More security – the new normal for the EU? – neofunctional analysis of the EU’s firearms directive.
This thesis is a case study of the EU’s firearms directive. It demonstrates how the firearms directive changed from a purely market-based directive in 1991, when the firearms directive was first introduced, into a security-oriented directive in 2017, when the latest version entered into force.

Arne Niemann’s revised frame for neofunctionalism is used to analyse the pressures shaping the directive. The focus is especially on the urgent threat of terrorism and media coverage on the ‘gun problem’ in Europe as ‘exogenous pressures’ shaping the outcome of the directive; the Commission’s leadership role as security promoter trying to create a ‘genuine security union’ and to reinforce EU’s role as a security provider for EU citizens; and Finnish resistance as an example of ‘countervailing force’ resisting Commission’s leadership and integration in the field of security.

The firearms directive is a case exemplifying EU security integration and it shows how terrorism has become a key factor defining security cooperation at EU level. It is also a case example, which shows how national dynamics are resisting security integration, and on the other hand, how supranational forces are pushing it forward. Analysis of the firearms directive suggests that the supranational institutions of the EU, especially the European Commission, seem to gain power in times of uncertainty. Moreover, it proves that the traditional intergovernmental frame and cost-benefit thinking of the member states fails to explain recent integration, at least in the area of internal security. Overall, my conclusions support recent theoretical trend suggesting that EU cooperation has intensified in the sensitive fields of CSDP/CFSP and AFSJ and that intergovernmental bargaining settling for ‘minimum denominator’ in the areas of high politics can possibly create serious challenges for the EU in the future.
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1. INTRODUCTION

What does the firearms directive say about EU integration? This is the question I try to answer in this thesis. The firearms directive is a case exemplifying EU security integration and shows how terrorism is a key factor defining security cooperation at EU level. It is also a case example, which shows how national dynamics are resisting security integration, and on the other hand, how supranational forces are pushing it forward. The firearms directive process reflects the controversial and complex nature of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice, which involves many sensitive issues related to security, border control and fundamental rights. Hence, it has traditionally been governed by national governments. This complexity is reflected especially in the inter-institutional relations of the EU. Even though both the Council and the Commission agreed that the directive should be renewed and admitted that some radical changes need to be made to make the directive effective, traditional domestic constraints and marginal interest groups were still able to impact the outcome of the directive process.

The firearms directive was introduced in 1991, and at that time, it was linked to the establishment of the single market in Europe. At the time, it was purely a market-based directive with no special focus on security. However, during the second revision of the directive, its nature changed and it became a clearly security-driven directive. This was affected especially by the urgent threat of terrorism after several deadly attacks in Europe in 2015–2016.

A closer examination of the Firearms directive has proven interesting for at least two reasons. It demonstrates a change from a purely market-based directive to a security-oriented directive, but at the same time it also proves that the EU, and especially its supranational institutions like the Commission, seem to gain power and legitimacy in times of uncertainty. It has also drawn attention to the problems of the EU integration project and the tensions around it. Moreover, I believe that the firearms directive is an excellent case to test on Arne Niemann’s (2006) updated framework of neofunctionalist analysis and the new spillover pressures identified in it.

There are four phases in this thesis. First, I link my analysis to the wider context of perception of security in the post–Cold War era. I will focus especially on the discourse of the War on Terror since it has been one of the major factors defining our security policies in the post-Cold War era,
especially after the attacks of 9/11. Since 9/11, the EU member states have also faced several deadly attacks conducted by Islamic extremists. Today, terrorism is recognised as one of the biggest security threats facing the EU, and numerous EU policies have been adopted to tackle terrorism. This threat of terrorism is also reflected in recent Eurobarometer surveys, which show that terrorism is perceived as a threat at EU level, rather than a national level. The revision of the firearms directive is one example of a policy initiative, which is closely connected with the EU’s counter-terrorism measures and justified based on fear that terrorist organisations can easily acquire legal firearms or their parts in the EU area. The terrorist attacks of Charlie Hedbo in early 2015, Paris in November 2015 and Brussels in March 2016 were significant factors speeding up the revision of the firearms directive, and that is why the discourse around the War on Terror and the fear of terrorism need to be taken into account in this analysis. References to terrorism in the firearms directive documents and justifications used by both the Commission and the Council prove not only that the firearms directive has transformed from a purely market-based directive to a security directive, but also that discourse on the fear of terrorism shapes EU policies at all levels.

Second, I link my analysis to the recent developments in the EU security integration. I will focus especially on the Commission’s role in the integration process, Lisbon Treaty as a ‘game changer’ of current policies and counter-terrorism as a driving force of EU’s internal security integration. These are all relevant to my analysis. Firstly, the Commission was responsible for drafting the firearms directive, and it made some significant changes to the proposal compared to the last revision in 2008. Secondly, since the newest version of the directive was drafted after the Lisbon Treaty, this directive process is also a chance to evaluate the changes and the ‘politicization’ of the Union after the adoption of the Treaty. Thirdly, the firearms directive is part of European Agenda on Security adopted in 2015, and security integration in the field of counter-terrorism has guided the drafting of the directive.

Third, I introduce my theoretical framework and methodological choices for the analysis. The firearms directive is one example of how EU integration has developed over time and how certain decisions, especially those connected to security and globalisation, are more often taken at EU level. This analysis focuses more on what the revision of the firearms directive actually tells us about the direction of the integration and where it is positioned vis-à-vis previous policy initiatives. Arne Niemann’s (2006) revised frame for neofunctionalism is used to analyse the pressures shaping the directive. The focus is especially on the urgent threat of terrorism and media coverage on the ‘gun problem’ in Europe as ‘exogenous pressures’ shaping the outcome of the directive; the
Commission’s leadership role as security promoter trying to create a ‘genuine security union’ and to reinforce EU’s role as a security provider for EU citizens; and Finnish resistance as an example of ‘countervailing force’ resisting integration in the field of security. Before the neofunctional analysis of the directive, I will carry out a more systematic analysis on the original firearms directive and its revisions and reflect the positions of different legislative institutions (the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament). My main focus is on the most recent revision of the directive, which was concluded in spring 2017, but I will also do a brief analysis on the introduction and the first revision of the directive in order to give a proper context for the second revision. I will use discursive and interpretative approaches to examine the different versions of the directive and its proposals. With a systematic analysis of different versions, we can detect the overall change that has happened between 1991, when the firearms directive was first introduced, and 2017, when the latest version entered into force.

I base my analysis on three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is the Commission’s influence seems to be the biggest when the member states have a feeling that ‘something needs to be done’, an idea that was presented by Marianne Riddervold in her recent study of 2016. In my analysis, I use the neofunctional concept of ‘cultivated spillover’ to analyse the Commission’s leadership role during the second revision of the directive. I found that the real need to revise the directive stemmed from political pressure to react to the threat of terrorism with all possible means, which supports Riddervold’s (2016) idea. The first hypothesis is linked to my second hypothesis: EU and especially its supranational institutions, like the Commission, gain power in the times of uncertainty. The complex nature of today’s global problems have created an atmosphere of uncertainty, which is also reflected in the firearms directive process. The neofunctional concept of ‘exogenous pressures’ is used to analyse the urgent threat of terrorism and media coverage on the ‘gun problem in Europe’ as outside pressures shaping the outcome of the directive.

Thirdly, my analysis shows that competences in the AFSJ have shifted from strictly intergovernmental towards shared competences between the EU bodies. Several recent studies in the field of EU integration research support this hypothesis. In my analysis, this shift is present especially in the language used during different revisions of the directive. Finally, spillback forces and pressure resisting the integration have also shaped the outcome of the firearms directive. Niemann’s (2006) concept of ‘countervailing forces’ is used to analyse the Finnish resistance during the second revision of the firearms directive. Finland strongly opposed the ban of semi-
automatic firearms proposed by the Commission and succeeded to lobby its position into the final act with support from interest groups and certain member states.
In 1996, neofunctionalist scholar Philippe Schmitter stated “in the future an increasing proportion of EU conflicts will take place not within Union institutions but between them” (Schmitter 1996b, 146). His prediction has proved to be somewhat true. Over the past decade, Europe has faced several crises, which have revealed risks and dangers of settling for ‘minimum denominator’ agreed by the national governments. In the late 2000s, Euro crises revealed the deep structural weaknesses of EMU. In 2015, an influx of asylum seekers fleeing from violence and repression showed that the Dublin system was doomed to fail and simply did not work. Several terrorist attacks in Europe raised questions about the effectiveness of EU’s counterterrorism policies (also Monar 2016, 134). These crises did not only turn attention to EU’s weaknesses, but also proved how important it is to have common solutions and policies in today’s globalised world. How would European countries have survived the global financial crisis without the euro? How could individual countries address root causes of the migrant crisis in international arenas without using the EU to get their message through? How could individual countries prevent terrorist attacks without the EU’s joint information systems and counter-terrorism toolkit?

In the aftermath of these crises, the supranational and intergovernmental institutions of the EU have increased their influence over national politics, especially in the fields of economic and monetary affairs (Jones et al. 2016), energy security (Poirée 2013), and AFSJ (Kaunert 2010a; Laybale 2013). Settling for the ‘minimum denominator’ in the original negotiations has forced EU leaders to take quick decisions to deepen the cooperation in the middle of the crisis. The question arises: Could we have avoided these crises by adopting deeper integration already when the policies were negotiated the first time?

The EU and its member states have realised that in order to be a credible player in world politics, they need to speak with one voice as the European Union. Since the Lisbon Treaty signed in 2009, the EU has been more united and stronger than ever. Since then, all EU institutions, especially the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament have increased their powers and, as Schmitter predicted, EU conflicts are increasingly taking place between EU institutions rather than within them. The Lisbon Treaty has also changed institutional dynamics within policy areas. For the Commission and the European Parliament, the Lisbon Treaty has increased the possibilities to influence policy formation, and the institutions have used their opportunities to do so. This has ‘politicised’ EU affairs even more. The Commission has reinforced its political profile and the
European Parliament has gained more power compared to its earlier, purely advisory role. Recent developments in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice and also in foreign affairs reveal these new dynamics especially well. Both foreign affairs and AFSJ are domains where member states want to hold on to their sovereignty. Despite this determination, the Commission and the European Parliament have succeeded to influence policymaking in these areas more than before. The firearms directive exemplifies these developments especially well. An analysis of the directive shows that today’s complex security environment creates pressure to shift more security policies to EU level. This gives the European Parliament and the Commission the opportunity to influence policymaking and push through their agenda over the member states. During the first revision of the firearms directive, the European Parliament was able to shape the outcome of the directive by drawing attention to the security aspects of the directive. However, at this time, the Council and the Commission were not that eager to make major changes to the Commission’s proposal and the changes the Parliament got through to the final act were quite moderate. During the second revision, the Commission introduced some major security-related changes to the directive. It was backed by several powerful member states and with this support, the directive adopted was much more ambitious than expected.

Next, I will guide you through some recent research and connect some ideas to my analysis. I will focus especially on the Commission’s role in the integration process, Lisbon Treaty as a ‘game changer’ of current policies and EU’s counter-terrorism as a driving force of EU’s internal security integration. These are all relevant for my analysis. Firstly, the Commission was responsible for drafting the firearms directive and it made some significant changes to the proposal compared to the last revision in 2008. Secondly, since the newest version of the directive was drafted after the Lisbon Treaty, this directive process is also a chance to evaluate the changes and the ‘ politicisation’ of the Union after the adoption of the Treaty. Thirdly, the firearms directive is part of the European Agenda on Security adopted in 2015 and security integration in the field of counter-terrorism has guided the drafting of the firearms directive. Before this, I will focus on the context of my analysis, which is how global discourse on the fear of terrorism has shaped the idea of European security and how so-called ‘new threats’, like terrorism and organised crime, shape security policies at EU level. I will show how media and political leaders have a significant role in framing and constructing this discourse. This is important, since in my analysis of the firearms directive, I show how media, political leaders and the Commission actively framed firearms as a ‘problem’ for the EU and as a challenge to EU’s counter-terrorism policies.
2.1. Firearms directive and the EU’s security integration

The firearms directive is a case exemplifying the EU’s security integration, and it shows how terrorism is a key factor defining security cooperation at EU level. It is also a case example, which shows how national dynamics are resisting security integration, and on the other hand, how supranational forces are pushing it forward. The firearms directive was introduced in 1991 and at that time, it was linked to the establishment of the single market in Europe. The creation of the single market increased the pressure to harmonise policies, including those dealing with the acquisition and possession of weapons. At the time, security was not a key element of the directive, which was purely market-based and created to guarantee the functionality of the internal market.

The year 1991 also marked the beginning of the EU security cooperation, especially in the fields of external relations. The European Council in Maastricht laid the foundations for a political Union with the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the beginnings of a common defence policy, as the second pillar of the Treaty of Maastricht. In 1992, the member states reached an agreement on the so-called Petersburg tasks, which set the stage for the EU’s involvement in the security field in third countries (Law and Myshlovska 2007, 13), and in 2003, the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy, a more comprehensive framework for European security identifying the threats facing the EU and defining strategic objectives to tackle these threats. Terrorism was identified as one of the key threats in European Security Strategy, which highlighted that “Europe is both target and a base” for the new global wave of terrorism. This declaration was done in the context of the ‘global war on terror’ declared by the US president George W. Bush in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11 two years earlier. Regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime were also identified as threats facing the EU. Overall, the strategy concluded that “Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable” (European Security Strategy 2003).

These changes in the security environment lead member states to think more about coherence between internal and external dimensions of security and to coordinate their efforts in the field of security. According to David Law and Oksana Myshlovska (2007, 20), this consensus was particularly important for the establishment of a joint approach to such transnational and cross-border challenges as illegal migration, trafficking of human beings terrorism and organised crime. Foundations for internal security cooperation were laid in the Tampere (1999), Haag (2004) and Stockholm (2009) programmes, which contained member states’ guidelines for the common policies in the field of justice and home affairs. However, it was only the Lisbon treaty that truly
shifted the focus towards the EU’s internal security. In the Lisbon Treaty, member states established the European external Action Service (EEAS) to better coordinate their actions in the field of foreign policy. They also renewed decision-making in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ), which made it easier to coordinate policies connected to the EU’s internal security.

The firearms directive was first revised in 2008, a year before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. The revision was needed because in 2001, the Commission had signed the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocol, which aimed “to facilitate and strengthen cooperation among states in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition” (UN 2004). This revision was a technical one, making the EU’s firearms directive compatible with new UN standards. This time, the European Parliament tried to draw attention to the security aspects of the directive and gun security and was able to push through some changes into the Commission’s proposal. However, the political will to truly address gun security at EU level was not there due to lack of interest in the Council and the Commission.

It was during its second revision, when the firearms directive changed from a purely market-based and technical directive into a ‘security directive’. Security has been one of the key strategic priorities of the Jucker Commission, which took office in late 2014. In 2015, just one year after taking office, the Commission adopted the European Agenda on Security, which laid down clear guidelines for joint action and highlighted the cross-border nature of today’s security challenges. The second revision of the firearms directive was one of the measures introduced in the European Agenda on Security. Originally, the Commission’s proposal on the second revision of the firearms directive was part of the Commission’s work program of 2016. However, terrorist attacks in Paris first in January 2015, and later in November 2015, resulted in an early introduction of the Commission’s proposal just a few days after the second Paris attacks on 18 November 2015. The Paris attacks revealed severe security loopholes in existing firearms legislation, which increased the pressure to adopt a new firearms directive as quickly as possible.

2.1.1. Commission work programmes 2010-2016

Even though security had been addressed in many EU conclusions, programmes and strategies in the 1990s and the 2000s, it was not until the 2010s that security really found its way to the Commission’s agenda. Commission work programmes illustrate that security has increasingly
defined EU’s agenda in the 2010s. The work programmes show how the Commission plans to give practical effect to the political priorities set out by the President of the Commission. The security dimension has been highlighted in the work programmes especially after 2014, when Jean Claude Juncker took over the presidency.

In the work programmes of 2010 and 2011, security was linked to the Stockholm programme, agreed by the Council in 2009. The Stockholm programme built on the previous programmes of Hague and Tampere and gave certain tasks to the Commission, related for example to terrorist financing and the asylum systems of the member states (Council of the EU 2009). In the Hague, Tampere and Stockholm programmes, security was tightly in the hands of the member states. They defined the agenda, and the Commission executed specific tasks issued by the Council. However, in the work programme of 2013, the Commission took a more proactive role with internal security. Instead of saying that it acts according to Stockholm priorities, it demanded that the EU should do more in the field of security but at the same time maintain the balance between security and freedom. The Commission put internal security high on the EU’s agenda by saying that “threats to safety and security evolve, and the EU’s response needs to reflect this” and that “areas like terrorist financing and the cross border traffic in weapons need particular attention” (European Commission 2012).

In 2015, the Commission took an even more proactive role by including preparations of the European Agenda on Security to its work programme. It argued that a specific agenda on security was needed to protect Europeans and to better tackle security threats like terrorism, organised crime, radicalisation and cybercrime (European Commission 2015a). In 2016, the Commission stated more clearly that terrorism, radicalisation, organised crime and cybercrime are threatening European security and due to their cross-border nature, a stronger EU response is needed. In order to respond to these threats and to implement the European Agenda on Security introduced in 2015, the Commission introduced several legal initiatives in its work programme of 2016. One of these initiatives was the proposal to revise the firearms directive.

There is a clear shift from ‘balance between security and freedom’ in 2013 to ‘more security’ in 2015 and 2016. This is a clear indication that during the Juncker presidency, the Commission has taken a more independent and proactive role in security issues, which has led to more influence over the AFSJ. However, we need to remember that the Commission mainly reacts to calls for action made by other political actors, especially by the Council and member states (Nugent &
Rhinard 2015, 285). The need for ‘more security’ rises from the fact that all member states can agree on the complexity of today’s security issues and a need for a common EU response. The Commission’s multinational experts can come up with ideas and solutions that would be politically impossible at a national level, and the need for a common EU response can serve as an argument for national governments to push some security initiatives through. This was the case with the firearms directive. It is unlikely that national governments would have made an initiative to restrict the use and acquisition of firearms without the proposal by the Commission, because there are so many national ambitions linked to firearms, which makes it a politically sensitive issue at a national level. Marianne Riddervold (2016, 360) argues that the Commission has increased its involvement in foreign policy initiatives, so similar developments are also recognised in the field of CFSP, which is considered the most sensitive domain of EU policies. Based on comprehensive interviews with the EU staff, she mentions EU’s Maritime Security Strategy of 2013 as an example where the Commission succeeded to broaden the scope of the strategy and influence the drafting process remarkably. According to Riddervold (2016, 361), “this is puzzling not only in light of the Commission’s formally limited role in CFSP decision-making processes, but also because the interviewees themselves referred to the national sensitivity of maritime security issues”.

Security threats are constructed in discourses framed by the elites and media (Weaver 1995; Balzacq 2011; Stritzel 2012; Stenvall 2007; Lazar&Lazar 2007). This means that the Commission is not solely reacting based on other actors’ demand, but also shaping the discourse around security by stating that something is threatening the security of Europeans. This is something that the Commission has taken over during the past few years. It has contributed to the debate over security and taken a more active role in defining security issues. During the Hague, Tampere and Stockholm programmes, the Commission solely stated that it is acting according to these programmes, in other words ‘does whatever member states tells it to do’. After the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, the Commission has taken a more proactive role in defining the security problems and creating the discourse on European security, especially on cross-border phenomena like terrorism, migration and organised crime. It might be the case that the Commission has taken a more active role by the request of the member states, but this does not eliminate the fact that the Commission has become an actor ‘per se’ when it comes to European security. This proves the point that member states need a supranational organisation to take care of their security or even more dramatically, Europeans need the Commission (not member states) to take care of their security.
2.2. Post–cold war European security and discourse on fear of terrorism

The threat of terrorism has been a major force driving EU’s security integration forward, and it has also framed the revision of the firearms directive. When I refer to terrorism, I refer to global discourse on terrorism created after the attacks of 9/11. This discourse has framed terrorism as a major security threat, especially to Western societies and values. This framing is done mainly by media and political elites, but today increasingly also by individuals in social media discussions.

The concept of terrorism is tightly linked with the concept of security, simply because terrorism is considered one of the most urgent security threats today. I understand security as a constantly changing social construction, which is built in the processes of securitazion and desecuritazion. This means that we ‘speak’ and frame certain things as security threats, and this framing does not necessarily have anything to do with actual and real threat to human life that the object of securitazion poses (Weaver 1995). Security is a key concept in international relations since ideas of security ultimately construct identities of international actors, such as states and organisations. As Alexander Wend (1999, 372) puts it, “ontology of international life (…) is ‘social’ in the sense that it is through ideas that states ultimately relate to one another, and ‘constructionist’ in the sense that these ideas help define who and what states are.”

Even though terrorism and counter-terrorism measures have such a central role in our societies today, there is a “distinct lack of agreement how to define terrorism” (Freedman & Thussu 2012, 4). According to Freedman & Thussu (2012, 7), instead of a clear definition on terrorism, there are different interpretations produced by various actors involved in the counter-terrorism scheme: government officials, security experts, consultants, academics and even organisations like the UN and the EU. States and organisations use a lot of resources on making sense of terrorism but it is still difficult to make a difference between terrorism and other forms of violence. According to Freedman & Thussu (2012, 7), it is due to this lack of clear definition that interested parties often adopt their preferred perspectives on terrorism and use it to justify their action and policies.

