Valeria Agafonova

SWEDISH NGO'S HUMANITARIAN ROLE IN POST-CONFLICT SETTLMENT: CASES OF AFGHANISTAN AND PALESTINE

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This work focuses on the Swedish humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan and Palestine. Using the cases of Diakonia and SCA I consider long-term NGOs activity in conflict and post conflict regions as development aid with humanitarian approach.

Based upon ideas of social constructivism and new humanitarianism I explore the theory and practice Swedish official and private humanitarian efforts. One of the main principle of social constructivism -the coherence agenda - has been reinterpreted such that humanitarian action have become one of the primary form of political action (rather than merely a substitute for it) and is reflected in a number of substantive changes in the humanitarian architecture. As a result of it Conflict Prevention became the one of the main priorities of Swedish foreign policy and was implemented on the ground, field and in new structure of MFA and SIDA.

Principles of new humanitarianism - right-based approach, result-oriented management and focus on capacity building efforts - are now in the core of Swedish NGOs activities. After more then 30 years of needs based assistance SCA drifts to development goals; meanwhile human rights advocacy efforts became the main priorities for Diakonia. But both NGOs keep the ‘heritage’ of classical humanitarian principles: unconditional approach to any assistance activity, deep roots in local communities and focus on the commune level. And this ‘synthetic’ approach lets Swedish NGOs to have more influence then one can expect based upon theirs modest funds.

The main challenge for Swedish NGOs and for Swedish Humanitarian Policy in general is to organize the effective coordination between all actors (including the military ones) in conflict areas. Now the internal struggle within the MFA and SIDA to maintain Conflict Prevention as a security issue or a development one still not finished yet. As a result NGOs and SIDA abstain from joint military-civilian humanitarian operations in conflict areas that reduce assistance efforts in conflict and post-conflict regions.

Key words: NGO, social constructivism, humanitarianism, development aid, needs-based and right-based approaches, coherence, Conflict Prevention, Afghanistan, Palestine.
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**Introduction**

Every year hundreds of millions of people suffer from the consequences of natural calamities, technological disasters, climate change, armed conflicts and wars. The number of people affected by extreme weather events is expected to exceed 375 million per year before 2015 (Tasneem Mowjee, Judith Randel 2010, p.39) and also over 43 million have been forced to flee from their homes due internal conflicts. (Finland’s Humanitarian Policy 2012, p.7) Humanitarian aid— is the most effective emergency means making it possible to save people’s lives and alleviate sufferings caused by natural calamities and man-made disasters, by military conflicts, epidemic outbreaks or any other catastrophes. The primary responsibility for responding to catastrophes and crises lies with the government of the affected countries and local communities, yet, in developing countries the needs of the affected people exceed the chances of their states to respond. The human health, life and future depend on appropriate, timely and effective international humanitarian assistance.

The actuality of this present academic paper is determined by the fact that the issues of conflict prevention, settlement and termination (especially the armed ones) are becoming widespread in global politics. Efficiency assessment of the tools at the disposal of the global community to settle the problem (direct military intervention, peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, sanctions, mediation attempts, humanitarian aid and development assistance) is becoming instrumental at decision-making in terms of such concepts as sovereignty and international security. In this respect, the role and experience of neutral Sweden, one of the most leading nations in providing international humanitarian aid, are particularly important for consideration and surveying of all the aspects of Sweden’s activities in this field.

In November 2012 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Relief signed a protocol pursuant to which EMERCOM of Russia is extending its participation in international humanitarian operations. In connection with this, the Russian EMERCOM Minister Mr. V.A. Pouchkov emphasized that the resolution in question ‘is particularly gravitas and momentous and will make it possible to coordinate the effort of the competent bodies, humanitarian institutions, also the national effort and state funds and, generally, to raise the level of security for those who find themselves in emergency situations’.¹ A high extent of coordination of national agencies and NGOs constitutes a specific feature of the Swedish model of humanitarian aid. For the

¹ Puchkov 2013, p.3.
Russian Federation the study of Swedish approach to collaboration with NGOs is especially appealing and topical, since in Sweden NGOs’ attitudes do not always coincide with those of their national institutions.

Sweden is the world’s fifes largest humanitarian donor, providing more than SEK 4.5 billion per year. This is 12-15% of the total Swedish international aid and more than 45% of humanitarian aid is gone to International Humanitarian Agencies and Funds via Swedish MFA. Up to 55% is distributed by SIDA as a key actor of Swedish humanitarian efforts. Humanitarian aid is largely focused on complex aid to conflict and post-conflict regions – more than 78 % of funding. It strengthens the Swedish role in such regions but rises the risk of failing to respond to the full spectrum of humanitarian needs in disaster situations. Sweden supports the central and unique role of the UN as the leader and coordinator of international humanitarian activity. Swedish humanitarian aid is guided by Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions, GHD principles, Fragile States principles, Government’s Humanitarian Aid Policies and SIDA’s Strategies for Humanitarian Assistance. Sweden also signed the Paris Declaration/AAA. The synergy of all these guiding documents could bring the multiplicative effects in complex assistance efforts but also contains serious challenges and gaps: GHD declared principals of neutrality and impartiality; Fragile States requires the state-building and peace-building and Declaration emphasis on government ownership.

Humanitarian aid – an activity which aim is to save lives, alleviate suffering and retain human dignity - has long been in the focus of political and scientific discussions. (see Sheriff&Vasko 2000.) Former Foreign Minister of Sweden Hakan Malmqvist in his monograph concentrates on the peculiarities in the approaches to providing humanitarian aid and development support and shows demonstratively the interrelation of these types of international collaboration. (Malmqvist 2000) Professor Carol Lancaster, the Dean of English School of Foreign Service, who built her career in the US government institutions in charge of international development, studied the Swedish model of humanitarian aid to conflict regions (mainly, based on the sample of African countries) and has come to a conclusion that in this issue Sweden shares a near position with Italy and Japan. Moreover, the author distinguishes a larger interaction (than in the majority of other countries) of government institutions and nongovernment organizations as a specific feature of the Swedish model. Ph.D. in international law and General Director of Asser College Europe (Netherlands) Gerard Tanja pays attention to the legal indefiniteness of the concept ‘humanitarian aid’ and studies into its evolution towards ‘humanitarian intervention’. A Swedish researcher

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2 Lancaster 1999, p.147.
3 Tanja 1998, pp.3-5.
Anika Bjordahl studies the Swedish best practices in conflict prevention. (Bjordahl, 2007, pp.169-185.) One of SIDA’s leading officers Tor Sellström points out the flexibility of Swedish position which reveals itself in the country’s readiness to a quick shift from emergency aid provision to economic cooperation (Sellstrom 2002, pp.84-87.) The independent journalist Bengt Nilsson provides a sample of critical analysis in the book. He claims that shortcomings in the system of control over the application of the funds allocated for the aid provision make it possible to use Swedish help for military and terrorist objectives. (Nilsson 2009, pp. 32-34.) Deputy General Director of Red Cross Beat Schweizer deals in most sensitive issues connected with the humanitarian imperative and necessity to attract militaries to assist in humanitarian aid reaching its target destination in conflict regions (Schweizer 2004, pp.554-557.) Elisabeth Ferris, head of World Council of Churches, contemplates the role of religious organizations, and first of all Christian organizations, as part of the community of nongovernment humanitarian organizations and their interaction with the representatives of other confessions and secular NGOs. (Ferris 2005, pp.322-325) David C Chandler (School of Social Sciences, Humanities & Languages) analyses the transformation of the humanitarian action after new humanitarianism had replaced needs-based approach by the human right-based aims. Through this discourse humanitarian efforts gave the way to the legitimation the policy of international condemnation, sanctions and bombing. (Chandler 2001, pp.678-700.) In the same time Hugo Slim, widely recognized as a leading international academic in humanitarian studies, has shown that right-based approach lets to fill the gap between development aid and humanitarian efforts. (Slim 2000, pp.21-25.) Thomas G. Weiss, one of the leading expert on the humanitarian intervention who is recognized as a foremost authority on the UN system, draws attention to the fact that humanitarian sphere cannot be maintained by humanitarians themselves and this political realities could not be ignored by humanitarian actors (Weisis 2001, pp.275-289.) (Joanna Macrae and Nichlas Leader from Overseas Development Institute analyse the coherence agenda and have shown that it make sense only if humanitarian action has to be coherent with a form of international politics that is based upon the need of conflict – affected people, but the domestic politics of powerful donor states. (Macrae, & Leader 2001, pp.290-307.) According to Fiona Fox, former Head of Media at CAFOD, new political reality needs a new humanitarianism and original “humanitarian impulse” will be qualified by political considerations and a good place to starts it is universal and unconditional right to receive humanitarian relief in times of crisis. (Fox 2001, pp.275-289.)

The major objective of this present study is aimed to show the role and specific features of Swedish NGOs’ activities in providing Sweden’s humanitarian aid in conflict and post conflict
regions. The core research tasks are planned so as, firstly, to consider the ways of humanitarian aid provision to Afghanistan and Palestine and assess its efficiency; secondly, to conduct a comparative analysis of Swedish NGOs and government agencies work in Afghanistan and Palestine; thirdly, to assess the chances and the extent of impact of humanitarian NGOs on Sweden’s foreign policy.

Sweden self-identity in international affairs till the 1990s was relied on neutrality (or, better say, non alignment) and active “moral based” foreign policy. After more and more close collaboration with NATO Sweden keenly need to fined the filed of activity which lets to save its foreign policy’s identity. It is especially important because after joined to EC Sweden was not active in Europe foreign policy (despite the fact that more than 30% of the total UN development programme’s budget is based on Nordic contribution), meanwhile its nearest neighbor Finland initiated “North Dimension” initiative. It’s also need to remember that even now there are no Swedish representatives in the decision-makers staff of the largest international humanitarian agencies. Hypothesis: humanitarian aid in conflict and post conflict regions and conflict prevention policy could be in the center of Swedish foreign policy in the nearest future. Such policy requires a high-grade cooperation between different actors and the humanitarian aid cannot be viewed in isolation from wider international policies towards conflict regions.

The choice of the regions (Afghanistan and Palestine) can be explained by the complexity, long-term and the extent of the impact of conflicts raging on these territories, both on the regional and global political processes. The unsettled situation in the Middle East is a most destabilizing factor of world politics. A more then 30-year long conflict in Afghanistan illustrates the impossibility of settling complicated problems by simple methods. Of special import in this respect is the analysis of approaches, methods and results of work performed by humanitarian NGOs in these unstable and vulnerable regions. Swedish nongovernmental organizations in Afghanistan and Palestine have acquired a unique experience, which shall be in demand with the world community in order to find ways to eliminate crisis situations.

A complex set of documents has served a resource database for this work. They can be divided into the following four groups, where the first one is comprised of the documents belonging to international organizations (See for ex. Study of Volunteering in European Union. Country Report Sweden. 2009), Resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council. Public documents of the Swedish government, as well as materials published by the governments of Finland, the USA, Islam Republic of Afghanistan (See for ex. The Government's Humanitarian Aid

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Policy. Government Communication 2004/05:52 ) belong to the second group, whereas the third group is made up of public and other speeches, interviews given by well-known statesmen (See for ex. Ahmed Rashid interview to Spiegel on December 31, 2012 ), and the fourth, - of the nongovernment organizations documents\(^5\).

Methods of the analysis/synthesis, interpretation of the resource data and case study have served the basis for the undertaken research. Comparative examination of the programs belonging to government agencies and nongovernment organizations has made it possible to undertake a complex study of the Swedish model of humanitarian aid. The actual data contained in reports of Swedish and international organizations served the background for the analysis of the change in the attitudes and priorities of Swedish humanitarian organizations in the period under consideration. The qualitative analysis was applied in consideration of political leaders’ speeches, public organizations bulletins, statutory and other documents. This methods includes the form of rigorous analysis should focus attention not only on what were said and written but on what people and organizations do.

The novelty of the research can be defined with the fact that on the grounds of vast actual data base the author has analyzed the specific features of the evolution and change in the principles of Sweden’s humanitarian which priority is focused on provision of aid to the regions suffering from long-term conflicts; has studied the role of Swedish humanitarian nongovernment organizations, both from the point of view of their interaction with Swedish government agencies and their contribution to settling concrete problems in Afghanistan and Palestine; has paid special attention to the study of such specific aspects in the work of Swedish humanitarian organizations as a combination of emergency aid and long-term programs and the flexible approach in their fulfillment. In addition the author has studied the specific aspects in the work of humanitarian organizations in various regions and analyzed the compliance of the achieved results with the set objectives; has shown the mechanisms of humanitarian NGOs placing an impact on Sweden’s foreign policy and has made an attempt to illustrate how the work of nongovernment organizations can lead to the change in defining such concepts as ‘humanitarian aid’ and ‘development support’.

In order to comply with the set objectives this dissertation for the Master’s degree consists of Introduction, four Chapters, Summary and Supplement. Introduction describes the timely character of the research theme, the extent to which the theme has been worked out; it also presents the set objectives, the research method and the academic novelty of the study; it contains an

overview of the scientific resource database. Chapter I deals in the major stages in the mechanisms formation of international humanitarian aid and offers an analysis of the evolution of Sweden’s perception of its place in this process and the core legal acts of Sweden governing the issues of humanitarian aid. Chapter II deliberates on the role and importance of NGOs for the development of Swedish civil society and reviews the mechanism of interaction between government institutions and nongovernment organizations. Chapter III is dedicated to a detailed description of the outcome of Swedish humanitarian aid to Afghanistan; it also offers a comparative analysis of the activities undertaken by government agencies and nongovernment humanitarian organizations. Chapter IV also provides a detailed analytical review of the major important humanitarian projects of Swedish humanitarian organizations in Palestine. Summary presents the research key implications and findings. There is then a list of the implemented resources and scientific works and papers. The dissertation Supplement contains the statistic data.

Chapter 1. Swedish System of Humanitarian Assistance

1.1. Main Principals and Approaches

1.1.1. Classical approach

Humanitarian assistance (or aid) is an action designated to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity in the time of and in the aftermath of the emergencies. The characteristic features that mark it out from other forms of foreign assistance and development aid show that it is intended to be governed by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Moreover, it should be essentially short-term and provide for the activities in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. In reality it is often difficult to specify where ‘during and in the immediate aftermath of emergencies’ ends and other types of assistance begin, especially in situations of prolonged vulnerability. (GHA A Development initiative Article 2012, pp.1-102.) This definition is repeated in Government Policies of the most states, but in 1986 the International Court of Justice chose not to define the term “humanitarianism” but to equate it with the activity of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The Red Cross movement, a leader among humanitarian organizations, has seven fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, universality, voluntary service and unity. The first three are the most broadly accepted principles to guide humanitarian action. Independence is less common (but all Scandinavian humanitarian actors accepted it) and the last three refer mainly to the Red Cross.
Humanity is a duty to save lives and alleviate human suffering wherever it is found and respect the dignity of those affected. It means that humanitarian aid must be recipient-oriented and is primarily directed at service delivery. Neutrality was and still is in the core of ICRC humanitarian mandate and is described as “in order to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature”. In 1965 Sweden, among a number of other states, adopted it as a basic principle for humanitarian operations of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement; later on UN also applied neutrality to all humanitarian activities, which is probably the sensitive and contested principle of humanitarian aid.

Impartiality demands that all humanitarian actions should be based solely on need, without discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion, ethnic affiliation, political view, etc. This principle is set out in Geneva Conventions contained in the UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991 (it needs to mention that this Resolution is controversial and was used to legitimize the intervention in Northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish population), and its legal status was confirmed in the judgment of International Court of Justice in 1986. The principle declares that humanitarian assistance does not have any special target groups but, in most cases more attention is given to the more vulnerable groups of population: women, children and disabled persons. This is quite natural and does not violent the principle of impartiality because vulnerable groups need more aid than others. Independence (“autonomy in relation to the non-humanitarian considerations that donors, recipients or other parties may have in dealing with the crisis where humanitarian assistance is carried out”) puts humanitarian aid outside the influence of political, economic and military or any other objectives. The UN GA adopted the principle of independence only in 2003 under its Resolution 58/114 on emergency humanitarian aid.

According to the universality approach every one has the same right for assistance (“our enemies are men”). UN GA had adopted Resolutions 2717 (1970), 2816 (1971), in which humanitarian aid is treated as universal assistance irrespective of the origins of humanitarian catastrophe. It was reflected in the title of Resolution 2816 “Assistance in cases of natural disaster and other disaster situations”. This Resolution also drew attention to the requirement for setting up
International and National Agencies that would be in the position to organize effective humanitarian assistance in such situations. UN GA Resolution 46/182 (1991) had aimed at improving and developing coordination of all actors involved in Humanitarian assistance. All these Resolutions, and the analysis of the activities of UN Agencies made it possible for UN in 2005 to reform the international system of humanitarian assistance. (Billing 2010, pp.1-20.) The Central Emergency Respond Fund (CERF) was established to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian aid both at the country and at the global level.

These principles, each of which, Jean Pictet defined as “a rule, based upon judgment and experience, which is adopted by a community to guide its conduct”, 11 and humanitarian imperative constitute the core of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) that is concertized and transferred into rules and codes of conduct of humanitarian actors. Among the more common ones are The Code of Conduct for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (1994), the Oslo Guidelines (1994), The Sphere Project and Humanitarian Charter (1997) and The Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD- 2003) containing 23 GHD Principles and Good Practices. (Government Communication 2004/05:52, pp.26-27.)

The value of humanitarian universalism was demonstrated by NGOs which initiated the inclusion of human rights references in the United Nations Charter and established the UN institutions with explicitly humanitarian mandates: UN relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 1943-1947, the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) in 1946. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHER) in 1950. In the past, Superpowers tried and did control on the most of conflict situations and either decided humanitarian problems themselves either (if theirs strategic interests in such regions were minor) humanitarian NGOs and/or international agencies did it under condition of universalism and political neutrality. There were some exceptions such as Biafra and Southern Sudan.

1.1.2. “New humanitarianism” and social constructivism

The Biafrian famine in 1968 that was a result of the war between Nigeria Federal Government and Biafrian rebels is often considered as the birth of the modern human right-based ‘solidarity movement’.12 While ICRC acted according to the “classical” humanitarianism’s need-

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based principles, the British NGO Oxfam and several others NGOs took a different approach because were sure that the victory of federal Government will means inevitable genocide to rebels (“the price of a united Nigeria is likely to be millions of lives”). Neutrality and impartiality were condemned by the “new humanitarians” stated that “ Humanitarianism… demands that we stand firmly alongside those striving against oppression, and assist there struggle for dignity and basic human rights”.

In 1971 Bernard Kouchner, the leading critic of ICRC and future UN Governor of Kosovo, established the Medecines Sans Frontieres (MSF) – the NGO which has been symbolized the new humanitarian principles: “freedom of criticism” (as James Orbinsky said in 1999 “silence can kill”) and the “right to intervention”. Other milestone on the road to new humanitarian approach was Helsinki Final Act (1975), which included the human rights and fundamental freedoms in its framework. It became absolutely clear before long that ‘third basket’ – the human dimension – was in the highest grade responsible for the changes of political landscape in Eastern Europe: “…for the West it was a weapon…used as enthusiastically by Western governments as by Helsinki committees themselves.”

Due to these events in 1970s and 1980s direct government funding of NGOs drastically increased; NGOs growth in numbers and influence and became more integrated in international institutions. Better funding let humanitarian NGOs to redirect their attention from the short-term emergency aid to long term assistance programs to fill the gap between “developed” and “humanitarian” aid. Development aid (or official development assistance-ODA) is an activity with the goal to reduce poverty and promote industrial and economic development. In general it has been designed to achieve long-term, sustainable development by addressing the roots of poverty and strengthening state institutes. It has target groups of population, deals with long-terms programs and is mainly based on cooperation between bilateral and multilateral donor agencies and recipient governments. Cooperation is usually based on the recipient’s national development plan. International development efforts are coordinated through UN Millennium Development Goals, Fragile States Principles, Paris Declaration /Accra Agenda for Action. In 1970 the 0.7% ODA/GNI target was agreed in UN and in 2005 15 EU member states agreed to reach these target by 2015. Sweden was the first to establish its national ODA at 1.0% from GNI. As a rule, humanitarian aid

13 ibid, p.682.
15 Orbinski 1999, p.2.
16 Matas 1996, p.75.
consists 10-15% of the total ODA

Development aid could not be political neutral and is usually donor-guided. In general, development aid is a Western invention that is widely used after US President Harold Truman 1949 stated that if “undeveloped” countries wanted to eliminate poverty and economical problems they had to modernise and industrialise. This statement reflects the success of Marshall Plan implementation. According to Western point of view development aid was a way to attract the large capital’s investments and technologies that would lead to western style industrial development. Humanitarian assistance in this case should be consisted mainly as emergency aid.

