“Believe in Britain.”

Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom Independence Party’s (UKIP) policies in 2009-2015

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Abstract:

This master’s thesis examines the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which is labelled as United Kingdom’s (UK) most eurosceptic party, whereby it essentially opposes the European Union (EU). This nationally unique party has only recently risen to the political mainstream – albeit still as a minor party – in the United Kingdom, even though the party’s success in the recent EU-elections has been exceptional. Given that UKIP is a one-of-a-kind political party, the noteworthy achievement of this thesis is the individually defined UKIP’s EU-attitude, which is built around the party’s ideology, three appropriate theories and two theoretical approaches. Its validity is tested in two analyses that scrutinise the data [a. UKIP’s official documents, and b. MEPs’ speeches in the European Parliament (EP)].

The research objective is two-fold: first, the objective is to assess the party’s attitude towards the EU in an entirely new context, and the second objective is to examine how the directly elected UKIP MEPs (Members of European Parliament) carry out their mandate in an institution which they heavily oppose. These aforementioned objectives are reached using theory-driven content analysis, with which the non-structured data are condensed into coherent and appropriate form.

First of all, the results confirmed that that UKIP, MEPs, and the party’s overall EU-attitude are at least as unique, as is the bilateral UK-EU relations. Most importantly, however, the results thoroughly support the constructed theoretical framework and thus revealed that the party fundamentally opposes the EU’s policies and actions, and that the membership cripples the UK’s economy, infrastructure and human capital. Moreover, UKIP strongly argues that the comprehensive control practiced by the EU limits the UK from developing both nationally and internationally, whereby the UK should withdraw from the EU entirely.

In terms of the behavior of the UKIP MEPs, it became evident that since they can be halved to passive and active players in the EP, the mandate is carried out immediately. All things considered, the achieved results can be considered academically important and a good starting point for further, related research.

Key words: United Kingdom Independence Party; UKIP; euroscepticism; European Union; United Kingdom; Britain; British politics.
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background and motives

The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is the United Kingdom’s (UK) most eurosceptic political party. The party won the United Kingdom’s European Union-elections (EU) in 2014, and against all odds, beat the current governmental parties, the Conservatives (also Tory) and Labour (BBC, 2014c). In the preceding EU-elections, in 1999, 2004 and 2009, UKIP’s success has steadily grown, as time by time, the party has increased its number of seats in the European Parliament (EP). These factors have largely contributed to the fact that the party has risen from sidelines to mainstream in the British political context, alike making UKIP a household name. Albeit still a minor party, UKIP is nowadays a significant political force, and therefore able to challenge the mainstream parties in the upcoming UK general elections in May 2015. In fact, UKIP’s main target is to win seats from the national Parliament, and through elected Members of Parliament (MP), influence to the current state of British society.

UKIP is oftentimes characterised as a single-issue, anti-EU -party, which requires complete withdrawal from the EU. Partially, this is true, as the party still strongly advocates complete withdrawal, but recently the party has introduced and developed new, timely policies for two reasons – a. to shed the single-issue -label, and b. to compete and challenge the rival parties in order to achieve office. Thus far, UKIP has achieved no seats in general elections, whereby it can be stated that electoral success has been void. Luckily, however, in 2014, the party achieved two seats from the House of Commons in the national by-elections; this arguably has returned faith in the party executives, and on its part, has spurred the party into taking further, pivotal steps. Despite the low levels of national success, the achievements in the EU-elections tell an entirely different story, as mentioned. All things considered, UKIP’s position in British politics is rather particular.

Given that UKIP is a profoundly eurosceptic party, euroscepticism also enacts as the theoretical framework. UKIP’s EU-stance is so particular that it could not be comprehensively covered with only one theory, whereby the theoretical part consists of three category-based theories, and two other theoretical approaches that deepen the understanding of the phenomenon in a case-specific context. Considering that these
theories combine cover both attitudinal and numeric aspects attitude, it was safe to re-
define UKIP’s EU-attitude in accordance of the appropriate observations (see chapter 4.6).

Since UKIP currently operates in two dissimilar political environments – the UK and EU –
both of these contexts are inclusively defined in this paper. This solution was made to
depthen the comprehension of both political environments, and also to demonstrate the
bureaucratic challenges that UKIP faces in both arenas. Without these introductions, it
would arguably be difficult to conceive the overall picture, and the research would remain
hollow.

Here, the empirical data consists of two inter-differing types of material. The first type
comprises of UKIP’s election manifestos and party platforms (also official documents),
whereas the MEPs’ (Member of European Parliament) speeches given in the EP compile
the second data. Despite the structural and characteristic differences between these data
types, they are of equal value and are accorded to the same analysis framework in a
similar manner.

Respectively, in the heart of the study is the three-fold analysis, which is conducted with
the means of a theory-driven content analysis. For the purposes of this thesis, theory-
driven content analysis is ideal, considering that it shapes the complex, non-structured,
data into a more straightforward form by identifying the essential elements. Moreover, by
transforming the data into a useful format, the analysis produces new information and
examines the underlying meanings of the chosen data. The analyses I and II are executed
similarly, whereas analysis III slightly differs, but only in terms of the theoretical foundation,
not method.

This particular timeframe of this thesis is delimited to 2009-2015, and this outlining can be
legitimised with two causes. Firstly, the starting point is 2009, since UKIP came second in
the UK’s EU-elections, and has politically been rising since; and secondly, the ongoing
year 2015 has been included in the study because UK-general elections are held in May,
and new appropriate data is published to be scuritnised.

The subjective motive for this particular topic is drawn from the researcher’s bachelor’s
degree, personal interest towards the European Union’s outcasts, and fondness towards
the British Empire. UKIP caught my eye for the first time whilst studying for my degree in
the UK in 2009-2012, and I have been following the party’s development in media and
online for years now. This master’s thesis provided a timely opportunity to study this political peculiarity in-depth, and bite into UKIP’s exceptional rise and exceptionally interesting political growth. Moreover, as my bachelor’s thesis concerned the EU in an optimistic light advocating the EU-enlargement to Turkey, it is justified to backtrack and cover the reverse side of the phenomenon in the name of euroscepticism.

1.2. Previous research

Regardless of UKIP’s upward slope, the party has not – yet – been the objective of wide academic interest. There are currently no theses regarding UKIP alone, and in the available theses regarding the party, UKIP is either sharing the limelight with another party (see Nissen, 2014), or featured indirectly (see Hädicke, 2012). On this argument, detailed analyses of UKIP are unsubstantial whereby the need for this thesis is legitimised. However, even if the relevant theses are few and far between, the vast number of appropriate articles in academic journal, working papers and seminar papers compensate that shortage.

The aforementioned publications are centered on a group of scholars, whom have both separately and together complied worthy papers. Out of these, Abedi and Lundberg’s (2010), Ford et al.’s (2012), Hayton’s (2010), Lynch et al.’s (2011), Sutcliffe’s (2010), (Usherwood’s (2008), and Whitaker and Lynch’s (2011) papers concentrate solely on UKIP, whereas the other papers tend to embrace a comparative element to other UK political parties (see for example, Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Lynch and Whitaker, 2013; Gifford, 2015; and Margetts, John and Weir. 2000). It is evident that certain scholars (Ford, Lynch, Usherwood and Whitaker) have an interest towards UKIP, whereby their works are repeatedly referred to in this thesis.

There are also UKIP-related books, which often deal with the party’s trajectory, and are written by insiders, and not by academics. The problem with these books is their bias, whereby they should be benefited with caution and objectivity. This partiality is also the main reason as though why books of this kind have been benefited with extreme caution in this thesis, especially since the aim is to write an independent presentation of the party.

To the contrary, the research regarding euroscepticism is more active, even though attempts of defining euroscepticism as a political phenomenon are limited (Topaloff, 2012: 22). However, Sørensen (2007) and Taggart (1998) have provided applicable definitions of
euroscepticism as a concept. The scholars who have approached euroscepticism from a theoretical point of view (see Flood, Kopecky, Mudde, Szczerbiak, Taggart and Usherwood) provided substantial material for in this thesis. Considering that UKIP is a right-wing political party, and this thesis analyses the behavior of representatives in a supranational environment, the appropriate papers by Brack (2012; 2013), Ford (2012; 2014) and Gifford (2006) were useful in contextualising the topic.

1.3. Research questions and thesis outline

This thesis has two research objectives, of which the first relates to UKIP’s EU-attitude, and the second to the UKIP MEPs’ behavior.

In terms of the first and major research objective, since UKIP’s stance towards the EU is not fundamentally defined anywhere ¹, an individualistic and constructed framework to mirror the party’s prevailing EU-attitude is formed from the basis of the theoretical framework and UKIP’s core policies. The applicability of this constructed framework (as presented in chapter 4.6.) is then tested in the analyses (see chapters six and seven), where it is reflected to predetermined policies that have been appropriately derived from the data.

On these grounds, given that the first research objective is to find out whether the set policies reflect the constructed framework, the major research question asks as to how well do the detailed policies in the party’s official documents and European Parliament’s speeches represent UKIP’s prevailing EU-attitude?

As far as the second – and minor – research objective is concerned, this thesis also aims to find out how do UKIP MEPs carry out their mandate in the European Parliament. It is important to find an answer to this question, since UKIP’s representation in the European Parliament is significant, whereby an analysis of the MEPs in this study gives a coherent outlook of the party’s actions in a supranational environment. For this part, Brack’s role theory is the most appropriate theoretical starting-point, and her findings are reflected to UKIP MEPs’ behavior.

¹ The indefinite interpretation that UKIP is UK’s most eurosceptic party, and seeks to withdraw from the EU is not an inclusive enough a definition for the purposes of this thesis.
For clarity's sake, the analysis consists of three parts; analyses I and II relate to the major research question and they are conducted exactly similarly. Analysis III benefits the same method, but tests a different theory.

Structure-wise this thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter one briefly gives a general outlook to the study and motives by presenting the party, research problems and the outline of this paper. Chapters two and three are the contextual chapters: these provide the frames to the study. More precisely, chapter two goes through the core concept of euroscepticism on two separate levels, as well as scrutinises the British eurosceptic landscape. Chapter three examines UKIP together with its trajectory and policies, and ties the party into the British political scene by making comparisons to two national, mainstream, parties. The appropriate theories and theoretical approaches are detailed in chapter four and that chapter is rounded off with an individualistic re-definition of UKIP’s EU-attitude. In chapter five, the method and data are introduced together with the structured analysis framework. This is put to test in the analysis – together with the re-definition introduced in chapter four – in chapters six and seven. Chapter eight presents the third and final part of the analysis, which seeks to answer the minor research question regarding the behavior of UKIP MEPs. The thesis is fine-tuned with chapter nine that answers the major research question, discusses the findings, evaluates the applicability of the frameworks, as well as proposes topics for further related study. Bibliography and appendices are found at the end of this study.
2. EUROSCPEPTICISM

Euroscepticism as a phenomenon has integrated its place in to the European politics and political discourse especially in the last 20 years, even though the oppositional, criticising voice has been present since the European Communities were established in the 1950s. This stabilisation has lead to the increasingly widespread use of the word ‘euroscepticism’, and most often it is used as an umbrella-term for all negative discourse on EU-integration and trajectory. Moreover, euroscepticism nowadays appears in left, right and center of the political spectrum, whereas originally it was considered as a privilege of the peripheral parties. (Brack, 2013; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003; 2013.)

Due to the multifaceted use of the term, as well as the multidimensionality of the phenomenon itself, a clear-cut -definition has not been outlined. As Topaloff (2012: 17) and Sørensen (2007: 56) state, comprehensible defining of social science’s concepts is extremely challenging – and euroscepticism is one of the most notorious terms to define. Generally the definitions in political science are required to be “exclusive and exhaustive” (Topaloff, 2012: 17) at the same time. This ambitious objective, however, causes a paradox: an all-inclusive definition tends to be too generalising and vague, making it empirically unusable. On the other hand, too specific definitions are often too narrow to be applied in general terms. With this dilemma at hand, it is arguably not necessary to define euroscepticism ‘from scratch’ for the purpose of this thesis, but rather utilise an applicable and well-tried definition.

This chapter’s aim is to define both general euroscepticism and party-based euroscepticism in an appropriate manner, bearing in mind the context of this thesis. Additionally, chapter 2.3. introduces British euroscepticism to provide a coherent, national framework for the remaining of the study.

2.1. Defining euroscepticism

As euroscepticism has grown in size and popularity among media, scholars and politicians, the word has lost some of its fundamental meaning. Generally speaking, euroscepticism is opposition towards the EU and its integration. It can also be titled as lack of satisfaction towards the EU. (Sørensen, 2007: 56.) However, given ‘definitions’ are ambiguous and too inclusive, and thus give no credit to the dynamics of the phenomenon.
The Oxford English Dictionary gives euroscepticism a more precise definition, stating that it is ‘a person, esp. a politician, who is sceptical about the supposed benefits to Britain of increasing co-operation with fellow members of the European Union, esp. one who strongly opposes greater political or economic integration’ (quoted in Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003: 6). Even though the quote gives special attention to Britain, euroscepticism is dealt with in virtually all over the EU-28 – it is the extent that varies. Additionally, this definition builds largely on the economic benefits / drawbacks, thus completely ignoring the cultural, social and political aspects of the phenomenon that cannot be excluded under any circumstances.

Although the ‘ism’ in euroscepticism could give an impression of it being a (political) ideology, this is not the case and euroscepticism should not be seen as an ideology (Sørensen, 2007: 57). Moreover, Simon Usherwood (2014) argues that euroscepticism is ideologically driven, and the underlying motives for euroscepticism differ, as “there are almost as many different motivations as there are parties” (ibid.). The motivations, and motivators, can also be applied to politicians and their subjective values, whereby it can be argued that the process of defining gets even more complicated.

Furthermore, it is also difficult to make wide political generalisations with regards to euroscepticism, as it is practised in all corners of the political spectrum. However in most cases, euroscepticism is most radical within parties at the utmost left-right -ends of the field. Centrist parties are more likely to be pro-European, but it is not exclusionary that they would not have any criticising arguments to the EU. Statistics (eg. Eurobarometers) prove that even in the most pro-European parties the EU-critique has escalated in recent years due to the financial obstacles. This supports the fact that euroscepticism is more of a flexible and adaptable phenomenon, as opposed to fixed. (Sørensen, 2007.)

Despite the conceptual ambiguity, academics have attempted to define euroscepticism in an applicable manner. Robert Harmsen (2005) describes it as fundamental opposition or scepticism towards the EU. Additionally, Paul Taggart (1998: 365) has presented that euroscepticism “expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration”. Since this latter definition only included the absolute EU-opposition and discarded its

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2 The EU-28 signifies the 28 member states of the European Union.
‘milder’ forms, Taggart’s definition later evolved into a bipartite theory of hard and soft euroscepticism, which will be applied into this thesis later (see chapter 4).

Given these challenges in defining euroscepticism, as well as the challenges with the above-presented academic definitions, Sørensen’s (2007: 62) outlining of the concept proved as most appropriate for this thesis. She argues that euroscepticism in general is “a sentiment of disapproval — reaching a certain degree and durability — directed towards the EU in its entirety or towards particular policy areas or developments. […]”. This definition encapsulates the fundamental principle of the complex phenomenon (“sentiment of disapproval”), but still manages to leave room for subjective variations and interpretations that all political parties encounter. Furthermore, it does not take a stand in the extent of opposition: a party, or a person, can oppose the EU as much, or as little as possible – it’s all possible in the name of euroscepticism.

2.2. Party-based euroscepticism

In this political, eurosceptic puzzle, the role of parties is crucial, and thus it is impossible and impractical to analyse euroscepticism without taking political parties into consideration and discursive. Therefore, the political process and the role of parties must always be integrated into the eurosceptic discourse in order to comprehend the entity. (Topaloff, 2012: 21-22.)

Due to the importance of parties, party-based euroscepticism has been distinguished from the general euroscepticism as presented earlier. Party-based euroscepticism especially focuses on the parties’ ideological position concerning the EU and the EU integration, as well as on the EU’s trajectory. Thus, in a way, party-based euroscepticism allows us to a glance the intraparty dynamics.

Party-positioning has interested scholars, and there are a number of explanatory reasons, and it is argued that most essential determining factor lies in the party’s in-built characteristics: is the party value-based goal-seeking, or pragmatic office-seeking? This value-base cannot be easily modified, whereby it, by-and-large, defines the party’s ideology (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008b: 254-256). This outlook has, however, been challenged by Marks and Wilson (2000), who believe that the fixed position can be legitimised with the party’s ideological-programmatic disposition. Marks and Wilson continue to argue that reasoning can be located from Lipset and Rokkan’s theory of
cleavages, according to which the ideological party family (Christian, democratic, liberal, social democratic and conservative) determines the EU-attitude (ibid.). Additionally, Kopecky and Mudde (2002: 319-321, referred to in ibid.) believe that the positioning is influenced by strategy and ideology. In their context ideology refers to an expansive attitude regarding the EU-integration, whereas strategy dictates the support/opposition towards the EU’s trajectory. Arguably there are a number of factors contributing to the party-positioning, but it is not lucrative to pinpoint one factor, be it strategy or traditional cleavages. The fundamental positioning is always a mix of ideology, members’ views and other interests, whereby Szczerbiak and Taggart’s approach is, in its broadness, the most relevant.

On the practical level, the operationalisation and measuring of the positions happens through theories, which often rely on categories, labels and categorisations. Even though categorisations can be dangerous with their over-inclusive or -excessive nature, party-based euroscepticism benefits from these stricter limits, due to its more specific and organised nature. (Sørensen, 2007: 59; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003: 3.) It has also been proposed that party-based euroscepticism can, alternatively, be measured through “public statements, the parliamentary voting on key European issues (treaties), and published party programmes and manifestos” (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008b: 5). Moreover, it has been argued (ibid.) that party-based euroscepticism is an more effective tool with which the levels of euroscepticism can be measured across EU-countries (not within), as opposed nationally ranging vote shares. This enables an EU-wide, equal comparison, if required. However, before the operationalisation can commence, data must be gathered and suitable parties selected. Problems arise, should there be not enough data. (op. cit., 253-254.)

Fundamentally, party-based euroscepticism studies political parties’ stance on a. the EU integration, and b. the EU’s trajectory. According to Harmsen (2005: 3), the take on EU-elements (both a. and b.) depends on the country- and/or party-specific context: it reflects the subjective, national experiences (for example start of membership and relationship to integration’s benefits) and current political climate. Most importantly however, the extent to which sovereignty, transparency and federalism are seen in the national discursive, largely affect the degree of opposition. (ibid.)
2.3. Eurosceptic Britain

Britain is an especially fruitful environment for euroscepticism, as the nation’s political atmosphere has – by and large – been critical towards the EU since the immediate post-war period. (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008a: 103; Ford et al., 2012: 204; BBC, 2014g.) Therefore, it can be argued that the Brits have grown into a culture that criticises the EU. Even eurobaromters show, that the UK is among the most eurosceptic EU-countries. Euroscepticism also has rooted its place into British mainstream politics. (Hayton, in Hug, 2014: 37.)

The path leading to membership negotiations has several twists and debatably British euroscepticism has evolved along the way. However, four explanatory, interlinked factors can be drawn from the history, politics, society and geography. Additionally, the UK-EU relations can be divided into four phases, each of which are introduced here.

The first two factors can be drawn from the bilateral UK-EU-historical events and from the national politics. The building of the European Union commenced immediately post-war, in 1945, with an objective tie the European nations so tightly together, that the war-era would not replicate within the continent. Britain was victorious in the Second World War (WW2), and when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was formed in 1951, Britain stood by and remained independent. Moreover, when European Economic Community (EEC) was established in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome, Britain refused to sign it, and thereby turned down an invitation to be one of the EU’s founding members. Due to the success in WW2, Britain largely considered itself an economic power and a global power, and believed that the economical support of other countries was uncalled for. However, come the 1960s, Britain’s economy began to deteriorate, and it humbly applied the EEC-membership in 1961. It is clear, that the motives for the membership were economic as well as political, and to an extent, needy. (BBC, 2014g; The Guardian, 2013; Norton, 2013: 152.)

The road to the factual membership, however, proved tricky, as Charles de Gaulle vetoed Britain’s application twice. He justified his stance on Britain’s inappropriateness as an EEC-member on the grounds that Britain is “insular, maritime, bound up by its trade, its
markets, its food supplies, with the most varied and often the most distant countries” and has “very special, very original, habits and traditions” (Grant, 2008: 1). De Gaulle’s strong resistance was later coupled with the bitterness of the loss of WW2, and accusations of too close UK-US -relations, that De Gaulle considered inappropriate and impending for Europe. (ibid.) At the same time, in the early 1970s, Edward Heath was the Conservative Prime Minister (PM) in Britain, who thought that the membership is crucial for the British economy and decisively stood behind his words, and consequently Britain began applying for the EU-membership. This move, however, was not entirely supported by Tories and Labour, but this opposition had no effect on Heath’s original decision. This shows to prove that British parties have partly fought against the membership all along. (BBC, 2014g; Hitchcock, 2003: 437.)

As presented, Britain’s particular position and both national and international situation hindered the accession process between the late 1950s and 1970s. It is believed that these hindrances provided a minor cause for the nation’s eurosceptic tendency (Gifford, 2015). However, after signing the accession treaties and accepting the *acquis communautaire* ⁴, Britain gained full membership of the EEC on January 1st 1973. This time between the post-war era and the EEC-accession is also characterised as the first phase of British euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008a: 94).

