The chapters in this book contribute to the research tradition of citizenship, social networks, social capital and social and political participation – as well as in the heyday that the tradition has now enjoyed for more than a decade. They do that by providing an extensive portrait of, particularly European, citizenship, and by covering phenomena such as citizens’ notions of the significance of citizenship and the characteristics of a “good citizen”, trust in political institutions and the functioning of the entire democratic system, as well as a variety of forms of social and political participation and association activity, together with cognitions such as sense of efficacy that form the foundation for feelings of belongingness to a society as well as rationale for social and political participation. The latter tie the newer stratum of social science research with the tradition of study of political efficacy, sense of belonging and alienation, started in the US in the 1950s, and with roots in Tocquevillean thinking.

The ISSP Citizenship data makes also possible larger scale comparisons between the EU countries and non-EU countries, within the limits of ISSP-membership and participation in the Citizenship module (see Appendix 2). The results show relatively large variety and sharp contrasts, also between European countries. One can, however, also observe notable similarities among them. The analysis starts with
the question of the special nature of Finland. The location of Finland in the conceptual grid of aspects of “good citizenship” corresponds to Finland’s position in the theories of types of capitalism and welfare regimes. Regime analysis is also consistent with the grouping of other countries in this grid. The main focus in the analysis was in the differentiation of EU-countries as well as in looking for the least common denominator: the signifiers of a “European” citizenship.

While the survey method constrains the study to methodological individualism, where phenomena such as social capital or trust are reduced to quantifiable and measurable qualities and perceptions of individuals, the comparison of nations opens perspectives that transcend this limitation: we can observe different citizenship regimes and their constitutive elements such as generalized trust or sense of political efficacy or forms of participation in their cultural and historical contexts. The special treatment given to Finland in some of the chapters of this book is, we hope, an example of such in-depth treatment.

The New Boom of Citizenship Studies in the 1990s

A new wave of studies emerging early in the 1990s has created many more or less ambitious typologies and categorizations of countries based on empirical generalizations. Quite often this has happened at the cost of older theory based typologies, many of whom were developed in the 1950s, some even in the classical period of sociology around the turn of the 19th and 20th century.

As the new boom started, most attention was paid to the different aspects of social capital as formulated by Robert D. Putnam (1993; 1995): trust, voluntary associations and social networks of bridging social capital that brings together people from different social backgrounds (Putnam 2000). This analysis led to empirical typologies based mostly on survey findings. Countries were first roughly grouped into those whose citizens had many association memberships (e.g. the
Netherlands; the Nordic Countries; Ireland) and those whose citizens didn’t belong to the same extent (see e.g. Morales 2001; Curtis et al. 2001; Siisiäinen 1999; Wallace 2005; Baer 2007). Putnam adopted this typology to differentiation between regions within nations, too (1993; 2000). The differences that he found between countries have presented themselves in approximately the same form in subsequent studies (with small fluctuations caused by methodical and operational choices).

A new dimension in participation research was opened by making a distinction between formal membership and working membership (e.g. Curtis et al. 2001). On working membership dimension, the USA and Canada, for example, rank high, whereas some countries of high formal membership show lower figures (e.g. some Nordic countries, Ireland) (op.cit. 792-793). A step further is made by Dekker and van den Broek (1998; 2005; see Stroemsnes & Wollebaek 2006; c.f. Morales 2001) who develop a typology using the percentage of association memberships in the population and the percentage of volunteers among members as variables. This results in three different types of civil society: (1) the parochial (few members, high percentage of the members as activists); typical representatives to be found among the Southern European countries. (2) active civil society (high proportion of members + high percentage of volunteers among members); typical countries in North America; (3) broad civil society (relatively high membership figures + modest proportions of volunteering); the Nordic countries, West Germany, and the Netherlands.

Another widening of this social capital perspective on associations and social networks has been the examination of both bridging (especially associations) and bonding networks (e.g. relatives, friends, community networks). The inclusion of these bonding “memberships” disperses the country groupings based on association activeness figures alone. Some countries seem to have both high association membership figures and social contact figures (e.g. meeting friends) (the Netherlands, Sweden), while some countries rank low in association memberships but high in friendship and other social networking activities (Bulgaria, Cyprus), whereas some countries with high memberships are located
clearly lower on the list of meeting friends and other informal forms of networking (e.g. Finland) (see Wallace 2005).

