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Regime Stability and Restructuration: From Industrial to Informational City

Introduction

Recent figures for the Finnish ICT sector indicate that in 2001–2004, employment increased in only one city: Tampere. Local know-how in the field is largely based on research and development functions and ICT services. In Finland, Tampere is widely recognised as a city that invests heavily in policies that support the ICT operating environment. Looking at the present local ICT sector in the light of the city’s industrial history, the transition from the industrial to the informational era has been dramatic indeed. It is difficult to recognise the city as the one that in the postwar years struggled to deliver Finland’s war reparations to the Soviet Union. Changes in local development have been accompanied by changes in the physical appearance of the city as economic restructuration has transformed the red brick industrial buildings in the city center into facilities for media corporations, ICT businesses and multiplex cinemas.

All these changes coincide with remarkably stable patterns of local governance. Virtually ever since the Second World War, the scene of local politics in Tampere has been dominated by the so-called Brothers-in-Arms Axis, a coalition formed by the conservative National Coalition Party and the Social Democratic Party. This chapter examines the processes and conditions that enabled the stabilisation of this co-operation into a local regime – and that have contributed to its transformation in the informational era. We anchor our analysis in urban regime theory, focusing on the problem of coalition formation and drawing
on related notions of governing capacity and preemptive power (Stone 1986; 1988; 1989). After a discussion of regime theory and a note on methodology, we present an historical account of the emergence and establishment of the Brothers-in-Arms coalition in Tampere. Taking a cultural-historical perspective on regime formation, we then introduce the notion of habitus. The historical account contributes to an analysis of the challenges faced by the local regime as Tampere was transformed from an industrial city into an informational one. Finally, issues of regime stabilisation and change are addressed through the identification of social mechanisms of continuation in governance patterns.

**Operationalising urban regime theory**

The study of urban regimes has continued to grow and expand since the introduction of the concept in the 1980s (Stoker 1995; Mossberger & Stoker 2001). According to the original definition by Stone (1989, 6), an urban regime is characterised as ‘the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions’. Regime analysis starts from the assumption of social complexity and fragmented sources of power, leading to the need for collaborative arrangements to enable effective governing decisions. Regimes thus provide a functional response to the challenge of governance in the context of social complexity, lack of consensus and political fragmentation, which denies any single actor the capacity to carry out governing decisions alone. Regimes structure resources and patterns of interaction, thus contributing to the stability of the mode of governance (Stone 1986; Stoker 1995).²

Regime theory has been criticised for its ‘localist’ bias, i.e. the lack of understanding regarding broader developments in the (global) economy (Davies 2002; Davies 2003). DiGaetano and
Lawless (1999) have drawn attention to its American bias, noting that unofficial interactions between public and private interests are more prominent in the United States where local governments are more dependent on resources generated by the private sector than their European counterparts. In a similar vein, Pierre (2005) notes that regime theory does not travel very well and argues that regimes should be conceived of as a culturally and historically specific model of urban governance.

Acknowledging this critique, we are interested in the original input of regime theory. In any case, the focus in regime analysis is inherently on the internal dynamics of coalition building, on ‘civic cooperation’ (Stone 1989, 5) or informal modes of coordination across institutional boundaries. For instance, in the context of the ‘city limits’ debate (Peterson 1981; Logan & Swanstrom 1990) on the relative weight of broader economic forces in the making of localities, the regime concept can be seen as a hinge between external causal variables and local policy outcomes, thus giving rise to the token slogan of regime theory: ‘local politics matters’. Indeed, one of the core claims of urban regime theory is that cities and urban life are produced and reproduced not by any externally imposed logic, but by bargains and struggles between various groups (Harding 1999, 674). Still, the debate on local politics vs. global political economy is not where the notion of urban regimes has made its most significant contribution.

Mossberger and Stoker (2001) argue that the proliferation of the regime concept has broadened the scope of the notion beyond its original meaning. For them, regime theory is a model based on inductive empirical and comparative evidence rather than a fully-fledged theory with explanatory or predictive powers. They do, however, credit regime theory for its important and original contributions. First, Mossberger and Stoker argue that regime theory helped to reorient the so-called community power debate that went on from the 1950s to the 1980s between elitist...
and pluralist positions over the question ‘who governs?’ Here, power was attributed to individuals and the goal of research was to figure out which individuals (few or many) held the power in local politics (e.g. Dunleavy 1980, 26–31; Waste 1986, 14–21). The demise of the debate and the birth of regime theory came about when regime analysts provided new insights into the way that power was conceptualised. Clarence Stone (1986) introduced notions such as intercursive power (i.e. the power to forge coalitions) and ecological power (i.e. the power to secure suitable social and institutional conditions for a coalition), which referred to the enabling dimension of power, instead of the previously emphasised dimensions of control and compliance. The notion of preemptive power clearly demonstrates the shift from ‘who’ to ‘how’. In Stone’s (1988, 83) words, preemptive power refers to the ‘capacity to occupy, hold and make use of a strategic position in setting the policy agenda’. It is a cornerstone of stable governance, which has a strategic role in the complex community context. It consists of 1) the power advantage that is based on holding a strategic position and 2) a capacity to occupy a strategic position (Stone 1988, 90–91). The notion clearly departs from the model of power related to social control and compliance (i.e. power over), conceptualising power, instead, as social production (i.e. power to).

Linking these forms of power to local governance patterns, DiGaetano (1997) makes a distinction between the kinds of power that are typical of these different social settings: while competing groups seek command power, or power over each other, stable regimes exercise preemptive power, i.e. hegemonic power with agenda-setting capacities. The shift also marks a growing interest to understand power in network structures instead of hierarchical structures. Second, Mossberger and Stoker (2001) claim that the regime notion has broadened the scope of analysis of local politics beyond formal government institutions.
Asking questions about the combination of social complexity and preemptive power naturally led to studying forms of co-operation and coalition-making. Further questions were asked about the coherence of governing coalitions, the resources they control and their stability, which were all seen as affecting the way that cities are governed. According to regime theory, local policy decisions are affected by 1) the composition of the governing coalition, 2) the nature of the relationships between the coalition members and 3) the resources contributed by the members to the governing coalition. These factors, together, constitute the governing capacity of the regime, which determines its scope of action. In addition, the construction of a local regime is largely about finding a shared purpose or direction and assessing the benefits of the co-operation. In order to be successful, a coalition needs to be able to mobilise resources that support its policies. Therefore, it makes sense for an actor to join forces with others who hold important resources (Stoker 1995, 59–61).