Post-accession, Europe faced an international financial crisis with rising inflations and noticeable unemployment. Britain got its share of bad luck, as the long-awaited financial benefits were more modest than expected, and the entire membership was questioned on that economic rationale. Consequently, a referendum was held in 1975 and as 67% of the voters said ‘yes’ to the membership, situation remained intact. ⁵ However, because the economic imbalance further rubbed the UK-EC -relations, a referendum on the continuum of the membership was held. (BBC, 2014g; Hitchcock, 2003: 437; Troitiño, 2009: 129.) The referendum marked the second phase of eurosceptic Britain (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008a: 94.) At this point, as Gifford (2015) states the EEC was considered as “a threat to Britain’s exceptional social and political development”, whereby this type of negative mood

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⁴ The *acquis communautaire* (or the community acquis) is the body of common rights and obligations that are common to all EU-member states. It consists of the treaties, declarations and international agreements. It is also referred to as the EU-law. Adopting the community acquis is a pre-requisite for the EU-membership. (EU-Abc, 2014; EUROPA, 2014.)

⁵ The period 1973-1975 is characterised as a transitional, or a ‘stay-in’ -period. This period ended as the referendum was held. (UKIP, 2014a: 57.)
could be comprehended slightly better.

The third period (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008a: 94) began as Margaret Thatcher was elected as Prime Minister in 1979 (Troitiño, 2009: 125). Around this time, British euroscepticism also became a more permanent, yet hidden feature, in the political discourse. Additionally, Thatcher actively spent her first term ameliorating the economic feud. Hitchcock (2003: 439) argues that Labour-leader Harold Wilson had initiated the issue of British contribution and reimbursement in 1974, and Thatcher continued in his footmarks. The ‘Iron Lady’ was determined to resolve the issue, stating that “the issue is demonstrably unjust” (ibid.) and her persistence paid off. She managed to balance the situation out, as Britain’s contribution was reduced, whereas other EC-members’ contributions were increased. (ibid.)

Even though the injustice was evened out, the bilateral relations were still tense. The EC was becoming more of a federal union with a single currency – a direction that was not to Britain’s, nor Thatcher’s liking. In 1988, Mrs. Thatcher gave her ‘Bruges speech’, in which she strongly disapproved the ‘European superstate’ and remained true to her nationalistic mindset. Later on, the speech has been considered the catalyst for euroscepticism. Despite all her best efforts, she was powerless in the eyes of the EC and the union continued the victory march. (BBC, 2014g.) With the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1993, the EC was officially renamed as the European Union, and ever since the UK has been tied to the EU.

The Single European Act (SEA) and the common currency, euro, have been founded in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with an objective to further join the European member states together. Stubbornly, and under Thatcher’s influence, Britain remained independent and opted out from both of components. Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008a: 94) argue that the fourth phase began in 1988, and has continued to date

Even though Thatcher resigned from the political life in 2002, she initiated Westminster’s eurosceptic discursive. One prime example of her successors was former prime minister, Labour’s leader Tony Blair. Daddow (2013: 211) has argued that Blair managed to ‘normalise’ the EU-Britain-relations during his long serving as PM, but euroscepticism was still strongly present on his agenda and citizens followed his lead; it has been claimed that euroscepticism dominated Blair’s terms and complicated the daily politicking (Gifford,
2015). He has also stated that he was not satisfied with the EU. (The New York Times, 1997.) Albeit Blair and Thatcher represented rival parties, they both were willing to protect Britain from outer threats, and according to their discourses, Britain was always better off than Europe (cf. Nugent and and Phinnemore, 2010).

With regards to Blair’s agenda in 1997-2007, he too demanded superiority and appreciation for Britain. His objective was to modernise Britain and achieve “an open, competitive and successful economy with a just, decent and humane society” (The New York Times, 1997). This, however, was to be achieved under Thatcher’s legacy and a strict, eurosceptic, framework that did not leave much room for subjectivity – but he did genuinely want to bring the EU close to the citizens and in that way improve the inflamed situation. (Blair, 2010: 533-537; The New York Times, 1997.) Blair saw potential in the EU, whereas Thatcher rather openly criticised almost everything related to the EU. In this sense, it can be stated that Blair’s general EU-stance could have been characterised as more pro-EU, than anti-EU. (Daddow, 2013.)

Nevertheless, Blair managed to combine his own agenda and acknowledge some of Thatcher’s views; most importantly he, too, wanted to secure the national British heritage. Both of the former PMs have also highlighted that fundamentally, the British are European by identity. This argument is based in the mutual struggles and Europe-wide wars, and as Thatcher has stated these to be “the dominant factor in our history’” (Thatcher, 1988). During Blair’s terms in office, his focus was on co-operating with the EU-member states, and he firmly believed that this would make Britain more attached to the EU. The result of this modernization – as is known – remained slim. (Daddow, 2013: 223.)

Although the current Conservative PM, David Cameron, is also a skeptical towards the EU, his stance is much softer than his predecessors. Cameron was elected as party leader in 2005, and he was to modernise the party and its ‘brand’. He managed to shake the most outdated policies, but facelift in the European question was very modest and, and thereby doubtfulness towards the EU remained on the agenda. (Hayton, in Hug, 2014: 34.)

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6 For example, EU’s growing job markets were considered a benefit for the British citizens. (cf. The New York Times, 1997.)

7 His EU-attitude was softer in the beginning of his terms, but with the rise of UKIP, his stance has now become more critical. In the last resort, the fact that the referendum takes place is a concession from Cameron, and a token of two things: first, the power of euroscepticism and two, the power of UKIP.
If Thatcher and Blair’s terms were demanding, Cameron’s term has not been too relaxed either. Instead it has been characterised with a deep international economic depression, and nationally growing euroscepticism. UKIP has increasingly challenged the Conservative’s and Labour’s EU-positioning, and this has, without a doubt, been tiring to tolerate. Arguably as a consequence of UKIP’s rise and their fundamental desire to withdraw from the EU, Cameron has promised to hold an in/out UK-wide referendum by November 2017. The vote will only take place should the Tories win the 2015 general elections. (Hug, 2014: 7, 14.) A Conservative and/or UKIP majority is a perquisite for the out-result, as Labour and Liberal Democrats would not want to withdraw. (ibid.)

A third crucial factor that is seen to enhance British euroscepticism is the national press. The UK politics are stretched over the political arena’s edges, and into the notoriously biased media. Consequently the printed and online presses provide an additional environment to the unfavorable discourse, and therefore quite happily spread the eurosceptic message (cf. Grant, 2008). The British press is considered very influential, and as 75% of the national, daily press is covered by Daily Mail, the Sun, the Times, the Express, the Star and the Daily Telegraph, all of which are considered eurosceptic magazines, and read by 30 million Brits on a daily basis (Grant, 2008: 3), the outcome is obvious: the press feeds euroscepticism to the public (Gifford, 2015).

Moreover, as the ownership of these most popular magazines is privatised, the competition for readers is vigorous and this leads to provocative, garbled and catching front pages, of which the British media is well-known. Grant (2008: 4) also states that sometimes the British journalists even make lies in their articles to attract more readers and circulation.

Additionally, the media also hampers policy-making. During Blair’s serving as PM, the press continuously and deliberately oppressed and manipulated his words and made him look more anti-European than he actually was. Indeed, he was critical towards the EU, but he was always more eager to co-operate and encounter problems in accordance with the Europeans, rather than criticise. The media exaggerated his statements and thus limited the citizens’ possibility to decrease negativity towards the EU. (Blair, 2010: 533-537; The New York Times, 1997.)

Fourth and finally, Britain’s geographical location largely supports euroscepticism. Britain
is situated amidst oceans, and thereupon has with no direct, physical contact, or geographic borders with nation states in the mainland. Grant (2008: 2) mentions that the Brits talk about Europe as “another place”, and this can be reflected as ‘otherness’ – this implies that the Brits are fundamentally British, and not European. Moreover, Britain’s colonial history and trade was directed to Africa and Asia (Commonwealth), rather than to Europe. Even though the participation in European wars is undeniable, it has been a compulsory, unavoidable action, but arguably the main focus of actions has been outside of Europe. (ibid.)

When taking all four, presented reasons into consideration, it is unquestionable that the relationship between Britain and the EU is, and has been, unique and seemingly identity-based (Harmsen, 2005: 4). Currently Britain’s EU-relationship is both in and out; they are economically and politically involved, yet the cultural and social involvement is lesser than other EU-member states.
3. THE UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENCE PARTY (UKIP)

The about twenty-year-long history of UKIP can be described as eventful. This chapter presents the party’s history by going through the most crucial turning points and assessing their effects on the party’s development. It also goes over the party’s most fundamental values and ideology. Additionally, in this chapter, UKIP’s position and role are evaluated in the British political field, as well as in the European Parliament.

3.1. 1993-2014 and the rise of UKIP

UKIP’s origins trace back to 1992, when Alan Sked established “the cross-party group” (Hayton, 2010: 27) called Anti-Federalist League (AFL), as a backlash for the Maastricht Treaty. Next year, in 1993, Sked collaborated with fellow AFL’s members and they formed UKIP. The EU-opposition and EU-withdrawal have been the core themes ever since the party was founded, and have not been compromised to date. (Usherwood, 2008: 4; Abedi and Lundberg, 2009: 13.)

Post-establishment, UKIP faced several years of internal disagreements and dismissals. Hayton (2010: 28) classifies these difficulties as “growing pains” of a young party trying to locate its own spot in the political spectrum, and trying to evolve into a mainstream organisation. Due to no-confidence votes, the party leader altered various times and, additionally, the party’s economy was out of order. UKIP’s organisational structure is bureaucratic (Abedi and Lundberg, 2009: 18), and this practice has resulted in a voting procedure every time a change of leader was at hand. Clearly, when a party faces a change in leadership, the dynamics take a hit and objectives must be put aside until the internal institutionalisation has been stabilised. As, at the time, UKIP’s foothold in the political field was limited, any hindrances were setbacks to the ultimate objective: office in Westminster. Abedi and Lundberg (op. cit., 19) argue that these fluid initial stages were so stressful to the party, that failure in the early years was inevitable. (Abedi and Lundberg, 2009: 18-19.)

More precisely, the life cycle of UKIP can be divided into four phases according to the prevailing party leader. First, under founder Alan Sked (1993-1997), the party began its life with “principled non-engagement”, during which UKIP was largely trying to locate the
courses of action as well as core policies to support the EU-withdrawal; second, following leaders, Michael Holmes and Jeffrey Titford (1997-2004), managed to practically commit UKIP to the national political life; third, Roger Knapman (2004-2006) took the party to the ‘next level’ by renewing some policies and activities; and fourth Nigel Farage (2006-2009 and 2010-) “recontextualised the entire opposition to the EU” and devised the idea of ‘Independent Britain’. (Usherwood, 2008: 10-11; The Guardian, 2014b; The Telegraph, 2014.) Farage stepped down from the leader’s stool in 2009 to focus on his personal campaign for the following year’s general elections. Lord Pearson of Rannoch took over, and filled in until 2010. As Farage did not win the desired Westminster seat, he re-applied as UKIP’s leader and was re-elected with an absolute majority in November 2010, and has been the head of UKIP since. (Sutcliffe, 2010: 19; The Telegraph 2014.) Clearly, the members’ trust on Farage and his expertise have been firm for many years.

As far as turning points are concerned, one of them took place in 2004, right after the prevailing EU-elections. Robert Kilroy-Silk was elected as an UKIP MEP in that round, but additionally, he was willing to lead the party. He stated that with the election results, this is the time to develop UKIP into something that can “kill the Conservatives” (Hayton, 2010: 28). This radical objective, when mirrored with the trajectory, came too early and Kilroy-Silk’s dream of leadership was revoked resulting in his resignation six months later. With this, UKIP was left stagnant and this affected next year’s general elections, where UKIP failed to achieve any seats from the House of Commons (later also Commons). In practice, UKIP gained more votes in 2005, than in 2001 (2.3% vs. 1.5%), showcasing that something had been achieved, but regardless, the topmost feeling was utter disappointment. All in all, as it has been stated (Abedi and Lundberg, 2009: 38) that, in the long run, Kilroy-Silk’s resignation was a positive culminaton rather than negative. This has been argued, since UKIP was, more than anything, a young, developing party, that only needed valuable people, and Kilroy-Silk could potentially have been fatal to the party’s development. (Hayton, 2010: 28.)

In terms of EU-elections, UKIP achieved its first seats from the European Parliament in 1999, when three MEPs were elected. In 2004 EU-elections UKIP performed very well, as the party got 12 seats (16% of votes) from the European Parliament. In 2009, the party came second in the EU-elections in the UK winning 13 seats (16,5% of votes) under very
challenging situations. On the following round in 2014, UKIP won the EU-elections with 24 seats (27.49% of votes) from Brussels, by beating the Tories (19 seats) and Labour (20 seats) to a tee. Undeniably, these electoral outcomes symbolise and underline the ‘rise’ of the party; especially the 2009 round is considered revolutionary. Consequently – and justly – UKIP is Britain’s most prosperous single-issue party; it is a household name and thrives in EU-elections. (Usherwood, 2008; Abedi and Lundberg, 2009; BBC, 2009; Sutcliffe, 2010; Lynch et al., 2011; BBC, 2014h.)

Building on the success in the EU-elections, it can be argued that UKIP’s triumphal march in England and Wales began in 2004. However, arguably this ‘Cinderella story’ would not have materialised without Dick Morris, who helped UKIP with its slogans, and simplified the essential message in 2003 – this can be considered as the second turning point. Morris’ aim was to mobilise the anti-EU -citizens and UKIP’s slogan was simplified to “Say NO”; this phrasing left it to the individual to contemplate their subjective dissatisfaction towards the EU without UKIP putting words or arguments into their mouths. The use of Morris’ service cost UKIP £2.36 million, but the spending enabled UKIP to rise from sidelines to the mainstream, albeit still as a minor party. (Usherwood, 2008: 6-7; Sutcliffe, 2010: 9.) Later on, come the 2009 EU-elections, the slogan was re-shaped to “Say NO to the European Union” to further specify the factual object of opposition. (Whitaker and Lynch, 2011: 5; Usherwood, 2008: 7.) As far as word choices in the official documents are concerned, they are arguably practical, easily understandable, appealing and easy for ‘the man in the street’ to identify with. This is yet another factor that can be seen to contribute to the party’s recent success. Of course, some of the examples illustrated in the documents can be exaggerated, but the strategy seems to work.

The third critical point was Nigel Farage’s re-election as party leader in 2006. He has been rather accurately named as the “hero of UKIP” (The Commentator, 2014), thanks to his achievements with the party. This well-mannered man has been a member of UKIP since 1993, whereby it can be stated that he knows the party very well (Dalton, 2013.) During his first time as leader he had one objective: to beat the result of 2004 EU-elections. He did what he promised, and UKIP’s 2009 round was a success in a sense that they managed to

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8 Around the elections, the euro zone was hit by severe depression, and Britain faced an MP expenses scandal. UKIP’s role in the MP scandal was non-existent as they had no MPs, whereby they succeeded. Moreover, during recession, the right tends to outperform the left, a reason that should be taken into consideration. (see Hayton, 2010, for more.)
add one MEP-seat to Brussels. However, UKIP could have performed even better, and their prevailing second-place finish was largely thanks to Labour’s weak outcome. (Hayton, 2010: 28-30.) On general terms, under Farage’s dynamic leadership UKIP has developed the party to its current state and “forward-looking message” (Dalton, 2013). Furthermore, Farage guided UKIP into the 2014 EU-elections victory with industrious campaigning and lobbying.

Nowadays UKIP’s actions are largely centered on Farage, who is the most known figure of the party. Dalton (2013) characterises Farage as a polite, yet persuasive character, who genuinely speaks from the heart. It seems that Farage’s dauntless style and personality bisect people, and he is either loved or hated. His colorful and verbally rich speeches, comments and columns are made well known by the media. In terms of public statements, Farage is one of the most blunt personalities in today’s British politics: he has insulted German chancellor Angela Merkel by calling her “cold” and “miserable” (IBT, 2014) and declared that European Council’s President Herman van Rompuy “has the charisma of a damp rag and the appearance of a low-grade bank clerk” (cited in Sutcliffe, 2010: 13). Not only has he offended fellow politicians, he has also affronted civil groups, such as “migrants, HIV activists, gay people, disabled people and breast-feeding mothers” (The Guardian, 2015). Farage’s comments in the media are generally rather witty and drastic, but it should arguably be seen as a part of his public character. Moreover, many akin party leaders act similarly in public whereby this type of public behavior is more easibly tolerated (Hayton, 2010: 33).

Farage has stated that he takes no notice on others’ opinions on either himself or his party, whereby it can be stated that he is a ‘lone wolf’ (Dalton, 2013). The extrovert man also claims that other politicians are boring, and his inner passion motivates him to work as party leader, although he could be working elsewhere. Importantly, Dalton (ibid.) states that Farage is down-to-earth, and has not let success get the best of him. Additionally, two crashes and a battle against cancer have humbled him and, in his own words, turned him “fatalistic” (ibid.). He now enjoys life to the fullest, both in his free time, and at work.

UKIP’s popularity can also be explained with a steady voter base that has been attained through active lobbying in constituencies. The party is popular in the rural areas of the country: the south and the Midlands. The connective concern here are the similar, negative, views on EU’s agricultural policies. (Lynch and Whitaker, 2011: 4.) A typical
UKIP-voter is a middle-aged man, whose finance is a bit shaky, and who is “exposed to competition from the European Common Market” (Ford et al., 2011: 206). Moreover, the core supporter is likely to read the eurosceptic tabloid newspapers, which downplay the EU. Often, this type of voter comes from a Conservative upbringing, but has leaped to vote UKIP, as the attitudinal motivator for voting is euroscepticism. (ibid.) Furthermore, Ford et al. (2011) have found that UKIP voters can be divided into two camps: strategic and core supporters. Strategic supporters only vote UKIP at the EU-elections, whereas core supporters, on the other hand, vote UKIP at EU-elections and national elections. Core supporters are considered as more loyal and devoted to the EU-issue, than strategic voters who give their vote to another party in national elections.

Ford et al. (2011: 18) argue that there are two policies that appeal to voters, of which the first are xenophobia and Islamophobia. The authors (ibid.) say that these two policies have a positive correlation with UKIP, whereas racism has a negative correlation. On these grounds, UKIP is not discriminatory; the party simply requires that national laws be obeyed.\(^9\) Moreover, the party states (UKIP, 2010a: 13) that they “embrace all races and religions”. Therefore, British voters, who are concerned about immigration and immigrants, are likely to grant their vote to UKIP, rather than those who are opposed to the phenomenon. Another appealing reason is unhappiness with current political climate, which UKIP could diversify if elected to power. (ibid.)

All things considered, UKIP nowadays portrays itself as a significant minor party with over 35,000 members\(^{10}\). The rise of the party has been noteworthy, and UKIP can now safely be considered as a true, political force that can conveniently challenge the current governmental parties.

3.2. Ideology, policies and values

UKIP is situated on the center-right of the political spectrum, and the party states that it is a patriotic party (UKIP, 2014b.). Patriotism in this context, this should be understood as proudness of Britain and its current standing, and firmly believing in the country being better off without the EU. UKIP smartly uses their core objective, EU-withdrawal, as a discursive mean to highlight this mindset. To back up their discursive, the party provides

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\(^9\) In this context, racism is discrimination of other races – a definition not applicable to UKIP.

practical examples on how sterling could be saved by withdrawing. An important conjunctive applying to all UKIP’s policies, as Hayton (2010: 27-28) argues, is that all issues can be linked to the EU-membership.

Nowadays – as mentioned – the party claims to be patriotic, but this has not always been the case. During Lord Pearson’s leadership in 2009-2010, in its manifesto the party stated that it believed in “civic nationalism which is open and inclusive to anyone, who wishes to identify with Britain, regardless of ethnic or religious background” (UKIP, 2010a: 13). At the time, they rejected "the “blood and soil" ethnic nationalism of extremist parties” (ibid.). Moreover, Lord Pearson brought about two discourses that were more radical, than what the party was accustomed for: the burqa ban, and warnings about Islamic extremism (Whitaker and Lynch, 2011: 4, 13). These statements do partly support a nationalistic ideology, but that direction was only temporary. In 2010, right after Farage was elected as Lord Pearson’s successor, he commented (Farage, 2010: 132) that UKIP as a party is libertarian and anti-racism, not nationalist – hereby correcting Pearson’s statements according to own preferences.

Therefore, there is an imminent paradox in UKIP’s ideology. In their manifestos between 2010-2015 they have not taken an accurate stand on whether they are either patriotic or nationalistic. As a result, it remains unclear whether this turn from nationalism to patriotism is Farage’s attempt to moderate UKIP’s ‘true colors’, or, in fact, the other way round; is he trying to disguise his nationalistic concepts in the current patriotic framework in order to canvass for votes? Whatever the reason, it seems to be working, as UKIP is, according to polls, currently the second most popular party, right after the Conservatives, and before Labour. (Hug, 2014: 6.) Importantly, this suggests that UKIP has a realistic chance of winning a distinctive amount of seats from Westminster in 2015.

Notwithstanding the ideological dilemma, UKIP still carries the remains of a single-issue-party stamp, regardless of their best efforts in shaking off that label (cf. Usherwood, 2008; Sutcliffe, 2010; Usherwood and Startin, 2013). Party ideology relies on strong EU-opposition, and their objective is a complete withdrawal from the EU, and consequently, an independent Britain. In other words, their goal is to return all power back to Westminster.

11 Of course, these issues are not de facto nationalism, but in a sense that they are not British phenomena, they can vaguely be characterised under nationalism in this context only.

12 Only reference to patriotism is in UKIP 2014b, and this itself is not a reliable enough allegation to the party’s ideology.
The party states that by voting UKIP, a vote is given for leaving the EU and thereafter reasserting all power to Britain. (UKIP, 2014b.) This objective might sound extreme, but right-wing eurosceptic parties often rely on radical arguments to make a point (Gifford, 2006: 857).