After the attacks of 9/11, the threat of terrorism has increasingly defined security and defence policies in Europe and in the US. On 11 September 2001, radical Islamic terrorists conducted deadly attacks in several locations in New York and in Washington, killing 3,000 and injuring over 6,000 others. These attacks gained huge media attention around the world and triggered global
discourse on the fear of terrorism. In the aftermath of the attacks, George W. Bush, the President of the US, declared a global ‘War on Terror’ and called all US partners to join the war to defeat terrorism and avoid future attacks.

The EU reacted immediately by adopting conclusions on the fight against terrorism just nine days after the 9/11 attacks. This was the starting point of EU’s counter-terrorism policies and EU’s security integration. This process is linked to a global political consensus on the fight against terrorism, which is supported by media and public opinion in Europe. Systematic discourse created around the War on Terror and terrorism has shaped the public opinion in Europe. This is evident when you take a look at the Standard Eurobarometer, a survey polling public opinion in the EU every six months. In these surveys, Europeans are asked ‘what are the most important issues facing the EU at the moment’ and ‘what are the most important issues facing your country at the moment’. If we compare most recent survey results to those from a few years earlier, we can see a dramatic change: in early 2014, only 6 percent of Europeans mentioned ‘terrorism’ as one of two things concerning them most at EU level. In 2017, 44 percent mentioned terrorism in this context. The fear of terrorism at EU level has risen a striking 38 percent in just three years, and it is seen as the most important issue facing the EU in 21 member states. Since 2014, terrorism has had an upward trend together with immigration, these two rising almost hand in hand. However, since early 2016, the concern over immigration has fallen while the concern over terrorism has continued to grow, with only a slight decrease during the more “quiet months” of 2016. Even though the fear of terrorism has grown at a national level as well, the increase is moderate compared with the EU level. Moreover, when asked what the two most important issues Europeans are facing personally were, terrorism was mentioned by even fewer respondents: only 6 percent perceived terrorism as a personal threat. (Standard Eurobarometer 87).

This trend suggests that terrorism is associated more with the EU and European identity than with national identity. The cross-border nature of terrorism as well as the supranational nature of the EU makes it easier to link these two together. Terrorism is also something that goes beyond the understanding of many Europeans, which might increase the support for join terrorism measures precisely at the EU level. This gives a mandate for the national governments to deepen the EU cooperation, and for the Commission to introduce new legislative initiatives, especially in the field of security. The firearms directive is an example of a directive reform that has been driven by a need for more security at EU level, especially in the field of counter-terrorism.
The discourse on the threat of terrorism has become the single most powerful force driving the EU’s security integration forward, and the Commission and the Council have increasingly used this to justify policy initiatives in the field of the EU’s internal security, especially in the aftermath of recent terrorist attacks in Europe. The latest revision of EU’s firearms directive is one of the policy initiatives which has been shaped and justified by the urgent threat of terrorism, and that is why it is important to pay attention to the origins of the discourse on the fear of terrorism.

2.2.1 Creating the discourse – the symbolic meaning of the 9/11

9/11 has been the most significant event shaping world politics since the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Attacks and the discourse on the War on Terror have led into dramatic developments around the world and changed the way people and societies perceive each other. The War on Terror was not created to defend a specific state, geographical area or even coalition of states. It is a global war created to defend Western values like ‘freedom’, ‘liberal market economy’, ‘security’ and ‘democracy’. These values are also central for the EU.

The whole concept of the War on Terror is somewhat problematic. Des Freedman and Daya Kishan Thussu (2012, 1–2) have argued that it is ”deeply questionable” to wage a war against ‘terror’, which is not a state nor an organisation. According to Julian Reid (2006, 62), the War on Terror is “a biopolitical war underwritten by a commitment to defend of a liberal conception of humanity which exceeds and challenges the boundaries of traditional forms of state sovereignty”. This makes it a war without boundaries, rules or specific enemies – a concept which is easy to use to justify any action or initiative defending Western values and way of life. World leaders have made good use of discourse on the War on Terror. 9/11 and the discourse on the War on Terror have been used to justify numerous new policies, security initiatives and even international wars. The attacks of 9/11 also gave significant impulse to the development of EU counter-terrorism policies (see for example Kaunert et al. 2012, 474). However, it is problematic to justify policy initiatives and acts of organised violence based on the War on Terror, even though it seems to be widely accepted in Western societies. The faceless and undefined enemy of the War on Terror gives leaders and policy-makers a reason to push through initiatives that would otherwise be impossible to get through in today’s globalised societies. Often, these initiatives are used to increase defence spending and surveillance, weaken the protection of personal data and limit the free movement of persons and goods, which are basically the driving forces of globalisation and peaceful societies.
The discourse on the War on Terror was created immediately after the attacks of 9/11. On 20 September 2001, the US president George W. Bush declared a global war on terror and called the US partners around the world to join the war – if they didn’t, they might be attacked themselves:

“The civilized world is rallying to America's side. They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next”.

(George W. Bush, 20.9.2001)

He also referred to violation of western values and emphasised that the world had changed after the attacks:

“Night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.”

(George W. Bush, 20.9.2001)

The discourse on the War on Terror created an enemy image, which had been missing after the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Lazar and Lazar (2007) associate the discourse on the War on Terror with the creation of the ‘New World Order’, a discourse that has been under formation in the post-Cold War era. This discourse has established an America-led moral order and constituted ‘new threats’ needed after the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the counterforce created by it. According to Lazar and Lazar (2007, 46) the threat of terror has been identified as the new enemy in the post-Cold War era, and this discourse on the threat of terror has systematically marked and set aside certain individuals and groups as terrorists and outcasts of a social order. By creating a threat around terrorism and representing America as a ‘world police’ above the law and legitimising its use of force as necessary for maintaining world peace, the discourse justifies America’s position as a global leader and reinforces the need for ‘New World Order’ to defend the Western values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law.

9/11 can be seen as a single catastrophic event triggering the developments leading to the creation of the global discourse on the War on Terror and the formation of a ‘new enemy’. The aim of the attacks was not only to cause as many civilian casualties as possible, but also to target neo-liberal values and the liberal identity of Western societies (Reid 2006, 83). Discourse on the War on Terror was approved unanimously by the elites, media and citizens (see for example Castells 2009, 159) – not only in America, but also in Europe and other Western countries. The surprising and devastating nature of the attacks triggered collective feelings of fear and anger among citizens and elites.
Castells (2009, 169) points out that the discourse on the War on Terror, together with the themes and images associated with it, have constructed a network of associations in people’s minds. These associations activate the deepest emotion in the human brain, the fear of death. This explains why the discourse has grown to be so powerful and has therefore been used to justify policies ever since it was created.

Given the intensity of the discourse created around terrorism after 9/11, it was easy for the citizens, elites and media to support Bush’s initiative on a global War on Terror and approve measures needed to implement this initiative. Bush’s speech on 20 September 2001 was also important for the creation of a global discourse; in his speech, Bush made a powerful call-to-action for the ‘civilized world’ to join the War on Terror and even more importantly, he threatened that if terrorists are not punished, others might experience attacks as well. This created a global atmosphere of ‘something needs to be done’, which, in turn, increased the pressure for other leaders of the ‘civilized world’ to react as soon as possible.

This call-to-action was immediately taken seriously by the EU, whose internal ministers held an extraordinary Council meeting on 20 September 2001 and adopted conclusions on the fight against terrorism. The Council stressed that “the seriousness of recent events has led the Union to speed up the process of creating an area of freedom, security and justice and to step up cooperation with its partners, especially the United States” (Council of the EU 2001). The reform of the firearms legislation was already mentioned at this stage. In the conclusions, the Council invited the Commission “to examine measures to be taken to harmonise further the legislation related to firearms, arms trafficking and explosives. This happened just a year after the report on implementing the firearms directive had concluded that there was no need to make significant changes to the directive (European Commission 2000).

2.2.2. Origins of the discourse on War on Terror – globalisation and the politics of fear

The discourse on the War on Terror is closely linked to globalisation. Globalisation and technological change have marked the free movement of goods, people, culture and ideas, but also made it easier for the international criminal organisations to function beyond national borders. This has meant that international criminal organisations have benefitted from the values of freedom and a liberal market economy, and thus created new border-crossing security threats that are hard to tackle for any single state. Some scholars have argued that promoting globalisation and the Western
values attached to it, the US and the EU have created preconditions for the downside phenomena of
globalisation, and thus contributed to the formation of new security threats, terrorism being one
example. For example, Benjamin Barber (2003, 85) says that the ‘international order’ promoted by
the US is actually an ‘international disorder’, a contrived war of all against all creating conditions as
favourable to the globalisation of crime as to the spread of unregulated market. Globalisation has
made it more difficult for states to predict the consequences of their policies and reinforced the
feeling of uncertainty in world politics. According to Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (2002, 5), 9/11
actually revealed the uncertainty world was facing at the time:

“The collapse of Twin Towers exposed a gap into which politicians and writers,
journalists and academics have poured explanations based on their worries about
globalisation, fears about anarchy, guilt about Israel, shame about Africa, anxiety
about the unknown, and a generalized sense of responsibility for what happened”.
(Booth & Dunne 2002, 5)

9/11 offered an easy explanation for the uncertainty and an easy way out from facing the
uncomfortable truth that there are a lot of things that have gone wrong in globalised world. 9/11
created an outside enemy to blame for the uncertainty in the globalised world: the faceless
terrorists. Nobody really knew who they were, but everybody knew they existed, and that they
posed the biggest threat of our time to our societies.

One purpose of terrorism is to spread fear among people by randomly targeting innocent civilians
(see for example Reid 2006, 83). Fear is a politically relevant emotion (Altheide 2006) and that is
why it has been such a predominant element in the global discourse on terrorism, and also why
counter-terrorism measures are a top priority in the European Agenda on Security adopted in 2015.
Basically, images and perceptions of fear are just reflections in our minds. They are constructed by
our memories and experiences, but also deliberately created by media and elites. Media has the
responsibility to tell people about events and phenomena that are somehow shocking, scary or
perceived as “relevant for the society”. Shocking stories sell better and gain more attention, which
make them especially interesting for the media. In the end, it’s a question of framing. Media frames
certain events as “more shocking” and scarier than others. For example, war crimes conducted by
American soldiers are not framed as shocking as terrorist attacks conducted by Islamic extremist
groups or famine in Africa does not gain as much media attention as migration flows to Europe.
These are all deliberate choices by media to tell us certain stories and frame those stories in a certain way.

Leaders also know how to make use of shocking and scary phenomena. They have a responsibility to react when citizens feel themselves threatened and that is why after shocking events, new policy initiatives are often introduced. This might also explain, for example, why the EU reacted to migratory flows only when it was framed as a huge and urgent problem by the media in 2015, even though the flows, or at least the indications of those, were acknowledged long before that. A shock reaction in Europe was needed to make “managing migratory flows” a top priority for the EU.

According to Altheide (2006, 6–7), leaders learn to promote fear in their media messages. For example, president Bush used images of 9/11 in his presidential campaign of 2004 in such an outrageous way that the families of those killed in the 9/11 attacks actually had to ask the candidates and the political parties not to use those images. Altheide (2006, 8) argues that “fear is promoted and exploited by leaders for their own survival and policies rather than that of their audiences”. Altheide (2006, 17) says that this ‘politics of fear’ emerges when there is a cumulative public definition of crisis that challenges political leadership, sovereignty, national identity or ideology. The critical point is how the event triggering the crisis is defined. The basic process of defining the event, and justifying actions after it, involves propaganda and manipulation of the information for a specific purpose. European leaders and EU institutions have also promoted fear in their messages related to terrorism. In European Security Strategy adopted in 2003, the EU stated that “the most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction” (European Security Strategy 2003). In reality, this is quite an unlikely and dramatic scenario, yet it was highlighted in the Strategy in the context of terrorism. Moreover, when the Commission introduced the second revision proposal to the firearms directive in November 2015, President Juncker stated that the directive “helps us tackle the threat of weapons falling into the hands of terrorists” (The European Commission 2015d). Juncker’s statement creates an image that without EU action, it is easier for terrorists to acquire firearms, which might increase the probability of further attacks.

After several deadly attacks in Europe in the past few years, media and leaders have developed a certain pattern on how to react when a new attack occurs. Usually, the attack is widely covered in news media across Europe, especially if there is a connection to extreme Islamic terrorism. Then, European leaders condemn the attack and often make terrorism an agenda point for the next Council
meeting. Citizens usually participate via social media, either by sending reports from the scene or by commenting on attacks. Tim Highfield (2016, 91) highlights the role of ‘hashtags’ in contemporary crisis communication. He argues that hashtags as common markers allow social media users to centralise important information and find relevant details, and hashtags and online platforms are also used by official sources like governments, emergency services and media to update information. This makes today’s crisis communication much more inclusive than before.

This media context is worth highlighting, because in my analysis of the firearms directive, I focus on media’s role as an exogenous pressure shaping the outcome of the directive and pushing the security integration forward. Media attention and the discourse on the fear of terrorism are not the main focus of this thesis, but it is important to acknowledge that they have played a significant role as a background factor shaping the outcome of the directive. Some dynamics of today’s media environment should be noted here. Social media and several new communication platforms have dramatically changed the way we communicate and the way we perceive and process information. According to Tim Highfield (2016, 71), “social media are an arena for collective sense-making of news and politics as they happen”. However, Highfield (2016, 76) says that mainstream media coverage of news and events is important to social media activity. Big news agencies and editorials still have the resources, capabilities and contacts to provide the news coverage while social media platforms provide audiences the opportunity to comment, discuss and critique the content. As noted earlier, fear is a politically relevant emotion, which might provoke extreme reactions both in media and the public. Hence, texts and visual media usually highlight the extreme personal experiences taking place after extraordinary and scary events like terrorist attacks (Highfield 2016, 92).

After the Brussels attacks in March 2016, Cas Mudde, a Professor for International Affairs and expert on extremism, wrote in Huffington Post that the attacks “show that terrorism is the new normal for Western Europe, at least for now. Citizens and politicians should acknowledge, rather than simply accept, this” (Huffington Post 26.3.2016). This ‘new normal’ has reinforced the discourse on the War on Terror and fear of terrorism in Europe, and made it a top issue defining European security. Altheide (2006, 17–18) says that audiences are systematically misinformed about scary events and policies adopted after them, usually by credible newspeople and respected leaders. The problem is that people think they know “the true story” even though this might not be the case. When it comes to terrorism, media and leaders should be especially careful with how the events are framed and what actions are justified based on the attacks. The firearms directive is an example of a policy initiative, which has been strongly influenced by the framing of terrorism in
public discussion. Immediately after the Paris attacks of 2015, media started to talk about the ‘gun problem’ in Europe, which increased the pressure to make the firearms directive proposal more ambitious and introduce it earlier than intended. The pressure created by the attacks also resulted in a ‘poorly drafted’ version of the proposal, which did not include the usual impact assessment.

2.3. Commission’s role in EU integration

The most important role of the European Commission is related to the creation and implementation of EU’s legal order. The Commission has an exclusive right to initiate EU laws and it is the ‘guardian of the treaties’ monitoring the implementation of the EU law in member states. Central political guidelines are defined in yearly work programmes, which serve as a guide for the Commission’s work for the coming year.

The Commission might have the exclusive right to initiate EU laws, but it rarely does so only based on its own analysis and preferences. Rather, it reacts to inputs and requests coming from other political actors, such as the Council, member states and the European Parliament, or obligations rising from international commitments or rulings of international courts. Nugent and Rhinard (2015, 286–294) have recognised three factors that shape the EU law. These are existing policies; competing interests; and guidelines defined in strategic yearly planning and programming. In its work programs, the Commission seeks to fill the gaps of existing policies, while different interest groups provide the Commission useful information and insight for the planning of new policies and proposals. Strategic planning and programming sets priorities and creates the basis for Commission’s work for the coming year. The Commission consults the European Parliament and the Council throughout its processes, and especially the priorities set in Council conclusions guide the Commission’s work forward.

The Commission’s several Directorate Generals (DGs) are responsible for drafting EU laws. The DG responsible for drafting depends on the policy area under which an initiative falls. If the initiative falls under several policy areas, one DG takes the lead, while others support. Generally, this process is quite straightforward, since initiatives and proposals usually fall under a specific policy area. For example, the Schengen Information System proposal dealing with checks at the external borders is submitted to the DG Home responsible for border security, and proposals related to 2020 climate and energy package are submitted to the DG Climate Action.
As pointed out by Nugent and Rhinard (2015), these proposals usually stem from long-term objectives set out in the Commission’s strategic planning or requests coming from the Council or other EU institutions. In the ordinary legislative procedure, the European Parliament and the Council examine the Commission’s proposal, and usually propose some amendments to it during the first or the second reading. The Council’s position is prepared in responsible working groups, and the Parliament’s position is prepared in responsible committees. For example, the proposal related to the 2020 climate and energy package is first examined and amended by the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety committee in the European Parliament, and then either amended or accepted by the Environment Council. The Council’s position is first prepared by the Working Group on the Environment and then adopted by the Coreper. Usually, the common position is agreed by the member states at working party level and the Coreper just takes a final look at the proposal before it is passed to the Council. Working Groups consist of national experts either from EU member state representations or from the capitals. Coreper is the last step before the ministerial level and consists of senior EU ambassadors. The Commission introduces the proposal, but preparatory bodies in the European Parliament and in the Council are the ones actually shaping the final version of the EU law. When analysing the Commission’s role in EU integration, we need to remember that the Council and the European Parliament always have the final say in EU legislation. In ordinary legislative order, the Commission is generally believed to be in a weaker position than the European Parliament and the Council, because ultimately, the latter two may agree on the final version of a law without an agreement with the Commission (Costello & Thompson 2013, 1027).

However, the Commission has a lot of power in ‘setting the mood’ for the legislative process. The Commission’s first draft proposal puts the initiative into context and sets certain preconditions for the amendments made later by the Council and the European Parliament. The Commission’s proposals are usually communicated to the public before readings in the Council and the European Parliament. If the member states’ or the Parliament’s positions differ significantly from the Commission’s proposal, it creates media attention and gives an impression of conflicts and lack of unity inside the EU. In addition, the Commission has the privilege to frame the proposal the way it prefers. When the context is set by the Commission and communicated to the public, it is not that easy for the European Parliament and the Council to reframe it. This gives the Commission an exclusive role in framing the legislative proposals, even if the actual input for the proposal comes from member states or other institutions.
2.3.1. Firearms directive as an example of change in EU policy formation

Against this background, there are some interesting elements in the firearms directive. In the Commission, the DG responsible for the directive was the DG Grow, which is responsible for EU policy on the single market, industry, entrepreneurship and small businesses. This is logical since the firearms directive was originally created to harmonise policies inside the single market. However, when we take a look at the security aspect of the directive, the DG does not make that much sense. Revision of the firearms directive is tightly linked to the European Agenda on security and the creation of a “genuine security union”. Moreover, Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Home Affairs at the time, highlighted the security aspects of the firearm legislation several times, even if the forthcoming revision was not on her DG’s agenda. This indicates that even though the firearms directive proposal was prepared by the DG Grow, it was significantly influenced by the DG Home. In the European Parliament, the committee responsible for drafting amendments was IMCO, the Committee for Internal Market and Consumer Protection helped by LIBE, the committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. This is in line with the Commission DG. However, also in the European Parliament the security aspects dominated the debate. The main concern of the European Parliament was the fact that in the light of recent terrorist attacks, the Commission rushed with the proposal and launched it without proper impact assessments (this will be addressed later in analysis). LIBE welcomed the Commission’s proposal especially so that the “loopholes in existing legislation can be closed and the security of the European citizens can be enhanced” (LIBE 2016). The question was not on how the single market will be affected by the proposal, but rather on whether the measures proposed by the Commission are the right ones to stop legal firearms ending up in the hands of terrorists.

In the Council, the firearms directive was even more linked to security. The draft directive fell under AFSJ and was discussed by the interior ministers in the Justice and Home Affairs Council. The Council’s position was mainly prepared by GENVAL, Working Party on General Matters including Evaluation, which coordinates measures to prevent and counter organised crime, unless they are dealt with by other working parties under the responsibility of interior ministries. Terrorist attacks clearly framed the Council position. In its policy paper for the JHA Council in March 2016, the Presidency highlighted that “in view of recent terrorist acts, certain issues on the firearms directive need further improvement” and that the Council had already called for revision of the directive in its conclusions of 15 June 2015 on the Renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy 2015-2020 (Council of the EU 2016a). These conclusions stressed the necessity to “contribute to the protection of European citizens with regard to ongoing increase of threats in
particular posed by terrorism and serious and organised crime” and they were published a few months after the Charlie Hedbo attacks (Council of the EU 2015a). In its policy paper before the JHA Council meeting in June 2016, the Presidency referred to the Brussels terrorist attacks in March, saying that after the attacks, ministers “expressed the need to pursue in a resolute manner the swift completion of legislation” on firearms (Council of the EU 2015b).

The emphasis on security in the Council is especially relevant since the Council is the most political of the EU bodies and considered as ‘master of the Treaties’. The member states changed the emphasis of directive when they linked legal firearms and the revision of the firearms directive to the threat of terrorism, creating an opportunity for the Commission to take stronger action on the revision of the legal framework for firearms. This also created an opportunity for the European Parliament, but in the case of the firearms directive, the Parliament was suspicious about the Commission’s security-driven proposal. The IMCO committee prioritised the rights of the industry, shooters and hunters in its opinion, while the Commission and the Council clearly put more emphasis on security.

