in the same context. Repetition, conjuctive words and vocabulary from a specific semantic field are also very common rhetorical tools that facilitate the strategic functions of framing by linking clauses together into coherent texts.

Force of utterances refers directly to the mobilizing and performative aspects of discourses and in this regard it has similarities with indirect perlocutionary acts. It suggests that arguments can carry multiple nuances and it is only in our interpretations where words get their situation-specific meanings. Understanding the situation-specific and verbal contexts can, however, reduce ambivalence and limit the amount of possible interpretations. Another way to reduce this force potential is to become familiar with the existing discourses concerning the problematization of an issue. This background information generally provides us with some basic understanding of

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210 Gee 2005, 39-42.
212 Fairclough 1992, 75.
previous and alternative discourses helping us to understand the existing boundaries between discipline-specific discourses.

In regard to discourses the coherence of texts doesn’t mean the mere textual aspects of language but rather the logical continuity and limited amount of contradictions that make meaningful interpretations possible\textsuperscript{216}. From this perspective coherence and force potential are interconnected concepts. Coherence is an important factor in decreasing ambivalence and reducing force potential but it doesn’t require a detailed explanation of all presented arguments. Quite the opposite, coherence depends on some mutually shared but silent assumptions that make participants understand the correlation even between seemingly separate sentences\textsuperscript{217}.

Depending on the situational context discourse analysis can concentrate either on the responsiveness of argumentation or on the rhetorical production of meaning in arguments. In regard to responsiveness the interest is in the reciprocal and reactive interaction between multiple participants whose communication here and now produces social reality. Rhetorics on the other hand is characterized by delayed feedback and the focus of analysis is on the persuasive elements of argumentation that promote the producer’s representation of reality\textsuperscript{218}. Even though both of these aspects can be simultaneously present, rhetorical aspects are usually more dominant in text-based research material such as political speeches. For this reason the emphasis of the upcoming analysis will be on rhetorics and on the different discursive elements that can be used to make argumentation more convincing. However, it is good to keep in mind that despite the substantive presence of rhetorical elements in discourses, the focus of any discourse analysis is not on the motives behind rhetorical choices but on the practical consequences of the argumentation for social reality, institutions and practices.

Factualization or construction of facts\textsuperscript{219} is a major rhetorical strategy that can be used to strengthen the truth value and credibility of arguments\textsuperscript{220}. It also has a major role in terms of adding textual coherence, reducing ambivalence and competing for hegemonic position among different discourses. One effective way to use this strategy is a chronological and causal presentation of arguments that leave little room for alternative statements. This can be done for example by building a continuum between past experiences and failures or between presented arguments and

\textsuperscript{216} Ibid 1992, 83.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid 1992, 134.
\textsuperscript{218} Jokinen & Juhila 1996, 77.
\textsuperscript{219} Factualization and construction of facts are my free translations of the word “faktan konstruointi”.
\textsuperscript{220} Jokinen & Juhila 1996, 79.
logical future options. Examples of own experience, quantitative information, reliable data and social norms are also good ways to strengthen one’s argumentation.\textsuperscript{221} In politics and in the security field factualization has an enormous role in legitimizing particular type of framing and the related policy choices.

In order to get a more detailed idea of the rhetorical emphases found in discourses we can divide them into offensive and defensive argumentation and examine their differences by explaining how some of the most commonly used rhetorical tools such as repetition, speaker positions, comparisons, evaluations and categorizations work.\textsuperscript{222} All discourse analysis that concentrates on the rhetorical aspects of signifying pays attention to the persuasive and convincing methods the producer uses throughout the text\textsuperscript{223}. Thus the biggest difference between offensive and defensive argumentation is in their goal-setting. Offensive argumentation is a strategy that attempts to weaken the truth value of any alternative arguments and/or the credibility of those who present these arguments. Defensive argumentation in turn is used to strengthen speaker’s own credibility and the truth value of one’s own arguments.\textsuperscript{224}

One of the most commonly used rhetorical methods in argumentation is the separation of the argument from the interests of the speaker as this generally makes the argument more convincing. This can be done, for example, by arguing that the preferences presented in the discourse are against the speaker’s general beliefs but as other options have failed he/she has come to the conclusion that one particular alternative should be chosen.\textsuperscript{225} This method could be used for example to justify measures that are in conflict with the promoted values of the same discourse. Other commonly used methods are so called speaker categories. Speaker categories mean situations where the speaker is considered to possess enough authority or expertise to credibly talk about certain issues. In many ways speaker positions can be used to rebuild the existing power relations. This is the case especially in terms of those positions that rely on power or authority as they are often supportive of the existing hegemonic discourses. In other words speaker positions can increase the reliability of the provided information but they can also weaken it. People who are categorized as unqualified, untrustworthy or in other negative ways might find it hard to get their statements approved by

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{221} Ibid 1996, 80-81.
\bibitem{222} Jokinen 1996, 128-130.
\bibitem{223} Ibid 1996, 126-127.
\bibitem{224} Ibid 1996, 130-131.
\bibitem{225} See Ibid 1996, 133.
\end{thebibliography}
Thus speaker position is not necessarily something that the speaker inherently possesses but it can also be determined by others.

Modalities are not directly connected to distancing but it is important to recognize that our way to talk about things always reveals our commitment to the given statements. Word choices and the manner in which things are presented can either distance or bring speakers closer to their statements. Modalities can be used to express subjective affinities with statements but also to present arguments in a way that they appear consensual and free of agency. Modalities help to construct facts as well as to strengthen argumentation. They also provide an important tool for showing solidarity to other participants. In a stream of seemingly separate speech acts modalities can help to bring utterances together to reveal the underlying social meanings that the speaker assumes and wishes to promote.

Other rhetorical methods that might help to strengthen the argumentation and help the producer to appear more trustworthy are nominalisations and passive verbs, details as well as the use of contrast pairs. Nominalisations can help to construct facts when speakers intentionally turn verbs into nouns and concentrate on explaining what was done or what happened instead of who did what. This strategy often requires the utilization of passive forms of verbs as the idea is to build a more neutral and objective picture of the course of events by ignoring the role and responsibilities of actors in the process. As a result successful nominalisations can decrease the amount of viable interpretation options and provide ‘a matter-of-fact’ impressions. In the same way as modalities, nominalisations inherently take certain social meanings as given and focus on promoting them. Details are fairly easy to understand as ways to provide more accurate, detailed descriptions of the course of events. Their function is generally to reduce the amount of future criticism. Lastly contrast pairs are based on the idea of comparing good to bad, positive to negative and objects that have seemingly different identities, interests and/or priorities in a way that promotes the fulfillment of the functional tasks of the discourse and the desired social meanings set by the speaker.

After introducing a variety of relevant aspects that define Critical discourse analysis as a methodological approach it is time to move towards the analysis. As a last remark before starting the analysis part I want to remind that even though the material comprises of speech acts in the form

228 Ibid 1996, 140.
of statements and interviews the object is to study them as constitutive features of discourses. The focus is thus not primarily on the performative aspects but on the social meaning that they collectively produce. In regard to the dimensions of this meaning I wish to pay special attention to the content of security, to the actors and issues that are framed in security terms and to the suggested ways of producing security.

4. Mexico - The framing of transnational organized crime

As mentioned earlier my research material comprises of all the organized crime-related speeches, statements, interviews and press releases given by the Mexican president Felipe Calderon Hinojosa in 2010. The material includes national statements as well as press releases and statements given during state visits. All the material has been collected from the official Presidency of the Republic website and only those publications whose content is technical have been excluded. All of the material used in this research is also in its original language as I have wished to avoid misunderstandings based on possible inaccuracies in translations. The intention has been to analyse to what extent the presented critical dimensions of wider security are integrated into more practice-oriented discourses outside the scholarly circles. This is done more or less on a case study basis by analysing the framing of transnational organized crime from the president’s perspective. However, considering that the collected material most likely represents the official and hegemonic discourses I have attempted to reflect the findings to a variety of other arguments as well. Had there been more resources for conducting the analysis it would have been interesting to focus the analysis on more than one year and possibly compare how the problem has been framed for example under different presidential administrations.

In the analysis I will focus on the most eminent discourses and their subdiscourses concerning transnational organized crime and security. I will also explain which argumentative and rhetorical elements have been used to construct them. The intention is to analyse more so the construction of social meaning as continuities and unconventional elements in speech acts rather than speech acts as mobilizing utterances. The provided samples exemplify how different discourses and their constitutive elements appear in the statements and are thus only an extract of all the analysed material. The samples have been chosen generally on the basis of adequately representing the contentual message of a particular discourse. In other words I will not present lists of the most recurrent themes or words but concentrate more on the constitutive aspects of the framing process.
It should also be mentioned that organized crime and transnational organized crime are concepts that Felipe Calderon uses in parallel and alternatively. Thus in the analysis they are also used accordingly. Lastly I wish to clarify that I have chosen the titles in the following sub-chapters on the basis of the most prominent discursive themes and their main content.

