Dramatized and Structural Violence within the Axis of Citizenship: An Ethnographic Exploration into Eastleigh, Nairobi.
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Master’s Thesis, 127 pages, one appendix

August, 2016

Abstract

This research is an ethnographic study into the processes of violence in contemporary Nairobi, Kenya. The ethnographic investigation was primarily focused on the residents of Eastleigh and its neighbouring districts. The ethnographic material taken from Eastleigh indicated that violence within that context appeared in two forms: dramatized and structural. Those two forms were a result of the observed and ongoing acts of police brutality, terrorist actions, gross inequalities, deep-rooted corruption and ethnic marginalization. Dramatized violence and structural violence were both used as theoretical tools to analyse these forms of violence taken from the ethnographic data. However, from the interlocutors’ stories regarding violence, the notion of citizenship arose as an intersecting feature between dramatized and structural violence. Thus, citizenship became a theoretical axis which connected structural violence and dramatized violence. Citizenship worked as a frame to observe how an act of dramatized violence could result in a reduction of one’s agency, in turn maintaining the victim as marginalised and therefore more prone to the forces of structural violence. In the case of Somalis in Eastleigh, police violence distinguished them as lesser or non-citizens. A reduced citizenship maintained a constrained agency, making one more susceptible to structural violence. Therefore, dramatized and structural violence interact with one another within the intersection of citizenship.

Keywords: Dramatized Violence, Structural Violence, Citizenship, Eastleigh, Nairobi
# Table of Contents

1. **Introduction** ........................................................................................................................................ 1  
2. **The Site, Method and the Ethnographic Experience of Eastleigh** ................................................. 6  
3. **History of Kenya, Nairobi and the Making of “Little Mogadishu”** .............................................. 18  
   3.1 **Kenya: Colony, Independence to Contemporary** ......................................................................... 18  
   3.2 **Somalian Civil War and the Subsequent Refugees in Nairobi** .................................................. 21  
   3.3 **Eastleigh as “Little Mogadishu”** ................................................................................................. 26  
4. **Dramatized and Structural Violence Traversing the Axis of Citizenship** .................................. 31  
   4.1 **The Manchester School and the Origins to the Anthropology of Violence** .......................... 32  
   4.2 **Rituals of Provocation** ............................................................................................................... 36  
   4.3 **Dramatized Violence: Personal, Practice and Symbols** ............................................................ 38  
   4.4 **The Intersection: Finding Citizenship and Features of Liminality** ........................................ 44  
   4.5 **Structural Violence** ................................................................................................................... 50  
   4.6 **Conclusion and Crystalized Theoretical Terms** ........................................................................ 54  
5. **Exploration into Violence** ................................................................................................................ 58  
   5.1 **Dramatized Violence and the Symbolic Consequences** ............................................................ 59  
     5.1.1 **Police (State) Violence** ........................................................................................................ 59  
     5.1.2 **Al-Shabaab Violence** .......................................................................................................... 78  
   5.2 **The Axis of Citizenship** ............................................................................................................... 89  
     5.2.1 **Citizenship in Nairobi** .......................................................................................................... 89  
     5.2.2 **Citizenship Regime** ............................................................................................................. 96  
   5.3 **Structural Violence** ...................................................................................................................... 101  
     5.3.1 **Corruption: “Wacha ya macho”** .......................................................................................... 102  
     5.3.2 **Tangible Inequality: Conditions in Eastleigh and the Refugee Process** ........................... 109  
   5.4 **Violence of the Anthropologist** ................................................................................................ 119  
6. **Conclusion** ........................................................................................................................................ 124  
7. **Bibliography** .................................................................................................................................... 128  
8. **Appendix: Cited Interviews** ............................................................................................................ 136
List of Photographs

i. Eastleigh, 7th Street after rainfall ................................................................. 5
ii. President Uhuru Kenyatta on the wall of Omar's office .................................. 17
iii. Unloading wares outside 7th Street Mosque .................................................. 30
iv. 8th Street Eastleigh ....................................................................................... 57
v. Receipts from police reports ........................................................................... 88
vi. Taking bribes on Waiyaki Way ..................................................................... 100
vii. Turning the subject on the Anthropologist, photograph by Shiko ................. 118
viii. Matatu view .................................................................................................. 123
Glossary

AU – African Union

AUMS – African Union Mission in Somalia

DRA – Kenyan Department for Refugee Affairs

EU – European Union

FGS – Federal Government of Somalia

ICU – Islamic Court Union

KAF – Kenyan Armed Forces

KAR – Kings African Rifles

KG – Kenyan Government

RSD – Refugee Status Determination

TFGS – Transitional Federal Government of Somalia

UN – United Nations

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USA – United States of America
1. Map of Eastleigh and the surrounding districts (UNHCR, 2014)
The intent of this work is to investigate the dynamics of violence in Eastleigh, Nairobi. The primary data is ethnographic material conducted in Eastleigh, where different forms of violence arose. Most notable of those forms were police brutality, terrorist actions, gross inequalities, entrenched corruption and ethnic scapegoating. In order to conceptualise the ethnographic data taken from Eastleigh, differing theoretical tools were used to understand the ongoing process of violence experienced. Most insightful in utility were dramatized and structural violence. These frames worked to capture and understand the contrasting forms of flamboyant and systemic forms of violence practised in Eastleigh.

Nairobi’s Eastleigh, a once quiet suburban district has undergone great changes within the last two decades. The ongoing conflict in Somalia since 1991, the numbers of Somali refugees and Kenyan Somalians settling in the district have made it an international trade hub for Somalian business, hence gaining the local nickname “Little Mogadishu”. With many four to five story malls, hotels, hundreds of shops and stalls flanking muddy and sewage filled streets, Eastleigh today attracts thousands of shoppers and traders. Regardless of Eastleigh’s contribution to boosting Kenya’s economy, the district has become affiliated with Al-Shabaab terrorism after the attacks on Westgate Mall in 2013 and the Garissa University in 2015. In response, Kenyan Police have systematically conducted crackdowns within the district. For instance, the 2014 crackdown was notorious for its excessive use of force, extreme human rights abuses and forced deportations. Coupled with inadequate investment into the districts health, education, sanitation and general infrastructure, the district is paradoxically one of great inequality, urban poverty, but economically beneficial to the Kenyan economy.

From June to August of 2015 I had the good fortune of conducting ethnographic fieldwork in Eastleigh Nairobi and other surrounding districts. During that time I made observations and interviews with residents from Eastleigh and connecting districts, while simultaneously participating in the daily activities of those residents. Those stories and practices witnessed were numerous, varied and ethnographically rich, yet what caught my ethnographic gaze were the forms of violence that appeared. This recognition and appreciation for violence appeared in
various forms. They are the result of the surrounding local, global and historic contexts and processes, from highly flamboyant and dramatic to candid, silent and encompassing.

The historic context in which the research found itself was a continuous process, having unforeseen and interesting results on the research, shaping its general focus and theme, prior to the research and during. For instance, in 2013, a series of Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks occurred in Nairobi, from Westgate Mall attack to series of explosions across Eastleigh district (Aljazeera, 2013; BBC, 2015). In April 2014, almost a year before my time in Nairobi, a major police ‘crackdown’ had occurred in the district of Eastleigh, as part of an attempt to round up suspected terrorists, Instead what occurred was a series of extreme human rights abuses enacted by the Kenyan police upon Somali residents and refugees (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Another major Al-Shabaab attack occurred in April 2015 at Garissa University, a month after I had arrived (BBC, 2015). While during my visit there was the US presidential visit (BBC, 2015), and threats from the Kenyan government to close the Dadabb refugee camps in Eastern Kenya (UNHCR, 2015). Against this backdrop my initial intention was to explore the state and people’s understanding of it in Eastleigh. However it became quickly apparent that other factors were more important and real for my informants from Eastleigh. For instance, daily forms of violence, be it from the Kenyan State, Al-Shabaab or gross inequalities of wealth and political influence all contributed to changing the focus of the research. These factors become the underpinnings of my understanding of life within Eastleigh, my primary research site.

Theoretical traditions from peace research coupled with social anthropology are both used here to understand violence in the Nairobi context, being dramatized violence, primarily from social anthropology and structural violence, which has origins in peace research. The two terms originate from Galtung (1969), who distinguished violence as either being a drama or structural. Using Riches (1986), I expand upon the notion of drama, noting when physical violence has instrumental and expressive purposes, it is dramatized. As opposed to being silent, dramatized violence must be locally recognised as violent within the cultural context where it is being enacted (1986). Yet these forms of violence shade onto one another (Galtung, 1969). This shading I argue, must have an intersection where they interact at a particular axis.

This interaction can be understood within the anthropological literature regarding the subject of violence. The Manchester School of thought has been a cornerstone in theoretical conjecture in
establishing methodological and theoretical applications to conflict and violence (Evens & Handelman, 2006). In particular, situational analysis (Gluckman, 1961) and the ritual process (Turner, 1969) are foundational works into conflict and violence. These seminal pieces of work allowed for an understanding into how rituals create forms of provocation and the modes in which they construct and reaffirm ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Gaborieau, 1985). This foundation has enabled for the understanding of dramatized violence, in particular how acts of violence practiced or symbolic may symbolically charge bodies and spaces as ethnic and/or political (Feldman, 1991). Concurrently, the Manchester School of thought developed understandings of social problems in ethnography, such as apartheid (Evens & Handelman, 2006). This basis, alongside world systems (Wallerstein, 2004), coupled with theoretical frameworks form peace research (Galtung, 1969), has encouraged anthropologists in recent years to study structural violence (Bourgois, 2001; Farmer, 2004) and ‘dark anthropology’ (Ortner, 2016).

The theoretical underpinning of this thesis is very much found within the contemporary turn towards ‘dark anthropology’ (Ortner, 2016), but also has some relevance for developing fundamental theories for peace research, in particular violence (Galtung, 1969). Dark anthropology generally conducts ‘ethnographic studies of economic insecurity (at best) and punitive governmentality’ (Ortner, 2016). These studies generally focused on the processes and impact of neoliberalism, ranging from state violence (Feldman, 1991; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2003) to gross economic discrepancies and inadequate health care (Farmer, 2004; Gupta, 2012). Yet, the theoretical importance of this thesis is the linkage between anthropology and peace research. Galtung’s distinction between dramatized and structural forms of violence (1969) works as a theoretical underpinning for such an exercise. From that theoretical setting, ‘dark’ anthropological concepts help develop the notion of dramatized and structural violence into conceptual tools to analyse the ethnographic data. The approach is of importance, firstly for cross-disciplinary debate; secondly to further develop notions within dark anthropology; and third, furthering the tools for social scientific inquiry into violence.

Deriving from my fieldwork experience, stories of dramatized violence and features of structural violence emerged from the concerns of interlocutors. However, from the stories and my own observations with Somalis in Eastleigh, aspects regarding the status of political acceptance and belonging in Kenya continuously emerged. In particular, how they felt distinguished and
separated from the rest of Kenya as a result of the police abuses. Moreover, my informants in Eastleigh noted how they were treated differently, from lacking health care and educational facilities, and overwhelming police corruption, to inadequate infrastructure. These aspects were most encompassing and profound amongst Somalis of refugee status or no status in Kenya. Thus, from the ethnography emerged the notion of citizenship (Lazar, 2013). In particular, those without formal status are somewhat more prone to being scapegoated by police forces and the state. In turn, as it appeared the case in Eastleigh, those oppressed by state apparatuses, experience exacerbated exploitation and constrained agency.

The site became a tremendous place for ethnographic enquiry. Eastleigh is at the forefront of ongoing global processes and change within Kenya. It is an epicentre for East African refugees to congregate outside of refugee camps. Coupled with this, it is a site of a bulging new market for goods from China and Dubai. Overlapping with a notorious amount of police brutality and corruption which attempts to respond to the increasing threat of transnational Islamic terrorism posed by Al-Shabaab. Eastleigh is a prime context for an ethnographic exploration into an increasingly internationalised and neoliberal world. It is a site at the vanguard of the contemporary ‘dark’ turn in anthropology (Ortner, 2016).

Therefore within this ethnographic context I draw upon various questions to explain this phenomenon. How can violence be comprehended in Eastleigh and the broader Nairobi context? Can dramatized violence and structural violence work to explain violence in those contexts? Can other theoretical frames, not directly related to violence, assist in explaining its ongoing presence? Moreover, how do the local understandings of violence manifest themselves, and how does this influence the theoretical categorizes of violence? And lastly, does the anthropologist contribute to those forms of violence, and if so in what respect?
i. Eastleigh, 7th Street after rainfall
From June to August 2015 I conducted ethnographic fieldwork within the district of Eastleigh, Nairobi. My ethnographic methods were conducted by means of recorded interviews, visual representations and participant observation. These methods are herein used to illustrate the dramatized and structural duality of violence in relation to citizenship. My initial plan was to explore aspects of the state in the daily lives of Eastleigh Somalis. However, due to the interlocutor’s interests and concerns, violence became the primary interest of this research. This is a result of the ‘snowballing’ effect (Jones & Holroyd, 2012). By allowing my informants to prompt the direction of the research I was drawn into alternative arenas of ethnographic interest. For instance my original interest in the state opened the way for informants to discuss police violence. Therefore, it was the very ethnography at the site itself, by means of ‘snowballing’ and ‘improvisation’ (Cerwonka & Malkki, 2008), which brought forth the theory and in turn gradually shifted the focus of the ethnography.

My research was primarily focused on Eastleigh as ‘the’ field site, however due to the ‘snowballing’ of the research other sites became important to the ethnographic process (Jones & Holroyd, 2012). Other districts and estates that where adjacent or connected to Eastleigh became alternative sources of information and insight, such as Westlands and Moi Avenue. Furthermore, other spaces outside Nairobi, which unfortunately could not be explored due to time constraints, became synonymous with Eastleigh. Such as Garissa, Mombasa, the Dadaab refugee camps, to Kenyan-Somalian Border and Mogadishu in Somalia. These are the results of the ‘snowballing’, allowing the informants to direct the research, connecting the researcher to other sites and actors which hold relevance to the informant’s stories or general interest of the research. To not allow the ‘snowballing’ effect to take place would be to disconnect Eastleigh from other sites and hamper the ethnographic experience. When studying conflict and/or violence, ethnography has a tendency not to be in any one locality, instead it appears in many different localities and across borders, due to the potency of violent phenomena (Nordstrom, 2004, pp. 45 - 47). Thus, I thought it imperative to include other findings from sites beyond Eastleigh here, yet I was limited to maintaining the yield within the boundaries of Nairobi.

Eastleigh as a research site was only made possible with the kind support and patience of my friends and informants. The hospitality and consideration for a mzungu (white) will not be
forgotten, and it is due to efforts in which they protected, housed and assisted me, that I owe this piece of research to them. Unfortunately, due to the nature of this thesis, names have been altered and ages not revealed to protect the identity of many of the informants. Due to fear of repercussions by police, Al-Shabaab or other dangerous forces that wish to inhibit their agency in speaking out against violence.

Previous research has been conducted in and on Eastleigh. The UNHCR and Human Rights Watch have made numerous public reports on the district (UNHCR, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2013, 2014). In recent years the district has gained the attention of several ethnographic studies. A large proportion of those previous ethnographic studies have been focused on the cultural and historic foundations for the diaspora driven economy of Eastleigh (Carrier & Lochery, 2013; Anderson, et al., 2012). While differing ethnographic accounts have analysed the varying moralities existing amongst Somali women in Eastleigh (Jacobsen, 2011). Other ethnographic explorations have looked at the refugee process itself, in particular its practices and how they are interwoven with xenophobia towards Somali refugees (Campbell, 2006). Some ethnographic accounts have noted an interest with violence, such as Al-Shabaab and its rise across Kenya (Anderson & McKnight, 2015). However, none have explored encompassing features of violence, structural and dramatized, in Eastleigh. Therefore the ethnography presented here, is in itself, relatively unexplored ethnographically, but also theoretically.

Those informants and friends whom assisted me the most are considered here as my gatekeepers: Kaki and Omar. Kaki was initially involved with housing me while staying in Nairobi, yet she became a close friend whom I could share ample time with due to her compassion, care and inexhaustible sense of humour. Kaki introduced me to many of her Kikuyu kin, most notably Mary, Chichi and Iko. From spending time with Kaki and those whom she associated with, I was able to gain insight into the localised understanding of the Obama visit to previous understandings of terror attacks. Furthermore, I owe Kaki so much in regards to keeping me safe, and helping me with bribing a ‘cop’ on Moi Avenue when I forgot my passport.

In contrast, gaining access to Eastleigh was a far greater challenge. I had contact with various human rights and refugee advocates from Eastleigh, some of whom gave interviews and others who had a change of plans last minute. However, my main entry into Eastleigh was through Omar. Omar was an independent middle management figure between Eastleigh resident refugees
and larger refugee organisations such as the UNHCR. Moreover, Omar was kind and extraordinarily helpful beyond my imagination. I owe so much to his patience and kind support with regards to my research in Eastleigh.

Gaining access to Eastleigh was because of Omar. After meeting him and his assistant Khadiija for the first time at a café near Moi Avenue, he quickly seated me into his car and brought me to his office in Eastleigh. Arriving into Eastleigh, Omar said “You see the woman” as he indicated to a woman fully veiled, “She is Somali” and as he turned the car into an avenue “we are now in Eastleigh”. The roads appeared as if they were merely dirt, but it was the rains that had made the filth of the city streets come onto them and make them into the greyish unsavoury substance as they appeared. The outskirts of Eastleigh were overwhelmed with small roadside stalls, but coming onto the main 1st to 12th streets the mercantile metropolis came into sight. The central area of Eastleigh was crammed with stalls, shops and catacombs of shops within enormous warehouses and seemingly apartment blocks, amongst the organised chaos was a small office belonging to Omar tucked away within a storage unit.

Eastleigh, became my primary field site, yet was not the only source of information regarding violence. Other regions of Nairobi are mentioned here, and explored ethnographically. Thus in a sense, I did ‘construct’ my field site (Rodgers, 2007), in order to suit the ‘improvised’ ethnographic experience (Cerwonka & Malkki, 2008) and ‘snowballing’ effect (Jones & Holroyd, 2012). Although this is an important aspect of the ethnographic experience, it is rarely within the firm control of the ethnography. This results in having to adapt to ever changing circumstances and is to be taken as ‘standard procedure’ (Amit, 2000, p. 16). Arguably enabling the research to grasp an encompassing understanding of the social reality in which they are a part of (Rodgers, 2007).

Omar’s office became a place of logistical centrality to my research, not only in Eastleigh, but for Nairobi at large. It was where I could arrive in the morning by budabuda (motorbike), and leave from in the afternoon by matatu (passenger bus). When open, the office became an inviting space, large and open to the public. In it was a large prominent desk with two computers, printer and telephone, perfectly laid out for daily tasks. Above the desk is a picture of the President of Kenya, and over the walls were printed quotes from Quran, Kenyan Government and UNHCR in Arabic, English and Swahili. Many individuals who came to Omar’s office would seek advice
and gain assistance in filling in forms for the Kenyan government, embassies and UNHCR. In a sense Omar was an international middle man. He was employed by various NGO’s as an assistant for refugees, thus giving him an in-depth perspective on the refugee process from below.

Spending time in Omar’s office gave me insight into the workings of the refugee process. Moreover, it granted me a snapshot into the lives of refugees and Somalis in Eastleigh at differing points of that process. From first arriving, to applying to embassies, Omar’s office was abuzz with activity, hope, and trepidation. That space granted me inexhausted access to people whom were willing to express their stories of hardship and determination, in turn moulding my own interests. Omar was very much a key component for me entering Eastleigh, and in granting me such unprecedented access I owe him profoundly. However his assistance does have some consequences in the shaping of the thesis. Primarily, in shifting its focus towards the issues of refugees at points. This was complicated further when I was presumed to be an aid worker or refugee consultant, due to my association with Omar. As a consequence, I have had to ponder upon the damaging effect this may have had not only on the research as a whole, but on the lives of the individuals who believed I could assist them with their refugee process. Due to the density of this issue within my thesis, it shall be discussed in full scope in section 5.4. Regardless, the capacity for information was astounding, and enabled a greater capacity for understanding violent phenomena in Eastleigh.

I became surprised at the many different ways in which I could interact and build snowballing networks with the various people who came into the office. The shift in focus from studying the state, to violence was almost a natural progression originating from the ethnography. Thus, by means of research practice, I distanced myself from the rigidity of theoretical underpinnings and allowed the theory to come out of the ethnography. In essence, I applied a somewhat ‘improvisational practice’, arguing ‘ethnographic fieldwork is not guaranteed by mastery of any one “set” of methods’ but ‘pertinent’ (Cerwonka & Malkki, 2008, p. 182). Therefore, knowledge through an interpretative process, situated in Eastleigh for me, was gathered by being with Omar. In essence, being with Omar channelled the direction of the fieldwork.

That channelling manifested on various occasions, however one such occasion was the most prominent. Early in August Omar had organised a day in which refugees, asylum seekers,
religious leaders, businessmen to single mothers could come and voice their concerns to me. Omar assisted me in booking a small conference room and he invited approximately twenty individuals to come meet me, have food, talk individually or in groups. One issue for several of those speaking with me, was my lack of Somalis. Fortunately, Omar or another interviewee would translate for the several of the interviewees who could not speak English. The entire day went extremely well. Some interviews were more informative than others, although each story resonated something different about life in Eastleigh for Somalis. Moreover, what came from this meeting was not only an explosion of information, but a sudden appearance of acquaintances and networks to other sites and individuals of interest. In doing so, I was granted greater access to people’s homes, families, places of work and general daily activities. By exchanging contact information I could follow up stories and build friendships, not only in the field but after the fieldwork on social media outlets. Moreover, I gained an actual understandings and knowledge regarding social problems occurring in Eastleigh, much of it relating back to refugee status, to police or Al-Shabaab violence.

It was at this point I had truly emerged myself in the study of violence, as it had been so prevalent within the stories of the interlocutors I had met. That shift in focus towards violence manifested itself from the ethnography as the interlocutors steered the exploration in that direction. It was an easy transition, steering away from my original course. In addition, uncovering the extent and gravity of violence towards the Somalis did come as an ‘existential shock’ (Nordstrom & Robben, 1995, p. 13). Yet it becomes encompassing. Violence shapes a group or society’s understanding of their own reality. It is a phenomena that changes peoples understanding of themselves, their social and material surroundings, and others (Feldman, 1991). Therefore, it was inescapable within the context of Eastleigh, and Nairobi at large.

After the large meeting organised by Omar I was travelling everyday into Eastleigh and staying longer amounts of time there. With a gradual confidence in the neighbourhood I began exploring it unaccompanied, making my own plans with different acquaintances and friends without Omar’s assistance. In time I was spending nights in hotels, making new friends and organising meetings. At this point I became overwhelmingly aware of different issues that could not be revealed from interviews, but participant observation. For example, from the window of my hotel room I witnessed police bribes and minor assaults taking place, to observing the selling
techniques of vendors and hawkers in the streets, alleys and mall entrances. From certain vantage points I could also take photographs without attracting attention, illustrating the ongoing activities and practices below from an elusive angle. However unforeseen tidings change this upward course of the ethnographic experience.

Unfortunately, as I had reached an almost informative peak I received a text message from Omar stating that I should leave Eastleigh. I immediately took his advice and left Eastleigh to Kaki’s apartment for several days. Omar had somehow thought it best I leave Eastleigh for my own protection, and still to this day has not explained fully the reasons why. The result of this did hamper my experience of Eastleigh, although I did eventually return, however my newly made acquaintances were now harder to reach. In retrospect I am glad I left, yet a part of me still wonders what data was left uncovered by leaving so abruptly.

This manifested in a large compilation of data, gathered by various techniques and methods. Overall I have compiled here for this thesis approximately twenty two recorded interviews, collected a large volume of field notes kept within a diary format, and have documented approximately two hundred photographs. From these different forms of data collection, I intend to collectively use them to illustrate my ethnography, and in doing so illustrate Eastleigh. However, due to particular constraints, such as limited time, ethical concerns, or information gained, some methods have been stressed more potently than others.

This thesis is predominately anthropological, and thus involves, ethnography, context and comparison (Sanjek, 1996, pp. 193 - 196). Ethnography entails long periods of investigation into the life of interlocutors through participatory fieldwork. Context is a means of observing particular historical and cultural processes. That context is then compared with other historic and cultural settings, ethnographically and theoretically. In the case of studying violence and conflict, ethnography serves to understand ‘how people make war and peace’ (Richards, 2005, p. 13), not the ‘triggers’ of violence but the social processes maintaining the practices of violence (Feldman, 1991, p. 10; Richards, 2005, p.12). In attempting to understand and observe violent practices which were maintaining social processes of conflict, my methodology within the field became highly ‘improvised’ (Cerwonka & Malkki, 2008). Various methods were used and improvised at vary points, depending on situation, sensitivity of the issues involved and practicality of that method.
However, by doing an ethnography on violence, the ‘gripping descriptions, harrowing photographs and seductive poetics, ethnographers risk contributing to a pornography of violence that reinforces negative perceptions of subordinated groups in the eyes of unsympathetic readers’ (Bourgois, 2001). Thus, the ‘challenge of ethnography, then, is to check the impulse to sanitize and instead to clarify the chains of causality that link structural, political, and symbolic violence in the production of an everyday violence that buttresses unequal power relations and distorts efforts at resistance.’ (Bourgois, 2001). While recognising the ethical issues of studying violence (in particular, when the anthropologist may contribute to violence, see section 5.4), the anthropologist is still tasked to capture the ongoing violence through the most suitable means of investigation.

The interviews were the primary source of information for this thesis, due to their depth of information and the ability to hide the informant’s personal details. Overall they amounted to approximately twenty two interviews which lasted from 30 minutes to two hours depending on informant. Each interviewee gave their consent to be interviewed and recorded, and every interviewee was explained the purpose of the interview. The interviewees ranged from primarily Somalian refugees and Somalian Kenyans, all of who had different life stories and occupations. These ranged from business, clerics, lawyers, traders, hawkers, mothers, to newly arrived refugees in Eastleigh district. The majority of the interviews were conducted in Eastleigh, with three conducted elsewhere. All interviews conducted were semi-structured stylistically (Bernard, 2011, pp. 210 - 226) due to context and information given the informants shaped in the direction of the conversation. In accordance with ethnographic style, these interviews were led by the dialogue of the informant. Moreover, conversation could change from contemporary issues and phenomena to past events. Therefore, they served not only as a source of ethnographic data, but also a means of gaining information on local history, in particular the police crackdowns in Eastleigh district of 2014.

The secondary source of information was from ‘jotting’ observatory notes and later enhancing upon them within my ‘field dairy’ (Bernard, 2011, pp. 389 - 392). Jotting, a means of briefly recording notes as soon as most convenient (Bernard, 2011, p. 389), was mainly reserved after an encounter or meeting as to not disturb it. While writing in my ‘field diary’ was left until later in the day, enabling to reflect and recourse the activities (Bernard, 2011, p. 390). The main function
of these notes was to serve as a general recording device to describe short points of participatory observations and diminutive interview transcripts to illustrating diagrams of police routes or drawings of places and people. Participant observations mostly manifested in my own or shared encounters with police, such as paying a bribe and showing documents. Its main function here was to serve for comparison or expanding the ethnographic effectiveness and detail. Over time, the diary also served as a mode of self-reflection upon my own activities and others in shaping and shifting the focus of the research. Moreover, self-reflecting within the research diary became a means to divulge feelings of depression and anger towards the conditions faced by those living in Eastleigh, allowing myself not to repress emotions but to deal with them and move on with the research.

In retrospect, visual representation held the least ethnographic detail for analysis, it still held potency for illuminating daily life. Though this methods have the same theoretical potency (Bernard, 2011, p. 342), within this thesis they served minor roles in capturing life in Eastleigh. Displayed in opening and subsections of the thesis, photographs are presented as illustration of Eastleigh and the surrounding districts. They are an attempt to bring forth the written ethnography within a visual setting.

The various modes of inquiry were varied in application and use. Yet overall they all shaped and continued to form differing presentations of a holistic site. Even though the site itself was interconnecting with various other spaces and places, it in itself, was a site of inexhaustible information to the anthropologist gaze. Yet in my case, violence and notions of citizenship were the primary concern of my informants. If a similar attempt of studying Eastleigh were to be repeated, most certainly varying ideas, thoughts and results would accompany that research. This would not just be a result of differing approaches to methods, but also the ever changing history of the site itself and differing perspectives of informants regarding the site.

It was interesting to note that contrasting opinions did emerge from my informants, regarding Eastleigh. Fatma for instance, a professor and researcher in a highly regarded academic institute in Nairobi, told me that she would never let her sister go alone to Eastleigh for fear of police demanding bribes, arresting her or worse. In contrast to Fatma’s opinion, coming from a comfortable office in an upmarket area of Nairobi, Abdul suggested a different point of view. On the streets of Eastleigh, Abdul introduced me to his sons, all of whom had North American
accents but dressed in local school uniforms. Abdul explained how he preferred his sons getting a primary education in Kenya than the United States were he had refugee status, as the schooling was better and they could learn Swahili and English while here. Regardless of the differing opinions of Eastleigh the same concerns regarding police, Al-Shabaab and gang violence were consistent. Moreover, this was accompanied by complaints towards the Kenyan Government and UNHCR for their lack of attention to the persisting discrimination towards Somalis, refugee or Kenyan. My interest with violence has emerged from the stories and concerns of varying informants of Eastleigh.

Thus, theory has emerged from the data, being situated in Eastleigh emerged the theoretical components (Cerwonka & Malkki, 2008). Yet being situated may have contradictions when regarding perceptions of the anthropologist. The informants to which I spoke with were led to believe that I had the capacity to change their situation directly. For example, this was alluded to by a friend Khadiiija who said to me on one occasion after speaking with several refugees outside Omar’s office, that “They think you are going to give them help”. At the time I was not exactly sure what she meant. However one evening at Kaki’s apartment it became apparent when I received a phone call from an informant, Hanad. He explained that he was given the impression I was there to help. I attempted to explain that I was a researcher (which I had done on countless occasions), yet he continued to insist I help him with an issue regarding the UNHCR. Fortunately I had recently made contact with various personnel from the UNHCR, to which I forwarded the contact details to Hanad. Later I found out he had received help with his problems and thanked me for the assistance, yet the main issue here was the perception of me. As noted by one Somali friend, “You are a mzungu” (white), “and so they think you can help, they think you have money and know people”. On various occasions I phoned embassies on behalf of refugees I had spoken to. Attempting to organise arrangements, they answered or gave much support or advice. It became apparent that the perception informants had of me, was one of contrast I intended to give. This resulted in an altercation of the information given to me, primarily due to the perception of the Anthropologist by the informants.

Amongst the moral and ethical dilemmas this brings, I think it is still important to bear witness to those stories. To totally remove the interviews due to the complications outlined above would

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1 A more comprehensive assessment of the impact of these issues will be dealt with in section 5.4
distance those in need of empowering more. However Farmer is right to point out, bearing
witness ‘needs to be done, but there is no point exaggerating the importance of the deed’, yet
considers it a noteworthy effort in contrast with postmodernist critic (2004, pp. 27 - 28). I would
agree with Farmer, and in this case not make bearing witness an acceptable excuse. Yet, within
my capacity to make a change or help those who asked me for it, not reporting or analysing their
stories would also betray them. For those who came to me with the belief that I could assist them
would additionally not be of benefit, if I had chosen not to use the interviews or not report the
stories they had entrusted with me. To ignore their stories would, in some sense betray their trust.
Therefore, in bearing witness, I fail to accomplish the help they asked of me, yet in not bearing
witness my failure as a researcher is twofold.