The DG responsible for the directive in the Commission was GROW, but it was also part of DG HOME’s agenda, since the revision of the firearms directive was part of the European Agenda for Security and the EU’s counter-terrorism measures. The Commission’s emphasis on security was demonstrated in DG GROW’s Annual Activity Report of 2016, where the firearms directive was mentioned only incidentally and even then, precisely in the context of security and counter-terrorism as follows: “the Commission is hereby supporting Member States in their efforts to protect Europe's citizens and prevent criminals and terrorists from accessing weapons” (GROW 2016, 12). DG GROW was clearly part of the process only because it was the DG originally responsible for the directive. The real need to revise the directive stemmed from political pressure to react to the threat of terrorism with all possible means. This supports Riddervold’s (2016, 360) notion that the Commission’s influence is biggest when MSs have the feeling that ‘something needs to be done’.

The firearms directive seems to be an example of change in EU policy formation. First of all, because its nature has changed from being “purely market-based” to “all about security”, and secondly, because it shows how terrorism as a global cross-border phenomenon is changing the formation of EU policies. This change is linked to EU’s intensified efforts to tackle terrorism after the recent terrorist attacks in Europe.
2.4. Lisbon Treaty as a ‘game changer’

The EU institutions and the dynamics between them are the main forces constructing and shaping the EU interest. According to Kaunert et al. (2012, 482), the process of constructing the European interest is defined by the “power struggle between different actors and institutions in a given EU policy”. Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, this power struggle has intensified and scholars have paid more attention to the Commission’s political role (Prifti 2013; Laybale 2013; Poirée 2013) as well as the Commission’s and the European Parliament’s attempts to gain more power (Kaunert 2010a; Kaunert et al. 2012; Laybayle 2013; Molino & Sellez 2013). The Lisbon Treaty has made the whole decision-making system of the EU more political. Traditionally, the areas of ‘high politics’, such as internal security and CSFP/CSDP have remained in the hands of the member states. Member states are still the ‘Masters of the Treaties’, but the Commission and the European Parliament know how to take advantage of the new Lisbon rules and use every opportunity to increase their influence. For example, the Commission knows that its expertise is much needed to tackle today’s complex problems. It has succeeded to influence intergovernmental policies in areas of CFSP (Riddervold 2016; Chou and Rirredvold 2015), AFSJ (Kostadinova 2013) and counter-terrorism (Monar 2014). Even though the Commission and the European Parliament have already used their opportunities to shape EU integration before the Lisbon era, the Lisbon Treaty and ambitious talks on EU constitution created new momentum for the institutions and reasserted their influence significantly. We can therefore consider the Lisbon Treaty a ‘game changer’.

In the beginning of the 2000s, the European integration project reached its peak when EU officials came up with the idea of a common constitution. However, the EU’s attempts to take the integration to new heights did not succeed, as the French and the Dutch rejected the idea of an EU constitution in a referendum in 2005. Based on the constitution draft, EU officials drafted the Lisbon Treaty, which was also rejected in a referendum in 2008, this time by the Irish. Finally, in 2009, a new Lisbon draft got support from all the member states and a comprehensive Treaty reform was ready for implementation. Michele Chang (2013, 17) Points out that the Treaty reform did not increase the motivations to push integration forward. On the contrary, it turned off the drive for integration. After the constitution failure, the political mood turned to favour national solutions, as referendums revealed citizens’ doubts towards the EU. In this sense, the Lisbon Treaty was a result of a miscalculation: EU officials thought there would be momentum for the EU constitution, but referendums revealed that, clearly, it was too early for that.
The atmosphere after the failed constitution did not favour the deepening of the integration. Despite this, the Commission decided to take a leading role in pushing the integration forward after the Treaty reform. Already in 2007, Barroso’s Commission dramatically changed its position on climate issues and suddenly made climate policy its top priority. Constan Poirée (2013, 77) argues this was mainly due to certain interest on energy security, but also because after the referendums, the EU needed to reinforce its legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens, and strong policies introduced by the Commission were an attempt to do so. In the Lisbon Treaty era, the scholars of European Studies have started to pay more attention to the Commission’s political role. Eva Prifti (2013, 40) points out that Barroso’s second Commission was much more political than the previous ones. All the Commissioners were members of some political party, and the new rules of the Lisbon Treaty guaranteed that the result of the MEP elections needed to be taken into account when the new President of the Commission was nominated. Juncker’s Commission that took office in 2014 has been even more political, ‘the most explicitly political Commission ever’ (Peterson 2017, 364). Juncker’s Commission has used the increased legitimacy guaranteed by the Lisbon rules to take new kinds of political risks. It has tightened the College’s direct relations to national capitals via a new vice president system and chosen a limited number of priorities it focuses on. According to John Peterson (2017, 363), “given the need to cope with multiple crises, Juncker could argue that his Commission had to be a political one”. With this justification, Juncker has taken a stronger political role as a leader of the European integration. Some officials working close to him have even described that “he will sometimes lead on process like a Prime Minister” (Peterson 2017, 363).

Molino and Sellez (2013, 93; 97) argue that also the renewed Comitology system has increased the Commission’s chances to influence policy processes, and together with the new role of the European Parliament, has increased the political elements in the EU’s decision-making system as a whole (also Laybayle 2013). These examples point out that the ‘political elements’ behind the Commission have increased since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force.

2.4.1 Commission in the AFSJ

The AFSJ (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) involves many sensitive issues related to security, border control and fundamental rights, and has, hence, traditionally been governed by the national governments. However, especially in the Lisbon era, the competences in the AFSJ have shifted from strictly intergovernmental towards shared competences between the EU bodies. The role of the Commission has also changed. In 2010, the Directorate-General of the AFSJ was divided
into two separate portfolios, when Viviane Reding became the Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, and Cecilia Malmström became the Commissioner for Home Affairs. According to Laybayle (2013, 229) this indicates that the Commission wanted to highlight its importance in these areas and put more emphasis on the AFSJ. In addition, the renewed Comitology system gave the Commission more chances to influence the AFSJ policies. Kaunert (2010, 174) agrees that since the Lisbon Treaty, AFSJ has become a top priority for the EU and therefore, more and more policies have been taken from national to EU level. He mentions migration, border control, criminal justice and counter-terrorism as areas where the EU involvement has increased the most. These are also policies that are most affected by globalisation and most related to phenomena benefitting from open borders of the Schengen area. These developments indicate that issues related to internal security are becoming a top priority for the EU, even surpassing internal markets and economy from time to time.

Kaunert (2010, 173) says that changes in the domain of AFSJ have increased the strategic importance of all EU institutions, not just the importance of the Commission and the European Parliament, but also the importance of the Council. The increased need for cooperation in the domain of the AFSJ does not eliminate the fact that the AFSJ is one of the most controversial domains of the EU policies. The Council has made sure that it is the one in control when it comes to the AFSJ. It is the only domain of the EU law where the Council has a right to initiate besides the Commission. According to Laybayle (2013, 235), AFSJ is a multi-layered domain with both technical and political elements associated with a mix of national traditions and strong identities. These elements make it an especially difficult domain for the Commission to use its expertise on and push the integration forward. The controversial nature of the AFSJ creates tensions among EU institutions. The Council is reluctant to proceed with some AFSJ initiatives because they are afraid of national confrontations, even if member states know these initiatives would be necessary. The Commission does not always understand member states’ reluctance and wants to push proposals through as quickly as possible. According to Ludvig Norman (2016, 636), tensions between the EU institutions might result from the gap between formal institutional rules on the one hand, and actual shared norms and perceptions guiding the policies in real life on the other. If there is a gap between formal institutional rules and reality, people must act against shared perceptions inside the institutions, which creates tensions and frustration.

These tensions are also present in the firearms directive. The proposal for the second revision of the directive was introduced without a proper impact assessment earlier than it was supposed to. This
was criticised especially by the European Parliament. Moreover, member states had very different views on some provisions of the proposal. Some member states, especially those affected by terrorism, pushed the Commission to introduce stricter measures, while others thought that the Commission was crossing the line with its ambitious proposal.

2.5. Counter-terrorism as a driving force for EU security integration

Counter-terrorism measures are part of the AFSJ’s domain and aim to respond to the threat of global terrorism. Counter-terrorism measures require close cooperation and engagement from the member states. In order for these measures to be successful, member states need to be ready to adopt new legal initiatives and share sensitive information, in other words trust more policies to be coordinated at EU level. Counter-terrorism has been a major driver for the development of EU’s internal security governance, as well as deepening EU cooperation in the domain of JHA/AFSJ (Monar 2014; Kaunert and Léonard 2010; Kaunert et al. 2012; Bures 2011; Penksa 2005).

Even though counter-terrorism measures were already part of the EU politics in the 1970s, it was the attacks of 9/11 that really made counter-terrorism the cross-cutting element in the EU’s internal security policies. The threat of terrorism has been a major factor defining not only the domain of AFSJ, but also the EU’s foreign policy and cooperation with its partners, especially with the US (Penksa 2005; Kaunert et al. 2012).

2.5.1. Building European approach

One thing driving integration forward in the field of AFSJ has been the need for ‘more security’ at EU level. Since 9/11 and after intensified attacks in Europe, the threat of terrorism has made tackling terrorism one of the key priorities of the EU. Because of this, the EU has directed a huge amount of energy and resources to develop the EU’s counter-terrorism measures, covering a wide spectrum of different policies and initiatives. The revision of the firearms directive is one of them.

9/11 was the starting point for the talks of deepening EU cooperation in the domain of security and counter-terrorism (Monar 2014; Kaunert et al. 2012; Penksa 2005; Kaunert & Leonard 2010; Ferreira-Pereira & Martins 2012; Kaunert 2009; Bures 2011). However, Jörg Monar (2014, 196–197) suggests that counter-terrorism has been a variable driving the EU’s internal security governance already since the 1970s, when the ministers of interior of European Community (EC) member states and the European Council decided to engage in a structured cooperation in the field
of counter-terrorism. At that time, according to Monar (2014, 197), the most characteristic element of this cross-border security cooperation was its informality: it was not based on any treaty provisions and operated outside the legal framework of the EC. This was again linked with the sensitivity of the domain, and the member states wanted to keep the cooperation firmly in an intergovernmental context. In the 1980s and the 1990s, terrorism was not the most pressing security challenge of the EU but it was still institutionalised in the 1990s treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, among others. It was the terrorist attacks of 9/11 that made terrorism a top priority of the EU’s security agenda (Kaunert et al 2012). According to Monar (2014, 198), 9/11 moved governance from ‘soft’ to ‘hard’ with the use of legally binding instruments and the development of institutional structure, for example strengthening the position of Europol.

The threat of terrorism has increased the pressure to deepen EU cooperation especially in the domain of AFSJ, former JHA (Kaunert & Leonard 2010; Kaunert et al. 2012; Bures 2011; Penksa 2005). The JHA Council is responsible for asylum and immigration policies, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, civil protection and the fight against serious and organised crime. It also deals with issues related to the Schengen area. Many of these issues are closely related to terrorism, which has increased the pressure to deepen cooperation in the domain of AFSJ. The Lisbon Treaty created the institutional base for joint action in the AFSJ and reinforced the Commission’s role in internal security issues (Kaunert and Léonard 2010, 145). However, the Lisbon Treaty also increased the legislative power of the European Parliament, and, hence, made the process of adapting new counter-terrorism measures more complex. According to Kaunert et al. (2012, 477), it was specifically the strengthened role of the European Parliament that changed the dynamics of the counter-terrorism policies since the Commission and the Council already shared largely similar positions on cooperation with the US on counter-terrorism issues. After the Lisbon Treaty, there have been several cases where the European Parliament has used its increased legislative powers to influence the shaping of the EU policies, also with counter-terrorism issues. Kaunert et al. (2012, 487) mention EU-US SWIFT agreement of 2009 as an example of a policy initiative where the European Parliament made its strict position very clear and pushed through several changes to the Commission’s original proposal. By doing this, the Parliament made it clear that not everything can be justified based on the threat of terrorism. A similar conclusion can also be drawn from an analysis on the firearms directive. During the second revision of the firearms directive, the Commission and the Council wanted to move forward quickly in the light of recent terrorist attacks in Europe. However, the European Parliament and some member states were reluctant to adopt the Commission’s proposal as given and wanted to make some changes to it. The parliament wanted to
make sure that legal and responsible possession of firearms is not confused with guns used by terrorists.

Developments mentioned above are connected to two trends in European cooperation. Firstly, the cross-border nature of security issues makes EU cooperation more important than ever. EU cooperation has become inevitable, because member states can’t tackle today’s security threats on their own. Secondly, the threat of terrorism has changed EU security policies dramatically and triggered deeper cooperation between the member states in the fields of AFSJ and foreign policy. This has created ‘a European approach’ to security threats and made it clear that the member states are able to act together in the sensitive fields of internal security and foreign policy if needed. Jörg Monar (2014, 196) finds three reasons why EU counter-terrorism measures merit special attention in EU internal security governance. Firstly, ‘a new global terrorist threat’ since the attacks of 9/11 has so far been the biggest challenge for the EU’s internal security governance. Second, the urgency of this new threat has influenced the development of the EU’s internal security governance more than any other single security challenge before. Finally, this has led to the process where the most advanced internal security instruments have been put into place to respond to the threat of terrorism.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: PRESSURES SHAPING EU POLICY OUTCOMES

The EU is an economic success story. With only 6.9% of world’s population, the EU’s trade with the rest of the world accounts for around 20% of global exports and imports, and along with the US and China, the EU is one of the largest players for international trade. The EU single market and the single currency, euro, are exceptionally deep forms of international cooperation that make the EU seem almost like a federal state. In other fields than economy, the EU’s role and supremacy is much more controversial. Especially the domains of CFSP, CSDP and the AFSJ have been under tight control of the member states, because internal security and foreign and defence policies are associated with national sovereignty and a high level of politicisation. However, scholars disagree on the level of integration in these areas. Schimmelfenning et al. (2015, 778) argue that the “EU defence policy has not crossed the high integration threshold so far” while Sjursen (2011, 1079) and Riddervold (2016, 354) argue that in the area of CFSP, the “processes of institutionalisation, socialisation and the development of informal decision-making norms have led to a de-facto move “beyond intergovernmentalism” and that “CFSP might not be as different from other policy areas as a reading of the treaties suggests” (Riddervold 2016, 353). Emil Kirchner (2006, 962) has analysed what kind of security provider the EU is and concludes that “the state is not the only legitimate provider of national security, but rather is one participant in a cooperative system” where other actors, such as the European Commission also play a leading role. Some scholars like Johan P. Olsen (2009) take a broader view and say that the focus should be more on ‘institutional change’ and on how institutions are actually the ones generating change since “they have an internal life of their own, and developments are, to some degree, independent of external events and decisions” (Olsen 2009, 4).

These different and even contradicting views on the EU’s role in domains closest to national sovereignty demonstrate how much confusion there is around determining the role of the EU. None of these views is ‘wrong’, they just put the focus on different aspects of the EU integration. In this thesis, I will take a closer look at one specific case, the firearms directive, which is closely related to member states’ sovereignty and national identity but at the same time calls for supranational cooperation. Addressing policies and integration that go ‘beyond intergovernmentalism’ contribute to a better understanding of the very status of the EU polity itself (Riddervold 2016; Sjursen 2011). The firearms directive is a particularly interesting case, because it demonstrates a change from a purely market-based directive to a security directive, and at the same time proves that the
EU and especially its supranational institutions, like the Commission, gain power in times of uncertainty.

The notions above are connected to the fundamental dynamics of EU integration studies, the dynamics between state-driven intergovernmentalism and integration-driven supranationalism. The rivalry between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism is defined by the question of ontology, the same question which also lies in the heart of International Relations: is the state still the only relevant actor in world politics or has globalisation created such forces that will eventually take over the state power. Next, I will take up some elements from literature examining these dynamics, focusing on the dynamics that I believe to be especially important for my analysis and hypothesis.

3.1. Supranationalism over Intergovernmentalism?

Whether the European integration is taken forward by the national governments or by supranational forces has been a burning question in integration studies since the launch of the Rome Treaty. Scholars supporting liberal intergovernmentalism argue that the integration depends on negotiations between the member states and national governments as the ‘Masters of the Treaties’, while some scholars (for example Niemann 2006) supporting neofunctionalism say that the integration itself creates supranational dynamics, such as incremental change in attitudes and learning among elites, which push the integration forward despite national resistance. Intergovernmentalists, such as Schimmelfennig et al. (2015, 771), argue that “governments engage in multilateral cooperation in order to obtain economic or security benefits they could not achieve otherwise”, while neofunctionalists, such as Haas (1958, 383) and Niemann (2006, 17), see that through “expansive logic of sector integration”, the so-called spillover effect, political elites push the integration from one sector to another. The regional integration in one sector only works if it is followed by integration in other sectors since “functional integration of one task inevitably leads to problems which can be only be solved by integrating yet more” (Niemann 2006, 17). Both integration theories agree that the driving factor of the integration is interdependence (Schimmelfennig et al. 771; Schmitter 1996a, 3). According to Philippe C. Schmitter (1996a, 3), the theories share at least two assumptions. Firstly, no European state or actor is likely to use physical force or organised violence to achieve its goals. This assumption is based on the very basic idea of the EU integration as a guarantor for peace in Europe. Secondly, European integration will proceed even though the states primarily seek benefits for themselves and their own citizens. For Schmitter (1996a), this is the problem of building “Europe without Europeans”. This notion is linked to the confusing role of
the EU. The EU is something that influences the everyday life of every European, yet Europeans associate their political identity more with a national level than a European level.

Recently, scholars have tried to create a fusion of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, especially when explaining the dynamics of the euro crisis that hit Europe a decade ago. Jones et al. (2016) argue that during the crisis, the EU was “failing forward” as national government sought for minimum short-term integration with EMU even though a durable solution would have required deeper integration pushed by forces determined by neofunctionalism. This is linked to ‘lowest common denominator bargaining’, the basic assumption of intergovernmentalism introduced by Andrew Moravcsik in 1998. This means that based on their national interests, powerful member states define the lowest possible denominator for EU cooperation in intergovernmental negotiations. This, rather than ‘supranational forces’, is the driving force on the integration. Similarly, in their analysis of a financial reform and banking structures after the euro crisis, Quaglia et al. (2017) draw on a synthesis of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. They argue that spillovers change national governments’ assessments of the pros and cons of policy supranationalisation and reshape their attitude towards integration. Similar ideas were also introduced by Haas (1958) in the early days of neofunctionalism.

Quaglia and Spendzharova (2017, 1114) also assume that member state governments’ engagement is defined by a cost-benefit analysis of supranationalisation in each policy area. This assumption brings both approaches closer to intergovernmentalism and earlier versions of neofunctionalism. In the context of finance sector, they accept the impact of supranational forces, like globalisation and spillovers, but also highlight that the deepening of the integration is tightly in the hands of member state governments. According to Quaglia and Spendzharova (2017, 1112–1113), bringing these two somewhat contradicting approaches together is important for at least three reasons: It helps to better understand how crises affect policy supranationalisation; it provides an opportunity to address the criticism towards both theories and finally, it allows to detect change in government preferences over time. However, by emphasising the role of national governments in the integration process, these approaches easily neglect the fact that in the complex world of today, there are many exogenous forces pushing for more integration. Terrorism is one example of a globalised problem, which requires deeper cooperation between member states and goes beyond the national interests of each member state government. In the field of security, integration seems to move forward almost regardless of the member states. This is why, in my analysis, I will focus rather on supranational forces driving the integration than on intergovernmental elements. Intergovernmental dynamics are
also present in the analysis since one of the frameworks used to evaluate the firearms directive is ‘countervailing forces’, in other words forces resisting the spillover pressures. These forces very often stem from national interests and sovereignty-consciousness (Niemann 2006, 48). In my analysis, I use Finland as a case example to show how defence and shooting organisations were able to pressure the Finnish government and parliament to seek opt-out on the ban of semi-automatic arms even though, in reality, Finland could have agreed on the Commission’s proposal and reorganise the storage policy of reservists’ guns.

3.2. Why does the firearms directive fall under supranationalism?

The concept of functional spillover is central for the neofunctionalist analysis. It stems from the early idea that integration in one policy area would increase the pressure to expand integration to other policy areas as well. According to Philippe Schmitter (2005, 256), Ernest B. Haas, an early theorist of Neofunctionalism, was one of the first to realise that by allowing the free flow of goods, people and investments over the usually well-protected European borders, regional integration had the potential to bring peace to Europe after two destructive wars. Haas (1958) even thought that integration would proceed up to a point where national politicians would shift their loyalty to the European level. This automaticity of spillover was rejected in later studies, and ever since, spillover has been used to describe certain dynamics of the integration process (Niemann 2006, 27–28). Arne Niemann (2006) has updated the neofunctionalist approach to better fit today’s political landscape of the EU. In addition to spillover’s automatic logic, Niemann (2006, 27–29) criticises the grand theory ideas of early neofunctionalists and encourages scholars to focus more on the ‘softer’ elements of the EU’s political reality, such as public opinion (original neofunctionalism focused solely on elites), countervailing forces (especially in the light of recent sovereignty-consciousness in member states) and a wider framework of the social construction of reality.