From the other side “Humanitarian action involves more than humanitarian relief and rehabilitation or pro- vision of safety nets in the form of food and shelter or even routine educational and health services. It is about making human societies capable of approaching their full potential in social, physical and moral terms. The goals of humanitarian action should be to ultimately render itself redundant except in cases of natural disasters”.17 This statement gives the possibility to consider humanitarian aid as a necessary action to support “social, physical and moral” society conditions for future development. Thus there are “emergency relief assistance “ and “development-promoting humanitarian aid.”18

The development agencies and humanitarian NGOs have the overall goal to support people to become the owner of their destiny but starting points are different. Development agencies spend the main share of their resources for direct budget support and strengthen of state’s institutes. This assistance is given via international funds, agencies and through national NGOs and their local partners. Humanitarian NGOs follow World Vision International (today one of the largest faith-based NGO) statement and “give priority to people before money, structure, systems and other institutional machinery”.19

Hugo Slim argues that the difference between the practice of humanitarian relief and development work is “false dichotomy” and “this false distinction has come to be corrected in the 1990s as human rights, humanitarian law, and right–based development have made increasingly common cause …Both ethic –the humanitarian ethic of restraint and protection and development ethic of empowerment and social justice – value …the same ideal of full human dignity”.20 Human rights could serve as an instrument to ensure the linkage between humanitarian and development

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17 Raj Pandy 2005, p.86.
18 Wohlemuth 2011, p. 8.
20 Slim, 2000, p.492.
assistance. Humanitarian NGOs (part of them) and international agencies began to consider human rights law as a more global principle of impatiently on the basis that the right to receive assistance for every person without any discrimination other than needs alone (impartiality) is similar to the right of non-discrimination – one of the key principles in human rights law. As a global principle human rights law was based in the fundament of right-based approach to guide the new humanitarianism. Right-based approach to humanitarian assistance, “when the focus is on the rights instated of needs”(Koskinen 2006,p.5.), means that humanitarian efforts have the ends to help the individual to become responsible actor that able to participate in community decision-making process that is necessary in all humanitarian and development programs, in order to strengths local capacity. The support and enforcement of capacity building became one of the main goals of the coherent humanitarian and development policies from the end of 1980s.

The end of the Cold War gave the start of profound changes in the relationship between humanitarian activity and political action. Joanna Macre and Nicholas Leader wrote that “unconditional respect for state’s sovereignty” that protected the right to self-determination for the Third World’s state “no longer guarantees protection from external intervention” and in the same time Northern states, UN and EU “no longer define security in primary terms of armies, alliance and threats. Human security is now defined much more broadly embracing ecological, demographic, economic”.21 The developing crisis in the South created a “violent environments” where “the distance between ‘war’, ‘organized crime’ and ‘human rights violations, is blurred”.22 New national security conception demanded to draw attention to conflict regions to control the flow of narcotics, refuges, illegal immigrants, the spread of epidemic and escalation of local ethnic, religious and political conflict. The understanding of the fact that human security deprivation has the direct impact upon peace and stability increased emphasis upon human rights and needs in a model of human security that goes beyond traditional state –centric concepts of security. It was reflected in the emergence of norms and theories embraced a wide range of issues from military, economics and democracy to development, humanitarian law and human rights.

In the post-Cold War period security studies have began to challenge the rationalist approaches to national and international security. Unlike neorealism and neoliberalism that believe only in predominance of material power (neorealism) or recognize a relatively weak influence of non-material power (neoliberalism), constructivism acknowledges the role of discursive power –

22 Kaldor1999, p.231.
ideas, ideology, culture, language and knowledge – as well as material power (military and economic). In the context of international relations (IR) constructivism “concerns with how ideas define the international structure; how this structure shapes the identities, interests, and foreign policies of states; and how state and non-state actors reproduce or transform that structure”. International structure is considered as a group of thoughts, ideas and a set of social facts (as norms), which has been constituted by the actors at specific time and place. Social facts including norms (“a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” are constructed by human agreements and this, from one side, provides its legitimacy and, from another side, has shown its temporary character (Finnemorre and Sikkink named it “the “Norm Life Cycle “). The validity of a norm increases when it appeals to a large audience and with wide acceptance of a norm the norm becomes legitimate. Norms that exist from common good are widely accepted and have a larger influence because of their universal humanitarian appeal. In short constructivism gives broader enlightenment in defining the dynamic of world politics to put in the focus on interests and identities of actors because those are socially formed and when changed, can make the system change. Thus, the system of IR is not a deterministic given – it is socially constructed. (at the risk of simplification, I dare say that constructivism in IR is close to impressionism in art: it reflects the reality adequately but without valid shape, everything is in dynamic; depends of the point of view and may be changed after the next glance).

It is difficult to overestimate the role of the concept of constructivism for international humanitarian agenda development. Firstly, constructivists consider the humanitarianism not as window-dressing but as an important motivator of state action. Secondly, according to constructivists security, sovereignty and humanitarian intervention are examples of concepts that can be described through the norms and ideas of states, international organisations and NGO. Wide accepted norms legitimise the international action or (non action). Norms that restrict or constrain certain behaviour are labelled as prohibitive norms, those that allow certain behaviour labelled as permissive norms and prescriptive norms require or prescribe certain behaviour. Accordingly to Finnemore the humanitarian norms have the permissive nature that allow but do not require intervention.

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25 ibid, p.899.
27 ibid.
To promote peace and security political, economical and military assets should be marshalled together and the humanitarian aid should not be used to fuelling conflict (as minimum). As maximum it should be “greater comprehensiveness and coherence between all actors and policy measures involved”. Thus it was elimination of all previous efforts to maintain political distance between donor and recipient countries. As British Minister George Foulkes said, the integration of humanitarian assistance into Northern states foreign policy for NGOs means:

- A recognition of the risk that aid could do more harm then good
- A shift from needs-based humanitarianism to right-based humanitarianism, to include political advocacy in which the UK public would be asked to play an important role
- An expectation that humanitarian assistance would contribute to conflict resolution and peace building
- An affirmation of a commitment to international law and the principle of impartiality (but not, explicitly, to neutrality).

According to the most radical point of view humanitarian aid was seen as substitute for justice and “it should be better to withdraw aid now, to ensure that in the long term, it is in the interests of the people.” As a part of “toolbox” that have been used to promote security and sustainable development in crisis regions new humanitarianism ought to share the common vision on the hierarchy of ends and values and not only change its ethic but reconsider the main principles including civil-military relations. Classical humanitarianism accepted interaction with military force (mainly in logistic sphere) under general civil guide. Broad coherence between all actors involving in action of conflict and post-conflict region created such form of civil-military operation as humanitarian intervention and conflict prevention.

Humanitarian interventions started in Iraqi’s Kurdistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the beginning of the 1990s and according to Tony Blair’s definition are “just war, based not on

29 Macrae& Leader 2001, p.298.
30 Kingham, Cited in Fox 2001, p.280.
territorial ambitions, but on values”.\textsuperscript{31} International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) issued its report “The Responsibility to Protect” (R2P in diplomatic argot) in December 2001 in an attempt to establish principles for international community actions (ICISS in their report used “military intervention… for humanitarian protection purposes” instead of “Humanitarian intervention”):

1. The just cause threshold (large scale loss of life; large scale ethnic cleaning);
2. The precautionary principles (right intention, last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects);
3. Right authority (the best way – Security Council authorization and The Permanent Five should agree not to apply a veto unless their state interests are involved; alternative options: General Assembly in Emergency Special Session under “Uniting for Peace” procedure provides the right to act to regional or sub-regional organizations under Chapter VII of the Charter and the subsequent authorization from Security Council);
4. Operational principals (among them: clear objectives, clear and ambiguous mandate, unity of military command, not defeat of a state, maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations).\textsuperscript{32}

This is difficult even to enumerate the huge number of problems that are connected with humanitarian intervention from its legitimacy till “Cui prodest?”, however, it appears requisite to point out that “The main interventions of 1990s were justified, at least in part, on humanitarian grounds, though again the humanitarian dimensions were framed as threats to international peace and security”\textsuperscript{33} and that such interventions “would be barely possible without the “flotilha” of humanitarian actors “standing ready to repair the damage and rebuild shattered civil societies after the military operations”\textsuperscript{34}. One of the forms of this “repair” – Provincial Reconstruction Teams is widely used in Afghanistan as the key element of program “to win the minds and harts”.

In the 1999 Brahmi Report (Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations”) was recommended that humanitarian and peacekeeping operations should be combined under responsibility of the Special Representative of Secretary-General,\textsuperscript{35} and in 2001 US Secretary of State Colin Powell recommended to humanitarian NGOs to expend the rich of US government and

\textsuperscript{31} Evans 2005, p.56.


\textsuperscript{33} ibid, p.5.

\textsuperscript{34} Schweizer 2004, p.549.

\textsuperscript{35} ibid., p.553.
be a “force multiplier” for US military efforts in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{36} In both cases ideas were strongly opposed by international humanitarian society but the message is clear: to protect their Impartiality, Independence and Neutrality humanitarian NGOs (especially those of them that work in conflict and post-conflict regions) should have an influence on foreign policy.

Other form of cooperation between a humanitarian organisation and other actors is the Conflict Prevention Policy (“conflict prevention was …farmed as a humanitarian idea and linked to sustainable development and eradication of poverty by stressing the need to address the root cause of conflicts” as an attempt “… to balance commonly held values, such as democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, with rational economic arguments”).\textsuperscript{37} Conflict prevention needs policies of long-term ‘structural prevention’ within and between communities that means strengthening of social/economic security, cultural security and the absence of gross inequality in diverse societies. (Newman 2001, (pp.239-251.) It is accepted both in academia and government departments that conflict prevention is more economical then dealing aftermath. Today Sweden has very strong and probably leading position in conflict prevention activity. Conflict prevention as guided idea for Swedish foreign policy was created as a result of analyses of its experience in development\&humanitarian aid, participation in international peace-keeping and peace-building operations and as a reflection of its own political culture which is founded on the idea of consensus.( Some analytics draw attention that even from the “linguistic” point of view “ conflict prevention” is more attractive for Swedish foreign policy rhetoric than “peace-keeping”, “peace-building” or “crisis management”.(ibid.)) A first step towards the institutionalisation a Swedish conflict prevention policy was taken in 1996 when Minister for Foreign Affairs Lena Birgitta Hjelm-Wallén presented a report on a conflict prevention. Currently Swedish position is presented in Government Communication 2000/01:2: “Government’s priorities for near future” are “To further integrate the conflict prevention dimension into the planning and delivery of Sweden’s development co-operation… To strengthen the Government’s co-operation with NGOs as a means of improving conflict prevention efforts.”\textsuperscript{38}

The potential of the idea was highly appreciated by UN after the first such mission in Macedonia headed by Swedish Brigadier General Bo Pellnas. The Director of Europe Division of UN department of political Affairs Derek Boothby said that Sweden was “the only country that has adopted conflict prevention as a major plank of its foreign policy and supported it with an action

\textsuperscript{36} Lischer, 2007, p.99.  
\textsuperscript{37} Bjordahl 2007, p.174.  
\textsuperscript{38} Preventing Violent Conflict-Swedish Policy for 21\textsuperscript{st} Century 2000, p.14.
Development and humanitarian activity in conflict or post-conflict regions is in the focus of implementation of the conflict prevention idea. And it is difficult to overestimate the role of humanitarian NGOs in this process. This is reflected in the fact that in MFA international humanitarian assistance is under control of Department of Security Policy and SIDA coordinates the activity of humanitarian NGOs via the Post-Conflict and Conflict Department. Conflict prevention was successfully tested in Macedonia and, despite the fact that was also headed under military command, put the humanitarian activity as one of the cornerstones of the operation. It’s look rather regrettable that Macedonia was and still is the only one example of such operation.

Cooperation with military efforts is one but not the only evidence of the humanitarian assistance’s transformation in the last 30-40 years. Starting its way from “the right to intervention” new humanitarianism firstly decelerated that “sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct”; soon it was stated that “the sanctity of human life is the first principle... but neutrality, impartiality and consent are second-order principles that may or may not be accurate tactical guides.” Right-based approach, goal orientated management and coherence with international policy of Western states had driven new humanitarianism to the new ethic and the hierarchy of goals according, to which even the saving of human life may be consider as a “second-order principle” if it may create “potential long-term harm either in fuelling conflict or legitimising and strengthening political factions”. Hugo Slim summarised this transformation of new humanitarianism like “rather then having the saving of life as its over-riding and prophetic concern, a new humanitarianism has emerged that basis action (or inaction) on assumed good or bad consequences of a given intervention in relation to wider developmental aims”.

It is rather symbolic how this transformation has reflected in the personal destiny of Bernard Koushner. He used to work as physician for ICRC in Bafra in 1968 and had leaved organisation to create Médecins Sans Frontières - a classic neo humanitarian structure. After MSF did not express a lot of enthusiasm in advocacy the theory of humanitarian intervention he founded Médecins du Monde (Doctors of the World) in 1980. And in 1999 he was nominated as second UN Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Interim Administration mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to repair the damage and rebuild shattered civil societies after the military operation.

New humanitarianism guided by human rights law can (and is) be easy manipulated by politicians and first of all due to the fact that there is no consensus between developed and

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39 Bjordahl, 2007, p.175.
developing countries about the universal character of the of human rights. Western governments and agencies finned themselves defining a universality of their moral values and right-based approach, which looks like a ‘weapon…used by Western governments’ against the “less-civilised nations. Under such circumstances new humanitarianism is very close to the new colonialism”. Cutting off or withdraw of short-time need-based activity (including the save the lives) for the beneficial in the long-term, is more acceptable in military operation but is far away from humanitarian approach (besides all, political leaders and humanitarian agencies are often good in retrospective analysis but can’t predict the long-term impact of humanitarian interventions).

British NGOs Oxfam predicted inevitable genocide in Biafra which never occurred; later on the organisation suspended clean water programme in Afghanistan after Taliban’s new restrictions on women, and more then 1 500 lives were lost as Afghans were forced to drink polluted water; thousands of people died when 145 of initial 150 humanitarian NGOs which had sought to help the Rwandan refugees leave the Hutu refugee’s camps in Zaire and Uganda in 1996; in 1999 in response to UN appeals donor states pledged USD 207 per person for Kosovo and only USD 16 per person in Sierra – Leone where objective needs have been greater. (Fox, 2001, pp.283, 286) Humanitarian assistance for Serbs became mainly acceptable only when Milosevic was dismissed. There are only the most visible results of political-motivated right-based approach of new humanitarianism.

In attempt to reform classical, low effective need-based approach new humanitarianism created new problems but it is clear that process of reformation should be continued. Integrationist interpretation of coherence when humanitarian assets are under political control is unfortunate and emphasis should be on their complimentary and separation of theirs functions at field level. Among the possible decisions is “new new humanitarianism”, the concept, according to which the integration of humanitarian aid into conflict management is replaced by establishing of the conditions for delivery of effective humanitarian assistance. Under this conception aid does not withdraw in attempt to force the authorities to alter the conditions for humanitarian efforts but “the framework has been established whereby it is now possible not provide the assistance until the appropriate political conditions are in place”.

New humanitarianism raised the agenda of share the responsibility between political, military, economic and a humanitarian actor to reduce suffering in conflict areas and this is its main

43 Fox 2001, p.284.
45 Macrae,& Leader 2001, p.300.
46 ibid.
achievement. All actors, including the humanitarian ones, should find their place, have clear vision of common goal and operate according their values and principles. New humanitarianism and constructivism also put the problem of redefinition of norms in the focus of modern scholars and policy agenda: changes in social/economic environment require adequate changes in approaches. It is scarcely possible to argue against such statement as “State sovereignty, in the most basic sense, is being redefined… States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa”.47

The greatest problem is who and according to what criterions will decide which norm has the enough legitimacy to guide the political action. The monopoly of UN SC is eroded by NATO, EC, IMF, international and regional organisations. But it needs to take in attention that scholars, politicians, analytics, mass media and all international society did their fist step on this “road to change” only 25 -30 years ago.

1.1.3. Values and practice of humanitarianism

Classical humanitarianism is guided by international humanitarian law and based on the human rights to receive help and protection without any form of discrimination. In such discourse it integrates human rights only as the universal principle to save the lives and alleviate the sufferings. Humanitarian assistance has based on human needs and should be given according to proportions of these needs. Time is a most critical factor for immediate help and any dilates for analyses of consequence or any others aspects of humanitarian activity drastically reduce its effectiveness. From this point of view it is clear that the main principles of need-based emergency humanitarian assistance (epitomized by ICRC) have absolute value.

Such humanitarian assistance is intended to be essentially short-term and provide for the activities in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, but in reality a number of countries have been receiving it over a long period. Long-term humanitarian assistance countries are those which were receiving more than average (10,4% of ODA ) in the form of humanitarian assistance for over 8 years between 1996 and 2010. In 2010 25 countries including Palestine and Afghanistan were classified as receiving long-term assistance. (Report 2012.Global Humanitarian Assistance ). Conflict and post conflict regions are among the long-term humanitarian assistance regions and humanitarian

organisations ought to coordinate its activity with others actors. In such situation principles and values of classical humanitarian approach often meet pressure and critics.

Needs-based assistance is criticised for a lack of effectiveness (“to do something”) and the ignorance of long-term consequence of such approach. It could be easy manipulated by the conflict’s actors in question. Besides of these needs-based humanitarian aid is considered as merely excuse for international community to avoid “more vigorous responses”. Neutrality and universality are under fire for potential harm in fuelling and strengthen political factions. (“neutrality is a dirty word” – Slim, 2004). Rieffer-Flangan argued that neutrality was newer really present in humanitarianism because if humanitarian actors provided aid to both parties or to neither of them, it automatically benefited the strong party and humanitarian actors are therefor encouraged to take sides in conflict. (Rieffer-Flanagan 2009, pp. 888 – 915.) Independence is considered as an obstacle on the road to unite resources for achievement the main goal in regions affected by crises: security and sustainable development. And besides all independence is not more then self-deception if humanitarian organisations are funded by governments. From this point of view MSF is one of the most independent NGOs because more then 80% of its USD 500 million annual budget comes from private donors as unrestricted funds. Impartiality is not so widely criticized because it allows humanitarian actors to speak out publicly inform international society about crimes and violations during a conflict as long as they use equal terms to all sides when neutrality demands that humanitarian organisations remain silent and completely abstain from the politics of a crisis. But non-discrimination approach is not acceptable by the voters of strong coherence between humanitarian and political actors.

To defend its values ICRC and other “orthodox” classists stated, “humanitarian work must be dissociated from military operations aimed at ensuring security and restoring law and order in regions affected by conflict”. ICRC argues that only neutrality and universality let to mitigate people suffering during Balkan Wars on the all sides. Humanitarian assistance is an individual right and could not be conditioned on the actions of others but those who control the access to it could violate its neutrality. In relation to it the ICRC was forced to recognise that its neutral position and silence during the World War II was not in line with human morale and values. Thus humanitarian aid often is less neutral in effect than was assumed. However when humanitarian actions were not

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49 Weisis 2001, p.286.
considered by militants groups as neutral, it led to tragedies as it was in Afghanistan in 2004 when MSF withdrew after five of its staff were murdered by Taliban for close relation with US agencies.

Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General in 1997, offered a more pragmatic vision: "Humanitarian activities take place in a political environment and thus are affected by and affect that environment". In line with it humanitarian organisations took the conception of "development relief" or "goal-oriented humanitarianism". Such "development humanitarian assistance to provide long term solution to acute needs" leads to the coherence between humanitarian and development efforts. Under this conception all humanitarian efforts, but emergency aid, should have development perspective. These approach was describe by Korn as "parallelism in which emergency assistance and the planning of development programs occur at the same time thus mutually reinforcing one another". Coherence with development assistance does not mean that needs-based approach is completely replaced by capacity-building one, but government developing agenises (main donors for humanitarian NGOs) make a pressure to do it despite of the risk "that humanitarian assistance is supposed to help people and protect them from suffering and abuse is missing from development relief". Most humanitarian NGOs try to combine (at least in its statements) both approaches but not to merge them and to limit capacity-building activity on the local commune’s level.

The exclusive role of the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence is in the core of the most of National Humanitarian Policies (Austrian Policy declared: "Aid that is not provided in accordance with these principles — even if well-intended or effective — is not classified as humanitarian aid"). However, without a real normative basis each country has its own view on the value of these principles. Austria excluded principle of independence but added "non-discrimination" what looks rather strange bearing in mined that non-discrimination should be an integral part of impartiality. It may menace that Austrian definition of impartiality has the different from the classical one. Finland fixed that "The objectives of the Finnish humanitarian assistance are to save lives, alleviate human suffering and maintain human dignity during times of crisis and in their immediate aftermath". At the same time Swedish humanitarian aid has "the goal to help to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity for the benefit of people in need who are, or are at risk of becoming, affected by armed conflicts, natural disasters or other disaster

51 Fox 2001, p.283.
situations”.\textsuperscript{56} Thus Swedish approach includes the results of risk analyses that are (or may be) politically motivated what is a move from the classical neutral position of “to do good without doing harm” to the modern “minimalist approach… to do the least harm”.\textsuperscript{57} Situation is paradoxical: to save their principals humanitarian NGOs should achieve compromise with political actors because “there are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems… problems are essentially political in origin and therefore have to be addressed through to political action.”\textsuperscript{58} If NGOs will prefer to separate themselves from the foreign policy decision-maker process it inevitably creates the situation in which NGOs loose independence, impartiality and neutrality.

Cooperation between classical humanitarian organisation and military actors are not so visible as with development programmes but even UNHCR took more flexible position during conflict prevention operation in Macedonia and for the first time agreed to accept the direct assistance of a military alliance in building and managing refugee camps.\textsuperscript{59} In humanitarian operation “the use of threat of force in support of a humanitarian operation, except in clear self-defence, will gravely prejudice that operation”.\textsuperscript{60} Obviously the threats to use force are a deadline for ‘classicist’ humanitarian actors. In crisis prevention operations humanitarian organisations consider their participation as a chance to win time for political solutions. From this point of view cooperation (but not integration) with other actors is quite accepted and not violated humanitarian principles. Humanitarian aid, based on these principles cannot end conflicts or solve problems that are political in nature. Such problems require the political will of international community and readiness to use sanctions and force or threat to use its. Humanitarian actors have the best chance when and where international community cannot mobilise its will for political decision and/or all else has failed. However, as it was shown by Nicolas Morris “ In the absence of real prospects for peace, a humanitarian operation will face increasing – and may even generate – problems.”\textsuperscript{61}

The roots of these problems are both external and internal. First ones are connected with global changes in political environment that demand new approaches and could not be ignored. Internal roots are ‘deeper’. Humanitarian activity and its principles were designed for the short-term relief assistance. Due to ambitions of humanitarian organisations and the rising of their strength, long-term activity became an essential part of their work. Meanwhile any long-term efforts (including the humanitarian ones) demand a comprehensive strategy and coordination between all

\textsuperscript{56} The Government's Humanitarian Aid Policy 2004, p.5.
\textsuperscript{57} Weisis, 2001, p.284.
\textsuperscript{58} Ogata. 2005, p.35.
\textsuperscript{59} Woodward 2001, p.340.
\textsuperscript{60} Morris 1998, p.5.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid. p.4.
actors involved what, in its turn, suggests a form of compromise in principles and approaches. Humanitarian obligation to protect people in needs also is challenged because exactly by invoking a responsibility to protect, modern Western governments justify interventions in sovereign states.

The humanitarian community are not reaching consensus on the failure of political co-option of the aid response (but was very close to it before 9/11) and each humanitarian organisation decides for itself what grades of cooperation, coherence or integration with others actors is acceptable. There are a wide spectrum of different strategies either organisational or conceptual: some approaches are common to development thinking, emphasise building the capacity of local communities (development relief); an attempts to promote accountability by establishing new standards and codes that should aspire humanitarian actors (f. ex. the Sphere project, the Humanitarian Ombudsmen project, the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct); the adaptation a stronger emphasis on protection and human rights activity; integration the humanitarian actions into an overall response to a complex emergency, encompassing a political goal, human rights development and relief concerns. (HPG Report 2 The Politics of Principle: the principles of humanitarian action in practice., 2000, pp.59.)

Some countries, like Austria, offered formal approach according to which humanitarian efforts should be divided on disaster relief phase (first hours, days, occasionally weeks after disaster situation) and needs-based humanitarian aid (during the first six month following an acute crisis); efforts in both phases are guided by the main humanitarian principles. After six month humanitarian aid includes rehabilitation, reconstruction and disaster prevention measures and should be provided in ways that will be supportive to recovery and long-term development. (International Humanitarian Aid. Policy document 2009, pp.7-8.)

SIDA’s official documents in 1960-70s referred humanitarian assistance as “catastrophic” or “disaster” aid and in 1980s after introducing the term “development humanitarian assistance” SIDA, in large grade, had returned to the original conception of international aid when all humanitarian assistance should have a developmental objective and development programmes should not only be flexible enough to be converted in humanitarian ones if needs had aroused but also be based on humanitarian approach. (Wohlgemuth 2011)

In any strategies, reforms and redefinition of values, practical and principles all humanitarian NGOs and international agencies need to remember that their legitimacy based on the priority of obligation to save lives and alleviating sufferings and that is very dangerous to trespass this mandate.
1.2. Historical review

In 1621 when Sweden successfully fought in Poland and Germany Gustavus II Adolfus, King of Sweden, decreed the first European rules to contain and specify provisions for the status of non-combatants and their rights. Five centuries thereafter it is next to impossible to understand his real motivation. However, he seems to have paid attention not only to the humanitarian aspects, but also to the absolutely pragmatic principles of ‘realpolitik’, which implied that the small Sweden could not reduce its army to control the invading territory. More attention to civilian population left to use its own recourses more effectively. This event has a symbolic meaning: primarily used to determine Sweden’s priority in international humanitarian sphere, it also shows how flexibly Sweden implements natural human senses into effective political programs.

The present-day international system of humanitarian aid was laid down in 1864 in the first Geneva Conventions which have been several times revised. After WWII, when around 50% of losses were of non-combatant and in fact civilian population (compared to no more, than 15% during WWI) four Geneva Conventions (1949) were adopted. Today there are in forth together with two Additional Protocols (1977) and there is an Additional Protocol of 2005. These documents and several Resolutions of UN SC and UN GA contain rules for the parties’ obligations in an armed conflict and make it clear that humanitarian assistance does not violate the country’s sovereignty and is legal as long as it serves to save lives and alleviate suffering.

Convention on Status of Refugees (1951) and its Additional Protocol (1967) laid down international law for refugees’ protection and gave to UNHCR a special and unique mandate to protect everybody who has the status of a refugee. In the beginning UNHCR and others UN Agencies generally dealt with people suffering after WWII, but after a series of Africa’s humanitarian crises in the 1960s UN had to broaden emergency aid and improved its coordination. In response to this challenge UN opened its first coordination office in 1971. Among its major tasks was setting up a better coordination between UN Secretariat, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP.

Sweden has played an active role in the processes of preparing all humanitarian UN Resolutions. In particular, Sweden provided strong support to include “neutrality” on the list of the major terms for humanitarian assistance (UN GA Resolution 46/182). In 1965 Sweden officially declared this principle as the basic one for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement humanitarian operations.

Sweden started to participate in international humanitarian operations following 1865 when Swedish Red Cross was established. Its activity gained wide support among the country’s
population, government and Parliament. The latter one voted for SEK 1 million in 1920 as the SRC’s fist grant to support refugees after WWI. In 1921 SRC started their first independent international operation with relation to a post conflict situation, i.e. assistance to Soviet Russia that had suffered from famine. SRC continued its humanitarian activity during WWII, during the conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and in Palestine and those operations found high appreciation with the international community.

However, neutral Sweden had to face gross challenges in the 20th century. The policy of neutrality (or better said “non-aligned” policy) made it possible for Sweden not to enter into stiff geopolitical constructions and escape destructive conflicts; yet, “the skill to say “No” to everybody” (Лусновский 1985, p.15.) turned inoperative in finding allies when Sweden needed to defend its interests. And, besides, the country’s traditional policy of neutrality could not provide a strong security guaranty in the period of world globalization (Sweden was “between hammer and anvil” 62 during WWII and in a very complicated situation during the Cold War period). In case Sweden wished to provide its security it ought to play a more active role in the construction of a new geopolitical reality. Its export-oriented economy had an important upswing after WWII, which also demanded that country’s foreign activity stay in line with its demands.

The possible joining of the NATO could not be the response to this challenge, because it did not reduce the risk of being involved in the global conflict of the Cold War time; and did not guarantee that Sweden would be in the first row of international actors. After joining the UN Sweden focused its activity on working out and supporting Resolutions and on creating the mechanisms that could reduce an arising conflict situation and /or stop the existing conflicts. It was among the group of countries that took the first steps to organize UN Peacemakers Force and also took an active part in their operations.

The first experience of those operations (e.g., in Congo) made it clear that to achieve the targets UN Force should have close cooperation with NATO (it was not easy for Sweden in the 1960s) and the lack of unity inside UN SC not only reduced the effectiveness of Peace operations, but also aroused the risks for Blue Helmets. Another of Sweden’s activities – humanitarian aid – leads to the country strengthening its position and standing and, thus, winning wide support among the Swedish population. The latter one was very significant for Sweden because an active foreign policy requires considerable expenses.

1.3. Public Support

Generally following WWII the national consensus about foreign aid has differentiated Sweden (and all Nordic countries) from a lot of others international donors. In 1955 – 1980 public opinion in Sweden not only supported but also often voted for the increase in foreign assistance. As a general rule, not less than 85% of respondents supported these activities ,(Lancaster 1999, p.157.) After 1989 the results of annual opinion polls began to fall: 52% - in 1992; 59 – in 1955; 44% - in 1996.(ibid) This drop in the opinion could be attributed to economic problems in Sweden and to some critical analyses of foreign aid’s effectiveness, which was being discussed in that period. However, public support of foreign aid in Sweden remained high – in 2008 about 44% supported it and another 16% thought that Sweden ought to do more. In 2010 96% Swedish respondents could name a minimum of one Swedish humanitarian organization (the average figure for the EC countries was 85%)

Public support of humanitarian assistance has been demonstrated in different forms.

First of all, as a personal activity. Here are some examples to review: Carl-Gustav von Rosen, a Swedish pioneer aviator who did a lot to create Ethiopian aviation and took part in mutual Red Cross’s missions before and after WWII; Henning Mankel, a famous author who had been financing the Mozambique theater Matmbela Godo (later on Teatro Avenida) out of his own money for 15 years.

Secondly, it appears in the different forms of civil society organisations. Humanitarian activity of Swedish Civil Social Organisations (or Non-Government Organization is analysed in Chapter III ) and around 800 000 Swedish citizens had been working in UN humanitarian programs.

Thirdly, it is widely supported by business. A lot of Swedish companies have there own programmes for humanitarian assistance. In 2009 UNICEF had announced that IKEA was its largest corporative donor. According to IKEA’s Social Initiative, 180 Mln USD is to be transferred for UNICEF health and education and child’s protection programs (mostly in India and Pakistan) during 2000 – 2015.

Still, a wide support doesn’t imply the absence of criticism. Swedish government’s humanitarian politics was blame for “political motivation”: Social Democrats up to the middle the

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1970s preferred contacts with Tanzania (which was under Social Democrats rule); Conservatives in 1976 attached their main attention to Ethiopia (till the Monarchy fell); Liberals redirected Swedish assistance to Zambia and Botswana. (Lancaster 1999, pp.148-149.) The result was the reduction of efficiency of humanitarian aid. Sometimes Swedish humanitarian assistance helped the repressive regimes to concentrate their own resources in order for them to continue oppressive politics, like it was in Ethiopia in the 1980s. Discussions following Benget Nilsson accusations that Swedish aid helps to start African Wars had shown the need for a more efficient control in the use of humanitarian assistance. At the same time the very likelihood of reducing the scale of humanitarian aid was out of the question.

1.4. Periods

Swedish expenses for humanitarian aid in the period between 1995 and 2004 are shown in Table 1. (differences arise due to the situations when sums, which originally were allotted for development aid, were used for humanitarian purposes). On comparing the quotient of assistance that had been distributed through multilateral and bilateral systems and the appearance of mechanisms for the distribution of aid, it is possible to single out three periods:

1. After Sweden joined UN and till the middle of the 1960s around 80% of Swedish international aid was channeled through UN Agency and multilateral organizations. (Wohlgermuth 2009,p.3.) During this period Sweden created the national structure for foreign aid. In the core of this net there was Central Committee for Swedish Technical Assistance to Less Developed Areas (CC), which successfully operated between 1952 and 1965. CC took part in setting up of 44 NGOs and played an important role in the change of Swedish public opinion: the results of opinion polls which showed negative attitudes towards development aid in the beginning of the 1950s drastically changed in the middle of the 1960s. In 1965 Swedish Agency for Development Assistance (NIB) was established. In the very same year NIB was reorganized by the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). During this period Sweden international aid, originally donor-driven (as in most countries-donors) was becoming still more recipient-orientated.

In 1968 Riksdag voted to commit 1% of GNP (later GNI) for development assistance, and in 1975 Sweden reached 0.7% (which is today the target for the EC) and has not ever since dipped below it (in 1999 it touched 0.7%). The record Swedish ODA - 1,02% of GNI was fixed in 1982. Oden & Wohlgemuth 2007,p7.) Following the decision to increase international assistance to up to 1% and the establishment of dominating development actor in Sweden – SIDA – more funds became available also for Swedish NGOs. The result was predictable: new NGOs aroused, they
became more active and consequently the share of international aid, which had gone through multilateral system, had decreased. Gradually it reduced down to 30 % in mid-1970s. (Wohlgemuth 2009, p.3.)

2. The mid-1970s to the beginning of the 1990s. During this period SIDA formalized some principles for cooperation with the NGOs. In 1979 a new rule was passed: ‘80/20’, i.e. if an NGO wanted SIDA to finance any project it should contribute 20% of the planned expenses and SIDA would offer 80%. Shortly, in the beginning of the 1980s the system with frame NGOs was established (it needs to be mentioned that the idea was tested in 1977 when the first frame agreement were signed with SCC). Overall aims of this innovation were, first of all, to make administration control of NGOs funds easy for both NGOs and SIDA; secondly, to create favorable conditions for dialogues on policy and practice between SIDA and NGOs; and to give NGOs more freedom of choice for long-term planning. In approximately 10 years nine NGOs had frame agreements with SIDA for 1 to 3 years but more than a hundred of NGOs were out of this system. (Onsander 2007, pp.63.)

Not only the number of NGOs was increased, but also the number of partner-states: up to the end of this period Swedish aid had been received in more than 120 countries worldwide. Around 70% of Swedish assistance was directed to bilateral projects, but it was true only for the development aid. The main part of humanitarian aid was distributed through the multilateral system. Sweden took its place among the five largest donors for such humanitarian funds like UNHCR, UNISEF and some others. Humanitarian aid on the average constituted 13 to 15% of the total Swedish international aid; however, starting from 1994 Sweden included funds for refugee programs into humanitarian assistance, that covered the first 12-month of refugees’ stay in well-developed countries. As a result the share of humanitarian aid constituted 23% in 1993/1994 and 24% in 1999. (Cooperation through the United nations (UN) 2009.)

3. Beginning of the 1990s until currently: the period of changes. The collapse of the Soviet Union and establishment of a new geopolitical situation forced Sweden to reconsider National Security Strategy. According to it, in the current situation there was no danger near the Swedish borders, however, the unsettled conflicts in any part of the world could come up with a bang and become hazardous and threatening. Swedish security demanded that the country should be ready to take part in the settlement of conflicts, peacekeeping and peace building activity and remain in force to prevent any conflict occurrence. For a small country it means that it has to coordinate its activity with others international actors and spend own recourses highly effectively (in the first place, such
doctrine suggests close cooperation with the NATO, however, this problem stands out beyond the set objectives of this research). Sweden has a strong conviction that the best way to prevent conflicts or successfully overcome the post-conflict situation is to develop the conflict region so that it can be included into the international trading system. Effective humanitarian and development assistance are the best instruments to achieve this target. All the reforms of Swedish international assistance in the course of the past 20 years has met three overall targets: firstly to create more effective assistance system, secondly to organise better cooperation with international actors and, thirdly, to consolidate Sweden position as world leader of humanitarian assistance.

The Government Bill “Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for Global development” dated 15.05.2003, emphasized that humanitarian assistance led to the reduction in total expenses and made development aid more effective. (Shared Responsibility 2002, pp.80.) It also pointed out that in post conflict regions any development aid is impossible without humanitarian aid. All the programs for international aid had special issues of humanitarian aid67. In 2004 Riksdag approved “The Government Humanitarian Aid Policy”68 and later on “Policy for Sweden’s Humanitarian assistance 2010-2016: Saving lives and alleviating Suffering”69 which also underlined that the humanitarian “policy takes as its departure Sweden’s policy for global development with its overall goal of contributing to equitable and sustainable development worldwide. Although this is not a specific aim of Sweden’s humanitarian assistance, the policy contributes indirectly to Sweden’s overall development cooperation goal which is to help create conditions that enable poor people to improve their lives”.70 All the above said comes in line with the EU Humanitarian Policy which also draws attention to the fact that poor people in developing countries are the most vulnerable part of population and due to this “The general aim of humanitarian aid is to help people in third world countries, particularly the most vulnerable among them, and, as a priority, those in developing countries. The principal objectives of such aid shall be:

(a) to save life during emergencies and their immediate aftermath and natural disasters;
(b) to provide the necessary assistance and relief to people affected by longer-lasting crises arising, in particular, from outbreaks of armed conflict;
(c) to help finance the transport of aid and efforts to ensure that it is accessible to those for whom it is intended;

67 Strategy for multilateral development cooperation 2007, pp.18.
69 “Saving lives and alleviating suffering. Policy for Sweden's humanitarian assistance 2010-2016”2010, pp.34.
70 Ibid. p.24.
(d) to carry out short-term rehabilitation and reconstruction work, especially on infrastructure and equipment, with a view to facilitating the arrival of relief;
(e) to cope with the consequence of population movement (refugees, displaced people and returnees) caused by natural and man-made disasters;
(f) to ensure preparedness for risks of natural disasters or comparable exceptional circumstances and use a suitable rapid early-warning and intervention system;
(g) to support civil operations to protect the victims of fighting or comparable emergencies, in accordance with current international agreements.”

These “Policies” serve the guidelines for SIDA’s “Strategies”. The present one is “Strategy for humanitarian assistance provided through the SIDA 2011-2014. (2011, pp.16.) “Strategy” governs Sweden’s humanitarian assistance which ought to be rapid, flexible quality-assured and especially draw attention to the fact that disaster prevention and recovery should be an integrated part of SIDA activity for the period 2011-2014. It also set and explained the eight goals, which were expected to contribute to the overall objective “to save lives, alleviative suffering and maintain human dignity.”( ibid., p5.)

