Local conceptualisations of violence and dialogue
in Burundi’s post-electoral crisis

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Abstract

Burundi’s current political crisis was launched by demonstrations against President Nkurunziza’s third mandate in April 2015 and a coup attempt the following month. It has led to political killings, an outflow of refugees, damaged the country’s media and made many opposition and civil society activists and opposition politicians leave for exile. Various international organisations have accused Burundi’s government of serious human rights violations.

The political confrontation in the crisis has been formed around the opposition and civil society in exile in Belgium, represented by an umbrella alliance called CNARED, and the Burundian government led by the CNDD-FDD party. The East African Community has attempted to establish a dialogue between the parties but has not succeeded in bringing all the actors to the same table.

Many international actors and organisations have commented the Burundian conflict and presented their analysis of the conflict issues. On the contrary, this study encompasses the local aspect of the conceptualisations of the conflict. It is a pioneering case study on the narratives of violence and dialogue in the political crisis in 2015–17 by the Burundian government, opposition and civil society and their supporters.

The study uses the theory of radical disagreement and the structuration theory to analyse the discrepancies in conflict narratives between the conflict actors. On the methodological level, it uses discourse and narrative analysis. The data for the study was gathered by interviewing politically active members of the Burundian diaspora in Brussels and by collecting social media, news article and video material.

The main findings of the study are that there are radical disagreements between the parties about the way that the violence is defined, about deciding who can participate in the dialogue on the conflict issues and about the right of President Nkurunziza to seek a third term. The dialogue has been reduced to a monologue, although inclusive dialogue is the objective of all the conflict parties. These issues explain the current tension between the conflict parties.

Keywords: dialogue, post-electoral violence, conceptualisations, narratives, conflict transformation, peacebuilding.
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List of abbreviations


DRC = The Democratic Republic of Congo.

EAC = East African Community, a regional inter-governmental organisation.

FAB = *Forces armées du Burundi*. Burundi Armed Forces, the national army of Burundi.

FOREBU = *Forces Républicaines du Burundi*. Republican Forces of Burundi, an armed opposition group.

FNL = *Front National de Libération*. The National Liberation Front, an opposition party allied with the Burundian government, as well as a separate armed opposition group wing.

FRODEBU = *Front pour la Démocratie du Burundi*. Front for the Democracy of Burundi, a traditionally Hutu-dominated opposition party.


MSD = *Mouvement pour la Solidarité et la Démocratie*. Movement for Solidarity and Democracy, an opposition party.

RADEBU = *Rassemblement des démocrates burundais*. Burundian Democratic Rally, a party allied with the Burundian government.


SNR = *Service national de renseignement*. The National Intelligence Service of the Burundian state.

UPRONA = *Union pour le Progrès National*. Union for National Progress, a traditionally Tutsi-dominated opposition party.
1. Introduction

We are being exterminated. We don’t know where to go. We have no refuge.

The cry of a Burundian woman in a documentary made by France24 on the refugees in Burundi’s political crisis illustrates the desperate situation of Burundian civilians that have had to flee the recent violence in this East African country. The outflow of refugees is only one of the consequences of Burundi’s political crisis that this study examines.

The small land-locked Burundi, home to a population of 11.2 million people, is one of the world’s five poorest countries with 64.9% of the population living below the poverty line (World Bank, 2016). In spring 2015, Burundi plunged into a violent political crisis that has triggered flows of refugees and internal displacement as well as hindered access to basic services. Due to the worsening socio-economic conditions coupled with several natural and climatic catastrophes, three million Burundians were in need of immediate humanitarian assistance by the end of 2016 (Equipe Humanitaire Pays, 2016, p. 5).

Despite the daily suffering of many Burundians, the country’s crisis is rarely present on the front pages of the international media. This is probably due to Burundi’s small size and its relatively minimal importance from a Western point of view. However, the Burundian case is part of a more general African debate on presidential mandates as will be demonstrated later in this chapter.

Another reason why Burundi’s relapse to violence is interesting is that Burundi has been the target of various peacebuilding efforts since the 1990s. One of the two first country-specific programmes of the UN Peacebuilding Commission was implemented there. The international community wanted to react to the Burundian civil war with determination after what had happened in Rwanda. (Jobbins and Ahitungiye, 2015, p. 206)

‘The local’ has become a centre of interest in peace and conflict research as a consequence of the local turn in peacebuilding. Richmond (2014) argues that liberal peacebuilding offers a universal framework that does not sufficiently take into account the local actors’ visions of creating a society specific to their culture, history and needs (p. 109). Although peacebuilding is supposed to create hybrid peace with local ownership and to answer to the needs of the local civil society actors, it brings about a positive peace defined according to Western norms that may rule out the local subjects’ needs (pp. 115-116).
This study analyses ‘the local’ from another perspective than that of peacebuilding. It examines the local conceptualisations of violence and dialogue in Burundi’s political crisis by studying the conflict narratives by politically active Burundians.

Although ‘the local’ is usually defined in geographical terms, I give it an extended, national definition in this study. I define ‘the local’ as the whole Burundian national community, including both those Burundians who live in Burundi and those who are part of the diaspora residing outside the country. Even though the diaspora members live abroad, they still maintain ties to their home country and are in contact with locally based Burundians. At the end of the thesis, I briefly discuss the differences between the discourses present in Burundi and in the diaspora.

Although this study does not attempt to generalise or to encompass all the aspects of the current conflict, a better knowledge of the Burundian situation in general would facilitate the understanding of the conflict dynamics of the whole Great Lakes Region and of other African political conflicts. It would also help to analyse the shortcomings of peacebuilding. Furthermore, I argue that the alarming humanitarian situation of Burundi requires more global attention. By examining the current political crisis as one of its causes, this thesis contributes to those needs.

Before introducing the research focus and aims of this thesis I will describe the dynamics of the current political crisis in Burundi and the peace mediation process that has aimed at finding a solution to it. I will also review previous research that has been completed on the current political crisis until now.

1.1. The political crisis of 2015–17

Burundi’s current political crisis began in April 2015 when CNDD-FDD’s Pierre Nkurunziza, the incumbent president since 2005, announced that he would run for a third term in the July 2015 election. The major opposition parties pointed out that the move was anti-constitutional and called for an electoral boycott. After that people started street protests in the capital Bujumbura that were repressed by the police forces. According to different sources, 58–80 people were killed in the protests between April and July 2015. (Amnesty International, 2015, p. 4; FIDH, 2016, p. 27; Jobbins & Ahitungiye, 2015, pp. 212–213)

On 13 May 2015, army officers led by General Godefroid Niyombare launched a coup attempt while the president was attending a summit on the Burundi crisis in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The attempt failed but caused damage to the Burundian media. Furthermore, the government closed five of the
country’s private radio stations, two of which were later allowed to reopen. (Daley & Popplewood, 2016, p. 648; Reporters Without Borders, 2015, 2016)

Many opposition candidates boycotted the presidential, parliamentary and local elections that were held after a short postponement during the summer 2015. In July 2015, Nkurunziza was re-elected with 69 percent of the votes, with FNL’s Agathon Rwasa as his only contender. (Jobbins & Ahitungiye, 2015, pp. 212–213; Jones & Wittig, 2016, p. 206)

An NGO report, refuted by the Burundian government, estimates that 1 000 people have died, 8 000 been detained for political reasons, 300–800 disappeared and hundreds tortured since the beginning of the political crisis (FIDH, 2016, p. 21). UN's Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has been able to verify 564 executions between April 2015 and September 2016, the majority of their victims being opposants of Nkurunziza's third mandate (UNHRC, 2016, p. 7). Because of the crisis that still continues at the time of writing of this study, 413 600 Burundians have fled the country, including journalists, civil society leaders and members of the opposition (UNHCR, 2017, May 11).

As a political reaction, the US and the EU have put in place sanctions against Burundian individuals and the EU has cut direct funding for Burundi’s government (Guardian, 2016; O’Kane, 2016). The African Union decided to impose sanctions as well but its decision has not been implemented (Crisis Group, 2016). Furthermore, many donors have stopped their aid programmes to Burundi (Söderberg Kovacs, 2016).

The initiatives to intervene in Burundi have not led to concrete action. In January 2016, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council discussed a military intervention to Burundi under the name MAPROBU. The Burundian government rejected any intervention, warning that it would fight against such a force, and the AU finally decided to only send an official delegation to Burundi to discuss the inclusive Inter-Burundian dialogue. Another AU initiative to deploy 200 human rights and military observers has not been fully implemented. At the UN level, the Special Envoy to Burundi Jamal Benomar tried to negotiate with the Burundian government about sending in 280 unarmed UN police officers as agreed by the Security Council Resolution 2303 in July 2016. The government rejected the resolution and it has not been put into practice. (Security Council Report, 2017; UN News Centre, 2016; Williams, 2016)

The central point of disagreement in the political crisis is the interpretation of the amount of terms that a president can serve. The Burundian Constitution states that the president “is elected by universal direct suffrage for a mandate of five years, renewable once” (Burundi Const., Art. 96). The Arusha Agreement that brought an end to the Burundian Civil War, on the other hand, limits the president’s
mandate to two five-year terms and states that “no one may serve for more than two presidential terms”. Nkurunziza was elected by the Parliament, not by direct suffrage, in the 2005 election and therefore he claims that he has the right to seek office once more. There has been opposition to Nkurunziza’s third mandate even within his own party CNDD-FDD from which many civilians and intellectuals have defected and gone into exile during the crisis. (Jones & Wittig, 2016, p. 206; Wittig, 2016, p. 150)

The legal argument that the Burundian government is making to justify the third term is uncommon in sub-Saharan Africa (Grauvogel, 2016, p. 11). The Constitutional Court of Burundi approved Nkurunziza’s right to seek a third term in May 2015. The decision came under criticism when the court’s vice president, who had fled to Rwanda before the ruling, pointed out that its judges had been pressured and threatened to approve the third term. (Al Jazeera, 2015; Daley & Popplewood, 2016, p. 648)

The question of a third presidential mandate has recently been subject to debate in several African countries and the issue has received wide attention from both the media and scholars. The constitution has been amended to remove the limitation of two terms *inter alia* in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, Guinea, the Republic of Congo and Uganda (Anyaeze, 2016, p. 531). Two of Burundi’s neighbours, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, have gone through third-term debates. The DRC’s President Kabila agreed not to seek a third term after two years of political unrest and mediated talks in the end of 2016, whereas the Rwandan President Paul Kagame decided to run for a third term in 2017 after a referendum enabled him to stay in power theoretically until 2034 (BBC, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2017).

### 1.2. Regional mediation without results

The formal dialogue on the Burundian crisis has been taking place on two levels: in regional mediation and in national inter-Burundian talks. The internal process, labelled Inter-Burundian dialogue, has been organised by a national commission established by the government. The aim of the commission has been to gather views on the political crisis from ordinary Burundians and civil society organisations in different parts of the country. The process has been criticised for presenting only one side of the opinions (see sub-section 4.2.1.).

On the other hand, the mediated talks have been led by the regional organisation East African Community. It first tried to open the dialogue on a high level with multiparty talks led by the Ugandan
President Yoweri Museveni in December 2015 but the talks ended without any concrete outcome. (Söderberg Kovacs, 2016)

In March 2016, the former Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa was appointed as the new EAC facilitator for the mediation process. Since then, several rounds of talks have been organised in Arusha, Tanzania. Mkapa’s approach has been to try to invite a broad range of participants to the talks, including civil society, women, youth and religious group representatives. However, the talks have been hindered by opposition boycotts and the government’s refusal to talk to some opposition groups, such as the CNARED alliance that it has labelled as an armed group. (Söderberg Kovacs, 2016, Wolters, 2016)

In December 2016, Mkapa visited Burundi’s capital Bujumbura and presented a roadmap for the dialogue process with the objective of reaching an agreement by June 2017. However, the opposition alliance CNARED announced that it denied Mkapa’s competence as facilitator, accusing him of taking the side of Nkurunziza by legitimising his presidency. (RFI, 2016b)

In March 2017, the government and opposition still had not entered into negotiations and Mkapa was asking for a regional summit to be organised for that purpose (AFP, 2017). Therefore I argue that there is a deadlock in the Burundian crisis between the government and the opposition.

1.3. Previous research

Little research has been done so far on the post-2015 political crisis in Burundi. Most of the research has been descriptive briefing papers, reports, conference syntheses and blog posts about the events of the political crisis and about the reactions of the international community. This is natural since analysing an ongoing crisis is difficult and the picture incomplete as the conflict dynamics change continuously. Nevertheless, there has already been analysis of the causes of the crisis.

Jobbins and Ahitungiye (2015) from the NGO Search for Common Ground explain the beginning of the current crisis with the structural challenges that have not been solved despite the peacebuilding efforts, including an unfinished security sector reform. Participants of a conference on Burundi’s post-election situation argued that the international community wanted to see a success story in the post-civil war Burundi instead of supporting real conflict transformation, which has led to a culture of tolerated impunity (Grauvogel, 2016). Jobbins and Ahitungiye (2015) further argue that the international community’s interest towards Burundi has faded, due to which there has been a decrease in projects supporting democratic governance and political cooperation.
Violence has been present in Burundi for a long time. Daley and Popplewell (2016), Reyntjens (2016) and Van Acker (2015) assert that the former rebel groups, including the now ruling party CNDD-FDD, did not truly adhere to the principles of the 2000 Arusha Agreement. According to them, CNDD-FDD has put in place a system of political violence and human rights violations since its coming to power in 2005. Van Acker and Reyntjens also point out a phenomenon of militarisation in Burundian politics created both by the CNDD-FDD and some armed political opposition groups.

The lack of economic growth is another key factor explaining the political crisis. Daley and Popplewell (2016) indicate political exclusion, economic marginalisation and the rising cost of living as explaining factors behind some of the frustrations in the Burundian society. Jobbins and Ahitungiye (2015) assert that the political patronage and state capture by elites have led to the stagnation of the economy. Van Acker (2015) also argues that the political patronage has led to the political exclusion of those who do not support CNDD-FDD.

Daley and Popplewell (2016) posit that there are some warning signs of ethnicity becoming a dividing issue in the political crisis. The Tutsi have been marginalised in power positions by the current Hutu-led government and on the other hand, some Hutu in the political elite have suspicions of the Tutsi. On the contrary, Daley and Chemouni (2015) argued right after the beginning of the crisis that ethnic contradictions had lost relevance and that divisions inside the parties were more prominent in Burundian politics. Nevertheless, they added that the Tutsi could become a scapegoat in the crisis. Ethnicity as a background factor in the conflict is further addressed in section 2.1.

Wilén (2016a) examined the roles of the neighbouring states in the Burundian crisis in an article published in the winter 2016. According to her, the flow of Burundian refugees to Rwanda had polished the image of Rwanda as a stable refugee-receiving country in the international community’s eyes. The same phenomenon had put pressure on Tanzania which already hosts 200,000 Burundian refugees from an earlier crisis in 1972. Wilén predicted spillover effects in the neighbouring countries in form of the perpetuation of autocratic leadership and problems in regional relations if the issues of autocracy and violence in Burundi were not addressed.

There has also been recent research on the impact of Burundi’s private radio stations and their situation in the post-electoral crisis. Frère (2016) argues that Nkurunziza’s election victory in July 2015 lacks credibility because the independent radio stations could not cover the election since the government had suspended them and they had been attacked in April and May. She adds that the international donors were unable to protect the media. Frère further asserts that the independent media
have informed Burundians about their democratic rights and thus had an influence on the emergence of the anti-government demonstrations of spring 2015.

There is one recent study on Burundians’ narratives, from the point of view of mobility. Purdeková (2017) examines Burundians refugees’ and IDPs’ narratives on displacement in a study conducted through ethnographic interviews two years before and during the beginning of the current crisis. She argues that the Burundian government attributed the outflow of refugees in the spring and summer 2015 to non-political factors, first framing it as people fleeing peace, then as fleeing hunger, and finally as a phenomenon based on “unfounded fear” and “rumours” (p. 19). She concludes that on the contrary, structural insecurity and historical experiences of violence in addition to the immediate threats caused the refugee situation and behind it lies the state’s inability and lack of will to protect its citizens (p. 20).

As this chapter has elaborated, the research on the post-2015 period of violence in Burundi until now has mostly focused on general analysis of the conflict factors and its possible consequences. What has been missing from the research until now is the voice of the local actors, except in one study on refugees and IDPs. The dialogue process during the current period of political tension has not yet been analysed at all by researchers, so my study provides a fresh point of view for analysing the political crisis.

1.4. Research aims: Dialogue and violence narratives

The aim of this Master’s thesis is to investigate the local conceptualisations of dialogue and violence-related narratives in the context of the current political crisis in Burundi. The thesis elucidates how Burundian government, civil society and opposition actors as well as other politically active Burundians conceptualise the conflict and legitimise their positions as well as how they conceive of the dialogue on the conflict issues. The aim is to analyse views by Burundians living in Burundi as well as by those belonging to the diaspora.

Conflict events are not objective facts that can be reported as one single truth. On the contrary, language in the form of discourses creates the reality and narratives are the units of discourse through which people make sense of the reality. Conceptualisations of violence mean the ways in which the conflict parties interpret the ongoing violence as well as the issues that they identify as the causes of the conflict and as solutions for it. By analysing conflict narratives with discourse analysis I aim to point out the issues that the parties disagree on. These are also the issues to which they refer in order
to legitimise their positions. I will address the methodological tools of discourse and narrative analysis in Chapter 3.

My study also examines the types of dialogue that the conflict parties aim for and the ways in which they qualify the dialogue or the lack of it in the current situation. Dialogue is a term that has been used in a variety of ways in international contexts and therefore lacks clarity. In this study, I have stayed open to all the forms of interaction that the Burundian conflict parties have understood as dialogue.

The parties’ understanding of the reasons of the conflict, of the solutions for it and the conceptualisations of dialogue are all interconnected issues. The discrepancies in these narratives and conceptualisations of the situation are what creates tension in the conflict. My aim is to understand what on the level of discourses explains the current political deadlock in Burundi.

The main concepts that constitute the theoretical framework of my study are radical disagreement and structuration. I use Ramsbotham’s theory of radical disagreement to examine the clash of discourses between the government, opposition and civil society about the core issues of the political crisis. Giddens’s structuration theory helps to analyse the discourses on violence by the conflict parties. The theoretical framework is explained in the section 4.2.

The aim of my research is to be a pioneering specific case study. Therefore, it does not aim to provide generalisations about the conflict or to compare it to other contexts.

1.5. Justification

My thesis contributes to the scarce body of research literature on Burundi. The country has lately been ignored by many international organisations and few researchers have been doing fieldwork there due to a lack of funding and a fear of repression (E. Féron, personal communication, April 15, 2016; Grauvogel, 2016, p. 6).

My research creates new information on the dialogue process and the local legitimisation and conceptualisation of the post-electoral violence in Burundi in 2015–17. The study gives some insight into the current political climate in this small East African country that has been targeted by many peacebuilding actors but on which there is little recent research.

The analysis may be useful for the non-governmental organisations that do peacebuilding in Burundi when they evaluate whether their programmes and practices suit the local context. The results of the
study may also be relevant for these organisations, other actors that operate in Burundi and for the general public that wants to understand better the current political situation and its roots. The study also paves way for future research on the dialogue process and the dynamics of political conflict in Burundi by suggesting new topics that should be studied further.

1.6. Research question

In the context of the tense political climate of the years 2015–2017, this thesis analyses the narratives and conceptualisations that the Burundian government, opposition and civil society actors have used when they have discussed violence and dialogue. More broadly, the study is interested in the ways in which politically active Burundians have justified their interpretations of the nature of the political crisis in the country.

My main research question is the following:

How do the conceptualisations of violence and dialogue that the Burundian opposition, civil society and government have presented during the post-electoral crisis of 2015–17 differ and how do these discrepancies in narratives explain the current tense political situation in Burundi?

There are six more specific sub-research questions which examine different categories related to the main research question:

- How have the Burundian conflict parties conceptualised the violence in Burundi?
- What kind of narratives have they presented on the legal and political aspects of the conflict?
- How have they conceptualised the question of ethnicity in the conflict?
- How have they discussed economy in the conflict?
- What implications have the different conflict narratives had for the conceptualisations of dialogue?
- Do the discrepancies in narratives by the conflict actors constitute radical disagreements and how do they explain the current tense political situation in Burundi?
2. Background: History, ethnicity and the actors of the crisis

Burundi’s recent history has been characterised by periods of stability that outbreaks of violent conflict have regularly interrupted. In this chapter I will provide a chronological overview of the post-colonial history of Burundi from the point of view of ethnicity and violence as cross-cutting concepts. I will first address the role and nature of ethnicity in Burundi’s violent events, then proceed to describing the civil war of the 1990s and then present the political evolvements since the 2000 Arusha Agreement. At the end of the chapter I will present some of the dynamics of the current conflict which require closer examination. This chapter is simultaneously an overview of relevant literature related to discourses of violence and the Burundian conflict context.

2.1. Burundi's history of inter-ethnic conflict

Burundi is composed of two main ethnic groups: the Hutu and the Tutsi, and a small Twa minority. Putting the question in simple terms, the German and Belgian colonisers reinforced the polarisation between the majoritarian Hutu and the minoritarian Tutsi by favouring the latter in administration and education.

After Burundi’s independence in 1962 Tutsi-led governance continued and the growing frustration of the Hutu led to further inter-group tensions. Massacres broke out five times in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991 and 1993. Most of these followed the pattern of Hutu rebels attacking Tutsi and Tutsi military troops violently counter-attacking. The 1972 killings were the most violent of these massacres, killing an estimated 300 000 Burundians, mostly educated Hutu, and forcing several hundreds of thousands to flee inside or out of the country. In 1988, Hutu farmers first killed about 3 000 Tutsi and the ensuing army reprisal caused the death of 20 000 Hutu in two northern communes. (Falch & Becker, 2008, p. 1-2; Jobbins & Ahitungiye, 2015, p. 207; Uvin, 1999, pp. 258–259)

2.1.1. The complicated question of ethnicity

According to estimations 84–85 % of Burundians are ethnically Hutu, 14–15 % Tutsi and 1 % Twa, a composition very similar to Burundi’s neighbour Rwanda. However, Lemarchand (1994) challenged this as what he calls “dogmatic distortions” and claims that these statistics do not recognise the Ganwa with princely origins, people with a mixed background, immigrants and the amount of
Hutu who were killed or left Burundi as refugees as a consequence of the massacres from 1965 to 1991. There is also a considerable amount of mixed marriages, especially between Hutu men and Tutsi women, as a result of which the children gain the ethnicity of the father but can easily change it. (pp. 6–9)

According to Lemarchand (1994), it has not been the ethnic identity that has traditionally determined the hierarchy in the Burundian society, but the social status and the categories of Hutu and Tutsi have been mutually inclusive. The social connotation of Hutu has been that of a “social subordinate” and therefore a culturally Tutsi person would be identified as Hutu in a client-patron relation where the Tutsi is in an inferior position. All in all, the hierarchy within the Hutu and Tutsi is much more complicated and nuanced than one would assume. (pp. 9–10)

Falch and Becker (2008) argue that the Hutu-Tutsi tensions in Burundi are explained by inter-group inequality and a struggle for power in a poor country rather than by pure ethnic rivalry (p. 1). Ndikumana (2005) agrees, stating that ethnicity was not a direct cause of conflict in Burundi but became instrumentalised along with other political and regional factors for pursuing political and economic power (p. 415).