UKIP actively highlights the EU-memberships costs to Britain, and offers alternatives as though what an independent Britain would look like. They argue that Britain would save £55 million of membership fees daily, should UK withdraw. Moreover, the £8 billion net contributions would be relocated to national benefits. (UKIP, 2014b; 2015a.) UKIP manifestos feature a large variety of other policies too, but everything is centered on (hard) euroscepticism, from which UKIP also “seeks electoral advantage” (Sutcliffe, 2010: 13) in relation to other parties. (Lynch and Whitaker, 2013: 292.)

UKIP’s most imperative ‘other policies’ are the following (derived from UKIP, 2014b; 2015a).

Immigration is the key-policy, and UKIP demands that border control must be completely returned to Britain, and immigrants entering the UK must be financially independent for five years. Before this five-year-period has ceased, immigrants are not allowed to use the services of the private sector. Additionally, persons willing to enter the country must carry a private health insurance. Permanent residency for immigrant will be awarded after ten consecutive years in the UK. Moreover, tighter requirements for EU-citizens are called for: one must have an affirmed job, accommodation and the ability to speak English (i.e. “time-limited work permit” [UKIP, 2015a]). Should an UK-resident’s spouse and/or children be non-UK-citizens, they would be allowed to move to Britain without restrictions. Immigration stands out, because it passes negative impacts on the infrastructure, and these effects have become increasingly imminent as immigration to the UK grows annually (The Telegraph, 2015). For these reasons, UKIP promises to “set out in full how we would aim to reduce migration, guarantee border security, accommodate sensible numbers of foreign students, protect asylum seekers, and make sure new migrants do not place undue pressure on our NHS”. (ibid.)

Respectively, on matters of security, the UK is to be separated from the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Then, the entering of foreign criminals will be prevented (by regaining control of own borders), and prisoners will be exploited the right to vote. UKIP supports full
serving of sentences – regardless of length – and this should be taken into consideration when sentencing the crime. Exceptions on serving and parole will be considered case-specifically. Additionally, to ensure the efficient handling of criminals, “front line policing” (ibid.) will face no financial cuts. In terms of the military, the work force would be entirely resourced.

Social benefits and other civil assistance are to be awarded for British citizens only, or to people who have stayed in the UK for five or more consecutive years. Those people are entitled for welfare benefits and medical care. Child benefits will only be paid of children who are UK-citizens, and live in the country for good. In a case of divorce, the custody is shared 50/50 between the spouses. The NHS (National Health Service\textsuperscript{13}) will be further developed in terms of opening hours, to enable medical care around the clock. The NHS will also remain free for UK-citizens.

UKIP demands that political ‘jargon’ must be minimised – citizens must understand the message. Also, the British law applies to all, and no other law systems are tolerated. All EU-law and regulations would be reformed into British ones. These acts would safeguard democracy on all levels.

British culture is all-encompassing in its uniqueness, and UKIP openly welcomes everybody to highlight its value. British culture also unifies people, in spite of one’s background. Additionally, children must be taught to appreciate Britain, and to have pride in being British from a very young age. As the pub culture in Britain is cherished, UKIP would lift the restrictions of smoking in pubs and bars, and give the venues the option of deciding where their customers should smoke. Correspondingly, the pricing of alcohol and tobacco products and labels should be minimalised to discourage adult citizens from using intoxicants.

UKIP obliges that available jobs are primarily given to British jobseekers, not European. Work permits for the non-UK-citizens will only be granted should the supply meet the demand. The unemployed will also be offered placement on communities’ local schemes. On taxes two reforms are in order: a. no tax for the minimum wage, and b. the inheritance tax to be removed.

\textsuperscript{13} The NHS provides free health care in the United Kingdom.
Hence, by “protecting jobs and increasing prosperity”, “repairing the economy”, “reducing debts”, “prioritising education and skills”, improving the National Health Services”, “controlling and managing borders” (ibid.), privatising agriculture and fishing, supporting “welfare and childcare”, protecting national infrastructure and culture, defending democracy, constitution, law and order as well as supporting employment and small businesses, UKIP wishes to generate an autonomous Britain. Should UKIP achieve governmental seats, it would resign from the Common Agricultural Policy and Common Fisheries Policy, as well as European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and European Economic Area (EEA), since both treaties promote free movement of people. To the contrary, and to enhance UK’s economical positioning and trade, UKIP wishes to re-join to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). (ibid.)

In respect with the upcoming, 2015 general elections, Farage has stated (SkyNews, 2014) that three issues concern the public and they will also dominate the 2015 general elections: immigration, NHS and the economy. Out of these, he proposes that immigration will rise to the top, because it affects on peoples’ wages and will result in damaged national economy and Gross Domestic Product.

3.3. UKIP in the British political context

The British political system is bicameral, and thus the Palace of Westminster consists of two chambers: the House of Commons (the Commons) and the House of Lords (the Lords). The Commons is the elected chamber and has the Members of Parliament (MP), with currently 650 members 14, and is thus the first chamber. The Commons is currently a hung Parliament 15, with 303 Conservative MPs. The Lords is the unelected, ‘subsidiary’ chamber, to which the members are appointed. Currently the Lords holds 790 seats. (Norton, 2013: 16-17; Parliament, 2014b.)

The elections are held with the First Past the Post -system (FPP). Accordingly, a voter marks his/her candidate with an X on the ballot paper, and the candidate(s) with most votes are elected. (Parliament, 2014a; Usherwood, 2008: 5.) Drawing from this, it can be

14 Upon elections, Britain is divided into 650 constituencies; one candidate from each parliamentary constituency gets elected to the Commons. MPs are elected on the basis of his/her party, but fundamentally he/she is expected to serve the constituency, and the constituents, in the Commons. Norton (2013: 34-35) calls this “the clear territorial base”.

15 Hung chamber means that no party has an won absolute majority in the elections. (The Parliament, 2014g.)
argued that FPP backs up larger, usually mainstream parties, and consequently this electoral disadvantage has surely been one of the highest barriers on UKIP’s way to Westminster. This could be classified as an institutional barrier for UKIP, as parties with “geographically concentrated support” (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008a: 110-111) outperform minor parties without such support. Moreover, Gifford (2006: 863) argues that a general outcome of the FPP is a “broad centrist government”, which, in fact, is directly applicable to the British case.\footnote{16 The current British governmental parties (term 2010-2015) are a centre-right Conservatives, and centre-left Labour.}

Both chambers have their own history, habits and agendas, but most importantly they hold different powers. The Commons is the source of governmental power, as well as legislative authority, whereby it can propose and amend laws, and set taxes. Additionally, MPs can ask the ministers questions in the Commons Chamber of Committees (Parliament, 2014e). The Lords, on their part, aid the MPs with the law introductions, and hold them to account. Together the Houses debate issues and keep an eye on the government’s actions. (Usherwood, 2008: 6; Norton, 2013: 16; Parliament, 2014c; GOV.uk; 2014.) In recent years, both Houses have become “more active, more specialized, better resourced, an more visible than before” (Norton, 2013: 47); all advantageous developments when competing with the EU.

By tradition, the Parliament has never been, is not, and will not be a policy-making body, but it does still have its prestigious place in the political system. In stead, the policy-making power lies in Her Majesty’s Government (HMG, or the UK Government) (op. cit., 47; 151.), currently being led by PM Cameron. HMG is a coalition government consisting of Conservative and Liberal Democrats’ ministers; \textit{in toto}, 121 ministers (PM + 21 cabinet ministers + 99 other ministers), all of who work under the PM. The 24 ministerial departments and 331 other agencies and public bodies are responsible for putting the policies into practice. (GOV.uk, 2014; Parliament, 2014d.) The Parliament gives its assent to the policies executed by the HMG (Norton, 2013: 151). To that end, the UK government holds the executive power and is accountable to the Parliament. Together the two bodies are responsible of the laws, but they still work separately, and are separate institutions, even though the government ministers are Parliament MPs.
As far as work in the Parliament is concerned, the majority of the MPs attend the Commons’ committees that are in a key position in the pre-legislative work. The committees are independent groups that work actively and meet on a weekly basis to discuss the topic at hand. Norton (2013: 153) argues that the documents often handle the EU, or talking points of debates-to-be. At the end of their meeting, the committee compiles reports for the government’s approval. In fact, both Houses largely function through the committees, and this newly developed pattern has placed the Parliament in a more influential and serious position. (Norton, 2013: 31; 47.) In the end, both the UK Government and Parliament are subject to the Queen on national matters.

In terms of the EU-legislation, the UK is subject to the EU. At the time, policy-making was partly handed over to the EC, and consequently, the UK was incapable of legislating in given sectors. Over time, the treaties have repeatedly decreased UK’s legislative power, and increased that of the EU and European Parliament. Since powers were largely transferred to the continent, the EU-activities were put under a microscope with the ‘Scrutiny Reserve Resolution’. Accordingly, no governmental minister going to the Council of Ministers shall agree to a proposal in the Council, should it still be “subject to scrutiny” by Parliament. (Norton, 2013: 152-153; Parliament: 2014f.) This procedure, therefore, provided inside information to the home front, and as all stances were to be determined collectively in the UK, arbitrary decisions were prevented.

Given the current British political context, the environment for UKIP is, and has been, somewhat challenging. Albeit still a minor party in this framework, it is more well-known than ever. Hayton (2010: 32-33) argues, that UKIP is nowadays considered as a potential alternative for Westminster, especially for the right-wing voters, but it should ameliorate its “electoral narrative” to secure the majority. In that sense, bearing in mind the latest polls on the party’s success, but also the electoral difficulties and ideological challenges, 2015 is UKIP’s time to show the true potential. However, should UKIP not win majority from the Commons, it will most probably be influential outside the Westminster – as it is now.

All in all, it is demanding for smaller parties to achieve seats from the Commons and the nature of the institution further supports this. Usherwood has argued (2008: 6), that since the Commons’ agenda consists of EU-policies together with a range of other policies,

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17 EU-related documents can handle the possible withdrawal, or "legislative proposals" (Norton, 2013).
UKIP’s mainly single-issue, withdrawalist agenda does not match that of the Commons’. Moreover, he has stated (ibid.) that their weak achievements in both general elections and by-elections in the past, can be justified with the political program. With all due respect, the fear of UKIP’s agenda being too unilateral might have been appropriate in 2008, but recently the party has diversified the policies in a manner more suitable for Westminster, and the single-issue label does not entirely apply today. There is no reason to assume that the current manifesto would clash with the Commons’ agenda. Additionally, as UKIP has achieved two MP-seats in by-elections in 2014, it has deniably developed from late mid-2000s, and will most probably adjust to Westminster through general elections as well.

As for the matter of euroscepticism in this context, it is believed that the structure of Westminster “contributes to the resilience” (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008a: 110) and additionally, has enabled euroscepticism to command the British political debate. Accordingly, the British electoral and party systems as well as the homogenous political culture are preferred over the European co-operation and compromises; the British political culture is perceived as contradictory to that of mainland-Europe – another factor that is believed to increase euroscepticism. Respectively, Gifford (2006: 858) believes that euroscepticism intervenes into mainstream politics, and as the two are intertwined in daily discourses, “the capacity of governing elites to achieve an effective and stable European policy” becomes troublesome and thus advances the growth of euroscepticism. (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008a: 110; Gifford, 2006: 854.)

In terms of the pattern of competition, Taggart and Szczerbiak (op. cit., 348-349) describe the UK’s system as open contestation. With this they mean that a. governmental parties stance towards EU is decidedly hard or soft, b. the EU integration is “an important component in party competition” (op. cit., 349) so that parties’ stance regarding the issue is certain and that other parties are aware of others’ attitudes, and c. the EU’s role in government-building has been noticeably, or alternatively has influenced the determination of major party leadership. In this type of governments, the contestation over Europe is open (op. cit., 352).

The British bipolar system is a ‘textbook example’ of this type of party system, as both governmental parties embody a crystal clear stance in relation to EU, and euroscepticism in Britain is not enclosed to the parties in Parliament. Indeed, it can be found from “the peripheries of the party system and in single-issue Eurosceptic parties” (ibid.), whereby it
can be asserted that euroscepticism is not only a Westminster-based phenomenon in the UK, but rather it can be met in all corners of the political spectrum. Resting on this argument, this contestation outside Westminster has increased in recent years, namely in the form of UKIP; the party has actively sought to challenge major parties and questioned topical policies, in which they have succeeded well.

3.3.1. UKIP and The Conservatives

In the British context, UKIP is most often compared to the Conservative party due to ideological similarities. The Conservatives are a also center-right party, whose EU-attitude is soft eurosceptic. Naturally, today’s Tories reflect Thatcherism, and it has been argued that UKIP also would apply some Thatcherite policies. (Hug, 2014: 7; op cit., Hayton, 34.) The Conservatives are aware of this current comparison, and they are lowering salience on UKIP’s core issue, the EU(-opposition) – this is their attempt of keeping UKIP away from the Commons. The Tories attitude towards UKIP is derogatory, as they have – more than once – bashed UKIP and its members in the media. (Abedi and Lundberg, 2008: 7.)
The figure above (taken from Lynch and Whitaker, 2013: 292) illustrates how UKIP and the Tories’ 2010 general election candidates position each other on the general left-right -dimension, and on the pro/anti-EU -dimension. It shows that both parties are almost identically situated in the general left-right -dimension. Quite naturally, the attitudes on EU-integration differ, as do their EU-attitudes. Interestingly, however, the candidates’ views of the other party’s position on the general dimension are fascinating: UKIP candidates view the Tories as more leftist, and the Tories view UKIP as more radically right, as they are in reality. These placements, therefore, indicate that UKIP candidates did not view the Conservatives as eurosceptic, but the Conservatives considered UKIP as a radical-right -party – both ‘speculations’ can be proven false with research (see 4.5.1.).

Hug (2014: 6, 35) argues, that the Conservatives have adopted a more eurosceptic tone in their politicking due to the EU’s “developing nature”, but also due to UKIP’s rapid rise. This statement has gained support from Gifford (2006: 865), who believes that UKIP has hardened the Tories’ EU-policies, and consequently the Tories are now a “middle way” to Europe. As polls prove, UKIP is right behind the Tories in terms of support levels, and as Conservatives are opting for another, successive majority from Westminster, they feel threatened and thus are forced to re-outline their policies. Moreover, as an example of Farage and Cameron’s dynamics, it was recently revealed that Cameron considers Farage as an outright threat, and is terrified of going in front of television cameras with the UKIP leader. In the British context, these debates are considered important under the elections, as they provide the voters a great chance to compare the party leaders and their stances. Moreover, the debates are an exemplary display of democracy and transparent UK-politicking. However, should Cameron not participate, it could arguably mean more votes for UKIP in the May 2015 general elections.

Research has proved that out of the 306 Tory-MPs seven are europhiles, 64 categorised as ‘European Agnostic’ , and the remaining 235 are eurosceptic. Furthermore, out of the eurosceptics, 81 have showed support for EU-withdrawal and therefore could be considered as hard eurosceptics (Heppel, 2012; referred in Hug, 2014: 35). Moreover, another survey showed that 71% of Conservative MPs are ready to withdraw from the EU.

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18 The middle-way implies the ideological position between hard eurosceptic UKIP and pro-EU Labour.
20 Author’s interpretation: ‘European Agnostic’ exemplifies a realist.
(YouGov 2013, in op. cit.) These statistics show that the Conservatives are generally, in fact, quite eurosceptic. This tendency is supported by the fact that EU-integration is a high salience issue among the MPs (Hayton, in Hug, 2014: 36). The next, crucial step for the Tories is the establishment of tougher policies on “immigration, EU and welfare“ (ibid.) so that they can match UKIP and not loose their majority in the Commons. Especially with immigration, Cameron needs to be careful, as the issue is one of UKIP’s current core policies, also very high in salience, and important to voters (Hayton, 2010: 32).

In practice, Cameron has initiated a policy in which he prevents migrants from gaining access to national welfare benefits. Also, his modernisation scheme is an intentional strategy to devalue UKIP’s issues, such as integration and immigration – his plan may be subjectively fatal, should voters dislike his policies and vote UKIP instead. (Dorey, 2007, in ibid.)

Moreover, ideological eurosceptic connection between UKIP and the Tories – in addition to Thatcherism – can be explained with the fact that some of UKIP’s policies have been taken up from the Conservatives, as the Tories have vetoed them. This is likely to be a tactical maneuver from UKIP’s part, as they are trying to angle Conservative-votes. In practice, this angling is not entirely impossible nor far-fetched, as UKIP and Tories are popular in the same geographical areas. Another important factor is the ‘turnover’ of politicians, which occurs between the parties. As prime examples, Nigel Farage and UKIP-MP Carswell are ex-Conservatives, and ex-UKIP Craig Macinlay is now a Conservative (BBC, 2014i). Therefore, if politicians can switch camps, there is no reason that voters could not do the same. (Whitaker and Lynch, 2011: 5-6, 13; Hug, 2014: 6.)

Some Conservative-MPs think that UKIP might be better off as a pressure group, rather than a minor political party. Perhaps the Tories want UKIP to be on the sidelines and out from Westminster, as UKIP is an absolute threat for them? In any respect, even though pressure group has a negative echo to it, the reality is rather positive as UKIP can be considered as a refuge for dissatisfied Tory-members, or -politicians. (Abedi and Lundberg, 2008: 7, 22.)
3.3.2. UKIP and the British National Party

Another British political party, to which UKIP is often compared to, is the British National Party (BNP). BNP is a far-right, populist party, who has been accused of being racist, violent and narrow-minded (Sutcliffe, 2010: 9, 18; Ford et al., 2011: 23). BNP made its breakthrough in 2009 when it won two seats from the European Parliament, yet in the 2014 EU-elections the party lost all the seats and thus currently it has no MEPs (Hayton 2010, 1; BBC, 2009).

BNP’s policies on immigration and discomfort over increasing Muslim populations, as well as their negative EU-attitude, have been used as overarching factors in relation UKIP. (Ford et al., 2011: 10). Margetts et al. (2004: 12) have argued that UKIP’s policies are built “upon the same well of social and political attitudes among the public as the BNP [...]”. Moreover, both UKIP and BNP underline the British identity and nation, and the voters value their policies on immigration, economy, crime and Europe the most. Another factor unifying the parties’ supporters is their distrust towards the current British political system. Potentially, as parties’ issues are similar, in the voters’ minds UKIP and BNP merge as one party. Nevertheless, BNP’s arguments and attitudes are more extreme than UKIP’s, and this has lead to BNP being marked too radical – a tendency that drives voters and supporters away. (Usherwood, 2008; Hayton, 2010; Ford et al., 2011.)

BNP has the strongest support base in industrial England, so it does not compete from the same votes as UKIP and the Conservatives. Rather, BNP competes from the same votes with Labour, and BNP’s voters often have a Labour-background (Goodwin, 2011; Whitaker and Lynch, 2011: 7.) Most likely, though, UKIP might benefit from the BNP’s voters, who favour the right-wing -policies, but do not wish to vote BNP due to their radical ideology or a specific policy. In fact, 47% of BNP’s voters could very well vote for UKIP due to their more moderate, yet similar policies (Hayton, 2010: 30).

Regardless of the resemblances, UKIP has, without fail, recently denied all links to BNP. Farage has declared (BBC, 2010a) that as UKIP is a “non-racist, non-sectarian party”, it will “under no circumstances whatsoever” work with the BNP. This statement also suggests that UKIP considers BNP as a racist and narrow-minded party, with which

21 It can be statistically proved that BNP’s attitudes are more radical than UKIP’s. See chapter 4.5.1. for precise analysis.
collaboration or electoral coalitions are out of the question. This message can also be understood in a way that UKIP does not wish to be associated with a radical political party.

3.4. UKIP in the European Parliament’s context

The European Parliament is an independent EU-institution, which currently entails 750 MEPs from the EU’s 28 member states. The EP is also the only EU’s body, which is elected directly every five years. The voting system used is Proportional Representation (PR), and it has been in effect since 1999 (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008a: 111). Accordingly, voters vote for the parties, instead of the candidates. When voting, the voter marks an X next to the party of preference to the ballot paper. When the ballot papers have been counted, the allocated seats are then proportionate to the votes per constituency. The parties, on their part, have a list, which indicates how many, and who, of the representatives get elected in relation to the vote share. (Parliament, 2014a.) This system, as opposed to the (British) FPP, gives equal opportunities for smaller parties to succeed, as it has been notified with UKIP.

The elected representatives are called Members of European Parliament (MEP), and their main task is to prepare policies and laws to be applied in the member states. Additionally the MEPs draw up a long-term budget in co-operation with the European Commission and safeguard the fulfillment of the human rights, democracy and liberties in the EU-28. The plenaries are held in Brussels, Belgium, and Strasbourg, France. (European Parliament, 2014a.)

The plenaries are the culmination of the proactive work, and where the MEPs can voice their opinions and participate in decision-making. The plenaries employ, in addition to the MEPs, a range of interpreters, translators, officials and the EP President, alongside his/her fourteen vice-presidents. The President opens the session, hands out the floor to speakers and conducts an organised course of action; the sittings must be structured due to the large quantity of people, but also because of numerous topical issues that need to be handled. The responsibility of the President is diversified, as he/she is in charge of “the voting procedure, putting amendments and legislative resolutions to the vote and announcing the results” (European Parliament, 2014c).

The plenaries mainly handle two tasks: debates and votes. The appropriate documents vary by subject and legislative procedure, and one of the following procedures is applied:
a. in ordinary legislative procedure, consent procedure or consultation procedure the EP can scrutinise legislative reports; b. budgetary procedure can be applied when creating the EU’s annual budget in co-operation with the Council; and c. the EP, or the appropriate committees, can initiate non-legislative reports on a chosen topic, and with these, catch the interest of other institutions and press for answers. These reports, albeit without legislative power, can be influential, as the Commission might use them as a springboard for further proposals. (ibid.). Additionally, the EP can bring up its opinion on whichever issue is considered important, and give suggestions to the Commission on matters of which it would be beneficial to conduct “a legislative act to be adopted” (ibid.). According to the transparency policy, all actions of each plenary are put on record and published.