To facilitate the effectiveness of Sweden foreign aid the Government decided to reduce the number of partner-states from 120 in the beginning of the 1990s to 67 in 2007 and around 33 in 2009-2011. (New Approach for Swedish Development Cooperation 2012, p.1.) These 33 countries, divided into three groups, included the countries in conflict or the post-conflict situation. Such countries are the main recipients of Sweden humanitarian assistance (SIDA spends up to 53% of the total humanitarian expenses on this group). Owing to its management group (7 people), which accounts for the humanitarian aid in MFA, now it is a part of Department of Security Policy and is separated from the development assistance’s group. Also SIDA’s Department Conflict and Post Conflict Countries group consists of 14 people, who are responsible for humanitarian aid. (Evaluation of SIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance 2010, p.75.) In1998 after progress in the process of conflict prevention policy’s institutionalisation SIDA was given a mandate to develop a comprehensive strategy. However Swedish authorities (as authorities of many others states) transferred the coordination of government humanitarian management to the structures that are directly responsible for national security agenda and conflicts solvation. Such position may reflect the desire to subordinate humanitarian aid to political efforts despite the declaration of independency, impatiently and neutrality of Swedish humanitarian assistance

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72 Sweden Government Strategy for humanitarian assistance provided through SIDA 2011, pp.16.
It needs to be pointed out that SIDA reorganization which started in 1995 after the “old” SIDA merged with four others Government Agencies (BITS, SAREC, SWEDCOOP and SANDO) is not yet over. In 2005 SADEV was set up to independently evaluate the development and humanitarian assistance programmes. SADEV does work not only with Government Agencies but also with NGOs because it plays an important and sometime even a unique role in Sweden’s international assistance programmes.

SIDA relation with NGOs is based on the framework agreements (see above) and has now covered 14 NGOs plus Red Cross. All the organization should be in line with SIDA Criteria for the selection on frame organizations”. It includes such notions as legitimacy, competence, experience us cooperation, reliability of systems for management and control, ability to mobilise commitment and resources etc. SIDA has established three types of frame cooperation:

“1. Frame organisations, which channel grants to other organizations (have their own framework agreements with SIDA)

2. Frame organizations with own activities (have their own framework agreements with SIDA)

3. Organizations with programme agreements (agreements approved by SIDA covering several years with frame organizations)”.

SIDA has 5-6 year- agreements with all the frame NGOs and finances NGOs on 1-3 years basis. It strives to organise a better cooperation and a more effective financial control not only for 15 frame NGOs, but for more than a hundred of them because 4 of the frame NGOs are umbrella-type (Chapter 2). One important target of changes - a considerable increase in the share multilateral assistance - is still out of reach when it comes to development aid. Despite all the declarations it increases very slowly and is still below 40% (Figure 2). Like in the previous period, the situation is quite different concerning humanitarian aid. In 1995 to 2005 on the average 60-68% of the total humanitarian aid was sent to international organizations (mainly UN Funds and Agencies); 8-9% was received by the EC, and NGOs had around 25%. (GHA Report Overview Sweden 2008.) About 30% of the total Sweden’s humanitarian assistance is generally received by UNCHR, UNRWA, and WFP, which have the Humanitarian Mandate(ibid.) Therefore, in general Sweden spends 75% of humanitarian aid through multilateral system. In the course of 2008 and 2010 Sweden’s humanitarian assistance equalled around SEC 4.16 and 4.64 billions, respectively.

74 Prat 2006, p.46.
Among the country-recipients of Sweden’s humanitarian aid in 1999 to 2008 the first three places were occupied by Palestine (USD 542 million), Sudan (USD 347.5 million) and Afghanistan (USD 222 million), i.e. 27.2% of the total Sweden’s humanitarian assistance in that period. (GHA Report Overview Sweden 2008.) All of them remain in the conflict situation.

Since joining the UN Sweden has been working to create a highly effective and strong system of humanitarian assistance. This has brought the country to occupy the position of a leading actor in the international assistance system, which is quite unusual and far from simple for a small country. This achievement has been possible mainly owing to the concentration of synergetic effects resultant from the close cooperation between Government Agencies and civil society and the unique role of Sweden’s NGOs.

Chapter 2. Swedish Non Government Organizations and Swedish International Development Agency

2.1. Generalization of Non Government Organisations

In 2000 more than 26 000 international NGOs were listed in Yearbook of International Organizations compared with 6 000 in 1990.75 About 2 million NGOs were registered in USA and about 1 million in India; some estimations show that total funding channelled through NGOs is more than 8.5 billion of dollars per year, and “as a group, NGOs now deliver more aid than the whole United Nations system”.76

This constantly growing number of humanitarian NGOs (or CSOs) and their variety makes generalizations impossible (Even terms – “NGO” and “CSO” – are used in different countries for the very same kind of activity. In Scandinavian countries historically preferred term “NGO” but not far long ago Swedish Government had started to use term “CSO” in all official documents). However it is possible to divide them to faith-based and secular organizations; some NGOs work for human rights or advocacy, some – for humanitarian assistance, but there are NGOs which engage in both. From the USA point of view “three main historical strands or traditions have been

75 Ferris 2005, p.312.
76 ibid.
important in the evolution of modern humanitarian actions”\textsuperscript{77}. Firstly, there is the religious tradition aroused out of missionary work and now combined social and religious goals. Among this NGOs such Catholic organization as CRS, CAFOD. Secondly, it is “Dunantist” (named for Red Cross founder Henry Dunant). This group of NGOs seek to position themselves out of state interests (the oldest one from its is Save the Children). And thirdly, we have “Wilsonian” (named for the USA President-idealistic Woodrow Wilson whose idea was to convert the USA values and influence into universal force for the good of the World). The largest NGO of this group is CARE especially successfully operated during the Marshall Plan. NGO from any group ought to fined answers for main challenges: what to do with relations with governments or armed force and how to choose shape and better place of advocacy. As a lot of other things in our world, answer depends mainly from the kind of NGO’s financing.

Before 1980s NGOs budgets, on the average, had been funded from the public sector by no more than 1.5%, however, after the Governments increased their ODA activities, the public sector funding accounted for NGOs 40% and more in 1990s. (Ferris 2005, p.312) In this situation there comes a question about the extent to which NGO is really non-government. In the meantime with this process there appeared on the political arena a lot of government-organized NGOs (or GONGOs), the aim of which was to increase the efficiency of public funds spending, and this has created a more competitive environment for all the NGOs. Big money means big media attention to humanitarian NGOs to implement more professional programmes but at the same time some international NGOs started to leave or to reduce their operations in emergency regions as soon as the immediate crisis was in the past.

In Sweden statistics generally do not distinguish actors with the profit and non-profit purpose in the voluntary sectors, and due to this it is difficult to assess how many NGOs exist in Sweden. However some suggestions show that in Sweden there are more than 200 000 such organizations (Swedish Government Factsheet “A policy for civil society” 2010,p.2) which are described as “organization or associations that are founded on the basis of common ideas or interests, that have some sort of public character and organizational form, that can be established and dissolved without decision from public authorities, that build on voluntary commitment and [most often] personal membership of some kind and are not looking for private financial gain”\textsuperscript{78}

Out of a variety types of such organizations more common and important are the two:

associations (ideal forening) and foundations (stiftelse). The former ones are set up by individuals (or legal entities), and are planned to coordinate efforts towards a common objective. Associations are usually controlled by the members (one member with one vote), have few paid employees, and members may not make any economic gain from their membership. The latter ones are “set up through the permanent designation of a certain property to be administered autonomously for a clear specified purpose”. Foundations provide an opportunity for small groups to influence the objectives to a greater degree than it is generally possible in a large-scale popular movement.

The situation in Sweden, where more than 85% of the population aged 16-84 participate in the voluntary movement; 43% of men and 37% of women are actively involved in some kind of association, is unique. (Factsheet “A Policy for civil Society” 2010, p.2) In the Swedish political discourse the popular mass movements and NGOs are considered as the most important school of democracy, effective instruments for promoting mutual and individual interests, and an integral part of modern civil society because one of the main outcomes of a strong popular mass movement has been to unite different groups of citizens, thereby, fostering the democratic system. Due to this, the state support to such activity has been constantly growing following the beginning of second half of the 20th century (especially after 1960s). Changes in the Swedish political landscape (1991 elections brought non-socialist government to power) and the economic recession of the 1990s did not change the existing consensus but shaped such issues as the efficiency of public funds spending with NGOs support.

Sweden does not have special legislation to regulate popular movements (and NGOs activity as part of it), however, the policy in respect to NGOs was established in 2001 in form of a special item in the state budget. It was done to create the best opportunities for people to get act together and provide a favorable climate for any kind of such organizations. This policy includes:


1. General matters concerning the terms and conditions for NGOs and popular movements;

2. General matters concerning grants to NGOs and popular movements;

3. The dialogue of the Government and its executive agencies with NGOs and popular movements;

4. Statistics, research and knowledge creation about NGOs popular movements and their

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79 Lundström, 1995, p.5.
activities”. 81

At the end of 2009 the Swedish Government submitted a bill (Govt. Bill 2009/10:55) entitled “A Policy for Civil Society” to the Riksdag in which they confirmed their intention to continue “investing in measures to encourage civil society organizations” 82. The Government also emphasized that the level of NGOs (CSOs) self-funding in Sweden is higher than on the average for the EU countries, i.e. 62 % of revenues comes from membership fees, 9% from donations and around 29% from the public sector. 83

There are several government agencies that are responsible for grants’ distribution, information support and the implementation of the policy toward NGOs within different sectors: The National Board for Youth Affairs, The National Board for Health and Welfare, The Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth, etc. Around 21 national agencies provide approximately 7.2 MSEK per year only as grants to NGOs that are active inside the country. 84 In addition to them municipalities also support voluntary organizations.

Swedish main agency for international development cooperation SIDA provides funding for a large number of development and humanitarian aid organisations which are involved in international assistance. In 2005 SIDA funded Swedish & International NGOs, the UN agencies and others actors involved in humanitarian activity with slightly less than 2 000 MSEK (see Tab.3). Out of this sum around 259.1 MSEK were allocated to Swedish NGOs (UN agencies received 793 MSEK and International NGOs about 660 MSEK). This situation reflects the priorities of Swedish Government who prefer to concentrate and unite efforts with multilateral organizations for many reasons, where last but not least is the desire to reduce own responsibility for the efficiency of humanitarian aid (This suggestion is in line with the fact that Sweden, one of the world largest donor for multilateral organisations, does not even strive for high positions in their staffs). The major recourses are channelled to them directly from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition up to 50% of SIDA’s humanitarian appropriation is granted to UN agencies such as UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). About 25% is channelled via Swedish Red Cross to International Red Cross and Red Crescent Federation. 85 Local NGOs are the second main recipient of SIDA’s humanitarian appropriation.

81 ibid, p.11.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
2.2. SIDA support to Swedish Non Government Organisations

The goal for SIDA’s humanitarian assistance is outlined in the Swedish Government’s Humanitarian Aid Policy for 2010-2016: “to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity for the benefit of people in need who are, or are at risk of becoming, affected by armed conflicts, natural disasters or other disaster situations”.

According to this document SIDA’s humanitarian work shall be based on the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the three 1977 and 2005 Additional Protocols, as well as those referring to the other instruments related to International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Refugee Law, Human Rights Law, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the legal instruments with reference to natural disasters, and the established international practice in the field. SIDA is also supposed to observe the 23 principles of the GHD, which Sweden was instrumental in developing. The policy outlines three focus areas for Swedish humanitarian assistance:

- “Flexible, fast and effective humanitarian assistance to meet current and future humanitarian needs;
- A strong and coordinated international humanitarian system;
- A better interaction with development assistance and other forms of action and actors”.

Under the guidance of the wide range of the above mentioned documents and taking into account world environmental changes, SIDA developed strategies for humanitarian assistance for each 2 to 3 years. Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance 2008-2010 outlined eight sub-goals for implementation of SIDA’s humanitarian programmers:

1. Promoting the principles of good humanitarian donorship.
2. Promoting needs-based humanitarian assistance.
4. Strengthening local capacity.
5. Supporting the link between humanitarian contributions and prevention.
6. Reducing the gap between humanitarian support and recovery contributions.
7. Strengthening the humanitarian system.
8. Strengthening the humanitarian principles.

All the sub-goals are drawn from the GHD (Good Humanitarian Donorship) principles,

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87 ibid.
focuse first of all on timeliness, flexibility and predictability of funding (GHD principle 5), secondly on supporting quick response …by providing unallocated funds to suitable organizations.(12) and thirdly on encouraging and supporting a long-term perspective in partner’s programming. (13).89 This “Strategy ”became a “milestone” and, as it was mentioned in Chapter 1, its sub-goals were developed in “Strategy for humanitarian assistance provided through the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) 2011-2014”.

Cooperation with NGOs and funding them are absolutely necessary for achievement of the sub-goals and overall aim of humanitarian assistance. First of all NGOs, especially the faith-based ones, have much more experience in humanitarian activity than any of the government agencies. Other reasons include the chances:to channel resources directly to people in need via the civil society rather than through the State; to fund personnel sending organizations; to support the development of civil societies in the South and in the donor country; to receive public support for overall aid budget; to support the positive image and the interests of the donor country; to react faster and in a more flexible way in catastrophe situations; and to work in countries whose policy does not comply with the Swedish one, and the governments cannot cooperate.

The Swedish system of funding NGOs is based on the concepts of partnership between NGOs and government agencies and of linking Swedish civil society groups with the groups in developing countries. In order to offer to the NGOs a long-term perspective in planning their activities and to provide additional opportunities for collecting resources and to ensure a better control over the funding effectiveness, SIDA in 1977-1980 tested and introduced a framework agreement model. SIDA cooperates with 14 NGOs on the basis of framework agreements and they provide the overall funds for the work of some 750 Swedish and 1500 developing countries NGOs.90

Currently there are agreements with fourteen frame organizations and Red Cross (via Swedish Red Cross – SRC) which have had a framework agreement under humanitarian appropriation since 1999 when SIDA’s administrative responsibility for it was transferred from its NGO division to humanitarian one. Out of the 14 NGOs the organizations which run their own programs and activities are: Plan Sweden; The Africa Groups in Sweden (AGIS); Diakonia; Swedish Cooperative Center (SCC, or Utan Granser); Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SNF); Save the Children Fund; Church of Sweden; Training for Development Assistance Operations (UBV). The six NGOs, which are umbrella organizations and which have framework agreements with SIDA, administer and assess applications to SIDA for grants to be channeled to

89 23 Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship 2003, pp.1-3.  
more than 300 organizations: Swedish NGO Centre for Development Cooperation (Forum Syd); LO-TCO Secretariat of International Trade Union Development Cooperation; Olof Palme International Centre (OPIC); Pentecostal Mission (PMU InterLife); Swedish Organizations of Disabled Persons (SHIS); SMR.

SIDA use umbrella frame organizations to fund the other NGOs under the programme agreements. This system successfully operates with Forum Syd through which SIDA funds are distributed to many organisations which are not members of SIDA’s Framework organisations. (In 2005 Forum Syd was a platform for 211 NGOs).

To become a frame organization NGO ought to have a democratic structure, operate with democratic values and be open to public and its partners. SIDA also elaborated nine formal frame criteria that should be used in the assessment of NGOs:

1. Legitimacy
2. Competence in development issues
3. Competence in learning and method development
   3.1. Communication capacity in development cooperation
   3.2. Communication capacity in Sweden
   3.3. Ability to mobilize engagement and resources
   3.4. Extensiveness and breadth in their activity and specific competence
4. Accountability and systems for management, monitoring and control
   4.1. Experience from prior cooperation.

It needs to be pointed out that the “nine criteria system” was established in 2005 at the same time with “rule 10/90”, for original selection of NGOs and allocation of funds were mainly based on custom and tradition that had excluded new actors from grant receiving. The new criteria was supposed to give the priority to NGOs which were in position not only to provide rapid aid, but first of all to organise effective and long-term cooperation between Swedish and local NGOs. This priority reflects SIDA’s (and Sweden’s MFA) stand that humanitarian aid appears more effective when it precedes development assistance. This concept is applied to natural disasters and conflicts and is described by the notion of “development humanitarian assistance” i.e., in other words, humanitarian aid should not be seen as an additional and separate activity, but is supposed to mean, “all humanitarian assistance should have a development perspective” (SIDA, 1999). Of course, all this does not cancel the priority of PURE humanitarian needs. (The danger of the coherence of

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91 Pratt 2006, p.49.
humanitarian and development aid was described by Mark Duffield who wrote that this concept “...could obscure the focus on pure humanitarian needs as the decisive factor for implementation...”). SIDA distributes its funds according to the above mentioned concept: out of the 8 NGOs, which receive the largest humanitarian grants, 6 also have framework agreements for development efforts (Diakonia, Church of Sweden, SMR, PMU, Save the Children and SCC), and another one – Forum Syd – distributes the received funds both to development and humanitarian NGOs.

SIDA distributes funds to NGOs for humanitarian efforts in three ways: firstly, through a frame agreement with Red Cross (via Red Cross Sweden); secondly, via minor frame agreements for “minor humanitarian efforts” through some frame organizations and thirdly, as humanitarian grants to the applying NGOs for their special efforts. In 2005 Red Cross received from the SIDA humanitarian division 307 MSEK for humanitarian actions and 3,9 MSEK as information grant.95

Between 10.5 MSEK and 62.1 MSEK were transferred by SIDA to each of the eight frame NGOs in 2005-2009 for minor humanitarian efforts (Table 3). In 2009 six NGOs (PMU, Diakonia, Church of Sweden, Save the Children, Plan Sweden and Swedish Mission Council) also had special agreements with SIDA according to which they could use Rapid Response Mechanism for limited and quick response (timeliness) to rapidly onset disaster. On the average, through agreements on minor humanitarian efforts frame organizations receive around 40% of all the assets granted by SIDA to Swedish NGOs.96 To receive SIDA support for their own programmes NGOs need to collect on the average 10% of the requisite funds (in 1979 the rule was 20/80 and in 2005 it was changed to 10/90).

Humanitarian grants are available to all Swedish and international NGOs that fulfil the SIDA basic criteria for humanitarian organizations. The major share of Swedish grants is channelled through the UN organizations and the International Red Cross. SIDA insists that organizations that do not have frame agreements with it and apply for grants would have a democratic structure, the elected board, own regulations, also non-profit goals, be active in Sweden for at least 2 years; have their head office in Sweden; have an experience; have fulfilled their obligations; nor would be a political party.

SIDA cannot directly finance foreign NGOs (following 2007 there are some exceptions, though, from this rule), however, acting as a largest donor of OCHA, it provides substantial funding

94 Duffield 198, p.15.
95 Onsander 2007, p.23.
96 ibid, p.13.
for OCHA to play a coordination role at the country level.\textsuperscript{97} Besides of all, SIDA’s long – term frame agreements (3 to 5 years) enable Swedish NGOs to work through local partners and strengthen them.

There is a difference between approving procedures for humanitarian and development funds: humanitarian aid is not delegated to the field level and at the same time after bilateral development programs are approved by SIDA, all the tranches under 50 MSEK could be authorized by Ambassador or Local Program Director; also tranches of 50 to 200 MSEK don’t need the SIDA’s Board of Directors approval.\textsuperscript{98} As a result, SIDA’s humanitarian staff members are overstretched and overburdened because 12 persons in Stockholm (1.8% of the total staff) ought to manage a larger number of grants and larger funds than their colleagues in the development department (around 223 MSEK per humanitarian staff members and 23.5 MSEC per development one; and a humanitarian grant, as a rule, is smaller than a development one).\textsuperscript{99} The fact that small staffs is required to comply with and observe a growing set of international regulations, has brought to fewer timely responses to crises. In 2009-20 SIDA needed between 4 and 9 months to sign funding agreements with NGOs.\textsuperscript{100} (It also needs to be pointed out that poor countries and ones in conflict and post-conflict situations tend to consider part of developing aid as a humanitarian assistance and this part rises. It complicates the estimates of the real size of humanitarian assistance).

Humanitarian assistance has two forms: material and protection. Both were designated and established by actors working with humanitarian aid. For material aid SIDA does not buy food, water, sanitary facilities, shelter, etc. but offers funds to NGOs and others actors to do it. SIDA also funds the organization that tries to protect people physically and help them to preserve and secure dignity and respect.