As Vandeginste (2014) notes, historical narratives have been used by actors representing one or the other ethnic group to justify their claims in both Burundi and Rwanda (p. 2). However, ethnicity is discussed in the Burundian society in a very different way than in Rwanda where ethnic and other potentially divisive factors are omitted in the Constitution since the genocide of 1994 (p. 7). On the contrary, Burundians talk about ethnicity openly, which became clear during the interviews that I conducted with members of the Burundian diaspora in Brussels. The openness about ethnicity is apparent for example in elections since the ethnicity of the candidates is mentioned in the electoral lists, although not in the voters’ cards or identity cards more generally (Frère, 2009, p. 339; Vandeginste, 2014, p. 4).

2.1.2. Historical discourses of violence

The conceptualisations of violence in Burundi have been previously described best by René Lemarchand (1994) with regard to the discourses emerging from the 1972 and 1988 massacres. He writes in his book *Ethnocide as a Discourse and Practice* about the concept of meta-conflict about how the Burundian conflict parties have historically “perceived, explained and mythologised” the actual ethnic conflict in terms of ethnicity, cultural differentiation and history (pp. 17–18).
Lemarchand (1994) uses Liisa Malkki’s concept of mythico-histories in explaining how each ethnic group used a combination of facts and fictive aspects to justify how it interpreted the conflict. He argues that cognitive dissonance was an explaining factor in the discrepancies between the interpretations:

Thus emerges a narrative strategy that is also a discourse in the service of ethnic interests. Interpretations of violence tend to pave way for the next foreseeable step, when violence itself becomes a mode of discourse. (p. 19)

Lemarchand distinguishes four historical myths behind the interpretations of violence. The first one, prominent among exiled Hutu refugees, is based on a belief in historical juxtapositions, according to which the Hutu saw the Tutsi as Hamitic invaders who enslaved the Hutu. The second myth is that the Hutu-Tutsi tensions were completely introduced by European colonisers, although Lemarchand argues that the Belgian colonisation rather divided princely Ganwa factions and only reshaped ethnic divisions, creating conflict potential. Thirdly, many Hutu have believed in a myth of the 1972 killings being part of a conspiracy plot by the Tutsi. The fourth myth, often present in Tutsi and official discourses about the 1972 and 1988 massacres, is that the killings were an external plot by Belgium or Rwanda. (pp. 19–30)

2.2. The Burundian Civil War

The events that led to the outbreak of civil war in Burundi began after a democratic transition process was initiated by President Pierre Buyoya from the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA party. A democratic election in June 1993 resulted in the victory of the Hutu-dominated FRODEBU party and the inauguration of Burundi's first Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye. His party got 80 % of the seats in the National Assembly, which brought an end to the traditional Tutsi domination in Burundian politics. Some believe that this sudden power shift was the reason for the coup attempt by the military of the FAB in October 1993, as a result of which President Ndadaye was assassinated and killings of Tutsi and Hutu started in different parts of the country. Some define these killings as a genocide. (Falch & Becker, 2008, pp. 3, 6–7; Uvin, 2009, p. 12, Vandeginste, 2014, p. 4)

After a short break in killings the violence broke out again in June 1994, a point which can be defined as the start of the Burundian Civil War. It was a guerrilla-type of war that lasted almost 15 years, opposing the Tutsi-dominated government army and radical Hutu rebel groups, the main ones being CNDD-FDD, Palipehutu-FNL and Frolina. The war was characterised by violence against civilians by both sides, human rights violations and impunity (Falch & Becker, 2008, pp. 6–7).
The first peace mediation attempt to end the Civil War was led by the UN Special Envoy Ould-Abdallah and led to the signing of an agreement called the Convention of Government in September 1994. However, this political agreement was not successful since the fighting continued. (Falch & Becker, 2008, pp. 11, 13).

In 1996, a coup d’état by the Burundian Army brought Pierre Buyoya from UPRONA back to power. As a consequence, the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative’s member countries Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire and Zambia imposed sanctions on Burundi. (Wodrig & Grauvogel, 2016, pp. 275, 279)

However, the peacebuilding attempts by regional actors in 1996 were met with local resistance. The planned regional humanitarian intervention was rejected by both the Burundian ruling Tutsi elite and radical Hutu groups that instead insisted on a domestic solution to the situation. This national debate involved the major political parties, public officials and civil society groups but armed groups were left aside the negotiation table. (Wodrig & Grauvogel, 2016, pp. 278–282)

Wodrig and Grauvogel (2016) argue that the regional and local elites conceptualised the conflict in different ways that both simplified its complexity and “talked past each other”, meaning that they did not have any common ground in their visions on peacebuilding. Consequently, a regionally led peacebuilding project to bring an end to Burundi’s Civil War did not take place. (pp. 282–284)

### 2.3. Arusha Agreement and the power-sharing model

The 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement can be conceived as the most important political agreement during Burundi’s recent history and is frequently referred to in the current political debate. This power-sharing agreement was achieved after negotiations that took two years and involved much more parties than the agreement of 1994. Altogether 17 political parties, the government and the National Assembly negotiated under mediation by Nelson Mandela. However, the main rebel groups PALIPEHUTU-FNL and CNDD-FDD refused to sign the agreement and it became a peace agreement without a ceasefire. After the Arusha Agreement the Civil War between the government and the rebel groups continued at levels of varying intensity until May 2008. (Falch & Becker, 2008, pp. 15–20)

the following year introduced a permanent ethnic quota system that Jobbins and Ahitungiye (2015) describe as unique so far in Africa (p. 208).

Most importantly, the National Assembly and the government are required to be composed of 60 % Hutu and 40 % Tutsi. A co-optation system guarantees this if the election outcome does not respect the ethnic balance. One of the two vice-presidents needs to be a Hutu and the other a Tutsi, and the same requirement is set to the two senators elected from each province. Furthermore, the 2005 Constitution determined a 50–50 ethnic balance in the army, the police and the intelligence services. However, it needs to be noted that the Twa minority does not have a percentage representation and has only a co-optation of three seats in the General Assembly and the Senate. (Falch & Becker, 2008, p. 22–23; Vandeginste, 2014, pp. 6–7)

Vandeginst (2015a) states that the biggest achievement of Burundi’s ethnic power-sharing model is that it has “prevented electoral violence from transforming into ethnic violence” (p. 636).

2.4. The rise of CNDD-FDD in the 2005 and 2010 elections

A key point in the recent political history of Burundi is the general election of 2005 which was generally considered free and fair and resulted in the victory of the CNDD-FDD party. The former rebel group had gradually transitioned into a political party after the 2000 Arusha Agreement, including also Tutsi into its structure. However, the opposition and civil society accused it of tactics of intimidation and direct violence against voters and opposition actors. (Vandeginst, 2011, p. 316; Wittig, 2016, p. 149)

As was mentioned in the section 1.1., the Parliament elected Pierre Nkurunziza as president in 2005. That year marked the start of CNDD-FDD’s period of reign which continues until today.

In 2010, presidential, legislative and communal elections were held, the presidential election being the first direct one since 1993. The opposition parties boycotted all the elections except the communal ones, leaving Pierre Nkurunziza of CNDD-FDD as the only presidential candidate who then won the election. A coalition of 11 opposition parties accused CNDD of fraud in the local elections but external observers considered them free and fair. During the ensuing post-electoral violence political figures were assassinated, government and opposition members conducted reprisal attacks and many opposition leaders fled from Burundi. (Jones & Wittig, 2016, p. 207; Vandeginst, 2011, pp. 319-320; Wittig, 2016, p. 150)
The CNDD-FDD-led government has emphasised Burundi’s sovereignty and been cautious about foreign interference in the country’s affairs – a theme that I will analyse in the sub-section 4.4.2. The United Nations Mission to Burundi, BINUB, which was set up in 2006, was reduced to a ten times smaller operation called BNUB in 2011 following the government’s demands to the UN to cut its presence (Wilén & Chapaux, 2011, p. 539).

2.5. Parties of the current conflict

Burundi’s current political crisis is the most recent period of violence in Burundi’s long history of inter-ethnic and political conflict that was outlined above. Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s definition of armed conflict is the following: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (UCDP, 2014). The current violence has been going on since April 2015 at varying levels of intensity. Taking into account the 564 verified executions between 25 April 2015 and 30 August 2016, the official figure of 87 casualties during the 11 December 2015 attacks by armed groups on military camps in and around Bujumbura and the following army reprisals, Burundi’s political crisis can be defined as an armed conflict. (UNHRC, 2016, p. 7–8)

The parties of Burundi’s armed conflict are on one side the government, including its army Force de défense nationale, the police and the intelligence service SNR; and on the other side various armed opposition groups of which FNL, RED-Tabara and FOREBU are the most important. Both sides have committed acts of violence but a UN investigation has attributed the majority of them to the security forces and the Imbonerakure militia. (IRIN, 2016; UNHRC, 2016, p. 7)

FNL is the ex-rebel movement PALIPEHUTU’s military wing, which still operates in RDC, but its leader Agathon Rwasa decided to leave the armed resistance and to engage in politics as the leader of an opposition party with the same name. He was appointed as the first vice-president of the Parliament after the 2015 election. RED-Tabara and FOREBU are armed groups fighting against Nkurunziza, of which the latter is composed of former officers of the security forces and the 2015 coup leader Godefroid Niyombare. (IRIN, 2016; RFI, 2016c)

Imbonerakure is the youth league of the ruling party CNDD-FDD that was created during the Civil War and is composed mostly of unemployed youth (Wittig, 2016, pp. 149, 152). It is officially a
political movement but its members have been accused on several accounts of participating in the repression of opponents of Nkurunziza’s third mandate (FIDH, 2016, pp. 148–149).

What comes to the political scene, most of the opposition parties in exile formed in 2014 an alliance called CNARED that the government refuses to accept as a negotiation partner (see section 1.2). It operates in exile in Belgium and, as of February 2017, consisted of approximately 20 opposition parties, including MSD, UPRONA and FRODEBU, and four former vice-presidents of Burundi were part of it (Interview of Pancrace Cimpaye, CNARED spokesman, 2.2.2017).

Burundi’s party system is complicated partly because of the system of nyakurisation in which the CNDD-FDD party creates a satellite wing inside an opposition party to support the party in power. There is a wide range of opposition parties and some of them have ties to the armed rebel groups while some do not, but it is difficult to get verifiable information about the links. (FIDH, 2016, pp. 121, 149–151)

A Brussels-based Burundian journalist described the phenomenon in the following way:

Since the second mandate [of Pierre Nkurunziza], even before, CNDD-FDD prepared the elections, prepared the third mandate by dividing the parties. The opposition parties, the majority of parties have been divided. — They sent in CNDD-FDD activists, or then they aroused a division inside the party to put in place organisms, people in the opposition party with whom they will collaborate. (Interview of a Burundian journalist, 1.2.2017)

The civil society is described in the following section. At its end, I will define the conflict parties of the Burundian political crisis in terms of this study.

2.6. The Burundian diaspora and civil society

The role of the diaspora is influential in the Burundian politics and the current crisis. Therefore, I describe the Burundian diaspora here briefly, focusing on the diaspora in Belgium which accommodates the largest number of Burundians outside Africa (Turner & Brønden, 2011, p. 6). The majority of diaspora scholars define diasporas as having at least two countries of destination, maintaining a relationship to their home country and being consciously aware of a common national or ethnic identity (Butler, 2011, p. 192). I apply this definition to this study but consider that a diaspora can also mean a part of a diaspora residing in a specific country.

Due to colonial ties Belgium is home to a considerable number of Burundians, although the size of the diaspora is difficult to estimate because the Belgian institutions do not possess exact figures on
the size of nationality groups (Siréas, 2004, p. 5). According to OECD statistics, there are about 10 000 Burundians altogether living in OECD countries (Turner & Brønden, 2011, p. 6).

In fact, rather than one single diaspora, there are several Burundian diasporas since the groups in exile are heterogeneous and fragmented. Those who fled the outbursts of violence in Burundi at different times since the 1972 massacres and those who left to study in Europe in the 1980s were mostly Hutu, and these different diaspora groups are fairly separated. There are also Tutsi diaspora groups. The communities in exile in Europe are very politicised, especially the younger generations. The Hutu diasporas have acted as critical watchdogs, providing alternative information to that spread by the government and trying to lobby the international community. Some of the Hutu returned or partly returned to Burundi after the 2000 Arusha Agreement, taking up positions in the government. Those who arrived in the 1970s tend to be integrated into the European societies and more disconnected from what is happening in Burundi. According to Turner and Brønden, the diaspora members tend to form opinions that are detached from what is happening in Burundi. (Turner & Brønden, 2011)

The Burundian civil society in exile in Belgium can be divided into two parts: cultural and political. The cultural civil society includes for example associations dealing with traditions, dance and solidarity. What comes to the political civil society, there have traditionally been some associations working for Burundi’s development and restructuration, whereas during the political crisis of 2015–2017, more civil society activists have left for exile in Belgium and the political civil society has become more active. (Interview of a Burundian civil society activist, 1.2.2017; Turner & Brønden, 2011, p. 19)

There is a lot of internal variety within the Burundian civil society. There are some political civil society associations and some solidarity and voluntary work associations which are still active in Burundi but have had to submit to the government (Interview of a Burundian civil society representative, 1.2.2017). Furthermore, the phenomenon of nyakurisation, discussed above with regard to political parties, has expanded to the civil society NGOs. The government has created NGOs which are loyal to it and control the activities of the critical human rights NGOs. It has also limited the activities of certain human rights NGOs in several ways. (FIDH, 2016, pp. 119, 121–122)

The politically active civil society that has fled the country has become involved in the CNARED opposition alliance in Belgium. This is how a civil society activist describes it:

There are also civil societies that are advocating for human rights. And it is that civil society that we hear. So it – – got, as a matter of fact, opposed to those in power because it criticised the instruments of the government. And the government saw this civil society as adversaries.

(Interview of a Burundian civil society representative, 1.2.2017)
The division between the Burundian government, opposition and civil society is not clear due to the complicated consequences of nyakurisation and the cooperation between political opposition and civil society. In terms of this study, I define the parties in the current political crisis as the government and the opposition-civil society camp. The latter includes the opposition that is against the third presidential mandate and the politically active civil society in exile, which are both mostly represented by the CNARED alliance. In addition, I consider that the independent civil society activists who criticise the government belong to the opposition-civil society camp.
3. Methodology

This chapter addresses the data gathering process and the methodological tools that I used when I conducted my study. I will first describe the types of data that I collected and describe in more detail open-ended interviewing which was one of my data collection methods. After that, I will describe the way in which I coded the data and the discourse analysis method. The last part of the chapter deals more specifically with narratives and narrative analysis as a methodological tool that I used in combination with discourse analysis.

3.1. Types of data

I decided to include both written narratives and interviews in my data in order to get a sufficiently broad range of material and to examine the topic as comprehensively as possible. I also thought that personal interviews among Burundians in Europe would increase my understanding of the situation since I did not have the financial possibility to conduct research on the ground in Burundi. Social media was an interesting platform to analyse because of its increasing popularity and the possibilities for instantaneous discussion among people in different physical places that it offers.

3.1.1. Social media data

Burundi is a country where the radio is still the dominant media outlet (Frère, 2013, p. 162). This is partly due to the Burundian illiteracy rate of over 60 % (Frère, 2016, p. 140). Internet penetration was estimated at 7.2 % and mobile phone penetration at 47 % in June 2016 (CIPESA, 2016, p. 5). The level of social media use in Burundi is unknown but in general social media use especially via mobile devices is on the rise on the African continent (Pfeiffer, Kleeb, Mbelwa & Ahorlu, 2014, p. 179). This suggests that using social media platforms is becoming more popular also among those Burundians that have internet access, mostly in the urban areas.

My primary social media data consists of posts on the political situation on the Facebook pages and in the Twitter feeds of prominent Burundian government, civil society and opposition actors. Several anti-government activists and government representatives have been active on Twitter during the political crisis (CIPESA, 2016, p. 11). Due to the fact that I do not speak Burundi’s national language
Kirundi, the data of my study is limited to the discourses by those Burundians who write posts and comments in French on social media platforms, including the Burundian elite.

I also analysed relevant comments under the Facebook posts and replies to the tweets. Analysis of these discussions led me further to Twitter feeds and Facebook walls of Burundians who were active in the discussions and I included some of their tweets and posts in the data. The nature of narratives in social media is discussed later in this chapter (in the sub-section 3.5.2).

The main source of social media data among the opposition and civil society actors was the Facebook page of Pacifique Nininahazwe, a leading Burundian civil society activist. In the government camp, I analysed the Twitter feed of Willy Nyamitwe, the Senior Advisor for Media and Communication of President Pierre Nkurunziza. I also analysed the Twitter feed and Facebook page of the president himself who was most active on Twitter in 2015 and 2016, often publishing several tweets in a row constituting a longer statement. One more target of analysis were the posts and the ensuing discussions on the journalistic social media platforms *SOS Médias Burundi* and *Burundi Journalistes et Société civile*. They are sites mixing journalistic and opinion content updated by journalists of the private media outlets that were damaged during the coup attempt in April 2015 and by civil society activists in Burundi and in the diaspora.

3.1.2. Interviews and other types of data

I conducted five mainly open-ended interviews among the Burundian diaspora in Belgium in order to get some primary data and to gain a better understanding of the context. I will further discuss the interviews later in this chapter.

In order to expand the base of my data I included some excerpts of discourses by civil society actors at an Inter-Burundian dialogue session organised by a governmental commission for dialogue in the City of Bujumbura on April 13, 2016. These discourses were given in Kirundi and enabled analysing Burundi-based civil society representatives’ conceptualisations of the crisis. A Burundian journalist based in Brussels kindly offered his help to translate these discourses into French.

I also used interviews and citations of Burundians in articles by local and international online media reporting on Burundi as data. The analysed international media outlets are *Radio France Internationale*, *Le Monde* and *BBC*. Some of the local journalists operate on non-conventional platforms, such as the Facebook-based SOS Médias Burundi that was already mentioned in the
previous sub-chapter. In addition, I collected data from an independent weekly elite newspaper *Iwacu* which is published with an online version in French (Frère, 2016, p. 140).

In addition, I analysed the narratives in an online TV documentary by France24 called *Burundi – à visage caché* in French and *Burundi: Fear in Exile* in English, published on January 20, 2017. I took both the French and the English version into account in collecting the narratives.

3.1.3. Time range

I chose the narratives for analysis based on their relevance to my research question. They had to include conceptualisations of the ongoing violence and the dialogue. The time range of the data was from April 2015 to April 2017. April 2015 was when the protests against President Nkurunziza’s third mandate started and April 2017 the latest period possible for the analysis process so that there would be as recent data as possible.

I chose social media narratives from different sources published around the same time and commenting on similar issues. For example, data from September and October 2016 was interesting since the UN Independent Investigation on Burundi released a report in the end of September revealing human rights violations by the Burundian security services which sparked a political debate and a denial by the government. The social media data was from April–June and December 2015; January, August-September and October 2016; February, March and April 2017.

3.2. Responsive open-ended interviews

My study aimed to gather conceptualisations and narratives by politically active Burundians. Therefore, I considered it necessary to collect some primary accounts from people with knowledge about the political crisis. Since it was not economically possible to go for a field trip in Burundi, I decided to travel to Belgium in the end of January 2017 for five days to conduct five qualitative interviews among the Burundian diaspora.

I decided to contact the Burundian Embassy in Brussels, a civil society association and the opposition alliance CNARED in order to get the points of view of the three groups that my study encompasses: the government, the civil society and the opposition. I contacted the embassy by telephone and was granted a fixed appointment with one of their diplomats. I sent an e-mail to the civil society
association and phoned the CNARED alliance. Their representatives answered positively and asked me to contact them once I would have arrived in Brussels.

Upon arrival, I had some difficulties to reach the CNARED representative for an interview since the number that he had used before was now in the use of another representative of the organisation. I later found out that the person that I was supposed to interview was in Germany. Instead, I was referred to the spokesman of the organisation, managed to reach him and went to do the interview in Charleroi where he lived.

I also called the representative of the civil society association who told me that he was not available for a live interview because he lived outside Brussels. Nevertheless, he gave me two contacts: the other one a Brussels-based Burundian journalist and the other a former diplomat in Brussels. Finally, I also interviewed the civil society representative on the phone.

Qualitative interviewing attempts to reveal the perceptions and experiences of the interviewees and to map their world views so that they can speak about them in their own terms (Patton, 2002, p. 348; Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 36). Responsive interviews with open-ended questions aim to discover examples, narratives and stories (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 37). Therefore, I chose the approach of responsive interviewing for my data gathering process.

Responsive interviewing focuses on the relationship that the interviewer and interviewee establish during their exchange, flexibility in designing the research and the objective of having a profound understanding of the issue. The interviewer keeps the questions broad and avoids restricting what the interviewee can respond. (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, pp. 30, 35, 36)

On the other hand, the interview guide approach enables the interviewer to lead the interview spontaneously and to use a conversational style but in the same time ensures the systematicity of the interviews since the topics have been determined beforehand (Patton, 2002, p. 343). I wrote down the main questions in an interview protocol that could be given to the interviewees before the interview (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 147). I shared most of my main questions to one of my interviewees, the diplomat representing the government, since he asked to see them beforehand. The main interview questions are presented in Table 1. I asked them in slightly different ways depending on the situation and the interviewees’ answers.