Analysing the acts of violence is additionally a form of bearing witness. In an attempt ‘to grasp
what underlines the striking capacity of violence as a social and cultural resource’ (Riches, 1986,
p. 3), is an endeavour to counteract its processes (Galtung, 1969, 1985; Schmid, 1968; Patomäki,
2001). The capacity for anthropology to improvise and borrow from different academic fields
(Cerwonka & Malkki, 2008, p. 163), grants it legitimacy to infringe upon the political tendencies
of those disciplines. Studying violence, in particular Galtung’s notions of structural and personal
violence (1969), envelopes the anthropology here within the frame and political allegiances of
peace research (Schmid, 1968; Patomäki, 2001). Peace research has always had the tendency to
at least counteract justified notions of violence, denaturalising violence and conflict as a societal
given, and instead argued it to be an exception (Schmid, 1968; Avruch & Black, 1991).
However, this may infringe upon that key component of anthropological thought: cultural
relativism. Nonetheless, as Farmer rightfully states: ‘culture does not explain suffering; it may at
worst furnish an alibi’ (2004, p.49).

The act of violence, be it physical assault or structural inequality that produces differing
contextual forms of suffering, is the act that is politicised and disagreed with by the author. By
analysing those actions and consequences, the very processes that enable the violent acts become
apparent, enabling for counter processes to take place. However, not only within the gaze of
violence do I find politicized critique, but within the axis of citizenship. ‘Studying citizenship as
apolitical practice often obliges us to take a political stand, perhaps alongside those advocating
for rights at individual or group level, or critical mainstream or counter-hegemonic notions of
citizenship’ (Lazar, 2013, p. 16). Those disconnected from political agency are more prone to these acts of violence and by studying them and the disadvantages they face, the ethnography is made politicised against the forces which oppress by simply bearing witness. Therefore by taking the fundamental methodological aspects of this thesis, the ethnography, and engaging with it theoretically, the work in itself becomes a counter force against the oppression the interlocutors faced. I am thus bearing witness and working here as a political advocate.

It must be noted that this ethnography is politically charged, particularly with regards to violence it is inseparable from politicized notions surrounding its processes. Yet the consequences of being engaged politically should not be unchallenged, especially in an attempt to be impartial. One should at times, step back and self-reflect upon their choices of understandings and analysis. However impartiality, is somewhat mythical, one always brings oneself into the field. You cannot be totally removed from your own cultural understandings and biases (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2003). Therefore, although this thesis is politicized due to the context of violence and citizenship, I will attempt to be self-reflective and keep personal, cultural and political opinions in check. In conclusion, the site, methods and moral issues presented here are intended for the reader to engage with the ethnography and the thesis as a whole. Yet the ethnography is a mere flash of the temporal process in which Eastleigh finds itself in.
ii. President Uhuru Kenyatta on the wall of Omar's office
Kenya has a rich and diverse history. Yet only a relevant fraction will be displayed here. The illustration of Kenyan history below is one of colonial and post-colonial oppression, political change and transnational developments. Moving focus within a temporal frame from a continental colony to a transnational, national, capital, and eventually contemporary view of the Eastleigh district. The history presented here is to display the field site from an alternative angle. This is distinct from differing histories of Kenya, many of which are peaceful. Contrastingly this thesis presents Kenyan history as one of political revolution, violence and inequality. Moreover, it is important to note that the history and the ethnography are inseparable due to their conceptual observations in regards to violence and citizenship. Due to this likeness, the ethnography and history are both analysed in section 5.

3.1 **Kenya: Colony, Independence to Contemporary**

The British Empire domination in East Africa originates with the ‘Scramble for Africa’, a period were European powers occupied and colonized through political manipulation and invasions. This period dating from 1881 to 1914, resulted in the carving of the continent into distinct territories. The British Protectorate formed in 1895 established plantations for white settlers in the Kenyan Highlands, a predominately Kikuyu region, and developed a rail road connecting Mombasa to Uganda with British Indian Labour opening up business for Gujarati traders within inland provinces. In 1920, Kenya was officially recognised as a distinct geographical space under the new Kenyan Colony. During the period of 1920 – 1963, the Kenyan Colony became increasingly centralised with the moving of the capital to Nairobi in 1905, increased local representation for white landowners and modernisation of agriculture. Modernisation and subsequently African nationalism became more prominent after the Second World War (Mugo Gatheru, 2005, pp. 14 - 30).

During the Second World War the Kenyan Colony was a key military base for successful military campaigns into Italian controlled Somalia. The King’s African Rifles were the primary force during this campaign, however after the War the promises of land made by the British establishment were not kept for those KAR who were not of ‘white’ descent. Furthermore, modernisation efforts in the agricultural sector had forced many small scale self-sufficient
farmers into the larger market economy or forced them to migrate to larger cities. In 1944, in response to these agrarian changes, a multi-tribal group of students formed the Kenyan African Union; an advocacy group for greater African representation in the Colony. Due to the lack of response initially by the governing body of the Colony, Jomo Kenyatta and a more Kikuyu dominated and aggressive KAU demanded greater African voice. The Kenyan Colony gave some concessions for some African representation (1954), however it was a proportionally tiny amount in comparison to the European and Indian populations. The Mau-Mau uprising (1952 – 1960) was an important turning point towards Kenyan Independence. The uprising was overwhelming a Kikuyu affair, which was a localised revolt against Colonial rule and white oppression. The Mau-Mau committed many atrocities, however in comparison to the British oppression it was rather minor in scale. The results of the revolt granted native African farmers the opportunity to grow coffee for the first time, but more importantly sowed the seeds of Independence (Mugo Gatheru, 2005; 42 – 75).

After the Mau-Mau uprising constitutional reforms were implemented in 1962, and in 1963 the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) won a majority leading to total internal self-governance and eventually independence in 1964. Kenyatta’s reign as President (1963 – 1978) resulted in some major land reforms. Tribal rivalries between Kikuyu and Luo however still persisted with the assassination of Tom Mboya; a Soviet supporting Luo. This followed a series of repressive measures against Tom Mboya’s party Kenyan People’s Union and the creation of a one-party state. After Kenyatta’s death in 1978, Moi formally became president as he was elected head of the KANU party, which installed further tribal rivalries (Klopp, 2001).

Since Independence in 1964, the Kenyan Republic has included a considerable population of Somali and other Muslim citizens, particularly in the North Eastern Province. The North Eastern Province has been a disputed border with Somalia ever since British officials granted the region to Kenya on the eve of its independence. The ceding of the North Eastern Province to Kenya resulted in a number of secessionist conflicts known as the Shifta Wars (1963 – 67), in which Somalis from the North Eastern Province attempted to join the region by force with Somalia to form a Greater Somalia (Howard-Hassmann, 1986, p. 96). The end of the Shifta Wars resulted in a ceasefire. However this has not stopped Kenyan security forces from committing acts of violence against the Somali inhabitants of Kenya. For instance, the Garissa Massacre in 1980
resulted in approximately 3000 deaths while the number of deaths in the 1984 Wagalla Massacre was estimated by eye witness accounts to be 5000 (Thompson, 2015, pp. 167 - 173). These acts were not uncommon during the British Colonial and Protectorate period. In fact, the method of ‘divide and rule’ (of particular ethnic subjects) was rather common across colonial nations under British domination (Howard-Hassmann, 1986, pp. 20 - 36). This developed into the Moi regime (1978 – 2002), which strongly supported the Kalenjin, an ethnic group that predominantly inhabits the Rift Valley Province. Even the introduction of the multi-party system in 1991 has not reduced ethnic based violence in Kenya, as shown by the post-election violence in 2007.

The majority of ethnic tensions and violence in Kenya has developed according to political party allegiances, as the post-election violence in 2007 demonstrated. For Somalis, ethnic tensions and violence have not been connected to political allegiances (Makinda, 1996). Instead, tensions between Somalis and other ethnic groups in Kenya are the result of the rising fear of Al-Shabaab attacks and the legacy of the Shilta Wars (Thompson, 2015, p. 169), correlated with the mass exodus of Somali refugees fleeing Somalia since 1988. The Al-Qaeda affiliated group Al-Shabaab has orchestrated various atrocities mainly within Somalia, but in recent years has turned its attention towards its neighbour because of the Kenyan military presence in Somalia (Thompson, 2015, p. 277).

Since October 2011, the Kenyan military has played a supporting role for the Somali military in combating Al-Shabaab (Wambua-Soi, 2012). Retaliation by Al-Shabaab has taken form in the Westgate Mall (2013) and Garissa University Attacks (2015) that resulted in the killing of over 300 people. These attacks have prompted the Kenyan government to increase its attempts at enhancing security, most of which have scapegoated Somali refugees (Muhumed, 2014). For example the Kenyan government threatens to close the Dadaab refugee camps because there is an alleged centre for Al-Shabaab recruitment, forcefully moving 350,000 Somali refugees across the Kenyan border (UNHCR, 2015). Moreover, security forces in Nairobi have been reported to conduct beatings, unlawful arrests and detentions of Eastleigh Somalis (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Although the Somali Eastleigh community has strong commercial ties within Nairobi, many Somalis have begun to flee for fear of persecution from police and the Christian majority (Wambua-Soi, 2012). The current government has done little in the means to reduce the level of tension and violence between Kenyan citizens and Eastleigh residence of Somali descent.
The documented tension between Kenyan citizens and Eastleigh residence has been heightened by the accusations of Eastleigh being a ‘terrorist hub’ by police (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Moreover, this accusation has been reportedly coincided with police beatings, unlawful arrests (Human Rights Watch, 2013), to the use of as an ‘ATM’ or corrupt source of income (Schifrin & Fannin, 2016). Corruption is an apparent common occurrence in Kenya, from high ranking judges, politicians and police chiefs being reportedly accused of corrupt activities such as extortion, money laundering to demanding bribes (Kubania J., 2016). Although the main experience of corruption from the average Kenyan comes from paying bribes to police or civil servants. This enables the individual to speed up bureaucratic processes, escape criminal punishment, and use a stretch of road (Kubania J., 2016). On the other hand, in Eastleigh paying a bribe is a far more common occurrence than other parts of Kenya, due to the auspicious nature of many refugee residents (Schifrin & Fannin, 2016). The current government and president were elected on the promise to rid Kenya of corruption, yet in recent years no sign of improvement has occurred (AFP, 2015).

In 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta was elected 4th President of Kenya and leader of the Jubilee Alliance. Kenyatta was charged with crimes against humanity in 2012 by the ICC for the deaths of 1,200 people during the post-election violence in 2007, although these were eventually dropped (BBC, 2014). During his presidency, economic growth has been consistent, yet poverty remains high. Insecurity has been a major concern in recent years in Kenya, with the Westgate Mall attack in 2013 and the Garissa University attack in 2015. In July 2015, President Obama visited Kenya for a state visit and to open a business summit to support Kenya’s private sector and international trade links (BBC, 2015). Currently, Kenya still suffers from large scale corruption, ethnic and tribal tensions, rising islamophobia and threat of terrorist attacks. However, with its successful economic growth and stabilised democracy, Kenya has become a relatively safe location for refugees across East Africa, particularly for neighbouring Somalis fleeing the Civil War in their homeland.

3.2 SOMALIAN CIVIL WAR AND THE SUBSEQUENT REFUGEES IN NAIROBI

The Somali Civil War originates with the armed resistance to the Barre regime and owes its continuation to the regime’s collapse (1988 – 1991). The collapse of the Barre regime created a power vacuum that enabled the emergence of a violent power struggle between the tribal militias
that once fought against the regime (Roque, 2009). This resulted in the arrival of a UN peacekeeping forces in 1992, which withdrew in 1995 as a result of heavy casualties (Thompson, 2015, p. 280). With the collapse of any central government and the establishment of various regional governments internal fighting decreased, creating an opportunity for the Transitional Federal Government to be established. Unfortunately in 2005 violent conflict remerged as a growing trend. This is related to the Ethiopian occupation of the Southern territory that was under control of the Islamic Courts Union, resulting in their collapse. With the collapse of the Islamic Courts Union emerged a more radical splinter group, Al-Shabaab (Anderson & McKnight, 2015). Contemporary fighting within Somalia is mainly between Al-Qaeda supported Al-Shabaab and the Federal Government of Somalia, which is primarily supported by the African Union Mission to Somalia (armed forces made up mainly from Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia and Kenya), and has operational support from the United States Navy (Thompson, 2015, pp. 280 - 300).

Al-Shabaab owe their origins to the Islamic Courts Union. The ICU mobilised after the collapse of the Barre regime forming mostly in the South of Somalia and with the support from prominent warlords they developed a state structure offering policing, education and basic health care under the apparent doctrine of Sharia law. The ICU collapsed in 2007 due to the Somali Transitional Government gaining military support and backing from the Ethiopian military. The consequent splintering of the ICU led to the formation of Al-Shabaab (the youth wing of the ICU), that had a more radicalised and militarised view of foreign intervention. Al-Shabaab was initially militarised to combat the Ethiopian military, to which it claimed to be defending Somalia from outside invaders (Thompson, 2015, pp. 264 – 285)

Al-Shabaab gained initial success by regaining areas of control from the Transitional Federal Government. However this initial success experienced by Al-Shabaab was hampered in 2011, when the Transitional Federal Government received military support from the Kenyan military (Thompson, 2015, pp. 285 – 89). After the completion of operation Linda Nchi, Kenyan forces integrated into the general African Union Mission in Somalia in 2012. Since then, Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for many brutal acts of terrorism in Kenya, claiming the defence and re-conquest of Muslim lands and resulting in the deaths of over 600 people since 2012 (Muhumed, 2015; Anderson & McKnight, 2015).
The result of such prolonged and wide-spread fighting has produced over one million externally displaced people in Somalia (UNHCR, 2015) and a further approximate half a million in Kenya alone (UNHCR, 2015). In 2015, the Somali refugee population made up 70% of the entire refugee population in Kenya (UNHCR, 2015). The Kenyan Department for Refugee Affairs (DRA) is currently in charge of registering refugees, and the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process is conducted conjointly by the DRA’s Refugee Status Determination (RSD) officers working alongside RSD staff from the United Nation Refugee Agency (UNHCR). The joint RSD work is currently being developed, as the DRA is gradually taking over governmental responsibilities for undertaking RSD activities, with the UNHCR overseeing the process and conducting operational assistance and support where the DRA needs it. This gradual shift in operation has created confusion for many refugees, particularly with regards to their legal status.

The legal status of refugees in Kenya is determined by the Geneva Convention. Under the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 protocol, refugees in Kenya are legally entitled to: the right not to be expelled, except under certain, strictly defined conditions (Article 32); the right not to be punished for illegal entry into the territory of a contracting State (Article 31); the right to work (Articles 17 to 19), under the same conditions as other foreign nationals; the right to housing (Article 21); the right to education (Article 22); the right to public relief and assistance (Article 23); the right to freedom of religion (Article 4); the right to access the courts (Article 16); the right to freedom of movement within the territory (Article 26); the right to be issued identity and travel documents (Articles 27 and 28) (UN General Assembly, 1951). In December 2012 the Kenyan Supreme Court Kenyan halted a bill by the government to move all known refugees to camps (Rorypeck Trust, 2015). In contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision based on the Geneva Convention Interior Minister Joseph Lenku, ordered all refugees to be relocated to Kakuma and Dadaab camps and demanded that all urban registration centres to be closed (Ombati, 2014). These reactionary declarations are usually the result of a recent terrorist attack, for instance in this case the Westgate Mall attack, although the ‘order’ is illegal it can cause legal disarray amongst police enforcement and scapegoating of Somalis in general (Rorypeck Trust, 2015).

In 2014, the Parliamentary Committee on National Security and Administration sent to the parliament the Security Laws (Amendment) Bill in response to the wave of terrorism across Kenya. Articles 62 through 66 of the bill amending the National Intelligence Security Act
broaden the powers of security officials to arrest and detain. The bill expands the powers of the National Intelligence Service to stop and detain suspects, search and seize private property, and monitor communications without a court warrant. Article 62 authorizes NIS officers to:

‘(3) The written authorization issued by the Director-General under subsection (2) — (a) shall be sufficient authorization to conduct the operation; (b) may be served on any person so required to assist the Service or facilitate the covert operation or investigations required to be undertaken; (c) may authorize any member of the Service to obtain any information, material, record, document or thing and for that purpose — (i) enter any place or 48 obtain access to anything; (ii) search for or remove or return, examine, take extracts from, make copies of or record in any manner the information, material, record, documents or thing; (iii) monitor communication; (iv) install, maintain or remove anything; or (v) do anything considered necessary to preserve national security; and (d) shall be specific and shall be valid for a period of one hundred and eighty days unless otherwise extended.’ (The Security Law (Amendment) Bill, 2014, p.48)

In response to this, human rights and advocacy groups have strongly called into the question these articles and others such as the ‘facilitation of terrorist acts’ which punishes ‘a person who advocates, glorifies, advises, incites, or facilitates’ (The Security Law (Amendment) Bill, 2014, p.49 – 50) acts of terrorism. This language could be used against the lawyers of suspects, some Kenyan lawyers fear, or to limit free speech (Human Rights Watch, 2014; Rorypeck Trust, 2015). The bill also amended Kenyan refugee laws, including article 58, which would cap the number of refugees in Kenya at 150,000 and compel refugees and their families to stay only in designated camps while their applications for asylum are processed (The Security Law (Amendment) Bill, 2014, p.44). Since Kenya houses approximately three quarters of a million refugees, half a million of whom are Somali (Aljazeera, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2014), these laws are controversial. Not only in their harsh stance on anti-terrorism, but are a direct violation of the UN Convention on Refugees (1951; Rorypeck Trust, 2015).

In April 2014, a large scale police crackdown was instigated in Eastleigh in order to ‘flush out’ terrorism (Muhumed, 2014), a manifestation of the Amendment Bill. These crackdowns were in response to the rising threat of Al-Shabaab operations in Kenya. Nevertheless, the police crackdown was seen as merely a government publicity response resulting in systematic roundups and imprisonments of ethnic Somalis, followed by accusations of corruption, torture and rape (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Eastleigh has thus become a politicised site, being primarily inhabited by Somalis, many of whom are refugees, and for its locality, in the capital and heart of Kenya.
Nairobi has become a central hub for refugees, not only from Somalia, but also Sudan and Ethiopia. Due to its geographical location in proximity to these states, Kenya has become central in accepting refugees from them. Urban districts such as Kayole, Eastleigh and Kitengela have become key points of rehousing refugees in Nairobi, yet a common theme amongst these districts is the transnational networks and diversified economies met with adverse levels of unemployment and poverty. 42% of Kenya’s 44 million live under the poverty line (UNICEF, 2015). Of 3.1 million residence in Nairobi, a least a third live under the poverty line and sixty 60% live in ‘poorly serviced informal settlements’ (Oxfam, G.B., 2009). This has been combined with a weakening economic growth rate, from a GDP of 7 percent in 2006 and 2007 to steady decline to 3.5 percent in 2011 (KNBS, 2012). Coupled with rising inflation from 4 percent in 2010, 5.42 percent in January 2011, to 15.6 percent in March 2012. Thus decreasing the purchasing power of wages. This combination of reduced growth, growing urban areas and rising inflation has resulted in a continued increase in urban poverty and unemployment particularly from those seeking employment in the informal sector.

Services such as education, health care and sanitation have been made available for refugees in Kenya. The Kenya government in 2003 enacted free primary school education, enabling Kenyan citizens and refugees to gain access to education. Asylum seeker and refugee children are eligible to enrol with legal refugee documents and birth certificates (UNHCR, 2012). A lack of documents, financial support for transport, school clothing, food and levies however all inhibit many urban poor from accessing education (UNHCR, 2012). Regarding health care diarrhoea, malaria, pulmonary and respiratory infections are common place (Oxfam, G.B., 2009). Nairobi City Council is responsible to treating patients, however overcrowding, poor availability and cost of specialist treatments makes it almost unavailable for poor urban refugees (UNHCR, 2012). Problems with health care have additionally increased with the massive expansion of informal settlements. This is a result of the city implementing adequate sanitation infrastructure (UNHCR, 2012). Overall, the lack of adequate social services has become a major problem for many residential areas across Nairobi, in particular those inhabited by refugees and asylum seekers such as Eastleigh.
3.3 EASTLEIGH AS “LITTLE MOGADISHU”

In Kenya, hundreds of thousands of registered Somali refugees have been accounted for in Dadaab and Kakuma camps, but also in cities across the country, especially Nairobi. Eastleigh is termed “Little Mogadishu” by the residents for its proportionally large population of Somali inhabitants. The majority of these Somali residents are the result of the ongoing civil war in Somalia, fleeing the internal feud between Al-Shabaab and the Somalian Government. This has resulted in Eastleigh becoming an epicentre of international trade within Nairobi, generating a mushrooming of shops, hotels and stalls selling cheap imported goods.

“[F]ew square kilometres are crammed over 40 shopping malls, thousands of shops, and tens of thousands of shopkeepers, market stall operators and hawkers, all selling a vast range of commodities from gold to televisions, though clothing and textiles make up the bulk. Commerce is the lifeblood of the estate, attracting customers from throughout East and Central Africa, as each year sees yet more real estate developments that cash in on this boom. Such developments are not just the typical Eastleigh malls several of which are multi-storey labyrinths lined with hundreds of small retail outlets but also restaurants, apartment blocks, and hotels that serve the tastes of shoppers and the many Somali residents’ (Carrier & Lochery, 2013)

The origins of this new commercial centre is the result of internal and transnational ties between Somali traders, predating the Somali civil war.

In 1921, the earliest settlers in Eastleigh were of Indian and Somali descent, who inhabited the Eastleigh district with the introduction of the Ugandan-Mombasa railway. With the Somali Civil War and mass influx of settlers, Somalis were easily integrated due to the already small Somali population within Eastleigh. This bringing radical change to the district, single story buildings were replaced by larger multi-story building to cope with the demand for housing and commerce, such as the iconic Garissa Lodge. Although, by means of Kenyan state absence and illicit trade networks from the late 1980s Eastleigh quickly expanded into the Nairobi trade hub. As Carrier and Lochery note, these pre-existing networks were further enhanced with the onset of the Somali Civil War (2013). When Somalis fled the war they established additional and expanded other trade hubs and networks, stretching from the United States, Britain, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates. It is the very absence of the state is some respects, such as infrastructure, in comparison to exaggeration in others, for instance police presence, in Eastleigh, that almost appears counter-productive.

Eastleigh district has been noted for its diverse range of ethnic populations, from Somalis, Kikuyus, Luos, Ethiopian Oromos, Eritreans, to Sudanese. UNHCR states that the ‘Eastleigh
district has a population of 174,349 spread over four divisions - Eastleigh North, Eastleigh South, Airbase, and a slum area Kiyambuyo. The majority of the asylum seeker and refugee population resides in Eastleigh North and Airbase, both with local population estimates around 43,000’ (2012). Most employment in Eastleigh comes from retail, trading and basic labour. Many refugees and asylum seekers gain employment through owning micro-stalls, small businesses or basic labour (Carrier & Lochery, 2013). Most education in Eastleigh is conducted through free primarily education, yet due to overcrowding and inadequate facilities many have opted for private schooling or religious madrasas (UNHCR, 2012). The most common ailments are diarrheal infections, typhoid and intestinal worms, as a result of access to clean water and the lack of sanitation facilities (UNHCR, 2012). The rapid population growth locally and from abroad has expanded pressure on an already inadequate infrastructure to deal with these ever expanding pressures.

Infrastructure in Eastleigh is primarily the result of the investment of residents. This appears in the form of four to six storied apartment and retail blocks that flank poorly maintained and sewage-filled roads. The constant influx of passenger buses and cargo trucks traversing the avenues that open into smaller tributaries of lanes and roads (Carrier & Lochery, 2013). This coincides with entrenched poverty and social inequality, particularly amongst those Somalis without Kenyan citizenship (Muhumed, 2014). This is due to the lack of social services, such as health care and education, to ambiguous laws and rights which are dubiously practiced by law enforcement (UNHCR, 2015).

In contrast to the dire state infrastructure, the police presence in Eastleigh is impressive. Yet it is more or less the result of the recent waves of terrorist attacks within the estate and Nairobi itself within the past several years. Due to and an enhancing factor contributing to the increase of terrorist atrocities within the capital city since 2012. Since the Kenyan forces began assisting the Somali government in ousting Al-Shabaab from the Southern region of Somalia in 2011, the activities of Al-Shabaab have been ongoing. For instance in Nairobi 2012, four minor attacks that were associated with Al-Shabaab (BBC, 2015). In 2013, the Westgate Mall attack were at least 67 were killed claimed by Al-Shabaab (BBC, 2015) and the suspected Al-Shabaab bus attack in Eastleigh district that resulted in 4 killed and 36 injured (Aljazeera, 2013); and in 2014, twin attacks occurred on the same day in Eastleigh resulting in 6 deaths
(Nairobi News, 2014), in the same year an attack occurred again in Eastleigh at Pangani police station resulting in the deaths of two officers (BBC, 2014). Many analysts have noted the connection between Kenyan military involvement in Somalia and the rise of Al-Shabaab attacks across Kenya, and in particular Nairobi (Carrier & Lochery, 2013; Anderson & McKnight, 2015; Thompson, 2015). It is interesting to note that the 2014 Pangani police station attack comes two weeks after a police round up and crackdowns in Eastleigh district (BBC, 2014), allowing some to question the tactics of police in countering terrorism in Nairobi and in particular the Eastleigh district (Muhumed, 2014).

The police crackdown in question are known as Operation Usalama² started in the early hours of the morning on the 4th of April 2014. During crackdown police and the US funded anti-terrorism units placed Eastleigh on lockdown (Muhumed, 2014). During the operation over four thousand people were either arrested, forced into police cells, or brought to Kasarani football stadium to be processed (Ombati, 2014), while another thousand were arrested and forcefully brought to refugee camps in the North East of Kenya. During the operation, which lasted several days, reports started appearing of beatings, bribes, rape, forced relocation, forced imprisonment without food, water, bedding or sanitation in Kasarani stadium far beyond the legal limit (Human Rights Watch, 2014; Muhumed, 2014). The violence and human rights abuses were noted to be systematic and encouraged racial profiling of Somalis (UNHCR, 2015). The exasperated violence, human rights abuses and illegal deportations which were enacted has been previously reported in Eastleigh, on a smaller scale (Wambua-Soi, 2012). Moreover, Human Rights Watch claims that these round ups are merely a single incident of many that has occurred in the capital, and stated that they amounted to ‘serious human rights abuses’ (2013; 2014). These abuses amount to ‘rape, beatings, and other unlawful violence against refugees, asylum seekers, and Somali Kenyans, some of which amount to acts of torture… arbitrarily detaining refugees… stealing and extorting money… charging refugees, asylum seekers, and Somali Kenyans with public order-related offenses without any evidence’ (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

These acts of violence and abuse are of interest here, within the frame of Eastleigh and its surrounding contexts. Not only those abuses enacted by police or state officials, but by also

² Usalama in Swahili in translated as security, safety or peace.
other actors of violence such as Al-Shabaab or ‘Christain community’ (Wambua-Soi, 2012; Muhumed, 2014). It is not just the exposed police crackdowns or terrorist attacks that gain the headlines of international news sources, but the silent and grey violence that lingers in the social inequalities that exist in the newly established trade hub. Furthermore, how does the actual site and legal status of those who inhabit Eastleigh and the surrounding estates enable further violence. Thus, it is the exploration of violence - dramatized and silent, within the frame of citizenship and the site of Eastleigh – that I intend to investigate and understand here.
iii. Unloading wares outside 7th Street Mosque
Within this section I outline the theoretical basis of this thesis. It is intended to outline points of interest with regards to social anthropology and peace research theoretical ideas of violence and social conflict. However, those points touched upon within this section all have relevance to my experience in Eastleigh Nairobi. Therefore, what is presented below is a mere snapshot of the theoretical explanations of violence, they are merely presented here due to their relevance to and appearance in the fieldwork experience.

I will begin this chapter with Max Gluckman and the Manchester School. Max Gluckman works as a basis, his work is touched on here due to its legacy in founding the anthropology of conflict and violence. Next I will outline Victor Turner’s ritual process, its link with the Manchester School of thought and later understandings of violence and in particular rituals of provocation. I will explore the rituals of provocation and the modes in which they construct and reaffirm ‘us’ and ‘them’. This flows into the understanding of practiced and symbolic violence, with the use of Allen Feldman’s *Formations of Violence* (1991) I will outline with a great deal of detail how acts of violence practiced or symbolic may symbolically charge bodies and spaces as ethnic and/or political. At this point I will briefly turn to more materialist and border orientated forms of violence, while simultaneously noting the intersection of state practices (Gupta, 2006) and state violence in the production of non-citizens (Genova, 2013) to explain how those without ‘citizenship’ are somewhat prone to violence, be it dramatized or silent. Lazar’s notion of non-normative citizenship (2013) works as a theoretical conjunction or intersecting point between two theoretical notions of violence: actor orientated dramatized violence (Riches, 1986; Feldman, 1991) and structural and encompassing silent violence (Bourgois, 2004; Farmer, 2004). Violence therefore is both practiced and symbolic (dramatized) as well as structural (silent). In order to explain this, I will move onto the Anthropological conceptualisations of structural violence, for instance Paul Farmer’s analysis of medical discrepancies across Latin America (2004). Overall I theoretically explore here the ‘shades’ between dramatized-symbolic and unseen structural violence (Galtung, 1969); however it is only at the intersecting point of producing non-citizens that this interaction between dramatized violence and structural violence plays a comparative role in the case of Eastleigh. Reading these texts crystallises the theoretical point from each ethnographic case.
4.1 The Manchester School and the Origins to the Anthropology of Violence

The social processes of violence and conflict are the result of the enactment and organisation of social agents. The Manchester School of thought, particularly with regard to Max Gluckman and Victor Turner, adhere to the recognition of social agents and their contribution to societal structures. This is a result of the Manchester School interest with conflict resolution to restructure societies, particularly with regard to understanding the African context (Werbner, 1984). The emphasis on social problems such as conflict, apartheid, labour migration and industrialism with regard to Central-South Africa, underpins the Manchester School of thought (Werbner, 1984). Moreover, this is drawn from an interest in individuals and how they ‘act accordingly to the particulars of the situation in which they find themselves’ (Evens & Handelman, 2006, pp. 3 - 4). It is the specifics of social problems and social processes that are of particular interest here, due to their current relevance to their eventual development into the study of violence.

Social problems and the tentative link to conflict were heavily emphasised by the Manchester School of thought, plausibly due to its inherent Marxist leaning and the recognition of ‘concrete reality’ taken from situational analysis (Evens & Handelman, 2006, pp. 3 - 5). Gluckman did not observe industrialization and/or labour migration as inherent theoretical problems, but instead noted how individuals could change or alter their social system depending on their situation (Gluckman, 1961). This was in contrast to Malinowski’s notion of cultural change through contact, and specific cultural types based on forms of production such as industrial and traditional (Werbner, 1984) Instead Gluckman observed how individuals could move from village and town, selecting behaviours to suit a particular situation (Gluckman, 1961). By means of studying social problems by extended case studies, the Manchester School attempted to study social processes within the framework of enabled structural-functionalism (Evens & Handelman, 2006).

