Debating Transatlantic Security in the United States Congress
A study of senate armed services and foreign relations committees in the 111th and 112th congress (2009-2012)
TEEMU MÄKINEN

Debating Transatlantic Security in the United States Congress

A study of senate armed services and foreign relations committees in the 111th and 112th congress (2009-2012)

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty Council of the Faculty of Management of the University of Tampere, for public discussion in the auditorium Pinni B 1097, Kanslerinrinne 1, Tampere, on 24 February 2018, at 12 o’clock.

UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE
TEEMU MÄKINEN

Debating Transatlantic Security in the United States Congress

A study of senate armed services and foreign relations committees in the 111th and 112th congress (2009-2012)

Acta Universitatis Tamperensis 2352
Tampere University Press
Tampere 2018
The originality of this thesis has been checked using the Turnitin OriginalityCheck service in accordance with the quality management system of the University of Tampere.

Copyright ©2018 Tampere University Press and the author

Cover design by
Mikko Reinikka

Acta Universitatis Tamperensis 2352
ISSN-L 1455-1616
ISSN 1455-1616

Acta Electronica Universitatis Tamperensis 1858
ISSN 1456-954X
http://tampub.uta.fi

Suomen Yliopistopaino Oy – Juvenes Print
Tampere 2018
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work is a result of a life-long interest in the United States politics and the long, complex relationship between Europe and the New World. How do Americans experience the transatlantic alliance? A satisfying answer demands a comprehensive understanding of American thinking. That thinking manifests itself in the United States Congress, an institution reflecting domestic struggles over ideas that define United States’ place in the world.

As I began my journey in 2014, the security context in Europe shifted dramatically due to events in Ukraine. The somewhat neglected transatlantic alliance had to form a response, and questions like NATO’s Article 5 commitments and American troop deployments in Europe were once again topical. The 2016 presidential election campaign in the United States alone – not to mention the actual results - alarmed European observers. The need to view the United States beyond the foreign policy elites and public diplomacy reached new heights. In short, this dissertation is my attempt to understand American politics.

Being a PhD student is an educational process. It is mentally demanding to keep the focus on important things. It is mentally demanding to fight for funding against your fellow PhD students all equally deserving of receiving a grant. Intellectually, it is a transformative process. Perhaps the most important lesson I have learned is recognizing the limits of my own knowledge, and using that recognition as a motivation to push those limits as far as possible. It is a humbling process. I have come to view the larger academic community with renewed respect, yet taking pride in my own contributions.

I would like to thank my thesis instructor Tapio Raunio. This work would not have been written without Tapio’s encouragement, advice and patience. The honest, fair and illuminating feedback and advice from the rest of the political science faculty – and my fellow PhD students - from the University of Tampere, opened my eyes to the high requirements a PhD candidate ought to fulfill. Anna Kronlund has helped me along the way both with substance of my thesis and integration to the wider academic community. She has been a true mentor, and of that I am grateful. I would also like to thank the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. The events organized by FIIA offered a valuable insight into American politics, and I have had the honor
to present some of my own ideas to the distinguished professionals at FIIA’s Center on U.S Politics and Power. Special thanks to Mika Aaltola, Juha Käpylä and Ville Sinkkonen. John Morton Center for North American Studies at University of Turku has offered both seminars and lectures invaluable to Finnish students of American politics. I would like to thank Benita Heiskanen for an opportunity to present my own views and work at the JMC, and for the valuable work JMC continues to do. I would also like to thank pre-examiners Julia Azari and Benjamin Fordham for their valuable feedback.

I would like to thank the Finnish Cultural Foundation for funding my work and allowing me to focus all my energy in this dissertation.

Finally, I would like to thank my beautiful Laura. With her, the lonely work of being a PhD student was never lonely, and disappointment never turned into despair.

Turku, January 7th, 2018

Teemu Mäkinen
ABSTRACT

Crisis in Ukraine has highlighted the continued importance of transatlantic security framework, while the election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States raised concern over American commitment to European security. Given the political instability in Europe and U.S., and changes in European security situation, a comprehensive understanding of American policy towards Europe is required. The purpose of this dissertation is to first fill a gap in understanding of congressional attitudes towards transatlantic relations, more specifically transatlantic security. This study will examine congressional behavior across different types of policy areas; i.e. defense procurement, international agreements, war-powers, bilateral relations and deployment of both troops and defense systems.

This dissertation is a study of congressional foreign policy hearings in two relevant foreign policy committees in the Senate; Foreign Relations and Armed Services during the 111th (2009-2010) and 112th (2011-2012) Congress. The timeline included six significant transatlantic security issues: American missile defense system in Europe, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Libyan intervention, American troop presence in Europe, NATO and European security, and U.S.-Russia relations. The focus lies in the debates over the direction of American foreign policy in transatlantic security matters. Given the dynamics affecting congressional influence - and activity - in foreign affairs, how are transatlantic security issues defined and framed in Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees? And further, what does it say about the role of congressional committees in foreign policy debates, about the effects of domestic politics on foreign policy deliberation, and perhaps most importantly, what does it say about the influence of both partisan and long-term American foreign policy ideology on congressional attitudes towards transatlantic security?

Methodologically, this study uses qualitative analysis to examine congressional hearings. More specifically, *inductive framing analysis* is used to examine how individual senators discussed transatlantic security issues. In short, 1) political, historical, ideological and institutional context in examine, 2) dominant and competing framings are recognized, 3) key players and competing factions are recognized, and 4) the debate is deconstructed in context. The analysis will have a specific focus on
argumentation and the substance, rather than on rhetorical or linguistic characteristics. This way the interpretation and conceptualization of issues and policy options by individual members of Congress are highlighted to produce a comprehensive idea of how transatlantic security issues are debated in the United States Senate, how are the issues defined and which interpretations of reality are made more salient than others.

The empirical part of the dissertation emphasizes ideological aspects of American foreign policy debate. Given the rise in partisan polarization and the extreme polarization of the party elites (see Souva & Rohde, 2007), the relevance of foreign policy in electoral context has gained importance. Thus, there is a reason to believe that members of Congress are concerned over the influence of their respective foreign policy attitudes on their electoral success. Using Milner and Tingley’s (2015) distinction into distributional and ideological factors affecting congressional foreign policy behavior, I will evaluate the case studies both in the partisan context of “Democratic doves” and “Republican hawks” (see Gries, 2014) and in the context of long-term American foreign policy ideology (see Mead, 2002), dividing American long-term foreign policy ideology into four schools; Wilsonians, Jeffersonians, Hamiltonians, Jacksonians.

Based on the results of the frame analysis, I would conclude that the more parochial and partisan views of congressional foreign policy decision-making can be challenged. Reflexive partisanship did not define the debate. Of all the issues examined, only missile defense produced a dominantly partisan response (see figure 41.), although it should be note that missile defense was debated only in the Armed Services. I would argue that the overall results in this study do challenge some of the more cynical views of partisan conflict and parochial nature of congressional behavior. Issues defined in distributional terms – NATO and American troop presence in Europe - produced a cohesive congressional response, whereas Libya, START and U.S.-Russian relations produced a factional response. All the issues producing either partisan or factional response were debated on mainly ideological basis. Republican factionalism could be explained by Mead’s distinction into Jacksonians, Hamiltonians, Wilsonians and Jeffersonians – Jacksonians being most vehemently against administration policy -, whereas the Democrats were united with regard to every issue examined. Thus, ideology and the specifics of the issue at hand explained congressional response better than reflexive partisanship. Of specific interest was the Jacksonian insistence of not compromising with Russia on any issue, yet at the same time many Republicans defined as Jacksonians were eager to support candidate Trump when he voiced his rather unorthodox – at least for a Republican presidential candidate – views of U.S.-Russian relations.
KEYWORDS: United States Congress, foreign policy, committees, ideology, transatlantic relations.


Metodologisesti tutkimuksessa käytetään kvalitatiivista tutkimusmetodia, tarkemmin sanottuna induktiivista kehysteoriaa. Kehysteorian avulla kartoitetaan yksittäisten senaattorien puheenvuoroja transatlanttisissa turvallisuusdebateissa. Tutkimusmetodi on lyhyesti seuraava: 1) poliittisen, historiallisen, ideologisen ja institutionaalisen kontekstin analysointi, 2) dominanttien ja kilpailevien kehysten tunnistaminen, 3) tärkeiden toimijoiden ja kilpailevien näkökulmien tunnistaminen,
4) keskustelun purkaminen kontekstissa. Analyysin keskiössä on politiikkasubstanssin argumentointi, eikä tarkoituksena ei ole tehdä retorista tai kielellistä analyyssia. Näin yksittäisten politiikkojen tekemät tulkinnat ja käsitteelliset näkemykset eri politiikkakysymyksestä ja toimintavaihtoehtoista korostuvat, ja on mahdollista luoda kokonaisvaltainen kuva siitä, miten transatlanttiset turvallisuuskysymykset määräteiltiin Yhdysvaltain kongressissä.

AVAINSANAT: Yhdysvaltain kongressi, ulkopolitiikka, valiokunnat, ideologia, transatlanttiset suhteet.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 19  
   1.1 Purpose of the Study ............................................................................................................. 28  
   1.2 Research Design .................................................................................................................. 30  

2 CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY ......................................................................................... 40  
   2.1 Constitutional Framework .................................................................................................. 41  
      2.1.1 The War Powers ........................................................................................................... 42  
      2.1.2 Treaties or Executive Agreements? ............................................................................. 46  
      2.1.3 Power of the Purse ....................................................................................................... 50  
         2.1.3.1 Regular Order: Congress and American Defense Policy ...................................... 51  
         2.1.3.2 National Defense Appropriations Authorization ..................................................... 53  
   2.2 Institutional Framework ...................................................................................................... 54  
      2.2.1 The National Security Establishment ......................................................................... 54  
      2.2.1.1 The National Security Act of 1947 ......................................................................... 54  
      2.2.2 Congressional Committees ......................................................................................... 58  
      2.2.3 Congress and Federal Agencies .................................................................................... 59  

3 BETWEEN CONSTITUENCY INTEREST AND IDEOLOGICAL RIGIDITY .............................. 61  
   3.1 Changing Executive-Legislative Relations ......................................................................... 62  
      3.1.1 Imperial Presidency ...................................................................................................... 64  
      3.1.2 …or Congressional Dominance? ................................................................................... 67  
   3.2 The Water’s Edge ................................................................................................................. 72  
      3.2.1 Partisan Conflict or Ideological Polarization? ............................................................... 74  
         3.2.1.1 Polarization ............................................................................................................. 74  
         3.2.1.2 Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965 ........................................ 75  
   3.3 Distributional and Ideological Incentives ........................................................................... 79  
      3.3.1 Distributional ................................................................................................................ 80  
      3.3.2 Ideological ..................................................................................................................... 83  
   3.4 American Foreign Policy Ideology ..................................................................................... 87  
      3.4.1 Republicans and Democrats – Conservatives and Liberals ...................................... 87  
      3.4.2 Foreign Policy Profiles ................................................................................................. 91
4 CONTEXTUALIZATION OF TRANS ATLANTIC SECURITY ISSUES
FACING THE 111TH AND 112TH CONGRESS
4.1 United States, NATO, and the Issue of Burden-Sharing
4.2 Missile Defense in Europe
  4.2.1 From Star Wars to Gulf War
  4.2.2 American Missile Protection Act of 1998 and National Missile Defense Act of 1999
  4.2.3 From Bush to Obama
4.3 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
4.4 American Military Presence in Europe
  4.4.1 Cold War
  4.4.2 Post-Cold War
4.5 Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and Russia Reset
4.6 Libyan Intervention
4.7 An Ideological Perspective to Post-Cold War Security Policy

5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS, 111TH CONGRESS
5.1 Issues debated
  5.1.1 Senate Armed Services Committee
  5.1.2 Senate Foreign Relations Committee
5.2 NATO and European Security
  5.2.1 Armed Services Committee
    5.2.1.1 Dominant Frames
    5.2.1.2 Competing Frames
  5.2.2 Senate Foreign Relations Committee
    5.2.2.1 Dominant Frames
    5.2.2.2 Competing Frames
  5.2.3 Individual Breakdown
  5.2.4 Discussion
5.3 Missile Defense in Europe
  5.3.1 Armed Services Committee
    5.3.1.1 Dominant Frames
    5.3.1.2 Competing Frames
  5.3.2 Individual Breakdown
  5.3.3 Discussion
5.4 The New START Treaty
  5.4.1 Armed Services Committee
    5.4.1.1 Dominant Frames
6 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS, 112TH CONGRESS

6.1 Issues Debated in 112th Congress

6.1.1 Armed Services Committee

6.1.2 Foreign Relations Committee

6.2 Libya

6.2.1 Armed Services Committee

6.2.2 Foreign Relations Committee

6.3 European Troop Presence / BRAC

6.3.1 Armed Services Committee

6.3.2 Individual Breakdown

6.3.3 Discussion

6.4 Implementation of The New START Treaty

6.4.1 Armed Services Committee

6.4.2 Foreign Relations Committee

6.4.3 Individual Breakdown

6.4.4 Discussion

6.5 European-based Missile Defense System

6.5.1 Armed Services Committee

6.5.2 Individual Breakdown

6.5.3 Discussion

6.6 Russia

6.6.1 Armed Services Committee

5.4.1.2 Competing Frames

5.4.2 Foreign Relations Committee

5.4.2.1 Dominant Frames

5.4.2.2 Competing Frames

5.4.3 Individual Breakdown

5.4.4 Discussion

2.2 Competing Frames

334 Competing Frames

325 Competing Frames

323 Competing Frames

314 Competing Frames

312 Competing Frames

311 Competing Frames

306 Competing Frames

295 Competing Frames

292 Competing Frames

284 Competing Frames

282 Competing Frames

271 Competing Frames

260 Competing Frames

252 Competing Frames

243 Competing Frames

237 Competing Frames

234 Competing Frames

230 Competing Frames

228 Competing Frames

227 Competing Frames

225 Competing Frames

222 Competing Frames

221 Competing Frames

219 Competing Frames

218 Competing Frames

216 Competing Frames

213 Competing Frames

211 Competing Frames

210 Competing Frames

208 Competing Frames

207 Competing Frames

201 Competing Frames
6.6.2 Foreign Relations Committee.........................................................340
   6.6.2.1 Dominant Frames.................................................................341
   6.6.2.2 Competing Frames.................................................................343
6.6.3 Individual Breakdown.................................................................344
6.6.4 Discussion......................................................................................347

7 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND MAIN FINDINGS.................................351

PRIMARY SOURCES ............................................................................371
   Armed Services – 111th Congress......................................................371
   Foreign Relations – 111th Congress...................................................372
   Armed Services – 112th Congress......................................................372
   Foreign Relations – 112th Congress...................................................374

LITERATURE..........................................................................................375
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Issues debated in Senate Armed Services Committee, 111th Congress ........ 152
Figure 2. Issues debated in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 111th Congress ... 153
Figure 3. NATO / European security by party – Armed Services.......................... 155
Figure 4. Argumentative breakdown of the NATO Negative -framing – Armed Services .......................................................................................... 159
Figure 5. NATO / European Security by party - Foreign Relations ..................... 161
Figure 6. Breakdown of NATO negative – framing – Foreign Relations.............. 162
Figure 7. NATO / European Security by individual - Armed Services................ 170
Figure 8. NATO / European Security by individual - Foreign Relations............... 172
Figure 9. Missile defense in Europe relative to administration's policy – Armed Services ........................................................................................................... 180
Figure 10. Missile defense by individual - Armed Services ................................ 188
Figure 11. Missile defense in Europe by party – Armed Services........................ 190
Figure 12. START by vote – Armed Services ..................................................... 196
Figure 13. Nay votes (START) – Armed Services.............................................. 198
Figure 14. Yea votes (START) – Armed Services .............................................. 199
Figure 15. START by vote - Foreign Relations................................................... 208
Figure 16. START by party - Foreign Relations ................................................. 213
Figure 17. START by individual - Armed Services ............................................. 219
Figure 18. START by individual - Foreign Relations.......................................... 221
Figure 19. Issues debated in Armed Services Committee, 112th Congress........... 228
Figure 20. Issues debated in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 112th Congress 229
Figure 21. NATO / European Security – Armed Services................................. 231
Figure 22. Libya - framings - Armed Services .......................................................... 232
Figure 23. Argumentative breakdown of U.S.-led and NATO negative - framings by
Republican Senators - Armed Services ............................................................... 242
Figure 24. Libya by party - Foreign Relations .......................................................... 251
Figure 25. Strategic - framing - Libya ................................................................. 253
Figure 26. Congressional - framing: Should President Obama Request a Congressional
Resolution or a Declaration of War? (Libya) – Foreign Relations .................. 261
Figure 27. Libya by individual - Armed Services .................................................. 271
Figure 28. Libya by individual - Foreign Relations ............................................. 272
Figure 29. European Troop Presence / BRAC - Armed Services ......................... 283
Figure 30. European presence - Armed Services ............................................... 296
Figure 31. Implementation of START by party - Armed Services ....................... 302
Figure 32. Implementation of START by party - Foreign Relations ..................... 311
Figure 33. Implementation of START by individual - Armed Services ............... 316
Figure 34. Implementation of START by individual - Foreign Relations ............. 317
Figure 35. Missile defense by party - Armed Services ....................................... 322
Figure 36. Missile defense by individual - Armed Services ............................... 330
Figure 37. Russia in Armed Services ............................................................... 334
Figure 38. Russia in Foreign Relations ............................................................. 340
Figure 39. Russia by individual - Armed Services .......................................... 344
Figure 40. Russia by individual - Foreign Relations .......................................... 346
Figure 41. Congressional behavior and dominance of distributional/ideological factor
by issue ......................................................................................................................... 352
Figure 42. Statements by ten most active senators in Foreign Relations .......... 363
Figure 43. Statements by ten most active senators in Armed Services ............... 364
This dissertation is a study of congressional foreign policy hearings in two relevant foreign policy committees in the Senate; Foreign Relations and Armed Services during the 111th (2009-2010) and 112th (2011-2012) Congress. The focus lies in the debates over the direction of American foreign policy in transatlantic security matters. Given the dynamics affecting congressional influence - and activity - in foreign affairs, how are transatlantic security issues defined and framed in Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees? And further, what does it say about the role of congressional committees in foreign policy debates, about the effects of domestic politics on foreign policy deliberation, and perhaps most importantly, what does it say about the influence of both partisan and long-term American foreign policy ideology on congressional attitudes towards transatlantic security?

This study leads from the theoretical postulation that words, and ideas wrapped in them, do matter. “Words are also deeds”, claimed Wittgenstein. (Quoted in Skinner, 2002. 4). In the era of congressional polarization, ideas framed for the domestic, partisan or ideological consumption can have far-reaching implication to transatlantic relations if the Congress defines transatlantic security issues with the end-goal of re-election taking the center stage as the basis of political argumentation. Take the example of NATO spending. As argued in this dissertation, senators in the two committees held a dominantly negative view of U.S. European force posture and NATO’s prospects as a security organization, and contributions by European member states to the alliance came under constant criticism. Long before the red “Make America Great Again” hats took over the 2016 election, the context which enabled Donald Trump’s message to resonate vis-à-vis NATO and Europe was established. Then again, the tonality around NATO was rather different when debating NATO or European security in the context of Russia. What explains this difference? What explains the factionalism within the Republican party on issues such as ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) or Libyan intervention in 2011, and, what explains the seemingly partisan nature of debates over European-based missile defense system?
In February 1793, Great Britain, Holland and Spain joined the German powers in a war against the French Revolution. (Gilbert, 1970. 116). Four years prior in 1789 - the year of the French Revolution and the ratification of the United States Constitution - a reluctant George Washington, “uncomfortable in possession of power”, became the first President of the United States. (Daynes, 2000. 3). Until 1792, foreign policy played little role in President Washington’s presidential agenda, but as English blockade of France adversely affected American trade with France and in the West Indies, and as fears of France demanding American assistance as per Franco-American alliance of 1781 to fight the British and Spanish in the West Indies became ever more realistic, Washington’s attention had to be focused on America’s relations with the old European powers. Shortly after his second inauguration, April 22nd, 1793, a “Proclamation of Neutrality” was issued by Washington, articulating American European policy to “adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial towards the Belligerent Powers.” (Quoted in Gilbert, 1970. 117). Washington and Jay’s policy was supported by Alexander Hamilton, who wrote to John Jay before Washington’s proclamation, and as the news about the war in Europe broke out, and requested that he’d draft the neutrality proclamation he eventually did. (Murray, 2007. 181). But much like the pre-World War II isolationists, Washington’s contemporaries had great difficulty to merge neutrality policy with real-life events. America’s ally in the Revolutionary War and a fellow republic France made every attempt to draw America into the war, and the actions of British navy against American merchant ships made certain the tensions remained high. Washington, wary of potential large-scale military conflict with any of the great European powers, sent John Jay as a special envoy to attempt negotiating a treaty, which came to be known as the Jay Treaty, with the British. (Gilbert, 1970. 117.)

June 29th, 1795, Republican Senator Stevens Mason from Virginia leaked the text of the Jay Treaty to Aurora, leading Republican newspaper. (Demmer, 2015. 579). As a treaty, John Jay’s accomplishments negotiating with the British fell short. Other than agreeing to evacuate their northern posts, the British refused to concede to American wishes, most notably, they refused to stop interfering with American merchant ships. (Gilbert, 1970. 118.) The treaty revealed a divide in American body-politic. Whereas Washington, Hamilton and Jay supported the neutrality policy and

---

1 The Franco-American alliance was signed between France and United States in 1778, and ended in 1800. The purpose of the alliance was from a French perspective to create a “permanent alliance” with the United States in order to prevent American-British rapprochement following the end of American Revolutionary War. United States, in turn, gained financial aid, military aid, and French recognition of American independence, in exchange for military cooperation against Britain and U.S. guarantees of France’s Caribbean holdings. (Chambers, 2004.)
the Treaty with Britain to keep America out of the war, orthodoxy republican Thomas Jefferson viewed the situation in ideological terms, categorically denying the rationale behind United States “submitted to the power of the old mother country in a counterrevolutionary alliance against republican France.” (Onuf, 2007. 129). For Jefferson, such concession would nullify the very idea of American revolution and independence. (ibid). Hamilton’s policy position was nevertheless victorious, as he argued that American foreign policy ought to be based on national self-interest, for other nations, behind their mask of altruism, are equally motivated by mere self-servitude. (Murray, 2007. 118).

Washington managed to receive the constitutionally mandated ratification in the Senate by exactly two-thirds of the senatorial vote.\(^2\) (See Gilbert, 1970). That did not end the debate. Republicans, as opposed to Federalists Washington and Hamilton, argued against the “constitutionality of the treaty”, claiming it to “being at war with every check, with every provision, by which it guards against the intrusion of one branch upon the rights of another.” (Quoted in Demmer, 2015. 579). For Republicans, the issue at hand was the separation of powers and foreign affairs. They requested Washington to submit the Treaty papers to the Republican controlled House of Representatives, arguing, that the president could not bypass the legislature by not securing explicit consent of the House of Representatives. Washington, however, maintained that since the treaty had received Senate’s approval and was signed by the president, it was now the supreme law of the land, and the House had no constitutional authority over the issue. In the end, despite threats to the contrary, Republican-led House of Representatives appropriated funds to execute the Jay Treaty by vote of 51 to 49, ending the year-long battle over the treaty (Demmer, 2015. 594-595), and consequently, determining the direction of early American foreign policy towards Europe.

Two hundred and twenty years later, during his 2015 State of the Union speech, President Barack Obama made a request to the Joint Session of 114th Congress: “I’m asking both parties to give me trade promotion authority to protect American workers, with strong new trade deals from Asia to Europe…” (White House, 2015). Trade promotion authority, also known as fast-track authority, would delegate congressional authority over American foreign trade policy to the president. Although trade promotion authority is by no means a perquisite, it is widely understood as a crucial tool for the president to negotiate trade agreements with foreign nations, including two large scale agreements currently in progress; Trans-

\(^2\) See U.S. Const. Art. II Sec. 2: “He [the President] shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur…”
The two examples, the Jay Treaty and trade promotion authority (TPA), exemplify two notable factors affecting American foreign policy formulation; distributive and ideological incentives. (Milner & Tingley, 2015). The case of trade promotion authority highlights different aspects of executive-legislative relationship in foreign policy. Although the American system gives great power to the executive branch of the government, one must bear in mind domestic factors affecting president’s decision making either directly, or indirectly. These domestic issues affect congressional actors and can have far reaching consequences on American foreign policy, especially since foreign and domestic politics have become ever more intertwined. (See. Putnam, 1988; Lindsay, 1993; Souva & Rohde, 2007). Needs of the U.S. Congress, and more precisely, the needs of individual members of Congress, should be considered when analyzing American foreign policy in Europe, as several key security and economic questions affecting it all fall under congressional influence. These needs have their roots in the constituency interests and ideology. Just like the case of trade promotion authority is a sum of power struggle over direction of American foreign policy, constitutional authority, electoral politics, ideology and American domestic politics, most foreign policy questions are subject to congressional oversight influenced by all of the aforementioned factors. In the case of TPA, direct distributional considerations played a considerable role, as free-trade agreements tend to have direct financial consequences to working class constituencies. In the case of the Jay Treaty, ideological considerations over America’s foreign policy, and its relationship with both United Kingdom and the new French Republic, affected the domestic debates and President Washington’s room to maneuver and formulate the early American foreign policy.

Given the changes in the security situation of Europe, brought on by both Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the election of Donald Trump as the
president of the United States in 2016, old questions of transatlantic relations, NATO, economic cooperation and bilateral relations between Russia and United States are back on the table. As American domestic politics continue to have an influence on concrete transatlantic issues, more study in the role of the Congress in American foreign policy formulation can help build a better picture of American policy towards Europe. This, however, is not a study of the implications of specific policy decisions of legislation themselves. Leading from an understanding that parliamentary politics is constituted through language, and that “speech is also action” (Skinner, 2002, 4), this is a study of individual members of Congress deliberating significant transatlantic security issues in a very specific institutional and political context. Methodologically, this is a study of framing, problem definition, legitimization, justification, and deliberation in the congressional context.

In the spirit of separation-of-powers and Madisonian democracy, the Constitution gives both the legislative and executive branch authority over foreign policy issues with no clear lines of demarcation. The constitutional problematization of executive-legislative relationship is perhaps most authoritatively defined by Edwin Corwin, who recognized the ambivalence of constitutional authority granted by the U.S. Constitution to both Congress and the president. Per Corwin, the U.S. Constitution de facto shares, not separates, the foreign policy privileges of the nation, thus invoking an “invitation to struggle” over the direction of U.S. foreign policy. Corwin’s assertion suggests contingency; i.e. which player leads and when? In this sense, executive-legislative relationship in foreign policy is always in motion. As Palonen (2007, 73) described Max Weber’s understanding of power: “Power is neither property nor a given structure, but a contingent constellation between struggling or competing political agents.” Similarly, the United States

---

3 Language is also used to exert political authority. Per Skinner (2002, 5): “…we employ our language not merely to communicate information but at the same time to claim authority for our utterances, to arouse the emotions of our interlocutors, to create boundaries of inclusion and exclusion and to engage in many other exercises of social control.” As such, we understand language as another tool at the disposal of individual members of Congress.

4 See Federalist Papers no. 48-50.

5 Thus, one must study the “struggle” itself to understand executive-legislative relationship in foreign policy. But the battle over foreign policy reaches beyond the constitutional separation of powers and congressional veto powers. The Congress affects foreign policy by giving informal advice, nonbinding resolutions, policy statements, policy oversight - especially in committees -, legislative directives or restrictions and structural or procedural changes. (Grimmet, 1999).

6 For early literature on congressional-executive relations in foreign policy see also Robinson, (1962); Dahl, (1964) and Carroll, (1966).
Constitution does not form a strict structural foundation on executive-legislative power in foreign policy.

Noting examples such as Theodor Roosevelt, Harry Truman and Richard Nixon, Arthur Schlesinger’s “The Imperial Presidency” (1974) was a forceful argument that the presidency indeed had seized the foreign policy power. Inspired by the George W. Bush presidency, Andrew Rudalevige brought the concept to the 21st century in his book “The New Imperial Presidency” (Rudalevige 2006a; see also: 2006b; 2012; 2016). The power over nation’s foreign policy culminates over questions of war and peace, i.e. who has the authority to deploy American troops in harm’s way. Louis Fisher (see for example 2004; 2005; 2009; 2010; 2012; 2015 & 2017) is one of leading authorities in the constitutionality of presidential war powers, and one of the more vocal scholars defending congressional war powers, yet arguing that Congress has knowingly deferred its power to the executive. (See Fisher, Hendrickson & Weissman, 2008.)

Other scholars have come to argue for the notion of presidential deference. Johnson (2005) for example argued that the Congress had indeed affected American foreign policy throughout the Cold War, and Howell and Pevehouse (2005; 2007a) have brought this argument to the new millennia by asserting that congressional influence vis-à-vis the presidency is more notable than previous scholars have cared to admit. Two important notions can be derived from the difference of thought between the two schools of thought in congressional influence. First, both stress the use-of-force as the main factor in calculating presidential power in foreign policy. Fisher et al. (2008) argue that the Congress had deferred its war-making powers to the executive, whereas Howell and Pevehouse (2005; 2007a; 2007b) argue that presidents are keenly aware of congressional support for their decision to use force, thus granting the Congress avenues of influence, especially when the Congress has domestic incentives to do so. Second, the methodological approach adopted - large data sets over a considerable time period - overpower individuals attempting to affect American foreign policy and the substantive policy issues under debate. The novelty of this study is its focus on a limited period ranging from 2009 to 2012 and the specific focus on Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees. As noted by Stocker (2015, 49):

---

7 See also Cooper (2002) for presidential tools in expanding executive power, for presidential power and war on terror see for example Goldsmith, (2007) and Goldstein, (2010). For other scholars arguing for presidential supremacy in foreign policy, see for example Krasner, (1978); Ikenberry, Lake & Mastanduno, (1988) and Legro, (2005. 49-83.)

8 For Congress and war powers see also Hendrickson, (2013a & 2013b).
…many studies of Congress’ impact on foreign policy use measures such as the composition of the Congress (Howell & Pevehouse, 2005) and pieces of legislation passed (Scott & Carter, 2002). This is in part because such measures lend themselves to easy quantitative analysis.

The qualitative approach adopted by this study enables me to closely examine individual senators in their approach to specific policy issues. Subject matter, transatlantic security, enables me to observe congressional behavior in foreign policy issues other than direct use-of-force. As the idea of considerable congressional influence has gained wind (see for example Lindsay, 1994; Hersman 2000; Carter & Scott, 2009; Owens, 2009), the scholars examining executive-legislative relations in foreign policy ought to widen both their contextual and methodological approaches to the issue.

Partisan polarization has been the defining aspect of congressional politics since the rise of the conservative Tea Party movement in 2010 midterm election. Battles over federal budget have highlighted executive-legislative relations ever since, as exemplified by the near shutdown of U.S. federal government over the issue of Planned Parenthood funding (Adams, 2011), and the 113th Congress being dubbed “the worst Congress ever” by some commentators (see Bolton, 2014), due to lack of legislation passed, and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid’s [D-NV] use of “nuclear option” to change Senate rules generating partisan animosities that are, in the words of then-sixth term Senator John McCain, “very deep, but also I believe they fundamentally change the way the Senate has worked.” (ibid). However, the effects of polarization on American foreign policy decision-making are not easily calculated. Jordan Tama argues in his working paper “Bipartisanship in a Polarized Age: The U.S. Congress and Foreign Policy Sanctions” that bipartisanship in American foreign policy still exists. He takes the example of sanction policies against Russia, China, and Iran as examples of partisan cooperation in formulating American foreign policy, and in the case of China, he demonstrates how Congress has asserted its role in a bipartisan manner even when opposed by the president. (Tama, 2015a. 2-3). William Howell and Jon Pevehouse argue that the dominating factor affecting congressional assertiveness is the partisan composition of the Congress. When president’s party holds the Congress, the Congress usually goes along and does not challenge the executive, while under divided government the opposition has actively looked for ways to challenge president in foreign policy. (Howell & Pevehouse, 2007.) Milner & Tingley (2015) further argue that partisan polarization appears not

---

9 See for example Abramowitz, (2011 & 2012).
to be the defining characterization of Congress’ role in foreign policy, at least in part due to more traditional congressional incentives - including distributive politics with close constituency connections and ideological factionalism - dominating the decision-making processes in the relevant foreign policy committees. (see Fowler, 2015 & Deibel 2005).

Jordan Tama argued in his article that U.S. sanction policy seems to gather wide bipartisan support, suggesting that foreign policy decision-making has at least in certain cases resisted partisan polarization. (Tama, 2015a. 2-3). However, the political context and the policy environment play a major role in defining how Congress asserts its foreign policy powers. Per Bert Rockman:

…politicians tend to discount the long-term future for the exigencies of the present or the electoral pressures of the near future…. Certainly, these pressures are felt relentlessly in areas such as trade, international agreements involving regulation, and frequently in such areas as defense procurement. (Rockman, 2005.)

Finally, ideas matter. Per Aldrich et. al. (2006, 478), three requirements are to be met for foreign policy to be a significant factor in the elections. First, voters must hold coherent beliefs about foreign policy; second, voters must be able to access their foreign policy attitudes in politically relevant way; and third, candidates must offer distinctly different foreign policy options to choose from.10 (ibid.) Given the rise in partisan polarization and the extreme polarization of the party elites (see Souva & Rohde, 2007), the aforementioned elements affecting the relevance of foreign policy in electoral context have, if anything, become more salient.11 Thus, there is a reason to believe that members of Congress are concerned over the influence of their respective foreign policy attitudes on their electoral success. Using Milner and Tingley’s (2015) distinction into distributional and ideological factors affecting congressional foreign policy behavior, I will evaluate the case studies both in the partisan context of “Democratic doves” and “Republican hawks” (see Gries, 2014) and in the context of long-term American foreign policy ideology (see Mead, 2002), dividing American long-term foreign policy ideology into four schools; Wilsonians, Jeffersonians, Hamiltonians, Jacksonians. (Chapter 3.)

The significance of my contribution to the general research on congressional authority in American foreign policy lies in my focus on congressional deliberation.

---

10 See also Aldrich et. al. (1989).
11 For the role of partisan ideology and polarization in American legislative politics see Hare & Poole (2014); McCarty & Poole (2007); Poole & Rosenthal (2007); Mann & Ornstein (2013); and for an institutional perspective, see Aldrich (2015).
When the Congress either opposes, or supports presidential initiatives, or presents some of its own, it must legitimize its response. By looking beyond voting behavior and constitutional veto powers – the two perspectives dominating current academic approach to congressional studies –, a broader perspective on the role of the Congress in American foreign policy can be formulated. The goal is not to critique or diminish the more quantitative approaches in the study of congressional politics, but merely broaden the methodological perspective.

The discussion on transatlantic relations and United States’ role in European security politics has gained importance since Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. U.S. troop deployments in the Baltic states, EU-USA economic sanctions against Russia, and the future of NATO exemplify the U.S. influence on European security. In Finland and Sweden, Russian action in the region led to public debate over NATO membership, civil organizations and interest groups were vocal on Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement (TTIP), and the Finnish Defense Forces have acquired and continue to consider acquiring high level military technology from the United States. (See Saloniús-Pasternak, 2012). This thesis examines transatlantic relations during president Obama’s first term. Most salient transatlantic issues include the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), future of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in both the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Libyan War 2011 context, America’s permanent, forward-based military presence in Europe, and U.S. European-based missile defense. By examining the congressional hearings in Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, my goal is to examine how, when and why the U.S. Congress either supported or opposed presidential initiatives, or otherwise actively affected American foreign policy debate in matters pertaining to transatlantic security policy. Methodologically the thesis relies on framing theory to identify substantive basis and issue emphasis in statements made by Committee members in transatlantic relations related hearings during 111th and 112th Congress. Once the overall tone, partisan inclinations and issue definitions are identified, further deconstruction of the debate follows. My dissertation will examine the transatlantic security policy debates from four separate perspectives: 1) how the senators in two influential foreign policy committees viewed transatlantic security issues, 2) role of ideology and partisanship in transatlantic security debates, 3) political

---

12 For a study of institutional influence of U.S. Congress on transatlantic relations through methods such as parliamentary diplomacy, see for example Jančić, 2016. For a non-security focused examination of EU-U.S. relations on an institutional level see Steffenson, 2005.
The new Trump administration has caused much concern in Europe over U.S. policy towards NATO and European security in general. President Trump’s and his administration’s insistence that Europe ought to pay its share of common defense for it to continue to enjoy its security guarantees under the military umbrella of United States has further put into question the relevance of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Transactional inclinations of the new Commander-in-Chief, America first -agenda, statements of NATO and an ambiguous stance on Russia have alarmed many in Europe. Adding to the confusion, President Trump has been somewhat erratic in his statements, making it difficult for outside observers to evaluate his policy preferences. This led Senator John McCain [R-AZ] to conclude that “we’ve learned to watch what the president does as opposed to what he says.” (Quoted in Erlanger, 2017). This dissertation will ignore the advice given by Senator McCain by focusing specifically on what the members of Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee said about NATO and transatlantic security issues during the 111th (2009-2010) and 112th (2011-2012) Congress. Speech is one of the key elements of American presidency, especially relative to foreign policy and conduct of alliances.\textsuperscript{13} Words are action, and as put by Daniela Schwarzer regarding President Trump: “What he says also changes reality”, and that change has consequences: “If you put NATO or the European Union into doubt, it changes their credibility and damages them.” (ibid).

\subsection*{1.1 Purpose of the Study}

The purpose of this dissertation is to first fill a gap in understanding of congressional attitudes towards transatlantic relations, more specifically transatlantic security. Now, the role of Congress has been studied on an institutional level (see for example Jančić, 2016; Steffenson, 2005), and from an IR perspective highlighting the post-9/11 drift in transatlantic relations (see for example Lansford & Tashev, 2005; Oswald, 2006; Shapiro & Byman, 2006; Herd & Forsberg, 2008; Pawlak, 2010; Dorman & Kaufman, 2011; Scott-Smith, 2012 & Hamilton, 2014), but the role of

\textsuperscript{13} See for example: “Here is my fear, let me be very concrete. First of all, given the President’s powers in foreign policy under Article II of our Constitution, a really determined President with a clear view of what he wants to achieve can move policy all by himself even if the bureaucracy is not happy about it. That is especially true when you are talking about the conduct of alliances.” (Galston, quoted in The Brookings Institution, 2016. 11.)
U.S. Congress in transatlantic security has been somewhat neglected, despite the strong scholarly focus on Congress and foreign policy per se. Second, this study will examine congressional behavior across different types of policy areas; i.e. defense procurement, international agreements, war-powers, bilateral relations and deployment of both troops and defense systems. Milner and Tingley (2015) examined the variance of congressional behavior across policy instruments, using roll-call data, lobbying reports and surveys. The qualitative approach in this study emphasizing *debate* offers a different, rather neglected approach to examining congressional foreign policy variance across foreign policy instruments. Great many authors have studied constitutional questions (see for example Corwin, 1957; Fisher, 2004; Finn & Kommers, 2004), executive-legislative relations (see for example Carter & Rowling, 2004a; Carter & Rowling, 2004b; Lindsay, 1993a; Lindsay 1993b; Manning, 1977; Owens & Pelizzom, 2009; Prins, 2001; Silverstein, 1997), but although some have studied congressional debates (see for example Kronlund, 2013), few have adopted the qualitative approach in this study. By using frame analysis to carefully go through all the hearings on transatlantic security matters, ideological and partisan argumentation can be identified from the *content*, rather than using DW-NOMINATE or other similar methods adopted by scholars studying congressional committees to map out ideological tendencies (see for example Bendix, 2016). This way, one can identify individual behavior and argumentation to add a new approach missing from studies in foreign policy entrepreneurship (such as Carter & Scott, 2009; 2010; Lantis & Marsh, 2016), which have used policy statements, public announcements, and legislation to identify foreign policy entrepreneurship. Finally, the focus on committee hearings in Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations fills a gap in scholarly understanding of the two foreign policy committees on an argumentative level. Studies such as Fowler’s (2015) focus on committee’s oversight role based on a long-term dataset. By focusing on public hearings, this study examines political action in the “public sphere”\(^\text{14}\), where individual actors attempt to define the foreign policy sphere, and public deliberation has its place (see Mayhew, 2000).

This study attempts to fill gaps in the knowledge regarding transatlantic security debates in the two Senate committees, congressional behavioral variance across foreign policy instruments, foreign policy entrepreneurship in matters of transatlantic importance, and partisan and ideological argumentation based on

---

\(^{14}\) Understood in Habermas’ terms as a sphere of “open and well-reported deliberation in Parliament, constant and open press criticism of the government, wide circulation of news, and attentiveness and sometimes assertiveness by a fairly broad public.” (Mayhew, 2000. 7).
frame-analysis, rather than commonly used DW-NOMINATE and other methodological tools based on roll-call analysis.

1.2 Research Design

Because of the magic quality of speech, the worlds you invoke are very likely to appear around you. (Pocock, 1973. 30.)

Blunt of the research will revolve around inductive analysis of committee hearing transcripts in the two Senate committees. The key operational goal is identifying frame packages in the content and attempting to recognize logical framing devices and a chain of reasoning devices that promote a specific interpretation of a topic. (Berbers et al. 2015. 802). Said attempts to frame the debate can be identified by “the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgements.” (Entman, 1993. 52). Framing, as its understood in this study, refers to “arguments and justifications embedded in political discourse.” (Kinder & Nelson, 2005. 103). As such, frames, and framing, form an integral part of the political debate and elite discourse, especially since they can be defined as something in the minds of the public; “cognitive structures that help citizens make sense of politics” (ibid). They make complex realities accessible for the general public. For this, ideology can be understood as a link between complex political issues and citizens understanding of their, and America’s, place in the world.

Jonathan Maynard (2013) created a mapping of different approaches to ideological studies. He divided the analytical methods in three separate categories: conceptual, discursive, and quantitative. Based on Maynard’s mapping, this study would fit in the conceptual category. Ideologies are understood as “systems of ideas”. (Ibid, 301). Instead of tying the ideological sphere to unidimensional liberal-conservative divide, this study understands ideology as a method to “…inject order and meaning…” into “…political phenomena…” (ibid). It uses ideology to understand political behavior, and sees powerful (political) individuals as key authorities in maintaining and promoting ideological interpretation of political issues. Thus, this thesis will focus on individual senators with the use of Mead’s (2002) separation into Jacksonians, Wilsonians, Hamiltonians, and Jeffersonians as the basis of historical understanding of American foreign policy ideology. These

15 See also Edelman, (1993).
conceptualizations of ideology are not mutually exclusive. Concepts are given a political meaning by using them as a framework to explain reality, and, by imposing certain meanings to them as a way to contest competing interpretations. 16 (Ibid.) Framing, as understood in this study, is a method to define concepts consistent with the ideological foundations of one’s belief system (of the best possible policy approach to a given situation). In this sense, partisan polarization can be seen as affecting ideologies by “strengthening” them in relation to competing concepts. As a result, a nuanced approach to ideology – if one ever existed - can shift towards “strong” ideology, defined by “tight fusion of fact and value, selective reinterpretation of the past, marginalization and suppression of alternative viewpoints, and airbrushing inconsistencies to hold together multiple constituencies.” (Whitehead, 2015. 14).

Regarding the organizational structure of a congressional hearing, each member of a Senate committee has a change of making a statement or question a witness during a hearing. 17 Committee chairman and the ranking member each have a change to make an opening statement, granting them a chance to perhaps make more salient statements than their rank-and-file colleagues. After the opening statements the witness’ present their prepared statements, after which the chairman recognizes members of the committee who in turn present their individual cases. In the content analysis, I will analyze each statement individually and pick out frame packages from the argumentation using inductive content analysis to recognize reasoning devices used in the argumentation. (Berbers et al. 2015. 803). The analysis will have a specific focus on argumentation and the substance, rather than on rhetorical or linguistic characteristics. This way the interpretation and conceptualization of issues and policy options by individual members of Congress are highlighted to produce a

---

16 Conceptual study of ideologies has long roots from Reinhart Koselleck to Cambridge School and Quentin Skinner, two authoritative figures in conceptual history studies, who’s primary critique was aimed at “unhistorical and depoliticizing use of concepts.” (Palonen, 2002. 91.)

17 Certain terms used in the text need to explained. The text uses term debate to describe the back-and-forth discussion taking place in the hearings. Now, the hearings are not technically a debate, since the senators do not talk to each other, but to the witnesses before the committee. Committee hearings are, however, action in the public sphere. As such, although the term debate more accurately defines the deliberation taking place on the Senate or House floor, congressional hearings one of the more important avenues of public deliberation in American political system. As such, term debate is thus extended to describe deliberations taking place in the hearings. Another term used in the text is statement. Now, both the committee chairman and ranking member present their opening statements, fitting the general description of statement. What follows is a series of questions presented by the senators to the witnesses. At times, these questions are described as statements, for the very formation of a question in many cases constitutes a deliberative framing action. As such, terms question and statement are at times used interlinked in the text.
comprehensive idea of how transatlantic security issues are debated in the United States Senate, how are the issues defined and which interpretations of reality are made more salient than others.

Transcripts of the committee hearings form the primary sources of this study. Transcripts of (public) committee hearings are available on U.S. Government Publishing Office website (www.gpo.gov) for all interest. The hearings transcripts are coded with a prefix “S. Hrg.”, followed by a number indicating the Congress (i.e. 111 or 112), followed by a number indicating the time of the hearing in ascending order (i.e. S. Hrg. 111-27). Quotations will be marked with the name of the senator quoted, followed by the prefix, year, and page number (i.e. Senator Cornyn [R-TX], S. Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 881.).

As the purpose of this study is to examine how transatlantic relations are being debated in the committee hearings, the analysis will use inductive method of framing analysis. Inductive framing analysis has been criticized for being too small in sample size and difficult to replicate. (de Vreese, 2005. 53; Hertog and Mcleod, 2001). To counter possible biases in content analysis certain criteria are to be established. Therefore, inductive content analysis is used to recognize frame packages that are mutually exclusive (competing frames), are more frequent (dominant frames) or appear in clusters. (see. D’Angelo & Kuypers, 2010). In addition, de Vreese (2005, 54) presented four criteria for identifying news frames: 1) frame must have identifiable conceptual and linguistic characteristics 2) it should be commonly observed 3) it must be possible to distinguish the frame reliably and 4) have representational validity. Once identified, frame packages will be codified and explained with due diligence to minimize analytical biases.

The issues on congressional agenda are problems requiring a solution. Congressional committees organize hearings and invite witness’ who offer their expertise on how to solve a given problem. Looking at governments around the world, nations seem to offer different solutions to seemingly similar problems. For example, governments in the Nordic countries offer very different solutions to social policy issues compared to the United States. More specific example would be President John F. Kennedy’s civil rights speech in June 1963, when he argued that when it came to civil rights: “We are confronted primarily with a moral issue.” (John F. Kennedy, 1963). Framing civil rights as a moral issue as opposed to cultural, economic, or security issue, means that certain options for solution are of the table, whereas some become available. In the same sense, certain foreign policy problems can be defined by framing them as military, diplomatic or humanitarian problems, each requiring a different set of tools to solve (for example: war on drugs, war on poverty, war on terror).
Deborah Stone described problem definition as a: “process of image making, where the images have to do fundamentally with attributing cause, blame, and responsibility.” (Stone, 1989. 282). Defining a problem is a way to create a causal story, a narrative, which sets the framework for political action. To use Carl Schmitt’s terminology, at the base level framing can function as way to define global (and domestic) actors on the friend-enemy divide. (See Schmitt, 1976.) Stone goes on to argue that political actors attempt to be proactive in this quest to define problems to suit their political goals or views in general. They do not succumb to other actors trying to define the problems for them. (Stone, 1989. 282.) Congressional committee hearings are a suitable place for creating a causal story, for it is by its very nature political action in the public sphere. The challenge for members of Congress is to redefine the problem when expert witness’ offer a definition not suitable for their goals.18

Burstein and Bircher (1997. 138) present congressional committees as crucial actors in problem definition, for they have the power to set agenda, organize hearings on selected issues, invite witness’ to present their views, and to gather and present evidence and arguments for and against competing policy proposals. Because the Senate or the House rarely consider a bill without a congressional approval, the committees have the greatest influence to affect not only policy outcomes, but also to formally define the problem. The very public nature of congressional committee hearings adds to their chances of affecting how a problem is perceived. Because “causal stories need to be fought for, defended, and sustained” (Stone, 1989. 293), a visible platform is required to defend one’s definition against competing stories. Thus, when studying the role of United States Congress in defining problems and offering solutions, congressional committee hearings, due to their high visibility and institutional prerogatives, are a suitable source for research.

The public speaker has...to carry along with him throughout all his efforts, unceasingly, a double respect, on the other hand to the inviolable law of truth, on the other to the defective and deteriorated mind of the hearer; and it is his perpetual labor while engaged upon his work to conciliate the two, observing the essential conditions of the first, and attempting to neutralize or escape the vices and weaknesses of the second. (W.E. Gladstone, quoted in Palonen, 2008. 168.)

18 Here the question who invites witness’ to a hearing plays a role. Although in Senate the majority party holds power over the decision-making, it is common that minority and majority party cooperate informally when selecting and inviting witness’ (Heitshusen, 2015. 1), although in the debates analyzed some argued that the process of inviting witnesses was itself partisan.
For W.E. Gladstone (1809-1898), the truth in itself functioned as a complimentary tool in parliamentary persuasion. Parliamentary deliberation was thus in essence a political act, dependent on the nature of the audience. (Palonen, 2008.168.) The institution known as a congressional hearing is by definition informative. The presence of expert witness’ severely hinders the ability of a speaker to escape the “inviolable law of truth”, and as such, hearings function as deliberative counter to partisan talks shows, fake news and snappy one-liners. But hearings are also very political in nature.19 The majority party has the ability to invite witness’ more likely to support their interpretation of an issue making it easier for majority members to confirm their interpretation of the truth.20 In fact, scholars have argued that hearings themselves hardly function as a method to persuade members of the committees themselves, and the committee leadership attempts to tip the scale in their favor by inviting selected witnesses, and members often come to the hearings with a pre-defined narrative of the issue, not as “blank slates” ready to take in what the expert witnesses witness. (Diermeier & Feddersen, 2000. 51). As such, committee hearings as the locus of research offers a suitable institutional context to identify narratives offered by political actors to make sense of the fluctuating contingencies of American foreign policy decisions.

Per Stone, a “causal story” is a process which begins when a problem is defined as a difficult condition which the people see as amenable to human control. (Stone, 1989. 299). In the foreign policy sphere, all problems are to some extent American problems – with the possible exception of the ideological postulations advanced by the isolationist school of American foreign policy. Although shifting from the unilateral interventionism of the Bush administration to a more multilateral approach, the Obama administration took lead on issues like piracy of the coast of Somalia, Ebola outbreak, and violence in the Middle East. This study aims to identify how the United States Congress sees American foreign policy towards Europe. Congress, being more responsive to public attitudes, can use congressional committees to define the problems and create the narrative to their own liking. One might ask, why does the narrative matter? It defines our beliefs of the world around us. Kenneth Waltz asks; “Do we only know what we see, one may wonder, or do we see only what we know?” (Kenneth Waltz, quoted in Crawford, 2016. 283). Beliefs

19 Please note the attempt here is not to describe political as an antithesis of truth.
20 See for example;” Senator LEVIN: Secretary Clinton, let me start with you. During the course of the negotiations on the New START, were there any side agreements, any informal agreements, any secret agreements with Russia that are not included in the treaty relative to any limitations on U.S. missile defenses or any other subject? Secretary CLINTON. No.” (S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 20.)
of the surrounding world define how we perceive the realities affecting decision-making. These beliefs and ideas in the back of our minds “...are the essential foundation for decision-making, action and institutionalized practices”, argues Crawford. (2016, 283).

Frame analysis allows me to recognize how the debate was organized, which issues were debated and which were not, and how the issues were defined. This in turn will lead to the heart of the research; how are transatlantic issues debated and how does the issue of transatlantic relations fit in the frames created in congressional debates and procedures. I will take advantage of Robert Entman's article “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm”, in which he not only defines what is meant by framing, but also articulates that frames: 1) define problems; 2) diagnose causes; 3) offer moral judgements; and 4) suggest remedies. (Entman, 1993. 52). These four ways by which the framing defines the issue and legitimates policy outputs is the methodological backbone of this research.21 What is recognized and defined as the primary problem, what are its causes (domestic/partisan, international), who’s at fault (the president, Europe, Republican/Democratic Party), and what needs to be done to fix the situation.

Whereas in rational choice theory people tend to make the most rational choice available, framing theory suggests that how an issue is represented influences the choices made. By setting the frame, actors attempt to legitimize their position and response. As per Robert Entman:

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.

Entman uses the Cold War as an example. As he argues, during the Cold War it was the very “Cold War frame” which came to dominate U.S. foreign policy news. When perceived through the “Cold War frame”, events such as civil wars were presented as “communist rebellion” and thus required certain response. Key aspects of framing are issue selection and highlighting, and using highlighted issues/perspectives to argument for certain response. Frames create causal links and provide a solution. (Entman, 1993. 52.) The purpose of framing, in this context, is thus to alter or strengthen public beliefs of the problem definition as to legitimate solution proposed

---

21 See also Fischer (2003): “The central question for the interpretive policy analyst is: how is the policy issue being conceptualized or 'framed' by the parties to the debate? How is the issue selected, organized, and interpreted to make sense of a complex reality? The framing of an issue supplies guideposts for analyzing and knowing, arguing and acting.”
by political actors. This is a move away from rational actor theory. Per Craford, ideas: “are neither ‘rational’ nor ‘irrational’ features of a decision-making process. Beliefs—philosophical, instrumental, identity, and normative—are historically and socially contingent.” (Quoted in Crawford, 2016. 284).

Whereas Robert Entman was more interested in traditional communications perspective on framing, George Lakoff described in his pamphlet “Don’t Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate” certain ways the Republican Party has – successfully, he argues – framed the political debate in America. For example, talking about “tax relief” creates a certain frame. In turn, when Democrats use Republican coined term “tax relief”, it comes with the notion that taxes are a burden the people need relief from, i.e. Democrats are in a disadvantage from the very beginning of the debate. Another popular example is the metaphor of “war”, which George W. Bush used to legitimize his administration’s actions in “war on terror”. (Lakoff, 2004.) Or, to take an example closer to the subject matter of this study, arms control treaties (such as SORT and START treaties) can be introduces as measures to prevent global nuclear war, or as efforts to test (in the Cold War context) Communist resolve on nuclear strategy. (Kinder & Nelson, 104). Framing will be examined to highlight certain aspects of an issue, to direct debate in certain direction and avoiding others, and as a rhetorical tool to define the language of the debate. Goal of the framing remains the same; to create causal links and to legitimize solution provided.

Continuing on Lakoff’s observation that the political framing in United States has been a conscious effort by conservatives and the Republican Party, Jeffrey Feldman goes to argue in his book “Framing the Debate” that the described framing effort began in 1964 after Barry Goldwater lost the presidential election to Lyndon Johnson. Per Feldman, conservatives’ effort to reframe the liberal tone in American political discourse did not take place just in language, but it was an effort to promote their moral system, values, and overall ideological worldview. To bolster their efforts, think tanks and idea factories were created to systemize the framing. (Feldman, 2007.) Timeline presented by Feldman converges with the idea that modern polarization has its roots in the civil rights legislation of the 1960’s, realignment of the American south into overwhelmingly Republican region, and the increasing polarization of partisan elites. (Souva & Rohde, 2007). The idea that political framing was a conscious effort by conservatives and the Republican Party correlates with the notion that the American median voter has remained centrist, while polarization of the political elites has been on the rise. (see. Gerber & Lewis, 2004 and Abramowitz, 2010). Although it is difficult to estimate the effect of framing to overall trend of
polarization, the post-war consensus on foreign policy and the idea that politics should stop at the water’s edge in foreign policy sphere no longer defines executive- legislative relations in American foreign policy.

Recognizing key players in the debate is crucial for variety of reasons. Although elected officials, political parties, interest groups, the media, and citizens are all central participants in framing public policy debates, within congressional context the key legislative players, such as party leadership, committee chairs and ranking minority members, as well as foreign policy entrepreneurs\textsuperscript{22} have the advantage in framing the debate, limiting rank-and-file members’ and interest groups’ chances to influence the debate.\textsuperscript{23} (Callaghan & Schnell, 2005). Per E.E. Schattschneider: “We shall never understand politics unless we know what the struggles are about…who can get into the fights and who is excluded.” (Schattschneider, 1960.) Players relevant to issue have variable chances to introduce alternative policy choices and to alter the prevailing frames, and to some extent, the rank-and-file members defer their respective duties to the party leadership, depending on the level of cohesion in the majority party. (Bendix, 2016. 692). In this dissertation, the key players and their influence - given the historical and political context - will be analyzed in the framework of foreign policy entrepreneurship.

Besides recognizing the key players in arena, comprehensive understanding of the political and institutional context requires me to identify competition among different groups.\textsuperscript{24} Competition among political parties and factional blocs, as well as their relative strength and resources can restrict the ability of one side of the debate to dominate the framing. (Callaghan & Schnell, 2005). The results of the empirical data show that depending on the issue, and foreign policy instrument, competition took different shapes, from a cohesive Congress (NATO, European military presence), inter-party competition (missile defense, Libya), to intra-party factionalism (START).

Thus, the conduct of the empirical study follows broadly the following structure:

\textsuperscript{22} The empirical part of this study confirms the rather natural assumption that committee chairs and ranking members were in fact the most active players in framing the debate.

\textsuperscript{23} Active efforts to limit minority party’s opportunities to present their views during the hearings were not evident in the analysis, although the identification of such efforts was not the goal of the empirical analysis.

\textsuperscript{24} See for example Legro (2005, 5): “…dominant ideas are often embedded in public discourse and symbols that also represent intersubjective phenomena that attach to group, not individual, orientation.” See also Kissas (2017) on ideology as a re-contextualizing tool in mediatized political campaigns, used to attach political profiles to existing “belief systems”.

37
1) Examining the political, historical, ideological, and institutional context
2) Recognizing dominant and competing framings
3) Recognizing key players and competing factions
4) Deconstruct the debate in context

Once the frame is recognized, I will examine how Europe and transatlantic relations are presented within the frame. As many have argued, partisan polarization and parochial interests have come to dominate congressional dynamics at the expense of congressional deliberation (see for example Aldrich & Rohde, 2000; Mann & Ornstein, 2006; Sinclair, 2006; Hanson, 2014; Bendix, 2016). Gutman and Thompson noted a deficit of attention to deliberative politics both in political debates and academia, concluding that scholars are: “…surprisingly silent about the need for ongoing discussion of moral disagreement in everyday political life.” And that: “As a result, we suffer from a deliberative deficit not only in our democratic politics but also in our democratic theory.” (Quoted in Shapiro, 1993. 65). Yet Europe is America’s oldest and strongest ally, thus making it difficult for members of Congress to outright ignore transatlantic issues in their deliberation. Using the theory of framing permits me to recognize the role of Europe and transatlantic relations in congressional decision-making and allows me to ascertain whether long-term strategic reflection over transatlantic relations takes place, or if the decision-making process is dominated by partisan politics, parochial and constituency interests, and short term gains.

Now, the methodological approach, subject matter, and time-frame leave me with several limitations restricting the scope of the conclusions. *First*, due to the limited subject matter – i.e. transatlantic security – the results cannot be used to explain congressional framing of foreign policy in general. Although subject matter includes different foreign policy instruments, they are all connected to transatlantic security. As such, although this dissertation touches on U.S. policy in the Middle East and Caucasian, it cannot comprehensively describe how American foreign policy in those areas is framed. *Second*, the time-frame adopted limits the study to four years – 2009-2012 – and as such does not include debates on such consequential events as Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, nor does it include the initial U.S. response to Russian aggression in Georgia in August 2008. *Third*, by focusing on the two committee’s and their members, this study cannot offer a comprehensive picture of congressional influence as a whole, nor does it include analysis of the House of Representatives. Focus on senators alone prevents me from studying such influential factors in American foreign policy decision-making as lobbyists, bureaucracies, media, or foreign policy elite (think tanks etc.). *Fourth*, due to the limitations described above,
this study cannot respond to the overall question of congressional influence on foreign policy, for its focus lies in debate and argumentation, not legislative outcomes themselves. Fourth, for students of framing, this study is not a study of framing per se, for it uses frame theory merely to quantify the qualitative empirical analysis to legitimize the findings extracted from hearing transcripts. Sixth, only public hearings are available for scholarly use. Thus, the classified hearings cannot be included in the empirical analysis, yet due to focusing on debate and framing rather than policy outcomes, the lack of access to classified data is not a critical impediment. Further, this is not a comprehensive study of committee action on foreign policy, for this study excludes such institutional functions as mark-up sessions and bill reports.

Structurally, the second chapter will outline both constitutional and institutional framework relative to the study. The constitutional framework examines how the U.S. Constitution and foreign policy intertwine in war powers, international treaties, and U.S. defense and foreign policy budget. The institutional framework defines the national security establishment, congressional committees, congress’ relationship with the federal agencies, and a brief introduction into roots of modern polarization. The third chapter outlines the theoretical framework adopted in the thesis and further discusses the contribution of this study to the general topic of Congress and foreign policy. It defines the study’s theoretical understanding of executive-legislative relations, distributional and ideological incentives affecting congressional behavior across foreign policy instruments, it presents American foreign policy ideology both in partisan terms and in the context of American long-term foreign policy ideology, and it dissects the theoretical viewpoint on both Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees and foreign policy entrepreneurship. Fourth chapter contextualizes transatlantic security issues analyzed in the empirical section. The issues identified are NATO and burden-sharing, U.S. European-based missile defense system, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), American military presence in Europe, U.S.-Russian relations as they were at the end of the Bush presidency, and the Libyan intervention in 2011. The fifth and sixth chapter form the empirical part of the thesis. Structurally, in both chapters the results are presented on an issue by issue basis, first identifying the issues debated, followed by an examination of Foreign Relations and Armed Services separately, and finally a discussion of main findings per issue. The seventh and final substantive chapter presents the conclusions and main findings of the thesis.
President of the United States has been perceived as the master of American foreign policy. Presidency has the advantage of informational asymmetry, as he has the entirety of American national security establishment feeding him information, whereas members of Congress are kept busy by constant constituency concerns and legislative matters. Whereas presidents must consider the global audience when explaining policy, congressional actors speak to a predominantly domestic audience, thus emphasizing certain dynamics of electoral politics (examined further in chapter 3), thus implying a different argumentative strategy. Presidents have a national (foreign) policy to think about, whereas members of Congress are more inclined to focus on constituency concerns. Presidential power in relation to Congress has grown from the times of the Founding Fathers, and especially after the wholesale reformation of American national security establishment during and after the Second World War. Woodrow Wilson argued in early 1910’s, that besides being the executor of laws, American president had become a law-making power, transcending the original intentions of the Constitutions, which saw the presidential veto-power as a “check” of Congress, not a tool for guidance or restrain. In fact, Wilson argued, the president “…has become the leader of his party and the guide of the national political purpose, and therefore in legal action.” (Quoted in Kronlund, 2015. 8.) Rest of the world pays close attention to policy initiatives, public speeches and overall stands the U.S. president takes in matters pertaining to American foreign policy. Although the American system gives great power to the executive branch of the government, one must bear in mind domestic factors affecting president’s decision making either directly, or indirectly. These domestic issues often rise from congressional actors, and can have far reaching consequences on American foreign policy. To fully understand executive-legislative relations in matters of foreign policy, one must look at the historical, constitutional and institutional framework affecting the role of Congress.

The defining aspect in the construction of American political system was the strong animosity felt towards the English crown. For the 13 colonies, the English monarchy represented tyranny, and tyranny was the monster American political
institutions were built to shackle - including the tyranny of the majority.\textsuperscript{25} Political enlightenment of the 17th and 18th century, especially John Locke’s “Second Treatise” published in 1689, gave American independence its philosophical justification, which is most evident in the Declaration of Independence stating that “…all men are created equal, that they were endowed by their Creator with unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” (Declaration of Independence, 1776). Thus, strong distrust of government and power has defined American political culture since the Declaration of Independence was signed by the Founding Fathers on July 4th, 1776. The concept of “federate power” in foreign policy that set the nation’s foreign policy sphere separate from domestic policy sphere and to the hands of the executive was also based on Locke’s political philosophy. (Hummel & Marshall, 2007. 5-6). Nowhere does this distrust manifest itself more clearly than in the Constitution of the United States. Contrary to its European counterparts, in America the constitution and democracy preceded the modern state creating a political system in which legislative and judicial powers were constructed to limit executive power. As the nation grew and the responsibilities of federal government kept mounting, the executive branch gained more power.\textsuperscript{26}

2.1 Constitutional Framework

One of the most prominent constitutional scholars, Edward Samuel Corwin, described the American constitution as an “invitation to struggle” (Corwin, 1957) as far as United States foreign policy is concerned. The constitution defines institutional roles and specific responsibilities of each governmental branch loosely enough, so that both legislative and executive can argue for a role in American foreign policy decision making. Per the constitution: “the executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America” (U.S. Const. Art II Sec. 1) making president the chief executive. President is also the commander-in-chief of United States Armed Forces (U.S. Const. Art. II Sec. 2) giving him the power to exert American military strength abroad. Limits of presidential executive privilege as well

\textsuperscript{25} See the Federalist Papers: No 47: “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system.” (Madison, 1788.)

\textsuperscript{26} See for example Shane (2009) on dangers of rising executive power to Madisonian democracy and Bose (2011) on expansion of executive power from Lincoln to George W. Bush.
as right of the president to deploy American forces without the consent of the Congress have been contested to this day. Although suspicious of executive power, already in 1788, John Jay wrote in "The Federalist no. 64" that its sources of information and capacity for secrecy give the executive the charge in foreign policy, compared to the Congress "composed of members constantly coming and going in quick succession." (The Federalist Papers, 1788). The “capacity for secrecy” referred to by Jay translates to informational asymmetries, which together with congressional electoral incentives to focus on domestic issues with direct constituency benefits place the power in foreign policy to the executive. (Milner & Tingley, 2015. 33). Yet, the overall issue of Madisonian separation of powers has been contested since the early debates on the ratification of U.S. Constitution, as Madison himself wrote in Federalist Papers that the republican liberty “…does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each other.” (The Federalist Papers, 1788). Thus, to better understand constitutional separation of powers context, one ought to understand it as de facto sharing of powers, a system wherein all three branches act as check to one another, and for the government to properly function, each three branches need to some degree co-operate. The degree of co-operation between the executive and legislative in foreign policy is thus context driven, and as Milner & Tingley (2015, 34) argue; “presidential power depends on the issue at hand.”

2.1.1 The War Powers

It is often assumed that everyday politics stops at the water’s edge and that legislators abandon their partisan identities during times of war in order to become faithful stewards of their constitutional obligations. But this received wisdom is almost always wrong. The illusion of congressional wartime unity misconstrues the nature of legislative oversight and fails to capture the particular conditions under which members of Congress are likely to emerge as meaningful critics of any particular military venture. (Howell & Pevehouse, 2007.)

…the truth is that in time of war . . . there is not a whole lot for Members of Congress to do. (Congressman Blunt [R-MO] quoted in Rudalevige, 2006. 2.)

Perhaps the most striking example of Congress’ constitutional authority in foreign policy is manifested in the debates over the authority to use American Armed Forces. The quote from William Howell and Jon Pevehouse touches the conventional wisdom that politics stops at the water’s edge. The expression itself is traced back to Elihu Root, a secretary of state to 26th president of the United States, Theodore
Roosevelt, but popularized by Harry Truman in 1948. During the 1948 presidential campaign, the Republican party platform expressed its support for the idea of stopping politics at the water’s edge, and the Democratic contender Harry Truman announced his agreement in his convention speech: “Partisanship should stop at the water’s edge; and I shall continue to preach that through this whole campaign.” (Quoted in Smith, 2008.) Howell and Pevehouse argue, that the assertion of politics stopping at the water’s edge crudely misrepresents congressional approach to checking the executive power in matters of war and peace. In their Foreign Affairs piece, Howell and Pevehouse argue that partisan politics is the defining factor in Congress’ eagerness to interject its authority between the president and his war powers authority. The argument goes, that the president’s party usually goes along with the White House when dominating the legislative branch, and when the opposition party holds one or both chambers, they actively challenge the president by ramping up congressional oversight of military conflicts. When the Congress actually decides to use its authority, it has a wide array of tools at its disposal, ranging from enacting laws dictating the length of military campaigns, deciding the funding levels and appropriating those funds, to holding hearings on foreign policy matters. Further, the administration knows the Congress can handcuff American military operations if it so desires, and knowing this the administration preemptively chooses another foreign policy option, when expecting strong congressional opposition to war. As such, argue Howell and Pevehouse, “[to assess the extent of congressional influence on presidential war powers, it is not sufficient to count how many war authorizations are enacted…” (Howell and Pevehouse, 2007.)

In 2008, Louis Fisher, Ryan Hendrickson and Stephen Weissman wrote a critical response to Pevehouse and Howell in another piece published in Foreign Affairs. Fisher et al. argued, that the argument presented by Pevehouse and Howell that congressional assertiveness in war-making is based on partisan calculations is false. Instead, the Congress has often “chosen the politically expedient route of deferring to the president…” due to lawmakers’ “…unwillingness to exercise their constitutional powers and understand the need for legislative checks.” (Fisher et al. 2008.) To back up their claim, Fisher et al. present several historical cases where Congress has deferred the constitutional authority over to the executive with little correlation to the partisan theory advocated by Howell and Pevehouse. In Korea, a Democratic president waged a war with no congressional declaration of war, nor a congressional authorization, instead relying on U.N. Security Council resolution. No significant Republican opposition existed, nor did Republicans make real effort to use constitutional measures to affect Truman’s policy. The infamous Gulf of Tonkin
resolution in 1964 received unanimous support from the House, and any significant opposition to Lyndon Johnson’s policy came from his fellow Democrats. No one argued Johnson’s decision to unilaterally send 30,000 troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965, and few Democrats raised concerns over the constitutionality of Ronald Reagan’s 1983 invasion of Grenada, and Democrats even applauded the unilateral strikes on Libya in 1986, even despite no prior congressional consultation. Democrats supported 1989 invasion of Panama, and despite their opposition, congressional Republicans took no action attempting to severely affect American operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. This led Fisher et al. (2008) to conclude that very rarely does the Congress muster the will to oppose a determined president, forgetting the “basic tenet” of American government, as intended by the Framers of the Constitution: “The framers believed that individual liberties and rights were protected not by trust in a president but by a system of divided government that puts a premium on deliberation and shared power.” (ibid.)

Hendrickson (2002) articulates three categories for scholarly studies on war powers. First category includes judicial evaluations over war powers. Scholars in the first group have generally agreed that federal courts have avoided creating guidelines on powers, at least on any meaningful and substantive scale. Franck (1992, 158-159) argues, regarding the military operations engaged by the United States after the Second World War, that: “…the institutional and instrumental process by which these and other initiatives have been authorized would surely have surprised Madison, Jefferson, and even Hamilton…” and regarding the lack of judicial participation; “…they would have been shocked to find the federal judiciary two hundred years later unable to determine legal challenges to such presidential initiatives by members of Congress and directly affected citizens.” Second category recognized by Hendrickson (2002) includes scholars studying the battles between the President and the Congress in the broad historical context of the past two centuries. This group generally argues that during the 19th century the Congress authorized the use of military force in most cases, whereas post-World War II Congresses have deterred their war-making powers to the President, leading them to conclusions of unilateral presidential authority. Third group places their focus on individual cases of the use of U.S. Armed Forces, with special attention to 1973 War Powers Resolution. Most of the scholars seem to agree that the War Powers Resolution has failed to generate executive-legislative cooperation in war-related decision-making processes. (Hendrickson, 2002. x-xi.)

August 10th, 1964 the Congress approved H.J. Res 1145, better known as “The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution” giving President Johnson as commander in chief the
right to “…take all necessary steps, including use of armed forces, to assist any member or protocol state of the South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.” (Government Printing Office. H.J. Res. 1145). As the President negotiated with congressional leaders for their approval he assured them that the conflict in Vietnam would not escalate into a wider conflict and would not require larger deployment of American troops. H.J.Res 1145 was a watershed moment in executive-legislative relations since it marked a new kind of interpretation of president’s right as a commander in chief to deploy American forces into large scale military operations without the declaration of war or a U.N. resolution as was the case in Korea. Instead, “Gulf of Tonkin resolution” gave President Johnson a “blank check” to escalate operations as he interpreted situation would require and increase American troop levels with no requirement for further approval of the Congress. With regard to Vietnam War, the United States Congress functioned as rubber stamp to presidential will. When the Congress realized the nature of the situation it had put itself into, and admitted it made a mistake giving President Johnson such unchecked power, Johnson’s response was that he never even believed congressional approval to be necessary to use American forces in Vietnam, as his constitutional power as commander-in-chief would suffice. (Kelley, 2005. 51-57). In the long term, all American presidents following Lyndon Johnson adopted his interpretation of presidential war making powers as the commander-in-chief.

Legislative consequence of the Vietnam War was the War Powers Act of 1973, which gives the president effectively 90 days to use United States military before having to ask for congressional war authorization. Since the days of declaring wars seemed to be far gone, War Powers Act was congressional answer to unchecked presidential power. The Act was an effort to “ensure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the president will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.” (Finn, 2004. 417.) No American president has admitted the constitutionality of War Powers Act, nor surrendered their power over military as the commander-in-chief. Nevertheless, a question of necessity of congressional authorization to use U.S. Armed Forces and very definition of war has been contested ever since and is one of the defining elements of executive-legislative relations.

The War Powers Act was a direct response to the Vietnam War (see Friedman, 2010) which began with a "blank check" from the Congress to escalate American participation. The Act was an effort to "ensure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the president will apply to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities." (Finn et al, 2004.) War Powers Act has since defined the relationship between the executive and legislature. Both the war against Afghanistan and Iraq were approved by the Congress, but when it became apparent in Libya that European forces could not operate without significant help from the Americans, the president re-deployed American forces without congressional approval. But even the War Powers Resolution was not a thoroughly bipartisan effort by Congress as a whole to keep the executive war-power in check. The resolution passed President Nixon's veto by a vote of 284 to 135 in the House, and 75 to 18 in the Senate. Although the “Saturday night massacre”, during which Nixon fired Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox for his too eager pursuit of the Watergate investigation paved way for the congressional usurpation, the newly elected Democratic “doves” were crucial for passing the legislation. (Friedman, 2010. 22-23.)

2.1.2 Treaties or Executive Agreements?

Congress has several direct means codified in the constitution to affect foreign policy decision making and implementation. Institutionally the Senate has more say in American foreign policy. United States constitution vests into Senate the power to ratify all international treaties made by the United States government. (U.S. Const. Art. II Sec. 2). The president requires two thirds of Senate votes to ratify any treaties he has negotiated. Given the fact that neither party controls two thirds of the Senate, international treaties are often contested on partisan basis, giving the Congress a strong veto power over the president. President has sometimes bypassed the Senate treaty power by signing executive agreements with foreign nations. Executive agreements do not require congressional vote but are still legally binding on the United States and future presidents. (Davidson et al., 2011. 458).

The precedent that executive agreements and treaties have the same legal impact was established in two Supreme Court cases in 1937 and 1942. Both cases, United States v. Belmont and United States v. Pink, had to do with State rights relative to U.S. establishing diplomatic relations with Soviet Union and recognizing the Soviet state. The 1933 agreement between President Roosevelt and Soviet Union established several terms as the basis of Soviet-American agreement, including “propaganda, freedom of worship, protection of nationals and the question of debts and claims.” (Duranty, 1933). The dispute was between the State of New York and federal government over property rights to assets of a former Russian firm in a private, New York banking company. The decision placed authority over foreign policy and executive agreements solely in the hands of the executive:
The recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations, the assignment, and agreements with respect thereto, were all parts of one transaction, resulting in an international compact between the two governments. That the negotiations, acceptance of the assignment, and agreements and understandings in respect thereof were within the competence of the President may not be doubted. Governmental power over internal affairs is distributed between the national government and the several states. Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government. And in respect of what was done here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of that government. The assignment and the agreements in connection therewith did not, as in the case of treaties, as that term is used in the treaty-making clause of the Constitution (Art. II, § 2), require the advice and consent of the Senate. (United States v. Belmont, 1937.)

And further, United States v. Pink decision in 1942 held that “all international compacts and agreements”:

…are to be treated with similar dignity [with constitutional treaties], for the reason that complete power over international affairs is in the national government, and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states. (United States v. Pink, 1942.)

The executive agreement is a modern invention, created during the 20th century to meet the needs of increased diplomatic requirements of the changing world. Obvious benefit of the executive agreement compared to constitutional treaties is the fact that the president does not have to go through the political struggle with the Congress in search for supermajority in the Senate. Since World War II, considerable majority of international agreements have been reached by executive agreements, yet the practice itself was popularized with no constitutional amendments. Its constitutionality, however, was established by the Supreme Court Cases United States v. Pink and United States v. Belmont. The significant increase in executive agreements has led some scholars to conclude that the presidency now held the monopoly over the treaty power. Certainly, the institutional dynamics have shifted greatly from the Articles of Confederation, which placed all the treaty making powers to the Congress and several states. (Krutz et al. 2009. 24-27.)