The most central feature of a plenary is the debate, in which the participants voice their opinions. The speaking time during that discussion depends on the number of speakers who have asked the floor – oftentimes the allocated time is short, as many wish to speak. This leads to the debates lasting for many hours. The following action is the voting, which often takes place by a show of hands, and in the case of an unclear result, the President can arrange an electronic vote to take place immediately. Another option is a roll call – vote, which is arranged should a political group or 40 MEPs request it the evening prior to the vote. If the roll call -vote takes place and is not a secret ballot, the individual votes will be annexed to the record. Decisions are in most cases made by an absolute majority. After the vote, an MEP, should he/she wish so, can explain his/her vote and provide justification for the taken stance; the explanation can be given orally or in writing. (ibid).

In terms of organisation, the EP is centered on eight political groups, and each MEP is assigned to one political group according to their political affiliation, not nationality. A minimum of 25 MEPs from one-quarter of member states is required to form a political group 22. Each political group handles the internal organisation without the EP’s help, and assigns a chair, a bureau and a secretariat. The seating is also arranged internally, and the personal political affiliation designates the MEP’s seat within the group. (European Parliament, 2014b.) The groups have an ‘agree to disagree’ -mentality, meaning that there is no voting disciplinity, and additionally the MEPs can act freely (Brack, 2012: 160; 2013: 89). It can be asserted that group work in the EP is more allowing, as opposed to working in the national parliament.

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22 EU requires that at least one quarter of member states must be represented in a political group. Currently one quarter of EU-28 equals as seven member states.
UKIP’s role in the European Parliament is visible. Currently there are 24 UKIP MEPs in Brussels, and the entire delegation belongs to the ‘Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy’ -group (EFDD), which is being co-lead by Nigel Farage and David Borelli\(^\text{23}\). There are a total of 48 MEPs in EFDD, of which one from the Czech Republic, 17 from Italy, two from Lithuania, one from Poland, two from Sweden and 24 from the United Kingdom. (EFDD, 2014.)

The EFDD states that it “rejects the bureaucratisation of Europe and the creation of a single centralised European superstate” and that it is “committed to the principles of democracy, freedom and co-operation” (EFDD, 2014). They also oppose further European integration, whilst highlighting that national borders and values are to be strengthened. EFDD also claims that there is “no single European people”, and that xenofobia, antisemitism and other forms of discrimination are not tolerated (ibid.). As far as EFDD’s agenda is concerned, it largely resembles some of UKIP’s policies – namely the opposition to EU-integration, protection of borders and zero tolerance for any sort of racism. This correlation, however, is not too surprising, given that the other group leader is Farage, and EFDD is considered as EP’s eurosceptic group. Interestingly, EFDD’s agenda has no mention about the economy. This on the whole supports Brack’s (2013: 86) argument that rightist groups oppose the EU and its integration on political and cultural grounds, whereas the leftist groups tend to highlight the economic issues.

3.4.1. Three-fold role theory and UKIP MEPs

Brack (2012 and 2013) has studied euroscepticism in the EP and managed to précis a three-fold role theory\(^\text{24}\) on how eurosceptic MEPs act in a supranational institution. She describes the (hard) eurosceptic MEPs as “untidy right” (2013: 86) and argues that they “conceive and carry out their representative mandate” (Brack, 2012: 152) in an extraordinary manner. Eurosceptic MEPs declare that they are in the EP’s opposition, and with that, they believe that they can downplay the EU in every arena possible. (ibid.) Also, although the ‘untidy right’ seems to hamper the policy-making, they actually contribute in making the EU even more legitimate by questioning the *modus operandi*.


\(^{24}\) Role is defined as “dynamic configuration of goals, attitudes ad behaviours that are characteristic of people in particular position”. (Searing, D. 1994. *Westminster’s world, Understanding political roles*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, quoted in Brack, 2012: 153). This definition helps to comprehend the behaviour of an individual.
In general, eurosceptic MEPs face a dilemma as though how far should they engage with a supranational institution they have been elected to, but which they strongly oppose? It has also been stated that since the extent of engagement to the EP varies, each MEP implements their mandate subjectively. To ease the understanding of this complex matter, the role theory of three ideal-type roles has been conducted. (Brack, 2012: 152-153; 2013: 86-88.)

The first role is the absentee. This role is composed of two elements: limited engagement in the EP and emphasised status of the national assembly or constituency. Absentees’ actions in the EP are slim; they take very little part in committees, since attending is considered ‘futile’ (Brack, 2013: 92). They vote in plenaries, but solely to portray opposition. The main reason for their involvement is selfishly to avoid punishments or fines, and to get paid. On the contrary, they are likely to be very active in national politics, as majority of their time is spent at home. (Brack, 2013: 97.) In relation to this, the absentee MEPs often use written questions: this unassertive medium is used as a diplomatic mean to highlight their national position, whilst showing seeming involvement in the EP. (Brack, 2012: 154-155; 2013: 97.) Moreover, in interviews UKIP MEPs that have been characterised as absentees, have stated the following:

“The whole thing is pointless” (MEP Colman, quoted in Brack, 2012: 155).

“They elected me to be opposed to the EU, it is my mandate. So I spent most of my time at home to explain how undemocratic and inefficient the EU is.” (MEP Whittaker, in ibid 25.)

These quotes sum up the nature of an absentee: they are holdouts with selfish motives, and thus consider the EP as irrelevant. Absentees feel that their duty is to campaign against Europe, and to be messengers of euroscepticism. Moreover, as Brack (2013: 92) claims, absentees would prefer to sit in national or regional assemblies, rather than in the EP. This, however, supports the dilemma and raises a question: why have they run in the EU-elections, if they wish to be elected elsewhere? As for the roles of UKIP MEPs, Brack’s interviews (2012) proved that a large part of current or former appropriate MEPs were, in fact, absentees. This founding is leveled with the party’s general attitude towards the EU,

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25 Given that MEP Whittaker’s service at the EP ended to the sixth term, and is thus out of scope with the timeframe of this thesis, his actions will not be included in the appropriate analysis.
whereby it is not too surprising a result. In her later work (2013: 98) she states that “hostile MEPs” 26 are often absentee, and respectively, this type of representatives can often be located from UKIP.

The pragmatist is the second role. These persons are involved in the EP’s work, and they value the rules of the assembly, as well as devote time to the institution. Pragmatists hold a very realistic mindset, as they are conscious about being in the minority, as well as having limited chances to influence. However, pragmatists often use a “voice strategy” (Brack, 2012: 156), whereby they give speeches and hope that they are even partially recognised. In a sense, the means are rather moderate, as pragmatists do not intervene the policy-making or question the EP in general. In comparison to the absentee, pragmatists attend committee meetings and consider them as important mediums to influence policy contents, but do not consider public speeches as efficient. (Brack, 2012: 159-158; 2013: 99-100.)

Brack (2012: 157) also states that pragmatists regard voting as a ‘must-do’; an integral part of the job. Akin to absentee, pragmatists prefer the national political arena, and they too, use the EP as a forum to advocate the national interest. For the most part, pragmatists are the most active out of the three roles: they smartly take advantage of “the various parliamentary activities at their disposal, including amendments, motions and reports” (op cit., 158). Even though pragmatists are seemingly most active of the three roles, they still condemn the EP and its actions: their involvement maximises the internal knowledge, and this is easy to misuse in the media. It is no surprise that nobody of Brack’s interviewees were UKIP MEPs.

The third and final role is the public orator. These MEPs are characterised by speaking in public and spreading a negative image of the EU (Brack, 2013: 98). Brack points out that public orators “exploit any piece of information that could support their position, especially concerning the failings of European integration – corruption, fraud, scandal...” (2012: 158). They, in other words, believe in representing people’s voice in the EP, and through public speeches they “deligitimise the institution” (ibid., also in Brack, 2013: 98). Furthermore, the moral obligation of a public orator is to educate the citizens on the EU’s atrocious decisions (Brack, 2013: 99). Given this motive, it is no surprise that public orators accentuate the EU’s breakdowns in their speeches. Public orators rarely take part in

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26 In this context, hostility is directed towards the EU and further integration.
committees, mainly because they get no speaking time and/or visibility behind closed doors, and because they feel that the set place in the opposition would discard their grandeur. They speak in public, because it gives them a feeling of satisfaction (Brack, 2013: 98) – they could be defined as ‘attention seekers’. They do vote in plenaries, but it is often considered as a protest, rather than a de facto, genuine, vote. (Brack, 2012: 159.)

Public orators are often very aware of the EP’s organisational structure, as knowing the bureaucracy facilitates when asking the floor, and maximised speaking time enables increasing levels of opposition at home. However, the main political groups in the EP try to prevent the eurosceptics from intervening the policy-making too much, as especially in the most sensitive issues, their actions can be harmful (Brack, 2013: 89-90). Often the speeches can be provocative, insulting and/or questioning in nature, their behavior is often unconventional and they take anti-conformism on trust (op. cit., 89-90; 98). This behavior, argues ex-UKIP MEP Clark, distinguishes public orators from others. Here again, Brack’s interviewees turned out to often be UKIP MEPs, most notably – yet not surprisingly – Nigel Farage can be numbered as a public orator. (op. cit., 159-160.) Farage has said that his “main role is to speak, talk and stand for the people”. His political advisor backed him up in saying that they don’t support anything it [the EP] does. (ibid.) Farage’s colleague, UKIP MEP Bufton stated that

“I try to be the eyes and ears for people back home… and I am here for that purpose so that we an actually highlight the negative things”. (ibid.)

A proof that UKIP MEPs are sometimes in the EP on an ‘inside mission’, came from MEP Booth:

“Everybody hates us here, but we don’t care. I am in a committee [...] and I try to attend those meetings but it’s incredibly boring. But we know from the inside exactly what is happening.” (ibid.)

The statements above prove that UKIP’s position in the EP’s context is, to a certain extent, as unique, as in the British context. The motives of elected MEPs vary significantly, they have fluctuating motives and modus operandi, and the MEPs have individualistic ways in which they carry out their mandates. 27

27 For a more accurate analysis, especially regarding the UKIP MEPs, see chapter eight.
4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As stated earlier, euroscepticism as a phenomenon is multidimensional and has no straightforward definition, nor an all-embracing theory to cover all aspects. That is also the main reason for why the theoretical framework of this thesis consists of three theories and two other theoretical approaches. Presenting a larger amount of theories would result in overlapping definitions, and most importantly, would not add academic value to the research.

The three theories are related to party-based euroscepticism, whereby they support each other. However, as they heavily rely on categorisations and solely used might forge the research and results, other approaches will also be applied in order to support the analysis. Consequently, the theoretical framework includes the niche party -concept and Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). They have been chosen to provide optional, non-categorical, standpoints to the categorical theories.

Neither of these additional approaches relies on party-based euroscepticism, but rather they measure the position and attitude in reflection to the EU and its issues. The niche party -chapter explains UKIP’s national position, and clarifies the experienced and upcoming challenges when seeking office from Westminster. The CHES provides numerical, quantitative, analyses on EU-attitudes on both national and European levels. It is widely used in political science due to its longitudinal characteristic and accessibility (Mudde, 2011: 13). The use of CHES’s numeric data in this thesis adds depth to both the theoretical framework and analysis. Moreover, it enables the EU-stances’ comparison in the national and European contexts, thus giving important evidence on UKIP’s positioning. Arguably, in order to empirically support both euroscepticism and UKIP’s EU-attitude, it is necessary to include both approaches.

This chapter first presents the appropriate, and then proceeds with niche party -concept and CHES. Chapters 4.1. - 4.3. simply present the theories, whereas in chapters 4.4. and 4.5.1 UKIP is incorporated into the text to support the theoretical approaches. Then, chapter 4.6. combines the key elements of each theory in relation to UKIP and most importantly, based on the findings, presents the individualistically constructed re-definition of euroscepticism will be constructed in 4.6., which is applied in the analyses.
4.1. Theory I: Taggart and Szczerbiak’s hard and soft euroscepticism

Paul Taggart initiated his and Aleks Szczerbiak’s dichotomy of hard and soft euroscepticism in 1998, and nowadays it provides a widely benefited theoretical base for (comparative) study on euroscepticism, due to its versatility and simplicity. In the early 2000s, when the objective was to clarify as though why European political parties behave the way they do, and what motivates them to take certain stands in relation to the EU and its integration, Taggart began collaborating with Szczerbiak (see 2002; 2003).

Their argument in which they state that “[…] those interested in European integration need to understand party competition in member and candidate states and those interested in political parties need to understand the nature of the European issue” (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002: 6) provided the base for the theory. Having coupled these two issues (that is, European integration and European issues) together, they began outlining euroscepticism, and ever since, it has been applied to European political party systems (ibid.). Initially the theory was based on the argument above, but since the theory was applied to central and eastern Europe, in addition to Western Europe, hard and soft euroscepticism were distinguished (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2000; 2008: 7).

Consequently, since the millennium, the authors have actively developed the theory into a more workable form, whereby it is appropriate to apply only the most recent definition.

In practice, hard and soft euroscepticism can be seen as each other’s opposites. The division between the two types of euroscepticism is characterised as follows: hard euroscepticism means

“[…] a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their counties should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived” (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008a: 7),

whereas soft euroscepticism is understood as a phenomenon

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28 See chapter 2.1. for a precise definition.
"where there is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU’s trajectory" (op. cit., 8).

In order for the hard euroscepticism’s definitions to be fulfilled, the authors have aligned that two criteria should be met: first, a party should be a single-issue anti-EU -party, which is primarily motivated by the principled EU-opposition; and second, it should address the EU as “too capitalist / socialist / neo- liberal / bureaucratic”, this, of course, being conditioned by the party’s ideological stance (“communist / conservative / socialist / populist”). Indeed, hard eurosceptics may see a former enemy in the EU 29 (op. cit., 7-8). Furthermore, such a party is believably “incompatible with the present trajectory of the European project” (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008a: 8) and then a withdrawalist position is plausible. Accordingly, it is not exclusionary for the hard eurosceptic parties to oppose the membership altogether.

Soft eurosceptic parties, in turn, can exist virtually everywhere, as this category is rather permissive and comprises of virtually all parties whose discursive criticises the EU. Basically a party can be labelled as soft eurosceptics, even if it criticises one of the EU’s policies. It can therefore be stated that soft eurosceptics prioritise the national policies and / or values over those of the EU, especially if the European alternatives are seen as problematic (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008a: 8). Lynch and Whitaker (2012: 3) suggest – similarly to Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) – that soft eurosceptics do not hold principled opposition to the integration per se, but rather oppose “the further transfer of competences to the EU”. Since soft euroscepticism is far more popular among the political scene (for further references, cf. Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008), than hard euroscepticism, the softer stance is rarely accentuated.

To highlight the differences of hard and soft euroscepticism, Sørensen (2007: 62-63) has argued that hard and soft euroscepticism are similarly constructed, but they are distinguished in strength. She states that hard euroscepticism resorting more to ‘rejectionism’ (see 4.2. and 4.3.). Of course, the two types can overlap, but it is crucial to

29 For example, EU’s supranationalism is an enemy for (ultra)nationalists (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008a).
have a framework for distinctive purposes. Moreover, hard euroscepticism is more permanent, and does not just ‘fade away’, whereas soft euroscepticism can turn into consensus if the “object of skepticism (be it financial, ideological […] or fear of losing national identity)” (ibid.) is amended. Therefore the premises for hard and soft euroscepticism are comparable, but hard euroscepticism is more fundamental.

Here, the scholars are aware of the limitations of their theory, and that it might be more of a continuum, as opposed to a de facto dichotomy (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008b). However, this theory, in all its straightforwardness, provides a very satisfactory base and a steady starting point for further appropriate research – for that reason, the dichotomy is applied in this paper.

4.2. Theory II: Kopecky and Mudde’s four-fold typology

Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde (2002) have been the most prominent critics of the dichotomy presented above. They argue that the dichotomy itself has shortcomings and it fails to fully explain the important phenomenon by simplifying it too much. They argue that especially soft euroscepticism is too inclusive. Most importantly however, the dichotomy overlooks the ideological aspect. Thus, Kopecky and Mudde have provided an alternative theory as a response, in which they categorise euroscepticism more precisely and also focus on the phenomenon’s structural aspect (ibid.; Topaloff, 2012: 23).

The base of their typology lies in David Easton’s (1965) political theory that states that the support for European integration can be distinguished to ‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’. By ‘diffuse’ they mean that a party supports the general ideas of the integration, whereas ‘specific’ support stands for supporting the general practice of the EU and its future (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 299; Easton: 1965). Drawing from this, Kopecky and Mudde distinguish two main issues, a. the support for the EU, and b. support for the EU integration, and these issues are named as dimensions, as illustrated in table 1.
In relation to the 1st dimension, the authors have made a distinction between EU-optimists and EU-pessimists. Optimists are content with the EU’s current state and accept the general actions and substance of the EU. Naturally the EU-pessimists act as an opposite to EU-optimists: they do not accept the EU and are against the further development of the EU and its policies. (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 300-302.)

In turn, the second dimension distinguishes the europhiles and the europhobes. Europhiles trust the EU and the key factors behind the integration; that is, the supranationality (political elements) and the liberal market economy (economic element). Though the authors (op. cit., 301) remind that the europhiles believe in the EU under any circumstances – EU integration does not define the overall trust towards the EU. Europhiles can be federalists or supporters of the free trade. Europhobes, then, are frequently nationalists, isolationists or socialists, whose ideological views differ excessively from those of the EU. Therefore, they out rightly reject further integration. (ibid.)

As table 1 indicates, the four groups, together with the dimensions, form a four-fold typology than can be applied to either political parties or the public. The subcategories have been formed to encompass all ideological stances towards the EU-issues. Kopecky and Mudde (2002: 302-303) argue that euroenthusiasts support the general idea of the EU integration process, therefore acting according the europhiles. Europragmatists oppose the integration, and take a relatively neutral stand towards the EU. The attitude might be

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for EU (1st dimension)</th>
<th>Support for integration (2nd dimension)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU-optimists (positive euroscepticism)</td>
<td><strong>Europhile</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Euroenthusiasts</strong>: pro-integration and trajectory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-pessimists (negative euroscepticism)</td>
<td><strong>Europhile</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eurosceptics</strong>: pro-integration, anti-trajectory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 303; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008b: 242.)
more positive, if the member-state is, for example, a net-receiver, whereby the financial profit overrules the ideological aspect. Eurosceptics give support to the EU, but do not advocate the integration. Finally the eurejects can be considered as a combination of EU-pessimists and europhobes, as they oppose both the EU and the integration. (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 302-303; Hansen, 2008: 29.)

Even though Kopecky and Mudde attempted to generate a more inclusive theory, they, too, have faced extensive criticism (see Flood and Usherwood, 2005; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008b). Other scholars have argued that Kopecky and Mudde have managed to include anti- and pro-EU -parties more extensively than, for example, Taggart and Szczerbiak, but the typology still faces a number of issues.

First, it simplifies a party’s ideology too much; varying ideologies cannot be “[...] encapsulated in a binary opposition” (Flood and Usherwood, 2008: 4). Moreover, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2003: 9) point out, that this flaw could lead to serious misinterpretations, as ideologically different political parties. For example, parties like ‘German Christian Democrats’ and ‘Forza Italia’ would all fit in the euroenthusiast -category, even though their attitudes towards the EU differ largely. Second, the terminology is misleading. Flood and Usherwood (2008) state that the use of ‘euroscepticism’ in the typology could cause false interpretations, since the usage of the word nowadays is so widespread, and its sense is not fully established. Third, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2003: 9) claim that the europragmatist -category is implausible, as it is nearly impossible to categorise a European party as pragmatic. They cannot think of any party that currently is opposing the integration, but has a semi-positive attitude towards the EU. Additionally, Hansen (2008: 29) rightly points out that the europragmatist -category fails to provide an accurate definition of what it entails. Fourth, the euroenthusiast –category has been accused of being too inclusive and inexact, whereby the incorrect placements are probable. On the account of inclusiveness, it has been compared to the criticised soft euroscepticism. (cf. Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2003: 9; Hansen, 2008). Fifth and finally, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2003: 10) claim that in order to effectively use the two typologies, an extensive amount of data must be collected. The most prominent challenge seems to be the operationalisation; is the researcher able to break down the available information on a party’s positioning, in order to maximise the advantages of the classification?
4.3. Theory III: Flood and Usherwood’s classification

Christopher Flood and Simon Usherwood have provided their own theory related to party positions, which could be considered as their ‘counter-reaction’ to Taggart and Szczerbiak, and Kopecky and Mudde. Having learned their lesson, they do not use the term euroscepticism at all. Their classification consists of six different categories covering all dimensions of the wide phenomenon. 30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: details of classification</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive euroscepticism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Maximalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reformist</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Gradualist</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Minimalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Revisionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Rejectionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negative euroscepticism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Flood and Usherwood, 2005: 6; Topaloff, 2012: 23)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This classification manages to include the key aspects of both integration and EU support into the same category, but fails in the nomenclature. The support / opposition for both the EU-integration and the EU-configuration covers both ends of the issue. Moreover, these labels can be used alone or together – an important factor as parties’ stances vary

30 NB. The prefix used in Flood and Usherwood’s classification is ‘EU-’, not ‘euro-’, indicating that the stance is taken towards the European Union and its by-products, not Europe as continent.
dramatically, not least because their political location in the left-right spectrum. (Flood and Usherwood, 2005: 6.) However, even the best of labels can be ambiguous, as happens with this theory: without accounting for what the categories’ names factually mean, it is impractical to apply them.

To this theory Topaloff (2012: 23) has added a differentiation between positive and negative euroscepticism. He argues that the key element is the dissent: maximalists call for deeper and faster integration, whereas revisionists and rejectionists wish that the pace would slow down, or even cease.