The main part of Swedish humanitarian assistance is disbursed to emergency help, i.e. around 91.4 % of the total 2005 humanitarian budget (Onsander,Sara 2007) and focused on complex emergencies in conflict situations, i.e. 78% in 2005 to 2010.\textsuperscript{101} Countries that have gone through armed conflicts are a politically prioritised issue for humanitarian (and development) assistance and this is reflected in the assignment of the responsibility for humanitarian aid from NGOs Department to Conflict and Post-Conflict Department in SIDA. On the other hand, SIDA is widely criticized for the lack of attention to international effort for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{97} DARA Humanitarian Response Index. Sweden, 2008
\textsuperscript{98} OECD Report 2009, p.55.
\textsuperscript{99} “Evaluation of SIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance 2010, p.75.
\textsuperscript{100} ibid.
\textsuperscript{101} “Evaluation of SIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance 2010, p.16.
\end{footnotes}
for which SIDA spent only about 1.5% of the total humanitarian budget in 2005.\(^\text{102}\) Due to this fact Swedish humanitarian response index after 2008 was reduced from the top position to the 2-3 places (in 2011 Sweden was on the third place).\(^\text{103}\)

SIDA’s partnership with NGOs is one of the most important features of Swedish humanitarian activity: NGOs not only have roots in the civil society in the countries affected by humanitarian situation, but their activity also strengthens Swedish civil society which has an absolute priority for Swedish political system. Owing to this fact, its role is unique from both sides. Wide public support lets Swedish NGOs collect 62% of revenues from membership fees, which is above the average level in Europe (see above), and that same public support forces government agency SIDA to spend 25% of the total humanitarian budget to fund NGOs. Swedish NGOs have been the principal constituency for Swedish humanitarian aid and have had a big influence over its policy orientation.

At the same time NGOs need-based and recipient-oriented approach (which is a result of roots in local societies) often reduces the efficiency of funds spending and not promotes the coherence between different actors. Owing to this, SIDA tries to unite its activity (and funding) with international organizations and to stimulate NGOs, which are ready to share this stand. For some NGOs it means losing its independence and they prefer not to apply for the framework agreements with SIDA, but to receive access to humanitarian budget through umbrella organizations and try to diversify theirs foundering.

**Chapter 3. Swedish Humanitarian Aid to Afghanistan**

Afghanistan has been living in conflict and post-conflict situation for more than 30 years and, according UNDP Human Development index in 2011, had rank 172 (out of 187 countries) where life expectancy (at birth) was 48.7 years.\(^\text{104}\) In 2007 about 42% of the population lived below the poverty line with an average income of about USD 14 per month and another 20% of the population were slightly above this line. Up to 20% of their children die before they reach the age of 5, and more than 40% of the population are younger than 14 years old.\(^\text{105}\) (in “Revised Strategy”.

\(^{102}\) ibid, p.26.

\(^{103}\) DARA Humanitarian Response Index. Sweden 2011.

\(^{104}\) UNDP. International Human Development Indicators, Afghanistan 2013.

The country lives in the state of a humanitarian catastrophe. Swedish humanitarian aid reaches Afghanistan in different ways. Direct aid from the budget is sent from MFA and partly via MID (International development) and Swedish Civil Contingency Agency (MSB). The major part is shared between SIDA and other Government Agencies.

3.1. Direct Government Aid

In 2008 Sweden transferred about 300 MSEC as aid to Afghanistan through UN and EU agencies and pursuant to the bilateral agreements with Afghanistan Government. In 2009 it increased to 400 MSEC, in 2010 to 420 MSEC and in the course of 2011-2013 it was supposed to be SEK 500 million per year.\textsuperscript{106} (according to “Revised Strategy” the aid was supposed to increase to about SEK 560 million in 2012, SEK 600 million in 2013 and SEK 620 million in 2014 ).\textsuperscript{107}

In accordance with the “Policy for Sweden’s Humanitarian Assistance 2010-2016” effectiveness of humanitarian aid in post-conflict situations depends mainly on the donor’s cooperation and success in state-building and peace-building processes. In line with its main part Swedish aid goes through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) (Sweden transferred 3,5% of its total fund), the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) and Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) (Sweden sent 16 MSEC).\textsuperscript{108}

SIDA spends up to 25% of the long-term Swedish development cooperation in Afghanistan in four north provinces: Balkh, Jowzjan, Sar-e Pul and Smangan.\textsuperscript{109} Also the agency participates in multilateral projects with WB, UNICEF (education programs), UNIFEM (gender equality), UNDP (government democratization), UNOPS (logistic). Among the main SIDA’s partners there are USAID, EC and the development agencies from Scandinavia countries. Priority should be given to human’s rights, private sector development, education and democratisation of the government rule with special focus on gender equality, rights of women and girls and anti-corruption. All the goals are in line with Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), 2008-2013.

In order to strengthen international donor’s cooperation following London Conference in 2006 and pursuant to the European Commission’s Country Strategy paper for Afghanistan (2007-2013),\textsuperscript{110} SIDA worked out a programme for the development of the private business sector in the forenamed four north provinces with a focus on the “risk group”, i.e. young men. Following the year 2012, SIDA resolved to phase out this programme at the central level and “contribute to

\textsuperscript{106} Strategy for development cooperation with Afghanistan 2009, p.2.
\textsuperscript{109} Strategy for development cooperation with Afghanistan 2009, p.2.
private sector development and job creation measures at regional level in northern Afghanistan”.\(^{111}\)

SIDA, Folke Bernadotte Academy and Swedish Embassy have a joint programme for “a systematic strengthening of capacity… the rule of law and security sector… providing support to various actors including civil society. With the focus on independent actors working with accountability and advocacy,”\(^{112}\) the programme was developed after Afghanistan Government request, and one of its aims was to help people receive information about NGO’s role in the civil society. The programme also focused on the four provinces in northern Afghanistan.

Even in northern Afghanistan SIDA’s staff is strongly limited for security reasons. In Mazar-i-Sharif where the main part of deployment Swedish troops are located, there are three civil advisers: one from Swedish MFA, another one from Police Department, and the other one from SIDA, and until 2004 those had been Civil-military Cooperation Teams in Kabul.\(^{113}\) SIDA also provides finance support to Province Reconstruction Teams. PRTs are given a mandate to force protection, and also to undertake development and humanitarian activities. This program is usually referred to as “to win hearts and minds”. Sweden sent to PRTs military personnel (75 troops in 2005), but no civilians.\(^{114}\) The reconstruction and the peace process were the focus of Sweden state humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and for this Sweden donated in 2002-2005 about USD 50 million per year.\(^{115}\) In 2002-2004 humanitarian Swedish support amounted to USD 136 million and another USD 150 million support were transferred in 2005-2008 .\(^{116}\) Also, Sweden Air Force in 2002 offered aircraft C-130 to MSB to deliver humanitarian cargos.

Swedish programs for development and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan take into account that the political situation in the country is unstable and can be drastically changed after 2014 when international military forces will be withdrawn from Afghanistan. In “Revised strategy” SIDA suggested that only in “an improved scenario” Sweden would continue development cooperation and civilian presence in the northern provinces. In cases “less favourable” and the “worst-case” scenarios (which are now looking more realistic) development aid should be replaced by pure humanitarian efforts and be implemented through NGOs or a few of the UN agencies.

In reality such position even now makes a long-term assistance projects impossible, and Swedish official aid is focused primarily on measures to prevent gender-based violence; sexual and reproductive health and rights: women’s participation in public activity and the girl’s right to

\(^{111}\) Revised Development cooperation strategy for Afghanistan 2011, p.4.
\(^{112}\) Strategy for development cooperation with Afganistan. 2009, p.8.
\(^{113}\) United States Central Command . Sweden.
\(^{114}\) OECD Report 2005, p.50.
\(^{115}\) ibid.
\(^{116}\) United States Central Command . Sweden.
education. As it was already pointed out above, all the programs are focused primarily on the four northern provinces of Afghanistan. Swedish society widely supports any efforts to eliminate any gender inequality and its help to spend substantial funds in Afghanistan. Swedish NGOs that work in Afghanistan also carry on information activities in Sweden and a number of Swedish schools, universities, municipals, etc. express their interest in strengthening relations with Afghanistan partners. Three Swedish NGOs are active in Afghanistan on the long-term basis: Save the Children Sweden, Swedish Red Cross and Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA). Among them SCA has been active in Afghanistan for a much longer period than any other Swedish NGOs or government agencies, and its experience is unique from different points of view.

3.2. Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA)

3.2.1. History, Values, Strategy

The Committee was founded in 1980 as a humanitarian NGO after the USSR invasion in Afghanistan. The main aims of SCA were firstly to support the struggle of the Afghan people for independence and secondly to influence public opinion to the work for the withdrawal of the Soviet Union troops from Afghanistan. SCA was established as an independent from any political and religious organizations entity (however it was created for pure political goals). From the very beginning SCA, unlike other NGOs and international donors, decided that assistance should be provided to Afghans inside their country and thereby became the first foreign NGO to work inside Afghanistan.

In Sweden SCA works as a member-driven association. The Annual Meeting (which normally meets at the end of April to the middle of May) is the supreme authority to determine the framework of the activity, policy and strategy and elects its Board for a term of one year. The Board takes the overall responsibility for all kinds of SCA activities in Afghanistan and Sweden. Secretary General, appointed by the Board, takes the responsibility for the policy implementation and works through two management offices in Stockholm and Kabul. The Country Director heads field operations in Afghanistan and the chief of the Sweden desk is responsible for the information, fundraising and other activities in Sweden. Since the end of 2009 all operations in Sweden have been under the Secretary General’s direct control with assistance from the head of Stockholm office.

At the end of 1989 SCA had 18 000 members and donors (of which 4 297 were members

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117 Revised Development cooperation strategy for Afghanistan 2011, p.6.
united in 55 local committees). After the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the change of regime in Kabul in 1992 the numbers of SCA donors and members left the Committee, and the increased interest in Afghanistan can be seen starting from 1998. At the end of 2011 SCA had 4 099 members.

In 1982 SCA employed their first person at Stockholm Management Office and in 1987 three people were already employed and only in the beginning of 1990s, when SCA members realized that it should be a long-term job, the Committee obtained professional management. In 2011 17 people worked in the Stockholm Management Office, 208 in Kabul Management Office and 959 in Project & Field Offices; and the project field staff included 5 137 Afghans. First three Project & Filed offices were open in Afghanistan in 1992-1993 (earlier the coordination office was in Pakistan’s Peshawar). In 2002 Kabul Management Office was open and now SCA also has 4 Field and 5 Project Offices (Figure 1).

In 2009 offices in Kabul and Stockholm jointly prepared the Strategic Plan for 2010-2013 in which tentative SCA budgets were SEK 203 million for 2010; SEK 208 million for 2011; SEK 204 million for 2012 and SEK 209 million for 2013. (in reality the total revenues in 2010 was SEK 208.7 million and in 2011 SEK 203.4 million). More than 92% of the available funds are grants from institutional donors (mainly from SIDA, Forum Syd and basically those were also SIDA, WB, EC, Afghan Connection); more than 6% are raised funds; others come from membership fees.

The first grant from SIDA was approved in 1982 and received in 1983. Obviously, to receive it SCA in 1981 resolved to add development assistance to its humanitarian activity. In reality SCA humanitarian aid consisted of health professionals, pharmaceuticals and primary education personnel. Towards the end of the 1980s SCA initiated programmes of support to the agricultural sector. In the 1990s programs for support to Afghans with disabilities was added to SCA activities. In the core of all the SCA programmes was concept of ‘people to people’. Since 1991 SCA has had the practice to adopt five-year Strategy Programs (the last one covered a short period of 2010-2013 due to the indefinite situation after 2014).

Real changes started after 2002 when SCA programmes became highly correlated with Afghanistan National Programmes. In 2005 SCA adopted the new Swedish Country Strategy for

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120 ibid., p.33.
121 SCA Strategic Plan 2011, p.7.
Afghanistan which stated “…that humanitarian assistance should be gradually phased out and to be replaced by long-term development assistance.”\textsuperscript{125} In 2005 SCA Annual meeting adopted the Status of SCA and specified the purpose of its operations as, first of all, to support Afghanistan’s national independence, secondly, to conduct development work in Afghanistan to promote democratic, economic and social development in the country, thirdly, to conduct fundraising operations to obtain funds for SCA’s development activities. In addition it was also planned “to disseminate information about conditions in Afghanistan and about SCA development activities, and to shape public opinion and thereby promote solidarity with the people of Afghanistan”.\textsuperscript{126}

In 2009 SCA confirmed its adaptation to contemporary events in Strategic Plan 2010-2013 fixed that activities should followed two main tracks:

“Firstly, the alignment of service delivery and related capacity development to the development plans of the Afghan Government, predominantly the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and sector strategies.

Secondly, strengthening the rights-based perspective to development cooperation emphasising the rights of women, children and men and the duties of the government and the international community in realizing the universal human rights of all citizens, with regard to how these rights are formulated in Islam and Afghan traditional values.”\textsuperscript{127}

Therefor SCA Strategy seems to be designed primarily to strengthen the government institutions, but at the same time SCA showed that it still desires to implement its core values and first of all:

“– Respect for the Afghan people’s right to sovereignty based on contextual understanding and knowledge of its heritage.

– Respect for universal human rights and the perspective of poor women, children and men in all the activities.

– Neutrality and impartiality vis-à-vis people of different religions, gender, ethnic origins and political affiliations.”

– Equal access to services, including women’s right to survival, protection and development.”\textsuperscript{128}

Here even the reference to the fact that SCA activity has the target groups (rural population with the focus on children and women and people with disabilities) doesn’t means that SCA has deviated from one of the main principles of humanitarian assistance – not to have special targeting

\textsuperscript{125}Carlsson, 2008, p.5.
\textsuperscript{126}SCA Annual Report & Final Accounts 2007, p.3.
\textsuperscript{127}SCA Strategic Plan 2010-2013, 2011.p.4.
\textsuperscript{128}ibid.
social groups. It just reflects the fact that in conflict and post-conflict situations the most vulnerable groups need maximum support. Generally SCA Strategy is the recognition that experience and scale of SCA activity are in demand not only at the semi-national sector levels mainly characterised by service delivery, but also at the national level through alignment with long-term government development plans.

3.2.2 Swedish Committee for Afghanistan work in Afghanistan

SCA activity in Afghanistan is largely focused on four areas: education; health; rehabilitation of people with disabilities; rural development.

In the course of 2009-2011 SCA set itself a task to implement three new features in all areas, moving from (A) a humanitarian to a development approach, (B) needs-based to rights-based programming, (C) activity-based to results-based management. For implementation of the new approaches SCA in 2010 established a new department, Policy and Quality Assurance (PQA) comprising the three crosscutting units (Human Rights and Gender, Civil Society, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation).

As it was pointed out above, the first process does not mean the refuse from “people to people” organization of work but rather the unification it with stronger efforts of capacity building and advocacy. A right-based approach in SCA interpretation means non-discrimination, equity, participation, transparency and accountability. Beneficiaries are viewed as active agents of their own improvement and change. Result-based management approach means that program results are considerate in terms of the outcomes, which has been a common demand for any development (and humanitarian) aid in the last 10-15 years.

Education. SCA described its objective for education programme as “Build the capacity of local actors supporting access to quality formal education opportunities for underserved rural population”.

SCA activities in this sector are in line with National Education Strategic Plan developed by Afghan Ministry of Education with expert input from SCA and other actors for the period of 2006-2010 and thereafter extended until 2014. The plan has priorities in several areas: general education; teacher’s training and working conditions; educational infrastructure; education in Islam; development of curricula and textbooks; administrative reforms; expansion of schools with limited grades to encompass grades 1-12; access to higher education.

Overall goals of SCA Education Programme (adopted in 2006 for the period of 2007-2012) are: (A) an increased access to quality education; (B) quality improvement and quality assurance of

130 National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan 2010, pp.120.
efforts: (C) a capacitated national education system. Special attention is given to expand an access to education for people from remote villages with focus on girls.

SCA’s support of General Education includes Model Schools, Community Based Education (CBE), and Girl’s Annex to provide quality education in grades 1-12. Model Schools have been run by SCA since 2006. These schools have better equipment, computers and laboratories and practise modern pedagogy. According to the Protocol between SCA and MoE the transfer of a teacher from SCA-supported Model Schools to another one is possible only after consultation between Moe and SCA (however, it is often ignored by MoE). SCA Model Schools are resource centres for schools in the vicinity: in 2010 3 335 teachers and students from neighbouring schools had visited them. The bigger part of SCA Model Schools participated in Twin School projects together with schools from the UK and Sweden. The Project was created to promote cross-culture understanding among children. The Twin Schools programme is also an important source of foundering activity in Sweden and UK for Afghan education system. Each Model School has a close relation with the local community through Community Education Committee, and SCA tries to involve parents to receive their support, material as well.

In 2011 SCA supported 54 model schools – 20 for boys, 21 for girls, 11 mixed and 2 shared (female and male students are in the same building, but in separate shifts), to which 60 481 students belonged (and of which 42% were female). After graduating in these schools 39% of the girls and 77% of boys successively pass tests to universities, the figure being higher, than on the average in the country, i.e. 30%. Community based Education (CBE) is an effective form (first of all cost-effective) for the youngest children schooling in remote areas and usually has grades 1-3. SCA started its activity in 2006 (it was then called Community Based School) and in 2011 supported 1 537 CBE classes (236 for boys, 480 for girls and 821 mixed ones) with 44 073 students. SCA overall aim in this area is to increase access to education in rural region, especially for girls and nomads. For Kuchi children 169 CBC (236 for boys, 480 for girls, 821-mixed) were organised in 2011. Girls’ Annexes are organised in schools for boys in places where mixed classes are not acceptable and girls’ schools are located far away. In 2011 SCA handed over 71 Girls’ Annexes for 16 071 students.

In 2011 in 1 831 SCA-supported schools had studied 125 781 Afghans (54% of which were female), as compared to 93 533(48% - female) in 2007, but at the same time the number of

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133 ibid, pp.13-14.
teachers increased only by 900 – from 3,031 in 2007 to 3,915 in 2011 (of which female were about 25% in all that period). Most of the females are working only in city-located schools (It would be reasonable to point out that before the Soviet Union invasion in 1978 at all the levels of the education system there had been enrolled about 1.2 million students, of which 18% were girls; in 1990 –after the Soviet Union withdrawal - in 2,633 schools (of which more than 560 were supported by SCA) there studied 628,893 children (34% girls); and under Taliban regime in 1990 girls’ enrolment ratio fell to 6.4%.

These facts reflect the SCA’s main problems in the education area: the lack of finance to make the teachers’ salary attractive and a slow rise in the number of female teachers despite the fact that SCA has an extensive teacher training programme. Due to these problems SCA Education Programme is developing slower than planned. It is mainly located in the east, northeast and southeast provinces: Laghman, Ghazni, Baghlan, Badakshan, Bamyan, Nangahar, Nuristan, Kunr, Kunduz, Takhar, Wardak and Paktika (Figure 1). In the four northern provinces Jowzjan, Balkh, Sar-e-Pul and Samangan SCA Education Programme started in 2009 after a special agreement with SIDA.

Health. Overall aims of SCA Health Programme are to improve the health system, to reduce mortality rate in general and maternal and infant mortality, in particular. To achieve these objectives SCA, first of all, is trying to improve access to quality healthcare for rural population.

SCA activity started from sending the volunteers with first-aid kits and basic medicine knowledge. In December 1982 SIDA offered funds to established medical clinics and by the end of 1983 SCA was already supporting 10 such clinics in 6 provinces. Doctors were Afghans recruited outside of the country and SCA not only supported staffs but also equipped the clinics with all requisite supplies. In 1997 SCA supported 201 such clinics (mainly for emergency aid) in 18 province, but after the situation improved in 2001 they reduced the number of clinics to 167 which treated more than 1.3 million and provided basic health care education to over 1.5 million Afghans per year. In additional to it SCA supported 54 Mother and Child Healthcare (MCH) clinics in 18 provinces.

In 2003 the National Health Policy (NHP) was launched in Afghanistan placing a major focus on the access to Basic Package of Health Service (BPHS) for the entire population. BPHS was supposed to be implemented by NGOs on the contractual basis. SCA has awarded BPHS contracts in three provinces: Kunduz, since 2003 (funded by the EC); Wardak (2004, funded by

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WB); Nuristan (2005, funded by the EC). In the middle of 2006 WB awarded BPHS contract in eastern part of Pakika to SCA. After the tender was held in 2007, Nuristan and Kunduz BPHS projects were awarded to the US and UK NGOs.

