Social Beings and Social Actions:
Examining Garfinkel’s notion of Trust

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This master’s thesis examines the notion of ‘trust’ presented by Harold Garfinkel in his 1963 article called “A Conception of, and Experiments with, ‘Trust’ as a Condition of Stable Concerted Actions”. The concept is defined as persons’ compliance to a constitutive order of events which constitutes the everyday world as a social reality. Trust features into the production of mutually intelligible actions that accomplish intersubjectivity.

Garfinkel’s 1963 article presents games as examples where trust and the constitutive order of events can be discovered, and proceeds to examine trust as a condition of concerted actions in daily life. The “Trust” article builds on Alfred Schutz’s earlier work, and presents some of Garfinkel’s earliest breaching experiments.

This thesis examines the significance of Garfinkel’s notion of trust in terms of the production of joint actions and intersubjectivity. Trust specifies how individuals participate in the constitution of the social world by producing actions that can be seen as belonging to an assumed normative order of events. In order to broaden the understanding of the underlying features of joint activities, some recent theoretical notions in evolutionary anthropology concerning shared intentionality will be discussed.

The thesis concludes that trust is an important concept in the sense that it unites individuals to the social through action. Trust recognizes that joint activities are based on individual’s participation in the social world as morality, and transforms individual actions into vehicles of social meaning. This enables a continuous process in which the social world is maintained.
1. INTRODUCTION

As we go about our daily lives, we continuously encounter and recognize a world that makes sense to us. We know what being a member of a particular society amounts to, what is expected of us and how to conduct ourselves in such a way as to be recognized as ordinary members of that society. The world we encounter consists of institutions and practices such as money, news reporting, politics and marriage, but also basic interactions within these systems such as greetings and goodbyes. Not only do we continually encounter and recognize these phenomena but we simultaneously produce them seemingly without much effort.

As human beings we are fundamentally members of society (Francis & Hester 2004, 2), which means that our ways of living are deeply defined by the social world we recognize. The world we recognize and maintain is inherently a part of how we function as a species, but also a part of who we are as persons within a group, culture or society. There is something about us as a species that enables us to establish a social world that involves institutions, obligations and responsibilities. Moreover, we are extremely well equipped to handle basic social interactions, communicate our intentions, and understand the intentions of others.

The way we interact distinguishes us from the rest of the animal kingdom. Human communication is based on processes of shared intentionality, which essentially define our ability to operate as a collective or group. (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll 2005.) The origins of human sociality are rooted in our ability to interact socially in a species-unique way. The universal features of our interactions are found within the cognitive abilities and reasoning that provides an infrastructure for complex languages. (Tomasello 2008; Levinson 2006a, 2006b.)

Human beings are able to conceptualize situations under different, even conflicting perspectives. We think in recursive patterns about other people’s mental states, such as “she knows that I know...” Humans also self-monitor, reflect and evaluate the way in which their thoughts correspond with the normative standards of the group. (Tomasello 2014a, 192.)
People make efforts to communicate so that the recipient of interaction can understand the person’s intention. No other animal has shown the ability to do this. (Tomasello 2008, 82.) There is a special conceptual organization in human social activities: humans understand joint activities from a “bird’s eye view” and are able to see their roles as interchangeable (Tomasello 2014a, 189).

The approach of evolutionary anthropology and the study of human cognition provides a perspective to human sociality that specially brings into view the cognitive abilities, the evolved traits, and in general, the necessary requirements for social interaction in humans. This research perspective emphasizes that what is evident in our way of interacting, and what sort of human-unique mental processes are involved in making our interaction appear the way it does.

A particular approach in social science called ethnomethodology seeks to understand the methodical accomplishment of everyday social actions and the social world. In ethnomethodology, human behaviour is seen as a continuous accomplishment of intersubjectivity. Ethnomethodology is interested in the very sociality of actions, that is, the production of actions that do not reduce to individuals’ personal interpretations or attitudes (Korbut 2014, 480).

The approach sees actions as situational products that are designed to be perceived and recognized. Actions are intelligible, orderly, and inherently social in the sense that they are produced by people, for people, in a shared world of meanings, interpretive methods, assumption, expectations, and eventually, a world taken for granted. Actions are events which cannot be isolated from their immediate, moment-to-moment production without losing their reflexively assigned sense and meaning.

The focus is on the processes, methods, ‘ways of doing’, and the achievements that are involved in the production of the everyday social interactions that recognize as ‘normal’ and take for granted. Ethnomethodology has a unique viewpoint to human sociality in the sense that it focuses on the way the social world is maintained by people, the way in which people rationalize about their surroundings, and the way in which people come to realize
the everyday world. Humans create a reasonable world for them to live in and use language and information as a *resource* in a commonsense manner (Coulon 1995, 16–17).

The perspective holds that people are actively engaged in the production of the social world, and sees that the world that is real to us is simultaneously being maintained by our recognition of it. As members of a group or society, we are able to produce actions that are for practical purposes recognizable to any other member. The possibility for achieving mutually intelligible actions therefore requires for individual actors to be competent in the use of methods that are shared within a group.

The production of social actions is therefore not only based on our innate abilities, but our competence in the continuous interactional work through which our communications can be recognized by others. Our interactions are characterized by the basic abilities that we are born with, but importantly also the continuous production of actions that are situationally equipped with meaning. The perspective of ethnomethodology provides us with a view of the way our interactions are achieved, provided with the abilities we inherit. Ethnomethodology does not examine individual minds, but takes notice of some mental attributes that play into the production of intersubjectivity. Discussing the lessons from both ethnomethodology and the research of our innate abilities might offer a possibility for a deeper understanding of how the social world is possible.

This thesis explores a special notion in ethnomethodology that features into the way in which we produce joint activities. The concept of ‘trust’, formulated in a 1963 paper by Harold Garfinkel, is one of the earliest works that eventually lead to ethnomethodology. In his paper *A Conception of, and Experiments with, ‘Trust’ as a Condition of Stable Concerted Actions*, Garfinkel formulates his ideas about the constitutive nature of joint social activities, and introduces some of the first breaching experiments as empirical demonstrations. The trust paper was written before *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (1967), and some academics do not consider it a fully ethnomethodological one (Watson 2009, 476). Still, many of Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological ideas were being formed already during his dissertation in 1952.
The notion of trust discussed in this thesis is not defined in the typical sense of the word. The Garfinkelian trust is defined as a specific condition of human interactions, a feature found in the production of actual joint activities that take place in the present moment. The concept captures how individuals orient to any social situation as morality, that is, how individuals trust that all participants are using the same methods and background knowledge to realize the situation in a similar way, and in doing so, participating in the same social reality. We trust that other people respect the same methods of producing sensible behaviors, and commit themselves to the social situation in a similar way. This kind of trust features into social life and the realization of everyday world.

Garfinkel’s notion of trust is referenced in ethnomethodological texts (e.g. Handel 1982; Heritage 1984; Korbut 2014). The notion has received some attention in the formal-analytic tradition, but remains in some respect understudied (Watson 2009). Some of the ideas in the 1963 paper were presented again in Studies in Ethnomethodology (1967), but after ethnomethodology took off as a social scientific approach, Garfinkel did not explicitly return to the issue of trust (Watson 2009, 476).

One motivation for visiting Garfinkel’s original paper is that trust has received little attention in the ongoing research concerning human sociality. Garfinkel’s notion importantly specifies the way in which trust features into joint action, and therefore should provide a perspective for investigating the nature of shared intentionality or the topic of intersubjectivity in general. This thesis begins with the assumption that integrating the Garfinkelian notion of trust with modern day research and theorizing should prove fruitful, and carefully considering the original formulation of trust can provide important insights.

Another motivation is that while ‘trust’ is substantial to the origins of the ethnomethodological tradition, and an exemplification of ethnomethodological (or pre-ethnomethodological) thinking, it can be an important topic of study in its own right. Trust reveals a relationship between individuals and the social environment in a particular way, and importantly relates to the way human beings are social. It is the contention of this thesis that trust should be promoted as a topic of study.
The thesis progresses in the following way. Chapter two is an introduction to the intellectual origins of Garfinkel’s thinking as well as the basic ideas in ethnomethodology. Alfred Schutz’s influence on Garfinkel’s works is significant, and the paper on trust is an attempt to continue Schutz’s line of thinking. Chapter three introduces the formulation of constitutive expectancies, which feature importantly into the notion of trust. Similarly as in Garfinkel’s original paper, games will be examined first as instances where the trust can be found. In chapter four, these ideas will be further examined and the everyday world is taken as a topic of study. Chapter five presents and discusses some theoretical concepts in Michael Tomasello’s work in evolutionary anthropology concerning the characteristics of human communication and discusses the ideas from an ethnomethodological perspective. Finally, chapter six further discusses the notion of trust and formulates the main findings.
2. THE PERSPECTIVE OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

Reading ethnomethodological writings, especially those of Garfinkel, forces the reader to adopt a special ‘attitude’ to social life in order to find the features that play into the constitution of social phenomena. Ethnomethodology endorses the ‘re-discovery’ of common sense knowledge of social structure as a topic of inquiry. Literature that presents ethnomethodological ideas are often difficult to grasp due to strange terminology and specific, detailed expressions about the methodical accomplishment of social life. Ethnomethodology consists of a conceptual web of interrelated notions that have been produced through examination and are presented as formulations that not only apply to social phenomena, but are derivative of them and discoverable as long as one wishes to go look for them. The terminology, expressions and demonstrations attempt to reflect the complexities that are found in actual social interactions. Ethnomethodological ideas are not abstract in nature, and in fact have an inherent empirical attitude to them.

Ethnomethodology is not a theory as such, but a research perspective with a specific shift in paradigm (Coulon 1995, 1.) Ethnomethodology ‘discovers’ ordinary action and reveals many of its forms empirically (Hester & Francis 2007, 3). Ethnomethodology is interested in “the practical orderliness of ordinary actions which cannot be reduced to the interpretive activities of actors” (Korbut 2014, 480). Ethnomethodology begins with re-specification of order “in-and-as-of-the-workings-or-ordinary-society,” seeing social actions as events which cannot be isolated from the phenomenon of social order (Button 1991, 5–7). The actors’ accounts and the local, moment-to-moment production of meaning are raised as topics of inquiry, and seeing actors as “constructors” of social situations is seen as highly important (Heritage 1984, 1–5).

2.1 Influence of Parson and Schutz

The intellectual roots of Garfinkel’s thinking are based in the works of Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schutz (e.g. Heritage 1984). Garfinkel was influenced greatly by Schutz’s approach to social theory. Schutz had proposed that sociological analysis should be based upon how persons experience social life, and produce ‘from within’ the society, the features we see
as social life (Francis & Hester 2004, 20). The common sense knowledge of social structure was conceived in Schutz’s several works and constituted as a topic of inquiry (Garfinkel & Sacks 1970, 59). Schutz contributed to ethnomethodology with his conception that social interaction is a process of interpretation and reinterpretation (Leiter 1980, 55):

Except in the case of the pure “we” relationship, where to people completely share each other’s experiences, it is impossible to get inside the other person’s mind. As a result, social interaction is interpretive. (ibid.)

One of Garfinkel’s criticisms was directed towards Parson’s conception of norms as explanations for actions. Specifically, he noted that the relationship between norms and actual real-world actions remains unresolved, because the way in which actors come to know a particular norm has to be accounted for. Garfinkel’s treatment of rules and norms is different in that norms do not determine actions but function as a resource for making sense of actions. Rules are used by members to account for the objective-seeming features of situated activities. (Maynard & Clayman 2003, 186–188.) Garfinkel’s view is that norms do not regulate actions, but constitute their sense as those actions (Heritage 1984, 98).