My interview method was a combination of the two aforementioned approaches. I defined the topics of the interviews before conducting them but stayed flexible during the interview process, adapting my plan to what came up during the interviews. Moreover, I recorded all of them.
### The main interview questions

- How do you describe the events in Burundi since April 2015?
- Why is there violence in Burundi since then?
- What do you think about the situation in Burundi today?
- What types of interaction have there been between the government, the opposition and the civil society since April 2015? What kind of exchanges would you like to have?
- Some have spoken about the ethnicisation of the crisis and even about the risk of a genocide. What do you think about that?
- What do you think about the reactions and the actions of the international community with regard to the political situation?
- What would, according to you, the essential elements of a political solution to the crisis?
- How did you personally experience the period after the Civil War and the Arusha Agreement?

*Table 1. The main interview questions to the government, opposition and civil society representatives.*

Three of the interviews were done anonymously and two without anonymity. I will discuss the question of anonymity in the sub-section 3.7.1. The interviewees who preferred to keep their anonymity were the diplomat, a middle-aged activist of a civil society association and a young journalist working for an independent media. In addition to them, I had among my interviewees Félix Ndayisenga, a former diplomat that the government had dismissed from his position, and Pancrace Cimpaye, the spokesman of the CNARED opposition alliance. All of the interviewees were men and they represented both the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups.

I interviewed the current diplomat at the Burundian Embassy in Brussels. He had prepared for the interview by writing down answers to the pre-sent questions and gave them to me as a text document before I started the interview. After the interview I realised that he had answered the questions following the written answers, sometimes from word to word. Nevertheless, as I made some follow-up questions partly based on what I had prepared for and partly improvising, the answers to those and the additional questions that I had not sent to him were spontaneous. At the end, the diplomat argued that the media are manipulating things and the information presented by them should be combined with other sources of information.

The interview of the journalist took place at his daytime job office, the one of Ndayisenga at a bar and the one of Cimpaye at the café of Charleroi’s railway station. The journalist’s interview was shorter than the other ones since time was limited and he also translated some civil society video speeches for me. Ndayisenga’s interview was the longest and most open-ended, consisting of many anecdotes. Therefore, I decided to use it as background information, not as material for the analysis.
Cimpaye’s interview was relatively brief and he answered my questions and follow-ups in a straightforward manner in which I saw many connections to CNARED’s collective views.

The telephone interview of the civil society representative was the most technically challenging since it was hard to hear his answers completely due to the connection. As a result, I had to base the interview mostly on the questions that I had prepared. However, the quality of the recording was finally quite good. The interview was long and there was a lot of repetition in it.

I conducted all the interviews in French, the common language for me and the interviewees. I have translated all the examples from the interviews from French to English for this thesis.

I transcribed all the interviews after I had returned to Finland. The level of precision of the transcription depends on how much in detail the analysis is done (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, pp. 203–204). As the interviews were not the only part of my data and I intended to analyse the conceptualisations, I decided to write a so-called clean transcript that leaves out repetition and utterances without lexical meaning (Elliott, 2005, p. 52).

However, for the sections of one interview that provided narratives and conceptualisations of specific interest to me regarding the research question I decided to use Gee's units of discourse transcription technique. It makes salient the rhythm and structure of the speech by breaking the text down into lines, each of which composes an idea unit, and poetry-style stanzas that deal with one topic (Elliott, 2005, pp. 54–55). After concluding that this technique was very time-consuming, I decided to write a clean transcript of the rest of the interviews.

3.3. Coding

Coding was the first phase of the discourse analysis process. Gill (2000) argues that coding for discourse analysis is based on the questions of interest that determine the categories (p. 179). Following my research question, the objective of the coding process was thus to identify the conceptualisations of violence and dialogue in the post-electoral crisis by the Burundian government, opposition and civil society actors, as well as who was speaking to whom.

At the beginning, in the coding phase, my approach to the analysis was inductive, as is often the case with the early phases of qualitative analysis. This allowed me to stay open to the data and to the categories that emerged from it. (Patton, 2002, p. 453)
According to Sundberg and Harbom (2011), a codebook is an important point of reference for the researcher to understand the data (p. 105). As there was various material to code – interviews, social media posts, videos and news text – I decided to create a systematic codebook (in Appendix 1) that listed the categories that I was looking for in the texts.

I wrote the codebook based on a reading of four out of my five research interviews, those that I had identified as including relevant data for the discourse analysis. During the transcription of the interviews I had highlighted sections that were of interest regarding my research question. I did a second, superficial reading of the transcripts for the codebook. Based on that, I identified categories with focus on the following types of information: types of violence; ways of legitimising the action taken; reasons and solutions for the conflict; types of dialogue; and social actors.

I stayed flexible and ready to adapt the categories during the coding process to a sufficient extent, while still keeping the process systematic (Sundberg & Harbom, 2011, pp. 97, 102). I added new categories to the codebook during the coding process when I found them relevant.

I considered it relevant to differentiate between actors in diaspora and those in Burundi because the context in which they comment on issues is different. I added this detail in the classification matrix if it was possible to find it out.

The classification matrix (in Appendixes 2 and 3) includes five types of information about each narrative: the source; the way in which the information is conveyed, such as a Facebook post or a comment in a news story; who speaks; to whom the message is intended; and finally the category of the conceptualisation.

3.4. Discourse analysis

There is a widespread tradition of discourse analysis in social sciences, mostly based on Michel Foucault’s work. Fairclough (2003) defines discourse as “a particular way of representing some part of the (physical, social, psychological) world” (p. 17). Discourses are constituents of social practices which partly form actual events, or in other words, social processes define our knowledge of the world (Fairclough, 2003, p. 24; Gill, 2000, p. 173). Foucault (1989) also sees discourses as practices that are represented by discursive relations (p. 46). Discourse analysis therefore analyses both language and society practices (Gee & Handford, 2012, p. 5).

Discourse analysis was a suitable method for my study since conflicts are essentially about different interpretations of the reality which are represented and made salient at the level of language. I will
discuss this more in detail in the following chapter about narratives. Discourse analysis helped to answer the questions of what divides the Burundian conflict parties and how they talk about dialogue. In this study, I use an elaborated version of Fairclough’s and Foucault’s definitions and understand discourses both as practices and as ways of representing and conceptualising violence and dialogue in the Burundian post-electoral conflict.

Foucault (1989) argues that a visible discourse is based on what it does not say (p. 25). This implied for my research that the things that a discourse omits also had to be analysed. The practice of not doing something or leaving something out are discursive practices just as visible discourses are.

According to Foucault (1989), statements are interrelated events and discourse analysis is concerned with determining the conditions on which a statement exists, its limits and correlations with other statements that exist before or after it (pp. 28–29). Fairclough (2003) posits that representations constitute discourses but not all representations are distinct discourses (p. 124). Finding out whether two representations are part of the same discourse requires identifying their similarities and differences (Neumann, 2008, p. 62). When one can perceive a regularity between different statements, they constitute a discursive formation which is subjected to rules of formation that are its conditions of existence (Foucault, 1989, p. 38).

Fairclough (2003) posits that discourses range from abstract to more specific, which implies that different levels of discourses can be distinguished (pp. 125–127). Furthermore, discourses can be combined with other, already existing discourses, to form new ones (pp. 126–127). I took this into account in the coding process by grouping together categories that were related to the same issue so that more specific categories were grouped under a general one. This was done in order to facilitate defining the abstract discourses later in the analysis and determining which more specific discourses belong to them.

Gill (2000) describes the actual discourse analysis after the coding phase as firstly finding patterns in the data and secondly forming hypotheses based on the functions of specific characteristics of the discourses and comparing them to the data (p. 180). Fairclough (2003) states that textual analysis includes identifying the main themes, that is the parts of the world represented, and finding out the perspective from which the representation is done (p. 129).

Legitimisation is one of the functions of discourses. People continuously seek to explain and justify their actions in social life (Fairclough, 2003, p. 88). The same happens when the conflict parties in Burundi justify their positions vis-à-vis the conflict. Van Leeuwen (undated, as cited in Fairclough, 2003, p. 98) has distinguished different forms of legitimisation such as authorisation, by referring to
an institutional authority; rationalisation, by referring to the usefulness of doing something institutionalised; moral evaluation, by reference to value systems; and mythopoesis, which means using narratives as legitimisation. I assumed that I would find these types of legitimisation in the conceptualisations of violence by the conflict parties. Analysing the discrepancies in legitimisation was part of the final analysis of the data.

Furthermore, discourses often include metaphors that can be lexical or grammatical. Lexical metaphors are words that connect one representation to another, such as representing a controversial suggestion by a conflict party as a red rag to a bull. One type of grammatical metaphor is nominalisation – transforming a verb into a noun in order to generalise and to make the phrase more abstract so that it is not clear who performs the action (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 129, 143–144).

My study is also interested in the representations of social actors in the Burundian crisis. Texts can represent social actors by excluding, passivating, impersonalising or generalising them among others. Exclusion can happen so that a social actor is not present in a text or so that the reader has to infer to whom the text refers. Passivating means that the social actor as a subject of others’ actions without agency is emphasised, while impersonalising takes away some of their humanness. Generalisation refers to social actors as a general group. (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 129, 145–146, 150)

Van Dijk (2006a) analyses discourses in relation to the structure of ideologies. His concept of polarisation between in-groups and out-groups was relevant for my research since it is typical for a conflict that a group emphasises its own good actions and the bad actions of the other group.

Distinguishing who speaks in the narratives and to whom was important in order to identify the different groups that participate in narrating the conflict: in the case of this study the government, opposition and civil society. It included identifying whose narratives in the social media, traditional media and other platforms I analysed, and whom they define as relevant actors in the conflict. I will discuss the narrative actors and tellership in social media further in the following chapter.

3.5. Narratives and narrative analysis

Narratives are stories that the Burundian conflict parties tell in order to understand and conceptualise the conflict. My data consists of narratives and conceptualisations inside them. Narrative analysis in social media has specific characteristics and I use it to analyse the data on Facebook and Twitter.
My interpretation of narrative analysis for this study is that it constitutes a sub-category of discourse analysis. I use a combination of the two in my analysis. In this section, I will first present the narratives and their analysis and then more specifically narratives in social media.

3.5.1. Analysing narratives

According to Autesserre’s (2014) definition, narratives are “stories that people create to make sense of their lives and environments” and they are in constant interaction with practices or can emerge from them (pp. 33–35). Another definition by Czarniawska (2004) defines a narrative as “a spoken or written text giving an account of an event/action or series of events/actions, chronologically connected” (p. 17). In my study, I use Autesserre’s definition which connects well with the discursive notion of practices.

Möller (2011) complements Autesserre’s and Czarniawska’s definitions by stating that narratives reflect what their author or orator views as important or interesting aspects. They provide information about the motivations and reasoning of the actors and give a deeper picture of the situation. (pp. 75, 86)

Bauman (1986, as cited in Brenneis, 1996, p. 42) has argued that there are “narrative events” and “narrated events”, meaning that the narratives both represent the situations in which they are told and the past or future events that they describe. The narrated events do not exist prior to a narrative but the narratives construct the events that they describe (p. 47). This implies that conflict narratives are units of discourse that create knowledge (Stewart & Maxwell, 2010, p. 4).

Sometimes narrative analysis deals with two competing stories about the same issue (Thornborrow, 2002, p. 57). This is typical for dispute communication in which the parties present discursively their interpretations of the interaction between them and of the events leading to the conflict (Stewart & Maxwell, 2010, p. 4). When examined in another context, that of a political conflict, these aspects refer to the objectives of my study. The conflict parties of the Burundian crisis interpret discursively their dialogue and the causes and patterns of the violence. An analysis of the differences in the conflict narratives presented by the government, opposition and civil society helps to identify the issues in which their positions differ and therefore answers my research question.

Another feature of conflict narration is that parties try to overcome the narratives of their adversary in order to advance their objectives for a conflict outcome. The narratives that are powerful in terms of culture or norms become dominant while those challenging them are called counter-narratives

The question of power and narratives is linked to the discussion on entitlement, the right to tell a story. That right is related to the position of the narrator in a community and it is subject to change. (Brenneis, 1996, p. 43–44; Stewart & Maxwell, 2010, p. 34)

Due to their nature as tools of power, narratives do not always provide clarity. According to Brenneis (1996), conflict narrators are prone to speculate about events that they are not completely familiar with. Conflicts also often inflict narratives about possible future outcomes of actions, in other words scenarios. (pp. 42–43)

In my study, I analysed the discourses present in the conflict narratives. A single narrative can include several discourses. They can be complementary, contributing to the same representation, or can compete with each other – an aspect that I will analyse further in the following section on social media narratives.

In addition, narratives can be primary or secondary sources of which the primary are written or told by the actors themselves or by direct observers of the events (Möller, 2011, p. 75). My study is mainly interested in primary narratives, for example social media posts and discussions and speeches in the national dialogue sessions. In news stories, I analysed citations instead of the interpretations by the journalist. However, the interviews are secondary narratives since my interviewees are not directly observing the events in Burundi but live in Belgium.

3.5.2. Narratives in social media

Social media posts and discussions are real-time narratives that put an emphasis on what is happening at the moment. Page (2012) analyses them through the concept of narrativity. One of the sub-categories of this concept is tellership that underlines the collaborative, co-constructed nature of social media narration (p. 13). Blum-Kulka (1997, as cited in Thornborrow, 2002, p. 58) labels this type of narration ‘polyphonic’.

A polyphonic narrative has several participants who have different narrative roles. Part of my analysis was to identify the social actors present in the narratives that are told by the conflict parties: who is talking and to whom? Ochs and Taylor (1992, as cited in Thornborrow, 2002, p. 58) have identified introducers, narrators, protagonists, primary recipients, problematisers and problematises as
participants of narration. In this study, I limit my focus to the introducers, narrators and primary recipients.

Page’s understanding of narrativity coincides with the idea of a dialogic and co-authored narrative that is based on the semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of multivocality. This school of thought posits that narratives can be created in interaction between the narrator and the audience and in that process narratives may be commonly created, favoured, rejected or transformed (Stewart & Maxwell, 2010, pp. 30–31). This describes well the process of social media interaction that may modify the original message and shift the discussion to a totally different direction than intended by the one who initially made the social media post. This implies for my analysis that a single narrative may include several discourses that may be contrary to the discourse originally presented by the initial narrator.

According to Page (2012), tellership options in social media formats vary from single to multiple tellers that compete in contributing to the narrative (p. 196). In the Facebook discussions that my study analyses the tellership is multiple and distributed to individual text units that take turns, making the tellership reconfigured (p. 197–198). This means that the initial Facebook update is the first unit, followed by individual comments made by other Facebook users. All of these combined constitute a narrative with multiple tellership.

On Twitter, other users can reply to individual tweets or retweet them. The tellership is multiple and reconfigured but in contrast to Facebook, the tellership in modified retweets is inside one text unit in which the original tweet is preceded by a comment. In this reconfigured format the original tweet can even be changed or information can be added to the original tweet text. (Page, 2012, p. 198–199)

Another characteristic of tellership in social media discussions is the control of the text. For example on Twitter, the initial teller has control of the narrative in their initial tweet but not in the modified retweets, in which the retweeter, the second co-teller, can modify the original text and publish it (Page, 2012, p. 197). On the other hand, on Facebook, the original teller retains moderating power as he or she can delete the comments that he or she dislikes. The same cannot be done on Twitter where unfavourable replies to a tweet can only be reported to the Twitter administrators.
3.6. Limitations and validity

The context of conflict and the low level of freedom of expression\(^1\) in Burundi have narrowed the space for dissident voices, which has limited the availability of opinions contrary to those of the government. This is the case especially in social and traditional media where a lot of the material may have been censored or self-censored because of a fear of consequences from the government, as illustrated by the following quote.

There are friends who tell us “please do not even send me this message”. On WhatsApp, you see. They are even afraid to receive a message. I say “but you can delete it afterwards but still you receive it, you read it, you delete it afterwards”. They say “no no no, I do not even want to receive. Because if I am caught reading the message” … that comes from the opposition camp for example, people are afraid to read it, to receive it or to listen to it, being in Burundi.

(Interview of a Burundian journalist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

Criticising the government has mostly been possible for those who are operating in exile outside Burundi. Even some of them are cautious about the ways in which they can voice the criticism, but there is still more space to express critical opinions outside Burundi than inside. Therefore, I argue that the emergence of a variety of opinions, which was possible by gathering accounts both from exiled Burundians and for example the Inter-Burundian dialogue participants’ videoed speeches, has made the study more comprehensive than it would have been to gather material only from informants who remain in Burundi.

I acknowledge, however, that the exiled Burundians have a different stance and point of view on the conflict than those who are based in Burundi and who are first-hand observers of events. As I was not able to travel to Burundi due to economic reasons and security risks, I could not gather first-hand accounts by interviewing Burundians in the country but had to rely on material available online.

Due to these limitations caused by the conflict context and the limited access to material and informants, my study cannot attempt to generalise about all the different conceptualisations of the conflict that Burundians have. It rather provides an analysis of the views that are available under the current circumstances.

Regarding social media, there are some limitations in the material because of the spontaneous nature of the platforms. Social media comments are often immediate reactions to events and the writer may not have reflected on the issue thoroughly before writing the post. Furthermore, when identifying the actors writing comments, I had to rely on the information that could be found in the public profile of

the writer. It is possible that the profile information is intentionally falsified for various reasons, such as personal security. As it is not possible to verify this, I had no other option than to evaluate that information on my own. Some profiles also did not have a description of the person’s position or background. In that case, I looked at the previous tweets and evaluated into which category I should classify the person. There were also non-Burundians commenting on the posts but I excluded them from the analysis as my study is concerned with the Burundians’ perceptions of the conflict.

Öberg and Sollenberg (2011) write about bias in news reports and the inference by the journalist regarding ‘soft issues’, such as beliefs or feelings of the conflict parties. They warn that reporting on such perceptions is often inaccurate (p. 51). In my study, I analysed comments in news stories to examine the conceptualisations and perceptions by the interviewees, so I did not examine the journalists’ accounts as such, which helped me avoid such bias. Furthermore, the source itself may present facts with a bias with regard to distortion of information, exclusion of certain types of it, and bias of the world-view for example by straightforward labelling (Höglund & Öberg, 2011, p. 189). This kind of bias was surely included in the research, although again, the research question was related to the perceptions and conceptualisations of the conflict, so perceptions were the object of the study rather than facts.

Concerning gender, there is unavoidably a bias in my study since the majority of the informants were men. As I mentioned in the section 3.2., all of my interviewees were males. Among the narrators on social media and in news articles and among the participants of the Inter-Burundian dialogue sessions, whose comments I analysed, there were a few women but the overwhelming majority were men. I did not intentionally leave women out of the analysis but did not especially choose publications of female narrators either – the data selection was based on the relevance of the themes addressed.

Burundi’s power-sharing practices outlined in the Constitution require a representation of women in the public positions, for instance 30 % of the National Assembly members and ministers should be women (Falch & Becker, 2008, p. 23). Nevertheless, men dominate the leading positions of the political parties and for example the majority of the board members of the CNARED opposition alliance are men.

Another limitation of my analysis was my cultural competence with Burundi (Neumann, 2008, p. 63). I was not very familiar with Burundi when I started planning my study but by reading about the country I began to learn about the Burundian context. Knowledge of the Belgian colonial legacy also helped to understand some of the external influences on Burundian culture and society and the diaspora dimension of Burundi. However, the most helpful thing to understand the context better was
doing the five interviews with Burundians. They provided me with a lot of historical information and helped to understand the concepts relevant for the people in this East-African country.

I already mentioned earlier my lack of knowledge of Burundi’s national language Kirundi. However, my knowledge of French enabled me to analyse material written in Burundi’s second official language\(^2\) and to conduct the interviews in a language more familiar to the interviewees than English. Translation of concepts from French to English, and from Kirundi to French and then to English in the case of the Inter-Burundian dialogue discourses, naturally caused a possibility of losing aspects in translation. As a result, the entirety of the discursive nuances could not be conveyed in the final analysis.

However, considering the lack of current research on Burundi, I felt that it was necessary to do conduct the study despite the linguistic and cultural limitations. Alongside the translation help that I received, I considered my cultural and linguistic competences good enough in order to produce a valid, although not perfect, study.

3.7. Ethics and positionality

3.7.1. Anonymity and ethical concerns

I decided to give anonymity to those of my interviewees that requested it, three out of five. Talking about issues related to political conflicts is in general sensitive and risky for people who are engaged in activities against an authoritarian government. In the Burundian case, the post-electoral violence has forced many members of the country’s opposition, civil society and journalists to flee and they are afraid of facing violence or death threats. According to a report by the human rights NGO FIDH (2016), members of civil society, especially human rights defenders, and journalists have been increasingly harassed and stigmatised since 2015 (pp. 117, 119). These findings have been confirmed by other studies.

Due to these risks, it was necessary to grant anonymity to those of my interviewees who wanted to have it. However, two interviewees did not require anonymity, saying that they are acting openly or that they have little to lose. This supports my understanding that most of the politically active

\(^2\) Burundi recently adopted English as a third official language for the purposes of integration within the East African Community but French remains as the most widely used European language (Uwimana, 2014).
Burundians that adhere to civil society organisations or opposition parties are aware of the danger that they might face and have made a conscious decision to criticise the government openly.

In order to clarify what my interviewees were engaging in, I explained the main objectives of my study to them before the interview. They could also deny answering a question if they did not wish to do so.

As I did not talk to people who had been directly involved in the conflict as victims of violence, I did not risk traumatising people by interviewing them about experiences of violence. I was exposed to some violent images myself, for example images of mutilated corpses shared on Twitter. However, there was no direct exposure to violence during the research as I did not travel to the conflict area.

3.7.2. Positionality

I acknowledge my own positioning as a researcher and a bias towards the Burundian opposition and civil society. Most of the news articles, analysis reports and research blogs that I had read on the situation in Burundi prior to gathering the material for this study had been written by international writers and organisations. In general, the international discourse on the Burundian crisis is such that there is more sympathy for the points of view of the Burundian opposition and civil society than for the governmental position. Also, as a student of Peace and Conflict Research I am aware of the patterns of structural violence and other cases in which there is a similar government-opposition confrontation with asymmetric power relations favouring the government. Therefore, my initial stance on the issue was leaning more towards the positions of the anti-government camp.

