Moral Hazard, Income Taxation, and Prospect Theory


Näytä suppeat kuvailutiedot Kanbur, Ravi - Pirttilä, Jukka - Tuomala, Matti - 2012-06-17T20:08:49Z 2012-06-16 09:02:34 - 2012-06-17T20:08:49Z 2004 -
dc.identifier.isbn 951-44-5941-5 -
dc.identifier.issn 1458-1191 -
dc.description.abstract Abstract: The standard theory of optimal income taxation under uncertainty has been developed under the assumption that individuals maximize expected utility. However, prospect theory has now been established as an alternative model of individual behaviour, with empirical support. This paper explores the theory of optimal income taxation under uncertainty when individuals behave according to the tenets of prospect theory. It is seen that many of the standard results are either overturned, or modified in interesting ways. The validity of the First Order Approach requires new conditions that are developed in the paper. And when these conditions are valid, it is shown that optimal marginal tax rates on low incomes will tend to be lower under prospect theory than under expected utility theory. -
dc.format.extent 24 -
dc.language.iso en -
dc.publisher Tampereen yliopisto -
dc.title Moral Hazard, Income Taxation, and Prospect Theory -
dc.type fi=Erillisteos | en=Monograph| -
dc.identifier.urn urn:isbn:951-44-5941-5 -
dc.type.version fi=Kustantajan versio | en=Publisher's version| -
dc.subject.okm fi=Kansantaloustiede | en=Economics| -
dc.oldstats 579 -
dc.seriesname.electronic Tampere Economic Working Papers Net Series
dc.relation.numberinserieselectronic 30/2004

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