To understand the prevailing tendency of modern presidents to resort into executive agreements rather than submitting themselves politically in the constitutional ratification process, the domestic politics effects on American foreign policy decision-making become apparent. The requirement set by the Constitution to obtain two-thirds majority in the Senate, 67 votes, makes it immensely difficult to
pass controversial legislation through the Senate. To demonstrate this point, Krutz et al. (2009) present the example of arms control legislation in the 1990’s, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II). Both Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush took part in the negotiations over CWC, a treaty that would have eliminated chemical weapons from twenty-two nations. The treaty was signed George Bush in January 1993, just before the inauguration of President Clinton. Both China and Russia, together with 120 nations had signed the treaty, and President Clinton confidently submitted it for the ratification and consent by the U.S. Senate in November 23rd, 1993. Yet, despite strong bipartisan support, the treaty was not ratified until April 1997. (Krutz et al. 2009. 135-136.)

Initially, the reason for delay were rather reasonable. The Clinton administration decided to focus on passing the START before pushing fully for the ratification of the CWC, and the foreign policy agenda in the early 1990’s was considerably crowded. Said reasons coupled with the coming elections in 1994 were to blame for Senate’s failure to report the bill from the committee in 1994. After the elections, not only did the Republicans take over the Congress, but the most conservative Republican of them all, Jesse Helms from North Carolina, became the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Jesse Helms [R-NC] had his own foreign policy agenda, including a full reorganization of the State Department, and he ended up taking many of Clinton’s foreign policy initiatives as a political hostage, including the CWC and START II, until a compromise was reached and the bill was finally reported from the committee April 25th, 1996. Yet, as the treaty was sent to the full Senate for ratification, it became evident that the Democrats were short of getting the 67 votes required for the passage. Leading Republicans organized a public effort to criticize the treaty, and President Clinton saw no choice but to send it back to the committee. Only after lengthy negotiations between Senator Helms [R-NC] and Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle [D-SD], full-on public efforts by the Clinton administration, and threats by Democrats to torpedo Republican initiatives, including national missile defense, Senate voted for a unanimous consent and voted on the CWC. Treaty was ratified on April 24th, 1997, by a vote of 74-26, with 29 Republicans voting for the ratification. (Krutz et al. 2009. 137-138.)

The example of CWC highlights the difficulties for the administration to pass formal treaties through the Senate27, especially during a divided government and

---

27 Furthermore, the Congress has the ability to insert policy initiatives to treaty documents as its works to ratify them. This authority has had effect on arms control and force distribution treaties entered by the United States, including: Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF)
when facing staunch opposition by the relevant committee chair. International treaties are vulnerable to all those parliamentary dynamics which affect the everyday policy-making in the Congress, including but not limited to partisan grandstanding, foreign policy entrepreneurship, and electoral politics.

The dominance of executive agreements since 1950’s has been irrefutable, as only 6% of all the international agreements by U.S. government were completed as formal treaties, as postulated in the Constitution. Scholars of executive-legislative dynamics have seen this dramatic rise through different lenses. Matthew and Ginsberg (see. 2006; 2007) see the use of executive agreements in striking opposition to Framers intentions when signing the U.S. Constitution: “They are called ‘executive agreements’ rather than treaties, but they amount to the same thing, except that presidents accomplish by signature and handshake what the Framers thought they could do only with the support of a senatorial supermajority.” (Matthew & Ginsberg, 2006. 214.) Rudalevige portrayed the use of executive agreements as a symptom of “imperial presidency”, especially due to the sensitive and military nature of great many international agreements entered by the U.S. president, thus interceding with the question of War Powers. Per estimates, between 1953 and 1972, approximately 75 to 80 percent of all the significant military commitments made by the United States abroad were completed as executive agreements, including commitments to defend Ethiopia, Thailand and Spain. As argued by Rudalevige: “Such a relationship linked directly to war powers and to the issue of national commitments…” (Rudalevige, 2006. 125.) Krutz and Peake (2009), however, argue that the use of executive agreements is based on the requirements of predictability in foreign relations, and efficiency in the decision-making process. As such, the use of executive agreements is a sign of adaptation to prevailing conditions, rather than a symptom of unilateral presidency and a power grab vis-à-vis the Congress. Hughes et al. (2012) go on to argue, that: “…modern presidents have continued to use the constitutional treaty process for a large percentage of their most significant agreements”, i.e. the START 3 analyzed in this thesis, and they continue: “…while treaties are relatively rare in the modern era, presidents still use them to complete major international agreements.” (Hughes et al. 2012. 1299).

At the outset of the Obama presidency, the prospects of fruitful executive-legislative cooperation in foreign policy seemed positive, especially regarding international agreements. Both Barack Obama and Joseph Biden ascended to the Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and perhaps most notably from a NATO perspective; Senate prohibited Clinton administration from granting security guarantees to European states during the 1998 NATO enlargement process, effectively dismantling the 1998 U.S.-Baltic Charter. (Auerswald, 2006. 83-84.)
White House from the U.S. Senate, the very political body embedded with the constitutional treaty-making power. Furthermore, the Democratic party held a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate, and Vice-President Biden had previously served as the chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In their 2012 study of international agreements during the first three years of Obama presidency (2009-2011), Hughes et al. (2012) observe that despite the optimistic basis President Obama met fierce partisan opposition to international agreements promoted by the administration: “While successful, the president met with substantial partisan opposition from Republicans to obtain the Senate’s consent to a seemingly uncontroversial New START with Russia.” (Hughes et al. 2012. 1312.) Hughes et al. contribute the lack of success to the polarized partisan context in the Senate. The treaty process is increasingly likely to be treated not as a bipartisan issue, wherein politics stop at the water’s edge, but rather dominated by politics over principles. (Hughes et al. 2012.) As such, the domestic politics play bigger and bigger role in the contemporary polarized congressional context, tempering presidential resolve to subject their foreign policy to the constitutional treaty process, especially if given an option. Yet, overly enthusiastic use of executive orders to forward president’s foreign policy agenda may curb what little incentive there was for the opposition to cooperate, and might end up expending political capital at a time when such resources are far apart.

2.1.3 Power of the Purse

Conventionally the House of Representatives tends to focus on short term gains instead of wider strategic implications of foreign policy decisions, whereas issues closer to immediate interests of their electorate, such as trade, international regulation and defense procurement weight more than strategic reflection. (Rockman, 2005. 24-26.) Nevertheless, constitution grants House the power of the purse as it “shall have the power to lay and collect taxes” (U.S. Const. Art. I Sec. 8), and “all bills raising revenue shall originate in the house of representatives” (U.S. Const. Art. I Sec. 7), although the executive has both *ex ante* formal proposal power in terms of budget, and *ex post* control over federal agencies responsible for the distribution of appropriated federal funds. (cha et al. 2007. 783). According to Article I, Section 8, the House is institutionally responsible for raising and supporting United States military. As the partisan fights over United States budget have shown, the Congress is not above using the threat of defunding the government to reach its policy goals. In times of partisan polarization in the U.S., traditionally less popular
foreign policy issues such development aid and United Nations funding could possibly be threatened by the House (see Milner & Tingley, 2015 & Fowler, 2015).

2.1.3.1 Regular Order: Congress and American Defense Policy

By waiting until the last week that the Senate is in session and refusing to allow an open amendment process, he [Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid] has effectively silenced debate on key issues vital to our national security. In January, when Republicans gain control of both chambers and if I have the great opportunity of leading the Senate Armed Services Committee, I am confident that we will return to the design of the Framers of the Constitution and restore the practice and principles that made the U.S. Senate the greatest deliberative body in the world. Anything less is a disservice to the men and women in uniform who are responsible for executing these policies and the taxpayers who pay for them. (McCain, 2014.)

John McCain became the junior representative of Arizona’s first congressional district in 1983. In 1980, Ronald Reagan had defeated Jimmy Carter and took the office of the presidency in January 1981. During his first term as a member of Congress, John McCain had to cast his vote on Reagan administration’s attempt to seek congressional approval for a multilateral intervention in Libya. Representative McCain decided to vote against the Republican president despite strong Republican support for the legislation. Again, in 1991, when a Republican President George H. Bush was on the verge of commanding American intervention in Libya, Senator McCain28 stressed the need for a diplomatic solution before using military force and putting American soldiers in the harm’s way. (Cullinane, 2008. 772-774.)

In 2014, Senator McCain [R-AZ] served as the ranking member of Senate Armed Services Committee, a committee responsible for the annual National Defense Authorization Act. But the American defense policymaking had changed since Senator McCain made his first remarks on the Capitol. In the above statement, given after the passage of “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015”, Senator McCain referred to Senate’s role as a responsible, deliberative body as intended by the Framers. These ideas and sentiments were articulated in the Federalist no. 63: “…such an institution [Senate] may be sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions.” (Madison, J. The Federalist no. 63). If we understand what James Madison wrote in the Federalist Papers no. 62 and 63 to refer to those parochial, local interests which might triumph over long-term strategic reflection of national interest, Senator

---

28 John McCain became the Senator of state of Arizona in 1987, preceding retiring Barry Goldwater.
McCain’s critique of Senator Harry Reid’s reluctance to bring NDAA on Senate floor reflects the change in American defense policy decision-making since the end of Cold War and especially since the rise of the Tea Party-conservatives in 2010 midterms.

Members of Congress have always had to tackle with the dual-nature of Congress by representing both the local interests that get one re-elected and the national interest of the United State of America. The relative consensus on foreign affairs enjoyed during the Cold War was similarly evident in defense policy, as the Soviet threat made members of Congress respect the agreed upon strategy of containment. Out of this consensus emerged the regular order, an institutional approach to lawmaking which balanced the dual responsibilities of Congress.

According to Mann and Ornstein the regular order was described as congressional “procedures guaranteeing adequate time for discussion, debate, and votes […] in committee, on the floor, and in conference, which are essential if Congress is to play its critical deliberative role…” (Mann et al. 2006. 7). In essence, regular order enabled policy-centered decision-making in the Congress by allowing input from individual members in the form of debate, amendments and votes with open rules. As per Mann and Thomas, notable critics of congressional dysfunction, the end of regular order was accompanied by the striking hike in closed rules, abuse of power, exclusion of minority party in committees (see Mann et al. 2006) and “enhanced politics of hostage taking of putting political expedience above the national interest and tribal hubris above cooperative problem solving…” (Mann & Thomas, 2013. 4).

In relation to defense policy, the end of regular order was specifically evident in the appropriations process. Republicans managed to conquer the House of Representatives and the Senate in 1994 midterm elections and put an end to decades of Democratic control over the Congress. As President Clinton prepared for the 1996 elections and congressional Democrats were eager to retake the House, the Republican Senate majority leader Trent Lott had troubles passing 13 appropriations bills that would fund the federal government for the upcoming year. Senate Democrats, with the upcoming elections in mind, attempted to halt the progress of said bills by offering amendments forcing Republicans to cast difficult votes. As a result, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and Senator Lott made the decision to package the spending bills into one huge omnibus spending bill29 and attempted to pass it without allowing amendments. The plan worked, although the Republicans were forced to compromise with Senate Democrats, leaving 14 Republicans voting

---

29 Speaker of the House and Senate majority leader used the defense appropriations conference report to pass all spending bills pending approval.
against the bill. By introducing the omnibus appropriations bill, the congressional Republicans created a process which would protect the party against dilatory tactics and difficult votes at the expense of policy outcomes. (Hanson, 2014. 519.)

2.1.3.2 National Defense Appropriations Authorization

August 2nd, 2011 the “Budget Control Act of 2011” became a public law. The law enforced discretionary spending limits by amending the “Balanced budget and Emergency Deficit Act” from 1985. Sequestration was to be enforced by the Congress and the president; “Within 15 calendar days after Congress adjourns to end a session there shall be a sequestration to eliminate a budget-year breach, if any, within any category:” (GPO, 2011). In short, the purpose of the sequestration was to cut federal deficit by automatically canceling any excess funds appropriated by the Congress to federal programs. Political catalyst for the sequestration policy was the Republican takeover of the House of Representatives in 2010 midterm election and the simultaneous rise of the Tea Party movement, with its own anti-spending and deficit reduction agenda. What followed was a government shutdown and constant battle over federal budgets, latest taking place in September 2015.

Congressional authority over United States budget and United States military spending is established in the Constitution. Article I Sections 7 & 8 place federal budgetary authority firmly in the hands of the Congress, and grants the Congress the power to: “raise and supports armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for longer than two years.” (U.S. Const. Art I Sec VII). Enacting, reviewing and debating annual defense budgets is the de facto mechanism the Congress has at its disposal to put its constitutional authority to practice. The annual defense budget procedure has three specific phases: 1) executive preparation and planning by the Department of Defense and submission to Congress, 2) congressional defense budget process, and 3) budget execution. The budget request is prepared by the Department of Defense in cooperation with the administration, and finally submitted formally by the president to the Congress. The process in the Congress is also divided in three separate phases: 1) passage of the Concurrent Budget Resolution, 2) the defense authorization process, and 3) appropriations process. The first step provides and overview of the overall federal budget, the second step establishes authority for defense programs and the third step creates the budget authority for the programs. (CRS, 1998. 25-29).
2.2 Institutional Framework

2.2.1 The National Security Establishment

October 8th, 2001, President George W. Bush issued an Executive Order 13228, “Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council.” The mission of the office founded less than a month after the 9/11 terrorist attacks was “to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The Office shall perform the functions necessary to carry out this mission, including the functions specified in section 3 of this order.” (Executive Order 13228, 2001.) Department of Homeland Security was to become the institutional answer to terrorism, including 180,000 employees and demonstrating greatest reorganization of American bureaucracy in decades. To quote Mabee (2007, 1):

When external threat is linked to monumental (and often catastrophic) events, it can lead to historical openings for the rearticulation of security. Although this is in some ways obvious, the ways in which threat is produced, or securitized, in these moments can also lead to re-articulation of security actors (i.e., those that have the power to respond to threats) through the institutionalization of response to threats. The approach of actors in security-making policy can undergo fundamental shifts due to institutionalization new ways of framing security.

2.2.1.1 The National Security Act of 1947

Before the United States was attacked by Japan in Pearl Harbor December 7th, 1941, United States was ill-prepared to wage a war of a global magnitude. The United States military had no conscription, and as the War broke out in Europe in 1939, the U.S. Army, Navy and Marines totaled in 334,473 military personnel, compared to 12,209,238 in 1945. (National WW2 Museum). President Franklin D. Roosevelt was a devout internationalist before the first World War, who had shortly after the Great War learned that internationalist foreign policy would not do well in the U.S. Congress, an institution at the time dominated by pacifist and isolationist sentiments. FDR nevertheless, sensing the coming storm, began to prepare for the inevitable in 1937 in a carefully orchestrated “preparedness” campaign to bolster U.S. wartime planning and mobilization efforts. National security was not institutionalized, and the critical question of how to organize U.S. government to best develop and execute national security policy remained unanswered. (Amos et al. 2011.) In fact, Stuart (2008) argues, that no systematic and sustained concept of national security existed
before Harvard Professor Edward Herrings pioneering book “The Impact of War”, published before Pearl Harbor. As per Herring, for U.S. to create a competitive national security system, the policymakers should “give thought to the possibility of adapting our governmental institutions to the maintenance of a powerful military force as part of the normal structure of our society.” (Quoted in Stuart, 2008. 6.)

The anti-war sentiment, however, remained strong as FDR in 1940 announced a “Selective Service Act”, a modest conscription plan requiring only one year of service and no military deployments beyond Western Hemisphere. Senator Burton K. Wheeler labeled the act “the greatest step toward regimentation and militarism ever taken by the United States Congress.” (Quoted in Stuart, 2008. 12.) For contemporaries, it ought to be reminded that militarism and regimentation were considered thoroughly anti-American in years before the World Wars, and specifically years leading to World War II. For the Roosevelt administration, the trick was to prepare United States for a war without alarming those in Congress vehemently opposing such efforts. (Stuart, 2008. 13-14.)

After the War, it had become evident that to be prepared for a Pearl Harbor-type surprise attack the United States could not rely on a “M-Day” mobilization strategy, referring to a pre-WW2 strategy dictating that the actual mobilization of U.S. military would not start before actual declaration of war. The nation ought to be able to respond, “immediately and massively”. (Stuart, 2008. 144.) To achieve such goals, per several policy makers:

…it required strategic reserves, dispersed and coordinated facilities for wartime production, and perhaps a new system of universal military service to ensure that America’s fighting forces could be quickly and effectively organized. (ibid.)

It ought to be stressed, that no historical pretext existed in the American peace time history of a state-centered national defense establishment. Before America entered the war, the seemingly unstoppable rise of totalitarian regimes in Europe and their reliance on propaganda highlighting the interest of the state above the individual, made any argument based on national interest appear suspicious in the eyes of the public. (Stuart, 2008. 26). Two important factors played into the creation of U.S. national security apparatus; United States experience of managing the World War II and the institutional models existing in America’s ally, United Kingdom. The debates reflected the forever question in national security policy: the never-ending battle over individual freedoms and the requirements of national security. Some tackled the debate using metaphors of “gestapos, men on horseback, Prussian General Staffs”,

55
as others made the analogy of a “sneak attack”, referring to Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. (Stuart, 2008. 6-7.)

The National Security Act of 1947 became a Public Law 253 in July 26th, 1947. In the Declaration of Policy, the bill stated the following:

In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States, to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces. (S.758, 1947.)

As President Harry Truman signed the bill into a law, he gave birth to American national security establishment. As per the National Security Act, three separate entities were created directly below the commander-in-chief, namely: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Defense (DOD), and National Security Council (NSC). Under the newly created office of secretary of defense were placed Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense, Research and Engineering, Assistant Secretaries, and lastly, three separate departments of the military; Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (Trager, 1977.)

For the Congress, one of the more contentious aspects of the legislative process was the debate over separating Navy and Army in their own departments. President Truman, as well as part of the Congress, championed the idea of creating one department, including the Navy, the Air Force and the Army. This plan would have also created an individual Chief of Staff responsible for Army, Navy and the Air Force. (Stuart, 2008. 94.) Early on it looked like the unification of all three military branches was inevitable. The Navy, however, was very much against the plan. The admirals, some members of the Congress, and the Secretary of Navy James Forrestal opposed the unification both in the Congress and in the negotiations with the Truman administration and military officials. In the Congress, Congressman Carl Vinson [D-GA] and Senator David Walsh [D-MA] in their capabilities as members of Senate and House Naval Affairs Committees elevated the issue of unification “to the status of a power struggle between the executive and legislative branches of the government.” (Stuart, 2008. 95.) Truman decided to drop the idea of one Chief of
Staff due to congressional opposition, and because the military leadership warned him against the dangers of imposing such authority in a single military official. In the end, the unification of all branches in the military saw its quiet death in the Naval Affairs subcommittee, and the final act established three separate departments within the Department of Defense. (See. Stuart, 2008.)

Highlighting the ambiguous role of U.S. Congress in American foreign policy and national security policy was the creation of National Security Council (NSC). The original text of the legislation defined the purpose of NSC:

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. (S.758, 1947.)

As such, National Security Council is an entity created by the Congress for the president of the United States. The creation of NSC could thus be seen in the context of “Cold War Consensus” and despite Truman’s inability to pass the legislation precisely as he would have wanted, the Act itself was a starting point for Congress abdicating some of its powers over national security to the president. As argued by Robert Cutler, President Dwight Eisenhower’s first National Security Adviser:

Fundamentally, the Council is a vehicle for a President to use in accordance with its suitability to his plan for conducting his great office. The Congress provided the vehicle, but it is in the President's discretion to do with it what he wishes. (Cutler, 1956.)

Of course, the Congress had its reservations regarding the creation of NSC. Four of the seven permanent slots in the council were designated for military personnel, which, much like the debate over a single Chief of Staff, awoke concern over militarization of foreign policy decision-making. In the final text of the Act, the wording was changed: “The function of the Council shall be to advice the President with respect to the integration of foreign and military policies…” (Stuart, 2008. 130), guaranteeing presidential freedom in the foreign and national security policy decision-making, as dictated by the president’s constitutional role as the commander-in-chief of U.S. military. During both the initial legislative process in the 1940’s and the amendment procedures in 1950’s, congressional opposition revolved around familiar themes: congressional prerogatives to partake in defense spending decision-making and fears of militarism. (Stuart, 2008.)
“Decentralization is the most distinctive characteristic of the congressional committee system” (Skinner, 2014. 1), are the opening words of Carla Skinner in her 2014 book on congressional committees. Quite understandably, decentralization of congressional decision-making processes is an unavoidable institutional machination, especially when considering the workload of a typical, modern Congress; approximately 10,000 bills and 100,000 nominations per Congress, and national budget of roughly $4 trillion. Committees function as “centers of policy making, oversight of federal agencies, and public education” (Davidson et al. 2011. 176), and as type of “safety valves” responsible for serving as “outlets for national debates and controversies.” (Ibid). Committees serve a legislative purpose by evaluating policies and policy alternatives, identify problems and propose solutions, serve as an oversight of the executive branch of the government, and committees investigate suspected wrongdoings in the government. (Skinner, 2014. 1-3). In short, committees function as “workshops” of the Congress with three primary roles: legislating, overseeing and investigating.

Political systems, in our case the United States Congress, are open to outside influence and their policy outputs are affected by the policy environment surrounding them. In short, the political context inside and outside of the institution has great influence on policy outcomes produced. If the examination is specified into congressional committees, the policy environment is affected by several outside factors, including: executive agencies (in this case the Department of Defense), pressure groups, party leaders and caucuses, and the entirety of House and Senate. Four distinct ways by which the policy environment affects decision-making in committees can be identified; 1) the environment shapes the content of public policy, 2) policy environment fosters mutual alliances among committees, 3) policy environment establishes decision-making objectives and guidelines for committees, 4) environmental factors influence the level of partisanship on committees. (Davidson et. al. 2011. 201-203.) One of the more salient institutional factors affecting the empirical analysis of this study is the relationship between the committees (Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations) and federal agencies (Department of Defense and State Department).
2.2.3 Congress and Federal Agencies

Perhaps the most compelling reason to limit my research to Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees is their respective relationships with federal agencies; Department of Defense and the State Department. Although the common practice dictates that the White House submits to the Congress a budget request for the upcoming fiscal year, and the main responsibility for the overall federal budget process lies in both Senate and House Appropriations committees, and the allocation of federal funds within Department of Defense and the State Department is the source of annual appropriations hearings in Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees. As such, both committees function with dual purpose; distributional and informational. (Davidson et. al., 2011. 176-177.) Given the actual size of an average defense budget and its distributional consequences nationally, the relationship between Armed Services and the Pentagon is of great consequence when debating both budgetary and policy issues.

Besides the complex and at times overwhelming defense appropriations process, committees play an important role in their oversight capability. The Congress is naturally concerned how federal agencies spend the taxpayers’ money allocated for them. Congressional committees, as noted by Davidson et. al. (2011, 176): “serve another important institutional function in the political system: they act as safety valves – that is, they are outlets for national debates and controversies.” A notable instance of a committee acting as a safety valve occurred before the modern system of permanent national defense committees took place, as then-Senator Harry Truman led “Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program” during the Second World War. Senator Truman [D-MO] was concerned over government’s way of handling military contractors. Truman embarked on a field trip to see for himself how the government spent money in its war efforts, and found “evidence of waste everywhere.” (Scott, 2015. 36-37.) This revelation led Truman to pursue an investigation into war-time spending to decrease what he considered wasteful spending, a role he postulated would best served by sustained congressional oversight. Truman’s committee was an example of successful civil-military oversight, as it “uncovered cases of wasteful spending, fraud, and corruption in the manufacturing and procurement of war materiel.” (ibid.)

Temporary nature of the Truman Committee was later institutionalized in the Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Subcommittees. Despite the changes in the overall committee system and the tendency towards greater institutionalization within the Congress (see for example Davidson et. al. 2011), Tama (2015b, 53-57) argues that ad hoc advisory commissions are formidable means for the Congress to
affect U.S. military. From 1981 to 2009 the United States Congress established at least 23 independent commissions – often in tandem with the national defense appropriations authorization (NDAA) process - to investigate or oversee military and defense affairs. The issues included “examinations of military roles and mission…nuclear weapons policy, defense contracting, military basing arrangements…the nature of certain security threats, and the value of particular weapons systems.” (ibid.) All these are highly relevant given the subject matter of this study. Now, the motivation behind lawmakers’ eagerness to create these ad hoc commissions may vary from policy reform, oversight of the Pentagon, or from a rather jaded perspective; to avoid the blame or otherwise contentious issue. A great example of the partisan nature of some ad hoc commissions is the “Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States”, established in 1996 by congressional Republicans led by Newt Gingrich [R-GA]. Commissions purpose was simple; “to advance a largely Republican agenda of deploying a national anti-ballistic-missile defense system.” (ibid, 67). To highlight the partisan nature of the commission, it included six members chosen by the Republican leadership and only three chosen by the Democrats. Overall, Tama argues, the effectiveness of congressional commission - given the great difficulty of shifting the status quo of American political system – is rather positive. Enacting commission is easier and less risky for individual lawmakers than attempting major changes in policy, and as such, ad hoc commission are likely to be used as a key congressional tool influencing national defense policy in the future. (Ibid.)

Finally, the United States Congress has influence over the national defense strategy in the form of strategic defense reviews mandated by the Congress and conducted by the Department of Defense. In 1996, the Congress mandated the first quadrennial defense review (QDR) to be conducted every four years. Consequently, the example set by QDR has been established as the standard for other strategic reviews, such as reviews of intelligence, homeland security and diplomacy. (Tama, 2017. 27.)
3 BETWEEN CONSTITUENCY INTEREST AND IDEOLOGICAL RIGIDITY

It is not easy to distinguish ideological rigidity, of which there is now a surplus, from the self-interest of members in procuring resources for their political careers. (Rockman, 2012. 1073.)

Theoretically this study derives from a long tradition of scholarly works regarding congressional influence on American foreign policy. Theoretical framework moves from a broad perspective to the specific, identifying key concepts defining each layer on the way. The grand question in the study of legislative-executive relations is “which player leads?” I will examine the two competing theories, imperial presidency and congressional dominance, the former referring to theories describing accumulation of power in the executive, the latter to a belief that the Congress controls the bureaucracy. If we believe the advocates of imperial presidency, what does it imply to transatlantic security issues? Is congressional deference universal in foreign policy, or is it rather issue-specific. Milner & Tingley (2015) argue that presidential power in foreign policy varies across policy instruments, congressional incentives being highly relevant to determine whether Congress defers the power or attempts to assert its authority in the process. Per Milner (2015), two key concepts define congressional issue-specific assertiveness in foreign policy; distributional and ideological factors. Distributional factors refer to policies affecting specific, often local, interests, which creates stronger constituency connections for Congressmen mindful of their re-election prospects, whereas ideological factors affect the policy preferences in specific foreign policy instances, i.e. which policy choice most likely leads to the desirable policy outcome. The question for this study is, what circumstances affect transatlantic security policy, and which incentives influence senators when debating transatlantic security issues.

Theoretical framework adopted in this dissertation derives from the viewpoint that ideas do matter. Ideas in their structured form lead to ideology, which is understood as a consistent approach to specific issues over longer period, and stands in opposition to ideological approached by others. (See Gerring, 1997). Ideological

---

30 This is not to say that ideological factors do not affect re-election prospects.
approaches will be examined from two separate perspectives; the partisan ideological difference between the Republican and Democratic parties, and the long-term foreign policy ideology as it relates to American policy towards Europe. The latter is examined using Mead’s (2002) distinction between Hamiltonians, Jeffersonians, Wilsonians, and Jacksonians. By the two-way approach adopted here, I am able to examine both contextual partisan nature of American foreign policy debates, and then identify the policy positions in relation to long-term American foreign policy ideology. By specifying my empirical analysis in the argumentation used, it is possible to identify how individual senators see transatlantic relations and what they suggest American global role ought to be, what issues lead to cohesive Congress (congressional assertiveness), which ones to divided (inter-party conflict), when are parties cohesive (partisanship or ideological polarization) and what brings about intra-party factionalism (foreign policy entrepreneurship). Of course, foreign policy entrepreneurship is evident in all the cases mentioned - although not necessarily visible in the committees\(^{31}\) - but by focusing the attention to argumentation, one can see how individual senators justify their position on an issue, especially when breaking ranks with the majority of their respective parties.

### 3.1 Changing Executive-Legislative Relations

After the fighting finally halted in 1945 after six long years and the world was at peace, a new world order began to emerge. Like Winston Churchill famously declared, an iron curtain had divided Europe and with it the world into to spheres of influence. As Churchill saw the British empire collapsing, the world had become bipolar. Soviet Union occupied eastern Europe and Mao defeated his opponents to declare a communist China in 1947. Cold War had begun. After 1947, congressional literature recognizes three separate time periods in executive-legislative relationship. Period since 1945 until 1967 was titled “Cold War Consensus”, from 1967 until 1990 consensus gave way to “Cold War Dissensus”, which did not end until the end of Cold War, leading way to “Post-Cold War” era in executive-legislative relationship.\(^{32}\) (Carter, 2004. 151-152). In the literature, Mark Souva and David Rohde argue that congressional assertiveness in foreign policy which followed the Vietnam War and

\(^{31}\) Carter and Scott (2009, 428-429) separate three strategies for foreign policy entrepreneurs: insider-incrementalist strategy, direct-action strategy, and the one being focused on here; legislative strategy.

\(^{32}\) This distinction between Cold War Consensus and Cold War Dissensus is also the basis of Fowler’s work on committees. (Fowler, 2015.)
Watergate has its origin in partisan polarization which began to emerge after the realignment of the American South, emergence of polarized party elites, and changes in the seniority-based committee system after an influx of new, young Democratic members of Congress. (Souva & Rohde, 2007. 114). Then again, external events can also become dominant factors affecting foreign policy debates, such as the well documented rally-the-flag phenomena after 9/11 terrorist attacks. (See for example Lindsay & Smith, 2003)33 Although this dissertation is not a study in IR34, it does attempt to recognize congressional behavior relative to presidential foreign policy initiatives, especially salient in the war-making debates over Libyan intervention in 2011.

During the first two decades after the World War II, United States foreign policy decisions appeared to have been made with relatively high level of consensus and bipartisanship. (Gries, 2014. 1). But consensus is a relative concept. For example, roll-call votes between 1953 and 1972 pertaining to matters of foreign and defense policies saw president’s initiatives gaining bipartisan support in 56 percent of all votes. 56 percent can be interpreted to represent abnormally high level of consensus, especially since after Nixon’s re-election in 1972 presidential foreign and defense policy initiatives were approved on bipartisan basis on 24 percent of all the roll-call votes. (Prins, 2001. 668). Conventional wisdom tends to explain pre-Vietnam consensus with the threat of global communism and Soviet Union. One might assume that change in the executive-legislative relationship requires some sort of external shock affecting international setting and creating friction between congressional and presidential goals in foreign policy. But instead of easement, Cold War seemed to be heating up as consensus in American foreign policy decision making gave way to dissensus; in 1968 Soviet Union occupied Czechoslovakia, year 1975 witnessed North-Vietnam taking over South-Vietnam spreading communism to southern Asia and in 1979 Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. (Souva, 2007. 114).

After realizing his role in passing the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, Senator William Fulbright expressed regret for granting so-called blank check to Lyndon B. Johnson to wage unlimited war in Vietnam. Fulbright came to argue that the Congress should

33 For a historical perspective on rally-the-flag effect see Bryan and Oneal (1995), who argue that the presidential support during crisis surged less than expected. Howell, Jackman and Rogowski (2012) in turn conclude that foreign crisis tend to skew congressional-executive negotiations to the president’s favor, making it easier to pursue seemingly unrelated domestic policy issues with less congressional opposition.

34 For an international relations perspective see Henehan, (2000). Although not being an IR study, the results help understand when and how the Congress challenges presidential foreign policy authority, thus limiting presidential authority in the international arena.
engage itself in meaningful debate over ends and means of American foreign policy and go beyond parochial interests of individual members and narrow-minded reasoning as the basis their policy positions. Congress, according to Fulbright, should debate the grand scheme of American foreign policy and focus more on long-term goals of United States’ foreign policy. Congress should assert its role as a reflective body politic which makes meaningful contributions to nation’s foreign policy discussion and its members should serve as Burkean trustees rather than paid representatives of narrow local interests. (Rockman, 2005. 24-27.) Allen (2011, 5) argues this was the viewpoint of George Washington, who contended that “enlightened opinion”, national morality and transcendent interests – as opposed to transient interests and partisanship – ought to guide American statesmen.

Substantial changes in the executive-legislature relationship occurred in the midst and aftermath of Vietnam War. Before Vietnam the Congress stood behind the president on foreign affairs (Tresolini, 1959), but after the war it began questioning presidential initiatives and turned foreign policy from an inside game to an outside game. Legislatures’ influence on foreign policy issues began to rise. (Lindsay, 1993.) Like Stone (2007) argued regarding debates in the 1970’s: "The Vietnam War triggered one of the most turbulent periods in American history." Gordon Silverstein (1997) argues that even after the Vietnam War Congress' attempts to balance the table on foreign policy it had constantly failed, although Friedman (2010) describes the Ford presidency as a conscious attempt by President Ford to “improve the balance of power in Washington and presidential respect for Congress”. (ibid, 42). Further, as a good example of Congress' growing power on foreign policy the Congress passed legislation contradicting the Reagan administrations preferences in the 1980's and blocked several of his initiatives in defense policy. (Lindsay, 1993). As an answer to President Johnson’s bypassing of Congress, Presidents Carter, Ford and Reagan each witnessed their foreign and defense policy initiatives fall in the Congress. (Lindsay, 1992. 417).

3.1.1 Imperial Presidency...

Presidents have regained freedom of unilateral action in a variety of areas, from executive privilege to war powers to covert operations to campaign spending…. The default position between presidents and Congress has moved toward the presidential end of the inter-branch spectrum – and irreversibly so. (Rudalevige, 2006. 261.)
Rudalegieve’s argument postulates an irreversible shift to imperial presidency. To be more precise, Rudalevige suggests that a new imperial presidency has presented itself, as evident by the unilateral presidency of George W. Bush (ibid). The original, modern idea of imperial presidency was presented in Arthur Schlesinger’s “The Imperial Presidency” (1974), which argued that the events in Vietnam and the unilateral expansion of American military operations by presidents Johnson and Nixon had shifted the constitutional and historical understanding of executive-legislative relations away from constitutional presidency, and towards an imperial presidency. Regarding foreign policy, the most obvious, and influential, proof of imperial presidency was the unilateralism expressed in the presidential use of America’s military force. A common factor pushing this development was Cold War and the threat of global communism, which centralized the power with the president at the expense of other branches and rest of the executive branch. The threat of communism had to be responded to swiftly and determinedly, thus leaving less and less space for constitutional considerations. (See Schlesinger, 1974.) The argument by Schlesinger and scholars following his school of thought, critical of expansive presidential power, was that presidential power in war-making transcended the somewhat expected rally-the-flag effect evident during foreign crisis, and instead constituted a transformation of presidential power outside its constitutional boundaries. Korean War, Vietnam War and American interventions during the Cold War were evidence of the eroding war-making powers of the Congress, while at the same time the informational asymmetries enhanced by a “shroud of secrecy” extracted what remained of congressional authority and placed it at the hands of the imperial executive. (See Bergerson et al. 2007.)

What would these signers of the Constitution have to say about this Senate which they created when they note the silence, that is deafening, that emanates from that Chamber on the great issue of war and peace? (Senator Byrd [D-WV] Quoted in Rudalevige, 2006a. 2.)

The quote from West Virginia’s Robert Byrd describes the congressional paralysis in the debates over the second war in Iraq. “The great issue of war and peace” failed to attract the attention of both House of Representatives and the Senate, institutions invoked with the constitutional authority to declare war. As argued by Fisher et al. (2008), Congress has consistently failed to function in its constitutional role as a check to executive power, especially in the realm of war and peace (see also Schlesinger, 1974). In 2003, Congressman Paul Ryan [R-WI] put in words the rationale behind the lack of congressional assertiveness regarding Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq: “there’s nothing for us to do… We
[Congress] don’t have any role on Iraq.” (quoted in Rudalevige, 2006a. 2). Rudalevige saw the George W. Bush presidency as a reincarnation of imperial presidency.\(^{35}\) He goes on to quote Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy, who made an analogy between the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which authorized an open-ended military campaign in Vietnam, and the resolution passed by the Congress to authorize use of force in Iraq. For Rudalevige, the congressional authorization was not a fulfillment of Congress’ institutional and constitutional authority, but an act of deferring the decision-making process to the executive both in Vietnam and 39 years later in Iraq. (Rudalevige, 2006a. 3-6.)

But Rudalevige did not see the 9/11 as the sole contributor to the re-emerged imperial presidency. In fact, he argues that President Clinton was equally enthusiastic about using unilateral military force during his presidency. Bush and Clinton administrations were not the only ones after Nixon and Watergate to hold such views over presidential power. All the presidents since have “resisted probes for information and have asserted ‘executive privilege’ over a wide range of records while protecting even historical material from public release” (ibid, 9). Presidents continued to rely on secrecy whether regarding public records or the use of covert military operations, and the War Powers Resolution failed to extract a congressional resolution when Clinton engaged in Kosovo. (ibid.) Both James Madison in the late 1780’s, and Justice Jackson in 1952 *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer* (343 U.S. 579) noted the interdependence of executive, legislative and judicial branches. Justice Jackson concluded that “Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.” (Jackson [343 U.S. 579], 1952). Corwin (1954) referred to this phenomenon in foreign policy sphere as an “invitation to struggle”, referring to ever-changing struggle over who leads American foreign policy built in the Constitution and the foundations of Madisonian separation of powers.\(^{36}\) Rudalevige (2006a), like Fisher et. al. (2008) argue, however, that regarding foreign policy, the Congress has knowingly conceded the struggle to the executive. As such, the imperial presidency is not inherited in the American political system, but rather a contingent. (See Rudalevige, 2006a). This contingency, “a constitutional perfect storm”, argues Shane (2009, 1-3), is a result of both “gathering

---

\(^{35}\) See also Adler (2010, 1): “In the aftermath of the 9/11 outrage, the Bush administration launched the executive on a trajectory toward the realm of unchecked and unfettered power.” For a more thorough examination of Bush presidency and the limits of executive power in the constitutional context, see for example Pfiffer (2009), who looks at the Bush presidency from both constitutional and political philosophical perspective.

\(^{36}\) See also Rudalevige (2006b, 507): “In the end, the framework of presidential power was left largely in outline form, to be worked out in practice.”
concentration of power in the hands of the federal executive” and “…relentless campaign of the right wing of the Republican Party…to steer the capacities of our national government toward the fulfillment of a conservative social, economic, and foreign policy agenda.” The double-track approach suggested by Shane (2009) adds a concrete partisan undertone to imperial presidency debate, making it difficult to conceptually differentiate between congressional assertiveness and partisan conflict. How much bipartisanship is required for an issue to express congressional assertiveness, rather than partisan juxtapositions? Owens (2009b, 150) notes how presidents tend to resort to unilateralist policy tools when facing crisis, or, when congressional approval for their actions is uncertain. For Owens (ibid, 148) George W. Bush’s administration and its Republican “old timers” Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and David Addington took the approach “led by Roosevelt and many other presidents to blow through ‘legalistic’ restrictions on presidential authority during times of crisis.” Nevertheless, whether deference or power grab, Republican specific or universal across party lines, “the modern presidency has aggrandized enormous powers to itself, especially in the control of the U.S. military”, and this progress has been aggravated by the passivity of Congress. (Bose et. al. 2009. 172).

3.1.2 …or Congressional Dominance?

John Owens discusses “congressional dominance theory”, implying that Congress does not only have the power to do so, but it in fact controls the executive. (Owens, 2009. 147-190). According to proponents of congressional dominance, the Congress holds such “nuclear” powers - especially in the appropriations authorization - that the executive agencies have to comply with the legislature. Members of Congress engage themselves in extensive oversight of the executive and raise concerns brought up by their constituencies. Using the tools at its disposal, Congress had managed to effectively check executive power in Vietnam and U.S. bombing of Laos and Cambodia, the domestic spying by CIA and by imposing checks to Clinton’s policy in the Balkans.

Howell and Pevehouse (2007a) attempt to explore the congressional assertiveness in American foreign policy against the background of accumulated presidential power. They argue, that regarding congressional influence on foreign policy,

37 Cushman (2015, 114) notes that the decline of “regular order” in defense appropriations legislation is also rooted in the rise of reasserted Republican Party, whereas the original “regular order” as it was construed during the Cold War was a result of 40 years of Democratic control. Furthermore, the Tea Party era has “replaced strong defense with budget discipline as a defining pillar of GOP politics.”
“...closer look reveals more [congressional] activity and more influence than scholars have been willing to admit.” (ibid, 6). The viewpoint adopted places focus on the ways Congress has affected foreign policy, as opposed to the viewpoint of those citing imperial presidency, focusing on what Congress should do. By making the distinction described, Pevehouse and Howell argue that the Congress continues to check presidential war powers, and that such congressional assertiveness is often present in the opposition party. (ibid.) Of significance to this study is Pevehouse & Howell’s admittance that certain foreign policy dynamics make it very difficult for Congress to retroactively criticize or revise presidential policy regarding military deployments. Once the American troops have been deployed, it is a high-risk proposition for members of Congress to sow discord while public generally tends to support the American military personnel putting their lives at risk. As such, the presidential power to deploy troops despite congressional opposition makes it very difficult for Congress to revise such policies without significant domestic politics tradeoffs. (ibid.) This study will examine the justifications of both Democratic and Republican senators as they supported or opposed an ongoing military intervention in Libya. By studying the debates and arguments within, one can identify argumentative means by which the opposing party, in this case Republicans, justified their opposition to presidential use of American military power. The 2011 intervention in Libya had little difference in comparison to Reagan’s handling of 1986 Libya bombings, as Reagan began his congressional consultations as the planes were already en route. (ibid). The difference in our case was that whereas Reagan acted in his unilateral presidential authority, Obama acted on multilateral authority by referring to U.N. Security Council Resolution. Further, Howell & Pevehouse conclude on the issue of Congress and war powers, that: “All of the institutional features of Congress that impede consensus building around military venture ex ante also make it equally if not more difficult, later, to dismantle an operation that is up and running.” (ibid, 7).

So, the question is; given the institutional powers held by the executive, what can the Congress do? Howell and Pevehouse concede with Rudalevige’s notion that congressional-executive relations are contingent. (ibid). But whereas Rudalevige argues that imperial presidency is the prevailing contingency, Pevehouse and Howell (2007b) argue that “both through legislative enactments and public appeals”, the Congress still holds considerable power and can make presidential decisions highly costly, financially and otherwise. Besides legislative bills and resolution, the hearings and public statements increase political costs of presidential action. (ibid). This study accepts the notion put forward here, that besides the more easily quantified
legislative action, public committee hearings function as a congressional check to presidential power by increasing political costs and raising public awareness. Novelty of this study is its focus on the substance of political arguments made in the committee hearings, and the qualitative approach to identifying argumentative justifications either supporting or opposing presidential policy (for example the new START and European-based missile defense, Libyan operation) and offers of policy guidance by highlighting the saliency of specific aspects of transatlantic security framework (NATO funding, European troop presence).

Especially strong congressional tool in checking presidential power exists in its constitutional appropriations power. Pre-World War II the United States was not yet the global superpower in turned out to be during and after the Truman presidency. Given the very different global context of American foreign policy, the pre-World War II example of congressional authority in handcuffing President Roosevelt’s efforts to aid European nations preparing for or already fighting in the World War might seem out of place. Yet, given that recent political developments - including the rise of the Tea Party in 2010 midterms and the election of Donald Trump as the president of the United States in 2016 - have challenged the post-World War II American foreign policy establishment, in what Mead (2011, 2017) frames as a Jacksonian revolt, a more nationalist and less engaged approach to America’s global posture, the pre-War example could once again prove relevant. In 1935 and 1937, Neutrality Acts legislated by the isolationist Congress prohibited the direct or indirect financial assistance to Allied nations in war. Fearful of congressional reprisal, Roosevelt had no choice but to comply with the Neutrality legislation despite his own policy preferences, or risk the high political costs to his domestic agenda had he decided to challenge the Congress on Neutrality Acts. It was not until 1939 as Hitler’s actions left little room for competing interpretations over his goals, that Roosevelt began to seriously challenge the isolationist Congress, invoking an isolationist counter-attack led by Charles Lindbergh and isolationist senators. Thus began a war over minds, as both sides attempted to persuade the country on their sides. (Howell & Pevehouse, 2007a. 12.) The battle over America’s foreign policy during the pre-War years had highly salient impact on transatlantic relations, and notably to the Finnish government, which during the Fall of 1939 made several attempts to secure American loans to prepare and eventually fight its war against the Soviet Union. Not willing to concede on American Neutrality, Members of Congress refused to grant loans, and President Roosevelt could not risk his overall strategy of lifting the Neutrality legislation by scaring off the Congress and American people by putting considerable political capital on the line for Finland. (See Jakobson, 2009).
The example here and the prevalence of appropriations authority as a congressional foreign policy tool form a considerable theoretical framework for this study. Two transatlantic security issues, NATO’s future and American troop presence in Europe, were primarily debated as a part of annual defense appropriations authorization process, whereas ideological competition between different foreign policy ideologies were most salient in debates over the new START, yet the ideological undertone was in one way or another present in most debates.

Besides legislative appropriations process, Congress often asserts its authority by what Howell and Pevehouse call “opposition through public appeals…” (Howell & Pevehouse, 2007a. 23). Relative to military operations, the Congress often appears to defer to president by not enacting ex ante legislation either for or against administration policy, and instead, they choose indirect means by “participating in larger debates about the efficacy of military action, raising concerns about the costs involved, and expressing doubts about the plans laid before the American public.” (ibid). This makes the political costs of presidential military ventures higher, and forces the president to explain his policy views to the public. Committee hearings offer the Congress a tool to publicly voice their critique, and raises the electoral costs for those supporting an unpopular foreign policy venture. A historical example of congressional public opposition through hearings is American Vietnam policy both during Eisenhower’s presidency, and later during the large-scale American operations during Johnson and Nixon. In the late 1980’s, Congress publicly questioned Reagan’s decision to offer military protection to oil tankers during Iran-Iraq War, and asked the president to persuade American people that such policy would be worth the risks involved. In 1990’s, debates involved the role of U.N. Security Council resolutions to bypass congressional resolution in Haiti. Based on historical evidence, Howell and Pevehouse conclude that public debates prior to military action have two distinct features: 1) likelihood of congressional complaints and critique is dependent on the scope of military action and risks involved. As stakes raised, more congressional action occurred. 2) Presidents appear to anticipate congressional reactions. If the military risks appeared high from the beginning, the president was more likely to be risk-averse. Then again, if president expected positive reaction, decision to use military action was more likely. (ibid.)

Prins & Marshall (2011) argue, that two distinct features of executive-legislative relations force president to take Congress seriously when deciding on the use of military force; 1) public opinion, which the Congress generally represents, and 2) need for congressional support in president’s overall legislative agenda, forcing him to placate Congress when making decisions in foreign policy sphere. Thus, argue
Prins & Marshall (ibid): “…the president's utility for military action may increase or decrease depending on the legislative environment and Congress's disposition toward the president's policy initiatives.” Where Prins & Marshall disagree, to an extent, with Howell & Pevehouse is the notion of partisan control over Congress. Whereas Howell & Pevehouse conclude that unified party control is the key for offering the president some “cover” in foreign policy and mute the congressional backlash, Prins & Marshall argue that besides party control, “motivation for the [president’s] decision comes from the president's prospects for making policy with Congress.” (ibid, 523.) Despite the difference in conclusions reached, both agree that that Congress does matter in American foreign policy formulation.

So, overall this dissertation functions closer to the theoretical framework suggested by Howell and Pevehouse, and what some describe as congressional dominance. However, this study cannot add much to the debate over which player leads in the formation of American foreign policy. Such studies require larger sample size over time and substance, and probably statistical methods prevalent in American political science literature, whereas the specific focus of this study is in transatlantic security issues during two congresses spanning over four years. The methodological approach and focus on the argumentative substance of committee hearings can answer questions posed by Howell and Pevehouse regarding what the Congress did do, as opposed to the imperial presidency advocates stressing what Congress should have done.

As Pevehouse and Howell conclude (2007a, 223), more than the constitutional duty of U.S. Congress as articulated in Article I of the U.S. Constitution, “congressional checks on presidential war powers materialize under well-specified conditions, having to do with the institution’s partisan composition, the size of a proposed deployment, and the strength of international obligations.” Moreover, the focus on public committee hearings highlights “opposition through public appeals” as opposed to direct legislative action or Congress’ role as a veto-player. Given the institutional developments between the executive and legislative branches, the Congress does what it does given the tools at its disposal. Given that one of the goals in this study is to better understand American foreign policy debates considering transatlantic security, the specific focus on several transatlantic security issues is better served by examining how Congress used one of the primary tools it has - congressional hearings - than by speculating on what it should have done in a constitutional sense. Furthermore, the framing theory as a methodological tool offers few tools to examine executive-legislative relations, rather it allows to identify the argumentative substance of the debates themselves, and as such can offer clues
as to what senators themselves see as a proper balance between the two branches in specific foreign policy situations.

3.2 The Water’s Edge

Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. (James Madison, quoted in The Federalist Papers, 1788.)

The prevailing question defining the theoretical postulations in this dissertation is the interconnectedness of domestic and foreign politics. Does politics in foreign policy sphere stop at the water’s edge? Are foreign policy issues debated based on “public good”, or are they as the Founding Fathers feared, and as articulated by Madison, subject to “conflicts of rival parties”. The short answer drawn from the theoretical breakdown as presented is, that it does not. To clarify this point, I’ll make a very brief comparison between two models of foreign policy determinants based on Mark Souva’s (2005) article.

According to “systemic realist model”, nations ought to be seen as units acting as rational agents in the international sphere, basing their unity on nation’s security concerns. As such, partisan behavior is rare in foreign policy for two primary reasons; 1) foreign policy issues are not parochial by nature, and 2) nation’s interests are not served by presenting a divided front in the international arena. Another key concept in the realist theory is the difference made between high- and low-polities. High-politics related to national security issues is less affected by partisanship than low-politics issues, i.e. general foreign policy issues. Especially foreign trade and foreign aid are suspect to partisanship, compared to high-politics issues generally receiving more bipartisan support. Realist theory concludes, however, that bipolar world-order presented a more simplistic international arena, wherein threat-perception was clearer (i.e. Soviet Union). In the multipolar world, threat is not nearly as easily calculated, and more partisan behavior is expected. (Souva, 2005. 151-153.) If we look at the issues examined in this study – NATO, Libyan operation, U.S.-Russian relations, European military presence, missile defense in Europe, and new START –

38 See for example Morgenthau (1948), Waltz (1979), and Mearsheimer (2001).
we find that: 1) all these if not parochial per se, had at least some distributional aspects affecting congressional behavior. Critique of NATO revolved around funding, and European military presence was presented in fiscal terms. Republican critique of START was based on modernization, i.e. financial backing for modernizing old nuclear weapons, construction, and research and development. 2) As argued by “congressional dominance theory”, the executive must take congressional behavior into account ex ante to ensure the success of his/her foreign policy. Moreover, Vietnam hearings organized by Senator William Fulbright during the War demonstrate the willingness of individual senators to portray a divided front when convinced over his/her cause even in high-politics matters. None of the issues examined here include high-politics issues exceeding or even comparable to the scope of Vietnam, nor issues identified especially inclined to breed partisanship; foreign trade and aid.

Another theoretical model, “Domestic-politics model”, hits closer to the theoretical framework adopted in this dissertation. According to domestic-politics model, public opinion is the key defining concept in analyzing congressional foreign policy behavior due to constituency concerns and electoral connection. Members of Congress are mindful of the public opinion as it connects to their future electoral fortunes, and such behavior is heightened when public opinion is divided on partisan basis. When public opinion divide is wide across partisan lines, members of Congress are more likely to stress the policy position of their respective party. In short; “as public opinion becomes more cleaved, partisanship is more likely to occur.”39 (Souva, 2005. 154-155.) Souva concludes in his analytical comparison between the two models – “systemic realist model” and “domestic-politics model” – that “a domestic-politics model of foreign policy outperforms a systemic realist model of foreign policy […] the principle motivating factors in international relations are domestic and not structural balance of power.” (ibid, 161.) Now, if we are to agree that the domestic effects bear great weight in American foreign policy decision-making, what does this imply for our study? It beckons the question whether transatlantic security issues are debated on distributional or ideological basis, and how does parochialism, partisanship and long-term foreign policy ideology find their place in the debates. And furthermore, besides analyzing the key foreign policy institutions – i.e. Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees – how

39 Souva and Rohde (2007, 121) conclude in their study of congressional foreign policy voting behavior, that the rising partisanship in foreign policy voting since Vietnam is primarily influenced by elite opinion cleavages. Applying to both high- and low-politics, more difference of opinion in both Republican and Democratic party elites express, more likely the issue is going to be contested on partisan basis.
do individual members of Congress, who we identify as foreign policy entrepreneurs, behave in the hearings and argue their policy positions. Is their behavior closer to House of Representative’s hearings on Benghazi, or the hearings organized by Senator Fulbright on Vietnam War?

3.2.1 Partisan Conflict or Ideological Polarization?

In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob. (Hamilton/Madison, Federalist Papers no. 55, 1788.)

The very concept of consensus is problematic when discussing American foreign policy. For a European observer, the American political system stands as the antithesis of consensus seeking multi-party democracies of continental Europe. American two-party system relies on conflict and since the Constitution was ratified in 1789 lawyers and courts took their role as an essential part of American democracy. Modern polarization has obviously further tarnished the prospects of consensus in American politics. But as President Harry S. Truman stated during his 1948 presidential campaign: “As I have said time and time again, foreign policy should be the policy of the whole Nation and not the policy of one party or the other. Partisanship should stop at the water's edge; and I shall continue to preach that through this whole campaign.” (Truman Library, 1948).

3.2.1.1 Polarization

In the beginning of the Cold War, the threat of communism was seen as an existential threat to American way of life and president’s policies to fight the spreading of communism, in what became known as the containment strategy, was accepted with bipartisan support. The American economy was probably the biggest winner of the World War II and with the economic progress, defeating and fighting communism became a national virtue. In this setting any senator and representative had to think twice before going public with anything that could be interpreted as being soft on communism or undermining president’s efforts to fight global communism. Nevertheless, ever since Toqueville the question of how democracies in American tradition can function in the international arena and handle their external affairs as a single state has been raised. Realists have often defined public opinion on matters of
international affairs and foreign policy somewhat irrational and reliant on mood swings. For example, shortly after the Japanese surrendered, public opinion polls showed that only 11% of Americans considered a foreign policy issue to be the most important one facing the nation, yet two years later the number was 73%. (Holsti, 2009. 30). No matter how irrational publics foreign policy preferences may be, due to electoral connection and institutional powers vested in the U.S. Congress one must bear in mind that whatever happens to be on the public agenda often affects American foreign policy decision making. As American political scientist Gabriel Almond put it in mid-20th century:

The average American is so deeply and tensely involved with immediate, private concerns that any diversion of attention meets with powerful resistance. When political issues impinge, or threaten to impinge, upon these concerns, public attention broadens to include them. But the moment the pressure is reduced there is a swift withdrawal, like the snapping back of a strained elastic. (Almond, 1950. 76).

When trying to make sense of American decision making in foreign policy field one must not only take into effect the domestic issues affecting the electorate and thusly Congress, but also elite opinion often leading the discussion and partisan divides that follow polarization in elite opinions.

3.2.1.2 Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965

Modern political polarization began to gain form after the rise of civil rights movement and Democratic Party’s decision to fully support equal rights for African Americans on the federal level. The political map of American South saw radical changes, as President Johnson and Democratic Party pushed for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act if 1965, while Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater took a stance against civil rights reform. Consequently, African American voters in the South identified themselves with the Democrats and conservatives who traditionally voted for pro-segregationist Democrats switched to Republicans. If the two parties were internally rather heterogeneous, this change in the makeup of partisan political map changed their internal structure internally homogeneous and diminished the number of bipartisan interests uniting both parties. (Prins & Marshall, 2001. 115.)

Maybe the most influential character behind the change in congressional foreign policy behavior was not John F. Kennedy nor Richard Nixon. As much as President Kennedy has been publicly revered for his civil rights legislation as well as his
handling of the Cuban missile crisis, and on the contrary the great infamy attached
to Richard Nixon, it was Lyndon B. Johnson whose actions on several fronts
brought about the change. After battling Kennedy for the leadership position within
the Democratic party leading to the 1960’s elections, John F. Kennedy realized he
needed Johnson in his campaign and nominated him to be his vice-presidential
candidate. (Savage, 2004. 44-46). Vast majority of African American votes were given
to JFK and LBJ to overcome Richard Nixon in the general election and this mandate
brought the question of civil rights - especially in the South - to the agenda in the
new Democratic White House.

After electing Kennedy to the White House the black caucus remained skeptical.
Some who carried great respect amongst the African American population in the
civil rights movement voiced their opinion out loud, especially Martin Luther King
and Malcolm X. Pondering on his upcoming re-election campaign in 1964, despite
having the African American votes in 1960 it now looked like the white population
was not prepared to proceed with integration as fast as they thought Kennedy’s
administration was about to. President Kennedy was in no hurry to advance his
comprehensive civil rights reform, until the issue became highly salient in the South.
(Savage, 2004. 197-198). In fact, the issue did not gain much attention until the
landmark Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education - which de jure ended
segregation in the public-school system - was being implemented in deeply divided
Birmingham, Alabama. (Brown v. Board of Education). Reluctance of local
governments in the South and their active opposition to the implementation of Brown
v. Board of Education ended with the decision of John F. Kennedy to deploy National
Guard troops to ensure the admittance of African American students to their classes
despite opposition of local police and parts of the white population. In his eloquent
speech to the nation after the decision to deploy the troops was made, JFK told the
American people that:

Nor is this a partisan issue. In a time of domestic crisis men of good will and
generosity should be able to unite regardless of party or politics. This is not
even a legal or legislative issue alone. It is better to settle these matters in the
courts than on the streets, and new laws are needed at every level, but law
alone cannot make men see right. We are confronted primarily with a moral
issue. It is as old as the Scriptures and is as clear as the American Constitution.
(John F. Kennedy)

Consequences of the administrations battle to pass Civil Rights Legislation despite
opposition within its own ranks lead to a monumental change in the partisan
divisions in the American political system.
Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the consequent Voting Rights Act of 1965, the centrist consensus on policy agenda was challenged in the presidential campaign of 1964. GOP ended up nominating Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater to challenge Lyndon B. Johnson after John F. Kennedy’s assassination in 1963. Goldwater was supported by the right-wing organizations and the conservative part of the Republican Party, while the centrist Republicans were more willing to compromise with the Democratic president in his social reforms. In fact, the moderate Republicans did not end up nominating anyone to compete for the party’s ticket in the upcoming election. Kennedy, as well as Lyndon Johnson later on, were rather confident in their abilities to defeat Goldwater in the upcoming election, although the challenge posed by conservative reaction to the “Great Society” was a noteworthy threat. (Savage, 2004. 203-210.) Looking at the election from the perspective of median voter and the centrist position of Lyndon B. Johnson, Barry Goldwater’s chances did not look strong. But the so-called “white backlash” over JFK’s civil rights reform made LBJ wary, and Goldwater confident enough to take an anti-civil rights legislation stand in the election. Although this strategy did not end up winning him the election, it won the Republican Party several conservative southern Democrats.

To demonstrate the change in American political life, one need not look further than the electoral map of 1964 presidential election. Lyndon B. Johnson defeated Barry Goldwater with a landslide margin. The electoral college went 486-52 in favor of the Democratic candidate. Of the five Southern states traditionally voting Democrats - all of which elected Kennedy in 1960 – all voted in favor of Goldwater in 1964. These five states were Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama and South Carolina. Only state besides these five to vote for Goldwater was his home state of Arizona. (Election of 1964). Not surprisingly, these Southern states stood most firmly in opposition of JFK’s civil rights reform and openly defied Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Brown v. Board of Education. Democratic Senator J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina went as far as changing his party affiliation in the middle of his term from the Democratic Party to the GOP in 1964 as a response to his former party’s endorsement of Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Senate.gov).

As Gary Jacobson put it: “Realignment in the South followed the national Democratic Party’s decision to champion civil rights for African Americans and the Republican Party’s choice of Sen. Barry Goldwater, who voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as its standard bearer that year” (Jacobson, 2000. 26.) The American electoral field saw its most significant reform since the Civil War and Reconstruction Era which followed it, as the conservative Democrats joined the
Republican party. If before the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965 there was a divide between the southern and northern Democrats - northern Democrats were often liberal and more supportive of the social reforms whereas the southern Democrats maintained the conservative nature they’d had since before the Civil War - after the legislation was passed the situation changed. Democratic Party received a great amount of African American voters who had previously been marginalized in the South and the conservative Democrats were no longer part of the party. Both the Republican and Democratic party became more and more homogenous due to this change in the American political landscape. (Souva & Rohde, 2007. 115.) If before it was easier for the executive to negotiate with the centrist members of the other party, now the need had been greatly diminished. Realignment of the South and increasingly homogenous parties gave birth to the modern polarization, which we are witnessing maybe stronger than ever since the years leading to the Civil War.40

Mark Souva and David Rohde (2007) argue that as a consequence of the realignment of American South, the opinions of the party elites began to gain more and more influence within the parties. Activists within both parties have gained stronger foothold and often the party candidates for the Congress rise from either the core activist group or otherwise come to reflect the positions of opinion leaders of one’s party.41 Given the rising price of running for office, party activists often prove themselves invaluable in mobilizing voters and rallying support. Especially in the House of Representatives, with its biannual election cycle, candidates are extremely reliant on their support groups if they hope to run a successful re-election campaign. Since individual candidates rely so heavily on party activists and opinion leaders – i.e. the party elites - members of Congress have come to reflect the views of their core supporters. (Souva & Rohde, 2007. 115.)

The rise of partisan polarization in the Congress also affects how the members react to foreign policy debate. It is not a secret that the American public often pays little attention to matters of international affairs. According to political scientist Alan Abramowitz (Abramowitz, 2010. 34) American people, as people in most

40 For a study of reformation in the Senate see Loomis, (2003. 59-75), who examines the shift in the individual nature of Senate shifting from the seniority-based – also referred to as “committee government” (Heberlig & Larson, 2012. 1) - system to modern day. The shift is somewhat paradoxical in nature, since some of the institutional structures of the Senate prior to civil rights legislation skewed the playing field to more conservative, anti-civil rights senators. In this sense, the polarization already existed before the realignment, but following the reformation it gained its partisan form, as the obstructionist Democrats now became obstructionist Republicans.

41 This notion is further supported by Abramowitz and Saunders (2008), who argue that the polarization of the elite is widespread, and acts as a catalyst for political participation.
democracies, also pay little attention to ideological divides so often represented by the party elites. As Abramowitz put it:

The clear majority of ordinary voters showed little evidence of using an ideological framework to evaluate political parties or presidential candidates and very limited understanding of basic ideological concepts such as liberalism and conservatism. Perhaps most tellingly, the opinions expressed by citizens on current policy issues were almost completely unrelated. According to Converse, the absence of consistency, or constraint, in the opinions of ordinary voters proved that they were responding to these issues idiosyncratically, rather than on the basis of an underlying liberal or conservative ideology. In fact, on some issues Converse concluded that most respondents did not even have meaningful opinions. (Abramowitz, 2010. 34.)

Similar sentiments were also echoed in Alexis de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America*:

Common sense is sufficient for dealing with routine matters, and in a nation whose people are educated, democratic liberty applied to domestic affairs yields goods sufficient to outweigh the evils that democratic government is likely to introduce. But this is not always the case when it comes to relations between nations. (Tocqueville, 2004. 262.)

This observation is especially important when discussing polarization and foreign policy. If American people rarely identify themselves as the party elites do – as argued by scholars such as Fiorina and Levendusky (2006) - this is even truer when discussing matters of foreign policy. On issues revolving around American foreign policy, the role of opinion leaders is magnified as they serve as a link between the policymakers and public. (Souva & Rohde, 2007. 116). When trying to arouse the interests of the public, positions taken by the party elites and opinion leaders play a pivotal role. Since the partisan polarization began to rise after the enactment of civil rights legislation in the 1960’s, polarized party elites often force the hands of individual members of Congress, making the kind on consensus that JFK based his centrist foreign policy if not impossible, at least improbable. When party elites differ in their opinions over foreign policy issues, it is very likely that the roll-call votes go per party lines. (Souva & Rohde, 2007).

### 3.3 Distributional and Ideological Incentives

As evident by the previous theoretical postulations, the distinction between *imperial presidency* and *congressional dominance* is dominated by the issue of war-making powers.
This is by no means a surprise, the executive war-making power is the most visible foreign policy tool at the executive’s disposal, and as demonstrated before, the institutional and global developments since the Second World War have accumulated presidential power in deploying American military might. Question of war-making powers is hardly irrelevant to our study of transatlantic security. The U.S. involvement in NATO operations such as the 2011 intervention in Libya was debated and critiqued on the basis of congressional-executive cooperation in deploying American troops overseas, and the use of U.N. Security Council resolutions as a substitute for congressional authorization. Furthermore, the debates over NATO’s enlargement and U.S. policy in Eastern Europe, Ukraine and Georgia specifically, invoked sensitive questions about Article 5 commitments as per NATO’s Washington Treaty. Also, as the committees discussed United States as a security producer in Western Europe, Article 5 considerations were raised. But, the issues analyzed in the empirical section of this study include issues other than ones related to war-making powers. NATO’s future, European military presence, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, European-based missile defense, and U.S.-Russian relations each involved different types of policy considerations. To examine different foreign policy instruments and their effects on congressional behavior on various issues, I will draw upon Milner and Tingley’s (2015) “Sailing on the Water’s Edge”. Therein is postulated a distinction between two separate features affecting how politics function in American foreign policy decision-making and Congress’ role in it. These two features are distributional and ideological, both affecting congressional agenda and making it rather distinct from president’s domestic and international agenda.

### 3.3.1 Distributional

Regarding distributional factors, “…policy instruments vary in the extent to which they have domestic distributional consequences and whether these costs and benefits

---

42 Article 5 refers to NATO’s founding treaty, which articulated that attack against one member state is an attack against all:

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them…will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” (NATO, 2017.)
are concentrated or diffuse.” (Milner & Tingley, 2015, 39). The distinction between distributional and ideological factors could also be seen in the context of “two-congresses”, wherein individual members of Congress have a two-fold agenda; to “bring home the bacon” by representing their respective constituencies within their districts or states, and to act as national decision-makers, keeping in mind the national interest of the United States. (see for example Davidson et. al., 2011; Mayhew, 2004.) As such, presidents often have more difficulties passing their policy initiatives when “distribution of gains and losses is large and concentrated” (Milner & Tingley, 2015, 39). The logic behind this rather simple; when the distributional effects of certain policy initiatives are significant and affect specific localities, interest groups and constituencies activate on the issue, creating powerful pressure for congressional action. Often certain policies – let’s say international trade agreements, for example - can have severe negative distributional consequences to others, and high positive consequences for others. In such cases, president’s informational advantages are less significant, and overall policy struggles between competing interests have a high likelihood to adversely affect presidential initiatives. Higher the distributional consequences, higher the political cost for the president will be. From a congressional perspective, issues with higher distributional consequences greatly affect the re-election chances of members of Congress. In such cases, presidents are likely to face difficulties convincing members from their own party to stand behind a cause with severe distributional consequences on the local level (ibid). For example, President Obama had great difficulty to get his own party behind the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) initiative, as his interlocutor to the senate, Majority Leader Harry Reid [D-NV] put it: “I have never, ever … supported a trade agreement, and I’m not going to start now – so the answer isn’t only no, but hell no.” (The Hill, 2015a) Higher the distributional effects, higher the domestic restraints, and as such, trade, economic aid and immigration issues garner more attention from interest groups and local constituencies, thus restraining president’s ability to dictate policy. (Milner & Tingley, 2015, 42-44).

None of the transatlantic issues studied in the empirical section of this study involve trade, economic aid or immigration. TTIP is a highly distributional issue with considerable constituency dimension for Democratic senators, but due to my focus on transatlantic security, TTIP debates will not be analyzed. Milner & Tingley (2015,

---

43 Prins and Marshall (2011, 542) similarly conclude, that presidents decide on use of military force based on their calculations on how such decision would affect their legislative agenda in the Congress. If the adverse effects of military tools are high, president is more likely to resort in other foreign policy instruments to safeguard his general legislative agenda in the Congress.
47-52) go on to argue, that geopolitical aid, military deployments, and sanctions are all foreign policy issues with less distributional consequences to local constituencies or interest groups. As opposed to centralized effects of international trade agreements, overseas military deployments, for example, have a decentralized effect on the public, as both the benefits and costs affect the nation as a whole. This does not mean that military deployments are cost-free, but rather that blood and treasure sacrificed does not affect a single, specific social group attracting attention from interest groups or localities. The costs are borne by all through taxation, and both the president and the legislature can claim the benefits of a successful military operation. Compared to other foreign policy instruments at the president’s disposal, “military deployments rarely attract the level of interest group activity that other policy instruments do.” (ibid, 48). What further separates military deployments from other foreign instruments is the recognition that three groups of elites influential in foreign policy debates - 1) members of Congress, 2) key members of bureaucracy (agencies such as Pentagon, State Department), and 3) military leadership – do not include interest groups. In general, presidents ought to have more influence in foreign policy decisions involving military deployments. (ibid.) An important exception to the rule is domestic military spending. Domestic military spending has highly distributional consequences, as troop movements from one district or state to another directly affect the localities and thus activate interest groups. Interest group activity and direct electoral connection make congressmen and congresswomen fight fiercely to prevent closing of military bases in their districts, and due to high level of local attention, the president does not enjoy the informational advantages he or she does in other fields of military policy. As such, presidential power in domestic military spending is highly constrained by domestic considerations and heightened congressional activity. (ibid, 50-51.)

The distributional consequences are relevant in almost all the issues examined in the empirical section of this study. NATO debates regarding the organization’s current and future viability was discussed in fiscal terms, highlighting the negative distributional consequences for American taxpayers caused by Europeans’ refusal to pay their fair share. European military presence, an issue of seemingly little consequence for localities in United States, was framed as a domestic spending issue by equating military spending in Europe to base-closure debates in mainland United States. The debates over the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) had considerable distributional consequences do to its implications on weapons programs, research, and dismantling weapons system, as many in the Senate highlighted the nuclear modernization aspect of the treaty. By examining the case-
by-case argumentation and issue-framing in transatlantic security related hearings, this study adds to Milner and Tingley’s empirical case-studies regarding *distributional* features of different foreign policy instruments. High distributional consequences are especially relevant to help understand congressional cohesiveness in certain issues studied, specifically the aforementioned debates over NATO and European military presence, where congressional cohesiveness overcame partisan divide.

### 3.3.2 Ideological

Milner and Tingley (2015, 56-65) argue, that alongside the material incentives creating winners and losers constituting the distributional features of politics surrounding foreign policy decision-making, ideological differences between the actors form another critical feature. Divisions between ideological perspectives do matter. Milner and Tingley draw upon Gerring’s (1997) understanding of ideology to postulate how they define foreign policy ideology:

> …we define ideology as the set of beliefs held by an individual about politics and foreign affairs that is consistent internally, contrasts with other individuals’ beliefs, is relatively stable through time, and is non-expedient – that is, it does not reflect their immediate, short term material interests. For foreign policy, this means beliefs about the dispositions of foreign actors and the appropriate way to deploy government resources to deal with them. (Milner & Tingley, 2015. 57.)

Ideology affect individual Congressmen as they attempt to decide whether to support or oppose presidential foreign policy action, and whether they think that the foreign policy instrument chosen by the president presents correct response to an existing issue. Further, ideological considerations affect how the electorate evaluates their leaders and the decisions they support, thus affecting the electoral chances of individual members of Congress.44 The public, argue Milner and Tingley, do care about the foreign policy instruments chosen by the president: “they [the public] have different causal stories in their heads about how policies connect to outcomes.”

---

44 In this sense, Michael Hunt’s understanding that ideologies “…elucidate complex realities and reduce them to understandable and manageable terms…” (Quoted in Gries, 2014. 33) helps link framing and problem definition to ideologies. i.e. Congressmen present the issues in “understandable and manageable” terms as to enhance their individual electoral chances by defining their response to a specific problem as a proper solution given the supposed ideological position of the electorate. This idea can of course be extended to the partisan definition of a problem, defining - and in some cases simplifying - the issue in terms favorable to one party over the other.
The methodological approach adopted in this study highlights the perceived causal connection between foreign policy outcomes and tools chosen to achieve said outcomes. As per Entman, “to frame is to…promote particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation…” (Entman, 1993. 52). To frame is to make perceived causal links salient, as to either support or oppose specific policies adopted. To quote Stone (1989, 282), “causal stories need to be fought for…”, and thus, the ideological interpretations of specific issues are analyzed by case-by-case qualitative frame analysis of transatlantic security policy hearings. Ideological features become salient in cases where the Congress is divided in its response to the president either across partisan lines, and especially in cases where intra-party factionalism is identified. Ideology is constituted by two critical elements, internal and external consistency, meaning that ideology needs to internally consistently shared by a group of people, and it needs to externally contrast with other sets of ideas. Overcoming significant ideological divisions can be extremely costly for the president, and attempting to use foreign policy instruments arousing ideological divisions constrains presidential influence. (Milner & Tingley, 2015. 58.)

As Milner and Tingley (ibid) conclude: “If ideological divisions over [foreign policy] instruments are wide, crafting coalitions across such instruments may be very difficult for presidents.” This contention is tied to the conclusions reached Howell and Pevehouse (2007a, 222), that the partisan composition, especially cohesive partisan opposition significantly alters how presidents make decisions regarding the use of force. When strong, cohesive partisan opposition to president’s policy choice is mobilized, it greatly affects the “president’s efforts to rally public support…” and equally importantly it affects how president can “communicate the nation’s foreign policy commitments to both allies and adversaries abroad.” (ibid.) The conclusion above does not, however, extend to smaller scale operations, such as perhaps the Libyan operation, wherein the presidential freedom to deploy military force is rather unconstrained, nor does it seem to influence president’s power to respond to crisis in countries with which United States has “long standing alliances.” (ibid). This theoretical postulation does not help to evaluate Article 5 considerations vis-à-vis Russia, for such conflict would greatly surpass the scale of operations analyzed by Pevehouse and Howell. But it brings up the issue of partisanship. Short of legislative efforts, the Congress has tangible ways to sow discord in presidential foreign policy initiatives. Public criticism in form of committee hearings and public statements can significantly heighten the political costs for the president. As George W. Bush saw his approval ratings sink, so did his support from moderate Republicans. If the members of Congress perceive the president losing the public support, they might
conclude that their electoral chances are better served by distancing themselves from the president’s policy.\textsuperscript{45} Lacking congressional support, or worse, facing unified congressional opposition, the president’s decision on the scope, timing, and size of military operations must be pre-emptively modified to appease congressional critics. (ibid.)

Comparing Pevehouse and Howell’s conclusion on the critical nature of partisan composition and Milner and Tingley’s assertion that ideological features matter leads to a question highly relevant to this study; is there a difference between ideological polarization and partisan conflict? In the case studies analyzed in this dissertation, two variations of congressional behavior are identified: 1) \textit{congressional cohesion}, wherein congressional argumentation regarding an issue is relative cohesive with little or no partisan deviations, 2) \textit{congressional divide}, wherein members of Congress disagree on an issue. Furthermore, when Congress is divided, two subdivisions exist: 1) \textit{inter-party division}, wherein Republicans and Democrats both have their own, cohesive perception of the issue, and 2) \textit{intra-party division}, wherein factionalism is identified within the parties.

Frances Lee (2009, 3) offers a more parochial view of the inter-party division, arguing, that “Congressional parties hold together and battle with one another because of powerful competing political interests, not just because of members’ ideals or ideological preferences.” Lee’s assertion derives from the adage that re-election is the paramount operational goal of members of Congress (see for example Davidson et. al. 2011), and that ideological differences are secondary to the political interests, all based in one overarching goal of staying in the office. Congressmen see their fates tied closely to the success or failure of their own party, and political interests are in a sense prerequisite to ideological considerations; one needs to get elected before being able to promote his/her ideological position. Majority party’s main goal is to remain in the majority, whereas minority party attempts to fight its way up to majority status by any means necessary. Lee argues, that due to the dynamics described above leads; “members of one party to support efforts to discredit the opposition party on the grounds of its incompetence and lack of integrity, not simply to oppose its ideological policy agenda.” (Lee, 2003. 3.) Now, such notions are supported by statements such as one made by Senator Mitch McConnell on the eve of 2010 midterm elections: “The single most important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term president” (quoted in Kessler, 2012), as well

\textsuperscript{45} Although one ought to note the effects of modern hyper polarization, wherein “abandoning” the president representing one’s own party might have more direct negative consequences now (post-2010), compared to the past.
as the argument made by Pevehouse and Howell (2007b) on Republican moderates turning their backs on George W. Bush’s Iraq policy, as they saw his approval ratings sink and as such, their respective re-election prospects shrinking. Lee’s argument continues to assert that the legislative opposition to president is reflexive partisanship, not based on the ideological policy differences, but on the fact that it is the opposing party’s president advancing them.46 (Lee, 2009. 4.)