However, as this theory is also based on categorisations, it can easily lapse into the same pitfalls as the previously presented, equivalent theories.

### 4.4. Niche party -concept

Niche parties are political parties, who limit their central ideological focus around a. one issue or b. a small number of issues (Meguid, 2005; 2008). This also distinguishes niche parties from the mainstream parties, who very rarely limit their political agenda. If a party’s agenda differs from that of their mainstream counterpart’s, the niche party -label can be applied. It is also noteworthy, that niche parties are often compared to the mainstream parties, albeit the altering political programs. Niche parties also tend to be ‘young’ and non-established parties, whose ideological base is not as inclusive, as ‘older’ parties’. Niche parties, therefore, pay special attention to issues that mainstream parties often disregard. (Meyer and Wagner, 2013.)

Wagner (2012a: 847) proposes that niche parties’ issues are non-economic, from which he draws out two criteria.

1. do not emphasize economic issues, and
2. emphasize a narrow range of non-economic issues.

As examples of non-economic issues, he lists “immigration, the environment, European integration or social liberalism” (ibid.). If these criteria are not met, a party is not a niche party.

Moreover, Jensen and Spoon (2010) have distinguished four types of niche parties: anti-EU, far-right, regional and green. In most cases, niche parties are non-centrist and / or
ideologically extremist parties, but it must be remembered that anomalies exist in the wide political spectrum. Commonly niche parties perform worse in national elections, but gain success in European elections, as Jensen and Spoon (2010: 174) point out. They continue that 35.2% of European Parliament’s composition consisted of niche parties, therefore comprising a noteworthy percentage. The percentage included 49 parties, of which five was anti-EU.

Generally it is possible to distinguish three objectives for political parties: policy, office and vote. These objectives are similar for mainstream and niche parties, however the means of achievement differ. Out of the three, vote-seeking incentive is the most crucial, as Strøm (1990) argues: both types of parties wish to maximise their electoral success, in order to implement their policies in political institutions. However, as niche parties tend to be newer, gaining office is crucially important for their further trajectory.

Respectively, Wagner (2012b) states that in order for a niche party to gain a voice and an extensive support-base, they are required to establish their core issue in the national politics, as well as distinguish themselves from the mainstream parties [(see also Strøm and Müller (2000) and Ezrow (2008) cited in Lynch et al. (2011: 3)]. This, however, causes a dilemma: how far are niche parties willing to move from their core issue, without the danger of losing their unique position and voters? On the other hand, if they are willing to increase their national representation, they need to broaden their policies, which is likely to cause internal conflicts. (Jensen and Spoon, 2010; Lynch et al., 2011.) Another important factor is salience of the core issue. If salience on the chosen core issue is low in the national politics, it is challenging to achieve seats from national parliament, as there is little visibility.

How can all this be applied to UKIP? In Britain, UKIP is most often compared to the Conservatives, due to the Tories’ soft eurosceptic attitude. However, by adopting this line, they have lowered the salience on the European issue – which translates as bad news for UKIP. (Lynch et al. 2011: 3.) The mainstream party (the Conservatives) has limited niche party’s (UKIP) appeal, by holding some possession of the eurosceptic approach. Although the Conservatives’ euroscepticism is not as far-out as UKIP’s, it can still be argued that UKIP’s thunder has been stolen, thus impeding their access to Westminster. (ibid.) UKIP

31 Salience means ‘most noticeable or important’. In this context it refers to the chosen issue of a niche party.
should also raise the salience on the EU-withdrawal, but for a niche party, this proves difficult, as their resources are limited (Lynch and Whitaker, 2013: 288).

Even though the Conservatives have impeded UKIP’s access to Westminster, their game is far from being over. UKIP is required to aggressively promote their core issue on the national field and start building their support-base from local constituencies - this is also an excellent technique to enhance salience. (ibid.) Arguably, UKIP has ‘wooed’ a few constituencies, but they started the lobbying too late and thus far, the results have been slim (Lynch and Whitaker, 2013). UKIP currently has two seats in Westminster, from the constituencies of Clacton and Rochester and Stood. (BBC, 2014b; BBC, 2014d.) Given that both MPs, Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless, have been elected through by-elections, UKIP is hungry for more: they will be a true force to be reckoned with in the 2015 general elections. In any respect, UKIP should continue its promoting in constituencies, as thus far their support in certain local constituencies has steadily risen in the last few years. (Webb, 2014.)

As for UKIP’s ‘nicheness’, UKIP does meet Wagner’s two criteria, and thus can be labeled as a niche party; they highlight the EU-withdrawal as their non-economic issue, and the existing economic issues are overshadowed by the EU-discourse. In this sense, fulfilling the perquisites, it is surprising that it has only recently been included in related studies. Thus, not a lot of material can be traced related to UKIP as a niche party.

The ‘nicheness’ is measured through the analysis of parties’ election manifestos and surveys. In practice, the appropriate data (i.e. European election survey or Expert survey) is analysed with the means of Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) 32, in which the mean salience is measured from operationalised data, and which determines the results. (cf. Lynch et al., 2011; Marks et al., 2007; Wagner, 2012b)

32 CMP is the most often used dataset to study policy positions. It has been used from 1945, and it “infers positions from party electoral manifestos” (Bakker et al., 2012: 10). See also Klüver and Spoon, 2013: 4.
Thusfar, Lynch et al. (2013: 291) are the only scholars who have studied UKIP’s ‘nicheness’. They have analysed UKIP’s 2010 general election manifesto and 2009 EU elections manifesto, giving the following results:

- 2010 general elections: left-right position 5.0 (0 = central, higher values represent right-wing)
  - in comparison: Conservatives 17.5, Liberal Democrats 4.7, Labour -1.5.
- 2009 EU elections: European integration -58.7 (negative values represent euroscepticism)
  - in comparison: Conservatives -7.

As presented, UKIP radically opposes the EU integration whereby it is safe to argue that UKIP can be defined as an anti-EU -niche party, resorting to hard euroscepticism. Lynch and Whitaker (2013: 286) argue that since hard eurosceptic niche parties parties not only deal with EU-issues, but also with inter alia expenditure and immigration, they have to be considered as a “distinctive sub-set of niche parties” (ibid). UKIP has, in fact, pursued this: they have included other policies – namely an aggressive immigration policy – to their political agenda, in an attempt to eliminate the single-issue -stamp.

To conclude, Lynch and Whitaker (2013) argue that should UKIP wish to get through to Westminster, and they fail to promote their core issue (i.e. salience on EU-withdrawal remains at low levels), they must broaden the political discourse and sharpen other essential policies, for example immigration. An even broader selection of policies would most likely secure votes from the Conservatives’ voters, whereby the potential outcome might be office in Westminster. In fact, UKIP is expected (op. cit.) to highlight its unique position and widen its policies, and not face internal disputes - a unyielding party will not let internal conflicts get in the way of their objective. As stated earlier, now that UKIP has two representatives in Westminster, they surely will not settle to this, and party leader Nigel Farage has stated that “all bets are off” (The Guardian, 2014a). UKIP does, however, face challenging times, as general elections are larger in volume and overall turnout, but there is no doubt that they would not pull out the big guns. In fact, some of the most recent UK-wide opinion polls reveal that in certain constituencies, UKIP has a prominent support (c.f. Thurrock Gazette, 2015).

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33 Their study is not overly excessive, but the general idea and main points can be understood.
4.5. Chapel Hill Expert Survey

Chapel Hill Expert Surveys have been conducted since 1999, and they have been executed in 2002, 2006 and 2010. The survey measures European countries’ national parties’ positioning on European integration, ideology and policy issues on different scales. The most recent survey was conducted in autumn 2010 and the survey questionnaire was internationally distributed to 1044 appropriate academics, who in this survey are referred to as experts. The total response rate was 32.9%. (CHES 2012; Bakker et al., 2012: 9.)

The CHES includes a total of 237 parties of EU-member states, and additionally national parties from non-EU -countries, such as Norway and Turkey. All parties are surveyed on their general position towards “European integration, several EU policies, general left/right, economic left/right, and social left/right” (CHES 2014). The most recent surveys posed also questions outside the official EU-policies, such as immigration. In order to give reliable and valid results, the CHES data is cross-validated with the CMP data and the 2009 European Elections survey data. (Bakker et al., 2012.) Results suggest (op. cit., 12) that CHES is both reliable and valid since it portrays “quite high levels of inter-expert reliability and considerable common structure with different measures”, thus justifying the safe use of CHES.

Moreover, Bakker et al. (2012: 3) highlight CHES surveys’ importance for political science on two reasons: first, CHES provides analyses on party positioning on a. general left-right -dimension, b. the economical left-right -dimension and c. the social left-right -dimension [green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN)]; second, it collects data on parties’ stand and attitudes towards the EU and its policies. Policies include “cohesion policy, internal market, foreign and security policy, European Parliament and enlargement to Turkey” (ibid.).

The four core parts are phrased in the survey are phrased in the following way:

1. **General Left–Right:** ‘We now turn to a few questions on the ideological positions of political parties in [country] in 2010. Please tick the box that best describes each party’s overall ideology on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).’
2. **Economic Left–Right**: ‘Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state.’ An 11-point scale ranges from 0 (extreme left) to 5 (center) to 10 (extreme right).

3. **GAL–TAN**: ‘Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. “Libertarian” or “postmaterialist” parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. “Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.’ An 11-point scale ranges from 0 (libertarian/post-materialist) to 5 (center) to 10 (traditional/authoritarian).

4. **European integration**: ‘How would you describe the general position on European integration that the party leadership took over the course of 2010?’ A 7-point scale ranges from 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly in favor). (Bakker et al., 2012: 3.)

The above questions are from the 2010 survey, albeit the similar style has been in use since 1999. The uniformity enables the comparison between the studies, and does not cause distortion. The 2010 questionnaire included, for the first time, questions on salience (see 4.4.). Depending on the question, the answering scale can vary from a 4 to 11-point scales, ranging from 0 or 1 up to 10. The lower end of the scale means, for example, ‘extreme left’ or ‘strongly opposed’, and the higher end imply, for example, ‘extreme right’ or ‘strongly in favour’.

**4.5.1. UKIP according to CHES**

In the CHES 2010, eight UK’s political parties were featured in the survey (brackets entail the party’s abbreviation in the data): ‘Conservative Party’ (Cons), ‘Labour Party’ (Lab), ‘Liberal Democratic Party’ (LibDems), ‘Scottish National Party’ (SNP), ‘Plaid Cymru’ (Plaid), ‘Green Party’ (Greens), British National Party (BNP), and UKIP. (CHES 2012.) To avoid confusion, each party is also given an ID-number, with which it is easy to locate from the raw data. Due to clarity and manageability, this section excludes the Scottish SNP and Plaid, and only compares UKIP to English parties.

In order to study UKIP’s EU-stands in the utmost precision, the comparison is executed in two sets: first, compared to English political parties; and second, compared to similar, non-
UK, niche -parties, who have, alike UKIP, been in the European Parliament during the seventh term\textsuperscript{34}. These parties examined will be the French ‘Front National’ (FN, ‘The National Front’) and ‘Mouvement Pour la France’ (MPF, ‘Movement for France’), Danish ‘Folkebevægelsen mod EU’ (FolkB, ‘The People’s Movement Against the EU’) and Austrian ‘Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs’ (FPÖ ‘The Austrian Freedom Party’). (Jensen and Spoon, 2010: 195.) MPF and FolkB are, by definition, closest to UKIP, as they are labelled as anti-EU -niche parties. FN and SPÖ are labelled as far-right parties, albeit it has been stated that they have eurosceptic ideologies (BBC 2014e; 2014f).

Even though the survey measures responses on an expert level, i.e. each academic has submitted an answer regarding each party, it is not sensible to take all separate answers into consideration. In stead, the data provides the means and standard deviations regarding the core themes, and they will be analysed in this context. The following tables (table 3, English parties and table 4, non-UK -parties) have been constructed according the CHES 2010 expert data. Both tables present the party’s ideological stance on a chosen issue, and the tables are re-modelled from the experts’ answers.

Precise questions, as well as scales, for the means and deviations, are as follows:

1. **EU-position (EU):** “overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration in 2010”, on a scale 1-7 (1 = opposed … 7 = in favour)

2. **Left-right (LR):** “position of the party in 2010 in terms overall ideological stance”, on a scale 0-10 (0 = extreme left … 10 = extreme right)

3. **Economy (ECON):** “position of the party in 2010 in terms of its ideological stance on economic issues”, on a scale 0-10 (0 = extreme left … 5 = center … 10 = extreme right)

4. **GAL-TAN (GT):** “position of the party in 2010 in terms of its ideological stance on democratic freedoms and rights”, on a scale 0-10 (0 = extreme left … 5 = center … 10 = extreme right)

5. **EU-salience (SAL):** “the relative salience of European integration in the party’s public stance in 2010”, on a scale 1-4 (1 = no importance … 4 = great importance)

6. **EU-dissent (DIS):** “internal dissent or conflict in the party on European integration in 2010”, on a scale 0 - 10 (0 = party was completely united … 10 = party was extremely divided). (CHES codebook 2012.)

\textsuperscript{34} European Parliament’s seventh term: 2009-2014.
From looking at table 3, it becomes clear that experts rank UKIP’s stance on the European Union and its integration as opposed. Furthermore, as the standard deviation is 0, there is perfect congruency between the respondents. Therefore, arguably, a hard eurosceptic line is present. In comparison to other English parties, the BNP’s EU-position is almost as radical as UKIP’s, however the deviation is more significant. The Conservative’s soft eurosceptic alignment can be drawn from the result (2,667), suggesting that, to a certain extent, they support the EU-integration. Other English parties seemingly are more in positively oriented towards the EU as their results clearly exceed the midpoint (3,5).

The outcomes of the general left-right -dimension support the findings presented above. The most hard eurosceptic parties, UKIP and BNP, are leaning the most to the right end of the political spectrum, and the Conservatives are not far behind. Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Green party lean towards the left side. Therefore, given this data, the rightist parties can be classified as the most eurosceptical - be it harder or softer.

Lynch and Whitaker (2013: 292) have constructed a graph, based on the same study:

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Table 3: English political parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>LR</th>
<th>ECON</th>
<th>GT</th>
<th>SAL</th>
<th>DIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>1 / 0</td>
<td>8,786 / 0,669</td>
<td>8,1667 / 1,030</td>
<td>7,615 / 1,557</td>
<td>4 / 0</td>
<td>0,933 / 2,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONS</td>
<td>2,667 / 0,594</td>
<td>7,133 / 0,640</td>
<td>7,643 / 0,929</td>
<td>6,627 / 1,534</td>
<td>2,667 / 0,816</td>
<td>5,400 / 2,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAB</td>
<td>4,800 / 0,676</td>
<td>4 / 0,756</td>
<td>4 / 0,784</td>
<td>4,067 / 1,486</td>
<td>2,133 / 0,516</td>
<td>3,600 / 1,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIB</td>
<td>6 / 0,756</td>
<td>5 / 1</td>
<td>5,643 / 1,216</td>
<td>2,733 / 0,799</td>
<td>2,733 / 0,799</td>
<td>1,867 / 1,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>4,692 / 0,950</td>
<td>2,533 / 0,743</td>
<td>1,923 / 0,641</td>
<td>1,429 / 0,756</td>
<td>2,429 / 0,514</td>
<td>2,455 / 1,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>1,2 / 0,561</td>
<td>9,929 / 0,267</td>
<td>5,846 / 3,051</td>
<td>9,533 / 0,915</td>
<td>3,267 / 0,594</td>
<td>1,455 / 2,660</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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35 Where the standard deviation (sd.) is more than 0, and significantly differs from the mean, the results are not congruent. The perfect congruency would be $sd = 0$. (KvantiMOTV: 2003.)
36 Results rounded down to three decimals.
In a more visual way, this figure\textsuperscript{37} portrays the attitudes towards the EU-integration. Moreover, the same graph demonstrates the English parties’ positions on the economic left-right -dimension. Out of all, UKIP is situated in the utmost far-right, and right to the Conservatives. BNP is situated in between the Liberal Democrats and Labour.

The same trio (UKIP, BNP, Conservatives) stands out in other columns, too. For example, in the GAL-TAN -dimension, the rightist parties are the most traditional (representing bigger values), as opposed to the leftist, more libertarian parties. Notably UKIP’s stance is assessed as less radical than BNP’s, and in this issue, UKIP leans closest to the Conservatives – suggesting that UKIP wishes to control a large part of the citizens’ freedoms and rights, slightly more than the Conservatives do. Moreover, as in this issue, the standard deviation on UKIP and the Conservatives is significant \((= 1,557 \text{ and } 1,534)\), the experts have not been unanimous, thus highlighting the contentiousness of this count. As a reference, BNP’s and Liberal’s standard deviation is much smaller, from which it is relatively safe to argue that their political agendas explain their values and ideology to a greater degree.

In terms of salience, UKIP’s results seem clear. The EU integration’s salience in their agenda is considered very important – the standard deviation \((= 0)\) also speaks in favour

\textsuperscript{37} The authors provided no reasoning for excluding the Greens from this graph.
of the strong EU-opposition. Similar results can be traced from BNP’s part, and alike, the EU-discourse is imminent in their public appearances. The Conservatives, in turn, do not render superfluous attention to the EU-discussion, which becomes clear from the respective mean. This kind of result supports their soft euroscepticism, whereas UKIP’s and BNP’s higher values back up the harder eurosceptic attitude.

The EU-dissent seems to be in line with the salience with UKIP and BNP. Experts came to the conclusion that both parties were nearly completely united in terms of internal EU-dissent. However, there was noteworthy dispersion, and these results should be used with caution. The Conservatives’ internal line seems more scattered, than that of other parties; their dissent was estimated in the midpoint, with the highest dispersion. This dispersion can also be taken as an indication of the differentiating eurosceptic tendency between UKIP and the Conservatives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: non-UK parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean / sd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FolkB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPÖ</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

When comparing UKIP to other similar, non-UK, parties, the variation is less notable. With this table, the objective is to point out that anti-EU and / or (far-)right -political parties across Europe may differ ideologically, yet still implement similar eurosceptic approaches. Here, it is important to include a Europe-wide comparison seeing that UKIP also operates
on European level, and not solely in the UK. This puts the party’s actions into perspective and proves that UKIP’s level of euroscepticism is extraordinarily hard.

The expert assessments indicate that all chosen parties’ overall attitude regarding the EU is negative (<2 in a 7-point scale), whereby these parties are rightly labeled as (hard) euroceptic. Moreover, we can judge that all parties are almost radically ‘rightists’, in terms of their general position and ideological stance – apart from FolkB. Importantly, the EU-salience among all parties is close to the ‘great importance’, which again can largely be interpreted as hard euroscepticism. In terms of the EU-dissent, the parties act coherently: they have been either completely united, or very largely united.

Despite the great amount of similarities, differences can also be distinguished from these five parties. First, as touched upon in the last paragraph, FolkB is a situated in the left side of the political spectrum, even though it is considered an anti-EU -niche party. (Jensen and Spoon, 2010: 195.) With this leftist alignment, FolkB also accents the post-materialistic values, whereas others implement the traditional values. Second, the economic policies are on the traditional side, as the mean in the ‘ECON’ -column is five or more - however the variation here is rather substantial, whereby it can be placed as a difference.

In terms of EU-matters, the FN’s ideology resembles that of UKIP’s the most. Both parties attitude towards the EU is very negative, and they largely refuse the further EU-integration. Both parties also eagerly underline the EU-discourse in their everyday politicking, and the party members are primarily likeminded with regards to the EU-integration. However, FN’s economic and general positions are further on the right, but it seems that the value-based premises are equivalent enough, in order for this kind of juxtaposition to be both valid and reliable.

Having compared UKIP’s positioning to first, fellow English parties and second, to non-UK -parties, it has become evident that UKIP’s attitude towards the EU and its further integration process is negative, and even loathing. Other contemplated parties do take an attitude (be it affirmative or skeptical) towards the EU, but their stances are less radical. Naturally, as the EU is a supranational ‘hot topic and features in the daily discourse of any party, the frequency is few and far between. In the case of UKIP, the situation is reversed: they highlight EU and EU-issues over everything else.
Undoubtedly, these findings prove that euroscepticism occurs notwithstanding the party’s ideological or economic position - and this takes place throughout Europe, not just in the UK.

4.6. Constructed theoretical framework

Having presented appropriate theories, it is legitimate to form the constructed framework of hard euroscepticism and the eurorejectionist -approach. These choices can be justified with by arguing that UKIP meets the criteria of a hard eurosceptic party; it is (mainly) a single-issue, anti-EU -party, who actively lobbies the EU-withdrawal on both national end European levels, as well as downplays the EU and its policies where possible. Furthermore, academics have repeatedly classified UKIP under hard euroscepticism (see Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002: 10, 19; Lynch et al. 2011; Whitaker and Lynch: 2014).

Despite UKIP’s hard eurosceptic -label, Kopecky and Mudde’s eurosceptic -category is not suitable for the party. However, their euroreject -category is more fitting, as UKIP opposes both integration and trajectory – not one or the other. This same nomenclature applies to Flood and Usherwood as well; the most suitable definition of this thesis’ euroscepticism matches their eurorejectionist view. Moreover, EU-withdrawal is also a favouring evidence for eurorejectionism, whereby the chosen approach is largely justified.

Additionally, in the light of statistical expert judgements in CHES 2010, UKIP can most definitely be called a hard eurosceptic party. They see the EU’s further integration and processes as radically negative, futile and possibly even destructive for the British society. Consequently, the vivid discourse on EU-withdrawal and the active promotion of independent Britain’s benefits speak volumes of UKIP’s EU-attitude. These arguments indicate a lack of confidence and contentment towards the union.