Early neofunctionalists thought that spillover worked well in areas of ‘low politics’, such as trade, but saw that areas of ‘high politics’, such as defence and security, were not that likely to be affected by its dynamics (Risse 2005, 301). It is true that the first goal of European integration was to foster economic cooperation. Economic integration reached its peak in the 1990s with the completion of the Schengen area, single market and the European Monetary Union (EMU). After the success in trade, European leaders started to explore integration opportunities in other policy areas as well. Tomas Risse (2005, 302–303) suggests that European integration has actually affected many areas of ‘high politics’, such as monetary sovereignty and internal security, and that several member states
are willing to supranationalise even external security and national defence. He also points out that in the field of defence, a majority of the EU member states are already NATO members and thus, their troops are willing to risk their lives under the command of other NATO member states. Lately, the EU has taken several steps to reinforce cooperation on security and defence and reinforced cooperation with NATO. In its conclusions of June 2017, the European Council reiterated its commitment to strengthen the EU cooperation on external security and defence and expressed its support for launching a permanent EU structure for military cooperation. Moreover, it called for closer cooperation with NATO in the framework of the Joint Declaration signed by the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, and NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, a year earlier. These recent developments prove that the EU is ready to take integration forward in the areas of ‘high politics’, and that spillover dynamics might also affect policies in these areas. Deeper cooperation with NATO has increased the pressure to intensify military cooperation among EU member states as well. Just as the cooperation on trade, the cooperation on defence has been justified by pooling resources and ‘spending better together’.

Deepening cooperation on security and defence did not come as a surprise to one specific neofunctionalist, even though it happened a bit later than he had thought. In the aftermath of the 1990s success of economic integration, Schmitter (1996b, 125) predicted that integration would eventually reach the areas of so called ‘high politics’ as well. He anticipated that in 2001, integration in the domains of “economic-military assistance” and “diplomacy and IGO membership” would reach 4/5 at his integration scale, four being “mostly policy decisions at EC [European Community] level” and five being “all policy decisions at EC level”. Integration in these domains would result from “growing regional and global uncertainties of the post-Cold War era”. However, Schmitter did not see that integration would intensify in the domain of “police and public order”. In this domain, he suggested that integration would reach 2/5, two being “only some policy decisions at EC level”. Since the 1990s, police cooperation has deepened with the establishment of European Police Office (Europol) and in the light of recent terrorist attacks, there is pressure to intensify cooperation even more. For example, Kaunert (2010b, 666) has argued that based on case studies examined on the Europol–U.S. relationship, and Europol’s role in the ENP, Europol has acted surprisingly strongly and independently at the international level. Similarly, Carrapico and Trauner (2013, 366) conclude that in today’s complex security environment, Europol has succeeded to increase its autonomy and influence member state policies, particularly by its strategy reports on organised crime, which give recommendations for member states and serve as guidelines for
Council initiatives. These examples indicate that at least to some extent, Schmitter failed to predict the potential integration in the field of internal security and put the emphasis more on external relations and economics.

The firearms directive is one example of a policy initiative in the field of internal security that has been affected by spillover. Other initiatives in fields related to counter-terrorism, such as Schengen Information System and initiatives to prevent radicalisation and to sanction terrorists, have increased the pressure to also adopt new measures in the field of gun control. The Commission has described the goal of this security integration as “Security Union”, meaning that member states “need to move beyond the concept of cooperating to protect national internal security to the idea of protecting the collective security of the Union as a whole” (European Commission 2016). This means that member states are expected to adopt security measures in the name of European solidarity, even if these measures would be hard to push through in their capitals. Reference to ‘Security Union’ is a risky move from the Commission since the AFSJ has traditionally been a domain full of sensitive issues, which has meant that member states do not want to pool their sovereignty in this field. Security is traditionally associated closely with national level and national institutions, such as armies and police forces, and seen as “supreme responsibility of state” in many national constitutions (Monar 2014, 195). That is why the field of AFSJ is not the most likely for ‘Union’ level integration. However, there seems to be an emerging consensus on deepening the EU’s security integration. The Commission would not have the courage to speak about ‘Security Union’ unless there was a striking consensus on a need for more security measures at EU level, especially related to counter-terrorism. National institutions, the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council have all called for more counter-terrorism measures at EU level, because ‘global terrorism’ has been the biggest single challenge for the EU internal security domain since 9/11 (Monar 2014, 196). The urgency of the threat of terrorism after recent attacks has speeded up this development.

The rather speedy integration and adoption of the EU’s counter-terrorism measures in the domain of AFSJ goes against the basic ideas of liberal intergovernmentalism and the rational cost-benefit thinking of the member states. Even though terrorism is recognised as a common threat which forces national governments to ‘engage in multilateral cooperation’ to seek security benefits, the integration has been pushed much deeper and much more quickly than one might expect based on the early ideas of neofunctionalism or the state-driven ideas of intergovernmentalism. Moreover, there is no guarantee that more security cooperation will help to tackle terrorism. For example, the
firearms directive has been criticised for not having an impact on problems related to the illegal firearms market, from which terrorists usually get their guns. This suggests that deepening cooperation in the field of security and counter-terrorism has been an act of “doing something” to tackle terrorism after several attacks in Europe, rather than integration based on rational bargaining between member states.

The threat of terrorism has increased the Council’s pressure to react quickly and adopt security measures without long negotiations and exhausting bargaining. It has also encouraged the Commission to speak about a ‘genuine security Union’. This goes beyond rational national interests and economic integration. As shown before, the fact that terrorism is an issue surpassing the national level is also proven in recent Eurobarometer surveys. In Eurobarometer 87 of May 2017, 44 percent of Europeans mentioned terrorism as the top concern at EU level and only 19 percent of Europeans saw terrorism as a top issue at a national level. Even though the fear of terrorism has recently grown at a national level, the increase is moderate compared with development at EU level. When asked what the two most important issues Europeans are facing personally were, terrorism was mentioned by even fewer respondents: only 6 percent perceived terrorism as a personal threat. This proves that ‘rational choices made by national governments’ cannot alone explain why we have seen speedy integration in the domains of AFSJ and counter-terrorism. The discourse on the threat of terrorism goes far beyond national decision-making and presents terrorism precisely as a European concern that all citizens around Europe share. This notion turns attention from rational intergovernmentalism towards a more supranational framework.

3.3. Neofunctionalist framework for analysis of the firearms directive

Neofunctionalist approach offers better tools for analysing the security integration happening around the threat of terrorism, of which the revised firearms directive is an example. Arne Niemann’s (2006) revised neofunctionalist framework is especially useful here. He seeks to explain the outcomes of EU decision-making by updating early neofunctionalist approach. The main updates are explained in the following table:
For my analysis, the concepts of ‘exogenous spillover’, ‘cultivated spillover’ and ‘countervailing forces’ are especially useful. The ‘classical’ framework of functional spillover is not used in my analysis for two reasons. First, because I see that security integration is driven by socially constructed ideas and threats rather than functional tensions and rational, cost-benefit driven decision-making. Secondly, my focus is on exogenous ‘outside’ factors affecting the directive process, such as media attention and terrorism, not that much on internal spillover logic pushing integration from one policy area to another. I believe that the logic of functional spillover cannot explain developments around the firearms directive because there were no market-based reasons to revise the directive; justifications were more connected to the security dimension. As mentioned

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Change pressure</th>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Extension</th>
<th>Contribution to analysis</th>
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| Functional spillover| • (Functional) ‘pressures from within brought out more explicitly and upgraded in importance  
• Departure from deterministic ontology (‘soft functionalism’) | Scope broadened from economic linkages to include all endogenous-functional tensions and contradictions | Not used in this analysis                                                                |
| Exogenous spillover | Internet groups not only influenced by functional, but also by exogenous and domestic structures | Exogenous spillover itself a new (mainly structural) pressure             | Used to analyse media coverage and discussion on 'gun problem' in Europe as possible exogenous pressure shaping the outcome of the directive |
| Political spillover | Emphasis on the quality of integration, reflexive learning and the role of communication | Advocacy coalitions are integrated into the concept                      | Not used in this analysis                                                                |
| Social spillover    | Was underestimated by neofunctionalists as a dynamic, now upgraded            | Concept of communicative and norm-regulated action is incorporated        | Not used in this analysis                                                                |
| Cultivated spillover| (1) Council Precedency (2) ECJ (3) EP and (4) Epistemic communities incorporated | Countervailing forces themselves a new element                            | Used to analyse the Finnish reservations and European Parliament's position as an example of countervailing forces resisting Commission's leadership role and security integration |
| Countervailing forces|                                                                               |                                                                          |                                                                                        |

Table 4. Main changes concerning the hypothesised pressures from early neofunctionalism to the revised neofunctionalist framework and contribution to this analysis. (Niemann 2006, 52)
before, I share the view of Ole Wiever (1995), Barry Buzan (1991), Thierry Balzacq (2011) and many others that security is a social construction, which is constructed in the processes of securitisation and de-securitisation, and hence, linked to our identities and perceptions of others. Elites and media define certain things and phenomena as security threats and frame events in a way that it seems those events are posing a great threat to our society, which is why we cannot treat security merely as a ‘rational’ pressure pushing integration from one policy to another. I acknowledge that some dynamics of functional spillover are present in the directive process, especially since the revision of the firearms directive is part of European Agenda on Security and it is pushed forward together with other reforms of the Agenda, such as Schengen Information System, Passenger Name Record and Radicalisation Awareness Network. However, there are more powerful exogenous forces pushing the firearms directive forward, especially since it is closely connected with terrorism.

The concept of political spillover would offer a great tool to analyse the role of the interest groups in the revision of the directive, and in fact, there are a lot of competing interests and lobbying in the field of firearms. However, this is not an aspect I will focus on in my analysis, which is why political spillover is not included. The dynamics of social spillover, which Neumann slip off from political spillover to give more room for analysis focusing on social interaction, socialisation and communication, definitely have a role to play in the firearms directive process, but rather as a background factor than the actual focus of my analysis.

Niemann (2006, 5–6) locates his epistemological position “somewhere between the positivist and post-positivist extremes, acknowledging the importance of interpretative and contextual features in establishing causal inferences and middle-range generalisations.” His dependent variable is the outcome of negotiations and independent variables are the pressures affecting negotiations, i.e. spillovers mentioned before. His analysis is qualitative and he uses a number of different methods “in order to arrive at valid causal inferences”. My position is more post-positivist than Niemann’s, as I put more emphasis on the “importance of interpretative and contextual features”. This is because the case I have selected has been especially affected by exogenous and contextual pressures, and, hence, requires analysis that focuses especially on these pressures. As mentioned above, I will focus especially on exogenous pressures, countervailing forces and cultivated spillover as pressures shaping the outcome of the firearms directive. My analysis is qualitative, and I will mainly use an interpretive approach and discourse analysis to detect the different discourses, meanings and structures shaping the process. With the help of several hypotheses laid out in the
introduction, my main goal is to examine what the firearms directive says about the current state of EU integration. My main focus is on the most recent revision of the directive, which was concluded in spring 2017, but I will also do a brief analysis on the introduction and the first revision of the directive in order to give a proper context for the second revision.

3.3.1. Exogenous spillover – focusing on outside forces pushing the security integration forward

Given the urgency and the supranatural nature of terrorism, the concept of exogenous spillover creates a good basis for analysing the firearms directive case. Exogenous spillover extends the concept of spillover to take into account the outside forces pushing integration forward, whereas early neofunctionalist considered the integration process to be isolated from the outside world. Exogenous forces increase the pressure to find common solutions to better address threats and problems that are coming from the outside and are not directly or exclusively linked to the Union or its member states. These problems or threats are usually linked to globalisation and other international phenomena that go beyond the EU and Europe. That is why exogenous pressures usually encourage taking integration forward (Niemann 2016, 33; Tranholt-Mikkelsen 1991).

According to Niemann (2006, 33–34), exogenous factors should be incorporated into neofunctional analysis more for at least three reasons. First, some outside events and developments are seen as threats or shocks, and hence, have the ability to drive integration forward. In the middle of the crisis, member states and partners tend to cooperate more closely to find common solutions. Secondly, regional integration is seen as an “effective buffer” against external threats, such as terrorism. Niemann (2006, 33) points out that the existence of the member states depends on their ability to produce wellbeing and security to their citizens. To be able to do this in today’s globalised world, they need to cooperate more closely at the European level and consider new EU-policies, which overlap with national policies. Thirdly, Niemann points out that exogenous logic connects internal and external events with each other. Common policies at EU level tend to create more common policies, which creates pressure to adopt more and more quickly in order to maintain the image of integration moving forward. Once the integration has got underway in one field, the process is likely to trigger new initiatives in the same field, and member states are pressured to take more common positions. As this process moves forward, member states are likely to rely increasingly on central institutions to do this (Schmitter 1969, 165; Niemann 2006, 34).
All the aspects described above are present in the revision of the firearms directive. The revision, as many other policy initiatives, was connected to the European Agenda on Security and it was important for the Commission and for member states to push it through as quickly and as ambitiously as possible, in order to show that the EU is doing more in the field of security. The firearms directive is an example of common policies not only increasing the pressure to create more common policies, but also serving as an incentive to updating old policies, and even changing the scope of the policies if needed. The firearms directive is a case where exogenous pressures are especially powerful due to the urgent threat of terrorism. In my analysis, I demonstrate this threat and the pressure affecting the outcome of the directive by examining how media created a discourse around the ‘gun problem’ in Europe in the context of terrorist attacks in 2015, and how this discourse significantly increased the pressure ‘to do something’ at EU level. This is closely connected to the earlier notion of Europeans perceiving terrorism as an issue at EU level rather than at a national level and trusting the EU more after shocking events.

3.3.2. Cultivated spillover – explaining the growing role of the Commission in the field of security

Given Commission’s active role in pushing the integration in the domain of AFSJ and in the framing of the EU’s counter-terrorism policies, the concept of cultivated spillover is also useful when analysing the firearms directive. Cultivated spillover refers to the institutional pressure, especially by the Commission, “to cultivate relations with interest groups and national civil servants so as to gain their support for releasing integrative objectives, and to cultivate pressures vis-à-vis governments, particularly by pointing to functional interdependencies or by upgrading common interests” (Niemann 2006, 42; also Haas 1961). This means that the Commission is an active player in integration, which does not simply execute the policies defined by member states, but rather takes the integration process forward and maximises its own interests by pressuring other actors (Pollack 1997; Tallberg 2003; Riddervold 2016).

Valentina Kostadinova (2013, 266) puts the emphasis on the initiative and the discursive nature of cultivated spillover: to employ cultivated spillover, the Commission should be the first actor to initiate certain policies, which it has presented as ‘necessary’ for successful integration. The Commission uses different discursive strategies to gain support for its ideas. According to Kostadinova (2013, 271) “recent EU developments provide signs that this approach is actually bearing fruit” since “lately there has been progressive incorporation in Commission discourses of previously absent issues that gradually expand the scope for the emergence of a common European
space with regards to visas, CEAS or movement of TCNs for work purposes”. A similar discursive approach seems to be bearing fruit in other policy areas as well, for example in the CSFP. According to Riddervold (2016, 360–361), the Commission’s increased involvement in the decision-making processes of EU CFSP missions and strategies is clearly evident from the Council conclusions. She points out that the Commission has been able to influence these processes simply by sitting in the meetings and taking the floor, and also by reframing strategies. In the case of EU Maritime Security Strategy, for example, the Commission first reframed the strategy from defence-oriented to cross-sectorial, and was therefore able to influence the process later, since the strategy involved several policy areas covered by the Commission. This notion shows that the Commission is being active in using different strategies to influence EU policy making. It can feed the Council and member states ideas, and by reframing strategies and initiatives as ‘cross-sectorial,’ it can make sure that its opinion matters at every stage of the decision-making process.

Drawing from existing integration literature, Niemann and Schmitter (2009, 60–61) define six factors which condition the Commission’s entrepreneurship. These are the ability to forge internal cohesion; the capacity to shape the agenda (for example by proactively tabling proposals and maintaining close ties with the Precedency); the ability to secure support for its policies by making use of its strategic position; the ability to build consensus and broker compromises; the instrumentalisation of functional and exogenous spillover pressures; and the capacity to know the limits of its entrepreneurial leadership. Niemann and Schmitter (2009, 61) point out that there are several ‘background factors’ affecting the Commission’s role. Firstly, the Commission’s initiatives are more likely to succeed if they are backed by relevant interest groups or powerful member states. The Commission’s leadership role is, at least to some extent, dependent on cohesion among member states and other institutions. Secondly, the Commission’s leadership seems to be most effective in “periods of swiftly changing events, uncertainty and incomplete information”. The latter notion is especially interesting in the context of terrorism and the firearms directive since there are a great deal of uncertainties, traditions and feelings attached in the process. In my analysis, I use the six factors defined by Niemann and Schmitter (2009) to examine the Commission’s role in the firearms directive. My analysis also shows that both of the background factors defined above are present in the second revision of the firearms directive, and hence seem to be important factors supporting the Commission’s leadership in the field of EU security integration.
3.3.3. Countervailing forces – acknowledging national interests

Countervailing forces refer to spillback forces and pressure resisting integration, which have also shaped the outcome of the firearms directive. Analysing these forces is important, because as Niemann (2006, 47) puts it, “one can only ascertain the relative strength of the dynamics of integration if one also accounts for spillback forces”. He argues that in the absence of strong countervailing pressure, even weak integrative forces can drive integration forward, and the logic of spillover no longer holds.

Niemann (2006, 48–50) recognises four main countervailing forces resisting integration. These are sovereignty-consciousness; domestic constraints and diversities; diversity; and a negative integrative climate. Sovereignty-consciousness refers to unwillingness to delegate sovereignty to the supranational level, and it tends to be linked with national traditions. Domestic constraints and diversities constrain governments at a national level. Governments may be constrained by agents such as lobby groups, media and opposition parties or by structural limitations such as the country’s economy, geographical position or legal or administrative tradition. Diversity inside or among member states can also be a countervailing force. This is mainly because some common positions and decisions “may require some member states to diverge substantially from existing structures”. The diversity aspect has been reinforced with the Union’s enlargement. Lastly, a negative integrative climate reflects general attitudes towards the EU and integration. Niemann (2006, 49) links this especially with the importance of subsidiarity, which has been increasingly highlighted by national governments and sub-national actors since the early 1990s.

In my analysis, I use Finland as a case example to show how defence and shooting organisations were able to pressure the Finnish government and parliament to seek opt-out on a ban of semi-automatic arms even though, in reality, Finland could have agreed on the Commission’s proposal and reorganise the storage policy of reservists’ guns. The Finnish example shows that a wide general support for the Commission’s proposal does not guarantee that all amendments are approved by all member states. As Niemann (2006) also points out, domestic constraints and sovereignty-consciousness tend to resist integration, especially if strong national traditions are involved.
3.3.4. Communitarisation of Visa, Asylum and Immigration Policy – Niemann’s example in the field of JHA

Niemann (2006) has used the updated neofunctionalist framework to analyse several policy areas, one being the negotiations of the communitarisation of visa, asylum and immigration policy in the Amsterdam Treaty. According to Niemann (2006, 188), this is an interesting case because, just as the firearms directive, it falls under JHA (current AFSJ) where there is a constant battle between the predominance of national sovereignty and supranationalism. Moreover, since many policies of JHA are close to national sovereignty, it is not the most likely domain to be affected by the dynamics of spillover.

Niemann (2006, 193) argues that especially functional pressures affected the communitarisation of external border control. In order to realise the free movement of persons, the EU had to adopt a large number of new policies to make the elimination of the EU borders run smoothly and to create a system that works for all member states. In addition to functional pressure, the pressure of exogenous spillover influenced the area of JHA in Amsterdam. Niemann (2006, 204) identifies the large number of asylum seekers, immigrants and refugees entering Europe as exogenous pressures increasing the pressure to take action at EU level. In this case, exogenous pressures were reinforced by functional tensions rising from the fact that the elimination of internal borders actually forced EU leaders to take migration issues to EU tables. The free movement of people meant that the national control of illegal immigration was not sufficient. This is also the case with the firearms directive. The revision was needed especially to harmonise firearms legislation and standards in member states. Variation in firearms legislation and standards was identified as a security threat, especially after terrorists succeeded to legally buy deactivated firearms from one of the member states and afterwards convert them back into functioning firearms.

The Commission also had a specific role in the communitarisation of visa, asylum and immigration policies. Niemann (2006, 215; 218) argues that there was some evidence suggesting that the Commission had a conscious strategy to promote the elimination of internal borders in order to spread integration further. During the process, the Commission was capable of influencing member states’ agendas and shaping their interests. The Commission’s everyday work convinced member states that the communitarisation of the third pillar was necessary. Moreover, the Commission’s reports concerning communitarisation were carefully drafted, and the Commission emphasised the functional and exogenous pressures in its justification.
The fear of uncontrolled immigration created the strongest countervailing force towards the communitarisation of visa, asylum and immigration. Nieman (2006, 231) says that this was especially strong in Germany, where Chancellor Kohl faced opposition within his own party. Some of his fellow CDU member opposed the use of QMV in this area for ‘ideological reasons’. Kohl needed his fellow members’ support to get the Amsterdam Treaty through the Bundestrat and was therefore forced to soften his position on immigration and asylum issues.