Another notable point of criticism was directed at contemporary sociological methods of theorizing, especially how they treated Durkheim’s aphorism. Durkheim’s aphorism states that the objective reality of social facts are the topic of inquiry for sociology. Garfinkel criticized the way sociology interpreted this task, especially the way in which social facts were construed as abstract, objective phenomena that can be accessed by theorizing. Alternatively, the ethnomethodological approach avoids theorizing social phenomena into abstraction, and sees common sense thinking and understanding as both the manifestation and production of social facts. Garfinkel’s alternative approach was to reveal the very possibility of any social phenomena, and this was to be done through examining the work that goes into making the social world what it is. (Garfinkel 2007, 14; Hester & Francis 2007, 3–6.) Garfinkel holds that social order is not found at the level of theoretical abstraction, but in the practical accomplishments of intelligibility. Therefore, the production and management of intelligible actions is equivalent to the production of social structure. (Hester & Francis 2007, 3–4.)
The 1963 article A Conception of, and Experiments with, ‘Trust’ as a Condition of Stable Concorted Actions, Garfinkel makes use of Schutz’s constitutive phenomenology, specifically the concept of the attitude of daily life and the thesis of reciprocity of perspectives. Members \textit{presuppose} that events and objects are what they appear to be, and appear so to others as well. Additionally, members assume the temporal succession of events presents a stream of experience similar to everyone, and each member is equally competent to make the similar interpretations. This intersubjective world involves presuppositions that are “so until demonstrated to be otherwise”. (Garfinkel 1963, 210.) The ‘thesis of reciprocity of perspectives’ consists of the supposed, agreed, practical similarity of people’s experiences. Participants assume a perspective of interchangeability:

He assumes that what each actually sees can potentially be seen by both under an exchange of positions. Thus, Schutz found, the person assumes that there are different appearances but assumes too that these are due to different perspectival positions in a world that is identical for both. (ibid., 213.)

Garfinkel restates Schutz’s thesis of reciprocal respective as \textit{constitutive expectancies} that are assigned to some set of expected behaviors or events. Social order becomes possible through making the actions visibly ‘normal’ for everyone, so that individuals can see them as instances of expected events. (Korbut 2014, 486.) These expected events define the constitutive order of social life (Garfinkel 1963). The idea of constitutive expectancies will be thoroughly examined in the next chapter.

\textbf{2.2 Ethno Methods}

Garfinkel was interested in the practical reasoning that is being used by people in everyday life. Ethnomethodology recognizes that individuals use certain \textit{methods} to make sense of actions in daily life. Through the use of these methods, individuals simultaneously \textit{accomplish} these environments as what they appear to be. Social order is revealed as a continuous production of individual’s use of reasoning methods in the moments of interaction. The important specification is that the interpretations individuals make are not personal interpretations. Individuals make use of methods that they assume are comprehensible to others.
as well. Interpretations of actions do not merely reside in people’s heads, but become observable for others through successive actions, which are always seen as relating to previous ones (Vom Lehn 2014, 53). People make sense of the ‘patterns’ that characterize specific interactions, and use a ‘documentary method of interpretation’ to interpret and re-interpret the meanings based on the visible ‘patterns’ (Benson & Hughes 1983, 90).

In ethnomethodology, membership is used to refer to a person’s competence in the use of methods that enable people to accomplish understandable interactions in a given social environment. Membership involves background understandings that are taken for granted in daily life. Daily life is a term that consists of these everyday interactions in society. Daily life refers to the everyday world that is identifiable and visible to members as a common-sense world. Activities in this world consist of events that are understood and oriented to as normal event, and this normality is restorable upon member’s judgmental work (Garfinkel 1963, 188). The processes of sense-making make events understandable as what they are. The situatedness of social order refers to the idea that all interactions receive their sense locally in the moment of their production and interpretation as those event.

Ethnomethodology also specifies socialization as not a process of internalizing norms but a process of acquiring the ‘typical’, shared, interpretative procedures. In socialization, members conform to what is common sense in that social organization, and thus becomes socially competent (Segre 2014, 43.) Members know the ‘ethno-methods’ of the group, and come to use them effectively. This in turn offers people the acceptance of the group. The notion of member, then, refers to the ‘mastery of natural language’. A member takes for granted the routines that are embedded in a given social practice in that group and thus, no member is a stranger to one’s own culture. (Coulon 1995, 27.)

By discovering ordinary action as a product of situated reasoning Garfinkel simultaneously revealed that the same methods used to produce intelligible actions are the very methods by which the everyday world is maintained. Ethnomethodology therefore specifies ordinary actions as the object of study and in doing so, reveals the possibility of the social world. The ethnomethodological proposal was stated in ‘Studies in Ethnomethodology’ (1967), where Garfinkel points out that the study of the very possibility of everyday world has been
Ethnomethodologists study the social order as a production problem. The view is the production of the ordinary society as members’ work. (…) For the ethnomethodologists, the production of social order is both unavoidable and a hopelessly situated, local accomplishment. (Livingston 1987, 56–57.)

To demonstrate the way in which the everyday social world is produced, Garfinkel conducted his famous breaching experiments. These experiments were designed to reveal the features that have to be altered in order to break down the common sense world and make it difficult to restore (Garfinkel 1963). A successful breach in a social environment reveals the absence of an important procedure and “elucidate[s] its constitutive import in normal circumstances” (Maynard & Clayman 2003, 178). Breaching experiments have demonstrative, practical and empirical importance.

[A] full appreciation of what ethnomethodology is ‘about’ comes less from reading the literature than from engaging in the sorts of investigation exemplified in that literature. This could perhaps be said of any organized practice, but it is an explicit – indeed obsessive – concern in ethnomethodology’s pedagogy. (Lynch & Peyrot 1992, 120.)
3. THE NORMATIVE ORDER OF GAMES

The ethnomethodological respecification of social order sees social life as a practical accomplishment of intersubjectivity. Our ability to share experiences and communicate about them is based on a process of acquiring this intersubjectivity, and simultaneously, is reducible to this process. Essential to this perspective is that the question of intersubjectivity can be answered without assuming that persons’ brains have identical ‘contents’ and so there is no need to “look under the skull” (Garfinkel 1963, 190).

This chapter deals with the question of practical intersubjectivity from the perspective of games. This chapter also introduces two important conceptualizations related to Garfinkel’s notion of trust. These are (1) the constitutive expectancies, and (2) the normative order. Constitutive expectancies are three specific assumptions that a person holds for the situation of social interaction, whether it is a specific instance of gameplay or ordinary life. They are person’s presuppositions that constitute a social environment as recognizable, understandable, normative order. A particular event is interpreted as an event-in-a-social-order, and an event is recognized as that event through a commonly shared scheme of interpretation that is assumed by members (ibid., 226).

As discussed earlier, Schutz’s view was that people do not actually have identical experiences, but act, for practical purposes by assuming that experiences are similar to everyone (Heritage 1984, 54). Persons realize there are differences between appearances for individual members and that each person has a personal perspective, but also assume these perspectives are irrelevant for practical purposes (Garfinkel 1963, 213). People accomplish an identical world through the understanding of interchangeability.

Another way to state this phenomenon is with the concept of “common ground”. In this formulation, people share a conceptual common ground which they use to interpret communicative acts. The shared common ground does not include personal perspectives that are inaccessible to others. What becomes relevant is that which is “out in the open”, public, for everyone to see. When I look at you and point my finger at an object, and you see me doing this, you are likely to seek an interpretation based on what is in our common ground.
(Tomasello 2008, 76–77.) Whether we use the concept of common ground or the notion of interchangeability, we are talking about a context that is relevant, available and public for all people engaged in that interaction and thus, the shared context within which social interaction and intersubjectivity are possible.

Intersubjective meaning is procedurally accomplished by trusting that other people implement the same methods and procedures that result in practically identical understandings (Heritage 1984, 99). In Schutz’s terminology, this idea was presented as the “thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives” which includes (a) the “interchangeability of standpoints”, and (b) the “congruency of relevances”. Garfinkel’s formulation of constitutive expectancies provides an alternative formulation of Schutz’s thesis of reciprocal perspectives. The constitutive expectancies are not only theoretical notions about what kinds of expectancies people have in social interactions, but they also define that these expectancies are importantly assigned to some set of possible events, which in turn constitutes mutual understanding of a specific normative order.

3.1 Constitutive expectancies

In his article, Garfinkel (1963) begins with consulting games as instances where constitutive expectancies are found (p. 190–206), and then proceeds to expand these notions into the basis of normal life that operates outside of games. Games have been useful in showing, in principle, the way constitutive expectancies are attached to normative orders. Games are good examples in the sense that they offer an explicit rule system that can be altered or breached. Additionally, the notion of member becomes easier to understand through the concept of a player.

Before considering the constitutive expectancies, it is important to note that Garfinkel equates assumptions and rules with “expected events”. The language of expected events specifies that persons assume that the events that appear are possible events in a certain rule system. In other words, in a particular game, the expected events are those that can be seen as actual and possible moves in the normative order of a game.
To say, for example, that a player assumes the rule of ticktacktoe that players move alternately A,B,A,B... means the same thing as saying that his actions are governed in their course by the normative sequence of events, A,B,A,B... What a person is said to ‘assume’ is equivalent to what he is said to “assume about the possible fall of events” which is equivalent again to saying that his actions are governed by a restricted way in which possible events can occur. What he is said to ‘assume’ therefore consists of attributed features of events that are ‘scenic’ to him. He attends their sense as a restricted frame of alternative specifications of the scene of events. (ibid., 209)

The three levels of constitutive expectancies provide the basic setting for any framework of social interaction. For present purposes they are presented in terms of game events.

**Constitutive expectancy no. 1:** From the standpoint of a player, out of alternative territories of play, numbers of players, sequences of moves, and the like, they frame a set that the player expects to choose regardless of his desires, circumstances, plans, interests, or consequences of choice either to him or to others.

Players choose and design their actions so that the actions appear to match the expectancies of normal game events. Normal game events are any behaviors that respect game rules as an order. Game rules, or “basic rules”, operate as a scheme of recognition for players, a reference point from which events receive meaning. This means behaviors are seen as instantiations of the rules, and behaviors are interpreted as displays of game conduct. (ibid., 190.) A player, then, acts in ways that appear as game events.

**Constitutive expectancy no. 2:** A player expects that as it holds for him it holds for the other person as well.

The player realizes that other players are in the same position of producing actions that respect game rules as an order. All players know, that everyone who plays the game is expected to follow the same set of game rules, and thus produce behaviors that appear as game events to everyone. The second expectancy takes notice of the fact that people are able to see others as bound by the same set of expectations.
**Constitutive expectancy no. 3:** A player expects that as he expects it to hold for the other person, the other person expects it to hold for him.

Additionally the player expects that other players hold a similar expectation for them. The third expectancy leads to an additional structure. Not only do players assume other players are expected to respect a set of game rules as a background for their actions, but they realize they are *sharing* these expectancies. Players *mutually* realize each other as being required to respect the same framework, through this assumption mutuality. In the third expectancy we find the essential defining feature of what it means to do something *together*, instead of simply individually producing actions of similar appearance.

The second and third property importantly define that not only are individuals themselves submitting to a certain frame of actions, but so are others expected to be, and so expected *jointly*. The second expectancy holds that other people have expectancies of behaviors that are similar. It does not yet produce the kind of three-dimensional infrastructure of actual, intersubjective sharing. By introducing the feature that players realize that other players expect these behaviors from them, they are mirroring their own expectancies onto others.

These three levels are ‘attached’ to either game rules or the attitude of daily life. The properties are called constitutive because their function, in this formulation, is to constitute the actual framework in which actors are to move around in, and from which the actions acquire their significance as *those* actions. This phenomenon Garfinkel refers to as the “constitutive accent” of events. In the instances of gameplay, the specific game rules in question present the “constitutive order of events” of the game (p. 191).