It is important to note, that Lee’s work was not limited to foreign policy, yet if partisan conflict is the driving factor in congressional politics, one can certainly extend the argument to foreign policy. But it is also important to make a distinction between the type of ideology-based research critiqued by Lee, and the one adopted in this study. Lee (2009, 182) argues, that contemporary analysis equates “party conflict in with party polarization on the ideological continuum.” This, according to Lee, is especially prevalent in the roll-call based analysis, which assume that member’s policy preferences can be drawn from the partisan patterns in the roll-call data, and that policy preferences are the driving reason why Republicans and Democrats vote on the opposite spectrums. Lee argues, that partisan conflict is neglected, and that conflict cannot be explained by simple acknowledgement that Republicans are conservative, Democrats liberal.47 “To understand partisanship in Congress…” argues Lee (ibid), “…it is necessary to pay attention to politics.” At the core of Lee’s critique is his observation that not all issues are ideological, and that liberalism and conservatism, despite their broad conceptual definitions, cannot cover every policy issue before the Congress.48 (Lee, 2009. 184). The methodological approach adopted in this study pays great attention to substance based argumentation. By not focusing on the roll-call data, but to a qualitative research of committee hearings, there’s no need for the liberal-conservative ideological separation critiqued by Lee (2009). But neither does our method entail that we simply accept Lee’s assertion that partisan conflict is the driving force behind congressional

46 This certainly seemed to be the experience of President Barack Obama, who in his final press conference in 2016 stated that: “…for too long everything that happens in this town, everything that's said is seen through the lens of does this help or hurt us relative to Democrats or relative to President Obama?” (Obama, 2016.) From Obama’s, perhaps less than unfair, perspective, Obama’s agenda was to further national policy, whereas congressional agenda was to obstruct presidential initiatives regardless of their substance.

47 This by no means implies that the parties are less polarized than argued by pundits and scholars alike. Keith Poole, for example, noted in 2012 that “Republicans are now [furthest] to the right that they've been in 100 years.” (quoted in James, 2012.)

48 See also Ashley & Bryan (2013), who argue that ideological partisan polarization has developed over time on issue-by-issue basis on a multidimensional scale, not simply on liberal-conservative unidimensional scale.
behavior, at least in transatlantic security issues. To balance between Lee’s viewpoint and Milner & Tingley’s emphasis on ideological features, this study will analyze the empirical results in the framework of American foreign policy ideology as articulated by Walter Mead (2002), who postulated four distinct ideological approached to American foreign policy, named after four authoritative figures in American politics; Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, Andrew Jackson, and Woodrow Wilson.

3.4 American Foreign Policy Ideology

Since the end of World War II, the United States has pursued a single grand strategy: deep engagement. In an effort to protect its security and prosperity, the country has promoted a liberal economic order and established close defense ties with partners in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East...The details of U.S. foreign policy have differed from administration to administration..., but for over 60 years, every president has agreed on the fundamental decision to remain deeply engaged in the world. (Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, quoted in Milner & Tingley, 2015. 273.)

Donald Trump’s election as the 45th president of the United States in November 2016 sent shockwaves through the world, including the American post-World War II foreign policy establishment, both literal and ideological. Walter Russel Mead wrote an article titled “The Jacksonian Revolt” in the March/April issue of Foreign Affairs, arguing that “not since Franklin Roosevelt’s administration has U.S. foreign policy witnessed debates this fundamental.” (Mead, 2017. 2.) From a transatlantic perspective, especially worrisome were President Trump’s perceptions of the organizational basis of transatlantic security framework, namely, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (see for example Erlanger, 2017). But if the Trump administration is such a challenge to existing transatlantic security framework and overall American foreign policy thinking, what constituted the existing foreign policy ideology of the United States?

3.4.1 Republicans and Democrats – Conservatives and Liberals

Conventional wisdom describes Republicans as more hawkish on foreign policy, compared to the dovish Democrats. Clark, Fordham and Nordstrom (2016, 791), however, observed that despite the strength of the common perception separating
the two parties on foreign policy, there’s no clear empirical evidence to support such claims. True, Republicans in the Congress and in public have generally supported military interventions and overall military spending with greater enthusiasms⁴⁹, yet the studies examining if this partisan difference carries into actual military action have come back inconclusive. (ibid.) For example, in 1991 President Bush asked for a congressional approval to intervene in Kuwait and Iraq. In the House, all but three Republicans voted for the bill (H.J. Res. 77, 1991), whereas out of 265 Democrats, 179 voted against the resolution⁵⁰, which eventually passed the House 250 for and 183 against. Then again, President Clinton did not seek congressional authorization to intervene in the Balkans, nor did President Obama as U.S. intervened in Libya. George W. Bush did go to the Congress both in 2001 (Afghanistan) and 2002 (Iraq). The second Gulf War was voted on highly partisan basis, as majority of Democrats both in House and the Senate voted against the war. (Hess, 2005. 63).

Gries (2014, 50-54) argues that the traditional liberal-conservative divide is not accurate enough to differentiate between competing partisan foreign policy views. Taking the example of foreign trade, Gries notes a divide within the two parties, as high profile politicians in both parties have offered divergent views on foreign trade (i.e. Dennis Kunich vs. Hillary Clinton, or Rand Paul vs. Patrick Buchanan). (ibid.) This leads Gries (2014, 52) to conclude that: “…different kinds of American liberals and conservatives hold systematically different foreign policy attitudes.” Gries thus divides the dichotomy of conservative-liberal demarcation into four dimensions: cultural, social, economic, and political. The different dimensions sometimes work to shorten the gap between liberals and conservatives – for example free trade - but mostly the effect is the rather opposite (i.e. further polarization). A good example of the four dimensions pulling conservatives and liberal in vastly different direction is United Nations, an issue resulting in “…massive differences on multilateralism at the aggregate liberal-conservative level.” (ibid, 53.)

Conservatives and liberals tend to have certain agreed-upon differences in their ideological approach to different foreign policy instruments. Considering foreign trade, conservatives tend to support removal of trade barriers constricting the flow of goods across the globe, whereas liberals tend to be more concerned over the effects of trade liberalization to social issues, inequality and worker’s rights.⁵¹ Foreign

⁴⁹ See for example Gries, 2014. 33-42.
⁵⁰ This despite the fact that the resolution was pursuant to a United Nations Security Council Resolution.
⁵¹ Democratic presidents have, however, supported free trade agreements, as evident by President Clinton’s passage of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Republican support in
aid as a foreign policy instrument takes money via taxation and redistributes it to places where individuals will not necessarily invest it in the free market. As such, conservatives on the right are more likely to oppose foreign aid, whereas liberals on the left are more open to redistribution of wealth. These two examples are a clear example of ideological differences between the left and the right, and are by nature similar to domestic politics debates over governments proper place in overall economy. (Milner & Tingley, 2015. 60-63.)

Then again, issues such as immigration are less consistently placed on the left-right spectrum. On the other hand, conservatives tend to oppose restrictions to flow of people, goods and services, yet immigration is often tied to redistributive policies opposed by those on the right. Sanctions are another example of less obvious ideological divide. Conservatives might see sanctions as a governmental intervention into economy, yet they tend to support sanctions against countries they deem disrupting to global capitalism. On the left, sanctions might be seen as targeted against innocent civilians who have nothing to do with the problem itself, yet liberals tend to support sanction regimes based on human rights violations etc. Geopolitical aid also awakens feelings on both sides. Geopolitical aid is not a government intervention into economy similar to foreign aid, nor is it a redistributive issue, but rather a security issue. On the other hand, aid to foreign militaries could be seen as an intervention into economy, but it might serve other goals supported by the right, i.e. promotion of free trade. For liberals, the aid is not directed to the poor, yet it might help solve the underlying human rights issues. As such, the nature of geopolitical aid is highly relevant to how both ideological spectrums react to specific instances of geopolitical aid. In domestic military spending, conservatives tend to be more supportive of distributing tax money into military, and more likely to oppose redistributing the wealth into social programs. The liberals tend to be the opposite, yet domestic military spending is complicated by the electoral connection and overall size of the military, i.e. some military spending is required, but how much is enough? (ibid.)

I have now examined some of the characteristics of both Republican and Democratic foreign policy thinking (see for example Milner & Tingley, 2015), and acknowledged that the ideological differences are not defined by the simple conservative-liberal divide, and that these two groups are not homogenous in their

the Congress, and President Obama’s support for both Trans-Pacific Agreement (TPA) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

52 Although per 2015 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey, immigration and climate change are two of the most partisan issues amongst the American public. (CCGA, 2015.)
foreign policy ideology (see for example Gries, 2014), we’ll attempt to recognize distinct Republican and Democratic foreign policy profiles using the internationalism, realism/idealism, and nationalism divide.

Internationalism (referring to means of American foreign policy) is understood in multiple terms. As Gries describes it (2014, 100):

> It can refer to international engagement/activism (opposed to isolationism), to multilateralism (opposed to unilateralism), or to diplomacy (opposed to militarism/force). It thus addresses a series of distinct questions. First, should the United States be actively involved in world affairs? […] Second, if America chooses to engage the world, how should it do so? Can it trust other countries enough to work multilaterally, whether through alliances, treaties, or international organizations? Or is it better to act alone? Third and finally, whether unilaterally or multilaterally, what is the best means to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals—diplomacy or the application of military force?

According to Gries’ survey analysis, liberals are more internationalist compared to conservatives. This is especially true when it comes to militarism and multilateralism – i.e. whether U.S. ought to act alone or with an international coalition and if it preferred diplomacy over military forces – confirming the idea of Democratic doves and Republican hawks. For example, the support for the United Nations was considerably higher among liberals compared to conservatives distrusting of U.N. But even within the Republican party, U.S. global engagement divides the Party, as members such as Rand Paul advocate isolationist policies as opposed to internationalist members such as John McCain or Marco Rubio. Gries continues to argue that conservatives tend to support isolationist policies due to their greater “social dominance orientation” and libertarian tendencies. (Gries, 2014. 100-102.) Overall, conservatives are much more likely to support the use of military force and unilateral action, whereas liberal’s stress diplomacy and international organization such as U.N. or EU. (ibid, 105-106.)

**Realism** and **idealism** refer to the goals of U.S. foreign policy. What types of policies should the United States pursue? Should it focus on core U.S. national interests (economic and military security), or should it work to promote certain universal values globally (humanitarianism, human rights, democracy etc.). Per Gries (ibid), humanitarian idealism proved out to be the most divisive partisan issue. Liberals are considerably more likely to support humanitarian idealism (i.e. foreign aid etc.) than conservatives. As such, foreign policy ideology is an extension of domestic politics

---

53 An example of isolationism affecting transatlantic security would be Rand Paul’s vote against Montenegro’s NATO ascendance in 2017. (See Time, 2017.)
ideology; liberals oppose social dominance and economic inequality, conservatives support social dominance and economic inequality. Same principles apply to the partisan divide over foreign policy, as exemplified by Republican and Democratic attitudes towards foreign and development aid. Political idealism, referring to promotion of American values globally, is not as divisive as humanitarian idealism. Liberals are more likely to support political idealism, whereas the issue divides the conservatives to some degree, as libertarians are much more likely to oppose political idealism in foreign policy. (ibid, 106-115.)

Nationalism, in terms of American foreign policy ideology, refers to how American’s feel about themselves in contrast to the rest of the world. Liberals are more likely to see themselves as Americans and as citizens of the world. Liberals are less likely to see themselves as exceptional compared to citizens of other nations, whereas conservatives tend to view Americans as exceptional amongst the nations of the world. For example, in 2012 Republican Party Platform, the section covering GOP's foreign policy agenda was titled “American Exceptionalism.” (Gries, 2014. 116.) Nationalism (belief that one’s nation is better than others) and patriotism (love of one’s country) do matter in terms of individual foreign policy preferences. Both nationalism and patriotism correlate positively with the use of U.S. military force, i.e. more nationalist or patriotic a person, more likely he or she is to support tougher foreign policy. Conservatives are much more likely to prefer nationalism and patriotism, although nationalism is more directly linked to support for tougher (military) foreign policy. In short, conservatives are more likely to see America as superior to other nations, and thus prefer stronger authority over foreigners and policies that separate Americans from the rest of the world. (ibid.)

This study contributes to our understanding of partisanship in foreign policy. Scholars have disagreed how much partisanship affects foreign policy, as some (see for example Busby, Monten & Inboden, 2012) argue that politics does stop at the water’s edge, while some (see for example Gries, 2014) argue it does not. Of course, given the sample size of our case study, this thesis cannot conclusively answer the grand question of water’s edge. It can, however, answer how partisanship affects certain key transatlantic security issues.

3.4.2 Foreign Policy Profiles

In his book “Special Providence” Mead (2002) divides the American post-World War II foreign policy thinking in four distinct schools of thought, named after four distinguished American characters; Alexander Hamilton, Woodrow Wilson, Thomas
Jefferson and Andrew Jackson. Mead’s approach has since been used to more delicately distinguish between foreign policy ideology (for example Gries, 2014), compared to the rather unidimensional separation between conservatives or liberals, and the more common, yet highly theoretical separation between idealists and realists. In fact, Mead (2002) argues that American foreign policy developed into a distinct American form, as opposed to the traditional European foreign policy models (of the previous centuries). First, the Hamiltonians argued that the U.S. national interest dictated, that the United States ought to take the global leadership role in the place of waning British empire, by creating a global liberal order, “understood primarily in economic terms”. Second, the Wilsonians agreed with the creation of global liberal order, but besides the economic terms stressed by the Hamiltonians, Wilsonians stressed the importance of values; human rights, democratic governance and rule of law. Third, Jeffersonians constitute a group of “so-called realists”, arguing for less American global involvement in order to “reduce the costs and risks of foreign policy.” This camp puts emphasis on more narrow definition of U.S. interests and seek to advance them by safe and economic means. Fourth, Jacksonians, a group associated with the rise of Donald Trump, define the United States in different terms compared to three other schools of thought. Jacksonian define United States as a nation-state rooted “in the country’s singular commitment to the equality and dignity of individual American citizens”, as opposed to more abstract idealizations of American exceptionalism based on “universal appeal of American ideas”, or America’s Enlightened founding principles. (ibid.) To understand American foreign policy ideology, I’ll further analyze these four schools of thought and the authoritative figures giving their names to such distinctive ideologies, and in doing so I will pay special attention to the place of transatlantic relations within the four categories.

54 Relying on liberal-conservative unidimensional conceptualization of political ideology more suitable for quantitative analysis would be a poor frame of reference in a nuanced study of argumentation, for it is by nature rather ahistorical in its conceptual understanding of both “liberal” and “conservative” ideologies (Maynard, 2013. 315.)

55 It is important to note here that Mead’s distinction into four schools of thought cannot be used to categorize individual members of Congress. It is rather a method to understand the domestic roots of different ideological inclinations, not a method to place individual senators into neat categories by simply expanding the conservative-liberal divide. I would not expect senators categorizing themselves in a specific category as defined by Mead, nor do all senators hold consistent views on issues over time, especially when it is no longer politically convenient for them.
Hamiltonians and Wilsonians

Hamiltonians formed one of the two schools of thought prevalent in the post-World War II world. International power being understood primarily in economic terms, the United States ought to take the leading role from United Kingdom and become the center of international order, argued Hamiltonians. During the Cold War, key foreign policy strategy was to contain Soviet Union and to advance U.S. interests, and after the Cold War, Hamiltonians “doubled down” by advocating the creation of so-called “global liberal order”. Wilsonians, the other of the two schools of thought formulating American post-World War II policy, were also internationalists in their orientation, but they understood the role of “global liberal order” in terms of values, as opposed to economic terms stressed by the Hamiltonians. Key concepts for Wilsonians were rule of law, democratic governance and human rights. Authoritarian and corrupt regimes were understood as the leading cause of conflict and violence. Wilsonians were later divided into two distinct camps, liberal institutionalists, eager to promote international institutions and global integrations, and unilateralists, who saw unilateral U.S. action coupled with potential coalitions-of-the-willing as sufficient to promote liberal agenda. (Mead, 2017. 2.)

Alexander Hamilton was one the Founding Fathers of the American Republic. Although known for his military role in the Revolutionary War, Hamilton was best known for his civilian accomplishments. He was one of the three authors of the Federalist Papers with James Madison and John Jay and played a significant role in the adaptation of the United States Constitution in 1789. From 1789 to 1795, Hamilton was the secretary of treasury to America’s first president, George Washington. As the leader of emerging Federalist party, Hamilton was a key factor in the creation of American two-party system, and due to his role as the intellectual force of the Federalists, he was often critiqued for his advocacy for urban and commercial society that Republicans saw as a danger to rural America, heart of American democracy. On the civil society side, Hamilton was one of the few strongly anti-slavery abolitionists of the first generation of American statesmen. In that sense, Hamilton was one the first embodiments of the great North-South divide in American political culture, and he advocated progressive civil rights movement backed by a strong federal government. (Mead, 2004.)

One of the defining moments in early American foreign policy towards Europe was the young republic’s response to the French Revolutionary Wars. In 1792, American commercial fortunes were decisively tied to United Kingdom (Murray, 2007. 193), a fact of life the British were eager to remind Americans of (Bowman, 1956. 23), and a state of affairs largely a result of the revenue system created and
established by then Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton. (Murray, 2007, 193). Great Britain held two advantages in the America’s. First, they controlled the trade in West Indies, a trade which would be highly beneficial for American economy, and second, U.S. western territories of Kentucky and Tennessee (then known as Franklin) were disappointed in the American central government, and were considering secession to build alliances independently to promote their specific interests, a notion subtly supported by the British. Furthermore, United Kingdom refused to withdraw their military establishments in the northwest as it had agreed in the 1783 treaty, and the British enforced their naval blockade of France with highly negative consequences for American merchant ships. (ibid, 193-195.) Alexander Hamilton’s response was that of restraint; “Wars oftener proceed from angry and perverse passions than from cool calculations of Interest.” (ibid, 199). The passions on the side of more aggressive policy towards Great Britain derived from the sympathy felt by many, especially Republicans, towards the fellow revolutionary republic of France. When John Jay was chosen to negotiate a treaty with the British, Hamilton’s priority was to ensure the free commerce of American ships and to end arbitrary seizure of American merchant vessels by the British navy. Hamilton further argued for a formalized trade treaty with the Great Britain, granting United States “most favored country” status, and opening West Indies for American trade, as articulated in his letter to Jay: “If you can effect solid arrangements with regard to the points unexecuted of the treaty of peace, the question of indemnification may be managed with less rigor and may be still more laxly dealt with if a truly beneficial treaty of Commerce (embracing privileges in the West Indies Islands) can be established.” (ibid, 199-201.)

Overall, Hamiltonian foreign policy is described as strong and assertive. Of all the Founding Fathers and statesmen of the early Republic, Hamiltonians were generally the most internationalists in their view of America’s relationship with the rest of the world. Compared to Jeffersonians and Jacksonians, Hamiltonian internationalists would be far more reluctant to act unilaterally in the world, thus the emphasis on the “global liberal order” in the modern Hamiltonian foreign policy. Yet, separating the Hamiltonian school of thought from Wilsonian idealism and universalism, Hamiltonians would be reluctant to acknowledge a type of Kantian “world government”, despite being positive toward international cooperation. In that sense, Hamiltonians could be described as more of realists compared to Wilsonian school of thought. (Knott, 2002.) Furthermore, given the example of Jay Treaty and U.S. relations with great powers of Europe during the French Revolutionary War, Hamilton himself stressed the importance of American
economic interests. Modern incarnation of Hamiltonian school embraces the international arena, but does so with economic interests at heart. America should engage the global community with the goal of ensuring economic terms most beneficial for the United States (Mead, 2005. 593), as exemplified by the creation of Bretton Woods institutions in the post-World War II world. After the World War II, the National Security Council 68 report to President Truman defined the optimal U.S. foreign policy for the Cold War in Hamiltonian terms; together with allies, highlighting economy and emphasizing the leading role of the United States.\(^{56}\) (NSC-68, 1950). The system created was the direct opposite of U.S. pre-war isolationism, and became the first version of U.S. led liberal international order, defined by John Ikenberry as Liberal World Order 2.0. (See Ikenberry, 2009.)

In a modern sense, Mead places the Hamiltonian school of thought in moderate Republicans. They believe in strong national government (as opposed to Jacksonians in the Tea Party), strong military to ensure realistic global policy, and a national government with a goal to promote American business interests home and abroad. (Mead, 2010. 60.)

Woodrow Wilson served as the president of the United States from 1913 to 1921. Most remember Wilson from his famous Fourteen Points and his support for the League of Nations in the post-World War I world. In his Fourteen Points speech, Wilson made a powerful argument for a just and enduring peace, a notion not equally revered among the great powers in Europe. Per Wilson, a just and stable peace could only be achieved “by removing the chief provocations of war”, and by extending to Germany the very same rights as other nations: “We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it.” And further: “We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing.” (Woodrow Wilson, quoted in Di Nunzio, 2006. 406.) The fourteenth point of the Fourteen Points expressed Wilson’s desire to form a “general association of nations…for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and

\(^{56}\)From the NSC-68 report and its “remaining course of action”: “The United States cannot alone provide the resources required for such a build-up of strength. The other free countries must carry their part of the burden, but their ability and determination to do it will depend on the action the United States takes to develop its own strength and on the adequacy of its foreign political and economic policies. Improvement in political and economic conditions in the free world, as has been emphasized above, is necessary as a basis for building up the will and the means to resist and for dynamically affirming the integrity and vitality of our free and democratic way of life on which our ultimate victory depends.” (NSC-68, 1950.)
small states alike.” (ibid). Wilson’s thoughts of American foreign policy called for a new set of incentives for American expansionism, new compared to those attributed to the great imperial powers of Europe: territorial occupation, strategic domination and economic gain. For Wilson, “the importance of American world power was not a matter of unleashing economic self-interest but of restraining liberalism.” (Thorsen, 2014. 163.)

The most visible example of Wilsonian internationalist idealism was his advocacy for the League of Nations, the predecessor of the United Nations. For Wilson, the first World War was truly supposed to be the war to end all wars. In a speech before the Paris peace conference in 1919, Wilson articulated his arguments for the necessity of League of Nations. “We have assembled for two purposes”, declared Wilson, “to make the present settlements which have been rendered necessary by this war, and also to secure the peace of the world… The league of nations seems to me to be necessary for both these purposes.” (Woodrow Wilson, quoted in Di Nunzio, 2006. 407). Wilson’s tone revealed the Kantian spirit of his ideology, as he declared that beyond appeasing the governments around the world, “…we should satisfy the opinion of mankind.” (ibid). Wilson’s was a worldly view. Unfortunately for Wilson, the United States Senate did not share his views of the necessity of a league of nations. Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in a great example of foreign policy entrepreneurship, used all his institutional tricks to delay Senate procedures on the ratification of the Paris peace treaty. Moreover, he filled the Committee with members suspicious over a league of nations (Di Nunzio, 2006. 411.), and in the end, Senate rejected U.S. participation in the League of Nations. Chairman Lodge’s action managed to frustrate President Wilson:

I asked the Foreign Relations Committees of both Houses to come to the White House and we spent a long evening in the frankest discussion of every portion that they wished to discuss. They made certain specific suggestions as to what should be contained in this document when it was to be revised. I carried those suggestions to Paris, and every one of them was adopted. What more could I have done? What more could have been obtained? […]

Why should they [mothers of men who died in the war] weep upon my hand and call the blessings of the God upon me? Because they believe that their boys died for something that vastly transcends any of the immediate and palpable objects of the war. They believe, and they rightly believe, that their sons saved the liberty of the world. (Woodrow Wilson, quoted in Di Nunzio, 2006. 417.)
Wilsonian foreign policy emphasizes the democratic principles and values exemplified by the United States. Democratization, rule of law and American social values are seen as universal, and to spread these values throughout the international community is not just means to achieve American economic goals, but a moral obligation and fulfilment of American national interest in itself. Legal and moral aspects of world order are evaluated higher than economic agenda. But despite their differences, both Wilsonians and Hamiltonians schools of thought were constitutive of American grand strategy. The difference in Wilsonian thought was the fact that the need for American hegemony was directly linked to Wilsonian “vision of a universal moral order”. (Mead, 2005. 593-595.) Wilsonian school of thought is still very much alive in the American foreign policy circles on both sides of the isle. Even George Kennan, whose famous containment policy painted him as one of the leading realist thinkers in American foreign policy came to see good in Wilsonian idealism, as he testified before the Senate in 1989: “I was long skeptical about Wilson’s vision. . . . But I begin today . . . to think that Wilson was way ahead of his time in his views about international organization.” (George Kennan, quoted in Munter, 2016.)

Looking at American post-Cold War administrations, Mead (2010) concludes that George H.W. Bush’s administration followed rather closely the Hamiltonian school of thought, later disapproving the approach adopted by younger President Bush in Iraq. Bill Clinton’s administration included both Wilsonians and Hamiltonians, leading to internal struggles over America’s response to foreign crisis, most notably the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda and the Balkans, the latter provoking U.S. action, former not. Mead further argues, that George W. Bush began as Jacksonian, but as the struggle in Iraq continued and supposed weapons of mass destruction remained at large, Bush became more and more Wilsonian in his policy. War in Iraq was no longer a direct response to a threat, it was a nation-building exercise and an attempt to bring Democracy in the Middle East, a Wilsonian effort indeed. (ibid.) To be sure, George W. Bush administration exemplified the unilateral wing of Wilsonian thought. Thus, as argued by Mead (2010), all three presidents before Barack Obama demonstrated Hamiltonian or Wilsonian tendencies; deep engagement in the global arena, and an idea that U.S. interests are best served by establishing a global liberal order with a single global hegemonic power.
Jeffersonians and Jacksonians

Walter Mead writes, that as the global liberal order championed by the Hamiltonians and Wilsonians “came under increasing strain in recent decades… the unquestioned grip of the globalists on U.S. foreign policy thinking began to loosen.” Because of globalist failures, Vietnam being a prime example, “more nationalist, less globally minded voices began to be heard, and a public increasingly disenchanted with what it saw as the costly failures the global order-building project began to challenge what the foreign policy establishment was preaching.” (Mead, 2017.) President’s, due to their institutional role as the chief diplomat of the United States acutely keen on the events in the global arena, are more prone to internationalist tendencies. (See for example Milner & Tingley, 2015). Members of Congress, however, are generally speaking less savvy in the affairs of diplomats, but more keenly focused on the immediate needs of their constituency. As such, one could argue that the “public disenchantment” described by Mead would more likely affect the legislature. Jeffersonian and Jacksonian schools of thought have “come back with vengeance”, posits Mead (2017). Jeffersonians represent today’s realists, eager to define U.S. global interests in narrower terms compared to the two internationalist schools of thought. For them, U.S. interests are better advanced in the safest, most economically prudent way possible, and by avoiding high risks of internationalist foreign policy. Libertarians, such as Senators Rand Paul [R-KY] and Ted Cruz [R-TX] represent the extreme version of modern Jeffersonianism, but their position is also shared by those on the left who oppose interventionism and excess military spending, especially abroad. Jacksonians represent populist nationalism. (ibid.) For Jacksonians, writes Mead, “United States is not a political entity created and defined by a set of intellectual propositions rooted in Enlightenment…” - as the Wilsonians would argue – “…oriented toward the fulfillment of a universal mission.” (Mead, 2017. 3). Instead, the United States for Jacksonians is something much more concrete, a “…nation-state of the American people, and its chief business lies at home.” (ibid). These two schools of thought cannot be ignored, for their rise in the form of Tea Party Republicans in the 2010 midterms, Donald Trump in 2016 presidential elections, and to an extent the grass-roots movement behind Bernie Sanders in the Democratic primaries, seems to significantly challenge the prevalent American post-World War II foreign policy ideology.

Thomas Jefferson was one of the Founding Fathers, the principal author of the Declaration of Independence, and America’s third president from 1801 to 1809. Prior to presidency, Jefferson held a prestigious post as the minister to France, and he turned out to be a great admirer of the French Revolution, which later during the
French Revolutionary Wars put him at odds with then Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton. Sympathizing the French Revolution, Jefferson assumed the position of de facto leadership of the newly forming Republicans, opposing the strong federalist and urban tendencies promoted by Hamilton’s Federalists. Instead, Jefferson and his fellow Republicans presented the values of the South; state rights and agrarian way of life. Two foreign policy events helped define Jeffersonian foreign policy; his fight against Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean and his attempts to keep the United States away from Napoleon’s wars in Europe. (White House, 2006a.)

During the early years of the American republic, the Northern Coast of Africa, modern Algeria, Morocco, Tunis and Libya, constituted so-called “Barbary States”, whose modus operandi since the 16th century had been to raid European merchant vessels, capture the cargo and crew, sell the crew to slavery or hold them for ransom. Barbary States offered a solution for the problem they had created; Europeans could pay tribute (i.e. bribe) to ensure the safety of their vessels. Great European powers concluded that it better served their interests to pay the tribute than to organize expensive wars against the Barbary States or pay for their ransomed subjects. Until the American independence, U.S. ships were protected under tributes paid by the British Treasury. After independence, however, protection enjoyed under British rule came to an end, and the British even encouraged the Barbary States to raid American ships in order to prove the weakness of the new republic. (Cogliano, 2014. 43-44.) Thomas Jefferson was introduced to the problem as the American minister to France, when Algerians captured two American vessels Maria and Dauphin in 1780’s. Jefferson’s response to the issue was stern; the actions of Barbary States constituted a mortal (existential) threat for the United States, and should be dealt with the use of military force. (ibid. 45.)

But to understand the rather severe attitude adopted by Jefferson during his years as the minister to France, one needs to understand the role of political economy and international trade in Jefferson’s political thought. As discussed, Thomas Jefferson stood in stark opposition to the vision of urban America promoted by Hamilton and the Federalists. For Jefferson, the American republic was best served by agrarian, virtuous and well-educated citizens. (ibid. 45-47.) Manufacturing, however, would eventually lead to the demise of American republic as Jefferson saw it, for it created circumstances for dependency on customers, a vise exciting severe threats to the republican spirit crucial for the United States. Most notable threat was corruption: “Dependence begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the design of ambition…while we have labour then, let us never wish to see our citizens occupied at a work-bench, or twirling a distaff.” (Thomas
Jefferson, quoted in Cogliano, 2014. 46). Jefferson understood, that in the world of empires preying on each other, America was alone. For the United States to survive as a republic, the very republican spirit on which it was built upon had to be sustained. Manufacturing, as it had emerged in Europe, created a “large class of propertyless laborers mired in poverty and ignorance.” (ibid. 47.) In such circumstances, republicanism could not survive. Luckily enough, United States – unlike Europe - had plenty of land for agrarian citizens. Nevertheless, Jefferson had to admit that American people had acquired a taste for “comforts furnished by the arts and manufacturers to be debarred the use of them.” (Thomas Jefferson, quoted in Cogliano, 2014. 48). Since this appeared to be the new reality, “We must then in our own defence endeavor to share as large a portion as we can of this modern source of wealth and power.” (ibid). But Jefferson still insistence that manufacturing would corrupt the American republic. Thus, it would be wise to let the workshops remain in Europe, and enjoy the benefits without the dire consequences as understood by Jefferson. Policy resulting from this line of thought was based on two features; western expansion for the agrarian needs, and “secure access to global markets via the Atlantic economy.” (Cogliano, 2014. 49). To ensure the latter, the United States would have to rely on power, occupying the ocean and building on naval strength. Naval strength would be the guardian of American trade. (ibid). So when it came to the Barbary States threatening American trade, Jefferson made his stance clear: “I think it is to our interest to punish the first insult: because an insult unpunished is the parent to many others. We are not at this moment in a condition to do it, but we should put ourselves into it as soon as possible.” (Thomas Jefferson, quoted in Cogliano, 2014. 50).

Mead notes that modern Jeffersonians are removed from the globalist consensus shared by Hamiltonians and Wilsonians. Jeffersonians, according to Mead, attempt to minimize the risks of global U.S. commitment and instead of allocating vast resources in the national security apparatus, Jeffersonians are more interested in “improving American democracy at home than exporting it abroad.” (Mead, 2010.) For example, efforts such as Senator Mansfields [D-MO] numerous initiatives to scale back American military presence in Europe during the 1960’s and 1970’s to allocate funds to domestic priorities demonstrate the Jeffersonianism of the American left. Jeffersonians pushed for War Powers Resolution in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, and have continued to stress the constitutionality of war powers and Congress’s institutional and constitutional role in the process. But it also seemed that President Obama would represent the dovish, Jeffersonian side of the Democratic party, as his candidacy was based on Democratic party’s critique over
Bush’s Iraq policy. Much like President Carter, candidate Obama represented the faction of Democratic party which stressed diminishing “America’s costs and risks overseas by limiting U.S. commitments wherever possible.” (Mead, 2010.) Best way for America to promote democracy globally is not Wilsonian or Hamiltonian global engagement and interventionism, but becoming an example at home. Excess global commitments abroad work against America’s democratic commitments at home by both diverting resources from domestic spending, but also by associating United States with tyrannical and authoritarian regimes abroad and by creating pro-engagement lobbies benefitting on military spending and interventionism. (ibid.) Jeffersonian viewpoint on America’s stance in the world frames it as idealist at home, and realist abroad, as formulated by Bowman (1956, 41) in his critique of Professor Morgenthau’s vision presenting Hamilton as the founder of American nation:

Jeffersonian foreign policy, on the other hand, flowed from a sympathetic understanding of the uniqueness of the American political experiment—that uniqueness which Jefferson and his colleagues sought to preserve in the main stream of American development. Jefferson was a nationalist who knew and loved his country as Hamilton never did. Jefferson’s view of the interest of the United States has been vindicated by American history. It represented the future of America and of the Western World.

Andrew Jackson (1767-1845) was a man of the people. Despite concerns articulated by politicians such as Henry Clay and President Monroe about Jackson’s aggressive military endeavors in the South, the people, especially in the South, saw him as “…a man of action who did not play political games or engage in diplomatic dances with foreign nations” (Warshauer, 2009, 99). Jackson rode on the tide of nationalism and followed his gut instinct with a thorough emphasis on national interest above all other considerations, legal constrains included. (ibid). Jackson’s victory at New Orleans as a general in the War of 1812 against the Great Britain turned him into a national hero. In 1828, after “one of the nastiest” presidential elections in American political history (Cheatheam, 2014. 1), Andrew Jackson became the seventh president of the United States, rallying support from the emerging Democratic Party, whereas National Republicans, or Whigs, formed a staunch opposition to what they saw as a usurpation of popular liberties, a backlash headed by Whig leaders such as Daniel Webster and Henry Clay. (White House, 2006b.) Jackson’s aggressive take on the presidency was not only evident in his frequent use of veto power as a method of controlling the Congress, but also in the so-called Jacksonian foreign policy. During his two terms, Jackson waged two wars against the British, invaded Spanish territories in Florida twice and consistently brought up the issue of foreign influence
upon the Indians. In his public announcements, Jackson paid considerable attention to foreign affairs, as up to half of his annual messages focused on foreign affairs. His foreign policy was expansive and aggressive, extending the boundaries of presidential power from the its traditional role in domestic politics to something akin to modern, dynamic diplomatic presidency. In doing so, Jackson focused on two key issues; settling the issue which had affected United States foreign policy pretty much throughout its existence: European nations seizing American ships and cargoes, and establishing trade agreements to support American interests in developing market economy. In doing so, “Jackson was always a nationalist.” (Warshauer, 2009. 143.) By most accounts, Jackson’s foreign policy has been described as successful. (ibid).

One of the defining external events prior to Andrew Jackson’s presidency was his handling of Spanish Florida and the issue with American Indians. Jackson, a southerner, was acutely aware of the so-called “Indian problem” affecting the western and southern states and territories. During the Seminole War (1817-1818) Jackson’s military prowess was called into action by President Monroe to put an end to attacks on American settlers in Georgia. Jackson found out that the Indians were armed and supported materially by two British merchants residing in Spanish Florida. Jackson’s response was straightforward and determined. He took his troops to Florida and overtook Pensacola, court-martialed the two British merchants and executed them for inciting the Indians. Popularity gained by Andrew Jackson in the South propelled him into his eventual presidency. (Mead, 2005. 594-595.)

As per Mead’s (2010) colorful notion, “Jacksonians are today’s Fox News watchers.” Jacksonians are populists vary of the elite. Jacksonian school of thought represents “…a deeply embedded, widespread populist and popular culture of honor, independence, courage, and military pride among the American people.” (Mead, 2005. 595). Jackson himself rode an anti-elite campaign with promises to weed out the corruption in Washington (see for example Warshauer, 2009.) Translating to foreign policy, Jacksonians are wary of Hamiltonian relationship with big business, Wilsonian idealisms and naivety and what they might perceive as Jeffersonian weakness and risk-aversion. For Jacksonians, physical safety and economic well-being should be the most important goal of American foreign policy. (Mead, 2005. 594.) Per Mead (2010), George W. Bush presidency was an attempt to incorporate Jacksonian and Wilsonian foreign policy. When United States faces a crisis, Jacksonians spring to action. After 9/11, the American response followed Jacksonian aggressive foreign policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan, which eventually transformed into Wilsonian nation-building mission. (ibid.) Jacksonian thought prevailed in the methods chosen by the Bush administration when fighting the war-
on-terror: “[T]hose who disregard the rules must be hunted down and killed, regardless of technical niceties.” (ibid). Similarly, the war against Iraq was initially based on Jacksonian rationale of fighting an international conspiracy bent on threatening the United States, but as the WMDs failed to emerge the mission turned into Wilsonian nation-building with the overall aim to bring democracy to the greater Middle East. Enforcing democracy and human rights internationally do not rank high on Jacksonian list of causes for war. Throughout the Clinton administration, Jacksonians generally opposed humanitarian interventions in Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia. (ibid.) In short, Jacksonians see America’s prevalent foreign policy of deep engagement and strengthening of liberal world order through highly skeptical lens, a sentiment magnified by the deep distrust in American foreign policy establishment and the cosmopolitan – as opposed to Jacksonian nationalist - nature of foreign policy elites. (Mead, 2017).

Mead’s categorization has been used in previous studies as a method to explain American foreign policy ideology. Dueck (2006. 31; 179) examined American grand strategy from an ideological perspective, and recognized four subcultures closely linked to Mead’s four schools: internationalists as Wilsonians, nationalists as Jacksonians, progressives as Jeffersonians, and realists as Hamiltonians. Mead himself used his categorization to explain the ideological foundations of American presidents from Carter to Bush and Obama, and finally Donald J. Trump. (Mead, 2010; 2011 & 2017). Rathbun (2013) conducted a quantitative study to specifically recognize Jacksonian and Jeffersonian ideas in the formation of Tea Party’s foreign policy ideology. Deudney and Ikenberry (2017. 22) understood liberal internationalism in terms of Mead’s Wilsonianism. Ikenberry’s studies in liberal world order – the defeat of Wilsonian ideals, Ikenberry’s liberal world order 1.0 and the rise of Hamiltonian post-World War II order, liberal world order 2.0 (see Ikenberry, 2009.) - and the foundations of American views on its place in the world order follow closely the historical understanding presented by Mead. Gries (2014) referred to Mead’s categorization as he mapped ideological divide between liberal and conservatives in an attempt to add dimensionality to the commonly used liberal-conservative divide. But whereas both quantitative studies relying on Mead and so-called meta-studies of American grand strategy and foreign policy ideologies do exist, a systematic study of congressional debates from an argumentative perspective using Mead’s categorization – to the best knowledge of the author – does not exist. The viability of Mead’s categorization as a method to understand American foreign policy is established, yet its use in a study of congressional debate has not been tested.
3.5 Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees in the Theoretical Framework

Due to limitations set by the methodological approach, the subject matter was limited to two Senate committees; Armed Services and Foreign Relations. Other committees certainly have power to affect foreign policy decision making. For example, Committee on Appropriations held hearings on both Department of Defense and State Department funding, as well as on (global) environmental issues. Since the methodological approach in this dissertation involves a thorough deconstruction of argumentative behavior by senators in relevant transatlantic security related hearings, limitations to committees analyzed, as well as Congresses analyzed had to be made to pay sufficient attention to individual issues, and on the behavior of individual senators in cases identified. Both the attention to selected committees and narrow subject matter (transatlantic security) limits the range of conclusions drawn. Yet the decision to limit the study to Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees was by no means arbitrary.

The theoretical framework to analyze foreign policy behavior of each respective committee, as well as the difference between the two, are drawn from a 2015 book “The Decline of Congressional Oversight of U.S. Foreign Relations” by Linda Fowler, wherein she argues that congressional oversight on foreign policy has been declining, and that such behavior can be explained by committees being accustom over decades “…to furthering the personal and partisan agendas of the members...” and being “…overly sensitive to budgetary politics and routine administration at the expense of more consequential matters.” (Fowler, 2015. 202.) Fowler’s argument is also present in Rockman’s (2005, 37) evaluation of congressional actors and foreign policy, as he argues that besides few exceptions; “…our national legislators…have much to lose by investing a great deal of time in complicated foreign policy issues.” Thus, by examining the argumentation by individual senators in Foreign Relations and Armed Services, committees Fowler (2015, 202) described as “most visible and consequential overseers of U.S. foreign policy”, we can not only identify the behavior of committees in relation to our understanding of congressional influence on foreign policy, but also examine those “few exceptions”, senators who are willing to risk their electoral fortunes by not reflexively sailing “under their party’s banner”. (Rockman, 2005. 37).

As noted by Fowler (2015, 4-5), the two most significant foreign policy agencies, Department of Defense and the State Department, fall under the supervision of Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, both in House and the Senate.
Further, the Senate committees hold higher prestige and present a more visible opportunity for foreign policy entrepreneurship (ibid), making it the ideal focus of this study given the research question and the limits set by the methodological approach. Fowler observes in her empirical studies, that the “official oversight activity” of the respective committees declined since mid-1990’s, resulting in lessened scrutiny over the executive branch. Both committees became more interested in shielding the president - especially Republicans -, reacted strategically to federal spending priorities and other major decision, and reacted to organized constituency interests rather that the general good of the public, leading Fowler to conclude that hearings in the respective committees were weakly “…connected to public opinion and deliberation about the nation’s collective goals in U.S. foreign policy.” (ibid, 5.) Committee hearings have significant role in public education and the rule of law, elements Fowler argues have been neglected. Fowler refers to “regular order” in foreign policy decision-making, which ensures the lawfulness of American foreign policy. Regular order, as understood by Fowler, refers to the decision-making process with an emphasis on public deliberation to evaluate alternatives, explain consequences, promote transparency and generate information. Yet, the committees face all-too-familiar juxtaposition between its institutional responsibilities and electoral realities, born out of the volatility of public’s interest in foreign policy. (ibid, 9-10.)

Similar to the debates over imperial presidency and congressional dominance, this study cannot contribute to the analysis of the long-term trends in congressional oversight. What it can do, however, is to examine the congressional incentives affecting transatlantic security policy given the institutional context, and identify the key players engaging in foreign policy entrepreneurship. Further, whereas Fowler's study emphasizes the frequency of public and secret hearings, this study offers a detailed examination of significantly more limited number of foreign policy hearings, with an emphasis on substantive argumentation. To analyze committee behavior in the institutional context, we need to understand the differences in both committee’s orientations.

The Armed Services Committee supervises the Department of Defense, an agency with a yearly budget ranging from $645 billion to $691 billion during the 111th and 112th Congress. (DOD, 2016). As such, the most significant institutional responsibility for the Committee is the annual defense appropriations authorization process, wherein the Committee and its members respond to the president’s budget request and partake in the proverbial slicing of the cake. Fowler (2015, 99) argues, that the heightened attention to fund Pentagon mutes the partisanship and de-
emphasizes the oversight role of the Armed Services Committee, although it has shown interest in oversight during major military operations to consider military personnel welfare. In contrast, argues Fowler, the Foreign Relations Committee does little to mute partisanship and partisan calculations due to its orientation to deliberation and institutional responsibility over foreign aid. Furthermore, Fowler concludes from the Committee hearing data from 1947 to 2008, that both committees engaged in oversight activities when it suited their respective purposes, and the responses to external factors relied on their connection to committees’ overall goals. (ibid.) As such, Fowler’s evaluation of Committee incentives is rather consistent with Lee’s (2009) assertion that individual political interests are the driving force in congressional activity, thus highlighting the emphasis on individual senators and foreign policy entrepreneurs.

Due to their different roles and incentives, the types of hearings the two committees conduct are more likely to differ. Since Armed Services Committee is closely tied to the distributional aspects of congressional politics, it is far more likely to engage itself in budgetary hearings than oversight, whereas Foreign Relations Committee is more likely to hold an oversight hearing. Moreover, partisan composition of the Congress had no effect on the type of hearings each committee held. Armed Services’ had a distinct incentive to present an appearance of bipartisanship due its specific goal of “delivering economic benefits to organized constituencies” (ibid, 102.) As such, the Armed Services was more likely to battle with White House over, among other things, U.S. force posture, and other distributional issues affecting public support and monetary allocations to Pentagon programs. To achieve said goals, the consistent strategy observed during divided and unified government was to “dampen conflict among its members and focus on budget authorization rather than oversight.” (ibid.) Further, the annual time spent on budget authorization took a large portion of Armed Services’ annual agenda, for the appropriations authorization was a prerequisite to push other significant bills through Senate. (ibid, 106).

Partisan effects on Committee work were more prevalent in the Foreign Relations Committee. Whereas the Armed Services was responsible for Pentagon budget, the Foreign Relations was responsible for State Department’s budget, which included decisions over foreign aid. Historical trend, argues Fowler, saw a greatly disproportional distribution of federal funding between defense and diplomacy, especially during post-Vietnam era. (ibid). Less money to allocate, less interest individual senators seemed to devote to Foreign Relations Committee. What little funds the Committee was responsible for allocating, involved considerably partisan
issue of foreign aid and funding for international organizations. These issues portrayed great partisan divide in American foreign policy ideology between multilateral and unilateral approach to issues abroad, and the time used by senators debating State budget payed disproportional attention to “modest program changes and what the nation achieved from the investment.” (ibid). As such, Foreign Relations not only had more time to spend on oversight issues, but it was also more responsive to partisan compositions and the inhabitant in the White House. Overall, argues Fowler (ibid), “…the president could not assume that the size of his party’s majority would insulate his administration from scrutiny by Armed Services, while he could expect partisan incentives to influence inquiries by Foreign Relations.” To wrap up theoretical understanding on committee differences, the Armed Services is more prone to focus on distributional issues due its emphasis on budget issues, whereas Foreign Relations is more like to engage in ideological debate, due to its more polarized nature and the issue-agenda with more controversial issues. (see Milner & Tingley, 2015, Fowler 2015). Thus, we expect to see more intra-committee cohesion in the Armed Services, whereas partisan factors ought to be evident in the Foreign Relations.

Cushman (2015, 115-116) further notes the role of partisan politics in the decline of Foreign Relations Committee. Armed Services inserted itself forcefully into American defense policy after the adaptation of Russell Amendment in 1959, requiring Congress to authorize DOD spending program-by-program, thus establishing both House and Senate Armed Services Committees “comprehensive oversight responsibilities that reached down into every aspect of the nation’s military.” (ibid). Armed Services was responsible for overseeing the most expansive part of the executive branch, thus asserting its role as a key overseer of foreign policy in Congress. At the same time, Foreign Relations lost much of its prestige by entangling itself in partisan struggle over committee’s control. Conservative Republican Jesse Helms [R-NC] used committee’s rules to give control over two-thirds of committee’s budget to GOP. This allowed GOP to hire more staffers and thus better promote their policy agenda, while the unity of the committee suffered. As Foreign Relations saw its capacity to act vane, Armed Services filled the policy vacuum. (ibid.)

This study will test the theoretical presuppositions of each committee’s tendencies in transatlantic security issues. The case studies analyzed here include both budgetary and oversight hearings, and each committee will be analyzed separately to see how Committee argumentation differed given the shifting context both between the committees and issues. And when both committees debated the
same issue, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty for example, were the different orientations between the committees on display in the argumentations given by individual members? Also, can we find support to the qualitative claim by Fowler (2015, 131), that: “The frequency of oversight, the record of public and closed sessions, the comparison with budget inquiries, and the lack of depth for individual hearings by Armed Services and Foreign Relations thus indicate a mismatch between the incentives that guide committee behavior and the needs of both Congress and the public.” And perhaps, we may ask, a mismatch between the incentives guiding committee behavior and health of transatlantic relations. As already stated, this study cannot contribute to the statistical analysis of long-term development, but the approach based on identifying and deconstructing the deliberations on individual issues can address Fowler’s concern for “lack of depth for individual hearings” on substantive basis, and perhaps the implications on transatlantic relations themselves.

3.6 Foreign Policy Entrepreneurship

Members of Congress and citizens at large do not have the facts or the background to tell the Commander-in-Chief how to wage war; but they do have the capacity to pass judgment on whether the massive deployment and destruction of their men and their wealth seems to serve their overall interests as a nation… (William Fulbright, quoted in Seibert, 1999.)

As U.S. involvement in Vietnam deepened, so did the debate in Congress between the hawks and the doves, those supporting the War and those opposing it. Leading the charge in opposition was Senator Fulbright, who launched a series of public hearings to question administration’s policy in Vietnam. Throughout the hearings, Fulbright’s stated goal was to focus on the issues themselves, not partisan politics, and thus include the American public into serious deliberations over America’s foreign policy. (ibid.) Although Kelley (2005, 3) notes that Fulbright was not reflexively against strong presidency at the time of crisis, his opposition to Vietnam War was a determined attempt to assert congressional powers vis-à-vis American foreign policy, and a direct opposition to imperial presidency. But advocating the focus on “real issues” as opposed to constituency-based concerns comes at a price, and acting as a “burkean trustee” has its risks. Although argued (see for example Gregg, 2010. 16) that the original intention of the Founding Fathers, as articulated in the Federalist Papers, was for members of Congress to “refine” the views of the
public as to promote the “true interest” of the United States\(^{57}\), members of Congress ought to be mindful that both Edmund Burke and William Fulbright ended their public service careers by losing a re-election bid. (see for example Davidson et. al., 2011. Kelley, 2005. 3-4.)

The common perception of individual members of Congress is that they operate on one paramount goal; the re-election. Per such notions, the electoral fortunes of individual members of Congress depend less on what Congress produces as a national institution than on the policy positions they take individually. (see. Davidson et al. 2011.) This argument it consistent with the fact that despite very poor congressional approval rating, 9% in 2014, 14% in 2016 (Gallup, 2017), the re-election rates remained very high; 95% in 2014 House elections and 97% in 2016 House elections. (OpenSecrets, 2017). Even when the public holds a very negative view of the Congress as a functioning political entity, the disappointment does not transfer to their representatives in the Congress.

Congressional committees are the workshops of the Congress. For individual senators, committee assignments are the key to establishing their position in the Congress and influencing constituency concerns, thus enhancing their respective electoral fortunes. (Davidson et al. 2011.) As Fowler concludes (2015, 72-73), the decline in committee hearings since Vietnam War had an adverse effect on oversight, and on the desirability of especially Foreign Affairs seats. Fowler places the fault on three contextual conditions; the end of Cold War Consensus, diminished media coverage and increased ideological polarization. Furthermore, average number of committee assignments per senator rose from 2.1 to 4.1. Thus, time allocated to committee hearings diminished, as senators had to spread their workload across their respective committee assignments. Due to less time allocated, individual senators pursuing their political interests and the lack of institutional incentives to do otherwise, less interest from the media and polarization in committee membership, both Armed Services and Foreign Relations have “diminished their capacity to generate public information.” (Fowler, 2015. 85.) What this means for individual senators, is that given Senate rules, each senator can be assigned to maximum of two “Super A” committees, which include Armed Services and Foreign Relations. Given

\(^{57}\)See for example: “…we see that the representatives as members of a “chosen body” can discern the “true interest of their country” and so are not subject to sacrificing it to “partial” (read local or parochial) considerations. Publius seems here to equate constituency opinion (referred to as “the people themselves”) with local interests (vis-a-vis the true national interest) and sees the remedy in the representative’s “enlarging” that view in accordance with the common good. Like Edmund Burke, Publius here outlines a theory of representation in which the representative’s primary ethical obligation is to look after the interest of the whole nation and to resist the impulses of parochialism.” (Gregg, 2010. 16.)
the declining respect enjoyed by the committees, especially Foreign Relations; “…today many senators shun the committee or leave it quickly if they receive and assignment.” (ibid, 89). For example, five freshman Republicans were assigned to Foreign Relations after the Republican victory in 1995. By the end of their first term, each had left the Committee.58 (ibid, 96). The general shift in senators’ behavior “away from policy specialization to coverage of more issue domains…” resulted in less hearings, reduced oversight ability in Armed Services and heightened focus on distributional issues, and inability of Foreign Relations to lure in senior senators. (ibid).

Furthermore, if we take the notion of declining value of committee assignments to political prospects of individual members of Congress and combine it with Fasone and Lupo’s (2017, 342-343) observation that increased transparency in parliamentary committees has led to “transparency trap”, wherein increased transparency incentives committee members to “…an overarching importance to the most sensational declarations and to populist tones, which can have an immediate echo in the media” in order reap the political benefits of their respective committee assignments at the expense of legislative consensus within the committee. Increased transparency can hinder the institutional role of committees as the locus of legislative work, but from a perspective of an individual member of Congress, committees have come to better connect with the citizens. (ibid). This phenomenon is visible in the rather straightforward statements made by members of Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees throughout this study.

According to the electoral logic, individual members of Congress ought to steer away from policy issues affecting the nation as a whole to avoid the risk of being identified with the institution of Congress itself, and focus their attention to issues affecting their districts or states. One such risks worth avoiding is commonly thought to be U.S. foreign policy, a sphere of politics where individual members of Congress often decide to let the president make the decision, and based on the outcome either praise or criticize him/her. (Carter & Scott, 2010.) If individual members of Congress decide to intervene in the field of foreign policy, they do it for narrow, parochial motives (See for example Rockman, 2005; Lindsay 1994) related to distributive policy consequence for their respective constituencies (see Milner & Tingley 2015.)

58 On the other hand, Foreign Relations drew in Democratic senators with ”presidential aspirations, such as John Kerry [D-MA], Joe Biden [D-DE] and Barack Obama [D-IL]…” who ”…used the committee to burnish their foreign policy credentials. (Fowler, 2015. 96).
Individual members of Congress have different ways to conduct themselves in doing the business of the nation. Some might specialize in crafting bills, another making deals, some conducting investigations or undertaking issues crusades. (Mayhew, 2000.) All members of Congress are not equal in their ability to project power in and out of the institution, and as such, some members are more strictly bound by the rational-choice theory, which stresses the importance of roll-call votes and placing oneself on ideal policy positions relative to their constituency. Yet, some members of Congress have greater role as agenda-setters with higher degree of autonomy. (Mayhew, 2000.) Overall, Carter and Scott (2009, 48-50; 2010) describe the process of foreign policy entrepreneurship: 1) contacting the administration, 2) going public, and 3) going formal. The subject matter of this study favors the second step in the playbook, going public – i.e. organizing hearings and presenting individual policy positions to the public by creating a narrative supportive of one’s cause.

According to Scott and Carter (2010), two situations are conducive to generating entrepreneurship in foreign policy: 1) policy vacuums and 2) policy correction. As argued by Carter and Scott (2010), foreign policy entrepreneurs use policy vacuums to define problems regarding a policy where no clear administration policy exists. Such entrepreneurship attempts to generate a policy response (Carter & Scott, 2010) to a problem they have an upper hand defining, enabling a more flexible response. Common situation relative to this analysis is policy correction, which reflects Congressmen’s juxtaposition towards enacted policy, framing it either ineffective or inappropriate. Congressmen attempt to correct the perceived policy mistakes by redefining the issue in a way that the policy response they offer is consistent with the problem identification. (Carter & Scott, 2010.) In short, policy vacuums encourage proactive action, whereas policy corrections spur more reactive responses. As postulated by Carter and Scott (2004, 280), foreign policy entrepreneurs are “members of Congress who seek to initiate action on the foreign policy issues they care about rather than to await administration action”. Foreign policy entrepreneurs are less like passive representatives, and more like shapers and mobilizers. In foreign policy, this becomes especially salient in senators’ ability, and willingness, to take stands in opposition to presidential foreign policy initiatives (Mayhew, 2000. 71), making committee hearings a suitable place for public evaluation of administration’s policy. Of the three congressional roles; legislative, investigative, and stand-taking, the latter two are “key ‘action’ ingredients.” (ibid, 72). The methodological approach in this study allows this study to pay great attention to stand-taking as Mayhew described it; “registering a position on some matter before some audience.” (ibid, 90). By focusing on the argumentative behavior on individual senators, those with higher
propensity for foreign policy entrepreneurship are more likely to make more of an effort to register their respective stance on the issue. By identifying key congressional actors within committees proactively participating in the debates, we can further recognize prevailing positions of foreign policy entrepreneurs in relevant transatlantic security issues.

Moreover, the emphasis on individual members of Congress addresses a specific shortcoming of congressional studies in political science, as articulated by David R. Mayhew (2008, 234):

... [members of Congress] do not enjoy much of a place in social science, even if they rate high with journalists, traditional historians, and alert citizens. As a theoretical matter, social scientists tend to see Congress as a place where externally determined views or interests— that is, those of the society’s classes, interest groups, electorates, and the like— are registered. Causal arrows are aimed at Capitol Hill, and they hit. That is virtually all that happens. Also, as a conceptual matter, the making of laws tends to be the only activity worth addressing. And as an empirical matter, roll-call voting in the service of lawmaking is virtually the only evidence worth examining.

Instead of rigorous emphasis on roll-call voting and interest group activity, this study will examine the argumentative behavior of individual senators as they take stands on policy issues for or against the administration in the realm of American foreign policy. As evident by our understanding of committee’s and behavior of individual members of Congress, being active on unpopular foreign policy issues pays poorly in electoral terms. This beckons the question, why and when do members of Congress activate in foreign policy, and especially, when can one see intra-party division at the time of heightened partisanship?

To operationalize the presented understanding of foreign policy entrepreneurs, I will use Carter & Scott’s (2010) article “Understanding congressional foreign policy innovators: Mapping entrepreneurs and their strategies”, wherein the authors use four categories to map out categories of foreign policy entrepreneurs; 1) policy specialists, 2) policy strategists, 3) process specialists, and 4) process strategists. Policy specialists focus on specific policy issues – i.e. what to do about Libya -, policy strategist think on a broader scale the strategic implications of foreign policy issues – i.e. whether taking a multi- or unilateral approach to a military intervention better suits U.S. interests -, process specialists are interested in how a specific policy issue is handled – i.e. how the process to consolidate European military bases is conducted -, and process strategist look at processes used to make policy decisions – i.e. war powers issues. (ibid.) Lantis & Marsh (2016) revisited the model presented by Carter and Scott by adding two
new categories; *revolutionary* and *mercenary*. *revolutionary* entrepreneurship is motivated by a desire to “transform the existing foreign policy order” with an object of “foreign policy paradigm shift”, whereas a *mercenary* is motivated to “advance individual political prospects” and aims at “political victory”. (ibid, 6). These two new categories were created as a response to new generation of foreign policy entrepreneurs brought on by the 2010 midterms, and more precisely, the success of Tea Party conservatives. Lantis & Marsh specifically single out Senator Rand Paul [R-KY] and Senator Ted Cruz [R-FL]. (ibid.) Clear majority of senators in this study fit the traditional categories included in Carter and Scott’s model. Rise of the Tea Party and the emergence of two new categories postulated by Lantis & Marsh do however affect the political context – the emergence of what Mead described as “Jacksonian…antiestablishment populism” (Mead, 2011) - inside and outside our two Committees, by breaking the existing roles and rules of congressional policymaking. Regarding policy, the “traditional” hawks in the Republican Party face a lot more difficulty to maintain the privileged position of defense policy and higher levels of military spending in the Tea Party era. (Cushman, 2015. 124.)

To sum up: based on the postulations formulated here, the theoretical framework is understood as consisting of three distinct features constituting congressional influence in American foreign policy; 1) Congressional cohesiveness versus partisan conflict. Depending on the issue, partisan conflict can play a significant role in American foreign policy, less so in Armed Services than Foreign Relations Committee. The partisan aspect of congressional behavior in our study is highlighted by the rise of Tea Party conservatives in 2010 midterm elections. We expect less partisanship in the Armed Services compared to Foreign Relations due to the more distributional nature of the Armed Services Committee. Thus, our exaptation is that the partisan nature of debate will be more muted in the Armed Services, and electoral benefits become more salient in the deliberations and framings. From a framing perspective, the expectation is that framing happens on an issue-by-issue basis consistent with partisan ideological framework with electoral logic functioning as the risk-factor; 2) distributional and ideological incentives for individual members and Committees studied. Depending on the issue, both distributional and ideological motives drive congressional action. In Armed Services, constituency concerns often triumph partisan ideology, which explains the relative consensus within the committee. More fruitful than rallying under party banner, is to ensure constituency benefits through annual defense appropriations process. Whereas distributional aspects dominated issues like NATO and European military presence, ideological factors were present in debates over missile defense, Russia and the New START. Because we are especially
interested in the influence of ideological factors to transatlantic relations, we examine ideology in terms of long-term American foreign policy ideology, instead of liberal-conservative division prevalent in studies roll-call voting and partisan behavior. We expect ideological factors to be more dominant in the Foreign Relations Committee. Due to its more deliberative nature, we expect overall foreign policy goals to be more prevalent than argumentation relying on constituency concerns. It ought to be noted though, that a distinction between self-interest and ideology is a difficult one to make.

3) Foreign policy entrepreneurship in Armed Services and Foreign Relations. Some senators were more active than others in the hearings analyzed. Despite U.S. Congress being a body of 535 individuals, quite the few are the defining voices in American debates over transatlantic security. We expect committee chairs and ranking members to be the more vocal actors in the deliberations, thus highlighting the specific foreign policy ideologies adopted, or promoted, by the language used by committee leadership. After identifying (quantitatively) the more vocal senators, relying mostly on Mayhew (2000) and Carter & Scott (2009; 2010) we’ll examine the policy debate (qualitatively) to map out the policy positions and argumentative substance of each senator in the context of foreign policy entrepreneurship, and foreign policy ideology, both partisan (Gries, 2014) and long-term (Mead, 2002).

Overall, it is understood that domestic factors play a salient role in debating American foreign policy. As such, it is justified to ask what place is given to transatlantic relations when the two Senate committee’s debate issues highly consequential for cross-Atlantic security. This question cannot be fully answered with typical methodological tools of roll-call analysis, for it requires a qualitative approach. Of the four theoretical building blocks constituting the theoretical framework of the study, three of the latter – congressional cohesiveness, distributional and ideological, foreign policy entrepreneurship – will be operationalized in the empirical portion of the thesis. The first one – executive vs.

---

59 See for example Gries (2014, 263): “While Republicans and Democrats in Washington, D.C. sometimes argue over foreign policy out of petty partisan desires that their party win and the other side lose, their disagreements are more often rooted in deeper ideological differences.” Gries further argues, that assertions by political scientists that little partisanship exists in foreign policy are false, and a result of poor methodological approaches. (ibid.)

60 See for example Rockman (2012, 1073): “The evolution of big money political action committees (PACs) and of lobbying and the implicit connection of these to the party system makes it as plausible for an ideologue to reinforce extreme ideological positions to procure these resources as it is for an opportunist to forge an ideological posture so as to attract such resources.” Big money does complicate our understanding of domestic effects on foreign policy. Whereas we previously concluded that interest groups activate less frequently on foreign issues – as opposed to domestic, constituency based issues – polarization between the two parties can create a situation where influential (wealthy) donors might prefer reflexive opposition to other party over ideological postulations based on policy.
legislature – cannot be analyzed as such given the empirical approach and subject matter of this study.
Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them. (George Washington, 1796.)

For 153 years, the United States foreign policy echoed the maxim set out by the Union’s first President, George Washington. United States ought to steer clear from any permanent alliances with European nations and continue to search its manifest destiny by inhabiting and integrating North America. America’s involvement in the First World War was quickly transformed into isolationism, as the Senate rejected the idealist organization dreamed up by President Woodrow Wilson, known as the League of Nations. In the years leading to American involvement in the Second World War, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had to counter the isolationist attitudes, exemplified by Charles Lindbergh’s America First-agenda, before the Japanese attack in Pearl Harbor paved way for America’s intervention in Europe.

Per Mead (2002), this common description of American foreign policy vis-à-vis Europe and rest of the world is not simply false, but a vast oversimplification on historical realities. Mead argues, that United States had practiced a very successful foreign policy in the shadow of British and Continental powers. In Asia, John Jay successfully worked for open-door trade policy with China. Theodore Roosevelt sent
U.S. Navy across the world to demonstrate American power, and functioned as arbitrator in Russo-Japanese War. It debated internally whether and how to annex Hawaii, Cuba, Philippines and Puerto Rico. It debated the pros and cons of a currency union it had with Great Britain. (Mead, 2002, 3-5.) Mead continues to give examples of successful (and active) American pre-World War II foreign policy; she took advantage of European struggles to win its own revolutionary war, the Louisiana purchase during Napoleons wars, annexation of Florida, western expansion to the Pacific, opening of Japan to world economy, conquering the Southwest from Mexico, managing to thwart European intervention during the Civil War, and the disproportionate influence by America in the Versailles Peace Treaty. (Mead, 2002, 8.) In fact, the literal interpretation of George Washington’s Farewell Address and the simplistic understanding of the Monroe Doctrine as the staple of isolationism are myths enforced by a literal and ahistorical reading those two common “truths”. This myth, per Mead (2002, 59): “…was the foreign policy equivalent of the Bill of Rights: the one true faith, handed down from on high.”

Regardless of historical interpretations of America’s place in the world, post-World War II realities put America in the forefront of the new global order. In 1948, the U.S. Senate approved S. 239, also known as Vanderberg Resolution, in which the Senate advised President Harry Truman to seek mutual defense agreements within United Nations, but outside UN Security Council. (S.Res.239, 1947). A year later Truman asked Senate for its consent and ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. During the debate in the full Senate and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, it was agreed that any new admission would mean a new treaty and thus being subject to congressional approval. Consequently, the Committee was fully satisfied by the commitment of the president, delivered by the secretary of state, that he would consider the admission of any new member requiring a new treaty with that member and would seek the advice and consent of the Senate. The Committee considered this an obligation binding upon the President office. (Garcia, 2009, 2-3.) All new admissions since have been approved by U.S. Senate.

4.1 United States, NATO, and the Issue of Burden-Sharing

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) held a conference January 21st, about two months prior to Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, dedicated to solving critical issues facing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). U.S. Senators Chris Murphy [D-CT] and John McCain [R-AZ] presented keynote
speeches, and while both acknowledged the viability of the alliance, they both expressed concerns over its long-term prospects, citing both the funding levels of individual member states and the reluctance of some to take part in NATO’s crisis management operations as the primary cause for the negative long-term prognosis. (Cipoletti & Hicks, 2014. 3.) In a panel held on the issue of “Washington perceptions of European security contributions”, the panelists agreed that the American narrative focusing on the negative aspects of NATO funding, namely the 2% of GDP threshold the member states are supposed to spend on defense, ought to be replaced by a narrative focusing on the overall role of NATO, thus justifying the increases in European defense spending. From a European perspective, the American focus on 2% of GDP was a “technical approach to solving a political problem.” Furthermore, European panelists argued that American leadership might even encourage the free riding phenomena in European defense spending, suggesting that a shared leadership role by the United States, such as “leading from behind” in Libyan operation, might provide a fruitful approach compared to continued U.S. leadership. (ibid, 7-8)

The issue of burden-sharing is by no means a new phenomenon in the U.S.-NATO relations. Burden-sharing debates concern the actual contributions to the alliance by each member state, and the perceived fairness of individual contributions. To define fairness is another, controversial issue. Should the member-state contributions be based on benefits they receive or on individual state’s ability to pay? What is the role of civilian and military contributions, and should one include international aid to burden-sharing assessments, if they’re perceived to enhance the alliance security? (Hartley & Sandler, 1999. 668-669.) Studies in burden-sharing during the 1950s and 1960s show evidence of free-riding, with larger member-states - namely USA, France, Germany and United Kingdom - paying a disproportionate share of alliance security. In the 1970s and 1980s the gap shrank, and in the late 1980s and 1990s the new developments (Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, the Fall of Soviet Union, NATO’s expansion) changed the threat perceptions and thinned European conventional military force, causing the re-emergence of burden-sharing debate. (ibid, 667-668.) Despite the changes in global security framework, Sandler and Hartley (1999, 678) argued, that “…the burden gap between the USA and Europe had reduced considerably, and that free-riding was no longer a major problem in the 1990s.”

The 21st century transformed NATO out of necessity. After September 11th, 2001, NATO made “…successful adaptation…to a new world order”, by shifting its focus from the German plains to new missions and political commitments against
global, transnational terrorism, leading to NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan. Yet, despite NATO’s efforts to transform itself from the ashes of the Cold War to a 21st Century coalition, the old nemesis lifted its head in the form of more assertive Russia, notably critical of U.S. missile defense in Europe and enlargement of NATO closer to its borders. (Cimbala & Forster, 2017. 1.)

4.2 Missile Defense in Europe

As we pursue our goal of defensive technologies, we recognize that our allies rely upon our strategic offensive power to deter attacks against them. Their vital interests and ours are inextricably linked. Their safety and ours are one. And no change in technology can or will alter that reality. We must and shall continue to honor our commitments. (Ronald Reagan, 1983.)

The issue of missile defense was very much a Cold War heritage, as demonstrated in the above quote from President Reagan and his address to the nation in March 1983, urging Congress to approve his buildup of the U.S. strategic defense spending. (Reagan, 1983). Simply put, it was about shooting down Russian nukes. During the height of the Cold War, both sides had such sizeable arsenals of deployable nuclear missiles, that missile defenses would do little to deter a full-scale nuclear attack. As confessed by Dr. Edward Warden during the 2010 START hearings, any missile defense system would not be able to deter a full-scale nuclear attack by Soviet Union: “…we were nowhere near being able to accomplish that objective against a substantial inventory of adversary missiles…” (S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 241). As the Cold War ended in 1991, the United States and Russia began to negotiate the scaling back of their nuclear arsenals, and the threat of a nuclear war between the United States and Russia became less acute. New worries included nuclear proliferation to the hands of rogue states and terrorist organizations, as exemplified by Iraqi SCUD missiles fired at Israel during the Gulf War. In the post-9/11 world, the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) getting into the hands of terrorist organizations or rogue states, namely Iran or North Korea, re-ignited the need for a missile defense system capable of responding to limited ballistic missile threat posed by both state and non-state actors in the Middle East (see. Palmore, 2004. 383, Cimbala & Rainow, 2007. 83).

4.2.1 From Star Wars to Gulf War

During the Cold War, the issue was very political. When Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency of the United States, he was dead set on defeating communism. Since
the Soviet Union was perceived as an existential threat to the United States, the idea of détente lacked some of its more graceful notions in President Reagan's thinking: “So far détente has been a one-way street that the Soviet Union has used to pursue its own aims…”, and adding that: “The only morality they recognize is what will further their cause. Meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime; to lie; to cheat.” (Ronald Reagan quoted in Hey, 2006. 58). Thus, a new strategy was formed. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) included a national missile defense system also known as Star Wars. The novelty of Star Wars as a ballistic missile defense system, as it was presented by President Reagan, was the idea that it was supposed to not only fortify deterrence, it would de facto replace deterrence as a comprehensive defense system, and as such negate the Soviet ballistic missile threat. (Reiss, 1992. 17). Its stated goal was to develop technologies that “…may lead to strategic defense options that would eliminate the threat by ballistic missiles.” (Project Muse, 1988. 33). The functional value of Star Wars was anything but certain. A study commissioned by the U.S. Congress concluded, that there existed a “significant probability” that the Star Wars would face a catastrophic failure in case it was ever needed in a real-world nuclear war. (Slayton, 2013. 4). Nevertheless, some argued that Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative played a crucial role in Strategic Arms Reduction, as the prospects of a comprehensive missile shield forced the Soviets to the negotiating table with U.S. over the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). (Talbott, 1988).

Although the threat of a Russo-American nuclear confrontation seemed to diminish considerably after the fall of the Soviet Union, proliferation of WMD’s and missile technology began to emerge as a growing threat. Only eleven months after the fall of Soviet Union, President George H. W. Bush made the decision to refocus U.S. missile defense strategy to focus on limited ballistic missile strikes, constituting a drastic shift from Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative aimed at countering the entirety of Soviet nuclear arsenal. The new plan was known as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). (Acton, 2015. 34.) For Americans, the Gulf War was a clear warning of the ballistic missile threat in the hands of a rogue state. During the war, Iraqis launched almost 90 SCUD missiles against targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia. One single successful SCUD attack was responsible for 25% of all U.S. combat fatalities during the war. (Payne, 1995.) As the threat of a missile attack from rogue states became more salient, the Clinton administration and Republicans in the Congress began to ponder a new missile defense system. However, even if the Clinton administration and the hawkish Republicans were sincere in their fear of Iran, Iraq or North Korea launching a missile attack against the United States, Russia
was still a factor affecting the decision-making process, as the ABM Treaty between Russia and United States explicitly prohibited the deployment of a national missile defense system. (Lippman, 1999.)

4.2.2 American Missile Protection Act of 1998 and National Missile Defense Act of 1999

In 1996, the Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich [R-GA] appointed Donald Rumsfeld as the chair of “Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to United States”. (Tama, 2015b. 56-57). The commission was established by the United States Congress namely to assess “…the nature and magnitude of the existing and emerging ballistic missile threat to the United States.” In reality, the creation of the commission originated from a partisan struggle over national missile defense. At the time, the Clinton administration believed that Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty would prevent the establishment of a national missile defense system, whereas the Republicans in Congress called for a missile defense system regardless of the ABM Treaty. (ibid). To assert congressional, and Republican, influence over the decision-making process, congressional Republicans decided to establish the commission as part of National Defense Appropriations Authorization for Fiscal Year 1997 (ibid), an annual process wherein Congress appropriates funds for the U.S. military.

The Commission presented an executive summary of its report in July 15th, 1998. In the report, the Commission unanimously agreed that efforts by hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads were a growing threat against the United States and its allies. The report highlighted threats from so-called rogue nations: “…developing threats in North Korea, Iran and Iraq are in addition to those still posed by the existing ballistic missile arsenals of Russia and China.” (Presidency, 2000). The report did not sway the Congress. It voted on the American Missile Protection Act twice, in May before the report was released, and again two months after the release in September 1998. Both votes ended up one short of filibuster-proof 60 votes. In his opening statement during a Senate debate, senator Thad Cochran [R-MS] repeated Republican concerns over rogue states attaining ballistic missile capabilities. Senator Cochran also noted his skepticism in Clinton administration’s policy “wait-and-see”, which relied on U.S. intelligence agencies to recognize when a state/entity would approach ballistic missile capabilities.
threatening United States. From a transatlantic perspective, the most curious notion was that related to Russia:

Who really controls the armed forces of Russia to the point that you can rely upon the good intentions of the Yeltsin government not to target U.S. sites with their missile systems, their intercontinental ballistic missiles, the most lethal and accurate of any other country in the world, with multitudes of warheads, nuclear-tipped warheads? We are sitting here hoping and assuming that we can continue to work with Russia and whatever government does come out of the struggle for power there to continue to destroy nuclear weapons under Russian control rather than to build them up and make them more accurate and lethal. (S10046, 1998. 62.)

Blunt of the Democratic opposition stemmed from the likely deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations and specifically the arms control regime established with the Russian government. Whereas the Republican argument called for disregarding the ABM-treaty, Democratic opposition linked it to the faith of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. In his statement, Senator Carl Levin [D-MI] turned the table on the issue, claiming it did not provide any additional value to American national security, rather it weakened it:

This bill is a pro-proliferation of a nuclear weapons bill. That is not the intent, obviously. But that is the effect of this bill, because instead of Russia just having a few thousand nuclear weapons on its soil—which are then subject to being stolen, or pilfered, or sold—it will have many more thousands of nuclear weapons. (S00149, 1998.)

The motion to invoke cloture and vote on the American Missile Protection Act failed with 59 votes to 41, yet again one short of the required filibuster-proof majority of 60 votes.

Senator Cochran, however, won the battle the following year as the Congress passed National Missile Defense Act. The act, which would change the U.S. missile defense policy to deploy National Missile Defense system as soon as technologically possible, passed the Senate 97-3 and the House 345-71. David Auerswald argues that

---

61 Senator Cochran noted that the U.S. intelligence community had failed to recognize both India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programs, further diminishing trust in intelligence-based approach to missile defense. In addition, he linked Russia to Iran as: “Russia has people who are cooperating in Iran right now, and have in the past, to develop systems that could inflict great damage not only in that region but beyond.”
the vote totals are rather deceptive. According to him, the congressional preferences did not actually shift and the vote reflected politics rather than policy. The Republicans who had 55 seats in the Senate in 1999 already had five Democratic votes, enough to invoke cloture, so the Democrats decided instead to add language supporting Democratic party’s arms control agenda by stating that the policy of the United States would be: “to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces.” (Auerswald, 2000.)