Labelling UKIP as a niche party does not necessarily contribute to the factual building of this individual framework, but rather, it helps to understand the party’s underlying and fundamental values and objectives. The niche party -concept was selected to explain the party’s position in the British political field. Moreover, the concept describes the upcoming challenges in the 2015 general elections, where they strive for Westminster seats and attempt the unthinkable – office through elections. UKIP has already made history in 2014 by getting two MPs to Westminster, demonstrating that the lobbying at the grass root-level has finally paid off.
Having presented the appropriate theories and theoretical approaches, this thesis’ eurosceptic line is formed from the aforementioned theories and other horizons. Therefore, since one theory does not extensively cover the party’s EU-attitude, the following re-definition of euroscepticism is proposed, and is to be used especially in this thesis to illustrate UKIP’s prevailing EU-attitude:

_Euroscepticism is profound opposition towards the European Union and EU-membership coupled with outright refusal for further integration and enlargement, and an absolute lack of satisfaction towards the European Union’s policies and actions._
5. METHOD AND DATA

This chapter presents the appropriate method and data, as well as seeks to explain how the material has been gathered. Moreover, the structured analysis framework and its application will be rationalised.

5.1. Theory-driven content analysis

Here, the applied method is a qualitative, theory-driven context analysis. This method systematically describes material, and does it by "classifying material as instances of the categories of a coding frame" (Schreier, 2012: 1). The fundamental objective of a theory-driven content analysis is three-fold. It seeks to a. transform the data into a more useful format, b. produce new information of it, and c. examine the fundamental meanings of chosen data. In other words, the endeavor is to reformulate and condense the multiform, non-structured, data into a coherent form *without* loosing its fundamental message. Respectively, it is important to preserve the thread: when it is not lost, the data can be clearly and reliably analysed. (GAO, 1989: 20; Tuomi and Sarajärvi, 2003: 105-106.)

This method allows the researcher to focus on preferred, selected, and essential elements only. In a broad range of data, it is important to identify the most appropriate themes, and concentrate on them, rather than vaguely abbreviating the data as a whole. It is, thus, safe to say that we are speaking of more than just word-counting, as this method goes beyond the physical elements of the text. (Stemler, 2001; Krippendorff, 2004.)

The fact that this method is theory-driven indicates two things. Firstly, the analysis emphasises the chosen theory and / or theoretical framework, and secondly the theory ‘channels’ the researcher in the process, and enables testing of the theory in a new context. (Carney, 1972: 47.) This testing is particularly important in the context of this thesis, as the theoretical framework is uniquely defined and requires a validity-check.

In practice, there are eight steps in the process of theory-driven content analysis. After deciding on the research question and data (steps 1-2), a coding frame must be built (step 3). The data must then be divided into units of coding, and the coding frame must be tested (steps 4-5). Then, the coding frame must be evaluated and, if needed, modified.
before the main analysis takes place (steps 6-7). Main analysis is to be conducted as a final step (step 8). (Schreier, 2012: 6.)

Coding frame, or analysis framework, is the most important tool: if it is constructed well, the analysis will most likely turn out accurate. It is an objective, custom-built pattern, which consists of suitable and reliable categories, all of which have been drawn from the appropriate data. (Schreier, 2012: 6-7, 37.) The coding frame can be compared to a puzzle: if the pieces do not fit in their places, the big picture will not take proper shape. The factual category-formation can take place in two ways. They can embody a. the “surface meaning” of the text, or b. the underlying meaning when “reading between the lines” (Schreier, 2012: 40). Accordingly, the former is a more descriptive, whereas the latter is more obscure – both of which are applicable and case-bound. The formation of the categories is in the authority of the researcher, as each study is unique and there are no binding guidelines regarding this phase (ibid.).

Categories should be based on inferences that can be pointed out from the text. In practice the categories should be descriptive, and specify the label, definition and a few examples. Additionally, the categories should be independent, so that the units placed under them cannot be manipulated by other categories – all units hold equal weight. (GAO, 1989: 16). Respectively, Carney (1972: 168) points out that the categories need to be inclusive enough, so that one unit only fits in one category; placing an unit into more than one category would skew the analysis as some items would have more weight than others.

GAO (1989: 12-13) introduces three most common category types, groupings, scales and matrices. In groupings, a number of themes can be merged into one category. Scales rank the information in a graded manner, for example ‘supports; opposes; does not know’. Matrices, in turn, are more intricate charts often combining both groupings and scales. These provide the means for studying the “space, frequency and intensity” (ibid.) of the topic. Moreover, they facilitate the analysis when all required information is, for example, in available one page or chart. When all data is rightly categorised, the dividing of the data can begin.

The data is broken down into analytical units of coding, each of which is to be placed under one category. Krippendorff (2004: 97-98) argues that these objects of study emerge
when the data is scrutinised, and that there are three kinds of units: sampling units, coding units and context units, of which coding units are the appropriate type for this thesis’ purposes. The coding units are “distinguished for separate description, transcription, recording, or coding” (op. cit., 99) – in other words, coding units require further, independent actions after they have been separated from the original text. Holsti’s (1969: 116) description of coding unit being a “specific segment of content that is characterized by placing it in a given category” extensively sums up the unit. Moreover, coding units can be inferred from any type of text (Krippendorff, 2004: 100).

As far as this thesis’ analyses are concerned, the inferences are drawn deductively from the data, and those observations are placed under the appropriate category in the coding frame.

5.1.1. Structured analysis framework

This thesis’ structured analysis framework benefits groupings. This is a natural choice, since the relevant themes are placed under one specific ‘umbrella’, which should be understood as the group. The scales or matrices are not an option here; the measures of the scaling do not interact with the objectives of this analysis, and matrices are too convolute.

Given that the analysis is theory-driven, the theoretical framework dictates the choice of categories and themes. Arguably, the theoretical framework draws attention to three aspects: a. anti-EU -mentality, b. the trajectory of the EU, and c. economic positioning. On the whole, since these elements are also present in UKIP’s political discourse, they were a solid starting point to a more specific category-formation. The five pertinent classifications – along with the themes – are built under these three ‘umbrellas’, and are a compilation of the elements in the theories and UKIP’s core principles. In order to achieve

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38 Sampling units are, for example, all newspaper issues from a certain time period. In turn, context units are entire texts/speeches/chapters that need to be analysed as a whole, in order to understand the fundamental context of the chosen issue. See Krippendorff (2004: 97-100) for more.

39 Here, the thinking moves from the general level (theory) to the particular level (inferences).

40 Regarding the anti-EU -mentality, see hard euroscepticism, eurejectionism and CHES; for EU-trajectory, see four-fold typology, negative euroscepticism, and CHES; concerning economic positioning, see CHES.
clarity, they have been re-arranged into six appropriate categories. Moreover, inasmuch as the objective is to construct a compact analysis that profoundly focuses on a handful of policies only, it is not right-minded to vaguely describe every available policy area.

The anti-EU -thematic is the most visible, and this factor can also be noticed from table 5; in its wideness, it reflects UKIP’s hard eurosceptic stance. Out of all presented categories, this category is the most lenient and could incorporate many sub-categories. UKIP’s hard eurosceptic attitude also contributes to the symmetry of the categories; there are four categories relating to the anti-EU -mentality, whereas both the economy and trajectory have one related category each.

However, the selected categories under this main-category express UKIP’s most central policies with applicable by-products. UKIP’s prominent underlining of EU-withdrawal and EU’s immorality justifies the first category, whereas the necessity of getting national borders back explains the second category. EU also inflects the legal and welfare systems, and this sparked the third and sixth categories. To the contrary, the economic positioning is handled by discussing the costs of the EU-membership common currency and monetary union, and especially regarding trade relations. Therefore, it is sensible to set them as subordinate themes to this particular category. The EU-trajectory – characteristically – includes both enlargement and integration. Since these two elements oftentimes go hand in hand in the EU-context, it was an instinctive decision to discuss them jointly here as well.

Due to the same research question and theoretical framework associated with analyses I and II, this analysis framework is benefited in these analyses only. For the different purposes and theory of analysis III, another – and more appropriate – analysis framework is introduced in chapter 8.

41 The fact that UKIP’s key policies have influenced the choices of categories and themes does not imply that there is an element of data-driven content analysis. The theories have dictated the three ‘umbrellas’, under which the relevant categories and themes have been added. Moreover, the theories dictated the selection of categories/themes – and not the other way round, whereby in the last resort, the theory-driven content analysis is the most predominant method.
### Table 5: structured analysis framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>THEMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. EU-withdrawal and superiority of UK (anti-EU) | a. traditional values  
b. national control |
| 2. border control (anti-EU) | a. immigration and asylum  
b. jobs |
| 3. law and order (anti-EU) | a. directives and regulations  
b. Habeas Corpus  
c. crime |
| 4. the economy, currency and trade (economic positioning) | a. EMU and the euro / sterling  
b. bilateral trade relations  
c. cost of EU-membership |
| 5. future of the EU (EU-trajectory) | a. further enlargement  
b. integration |
| 6. benefits and health (anti-EU) | a. NHS  
b. other social benefits |

According to the principles of theory-driven content analysis, the formation of categories and themes follow Schreier’s (2012: 40) lines: the categories embody the surface meaning of the text, whereas the themes typify the more intricate and underlying meanings. This exact framework is custom-built to service both data, and the analyses, whereby alternative frames are not required; in this manner, the analyses are more comparable and similarly interpretable.

All documents and speeches are thoroughly studied – not memorised – and appropriate arguments placed under the right category. Hereby the data is re-coded to match the objectives of this study. Theory-driven content analysis is also a very suitable method for testing a new theory in a new context (Carney, 1972: 47), and this is literally what the forthcoming analyses tackle: they assess the validity of the uniquely re-defined EU-attitude in the custom-built context.
Even though theory-driven content analysis is very resilient and useful, there are still a few pitfalls to avoid. Firstly, it might be challenging to creatively ‘invent’ the categories: Newton Suter (2012: 346) notes that the process of content analysis requires imagination, and it might be difficult to draw out clear-cut categories from complex data. Special attention must be paid in order to create inclusive and coherently labelled categories. Secondly, over-exaggerated descriptiveness should be avoided. In the analysis, should the similarities be highlighted as opposed to differences, the results tend to remain shallow. Third and finally, should the research question and / or data be “too flimsy or unrepresentative for analysis” (Carney, 1972:16), the findings will be irrational. It is, therefore, important to spend some extra time adjusting the appropriate elements to ensure a high-quality outcome.

However, with careful use, content analysis is an efficient method of redefining the data and hence conducting a good and accurate analysis. Without careful and proactive groundwork regarding the research question, coding frame and data, the results can easily become shallow and insignificant. Should this be the case, the fine nuances of data will be neglected and the analysis becomes descriptive.

5.2. Data

Generally speaking, data can be never-ending for the purposes of qualitative research and thereby it is important to precisely outline it to prevent the analysis from expanding. An important aspect of the process is to thoroughly study the data prior to analysing it; in this way, the entire data will be scrutinised and the results will be coherent and reliable. Moreover, the data should be understood, rather than memorised whereby the analysis will be directly commensurate to the data. (Newton Suter, 2012: 352.) In most cases, the data comes in written form, and is often readily available – thus the researcher can avoid the trouble of gathering data via interviews or observations. The data of this thesis is double-barreled: it consists of UKIP’s official manifestos and other party platforms, and of speeches that MEPs have held in the EP.
The first type of data consists of UKIP’s official documents. In the timeframe of 2009-2015, there are four official manifestos available for general and EU-elections. These are the a. 2010, and b. the 2015 general election manifestos (UKIP, 2010a and UKIP, 2015b), c. the 2009 and d. the 2014 EU-elections manifestos (UKIP, 2009 and UKIP, 2014c). The party platforms from 2014 (UKIP, 2014b) and 2015 (UKIP, 2015a) will also be benefited. The 2015-document replaces the corresponding 2014 paper, but both are scrutinised equally because the introduced arguments vary.

Additionally, other benefited documents have been acquired via email from UKIP head office, and are not available online. These four platforms include the party’s views on benefits, immigration, trade, and law and order. The findings from both types of documents will be placed into the coding frame under one appropriate category, from where the results are interpreted.

The second type of data is comprised of the UKIP MEPs speeches in the EP. Due to the generous amount of public commenting in the plenaries, only speeches have been taken into consideration. In this context, speeches mean spoken floor in plenaries. Respectively, motions, written declarations and parliamentary questions have been ruled out, alike the videoed speeches. According to the EU’s policy transparent policy-making, all speeches held in plenaries are transcribed, and available under the MEP’s name in the EP’s website, whereby they are easily accessible. Seeing that the time period of 2009-2015 extends over two separate terms – all of the 7th term (14.7.2009-1.7.2014), and a part of the 8th term (1.7.2014-2019) – in the EP, the speeches are gathered from two separate terms.

Table 6 is drawn to indicate two things: first, to indicate the number of both MEPs and speeches that are taken into consideration in the analysis; second, to showcase the composition of the selected MEPs per term. The column on the far-right shows how the number of speeches have been divided in terms of calendar years.

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42 The manifestos for UK local elections have been excluded on the grounds that these document replicate the arguments presented in the manifestos of general elections, and therefore do not offer added value to this research.
## Table 6: activity in the European Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEP</th>
<th>TERM</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SPEECHES</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SPEECHES / YEAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Aker, Tim</td>
<td>8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2009: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Batten, Gerard</td>
<td>7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; and 8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2010: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Colman, Trevor</td>
<td>7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; and 8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2011: 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Dartmouth, William</td>
<td>7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; and 8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2012: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Farage, Nigel</td>
<td>7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; and 8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2013: 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Helmer, Roger</td>
<td>7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; and 8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2014: 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Nuttall, Paul</td>
<td>7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; and 8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2015: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. O’Flynn, Patrick</td>
<td>8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Woolfe, Steven</td>
<td>8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**In total:** 33 speeches

Since UKIP has had, *in toto*, 37 MEPs during the EP’s seventh and eight terms, and the timeframe of this thesis elongates over the two terms, each held speech from each MEP has been read. This procedure was substantive, seeing that the titles of the speeches alone do not insinuate sufficiently about the contents. In practice, the speeches were chosen on the premises that they can be linked to at least one of the set categories in the structured analysis framework. The fact that the chosen speeches are parallel to both theory and the analysis framework is not a coincidence: the objective of a concise and comprehensive analysis would not be possible should all possible policy areas be included in the analysis. Alike with the official documents, the deducted arguments are placed under appropriate category prior to analysing the entities one by one.

Interestingly, there is an imminent peak in the given speeches with regards to year 2014. The reasoning for this culmination point can be derived from the EU-election round, and consequently from the newly elected, enthusiastic and motivated MEPs (Aker, O’Flynn and Woolfe, as indicated), whose work contribution has increased the number of speeches.

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43 Moreover, the scope of this thesis does not allow the inclusion of all held speeches.
6. ANALYSIS (I): UKIP MANIFESTOS AND DOCUMENTS

In this chapter, UKIP’s official documents are analysed in reflection of the tailor-made definition of UKIP’s EU-attitude, and, at the same time, this re-defined point-of-view is tested in a new context. All appropriate deductions are replayed, and the findings are presented at the end of this chapter. The categories are discussed here separately, as this is beneficial in terms of both structure and content. They are handled in order of appearance, thus beginning with the EU-withdrawal and supremacy of UK.

The thread in all official documents was that the UK is forced in a EU-straightjacket (UKIP, 2010a: 3), which restricts the nation state from making independent, subjective and beneficial decisions. With this straightjacket -metaphor the party refers to comprehensive control exercised by the EU, and which is applied to all member states in all policy areas; they state that “the EU’s tentacles stretch into almost every area of out national life” (UKIP, 2015b: 70). Upon membership, in the 1970s, the UK did not sign up for all-inclusive control, and on this argument the party continues that they have been fooled: should the UK have known that they signed into a supranational political union, in stead of promised a common market, the membership would have never materialised. The EU’s line is illegitimate, arbitrary and too bureaucratic, and this authority can only be disregarded by completely withdrawing from the union. The UK does not need to be part of an autocratic union that only gives commands, but does not listen back. As argued (UKIP, 2009) this dictatorship-like command means that the union is not up-to-date, but its policies and moral standards are stuck in the 1950s. More to the point, the need for withdrawal is accentuated; it is required in order to augment a. the national democracy and b. the power of national MPs – UK’s own people – that are currently paralyzed by the EU. (UKIP, 2010a; 2014b; 2015b.)

Not only are the current policy-makers ‘irrelevant’, but also Britain’s wartime achievements, monarchy and national history are going to waste in the EU, where national attainments have no importance in the eyes of the faceless EU-bureaucrats. History has shown that Britain is, indeed, capable to govern the nation state autonomously, as proved in the 1900s, so why does it have to be patronised by the EU, given that it has all the appropriate premises for independent decision- and policy-making? (UKIP, 2014a; 2014c; 2015b.)
The EU-membership also dims the status of traditional values and traditions. As prime examples, pubs, the Post Office and Royal Mail are extremely valuable to the British culture, and due to the EU’s dominance, their branches are now being closed – this has direct unfavorable, consequences to the infrastructure. UKIP also sees that should the noteworthy national success be taught in schools already at a young age, the kids would learn to appreciate their country even more. The consequence of this would be national integration. Accordingly, the social aspect of British culture is so compelling, that it unifies the entire nation regardless of the origins of an individual. On the whole, the EU is said to largely threaten UK’s cherished values. (UKIP, 2014a; 2014c; 2015a.)

Not only does the EU restrict national maneuvers, the official documents also reveal that EU limits the UK’s participation to other supranational actors and stops the country from representing itself in international organisations. UKIP argues that the memberships of United Nations (UN) Security Council, G8, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), World Health Organization (WHO) and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) are paramount to the EU-membership, yet UK is solely tied to the EU. To the party, this seems unfair. (UKIP, 2014a.)

As accorded with the documents, the storyline regarding the EU-withdrawal is clear: the membership is dangerous to the British Empire in virtually all policy areas, and Brexit 44 (UKIP, 2015b: 70) must take place as soon as possible. UKIP is convinced that the country will only gain from the withdrawal, and not loose anything. Building on this, UK’s future seems much brighter without the EU.

As for the second category, UKIP demands that border control should be completely returned to the UK. This current model, in which the EU’s open border-policy as part of the SEA, has no benefits for the UK and allegedly the “system is broken” (UKIP, 2015b: 10). On the grounds that immigrants can shamelessly take advantage of the UK social benefits and job markets, UKIP argues that the policy has failed (UKIP, 2013b). Presently this policy enables uncontrolled immigration, since open borders welcome everyone to the country. Regrettably often the immigrants shamelessly take advantage of the social benefits and predispose the public services near breaking point. (ibid.)

44 Brexit refers to Britain’s exit from the EU.
Against common prejudices, UKIP does not have a problem with immigration per se, but it has a problem with uncontrolled, politically driven immigration that needlessly takes up space from the country, and causes distortion of job market and housing (UKIP, 2015b: 10). They further argue that people as such are not a problem, but the lack of space they are causing is becoming a pivotal issue. However, the shortage of space is not the only problem, but immigration also distorts the job market and wages. What UKIP says is that the minimum wage has now become the maximum wage explicitly due to immigrants in the workplace, and that the immigrants employed over the UK-citizens – even though it should be vice versa. With this, UKIP blames the EU’s immigration policy as discriminatory towards the British people. (op. cit.)

Even though UK should hold the upper hand with regards to this matter by deciding who gets in, stays or goes, the country is utterly unable to control immigration due to current open-door immigration policy. After all, as argued, (2014a), the nation can only receive unskilled workforce from the EU-area, but not skilled people for example, from the United States. They continue to argue that should the EU accept Turkey, Albania and Moldova as members, the issue would deepen, as the inhabitants of these southeastern countries are likely to migrate en masse to central Europe, including to the UK. Because the control over immigration with all its side effects cannot be performed whilst in the EU, the withdrawal is mandatory. (ibid.; UKIP, 2009; 2014b; 2015b.)

In terms of asylum, UKIP argues that the EU has ruined UK’s trust in people by enabling a too facile entry to the country. Too many migrants come to the country to seek benefits insincerely, and this is said to cause a grave lack of confidence. In its current form, the EU’s asylum policy is ineffective, and UKIP proposes that it should be replaced with a UK asylum act, which is compiled “to make provision about nationality, immigration and asylum; to create offences in connection with international traffic in prostitution; to make provision about international projects connected with migration; and for connected purposes” (Legislation UK, 2002a). Accordingly, the act proposes that “new asylum system will be based on a network of induction, accommodation and reporting centres as well as existing National Asylum Support Service (“NASS”) accommodation” (Legislation UK, 2002b), whereby the asylum-seekers are preconditioned to be acquainted with the British habits and culture prior to acquiring the citizenship. The act also contains restrictions as to who is not entitled for support. As for immigration in the UK-act is concerned, the UK-officials are entitled to require “physical data, such as iris or facial images, to accompany
applications”, and “to require an employer, financial institution, or local authority to supply him with specified information” (ibid.). These provisions ensure that the both sides are well aware of the intentions, and that misapprehensions can be avoided. Since this act is more in accordance with UKIP’s ideology, than the EU’s equivalent and permissive policy, it is easy to understand why the party wants to promote the national amendment.

The benefits of controlled immigration are recognised by UKIP, and the party does not oppose a situation in which the UK would be able to choose who they want settling in the UK, and where individuals could fill the work-related gaps (UKIP, 2014a). For this procedure, UKIP proposes a points-based-system to control immigration\footnote{Accordingly, an immigrant must have a job, good knowledge of the English language, accommodation and health insurance prior to entering the UK (UKIP, 2015c).} that would guarantee the good quality of immigration, and consequently put a halt to uncontrolled mass immigration. To stress the profit of controlled immigration, and to stop allegations of discrimination, the same procedure would also be extended to both EU- and non-EU - citizens entering the UK. This system would be co-existing with the asylum act. UKIP demands the removal of open borders, and self-determination regarding immigrants. All in all, the party claims that EU is the culprit for UK’s immigration-related anxiety, and this needs to change. (UKIP, 2014c.)