The constitutive expectancies specify the way in which a rule system of a game becomes recognized as a shared framework for operation, and the way in which a player is able to operate from ‘within’ the rules. In other words, actions within a social framework derive from expectations that members hold from themselves, hold to others, and expect the other members to similarly hold it for them.
3.2 Disrupting a game of Tick-tack-toe

Garfinkel instructed the students to play Tick-tack-toe with persons who were either friends, family members, acquaintances or strangers (i.e., “the subjects”). The subjects were asked to mark their move first, after which the experimenter (i.e., the student implementing the experiment) was to erase the subject’s mark, move it to another cell, and continue to mark their own move. While doing this, the experimenter was to behave as if this was in no way unusual. Students were to report the subjects’ reactions according to the degree of surprise, irritation, suspicion, anger, confusion, or other behaviors immediately after the experiment was completed. Up to 253 instances of play were reported. (Garfinkel 1963, 202).

The evaluations from the Tick-tack-toe experiments show some general ways in which people can handle an abnormal event in a social order. When the subjects noticed a disruption in the order of the game, and an inconsistency between their expectations and the appearance of the event, they appeared confused. The initial confusion was coded as either mild, moderate, or severe, depending on the reaction. (p. 202) The player’s choice of action supported two theoretical ideas:

First, a behaviour that was at variance with the constitutive order of the game immediately motivated attempts to normalize the discrepancy, i.e., to treat the observed behaviour as an instance of a legally possible event. Second, under the condition of a breach of legal play the discrepant event seemed best to produce a senseless situation if the player attempted to normalize the discrepancy while attempting to retain the constitutive order without alteration, i.e., without leaving the game or orienting a “new game”. (ibid., 206.)

The attempt to make sense of odd events in a supposed order resulted in either changing the very order (i.e., in this case, changing the game), or restoring the order by rebuking the experimenter. The experiment consisted of breaking the explicit game rules while acting as if the strange move was one that a player would ordinarily expect. The oddness of the experimenter’s action was that they gave no indication as to why they made this strange move, or that it was in fact strange in the first place. In this situation, the subject was initially not
able to make sense of the event as a normal move in a game. They resorted to making sense of the move by altering the normative order so that the event matched with it, or upholding the original order by rebuking the experimenter’s move as that of cheating. In the case where the play was turned into a joke, the actual gameplay had seized.

There were cases in which the subject interpreted the experimenter’s move as a new form of Tick-tack-toe: perhaps erasing other player’s mark was actually a new, legitimate rule, and perhaps this was not the game the subject assumed it to be. Therefore, if the subject assumed that the experimenter was playing in a new fashion, or perhaps a new form of Tick-tack-toe, the evaluation consisted of the players’ abandonment of the game as an order, and the election of a new order.

There were also cases in which the experimenter’s strange move was interpreted as a joke. If the player thought the experimenter was playing a prank, or engaging in some other form of action than gameplay, the evaluation consisted of the players’ abandonment of the game as an order, but without electing an alternative order. Third, there were cases in which the subject accused the experimenter of cheating. In this case the evaluation consisted of the subject’s retention of the order of Tick-tack-toe. The subject attempted to normalize the situation to the assumed normative order. The ones who attempted to normalize the game situation showed most disturbance overall. Additionally it was found that

[the] ticktacktoe produced a convincing and enduring bewilderment for children, particularly those from five to eleven years old. The procedure was less efficient in producing bewilderment for adults, though for them it was very efficient in producing an ambiguous situation of events. Protocols of both adults and children, however, were filled with expressions of distrust. This held across the board regardless of age, sex, or familiarity with the experimenter. (Garfinkel 11963, 206.)

It seems to be the case that normative orders demand events that are ‘possible’ in that order. If we want to play a game of Tick-tack-toe, it is required for both of us to keep to the rules. Of course, as competent social members who grasp the rules of Tick-tack-toe (which are simple enough to spell out with a few sentences) we find it obvious and common sense that
if people stopped playing according to the rules, there could be no actual game in the first place. We understand that the game depends on accurate, specific types of actions, and that these actions are entirely dependent on individual’s performances.

When I was playing cards with a group of friends, I had misunderstood a particular game rule which resulted in the game running to a ‘dead end’ where players turns kept switching but the game did not progress in any way. After my misunderstanding had been revealed, one of the players said “this game has been dead for a while now”. My misunderstanding resulted in a failure to produce an unproblematic normative order. The very existence of the game was called into question: the game was not “alive”. But interestingly, the players had been playing the game as if it was still ‘alive’, not questioning the possibility that rules might have been broken at some point during. It turns out that the players expected others to know the rules in a similar way, as it is indeed the case when people ordinarily play games. Additionally, and importantly, the expectation that people are playing ‘by the rules’ had been in the background for the players’ conduct, and thus, the game was assumed ‘alive until proven otherwise’. The events that appear an instances of gameplay are expected to be a part of the order of the game. If it turns out there are events that do not belong to the set of possible events in that game, but appear in the middle of the game as if it was part of that order, causes a disturbance that we need to solve in some way.

The findings from the Tick-tack-toe experiment suggest that as persons produce interpretations about events, they are simultaneously affirming, altering, or maintaining a social order. By producing actions that either rebuke the experimenter or confirm the experimenters ‘strange’ move as a legitimate one (i.e. adopting a new form of game), the game situation moves into a certain direction. The strange move does not belong to the assumed normative order, and is thus an ‘impossible’ move in that normative order. The strange move, then, invites interpretations that either change the normative order, or maintain the expected order.
3.3 The constitution of a game

The basic rules (i.e., game rules) offer the behaviour’s *sense* as a specific, recognizable action. Players realize that there exists a correspondence between the ‘appearance’ of an action, and its identity as an ‘action-in-an-order’. Therefore, the rules of a game offer a scheme of recognizing them in some particular way. The rules of a game specify an assumed normative order, that is, a set of possible actions, “to which the variable of ‘mere behaviors’ can be assigned” (p. 195).

To illustrate, bridge players respond to each other’s actions as bridge events, not behavioural events. They do not treat the fact that the other player withdraws a card from his hand and places it on the table as the event putting down a paste-board’ or ‘effecting a translation of position of a card’. Instead, through the translation of the card’s position the player signalized that “he has played the ace of spades as the first card of the trick”. From the player’s point of view the question ‘What can really happen’ is for him correctly decided in terms of basic rules. (p.195).

In Garfinkel’s formulation, it is not the rules of the game that are constitutive, but the actions that are perceived as game events. The rules of a game, or the norms of daily life, do not have the ‘power’ to constitute social environments by themselves. Actions are always seen as events-in-a-social-order (p.226). The events acquire a meanings as game moves when they are interpreted through the common scheme of gameplay. It is by this process of seeing events as events-in-an-order that specifically show how the rules become attached to actions. The actions are considered as game events because the players assume that each player is designing their actions as actions in a game. This perspective takes another step back and perceives the world beyond abstract rule systems. As noted earlier, the role of norms and rules is specified in a way that avoids treating them as explanations for behaviors, and rather as the interpretive schemes for the ‘appearing events’.

Garfinkel’s formulation involves the notion of ‘constitutive accent’, ‘constitutive possibilities’ and ‘preferential possibilities’ of events (Garfinkel 1963, 193). The constitutive accent that is attached to the constitutive expectancies define the game as *that* game. For the game to change into another game, the accent is overwritten with a new set of possible
events. In Garfinkel’s formulation, game is not merely its rules but all the possible events that play can involve, which include by definition the ‘bad moves’ and any kinds of events that are seen as game events. The constitutive accent is attached to a set of explicit game rules. The ‘constitutive possibilities’ involve that events are such that they constitute the game, that is, they include all the possible things that people can do without altering the constitutive accent. The ‘preferential possibilities’ include the possible ways in which the events can be produced. In games, they include the ways in which games can be played. To play ‘poorly’ so as to let someone win is equally legitimate gameplay as it does not, by definition, break the normative order of events. Events in a game always involve both constitutive and preferential possibilities.

To say that the constitutive accent is ‘removed’ from one set of events is synonymous with the statement that the events have been moved to the set of preferential possibilities. Conversely, to say that events have been removed from the set of preferential possibilities necessarily entails that they have become members of the set of constitutive possibilities. The case where all possibilities are constitutive possibilities such that the set of preferential possibilities is an empty one defines a ceremonialized game. To speak of the set of constitutive possibilities as an empty set and simultaneously to intend a game is formal nonsense. (ibid., 193.)

In daily life, the preferential possibilities are similarly present. We understand that there are many ways to establish a greeting, and many ways in which one can accomplish communicative acts in general that are intelligible as certain actions with certain meanings. Reversely, in theatre, we assume that the actors in stage are performing a pre-established routine that they are supposed to repeat each time they step on the stage. As another example of ceremonialized acting, consider the American Civil War re-enactments. People dress up and act out a certain war episode to a certain detail according to what has historically taken place. The persons performing these ceremonialized situations are bound by pre-established types of actions that they are supposed to re-create. The actors on the stage performing a theatrical piece are not supposed to change their lines or improvise (except when the performance is that of improvisation theatre), nor are the participants in the Civil War enactment supposed to change the outcome of the battle.
Producing situations of real gameplay involve that events are recognizable as constitutive and/or preferential possibilities of the particular game. Erasing the other players mark and putting that mark in to another cell was not a constitutive or a preferential possibility, because the particular game in question does now allow such an event. The breach produced an inconsistency between the possible events and the ‘appearance-of-actual-events’. The fact that subjects reacted to the breach in particular ways suggest that they rely on the constitutive order of game events by default, and should a breach occur, attempts are made to restore the order, or alternatively, the game is abandoned.

3.4 To trust is to be a player

The game of tick-tack-toe is a normative order when it is being played by people. Without considering this normative order, we would not be able to see the cross or the square as moves-in-a-game. We would not see that the three-in-a-row represents a finished game and declares one of the players as a winner.

Trust enables to us take for granted the expected events (i.e., actions that respect the rules as a normative order). Trust allows us to see the events as game events, and continue to do so throughout the game. As people play a game of cards, they expect that all players are using the game rules as definition of their action, which in turn produces and constitutes the game. Trust is, then, is defined as compliance to the constitutive order of events. Players that act in compliance to these basic rules, are players by definition (Garfinkel 1963, 191). Individual players become a part of actual gameplay when they are responding to events as game events, and producing actions that are perceivable, and understandable as the game events.

To say that one person ‘trusts’ another means that the person seeks to act in such a fashion, as to produce through his action or to respect as conditions of play actual events that accord with normative orders of events depicted in the basic rules of play. Alternatively stated, the player takes for granted the basic rules of the game as a definition of his situation, and that means of course as a definition of his relationships to others. (ibid., 193–194.)
For a game to exist, it requires for its players to recognize the situation as *that* game. All players should know the answer to the question “what is happening” and thus provide each a similar sense to events. Each players is able to ‘know’ or see the situation in a similar way, and is able to see that others see it in a similar way through the interchangeability of standpoints (or common ground). But it is not enough that players see the game and understand the events as events of that game, they need to also produce the game if they are to play it. To play the game, thus, requires for the player to produce actions that are possible as game actions, within the normative order of the game, that is, actions that others can see as game events. This shows that trust is importantly a part of the production of actions in a given social order, and simultaneously, a matter of individual participation in that order.

The ‘power’ of constitutive expectancies is based on their potential of establishing a certain social environment that each person can recognize in a similar way. They define the basic structure that is involved in making mutually accomplished actions an everyday reality. In the case of games, when a player expects that other participants design their actions on the base of game rules, and expect others to expect that of them, they (1) produce the game by definition, and, (2) trust.

In conclusion, constitutive expectancies present a structure by which people constitute a social order. So far we have examined games, but this structure presents the fundamental requirements for the creation of *any* constitutive environment. They can be found in all joint activities, which in this case refer to all interactions between people from the most mundane to the most institutionalized. Trust is defined as person’s (or member’s) compliance to the constitutive order of events, the actions that produce sensible and normal environments that any member can discover. This order is normative, and includes a variety of ‘possible events’ that can be seen as events of that order.