4.2.3 From Bush to Obama

President George W. Bush accepted the nomination as the Republican presidential candidate in Philadelphia August 3rd, 2000. In his acceptance speech, he promised to deploy national missile defense system (NMD) as early as possible. Regarding Democratic notions of the arms control regime, President Bush noted that: “Now is the time not to defend outdated treaties but to defend the American people.” (Presidency, 2000). Thus, the tone was set for the upcoming administration. President Clinton, after signing the National Missile Defense Act into a law, decided to delay the deployment of NMD until further research and testing could be conducted. (Auerswald, 2000.) Despite President Bush’s promise to deliver national defense system, his presidency began with little progress, and in the summer of 2001 the Senate Armed Services Committee even voted to reduce missile defense funding. (Arms Control Association, 2009.)

After the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks the playing field changed significantly. The threat of a ballistic missile attack against the United States by a rogue state became more concrete than ever: “…with long-range ballistic missiles sprouting up like wildflowers around the globe” (Dowd, 2004. 7). On December 2001 President Bush formally announced that the United States was withdrawing from the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) signed with the Soviet Union in 1972, a move much criticized by the international community. (The New York Times, 2001). The United States ballistic missile defense had based its rationale on the threat assessment in the 1999 report of congressional commission chaired by Donald Rumsfeld. Until 9/11, the U.S. military was attempting to develop missile defense technologies conforming to the restrictions posed by the ABM treaty, but now more resources were spent to develop a missile defense system transcending the limitations of the U.S.-Soviet ABM treaty. (Palmore, 2004. 382.) In response, July 14th Russia formally withdrew from START II treaty, a decision it linked directly to the ABM treaty discarded by the Bush administration. (BBC, 2002.)
Congressional reaction to Bush administration’s decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty followed partisan divisions: Republicans tended to support the decision, whereas the Democrats argued that national security would weaken, not improve after the decision. Democratic Senators, namely Carl Levin [D-MI] and Joseph Biden [D-DL], argued not only that the rationale of deploying NDM was flawed, but also that the withdrawal would have severe consequences to U.S.-Russia relations and transatlantic cooperation. Not only would worsening of U.S.-Russia relations add to Democratic worries over arms control and nuclear proliferation, it could also affect the future of NATO: “Although they have no veto right on that, they can make it more difficult on our European allies to go along with us on expansion of NATO.” (FAS, 2001.)

The decision to discard the old ABM Treaty - signed in 1972 - and subsequent Russian reaction did not spark a new Cold War. President Putin refused to cease all security cooperation with the United States, and in May 2002 the United States agreed to sign an official treaty in Moscow, reducing both American and Russian deployed strategic weapons by approximately two-thirds by 2012. Also, in the 2002 NATO summit in Iceland, United States and its NATO allies approved the formation of a new relationship between Russia and NATO in the form of NATO-Russia council, granting Russia a seat in the NATO table. (Cimbala & Rainow, 2007. 75.)

Since the middle of first Bush presidency, the focus of U.S. missile defense was regional defense. (Kelleher & Peter, 2015. 1). The Bush administration announced the deployment of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) at two military installations in Alaska and California, and after their activation in 2004 the United States had its first operational Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in thirty years. The focus of the BMD was clearly to defend homeland, and U.S. forward based systems were more modest, consisting of Standard Missile-3 interceptors on Aegis-equipped ships. The administration mentioned a possible “third site” for Ground-Based Interceptors, like those deployed in Alaska and California, somewhere in Europe. After winning the re-election, the Bush administration unveiled plans to place ten interceptors in Poland and a radar-system in Czech Republic. This would constitute a full-time BMD against perceived ICBM threat posed by Iran. (Acton, 2015. 37-38.) The plan to deploy the “third site” in former Soviet satellites caused a reaction from Vladimir Putin, who rejected minor confidence-building measures advocated by President Bush. Bush suggested that U.S. would not activate the sites until Iran had missiles capable of striking either U.S. or deep into Europe. Russia, in turn, suggested that U.S. could use radars in Azerbaijan instead of building one in Czech Republic, or
placing Russian observers at BMD locations. These suggestions were equally ineffective. (Gallagher, 2015. 94.)

In 2009, President Barack Obama decided to cancel Bush-era plans to deploy Ground-Based Interceptors in Poland and radar system in Czech Republic, and instead decided to go forward with a program titled European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The system was built to primarily deter midcourse missile attack from Iran by deploying a sea-based BDM system in the form of Aegis ships, with radar systems in Turkey, Israel and Qatar. (Schaffer, 2013. 92-93.) So, in short, the Obama administration decided to replace the land-based static GBI system with a sea-based system. Given the context, i.e. resurgent Russia, Russo-Georgia War, NATO's eastward expansion and the election of Democratic president in Barack Obama, it was no wonder that the decision was perceived by some as an appeasement of Russia and abandonment of U.S. allies. (Codner, 2010. 14.) This, even though as shown above, the limited GBI capabilities in Poland would not serve as an effective deterrent against Russian strategic nuclear force.

In the U.S. Congress, the missile defense has been a contentious issue, as consensus exists neither on the scope nor the desirability of a comprehensive missile defense system. Despite being a matter of great national importance, little attention by the public has been given to the issue of missile defense, granting Congress the power to use the issue of missile defense for political and partisan gamesmanship. The debates, especially up and until 2001 revolved around implementation details, rather than the strategic questions considering the feasibility or desirability of a missile defense system. (Gallagher, 2015. 84-85.) As the Bush presidency was coming to an end, no consensus on missile defense existed. Different groups called for a change, but a change based on different objectives. Some called for a comprehensive missile defense layer, some for some near-term focused and limited BMD capabilities, while other wanted to question the entire feasibility and desirability of a BDM system, as they argued that money could be better spent on cooperation and nuclear risk reduction. (Gallagher, 2015. 94.)

4.3 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)

As the Soviet Union conducted its first successful nuclear bomb test in 1949, world changed. Demonstrated by the 1950 National Security Council Report, commonly

---

63 AEGIS refers to a computer-based weapons system capable to detect, track and kill targets. The systems are deployed in Navy cruisers operational both independently or as a part of aircraft carrier strike-groups. (see. Navy, 2017.)
known as NCS-68, Soviet thermonuclear capabilities called for an immediate and
decisive response:

In particular, the United States now faces the contingency that within the next
four or five years the Soviet Union will possess the military capability of
delivering a surprise atomic attack of such weight that the United States must
have substantially increased general air, ground, and sea strength, atomic
capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to provide
reasonable assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow
and go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. In turn, this contingency
requires the intensification of our efforts in the fields of intelligence and
research and development. (NSC-68, 1950. 60.)

As these doomsday weapons began to develop in both potency and numbers, the
cost of the Cold War turning into a real war raised dramatically. The result of a total
war would be the destruction of human life on earth as people knew it, bringing
forth the horrific logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), referring to the
logic that a nuclear war would ensure the destruction of both sides, and thus the very
existence of the threat deterred both sides from conducting the first strike. The
prospects of a total nuclear war, and the astronomical price of the nuclear force,
forced the Soviets and American’s to negotiate a set of treaties (SALT I & II, START
I&II) to curb their respective nuclear arsenals. After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962,
a confrontation which President Kennedy gave one out of three change to turn into
nuclear war, an array of diplomatic initiatives began to take shape, highlighted by the

U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s administration initiated the idea of making cuts to
Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear arsenals, but the Soviet side was not prepared to go
along with Carter’s initiative. Still, later during Carter’s reign, in 1979, Carter and
Leonid Brezhnev managed to sign a strategic arms control treaty known as SALT II
in Vienna. This too came to fail, but now due to domestic opposition in the U.S.
Senate, led by the Republican party. Senate never agreed to ratify SALT II. Ronald
Reagan returned to the issue in his 1982 Eureka University speech, as he proposed
that the negotiations would cut 50% of both sides’ nuclear weaponry. These
negotiations, the first START negotiations, faced a roadblock in 1983, as this time
the Soviet side halted the progress as a response to U.S. deployment of medium-
range missiles in West Germany. Although the negotiations reignited in 1985,
President Reagan’s 1986 Strategic Defense Initiative, also known as Star Wars,
affected the calculus to include missile defense. No formal agreement on START I
was achieved before the Soviet collapse. (Pick, 1990.)
The collapse of the Soviet Union caused concern for the START treaty. From a practical point of view, of the Soviet nuclear weapons included in the negotiations, 70% located in Russia and 30% in newly independent Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, although the command and control over these weapons were strictly in the hands of Presidents Yeltsin and Putin. In May 1992, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and the United States signed a Protocol making all four new republics part of the START treaty. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus further agreed to eliminate all their nuclear weapons and become signatories of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). United States Senate ratified the treaty in October 1992 and Russia November 1992. Final piece of the puzzle was Ukraine, which finally in 1994 agreed to comply with the treaty in exchange for security guarantees by Russia, United States and Great Britain. (Kerr et al. 2016. 8-9.)

Technically, the START I limited long-range nuclear forces, i.e. land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM’s), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM’s), and heavy bombers. As per the treaty provisions, both sides could still deploy approximately 8,000 to 9,000 actual weapons. Of those, 4,900 could be deployed on ICBM’s and SLBM’s, and further limited warheads on “heavy” ICBM’s to 1,540 warheads, a 50% reduction. The treaty did not force significant reductions in missiles themselves, but it rather mandated the elimination of launches. Most missiles were placed in storage, together with warheads. The treaty was set to expire in December 2009. (Kerr et al. 2016. 9.)

The New START, also known as START III, cut both American and Russian arsenals to 1,500 deployed warheads and 700 deployed strategic missiles and bombers. United States nuclear strategy has relied, and will rely on the so-called nuclear triad, referring to long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines. (Zenko, 2010. 7-8.) As such, much of the debate in the Congress revolved around the issue of modernization and maintenance of American nuclear triad.64 Although diminished in size, the Cold War nuclear arsenal of the United States was approximately four times larger than its pre-START III posture, the American nuclear arsenal is very much more capable than its Cold War predecessor, especially considering its ability to destroy enemy nuclear weapons before they could be used. The nuclear weapons logic has shifted from the Cold War thinking of “missile gaps”, as argued by Lieber and Press:

64 Overall, argues Karako (2015, 352), post-Cold War the Congress has deferred to the executive in regard to the shape and size of U.S. nuclear arsenal and reductions to it. Brown (1994) contends, that even during the Cold War nonproliferation efforts were led by the executive, and were it left for Congress to initiate such efforts, advancement would have been unlikely.
Simply counting U.S. warheads or measuring Washington’s counterforce capabilities will not, however, reveal what type of arsenal is needed for deterrence in the twenty-first century. The only way to determine that is to work through the grim logic of deterrence: to consider what actions will need to be deterred, what threats will need to be issued, and what capabilities will be needed to back up those threats. (Lieber & Press, 2009.)

Disappointing many in the Congress, the new treaty would not include tactical nuclear weapons. The United States had approximately 400 operationally deployed tactical nuclear weapons at the time of the signing of the START III in 2010, maintained at South Carolina and in five NATO countries. On the other hand, Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal was approximated to include 2,000 operationally deployed tactical nuclear weapons, deployed mostly in nuclear bases close to NATO’s border. (Zenko, 2010. 7-8.) The difference between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons lie in the definition of military goals pursued by their use. Whereas the strategic nuclear weapons are directed against: “…one or more of a selected series of enemy targets with the purpose of progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy’s warmaking capacity and will…”, the use of tactical nuclear weapons is described as:

The use of nuclear weapons by land, sea, or air forces against opposing forces, supporting installations or facilities, in support of operations that contribute to the accomplishment of a military mission of limited scope, or in support of the military commander’s scheme of maneuver, usually limited to the area of military operations make war. (Woolf, 2016. 6.)

Regarding Europe, the role tactical nuclear weapons in military calculus has reappeared with force, since U.S.-Russian relations rapidly deteriorated in 2014. Russia fears, that U.S. first strike capabilities would be enough to endanger survivability of its own nuclear arsenal. U.S. nuclear strikes, conventional military force and non-kinetic attacks, such as cyber-attacks, combined with U.S. missile defenses in Central Europe could shift the strategic landscape and grant United States notable coercive leverage over Russia. Despite Russian fears, American capabilities in short-to-medium term fall short of being able to destroy all, or nearly all, Russian nuclear forces. (Colby, 2016.) At the same time, some argue that United States should remove its tactical nuclear weapons, located in Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and Turkey, as their maintenance is very expensive, strategic role obsolete, and NATO’s combined conventional forces outperforming Russia’s. (see Blechman & Rumbaugh, 2014). James Blackwell argued against such assertions, claiming that Russia’s new capabilities threaten U.S. allies and as such, tactical nukes
serve their purpose. He goes on to argue, that due to Moscow’s testing of new midrange cruise and ballistic missiles, specifically forbidden under 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, its newly adopted first-use doctrine and expansionist action in Eastern Europe. Without American tactical nuclear weapons as a deterrent, Russia would be reasonably certain that Washington would not respond to Russian aggression, let’s say in Estonia, with nuclear weapons. (Blackwell, 2015.) Blackwell argument appeared to have won the hearts and minds of the U.S. government, as it made an $8 billion investment\textsuperscript{65} in 2014 to modernize and upgrade its US B61 tactical nuclear bombs, 180 of which are stationed in Europe. (Borger, 2015).

4.4 American Military Presence in Europe

American global military posture could be seen as a sum of three variants: 1) military/strategic, 2) diplomatic/alliance-based, and 3) domestic (budget) politics. First, regional theater commanders are largely responsible for defining the requirements for American overseas presence in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Central and South America. Yet, as argued by Lynn (2013, 2-3), leaving the decision for specific regional commanders brings forth problems, as threats are often transnational rather than regional, and it is difficult to define overall strategy and to establish priorities between the theaters. Commanders present their views in various strategic documents requested by the Congress, and in the congressional hearings, especially relative to National Defense Appropriations Authorization process. Second, the United States force posture is dictated by its alliance commitments, for example the Article 5 commitments of the Washington Treaty, and diplomatic assurances, for example American troop presence in the Baltics post-2014 Ukraine crisis.\textsuperscript{66} Regarding American military posture in the European context: “The bases were also a potent symbol of the transatlantic security partnership with NATO at its core.” (Glebov & Rodrigues, 2009. 3). Third, as per the U.S. Constitution, the Congress has the authority “to raise and support armies” (U.S. Const. Art. I Sec. 8.),

\textsuperscript{65} For the comparison, the Finnish Defense Budget for 2015 totaled 2.8 billion euros. (Defmin, 2016.)
\textsuperscript{66} For an example about lack of U.S. military presence for diplomatic reasons, see Senator Inhofe’s statement in 2011 regarding U.S. African Commands headquarters: “At the time my preference was to have the headquarters in Africa. The place that I, at that time, felt would be more because of the location of the various AFRICOMs or unions would be in Ethiopia. But we also understand—it’s interesting. When you talk, as I do, individually to the presidents of the various countries, they agree that it would be better. But the problem is, and we all know it, with this whole idea of the colonialism and all that, they felt nobody wanted the presence in Africa because it would make it look like a takeover thing. So I understand all of that.” (Senator Inhofe [R-OK], S. Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 895.)
as it does in the form of annual defense budget process. As such, United States Congress holds the power of the purse, and all the electoral-institutional dynamics governing the functions of U.S. Congress can also affect the military budget and the priorities within.

4.4.1 Cold War

When the United States Senate held hearings on the creation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper from Iowa asked then Secretary of State Dean Acheson whether United States was preparing to send “substantial numbers of troops…” to Europe for the purpose of “development of these countries’ capacity to resist.” Secretary of state answered: “The answer to that question, Senator, is a clear and absolute NO!” (Quoted in Zimmerman, 2009. 3.) Secretary of state was, however, not entirely correct on the issue. By the end of the Cold War, United States had 242,800 U.S. Army personnel and 40,031 U.S. Air Force personnel stationed in Germany alone, before the inevitable withdrawal began as the Soviet Union grumbled. The rationale behind the American troop presence even during the Cold War was not obvious. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact vastly outnumbered the American military presence on the continent, giving the East a clear edge if a conventional large-scale military conflict in Europe would have occurred. The argument was, that the American presence forced the United States to respond if Soviet Union invaded the Western Europe, yet even this logic, from a military/strategic perspective had its flaws, as it limited the possible U.S. response by tying vast number of troops in Europe. (Zimmerman, 2009. 4-5.)

At the outset, in the aftermath of the World War II and the rebuilding efforts in the war-torn Europe, the American strategy was to bolster American and British troops in Europe while the Western European states would rebuild their military strength to stand up against the Soviet threat. (Zimmerman, 2009. 7). As President Truman announced his “temporary” buildup of U.S. forces in Europe, the experience of Korean War demonstrated the dangerous and aggressive nature of communist regimes: “If aggression is successful in Korea, we can expect it to spread throughout Asia and Europe to this hemisphere.” (Truman, 1950). Due to the threat posed by both the Soviet Union and the Communist China: “it is more necessary than ever before for us to increase at a very rapid rate the combined military strength of the free nations.” (ibid), yet the expectation was always that the Western European governments would match U.S. commitments. (See ibid & Zimmerman, 2009. 7.)

President Truman himself vowed to hold down the defense spending prior to his 1948 re-election. The domestic forces arguing for less military spending and the
external world events drew Truman in different directions. The initial defense spending for FY1950 was set at $14.4 billion, but the turn of the decade proved volatile; Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, and the successful nuclear test by Soviets in 1949. Truman requested that State Department and Department of Defense would conduct a re-examination of U.S. objectives in matters of war and peace, and articulate the effects of established objectives for strategic planning. As a result, NSC-68 was presented to the president. The report proposed to quadruple U.S. defense spending by 1951, raising it from 5% of GDP to 20% of GDP. (Young, 2013. 6-7.)

In the U.S. Congress, especially during the 1960’s and 1970’s, many called for bringing back the American troops from the European continent. (Zimmerman, 2009. 6.) In the heart of the debate stood Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield, a Democratic senator from the state of Montana. Mansfield was the longest serving Senate majority leader, serving from 1961 all the way until 1977. From 1966 to 1975 Senator Mansfield proposed several resolutions and amendments calling for dramatic troop withdrawals from Europe, arguing that such withdrawals would not affect U.S. capabilities to respond to its NATO-commitments. Although the initial resolutions called for less dramatic reductions, in 1971 Senator Mansfield introduced an amendment (H.R. 6531) calling for 50% reduction in U.S. European deployed forces by the end of 1971. The amendment garnered wide support from the Senate, and only after an intensive lobbying campaign by the Nixon administration, involving former secretaries of state, secretaries of defense, NATO commanders and chiefs-of-staff, the amendment was defeated. After a defeat in 1975, when Senator Mansfield proposed and amendment calling for a withdrawal of 200,000 U.S. troops deployed in Europe, Senator Mansfield as well as the U.S. Senate let go of the idea of dramatically decreasing the number of U.S. troops stationed in Europe. (Lázár, 2003. 13-16.)

As demonstrated by the Mansfield resolutions and amendments of the 1960’s and 1970’s, the latter part of the Cold War saw liberals - in Mead’s terms Jeffersonians (see Mead, 2002) - arguing for less military spending. But the logic of the argument remained the same as one described by Benjamin Fordham (2007, 372):

The basic charge was this: by consuming an inordinate share of national resources, runaway military spending could damage the economy. It diverted investment away from the more economically beneficial uses, and fueled inflation. It warped fiscal priorities, forcing tax increases or diverting funds from domestic priorities such as education, health care, and social welfare. Perhaps most importantly, permanent high levels of military spending
promised to distort American politics and society, creating a constituency for militarism.

4.4.2 Post-Cold War

A 1992 study commissioned by the Department of Defense and the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) conducted by RAND’s National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), was aimed at identifying “future missions and requirements for U.S. forces in Europe and to evaluate force posture alternatives in light of them.” (Kugler, 1992. iii). The report presented four distinct options for the post-Cold War force posture in Europe: 1) Forward presence would deploy 150,000 U.S. troops in Europe, including 3.5 tactical air wings; 2) dual-based presence would deploy 100,000 troops in Europe, leaving almost half the force dual-based in the United States; 3) limited presence would include 70,000 troops and 1.5 air wings, with a bare-bone support structure, and 4) symbolic presence would provide 40,000 troops. The choice between the options ought to be based on four factors: U.S. security goals, threats and contingencies ahead, NATO’s military strategy, and military missions. (Kugler, 1992. v-vii.)

In the immediate aftermath of the German unification and Soviet collapse, the future of Europe was a mystery to political and military analysts alike. A positive scenario would include a peaceful Europe with Russia becoming a “truly benign partner of the West or else permanently collapse impotency…” (Kugler, 1992. viii). Also, the Middle East and Persian Gulf would have to become stable with a risk of another war unlikely, and the transatlantic relations ought to be strong enough to withstand a withdrawal of American forces from Europe. Perhaps due to the inherently pessimistic nature of military analysts, the positive scenario could not be counted on. Senior military personnel in the early 1990’s favored the forward presence in American European force posture. As per the report, the forward presence of 150,000 troops and 3.5 air wings would add a meaningful symbol to American military contribution to NATO, provide a “wide range of diverse capabilities for meeting peacetime needs”, and perhaps most importantly, would project a strong American military presence on Europe as a sign that the United States is in fact a European power “with vital interests there”. Withdrawal would create instability, especially due to the weakness of European force structure. Still, some experts in the immediate aftermath agreed that levels slightly below 150,000 would not massively affect the European security-setting. Yet, there was a clear agreement that troop levels described in limited and symbolic presence (70,000 or 40,000 troops) would dramatically alter “the character of the U.S. military presence” in Europe:
A posture of 40,000 troops would leave virtually no combat forces at all. By making the United States entirely dependent on outside reinforcement in a crisis, it could undercut the U.S. political and military goals across the board. (Kugler, 1992. ix-xi.)

Similarly, to the Cold War dynamics, two camps existed on the issue of American global posture. Yet, after the fall of the main antagonist in the form of strong Soviet state, the side of the debate arguing for lesser U.S. commitment globally gained wind. Per this side of the debate, U.S. defense spending hindered the domestic progress on issues such as social justice, strengthening American economy and so on. The other side of the debate did agree that the global security-setting had indeed changed significantly, but did not agree that U.S. ought to withdraw from its global military posture. Quite the opposite, U.S. was now the sole super power, and in its new role it should rather assert its global military power and lead the world towards the coming millennia. For example, in 1989 conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats, or in Mead’s (2002) terms Republican and Democratic Jeffersonians, in the House Armed Services Committee called for a withdrawal of American troops from Europe. At the same time, Hamiltonian George Bush administration attempted to make the argument that such withdrawals would weaken the transatlantic alliance. (Gordon, 1989.) The reality was set somewhere in between, but closest to the dual-based approach described before, as the United States would decrease the number of troops in Europe from approximately 300,000 in 1989 to 130,000 in 1995. (Allen, 1992. 2-9.) Troop numbers would keep diminishing, for example, the United States had 105,254 troops stationed in Germany in 1993, dropping to 69,203 by year 2000. (Kane, 2004).

The shifting strategic rationale became more evident during the George W. Bush administration. The end of the Cold War meant that the threats against European security were not perceived existential by nature, and the U.S. influence in Europe as a security guarantor changed, strong military presence did not seem to have the positives it had when there was still a credible threat of Soviet invasion of Western Europe. (Duke, 1995. 192). The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) took on the objective of reorienting American global military presence, eventually leading to 2004 announcement by the Bush administration to withdraw 70,000 troops from Europe and Asia. (Telegraph, 2004.) This shift was presented in the 2001 QDR, published September 30th, 19 days after the 9/11-terrorist attacks. The QDR stated, that since containing Soviet Union was no longer the primary objective of American military power:
…overseas presence posture, concentrated in Western Europe and Northeast Asia, is inadequate for the new strategic environment, in which U.S. interests are global and potential threats in other areas of the world are emerging. (QDR, 2001a. 25.)

In the 2004 announcement, President Bush stressed the impact for military families and American taxpayers. The idea of a slimmer American global troop posture was initiated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld – overseeing the DOD-led 2001 QDR – who since his confirmation had called for withdrawing large garrisons of American troops from abroad, focusing instead on a more mobile, rapidly deployed force. This idea gained traction after the 9/11 and the consequent War on Terror. (Telegraph, 2004.)

In the United States Congress, the decision to withdraw troops from both Europe and Asia (Korea) was debated in a September 23rd hearing “The Global Posture Review of United States Military Forces Stationed Overseas” held by Senate Armed Services Committee. In his opening statement, chairman of the Committee John Warner [R-VA] argued that the restructuring:

…represents the final chapter, in my judgment, of this Nation’s efforts to transform our global defense posture away from the outdated Cold War strategies and missions to better meet today’s and tomorrow’s very complex, very different threats to our Nation’s security. (S.Hrg. 108-854, 2004. 3.)

The notion of American European presence being a Cold War relic was further supported by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who in his statement to the Committee noted that: “We are still situated in large part as if little has changed for the last 50 years, as if, for example, Germany is still bracing for a Soviet tank invasion across the northern German plain.” (S.Hrg. 108-854, 2004. 7.)

When the year 2012 began, U.S. had some 80,000 troops deployed in Europe, down from relatively stable 300,000 it had deployed on the continent during the Cold War. As a part of an effort to cut military spending, U.S. secretary of defense announced in January 2012 that the United States would further reduce its European footprint by withdrawing 7000 combat troops from Europe. The move would take out two combat brigades from Europe. Prior to the decision, three were stationed in Germany and one in Italy. Some of the lost presence would be replaced by rotating troops in Europe, a move which in itself would save costs, as military families would not be moved with the forces. The logic set forth by President Obama followed a familiar narrative; U.S. would focus its economic strength in United States, while remaining committed to its European allies. (BBC, 2012b.)
The move by the Obama administration to withdraw combat brigades from Europe was swifter than the 2004 process by the Bush administration. If the 2004 announcement followed a strategy laid out by the 2001 QDR and was championed by the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld since 2000, the 2010 QDR, the first by Obama administration, did not recommend changes in the European force structure. To the contrary, it stated that: “the United States will retain four brigade combat teams and an Army Corps headquarters forward-stationed on the continent.” (QDR, 2010b. 65.) Despite the reassurances by the administration officials, the move to remove army combat brigades did cause some concern in Europe. After the withdrawal, Europe was left with a cavalry brigade in Germany and an airborne brigade in Italy, leaving 30,000 U.S. Army troops in Europe. Besides the local revenue losses in Germany, European officials and analysts argued for a more sustained American presence in Europe, especially since Russia had become notably more assertive compared to the European security context affecting the previous U.S. withdrawals. (Shanker, 2012.) In fact, even some senators expressed their surprise over the dramatic reductions in American European military presence, contributed as much to parochial interests of members of Congress as to American strategic interests:

At that time I actually went over to Eastern Europe, Bulgaria, and Romania, places where they wanted us to come over and were willing to give us 24–7 and also do a lot of the billeting and other things. I just wondered where that was now. Let me ask you this. There’s a lot of criticism since the downgrade. I was shocked when I read your written testimony and found that it [American military presence] was down 80 percent from where it was in the 1990s. I didn’t realize that. That being the case, there’s still some military construction (MILCON) that is going on there, and I know a lot of people are critical of that. There are some parochial reasons for that back here also. (Senator Inhofe [R-OK] S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 607.)

U.S. military spending, however, remained rather constant ever since the watershed moment of 1950 Korean War and NSC-68, with four notable peaks in the spending: The Korean War, Vietnam War, Reagan buildup, and post-9/11 military spending. (Fordham, 2007. 374.) Due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military spending has not, however, scaled back to pre-9/11 levels.

4.5 Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and Russia Reset

As Barack Obama was preparing to face Mitt Romney in the 2008 presidential election, and the world prepared for the Beijing Summer Olympics, one of the so
called “frozen conflicts” in Eurasia erupted into a war. Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 and formal recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on August 26th, 2008 were game changers in Russian foreign policy towards what it considers its sphere of influence, “near abroad”. If before Georgian War Russia managed its foreign policy by influencing post-Soviet regions on a grass-roots level, intervention in Georgia was a clear intervention against a sovereign state. (King, 2008).

In his statement on August 15th, President George W. Bush proclaimed: “Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected. Moscow must honor its commitment to withdraw its invading forces from all Georgian territory.” (The New York Times, 2008). The Bush administration and its military advisors quickly dismissed military action as a response, and decided instead to airlift Georgian troops fighting in Iraq to Georgia. (Shanker, 2008). Five days after the fighting erupted, the war was over. Before the hostilities began in 2008 the United States was eager to further integrate Georgia into transatlantic security institutions. February 14th the United States Senate agreed to Senate Resolution 439: “A resolution expressing the strong support of the Senate for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to enter into a Membership Action Plan with Georgia and Ukraine.” The language of the resolution was clear, as it proclaimed that “United States should take the lead in supporting the awarding of a Membership Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine.” (S.Res.439, 2008).

Similar resolution was passed in the House of Representatives on April 1st. (H.Res.997, 2008). The House of Representatives brought up the resolution one day before the beginning of the 2008 NATO summit, highlighting congressional resolve over the issue. Defending the resolution, representative Robert Wexler [D-FLA] considered providing a membership action plan for Ukraine and Georgia “a golden opportunity for the alliance to take steps forward to bolster transatlantic security and further entrench democracy, freedom, and the rule of law throughout Europe.” (Congress.gov, 2008).

During a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the issue of NATO enlargement in March 2008, then chairman of the committee Joseph Biden asked:

If we don’t grant MAP status to Ukraine and Georgia, what in the devil does that say? The Russians threaten to target Ukraine and we conclude not to offer the status? It seems to me it’s almost an overwhelming reason why you almost have to offer the status. Anybody disagree with that notion?
Although the congressional support for a membership action plan (MAP) in regard to Ukraine and Georgia seemed overwhelming, Ronald Asmus, then executive director of Transatlantic Center was correct in his answer to Joseph Biden:

I’m in favor of MAP for Ukraine and Georgia, but I would say the chance of it happening at NATO in Bucharest are about 10 percent today; and they were zero percent a couple of months ago. And they’ve only become 10 percent because of the Russians saying the things they have. (S. Hrg. 110–506, 2008. 77.)

European member states, especially France and Germany, were suspicious of offering a MAP to Georgia and Ukraine, and despite strong U.S. support, NATO did not offer MAP even after the war due to European resistance. (Nichol, 2009. 30-31). The reluctance of European NATO members to offer membership action plan for Georgia and Ukraine is consistent with European states’ - France and Germany’s especially - tendency to highlight good relations with Moscow. (CRS, 2008. 24). On the other hand, the eastward expansion of NATO has been championed by the Congress ever since the end of the Cold War, as evident in the fact that Congress has given its approval for all NATO enlargement rounds and that in 1994 it passed the NATO Participation Act, authorizing the president to assist designated former Soviet Bloc countries to become full NATO members. (CRS, 2008. 27.) Despite Bush administration’s last minute efforts to integrate both Georgia and Ukraine in the transatlantic institution through MAP, resolute opposition by European member states thwarted both the administration’s and U.S. Congress’ aspirations on the issue. (CSMonitor, 2008.)

The administration reacted to Russian invasion with statements condemning Russian action. Bush administration still wanted to maintain strategic cooperation with Russia especially considering anti-terrorism, non-proliferation and sanctions against Iran and North Korea. Some of the language by administration officials painted a darker picture. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said on August 14th that “Russian action had made the administration reconsider a long-term strategic dialogue with Russia,” and that “Russia’s behavior ... has called into question the

---

67 What’s interesting about this specific hearing and Joseph Biden’s question, is that after listening to the expert argument that MAP will not be offered due to European resistance, he did not continue questioning the motives or rationale of European member states, but instead steered the responsibility to president Bush in his later statement: “Ron says that, no matter what we all say right now, unless somewhere there’s a transformative moment at the White House and the President wakes up tomorrow morning and decides to make this a priority, that there is a 10-percent chance that such an invitation will be made. Do you——” (GPO, 2008. 79.) The reluctance of members of Congress to publicly criticize United States’ transatlantic allies will be further examined later on.
entire premise of that dialogue and has profound implications for our security relationship going forward, both bilaterally and with NATO.” (Quoted in CRS, 2009. 25.)

U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney visited both Georgia and Ukraine in the fall of 2008 to reassure both countries of U.S. support for their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Both Cheney and Secretary Condoleezza Rice strongly condemned Russian action as premeditated and undermining U.S.-Russian relations. (CRS, 2009. 27.)

Quickly after the hostilities, Robert Asmus, who predicted European reluctance to offer MAPs for Ukraine and Georgia in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, stated that:

…despite everything we may have hoped for we are in a new geopolitical competition in the old Soviet spheres of influence. We may lose Georgia. We may lose the ... best chance for a democratic future in the Caucasus. The next target for Moscow will be Ukraine. (Quoted in CRS, 2009. 21.)

Congressional response came both in the form of statements by individual members and committee hearings. One such statement was a bipartisan joint statement by then House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, House Majority leader Steny Hoyer, House Republican leader John Boehner and House Republican Whip Roy Blunt. In the said statement, Roy Blunt went on to “make it abundantly clear that the U.S. Congress stands ready to assist the people of Georgia and protect our nations' strategic alliance.” (Democratic Whip, 2008).

How the United States would be able to protect its strategic ally in Georgia remained less clear, as U.S. support came in most parts in a form of humanitarian assistance and a declaration of U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership. Regarding the MAP, the European allies were - if anything - less inclined to support the idea of offering such arrangements for Ukraine and Georgia in the fear of further Russian reaction. (CRS, 2009. 28-30.)

Bush administrations reluctance to offer military assistance to Georgia did not go unnoticed in the Democrat controlled Congress. On September 9th, 2008, the House Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing on U.S.-Russia relations in the aftermath of the Georgia crisis. House Foreign Relations Committee in the 110th Congress was chaired by Howard Berman, a Democrat from California, who in his opening statement noted that:

---

68 Similar charters exist with the Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia (signed in 1998) and Ukraine (signed in 2008). (CRS, 2009. 30.)
…there has also been resounding silence from the White House thus far on the issue of military assistance…If Georgia is to remain a viable candidate for NATO membership, it will require significant assistance in rebuilding its military. To me, it seems that our approach to the Bucharest Summit in April produced the worst possible outcome. The administration pushed for Georgia to receive a Membership Action Plan, knowing full well that this step would be blocked by the Germans and the French. As a consolation prize, the final communiqué expressed NATO’s intent to admit Georgia to the alliance eventually. Did this decision signal to the Russians that Georgia has no current security guarantees, but would eventually be covered by Article V protection, and that therefore this was the time for Russia to set the trap to “justify” an immediate attack?” (House Hearing, 2008.)

More than simply criticizing Bush administration for its lackluster response the crisis, Mr. Berman went on to suggest that Bush administration, being aware of European resistance to offering MAP for Georgia, was at least in part responsible for creating an environment where Russia would be incentivized to intervene in Georgia. Later in his statement Mr. Berman expressed his concern over the U.S. ability and willingness to support its allies in Eastern Europe, Ukraine included, and claiming that the administration lacked regional strategy, responding merely with rhetoric. (House Hearing, 3. 2008). Similar sentiments were echoed in 2014 after Russian intervention in Ukraine, this time by Republican members of Congress against a Democratic administration.

Ranking member of the Committee, Republican Ileana Ros-Lehtinen brought up the analogy of Western inability to stop Germany in the 1930’s and expressed her concerns of Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy aspirations. Implications of the intervention in Georgia for Ukraine were also acknowledged, as she asked: “Will there be claims that parts of Ukraine rightfully belong in Russia?” (House Hearing, 4. 2008). Despite expressing grave concerns over the direction of Russian foreign policy, Ros-Lehtinen did not mention the failure to offer MAP for Georgia or any shortcomings by the Bush administration in her opening statement.

Despite the strong condemning statements by both the chairman and ranking member of the House Foreign relations Committee, the debate revealed dissenting opinions regarding the official narrative. Brad Sherman [D-CA] described U.S. policy towards Russia “unthinkingly and reflexively anti-Russian”, pointing out the contradiction in promoting self-determination in the case of Kosovo, yet opposing self-determination regarding South Ossetia and Abkhazian. Dana Rohrabacher [R-CA] insisted that the U.S. post-Cold War policy towards Russia has pushed the country “…into the arms of China and Iran” and claimed that Georgia was to blame
for the crisis: “The Russians are right. We are wrong. The Georgians started it. The Russians ended it. Thank you.” Diane Watson [D-Ca] warned about the return of a Cold War mindset regarding Russia and stressed the need for a realistic foreign policy towards Russia, whereas Edward Royce [R-CA] expressed his concerns over possible Georgian NATO membership: “And what about our security? In this territorial dispute, one that CRS reports derives from age-old ethnic rivalries, is this dispute worth a 10-percent chance of war with Russia?” (Quoted in House Hearing, 6-8. 2008.)

United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing on September 17th, 2008 deliberating on the consequences and responses to Russian aggression in Georgia. The tone of the opening statements was a bit toned down compared to House Committee. Senator Chris Dodd [D-CT] chaired the committee as Joseph Biden was tied to the presidential election as a vice presidential candidate. In his opening statement, Senator Dodd stressed that Russian action was unacceptable, yet no calls for military assistance nor NATO membership was brought up. Geopolitical implications of Russian action did not escape chairman pro tempore, for he too recognized the threat to Ukraine and rest of Eastern Europe. (S. Hrg. 110–707, 2008.)

Republican ranking member of the committee Richard Lugar [R-IN] began his opening statement by listing ten different ways Russia had lured Georgia into a military response despite Senator Lugar’s personal attempts to persuade President Saakashvili to not respond militarily, thus laying some responsibility to the Georgian president. U.S. aid efforts as well as the need for international monetary and humanitarian assistance were in the focus, whereas the greater geopolitical implication for Senator Lugar was energy:

The conflict in Georgia cannot be separated from Europe’s dangerous dependence on natural gas from Russia. In fact, the conflict in Georgia makes it all the more important for European leaders to act on energy security. Commitment to energy diversification, including new pipelines circumventing Russia, is essential to the security of our European allies. (Senate Hearing, 2008.)

Whereas Senator Dodd in his opening statement steered clear of the NATO issue, his Republican Colleague Senator Lugar insisted that the United States should “redouble our efforts to extend MAP to Georgia”. He specifically pinpointed the failure to offer MAP for Georgia and Ukraine at the NATO summit in 2008 as a clear signal to Russia. (Senate Hearing, 2008.) Despite his clear view of the issue, Lugar did not specify that the European member states, Germany and France
especially, were to blame for such failures. Similar to Democratic representative Howard Berman in the House committee, the blame for such failure rested more heavily on U.S. efforts, rather than reluctant European member states, continuing a trend that members of Congress were not eager to point fingers at NATO’s oldest allies over the Atlantic.69

Following similar route with its House counterpart, statements following the opening statements by both parties brought up the complexities of the issue. Yet, unlike in the House, Senators Bill Nelson [D-FL] and Bob Casey [D-PA] did not put the blame on Georgian government or U.S. anti-Russian policies. Senator Nelson brought up the issue of cooperation with Russia in the International Space Station and Senator Casey raised the question of destruction of WMDs and nonproliferation cooperation with Russia. Casey managed to sum up the American response on the whole issue: “…I think there’s a real frustration that the American people feel, that sometimes more specific action can’t always take place, beyond condemnation and beyond engagement in diplomacy.” (Senate Hearing, 2008.)

Overall, the bipartisan consensus on a national level was the condemnation of Russian action, calls for Membership Action Plan for Georgia and strong U.S. support for rebuilding Georgia.70 Many in the Congress recognized the ramifications of Russian action and contemplated on possible consequences for Ukraine and the Baltics. Yet behind the opening statements and the bipartisan condemnation, many in the House warned against return of the Cold War rhetoric’s and demonizing Russia. Some even put the blame on Georgian president and pondered whether a regional conflict in Georgia would be worth risking a war with Russia, thus placing a shadow over Georgian NATO aspirations. Nevertheless, this peek in congressional response already portrays the complexities beyond the initial response of condemnation by the administration and Congressional leadership.

As Barack Obama was inaugurated as the 44th president of the United States, U.S.-Russian relations had severely strained during Bush’s eight-year tenure. Obama administration looked to better its relationship with its former adversary. In the 2009 Munich security conference, Vice President Joseph Biden said United States ought to reset its relationship with Russia. Few months later, Secretary of State Hilary

69 It should be noted, that the specific language Senator Lugar used did not blame the Bush administration for not offering MAP for Georgia, rather he called for redoubling such efforts as the U.S. near term objective.

70 This was also the message from then Senator Barack Obama, who stressed the need for international response with European nations and stressed the role of United Nations. Although some members of the Democratic Party were more understanding of the Russian action, Obama argued that “There is no possible justification for these attacks.” (Huffington Post, 2008.)
Clinton and her Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov literally pressed (misspelled) reset button. (Foreign Policy, 2017.) United States under the Obama administration had three primary goals in mind when it attempted to reset the relationship. It wanted Russia's support to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambitions, it needed Russian support for its operations in Afghanistan, and it needed Russia’s support in Obama’s nuclear proliferation agenda, i.e. the signing of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. (Kuchins, 2011.) Republicans did not agree. In 2011, House Speaker John Boehner [R-OH] called Russia’s reaction to the administration policy as “nothing short of an attempt to restore Soviet-style power and influence”, and stressed the abysmal human rights record of Russia ought to be kept on agenda: “we cannot sacrifice values or get away with walling off our interests from our moral imperatives.” (Boehner, quoted in Spetalnick, 2011.) Although some timed the end of Russia reset to Obama’s 2012 decision to begin withdrawing American troops from Afghanistan (Hahn, 2013. 216), some to 2013 (see for example Goldgeier, 2014), but the Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014 finally did it in: “No more reset buttons, no more 'Tell Vladimir I'll be more flexible.' Treat him for what he is”, noted Senator McCain [R-AZ] in 2014. (John McCain, quoted in Frizell, 2014.)

### 4.6 Libyan Intervention

Amid turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, commonly known as the “Arab Spring”, Libya’s eastern capital Benghazi gave birth to a popular uprising against the government of Muammar Qaddafi. Colonel Qaddafi was no stranger to the West. President Ronald Reagan famously named him the “mad dog of the Middle East”, whereas Qaddafi’s political ideology had its roots in anti-colonialist, and consequently anti-Western sentiments. U.S. actions against Libya went beyond Reagan’s words, as U.S. conducted a short air campaign against Libya in 1986, and the international community placed sanctions against Libya in 1992 for its refusal to extradite two suspects in 1988 Lockerbie bombing. Finding himself in isolation, Qaddafi took upon himself to better Libyan relations at the turn of the century, culminating in Libya’s 2003 decision to give up its weapons of mass destruction - program. The economic prospects of the Libyan people, however, remained grim, as the Qaddafi family and his close associates reaped the benefits of economic fortunes, creating with the lack of political reforms an atmosphere suitable for a popular uprising. (Pargeter, 2012. 1-6.)

In his speech on March 23rd, 2011, President Obama described to American people his rationale for intervening in Libya. According to Obama, United States was an “anchor of global security”, yet mindful of when and how to use its military
might. Libya, and its “tyrant” Qaddafi, took upon himself to violently oppress the people’s “claim [to] their basic human rights”, and as such, a great humanitarian crisis was at hand. Facing the prospects of “brutal oppression and a looming humanitarian crisis”, the president together with the international community had no choice but to intervene, deploying American and allied assets to the Mediterranean Sea to impose U.N. sanctioned no-fly zone and prevent the looming massacre in Benghazi, as Libyan forces approach the city:

At this point, the United States and the world faced a choice. Qaddafi declared he would show “no mercy” to his own people. He compared them to rats, and threatened to go door to door to inflict punishment. In the past, we have seen him hang civilians in the streets, and kill over a thousand people in a single day. Now we saw regime forces on the outskirts of the city. We knew that if we waited — if we waited one more day, Benghazi, a city nearly the size of Charlotte, could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world. (Obama, 2011.)

Obama’s eventual decision to intervene faced controversy. Critics argued that the initial response to the looming humanitarian crisis was slow, overall U.S. attitude regarding the operation was unenthusiastic, some argued the U.S. was notably eager to hand over the mission to European as soon as possible, and that the administration had failed to incorporate Congress in the decision-making process and had no clear end-strategy.71 (O’Hanlon, 2011a.)

Some made the argument that Libya was an example of the new “Obama doctrine”, which would have given the lead in certain international operations to international community, most notably NATO. Some called this rather gracelessly “leading from behind”, but by Obama’s own assertion the U.S. eagerness to hand over the lead to NATO in Libya was part of the “anti-free rider campaign”, forcing U.S. allies to take the lead instead of “holding our coats while we did all the fighting.”

---

71 The Republican opposition to president Obama’s handling of the Libyan crisis, especially in the Republican controlled House of Representatives, stemmed from the administration unwillingness to request a congressional resolution authorizing the use of American military forces, as articulated in the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Then Speaker-of-the-House John Boehner [R-OH] articulated the Republican stance on the issue in his letter to President Obama in the summer of 2011, as the Libya mission was nearing its 90th day: “Since the mission began, the Administration has provided tactical operational briefings to the House of Representatives, but the White House has systematically avoided requesting a formal authorization for its action. It has simultaneously sought, however, to portray that its actions are consistent with the War Powers Resolution. The combination of these actions has left many Members of Congress, as well as the American people, frustrated by the lack of clarity over the Administration’s strategic policies, by a refusal to acknowledge and respect the role of Congress, and by a refusal to comply with the basic tenets of the War Powers Resolution.” (Boehner, 2011b).
O’Hanlon argues, that Libya ought to be seen as a special case in five specific aspects: 1) Libya was a second-tier regional player and played little role in American strategic thinking; 2) U.S. economic troubles became so severe during the campaign that public interest in Libya dwindled; 3) Libya’s geographical layout was very suitable for waging an effective air campaign; 4) Qaddafi was very unpopular in the Arab world, even compared to the United States; 5) U.S. taking a secondary role in humanitarian crisis has a strong precedent in American foreign policy. (O’Hanlon, 2011b.)

NATO’s performance in Libya was initially hailed as a victory. It managed to halt the advance of Qaddafi forces, and thus prevented a likely humanitarian crisis. It managed to pave the way for the overthrow of Qaddafi regime, and managed to do so by involving allies and sharing the burden within the organization. NATO managed to take the command from United States in Operation Unified Protector, and, according to Daalder and Stavridis, NATO succeeded in Libya “by any measure.” The transatlantic alliance did face some problems. The operation revealed serious gaps in member states’ military capabilities, demonstrated by its failures to:

…find and engage the types of mobile targets common in contemporary operations, plan joint operations in parallel with fast-paced political decision-making, support the targeting process with legal advice, and provide timely and reliable information on operational developments to the public. NATO has also neglected to cultivate essential tools for military campaigns, such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, precision targeting, and aerial refueling -- despite nearly two decades of experience that have demonstrated their value. (Daalder & Stavridis, 2011.)

So, after highlighting the success of NATO’s operation in Libya, Daalder and Stavridis do acknowledge the serious shortcomings of NATO’s European partners. The success described above could be seen as political. NATO managed to unify in its efforts, and it gained a wide-ranging support from nearly all member-states, with notable exceptions of Germany and Poland. The operation did however demonstrate the reliance on American military capabilities. U.S. military provided 75% of all the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data, it contributed 75% of the refueling planes, and U.S. European command had to dispatch 100 military personnel to NATO targeting center, as it became evident that other member states lacked the ability required to provide their air power with targeting information. The failures, as per Daalder and Stavridis, were results of “decade of European underinvestment in defense”, highlighted by the fact that U.S. allies in Europe spend about 1.6% of their GDP on defense, compared to over 4% spent by the United
States. Such progress will inevitably lead to a two-tiered alliance. (ibid.) Secretary General of NATO Anders Rasmussen argued that “Any shortfalls have been primarily due to political, rather than military, constraints”, although he went on to admit that the downward spiral of European military spending - defense spending by European NATO countries had fallen 20% while their GDP’s had grown approximately 55% - would be a legitimate concern: “But if European defense spending cuts continue, Europe's ability to be a stabilizing force even in its neighborhood will rapidly disappear. This, in turn, risks turning the United States away from Europe.” (Rasmussen, 2011.)

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who gave his farewell speech in June 10th, 2011 offered a rather blunt assessment of NATO’s performance in Libya:

However, while every alliance member voted for Libya mission, less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission. Frankly, many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can’t. The military capabilities simply aren’t there. (Gates, 2011.)

If taken a more theoretical and detached look at the issue of burden sharing, the undeniably disproportionate contributions by the United States to NATO are consistent with collective action theory, the dominating theory in military burden sharing research. As per the collective action theory: “military operations produce public benefits from which noncontributors cannot be excluded.” (Haesebrouck, 2016. 3). Given the deniability of common benefits, some member states may decide to act as “free riders”, happy to reap the benefits without partaking in the sowing. Yet, in some cases the member states decide not to act as “free riders”, as evident by the sizable participation by European member states in the Libya operation. Such anomalies can be explained by the alliance-dependence hypothesis, which argues that states are so dependent on U.S. security umbrella that they contribute out the fear that lack of commitment might leave them abandoned by Washington. (ibid.) These theories could explain why some of the European member states, most notably the Eastern European states, have been more eager to partake in U.S.-led operations, whereas Germany, for example, has remained on the sidelines. Of course, the same dynamics that affect all governments affect the decision-making process in European member states, namely, the fiscal realities and public opinion.

After the NATO operation in Libya in 2011, the prevailing opinion of both the Congress and the administration was that Europe should take more responsibility over security issues within and around its borders, and that European allies should allocate more funds for military spending. Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
expressed his view while giving a speech at the Security and Defense Agenda Conference in June 2011. In his speech, Gates remarked that:

The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the US Congress - and in the American body politic writ large - to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense...Nations apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the growing security burden left by reductions in European defense budgets. (Robert Gates, 2011.)

Former secretary of defense noted the apparent shortcomings of America’s European allies during the Libyan operation, as well as the lack of both military capability and political will in Afghanistan. Gates’ observation that the United States Congress would be tired of spending political capital by allocating funds to fill the holes left by diminishing military budgets was further demonstrated in 2012. (BBC, 2011.)

4.7 An Ideological Perspective to Post-Cold War Security Policy

The contextualization of transatlantic post-Cold War security as demonstrated above described some of the partisan infighting within the American body politic in transatlantic security policy issues. Mead’s (2002) categorization of American foreign policy ideology into four schools of thought – Jeffersonians, Wilsonians, Jacksonians and Hamiltonians – works on two levels beneficial for the theoretical approach adopted in this dissertation. First, it adds complexity to the partisan understanding of American foreign policy ideology. The United States has purposed policies of all the four schools, yet all the schools have defined American strategic interests in fundamentally different ways. (Mead, 2002. 313). This fact escapes the partisan juxtaposition based on the conservative-liberal divide. Second, Mead’s understanding of the four schools grounds their respective ideological foreign policy approaches in American domestic politics. This helps to link American domestic policy struggles to American foreign policy struggles far better than the more theoretical division into realists or idealists. This is crucial when specifying the examination into congressional foreign policy behavior. For a congressional perspective, it is helpful to examine transatlantic security policy from a perspective
outside the foreign policy establishment, and for this, Mead’s categorization offers a fitting method of conceptualization.

The post-Cold War era in American foreign policy began with two predominantly globalist American governments representing both the Republican and Democratic parties. George H. Bush administration established the idea that both Hamiltonian and Wilsonian ideals could be transformed into successful foreign policy, as the first Gulf War – framed by Hamiltonians as a preventive war against a nation threatening American national interests, and by Wilsonians as proof of the value of United Nations Security Council and international law – seemed to begin the era of a “new world order.” (Mead, 2002. 269.) The difference between Hamiltonian and Wilsonian ideals in forming America’s post-Cold War policy was demonstrated by the hierarchical position of the United States in the international arena. For Hamiltonians, the United States ought to take the lead role in the “new world order” and specifically its collective security sphere. Clinton administration engaged American forces in Wilsonian interventions in Somalia and Haiti, culminating in the humanitarian intervention in the Balkans justified by the Clinton administration on humanitarian grounds. Wilsonian initiatives in the 1990’s – The Kyoto protocols, the International Criminal Court, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Land Mine Treaty (Mead, 2002. 290) – seemed to neatly integrate both European and American foreign policy interests in globalist, internationalist fashion. But the drift between Hamiltonians and Wilsonians grew as the Clinton presidency progressed. Wilsonian eagerness to intervene in the Balkans caused distress in the Hamiltonians concerned for the lack of concrete American national security interests at play in the Balkans. (Mead, 2002. 295). Hamiltonians – more likely Republicans – were more willing to ignore morality in the American foreign policy, as opposed to dominantly Democratic Wilsonians. Hamiltonians, like those forming the George H. Bush administration, disagreed with the Wilsonian Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,  

---

72 See for example George W. Bush in his 1991 State of the Union Address: “The world can, therefore, seize this opportunity to fulfill the long-held promise of a new world order, where brutality will go unrewarded and aggression will meet collective resistance. Yes, the United States bears a major share of leadership in this effort. Among the nations of the world, only the United States of America has both the moral standing and the means to back it up. We’re the only nation on this Earth that could assemble the forces of peace. This is the burden of leadership and the strength that has made America the beacon of freedom in a searching world.” (Bush, 1991.)

73 See President Clinton on crisis in the Balkans: “We have to decide whether we are going to take a stand with our NATO allies and whether we are prepared to pay the price of time to make him pay the price of aggression and murder. Are we, in the last year of the 20th century, going to look the other way as entire peoples in Europe are forced to abandon their homelands or die, or are we going to impose a price on that kind of conduct and seek to end it?” (Clinton, 1999.)
who they thought took American foreign policy in a dangerous direction. Hamiltonians – conservatives that they tend to be – do not adhere to the idea of international law justifying American global military ventures where it's security concerns are not threatened, the Balkans being the prime example of the growing globalist drift. (Mead, 2002. 296.)

While the two globalist – or internationalist, to use the more common terminology – schools began to drift apart, the more nationalistic minded Jeffersonians and Jacksonians gained traction. Although both opposed the humanitarian justification of the War in Balkans, and both thought the end of Cold War was an opportunity to scale back American involvement in the global arena, they were less than cohesive in their respective policy positions. A major issue at the end of the Cold War was the fate of America’s military posture. Jeffersonians – like Senator Mansfield in the 1960’s and 70’s – thought America should finally begin considerable reductions in its European based forces, whereas Jacksonians demonstrated little eagerness to cut back on the military front. For Jacksonians, the goal was to cut back the concessions it was forced to make in the Soviet-dominated Cold War context. (Mead, 2002. 297.) For Jacksonians, the end of Cold War meant that the United States could afford to act outside the international arena – as opposed to Wilsonians who worked to include U.S. in international frameworks. Whereas Wilsonians and Jeffersonians were increasingly concerned over the congressional – namely Republican – eagerness to abandon U.S. commitments to nuclear disarmament and anti-missile defense regimes (Mead, 2002. 290), Jacksonians pushed for unilateralism. In the U.S. Congress, efforts like UN dues, foreign aid and ratification of international (arms control) treaties began face fierce Jacksonian opposition.74 (Mead, 2002. 298). Since the Soviet Union no longer defined the global context, U.S. had less reason to intervene in the global crisis not relevant to American security. When the Balkans erupted, Jacksonians argued it was the Europeans who ought to police their region. If they failed, so be it. (Mead, 2002. 299.) National missile defense policy was a key example of the nationalist drift between the Jeffersonians and Jacksonians. Jacksonians supported the idea of a national missile defense despite concerns by allies and enemies alike, and despite the technical realities facing its deployment and military value. For Jeffersonians in both parties, the missile defense was a prime example of wasteful military spending with little added security benefits – in fact both Wilsonians and Jeffersonian saw it as harmful for American security interest. (Mead, 2002. 302.) For the Jacksonians, space-based

74 Per Republican SFRC Chairman Jesse Helms, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was “scarcely more than a sham.” (Jesse Helms, quoted in Isaacs, 1998.)
national missile defense system – like that of Reagan’s Star Wars – was the “holy
grail” (Mead, 2002. 303). It would establish the United States as the absolute military
hegemony on planet Earth. National missile defense was not the only security issue
Jeffersonians and Jacksonians disagreed on relative to transatlantic security.
Jeffersonians tended to oppose NATO expansion, Jacksonians supported it.
Jacksonians pushed for unilateral U.S. action vis-à-vis its nuclear arms policy and
missile defense, Jeffersonian supported international agreements as a tool to curtail
the harmful effects of both missile defense and nuclear arms. Jacksonian ended up
supporting the first Gulf War, Jeffersonians opposed it. Both opposed U.S.
intervention in the Balkans. (Mead, 2002. 290-308.)
The nationalist pushback against globalist 1990’s culminated in the election of
George W. Bush. The Bush administration consisted of Jacksonians – like of Paul
Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney – and Jeffersonians – like Colin Powell.
George W. Bush opposed Clinton’s humanitarian interventions and campaigned on
scaling back U.S. global involvement. U.S. global strategy ought to strengthen its
position as the global military hegemony, by pushing on policies such as the
implementation of the national missile defense system. For the Jacksonians, United
States was now powerful enough to ignore protests by its European allies and
potential enemies in Russia and China. U.S. should go forward with its missile
defense plans without negotiating with Europeans or Russia, and furthermore, it
should denounce itself from the Wilsonian treaties entered into by President Clinton.
For Jeffersonians in the administration, U.S. ought to preserve its current network
of alliances and work to avoid risks with nations like China. (Mead, 2002. 307-308.)
The terrorist attacks on September 11th called for a Jacksonian response. The
Jacksonian method of dealing with those who engage in dishonorable war – like the
terrorists – was demonstrated by the acceptance of so-called enhanced interrogation
techniques implemented by the CIA, strongly supported by then Vice President Dick
Cheney: “I have no problem [with torture] as long as we achieve our objective.”
(Dick Cheney, quoted in Friedersdorf, 2014.)75 The former Speaker of the House,
orchestra of the mid-1990 Jacksonian surge in the Congress and a 2012
presidential candidate Newt Gingrich had a very Jacksonian response to U.S.

75 Jacksonians generally do not accept the undeniable universality of human rights (see Mead, 2002,
evident in the handling of terrorist suspets based on them being non-American and engaging in clearly
cowardly and unlawful warfare, justifying “by-any-means-necessary” response from the United States:
“These are not American citizens. They are unlawful combatants. They are terrorists. They are people
who have committed unlawful acts of war against the American people. And we put them in places
where we could proceed with the interrogation program and find out what they knew so we could
protect the country against further attack.” (Dick Cheney, quoted in Friedersdorf, 2014.)
handling of terrorism: “Andrew Jackson had a pretty clear idea about America’s enemies. Kill them.” (Newt Gingrich, quoted in Benwell, 2016). U.S. entered in two wars, the latter in Iraq with little regard for a multilateral approach and European opposition – despite Jeffersonian voices like that of Colin Powell’s arguing for a different approach. Iraq War was not simply supported by the Jacksonian forces demanding retribution. Deudney and Ikenberry (2017, 22) noted that some liberal internationalists – a group they define in terms of Mead’s Wilsonianism – supported the Iraq War. Although critics claimed such support was based on idealistic views on the promotion of democracy, Deudney and Ikenberry argue that fundamental Wilsonian arguments were at stake: threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of revisionist states or terrorists, international arms control and security regimes, and international law commonly broken by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, compromising collective problem-solving system created by the U.N. framework. (ibid). Military budgets began to rise as U.S. relations with continental powers like France and Germany deteriorated. United States announced it would unilaterally abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and pushed forward with its national missile defense plans despite European or Russian opposition.

But as the Jacksonian interventions in both Iraq and Afghanistan turned into a Wilsonian nation-building effort, the one school left to little attention in the post-Cold War America emerged victorious. Barack Obama was the Jeffersonians candidate campaigning on withdrawing U.S. forces both from Iraq and Afghanistan and scaling back U.S. involvement in the global arena. Jeffersonians, mindful of the constitutionality of War Powers, argued that Congress ought to be included in the decisions to wage war against terror⁷⁶. In Iraq, the costs both in blood and treasure had far exceeded the benefits gained by engaging U.S. military might globally, and resources that ought to be used at home were wasted abroad: “Our government seems more intent on rebuilding Iraq than they are rebuilding here at home.” (Senator Obama in 2003, quoted in Fuller, 2014).⁷⁷ The key transatlantic decisions

⁷⁶ See for example Senator Feingold in a 2002 congressional hearing “Applying war powers resolution to the war on terrorism”: “The War Powers Resolution has been set in motion in our present response to terrorism. And Congress has taken an important step to reassert its constitutional responsibility in this area. Now Congress and the President have a chance to balance the power to wage war in the way that the War Powers Resolution dictates and in the way that the Framers of the Constitution intended. Such cooperation preserves our constitutional structure. It also increases the moral authority of the United States to act forcefully. Given the unprecedented nature of the threat confronting us, a powerful and constitutional unified response remains essential” (Senator Feingold, 2002. S.Hrg. 107-892. 3.)

⁷⁷ See also Senator Obama’s comment in 2006 on the futility of a military response in Iraq: “If we don’t see significant political progress ... over the next six months or so, we can pour money and troops
of the early Obama presidency all demonstrated Jeffersonian school of thought with a hint of Wilsonian internationalism (see Mead, 2002); the Russia reset, decision to cancel Bush era plans for missile defense in Europe, and the New START.

This rather brief summary of American foreign policy ideology regarding areas of interest for transatlantic security highlight the complexity of American foreign policy decision-making. Despite the strong liberal undertone prevalent in all of the four schools (Mead, 313), they do not constitute a clear grand strategy. In fact, Mead argues that relative to post-1989 foreign policy “no effective consensus in the American political system” existed. (Mead, 2002. 321). The domestic politics at the foundation of each four schools tend to highlight gridlock instead of consensus. (ibid). Given the hyperpolarized context of the 2010’s, the prospects for a coherent U.S. foreign policy strategy seems even less probable. Mead goes on to argue, that the overarching issue of America’s place in the world – a question highly relevant for transatlantic security framework – has been largely ignored. Regarding the grand issue - i.e. what kind of a hegemony the United States ought to be - Mead argues:

Virtually everything that happens in American foreign policy is in some way related to this overarching—and sometimes overwhelming – national responsibility, but candid discussion of this reality is largely absent from our national political discourse. (Mead, 2002. 324.)

in here until the cows come home, but we're not going to be successful.” (Senator Obama in 2003, quoted in Fuller, 2014).
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS, 111TH CONGRESS

5.1 Issues debated

5.1.1 Senate Armed Services Committee

Senate Armed Services Committee held 50 hearings during the 111th Congress. As expected, the most salient issue in the Committee was the annual defense appropriations procedure, as the committee held 13 hearings on the issue. (GPO, 2016.) The committee held hearings on various other issues ranging from the “don’t-ask-don’t-tell” policy to U.S. military policies in the Middle East. Three issues of transatlantic interest rose from the hearings held: NATO’s role now and in the future, U.S. missile defense system in Europe and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between U.S. and Russia. (see. Figure 1).

Figure 1. Issues debated in Senate Armed Services Committee, 111th Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO / European Security</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Defense</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START Treaty</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The only hearing with “Europe” in its title was the one regarding President Obama’s missile defense decision in 2009: “S. Hrg. 111-289 - The President’s Decision on Missile Defense in Europe”. No specific hearings were held on the issue of European security, NATO, transatlantic relations or European Union. Since NATO was not a topic of any specific hearing78, the frame packages identified occurred in separate hearings79, most notably in hearings on nominations and defense appropriations. Two dominant security policy themes involving transatlantic relations were missile defense in Europe (75 framings identified) and the New START Treaty with Russia (63 framings identified). NATO/European security related statements were dominated by the issue of NATO’s role in Afghanistan (31 framings identified). (Figure 1.) Armed Services Committee held separate hearing on the issue of missile defense in Europe and five specific hearings on the issue of New START Treaty. (GPO, 2016). In addition, the debates over new START Treaty and President Obama’s missile defense policy shift were intertwined, as many who opposed the New START Treaty also raised up the issue of missile defense in the same floor statement.

5.1.2 Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 89 hearings during the 111th Congress, ranging from issues like “Assessing the Strength of Hezbollah” to grand policy issues such as “Finding Common Ground with China”, and a few high-profile nomination hearings, such as nominating Hillary Clinton to become secretary of state. (GPO, 2016). Unlike the Armed Services Committee, the Foreign Relations did not spend considerable portion of its time on budgetary issues. The

---

78 Not including EUCOM (United States European Command) budget hearings.
79 Hearings where NATO was debated were: “S. Hrg. 111-362 - Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, First Session, 111th Congress”; “S. Hrg. 111-138 - The Challenges Facing the Department of Defense”; “S. Hrg. 111-254 - Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States”; “S. Hrg. 111-100, Part 1-7 - Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010”;
Committee organized hearings on transatlantic security issues, including hearings on NATO and its future, European energy security, and U.S.-Russian relations after the Georgian War. The most salient transatlantic security issue debated was the bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia, which was the source of several hearings and considerable debate; a bilateral treaty submitted to Senate’s ratification was a rare sight for Senators used to executive agreements. Besides the New START, NATO’s role in Afghanistan and prospects for its future were debated, along with European-based missile defense system. (see Figure 2.)

The framings identified in the debates and in statements by individual members were different between issues debated, as was well expected. From a transatlantic perspective, the unifying theme was the perceived threat, challenge, or opportunity presented by the Russian Federation. Also, what were identified as empty phrases were not included in framings quantified. Such phrases often appeared at the beginning of the statements as precursors and often had no issue specific substance other than softening the blow before criticism. To be counted as an attempt at framing, statements either propose, oppose or support specific policy, attempt to define the issue (problem), or attempt to define themes, concepts or interpretations of reality relevant to an issue. A single statement here refers to Senator’s “turn” in the hearings, wherein he or she can question the witness or present his/her evaluation of the issue. One such “statement” can include several framings. For example, the opening statements by chairman and Ranking Member were often attempts to present a general definition of the issue by presenting a multitude of individual framings.

5.2 NATO and European Security

5.2.1 Armed Services Committee

In the committee hearings, 31 floor statements regarding NATO or European security were identified. (see Figure 3). Understanding that European security is rather ambiguous term, here the term refers to framings where a senator discussed security threats against European security other than ones debated in missile defense debates (i.e. ballistic missile threat). Examples of threats defined here were energy dependence (on Russia) and fiscal issues affecting European security. Most framings of such nature involved threat presented by Russia to Eastern European countries. Framings identified were NATO positive, NATO negative, troop presence positive, troop presence negative, Russia negative (Russia positive had no framings in this context).

NATO negative (18). Statements which defined NATO’s European member states and their role in Afghanistan negative. These statements defined European member
states’ contributions in Afghanistan with terms such as inadequate or pitiful. European allies have not fulfilled their commitments, nor are they contributing to the actual fighting. Similarly, NATO was seen as becoming a two-tiered organization where European member states were happy to let U.S. carry the weight and pay the price in blood and treasure. The statements reflect on the direction of NATO and the long-term viability of the organization, none argue that NATO is obsolete or ought to be replaced (if such arguments are identified, they will be analyzed separately).

**Figure 3. NATO / European security by party – Armed Services**

Russia negative (6). Statements which defined Russia or Russian action as a challenge/threat against European security.

NATO positive (4). Statements which defined NATO’s European member states and their role in Afghanistan as a positive. These statements described NATO’s role in Afghanistan as crucial without negative connotations or follow-ups, or which described the alliance as crucial for European/American security and thus called for certain policies (as opposed to empty phrases with no policy implications).

Troop presence positive (2). Statements which defined U.S. troop presence in Europe as positive critiqued possible drawdowns of U.S. military presence in Europe.

Troop presence negative (1). Statements which defined U.S. troop presence in Europe as negative or called for drawdown of U.S. military presence in Europe.
5.2.1.1 Dominant Frames

By far the most common frame identified in the hearings was *NATO negative*, which appeared in 58.1% of all the statements analyzed. (Figure 3). Statements defining NATO, and especially its European allies, argued that NATO does not carry its weight in Afghanistan and that European member states refuse to take military responsibility, mainly by refusing to take part in certain types of combat missions and lacking in promised monetary contributions. NATO was described as in danger of becoming a two-tiered organization, wherein European member states are unwilling to pay the political price within their respective countries to make sufficient contributions to their national defense. Thus, U.S. has assumed the dominant role and European nations are satisfied with being under American defense umbrella and not contributing to the common defense.

This is not the NATO that I was working with in the 1980s. In my view, NATO was kind of broken down into three pieces. This is my concern, anyway, and I would like to hear you views on this. We have the United States having moved into position—even more so than in the 1980s—of being the military guarantor. We have the traditional countries of NATO moving into their historic relationships with Central and Eastern Europe—there’s nothing wrong with that, it’s to be expected, and it’s healthy for Germany, particularly—and then we have, in my view, picked up a worrisome set of dependencies, for lack of a better term. Not allies, in the traditional sense of the word. What do you think about that? What do you think about the further expansion that’s on the table? (Senator Webb [D-VA], S. Hrg. 111-362, 2009. 45-46).

The example above from Democratic Senator Jim Webb from Virginia highlights several aspects of how NATO was framed in the Senate Armed Services Committee. The notion of America’s leading role in NATO is not a contested notion, as the alliance has relied heavily on American military presence in Europe ever since the end of World War II. Even after the NATO intervention in Balkans, it was widely argued that “This renaissance of NATO's has depended on an American commitment to remain strategically engaged in Europe and, at each critical juncture, to lead.” (Hunter, 1999). The common argument in the Armed Services committee was that this fact of life had now reached unhealthy proportions, as the United States had become the “military guarantor” of the alliance, whereas the new member states were described by Senator Webb as “dependencies” as opposed to allies. By Michael Oren’s definition; an ally shares America’s values, stands with it through conflicts and shares its global vision, enhances American intelligence and defense.” (Oren,
By this definition, the new NATO countries were not allies in the same sense as western European countries during the Cold War – per Senator Webb’s evaluation of the alliance – but rather American protectorates relying on America’s military might, yet refusing to pay the price themselves. Again, by defining an ally as something enhancing American national security, the argument goes on to suggest that perhaps the old allies in western Europe are transforming from being allies into dependencies, same as their Eastern European counterparts. This, however, is not due to their economical, historical and geopolitical realities, but rather as a result of their own action.

The notion of two-tiered alliance became more evident in the debates over EU’s and NATO’s role in America’s longest war. From 2003 until 2014, NATO was responsible for leading the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to conduct security mission and help build the Afghan army. (NATO, 2016). The problems with troop contributions were already evident before 2009. In 2006, NATO’s top commander General James Jones noted that NATO members had failed to contribute needed security forces for the mission, a mission the importance of which was highlighted by then U.S. ambassador to NATO’s - Victoria Nuland - statement that: “If we can't do missions like that of Afghanistan, then we can't do our overall mission.” (Dale, 2006). These sentiments found their home in the Senate Armed Services committee:

It seems to me, listening to Europeans talk, that they view their contribution and ours as being complementary, meaning the Canadians, the Americans, perhaps the British and a few others will engage in the fight and secure, while they will complement that with the building of bridges if it’s safe, the building of a school if it’s safe, and creating other civil sort of society issues, which are important and I don’t mean to minimize them by any means. But do you anticipate that over the long term our alliance can continue to be a strong alliance if we have this kind of a two-tiered alliance where some fight and others are there to be complementary? (Senator Martinez [R-FL], S. Hrg. 111-362, 2009. 274).

The quote above from Senator Mel Martinez [R-FL] from Florida continues to paint the picture of an alliance with varying levels of contribution. In the clear majority of statements made within this frame, senators did not differentiate between individual countries, but Martinez did give a pass to Canada and the British. Linking this
evaluation with Senator Webb’s notion that some NATO allies did not fit the
definition of an ally, Senator Martinez makes a difference between countries that do
contribute and those that do not. Rest of the allies would contribute to the mission
only when it was safe for them and their troops, i.e. building bridges, schools and
“creating other civil sort of society issues”. These, of course, were not necessarily
unfair notions. At the onset of the ISAF operation in 2003, the definition of the
mission had different connotations on either side of the Atlantic, as the U.S. focused
more on the relative importance of military operations, whereas Europeans focused
on the wider political approach. (Brattberg, 2013. 3). When President Obama
announced that he would escalate the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan, he also
called for European allies to increase their contributions. The European nations,
whose public opinion had turned against the war in Afghanistan81, remained mostly
silent or simply refused to increase their troop contributions. (Siegel, 2010. 461.) This
notion of European public opinion questioning their governments commitment to
war in Afghanistan went mostly unnoticed by the senators, as the focus was on
framing the issue around Europe’s reluctance – for whatever reasons – to partake in
the real fight82, and the problem facing the Senate Armed Services committee was,
as Senator Martinez [R-FL] put it: “how to obtain the true participation without the
caveats of our NATO allies in the fight in Afghanistan” (S. Hrg. 111-138. 44).

The argumentative breakdown of the NATO negative-framing (Figure 4) reveals
the dominance of the argument that NATO’s European members do not contribute
enough, as 60% of the statements framing NATO negatively stressed the lack of
both monetary contributions, as well as failure to contribute troops necessary to
combat Taliban and train Afghan security forces. Much of the argument formed
around the idea that European member states, as well as European Union, had the
resources to contribute but simply had not followed through: “…look at the EU. They
have resources, they have money. How can we get more involvement out of
them?” - Senator Inhofe [R-OK] (S. Hrg. 111-100, 2009. 266) and as Senator Graham

81 According to a 2012 survey, 75% of Europeans supported either total or partial withdrawal of troops
from Afghanistan. (Brattberg, 2013. 7).

82 Auerswald and Saideman (2011) conclude that the instead of public opinion, threat perception or
strategic culture, institutional model of each member country best explained the different caveats set
on coalition forces. ISAF forces from coalition governments tended to have more caveats compared
to nations with majoritarian parliamentary governments or presidential systems.
[R-SC] made clear, the contributions they had made did not impress the Committee: “Secretary Gates said that fund [to train Afghan security forces] has accumulated 200 million Euros, which I think is pretty pitiful.” (S. Hrg. 2010. 436).

Although less frequent than the Europe does not contribute enough -argument, the two other arguments (European members do not partake in fighting [30%] and two-tiered organization [10%]) addressed the long-term strategic implications of NATO’s failure in Afghanistan. (Figure 4). These two arguments were rather intertwined, as the fact that some NATO members refused to partake in fighting and had severe caveats for their combat contributions de facto contributed to the creation of two-tiered organization. This sentiment was most evident in statements such as Senator Martinez’s [R-FL]:

But do you anticipate that over the long term our alliance can continue to be a strong alliance if we have this kind of a two-tiered alliance where some fight and others are there to be complementary?” (S. Hrg. 111-362, 2009. 274)

With a similar sentiment expressed by John McCain [R-AZ]:

I believe that in order to ensure that NATO remains relevant today and in the future we must win in Afghanistan -- defeat [in Afghanistan] … would spell disaster for NATO. (S. Hrg. 111-362, 2009. 215).

NATO’s failure would be a disaster for the organization and transatlantic security in the short term and threat to long-term viability of NATO.

5.2.1.2 Competing Frames
The qualitative analysis of framing the NATO -debate did not produce a clear set of competing frames attempting to define the issue in a mutually exclusive fashion. Of all the framings, only four (4) were positive whereas NATO negative -framing (18) was quite obviously the dominant argument. (Figure 3.) Arizona Senator and the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee John McCain offered slightly
differing remedies for the problem defined (European member states’ reluctance to contribute in Afghanistan). As senators seemed to pay little to no attention to European public opinion or the challenges the European governments faced in rallying support for President Obama’s surge in Afghanistan, McCain stressed the need to convince the Europeans that success in Afghanistan is worth contributing:

> While I believe the United States should continue to encourage European troop contributions and press for reductions of caveats on their use, I also believe we should move away from stressing what Washington wants Europe to give and more toward encouraging what Europe is prepared to contribute. (Senator McCain [R-AZ], S. Hrg. 111-362, 2009. 721.)

This by no means constitutes a competing frame, as the definition of the problem remains the same: Europe does not contribute enough and should do more. Moral judgement offered differs, as well as the remedy suggested. The absence of competing frames is further explained by the bipartisan nature of the debate. Both parties defined NATO through the negative-framing (10 Democrats, 8 Republicans), while the most vocal of the senators was the chairman of Senate Armed Services Committee Carl Levin [D-MI] with seven (7) statements identified within the NATO negative-framing. (Figure 3.)

### 5.2.2 Senate Foreign Relations Committee

During the 111th Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 95 hearings on issues ranging from drug trafficking to climate change. Unlike the Senate Armed Services Committee, Foreign Relations Committee held several hearings dedicated to NATO, Russia and transatlantic relations. In addition to specific hearings on transatlantic security issues, NATO, Russia and European security were discussed during the nominations hearings. All in all, eight (8) hearings specifically focusing on transatlantic security were analyzed statement by statement, and eight (8) hearings on nominations were analyzed using a keyword search. The tone of the debate differed in certain aspects from the debates in Armed Services Committee, but the general framings identified followed similar logic in both committees. Framings

---

identified were NATO negative (22), NATO positive (3), Russia negative (9), Russia positive (8), European security (9). (Figure 5.)