With regards to law and order, the documents highlight that the UK law-system is needlessly subjective to the EU-law, and as a direct consequence, the EU imposes 72% of UK-laws and sets 120.000 regulations (UKIP, 2010a). For this reason UKIP argues that the EU endangers the UK’s national security (UKIP, 2015b). The party argues (2014a; 2015a) that the absorption of UK law under the EU law is a threat to UK’s international legal position, and that British law must overrule the EU-equivalent. UKIP confidently asserts that upon withdrawal, a. all legislation and regulations will be examined and the dangerous ones will be eliminated, b. UK will, in tandem, withdraw from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Strasbourg Court, and c. UK Bill of Rights will be renewed and implemented and together with the UN Declaration of Human Rights, they will replace the current EU-laws (UKIP, 2013a; 2015a; 2015b).

The EU-membership also binds the UK to the memberships of the ECHR and the European Court of Justice, and of this obligation the UK wants to separate. The party provides three reasons: firstly, the EU’s laws are partial, whereas it should rest upon the
UK Parliament to establish more humane laws (UKIP, 2014b: 7), and second – and consequently – the British legal system should be re-placed under British control to ensure the fair treatment of British citizens. (UKIP, 2014c; 2015b.) Third and finally, the ECJ operates partially: it favors the EU in a case of a divisive policy issue between the sides. In practice, should the UK contest an issue, it would – in all likelihood – loose the battle. (UKIP, 2013c.) This type of behavior is undemocratic and out of tune with UKIP’s ideology, whereby the resignation of these two institutions will take place upon withdrawal.

In terms of criminals, under EU’s policies, foreign lawbreakers are free to enter the UK and this easy access has caused risen levels of criminality in the streets. UKIP is extremely concerned over this policy, since it puts the citizens at risk, whereby UKIP feels that the EU has let them down in this matter. A political union should not encourage any forms of criminality. (UKIP, 2015b.) Consequently, the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) causes concerns. The EAW has replaced appropriate UK-based related laws, thus preventing the UK from “deporting terrorists and career criminals and from implementing whole-life sentences (UKIP, 2015b: 52). The EAW is a poorer alternative, since it puts criminals in asymmetric positions by allowing the expulsion of a criminal from one country to another, where the prison conditions can be worse. Moreover, the EAW is completely in contravention of the primary juridical objectives, which is “to protect people from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment” (UKIP, 2014a: 43). This fair and impartial objective of “innocent until proven guilty” (UKIP, 2015b: 53) is considered vital, and is fulfilled under British Habeas Corpus\textsuperscript{46}, but not exercised by the EU. Moreover, in the name of justice, foreign criminals who have committed a crime in Britain should – under UKIP’s watch (2013a) – be sent to serve their sentences in the home country; this act would release prison seats for native British criminals. In order to safeguard UK-politics, prisoners will not have a right to vote. In UKIP’s eyes, a person who breaks democracy by committing a crime, should not have the mandate to vote, since voting is the paradigm of democracy.

UKIP also states (2013a) that since funds for policing are minimal, there is more crime. This allocation of funds comes from the EU, who – from UKIP’s point-of-view – prioritises wrong actions, such as foreign aid. These sums could be assigned to prisons and frontline policing to prevent futile crimes. When in prison, the criminal is off the streets and serves a

\textsuperscript{46} Under Habeas Corpus, the criminal is addressed before the court, and the legality of actions is assessed. Accordingly, “if the charge is considered to be valid, the person must submit to trial but if not, the person goes free” (BBC, 2005).
fitting sentence. UKIP overlooks EU’s current criminal law, and opposes the judicial system all together. The superiority of the UK-law is built-in the manifestos, and upon withdrawal from the EU, the UK-law will take over. Moreover, since the current, relevant policies put the national safety at risk, it is not sensible to stay under the EU’s jurisdiction.

The unfavorable effects that the EU has on the economy are also enlisted. The heart of this matter lies in costs of the EU-membership and bilateral trade relations. In terms of bona fide money, the membership to UK is pricey. Arguably, (UKIP, 2014c) the UK would save £55 million, should it withdraw. Moreover, an additional £8 billion would be saved from net contributions, and these billions could be allocated more constructively, for example, to schools, hospitals and pensions (UKIP, 2015a; 2015b). Even if the EU-membership would have some benefits, they are dampened by the costs, thereby making the participation forbidding (UKIP, 2014a). The UK has also lost its tax sovereignty to the UK, namely in the form of the Value-Added Tax (VAT). The present tax policy imposes VAT on goods and services, but once the UK is out of the EU’s command, the VAT can be removed, consequently lowering the overall price level. (UKIP, 2015b.)

As far as trade is concerned, UKIP argues that the EU restricts UK’s trade and trade relations. The EU over-regulates (UKIP, 2010a) the commerce, and UK’s interests are not looked after, since EU’s Trade Commissioner negotiates the trade agreements – clear signs of bias business. A better solution would be that UK would be able to independently settle the deals (alike Switzerland), and thereby secure that the nation has the most beneficial trading partners. Momentarily the UK is unable to negotiate deals to suit its best interests (UKIP, 2014a: 57; UKIP, 2015b), and this significantly dilutes the country’s influence. With this type of policy, the EU acts against “the interests of a large part of the developing world” (op. cit., 58) and thus only brings disadvantages to the trade.

Since the UK is EU’s biggest trading partner in the eurozone, and the majority of UK-exports are already shipped to non-EU-countries (UKIP, 2014b: 55), UKIP seeks to negotiate a tailor-made trading deal with which the bilateral trade could see a continuum post-Brexit. There is every reason to believe that this deal will materialise, considering that the “EU needs us [UK] more than we need the EU” (UKIP, 2015b: 63). However, the Common Market prohibits this type of bespoke agreements, whereby this optimal scenario cannot take place until the UK has withdrawn from the union.
In a scenario where the Brexit and the tailor-made agreement fail, there is one alternative: EFTA. An EFTA membership would mean closer trade relations with the EU as well as fewer tariff restrictions to the goods. The most distinguished and economically beneficial asset of EFTA is that as a member, the UK would be entitled to negotiate its own trade deals independently. The membership would also widen the trade market to, for example, China and the US, with which the EU does not currently have trade agreements. Additionally, the UK would be freed from the subjectivity of EU’s regulatory policies, since EFTA countries are not subjective to the EU’s policies. Seeing that EFTA is run with a surplus, whereas the EU has a trade deficit, it seems more stable to unite with EFTA. (UKIP, 2013b: 15-19.)

On the other hand, accession to EFTA would mean fewer possibilities to influence policy-making, as the EFTA countries have no representation in the elective bodies – in other words, the EFTA membership would further decrease the UK’s influence within the union. Another clause speaking against the EFTA membership is the accepting of Lisbon Treaty’s Article 45: this article bounds the UK to the free movement of people, of which the country fundamentally is willing to eliminate. The expenditure also requires some brainwork: EFTA members (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) together paid €321 million in 2012, thus around €78 million each. In comparison, the UK alone paid £50 million in 2012. These figures indicate that EFTA membership would be more costly, than the EU-membership, although the trade benefits could most likely compensate the gap. Everything included, the EFTA is not a risk-free movement – the potential of raking it in is noteworthy, but is there a price tag for loosing virtually all policy-making power? (UKIP, 2013b: 15-19.)

As far as WTO is concerned, the EU currently combines the EU-28 into one EU-position. This arrangement serves the French and German interests, due to their influence in the decision-making bodies, but definitely not the UK interest. Since WTO is an important, international actor, the UK is willing to represent itself. Therefore, post-withdrawal, it will seek for its own seat to promote subjective interests.

All in all, UKIP says ‘yes’ to free trade with the EU, but ‘no’ to current political union and binding rules and regulations. In its current form, the trade policy does not function well and UK does not want to be in a dysfunctional union in order to trade. On its own, the UK could negotiate superior deals and consequently ameliorate the national economy.
The party argues that the eurozone and euro do not provide a first-rate operational environment; the eurozone is fragile, untrustworthy and should be abolished. Moreover, since the EU-economy is likely to deteriorate in the future, whereas the UK-economy is expected to grow (op. cit., 54) UKIP raises a question as though why the UK needs to be in an economically deteriorating union, when it is better off without? (op. cit., 55).

Regarding the party’s opinion on the future of the EU they argue (UKIP, 2014a) that further enlargement would only have negative consequences: the vote share in decision-making bodies would be diminished subsequently, whereby the country’s powers would fade. In fact, UK’s power “in terms of votes in the Council of Ministers, percentage of MEPs, numbers and percentage of Commissioners and UK staff at the Commission (op. cit., 28) has been in decline since the 1970s due to enlargement-rounds and treaties. In this “ever growing union” (op. cit., 18) it would be of first-rate importance to be competent, but if the UK has no chance in making the grade, then surely the membership can be discarded as futile.

UKIP strongly opposes further enlargement on the grounds that it is costly, and the UK should not be liable to provide capital to support the accession of poor countries. Currently the UK is obligated to submit funds to the EU’s cohesion fund, and this money is allocated to EU-candidate countries as pre-accession funds. The party also protests against the Turkish enlargement, and the reasoning is purely strategic. Turkey is too different and – as a full EU-member state – would harm both politics and the national infrastructures, and the UK cannot take this risk on top of other disadvantages the EU brings to the table. (UKIP, 2014a.)

What is more, EU’s objective is to further integrate and create a United States of Europe. This idea, according to UKIP (2014a; 2014b) is groundless, as one union is unable to objectively represent all of its members. Moreover, the EU is not what it used to be: it is now an ever closer union, and not a trading bloc as expected. By means of this structural transformation, UK must withdraw before the next pivotal steps towards a more federal union are taken.

The eurosceptic attitude is also evident in policies regarding benefits and health. EU’s control reaches to this sector as well, and causes annoyance. In practice, without this supervision, the NHS could work more cost-efficiently and consequently guarantee a
better quality of treatment for its patients, who are currently suffering from “political expediency” (UKIP, 2015b: 13). The NHS is now free of cost for all citizens entering the UK, and this is enabled by the EU regulations and the EHIC (European Health Insurance Card). This policy, however, places an economic burden to the UK since the system provides no cashflow. Essentially, should the non-EU -citizens use the services of NHS whilst in the UK, they rarely pay for them – even though they should. The EU’s open-border -policy also has a direct effect regarding the quality of health services, as the level of English of the employed NHS staff is inadequate, and patients sometimes find it hard to understand the details of their conditions.

The NHS is also suffering from the applications of European Working Time Directive (EWTD) and European Clinical Trial Directive (ECTD). The former restricts the doctors and nurses’ weekly working time to 48 hours, and this limitation prevents the staff from mastering new expertise, which in the long run can harm the patients. On the other hand, the latter has cut the time devoted to clinical research, which does harm to the UK’s status “as a world-class leader in this field” (UKIP, 2015b: 17). Naturally, UKIP demands that the application of both EWTD and ECTD to the NHS is limited. (UKIP, 2014a.)

UKIP argues that post-withdrawal, NHS will only be free of charge for UK-citizens (or individuals who have been in the country for five or more consecutive years), and not to migrants. Respectively, the ‘misspent’ money can be used more wisely. UKIP will also make sure that all employees speak proper English. (UKIP, 2010a; 2014b.)

6.1. Findings

The party’s official documents demonstrate that the EU-critique is visible in UKIP’s delivery. However, this tone was not too surprising, given the hard eurosceptic attitude. The critique applies to both the union and its policies, and UKIP considers the EU as the root of all evil. However, it was agreeable to notice that all documents hold the similar tone from first to last, implying that UKIP’s stance has been unaltering from 2009. Additionally, the long-term, fundamental objective of EU-withdrawal – or Brexit – has been fixed throughout the time scope of 2009–2015. In fact, the adhesive element of the examined documents lies in the withdrawal: all assertions are cleverly tied to the resignation, and the central argument is that post-withdrawal, the UK will be more productive, more stable,
fairer and free from regulations, whereas now the country is repressed to supranational control. This analysis revealed four main points, which are the following:

First, the EU’s applied policies and control cause anxiety within UKIP. Not only are the policies hindering the nation’s development nationally and internationally, they also largely discriminate the UK-citizens. To ameliorate the natives’ civil position and the UK’s international position, UKIP demands that the EU-policies are replaced with equivalent, British policies. Since the EU does not act democratically and treat all citizens equally (cp. immigrants and British citizens in the job market), nor take member states’ wishes into account, UKIP is willing to step up and act according to the nation’s best interests. The EU’s rather comprehensive control also prevents the UK from representing itself in international organisations, and this worrying maneuver is seen to weaken the UK’s international position even more.

Second, EU’s plans for the future are worrying. The EU is developing into a more federal union, thus facilitating the administration, but arguably further weakening the influence of member states. In terms of enlargement, the EU is heading towards the South-Easterly Europe and Turkey – a direction heavily opposed by UKIP. The party does not approve the EU of having common borders with the Middle-East, nor does it accept the federalist trend. Both of these directions are arguably unprofitable and dangerous to both the union and EU-28.

Third, the fact that the UK’s economy is declining due to the EU and bilateral trade is unacceptable. The futile membership alike the net contributions cost a great deal of money to the UK, and these billions could be allocated to more productive, national targets. Furthermore, UK’s inability to negotiate own trade deals has lead to unprofitable trade, and should the country have the mandate for independent agreements, the economy should see a radical betterment.

Fourth and finally, the UK’s achievements and traditions are fading under the EU’s dominance. As prime examples, the Crown, the Commonwealth and history together with the legislative bills, courts and national symbols are going to glory, since the EU holds no reverence to these traditional details. Also, the Brits’ precious pub culture and postal service are suffering by cause of EU-directives (i.e. smoking ban in bars and pubs and postal legislation). Without a doubt, all of the above are of great significance to the British
citizens and will always hold great value regardless of the UK being in the EU or not. However, overlooking the British traditions and traditional elements the EU does not better itself in the eyes of UKIP.

To conclude: each of the aforementioned points proves that UKIP strongly dislikes and opposes the EU. UKIP does not wish to see the UK as part of this type of political union, and on these grounds, the party demands a Brexit as soon as possible. When looking at the deductions in detail, it is imminent that the selected policies thoroughly embody the constructed framework, and to which these presented findings can well be matched. This embodiment can be reasoned since the party very clearly articulates that the EU-membership is by no means essential for the UK; the EU and UK are heading in different directions with regards the future; and that the union’s overarching control restricts the UK from developing in virtually every policy area. UKIP additionally argues that due to the EU-membership – that has been a mistake all along – and accompanying policies, the UK is not competitive, and that the policies require a complete reform. All things considered, it is justified to say that the constructed definition is largely applicable to UKIP’s current EU-attitude, and that the composition has been successful.

Even if the congruency between the constructed framework and the empiric findings was noteworthy, there were a few surprising concessions to the EU’s benefit. UKIP recognises that controlled immigration from the EU-area can be beneficial for the nation, and that the free trade with the EU can be cost-effective, when conducted correctly. These findings – albeit incredibly important – represent the milder side of hard euroscepticism, especially given the fact that the motives behind these are fundamentally self-seeking. In terms of an antithesis, more evidence would be needed to provide a strong counterargument for the constructed framework; as such, this sampling remains too trivial for these discoveries to be substantive in this particular context.
7. ANALYSIS (II): SPEECHES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

This chapter – alike the preceding chapter – tests the constructed framework, but in reflection to the MEPs’ speeches in the European Parliament. The analysis is conducted in the exact same manner as with the official documents, thus making the two analyses are intercomparable. The findings from appropriate deductions are presented in 7.1.

When deducting arguments with regards to EU-withdrawal, it becomes evident that the UKIP MEPs believe that the EU-membership destroys the UK, and that the entire membership is futile. Respectively, the MEPs also criticises EU on the grounds that the union’s priorities are falsified and wrong: currently everything rests on bias contracts, restrictions and state-building (i.e. building a federal union), and not on democracy, trade, cooperation and sensible rules, as it should. On these grounds, the EU-project is a scam, operates in an unfair manner and it exploits the EU-28 – already Thatcher realised this, but nothing has been learned up to today (Farage, 17.4.2013). Also, the unfair behavior is visible when looking at the official symbols of the EU; the Brits had no say in the selection of neither the flag nor the hymn, but the EU officials arbitrarily chose them.

It is also stated that the unwritten aim of the EU is to destroy national democracy, whereby it can be asserted that the union does not take the electorate’s opinions into account in this matter either. Moreover, the MEPs accuse the EU for not valuing freedom, democracy and the nation state, all of which are of great importance to the UK. These contradictions in terms of values, and the all-inclusive domineering of both the nation-state and the citizens strongly favor the withdrawal.

The MEPs also disapprove the concept of a EU-citizenship by arguing that the UK-citizens are estranged from the EU, and thereby they feel largely British, and not European. Accordingly, there is no such thing as a European citizenship, because the UK-citizenship will always overrule any other possibilities (Helmer, 22.10.2012). Moreover, the MEPs argue that they are against this Europe, but not Europe in general, and that “UKIP rejects this union” (Aker, 15.9.2014) and only withdrawal pacify the UK.

Border control, on the other hand, heats up the representatives as well. The MEPs explain that since the EU has completely stolen UK’s borders, the country must be taken
back through national control. The EU’s current immigration policy is also superfluous, whereby it should be discarded. More precisely, this ‘bad’ policy compiled with open borders enables the entering of substandard criminals into the UK, which should not be tolerated. On this note, the UKIP representatives demand that uncontrolled immigration cannot continue as such, and the UK should decide itself who stays and who gets in. UK’s economy is also exposed to a great risk, should borders remain open for much longer. Closed and / or controlled borders, as argued, would also halt illegal asylum.

In the eyes of UKIP MEPs, policies regarding law and order are constructed under false pretenses. Accordingly, the British juridical system and national courts are considered better and impartial than those of the EU, but still the EU-law system overrules the UK-system, and this configuration causes great injustice at the home front. The MEPs assert that the UK democracy developed 800 years ago, and is far more comprehensible than EU’s ‘democracy’. Based on this argument, they suggest that the UK-originated fundamental rights of Magna Carta and Bill of Rights should replace the hollow and bias EU-laws. Additionally, the Sale of Goods Act from 1979 should replace the Common European Sales Act on the grounds that the former is “a model of brevity, clarity and simplicity” (Darthmouth, 26.2.2014). The latter is a minor masterpiece, and yet it has transformed the related UK-laws powerless. As argued, these fore mentioned charters would not only humanise the treatment of UK-citizens, but also cut down costs. Respectively the usage of national schemes would be more economical.

The MEPs feel that the way in which the EU passes directives is undemocratic, and factually the directives are too binding. If the rules, laws and regulations would be made at national level, costs would be lower, and national interests would be met more precisely. It is neither practical nor cost-effective to outsource the regulating to the EU, since it only consumes the taxpayers’ money at the time of recession. Under these circumstances, UKIP MEPs are willing to engage with the world – including the EU-area – but with a. independently legislated laws, and b. without strict rules passed by the EU.

As far as the economy with currency and trade is concerned, the MEPs very strongly argue that the eurozone has failed, and it will lead to a further disorder. Not only is the eurozone a failure, but the euro has also been doomed from day one, and it should be abolished as soon as possible. Neither of these two provide a stable framework for European-wide trade or other commerce.
It has been claimed that nothing good has come from the common currency: the level (youth) employment is still low, and countries have not faced prosperity. Moreover, the euro slows down the financial mechanisms and exposes national economies to economically tough times. The euro has suffered a severe vote of no-confidence, and the current eurocrisis and deflation are unquestionably its by-products. What the UKIP MEPs want to say is that the break-up of the euro would solve all these issues, and luckily this rupture is merely a question of time (Farage, 18.4.2012). In any case, the legacy of euro will be tragic, be the eurozone broken up now or in ten years (Woolfe, 15.7.2014). The MEPs are also relieved that the UK, as a user of the pound, is not a part of the Eurozone: the Brits have not lost jobs, and their economy is not momentarily in depression – in fact, they believe that more if EU-countries would have maintained their national currencies, the economic downturn would be either moderate or non-existent.

With regards to trade, the MEPs state that UK’s and EU’s views are dissimilar, and the EU is characterised as “too administrative and regulatory, inefficient and costly” (Woolfe, 16.9.2014), indicating that as such, the trade relations do not function well. The dysfunctional nature escalates to too big a contrast and prevents peaceful commerce. Additionally, the UK-US -trade relations are considered more beneficial, as opposed to the UK-EU -relations. This argument is based solely on the fact that the European trade is remotely profitable for the UK, given that the EU’s trade commissioner partially negotiates the trade deals on behalf of the Brits. These specific deals should be agreed on a national level, rather than European, in which case the profits would increase significantly.

Through and through, the statements concerning the EU's future are averse. The UKIP reps very strongly oppose further enlargement, and especially the Turkish accession is a red flag for them. Accordingly, enlarging to Turkey brings nothing good to the EU-area, but the union will only receive masses of immigrants. Moreover, Turkey is not even classified as a European country due to the common border with the Middle-East. The possibility of a full membership is arguably filled with question marks, especially regarding human rights and media subjugation, but also whether Turkey has anything socially or economically lucrative to offer (i.e. regarding NATO or trade), of which the EU could gain capital? It has been suggested that the accession debates are handled in year 3000 (Darthmouth, 11.3.2013) – this statement can be interpreted as hard resistance towards new member states.
In the matter of **benefits and health** the MEPs assert that the overpopulation formed through (mass) immigration damage and overburden on the NHS and national infrastructure. The negative effects of this are naturally placed over the UK-residents, and this is not in the interest of the UKIP MEPs, who, in the last resort, represent their constituents at home. Additionally, another negative impact from the immigration is related to child benefits. The incoming traffic obliges the UK into paying child benefits to the non-UK-immigrants, and the price tag for these benefits *per week* is £1 million. As stated in the speeches, this money could be allocated to native families who – in UKIP’s eyes – are the overriding recipients, when compared to immigrants.