Niemann’s analysis shows that the updated neofunctional framework offers a good basis for analysing policy initiatives and revisions in the field of AFSJ. With this framework, it is possible to identify the elements that actually push integration forward. The framework is especially applicable for analysing single policies and directives since the different dynamics of spillover are easier to detect within single cases. This is why I have chosen to use the updated neafunctionalist framework to explain changes in the firearms directive process and to see what the directive says about the current state of integration.
4. METHODOLOGY

In my analysis, I focus especially on security debates around the firearms directive to demonstrate how the directive changed from a purely market-based directive in 1991 into a security-oriented directive in 2017. The purpose of this analysis is to see, whether the EU’s firearms directive is a case of ‘going beyond intergovernmentalism’ and whether new cross-border security threats, like terrorism, have the ability to shape EU policies. As mentioned before, I share the interpretive view of Ole Wiever (1995), Barry Buzan (1991), Thierry Balzacq (2011) and many others that security is a social construction closely linked to our identities and perceptions of others. Elites and media frame certain things and phenomena as security threats in their speeches and performances. Events framed as security threats trigger strong emotions, which, in turn, affect our decision-making. The role of emotions, especially negative emotions like anxiety and anger, in political decision-making is widely recognised in psychology, sociology, political studies and communication studies (Atkeson and Maestas 2012; Castells 2009; Marcus & MacKuen 1993; Lerner and Keltner 2000; Jervis 1976). This is why I have chosen to use a combination of discourse analysis and interpretive approach to detect the different discourses, meanings and structures shaping the firearms process and to find out what this specific case tells us about the European integration process. Documents related to the original firearms directive and the first and the second revision of the directive are examined systematically in order to detect the key pressures changing the directive. This analysis is completed with an analysis of relevant media coverage, public opinion, speeches, tabled opinions, reports and press releases that are considered important for an overall understanding of the directive process.

A few things about media sources are worth mentioning here. In my analysis, I use media coverage on terrorist attacks to demonstrate exogenous pressures shaping the outcome of the directive. I focus on the discourse that mainstream media created around the ‘gun problem’ in Europe while covering both Paris terrorist attacks of 2015. Considering media’s central role in European societies, it is likely that media coverage on terrorism and the ‘gun problem’ in Europe was one of the exogenous pressures leading to the ambitious directive proposal by the Commission. This ‘gun problem’ was also acknowledged by experts like SIPRI already in 2013 (Poitevin 2013), but was brought up by media only after the attacks of 2015. For my analysis, I have chosen some examples of the ‘gun problem’ discussion in mainstream media in Europe and the US. Stories of the ‘gun problem’ have been published in several important media outlets including The Telegraph, Huffington Post, The Time, The Guardian, BBC and Spiegel International. These are all trusted media outlets with worldwide reach. All these papers discussed the ‘gun problem’ in Europe after
the attacks, which indicates that the problem was also acknowledged by European elites and decision makers. My analysis is not an extensive and systematic analysis of media attention on terrorism in Europe. Rather, the purpose of my analysis is to offer some examples of how discourses created by media might affect EU policies, especially if those policies are connected to hot media topics, like terrorism.

As noted before, I use discursive and interpretative approaches to examine the different versions of the directive and its proposals. With a systematic analysis of different versions, we can detect the overall change that has happened from 1991, when the firearms directive was first introduced, till 2017, when the latest version entered into force. In positivist terms, I would consider the outcome of the directive process my dependent variable and the pressures changing it an independent variable: certain pressures have caused changes, which can be detected in different versions of the directive. My main focus is on the most recent revision of the directive, which was concluded in spring 2017, but I also do a brief analysis on the introduction and the first revision of the directive in order to give a proper context for the second revision.

Since my focus is on one specific case, the firearms directive, the limitations of a single case study should also be addressed. According to Harry Eckstein (2000, 119), in political science, case studies are valuable tools at all stages of the theory building process, but most valuable at the stage at which candidate theories are tested. One way to test a theory is to look for ‘crucial cases’ and see what a systematic analysis of those reveal about the theory. Eckstein (2000, 148) argues that a ‘crucial case’ is a case that “must closely fit” a theory, in other words a theory should offer tools to explain both findings contrary to the theory and findings supporting it. I believe that the firearms directive is an excellent case to lightly test the new framework of neofunctionalist analysis and the new spillover pressures identified in it. However, as I have explained before, I have chosen to focus on certain spillover pressures, which I see as most relevant for this specific case. This does not mean that other pressures identified by Niemann (2006) would not be relevant, but only that my focus is on the three pressures that have shaped, in my opinion, the outcome of the firearms directive the most. Moreover, my main goal is not to “test” the renewed neofunctional theory but rather use it as a framework to better understand the outcome of the directive and to demonstrate the pressures shaping it. This is why I don’t consider my analysis a ‘crucial case’ testing the theory, but rather I use the theory to better understand the developments inside the case.
4.1. Interpretive approach

Interpretative research in International Relations focuses on how meanings are made and constructed (Lynch 2014, 12). According to Cecilia Lynch (2014, 12–13), interpretative approach challenges the assumptions that we easily take for granted and expose the contradictions in the conventional explanations of world politics. This is done by focusing on the different meanings we give to phenomena and acknowledging the importance of context that is produced in those meanings. Lynch (2014, 14) points out that post-positivist research is often accused of rejecting facts, but according to interpretive scholars, social facts cannot even be separated from the value that is given to them by their evaluators. ‘Security’, ‘terrorism’, ‘threat posed by firearms’ and even ‘the EU’ are all social facts that cannot be systematically measured because their “value” depends on the meanings given by their evaluators. Some Europeans link firearms with hunting, while some automatically link them with terrorism. Some see legal semi-automatic firearms as a threat, while others see them as a guarantee for national security. Phenomena related to these things cannot be measured as ‘facts’ and numbers. According to Lynch (2014, 15), this symbolic relationship between fact and value has led many interpretative scholars to argue that actually, there is no ‘objective’ analysis in social sciences.

A case study on the firearms directive has shown that European integration is defined by different and competing meanings given to the integration project. EU institutions, political parties, member states and Europeans have their own vision for the future of European integration, and it is these competing visions that the European Union as a whole tries to reflect in its policies. Positivist approaches provide systematic and ‘fact based’ tools to explain European integration, but fail to recognise the importance of a context and the discursive nature of reality in their analysis. Lynch (2014, 23) criticises positivist research design where the analysis is based on “already-constituted variables” and points out that interpretivism calls into question the very idea of construction of variables. In interpretative approach, the relationships between different variables are seen as “fluid rather than having discrete boundaries”, which allows researchers to focus on context, indeterminacy and language, and relies on abductive forms of interference (Lynch 2014, 24).

In my analysis, I focus especially on the dynamics that have shaped the firearms directive into a more security-oriented directive. These dynamics are closely connected to current perceptions of security and security threats and these perceptions, in turn and as stated before, are mainly shaped
by media and political elites and constructed in dominant discourses. Interpretative approach highlights the “constitutive relationship among discourse and ethics” and focuses on criticising and deconstructing traditional security assumptions and concepts (Lynch 2014, 47). This allows a more in-depth analysis of perceptions of security as a political dynamic shaping the firearms directive: it is not ‘security’ as such that has changed the directive, but the perceptions of security framed by different key players (e.g. member states, the Commission, the European Parliament, media) in the process. For example, the Commission took a leadership role during the second revision of the directive by actively framing the firearms directive as a ‘security directive’. This leadership was reinforced after the Paris attacks and allowed the Commission to make an exceptionally ambitious proposal with the support of member states. I focus on the language used in different versions of the proposal and the different meanings and emphasis given to security at different phases of the directive process. My goal is to show how the firearms directive transformed from a market-based directive into a security-driven directive and to find out how neofunctional supranational pressures shaped this process.

### 4.2. Discursive approach

Discourses give a meaning to our everyday social interaction. Discourse refers to the social use of language, language in its ‘social context’, and discourse analysis aims at better understanding the relations between discourse and other elements of social life, such as power, ideologies, social institutions and social identities (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, 78). Discursive orders are relatively stable communicative structures, which, in turn, construct relatively stable social practices (Fairclough 2003, 3). This way, our institutions, organisations and entire social life are created in discourses. A focus on discourses and the power of language has revolutionised the way we understand research in social sciences. According to Ole Weaver (2004, 165), all the things we experience are produced in discourses, which is why it is problematic to take anything as ‘pre-given’ in social sciences.

Discourse analysis analyses texts. According to Norman Fairclough (2003, 3), anything from written articles to speeches and internet pages can be considered a ‘text’. In social sciences, texts are usually analysed in the context of wider discourses. However, Fairclough (2003, 3) says that texts should also be analysed systematically and technically in order to truly understand the power of discourse. Fairclough (2003, 8) points out that as elements of social life, texts have causal effects and have the power to reshape reality: texts shape our values, beliefs, perceptions and attitudes.
However, this causality is not ‘mechanic’ causality but rather refers to the power the text has in its context and in relation to other texts.

If texts include universal assumptions, there is usually less space for open dialogue and difference among texts. These assumptions are based on shared ideas and a ‘common ground’ of knowledge (Fairclough 2003, 40; 55). According to Fairclough (2003, 55), we can find three kinds of assumption in texts: *existential assumptions* referring to fundamental questions of existence, *propositional assumptions* referring to the current status quo of things and *value assumptions* referring to things we perceive valuable and desirable in life. Based on this, Iver B. Neuman (2008, 63) encourages scholars to pay more attention to cultural context when they analyse discourses. The better you know the subject of your analysis, the easier it is to pay attention to particularities and exceptions in text. This allows more in-depth analysis.

Diez (1999) argues that certain discursive phases can also be used to better understand European integration. With Austinian approach, we can focus on those ‘speech acts’, which have defined the rules of belonging in European community, and hence shaped integration. With Focaultian approach we analyse the struggles over meanings that we give to the EU and its processes. Derrianian approach provides tools to understand the discourses of change, which usually occur in times of crisis and can dramatically change the way we perceive the EU. All of these approaches can be used to better understand why security has become a top priority for the EU, and how this shift to ‘more security’ is present in a single case, the firearms directive. To see whether we are really moving towards ‘more security’ at EU level, we need to focus on the language used and the meanings produced in the directive process and see whether the concepts and perceptions of security are increasingly defining the directive. This can be done by systematically going through the key directive documents and looking for any references to security. After this, we need to analyse how these references to security are framed and who the actor framing them is. Secondly, these approaches, especially the Focaultian one, also provide tools to address the power struggles between the institutions. In order to do this and to analyse how these struggles relate to discourse on security, we need to focus specifically on the language, the meanings and the arguments used by these institutions in different phases of the directive process. This can be done by examining how each of the institutions talk about security and how their views are presented in the outcome of the directive process (the final act) in comparison to other institutions. Through systematic analysis of language used in the directive process, we can find out how different spillover pressures have affected the outcome of the directive and what the role of security is in this process. All this needs
to be done, as Fairclough (2003) and Neuman (2008) have pointed out, in relation to a wider cultural context and general assumptions in texts.

4.3. Firearms directive as a ‘deviant case’

Phenomena in international politics are often extremely complex, which causes trouble for scholars of International Relations. There are hardly ever two similar cases, which is why it is hard and problematic to make any generalisations. Case study research offers tools to analyse complex phenomena through single cases and to avoid problems of overgeneralisation.

According to Andrew Bennet and Colin Elman (2007, 171), research in International Relations is challenging because subjects, like wars and forms of security and economical cooperation, often involve different forms of interaction between several different actors on many different levels. Moreover, international policies often include strategic interaction and secret information that is impossible to address in research. These factors make phenomena of international politics unstable and undefined. Therefore, it is often better to do in-depth research on a limited number of cases than to try to make generalisations based on many different cases. Audie Klotz (2008, 49) argues that case study research can be used to track the causal processes which link independent variables to dependent ones, and hence provide an explanation for the existence of certain patterns.

There are several ways to do case study research and it cannot be considered as one single method. Rather, it is a useful and practical way of doing research. According to Bennet and Elman (2007, 188), case study research can be used to analyse different types of cases: deviant cases, least-likely cases and most-likely cases. Case study research also allows several methods in a single research and it is a useful tool for addressing the development of concepts and typologies.

I consider the firearms directive a ‘deviant case’ because there are several particularities involved: change of the scope of the directive (from market-based into more security); exceptional exogenous forces (the threat of terrorism); the Commission’s early proposal without impact assessment; and especially the Council and member states’ strong support for the Commission’s work. These particularities stem from the fact that especially during its second revision, the firearms directive involved elements of security, and hence differs from typical internal market directives, which are the main drivers for integration and set as legal norms for EU policies (Strikwerda 2017, 24). The exceptionality of the firearms directive case is problematic for any generalisations but provides
interesting insight on the development of supranational policies in the context of crisis and the growing complexity of global problems. The legal basis of the firearms directive has remained the same, but changes in political environment have considerably changed the scope of the directive. By taking a closer look at this particular case, we can see how EU integration has evolved and what the pressures pushing it forward are.

In her recent study, Johanna Strikwerda (2017) noticed same kinds of developments in the field of CSDP with the Commission’s Defence and Security Procurement Directive of 2009. In her analysis, she focused on member states’ role, as the CSDP was expected to be ‘in the hands of the member states’ and used a process-tracing method to study the change in the position of member states. The basis of this case study was very similar to the one in this thesis. As CSDP, AFSJ is also a domain which is expected to be in the hands of member states. The findings of Strikwerda’s study were also similar to the findings in this thesis. Her analysis showed that member states changed their position from “mere reluctance towards the Commission proposals to accepting the Directive” (Strikwerda 2017, 32). Moreover, she concluded that “rational choice perspective, often used to explain European integration, fails to account for the acceptance of a Directive”. Both of these findings are present in my analysis as well.

In his research on the renewed neofunctional framework, Niemann (2006, 6) minimised the danger of case selection bias by choosing cases according to a range of values concerning the dependent variable, without paying attention to the values of the key causal variables. I base my case selection on Klotz’ (2008) notion of “case of what”: I see the firearms directive as a case explaining the EU’s security integration and as a possibility to study pressures shaping the outcome of a directive. The change in the scope of the directive offers sufficient variation, but as a single directive, it is also easily controllable.
5. ANALYSIS

5.1. Original directive – adaptation to single market

In 1986, 12 members of the European Community were looking for new ways to move the European integration forward. Member states signed the Single European Act, which aimed to develop the single market in Europe. The creation of the single market increased the pressure to harmonise policies, including those dealing with the acquisition and possession of weapons. The Commission launched the first proposal (COM (87) 383 final) on controlling the acquisition and possession of weapons in 1987, right after the Single European Act was signed by the member states. The Commission (1987) stated that after the abolition of the internal borders, it was necessary to create a directive to harmonise firearms’ legislative framework inside Europe to better track the movements of legal weapons between member states.

In its first proposal, the Commission did not aim to fully harmonise firearms legislation in Europe for two reasons (EESC 1987, 1.4). First of all, there were substantial differences in member states’ firearms legislations, which made it difficult for the Commission to propose significant changes for some at once. Secondly, the Commission wanted the process to run smoothly since member states had set a tight deadline for the creation of the single market by the end of 1992. The first proposal was clearly driven by the need to establish the single market as quickly as possible, and improving gun security in Europe was not a top priority for the Commission. However, in its comment, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) stated “in its present form, the proposal is completely inadequate to ensure that the objective referred to in point 1.1 is attained, namely replacement of internal frontier checks in proper conditions, particularly as regards the safety of Community citizens (EESC 1987, 1.3.).” The EESC warned member states that without stricter provisions, the proposal could even facilitate the illegal acquisition and transport of arms, and hence suggested that the proposal should be tightened.

After the first draft, the Commission made some changes to the proposal based on EESC’s recommendations. The Commission’s second proposal (COM(89) 446 final) was published in 1989 and in this new proposal, the Commission set more detailed conditions for the acquisition and possession of weapons. This time, the European Parliament (1990) tried to tighten the proposal by introducing restrictions on gun marketing and suggesting that a person would lose his/her firearms licence if the firearm got lost. Moreover, the European Parliament suggested that a new article
should be included in the proposal, laying down measures that would decrease the number of firearms in the Community area. The Commission approved some of the European Parliament’s suggestions, but rejected the ideas of stricter marketing rules and measures to decrease the number of firearms.

The EESC’s and the European Parliament’s suggestions, as well as the Commission’s small concessions, show that the elements to create a strict legislative framework for firearms were already there in the late 1980s when the directive was introduced. However, neither the Commission nor the member states were ready to take the directive any further than what was necessary for the creation of the single market.

5.2. First revision – updates based on UN convention

In 2000, the Commission published a report on the implementation of the firearms directive. In the Commission’s report (2000, 9–10), national experts highlighted problems regarding the exchange of information and differences in national legislations and firearm categories. Firearms lobbyists pointed out that the European firearms pass introduced in the first directive did not work as it was supposed to. The report also concluded that in some areas, all member states had implemented stricter rules than those laid down in the directive (European Commission 2000, 10). In the ‘future developments’ part of the report, the Commission highlighted that “the directive is a result of a compromise of several years of negotiations” and that there is no need to make significant changes to the content of the directive.

After the report, the Commission made its first revision proposal on the firearms directive in 2006. As mentioned earlier, this revision was needed because in 2001, the Commission had signed the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocol, which aimed “to facilitate and strengthen cooperation among states in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition” (UN 2004). Based on the UN convention, the Commission had to propose some minor technical changes to the existing directive. This first revision of the firearms directive was connected to reinforced global efforts to tackle security threats posed by firearms and organised crime. For the first time, UN member states reached a global agreement to combat illicit arms trade and to manage arms flows from previous conflict zones to other parts of the world. The UN Convention (2004, 71) highlighted that the illicit trade and manufacturing of firearms posed a severe threat for the security
of states, regions and world as a whole, and that urgent national, regional and global measures were needed to tackle this threat. Measures listed in the UN provision were similar to those in the EU’s firearms directive and aimed to achieve better regulation, tracing and marking of firearms at a global level (UN 2004, 75–78).

This time, the EESC (2006) linked the revision more closely to the current security environment and highlighted that the firearms directive was connected to security concerns like terrorism and organised crime. The committee also noted that even firearms used for hunting can be lethal and dangerous if they end up in the wrong hands and suggested that hunting licenses should be under tighter control. From the beginning, member states wanted to make sure that the directive did not affect hunters and sport shooters. Free from national constraints, the EESC could point out that sport guns were also part of the problem and just as dangerous as other arms if they ended up in the wrong hands.

5.2.1. The European Parliament changing the scope of the directive

After the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, the European Parliament had increased its role from a purely advisory body to an actor taking part in the legislative process next to the Commission and the Council. During the first revision, the Committee for Internal Market and Consumer Protection, IMCO (2007a), and its rapporteur Giselle Kallenbach suggested significant changes to the Commission’s proposal and put the emphasis on the security aspects of the directive. IMCO tried to expand the scope of the directive to cover ammunitions, parts of firearms and converted firearms as well as collectors. IMCO also drafted stricter provisions on marking and deactivating firearms and suggested that the acquisition of firearms should be banned for those who have committed certain serious crimes. It also suggested that the directive should cover guns purchased via the internet and stated that registration time (model, producer, serial number, production year) for guns should be prolonged from the 10 years proposed by the Commission up to 20 years. Finally, IMCO also pointed out that the information exchange between member states needed to be improved.

The rapporteur Giselle Kallenbach justified IMCO’s strict position by saying that “the issue of illicit possession of firearms cannot be separated from the issue of violent deaths due to small firearms, whether these are illicit or not. Readily available, cheap, portable and easy to use, small arms are tools of violence in society” (IMCO 2007b, 29). Moreover, she referred to the World Health Organisation’s report according to which suicides and interpersonal violence were the most common causes of death and injuries and noted that firearms play a major role in these incidents.
The Commission and the Council approved many of IMCO’s amendments, e.g. on extended registration time, marking of firearms, deactivation standards, online sales and persons convicted of serious crime. Some suggestions linked to hunters and sport shooters were again rejected clearly because of national traditions and sensitivities linked to strong hunting and shooting cultures in member states.

During the first revision, the Commission’s first proposal changed significantly. At first, the Commission proposed only minor technical changes to the original firearms directive, and those changes stemmed from obligations to the UN convention. In its assessment in 2000, the Commission stated that there was no need to make changes to the content of the directive, so the only reason for the Commission and the member states to revise the firearms directive came from updates required by the UN convention and its provision. Nevertheless, the EESC and especially IMCO were able to push through some amendments, which changed the content of the directive, such as expanding the scope of the directive to also cover converted firearms and banning the acquisition of firearms from persons who had convicted serious crimes. At this stage, the Commission did not frame the firearms directive as a ‘security directive’ and proposed only small technical changes, probably because it acknowledged member states’ strong national interests attached to the firearms culture. The Commission based its proposal on the implementation report of 2000, and since there was no specific input from member states, the Commission saw no reason to make the proposal more ambitious than what the UN convention required. During the first revision, the European Parliament and especially IMCO and its rapporteur Giselle Kallenbach proposed significant changes to the Commission’s proposal and drew attention to possible security threats posed by legal and illegal firearms. IMCO used this opportunity to change the scope of the directive, even though the Commission or member states had no intention to put emphasis on the security aspects of the directive. The focus on security was demonstrated in rapporteur Kallenbach’s proposal as follows:

“15 years after the adoption of the 1991 directive, and 6 years after the European Commission's report on the implementation of this directive, it would be appropriate to include in the current revision all the relevant elements which could improve the effect of this directive on the safety of persons.” (IMCO 2007b, 29)

This example shows that the European Parliament can influence the legislative procedure significantly with the right conditions and the right rapporteur. Here, IMCO saw the potential to
draw attention to security aspects and propose amendments to the revision based on that. The Council approved some security-based amendments, which shows that despite the national reservations, member states already acknowledged possible threats posed by firearms and their free movement in the Schengen area at this stage.