We subscribe to Stone’s (2004) view that it is important to explain how strong and stable governance can take place, even regardless of context. The question of context cannot, however, be overlooked. Wanting to emphasise this, we adopt a qualitative case-based approach, which is suited for a diachronical analysis of the logics of historical processes of regime evolution. Instead of searching for independent variables, we seek to outline socio-cultural mechanisms that account for the characteristics of the local regime. In this perspective local governance is seen as growing out of a specific historical and cultural context. This is what Meredith Ramsay (1997) has referred to as the ‘embeddedness’ of local governance. She emphasises the importance of distinct historical roots and traditions in shaping patterns of local political culture and development strategies. This view is also related to the credo of political geography formulated by John Agnew (1987), stating that 'place-specific social structures
and patterns of social interaction give rise to specific patterns of political behaviour’.

Following a lead by Painter (1997) – who has criticised urban regime theory for its emphasis on voluntaristic rational action models in explaining local governance – we have chosen to complement the analysis of governance in Tampere with ideas drawn from Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977; 1990; 1994) cultural theory and concept of habitus. This perspective can be seen as part of a recent approach in urban studies that combines discursive elements and ‘meaning-making’ into the analysis of local development and policy processes (McCann 2002).

Below, we present an historical narrative on local regime formation, stabilisation and change. Stressing the cultural dimension of local governance in Tampere, we seek to answer the following question: What social mechanisms contributed to the creation and maintenance of the Brothers-in-Arms regime and its preemptive power in Tampere?

Our data were mainly collected for the purposes of our earlier research on the politicisation of environmental issues at the local level (Laine & Peltonen 2003). We used five environmental disputes as case studies to depict the tensions between the emergence of environmentalism and persistent traditions in local governance. The present description of the Brothers-in-Arms Axis is based on that study. It has been complemented, however, with two additional interviews (see list of interviews on page 382) and statistical material to illustrate changes in the local political economy.

The origins and stabilisation of the Brothers-in-Arms coalition

Tampere is sometimes called the ‘Manchester of Finland’, referring to its industrial cityscape with red brick factories and
smokestacks. The city was founded in 1779 by King of Sweden Gustav III at the Tammerkoski rapids between two lakes – Näsijärvi and Pyhäjärvi. The industrialisation of Tampere was made possible predominantly by foreign investment, which increased in the 19th century when Finland was part of Russia. The factories attracted workers from the countryside, and Tampere grew rapidly: the city became the most important industrial center in Finland, with a whole range of textile, paper, timber and metal industries. By the late 19th century over 40% of Finland’s industrial workforce were employed in Tampere, and the city remained an important industrial centre throughout the 20th century.³

Because of the large industrial workforce, labour parties, namely the Social Democrats and the Communists (SKDL⁴), were influential in local politics during the second half of the 20th century. As we can see from Figure 1, there have been three major turning-points in the history of the local city council since 1939. The first peacetime municipal elections in Tampere in 1945 witnessed a massive change in the local political landscape. This happened for two reasons. First, there was a clear age shift as the younger generation (of men) returning from the war took over. Second, the communists were reinstated as a legal actor in Finnish politics, allowing them to take part in the elections. Consequently three political groupings of equal size emerged from these elections: the social democrats, the communists (under the SKDL coalition) and the conservatives (The National Coalition Party), all of which had a large number of new council members from the Brothers-in-Arms generation.⁵
Figure 1. Parties in the Tampere city council from 1937 to 2005. Each year marks the beginning of a new electoral term.

None of the three parties were able to control the majority of the council on their own, and therefore two of the three parties were under pressure to acknowledge a common interest. A critical event for the emerging political co-operation between the social democrats and the conservatives was the 1948 debate on the level of municipal taxes. The two parties first tried to sabotage each other’s motions, so that the meeting went on for 14 hours. This experience clearly highlighted the need for negotiation and co-operation prior to city council meetings, especially on difficult issues, so that decisions could be made in due order. The network for co-operation had been created as early as 1940, when the local association of ‘Brothers in Arms’ was founded. The key figures of the two parties, Erkki Napoleon Lindfors (The Social Democratic Party) and Lauri Santamäki (the conservative, National Coalition...
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Party) had worked together in the association, the aim of which was to give financial support to veterans of the Winter War, and to secure national independence through reconstruction.

In local politics, the Brothers-in-Arms considered the communists a threat to Finnish independence and democracy. This perception was particularly strong during the postwar years (1944–1948), which became commonly known as ‘the years of danger’, referring to the fear and threat of a communist coup with Soviet backing. The wartime setting was now transposed to local politics. Erkki Napoleon Lindfors, who later became Mayor of Tampere, has been quoted as saying to Lauri Santamäki: ‘We Social Democrats and Conservatives, who have experienced these difficult years together [know that] our fight is not over. It has just shifted from the fields of war to those of politics’ (Seppälä 1983). In a sense, politics became the continuation of war through other means. For the older generation, co-operation over the left/right divide was unthinkable, but for the Brothers-in-Arms it was not all that big a step.

We knew how to play together, and we had much the same views on local and social development. This gave us faster results as we had, how should I say, a more straightforward decision-making mechanism than your usual municipal democracy . . . in its principles. Fast results were sought and achieving them in a straightforward manner was admired. (Vilho Halme, interview, 24 March 1999)

Coalition formation was thus based on shared wartime experiences. From the 1950s onwards, the influence of the Social Democratic Party and the National Coalition Party became more and more firmly established in local politics. The notion of the Brothers-in-Arms Axis can be dated to the early 1950s. The Axis coalition’s regime ranged from labour unions to corporate directors, from building companies to banks, trust funds,
sports clubs and newspapers. At the same time SKDL had its own competing network, although they lacked strong business partners, who were less keen on the idea of a labour revolution. In addition, the Social Democrats and the Communists were fighting it out within trade unions to gain dominance among factory workers (Rasila 1992, 317). The Axis’ connections, its regime facilitated government of the city and provided financial resources for welfare service provision and development of the city. Mayor Lindfors was thus in the position to implement his motto: ‘it’s not worth putting money in the bank; it should be put in steel and concrete instead’. The speech of the then Mayor-to-be Lindfors in 1951 captures the spirit of the times:

In the near future, we will be starting work on the construction of a central office block, . . . the construction of a hospital for the chronically ill, a workers’ institute, day-care centers, vocational school training workshops, 250 flats annually, a new sports center, a new bridge and sewage treatment plant, the renovation of water pipeline pumps, the construction of a new main water pipeline and the renovation of an electrical power plant, an extension to the public transport system, and the construction of a new police station. (Seppälä 1983, 126–127)

The postwar economic boom had generated enough capital for reconstruction, welfare services, and urban development projects. In addition, the metal and engineering industries in Tampere benefited from the war reparations to the Soviet Union, which in turn generated increased tax revenues for the city.

Once the communists had effectively been excluded from the decision-making process, securing local growth was coupled with securing political influence. That continued steadily to grow as Axis members advanced to more important political positions. The golden age of the Axis occurred between 1957 and 1969, when Lindfors was Mayor and Santamäki headed
the conservative group in the council. A pattern of negotiations was gradually established whereby the two men maintained close contact on upcoming issues. Having discussed these issues amongst themselves, they brought their proposals to their respective political groups, where a joint position was then agreed. That position was binding upon individual council members. Consequently the proposals were accepted by the votes of the two groups, leaving the communists in the position of critical bystanders with no access to the local policy process. This exclusion also applied to various municipal committees and the nomination of municipal employees. Loyalty was thus guaranteed throughout the city bureaucracy.