BPHS was revised in 2009 and priorities were directed to disability and physical rehabilitation, primary eye care, prisoner health and integration of mobile health teams and small rural hospitals into BPHS. At the same time Health and Nutrition Sector Strategy (HNSS) for 2009 to 2013 was approved as part of ANDS. Its objective was to improve the health and nutritional status of Afghans with focus on children and women and on underserved areas.

Implementation of these programmes is in the key objective of SCA Health Programme. In 2011 SCA organised health facilities in Wardak, Samangan, Sar-e Pul and Laghman, where it runs 958 Health Posts (minimum one male and one female health workers), 52 sub-centres to health facilities, 66 basic Health Clinics, 27 Comprehensive Health Clinics (24-hour service), 7 district Hospitals, 3 Mobile Health Teams, and 2 Prison Health Facilities. In Paktika SCA handed over a BPHS project to International Medical Corps in 2009 because the project was to be funded by USAID, and the SCA Strategy states that its activity cannot be founded by the USA.

In Laghman province (with the population of 39,700) with its relatively developed health care infrastructure the priority was given to the organization of Mobile Health Teams for nomads. Samangan (with the population of 328,000) has harsh winters in mountain regions and the supply of medicine and heating equipment was one of its main problems. In Samangan and Sar-e Pul (with the population of 517 000) SCA introduced a system of Result Base Financing 2010 as a pilot project, which made healthy workers income directly dependable on the amount and quality of their service. The Project was founded by Norway. In Sar-e Pul SCA also run a project “Ibn Sina 12” the goal of which was to improve food supply and to deliver blankets to pregnant and breast-feeding women, and children under the age of 5. Finance was provided by WFP.

SIDA financed SCA Health Project outside BPHS: in Ghazni, Khost, Zeruk and Paktika. the Project included 23 health facilities 4 comprehensive Health Centres and 19 Basic Health Centres), 34 Health Posts and 10 Basic Health Centres for Mother and Child Health services in areas which were not covered by BPHS strategy. Besides Mother and Child Health Care (MCHC) SCA runs midwife schools in 3 provinces, supporting Afghan Midwives Association’s programme Learning for Healthy Life (LHL) and HIV/AIDS programme.

In 2011 more than 2.4 million of Afghans received healthcare in SCA-supported health facilities; 1,350 women received education on health, hygiene, family planning together with

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139 SCA Health Project outside BPHS pp.2-5.
literacy courses; over 60 students were trained in midwife schools. SCA is involved in formulation of health policies and represents the NGO health community in a number of coordination and technical bodies. SCA activity strengthens local health authorities and helps the country to reduce infant mortality from 16% in 2003 to 8% in 2011: at the same time mortality among children over the age of five has fallen from 26% to 10%\textsuperscript{140}. In 2002 only 9% of Afghans could reach a health centre within an hour, in 2009 this amount rose to 85\%.\textsuperscript{141}

One of the main problems is the lack of female health workers and a slow increase in the number of students in midwife schools (before 2011 SCA about 200 midwives had graduated from three schools) and LHL classes. Probably the greatest challenge in health programme is the lack of qualified female staff (primarily due to low salary and security situation).

Rehabilitation of people with disabilities. According to the official estimates, nearly 3% of Afghans are disabled but the real-life situation may be worse and up to 5% of the population could be disabled.\textsuperscript{142} SCA has been working with and for these people since 1991. The overall goal for SCA programme “is full inclusion in society for persons with disabilities, including their rights to community participation and development, as well as improved access to general service.”\textsuperscript{143} Initially the programme started as sub-component of UNDP’s “National Programme for Action on Disabilities” and SCA took over the ultimate responsibility for UNDP in 2004 and “Programme” was soon re-named as “Rehabilitation of Afghans with disability” (RAD). Now SCA’s RAD programme and the programme for Disabled Persons of ICRC are the largest ones in Afghanistan.

SCA runs the RAD programme in 13 provinces: Bulkh, Samangan, Jowzan, Badakshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Baghlan, Ghazni, Wardack, Logar Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar (in the three latter ones SCA used to work with the UK NGO Sandy Gall’s Afghanistan Appeal). The programme is financed by SIDA, Forum Syd, Forum Syd, Radiohjalp. Sandy Gall’s financed the programme in 3 provinces where they had previously run it themselves.

To achieve its aims RAD has worked with Community Based Rehabilitation (CBR) approach at thee levels: individual, community and national. Individual and community levels are in the core of SCA/RAD. The leading role is given to Community Based Rehabilitation Committees (CBRCs) the number of which exceeded 100 in 2008. In the same year SCA/RAD supported 4 orthopaedic workshops, 36 physiotherapy out-patient clinics, 49 Community Rehabilitation and development Centres (basically for clients with seeing, hearing and learning problems) and about 85

\textsuperscript{142} Carlsson, 2008, p.28.
\textsuperscript{143} SCA Strategic Plan 2010-2013, p.59.
Disabled Person Organizations.\textsuperscript{144}

In 2009 SCA/RAD provided information, advocacy and serviced up to 264,000 persons with disabilities, their families and local communities. Home-based treatment was organised by 143 CBR workers (66 women) and 770 communities volunteers (including 240 newly trained ones).\textsuperscript{145} In 2010 2,036 persons with disabilities received home-based training, 3,346 received special education and physiotherapy, 5,136 received orthopaedic devices.\textsuperscript{146} SCA/RAD also has micro finance programmes under which beneficiaries are given a 3-month grace period before starting to repay (the repayment period lasts 1-2 years).

Special attention is given to school-age children with disabilities. According to some estimates, in 2007 there were around 196,000 such children, 75\% of which had not accessed school.\textsuperscript{147} In 2009 SCA/RAD started a new programme with SCA /Education. The staff in two Model School, two RAD centres, and community members were trained in the Inclusive Learning Friendly Environmental Toolkit produced by UNESCO in local languages. In 2011 Special & Inclusive Education became an important part of SCA/RAD which had an overall objective to let the children with disabilities go to school in their own community.

SCA/RAD experience helped to prepare the National Law on Rights and Benefits of Disabled Persons (enforced in 2010), but interaction between three Ministries responsible for it implementation (The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled; the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Education), leaves much to be desired. This is one of main reasons why SCA/RAD activity at the national level is not so successful, as at the individual and community levels.

Rural Development. SCA overall objective is to increase “capacity acquired among local communities and increasingly take ownership of the process of sustainable development”.\textsuperscript{148} To achieve this objective SCA works in three strategic directions: firstly to improve health and hygiene status of rural communities; secondly, to support the strengthen of sustainable livelihoods through socio-economic development; thirdly, to assist the strengthen of rural civil society by means of community mobilisation.

SCA activity is in coherence with National Solidarity Programme (NSP) which was launched in 2003, and it supports rural population to organise and mobilise themselves for participation in priority development projects. NSP is led by Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and

\textsuperscript{144} Carlsson 2008, p.29.
\textsuperscript{145} SCA Annual Report&Final Accounts 2009, p.36.
\textsuperscript{146} SCA Annual Report and Final Accounts 2010, p.43.
\textsuperscript{147} SCA Annual Report &Final Accounts 2007, p.31.
\textsuperscript{148} SCA Strategic Plan 2010-2013, p.70.
Development (MRRD). SCA/NSP also cooperated with local NGO Coordination for Afghan Relief (CoAR) and the organization Afghan Carpet Exports Guild. SCA/NSP is funded mainly by WB, SIDA, Forum Syd, UNICEF, Water for All, and Afghan Connection. Since 2009 the SCA/NSP has focused on support to the established Community Development Councils (CDCs) consisting of village people who take the main responsibility for the local development. From 2003 to 2008 SCA/NSP supported 1,003 projects with 260 CDCs, while only in 2009 SCA/NSP these amounts constituted 504 and 268, respectively.\textsuperscript{149} After receiving support from SCA/NCP, CDCs are falling under administrative coverage of MRDD. In 2010 SCA/NSP completed the training of 1,790 members of CDCs (of whom 755 were female) and MRDD handed over 439 CDC.\textsuperscript{150} In 2011 SCA/NCP engineering teams constructed 59 water points equipped with hand pumps, 7 demonstration latrines, 110 household latrines, 4 new schools, 2 delivery rooms, 8 health clinics: in additional 12 schools and 1 hospital were repaired.\textsuperscript{151}

In Afghanistan access to the water and hygiene education are among the main priorities of SCA Rural Development Programme. In 1989 to 2001 SCA Rural Engineering Unit constructed 9,000 wells.\textsuperscript{152} Following 2003 SCA coordinates its activity with MRRD through Water and Sanitarian Group. In 2009 SCA/NSP constructed 95 and deepened 35 dried out wells and provided basic hygiene training for 2,500 men, 2,800 women and 700 children.\textsuperscript{153}

Due to the high quality of its construction work SCA/NSP has been exempted from the law, forbidding NGOs to do construction. SCA Rural Engineering Unit not only constructed wells, schools and hospitals, but also roads and irrigation systems in Laghman and Nangahar province. Due to the lack of financing roads construction and irrigation works were stopped, but others projects continued. In the beginning of 2013 SCA/NSP completed construction of a building of Comprehensive Health Clinic in a remote mountains village in Laghman and handed it over to Province Health Authorities. Project was initiated in 2010 and was awarded to another contractor but the company left it uncompleted because it was difficult to carry out the construction work. To transport construction materials SCA/NSP Engineering unit used the help of local people (in fact, they used donkeys to transport materials).

This is a good illustration to one of main principle of SCA/NSP: local people ought to participate in construction works and their contribution (labour force or materials) should be around of 15-20% of the total value. It is being done mainly to create a sense of ownership among the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[150]SCA Annual Report and Final Accounts 2010, p.53 .
\item[152]SCA Newsletter Vol.7, No.3.10,pp.1-3 .
\item[153]SCA Annual Report & Final Accounts 2009, p.44.
\end{footnotes}
village citizens. Plenty of actors in Afghanistan prefer not to involve the Afghans in their humanitarian and development projects and just hand things over to local people as gifts (or often use SCA’s training the Afghans just as interpreters for a bigger salary). It is a serious challenge to SCA, and in 2010 SCA/NSP stopped the joint programme with CoAC for seed supply. Wheat and rice seed were sold at low prices to more than 15 400 farmers in 11 provinces but some actors (and in the first place military PRTs) distributed seed for free. Yet, at the same time the citizens of Jai Ghani in Wardak province contributed 53% of total expenses which were needed by SCA/NSP to construct a hydro power station to bring electricity in their houses.

In 2011 the cost of SCA/NSP was around 11.4 MSEK; SCA\RAD 33,1 MSEK, SCA Health Programme 68,3 MSEC; SCA Education Programme 54,4 MSEK activity SCA in Sweden 7,6 MSEK. With addition of SCA activities outside main areas, the total cost of its projects increased to 187.7 MSEK; administration and fundraising costs in 2001 reached 4.5% of the total revenues.\textsuperscript{154}

\textbf{3.3 Approaches, Results and Plans}

Afghanistan is one of the main receivers of Swedish international aid, yet, Sweden is not involved into the group of Afghanistan main donors: in the course of 2001-2008 direct international aid to Afghanistan comprised more than USD 15 billion and in 2009-2013 this sum should increase to USD 45-50 billion.\textsuperscript{155} Out of this sum the overall Swedish aid will make about SEK 600 million per year.\textsuperscript{156} In the same way Swedish aid is appreciated by Afghanistan Government owing to its high correlation with National Programmes, readiness to take into consideration the Afghans offers and flexibility in the process of programmes implementation.

SIDA’s aid to Afghanistan is highly coherent with international efforts in accordance with “Afghanistan Compact” and, as it was pointed out above, it has focus on the strengthening of government institutes, state-building and peace-building processes. The main channels for assistance are government funds and international NGOs. Without any doubt, this allows to concentrate considerable resources and effort. The problem is that in reality Kabul Government is still weak and in order to stay in power it needs to spend more and more funds as a payment to warlords for current and especially for future security. Ahmed Rashid, one of the foremost experts on Afghanistan, said to Spiegel that “USAID, or Germany’s International Technical Cooperation Agency…are simply not capable of promoting the indigenous economy… They provide temporary

\textsuperscript{154} SCA Annual Report&Final Accounts 2011, p.40.  
\textsuperscript{156} Norad Report, 2009, pp.12,29.
assistance, no more than that. Many billions of dollars flooded into Afghanistan, but without any significant effect. "Temporary assistance", provided by military PRTs, is not in line with Swedish principals, according to which all the development and humanitarian assistance should be run by civilian organizations (military force could be used only for protection and logistic). Due to this, SIDA participated only in funding of PRTs, but not in their activity.

There is no consensus in Sweden about military presence in Afghanistan, where Swedish soldiers are under the NATO command, especially taking into consideration the fact that today there are no Swedish troops in the UN 18 peace-keeping operations. In order to keep at a distance from military PRTs SIDA in mid-2008 initiated Northern Development Project (NDP) with the aim to develop the capacity of district authorities, to increase access to education and to support persons with disabilities in three northern provinces. The project was run by SCA and was completed in the beginning of 2011. One of the main SIDA’s demands to SCA was to run this project on the multi-sector programming basis (Health and Education, Education and RAD) to achieve the synergetic effect.

Multi-sector programming, better programme coordination, result-based management, documentation and replication of best practices, mainstreaming gender and right-based approach have been in the core of SCA evolution the last 10 years. These changes were widely supported, recommended and partly forced by SIDA and had the aim to unite SCA activity with SIDA and other donors’ efforts to strengthen the state-building process in Afghanistan. SIDA regularly, criticises SCA for not enough efforts on national level but it seams like this critique is mainly directed by MFA. There are some arguments in favour of this suggestion: first of all it is exactly MFA responsibility to coherence the Swedish aid with its international obligations; secondary – SIDA prefers to protect the independence of its humanitarian aid when some tension arises between the GHD and others sets of principles and at the last – SCA is the SIDA’s largest recipients in Afghanistan (at least it was in 2001-2004): it received 17.9% of Swedish disbursements in Afghanistan (other four main EU donors –Denmark, Ireland, Netherland and UK – transferred the largest grants to UNCHR, ARTF and UNDP).

More important that SCA, SIDA and (at least partly) MFA have rather close position on the military presence in the region. SCA with some others NGOs signed a letter in the spring of 2004 with demand to expend MATO role in the country (mainly in western regions) but Committee never


participated in any joint action with military forces. During last few years SCA supported ISAF withdrawn and is ready to continue its activity after it. Swedish troops in Afghanistan supported deliverance of humanitarian cargoes and took an active role in the PRT activity in the north provinces but it was no SIDA’s or other Swedish civilian personal in Swedish lead PRT. According to SIDA Strategy and SCA principles military forces may be used for humanitarian assistance only if civilian runs such operations. If it is impossible (as in Afghanistan) all military aid is pure military business. It seems that no SIDA no SCA has a desire ‘To share responsibility’ in any humanitarian intervention.

However, the SCA evolution doesn’t mean that SCA refused from its own vision of the aims, methods and perspectives of its work in the country. The SCA activity focuses on the development of the capacities of rural community members and community organization. Much more attention is given to support local District Authorities than National Ministries. Torbjorn Pettersson, the SCA Secretary General of the time, wrote in 2009 that agreement “with SIDA to more or less abandon service delivery and replace it by capacity building or at least that capacity building should become the main activity...has not been the intention of SCA”. Instead of it SCA just extended its activity from sub-national to national level.

Its looks quite natural because a lot of Kabul Authorities have had a long-term connection with SCA (among them H.E. Faroog Wardak, Minister of Education, who used to work as a Deputy Director and Director of SCA Health Department in 1986-1996). And at the same time SCA “have to deal with the Taliban on almost daily basis... so three hundred schools the SCA has managed... in the area under Taliban control... can be kept open for boys and girls”. SCA connections with the government and opposition (not only Taliban movement) are unique and can be used to establish a more peaceful environment before of withdrawal of ISAF.

Probably, this was taken into consideration when SCA Secretary General Mr. Torbjorn Petterson was appointed new Swedish Ambassador to Afghanistan in May 2010. And without doubt, this appointment is the recognition of the SCA role: SCA works in 17 out of 34 Afghans provinces and its share in the implementation of all Education & Health programmes in Afghanistan is around 10%.

SCA status forbids receiving funds from the USA government agencies and this creates some financial problems because USAID is the biggest donor for Afghanistan development programmes. Disagreements with SIDA are mainly connected with inadequate forces, which are

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161 Official biography of H.E. Farooq Wardak, Minister of Education.
162 Ahmed Rashid interview to Spiegel on December 31, 2012.
given by SCA to strengthen the state-building process, and SIDA wishes to see more attention to the gender problem in SCA’s programmes.

In its turn SCA mentioned that “the international community has not be able to come up with a coherent and needs-based strategy aimed at comprehensive efforts for state building and development”.163 About 80% of Afghans are receiving income from agriculture and only 5% of USAID budget has been spent in this sector. Huge resources inefficiently spent by PRTs and other military units: only “Commander’s Fund “is estimated at 1.2 billion USD, i.e. more than the combined budget of Afghans Health and Education Ministries.164 A safe birth for one Afghan woman costs 35 SEK, the cost for a child at a primary school is 350 SEK per year; the cost of one Swedish soldier in Afghanistan reaches 1,000,000 SEK per year.165

The main challenge for Afghanistan and its developing and humanitarian donors is unpredictable security situation after the ISAF withdrawal in 2014. SIDA, like others donors, prepares to stop its activity if the worst scenario is realised. For SCA situation is different:

“The conclusion many Afghans have dawn is that the world has once again let them down… Perhaps the world will do it again.

For SCA this means that work must go on and even be intensified. In Afghanistan SCA is not seen as part of the problems caused by the international intervention, but rather as part of the solution. In rural villages, schools and clinics are welcomed” - Ann Wilkens, the President of SCA, 2010.166

Chapter 4. Swedish Humanitarian Aid to Palestine

The Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) - the West Bank and Gaza Strip plus eastern Jerusalem – have a population around 5 million Palestinians. In 2012 2.6 million lived in the West Bank (territory 5 860 square kilometres) and 1.7 million of Palestinians in Gaza Strip (land – 360 square kilometres), more than half of total population is younger than 15 years and unemployment in this group is about 50%.167 Economic and humanitarian situation in OPT has collapsed: in Gaza 80% of population are dependent of humanitarian aid about 56% of population live below the poverty line, participation of women in working life is one of the lowest in the world.168 And every

164 ibid.
166 SCA Annual Report and Final Accounts 2010, p.5.
168 Strategy for development cooperation with the West Bank and Gaza, 2008, p.16.
year situation become worse and worse.

The OPT are divided not only geographically: the Palestine administration – often referred to as Palestinian Authority (PA) - exist in the West Bank. The majority in PA belongs to the members of Fatah – the largest Palestinian party consists and Gaza Strip from the beginning 2006 is under control of Hamas. Both political parties several times tried to unify in one government, but the last election on October 2012 was held only in minority of West Bank’s municipalities and Hamas had refused to recognise its legitimacy. Situation is more complicated (and, by the way, unique) : Hamas – the legal winner of local election is under EU sanctions against terrorism (No. 10 on the list in the Council Regulation in Council Decision 2006/379/EC). Due to this fact any international development assistance with Hamas should be restricted.

4.1. Swedish International Development Agency Assistance to the Occupied Palestinian Territories

According to Swedish official position “Only an end to the occupation can lead to lasting improvements of benefit for whole region”. Overall aim of all efforts is a two-state solution, based on pre-1967 borders according UN Security Council resolutions:

- 242 (1967) – “withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied”
- 338 (1973) – “negotiation start between the parties”
- 1397 (2002) – “two States, Israel and Palestine live…within secure and recognised borders.”

Sweden considers currently situation as a serious threat because “ the conflict in the Middle East between Palestinians and Israelis serves as a strong alibi for radicalisation and recruitment of terrorists.” Sweden condemns all forms of terrorism in the region, calls upon the Palestinians to step up the inter-Palestinian reconciliation efforts, to reduce the corruption and, in according with Fourth Geneva Convention, requires the Israel to protect the Palestinian civil population as long as the occupation lasts.