During the research process, I have read a considerable amount of material related to the Burundi crisis, both by international and local actors. Among the material that I have collected for the study and that I have read for my own interest, there have been articles, social media publications, research reports and interviews which have supported both the points of view of the opposition-civil society camp and the government. During the research process, I have gained knowledge about various aspects of the situation in Burundi and my positionality has become more detailed and nuanced. All in all, I still think that there are enough reasons to support the argument that human rights violations by the government forces are taking place against the civilian population in Burundi. However, as the objective of the research was to study local conceptualisations of the conflict issues, it was evident that both the views of the government and those opposing it would be taken into account.
Since I have worked as a journalist, I am used to upholding a standard of objectivity. That helped me to balance between the opposing accounts to some extent. I consciously tried to avoid a bias by being open to various opinions and interpretations of conflict events. However, there may have been an unconscious bias in the way that I treated the different sources in the text and put them into order, as well as in the process of selecting social media material for the data, due to my personal point of view mentioned above.

3.8. Conclusion

In this methodological chapter I have discussed the types of data that I am analysing in my study, the responsive open-ended interviewing technique that I used to gather interview material and the way in which I coded the material. I have presented the methodological tool of discourse analysis and how I used it to analyse the material. Finally, I have discussed the limitations and the ethical points of view in the research.

I had various types of material including interviews, social media posts and discussions, videos and news articles. I therefore had to code the material according to systematic categories. I had listed them in a codebook based on an initial reading of the transcripts of four of the five interviews. Discourse and narrative analysis were the tools to identify patterns in the data in order to analyse the conflict parties’ legitimisation and the discrepancies in their conceptualisations of violence and dialogue.

The next chapter presents the analysis of the data that I gathered and the discussion of the results.
4. Analysis of the narratives on violence and dialogue

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will present the analysis of the narratives and conceptualisations of violence and dialogue in the Burundian crisis. I will first present a brief overview of the theoretical concepts that constitute the framework of my study and then proceed to the data analysis in which I will make more detailed references to the theory.

The analysis uses a combination of discourse and narrative analysis as I explained in Chapter 3. The cross-cutting concepts throughout the analysis are violence and dialogue. I will present the analysis in broad groups of discourses which are organised according to the main themes that my sub-research questions deal with: conceptualisations of violence; legal and political aspects; ethnicity; and economy. The differences and similarities in the narratives and conceptualisations presented by the conflict parties are identified in each discourse group. The analysis of the conceptualisations of dialogue is connected to the analysis of the conflict discourses. I analyse the discourses’ implications for dialogue at the end of the section 4.3. with regard to violence-related discourses and at the end of the section 4.4. concerning legal and political narratives.

The configuration of the conflict parties was discussed in the sections 2.5. and 2.6. Regarding the actors, I will analyse the narratives by the government, the opposition and the civil society representatives together, not separately. In addition to political actors, my data includes statements of ordinary Burundians who are active on social media. I will examine them as part of either the government or the civil society-opposition camp, depending on how their positions are aligned. The same applies to the civil society representatives at the Inter-Burundian dialogue session that I analysed. Although the division to two camps does not always represent all the nuances of the opinions within the Burundian society, it helps to analyse the polarisation of the conflict discourses.

After presenting the theory, I will start the analysis with the discourses on violence in Burundi. The following section addresses the discourses of legality, sovereignty and the rule of law. After that, I will examine the discourses on ethnicity and economy. The chapter ends with a conclusion which discusses the findings. The excerpts from interviews and media sources in French have been translated from French to English by the author, as well as the social media posts when mentioned.
4.2. Theoretical concepts

Part of my theoretical framework evolves around the concept of dialogue in the field of conflict transformation. Another part of the theory deals with the discursive legitimisation of war and violence. I will first explain two concepts relevant in the Burundian conflict context: inclusive dialogue and the Inter-Burundian dialogue. After that, I will introduce the theoretical framework of radical disagreement and agonistic dialogue and relate these concepts to my research question. Lastly, I will present the sociological theory of structuration by Anthony Giddens.

4.2.1. Inclusive dialogue and the Inter-Burundian dialogue

The international third-party actors have made requests for an inclusive dialogue in the Burundian society as a way to deal with the post-electoral violence since 2015. The concept has been popular in the United Nations’ peacebuilding discourse and was used for example after the political transition in Tunisia in 2011 to bring together different local and national approaches to building peace (Ryan, 2012, p. 19).

Regarding Burundi, the African Union and the United Nations among others have called for a “genuine and inclusive dialogue, based on the respect of the Arusha Agreement” (Vandeginste, 2015b, p. 1). On the international level, this has usually referred to the mediation process led by the East African Community and facilitator Mkapa (see section 1.2.). Regardless of the interpretation, ‘inclusive dialogue’ is a term that has been used by Burundians as an ideal of how the dialogue between the conflict parties should be, as I will demonstrate in the analysis.

In addition to the regionally led dialogue, the Government of Burundi organised its own dialogue process on the national level. The process started in September 2015 when the government created the National Commission of the Inter-Burundian Dialogue [Commission Nationale du Dialogue Inter-Burundais, CNDI]. Its objective, defined in Article 6 of the decree on the organisation of the dialogue, was to “conduct the process of Inter-Burundian dialogue in the whole country and on all levels” (Republic of Burundi, 2015).

Dialogue sessions were held in the Burundian communes [municipalities], including the capital Bujumbura, starting from January 2016. The sessions included participants from women’s, youth’s and other civil society organisations, as well as individual participants. There was also a separate dialogue session for the police forces in February 2017. The closing ceremony of the dialogue was held in March 2017. (RFI, 2016d; Ministère de la sécurité publique, 2017; Isanganiro, 2017)
Opposition and civil society groups have criticised the dialogue about being organised on the government’s terms (RFI, 2016a). According to Söderberg Kovacs (2016), it was an “orchestrated process” with people expressing “with almost mechanical consistency” their will to modify the Arusha Agreement and the Constitution to remove the president’s term limits.

The civil society representatives were given two questions to reflect upon: “According to you, what are the reasons of the current crisis?” and “What do you suggest as a solution?”. A government representative argues that the participants could express themselves freely and that there were no taboos. (Interview of a Burundian diplomat, 31.1.2017)

4.2.2. Radical disagreement and linguistic intractability

The problem in Burundi is not to say the truth, it is to listen to the truth. Everybody seems to say “it’s my truth, it’s my truth”. So do they listen to each other? That is the problem. It is a dialogue of the deaf, on one side the power says “it’s like this”, on the other side the opposition says “it’s like this”.

(Interview of a civil society representative, 1.2.2017)

This definition by an interviewee from a civil society organisation connects well with the concept of radical disagreement, defined by Ramsbotham (2010) as “the chief linguistic manifestation of intense and intractable political conflict”. He posits that the heated emotions of the conflict parties reduce the constructiveness of the communication to the point of a “conversation of the deaf” in which central conflict issues cannot be debated anymore and neither party wants to listen to the other (pp. 57, 96).

According to Ramsbotham (2010), radical disagreement is a clash of discourses. There are major, bipolar conflicting discourses and a great number of underlying sub-discourses, the more complex the more profoundly the conflict is examined (pp. 18–19). Radical disagreement is a conflict of belief understood broadly, opposing for example contradictory subjective perceptions, attitudes, different discursive representations and points of view about the reality (pp. 6–8). I argue that Burundi’s post-electoral crisis is a conflict opposing precisely these types of differing discourses and interpretations of the essence of the conflict.

Radical disagreement can be analysed in terms of the content: arguments opposing each other; or the form: incompatible cultural narratives (Ramsbotham, 2010, pp. 6–8, 127). In this study, I analyse the content of the arguments of the conflict parties since the parties represent the same cultural background. Ramsbotham presents radical disagreement visually by placing opposing statements between bar lines ( | | ). I use the same presenting style in this study.
There is also a distinction between truth and validity in radical disagreement. Evaluating whether an argument is factually true differs from evaluating if an argument is logically valid – that is, if the inference from the basis of the argument to the conclusion holds (Ramsbotham, 2010, pp. 23–24). The form is closely connected to content in a radical disagreement: when two claims clash, the logical validity of the adversary’s claim cannot be separated from the questions of what he or she is actually talking about and if it is true (p. 128).

Ramsbotham (2010) states based on Habermas’s theory of communicative action that the validity claims presented by a conflict party are based on the worlds of objectivity and subjectivity as well as the shared social world. The other way around, a conflict party answers to the other by challenging the factuality, the moral justification or the personal sincerity of what the adversary is saying (p. 125). The justifications and claims that the parties make are always related to the conflict context and are politically loaded (p. 25).

Furthermore, Ramsbotham (2010) argues that facts and values merge together in intense radical disagreement and that it is not possible to separate emotion from facts when addressing a radical disagreement. When a conflict party wants to challenge a fact presented by the adversary, it does so by stating that the argument is not in accordance with a norm. Conversely, challenging a value is done by arguing that the adversary’s argument is not legitimate in terms of a fact. This fact/value distinction explains why parties can justify their positions with the same principle but contradictorily, since the parties may define differently what the principle includes and does not include. (pp. 96, 125–126)

Ramsbotham applies the concept of radical disagreement to long, intractable conflicts. As I explained in Chapter 2, conflict has been present in Burundi since the first inter-ethnic massacres of 1965, with more and less active periods of violence. Despite conflict resolution attempts such as the 2000 Arusha Agreement, violence has stayed in Burundi and recently manifested itself during and after election periods.

Based on these characteristics, I argue that the Burundian conflict constitutes an intractable conflict in which radical disagreement is a useful concept to analyse the tension between the conflict parties, namely the government and the opposition-civil society camp. The concept helps to answer the last part of my research question: Do the discrepancies in narratives by the conflict actors constitute radical disagreements and how do they explain the current tense political situation in Burundi?
4.2.3. Agonistic dialogue

Radical disagreement is connected to the concept of agonistic dialogue. I understand it as a concept which underlies the theory of radical disagreement, although I will not use it as a tool for the analysis. Ramsbotham (2010) defines it as a dialogue in which opposing parties answer to each other’s statements directly or through a third party in intense political struggle. It is not bound by the rules of conventional polite discussions. (pp. 93–94)

The concept of agonism has emerged from the school of thought of agonistic pluralism, one of the main figures of which is the political theorist Chantal Mouffe. Agonists agree with the classic idea of conflict being inevitable. Mouffe (2007, as cited in Maddison, 2014, p. 1021) argues with regard to identity-related conflicts that accepting their inevitability would decrease the probability of violence. Ramsbotham (2010) also thinks that conflict that is or could become violent can and should be transformed into non-violent change in society (p. 53).

The analysis of agonistic dialogue is interested in the power relations underlying the dialogue. Agonistic dialogue goes beyond the surface and addresses fundamental issues of the conflict such as identity, history and politics. Through agonistic dialogue the conflict parties can recognise their differences and understand the core issues of the conflict better. (Maddison, 2014, pp. 1022–1023)

4.2.4. Giddens’s theory of structuration

I already discussed legitimisation as a discursive practice in Chapter 3. The sociologist Anthony Giddens’s theory of structuration addresses more specifically the question of legitimising war as a social continuity in discourses. I find his theory relevant for my understanding of the Burundian conflict parties’ conceptualisations of violence and the narratives with which they legitimise their positions in the conflict. The discursive practices are tools that help the conflict parties to make sense of what they are doing in the conflict and why they do it.

Jabri (1996) argues in her book Discourses on Violence, based on Giddens’s theory, that “there are discursive and institutional continuities which legitimise and enable war as a form of human conduct and which are drawn upon and reproduced by actors in strategic interaction” (p. 54). She sees violent conflict, such as Burundi’s political crisis, as conscious human action and a social continuity from the point of view of legitimising violence (p. 55).

Giddens states that there are structured continuities of signification, legitimisation and domination in the society. First, Giddens argues that in communicative interaction, there are structures of
signification that actors achieve through interpretive schemes and that include symbolic orders and discourses that the actors share. Second, structures of legitimisation are based on the norms and sanctions in social interaction. Third, there are structures of domination that emerge from asymmetrical power relations and produce dominant discourses. According to Giddens, these can be challenged by counter-discourses. (Jabri, 1996, pp. 82–85)

I will explain the theory of structuration more in detail during the analysis.
4.3. Discourses on violence

My first sub-research question concerns the ways in which the Burundian conflict parties have conceptualised the violence in Burundi between 2015 and 2017. In order to examine the discrepancies between the parties’ narratives on violence, it is illustrative to take an example of the ways in which the representatives of the government, the opposition and the civil society answered my interview question of how they define the events in Burundi since 2015:

Since the end of April 2015, right after the designation of Pierre Nkurunziza as the candidate of the party CNDD-FDD for the presidential election of 2015, part of the civil society organisations and of the opposition parties organised demonstrations … since, as they said, they demonstrated to express their opposition to this third term of President Nkurunziza. The demonstrations, which were peaceful in the beginning, quickly degenerated into violent protests. And then into an armed insurrection. (Interview of a Burundian diplomat, 31.1.2017)

There is a political crisis, the security crisis, the institutional crisis, the humanitarian crisis, there is an economic crisis, so it is a deep crisis which follows from the coercion for this illegal third term of Pierre Nkurunziza. (Interview of Pancrace Cimpaye, CNARED, 2.2.2017)

What comes to 2015, it is the end of a process of real democratisation of the country, a process that we had since 2005 with the return to democratisation and to elections. And during the ten years we have seen that the incumbent government has done everything to reverse the progress that we had. (Interview of a civil society representative, 1.2.2017)

The government representative defines the violence as an armed uprising against the government, speaking within the discourse of ‘rule of law’. On the other hand, the spokesman of the CNARED opposition alliance Pancrace Cimpaye emphasises the illegality of the third mandate and defines the conflict as multi-layered – conceptualising it in terms of ‘security’, ‘institutions’, ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘economy’. The civil society representative residing in Brussels conceptualises the crisis with the discourse of ‘authoritarianism’ and defines it as regression from democratisation.

The discursive divide between the definition of the conflict by the government and the opposition-civil society camp is deep here. The diplomat conceptualises the conflict as a breach of the ‘rule of law’ by those opposing the government, whereas the two others legitimise their positions by identifying problems in the government’s actions. This already suggests that there might be a radical disagreement between the parties, following Ramsbotham’s (2010) theory.

A word that often appears in the conflict parties’ statements about the opponent is “manipulation”. It is used both by the government and its supporters and the opposition and civil society activists. The word is connected to the discourse of ‘information war’ which posits that the opponent manipulates information in order to advance its own objectives for a favourable conflict outcome. Jabri (1996)
argues that in communicative interaction actors may opt for a strategy of manipulating information about what they intend to achieve or of the outside world (p. 165). A statement of an opposition leader allied to the government, who comments the phenomenon of corpses found in various places in Burundi, illustrates this discourse of ‘information war’ which often delegitimises the diaspora-based opposition and civil society in the government camp’s statements:

According to the President of the party Radebu, talking about a relapse to violence is an easy affirmation, an international forgery forged by the radical opposition and supported by the civil society expelled from the country to manipulate the opinion.
(Interview of Jean de Dieu Mutabazi, opposition leader (Radebu), Iwacu-burundi.org 27.3.2017)

In the ‘information war’ discourse, the phenomenon of increasing violence is conceptualised as a lie and as manipulation of information by the opposition-civil society camp.

The main discourses within which the theme of the essence of the violence in Burundi is addressed in my material are the government’s discourse of ‘normality’ and the opposition-civil society camp’s discourse of ‘state-led violence’. I will present the analysis of these different narratives first. The opposition’s discourse of ‘violent resistance’ is discussed in a separate sub-section and analysed with the theory of structuration. The final sub-section analyses the implications of these discourses for the dialogue in the crisis and the central question of the disagreement about who the participants of the dialogue should be.

4.3.1. Discourses of ‘normality’ and ‘state-led violence’

A narrative of ‘normality’ has been very prominent in the Burundian government’s statements about the situation in Burundi since the political crisis began. President Nkurunziza’s media and communication advisor Willy Nyamitwe described the events in terms of that narrative during the coup attempt in Bujumbura in May 2015 and after the attacks on two military bases in the capital in December 2015:

The office of president ordered all Burundians and foreigners to keep calm, he [Willy Nyamitwe] said. More than 95% of country is normal and quiet, Mr Nyamitwe added.
(A live news feed on Burundi’s coup attempt, BBC.com, 13.5.2015)

#Burundi : Rumors are flying that #Bujumbura downtown is vacant because of this attack. It's business as usual, ppl at work, kids at school
(Willy Nyamitwe, @willynyamitwe on Twitter, 11.12.2015)
On both occasions, the message of the government representative is that normal life continues in Burundi. The second tweet includes the discourse of ‘information war’ in addition to the ‘normality’ narrative since Nyamitwe refers to “rumours” that argue the opposite.

In the structuration theory, Giddens states that structures of domination arise from a situation in which power is distributed asymmetrically. The hegemonic group uses structures of signification, such as shared cultural concepts, to legitimise the groups’ interests. That is the case in Burundi with a powerful ruling party and a fragmented opposition and civil society. There are dominant discourses in a society’s discursive and institutional practices that are understood as legitimate. Giddens refers to the “dialectic of control” as the possibility to challenge a dominant discourse with a counter-discourse to transform society. (Jabri, 1996, pp. 83–84, 96)

The dialectic of control can often be observed in the way the ‘state-led violence’ counter-discourse of the opposition and civil society challenges the government’s dominant ‘normality’ discourse in social media debates. A good example is the discussion in President Pierre Nkurunziza’s Twitter feed in September 2016 that followed the release of a report by the UN Independent Investigation on Burundi. It revealed human rights violations by the Burundian security services. The series of tweets constitutes a long narrative that exemplifies the narrativity and multiple tellership presented by Page (2012) and Ochs and Taylor (1992) (see section 3.5.2).

The stage that was reached more than a year ago is solid. #Burundi is in peace, the Burundians are united, whatever certain people say (Pierre Nkurunziza, @nkurunziza, 24.9.2016 (translation from French))

In his first tweet, Nkurunziza as the initiator of the narrative promotes the idea of Burundi being in a situation of normality instead of conflict. The tweet also includes the discourse of Burundian ‘unity’ which is often mentioned in discourses supporting the government. Furthermore, Nkurunziza uses the discursive strategy of exclusion (Fairclough, 2003, p. 145) by omitting the actors who disagree about the purported unity and peacefulness of Burundi. However, based on the timing of Nkurunziza’s tweet, it is not difficult to conclude that “certain people” refers to the UN investigators whose report accuses the Burundian security forces of violence towards civilians.

This exclusion of actors is part of the Burundian diplomatic discourse throughout my material. The Burundian diplomat in Brussels that I interviewed justified his choice of not naming partners that he sees as spoilers in the Burundian crisis by saying: “it is not in our habits to name them directly”.

The second tweet and the ensuing replies engage in a discursive competition:

It is my faith, it is what I have lived: finally, it is not the number of lies or rumours that counts, neither the force of those who say it
Two discourses cross in Nkurunziza’s second tweet. The first one, once again, is the discourse of ‘information war’ which labels the accusations of government-related violence as “lies” and “rumours” disseminated by external actors. The other one is a religious discourse that is present in the expression “my faith”. This discourse is part of the dominant discourse and often used by the president when he talks to Burundians in a local context. Also some opposition and civil society supporters refer to religion in their narratives, but not to the same extent as the president and the government camp.

Nkurunziza addresses his narrative to the Burundian nation as a whole, using in one of his later tweets the expression “dear countrymen”. The discourse of ‘information war’ is reinforced by KARIKERA who labels “them”, the external powers, as “nihilists” and asserts that Burundians know better what they need. The tweets of the other narrators Ngendakumana, David Ndabacekure and Tuyisenge Marc replicate the religious discourse that is present in Nkurunziza’s tweet.

The ‘state-led violence’ counter-discourse in this social media narrative comes from Barabitembeje who challenges the dominant narrative on Burundi’s situation in the discussion. His tweet contains a photo of five corpses and probably refers to the killings of five young people by police officers in the quartier of Mutakura in northern Bujumbura in December 2015 (Couteau, 2015).

In another example of Giddens’s concept of dialectic of control, the Burundian journalist based in Brussels challenges the dominant government discourse of ‘normality’:

They [the government] say that everything is perfect, that everything is fine, but in the same time the president now does not travel anymore. And when he has to move from a province to another, he has to do
it in an armoured car. Why all these measures when everything is going well? (Interview of a Burundian journalist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

Part of the ‘normality’ discourse of the government narrative is to conceptualise the violence in Burundi as ‘isolated attacks’ or as ‘terrorism’. The interview of the diplomat at the Burundian Embassy in Brussels illustrates this conceptualisation:

…compared to 2015 security prevails in the country. Apart from a few assassinations that one notes, targeted assassinations of political and military personalities, and apart from a few armed attacks. And that is not only in Burundi, one finds it also in other countries, even countries with strong democratic traditions, like in Europe, there are crazy people who commit this kind of regrettable acts. And the people do their daily activities everywhere, people are at their work, be it in the countryside, the farmers work, farm their fields and raise their cattle, the salesmen do their activities. (Interview of a Burundian diplomat, 31.1.2017)

The diplomat compares the violence in Burundi to terrorist attacks in Europe and undermines the importance of violent acts: there are only “a few” of them. Nevertheless, he recognises that there are “targeted assassinations” of politicians and army officers taking place.

Furthermore, the ‘isolated attacks’ narrative echoed by public officials sometimes qualifies the killings as mere criminal cases of public order, as the following comment of the spokesman of the Burundian police forces shows. The spokesman was interviewed after there had been news reports on “the phenomenon of corpses” – an increase of the amount of dead bodies found around the country in March 2017.

“There is no relapse of violence”, indicates the spokesman of the police. It is about mere isolated criminal cases of public order (showdowns, banditry, witchcraft). According to Pierre Nkurikiye, there is no political machinery behind these killings and no ethnic group is targeted. (Interview of Pierre Nkurikiye, spokesman of the police, Iwacu-burundi.org 27.3.2017)

The counter-discourse by civil society representatives concerning the same issue falls under the discourse of ‘state-led violence’. The interpretation by one of them was that there had been an increase in violent acts by the government’s security forces and the Imbonerakure youth militia, targeting especially the opposition and the former members of the Burundian Army which had an ethnic Tutsi majority.