The cultural constitution of the regime

The cultural and historical constitution of the local regime in Tampere can further be illuminated through Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological notion of habitus, which he defines as a ‘system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures’ (Bourdieu 1977, 72). The notion allows for an interpretation of the Brothers-in-Arms Axis as a contingent product of past events that secures the presence of history in the present, and participates in the constant production of novel realities, actions, and classifications. It is the inertia in habitus that serves as a carrier of dispositions held by the Brothers-in-Arms, thus accounting for the transfer of these dispositions from war to peacetime politics. In this sense, it is revealing to look at the way that social democrat Vilho Halme, long-time chairman of the local council, describes the situation after the war:

During the war we had learned to look at things regardless of party lines, so the same was naturally carried on in peacetime as well. In a way, it was a natural coalition. The communists had
appeared from underground to take responsibility, or to pursue political power. They were considered an opponent much like the wartime enemy, and for a long time they were sort of a natural opponent. (Vilho Halme, interview, 24 March 1999)

Halme’s quote suggests that the Brothers-in-Arms were simply ‘doing what came naturally’ in the transition from war to politics. Similarly, the preface to the book *The Deeds of Brother-in-Arms* by Santamäki (1966), can be read as a document of how the Brothers-in-Arms movement perceived themselves and others.

*Table 1. Classifications constituting the Brothers-in-Arms habitus in Santamäki (1966)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Us’</th>
<th>‘Them’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Finland</td>
<td>– Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Responsible statesmen</td>
<td>– Communists, extreme left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Brothers-in-Arms</td>
<td>– ‘Defence nihilistic’ new generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Characterisations of the actors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Characterisations of the actors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– ‘Different from Baltic countries (i.e. Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia)’</td>
<td>– Anti-national features</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Nationalism</td>
<td>– Ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Realism</td>
<td>– Fanaticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Responsibility</td>
<td>– Short-sightedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Democracy</td>
<td>– Opposed to democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Calmness and moderation</td>
<td>– Totalitarian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distinction in the discourse between good guys and bad is clear. It shows how the construction of the self becomes meaningful in relation to three significant others: the wartime enemy (Soviet Union), Finnish communists and postwar peace movement activists. In generational terms, the former two are
contemporaries of the Brothers-in-Arms, while the last one clearly belongs to a younger generation. Table 1 illustrates some classifications relevant to the self-perception of the Brothers-in-Arms Axis, as found in Santamäki’s preface.

One of the keys to the Brothers-in-Arms habitus was the justification for peacetime activities that derived from having been on the front in life-or-death situations. This is demonstrated in a quote from an autobiographical book by Väinö Leskinen, one of the most prominent social democratic members of the Brothers-in-Arms fraction at the national level:

[W]e saw many negative features in other political groups – there was the threat from the left, panic on the right. In our own group we Brothers-in-Arms socialists were convinced that the attitudes of 1930s politicians could not effectively address the situation in 1944–45... It was – and still is – quite natural that political organisations are rejuvenated. Rarely has that happened as quickly as after the return of the young generation of social democrats from the war. That generation brought with them their experiences from the front, and a consequent clear-cut understanding of the realities of life and death. They had fought a communist superpower, and now they were facing the communists at home. One had to keep fighting in this situation. The straightforward and coarse methods derived partly from the war. (Leskinen 1967)

The relational nature of habitus is evident here. The social democrats saw themselves as occupying a position in the middle ground of the political spectrum, in opposition to both the extreme left and right. The relevance of a generational shift is also visible in the contrast made by Leskinen between the young social democrats and the old politics of the 1930s.

This polarisation was particularly stark in Tampere – which partly explains why the Brothers-in-Arms coalition is unique to
Tampere, when compared with other Finnish cities. Tampere has always been a predominantly industrial town, ever since it was founded, and therefore the communists have traditionally enjoyed strong local support. The industrial history of Tampere accounts for the fact that, in the postwar years, almost 70% of the local population supported the left, i.e. either the communists or social democrats. According to Timo P. Nieminen, the present chairman of the city board, the same polarisation was clearly visible as late as the 1980s:

And if I look back to the 1960s and 70s, and all the way to the 80s, there's this strange phenomenon, well maybe not very strange, but a local phenomenon that here you are either conservative or leftist – either more moderate, hence a social democrat or more radical, then you'd join the communists. . . . This began to fade in the 1990s, but in the 80s it was still very clear. (Timo P. Nieminen, interview, 31 Aug 2000)

Polarisation of the political space also partly explains why Tampere assumed quite an ‘independent’ image in terms of local development and rivalry with the much bigger Finnish capital, Helsinki. The left-right division in postwar Finnish politics ran through the Social Democratic Party. The right wing social democrats were the minority fraction at the national level, but they held the majority position in Tampere. Since the Brothers-in-Arms fraction held the majority of SDP seats in the council, left-wing social democrats had only limited influence in municipal politics – even though they enjoyed the trust and confidence of the national party leadership. The Brothers-in-Arms social democrats in Tampere, under Erkki Lindfors who became Mayor in 1957, were thus more loyal to their wartime network than to the national Social Democratic Party.

The decoupling of the local party organisations of both the National Coalition Party and the Social Democratic
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Party (both being to the right) from their respective national organisations seems partly to account for an increased sense of local independence vis-à-vis Helsinki. It serves to note that the Brothers-in-Arms co-operation in Tampere had parallels in some other cities, but not at the national level, where the postwar political scene was dominated by centre-left governments, with the conservatives excluded from government for decades. Finnish-Soviet relations had an undeniable impact here. This decoupling of the local governing coalition from national politics was manifested in ambitious local development initiatives and projects, often flying in the face of national party leadership – and making use of national-level Brothers-in-Arms contacts in furthering local development.