Besides usual aims Swedish development and humanitarian assistance to OPT has the specific objectives: to promote peacebuilding, the peace process; secondly, democratic Palestinian state building. Special consideration has been given to UN General Assembly Resolution 1325 (participation of women in political, development and economic) and 1612 (on children in armed

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169 Strategy for development cooperation with the West Bank and Gaza. 2007, p.2.
170 Strategy for development cooperation with the West Bank and Gaza. 2005, p.2.
171 ibid., p.12.
conflict).

The main priorities of Swedish aid are: human rights, democracy, promotion of gender equality and of the role of women in peace process and social-economic development, environment and climate, especially the fair and sustainable use of water resources. Humanitarian assistance must be strictly needs-based for protection civilians and alleviation human suffering. In the focus of these activities are strengthen the donor’s cooperation and requirement to both sides of conflict to respect of humanitarian law.

Due to unpredictable situation in the region SIDA’s “Strategies” sometime covers very short period (March-December 2005; January 2007-June 2008), the latest one was more longer – July 2008 – December 201. In January 2013 SIDA started to work on draft of “The Strategy” for a nearest period. The same obstacles (unpredictability and absence of security) make difficulties for the implementation of long-time projects, and Sweden (and others donors) aid provision has been fragmented. In such situation Swedish support should seek to:

Concentration – focused on major projects, which should be carefully weighted
Flexibility - be ready for redistribution of the resources between areas of cooperation, development and humanitarian assistance
Synergies - cooperation is to be designed to create synergies between humanitarian and development assistance; projects within different areas and strength the donor’s cooperation.

It means that SIDA is ready for situation when due to conflict’s intensification it will be need full or partly stop the implementation of any project. The increased militarisation of the conflict has aggravated the situation with development cooperation and drastically aroused the need for short-term humanitarian efforts and should the situation develop in favourable direction, attention should be focused on long-term development assistance.

SIDA has been providing substantial aid to OPT: during 2005-2007 Swedish aid consisted SEK 550-630 million. Its distribution is shown in the Table 4 and Table 5. These figures pointed at the fact that the implementation of long-term developing projects was actually stopped after 2006 (financing of education and health programmers, which aroused on 278% in 2006 compare to 2005 in 2007 was cutting down by three times). In the same time humanitarian aid aroused on more than 70% and financing of human rights, democracy and state-building activity increased by more than twice. The similar situation was in 2000-2003: financing of energetics’ infrastructure projects was reduced from SEK 135 million till less than SEK 1.5 million and humanitarian expenses by more than five times (Table 5.). And during all period the biggest item of Swedish aid was support of refugees through UNRWA – SEK 20-242 million per year.

In 2008-2011 Sweden had planned to spend more than SEK 800 million per year (SEK
215 million in 2008, 225 in 2009, 235 in 2010 and 240 in 2011). Annual sums were established only preliminary and may be revised especially for humanitarian aims (in the period 2005 Sweden originally estimated expected volume of aid as SEK170 million per year but in reality it was close to SEK 650 million). According to some estimation only in 2008 Swedish aid to OPT was more than SEK 455 million.\textsuperscript{173} Even without support of UNRWA the volume of Swedish humanitarian assistance after 2002 consisted from 30% till 85% from total Swedish aid to OPT and with the funds for UNRVA Swedish humanitarian aid was more than twice bigger than the development one. OPT is the one of the highest recipient of Swedish humanitarian aid – in 2008 it received more then 70% of total Swedish humanitarian funds aid for the Middle East and North Africa.\textsuperscript{174}

Sweden is one of main OPT’s donors: the biggest ones are EC and USA followed by UK, Sweden and France and volume of Swedish aid does not depend of temporary results of peace-building process in the region (unlike UK assistance). From 1994 till 2008 Sweden financed 267 projects in OPT for which offered more than USD 463 million.\textsuperscript{175} The most part of these projects (97) supported human rights and democratisation of the society, 10 projects had pure humanitarian goals. Among them were programmes for organization of emergency aid, support SRC and Swedish Lutheran Church’s programmes, information and juridical support of local NGO, organization the dialog between Palestinians and Israelis, refugees support and finance of the programme “From woman to woman” (physiotherapy and social aid).

Swedish aid is received to OPT via budget of OPT (the largest part of aid); through International Funds (first of all through WB, UN and EU agencies) and NGOs. Each way has its own particulars and problems. Palestine Authorities are widely criticised for the high level of corruption (according to Transparency International from 2003 till 2005 Palestine Corruption Perceptions Index had moved from 82 to 107 place).\textsuperscript{176} Weak control for donor’s humanitarian aid is one of the biggest problems.

As long as Hamas (and others EU terrorist-listed group) controls certain ministries, Gaza Strip and some municipalities and any international assistance ought to be carried with more stronger care and control. Due to this reason Swedish NGOs carry out theirs humanitarian activity (especially in Gaza Strip and refugees camps) through International Agencies and local NGOs. But without cooperation with official authorities effectiveness of international assistance significantly reduces and Swedish official position consists of following: support channelled via the Palestinian President’s office and ministries and institutions and others part of Palestinian Authorities, which

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\textsuperscript{173} Strategy for development cooperation with the West Bank and Gaza. 2007, pp.11, 22.

\textsuperscript{174} NGO Monitor Report A clouded EU Presidency: Swedish funding for NGO rejectionism 2009. 1.1.


are not under control by terrorist listed organization, is not restricted by EU legislation. Such position lets Sweden if not to escape the critics but at least reduces it considerably.

As a rule all humanitarian projects are implemented by NGOs (Swedish, Palestinian Israelis and International). Sweden funds them through: grants channelled via Swedish framework NGOs; through direct financing of NGO in “partner countries”; and via international NGO Development Centre (NDC) with partnership with Denmark, Switzerland and Netherlands. Among SIDA framework organization Diakonia, the Swedish Mission Council (SMR), the Olof Palme International Centre (OPh) and Save the Children Sweden are carry on projects in OPT. SIDA also directly funds International Federation o Human Rights (FIDH), Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI) and Palestinian Medical Relief Society (PMRS).

Diakonia is the most experienced and sophisticated Swedish NGO in this region.

4.2. Swedish Non Government Organisations in Palestine

4.2.1. Diakonia Values and Principals

Diakonia (in Greek it means “care and service”) is the largest Swedish faith-based NGO. It was founded in 1966 as the joint development organization of the Swedish Alliance Mission, the Evangelical Free Church of Sweden, the Baptist Union of Sweden, the United Methodist Church in Sweden and the Mission Covenant Church of Sweden. The last three of its decided to merge in 2011 to form one united church – Joint Future (Gemensam Framtid) and the Evangelical Free Church of Sweden ended its role as one of parent organization for Diakonia. In 2012 according to the new status Diakonia has two parent organization - the Swedish Alliance Mission and the Joint Future Church with equal voting power. In 2011 Diakonia became of a member of a global alliance of Christian aid organizations - the Action by Churches Together Alliance.

From the middle of 2011 Diakonia Head Office is situated in Stockholm (moved from Sundbyberg) and NGO’s four Regional Offices have location in Nairobi, Bogota, Chiang Mai and Jerusalem and Country offices in about 30 countries.

In 2011 total Diakonia’s revenue was close to SEK 400 million (to be precisely 399.784), from which around SEK 370 million were received as external subsidies and around SEK 29 million were the raised funds. From total external subsidies SEK 329 million were SIDA’s grunts, SEK 31 million were received from EU, SEK 9 million were given by Foreign Embassies and the Norwegian Association of Disabled transferred SEK 5.5 million. One of the long-term aim of Diakonia is to decrease its dependency on Swedish government funding down to 75% (it was

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178 Diakonia Annual Report 2011, p.36.
88% in 2008 and 80% in 2011; in the same period total programme budget has increased by 8% - from SEK 367 million in 2008 till SEK 399 million in 2011. More than 93% of total budget Diakonia spends for its project’s activity and in 2011 13% from this amount - for activity in OPT.

As a Christian development organization Diakonia describes its mission as “to seek Gods will and, based on our Christian values, to work for human liberation and restoration, and for the creation or reestablishment of fair and just social and economic structures” and has the aim “to change unfair political, economic, social and cultural structures that generate poverty, oppression and violence”; the aim of NGO is “to change unfair political, economical, social and cultural structures that generate poverty, oppression and violence”. Guided values for organization are freedom, solidarity, responsibility, righteousness, hope and peace. According to its STATUTES Diakonia is “non-profit organization which performs international aid and development work on a Christian basis”. In Monitor documents its usually referred as the largest Swedish humanitarian NGO; Sthlm Policy Group wrote that “.. Diakonia is neither a humanitarian actor, nor a specialized legal organization.”

Cooperation with local partners – grass roots organizations, social movements – has been a fundamental principle of Diakonia, which is added by coordination with faith based and secular international NGOs and membership in global networks. In 2009 Diakonia worked in 34 countries in partnership with 433 churches, NGOs and popular movements. In 2011 the total amount of partners organization decreased till slightly more than 350, but in the same year Diakonia in Palestine had 34 partner organizations compare to 21 partners in 2009 (in Israel Diakonia had 4 partners in 2009 and 2 – in 2011).

4.2.2 Diakonia in Palestine

Work in Palestine is in the focus of Diakonia activity and it is reflected in the fact that only for this region (and DRC) Diakonia has issued special statement: “Diakonia position paper on Israel/Palestine”.

In the “Position” Diakonia confirmed that its starting points are to uphold the rights of individuals and not to take side with any of the parties; to reject the violence; to recognise Israel and Palestine boards along 1949 armistice line, confirmed its vision the status of Jerusalem as an open

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180 Diakonia Strategic Plan 2012, p.7.
185 Diakonia position paper on Israel/Palestine 2006, pp.12.
city for two people and three religions. In section 4.5.1 (“Not violence and right to resist”) Diakonia “recognizes the right to resist by non-violent means” and draws attention on the fact that “International Humanitarian Law relates to resistance movements as a fact that needs to be taken into account in an armed conflict. The struggle for freedom from occupation should always be conducted in accordance with IHL namely, either as mass resistance against an occupying force at the time of the invasion as long as the resisters carry arms openly and…conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war”. For Diakonia is unacceptable to participate in a double standard approach towards the both sides and to recognise, in general, that the threats of sanctions should be apply for both parties, NGO “is not ready today to support general and board financial sanctions against any party”. 186 This is a very important statement because it clearly expressed Diakonia principal positions and bounds of possible compromise’s decisions.

All Diakonia works in OPT is in line with organization’s priorities: democracy, gender, human rights and international law, conflict transformation and peace, social and economic Justice. During last decade its activity in the region has a strong focus on human rights and IHL (IHL Programme); The Rehabilitation Programme (RP) and Civil-Society Development Programme(CSD). In all cases Diaconia uses strategies of networking, promoting education, self-organization and participation of marginalised groups in decision-making.

The pilot phase of IHL projects was started in 2004 in Palestine and Israel as a result of the discussion between Diakonia, SIDA and SRC which was ended by the conclusion that “humanitarian assistance…may even be considered as a big problem that the donor community is in practice financing the occupation”. 187 To change that situation and to increase respect for and further implement international humanitarian law in Israel and Palestine was the ambitious overall aim of the Diakonia’s IHL Programme, which included activities in the areas such as education, information, monitoring and advocacy. Programme was addressed to decision-makers, lawyers, NGOs, region and international general public. Very soon International Advisory Council joined to the Programme to provide strategic advice and support.

In 2006 the second phase of IHL Programme was set up and Diakonia,s proposals were partly approved by donors: programme was limited tot three years, till 2009 with total cost of 35 MSEK. 188 Simultaneously SIDA demanded for the external audit of Diakonia activity and refused to funds one of the Programme component – advocacy (SIDA was not ready to finance advocacy activities in Riksdag) – and Diakonia funded its independently from its Head Office in Stockholm.

186 ibid, p.11.
188 Ibid, p.15.
As in all Diakonia’s programmes in the core of IHL is a support of local civil organizations. In the period of 2004-2009 it were seven local and international partners. One of them was (and still is) an Israeli Human Rights organization B’Tselem, that was founded in 1989 by a group of Knesset members, academics, journalists and attorneys. Organization had prepared flied observers (in 2009 10 people worked in the West Bank and 2 in Gaza) who collected evidences of the violations of human rights and IHL. On this basis B’Tselem every year publishes 4-5 reports, which include a legal analyses and a response from relevant government agency. Primarily B’Tselem focuses on responsibility of the state but also draws attention on settler violence from the position of the state’ obligation to protect the West Bank population. In 2006-2008 Diakonia granted SEK 4.4million (the highest grants in the IHL Programme) to B’Tselem which were used (among others purposes) to buy 150 cameras and to collect over 1 600 hours of footage for programme Shooting Back. The joint project received international backing – more than 75% of media references to the B’Tselem work were focused exactly on its IHL Programme – but had very limited effect inside the Israel.

About SEK1.5 million per year Diakonia transferred to its another partner – the Israel’s oldest and largest human rights organization – Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI). The NGO is active not only in Israel but also in OPT. Diakonia supported its project Education in IHL in Israel Civil Society. Project was addressed to NGOs, lawyers, journalists and, especially, to young adult on their way to the military service. As a part of Education Project ACRI from 2006 runs Training for Trainers project, Diakonia gave the idea of which. In 2008 this project included 56 hours of training for 20 trainers per year and about 2000 persons had participated in Educational Project.

During 2006-2009 Israel NGO HaMoked received around SEK 1.6million from Diakonia for carry on independent IHL researches and make its result available in the legal community. In 2008 NGO sent to Israelis courts 297 petitions, from which 254 included relevant IHL argumentation; Diakonia also supported to develop and to publish more than 600 documents on the website in Hebrew. The main Diakonia IHL Programme partner in OPT is Al Haq – Ramallah based NGO which was founded in 1979. The aims of cooperation were, firstly, to increase quality and quantity of monitoring IHL violations; secondly, to establish education centre for Palestinians in the West Bank; thirdly, to transfer Al Haq in a focal organization for monitoring methods and skills on IHL

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190 ibid,p.7.
violations. For these purpose Diakonia transferred SEK 3.2 million during 2006-2010.\textsuperscript{192} Like B’Tselem, Al Haq has run Training of Trainers programme (40-50 participants in courses) and started to use video cameras for documentation the cases of IHL violence.

It needs to be especially mentioned that for Diakonia partnerships with Al Haq was a natural choice because the Palestinian NGO had a big experience and developed its own field monitoring net. But Al Haq usually does not accept project funding because it is normally unstable, and unpredictable due to every year’s changes. The Al Haq agreement for project cooperation with Diakonia is a clear evidence of very high reputation of Swedish NGO.

Among the others Palestinian partners are NGO Mossawa, which works not only in OPT but also with Palestinian who live in Israel; Al Mezan – NGO mainly active in Gaza Strip and Al Qudz University. Partnership with Mossawa was ended in 2011 due to current funding limitation. For the same reason Diakonia in 2011 continued cooperation only with 2 out of 4 Israelis NGOs: ACRI and B’Tselem. In 2010 and 2011 IHL programme was restructured and more focused on advocacy work through IHL Resource Centre. In 2011 Programme received additional funds from the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC). French Consulate and UNDP Rule of Law programme started to support Diakonia IHL Programme in 2012.\textsuperscript{193} Diakonia continues to support the website “Easy Guide to IHL”- one of the most important part of IHL Programme, - to organise seminars, briefings and to published documents about situation in the region (like “Falling Caza”).\textsuperscript{194} Up to now IHL Project had very limited success in the region and received bigger results in international information space.

The Civil Society Developed Programme (CSD) has the goal to “change unfair structures in society from within” and in 2008-2010 Diakonia spent SEK 13.5 million for this purposes.\textsuperscript{195} In this project Diakonia focuses on providing equal opportunities for men and women (especially for young men and young women) to become more active in public affairs within their communities. In particular attention is given to support the young women confidence and ability to express their opinions and participate in decision-making process in their families and communities.

Diakonia CSD Programme has ten Palestinian partners including Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Centre (Saabel), Alternative Information Centre (AIC) that are among the most radical Palestinian NGOs according to Israel point of view. Physician for Human Rights – Israel (PHR-I), conducts advocacy work in Israel and one of its achievements is involving medical

\textsuperscript{193} Diakonia. Report to SIDA 2011, p.21.
\textsuperscript{194} Diakonia Report. 2009, pp.17.
personnel in preventing prisoner’s torture.

CSD united several programmes. Programme “Made in Palestine” by Al-Nayzak for Supportive Education and Scientific Innovation R.A. (Al-Nayzak) has the aim to encourage youth (especially women) to produce in order to make a positive changes in national economic. In 2010 “Made in Palestine” has resulted in 85 new products, 41 patents, 7 new business and 49 new job opportunities: Diakonia support consisted 0.23 MSEK per year during 201-2011.\(^{196}\)

Women’s Affairs Technical Committee (WATC) has run project “Youth as Agents of Change” which is focused on training 113 young journalists (half of its young women) to carry out media campaigns, producing audio and TV spots that are sensitive to marginalization, discrimination and gender inequality.

In 1992 Diakonia started Children’s Literature (CL) programme. Its starting point was the dissatisfaction with the reading habits of Palestinian children. The aims were to organise the trainings for local teachers and give the children the opportunities to receive knowledge about European and Swedish literature. The main partner for this programme is Tamer Institute for Community Education (Tamer). During 2005-2007 Diakonia spent SEK 18 million for implementation of the project\(^ {197}\)

More than 200 000 books (such as translated into Arabic Peppi Longstocking) were distributed to schools and libraries in OPT. More than 4 000 teachers have been trained and more than 200 trainers have been prepared for future courses.\(^ {198}\) In 2009 CL Programme has been handed over to local ownership under control of National Committee for children’s literature and Diakonia continues its support to it. Diakonia’s initiated CL Programme has a far distance goal: to reduce (even partly) the influence of radical and extremist propaganda and is one of few NGOs projects in OPT which are not criticised by Israel.

Diakonia Rehabilitation Programme (RP) was begun in the early 1990s as a joint project with The Norwegian Association of Disabled (NORAD).

SIDA and NORAD founded RP: during 1992-2008 NORD’s total contribution was around NOK83 million USD11.8 million ) and SIDA’s – around SEK 70 million (USD 9 million).\(^ {199}\) RP budget 2008-2009 was around SEK 24.8 million.\(^ {200}\)

Initially support was provided to institutional medical service but after the short time RP was received six main components:

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\(^ {198}\) Diakonia Official Palestine Info 2013, p.3.


1. Community Based Rehabilitation Programme (CBRP)
2. Development of the rehabilitation referral system
3. Lobbying, advocacy and networking
4. Policy development
5. Capacity Building, research, documentation and development
6. Regional cooperation.

UNESCO and WHO defined CBR as: ‘…a strategy within general community development for rehabilitation, equalisation of opportunities and social inclusion of all children and adults with disabilities. CBR is implemented through the combined efforts of people with disabilities themselves, their families and communities, and the appropriate health, education, vocational and social services.”

An overall aim of RP is to empower disabled persons and promote their right to inclusion within families, society and state. RP is in the focus of general Diakonia efforts to reduce the influence of radical ideology because disabled persons are attractive target group for extremists if they are not integrated in local communities and don’t receive support from authorities. Diakonia works in close cooperation with Stars of Hope (national movement of disabled women), Jerusalem Centre for Disabled Children (JCDC), General Union for Disabled Palestinians Jericho Branch, Community Based Rehabilitation Programme (Central, Nablus, Jenin, Gaza), Society for Deaf Adults, The Israel Human Rights Center for People with Disabilities and others local NGOs. RP has developed itself through partnership with Palestine Paralympics Committee, Future Society for Deaf Adults and others self-organised interest groups of disabled persons.

To strength and harmonise cooperation with foreign actors RP managed to agree on one reporting format which from 2011 is used between SIDA and Norad. In the same year EC contacted RP and ask for a concept paper. RP regularly provides information for World Health Organization (WHO) annual reports and in 2011 RP cooperated with ICHR to carry out the inquiry on the rights of disabled persons to work (the first ICHR national inquiry). Also in 2011 RP cooperated with UK based group Enabling Education Network (EENT) to facilitate a workshop to support Palestinian Ministry’s the inclusive education team to identify the difference between special and inclusive education.