4.1. Expanded security

Based on social constructivism according to which the content of security lacks any final meaning, it can be said that Calderon constructs security in a way that stretches the boundaries of disciplinary conventions to new directions. In regard to building significance through discourses, Calderon consciously expands security both vertically and horizontally by emphasizing the security relevance of transnational organized crime, by linking the threat it causes to a wider range of referent objects than just the nation-state and by promoting policies that have a clear emancipatory dimension.

“[...]... one of the biggest challenges that Mexicans face today is organized crime, which expects through violence, threat and terror, to impose its conditions and its authority and along with that oppress the communities of Mexico socially and economically as well as restrict the freedoms of citizens.”

Here the first unconventional aspect concerns the complexity of the threat itself. By using a generalized definition such as organized crime the threat becomes only partially defined. This means that it appears less tangible and is yet to be given a visible form. Also by emphasizing how organized crime is a threat against “communities” and “citizens” Calderon clearly promotes either an idea of a more collective security or multiple referent objects. He states: “The fight is worth in the first place as it is the security of the citizens that is at stake.”

Lastly the first quotation also gives hints of societal power diffusion that comes up in several other occasions as well. It suggests that the empowerment of non-state actors caused by power diffusion in Mexico has created further decentralization of power to the extent that these actors are now penetrating the society.

Another insight found in the Expanded security discourse is that security is not perceived as mere survival, even though on a functional level it is used as a clear justification for mobilization. Overall

230 “[...]... uno de los mayores desafíos que enfrentan los mexicanos hoy es el crimen organizado, que pretende, a través de la violencia, la amenaza y el terror, imponer sus condiciones y su autoridad, y con ello oprimir social y económicamente a las comunidades en México, así como coartar las libertades de los ciudadanos.” Calderon 5.5.2010.

231 “La lucha vale la pena por el sólo hecho de que lo que está en juego es la seguridad de los ciudadanos.” Calderon 2.9.2010.
the concerns over physical survival are, however, only a half of what becomes defined as ‘security’. As an example of how the content of security becomes discursively expanded, Calderon repetitively states that the biggest threat against Mexico is very multidimensional by nature. The collective implications of transnational organized crime on both humans, societies and states are further emphasized in other national and international contexts and become also supported by such political leaders as president Barack Obama. In this regard Calderon’s perception of security carries elements of intersubjective negotiations:

“At present the biggest threat in Mexico against human rights is organized crime for which reason it has to be fought with all the force of the law and without preferential treatment.”

“[...]... criminal organizations present a serious threat to the security and well-being of Mexicans and Americans.”

“Criminality has turned into not only the principal threat against peace, security and the freedom of Mexicans but also as the biggest risk for our development and the democratic stability of the country.”

It appears that in the current security environment it is not the national security or inter-state relations that define security framing in relation to transnational organized crime. Instead the meaning of security is derived from the complex implications the phenomenon causes both on the security and freedom of people as well as on the state functionality and the regional stability. In the new environment those values that are so crucial for traditional security theorists, authority and sovereignty, exist but according to the proposed threat description the first cannot be fully implemented due to power dispersion and the second loses its relevance against adversaries whose existence doesn’t depend on the mutual respect of this value.

Most of the analysed material is produced for national audiences or with Mexican participants so humans in these statements mean often Mexicans or people residing in Mexico. However, in several international statements given throughout the year Calderon builds similar presumptions which implicate that organized crime is ultimately a transnational problem and a common concern of Mexicans and Americans, of all Central-American states and strongly related to questions of

232 Calderon 5.5.2010.
233 “[...]. hoy por hoy la mayor amenaza en México a los derechos humanos es el crimen organizado, razón por la cual hay que combatirlo con toda la fuerza de la ley y sin distingos.” Calderon 5.3.2010.
234 “[...]. las organizaciones criminales que representan una seria amenaza a la seguridad y al bienestar de mexicanos y estadounidenses.” Declaración Conjunta de los Presidentes de México y EUA 19.5.2010a.
235 “La delincuencia se ha convertido no sólo en la principal amenaza de la paz, la seguridad y la libertad de los mexicanos, sino también en el mayor riesgo para nuestro desarrollo y para la estabilidad democrática del país.” Calderon 27.8.2010a.
regional stability. Calderon hereby recontextualizes organized crime as a threat on multiple levels in relation to Mexico but also to the security of humans, localities and regions. Especially in terms of referent objects Calderon’s imagination is not limited by his position as a representative of a sovereign-bound entity. As an example Calderon repetitively expresses his concern over the security of migrants who travel through Mexico and who have been targeted by organized crime groups. Simultaneously he notes that border issues are closely intertwined with the attempts to control transnational organized crime. Transnational organized crime doesn’t arise in a vacuum but affects and depends on multiple economic, societal and political factors. In the joint declaration given by Felipe Calderon and Barack Obama on 13 May 2010 one relevant referent object is contiguously specified as:

“[...]... the communities on both sides of the shared border.”
“[...]... the United States is also doing everything in its reach to protect the population in the named region [...]...”

In some occassional statements it appears that the two countries are building a regional security complex by suggesting that the securities of people on both sides of the borders are interconnected. However in a majority of the statements Calderon still departs from this assumption and states that the cooperation related to transnational organized crime between the two countries is based on the respect of national legislation and sovereignty. Thus in regard to sources of insecurities and legitimate referent objects, transnational organized crime becomes framed as a relevant security issue.

In the Expanded security discourse Calderon repetitively emphasizes that those who suffer most in the current situation are communities and individuals whose lives and freedom are being threatened at times on a daily basis. The structural and institutional challenges posed by transnational organized crime to state functionality are in no way denied but the goal-setting prioritizes human or collective security over sovereignty issues. State authority, monopoly on violence, rule of law and strong institutions have a vital role in the security paradigm but their importance is presented as

238 “[…]...las comunidades en ambos lados de la frontera”. Declaración Conjunta de los Presidentes de México y EUA 19.5.2010.
239 “[…]...Estados Unidos está haciendo todo a su alcance para proteger a la población en dicha región”. Calderon 19.5.2010a.
240 Calderon 16.3.2010
241 Calderon 2010.
instrumental in controlling dispersion and penetration of crime and in providing people a safe living environment:

“The key is to reduce the actions of organized crime against the population by enforcing the authority of the state in the entire national territory and by recomposing the social fabric whose shortage is a favourable foundation for the expansion of crime.”\(^{242}\)

The difficulty of defining the issue only from one perspective is, however, eminent throughout Calderon’s statements. Transnational organized crime is being clearly recontextualized as a complex security issue instead of a law-enforcement problem but its multidimensionality carries through into the security framing making it difficult to define any ultimate referent object. In this regard Calderon’s framing follows John Picarelli’s idea of the different consequential dimensions of transnational organized crime which are norms and institutions of the international system, the destabilization of the national level meaning both weaker social cohesion and undermined authority as well as its negative impact on human security.\(^{243}\)

In many ways Calderon perceives that the security of individuals overlaps with the security of the state and thus the argumentation flows alternatively and inclusively between these two levels. The categorization of a non-military issue as a security threat moves Calderon clearly away from concerns over mere sovereignty or territoriality and towards a more integrative understanding of common security. This idea is then applied both in the national-context as well as outside it. The instrumental role of the state and its conditional sovereignty are emphasized in sub-discursive statements that underline the goal of the government in restoring public security and the security of Mexican families.\(^{244}\) Thus the relationship between contributing agents, producers of security and referent objects appears rather reciprocal on the ideological level.

### 4.2. Transnationality and Shared responsibility

Calderon pays a great deal of attention to transforming the content of security by framing organized crime in security terms. A major thematic element in this recontextualization process is transnationality which is used to construct organized crime as a legitime security concern both

\(^{242}\) “El punto clave es reducir la acción del crimen organizado contra la población, mediante el fortalecimiento de la autoridad del Estado en todo el territorio nacional y la recomposición del tejido social, cuya carencia es campo propicio para la expansión de la delincuencia.” Calderon 13.6.2010.

\(^{243}\) Picarelli 2008, 462.