### 7.1. Findings

In this part of the analysis, the argumentation is parallel to that of the manifestos, and the EU – together with inoperative policies – is demonised almost completely. The wording ‘almost’ is used in this context, since a few compliances were derived from the speeches; 

a. the MEPs reject *this EU* and b. *this union*, indicating that in this form, the EU does not bode well, but with adjustments to rules and procedures, the the *new EU* might tickle their fancy; and c. the UKIP MEPs are happy to see their country co-operating with the EU, as long as they can do it in their own terms. This, on the other hand, hints that the EU’s importance and relevance is acknowledged, but then again, it seems that the union is less imperative than autonomy.

In terms of differences in relation to the official documents, the findings reveal that the UKIP MEPs highlight issues, such as common currency, eurozone and enlargement that do not directly apply to the UK, but rather to the EU. Especially in the matter of euro and eurozone, the MEPs feel that the entire monetary policy has enhanced economic, social and national concerns, rather than decreased them, and on this argument the common currency should not have been initiated in the first place. EU’s future receives no sympathy from the UKIP MEPs either: they would preferably not discuss the matter at all, since nothing good will come from further enlargement – especially should Turkey gain full membership.

Moreover, a major difference lies in the Brexit: is not as accentuated in the speeches, as it is in the official documents. Here, the withdrawal was mentioned in a handful of speeches,
whereas the manifestos and platforms tied all arguments around it. The explanatory reason can be drawn from the target audience: the UKIP MEPs are not expected to convince their fellow MEPs of Brexit – it’s the British citizens who need to be vowed – whereby the UKIP MEPs can concentrate on deligitimising the EU during plenaries on its home turf.

From the speeches – alike from the official documents – three points arise. Firstly, in the eyes of the UKIP MEPs, EU’s policies and actions are regarded as undemocratic and bias. The EU’s governing bodies arbitrarily make decisions, and this behavior indicates that the EU-28 are just the union’s puppets. Accordingly, the EU attempts to fit the heterogeneous population into one mould, which is easy to govern, but the member states do not cash in on this situation. Moreover, the union is so bureaucratic, cryptic and distant that the Brits do not identify themselves with the union, or its personnel – this situation reminisces of an ivory tower. The MEPs are trying to voice that since the EU does not currently collaborate with the electorate or the member states, there is no reason for the UK to be a part of this type of political union.

Secondly, the UKIP MEPs state that cost of membership, immigration and policy-making is too high for Britain, especially in respect of the non-existent advantages that they gain from the EU’s membership. With the current EU-spending, the UK should have a good run for its money – not the cold shoulder. Furthermore, risen national spending, following the ever-growing uncontrolled mass immigration and deviously claimed social benefits, distorts the UK’s economic situation unnecessarily. More to the point, since the regulations, directives and rules are devised by the EU and the member states are not consulted, unexpected structural changes might be required prior to a directive / regulation / rule can be fully applied. Of course, these adjustments can be expensive, and the EU certainly does not finance them. These avoidable costs could be avoided should the regulations be passed nationally.

Thirdly, the MEPs do not sympathise the EU overlooking the human capital. This is especially clear with regards to the jurisdiction and courts. Replacing the UK’s original human rights documents with EU’s bias schemes not only dehumanises the citizens, but also makes an established UK-democracy redundant. The EU-based courts have also overtaken UK’s impartial legal system, and the UK-citizens face a situation in which they

47 This aspect has also been noticed by Hayton (2010).
are nervous of being treated unjustly. UKIP MEPs are also concerned about the Brits' job situation: they are worried that the Brits do not get satisfactory jobs, because the majority of jobs are handed to immigrants in the fear of discrimination. Most worryingly, unemployment disheartens individuals, and significantly weakens their human capital. The meaning of human capital is socially significant, since, in the long run, it accelerates economic growth, which is the culmination of a successful nation. Since UK definitely aims to accomplish its aim of a sovereign nation, human capital cannot be compromised and thus jobs need to be allocated to Brits rather than immigrants.

Importantly, the overall findings derived from the speeches confirmed that the attitude of UKIP MEPs is extremely critical towards the EU. Moreover, the findings hint that they consider the membership as useless, and they strongly oppose the further integration and enlargement of the EU. In the future, UKIP MEPs also wish to see an independent Britain, whose comprehensive control should be returned to national parliament. What’s more, with the return of powers, the UK would re-gain the full and unconditional appreciation of national values and achievements, which are currently being overlooked. On these grounds, the forenamed points and arguments support the constructed theoretical framework and thus legitimises its use in this set context.
8. ANALYSIS (III): BEHAVIOR OF UKIP MEPs IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

In this third and final analytical chapter, the focus from the contents official documents and speeches is channeled to the UKIP MEPs and their behavior in the supranational arena. All activity conducted by the MEP – as indicated above – can be located from http://www.votewatch.eu, and from where the appropriate facts have been listed out.\(^\text{48}\) The scope of their actions during the years of service is then reflected to Brack’s three-fold role theory (2012; 2013), and each MEP’s behavior is categorised under the role type, which ever coheres the best. The objective is to find out how active operators the UKIP MEPs are in the EP, and additionally assess how they fit into Brack’s framework. In this context, the original theory is further developed, whereby each role is matched with a descriptive expression. This expression, in turn, defines the level of engagement, i.e. mandate, from where the research question can comfortably be answered.

Nota bene: even though this analysis does not benefit from the analysis framework as presented in chapter 5.1., it is still conducted with theory-driven content analysis, and hereby the non-structured data is also pressed into coherent, readable form. The main difference also lies in the footing: Brack’s role theory is tested in this chapter, whereas the constructed theoretical framework was tested in chapters six and seven.

As argued in chapter 3.4.1., the right-wing-MEPs in the EP can be divided into three types (Brack, 2012; 2013): to an absentee, a pragmatist and a public orator. Since the original theory (op. cit.) has already categorised MEP Colman as an absentee, and MEPs Button and Farage as public orators, these three MEPs are excluded from this analysis, but their statistics are included in table 7 for referencing purposes. All other MEPs from terms 7 and 8 are taken into consideration, and the relevant facts regarding the number of speeches, parliamentary questions and participation in roll-call votes are placed in the following table. Inasmuch of importance is the MEPs’ attendance to EP’s committees holds, there unfortunately is nothing that measures out this type of activity; both the votewatch.eu and EP’s website simply tell of which committee(s) an MEP is a member. Therefore, under these conditions, the selected indicators should be considered as the most fitting measurers of the behavior.

\(^{48}\) In this part, the content of the speeches is not examined, but rather the amount of them.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEP</th>
<th>No. of speeches *</th>
<th>No. of parliamentary questions *</th>
<th>Participation in roll-call votes *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1. AGNEW</td>
<td>84 / 10</td>
<td>200 / 9</td>
<td>91.87 % / 97.14 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. AKER</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60.07 %</td>
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<td>3. ARNOTT</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>97.97 %</td>
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<td>4. ATKINSON</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>78.19 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. BATTEN</td>
<td>193 / 19</td>
<td>42 / 1</td>
<td>68.06 % / 75.42 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. BLOOM</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23.11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. BOURS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>51.02 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. CARVER</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>98.89 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. CLARK</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79.70 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. COBURN</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>79.11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. COLLINS</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60.26 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. DARTMOUTH</td>
<td>544 / 26</td>
<td>266 / 27</td>
<td>69.03 % / 46.58 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. ETHERIDGE</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>77.08 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. FINCH</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>70.61 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. GILL</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>91.87 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. HELMER</td>
<td>40 / 5</td>
<td>103 / 2</td>
<td>87.53 % / 92.05 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. HOOKEM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80.41 %</td>
</tr>
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<td>18. JAMES</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>82.81 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. NUTTALL</td>
<td>56 / 13</td>
<td>24 / 10</td>
<td>42.62 % / 60.63 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. O’FLYNN</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>95.19 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. PARKER</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>68.95 %</td>
</tr>
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<td>22. REID</td>
<td>18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. SEYMOUR</td>
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<td>84.29 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. WOOLFE</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>77.08 %</td>
</tr>
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## Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Speeches</th>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25. <strong>BUFTON</strong>&lt;br&gt;(public orator)</td>
<td>Term 7</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>55.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. <strong>COLMAN</strong>&lt;br&gt;(absentee)</td>
<td>Term 7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. <strong>FARAGE</strong>&lt;br&gt;(public orator)</td>
<td>Term 7/8</td>
<td>138/17</td>
<td>109/-</td>
<td>42.97% / 35.49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* the situation as of 15.4.2015. (facts derived from [http://www.votewatch.eu](http://www.votewatch.eu))

Before analysing the table, it must be stated that the figures are not entirely intercomparable, given that – at the time of writing – the 8th term has been active for less than a year, whereas the 7th term lasted the full four years. However, arguably one year out of four is a long enough period for evaluating an individual’s behavior in this set context, whereby they can be trustworthily scrutinised.

It seems, that the manner in which the UKIP MEPs carry out their mandate fluctuates considerably, and three altering styles can be derived. Firstly, out of the veteran MEPs, who have served during both studied terms, Batten and Dartmouth – in addition to Farage and Bufton – have held several hundred speeches, and on this account they can clearly be labeled as public orators. Additionally, MEP Clark, who was not elected to serve the 8th term, also qualifies as a public orator with his almost hundred speeches. Interestingly, however, out of these representatives, the amount of Farage's speeches is the most modest, although his physical presence is the most prominent in the EP. Arguably, his EFDD-presidency potentially such a time-consuming post that it takes up time from the plenary. This theory is backed up by his low roll-call participation as well.

Moreover, the newcomer MEPs Arnott, Carver, Etheridge, Gill, James and Woolfe all classify under this role type as well. For this clear classification, there are a three of reasons: a. the amount of speeches during the 8th term is significant and in some cases, exceeds the number of senior-MEPs who have served at least two terms, b. they have held more or equally speeches, than asked parliamentary questions, and c. their voting participation is excellent, or just below the party average. Considering that these MEPs have been somewhat engaged in the parliamentary activities during their first year, it is rather safe to assume they shall behave similarly until the end of their mandate.

Secondly, even though Brack’s findings indicated that, at the time of her writing process, no UKIP MEPs were pragmatists, there are currently different representatives whereby it is
justified to disagree with Brack’s arguments. Accordingly, the utmost utilised medium of a pragmatist is a written question, and arguably MEPs Agnew, Finch and Helmer qualify as pragmatists, especially given that they have presented more parliamentary questions than held speeches. Moreover, especially Agnew and Helmer have participated extremely actively in roll-call votes, and Finch’s attendance is on an average level. These three arguably do participate in the plenaries, but the fact that their activity heavily rests on less demanding and / or persuasive parliamentary questions indicates that their genuine interest is somewhere else.

Third and finally, the amount of absentees among the UKIP MEPs is almost as noticeable as that of the public orators. The absentee-MEPs – Aker, Atkinson, Bours, Collins, Hookem, O’Flynn, Parker, and Colman – have all initiated their mandate in 2014, and have not yet shown great interest towards the practical work in the EP. The number of speeches and parliamentary questions is trivial, whereas their participation in roll-call voting is noteworthy. However, this high activity is explained with the fact that voting in roll-call votes is mandatory in set situations, namely in “final vote on legislation and non-binding resolutions based on reports from EP’s committees” (European Parliament Research Service, 2014).

MEPs Bloom, Coburn, Nuttall, Reid and Seymour are identified as absentees on the grounds that their annual mean of speeches is around 15-20. This quantity reflects Colman’s amount very well, and through which these ‘nominations’ can be validated. All things considered, it can be stated that absentees are not comprehensively engaged in the EP, whereby they are labeled as passive MEPs.

### 8.1. Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 8: roles of UKIP MEPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role type</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Public orator, active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pragmatist, involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Absentee, passive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The findings aggregated in table eight indicate how the roles within the party have been divided. As demonstrated, the UKIP MEPs are essentially split into two extreme camps: public orators and absentees, with a few pragmatists, whereby there is evidence of definite untidiness. In terms of the descriptive expressions, here the former is understood as the active member, on the grounds that they use their mandate mainly by public speeches, but also through parliamentary questions and voting. The latter is defined as the passive member, who scarcely speaks or asks a question in plenary, and votes when obliged. This type of participation is static, and even apathetic, and the mandate is rather void. As far as the pragmatists are concerned, they are clearly the ‘odd ones out’: they are involved in the parliamentary work, but they are neither active, nor passive, but their overall effort remains slim, whereby the mandate in their case is insufficiently implemented.

Resting on the descriptions above, the UKIP MEPs’ overall execution of their EP mandate is unambiguous. It is mainly carried out well, given that all MEPs – even the absentees – do take part in the parliamentary activities. Of course the extent varies depending on the role, as presented in tables seven and eight; it can be argued that the public orators’ participation is agreeably and spontaneous, the pragmatists’ is deliberate, whereas the absentees’ participation is begrudging. The level and / or type of participation can naturally be a question of personality as well, as extroverts (i.e. most likely public orators) probably have a facility for public speaking, while introverts can have a more apprehensive attitude towards social situations.

Taking all aspects into consideration, and after weighing the proportions of the roles – especially the marginal difference of public orators and absentees – it is fair to argue that the UKIP MEPs carry out their mandate surprisingly well. This type of participation is rightly described as *intermediate*. In this case, the mentioned result is rather satisfactory: a party, which heavily opposes the EU and the EP is semi-actively taking part in activities of a certainly unappealing institution. The most positive aspect of this finding was that all MEPs – even the most passive ones – participated even a little during their mandate. *But*, it must be remembered that this level of general attendance is most likely a medium with which they delegitimise the union, and through which euroscepticism is advertised. The end, therefore, justifies the means, and debatably any mean that promotes the hurtfulness of the EU to the wider public, will be benefited. UKIP’s extraordinariness clearly pushes through in this field as well.
Moreover, when considering Brack’s original framework, this result also suggests that her theory is still widely applicable. Factually, since her original analysis was conducted of the terms prior to seventh and eighth, and the results are, indeed, in line with the findings of this paper. Brack has also said that the untidy right executes their mandate in a bizarre way (2012: 152; 2013: 86), and this most certainly can directly be related to UKIP’s way of carrying out the mandate. There is every reason to believe that the role theory applies to other similar parties as well.
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

9.1. Answer to the research questions

As argued (see 6.1. and 7.1.), the analyses regarding both the party’s official documents and MEPs’ speeches indicate that UKIP decrèes the EU *in toto*. The arena in which the party operates is completely irrelevant in a sense that the EU-critique follows UKIP everywhere. However, this hard critique towards the EU came as no surprise, since even the preliminary readings hinted that the political union is a red flag to UKIP. The fact that the critique is extended to each analysed policy-area with close-to-no-exceptions was unanticipated.

Furthermore, the analyses also revealed that the EU’s comprehensive control over UK agitates UKIP the most. The right for self-governance and national control is deprived, and Brits have little leverage in subjective matters because the UK is currently subjective to the EU. EU’s directives, as argued, rules and regulations cause losses for British traditions, values and politics, whereby it can be said that the nation’s achievements and established democracy hold marginal importance. The appropriate policies, on the other hand, largely complicate the citizens’ daily routines and prevent the UK from evolving on national and international fields. With regards to the factual membership, the results point out that it is extremely costly, yet also extremely insignificant: the UK only receives masses of immigrants, who increase criminality and claim social benefits without proper justifications, in stead of much anticipated and earned economic or social support, EU-wide co-operation, equality and / or democracy. On this note, the analyses assented that since the 1970s when Britain gained the EU-membership, it has only done harm to the Empire.

Having scrutinised the data through analyses, and after weighing the similarities and differences between the results, it is appropriate to answer the major research question, which asks *how well do the detailed policies in the party’s official documents and European Parliament’s speeches represent UKIP’s prevailing EU-attitude?* The ultimate results advocate the fact that it is more than fair to argue that *the detailed policies represent UKIP’s prevailing EU-attitude thoroughly*. In this sense, a definite congruence was found between the theory and analyses, whereby the result should be considered rather noteworthy. Arguably, this outcome is a direct implication of UKIP “believes in Britain” (UKIP, 2015b), and respectively has no faith in the EU.
In terms of the minor research question regarding the behavior UKIP MEPs, an additional and significant congruency was noticed between Brack’s theory and the conduct of UKIP’s MEPs. The findings of this thesis slightly diverged from those of the original theory, since this time three pragmatists were identified. It was still impressive to find out that it can be coordinated with current UKIP MEPs as well with those of previous terms. However, as stated, the mandate is carried out intermediately, since each MEP participates in the activities of the EP and the average attendance is good, but arguably the motive is exceptional – but then again, so are the UKIP MEPs.

9.2. Evaluation

During the early stages of this thesis’ writing process, it became apparent that UKIP was a far more intricate political party, than the media and even the party itself lead to understand. It was interesting to study the party’s vivid history and numerous turning points, and to learn that the path to the EU-elections’ victory in 2014 has been anything but effortless. Arguably, Nigel Farage is a godsend to UKIP, without which the achievements on national and European levels would be rather slim. It was also easy to presume that UKIP is just an anti-EU-party wanting to leave the EU, but this is certainly not the case: they are a multidimensional, opinionated and genuinely different political party. Many people mistake UKIP as aggressive, arrogant and racist, but this close examination revealed that they may be radical in the British political context, but they are definitely neither aggressive nor racist. Very well might UKIP be arrogant and critical, but that is due to knowledge and questioning, not negativity. All in all, this research confirmed UKIP to be a unique party like no other.

For what it’s worth, euroscepticism was also a complex term to define on its own, not to mention that the definition must also meet the purposes of this thesis and UKIP’s ideology. This complexity, on its part, favored the formulation of the constructed framework. In practice, however, the formation of the appropriate framework to both elements was relatively straightforward – already at this point it felt as though it meets the criteria of this thesis. When this constructed framework was tested in the analyses I and II, and it turned out to be very befitting, it was a very satisfying moment for a researcher. In the end, when the structured analysis framework emerged as applicatory, and the results of all analyses were in agreement of the research questions and the overall findings were consistent, the writing-project of this thesis can justifiably be characterised as a rewarding entity.
The choice of method turned out fitting and practical since all three analyses became accurate and valid within the limits of theory-driven content analysis. Even though the categories and themes of the analysis framework required a great deal of constructing and testing – and even re-constructing and re-testing – before the analysing could begin, the final product was a well-functioning tool, with which the study was enjoyable to conduct.

It is also appropriate to evaluate the three conducted analyses together, and contemplate whether they have a connecting factor. Here, without question, profound EU-opposition acts as the conjunctive link. Since the results of the first two analyses – for certain – pointed out that both UKIP and UKIP MEPs are fundamentally set against the EU, this hostility is imminent. Moreover, given that the third analysis verified that the MEPs’ activity in the EP is moderate, it is safe to argue that solid EU-opposition is easily noticeable. Should a larger number of the UKIP MEPs participate more actively in the practical, everyday work of the EP, this particular association could not be legitimised.

The fact that profound EU-opposition connects the analyses together is not necessarily unpredictable, but this result should not be taken for granted. To the contrary, it further strengthens this thesis’ core argument that UKIP is a fundamentally hard eurosceptic party opposing the EU, and that euroscepticism is the glue that unifies UKIP’s members and enables the party to efficiently operate as one front. On the whole, this glue aids UKIP to work together for the common good – be it MP’s seats from Westminster or complete withdrawal from the EU – whereby a positive and satisfactory outcome is most likely.

9.3. Suggestions for further research

Unfortunately, due to the scope of this study and limited number of pages, interesting subjects were forcibly excluded and thus left for others to examine in the future. For example, the dilemma regarding UKIP’s main ideology – whether the party relies on nationalism or patriotism, or something else – requires further attention. As interesting as the paradox is, and its incorporation to this thesis would have been fruitful, it deserves an in-depth study of its own.

Moreover, given that the Brexit is UKIP’s fundamental target, it is desirable that time and energy are devoted to study the possible scenarios concerning the factual withdrawal, and to analyse as to how Britain would look post-Brexit. It has been proposed (UKIP, 2014b) that as a sovereign and free nation, the UK could build its relationship with the EU to
correspond with the models of Norway or Switzerland – this point could also be broadened into an academic study.

Given the academic importance of the constructed theoretical framework, it would be appreciated should a fellow academic either deepen that definition, or benefit of it in a related study. UKIP is needlessly ignored in the academic circles, and would deserve more detailed and illustrative studies – especially if the party does well in the general elections. Then again, a victory in the national elections might very well cause spark in this arena. On the other hand, if one is willing to challenge the definition of yours-truly, a counter-definition is happily received. Furthermore, the thematic elements could also be broadened: the array of policies elongated and underlying behavioral motives examined more profoundly. The expansion of either one or both aspects would result in even more thorough results regarding UKIP’s and UKIP MEPs’ mindset and presence.


** All translations by the author.
Data

Manifestos and platforms
*** UKIP. (2009). Say NO to European Union.
*** UKIP. (2013a). Restoring Law and Order.
*** UKIP. (2014a). Out of the EU and into the World. The UK does not need to be in a political union in order to trade and other inconvenient truths.

Speeches
Colman, Trevor. 14.19.2011
Helmer, Roger. 22.10.2012, 15.2.2014.
Woolfe, Steven. 15.7.2014, 16.9.2014.

*** Available on request.
APPENDICES

Appendix (I). Number of deductions per official documents per category

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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP, 2013b</td>
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TOTAL = 169 deductions

NB. The length of documents varies from three to 90 pages.
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