Board Independence and Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings in a Bank-oriented Financial System: Evidence from Finland

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dc.contributor.author Kankaanpää, Jari -
dc.date.accessioned 2012-06-17T20:09:29Z
dc.date.available 2012-06-16 08:56:54 -
dc.date.available 2012-06-17T20:09:29Z
dc.date.issued 2009 -
dc.identifier.isbn 978-951-44-7864-2 -
dc.identifier.issn 1797-7789 -
dc.identifier.uri http://tampub.uta.fi/handle/10024/65607
dc.description.abstract This study examines the link between the board independence and asymmetric timeliness of earnings in a bank-oriented financial system. The models by Basu (1997) and Ball & Shivakumar (2005) are re-estimated. This study extends prior research by Beekes et al. (2004), Ahmed & Duellman (2007) and Garcia Lara et al. (2007) and investigates the relationship between board compositions and asymmetric timeliness of earnings in civil law regime and capital markets, which are commonly considered more bank than market based. Such institutional settings exist among others, in Finland, Japan, Germany and Scandinavia. The Finnish data serves well for this study because accounting quality in Finland is considered to be among the highest in the world. The estimation period 2003-2005 serves well for this study, because the renewed and highly detailed corporate governance recommendation for Finnish listed companies entered into force in December 2003. The results obtained using the Basu model show that bad news (negative returns) are reflected in earnings on a more timely basis than good news (positive returns). In this respect the results are in line with earlier findings. Unexpectedly it was found that timeliness of bad news reporting does not depend on the number of independent directors, while the timeliness of good news reporting does. The result can be interpreted in such a way that independent directors do not directly increase the market reaction to good news (positive returns) but have an indirect effect by increasing the markets` credence in the board and their reporting. The results from the Ball & Shivakumar model indicate that, inconsistently with the Basu model, timely recognition of bad news (negative cash flows) over good news (positive cash flows) is statistically insignificant. -
dc.format.extent 40 -
dc.language.iso en -
dc.publisher Tampereen yliopisto -
dc.title Board Independence and Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings in a Bank-oriented Financial System: Evidence from Finland -
dc.type fi=Erillisteos | en=Monograph| -
dc.identifier.urn urn:isbn:978-951-44-7864-2 -
dc.type.version fi=Kustantajan versio | en=Publisher's version| -
dc.subject.okm fi=Liiketaloustiede | en=Business and Management| -
dc.oldstats 721 -
dc.seriesname.electronic Tampere Economics and Accounting Net Series
dc.relation.numberinserieselectronic wp2

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