Trust and high number of association memberships have correlated highly on country level ever since they have been measured since early 1990s (see Warren [ed.] 1999; Inglehart 1999; Wallace 2005). Generally speaking, the top ten “trusting” nations consist of citizens in – mostly protestant – welfare states (Nordic countries, some central European countries, some English-speaking countries). The relationship between association memberships and trust is one of the most studied sociological problems around the turn of the Millennium. The differences between countries seem convincing at the macro level whereas at the individual level, most of the researchers tend to think that there is not enough evidence about the positive effect of association memberships on the level of trust (see Siisiäinen and Kouvo in this volume). As many researchers, especially in the Nordic countries, have noted, the relationship between trust and association membership on individual level seems to be more or less spurious and “the scope of the voluntary sector […] appears more important than activity level for the aggregate level of social capital and civic engagement” (Stroemsnes & Wollebaek 2006, 15).

In can be concluded – especially from the results of many Scandinavian studies – that the role of broad, visible and widely known system of voluntary associations is of utmost importance for the creation of social capital and trust. And second, the role of the public sector and state institutions (the Nordic welfare state institution) as well as various forms of neo-corporatism (study circles, tripartite state commission with trade union representation, tradition of large citizens’ movements etc.) belong to the most central background factors in the explanation of the high level of social capital in the Nordic countries (see Rothstein 2001; Trägårdh 2007). Third, the relationship between broad system of voluntary associations and the (welfare) state as well as general knowledge about the effectiveness of this dialectics has been very important in the creation of the sense of security among citizens as the basis for social capital. This is connected with the historical devel-
opment of specific types of relationships between civil society and the state, and with different kinds of political opportunity structures (e.g. open vs. closed state; inclusionary vs. exclusionary state to challenging movements) (see Kriesi et al. 1995).

On the basis on these kinds of findings, it seems well grounded to conclude that

1. research has to take the macro level more seriously into focus as the context of micro relations between individual association memberships and social capital;

2. state and welfare regimes need to be included among the independent “causal factors” in the explanation of the differences (or similarities) between countries;

3. state – civil society relations need to be theoretized and typologicized as a general basis for more detailed comparisons between countries;

4. this stresses the importance of historical analysis: (a) of state – civil society relations; (b) of conceptual and rhetorical analysis of civil society in different countries (e.g. Trägårdh 2007; Brown et al. 2000).

5. 15 years after the Putnamian turn, some of the partly forgotten “classical” themes dealt with in theories about the relationship between (interest) associations and the political system should be reinstated in the frame of reference of (regulation of) conflicts (e.g. Dahrendorf 1957), relation between organized and non-organized interests (e.g. Schattschneider 1960; Bachrach & Baratz; see Blom 1981; Siisiäinen 1985; 2004; Blom & Siisiäinen 1992), relationships between inequality structures (classes), other discourses of difference and voluntary organizing (discussions about sociological pluralism; see Siisiäinen 1986).

In making theoretical typologies, a central decision concerns the level of generality. Very general typologies (c.f. Weber’s discussion about the relationship between religions and the development of capitalism or Marx’s analysis of the modes of production that preceded capitalism)
can only form the first, abstract point of departure for developing more concrete classifications. On the other hand, if a more empirically based typologizing classification tries to follow too closely the empirically depicted reality, the theoretical usefulness and fruitfulness will be lost. It then resembles a small-scale map, which copies its geographical object too keenly and becomes useless in orientating oneself.

The typologies utilized here are the first step in specifying the characteristics of the Finnish case. They help us to first place Finland in a more general category among European welfare political regimes; and second, help make distinctions within the more general, “Nordic (Scandinavian) type”. General, theoretically grounded typologies are needed to open all survey figures which can be “attained” in so many different ways (c.f. China’s high scoring in international comparisons of trust, see Inglehart 1999); difficulties in interpretations of the Johns Hopkins study of the non-profit sector (c.f. Salamon et al. 1999).