5.3. Second revision – Commission taking the lead

In 2012, The Commission organised a conference on arms trafficking, where Cecilia Malmström, the Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, gave her assessment of the current state of play in the fight against arms trafficking. Commissioner Malmström (2012) pointed out that a lot had been achieved in the last decade but also drew attention to potential threats posed by all firearms, saying “there is, simply, no evidence that firearms are causing less damage or insecurity in the EU today than, say, five or ten years ago. The trend appears, in fact, to go in the opposite direction”. She also highlighted the link between legal and illegal markets as follows:

"Legally owned weapons in the EU continue to feed the illegal market, powerful and highly dangerous weapons continue to be smuggled – apparently without great difficulty – over our external borders, notably from countries in the EU’s neighbourhood, where weak management of stockpiles, looting, and corruption fuel the illicit market. There is evidence that criminal groups creatively exploit new technologies, for example making and distributing weapons from spare parts bought legally on the Internet, by converting lawful air guns into more dangerous weapons, and by re-activating neutralized weapons bought both outside and inside the EU”

(Cecilia Malmström, 2012)

This was the first moment that the Commission took an active role to promote the security aspects related to the firearms directive. For the first time, the Commission linked the directive with the fight against arms trafficking and the broader security debate on gun safety. Cecilia Malmström (2012) asked whether the firearms directive should be tightened and said that urgent updates were needed, especially concerning the civilian use of the most dangerous weapons, deactivation standards and technical security features. She also added “these are issues the Commission will have to address sooner or later”.

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A year after Commissioner Malmström’s speech, EU gun policies were criticised by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). In its publication on European Union initiatives to control small arms and light weapons, SIPRI called for a more coordinated EU approach and pointed out that one shortcoming of the current EU SALW strategy is “its focus on illicit proliferation of small arms outside the EU”, and stated “trafficking of weapons is transnational per nature as illustrated by the Western Balkans origin of many illicit weapons in circulation inside the EU” (Poitevin 2013, 20). This indicates that in 2013, experts were already aware of the ‘gun problem’ highlighted by mainstream media after the Paris attacks of 2015, and called for the EU to address this problem.

In 2014, the Commission ordered an evaluation of the firearms directive prepared by outside consultancy agencies, which concluded: “in terms of security, the firearms directive proves to be relevant to most current security risks” (European Commission 2014, 77).

5.3.1. Focus on terrorism – European Agenda on Security

The security dimension was reinforced in 2015, when the Commission added the firearms directive to its new security framework, the European Agenda on Security. The agenda was published a few months after President Juncker took office, and it set the security priorities for the new Commission. One clear priority was the fight against terrorism, which was also demonstrated by President Juncker in his early speech in which he stated, “combating cross-border crime and terrorism is a common European responsibility” (European Commission 2015a, 2). The agenda was published just a few months after the Charlie Hedbo attacks which gained a lot of media attention and created a debate on the ‘gun problem’ in Europe (this debate is addressed later in section 5.4.1). The Commission had to take on gun safety and counter-terrorism measures. In its press release on the European Agenda on Security, the Commission linked an updated security agenda with recent terrorist attacks, saying “it is time we Europeans work better and more closely together to make sure our citizens are safe” and “there can be no security without freedom, and at the same time there can be no freedom without security” (European Commission 2015b). It framed the agenda in a way that, due to the complex and cross-border nature of today’s security threats, The Commission had to step up its actions in the field of security and take a more proactive role.

The European Agenda on Security made the firearms directive one of the EU’s counter-terrorism tools and shifted the emphasis from a ‘market-based directive’ to a ‘security directive’. The second
revision of the firearm directive was part of the Commission’s work programme of 2016, and the proposal was scheduled for early 2016. However, the Paris attacks in November 2015 increased the pressure to do more in the field of counter-terrorism, and the proposal was published earlier than expected, just a few days after the Paris attacks. Just like after the Charlie Hedbo attacks, media drew attention to the possible ‘gun problem’ in Europe, which together with the urgent threat of terrorism increased the Council’s and the Commission’s pressure to launch the proposal for the second revision of the firearms directive as soon as possible, and to make it ambitious and effective enough to show that the EU is ‘doing something’ to tackle this problem. In its proposal, the Commission (2015c) highlighted that “effective action to ensure a high level of security and regulate the cross-border movement of firearms can only be taken at EU level”.

The new proposal was much more ambitious than the earlier ones. The Commission proposed several amendments to tighten the common legislative framework of firearms. For the first time, the Commission’s proposal included elements that directly aimed to improve security. This differs from the position that the Commission had during the first revision, when it only proposed minor technical changes to the directive in order to make it as balanced as possible. The Commission (2015c, 9) wanted to create common deactivation standards to better track deactivated firearms and to make them harder to reactivate. It also suggested that the possession of most dangerous deactivated automatic guns belonging to category A and semiautomatic guns belonging to category B should be completely banned from civilians. Moreover, the Commission tried to ban the online trade of firearms, excluding distributors and sellers. It also demanded that sellers and distributors join common registers and wanted to improve the change of information between member states.

5.3.2. Negotiation positions – The Council and the European Parliament

This time, IMCO and the European Parliament took a more critical stance towards the Commission’s proposal. IMCO, who wanted to reduce the number of firearms in Europe during the first revision, now supported the gun industry, hunters and sport shooters highlighting that “it is important to recognise that the vast majority of firearms held legally in the EU do not present any danger to the public” (IMCO 2016a, 56). It also criticised the Commission for not conducting a proper impact assessment (IA) before launching the proposal. IMCO also said that “such an IA would have helped clarify the reasons for these proposals as well as the evidence base on which the proposals rest”. IMCO’s rapporteur, European Conservatives and Reformist Group’s Vicky Ford (2016), stated that “many people are worried about the consequences of what are clearly poorly drafted proposals that need a lot of work,” and added “the absence of an impact assessment makes
our work even harder”. It was clear that many were surprised that the Commission rushed with the revision and launched a proposal that was prepared without a proper assessment.

The Council’s position was clearly driven by a need to respond to the urgent threat of terrorism after several deadly attacks in Europe. Shortly after the Charlie Hedbo attacks, Justice and Home Affairs Ministers met in Riga and dedicated the whole session to discussing the EU’s fight against terrorism. In the Riga Joint Statement adopted at the meeting, the ministers gave their strong support for joint counter-terrorism measures at EU level:

“The recent terrorist-attacks in France, the counter-terrorism measures taken in Belgium and the growing threat posed by the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters all over the world sends a clear and strong message that counter-terrorism efforts have to be reinforced both at national and EU level.” (Council of the EU 2015b)

They also linked the revision of the firearms directive to these efforts. In the Charlie Hedbo attacks, some of the firearms used by the terrorist were deactivated guns that had been converted back to functional firearms. This increased the Council’s pressure to address the problem of deactivation and converted firearms as urgently as possible. In the Riga Joint Statement, the Council encouraged “decisive action, including legislation where necessary to curb this criminal activity” and stated, “specific attention should be given to deactivation of firearms, reinforcement of their traceability, information sharing and countering firearms’ trafficking on internet” (Council of the EU 2015b)

The EU stepped up its counter-terrorism efforts in late 2015, when Daesh’s terrorists conducted several coordinated attacks in Paris, killing over 100 and wounding over 400 more. EU leaders were shocked as Paris faced two deadly Islamic terrorist attacks within a year. Both the JHA Council and the European Council put a strong emphasis on the fight against terrorism in their meetings after the Paris attacks, and because of the attacks, the Commission published the proposal for the second revision of the firearms directive earlier than intended. On 20 November 2015, a week after the attacks, the JHA Council again dedicated the whole meeting to terrorism.

The Paris attacks raised questions on how terrorists get their weapons and how guns move easily in the Schengen area. Just like after the Charlie Hedbo attacks, media talked about the ‘gun problem’ in Europe and linked the problem especially to black markets in Eastern Europe and the Balkans,
and the dangers of free movement in the Schengen area (this media pressure is addressed later in section 5.4.1). The JHA Council raised firearms high on its agenda. It welcomed the Commission’s proposal for the revision of the firearms directive published just two days before the meeting and said that work on this proposal will start “without delay” (Council of the EU 2015c). The Council’s position was endorsed by heads of state in the European Council on 18 December 2015. In EUCO conclusions, leaders listed urgent measures that needed to be taken to address the pressing threat of terrorism. The revision of firearms’ legislative framework was one of these measures, together with e.g. improving external border checks, enhancing information sharing and engaging with international partners. The leaders invited the Council to “rapidly examine the Commission proposals on combatting terrorism and on firearms, in particular on high-powered semi-automatic weapons” (EUCO 2015).

Just a few months after the Paris attacks, terrorists stroke again, this time in Brussels. The Brussels attacks in March 2016 increased the pressure to proceed even more quickly with counter-terrorism initiatives, one being the revision of the firearms directive. In its Joint Statement on the attacks, the Council called for swift completion of legislation on controlling the acquisition and possession of firearms, among other initiatives (Council of the EU 2016c). In June 2016, the Council agreed on its negotiation position to strengthen the control of firearms, and the Council’s position “gathered a strong support amongst the delegations” (Council of the EU 2016b).

5.3.3. Reaching a compromise between security and fundamental rights – analysis of the final act

In annex 1, I have taken together some of the pressing issues of the second revision of the firearms directive and how each of the main legislative institutions (the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament) has been able to push through its positions to the final act reached in April 2017. The last column shows whether the Commission’s original proposal ended up in the final act (European Commission 2017) or not. This is interesting since the Commission’s proposal was considered ambitious in the light of recent terrorist attacks and was even described as “poorly drafted” by European Parliament’s rapporteur.

The first of the pressing issues of the directive was the question of deactivation, which was raised after terrorists used converted firearms in their attacks. The Commission suggested that deactivated

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1 Not all the pressing issues are covered in this analysis. I have taken some examples to demonstrate the different negotiation positions of the institutions.
weapons should be covered by the directive. The European Parliament wanted to reject this amendment, but the Council supported the Commission's position, which led to the adoption of the deactivation amendment in the final act. The second issue concerned alarm and signal weapons that could be easily converted to more dangerous firearms. The Commission wanted that alarm weapons would also be covered by the directive and suggested an adoption of technical specifications in order to ensure that they cannot be converted. The European Parliament wanted to delete the part, which would have included these weapons under the scope of the directive but agreed on adopting technical specifications. The Council again supported the Commission’s original proposal, and it was adopted in the final act with only minor changes in language.

The most pressing issue of the proposal was perhaps the question of banning the civilian use of semi-automatic weapons. The Commission stressed that certain semi-automatic firearms (category B) can be very dangerous due to their capacity to fire several shots in a short period of time and that some semi-automatic firearms can be easily converted to automatic firearms (category A). That is why the civilian use of some semi-automatic arms should be banned. The Commission knew that some member states, like France, Italy, Belgium, Spain and the UK supported this idea, and some, like Belgium, France and Spain called for tighter rules than those proposed by the Commission (Ministry of the Interior of Finland 2016). Especially the UK, known for its tight gun laws, was active in lobbying for the ban of high-powered semi-automatic firearms. In the European Council of December 2015, the UK’s Prime Minister David Cameron spoke up for a total ban, saying, “the horrific terrorist atrocities in Paris underlined the scale of the terrorist threat facing Europe” and “we need to ensure that terrorists do not have the weapons with which they can wreak such tragedy” (The UK Government 13.12.2015). The European Parliament wanted to keep the categories as they were in the original directive. Finally, the Council came up with a compromise, which banned the civilian use of category B firearms only if they were used with a fixed loading device allowing a high number of rounds. This compromise was promoted especially by gun and defence associations (Reservilainurheiluliitto 2015; Pääesikunta 2015; The Firearms United) and certain member states which feared that a total ban on category B firearms would complicate the voluntary defence training for reserve units and hence, affect defence capabilities. This compromise ended up in the final act.

The Commission tried to tackle the ‘gun problem’ also by tightening the rules on traceability and online sales. It suggested that a record of firearms should be kept “for an indeterminate period of time until destruction is certified” and wanted to limit the online sale of firearms. The European
Parliament and the Council approved the amendment on traceability but did not want to pose tight restrictions on online sales. Instead, they proposed that a public authority or an authorised broker should check the buyer’s identity, and “where relevant”, their right to acquire a firearm before the firearm is handed over. The Commission also introduced an idea to create common Union rules on marking firearms, which gained support from both the European Parliament and the Council. Furthermore, the Commission wanted to include collectors to the scope of the directive since they were seen as a “possible source of traffic of firearms”. The Council agreed that collectors should be covered by the directive, but insisted that member states could authorise collectors to acquire firearms and “in individual special cases and subject to strict conditions on security”, also prohibited category A firearms. The text in the final act only encouraged member states to ensure that collectors “address any risks to public security” and hence, it was closest to the Parliament’s position, which wanted to stick to the original directive.

In addition to the ban of semi-automatic weapons, two other paragraphs in the new proposal gained special attention: standard medical tests and national defence. The Commission proposed that member states should provide standard medical tests for issuing or renewing authorisation for firearms. The European Parliament suggested that member states establish a monitoring system, “which shall reflect different best practices across member states” (IMCO 2016a). The Council wanted to leave this completely up to the member states, saying that “member states should decide whether or not the assessment is to involve a prior medical or psychological test” (Council of the EU, 2016b). The final act was closest to the Council’s position and left medical assessment for the member states. The issue of national defence was especially important for some member states, e.g. Finland, Czech Republic and Estonia. This was due to their special voluntary national defence system, which was based on the voluntary training of reservists, including shooting training. Finland, for example, looked to opt out of the directive, arguing that the firearms directive threatened the shooting practices of reservists, which was an essential part of their activities. According to the Ministry of the Interior of Finland, this would have an “immediate impact on reservists’ capabilities, and also on will for national defence” (Ministry of the Interior of Finland 2015). Due to this this lobbying, the final act included a provision which entitled member states to grant authorisation for firearms based on national defence. Lobbying in the name of ‘national defence’ was also one of the reasons why category B firearms were not totally banned in the final act since those were the weapons used by reservists. Finnish resistance is addressed in section 5.4.3.
As we can see, many of the Commission’s original amendments examined here actually ended up in the final act. These were amendments concerning deactivation, alarm weapons, traceability and union rules on marking. All of these were rather technical amendments, which made them easy to adopt for the member states. The most important one was probably the amendment on deactivation, which was deleted by IMCO but supported by the Council. For the Council, the amendment on deactivation was especially important since it wanted to show that the EU was taking new measures to tackle the ‘gun problem’ in Europe. In recent terrorist attacks, terrorists had used converted deactivated firearms, and it was important for the Council to show it was doing its utmost to tackle this problem.

Deactivation was not the only amendment where the European Parliament’s position was more moderate than that of the Commission and the Council. The Commission and the Council used ‘security’ to justify their position in many of the amendments but the European Parliament did not refer to security in its positions at all, which shows two things. First of all, the Council and the Commission created the discourse on security together and had similar views on many issues. On some amendments, like the total ban of semiautomatic firearms, medical tests and adding collectors to the scope of the directive, the Commission’s proposal was too ambitious for the member states to approve. The Council ‘softened’ these amendments to better fit national contexts but kept the reference to security in the final act. This is one example of how security is more and more included in EU language and also more present in EU legislation.

Secondly, different language used by the European Parliament on one hand and the Council and the Commission on the other shows that not everything could be justified based on security and terrorism, at least if you ask the European Parliament. Clearly, the European Parliament highlighted fundamental rights and a strong firearms culture in Europe and did not want to tighten the directive just to show that the EU ‘is doing something’ to tackle the gun problem related to terrorism. It did not see the firearms directive as an effective tool to fight terrorism and stop illegal firearms ending up in the hands of terrorists. As mentioned before, the European Parliament’s position differed greatly from that of the first revision of the directive. Then, Rapporteur Gisele Kallenbach adopted a very security-oriented approach and called for a more ambitious proposal than what the Commission had introduced. During the second revision, the European Parliament took the opposite position, as it criticised the Commission’s proposal and defended the rights of hunters and sport

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2 References to security are shown in bold in the annex 1
shooters by saying that the firearms directive was not the right tool to address the problem. One thing that might explain this dynamic is the different political orientation of these two rapporteurs. Giselle Kallenbach is a member of the European Greens, who tend to call for more EU cooperation and promote liberal values at EU level. The rapporteur of the second revision, Vicky Ford, is a member of European Conservatives and Reformist Group, which stand for traditional values and have a more intergovernmental approach. Of course, this is just one aspect of the drafting process in the European Parliament, but it indicates that the rapporteur’s political orientation is reflected in directive drafting.

A comparison of the positions of different institutions reveal the difficulty that member states experience in balancing between showing unity and keeping domestic interest groups happy, which is one of the basic dilemmas of EU studies. Member states wanted the outcome of the firearms directive to be ambitious and send a message of joint action for better gun control and fight against terrorism. At the same time, there was a great deal of national traditions and sensitivities that the Council needed to fit together before reaching a conclusion. Given these sensitivities, the final act published was surprisingly ambitious and showed that a compromise can be found if the stakes are high enough. In this case, the pressure came mainly from external events and the urgent threat of terrorism and the acknowledged ‘gun problem’ in Europe, also discussed in mainstream media.

5.4. Neofunctionalist analysis of key pressures shaping the directive

Early neofunctionalists focused on inside pressures pushing integration forward. The inside pressures were usually linked to the economic advantages of pushing integration from one policy area to another. However, Niemann (2006) had discovered that other pressures affecting integration lacked the attention they deserved and wanted to include these into the neofunctional framework in order to better address developments in European cooperation.

In section 3.3 I explained why I chose to use three specific spillover pressures (exogenous pressures, countervailing forces, cultivated spillover) to explain the developments around the firearms directive. Niemann included exogenous spillover into the new framework to better understand how outside pressures affect the integration process. I have recognised media attention on terrorism, and especially on the ‘gun problem’ in Europe, as an exogenous pressure shaping EU officials’ and national decision makers’ agenda, and hence also possibly shaping the outcome of the
directive. I have analysed the media coverage on firearms after both Paris attacks of 2015 in some of the main media outlets in Europe and the US. After both attacks, the origins of the guns used by the terrorists were widely speculated in media, and I suggest that this attention in the aftermath of the dramatic events increased the pressure to make the directive more security-oriented.

When there is a wide political consensus behind a certain issue, media tends to support the narrative created by elites (Castells 2009). Castells (2009) has pointed out that after 9/11, there was a wide consensus among elites and opinion leaders on the War on Terror frame, and thus also among media in the US, and we have seen the same kind of consensus on counter-terrorism measures in Europe after the attacks. However, this logic also works the other way around. If there is a wide consensus behind a certain issue in media, political elites tend to act upon it. Media has a huge impact on public opinion, especially after shocking and extraordinary events like terrorist attacks, because it is the first one reporting them to the public (Atkeson and Maestas 2012, 31). This means that when the elites start commenting on events, they are late in the sense that information provided to the public is already framed by the media stories created around the events.

Secondly, I use the concept of cultivated spillover to show how the Commission changed its position in the course of the directive process and deliberately made the firearms directive a part of EU’s security integration, and also used the pressure created by the recent terrorist attacks in Europe to include stronger language on security into the directive. I show how the Commission took a leadership role in the second revision and how this was supported by member states.

Thirdly, I will focus on countervailing forces to show how even urgent proposals backed by powerful member states and generally supported by all can face strong countervailing forces, especially if the proposal is linked to sensitive fields of national security, or as Niemann (2006) has pointed out, national welfare. I use the Finnish resistance linked to a strong national culture of voluntary defence forces to show how these countervailing forces in individual member states have the ability to shape the outcome of the directive.

5.4.1. Logic behind exogenous spillover – media attention and public opinion as pressures

Early neofunctionalists argued that European integration was pushed forward mainly by the indigenous logic of spillover, where integration in one policy area creates pressure to adopt
common policies in other close-by policy areas as well. Later, Niemann (2006) wanted to include exogenous forces into neofunctional analysis because he wanted to focus more on the outside events and developments driving integration forward. Niemann (2006, 127) points out that exogenous pressures “are only as influential in a particular decision as they are perceived by key players who then act upon their perception and conviction”. In other words, exogenous pressures are influential only if they are perceived as relevant for the policy in question. It is therefore important to focus on the processes, meanings and discourses that make exogenous pressures perceived as relevant and important in the first place.

In my analysis, I aim to demonstrate how extensive media attention around terrorism and the ‘gun problem’ in Europe shaped the perceptions of the key players in the firearms directive and how these perceptions were present in the final act as well. I present some examples of the ways that media created a discourse around the ‘gun problem’ in Europe while covering both Paris terrorist attacks of 2015. The extensive media attention on the attacks increased the pressure to coordinate more and better in the field of counter-terrorism, and media created a specific discourse on the ‘gun problem’ in Europe which put special emphasis on the firearms directive. Earlier, I have suggested that wider discourse on the ‘war on terror’ has shaped the public opinion in Europe and demonstrated how terrorism is perceived as a problem at EU level rather than a national level. Originally, neofunctionalist approach did not give that much importance to the change in popular attitudes, but rather focused on the change in elites’ attitudes (Niemann 2006, 12). However, I believe that public opinion is directly linked to how EU leaders and policy makers justify their positions either against further integration or for it. Member states are more likely to promote integration if Europeans perceive something as an ‘EU-issue’. Moreover, it is not only member states who benefit from public support, it is also the EU credibility as a whole. When Europeans perceive terrorism as an issue at EU level rather than a national level, they most likely also expect the EU-level measures to tackle the problem. This gives certain mandate and legitimacy for the EU’s counter-terrorism measures.

Neofunctionalists highlight that decisions about integration are often taken under high pressure, tight deadlines or deepening crisis, and also with imperfect knowledge (Schmitter 1996a, 5). Moreover, given the absence of clear historical precedents, leaders are likely to miscalculate their capability to implement agreed decisions and to miscalculate the impact their decision will have. After the terrorist attacks of 2015, first in the Charlie Hedbo editorial in January and later in Paris city centre in November, the Council decided to speed up the revision of the firearms directive and
asked the Commission to step up its drafting process. This led to the early launch of the directive proposal in late 2015, instead of the originally planned release in 2016. Later, member states and especially the European Parliament criticised the Commission for the fact that it did not make a proper impact assessment before launching the proposal. One especially significant factor impacting the Council’s determination to push the firearms directive proposal through as ambitiously as possible stemmed from the fact that some terrorists used legally acquired deactivated guns that had been converted back to functional firearms in the Paris attacks. This was one of the problems the Commission wanted to tackle with the revised directive.