“The phenomenon of corpses comes back at a worrying speed. The tendency resembles the one observed towards the end of the year 2015”, indicates this activist of human rights. According to him it is a repression done by the defence and security forces and by the young militants of the party in power, the Imbonerakure. “What scares still is that this repression concentrates on the ex-FAB members and the youth of the opposition.” (Interview of Anschaire Nikoyagize, human rights defender, Iwacu-burundi.org 27.3.2017)
The lexical choices in the statement are typical for this discourse: the word “repression” reinforces the image of a powerful government against an oppressed opposition and ethnic minority. The words “worrying” and “scare” indicate the fear of facing violence by state forces.

Interestingly, the ‘isolated attacks’ discourse, almost exclusively attributed to the government, is present in the civil society representative’s narrative at one point.

So regarding the other movements we do not know, there are sometimes some attacks, we do not know exactly who it is, there are movements that are… but without an organised structure. — So on the other side there is a government that holds its grip on power by force and on the other side some opposition actors that are organising themselves and maybe, since there is a lack of dialogue, will be facing each other —

(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

This may indicate that the civil society representative sees the opposition actors as dispersed and that there are some acts of violence that cannot be clearly attributed to any group. However, his statements later in the interview reinforce the narrative that the majority of the violence is committed by the government forces. He speaks within the ‘history’ discourse, stating that there has been violence in Burundi since the 1960s. He states that there is a “system of political violence” in Burundi since 2008 when the last rebel group, FNL-Palipehutu, signed a peace agreement with the government.

So it started with the hunt for the opposition members from FNL — There was the hunt for opposition members, even in CNDD-FDD, the party in power, those who did not agree were either hunted or even imprisoned. So there was a whole system of violence which was put in place. And until 2015 when the ruling party faced texts violating the Arusha Agreement. So it was necessary to use violence to refuse to apply these texts. — and when the people demonstrated, it could only end with a violent repression by the current government —

(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

The ‘repression’ sub-discourse of this narrative belongs to the discourse of ‘state-led violence’. The activist thinks that the system of violence is a state machinery used against all those who oppose the government. This perception of a system of political violence put in place by CNDD-FDD is supported by the studies of Daley and Popplewell (2016), Reyntjens (2015) Van Acker (2015). The role of the Arusha Agreement is further analysed in the section 4.4.

The discourse of ‘state-led violence’ comes across strongly from the Facebook post published on December 16, 2015 by Félix Muheto, a Burundian author-businessman living in Canada, and shared by the civil society activist Pacifique Nininahazwe. Muheto’s post is in the form of a letter addressed to President Nkurunziza and concerns the death of Muheto’s brother in the massacres of December 11-12, 2015. According to the Burundian army, 87 people died in Bujumbura during those two days in killings that followed the attacks to three military bases by armed groups (FIDH, 2016, p. 48; RFI, 2015). Here are some excerpts of the post:
My friend Peter, HE Pierre Nkurunziza, President of Burundi,
Contrary to what your advisors and spokesmen say, to me, all the Burundians are friends. “We have killed
this many enemies and have arrested this many; and on the friendly side, there have been this many dead
and injured.” I cite your delegates or functionaries. To speak in terms of enemies and friends does not make
any sense in the context of Burundi. Brothers and sisters would be more appropriate. Because the
dissensions between brothers and sisters do not necessarily lead to killings. But rather to dialogue. –

My little brother died this Saturday 12th December (1212victimes). He was really not your enemy. On the
contrary, he admired you. He probably received fatal and cowardly gunshots in the back while he was
running for cover in order to protect himself against the rain of bullets that hit his body. He really believed
in you, in your capacity and your willingness to protect all the Burundian citizens. –

The Burundian people believed and hoped that, with your experiences of horror, first with the death of your
father in 1972, then with your painful experience of the 90s, you would be sensible to human suffering.
Power makes one blind, especially when one comes from that far, humanely speaking. I am almost not
angry at you.
(Félix Muheto on Facebook, 16.12.2015)

The narrative is written in a poetic language typical for the literature genre, creating a narrative story
as defined by Fairclough (2003, p. 83). In addition, its medium is letter, a text that is addressed to a
specific recipient, in this case President Nkurunziza. The author has published it in the social media.
The personal way of writing to the president and the literary style make the narrative rhetorically
powerful.

In addition to the discourse of ‘state-led violence’, the narrative contains the discourses of ‘unity’,
‘inclusive dialogue’, ‘history’ and ‘authoritarianism’. The discourse of ‘unity’ is conveyed by the
expressions “all the Burundians are friends” and “brothers and sisters”. This implies in terms of
dialogue that the narrator conceptualises the ideal dialogue in the Burundian conflict as inclusive, like
between friends or family members. The narrator creates a discursive contrast between ‘unity’ and
‘state-led violence’ by stating that his brother was a supporter of Nkurunziza but still got killed by
the security forces. In the last chapter, the ‘history’ discourse connects Burundi’s 1972 killings and
the Civil War of the 1990s with Nkurunziza’s personal history and suggests that those events should
have changed his attitude towards violence. At the end, the narrator conceptualises the Burundian
crisis as a consequence of ‘authoritarianism’, the abuse of power, and suggests that the blinding effect
of power is somewhat understandable and that it is possible to forgive.

My material also includes other similar narratives that describe the violence within the discourse of
‘state-led violence’. Most of them are written by the civil society activist Pacifique Nininahazwe.
Furthermore, France24’s online TV documentary Burundi: Fear and Exile narrates the Burundian
conflict by interviewing Burundian refugees in Uganda and Tanzania as well as exiled civil society
and opposition activists mostly in Belgium. In the documentary, a member of the opposition party MSD in exile in Uganda presents a primary narrative on violence:

I was arrested by the commander of the brigade Gihanga. I was arrested on a Sunday, it was the 2nd August. On Monday I was taken to the police station in Gihanga. On Monday around 11 o’clock I was handcuffed and transferred to the Documentation [SNR intelligence service headquarters] in Bujumbura. At that moment, they started to hit me. They hit me the whole day. I was beaten hard. I was kicked in the face, in the back, I was beaten by the colonel Alexis. I was in a cell with 42 men. In the night we organised it so that there were 20 who slept and 20 who stayed awake. Every evening they came to take away young men. I don't know where but they never came back. It’s obvious they killed them. Every ten years there’s a crisis. I grew up during the war, I grew old during the war. I don’t want to go back to my country.


This account differs from the other narratives presented in this section since it gives a first-hand account of the violence. This narrative clearly belongs to the ‘state-led violence’ discourse. It conceptualises the violence as torture done by members of the intelligence service.

In conclusion, the opposition and the civil society have mostly conceptualised the violence in Burundi as repression by the government forces. On the other hand, the government has conceptualised the violence as ‘isolated attacks’ and ‘terrorism’ and repeatedly described Burundi as being in a situation of ‘normality’. There is a radical disagreement between the conceptualisations of violence and it can be described in the following way:

| ‘The violence in Burundi consists of isolated violent acts.’ |
| ‘The violence in Burundi is systematic state repression of those who are against the government.’ |

4.3.2. Discourse of ‘violent resistance’

According to Giddens’s structuration theory, signification is related to communication and the key role of language in conflict. Conflicts include communicative acts like threats, complaints or warnings which are signals specific to their context. They are bound by the rules of the society that apply also in the time of conflict, even though conflict creates its own code of conduct. Furthermore, there are discursive paradigms which justify using violence in a conflict. (Jabri, 1996, pp. 73–75)

Regarding legitimisation, the actors’ desires and beliefs affect their response to arising conflict. Besides, the way in which an actor justifies decisions depends on the expectations towards the actor’s role which offers him or her “legitimising reasons”. They are different from the real reasons for taking a certain type of action (Jabri, 1996, pp. 67, 69)
These legitimising reasons and signals are central to how the actors in the Burundian conflict justify their positions. The dependence of the legitimisation on the actor’s role is visible in the discrepancies between the conflict parties’ narratives: the ways in which the government of Burundi legitimises its positions are different from those of an opposition actor due to their different statuses. The political opposition, for example, is expected to criticise the government, which sets certain limits to its legitimisation possibilities. Moreover, the signals that the conflict parties use are based on their common cultural and linguistic framework and discourses that all of them understand.

Threats are in Burundi’s case for example warnings of historical acts that will be repeated, as demonstrated by this comment by a civil society representative:

So we can say that today’s Burundi has come back to how it was in the 1990s, the years in the beginning of the 90s after the bloody coup, so today it is almost the same thing. We have a somewhat illegitimate government, some elections have not been according to democratic norms. We have a government that imposed itself, that has refused to apply the Constitution and the Arusha Agreement … And at some point there is the risk of a popular movement. People will be facing a wall and from there there is no peaceful solution. … We try to see [sic] in the violence what has happened in Burundi before; that people have taken up arms to fight the government in power.

(Interview of a Burundian civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

The activist refers to the failed coup attempt by the army and the outbreak of the Burundian Civil War in 1993 (see section 2.2.). The warning expressed here is that the violent history might repeat itself since there is a culture of popular armed ‘violent resistance’ in Burundi. The ‘history’ discourse specific to the Burundian context constitutes a framework that all the conflict parties know. The comparison to the beginning of the 1990s in Burundi is a structure of signification that is commonly shared.

Discursive paradigms of legitimisation that justify the use of violence in the conflict are common in the opposition’s statements. For example, the representative of the CNARED opposition alliance justifies the possibility of using violence with the government’s violent acts and states that the government’s violent means dictate the ways in which the opposition should respond.

Well… you know… in this kind of a situation it is the enemy that dictates to you the ways to fight it. The first way is the peaceful way – – If he comes to the negotiation table, we will negotiate, we will find a solution. But if he does not come to the negotiation table, it is classical, it is well known. There is a youth that cannot stand, cannot eternally accept to be killed, to be hunted, to die in the refugee camps. And you know very well that – – every person in a refugee camp abroad only dreams about coming back in any possible way. – – One day, the youth will wake up and say that we have to use the means that Nkurunziza understands. And the way that Nkurunziza understands more and more is violence, unfortunately.

(Interview of Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017)
Cimpaye uses several techniques of discursive legitimisation and rhetoric to justify the potential use of violence. The discourse of ‘violent resistance’ here resembles classical leftist revolutionary discourse. Cimpaye sees the violence as an alternative to negotiations if they fail and legitimises the use of violence with the president’s authoritarianism. He also uses the expression “in every way” many times during the interview, emphasising the all-encompassing nature of the resistance and the purported readiness of all the parties to use force if needed. Earlier during the interview Cimpaye used similar rhetoric:

So I am telling you that currently the project that is going on is to appoint Nkurunziza as a president for a lifetime, which is something that the Burundian people will not accept, of course. Because it would be a collective suicide to accept an autocrat like Pierre Nkurunziza as the head of the state ad vitam aeternam [eternally]. It is unacceptable. It is unacceptable. We will fight this project in every way.

(Interview of Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017)

Here, Cimpaye uses the lexical metaphor “collective suicide” to demonstrate the alleged willingness of Burundians to resist Nkurunziza’s rule. Furthermore, the repetition of the expression “It is unacceptable” is also a discursive element that underlines the speaker’s negative stance on Nkurunziza’s prolonged presidency. Van Dijk (2006a) mentions repetition as one rhetorical function that can be used as a way to underline the negative features of the opposing group (pp. 126–127).

As Jabri (1996) argued above, the desire of Cimpaye and the CNARED alliance in general to get rid of Nkurunziza’s rule affects their response to the conflict. It is used as a legitimisation for potentially using violence in resistance.

Cimpaye’s comments constitute the kind of counter-discourse attempting to transform the society that Giddens’s concept of “dialectic of control” suggests. Cimpaye defines the ways in which the opposition pursues the transformation as either dialogue or violent uprising, depending on the government’s actions.

4.3.3. Implications for the dialogue

The government’s discourse of ‘normality’ sometimes implies in terms of dialogue that the government refuses to dialogue. In a news article published on the day on which the crisis entered its third year, Burundi’s vice-president iterates this position.

There is total peace in Burundi. It is an imaginary crisis, whether the detractors like it or not. There may be some incidents which, however, cannot spoil the national peace and the national harmony. Today, the crisis is behind us. Unfortunately, the sequels are still there and we are facing all of that.

(Interview of Burundi’s Vice-President Gaston Sindimwo, RFI.fr, 25.4.2017)
The vice-president also refers to the violence through the discourse of ‘isolated attacks’ and rhetorically de-emphasises the violence with the use of the word “may”. This kind of de-emphasising is called discursive group polarisation and is usually done to diminish the importance of the bad things done by the speaker’s own side (Van Dijk, 2006b, p. 374). The vice-president sees the crisis as being behind, which implies that there is no need for dialogue to solve any crisis. Therefore, the discourse of ‘normality’ indicates here a discursive practice of not participating in the dialogue (Fairclough, 2003, p. 24).

On the other hand, the government has also claimed to be open for dialogue. For instance, the Burundian diplomat in Brussels conceptualises the dialogue as ‘inclusive’ and refers to the participation of Burundi in the meetings of the regional mediation process.

And another factor is that Burundi still enjoys the support of the region East African Community, of the African Union, of the United Nations and of other partners in pursuing the inclusive dialogue which is, in my opinion, the only way that can lead to a durable solution of the Burundian conflict. (Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

The discourse of ‘inclusive dialogue’ is something that both conflict parties share. It is represented as an ideal and as the unique way to solve the crisis in several narratives, for example in a Facebook post of the civil society activist Pacifique Nininahazwe:

But one thing is for sure: the honour of Burundi will happen through inclusive dialogue and the construction of a real constitutional state. It cannot accommodate the impunity of crimes. It will never be constructed with an impostor like Pierre Nkurunziza. The honour of Burundi will also happen through national reconciliation and the changing of mentalities about governance. (Facebook post by Pacifique Nininahazwe, 25.8.2016, translated from French)

Nininahazwe’s narrative contains the discourses of ‘legality’ and ‘democracy’ and he connects ‘inclusive dialogue’ to reconciliation that should accommodate all the constituents of the society. There are also requests for an inter-ethnic inclusive dialogue, like this one by a representative of a Twa association in the Inter-Burundian dialogue session:

There have to be negotiations between the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa and the Ganwa and that the Burundian refugees are also included. (A male speaker at the CNDI dialogue session in Bujumbura on 13.4.2016, UNIPROBU association)

There is a deep disagreement between the conflict parties about who is entitled to participate in the formal dialogue process, the negotiations in Arusha. The civil society activist based in Brussels analyses the implications of Burundi’s political situation for the dialogue in Arusha like this:

The facilitation is ambiguous, we do not know what the facilitation is, where it is headed. So it is this kind of dialogue, I do not know if it is a dialogue for dialoguing, – – there will be no solution. And so now, if it
is about negotiating, it is a question of power relations. And at the moment, the government refuses to dialogue, that is, refuses to negotiate, because what is on the other side? That is the question.

(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

The civil society activist conceptualises the dialogue within the discourse of ‘power’. He thinks that the Arusha mediation process does not progress because of the “power relations”, the fact that the government is more powerful than its counterpart, the fractured opposition.

The last sentence indicates that the messiness of the opposition is a problem that makes it difficult to define who should be negotiating with the government. The activist thinks that the opposition should organise itself better and speak with one voice. One problem is the phenomenon of nyakurisation (see section 2.5.) which has blurred the line between the government and opposition actors, as quotes by the civil society activist and the journalist illustrate:

There are some political parties in the opposition that we call alimentary parties. There are people who create parties in order to survive. So they are there around the government, some satellites – or they are false opposition activists.

(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

They sent CNDD-FDD party members in or created a division inside the party to put in place organisms, people of the opposition party that they will collaborate with. And so, the so-called dialogue announced by the government is a dialogue by CNDD-FDD with the opposition parties that agree with it. – The parties that constitute the real opposition have not been associated to the dialogue.

(Interview of a Burundian journalist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

The journalist conceptualises dialogue in terms of freedom of expression and plurality of parties. He argues that the government has put in place a monologue instead of an inclusive dialogue.

In addition to the opposition, the problem of blurred boundaries concerns the Burundian civil society. The Brussels-based diplomat and civil society activist describe the emergence of a political civil society in addition to the traditional civil society organisations:

The civil society and political opposition came together in order to fight the third mandate. – this civil society, since they did not have the trust of those in power in the beginning and found themselves clearly on the side of the politicians. – This activist civil society is between two tendencies. At the same time, they played the game by saying “we are the civil society” but at the same time they did politics.

(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

I mean that from 2015 until today we have seen that on the one hand, part of the civil society organisations has unfortunately shifted to a role that was not theirs. It has played the role of the political opposition. – And so this disqualified it from the traditional role of a civil society that is recognised by the laws in Burundi and elsewhere in the world.

(Interview of a Burundian diplomat, 31.1.2017)
The diplomat delegitimises the political civil society by speaking within a national and international legal discourse. Furthermore, he uses the expression “traditional role” to argue that these organisations are not acting according to norms.

The government’s recurrent discourse of conceptualising the violence in Burundi as ‘terrorism’ provides legitimisation for excluding from the dialogue those members of the opposition that the government sees as terrorists and plotters of the coup attempt in May 2015. The diplomat at the Burundian Embassy in Brussels legitimises his position by a combination of discursive moral evaluation and authorisation, referring to the international values and practices of dealing with acts of terrorism.

In no country is a terrorist, for example, invited to sit on [sic] a table, he goes in front of the tribunals. So that is not only the government, … even the United Nations, even the region, the East African Community, agree on that. So the people who have killed innocent citizens do not have a place in the dialogue because they have opted for unfounded violence, people who have thrown grenades onto the marketplace, no place in the dialogue.
(I Interview of a Burundian diplomat, 31.1.2017)

The diplomat refers to the United Nations as part of the international community and to the regional organisation EAC as other authorities that according to him agree with Burundi’s position on terrorism. The strategy of discursive authorisation with reference to international norms or to the government’s cooperation with the regional and international institutions is present in many of the government’s statements that I analysed. This is interesting since on the contrary, sovereignty is a value that the government often emphasises, as I will argue in the next section.

The spokesman of the CNARED alliance has an opposite view to that of the government about the participants in the dialogue. He mentions “inclusiveness” as the goal of the dialogue process and wants it to include also the armed movements:

And this framework, we want it to be inclusive. If it is not inclusive, it becomes a monologue. We want the civil society to be there, we want that the representatives of the religious confessions are there, we want that the representatives of the youth are there. We even want that those who have taken up the armed fight are there, — — the FNL of Nzabampema, the RED-Tabara of Melchiade Biremba, the FOREBU of Godefroid Niyombare. All these three major armed movements have to be around this table to discuss. Because we cannot leave them outside and think that we will have peace.
(I Interview of the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017)

Also the civil society activist in Brussels thinks that the government should dialogue with the CNARED. According to him, the military coup of May 2015 was internal. The activist accuses the government of a lack of logical validity:
In CNARED, there are no putschist militaries. – – There are putschists – – who are imprisoned in Burundi and others who have fled but until now the putschists have not spoken out to form a dialogue, have not formed a movement that would come to negotiate with him [Nkurunziza].
(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

However, the government position has stayed uncompromising throughout the crisis. Another example of the government’s refusal to dialogue with those to whom it refers as “radical opposition” is visible in the tweets by President Nkurunziza’s media and communication advisor Willy Nyamitwe in January 2016. The government first responded to the invitation to an African Union-led dialogue session in Tanzania in the following way:

No dialogue tomorrow, neither the 16th January like many thought because there is no consensus on the date. (Joseph Bangurambona, the Permanent Secretary of the Burundian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, LeMonde.fr 5.1.2016)

Nyamitwe commented the participation of the CNARED opposition alliance in the negotiations on Twitter like this:

#BurundiDialogue I told Jeremie Minani it’s one’s right to dream when he stated @cnaredburundi needs to be part of a transitional Gvt
Willy Nyamitwe, @willynyamitwe, 8.1.2016

#BurundiDialogue @cnaredburundi would like to have 2 parties in this dialogue (Gvt - Cnared). Something that he won’t get.
Willy Nyamitwe, @willynyamitwe, 9.1.2016 (translation from French)

Jeremie Minani has called for the population to arm themselves. Sinduhije of @CnaredBurundi is a trouble-maker and distributes weapons in Mutakura & Musaga.
Willy Nyamitwe, @willynyamitwe, 9.1.2016 (translation from French)

The Gvt of #Burundi cannot be on the same table with @cnaredburundi according to the 2248 Resolution of the #UNSC “peaceful stakeholders”
Willy Nyamitwe, @willynyamitwe, 9.1.2016 (translation from French)

Nyamitwe addresses his tweets to the president of the CNARED, Jérémie Minani, and to the Commissioner for defense and security questions Alexis Sinduhije. Both are also leaders of opposition parties. Nyamitwe engages in a discursive battle against CNARED and claims that the platform is inciting Burundians into violence.

Jérémie Minani commented the same issue in a news article, accusing the government of refusing to dialogue:

It is a shame for the country and for Africa, who continue to observe the arrogance of this man who still dictates his criminal law to everybody. … It is simply a way to mislead the national and international opinion. The government of Bujumbura simply does not want negotiations. The problem of consensus on the date is simply a pretext. (Jérémie Minani, the president of the CNARED, Iwacu-Burundi.org 10.1.2016)
The parties have conflicting perceptions about who can be accepted as a negotiating party. The opposition alliance, represented here in the latest example by its president Jérémie Minani, wants the government to come to the negotiation table with the alliance. He also presents a claim about the President Nkurunziza “dictating his criminal law”, implying that the government is illegitimate. The government, on the other hand, sees the opposition alliance as an armed movement that also incites citizens to violence. Nyamitwe’s last tweet implies that the government does not negotiate with actors who are not peaceful. The reference to the United Nations Security Council is an external authorisation for his argument.

The positions of the conflict parties can be presented in terms of the theory of radical disagreement. The core issue at stake, deciding who should participate in the dialogue on the Burundian crisis, is presented here between the bar lines used for describing radical disagreement:

| ‘The (illegitimate) government has to negotiate with the whole opposition.’ |
| ‘The government does not negotiate with the armed opposition.’ |

The position above is that of the opposition and civil society. It states that the government should talk to all the opposition actors, mainly the CNARED alliance. The one below is the government’s position which excludes negotiating with the “radicalised”, armed opposition groups.
4.4. Legal and political discourses

In the Burundian post-electoral crisis, the government, opposition and civil society actors most often refer to legal and political aspects when they justify their positions. This section addresses the sub-research question What kind of narratives have the conflict parties presented on the legal and political aspects of the conflict?