We have found Eva Schofer and Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas’ syntheticizing typology a fruitful basis for our analysis. Building on a thorough meta-analysis of empirical studies, Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas conclude that there are two distinctions that account for much of the variation of voluntary association memberships among nations in terms of the number and types of associations that people join: (1) between statist versus non-statist (sometimes called “liberal”) societies, and (2) between corporate versus non-corporate societies (2001, 806). Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas’ interpretation of their results emphasize the differences on the societal, structural (or “macro”) level and thereby adds evidence to the ideas that have risen in many new Nordic studies (see Rothstein 2001; Wollebaek & Selle 2002; Ilmonen 2007).

Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas also stress the importance of classical sociological theories of the field and of the historical analysis of collective action as well as attitudes and behavioural patterns leading to participation: these practices and attitudes do not develop independently from their “dialectical” and historically grounded relations with different kinds of institutions. Institutional means to pursue
civic engagement, on their part, are constrained by political structures. Political structures “serve as social sites where perceptions and ideas about actorhood and sovereignty are played out, institutionalized, and constructed as ‘legitimate’” (Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001, 810). This all gives support for understanding the relationship between associations (and other forms of social and political participation) as dialectical interaction between constraining and/or enabling “dual” opportunity structures and challenging or consensual movements and associations (see Tarrow 1989; Siisiäinen 1990).

Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas build their typology on the work done by neo-institutionalists and regime theoreticians. The most central ideas are derived from Gösta Esping-Andersen’s typology that distinguishes between liberal, social-democratic and conservative regimes (1990; op.cit. 810-811). The basic variables of the new typology are defined as follows:

1) **Statism** describes the different ways of deriving political legitimacy in modern societies (the state vs. civil society). In statist countries, like France and Germany, “the state constitutes a separate and superior order of political governance that derives much of its legitimacy from a well-developed bureaucratic elite […] and is therefore often subject to some form of state control”. In Anglo-Saxon countries, by contrast, the state derives “its legitimacy from its function as the representation of civil society, which is considered to be the principal locus of public life” (op. cit. 811). In Scandinavia states, also support and act benevolently toward associations but the boundaries between the state and civil society are more blurred (op. cit. 812).

2) **Corporateness** is the second variable of the typology bringing some central ideas of theories of corporatism back to the fore: “polities vary in the way in which social actors are incorporated… Some social systems assign sovereign “actorhood” to private persons and typically locate interest representation in individuals – with group action being legitimate only as the embodiment of individual wishes. Other systems assign a higher moral purpose to organized groups, empowering individuals chiefly as members of broader collectives that have specific
“rights and functions” (op. cit. 813). As a modern representative of a corporate society, Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas take up Sweden as distinguished from its opposite, the Anglo-Saxon nations representing individualistic political cultures (op. cit. 814). By cross-tabulating these two variables, a new typology utilizing older Jepperson’s (1992) ideas is obtained (op.cit. 817):

**Figure 1.** Variation in National Polity Structure; Statism versus Corporateness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Corporateness</th>
<th>Degree of Statism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States, Britain, Canada</td>
<td>France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian (Nordic) countries</td>
<td>Wilhelmine Germany, postwar Germany, Austria, Central and Eastern Europe, Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is easy to locate Finland in this typology in the same category with the other Nordic countries as a non-statist and corporate country. There are also some other theoretically based attributes that could be added as complementary aspect to the typology. Finland can be regarded also strong and as an inclusionary state in its relations with challengers (c.f. Kriesi et al. 1995).
The background for the analysis of the types of capitalism is the French regulation school (Aglietta 1973, Lipietz 1987, and as general review Jessop 1990). In our analysis the starting point is not the whole institutional structure of regulation but only the main features of the structural differentiation of capitalism. The theory used is that of Boyer’s (1997). We can proceed by investigating the foundation of Boyer’s types.

The basis of Boyer’s classification for types of capitalism is the distinctive forms of labour market relations, their institutional characteristics and adjustments, as well as the consequential advantages and disadvantages, respectively. The four types of capitalism are ‘market-oriented’ (USA, Canada and Britain), ‘Rhineland or corporatist’ (Germany, Japan), ‘statist’ (France, Italy) and ‘social democrat’ (Sweden, Austria) (Boyer 1997, 90).