At the end of 1999 CBR was active in 300 localities in OPT and covered 60% of its population, having reached 35 000 disabled persons; 82 community self-help groups and 63 school-

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based student support groups were established in West Bank and Gaza; 5 classes were organised for children with intellectual disabilities. The successful implementation of RP partly supported an approval of Disability Law by the Palestinian Authority in 1999.

In all its programmes in OPT Diakonia addresses to individuals, helps their integration in communities and supports the strengthening local civil society in democracy and human rights. Diakonia supports activity carried out by local NGOs on three levels: at grass-roots level inside local communities, at the national level by publicly advocating for changes and at intermediate level by facilitating coordination amongst partners. In the core of any Diakonia activity is the NGO’s strategy: Theory of Changes – Diakonia’s interpretation of right-based approach. Individuals are supported to receive knowledge about their rights and aid is given to rights holder for self-organization on common interest.

In general Diakonia activity in OPT are in line with SIDA’s view. Some differences are in their rhetoric: Diakonia position is more harder (demand to return to 1949 border line and especially recognition of Palestinian “right to resist”, which is not often use by government agencies), but both escape to touch the problem of refugees return. SIDA also rejected to fund the visits of Swedish MPs to OPT under the IHL programme but this was obviously connected with SIDA unwillingness to spend budget for MPs expensive trips. Full-fledge recommendations from SIDA and MFA are implemented in financial reports, external audit and partly in the management of NGOs. During last few years Diakonia’s Reports to SIDA have bigger volume than its Annual Report. SIDA is the largest donor for Diakonia but NGO tries to reduce its dependence from SIDA funds and carry on extensive negotiation with Scandinavian and EU donors (but Diakonia has published an information about contacts with EC, WHO and some UK and Norway funds).

Activities of Swedish Mission Council (SMR) and Save the Children Sweden in OPT in general are very similar to Diakonia one. The Olof Palme International Centre (OPC) (was established by the Swedish Social Democratic Party, the Trade Union Confederation and Cooperative Union) which now includes 26 organization, works in OPT mainly for organization of dialog between all sides irrespective of their status. OPC in 2005 was among the founders of the “Palestinian-Israeli Peace NGOs Forum” that has united more than 100 groups and movements. Forum tries to serve as a link between micro (grass-roots NGOs) and macro (government) levels in order to joint theirs efforts. Today it is scarcely possible to say that this strategy brings any positive results but without such efforts situation defiantly would be worse.

This conclusion can be applied for appraisal of any NGOs activity in the region. Swedish

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(likewise any others) NGO are absolutely convicted that without the political solution theirs development and humanitarian assistance cannot stop the worsening of situation in OPT.

**Conclusions**

The overall goal of Swedish humanitarian assistance is “to save lives, alleviate suffering and retain human dignity for the benefit of people in need who are, or are at risk of becoming, affected by armed conflicts, natural disasters or other disaster situations” (see Chapter 1). SIDA distributes more than SEK 2.6 billion from which up to 18% is granted to Swedish NGOs and the largest part of it is gone to NGOs which work in conflict and post-conflict regions.

Swedish Humanitarian Policy declares strict compliance with the main principles of classical humanitarianism but in reality it is strongly moral-guided. From the beginning (the support of ANK initiatives) Swedish humanitarian aid was not so neutral as it was decelerated, but reflected the political vision of Swedish society: at the end of 1989 SCA had 18 000 members and donors most of them left NGO after the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan despite the fact that leaving conditions in the country became even worse.

In according to the approach of new humanitarianism Sweden did an efforts to achieve a high grade of coherence between development and humanitarian assistance via so-called ‘development humanitarian assistance’ that provides long-term solutions to acute needs. Swedish conception does not separate activities or considers humanitarian aid as additional effort to development assistance but has created the model, where “all humanitarian assistance should have a development objective”. This model also unites ‘donor – recipient consensus’ of the development approach and ‘needs guided’ humanitarian one; state-building developments efforts and humanitarian assistance to strength the local communities. To achieve the coherence between development and humanitarian policies Sweden focuses on the programme’s flexibility that lets to concentrate funds and efforts on humanitarian or development projects when needs arose. This is especially important for conflict and post-conflict regions but is more and more complicate because the humanitarian aid became an increasingly subject of the same regulations as a development one. Together with small humanitarian personals in SIDA (less than 2% of total staff) and a lot of applications for humanitarian grants it leads to slow-down of decision-making process.

Swedish NGOs are in the core of its international assistance policy’s implementation. SIDA as the largest donor for NGOs focuses on the long-term cooperation providing funding through framework agreements with 12-14 NGOs. Some of frame NGOs are an umbrella-type organization that united 150-300 NGOs. In general system is effective but SIDA criteria is the subject of
discussion because it is very difficult for any new NGO to be included in framework agreement.

SCA and Diakonia are the most experienced Swedish NGOs that have been working in Afghanistan and OPT more than 30 years. SCA calls itself a development NGO and Diakonia is often referred as “the largest Swedish humanitarian NGO” but approach, scale, period and result of theirs activity doesn’t let to define NGOs as pure “humanitarian” or “development”. Their approaches have the common principles: firstly, both NGOs focus on the conflict areas but not on the refugees camps, secondly, their assistance efforts (including development programmes) have been carry on unconditionally and do not stop after changes in political landscape; thirdly, all programmes are flexible: capacity-building activity may be quickly replaced by service deliverance and vice versa. Due to such strategy Diaconia and SCA are among the most influential NGOs in their regions despite relatively modest budgets. Sweden is also one of the main beneficiaries of their work to strength it positions in OPT and Afghanistan. Long–term unconditional & flexible aid and deep roots in local communities may be recommended as a core elements for any assistance programme in post-conflict regions

Both NGOs consider theirs activity as a way to help the locals to became the right–holders but do it in a different ways: SCA concentrates on the involvement of local population into developing projects, meanwhile human-rights activity as part of holistic response became one of the most important priority for Diakonia. SCA and Diakonia use similar right-based approach: at the initial stage they help citizens to receive knowledge and awareness on their rights and thus to became so called “right-holders”. In the focus of NGOs activity are the most vulnerable groups – women, children and people with disabilities. After that NGOs support right-holders self-organization to solve their problems and advocate changes. The third stage is an involvement of such groups into decision-making level of local communities as well as strengthens the capacity of the commune to act collectively in social-political context. Diakonia calls it the “Theory of Changes” and this is very close to SIDA’s CSO strategy, but the difference is visible: NGOs are convinced that Swedish government’s recommendation to give the priority for state-strengthen assistance is a poorly justified. NGOs believe it advisable to keep to the practice of previous years and focus theirs activity on the commune level despite donor’s demands.

SCA is a key actor in the implementation Afghanistan National BPHS programme; it is one from very few NGOs that have rights to carry on construction works; it plays the important role in education programmes. In 2007 NGO declared that in the core of its activity is service delivery, suffering alleviation and human dignity retain but in three years efforts have been made a shift towards stronger development, mobilisation of and capacity building among local communities, result-oriented and right-based approach. It is noteworthy that SCA does not hesitate to head the
National medicine programme (BPHS) and thus to share the responsibility with contemporary Afghan Governments (usually NGOs try to keep the distance from government’s efforts). It reflects not only the strength of SCA but also an ambition of Committee.

It is possible to state with confidence that “Diakonia” and SCA have clear and definitely expressed intention to be an active political actors. “Diakonia” published its political statement (Diakonia “Position paper”) on both conflict regions where it works – OPT and DRC. One of the goals of “Diakonia” is to “..be an important actor in Swedish debate on global development and thereby influence decisions and actions..”203 SCA as a closer organization express its views in Annual. In the 2011 report SCA drown the attention that Taliban is not the main opposition force in Afghanistan political environment and situation in the country is more complicated than it is usually described. Besides of it the principal SCA’s position – no participation in programmes, which are funded by USAID - is also political motivated.

The NGOs should be prepared to pay for their ambitions by developing a more coherent policy with others actors, and above all, with SIDA and MFA of Sweden. Such coherence can be visible through the appointment of Secretary General Torbjörn Pettersson as Swedish Ambassador to Afghanistan in 2010 and in 2012 as the Director Department for Conflict and Post-conflict Cooperation at SIDA. In 2011 from13 members of the Board of SCA three were the members of Parliament from Green Party, Moderatema, Left Party and two former ambassadors; Lena Birgitta Hjelm-Wallén, former foreign minister of Sweden, chairs the Board of the Olof Palme International Centre.

However the greatest challenge for Swedish Humanitarian Policy – necessity to organise effective coordination between all actors in conflict areas still has not an adequate answer. Conflict prevention as one of the main priorities of Swedish foreign policy and was implemented on the ground, field and in new structure of MFA and SIDA. From one side, it is in line with the constructivism’s ideas of international security and potential threat of any conflict situation and, from other side, lets Sweden integrates to EU and NATO structures and not loose the identity of its own foreign policy. But two largest humanitarian NGOs and SIDA still abstain from joint military-civilian humanitarian operations in conflict areas. It may reflect the fact that an internal struggle within the MFA and SIDA to maintain conflict prevention as a security issue or a development one still not finished yet. From this point of view above mention Torbjörn Pettersson’s appointment to SIDA should enforce SIDA position. In any way, humanitarian NGOs as well as SIDA and MFA should fined new approaches for more effective joint efforts with all actors “working in conflict”

and “working on conflict”.
SCA and Diakonia became the essential part and active actors not only in humanitarian space but also in all spectrums of political, economical and moral decision end efforts, which should be taken by people, local elites, donors and international community to fined the salvations of conflicts. In this new form of humanitarianism the question for NGOs is not “how far are you ready to step aside from neutrality, independence and impartially” but “what do you ought to do to place the humanitarian approach in the core of any political decision”. NGOs could not stop The Security Council from to take the decision to start the military phase of humanitarian intervention, but its activity both in the conflict region and among political decision-maker groups could let to dilate military action and to win the time to fined more peaceful solution.

Diaconia and SCA actions are not so neutral and impartial as it demands in their statements; their independence is questionable due to dependency from government funds; goal orientated management and right-based approach of their developing programs and focus on capacity-building efforts may be interpreted as a refuse from the main principles of humanitarianism. But all above are just a form of actions that are based on the most important and universal right of each human person: unconditionally right to live.
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### Table 1 Swedish humanitarian aid (approximate amounts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Parliament’s and Government’s appropriations for humanitarian aid (SEK million)(^{204})</th>
<th>Swedish official humanitarian aid USD million(^{205})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952/3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956/7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960/1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968/9</td>
<td>201</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/3</td>
<td>1 260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/1</td>
<td>1 880</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/5</td>
<td>1 940</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993/4</td>
<td>2 510</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td>321.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{204}\) The Government's Humanitarian Aid Policy 2004.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value 1</th>
<th>Value 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1870</td>
<td>311.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2050</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>2450</td>
<td>384.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2715</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2250</td>
<td>470.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2150</td>
<td>378.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2320</td>
<td>405.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2400</td>
<td>343.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>521.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>563.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>536.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td>603.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>497.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Humanitarian aid distributed by SIDA 2005 (SEK)\textsuperscript{206}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanitarian aid</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Multilateral Organizations</td>
<td>69 017 056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Companies – Sweden</td>
<td>178 720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs Swedish</td>
<td>259 118 685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>793 018 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Persons- Sweden</td>
<td>227 364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration, Organizations – Sweden</td>
<td>114 470 624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs - Other Countries</td>
<td>11 598 793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGOs</td>
<td>659 938 951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB and IMF</td>
<td>80 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration - Partner Country</td>
<td>3 384 298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs Partner Country</td>
<td>930 204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{206} Onsander 2007
Table 3 Swedish Humanitarian Aid (SEK million)\textsuperscript{207}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MFA</strong></td>
<td>1468</td>
<td>1593</td>
<td>1439</td>
<td>1739</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SIDA</strong></td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2064</td>
<td>2419</td>
<td>2675</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1 ORGANIZATION OF SCA IN 2011

[diagram showing the organization structure of SCA with annotations]

Figure 2. SCA IN AFGHANISTAN

**Färgade provinser indikerar att SAK bedriver arbete här. Coloured provinces indicate where SCA is operating.**

**Landsbygdsutveckling**

Rural development

In these provinces, SCA is implementing its rural development programme. It includes drilling or deepening of wells, construction of latrines, National Solidarity Programme, construction and repair of buildings, and livelihood support.

**Utbildning**

Education

Verksamheten omfattar över 300 läroanstalter på landet där behoven är som störst. I ett 50-tal modellskolor med mer resurser bedrivs lärarutbildning. Modellskolorna är även tillsammans med skolor i Sverige och tre andra europeiska länder.

**Rehabilitering**

Rehabilitation

In these provinces SCA is rehabilitating people with disabilities through special education, orthopaedic workshops and employment support.

**Hälso- och sjukvård**

Health care

I de rödmarkerade provinserna har SAK det övergripande hälsovårdsansvaret. I provinser med röda markeringar bedrivs annan arbetskostnad och sjukvårdsstöd. I sex utbildningscentra för barnmorskor och Learning for Healthy Life.

In the provinces marked in red, SCA has the overall responsibility for health care. In provinces with red markings, other work coupled to health care is implemented, such as midwife education and Learning for Healthy Life.

---

Table 4  Total assistance provided by SIDA and Swedish MFA Palestine, 2005-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIDA sectors, SEK thousands</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education and health</td>
<td>27,109</td>
<td>75,428</td>
<td>23,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights and democracy, state-building</td>
<td>57,173</td>
<td>59,021</td>
<td>122,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict, peace and security</td>
<td>14,327</td>
<td>6,162</td>
<td>6,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>32,439</td>
<td>36,815</td>
<td>25,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and commerce</td>
<td>5,631</td>
<td>3,009</td>
<td>4,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other areas</td>
<td>31,252</td>
<td>22,929</td>
<td>13,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total SIDA long-term development cooperation</td>
<td>167,928</td>
<td>203,363</td>
<td>196,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>92,690</td>
<td>155,690</td>
<td>150,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Region:NIR</td>
<td>2,043</td>
<td>4,086</td>
<td>2,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary International Presence in the Hebron</td>
<td>14,540</td>
<td>10,300</td>
<td>10,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total SIDA Humanitarian aid and others</td>
<td>94,733</td>
<td>175,076</td>
<td>167,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total SIDA</td>
<td>262,661</td>
<td>378,439</td>
<td>363,599</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry for Foreign Affairs aid</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>210 000</th>
<th>230 000</th>
<th>242 000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Council of Swedish Industry (NIR)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpeace</td>
<td>1 700</td>
<td>1 700</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decaf</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Border Assistance (EU BAM Rafah)</td>
<td>12 500</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td>4 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>21 900</td>
<td>11 050</td>
<td>3 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA other</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ministry for Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>286 100</td>
<td>251 750</td>
<td>253 846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SIDA</td>
<td>548 761</td>
<td>630 189</td>
<td>617 445</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5. Distribution of Swedish development aid to Palestine, 2000-2003 (SEK thousand)\textsuperscript{211}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct support to peace process</td>
<td>18 337</td>
<td>28 802</td>
<td>21 581</td>
<td>25 509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy and Human Rights</td>
<td>32 405</td>
<td>30 485</td>
<td>28 995</td>
<td>30 756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and Media</td>
<td>20 191</td>
<td>25 033</td>
<td>26 472</td>
<td>16 680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>20 499</td>
<td>20 315</td>
<td>24 067</td>
<td>23 734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure- Energy</td>
<td>135 027</td>
<td>53 993</td>
<td>9 657</td>
<td>1 402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job creation</td>
<td>14 706</td>
<td>42 327</td>
<td>6 223</td>
<td>15 904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector(incl. financial planning)</td>
<td>6 787</td>
<td>3 340</td>
<td>1 678</td>
<td>2 219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure- Water Sanitation</td>
<td>24 486</td>
<td>14 204</td>
<td>19 684</td>
<td>22 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESSP, WB fund (social service)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>45 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>2 298</td>
<td>3 340</td>
<td>2 754</td>
<td>3 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>274 736</td>
<td>221 942</td>
<td>181 111</td>
<td>186 710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Proframmes</td>
<td>1 872</td>
<td>4 040</td>
<td>78 576</td>
<td>83 939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish NGOs</td>
<td>17 839</td>
<td>10 416</td>
<td>13 865</td>
<td>13 381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>294 447</td>
<td>236 398</td>
<td>273 552</td>
<td>284 030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{211} Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs Strategy for development cooperation with the West Bank and Gaza. March - December 2005/ UN OCHA information official web-service ReliefWeb // http://www96.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/BF6B43EFC2E2071EC1257026003E0D89-opt-gov-swe-20jun.pdf (January 2013)
List of abbreviations

AAA – Accra Agenda for Action
AGIS – the Africa Groups in Sweden
ANC – African National Congress
ANDS - Afghan National Development Strategy
ARTF - Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
BITS - Swedish Fund for International Technical and Economic Cooperation
BPHS - Basic Package of Health Service
CAFOD – Catholic Agency For Overseas Development
CARE – Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CBE - Community Based Education
CBRCS - Community Based Rehabilitation Committees
CC – Central Committee for Swedish Technical Assistance to Less Development Areas
CDC - Community Development Councils
CERF – Central Emergency Respond Fund
CL - Children’s Literature
CNTF - Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund
CoAR - Coordination for Afghan Relief
CRS – Catholic Relief Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNRWA regional total</th>
<th>160 000</th>
<th>168 000</th>
<th>170 000</th>
<th>175 000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

CSD - Civil-Society Development Programme
CSO – Civil Social Organization
DAC – Development Assistance Committee
DWB - Doctors Without Borders
FAO – UN Food and Agriculture Organization
FIDH - Federation of Human Rights
Forum Syd – Swedish NGO Center for Development Cooperation
GHD – Good Humanitarian Donorship
GNI – Gross National Income
GNP – Gross National Product
HIV/AIDS – Human immunodeficiency virus/ Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
ICHR- Independent Commission for Human Rights
ICISS – International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IHL – International Humanitarian Law
INCAF – International Network on Conflict and Fragility
IRC - International Red Cross
IRRCRC - International Red Cross and Red Crescent
ISAF- International Security assistance Force
JCDC - Jerusalem Centre for Disabled Children
LHL - Learning for Healthy Life
LOTFA - Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MCH - Mother and Child Healthcare
MCHC - Mother and Child Heals Care
MFA – Ministry for Foreign Affairs
MoE – Ministry of Education
MRRD - Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development
NDC - International NGO Development Centre
NDP - Northern Development Project
NGO – Non-Government Organization
NHP - National Health Policy
NIB – Swedish Agency for Development Assistance
NSP - National Solidarity Programme
OCHA – UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA – Official Development Assistance
OECD – Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPIC – Olof Palme International Center
OPT - Occupied Palestinian Territories
PA - Palestinian Authority
PCATI - Public Committee Against Torture in Israel
PHR-I - Physician for Human Rights –Israel
PMRS - Palestinian Medical Relief Society
PMU – Pentecostal Mission
PQA – Policy and Quality Assurance
PRT - Province Reconstruction Team

R2P - The Responsibility To Protect

RAD - Rehabilitation of Afghans with disability

RP - Rehabilitation Programme

SADEV – Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation

SCA – Swedish Committee for Afghanistan

SCC – Swedish Cooperative Center

SEK – Swedish Krone

SHIS – Swedish Organizations of Disabled persons

SIDA – Swedish International Development Agency

SMR - Swedish Mission Council

SNF – Swedish Society for Nature Conservation

SRC – Swedish Red Cross

SWEDFUND - Swedish Fund for Industrial Cooperation with Developing Countries

UBV – Training for Development Assistance Operations

UCDP – Uppsala Conflict Data Program

UN GA – United Nations General Assembly

UN SC – United Nations Security Council

UNCHR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNDP – United Nations Development Program

UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Culture Organization

UNICEF – United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
UNIFEM – United Nations Development Fund for Women

UNOPS – United Nations Office for Project Service

UNRWA – United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the near east

USAID – United State Agency for International Development

USD – Dollar of the United State

WB – World Bank

WFP – World Food Program

WHO – World Health Organization

WWI – World War One

WWII – World War Two