The clash of discourses between the ‘rule of law’ discourse of the government and the ‘legality’ discourse of the opposition and civil society is related to the debate about the right of President Pierre Nkurunziza to a third term and about the legality of the 2015 elections. Furthermore, the government camp’s discourses of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘foreign interference’ accuse international actors of interfering in the Burundian crisis.

I will first present the analysis of the discourses of legality, rule of law and sovereignty. After that, I will discuss the implications of the legal and political aspects for the dialogue in the political crisis with a special focus on the opposition’s ‘external pressure’ discourse.

4.4.1. Discourses of legality, sovereignty and the rule of law

The ‘legality’ discourse of the Burundian opposition and civil society narratives represents the Arusha Agreement of 2000 and the Constitution of 2005 as core documents which the government has violated during the political crisis. The legal framework is mostly used in this discourse to demonstrate that Nkurunziza’s third term is illegal and illegitimate (see section 1.1.). This comment of the vice-president of the opposition party FRODEBU illustrates the importance of the Constitution for the opposition:

This Constitution has been accepted via referendum and as a consequence, it is our property and nobody can appropriate it to himself, not even the president of the Republic.
(Frédéric Bamvuginyumvira, vice-president of the opposition party FRODEBU, RFI.fr, 10.6.2015)

The opposition politician commented the issue with regard to participating in dialogue with the government before the elections of the summer 2015. He considered the question of Nkurunziza’s third term as non-negotiable in terms of the Constitution as well as the Arusha Agreement. The Burundian journalist in Brussels conceptualises the political crisis as a violation of the Constitution and the third term as illegal.

A term is a term. So, for me it was two terms that were already completed, and a third was added to them -- He wanted to change it via the Parliament, by changing the Constitution, but he did not get a favourable
outcome in the Parliament. And so, he did it by coercion, he said “yes, I have to do a third term”. Before that, he had said that he will defer to the will of his party. Well indeed, formally his party did this favour to him, but one can see that there are disagreements in his party – –

(Interview of a Burundian journalist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

The journalist conceptualises the third term issue within the sub-discourse of ‘authoritarianism’, stating that the president changed the term limits by coercion. The same expression is used by the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye (see the beginning of Chapter 4.3.). He also conceptualises the situation in Burundi as authoritarian rule and indicates an “absence of justice”:

They would like to put us in a pensée unique, in a form of governance of a unique party, a single-party system – – We have a Burundi beyond all of that, without the press, without the civil society, without the political parties of opposition, we are in a de facto single-party system in which there is state terrorism in Burundi – –

– – Justice does not exist anymore. Justice is at the mercy of politics, it is dramatic.

(Interview of the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017)

Cimpaye makes the lexical choice of using the words “state terrorism” and “single party system” to describe the situation in Burundi. There is an underlying sub-discourse of ‘totalitarianism’ which makes intertextual references to dictatorships like the former East Germany or Stalin’s Soviet Union.

The Brussels-based civil society activist, on the other hand, conceptualises the political crisis as a failure of putting the legal framework of the Arusha Agreement into practice:

– – if all of this had to happen, it is because in reality there are things in the Arusha Agreement that have not been implemented. And since these things have not been implemented, we could only get to this situation.

(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

The activist mentions the Truth and Reconciliation Commission which was agreed upon in the Arusha Agreement and would investigate the crimes committed in Burundi between 1962 and 2008 (RFI, 2016e). It was planned that the Commission would be founded soon after 2000 but it was only launched in March 2016.

Furthermore, the ‘legality’ discourse legitimises violence in resistance against the government, as was discussed in the sub-section 4.3.2. The opposition activist conceptualises the coup attempt of May 2015 within the ‘legality’ discourse and legitimises the putschists’ use of violence:

The coup d’état… they were indeed militaries… I would not really call that a coup d’état. They wanted to establish the constitutional order because the man who did the coup d’état is Pierre Nkurunziza. He did the coup d’état against all the institutions, he did the coup d’état against the Constitution, he did the coup d’état against the Arusha Agreement. It is him who is illegal, irregular.

(Interview of the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017)
The discursive strategies of repetition, regarding the bad deeds of the government; and group polarisation, by de-emphasising the bad deeds of the opposition, are in use here (Van Dijk, 2006a). In terms of Giddens’s structuration theory, the discursive paradigm that legitimises the violence during the coup d’état is representing Nkurunziza as an “illegal” leader that should be deposed by force.

The ‘constitutional order’ narrative is a counter-discourse to the dominant discourse of ‘institutional order’ in the government’s statements. The latter belongs to the ‘rule of law’ discourse that emphasises the decision of Burundi’s Constitutional Court on May 5, 2015, to approve President Nkurunziza’s third term as constitutional, as demonstrated by this quote by the Burundian diplomat based in Brussels:

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-- a political solution for the current tensions would be that the political class as a whole, the civil society as a whole, and the society as a whole, and even the Burundians yield to the verdict of the ballot and that the decisions of the tribunals are respected and that the laws of the country are respected. Because now if the civil society and, a part of the civil society and the radical opposition fuel the crisis, it is because they did not want to yield to the decision of the Constitutional Court, even though it is the only one authorised by the law to interpret the Constitution. In other countries, there is the Supreme Court or the Council of State. Once they have judged, nobody can contest any more. You yield.
(Interview of a Burundian diplomat, 31.1.2017)

The discourse of ‘rule of law’ also contains external authorisation. The diplomat refers to the Court of Justice of the East African Community which decided that it cannot rule on a case on which Burundi’s courts have already made a judgement (Iwacu, 2016).

The discourses of ‘democracy’ and ‘sovereignty’ are also recurrent in the government’s narratives. It legitimises its position in power by referring to the results of the 2015 elections (see the section 1.1.) and the “will of the people”. The government narrative is that the Burundians have given the president and the CNDD-FDD party a mandate to govern. Therefore, the ‘sovereignty’ discourse has two implications: combined with the ‘democracy’ discourse, it gives the government internal legitimisation for staying in power, and the discourse of ‘sovereignty’ alone gives it external legitimisation. The two discourses underlie the Burundian diplomat’s conceptualisation of the reasons for the conflict:

And I would say that certain leaders of the radical opposition and certain other adventurers deny the deep entrenchment of democracy in Burundi. In their error of reasoning, they continue to think that they will rise to power without passing through the verdict of the ballot. And that probably due to the support of certain foreign political and financial circles. --

Another reason, for me, is the determination of the current government to -- ensure the sovereignty of the country and not to answer positively to the orders of some of our partners who unilaterally set the norms of
what is or is not suitable for Burundi. You see a regrettable attitude of some of our partners who say “ah, that is good for Burundi and it has to go to this direction” without even asking the Burundians.  
(Interview of a Burundian diplomat in Brussels, 31.1.2017)

The diplomat uses the word “adventurers” as a way to undermine the seriousness of the opposition groups that are against the government and challenges the logical validity of their claims by saying “in their error of reasoning”. According to Ramsbotham (2010, see sub-section 4.2.2.), this is part of the evaluation of the form of the opponent’s argument in radical disagreement.

The Facebook post of Pierre Nkurunziza after the CNDD-FDD’s victory in the parliamentary and communal elections of June 29, 2015 also represents the discourses of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘democracy’:

> It is a very important victory for the independence of Burundi in terms of political leadership, but also a victory which reminds of the sovereignty of the Burundian people. -- Voting and democracy are the only ways to access power in Burundi. (President Pierre Nkurunziza on Facebook, 30.6.2015)

The discourse of ‘foreign interference’ as a sub-discourse in the category of ‘sovereignty’ is also often present in the government’s statements. As I mentioned in the sub-section 4.3.1., there is a discursive strategy of exclusion in the government’s narratives, especially in the diplomatic discourse. The diplomat’s statement above mentions “foreign political and financial circles” and “some partners” that the government accuses for destabilising Burundi. These probably refer to Burundi’s creditors, especially the European Union which has cut its financial aid and imposed sanctions on Burundi. Two weeks before the interview, the European Parliament had also passed a resolution condemning human rights violations in Burundi.

The comments of three social media activists, in the discussion after a Facebook post of SOS Médias Burundi about the demonstrations demanding UN’s human rights investigators in Burundi to leave, illustrate the discursive battle about conceptualising the Burundian political crisis either in terms of ‘foreign interference’ or ‘legality’:

> They are perfectly right are crooks and killers they frankly have to quit the country -- these members think that they can divide us we are more united than ever we will mobilise ourselves so that these idiots so-called members of commission and EU agents have to quit the Burundian territory  
(Abdon Senen Nkinahamira in a discussion on SOS Médias Burundi’s Facebook wall, 8.10.2016 (translation from French))

> Burundi is not an island where the bush fighters can lead the Burundians like in their bush we said NO to the 3rd term of Pierre Nkurunziza that’s all. Whether they demonstrate or not obeying the laws of our country falling more into chaos. --  
(Joseph Dondogori, 8.10.2016 (translation from French))

> They give the opinion of their boss in order to be payed. But the majority that did not demonstrate reclaims justice!!!  
(Nzeiyimana Bernard, 8.10.2016 (translation from French))
The first person commenting in this narrative with a multiple tellership defends the government camp’s position and conceptualises the situation within the discourses of ‘unity’ and ‘foreign interference’. He delegitimises the UN investigators by discursive derogation (Van Dijk, 2006a, p. 126), labelling them as “idiots” and “agents” of the European Union. The post of the second narrator, a member of the former armed opposition group Front Patriotique de Libération [Patriotic Liberation Front], falls under a counter-discourse of ‘legality’ and ‘militarism’, representing Nkurunziza and CNDD-FDD as “bush fighters”, a term that evokes the party’s rebel group past. The last comment, by a diaspora-based Burundian, follows the discourses of ‘clientelism and corruption’ and ‘legality’.

Some civil society representatives in the Inter-Burundian dialogue session indicate the foreign interference as a reason for the Burundian political crisis.

As we can notice, the crisis that we live is due to the implication of certain foreign countries: Rwanda, Belgium and France. I think that in addition to the internal dialogue, there also has to be negotiations with these countries so that they tell us why they intrude into the Burundian crisis.

(A female speaker at the CNDI dialogue session in Bujumbura on 13.4.2016, ONACOM association)

There has to be love for the fatherland. People have to devote themselves, people have to work. One cannot say that one loves her country and that you do nothing for this country. There has to be mutual respect, truth has to be promoted in a regular manner. — We underestimate ourselves on the international level. We have an inferiority complex vis-à-vis others. In international relations, we have to know which example we should take and which not.

(A female speaker at the CNDI dialogue session, CAFOB association)

The speaker from the relief association ONACOM follows the government’s narrative about other countries interfering in Burundi’s crisis and emphasises Burundi’s sovereignty. The statement of the member of the CAFOB association belongs to the discourses of ‘patriotism’ and ‘sovereignty’ promoted by the government and she calls for Burundians to have a higher self-esteem.

In conclusion, the clash of the ‘legality’ and the ‘rule of law’ discourses constitutes a radical disagreement between the two camps. It can be expressed with the following statements:

| ‘The Burundian people and courts have given the president the right to a third term. ‘The president has already completed two terms and the third term is illegal.’ |

The government’s position, presented first, connects the ‘democracy’ and ‘rule of law’ discourses. The second, the position of the opposition-civil society camp, represents the issue with the ‘legality’ discourse. The opposition and civil society interpret the question of the third term from a constitutional point of view, whereas the government legitimises it with the popular will expressed in the presidential and legislative elections – which the opposition boycotted – and with the ruling of a Burundian court.
4.4.2. Implications for the dialogue

One of the conceptualisations of dialogue in the current crisis, within the political framework, is that there should be international pressure on the government to either force it to step down or to negotiate. The opposition’s ‘external pressure’ discourse, which legitimises the need for a foreign intervention to Burundi, is a counter-discourse for the government’s dominant narrative of ‘sovereignty’. The CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye calls for the UN Security Council to apply the Chapter 7 which would enable the use of military force in Burundi. He considers it to be a “moral duty” of the United Nations.

Why do not we want to do the same in Burundi that was done in the Gambia? Because the CEDEAO did very good things, they ousted Yahya Jammeh, they respected the Gambian popular will. Why is it so complicated to do the same thing here? Because we are living the same situations with the difference that today there is a drama, there is blood, there is a dispute of blood that is going on.

(Interview of the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017)

Cimpaye refers to the events of January 2017 when the President of the Gambia who was forced to step aside by the regional organisation CEDEAO which had threatened the president with military intervention. Cimpaye legitimises the need for an intervention with the violence in Burundi.

There is also the discourse of ‘external pressure’ underlying the civil society activist’s comments. He argues that foreign leverage is needed in order to solve the political crisis by negotiating.

--- it is the responsibility of the international community to put pressure on the current government by saying: “you are forced to listen to the others”.

We know well that even the military pressure always ends with… on the negotiation table. Because that is where the power is taken by force. So in Burundi, either the international community will wait for violence until people negotiate after the violence, -- years of war will be added. Or they will put the whole package, push them to dialogue. That is what we hoped for but the Obama administration left without being able to do it. -- And today with Trump we do not know what will happen.

(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

According to the civil society representative, the “international community” should be in charge of putting pressure on the government to dialogue. He legitimises using the threat of a foreign intervention in creating pressure with the possibility of protraction of the conflict. The activist considers that the United States under Obama’s presidency could have used leverage on the Burundian government but that did not happen.

There is also a historical narrative that creates pressure for the government to dialogue. An argument emerging from both opposition and civil society actors is that Nkurunziza came to power through negotiations, so he should now be ready to negotiate himself. This discourse can be named as the discourse of ‘negotiated legitimacy’.
Nkurunziza personally has to know that he is resultant of negotiations. He had taken up the arms, he was condemned to death at the time, and nevertheless they negotiated with him, they negotiated with him, the transitional government at the time negotiated with him.
(Interview of the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017)

Cimpaye refers to the negotiations between the transitional government and the armed movements, including CNDD-FDD, that brought an end to the Burundian Civil War (see section 2.2.). Nkurunziza had been condemned to death during the war for having laid mines but received amnesty during the peace negotiations (Caslin, 2015). The Brussels-based journalist also brings up the negotiations in 2003 in order to justify the need for the government to accept inclusive dialogue.

This type of legitimisation is based on the Burundian conflict parties’ shared cultural knowledge of the country’s political history. It uses the structure of signification, as indicated by Jabri in Giddens’s theory of structuration (see sub-section 4.2.4.), that relates Nkurunziza’s past as a participant of negotiations to the current situation and creates a symbolic order and a discourse that all the actors acknowledge.

In addition to the regional dialogue process led by the East African Community, the government has justified its willingness to dialogue by organising the national Inter-Burundian dialogue which was introduced in the sub-section 4.2.1. The government legitimises this process with the need to include all the Burundians in the dialogue. The Brussels-based diplomat argues that the political opposition and civil society are not representative of the whole nation:

The approach of the government and of the other institutions is that the radical opposition and a part of the civil society is a part of the Burundian people. If we have to look for an answer, answers, a solution, the whole Burundi has to be involved. That is why the government said “let us ask every Burundian, or representatives of Burundians, how they perceive this crisis”. —
— People expressed themselves with an open heart. There were no taboos.
(Interview of a Burundian diplomat in Brussels, 31.1.2017)

The diplomat conceptualises the dialogue as open and inclusive. Contrarily, the Inter-Burundian dialogue is criticised by the civil society representative and the opposition spokesman for not enabling the participants to express themselves freely. The civil society representative conceptualises the issue in terms of the discourse of ‘authoritarianism’:

It is organised internally, it is organised by the government, the people did not dare express themselves freely and most of all … the questions that were asked were leading, in order to come to conclusions that the government had prepared since the beginning. We saw the big conclusion of this dialogue: the Arusha Agreement is not favoured any more, the limit of two presidential terms is not wanted any more. … So this thing of internal dialogue is just a dialogue, it is a thing organised by the government. So we knew the questions, we knew the conclusions beforehand. And that is what happened.
(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)
Well, it is not a dialogue, it is a monologue. A dialogue is between people… while this cinema done internally – – is a monologue because these are people who are prepared in advance and who have been given ideas to pronounce. And in this monologue, the objective was to say, it is to come to a conclusion that the Constitution has to be amended, that the terms for a President of the Republic have to be unlimited. (Interview of the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017)

Both representatives refer to a report by the Inter-Burundian Dialogue Commission CNDI published in August 2016. It suggested the removal of the term limits and the primacy of the Constitution over the Arusha Agreement, which would enable the removal of the power-sharing quotas (RFI, 2016a).

The conceptualisations of the Inter-Burundian dialogue differ again radically between the government and the opposition-civil society camp. Whereas the government conceptualises the internal dialogue as inclusive and providing the participants with freedom of expression, the opposition and civil society actors conceptualise it as “pre-determined” and as a “cinema”.
4.5. Discourses on ethnicity

This section discusses the conceptualisations of the role of ethnicity in Burundi’s current political crisis and examines the research question *How have the parties conceptualised the question of ethnicity in the conflict?* I already discussed the role of ethnicity in Burundi historically and as a background factor in the current crisis in section 2.1. Ethnic quotas are included in the Burundian institutional arrangements (see section 2.3.) and ethnicity is discussed openly in the public sphere. Against this backdrop, it was not surprising to perceive elements of ethnicity in the local conflict narratives.

I specifically asked my interviewees about the possibility of ethnicisation in the crisis and about the risk of a genocide. However, the topic of ethnicity also came up spontaneously in the interviews of the journalist and the opposition activist.

The Burundian government officially denies the role of ethnicity in the conflict. Instead, it emphasises the ‘unity’ of Burundians. In a speech on the Day of the National Unity Charter, reported by the media, President Nkurunziza accused the Belgian coloniser of having disseminated ethnic divisions in Burundi:

> “Certainly the terms Hutu, Tutsi and Twa existed in Burundi well before the colonisation. But the former [a decree by the Belgian King Albert in 1925 I on the reorganisation of administration in the Belgian colonies] still radically changed their substance with divisional objectives and diverted them from their real interpretation.” (President Pierre Nkurunziza, Iwacu-burundi.org, 7.2.2017)

A member of a civil society association for the ethnic Twa minority follows the same discourse of ‘colonial manipulation’ in his speech at the Inter-Burundian dialogue session:

> We have to return into the history of Burundi and analyse together with those who colonised us. They left something in the country.  
> (A male speaker at the CNDI dialogue session in Bujumbura on 13.4.2016, UNIPROBU association)

A theme that emerges from the data from both the government and opposition-civil society narratives is the role of ethnicity in the Burundian security apparatus. In the security sector reform that followed the end of the Civil War, former Hutu rebels of CNDD-FDD were integrated into the newly named army, *Forces de Défense Nationale* [National Defence Forces]. It was decided that they should constitute 40 per cent of the high administration and members of the former national Tutsi-dominated army FAB 60 percent, with ethnic parity on all the levels (Wilen, 2016b, p. 83). Furthermore, the whole security sector with the police and the intelligence services observes an ethnic balance between the Tutsi and the Hutu (section 2.3.).
On the government side, the Brussels-based diplomat delegitimises the suggestions of ethnicity playing a role in the conflict and the possibility of a genocide breaking out as “manipulation” and incitement to a foreign intervention in Burundi. He argues that the institutional power-sharing arrangements guarantee the representation of all the ethnic groups and prevent any ethnic conflict:

Me, for example, I am a Tutsi, would I give weapons to people who will kill people of my ethnicity? It is inconceivable.

(Interview of a Burundian diplomat in Brussels, 31.1.2017)

On the contrary, the diplomat says that the ethnic quotas should be reviewed in order to share the power more equally in terms of the size of the ethnic groups. According to estimations, the Tutsi represent 14 per cent of the Burundian population and the Hutu 85 per cent. The diplomat argues that some of the stipulations of the Arusha Agreement and the Constitution on Tutsi over-representation in public institutions are not valid any more. He compares this aspect to the United States, taking the security sector as an example:

You have the Blacks who constitute about 12–13 per cent of the population. And the rest of the Americans 85 per cent. Is it possible to find an explanation, a moral, ethical, democratic justification that would say “the Blacks have been so excluded, for example, that now, in order to attain peace, in order to have development, we will make 50 per cent of the political positions in the army, in the police, reserved for the Blacks”. If you do that in the United States, the other Americans will revolt, wouldn’t they? – – We cannot continue to operate under such a system because it could generate more significant conflicts than before.

(Interview of a Burundian diplomat in Brussels, 31.1.2017)

Despite denying the role of ethnicity in the crisis, the diplomat asserts that ethnic quotas should be reviewed in order to avoid “more significant conflicts” in the future, legitimising his position with conflict prevention. By comparing the situation of Burundi to the United States, the diplomat seeks external legitimisation for his argument. Furthermore, he legitimises his position with the “evaluation of the Burundian society”, the “geopolitical environment” and the recent entry of Burundi in the East African Community which would, according to him, require reviewing some stipulations.

This discourse of ‘ethnic rebalancing’ implies that the government attempts to ameliorate the situation of the Hutu majority during the crisis. The discrepancy with the views of the opposition and civil society is that the government seems to perceive the position of the Hutu majority as threatened while the opposition and civil society actors more often indicate the Tutsi minority as being persecuted by the regime. All in all, the discourses of ‘unity’, ‘information war’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘institutions’ underlie the government’s statements with regard to the question of ethnicity.

In the civil society-opposition camp, there are in general two kinds of interpretations of the role of ethnicity in the crisis. One of them is that there is a ‘man hunt’ of the Tutsi. This discourse is
sometimes connected with the warning that a genocide might break out in Burundi. The alternative conceptualisation is that the government targets all those who oppose it, regardless of the ethnicity.

The discourse of a ‘man hunt’ emerges many times in the data with regard to the assassinations of Tutsi within the Burundian army. The following quotes by two opposition activists illustrate this discourse:

Nowadays, there are targeted assassinations of essentially young Tutsi, of essentially the ex-FAB, the ex-Burundian Army members, the majority of whom were Tutsi. We see that these soldiers and military officers are arrested, executed exactly because they are Tutsi. We also see it in the ways of operating of the militia Imbonerakure that chants and shouts “we will eliminate them, the Tutsi”.