\(^{244}\) Calderon 13.6.2010.
inside and outside the nation-state. Argumentatively speaking transnationality is used mainly for three purposes; first of all to construct transnational organized crime as a source of insecurity, secondly to explain the causes, consequences and modus operandi of transnational organized crime and lastly to open a dialogue between multiple actors concerning the measures that ought to be taken to successfully manage the issue. In the Transnationality discourse the framing of transnational organized crime as a security issue is closely linked to the promotion of multiple security agents and their overlapping security goals. In the discourse two themes appear dominantly intertwined. These are transnationality and shared responsibility. As an example Calderon goes through all the causes that have contributed to the current prosperous existence of transnational organized crime. This in turn is a practical starting point for defining concrete measures. In regard to the nature of organized crime Calderon points out:

“It is a complex problem, whose character is not only criminal but also social.”245

“Organized crime is a transnational phenomenon that has similar ways to operate wherever it appears and it doesn’t know borders.”246

“[…]. this is clearly a transnational phenomenon, it has the structure of transnational, international markets and it requires, precisely, to be analyzed in a much wider context than that of the State.”247

In other contextual situations Calderon repetitively argues that the most crucial factors contributing to the existence of organized crime are the demand for drugs created in the United States, the changed modus operandi of organized crime, the shift from transition activities to territorial and societal control, the damage caused by corruption, the inutility of made arrangements with crime groups in the changed environment, easy access to weapons, increased competition between crime groups and related increase in violence as well as prior passiveness.248 At least two of these factors are issues that cannot be solved by national measures; the demand for drugs and the access to weapons. As Calderon underlines, these are major contributing factors caused mainly by the United States. Also many of the other aspects are derivative problems whose management would be easier if the transnational dimensions of the problem could be removed. Without the high demand for drugs created across the border illegal drug markets would appear less lucrative, without the weapons trade from the United States the intimidation power of organized crime groups would be

245 “Es una problemática compleja, de carácter no sólo criminal sino social […]...” Calderon 2.2.2010.
246 El crimen organizado es un fenómeno transnacional que tiene modos de operación similares en cualquier parte donde se presenta y que no conoce fronteras.” Calderon 18.5.2010.
247 “[…]. este es un fenómeno claramente transnacional, tiene una estructura de mercado transnacional, internacional y requiere, precisamente, ser analizado en un contexto mucho más amplio que las de un Estado.” Calderon 26.10.2010.
much weaker and without the assistance of the private sector in laundering dirty money it wouldn’t circulate back into Mexico weakening legal economy and the position of legal actors.\textsuperscript{249}

Added to the eminent contributing role of the United States Calderon promotes an idea of a united front among Central-American countries and underscores the necessity for a more extensive cooperation between the European Union and Mexico. He also emphasizes the need for a more comprehensive approach that takes into account all aspects of transnational organized crime and not only drug-trafficking.\textsuperscript{250} At the same token Calderon points out that because of the transnational dimensions of the problem, cooperation should be based on coherent actions. He states:

“[…] effective results can’t be expected if on one side there is a criminalizing policy and on the other side there is an open policy or veiled legalization.”\textsuperscript{251}

Central-American countries and especially Colombia are prominently present in Calderon’s discourses. Functionally they serve two conflicting purposes. On one hand they support the Transnationality discourse by exemplifying that similar problems have occurred elsewhere and cooperation with these countries is important to Mexico. On the other hand they are used as negative comparisons to demonstrate that compared to some other countries the situation is Mexico is better and thus hope shouldn’t be lost. In this regard they are used as negative reference points that help to build social cohesion in the national context. Both of these functions appear in the following extracts:

“I believe that what responds to the level of violence in a state is the structural weakness of the state. And by definition, the developed States, like the United States, or the Europeans, have much more institutional strength than the developing countries. Like Mexico has more institutional strength than many of the other Central-American countries: Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, for example that have levels of violences over 60 dead for every 100 000.”\textsuperscript{252}

“Nevertheless, it is Mexico, even with these figures, the one of the five countries in the whole Latin-America with a smaller number of homicides for every 100 000 inhabitants.”\textsuperscript{253}

\textsuperscript{250} Calderon 16.5.2010; 26.10.2010.
\textsuperscript{251} “[…] no se puede esperar resultados eficaces si por un lado hay una politica de criminalización, y por la otra hay una politica abierta o velada de legalizacion.” Calderon 26.10.2010.
\textsuperscript{252} “Creo que lo que responde al nivel de violencia de un Estado es la debilidad estructural del Estado. Y, por definicion, Estados desarrollados, como Estados Unidos, o los europeos, tienen mucho mas fortaleza institucional que los paises en desarrollo. Como México tiene más fortaleza institucional que muchos paises centroamericanos: Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, por ejemplo, wue tienen niveles de violencia de más 60 muertos para cada 100 mil.” Calderon 10.8.2010.
\textsuperscript{253} “Sin embargo, es México, aún con esas cifras, es uno de los cinco paises con menor numero de homicidios por cada 100 mil habitantes en toda America Latina.” Calderon 5.10.2010.
Shared responsibility is not exactly a sub-discourse but more so a complementary discourse that becomes constructed in parallel with the Transnationality discourse. It is also one of the most intersubjectively built discourses in Calderon’s argumentation and it consists of both internal and external parts. The internal part of this discourse is closely connected to the so called security dialogues that Calderon held with a variety of local, federal and national authorities in the fall of 2010. The external part in turn is built primarily in those statements and interviews that Calderon has given during state visits. In many ways the Shared responsibility discourse is anchored to the same aspects which the United Nations emphasizes. Especially the external part of the discourse follows the definition of the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change according to which collective security, meaning human and state security, requires shared responsibility on the part of the states as well as international institutions. In this regard the scope of relevant security agents is expanded via the notion of shared blame and suffering. The following examples are extracts of statements Calderon gave during his state visits to Spain and Colombia in 2010 and exemplify how shared responsibility is also negotiated among other internationally recognized state-actors. Similar dialogue doesn’t, however, exist between Calderon and non-state actors:

“We will increase the cooperation to fight transnational organized crime, the trafficking of arms and explosives, diversion of chemical precursors, trafficking of drugs, trade in humans and money laundering, among other problems, because we know that organized crime doesn’t respect borders and us Mexicans and Europeans, we are determined to have a united front to stop this international calamity.”

“And it is not possible that in an isolated manner of our national borders we confront it effectively. We require regional harmonization and sense of urgency.”

In a response statement to the first provided example the Prime Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Zapatero stresses the importance of Mexico in the dialogues concerning international stability and the stability of Latin-America.

Based on the analysed material the effectiveness of Shared responsibility discourse appears highly dependant on the factualization of the Transnationality discourse. To explain this interconnectedness better, shared responsibility will be effective only if external actors agree on the content of the Transnationality discourse and admit their role in contributing to the problem.

254 See UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004, 1, 17.
255 “Vamos incrementar la cooperación para combatir el crimen organizado transnacional, el tráfico de armas y explosivos, el desvío de precursores químicos, el tráfico de estupefacientes, la trata de personas y el lavado de dinero, entre otros problemas, porque sabemos que el crimen organizado no respete fronteras y mexicanos y europeos estamos decididos a hacerle un frente común para detener este flagelo internacional.” Calderon 16.5.2010.
257 Zapatero 16.5.2010.
Transnationality and Shared responsibility discourses are thus constructed concurrently and at times alternatively. In his statement to the United States Congress Calderon once again relies on strong modalities to share blame and responsibility. However, rhetorically speaking there is also alternation between strongly factualized truths and reciprocally negotiated presumptions which imply shifting between defensive and offensive argumentation:

“We accept your share of the responsibility. We know that the demand for drugs generates to a large extent this illicit business.”

“If you carefully observe, you will notice that the violence in Mexico started to rise a few years before I took office in 2006. This coincides at least with the abolition of Assault Weapons Ban in 2004.”

He continues to reinforce this discourse in several other occasions both in the national context as well as during other state visits:

“[...]... our strategy includes measures of international cooperation, of which Merida Initiative is emphasized, which marks the beginning of a new phase in cooperation with the United States, a nation which has admitted that organized crime is a common problem and that it is important to fight in a jointly responsible and coordinated manner against transnational organized crime.”

“International cooperation is the best instrument to achieve success.”

“And yes we need to mobilize not just the public opinion and be united, but the international opinion, in order to show the irresponsibility of the Americans, once and again, as much as it bothers them and as much as it disturbs them in their campaigns.”

On a rhetorical level shared responsibility among multiple security providers follows the requirements set by the nature of organized crime as an asymmetrical and trasnational phenomenon. The above quotations also provide a reminder of the transnational spill-over effects that national decision-making can cause and of the structural limitations of state-entities in managing non-traditional threats. The traditional systemic structures make efficient cooperation difficult as this inherently transnational issue is rhetorically confronted in unison but the practical implementation of common initiatives is still based on national decision-making and international (intergovernmental)

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258 “Nosotros aceptamos nuestra parte de la responsabilidad. Nosotros sabemos que la demanda de drogas genera en gran parte este comercio ilícito.” Calderon 20.5.2010

259 “Y si observan detenidamente, se podrán dar cuenta de que la violencia en México empezó a crecer un par de años antes de que yo tomara posesión, en 2006. Esto coincide, por lo menos, con la derogación del Assault Weapons Ban en 2004.” Calderon 20.5.2010.