In the city council, the Brothers-in-Arms Axis depended importantly on group discipline in order to remain functional and exert control. Basically, this meant that anyone voting out of line risked being sacked from the group. The practice of group discipline is traditionally the strongest in the SDP, but it is also applied in the National Coalition Party. This is demonstrated by Timo P. Nieminen’s (The National Coalition Party) account of a situation where his own preferences conflicted with those of the group in the matter of demolishing an old Art Nouveau style office building in the city centre:

I was such a conservative [by nature] that I thought, at the time [early 1970s], that we should preserve all the old buildings at that end of Hämeeentu. . . . This may have had to do with the fact that I had travelled in Central Europe and seen long streets lined with fine old buildings. So I thought that [demolishing] was stupid. But still, I must have voted in favour myself, along with the rest of the group, because the principle of group discipline was applied in those days, that the old building should be demolished. (Timo P. Nieminen, interview, 31 Aug 2000)
The mode of governance thus worked to undermine democracy while favouring efficiency. The streamlining of decision-making allowed for rapid local development coupled with economic growth and steady inflation. At the same time (between 1950 and 1970) the population of Tampere soared from 100,000 to 160,000. The fact that the golden age of the Brothers-in-Arms Axis under Lindfors’s term as Mayor coincides with unprecedented economic growth, i.e. the postwar golden decade of 1955–1965 (see Becker 1989), lent the Brothers-in-Arms coalition an heroic aura. The people of Tampere saw how their city changed as ‘the old made way for the new’ before their very eyes. The changes in the cityscape and environment were the most visible part of the political project of the Brothers-in-Arms, who became known as the men who transformed Tampere into a modern industrial, ‘efficient’ city, with modern housing, new roads, welfare services such as libraries, hospitals, homes for old people and sports facilities. Through this local welfare state project, emphasising hegemonic projects of welfare creation and economic efficiency, the governing coalition bridged the interests of workers and industrialists. The growth would not have been exploited to the extent it was had it not been for the eagerness of the Brothers-in-Arms coalition.

These cultural and symbolic features are to be seen as an integral part of the governing capacity of the local regime in Tampere. The cultural and historical constitution of the coalition possesses its own relational dynamics that cannot be explained solely through (the coalition partners’) rational choices or the resources brought by individual partners into the coalition, for example. Instead of ‘rational choice’, the governing coalition was formed on a ‘cultural-historical choice’, on the grounds of a common historical trajectory, based on similar ideological commitments, shared goals and mutual trust (see Painter 1997).
From industrial to informational city

Erkki Lindfors was followed as Mayor in 1969 by Pekka Paavola. Paavola was a social democrat, but more than 20 years younger than Lindfors. The young candidate had earned Lindfors's trust by succeeding in bringing a Nationwide television channel (TV 2) to Tampere. The appointment of Paavola as Mayor marked a generation shift and at once a downgrading of the influence of the original Brothers-in-Arms generation. Many war veterans either retired or died during the 1970s. With this generation shift, the original ethos of the Brothers-in-Arms network grew thinner, but the institutionalised practice of co-operation between the two parties continued unchanged.

Here [in Tampere] everything is based on the co-operation of two groups in the council. It’s obviously much easier if you don’t have as many groups as they do in Turku, for example. We don’t need to mess around with half-a-dozen groups. When there are three groups and when I take an active role, I get things done. (Pekka Paavola, in Aamulehti 4 Dec 1983)

This attitude earned Paavola the nickname ‘The Boss’, highlighting the even more exclusive style of decision-making than in the original Axis, as well as Paavola’s introduction of new management methods in city government. Unlike Lindfors, Paavola was of the ‘businessman’ ilk, quick in his moves and keenly focused on economic efficiency.

The early 1970s, with the oil crisis in 1973 and the economic recession that followed in 1974 and 1975, saw a clear change in the local development outlook. According to Clark (2000), this was an international phenomenon. The Arab oil boycott, together with rampant inflation, marked the end of economic growth that had continued since 1945 around most of the world. This did not, however, stop governments from growing, but there were
increasing fiscal strains as government spending continued to rise in spite of a stagnant or declining economic base.

This was also the case in Tampere, where the public sector expanded rapidly from the 1960s onwards. Much of this expansion was attributable to new welfare state policies, whereby Finnish municipalities became outlets for the distribution of state-funded welfare services. These measures did therefore not cause any acute fiscal strain in local government finances. In fact it was not until 1990 that the fiscal strain began to show as Finland slipped into a deep recession and banking crisis, partly on account of the collapse of trade with the Soviet Union.

The local role of industry began gradually to diminish from the 1970s, and by 1990 the service sector accounted for a larger proportion of employment. The numbers working in services more than doubled in the space of 30 years from 1970 to 2000 (see Figure 2). Part of these changes were planned, part of them were fortunate coincidences. It is easy now, in hindsight, to argue that the transformation from an industrial to an informational economy started around the 1970s. As an important precursor to the present ICT cluster, there were deliberate and successful attempts to establish institutions for higher education and new public services.
The Brothers-in-Arms network was instrumental in the decision to get the School of Social Studies, the predecessor of the University of Tampere, relocated from Helsinki to Tampere. Initially the school was reluctant to move, but after some political wrangling the University of Tampere was opened in 1960. Another move followed in the mid-1960s when a branch of the Helsinki University of Technology was relocated to Tampere; the unit became known as the Tampere University of Technology. A third institution that further increased employment in the knowledge-intensive service sector was the nationwide television channel TV2 operated by the Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE. Persuading YLE to relocate TV2 from Helsinki to Tampere was a mission that Mayor Lindfors entrusted to the Mayor-to-be, Pekka Paavola. His was a simple gambling strategy: Tampere poured so much money into the project that the national government simply could not back down. This same strategy had
previously been successfully used to establish a medical school and a Central University Hospital in Tampere. In addition, technical research and development received a major boost when the state-funded Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT) opened a branch in Tampere in the mid-1970s.

The decisions that brought the two universities and VTT Finland to Tampere provided the foundation for the development of the ICT sector in Tampere. In the latest phase of the ICT breakthrough from the 1980s, small steps can be traced that in hindsight can be seen as the starting-points for major changes. Based in Hervanta together with the Tampere University of Technology, Technology Centre Hermia was established in 1986 to attract new technology and ICT businesses into town. Nokia started a small research team in Hermia in 1988. This was the embryo for Nokia’s research and development functions in Tampere, a key player in local ICT employment.

Table 2. Fields of expertise in the Tampere Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Turnover (€ million)</th>
<th>Share of exports</th>
<th>Jobs</th>
<th>Annual growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical engineering and automation</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>over 50%</td>
<td>25,500</td>
<td>3–5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>60–70%</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health technology</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>12,000*</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media services</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

High-ranking officials and politicians in Tampere understood that ICT was a growing branch, and they established a local centre of expertise programme in the early 1990s under the umbrella of the national centres of expertise programme led by the Ministry of the Interior. According to Olli Niemi, Chief Executive of Hermia,
this was the first deliberate and serious move in Tampere towards a new business policy (Olli Niemi, personal communication 19 Jan 2005).

As a spinoff from the centre of expertise programme, the Media Tampere digital media development company provides an example of the new ICT development partnerships in Tampere between the council and new ICT businesses. Media Tampere is now situated in the historical centre of industrial Tampere, the Finlayson area, which is owned by the pension fund Varma. While the real estate company looks after the physical structure, Media Tampere focuses on the development of digital media competencies and online service systems. The company ownership structure is quite unique in Finland in that is so broadly based: four major media and ICT companies and the city of Tampere each have a share of around 20% in the company

As it became clear that the heavy industries, the former mainstay of employment in the city, were not about to return, Tampere issued its first-ever City Strategy entitled ‘The Future of Tampere is in Knowledge’ in 1997. The strategy emphasises the commitment of Tampere to become the country’s leading ICT centre and a major player even on the European scene.