(Charles Nditije, President, opposition party Uprona, in exile in Belgium, France24 documentary Burundi: Fear and Exile 20.1.2017)

The threat of a genocide is hovering on the country because when the institutions on the top, the head of the Senate, the head of the National Assembly, the Military Chief of Staff, when they unleash a campaign of ethnic hatred officially, when the Military Chief of Staff dares to gather only a part of the army and gathers only the Hutu component without the Tutsi knowing, when the man hunt of the Tutsi is done in the defence forces of security, the risk is high – that a genocide will happen. Because such lessons are given by the authorities, the state officers, there is a permanent danger. A minor thing is enough for the genocide to break out.

(Interview of the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017)

As I mentioned in the section 1.3., Daley and Popplewell (2016) have argued that ethnicity could become a dividing issue in the current crisis because the government has marginalised the Tutsi in public positions. Daley and Chemouni (2015) also mentioned the possibility of the Tutsi becoming scapegoats. Both Nditije and Cimpaye reinforce these narratives by describing the targeting of the Tutsi in the army. Furthermore, Nditije argues that the CNDD-FDD youth militia Imbonerakure has genocidal ideas.

The ‘risk of genocide’ discourse has to some extent emerged from international organisations. The international NGO FIDH has warned about the risk of a genocide in a report (see FIDH, 2016). The report of the United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi UNIIB from September 2016 also mentioned the risk by stating: “Given the country’s history, the danger of the crime of genocide also looms large” (UNHRC, 2016). Cimpaye refers to the latter in the interview. In addition to Burundi’s own past massacres, the genocide discourse has an all the more threatening connotation in Burundi because of the recent memory of the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

There are also opposite examples about the ‘risk of genocide’ discourse, such as this tweet by a person who supports the government’s positions in his tweets:

#Burundi almost all the #Burundi –an private medias are led by the Tutsi, are they preparing for a genocide? I address this to #ICC

(Gitare Bruce Marcel, @gbrucel on Twitter, 7.10.2016 (translation from French))
This person suggests that the Tutsi would be planning a genocide against the Hutu. He refers to the International Criminal Court which had decided to investigate human right violations by Nkurunziza’s regime and from which Burundi decided to withdraw in October 2016 (Kaneza, 2016).

In Giddens’s structuration theory, warnings are part of signification in a conflict situation. Cimpaye’s comment about a minor incident being able to launch a genocide follows the discourse of ‘risk of genocide’ and is a warning intended to the international actors. The ethnicity-related ‘risk of genocide’ discourse appears in my data a few times but is not as recurrent as the political and legal conceptualisations of the conflict (see section 4.4.). For example, the Brussels-based civil society activist considers ethnicity to be only a tool in political violence:

For years, the Burundian leaders have always used ethnicity to stay in power. – – But the reality is that in Burundi nowadays, the government lashes out against all the ethnic groups together, against all those who object to it. – – Everybody tries to use it [ethnicity] for their advantage. If we watch closer, we know what has happened in the region, that is why the people alert by saying “caution, take caution, you risk to end up to a genocide”. But for now, we can say that they are massacres – – of political nature and that ethnicity is used for political purposes.  
(Interview of a Burundian civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

This statement belongs to the discursive category of ‘information war’ and the representation of ethnicity is that it is a tool for advancing political goals. The civil society activist attributes this manipulation both to the government and to Tutsi extremists that he calls “nostalgic of the earlier governments”. This probably refers to the former Tutsi president Pierre Buyoya’s rule in the 1980s and 90s. The activist admits that the risk of genocide may potentially exist but does not think that it is actively being planned. As a counter-narrative to the ‘man hunt of Tutsi’ discourse, the activist mentions that Nkurunziza’s government has actually killed more Hutu than Tutsi due to the repression of the members of the FNLF opposition party, which means “tens of thousands” of Hutu.

The discourse of ‘manipulation’ also comes up in a Facebook discussion after a post of the media outlet SOS Médias Burundi about anti-UN protests in Bujumbura:

Hutu people still manipulated by a dictator with no faith or conscience. Nkurunziza is a cancer for Burundi. Hutu people, wake up and quit the manipulation of this Burundian Bokassa fast!!! ENOUGH!!!  
(Tite Kubushishi in a discussion on SOS Médias Burundi’s Facebook wall, 8.10.2016)

The narrator of this post, a Burundian, compares Nkurunziza to the former dictator of Central African Republic, Jean-Bédel Bokassa, and suggests that Nkurunziza manipulates the Hutu, his own ethnic
group. The lexical metaphor of “cancer” represents the president as an illness that has spread all over the country.

Léonidas Hatungimana, the former spokesman of President Nkurunziza and the president of the opposition party PPD-Girijambo, conceptualises the role of ethnicity within the ‘power’ discourse and argues that the government wants to accomplish a “revolution” and concentrate the power in the hands of the Hutu ethnic group. This is, however, the only time that this conceptualisation comes up in the data:

The revolution had to be finalised. The revolution was to put aside the Arusha Accords so that the quotas would not be discussed anymore. So, to have the power in the hands of only Hutu instead of having power shared with the Tutsi. So, that is, a kind of revenge. In the previous years it was the Tutsi ethnic group that ruled, they said, so we have to achieve a situation in which only the Hutu rule.

(Léonidas Hatungimana, France24 documentary Burundi: Fear and Exile 20.1.2017)

As was discussed in the sub-section 3.5.1., narratives construct the reality and can provide two competing versions of it in situations of conflict. This is apparent in two Facebook posts that narrate the first demonstrations against Nkurunziza’s third term in Bujumbura on April 26, 2015 very differently. One of the posts gives an ethnic connotation to the events while the other one narrates them within the discourse of ‘state-led violence’.

President Nkurunziza’s media and communication advisor Willy Nyamitwe’s narrative partly follows the ‘security’ discourse and its sub-discourse of ‘violent political insurgency’ that names the government’s political opponents as insurgents against a legitimate government. However, there is an underlying discourse of ‘ethnicity’ represented with the discourse of ‘history’ in the post. This is an excerpt of it:

Sunday morning, called by civil society activists but mobilised, especially, by the medias, several onlookers [badauds] boo, whistle, take to certain streets of the capital, especially in the quartiers of Musaga, Mutakura, Cibitoke, Ngagara and Nyakabiga. – – A rain of stones, barricades erected here and there, with makeshift material, burned tyres, a setting that reminds of the very bewildering sight of the dead cities in 1994 after the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye. – – This forced the police to take out its artillery, heavily wet with water cannons and smoke-filled with tear gas, … By way of a reminder, many fellow citizens were killed and/or burned alive by young insurgents with the nicknames of “sans-échec” [without failure], “sans défait” [without defeat], “sans-amour” [without love], to name a few, in these quartiers which were today the torchbearers of the insurrection. – – The country laments a casualty, then two, then three, very regrettable innocent victims and even several policemen are injured.

(Facebook post by Willy Nyamitwe, 27.4.2015, translated from French)

3 Pierre Nkurunziza was a child from a mixed marriage, his father was Hutu and mother Tutsi (Caslin, 2015). The father’s ethnicity is passed on to the children in mixed marriages.
In the first sentence, Nyamitwe mentions five specific *quartiers* that are known to have an ethnic Tutsi majority (Immigration Board of Canada, 2002). He draws a connection to history by referring to the inter-ethnic killings of 1994 after the Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye was killed in a coup d’état by the Tutsi-dominated army. The *sans-échec* and *sans-défaite* mentioned later in the post were Tutsi-led urban militias in the Burundian Civil War (Lemarchand, 1996, xviii). These references add an ethnic connotation to the events.

Other interesting discursive features of the post are lexical choices, such as using the expression “this forced the police to take out its artillery”, which legitimises the action of the police forces with the necessity to topple an illegitimate uprising. Furthermore, the ‘security’ discourse used here emphasises the injuries of policemen and undermines the seriousness of the insurgents as “onlookers” that were easy to mobilise by the civil society and the media.

An opposite narrative about the same events comes from the civil society activist Pacifique Nininahazwe. His post follows the discourse of ‘state-led violence’ which was examined more in detail in the sub-section 4.3.1. The post starts with an appeal to Burundians:

My dear fellow citizens, let’s not give in to provocation. They want to drag us into violence but let’s keep our dignity.

The beginning of the post contains an us/them polarisation and an appeal to a value that Nininahazwe assumes is shared by those Burundians who are against the government: dignity. Another discursive strategy used in the post is exclusion: the reader has to infer that “they” refers to the Burundian government. The post, an excerpt of which is presented here, continues with a description of the events of the previous day:

Yesterday, the Burundian authorities, the police and the militia of the government multiplied acts of provocation. In Musaga, a policeman fired at a citizen right in front of his home. In Mutakura, a policeman fired at a 15-year old youngster who had put his hands up — The office of MSD in Cibitoke was pillaged by Imbonerakure in the presence of the police. — Groups of security services led by Bertin Gahungu would be assigned to pursue certain civil society figures: Vital Nshimirimana, Pierre-Claver Mbonimpa and myself. In the evening, citizens of Mutakura were attacked and robbed at their homes by unknown people in police uniforms. — In the same time the presidency of the Republic, via its main communication advisor Willy Nyamitwe and Rema Fm, continues the manipulation. They insist on the demonstration sites of yesterday (a way to give a certain ethnic connotation to the refusal of the third mandate). (Facebook post by Pacifique Nininahazwe, 27.4.2015, translated from French)

The latter part of the post mentions more explicitly the forces committing violent acts. This narrative presents the narrated event as violence by state actors against protesters, opposition and civil society. The narrator makes the lexical choice of using the word “provocation” in order to give the events a political connotation and to make a statement about the government and police forces as the initiators of the violence.
In the rest of the post, Nininahazwe lists several events in order to prove that the violence is committed by state forces. Finally, he refers to Nyamitwe, probably to the post that was analysed above, and to a private radio channel within the discourse of ‘information war’ and mentions the “ethnic connotation” of the demonstrations that he disagrees with. All in all, the discourse of ‘state-led violence’ represents the demonstrations as justified and the demonstrators as victims.
4.6. Discourses on economy

Economy is conceptualised by several actors as a background factor of the political crisis but also as an element of solution. This section addresses the sub-research question *How have the conflict parties discussed economy in the conflict?* The main discourses that emerge from this theme in my data are the ‘interests’ and the ‘economic development’ discourses.

4.6.1. Interests discourse

The government’s discourses of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘foreign interference’ were already discussed in the section 4.4. Related to that theme, the Burundian diplomat in Brussels conceptualises foreign economic interests as a factor explaining the current political crisis. He refers to Burundi’s mining law of 2013 which reduced the length of mineral exploitation permits of international companies and made them pay a bigger share of the income to the state.

> It is the oversized appetite of certain multinational companies that puts down the new mining law. — — So, the multinational companies do not want that, and as a consequence they are tempted to… favour operating regime changes — — Which explains that the tensions do not necessarily have local origins but there is also the external that comes along, all the foreign interests that will fuel — — certain tensions.

*(Interview of a Burundian diplomat in Brussels, 31.1.2017)*

The diplomat also attributes the failure to implement certain reconstruction programs after the end of the Burundian Civil War to the foreign donors. He considers the ensuing economic frustration to be one of the economic causes of the current political crisis.

> This hope [after the Arusha Agreement] was nevertheless diminished by the — — lack of respect for financial engagements of some of our partners. Because in Arusha, — — there was a meeting of the major donors who promised many things to reconstruct the country and if that had been realised, there would have been economic growth, a redistribution of income, and that would have helped to stabilise the country. As we got a lot of promises but very few achievements, that weakened a lot the process of returning to stability and to peace, and in my opinion created a breeding ground for the current crisis. — — The former combatants who were demobilised and then there was no program to reintegrate them into the economic society, which made some of them become for example thieves, or to go to fuel other rebel movements.

*(Interview of a Burundian diplomat in Brussels, 31.1.2017)*

The end of the narrative also refers to the problems in implementing the reintegration phase in Burundi’s post-Civil War DDR [disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration] program that, according to the diplomat, destabilised Burundi.

The opposition and civil society present a counter-discourse to the dominant ‘foreign interests’ discourse. They conceptualise the Burundian crisis in terms of the discourse of ‘clientelism and
corruption’ of the government, as a consequence of people in power seeking personal interests. The Brussels-based journalist and civil society activist consider that corruption is one of the central reasons for the crisis:

--- essentially, it is a crisis connected to the search for individual interests. --- And President Nkurunziza but also those around him, the close ones, do not want to let go of the power, they are afraid of losing here and there the advantages, the mining contracts that they have signed with the foreign companies here and there, but also they do not want to quit the power because they are afraid of the crimes that they have committed in the country while they have been in power since 2005.
(Interview of a Burundian journalist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

--- A course for enrichment seized the country. --- a government came, they got rich very fast, you see, a system of corruption, because in reality it is essentially --- a question of money.
--- Today, we are again in a situation like the beginning of the 90s. --- They are doing the same thing that they reproached others for. To be corrupt, to kill people. So, all of this, it is reproaches that were done against the regime of Buyoya.
(Interview of a civil society activist in Brussels, 1.2.2017)

The civil society activist speaks about the beginning of the 2000s and the rise of the CNDD-FDD party (see section 2.4.), as well as the wrongdoings of the Tutsi-led government of Pierre Buyoya in the 1980s and 90s. He suggests that those in power always commit the same mistakes. The journalist, on the other hand, refers to a clientelist system in which the CNDD-FDD party members have gathered personal advantages and signed lucrative deals with international companies. Jobbins and Ahitungiye (2015) and Van Acker (2015) have argued that there is a system of political patronage in place in Burundi (see section 1.3.). Both narratives connect clientelism and patronage to the current political crisis.

The ‘clientelism and corruption’ discourse is also represented in some social media comments, like this angry Facebook comment by a diaspora-based Burundian after a post on the SOS Médias Burundi platform about the demonstrations led by local and national authorities against the presence of UN’s human rights investigators in Burundi:

They have nothing to do, these idiots!!!!, where are the kids of these authorities? They are in Europe, in USA, in Canada in good schools, and you miserable brain-washed who each get a beer, you will go back home with this beer, work instead of sitting in front of the embassies, these authorities look for their advantages and they will give you a beer and you will go home with this primus !!!!!
(Rita Nahimana in a discussion on SOS Médias Burundi’s Facebook wall 8.10.2016 (translation from French))

The commenter mentions the “advantages” that, according to Van Acker (2015), members of the CNDD-FDD party get, including for example university grants to study abroad (p. 6). The post also criticises the “manipulation” of ordinary citizens by authorities.
4.6.2. Economic development discourse

The government narratives include the discourse of ‘economic development’ which posits that developing and diversifying Burundi’s economy would be one of the solutions to the political crisis. According to the Brussels-based Burundian diplomat, one of the problems related to the economy is the attractiveness of the political sector as an employer in Burundi.

– – It is the development of the private sector because that makes it possible to manage in the same time the political class which are not in the institutions. Their leaders are like unemployed, they do not have income. So that, that puts them in a very uncomfortable situation. And if the private sector is very developed, that enables creating jobs in the private sector so that the state would not be the biggest employer, that the politics would not be the best sector, the best paying sector.
(IInterview of a Burundian diplomat in Brussels, 31.1.2017)

The diplomat also connects the theme of economic diversification to the need for an education reform in order to create employment opportunities for the youth:

Because one of the origins of the tensions are the youth who see with the new information technologies what is happening elsewhere. It aspires sensibly that it should have such basic services. And, since the education sector is not organised so that the youth could find work and create jobs in all the sectors other than the agricultural sector or the public service, it follows that from the employment point of view it is very limited and so the unemployment will not be curbed easily.
(IInterview of a Burundian diplomat in Brussels, 31.1.2017)

The diplomat conceptualises the tensions in terms of unemployment and the need for reform expressed by the youth. The frustrations related to economic marginalisation and lack of economic growth were also mentioned by Daley and Popplewell (2016, see section 1.3.) as factors behind the current conflict.

The governmental discourses of ‘economic development’ and ‘education’ are echoed by many of the civil society representatives speaking at an Inter-Burundian dialogue session. One of them, representing a relief organisation, connects the economy to the problem of “exploitation of the youth”:

The youth needs to be mobilised and be given a place because it is used in the various crimes in Burundi. So there has to be an employment policy for the youth but especially also programs for fighting against poverty in Burundi. So that all Burundians would not turn towards politics but that they would know that there are other sectors that can create means for Burundians to earn their living.
(A female speaker at the CNDI dialogue session in Bujumbura on 13.4.2016, ONACOM association)

The vulnerability of the youth is raised in several speeches. A demand for a “civic education” for Burundians is made, concerning diverse issues such as the elections and general values. The representative of an association for repatriated Burundians justifies the need for civic education with the youth’s proneness to political manipulation:
There should be civic or citizen education because the politicians in Burundi exploit the youth as tools in order to fulfil their personal interests. Politicians come to disturb the peace and democracy in Burundi and manipulate the youth without civic education. I do not only speak about opposition politicians, but also those of the government in Burundi like in Africa exploit the youth. (A male speaker at the CNDI dialogue session in Bujumbura on 13.4.2016, ARDID association)

As a counter-discourse, the opposition conceptualises the current government as responsible for the bad state of the Burundian economy, which it sees as a background factor of the current crisis. This comment by the spokesman of the CNARED alliance, who was a spokesman for the transitional government after the end of the Civil War, illustrates this discourse:

[After the Civil War] we thought that we would have new bases from there on – – that we would start a path of rapid economic growth, that we would start the development of the country. – – I tell you that [now] all the economic indicators are red. – – So I tell you that it is a disappointment, a total disappointment, a total disappointment. That is why I am so angry at Nkurunziza, because he brought down completely all the efforts that had been made to put Burundi back on the track. (Interview of the CNARED spokesman Pancrace Cimpaye, 2.2.2017)
5. Conclusion

The aim of this study was to analyse the narratives and conceptualisations that the Burundian government, opposition and civil society actors have used when they have discussed violence and dialogue during the political crisis of 2015–17. I analysed the question with the theories of radical disagreement and structuration and with the methods of discourse and narrative analysis. The central research question was to identify the discrepancies in the conceptualisations of violence and dialogue by the different actors and to analyse how the differences explain the current tense political situation in Burundi. In the preceding chapter, I analysed and discussed the data and provided answers to my sub-research questions. In the first part of this chapter, I will conclude the study, discuss the findings and provide answers to the main research question. In the second part, I will present a suggestion for future research and an estimation about the future of the conflict.

5.1. Findings and discussion

The apparent discrepancies in the discourses on violence by the Burundian opposition and civil society as opposed to those by the government demonstrate that there is a radical disagreement between the two conflict parties. Ramsbotham (2010) states that among discourses of violence those that emerge from the “discourse of violent repression” and from the “discourse of violent resistance” are prominent (p. 218). One of the clashes of discourses is in Burundi’s case between the discourse of ‘normality’ and that of ‘state-led violence’. The government camp has conceptualised the violence in Burundi recently as isolated attacks and terrorism, whereas the opposition-civil society camp has mostly conceptualised it as state-led violent repression of those who oppose the government. This clash of discourses constitutes a radical disagreement. However, the civil society narratives also mention isolated attacks, which illustrates the complexity of the Burundian conflict. Furthermore, the discourse of ‘violent resistance’, mostly present in the statements of the opposition alliance CNARED, considers violence to be legitimised in opposing the government.

The discourse of ‘state-led violence’ has been present in the narratives of the opposition and the civil society since 2015, whereas the government discourse of ‘normality’ is most strongly present in the narratives from 2016 and 2017. The government’s narrative has shifted from describing the events as ‘violent political insurrection’ in the beginning of the anti-third term demonstrations in April 2015 to emphasising that the situation is ‘normal’ in Burundi. However, the government’s communication
advisor argued already during the coup attempt in May 2015 that the immediate situation in the country was normal.

Jabri (1996) argues that conflict parties may use a strategy of manipulation of information on their intentions or external issues in order to achieve a favourable conflict outcome. The Burundian conflict parties have accused each other of this kind of manipulation, which is common in a conflict context, in addition to the intertwining of emotions and facts in radical disagreement (Ramsbotham, 2010). The discourse of ‘information war’, in the sense of accusing the adversary of manipulation, is present both in the government and the opposition-civil society narratives. However, this discourse is more typical to the government which refers with it both to the opposition and to external actors.

The conceptualisation of inclusive dialogue as the ideal type of dialogue is shared by both conflict parties. However, the ‘normality’ discourse of the government has to some extent led it to a practice of refusing to dialogue. Furthermore, there is a deep radical disagreement between the parties about who is entitled to participate in the inclusive dialogue. The government discursively denies to dialogue with the ‘radicalised’ opposition that it considers to be ‘terrorists’ and participants of the May 2015 coup attempt, whereas the CNARED opposition alliance would like the dialogue to include all the different actors, along with the armed opposition groups. In addition, the ‘messiness of the dialogue’ is one important conceptualisation, since the blurred boundaries between the political opposition and civil society have made it more complicated to define who the dialogue participants would be.

The radical disagreement about the dialogue participants has been an immediate cause for the current standstill in the formal East African Community-led dialogue process. However, the deeper reasons that partly explain the current tensions between the conflict parties are connected to a discursive divide between the ‘normality’ discourse and the ‘state-led violence’ discourse: the very definition of the essence of the violence in Burundi.

The narratives presented at the internal Inter-Burundian dialogue session which I analysed, were the most difficult to categorise since they included some conceptualisations that were not mentioned by any other actors, such as the need for ‘civic education’. This reveals something about the complexity of the context: participating in a dialogue session organised by the government has very probably led to self-censorship regarding at least the most critical opinions about the government. On the other hand, it tells about the diversity of opinions within the Burundian society. All in all, the narratives of the Inter-Burundian dialogue session mostly followed closely the official government positions.
There is a discrepancy in the conflict parties’ conceptualisations of the internal Inter-Burundian dialogue process. The government has considered it to be an opportunity for ordinary Burundians to express their opinions on the conflict, whereas the opposition and the civil society have criticised the dialogue for being a ‘monologue’ of like-minded people with pre-determined conclusions.

The ways in which the actors refer to the legal and political aspects differs. The opposition-civil society camp refers more to ‘legality’ as a value and to the international political institutions. The government, on the other hand, mostly speaks within a ‘rule of law’ discourse that justifies positions by referring to Burundi’s own institutions and judicial bodies. With regard to international actors, the government emphasises Burundi’s ‘sovereignty’ and objects to ‘foreign interference’ into its internal affairs especially by the European Union and the United States. This discourse has got considerable support from the social media narratives and the Inter-Burundian dialogue participants, although the latter were not completely free to present critical opinions due to the above-mentioned reasons.