260 “[...]...nuestra estrategia incluye medidas de cooperación internacional, entre las que destaca la Iniciativa Mérida, que marca el inicio de una nueva etapa de cooperación con Estados Unidos, nación que ha reconocido que el crimen organizado es un problema común y que es importante luchar de manera corresponsable y conjunta en contra del crimen organizado transnacional.” Calderon 16.8.2010.

261 “[...]…la cooperación internacional es el mejor instrumento para lograr el éxito.” Calderon 23.3.2010b.

262 “Y si necesitamos movilizar no sólo a la opinión pública y estar unidos, sino a la opinión internacional, para señalar la irresponsabilidad de los americanos, una y otra vez, por mucho que se molesten y por mucho que les estorbe en sus campañas.” Calderon 19.8.2010b.
cooperation. This is the case for example in regard to Calderon’s request for the United States to
restitute Assault Weapons Ban.\textsuperscript{263} The request exemplifies that despite a common
problem and common initiatives, there is still a somewhat divided mindset based on separate
national interests that takes primacy. For this reason for example the bilateral cooperation between
Mexico and the United States is mainly reactive emphasizing technical assistance, training and
financial support under the Merida initiative.\textsuperscript{264} In terms of shared responsibility
the practical implementation of cooperation is based on alliance and on each state working in its
own territory. Cooperating is mainly limited to the fields of information, intelligence and public
policies.\textsuperscript{265}

The internal part of Shared responsibility discourse is closely connected to several other discourses
and it focuses on bringing different administrative levels as well as citizens and authorities
together.\textsuperscript{266} In one of his statements Calderon underlines:

\begin{quote}
“The threat that organized crime presents for the peace of communities as well as the challenges it
imposes on local authorities require firm and politically committed action from the part of the three
branches of government.”\textsuperscript{267}
\end{quote}

By administrative levels Calderon means muncipalities, the federation and the state authorities.
Argumentatively internal Shared responsibility discourse relies on raising moral consciousness
and promoting dialogue among participants as a precondition for a successful cooperation. Aspects
of this discourse will be presented also in relation to the Social cohesion discourse, which I
would say functions as a ‘prerequisite discourse’ for shared responsibility. The following extract
provides an example of what internally shared responsibility contentually means in Calderon’s
argumentation:

\begin{quote}
“We need to change the expression that the issue over there is none of my business into an expression
that it is also my business, it is also my concern, it is also my duty to give my all to resolve the
security problem.”\textsuperscript{268}
\end{quote}

The meaning of security as it arises in the Transnationality and Shared responsibility discourse
reflects several transformative rather than conventional elements. Together with the Expanded

\textsuperscript{263} Calderon 20.5.2010.
\textsuperscript{264} See Calderon 2010.
\textsuperscript{265} Calderon 16.3.2010, 22.3.2010.
\textsuperscript{266} Calderon 27.8.2010a, 27.8.2010b.
\textsuperscript{267} “La amenaza que representa la delinquencia organizada para la tranquilidad de las comunidades, así como los
desaños que impone a las autoridades locales, requieren de una acción firme y comprometida por parte de los tres
\textsuperscript{268} “Tenemos que cambiar la expresión de que: ahi ese asunto no me toca; a la expresión de que: a mi también me toca,
a mi también me corresponde, a mi también me toca poner mi parte para resolver el problema de la seguridad.”
Calderon 12.10.2010a.
security discourse, it supports the critical project and frames organized crime as an issue that has multidimensional security relevance. This relevance is derived mainly from the collectively created causes and suffered consequences related to the phenomenon. As an exemplifying comparison concerning the issue at hand it should be mentioned that according to a survey conducted in August 2010, the views presented by Calderon are supported by the majority of the country’s population. As an example 51% of Mexicans perceived organized crime and related criminal violence as a common responsibility between Mexico and the United States.\textsuperscript{269} However, in order to get a more comprehensive understanding of the promoted social meanings we need to compare the already discovered findings to the other emerging discourses before we can draw any final conclusions of how transnational organized crime and security are ultimately linked together.

### 4.3. Positive and negative securities

Added to the horizontally expanded security Calderon’s argumentation has also signs of deepened security. He keenly promotes a comprehensive perspective that emphasizes overlapped negative and positive securities. Concrete resemblances of this are the reactive and preventive security measures that are constructed and justified in parallel. Here reactive measures focus on restoring the authority of the state whereas preventive measures focus on improving human life and strengthening the social fabric. Calderon’s framing does have undeniable elements of militarization but it also promotes emancipation as a proactive method to prevent survival threats from arising. Due to the multidimensional causes and consequences that make transnational organized crime what it is Calderon argues that a comprehensive long-term approach is required. In this regard prevention and proactive measures fight against the attitude of tolerance whereas reactive measures confront the threat in its imminent form.\textsuperscript{270}

#### 4.3.1. Proactive measures and emancipation

In Calderon’s argumentation the relevance of organized crime as a source of insecurity is built via two perspectives. The first is connected to the instrumental role of the state in protecting its citizens and the importance of the rule of law, strong institutions and state authority in fulfilling these obligations inside a predefined territorial entity. However, due to its transnational aspects, organized crime is also perceived as a threat against humans regardless of their citizenship rights in

\textsuperscript{269} PewResearch Center 12.8.2010.  
\textsuperscript{270} Calderon 13.6.2010.
a borderless space where state power and authority have less relevance. The proactive measures and emancipation dealt by Calderon apply mainly in the context of the nation-state but combined with the Transnationality discourse they become applicable also in a wider context.

Calderon stresses the importance of opportunities as a proactive method to reduce crime involvement referring both to consumers of illegal products and services and to direct participation. Argumentatively his attention is focused especially on the youth which is currently the main target group for criminal recruiters.

“Insecurity, the lack of development opportunities, the disintegration of communities and the proliferation of delinquent behaviour are all intertwined phenomena.”

Calderon highlights the importance of home, educational opportunities, societal participation and free-time activities as the most relevant ways to create legal pathways to successful life. Calderon sees emancipation as closely connected to transnational organized as a source of insecurity:

“[…]... the ultimate objective is to change the social conditions that bring about the reproduction of crime and violence.”

Calderon repetitively stresses the importance of a comprehensive reform that is based on creating employment opportunities, infrastructure and improving the living environment. Proactive measures are ultimately aimed at improving the overall well-being of people so that the desire or the need to become involved in criminal activities will decrease and the sense of morality will evolve. This part of his argumentation is strongly focused on the aspects of human security on the individual and societal levels.

Prevention and emancipation also have an empowering function as they promote the delegation of responsibility away from the state and back to the people by providing choices to make ethically right decisions. In this regard the preventive aspect of security is split into the responsibilities of the state in creating opportunities and to the responsibility of the public in seizing these opportunities. Emancipation is thus linked not only to the well-being of individuals but also to the responsibilities

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271 “La inseguridad, la falta de portunidades de desarrollo, la desintegración de las comunidades y la proliferación de conductas antisociales, son todos fenómenos entrelazados.” Calderon 3.6.2010.
272 See e.g. Calderon 9.9.2010; 27.10.2010b; 18.10.2010.
273 “[...]... objetivo último es cambiar las condiciones sociales que propician la reproducción del crimen y la violencia.” Calderon 3.6.2010.
274 Calderon 2.9.2010.
humans are presumed to feel especially in relation to people they identify themselves with. The discourse promotes somewhat predetermined and unnegotiated premises of what the relationship between ‘good’ people should be, who they should identify themselves with and what rights and responsibilities this identification should produce. Future generations, families and children are extensively used reference points in Calderon’s argumentation for enforcing this desirable identification goal:

“[…]… Mexico is able to come and see the light, I don’t know if for us, but I am sure, for the millions and millions of Mexicans that come, for the young, for the children, for those who will come and deserve neither our cowardness, mediocrity, nor our silence […]…”

In the changed security environment Calderon pays a great deal of attention on influencing on the attitudes and values of his listeners. However, the primary purpose of the proactive measures and emancipation aspects remains unclear. Overall well-being and importance of human security is repetitively emphasized but it is difficult to say whether it is a normative goal of security or one functional dimension of the phenomenon.