But has this answered the question how a normative order itself is possible? We could say that a game comes into existence as a normative order through being invented by people. It can be passed on to others, the rule system can be communicated easily and documented for future players. So is it enough to say that we simply invent a game and then proceed to recognize it as a normative order and then constitute it by our actions? As it turns out, the invention of a game itself requires a normative order in which a game can be assigned rules.
and in which these rules can be confirmed. Games are in fact normative orders within normative orders.

Games are problematic examples in the sense that they are not part of ‘serious life’ and provide an alternative order (Garfinkel 1963, 207). One of the biggest issues is the fact that it is possible to leave the game or change it to another one. Garfinkel points out that games represent “encapsulated episodes” within ordinary life, and are therefore problematic examples for this kind of analysis. In fact, many adults in the Tick-tack-toe experiment were able to solve the situation by abandoning the game as an order of activities without showing signs that their relationship to the experimenter was in any way further confused (p. 206). A game presents a situation that “involves by definition the suspension of the presuppositions and procedures of serious life”. Additionally, persons have the option to disengage themselves from the game without any serious social consequences. (ibid., 207.)
4. THE NORMATIVE ORDER OF DAILY LIFE

How are we to find the constitutive expectancies in daily life outside of games? How does a situation need to be breached in order to reveal the normative order? How does trust feature into daily life? In everyday life, we do not have the ability to suddenly quit a process of interaction without consequences. Unlike games, daily life presents a normative order that fundamentally defines our way of being in the world and our relationships with others.

The concept of daily life is essentially used to capture everything that involves some kind of normative order. Daily life is life in society, as a member of society, as a person who is able to talk with others, have discussions, greet one another, and argue about topics. Daily life involves the various roles we operate in, such as a waitress, a customer, a professor or a student. It is the perspective of ethnomethodology to consider the daily operation of society, and the interaction that produces it as a social order, and consider all events in it orderl'y, and essentially non-chaotic. Ethnomethodology fully opposes the Hobbesian nightmare: even events that seem to be chaotic such as riots are not situations that are chaotic in and of themselves. Consider the ‘mosh-pit’, an event that seems chaotic to the naked eye. Even that kind of activity has certain ‘rules’ of operation. Pushing each other while ‘waving’ their hair, heavy metal moshers recognize this is part of the normative order of the event they recognize as moshing. The situation makes sense to people and is intelligible to other moshers in that situation. Thus, the appearance of chaos is not necessarily a sign of real, authentic chaos. But what would authentic chaos consist of?

4.1 The normative order of daily life

As mentioned previously, there is no ‘time out’ in daily life. A truly chaotic situation would consist of persons’ inability to make sense of it. As presented in the earlier example of Tick-tack-toe gameplay, a breach reveals the normative order of events. In Garfinkel’s opinion, a successful breach involves that the member should be unable to recognize the situation as anything he or she knows. A breach in daily life should be designed so that the person cannot leave the situation or normalize it. The breaching move should be inserted within
the normative order, and it should be accounted for, by the experimenter, as belonging to that order. (Garfinkel 1967, 54.) If the breach is successful,

[t]he member’s real perceived environment on losing its known-in-common background should become “specifically senseless”. Ideally speaking, behaviors directed to such a senseless environment should be those of bewilderment, uncertainty, internal conflict, psycho-social isolation, acute, and nameless anxiety along with various symptoms of acute depersonalization. Structures of interaction should be correspondingly disorganized. (Garfinkel 1967, 54–55.)

The question remains, however, is a fully senseless environment possible in real life? In the Tick-tack-toe experiments the possibility to leave the game (or end the game) was one way to solve the situation. To attempt a game that does not make any sense would feel like a pointless effort. In daily life, however, we cannot step outside of the ‘game of life’. We are continuously faced with the task of making sense of each other’s actions, but we are well equipped to handle these everyday situations as they furnish our lives. This is not only because we are able to do so, but also because in everyday life, people are not usually attempting to cause disruption the typical and mundane environments in which our lives take place.

However, sometimes people find it entertaining to produce practical jokes in the midst of ordinary life. Hidden camera television shows for instance have taken the job of producing disruptions and approaching playfully the normative order of daily life. Before presenting two of Garfinkel’s (1963) demonstrations, the following story will be considered.

In January 2002, a woman was taking the 6th train in New York. She was sitting down reading a book and going about her normal daily life when she took notice of a man entering the train. The man glanced the map on the wall and stood calmly and casually as the train continued its route. The man was wearing a winter coat, shoes, scarf and gloves, but somehow seemed to have misplaced his pants, wearing only a pair of yellow underwear. After spending a few seconds staring at the man, she turned her eyes to her book and appeared to be reading. At the next stop, another man entered the train, again with no pants, and appeared to casually go about his daily life without indicating that anything unusual was going
The woman, after taking notice of the second man, put the book in her bag. After some men sitting opposite to her started laughing quietly, she covered her mouth and laughed with them. After a while, a third man with no pants entered the train. The ride continued for another four stops.¹

The situation was recorded on video, and uploaded on YouTube five years later. When the woman discovered she had been the “star” of this film because her reactions were being recorded, she was able to tell her experience of that strange train ride:

“I was going to meet someone for brunch so I was on the 6th train, I'm reading my book, minding my own business and there's like commotion on the train, some people are like murmuring and I look up, and there's a guy, he has no pants on. So, I mean there is that moment where you're like something weird is going on and it could potentially hurt me.”

“Because those guys were laughing everyone on the subway I realized that this was some sort of prank they meant us no harm we weren't gonna get hurt and it just became really funny. I think I got to my stop and a got off and I never really knew what it was all about.”²

This case illustrates a classical situation in which anyone’s basic understanding of normality can be breached during daily life. In the midst of the strange, and what appeared to be even a threatening situation to the woman, two men across the woman had started laughing, and upon noticing this the woman covered her mouth to laugh quietly with them. Usual cases of laughter involve either “laughing at” or “laughing with” (Glenn 1995, 55). The people in the subway were able to interpret it as a joke through laughter, specifically “laughing with” each other. Laughter in this case provided a transformation of social structure, in which the previously odd was transformed into understandable.

**4.2 The process of normalization**

Social interaction is full of meaning, and this meaning is being interpreted, produced and confirmed by members’ continuous interactional work. Everyday life is a continuous process of producing normal environments that for members consist of recognizable, analyzable and sensible events.

The organizational and operational features of concerted actions are importantly determined by whatever the personnel of the system treat as actual and potential displays of perceivedly normal events of their interpersonal environments and relationships of interaction (Garfinkel 1963, 188).

The term ‘perceivedly normal’ refers to the idea that not only are events judged based on the expectations of what is normal, but they are observable ones, that is, the very normality of an event is necessarily something ‘anyone’ can see and judge. Perceivedly normal is always scenic to people, and not found in the privacy of one’s mind. Garfinkel (p.188) lists five features that people respond to in determining the typicality, that is, ‘perceived normality’ of an event. These are (1) likelihood, (2) comparability, (3) causal texture, (4) instrumental efficacy and (5) moral requiredness. These mean, respectively, that 1) events are considered to have a chance of occurrence (what is likely to occur and what is unlikely to occur); 2) they are comparable to an earlier set of events and project future events in retrospect; 3) they are seen as arising from and being causally linked to the conditions in which they occur; 4) they express intentions toward goals; and 5) they are evaluated in their response to a recognized order.

A process of normalization takes place when normal environments are disrupted by odd events. The normality is restorable through “judgemental work”. When an event does not seem normal to an ordinary observer, the above mentioned formal features are used to restore the normality of the situation. This work is “determinative of routinized structures” (Garfinkel 1963, 188), that is, judgemental work involves elements that are already shared. Through this work of recognizing and maintaining normality of ordinary events, emerges their inherent stability. On one hand these environments have a ‘seen from within’ character, and on the other hand they are stable throughout.
To test how trust features into daily life, Garfinkel introduces his students with a task of breaching the expectancies that operate in the background of any normal environment. In games, the events are seen as events-in-an-order, which means they are essentially perceived as normal game events as opposed to isolated behaviors. People are engaged with each other so that they mutually attach the meaning to the events. The background holds that persons expect themselves and others being mutually assigned to see the marking of “x” in the empty square as making the first move, and so on. Similarly in real life, people have as their background understanding that people are supposed to utter certain possible things for instance in order to establish greetings.

In everyday life the rules are not explicit, but are nonetheless referenced continuously. In a state of normality, there is no necessary need to be attending to the rules explicitly. They become visible only in situations where they are somehow, for some reason, called into question. (Mehan & Wood 1975, 23.)

4.3 Breaching normal environments

The first experiment presented here was conducted in the midst of ordinary conversations, so as to reveal the expectancy that people have a common sense understanding of everyday communications. The second was conducted in family homes, where the experimenters were instructed to pretend to be boarders in their own homes to their parents or spouses. This experiment demanded more effort, and many in fact refused to carry it out or were unsuccessful. The ones that were successful, provided important insights about the morality of everyday life.

4.3.1 Strange conversations

When people who know each other are engaged in a conversation, they assume common knowledge, “matters just known in common”, that are taken for granted. People expect that the other person will understand the meaning of their utterances and the references they make. This extends to matters that are not mentioned. (Garfinkel 1963, 220.) Students were to behave as if they were unaware of the clear meaning of the subject’s utterance. During a conversation with a friend, family member or an acquaintance, students were not to take
the other person’s utterances at face value, and insist for clarifications. Reports came back from 25 instances of these types of situations (p. 221). The following three excerpts (1–3) serve as examples. The original excerpts in the “Trust” paper consist of eight cases (p. 221–223) of which seven were also presented in Studies in Ethnomethodology (p. 42–44).

S = Subject; E = Experimenter

**Excerpt 1 (“Case 2”)**

S: “Hi, Ray. How is your girlfriend feeling?”
E: “What do you mean, how is she feeling? Do you mean physical or mental?”
S: “I mean how is she feeling? What’s the matter with you?”
E: “Nothing. Just explain a little clearer, what do you mean?”
S: “Skip it. How are your Med School applications coming?”
E: “What do you mean, ‘How are they?’ “
S: “You know what I mean.”
E: “I really don’t.”
S: “What’s the matter with you? Are you sick?”

**Excerpt 2 (“Case 3”)**

On Friday night my husband and I were watching television. My husband remarked that he was tired. I asked, “How are you tired? Physically, mentally, or just bored?”
S: “I don’t know, I guess physically, mainly.”
E: “You mean that your muscles ache, or your bones?”
S: “I guess so. Don’t be so technical.”
S: (After more watching) “All these old movies have the same kind of old iron bedsted in them.”
E: “What do you mean? Do you mean all old movies, or some of them, or just the ones you have seen?”
S: “What’s the matter with you? You know what I mean.”
E: “I wish you would be more specific.”
S: “You know what I mean! Drop dead!”
Excerpt 3 (“Case 7”)

My friend and I were talking about a man whose overbearing attitude annoyed us. My friend expressed his feeling.
S: “I’m sick of him.”
E: “Would you explain what is wrong with you that you are sick?”
S: “Are you kidding me? You know what I mean.”
E: “Please explain your ailment.”
S: (He listened to me with a puzzled look.) “What came over you? We never talk this way, do we?”

The experimenters’ behaviour in these examples accomplishes to confuse the subjects. The question “are you sick?” or “what came over you?” creates a situation where the experimenter’s behaviour is interpreted as something that requires an explanation. In normal conversations, we respond to each other’s questions without doubting their meaning. We take meanings at face value, and are able to respond to them without much trouble. If social interactions involve a problem of meaning, it refers to occasional problems in particular contexts. Most of the time what others do is ‘transparent’ to all parties. (Francis & Hester 2004, 5–6.) Another example from this particular experiment is described in the following report (Garfinkel 1963, 222–223).

“Case 8”

Apparently as a casual afterthought, my husband mentioned Friday night, “Did you remember to drop off my shirts today?”