Figure 5. NATO / European Security by party - Foreign Relations

5.2.2.1 Dominant Frames

NATO negative. Much like in the Armed Services Committee, the NATO negative framing was the most frequent framing identified, as it was identified in 51% of all the statements analyzed, compared to 58% in Armed Services. Furthermore, in Foreign Relations the NATO negative -framing was equally invoked by both parties, making it a bipartisan notion, much as it was in the other committee.

But the tone of the NATO negative -framing was rather different compared to Armed Services Committee, and thus it ought to be analyzed from a different perspective. Senate Armed Services Committee by its nature is more responsive to distributive consequences of American security policy, for it is the one committee mainly responsible\(^{84}\) for the strategic notions of annual defense appropriations

\(^{84}\) Together with House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees in both chambers.
process, whereas the Foreign Relations Committee viewed NATO from a more diplomatic perspective. (see for example Fowler, 2015). Overall, the tone was less harsh in the Foreign Relations. The Armed Services Committee held the view that European NATO allies ought to contribute more in Afghanistan and that success in Afghanistan was crucial for the viability of NATO as a relevant security organization. This was also the argument by some in the Foreign Relations Committee, but overall the debate was conducted in a larger context exceeding the issue with Afghanistan.

The argumentative logic of NATO negative -framing concluded that if the status quo – as it was understood by the members of the Committee - persisted, NATO’s viability as a relevant security organization would be in jeopardy. As opposed to the notion of NATO’s lack of commitment in Afghanistan, the Foreign Relations Committee stressed the long-term consequences of NATO’s European member-states’ inability to reform their security thinking vis-à-vis NATO. As such, the debate in Foreign Relations Committee revolved more on the long-term, strategic role of NATO as the defining transatlantic security arrangement. Dissecting the argumentative breakdown of the NATO negative -framing three lines of argumentation stand out: 1) USA being the main security producer in Europe, 2) caveats in the use of NATO military force and NATO’s shortcomings in Afghanistan, and 3) Deterrent value of Article 5 Commitments. (see Figure 6.)
NATO’s transformative expansion between 1999 and 2009 to include former Soviet satellites\(^8\) and the war in Afghanistan unmasked the burden-sharing issues within the organization. Causes for the perceived disparity between member-states can be summed as follows: 1) growing gap in weapons technology between member-states 2) greater reliance on out-of-area mission (i.e. Afghanistan), 3) declining threat perception regarding Russia, 4) financial crisis and the consequent Euro-crisis, and 5) difference in strategic doctrines post-9/11. (See. Sandler & Shimizu, 2012.) Some outside observers argued, that the dual nature of the alliance was natural and in some ways desired; NATO’s military strength is dominantly derived from the United States, combined with Europe’s collective political and economic might, making the alliance globally significant actor. (See. Brzezinski, 2009).

But the idea of NATO being by design a two-tiered organization did not gain much - in fact none - traction in the Foreign Relations Committee:

> I guess one of the—I’m a NATO supporter, but I do realize that NATO is evolving right now. And I guess one of the issues that I have, it appears to me that NATO is being divided between security providers and security consumers. Only 5 of the 28 countries that exist in NATO actually are living up to 2 percent of their GDP being utilized to support defense mechanisms. So, what’s really happening is, we have countries coming in to NATO. It almost appears, in some cases, we do that in a willy-nilly way. And we’re providing the security, it seems. We’re expending the American citizens’ dollars to make sure that NATO is protected, and certainly our lives—our military men and women’s lives—and yet, we have most of NATO being security consumers. That, to me, is troubling, and I wonder if you might comment on that. The most frequent line of argument was that the United States had become the main security producer in Europe. (Senator Corker [R-TN], S. Hrg. 111-465, 2009. 17-19.)

As exemplified by the above quote from Senator Corker [R-TN], the United States Senate yearned for NATO of equal partners in all aspects, both military and political. Of course, individual European countries could not match the contribution of the U.S., as the agreed upon level of commitment was set at the well-known 2% of GDP level.\(^9\) But the problem with Europe was not only military-economic. It was political

---

8. Both Republicans and Democrats were extremely supportive of NATO expansion in the 1990's, and the common critique presented expressed concern over supposed delays in President Clinton’s decision-making regarding the expansion to the former Soviet satellites. (USA Today, 1996).

9. The data on burden-sharing within NATO in consistent with senators’ argument. After 2002, evidence points that the security benefits gained from the alliance no longer matched the individual contributions from European member-states. (See. Sandler & Shimizu, 2012.)
by nature. As argued by the Committee, European nations were satisfied with the existing condition; the United States being the chief security producer. Europe was happy to settle as a mere security consumer under the safety net provided by its bigger and stronger protector on the western bank of the Atlantic. This was not merely the unavoidable state of affairs, but also brought on by the lack of interest in NATO by European governments and publics. For United States, this was not an acceptable line of thinking, and such logic, coupled with European aspirations of strengthening EU’s common defense stature, would eventually lead to NATO’s demise:

But the difficult thing I think for us as we look at this as a long-term commitment of the United States is that those countries now that seem to want less and less—have a fighting role are those that seem to be most committed to developing the alternative European Union security force approach. (Senator DeMint [R-SC] S. Hrg. 111-628. 34.)

The notion of United States becoming de facto military guarantor of Europe was well accepted by both parties. Both the Republicans and Democrats argued, that the longevity of the transatlantic alliance was jeopardized by the lack of commitment from European member-states, most evident by its lackluster contributions in Afghanistan, both financial and military. But the divide between the political parties in the Committee began to emerge within the NATO negative framing, and especially with regards to threat perception and Article 5 commitments. Speaking

87 See for example: “And we’ve been bringing in these other countries that—you can put a label on them, you can call them an ally, but in reality they’re protectorates.” (Senator Webb [D-VA] S. Hrg. 111-465, 2009. 19).

88 See for example: “I’m curious about your thoughts on the problems that governments in Europe have in either making available to their publics word about NATO, news about NATO, reasons for the importance of NATO, because I am under the impression that the general publics in several countries do not have either a great interest in this subject or are worried about obligations that may come, that have not been fully explained by their governments.” (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S. Hrg. 111-465, 2009. 13-14).

89 Reference here is to German and French aspirations, supported by non-NATO countries such as Sweden and Finland, to strengthen EU’s common defense. United Kingdom had traditionally opposed any development parallel with NATO-structure. After the 2016 Brexit-vote, such notions have once again resurfaced. (See. Keohane, 2016.)

90 Reference here being to NATO’s founding document, Washington Treaty from 1949, and its 5th Article: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems
to the partisan nature of the debate, Article 5 aspects of the alliance were dominantly brought up by the Republican side on the debate.

The discussion on NATO’s Article 5 commitments had two separate facets; 1) Article 5 in relation to Georgia and Ukraine, and 2) Article 5 commitments relative to traditional NATO allies. First, the war in Georgia revealed some of the shrouded weaknesses of the NATO alliance especially relative to its eastern expansion. Both Georgia and Ukraine had showed aspirations to becoming full-pledged members of the transatlantic security alliance prior to Russian invasion in August 2008. The Russo-Georgian war put the Article 5 into a perspective, as it in many ways functioned as a warning to NATO; Article 5 Commitments had a concrete meaning:

Again, I want to see Georgia and Ukraine and others be very successful, and I very much appreciate much that’s being undertaken there. But what lessons can we learn from a year ago as it relates to us looking at countries who want to be admitted to NATO, especially when it appears that NATO more and more is becoming a situation where under Article 5 we protect the world, those members of NATO; very little, it seems, over time will be coming the other way. (Senator DeMint [R-SC] S. Hrg. 111-221, 2009. 26.)

The above statement signifies both the argument that U.S. is becoming the security umbrella for rest of the Europe, especially the new NATO member-states in the east, and the increasing reluctance of United States to commit their conventional forces to Russian border and risking a military conflict with its former Cold War enemy over some of the countries in the area. In ideological terms, this was a rather realist, or in Mead’s terms, Jeffersonian or Hamiltonian viewpoint, highlighting the undue risks for U.S. interests, while very little seemed to come back to justify such risks. This was specifically the case regarding Georgia, as the U.S. military involvement in the crisis was questioned, “especially when the nature of this conflict in some ways was personality-driven…” (Senator Corker [R-TN] S. Hrg. 111-221, 2009. 26.) As opposed to the initial reaction to the Russo-Georgian War as described in chapter 4, one year after some members of Committee began to question the U.S.-NATO policy of expanding to Russian borders:

The fact is that the Bush administration did a number of things that Russia was pretty much dead-set against, and stated so before they happened, and we did ’em anyway... The NATO expansion, we were pushing like crazy; in the last months, we were pushing like crazy to get a couple of countries in that

necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” (The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949.)
they obviously saw as a major threat to their perceived interests. (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S. Hrg. 111-71, 2009. 34-36.)

And automatically committing to defend them, especially since the benefits of the deal seemed to go only one way:

I have to tell you, when I realized that President Saakashvili, who I respect, and certainly appreciate what’s happening in Georgia right now—when I realized that he had—if, for lack of a better word, had “taken the bait”—OK—with Georgia coming down—I mean with Russia coming down from where it was, that under Article 5, had they been in NATO at that time, I suppose there would have been some United States response to the fact that Russia came into part of their sovereign territory. And I just wondered if issues like that, in some of these more fledgling countries, caused you concern as it relates to Article 5. (Senator Corker [R-TN] S. Hrg. 111-465, 2009. 17-19.)

Secondly, the Republican members of the Committee were increasingly wary of the declining deterrent value of the traditional Article 5 commitments in relation to traditional NATO member-states. Article 5 commitments, as per the Republican argumentation, had become to imply a security arrangement where European member-states had begun to overlook their own security commitments, “So they can keep us on the shelf, do their own thing until they need us…” (Senator DeMint [R-TN] S. Hrg. 111-628, 2009. 34.) For the Republican senators, the “…paramount question facing NATO today is how to strengthen the credibility of Article 5.”, and the need to for stronger European commitment to traditional Article 5 related military threats has its basis in the threat perception relative to the assertive nature of Russia, something both the NATO’s European allies and the Democrats had continued to ignore, as:

The decline in the deterrent value of Article 5 became more apparent with the onset of a string of energy crises in Europe and the adoption by several West European governments of beggar-thy-neighbor policies with respect to oil and natural gas arrangements with the Russian Federation. (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S. Hrg. 111-465, 2009. 3-4.)

The bipartisan agreement over NATO was the perception that U.S. would increasingly have to carry the torch as it came to European security. NATO’s decline was not inevitable, but the lack of European contributions in Afghanistan and the overall scaling back of defense budgets constituted a downward trajectory for the alliance. Republican side of the debate highlighted the perception that Europe was reluctant to recognize resurging Russia as a security threat requiring a response
(evident in the use of European security -framing). Democratic side of the debate was seemingly affected by the Russia-reset policy, as the argumentation was less about Russia as a threat, and more about European shortcomings.

5.2.2.2 Competing Frames

The defining difference within the Committee was its interpretation of the threat posed by the Russian Federation. For the Republican side of the debate, the Western European dependence on foreign - i.e. Russian - oil was the primary cause of concern. Moreover, the Europeans seemed to be content with such notions. The Democratic side of the debate interpreted Russia through the viewpoint of President Obama’s Russia-reset policy. Competing and mutually exclusive framings identified in the debates were: \textit{Russia positive} - and \textit{Russia negative} -framings. \textit{Russia positive} -framing was identified in 30,4\% of the statements by Democratic senators, whereas the \textit{Russia negative} -framing was invoked in 30\% of Republican floor statements. (Figure 5.)

\textit{Russia positive}. No political decision is created in vacuum. U.S.-Russia bilateral relations during the 111\textsuperscript{th} Congress ought to be considered in the context defined by years of deteriorating relations under the Bush administration, owning to both Russian assertiveness which culminated during the Russo-Georgian War, and normative differences in U.S.-Russian foreign policy and underlying attitudes in the U.S. towards Russia. (See for example Light, 2008.) The Obama administration attempted to break the cycle with the so-called Russia-reset policy, aimed at scaling back the tensions. The effort was supported by Senate Democrats, most notably by the chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the would-be Secretary of State John Kerry [D-MA].

From Iran’s nuclear program to human rights in Burma to our presence in Afghanistan, there is scarcely an issue of global importance which could not benefit from greater cooperation and participation from Russia. Our challenge is to ensure that, to the extent possible, we enlist Russia to act, not just as a great power individually, but as a global partner with us and with our European allies. (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 111-71, 2009. 1-3.)

The argumentative logic of the Democratic argument was that Russian Federation and the United States had common interests in several issues of global significance, and the efforts by the United States to tackle said issues would be enhanced by

\footnote{Of seven (7) framings identified as \textit{Russia positive}, four (4) floor statements were given by Senator Kerry [D-MA].}
Russian cooperation. As such, it would be conducive for U.S. and European interests if Russia could be integrated in the process. First, in a rather surprising move, Senator Kerry puts blunt of the blame for deteriorating relations on the Bush administration, as he argues that years of U.S. policy failed to take into account the legitimate security considerations of the Russian Federation. Senator Kerry goes on to argue that the Bush administration amplified the idea that United States was a threat by its role in the independence of Kosovo, NATO expansion pushed despite Russian opposition, abrogating the ABM treaty “unilaterally, boom, gone.”, and missile defense in Europe. (Senator Kerry [D-MA], S. Hrg. 111-71, 2009. 34-36.)

Secondly, the Democratic side called for incorporating Russia to the relevant security arrangements vis-à-vis Europe. Senator Cardin [D-MD] made references to the new security document put forth by Russia to discuss European security regime. The draft text was presented prior to 2009 OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) meeting in Athens, by then-President Dmitri Medvedev. The goal of the proposed treaty was to establish a common Euro-Asian security space, open to all European states regardless of their membership in other alliances. Guiding principles of the treaty included “mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, as well as the renunciation of force.” (Mützenich, 2010. 67.) Not talking specifically about the substance of the treaty, Senator Cardin nevertheless describes it as an initiative by Russia to form a framework within to discuss Euro-Asian security matters. OSCE would have a significant role, as the senator goes on to argue that the organization originally would be a forum that “includes both the United States and Russia to deal with security issues in Europe”, and the value of OSCE would in fact “strengthen if Russia would join those, strengthen those security provisions within the OSCE.” (Senator Cardin [D-MD], S. Hrg. 111-270, 2009. 31-32.)

Russia negative and European security. Both Russia negative -and European security -framings were used by the Republican side of the debate to impose a very different picture of the European security framework compared to their Democratic counterparts. The argumentative logic is connected to Republican viewpoint that NATO is before all an alliance built to deter attacks against member-states as obligated by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. As such, the foremost factor in the European security framework is the challenge presented by the very adversary NATO was created to thwart, namely Russian Federation. Both the NATO negative -framing and the European security -framing highlight the jeopardizing effects of European reluctance to acknowledge the security threat presented by Russia,
especially in the energy sector.\textsuperscript{92} As for the Russia reset policy announced by the Obama administration and endorsed by the Senate Democrats, aspirations to negotiate with Russia to form a new, more positive relationship are more wishful thinking than based on the political reality:

Negotiating with Russia will be a far more complex and difficult proposition than simply appealing for a new relationship. Russian actions related to Iran, Afghanistan, and North Korea, for example, have exhibited a reflexive resistance to United States positions, even when we have substantial commonality of interests. Russia’s repeated use of energy exports as a political weapon, and its treatment of Ukraine and Georgia, demonstrate an aggressiveness that has made comprehensive negotiations on regional problems impractical. (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S. Hrg. 111-71, 2009. 3-5.)

The above quote from Indiana Senator Richard Lugar [R-IN] could be seen as a direct response to the change in policy as proposed by Senator Kerry [D-MA]. Whereas Senator Kerry puts some of the blame on the Bush administration and argues that cooperation with Russia is a mutually beneficial objective of American foreign policy, Senator Lugar goes on to argue that such notions are not relevant to Russian way of thinking. Instead, he goes to argue that Russian foreign policy with regards to U.S. still follows the Cold War rationale of zero-sum thinking, where any advantages perceived as benefiting the United States are reflexively resisted. Furthermore, Russian assertiveness in the form of aggression in its “near abroad” and its use of energy as a gun directed at Europe cause no reason to believe that Russia is a country to be negotiated with, at least not in the sense and extent proposed by the Obama administration.\textsuperscript{93}

5.2.3 Individual Breakdown

In the Armed Services, both chairman Levin [D-MI] and ranking member McCain [R-AZ] were the most active participant in the debates over NATO and European security. (Figure 7.) For example, of the statements identified within NATO negative

---

\textsuperscript{92} See for example: “It’s pretty fascinating to think about a pretty civilized part of the world, Europe—been around for a long time. Has a European Union that is put together. And it seems that we, in many ways, are far more concerned about their energy security than they are.” (Senator Corker [R-TN] S. Hrg. 111-270, 2009. 20-21.)

\textsuperscript{93} Senator Lugar [R-IN] however concludes that U.S.-Russia relations demonstrate positive signs with regard to nuclear nonproliferation and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, both of which are policies worth negotiating and engaging with Russia. (See. Senator Lugar [R-IN] S. Hrg. 111-71, 2009. 3-5.)
-framing (Figure 4), Senator McCain was identified making five statements, whereas the second most active Republican was identified making two statements. On the Democratic side, chairman Levin made nine statements identified within the NATO negative, whereas only two Democratic senators were identified within the framing, both making just a single statement. Overall, Senator Levin was the most active senator identified invoking the NATO negative-framing.

![Figure 7. NATO / European Security by individual - Armed Services](image)

Carl Levin’s argumentation was based on the specific issue of NATO not fulfilling its commitments in Afghanistan. President Obama had just announced a surge of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and European allies ought to do their part by contributing both blood and treasure. As such, Levin’s position in the Committee could be seen as supporting Obama administration’s choice of policy, a notion highlighted by the fact that Levin’s activity on this specific issue was negligible when the Committee debated NATO and European security in the 112th Congress.

94 See for example: ”Our European allies continue to provide the majority of the nearly 35,000 non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan, but only a portion are in the fight where the fight mainly is, in the south and east of Afghanistan. The NATO contribution in Afghanistan remains inadequate, even as President Obama has approved increasing the U.S. presence by some 21,000 soldiers, to a total U.S. force of 68,000 by the end of this summer.” (Senator Levin [D-MI] S.Hrg. 112-362, 2009. 718.) Majority of Levin’s arguments were made with a similar substantive argumentation.
Overall, Levin’s role could be described as an interlocutor between the administration and the Committee, and given the lack of partisan infighting over the issue, his job was not a specifically difficult one. Thanks to his powerful position as the Chair of Armed Services granting him power to exert influence and define problems – i.e. NATO’s lack of commitment – Levin matched Carter and Scott’s (2010) definition of a foreign policy entrepreneur. Following on Carter and Scott (ibid), Levin’s behavior in NATO related debates places him in policy specialist\(^{95}\) category, as his definition of the problem focuses on a specific policy issue – i.e. how to achieve maximum performance from NATO allies vis-à-vis Afghanistan. His argumentation did not touch on Committee processes or overall U.S. foreign policy strategy in Europe or NATO.

John McCain [R-AZ], the ranking member of the Armed Services, was the most vocal Republican in the Committee. (Figure 7.) Although McCain shared Levin’s concerns over lack of European commitment to Afghanistan – he was identified invoking NATO negative -framing five times – he was also the one senator in Armed Services offering a more European-centric viewpoint on the issue, as he argued for not simply telling Europeans what to do, but asking what European states would be prepared to contribute. As such, McCain cannot be defined as a pure policy specialist, like Carl Levin. Even in his critique, McCain took a more long-term point-of-view regarding NATO’s shortcoming and prospects for future:

> Member states should be explaining to their parliaments and to their citizens that NATO faces common threats and shares common goals. I am concerned that they continue to allow the idea to build up among their publics that NATO is fighting wars because the Americans are making them do it. The alliance must be about more than fulfilling our obligations under Article 5, as essential as that is. It must also serve to deter potential adversaries and build partner capacity within the alliance and beyond. Only then can we begin to collectively transform our alliance from one of common defense to one of common security. (Senator McCain [R-AZ] S.Hrg. 111-701, 2010. 536.)

Due to the more strategic-minded approach and a wider perspective adopted, McCain ought to be seen in a different category compared to chairman Levin. Whereas Levin’s focus was, per Carter and Scott’s terminology (2010), on issue and external policy focus, McCain’s focus was set on strategies and external policy focus, placing him in the policy strategist category. The argumentative substance in McCain’s statements focused on the large-scale issues with NATO and offered policy guidance

\(^{95}\) See Carter and Scott’s four foreign policy entrepreneur categories: policy specialist, process specialist, policy strategist, process strategist. (Carter & Scott, 2009.)
on how to engage with America’s European allies. Although Afghanistan was in the center of the debates, McCain’s perspective on most parts ascended issue-specific framings related to NATO’s operational success in Afghanistan.

In the Foreign Relations, leading members were also most vocal in the debates. Ranking member Lugar [R-IN] was identified making 10, and chairman Kerry [D-MA] 9 statements relevant to discussions of NATO and European security. Senators Cardin, Corker and DeMint all made 4 statements each, making them most active rank-and-file senators within the Committee. (see Figure 8).

Senator Kerry was responsible for nine statements during NATO and European security related debates. Out of the nine (9) overall statements analyzed, seven (7) were identified invoking NATO negative -framing, making it the most common framing identified in statements by the Committee chairman. Similar pattern was identified in the framings by Armed Services chairman and fellow Democrat Carl Levin, highlighting the overall tone with which the Democratic leadership approached the issue of NATO and transatlantic burden-sharing. But Kerry’s argumentation differed from that of Levin’s. Whereas Senator Levin focused on the very specific issue of NATO contributions in Afghanistan, Kerry’s perspective was
wider, involving strategic contemplations over European-Russian relations especially regarding energy and former Soviet republics.\textsuperscript{96} Despite the wider strategic perspective, Kerry did note NATO’s inadequate performance in Afghanistan, and overall tone on NATO was negative, while both Kerry and Levin highlighted the prospects of engaging with Russia positively. Regarding the most substantive question defining the alliance, NATO’s Article 5 commitments, Kerry did display pessimism over European member-states willingness to fulfill their respective obligations:

I’m a little either confused or troubled by the notion that they can deal with the future, but not the present, and I’m not sure what gets them to perform differently in the future if they’re unwilling to do so now. What if there’s the same desultory response to some particular challenge—if one other nation gets hit, and they say, “Well, now we all have to respond.” What is there to suggest that they will do so differently than they have in this particular instance? (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 111-270, 2009. 10.)

The reference here was to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan and the first ever activation of NATO’s Article 5 after the 9/11 attacks. Kerry’s concern was, that given NATO’s lackluster commitment in Afghanistan, what, if any, reason is there to believe Article 5 would lead to a strong commitment if any member state were to fall under attack. Given the emphasis on NATO’s shortcomings in Afghanistan, Kerry could be placed into policy specialist category much like his colleague in the Armed Services, Senator Levin. Kerry did bring up the issues of longevity and internal strength of NATO and its institutions, although tied closely to war in Afghanistan, in ways closer to McCain’s policy strategist. Overall, categorizing Kerry’s positioning regarding NATO would place him somewhere between the two categories.

Senator Lugar [R-IN] shared the concerns over NATO’s current and future contributions to transatlantic security cooperation, and six out of ten statements were identified to include NATO negative-framing. Yet Lugar’s approach to NATO

\textsuperscript{96} See for example: “Energy piece, so, if you take that context, you’ve got to have Russia. You’ve got to think about the “stans” and what’s happening there, and down into South Asia. And they don’t figure directly into NATO, except to the degree that NATO is in Afghanistan, which sort of leads you to say, “OK, why aren’t we getting a better effort out of them with respect to that?” So I would simply comment to you that we have to match the threat—the cold war was the cold war, very clearly delineated, East/West, bipolar relationship. And things were a lot simpler in that context. And we exploited it, to a degree, because we were able to put almost every major decision in that context. That is not the world we live in today, but we live with NATO, which is not responding adequately to the reality of the real threat that we face. And nations that we need to have respond to that real threat are outside of it.” (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 111-465, 2009. 31.)
was different from most senators active in the debates. Lugar did not concern
himself with operational details in Afghanistan nearly as much as his colleagues both
in Foreign Relations and Armed Services. In fact, of the six NATO negative -framings
only one was specifically directed at NATO’s performance in Afghanistan97. Instead,
Lugar’s focus was directed at European energy dependence (on Russia) and article 5
considerations.98 Lugar’s concerns over NATO emphasized the core institutional
structures of NATO – i.e. article 5 deterrence – and the political context, the so-
called “beggar thy neighbor” policy adopted by Western European nations, which
he saw as detrimental to overall unity, wellbeing and longevity of the transatlantic
alliance. Based on the overall strategic emphasis and lack of special attention to
operational details regarding NATO and Afghanistan, ranking member Lugar fits
the strategy specialist category, as articulated by Carter and Scott (2010). For Lugar,
NATO’s shortcomings were not defined by its lack of commitment in Afghanistan
as much as the general trend towards European member states being overly
comfortable with the idea of the “presence of United States troops and hardware as
the ultimate guarantor of their security” (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 111-629, 2010.
3) and by the declining public support99 in European member states.

97 See: “For the last several years, our Government has struggled to gain greater European participation
in Afghanistan. We are unlikely to succeed if military and political efforts in that country trend toward
greater U.S. domination. Europe has strong incentives to cooperate closely with us to make the NATO
mission a success. The September 11 attacks were planned in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda still operates
there. The fate of the country remains both strategic and symbolic.” (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 111-930, 2009. 4.)

98 See: “The decline in the deterrent value of Article 5 became most apparent with the onset of a string
of energy crises in Europe and the adoption by several West European governments of “beggar-thy-
neighbor” policies with respect to oil and natural gas arrangements with the Russian Federation. When
I speak with leaders from Eastern European countries, they are especially concerned with the threats
posed by cyber war, energy cutoffs, and hazardous materials. Since 2006, I have advocated that energy
security be incorporated into Article 5, and I continue to believe that the alliance must undertake
planning to establish a credible deterrent against emerging unconventional threats. (Senator Lugar [R-

99 See for example: “…could there be a decision on the part of some of the members to opt out of the
alliance? In other words, as the criteria become very difficult politically or economically for them,
could some say that, “By and large, you just can’t count on us. Our public support and our country
would not support these problems which impinge upon our sovereignty of our decision making in
some way?” Most countries probably don’t act in such decisive, abrupt ways as that, but, nevertheless,
the debate internally may commence which may lead an undermining of enthusiasm for the alliance.”
5.2.4 Discussion

All the arguments lingered around the same definition of the problem with NATO; the all-around contributions between member states were vastly disproportioned leading to NATO becoming an organization with varying levels of commitment and contribution between the member states. Some nations were eager to take advantage of the American security guarantees while holding back their own commitments to the alliance. The fundamental issue with Afghanistan was the fact that senators tied the fate of Operation Enduring Freedom to the credibility and longevity of NATO as a military alliance. To complete such goals – longevity of NATO as a security organization - the senators argued that European members should support the operation by providing troops and partaking in combat missions. However, the senators remained silent about the underlying difference in threat perception and overall strategy regarding Afghanistan. From the very beginning, most European governments saw the American approach as overly militarized, and the “coalition of willing” undermining the U.S. commitment to NATO. Further, the European’s did not see Afghanistan as the kind of existential threat the Americans perceived it as, and few drew the conclusion that fighting the “war” against terrorism in the mountain ranges of Afghanistan was crucial for European security. (Flanagan et. al., 2009. 190-192.) Only two statements, both by Senator McCain [R-AZ], were made suggesting convincing the Europeans that the war in Afghanistan was in fact a war, and one they should commit themselves fully into.

In the Foreign Relations Committee, the major difference between the Republican and Democratic side of the debate was the threat perception regarding Russian Federation. For the Democratic side of the debate, Russia ought to be included in the larger European-based Missile Defense System and European security framework via organizations such as the OSCE. The rationale leading to said conclusion was that U.S. and Russia had more to gain by cooperation on globally impactful issues, and the deteriorating relations between the nations were not set in stone, but a result of foreign policy decision-making on both sides of the Atlantic. For Republicans, the Russian behavior in its “near-abroad” and Europe in general demonstrates the impracticality of such cooperation with Russia as had been suggested by the Obama administration. Although the concrete security threats, as

100For example, see Senator McCain’s opening statement March 24th during a budget hearing: “I believe that in order to ensure that NATO remains relevant today and in the future we must win in Afghanistan.” -Senator McCain (R-AZ) (S. HRG. 111–100, 2009. 215).
in form of a military/terrorist attack, are in the Middle East. Russia is still the defining threat against which NATO and its common defense clause are created for. Europe, especially Western Europe, has ignored this state of affairs for too long, leading to deteriorating security climate, especially with regard to foreign oil dependence:

I don’t want to suggest a division in which Germany and France and maybe Italy and Spain are in one camp and those countries—Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, what have you—are in another; but, nonetheless, when I visited NATO headquarters, the EU—and two of our witnesses today, General Craddock and Kurt Volker, were extremely helpful, in my understanding, about a year ago—it was apparent to me that the Article 5 issue arose very frequently and with regard to those that were close to Russia. (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S. Hrg. 111-465, 2009. 13-14.)

The perceptions of U.S.-European security cooperation followed similar logic within the congressional, as well as European context. The Republican-dominated argument considering hard security guarantees followed the logic of realist security cooperation discourse, according to which, cooperation between allies is built on a perception of common military threat. As such, the state-actor identified as a threat is commonly defined as the other, the object and primary motivational factor of alliance building efforts. In the European security context, states following the realist discourse locate in the Baltic Sea Region, also including to some extent Finland. (Browning, 2010. 399.) The distinction did not escape Senator Lugar, who observed on his European trip that the “Article 5 issue arose very frequently and with regard to those that were close to Russia.” (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S. Hrg. 111-465, 2009. 13-14.) Some Democratic notions, such as Senator Cardin’s [D-MD] about the inclusion of Russia to European security framework through OSCE, followed closer to liberal security cooperation discourse. The liberal discourse pays notably more attention to “soft security” issues, “where the threat is seen as coming from a range of inherently transnational problems that are beyond the capacity of states to deal with individually…” (Browning, 2010. 400). According to the liberal logic, issues affecting regional, or global, security are seen in a broader context requiring much more cooperation between the states affected. (ibid.)

Framing an issue works in two ways: 1) “It organizes prior knowledge (including that derived from experience) and values held”, and 2) “guides emergent action.” (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016. 98). With regards to U.S.-Russian relations, both sides of the debate framed the issue quite differently, leading to contradictory policy proposals. For the Democrats, the “causal story” (see. Stone, 1989) was built on the
interpretation that George W. Bush’s Republican administration took on unilateral policies with no regard to legitimate security concerns of the Russian Federation, thus leading to deterioration of Russo-American relations. Said relations ought to be patched by taking on a multipolar approach, where Russia ought to be engaged in the common European security framework to combat common foreign policy issues in Europe and globally. For the Republican side of the debate, the reflexively anti-American, Cold War-like foreign policy conducted by Russia and its aggressive foreign policy in Euro-Asian context had caused the bilateral relations to deteriorate. Thus, United States ought to conduct limited cooperation with Russia, namely regarding nuclear weapons policies, but Russian Federation still constitutes a major security risk for European security, leading to the realization that NATO and its European member-states ought to bolster their defenses to reinforce the foundation of NATO, i.e. common defense as formulated by the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

In this context, framing the issue as NATO not contributing what it promised, refusing to partake in the fighting and refusing to carry its share of the burden was a logical argumentative strategy, by framing the issue with NATO a *distributional* issue (See Milner, 2015), wherein lack of commitment by European member-states took American taxpayer money from U.S. to financing European security framework. Discussing the situation in Afghanistan - importance of building local institution, rule of law and the overall strategy when 68 per cent of Americans supported the withdrawal from Afghanistan (Brattberg, 2013. 7) - had few of the added benefits compared to the idea of NATO not doing its part as it well should. From the “two-congresses” perspective (see Davidson et. al. 2011) the issue of NATO served a dual purpose. First, perceived “overfunding” of NATO alliance was presented as money taken from American taxpayer and allocated in European security instead of local domestic military spending, a policy instrument with highly distributional effects attracting special interest attention and heightened congressional interest (see Milner & Tingley, 2015). Second, NATO funding is of national interest, as it is perceived as draining disproportionate share of American blood and treasure, especially in the context of Afghanistan. As such, the two spheres of “two-congresses”, national and local, overlapped as NATO was defined dominantly as a distributional issue, establishing both local and national incentives to present rich European member states as the culprits.

The difference in framing the Russian threat and prospects for cooperation, however, revealed the *ideological* aspect of the debate as the Republicans perceived Russia as a reflexively anti-American actor, whereas the Democrats presented past
American action as a causal link leading to the deteriorating U.S.-American relations. In short, the argumentation vis-à-vis Russia revealed the partisan, ideological demarcation between the two parties, yet the debate regarding NATO was dominated not by Russia, but by *distributional* factors defining the unbalance of the transatlantic burden-sharing.

The issue of NATO did not stir any significant debate within the committees, nor did it reflect partisan divisions on the issue. The dominance of *NATO negative* framing in both committees is consistent with the theory that congressional assertiveness is highest when material interests of constituency are in question. (Milner & Tingley, 2015. 121). The issue of NATO was discussed primarily during the appropriations process at the time when the United States was still coping with the fallout of the 2008 financial crisis and the consequent budget cuts across the federal government, including the military. Unlike the issue of domestic military spending pitting individual states and districts against one another, the issue with NATO was that of federal government having to spend more than it should due to European member states not fulfilling their commitments. Some difference consistent with our theoretical understanding of the nature of both committees was observed, as *high politics* (see Fowler, 2015) issues – i.e. Senator Lugar’s notable focus on the European energy security regarding Russian oil and gas exports and Article 5 considerations – were identified in Foreign Relations, whereas the Armed Services was consistently fixated on the appropriations process.

Looking at the ideological tendencies identified in the deliberation, a few different perspectives can be observed. First, none of the senators in the debates went as far as calling NATO obsolete, or undermined the overall value of the transatlantic alliance. NATO in itself was, and is, the foundation of Hamiltonian world order the United States created after the Second World War as it built a web of security treaties across the globe (Mead, 2002. 130.), whereas Jeffersonians argued for a language – during the original treaty debates – that did not bind U.S. to send its troop abroad without a specific congressional approval. (Mead, 2002. 191.) Now, it was the very direction of that alliance they perceived as harmful, not the existence of the alliance itself. As such, no overly isolationist views were expressed in the two committees. But some ideas presented were closer to Jeffersonian views as opposed to Wilsonian ones. For example, senators Corker [R-TN] and DeMint [R-SC] argued, in almost transactional terms, that United States did not get much in return for providing security to Eastern European states, the new protectorates of America’s. In Jeffersonian thought, question needing an answer when conducting foreign policy was whether the benefits truly outweighed the costs. (Mead, 2002. 194.) The
Jeffersonian assumption regarding NATO was, that for United States to extend its security net, something must be gotten in return, and Wilsonian spread of democracy, rule-of-law, and human rights to former Soviet states (Mead, 2002. 283) was not enough.

Even so, Jeffersonians would not be too hasty to abandon America’s European allies. The key for Jeffersonian foreign policy is conserving existing U.S. alliances “while avoiding unnecessary conflicts.” (Mead, 2002. 308). Issues such as NATO expansion ought to be seen from a realistic perspective. Regarding Russia, some expressed Jeffersonian risk aversion – or more eloquently put, intellectual skepticism (Mead, 2002. 216) - vis-à-vis annoying the Russian Federation by aggressive foreign policy in Eastern Europe, as argued by Senator Kerry [D-MA], an example of a type of “American realism”, which in Jeffersonian context can be understood as an acknowledgment that U.S. cannot control the design of the world order, yet it should make its best to accommodate American interest and global realities (Mead, 2002. 217.). Some Democrats extended Wilsonian views highlighting international order (Mead, 2002. 164-165) by suggesting that Russia ought to be further incorporated into multilateral security organization in Europe, whereas Senator Lugar offered a more traditionally Republican view of U.S.-Russian relations, arguing that a realistic view of Russia would reveal a reflexively anti-American country with little prospects for fruitful cooperation.

Whereas Jeffersonian generally opposed NATO expansion, Jacksonians bound by honor to withhold the commitments they had made (Mead, 2002. 251), supported it. (Mead, 2002. 300). Whereas Rand Paul voted against Montenegro’s NATO ascension, Jacksonians such as Senator McCain were the strongest supporters of NATO’s eastern expansion. In the 111th Congress, Senator McCain argued for a more thorough dialogue with Europe in order to strengthen the transatlantic alliance to become a security organization beneficial for both American and European security. The difference in Jacksonians views towards American NATO policy were further evident in the debates over European troop presence in the 112th Congress.
5.3 Missile Defense in Europe

5.3.1 Armed Services Committee

Figure 9. Missile defense in Europe relative to administration's policy – Armed Services

Senate Armed Services Committee discussed the issue of Missile Defense in Europe in one specific hearing\textsuperscript{101} devoted to President Obama’s decision to cancel the deployment of parts of ground-based missile defense system in Europe, namely in Poland and Czech Republic. The issue was debated prior during 2009 nominations hearings, defense budget hearings, and two strategy-focused hearings\textsuperscript{102}. The debate went on during the five hearings on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) hearings in 2010.

Overall, 75 floor statements debating the issue were identified (Figure 1). The debate over missile defense in Europe was very different compared to how the committee approached NATO. Whereas the debate over NATO saw no real debate regarding the U.S. policy position nor did it argue for or against administration’s decision-making rationale, the issue of static missile defense in Europe stirred much

\textsuperscript{101} S. Hrg. 111–289,” The President’s Decision on Missile Defense in Europe”, September 24th 2009.
fiercer debate, especially since President Obama decided to deviate from Bush administration’s plan to deploy ground-based interceptors and radars in Europe. From the debates, eight (8) separate framing methods were identified (Figure 9): Russia positive, Russia negative, Iran & North Korea (i.e. rogue states), national Security, military/technical, Congress’ role (i.e. process), intelligence community, transatlantic relations.

Russia positive (11). Statements describing the decision to scrap static missile defense in Europe as a chance to better relations with Russia, and highlighting the importance of cooperation with Russia in regard to strengthening missile defense capabilities (especially against Iran and North Korea).

Russia negative / administration caved (23). Statements describing the role of Russia in the process as negative and arguing that the Obama administration gave in to Russia. Per these statements, Russia attempted to impose its will in Eastern Europe and made attempts to dictate U.S. policy on the issue. Administration’s decision was framed as an appeasement to Russia.

Iran & North Korea (26). Statements arguing that the whole rationale of deploying a missile defense system in Europe was to counter ballistic- and medium range missile threat presented by rogue states Iran and North Korea.

National security (13). Statements describing the issue as a national security issue, affecting the safety and well-being of the United States.

Military/technical (16). Statements describing the issue through technical terms and supporting their position by referring to military personnel/experts.

Congress' role (4). Statements highlighting the constitutional and institutional role of Congress in the decision-making process.

Intelligent community (5). Statements criticizing the assumption that the U.S. intelligence community can be trusted to provide enough early evidence of development of credible missile threats by rogue nations Iran and North Korea to react in time with means other than static missile defense sites in Europe.

Transatlantic relations (29). Statements describing the issue as a security issue for Europe or considering the ramifications of U.S. missile defense policy on transatlantic relations in general and bilateral relations between U.S. and its European allies.
5.3.1.1 Dominant Frames

Unlike in the discussions over NATO, no single dominant frame was identified in the debate over missile defense. Three separate framings were used more than 20 times during the debates: transatlantic relations (29), Iran & North Korea (26) and Russia negative / adm. caved (23). Of the dominant framings identified during the debates, Iran & North Korea was used both by senators opposing administration policy as well as those in favor of it. Framing the issue through transatlantic relations was more dominant amongst those opposing (with 20 statements against as opposed to 9 pro), and Russia negative / adm. cave was identified as the most dominant argument by those opposing the administration policy. (with 22 statements against as opposed to 1 for). Of all the framings in defense of the administration, four stood out: military/technical (13), Iran & North Korea (11), Russia positive (10) and transatlantic relations (9).

Comparing these four to those four distinguishable from the framings used in opposition of the administration, two are the same: Iran & North Korea (15) and transatlantic relations (9). Two other frequent framings against were Russia negative / adm. caved (22) and national security (10). Of all the framings, only one was used in a bipartisan fashion and with similar argumentative rationale by both sides of the argument: Iran & North Korea. (Figure 9.)

Iran & North Korea. Using the so-called rogue states Iran and North Korea as the primary threat against which missile defense would be deployed against serves two distinct purposes: 1) legitimizing the necessity of U.S. missile defense capabilities in Europe and 2) delegitimizing any arguments by Russia that missile defense system in Europe would be targeted against Russian missiles and thus requiring Russian approval.

I believe this decision will enhance our national security and the security of our allies and partners in the region. It will deploy demonstrated technology sooner to defend against the number one existing threat in the Middle East, the threat of Iranian short- and medium-range missiles that can reach our forward-deployed forces and allies in Europe and Israel. Secretary Gates has said the existing Iranian threat “was not addressed by the previous plan.” (Senator Levin [D-MI], S. Hrg. 111-289.)

The above quote was presented by committee chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) during his opening statement at a hearing devoted to assessing President Obama’s decision on missile defense in Europe. As an opening statement in a significant foreign policy hearing of a newly elected president, it could be analyzed as the legitimization of administration policy in the Congress. Framing as a process is action where agents
attempt to identify the source of causality and then articulate a proposed solution to the problem. (Benford & Snow, 2000. 616). The use of rogue states Iran and North Korea, and their respective offensive weapons aspirations as the identified and agreed upon source of causality legitimizing U.S. missile defense systems in Europe, excludes notions that the system would be there without such threats and that the missile defense system could be conceived as a threat to Russia.\textsuperscript{103} The United States needs to deploy a missile defense system in Europe because rogue states threaten their core allies in Europe and Middle East. In short, this is a concrete security issue (as an anti-thesis of political issue) with real-life implications to U.S. and its allies, as demonstrated by the statement from Senator Inhofe [R-OK]:

Senator Inhofe: I’m getting mixed signals here, because we’re all very familiar with the capabilities that we need to protect western Europe, and maybe even the United States, from a missile coming from Iran, and it’s necessary to have the radar in the Czech Republic, as well as the Poland opportunities…

Admiral Stavridis: Sir, as you fully appreciate, and the Chairman alluded to this in his opening statement, any of these decisions really are a matrix of diplomatic and political activity that goes well beyond the purview of a military commander. My own view, at this point, looking at it from a distance and before I have an opportunity, if confirmed, to go and interact with the—

Senator Inhofe: Forget about the politics, just the importance of the European site, from a military perspective. (Senator Inhofe [R-OK], S. Hrg. 111-362, 2009. 741).

The frequency and bipartisan nature of the Iran & North Korea-framing demonstrates that the construction of “Missile Defense in Europe” problematization is based on a very specific theme: threat of rogue states – notion strengthen by the trauma of 9/11 and the consequent formulation of “axis of evil” – against American national security, as well as safety and well-being of allies and friends in Europe. Threat assessment by both sides of the argument builds on the conceptual logic that Iran and North Korea present a clear threat requiring an American response (as opposed to European response). Notion of national security or the security of allies forms the framework of legitimacy, whereas presenting the issue as something else, such as having geopolitical implications for Europe vis-à-vis Russia, is as Senator Inhofe argued: politics. Problem definition through Iran & North Korea-framing legitimates

\textsuperscript{103} Even though the previous plan would have placed parts of the system in such vocal critics of Russian geopolitics as Poland and Czech Republic, not to mention the historical ties between the new NATO allies and former geopolitical rival.
certain foreign policy tools compared to a situation where the committee would acknowledge the legitimacy of Russia’s concerns on the issue.

5.3.1.2 Competing Frames

Providing a diagnosis of an issue and defining a problem includes some type prognosis of what the best solution to solve said problem would be. (Jørgensen, 2012. 50). From a very similar diagnosis of the problem – threat presented by Iranian and North Korean long-range missiles – emerges two different prognoses. After President Obama’s decision to not go forward with the planned missile defense system in Europe, he cited both new missile defense technologies and intelligence on Iranian missile capabilities as the rationale behind the change in policy. (The Guardian, 2009a). During the debate that followed, including the hearing on September 24th titled: “The President’s Decision on Missile Defense in Europe”, both those opposing the decision and favoring it offered different interpretations of the administration’s decision104 (see. Figure 9).

The debate was framed by those defending administration’s policy by Russia positive (10)105 and military/technical (13) -framings, whereas those opposing it were identified using Russia negative/administration caved (22) and transatlantic relations (20) -framings, and to a lesser extent Congress’ role (4) and intelligence community (5) -framings106. (Figure 9.)

The main argumentation by those defending administration’s policy was that the new policy would strengthen the missile defense in Europe and thus the safety of American allies in the area. To back up these arguments, senators defending the policy used military-technical arguments about the superiority of the new system compared to static defenses proposed by the Bush administration. To confirm their argument, senators on defense relied on expert opinion and authority figures in the military and the administration:

As you just mentioned, the President announced a new missile defense plan for Europe that had been unanimously recommended by Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That plan includes a number of elements that are

104 President Obama’s decision to deviate from Bush’s missile defense plans in Europe did not face a formal vote in the Congress. Senators’ position on the issue was identified by analyzing the floor statements themselves.

105 During the debates, one instance of a Republican senator using Russia positive -framing was identified (S. Hrg. 111-138, 2009. 50), but this statement was delivered before President Obama’s decision in September 2009 to scrap the static missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic.

106 What’s interesting about the use of these two framings (Congress’ role and intelligence community), is the fact that those defending administration policy remained entirely silent on these issues.
intended to enhance defense of the United States against potential future long-range Iranian missiles: a forward-deployed radar in southeastern Europe, and development of an improved version of the Standard Missile-3 Block II for deployment in Europe. Do you agree that this phased adaptive approach that’s being planned for Europe will improve our capability to defend the homeland against potential future long-range missiles from Iran? (Senator Levin [D-MI], S. Hrg. 111-701, 2010. 691).

The above statement by chairman Levin [D-MI] highlights the essence of argumentation by those defending administration policy. Instead of acknowledging that President Obama de facto scrapped the plans for a missile defense system which had been in planning for years, Senator Levin describes the decision as a new plan for Europe. This leaves the impression of a proactive administration looking actively to enhance the American and European defense against the agreed upon threat: Iran. To dispel any rumors that the decision had anything to do with appeasing Russia, the Senator noted the unanimous recommendations by both Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Not only was Secretary Gates the sitting secretary of defense, he also served that spot in the Bush administration responsible for planning the scrapped plans, and was the bipartisan choice to build bridges between the Republicans and Democrats during the first Obama administration. In short, the argumentative logic goes as follows: President Obama, unanimously supported by the military (and the most bipartisan member of his administration, Republican Robert Gates), decided to form a new plan for missile defense in Europe to enhance the security of the United States and its allies against Iran.

Secretary Flournoy, if we were able to involve the Russians somehow in a missile defense system and gain the benefit of their radar information, for instance, in addition to being useful technically, not necessary but advantageous, as General O’Reilly has just told us, would there be a positive powerful political signal to Iran if we could involve Russia in a joint missile defense? (Senator Levin [D-MI] S. Hrg. 111-289, 2009. 26).

The other main argument defending administration policy, and demonstrated by the above quote from Senator Levin [D-MI], was the inclusion of Russia in the missile defense system through the Russia positive-framing. This framing is reliant of the success of the dominant Iran & North Korea-framing, which unanimously concluded that the threat against the U.S. and European security came from Iran (and in the case of U.S., North Korea). As it was concluded that static missile defense was not planned against Russia, in the context of Russia reset-policy the logical step would be to maximize the security effects of the missile defense plans by incorporating
Russia in the process. Not only would this delegitimize Russian opposition, it would also delegitimize the congressional opposition on the basis that president’s decision could be interpreted as caving in on Russia; Russia was not part of the threat assessment (Iran & North Korea -framing), nor was it part of the political rationale (military/technical). Instead, cooperation with Russia would include it in the fight against the rogue states in the Middle East and thus enhance the regional security and the security of the United States (Russia positive and national security).

Two most favored framings by the opposition (Russia negative/administration cave and transatlantic relations) competed with the argumentation laid down by the defense. The blunt of the argumentative logic behind the opposition drew upon two interpretations of the administration’s decision-making and the implications thereof. First, as opposed to competing assertion that the decision was a logical enhancement of U.S. missile defense in Europe, the opposition describes the process as political in nature with the goal of appeasing Russia in the spirit of administrations’ Russia reset -policy while ignoring its European allies, namely Czech Republic and Poland. Second, as those favoring the administration policy argued that the threat posed by Iran should encourage cooperation with Russia, the opposition did not deviate from the Iran & North Korea -framing, as it stressed the immediacy of the threat and categorized Russian opposition as illogical and driven by its regional political ambition and Cold War mentality. 

Madam Secretary [Under Secretary of Defense for Policy], you’ve said three times this morning: This is not about Russia. You’ve literally said that three times. Are you saying then that you do not expect that this new approach will enhance Russia’s willingness to cooperate to deter Iran? I had thought that would be an advantage of this new approach, but you’ve said very emphatically three times this morning: This is not about Russia; this has nothing to do with Russia; we haven’t asked anything of Russia. I find that very troubling. (Senator Collins [R-ME], S. Hrg. 111-289, 2009. 51.)

The statement by Senator Collins [R-ME] during the hearing on President Obama’s decision on missile defense highlights the reluctance of the opposing senators to believe in administration’s insistence that the decision was not made based on Russian opposition (political) but in fact the goal was to simply strengthen the missile

---

107 E.g. see Senator McCain’s statement during defense appropriations hearings: “Missile defense is not and should not be viewed in Moscow was some new form of post-Cold War aggression. It is, rather, a reasonable and prudent response to the very real threats that the Iranian and North Korean regimes pose to the United States, our friends, and our allies.” (Senator McCain [R-AZ], S. Hrg. 111-701. 2010. 918.)
defense in Europe (technical). The above statement further challenges one of the main assertions of those advocating the administration policy that the new plan would enable cooperation with Russia in regard to Iran. Instead, it appears, that the administration used the argument about cooperation with Russia to justify it yielding under Russian pressure. During the hearings, the argument that administration had some hidden agenda with Russia to achieve other goals regarding Iran at the expense of American allies in Europe was furthered by Senator Thune [R-SD]:

But I also have a lot of questions about the perception that this creates among people who have been very friendly to us and very reliable, and also the issue that’s been broached about whether or not this was designed to curry some favor with the Russians in dealing with the Iranians. (Senator Thune [R-SD], S. Hrg. 111-289, 2009. 60.)

Thus, framing the decision-making process through Russia negative/adm. caved is tied to the transatlantic relations -framing, by emphasizing the importance of transatlantic relations above any political goals achievable by appeasing to Russians. According to those opposing the policy, not only was appeasing to Russia itself wrong, it further damaged the transatlantic relations by “undermining two NATO allies” (Senator McCain [R-AZ], Hrg. 111-701, 2010. 918) as the administration “pulled the rug out from under Poland and the Czech Republic” (Senator Inhofe [R-OK], Hrg. 111-701, 2010. 629).

Thus, the opposition argumentation on the issue can be summed up as follows: the administration under pressure from Russia yielded (Russia negative/adm. caved) on the issue of missile defense to gain on political goals regarding Iran, thus underestimating the threat posed by Iranian long-scale missiles (Iran & North Korea). To achieve its political goals, the administration betrayed its allies in Europe (transatlantic relations).
5.3.2 Individual Breakdown

Chairman Levin [D-MI] was the most active senator discussing the Obama administration’s decision on missile defense, as he was responsible for 23 statements regarding the issue. To highlight the active role of Armed Services chairman, second and third most active senators – McCain [R-AZ] and Inhofe [R-SD] – made 13 and 11 statements respectively. Rest of the senators in the Committee were responsible for one to five statements each, making the trio of Levin, McCain and Inhofe, three most active members of the Committee. (See Figure 10.)

Carl Levin [D-MI] was the interlocutor between the administration and the Committee. The role he adopted was one of a spokesman for the administration and his statements functioned as a justification for the policy choice of cancelling ground-based missile defense plans in Europe. Argumentatively, Levin invoked Russia positive and Iran North Korea -framings, as well as military-technical -framing to justify the “new” plan to better defend both U.S. and its allies against ballistic missile threats from rogue states. As the debates turned to the START, Levin was very active to downplay any assertions that the ratification of a New START treaty would have adverse effects on U.S. independence in its missile defense policy. Given the positions adopted, and the argumentative substance of Levin - i.e. focus on the military-technical specifics of the new EPAA system, presenting Russia cooperation...
as a practical method to enhance U.S. and European security, and highlighting that the only realistic threat against U.S. and Europe comes from Iran and North Korea – once again define Senator Levin’s role as a policy specialist (see Carter & Scott, 2010). His argumentation was based on the practicalities of President Obama’s decision by detaching it from strategic power-politics calculations based on perceived changes or compromises in U.S.-Russian and transatlantic relations.

Both Senator McCain [R-AZ] and Senator Inhofe [R-OK] had rather opposite approach. From the very beginning of the debates, both highlighted the perceived harm done to U.S. allies in Europe.108 As such, McCain’s approach was a strategic one, as he framed the U.S. policy as making a choice between its allies and fellow democracies in Europe on one side, and the administration’s Russia reset-policy on the other.109 If Senator Levin attempted to downplay the dramatic notions of “choosing” between Russia reset and European allies by framing the issue as a practical one, McCain and Inhofe made it one of values and principles. For them, the administration had made two incorrect decision; to let down allies110 and grant Russia de facto veto over U.S. missile defense policy. As such, both McCain and Inhofe framed the issue as a strategic choice, defining his position and approach as a policy strategist. (ibid).


109 See: “United States views resetting its relations with Russia more important than commitments made to close friends and allies, and that the administration is willing to let Russia have veto power over the disposition of our missile defense architecture.” (Senator McCain [R-AZ] S.Hrg. 111-289, 2009. 6.)

110 See for example: “I do agree with Senator McCain on his concern over pulling the rug out from under Eastern Europe on the third site. I read something yesterday that Russia doesn’t want us to have any ground based capability. I don’t know.” (Senator Inhofe [R-OK] S.Hrg. 111-701, 2010. 38.)
Overall, the debate over missile defense in Europe was very different compared to that over NATO. The first major contextual difference was the fact that discussion over NATO did not revolve around a specific administration policy proposal nor did it involve a congressional vote. The issue of missile defense was well rooted in the American Post-Cold War foreign policy debate, most recently at the end of Clinton presidency, when congressional Republicans managed to pass National Missile Defense Act against opposition from a Democratic administration. This time the Democrats held the majority over the Senate, yet the opposition to any perceived scaling back on missile defense from the Republican side of the isle remained strong; not a single Republican senator gave a floor statement supporting the administration policy, and the Democratic statements identified as critical towards changing the plans of missile defense took place before President Obama’s September 2009 decision. Thus, the policy position during the debate followed strictly the partisan lines, as they did during the National Missile Defense Act debates in 1999. (For a partisan breakdown of framings, see Figure 11.)
The dominance of the Iran & North Korea-framing legitimized the general necessity of American missile defense system, static or sea-based, and argued that the entire rationale of the system was to counter credible threat presented by Iran. Threat posed by the rogue countries is a threat against American allies in Europe and against national security in the mainland United States.

I am disappointed and frankly troubled because I believe that it opens a much greater risk of a period of time during which we, the United States, will not have an adequate defense against an ICBM, long-range missile, fired, launched, from Iran against the United States. That's serious stuff. (Senator Lieberman [I-CT], Hrg. 111-289, 2009. 38.)

The use of Iran & North Korea-framing is consistent with the notion that military policy instruments that are used to deter attacks against mainland United States are widely approved by both sides of the left-right spectrum. Further, both Democrats and Republicans have generally approved the idea of deploying U.S. troops globally in the name national security. (Milner & Tingley, 2015. 61-62.) In sum, both sides of the debate built their arguments on the common threat assessment, which understandably had become reasserted in the post-9/11 world.

To use the framework set by Entman (1993) to recognize core framing tasks -1) define problems; 2) diagnose causes; 3) offer moral judgements; 4) suggest remedies – the need for competing framing becomes evident. Before the decision to cancel ground-based missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic, the commonly defined problem was the threat posed by Iran and North Korea, as supported by the dominance of Iran & North Korea-framing. After the decision was made, the object of problem definition for the opposition became not the missile defense system itself, but the decision made by the president. For the opposition, the situation defined as in need of a change (Benford & Snow, 2012. 615) was administration’s decision itself. United States’ national security, as well as the security of U.S. allies

111 Hentz (2010, 294) notes, that justifications for a National Missile Defense (NMD) in the post-Cold War era are five-fold: “…the ‘Rogue State’ threat; the terrorist threat; the Russian threat; the possibility of an accident; and the China threat. Only the last makes sense…” Considering this background, the dominance of Iran & North Korea-framing not only highlights the rogue state-defined context of American post-9/11 foreign policy, but also refers to the convenience of arguing on a policy based on commonly accepted threat perception, as opposed to more contested notions of framing either China or Russia as a major nuclear missile threat.

112 See for example: “We’ve asked our friends in Poland and in the Czech Republic to participate in a system that would defend virtually all of Europe and the United States from attacks from Iran, and they’ve gone along with us on that. I am, I have to say, disturbed, troubled, worried that some of the politicians are now talking about making a deal with the Russians and maybe they’ll promise us
(transatlantic relations -framing) was threatened by the administration’s decision (national security and Iran & North Korea -framing).

The decision to cancel ground-based missile defense in Europe was further problematized by the perceived weakness demonstrated in administration’s willingness to give in to Russian demands113 (Russia negative/adm. caved -framing) at the expense of European allies by “unilateral concession to the Russians” (Senator McCain [R-AZ], S. Hrg. 111-289, 2009. 37), and setting the moral blame on the administration. Setting the moral blame was evident throughout the transatlantic relations and Russia negative/adm. caved -framings: “I believe it is essential in the future that we keep faith with our close allies in Poland and the Czech Republic.” (Senator McCain [R-AZ], S. Hrg. 111-362, 2009. 979), and: “the administration is adopting a new European missile defense strategy that has clearly bruised some of our staunchest allies in Europe while encouraging hard-liners in my view.” (Senator McCain [R-AZ], S. Hrg. 111-289, 2009. 6).

The Democratic support for the administration followed the logic set by President Obama as he announced the shift in policy. The statement given by the president September 17th, titled “Remarks by the President on Strengthening Missile Defense in Europe”, presented the issue as conscious effort by the administration to strengthen and enhance the defense of United States and its European allies against threat posed by Iran. (The White House, 2009). Congressional Democrats followed the same line of argument, as they continued to frame the issue as a military-technical114 (military technical -framing) issue responding to the threat posed by Iran (Iran & North Korea -framing). The logical conclusion derived from the premises set was to deploy the strongest possible missile defense system115, and if possible, support the effort by cooperation with Russia (Russia positive-framing).

something and we won’t go forward with this site, maybe.” (Senator Sessions [R-AL], S. Hrg. 111-100, 2009. 93).

113 See for example: “I wondered whether you felt like Russia’s position, which seems to me to be not only to try to impose its will on not having this system deployed, but in addition to that to also perhaps even dictate where it should be deployed—I believe Foreign Minister Lavrov, I heard him say recently that he thought it was not so bad if it was in certain places, but not in others, which perhaps may really get to the root of their concern, which may have to do with the very reasons Poland and the Czech Republic are happy to be a part of NATO.” (Senator Martinez [R-FL], S. Hrg. 111-100, 2009. 272).

114 See for example:“General Chilton, there’s a new approach, called phase adaptive approach (PAA), relative to the missile defense plan for Europe. I think your prepared testimony, and maybe your oral testimony, covered this; but, if so, I missed it. In your judgment, does the PAA give us an effective way to address the Iranian missile threat, which is a growing threat?”. (Senator Levin [D-MI] S. Hrg. 111-701, 2010. 878).

115 See for example:” As you just mentioned, the President announced a new missile defense plan for Europe that had been unanimously recommended by Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That plan includes a number of elements that are intended to enhance defense of the United States
The Republican opposition to administration’s policy remained consistent throughout the debates, with no significant deviations from the argumentative logic explained before. Some Democrats, however, deviated from the argumentation based on military-technical framework. The argumentative logic set out by the Democrats remained silent about acknowledging Russian influence on the decision-making process. Republican argument was, that there was no legitimacy in Russian assertion that static missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic would present a threat to Russia, and any such notions were political in nature. As such, acknowledging the legitimacy of Russian concerns would affect American allies in Europe negatively and to base American foreign policy decision-making in Europe on appeasement would be normatively wrong. Despite this, two Democratic senators deviated from the norm set by majority of Democrats:

The reason that I was opposed to the original proposal was due to the cost and the static nature of the technology, at the same time that it was widely being viewed as provocative of Russia, at a time when the Russians actually, as I recall, were offering to cooperate on alternate sites such as the site in Azerbaijan; and also that it was not really as proposed doing the job that we were expecting it to do in terms of the threat from Iran. (Senator Webb [D-VA], S. Hrg. 111-289, 2009. 54-55).

In the above statement, Senator Webb from Virginia acknowledged that the old system, referring to Bush administration’s plans for static missile defense in Europe, was provocative to Russia. The argumentation here relies on the strength of Iran as the dominant threat assessment and the viability of the military-technical approach to solving the problem. It does not question the political implications of cooperation with Russia regarding to American global military posture nor its implications for American allies formerly ruled by Russia. In other words, only Senators Webb and Senator Reed acknowledged the realpolitik implications of American missile defense against potential future long-range Iranian missiles: a forward-deployed radar in southeastern Europe, and development of an improved version of the Standard Missile-3 Block II for deployment in Europe. Do you agree that this phased adaptive approach that’s being planned for Europe will improve our capability to defend the homeland against potential future long-range missiles from Iran?" (Senator Levin [D-MI] S. Hrg. 111-701, 2010. 691). This quote from chairman of the Armed Services Committee Carl Levin highlights the full set of argumentative logic behind support for administration’s policy: new plan, unanimously recommended by Secretary Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff, against Iran, better and improved plan to protect Europe and U.S.

116 See for example: ”The administration must have firmly in mind the possible effect a dramatically shifting course on this issue would have on some of our closest allies in Europe and what signal it would send to other countries in the region.” (Senator McCain [R-AZ] S. Hrg. 111-100, 2010. 215).
system, as opposed to normative approach embraced by rest of the Armed Services Committee.

Given the institutional and political context reflected by the NATO discussion – appropriations process and the financial crisis – the issue can be seen as distributive issue, whereas the debate on missile defense was rather motivated by ideological factors. Ideological issues are by definition less affected by the economic rationale but by the ideological divisions in the institutional context. (Milner & Tingley, 2015. 56-57). By Gerring’s definition, ideology is internally consistent, contrasts other actors’ opinions, is stable through time and is not reflected by short-term parochial objectives. (See. Gerring, 1997 and Milner & Tingley, 2015). Thus the debate over missile defense by Gerring’s definition followed the ideological logic; it was internally consistent as no Republican nor Democrat crossed the partisan lines (see Figure 11), the identification of competing framings (i.e. Russia positive vs. Russia negative/adm. viewed) highlighted contrasting interpretations of the problem definition, and followed the same ideological and partisan battle lines as the debate over National Missile Defense Act of 1999 and American Missile Protection Act of 1998, as it did not have noticeable short-term material incentives dominating the policy formulation process. In addition, the aggressive tone taken towards Russia is convergent with the observation that since the 1960’s, Republicans have on average supported more hawkish foreign policy compared to the Democrats (see Clark et. al. 2016), and that Republicans have made conscious attempts to portray the party as strong on defense and unrelenting defenders of U.S. interests globally (Fowler, 2015. 58).

The hawkishness of the Republican opposition – consistent with the nature of Armed Services Committee (Fowler, 2015. 47) - was articulated by two vocal senators; John McCain and Jim Inhofe. Both argued on ideological viewpoint closest to Jacksonian foreign policy ideology, by offering an aggressive, military-dominated, coercive approach to European-based missile defense as opposed to cooperation advocated by the administration. (Deibel, 2005. 69). It was not only a question of commitment to allies, something Hamiltonians committed themselves into post-World War 2 (Mead, 2002. 130), but of principle. Russia was the schoolyard bully, demanding others to conform to their viewpoint, “or else…”. Much like Andrew Jackson himself did not back away from a duel, neither does Jacksonian foreign policy. Instead of Jeffersonian risk aversion - identifiable in the Obama presidency

---

117 This question could be further debated and would require further analysis, as scholars tend to agree that following the ideological/partisan lines have a strong connection to electoral success of individual member of Congress, especially given the levels of polarization witnessed in American politics. The assertion here, nevertheless, is that the issue of missile defense in Europe did not have similar distributive factors as, for example, domestic military spending.
and in the argumentation of Carl Levin defending Obama’s policy -, prepared to appease the bully in them most risk-free manner, Jacksonians take the bully head on in a principled stance. Thus, the idea of soft Democratic foreign policy was enforced by the Jacksonian minded argumentation by the Republican side, highlighting the difference in ideological postulations dominating both sides. Then again, although the aggressive tone regarding Russia can be perceived as Jacksonian by nature, due to its military-mindedness, the preparedness to defend American allies in Europe, allies sharing a very different world-view compared to nationalistic minded Jacksonians, reveals the Jacksonian commitment to its allies once United States has given its word. (Mead, 2002. 251). The debate over missile defense highlights some of ideological tendencies regarding European security. Thus, the Jacksonian mind, although accused of populism and nationalism, seems to move towards Wilsonian value-based thinking - perhaps due concept of honor as Jacksonian foundational value (Mead, 2002. 231) - when we move from distributional issues to security issues, and a clear adversary (i.e. Russia) defining the deliberational context. Yet, Mead (2002, 322) notes that post-Cold War Jacksonians have been determined to build a national missile defense system “whether it made sense or not”, and post-Cold War America was wealthy enough to disregard Russian objections to its missile defense planning. U.S. ought to become the defining military hegemony in the post-Cold War world. This effort called for “strengthening the U.S. military lead, and especially the creation of a massive, space-based weapon system” as means to that end. (Mead, 2002. 307.) In this world view, military-technical argumentation was not enough to curtail Jacksonian critique over Obama’s decision, for Jacksonians the European-based missile defense system meant much more than shooting down theoretical Iranian missiles. Thus, based on the argumentation, it is difficult to abstract if the role of transatlantic alliance had intrinsic value, or whether it functioned as a mere rhetorical tool to justify Jacksonian military hegemony.

5.4 The New START Treaty

5.4.1 Armed Services Committee

Senate Armed Services Committee held five (5) separate hearings devoted to the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 2010 from June 17th to July 29th. (S. Hrg. 111-897). At the same time, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held nine (9) hearings on the same issue (S. Hrg. 111-779), making the New START Treaty one of the most visible foreign policy issues in 111th Congress. The Senate ratified
the START Treaty December 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2010 by a vote of 71 to 26. (Washington Post, 2010).

Figure 12. START by vote – Armed Services

In the Armed Services Committee, the debate over the START was a continuation of the debate over President Obama’s decision on missile defense in Europe. The obvious institutional difference was the fact that debate on the START Treaty culminated in a Senate vote. Unlike the issue of missile defense, START Treaty was a treaty in the constitutional sense of the word, requiring congressional ratification by a two-thirds margin, as per U.S. Constitution Article II Section 2. But thematically, the debate followed the similar pattern. This time Russia was the clear object of the debate, as opposed to debate on missile defense where senators took a different approach to how much Russia would, or should, affect the decision-making process. From the debates, twelve (12) framing debates were identified: missile defense negative (20), missile defense positive (9), verification positive (9), verification negative (15), NPT/arms control (9), national security (17), European security (2), military/strategic (19), bipartisan/water’s edge (5), Partisan/adm. negative (12), Congress/process (11), Iran & North Korea (9) (see Figure 12). The analysis is based on 62 floor statements made by the
senators during the debates. Of the 62 floor statements, 28 were made by a Republican senator, 30 by a Democrat and 4 by an Independent.

Missile Defense Negative (20): Statements arguing that the new START Treaty would have negative consequences on U.S. missile defense capabilities and statements arguing that the administration gave up on static missile defense to get Russia sign the START Treaty.

Missile Defense Positive (9): Statements arguing that the administration policy has no ill implications on U.S. missile defense capabilities nor did the administration give up on missile defense in order to appease Russia.

Verification Positive (9): Statements arguing that the new START Treaty would enhance verification of nuclear stockpiles and better help keep track on Russian nuclear capabilities. Key argumentative logic is that without a treaty in place, no verification exists. Uses positive terms to describe the effects of verification regime.

Verification Negative (15): Statements questioning the benefits of verification regime as it is formulated in the treaty. Also suggests, or in some cases bluntly asserts, that due to untrustworthiness of Russia, credibility of verification process is questionable.

NPT / Arms Control (9): Statements stressing the importance of the new START Treaty for the overall grand strategy of nuclear proliferation and arms control.


European Security (2): Statements stressing the implication the new START Treaty on European security.

Military / Strategic (19): Statements arguing for or against the treaty based on military-technical or strategic arguments. Such statements often rely on questioning the expert witness’ and quoting authority figures in the military and/or politics.

Bipartisan / Water’s Edge (5): Statements arguing that the debate on the treaty should be conducted in a bipartisan matter, implying that opposing the treaty on partisan basis is counter to the agreed upon ideal that foreign policy stops at the water’s edge.

Partisan / Administration: (12): Statements arguing that the other party has a negative effect on the legislative process or the treaty itself. From the opposing side, arguments that criticize the Obama administration.

Congress / Process: (11): Statements arguing about the role of U.S. Congress in the overall legislative process and especially the negotiating process itself. Asserting the notion that due to Congress’ constitutional authority, Congress’ ought to play more significant role in the process as opposed to simple Yea/Nay vote.
Iran & North Korea (9): Statements arguing for or against the treaty based on the notion that the rogue states Iran and North Korea constitute a significant threat against U.S. security and arms control regime in general.

5.4.1.1 Dominant Frames

Much like during the debate on missile defense, no single framing could be identified as the dominant frame defining the issue. Many of the arguments followed the same lines, although this time the Iran & North Korea - framing was not the defining argument, as the Senate’s focus was more directly set on Russia. Four (4) framings were identified in more than 20% of all the statements. Of these four, two were used by both sides of the argument: military/strategic (19) and national security (17). Both missile defense negative (20) and verification negative (15) framings were used by senators opposing the ratification of START Treaty.

The dominant framings of both sides of the argument differed in diversity and substance. Of all the arguments used to oppose the treaty, missile defense negative - framing dominated the argumentative strategy of the opposition, as it was identified in 25 % of all the arguments made by senators voting against the treaty (see. Figure 13). The dominance of the missile defense negative - framing was further highlighted if taken in the account the partisan nature of the debate. In the five hearings held on the treaty, 28 Republican statements were made, out of which 19 (68%) framed the
issue using missile defense negative -framing, while the next common framing (partisan / administration) was used in 12 (43%) statements. The support for the treaty was more diverse, and no dominant framing used to support the administration policy was identified (see. Figure 14). Five framings could be identified over the rest: military/strategic (18%), missile defense positive (16%), verification positive (16%), national security (14%) and NPT / arms control (14%). If we look at the defensive side from a partisan perspective, of 30 Democratic statements military/strategic -framing was used in 30% of the statements, missile defense positive- and verification positive -framing in 30%, national security- and NPT / arms control -framing in 27%. Of all the framings identified, two were used in significant frequency by both sides of the debate: military / strategy- and national security -framings. (Figure 14.)

**Figure 14. Yea votes (START) – Armed Services**

![Pie chart showing distribution of framings](image)

**Military / strategy.** Defining the issue by framing it through military/strategy -framing is based on certain unquestioned and agreed upon facts about U.S. foreign policy, and more precisely, U.S. nuclear policy. Although stressing arms control and non-proliferation regimes, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report by Department of Defense also defines the basis of U.S. nuclear policy:

…as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces, including deployed and stockpiled nuclear weapons, highly capable nuclear delivery systems and command and control capabilities, and the physical infrastructure and the expert personnel needed to sustain them. These nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role in deterring potential adversaries, reassuring allies and partners around the world,
and promoting stability globally and in key regions. (Department of Defense, 2010. 6).

Both sides of the debate agreed that the new treaty ought to ensure that U.S. nuclear posture and force structure would still be able to maintain strong strategic deterrence.\(^{118}\)

National security -framing is based on the same agreed upon meta idea about U.S. nuclear policy. Nuclear policy is very closely linked to national security. Although the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report states that: “the easing of Cold War rivalries – enable us to fulfill those objectives [international security] at significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.” (Department of Defense, 2010. 6), the idea that strong nuclear deterrence enhances the American national security remains prevalent, especially with regard to Russia.\(^{119}\) Thus, the bipartisan framing through military/strategic- and national security -framings can be explained by the strength of the thematic framing of nuclear policy and security in a broader context. (Schnell & Callaghan, 2005. 4-5). In this case, the issue of START treaty, and its military/strategic implications, is put into a broader context of U.S. national security. National security can be seen as an even broader concept, known in the framing theory as a generic frame. (Schnell & Callaghan, 2005. 6). As such, generic frames have the capacity to “transcend issue, time, and space limits.” (de Vreese et. al. 2001. 109). Another way to look at the national security -framing is to see it as a type hard-limit for the debate. The difficulty to circumvent such a strong contextual framing of the issue during a very traditional national security policy debate de facto limits the ability of senators to offer differing opinions or interpretations of the core problem; the national security implications of the new START Treaty. The strength

---

\(^{118}\) See for example Republican Senator Thune [R-SD] who ended up voting against the treaty: “Clearly, significant additional decisions are going to have to be made with respect to U.S. force structure under the treaty. I would be reluctant to cast a vote in favor of the treaty without being fully briefed in more precise detail about the plans for our nuclear delivery force structure.” and the Democratic Senator Burris [D-IL] voting for the treaty: “I would just like to ask you, was any of the wargaming done to determine whether we still will be able to respond effectively to a provocation if our nuclear arsenal is reduced to the level that’s indicated in the treaty?” (S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 30-40.)

\(^{119}\) See for example:” In May, Henry Kissinger testified in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the large Russian stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, unmatched by a comparable American deployment, could threaten the ability to undertake extended deterrence. According to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission (CSPC), Russia has 3,800 tactical nuclear weapons, with a 10 to 1 advantage over us, and some are concerned that if you factor in those tactical weapons, this New START treaty will put us in a position where they have more total nuclear weapons.” (Senator LeMieux [R-FL], S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 215). In the above statement by Florida senator George LeMieux invokes the authority figure Henry Kissinger, highlighting the continuity of strong U.S. nuclear deterrence as the basis on good statesmanship.
of *generic frames* in the national security context is consistent with the bipartisan framing of the treaty, making national security requirements the starting point for further debate.

### 5.4.1.2 Competing Frames

Competing framings identified in the new START Treaty hearings were missile defense negative (25% of Nays, 4% of Yeas), missile defense positive (0% of Nays, 16% of Yeas), verification negative (14% of Nays, 7% of Yeas), verification positive (0% of Nays, 16% of Yeas), NPT / arms control (1% of Nays, 14% of Yeas), bipartisan / water’s edge (0% of Nays, 9% of Yeas), partisan / administration (15% of Nays, 0% of Yeas) and Congress / process (13% of Nays, 2% of Yeas). (see Figure 12). Several framings can be identified as mutually exclusive, fitting the very definition of a competing frame. These framings offer distinctly incompatible interpretation of the reality, whereas some framings are used by the other side of the argument while the opposing side remains silent on the issue. Latter attempt to make certain perceptions of the reality salient, and during the START debate these framings were ideological (NPT / arms control) and institutional (Congress / process).

The most frequent mutually exclusive argument was the role of U.S. missile defense system in the START negotiations. Similar to the debate over administration’s plan for missile defense, the opposition to START Treaty stemmed largely from the negotiating process and the supposed (negative) role of Russia:

> There’s a press report that came out last night that claims that the administration is secretly working with the Russians to conclude an agreement that would limit U.S. missile defenses. It goes on to say that the administration last month presented a draft agreement to the Russians. (Senator Collins [R-ME], S. Hrg. 111-779, 2010. 25.)

*Missile defense negative* -framings had defining characteristics in argumentative logic and rhetorical instruments. Argumentatively, statements identified within the *missile defense negative* -framing made a direct link from administration’s decision on missile defense in Europe to START negotiations. According to opposition’s rationale, the administration made a deal with Russian government; United States would back down from Bush administration’s plan to deploy static, ground-based missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic, and in return, Russia would agree to sign the New START Treaty. The argumentative logic here follows directly the argumentative logic of those opposing the decision on European missile defense site.
back in September 2009. In both these cases, the Obama administration had sacrificed U.S. national security interests to appease Russia. Rhetorically the opposition took advantage of terms creating a negative impression of the process itself, such as senator Collins’ [R-ME] use of the word *secretly* to describe the process.

The idea about the linkage between START Treaty and U.S. missile defense was based on the unilateral signing statements accompanying the treaty. Russian statement read:

…the [START] Treaty can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively. Consequently, the exceptional circumstances referred to in Article 14 of the Treaty include increasing the capabilities of the United States of America’s missile defense system in such a way that threatens the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation. (Woolf, 2016. 15.)