The ‘adherent commitment to empirical investigation’ led Gluckman to the ‘scrutinizing of particular situations of conflict as complexes of connected incidents that were occurring in the field, in order to isolate and identify the actual mechanisms underlying the development of the conflict’ (Evens & Handelman, 2006, p. 2). It was the observation of specific actors during conflict and social problems that were important reproductions of macro-processes within a
given social system (Werbner, 1984). Thus, through observing particular actors and their roles of conflict while observing the same actors in other incidents, the linkages and mechanisms can be identified within a given social order. As Gluckman noted with reference to the Nuer – ‘Conflicts are a part of social life and custom appears to exacerbate these conflicts: but in doing so custom also restrainsthe conflict from destroying the wider social order’ (Gluckman, 1956, p. 2). In other words, during moments of conflict or social problems, social processes could be best observed and how they served to maintain a given social system/structure.

In my understanding of Gluckman’s social structures, they are the entire political hierarchy articulated in terms of cross-cutting ties and alliances (Gluckman, 1963). These roles are for Gluckman the processes which serve to maintain a given social structure. For instance, ‘customary ties link a number of men together in a group. But other ties divide them by linking some of them with different people who may be enemies to the first group’ (Gluckman, 1956, p. 10). Thus, when conflict erupts a set of allegiances are set up, destroyed and enacted by those involved. These cross-cutting ties and alliances are assumed to maintain the social system/structure in times of conflict and are enacted through custom and ritual within the social system (Gluckman, 1963, pp. 66 - 67). For instance, Gluckman argues within the Nuer context, that ‘it is custom which establishes this conflict of loyalties. Men are tightly bound by custom, backed by ritual ideas, to their agnatic kin’ (1956, p. 17). Moreover, ‘custom unites where it divides, co-operation and conflict balancing each other… ritual reconciliation and sacrifice often follow the settlement of the quarrel, and ritual methods are used to reach adjustment’ (Gluckman, 1956, p. 23). This is ‘the social process of the feud’ (Gluckman, 1956, p. 23). Thus, the theoretical position of Max Gluckman is that conflicts within and between small social groups serve larger social systems of those groups, allowing for consistent understanding of social problems. Regardless of the apparent structural-functionalist overtone, Max Gluckman’s work was not disconnected from colonial influences.

The influence of colonial authorities and its recognition within Gluckman’s work is important to note here, particularly with regard to theoretical implications concerning the structural-functional paradigm. For instance, Gluckman recognised the interhierarchial roles Zulu chiefs played between colonial authorities and the general populous:

‘[A] chief may try and enforce old form forms of allegiances which some subjects will not render and this leads to conflict between them. If he tries to exploit or oppress a man, the latter can turn to the magistrate
who will protect him… The chief can compel only that allegiance which Government, in its desire to rule through the chiefs, will make the people render, though his disapproval is a serious penalty in public life. Nevertheless, the chief still occupies a vital position in the people’s life. Not only does he lead them in their opposition to Government, but also has for them a value the magistrate cannot have’ (Gluckman, 1963, p. 173)

This recognition of colonial circumstance for Zulu chiefs may be seen as having enhanced the argument that conflict is an intersecting point to observe a political and legal social process within a given society. Regardless of the structural-functionalist theoretical bases, the attempt to analyse conflict as a form of social process was not just a hallmark of the Manchester School of thought but an innovative mode of inquiry. For instance, when remarking on ritualized rebellion in South-East Africa, Gluckman argues that the rebellion against the elites in positions of power serves to illustrate the importance of that position, moreover those acts of violence within the ritual highlight the importance of the position, allowing ‘for instituted protest, and in complex ways renews the unity of the system’ (Gluckman, 1963, p. 112). Conclusively, even though Max Gluckman may not have explicit connection with contemporary study of violence, it is however important to note that his work set the precedence for recognising conflict or violence not as a pathology but as a social reality in which social agents enacted and organised. Thus, recognising the organisational and ritualised modes of a conflict or act of violence allowed for a historic context of the actors involved and the processual form and effect it had on an overall social system.

Davidheiser notes how the Manchester School has applied rituals and rites of passage to conflict and conflict resolution processes (2006). Taking from the East African context, these rituals are used to understand conflict and conflict resolution. Moreover, ritual events in particular were prominent in understanding conflict management (Davidheiser, 2006). Therefore, those who partake in the ritual are, as Max Gluckman recognised, the social agents who organised and enacted conflict or violence. To fully appreciate the ritual in this process, I now turn to Turner, who developed the understanding of the ritual model with a cross-cultural analysis.

In *The Ritual Process*, Turner initially examines ‘how the Ndembu themselves felt and thought about their own ritual’. Later Turner expands upon the ritual being an integral societal process can be used to respond to a social crisis (like to Gluckman), with symbols, liminality and communitas within the ritual (1969, pp. 11 - 12). A rite of passage acts as a form of ritual, and
like a ritual is needed either when a social norm is violated or when different social norms are in contrast with each other; this causes the social crisis. For example, in Ndembu culture female infertility is understood by the paradox between the two obligations of a married woman: firstly, to stay with her husband; and secondly, to honour her maternal home. Infertility is understood as the woman in question moving too close to her husband, thus the Isoma ritual is practiced to resolve the crisis (Turner, 1969, pp. 10 - 42). For Turner symbols are ‘the basic building-blocks, the “molecules”, of ritual.’ (1969, p. 14) Turner outlines three closely related aspects of rituals: condensation, one characteristic is represented in a different and binary form; unification of disparate referents, characteristically formed from different ‘domains of social experience and ethnical classification’; and polarization of meaning in which the symbols ‘unite the organic with sociomoral order, proclaiming their ultimate religious unity, over and above conflicts between and within these orders’ (Turner, 1969, p. 52).

During the ritual process a liminal period is formed, the first phase ‘comprises symbolic behaviour signifying the detachment of the individual or group either from an earlier fixed point in the social structure, from a set of cultural conditions’ (Turner, 1969, p. 94). The second phase, according to Turner, is ‘the intervening “liminal” period, the characteristic of the ritual subject (the “passenger”) are ambiguous; he passes through a cultural realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming state.’ (Turner, 1969, p. 94) Thus, those who enter the ‘liminal’ space lose their distinctiveness attributed to them by the social structure. In Ndembu culture, the chieftain inauguration ritual portrays the future chief as a slave who succumbs to the abuse and arbitrary power of the community. For Turner, this treatment has a functionalist quality, which ensures the chief will act accordingly and not abuse their position, since they return from the liminal state with a greater understanding of their obligations (1969, pp. 98 - 101). Those who occupy this liminal space are in turn members of the ‘communitas’. Turner explains that

‘Communitas breaks in through the interstices of structure, in liminality; at the edges of structure, in marginality; and from beneath structure, in inferiority. It is almost everywhere held to be sacred or “holy”, possibly because it transgresses or dissolves the norms that govern structured and institutionalized relationships and is accompanied by experiences of unprecedented potency… Liminality, marginality, and structural inferiority are conditions in which are frequently generated myths, symbols, rituals, philosophical systems, and works of art. These cultural forms provide men with a set of templates or models which are, at one level, periodical reclassifications of reality and man’s relationship to society, nature and culture. But they are more than classifications, since they incite men to action as well as to thought’ (1969, pp. 128 - 129).
Thus, the communitas is inhabited by those in liminality, who possess a potency reserved for the weak. Those inhabiting the communitas exist within the ‘interstices’, ‘margins’ or ‘lowest rungs’ of a social structure (Turner, 1969, p. 125). Within this marginality they hold ‘magico-religious properties’ that possess the wielder as ‘dangerous, inauspicious or polluting to persons’ but also ‘mystical powers of the weak’ (Turner, 1969, pp. 108 - 109). Moreover, Turner explains that communitas is separate from a social structure through ‘idiosyncratic individuals’ and roles that are not hierarchical or segregated (1969, pp. 130 - 131). However, ‘the spontaneity and immediacy of communitas – as opposed to the jural-political character of structure – can seldom be maintained for very long’ (Turner, 1969, p. 132). In my understanding of Turner, the ritual creates the communitas which in turn reconditions the social structure from the experience of the crisis the communitas have experienced. Understanding the ritual and the communitas came from my field work experience, it is from the liminal existence of the refugee and social crisis in which they inhabit that I have explored Turners ritual process³.

4.2 RITUALS OF PROVOCATION

On the basis of my field work in Eastleigh, I argue the ritual process to be a mode in which to understand the practices of violence enacted, witnessed and experienced by those involved. From the accounts of those I spoke with and interviewed, it was apparent that certain aspects of Turner’s ritual process enacted on a daily basis. However, these were not for means of religion or coming of age, but instead were daily rituals of intimidation and threats. Drawing on aspects of Turner’s ritualised process, Gaborieau in his work on Hindu-Muslim confrontation in South Asia the means by which the provocation is ritualised (1985).

Gaborieau outlines two components of the ‘rituals provocation’: first, the use and selection of important symbols that represent particular communities; and second, ‘the selection of the means by which such symbols may be most effectively desecrated’ (1985). Not distancing himself too far from Turner’s original pretence for the ritual process being mainly for the study of religion, Gaborieau only attempts to interpret ‘religious conflict’, and that within the context of South Asia. This notwithstanding Gaborieau gives various examples from historic record and his own fieldwork, outlining how ‘rituals of provocation’ can manifest themselves in the context of India.

³ For all intents and purposes of this thesis, when referring to ‘ritual’, be it within the context of religion, violence or refugee process I am following the social model outlined by Victor Turner in The Ritual Process (1969).
For instance, the killing of cows is an effective means for Muslims to offend Hindu sentiment. On the other hand, Muslims are for Gaborieau ‘particularly sensitive’ to ‘disturbances of worship by Hindu religious music, and the desecration of places of worship with pigs’ (1985). In my understanding of Gaborieau, it is within the modern period where these rituals of violence have been exacerbated to ‘eliminate the rival community’ and impose a religious state, as opposed to the medieval period where violence apparently could be kept in check (1985). To support his argument, Gaborieau merely outlines some brief evidence for this and attempts to select particular events (1985). To a greater extent, and with better clarity with regards to the modern period, Peter van der Veer (1996) expands upon Gaborieau’s point regarding rituals of provocation.

With a more precise focus on Hindu nationalism in India, van der Veer indicates how riots operate as processual rituals and contribute to the symbolic and performative construction of social identities (1996). For van der Veer, riots, akin to rituals, are well planned and organised affairs with purposeful ‘sets of actions’ that make public spaces significant in the identity construction process (1996). What sets van der Veer’s (1996) use of rituals of provocation and Gaborieau’s original contribution (1985) apart is the way in which the ritual creates difference. In my understanding Gaborieau, appears somewhat static in reference to symbolic differences between Muslims and Hindus (1985). On the other hand van der Veer, illustrates a more concrete explanation of how rituals of provocation create distinctions between groups in India. With reference to the rise of the Hindu nationalist party Vishva Hindu Parishad, van der Veer indicates how their use of riots and ritual processions formed a particular nationalist discourse that demonized other groups such as Muslims while constructing a particular notion of ‘self’ (1996). Based on this evidence van der Veer outlines the connection between ‘riot and ritual’ stating that ‘first is that an important function of ritual is the construction of identity’, and ‘second is that the ritual construction of identity often implies actual violence and antagonism’ yet this antagonism is ‘an important mechanism of integration’ (1996). Thus rituals of provocation are not so much a form of destruction of another community (as argued by Gaborieau 1985), but an organised and violent attempt to ‘integrate’ another community while simultaneously constructing and understanding their own.

Regardless, Gaborieau and van der Veer indicate how riots are rituals, because of the symbolic meaning and performative quality they entail. In performing distinctions of difference they
remould and entrench symbolic ethnic and religious identities in South East Asia. Moreover, both authors illustrate the influence of the modern context in formulating ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson B., 1982). However, even when we recognise the influence of the modern context, it is primarily the actors themselves who enable the constructive process. Thus, in the same vein violence, like identity, is performed by the actors, it is not something pathological, but, as Gluckman argued is socially mobilised and organised by social agents involved (1956).

4.3 DRAMATIZED VIOLENCE: PERSONAL, PRACTICE AND SYMBOLS

Riches argues that violent actions enacted by social agents can be distinguished by a dichotomy of practices and symbols of violence, and notes that ‘it is highly appropriate both for practical (instrumental) and for symbolic (expressive) purposes: as a means of transforming the social environment (instrumental purpose), and dramatizing the importance of key social ideas (expressive purpose), violence can be highly efficacious’ (1986, p. 11). Occult and physical violence are thus different, but have feedback loops into one another and are therefore not inseparable. Although in my understanding of Riches (1986) violence is very much determined by a cultural legitimizing process, a random act of brute violence does not have the same capacity as say a very symbolically charged act, for instance, the ‘rituals of provocation’ illustrated by Gaborieau (1985) and van der Veer (1996). Riches illustrates a triad taking place during violence, the perpetrator, the receiver and the witness who legitimizes the act of violence (1986). Violence which is legitimized is dramatized. Although the act of violence by the perpetrator is the practice, to be symbolically charged within a cultural context the witness must legitimize the violence.

Coinciding with Riches (1986), Comaroff makes a connection between ‘ideology as explicit discourse and as lived experience’, instead noting how ‘social action as communicative process, in which the pragmatic and sematic dimensions are fused’ (1985, p. 5). In this sense, bodily and social practices intersect with formations of ideology, with this intersection is being constantly mediated through ritual acts. These rituals, are illustrated in the case of the religious resistance amongst the Tshidi in apartheid South Africa, combine features of traditional culture with symbols appropriated from hegemonic capitalist culture in a unique synthesis; doing so allows people to understand cultural changes. In synthesizing these contradictions, the rituals are more
than simple syncretistic operations; rather, they construct a complex dialectic through which the domination is resisted. Thus, in a sense Comaroff combines symbolic actions with World Systems through a dialectic synthesis of ritual (1985, pp. 5 – 18).

Comaroff sets a precedent, illustrating in the case of the Tshidi how ritual becomes a construction of symbolic meaning within the oppression of the Apartheid era. By blending a combination of traditional and new symbols of the Apartheid era, the Tshidi attempt to: ‘undermine the very coherence of the system they contest...’ the ritual ‘appropriates select signs of colonial dominance, turning historical symbols of oppression into dynamic forces of transcendence’ (1985, p. 225). Thus, the ritual not only constructs symbols, but those symbols may constitute a form of resistance. Equally important to Comaroff’s text is the use of historic processes in recognising the formations of rituals, through their resistance to apartheid the Tshidi are a clear example of that formation.

The most sustained work considering dramatized violence in the shape of performed practices and symbolic charges, is Feldman’s *Formations of Violence* (1991). Feldman’s analysis of oral history relates to the 1969 rioting to the 1981 hunger strike in Northern Ireland, Belfast. From these Feldman examines the production of politics, violence and terror from its originating cultural meaning and localised historic cosmologies. Feldman’s main contribution to understanding conflict, I argue, is how bodies and spaces can become ethnically charged symbols through performance, and the Northern Ireland conflict or ‘Troubles’ were transformed by this process. The process of the conflict in Northern Ireland used ‘bodily, spatial, and violent practices as forming a unified language of material significance, circulating between and formative of antagonistic blocs’ (Feldman, 1991, p. 1). For Feldman, political violence appears to have an intrinsic relation to agency, it is a process that spurs and feeds a maintained symbolic, political and violent agency or ‘labour’ for the social actors involved. This ‘labour’, as Feldman refers to it, continuously remoulds and entrenches social boundaries, particularly with spaces, communities and bodies. Feldman notes ‘the conditions of this conflict can be traced in part to relations of production, the reproduction of antagonism takes place in other spaces and materialities’ (1991, p. 5). In my understanding, Feldman suggests the practice and representations of violence can shape public understanding of their given society. Thus, in contrast to Gluckman, violence (or conflict in Gluckman’s case) does not maintain a given social
system (1956), instead acts and practices of violence assist in constructing individuals’ understanding of their society.

Feldman expands upon this key component of his theoretical underpinning by illustrating how formations of violence are dependent on the acting subject and the space of the political action. This is represented in the flow of the chapter within the book. Thus the book itself inherently spatial: ‘[W]herever encountered in the book, the shrinkage of the space of political enactment corresponds to the expansion of the acting subject—the increasing correlation of personhood to historical transformation’ (Feldman, 1991, p. 10). Thus the flow follows the spatial argument, beginning with the city, neighbourhood, traversing to the jail, the cell, to the body of the hunger striker. With each shrinking of the political enactment the potency of that agency expands. In my understanding and assessment, the hunger striker has greater political agency than the rioter on the streets of Belfast, in essence – ‘the process by which an entity violently expelled from the social order is transformed into an emissary, a cultural donor and bearer of seminal political messages’ (Feldman, 1991, p. 8).

This sectarian divide in Belfast was formed tense and violent spaces, that Feldman refers to as ‘interfaces’. ‘The “interfaces” is a spatial construct pre-eminently linked to the performance of violence’ (Feldman, 1991, p. 28). Feldman rightfully indicates how marching, protesting and rioting are all culturally unique and harness their own ‘political meaning’ (1991, p. 21).

Feldman’s work does have a capacity for comparison with the South East Asian context outlined by Gaborieau (1985) and van der Veer (1996) with regard to rituals of provocation. For instance, Feldman refers to rioting, which ‘at the interfaces appears to function as a traditional mechanism for setting and even extending territorial boundaries between Catholic and Protestant communities’ (1991, pp. 28 - 29). Rioting, marches, and protests in public spaces explain, form and mend ethnic identity in Northern Ireland. Particularly at the ‘interfaces’ they construct or manifest a representation between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

The primary proposition Feldman presents is that space and body are indivisible with regards to political violence in Northern Ireland (1991). For instance, Feldman discusses how the very dress and speech of the individual ‘indicate residential affiliation of the subject and his precise relationship or nonrelationship to the social space in which the subject is encountered’ (1991, p. 58). The body therefore, like space, conveys political allegiance and ethnically charged
symbolism. With regards to door step killings known as ‘stiffs’ by paramilitaries in North Belfast, Feldman notes:

The stiff displaces unstable boundaries and functions for the assassins as a rigid concentrate of the communities located within these shifting borders. The corpse and the border are both points of separation and contact between opposing spaces. These thresholds define the space of political exchange. The corpse and the border form a metonymy that permits political codes and values to circulate. Corpses or stiffs become mobile surrogate borders or interfaces and thus bearers of political spectacle. The stiff is a commodity form of a political exchange. Violence injects spatial and temporal value into the stiff. It activates metaphorical transactions between borders and corpses, exchanges which externalize the internal time of political violence as a history effect. (1991, p. 74)

The violent act in this case illustrates the body and space as a politically powered border, the body of the victim and the site in which it was enacted have been charged with agency. The violent action is performative, the performance encodes the body with political symbolism. Feldman argues that it is through the performance and the body that an understanding of the violence is portrayed argues Feldman (1991, p. 100). Moreover, Feldman notes how the ‘polluting’ or significant ‘other’ within a community appears within their master narrative. As he explains: ‘the brutal killing of a single individual is commensurate in its political and polluting impact to the forced movements of entire communities, that terror has its own circuits of amplification that do not require material destruction on a large scale, is an essential discovery of paramilitary practice.’ (1991, p.77 – 78). As a result of control certain spaces through violence enacted upon the body, the body and space became inseparable symbolically charged, reinforcing constructed ethnic differences and entrenching the violence further.

The tactic outlined was not specific to paramilitaries, it was also enacted by agents of the state. This recognition of the state as a violent actor is of importance here in this thesis, as it was a characteristic component of my own research in Eastleigh. In my understanding of Feldman the state, too, acts according kind of rationality as paramilitaries. For instance, Feldman traces the processes in examining state performances like arrests, interrogations and raids. The state it seems additionally assists in constructing social life. However, more specifically Feldman notes ‘arrest and interrogation forces one to read the state not only as an instrumental and rationalized edifice but as a ritual form for the constitution of power; in turn, one is led to the central role arrest and interrogation play in the performative construction of state power in Northern Ireland.’
The state itself is attempting to reaffirm its power, through symbolic acts, similar to ‘stiffs’.

The formation of reclaiming territory and power over spaces and bodies came in the form of police raids; by means of internment British government forces could arrest suspected paramilitaries in dawn raids. ‘Predawn arrests are spectacles that elicit subject positions by commanding complicitous silence and passivity. The predawn house raid by the counterinsurgency forces is a display of colonizing power and the command of territory; it reclaims a temporality and geography of subversion’ (Feldman, 1991, p.89). Thus, my understanding of state violence in Northern Ireland is that it enacts upon the same cultural principles as the ‘stiffs’ by crossing the safe threshold and sanctuary of ‘home’. In doing so, the state reaffirms its territorial claim through such a ritualized and performative symbolic acts.

State reclaiming of territory was ritualistically resisted by Catholic women in Belfast. When military squads entered communities as ‘duck patrols’ they procedurally smashed street lights and patrolled streets in black armoured vehicles, giving them a vantage in the cover of darkness. In a form of community resistance, women and children would take to the streets in opposition as ‘hen patrols’ bashing bin lids and pots while throwing cans of white paint in an attempt to indicate the location of the patrol warning others of its presence in the community (Feldman, 1991, p.94 – 97). Feldman explains ‘Bin-lid banging communicates not only a warning, but also signals that the community has been moved into a liminal and defiled state due to the presence of the Other’ (1991, p. 97). For Feldman, when the ‘colonizing force’ of the state is met by the resistance of women, they the women become the feminized ‘communitas’ performing for control of their streets. It is at these moments of social conflict that groups enter the communitas, the drama which unfolds is an essential component to understand a given conflict. Be it either riots between religious groups in India or dawn raids in Northern Ireland, it is the symbols and performance of the actors themselves that are important in order to understand how the conflict becomes transformed and manipulated for those social agents. Therefore, I agree with Feldman that it is the state and its actors essential to recognise as social agents in an unfolding conflict.

State power, like the power wielded by paramilitaries appears in particular localities and spaces. In Northern Ireland, prison and interrogation personified the power of the British state: ‘In a single self-constituting rush of violence, seeming to emerge from the very architecture of
coercion itself and establishing its dominance in a total immediacy that distributes all the participants of the interrogation into their appropriate spatial, political, and historical positions’ (Feldman, 1991, p. 128). For Feldman the body again formed an ambiguous site to observe state power, ‘[E]ither the body was extended by the technology of weaponry in the military operation or it was extended into a weapon of interrogation center of the prison’ (1991, p. 143). Thus to observe state power, it is how the body is treated at specific localities or performances. However, the social agents involved in the drama do not necessarily succumb to state power, they also yield a potential for resistance.

The culmination of Feldman’s argument regarding ‘the shrinkage of the space of political enactment corresponds to the expansion of the acting subject’ (1991, p. 10). This becomes ever more apparent when referring to the changes in tactics of those under interrogation. Starting from resisting interrogations and progressing to the prison insubordinations with blanket and dirty protests, the shrinking of space and the historic personhood becomes more apparent. From Feldman’s research, the prison became a reverse of state power, and instead spurred further insurgencies within communities across Northern Ireland. The growing resentment of prisoners to be recognised as prisoners of war went far beyond a simple protest. It was an entire counter conduct, the smearing of shit on prison walls and the refusal to wear prisoner uniform but adorning themselves in blankets instead were all forms of political resistance that resonated outside the prison walls.

‘The Dirty Protest finalized the transformation of prison resistance from instrumental political action with objective goals toward a systematic cognitive and cultural otherness. No one expected to live in these conditions for five years. There was a tacit expectation among the Blanketmen that the fundamental disordering of their physical environment had set a biological clock ticking. As they realized the full implications of living in a scatological ecology, the prisoners initially experienced the Dirty Protest as a death ritual, a final act that would resolve their predicament in a biological eschatology of disease and possible death. Their condition of fecal disorder was to be an escape from the suspensions of juridical time—a fundamental structure of their oppression—and an entry into the resolving finitude of biological time.’

The body became a tool, reorganised to fit the surroundings of the prison. This eventually concluded with the 1981 hunger strike in which ten prisoners of war died in their hospital beds. The ‘Blanket men’ viewed the hunger strike as ‘a military campaign and organized it as such. For them, it was a modality of insurrectionary violence in which they deployed their bodies as weapons. They fully expected a coupling of this act of self-directed violence with mass
insurrectionary violence outside the prison’ (Feldman, 1991, p. 220). This again reasserting Feldman’s point regarding ‘the shrinkage of the space of political enactment corresponds to the expansion of the acting subject’ (1991, p. 10). That political enactment grants the agent prominent political membership to a particular ideological ideal.

Feldman makes rather interesting and important points regarding bodies and spaces, how they can become ethnically charged symbols through performative acts of violence. Moreover, the cultural examples such as arrests, interrogations, stiffs and riots are of further importance as they have a comparative reach into my own fieldwork. However, Feldman’s work fails, in my opinion to grapple with the very materiality of the Northern Irish conflict. It almost ignores the existence in the border, between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland in developing political distinctions of inclusion and exclusion. Thus, I turn to citizenship as a form of political participant (Lazar, 2013), in order to examine materiality, borders and citizenship.

4.4 THE INTERSECTION: FINDING CITIZENSHIP AND FEATURES OF LIMINALITY

Within cross-cultural analysis one can find evidence for the coupling of borders and dramatized violence in constructing non-citizens. For instance, Bornstein outlines how the ‘green line’ bordering the West Bank and Israel is an important mechanism in processing exploitation, domination and violence (2002). Bornstein outlines how performance of violence at particular borders have been primarily used to ‘conjure state power’ and reassure Israeli public that the war on terror has been a political success (2002). However instead, particular border crossing were strikingly more prone to violence and oppression than others, thus illustrating the dramatized aspect of violence at particular materialised points (Bornstein, 2002). Thus, Bornstein concludes that this ‘symbolic action’ to protect against terrorism has a real effect, in particular the militarization of the border and enabling a ‘superexploitative’ response to Palestinian labour (2002). It is at a border that the ‘superexploitative’ experience dramatized state violence. Therefore the movement of migrants and/or refugees who cross such state lines is of interest, as it can illustrate the process and formation of group boundaries that manifest themselves at specific sites.
In an attempt to understand the process of constructing groups\(^4\) (Brubaker, 2004) within the frame of social conflict, I turn to a historic development of the topic, initially with the Manchester School and its contribution to its understanding of group formation. Barth (1969) outlines with great detail and precision how ethnic groups or units are maintained by formation of ‘us’ and ‘them’, this is distinguished by cultural constructed boundary between insider and outsider. Moreover, Barth suggests ‘a group maintains its identity when members interact with others, this entails criteria for determining membership and ways of signalling membership and exclusion’ (1969, p.15). Thus a group dynamic and boundary are liable to change and shift, given that the features of the boundary between groups are able to change and shift (Barth, 1969, p. 14). This is additionally evident in other works by Barth, regarding ‘groups’, for instance the Pashtuns and Afghans intermarry on frequent basis, forging alliances and networks (Barth, 1954, p.33-35). The primary notion to take away from Barth’s work is the notion that the ‘self’ needs the ‘other’ to formulate a notion of ‘itself’; moreover, ‘self’ and ‘other’ are highly subjected to power and economic relations that encompass them (Barth, 2007).

As highlighted earlier, Gluckman’s recognition of social problems as a subject of study enabled many of his predecessors to study various social phenomena (Gluckman, 1961; Evens & Handelman, 2006), for instance aspects of political economy in forging group dynamics such as class under the oppression of colonialism (Mitchell, 1956). Mitchell detailed the ‘prestige’ of what he termed the ‘European way of life’. In essence Mitchell illustrates how the Kalela dance in the Rhodesian (contemporary Zambia) Copperbelt was a form of mimicry between colonized and colonizer. Mitchell argues that ‘struggle for political power was going on not between skilled and unskilled workers or manual and non-manual workers, but rather between broad ethnic groups within the same general socio-economic stratum’ (1956, p. 17).

Recognising inequalities intersecting with group ‘identity’ formation, has given rise to theoretical explanations of ‘superexploited’ Palestinian labour (Bornstein, 2002). However, there is a tendency to forget a feature the ‘superexploited’: the state. The state in this respect thus disconnects itself from the Weberian notion of the state; that society/culture and the state are

\(^4\) The notion of group is emphasised here due to the contested nature of ‘identity’, Brubaker (2004) rightfully argues against the use and abuse of the term identity in policy and theory as a notion that is fixed and consistent within social reality. Instead Brubaker notes identities or groups capacity for shifting change and crystallisation in times of conflict.
separate (Gupta, 2006). Instead, Gupta notes that the state itself is a cultural product: ‘bring together the ideological and material aspects of the state construction, and understand how “the state” comes into being, and how “it” is differentiated from other institutional forms, and what effects this construction has on the operation and diffusion of power throughout society’ (2006, p. 7). Gupta illustrates two modes of recognising the state: firstly, everyday practices ‘is the primary arena in which people learn something about the state…’ such as ‘bureaucratic procedures thus provide important clues to understanding the micropolitics of state work, how state authority and government operate in people’s daily lives, and how the state comes to be imagined, encountered, and reimagined by the population’ (2006, p.10 – 12) and secondly, ‘ethnographies of the state also invoke how messages about the state are interpreted and mobilized by people according to their particular contexts and social locations’ (2006, p.19).

Thus, what may be explained further here with the ‘superexploited’ Palestinian labour (Bornstein, 2002), is the state’s enactment or practice of power, by means of dramatized violence when crossing the border. By crossing the border they leave the periphery (Palestinian Territory) and entering the core (Israel) (Wolf, 1982). Doing so they engage with a ‘practice’ of the state and its acts of violence, this form of state violence it granted as a ‘representation’ of the state (Gupta, 2006), in this case Israel, is combating terrorism (Bornstein, 2002). Yet through these modes of violence, enacted and represented by the state, what is constructed is a boundary between Palestinians and Israelis.

Citizenship, in the non-normative sense, is an aspect that can be explored in the case of Eastleigh, as it has ethnographic connections between the police violence and the construction of citizen and non-citizen. Lazar argues ‘if we take an Aristotelian position and agree that citizenship is participation in government, in taking decisions that affect our lives, then the citizen’s position regarding a range of governing entities becomes crucial in an assessment of the quality of his or her citizenship under a political regime’ (Lazar, 2013, p. 5). Lazar outlines two Aristotelian points of observing citizenship: firstly, it is not merely being a part of a political body, but a ‘set of practices associated with participation in politics’; secondly, it indicates that politics ‘cannot be assumed to exist’ but must be formed out of practice, participation and imagining (Lazar, 2013, p.6). Lazar rightfully indicates that it is the migrant and refugee who are at the forefront of the boundary of citizenship (2013). In this highly contested distinction, this
boundary is highly dependent upon the ‘citizen regime’ and how it encourages certain practices of citizenship (Lazar, 2013, p. 10).

A citizenship regime is ‘legal, bureaucratic, ideological and material frameworks that condition practices of and about government and participation in politics’. For example under neoliberal regimes a citizen is expected to act a specific way with certain characteristics such as entrepreneurship and self-sufficiency distancing themselves from state support (Lazar, 2013, p. 10). Citizenship regimes are thus a potent feature in political subject formation. However, it does not just exist in the top down formation; bottom up approaches illustrate that citizenship can also be claimed and enacted, forcing hierarchical forces to shape to grass-root ideals (Wittman, 2013).

To recognise these formations of citizenship is to analysis a ‘complex bundle of practices constituting political membership’, in doing so one can reveal that ‘the dual or even multiple nature of people’s citizenship in practice highlights cultural aspects of political belonging and denaturalizes the automatic equation of citizenship with the nation-state of residence’ (Lazar, 2013, p. 13). Thus in contrast to normative citizenship, citizenship is a means of claiming membership or higher quality membership. Moreover it is also about sites and spaces that shape those claims to citizenship. In claiming these forms of membership, it additionally means exclusion of others from a chosen membership, be it from above or totally separate. Thus, citizenship exists by its boundaries and strategies.