Esping-Andersen distinguishes three welfare regimes: ‘liberal’ (USA as modal example), ‘social democratic’ (the Nordic countries) and ‘conservative’ (Germany, Italy) (Esping-Andersen 1999, 73-). The original basis was the de-commodification of welfare or the decrease in the commodity nature of labour power. In the liberal model, few rights and a low level of de-commodification mean that the liberal welfare regime is almost completely Anglo-Saxon: it comprises the United States, Canada, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, and Britain. The social democratic welfare regime includes the Nordic countries, and the conservative model almost all other countries. There are different variants inside the three welfare regimes and, in some cases, the situation has changed after the publication of Esping-Andersen’s 1999 book.

De-commodification of welfare, the basic feature of Esping-Andersen’s regime typology has certainly changed. Labour market relations are more fragmented and insecure than earlier and their mode of regulation is changing. In a similar way, the de-commodification of welfare and welfare state have been under new pressures. (Julkunen 2001, Esping-Andersen et al. 2002). For example Esping-Andersen (2002, 25) describes a transition where welfare is “externalized to market” and “internalized in the family” We can add to the picture also Manuel
Castells’ (1996) contribution and the question of new informational mode of capitalism or the multitude of world-scale transformations called globalization. Globalization sets both new limits to nation states and new demands for global citizenship.

Regime analysis has experienced many challenges and further developments, which give new significance for the whole regime idea. A good example is the work of the group Globalization, Gender and Work Transformation. Their book (Walby et. al. 2007) Gendering the Knowledge Economy. Comparative Analysis provides many critical questions as well as important answers. From our perspective, the most interesting matters are 1. the different dimensions, often dualities, used in the definition of the types of capitalism, 2. the institutions used in classification of (gender) regimes, and 3. the place of the types of regulation in the analysis, for example in the regulation of gender relations.

In the literature, there are well-known distinctions between corporatism and liberalism (Crouch 1982), liberal market and coordinated economies (Hall and Soskice 2001) and institutionally thin and thick societies (Streeck 1992). Walby (2007, 13) says that capitalist production regimes differ on series of a dimensions, and many dualities need still further subdivisions (for example corporatism or the nature of regulating institutions). In the case of ‘citizenship regimes’, the relevant institutions are both the official institutions supporting the democratic system and also the socio-political institutions regulating the use of citizenship rights. Also Streeck’s (1992, 37) distinction between institutionally thick and thin societies can be relevant in the analysis of citizenship regimes. Still, in the case of associations as institutions we must notice that there is a danger of tautological explanations.

Our analysis does not move on the level of regulation of organizations and practices. However, we know well that welfare state regimes and the actual regulation differ a lot. Walby’s idea of the move from domestic to public formation of welfare and gender relations can have analogical use in the sphere of citizenship analysis. A good example regarding the regulations related to the gender regimes is the com-
parative analysis of Lenz (2007) that unites the levels of nation-state, European Union and UN and the global structure. In the work of the research group mentioned above, globalization forms a highly important context. For example, the background for Lenz’ analysis is the ‘magic triangle’ of Altvater and Mahnkopf (2000; Lenz 2007, 111). In Altvater’s and Mahnkopf’s model the levels and codes relevant for research are supranational organizations/nation states with the code of power and decision-making, transnational corporations following the code of the market, and civil society following the code of negotiation and communication. The levels presented above are analogous to an extent with the conceptual differentiation of citizenship. ‘Cosmopolitan citizenship’ (Delanty 2000) comes to the level of supranational organizations. The global companies use and are also benchmarking corporate citizenship (Sklair 2001) and the civil society with the concept of ‘civil’ as the root of citizenship.

The comparative analysis of Lenz (2007) shows among other things the difference between German corporate capitalism and Japanese hybrid corporate capitalism. In the German case the level of nation-state is dominant. In the case of Japan, corporatism works at the enterprise level. The other example is the US which is totally separated from international regulation of UN and other bodies concerning global equality norms and gender regulations. Both examples are as such relevant for comparative citizenship analysis. More generally, the example refers to the need of clearly defined multi-level analysis, which also understands the different codes used in different sectors. In relation to our book this is mainly the next step of citizenship research.