Although the United States maintained that American missile defense capabilities were not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia, but defend U.S. and its allies against other regional threats, President Obama and then President Medvedev agreed that the Treaty would contain “provision on the interrelationship of strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms”. (Woolf, 2016. 15.) Such notion was unacceptable to the Republican side of the debate, as demonstrated by the Committee’s ranking member Senator McCain [R-AZ]:

I continue to have serious concerns about why the administration agreed to this language in the treaty text, after telling Congress repeatedly during the negotiations that they would do no such thing, and I fear it could fuel Russia’s clear desire to establish unfounded linkages between offensive and defensive weapons. […] I would reiterate my long-held view that any notion of a Russian veto power over decisions on our missile defense architecture is unacceptable, and we should oppose any attempts by any administration to do so. (Senator McCain [R-AZ], S. Hrg. 111-779, 2010. 4.)

Even though the statement was not legally binding and in theory it did not constrain U.S. missile defense infrastructure, the argumentative strategy of the Republican side was to suggest that there existed a secret *de facto* understanding between the Obama administration and Russia that U.S. would not make significant changes to its missile defense capabilities. Above quote from senator McCain highlights the strong distaste for the way the administration conducted itself during the negotiations vis-à-vis Russia, granting them a veto-power over U.S. missile defense policy. Much like during the debate on missile defense in Europe, Senator McCain delegitimizes the
assertion that U.S. missile defense in Europe would be a strategic threat against Russian, and thus any statements to the contrary would be based on false premises.

Missile defense positive. Senate Armed Services Committee’s chairman Senator Carl Levin was the spearhead of Democratic opposition to the Republican-led allegation that the Treaty would impose limits to U.S. missile defense:

Fundamentally, this treaty is a treaty that limits strategic offensive nuclear arms. It does not limit anything else. Some might want it to limit more. Some might fear that it does limit more. But it does not. For instance, there have been statements made suggesting that the treaty imposes constraints on our missile defense plans and programs. That is simply incorrect. (Senator Levin [D-MI], S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 35.)

The base logic behind the Democratic argument followed the rationale of missile defense debate: Russian assertion that U.S. missile defense would affect strategic balance in Europe is based on false premise, and there is no legitimacy in the Russian argument. Thus, the argument made by the Russian administration would not affect the decision-making process of the Obama administration. Same is true about START. As demonstrated by the above quote, START is a treaty limiting strategic offensive nuclear arms, nothing else. The argument continues, that “some might want it to limit more”, referring to Russia and the unilateral statement made by Russian administration at the signing. They might want it to limit missile defense capabilities, but as per Senator Levin, ratification of the treaty does no such thing, as the Russian rationale is based on false premises. Chairman Levin goes on to say, “some might fear that it does limit more”, referring to the Republican opposition. Much like with Russia, the Republican side of the debate does not have legitimacy for it is based on rationale belied by both the administration and congressional Democrats. Of course, as it came to conducting the hearings themselves, the Democratic side of the debate had the benefit of questioning Democratic administration, benefits of which displayed by chairman Levin’s questioning of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton:

Senator LEVIN: Secretary Clinton, let me start with you. During the course of the negotiations on the New START, were there any side agreements, any informal agreements, any secret agreements with Russia that are not included in the treaty relative to any limitations on U.S. missile defenses or any other subject?

120 Committee’s ranking member Senator John McCain led the attack on the Republican side, highlighting the role of congressional leadership during key foreign policy debates.
Verification negative. One of the major rationales behind the treaty was its verification and monitoring provisions. According to the Treaty text, both sides would be able to gather data on each side’s forces and activities, including inspections to verify the numbers, types and locations of items limited by the treaty. (Woolf, 2016. 13.) Its self-explanatory that the verification provision is to an extent what makes or breaks the effectiveness of the treaty, and as such forms the backbone for the other provisions within it. Thus, the verification process was natural locus of Republican argumentation when questioning the rationality of the treaty as negotiated:

For me, it’s also a trust and verification issue. In the back of my mind I’m saying, yes, we’re going to do all these wonderful things, but how can we actually verify and ensure that we’re not being misled. (Senator Brown [R-MA], S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010, 43.)

Argumentative logic of the verification negative relied on the idea that United States could not trust that Russia would comply with the treaty it signed. As Senator Brown noted, “it’s also a trust and verification issue.” How does the United States make sure that they are not “misled” by the Russian government? Per the opposition, verification regime under START is not necessarily an even trade: “I have all the confidence in the world you’re going to tell them the truth. I think there are still some issues relative to the Russians.” (Senator Chambliss [R-AL], S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 153). Although the United States would uphold its end of the bargain, the administration should not naively trust that Russia would do the same.

Verification positive. As the Republican opposition warned against trusting Russian government’s benevolence, Democrats argued from “it’s better than nothing” perspective, rather than insisting on Russian trustworthiness. The Democratic argumentative logic went as follows: without a Treaty in place, the United States would have no way of monitoring Russian strategic nuclear weapons capabilities, thus endangering U.S. national security. With the Treaty and its monitoring/verification provision in place, U.S. would be able to monitor Russian nuclear capabilities and measure its policy against verified information. The verification positive -framing did not insist that Russia is a trustworthy partner to be made deals

---

121 This kind of silent acceptance that Russia is not exactly a trustworthy partner to be signing treaties of such importance with was answered by the opposition. See for example Senator Chambliss [R-AL]: “It’s unbelievable to me that we’d be discussing a treaty and, at the same time, discussing how likely it is that the other party to it is going to cheat, and how much they’re going to cheat, and they have a history of doing this.” (Senator Chambliss [R-AL] S. Hrg. 2010, 320.)
with. Instead, the argumentative logic was built on the idea that Russia would have more to lose by cheating than they could gain:

The costs and risks of Russian cheating or breakout, on the other hand, would likely be very significant. In addition to the financial and international political costs of such an action, any Russian leader considering cheating or breakout from the New START treaty would have to consider that the United States will retain the ability to upload large numbers of additional nuclear warheads on both bombers and missiles under the New START, which would provide the ability for a timely and very significant U.S. response. (Senator Levin [D-MI], S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 231.)

Russia would severely risk its own security by resorting to cheating, not to mention the political and financial costs. United States has the upper hand; Russia has more to gain by following the treaty as signed than attempting to cross the United States.

Republican opposition argued the logic set out above. Per the opposition argument, the Treaty, even if verified, would only serve to benefit Russia, who were already preparing to cut down their strategic nuclear weapons arsenal. By agreeing to sign, Russia could buy time to modernize its smaller nuclear weapons infrastructure, and the United States is willingly going along by agreeing to diminish its own capabilities.

He [Yuri Savenko, the first deputy chairman of the Duma Defense Committee] said, “Whether the Americans want it or not, they, after adopting the New START treaty, will give us a breathing space that we can use to reform and modernize the country’s nuclear missile potential. So, if the”—he goes on to say—“So, if the Russian nuclear arsenal is getting smaller, anyway, but its leaders believe locking us into a reduction gives them time to improve it, why would the White House make the New START treaty centerpiece of the arms control strategy?” In other words, what we’re requiring them to do, they’re already doing. That really is unilaterally what we would have to do. (Senator Inhofe [R-OK], S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 308.)

This idea of United States unilaterally agreeing to diminish its nuclear capabilities without taking into consideration the national security perspective - i.e. letting Russia tip the scale relative U.S. – Russia strategic balance on nuclear infrastructure voluntarily - was significant part of the Republican narrative framing a Democratic administration being weak on Russia in order to accomplish its leftist arms control agenda.\textsuperscript{122} Partisan interpretation of administration’s agenda is in the core of partisan

\textsuperscript{122} See for example Senator Sessions [R-AL]” I think this administration has a progressive, leftist aversion to national missile defense and to nuclear deterrence. They don’t like it, emotionally and
administration-framing. This set of framings highlights the administration’s leftist orientation towards arms control and nuclear-free world, and it also puts some of the blame to House Democrats for failing to provide needed funding to maintain American nuclear deterrence:

...major concern for me has been this issue of modernization and, in particular, the commitment not just of this administration but a commitment of Congress to put the dollars in place to make sure that we have the capability to modernize. (Senator Chambliss [R-AL], S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 320.)

The issue of modernization puts a partisan spin on the issue, and continues to paint the picture of a leftist agenda controlling U.S. nuclear policy. Here, leftist describes an attitude reluctant to admit the importance of strong strategic nuclear deterrence for U.S. national security. This line of argumentation compliments the missile defense negative-framing, as it confirms the idea that the Democratic administration has some sort of hidden plan to reach its overall strategy to rid the world of nuclear weapons at the expense of national security.123 Such notions were ignored by the Democrats led by the Committee’s chairman Carl Levin [D-MI], who reminded his colleagues several times about the long-held tradition to solve such essential national security questions in a bipartisan manner (bipartisan/water’s edge-framing). Issues of such importance should not be debated on partisan basis but as cooperative undertaking devoid of politicking and partisan gamesmanship:

The U.S. Senate has previously approved 10 bilateral arms control agreements with Russia, and before that the Soviet Union with overwhelming bipartisan majorities. Only 1 was opposed by more than 6 votes and, in that case, there were 19 votes opposed to it, and that was in 1993. (Senator Levin [D-MI], S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 2.)

The significance of the above statement by chairman Levin is strengthened by the fact that it was presented as the opening statement at the very first START-hearing. With regards to saliency, extra attention ought to be paid to opening statements by both committee chairman and the ranking member, as they precede opening statements by witness and the overall questioning of the witness’. As such, they offer the committee leadership an opportunity to set the tone of the debate and decide otherwise. That vision, I think, is affecting policy, and it causes me to be uneasy.” (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 313.)

123 See for example Senator Sessions [R-AL]:” The only problem is that if the President had his way, the three of you [nuclear weapons scientists witnessing] wouldn’t have jobs because he wants no nuclear weapons. It’s his stated goal, and this makes us all a bit.” (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 148.)
which aspects of the issue they decide to make salient on any specific issue. If we take a closer look at the actual structure of the opening statement by Senator Levin, the logic is clarified. The opening statement by the chairman includes 12 paragraphs. First two (2) of the paragraphs are used to introduce and welcome the witness’ as the courtesy dictates. Next paragraph (3.) discusses the national security implications and U.S. commitment to nonproliferation. But the fourth (4.) and fifth (5.) paragraphs describe the bipartisan fashion of conducting U.S. foreign policy with regard to nuclear arms policy “…during some of the most difficult days of the Cold War.” The United States Senate has managed to tackle the issue of arms control with Russia during the harsh days of the Cold War “with overwhelming support”, so there should be no reason to succumb to partisan frolicking on a treaty continuing the nuclear arms reductions “which [Republican] President George W. Bush negotiated” (Senator Levin [D-MI], S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 2.)

But if chairman Levin spent three (3) out of the twelve (12) paragraphs in his opening statement to describe the bipartisan tradition on the issue, he spent four (4) paragraphs to emphasize the arms control and nonproliferation aspects of the New START. Arms control and nonproliferation turned out to be a very partisan notion during the debates (NPT / arms control -framing), as argumentation based on the treaty’s effects on arms control regime and nonproliferation treaty (NPT) was used overwhelmingly by the Democratic side of the debate. The argumentative logic constituting the NPT / arms control -framing can be deconstructed from Levin’s opening statement. Regarding nuclear arms, “each nation clearly has more weapons than needed” and the New START would create a controlled mechanism to diminish nuclear arsenals on both sides, as such efforts “are also required by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).” Nuclear proliferation efforts have a direct national security link, as “proliferation threat is real and includes the possibility that nuclear weapons and materials could fall into the hands of terrorists or others who wish to threaten the use of or use nuclear materials.” (Senator Levin [D-MI], S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 2-3.)

5.4.2 Foreign Relations Committee

Senate Foreign Relations Committee held nine (9) separate public hearings on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia. Themes in the hearings included: The History and Lessons of START, The Role of Strategic Arms Control in a Post-Cold-War World, Strategic Arms Control and National Security and Maintaining a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Arsenal. (see. S. Hrg. 111-738). The hearings differed in tone and substance in many ways compared to the debate in the Armed Services Committee,
yet the opposition to the treaty, or more specifically senators who voted against the treaty, relied on similar framing devices compared to the Armed Services hearings. Of the 17 members of the committee four (4) voted against the treaty, whereas of the 30 members in the Armed Services Committee, ten (10) voted against the START. Another key difference was the fact that whereas ranking member in the Armed Services Committee Senator McCain [R-AZ] voted against, the ranking member in Foreign Relations, Senator Richard Lugar [R-IN], was a staunch proponent of the Treaty.

As for the framings identified in the Foreign Relations Committee, the logic of the debate was mostly similar to the Armed Services Committee. (see Figure 9). One framing was added to the analysis of Foreign Relations Committee: Russia positive / negative. In Armed Services the missile defense negative -framing was the de facto locus of Russia-based argumentation, while in Foreign Relations a specific Russian related argumentation was identified. Russia positive -framing refers to statements describing the treat as beneficial to Obama administration’s Russia-reset policy, or otherwise stresses the importance of improved Russo-American relations.

5.4.2.1 Dominant Frames

Figure 15. START by vote - Foreign Relations
Overall, the opposition to the Treaty was much less significant in Foreign Relations compared to Armed Services. In the nine (9) START hearings, 72 statements were identified by those voting for the ratification, while 16 statements were identified by those voting against it. Some similarities did occur, however, as the most dominant argument amongst those opposing the Treaty in the Foreign Relations was *missile defense negative* -framing (14), whereas those favoring it invoked *verification positive* (41), *NPT/arms control* (42), *national security* (36), *military/strategic* (32), and *missile defense positive* -framings (31). (see Figure 15.)

*NPT/Arms Control.* Three different arguments were embedded within the *NPT/arms control* -framing: terrorism, arms control relative to Russia and global nuclear proliferation regime. One of the key arguments supporting a strong nuclear arms control regime was the idea of weapons of mass destruction ending up in the hands of terrorist organizations. The argumentative logic behind such statements was that without a strong institutional control over nuclear proliferation, the risk of nuclear materials ending up in terrorists’ hands would increase, thus creating an existential threat to global security:

And, I think, in a time in which terrorism raised its ugly head in the world, in 2001, and continues to be a threat, the most important thing we can do is make sure those spent warheads that are laying around are captured, deactivated, and we don’t have the danger of a possible dirty bomb somewhere in the world. (Senator Isakson [R-GA] S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010.)

The argument of nuclear-armed terrorists is quite understandably strengthened by the post-9/11 context, but it is also consistent with the foreign policy strategy proposed by the Obama administration. According to the 2010 *National Security Strategy*, a document outlining the security policy of the administration, one of the security issues identified as most relevant to American national security was securing vulnerable nuclear weapons and materials. Such efforts, as by the president’s strategy, would be based on sustained “broad-based cooperation with other nations and international institutions…” (White House, 2010. 24.) Of all the three variations within the *NPT/arms control* -framing, the terrorism-based argumentation was most common among the Senate Republicans, whereas the other aspects of the argument were more visible in Democratic statements.

While the terrorism-based argumentation was more broadly used by the Republican side, as is consistent with the Republican inclination to highlight security aspects of most issues, the Democratic arguments further followed the strategy laid out by President Obama: pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons and strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (White House, 2010. 23.) Such
notions were further detailed in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review presented by the Department of Defense in April 2010, describing the top two objectives of U.S. nuclear policy as: 1) preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; and 2) reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. (Department of Defense, 2010. iii). The argumentative logic of the Democratic side of the debate stressed the international aspects of the treaty. According to this line of argumentation, not signing the treaty would send a negative signal to other NPT signatories and hinder the international efforts to curb Iranian and North Korean nuclear ambitions, as the Treaty:

…addresses our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, obligations, and therefore assists in gaining cooperation from other countries on key nonproliferation priorities […] helps strengthen broader United States-Russia cooperation, which is important in responding to proliferation challenges from Iran and North Korea. (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S. Hrg. 2010. 343.)

The above quote from the ranking member Senator Richard Lugar highlights not only the interconnectedness of nuclear proliferation efforts and international cooperation, it further highlights the connection between the treaty and cooperative efforts by U.S. and Russia to tackle nuclear weapons related issues with regard to Iran and North Korea. To speak in partisan terms, this connection was prevalent in Republican statements framing U.S.-Russian cooperation in positive terms, as opposed to Democratic statements which ought to be seen more in the context of President Obama’s Russia reset policy:

Secretary Perry, you wrote in an op-ed that this treaty is the first tangible product of the administration’s promise to “press the reset button on the United States-Russian relations.” Should we be concerned about the kind of message we’d send to other nations, for example Iran, about the United States-Russian ability to work together on nonproliferation concerns if we failed to

---

124 See for example “Do you have thoughts about what ratification or failure to ratify might—what signals that might send to the other NPT signatories?” Senator Shaheen [D-NH] S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 23.

125 See for example “We also should avoid the idea that the New START Treaty can reset our relationship with Russia on its own.

But recent difficulties in the United States-Russian relationship make the New START Treaty more important, not less. Distancing ourselves from nuclear engagement with Russia would greatly reduce our knowledge of what is happening in Russia, hinder our ability to consult with Moscow in a timely manner on nuclear and national security issues, further strain our own defense resources, weaken our nonproliferation diplomacy worldwide, and potentially, heighten arms competition.” (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 166.)
ratify a treaty that brings mutual security benefits?” (Senator Feingold [D-MI] S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 16.)

Verification positive-framing coupled with national security-framing followed rather closely the lines of argumentation established in the Armed Services Committee. Much of the argumentation relied on “if not, then what”-argument that if there exists no treaty between the United States and Russia on nuclear weapons, no verification or monitoring regime would be in place, thus endangering both U.S. nonproliferation efforts and American national security. Without a strong verification regime, United States would not be able to detect changes in the Russian military infrastructure relative to nuclear arms. Further, a strong verification regime builds a strong relationship between United States and Russia, and nuclear issues could be tackled with transparency not available without the Treaty. Basing on his own experience as someone who’s traveled Russian nuclear weapons sites, Senator Lugar [R-IN] argued that this very relationship is the key to a strong arms control regime:

And I mention this because occasionally people say, well, why do we need a treaty at all? What is the point of all of this? I have seen vividly the point of this. In terms of our national security, a lot of things would never have happened without there being this relationship. It is a very personal one that came about because of that format. (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 234.)

Although in many ways similar to the debate in the Armed Services Committee, those Republican senators who opposed the ratification did not invoke verification negative-framing in any meaningful capacity when debating the issue at the Foreign Relations Committee. Whether this was due to the more diplomacy-leaning nature of the Foreign Relations Committee, or for the fact that one of the strongest proponents of a strong, positive verification regime was a Republican ranking member Richard Lugar [R-IN], the debate did not have the same “Russians have cheated and will cheat in the future”-logic as it did in the Armed Services Committee.

Military/strategic-framing was used by both sides of the argument. Most salient military-related issue had to do with the issue of modernization. Both the president’s and Department of Defense’s strategic documents highlighted the importance of

---

126 It ought to be noted here, that the hearings in both committees occurred at approximately the same time. Although structurally the Armed Services Committee is analyzed here first, this by no means implies that the argumentation in the Foreign Relations Committee imitated purposefully its sister committee or vice versa.
modernizing America’s aging nuclear infrastructure. President’s National Security Strategy called for “…investing in the modernization of a safe, secure, and effective stockpile without the production of new nuclear weapons.” (White House, 2010. 23). In the document, the issue of modernization was clustered with the goal of “a world without nuclear weapons.” (ibid). Also, in the Nuclear Posture Review composed by the Department of Defense, “sustaining a safe, and effective nuclear arsenal” was preceded by notions of “reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national strategy” and “maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels.” (Department of Defense, 2010. iii.) The role of modernization was one of the key issues in the inner debates within the administration, as some thought it would derail the overarching goal of a “world free of nuclear weapons.” The Obama administration, however, ended up with a more pragmatic approach by introducing a plan to modernize U.S. nuclear infrastructure with a price tag of estimated $185 billion over the decade, upgrading or replacing nuclear submarines, creating new nuclear-capable bomber and fighter aircraft, updating nuclear bombs, missiles and warheads. (Lieber & Press, 2011.)

The argumentative logic of both sides of the military/strategic-framing was rather straightforward: both those favoring and opposing the ratification argued that the modernization is a crucial aspect of U.S. nuclear policy and preamble to scaling back U.S. nuclear capabilities. As per those favoring the ratification, the argument was that the Obama administration is committed to both modernization and maintenance of a strong nuclear deterrence as the basis of national security.
5.4.2.2 Competing Frames

Figure 16. START by party - Foreign Relations

Much like in the Armed Services Committee, *missile defense positive* and *missile defense negative* -framings formed the key competing argumentative dynamic in the Foreign Relations. The key Republican argument in the hearings was the assertion that the Treaty would in fact limit U.S. missile defense capabilities, and any such notions were unacceptable. The important difference in the debates was the fact that in the Foreign Relations Committee, seven (7) Republican statements were identified invoking the *missile defense positive* -framing (see Figure 16), most frequently by the committee’s ranking member Senator Lugar [R-IN]. Now, as mentioned, the presence of Senator Lugar and his strong support for a verification regime correlated with the absence of *verification negative* -framings in Foreign Relations, but his presence did not seem to affect the dominance of *missile defense negative* -framing as the key argumentative tool at the opposition’s disposal. Yet, Senator Lugar’s stance on the issue was acknowledged:

So, that’s why I am concerned when, at the end of the day, after all the discussions, we have irreconcilable differences with the Russians. We say this doesn’t impede our abilities, the Russians say, “Yes, it does.” And I have the
greatest respect for the ranking member, here, who says, “We need to say, over and over again, that this doesn’t affect our ability to do that.” But, yet, when you read the preamble, when you read some of the language in it, and, most importantly, when you read the unilateral statements, we have irreconcilable differences. This treaty means something different to the Russians than it means to us when it comes to protecting our people using a defensive missile structure. (Senator Risch [R-ID] S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 67.)

Of course, the ranking member did not simply assert that, as Senator Risch quoted: “We need to say, over and over again, that this doesn’t affect our ability to do that.” (ibid). Ranking member Lugar was rather strong proponent of the idea that the New START did not in fact impede U.S. missile defense infrastructure, and he went as far as to suggest any notion to the contrary was perhaps made for domestic, political purposes as opposed to national security concerns:

But I mention this because I think that proponents of the treaty are going to have to face this particular issue, if in fact this is being raised. If this treaty somehow inhibits in any way the defense of our country and accepts or ensures mutually assured destruction, why, that becomes a rather volatile message that somehow or other we were derelict in our duties, myopic with regard to the world in which we are. (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 240.)

Now the above quote is related to the debate over the role of U.S. missile defense system as a part wider national security infrastructure. Both sides of the debate in both committees acknowledged the role of missile defense against limited-strike capabilities possessed or pursued by Iran and North Korea. This notion is supported by the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report published by the Department of Defense in February 2010, which states that:

The United States is currently protected against limited ICBM attacks. This is a result of investments made over the past decade in a system based on ground-based midcourse defense (GMD). Because of continuing improvements in the GMD system and the number of ground based interceptors now deployed compared to potential North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missile capabilities, the United States possesses a capability to counter the projected threat from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future. (Department of Defense, 2010b. iv.)

The U.S. missile defense capabilities would be further developed to contain the rising regional threat posed by Iran and North Korea against mainland United States or America’s regional allies. Such threats would be answered by investing in mobile
missile defense (PATRIOT batteries, AN/TPY-2 X-band radar, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense batteries, sea-based SM-3 Block IA interceptors) capable of responding to limited threat posed by rogue nations. (Department of Defense, 2010b. iv-vi.) The United States ballistic missile defense would not be prioritized to combat threats posed by Russia. As the report states:

With Russia, the Administration is pursuing an agenda aimed at bringing the strategic military postures of the two countries into alignment with their post-Cold War relationship – no longer enemies, no significant prospect of war between them, and cooperating when mutually advantageous. (Department of Defense, 2010b. 4-5.)

Of course, not focusing United States ballistic missile defense capabilities against threat posed by Russia was not only a policy choice, but rather unrealistic notion in the first place. As the report concludes, ground-based missile defense (GMD) would be deployed against limited missile launches from any source, “it does not have the capacity to cope with large scale Russian or Chinese missile attacks.” (Department of Defense, 2010b. 13.) The issue became relevant in the debates over the New START Treaty, as Senator DeMint [R-SC] criticized the treaty for maintaining the Cold War mentality of mutually assured destruction (MAD) by establishing that United States would not try to attempt to develop and build a missile defense system capable of countering the mutually assured destruction -threat posed by Russian nuclear missile capabilities.127 The argument by Senator DeMint that U.S. would

---

127 For the exchange between Senator DeMint [R-SC] and witness Dr. Edward Warden (Secretary of Defense Representative to Post-New START negotiations, Department of Defense), see:

“Senator DEMINT. And I do not have much time. So I really would like some direct answers. Is the START Treaty a continuation of mutually assured destruction?

Dr. WARNER. The START Treaty’s concept of strategic stability includes the idea of having a secure second strike, the ability for both sides to be able to retaliate substantially or devastatingly against one another. That has been characterized as mutual assured destruction.

Senator DEMINT. And it is your understanding that it is the American policy that we will not attempt to develop a missile defense system that could shoot down multiple missiles. Is that your understanding?

Dr. WARNER. Well, that of course is the choice of each new administration. That is not embodied in the New START Treaty.

Senator DEMINT. But that is clearly the understanding of the Russians, that we will not develop any defense system that threatens their offensive capability.

Dr. WARNER. They made clear that should we develop a system that would threaten their ability to have deterrence, to have strategic retaliatory deterrence, that they would consider leaving the treaty. That was their unilateral statement, sir.

Senator DEMINT. Right. Well, it is a very important issue to us because I think if we told the American people that we are going to continue with the cold-war strategy with Russia of mutually assured
concede to Russia by accepting it would not enhance its missile defense structure invoked a rather rare counterargument within the Republican party by the ranking member Lugar:

I cannot recall at any point during this period of time that either Russia or the United States seriously discussed creating a sufficient missile defense that would stop several thousand missiles, all aimed with additional warheads on them, at the United States. (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 240.)

The argument made by Senator Lugar is that there is not, nor ever was, a plan to deploy a missile defense system capable of protecting United States from a large-scale nuclear missile attack by Russia. The argument made by some of the proponents of the treaty that establishment of such system ought to be U.S. policy is “as wild as it can be and not really a part, as I can see it, of any serious talk about arms control.” (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 381.) As such, either the opponents of the Treaty arguing for “an interesting Star Wars128 view” (ibid) have lost their perception of reality, or, perhaps motivated by something other than a serious concern for U.S. national security as it is established in real-world.

Bipartisan/water’s edge. As other lines of argumentation revolved around issue-specific framing, perhaps the most interesting part of the debate was the one concerning the role of Congress in a more general sense. Those voting for the ratification remained steadfast in their assertion that issue of such great importance ought to be tackled by its merits and on bipartisan basis. The water’s edge -framing highlighted the long-standing position of the United States on arms control vis-à-vis Russia,129 supported by authority figures130 on both sides of the isle and by several administrations:

128 Referring to Ronald Reagan’s famous Strategic Defense Initiative, also known as “Star Wars.”
129 See for example: “This is a good treaty. From the historical perspective, it is another step contributing to our decades-long process of responsible, safe, and secure nuclear arms reduction.” (Senator Kaufman [R-CO] S. Hrg 111-738, 2010. 213.)
130 See for example: “James Baker and William Perry said that ratifying the New START Treaty is crucial if few want to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of rogue states and terrorists. Henry Kissinger and Stephen Hadley explained that New START is fundamental to the United States-Russian relationship. James Schlesinger called ratification “obligatory.” And Brent Scowcroft warned that if we don’t ratify the treaty, we’d throw all of our diplomatic efforts to control nuclear weapons into “a state of chaos.”” (Senator Kerry [D-MI] S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 267.)
On a matter that’s vital to America’s national security, it’s more important than ever that we put aside politics and judge this treaty on its merits. This should not be a partisan issue. Some of the most important arms control treaties have been negotiated by Republican Presidents. Remember, it was Ronald Reagan who began negotiations on the original START Treaty, and George H.W. Bush completed them. That treaty was approved with the overwhelming support of Democrats. (Senator Kerry [D-MI] S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 2.)

The reference to the 40th President Ronald Reagan became a controversial issue outside the Senate, as several outside commentators engaged in a “what-would-Ronald-Reagan-do” type of debate over the legacy of President Reagan. (Baker, 2010). One such engagement was an op-ed essay published in the Washington Post, signed by such prominent Republican characters as: Henry A. Kissinger, George P. Shultz, James A. Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger and Colin L. Powell. The essay concluded that the Senate ought to engage the Treaty on its national security merits, and battle over domestic policy issues in forums where such battles belong to, for “it is, however, in the national interest to ratify New START.” (Washington Post, 2010.)

In the Senate, Democrats were eager to make references to such widely-respected Republican figures unanimously supporting the treaty and encouraging the Senate to approach it as a national security issue, not a domestic policy one. As such, statements arguing against the treaty were quickly framed as being partisan by nature, as it was obvious that any type of informed, bipartisan observer ought to support the ratification of the START. For example, as Republican senators argued within the missile defense negative -framing that the unilateral signing statement by Russia would de facto concede the decision-making power over missile defense to Russia, Senator Kaufman [D-CO] offered a different explanation for Russian behavior:

The simplest explanation is the best. I think it is pretty clear they are doing this for domestic political consumption. That is the reason they are doing it. And as you said so eloquently about Senator Lugar, who we have all learned a lot from, the preamble and these unilateral statements, if you take them into account, do not mean a whole lot in terms of international treaties. Is that fair to say? (Senator Kaufman [D-CO] S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 207-208.)

Republicans, referring to those Republican senators voting against the treaty, argued similarly to the Armed Services Committee, that the congressional process itself was partisan. According to the Congress/process -framing as it was used by the opponents of the treaty, the hearings themselves were conducted in a way that no real debate
was possible. This was due to the idea that the Committee had only invited witnesses who supported ratification, thus giving the Committee only one side of the story. As per the argument presented by Senator Inhofe [R-OK], both the Armed Services as well as Foreign Relations Committee had invited 17 witnesses, all of whom had been for the treaty: “I don’t know who thinks that can be reasonable, because it’s not.” (Senator Inhofe [R-OK] S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 354.)

Finally, both sides of the debate made some considerations relevant to European Security, Republicans more frequently (see Figure 16). Those voting for the ratification made a rather lazy argument that the Treaty was consistent with American efforts to protect its allies in Europe and elsewhere, with rather limited emphasis on the strategic or military implications for Europe or NATO allies. The opposition to the treaty, on the other hand, made a strategic argument relevant to European security and challenged the conventional thinking that symmetrical nuclear arms reduction is automatically a positive:

I think implicitly the treaty accepts the idea that these are two—the United States and Russia are two superpowers agreeing to parity as far as nuclear missiles. As I look at the size of our economies, our role in the world, again, it is another assumption that is very difficult for me to accept. The United States is a protector of many and a threat to none. Russia is a protector of none and a threat to many. Over 30 countries count on us. (Senator DeMint [R-SC] S. Hrg. 111-738, 2010. 385.)

The argument here is rather simple. Given the U.S. superiority as a global hegemony surviving the Cold War as an undisputed champion, why should the United States concede to the notion that its nuclear missiles policy ought to be viewed from the perspective of U.S. and Russia being equals, and limiting U.S. capabilities when its global position and alliance networks require it to remain stronger than its adversaries. Conceding to Russia, who Senator DeMint views as a “threat to many”, would be a great disservice to American allies, and given the strength of American strategic position, unnecessary.
5.4.3 Individual Breakdown

In the Armed Services, the Committee leadership was again active on the issue. Chairman Levin was identified making 13 statements, and ranking member McCain 10 statements regarding START. No single rank-and-file member separated himself or herself from the rest of the Committee in terms of activity in the hearings, as all 16 rank-and-file members of the Committee partaking in the debates were identified making one to four remarks. (See Figure 17.)

![Figure 17. START by individual - Armed Services](image)

Carl Levin was once more the one Democratic senator speaking on behalf of the administration. Levin’s argumentation was based on MD positive and verification positive -framings, highlighting the positives of U.S.-Russian cooperation for both nuclear cooperation and missile threats emanating from Iran. Very similar to debates over missile defense, Levin’s argumentation was closely tied to practical aspects of the treaty and its merits to concrete military/technical and national security considerations, with emphasis on the historical and bipartisan foundations of overall arms reduction efforts. Verification regime would help build trust between the U.S. and Russia, and a situation where no verification procedures were in place would greatly endanger U.S. national security. The administration policy was by no means a result of unsavory compromises with the Russians, but based on U.S. policy. Following Carter and Scott (2010), Levin could be once more defined as a policy
specialist, for the substantive basis of his argumentation was highly reliant on stressing the practical positives of ratifying the Treaty as negotiated.

Senator McCain’s approach to the START Treaty and the process of ratification in Congress was the first serious attempt to highlight the institutional processes as a policy-decision was debated and pushed through. McCain’s concerns over the treaty were closely tied to the perceived weakness portrayed by the administration vis-à-vis missile defense, thus making missile defense negative-framing the one defining argumentative tool at ranking member McCain’s disposal. Furthermore, he painted a picture of an administration misleading the Congress by saying one thing to the legislature and another thing to the Russians, with an overriding emphasis on maintaining Russia reset policy adopted by the Obama administration. Congress, and Armed Services as an oversight Committee, ought to take its time and not follow “arbitrary” deadlines set for it, as it debates such pivotal Treaty with significant national security implications. By highlighting the role of Congress and the Committee on one hand, and the negative implications of compromising with Russia on the other, per Carter and Scott’s (2010) definition Senator McCain’s stance in START debates is placed between process strategist and policy strategist.

In the Foreign Relations, the overall number of statements was notably higher compared to Armed Services, even though Foreign Relations had almost half the members of the Armed Services. The explanation is rather straightforward, as the Foreign Relations held more hearings (7) than the Armed Services (5). Two most active members were chairman Kerry [D-MA] (19) and ranking member Lugar [R-IN] (25), both of whom ended up voting for the ratification. From the rank-and-file members Senator Risch [R-IN] was identified making eight statements on the issue, making him the most active senator opposing the Treaty. (Figure 18.)
Chairman Kerry was identified in almost every category of framings identified. Yet, the most fundamental issue he consistently brought up as the basis of his argumentative substance, was the bipartisan background of previous arms control efforts engaged by both Democratic and Republican administrations. Of course, the national security related issues were also brought up, but as a rather striking departure from chairman Levin, Kerry on some level acknowledged the legitimacy of Russian concerns over missile defense U.S. capabilities. Kerry was also vocal on the process. Senate Republicans were concerned that the administration had conceded to Russians during the negotiation process, and requested the negotiating records for their review. Kerry was adamant that such measures were inappropriate and counterproductive to Senate’s treaty-making power and American diplomacy at large. For Kerry, the treaty had clear positive national security implications, yet the spearhead of his argumentation relied on the positive aspects of bettering U.S.-Russian relations and highlighting the bipartisan nature of U.S. arms control efforts. As such, Kerry could be defined somewhere between process strategists and policy strategist (see Carter & Scott, 2010.)

Senator Lugar was one of the staunchest supporters of ratifying the new START. Already in 1991, Senator Lugar [R-IN] and Senator Nunn [D-GA] worked together to pass the Soviet Threat Reduction Act to dismantle weapons of mass destruction.
and relevant infrastructure in former Soviet states, an effort better known as the Nunn-Lugar Program housed at the Department of Defense (Bresolin, 2014), making Senator Lugar one of the foremost experts on nuclear proliferation in the Committee and the Congress. Lugar’s argumentation stood on three core principles; nonproliferation and U.S. security, verification argument based on his personal experience through the Nunn-Lugar Program, and the bipartisan basis of arms reduction regimes. The more powerful aspects of his arguments were based on his personal experience highlighting the potential destructive power of nuclear arms, either in the traditional U.S.-Russian context or in the hands of terrorist organizations. Overall, Lugar could very well be defined as a policy specialist based on his experience on the issue, but his perspective stretched to include strategic postulations, defining him somewhere between policy strategist and policy specialist.

5.4.4 Discussion

Similar with the debate over missile defense in Europe, national security-framing was the common denominator on both sides of the debate. Both Republicans and Democrats had to base their arguments for or against the Treaty on its implications for United States national security. National security in this context is understood as describing values held by the U.S. government focusing on securing the nation from threats posed by real or imagined actors. As such, strengthening the state against the threats described involves the creation of external or internal policies, and securing the state and its citizens becomes the highest priority. (Campos, 2007. 2.) Term “national security” in U.S. political discourse is heavily tied to Russia. After the second World War, the American pre-war isolationism gave way to a new world view, painting a picture of America as the only true contender against aggressive Soviet Union. The new strategy of containment required permanent defense establishment to expand American military power globally. During these debates, the policymakers began to frame the discourse through “national interest”, and the phrase “national security” was invoked more frequently than before. (Hogan, 1998. 2-3.) Given the historical interconnectedness of U.S. nuclear policy and national security, the bipartisan use of national security-framing is consistent with the

131 Senator Lugar is also a leader of “The Lugar Center”, a Washington based institution devoted to global issues, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (see The Lugar Center, http://www.thelugarcenter.org/about.html.)

132 The hearings themselves were named” The New Start and the Implications for National Security” (sec. S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010.)
institutional and political context of the debate. Furthermore, as much as national security works as an argumentative tool, its overreaching area of effects limits the debate as it jealously demands to be taken into account for any other argument to be legitimate.

As the 111th Congress debated the New START Treaty, argumentative similarities with the 1999 CTBT –debate were evident. In 1999, the main arguments of the opposition were 1) they did not believe the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear arsenal could be assured without testing, 2) had little faith that treaties could stop nuclear testing and weapons development and 3) Republicans were fearful that the verification and monitoring regime could not detect cheating. Overall, the ideological strategy chosen by the opposition was to defend against possible (nuclear) threat rather than attempting to change the international environment (nonproliferation) (Deibel, 2002.) The argumentative logic of the START –debate followed much of the rationale set forth by the CTBT –debate 11 years prior; verification negative – framing highlighting the untrustworthiness of Russia and the military/technical – framing with a partisan twist painting a picture of an administration more keen to further its leftist NPT / arms control –agenda at the expense on national security, with the added effect of the missile defense negative –framing to describe suspiciously secretive, behind the doors negotiating process, during which the Obama administration gave Russia de facto veto over American missile defense policy.

The partisan nature of the debate was demonstrated by both sides of the debate. Institutionally, congressional oversight of the administration’s national security strategy is commonly seen as a positive, for it enables the Congress to hold the executive branch in check and thus shape real-world outcomes. (Waylon, 2014. 100). As such, the START hearings offered the Congress a chance to evaluate administration’s nuclear arms policy and bilateral cooperation with Russia. Previous votes on bilateral arms control regimes with Russia have been approved by overwhelmingly bipartisan majorities; United States Senate ratified the SALT I treaty August 3rd by a vote of 88-2, START I treaty October 1st, 1992 by a vote of 93-6, START II treaty on January 26th, 1996 a vote of 87-4, and the SORT treaty by a vote of 95-0. (Arms Control Association, 2014). By comparison, the New START Treaty was ratified by the 111th Congress December 22nd, 2010 by a vote of 71-26, three senators withholding their votes. (Senate.gov, 2010). Compared to previous votes, the Nay-vote gained significantly more traction compared to years past. All the Nay-votes were casted by Republican senators, including Armed Services Committee’s ranking member Senator John McCain [R-AZ]. Thirteen Republican senators ended
up voting for the ratification, including two members of the Armed Services Committee; Susan Collins [R-ME]\(^{133}\) and Scott Brown [R-MA]. (ibid.)

Now, let’s look at the bipartisan argument made by chairman Levin [D-MI], that the Congress managed to agree on nuclear policy “…during some of the most difficult days of the Cold War”, from two different perspectives. The argument made by Senator Levin relies on the so-called \textit{water’s edge} -argument, meaning that the when it comes to foreign policy, “politics stops at the water’s edge”, and politician ought to speak with one voice. Considering the relevance of nuclear policy to American perception of national security, the notion of \textit{water’s edge} ought to be doubly effective. Yet, given the partisan nature of the vote and prevalence of the competing frames, the debate on START seems a lot more like a domestic policy argument, something Milner (2015, 1) describes as “sailing the water’s edge”. Rather than analyzing the debate through \textit{water’s edge} -argument, it seems to correlate more accurately with the rising partisan polarization evident in all aspects of American politics.

Yet to simply conclude that the partisan polarization explains the vote is an oversimplification of a complex situation. In the end, thirteen Republican senators ended up voting for the ratification and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s ranking member Senator Lugar [R-IN] advocated the ratification. Although previous START and SORT treaties have been approved by an overwhelming bipartisan support, the vote on the New START imitated more closely the Senate vote on Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997 and on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999. Deibel (2005, 86-91) argues that instead of partisanship, American Post-Cold War foreign policy decision-making is characterized by factionalism, a phenomenon, he argues, being more prevalent amongst the Senate Republicans. Senate vote on CWC was approved by a vote of 74-26, dividing the Republican vote in much of the same way as the new START treaty. As Deibel argues, based on analyzing the voting behavior of individual members of Congress, the Republican Party is divided into \textit{internationalists} and \textit{unilateralists}. Of these two factions, the \textit{unilateralists} voted vehemently against both treaties, while the \textit{internationalist} faction sided with the Democrats.\(^{134}\) Thus, the explanation to the

\(^{133}\) Senator Susan Collins [R-ME] still serves as a U.S. Senator, having won a re-election in 2014. Her vote for the treaty proposed by the Obama administration and opposed by chairman McCain [R-AZ] is consistent with her liberal record (liberal from a conservative perspective). \textit{Conservative review}, one of many websites tracking congressional voting records, gave her a letter grade F on her “liberty score” based on her voting record, granting her a liberty score of 10% (100% being the “best”). (Conservative review, 2017.)

\(^{134}\) Interestingly enough, Deibel categorizes Senator McCain [R-AZ] in the \textit{internationalist} faction. In fact, Senator McCain voted \textit{for} the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and co-signed a letter to Republican leadership to postpone a vote on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as requested
divided vote within Senate Republicans\textsuperscript{135} in 111\textsuperscript{th} Congress is more likely to be found in ideology; “a radical hostility of unilateralists to national defense through treaties.” (Deibel, 2005. 86-87.) As such, neither the water’s edge -argument nor the polarization -argument in itself can satisfactorily explain the results of the framing analysis, and the analysis must be extended to examine the behavior of individual senators, especially in cases where inner-party factionalism is present.

Overall, as we look at the debate from Milner & Tingley’s (2015) distinction between distributional and ideological factors affecting congressional foreign policy behavior, both have their place in the START debate. Ideological factors are more evident in the statements highlighting the high politics side of the debate, i.e. overall role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy, nonproliferation and U.S.-Russian relations, whereas other aspects, such as modernization and research, had significant distributional consequences for constituencies and districts where American nuclear weapons complex, in its entirety, affected local interests.

In the Foreign Relations Committee, the dynamics of the debate formed differently compared to the Armed Services Committee. As pointed out earlier, of the 30 members in Armed Services, 10 voted against the treaty, whereas in the Foreign Relations out 17 members only 4 voted against. This translated into the debates, as the senators voting for the Treaty had a clear dominance over the flow of the debate. In the Armed Services Committee, 39\%\textsuperscript{136} of the statements were made by senators voting against the treaty, while in the Foreign Relations Committee only 18\%\textsuperscript{137} of the statements were made by senators opposing the ratification. A key explaining factor for the difference was that the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee Senator Lugar [R-IN] was staunch supporter of the Treaty, whereas the ranking member in Armed Services John McCain was against the ratification. Given the fact that both chairman and ranking member have both the ability to present opening statements as well as begin the debate, having both chairman John Kerry [D-MI] and ranking member Richard Lugar [R-IN] strongly favoring the ratification contributed to the flow of debate in Foreign Relations Committee to favor the ratification. Furthermore, distributional factors affecting Armed Services contributed to the more partisan nature of the debate, as members

\textsuperscript{135} According to a 2010 poll, of the voters identifying as Republicans, 38\% favored and 37\% opposed the Treaty, supporting the idea of a divided Republican caucus on the issue. (The Pew Research Center, 2010. 7.)

\textsuperscript{136} 23 out of 59 statements.

\textsuperscript{137} 18 out of 88 statements.
in Armed Services were vocal on nuclear modernization, which constituted a traditional “bring-home-the-bacon” issue for individual members in the committee. Given the eventual success by Republicans to obtain a pledge from the Obama administration to go forward with modernization efforts (Reuters, 2011), the case with START demonstrates the direct effects of *distributional* politics to U.S. foreign policy, as the promised modernization effort led to U.S. modernizing its European tactical nukes despite their rather minimal role in U.S. European military strategy (see for example Borger, 2015).

Ideologically, the advocates of the ratification relied on defending the established foreign policy of the past administrations. The emphasis on the bipartisan nature of the decision enforced the idea of a successful U.S. nuclear strategy in the past, as American foreign policy ideology was dominated by the Hamiltonian school of thought, placing U.S. as the center piece of the new world, thus responsible to act on a global scale to further American interests, one of which undoubtedly was the reduction of risks of nuclear war or nuclear proliferation. Of course, this was complimented by a Wilsonian idea of nuclear proliferation through international agreements and a multilateral approach to international politics, something brought up by Democrats like John Kerry. For Wilsonians, an international global order based on democratic values and avoidance of war required U.S. compliance evident in Wilsonian insistence on paying America’s UN dues. (Mead, 2002. 166). Wilsonian emphasis on international cooperation as the basis of stable global order finds its place in the international arms control regime.

Concrete benefits to U.S. security were highlighted by Senator Lugar, the Jeffersonian. Ratification of the START did not fight against the Jeffersonian ideal. During the Cold War, arms control was a key Jeffersonian issue. It was, at its basis, a way to avert such existential risks to American national interest, it saved money, weakened the military-industrial conflict, and was deemed worthy of a deep engagement in the global arena. The benefits outweighed the risks. (Mead, 2002. 211.) Thus, both Jeffersonian Republicans (see Deibel, 2005. 70-71) and Democrats, as well as Wilsonian Democrats saw the ratification as consistent with their views of American foreign policy. Jeffersonian inclination to support arms control regimes as the basis of sound American foreign policy had bipartisan support across the two political parties, as well as different spectrums of ideology. During the Cold War, all presidents since Kennedy supported arms control, including Jacksonian Ronald Reagan. (Mead, 2002. 212.) The Jeffersonian tendency to define America’s interests as narrowly as possible and to pursue most realistic policies to defend those interest
(Mead, 2002. 216) culminated in the dispassionate attitude towards the Soviet Union – later Russia – in negotiating nuclear disarmament with America’s great adversary.

The opposition, on the other hand, followed the similar logic – and similar actors (McCain and Inhofe) – as did the debate on missile defense. Jacksonians were very much alarmed by notions of America backing down from its missile defense plans in Europe due to Russian opposition. A notion that such deals would have been made behind the curtains was highly alarmist in the Jacksonian thought vary of elites. (Mead, 2002. 224). And furthermore, some brought up the idea that given United States’ relative power over weaker Russia, U.S. should pressure Russia, instead of working actively to achieve parity with a hostile country in a weaker position than the United States. Such nationalist Jacksonian views were not only suspicious of elites, but also of the international frameworks – such as Nonproliferation Treaty – restricting American independence of action on a global scale. (Deibel, 2005. 69.) What for Jeffersonians was a realistic approach to an existential threat against U.S. security, was framed as appeasement by Jacksonians. Jacksonian opposition to what was framed by others as a bipartisan effort to pursue key national interests was by no means a surprise. Efforts to frame START as a bipartisan effort and opposition to it as partisan gamesmanship had little effect on Jacksonians, arguably most obstructionist force in U.S. foreign policy; “least likely to support Wilsonian initiatives for a better world, the least able to understand Jeffersonian calls for patient diplomacy…” (Mead, 2002. 225.)
6.1 Issues Debated in 112th Congress

Figure 19. Issues debated in Armed Services Committee, 112th Congress

6.1.1 Armed Services Committee

Armed Services Committee in the 112th Congress held 39 separate hearings. Once again, the annual military appropriations process took the lion’s share of the Committee’s time, as Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013 were debated in about one third of all the hearings. No
specific hearings on European security issues were held in the 112th Congress, although the European situation was debated as part of appropriations process (United States European Command). NATO’s role in Libya was a target of further debate in a specific hearing on the American intervention, titled: “Operation Odyssey Dawn and the Situation in Libya”, held in March 2011. The Committee also held a follow-up hearing on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) it ratified in December 2010, titled: “Implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and Plans for Future Reductions in Nuclear Warheads and Delivery Systems Post-New START Treaty”, held in May 2011. (GPO, 2016.)

Although the issues related to U.S. missile defense system in Europe and the implementation of the New START Treaty gained attention, the table was turned in a sense that NATO/European security was now the most debated issue. This was due to the fact that no significant announcements regarding transatlantic security settings, such as 2009 decision on missile defense or the 2010 START treaty, were made. Instead, the NATO operation in Libya during 2011 was the defining transatlantic issue debated in the Senate Armed Services Committee.

6.1.2 Foreign Relations Committee

![Figure 20. Issues debated in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 112th Congress](image)

Senators Foreign Relations Committee in 112th Congress held 73 separate hearings on issues ranging from human trafficking in Asia to famine and drought in in the Horn of Africa. The difference in the number of hearings between the two committees – 73 in Foreign Relations compared to 39 in Armed Services – does not mean that the Foreign Relations Committee was simply more diligent in its conduct of hearings. Rather, the Foreign Relations Committee is freed from the burdensome process of annual defense budget legislation, which ties much of Armed Services Committee’s agenda. As such, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is left with more time to deal with issue specific
hearings related on overall policy issues, rather than the distributive-oriented Armed Services Committee. The most significant issue related to transatlantic relations and NATO was the intervention in Libya. (Figure 20.) The Foreign Relations Committee held five separate hearings on the issue, including one devoted entirely to the issue of congressional war powers as they related to the situation in Libya. The Committee also held hearings on specific European issues ranging from European debt crisis to unrest in Belarus. As this study is focused on analyzing transatlantic security issues, European issues as Balkan’s European Union aspirations, Eurozone’s debt crisis and human rights issues in Belarus are not included in the analysis. Given the importance of Russo-American relations, a hearing on the status of human rights in Russia was included in the analysis as it related to overall congressional perceptions on U.S.-Russian relations, and more specifically, relative to Obama administration’s Russia reset policy. Further, the Committee held one specific hearing a piece on both the future of NATO and the implementation of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Other European security and Russia related issues analyzed were debated in hearings devoted to international affairs budget and the situation in Ukraine. (GPO, 2016.)

Like Armed Services Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee regarded the Libyan intervention as the most salient transatlantic security related issue. (See Figure 20.) As stated, the issue was debated in five specific hearings before and after the Obama administration made the decision to push for an international intervention in March 2011. Of all the 95 statements identified in the 112th Congress, the Libya issue was the focus of 54, European security, NATO and Russia of 34, and the New START only of 7. Both in Libya debates as well as European security/NATO debates the Democrats were more active, at least as it came to statements delivered or questions asked. (ibid.)

6.2 Libya

6.2.1 Armed Services Committee

As the Armed Services Committee debated issues related to NATO, European security and Russia, NATO’s Libyan operation formed the center of the debate (see Figure 21) with 42 framings identified debating the issue, and the Armed Services Committee devoted one hearing to the operation (Operation Odyssey Dawn and the Situation in Libya). Libyan operation gaining most airtime of all the issues is by no means a surprise. It was a military intervention placing American blood and treasure in the harm’s way, it was initiated by a president who won the election with foreign
policy message defining America’s military interventionism as harmful, it stirred conflict with the Congress relative to War Powers Resolution and awoke questions of congressional approval to deploy American military force, it meant spending sparse American dollars at the time of austerity and diminishing defense spending, and it was an operation supposedly highlighting the role of NATO’s European member states’ contribution to NATO’s fighting force, as the alliance began to withdraw from its most sweeping mission ever in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{138}

\textbf{Figure 21. NATO / European Security – Armed Services}

Eleven (11) specific framings were identified in the Armed Services Committee’s debates over Libyan operation. The most frequently invoked framing was strategic / end game-framing, used in 29\% (12) of all the statements. The other major issues for the Committee were the operational leadership and NATO. \textit{NATO-led} -framing was identified in 24\% (10) of the statements, \textit{U.S.-led} -framing in 10\% (4) of all the

\textsuperscript{138} As United States began to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the statements highlighting NATO’s shortcomings began to drop off as well. Of the few statements regarding NATO’s contributions in Afghanistan, many held a positive view as opposed to the overwhelmingly negative framings during the 111\textsuperscript{th} Congress: “A failure in this first time at war, interestingly outside of the geographic area of NATO, would have terrible consequences for NATO’s credibility, and NATO’s credibility at this uncertain, dangerous time in the world is critically important to the stability and security of a lot of other places far from the United States, Europe, and Afghanistan. So I think we are at a point where the alliance is really moving together in a very positive way.” (Senator Lieberman (I-CT), Srg.112-80, 2011. 41.)
statements, and the overall question of *who leads?* was brought up in 33% (14) of all the statements. NATO’s role was identified similarly to previous chapter by both *positive* and *negative* connotations identified in the statements. *NATO positive* -framing was used in 21% (9) of all the statements, *NATO negative* -framing in 19% (8) of the statements, and overall NATO’s contribution to the operation was adduced in 40% (17) of the statements. Other significant issues brought up were *Multilateral positive* and *negative* (8), *humanitarian* (4), *terrorism / al-Qaeda* (6), *Congress / War Powers* (6), and *administration* (3). Of all the framings identified, *strategic / end game* and *terrorism / al-Qaeda* -framings were identified with considerable bipartisan frequency, whereas the rest presented notable partisan contention. (See Figure 22.)

**Figure 22. Libya -framings - Armed Services**

![Bar chart showingframings in the Libya context.](image)

*NATO-led* (10). This framing described the Operation in Libya as a NATO-led operation, as opposed to statements stressing U.S. involvement and those describing it as *de facto* U.S.-led operation. According to these statements, U.S. was merely enabling NATO, while European member-states took the lead in the operation.

*U.S.-led* (4). *U.S.-led* -framing described the operation as *de facto* American led operation, with NATO’s European member-states playing a complementary role.
These statements stressed that U.S. capabilities, as well as U.S. dollars, were the driving force in the operation.

NATO-positive (9). Similarly, to the framings used in the 111th Congress, NATO-positive -framings described NATO and its role in Libya as positive. According to these statements, NATO’s European member-states carried the torch in Libya and made crucial contributions to the operation.

NATO-negative (8). This framing described NATO’s European member-states’ military contributions, as well as political positions taken by some states, as a negative.

Multilateral positive (7). These statements highlighted the importance of a multilateral approach to Libyan military intervention. Multilateral positive -framing stressed the importance on United Nations Security Council (UNSC), NATO, and the Arab League to legitimize the intervention in Libya.

Multilateral negative (2). These framing argued that the multilateral approach was negative, either for military/strategic, or political reasons.

Humanitarian (4). These framings highlighted that the Libyan intervention was legitimized by the humanitarian nature of the operation. According to these statements, the intervention prevented a humanitarian crisis and mass atrocities, thus justifying the use of military force.

Terrorism / Al-Qaeda (6). These statements argued, that the chaos in Libya was exploited by terrorist organization, most visibly al-Qaeda, and that the ‘rebels’ supported by the NATO might be infiltrated by supposed terrorists.

Strategic / end game (12). These statements argued for the importance of some type of end game strategy, whether it was to remove Muammar Qaddafi from the power, or simply prevent a humanitarian crisis and limit the intervention as much as possible. Lack of specific strategy by Obama administration was criticized.

Congress / war powers (6). Framings arguing that the administration ought to consult and cooperate with the Congress when deploying American military force were part of a wider debate in the Congress about congressional War Power in contrast to executive as the commander-in-chief. These arguments stressed the importance of congressional participation in the decision-making process.

Administration (3). These arguments implicitly criticized the Obama administration for its handling of the Libyan intervention based on issues other than identified in the specific framings.
6.2.1.1 Dominant Frames

The dominant framing used by both the Republican and the Democratic side of the debate was the strategic / end game framing, used in 29% of all the framings identified in the Libya debates. Both Democrats and Republicans pondered the strategic choices for the aftermath of the conflict. Both sides of the debate, Republicans being more critical, were eager to hear administration’s plans for the end game vis-à-vis Qaddafi regime, and whether sending in ground troops would eventually become inevitable. Looking at the debates from a contemporary perspective, we know that the question of Qaddafi’s replacement became a moot point, as Libyan rebels took over Tripoli in August 2011, and the former Dictator was killed in October 2011. NATO’s exit strategy, however, was a legitimate cause for concern, as demonstrated by President Obama himself in the twilight of his presidency.

In a 2016 interview with the Fox News, President Obama admitted that the handling of Libyan operation was the worst mistake of his two-term presidency. When asked about the worst plunder of his presidency, President Obama responded: “Probably failing to plan for the day after, what I think was the right thing to do, in intervening in Libya.” and that

[We and] our European partners underestimated the need to come in full force if you’re going to do this. Then it’s the day after Qaddafi is gone, when everybody is feeling good and everybody is holding up posters saying, ‘Thank you, America.’ At that moment, there has to be a much more aggressive effort to rebuild societies that didn’t have any civic traditions. (Barack Obama, quoted in Tierney, 2016.)

One of the major criticism of George W. Bush administration vis-à-vis Iraq was his administration’s lack of planning for post-invasion Iraq. As argued by Michael O’Hanlon: “The post-invasion phase of the Iraq mission has been the least well-planned American military mission since Somalia in 1993…” and continuing that “…its consequences for the nation have been far worse than any set of military mistakes since Vietnam.” (O’Hanlon, 2005). O’Hanlon goes on to argue, that the United States Congress ought not to be blamed for American shortcomings in the post-war Iraq, for in its debates the Congress highlighted the importance of post-Saddam regime and stability. As argued by O’Hanlon, the Congress did its part by making the issue of post-war planning salient, and regarding the planning itself: “it [the Congress] was not well positioned to critique or improve or even know the intricacies of war plans.” (ibid.) But in many ways, the Iraq operation was considerably different that American intervention in Libya, for Libyan intervention
had widespread, multilateral legitimacy, it did not include the use of ground forces, and it did not have an articulated goal of changing the regime.

In his speech explaining to American people administration’s policy towards Libya and the justification of military intervention, President Obama highlighted the humanitarian aspect of the operation. The goal of the operation was to prevent a massacre in city of Benghazi, consistent with the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973. To achieve said goals, NATO would impose a no-flight zone with the purpose of protecting Libyan people from advancing Libyan (Qaddafi) forces. The president made clear that U.S. involvement would be limited, and the deployment of U.S. ground troops was off the table. Qaddafi had lost his legitimacy to lead, yet President Obama specifically excluded regime change from NATO’s military objectives regarding Libya: “while our military mission is narrowly focused on saving lives, we continue to pursue the broader goal of a Libya that belongs not to a dictator, but to its people.” (Obama, 2011.)

My question is getting at overall, what’s our objective? How do we measure successes in Libya? Meaning, if we have Qadhafi in power and he decides to wait us out, one of the concerns I have is, what’s our strategy if that’s the outcome? (Senator Ayotte [R-NH], S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 618.)

The above quote by Senator Kelly Ayotte, a Republican Senator from New Hampshire, exemplified Republican suspicions about Obama’s Libya policy. In her line of questioning, Senator Ayotte pressed Admiral James Stavridis, the Supreme Allied Commander, on the metrics of success regarding NATO’s mission in Libya. Admiral answered as a soldier, describing the operational goals set for the military, i.e. enforcing arms embargo, protecting civilians, and enforcing the no-fly zone. As Senator Ayotte stressed the overall strategic goals and removal of Qaddafí, Admiral responded with a line of argumentation much like that of Obama’s in his March 2011 Libyan speech, stressing the role of international and economic pressure to oust Qaddafí from power. Senator Ayotte questioned the strategy laid down by the administration, suggesting that military tools would be necessary to rid Libyans of their Dictator: “Don’t you think it will be difficult without some type of military involvement to get a man like Qadhafi to go?” (ibid.) Senator Ayotte did not, however, offer her take on whether the administration ought to resort to the use of military force to usurp the Qaddafí regime.

Questioning administration’s strategy in Libya was consistent with the general Republican sentiments, as they were articulated in a letter from Speaker of the House John Boehner [R-OH] to President Obama. In his letter, Speaker Boehner
acknowledged his respect for presidential authority as Commander-in-Chief, but questions why the United States went to war “without clearly defining for the American people, the Congress, and our troops what the mission in Libya is and what America’s role is in achieving that mission.” He goes on further to argue that even though the president had stated that removal of Muammar Qaddafi would be consistent with U.S. policy goals, the U.N. resolution makes clear that the regime change is not part of the deal. As such, the president has sent a contradictory message to the American people, for the U.N. resolution championed by President Obama is inconsistent with the stated goals as presented by the administration. Boehner continues to the fundamental question, identical to one asked by Senator Ayotte [R-NH]: “what is your benchmark for success in Libya?” (Boehner, 2011.)

So we’re in an anomalous situation in which we are conducting military operations with the goal of deposing a government or at least the leader of a government which we still recognize. That would lead me to assume that what we are doing in terms of our military operations are indeed limited and the goal is perhaps the implosion of the government in terms of Mr. Qadhafi. So I think we ought to be real careful about another end state; we’re talking about another end state for this individual. (Senator Webb [D-VA], S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 893.)

The faith of Muammar Qaddafi was in the minds of both Democratic and Republican senators. The above quote from Senator Jim Webb, a Democrat from Virginia, is an example of Democratic reservations about possible end game scenario regarding the Qaddafi regime. The argumentative logic is very similar to that of Republicans; United States, and its allies, are conducting military operations with the goal of removing the Qaddafi government, yet the United States still recognizes the very government it is attempting to dethrone. At the heart of such set of arguments is the contradictory nature of conducting a military operation based on the U.N. resolution absent of a mandate to dispose Qaddafi regime, yet the president himself has recognized that Qaddafi had lost his legitimacy to lead Libya. In that sense, the NATO operation in Libya was very different from American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the clearly stated military objectives were the disposal of Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes respectively. Although setting “end states” for American military operations have not produced particularly positive results (See for example Cordesman, 2016.), the strategic / end game framing paints a picture of amorphous strategic planning by the administration vis-à-vis the end game in Libya.

---

139 Senator Webb uses the term ”end state”, a military term referring to the specific situation at the end of an accomplished military mission.
Such ambivalence, “[to the average Louisianian, that doesn’t connect”, as framed by Louisiana Senator David Vitter [R-LA].\textsuperscript{140} (Senator Vitter [R-LA], S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 635.)

In his line of questioning, Senator Levin [D-MI] asked if the Libya mission would be expanded to include a regime change: “what would be required to achieve that military mission?”, leading him to further ponder whether the increased efforts by the military would “probably require boots-on-the ground, then?” (Senator Levin [D-MI], S.Hrg.112-80, 2011. 903.) Of course, the prospects of sending American ground troops to Libya were not especially attractive to members of Congress, as March 2011 polls revealed that 76% of Americans opposed ground troops in Libya. (CNN, 2011. 4). If the argumentation based on linking regime change to the very unpopular notion of ground troops appealed to the Committee as a whole, Senator Levin further pleaded to those supporting a multilateral approach by highlighting the adverse effects of regime change to U.N. resolution\textsuperscript{141}, NATO agreement and the support by Arab League. (S.Hrg. 2011. 903). As such, chairman Levin – already a proven and loyal supporter of Obama administration – justified the limited military goals by laying out the domestic realities (ground troops) and the importance of international consensus.

6.2.1.2 Competing Frames

As opposed to strategic / end game and terrorism / al-Qaeda -framings, rest of the framings identified in the Libya-debates were employed on partisan basis. (See Figure 22). Two most frequently brought up issues displaying the partisan division over Libyan intervention were who leads? and congressional evaluations of NATO’s role, contributions, and success vis-à-vis the military campaign. Based on the results of the qualitative analysis of Committee’s hearings, Democratic senators painted a vastly more positive picture of the transatlantic alliance, as nine (9) Democratic statements were identified in the NATO-led-framing, and eight (8) statements within the NATO positive-framing. On the other hand, the Republican statements regarded

\textsuperscript{140} For the full statement, see: “Admiral, the fundamental confusion about the situation in Libya is this: The statement is that we’re mostly there to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe. Everyone knows that the greatest threat toward that end is Qadhafi remaining in power and regaining control of the country. Yet ousting Qadhafi is not a goal of the operations. To the average Louisianian, that doesn’t connect. Can you explain that to us?” (Senator Vitter [R-LA], S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 635.)

\textsuperscript{141} See Senator Levin [D-MI]: ” If that mission were amended, expanded, to include that goal, does that have an effect or might it have an effect on the coalition and on the resolution?” (S.Hrg. 2011, 903.)
the role of NATO rather differently; four (4) statements were identified in the *U.S.-led* framing\(^{142}\) and five (5) in the *NATO negative* framing. (see Figure 22.)

At the core of the *U.S.-led* framing was the fundamental idea that United States is *de facto* leader of NATO. As evident by the NATO-debates during the 111\(^{th}\) Congress, both Democrats and Republicans stressed NATO’s European member states’ shortcomings in Afghanistan (see for example Figure 4). The Republican argument that the operation was *de facto* U.S.-led was very closely tied to the *NATO negative* framing, and both are analyzed as a type of “issue-specific meta framing”. The blunt force of the argument came from the rationale that European member states lacked the skill, capabilities, and resources to act as an effective force. This led to the situation where the United States would have to “foot the bill”\(^{143}\), both by paying for the ordinance and deploying its own capabilities to enable NATO allies to deploy their more limited capabilities. The logic is a continuation of the *two-tiered alliance* -argument; everyone is eager to stress publicly the shared values and critical nature of the transatlantic alliance, yet quite the few of the member states are happy to let the United States do the dirty (and expensive) work. Coupled with the sequestration context in the post-Tea Party Congress, the shear price of the campaign witnessed to the existence of two-tiered alliance paid by the American taxpayer:

Senator BROWN. […] Is it true that we have been flying virtually all of the military aircraft sorties into the region over the last couple of days?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, sir. I can give you just a rough idea of the numbers.

Senator BROWN. If you could, that would be great.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sure. We have flown the majority. In very round numbers, out of 1,600 sorties the United States has flown 980 of them. We’ve probably flown 60 percent of the sorties. As we now get NATO into the picture, you’ll see that U.S. percentage go down significantly and you’ll see the

\(^{142}\) It ought to be noted here, that as the operation progressed, more Republican senators acknowledged that NATO was officially leading the operation. These statements were not identified in the framings, as they held no argumentative value as such. They merely acknowledged that the official line was that the operational lead was given to NATO, yet this seemed have no effect on the tone of the argumentation itself, and thus only statements with specific argumentative value were identified, as was the case with all the other framings.

\(^{143}\) See for example McCarthy, a fellow at the conservative *National Review Institute*: “The bill for NATO’s services was willfully footed by the Obama administration — which had previously funded the Libyan regime on the oft-repeated grounds that Qaddafi was a valuable counterterrorism ally, but which then initiated a war against Qaddafi in the absence of any provocation or American national-security interests.” (McCarthy, 2011.)
allied component of it go up. For ballpark purposes, about 60 to 40 U.S.-allied. Just to give you one other number, if you don’t mind, the actual strike sorties, the bomb dropping, we’re roughly 50 to 50 U.S. and allied. The allied contribution has been reasonable and it’ll increase a bit as we get NATO more involved.

Senator BROWN. In terms of submarines, Tomahawks, et cetera, we’re the only ones.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. In terms of Tomahawk missiles, those were virtually all from the United States. There were a handful from the Brits, but for all intents and purposes the Tomahawks were a U.S. mission with a little bit of help from the Brits.

Senator BROWN. What’s the cost per Tomahawk?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I'll find out and get back to you, but I want to say $1.5 million.

[The information referred to follows:]

Each Tomahawk missile costs $1.5 million.

Senator BROWN. That’s my understanding as well. How many did we drop?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Two hundred.

Senator BROWN. That’s some real numbers. I’m concerned about when we get into these conflicts. Here we are, we’re wrestling with cutting billions and we’re dropping billions on the other hand. Like I said, who’s next, what’s next? I’m a little concerned as to where we’re going from here, but I’ll deal with that in other measures.

The above quote demonstrates the fiscal nature of the Libya-debate. Many in the Congress questioned if the United States could afford opening the “third front”, as it was already fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The question had stirred significantly more partisan response relative to defense budget, as the sequestration-policy together with the Budget Control Act of 2011 caused severe limitations on U.S. military budget planning, and the Act itself was borne out of a budgetary stalemate between House (Tea Party) Republicans and the administration. For example, the Republican Party Platform for 2016 stated that: “We support lifting the budget cap for defense and reject the efforts of Democrats to hold the military’s budget hostage for their domestic agenda” (Harrison, 2016.), highlighting the highly partisan nature of post-Tea Party appropriation processes. By September 2011, the Libyan operation ended up costing the American taxpayers approximately $1.1
billion, a price tag consisting of 26,000 sorties and over 9,600 strike missions, munitions, supplies and humanitarian assistance. To compare the cost of U.S. Libya mission to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the difference is rather stark. By 2011, the U.S. had spent almost $500 billion in Afghanistan and well over $1 trillion in Iraq. (CBS, 2011). Of NATO’s European member states, United Kingdom had spent £950 million\textsuperscript{144} by September 2011. (The Guardian, 2011).

Now, one could make an argument that the $1,1 billion price tag for the American taxpayer is not an earth-shattering burden to bear. The United States spent about $718 billion on defense in 2011, including $159 billion in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Plumer, 2013). Overall, the cost of Libyan operation was 0,15% of all the U.S. defense spending in 2011. Of course, this is not the way Senator Brown [R-MA] presented the numbers. His statement exemplifies the strength of a fiscal argument in the political context of 2011. Obviously, those opposing American military interventions and overseas deployments have always stressed the financial strains of what they deemed unnecessary military spending. But the Republicans on the Capitol have on the contrary suggested that President Obama has been ravaging the military budget and letting American military spending go down the drain. (See for example Kaplan, 2016). So, given the miniscule cost of the operation in comparison to overall military spending, the Republican argument that United States could not factually afford the operation ought to be seen as a supporting argument based on certain principles. The main argumentative logic still lied in the idea that NATO’s European member states refused to carry the torch when it came to NATO’s military might. As demonstrated by Senator Brown’s argument, “[i]n terms of submarines, Tomahawks, et cetera, we’re the only ones” contributing to the mission.

Senator CORNYN. Then finally, let me ask, General, I think there’s a mistaken impression that by the United States initiating this fight and then handing it off to NATO, it’s somehow handing it off to a third party that is not the United States. But the truth is that NATO could not function as a fighting force without U.S. support, could it?

General HAM. Senator, the Supreme Allied Commander is a U.S. officer. Much of the military capability that enables the current operation is provided by the United States.

Senator CORNYN. One of the perennial problems in NATO is that our allies do not resource either funding or in terms of personnel their military requirements like the United States. The United States spends more on our national security than I think the next 22 nations in a row. In other words, the

\textsuperscript{144} Approximately $1,5 billion using 2011 exchange conversion rates.
Republican Senator John Cornyn from Texas brought up all three key elements of the fiscally enhanced NATO negative and U.S.-led -framings. NATO’s military strength is highly dependent on American military (monetary) support, and the argument brought up by the Obama administration that the United States has somehow managed to finally persuade America’s European allies to do their part in the NATO context is voided by the de facto American leadership. The argumentation follows the logic of two-tiered organization, wherein other NATO members refuse to resource their militaries, and NATO’s military capabilities refer to American military capabilities. Thus, the assertion that the Libya mission would be NATO-led is based on the fallacy that NATO’s capabilities are somehow different from American capabilities.

Fiscal concerns were not lost to Democratic senators either. Although the Democrats agreed on most parts with the administration that the operational lead was de facto in NATO’s hands145, the senators did voice serious concern over the cost of the mission. Similar issues were raised by Democratic lawmakers in the House of Representatives. Rep. Brad Sherman [D-CA] criticized the Department of Defense for misleading the Congress about the actual cost of the Libya mission by using so-called “marginal-cost” accounting, which fails to consider the full cost of the operation. (McLaughlin, 2011). Some Democratic senators were equally confused about the way Pentagon seemed to produce their calculus for the full cost of the operation:

Here’s my struggle, because I heard that from the Comptroller also about a week ago or so. I read a report yesterday that the Air Force is burning about $4 million a day. So doing the math, on a 30-day cycle, that’s more than $40 million. So I guess, when do we get to that $40 million level? (Senator Begich [D-AK] S.Hrg. 112-80. 2011, 874.)

145 See for example Senator Levin [D-MI]: ”The President has consistently made clear that the U.S. leadership of this mission would be limited in time, and that there would be a handoff of command and control to a NATO-led coalition, which currently includes at least two Arab countries.” (Senator Levin [D-MI], S.Hrg. 2011, 536.)
Returning to the Republican argumentation over NATO’s capabilities and leadership role in the operation, a rhetorical breakdown of NATO negative and U.S.-led -framings paint a clear picture. (Figure 23.) Of the nine (9) instances of framing identified in the categories, two rhetorical arguments arise. First, championed only by the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee Senator John McCain [R-AZ], was the military argument, claiming that United States military capabilities ought to be used to their full extent. According Senator McCain, “rather than playing a supporting role within NATO, America should be leading” (Senator McCain [R-AZ], S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 840), a statement running in obvious contradiction to infamous “leading from behind”-approach attributed to the Obama administration146, and instead of working in a supportive role; “Our military should be actively engaged in degrading Qadhafi’s forces in the field, which could significantly increase the pressure on his regime.”147 (ibid). Second, championed by Republican senators other than John McCain, most of the argumentation within the NATO negative and U.S.-led -framings tackled the issue by highlighting either the fiscal consequences for the United States, or the already familiar two-tiered alliance -argument. (See Figure 22.)

Figure 23. Argumentative breakdown of U.S.-led and NATO negative -framings by Republican Senators - Armed Services

146 Foreign policy strategy termed as "leading from behind" and attributed to the Obama administration was used by the Republicans to criticize President Obama’s foreign policy approach, yet the origins of the term itself remain clouded. According to Obama White House in the 2011, no such strategy was decided upon by the administration, and such term was not publicly used by President Obama himself. (Rogin, 2011.)

147 See Senator McCain [R-AZ]: “I’m very grateful that we have capable friends, especially our Arab partners and NATO allies, who are making critical contributions to this mission. But for the United States to have withdrawn our unique air-to-ground capabilities at this time is only increasing the odds that this conflict will last longer, that more civilians will be lost unnecessarily, and that what began as a peaceful protest could turn into a long and bloody stalemate.” (Senator McCain [R-AZ], S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 840). Senator McCain was the only notable Republican, who argued that U.S. ought to maintain the military lead, and one who did not once use the fiscal arguments in his statements.
The U.S.-led framing was also closely tied to multilateral negative framing, identified only in two (2) statements by Republican senators, but the statements themselves offer a revealing interpretation of prevailing attitudes towards international organizations and American foreign policy decision-making. (See Figure 22.) The unilateralist approach to America’s foreign policy, most notably evident in the George W. Bush administration, derives from the post-Cold War realization that the international system is unipolar, with the United States as the sole superpower with little reliance on alliances, evident for example by United States outspending Europe 5 to 1 in military research and development. As such, United States is capable “to project force where and when it desires, often reasonably confident of quick victory, low casualties, and little domestic fallout.” (Moravcsik, 2006. 2.) Regarding the Libya operation, two arguments based on criticizing Obama administration insistence to negotiate with U.N. and NATO before engaging in Libya were picked up from the debate. First, an argument made by likes of John McCain [R-AZ], that the United States ought to prioritize military realities over coalition building, and U.S. failure to act unilaterally before U.N. and NATO commitments were secured, adversely affected the operational success of American intervention:

At least in the view of some of us, an opportunity was passed up by not invoking a no-fly zone 3 weeks ago, which would have then prevented Qadhafi from using his superior armor and air power to drive the rebels all the way back to Benghazi. There’s an upside and a downside to seeking coalitions. There is an argument to it that you should act in warfare when the opportunities present themselves. (Senator McCain [R-AZ] S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 600.)

If Senator McCain’s argument was that U.S. ought to use American military power when most efficient relative to military realities on the ground, Senator Sessions [R-AL] questioned the overall value, and desirability, of seeking coalitions when critical issues are at stake:

Senator SESSIONS. Additional language comes from the U.N., apparently, which is nice to have. I would ask you, Admiral Stavridis, what if China had vetoed that resolution? What if Turkey or some other country in the NATO family objected? What if the Arab League had some objections to this? Would the United States then stand by and allow a slaughter to occur?

Admiral STAVRDIS. That’s a decision that would squarely rest with the President in terms of making an executive branch decision and my point in saying that the U.N. Security Council resolution was a good thing to have is
that it simply broadens the mandate. From a military officer’s perspective, the U.N. Security Council resolution, sir, lays out those military tasks very clearly. In that way, it was helpful.