This has manifested itself in various localities and cultural contexts, for example Mandel has highlighted this with the example of ‘Soviet Germans’ in reunified Germany and their highly contested appeal to gain German citizenship, and moreover, be recognised as Germans (2013). Mandel argues that German citizenship is characterised by ‘mechanisms of inclusion or exclusion of outsiders’ that ‘rests in the implicit acceptance of mimetic models of Germanness, that is, to prevailing correspondences with “images” of a common people bound by language, history, and tradition regardless of geography’ (2013, p.292 – 293). These notions of a common people as Mandel describes, are bound to a political discourse surrounding purity of ‘blood’ and ‘folk’, while in contrast those who do not comply to these features of the ‘citizen’ are manifested as a pollutant (2013, p.293 – 297). Regardless of these strong distinctions between citizen and non-citizen, Mandel shows that citizenship is not only performative, but can also display itself as a form of mimesis. Citizenship in this case is a form of ‘political mimetism’ through ‘forced
inscription of ethnos’ upon the body (Mandel, 2013, p.297). This illustration of citizenship indicates its performative quality for those seeking the ascription of a citizen. The creation of the non-citizen is also performed. Similar to the mode in which one attempts to be recognised as a citizen, further performances are also made to distinguish the ‘other’ a non-citizen. For instance, in the production of the ‘illegal’ migrant or Mexican in the United States, Genova indicates that this production of ‘illegality’ not only ‘serves to create and sustain’ vulnerable and cheap labour, but also naturalises the ‘fundamental origin of this juridical status’ that enables the production of ‘illegality’ (2013, p.310). It is through the means of the ‘deportability’ of the migrant by the exaggerated and militarized US/Mexican border that maintains an ‘eminently disposable commodity’ of Mexican labour (2013, p.310). In this case of the ‘superexploited’ Palestinian labour (Bornstein, 2002), ‘it is precisely the border that provides the exemplary theatre for staging the spectacle of “the illegal alien”’ (Genova, 2013, p.319).

Thus, particular material realities can contribute to the construction (Barth, 1969), crystallisation (Brubaker, 2004) and production (Genova, 2013) of the ‘other’ group and/or non-citizen. Moreover, the example of the US/Mexican and Palestinian/Israeli borders illustrate the dramatized and theatrical elements of violence ‘intimidation and harassment’ of the ‘undocumented’ (Genova, 2013, p.322). Lazar rightfully notes: ‘[T]he archetypal non-citizen is the foreign migrant’ (Lazar, 2013, p. 15).

Yet within the emergence of the nation state, particularly for those who had undergone the trauma of colonialism, the ‘migrant’ or ‘refugee’ has a tendency to be produced and/or constructed within the frame of liberation. For example, Marshall-Frantani analyses the Ivory Coast crisis (or first civil war) of 2002 (2013). Marshall-Frantani notes ‘above all a war about borders, crystallizing in liminal spaces and social categories and practices’ between so called original or ‘autochthons’ and Northern Muslim inhabitants some of whom were economic migrants or descendants of migrants to the plantations of the Ivory Coast (2013, pp. 272 - 275). As Marshall-Frantani persuasively argues, it was the plantation economy in which the colonial state created the ethnic identities that gave ‘rise to a territorialized and ethnicized definition of citizenship and national identity’ (2013). It appears the process of self-determinism in the case of Ivory Coast formed ‘the principle of territorial autochthony as the basis not only of self-determination, but also national belonging, citizenship, and authentic identity’ (Marshall-Frantani, 2013). For Marshall-Frantani the fluctuating processes of self-representations within nation-state
building and globalisation ‘particularly among the youth… are liminal and unstable’ (2013). Marshall-Fratani concludes at an interesting juncture, that ‘uncertainty itself triggers violence’ - however ‘brutal actions by no means establish certainty; indeed, they only exacerbate the frustrations of their perpetrators’ (2006). Thus it appears that liminality within the state by means of constructing ‘self’ and ‘other’ are additional components in forming notions of citizenship that intersect and enable practiced and symbolic violence.

Thus I turn to liminality, not for theoretical enhancement but to advocate an altering substance within the text. Merely, as Marshall-Fratani noted, it was within the frame of liminality that acts of violence occurred, coupled with the formation of the boundary between the ‘other’ (2013), thus I think it necessary to explore this aspect of liminality in order for it to be exposed fully in the light of the data.

Human and Robins have attempted a return to analysing the process of violence towards the non-citizen with the aid of Turner’s model of ritual, liminality and communitas (2011). Human and Robins illustrate the contemporary use of Turner’s model with regard to Zimbabwean refugees living in Cape Town and their experienced violence during South Africa’s hosting of FIFA 2010 (2011). In 2010 FIFA World Cup created a hyper state of communitas within South Africa, however for those Zimbabwean refugees they experienced a liminality forced upon them by their ‘almost permanent state of uncertainty… that made them vulnerable to arrest, deportation and xenophobic violence’ (Human & Robins, 2011). These Zimbabwean refugees experienced the tournament as liminal in two ways: firstly, they sold FIFA merchandise and marketed their crafts for financial gain, therefore ‘they were not excluded from the World Cup ritual’; secondly, ‘they experienced the tournament as liminal as a result of being cognisant of rumours and xenophobic Uprising post-World Cup… For some of them the sense of liminality was a product of being forced to leave home in hope of one day returning’ (Human & Robins, 2011). The violence and threat of violence, practiced and symbolic, exacerbated a sense of liminality and forced Zimbabwean refugees form their own communitas, unlike the ‘middle class hippie communes’ (Human & Robins, 2011) which were voluntary in formation as explained by Turner (1969). ‘It is precisely such status uncertainty that made them so vulnerable to arrests, deportation and xenophobic violence’ (Human & Robins, 2011), thus it may appear that liminality exacerbates violence, dramatized or structural.
The borders of states and the crystalized borders between enacted ‘groups’ appear to form a sense of liminality for some actors involved resulting in acts and experiences of dramatized violence (Human & Robins, 2011; Marshall-Fratani, 2013), while for others it is merely the production and construction of the citizen and non-citizen through political discourses and practices (Lazar, 2013), such as dramatized and structural violence. However, at this interval I will readdress the ‘superexploited’ Palestinian (Bornstein, 2002) and ‘illegal’ Mexican labour (Genova, 2013). Not only did they experience ‘symbolic action’ (Bornstein, 2002), but the point that they were exploited to a hyper state illustrates another form of violence after crossing the border: the ‘unseen’ violence (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004).

4.5 STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE
From my explorations into Eastleigh, I found that alongside dramatized violence other forms of violence existed, a far more sinister and unnoticed form. Structural violence exists within the everyday ‘grey zone’ (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004), and is the result of avoidable suffering (Galtung, 1969). Galtung defines structural violence as ‘the indirect violence built into repressive social orders creating enormous differences between potential and actual human self-realization’ (1975, p. 173). Alike to dramatized violence, structural violence appeared also within the frame of citizenship (Farmer, 2004). Citizenship is the point of intersection between these two theoretical aspects of violence: dramatized violence and structural violence. Citizenship is an axis, a point where the meridian of both structural violence and dramatized violence cross and intersect.

Structural violence transcends the notion of dramatized violence, legitimized acts of violence that become symbolic (Riches, 1986), as it does not correspond with an expressive quality. In contrast structural violence is inherently silent and is taken as a normative fact of life. Galtung outlines that ‘violence with a clear-subject relation is manifest because it is visible as action. It corresponds to our ideas of what drama is… violence without this relation is structural, built into a structure’ (1969). Galtung primarily contrasts physical and structural violence by the absence of ‘drama’, thus his notion of physical violence is more in line with Riche’s (1986) notion of practiced violence due to its visible attributes. Moreover, in contrast with Allen Feldman’s analysis of oral histories from the Northern Irish ‘troubles’, where violence had a powerful impact upon bodies and spaces, becoming ethnically symbolically charged through acts of
dramatized violence that peaked at certain points of time (1991), structural violence differs since it ‘is silent, it does not show – it is essentially static’ and constant (Galtung, 1969). Therefore, for Galtung ‘the two types of violence simply do not seem to be more tightly connected empirically than logically’. Since they contrast by means of appearance within time, dramatized violence peaks at certain points while in contrast structural violence is constant and rarely fluctuates (1969). Thus ‘the whole exercise is an effect to show that they may seem as logically independent even though they are continuous with each other: one shades onto the other’ (Galtung, 1969). It is the point in which they shade onto each other that is under investigation within this thesis.

Paul Farmer has been a prominent contributor to the study of structural violence, as an anthropologist and a physician. Thus, I turn to his compelling work *Pathologies of Power* (2004). Although the book is primarily concerned with health and healthcare in certain localities such as AIDS in Haiti and Tuberculosis in Russia, its primary theme is the vast global inequality that contributes to structural violence. Regardless of the medical undertones, Paul Farmer’s personal illustration of structural violence is of importance here due to its descriptive potency in explaining structural violence. In doing so, Farmer uses the ‘term as a broad rubric that includes a host of offensives against human dignity: extreme and relative poverty, social inequalities ranging from racism to gender inequality, and spectacular forms of violence that are uncontestably human rights abuses’ (2004, p. 8). The examples given by Farmer indicate a frame of observing structural violence, which according to Farmer ‘is apt because their suffering is “structural” by historically given (and often economically driven) processes and forces that conspire – whether through routine, ritual, or as more commonly the case, the hard surfaces of life – to constrain agency’ (2004, p. 40). However, in order to recognise constraints on individual agency enacted by means of historical and economic processes, Farmer outlines various social axes to observe structural violence: gender, ethnicity (race), and citizenship.

These three ‘axes’ are what I have come to discern as Farmers praxis of structural violence. Although Farmer is primarily concerned with the practical alter to contemporary health care and human rights, the axes can assist in explaining why ‘Acephie died of AIDS and Chouchou died of torture’ (2004, p. 43). Regarding gender, it is the silent violence in the forms of domestic violence, rape, maternal mortality and ‘AIDS and its distribution’ discriminately amongst the poor (2004, p. 44). Ethnicity (and/or race), plays an additional point, although as noted by
Farmer, it is class and inequality that intersect race or ethnicity to such an extent that it appears indistinct at times, for instance post-apartheid South Africa (2004, p.46). Other ‘axes of oppression… refugee and immigration status is one that steadily comes to mind, when thinking of the poor and the powerless’ (Farmer, 2004, p. 46).

Farmer illustrates the axes of oppression with the case example of Yolande and her husband, Athenor, both of whom were members of the democratic organization Komite Inite Demokratik in Haiti. During the junta, Yolande was arrested and tortured due to her political affiliation, and subsequently miscarried. As a result of some internal pressure from the US trade embargo, Yolande fortunately got released, and fled to the USA with the belief that amnesty would be granted. Unfortunately for her, she was arrested, cloths and belongings confiscated and burnt, then imprisoned. Very few fleeing state oppression from Haiti made asylum to the United States was the result of the ‘Bush administration’s actions – denying the refugees legal counsel or a hearing, preventing press coverage of the conditions of the detainees – reinforced widely held beliefs’ (Farmer, 2004, p.59). Those structures were reinforced for those, who like Yolande, were granted asylum, but then found to be HIV positive. Due to the presence of HIV in the Caribbean in the 1990s (apart from Cuba), ‘U.S. legislators at state and federal levels had introduced enormous numbers of bills regarding HIV, most of them punitive, restrictive, and directed at infected persons. Although immigration law is in principle strictly separated from laws regarding political refugees, anyone familiar with INS policies towards Haitians could also have predicted mandatory HIV screening’ (Farmer, 2004, p. 59). With the case of Yolande this resulted in forced relocation, imprisonment, beatings, forced abortions – in essence, overwhelming human rights and constitution rights abuses due to not ‘technically’ being on U.S. jurisdictional soil (Farmer, 2004, pp. 60 - 68). Overall, what Farmer displays with this case example is the axes of immigration and gender with regards to structural violence. Although it primarily is to indicate the moral obligations of states to apply the code of conduct towards human and medical rights, I additionally note it instructs the reader to recognise and identify a connection between pathologies of power and structural violence. These ‘pathologies’ within power, which are at first invisible are the inherent enabling for the structure that disables individuals, like Yolande, agency.

Thus, with the case of Eastleigh, it may be essential to recognise the historic and economic processes that enable structural violence. Additionally, it may appear that those historic and
economic processes interact with the role of citizenship for those Somalis of Eastleigh, and sub sequentially connect with dramatized violence. Farmer hints to this, remarking on the case of the Zapatista revolt in Chiapas, Mexico – ‘On August 7, paramilitary groups burned homes and forcibly expelled civilians from the village of Yajalon. The structural violence that generates such atrocities remains unaddressed by the superficial palliatives of the Mexican government. Militarization has only exacerbated violence in Chiapas’ (Farmer, 2004, p. 114). It appears Farmer argues that the encompassing structural violence enables acts of physical (practiced (dramatized) violence) to coexist, interact and be products of one another. Moreover, Farmer additionally highlights that structural violence may not just be enacted upon those seemingly receiving the physical abuses, but additionally the abusers in question, for instance, the actions of police such as demand bribes against the poor and weak in Chiapas. According to Farmer, this is a result of structural violence (2004, pp. 98 - 104). However, Farmer does not clarify this connection, simply put, he places the result of all violence, seemingly, as a result of structural inequalities and pathologies of power. Therefore I find Farmer a highly intuitive source for structural violence and his call for health reform alongside economic and social rights for poor insightful (2004, p. 244), however his work fails to illustrate the encompassing nature of acts of violence intersecting with the ‘shades’ between ‘dramatized’ and ‘unseen’ violence (Galtung, 1969).

Akin to Farmer (2004), Gupta examines structural violence enacted against the poor through government apparatuses in India, in Uttar Pradesh (2012). He argues that the societal order that perpetuates poverty, needs to be named and recognised as violence, even if that violence is inherent within the structures of power rather than the identifiable result of interpersonal violence. However the structural violence experienced in India is arbitrary and does not conform to the ideal of biopolitics, because the state apparatus does not work with unity (Gupta, 2012, pp. 65 – 71). A large focus of the book examines practices and representations of corruption in India. Corruption, is not just a tax on the poor, but an action which has to be socially learned and mastered. The practice of corruption has to be learnt in order to navigate and gain the best benefit from the state. It requires the correct deployment of educational and cultural capital within a discursive terrain to understand the states benefits and failings. Thus, those who do not have the cultural capital to interact with the states practices cannot benefit from it and are likely to undergo practices of corruption in the form of bribes instead. As a result, not having the cultural
capital or education in state practices makes one more prone to arbitrary structural violence (Gupta, 2012, pp. 75 – 111). The importance of Gupta is the theoretical grounds for recognising corruption as a form of structural violence. This is achieved by recognising the state as a possible axis for investigation. However, the work, alike to Farmers (2004), still fails to grasp the interconnection between structural violence and interpersonal violence.

In analysing structural inequalities in East Harlem, Bourgois develops ‘a political economy perspective that takes culture and gender seriously, and which recognizes the link between intimate individual actions and social/structural determinism’ (2004, p. 303). Akin to Farmer (2004), Bourgois uses gender as an intersection to explore the historic development of gender relations for Puerto Rican males in a globalised market based economy, noting that the shift away from male household provider to exploited low-waged clerk resulted ‘in rapid historical structural transformations of their generation as a dramatic assault on their sense of masculine dignity’ (2004, p. 306). ‘In the worst-case scenario, as males became impotent economic failures in the service of the economy, they lashed out against the women and children they could no longer support economically or control ideologically’ (Bourgois P., 2004, p. 306). This culminates in an example given by Bourgois regarding a gang rape of a 12 year old girl. When questioning his informants who know the girl, they simply regard it as the fault of the victim (2004, p. 306). In a sense this illustrates the interconnection between interpersonal violence and structural violence within the axis of gender. Acts of violence that are not legitimized do not become symbolic to that given culture or community. Bourgois concludes that the structural formation of inner-city apartheid maintains internal interpersonal violence; instead of attacking their oppressor, inner-city ‘drug dealers, addicts and street criminals’ fight amongst themselves. The interaction between dramatized violence and structural violence here is that those structural process - historic and economic (that exacerbate structural violence) - are the same processes that may inhibit the symbolic potency of interpersonal violence.

4.6 Conclusion and Crystalized Theoretical Terms

In this thesis, I base my primary question around Galtung’s understanding of dramatized and structural violence (1969). For Galtung, violence was either structural and constant or dramatized and sudden (1969). This dichotomy almost intersects with Riche’s notion of the practiced and symbolic, the idea that violence is always practiced, yet for it to be symbolically charged and
recognised as a form of violence it needs to be witnessed and legitimized through social and cultural components (1986). Therefore, Galtung’s (1969) and Riche’s (1986) notions of violence do intersect in the form of a dichotomy of the silent and vivid; it is merely the scale of enactment that is different. For instance, Galtung's (1969) notion of structural violence is very much an aspect of inequalities and discrepancies of power and wealth, within the frame of centre and periphery. While in contrast, Riches ideal of violence is more or less interpersonal violence, not on the scale of political economic forces. Yet, in my understanding, they are the result of coupling structural and cultural (legitimizing) factors. Bourgois alluded to the intersection with the axis of gender, noting that the same process (material and historic) that exacerbates structural violence also inhibit the potency for recognition as violence (dramatized) (2004). As I alluded to above, there may be additional axes in the production and construction of non-citizenship with the case of Eastleigh to explain this interaction. Therefore, I return to my research question: How can violence be comprehended in Eastleigh and the broader Nairobi context? Can dramatized violence and structural violence work to explain violence in those contexts? Can other theoretical frames, not directly related to violence assist in explaining its ongoing presence? Moreover, does the local understandings of violence manifest, and how does this influence the theoretical categorizes of violence? And lastly, does the anthropologist contribute to those forms of violence, and if so in what respect?

The intention of this chapter was to explain and explore the dichotomy between structural and dramatized violence that Galtung referred to (1969), in order to formulate a grounding to expand upon the research question. Additionally, my intention was to intersect the connection between structural and dramatized violence with the production of citizenship, as it may yield potential indications into the workings of each formation of violence. The primary focus of the chapter is understanding theoretical assumptions of violence, therefore it is imperative to illustrate the exact features of violence I intend to focus upon in the analysis and to explain my understanding of each feature of violence for the purpose of the analysis. My secondary focus, was to indicate the connection of violence in producing forms of citizenship, thus laying the foundations for exploration into the interconnection between what I term here dramatized and structural violence.
The terminology I intend to follow in this thesis is based primarily on the theoretical background I have outlined above. However, although I argued for these forms of recognising violence that can be applied in my own analysis, I do collectively summarise my own notions with regards to the specific terms I have indicated. This stems from the intersection of theory, ethnography and analysis, with the intent to apply theoretical terms from my own fieldwork. Moreover, this should allow for a more fluid and applicable understanding of the theoretical notions. Thus, by taking various notions and terms of violence with relation to their ethnographic texts it is imperative to outline some theoretical intersections. In an attempt to do so, I now turn to crystallise these notions in order to pursue a convincing argumentation within the analysis.

Dramatized violence is a practiced act of violence that is legitimimized by a localised cultural actor thus rendering it symbolic. Dramatized violence occurs in events and at particular moments in time, they are explosive and symbolic within a temporal frame. The legitimiser, is not a single actor, but a series of actors who perpetuate the act of violence as having symbolic potency to them. This symbolic potency is usually charged and attaches itself to sites and/or bodies. Thus dramatized violence has a tendency to be highly performative, with intended or unintended symbolic consequences. Violence without symbolic residue, is disconnect from the dramatized act, often that act of violence is produced as structural.

Structural violence is endemic, granting it a continuous white noise effect, yet more importantly here structural violence is silent and almost granted a normative aspect of life by the localized cultural actor. Structural violence, however, can be enacted by an actor, yet those actions are the consequence of historic and material structural processes. Thus those who undergo structural violence deem it almost an aspect of ‘normal’ life. Moreover, the main the result of structural violence is global gross-inequalities kept in maintenance by an economic world system.

In conclusion, these aspects of violence will be reviewed within the light of Eastleigh and the surrounding districts within Nairobi, Kenya. In doing so I will expose the intersection between dramatized and structural violence with the assistance of the axis of citizenship and non-citizenship.
iv. 8th Street Eastleigh
“The Police won’t stop us, they know whites always have their papers”
Kenyan White Farmer

“The Somalis don’t have political power. Even with Kenyan Somalis they have a problem, even when they show them their ID they don’t accept it. Whether they are Somali Kenyan or not, they are beaten.”
Abdul, Somali Refugee

On the outskirts of Nairobi I had received a lift from a Kenyan farmer and conservationist after visiting a friend near Mount Kenya. She was genuinely interested to hear what I was doing in Kenya and showed a great amount of sympathy towards refugees in Kenya. Yet what I took away from the journey back to Nairobi was the possible class distinction in her being white. Coming up to a police check on the outskirts of Nairobi, we were not stopped or subsequently asked for a bribe like the other motorists at the police check point. Instead, we simply slowed down, waved to the smiling officer and drove around the placed traffic spikes. In response, she simply put it “The Police won’t stop us, they know whites always have their papers”.

In Eastleigh there are no whites. It is primarily inhabited by Somalis, with Kenyan or Somali citizenship. In contrast, police stop people every day. Even with documentation, a Kenyan Identification Card or United Nations Refugee Card, people still bribe police. When visiting Abdul, a Somali friend with refugee status in the United States of America, he declared “The Somalis don’t have political power. Even with Kenyan Somali they have a problem, even when they show them their ID they don’t accept it. Whether they are Somali Kenyan or not, they are beaten.” In his understanding, Somalis, regardless of their citizenship were being targets of violence, because they did not have “political power”.

Violence in Eastleigh is dual-faceted. It appears apparent and silent. However there is a point where the two coincide and interact with one another, almost indistinguishably. Through the lens or axis of citizenship (“political power”) working as a theoretical framework, I intend to explore the intersection between structural and dramatized violence. That intersection I argue is citizenship.

The ethnographic data I present here all stems from my fieldwork. The data couples the witness’ accounts of interviews with my analysis of Eastleigh and reading of Kenyan history. Moreover,
the use of refugee here applies to all those of refugee and asylum status. This is due to the interlocutor’s description of themselves as such, in every case. My theoretical premise stems from those field notes, observations and interviews from Eastleigh and the surrounding districts that are connected to Eastleigh. Those dramatized forms of violence comprise of: acts of police brutality, false imprisonment and arrests, large scale raids and crackdowns to acts of violence enacted by Al-Shabaab such as terrorist attacks, beatings and stabbings. By means of dramatized violence, Kenyan police and Al-Shabaab symbolically charge spaces and bodies, with connotations of pollution, security and citizenship. Citizenship in Eastleigh manifested itself as a result of that dramatized violence, the symbolic qualities left on bodies and spaces helped construct and maintain varying political strata of citizens. Those citizens without a citizenship became classified by ethnicity and documentation. While the Kenyan government had made attempts to represent itself as accepting its Somali and Muslim population, it has failed to additionally produce a working citizenship regime to incorporate them. As a result, further distinguishing them as non-citizens and reducing their political agency. Lacking political agency, Somalis in Eastleigh experience structural violence by means of exploitation from police corruption and inadequate social welfare, thus further endangering their already fragile agency of Somalis within the district.

5.1 Dramatized Violence and the Symbolic Consequences
In Eastleigh dramatized violence is enacted by various actors and groups, from the Kenyan Security Forces to Al-Shabaab. These organisations and their actions are not only brutal, but physically and mentally harmful. Due to limitations this thesis will restrict its analysis only to Eastleigh and its immediate surroundings. In doing so, I intend to illustrate the political motives in those actions by observing the politically charged symbols inhabiting bodies and spaces, as to highlight those historic, political and economic processes that intersect at particular axis of citizenship.

5.1.1 Police (State) Violence
In this section I examine the violent actions of police and the symbolic meanings that appear from its enactment. Police violence is state violence in the sense that police are one of the few primary actors in Eastleigh who belong to the state and represent its presence. The practices of the police shape Eastleigh residents’ understanding of the state and indicate the state’s political
perception of Eastleigh and its residents. Similar to Gupta’s two modes of the state: practices and representations. Practices signifies ‘how state authority and government operate in people’s daily lives, and how the state comes to be imagined, encountered, and reimagined by the population’ (2006, p.10 – 12); and representation of ‘messages about the state are interpreted and mobilized by people according to their particular contexts and social locations’ (2006, p.19). In a similar fashion, police violence is an encounter with both practice and representation of the state.

State violence is akin to all forms of dramatized violence examined within this thesis. Its formation of symbolism is a result of culturally legitimized violence by means of performance and ritual (Riches, 1986). It should not be examined in total disconnection with other forms of dramatized violence enacted by different group. However it is regarded as a special case here, not just for its frequency but also for its interconnection with policy. Therefore, I outline its significance in the case of Eastleigh, by firstly noting how it possesses circulatory and repetitive response to terrorism. Then secondly outlining the symbolic potency of police practices of violence towards Somalis bodies, rendering and maintaining them as inseparably all non-citizens regardless of documented legal status. Thirdly and finally, I summaries the invading presence of the state upon spaces and sites, and finally by noting how police violence mimics with colonial oppression. By outlining these points, I illustrate how violence enacted by police, the state and Al-Shabaab can become dramatized. Be it in the form of flamboyant ‘crackdown’, mundane daily arrests and assaults to the aftereffect of a terrorist attack.

In 2014 a major ‘crackdown’ occurred in Eastleigh district between the 4th and 8th of April. The operation known as Usalama (security) closed all public entry or exit into the district. In the early hours of the morning on the 4th of April police entered homes and apartment blocks regardless of suspicion or citizenship of the tenant, forcefully arresting many without just cause (Muhumed, 2014). This coincides with Kenyan law being amended in 2014. National Intelligence Security (NIS) Act, broadened the powers of security officials to arrest, stop, detain, suspects or search and seize private property without a court warrant. In essence, Article 62 authorizes NIS officers to ‘do anything considered necessary to preserve national security; and (d) shall be specific and shall be valid for a period of one hundred and eighty days unless otherwise extended.’ (The Security Law (Amendment) Bill, 2014, p.48). The bill also amend Kenya’s refugee laws, including article 58, which would cap the number of refugees in Kenya at
150,000 and compel refugees and their families to stay only in designated camps while their applications for asylum are processed (The Security Law (Amendment) Bill, 2014, p.44). This has enabled police and security forces to securitize personal spaces and sites such as homes and belongings, and bodies through imprisonment. Such measures resembled colonial decrees, such as the state of emergency during the Mau-Mau uprising (Mugo Gatheru, 2005, p. 42).

Ethnographically, police violence primarily manifested within stories of interlocutors, how they felt, thought and learned from their experiences was apparent within the stories they told. Observing the police violence however was rare. On a few occasions I did witness grabbing and restraining, as well as several ‘slaps’ on various individuals while being questioned by police. The police moved in pairs and sometimes groups, wielding assault rifles and batons. With their camouflaged gear and the occasional escorts of converted green pickups, they were a formidable and threatening force. However, due to my own fear of being arrested, or worse, I tended to stay clear from police when such activities were occurring. On the other hand, when I was in a safe vantage point, such as a hotel, bedroom or café window or balcony, I could observe the police activities from afar. From this point I could photograph and observe police practices in Eastleigh and other parts of Nairobi. Although I could never hear the conversation, I could observe body language, in particular the quick movements of a bribe or physical intimidation. I recognized these body performances from interlocutor’s descriptions and also from my own body language when paying bribes and showing papers in past situations. Fortunately, I never underwent a ‘beating’ or ‘slap’, but from the stories and descriptions detailed to me, they were clearly a daily manifestation on the streets of Eastleigh, and at large across Nairobi.

My first encounter was with Abdunnasir, a legal advocate and later friend, who lived and worked in Eastleigh. Our first encounter was organised over the phone, and we met in a café on Moi Avenue. In the busy and crowded café on a central avenue in Nairobi, Abdunnasir explained in great length and detail the legal and personal implications surrounding Somalis and Eastleigh. Abdunnasir was a law student, well-spoken and dressed, with an impeccable passion for his studies and advocacy for Somalis. He spoke with great confidence regarding Somali business and how they faced various challenges to survive, some of them appearing almost like conspiracies, yet grounded in an attempt to understand the situation for Somalis. For instance, he referred to the ‘crackdown’ as orchestrated to oppress and reduce Somali business, as they
competed with businesses owned by Kikuyu and Asian. Moreover, the issues surrounding Eastleigh and Somalis were almost inseparable. He remarked that on several occasions he had been interviewed regarding 2014 police ‘crackdown’ in Eastleigh, noting that the last person he had spoken with was a Swedish journalist a few months before our first meeting. Yet, the manifestation of the ‘crackdown’ for Abdunnasir was not a single event, but an appearance of many police activities, as illustrated in the interview he gave:

“Actually after the terror attack in Garissa, Muslim youth in Mombasa were arrested, killed and dug up somewhere. You also get this in the Northern parts of the country. You just find police come to your house, pick you up and you are never seen again. Actually, personally I was a victim also… I was an activist, we were trying to stop the police from harassing the Somali community who had no documents.” (Abdunnasir, 2015)

Abdunnasir initially references the Garissa University Attack on the 2nd of April 2015 where over 300 Christian students were killed by Al-Shabaab assailants, and where police retaliated by making people disappear and reappearing as bodies. For Abdunnasir these acts of violence enacted by Al-Shabaab have highly recurring and circulatory effects upon Muslim and Somali communities within Kenya.

Personal stories of violence was a way for informants to explain the crackdown. The crackdown of 2014 was not just a single event, but varying practices, captured in differing accounts according to the informant. For example, Abdunnasir outlines his experience of the 2014 crackdown with reference to his own experiences:

“So this time, I was heading home and immediately I came to my house, I was living in the third floor of the building and I heard commotion down stairs. When I came downstairs I say three policemen harassing a sixty year old mother, and I was like ‘Hey whats wrong?’ and I was moved by how they were harassing the mother and asking for money, telling her ‘give us money unless we are going to arrest you’… And when they say me, they were like ‘Hey what do you want’, and I say ‘I am trying to stop you from harassing the mother’, so they say ‘we are not harassing her we are asking her questions’, I say ‘so take her to police station’, then they pounce on me there were three. One of them hit me here, I had a small injury here. So I went to my house, went to my computer and search for the Kenyan corruption commission and I call them tell them the police harassed me where are you guys this is your work. In Kenya, if you are Somali, there is no day you will be free in this country you always have to carry your documents in your pocket. Even if you are an MP, you even have to carry a document.” (Abdunnasir, 2015)

Abdunnasir conveys a story of physical violence and the symbolic qualities that are entangled within it (Feldman, 1991), an example of dramatized violence. Dramatized violence enacted by
police is a recurring theme in Abdunnasir’s descriptions. Abdunnasir understood police violence being a vengeful act or a response for Al-Shabaab terrorism, such as the Garissa University attack. Abdunnasir thus connects his understanding of police assaulting him with the crackdown and their response to Al-Shabaab terrorism. Therefore, what is of interest here is not directly the ‘crackdown’ itself, but the practices of police. Descriptions of police practices, such as those outlined by Abdunnasir (demanding identification, bribes and assaults), take on a symbolic association with the state in the eyes of Somalis like Abdunnasir, who recognise these dramatized actors of violence as a misplaced state response to Al-Shabaab terrorism. Thus, the practices of the police are representative of the state in Abdunnasir’s story (Gupta, 2006). Moreover, those state practices are dramatized acts of violence are understood as reoccurring in response to Al-Shabaab terrorism.