What are we actually doing when trying to find the differentiation of social and political participation according to regimes or systems? Let’s start once more from the basics. The conceptual background of our analysis is formed by the types of capitalism and the welfare regimes. In addition, some differentiating features of political system like the degrees of statism and the degree in corporateness (in earlier typology, page 176) and also the nature of civil society and its relation to the state and politics must be considered.
Let’s go back to the original presentations of Boyer and Esping-Andersen. The basis of Boyer’s classification for types of capitalism are the distinctive forms of labour market relations, their institutional characteristics and adjustments, and the consequential advantages and disadvantages, respectively. The four types of capitalism are ‘market-oriented’ (USA, Canada and Britain), ‘Rhineland or corporatist’ (Germany, Japan), ‘statist’ (France, Italy) and ‘social democrat’ (Sweden, Austria) (Boyer 1997:90; table 4.6.).

The types or regimes in question are relatively stable and longer lasting and historically based on definite types of class relations, political structures and coalitions. They are not subject to immediate political changes or conjunctures. If they were, for example present Finland and Sweden with their right-wing governments would not be very good examples of social democratic regimes. Still, there remains the question of the possibility of change. To determine whether a regime shift has occurred or not, we must ask if the decisive factors have changed?

The very basic structural conditions, forms of labour market relations that are dealt with in Boyer’s typology or de-commodification of welfare in Esping-Andersen’s regimes have certainly changed. Labour market relations are more fragmented and insecure than earlier, and their mode of regulation is changing. In a similar way, the de-commodification of welfare and welfare state has been under new pressures. (Julkunen 2001, Esping-Andersen et al. 2002.)

After seeing the obvious limits of regime analysis we can notice that in many ways our regime based analysis of social and political participation is also a test of the usefulness of “regime type” concepts in the analysis of the differentiation of countries.

One theoretical step closer to the Putnamian concept of (system integrative) concept of social capital could be found on the home field of Putnam, from the American theory of sociological pluralism (Bentley, Schattschneider, Lipset). In this tradition, the relation between the reproduction of the structures or inequality (class interest), the forms of voluntary organizing and political democracy are analysed in a way that could fill in some of the gaps found in Putnamian analyses (see Siisiäinen 2004b).
The concepts of citizen and citizenship have many dimensions and aspects. The adequacy of regime analysis depends on what approach to citizenship we have. If we look at the regimes of social and political participation, the regime analysis is very limited.

If we take as example the means of participation scores by countries, the regime picture is unclear. The Nordic countries have scores between 525 (Finland) and 551 (Denmark). At the top there is Canada (572) and New Zealand (567). USA is on the level of Nordic countries (550). But on the same level there are Austria, France, Australia, Germany, Netherlands Portugal and Uruguay, all between 520 and 550 scores. This tells that in non-associational participation there are no clear regimes, at least regimes following the welfare – state typologies. At the bottom of the scale are earlier socialist countries Hungary (414) and Bulgaria (428) and Russia (438), and on the other hand some Asian and Latin American countries like Philippines (422) and Chile (433). The form of political system and political culture with the socio-economic development level of the country unite to form the background of the means of participation scores.

If we go to deeper analysis of social inequality of participation, the picture changes once more. The effects of social position on participation are of top significance. Measured by education, the social position has a clear effect on social and political participation in every country. The level of education and participation correlate positively in all countries. The correlation is highest in Germany and USA, and very clear also in Norway. The education has the lowest effect on participation in Finland. Thereby Finland is also in this respect different than the other Nordic countries. It has higher social equality. The same kinds of results concern also the effects of gender and age on social and political participation (Siisiäinen & Blom 2008).
### Figure 2. Participation by level of education

#### PARTICIPATION BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION
(means of factor scores; ISSP total = 500).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>LOW (1-9 yr.)</th>
<th>MEDIUM (10-13)</th>
<th>HIGH (14-25 yr.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total ISSP</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic Countries</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Countries</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU Countries</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main conclusion from the analysis is that more educational equality is needed if we want to create a more democratic society in terms of social and political activity and possibilities to influence on social conditions. This concerns both associational activity and other forms of participation.

In taking into account associational membership as well as different forms of socio-political participation, we will clearly see that citizenship is a cultural matter and that it is also strongly related to moral consciousness and to value related conceptions of good citizenship. All these aspects can be reasons and motives of action.