Taking nothing for granted, I replied, “I remember that you said something about it this morning. What shirts did you mean, and what did you mean by having them ‘dropped off’? He looked puzzled, as though I must have answered some other question than the one asked.
Instead of making the explanation he seemed to be waiting for, I persisted, “I thought our shirts were all in pretty good shape; why not keep them a little longer?” I had the uncomfortable feeling I had overplayed the part.

He no longer looked puzzled, but indignant. He repeated, “A little longer! What do you mean, and what have you done with my shirts?”

I acted indignant too. I asked, “What shirts? You have sport shirts, plain shirts, wool shirts, regular shirts, and dirty shirts. I’m no mind reader. What exactly did you want?”

My husband again looked confused, as though he was trying to justify my behaviour. He seemed simultaneously to be on the defensive and offensive. He assumed a very patient, tolerant air, and said “Now, let’s start all over again. Did you drop off my shirts today?”

I replied “I heard you before. It’s your meaning I wish was more clear. As far as I am concerned dropping off your shirts – which ever shirts you mean – could mean giving them to the Goodwill, leaving them at the cleaners, at the laundromat, or throwing them out. I never know what you mean with those vague statements.”

He reflected on what I said, then changed the entire perspective by acting as though we were playing a game, that it was all a joke. He seemed to enjoy the joke. He ruined my approach by assuming the role I thought was mine. He then said, “Well, let’s take this step by step with ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers: Did you see the dirty shirts I left on the kitchenette, yes or no?”

I could see no way to complicate his question, so felt forced to answer “Yes”. In the same fashion, he asked if I picked up the shirts; if I put them in the care; if I left them at the laundry; and if I did all these things that day, Friday. My answers were “Yes”.

The experiment, it seems to me, had been cut short by his reducing all the parts of his previous questions to their simplest terms, which were given to me as if I were a child unable to handle any complex questions, problems, or situations.
In this example, the subject managed to turn the situation into a joke, in which the experimenter was “unable to handle any complex questions”. The outcome is interesting in the sense that the subject was able to solve the problem he was presented with by acting for practical purposes as if the experimenter was indeed unable to grasp the meaning of what was being said.

This example illustrates how social reality can function without considering how the mental states of persons are in relation to the situation. It was possible to restore a state of intersubjectivity by altering one’s own actions to suit the normative order (in this case, the experimenter’s “practical joke”).

4.3.2 Home life disrupted

Garfinkel instructed his students to treat a normal social situation as something it ‘really’ was not. Students were asked to spend a short time in their own home pretending to be boarders (i.e., persons who pay to live in another persons’ home). As boarders, the student was to behave in a polite fashion, avoid getting personal with others and speak only when spoken to. Some students refused to do the assignment out of being afraid to do it, or reported being unsuccessful because the family members treated their conduct as a joke. Other students reported that family members attempted to make sense of the situation while appearing confused, shocked, anxious, and even angry. Family members insisted the student explains the reason for acting this way, mocked the students “over-polite” manners, and sought various explanations such as the student being ill or having something to hide from the family. In all situations it was possible to restore the situation upon explaining the situation having been an experiment. Family members, however, were not amused and felt offended.

[Family members were stupified, vigorously sought to make the strange actions intelligible, and to restore the situation to normal appearances. Reports were filled with accounts of astonishment, bewilderment, shock, anxiety, embarrassment, and anger as well as with charges by curious family members that the student was mean, inconsiderate, selfish, nasty, and impolite. Family members demanded explanation: “What’s the matter?” “What’s gotten into you?” “Did you
“Are you sick?” “What are you being so superior about?” “Why are you mad?” “Are you out of your mind or are you just stupid?” One student acutely embarrassed his mother in front of her friends by asking if she minded if he had a snack from the refrigerator. “Mind if you have a little snack? You’ve been eating little snacks around here for years without asking me. What’s gotten into you?!” One mother, infuriated when her daughter spoke to her only when she was spoken to, began to shriek in angry denunciation of the daughter for her disrespect and insubordination and refused to be calmed by the student’s sister. A father berated his daughter for being insufficiently concerned for the welfare of others and of acting like a spoiled child. (Garfinkel 1963, 226-227.)

There were unexpected results in terms of the students’ own feelings during the experiment. The students did not feel much guilt, shame or embarrassment during the episode. Only in one case did the experimenter report serious regrets. When they were faced with angry family members, they became angry in return and “slipped easily into subjectively recognizable feelings and actions”. (ibid., 227.)

The family members’ reactions to the episode was occasionally treated as a cue for a “joint comedy routine”, but it was soon clear to them that this was not the nature of the situation. They were soon irritated, angry, and felt the experimenter had taken the “joke” too far. The student’s polite manners were mocked and responded with sarcasm. As family members attempted to make sense of the situation as it unfolded,

explanations were sought in terms of understandable and previous motives of the student: the accusation that the student was covering up something important that the family should know; that the student was working too hard in school; the student was ill; that there had been “another fith” with a fiancee. (…) A father followed his son into the bedroom. “Your mother is right. You don’t look well and you’re not talking sense. You had better get another job that doesn’t require such late hours.” To this the student replied that he appreciated his consideration, but that he felt fine and only wanted a little privacy. The father responded in high rage, “I don’t want any more of that out of you. And if you can’t treat your mother decently, you’d better move out!” (ibid., 227.)
The strange episode ended once the student explained the real motive behind his or her acting this way.

There were no cases in which the situation was not restorable upon the student’s explanation. Nevertheless, for the most part, family members were not amused and only rarely did they find the experience instructive, as the student argued that it was supposed to have been. After hearing the explanation, a sister relied coldly on behalf of a family of four, “Please, no more of these experiments. We’re not rats you know.” (ibid., 227.)

This experiment showed, more than the previous one, the possible moral consequences of disrupting behavior. We can find that everyday life involves a series of “normal environments”, in which people are producing intersubjectivity and taking each other’s actions and words at face value. More importantly, we find that normal environments involve persons’ expectation that each person is behaving to produce actions that are to be understood as how they appear to be. The family members assumed there was some explanation behind the student’s behavior (e.g., a bad day, trying to be funny) but once these explanations no longer fit the scene, the family members began to see the student’s behavior as rude and intentionally disruptive. We find that the family members held their understanding that the student was able to produce ordinary environments, cooperate and act ‘normally’, but had chosen to do otherwise during this episode.

“Case 8” turned out to be an unsuccessful breach, because the husband was able to find a ‘way out’ of the strange situation by interpreting his wife’s behavior as a practical joke. Whether the husband knew afterwards her original intention does not change the fact that during this situation, he was forced to make sense of the behavior in some way to be able to continue to interact and sustain a sensible environment. In excerpt 1, the short conversation resulted in the subject’s confused remark “are you sick?” The experimenter could have continued to test his subject’s patience by explaining that he did not have a flu or any kind of illness at the time being, and so on. It should be noted that these kinds of interactions can be considered uncooperative in the sense that the subject’s attempt to engage the experimenter continuously fails as the experimenter refuses to react to the communicative acts accordingly.
4.4. Trust and the constitution of actions

If we consider the above examples, we can make the discovery that all interactions are essentially cases of cooperation. But moreover, people engage each other with the assumption that the other person’s actions are designed to be discoverable as what they seem to be, that is, they are designed to be seen as normal communicative attempts, normal everyday conduct that anyone is able to see and interpret in a similar manner. There is no problem of meaning in social interaction, because people assume other’s utterances at face value and take for granted that they are designed to be understood exactly the way they appear in a normal environment: as greetings, as questions about other’s well-being, or as inquiries about previous events, and so forth. The broader experiment showed the way in which a disruptive behavior can result in feelings of anger and frustration towards the person who behaves in ways that are not expected in a given normal environment. The issue was not necessarily that the experimenter’s behavior itself was rebuked as a case of misconduct or breaking a norm. It was actually the fact that the experimenter had intentionally done this and the family members’ were forced in a situation where they had to make sense of the behavior in order to normalize the situation in some way. The family members were ‘fooled’ as they ‘trusted’ that the experimenter’s behavior was a case of normal cooperative, intentional behavior even if seemed as odd as it was.

What was essentially drawn into view by these experiment, turns out to be related to trust. In Garfinkel’s article, trust is defined in terms of person’s participation in the constitution of the social environment. Previously in the case of games, it was defined that when a person trusts, they are producing actions that comply with the constitutive order of events, that is, they produce events that can be seen as game events. In daily life, in social situations, we also trust, and produce actions that comply with the constitutive order of daily life. Just as in games, in daily life we assume that the events we see are a part of a normative order, and we as individual members of society are able to produce the kinds of actions that are understandable and discoverable as actions in-a-normative-order. Trust describes the way in which a person takes for granted the meanings and the definitions of actions as events-in-an-order, and is able to produce them on the basis of this assumption. By taking for granted the presuppositions of daily life, people participate in the social world and simultaneously constitute it.
The concept of trust defines, importantly, something that seems to connect the individual to the social. The concept also reveals that this connection is moral in nature, because it requires for members to orient to the social situation in order to make it real for others as well. In some sense, trust seems to be a matter of person’s experience of the social world, and at the same time, it seems to be related to how humans are social in general.

Garfinkel considers trust as a background condition of constitutive action, it does not emerge from that action (Watson 2009, 479). Trust is not an outcome of interpretive procedures but something that enables these interpretations and makes them sanctionable matters. Moreover, the subjects in these experiments saw the experimenter’s behavior as a departures from the ordinary, and thus, sought to make sense of the experimenter’s behavior as intentional deviation from the expectancies of daily life.

Rather than their belief that ‘anyone could see what they meant’ being shaken by the experimenters’ behaviour, the subjects inferred instead that the experimenters were ‘up to something’. Further, their expressions of ‘righteous hostility’ indicate that, while they could not fathom quite what the experimenter was up to, they saw it as uncooperative and somehow directed ‘at them’. (Other interpretative possibilities, including the possibility that the experimenter had temporarily taken leave of his senses, also seemed to have been entertained. Nonetheless, the conclusion that the experimenter’s behaviours were intelligibly motivated seems to have been most viable across a range of interactional exigencies and, hence, the predominant one.) (Heritage 1984, 99: parenthesis original)
5. EVOLUTIONARY ANTHROPOLOGY AND SHARED INTENTIONALITY

At this point the ethnomethodological viewpoint to social interaction and the creation of social actions has been discussed. There are certain assumptions and expectancies that are an important part of the creation of shared understandings. The constitutive expectancies formulate a structure that features three levels of expectations. Individuals have expectations not only of other people's actions, but about other people’s expectations about their own actions. The breaching experiments demonstrated how breaking these expectations causes confusion and the immediate attempt to normalize the situation, and thus the attempt to restore the intersubjective world. It was also discovered that the subjects upheld their expectation that the experimenter was able to understand and produce normal interaction but was intentionally causing confusion in them by behaving this way.

There are certain cognitive abilities that enable the kind of intersubjective sharing characteristic to human sociality. The two concepts reviewed in this chapter are (1) cooperation and the notion of (2) intersubjective context. These are considered to have an important role in terms of human sociality, and they are essentially related to how we are able to function together as groups, and produce the kind of interaction that is unique to humans.

The concepts reviewed in this chapter are theoretical notions in evolutionary anthropology. Michael Tomasello and his colleagues have compared chimpanzees with human children in various situations and settings to produce understanding of the unique features that are found in humans. In studies where children have been involved in tasks that require cooperation and collaboration, research has been able to show specifically the way human collaboration differs from that of chimpanzees, our nearest relatives.

This chapter presents these ideas and discusses them from an ethnomethodological perspective. Considering the innate and species-unique features that are at the base of our way of interacting offers an interesting topic in its own right, but in the present discussion I have found it important to discover the possible relationship these abilities have with the processes of producing intelligible, social environments. How are these abilities used and in what sense do they enter the actual, practical accomplishment of intersubjectivity?
5.1 The ‘uncoded’ basis of human communication

Human communication can be described in terms of ‘shared intentionality’. The concept refers to skills that enable us to cooperatively pursue joint goals and act together as groups. The notion of shared intentionality refers to “a suite of social-cognitive and social-motivational skills”, that enable individuals to share psychological states in a truly intersubjective way. (Tomasello 2008.) This kinds of sharing is not a matter of individuals’ simultaneous processing but something that emerges from it.