In essence, the long and detailed story Abdunnasir describes above is one of resistance, attempting to counter those personally witnessed acts of violence. In an effort to counter police brutality, Abdunnasir became a target of violence himself. Yet what manifested from the violence was a distinction and boundary in which he himself, the elderly woman, a ‘friend’ and a Member of Kenyan Parliament were distinguished by ethnicity and citizenship through demanding ‘documentation’ (Barth, 1965; Lazar, 2013). The distinction here between Somali and citizen is made within the context of violence in two dramatized forms, the surrounding Al-Shabaab and police violence met with the personalised story of police assault. The violence penetrates particular bodies through performative acts of violence which ‘enriches’ them with a ‘symbolic charge’ (Feldman, 1991), distinguishing them as ‘non-citizen’ and thus political participation to combat further police violence (Lazar, 2013).

Acts of violence by police in Eastleigh are an ongoing attempt to distinguish those Kenyan citizens residing in the district and of Somali descent as non-citizens. For many that I spoke with and interviewed, even having one’s identity papers tended to be unacceptable for many interactions with police. On various occasions I witnessed first-hand instances of police holding individuals and possibly arresting them. From those I spoke to regarding this, they commonly experienced a form of ethnic profiling due to being Somali. Police used phenotypic features and dress as ethnic/cultural indicators. On most occasions I witnessed a basic exchange of communication with the police and residents of Eastleigh, resulting in them moving on.
However, on occasion people were either escorted or roughly grabbed and forced to a parked police vehicle were they either bribed the police or disappeared into the truck. Once an individual is taken by police, many claimed that violence ensued, particularly in the form of beatings or rape. In this way, the police, actors of the state and a form of state interaction in Eastleigh, are formulating and constructing Somalis, be they Kenyan citizen or refugee. Not only does this enable violence towards them, but violence becomes symbolically charged (Feldman, 1991) with the distinction and boundary (Barth, 1969; Brubaker, 2004) of citizen and non-citizen (Lazar, 2013).

This theme of being distinguished as a non-citizen was common amongst those I spoke to. Saad was one of the first I interviewed at the large meeting I organised with the assistance of Omar on the first of August, 2015. Saad fled Somalia in the early part of the Somalian Civil War, and since then he had been living in Kenya and had gained an accepted refugee status. As a cleric, Saad often preached at the local Mosque directly opposite Omar’s office. However, he had recently started to feel threatened because of his dress and, indirectly, his beliefs. In the interview with Saad, he outlined his experiences of the crackdown:

““I was made a citizen of Kenya in 2010, I am with the alliance of Kenya a fully accepted refugee. Problems started in 2014, I get disturbed by the police they ask me questions and I give them this ID and they do not accept it. I was brought to the Kasarani Stadium, for three days I was arrested. They come to Eastleigh after the attack from Al-Shabaab, and they arrested me and others for this, the Kenyan police. When the attack happens they go for Somali citizens. They come to Eastleigh because of the refugee people. The majority of refugee people from Somalia, that’s why they are coming here and arresting us.”” (Saad, 2015)

Saad has accepted refugee status in Kenya, however police are apparently ignoring it. For Saad this establishes the means to round him up and place him into Kasarani Stadium for three days, due to the practice of not recognising his status. Saad’s understanding of the situation is that he and fellow Somalis are being targeted because of their origins. Being of Somalian citizenship, he feels he is being targeted, abused and imprisoned because of it. Forced into the Kasarani Stadium by police, is within the context of terror attacks associated with Somalis. Moreover, Eastleigh, the site is additionally associated with Somalis, due to in Saad’s understanding because of the large Somali population within the district. Therefore, being Somali conveys an association with the Somalian state and Eastleigh.
Others to who I spoke with felt similar restraints upon their daily lives. Fatma for instance, a University Professor of Somali descent who was not a resident of Eastleigh faced similar accusations as those living in Eastleigh with refugee status. From her relatively comfortable position as a professional, in an air conditioned room in a locally prestigious university, she still faced challenges to her national identity:

“Exactly, refugee, it doesn’t matter. I am more Kenyan than the people who judge me! You know about my nationality and all that. Sometimes it depends, if a police decides you are not a Kenyan he decides. He will take your ID, until you understand what he is saying… The thing is, the refugees, if they are not going to be here forever who are going to blame tomorrow. And also, it’s a knee jerk reaction, its reactionary. So when there is an attack what do you do, you go to Eastleigh and you do a police crackdown. But this is not just in Eastleigh, these people can hide anywhere, it’s not written on their forehead. Also, it’s a way of showing something is being done and it is us vs. them.” (Fatma, 2015)

Fatma expresses how those with Kenyan citizenship, yet Somali, are still prone to being treated like non-citizens. They are in a sense, in her view, treated somewhat the same as refugees regarding the practice of accepting “documents” or “ID’s”. Moreover, alike to the stories described by Abdunnasir and Saad, Fatma’s story alludes to the body practices of the arrest, being instilled upon the “forehead”. She also notes how refugees are accused for issues within the state, pointing to that if they did not exist within the state, then the police would turn to someone else to blame. In this sense, Kenyan Somalis are scapegoated for terror attacks, based on their association with refugees. The main feature of asking for documents, and refusing to accept their legitimacy is an attempt to produce and simultaneously maintain the non-citizen.

What is apparent is the similar social processes that are occurring in the Eastleigh context, as to those that have manifested in Northern Ireland (Feldman, 1991) and the Ivory Coast (Marshall-Fratani, 2013). For Feldman a police arrest is ‘a ritual form for the constitution of power; in turn, one is led to the central role arrest and interrogation play in the performative construction of state power in Northern Ireland’ (p.86). While simultaneously, ‘weaving a new body through language’ (Feldman, p.10), allows the interlocutors to reconstruct the history of the body to differing contexts. In the case of Northern Ireland, allowed political prisoners to reconstruct their body and thus their political agency (Feldman, p.220). In the case of the Ivory Coast, the theoretical relation with this thesis is the ‘rise to a territorialized and ethnicized definition of citizenship and national identity’, distinguishing and verifying those who were ‘authentic’ citizens through acts of violence (Marshall-Fratani, 2013). In the stories of the interlocutors,
illustrated above, those classified as ethnically Somali are constructed and maintained as non-citizens through ritual practices. Within the descriptions and observations of police arrests and detaining, the Somali is distinguished as non-citizen. By refusing their documents they are rendered alien or unauthentic citizen, legitimized with the association of the territorialized Somalian State and the phantom terrorist. The Somalian is distinguished as non-citizen due to their ethnic and territory association with the Somalian State.

The police here are creating a distinction of citizen and non-citizen with their violent and manipulated practices. By ignoring the legality of documents or physical assaults and roundups they create, through performance, an alien other or non-citizen of the Somali. As a result similar experiences are felt by those Somalis who are Kenyan and those who are not, as if there was not a distinction between them being refugee or Kenyan citizen. It appears as a process of maintaining non-citizens, ensuring those in Eastleigh cannot determine political action. However even though on occasion police do recognise documentation of Kenyan citizenship, or accept a bribe, those whom have absolutely no documentation or available economic support have a complete lack of agency in countering these forms of ascription.

To ratify this point, I now turn to two accounts of police practices and violence in Eastleigh. Both stories described originate from the large meeting organised by myself and Omar on the 1st of August. The two interlocutors were refugees of Somali descent and nationality: Ayuub and Nagaado. Ayuub was young male, a recent arrival from Somalia to the Eastleigh district undergoing the refugee process. His lack of identification made him fear encounters with police, which manifested in his detailed description of police activities in the district:

“The main problem here is the police and the government. I don’t have any documentation to live here legally, so I have to hide from them or running from them. You know what has happened here, the police will try to detain you in a way that they want you to bribe them. It has become routine for the police, because they know that you ask them if they want money. They will come on the streets as two or three, they will come in a pickup truck. And it depends, it varies, when they will actually come pick you up you just cannot tell. They come down from the station into Eastleigh to do their routes and stuff like that. They don’t normally come after you, not normally. Unless you do something that they dislike, then they come and get you. But even if they do not come get you, I do feel it’s a threat because if you are being harassed or detained, than that actually is a threat itself. So many times this has happened, I just don’t know how many exact, but so many.”

(Ayuub, 2015)
Ayuub’s account outlined police activities and patrol routes with a sense of fear. His understanding of police tactics displayed a sincere comprehension of their motives to take bribes and generate a sense of threat. Moreover, that sense of fear led him, in my understanding, to learn their tactics, as a means to avoid them. The way in which police were detailed in this discourse was one of threat, fear and a feeling of unease to their presence, with a sole intent to make him feel unwelcome.

Nagaado, a female Somali refugee didn’t want to answer questions. Instead she sat down across the table from me and said “I want to tell you something” and proceeded with the story regarding herself and her sister encounter with police:

“They have detained me before, my sister came after me and bribed them and I came out. But the Kenyan citizens they have actual been fighting me and my sister when we were together, and the Kenyan ran away and we were just walking there, so they just targeted us for being Somali. Since we have been fitting the profile they have been attacking us. They inflicted some wounds on her. The reasons are we were there by accident, I did not know there was a problem. And usually these things happen most of the time, because you cannot be at a place for a long time something has happened prior for you to be actually there. The guy we were fighting with had already left, but see, the cops were on their way to the place we were. So when the cops come they actually attack us, they caught my sister and were threatening and beating her up, because we are refugee.” (Nagaado, 2015)

In the dialogue Nagaado outlines how she and her sister were targeted for being Somali. After leaving the incident, the police accused them for the previous ensuing violence, in her understanding due to her refugee status. It appears, from the stories conveyed above, that the two are conjoined: refugee and Somali. The violence in this case, made Nagaado think that being Somali or refugee was the reason she was attacked. In that sense, she came to the conclusion that the lack of Kenyan citizenship and ethnicity was reaffirmed by acts of violence. Alike to the Ayuub’s situation, his lack of ‘documents’ (Kenyan citizenship) and past experience with police practices instills fear, thus making him feel unaccepted within the Kenyan state.

Simply being non-citizen for those interviewed has become securitized. It is through the act of not having documentation that enables the body to be at risk of violence, which is produced at ‘interfaces’ (Feldman, 1991) of the police work or ‘borders’ (Genova, 2013) of state presence. Thus rendering the individual to become produced as a non-citizen or alien presence within the state (Mandel, 2013). This is made more concrete when the individual is found without documentation, they then go through a ritual of harassment, abuse and bribery as they are already...
distinguished and highlighted as non-citizens. This is in contrast to those Somalis who have citizenship documentation. Violence must be performed to symbolically charge their bodies as alien. Violence is a practice here to give symbolic charge to bodies. That symbolism maintains and constantly constructs boundaries between the citizen and non-citizen.

Documentation, particularly showing documentation, is a form of performance and ritual (Feldman, 1991; Gupta, 2006). On various occasions I was shown two forms of documentations, a copy and the real. In this attempt to mimic the hard copy of a UNHCR certificate, visa or Kenyan Identity Card, the interrogated individual attempted to resist forms of harassment with the police by showing the copy. Acquaintances of Eastleigh had explained how police would take a form of identification and not return it until bribed. Others had noted that if they wanted to accuse you of something, your identification would disappear and you would be incarcerated. Thus in a form of resistance to police harassment, Somali documentation would be copied and shown when requested, in an attempt to mimic the ritual interaction with police and protect one’s recognised status within Kenya. In doing so the showing of ‘documentation’ becomes a performative piece, not only in an attempt to render one non-citizen instilled through violence but additionally as a form of resistance to the construction as alien and undocumented.

Here indicates the police act as a locally recognized form of violence, even those with ‘documentation’ are routinely made to experience police violence. The ‘crackdown’ is expressed as a moment of many dramatized acts of violence, consistently one of many locally recognised or ‘legitimized’ forms of violence (Riches, 1986). Yet the symbolic shrapnel that is produced has strong politicized residue for those that have experienced it, limiting their agency against police actions and practices towards them. This enables the police to enter personal spaces and homes, crossing thresholds of private and public. In turn repetitive dramatized violence enacted by the police result in a layering and enriching of symbols that distinguish boundaries and borders producing the Somali as a non-citizen or alien.

In this case the state entering the private spaces such as the home, is now amended within the Article 62 of the Security (Amendment) Bill: ‘may authorize any member of the Service to obtain any information… enter any place or 48 obtain access to anything; (ii) search for or remove or return, examine… install, maintain or remove anything’ (2014). In practice this enables police to legally enter homes and private spaces with a mere suspicion of activities. This
has enabled the police to enter these spaces and expand the presence and the state boundary within, resulting in a display of state power within the private spaces.

On the same day as meeting Abdunnasir, I was additionally introduced to his friend, fellow law student and Somali Kenyan, Ahmed. Ahmed was polite, well dressed and sincere to his cause of advocacy for Somali rights in Kenya. For most of the time with Abdunnasir and Ahmed, Ahmed was quiet, slightly nervous and tended to scan the surroundings of the café when we met and for the duration of time I was in conversation with Abdunnasir. However at a particular moment, he voiced his concern towards the police ‘crackdown’ of April 2014, detailing in great clarity what had occurred and how he came to understand it:

“So, the operation normally goes on twenty four hours, so at 2am, they will come to your door if they don’t open they will crack it open. So in one of the nights they go around the apartments, we live in one of the apartments, and we know they are coming. There was three of us in a room, it was 2am nobody is lying awake, yeah, we delayed, and we did not even hear them knock. They knocked it a second time, and then they break the door. I was sleeping nobody was awake! Fortunately, it was all men in the apartment, maybe if there was women they would have raped them. So they just come in demand to see our identity cards, and there was nothing. So they tried to find something suspicious anything, like explosive materials. So, thank goodness there is nothing they find and they left. If they find nothing, they try and plant whatever they can. So they just plant something on your table like this, and so you are now one of their suspects. Actually a scholar, they tried to find something at his house and found nothing. So they try and place something on the dining table, but the wife spotted it so she shouted at him. So they were both arrested as both terrorist suspects. So that is how Somalis are discriminated against.” (Ahmed, 2015).

From a mixture of personal account and description of the details regarding Operation Usalama, Ahmed displays an important life event that has shaped his focus and understanding of police actions. By recounting the operation Ahmed is drawn into explaining how police “plant” objects within the home or personal space. Using his own example, then transferring to another regarding a “scholar” or cleric, he describes how these acts by police are almost routine; interlinking the “operation” with “planting”, these acts are made out as almost routine activity of police. The story Ahmed describes, true or not, is still understood as discrimination, yet one which is enforced and displaying an aggressive power over those who are innocent.

On another occasion a similar explanation was made by Dhuuxo, a Somali fully recognised refugee and mother of three. At the meeting organised by Omar and myself on the 1st of August,
she disclosed to me in a clam and heartfelt manner her experiences during the ‘crackdown’ or Operation Uslama:

“When in 2014, when the police came, they come into the houses. They remove us from the house with my children, because I did not have my papers. My neighbours helped by sending money to get me out. They paid the police. They treat other communities better, the police, Somalis they do not treat well.” (Dhuuxo, 2015)

Her experiences of being taken away from her children in the early hours of the morning has resonated in a story in which appeared to have been told many times. Moreover, alike the story described by Ahmed, she too felt Somalis were discriminated against. Aligned with this, both Kenyan Somali or refugee Somali come to describe the same event as a form of mistreatment and discrimination at the hands of the police. In particular to these stories it appears important the site in which this occurs, the home.

What appears in these cases is similar in many respects to Feldman’s ‘counterinsurgency forces is a display of colonizing power and the command of territory; it reclaims a temporality and geography of subversion’ (Feldman, 1991, p. 89), the means in which the state is manifested in spaces and imaginations. State power erupts into the private lives of those described above, their once private spaces are thrust into state authority and expanding its boundaries. This practice of the state by the police force is the localised manifestation of policy, the Security (Amendment) Bill (2014) in this case acts alike to a state ‘representation’ while the practices of the police in those private spaces is the formation of ‘everyday practices’ (Gupta, 2006). These practices by Kenyan police officers has manifested an imagination of the state as a ‘discriminator’ of Somalis by forced entry and removal, yet these violent practices hold additional symbolic meaning.

The forced entry by the police creates an understanding and imagination of the state (Gupta, 2006), and its expansion of its boundaries into private spaces (Feldman, 1991). However, the additional act of “planting” adds a layered symbolic meaning to those private spaces. By “planting” dangerous or suspicious objects police practices become legitimized as necessary for the police, and simultaneously problematic for those who inhabit the space. This problem for the inhabitants is the symbolic quality the “planted” object possess, which appears in Ahmed’s case as polluting and volatile one. Alike to Feldman’s examples of the “stiff” in the context of Northern Ireland, where ‘the brutal killing of a single individual is commensurate in its political and polluting impact’, causing the construction of a surrogate political border (p.77). Thus by
having such an object with the space it additionally encodes those that inhabit the space as possessing a dangerous symbolic quality, a dangerous boundary between themselves and the police, regardless if the police found the object or planted it. By possessing such a quality the bodies of the individuals become charged with the same polluting and volatile symbolism as the object, and thus are removed. Conclusively the ritual act of police entering the home or private space has dual meaning: firstly as a manifestation of state and its boundary; but secondly, as a form of dramatized violence that makes the site and its inhabiting bodies as a volatile pollutant that is deemed removable.

This is additionally true for those without “papers” or “documents” in their homes or private spaces. Without having documentation they become symbolically charged bodies, again rendered as non-citizen and alien presence within the state. Yet this can only occur once the undocumented individual crosses, collides or is forced into a state boundary, for instance at a checkpoint, police patrol or in the example above with Dhuuxo when police enter the home or private space. Violent acts by police such as beatings, raids, rapes, not only create the boundary of the state but maintain it (Gupta, 2006), and within those state spaces the body of the Somali is rendered non-citizen and thus lacking political agency (Lazar, 2013). In epicentres of state power, such as jails and concentration camps, boundaries between police and the Somali are at their most profound.

Bodies which are removed are violently forced into state spaces. Once contained they are prone to brutal acts of violence or forced relocation (regardless of the UN Convention of Refugee which Kenya and the African Union has ratified into law (UN General Assembly, 1951)). In essence the jail and concentration camp is the epicentre of state power, a power which is manifested and intensified most brutally through dramatized violence. Ahmed was one of those victims during the ‘crackdown’ of April 2014; an abuse he came to understand as something which was enacted upon all Somalis of Eastleigh:

“Ok, maybe during the crackdown that happened in Eastleigh in 2014. I live in Eastleigh in section three, so these guys go around, as early as four, obviously looking for anybody. If you don’t have your ID card, you will be packed in and moved to the concentration camp. The gymnasium, for that particular time it was being used as a concentration camp by all the rounded up Somalis, whether you have got citizenship or not, you will be deported there to that camp.” (Ahmed, 2015)
The “ID card” which Ahmed refers to is his Kenyan National Identification Card. The “gymnasium” or “concentration camp” as the Kasarani Stadium was the temporary holding cell for rounded up Somalis during the crackdown. While the “camp” in which Ahmed refers to is the Dadaab refugee camps. Aside from the details of the story, what Ahmed is illustrating is how police violence can disempower the actor. In the case of Ahmed, citizenship is a political tool used by police, to enact violence or control bodies. A similar experience was expressed and detailed by Saad regarding the ‘crackdown’ as a whole:

“I don’t know, but when they attack us some other refugees of Somalia they bring back to Somalia, but for me I was brought to the stadium. They are attacking, because those people that did Westgate are Somalian people, that’s why they think they should return to their homes. I say them, there was a Somali girls inside and they raped them. I did not see them, but when I went to the Somali women they were raped by the police. I feel bad, but you cannot talk you can’t do nothing. If you are in the prison, even if they pity for us… We don’t have any rights, they treat us badly. I am a community Sheik for the local mosque, when they see me wearing this they don’t like it.” (Saad, 2015)

What Saad expressed was a feeling of absolute lack of agency to change or influence his surroundings. He express a feeling powerless to halt the abuses he witnessed. In turn, naturalising, a sense of disempowerment towards police violence. Alike to all the examples and interviews illustrated above, police actions are understood as stripping Somalis, refugee or Kenya, of any sense of political capacity.

During the ‘crackdown’ accusations began to emerge of beatings, rapes, bribes, and many other ‘extreme human rights abuses’, across private and public spaces of Eastleigh (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Approximately four thousand people were arrested, most of whom were of Somali descent and had refugee status in the country (Ombati, 2014). Of those four thousand, around one thousand were brought to Kasarani football stadium, while the rest were brought to police stations to be processed (Ombati, 2014). During the operation many were detained beyond the legal limit, within cells filled far beyond capacity forcing many to defecate and degrade themselves while standing (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Additionally, many refugees were forcefully sent back to refugee camps in the North East of the country (Muhumed, 2014), against UN law to which Kenya has ratified (UN General Assembly, 1951). With a combination of both interlocutor’s stories and reports from Human Rights Watch, it became apparent how police were constructing a feeling of fear and political alienation amongst Somalis of Eastleigh.
Additionally when within state spaces (Feldman, 1991), such as a street patrol or being forced into the Kasarani Stadium, the state maintains the capacity to deduce non-citizenship (Lazar, 2013) and maintain it primarily through displaying and performing acts of locally legitimized acts of dramatized violence (Riches, 1986). The main contrast is the site and its capacity for state power. For instance the ‘epicentre’ (Feldman, 1991) being the jail or concentration camp has far greater capacity to enact violence or forced relocation. This coincides with Feldman’s Northern Irish state context in which ‘arrest and interrogation forces one to read the state not only as an instrumental and rationalized edifice but as a ritual form for the constitution of power; in turn, one is led to the central role arrest and interrogation play in the performative construction of state power’ (1991, p.86). In a similar respect, roundups, crackdowns, beatings, imprisonment and force relocations all serve as performative acts of dramatized violence (Riches, 1986), illustrating the state’s power (Gupta, 2006), boundaries (Barth, 1969) and selected citizens (Lazar, 2013).

Dramatized violence enacted by the police inscribes and maintains a formation of non-citizen. That symbolic distinction of non-citizen and citizen has further implications for those distinguished by that symbolic feature. Once a community is distinguished as a pollutant threat they become more prone to outbursts of scapegoating and harassment (van der Veer, 1996). Not just from the police forces but the general public. In several cases when speaking with refugees or Kenyan Somalis in Eastleigh consistently referred to the outsiders of Eastleigh as “Kenyan Citizens”, never referring to a particular tribe or ethnicity, to which Kikuyus frequently ascribed other groups as, Eastleigh Somalis had a tendency within high frequency to remark on citizenship.⁵ This might have roots in the frame of ascription upon the Somalis of Eastleigh as non-citizens by police. Distinguishing them in such a manner may result dual prescribed boundary between those perceived to have citizenship and those who have not. Regardless of the reasons for the terminology of ascription, the dramatized violence that produces its symbolism through ritual and performance has powerful consequences. In the interview with Nagaado, she expressed a deep need to expand upon this, refusing to answer questions and instead deciding to detail the issues facing Somalis by means of recounting a recent incident:

“Me as a Somali and being in Kenya I have a lot of problems. The main problem that we are facing as a community are the Kenyan police, secondly the citizens of Kenya. Before, when they detainee you, you could bribe them or of you had documentation people would provide those documents they would release

⁵ This may in fact be a result of mistranslation, a fault of the author.
you. But now, you don’t know where they will take you and know will ever see you again. Another thing, something that happened yesterday… I live in section one, two people were killed in that area. Two Somali guys were killed by Kenyan citizens. These people were in a facility they were securing it. They jumped in and cut them to pieces, and there was one guy who was actually a Kenyan, a Maasai, he said they were Al-Shabaab that’s why we are targeting them, even though they were not Al-Shabaab. And they were accusing them you see. When the police actually came, they were supposed to find out the cause of those being killed. But the Kenyan citizens were actually saying that, even if they are being killed, oh all Somalis are Al-Shabaab. It is not a problem for them to be killed. Majority of them they have the same mentality, the Kenyan citizens they have the same mentality. And the government they are not actually intervening and doing anything about it. And if, this actually escalates, it will continue and become a problem for us to survive, for Somalis living in Kenya.” (Nagaado, 2015)

Although this piece is long, I felt it necessary to include the entire story for its personal importance to Nagaado. By initially remarking on how one bribes police or shows documents, Nagaado then moved quickly onto a personal story regarding an event which she personally witnessed and felt emotively responsible to report and disclose to me. She explained how a group of “Maasai” or “Kenyans” brutally butchered some Somalis because of their accused connection with Al-Shabaab. Then she goes onto explain that the “government”, or police, do nothing to intervene. This is a repeated theme for Somalis of Eastleigh. Not only do they describe police not accept Somali “documents”, but they also always remark how they refuse to protect them. This, for Nagaado, displays a total lack of political inclusion of Somalis in Kenya, the reasons being for her, the actions of Al-Shabaab in Kenya and the accusations that emerge from them.

The symbolic layer of terrorist is loaded to those who receive violence in an attempt to construct them as a volatile and pollutant body (Feldman, 1991) that is to be removed from the state. The ideal of the phantom “terrorist” grants an imagined volatile pollutant within the state, while simultaneously accusing particular individuals of terrorism grants legitimate violence towards them. For non-Somalis I spoke with, particularly Kikuyus, terrorism was something from the outside of Kenya brought into Kenya from other places, many referencing Somalia. It is interesting to note here accusations of terrorism have increased in recent years since Kenya’s military involvement in Somali in 2011 (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Thus, accusing one of a terrorist has double symbolic meaning: firstly, indicating the individual is a volatile and pollutant body within the state; and secondly, they are a foreign non-citizen. The act of accusing and/or attacking an individual as a terrorist is an additional form of distinguishing them.
Formulating the foreign terrorist enabled even greater agency and legitimacy to police forces to enact out their conveyed goals of removing Somalis from Eastleigh. When visiting a Somali friend Amiir, he took me to meet some of his family on 10th street. Living in the small two roomed flat on the top floor of a tower block was a Somali family. A mother with her daughter and son, who had the good fortune to be taken in by an elderly woman out of her own charity. They mentioned how hard life is without Kenyan ID’s and the difficulties with the police when using refugee ID cards – like so many others. The mother explained how in 2014 when the police raids were happening, she was picked up and imprisoned for being a ‘terrorist’. She was threatened to be deported until she bribed the police officer. Even issue UNHCR documents are not respected by the police. Even when entering embassies, the security may not accept it at the door. This appeared to me as an endemic theme amongst many Somali refugees. It may appear absurd that a mother of two living under the charity of another has time for terrorism, yet ascribing one as a terrorist through acts of dramatized violence enables greater state power over the ascribed “terrorist” body, in this case forced deportation.

For those enacting dramatized violence upon Somalis in Eastleigh, terrorism or terrorist is an optimal tool for legitimizing their act of violence. Those dramatic acts of violence enacted by Al-Shabaab within Kenya appeared to be met with further violence, resulting in a perpetuation of dramatized violence. On particular occasions in Nairobi Centre, Moi Avenue, groups of young and old political protagonists would gather and discuss current politics, particularly with regards to Kenya and its future. Many felt disgruntled with the current government, particularly regarding economics. On the subject of terrorism however some felt more must be done to keep them out of Kenya. Thus, terrorism, was met with and seen to need a recurrence of dramatized violence. The recurring acts of dramatized violence created a degree of uncertainty; and that ‘uncertainty itself triggers violence’, however ‘brutal actions by no means establish certainty; indeed, they only exacerbate the frustrations of their perpetrators’ (Marshall-Fratani, 2013). Dramatized violent acts as a result of terrorism and towards those believed to be terrorist maintains a constant construction and reshaping of what a terrorist is.

The origins of such terminology in the Kenyan context can be traced to the Kenyan military involvement in Somalia (Thompson, 2015, pp. 285 – 89). After the completion of operation Linda Nchi, Kenyan forces integrated into the general African Union Mission in Somalia in
2012. Since then, Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for many various acts of terrorism across East Africa, in particular Kenya resulting in the deaths of over 600 people since 2012 (Muhummed, 2015; Anderson & McKnight, 2015). This has resulted in the ‘crackdowns’ and acts of violence enacted by police, resembling a syncretism (Comaroff, 1985) of militarised ritual between colonial oppression similar to which the Mau-Mau faced and the coupling with United States style anti-terror policy.

Terrorism has therefore become a term to legitimize oppression in Kenya. Yet to ascribe it, there must already be an existing identity or group frame to relate it to. Since terrorism correlated with the interventions in Somalia, Somali Kenyan and refugees have become symbolically charged as the appropriate fit to accuse for terrorism. As noted once with a friend and political activist Njeri, she noted that “terrorism you get popular support against… if white people got called terrorists, then you could be treated a lot worse”. She went on to explain tribal politics in Kenya and how the current ruling coalition all comes from a related linguistic group. This is therefore difficult for Somalis, as they are isolated in the Eastern and Northern provinces with little political unity and are very underdeveloped. Lastly Njeri noted that Somalis in Eastleigh have become rather wealthy. This has led the middle class to attack them, such as the “Asians” (Gujarati Indian migrants) and the Kikuyus. In a sense, terrorism has become the incriminating framework to repress and alienate communities in Kenya.

Dramatized violence is therefore not solely enacted by police in Eastleigh, the performance and actions of violence within the district has shaped and constructed various symbolic forms upon its inhabitants. “Terrorist” is an additional symbol layered amongst those bodies who are deemed non-citizens, granting them dual meaning, the foreign non-citizen with a volatile and pollutant power (Feldman, 1991). This symbolic quality is consistently being re-shaped, and highly context dependent (Comaroff, 1985). Moreover, the constructed and almost phantom like terrorist is as much a creation of police violence as it is the dramatized acts of violence claimed by terrorism. Yet in turn ascribing one as a terrorist through acts of dramatized violence enables greater state power over the ascribed “terrorist” body. Therefore, the symbol of terrorist is not something concrete, it is a symbolic instrument to discriminate that has been produced through acts of dramatized violence.
The ‘crackdowns’ themselves have been highlighted as an ongoing process of oppression in response to terrorist activities, yet it is an almost recurrent feature that has lasting effects dating back to the colonial era (Thompson, 2015). These ‘crackdowns’ or ‘swaps’ appear to form from a colonial historic structure that have shifted their mobilising force against varying political rivalries. These range from the Mau-Mau rebellion (1952 – 60) (Mugo Gatheru, 2005; 42 – 75), Shifta Wars (1963 – 67) (Thompson, 2015, p. 169), to the roundup of the Mombasa Republican Council (1999). In all three of these cases extreme violence has been used against their members in order to force them to disband and eliminate their political claims. Here I argue, that anti-terrorism has merged with previous methods of oppression against dissent groups within Kenya. This has been enacted by differing governing groups, under the same administrative structures and through similar state practices.