Interestingly, the tone of the new local information society strategy reveals its origins in the straightforward hierarchical style of decision-making by the Brothers-in-Arms Axis. In a close reading of the strategy documents, Lehtimäki (1999; 2000) found that despite its explicit networking agenda, the text was written in the passive voice and in a unisonous and authoritarian tone. In the strategy’s discursive imagery, the city of Tampere was set at the top of an hierarchical power structure, imposing demands upon other actors. This can be seen as a consequence of the secured strategic capacity of the regime, which had grown used to operating on its own terms. The strategy also reflects
the critical stance that the coalition had always held towards public participation, favouring instead the formal apparatus of representative democracy and its in-built mechanisms for interactions within the governing coalition.

**Social and cultural transformations**

The shift towards a postindustrial economy helped to offset the decline in industrial employment in Tampere. This led to social and cultural transformations through a gradual change in the population structure as a blue-collar city transformed into a white-collar one. There were several implications: first, changing class allegiances gradually changed the balance of power in local politics, undermining support for leftist parties. This trend has now continued for some time in local politics (see Figure 1 above), Particularly since the Greens won their first seats in the city council in the aftermath of local and national environmental disputes in the mid-1980s. In the 1988 elections, non-socialist seats already outnumbered the socialist section in the council. This was mainly due to the declining number of representatives of the ‘League of the Left’. The dwindling support for socialists (i.e. the social democrats and communists) is depicted in Figure 3.
The growing middle class and the increasing number of university students since the 1960s created a new cultural force that eventually unfolded into new social movements and threw up new challenges to the Brothers-in-Arms. Reflecting the shift towards a post-industrial era, the rise of environmental protests challenged the local regime into a public discussion. The first wave of environmentalism began at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s, raising public concern over the rapid environmental changes of the growing industrial town. A second wave of environmental protests followed in the 1980s, which saw the birth of both local and national green movements. Environmentalism now emerged as a prominent issue of public political debate. The early 1980s were a formative period for a new type of local green movement in Tampere. This became evident in local environmental disputes such as the occupation of the old Art Nouveau office block and the dispute over the Epilä power plant in the early 1980s, which brought together diverse groups of people who shared similar ways of thinking. The coalition that grew out of this movement had its own list of candidates in the 1984 municipal elections,
and it also contributed to the formation of the Finnish Green Party. There was a new player in local politics, and it was gaining in importance.

The SKDL had been an opposition group in local politics for a long time. The Greens took their position as another opposition group. We were an opposition group, but not on the left. . . . you could say that ever since, there have been independent alternatives in the council. . . . At that stage the division into three [political parties] broke down. (Pauli Välimäki, 17 interview, 6 Aug 2000)

A subtle but clear transformation, which had started in the 1960s and which continued to gather pace with the Green movement in the 1980s, was the increase in the number of women in the city council. Their share of seats in the local council has steadily grown from 8.5% in 1939 to 49.3% in 2005 (see Figure 4). As women representatives now accounted regularly for almost 50% of the council, the heads of the social democratic and the conservative groups decided in the late 1980s that the term ‘Brothers-in-Arms Axis’ should no longer be used for other than purposes of historical reference (Timo P. Nieminen, interview 31 Aug 2000).

Figure 4. Proportion of Tampere city council seats occupied by women 1937–2005

Markus Laine, Lasse Peltonen
A major source of conflict between the Axis and environmentalist views was the ‘politics of construction’: construction, especially for developers and many workers, meant progress, employment and welfare. It constituted a shared interest, bridging the left-right political spectrum and the Brothers-in-Arms coalition.

We do have a strong history of construction workers... Construction has brought jobs, fuelling business opportunities. It has been powerful in the SKDL and also in the Left Alliance. They have been linked to welfare like that – so it’s about this very traditional structure. We have seen that construction creates jobs, gives contracts to the industry and products to be produced and so on. (Simo Isoaho18, interview, 24 May 2004)

This politics of construction was challenged by environmentalists and the Greens. Local disputes over increasing traffic, energy production or the use of city space challenged the core idea of the Axis’ political project, which maintained that economic growth and development geared by the Brothers-of-Arms coalition was beneficial for everyone. The Brothers-in-Arms conception of welfare and the new environmentalist ideas of well-being clashed in local disputes. The dominant mindset geared towards employment and economic growth, or ‘simple modernity’ as Ulrich Beck (1992; 1997) would have it, was challenged by environmental protests along with demands for open and democratic local decision-making. The environmental movement thus turned the attention of local people to the problematic by-products of rapid local development, such as the shrinking green spaces, the vanishing cultural heritage, traffic and pollution. The style of local governance also attracted public debate as critics complained that the Brothers-in-Arms politics was undemocratic. The close relations between city leaders and local business (e.g. construction companies) and other features of the local regime were contested. This collision is well-illustrated by a quote from

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the SDP spokesperson during the so-called Tampella dispute in 1989, which frames the juxtaposition as a clash between a proud industrial history and a ‘frustrated’ reaction by an unthankful younger generation, spoiled by their life-style of abundance:

I would have expected the discussion to deal not only with architectural and historical values, but to place more emphasis on the local historical tradition of solidarity, which takes the side of the ordinary citizen’s work, income and future. . . . The history of work and industrial culture is not only made of matter or surface, but also of the spirit and contents of work. The longer the roots of industrial culture, the more important the continuation of the spirit of work and the workforce. The shorter the contact to this tradition, the more emphasis is put on inanimate matter. . . . The social democrats will not submit to pessimism and backward-looking stagnation, which is fed by the life-style of those that have got everything for free and are frustrated by their affluence. (SDP city council group leader Jukka Leino 22 Aug 1989)

The rise of environmentalism signalled a process of pluralisation, with the emergence of new civic groups and their political demands and new, post-industrial values. It did not, however, seriously threaten the core agenda of the Brothers-in-Arms, for it was based on a modernist horizon of increasing welfare and prosperity in Tampere as an important Finnish city. The priorities of the local governance agenda became evident in the early 1990s with the recession. By then, the environmental protest had been partly undermined by the institutionalisation of environmental protection as a national and local government function.

However, the social changes and political challenges made visible the dispositions of the Brothers-in-Arms habitus in the 1970s and increasingly so in the 1980s. The opponents of the Axis in all of these disputes were highly critical towards the non-participatory, elitist and hierarchical decision-making practices
of the Brothers-in-Arms. The critique was directed at the inertia of the Brothers-in-Arms habitus, which is displayed as political dispositions towards other actors in local politics. In some senses, the opponents’ criticism of the Axis as the local mafia (Kihlström, Niskasaari & Sneck 1984) is telling and also explains the endurance of the Axis: it has been a key source of social capital and mutual trust, security and predictability that has captured a preemptive position in the local decision-making system.