Several components can be seen to characterize our way of interacting. Levinson (2006a) has articulated the notion of an “interaction engine”, which singles out at least four types of abilities that are involved in human interactions. These are (1) mind-reading abilities, (2) mirror mind-reading abilities, (3) Gricean intentions, and (4) behavioral predispositions or proclivities such as the ritual of greetings. The Gricean intentions were originally formulated in philosophy, and offer some basic intuitive ‘rules’ that we must adhere to when we interact in a cooperative manner. These ‘rules’ or ‘maxims’ consist of instructions for interactions that each party to a conversation should recognize as normative.

Mind-reading refers to our ability understand and infer other people’s intentions and their goal-oriented behavior. Interestingly, primates have been discovered to have some forms of mind-reading abilities (Call & Tomasello 2008). Mirror mind-reading abilities refer to our understanding of other people’s understanding of our own intentions. This is a key component when coordinating actions and understanding the interchangeability of roles (Levinson 2006a). This ability is also described by the constitutive expectancies. Gricean intentions refer to the normative ‘instructions’ for conducting ourselves so that we can be understood by others. From an ethnomethodological perspective, these features are essentially part of common sense and are to be followed not for the sake of being normative, but for the sake of being intelligible and cooperative.

What about language? When we look at human interaction we can see that the spoken language clearly characterizes our communication. However, Tomasello’s (2008) central claim is that if we seek to understand human communication, we have to begin with something other than language, because human languages are in some sense coded. An explicit,
symbolic code would require a communicative infrastructure that is as rich as the code. (Tomasello 2008, 57–58.) The abilities in our “interaction engine” are independent of language and in fact provide a basis for language. Language “piggy-backs” on a system of cooperative communication that is fully operational, and diversify the way in which people are able to interact socially. Any universal features found in human interaction derive from this infrastructure, while languages across the world take on different variations. (Levinson 2006a.)

There are two important communicative action types that can be distinguished as ‘uncoded’ communications: (1) Communicative pointing gestures have the potential of directing attention to something in the immediate environment, and (2) communicative pantomiming can iconically simulate something that is not in the immediate environment. These gestures do not begin with a pre-established code between people. They are based entirely on seeing behaviors as intentional, communicative, and cooperative attempts to convey information. The acts of pointing and pantomiming, although simple in appearance, can be used to communicate complex messages. (Tomasello 2008, 79–80.) These gestural communications are based on our ability to infer meanings and intentions.

5.2 The ‘intersubjective context’

Tomasello uses the concept of a conceptual common ground to refer to the shared context from which we can infer the meanings for different communicative acts. In one of Tomasello’s (2008) examples, the pointing to an empty glass can convey a request: a man in a bar, upon reaching eye-contact with the bartender, points to his empty glass, and thus accomplishes to communicate “please fill it up with liquor”. This kind of communication is possible because of shared background knowledge. A simple pointing gesture involve[s] the split between the referential and the social intention, as the communicator attempts to direct the recipient’s attention to something for some reason, and the recipient attempts to follow this attention directing and to infer this reason— sometimes with a great inferential “distance” to be covered. (ibid., 64–65.)
Reading the meaning of a simple gesture involves the recognition of what the reference is, and the reason, that is, the social intention behind the gesture. We are able to understand why someone’s pointing gesture is a communicative act. Importantly, the more is assumed between interactants, the less needs to be overtly expressed (ibid., 79–80). Because of shared background knowledge, I only need to make an annoyed face and my spouse understands to turn the volume down on a commercial break during our TV watching. Therefore, gestures themselves, or other communicative ‘signals’ do not contain meanings in and of themselves, but are assigned with meanings in the immediate environment by a shared background understanding of common ground.

Common ground takes people beyond an egocentric perspective (ibid., 76). It would not make sense to attempt to communicate without considering how the partner sees our own actions. What is in person’s own private perspective, becomes irrelevant for practical purposes. The things that do not belong to the common ground are essentially private in the sense that referring to them would not permit the other person access to it in order to make sense of the communicative attempt. What is private would first have to be made public in some way so that it can be found from within the common conceptual ground.

The common ground may involve either the immediate perceptual environment or implicit cultural knowledge. In communicative contexts, the common ground is specified by what interactants find relevant for the social interaction. What people pick out as relevant for the production of communications presents an intersubjective context. (Tomasello 2008, 75.) This is illustrated by the fact that when I point to some object in the immediate environment, you are likely to find an aspect of that object that I am referring to. The complexity of the environment is not a problem in this sense, and there is no real problem of meaning. Our ability to find shared understandings is entirely based on our ability to conceptualize the context in which such an understanding is possible. As we know how a specific meaning is possible to infer in a given situation, we can rely on others to find it. In communicative situations, it would not make sense to look for meanings anywhere else than the context of shared conceptual common ground (cf. Goodwin 2000).
In the ethnomethodological perspective, the problem of meaning also disappears through the interaction process, where the subsequent turn provides a ‘document’ of how the previous communicative attempt was interpreted. We continuously receive feedback and evidence of the accuracy of our interpretations, and we quickly find when misunderstandings have occurred. The misunderstanding is revealed as it becomes discoverable by successive actions and interpretations. The intersubjective context is therefore assumed, and evidence for this context being relevant is continuously proven, which suggests the intersubjective meaning is not a static in nature but assumed, taken for granted, and continuously discoverable. The notion of congruency of relevances in Schutzian terminology recognizes the same idea that has been discussed.

[P]erson expects, expects that the other person does the same, and expects that as he expects it of the other the other expects the like of him that the differences in their perspectives that originate in their particular individual biographies are irrelevant for the purposes at hand of each and that both have selected and interpreted the actually and potentially common objects in an “empirically identical” manner that is sufficient for the purposes at hand (Garfinkel 1963, 220).

The notion of common ground and the interchangeability of standpoints recognize in a generally similar way, the very basis of our rationalizations in cooperative communication. We are able to produce an understanding of what is in our common ground by positioning ourselves in the place of another person. It seems that the recognition of common ground is related to our rationalizations about what is communicable, and what is possible to use as tools or references in communications. Common ground, then, provides us with perspectives that are socially based.

5.3 Cooperation

Interaction involves cooperation to a large extent. People design their communicative actions so that their underlying intentions are recognizable, and so that the actions belong to some recognizable joint activity, such as greetings, having a conversation, or even exchanging insults. Interaction consists of sequences of closely timed turn-taking, where each new turn constitutes the interpretation of the previous turn. People attribute intentions onto the
visible actions, and assume cooperation on all participants in order to achieve the communication of a message. (Levinson 2006b, 45–46.) Therefore, another important aspect of common ground is the assumption that communications are assumed to involve cooperation, and cooperative motives. When I point to an object, I create an environment in which you are likely to rationalize my communicative attempt as intentional and cooperative, so that I do not point so as to stretch my hand for the purpose of some sort of exercise, but do so that you would understand that I want you to know my communicative intention. The communicator has the idea that “I want you to know what I mean” and “I want you to know that I want you to know what I mean”. The referential and social intentions are involved in all communications. (Tomasello 2008.)

5.3.1 The ‘evolutionary logic’ of cooperation

What can be discovered about the cooperative nature of human sociality from the evolutionary perspective? In terms of cooperation and sociality in the human species, we can talk about the evolutionary selection pressures such as why cooperation makes sense in an evolutionary scale. Pro-sociality, helping and cooperation can be seen as features that have evolved in the course of human evolution and that they have selected due to certain selection pressures. Since we live our lives in groups and societies, it is perhaps no wonder that the cooperative tendencies have been favoured. Prosocial behavior, helping and caring for others is beneficial to individuals when the group members are collaborating. There is therefore an evolutionary logic to cooperation. (Tomasello 2014a.) Cooperation in humans does not refer to only the idea of helping and being pro-social but is a part of the way we interact with each other in general.

Research has shown that young children have an understanding of the commitments related to joint activities. Children of 18- to 24-month-old were studied in terms of their ability to coordinate actions in joint activities. In one part of the study, the adult engaging with the child was to stop and interrupt his or her participation in the joint activity. It was discovered that children attempted to re-engage the adult and communicate so as to encourage them to continue. This shows children understood the joint goal or shared activity taking place. The study also revealed that children cooperated for its own sake. (Warneken, Chen & Tomasello 2006.)
While cooperation makes sense evolutionarily, it has been found that infants are intrinsically motivated to help other people even when there is no indication of a reward. (Tomasello 2014a, 190.) This suggests that cooperation is something people do without necessarily rationalizing about the possible outcomes that might benefit the individual. It can be pointed out that human cooperation does not necessarily consist of persons’ seeking individual gains or the avoidance of punishments. Cooperation seems to be intrinsic in humans in the sense that people act in cooperative and helpful ways in an altruistic fashion. Interestingly, in a study by Hepach & Vaish & Tomasello (2012), it was found that children like to see others helped even when they are not themselves actively engaged in the situation or in a position to offer help. Children were thus not motivated by the possibility to gain credit for their actions (ibid., 5). This suggests something fundamentally important about human sociality. Human beings have evolved to be a highly cooperative, “ultra-social”, with intrinsic tendencies for prosocial behavior (Tomasello 2014a).

5.3.2 The cooperative motivations

Tomasello argues that there are three types of motivations humans have evolved that relate to communication. One is requesting, which is basically about getting others to do things. They can also involve polite, suggestive, or gentle requests for help. On many occasions, all people need to do is make their desires known, and others will react to them. Requesting involves getting the participant to do something by communicating this desire. Another communicative motive is informing, which is a type of helping. There is also a third motive which consists of sharing of attitudes and feelings with others so as to expand our common ground with other people. (ibid., 84–87.)

These cooperative motives are involved in the common ground. People understand, together, that individuals do not generally point to objects without a communicative reason. The expectation that people can read our social intentions importantly adds an additional layer that plays an important role in human communication (ibid., 89). Participants trust in these social intentions, that is, the cooperative motives are involved in communicative attempts (ibid., 90). The communicative motive is part of the common ground in which communication happens, that is, participants know together the motivations, as well as what is relevant for the interaction (ibid., 91–92).
Cooperation seems to be a part of the constitution of any intelligible action. This is visible in recipient design. By uttering the words “what time is it”, I am choosing my words so as to make an intelligible communicative attempt which you can grasp and respond to. It is irrelevant whether I am interested in what time it is, or what my underlying motive is for asking this question in order to accomplish a successful communication. It is irrelevant what is ‘inside my head’. It is in our understanding that this turn was designed so as to be understood. This feature becomes most interesting when we look at arguments or fights between people. Even the exchange of insults importantly includes the cooperative motive, in which “I want you to know that I am insulting you”.

In daily interactions, when there are misunderstandings or breakdowns, we can repair them and correct the misunderstanding on the spot. A communicative attempt would fail if the recipient were to misunderstand the reference as something that was not intended. The communicative attempt would fail also if the communicator thinks the recipient thinks the communicator is referring to something he/she is not. (Tomassello 2008, 95–96.) Communication therefore requires that participants assume that all parties have the same understanding of what is going on. To go on by assuming that others are not following the idea or the object that is referenced, constitutes a failed communication.

5.4 Discussion: the cooperative structure and the normative order

In the light of previous examination of the cooperative structure of human communication, two key points can be discussed. These points show the relation between the features that characterize human interaction and the way in which they are simultaneously realized in the normative order of daily life, and thus, social interaction in general.