The Council’s determination was also reinforced by media attention around the ‘gun problem’ after both Paris attacks. Several papers asked where the Charlie Hedbo attackers got their guns and wrote about the threat of deactivated guns and dangerous illegal markets and leftover guns in the Balkans. Soon after the Charlie Hedbo attack, British newspaper The Telegraph asked how terrorists managed to acquire such a significant arsenal of guns for the attack and referenced ‘the Balkans connection’ (The Telegraph 17.1.2015). Similarly, right after the attacks, Al Jazeera asked “where are the guns in France coming from” and wrote that according to experts, “arms brokers play a primary role in black market trafficking, often forging government documents or licenses to complete deal” and that “Europe has been hesitant to conform to stricter directives when it comes to the illicit arms trade because of the red tape and cost involve” (Al Jazeera 9.1.2015). Britain’s national broadcaster BBC (15.1.2015) took part in the ‘gun problem’ debate by asking whether the weapons used in the Paris attack could reach the UK. The BBC also interviewed EU’s counter-terrorism coordinator Gilles de Kerchove who commented: “it is probably too easy to get hold of military weapons in Europe”. A month later, online news site Euronews revealed that “Charlie Hedbo attacks may have used weapons legally purchased in the EU” as deactivated weapons (Euronews 18.2.2015). American paper Huffington Post highlighted the worrying situation in the Balkans, saying that the region plays a major role in terrorism financing, weapon supply and terrorists crossing borders and described the problem as “the ignored enemy from within” (Huffington Post 17.1.2015).

These examples indicate that after the Charlie Hedbo attacks, insufficient gun control and illegal markets of firearms were recognised as a major problem for the EU, first by the media and later also by leaders, who wanted the Commission to speed up the drafting process. The Commission had already recognised this problem when drafting the proposal, but political emphasis was put on these issues after the attacks.
Media debate on the ‘gun problem’ recurred after the Paris attacks in November 2015. On 13 November 2015, terrorists attacked several sites in Paris using gun bombs and leaving 130 people dead and over 400 injured. After the attacks, the BBC (19.11.2015) pointed out that in several recent attacks, including those in Paris, there was a link between the guns used and Belgium. Every year, illegal military-style firearms end up in Belgian black market because of the country’s long tradition of liberal gun laws before 2006. According to Nils Duquet, a researcher at the Flemish Peace Institute who wrote the story for the BBC, the increase of heavy firearms on the illegal market is mainly linked to smuggling from the Balkans. He stated: “once they [illegal weapons] cross the EU’s external borders, these weapons can easily be transferred from one European country to another within the Schengen zone”. He also called for more integrated approach at the EU with a special focus on harmonised legislative frameworks for legal guns. He said “the clearer the rules on legal possession, the more efficient the fight against the illegal market”. Similarly, The Guardian (15.11.2015) wrote: “the arms used [in the attacks] prove how difficult it is for France – which has strict weapons laws – to tackle flow of illegal weaponry across Europe’s porous borders”.

A month after the attacks, Time Magazine (7.12.2015) published a wide article with the title: “How Europe’s Terrorists Get Their Guns - Long seen as a haven from gun violence, Europe faces a new threat”. In the article, journalists Naina Bajaekal and Viviennen Walt described how “guns have increasingly become the weapon of choice for extremists” in Europe. They identified two critical issues that were in the centre of the ‘gun problem’ in Europe: leftover guns from the Balkans and Eastern Europe and free movement guaranteed by the Schengen area:

“Once European terrorists realized the strategic advantages of guns, they quickly discovered they were surprisingly easy to find. Just beyond the countries of Western Europe, with their restrictive gun laws, lie the Balkan states, awash with illegal weapons left over from the conflicts that raged there in the 1990s. According to the Switzerland-based Small Arms Survey, there are anywhere between three million and six million firearms in circulation in the Western Balkans—and possibly more. (...) For E.U. officials, the Paris and Copenhagen attacks this year have confirmed a suspicion that illegal weapons are flowing freely through Europe’s 26-country Schengen zone, which allows near frictionless travel across borders, and that European leaders are lagging behind in cracking down on the trade.” (Time Magazine 7.12.2015)
Similar analysis on Europe’s ‘gun problem’ was done by The Washington Post (28.12.2015) right after the Paris attacks, and Spiegel International (24.3.2016) right after the Brussels attacks. Both papers criticised the EU for not taking the ‘gun problem’ seriously enough and called into question EU’s policies on gun control in the Schengen area. The Washington Post (28.12.2015) wrote that the converted rifle used in the Charlie Hedbo attacks in Hyper Cacher market “points to a problem within the EU itself: legislative differences among the member states on what constitutes a firearm and the extent to which blank and deactivated weapons should be similarly regulated”. The paper also noted that the EU is not able to ‘live by example’ when it comes to efforts to tackle illicit trafficking in weapons, saying that “ironically, there is today more detailed information available on the arms used by armed groups in Syria than those used in the Charlie Hebdo or recent Paris attacks”.

Spiegel International argued that “years of EU shortcomings helped the firearms on their way” to Europe, and even added a graphic showing how easy it actually is to convert deactivated military-style weapon back to operational. It criticised the EU for not making the firearms directive ambitious enough in 2008 when it was first revised. Then, the EU namely introduced deactivation standards but in reality, according to Spiegel, “nothing happened -- for six years and 233 days”. The EU officials and member states woke up too late, only after the terrorists attacked the Charlie Hedbo editorial using converted guns. The paper also criticised the EU for not including alarm weapons in the directive revision since they were also identified as a possible security threat and source of weapons for the terrorists.

As pointed out before, the first revision was introduced simply because of the UN convention obligations, and the Commission did not have interest to promote the security aspects of the directive at that point. Deactivation standards were set in the UN convention and were therefore included in the revision as well. It was the European Parliament’s IMCO and rapporteur Gisele Kallenbach who wanted to tighten the rules on deactivation during the first revision, and it was because of them that tighter rules on deactivation ended up in the final act as well. The Commission and the Council were not promoting security during the first revision. According to Spiegel (24.3.2016), it was only in 2013, after serious warnings from Slovakia, that the Commission and the Council realised how big of a threat deactivated guns and alarm weapons actually posed to the EU. Still, it was only the Charlie Hedbo attacks that really increased the pressure to include security aspects in the directive. Spiegel International concluded:
“Our reporting shows that obtaining a weapon in Europe is hardly an insurmountable hurdle to the carrying out of an attack. Indeed, the EU has essentially fostered an easily accessible weapons bazaar for terrorists. The research reveals years of European Union failures.” (Spiegel International 24.3.2016)

Later in 2016, The Independent (31.10.2016) published a story with the title “Police fear terrorists using UK black market to buy weapons for Paris-style gun attack” after British police revealed that terrorists often plan to use guns in their attacks. These guns are often acquired from the black market or in some cases, converted from deactivated guns or alarm weapons. The Independent quoted National Crime Agency’s director Lynne Owens, who stated: “disrupting the supply of firearms has never been a more significant priority”.

These examples from Europe’s and North America’s mainstream media show that after the attacks, illegal gun flows in the Schengen area, as well as converted guns were framed as a major security threat for Europe. There is no systematic way to prove that this framing of media affected the decision making of those involved in the drafting of the firearms directive in the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, but given media’s central role in European societies, it is very likely that these stories have increased the pressure to include change certain language in proposal, especially concerning alarm weapons, deactivation and the ban of semi-automatic guns. As mentioned earlier, both the Council and the Commission agreed on using language that highlighted the security aspects of the directive.

There is also another point which proves that media discourse around the ‘gun problem’ might have been one aspect speeding up the directive process and making it more security-oriented. Already in 2012, the Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström reminded member states that there is a link between illegal and legal gun markets and also drew attention to the situation in the Balkans:

“Assessment from 2011 highlighted the risks that in particular military grade arms trafficked from the Western Balkans pose to the EU’s internal security. The figure of 4 million unregistered illegal war firearms in the Balkans is well-known, but it remains deeply worrying.” (Cecilia Malmström 2012)

Hereby, it is obvious that the EU was already aware of these problems in 2012, but still decided to revise the firearms directive only in 2016 as a part of implementing the European Agenda on
Security. The attacks in Paris together with the fact that terrorists used converted guns led to the early launch of the directive in late 2015, almost a year after the Charlie Hedbo attacks, which also had a connection to converted guns. Since the EU and the Commission were already aware of the problem in 2012, the media coverage on and the acknowledgement of the ‘gun problem’ in Europe can be considered a possible exogenous force pushing member states to adopt tighter EU rules on gun control, and hence taking integration forward in the field of security.

5.4.2. Cultivated spillover – Commission’s leadership during the second revision

As shown in the previous chapter, if we compare the first proposal of the firearms directive from 1991 with the latest proposal of the second revision, we can see a significant difference in the Commission’s position and the language it uses. The neofunctional concept of cultivated spillover offers a great tool for examining this change. Riddervold (2016) and Kostadinova (2013) have shown that the Commission uses discursive strategies to frame certain things important for the integration and has been increasingly active, especially in the fields of AFSJ and CFSP. Moreover, for example Kaunert et al. (2012) and Monar (2014) have argued that counter-terrorism has been a significant factor driving the EU’s security integration forward, and there the Commission’s multinational expertise is well appreciated. However, Kaunert et al. (2012) say that after the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament has also been more active and has changed the dynamics of the institutions. Even if the Council and the Commission have had similar positions on counter-terrorism issues, the European Parliament has hold on to its own principles, saying that not all policies can be justified by terrorism. As mentioned before, these dynamics were present in the latest revision of the firearms directive, where the Council and the Commission used very similar language on security, but the European Parliament did not refer to security in its amendments (see annex1).

The firearms directive is one case example which shows that the Commission has taken more active role in EU’s security integration in the AFSJ. During the first revision, the Commission framed the directive as necessary for the creation of the single market, not for the security of the Europeans. In their comments, the EESC and the European Parliament were the ones who drew attention to security issues, and the Commission made some changes to its proposal based on those. The same pattern recurred during the first revision. The Commission proposed minor technical changes based on the UN convention. Again, the elements for a more security-oriented directive were there, and this time the European Parliament’s IMCO tabled a number of amendments related to security. The
Commission and the Council quietly approved some of these amendments, but the specific
discourse on security was not present in the first revision.

In 2012, with Cecilia Malmström’s speech on a fight against the illicit trafficking in firearms, the
Commission started to frame illegal firearms as a serious security threat for Europeans and attached
the legal framework of legally owned guns in Europe to this frame, highlighting that there was a
link between illegal and legal gun markets. In 2015, the firearms directive became a security-
oriented directive when the new Juncker Commission linked it to its new security framework called
the European Agenda on Security, which was published only a few months after the Charlie Hedbo
attacks in Paris. As mentioned earlier, the terrorists used converted and legally acquired guns in
these attacks, which scared both the Commission and the member states and triggered a debate on
the ‘gun problem’ in Europe. The attacks and the debate revealed severe problems with gun security
in Europe: illegal weapon flows from the Balkans, easy access to convertible guns in Eastern
Europe and dangers of free movement in the Schengen area.

These developments placed a special focus on the firearms directive. In the Riga Joint statement,
where the member states addressed the increased threat of terrorism after the Charlie Hedbo attacks,
they tasked the Commission to address the problems with gun security in its proposal for the
revised firearms directive. The security debate was intensified after the Paris attacks of November
2015, and the Commission decided to launch the directive just a week after the attacks, even though
it was scheduled for early 2016. This decision led to a “poorly drafted” version of the proposal, as
described by the IMCO rapporteur Vicky Ford, as Commission officials needed to finalise the
proposal in less than a week. Moreover, the Paris attacks clearly shaped the language and the
emphasis of the proposal. After it was launched, even experts described it as a bit too ambitious. In
Politico’s interview just two days after the launch, Nils Duquet of the Flemish Peace Institute
stated: “the Commission took a couple of steps more than I expected. I think this is direct result of
the attacks in Paris” (Politico 20.11.2015).

Even though the Commission’s proposal was considered “poorly drafted” and going further than
expected, surprisingly many of the Commission’s amendments ended up in the final act. Moreover,
even if the Council or the European Parliament softened the Commission’s original amendments,
the strong language and emphasis on security remained. As mentioned before, the Commission’s
leadership role is particularly dependent on two things: the level of uncertainty and the support of
member states (Niemann and Schmitter, 2009, 60–61). Both of these elements were present in the
firearms directive case. The urgent threat of terrorism after the attacks of 2015 guaranteed that the Commission had justification for its security-oriented approach, and wide support from the member states gave the Commission the freedom to draft the proposal as it saw best. These two background factors explain why the Commission succeeded to change the focus of the firearms directive from a market-based directive to a more security-oriented directive and link it to the EU’s counter-terrorism policies.

The Commission succeeded in five out of six factors that condition its leadership role, defined by Nieman and Schmitter (2009, 61). It was able to forge internal cohesion by attaching the firearms directive as a part of the European Agenda on Security and by creating a security frame that was perceived as ‘credible’, at least by most of the key players and some powerful member states (in the next section, I will address the countervailing forces resisting the Commission’s success more closely). It shaped the agenda actively and tabled ambitious amendments to the proposal, even though it might have known that some of them were too much for the member states. The Commission also took advantage of exogenous pressures (pressure created by the terrorist attacks) and functional pressures (linking the firearms directive to the EU’s counter-terrorism measures and to the European Agenda on Security) to gain wide support from member states. Finally, it succeeded to broke compromises in trilogies in a way that security-oriented language remained in the final act.

However, the Commission did not seem to recognise “the limits of its entrepreneurial leadership”. As mentioned before, many member states as well as the European Parliament regretted that the Commission did not make a proper impact assessment before launching the directive, and the comparison of the first proposal and the final act done earlier showed that with some amendments it simply pushed its proposal too far. It almost seems as if the Commission was testing its limits and its new leadership role in the field of internal security and counter-terrorism with the firearms directive.

There are at least two points worth highlighting about the Commission’s leadership in the firearms directive case. First of all, the Commission took a more security-oriented position only during the second and most recent revision of the firearms directive. This was directly linked to the urgent threat of terrorism, especially after the Paris attacks of 2015, but also to the new Juncker Commission that took office in 2014. Juncker’s Commission has been described as ‘the most explicitly political Commission ever’ (Peterson 2017, 364), and Juncker has used his opportunity to
promote security integration as uncertainty has increased in Europe. Juncker’s goal is ‘a genuine Security Union’ where member states would engage in “protecting the collective security of the Union as a whole” (European Commission 2016), which indicates that the Commission wants to take the lead in framing and promoting internal security in Europe. As mentioned before, this shift towards ‘more security’ has also been demonstrated in Commission working programs. This new leadership role might explain why the Commission tested its limits with the firearms directive and made the proposal exceptionally ambitious, especially if it is compared with the earlier proposals of 1991 and 2006.

Secondly, we need to bear in mind that the Council and the member states were especially active in supporting the Commission during the second revision and tasked the Commission to address the ‘gun problem’ in its proposal. This gave the Commission the support and legitimacy it needed for the security-oriented approach it had in its proposal. The member states gave significant input for the process and therefore, it is actually difficult to separate how much of the emphasis on security came from the Commission and how much of it was simply reacting to the Council’s needs. The total ban of semi-automatic guns, the establishment of medical tests and limiting online sales were most probably emphasis that came from the Commission since they were rejected by the Council. However, with alarm weapons and deactivation, the input came from the member states, because they ended up in the final act exactly as drafted by the Commission. Moreover, during the first revision, the European Parliament had an active role in promoting the security aspects while the Commission and the Council were happy to settle with minimum changes required by the UN convention. Then, it was the European Parliament that was able to push through some of its amendments and thus make good use of its institutional power. However, the wider discourse on security and gun safety was missing in 2008, which is why a more ambitious directive was not an option. There were not enough pressures pushing the security integration forward during that time, as the EU’s priorities were still more on economics. The question arises if the EU could have avoided some of the serious problems in gun security that have occurred recently, if it had adopted a more ambitious firearms directive during the first revision. The European Parliament’s emphasis on security during the first revision reveals that many of the problems were already acknowledged back then, but there was not enough political will to actually address them.
5.4.3. Countervailing forces – European right to bear arms

As mentioned earlier, Niemann (2006, 231) found out that the fear of uncontrolled immigration created the strongest countervailing force towards the communitarisation of visa, asylum and immigration policies. He has also recognised other countervailing forces shaping the outcomes of the integration project, such as Finnish and Swedish reservation on QMV in the field of trade in social, education and health services in negotiations on the reform of the Common Commercial Policy (Niemann 2006, 183). According to Niemann (2006, 293) his empirical analysis has revealed the importance of including countervailing pressures into analysis, because “outcomes could not have been (adequately) explained without taking recourse to spillback forces.”.

I use the frame of countervailing forces to show how it was impossible for the member states to support some of the Commission’s amendments during the second revision of the firearms directive, even though the pressure to adopt certain amendments, for example the ban of semi-automatic arms, was extremely high in the light of recent terrorist attacks. I use case Finland to demonstrate the countervailing pressures resisting the Commission’s leadership and ambitious plans to ban semi-automatic firearms in all member states. Finland together with the Czech Republic strongly opposed stricter measures, arguing that their national defence would be detrimentally affected as a result. I focus especially on Finland’s arguments based on national defence, which show that strong traditions related to national security can serve as a counter pressure for the EU security integration. Niemann (2006) identifies that this kind of ‘sovereignty consciousness’ is one of the main countervailing forces resisting integration. Moreover, several member states have a strong hunting and sport shooting culture, which also shaped the outcome of the directive. The European Parliament took an especially strong position to defend the rights of hunters and sport shooters, as reflected earlier in the analysis. This is why the position of the European Parliament is also a countervailing force resisting the security integration in the field of firearms. This position differed from its earlier positions during the original directive and the first revision, when it was the one lobbying for more gun security.

Finnish reservations are demonstrated in several position papers submitted to the Administrative Committee, which coordinated the Finnish position in the national parliament. In its official position paper, the Finnish government welcomed the Commission’s proposal but strongly opposed the ban of all semi-automatic guns for civilian use. Every year, volunteer defence units organise training for 10,000 reservists in Finland, including shooting training. In these trainings, reservists
use their own guns, which is why the ban would have “a significant impact on national defence” (Ministry of the Interior of Finland 2015). The government suggested that the ban should be removed from the directive or otherwise Finland would seek an opt-out to guarantee the activities of volunteer defence units “needed for maintaining national security”. Moreover, the government highlighted several administrative difficulties related to a total ban of semi-automatic firearms. The ban would mean that all semi-automatic guns, including deactivated ones, should be traced and collected, which might prove to be impossible. Like many others, for example the European Parliament, the Finnish government also emphasised the importance of a fight against the trafficking of illicit firearms and did not consider the link between legal and illegal gun markets that important. According to the Finnish government, “the chance that a legally owned firearm would end up in the hands of terrorists is extremely small”. This reflects a common position that terrorism is still perceived as an external security threat rather than an internal threat rising within the EU.

Volunteer defense units and hunter and shooting associations were the major forces shaping Finland’s position and seeking opt-out from the ban on grounds of special national characteristics. Reservist sport association (Reserviläisurheiluliitto, 2015) criticised the Commission for not making a proper impact assessment before the directive, describing this “very bizarre” considering that certain amendments, like the ban on semi-automatic weapons, would have a significant impact on the overall security of certain member states. The Reservists also argued that the directive would interfere with fundamental rights. Military headquarters (Pääesikunta, 2015) highlighted that in its current form, the directive would seriously harm “national defence capabilities as well as the will for national defence.” It stated that national defence capabilities should be developed in order to tackle complex security threats, and the directive would do the opposite. It also said that the directive goes against the European Council’s decision of June 2015, which stated that member states should reinforce their defence capabilities, and claimed that the firearms directive did not stop terrorists from acquiring guns. It denied that the guns used in the Paris attacks would have anything to do with the directive. The Finnish Shooting Sports Federation (Suomen Ampumaurheiluliitto ry, 2015) supported the government’s position and argued that shootings taking place in France, Netherlands and Denmark cannot automatically mean that firearms legislation needs to change in all EU member states.

The Administration Committee also asked for Helsinki Police Department’s opinion for the revision of the directive. The Police Department’s (2015) opinion differed from others and gave more support for the Commission’s proposal. It pointed out that there are thousands of deactivated
category A weapons in Finland, some of which can be easily converted back to operational. It also said that in reality, the ban of the most dangerous semi-automatic firearms would not complicate the training of voluntary reservists because the most dangerous firearms used for training could be stored by reservist organisations rather than individuals. Moreover, the Police Department supported the idea that a firearms license should be renewed every five years in order to increase the traceability of firearms, and to make sure that the person renewing his/her license was still eligible to possess a firearm.