Regime continuity through change

The tradition of the Brothers-in-Arms Axis, i.e. the division of power between the Social Democratic Party and the National Coalition Party, has continued virtually uninterrupted for the past 20 years. Although support has wavered from time to time, the position of the Axis parties has remained strong enough for them to persist with Axis co-operation. A key element of this continuity is the Mayor’s office, designated SDP territory that has been held since 1985 by Jarmo Rantanen, who inherited the post from his predecessor Pekka Paavola. Historically, the Tampere regime coincides remarkably well with three distinct cultural phases in postwar Finnish history as identified by Alasuutari (1996): 1) the moral economy of the 1950s and 1960s, 2) the planning economy of the 1960s and 1970s and 3) the competition economy from the 1980s onwards.

These three cultural phases have been characterised by their respective discursive patterns, which can also be seen in the changes and evolution of the Brothers-in-Arms governance. The three Mayors, Lindfors (1957–69), Paavola (1969–1984) and Rantanen (1985–), for instance, have operated in very different environments. Lindfors, and the original Brothers-in-Arms, had a strong ‘moral economic’ agenda, which derived its strength from the wartime experiences and postwar reconstruction efforts
and close contacts with local industrialists. Paavola's approach was less dogmatic in political terms, but heavily focused on efficiency. Rantanen has had a less visible public role than his predecessors, yet he has supported the Axis coalition that has continued to function throughout a string of difficulties, such as the major recession of the early 1990s, increasing fiscal strain and cutbacks in welfare state policies. In sum, the moral and ideological commitment of the original Axis has withered away, but the operating logic, namely the close collaboration between the two major political parties, has continued all the same. The Brothers-in-Arms Axis can thus be seen as an interesting quasi-institutional innovation that has guaranteed the coalition’s access to preemptive power in local politics and has carried the regime through changing times.

Two examples from the most recent municipal elections in 2000 and 2004 serve to illustrate how the Brothers-in-Arms coalition has maintained its support. In 2000, the National Coalition Party and the social democrats lost one seat each in the council. The Christian democrats, the Greens and the politically non-aligned groups all gained in popular support. Nonetheless the Axis parties held on to their majority position by striking a deal with the Christian democrats over the division of seats in the city cabinet and the municipal sectoral boards. The chair of the social democratic group in the city council had stated that the Axis parties were only interested in co-operation with ‘responsible parties’. The local newspaper editorial had critical comments:

[Very soon] after the elections on Sunday the ruling parties of the old Brothers-in-Arms Axis had divided power in the city amongst themselves. It is almost as if there had been no elections at all. . . . Could there ever be a clearer message to the people of Tampere saying that ‘you voted wrong?’ The head of the Social Democratic Party takes the view that at least the eight Green and six non-aligned council members are irresponsible. Luckily the
Social Democrats and the Coalition Party both have a responsible leadership who can immediately set right the flawed results of the popular vote. (*Aamulehti* editorial 26 Oct 2000)

The Brothers-in-Arms coalition thus safeguarded its majority position in the council and its governing capacity by striking deals with third parties after the elections. Interestingly, the discourse in 2000 resonated with the early Brothers-in-Arms postwar discourse that divided ‘us and them’ into responsible and irresponsible actors.

In the 2004 elections, the Axis parties regained their votes after heated debate over the outsourcing of municipal services, in which the two parties were sharply opposed to each other. The pre-election debate and the election results provide an interesting example of the dissociation of ideological discourse from practical co-operation within the Axis coalition. The pre-election debate, which addressed the traditional division between left and right, favoured both of the parties on the opposite sides of the fence. The Greens and other political groups that did not have such a strong agenda on municipal service provision, received much less public attention. Pekka Paavola, the previous Mayor, who was now observing the debate from the vantage-point of a new non-aligned and populist political group, said that the whole debate was very much tinged by election propaganda:

> The Coalition Party’s advertisements for outsourcing and the Social Democrats’ defense of publicly owned services is largely a matter of election propaganda. Before every municipal election it seems that the two parties have visible disagreements on some issues. However [after the elections] they will continue to co-operate just as before, if there are no major changes in electoral support. (Paavola interviewed in *Aamulehti* 10 Oct 2004)
A crucial characteristic of regimes, well visible in the case of the Brothers-in-Arms Axis, is the conscious maintenance of the regime’s governing capacity. The maintenance of co-operation becomes an end-in-it-self, something that is valued over and above temporary disagreements between partners. The social ‘investments’ that the Axis parties had made in the process of building up their co-operation, such as fostering social networks and mutual trust, including shared wartime experiences, were considerable. It would have been extremely difficult if not impossible to develop a similar network for co-ordinated decision-making without the Brothers-in-Arms network. There is also a dynamic of increasing returns at play here. The preemptive power of governing elites means that they can acquire power ‘at wholesale’ (Stone 1988). Instead of spending their energies in gaining the upper hand over other actors in each controversial issue, they use their resources strategically to control the decision agenda to their own benefit. Stone (ibid., 83–84) argues that it is clearly more effective to invest in governing arrangements and in the stabilisation of shared values than to engage in a series of battles concerning individual issues (on increasing returns, see Peltonen 2004; Pierson 2000).

In a comparative study on two German cities, Scott Gissendanner (2004) has identified low party competition as one factor of governing capacity. In our case this applies to the two parties within the governing coalition, their equal strength guaranteeing the need for co-operation. However, it should be noted that their co-operation started precisely because of intense competition between the parties. Complementing Gissendanner’s observation, we found an interesting addition to party competition, namely a low level of competition between individual politicians in national politics. As one of our interviewees observed, most key political figures in the Brothers-in-Arms Axis have never sought to move from local to national
politics (i.e. Parliament). For any local politician, running for Parliament would require efforts to build up a visible individual profile – which might well threaten the unity and collective trust of the local political group.

One of the key challenges for the continuation of the Brothers-in-Arms regime has been the socialisation of newcomers in politics. This has been facilitated by different institutional arrangements. Among the most important of these have been different foundations which brought old and new members of the two Brothers-in-Arms parties together to agree upon projects that it was thought were best kept outside the formal political arena. In these foundations newcomers learned how the interaction between the two parties and with the local business elite worked and how co-operation was maintained in changing social situations.

No political project can gain sufficient credibility unless it is articulated in a way that resonates with the social environment. For this purpose, the Brothers-in-Arms regime used certain characteristic forms of speech from the very outset. Later it had to modify its discourse according to changes in the social situation. This reorientation was facilitated by the regime habitus. As a generative system of dispositions that help to incorporate the old into a new, it enables political actors to form a style, allowing them to select the kind of acts and discourses that are consistent with their political identity. The Brothers-in-Arms discourse became a recontextualising principle with which one appropriates ‘other discourses, bringing them into a special relation with each other for the purposes of their selective transmission and acquisition’ (Bernstein 1990). Some ideas are more consistent with it than others, as our examples above show. The Brothers-in-Arms discourse worked well in terms of securing continuity, until it came up against the task of incorporating the environmental challenge. This was a black spot for the discourse
as the environmental movement was calling into question the whole development project based on linear economic growth, which was at the very core of the Axis agenda.