4.3.2. Reactive measures and militarization

A prominent aspect in Calderon’s argumentation is that he prefers to use indirect and ambivalent vocabulary. The emphasis is often on the word *fight* (lucha) which, however, carries multiple nuances. Depending on the situational context it refers on one hand to a wider security agenda including reactive and proactive measures and on the other hand to a more straightforward militarized confrontation between the state and the organized crime groups. However, it is clearly a metaphor that describes the ideological competition between good and bad; the good being the state(s), the people and the government(s) and the bad being all organized crime that threatens people, the economy and the institutions. In a few statements Calderon consciously draws a distinction between *war* (guerra) and *fight* (lucha) pointing out that again due to the transnational and asymmetrical nature of organized crime it cannot be solved by relying solely on militarism. Calderon also points out that the term “War on Drugs” as used by United States is not the fundamental theme promoted by his paradigm:

275 “[…]… México puede venir y ver la luz, no sé si para nosotros, pero estoy seguro, para los millones y millones de mexicanos que vienen, para los jóvenes, para los niños, para los que vendrán y no merecen ni nuestra cobardia, ni nuestra mediocridad, ni nuestro silencio […]…” Calderon 22.10.2010.

276 Calderon 16.5.2010.
“In fact, there was a term that was made up in the United States during the Nixon times: War on Drugs. But here our fundamental theme is not that, to include it, but the fundamental theme is the rule of law and security [...]... That insecurity-drug trafficking, insecurity of the people and the lack of rule of law and drug trafficking have a connection. There is a uniting element which is organized crime.”

Calderon uses a defensive vocabulary whenever he suggests or talks about any concrete reactive measures. In the national context he emphasizes that the country is dealing primarily with a fight for and not against something and thus the tasks at hand should be seen as restorative and not as interventionist. Even though the fight is against organized crime the ultimate goal is to return peace, order and security, to protect the people and defend the country. In this regard the content of security including those who should be protected remains extended beyond the security of the state. As an example Calderon stresses:

“[...]... In this fight for legality, in this fight for order, in this fight for security the basic rights of Mexicans will be scrupulously respected.”

Once again Calderon uses very strong modalities and comparison pairs to reduce the ambivalence of his own arguments and the credibility of alternative representations.

Calderon repetitively underscores that it is not the government that has caused the escalation of violence but the criminals. Thus the actions of government are based on the ethical and moral conviction of protecting defenseless families. He underlines:

“The reason for our fight is this: to make our country a stronger Mexico where families can live together and walk peacefully in its streets, in its communities, in its market areas.”

“Our battle is for the government and only for the government, constitutionally recognized in any of its levels, to be the one to exercise the monolopoly on force and so that the only law that prevails among citizens is the one that congress issues in compliance with its constitutional rules.”

277 “De hecho, fue un término que se acuñó en Estados Unidos en la época de Nixon: War on Drugs. Pero aquí nuestro tema medular no es ese, lo incluye, pero el tema medular es Estado de Derecho y seguridad. [...]... Qué vinculación tiene inseguridad-narcotráfico, inseguridad de la gente y falta de Estado de Derecho con narcotráfico. Tiene un elemento cohesionar, que es crimen organizado.” Calderon 24.3.2010.

278 Calderon 5.3.2010; 3.8.2010a.

279 “[...][...] en esta lucha por la legalidad, en esta lucha por el orden, en esta lucha por la seguridad, se respeten escrupulosamente los derechos fundamentales de los mexicanos.” Calderon 5.3.2010.

280 Calderon 28.11.2010.

281 “La razón de nuestra lucha es esa: hacer de nuestro país un México más fuerte, donde las familias puedan convivir y caminar tranquilamente por sus calles, por sus comunidades, por sus plazas.” Calderon 3.6.2010.

282 “Nuestra batalla es para que el Gobierno y sólo el Gobierno, reconocido constitucionalmente en cualquiera de sus niveles, sea quien ejerza el monopolio de la fuerza, y que la única ley que prevalezca entre los ciudadanos sea la que los congresos emitan en cumplimiento de sus normas constitucionales.” Calderon 21.4.2010.
Calderon’s security paradigm is a multidimensional strategy that consists of institution-building, improving transparency, increasing citizens’ participation, applying preventive policies and establishing legal reforms. However, it also strongly relies on the use of reactive measures and as a legitimizing factor Calderon uses figures and statistics to justify the involvement of the army. By presenting a flattering picture of the already gained success the following extracts send a message of willingness and determination of the state to use armed force. The provided details also give an impression of minimal harm to ‘the good’ whereas the casualties suffered by ‘the bad’ are clearly bigger, making the strategy appear effective:

“In the military confrontations, for example, even though there are casualties in the Army or in the Federal Forces, the casualties on the side of the criminals are considerably bigger. I am talking about proportions of maybe 8 to 1 or more. Inevitably, the victory, let’s say, of this military confrontation belongs to the Government.”

“The mere use of force won’t resolve the problem. But without the use of force it is not possible to solve the problem. This is the truth.”

“And it is important to remember that the military confrontations between the Federal Forces and the criminal organizations have discouraged relevant criminal leaders.”

In the above examples Calderon’s approach and vision appear to be rather militaristic. However, once again we come across with the blurring of boundaries that apply both to the problem as well as to the provision of security. Here ‘the other side’ doesn’t clearly refer to any external entity but rather to the transnational other that operates both inside and outside Mexico. Also it should be mentioned that the extensive corruption of the police has provided a major reason to expand the functional responsibilities of the Army from external protection to internal security tasks as well. This kind of blurring of operational functions and redistribution of responsibilities makes sense considering the lack of any direct external threats. However, again it becomes challenging to determine if human and collective securities are concerns in their own right or if their inclusion helps to legitimize the use of reactive measures. Regardless of this 80% of Mexicans still give their support for the involvement of army in the fight against organized crime.

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283 See e.g. Calderon 9.9.2010.
284 “En los enfrentamientos, por ejemplo, aunque hay lamentablemente bajas del Ejército o de las Fuerzas Federales, las bajas del lado de los criminales son considerablemente mayores. Estoy hablando de proporciones quizá de 8 a 1 o más. Indefectiblemente, la victoria, digamos, de ese enfrentamiento corresponde al Gobierno.” Calderon 10.8.2010.
286 “También es importante recordar que los enfrentamientos entre Fuerzas Federales y las organizaciones criminales, han caído abatidos líderes relevantes de la delincuencia [...]” Calderon 23.12.2010.
Calderon uses exclusive categorizations to imply that coexistence between organized crime groups and the society is not possible. His message to those who see the country as divided is that the women and men of Mexico “will keep on fighting until they reach victory […]” 289 Here the word *victory* clearly refers to a competitive situation where there are only winners and losers. Added to this Calderon builds further justification for ‘the fight’ by reiterating that despite the unfortunate human costs that *will* result from “the cleaning of Mexico”, it *has* to be done. 290

“[…]... We are acting against the criminals because we have to do it and because the alternative of deploying, of not acting, of closing our eyes, of crossing our arms is, simply, unthinkable for me and unthinkable for the Mexicans.” 291

It is not only strong modalities but also order-like statements that deny the possibility for alternative representations. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, it is not always the word itself but the way it is used in specific contexts and in relation to other words that determine its situation-specific meaning, possible indirect meanings and perlocutionary effects. It is thus in the zero-sum categorizations between organized crime and the rest of the country where ‘fight’ becomes somewhat equivalent to ‘war’. Also the management of non-traditional security issues as suggested by Kessler and Daase 292 takes a step towards the pursuit of total victory:

“[...]... “we are going to win this fight […]... Throughout the history Mexicans have defeated many enemies. We will beat this one as well.” 293

The presented win-lose scenario appears to be in a rather sharp contrast with some of the proactive elements presented within the same discourse. In this regard and considering the modus operandi of organized crime it is at best sectors of the metamorphotical ‘enemy’ that can truly be defeated. Analytically speaking Calderon’s contradictory discourses reflect the paradoxicalness caused by the ambiguity of organized crime and the traditionally preferred responses used by sovereign-bound entities. As a result he chooses to ignore the inconsistency of the presented premises in his discourses. 294 In discourse analysis terminology this refers either to conscious or unconscious erasure. The two contradictions where this comes up most distinctly are between the normative

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289 Calderon 10.2.2010.
290 Calderon 24.3.2010.
291 “[...]... Estamos actuando contra los criminales porque lo debemos hacer y porque la alternativa de replegarse, de no actuar, de cerrar los ojos, de cruzarse de brazos es, simplemente, impensable para mí e impensable para los mexicanos.” Calderon 7.9.2010.
292 See Kessler & Daase 2008.
293 “[...]... vamos a ganar esta lucha”. “A través de la historia, los mexicanos hemos vendido a muchos enemigos. A éste también lo derrotaremos.” Calderon 5.6.2010.
goal-setting and the militarized measures as well as between the transnationality aspects and the national implementation of cooperation. These same contradictions have also been noticed by Human Rights Watch who wrote a letter to president Calderon in September 2010 critizing the self-contradictory statements on human rights implying the normative ends and the questionable means to these ends.\footnote{Human Rights Watch 24.9.2010.} In sum Calderon is keen to promote unconventional perceptions of security on an ideological level but in terms of concrete actions his mindset still seems to be confined by the structures of the nation-state.