5.4.1 Abilities and assumptions

The intersubjective context specifies a structure or a ground that is required in order to accomplish any communicative acts. Our ability to recognize this context enables us to design our actions so that the content of our communicative acts and our social intentions are recognized. If I try to reference something that is clearly not in our shared intersubjective context, my communicative act has failed.
If I intentionally start talking to you in a language you don’t speak, or refer to objects that you cannot see while assuming that you are able to presently see them, I have perhaps made you feel uncomfortable, or I have appeared rude or arrogant towards you, and you may rebuke me for this. In acting this way, I have violated the expectancy of congruency of relevances. I have based my action not in what is in our shared intersubjective context, but on what is in my private context. I have acted in a way that is essentially uncooperative, but importantly, I have also violated the very expectancy of cooperation. Our understanding of the intersubjective context as a ground for communication is expected and assumed in everyday life. It seems that the person’s understanding of this intersubjective context is itself embedded in a normative order.

The assumption of cooperation is described in Tomasello’s account as a recursive structure. The structure involves that “we both know together that we are helpful” so that “you expect me to expect you (and so on) to be helpful”. This recursivity is essential for adopting mutually expected norms of cooperation. It is how we are able to assume that everyone will be a cooperative partner. (ibid., 94–95.) We can formulate Tomasello’s cooperative expectancy in terms of constitutive expectancies as follows:

1. A person’s actions are expected to be helpful and be motivated by cooperation with the communicative partner.
2. A person expects that as it holds for themselves, it holds for the other person as well.
3. A person expects that as they expects it to hold for the other person, the other person expects it to hold for them.

The Garfinkelian treatment would specify the cooperative motivation as a normative order to which the constitutive expectancies are attached. This would suggest that the expectation of cooperativeness is specifically recognized as a part of the constitutive structure. The social motivation is therefore discoverable, and part of the process of interpretation, rationalization or sense-making. This formulation suggests that the features that characterize human communication are simultaneously realized and attended to by people in social inter-
action as expectancies. In other words, in addition to saying that human interaction is characterized by cooperation, we can say it is also characterized by the assumptions of cooperation.

In terms of mind-reading abilities, we can similarly find that in addition to having the ability to infer about the intentions and goals of others, in daily life, we assume that other people have goals and intentions, and operate based on the assumption that this is the case. We do not need to have absolute knowledge of what someone is ‘really thinking’, or that they really indeed have minds, but we base our actions and understandings, our rationalizations, on the assumption of other minds. The Schutzian notion of ‘other minds’ captures this very idea.

[T]he actor in the natural attitude does not need to prove (or have it proved) that the other’s actions are animated by goals and intentions. Rather the actor starts out with the unquestioned assumption that this is the case. Thus the actor’s task is not the ‘philosophical’ one of justifying a belief in ‘other minds’, but the empirical task of specifying their ‘contents’ – the goals, intentions, etc. – which are operative on any given occasion. (Heritage 1984, 57.)

In conclusion, while human interaction is characterized by the basic abilities such as mind-reading, mirror mind-reading, and the contextual inferences such as the common ground, in addition we can find that human interaction operates on the assumptions of mind-reading, mirror mind-reading, and the recognition of common ground. These assumptions, then, become a part of the normative order. These abilities and features become trusted and relied upon not just as abilities in the head but as practical procedures that constitute any intersubjective meanings and social situation.

5.4.2 The ability to cooperate

Another point of discussion concerns our ability to recognize each other as cooperative beings who we can engage in cooperative communication. Seeing one another as cooperative beings seems to be, in some sense, a primary feature of our ways of interacting. In order to act cooperatively, we would simultaneously have to assume the other person is capable of acting cooperatively with us.
There is a difference between the assumption that other people are capable of cooperative communication, and the matter of whether people are actually being cooperative towards us in a given environment. The assumption of cooperation holds that people, in successful communicative exchanges, are being cooperative in order to produce actual, intersubjective meanings and interactions. But what about the matter of seeing person’s as capable of communication? How should we account for that?

If I suddenly refuse to communicate with other people, and if I act as if I was unable to engage in interactions, I will ruin my relationships. At worst, if I consistently act this way and keep it up, it can lead to a psychiatric diagnosis or the removal from society into a mental institution. A person who refuses or seems unable to engage in cooperative communication will be thought pathological. (Tomasello 2008, 92–93.)

As it has been pointed out earlier, we are relying on our communications having been designed so as to be understandable in everyday life. In the breaching experiment, where students were to engage people in a conversation and not take their meaning at face value, the experimenter was intentionally uncooperative towards the other person. They were not participating in the way that the subject would have expected them to participate, and this was immediately recognized by them. Interestingly, the experimenter, whether it was their objective or not, did not manage to convey themselves as person’s who are unable to cooperate. Instead, they produced what was a case of irritating behavior. In the case where experimenters pretended to be boarders in their own homes, the subjects responded with frustration and even anger. The experimenter’s behavior was interpreted as rude. If it had been the case that the person had lost their memory and thought they were in fact boarders in the house, the family members would have discovered that there was nothing intentionally rude behavior directed at them.

However, even in this case, we could argue that that the recognition of the ability to cooperate, while being in some sense primary to interaction, is still involved and assumed in the normative order. How could we breach this expectation? If we act as if we are unable to cooperate, or as if we cannot communicate in any way, it can lead to the removal from society and thus, from the ‘realm’ of daily life. Garfinkel’s breaching experiments were designed to attempt to cause a senseless environment, and it was discovered that the
breaches resulted in departures from the assumptions of daily life. By the examination presented here, we can argue, or give an account for what a truly senseless environment would amount to. If a person does not appear able to communicate at all, the basis for intersubjectivity is removed entirely.

If I walk in the savannah and encounter a lion, I am likely to be alarmed. It does not take long to realize that when I look into the eyes of the lion, there is no one there communicating with me. I realize that I am not able to get the lion to understand my communicative gestures, or any other kinds of cooperatively based communicative attempts. The lion does not follow my gaze or my pointing gesture, nor does it infer that my pointing gesture is an attempt of communicating my intention. However, if I come across a tribe of some unknown culture, I am quick to find that a mere eye gaze seems to have communicative power. This opens up the structure for the communicative attempts by which we can try to convey that we are friendly. Seeing each other as capable of communicating immediately furnishes the framework of a shared world in which we can begin to show the other person through our bodily movements, gestures and vocalizations, the things we want them to see. And in some cases, we don’t intentionally communicate something, but something gets communicated anyway. We cannot escape the fact that we are sharing the same world once we realize it, and this is apparent in the fact that whenever we enter a public setting, our behaviors become public as well. We understand each other as cooperative beings, and trust that when we engage each other in interactions, the other person not only is being cooperative, but is able to cooperate in the first place. This forms the foundation for any kind of constitutive practice.
6. TRUST AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Garfinkel’s notion of trust is not an easy concept to define. In order to fully appreciate it, we have to recognize the way in which social order is possible as a practical accomplishment, the idea of constitution, the assumptions and expectancies that are at the base of trusting, and perhaps even the very idea of recognizing each other as beings capable of communication. Trust seems to be a phenomenon that ties to cognition, because in order to trust, a person transforms events, actions and ‘mere behaviors’ into social objects with social meanings. At the same time, trust has an inherent moral quality. By trusting, we are choosing the social world as a framework for acting and in doing so, participating in the social world, constituting it with others and simultaneously, by doing this, enabling the constitution of the world for others as well. On one hand, trust presents an individual’s directedness towards the social, and on the other hand, it simultaneously creates a possibility for others to engage with that individual and the social processes they create. This creates an ongoing process where individuals can ‘enter’ the process in which people create actions that produce, respect and maintain the assumed normative order. Simultaneously, this normative order presents as a framework in which actions can become social and can constitute the very order in question.
How does this relate to intersubjectivity and human sociality? As social beings, we live our lives together and depend on others in order to be the people we are. In society, we continually recognize the institutions and the practices that present themselves as facts of reality. We rely on the ‘reality’ of the social world, take it at face value, and continually involve ourselves in both its constitution and maintenance. Trust, as *compliance* to the constitutive order, shows that our participation in this process involves a recognition of what is an ‘accurate’ way of doing things. Trust is always directed at something, and involves some form of action.

Trust defines how the social world becomes possible through actions of individuals. When we think of social phenomena, we might consider the social to be something that is more than individual’s actions. The ethnomethodological consideration holds that individual actions in concerted activities are not individual or personal actions, but involve a social nature by their very appearance as events in a social order. The rationalizations and interpretations people make during social life in order to grasp the meanings of what is ‘happening’ around them involve processes that are not reducible to individual’s personal ideas, personal opinions, or personal thought processes as such. They involve the recognition of the very possibility of how a social action in a given setting can be interpreted not by an individual such as themselves, but by *any* individual, that is, *any* member. The rationalization process involves the suspension of egocentric perspectives (Tomasello 2008) and the adoption of the ‘logic’ that applies to the basic understanding of common ground and interchangeability of standpoints.

The Garfinkelian notion of trust describes that we as individual beings can produce actions as separate of our personal, egocentric perspectives. As I point my finger at an object to communicate something to you, I do not do this for the sake of pointing my finger, but I point my finger for the sake of doing a communicative act. I realize that my own actions have the potential to be understood in a certain way, and begin to see my own actions as means to an end. Action becomes a vehicle for social meanings. This perspective emphasizes that it is our *actions* that accomplish intersubjectivity. And this is why in order to produce social reality and social meanings we have to act in cooperative ways in order to produce appropriate actions that are in that given setting discoverable as a part of the nor-
mative structure. Our actions become documents for common understanding. In our everyday life and in joint activities, shared understanding is continuously maintained and updated with successive actions that provide evidence for the way they have been recognized and discovered.

Considering actions as vehicles for social meaning succeeds to separate in the structure of intersubjectivity the elements that are individually possessed, and the elements that depend on external, inter-individual processes. The irreducibility of social phenomena is reflected in the fact that a single person cannot by themselves produce the social world. Social facts are not products of individual thinking and rationalization, but importantly, products of cooperation. Individual rationalization becomes social at the point where individual recognizes that the actions they produce become public demonstrations of social intention.

Odd, unrecognizable behaviors make the constitution of everyday social world problematic. Strange, unexpected events invite people to attempt to place the odd event in the normative order. People live with the assumption that they share a social world in which every member participates, and that each member is capable of producing actions that other people can understand. A person who continuously chooses to act in ways that do not produce sensible actions that are understandable to others, places him or herself outside of the social world, and refuses others to see them as ordinary members of society.

The notion of trust is important in the sense that it specifies how individual actions can be social in nature, and how individuals themselves can intentionally produce these actions by seeing them as social actions. Trust enables the individual’s participation in the ‘social’. Individual’s thinking and rationalization is based on a process that recognizes the structure of intersubjectivity and operates on the basis of that structure. In a state of trust, the person takes for granted the expectations of daily life, common sense world, and the possibility of social interaction. What is ‘social’, is not reducible to personal interpretations but the adoption of a framework of methodical procedures and the relation to this framework, and the social world in general is expressed as ‘trusting’.
6.1 The question of irreducibility

The idea that the ‘social’ is irreducible to individual minds has been discussed in this thesis to a certain extent. Understanding the relationship between individual minds and the social world can present a philosophical puzzle. The ethnomethodological account for this problem might be an interesting topic for future research.

As a final topic of discussion the notion of irreducibility of social phenomena is shortly visited. There is reason to believe that ethnomethodological considerations of social order and the production of intersubjectivity may contribute to discussions about the irreducible nature of social phenomena.

Theories of collective intentionality have been debated in philosophy under social ontology – a sub discipline of the philosophy of the social sciences. Social ontology is the study of social phenomena such as social groups, norms, institutional facts and collective agency (Chant & Hindriks & Preyer 2014, 5). Social ontology is concerned with the way in which things exist in the social realm. In a sense, we ascribe agency to institutions and groups, even to countries. A summative account holds that groups are merely combinations of individual agents. A non-summative account on the other hand holds that group activity is not possible to account for in terms of individual actions, but is something that emerges from them. (Schweikard & Schmid 2013.)