As an integral part of the Brothers-in-Arms discourse, narratives about the origins and glorious history of the Axis achievements became discursive vehicles for the transmission of the Axis traditions to following generations. One of the most important is a book called *The Napoleon of Tampere,* the biography of the first legendary Brothers-in-Arms leader, Erkki Napoleon Lindfors. A quote from an interview with leader of the National Coalition Party’s city council group, Seppo Rantanen, illustrates how socialisation to Axis thinking worked. He said the first thing he was advised to do upon being elected to the city council (in 1984) was to read the biography of the legendary Mayor Lindfors:

That brought home to me the need for the Axis. Its achievement is development. I am committed to the work of the Axis... The Axis carries both joys and sorrows. It provides a backbone, continuity and predictability. (*Aviisi* 1 Feb 2003)

The Brothers-in-Arms discourse had a strong growth component, which both promoted welfare and was in tune with local corporate interests. Mayor Lindfors was sometimes called ‘the Mayor of industrialists’ – a critical remark from the political left that reveals Lindfors’s business-friendly orientation. In those days, the city granted loans to local companies and listened attentively to corporate demands on local development and city planning. It also took out loans to finance extensive infrastructure and welfare projects. Another important aspect here is the close relationship between local construction companies and the city of Tampere; witness the present Mayor Jarmo Rantanen, who used to be a local manager of a construction company before he took up his public office. In recent years there have also been other moves
from high ranking positions in construction companies to top positions in the city administration.

While the old industries were embedded in the locality and the social fabric of the city, being as old as the city itself, the mobility and volatility of present-day companies calls for new tools for such ‘embedding work’. The governing coalition has gone to great lengths to safeguard its image as a trustworthy partner for businesses. Media Tampere and other similar partnerships are now used in campaigns to try and attract companies to Tampere. Initiatives and strategies such as the centre of expertise programme and the eTampere initiative on electronic governance have the function of channelling both public and private resources to foster innovation.

**Conclusions**

In this chapter we have presented an historical account of the emergence and stabilisation of the local regime in Tampere and described the challenges presented to that regime. We set out by asking what kinds of social mechanisms lie behind the preemptive power excercised by the Brothers-in-Arms Axis. These mechanisms might also be understood as adaptive capacities that allow for a regime to change without losing its character or identity. Our focus here has been on mechanisms through which any regime can be socially regulated in a controlled way, which in turn secures the stabilisation of shared values and social order among the coalition who are in preemptive power position. We conclude that the regime has remained effective and operational by virtue of different social mechanisms, namely institutional, interactive and discursive ones.

First, the official and unofficial institutional mechanisms in local politics have been based on securing a long-standing majority in the city council. The key to co-operation has been
that the social democratic and conservative counterparts have needed each other in order to be able to govern the city. This has included the initial shift from competition between three parties to stable co-operation between two and, eventually, agreements between the leaders of the respective groups, backed by the principle of group discipline applied to voting in the council and an institutionally strong Mayor’s office. This dominance also guaranteed control over the city administration, which was divided into social democratic and conservative mandates. From the political point of view it was also important that the Axis successfully bridged the divide between the political left and right, thus bringing together the representatives of both the local business elite and the strong labour organisations. The relative autonomy of the local political setting vis-à-vis national politics also supported the status of the coalition, giving it a distinctly local character. After the Brothers-in-Arms Axis was stabilised, there was less competition within the coalition. Also, the lack of competition between individual politicians within the coalition maintained the collective, albeit exclusive style of decision-making.

Second, at the cultural plane, the preemptive power of the Axis was based on interactive social mechanisms. These regulated the relationships within the institutions mentioned above. The war was a ‘critical event’ in national and local politics, and it gave rise to a specific kind of habitus which embodied ideological commitments and dispositions towards social and political matters tied together by close personal relations of war-time camaraderie. The habitus of the Brothers-in-Arms, along with tightly-knit social networks, provided an important source of human and social capital, which gave the local regime its cohesion. One important interactive mechanism related to the coalitional habitus was the socialisation of newcomers into the original institutional configuration. Younger generations
of politicians learned how the Axis worked and grew to honour its traditions. Interactive social mechanisms have been also important in partnerships between governing coalition and local business elites. Co-operation was established in the ‘years of danger’ and kept alive by constant attunement by both parties. Close interaction between the counterparts has kept the relationship practical and effective, but this arrangement has also provided terrain for non-public manoeuvres, which faced serious critique in environmental protests from the 1980s on.

Third, discursive social mechanisms supported the cohesion and legitimacy of the regime. A distinction can be made between two types: the ‘Brothers in Arms discourse’ and narratives about the origins and glorious history of the Axis achievements. They served different purposes. The ‘Brothers-in-Arms discourse’ emerged as a legitimising discourse which it resorted to in the face of criticism from the communists and in the environmental disputes starting from the 1970s. The discourse was grounded in the position of the local regime as a guarantor of, first, Finnish independence and, later, the continued welfare of its population. It thus became a recontextualising mechanism which helped to reinvent the purpose of the governing arrangements and to steer through changing times. The straightforward style of decision-making was justified by the remarkable results. The ‘common good’ was closely linked to a discourse of modernisation, promoting local development and technological progress. The ‘politics of construction’ was embraced by the whole political spectrum – at least until the environmentalist critique entered the debate. The discursive resonance between the war-time crisis and the crises of the postwar reconstruction, the restructuring of the economy and the recession of the early 1990 also serves as an interesting case of cultural and institutional continuity and transformation. The crisis mentality sharpened the shared goals of the Axis, bringing them to focus on the very survival of Tampere
and enhancing the legitimacy of effective governance (for crisis mentality, see also Gissendanner 2004). Narratives about the origins and the glorious history of the Axis achievements, on the other hand, were not used for steering purposes, but rather for stating the fact that the Brothers-in-Arms co-operation has been and will be beneficial for everyone, even the local critics of the Axis. These narratives were told at suitable occasions: to initiate the newcomers or to strengthen the sense of collectivity, but also to legitimise the longue durée of the regime.

From a contextual perspective it is apparent that a virtuous cycle emerged in the postwar years between the outcomes of the regime policies and the legitimacy of the governing coalition. The momentum began to fade as the economic boom petered out, especially since the 1970s, but the long period of success still remained an important source of pride for the regime. The idea of a virtuous circle is linked to the mechanism of increasing returns, whereby the coalition gained power ‘at wholesale’ through its strategic position in local governance. This strategic position remained strong even in the wake of the socio-economic downturn. In any case, the ‘golden age’ of the local regime became a reference point and an example for later development efforts.