Fatma Ali, a middle aged Kenyan Somali woman and an academic with a keen interest in Somalian affairs in Kenya spoke with me in length regarding the political situation for Eastleigh and Somalis in Kenya. In a large air conditioned cool white room on an upmarket university in Nairobi, Fatma Ali spoke in length regarding the operations of Al-Shabaab and the Kenyan authority’s response. The main theme which I grasped from her understanding of Kenyan security concerns, and the 2014 ‘crackdown’ or in her case ‘swaps were that they were a result of an ongoing historic process:

“So, what I was saying the issues of terrorism, the swaps you say in 2013/14 is not something new, since the refugees came the police came to do swaps for illegal immigrants not because they want to do swaps anywhere, but because of the corruption... But in reality we know it is not, it is Kenyans Al-Shabaab is penetrating through gaps in our society: historical, marginalization, ideological reasons, and economical reasons. It is not just one particular reason… The other approach is the Kenyan government, you can clearly see this, and there is criticism from the public how they do it. The Swaps, this is historical, even if you look at the Shifta wars. This is something that is historic not a new idea, it’s a way of reacting. Like in Wangigi, the police killed all those boys, they would do the same swaps on them… because the colonialists would do something like that for repressing the Mau Mau… I think historical, it comes from Kenyatta. All of these leaders have done that, there is no innovation of something new or something different. You know, the swaps have been with different people, it’s a colonial kind of a system.” (Fatma, 2015)

What is appears from Fatma’s understanding and socialising of the topic, in these cases, is that the ‘crackdown’ or ‘swap’ is not something new. Instead the Kenyan political structure functions in order to oppress and silence various groups within the state, dating back to the colonial period. The actions of the state that will be regarded below are very much a result of historic processes
with colonial roots. Moreover the framed aim of these oppressive measures tends to enforce a distinction of not belonging. In some respects these are oppressive rituals, not so much for provocation, but to engulf the dissident group into the fold and simultaneously make it disappear. These repressive measures to a greater effect ‘eliminate the rival’ (Gaborieau, 1985), than any ritual of provocation. Instead, they seemingly recreate previous cultural structures with global contemporary global formations.

Aligning with Comaroff (1985), the crackdowns appear as syncretic rituals from the descriptions given by interlocutors such as Fatma and Ahmed to the historic accounts on Kenya. However, not as a form of resistance, in Comaroff’s ethnographic case (1985), but as a ritualised mode of oppression and social control. Take for instance the British suppression of the Mau-Mau rebellion (1952 – 1960), the Royal African Rifles were used to roundup ‘suspected’ rebels in Kikuyu from townships and villages, and force them into labour and concentration camps to be processed, tortured and conduct forced labour (Mugo Gatheru, 2005, pp. 138 - 152). The actions of police undertaken in Eastleigh April 2014 in the form of ‘crackdowns’ are a recurring reaction that has developed from the colonial era. This is the structural feature in which the ‘crackdown’ has developed from. The symbolic quality of the police action in those ‘crackdowns’ are of interest here. It is the ritual and the formed symbols of the police violence that mimics historic strategies of colonial Britain while simultaneously formulating their own anti-terror tactic. In turn this ritual is constructing contemporary distinctions and boundaries between those with and without citizenship. The actions of the police should not be taken as simply temporal outbursts determined to a structure, but recognised as the consistency of actions that on occasion accumulates into what seemingly appears as an outburst.

5.1.2 Al-Shabaab Violence

Terrorist attack are highly theatrical and a symbolically powerful affair (Schepers-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004). Al-Shabaab’s attacks have been so powerful in fact that they tend to shape policy and its enactment across Kenya in accordance to the gravity of the violence. It has even assisted in changing and shaping forms of symbolic ascription and syncretised the means of police oppression in Kenya, as mentioned above. Yet its true potency becomes apparent in social terms:

‘Terrorism aims at high levels of demoralisation for limited deployment of tactical resources. By overtly seeking to undermine social cohesion terrorism underlines the true significance of social dimensions in times
of war. Social cohesion is the asset that counts above all others. Terrorism skips the battlefield, and cuts to the societal core – it seeks above all to destroy moral. The true threat posed by terrorism as a tool of war becomes fully apparent only when we pay due regard how it functions in social terms’ (Richards, 2005, p. 17)

Thus, as Richards alludes to, terrorism being understood and addressed from the perspective of the audience (2005, p. 18). That audience in my case was not only the Somalis of Eastleigh, but also Kikuyus.

Terrorism in Kenya has largely been associated with Al-Shabaab. In 2013 the Westgate Mall (BBC, 2015) and the 2015 Garissa University Attack (BBC, 2015) were both claimed by Al-Shabaab. These two examples became, in my case, hyper-symbolic in their conveyed meaning, and their impact on perceptions of terrorism amongst Somalis and Kikuyus of Nairobi. I had arrived approximately three months after the Garissa University attack. Its presence still lingered in general conversation illustrating its political and symbolic potency.

That symbolic potency lingers and occupies the space of a past terrorist attack, alike to the victims of the ‘stiffs’ in the context of Belfast (Feldman, 1991, pp. 77 - 78), the sites of violence exhumed a dangerous and fearful potency. In contrast to the police ‘crackdowns’ or raids, terrorism does not attempt to control people, bodies or ascribe denied citizenship, but instead leaves a fearful presence and symbolic potency. Across Nairobi and other parts of Kenya, securitization of shopping centres and banks has been enforced on a huge scale in response to those Al-Shabaab attacks. It usually comes in the form of police and private security guards stationed outside a bank or shop, some armed with assault rifles and others with metal detectors. According to my interlocutors, the premise of the securitization comes after the Westgate Mall Attack. I had the good fortune to visit Westgate mall with Chichi, who had experience working in middle management in a similar Mall. She explained that it had been opened for two months yet she had no intention to ever visit the place. With my persuasion to see Westgate Mall she changed her mind, and reluctantly brought me. She explained her fear of going there, remarking that “There was bullet holes for so long”.

Upon arrival I found myself entering a heavily guarded building, however after entering it became apparent that this was a large upmarket shopping mall. Instead of the usual hand held metal detectors at most general shopping centres, Westgate had a walkthrough scanner and security cameras. Furthermore, an excessive security presence was felt in contrast to other
shopping centres. Private security was mixed with police, and all personnel were armed with either 9mm pistols or semi-automatic rifles. Some police wore full kevlar armour, somewhat resembling military. Inside the shopping centre only a few shops had reopened, and only a handful of shoppers were within the mall. Even after entering the mall security was still tense. The mall had signs stating that cameras were in operation and not to leave bags unattended. Still, police patrolled the shopping centre, some in uniform and others in civilian clothing holding handheld transceivers. Before entering Chichi noted how she felt, stating “My heart is in my stomach” and later confessing “I might cry” after entering. The securitized presence of the police was an attempt to indicate control and re-capture the space.

The Al-Shabaab’s dramatized violence has had a powerful impact on Nairobi’s populous. The bodies and sites of their victims have had a profound impact far beyond the places in which they were originally orchestrated. The securitization of spaces as a result of Al-Shabaab attacks also resonated in other spaces, even those that had not been effected by the Al-Shabaab attacks yet were deemed worthy of state securitization and symbolic presence. Some of those spaces would receive an excessive securitized presence, for instance at the UNHCR office in Nairobi.

Surrounding the UNHCR office block I found a large brick wall with barbed wire surrounding a tall modern office block fortified with a cohort of private security guards and a few police, most of who were armed with automatic weapons. Buses would arrive with a group of women and children departing it only to be greeted by approximately three to four police officers who escorted them to the front entrance. When I entered I was shown to the side entrance of the compound, gave my passport and reason for visiting to a security personnel and walked through a large metal gate into a small outside room with a walkthrough metal detector. Inside I noticed all non-UN staff was G4S security guards and cleaners, displaying a sense of securitization. This display was made more profound and relevant when Fahmo a Somali refugee, she stated that “The UNHCR has too much security, they fear Muslims that is why they cannot go”. This securitized presence almost appears counterproductive for an agency whose purpose is to assist refugees in gaining legal status in Kenya. Yet many acquaintances, even a few UNHCR staff remarked on the security being necessary due to the risk of Al-Shabaab. Thus, the securitized sites become a produced ‘interface… a spatial construct pre-eminently linked to the performance of violence’ (Feldman, 1991, p. 28). At these spatial interfaces the scanning, guarding and
processing of bodies are a symbolic performance of the power of the Kenyan State over residing phantom symbols of Al-Shabaab’s presence. In essence, Al-Shabaab manifested themselves within the security.

The scanning of bodies at entry points acts as a performance (Feldman, 1991), after which the body is encoded symbolically with either a pollutant or clean. On my return journey to Nairobi airport, I again noticed the symbolic residue of terrorism. Driving up in the taxi we were stopped by a huge police check point, buses, taxis and private vehicles were being also stopped, telling the drivers to go through the check point with their luggage. Passengers were ask to get out and walk to segregated lines for males and females. Each line consisted of a male and female police guard. Each guard quickly performed a security pat down for those walking through, only to get back in the vehicles after the check point. Chichi, who was travelling with me noted that the female security guard “Just let me through and did not even scan me”, while Francis the taxi driver stated “They have scanning equipment but they don’t even use it”. Mari, another close friend said “What stops a terrorist bringing a gun in”. Of course this security check was merely for the grounds of the airport, however it was an illusion of safety. Performing such an action appeared to reaffirming the Kenyan states presence, ‘representation’ (Gupta, 2006) and boundary (Bornstein, 2002), yet its results were merely symbolic. The actions undertaken by members of Al-Shabaab ensured that the conditions of the conflict were to be ‘traced in part to relations of production, the reproduction of antagonism takes place in other spaces and materialities’ (Feldman, 1991, p. 5). In essence, Al-Shabaab’s brutal atrocities in certain spaces had reoccurring symbolic impact in other localities across Nairobi, as it seemingly appeared to have had a tactical intent (Richards, 2005).

The reoccurrence of Al-Shabaab’s presence appeared in other contexts than their origin. Victims of Al-Shabaab also displayed the aftermath of violence within their stories and upon their bodies. Dramatized violence performed in Eastleigh by Al-Shabaab was encoded symbolically upon the bodies of their victims and within the social reality in which they conveyed. The body of the survived victim of an Al-Shabaab attack, be it from an explosion or stabbing, served not only as a remainder of Al-Shabaab’s presence and power, but also a ‘politically charged border’ (Feldman, 1991, p. 77) within the Eastleigh community.
Ayuub stated he was both of a victim of the police and Al-Shabaab. As a recent arrival to Eastleigh, he explained how he fled Somalia after the death of his brother and attempts on his life had been made by Al-Shabaab. Ayuub’s current situation was not a major improvement, as he explained how he still feared Al-Shabaab’s presence in Eastleigh and found gaining refugee status a slow and unrewarding process. Ayuub was shy, thin and nervous, speaking in a soft tone describing a series of the deep and traumatic events:

“My main problem is with Al-Shabaab, knifing me. If I stayed in Somalia, I would be a victim of them. Not only have they threatened me in Mogadishu, but here, they are around us. Even here I feel insecure. They have got the Kenyans themselves, their threat is all over the place… After five months that is the time that I ran away from them, but before that I have actually went through a lot of trouble with them because of my living conditions there are so many issues going around. The main thing, the pain that has been inflicted on me is that I was knifed in the stomach and I have a scare that I can actually show you… They left me for dead, fortunately I survived… They killed my brother, who once worked for the government so we became a target. As if anybody is associated with the government becomes a target. So anybody that is actually surrounding him, also becomes a target because I was involved with the government. Al-Shabaab their main, when they see you are involved with the government then you are not working with them, then you are against them so you are a threat to them. So if anybody that they feel is a threat they will try to eliminate.”

(Ayuub, 2015)

What Ayuub detailed was a story of how and why he had to leave Somalia, yet even after fleeing Somalia for his safety Ayuub he still feared for his life. The knife attack that left him for dead, served not only as a symbolic charge but additionally as a form of political control. The brutal violence illustrated in this case highlights the purpose of the dramatized violence. It is a form of violence that is intended be recognised as a violent act (Riches, 1986), not to be interpreted, but to powerfully indicate an act of aggression with intended symbolic charge. The performed violence here is consistently displayed upon the bodily wound, richly encoded with symbolic meaning detailing the acts intention: social control. That control is enacted through the ensuing paranoia, detailed in Ayuub’s story. Yet the wound itself, appears to serve as a constant and ‘resonating’ (Feldman, 1991, p.128) remainder for Ayuub of Al-Shabaab’s presence and power, which curtailed his agency.

The dramatized violence performed by Al-Shabaab has different symbolic intention towards Eastleigh’s Somalis in comparison to dramatized violence performed by the police. As noted above, police violence has strong symbolic connotations to distinguish Somalis of Eastleigh as non-Kenyan citizens. However, in comparison, Al-Shabaabs dramatized attacks serve to form of
hegemonic social control upon Somalis. By leaving scares on the body, the body becomes symbolically charged with a remainder of the attack, and that remainder symbolically serves to silence those who openly contest Al-Shabaab’s activities. In defying that silence the scare no longer serves to be a personal symbol of oppression, hidden from view and made silent. Instead when made public the mark, scare or wound upon the body of the victim becomes an act of defying Al-Shabaab’s attempts to control.

Idman was an additional case of refusing to give into the social control of Al-Shabaab. As a journalist and blogger in Somalia he wrote articles and segments regarding Somali activities, while denouncing their acts of violence. After death threats in Somalia he explained how he fled to Kenya, only later in Kenya as a refugee he was attacked, and like Ayuub left for dead. Fortunately he recovered and still persists today to counter Al-Shabaab activities within Kenya and Somalia:

“I fear Al-Shabaab more, than the police. They have hit me with a machete once. But the police it is financial, they are going to detainee you just for money. Al-Shabaab, I am more threatened. I came here in 2011, I ran away from them… They used to threaten me over the phone, and they would say I am going to kill you. So I hid out in another region of Kenya, I changed my phone and took another phone. Now I have come back in 2013, but the threat is still there. I don’t know how they do that, but somehow they do it, even in Somalia… If you don’t abandon what you are involved in, like me, then they will keep threaten you and attack you, like they did to me... In 2014, between 2013 and 2014, I spread awareness to the people of who they are and what they are, and what they do, so people don’t want to join them and like that. So one night I was leaving my house and going to another friend’s house two guys actually approached me and hit me with a machete. They did not take anything from me, they did not search me, just left me for dead. People took me to the hospital, they helped me with medication and all that. And then, now they have called me and said that is a warning, next time you won’t survive. If you continue what you are doing we are going to take your life away. I don’t know why they left me alive, just a warning for me… Yes I still go against them, it is for the better… I am motivated you see, because people need to be warned and spread awareness. What they are doing is not something good. The main thing is they kill people innocently, people are sitting in an office like we are sitting here and someone will come in, you don’t know what he has, and he will blow himself up. People who are dead are victims who have never done anything to them. That is the main thing that drives me to spread awareness.” (Idman, 2015)

These forms of harassment were common place and appeared frequently in descriptions of Al-Shabaab activities towards Somalis in Eastleigh. Different from the theatrical Al-Shabaab attacks on sites such as Westgate, these stabbings or beatings were far more common place descriptions of violence for Somalis.
Alike to Idman’s experience, others who spoke out against Al-Shabaab like Yusri felt similar threats and challenges to their life and personal agency. I met Yusri during my large meeting co-organised by Omar. He was tall and stern, wearing a *koofiyad* (embroidered cap), a white shawl and had his wispy goatee died red; entitling him to religious and senior status. Yusri never approached me, like many of the younger Somalis did, nor did he answer questions directly, he changed them to how he wanted to answer them himself. He described how he came to Eastleigh in 1991 and developed a life there. However, since the recent wave of terrorist attacks and police crackdowns, he decided to speak out against Al-Shabaab at the local Mosque. This dislike for Al-Shabaab seemed to stem from an incident where his brother was killed and nephew blinded by an Al-Shabaab attack. Regarding Al-Shabaab violence in Eastleigh, he was quick to the point and outlined his thought to me in relatively detail:

“Yes in different times, I have face violence, I underwent. Bullies and some terrorists, Al-Shabaab, because I make some words against Al-Shabaab. So whenever they find me around, they find me and hit me, some of their militia. Earlier this year in January I had an incident with young boys just picked me. Also on the 22nd of March I reported to the police and in June… about two months ago, it was evening, three men attacked me, people were targeting me… Because in the Mosques I give some speech against Al-Shabaab, and that’s why they are targeting me. Because there is a conflict between me and them, I give the speech in the Mosque here. Preaching peace is the way to make Somalis welcome here. Yes, every people, these are welcome there. And they don’t need any peace preachers so that’s why they attack. So they disturb people, they harass… The Al-Shabaab they want to control me, because they have some supporters if they hear this, you know the speech, they join the peace makers and those who don’t want to… People are divided into two, those who are hateful towards Al-Shabaab and those who co-operate with them. They did action onto me, brutal action and other families. It is good to remember that Islam is a peace, Islam is a world religion, the one who is harass Islam people is just terrible, what they need is against religion. And they say religion is this way, but we say religion is no this way. So two ways.” (Yusri, 2015)

Yusri conveys a story about oppression. Simply put they are an attempt to silence those who speak out against Al-Shabaab. As an anthropologist, it appears those bodies of the survived have become instrumental in creating social awareness of Al-Shabaab’s power, not only through the symbolism embedded in the scare or wound but additionally by forcing the individual into hiding or silence. In doing so, Al-Shabaab attempt to silence Somali opposition and construct a hegemonic view of their activities and ideology. Alternatively, the continued attempt by those to continue to speak out against Al-Shabaab is testament to their resilience. Moreover, it displays
that the tactic of violence - practiced and made dramatized - has failed in these cases, as they continue to be outspoken regardless of Al-Shabaab’s attempts.

The dramatized acts of violence in these cases illustrate the body and space as a politically powered border, be it the site of a terrorist attack or a stabbing of a journalist, the body of the victim and the site in which it was enacted have been charged with agency. That agency is determined and reduced to two forms of response: a silent oppression or outspoken defiance. In not being silenced, that act of violence becomes dramatized, it is legitimized as an act of violence (Riches, 1986). When one speaks out against violence, and deems it a culturally recognised form of violence, then that form of practice becomes a performance. When the testimonies of violence mentioned above have encoded the bodies and sites with rich symbolism, then it is clearly a result of dramatized violence. Simply put, through the performance of the body an understanding of the violence is portrayed (Feldman, 1991, p. 100).

Al-Shabaab dramatized violence has had primarily two main impacts. Firstly, the highly theatrical and symbolic terrorist attacks on Westgate Mall (2013) and Garissa University (2015) have had a profound impact upon those sites, but also other spaces not directly affected, resulting in a re-conquest of the state in those spaces through excessive symbolic securitization. Secondly, physical and interpersonal attacks on Eastleigh residents are framed as an attempt to silence dissident voices. Yet in defying Al-Shabaab and countering their social control and marginalization, victims have made the practice of violence a performance.

Al-Shabaab attacks in Nairobi have a double marginalizing effect upon Somalis. As mentioned in section 5.1.1, police legitimize their use of force against Somalis because of the Al-Shabaab attacks. Yet as illustrated above, Somalis routinely convey a feeling of fear towards Al-Shabaab in Eastleigh. Somalis in Eastleigh have become marginalized victims of both Al-Shabaab and the police. Al-Shabaab commits attacks across Nairobi, in turn police scapegoat the entire Somali population for the attack, maintaining a marginalized group. Coupled with this, Al-Shabaab appear to be additionally committing violent acts towards Somalis. This was noted by Fatma in an interview:

“Yeah, they think Eastleigh is the hub. Not the target. Everything you know, even a member of parliament. Al-Shabaab, they bomb mosques, churches, buses, thankfully not hospitals yet. This is not an ideology. They try to divide people. My conclusion and my personal opinion, I don’t think that the swaps, probably for security people in their mentality, belief and approach is that way” (Fatma, 2015).
Fatma attempts to rationalise both why the police crackdowns (“swaps”) and Al-Shabaab attacks are being legitimized, but understands them as being problematic for the Somali community. From other interlocutors stories described in section 5.1, and from the observations of police aggression and securitization of particular sites, there appears to be a complex array differing groups vying for social control. In essence, there is a social conflict being enacted and practiced by police and Al-Shabaab actors (Richards, 2005). Both appear to be using violence as a social mechanism for social control. While simultaneously, both are legitimizing their violent acts in response to violence occurring in particular sites and spaces. For Kenyan police, it appears to be a result of Al-Shabaab attacks across Kenya. Whereas reportedly, for Al-Shabaab it is a response to Kenyan intervention in Somalia (Thompson, 2015). As a result, both groups help perpetuate the feeling of marginalisation for Somalis in Eastleigh, because of an ongoing conflict for social control.

In conclusion, violent acts illustrated above all constitute dramatized violence, for the reasons that they are locally recognised and legitimized as such by the informants (Riches, 1986). In doing so they render them performative, producing symbolic qualities displayed and encoded within and on bodies and spaces (Feldman, 1991). Furthermore, these acts and performances of violence, from the most minor to grand, all derive from historic processes (Comaroff, 1985), in particular those acts of police violence. The result of those practices of dramatized violence constitute an ascription and maintenance of non-Kenyan citizenship (Lazar, 2013) on Somalis within the Eastleigh district, particularly within the expanded power and boundary of the state (Gupta, 2006). However, through dramatized violence the ascribed “terrorist” is also applied to those of maintained symbolic non-citizenship. Once enacted, the ascription of foreign non-citizen is coupled with the symbolism of volatile and pollutant power within the state (Feldman, 1991). Attributing one as a terrorist through acts of dramatized violence enables greater state power over the “terrorist” body. The terrorist symbol is not something concrete, it is a symbolic instrument to discriminate that which has been produced through acts of dramatized violence. These accusations of “terrorism” have a very real origin, such as the Westgate Mall (2013) and Garissa University (2015) that have had profound impact upon those sites and others not directly involved, precipitating to the state re-conquer them through excessive symbolic securitization. Furthermore Al-Shabaab violence towards Eastleigh residents are an attempt to silent
disagreeing voices. While defying Al-Shabaab’s attempt for hegemonic control, they have made the violent acts dramatized, ensuring they are not silenced.

Primarily apparent from the acts of dramatized violence in Eastleigh is the power to construct and maintain others as not belonging to a politicized group. The boundary of belonging was a cornerstone of the witnessed violent act. That dramatized violence is directly responsible and related to the processes of citizenship in Eastleigh. It constructs and maintains it through interpretative state practices that are legitimized as violent (Riches, 1986). Moreover, it is apparent that structural violence is not directly coinciding with dramatized violence. Therefore, I now turn the focus onto the manifestation of citizenship within the context of Eastleigh, as it is a direct product of dramatized violence.
v. Receipts from police reports
5.2 THE AXIS OF CITIZENSHIP

The intersection between dramatized violence and structural violence in Eastleigh can be noticed with the lens of citizenship. This has derived directly from explorations within the field, the conducted interviews and reflections upon my field diary. Dramatized violence and structural violence have both manifested themselves within the intersections of citizenship. In some respects, the notion of citizenship is a lens in which to observe the ‘shades’ between dramatized and structural violence (Galtung, 1969). In the case of Eastleigh, I argue citizenship can work as an axis that illuminates the interconnections between dramatized and structural violence.

Yet the manifestation of citizenship is not convenient in all respects to understanding structural and dramatized violence, due to its hierarchies of privilege and political engagement. Within those hierarchies of citizenship, political engagement has been ranked according to different scales of oppression: silent and dramatic. The production and maintenance of this scaling citizenship (Genova, 2013) is the result of differing forms and intensities of oppression, marginalization and social control. Oppression is formed as dramatized and structural violence which share common processes in constructing and maintaining differing levels of experienced citizenship within Eastleigh and the surrounding districts. Additional to these hierarchies appear state attempts in creating a framework for which citizenship can be assessed. However an attempt in creating a citizenship regime (Lazar, 2013) has become somewhat superficial, due to state representations countering state practices (Gupta, 2006).

This section will explore the differing experiences of citizenship taken from the fieldwork experience. Starting from those with the most political capacity in regards to their citizenship, and moving down the scale of that capacity of political participation. Initiating with the experience of a Kikuyu as a control parameter, then moving down Somali Kenyans and eventually ending with the experiences of Somali refugees in Eastleigh. In doing so, I intend to explore the varying political strata that exists within Nairobi and which manifested themselves in the form of citizenship and non-citizenship or those with political agency and without.

5.2.1 Citizenship in Nairobi

Citizenship in Nairobi is in constant play, being reformed, maintained and constructed. However, this is highly dependent on varying factors, the most notably being who is in political control. Kenyan politics is highly ethnically charged (Makinda, 1996), and has its roots in its colonial
heritage and early independence (Mugo Gatheru, 2005). The Moi regime (1978 – 2002), primarily a party dominated by the Kalenjin ethnic group, maintained varying positions of power and privilege for those of Kalenjin ethnicity and loyal to the regime (Makinda, 1996). With the introduction of the multi-party system in 1991, ethnic based violence and political privilege has not ceased in Kenya, as illustrated in the post-election violence in 2007 (Klopp, 2001).

The tribal and ethnic divisions characterizing Kenya’s political structure explain the various levels of citizenship in Nairobi. To illustrate the varying strata of citizenship I ‘take an Aristotelian position and agree that citizenship is participation in government, in taking decisions that affect our lives, then the citizen’s position regarding a range of governing entities becomes crucial in an assessment of the quality of his or her citizenship under a political regime’ (Lazar, 2013, p. 5). To support my argument I draw not only upon the experiences of Somalis from Eastleigh, but also Kikuyus, in order to complement the idea that citizenship is a practice rather than a normative given or exception within all states.

One particular experience highlights this point, when travelling with Chichi, a Kikuyu friend, to Westlands district police station to collect her new Kenyan ID card. The police station, a rather large one story building painted green surrounded by a large metal gate and fence decorated in the Kenyan national colours, it was a formidable sight. Within the grounds were large storage containers, military grade vehicles and small tin octangular huts for the servicemen and women. Police patrolled the area, fully clothed in camouflaged uniforms wielding automatic assault rifles, some even wearing full kevlar. I asked Chichi about the small tin octangular huts, she noted that the police “look after their own”, hinting towards the tribal division that exists within the Kenyan police.

The waiting area was on the grounds of the police station, mostly outside some windows which had desks and filing cabinets within. After some time waiting without anyone appearing at the desk, Chichi turned to me and said “I guess they are out to lunch, which can last as long as they want”. So we left ourselves and returned later to discover that it was not ready. When asked a relevant question regarding when the card could be expected, the officer seemed disconcerted and replied “I don’t know”. Chichi explained the difficulty of life without an ID card, even for a Kikuyu. For instance, getting into certain government buildings, paying with phone payments (M-Pesa) to banking. The most important reason to have an ID is if you are stopped by police, as
they can arrest you or demand a bribe even if you have the proper documentation stating that your card is in process. Chichi explained how she had been stopped on several occasions, and instead showed her supplement ID paper that was accepted on every occasion. Even though the police were incompetent in bureaucratic affairs and obviously had ethnic bias of their own, the comparative treatment of Chichi was reasonable in comparison to the treatment of Kenyan Somalis I had met.

For example, when speaking with Fatma, as noted previously above; a relatively affluent women with a precarious situation regarding her ethnicity. According to her understanding, being Somali meant she was automatically associated with terrorism in the eyes of the police: “Exactly, refugee, it doesn’t matter. I am more Kenyan than the people who judge me! You know about my nationality and all that. Sometimes it depends, if a police decides you are not a Kenyan he decides. He will take your ID, until you understand what he is saying!” (Fatma, 2015) As a result, although Fatma may describe herself as having a lack of political agency when dealing with police, indicated in her claim of Kenyan Citizenship. However, important to note, Fatma had been granted audience to one of the receptions of Obama’s visits in Nairobi. A rare privilege, and one which only comes with some influence. Therefore, her claim to Kenyan Citizenship is dependable on context. Be it observing one of Obama’s speeches or her story of police officer ignoring documentation. Thus ratifying the notion that citizenship, being political participation, very much depends on the circumstances of that participation and quality of it (Lazar, 2013). Regardless she expressed frustration towards the practices of the police who disregard her claim.

Taking a comparative look at the two examples, the first from a Kikuyu Kenyan and the second a Somali Kenyan, there is an appearance of contrast in experiences with police. Both have issues regarding their ID, yet the distances in grievances are far more apparent with the Somali. There is self-recognition of Kenyan citizenship, but that citizenship is not fully accepted in practice. In accordance, it is apparent that citizenship is in effect a ‘complex bundle of practices constituting political membership…’ that has ‘dual or even multiple nature of people’s citizenship in practice highlights cultural aspects of political belonging and denaturalizes the automatic equation of citizenship with the nation-state of residence’ (Lazar, 2013, p. 13). Citizenship in Nairobi is something practiced, and those practices can illustrate the varying scales of political belonging.
When I interviewed Abdunnasir and Ahmed the first time on Moi Avenue, it was not apparent to me the significance of being Kenyan Somali. For them, being citizens of Kenya held great importance, especially since they were law students and understood the legal aspects of their citizenship claims. Only after meeting refugees and grasping police activities as a whole did the significance of citizenship emerge:

“I am a Kenyan I was born here, my forefathers were Kenyan; so when you tell me I am a not a Kenyan and you want to chase me out of this country this is just cheap politics to side line us as a community. Like with Dadaab, the international law, all the treaties, article two of the constitution recognises international treaties. So when they say they will shut down the camps, this is just political rhetoric. For you to return refugees to their country, you must follow the according laws signed by the UNHCR, the Kenyan and Somali government. So it is not within the law that they will return back the refugees, it is just a political thing to get support from the Kenyan people. So it was very bad light for the President. You know there is no distinction between the Kenyan Somalis and the refugees as we all look alike. Yes it made us come together, as we say the government is trying to attack us regardless of you are a refugee or a Kenyan citizen.” (Abdunnasir, 2015)

What Abdunnasir is connecting is the Kenyan constitution, which recognises international laws towards the free movement of refugees, and the actions of police and politicians in blatantly ignoring these legal obligations.

For Abdunnasir, that disconnection between law and practice is in his understanding making no distinction between Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees. Due to this recognition of the law, Somalis have created interesting practices to adapt to this legal recognition. As Ahmed demonstrated with his card:

“Just to prove what you say, I don’t even carry my identity card in my wallet. Because whatever I am doing, regardless if I have done any crime or anything, my resemblance is a crime. So to be on the safe side I don’t even have the time to open my wallet and show my identity card, so I place it somewhere like this. That is the greatest part of our marginalisation, maybe our discrimination. We are potential criminals, terrorists; all sorts of crimes are associated with us. So that is first of all how Kenyan governments, so that is their perception regarding Somalis.” (Ahmed, 2015)

Ahmed outlines a strategy to improve his political agency when dealing with police. Doing so requires a degree of ‘cultural knowledge’ in countering police threats and attempts to marginalise people (Gupta, 2012). In essence, by knowing the legal frameworks of Kenyan law, Ahmed has armed himself with a capacity to counter police efforts to ascribe him as non-citizen and reducing his political participation in that context.
The actions enacted by police are an attempt to make Ahmed and Abdunnasir feel as if they are lesser citizens of Kenya, usually through means of dramatized violence. Thus making citizenship in Eastleigh a play of strategies of exclusion or inclusion between police and Somali, who adapt their cultural knowledge and political agency regarding context. However, when a Kenyan Somali is ascribed as a non-citizen (with the possible additional ascription of “terrorist”, as noted in section 5.1.1), the Somali Kenyan is below in the scale of ‘citizen’ in comparison to a Kikuyu Kenyan. Thus reducing their political agency and participation in that interaction, and forcing them to rely on ‘cultural knowledge’ to ‘navigate’ the situation (Gupta, 2012), such as photocopying an ID. This form of ascription and maintenance of Kenyan Somali non-citizen is not just the result of top down formation by political scapegoating for Al-Shabaab attacks (Human Rights Watch, 2013), but a coupling with bottom up approaches as indicated with the dramatized violence enacted by police (Wittman, 2013).