Finally it must be said that even now the core of any citizenship conception is citizenship rights. These rights are more or less related to other aspects of citizenship. As experienced matters or practical means they are central in the examination of citizenship. It can be added that in the times of economic crises as nowadays the significance of rights acquire further importance.

In the formation of identity citizenship is important but there are also other factors which have the same or even bigger influence on identity than citizenship as such. A Finnish study based on the ISSP Citizenship data of the year 2005 show that the occupation and region has bigger influence on identity than the citizenship (Oinonen et al. 2005). In other circumstances, the ethnicity, race, religion and also generation can be significant in identity formation.

Our analysis gives results that have some wider significance to the direction of the analysis of democracy and power, for example the differences in degrees of equality of participation between countries according to education, gender and age groups. The relatively clear differentiation of countries according to the types of welfare regimes and the degree of statism and corporativeness as such is meaningful evidence about the wide scale of different socio-political possibilities. Secondly, the wide differences according to social position using education as the indicator tell that although the ordinary people's real possibilities to influence political decisions are very limited everywhere, there are those who do not have those possibilities at all or only have them to
a very limited extent. Large parts of population have no possibilities
to influence the society and politics, even though the assumptions of
participatory concepts of democracy state differently. This is why the
results are good evidence about the state of participation in different
countries but relatively weak evidence about the state of democracy,
power and hegemonic relations. Therefore it can be emphasized that
research on participation cannot take place in a vacuum.

EU as a Political Entity?
Cosmopolitical Convictions or Nationalist Thinking?

The citizenship model of Europe has experienced heavy transformations
as well as significant blows in the last few decades. The foundations of
ideals of equal participation rights and welfare rights have been tried
by different resource allocation battles. Also the rise of neo-liberalism
has tended to reinforce differences instead of alleviating them. New
Europeans, immigrants and members of new EU countries are often
in a weaker position. The Nordic welfare model has suffered, especially
in the recession-ridden 1990s to the point that some wonder if the
paradise is already lost.

In Marshall’s model of citizenship, legal citizen rights were born
first, in the 17th and 18th centuries, political rights in the 18th and 19th
centuries, and social rights in the 19th and 20th centuries. The institutions
supporting citizens’ different basic rights, such as the parliament for
political rights or the welfare state for social rights, followed the devel-
opment of principles defining them. Nowadays, cultural rights have also
gained increased significance in the globalized world (Pakulski 1997).

The different categories of citizen rights have been dealt with in
an uneven manner in this book. The more established legal rights have
only been given fleeting attention, while political rights have been
discussed at length. A perspective that has repeatedly manifested itself
is the dependence of the realization of political rights on social rights:
important political perceptions such as sense of political efficacy are still unevenly distributed among different segments of societies. One could go as far as to state that all the other rights depend on the economic rights and social position. Because of the economic dependence, the concept of citizenship is always incomplete and impossible to realize in practice.

Some limitations to the realization of citizen rights have been brought about by globalization: the nation state, while still an important locus of political identity, has lost some of its significance as the guarantor of citizen rights. These ideas resonate with the work of a number of contemporary writers such as Heater (2002) on ‘world citizenship’, Falk (1994) and Urry (2000,172-86) on ‘global citizenship’, Hutchings and Dannreuther (1998) and their contributors on ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’, Soysal (1994) on ‘post-national citizenship’, and Kaldor (2003) and Keane (2003) on ‘global civil society’ in that they see identifications, networking and mobility that crosses national borders as a force that is permanently going to change the way we conceptualize citizenship.

The most influential normative perspectives upon the ethical character of global civil society are liberal cosmopolitanism and nationalist thinking. Within international political theory, the main alternative to cosmopolitan arguments is usually regarded as provided by moral theories that call upon the continuing significance of national boundaries in relation to political community.

These kinds of perspectives tend to drive us to see things as either-or: either we have bonds with as well as obligations to others, irrespective of our nationality; or the nation-state defines our sense of political. Overcoming this dualism and seeing alternative notions of belonging, and of exercising rights and obligations is a remarkable challenge both for theoretical and empirical social research. In EU, divergent political cultures are wise to cherish diversity while looking for what unites us all.
References