In recent post-industrial times, the traditions of governance demonstrate both continuity and transformation. As far as the critics are concerned, the strive for local dynamism has undermined local democracy, as the social production of power (power to) operating in the regime becomes a preemptive form of power which excludes some actors from agenda-setting. Contradictions surrounding the goals and values promoted in local development have also become imminent. This has been clearly demonstrated through the history of local environmental protests and demands for open decision-making. It seems, however, that the stability and trust embodied in the long-lasting
regime has become a crucial part of local governing capacity. The decision-making mechanism developed over the years and decades by the Brothers-in-Arms has allowed for effective strategic decision-making. From the point of view of legitimacy and accountability, this means that the prospects for effective implementation of local strategies remain high. Despite recent social transformations, the Brothers-in-Arms tradition has been successful in framing Tampere as a unified entity with unified interests. In sum, the history of local governance in Tampere demonstrates that, to modify the motto of regime theory, ‘local politics, with its historical roots of interactions, matter’.

Manuel Castells concludes his *Informational City* (1989) by assigning a fundamental role to local governments in the new global economy. According to Castells’ agenda, they are to engage local civil societies and develop trans-local networks to counter the volatility of the global economy. The Tampere model shows that the Brothers-in-Arms style of decision-making (‘it has been agreed that…’) presents a historically tested balance point between the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of local government. Interestingly, inter-organisational trust in network society seems to require clear control within organisations. It can be argued that the Brothers-in-Arms political culture, constructed around the use of preemptive regime power, has enabled a streamlined decision-making mechanism that is needed in consolidating trust and networking with other organisations. The historical origins of the Brothers-in-Arms style of governance have faced and continue to face the challenge of representing local civil society. Indeed, one of the future challenges is to secure political participation itself, which has been lingering close to the level of a 50% voter turnout.

Despite the pluralisation of politics and society and the increasing complexity of the network economy, it seems that the Brothers-in-Arms tradition of straightforward dynamism,
strategic leadership and effective government is well justifiable. Since the Brothers-in-Arms regime has provided the core mechanism for political decision-making for such a long time, it will be interesting to see how flexible this pattern is. Eventually, if the present trend continues, the leftist parties will lose support, which may bring the position of Social Semocrats under pressure. Tampere could then enter a phase of pluralistic competition between political groups – something the city has not seen since 1945. It is possible, however, that the major innovation of the Brothers-in-Arms, i.e. the decision-making mechanism of ‘it has been agreed…’, could still prevail, despite changes in local political alliances.

List of interviews

**Vilho Halme** (Social Democratic Party, former long-time city council chairman and long-standing editor of local social democratic newspaper), interviewed on 24 March 1999 by Markus Laine (M.L.) and Lasse Peltonen (L.P.)

**Pauli Välimäki** (The Greens, head of The Green city council group), interviewed on 6 Aug 2000 by M.L. and L.P.

**Timo P. Nieminen** (National Coalition Party, former head of the NC city council group and long-time chairman of city government), interviewed on 31 Aug 2000 by M.L. and L.P.

**Simo Isoaho** (Left Alliance member), interviewed on 24 May 2004 by M.L. and L.P.

**Olli Niemi** (Managing Director, Tampere Technology Centre Hermia Ltd.), personal communication 19 Jan 2005 with M.L.

References

V Democratic Governance


V Democratic Governance


Endnotes


2 In many ways, regime theory resonates with the broader notion of governance, referring to multi-agency partnerships, power dependencies between organizations involved in collective action and the intertwining of
V Democratic Governance

responsibilities between public and private sectors in meeting governance challenges (Stoker 1998).

Partly due to its industrial history and sizeable labour population, Tampere was one of the last postings of the reds in the 1918 Civil War. The war followed Finnish independence from Russia in 1917 and pitted ‘reds’ against ‘whites’. The former were mostly smallholders and workers, while the latter were typically landowners, entrepreneurs and middle class professionals.

The Finnish People’s Democratic League, Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto (SKDL) in Finnish. The coalition included the Communists. The SKDL was the predecessor of the present-day Vasemmistoliitto, ‘League of the Left’.

As Figure 1 indicates, there was a minor change in the early 1960s when the conservative National Coalition Party lost places to other non-socialist parties such as the liberals and the Swedish People’s Party. In addition, there were small and temporary moderate conservative groups that were close to the National Coalition Party and that are included in the National Coalition numbers in Figure 1.

Translation from a book in Finnish by Raimo Seppälä: Tampereen Napoleon (The Napoleon of Tampere), which focuses on the political career of Erkki Napoleon Lindfors.

Long-time social democratic chairman of the local council and long-time editor of the local social democratic newspaper Kansan Lehti (‘People’s news’).

The war reparations were entered as part of the peace treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union and they were mostly made in kind: ships, locomotives and machinery.

In Finnish: Tekojen aseveljeyttä (Tienari 1966)

The quotation is from a 1960s campaign film commissioned by the City of Tampere where images of demolished old wooden buildings were shown as a symbol of a better, ‘concrete’ future.

According to Seppälä (1983), mayor Lindfors had an ‘academic trauma’: he valued higher education and university degrees but did not have one himself. This may explain his personal motivation to make Tampere a university town in the 1960s.

Alma-Media (owner of the local newspaper Aamulehti), Elisa (the former local telephone co-operative, Tampereen puhelinosuuskunta), Nokia and Fujitsu-data. See also http://www.mediatampere.fi/in_english/

The original Finnish title Tampereen tulevaisuus on tiedossa, translatable as ‘The future of Tampere is in knowledge’, is a play on words and also has the meaning ‘The future of Tampere is known’. The second strategy was prepared in 2001 under the title The very best Tampere (In Finnish Kaikem paree Tampere, making use of the local dialect). It places greater emphasis on civic participation than the first one. Its effect is as yet unclear.

We have discussed local environmentalism in greater detail elsewhere (see Laine in press; Peltonen in press; Laine and Peltonen 2003; Laine, Peltonen, and Haila 1998).

The Green movement was born following a major wave of environmental mobilization after the 1979 dispute over the protection of Lake Koijärvi, an important lake for birds in Southern Finland. The repercussions of the Koijärvi dispute were seen across the country in the outbreak of local environmental disputes.

A long standing environmental activist and a Green city council representative.

A long-time Finnish Communist Party member.

Here we follow Basil Bernstein’s definition of pedagogic discourse as ‘the rule which embeds a discourse of competence (skills of various kinds) into a discourse of social order in such a way that the latter always dominates the former. . . . Pedagogic discourse is a principle for appropriating other discourses and bringing them into a special relation with each other for the purposes of their selective transmission and acquisition. Pedagogic discourse, then, is a principle which removes (delocates) a discourse from its substantive practice and context, and relocates that discourse according to its own principle of selecting, relocating and focusing’ (Bernstein 1990).

The book was authored by a former editor-in-chief of Aamulehti, Raimo Seppälä (1983).