Senator SESSIONS. That is interesting, that you seem to be taking, as your command, the U.N. and the rules of engagement they have authorized, and we don’t have any U.S. rules of engagement that I’ve understood with clarity, certainly not from Congress. It’s not your fault. I’m just saying that the extent to which Congress has been bypassed in this process is rather breathtaking. I hope there’s no suggestion that we’re establishing a precedent by which the United States won’t act unless multiple international bodies approve that action, because I remember the famous Patton quote, “A good plan violently executed today is better than a perfect plan tomorrow.” Sometimes that means a lot of lives at stake. Proper, prompt, aggressive action can be decisive in military conflicts, is not that true, Admiral Stavridis? Delay can be fatal to the success of an operation? (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg., 2011. 626-627.)

The above quote from Alabaman Senator Jeff Sessions goes a step further than the military-based argumentation laid down by John McCain. It presents a scenario wherein the United States would have based its decision to intervene on the approval of U.N. and NATO resolutions - as opposed to acting based on U.S. unilateral interests or to prevent a humanitarian crisis - and one of the UNSC members or a NATO ally would have objected, effectively vetoing a required unanimous support for the operation. In this scenario, would U.S. have made the decision to back down and let the slaughter continue? To highlight the obscenity of replacing congressional consultation with international mandates, and sacrificing operational military realities to seeking an international consensus, Senator Sessions invokes the authoritative figure of General George S. Patton (1885-1945), the hero of the Battle of the Bulge. (History.com, 2009). Delaying the military operations to seek a broad international coalition was presented as a fool’s errand in any case, even more so while such coalition building replaced the Congress as part of the decision-making process.

Republicans in the Armed Services Committee took exception not only to the decision to intervene itself, but perhaps even more forcefully to the process. Congress / war powers and administration – framings were identified predominantly in statements made by Republican senators, although one Democratic statement was identified (Senator Jim Webb [D-VA]) within aforementioned framings.148 The argumentative

148 See: “I’ve had concerns about the way that this decision was made by the President. This was an unilateral decision to use military force when it came to the way that the U.S. Government is structured. We were not under attack. We were not under an imminent threat of attack. We were not responding to localized attack on our people, as we did in 1986 when I was in the Pentagon. I fully
logic was simple, yet based in one of the defining questions of limits to presidential power in projecting American military might globally. The Republican opposition to unilateral action by President Obama, unilateral relative to the Congress, rose from the assertion that the administration ought to have consulted the United States Congress prior to making the decision to intervene, and United States Congress ought to have functioned in its institutional - if not constitutional - function by voting on a congressional resolution:

You stated in response to a question from our chairman that it was important to have a U.N. resolution and an international coalition. Don’t you think that it also would have been helpful to have a congressional resolution that specifically authorized the military strike against Libya, given that there was no national emergency on our part? (Senator Collins [R-ME], S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 622.)

The statement by Senator Susan Collins, a Republican from Maine, sheds light on the issue from two interesting perspectives. First, it mentions the fact that the administration found time to form coalitions and seek international support from United Nations, yet it did not see any need to involve Congress in the discussion. The argument postulates, that the president prioritized organizing international legitimacy for his decision to intervene in Libya at the expense of U.S. Congress. Similar sentiments were echoed by Senator Jeff Sessions (Senator Sessions, S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 626), noting: “we got approval from a lot of different places [U.N. and NATO resolutions], but we don’t have one from Congress.” In a sense, the argumentative substance of Congress / war powers is linked with the multilateral negative –framing, as the latter criticized the administration for negotiating international consensus at the expense of operational realities. To highlight the glaring indifference to the Congress, the American president was willing to sacrifice the military edge to achieve U.N. and NATO support, yet he saw it fit to leave Congress on the sidelines vis-à-vis the decision-making process.

Second, President Obama made his decision to circumvent the Congress at the time when no clear national emergency was evident. The rationale behind this line of argumentation can be tracked back down to two different notions; one political, one legalistic and institutional. Politically, the conservatives had already begun to frame Obama as weak on foreign policy, starting with what they conceived a politically-motivated withdrawal from Afghanistan, and later culminating in Obama’s support what we did in 1986 after the Qadhafi regime had supported the killing of some of our soldiers in Berlin. We were not rescuing Americans, as we have in many periods of our history, including Grenada or in the piracy situation.” (Senator Webb [D-VA], S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 893.)
perceived failures in Syria, Iraq, Iran and regarding Russia. (See for example Harris, 2016). Some Republicans in the Senate drew similar conclusion prior to Libyan intervention from what they understood as concessions to Russia regarding missile defense and the New START. So, from a Republican perspective it might have been less than ideal to criticize President Obama for his decision to use military force _per se_, but rather stress the lack of national emergency as the legitimacy for circumventing the Congress.\textsuperscript{149} Furthermore, the War Powers Resolution appears to be clear on the circumstances legitimating the use of American military:

The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces. (WPR)

As such, the insistence of a congressional consultation and resolution is truly consistent with the legitimate authority of the United States Congress as articulated in the War Powers Resolution. Further, the last Republican President George W. Bush managed to get congressional resolutions authorizing the use of American military both in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Republican argument for congressional resolution was echoed by the House of Representatives operating with a Republican majority. In a March 2011 letter to President Obama, Speaker of the House John Boehner [R-OH] presented the administration several critical questions relating to president’s decision to intervene in Libya, including a notion regarding congressional consultation: “It is regrettable that no opportunity was afforded to consult with Congressional leaders, as was the custom of your predecessors…” And consistent with the Republican arguments in the Armed Service, Boehner did not miss the fact that the administration found plenty of time to persuade the international community, yet little to convince the American people or the Congress: “At the same time, by contrast, it appears your Administration has consulted extensively on these same matters with foreign entities such as the United Nations and the Arab League.” (Boehner, 2011.)

\textsuperscript{149} See for example Senator Sessions [R-AL]: "I would make one more complaint, that this administration apparently found time to consult with the U.N. at length, with NATO at length, but a totally unacceptable amount of time spent with the U.S. Congress to explain why they felt it necessary to commit the U.S. military to this action. I think we should let this thing calm down a little bit. At some point we need to talk more in detail about congressional role under particularly these military actions that are actions of choice and not defending the direct interests of the United States. (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 876.)
The leading arguments of the Democratic senators were exactly the opposite relative to the Republican side of the debate, and by their argumentative logic mutually exclusive; i.e. NATO positive and NATO led -framings as the opposite of Republican-led NATO negative and U.S.-led -framings, and the juxtaposition in the framing of multilateral approach to American foreign policy decision-making. Demonstrating the partisan nature of the debate, only one Republican statement was identified both in NATO positive and NATO-led -framings.\(^{150}\) (See Figure 22.) Furthermore, it ought to be mentioned that to be identified in the NATO positive -framing, the statement had to argue that the North Atlantic alliance offered indisputable value to the Libya mission, and it played a genuinely positive role in the operation either militarily or due to the inherent value of operating with an international coalition as opposed to unilateral U.S. action. Overall, much like the case with Republican opposition to administration policy, the Democratic support was formed by a combination of inter-linked framings, namely: NATO positive, -NATO-led and multilateral positive. (See Figure 22.) These three framings constituted 64% of all the Democratic framings identified in the Armed Services Committee.

I understand now as of April 4, $608 million has been spent in Libya. It was $550 million. There’s been an additional $58 million since then. With that being said, if we’ve been asked to come in by the people, the neighbors of Libya, why won’t they pay? Why do we have to, as the American people, burden this financial obligation? Secretary Gates said that he did not expect to get any money at all from the other ones because they don’t see it’s of imminent interest or an imminent threat. I’m thinking, if you have a bad neighbor, a thug in the neighborhood, you want to get rid of that thug. But if they don’t think, and they’re living there, why should we interject ourselves? Because I applaud basically getting the agreement from NATO and the other, Arab League, before we did go in, because we tried going alone and we see where that’s ended up and we’ve been in the longest war in the history of the United States. (Senator Manchin [D-WV] S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 888.)

\(^{150}\) It should be noted, that the only NATO positive -framing identified in a Republican statement was one by Senator McCain [R-AZ], who’s overall attitude towards the transatlantic alliance in the debates was notably positive compared to rest of his party, and even in some cases, compared to his Democratic colleagues: “I’m very grateful that we have capable friends, especially our Arab partners and NATO allies, who are making critical contributions to this mission. But for the United States to have withdrawn our unique air-to-ground capabilities at this time is only increasing the odds that this conflict will last longer, that more civilians will be lost unnecessarily, and that what began as a peaceful protest could turn into a long and bloody stalemate.” (Senator McCain [R-AZ], S.Hrg.112-80. 2011. 840.)
The quote from West Virginian Joe Manchin demonstrates the complexity characterizing the prevalent Democratic sentiments regarding the operation. Similarly, to Republicans, Democrats took exception to spending American dollars in Libya. In Joe Manchin’s statement, he brings up the question of fairness; if people surrounding Libya “don’t see it’s of imminent interest or an imminent threat” (ibid), and thus refused to contribute significant resources to the operation, why should the American taxpayer bear the burden? If Libya’s neighbors, those who ought to be most imminently concerned, do not see the situation in Libya as a threat, why should the United States? Nevertheless, the resolution by NATO and U.N., as well as support from the Arab League, was framed in positive terms. In the statement made by Senator Manchin, he presented an obvious analogy to the Bush administration’s decision to intervene in Iraq unilaterally. Although the rationale of intervening, the financial burden during the sequestration era, and prospects of ending up with another failed military adventure loomed clear, the Democratic framing of Libya mission exemplified the internationalist tendencies of many in the Democratic party.

Certainly, the decision to intervene in Libya was not unanimously supported by the Democrats in the Senate, nor was it an easy decision to the administration either. President Obama was reportedly wary of another military intervention in a Muslim country, toppling another strongman in power with no clear idea how to replace him, and eventually most his advisors urged him to not intervene. Yet, with a strong support from America’s allies France and Britain, and with the eventual support from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the decision was made to intervene. (Becker & Shane, 2016.) The liberal part of the Democratic party was certainly not happy about the decision made by President Obama. Several liberal lawmakers made remarks about the unconstitutionality of American missile strikes in Libya, while Representative Dennis Kunich [D-OH] went as far as calling for impeachment. Describing the mood in a conference call organized by the Democratic caucus, one House member noted that:

151 Similar sentiments were echoed by the Republicans. See for example Senator Collins [R-ME]: “From 2001 to 2008, we provided $10 billion in Foreign Military Sales to Egypt, $10 billion to the Saudis, $2.6 billion to Turkey, and $2.4 billion to Kuwait. The Saudis have more than 200 F–15 fighters. Egypt operates more F–16s than all but three countries in the world.

I’m very concerned about the lack of Arab state participation in enforcing the no-fly zone. In fact, I believe they should have taken the lead. I realize that only the United States and a few of our allies have the capabilities to provide intelligence, coordination, and logistics. What is the reason that we’re not seeing more of a contribution from Arab states in the region, particularly those that do have significant air assets?” (Senator Collins [R-ME] S.Hrg.112-80, 2011. 622.)
Almost everybody who spoke was opposed to any unilateral actions or decisions being made by the president, and most of us expressed our constitutional concerns. There should be a resolution and there should be a debate so members of Congress can decide whether or not we enter in whatever this action is being called. (Quoted in Allen & Bresnahan, 2011.)

The disappointment felt towards the administration at the House did not translate to the Senate Armed Services, at least not to the extent comparable to House. Key actors in Senate Armed Services, Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Committees were prepared to back the administration (ibid), as confirmed by the frame analysis of the Armed Services Committee. (See Figure 22). The Committee members did voice concerns, such as the fiscal argument presented by Senator Manchin, questions about the Libyan end-game, and the possibility of al-Qaeda gaining a foothold either within the rebel forces or due to the chaos created by the grumbling Qaddafi regime. The Committee leadership, most notably Senator Carl Levin [D-MI], were decisively on the administration’s side during the hearings:

President Obama has taken a thoughtful and deliberate approach to the U.S. involvement in the Libyan crisis, emphasizing that a military mission be limited and have the support of a broad international coalition, including the endorsement of the United Nations (U.N.) and the Arab League. Securing the support and participation of an international coalition has been critical, both for regional and international acceptance of the use of military force and ensuring that the risks and costs of operations are not principally America’s. (Senator Levin [D-MI], S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 536.)

The quote from Armed Services chairman Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat, is from his opening statement of defense appropriations hearings for fiscal year 2012, particularly a hearing on European Command (EUCOM). The hearings, as well as subsequent African Command (AFCOM) hearing were the defining instances of the Committee’s Libya debate, especially the EUCOM hearings, which took place March 29th, shortly after the intervention began. As such, the opening statement by Senator Levin [D-MI] exemplifies the argumentative logic in defense of the administration’s policy. The argument begins with the assertion that the decision to intervene was made after thoughtful and deliberate considerations of U.S. role in the Libyan crisis. The result of these thoughtful considerations was the decision to limit U.S. involvement in the operation and to seek international coalition, including United Nations and the Arab League. Mentioning the Arab League and United Nations specifically creates space between the Obama administration and Bush administration. The American intervention is an internationalist undertaking, as
opposed to previous unilateral U.S. action. *Multilateral positive* -framing championed by chairman Levin first establishes that this military intervention is justified, and both U.N. and Arab League conformity functions as the basis of such justification, and exemplifies a progressive, cooperative approach to U.S. policy towards the Muslim world. Second, it responds to the domestic context of sequestration and budget control, by maintaining that the “risks and costs of operations are not principally America’s.” (ibid).

Of course, such notions appealed to publics war weariness and congressional fixation on defense spending. Unlike wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Libya mission would be “limited in time, and that there would be a handoff of command and control to a NATO-led coalition”, and to demonstrate the administration approach to its regional allies, this is a coalition “which currently includes at least two Arab countries.” (ibid). Another critical leap from the Bush doctrine is defined by the limited nature of the mission. The mission would not include a regime change, but rather the goal “is to make it possible for the Libyan people to have the opportunity to decide Qadhafi’s fate, just as the Egyptian people decided Mubarak’s.” (ibid). The reference to former President Mubarak of Egypt is consistent with Obama administration’s attitude towards the Arab Spring. Both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued that President Obama ought not to drop American support to President Mubarak too hastily, yet Obama’s younger aides, “the backbenchers” being Mr. Gates’ term, had argued for the moral nature of the Arab Spring: “Mr. President, you’ve got to be on the right side of history.” (quoted in Becker & Shane, 2011.) As such, the Libyan mission had its justification in the Arab Spring sweeping across the northern Africa, and the limited nature of the mission highlighted the role played by people reclaiming their rightful rights from a murderous dictator. Beyond the moral justifications, the *NATO-led* -framing established by Senator Levin clearly placed America’s role in the operation under NATO leadership and decision-making procedures. Regarding the possibility of arming the rebels fighting Qaddafi: “Such a step must be considered in the context of a NATO decision, it will require consensus.” (Senator Levin [D-MI], S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 536.)
6.2.2 Foreign Relations Committee

The framings identified in the Foreign Relations Committee differed from the ones in Armed Services. Overall, 11 framings were identified in the five hearings analyzed. (see Figure 24). Of the 11 framings, some were identical with the ones identified in the Armed Services (humanitarian, strategic, multilateral positive, multilateral negative, NATO-led, congressional, administration), some were new (partisanship, national security), some were missing entirely (U.S.-led, NATO positive, NATO negative), and some were slightly differently framed (opposition, fiscal). The most frequent framing identified was strategic, identified in 63% of all the statements. Strategic-framing was slightly more frequently identified in the statements made by Republican senators, as 78% of all the Republican statements (23) included a reference to the strategic-framing. The second most frequent framing, congressional (50% of all the statements), was also identified more frequently in Republican statements (identified in 74% of Republican statements and 32% of Democratic statements). Democratic senators were more frequently identified framing the issue as humanitarian (identified in 42% of Democratic statements), opposition (identified in 48% of Democratic statements, partisanship (identified in 19% of Democratic statements), NATO-led (identified in
19% of Democratic statements), and *multilateral positive* (identified in 48% of Democratic statements). Republican senators were more likely to frame the issue *administration* (identified in 39% of Republican statements), *fiscal* (identified in 30% of Republican statements), and *national security* (identified in 26% of Republican statements). (Figure 24)

**Partisanship** (8). Statements describing the process of congressional decision-making and debate in partisan terms. Common phenomena observed in the debates was Democrats framing the opposition by Republicans as partisan by nature, and Republicans refuting such claims.

**National Security** (8). Statements framing the Libyan intervention in national security terms, either claiming that intervention in Libya served American national security interests, while other claimed the contrary. Argumentatively close to *strategic* -framing, but with a more explicit emphasis on American national security.

**Opposition** (20). Statements evaluating the nature and significance of Libyan opposition to Qaddafi. Statements attempted to poke at the question “who do we fight with?”, with notably less emphasis on the al-Qaeda or terrorism aspects evident in the Armed Services debates.

**Fiscal** (9). Statements framing the rationale of American Libya intervention in fiscal terms, stressing most notably the domestic fiscal realities and irresponsibility of administration in waging an expensive war while pursuing budget cuts at home. Framing was different from Armed Services Committee, where senators brought up the *fiscal* issue in connection to *U.S.-led* -framing, a framing absent from Foreign Relations Committee.

### 6.2.2.1 Dominant Frames

*Strategic* -framing turned out to be the most frequently used dominant framing identified in the Libya hearings. Overall, 158 framings were identified in the hearings, and 34 of them framed the issue in *strategic* terms. (See Figure 24). This constitutes 22% of all the framings identified, 25% of all the Republican framings and 19% of all the Democratic framings. Once we dig into the substance of arguments within the *strategic* -framing, two specific lines of argumentation are identified; one emphasizing the *wider strategic context* and other the *end-game* of Libyan operation. (See Figure 25). Both Republicans and Democrats framed the issue in *wider strategic context* and in specific *end-game* scenarios with equal frequency. Precisely half the Democratic and Republican framings within the *strategic* -framing framed the issue with broad strokes, and half within the specific, Libyan context.
End-game-framing followed a similar logic to Armed Services Committee. Senators on both sides of isle, those favoring the intervention and the ones critical of it, brought up the issue of post-Qaddafi Libya. Overall, the strategic-framing of Libyan intervention was closely tied to perceived American shortcomings in Iraq. As the Bush administration was discussing whether invading Iraq and disposing Saddam Hussein’s regime was the right choice, Secretary of State Colin Powell reportedly warned President Bush that after military victory, President Bush would “own” Iraq with all its problems; “You break it, you own it.” (quoted in Safire, 2004). In 2011, the United States was aware of the price paid for owning Iraq and all its problems. As the administration was still indecisive on the issue, ranking member of the Committee, Senator Richard Lugar [R-IN], noted that “given the costs of a no-fly zone, the risks that our involvement would escalate…the unpredictability of the endgame in a civil war” led to the conclusion that it was doubtful whether ”United States interests would be served by imposing a no-fly zone over Libya.”(Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 112-56, 2011. 4.) The argumentative logic remained in place even after the Obama administration made the decision to intervene:

In the last decade alone, we have witnessed mission creep, intelligence failures, debilitating conflicts between civil and military leaders, withdrawal of coalition partners, tribal feuding, corruption by allied governments, unintended civilian casualties, and many other circumstances that have complicated our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and raised their cost in lives and treasure. The last 10 years also have illuminated clearly that initiating wars and killing the enemy is

---

152 Both Republicans and Democrats were wary of strategic implications of intervention in the pre-intervention context, as evident by the following statement by Senator Webb: “I remember when I was a journalist in Beirut, when the Marines were there in 1983. During one firefight a Marine turned around to me and said, “never get involved in a five-sided argument.” This tends to repeat itself in our policies in this part of the world. So any approach that we take to a situation, even with some of the compelling circumstances in Libya, really needs to be taken carefully with the understanding that there are down sides, that these things are easily begun and very difficult to end and to adhere to the principles of international law. (Senator Webb [D-VA] S.Hrg. 112-56, 2011. 30.)
far easier than achieving political stability and reconstructing a country when the fighting is over. This is why going to war should be based on the United States vital interests. It is also why Congress has an essential role to play in scrutinizing executive branch rationalizations of wars and their ongoing management. This holds true no matter who is President or what war is being fought. (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 112-362, 2011. 4.)

The above quote from Senator Lugar exemplifies the strategic -framing both from the Libyan specific end-game context and the wider strategic context. First problem was the risk of “mission creep”, a term used to describe a sort of snowball-effect, where limited operations grow both in size and scope until it becomes extremely difficult to detach from the operation altogether. Senator Lugar refers to “last decade”, highlighting the effects of American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq and the consequent toll in both “lives and treasure”. But “mission creep” in American military interventions reaches farther down the history than the War on Terror. In the 1960’s, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution led to 500 000 American soldiers being deployed to Vietnam, with 60 000 American casualties. In the early 1990’s, American peacekeeping mission in Somalia led to direct American military operations against Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid, resulting in urban warfare on the streets of Mogadishu. Of course, the U.S. operations in Somalia paled in comparison to the toll of its nation building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. (Korb, 2013.) Thus, “mission creep” adds to the notion of “if you break it, you own it”, creating a toxic mix of American commitment into a crisis not clearly defined as crucial to American national security, nor national interest. As such, the situation in Libya ought to be seen in the wider context of American global involvement in the Arab world, given America’s experience and the overall logic of military operations. To this end, Senator Lugar argues that “going to war should be based on the United States vital interests.” (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 112-362, 2011. 4). All the factors Lugar identified complicating America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, “intelligence failures, debilitating conflicts between civil and military leaders, withdrawal of coalition partners, tribal feuding, corruption by allied governments, unintended civilian casualties” (ibid), factored in the decision to intervene in Libya. Overall, the Republican argumentation during the hearings, especially as articulated by ranking member Lugar, stressed the military-strategic implications of the Libyan intervention, or more specifically, the decision to intervene in a civil war with little demonstrated effect on American national security interests.153

153 See for example: “Given all that is at stake in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere in the Islamic world, a rational strategic assessment would never devote
But I am convinced that because of the actions taken by NATO and by the GCC, by the Arab League, and the opposition themselves, I believe that the Libyan people have been given a fighting chance for a better future, and I think catastrophe was averted in Benghazi. Unlike Iraq or Afghanistan, we have been able to achieve what has been achieved with broad international support, in fact, with other NATO members really carrying the brunt of the load. I think there can be no denying that had the international community not taken action against Qadhafi, I think the situation in Libya would be far worse today. But also I think the message across the Arab world, across North Africa and into the Middle East, would have been significantly damaging to the aspirations of the Arab Spring and to other interests that we have. (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 112-611, 2011. 1.)

The above quote from Committee chairman John Kerry [D-MA] demonstrates the argumentative logic as set forth by the Democrats supporting administration’s Libya policy. Further deconstruction of Kerry’s statement reveals not only the use of strategic-framing to justify the administration policy, but also reasons why this course of action is consistent with the wider strategic goals of the United States. First, it invokes the multilateral-positive-framing, which, unlike in the Armed Services, enjoyed support from both sides of the isle. Libyan intervention, or rather, President Obama’s Libyan policy altogether, was justified because the administration managed to gather a wide international coalition before engaging in hostilities. To highlight his point, Kerry makes a comparison to Iraq and Afghanistan, where United States, as argued by Kerry, had failed to garner international support for its policy. This time NATO members are “really carrying the brunt of the load.” (ibid). Although some had strongly argued that the Obama administration had no clear foreign policy doctrine\(^\text{154}\), the line of argumentation put forward by Senator Kerry echoes President Obama’s pre-election views. In a 2008 foreign policy speech, then Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama argued, that instead of gathering wide-ranging international support in the post-9/11 environment: “…we have lost thousands of American lives, spent nearly a trillion dollars, alienated allies and neglected emerging threats - all in the cause of fighting a war for well over five years in a country that had absolutely nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks.” (Obama, 2008). As such, Obama’s Libyan policy managed to avoid the pitfalls of Bush’s Iraq policy by sizable military, diplomatic, economic, and alliance resources to a civil war in Libya.” (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 112-611, 2011. 2.)

\(^{154}\) Other than the infamous “leading-from-behind”, a term tagged on Obama administration by outside observers. (see for example Krauthammer, 2011 & Cohen, 2011.)
gathering a strong coalition to support America’s policy, instead of alienating allies and potential allies in the region.\footnote{Senator Kerry, along with other Democrats, highlighted the regional aspect by emphasizing the support gained by Arab League and the United Nation’s: “The international community cannot simply watch from the sidelines as the Libyan people’s quest for democratic reform is met with violence. The Arab League’s call for a U.N. no-fly zone is an unprecedented signal, a rather remarkable transformation and statement that the old rules of impunity for autocratic leaders don’t stand.” (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 112-56, 2011. 1.)}

Second, the Democratic side of the debate highlighted the humanitarian aspect of the Libyan situation, as 13 Democratic senators and only 1 Republican were identified invoking the \textit{humanitarian} -framing. The statement by Kerry emphasizes not only the international success in avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe in Benghazi, but also the limited enforcement of the no-fly zone. Kerry goes on to assert, that the coalition action had given Libyan people “a fighting chance” (ibid), leaving the eventual ousting of Muammar Qaddafi to Libyan people, not American military. Overall, in the Democratic arguments in \textit{international positive} and \textit{humanitarian} -framings were often clustered\footnote{See for example: “I think Senator Corker expresses the view of many of us, as does Senator Menendez. We’re all very pleased by the way the administration engaged the international community. I think we all want to take action against the type of brutality that Colonel Qadhafi represents and save innocent lives. And the administration was able to work with the international community and we think that’s the only way this could have worked. So I applaud you on that.” (Senator Cardin [D-MD] S.Hrg. 112-362, 2011. 21.)}, demonstrating the importance of international coalitions and humanitarian considerations as the justification of American military intervention. As such, the Libyan operation, in the argumentation put forth by the Democratic side of the argument, bore resemblance to NATO’s intervention in the Balkans, rather than American operations in the Middle East. This logic finds it international justification in the modern concept of “Responsibility to Protect”, brought forward by Canada and presented to the United Nations in early 2000’s, which legitimized humanitarian intervention by “delivering practical protection for ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are unwilling or unable to protect them.” (ICISS, 2001. 11). In fact, in an article published in August 2011, Stewart Patrick argues that the Libyan intervention was a model humanitarian intervention based on the principle of Responsibility to Protect (RtoP):

By setting overall strategy while allowing others to shoulder the burden of implementing it, the Obama administration achieved its short-term objective of stopping Qaddafi’s atrocities and its long-term one of removing him from power. This was all done at a modest financial cost, with no U.S. troops on the ground, and zero U.S. casualties. Meanwhile, as the first unambiguous military enforcement of the Responsibility to Protect norm, Qaddafi’s utter
defeat seemingly put new wind in the sails of humanitarian intervention. (Patrick, 2011.)

Third, all the above leads to the conclusion that America’s involvement in Libya is consistent with America’s wider strategic interests. The U.S. intervention sends a message across the region; United States will stand with all the nations pursuing democracy and attempting to rid themselves of illegitimate, authoritarian dictators. Per logic set forth by Democratic senators such as John Kerry and Robert Menendez [D-NJ], United States ought to include itself in the flow of events sweeping across the Arab world, and to be an active force in the events of Arab Spring.

Although no significant argumentation involving negative views over humanitarian intervention was identified, Committee’s ranking member Richard Lugar [R-IN] did challenge the humanitarian justification for America’s involvement:

And I think we are on the threshold, not only with regard to Libya but also the stream of civil wars currently taking place in the region. Now is it our policy, generally, that the administration might simply participate in select civil wars on behalf of what it believes is the best interest of the country by simply citing humanitarian concerns? (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 112-56, 2011. 16.)

Senator Lugar brings up the juxtaposition between American national interest and humanitarian concerns. His statement not only implies to the folly of American strategy of involving itself into civil war in Libya, but the wider strategic implications of a policy justifying military interventions “by simply citing humanitarian concerns.” (ibid). In fact, during 2011 Arab Spring several countries were unravelling in the hands of popular uprisings, including Tunisia, Syria, and a long-time strategic ally of the United States; Egypt. The argument Senator Lugar makes, is that the United States cannot predict what will happen in civil wars across the globe. Some may provoke even greater humanitarian risks than Muammar Qaddafi in Libya. Is it the U.S. policy to intervene in any such eventuality despite the lack of American national interest at stake, as Senator Lugar’s argument attempts to ask? Such policy would certainly be a shift from America’s traditional approach to large-scale, man-made

---

157 See for example: “I want to continue to pursue Senator Corker’s line of questioning, because I am still not sure what we support. It seems to me a dangerous proposition to urge people to seek democracy and revolt and then not help them. I am concerned, as I listen to your answers, with what happens if Qaddafi prevails. The situation in Libya is rather grave, and I think we are going to miss an opportunity to promote democracy, with a small “d”, throughout the region, be seen as on the side of those who have aspirations of freedom and ultimately be able to help shape the course of events that flow from those ideals, not only in Libya but beyond. And at the rate that it is going Qaddafi is probably going to capture Benghazi if we don’t see some movement there by the international community.” Senator Menendez [D-NJ] S.Hrg. 112-56, 2011. 22.)
humanitarian crisis. As Obama administration’s ambassador to U.N., Samantha Power, argues in her 2013 book “A Problem from Hell”, “…the United States has consistently refused to take risks to suppress genocide.” (Power, 2013. 503). Power goes on to argue, that during some of the worst humanitarian crisis, or genocide, ranging from Turkey’s slaughter of Armenians, the Jewish Holocaust, Pot Pot’s reign of terror, Saddam Hussein’s efforts to eradicate Kurds, killing of Muslims in the Balkans, to the genocide in Rwanada, not only did United States refuse to deploy ground-troops to stop such atrocities; “U.S. policymakers did almost nothing to deter the crime.” (Power, 2013. 504.) And hitting closer to Senator Lugar’s argument that America’s national interest, not mere humanitarian concerns ought to direct America’s global engagement, Power notes regarding genocides of the past: “Because America’s ‘vital national interests’ were not considered imperiled by mere genocide, senior U.S. officials did almost nothing to deter the crime.” (ibid). This by no means implies that Senator Lugar is advocating silent acceptance of genocide if no U.S. interests are at stake, but the argument here stresses that Lugar’s emphasis on national interest has historically triumphed over humanitarian concerns.

But whereas Republicans were less eager to accept humanitarian concerns as a justification for the use of United States Armed Forces than their Democratic counterparts, Democrats were more supportive of a multilateral approach than their Republican colleagues in the Armed Services Committee. 22% of Republican statements in the Libya hearings were identified invoking multilateral positive-framing (5 statements), and 9% multilateral negative-framing (2 statements). At least equally interesting as Republican willingness to support coalition-building was the insignificance of NATO related statements during the hearings, as even the fiscal-framings identified in Republican statements referred to overall fiscal realities, as opposed to U.S. contributions compared to other NATO member states or burden-sharing issues within the transatlantic alliance. For Republican’s in the Committee, the fiscal realities affected the broader strategic context of the United States spreading its forces, and treasure, too thin. Instead, several senators on both sides of the isle suggested that the Arab League and other regional allies ought to partake in the financial and military costs of the operation.

158 See for example: “With roughly 145,000 American troops still in Iraq and Afghanistan and with a budget that, according to the President’s own proposal, will carry a deficit of approximately $1.5 trillion this year, we have to recognize that war spending is especially difficult to control.” (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 112-56, 2011. 4.)

159 See for example: “Well, I was going to actually start with one question, because one of the things that I asked is whether we have military commitments from any other Arab countries besides the UAE and Qatar to participate in the mission? And Secretary Gates indicated that we don’t at this time. As I
I am glad that, if something like this is going happen, we have a coalition. I’m glad that others are involved. And I think others can take the lead on those types of things we just talked about. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. I think that last comment is one that expresses my sentiment. I just don’t see where there’s anything about Libya that causes us to uniquely need to take the lead. I think there are much greater reasons for European allies and others to do that. And we have a lot on our plate. It’s evident that the President, even, is not interested in additional activities. And I hope we’ll do everything we can to move others into the lead, as it relates to this effort. (Senator Corker [R-TN] S.Hrg. 112-58, 2011. 30.)

Senator Corker’s statement does not make the analogy between Libya and Iraq, a common theme in the Democratic argumentation, although it is difficult to judge whether this is out of discretion towards the Bush administration. During the Bush administration’s tenure, Republicans in the House of Representatives did their best to protect the administration from harmful hearings in relevant House committees, but their Senate counterparts, led by Senator Lugar [R-IN], pushed on with hearings evaluating U.S. policy in Iraq with little regard to Bush administration’s wishes. (Fowler, 2015. 21-22). Regardless of partisan notions, Corker’s argument stresses the role of America’s international allies, especially Europeans, taking the lead in security issues in their near abroad. He goes on to argue, that the United States has no such significant interests in Libya “that causes us to uniquely need to take the lead”, a sentiment echoed by Republican led argumentations identified within the national security and strategic -framings. United States does not have crucial interests in play, making the Libyan intervention an ideal opportunity for NATO’s European member states to take the lead and prove their worth in the alliance. In fact, Senator Corker’s evaluation of the situation is rather close to President Obama’s perception, that the Libyan operation is a chance to showcase NATO’s operational prowess with European leadership, as Obama later noted regarding Libya “We don’t have to always be the ones who are up front”, and that European leadership on the issue was “part of the anti–free rider campaign.” (Quoted in Tierney, 2016). Nevertheless, Republican’s in the Foreign Relations Committee, namely Senators Corker and

---

was watching the lead up to passing the resolution in the U.N. and the actual decision by the allies to put in place the no-fly zone, I think one of the really important steps along that way was having the Arab League pass their resolution asking for a no-fly zone. So I guess my question is, having heard Secretary Gates’ answer, are there diplomatic discussions under way with any other Arab countries about participation in this effort and do we expect to see additional support from them as this goes forward?” (Senator Shaheen [D-NH] S.Hrg. 112-362, 2011. 36.)
Lugar\textsuperscript{160}, did not necessarily represent the views of other members of the Republican caucus, as acknowledged by Senator Corker:

At the same time, I do appreciate the fact that the administration tried to build a coalition. I know a lot of people have criticized that. I think that was a good move. I know it’s one of the most narrow coalitions that we’ve built in recent times. But we did build it and I know that we are turning over activities.


Both Republicans and Democrats agreed that NATO played primarily a positive role in America’s intervention as a part of international coalition, a coalition which both sides described as a positive factor in Libyan conflict. Neither side refuted that Qaddafi was a negative force and that the risk of humanitarian catastrophe was real, if not for the intervention. So, the operational understanding of the circumstances affecting the crisis was framed in roughly the same terms, but with differing frequency.

6.2.2.2 Competing Frames

The most salient disagreement over Libyan intervention in Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerned the role of United States Congress in the decision to deploy American troops in the harm’s way. Several months after the initial decision by Obama administration to intervene in Libya, the Committee held a hearing titled “Libya and War Powers” (S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011), devoted solely on the issue of executive-legislative relations in the deployment of American military forces. Congressional-framing\textsuperscript{161} was the second most frequently invoked framing identified in Republican statements. The framing was identified in 17 of the 23 statements made by Republican senators (74%), whereas the Democrats were identified invoking the congressional-framing in 10 out of 31 statements (32%). (see Figure 26.) The question was, should President Obama request a congressional resolution to use

\textsuperscript{160} Lugar’s arguments stressed the Arab League’s support of the military operation, but also stressed it should also take part in the financial costs of an operation they so eagerly support: “I also have made the point that if American forces go to war in Libya, we should ask Arab League governments and other governments advocating for American military action to pledge resources necessary to pay for it. This is not unprecedented. More than $50 billion in foreign contributions were received to offset United States costs in association with the first gulf war in 1991.” (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 112-56, 2011. 4.)

\textsuperscript{161} Due to relatively high number of neutral positions within the congressional-framing (5 out of 27), the graphical presentation in Figure 26 did not separate the congressional-framing into statements requesting authorization and those supporting the administration’s stance on the issue. As such, to analyze differing opinions within the framing under title competing frames.

260
military force, or even a formal declaration of war against Libya, to legitimize the use of U.S. military. Further breakdown of the *congressional* -framing reveals the partisan divide. Of the 17 Republican statements identified within the framing, 15 called for a congressional resolution or a declaration of war, and only one Republican senator\(^\text{162}\) concluded that such action by the administration was not necessary. Democratic senators were either of the opinion that congressional authorization was not necessary, or presented a neutral viewpoint on the issue. Like Republicans, only one Democratic senator went against the majority opinion within their own party and called for a congressional authorization. (see Figure 26.) From the Democratic side, Committee chairman John Kerry led the argumentation supporting the Obama administration decision not to call for congressional authorization, whereas the Republican arguments for deeper congressional inclusion in the decision-making process.

---

\(^{162}\) The one Republican senator who argued that congressional action was not necessary was newly elected Marco Rubio from Florida: “So suffice it to say that some folks probably came to the conclusion that, given the—we’re not exactly—I’ve only been here a few months, but they don’t exactly set speed records here in Congress for dealing with things. I would imagine that went into the consideration when the decision was made to act. The bottom line is that if you had pursued some sort of congressional authorization for the specific move that you made, you wouldn’t have had time to act to prevent—or to be a part of this prevention of what happened, what could have happened in Benghazi.” (Senator Rubio [R-FL] S.Hrg. 112-362, 2011. 362.)
process were advocated primarily by the future Committee chairman Bob Corker and ranking member Richard Lugar.

Well, let me then be more direct in terms of congressional consultation. That is important and certainly welcome. My view is that there should be considerably more than that. There should be congressional participation. Specifically, if we are going to declare war against Libya, then we ought to have a congressional declaration of war. Now what I question is, Is the administration authorized, constitutionally, to simply proceed into a conflict in Libya involving American forces without a declaration of war?

We have unfortunately, I think, participated in some wars in recent years in which there was not a declaration of war by the Congress. I would like to prevent that from occurring again. And I think we are on the threshold, not only with regard to Libya but also the stream of civil wars currently taking place in the region. (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 112-56, 2011. 17.)

Above quote from Senator Lugar is from a hearing on March 17th, prior to the Obama administration’s announcement of American intervention. The first part is a direct response to administration’s witness, Undersecretary of State William Burns, who argued that “President and Secretary Clinton take very seriously the importance of continued close consultation with the congressional leadership” and that the “White House will remain in touch with the congressional leadership on this in the days ahead.” (S.Hrg. 112-56, 2011. 16). Senator Lugar dismisses the notion that the executive-legislative process of deploying American force is served by simple consultation’s and phone calls between the White House and congressional leadership. Not only is Lugar unsatisfied with administration’s understanding of Congress’ role in the process, but he goes on to argue that a formal congressional declaration of war ought to be requested by President Obama. As per the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, the United States Congress has the sole authority to declare war. (U.S. Const. Art. I Sec. 8.). Although the Constitution sets the formal legal framework to America’s decision-making process in matters related to war and peace, the way United States enters in hostilities has dramatically shifted since the days of the Founding Fathers. (see Kronlund, 2015). The last time United States Congress made formal declaration of war was in 1942, when the Congress declared wars against Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. (Senate). Senator Lugar’s argument that the administration should go to Congress for a formal declaration of war, not a congressional resolution to authorize the use of force like with Iraq and Afghanistan, was especially interesting. As quoted, the argument put forth by Senator Lugar is that the lack of congressional declarations of war has been a grave mistake,
and that given the broader strategic context, the United States’ interests would be best served by including the United States Congress in the decision-making process by submitting the administration decision-making process to formal process of congressional declaration of war.

I believe Congress has its work cut out for it with regard to Libya. On March 7, 12 days before the United States began hostilities, I called on the President to seek a declaration of war from the Congress if he decided to initiate hostilities. He declined to do that. As a result, the United States entered the civil war in Libya with little official scrutiny or debate. I continue to advocate for a debate and vote on President Obama’s decision to go to war in Libya. I do not believe the President has made a convincing case for American military involvement in that country. Declarations of war are not anachronistic exercises. They force the President to submit his case for war to Congress and the American public. They allow for a robust debate to examine that case, and they help gauge if there is sufficiently broad political support to commit American blood and treasure and to sustain that commitment. Furthermore, they define the role and strategy of the United States.

Neither U.N. Security Council resolutions nor administration briefings are a substitute for a declaration of war or other deliberate authorization of major military operations. (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 112-362, 2011. 3.)

The above quote is from March 31st, the first hearing held on Libya after the military operations began. The Obama administration did not seek a congressional authorization, and certainly not a congressional declaration of war, as suggested by Senator Lugar before. Instead, the formal legal justification for the operation was United Nations Security Council’s resolution 1973, which the council accepted with 10 votes for, and 5 member-states absenting (including China and Russia). The resolution called for a no-fly zone to stop attacks against civilians, which might constitute “crimes against humanity.” Security Council “authorized all means necessary” to protect civilians. (UN, 2011.) Senator Lugar did not accept the idea that congressional consultations could replace the formal war-making powers of the Congress, nor did he accept the United Nations resolution as a substitute for a congressional authorization. Lugar’s emphasis on congressional authorization and unease about the U.N. Security Council resolution as the legal justification for war can be traced back to debates considering America’s involvement in the Korean War in 1950. Some argue, that the Korean War was a prime example of Congress deferring its constitutional authority, or responsibility, to check presidential war-making powers. For the first time in history, American president authorized the use of military force by going to U.N. Security Council, and bypassing the Congress. As
argued by Fisher et al. (2008), despite the criticism by Republicans, there was little interest to deploy constitutional tools to end the war. Another example brought up by Fisher et al. regarding congressional deference was the crisis in Balkan, when the Republican Congress opposed the policy choices of President Clinton, but appropriated the funds necessary to “support the troops but not the policy.” And when Republican Representative Tom Campbell [R-CA] tried to assert constitutional congressional authority, the Republican leadership in the House stopped him. (See Fisher et al. 2008.)

Senator Lugar’s argumentative logic highlighted the deliberative nature of the United States Congress. Given the grand strategic ramifications of the Arab Spring and ensuing civil conflicts, United States strategy - especially when involving major military operations - ought to be thoroughly discussed, debated and scrutinized by the United States Congress. After Congress has been given the chance to weigh in on the strategy, and the president has submitted his “case for war” to the Congress, and subsequently to the American people, the legislative branch ought to vote for an authorization. Lugar’s arguments throughout the hearings highlighted the fact that congressional debates “define the role and strategy of the United States.”

But whereas Senator Lugar stressed the strategic implications of using America’s military might as the constituting factor demanding congressional authorization, those arguing the opposite claimed that operational realities and circumstances on the ground do not allow such thorough process to take place, and that the historical precedent demonstrates the use of military force by both Republican and Democratic presidents with little consideration to congressional authority, as exemplified by the following quote from chairman Kerry:

I think we have to be really thoughtful, and I know you are being, but I think all of us here need to be recognizing the precedents that exist. When Ronald Reagan sent cruise missiles into Qaddafi’s palace and we killed his daughter, did we have any authorization from Congress?

Further stating regarding congressional authority and operational realities that:

I have always taken the position, I think Senator Lugar knows this, that it is better to proceed with the authorization and support of Congress if you have the time and if the opportunity provides for it. It is always better, because we represent the people and as a branch of government that has the constitutional power with respect to war or that kind of thing it is better. But life does not always present us with circumstances that afford us the opportunity to do that. And we haven’t always—Republican and Democratic Presidents alike have
had to make tough choices, faced with the moment. (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 112-362, 2011. 33.)

The former quote by Senator Kerry [D-MA] worked on two levels. First, it invoked the name of Ronald Reagan, a great authority figure in the Republican party. Second, it reminded everyone that a precedent existed of a Republican administration using military force against Libya without authorization from Congress. The precedent set by the Reagan administration was by no means an insignificant historical factoid. Muammar Qaddafi’s Libya in the 1980’s proved to be one of the rare examples of American administration openly advocating a regime change. In 1986, Reagan’s Secretary of State George Shultz said that relations between U.S. and Libya had become “pretty darn close” to war, and that “If a coup takes place, that is all to the good.” (Quoted in Schumacher, 1986.) So, against the historical background of volatile relations with the Qaddafi regime, exemplified by the Reagan administration, the fact that President Obama had not requested a congressional authorization was by no means an exception to the bipartisan norm.

The latter quote characterizes the argumentative logic of Kerry’s stance on the issue of congressional authorization. He goes on to admit, that in an ideal situation, congressional authorization with all the institutional processes it entails, is the desirable course of action. But only if the situation so permits, and the administration has the time to proceed through the congressional route. By postulating an argument based on the conditionality of requirement for congressional authorization, time and opportunity being the variable constituting the foundation of such conditionality, Senator Kerry’s understanding of a congressional authorization in this case differs starkly from Senator Lugar, who indicated rather strict, constitutional grasp on legislative-executive relations regarding war-making. The congressional authority within the legal framework is articulated in the War Power Act of 1973. The Act itself articulates its “purpose and policy” to “…fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States” by insuring that “the collective judgement of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.” (WPR, 1973.) Senator Lugar’s argument was in line with the policy set by the 1973 War Powers Act, which put emphasis on the original interpretation by the Founding Fathers. (see Kronlund, 2015).

As the conflict went on, the debate turned towards the War Powers Act - which stated that the “commander-in-chief” should “terminate the use of United States Armed Forces” after 60 days (plus a 30-day withdrawal period), unless the Congress declared war or granted a specific congressional authorization (WPR, 1973) - culminating in the June 28th hearing titled “Libya and War Powers.” (S.Hrg. 112-89,
2011.) The Committee had invited three witnesses; Harold Koh, the Legal Adviser in the State Department, responsible for articulating administration’s stance on the issue, Louis Fisher, a scholar and an expert in the Constitution and the separation of powers, and Peter Spiro, a professor of law at Temple University.

The hearing was organized to discuss the legal ramifications of the War Powers Act and its implications to President Obama’s authority to continue deploying American Armed Forces to Libyan operation. During the hearing, the issue of legal definition of hostilities, as well as the original meaning of War Powers Act, became the focus of the debate. Senator Kerry was the voice for the administration’s stance on the issue: “I have made clear my belief that the 60-day restriction contained in the War Powers Resolution does not apply in this situation, particularly since we handed the operations over to NATO.” (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 1). The War Powers Act itself makes no exception regarding deployment of American Armed Forces as a part of NATO operation, yet Senator Kerry argues that since the United States “handed the operations over to NATO”, the administration was free of the restraints set by the Act. This was also the opinion of the administration, as expressed by the Legal Adviser Mr. Koh: “the situation in Libya does not constitute a war requiring specific congressional approval under the Declaration of War Clause of the Constitution.”163 (S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 8). Senator Kerry further argued, that the intervention in Libya did not constitute a situation falling under the authority, or the principles, of War Powers Act. According to Kerry, the original purpose of the War Powers Act, an act passed by a Democratic Congress over President Nixon’s veto, was to respond to the specific circumstances enabling executive overreach in Vietnam:

It is important, in my judgment, to remember that the War Powers Resolution was a direct reaction to a particular kind of a war, to a particular set of events, the Vietnam war, which at that time was the longest conflict in our history and which resulted, without any declaration in war, in the loss of over 58,000 American lives, spanning three administrations. And during those three administrations, Congress never declared war or, I might add, authorized it. They funded but there was no formal authorization. (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 1.)

163 See: “And from the outset, we noted that the situation in Libya does not constitute a war requiring specific congressional approval under the Declaration of War Clause of the Constitution. As my testimony notes on page 13, the President has constitutional authority, long recognized, to direct the use of force to serve important national interests and preserving regional stability and supporting the credibility and effectiveness of the U.N. Security Council. The nature, scope, and duration of the military operations he ordered here did not rise to the level of war for constitutional purposes.” (S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 8.)
For Kerry, the actual operational scope of the intervention fell far below the level of Vietnam, and as such, the principle on which the War Powers Act was created for was not violated by the Obama administration’s decision to intervene in Libya. The nature of America’s involvement in Libya became the source of further - rather parochial-appearing - debate over the definition of hostilities.\(^ {164} \) As argued by Kerry, American operations in Libya did not equate *hostilities*, as defined by the language of the War Powers Resolution. Kerry’s argumentative logic relies on historical precedent: “The Ford administration, for example, defined “hostilities” only as those situations where U.S. troops were exchanging fire with hostile forces.” and bipartisan acceptance of such historical precedent: “subsequent administrations, Republican and Democrat alike, built on that interpretation.” If the bipartisan conclusion by past administrations - both Republican and Democratic - is correct, the U.S. military operations did not fit the agreed-upon definition of hostilities. (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 2.) In fact, although Kerry argues that the Libyan operation did not fit the “purpose and policy” of the War Powers Resolution, President Obama did act consistent with the War Powers Resolution, unlike any president before him: “the President of the United States accepts the constitutionality of the War Powers Act and sought to live by it. No President has done that yet.” (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 25).

The partisan tone of the debate became salient during the War Powers hearings. Both the *partisan / bipartisan -*framing, and *administration -*framing were closely linked with the *congressional -*framings. Committee’s ranking member Senator Lugar began his opening statement by describing the administration’s refusal to seek congressional authorization as being “at odds with the Constitution, and it is at odds with the president’s own pronouncements on war powers during his Presidential candidacy.” (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 4). As such, despite Senator Kerry asserting that President Obama was in fact the first president to accept the constitutionality of the War Powers Act, Lugar goes on to argue that his actions regarding Libya betray his words. And further, despite the emphasis by Senator Kerry on operational realities, Lugar argued that there was no “good reason why President Obama should have failed to seek congressional authorization to go to war

\(^ {164} \) The emphasis on term “hostilities” was based on the language of the War Powers Resolution: “It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgement of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.” (WPR, 1973.) The issue before Congress was whether American operations in Libya introduced U.S. forces in hostilities.
in Libya.” (ibid). The reasons not to seek congressional authorization presented by the administration, including the existing U.N. resolution, were labeled as mere excuses. President Obama “made a deliberate decision not to seek a congressional authorization” constituting a “fundamental failure of leadership that placed expediency above constitutional responsibility.” (ibid). Such failure is further magnified by the continued refusal of the administration to act according to War Powers Resolution and request a congressional authorization\textsuperscript{165}, based on the Obama administration’s “incredible assertion that U.S. military operations in Libya do not constitute hostilities”, and the position supported by Senator Kerry, that the congressional authorization is not necessary due to NATO’s leading role in the operation:

The administration’s report also implies that because allied nations are flying most of the missions over Libya, the United States operations are not significant enough to require congressional authorization. This characterization underplays the centrality of the United States contributions to the NATO operations in Libya. We are contributing 70 percent of the coalition’s intelligence capabilities and the majority of its refueling assets. The fact that we are leaving most of the shooting to other countries does not mean the United States is not involved in acts of war. If the United States encountered persons performing similar activities in support of al-Qaeda or Taliban operations, we certainly would deem them to be participating in hostilities against us. Moreover, the language of the War Powers Resolution clearly encompasses the kinds of operations U.S. military forces are performing in support of other NATO countries. (ibid.)

The argumentative logic not only refuted Kerry’s argument that the operation being NATO-led somehow recused the administration from having to engage the Congress, it also followed the argumentative logic of the U.S.-led-framing used by senators in the Armed Services Committee, by stressing the \textit{de facto} enabling role of the United States in the NATO operation.\textsuperscript{166} As such, although acting formally

\textsuperscript{165} At least one Democratic senator, James Webb from Virginia, shared Lugar’s view on the issue: “I would just like to say a couple things very quickly in reaction to the exchange that just took place. One of them is that whether or not the President consulted with certain people in the Senate, and whether or not there was a request for us to validate the actions, the issue before us right now is this administration is coming forward and saying the War Powers Act does not apply in this situation because of their very narrow and, in my opinion, contorted legal definition of “hostilities.” That is the issue that is before us—not the other one.” (Senator Webb [D-VA] S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 28.)

\textsuperscript{166} Democratic Senator Webb also argued that NATO leadership did not substitute for congressional authorization, and critiqued the administration’s insistence that U.S. Armed Forces were not introduced into “hostilities”: “But I will say when you have an operation that goes on for months, costs billions of dollars, where the United States is providing two-thirds of the troops even under the
under the NATO leadership, U.S. military action in Libya constitutes the type of military operation envisioned under the War Powers Resolution requiring a congressional authorization. This position as postulated by Senator Lugar was also one presented by Louis Fisher in his testimony to the Committee: “NATO is a treaty. Treaties cannot amend the Constitution, cannot take congressional power and give it to outside bodies.” (S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 42), and Mr. Fisher further concluded that neither NATO nor U.N. Security Council has the authority to amend the U.S. Constitution. Overall, Senator Lugar and some of his fellow Republicans shared the Constitutional view of congressional War Powers, as articulated in the statement by congressional scholar Louis Fisher.

The Republican use of *congressional* -framing was also coupled with *wider strategic context* -framing, highlighting the grand-scale implications on unilateral use of force by the Obama administration. Since the congressional Republicans were attempting to paint the issue with broad strokes, the decision by the administration to send a State Department lawyer to the hearing and debating the definitions instead of strategy, frustrated some in the Republican camp:

Senator CORKER. …I will say then that I find it humorous sitting here on the Foreign Relations Committee, the most deliberative body in the world some say, and basically you guys have not provided witnesses from the Department of Justice or the Pentagon. We seem to take that as a humorous thing. You know, the administration has basically said there is no reason for us to get any kind of resolution from Congress, and yet the Senate today in its urge to be “relevant” is rushing to give the administration a resolution even though it is basically saying in this case the Senate is irrelevant. So I would ask you this one question. Now that you have taken this argument and seen the response that you have gotten from people on both sides of the aisle, are you still glad that you traveled this route as it relates to making the argument you have made about the War Powers Act?

NATO fig leaf, where they are dropping bombs that are killing people, where you are paying your troops offshore combat pay—and there is a prospect of escalation. It has something I have been trying to get a clear answer from with this administration for several weeks now, and that is the possibility of a ground presence in some form or another once the Qadhafi regime expires. I would say that is hostilities.” (Senator Webb [D-VA] S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 28.)

167 See Fisher’s testimony before the Committee: “My position is that the Security Council cannot authorize any military action, cannot mandate any military action. If you believe that, then you would have to say that the U.N. Charter or Treaty transferred Article I power from Congress, not just from future Senates but from the House of Representatives, and gave it off to some outside body. I think that’s an unconstitutional theme, and I don’t think that you can get any authorization from the Security Council. So then you have to ask what authorization did President Obama have for this military activity?” (S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 42.)
Mr. KOH. Senator, I believe this argument. I think it is correct. I would not be here if I did not believe that.

Senator CORKER. I did not ask that. Are you glad that you basically created an issue where no issue had to exist by taking this narrowly defined route and basically sticking a stick in the eye of Congress? I mean, is that something that you are glad you have done? [...] So let me ask you this. The chairman mentioned that since no American is being shot, there are no hostilities. Of course, by that reasoning, we could drop a nuclear bomb on Tripoli and we would not be involved in hostilities. It just goes to the sort of preposterous argument that is being made.


The above quote from Tennessee’s Senator Corker highlights the level of frustration - real or rhetorical - directed at the way the administration handled executive-legislative cooperation regarding Libya. First, Corker expressed his disappointment in the administration’s witness, Legal Adviser Koh. Senator Corker refers to his Committee as “the most deliberative body in the world”, and the administration has insulted it by refusing to send in witness’ from the Department of Justice or Pentagon, departments Senator Corker argues would better respond to the magnitude of the issue at hand. Instead, the administration revealed its hand by sending in a lawyer. By sending a lawyer, the government did not approach the committee in its deliberative function, but in the way a lawyer approaches a court of law; by presenting a case. The case was argued based on the definition of hostilities. As per the White house: “U.S. operations do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve the presence of U.S. ground troops” (The New York Times, 2011), and thus do not constitute “hostilities” as defined by the War Powers Resolution. By going down this road, defining the issue in narrow legalistic terms, Corker argues the administration has basically made Senate irrelevant by “sticking a stick in the eye of Congress” with the “preposterous argument” that U.S. Armed Forces are not involved in hostilities.

168 Senator Lugar [R-IN] faced similar issues when in 2004, as a new chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee he held hearings on Iraq War despite strong opposition by Republican leadership and the administration. Similarly to Corker’s disappointment in administration’s witness, the Bush administration concerned about 2004 election, sent “second tier” witnesses to testify in Lugar’s hearings. (Prins & Marshall, 2011. 522.)
6.2.3 Individual Breakdown

Senator McCain [R-AZ] did not separate from the rank-and-file members of the Armed Services in terms of quantity of statements made. His four statements, compared to one to three statements made by rest of the members, was surprisingly low number, given his activity in other issues of transatlantic importance, yet explainable by his overall support for the operation and eventual demise of Qaddafi regime (see McCain, 2011). Chairman Levin led the charge by making ten statements on the issue of Libyan intervention and NATO’s role in it. (Figure 27.)

Figure 27. Libya by individual - Armed Services

[Bar chart showing the number of statements made by different senators]

Senator Levin departed from his critique of NATO in Afghanistan to support the Obama administration’s approach in Libya. Highlighting the change in Senator Levin’s tone from his NATO related remarks in the 111th Congress was the dominance of NATO positive and NATO led - framings during Libya hearings. Levin’s argumentation followed closely the tone set by the Obama administration, defining the operation as an international, NATO-led effort to stop a humanitarian crisis. As such, Levin once again functioned as an interlocutor between the administration and the Congress, defining the issue in identical terms with the administrations. As such,
Levin’s approach to Libya and NATO could be defined as a policy specialist, especially given the lack of serious considerations of overall U.S. policy in the wider context.

In the Foreign Relations, both chairman Kerry (14) and ranking member Lugar (12) were vocal in the Libya related hearings. (See Figure 28). The core difference in the committees was difference in opinion vis-à-vis the ranking members. Whereas Senator McCain supported U.S. military intervention in Libya, Senator Lugar was from the very beginning critical of further U.S. involvement in Libyan civil crisis and opposed imposing a no-fly zone. (Memoli & Oliphant, 2011). Rest of the Foreign Relations made one to five statements each regarding U.S. involvement in Libya.

**Figure 28. Libya by individual - Foreign Relations**

As later accounts of the administration’s decision-making process have asserted (see Tierney, 2016), President Obama though about his “place in history” vis-à-vis the Arab Spring, as he made the final decision to intervene. Senator Kerry made the same conclusion during the hearings. At the time of historical change in the Arab world, U.S. ought to seize the moment and support the democratic revolution in the region and, consequently, help prevent a humanitarian crisis unfolding in Libya. To do so, U.S. built a robust international coalition for a multilateral approach, separating U.S. policy in Libya from previous unilateral interventions. Overall,
Kerry’s approach to Libya presented the issue in a wider strategic context. But as the debate turned into congressional authorization, Kerry focused on the specific contextual factors legitimizing Obama administration’s decision to not go for a congressional authorization. Kerry argued throughout that congressional authorization *per se* was a positive, yet this instance did not constitute a situation where such authorization was necessary. Instead, the insistence on congressional authorization was a partisan effort to curtail presidential power, rather than a sincere attempt to reassert congressional power. As such, Kerry’s [D-MA] approach should be placed somewhere between *policy strategist* and *process specialist*. He saw U.S. role in Libya and wider region through a strategic lens, yet he kept the argumentation about congressional authorization closely tied to the specifics of Libyan operation.

Senator Lugar was the most vocal opponent of the intervention. From the very beginning, Senator Lugar did not see a military response a proper one, given the risks involved. U.S. national security interests ought to prevail humanitarian considerations, and one of the core arguments by Lugar revolved around the perceived failure of the Obama administration to articulate what concrete national security concerns were at play in Libya. So, regarding the operational aspects of U.S. intervention in Libya, Lugar was concerned over mission creep, fiscal costs and overall lack of an articulated end-game strategy. But besides operational considerations, Lugar was highly vocal on the need for congressional authorization. Lugar went as far as requesting that Congress ought to make a formal declaration of war to authorize the use of American force, as such process would force the administration to better explain its rationale behind the use of force, as well as reassert congressional war-making power. Overall, Lugar ought to be defined somewhere between *policy strategist* and *process strategist*.

6.2.4 Discussion

Overall, the Senate Armed Services was rather divided as it framed U.S. Libyan policy. Democrats in the Senate framed the issue from a rather internationalist perspective, as *NATO-led, NATO-positive,* and *multilateral-positive* -framings dominated their argumentation. American intervention in Libya was seen as an example of a successful multilateral approach to an international crisis. Republicans in the Committee framed the issue in rather different terms. For the GOP, the operation was a *U.S.-led* effort and it revealed the shortcomings of NATO’s European member states (*NATO-negative*). As Democrats remained silent on War Powers Resolution, the Republicans brought up the issue with some frequency. Both *terrorism/al-Qaeda* and *strategic* -framings were invoked by both sides. In the Foreign
Relations, the issue was framed in a somewhat different tone, as NATO garnered less attention compared to congressional resolution and strategic considerations. Democrats highlighted the humanitarian justification for the operation, brought up the issue with Libyan opposition, and stressed the positive sides of a multilateral approach and NATO’s leadership role (multilateral positive and NATO-led). Republicans highlighted the national security considerations, especially the question whether Libyan crisis constituted a national security threat against the United States, and the fiscal strains caused by the operational costs. Both sides debated the strategic implications, with a considerable attention paid to American long-term strategy (see Figure 24), and the role of U.S. Congress in deploying American military force globally (congressional). (Figure 26).

Senators on neither side of the argument supported the validity of administration’s argument that U.S. action in Libya did not constitute “hostilities”, some being subtler169 about it than the others (see also Hendrickson, 2013). Chairman Kerry - as the interlocutor between the White House and Senate - put the blame on the Congress, by basing his argumentation on the political and institutional context defining the decision-making process in the Senate, which “has been having a very difficult time getting anything done lately.” (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 25). In the past, both Republican and Democratic administrations have taken the stand that the language in War Powers Resolution did not include every military operation, and although “that does not make it right” (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 1), the opposition argumentation knowingly ignores the historical context of War Powers Resolution. On the other side, Senator Lugar argued for the constitutional authority of the United States Congress to authorize war, claiming that the administration’s action is “at odds with the Constitution” (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 4-5) and the intentions of the Founding Fathers, and unilateral action by the administration goes against the strategic interests of the United States. When debating whether a situation - especially a humanitarian crisis - justifies America’s military intervention, it is the United States Congress which is “vested with the authority to determine which, if any, of these circumstances justify the consequences of American military intervention”, and if the president is unsure if he could get a congressional authorization, “it is all the more reason why a

169 See for example: “You have, I think, as ably as one possibly could, explained a very narrow reading of hostilities, and a number of the Senators who have spoken before me have reflected the fact that our constituents are finding very real tension between a commonsense understanding of hostilities and the exercise of statutory construction in which you are engaged, appropriately in your role, to define these four narrowing factors of mission, exposure, means, and risk of escalation.” (Senator Coons [D-DE] S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 34.)
President should seek a debate.” (ibid.) Lugar’s argumentation drew upon the traditional constitutional understanding of executive power and war-making, going back to the republican founding principles of the United States, wherein the executive privilege to wage wars was just another tool of authoritarian oppression, as eloquently articulated by then Congressman Abraham Lincoln [R-III]:

The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons: Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This our convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution so that no one man should hold the power of bringing oppression upon us. (Hendrickson, 2002. x.)

For Lugar, congressional debate alone functioned as a check on executive power, forcing the executive to explain to the American people his rationale to wage wars.

To conclude on the issue of War Powers, it is easy to state after-the-fact that Libya was another example of congressional deterrence to executive in matters pertaining to use of American Armed Forces. (see for example Fisher et. al. 2008, Hendrickson, 2013). Despite opposition from both political parties, no significant congressional action was taken to stop the president, thanks to congressional leadership, most visibly House Speaker John Boehner [R-OH], argues Hendrickson (2013, 176). Senator Kerry’s argument fell into conventional thinking of Congress and War Powers. Other than mentioning Obama’s respect for the constitutionality of War Powers Resolution, Kerry de facto accepted historical contextualization of the issue; since the end of the World War II, the Congress has authorized the use of force five times (see for example Heiss, 2005), and other times American administrations have defined the limits of War Powers Resolution and congressional inclusion unilaterally, leading Heiss (2005. 63) to argue that “the war-authorizing resolution has become an instrument in the growth of presidential power.” In the Armed Services Committee, senators McCain [R-AZ] and Levin [D-MI] supported presidential action same as Kerry (see for example Hendrickson, 2013b. 183). Two leading senators in the committees analyzed called for congressional assertiveness and constitutional authority, namely Richard Lugar [R-IN] and Bob Corker [R-TN], who argued for the “original” interpretation of Congress’ war-making powers as a check to executive power, as intended by the Founders. Kronlund (2015. 8-9) writes on the “[c]onstitutionally granted war powers in theory and practice”, and here, Lugar and Corker based their arguments on theory, Kerry-camp on practice.
Question arises whether the Democratic argumentation identified within the humanitarian – framing constituted a mutually exclusive framing with Republican led argumentation emphasizing national security – framing, thus constituting competing framings of the issue. National security – framing was identified in 26% of all the Republican statements in Libya hearings, whereas Democrats were identified invoking the framing in 6% of all the Democratic statements. Clearly, Republicans were more concerned about the national security implications of the Libyan intervention, while Democrats stressed the humanitarian aspects. Democrats did, however, argue that Obama’s Libyan policy was consistent with American national interests, as demonstrated in the analysis of strategic – framings by Democratic senators. As per the Democratic argumentation, intervention in Libya and engagement in the wider regional context did serve America’s global interests, whereas the Republicans were left pondering what such interests were at stake in Libya that justified putting American blood and treasure on the line.

And furthermore, the President has not yet really spoken directly to United States national interests at stake in Libya, aside from our opposition to Qaddafi and the protection of innocent civilians. Does the President plan to spell out what our national interests are in Libya that might justify the use of our Armed Forces? (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 112-56, 2011. 16.)

To sum up, the difference in the viewpoint adopted by both committees was very much consistent with Milner’s distributional and ideological distinction; Armed Services stressed the unbalance between contributions by individual member states of the North Atlantic alliance - comparable with the debate over NATO and European security in the 111th Congress – whereas the Foreign Relations highlighted the ideological implications of choosing to intervene in Libya on mainly humanitarian basis, debates over War Powers Resolution, and American long-term strategy in the Middle East and North Africa. Now, Milner & Tingley (2015, 255) argued that both ideological and distributive disputes affect the how the president can use foreign policy instruments at his disposal. Overall, the argument goes, presidents have more power over policy instruments when distributional and ideological factors are low, and the president has informational advantage over Congress. This, of course, is more often the case when president decides to use the U.S. military force. Due to the scale of intelligence community, the information at president’s disposal is considerably benefitting of the executive compared to individual members of Congress. Furthermore, military intervention, depending on scale, has less direct distributional effects on American people, thus creating less interest group activity – and
consequently information for Congress – than policy instruments with direct domestic effects. (ibid.)

Based on the frame analysis, the most notable difference between the two committees was NATO’s role in the debates. Of all the framings identified in the Armed Services, 42% included NATO, whereas that same number in Foreign Relations Committee was 4%. (see Figure 22 and Figure 24). In part, this could be explained by the difference in both Committees’ nature. To explain this difference, one might compare it to both committees’ response to U.S. peacekeeping-turned-into-nation-building mission in Somalia early 1990’s. The operation initiated by the Bush administration and continued by President Clinton gained initial public and congressional support. As the mission grew, both Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees approached their respective oversight responsibilities from two different perspectives; Armed Services focusing on defense budget issues, Foreign Relations on humanitarian aspects of the operation. Overall, the Somali case was consistent with “long-standing patterns…to use oversight strategically to promote their [the Committees] respective interests of supporting the Pentagon and fostering public debate about foreign affairs.” (Fowler, 2015. 99.) Although those in the Foreign Relations opposing Obama’s policy stressed the fiscal realities facing the nation, the Armed Services was notably more sensitive to perceived shortcomings in NATO’s European member states’ contribution to the operation. For them, the Libyan operation was an addition to the long-list of examples of European member states failing to carry their weight. For Armed Services, more often than not Pentagon funding triumphs the committee’s oversight role (see for example Fowler, 101), and in the case of Libya, NATO’s shortcomings were magnified by the fiscal consequences of the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the consequent cuts in defense spending, and the long-term perceptions of NATO becoming a two-tiered alliance, with declining defense spending by rich, Western European states. Furthermore, Democratic senators in the committee highlighted the positive leadership role played by NATO, thus justifying the treasure sacrificed by American taxpayer. All this was not only consistent with the patterns displaying priority for budgetary hearings in Armed Services Committee (Fowler, 2015. 31-33), but also a logical continuum of the committee’s NATO debates regarding Afghanistan. Only the conclusion differed. Democrats argued that the Libyan case was an example of Obama administration’s ability to make Europeans do their part, whereas for the Republicans, Libya presented more of the same, with United States carrying the torch.
Foreign Relations Committee, a body joined by senators to pursue high politics in the sphere of statecraft and a place of pure policy (Fowler, 2015. 55), paid less attention to operational details and budgetary issues compared to Armed Services. As a staunch critic of congressional assertiveness, or rather lack of congressional assertiveness, former Foreign Relations Chairman Senator Fulbright argued that Congress failed to involve itself in substantive and constructing deliberations about U.S. foreign policy strategy. For Fulbright’s taste, Congress spent too much effort focusing on operational details, for it ought to pay considerable attention to foreign policy guidance. (Rockman, 2005. 25.) So, did Foreign Relations Committee ascend the micromanagement of American foreign policy in Libya by focusing on pure policy and high politics issues to achieve something closer to what Senator Fulbright envisioned? The debate over War Powers was divided between arguments framing the issue in grand terms, considering the implications for separation-of-powers and executive-legislative relations in a long-term, and arguments focusing on defending President Obama’s decision not to seek congressional authorization on a legalistic – one might say tactical - basis.

Let’s begin our summary of the foreign policy ideology with a brief recap of Mead’s (2002) understanding of the four schools of thought and their relationship with war. Hamiltonian justification of war would rely on a threat against vital U.S. interests; free trade, freedom of the seas, free flow of goods and capital and so on. A good example of a Hamiltonian war would be the first Gulf War. Wilsonian thirst for world peace is only preceded by the universal goal of democratization. Thus, the spread of democracy, rule-of-law and human rights can justify a humanitarian intervention. Think of Clinton and Kosovo. Jeffersonians are the pacifists, skeptical of revolutionary action abroad, and thus vary of democratization efforts abroad, which they not only see futile, but also a danger to American domestic peace and

170 See for example Senator Lugar: “Before our discussion turns to constitutional and legal issues, I believe it is important to make a more fundamental point. Even if one believes the President somehow had the legal authority to initiate and continue United States military operations in Libya, it does not mean that going to war without Congress was either wise or helpful to the operation.

The vast majority of Members of Congress, constitutional scholars, and military authorities would endorse the view that Presidents should seek congressional authorization for war when circumstances allow. There is a near uniformity of opinion that the chances for success in a war are enhanced by the unity, clarity of mission, and constitutional certainty that such an authorization and debate provide.” (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 4.)

171 Senator Kerry brings up the argument that the President in fact did attempt to seek congressional approval, but the partisan forces in the Congress made such efforts impossible: “But we did not do it. Do not blame the President. The Congress of the United States did not do it, and let me tell you why bluntly. Because both leaders in both Houses were unwilling at that point in time to do it. You know, let us be honest about this.” (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 112-89, 2011. 25.)
tranquility. Whereas others see opportunities abroad, Jeffersonians see threats. Think of Jeffersonian outrage at the reveal of Reagan’s Iran-Contra affair in the 1980’s and opposition to U.S. involvement in the Balkans. Jacksonians are the opposite, the NRA (National Rifle Association) representatives of American foreign policy. When United States enters a war, it must be fought by any means necessary to achieve and unconditional victory, thus making Jacksonian vary of “limited operations”, such as U.S. decision not to topple Saddam Hussein in 1991, and similarly the limited efforts in Libya. Think of the unilateral power and resources allocated by Jacksonians to George W. Bush to wage war against terror by any means necessary. (Mead, 2002.)

Jacksonian sentiments are more likely to be present in the Armed Services, wherein senators’ hawkish foreign policy attitudes more frequently lead to support in use-of-force. (Fowler, 2015. 107). John McCain’s approach to Libya could be described as Jacksonian.172 Unlike his colleague in the Foreign Relations, Richard Lugar, he supported the American military operations in Libya. If anything, he argued that they should have been used more determinedly (unilaterally), instead of waiting for NATO allies and the UN (i.e. multilaterally), which represented a symbol of ideologicaal divisions between multilateral and unilateral action abroad. (Fowler, 2015. 106 and Mead, 2002. 308). Jacksonians do not want to waste time with negotiations, sanctions or UN Security Council meetings. (Mead, 2002. 223). As opposed to senators raising alarm over fiscal costs, McCain paid little attention to fiscal costs of the operation. Although genuinely valuing the contributions of NATO allies, McCain critiqued any efforts to withdraw American military capabilities, and instead push for a quick and decisive victory. Jacksonians see the idea of a limited war as oxymoronic. Once the United States enters itself into hostilities, it must hit the enemy with all its might and power. (Mead, 2002. 254.) McCain’s approach to U.S. war conduct in Libya once the operation began was Jacksonian, yet his support for the operation itself was less Jacksonian in nature. Jacksonians supported the original war in Iraq – as well as the second one – for it was based on clear U.S. oil interests, but failed to see the rationale behind U.S. involvement in the Balkans. (Mead, 2002. 246-247.) U.S. Libyan policy was arguably Wilsonian in nature, and comparable to President Clinton’s decision to intervene in Yugoslavia. Whether based on his support for U.S. military in all eventualities or Wilsonian humanitarian concerns, Senator McCain’s approach to U.S. foreign policy ideology cannot be explained solely on Jacksonian basis.

172 Although Mead (2002, 322) notes that Jacksonian were eager to “…yank the purse strings…when Wilsonians pressed too hard for intervention in some godforsaken hellhole far from the beaten track of obvious American security interests.”
His colleague in the Foreign Relations, Richard Lugar, was the opposite. He was staunchly Jeffersonian in his insistence that no vital U.S. interests were at play in Libya—“excessive involvements overseas can compromise our democratic standards at home” (Mead, 2002. 193)—, humanitarian concerns do not justify American military intervention\(^{173}\), and that the process to enter the war itself was unconstitutional, for no congressional approval was requested. Jeffersonians argue for “a constitutional approach to foreign policy and scaling back the imperial presidency.” (Mead, 2002. 217.) The Jeffersonian thought prioritized American liberty and democracy at home, war, on the other hand, was the great evil in Jeffersonian foreign policy thought, and domestically the U.S. government was a necessary but dangerous force needing to be constrained. (Mead, 2002. 186). In matters of war and peace, the government was far too eager to enter U.S. military in unnecessary hostilities. To safeguard American democracy at home, congressional checks on governmental power are a necessity not to be circumvented—“democracy they [Jeffersonians] defend is more valuable than opportunities they lose.” (Mead, 2002. 215). Unlike the other three schools, all of which are prepared to forgo the constitutional process when American military is needed for whatever reasons they support, Jeffersonians have remained steadfast in their opposition to wars without a congressional resolution or declaration of war. For Jeffersonians, no UN or NATO resolution is enough to bypass the U.S. Congress, and no international treaty or obligation can circumvent the congressional process. War Powers Act of 1973 was the highlight of Jeffersonian influence on congressional war powers. (Mead, 2002. 190-191.) Lugar’s emphasis on a congressional resolution is consistent with Jeffersonian ideology. Safeguarding American democracy by committing U.S. government to the constitutional process outweighs other considerations, such as Wilsonian ideals of international legitimization, or Jacksonian insistence on maximum military force based on operational realities.

Internationalist Democrats, most notably John Kerry, highlighted the Wilsonian thought process legitimizing the intervention on humanitarian grounds, as a part of a sweeping change exerting over the Middle East and North Africa, wherein the forces of democracy took over the authoritarian regimes holding down the peoples in the region. United States had a unique opportunity to be on the rights side of history. As relative and absolute U.S. power grew ever stronger in the 20\(^{th}\) Century,

\(^{173}\) This Jeffersonian argument is most eloquently articulated by John Quincy Adams, America’s sixth president: “Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her [America’s] heart, her benedicitions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.” (John Quincy Adams, quoted in Mead, 2002. 193.)
Wilsonian interventions based on humanitarian concerns became more regular, and U.S. insistence democratic Japan, Germany and Italy post-World War II was rooted in Wilsonian thought. (Mead, 2002. 168). Although Wilsonians and Hamiltonians have similarities in legitimizing the use of force against nations or entities acting against international order, Wilsonian universalism most vividly separates it from the three schools. (Mead, 2002. 169.) It was perhaps these ideals that equated an intervention in Libya with the idea of being on the “right side of history”, if the “right side of history” is understood in universalist terms as opposed to American self-interest. American intervention followed the logic of President Clinton’s decision to use U.S. force in the Balkans, not the logic constituting George W. Bush’s Iraq War. Both Hamiltonian and Wilsonian ideas battled in the Clinton administration (Mead, 2002. 304), eventually leading the Wilsonian side to win the policy battle on U.S. intervention in the Balkans. Similarly, the Wilsonian streak in Jeffersonian Obama might explain his decision to act on Libya, while the committee leadership followed suit, framing the issue in both internationalist and humanitarian terms.