“The central concern of the theory of intentionality is to grasp the unity of, or the interaction between, the natural and the mental” (ibid).

The main challenge for philosophers is analyzing collective intentions as they involve a conceptual contradiction. On one hand ‘collective’ is more than the summation of its parts (the Irreducibility Claim) and on the other hand the same collective intention has to be had by all of the members in the unit individually (the Individual Ownership Claim). This is the central problem of collective intentionality. (ibid.)

An ethnomethodological account for the irreducibility of shared intentional states would involve the structure of intersubjectivity that has been discussed so far. The problem of
Collective intentionalism in philosophy is based on the idea that intentionality has to be personally held, and simultaneously the collective action is more than a mere summation of individual actions. This conceptual paradox would not exist at all if we actually shared a mind. But the case is that we do not, and this is why we have to communicate and interact to produce shared understandings. The ethnomethodological tradition specifies the structure of this process so that we can consider actions as productions of intelligibility. Actions are social in the sense that they have been designed so that they can be perceived as those actions. Via trust, our actions receive a social basis. The special deconstruction of social actions that is provided by ethnomethodology seems to avoid the philosophical paradox.

Ethnomethodological perspective does not assume that the content of the personal ownership is the same content as the collective. In fact, there is a clear distinction between what is in one’s private thoughts and what becomes publicly available and discoverable. Social phenomena are not reducible to personal mental states as such, and they need not be. It is not necessarily the case that individuals need personal attitudes for social interaction. Ethnomethodological account would hold that there is a process by which social phenomena are produced, and they can only exist through this process. The process reveals how actions can have a genuinely social meaning, and how they, while being received as those actions, contribute to the very constitution of the social world. Shared intentionality does not amount to some kind of similarity or ‘correct alignment’ of minds, but is expressed as actions, in the moment of their production and realization. Tomasello (2014b, 152) suggests that shared intentionality is irreducible “in the moment”, and only exists when two or more people are interacting.

Ethnomethodological account recognizes how shared intentionality is produced by individuals. It would avoid conceptualizing this ‘sharedness’ as a combination, or something ‘above’ individuals. Instead, it recognizes a structure that is continuously at play when people act together. The ethnomethodological perspective agrees that we cannot locate the collective within the individual, nor does it exist independent of people either. Collective is when people orient to the expectations, ‘trust’, and produce the world they recognize. Ethnomethodology would redefine the ‘collective’ as not the similarity of personal perspectives or attitudes, but the production and discovery of ‘scenic’ material that members recognize and confirm.
Gallotti (2012) emphasizes the importance of empirical research over pure conceptual analysis if we are to understand further the nature of shared intentionality. He argues (2012, 5) that the problem of irreducibility (i.e. not being able to reduce the we-mode into I-mode) is in fact an empirical problem, and not going to be settled by mere intuition or language analysis. Irreducibility is in fact a question of whether collective intentional behavior is explainable in the concepts we employ. (Gallotti 2012, 5–6.) The ethnomethodological approach, with its empirical emphasis has the potential to at least specify some aspects of collectivity in a manner that avoids overgeneralizing or simplifying the phenomenon. This thesis has presented a possible perspective to the problem of irreducibility that has an empirical basis. Rather than providing an account for the sociality of the individual mind, this thesis has presented the ethnomethodological conception of actions as genuinely social, and the processes and procedures of meaning-making and interpretation as the foundation of concerted management of the social world.
7. CONCLUSION

This thesis has been an exploration into the Garfinkelian notion of trust, and how this concept relates to the production of intersubjectivity. The concept of trust is an important one in the sense that it specifies how individuals can act socially, that is, how their actions can be genuinely social. In a state of trust, persons are assuming a normative order, whether it is a particular game of Tick-tack-toe, some other socially constituted practice, or the world of daily life. It is important to understand that trust alone does not constitute anything, but functions as the individual’s choice of participating in a constitutive activity. Social life is full of constitutive practices that we participate in without much conscious awareness of doing so. When we interact with people, we do it almost spontaneously without much consideration about what is ‘really going on’. We are not necessarily aware of the fact that by acting ‘this way’ we jointly constitute a world that only exists between us and is only ‘real’ to the people that participate in it or have the possibility to participate in it. In fact, why would we need to be aware of the nature of the process? According to Garfinkel, we are “practical theorists” who produce the world from within society as an ongoing process of sense-making, common sense procedures and the practical accomplishment of intersubjectivity. The world is invented, and appears as we create it. In a sense, we are sailing while we are building the ship we sail on.

Trust in the Garfinkelian sense refers to the point at which individual beings act in ways that are understandable to themselves and to others as actions in a given normative order. Trust enables the individual to take part in the social order and simultaneously constitute it with others. By trusting, we are making everyday life a reality for ourselves and others. Because we are not engaged in the social world alone, our decisions about how to conduct ourselves and the production of understandable actions is essentially a moral matter. This means that when a person refuses to recognize through his or her actions the environment as what it normally and ‘obviously’ appears to be for people, they are not only removing themselves from being a part of the particular social ‘reality’, they are simultaneously forcing others to make sense of this action and to maintain the normative order. Each person’s participation, then, is a moral matter, because it influences not only themselves, but the
entire constitution of the environment. Playing a game of Tick-tack-toe involves that players take for granted the situation as that of Tick-tack-toe gameplay, and realize that in order to participate in this activity, they have to produce actions that other players can perceive and confirm as moves in a game.

Trust shows that our participation is moral in nature: we realize our actions have consequences that can alter the very constitution of the game. We realize that our actions give us the possibility to share a world, and as we share a world, we become a part of it. We realize that we have the possibility to create something together that is simultaneously yours and mine. Trust enables the very phenomenon of sharing and creating something together. Our actions are the vehicles that enables us to produce something extra-individual when they are recognized by other people. Seeing other people as cooperative beings seems to be a pre-requisite for trusting, because to see each other as having the ability to engage in interactions does not need to be socially constituted as such, but is still required for any person to begin trusting and thus assuming that the partner can understand and infer certain things. Understanding that our partner is able to cooperate with us in order to produce shared understandings is an important feature of the very possibility of social actions.

In a state of trust, we operate with the assumption that our actions contribute to and constitute social activities. As I point my finger at an object, I have already made the assumption that you are able to see this gesture as an attempt to communicate something. Only then can I ‘trust’ that this gesture is transformed into something that we together can see as more than a mere movement of the finger. At the moment of making the gesture, we ‘trust’ that this gesture is a social gesture. This way the social meanings build on top of the physical world we perceive. We see that our actions, our behaviors and our ways of expressing ourselves can be interpreted by others, and by regulating, designing and shaping these behaviors we can produce the possibility that others recognize these behaviors in a similar way. Through interchangeability of standpoints and the recognition of a shared conceptual common ground we recognize how an event may seem to others, and use this rationalization to produce behaviors that can be recognized socially as actions.

Why do we trust? What exactly does trust bring to social interaction and human sociality? What we learn from Garfinkel’s notion of trust is that there is a way in which persons can
be considered to be continuously faced with the choice of belonging to a given environment. The notion of choice, however, is problematic because it indicates the involvement of a decision-making process. It turns out that in everyday life, and in the constitution of any environment, we simply trust without ‘thinking about it’. This thesis has brought into view the fact that people, in their natural ‘attitude’, are in a state of trust. Human sociality seems to involve a component of moral attunement that enables us to accomplish the various kinds of social realities that we base our lives on. The experience of an individual is not filled with personal thoughts about personal matters, but involves thoughts about matters that are ‘real’ in so far as people together recognize them as real. Trust, then, seems to also enable us to experience the social world.

The relation between abilities and processes has been discussed in this thesis. We can talk about the ability to recognize minds, but then, at the same time we also operate on the assumption of other minds. Our recognition of other minds and the intentionality of other people seems to be a matter that can be assessed either in the individual, or the social sense. As individuals we can produce interpretations about other people’s actions, about their hidden motives or their ‘real reasons’ for doing something. We can wonder about other minds and try to find out more about the inner workings of other people’s minds. In the social side of things, however, the process of reading minds acquires a specific structure that is attended to by every interacting partner. We have to attend to the material that is publicly available and recognizable in the common ground. Therefore, our reading of other minds becomes a matter of inferring the shared, social and intersubjective contexts that present the realm of communication and the very possibility of intersubjectivity itself. To make the correct inferences and produce the kinds of actions that can be inferred similarly by everyone, is a matter of ‘acting socially’, or ‘being social’. In this, we find how the understanding of the intersubjective context presents a fundamental requirement for any social action.

There is no guarantee, however, that each person is using the same set of procedures and methods to accomplish the same understandings. What makes us think anyone is being cooperative in the first place? It has been shown by research that cooperativeness in the human species seems to be somehow intrinsic, so that we do not cooperate merely for the sake of personal gains (e.g. Tomasello 2014a; Warneken & Tomasello 2006). In terms of trust, we could say that persons’ participation in the social world is not a matter of moment-
to-moment decision making, but the adoption of a ‘social attitude’ that we take on the social world as a definition of actions. Our way of seeing things becomes a matter of social perception that is simultaneously produced and maintained together with others.

The ethnomethodological perspective and the notion of trust show how these abilities (mind-reading, and mirror mind-reading) become involved, by themselves, in the production of social worlds. It shows that our ability to create and constitute a social world not only rests on these abilities, but how they become involved in the process, in action, in understanding. The material that is at person’s disposal, the rationalizations and interpretations, are reflected in the process of intersubjectivity if they are to matter to the process in any way. The ‘social’ captures the essential features of our rationalizations and produce an entirely public, available structure that we use as a basis for our shared activities. The availability of this structure to its members is an essential property and a requirement if there is to be anything ‘social’ in the first place.

We do not need to attend to the person’s private thoughts and personal intentionality when considering social interaction. After all, the process of interaction happens between people. However, the person’s participation in this process has to be accounted for in some way. People can participate in this process because the process itself is a public one. The person has to be equipped with the appropriate, typical, interpretive procedures that enable him or her to make sense of and produce sensible actions in a given environment. The person has to be aware of the intersubjective context between these people, and simultaneously utilize this context. Actors are

competent and their information [is] sufficient to any situated action that works. If they were not competent – and their information were not sufficient – then they would not be able to produce mutually intelligible practice. (...) [The actors] must be morally competent as well, because they must both trust the competence and commitment of others and be trusted in return: a gift exchange at a highly detailed sophisticated sequential level of interaction. (Rawls 2008, 52.)

In order to understand the sociality of people, we have to understand the sociality of actions and the very possibility of transforming individual thought processes into social ones. The
notion of trust has been able to show the process of transforming ‘mere actions’ into social actions, and doing so relying on the expectancy that the action is received as *that action*, and seen by others in the similar. Central to this process is the recognition of an order of activities, and the very intelligibility of actions. Intelligibility is possible because the design of actions rely essentially on the same set of procedures as their interpretation.

It is possible to infer that mental attributes, mind-reading abilities and the recognition of common ground that are involved in cooperative communication, are in the process of interaction transformed into assumptions that enable the coordinative, public, and essentially social character of our everyday understanding. Central to this is trust, that is, individual’s management of their own actions to match the expectancies to daily life, and thus enabling the constitution of the social world for other people as available, sensible, intelligible, cooperatively designed matter of evidence.

This thesis has emphasized that people are not engaging in egocentric thinking when they are communicating or acting socially. They are engaged in a reflexive meaning-making and in doing so, employ a fundamentally social view of their surroundings. By trusting, we constitute the social world in which our actions receive meaning and become the very actions we intend them to be. Trust opens up the possibility to share, and enable the very production and constitution of the social world. We can learn from trust that individual’s participation in the social world is a moral matter. The interactional work that goes into maintaining intersubjectivity does not reduce to individual actions alone but their continuous recognition and discovery. The world we recognize and operate in on a daily basis is recognizable, graspable, and sensible because we trust and by doing so, transform ‘mere appearances’ into the world of daily life.
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