The legitimacy of the promoted reactive measures is ultimately a matter of opinion but they can be at least reflected to the guidelines the UN Security Council uses in evaluating the necessity of hard power. The criteria being seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of consequences Calderon emphasizes especially the first two as well as the last one.\footnote{See UN Higl-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004.} These issues overlap with the themes in other discourses but if analysed independently there are multiple occasions in which he uses the protection of people as a defensive purpose to explain the use of force. He also refers repetitively to the decades of inaction and uses past experience as a comparative example that proves the insufficiency of preventive measures in stopping organized crime. Added to this Calderon also stresses how inaction would only lead to greater suffering and to the complete surrender to organized crime.\footnote{Calderon 2010.} The seriousness of threat and proportional means are objects of further debate under Social cohesion and identity-building discourse.

\subsection*{4.4. Institution-building}

Calderon pays a great deal of attention to explaining how organized crime and its modus operandi have changed and evolved in the past 10-15 years. In this recurrent narrative which could be described as the evolution of crime the contribution of transnational factors is noticable.\footnote{Calderon 12.10.2010a.} According to Calderon crime per se is an old phenomenon in Mexico but its current ‘threat status’ is based on its transnational and violent evolvement both operationally and territorially.\footnote{Calderon 19.8.2010a.} According to Calderon the origins of the contemporary organized crime are based on the drug-trade to the United States in which Mexico was initially a transit country. Calderon explains how during several decades many officials adopted an approach of coexistence with the crime groups and a culture of

\begin{footnotes}
\item Human Rights Watch 24.9.2010.
\item See UN Higl-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004.
\item Calderon 2010.
\item Calderon 12.10.2010a.
\item Calderon 19.8.2010a.
\end{footnotes}
corruption entrenched the country. Added to this in the 1990’s the NAFTA agreement increased the average income level in Mexico which created internal markets for drugs. At the same time the power of Colombian drug-cartels weakened creating favourable conditions for organized crime to expand elsewhere. Along with more business came more actors, more competition and more violence. As the foothold of organized crime groups got stronger and their financial and intimidation power increased, the operational activities started to expand to extortions, robberies, kidnappings, intimidation and so on leaving the people to be the primary targets.\(^{300}\)

Despite the fact that Critical theory considers institution-building an unsuitable solution to security problems it is still a necessary element in managing non-traditional issues\(^ {301}\). Calderon’s Institution-building discourse offers an interesting locus for analysing the dispersion of power in Mexico and how this has weakened the state’s institutional capacity to control the use of its own power resources, especially that of authority. In regard to institutional capacity Calderon points out straightforwardly and repetitively that the evolution in the behaviour of crime has created a semiparalisis that applies both to the police, to the cabinet as well as to the judicial sectors.\(^ {302}\) As an example he states that:

“[…]it some cases it created a fate of semiparalisis in the public institutions, and in the different sections of the police.” \(^ {303}\)

The impact of crime on institutions has also had a major contributing role in spreading crime further and deeper into the society. There has been a real negative correlation between the institutional power of the state and the financial and intimidation power of organized crime groups. Impunity has resulted in criminals getting away without punishment which has created more impunity and more crime.\(^ {304}\) This acknowledgment echoes in the statements of some American politicians such as Hilary Clinton who in September 2010 compared Mexico to Colombia 20 years ago, stating that organized crime groups have already gained control over some parts of the country.\(^ {305}\)

Institution-building has a major role in Calderon’s security paradigm and despite his sincere honesty in admitting the state’s role in contributing to the problem he wants to avoid creating

\(^{300}\) Calderon 24.2.2010.
\(^{301}\) See Newman 2001.
\(^{302}\) Calderon 19.8.2010a.
\(^{303}\) “[…]… generó, en algunos casos, una suerte de parálisis en las Instituciones públicas, y en diversos cuerpos policiales.” Calderon 12.10.2010a.
\(^{304}\) Calderon 12.10.2010a; 12.10.2010b.
\(^{305}\) Clinton 9.9.2010.
distrust or suggest that Mexico would be a weak or a failing state. As a way to reduce such interpretations he stresses:

“Since the beginning of this Administration we decided to confront organized crime and not escape our responsibility.”

In the intriguing dialogue that Calderón has with alternative voices in this discourse, he admits the dispersion of social power but clearly wants to claim it back to those who can legitimately represent the interests of Mexico or its people.

“The federal government endorses its political commitment to continue to strengthen the capacities of its security institutions and obtaining justice in such a way that these operations maintain and weaken the criminals as they have managed to do so far.”

In several contexts concerning the evolvement of organized crime Calderon states that the main power sources of organized crime groups are money and force and in these two areas the capacity of organized crime groups already exceeds the capacity of local authorities. Admitting this fact could be perceived as a rhetorical tool that increases the credibility and truth value of Calderón’s representation. It also helps to reflect the initiated institutional efforts to a comparable starting point. In this regard Calderón’s focus is indeed on proving that the government works hard to fulfill its obligations, which are comparable to those of conditional sovereignty. He speaks keenly about the restorative projects of the government such as “[...]... the institutional strengthening at the federal level [...]...” and emphasizes that the government and the parliament will have to “[...]... work together to create a reform that will strengthen the citizenship rights.”

Institution-building per se could be seen as a very traditional approach to solving security problems but as mentioned, it can have a major role in managing non-traditional security issues even from a human security perspective. Thus I would say that transnational organized crime is best approached from an inclusive perspective that is willing to accept different and overlapped ways to produce security.

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308 El Gobierno Federal refrenda su compromiso de continuar fortaleciendo las capacidades de sus instituciones de seguridad y procuración de justicia, de tal forma que estos operativos se mantengan y debiliten a los criminales, como hasta ahora se ha logrado.” Calderon 23.12.2010.
310 “[...]... el fortalecimiento institucional a nivel Federal [...]...” “[...]... trabajar juntos por una reforma que fortalezca a la ciudadanía.” Calderon 2.9.2010.
4.5. Social cohesion and common identity

Throughout the year of 2010 Calderon characterizes organized crime as ‘the common enemy’ which threatens the security and freedom of people as well as the freedom of expression. Organized crime is described metaphorically as “cancer” which in itself represents a potentially lethal condition that requires long-term fighting. The solution to the problem, on the other hand, is described with strong metaphors such as “cleaning the house” or “eliminating the cancer once and for all”. Of these two examples the first raises thoughts of a place that is dirty or messy and thus the metaphor works as an alternative for restoring order or status quo. The second metaphor in turn is a direct indication to a win-lose situation. Calderon’s argumentation both relies on and questions the durability of traditional national identity and related loyalties. As the primary threat to Mexicans, the state and regional stability, transnational organized crime is not a clear external entity but instead an asymmetrical, somewhat invisible and partially internally located. For this reason the nature of the threat itself poses challenges for the effective use of comparison pairs. However, the repetitive categorization of organized crime groups as enemies clearly serves a traditional identity-building purpose and builds the security of “us” against the security or emancipatory demands of “them”. The categorization of enemies is used as a negative comparison in relation to the assumed hegemonic identity of the majority. From a power perspective this categorization thus also serves a normative purpose in helping the hegemonic discourse to determine the legitimate users of force. However, the concept ‘national security’ is not commonly used in Calderon’s argumentation but instead he prefers alternative concepts such as ‘us’ or ‘citizens’. This categorical choice can be a sincere implication of an extended security mindset and more collectively perceived security but from a power perspective it is also a rhetorically smart choice that helps to build common identity and a more coherent value system in the society, which then facilitate the legitimization of any concrete security measures.

Calderon uses two alternative social languages to build identification and produce text throughout several discourses. His argumentation relies generally on nominalisations that neutralize the presence of any actors and increase the perceived consensuality. However, perhaps due to the human security aspect he also relies on personalisation as an argumentative tool. In individual occasions the argumentation is not based on his speaker position as a political leader but as a

312 “[…]... “cáncer” [...][]...” See e.g. Calderon 28.11.2010.
314 See Calderon 2010.
human being and a fellow citizen. As an example of this argumentative tactic: “I’m hurting just as anyone.”315 This kind of personal attachment to presented arguments imply loosened boundaries between genres in political argumentation but they may also facilitate people’s identification with Calderon’s framing. This in turn could increase people’s willingness to internalize the promoted social meanings concerning the content of security.

