Labour Income Uncertainty, Taxation and Public Provision


Näytä suppeat kuvailutiedot Pirttilä, Jukka - Tuomala, Matti - 2012-06-17T20:08:44Z 2012-06-15 14:02:52 - 2012-06-17T20:08:44Z 2003 -
dc.identifier.isbn 951-44-5767-6 -
dc.identifier.issn 1458-1191 -
dc.description.abstract This paper examines optimal non-linear income taxation, commodity taxation and public good provision under income uncertainty. Workers’ income depends randomly on their effort, and effort is unobservable to the government. When income is taxed on a non-linear scale and commodities linearly, the consumption of commodities that are negatively (positively) associated with effort should be discouraged (encouraged). A similar rule is derived for public good provision. Conditions for when uniform commodity taxation and the first-best Samuelson rule for public good provision are desirable under income uncertainty are shown to be analogous to those derived in the conventional tax model. The paper also examines rules for optimal non-linear income and commodity taxation under income uncertainty. -
dc.format.extent 23 -
dc.language.iso en -
dc.publisher Tampereen yliopisto -
dc.title Labour Income Uncertainty, Taxation and Public Provision -
dc.type fi=Erillisteos | en=Monograph| -
dc.identifier.urn urn:isbn:951-44-5767-6 -
dc.type.version fi=Kustantajan versio | en=Publisher's version| -
dc.subject.okm fi=Kansantaloustiede | en=Economics| -
dc.oldstats 623 -
dc.seriesname.electronic Tampere Economic Working Papers Net Series
dc.relation.numberinserieselectronic 16/2003

Viite kuuluu kokoelmiin:

Näytä suppeat kuvailutiedot