Bodily attributions characterised with phenotypic features were common place in Eastleigh. As the examples above claim, it is the phenotypic features that distinguish one as a Somali. Citizenship in Eastleigh, and other parts of Nairobi is therefore a form of ‘forced inscription of ethnos’ upon the body (Mandel, 2013). This indicates to citizenship’s performative quality in ascribing and maintaining one as a symbolic non-citizen. In making the non-citizen identifiable by particular attributes and maintained through ritualized acts of dramatized violence, the non-citizen loses their political agency. In essence, by noticing someone as Somali they can be harassed through acts of violence, in turn maintaining them as a lesser or non-citizen.

The lesser or non-citizens are generally associated with peoples or bodies crossing borders. For the Kenyan Somalis this is also the case. They are ascribed and maintained as non-citizens through acts of dramatized violence in an attempt to associate them with Somali refugees. With near identical ethnic and religious roots, Somali Kenyans and Somalian refugees are almost vaguely similar without documentation. Kenyan Somalis have become associated by police practices as non-citizens, alike to Somali refugees, a consequence of state oppression and social control coupled with transnationalism. Transnationalism and ‘globalisation...’ are ‘usefully understood as a definable network of relations among spatially located entities, allowing for some processes that tend toward multilocality or even truly global coverage’ (Heyman & Campbell, 2009). This is apparent with refugees, whose existence within the state acts as the
‘archetypal non-citizen’ (Lazar, 2013, p. 15) is practiced across localities and states. Although Kenyan Somalis are associated with Somalian refugees, they are in effect in a strata above refugees, and in particular the undocumented refugees.

Abdul was a Somali with refugee status in the United States of America. Before leaving for the United States he had lived in Eastleigh. Abdul spoke with a North American accent and was impeccably well dressed. During my time in Eastleigh I had met Abdul on several occasions, and on every occasion he came across relaxed and content. The first time we met was at the meeting arranged by Omar and myself, and the second time when we arranged to meet, talk and have lunch together. In a small Ethiopian restaurant on 5th street in Eastleigh, he described his feelings of what it is to be a refugee in the district:

“The majority of Somalis have refugee status here, but some don’t I understand that. They have the right to question people, to distinguish you is a good guy and who is a bad guy. Because we all look alike, you may go out there together and you see somebody, you may think this person is a good person but hey he may have an affiliation with a terrorist organization or a terrorist himself. Because there has been attacks here several times. This is really bad for some Somalis, because they are making them look bad. Once a Somali does something that will fall back on you because this guy is a Somali. This is a type of specific mentality that Africans have, if one ethnic group does something then it falls on all of them. Because once you do that, you know, some of them are good and some are bad, you know… you can’t put them collectively and put them in one, and say all these people are bad. This is how politics works here in Africa, and especially in Kenya. So… that is the main thing. You try and provide some document and even though they know your document is legit, they want to find a way to say hey there is something wrong with it. That is Africa it won’t go away overnight.” (Abdul, 2015)

Abdul explained in great length the issues faced by Somalis in Eastleigh. Although in a comfortable position now, this was not always the case. In his understanding of citizenship in Eastleigh, he came to see Somalis as being classified as one generic group. Yet for that distinction between refugee and Kenyan citizen is very dependent upon the individual police officer, and understanding of the legal and cultural protocols and practices. Having documentation is not an insurance of political agency when dealing with police, rather it grants a small yet irregular degree of agency depending on how it is used.

A similar sense of understanding towards documentation and agency was referred to by Idman: “The reason, the main one, is because even though they know you are different from them, even people living here there are so many Kenyans. Even so, they just want to make sure you have a
documentation and if you have documentation or don’t have the documentation from the UN this still won’t help you because they will make money out of you, they want you to bribe them that’s all.” (Idman, 2015) Although Idman had refugee status in Kenya, he did not feel totally secure from police abuse. This is derived from how he refers to documents, particularly from the UN having little capacity to deter police from demanding bribes. In essence, the UN document indicates one is a refugee, thus their very legal status becomes significant in limiting their political participation. As a result, forcing Idman to feel marginalised and outline how one turns to his ‘cultural knowledge’ of ‘state practices’ (Gupta, 2006, 2012).

Somalian refugees are therefore distinguished as the ‘archetypal non-citizen’ (Lazar, 2013, p.15). This is a result of the physical border between Kenya and Somalia. The border is symbolically meant to encase the Somalian Civil War. That war has now crossed the border and appeared in forms of Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks across the country. The Somalian refugee is associated with that border spill over, a dangerous pollutant within the state. In comparison, the Somalian Kenyan is associated with the Somalian refugee, but not the war in Somalia.

Physical realities contribute to the construction (Barth, 1969) and production (Genova, 2013) of the Somalian refugee as a dangerous ‘other’ in the state. The association of Kenyan Somali and Somali refugee is due to the ‘rise to a territorialized and ethnicized definition of citizenship and national identity’ (Marshall-Fratani, 2013). This is crystallised of groups (Brubaker, 2004) or layers of citizenship, has been enacted through dramatized acts of violence such as ‘intimidation and harassment’ of the ‘undocumented’ (Genova, 2013, p.322). Documentation has become a defining feature between the Kenyan Somali and the Somali refugee. Although Kenyan Somalis may feel as if they are treated as non-citizens, lacking a degree of political participation, the Somali refugee feeling of being a non-citizen is reinforced by their very legal status.

The Somali refugee experience of state oppression appears to be more potent than that of the Kenyan Somali. Regardless of both experiencing state oppression and dramatized violence, the distinguishing feature of having Kenyan identification, which is commonly ignored by police, is still an object that grants political agency over that of any UN document. It appears the Somali refugee is equated to a low strata of non-citizen, constructed by a legal status and maintained by police oppression and marginalisation. They are in essence the quintessential non-citizen within Eastleigh and in large Nairobi. Citizenship, being political participation, has been identified here
in three hierarchical layers: firstly and most prominent, ethnically and fully accepted citizens with Kenyan citizenship and documentation; secondly and within the intermediate level, ethnically ascribed lessor or non-citizens but with Kenyan citizenship and documentation; and finally in the lowest levels, non-citizens with ethnic descent with refugee status or without documentation.

These layers have been distinguished through acts of dramatized violence. That dramatized violence is committed by means of performative acts of ascribing and maintaining symbolic potency upon their bodies in order to reduce their political agency and participation. Within those layers, differing scales of oppression and silent violence emerges.

5.2.2 Citizenship Regime
A citizenship regime is a ‘legal, bureaucratic, ideological and material frameworks that condition practices of and about government and participation in politics’ (Lazar, 2013, p. 10). It is a means of attributing and encouraging attributes and ideas to a population in an attempt to encourage a desired citizen. In other words, it is a set of parameters the state alludes to, giving benefit to those who can comply with those citizen ideals (Benei, 2013). Arguably, the dramatized violence practiced by police has not constructed a citizenship regime in Eastleigh for Somalis, giving the indication that the Kenyan government is distancing itself from Somalis in the district at large.

During my interview with Nagaado, she expressed a feeling of not being welcomed in Kenya. This was coupled with her experiences with Kenyan police as noted above. Yet from within that conversation lay the emotive feeling that the Kenyan government was marginalizing Somalis:

“The only thing is, the Kenyan government was supposed to facilitate what is transpiring between Somalis and the actual citizens of Kenya. If the government was actually involved to spread awareness that they are no threat to them just human beings just like them, like they are here for a reason and try and bring communities together. Instead of continue what they are doing right now. The main reason they do this is Al-Shabaab because Al-Shabaab are the ones causing the problems in Kenya. We are not a part of Al-Shabaab! So the Kenyan government was supposed to realize that, as not being a man being Al-Shabaab… But they don’t understand that, they take us collectively. Like being one being a threat to the Kenyan government, but another being the problem.” (Nagaado, 2015)

What Nagaado illustrates is a disillusion with the Kenyan government’s attempt to integrate Somalis. In her understanding they have not encouraged the process, instead have been
counterproductive in accepting Somalis to have political participation and engage with internal Kenyan affairs.

The interview above illustrates the lack of government interaction with Somali Kenyans in Eastleigh to construct a profound ‘citizenship regime’ (Lazar, 2013). The police actions are in fact not producing a citizenship regime, but instead, constructing and maintaining Somali Kenyans as lesser or non-citizens (Genova, 2013). The construction of a citizenship regime by police practices is not apparent in this study. However, ‘representations’ of the state (Gupta, 2006) that attempt to make ‘citizenship regimes’ (Lazar, 2013) are abundant.

Television and social media are excellent mediums displaying state ‘representations’ (Gupta, 2006). These state representations came in the form of lavish television spectacles that ranged from: terrorism; to Obama’s visit; and corruption. For example, one advert included President Uhuru who spoke on national television stating that corruption is a ‘personal matter which we all must fight’. Regarding terrorism an advert from the ‘BRAVE’ movement attempted to ‘promoting religious tolerance’ by having Muslims in different places of work say “This is my Jihad” while they did tasks such as office work, preaching to flipping donuts. Additionally, another advert called for a ‘Fatwa on terrorism’, which was followed by various verses of the Quran telling Muslims to support their ‘law enforcement’. These varying adverts, even though only witnessed by a relatively wealthier proportion of the Kenyan population, did have interesting aspects into what an ideal citizen should be. The states notion of a good Muslim citizen is one that does not pay bribes, works, dislikes terrorism while is supportive of the police. This almost counterintuitive citizenship regime represented by the Kenyan state was absent in everyday practices. This was noted in an interview with Fatma Ali:

“You have seen the advertisement in the news, my Jihad is working. The concept of Jihad is different. Those kind of things are so ignorant. The women and the youth are key in this process, especially the youth who have returned, because the process of recruiting is different. Al-Shabaab looks like they have penetrated our system, but it does not look like we have penetrated theirs. These swaps bring negativity towards the security forces, their approach. Human rights, Hawala’s, businessmen were targeted. Every Muslim is seen as a terrorist.” (Fatma, 2015)

It is apparent that the Kenyan Government is attempting to outreach to sectors of Somali, and large Muslim communities. Yet government sponsored adds are far from enough to create an ideal citizen. There is no consistent framework for a citizenship regime for Kenyan Somalis.
Instead dramatized violence by police forces have distinguished Somali communities as lesser or non-citizens. Moreover, these forms of lesser or non-citizen do appear in to have varying strata and layers (within particular contexts). They are not distinguished by forms of government sponsored frameworks but sever dramatized acts of police violence.

In distinguishing others by boundaries and hierarchical levels, a formation of differing citizens have emerged across Nairobi. Regardless of state attempts to construct a representation of an ideal citizen (Benei, 2013), it has been through means of practice and production that the Somali lesser or non-citizen has emerged (Marshall-Fratani, 2013). As indicated above, the notion of non-citizen is still distinct between the Somali Kenyan and the Somali refugee due to the refugee legal status. Yet the strata layer between Somali refugees and Somali Kenyans is still a combined result of dramatized violence enacted by police and the legal status. Between these hierarchical layers and levels of citizen, lesser citizen and non-citizen refugees appear different symbolic attributes. For lesser and non-citizens that symbolism has been ascribed and maintained through dramatized violence. As a result, contrasting symbolism enables different types of silent violence to occur. For those with documentation, they possess means of agency to make violence against them dramatized and recognisable. However those within lower levels of perceived non-citizenship, such as refugees, possess less political agency and cultural capital to resist deeper oppression and marginalization. In a sense ‘the shrinkage of the space of political enactment corresponds to the expansion of the acting subject’ (Feldman, 1991, p. 10). In contrast to the Northern Ireland context, Eastleigh’s the shrinkage of political enactment corresponds to the production of non-citizenship. In sum: violence enacted on refugees is rarely dramatized due to their marginalised situation, making it a silent and structural feature of life.

From the observations and interviews illustrated above, having a recognised citizenship in Eastleigh and the larger area of Nairobi is distinguished by acts of dramatized violence. Dramatized violence has manifested itself in many forms in Eastleigh yet a recurring theme of witness accounts is the demand of documentation and consequential unacceptance of it. A personal assault or violent act by Kenyan police inflicted upon a Somali in Eastleigh, is rendered dramatized by the social recognition of the local inhabitants (Riches, 1986). In doing so, the police not only distinguish the Somali as a non-citizen (Lazar, 2013), but in most occasions demand a bribe. Demanding a bribe makes the Somali exploited by the police, a consequence of
structural violence. This is the axis or intersection between dramatized and structural violence. The consequences of dramatized violence, constructing the Somali as lesser or non-citizen, enables and exacerbates structural violence towards Somalis.

‘The situation is aggravated further if the persons low on income are also low in education, low on health, and low on power - as is frequently the case because these rank dimensions tend to be heavily correlated due to the way they are tied together in the social structure… Violence with a clear subject-object relation is manifest because it is visible as action. It corresponds to our ideas of what drama is, and it is personal… Violence without this relation is structural, built into structure’ (Galtung, 1969).

Distinguishing one as lesser or non-citizen through dramatized violence disconnects them from political agency (Lazar, 2013). Without political agency or political participation makes one low on power. Deprived of any form of power or representation, one is unable to protect themselves from structural violence. This is the ongoing process of violence in Eastleigh and the surrounding regions of Nairobi (Richards, 2005).
vi. Taking bribes on Waiyaki Way
5.3 **Structural Violence**

Eastleigh was a consequential site of two forms of violence, dramatized and structural. As outlined above, dramatized violence appeared highly performative and was easily recognisable within the stories of the interlocutors and ethnographic observation. This was made possible by the locally recognised act of violence that manifested themselves within the stories (Riches, 1986). However, to recognise structural violence was a far more enduring task. It meant delving and probing the stories of interlocutors, while simultaneously observing the differences of spaces, not so much for their cultural quality, but their contrasts with modernised and franchised infrastructure. It is a different kind of observation that is required at times, and depending on the context, the etic to probe the emic (Cerwonka & Malkki, 2008).

Structural violence may appear in the same instances as dramatized violence. At times structural violence may appear inseparable from dramatized violence. This may be a result of their intersecting features, which can be taken apart with careful analysis of ethnographic detail. For instance, the first time I had met Khadiija with Omar, she showed me around Eastleigh. While walking I asked her about the police crackdown in 2014 and of police violence in Eastleigh. She responded by explaining to me her experiences when arrested in 2014 during the police raids in Eastleigh. She noted in her experiences how she was mistreated by police and physically forced into Kasarani Stadium. Then she quickly changed subject to life in Eastleigh, how Somalis had started up many businesses while pointing to the surrounding buildings saying “See these, this is all Somalian”. Asking her about life for Somalis in Kenya, she compared it to Kenyans stating “We have many problems, but they have no problems”, yet without resentment, merely as an understanding of life in Eastleigh. At that moment I asked her again about Kasarani, and she opened up stating how she had been kept on the floor of the stadium, without any food, water, a bed or place to sleep for four days. In my understanding, this lacked the recognition of violence. It had been rendered structural, by reducing the interlocutors as powerless during crackdown (Galtung, 1969) and simultaneously by her not recognising it as a form of violence (Riches, 1986). The imprisonment of Khadiija for four days was structural violence.

Akin to Farmer (2004), I take my encompassing understanding of structural violence to manifest themselves from the ethnographic examples given. In that sense, these testimonies and observations, lay the theoretical foundation for understanding structural violence. From those
examples given below, I will illustrate how dramatized violence and structural violence differentiate and intersect. Moreover, I will outline how theoretical notions of dramatized and structural violence derive from the local context. To highlight this I will present structural violence in two forms in Eastleigh, as corruption and inequality.

5.3.1 Corruption: “Wacha ya macho”

When paying a bribe, police would say “Wacha ya macho.” In Swahili this means, “For us to turn away you have to pay us”. Bribes were strikingly common place across Nairobi. From the stories detailed to me from my informants, to my own observations and personal experiences, paying bribes either to police or civil servant was a common occurrence. They were, from my informants understanding, an institutional feature of governance in Kenya. The issue of corruption in Kenya has gone beyond state borders, and has the attention of governance based NGO’s. As Kubania has noted in Kenyan national news outlet, the Daily Nation, the low ranking grade in the corruption index is due to the government doing little to tackle the root causes of corruption, such as the tribal and political hierarchy which supports its continuation (2016). Though corruption and bribes are not seen as an act of violence locally, due to its non-physical enactment, it is still exploitative of certain sectors of Nairobi society. However, I argue corruption has some features of structural violence, depending on who it is being enacted upon. These features become forms of structural violence when it curtails one’s agency (Farmer, 2004) enough to produce lasting economic and social inequality (Galtung, 1969). In order to illustrate how giving and receiving bribes are an aspect of structural violence in Nairobi, I will outline two points relating to method and theory. Firstly, by outlining some examples taken from my field work, through means of participant observation and interviews. Then secondly, move onto explain how corruption, manifested itself in the form of bribes, is structural violence that has appeared in the axis of citizenship (Farmer, 2004; Gupta, 2012).

I saw bribes being given nearly every day. Either by entering or leaving greater Nairobi or the district of Eastleigh. It was by traveling on a matatu (mini bus), that the drivers would pay police at set up checkpoints. When driving to a location across the Kenyan capital, the main form of transport I would use was the matatu. A small mini bus, extravagantly decorated with the images of rappers such as Tupac and Snoop Dog, or political figures such as Uhuru Kenyatta, Gadhafi, Obama to stencils of Adolf Hitler. Inside the matatu was space for twelve seats, including the
driver. Due to the need for additional economic income, this number tended to surpassed twenty. On board, I came to expect blaring loud music ranging from rap to reggae, but also, I came to expect to see the driver give a bribe to the police.

From the vantage point of the back or front seat, one of the few positions where my legs could fit, I could observe the short hand practices of matatu drivers, police and the whole economic cultural practice of giving a bribe. From speaking with the drivers, fellow passengers or friends such as Kaki, Chichi, Mary and Iko, I was able to develop a whole understanding of the matatu economic and social organisation. Beginning at the head of the organisation usually in their 40’s to 50’s is the owner, who monitors various matatus with pen and paper, issuing pay and additional income for bribes. Then comes the driver and conductor, who physically deal with the matatu and its on-board economics, collecting on board payment, to giving change and bribes. Next are the bystanders, individuals who roam the matatu stops shouting the various destinations, they tend to be young and intoxicated on Khat. And lastly, the police are an aspect of the matatu social and economic organisation. Parking their vehicle on the side of the road they pull over matatus, speak with the driver, while another walks around the vehicle waiting for the other officer to be slipped 200 shillings (approximately two euro) by the driver. I have witnessed this on many occasions, sometimes on board and others as a road side bystander. According to Iko, it ensures that you will not spend a night in jail and pay an even larger fine as the “cops will find something” as they want their “lunch money”.

In my understanding, this act of giving a bribe required a degree of ‘cultural knowledge’ (Gupta, 2012) to be enacted adequately. While in the understanding of my friends and interlocutors, the bribe has to be given, or as Mary notes “they will find something wrong” with the vehicle. A driver once explained the intention of the road block enacted by police is to ensure the matatus or other passenger vehicles are road safe and licensed. In reality they tend to enable police to collect bribes. Moreover, from my observations, the routines of giving a bribe illustrated its accepted presence. Never did a driver in my presence ever disagree with a police officer, nor was an example or story ever told to me of such an incident occurring. In my understanding, this police practice has become institutional and locally accepted as a perceived fact of life or custom. The reason for it being enforced was very much present in interviewee’s testimonies.
Drivers and friends explained that you would rather pay 200 shillings than spend a night in jail or worse, even bribe a judge. The fear of repression ensures the custom continued.

On one occasion I had the opportunity to experience an act of bribery first-hand. Early into my fieldwork, while still staying with Kaki, on the same day I was meeting Abdunnasir and Ahmed, I had a particular incursion with a police officer. Walking with Kaki to get food, I was stopped by a police officer who said “Hey, he is talking to you” and he gestures to an older officer. The older officer, who I presumed to be in command asks for my passport and visa, which I did not have, then checks my driver licence and other materials I had on me. These did not satisfy him. Kaki attempted to defuse the situation, stating “He is staying with me”, this did not work either and we started walking towards the police station. There was approximately 8 individuals meagrely surrounding us in a skirmish formation. They were fully clothed in military uniform wielding assault rifles in their mid to late twenties. As Kaki explained I may have to spend a night in a jail cell, maybe “get slapped around”. Fortunately, Kaki later explained she might be able to get me out with 1000 shillings, which I pass to her discreetly and with haste. She returns a second time after speaking with the officer in charge and asks for another 1000, then as we leave Moi avenue, away from the security cameras, she said quickly “sit”. I follow orders and sit on a bus stop, the police walk past, and I am left, watching Kaki walk briefly and exchange money with the police. Kaki returns after paying the bribe, stating “They said they were hungry too”.

There is a tremendous amount of fear in interacting with police. The fear of being “slapped around”, or made to pay more money to a judge in the aftermath of not paying a bribe. What appeared was that corruption was an endemic issue within Kenya. As many explained, not only from my Kikuyu informants, but also Somalis, is that even if you refuse to pay a bribe and are sent to court, the judge might also demand a bribe or deal you a harsher sentence. This was apparent not only in the legal and policing systems but within other state institutions. When visiting a friend of Kaki’s, Chairty a mother in a modest apartment in Nairobi, explained how she had been exempt paying bribes in the past. She explained that when you have family members in the police, things can be a lot easier for you when particular issues arise. For example when she was caught in the back of a truck by police and they demanded money, she mentioned her family member in the police and she was let off. Additionally, she explained that when she was
collecting her son Jason’s birth certificate, the Nairobi county clerk demanded a bribe of 2500 shillings (approximately 25 euros). She refused to pay, and the clerk apparently replied that it will only cost more on a later date. Only after bringing a relative with an association to The National Alliance party did the clerk give the birth certificate, free of charge.

Having kin, ethnic or political affiliations, as in the case of Charity illustrates, has enhanced her political agency and cultural capital in the wake of corruption (Gupta, 2012). For those who do not possess such cultural capital, they become subdued to corruption and possibly the effect of structural violence. For many Somalis, their constructed lack of citizenship (Lazar, 2013) enacted through state practices (Gupta, 2006) that manifested themselves in the form of dramatized violence (Riches, 1986), has produced a decrease in political agency and cultural capital to combat such corruption. The lack of political agency and cultural capital has made them a consistent target of corruption and as a result demands for bribes from police.

For many of my informants from Eastleigh, they understood police demands for bribes as a form of discrimination and stereotyping of Somalis within the district. Abdunnasir described the Somali community as powerless to the ‘crackdown’ of 2014: “The main issue is for them to crackdown on the Somali community is to get that money from them. If you are robbed and you don’t have the right documentation at the police station, they never go through the right proceeds of the law.” (Abdunnasir, 2015). Being a law student and an advocate, Abdunnasir spoke with a fierce passion regarding the issue. He described various instances when Somalis were powerless to the demands of police for money. Moreover, Abdunnasir noted the main reason for feeling powerless is a lack of understanding of Kenyan law and legal proceedings. This was repeated by many informants who felt they were being hoaxed by police into paying a bribe. As a consequence, those informants did not possess the ‘cultural capital’ to combat those corrupt state practices enacted by police (Gupta, 2012).

Combating corrupt practices required various cultural strategies in order to inhibit police from extracting money. This was illustrated by the Somali with refugee status in the United States, Abdul. Abdul encouraged me on various occasions to “Photocopy your passport, don’t let them take it off you”. He described how police would take your documentation, and not give it back until you bribed them. As a result he carried with him a copy, and recounted how he would interact with police if they asked for his identification. This was explained in an interview:
“Even if you have the refugee status, the police it may not even work for you, because hey it’s just a piece of paper. It has become normal for the refugees they know once if they get arrested, to not have that hassle they would rather bribe the police. For you to call a UN representative to come and bail you out, it’s a long process and it will take a while. They don’t want to go through that hassle, and just bribe… But I wouldn’t bring my actual ID with me, I would bring a copy like the one I have here. See, they will take it off you and say that they never say it, until you bribe them. And if you disagree, oh no, it’s two or three against you.”

In the Ethiopian restaurant we were dining in, he illustrated clearly to me how Somali refugees do not have the capacity to combat this form of corruption. Instead they rather give bribes, than face the consequences. It is not the ‘act of corruption that has to be learnt’ in order to gain the best benefit of the state (Gupta, 2012, p.75), but in the Kenyan context it is a strategy to combat corruption. Although to combat corruption one still must deploy a degree of ‘cultural capital’ within a discursive terrain to succeed (Gupta, 2012). As a result of having a “photocopy”, Abdul did not experience corruption, and therefore did not undergo structural violence.

Accounts of bribes were a major aspect of my fieldwork in Eastleigh. They intersected with other aspects of people’s lives in a multitude of ways and forms. The most apparent was citizenship (Lazar, 2013). Not having citizenship in Eastleigh, made one highly prone to corruption. The most prone to police violence and demand for a bribe were those without any form of identification or cultural capital to combat it (Gupta, 2012). This was explained to me by Ayuub, the young Somali male who had no form of identification or refugee status in Kenya. As a new comer to Eastleigh, he expressed a great deal of confusion about the district, in particular who to trust. Moreover, while waiting for the process of receiving refugee status to be completed, Ayuub had explained how he feared encountering a police officer for fear of violence and demand for a bribe (as additionally noted in section 5.1.1). This was due to his total lack of documentation, understanding of the local area and adequate financial support to pay a bribe. In this case, Ayuub’s experience is very much a result of the structural features of a slow refugee process coupled with an alienating and corrupt practices by the police force. Ayuub was experiencing structural violence, as a result of his legal status (Lazar, 2013), lack of cultural capital for his new surroundings (Gupta, 2012) and financial circumstances.

For others, even with documentation, this was not always a safeguard from police demanding bribes. By ignoring a Somali’s documents the police not only could grant themselves an
additional source of income, but maintain the distinction of Somalis as lesser or non-citizens in Kenya. As noted when I spoke with Idman regarding the issue of police bribes:

“It has become a routine for me being arrested most of the time not having any status as a refugee. I do have refugee status but the police don’t value it. They are used to being bribed, it has become a routine for them to be bribed, regardless. This is how they get their money. They have a mentality, you know a mentality… to think that Somalis are wealthy and they have the money. This is something I have heard, and something I have come to know. Even if the person being detained or arrested does not have any money, then Somalis are connected ethically.” (Idman, 2015)

Within discourses like this, the notion of ethnicity makes Somalis are made distinguishable. Yet it is that very process of distinguishing Somalis, through acts of violence noted above that enables them to be exploited. That exploitable feature (Bornstein, 2002), as apparent non-citizens (Lazar, 2013) is a result of the ongoing dramatized violence (Riches, 1986).

What enables police to take bribes on such a scale in Eastleigh is the Somalis exploitability. Somalis as distinguished and constructed as another group (Brubaker, 2004), featured within the site of Eastleigh, are distinguished according to their connotations to the Somalian state, terrorism and large population of Somali refugees in Kenya. Through violent ‘crackdowns’ and practices the police attempt to play themselves as fighting terrorism. In fact, what appears is a distinction of Eastleigh as a symbolic site of residing pollutants (Feldman, 1991). As Abdunnasir described the crackdown: “You find they are all there to do arbitrary arrests, so there is nothing serious about the security, it is just for money” (2015). This distinction through dramatized violence, has enabled police to super-exploit (Bornstein, 2002) Somalis for bribes. This has been additionally noted by Galtung, stating that ‘the violence committed by the police is personal by our definition, yet they are called into action by expectations deeply rooted in the structure - there is no need to assume an intervening variable of intention. They simply do their job.’ (Galtung, 1969). Thus, police violence, from beating to bribes upon those without or lesser citizenship, are an intersection of dramatized and structural violence.

Not paying bribes, although no actual detail of an example was given, appeared in the discourse of the interlocutors as highly problematic and dangerous affair. Many of my interlocutors, Kikuyu and Somalis, could described how not paying a bribe underwent. One in particular stood out. When speaking with Abdul, another law student and advocate for Somalis rights, he described it as: “If you don’t bribe, things will be worse for you. Because you will go through the
system and going through the system is worse than bribing them. Because it is not hospitable, and to bail yourself out is expensive, because here with them it’s cheaper. It may be 100,000 to get out of the system… They will go to jail or go through the system, which is even worse than that little amount of the little amount. If you went to a jail, you would stay there for three days sitting on millions of urine, you urinate just there.” (Abdul, 2015) Therefore, within the discourses of my informants, the actual thought of not paying a bribe made the issue far more inconceivable. Not paying a bribe would result, in my informants understanding, a greater loss of agency than paying an initial bribe. Even when one pays a bribe, they lose a degree of their financial income, the price of not paying out ways the cost of the initial bribe. However, taken from the local understanding, when one does not possess the economic power, political agency or cultural capital to deal with a bribe, then one is likely to have their agency heavily curtailed (Farmer, 2004) by imprisonment. This may go to explain Ayuub’s description of hiding from police.

The practice of demanding and giving bribes encompasses here an understanding of corruption in Eastleigh, and other sections of Nairobi. From my own observations, participations, and encompassing data from the interviews, it becomes apparent the exploitative feature of bribes and in general corruption has in Nairobi and in particular Eastleigh. Akin to scales of citizenship (Lazar, 2013), exploitation has similar degrees of scales resulting from harsher experiences of bribes. Considering the Kikuyu experiences mentioned at the onset, for instance the experiences of Charity in comparison to the documented or undocumented Somalian refugee such as Idman and Ayuub, a pattern appears.

Those who have possess practiced citizenship, in particular Kikuyus, such as Charity, have political agency (Farmer, 2004) and the cultural capital (Gupta, 2012) to counter the extreme consequences of corruption. Somalis with documentation, are practiced as lesser citizens by police by means of dramatized violence (Riches, 1986), such as Abdunnasir, Ahmed or Abdul. They have less political agency and cultural capital to combat corruption. Although their experience of bribes is more of an inconvenience than a feature of structural violence, as it does not curtail their agency (Farmer, 2004). In comparison to those Somalis without any documentation, who are super-exploited by police (Bornstein, 2002), such as Ayuub, they lack a modicum of political agency or cultural capital to combat this form of corruption. Therefore,
structural violence as a result of corruption is not universal in Eastleigh. Instead structural violence only appears as a result of corruption when one already lacks social agency and economic power, thus making consequences corruption more severe, as with the case of Ayuub. Thus, within these layers of citizenship, are greater degrees of exploitation in accordance to the political agency and cultural capital of the individual. As a result, structural violence is experienced in scales according to degree in which one experiences citizenship. Galtung rightfully notes, ‘the general formula behind structural violence is inequality, above all in the distribution of power’ (1975, p. 75). That distribution of power also appears to correlate with the distribution of political participation and citizenship (lazar, 2013).

5.3.2 Tangible Inequality: Conditions in Eastleigh and the Refugee Process

The corruption enacted by police was however not left without scrutiny by my informants. Some of them felt a degree of remorse and sympathy for the police. When speaking with Abdul, the Somalian refugee with refugee status in the United States of America, he understood police corruption as something inherently Africa, a result of tribal politics and the poverty faced by the police officers themselves. “Actually, if you are a cop and you are underpaid, you know, for someone who has a family it’s very difficult for him, he doesn’t have any other option to, accept a bribe” (Abdul, 2015). Police demanding bribes, was in Abdul’s understanding a result of their own poverty. In a sense their situation was recognisable for many I had spoken with, encouraging me to make the link between the circulatory processes of structural violence.