As a way to combine Social cohesion and Shared responsibility discourses Calderon uses an open destiny metaphor: “We are facing a historical opportunity to change destiny in this regard.”316 With this metaphor Calderon implicates that destiny is not predetermined or controlled by outsiders but dependent on people’s own actions. The dual message of this metaphor is based on multiple nuances that could be interpreted in alternative or complementary ways. Ultimately the metaphor encourages people to empower themselves and believe in the freedom they have but it can also be seen as a reminder according to which along with freedom comes responsibility for choices made. As the Social cohesion discourse is based on creating some kind of a continuum between a shared identity, hope, determination and action Calderon exemplifies how they are connected with each other:

“[...]… a perception is created for a citizen that there is nothing that can be done, and the citizen surrenders.”317
“We have a moral superiority, to be fighting against crime, the people are on our side.”318

Calderon is keen to talk about the suffering that ordinary people experience in the current security environment and he uses these grass-roots experiences to plead to the public. Considering again that the threat stems partially from within the state and partially from the transnational sphere it is extremely important from the functional point of view that Calderon’s argumentation can gain a high truth value when building a united front.319 All the functional tasks of the above named discourses, particularly in the national context, depend on the internalization of the promoted social meanings considering the interests that should be promoted, the objects that should be protected, the “enemies” that should be fought against, the actors who should provide security and the ways that this should be done. Calderon emphasizes:

315 “Me duele tanto como a cualquier persona.” Calderon 27.8.2010c; Also Calderon 25.8.2010b.
317 “[...]…se genera la percepción para el ciudadano de que no hay nada qué hacer, y el ciudadano se rinde.” Calderon 25.8.2010b.
318 “Tenemos una superioridad moral, al estar combatiendo a la criminalidad, la gente esta de nuestro lado.” Calderon 25.8.2010b.
“[…]… este problema es un problema superior del país que sólo se puede resolver con la unidad superior en el país.”

“[…]… se require unidad de propósitos y de acción. Si no cerramos filas, ese enemigo común avanza, y pierde la sociedad, pierden las instituciones, pierden los medios y pierde México.”

As the previous examples indicate, the modalities used to describe the viable options are strong to the point that they appear almost unconditional. There is no room for alternative identities and the situational choices are represented in zero-sum terms. In this regard Calderón’s argumentation doesn’t reflect negotiation or intersubjectivity but appears to be rather unilinear. Alternative loyalties, identities, interests or security demands are presented to be in conflict with the morally sustainable good life which is determined by Calderón. Considering the dispersion of power, this attempt to control the public discourse is a symbolic resource to increase the state’s social power which then competes with other alternative ways to dominate public opinion. Based on Robert Keohane’s and Joseph Nye’s definition Calderón’s argumentation relies strongly on the use of soft power to shape the public’s perceptions of what is acceptable, necessary and desirable. The intention is to make the public to adopt the promoted values and identities of the hegemonic discourse so that the mobilization could be derived from a consensual basis. The alternative, using especially military measures without the approval of the public would be in sharp contrast with the stated goal of the security paradigm, which is the promotion of public security or ‘common good’.

This notion takes us back to the earlier discussed difference between acceptance and legitimacy and the meaning of resonance in regard to argumentation. If we analyse Calderón’s argumentation merely as speech acts, it consists of all the necessary elements to achieve mobilization. The public’s persistence, long-term support and willingness to endure setbacks, however, depend on the importance of the expected gains compared to suffered sacrifices and on the endurance of social cohesion.

The desire to produce highly factualized framing is rather common for someone in Calderón’s position and he clearly wishes to control the communicational space against those that tolerate criminal involvement. Reducing excess optimism but maintaining hope is thus a particular concern.

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320 “[…]- este problema es un problema superior del país que sólo se puede resolver con la unidad superior en el país […]” Calderón 4.8.2010.

321 “[…]- se require unidad de propósitos y de acción. Si no cerramos filas, ese enemigo común avanza, y pierde la sociedad, pierden las instituciones, pierden los medios y pierde México.” Calderón 5.8.2010.

322 See Keohane & Nye 1998, 94.

323 See Keohane 2010.
in the Social cohesion discourse. Social cohesion and common identity are built in a traditional manner relying mainly on historically shared hardships and on learned lessons, which should suffice to make people understand the lack of alternatives in the current situation. It is repetitively argued that social cohesion and unity are necessary requirements for any initiatives or policies to be successful but at the same time it is emphasized that there are no short-term solutions. As mentioned, according to Calderon the fight will cost not only resources and time but also human lives.  

In the Social cohesion discourse restoring order is used as a clear synonym to security whereas unlimited freedom in its contemporary form appears comparable to disorder. Calderon keenly promotes action by condemning inaction and laziness. Related to this task Calderon condemns anyone who wishes to stay in the margin and argues that the sacrifices paid today “are worth it” as the only way forward is by taking these risks and paying the costs now.

Calderon uses a football metaphor to explain how unity is derived from a common purpose that is currently being threatened. In these metaphorical explanations shared responsibility and cooperation are presented as necessities for success but without unity they cannot be actualized. In his intervention concerning the security dialogues with Mexican governons Calderon exemplifies how the lack of cohesion between federal and regional governments can result in inaction:

“And the worst that can happen to us is that this is, excuse me for the football metaphor, it’s that a ball is against our goal, inside our area, and that none of the two is trying to stop it, because we don’t have clarity, as Governor Toranzo said of whose duty it is.”

Borrowing the ideas of Renata and John Fox I claim that the football metaphor has three main purposes in Calderon’s discourse. Above all it is a cultural metaphor that speaks for an ongoing competition, it describes the nature of a win-lose scenario and underlies the importance of team work in achieving victory/preventing the opponent’s victory. Based on this notion Calderon promotes once again a very sharp division between “us” and “them”.

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324 Calderon 20.5.2010; Calderon 27.8.2010a.
326 Calderon 2.2.2010; 25.8.2010b.
327 “Y lo peor que nos puede ocurrir es que éste sea, perdóname la metáfora futbolística, es que sea un balón que está contra nuestra portería, dentro de nuestra área, y que ninguno de los dos trate de atajarlo, porque no tenemos claridad, como dijo el Gobernador Toranzo, de a quién le corresponde.” Calderon 12.8.2010b.
328 See Fox & Fox 2004, 135.
As mentioned a crucial rhetorical tool in the Social cohesion discourse is identity building that is based on comparing ‘the good ones’ in a normative way to ‘the bad ones’. However, the same discourse also reveals that this presumption of a fixed negative other is not necessarily taken for granted by all the listeners. Major reasons for this are obviously deep-rooted corruption and impunity. Argumentatively speaking some of Calderon’s statements appear to be suggestive rather than declaring and they imply that competing discourses do indeed exist. This ambivalence as well as movement between defensive and offensive rhetorics can be found for example in the following statements:

“[...]... it is a critical moment for Mexico, but hopefully that, at least, makes us all understand that the enemy is them.”329

“The nation demands us all for the necessary greatness to overcome disagreements.”330

“Insofar that the people slowly recover their trust to the authority, people start to condemn. But insofar that people know the police is as far as with the criminals. Who is condemned.”331

“The enemy is organized crime and this is how it much be understood by everyone.”332

Important aspects in Calderon’s argumentation are also the rhetorical tools he uses to increase the credibility of the chosen framework. Calderon acknowledges and accepts the role of the state in contributing to the problem but argues that without the involvement of all layers and sectors of the society the threat cannot be tackled. Pointing out someone who to blame will not resolve the problem.333

5. Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War the content of security in International Relations has been increasingly under a vigorous debate. Some of the major questions have concerned the content of security and whether it means solely the existential survival of nation-states or something more. Critical theory as a school of thought is a promoter of one of the most flexible perspectives to security and it challenges many of the presumptions suggested by traditional theorists. As earlier

329 “[...]... es un momento crítico para México, pero ojalá que, por lo menos, nos haga entender a todos que los enemigo son ellos.” Calderon 26.8.2010b.


331 “En la medida en que la gente recupera poco a poco la confianza en la autoridad, a gente empieza a denunciar. Pero en la medida que la gente sabe que la policia esta metida hasta adentro con los criminales. Ante quien denuncia.” Calderon 4.11.2010c.

332 “El enemigo es crimen organizado y así debe ser entendido por todos.” Calderon 8.11.2010.

333 Calderon 2010.
discussed, it wishes to question both the central position of military threats as well as the primacy of states and build a more comprehensive approach to security. This means expanding the scope of potential security issues, referent objects and ways to produce security. Thus a major interest of the critical thinkers is the well-being and emancipation of such non-state referent objects as individuals and humankind. In other words a fundamental statement made by critical theorists is that survival alone doesn’t sufficiently determine the inner experiences of feeling safe or unsafe. For this reason security should mean not only the absence of existential threats but also the pursuit of some normative goals. Applied in practice this implies behavioural redirection towards a more holistic problem-solving that is willing to challenge any structured frameworks. As for security analysis, the priority is given to interpretative methods as the most suitable ways to acquire security-related information.