These were the main expert opinions shaping the Finnish government’s position on the firearms directive. On 8 December 2015, The administrative Committee invited four experts to give their opinion on the firearms directive. These experts came from the Police Administration, The National Defence Training Association of Finland (MPK), the Finnish Hunting Association and the Reservist’s Sport Association (Reserviläisurheiluliitto). Moreover, several national agencies in the field of internal security and defence submitted their opinions for the Committee. (The administrative Committee 2015)

The Police Department was the only organisation which supported the main lines of the Commission’s proposal, while the other organisations and associations were much more critical towards the proposal, especially towards the ban of semi-automatic firearms. This ‘sovereignty-consciousness’ driven pressure towards the government and the national parliament was so intense that the Finnish government had no other choice than to oppose the Commission’s proposal when it came to the ban of semi-automatic firearms. The opposition towards the ban of semi-automatic arms was surprisingly strong considering that, as the Helsinki Police Department stated in its opinion, this ban would not affect the capability of national defence if the weapons were stored by the reservist organisations. The opposition was based on strong traditions rather than reasonable statements. Finland’s former foreign minister Erkki Tuomioja commented the debate around the firearms directive and national defence by saying “the military refreshers of reservists and maintenance of firearms skills cannot be based on voluntariness or [privately-owned] firearms. Whatever the needs for improvement may be, they have to be addressed without bringing household armaments to Finland” (Helsinki Times 25.12.2015). He also pointed out that in reality, only 3,000 firearm owners (not 20,000 as claimed by the shooting organisations and associations) would be affected by the directive since only 3,000 are of an age that allows them to serve in the Defence Forces. He was surprised that firearms enthusiasts succeeded to lobby against proposed
amendments in a way that parliamentary committees actually declared these amendments impossible for Finland.

This example shows that even urgent proposals backed by powerful member states and generally supported by all can face strong countervailing forces, especially if the proposal is linked to sensitive fields of national security, or as Niemann has pointed out, national welfare. As pointed out by former foreign minister Tuomioja and Helsinki Police Department, in reality, the proposed amendment on banning semi-automatic arms would not be impossible for Finland, but the reference to national security made it impossible for the government to argue against this. It is also important to note that the forces supporting Finnish opt-out were much stronger than opposite arguments presented by Tuomioja and the Police Department. If the national parliament and the government only hear one type of arguments, their decision is made accordingly.

The strong opposition of the firearms directive proposal was not limited to certain member states. Gun enthusiasts around Europe expressed their dissatisfaction with the Commission’s proposal. Firearms United, a worldwide confederation of gun owners, launched a petition against the proposal to pressure the Council of the EU and succeeded to gather over 340,000 signatures from European gun owners. In the petition, Firearms United stated: “unfortunately nothing in the draft would have prevented these two [Paris] attacks since neither were done with weapons that are now legal and would be banned with this new law.” It also argued “these weapons [semi-automatic firearms] were not used by terrorists and are not even typically used by criminals. They use unregistred, untraceble black market full auto Kalashnikovs.” (The Firearms United). Like many organisations opposing the proposal in Finland, Firearms United also did not want to acknowledge the fact that there is a link between legally owned guns and terrorism in Europe and wanted to create an image of an external gun problem that has nothing to do with the EU’s internal markets. It stated that the EU should bring focus on the real problems: illegal arms trade and the protection of the EU’s external borders.

As mentioned before, the Commission ambitious proposal received strong general support from member states. They urged the Commission to quickly proceed with the proposal and supported the early launch of the proposal after the Paris attacks. The European Parliament, however, was much more critical towards the Commission’s proposal, and IMCO’s rapporteur Vicky Ford described it as a “poorly drafted proposal which needs a lot of work”. IMCO was not happy with the Commission’s and the Council’s decision to rush with the proposal without conducting a proper
impact assessment and to use the Paris attacks as a reason for justifying this rush. The rapporteur therefore decided “to consult as widely and transparently as possible in order to ensure her report tackles real problems and to limit unnecessary unintended consequences” (IMCO 2016b, 65). Rapporteur Vicky Ford stated that “any changes to the Directive must therefore balance the right to ownership of certain types of firearms with controls appropriate to the risk they present”, hence calling for a much more balanced proposal than that of the Commission’s.

As showed earlier, the European Parliament succeeded to balance the proposal with certain amendments, for example on online sales, semi-automatic arms, collectors and medical tests. However, in these cases it was backed up by the Council. Originally, IMCO wanted to delete the amendment on deactivation but with strong support from the Council and the Commission, the amendment on deactivation ended up in the final act as proposed by the Commission. Deactivation was a highly political question after the Paris attacks, and hence strongly supported by member states. The European Parliament’s position was a countervailing force resisting the Commission’s leadership, which was demonstrated especially in the way it criticised the Commission’s proposal and pointed out that the Commission did not act ‘by the book’ with it. However, the Parliament’s position was weakened by the fact that after the Paris attacks, member states had to ‘do something’ to address the urgent threat of terrorism, which is why they easily bought the Commission’s and certain member states’ (the UK, France, Spain, Belgium) idea of making the firearms directive as ambitious as possible. In this uncertain and extremely sensitive situation which touched all Europeans, the member states trusted the Commission’s expertise and acknowledged the need to adopt new common measures. Juncker’s Commission as the ‘most political Commission ever’ was ready to take the lead with the support of member states. This notion supports Niemann’s and Schmitter’s (2009, 60–61) notion that the Commission’s leadership is most effective in “periods of swiftly chancing events, uncertainty and incomplete information” and when it is supported by powerful member states.
6. CONCLUSIONS

A closer examination of the Firearms directive has proven interesting for at least two reasons. First of all, it demonstrates a change from a purely market-based directive to a security-oriented directive and proves that the EU, and especially its supranational institutions like the Commission, seem to gain power and legitimacy in times of uncertainty. At the same time it also demonstrates how resistance from a member state can significantly weaken this power-gaining by the supranational institutions and resist integration. Moreover, the firearms directive has also proven to be an excellent case for lightly testing the new framework of neofunctionalist analysis and the new spillover pressures identified in it. In my analysis, I focus on exogenous ‘outside’ factors affecting the directive process, such as media attention and terrorism, as opposed to internal spillover logic pushing the integration from one policy area to another. I believe that the logic of functional spillover cannot explain developments around the firearms directive because there were no market-based reasons to revise the directive.

The changes in the firearms directive demonstrate the increasingly complex nature of EU policies and also the complexity of the problems the EU is expected to tackle: migration, flow of illegal arms, terrorism, human trafficking and climate change are all interconnected global problems that can only be truly addressed in international institutions, like the EU and its cooperative structures. It is the difficulty to address this complexity that the new neofunctional framework introduced by Arne Niemann in 2006 is criticised for. For example, Luis Simon (2008) has criticised Niemann’s approach for “failing to rise up to neofunctionalism’s real challenge by avoiding testing his revised model against the more intergovernmental policy areas, somehow appearing to side-step the fact that the real tension in EU integration studies is not between the internal and the external, but between the supranational (Single Market-related) and the intergovernmental”. My analysis on the firearms directive has focused especially on this tension between the supranational and intergovernmental dimensions of EU policies, and I have shown that at least some of the supranational pressures introduced by Niemann (2006) have been useful in analysing EU integration in the complex area of security.

However, the complex global problems mentioned above are not only external to the EU but also tightly connected to, and even facilitated by, the internal policies and the very nature and fundamental values of the EU itself. My analysis has shown how free movement of the Schengen area, one of the basic principles of EU integration, has actually fed the ‘gun problem’ in Europe and
made it easier for terrorists to acquire guns inside the EU. This is one of the problems the Commission and member states wanted to tackle by introducing a more ambitious version of the firearms directive after the Paris terrorist attacks of 2015. However, the firearms directive has been criticised for not having an impact on problems related to the illegal firearms market, from which terrorists usually get their guns. This suggests that the revision of the firearms directive was an act of ‘doing something’ to tackle terrorism after several attacks in Europe, rather than integration based on rational bargaining between member states.

The analysis of the firearms directive has also shown that as “terrorism is the new normal for Western Europe”, as Cas Mudde stated in Huffington Post after the Brussels attacks, security is the new normal for the EU. A systematic examination of positions in the firearms directive process shows that the Council and the Commission created a common discourse on security and had similar views on many issues. On some amendments, like the total ban of semiautomatic firearms, medical tests and adding collectors to the scope of the directive, the Commission’s proposal was too ambitious for the member states to approve, but in these cases the Council ‘softened’ the language to better fit national contexts but still kept the reference to security in the final act. The firearms directive is one example of how security is more and more included in EU language and also more present in EU legislation and indicates that issues related to internal security are becoming a top priority for the EU, even surpassing internal markets and economy from time to time. This also reflects the growing tensions between the intergovernmental and supranational level of EU integration. Even though terrorism is recognised as a common threat which forces national governments to ‘engage in multilateral cooperation’ to seek security benefits, the integration has been pushed much deeper and much more quickly than one could expect. Firearms directive is an example of how terrorism as a global cross-border phenomenon has changed the formation of EU policies. Even though most of the EU law is originally created around the single market, directives can be updated to be more security-oriented if member states and institutions recognise a need for more coordinated policies to tackle global threats, like terrorism and climate change. Security in Europe is moving from a member state level to EU level, of which the firearms directive is one example.

Another conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of the firearms directive is that especially after the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission has taken a leadership role in promoting the EU’s internal security integration. This proves Peterson’s (2017) point that Juncker’s Commission is the ‘most political Commission ever ‘. The Commission succeeded to draft a proposal that went further than
expected, to frame the proposal as a part of the EU’s wider security agenda and counter-terrorism measures and to push through even some of its politically risky amendments. However, the Commission’s leadership was supported by two powerful facts. It was backed by powerful member states and it was able to use the uncertainty created by the Paris terrorist attacks to promote its position. This supports the neofunctionalist notion that the Commission’s leadership role depends especially on these two things: the level of uncertainty and the support received from the member states (Niemann and Schmitter, 2009, 60–61).

However, not everything can be justified based on security and terrorism, at least if you ask the European Parliament or certain member states. First of all, my analysis shows that the Commission’s proposal was too ambitious for some member states to approve, even though it gained general support from the member states. Secondly, the analysis on countervailing forces shaping the directive showed that the European Parliament did not want to tighten the firearms directive just to show that the EU ‘is doing something’ to tackle the gun problem related to terrorism. It did not see the firearms directive as an effective tool to fight terrorism and stop illegal firearms from ending up in the hands of terrorists. This supports the Kaunert et al. (2012) notion that the European Parliament resists certain counter-terrorism measures even though they would have firm support from the Commission or the member states.

Moreover, the example of Finnish resistance shows that even urgent proposals backed by powerful member states and generally supported by all can face strong countervailing forces, especially if the proposal is linked to sensitive fields like national security. Sovereignty-consciousness has been a major countervailing force affecting the outcome of the firearms directive. Generally, member states supported the Commission’s proposal, but especially amendments on the ban of semi-automatic weapons and standard medical tests were too much for some member states. Sovereignty-consciousness was present especially in Finnish and Czech positions since both countries were ready to seek an opt-out from the ban of semi-automatic firearms on the grounds of maintaining national defence capabilities. Both countries have a strong culture of volunteer defence units who use their own guns in shooting trainings provided by reservist organisations. Finland, the Czech Republic and other member states opposing the ban of semi-automatic weapons were able to lobby their position into the final act: semi-automatic weapons were not banned and member states could use national security as a justification for granting authorisation for otherwise banned weapons.
The analysis of the first revision of the firearms directive showed that the European Parliament can influence the legislative procedure significantly with the right conditions and rapporteur. During the first revision, IMCO saw the potential to draw attention to security aspects and propose amendments to the revision based on that. The Council approved some of these security-based amendments, which also shows that despite the national reservations, member states already acknowledged possible threats posed by firearms and their free movement in the Schengen area at this stage. This brings me to my final conclusion. The amendments done by IMCO in 2007 were much like the ones that the Commission proposed after the Paris attacks of 2015. The question arises if the EU could have avoided some of the serious problems in gun security that have occurred recently, if it had adopted a more ambitious firearms directive during the first revision. The European Parliament’s emphasis on security then and Cecilia Malmstöm’s emphasis on gun security problems in 2012 reveal that many of the problems were already acknowledged in the early 2010s, but there was not enough political will to actually address them. This also draws attention to the role of shocking events, emotions and media in politics. In the case of the firearms directive, the urgent threat of terrorism and ‘the gun problem’ in Europe framed by media turned the political atmosphere to favour a tighter legislative framework for firearms and increased the Council’s pressure to react quickly and adopt security measures without long negotiations and exhausting bargaining.

Monar (2016, 147) has argued that the 2015 ‘crisis’ of the AFSJ “showed the risks and fallacy of the Member States launching a major European political and constitutional project without vesting the Union with the necessary powers and instruments to make it work and succeed”. Similarly, Jones et al. (2016) have argued that during the economic crisis, the EU was “failing forward” as national government sought for minimum short-term integration with the EMU. My analysis of EU’s firearms directive points to the same direction: the EU’s failure to address the ‘gun problem’ before the Paris attacks shows that intergovernmental bargaining settling for ‘minimum denominator’ in the area of high politics might be dangerous for the integration and the security of the Union as a whole. If the problems related to gun security in the Schengen area had been addressed during the first revision of the firearms directive, Europe could have possibly avoided some deadly attacks. Unfortunately, the political pressure to address these issues was created only after several deadly attacks and exogenous pressures created by the urgent threat of terrorism and media attention on the ‘gun problem’ after the attacks. My conclusions are much the same as those in Johanna Strikwerda’s (2017) recent study on CSDP and the Commission’s Defence and Security Procurement Directive of 2009. Her analysis showed that member states changed their position
from “mere reluctance towards the Commission proposals to accepting the Directive”, She also concluded that “rational choice perspective, often used to explain European integration, fails to account for the acceptance of a Directive”. My analysis on the firearms directive shares both of these notions, except that I focused more on the change in the Commission’s position. However, the similarity of these cases and their conclusions suggests that the area of security is truly becoming the new normal for the EU.

The analysis of the firearms directive raises several questions for future research. This analysis has shown that a closer analysis of a single directive is a useful tool for examining changes in the EU integration process, especially in controversial domains like the AFSJ. Secondly, the analysis has drawn attention to the growing problems of the Schengen area and links between the external and internal dimensions of the EU, which could be addressed more. In this analysis, I have focused on the Commission’s role and the pressures pushing the integration forward in the field of security. However, the analysis has shown that a more precise analysis on the roles of the European Parliament, powerful member states and the Presidency could also offer valuable insight on the developments of EU integration.
SOURCES

Newspaper & media sources:


Firearms United, “EU: You cannot stop terrorism by restricting legal gun ownership.”


Documents:


Council of the EU (2015c), Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3432nd Council meeting of Justice and Home Affairs. 14382/15 (Presse 71), Brussels 20.11.2015.


European Council (2015), European Council meeting (17 and 18 December 2015) – Conclusions. EUCO 28/15.


Biography:


### Annex 1 – Comparison of positions during the second revision of the firearms directive.

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<td>Deactivation</td>
<td>Taking into consideration the high risk of reactivating badly deactivated weapons and in order to <strong>enhance security</strong> across the Union, deactivated firearms should be covered by this Directive.</td>
<td>Deleted</td>
<td>As a response to recent terrorist acts which demonstrated gaps in the implementation of Directive 91/477/EEC especially with regard to the deactivation of weapons, convertibility and marking rules, the &quot;European Agenda on Security&quot; adopted in April 2015 and the Declaration of the Home Affairs Ministers Council of 29 August 2015 called for the revision of that Directive and for a common approach on the deactivation of firearms to prevent their reactivation and use by criminals.</td>
<td>Taking into consideration the high risk of reactivating improperly deactivated firearms and in order to <strong>enhance security</strong> across the Union, such firearms should be covered by Directive 91/477/EEC.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Alarm weapons</td>
<td>Furthermore, the risk of alarm weapons and other types of blank firing weapons being converted to real firearms is high, and in some of the terrorist acts converted arms were used. It is therefore essential to address the problem of converted firearms being used in criminal offences, notably by including them in the scope of the Directive. Technical specifications for alarm and signal weapons as well as for salute and acoustic weapons should be adopted in order to ensure that they cannot be converted into firearms.</td>
<td>Furthermore, to avoid the risk of acoustic weapons and other types of blank firing weapons being converted to real firearms is high, and in some recent terrorist acts such converted arms were used. It is therefore essential to address the problem of converted firearms being used in criminal offences, in particular by including them in the scope of the Directive. Technical specifications for alarm and signal weapons (...) should be adopted in order to ensure that they cannot be converted into firearms.</td>
<td>The risk of acoustic weapons and other types of blank-firing weapons being converted into real firearms is high. It is therefore essential to address the problem of such converted firearms being used in the commission of criminal offences, in particular by including them within the scope of Directive 91/477/EEC. Furthermore, to avoid the risk of alarm and signal weapons being manufactured in such a way that they are capable of being converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of a combustible propellant, the Commission should adopt technical specifications in order to ensure that they cannot be so converted.</td>
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<td>Semi-automatic Firearms</td>
<td>Some semi-automatic firearms can be easily converted to automatic firearms, thus <strong>posing a threat to security</strong>. Even in the absence of conversion to category &quot;A&quot;, certain semi-automatic firearms may be very dangerous when their capacity regarding the number of rounds is high. Such semi-automatic weapons should therefore be banned for civilian use.</td>
<td>There is a risk that any firearms converted to firing blanks, irritants, other active substances or pyrotechnic ammunition can be converted back in such a way as to make them capable of firing live ammunition. Such firearms should therefore remain in the categories in which they were classified prior to their conversion.</td>
<td>Some semi-automatic firearms can easily be converted to automatic firearms, thus <strong>posing a threat to security</strong>. Even in the absence of such conversion (...) certain semi-automatic firearms may be very dangerous when their capacity regarding the number of rounds is high. Therefore, semi-automatic firearms with a fixed loading device allowing to fire a high number of rounds, as well as semi-automatic firearm in combination with a removable loading device with a high number of rounds should be prohibited for civilian use. Such loading devices, such as fixed or detachable magazines, as well as feeding belts, should also be prohibited. When individuals are found to be in the possession of such loading devices these should be seized, as well as any semi-automatic centre fire firearms to which these could be fitted, even if the possession of these firearms was authorised. These individuals should also be deprived from their authorisation.</td>
<td>Some semi-automatic firearms can easily be converted to automatic firearms, thus <strong>posing a threat to security</strong>. Even in the absence of such conversion, certain semi-automatic firearms might be very dangerous when their capacity, in terms of the number of rounds, is high. Therefore, semi-automatic firearms with a fixed loading device allowing a high number of rounds to be fired, as well as semi-automatic firearms in combination with a detachable loading device having a high capacity, should be prohibited for civilian use.</td>
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<td>Traceability</td>
<td>Firearms may be used for far more than 20 years. In order to ensure their traceability, records of them should be kept for an indeterminate period of time until destruction is certified.</td>
<td>Firearms may be used for far more than 20 years. In order to ensure their traceability, records of them, and of the essential components thereof, should be kept for an indeterminate period of time until their destruction or deactivation is certified.</td>
<td>Firearms may be used for far more than 20 years. In order to ensure their traceability, records of them as well as of the essential components thereof should be kept for [20] years after destruction by the competent authorities.</td>
<td>In view of the dangerous nature and durability of firearms and essential components, in order to ensure that competent authorities are able to trace firearms and essential components for the purpose of administrative and criminal proceedings and taking into account national procedural law, it is necessary that records in the data-filing systems be retained for a period of 30 years after the destruction of the firearms or essential components concerned.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Online sales</td>
<td>Selling arrangements of firearms and their components by means of distance communication may pose a serious threat to security as they are more difficult to control than the conventional selling methods, especially as regards the on line verification of the legality of authorisations. It is therefore appropriate to limit the selling of arms and components by means of distance communication, notably internet, to dealers and brokers.</td>
<td>It is therefore appropriate to ensure that the conditions for purchasing firearms, essential components and ammunition by means of distance communication, in particular the internet, are such as to enable at least the identity of the purchasers and, where required, their authorisation to acquire a firearm to be verified, at the latest upon delivery, by the dealer or broker or by a public authority or a representative thereof.</td>
<td>Selling arrangements for firearms and their essential components by means of distance communication may pose a serious threat to security as they are more difficult to control than the conventional selling methods, especially as regards the on line verification of the authenticity of authorisations. It is therefore appropriate to enhance the specific provisions for sales (...) by means of distance communication, in particular the internet (...).</td>
<td>As regards purchasers, it is therefore appropriate to ensure that their identity and, where relevant, the fact of their authorisation to acquire a firearm, essential components or ammunition be checked by a licensed or authorised dealer or broker, or by a public authority or a representative of such authority, prior to, or at the latest upon, delivery.</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Collectors</td>
<td>Since collectors have been identified as a possible source of traffic of firearms, they should be covered by this Directive.</td>
<td>To avoid that collectors become a (...) a possible source of traffic of firearms, they should be covered by this Directive. Member States may authorise collectors to acquire and possess firearms, essential components thereof and ammunition in line with this Directive. Moreover, in individual special cases and subject to strict conditions on security, Member States may, subject to periodic review, authorise collectors to acquire and possess prohibited firearms.</td>
<td>Member States should be able to choose to grant authorisations to recognised museums and collectors for the acquisition and possession of firearms, essential components and ammunition classified in category A when necessary for historical, cultural, scientific, technical, educational or heritage purposes, provided that such museums and collectors demonstrate, prior to being granted such an authorisation, that they have taken the necessary measures to address any risks to public security or public order, including by way of proper storage. Any such authorisation should take into account and reflect the specific situation, including the nature of the collection and its purposes, and Member States should ensure that a system is in place for monitoring collectors and collections.</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union rules on marking</td>
<td>To avoid that markings are easily erased and to clarify on which components the marking should be affixed, common Union rules on marking should be introduced.</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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