The government has invoked the role of Burundi’s judiciary system as focal in ruling on President Nkurunziza’s right to a third term, one of the immediate causes of the current crisis. Furthermore, its ‘democracy’ discourse emphasises the election results of 2015 and the ‘popular will’ of Burundians to elect Nkurunziza as president for the third time.

Concerning legal documents, both the government and the opposition-civil society camp refer to the Constitution of Burundi and the 2000 Arusha Agreement as tools for national reconciliation and political regulation when they legitimise their positions. The opposition and civil society actors cherish the Arusha Agreement the most and accuse the government of violating it in the third-term question, whereas the government discourse has underlined the need to review especially the ethnic power-sharing quotas defined in the Agreement. The narrative of an opposition leader suggests this to be a way to concentrate power in the hands of the Hutu elite.

Furthermore, the CNARED opposition alliance legitimises the use of violence in the coup attempt of May 2015 as an attempt to re-establish ‘constitutional order’ by overthrowing an “illegal” government. The ‘authoritarianism’ discourse of the opposition and the civil society representative’s conceptualisation of a ‘system of violence’ established by the ruling party CNDD-FDD delegitimise the government’s position in power.

There is a clash between the opposition-civil society camp’s ‘legality’ and the government’s ‘rule of law’ discourses which constitutes a radical disagreement. The opposition-civil society camp considers Nkurunziza’s third term and the current government to be illegitimate, whereas the government considers itself to have been democratically elected by Burundians and the president’s third term to
have been validated by sovereign Burundian courts. These discrepancies in the conceptualisations partly explain why there is tension between the conflict parties.

The ‘external pressure’ discourse, calling for a foreign intervention or for pressure on the government to negotiate, is a narrative that belongs to the diaspora-based opposition and civil society activists. This discourse is almost not at all present in the social media comments. The reason may be that those who oppose the government but remain in Burundi are afraid to voice demands for foreign intervention, but it is not possible to form such a generalisation based on this data. The ‘external pressure’ discourse is in radical disagreement with the government’s ‘sovereignty’ discourse, which provides one more explanation for the current deadlock in the Burundian conflict.

There are different conceptualisations within the opposition-civil society camp about ethnicity playing a role in the conflict. Some narratives present the current crisis as a political conflict opposing the government and all those who oppose it, whereas others conceptualise that the government is ‘hunting’ the Tutsi. This ‘Tutsi man hunt’ discourse is prominent among the opposition and the civil society, whereas the ‘risk of genocide’ discourse is emphasised less and has mostly been voiced by international NGOs. In the statements of the CNARED opposition alliance, the ‘risk of genocide’ narrative may be used as a warning, as suggested in the structuration theory, to draw international attention to the issue. On the other hand, the civil society representative’s more prudent interpretation of no immediate risk of genocide correlates better with the current situation of the conflict.

The government and those who support its views conceptualise the role of ethnicity to be non-existent in the conflict and emphasise the ‘unity’ of Burundians. They consider the evoking of the ethnicity issue to be ‘manipulation’ by the opposition and international actors and sometimes connect ethnicity to colonialism. The question of ethnicity does not constitute a clear radical disagreement between the parties.

The ‘economy’ discourse is shared by the government, opposition and the civil society. On the government side, this discourse is connected to the ‘foreign interference’ discourse so that the foreign economic interests are considered as playing a role in the conflict. The opposition-civil society camp, on the other hand, sees clientelism and corruption in the state structures as background factors of the current crisis. Economic development is presented by the government camp as a solution to the crisis, whereas the opposition considers the miserable state of the economy as its cause, attributable to the current government’s actions.
Based on all the different narratives both by the government, opposition and civil society, I conclude that Burundians interpret the recent events in the light of history. Historical narratives appear often and comparisons of current developments with the past are commonplace in the conceptualisations. However, these interpretations are used in differing ways to justify contrary points of view. This confirms what Ramsbotham’s (2010) radical disagreement theory argues about the fact/value distinction: conflict parties can justify things with the same principle but contrarily, in this case with historical principles. The former Burundian diplomat Félix Ndayisenga defines the issue well in my interview: “When there is an objective point of dissent, people exploit it with their subjectivity related to the past.” (Interview of Félix Ndayisenga, 31.1.2017)

This research has given the parole to the local and diaspora-based politically active Burundians to interpret the political crisis in their country. These locally rooted findings of my research support the findings of some of the earlier research on the current political crisis. For example, the government camp’s conceptualisation of ‘manipulation’ and ‘information war’ by the opposition and foreign actors as a background factor of the crisis supports the findings of Purdeková (2017) about the Burundian government’s discourse of ‘unfounded fears’ and ‘rumours’ in explaining the outflow of refugees during the crisis.

The core question that was posed earlier in this thesis was whether the dialogue between the Burundian conflict parties constitutes a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ as the theory of radical disagreement indicates. In conclusion, there is a radical disagreement between the government and the opposition-civil society camp about defining the status of the current conflict as either in a state of ‘normality’ or as continuing ‘state-led repression’. The second radical disagreement is between the opposition-civil society’s conceptualisation of the ‘illegality’ of the government and the president’s third term and the government’s conceptualisation of ‘sovereign, democratic and legal rule’.

In terms of dialogue, there is a radical disagreement about defining who has the right to dialogue in the current conflict. Although inclusive dialogue is the stated objective of all the parties, the current interaction is conceptualised as a monologue by the opposition and civil society, and the government wants to limit its dialogue partners to those that it considers ‘the peaceful stakeholders’. Due to this radical disagreement between the parties, there is a deadlock in the conflict which reduces the interaction to a dialogue of the deaf.
5.2. Further research and the future of the conflict

My study suggests that there are some differences between the discourses in the narratives of the locally-based Burundians and those that are part of the European diaspora. However, the scope of the study did not enable conducting a comprehensive study on the different views of the Burundian diaspora members. This point of view would deserve attention in further research.

The themes that were almost exclusively present in the diaspora members’ narratives were on the opposition side the ‘external pressure’ discourse calling for foreign intervention and the ‘violent resistance’ discourse. The references to international legal principles and violations of human rights were present only in the diaspora members’ narratives. On the government side, the discourse of ‘religion’ was used most extensively by President Nkurunziza when he addressed a local audience for example in his tweets. In addition, religion was mostly mentioned in the ordinary Burundians’ social media comments. It is therefore clearly a local discourse.

More research would be necessary to identify the role of the diaspora in shaping opinions of the conflict within the Burundian community. Turner and Brønden have examined the roles of the earlier diasporas in their 2011 study, but research on the influence of the exile caused by the 2015–17 political crisis is lacking at the moment. An inquiry among the members of the Burundian diaspora would bring more light to this issue, and by comparing their answers to the local conceptualisations of Burundians it would be possible to get qualitative data on the theme.

Regarding the future of the Burundian conflict, the findings of this study do not present a positive scenario. As my research has demonstrated, the deadlock in the current situation has led to a stagnation in the peace process and it is hard to see a clear way forward in solving the crisis. If the parties could engage in an agonistic dialogue supported by an inclusive dialogue process, both of which would address the deep conflict issues including the history, past crimes and ethnic identities, there is a possibility to find a solution to the Burundian political conflict. Whether this attempt can succeed, remains to be seen. In the current situation, the Brussels-based civil society representative’s words illustrate the pessimistic attitude of many:

In any case, a pacific solution, I am not very optimistic at the moment.
Bibliography


Republic of Burundi. (2015). Décret N. 100/34 du 23 septembre 2015 portant création, mandat, composition, organisation et fonctionnement de la commission nationale de dialogue interburundais [Decree N. 100/34...


Appendix 1

Codebook

Conceptualisations of violence

1. Ethnicity
2. Legality
   2.1. Constitution
   2.2. Institutions/institutional order
   2.3. Impunity
3. Religion
4. Sovereignty
   4.1. Foreign interference
5. Security
   5.1. Terrorism
   5.2. Isolated attacks
   5.3. Violent political opposition
6. Economy
   6.1. Natural resources
7. Politics and power
   7.1. Democracy
   7.2. Authoritarianism
      7.2.1. Repression
      7.2.2. Clientelism / corruption
   7.3. Arusha Accords
   7.4. Resistance / fight
   7.5. Unity
   7.6. Patriotism
   7.7. Internal divisions
8. Manipulation
   8.1. Political labelling
   8.2. Denial of reality
9. Humanitarianism
   9.1. Refugee situation
   9.2. Disappearances
10. Freedom of expression
11. Human rights and their violations
    11.1. Violence and torture by state actors
12. Militarism
13. Killing
   13.1. Genocide
   13.2. State-sponsored killings
14. Responsibility
15. Fire
16. Hunt
17. History
18. Normality
19. Protraction
20. Negotiated legitimacy
21. Education
22. Peace policy
23. Psychology

Conceptualisations of dialogue/solutions

T. Armed resistance
U. External pressure
V. Refusal to dialogue
W. Monologue
X. Dialogue of the deaf
Y. Inclusive dialogue
Z. Formal negotiations

Actors

b = in Burundi
d = in diaspora

A. Government
B. Opposition
   B1. Armed opposition
C. Civil society
   C1. Youth
   C2. Women
   C3. Ordinary, politically active Burundian
   C4. Political civil society activist
   C5. Journalist
D. Third parties
   D1. International community
      D1A. United Nations
      D1B. European Union
      D1C. United States
      D1D. European countries
D2. Regional actors
   D2A. African Union
   D2B. East African Community
   D2C. Other African countries
D3. Donors, funders
E. Church/ religious communities
## Appendix 2

### Interview and dialogue video coding matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrative</th>
<th>Category of conceptualisation</th>
<th>To whom? / Actors mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Solutions</strong>&lt;br&gt;7.1. Democracy&lt;br&gt;7.3. Arusha Accords&lt;br&gt;2.1. Constitution&lt;br&gt;2.2. Institutions</td>
<td>D1D. European countries (Belgium?)&lt;br&gt;D2B. East African Community&lt;br&gt;D2C. Other African countries (Rwanda, Southern Africa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.1. Democracy
2. Legality
2. Legality
7.3. Arusha Accords
1. Ethnicity
6. Economy
2. Legality
7. Power (revisiting the quotas)
7.3. Arusha Accords
2. Legality
4. Sovereignty

Personal narrative
7.3. Arusha Accords

6. Economy
12. Militarism

Ethnicisation
8. Manipulation
2.2. Institutions
4.1. Foreign interference
8. Manipulation
6. Economy

ICC
2. Legality

3. The journalist, 1.2.2017

7.2.1. Repression
10. Freedom of expression

Why violence?
13. Killing and death
9.1. Refugee situation
8.2. Denial of reality

Reasons
2.1. Constitution
7.2. Authoritarianism
7.3. Arusha Accords
1. Ethnicity
7. Politics and power
7.2. Authoritarianism
7.2.2. Clientelism
7.7. Internal divisions
V. Refusal to dialogue

Dialogue
10. Freedom of expression
W. Monologue
7.2. Authoritarianism
8.1. Political labelling
20. Negotiated legitimacy
7.2.1. Repression
10. Freedom of expression

C. Civil society
C3. Burundians

B. Opposition

D2. Regional actors, D1. International community
D1C. United States

D3. Donors, funders

A. Government

C3. Burundians, D1. International community
C. Civil society, D1A. United Nations, E. Church

A. Government

A. Government
<table>
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<tr>
<th>4. The civil society activist, 1.2.2017</th>
<th><strong>Events in Burundi since 2015</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>7.2. Authoritarianism</td>
<td><strong>Why violence?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. History</td>
<td>16. Hunt</td>
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<td>7.3. Arusha Accords</td>
<td>7.2.1. Repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current situation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Opposition and coup</strong></td>
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<td>7.2. Authoritarianism</td>
<td>7.7. Internal divisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Militarism</td>
<td>7.2.1. Repression</td>
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<td>5.2. Isolated attacks</td>
<td>19. Protraction</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. History</td>
<td>7.2.1. Repression</td>
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<td>7.2. Authoritarianism</td>
<td>11. Human rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1. Constitution</td>
<td>7.2.1. Repression</td>
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<td>7.3. Arusha Accords</td>
<td>10. Resistance / fight</td>
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<td>7.4. Resistance / fight</td>
<td>7.2.1. Repression</td>
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<td><strong>Ethnicisation</strong></td>
<td>8. Manipulation</td>
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<td>13.2. State-sponsored killings</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.3. Arusha Accords</td>
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- **A. Government**
- **B. Opposition**
- **D1. International community**
- **D2A. African Union**
- **D2B. East African Community**
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<td>U. External pressure</td>
<td>2.2. Institutions</td>
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<td>7.4. Resistance/fight</td>
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<td>Z. Formal negotiations</td>
<td>16. Hunt</td>
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<td><strong>Ethnicisation</strong></td>
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<td>16. Hunt</td>
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<td>W. Monologue</td>
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<td>Z. Formal negotiations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Y. Inclusive dialogue</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>Opposition and coup</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>D2B. East African Community</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. Church/religious communities, B1. Armed opposition</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. Negotiated legitimacy</td>
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<td>7.5. Unity</td>
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**International community**

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<tr>
<td>U. External pressure</td>
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<td>U. External pressure (intervention)</td>
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<td>13. Killing</td>
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<td>14. Responsibility</td>
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**Solutions**

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<td>11. Human rights and their violations</td>
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<td>5. Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Freedom of expression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. Institutions/institutional order</td>
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<td>7. Politics and power</td>
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**Personal narrative**

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<td>6. Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.4. Resistance/fight</td>
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<td>5. Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.1. Political labelling</td>
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**Civil society Inter-Burundian dialogue videos**

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<td><strong>C4bM. ARDID, Association des rapatriés au Burundi (Association of the repatriated Burundians)</strong></td>
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</table>

| C4bM. ONACOM, Organisation nationale contre les catastrophes et l’obscurantisme de la mentalité (National organisation against catastrophes and the obscurantism of the mentality), relief organisation | **Reasons/solutions** |
| | 2.2. Institutions |
| | 2.3. Impunity |
| | 4.1. Foreign interference |
| | Z. Formal negotiations |
| | 7.3. Arusha Accords |
| | 6. Economy |

| **C4bM. ARDID, Association des rapatriés au Burundi (Association of the repatriated Burundians)** | **Reasons** |
| | 7. Politics and power (before & after elections) |
| | **Solutions** |
| | 7.1. Democracy |
| | 2.1. Constitution |
| | 7.2.2. Clientelism / corruption |
| | 21. Education |
| | 13. Killing |
| | 2.2. Institutions / institutional order |
| | 1. Ethnicity |
| | 6. Economy |

| **C4bM. ONACOM, Organisation nationale contre les catastrophes et l’obscurantisme de la mentalité (National organisation against catastrophes and the obscurantism of the mentality), relief organisation** | **Reasons/solutions** |
| | 2.2. Institutions |
| | 2.3. Impunity |
| | 4.1. Foreign interference |
| | Z. Formal negotiations |
| | 7.3. Arusha Accords |
| | 6. Economy |

| **C4bM. ONACOM, Organisation nationale contre les catastrophes et l’obscurantisme de la mentalité (National organisation against catastrophes and the obscurantism of the mentality), relief organisation** | **Reasons/solutions** |
| | 2.2. Institutions |
| | 2.3. Impunity |
| | 4.1. Foreign interference |
| | Z. Formal negotiations |
| | 7.3. Arusha Accords |
| | 6. Economy |

**D2A. African Union**

**D1A. United Nations**

**D2B. East African Community**

**D1A. United Nations**

**C. Civil society**
| C2/C4bF. AFRABU, Association des femmes rapatriées au Burundi (Association of the repatriated women in Burundi) | **Solutions**  
6. Economy  
21. Education  
2.3. Impunity | **A. Government** |
|---|---|---|
| C2bF. Individual member of CAFOB, Collectif des organisations des femmes au Burundi (Collective of women’s organisations in Burundi) | **Solutions**  
7.7. Internal divisions  
**Reasons**  
4. Sovereignty | *(politicians)* |
| C4bM. UNIPROBU, the association of the Twa | **Solutions**  
Y. Inclusive dialogue  
9.1. Refugee situation  
21. Education  
**Reasons**  
17. History  
4.1. Foreign interference  
1. Ethnicity | **D1D. European countries (coloniser)** |
| C4bM. ACPDH, Association communautaire pour la promotion et la protection des droits de l’homme au Burundi (Communitarian association for the promotion and protection of human rights in Burundi) | **Reasons/solutions**  
6.1. Natural resources  
6. Economy  
7.2.2. Clientelism / corruption  
17. History  
7.6. Patriotism | **C3. Burundians** |
| C1/EbM. Youth Commission International Burundi. | **Solutions**  
3. Religion  
11. Human rights  
**Reasons**  
7.2.2. Clientelism / corruption  
**Solutions**  
21. Education  
7.2.2. Clientelism / corruption  
Y. Inclusive dialogue |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Appendix 3 | Social media coding matrix | - Intentional community
- 1.1. Vincent and James by Laws
- 2.2. Facebook
- 3.3. Pinterest
- 4.4. Instagram
- 5.5. Twitter
- 6.6. LinkedIn
- 7.7. Other platforms

|  | | - Facebook platform frequency
- 1.1. Facebook page
- 2.2. Facebook event
- 3.3. Facebook group
- 4.4. Facebook post
- 5.5. Facebook comment
- 6.6. Facebook ad
- 7.7. Other Facebook features

|  | | - Instagram platform frequency
- 1.1. Instagram profile
- 2.2. Instagram story
- 3.3. Instagram post
- 4.4. Instagram comment
- 5.5. Instagram ad
- 6.6. Instagram hashtag
- 7.7. Other Instagram features

|  | | - Twitter platform frequency
- 1.1. Twitter profile
- 2.2. Twitter tweet
- 3.3. Twitter follow
- 4.4. Twitter mention
- 5.5. Twitter retweet
- 6.6. Twitter hashtag
- 7.7. Other Twitter features

|  | | - LinkedIn platform frequency
- 1.1. LinkedIn profile
- 2.2. LinkedIn post
- 3.3. LinkedIn article
- 4.4. LinkedIn group
- 5.5. LinkedIn recommendation
- 6.6. LinkedIn email
- 7.7. Other LinkedIn features

|  | | - Pinterest platform frequency
- 1.1. Pinterest profile
- 2.2. Pinterest board
- 3.3. Pinterest pin
- 4.4. Pinterest follow
- 5.5. Pinterest repin
- 6.6. Pinterest search
- 7.7. Other Pinterest features

|  | | - Pinterest platform frequency
- 1.1. Pinterest profile
- 2.2. Pinterest board
- 3.3. Pinterest pin
- 4.4. Pinterest follow
- 5.5. Pinterest repin
- 6.6. Pinterest search
- 7.7. Other Pinterest features

|  | | - Other social media platform frequency
- 1.1. Other platform profile
- 2.2. Other platform post
- 3.3. Other platform story
- 4.4. Other platform comment
- 5.5. Other platform ad
- 6.6. Other platform hashtag
- 7.7. Other social media features

|  | | - Total social media platform frequency
- 1.1. Total platform profile
- 2.2. Total platform post
- 3.3. Total platform story
- 4.4. Total platform comment
- 5.5. Total platform ad
- 6.6. Total platform hashtag
- 7.7. Total social media features

|  | | - Engagement frequency
- 1.1. Facebook page engagement
- 2.2. Facebook event engagement
- 3.3. Facebook group engagement
- 4.4. Facebook post engagement
- 5.5. Facebook comment engagement
- 6.6. Facebook ad engagement
- 7.7. Other Facebook engagement features

|  | | - Instagram engagement frequency
- 1.1. Instagram profile engagement
- 2.2. Instagram story engagement
- 3.3. Instagram post engagement
- 4.4. Instagram comment engagement
- 5.5. Instagram ad engagement
- 6.6. Instagram hashtag engagement
- 7.7. Other Instagram engagement features

|  | | - Twitter engagement frequency
- 1.1. Twitter profile engagement
- 2.2. Twitter tweet engagement
- 3.3. Twitter follow engagement
- 4.4. Twitter mention engagement
- 5.5. Twitter retweet engagement
- 6.6. Twitter hashtag engagement
- 7.7. Other Twitter engagement features

|  | | - LinkedIn engagement frequency
- 1.1. LinkedIn profile engagement
- 2.2. LinkedIn post engagement
- 3.3. LinkedIn article engagement
- 4.4. LinkedIn group engagement
- 5.5. LinkedIn recommendation engagement
- 6.6. LinkedIn email engagement
- 7.7. Other LinkedIn engagement features

|  | | - Pinterest engagement frequency
- 1.1. Pinterest profile engagement
- 2.2. Pinterest board engagement
- 3.3. Pinterest pin engagement
- 4.4. Pinterest follow engagement
- 5.5. Pinterest repin engagement
- 6.6. Pinterest search engagement
- 7.7. Other Pinterest engagement features

|  | | - Other social media engagement frequency
- 1.1. Other platform profile engagement
- 2.2. Other platform post engagement
- 3.3. Other platform story engagement
- 4.4. Other platform comment engagement
- 5.5. Other platform ad engagement
- 6.6. Other platform hashtag engagement
- 7.7. Other social media engagement features

|  | | - Total social media engagement frequency
- 1.1. Total platform profile engagement
- 2.2. Total platform post engagement
- 3.3. Total platform story engagement
- 4.4. Total platform comment engagement
- 5.5. Total platform ad engagement
- 6.6. Total platform hashtag engagement
- 7.7. Total social media engagement features

|  | | - Content type
- 1.1. Text-based content
- 2.2. Image-based content
- 3.3. Video-based content
- 4.4. Link-based content
- 5.5. Other content types

|  | | - Total content type
- 1.1. Total text-based content
- 2.2. Total image-based content
- 3.3. Total video-based content
- 4.4. Total link-based content
- 5.5. Total other content types
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**Comments:**
- Comments on the proposed changes to the constitution.
- Discussion on the impact of the proposed changes.
- Voting on the motion to approve the changes.
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<th>Comments on Facebook Posts</th>
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**Note:** The table is partially visible and may require more context or a zoom-in to fully understand the content.
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**Facebook Posts about theにての of**

- 1972, Facebook
- 1973, Facebook
- 1974, Facebook
- 1975, Facebook

**Comment in a news article:**

- 25/4/2017 RFI article

**Vice-President of Brunei:**

- 127, The Brunei Times
- 128, Brunei Times

**To the International Community:**

- 129, The Brunei Times
- 130, Brunei Times