In this thesis the theoretical foundation for approaching non-traditional security issues such as transnational organized crime has been derived from Critical theory. It has been argued that in its contemporary form and scale transnational organized crime can’t be efficiently managed from a narrow perspective of law-enforcement. The debate that I have wished to take part in is thus largely normative concerning the imbalance between institutionalized ways to perceive security and the changes in our security environment. As for transnational organized crime we are dealing with an issue that doesn’t target the survival of states directly but the interconnected securities and well-being of primarily other referent objects. However, in regional contexts transnational organized crime has also posed institutional and even existential challenges to some states.

Mexico, which has been the main area of interest in this study, is used as an example of a territorial entity plagued by the strengthening power of transnational organized crime and non-state actors. As I have presented, the implications of transnational organized crime in Mexico are truly versatile ranging from hindered economic development to public disorder, terrorization of citizens and political instability. The analytical purpose of the thesis was therefore to analyse how transnational organized crime has been framed by the Mexican president Felipe Calderon. Analytically speaking the focus was on the social meanings of security as well as on the relationship between security and transnational organized crime. In the analysis part I searched answers particularly to such questions as how the content of security is perceived, who it applies to and how it can be achieved in relation to transnational organized crime. The intention was to analyse the security mindset of Felipe Calderon by paying special attention to the conventional and transformative aspects of the produced discourses.
Considering that in this thesis the concept ‘social meaning’ has referred to ways of perceiving, ways of being and ways of acting I argue that it is not something that can be derived solely from individual utterances. In many ways social meanings locate between discourses and in the effects of perlocutionary acts whose interpretation might differ from the literal meaning of words. In Calderon’s argumentation these three dimensions of social meaning seem to represent different levels of conventionality. In the discovered discourses the social meaning as a way of perceiving reflects a conceptually transformative shift towards a more comprehensive security. The social meaning as ways of being in turn has both conventional and unconventional features. On one hand Calderon acknowledges the interconnectedness of security issues, actors and interests and indicates that security should be perceived in collective rather than exclusive terms. On the other hand this idea of multidimensionality disappears to the background as he moves towards more functional tasks of discourses. In this regard the social meaning as ways of acting represents the most conventional dimension of his framing. In terms of providing security Calderon’s argumentation still seems to prioritize national institutions and traditional ways of coordinating cooperation between sovereign states.

The analysed material represents some kind of a ‘twilight zone’ of discursive conventions meaning that Calderon uses both traditional and transformative ways to frame transnational organized crime. Most of the discovered discourses are based on an idea of collective security that brings the security of people and the security of the state(s) together. Thus the security relevance of transnational organized crime is derived from its multidimensional causes and consequences that affect and become affected by actors in local, national, regional and international levels. Ontologically speaking the field of security is expanded to comprise of a variety of referent objects and asymmetrical sources of insecurities both in the national sphere as well as on a global scale. Organized crime is actively constructed into a priority security concern and its transnational nature is well acknowledged when explaining its modus operandi and sharing functional responsibilities among different actors. Added to this there seems to be discursive blurring of foreign and domestic policies as the issue is approached from both angles as well as from an additional viewpoint of transnational space that exists outside the inter-state sphere.

Intersubjectivity in Calderon’s argumentation is derived mainly from the statements of those actors who either contribute to the causes that feed transnational organized crime or who are affected by the consequences and spill-over effects of the phenomenon. The main partners in this negotiation
are Barack Obama as well as other political leaders from Spain, Colombia and some Central-American states. Intersubjectivity can also be found in all of those statements that emphasize the importance of alternative referent objects such as individuals and humans. The fact that 80% of Mexicans still support the involvement of the army and 51% see the problem as a common responsibility of Mexico and the United States clearly shows that Calderon’s arguments resonate with the beliefs and values of the country’s majority. From a critical point of view Calderon manages to expand the range of referent objects and security providers horizontally to international actors as well as vertically to individuals, the society and the government. The private sector, however, remains underrepresented in Calderon’s discourses and comes up only occasionally in regard to money-laundering.

The main message of both Expanded security and Positive and negative securities discourses is the need to reorient security away from mere protective thinking towards a more multidimensional approach, normative goals and the emancipation of individuals. One of the main elements promoted in these discourses is the need to improve legal opportunities but in the used contexts their intrinsic value doesn’t become fully explained. In the argumentation human security and development are dealt with as crucial tools in preventing existential threats from arising and thus they are given a somewhat instrumental role. This may not be of interest from the point of view of practical problem-solving but from a theoretical perspective it raises a question if human security has relevance in its own right or whether its inclusion results from the issue becoming a national security threat. In the former case human security is seen as a truly relevant dimension of collective security but in the latter case the use of human security serves as a normative justification for the suggested reactive measures. This in turn would mean that human security is used in its narrowest sense to imply the avoidance of human costs in a conflict-like situation.334

As Calderon’s Institution-building discourse points out the state is still the most common entity for providing human security but without functional institutions and control over the use of authority it won’t be able to fulfill these obligations. From the point of view of conditional sovereignty, the legitimacy of the state as a plenipotentiary actor might become challenged not only as a result of sovereignty crisis but also as a result of underperformance in providing human security. However, as Calderon very well explains the power sources of sovereignty-bound and non-state actors are very different and the lack of internal limitations for the use of power makes transnational

organized crime a very unpredictable adversary. In this regard, institution-building plays a crucial role in hindering organized crime from further penetrating the moral fabric and the value system of the public.

Occasionally the strong modalities used by Calderon guide the listener’s interpretation towards a militarized direction but at the same time it might be excessively idealistic to assume that mere preventive measures would even suffice in the current situation. Depending on the evaluation of how urgent the listeners consider the threat, Calderon’s representation has the potential to gain full legitimacy in which case the promoted social meaning might become internalized by people. However, it can also gain merely mobilizing effects based on obedience and acceptance or even result in counterarguments especially from a human security perspective.

Without taking a stance in the identity formation of organized crime groups I argue that the Social cohesion discourse sees these actors as a concrete threat to the national identity. In other words powerful non-state actors that can provide alternative ways for people to feel protected or emancipated can potentially affect people’s loyalties that correlate negatively with their national identity. In the Social cohesion discourse this comes up as an argumentative hesitation and acknowledgement of conflicting opinions concerning who are *us* and who are *them*. In this regard and in order for the security paradigm to create any long-lasting results it becomes obvious that perceiving the issue as a collective problem is a useful argumentative strategy that serves many purposes. As transnational organized crime is gaining more power and is maintained by so many non-state forces it cannot be solved merely by governmental or inter-governmental measures. Social cohesion is thus needed not only for the legitimization of the reactive measures but also in order to create a preventive mindset that is present at the top as well as on the grass-roots level. This applies not only to Mexicans but as Transnationality and Shared responsibility discourse suggests also to foreign societies and states. Added to that collective security requires a change of mindset by the consumers of illegal products and services, by the private sector that facilitates money-laundering and by those whose participation in legal businesses is intertwined or supports the illegal economy.

### 5.1. Suggestions for further research

As suggestions for further research I wish to bring up a few remarks. First of all I believe that Critical theory would benefit from a more practice-oriented contribution. This would not only test the applicability of the theoretical suggestions in real life but also make sure that Critical theory
stays true to its presumptions and doesn’t become tied by internal limitations. Also due to the problematic relationship between Critical theory and the state, I would encourage scholars and students to be more open to theoretical cooperation with different collective and human security perspectives. This would further strengthen the credibility of CSS not only as the critic of traditional theories but also as a concrete thematic contributor in the security studies. Critical theory has the potential to give answers to many of the questions concerning the present security challenges but in order to be truly holistic it needs to be able to contribute to practice as well.

In regard to Mexico it is obvious that I have only managed to scratch the surface of how transnational organized crime is framed and dealt with. Thus I suggest that in order to get a more comprehensive understanding of this issue and its relevance in security framing, any future research should cover at least Calderon’s whole tenure from 2006 until present and possibly also different presidential administrations. This would provide a deeper insight into how security framing has evolved along the years and what issues or events might have caused argumentative redirections. It would also provide more information about the overlapping of human and national securities and enlighten about different temporal variations regarding the presence of ‘collective security’. An analytically wider study would also help to distinguish if and how specific events or general escalation of violence have affected the argumentation. Based on the conducted analysis here, this question still remains unanswered.

In regard to non-traditional security issues in general, transnational organized crime still lacks the kind of attention environmental or immigration issues have gained. Thus it would be desirable to see more interdisciplinary research done on the issue. However, it should be acknowledged that at the moment the lack of extensive research material still poses challenges for research outside the nation-state frame. Due to the fact that security is still very much an issue dealt by states and intergovernmental cooperation the most detailed statements about transnational organized crime is done on international arenas such as the UN by state representatives. However, alternative perspectives to the issue could be that of localities and regional complexes such as European Union. Transnational organized crime could also be approached from a particular viewpoint concentrating on some specific aspects of the phenomenon such as the relationship between corrupt practices and normative breakdown in the context of identity-(re)building.
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