Inequality of power, resources and wealth force Kenyan police to prey upon others. Yet when they demand bribes from the weakest strata of society, they are prone to perpetuate the gross inequalities they experience. Police are just one of many sets of actors who enact and receive structural violence. Within the Eastleigh context however, that frame of inequality is most understandable in the lack of social welfare for Somalis, and in particular Somali refugees.

Regarding police taking bribes, many of my interlocutors, Somalis and Kikuyu, all alluded to the link between rising inflation and the lack of wage changes as a result of bribes demanded by police. For instance, Charity, who had a relative in the police force hinted at the connection between inflation and bribes: “they have to, the government gives them nothing more now”. The inflation in Kenya has slowly risen from 4 percent in 2010, 5.42 percent in January 2011, to 15.6 percent in March 2012. Coupled with a weakening economic growth rate, from a GDP of 7
percent in 2006 and 2007 to steady decline to 3.5 percent in 2011 (KNBS, 2012). Somalis, hinted at this also, not just regarding the police, but also Al-Shabaab. This was explained by Idman when he was detailing how he understood why Somali youth join Al-Shabaab: “Just you know, most people come here as a refugee and things get worse, they don’t have job, they don’t have money, that is actually causing them to be a part of Al-Shabaab” (Idman, 2015). Although Idman was mainly campaigning against Al-Shabaab activities on his blog, he still understood the reason for Somalis to join Al-Shabaab was for economic reasons. Therefore, it may appear police and terrorist organisations have the same organisational issues: financial security.

In Eastleigh, and the broader Nairobi context, corrupt activities such as bribes to Al-Shabaab membership was linked to poverty. Poverty or the lack of resources (Galtung, 1975) was almost built into the stories, as an explanation for many issues faced by different communities. For residents of Eastleigh, refugees and Kenyan nationals, the main issues for the district was the lack resources placed into social welfare and infrastructure. Even though in 2003 the Kenyan government provided basic health care and free primarily school education (UNHCR, 2012). The lack of funding into these institutions, has left them inadequate to deal with the demands of the growing population of Eastleigh (UNHCR, 2012).

To grasp the scale of the ongoing structural violence in Eastleigh, I will observe these stories from the framework of citizenship (Farmer, 2004; Lazar, 2013), in particular the stories of refugees due to their near total lack of political participation. It became apparent that the connection between state institutions lack of resources and the lack of personal finance were duel issues for refugees. When state institutions like clinics and schools were overstretched, refugees of Eastleigh did not have the capacity to afford private services. It appeared a lack of resources was systemic. For instance, Khadiija, a female student, yet suffering under the uncertainty of refugee status and lack of financial support to carry on her studies. With the encouragement and support from Omar she had supported me in my initial days in Eastleigh, working as a guide in the district. She explained that she wanted to study, yet found Eastleigh “too hot”, meaning uncomfortable. As she later detailed her dream of going to Europe, going somewhere “safe” and studying languages especially English. She consistently expressed her dislike for Kenya, but not Kenyans themselves, more the experience of being a refugee in the country. In my
understanding, this is due to her inability to control her future, a feeling of disconnection limiting her potential agency.

Similar issues regarding limited agency and education were recurrent. When meeting with Absir, another Somali who had refugee status in South Africa, he took me to visit some of his family in Eastleigh. Absir, who I first met during the large meeting on the 1st of August, had met with me privately after the meeting to ask for my “facebook”, after which he insisted I meet his cousin Iqra. Iqra was a mother of five, living in a modest apartment building on 6th street temporarily given to her by another family member. She explained issues with school fees and bribing police had become a major burden upon her: “I was arrested with my children I have five children, three here with me in Kenya, we caught me and later brought to a police station. So the children of me, they didn’t beat but they arrested us in the Police station. It makes me a lot of trouble, I had to give them money to get out of the police station… The children, they do not go to school they just stay at home. I have no way to pay for them to go to school, I have no money to send them, only to feed and that is given by friends… I ask the United Nation to give me money for school fees. And they keep sending me to different offices.” (Iqra, 2015) For Iqra, having issues with the police demanding bribes, not being able to afford schooling and food for her children, forces her to ask for support from family and the UNHCR. Between the Kenyan police and the UNHCR, it appears that it is not the institutions themselves that are the issue, it is the inherent structure (Galtung, 1975, p. 175).

Structural violence is very much manifest in the examples of those with constrained agency. Farmer rightfully notes that those forces which constrain agency, such as inadequate health care, are made structural by the inability to treat curable diseases (2004). Lacking health care and support for treatable health issues were common place in Eastleigh. During an outing with Khadiija, we stopped to have tea and meet with some of her friends. All of whom were female, wearing beautiful Jilbāb’s, jewellery and decorated henna upon their hands. We spoke for some time, taking time out of the sun, when suddenly Khadiija began shaking her friend Sindiyaa. Sindiyaa appeared to have suddenly fainted, her head draped over the chair with eyes shut. While shaking her, Khadiija said to me “she has heart problem”, while nervously laughing. After some moment Sindiyaa awoke, seeming rather confused and disorientated. Explaining the situation later to another friend studying medicine, they suggested it was likely to have been cardiac
arrhythmias, where the rhythm of the heart is irregular and can cause a lack of oxygen to the brain (Miller & Keane, 1983). A relatively treatable condition in Europe, however without treatment can become deadly. Unfortunately for Sindiya, it appeared her condition was likely to become serious.

Health concerns were common place amongst many of those I met in Eastleigh, most were small and easily treatable ailments were usually dealt with accordingly. However, the more complicated or costly procedures tended to be life threatening. In these cases, it was not the lack of health facilities for serious treatment, many Somalis, Kenyan nationals and refugees, could use the larger hospitals in Nairobi, it was instead the lack of financial capital to pay for the treatment and the encompassing sanitation. As noted in section 3.3, most health issues in Eastleigh are a result of bad sanitation resulting from inferior infrastructure (UNHCR, 2012).

There is an encompassing issue here for those residing in Eastleigh, combining features that appear structural, such as a lack of clinics, financial support to pay for health care, and a lack of proper sanitation infrastructure in place. The sanitation, a primary root cause of most the health care issues in Eastleigh (UNHCR, 2012). For a district to have five storied malls and hotels, it had an unprecedented issue with sewage. The sewage had a tendency to overflow and spill onto the streets and roads, forming thick layers between the cobbles when it rained. This issue, from my observations had manifested itself into the various pulmonary problems many of my informants reported. Thus, the lack of health care and cause of health issues was incremental to the structural violence (Farmer, 2004) in Eastleigh.

It became increasingly noticeable the scale to in which Eastleigh refugees suffered from treatable health issues, rendering an almost loss of agency in an attempt to pay for bills (Galtung, 1969; Farmer, 2004). One very poignant example of this was regarding Xanaan, a mother and a refugee. Khadiija introduced me to her one afternoon after visiting Omar’s office. Xanaan was sitting with in a shaded alleyway, talking with a relative quietly. After being introduced, seated and offered tea, Khadiija quickly explained that Xanaan was looking for someone to help her. In particular going to the UNHCR office and asking on Xanaan’s behalf for financial support for her hospitalised son. As I understood, I was asked firstly, because, I had told Khadiija previously that I had arranged a meeting with a staff member there; second, as later explained rather bluntly by Khadiija, “You are mzungi (white), we trust you will get what is needed.” And third, Xanaan
did not have the social or economic capacity to make the trip herself. Khadiija ushered Xanaan to show me a video on her phone, to which Khadiija quickly explained was Xanaan’s son in hospital. The video showed a small boy in agonising pain. He lay still on a hospital bed with tubes protruding from his bloated stomach moving unknown fluids from it. It was a harrowing sight, making the ethnographic experience almost trivial in comparison. Raising my head from the video, I could see the tears swollen up within Xanaan’s eyes. Her motherly compassion only wanted to secure a future for her son in a new country. After playing the video, Xanaan gave me a slip of photocopied paper on it read the price of the treatment, 250,000 Kenyan shillings (approximately over 2500 euros). With that it read the health issue of her son, ‘multiple holes’ of gastrointestinal perforation. Gastrointestinal perforation is a complete penetration of the intestinal wall, and the symptom of the swollen stomach was the onset of bacterial infection, a life threatening condition (Miller & Keane, 1983). The ability to treat the illness therefore lay with a response from the UNHCR.

When visiting the UNHCR, apart from the excessive security as mentioned in section 5.1.2, I additionally found it proceedings in communications and administration to be inadequate to cope with the surplus of refugees in the country. This was alluded to me by Omar when I visited his office prior to visiting the UNHCR. Omar’s main task was assisting and preparing refugees for the refugee process with the UNHCR. On one occasion, while I was observing Omar deal with a client, he turned to me and said “We never give them absolute hope”. Later I asked him what he meant, to which he explained that the process can go on for a very long time, months to a year, and on some occasions the UNHCR has lost vast quantities of documents belonging to hopeful refugees. This was made real with my own experiences. In an attempt to ask questions to the UNHCR staff on behalf of the refugees I had spoken with, I had arranged several meetings with members of staff, such as Immanuel and Caroline. Both cancelled. Immanuel understandably due to illness (however only informed me when called from outside his office), although Caroline had no explanation. Moreover, when I finally got a phone interview with an unknown officer, they came across arrogant and less than helpful. They merely stated that due to the development of the Kenyan Department for Refugee Affairs (DRA), the DRA is gradually taking over governmental responsibilities for refugees from the UNHCR. The only outcome was passing the UNHCR staff personal contact details onto Xanaan and other refugees.
Regardless of the change, all my refugee informants still referred to the UNHCR as the main source to receive status or economic support through the process. For instance, Fahmo, one older lady I had met with Khadiija explained that when visiting the UNHCR she had fainted, only to be carried out by guards and told to make another appointment. She complained about the great lengths one has to go through in order to get an appointment and the waiting period afterwards. Since then she has received no assistance for her heart problem or gained an additional meeting with the UNHCR. Her health issue was ignored, and allocated appointment forgotten. It appeared relevant to note, that this was the failing of the UNHCR. Moreover, no matter the institution, DRA or UNHCR, the same issues for refugees will continuously reoccur. This is a result of structures maintaining inequality, not a matter of changing institutions, if those structures encouraging inequality cannot be addressed then the same silent violence will continue (Galtung, 1969; 1975).

Although institutions such as the UNHCR were in place, refugees were experiencing forms of structural violence. Within the framework of citizenship (Farmer, 2004; Lazar, 2013), it became apparent that structural violence manifested itself in aspects such as poverty, education and health, all of which were major constraints upon these refugees lives. Yet one major constraint was the refugee process itself, many interlocutors expressed a great deal of stress as a result of the process. Take for example Yusuf, a middle aged Somali refugee who spoke to me on the 1st of August, during the meeting arranged by Omar. Yusuf outlined his experience of the refugee process: “Yes very slow… So now I am still on the waiting list for the RCK, they told me they will submit it, but they still have not submitted my case! My case is being conducted by four different officers, so there was one who started with my case and she has left the office. The second and third also left, but the third one cried - ‘Why are you still here’ - she was asking such questions. The fourth one was last week nearly completed, however that one is also leaving, so my case has experienced different stages.” (Yusuf, 2015) What Yusuf is explaining is the change over from the UNHCR to the DRA. Yet, within the maze of bureaucracy he has been left within a highly fragile position. Without refugee status he becomes prone to, as noted above, dramatized violence (Riches, 1986) and structural violence (Galtung, 1969; 1975; Farmer, 2004) as a result of his ‘undocumented’ status (Genova, 2013, p.322), rendering him, the ‘archetypal non-citizen’ (Lazar, 2013, p.15) thus distancing him from political participation.
By observing from the axis of citizenship, structural violence and dramatized violence are manifesting themselves together within the experiences and stories of refugees in Eastleigh. Ismahaan’s story resonates this, and brings to light the intersecting of the duel forms of violence, that ‘shades onto the other’ (Galtung, 1969). Ismahaan was a female Somali refugee, well educated, who spoke English fluently because of her once relatively affluent status in Somali. As she explained: “My father and mother was killed by Al-Shabaab, I fled here last week. My father was working for the government of Somalia, they both died in Mogadishu. I have been here since 2011, and I have gotten in trouble with the police of Kenya since I do not have any ID, they can slap or hit you. It is hard, I have no appointment to stay here, even the documents I am holding I must go to Dabaab and other places. I cannot stay here. There was a time they were asking for money. If I go to Somalia I am scared for Al-Shabaab and if I am here I am scared of the police. I was sick so I had to leave my job and now I am staying at home, resting and still not better, I am not married, I am looking for someone to help with my life.” (Ismahaan, 2015)

She recognises the police actions as dramatized violence by legitimizing them contextually as a form of violence (Riches, 1986), since they will “slap or hit”, but this is understood by Ismahaan by her not having an “ID”. Thus, she is rendered as a symbolically distinguished non-citizen by the act of violence (Feldman, 1991; Marshall-Fratani, 2013). Yet additionally, from her understanding, not having an “ID” makes her prone to structural violence, such as police bribes making her ‘exploited’ (Bornstein, 2002). Additionally, due to her sickness she has become house bound, constraining her agency further (Galtung, 1969; Farmer, 2004). Therefore, here the ‘shade’ of structural and dramatized violence has disappeared, and through the lens of citizenship, they are interacting. Police dramatized violence has become a process of maintaining one, in this case Ismahaan, as the total lower strata of non-citizen. In that strata, she is prone to further violence, structural violence, which constrains her agency.

Dramatized and structural violence intersect at points, within the context of Nairobi, in particular Eastleigh, that intersection has been found within citizenship. That intersection however comes with a great poignancy, as additionally noted by again by Ayuud: “My refugee status, it is not going at all. It makes life difficult, hard to do anything. I have tried, many times to get status, but I haven’t succeeded. Because I don’t have any documentation, I am here by myself, undocumented that is the reason why I am targeted to the police. They will hit you, ask for money. I don’t have document and every time I don’t have money the police will arrest me,
because I cannot bail myself out. It is hard, since I came here recently, so I do not know my way around.” (Ayuub, 2015) The dramatized act of violence (Riches, 1986), by hitting and being arrested, is met with a corrupt and structurally violent act (Galtung, 1969) of demanding a bribe. This is a display of two forms of theoretical violence happening within the same case. They are both manifest themselves in this case because they intersect (Bourgois, 2004) at the axis of citizenship (Lazar, 2013). The poignant remainder here, within Ayuub’s story, is the potency of all forms of violence to constrain agency and construct differences.

That constraint upon their lives has manifest itself with the very securitization of the UNHCR. The spaces which have become symbolically charged as a result of terrorist attacks, can impede and constrain the lives of the individuals associated with it. This became clear when speaking with Hanad, an elderly Somali refugee. Hanad explained that his wife had been shot when fleeing Somalia, only to get treatment in Kenya and “now has a magnet in her leg”. However when trying to enter the UNHCR, she cannot pass the metal detector, to which Hanad declared: “I have even the document from the hospital to show that it is metal. That operation it was helped by the United Nation… The security at the UN is the problem. But there is too much people there, they give them the document and they don’t do anything.” (Hanad, 2015) With the securitized site becoming a produced ‘interface… a spatial construct pre-eminently linked to the performance of violence’ (Feldman, 1991, p. 28). At spatial interfaces where scanning is conducted, the scanning and searching of bodies is a symbolic performance of the power by the Kenyan State over residing phantom like presence of Al-Shabaab. Instead the reality is a form of structural violence, which has again constrained the agency (Farmer, 2004) of Hanad. The highly dramatized act of violence enacted by Al-Shabaab within Nairobi, has in turn resulted in excessive symbolic securitization of spaces. That securitization in turn produces structural violence, by not only inhibiting Hanad and his wife’s entry, but stopping her from gaining entry into the UNHCR building. Dramatized violence can produce structural violence.

Galtung was correct in stating: ‘One could now proceed by saying that even if one type of violence does not presuppose the manifest presence of the other, neither synchronically, nor diachronically, there is nevertheless the possibility that manifest structural violence presupposes latent personal violence. When the structure is threatened, those who benefit from structural violence, above all those who are at the top, will try to preserve the status quo so well geared to
protect their interests’ (Galtung, 1969). Structural violence and dramatized violence, are apparently co-dependent on one another in particular contexts. They seemingly produce and interact with one another, yet only within particular frames.

Observing the interaction of structural violence and dramatized violence has only become possible due to the ethnographic exercise. By means of ethnographic investigation the data has revealed aspects of violence and illustrate how they are locally understood and accepted by the interlocutors. Ethnographic detail can pick up on the meticulous features, such as citizenship, and explore it as a framework which intersects structural and dramatized violence. From it the local context become relevant, and recognisable in regards to differing and encompassing processes. Allowing for comparison with other historic and cultural contexts, coupled with comparisons of different ethnographic and theoretical texts (Sanjek, 1996, pp. 193 - 196). What is illuminated in the case of conflict and violence, is ‘how people make war and peace’ (Richards, 2005, p. 13), not the ‘triggers’ of violence but the social processes maintaining the practices of violence (Feldman, 1991, p. 10; Richards, 2005, p.12). Thus, I argue, it is not just within the frame of citizenship that structural violence and dramatized violence appear in the case of Eastleigh, but observing the frame of citizenship from the vantage point of the ethnographic gaze.
vii. Turning the subject on the Anthropologist, photograph by Shiko
5.4 VIOLENCE OF THE ANTHROPOLOGIST

In reflective solace, structural violence, is an aspect of the ethnographic work enacted here by the anthropologists. As alluded to in section 2, my field work was at times perceived to be some sort of aid or refugee work, on the behalf of an NGO or the UNHCR. Thus, I found it important to end the analysis, with a description into how the anthropologist can also be a feature of violence within the ethnographic work. The intention of leaving this section to the end is to represent the discovery within the field work, and to bring solemn attention to violent practices of the anthropologist. In doing so, I intend to illustrate how the anthropologist contributes to structural violence.

It was first hinted to me when visiting Omar’s office. On one occasion, as I was sitting on a bench directly outside Omar’s office an unknown refugee came to me as I was taking notes. He initially asked what I was doing in Eastleigh, a question I had become well acquainted with. After the general formalities he posed a question to me, to which I had little to a rather limited response, “What are you going to do for us?” and “What will you do for the Somalis in Eastleigh?” At first, I took the question lightly, only for it to later manifest itself in other contexts. For instance, on the 1st of August, during the jointly organised meeting between Omar and myself, the questions remerged. This time I had formulated a reasonable excuse for myself, I offered to take their information, such as UNHCR number and complaints to the UNHCR. However, at every interview, I made sure to inform the participants that I was first and foremost conducting research. In doing so I felt secure in what I was doing was ethical and worthwhile. Only when my series of meetings with staff from the UNHCR fail to manifest themselves did I begin to find other alternatives to this moral complication. I began giving those I spoke with the personal contact details of the UNHCR staff and forward their information and complaints onto Omar. Again, I reassured myself, that the work I was conducting was ethical, and I was “helping”.

This came to be an ‘existential shock’ (Nordstrom & Robben, 1995, p. 13) during one of my final interviews in Eastleigh, with a close and dear friend Abdul. In an abstract from our last meeting, he detailed how the confusion of me being an ‘aid’ worker came about:

“For you, you are doing research. It is a process you have to go through in order to achieve your degree. For them, they don’t know that. The only thing they know, they see a white man, and it’s easier to get closer to either Europe or America. But majority of them don’t understand that. See the problem is you have to
educate them. You see, Omar was the one who was facilitating, and Khadiija, they didn’t actually inform them what the reason you were here. And I am sure if they had informed them, you would have never seen them. To be honest, I am being honest with you… that is a fact. Even though I knew, I never told you afterwards and I found out the purpose you were here. I never informed them. You see if I had done that, it would have been unfair to you because…” (Abdul, 2015).

A phone call interrupted the conversation, but I had received an understanding and gravity of the situation. The organised meeting, which I had claimed allowed me to gain such access to the Somali community of Eastleigh in such detail was a result of misinterpretation of an opening address. I had explained to Omar my intentions, and Omar explained to the participants of the meeting those intentions in Somalis. However, Omar’s explanation did not clarify my position as a researcher, and instead opened up my being in Eastleigh to interpretation. Therefore, in an etic standpoint, I had become a feature of the structural violence I had come to understand and criticise.

I enacted structural violence, because of my position. Coming from Europe and being white, I was perceived as a means of getting refugee status. My blatant ignorance coupled with my lack of local language, has in this case produced me as a feature of structural violence. For many of my informants gave personal stories regarding the violence and social problems they faced every day, with the hope of receiving a better future for themselves and their loved ones. Instead I stole their stories, in an unfair exchange, as Abdul put it because they were not fully informed. In my own defence, this discovery only came at the end of my research and with every interview I conducted I explained my true intentions was to conduct research. Yet without Omar’s full explanation of this, I don’t know to what extent this was fully understood. Thus, I was a feature of structural violence due to the perception of me, I had become associated with the failings and the lateness of the UNHCR. Recognised as an mzungu and therefore associated with white landowners and aid workers, in sum a feature of the disproportionate wealth in Kenya. Moreover, being European, I had become a facet of the global failings to do deal with humanitarian crises and inequalities. The manifestation of my field work represented to my informants, was not a locally constituted form of violence (Riches, 1986), but the ‘grey’ (Schepers-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004) and constant violence (Galtung, 1969; 1975) which encompassed the lives of my informants (Feldman, 1991) and constrains their agency (Farmer, 2004). In sum, I failed my informants, and only within this piece I hope to redeem myself.
Other anthropologists have come across similar moral difficulties in regards to being an aspect of the violence they intended to study. Rodger outlines how from changing his research focus from Nicaraguan social organisation technics in profound economic crisis to Nicaraguan gang violence (2007). This shift of focus came about as a result of the violence itself, which penetrated everyday life in barrio. Yet through haphazard encounters with a local ‘pandillo’, Roger’s gained access into gang life and the violence which ensued (2007). However as a result Rodger’s conducted a series of rites of passage into the gang allowed him ‘to experientially uncover a particular aspect of the pandillo’, violence (2007). As a result, through a series of trials and encounters of violence, Rodger not only gained the respect and acceptance of his informants, but an in-depth understanding of personal violence. Rodger also crossed an ‘ethical’ line (2007), by enacting forms what I would term as dramatized violence (Riches, 1986; Galtung, 1969). As a result of gaining access to understand violence, Rodger enacted personal violence, which he argues was a ‘primarily a survival strategy’ (2007). ‘I did not kill anybody, even if I did engage in violence. Some of this brutality could be seen as gratuitous or unjustified, but most of it was directly aimed at protecting myself or the inhabitants of the barrio that I was living in, both of which I felt were valid reason for being violent’ (2007). I would comply with Rodger’s defence of himself, noting that the context of the field site almost permits the anthropologist to engage in local activities.

For myself however, I do not feel the same permissiveness to my own research. My only defence, in recognising myself as a feature of structural violence, is that I have immersed myself within that context (Sanjek, 1996). By being a feature of the structural violence, perceived as a NGO, UNHCR or other aid worker, I gained a perceptual edge onto the study itself. This does not excuse my bewilderment to the ongoing circumstances. I therefore turn respectfully to Nancy Scheper-Hughes two pinnacles regarding the moral implications of violence. The first is to ‘understand morality as always contingent on, and embedded within, specific cultural assumptions; and the second is that ‘the ethnical is always prior to culture because the ethnical presupposes all sense and meaning and therefore makes culture possible’ (1992, pp. 22 - 23). The epistemological questions drawn from these tenants are strikingly contrasting, yet they set the anthropologist a thoughtful tone in response. I would have always considered myself to have followed the second tenant, being associated with peace research and its principles (Galtung,
1975). Yet it would appear I have failed to take into account the epistemological consequences of such an issue.

Conclusively, my own moral defence is a practical one. I was wrongly perceived by my informants, and they were wrongly informed by Omar. I do not blame Omar for this issue, nor do I think he considered what he did was wrong. Instead he was merely facilitating. My lack of Somalis is the primary reason for this misunderstanding, an aspect which can, and will be, only built upon in later research. What can be drawn from this is a deeper understanding of structural violence, in particular how the anthropologist can be a feature of it relating the anthropologist as a feature of its appearance.
viii. Matatu view
6  CONCLUSION

The intention of this thesis was to explore the facets of violence that have manifested themselves within the context of Eastleigh, and other sectors of Nairobi. Dramatized violence and structural violence are the duel frames of violence to have appeared within that context. The distinction of violence being either a drama or structural was originally noted by Galtung (1969). Structural violence was an encompassing force that is indirect and silent, in contrast drama was an absence of silence (Galtung, 1969). Dramatized violence was physical tending to have instrumental and expressive purposes (Riches, 1986). Although these two frames of violence contrast each other in certain contexts, they do ‘shade onto one another’ (Galtung, 1969). Thus the primarily intention of this thesis was to explore how dramatized violence and structural violence intersect and differ from one another. Moreover, as it became apparent from the fieldwork experience itself, citizenship (Lazar, 2013) became an aspect in framing that intersection between dramatized and structural violence within the context of Eastleigh and Nairobi.

Dramatized violence, by being locally recognised act of violence, is performed by instrumental and expressive purposes (Riches, 1986). In doing so, the dramatized violent action symbolically charges bodies and spaces as ethnic and/or political (Feldman, 1991). In the case of Nairobi, and in particular Eastleigh, this had manifested itself in the form of Kenyan police violence and Al-Shabaab violence. Al-Shabaab violence has appeared in the form of terrorist attacks, the sites and bodies of these attacks were highly symbolically charged as a result. On the other hand, police violence distinguished Somalis (Brubaker, 2004), as lesser or non-citizens (Lazar, 2014). Dramatized violence in this frame worked to construct and maintain Somalis as not being citizens, thus rid of political agency. Thus dramatized violence is related to the processes of citizenship in Eastleigh, as it is constructed and maintained through interpretative state practices that are legitimized as violent.

Citizenship in Nairobi was organised in a hierarchical stratum that became distinguished by dramatized violent acts initiated by police. Between the hierarchical layers or levels of citizenship (Lazar, 2013; Marshall-Fratani, 2013), the non-citizen Somalian refugee was of the lowest ranked. For those within that division, various symbols were ascribed and maintained through dramatized police violence, such as ascribed notions of being a pollutant “terrorist” (Feldman, 1991). It reduced one’s political agency and as a result, the contrasting agency
enabled different types of silent violence to occur (Galtung, 1969). Thus those within the lower stratum have little capacity to counteract the violence they face being locally recognised and legitimized as a violent act (Riches, 1986). In turn, this makes them exploitable (Bornstein, 2002), enabling police and members of governing bodies to demand bribes, thus enacting structural violence (Galtung, 1969; Scheppe-Hughes, 2004).

Structural violence, however, is not recognised as being violent by the local actors, thus giving it a silent quality (Galtung, 1969). Definably, structural violence is ‘the indirect violence built into repressive social orders creating enormous difference between potential and actual human self-realization’ (Galtung, 1969). The structural violence observed within the Eastleigh and general Nairobi context as a whole, was most apparent and severe with those without agency to combat it (Farmer, 2004). For Somalis, that lack of agency was primarily the direct result of absent citizenship or political membership (Farmer, 2004; Lazar, 2013). Somalian refugees without documentation were far more prone to exploitation by police as a result of their lack of political agency to combat it. Moreover, in Eastleigh the lack of health care and education, as well as inadequate infrastructure all contributed to further constrain agency of the inhabitants (Farmer, 2004). Additionally, the anthropologists can be an aspect of structural violence they intend to study. Although, as detailed prior, the fieldwork itself may not have been constituted as a form of violence to the informants, yet it did appear as a form of ‘grey’ (Scheppe-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004) and continuous violence (Galtung, 1969) by means of miscommunication regarding the research intentions.

In an ironic turn, the example of the researcher being an aspect of structural violence further crystallises the distinction of what constitutes structural and dramatized violence. It is a distinction which derives from the ethnographic account itself. Dramatized violence is distinguished as an act of violence by the local informants. For instance, the two cases of Al-Shabaab violence upon Idman and Yusri, became dramatized by means of the informants recognising them as such (Riches, 1986). In contrast, structural violence, is acknowledged by the researcher as a means of limiting one’s agency. The health issues experienced by Sindiya and Xanaan provide an example of this. Their circumstances were a result inadequate health care for treatable diseases, a result of historic and economic processes that have constrained their agency.
Local understanding and recognition are the derived basis for the theoretical distinction of dramatized and structural violence. The ‘shades’ (Galtung, 1969) and the intersections (Bourgois, 2004; Farmer, 2004) between structural and dramatized violence have also manifest themselves in the ethnographic fieldwork. It is apparent that citizenship, derived from the Eastleigh context, illustrates the connection between dramatized and structural violence. Police violence, by means of beatings and roundups, are locally constituted as a forms of violence (Riches, 1986), and thus are dramatized. This form of dramatized violence adds symbolic meaning to bodies and sites of violence (Feldman, 1991). In the case of Somalis in Eastleigh, police violence distinguishes them as lesser or non-citizens. Non-citizenship is a near total reduction of political agency (Lazar, 2013), and a constrained agency makes one more prone to forms of structural violence (Farmer, 2004). For example, in the case of Ismahaan, not receiving adequate assistance with her refugee status was a result of structural violence. Therefore, dramatized and structural violence interact with one another within the intersection of citizenship. The consequences of a locally recognised form of violence (Riches, 1986), have symbolic results in deterring one’s agency (Farmer, 2004).

This piece has expanded upon Galtung’s ‘shade’ between dramatized and structural violence. By using ethnographic data to illuminate the differing features of dramatized and structural violence, while simultaneously finding an intersection within the frame of citizenship, I have illustrated that dramatized and structural violence do more than simply ‘shade onto each other’ (Galtung, 1969). Instead, they interact and influence each other by highly profound means. However, this could not have been possible without ethnographic detail contextualising Eastleigh and its proximal districts, which indicates the importance of ethnographic accounts in the study of violence.

However, much as been left unexplored, such as symbolic violence, everyday practices of violence and political violence. Symbolic violence is the internalised humiliations and legitimations of inequality ‘exercised through cognition and misrecognition, knowledge and sentiment, with the unwitting consent of the dominated’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 162-173). In contrast, everyday practices of violence enacted on the micro level create a common sense or community understanding of violence (Schep-Hughes, 1992). Furthermore, political violence is ‘directly and purposefully administered in the name of a political ideology,
movement, or state such as the physical repression of dissent by the army or the police’ (Bourgois, 2001). These forms of violence have not been explored in depth here. Yet future research, with more time to investigate the phenomena of violence, may yield more detailed accounts, allowing for further cross comparison to understand and combat the processes and forces of violence.

Although, certain issues regarding the ethnography need evaluation. Primarily, the lack of Somali language was a major concern for the research. The lack of local language forced the research to occasionally rely on interpreters, which reduced understanding of the local context and lead to various moral implications regarding miscommunication as a result. The ethnographic detail of the work could have been enhanced with an extended period in the field. Thus, if an ethnography were to be repeated in Eastleigh it would be necessary to learn Somali, and a longer period of emersion in the local culture is required.

For the residents of Eastleigh and greater Nairobi this piece may serve some purpose. Firstly, as a critic towards police practices in Eastleigh and a call for the repeal of The Security Law (Amendment) Bill (2014). Secondly, to redress the need for redevelopment in urban poor areas across Kenya. Thirdly, it is an attempt to highlight the inability of the UNHCR and the DRA in creating a workable refugee status in Kenya. Fourthly, and finally, to bring to light the marginalising of Somalis across Kenya, not only in Eastleigh, but also in the North Eastern Province.
7  Bibliography