6.3 European Troop Presence / BRAC

Perhaps more than anything else, the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the resulting sequestration policy defined the context of Senate Armed Services Committee’s debates over the issue of American troop presence in Europe. But the new fiscal realities pushed on by the assertiveness of Republican House created new issues, and emphasized the effectiveness of already existing sentiments in congressional politics. One of the direct consequences of Budget Control Act and sequestration were the defense budget cuts. At the end of the 112th Congress, in 2012, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the defense spending would drop from $554 billion in 2012 to $491 billion in 2013. The cuts proposed, amounting to approximately 9.4% decrease, would not cut into war funding, nor into military personnel and veteran’s affairs. (Sahadi, 2012.) As such, the cuts into defense spending would cut directly into the parochial interests of the members of Congress, as the nation prepared for 2012 elections. Both the context of Budget Control Act of 2011, born out of a compromise between the president and the Congress, and the upcoming elections created an environment susceptible to partisan politicking. Further, as evident by the analysis of the 111th Congress, the Committee found considerable bipartisan support to the idea that Europe ought to pay its share of the common European security arrangement. As such, notions of NATO’s shortcomings vis-à-vis individual
member states’ defense spending were only heightened by the new domestic realities affecting congressional politics.

6.3.1 Armed Services Committee

The United States Congress, and especially the Armed Services Committees both in the House of Representatives and the Senate, have considerable leverage over the executive regarding Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. Other than simply withholding their constitutional approval of a defense spending bill, the BRAC related legislation itself has been amended several times to enhance congressional authority over the issue. Under 10 U.S.C. § 2687 statute the secretary of defense cannot initiate the BRAC process if the closing or realignment of military bases affect Department of Defense civilian workforce exceeding a certain threshold, unless Armed Services Committees are notified as a part of defense appropriations process. A later amendment to the statute added that the notification to Congress must include the planned reductions in the amount of military personnel affected by the change. As the result of congressional amendments and statutes set;

It [Section 2687] barred the Secretary from taking any irrevocable action until he notifies the Committees on Armed Services of the proposed reduction, submits a justification for the reduction and an evaluation of its local strategic and operational impact, and a waiting period has expired. (Towell, 2012. 55-56.)

Overall, the Armed Services Committee was a key player not only in the annual defense appropriations process, but it also carried considerable weight regarding the debates over Base Realignment and Closure process. Given the domestic realities, congressional perceptions of European member states’ disregard of military spending\(^{174}\), and the legislative authority vested in the Armed Services Committee,

\(^{174}\) Of course, the United States Congress was not the only institution worried about the lack of commitment in Europe to military spending. As evident by the comments made by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in 2010: “The demilitarization of Europe — where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it — has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st” (Quoted in Knowlton, 2010) and in 2011: “The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress, and in the American body politic writ large, to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources ... to be serious and capable partners in their own defense” (Quoted in Birnbaum, 2011.)
European troops presence became a substantial issue regarding debates over American military spending.

The Senate Armed Services Committee debated the issue of European troop presence in several hearings, yet none were specifically dedicated to the issue. The hearings debating troop presence included the annual defense appropriations hearings, more specifically hearings on European Command (EUCOM), African Command (AFRICOM), Readiness subcommittee, and military posture hearings. Further, the issue was debated during nominations hearings, both in 2011 and 2012. Overall, framings of American troop presence in Europe were identified in 36 statements. The initial analysis of the debates divided the statements in three specific categories based on the framings identified. These included European presence positive, identified in six (6) Republican statements, one (1) statement by an Independent, and zero (0) times by a Democratic Senator; European presence negative, identified in eight (8) Republican statements and eight (8) Democratic statements; and Europe first, identified in nine (9) Democratic statements and three (3) Republican statements. If we disregard the partisan divide, proportionally the European presence negative -framing was identified in 46% of all the statements, Europe first -framing in 34%, and European presence positive -framing in 20% of all (35) the framings identified. (Figure 29.)

European presence negative (16). These statements regarded American military presence in Europe in negative terms, most notably based on the assertion that European should rather build up their own defense infrastructures, instead of relying on American military umbrella.

Europe first. (12). These statements clustered argumentatively the issue of Base Closure and Realignment process affecting mainland United States and American military presence in Europe. In the statements identified in Europe first -framing, the
decision-making process regarding BRAC ought to be done alongside changes in American military posture in Europe. Although the argumentation in many of these framings were negative vis-à-vis European troop presence, some were neutral and strategic by nature, although arguably hinting to the conclusions reached within the European presence negative framing.

European presence positive (7). These statements argued for the positive aspects of continuing American military presence in Europe, most notably by relying on military-strategic arguments and value-based arguments highlighting the importance of the North Atlantic alliance.

6.3.1.1 Dominant Frames

The dominant framing identified in the debates was European presence negative. Senators invoked it in approximately 46% of all the framings, with equal frequency in both the Republican and Democratic statements. (Figure 29.) Rhetorically, the bulk of the argument revolved around the prevalent theme common in other Europe related security debates; spending. Although some argue that the transatlantic bargain is becoming more and more symmetrical in nature, as suggested by European influence on American foreign policy in issues such as Kosovo War and the Iraq conflict (see Schomaker, 2010), the United States Congress hardly saw NATO as an alliance of equals, at least as it came to taking (financial) responsibility over defense. If we look at NATO’s self-imposed (see Bremmer, 2017) requirement for member states to spend at least 2% of their respective GDP to defense, few pass the bar. Per SIPRI report (see SIPRI, 2016. 13), Germany spent 1,3%, Denmark 1,3%, and Spain 1,3% of GDP on defense, supporting the belief held in the U.S. Congress that Europe has failed to pull its weight. Of course, Germany’s lack of commitment to defense was seen especially worrisome, given the strength of German economy and the fact that most U.S. troops during and after the Cold War were stationed specifically in Germany:

With regard to our forces in Europe, the original plan was to bring back two Army brigades, General Odierno, from Europe. I understand those plans are now on hold. According to Stars and Stripes, in April, the Army will return only 1 brigade, and that only represents 5,000 soldiers out of 80,000 U.S. troops in Europe. I think it is time for us to have a serious heart-to-heart with the Europeans on their defense expenditures. In Germany, I understand they are about 1.2 percent of GDP. Other countries are at that level in Europe. Very few are meeting their goal of 2 percent of GDP on defense as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization obligation, while we are at about 4 to 5 percent of GDP on defense. Are you aware of this discussion? Maybe Admiral
Winnefeld would be, and I just have to say it means a lot economically to Germany or other places where we have people spending money in their economy. It means a lot to our Nation when our people are at home spending money in our economy, number one. Number two, if they do not need to be there for serious strategic reasons, I think we should look to bring more home and reduce our presence. (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg. 112-419, 2011. 614)

The above quote from Alabaman Senator Jeff Sessions highlights the dominant themes in European force posture debates. First, it directly targets Germany as the one country exemplifying the European lack of commitment to defense. Such notions are not completely unfounded. Despite NATO’s original purpose, as described by the organization’s first secretary-general Hastings Ismay, is “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” (quoted in Braw, 2016), the post-Cold War defense cuts by Germany have, to an extent, turned the tables regarding historical fears over strong German military. Of the larger European member states, Germany’s post-Cold War defense cuts have been the starkest, emphasized by the strength of Germany’s economy.175 (ibid). Perceptions of weakening German military have even led Poland to express their concern over the situation, as the former Polish defense minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz recounted that “[t]oday, we’re seriously worried about German armed forces that are too weak.”, a striking statement from a country with such tragic historic ties to its western neighbor, continuing to assert “[the permanent underfunding of the defense sector could create the impression that Germany is not taking its commitments to NATO’s common territorial defense very seriously.” (Quoted in Braw, 2016.) Of course, it did not help that Germany decided not to partake in NATO’s Libyan operation.

Second, it brings up the parochial issue of domestic politics relative to military posture. If United States has troops deployed in Germany, such deployment benefits the local economies, businesses etc. In a sense, it entails a transfer of wealth from local (American) communities to foreign communities, and a country willingly ignoring its responsibility to spend money on defense. The logic follows, that the American military, funded by American taxpayers, ought to spend that money in local communities supporting businesses in mainland United States, rather than indirectly transferring funds from American taxpayers to German taxpayers, already

175 See Senator Sessions [R-AL] during the EUCOM hearing in 2011 dominated by the intervention in Libya: “Our German friends are some of the best economic and political partners we have in the world. However, tell the American people why we have to have 40,000 troops in Europe if they’re cutting their budgets far more substantially than we’re cutting ours?” (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 626)
relieved from the duty of funding their own military.\textsuperscript{176} Both using Germany to exemplify NATO’s failure to reach the agreed-upon 2% of GDP on defense spending and the adverse effects of spending taxpayer money to fund overseas economies instead of those in mainland United States demonstrate the dominance of financial aspects of American overseas troop presence.

Third, if the United States does not need to deploy troops overseas for “serious strategic reasons”, the fiscal logic dictates that U.S. ought to withdraw those troops to mainland U.S., where they would benefit American’s directly, as opposed to vague strategic benefits achieved by overseas U.S. presence. The military-strategic arguments followed the logic that a strong, U.S. Army based deterrence based in fixed military installations in the continental Europe was a Cold War relic, a military strategy formed to counteract Soviet aggression. Such outdated “forward strategy” is replaced by advances in moving air- and sea-based forces, as articulated during the George W. Bush administration studies by Joint Chiefs of Staff and a study by the RAND corporation. (Vine, 2015). So, if America’s forward based forces in Europe do not serve a “serious” strategic purpose, why spend taxpayer money to deploy such expensive forces in rich Western European countries apparently unwilling to make budgetary commitment to defend themselves.\textsuperscript{177} Surely, if the military-strategic situation so required, the wealthy Germans, French, and Brits would take the lead in hard European security questions: “If Europe is not committed to defending itself, does it need to have us to defend them?” (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 626).

Equal number of Republican and Democrat Senators were identified invoking European presence negative-framing, with eight (8) statements identified by members of both parties. (See Figure 29). The tone of the statements made by Democratic senators were less vindictive compared to the rhetorical tone used by Republican senators such as Jeff Sessions [R-AL]. Although some statements by Democrats tackled individual issues\textsuperscript{178}, Democratic senators stressed the reassessment aspect of

\textsuperscript{176} Compare Germany’s 1,3%, or 1,2% as quoted in Senator Sessions’ statement, to ”4 to 5%” of GDP in the U.S.

\textsuperscript{177} See for example: “The Government Accountability Office has reported that it costs $17 billion for DOD installations in Europe and they estimated $24 billion through 2015 to operate and maintain our bases there. Is NATO so frail that we have to have another $1.8 billion construction project to maintain perhaps more troops than the plan has called for?” (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 626)

\textsuperscript{178} See for example Senator McCaskill [D-MO]: ” There are other areas in which we can, and should, do better.

For example, the budget request includes funding for a new medical center near Ramstein Airbase, Germany, at an expected cost of $1.2 billion. That is as much as the entire DOD budget for family
the issue, highlighting the need to reassess American global posture in the era of fiscal conservatism:

Dr. Carter, thank you for coming to see me a few days ago. I appreciate the opportunity to have a conversation with you. I want to just make sure of a couple things. With all due respect to my colleague from Alabama, actually, the 40,000 troops in Europe, we are on the same page here. We want to see some reassessment, not only in Europe, but around the globe, of where we have our resources and so forth. (Senator Begich [D-AK] S.Hrg. 112-419, 2011. 1032.)

The above quote is interesting for several reasons. First, Senator Begich, a Democrat from Alaska agrees with Republican Senator Jeff Sessions, one of the most consistent critics of NATO and European troop presence. Second, he calls for “reassessment, not only in Europe, but around the globe.” (ibid). Missing from the Democratic statements was the antagonist. Whereas the Republican arguments framed the issue as a specific problem willingly created by European member states and exacerbated by the fiscal context, the Democrats framed it purely around the fiscal context. But despite the difference in argumentative strategies, Democratic senators had reached the same conclusion as their Republican counterparts, yet articulated it in fiscal and strategic terms. Regarding the European presence negative framing, several statements were excluded from the category due their apparent neutral approach to the issue. These statements, exemplified by the below statement by Senator Levin [D-MI], outsource the policy-decision to Department of Defense’s global posture review and as such portray an aura of military-strategic emphasis. Informal Democratic influence on the review, or the public statements by the Pentagon officials, remains unclear, and hence excluding some Democratic statements from the framings identified in Figure 29.

General Welsh, let me ask you about a policy question which we asked in our prehearing questions, and it relates to European bases. You indicated in your

housing this year, for one single hospital. I recognize that the medical facility at Ramstein [sic] has been the first stop for our wounded warriors returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. But, we will be out of Iraq, and maybe out of Afghanistan, before this facility is ever built.” (Senator McCaskill [D-MO] S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 40.)

Reference being to Senator Sessions’ statement before Senator Begich, “I believe Senator Levin asked you about deployments in Europe. It’s just a matter that’s come up again recently. I am of the belief it’s difficult to justify 40,000 troops in Europe at this point in time. For our economy it’s better for those troops to be in the United States spending their wealth and creating tax growth for the local communities and jobs. Will you examine our force levels in areas like Europe and maintain the levels we need, but not maintain them at higher amounts than necessary?” (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg. 112-419, 2011. 1017.)
answer that we should consider reductions and consolidation opportunities in Europe and that planning must begin with a careful assessment of the enduring missions in Europe, but that you were willing to take a look at possible reductions and consolidations. I just wonder if you know going in of any possibilities, or you just want to go in there with an open mind? (Senator Levin [D-MI] S.Hrg. 112-745, 2011. 541.)

*Europe first-* argument was prevalent in Democratic argumentation considering the Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) process as proposed in the administration’s defense budget proposal. (See Figure 29). Now, the BRAC process itself is rather evident a highly salient domestic policy issue, given the direct electoral consequences for members of Congress affected by base closures, and congressional authority in the appropriations process itself. For example, during the Bush administration’s second term, in 2005, President Bush endorsed the closure of 22 domestic military bases, despite the opposition by Republican-led Senate which attempted to curtail such efforts. President Bush made an effort to make the process neutral by appointing a “nonpolitical” commission to work with the Department of Defense to present a report on which bases to close, and which to maintain. Despite recommendations made by the Department of Defense, the “nonpolitical” commission did decide to recommend maintaining several bases suggested to be closed by the Pentagon. The “nonpolitical” commission voted to maintain bases, against Pentagon’s wishes, in home states of John Thune [R-SD] and several other Republican senators who opposed the BRAC process. (Riechmann, 2005.) Such political “horse trading” is by no means extraordinary. What made the process in 112th Congress different, was the sequestration policy adopted in the Budget Control Act of 2011 and fiercely championed by the conservative House Republicans. Sequestration meant that for any increase in budget, equal number of dollars must be cut from some part of the federal budget. In this fiscal reality, coupled with the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, few senators were willing to cut those dollars from domestic spending.

The BRAC process itself is inseparable from the annual defense appropriations process. Although in theory the United States Congress has the sole constitutional authority to “raise and support armies…” (U.S. Const. Art. I Sec. 8), the appropriations process itself begins with a budget proposal by the Department of Defense, made in cooperation with the administration. The budget proposal - also known as budget request - for fiscal year 2013 proposed a $5.2 billion drop from the FY2012 defense budget. The first hint of Obama administration’s approach to
European military posture comes in the FY2013 budget requests overview of the global security environment:

The U.S. has enduring interests in supporting peace and prosperity in Europe as well as bolstering the strength and vitality of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In keeping with this evolving strategic landscape, our posture in Europe must also evolve. As this occurs, the U.S. will maintain our Article 5 commitments to allied security and promote enhanced capacity and interoperability for coalition operations. (DOD, 2012. 2-2.)

So, what does it mean for the United States posture in Europe to evolve? Per the document, U.S. “presence and activities” will in the future focus on “interoperability and sustaining alliance commitments.” Of course, interoperability here refers to the idea that United States will continue to fulfill its Article 5 commitment with increased emphasis on interoperability, leading to the conclusion that the future U.S. emphasis in Europe will be based on building capabilities for “allies to defend their own territory and interests.” (DOD, 2012. 2-2.) So, in short, U.S. will withdraw its conventional capabilities and continues to stress the need for Europeans to take responsibility for their own defense. As such, the strategic viewpoint adopted by the Department of Defense in 2012 was consistent with congressional disappointment in NATO’s willingness to invest in defense. Furthermore, the document stressed the now infamous Asia pivot, an effort to rebalance America’s global posture towards Asia: “The Department’s Armed Forces will have a global presence that emphasizes the Asia-Pacific and Middle East...” whereas the transatlantic alliance played a secondary role: “…while still ensuring our ability to maintain our defense commitments to Europe and strengthening alliance and partnerships across all regions.” (DOD, 2012. 7-37).

The administration has called for two more base realignment and closure (BRAC) rounds. In my view, however, before we consider another round of BRAC, DOD ought to take a hard look at whether further reductions in bases can be made overseas, particularly in Europe. While DOD has announced the removal of two of the four combat brigades currently stationed in Europe, even after the brigades are withdrawn there will still be over 70,000 U.S. military personnel deployed in Europe. Finding further reductions and consolidations in our overseas force posture should be our first priority before another BRAC round. (Senator Levin [D-MI] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 3.)

Committee chairman Carl Levin’s statement demonstrates the argumentative logic of the Europe first-framing. The Department of Defense (DOD) in its FY13 Budget Request already acknowledged the strategic “rebalance to Asia” and the need for
“our posture in Europe to evolve.” (DOD, 2012. 2-2). Logically thinking, the argument is sound. U.S. is rebalancing to Asia-Pacific, domestically the American public is facing sever fiscal restraints, and the congressional disappointment in Western European military spending hardly persuades the Senate risk their electoral success to maintain current posture in rich Western Europe. But Senator Levin called the DOD to “take a hard look” if the Department can make further cuts in American military posture in Europe. The previous hard look at the issue of American military strategy was the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. The review defines the U.S. defense posture as a result of three key elements: “forward-stationed and rotationally deployed forces, capabilities, and equipment…” including forward deployed forces in Germany etc., “a supporting overseas network of infrastructure and facilities…” including military hospitals and fixed bases in Western Europe, “and a series of treaty, access, transit, and status-protection agreements and arrangements with allies and key partners”, including of course the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. (DOD, 2010. 62). Regarding American force posture in Europe, the review states:

Maintaining a robust U.S. military presence in Europe serves to deter the political intimidation of allies and partners; promote stability in the Aegean, Balkans, Caucasus, and Black Sea regions; demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO allies; builds trust and goodwill among host nations; and facilitate multilateral operations in support of mutual security interests both inside and outside the continent. (DOD, 2010. 65.)

Overall, the American military presence in Europe is considered to have an added value to security and safety in Europe, as well as to building trust and goodwill. The review emphasized the importance of a long-term U.S. military presence for its diplomatic merits, recognizing that “we cannot simply ‘surge’ trust and relationships on demand” (DOD, 2010. 63), referring to need for a long-term presence to ensure America’s sustained relationships with its allies. Yet, no concrete recommendations about the actual troop numbers in Europe can be found in the document, and the 2010 QDR only managed to pass the issue further down the line, as it stated that “the United States will retain four brigade combat teams and an Army Corps headquarters forward-stationed on the continent”, but the decision would be revisited after NATO’s new strategic concept and the accompanying review of U.S. European defense posture network finished. (DOD, 2010).

The quadrennial strategy review by the Department of Defense did not support the type of strategic argument for a withdrawal it could have, and for some, should
have. The issue was primarily a fiscal one\textsuperscript{180}, and the tone in the debates demonstrated that the strategic argument functioned merely as a complimentary one. To highlight the fiscal nature of the debate, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans’ Affairs requested a review by United States Government Accountability Office to evaluate the total costs associated with American military presence in Europe. (Pendleton, 2011). The review itself was admittedly a response to QDR’s insistence on maintaining four combat brigades in Europe instead of withdrawing two of them. The report itself concludes that the Department of Defense is lacking a comprehensive review of the fiscal consequences related to American overseas presence in Europe, and calls for a more cost-conscious approach to EUCOM’s defense posture planning vis-à-vis Europe. (Pendleton, 2011. 20.)

In early 2012, the fiscal restraint won the battle over the two combat brigades the DOD’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review recommended to be left in their place. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced the “replacement” of two U.S Army brigades in Europe with rotating units\textsuperscript{181}, a decision the DOD argued was based on the new air-sea doctrine better suited to fulfill the strategic requirements of the U.S. global military commitments. (Garamone, 2012). Looking back at the statement by Senator Levin, even the decision to withdraw two Army brigades was not enough to satisfy congressional thirst to replace the domestic BRAC process with the withdrawal of American military forces from Europe: “…even after the brigades are withdrawn there will still be over 70,000 U.S. military personnel deployed in Europe;” (Senator Levin [D-MI] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 3.), and the Department of Defense ought to continue to look for ways to save money in Europe: “Finding further reductions and consolidations in our overseas force posture should be our first priority before another BRAC round.”\textsuperscript{182} (ibid). The result of the debate over

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{180} See for example Senator Sessions [R-AL]: ” I would just say I am personally somewhat pleased that we will draw down that second brigade out of Europe because we have a financial crisis in America.” (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 361.)
\item \textsuperscript{181} The first brigade-sized, approximately 4000 troops, did not arrive to Europe until 2017, when the United States deployed an Army brigade to Poland. (Smith-Park & Shubert, 2017). Of course, the European security context had shifted considerably due to annexation of Crimea in 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{182} This line of argumentation demonstrated the bipartisan nature of the Europe >> BRAC -framing, as both Democratic and Republican senators insisted that no BRAC could be authorized prior to a thorough review of American overseas presence: “First, DOD is reviewing military force posture overseas in Europe and in Asia and developing plans that will not be finalized in the near future, and we need to know what those plans are. Those plans will have a direct impact on bases in the United States. Initiating another BRAC round before those overseas plans are finalized would be premature.” (Senator Ayotte [R-NH] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 5.)
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
American troop presence was that by 2017, United States had approximately 25,000 strong permanent fighting force in Europe (Hertling, 2017), compared to 250,000 during the Cold War, and approximately 80,000 during the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.

6.3.1.2 Competing Frames

There were no competing perceptions over the issue of American troop presence in Europe. Further analysis of the six (6) European presence positive -framings by Republicans and the one (1) by an Independent (See Figure 29) highlight the lack of serious (strategic) policy debate regarding the issue of American troop presence in Europe. Certainly, no one was fighting the issue in the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings. But if we further examine the framings identified in the European presence positive -framing, some are borderline positive, yet the argumentative logic admittedly parochial, and focused on the placement of AFRICOM’s headquarters, at the time located in Stuttgart. But some debate involved discussion whether the base should be moved to continental United States. Two of the six framings identified within the European presence positive -framing had nothing to do with overall question of American force posture in Western Europe, but there were statements stressing the strategic and military implications of decreasing America’s troop presence in Europe based on serious arguments about the European security framework:

What is clear from our commanders’ prepared testimonies, and what will become clearer today, is that the work of our Armed Forces, both in Europe and Africa, is not decreasing. It is increasing. It is becoming more complex, and it is becoming more important to our national security. I think we should

183 See for example: "Okay. I’m sure you will get asked a lot of questions about that when you are before the Appropriations subcommittee. There are some 20 State partnership programs going on right now. I know that my State of Oklahoma has Azerbaijan. They have all kinds of good reports, but I’m wondering how you see it when you’re looking at the whole thing. Is it time and resources well spent with our Guard activities?" (Senator Inhofe [R-OK] S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 606.)

184 See for example Senator Sessions acknowledging the parochial nature of the debate over AFRICOM’s headquarters: "A couple of things there. There is always an effort by Members of Congress to say, “let us take that AFRICOM and take it away from Stuttgart in this case and put it in my State.” I would like to have you be aware and talk to General Ham about what a mistake that would be. My feeling was it should have actually been located in Ethiopia or someplace on the continent. However, with all of their concerns, I have personally talked to the presidents of many of the countries who agree that would have been good except they can never sell the idea to the Africans because they will think about going back to colonialism and that type of thing.” (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg. 112-745, 2012. 452.) As demonstrated in the previous analysis, Senator Sessions was by no mean an advocate of strong military presence in Europe.
bear all this in mind as we in this committee and we in Congress more broadly debate whether and how to reduce our defense spending, including the catastrophic effects of sequestration.

Our European allies remain our preeminent security partners. Today, EUCOM and NATO are being called upon to bear an ever greater responsibility for diverse international security challenges, from Afghanistan and Libya, to cyber threats and transnational terrorism, to BMD and the strategic balance of forces on the continent. We must be mindful of the enduring value and impact of our European alliances as we evaluate change to our force posture. In its recently released defense strategy, DOD has proposed the withdrawal of an additional brigade combat team from Europe. At the same time, this drawdown of forces is complemented by new U.S. military commitments to Europe, including a brigade-sized contribution to the NATO response force, new rotations of troops for joint exercises and operations, the installation of a ground based radar in Turkey, and the stationing of four BMD-capable Aegis ships in Spain. Overall, this seems like a prudent realignment of our forces and commitment in Europe. (Senator McCain [R-AZ] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 270.)

The above quote from Republican ranking member John McCain from Arizona ought to be further deconstructed, for it offers an argumentative logic separate from other senators – Republican or Democrat - in the committee. In his statement, an opening statement of the defense appropriations hearing on U.S. European Command and U.S. African Command on March 1st, 2012, begins with the observation that the “work” of U.S. military in European region is in fact increasing. It postulates that the security issues affecting Europe and wider European context including North Africa are American security issues. Thus, the conclusion that real-world contingencies have led to an increasing workload for U.S. armed forces lead to another conclusion; Europe and its near abroad are in fact more important to U.S. national security than in the past. European security framework has grown more complex, yet influential to U.S. national security, especially given that “war-on-terror” and “Arab Spring” context affecting both European and American security interests in the region. As per the argumentative logic, the fiscally conscious debate in the U.S. Congress has distorted the American view of the real-world situation in the area, an unfortunate consequence of the “catastrophic” sequestration. The danger for the committee, the Congress, and the United States security interests, is that the effects of the sequestration have led to attempts to base the military-strategic calculations on fiscal realities, rather than realities on the ground.
The second quoted chapter describes the added value of continuing transatlantic commitment. United States’ European allies are America’s “preeminent” allies, thus transcending it above other alliances formed by the United States. But the U.S. commitment as postulated by Senator McCain is based, besides shared framework of values, on real-life strategic issues affecting both U.S. and European security, ranging from Afghanistan and Libya to cyber, and all the way to traditional security issues, such as U.S. strategic forces and missile defense. Yet, as stated, Senator McCain did not oppose the withdrawal of two American brigades itself, his argumentation opposed the defense spending cuts caused by the catastrophic sequestration policy. Notably, he does not follow the argumentative logic imposed by many in the committee, that the European member states’ refusal to spend on their own defense somehow legitimizes U.S. withdrawal from the continent. In fact, his acceptance of withdrawing two combat brigades is based on consequent U.S. commitments to European security, i.e. “a brigade-sized contribution to the NATO response force, new rotations of troops for joint exercises and operations” and “installation of a ground based radar in Turkey, and the stationing of four BMD-capable Aegis ships in Spain.” This, force Senator McCain formed a “prudent” balancing act as a response to withdrawal of permanent fighting forces. (ibid.)

It’s hard for me to conclude that there’s any reason you would make such a recommendation [spending reductions in administration’s defense budget request for FY13] other than the fact that you’re required by law to do it. In other words, what drives this presentation is the budgetary pressure, as I said, the accumulated weight of the fiscal irresponsibility of our government over the last decade, and the specific requirement of the BCA, not the threat environment in the world. (Senator Lieberman [I-CT] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 37.)

185 Senator Ayotte [R-NH] also brought up the strategic importance of European-based forces relative to real-life situation on the ground: ”This is a very critical part of the world when you think about our ability to respond in the Mediterranean with what we see happening right now. In that area of the world, you have Syria, Israel, and Egypt, all in that area. As I look at the 2013 budget, to my knowledge, we have not yet received that certification from the Secretary of Defense in terms of the impact of readiness on a reduced operating status. Now in the 2013 budget, we are actually eliminating the squadron in the Mediterranean even though the unrest in that area—you think about Israel, Syria, Egypt, and Libya. Certainly, even from when it was an initial recommendation in 2012, really the circumstances have actually changed. Now we are going to eliminate that prepositioned force.

I wanted to know what the strategic rationale was for that and also what your view is in terms of an impact on readiness. This is a real concern. I understand we are in a constrained budgetary time, but we certainly, when you think about the critical area of the world that we are talking about, do not want to put ourselves in a position where we are not able to respond promptly in those areas, particularly with our ally, Israel.” (Senator Ayotte [R-NH] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 356.)
This leads to another conclusion articulated by Senator Lieberman [I-CT] in the quote above. That is, that the sequestration policy leading to defense cuts is a result of poor fiscal policy, and the defense budget is victimized over mistakes made in the past. The reference to “fiscal irresponsibility...over the last decade” is an obvious reference to George W. Bush administration’s fiscal policy, spending over $1 trillion to fund wars in Afghanistan and Iraq - by the time President Obama took office - with mostly borrowed money and a supplemental appropriations process. (See Thompson, 2008). Now, due to failures of leadership, the United States Congress has received a budget request based on budgetary pressures created by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), rather than a reality-based threat perception formulated by the experts in the Department of Defense. By submitting to this new budgetary reality mandated by the BCA, the United States Congress fails in one of its key constitutional duties: “we’re not fulfilling our responsibility under the Constitution to provide for the common defense.” (ibid).

6.3.2 Individual Breakdown

Both chairman Levin and ranking member McCain supported a BRAC round in 1999 as a part of FY 2000 defense spending bill. (Mitchell, 1999). In 2004, then ranking member Senator Levin argued, together with then chairman John Warner [R-VA], that the Bush proposed 2005 BRAC ought to target exclusively American overseas bases. (see Farrier, 2010). During the 112th Congress, chairman Levin [D-MI] maintained his insistence on targeting first and foremost the U.S. overseas presence. His political support did not come from ranking member McCain, who made just a single statement regarding U.S. presence in Europe, but from Senator Sessions [R-AL]. Sessions was in fact the most vocal Senator in the Armed Services with seven statements regarding U.S. military presence in Europe, while chairman Levin came close second with six. Rest of the Committee remained either silent, or made one to three statements on the issue. (See Figure 30.)
Senator Sessions [R-AL] argued strongly for the scaling back of American military presence in Europe. His argumentation relied heavily on the NATO negative-framing and the existing sentiment that NATO’s European member states did not contribute enough for their own and common defense, thus pushing unfair financial burden to United States to maintain strong deterrence in Europe, as Europeans themselves are happy to reap the advances of American security umbrella. Besides referencing the overall status of NATO spending, Sessions made specific references to Germany, which hosted two Army brigades now under consideration to be pulled out. As argued by Sessions, German contributions to NATO alliance do not earn them such security investment from the U.S.:

But, they haven’t been that reliable. The Germans didn’t even support the no-fly zone in Libya. They don’t allow their soldiers to fire their weapons. I know they have troops in Afghanistan, and we’re supposed to say we’re thankful, and we are thankful, but, really, give me a break. I think we have to ask more of our European allies. The Japanese are paying 40 percent of our Navy and base supports in Japan when we deploy our military there. We’re not having the same kind of support out of Europe. (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 729.)

Sessions presented the issue through NATO negative-framing as a structural problem with NATO funding, especially prevalent in the unwillingness of rich Western
European to contribute. Sessions argued that America’s European allies did not deserve the financial investment carried by the U.S. to European security. As such, Sessions’ argumentative approach could be defined as policy strategist, although his argumentation was based on the very issue-specific context of domestic military spending in terms of a proposed BRAC round.

Senator Levin’s attention was focused on the two Army brigades under consideration to be pulled out from Germany, as he argued for reductions and consolidations to U.S. overseas basing. As the administration proposed a based realignment plant, Levin doubled down on his insistence to make reductions to U.S. overseas bases, especially in Europe, before decisions to consolidate domestic military installations can be considered. Different from Sessions, Levin’s argumentation did not rely on NATO negative -framing or similar argument for NATO’s shortcoming. Instead, he focused solely on Europe first -framing with a notably neutral tone. As such, Levin’s approach could be defined as a policy specialist.

6.3.3 Discussion

Perhaps the most striking conclusion to be drawn from the analysis is the lack of depth in the framings identified. Only three separate framings were identified; European presence positive, invoked by Republican senators, Europe first, invoked by mostly Democrats but also some Republicans, and European presence negative, invoked by both sides of the debate. (See Figure 29.) The issue was not debated in any specific hearing devoted to American military strategy vis-à-vis its European-based forces. Instead, it was discussed in a rather loose manner spread across several, mainly budgetary hearings. As such, the issue was not a military-strategic one, but rather a fiscal one, an observation supported by the argumentative logic recognized in most statements analyzed.

Luke Coffey, Director of Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy wrote in 2012 on America’s shrinking military presence in Europe. Coffey argued that President Obama’s cuts “are sending the wrong signal on America’s commitment to transatlantic security…” by demonstrating dangerous developments to regional adversaries, and most importantly, the cuts would impair U.S. flexibility to respond in wider regional context. For Coffey, U.S. bases in Europe represent “forward operating bases of the 21st century” in “one of the most important crossroads of the world”, leading him to conclude that “[r]educing these capabilities will only weaken America on the world stage.” (Coffey, 2012.) In a 2014 Armed Services Hearing, when the Congress once again advocated further cuts in American presence, Admiral Stavridis made a similar argument:
People sometimes say, "You know, those bases in Europe, they're kind of the bastions of the Cold War." They're really not. They're the forward operating bases for 21st century security. They allow us to support Carter Ham in Africa. They allow us to support Jim Mattis in the Levant, in the Near Middle East and indeed, in Central Asia. (Admiral Stavridis, 2014.)

Implications for transatlantic security were embedded in the process. By not debating the European military presence in Foreign Relations, and placing the issue solely in the appropriations process for America’s defense budget in the era of sequestration, the Congress circumvented the strategic implications of drawing down forces in the Europe. As such, the debate over America’s military presence followed the logic of NATO-related debates in 111th Congress and Armed Services Libya debates in the 112th, debates expressing congressional disappointment in Western European defense spending and unwillingness to take control over their own defenses. The argumentative logic followed; if the rich European nations are not willing to spend money on their national defense, why should American taxpayer carry the burden? The issue was rather straightforward example of domestic policy effects on American foreign policy decision-making. If an issue is framed and processed as a distributive politics issue, rather than a strategic one, the domestic and institutional forces affecting distributive politics dictate the debate and “foresight will remain scarce in the absence of challenging debate” (Rockman, 2005. 38). Little foresight or strategic thinking was evident in the debates over America’s troop presence in Europe.

From a partisan perspective, the Committee remained notably bipartisan in its considerations. Despite efforts by John McCain [R-AZ] to stress the importance of maintaining overall military budget even in the new BCA environment, the issue did not turn into a partisan fight, for the obvious reason that a newly elected Republican House majority was to blame for the new fiscal constrains handcuffing the defense budget. As Cushman (2015, 120) notes, the rise of the Tea Party in 2010 midterms eroded the “privileged position” previously reserved for defense policy, and moreover, it managed to undercut the policy influence of the Armed Services Committee.186 Instead of contemplating changes to their institutional role, both Republicans and Democrats were eager to describe the negatives of European military presence if that presence costed Americans at home. Instead of seeing the

186 This despite the survey data supporting the notion that conservative’s support for greater military spending outshines the need for fiscal austerity - in Ronald Reagan’s terms: “Defense is not a budget issue. You spend what you need.” (Quoted in Gries, 2014. 42) – only two senators made this point especially salient, i.e. John McCain and Joseph Lieberman.
U.S. presence in Europe as a security issue, it was framed as a fiscal one. Rather than spending taxpayer money to support German economy, taxpayers’ dollars ought to be spent in mainland United States. If one attempted to find some difference between the parties and their definition of the problem, the Democratic side of the debate was less vocal on blaming the wealthy Western European nations for ignoring their defensive obligations, whereas Republicans – most notably Senator Sessions [R-AL] – was not afraid to put the blame on America’s allies.

Thus, the debate over American military presence in Europe was defined in *distributional* terms. Presidents tend to see less support for their policies in the Armed Services187, where partisan majorities play less of a role compared to Foreign Relations (Fowler, 2015. 107), and the committee has consistently battled with the White House on issues such as U.S. defense posture. (ibid, 102). As argued by Milner & Tingley (2015), domestic military spending is one of the most strikingly distributive policy instruments at the president’s disposal. As such, local constituencies and interest groups are much more likely to activate on the issue and individual senators see their electoral fortunes walk hand in hand with the policy they advocate. Constituency concerns and negative interest group activity is highlighted in the Senate, where re-election rates have been consistently lower compared to House, thus making incumbent senators more vulnerable to negative attention from interest groups. (Cox & Duffin, 2008. 35.)

The lack of debate in the Foreign Relations and the overarching effects of the new budgetary context kept most of the *ideological* considerations out of the debate. Now, the Democrats and Republicans in general hold divisive views of spending, as Democrats tend to be more willing to cut military spending, whereas the Republicans are more likely to support cutting non-military foreign aid, such as foreign aid. (Milner & Tingley, 2015. 204.) Such general differences were muted by the nature of Armed Services, wherein cutting overall military spending is a highly unpopular notion, and non-military foreign aid out of the committee’s jurisdiction. Although senators agreed that scaling back American military presence out of Europe was the choice to make, few argued that on *ideological* basis. Per Fowler (2015, 99), partisanship in the Armed Services tends to be muted by de-emphasis on oversight. This, certainly, was true with the debates over America’s European military presence.

Despite the importance of America’s military presence in Europe and the strategic significance of the wider region, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the “pure policy” body committed to “high politics” (see for example Fowler, 2015),

---

187 Where partisanship is muted due to the Committee’s priority to defend military funding by acting as the protector of U.S. military. (Fowler, 48 & 99.)
held no hearings debating the strategic rationale of reductions in America’s overseas presence in Europe. The simple explanation would argue that the issue of European military presence fell decisively under the jurisdiction of Armed Services. As stated before, Armed Services historically prioritizes its budgetary role over the more strategic-leaning oversight role, emphasized in the Foreign Relations. Armed Services has historically made strong connections between the senators serving and Department of Defense, as well as military personnel in their home-states. Scholars have generally argued, that members of Armed Services have mixed goals of serving constituency and the policy interests of its members. (See Fowler, 2015). As such, the issue could be defined in the realm of distributive politics simply dividing pieces of the budgetary cake. The apparent bipartisan support for closing military bases in Europe to accommodate budgetary needs in mainland United States is consistent with what Milner (2015, 266) concluded considering bipartisanship in foreign policy: “For those issues that seem the most like domestic political ones, where distributonal concerns are strong and informational asymmetries do not favor the president, declining bipartisanship over time may be more manifest.” Missing partisanship was further evident in Senator McCain’s [R-AZ] lonely position as the one Republican suspicious of cuts in overseas military presence and as an advocate of more defense spending regardless of Budget Control Act of 2011. As argued by Cushman (2015, 119): “parochial concerns will trump party leaders’ policy preferences – and defense policy was no longer immune from this after the Cold War”, and regarding Senator McCain’s own party: “budget hawks were as powerful as the war hawks…”

Hamiltonian thought in the post-World War II world called for a global American posture in order to replace United Kingdom as the one global hegemony. The leader of the free world. Did the debate mean that a vast majority of senators in the Armed Services disagreed with such notions by requesting a drawdown of U.S. presence? The debate had little Jeffersonian tonality - Jeffersonians were vocal in suggesting that U.S. troop presence in Europe ought to be put in question (Mead, 2002. 193) - suggesting U.S. ought to scale back its global posture for ideological reasons to avoid the risks involved in an expensive overextension, with the notable exception of Jeff Sessions [R-AL], who argued for the domestic spending instead. Jeffersonians are wary of active U.S. foreign policy (ibid), those on the left arguing for less spending on military and more domestic issues, those on the right arguing for a smaller federal government. The fiscal conservatism as the basis of sequestration policy sees deficit spending as the great evil, and a dollar saved on military spending was a dollar saved to American taxpayer. Jeffersonian conservatism in the form of fiscal conservatism
and fear of budget deficits was evident in the Tea Party movement overtaking the House, but the Armed Services was still controlled by hawkish Jacksonians. Even Sessions’ insistence on less spending in Europe could be seen as based on Jacksonian themes; U.S. allies in Europe had dishonorably failed to fulfill their promises vis-à-vis defense spending (i.e. the 2% of GDP rule), thus legitimizing the argument of scaling back U.S. fiscal commitments in Europe. Much like Jacksonian war doctrine justifying mistreatment of an enemy fighting dishonorably (Mead, 2002. 251-252), one could extend this argument to allies who betray the pledges they have made.

John McCain exemplified the Jacksonian support for the military spending (Mead, 2002. 300). He argued for an overall increase in defense spending, regardless of the fiscal “realities” facing the nation. The support for a strong and astronomically expensive military resonates with Jacksonians. American people – thanks to Jacksonians – support far greater military spending than Western European publics, mostly due to successful mobilization of Jacksonian support for U.S. efforts to defeat Soviets in the Cold War. (Mead, 2002. 221-222.) Whereas Jeffersonians are much concerned over the military-industrial complex and its hawkish tendencies, Jacksonians see military spending itself as the best use of taxpayer dollars despite the necessary evil of corruption and hawkishness it produces. (ibid.) Jacksonians are well prepared to pay the price in blood – and in this case treasure – to maintain U.S. global posture (Mead, 2002. 247) in defense of its commitments in Europe, whereas Jeffersonians look to achieve maximum foreign policy goals with minimum costs. (Mead, 2002. 211).

6.4 Implementation of The New START Treaty

6.4.1 Armed Services Committee

The Armed Services Committee continued its debate over the New START ratified at the end of 111th Congress. The overall tone in the debates was different from the pre-ratification debates, and the issue was debated on highly partisan basis, with one single Republican Senator, namely Jeff Session from Alabama, arguing against the nuclear policy decision-making of the Obama administration, and several different Democratic members defending the administration. The issue followed rather different pattern compared to the pre-ratification debates regarding the framings identified, as the one defining argumentative logic was ideological; i.e. Senator Sessions’ assertion that the Obama administration shared an ideological viewpoint which called for unilateral reductions in U.S. nuclear capabilities regardless of national
security implications, whereas the Democrats worked to refute such claims. In two hearings devoted to issue of U.S. strategic forces and implementation of the New START in 2011, the only Republican Senator taking part in the debates was Alabama’s Jeff Sessions. Notably, committee’s ranking member John McCain [R-AZ], who was a one of the more prominent critics of the original START process during the 111th Congress and ended up voting against the ratification, was not identified once in the statements analyzed. Since the debate differentiated significantly from the previous debates, the framings identified were also different from the ones used to analyze previous debate. For example, the verification positive/negative -framings identified in significant numbers in debates prior played no part in 2011 and 2012. To sum up the notable difference in framings analyzed, a lot less emphasis was put on the technical and practical aspects of the treaty. For the analysis of the START debate in 112th Congress, a different set of framings were identified, although some comprised of similar argumentative logic compared to 111th Congress. (See tables 12 & 15.)

**Figure 31. Implementation of START by party - Armed Services**

![Image of bar chart showing implementation of START by party - Armed Services](image)

*Strategic (5).* Statements evaluating the strategic implications of the New START, or the implications of perceived nuclear weapons policy advocated by the Obama administration.

*Adm. neg. / partisan (9).* Statements framing the Obama administration’s approach to the implementation of the New START or the overall nuclear weapons policy in
negative terms. These statements highlight the ideological viewpoint of President Obama, his administration and the Democratic party in negative terms, often implying a negative impact of administration’s policy to national security. Often clustered with national security-framing.

Adm. pos. / partisan (5). Statements framing the administration’s approach to New START or overall American nuclear weapons policy in positive terms, describing the (Republican) opposition as partisan in nature, and in many cases responding directly to statements/accusations made by Republican senators, namely Senator Sessions [R-AL].

European security (3). Statements referring to implications of New START or overall American nuclear policy for European security.

Russia (3). Statements evaluating the administration’s implementation of New START or the overall U.S. nuclear weapons policy based on perceived effects on the strategic balance and battlefield conditions vis-à-vis Russian Federation.

National security (8). Statements evaluating the merits or shortcomings of administration’s nuclear weapons policy based on perceived implications to American national security.

6.4.1.1 Dominant Frames

National security-framing remained the dominant bipartisan framing comparable to the original debates. (Figure 31.) As observed before, national security-framing de facto limits the debate, since it creates a kind of objective evaluative basis for subjective perceptions of national security issues. Senators need to legitimize their policy proposals by arguing linkage between their ideas and wider national security interests of the United States. Now, as evident from most security related debates, what is objectively positive or negative in relation to perceived national security implications is highly subjective, and highly partisan-ideological issue. For example, during the debates in the 111th Congress the Republicans stressed that maintaining strong, capable, and modernized nuclear trident trumps the argumentation that nuclear disarmament necessarily enhances American national security. On the other hand, the Democratic side of the debate highlighted the importance of nuclear proliferation and international treaties, such as Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as tools for strengthening American security. Of course, such simplistic dichotomy is often visible only in political argumentation characterizing the other side in distinct categories, which often bear little resemblance to multifaceted deliberations in the Senate committees. In the 112th Congress, the national security angle was tied to overall critique of Obama administration’s nuclear weapons policy:
So, to follow up a little bit on the Chairman’s question, the House CR [continuing resolution] version calls for a $312-million reduction; the Senate’s, $185 million. Can you give us any more information about how much could be sustained and how much can’t be sustained to reach your mission? Because I am of the long-term view, I think that all of you share, that we have diminished the weapons complex for a very, very long time, and it’s at a very dangerous stage. We made a national commitment. The President made a commitment as part of this START Treaty. (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 62.)

The above statement by Senator Jeff Sessions ties the national security angle to the fiscal choices made in the first year of Budget Control Act (BCA) and sequestration policy. The overall argumentative logic is very simple; the connection between defense budget allocated to strategic forces of the United States is arithmetically linked to national security implications, i.e. the less money allocated, the worse off America is security-wise. Of course, the fiscal situation is directly linked to sequestration policy of making over-the-board cuts to federal spending, and thus, the issue becomes where to save instead of if to save. Due to national security implications of diminishing budget for military’s strategic forces, saving money from U.S. nuclear forces implies a political choice undermining America’s national security interests. Senator Sessions makes the reference to House Continuing Resolution which would have cut the budget more than the Senate version at the time when House was under Republican and Senate under Democratic rule. Never mind the fiscal realities, commitments were made as a part of the original START debate, and now both the Senate and the president is on its way to betray the American people at the expense of national security. The argumentative logic as laid out by Senator Sessions is consistent with the fact that several senators, notably those voting for the ratification, agreed to support the New START based on the promise that United States nuclear weapons complex would be modernized. Senate version of the FY2012 defense budget placed restrictions on U.S. nuclear weapons policy, although less than the House version, including provision which would have required the president to provide “a net assessment of the proposed smaller force” in case the administration proposed nuclear reductions exceeding the levels set by the START. (Towell, 2012. 49-50.)

From a Republican (read: Jeff Sessions) perspective, strategic -framing was tied to both Russia and European security -framings. The argument was, that the United

188 See for example Senator Sessions: "Having just returned from the Baltics and the Ukraine and Georgia, Dr. Payne, what we heard was a very unease about a concern over tactical nuclear weapons. Apparently, the German foreign minister seems to believe that—we should—I don't know if it's the
States has commitments in Europe based on American nuclear umbrella, including tactical nuclear weapons still fulfilling their original, Cold War role of deterring conventional and nuclear offense by Russia against NATO’s European member states. President Obama’s stance on nuclear disarmament and possible withdrawal of European-based tactical nukes would severely distort the strategic balance in European theater, causing grave concern especially among the Baltics. Once again, the “Old Europe” seemed to be the antagonist, as Senator Sessions stated that “Apparently, the German foreign minister seems to believe that—we should—I don’t know if it’s the position of the government, but the foreign minister’s view is that tactical nuclear weapons should be drawn down in Europe” (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg. 112-228, 2011. 22), whereas the consequences of a nuclear pullback could prove critical to “New Europe”, namely the new NATO member states accepted into the alliance in 2004 and 2009. Regarding the European security -argument, the Democratic senators maintained that the administration’s approach was consistent with European security considerations, and, in fact, the administration policy was supported by America’s NATO allies from west to east:

I would like to just point out that all our NATO allies came out very strongly in support of passing New START, and one of the strongest statements came from Poland. So, I think, while I appreciate some of the issues that have been raised about next steps, I think it’s important to point out that they were very supportive of the passage of the treaty. (Senator Shaheen [D-NH] S.Hrg. 112-228, 2011. 24.)

Democratic strategic argument drew upon similar themes observed in the original debate; nonproliferation regime and military-technical aspects of the Treaty. From a nonproliferation perspective, the implementation of the New START and the outlying rationale of nuclear reductions, were brought up especially relative to non-European nuclear powers, China, Pakistan and India. The overall argumentative position of the government, but the foreign minister’s view is that tactical nuclear weapons should be drawn down in Europe. I got the great concern that ours should be drawn down; and that these nations are really worried that we might reach an agreement that would make the situation even more precarious for them. In fact, that’s what they expressed to us, is a concern that there might be some sort of agreement reached with the United States and that they would make a token reduction or a token pullback, but it would enhance or certainly not diminish the advantage they have.” (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg. 112-228, 2011. 22.)

189 Reference here being to similar argumentative logic found in NATO / European presence -debates, framing the wealthier Western European nations lacking in their defensive capabilities and political will to take their security in their own hands.

190 See for example: ”Senator Shaheen mentioned, and so did my colleague, Senator Sessions, about engaging in conversations with China about nuclear reduction. Given the situation with Pakistan quite
logic was that nonproliferation regime, as articulated in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), would encourage overall reductions in nuclear arms globally, specifically vis-à-vis the unstable Pakistan-India relations. As such, United States ought to lead the nonproliferation effort by setting an example, as opposed to Republican argument made by Senator Sessions [R-AL] asserting that any reductions in U.S. nuclear arsenal would play into Chinese hands: “One of the problems we have is that as we draw down our weapons, it seems to me that China may have an incentive to seek equivalence with the United States, nuclear parity with the United States, as might other countries, frankly.” (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg. 112-228, 2011. 16).

6.4.1.2 Competing Frames
The competing framings demonstrated the highly partisan nature of the debate. The Republican administration negative / partisan framing was founded on the interpretation that the Obama administration was preparing to make unilateral reductions to American nuclear force (see Figure 31). Senator Sessions led the charge against the administration, and only one statement by senators other than Mr. Sessions was identified within the framing. The argumentative logic was, that the Obama administration was planning to reduce American nuclear forces unilaterally, regardless of Russia’s intentions considering the issue. Whereas the agreed-upon cuts to U.S. nuclear arsenal were predicated on the START process - promising equal cuts to both American and Russian capabilities - the Obama administration was preparing to make cuts separate from the already controversial New START. Such cuts would not only endanger American national security interests, but also portrayed the ideological viewpoint adopted by the administration prioritizing the idea of nuclear disarmament over real-world threat perception. Since Jeff Sessions was the voice of his party in Armed Services Committee, one can deconstruct the Republican argument against administration policy by analyzing his opening apart from the events of this week, but the fact that they’re a nuclear power and things are less stable in Pakistan, would it be appropriate for us to begin to engage in discussions there with Pakistan about nuclear reduction? Or would we have to do it in conjunction with Pakistan, India, and the United States.” (Senator Nelson [D-FL] S.Hrg. 112-228, 2011. 20.)

191 See Senator Inhofe [R-OK]: “General Kehler, back during the time that we were considering the bill a year ago, we were talking about the fact that President Obama was weighing options for sharp new cuts in our nuclear arsenal unilaterally. Then, of course, that was an agreement with Russia to bring it down to the 1,550. I guess it was a month ago, it was reported that President Obama is weighing the options of sharp new cuts to our nuclear arsenal unilaterally, potentially up to—and these are the figures they used—80 percent proposing three plans that could limit the number as low as 300.” (Senator Inhofe [R-OK] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 982.) It ought to be noted though, that the above statement by Senator Inhofe was identified in FY13 appropriations hearing, whereas the debate over START took place in its own separate hearing.
statement in the *Implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty* -hearing, which articulated the essence of *administration negative / partisan* -framings argumentative logic.

Today’s hearing is a continuation of our dialogue on U.S. strategic posture in a post-New START treaty environment in what appears to be the administration’s intention to change U.S. nuclear doctrine and targeting guidance in an attempt to pursue further reductions in the nuclear stockpile on the path to what many of us feel is a misguided and dangerous idea of a world without nuclear weapons. (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg. 112-228, 2011. 2)

First, Senator Sessions describes the current political context vis-à-vis America’s strategic nuclear posture. The new reality facing the nation is that of post-New START, a Treaty Mr. Sessions opposed and voted against the ratification in the 111th Congress. But whereas the kind of START both Sessions and other Republicans could have supported would have been one supportive of U.S. national security goals and maintaining strong strategic posture, the new reality facing the American public was customized to meet the ideological standards set by the Obama administration. This new post-START reality held within it the “dangerous idea of a world without nuclear weapons”, a leftist idea manifesting itself in the Obama administration and resulting in a change in U.S. nuclear doctrine. The argument hedged the Congress and the administration against one another, as Senator Sessions referred to the Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission as “a distinguished panel of 12 independent experts” (ibid), which supported a balanced approach to U.S. nuclear reductions by combining lesser reliance on nuclear deterrence with sustaining that very deterrence. The Obama administration, a year after getting the ratification it sought from the Congress, was about to deviate from the strategy laid out by the Perry-Schlesinger Commission:

> It is a balanced approach, and I’m concerned that the administration may be on the verge of abandoning that approach, opting instead for a nuclear weapons policy focused on unilateral reductions, an approach the Posture Commission warned would “weaken the deterrence of foes and the assurance of allies. (ibid).

---

192 Although Senator Sessions ended up voting against the ratification, he was a part of a group of moderate and conservative senators who wrote a letter to President Obama stating that they supported administration’s efforts to work on a follow-up agreement to expiring START. One of the major points of contention was the perceived restriction on U.S. missile defense system in Europe. (NTI, 2010.)
As argued, the shift Senator Sessions is contemplating would go against the recommendations of the expert panel by focusing on unilateral reductions. The argument supposes that for the Obama administration, the nuclear disarmament an sich (itself) is the ultimate operational focus, whereas other aspects of U.S. nuclear posture, such as the reality-based national security implications, appear to be secondary.

The proof of administration’s intentions to go forward with unilateral reductions, as per Senator Sessions, was President Obama’s National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon’s speech at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference in March 2011. Quoting Mr. Donilon, Senator Sessions argued that the administration is going to instruct the Department of Defense to change its targeting requirements and alert procedures, with the end-goal of further nuclear reductions already planned. Administration legitimizes this action, as argued by Sessions, by referring to the New START as a sign of “shared goal of disarmament.” This goal, argues Sessions, was not ratified by the U.S. Senate as part of the START, and neither did the Senate give its consent to further reduce American nuclear stockpile. (ibid). So, in sum, the argumentative logic of administration negative / partisan -framing was that the Obama administration took advantage of the New START and used it as a vehicle to pursue further, ideologically charged and unilateral nuclear reductions despite the national security implications as postulated by experts such as the Perry Schlesinger Commission. To highlight the political rationale behind such logic, the administration is prepared to go forward independently regardless of Russian participation, and, as suggested by Sessions, might even pressure the Department of Defense to agree with reductions:

So all of a sudden, as soon as we sign the New START treaty, the President, who has repeatedly said his goal is to go to zero nuclear weapons, his goal is to set an example for the world, his staff person I’ll acknowledge anonymously says that they might do it independent of Russian participation. It just causes me concern that there will be pressure on DOD to produce targeting policies to meet and justify the reduction. I’ve been around here long enough to know

---

193 As a proof of administration’s policy, Sessions also made references to press reports, see for example: “Yes. I’m looking at the Associated Press article of April 5 by Desmond Butler: “In the mean time,” it says, “the administration is looking for other ways to cut its arsenal. A senior administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, confirmed that the United States is considering these cuts independent of negotiations with Russia.” So do you know who made those comments and do they reflect the opinion of the administration, Dr. Miller?” (ibid, 5.)

194 For the full statement see Donilon (2011): ” By significantly reducing levels of U.S. and Russia deployed strategic weapons, the Treaty represents a commitment by the world’s two largest nuclear powers to the goal of disarmament.”
that can happen, and I’m uneasy about it. (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg. 112-228, 2011. 5-7.)

The Democratic response was argumentatively based on three aspects of the issue: 1) bipartisan tradition of nuclear reductions, 2) the reductions in tactical nuclear weapons in European theater is consistent with American national security concerns, and 3) Obama administration was not planning to reduce its nuclear arsenal unilaterally.

I have some specific questions, but I did want to comment on the line of thinking that my friend from Alabama just explored. Dr. Miller, you said every President with the exception of George W. Bush starting with General Eisenhower has called for an ongoing reduction in nuclear arms consistent with the national security needs of the United States? (Senator Udall [D-NM] S.Hrg. 112-228, 2011.)

First, Senator Udall from New Mexico refers to long-held American tradition of equating reductions in nuclear arsenals with American national security interests, starting with the Eisenhower\textsuperscript{195} administration, yet excluding George W. Bush administration. The argumentative logic here is obvious, American post-World War II administrations have all agreed that reductions in overall nuclear arsenals are consistent with American interests, and as such, Obama administration’s position on the issue is based on bipartisan consensus, rather than some explicitly Democratic, leftist ideal of “world without nuclear weapons”. Rather, the position adopted by the administration follows the example set by Dwight Eisenhower: “…the United States pledges before you—and therefore before the world—its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma…” (Eisenhower, 1953). Argumentatively, the postulation that certain policy is implicitly bipartisan leads to the obvious conclusion that opposition to bipartisan consensus based on partisan assertions (i.e. idealist leftist agenda, “world without nuclear weapons”), is necessarily in itself partisan.\textsuperscript{196}

The second and third part of the argumentative logic were intertwined, as rationale advanced by the Democratic side stressed that administration’s policy

\textsuperscript{195} For reference, see President Eisenhower’s ”Atom’s for peace” -speech to United Nations General Assembly: ”I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United States, and with every expectation of approval, any such plan that would: …begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles” (Eisenhower, 1953.)

\textsuperscript{196} For another example of this line of Democratic argumentation, see for example Senator Shaheen [D-NH]: ”It was interesting to me that after support from virtually every living Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense from both sides of the aisle, that it took us so long to get agreement on the treaty.” (Senator Shaheen [D-NH] S.Hrg. 112-228, 2011. 10)
towards tactical nukes in Europe was consistent with Senate approved START and overall American policy, and that the administration was not approaching the issue by unilaterally announcing reductions in American nuclear arsenal, thus endangering the strategic balance in Moscow’s favor. In fact, as the Senate, former Secretaries, and nuclear expert agreed, the Obama administration is pursuing a policy agreed-upon by all relevant actors, and that policy concept is consistent with American and European security interests. As such, the opposition to Obama’s nuclear policy must have been based on factors other than reality-based calculations evaluating America’s long-term nuclear weapons policy. The Obama administration was approaching the issue responsibly, with a strong bipartisan support, and most importantly, it was not pursuing reductions in American nuclear capabilities unilaterally regardless of Russian action.

---

197 See for example: "Secretary Perry and Dr. Miller, I note that National Security, Advisor Donilon, wrote an op-ed in the Financial Times focused, I think, in particular on the reduction of tactical nukes in the European theater, as did Minister Ivanov and former Secretary of State Albright as well. It seems to me that was a part of the debate we had on the floor of the Senate last year, that being can we do more to reduce tactical nukes, are we not putting ourselves at a disadvantage because of the Russian arsenal? So my interpretation of what they’re doing is following through on the promises and the commitments that were made in the Senate and by our nuclear arms experts to continue to pursue ways to meet that concern.” (Senator Udall [D-NM] S.Hrg. 112-228, 2011. 8.)

198 See for example Senator Udall [D-NM]: "I may be misinterpreting what I’ve heard, but it strikes me as a little strange that those who had concerns about the treaty, those who may have even, in fact, voted against the treaty, would be critical of attempts to begin to undertake this important mission to reduce the number of tactical weapons.” (ibid.)

199 This assertion refers to administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which stated the following regarding future reductions: “First, any future nuclear reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners. This will require an updated assessment of deterrence requirements; further improvements in U.S., allied, and partner non-nuclear capabilities; focused reductions in strategic and nonstrategic weapons; and close consultations with allies and partners. The United States will continue to ensure that, in the calculations of any potential opponent, the perceived gains of attacking the United States or its allies and partners would be far outweighed by the unacceptable costs of the response.” (NPT, 2010. 29-30.)
Like the Armed Services Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee held one specific hearing devoted to the implementation of the New START Treaty. The hearing in question, “Implementation of the New START Treaty, and Related Matters”, was held on June 21st, 2012, and the Committee invited three witnesses: Rose Gottemoeller, Undersecretary of State for Verification and Compliance; Tom D’Agostino, Administrator of the National Security Administration; and Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs. Not much debate was had, as only five senators out of 19 in the Committee gave statements or questioned the witnesses during the hearing. (S.Hrg. 112-652, 2012.) Four of the nine framings identified were used four times during the hearing; bipartisan/partisan (4), verification positive (4), national security (4), and modernization (4). Given the low number of overall statements, seven altogether, these four constituted dominant framings of the issue, and only one them was identified in the two statements critical of the New START Treaty; modernization. The only pairing of competing framings was administration negative (1) and administration positive (2). (Figure 32.)

**Figure 32. Implementation of START by party - Foreign Relations**
6.4.2.1 Dominant Frames

Two Republican and two Democratic senators were identified invoking the *verification positive* framing. Like in the Armed Services, the argumentative logic built on “what if?” argumentation; what if the New START would not be in place? For example, Senator Shaheen [D-NH] brought up a specific instance where United States officials were given a chance to get “up close and personal” with a new Russian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), RS-24. Shaheen goes on to ask, “if we think this exhibition would have been possible without New START in place?” and further, “would we have the insight that we do into Russia’s strategic forces without New START…” (Senator Shaheen [D-NH] S.Hrg. 112-652, 2012. 25.) The other Democratic Senator arguing the merits of the new verification regime was chairman Kerry, who also brought up concrete examples of success: “On 23 occasions, teams of well-trained, well-prepared U.S. inspectors have, on short notice, brought radiation scanners and other equipment to highly sensitive Russian nuclear bases of our choosing” and thus the Treaty “gives us visibility into Russia’s nuclear activities”, allows the United States to “track movements and changes in the status of Russia’s nuclear arsenal”, with all this leading to United States having “far more up-to-date information on each Russian missile, each launcher, each bomber than we had before we ratified the treaty.” (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 112-652, 2012. 2.) As Democratic senators brought up concrete examples of successful verification regime, Senator Lugar emphasized the intrinsic value of transparency and the positive national security implications of professional inspection officials deployed by the United States. 200

The legislative process resulted not only in the approval of the treaty, but also a commitment to spend $185 billion over 10 years to modernize nuclear warheads and delivery systems. This was a rational policy outcome that bolstered U.S. national security. (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 112-652, 2012. 3.)

The above quote from Senator Lugar referred to both modernization and national security. Much like in the Armed Services, the issue of modernization and national security walked hand in hand, mostly because Republican senators suspicious of the Treaty argued that the Obama administration was not serious in its promise to

---

200 See for example: "...you have people who, for 15 years, have been doing this job. They have a Russian speaking capability, and they got 2,500 notifications of material. So when they have these spot inspections, they know what they are looking for. They are able to fathom immediately any changes or anything of significance in terms of our defense.” (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 112-652, 2012. 19.)
modernize the aging nuclear triad. (see for example New York Times, 2010). As such, the Republicans arguing for the Treaty did so based on their belief that the administration’s promises to fund nuclear modernization if the START was ratified could be trusted. Senator Lugar, although deeply concerned of the modernization issue, nevertheless expressed his belief that “both the New START agreement and the nuclear modernization commitments were justified, even without reference to each other”, and that “[b]oth [modernization and START] were good policies made even stronger by being accepted in the same political and policy context.” (Senator Lugar [R-IN] S.Hrg. 112-652, 2012. 4.)

Now, Senator Corker, myself and others supported this legislation based principally on a final statement from the President with regard to modernization of our nuclear arsenal in the United States of America. I don’t want to one day wake up and find out the Russians were doing inspections under the START Treaty in America and found out we were not modernized and competitive anymore. And I have had some concern on the administration’s commitment to modernization. (Senator Isakson [R-GA] S.Hrg. 112-652, 2012. 21.)

Senator Isakson, together with Senator Corker, expressed their reservations on the implementation of the New START. Isakson worries concerned the modernization of existing nuclear forces as promised by the Obama administration. As stated by Senator Isakson, he and Senator Corker supported the legislation based on that very promise, and now that commitment by the administration seemed to be fading. When Obama administration was negotiating with Republicans to ratify the New START, Obama made a commitment (known as Section 1251 Report) to invest $85 billion over 10 years for nuclear laboratories and modernizing, and proposed spending $125 billion over the next decade to pay for a new fleet of nuclear-capable submarines, land-based ballistic missile and 100 bombers. (The New York Times, 2011.)

Robert Kagan wrote an article in the Washington Post after the initial ratification of the New START, questioning whether the “big show” the Republicans put up regarding missile defense programs and nuclear modernization funding would lead the next, “more Republican Congress put money where its mouth is?” (Kagan, 2010). After the 2010 midterm elections, the House turned Republican. Under the new Budget Control Act of 2011 and the consequent sequestration policy, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee Hal Rogers [R-KY] introduced a budget resolution cutting National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) funding by $312,4 for fiscal year 2012, and although some of the funding was restored, levels
were still below the administration’s proposal for a 10-year modernization plan. (Reif, 2013.) This distinction between the commitments made by a Democratic president before the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the federal budget pushed forward by the Republican House of Representatives was no missed by chairman Kerry, who noted that when “the House of Representatives cuts the budget, it is not the fault of the administration.” (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 112-652, 2012. 31). As such, the Republican argumentation based on the administration’s lack of respect for its commitments was misrepresenting at best, and outrageously partisan at worst.

6.4.2.2 Competing Frames

As already stated, not much debate was stirred in the Foreign Relations Committee. Of course, both Republicans expressing somewhat critical arguments in the hearings voted for the ratification during the 111th Congress, and as such, their argumentative toolbox was rather limited. Two competing framings of the New START Treaty’s implementation were the administration negative and administration positive -framings. The argument identified within the administration negative -framing was articulated by Senator Corker [R-TN], who in his statement expressed strong disappointment “in the follow-through” (Senator Corker [R-TN] S.Hrg. 112-652, 2012. 28) of the implementation, and that “the administration has not lived up to what was agreed to”, namely the 10-year modernization plan, known as Section 1251 Report, mentioned before. Regarding the administration’s efforts to implement what was agreed upon, Corker was quickly “losing faith in your [administration] ability to carry out what was agreed to.” Corker’s argument was not only about perceived shortcomings regarding modernization, as the Senator also echoed themes prevalent in the Armed Services Committee, namely, fears over Obama administration’s unilateral reductions in U.S. nuclear capabilities:

I see the President out now announcing further reductions. It seems like things are being slow-walked. And I almost wonder as the President is announcing further reductions, the reason that much of the modernization is being slow-walked is that there is no intention to follow through, and they actually hope to come up with more reduction so that much of the modernization that we are talking about does not have to take place. (ibid.)

The above quote from Senator Corker reveals the logic behind the rationale by Republicans wary of President Obama’s true intentions. The argumentative logic presents the Obama administration as prioritizing its policy of “world without nuclear weapons” by knowingly and purposefully delaying the modernization
process. The Obama administration has no intention to fulfill its commitments under the Section 1251 Report, but rather, it is attempting to “slow-walk” the modernization process to a halt, enact further unilateral reductions, making the entire endeavor of nuclear modernization unnecessary. Given the overall strategy of the Obama administration, this approach appears rational:

Let me ask you this. If the President wants to reduce the nuclear capabilities of our country, which apparently he has just announced he wants to do, it seems to me that he would intentionally slow-walk these because he is hoping that our nuclear arsenal will be much less than it is today. I mean, would that not be a rational place for him to be? (ibid.)

Chairman Kerry did not refute the long-term strategy of reducing American, and global, nuclear arsenals. Instead, he drew comparison to his time serving in the Navy, where he learned how nuclear, biological and chemical weapons work, leading him to conclusion that in a case of war, “most rational people would decide they don’t want 1 or 2 or 3 of them fired, let alone 10 or 20, let alone 100.” (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 112-652, 2012. 32-33). Thus, regarding the quantitative levels of U.S. nuclear arsenal, “we need to think carefully about what is the appropriate level”, and besides the ideological debates, those deliberations will be “forced on us in the context of our budgets over these next years anyway.” (ibid.) Overall, the Democratic side defended the ideological viewpoint of the Obama administration, refused to take the blame over the shortcomings in NNSA funding, and maintained that U.S. national security vis-à-vis its nuclear deterrence remains strong.201

6.4.3 Individual Breakdown

The implementation of START did not gather that much attention in the Armed Services. Two senators debating the issue in hearings were chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee Senator Nelson [D-NE] and the ranking member of said subcommittee, Senator Sessions [R-AL]. Neither Armed Services chairman Levin nor ranking member McCain discussed the implementation of the New START, and only three other senators were vocal on the issue. (Figure 33.)

201 See for example: ” And with the current level of expenditure that we are putting into modernization, can you say with certainty to the United States Senate and the country that our weapons are fully functional, protected, and on a track to remain so in the foreseeable future?” (Senator Kerry [D-MA] S.Hrg. 112-652, 2012. 33).
Senator Nelson took the responsibility of defending the New START. His argumentation relied on the modernization issue, arguing that any shortcomings in nuclear modernization funding were the result of new budgetary environment created by the Republican House, and as such any critique of Obama administration based on modernization was unfounded. On the issue of START itself, Nelson maintained that the technical aspects of the Treaty were in American interest, and the overall effects on nuclear proliferation and arms control positive.

Senator Sessions brought up both the issue with modernization and START's national security implications. Per Sessions, certain provisions of the New START hindered the ability of American weapons designers to design weapons needed to defend America, and as such, the Treaty could be seen as harmful to U.S. national security. Reduced nuclear arsenals, and especially reduced funding for nuclear modernization, cause harm to U.S. nuclear complex, scientists, and in the end to overall U.S. security interests. Moving from the treaty itself, Sessions also argued that the Obama administration had made changes to U.S. nuclear strategy in general, with the goal of global nuclear disarmament. This, of course, was not the mandate granted by the Senate when it approved the treaty, argued Sessions. Sessions maintained that the Obama administration functioned with the core principle of a “world-without-nuclear-weapons”, thus endangering not only U.S., but also European security by relying on unrealistic goal of nuclear disarmament.
The discussion of the New START in Foreign Relations was even less active than in the Armed Services, one reason being the strong support for the treaty by ranking member Lugar [R-IN], curtailing some of the more partisan efforts to criticize the treaty. (See Figure 34). Overall, senators Kerry [D-MA], Lugar [R-IN], and Shaheen [D-NH] actively supported the treaty and its implementation, whereas both senators Isakson [R-GA] and Corker [R-TN] voiced concerns over modernization and the new fiscal environment limiting defense spending and nuclear modernization efforts. Both requested firm commitment from the Obama administration to invest in U.S. nuclear modernization as agreed in the original process to ratify the New START.

6.4.4 Discussion

The initial impression drawn from the results obtained by qualitative framing analysis is that the debate in 112th Congress was dominated by senators’ perceptions of administration policy, not the New START itself. That much is evident from the lack of verification positive or verification negative -framing and the absence of military/technical -framings identified in the original debates (see tables 12 and 15). Furthermore, the partisan opposition to administration’s policy in 111th Congress was framed around the perceived linkage between the ratification of the START, and behind-the-doors deals reached with Russia by the administration vis-à-vis American missile defense infrastructure in Europe. The debate in 112th Congress included no significant references to perceived interconnectedness of the New START and missile defense. Instead, the partisan nature of the debate in 112th was
dominated by Senator Sessions’ [R-AL] argumentation that the ideological stand taken by the Obama administration would have adverse effects on American national security, whereas the Democrats, who during the original debate spent considerable time counter arguing the Republican MD negative -framing, argued once more reactively to dispute Republican claims. Overall, the dynamics in Foreign Relations Committee differed from the Armed Services, as both chairman Kerry and ranking member Lugar were staunch supporters of the Treaty. Two Republican senators, Bob Corker of Tennessee and George Isakson of Georgia, both of whom voted for the ratification in the 111th Congress, were critical of the administration’s implementation of the Treaty.

From a transatlantic perspective, the Republican argument in the 111th Congress that missile defense in Europe was offered as a sacrificial lamb no longer dominated the debate in the 112th Congress, besides references to the “open-mic” incidence\(^{202}\), which the Republicans in Armed Services Committee argued proved that the president was making back-door deals with Russia prioritizing his Russia reset policy over transatlantic security concerns. Senator Sessions [R-AL], who engaged in a one-man battle against the administration’s implementation of the Treaty in Armed Services, did consider the negative implications of supposed unilateral nuclear reductions to America’s allies who count on Her nuclear umbrella:

> Is not it true that other nations depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, that there is a political, psychological dimension to clear and strong nuclear capability, and that as a member of the Posture Commission you were able to ascertain that nations around the world who don’t now have nuclear weapons, good civilized nations, become concerned as the United States draws its weapons arsenal down too low? (Senator Sessions [R-AL] S.Hrg. 112-228, 2011. 16.)

Besides the above quote from Senator Sessions, little debate involved strategic implications for transatlantic security, as the debate revolved around the national security implications of President Obama’s overall nuclear force strategy. Yet, the Republican attention to nuclear modernization as the justification for the Treaty did result in the United States spending $8 billion to modernize its US B61 tactical nuclear bombs in European theater (Borger, 2015), and despite some commentators supporting Obama’s nuclear policy as “farsighted” approach making once utopian idea of nuclear disarmament “a useful tool for U.S. foreign policy” (Hoagland, 2010),

---

\(^{202}\) See “I really need to understand the President’s remarks to Dmitry Medvedev a few months ago when he said, thinking the mic was off, “let us get this election behind us and I will be more flexible.” I understood that statement to be in reference to missile defense but I don’t totally know.” (Senator Isakson [R-GA] S.Hrg. 112-652, 2012. 21-22.)
the Republican opposition made the Obama administration scale back on investing political capital in nuclear disarmament during the 112th Congress. (Cirincione, 2013).

Similar to the discussion in the 111th Congress, the debates in 112th demonstrated intra-party factionalism rather than partisan polarization, consistent not only with Milner’s conclusion that polarization plays less significant part in foreign policy than has been suggested (Milner, 2015, 266), but also with Deibel’s (2005, 89) observation that Senate internationalists were more likely to break ranks with unilateralist Republicans in cases such as Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and that Republican internationalism was “considerably [more common] in the Senate than in the House.” Although this study cannot make the comparison between House and Senate Republicans, the analysis of START related debates support the idea of Republican factionalism in the foreign policy sphere. On the Democratic side, no one spoke against the Obama administration’s handling of the implementation.

Much like the debate in 111th Congress, the implementation of the New START was both distributional and ideological issue. The ideological aspects of the treaty remained the same compared to the debate in 111th; Republicans in general stressed the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy and were wary of what they perceived as ideologically motivated goal within the Obama administration to rid the world of nuclear weapons, whereas many in the Democratic party saw nuclear reduction in itself a worthwhile goal. What did change from the previous debate was the distributional aspect promoted by the Senate Republicans in what they considered a betrayal of their trust regarding nuclear modernization. Argumentatively, the Republican issue with modernization followed the logic set in the ideological postulations: the Obama administration has a hidden agenda to mislead the American public, and its promise to modernize American nuclear triad was just a ploy to achieve congressional ratification. Yet, the distributional nature of Republican argumentation is consistent with what scholars have observed as a general Republican trend to prioritize defense spending. For example, Albouy (2013, 139) found that Republican lawmakers have secured on average $500 million more for defense procurement compared to their Democratic counterparts. The parochial nature of Republican argumentation, however, was presented in arguments linking modernization and national security, as well as presenting the administration as going back on its promises.

Both committees functioned in their oversight roles by scrutinizing the administration’s implementation of the New START Treaty and ensuring that the
promises made during the initial ratification phase would be kept. This made the issue of modernization per Section 1251 Report the focus of Republican critique, as well as placed emphasis on the new fiscal realities affecting the budget process in the era of Tea-Party and sequestration. In general, scholars have been unsuccessful in explaining what motivates lawmakers to engage the president in foreign policy (Fowler, 2015. 24), and despite observing extensive variation in legislatures oversight efforts, the studies conducted “do not propose institutional conditions under which we would expect to see more or less oversight.” (McGarth, 2013). McGarth (2013) suggests a logic of the “ally principle”, referring to an idea that “when legislators and agencies have sufficiently similar preferences, oversight is unnecessary from a policymaking perspective.” According to this logic, low level of oversight can be explained as congressional agreement with the executive agencies, rather than by congressional deference. If we take this logic to the START hearings, we can see some correlation with the theory prescribed before. The Foreign Relations Committee devoted one hearing to oversee the implementation of the Treaty, yet only five senators had something to say on the matter. Consequently, both chairman Kerry [D-MA] and ranking member Lugar [R-IN] were staunch supporters of the Treaty, with little incentive to organize thorough hearings on the issue when partisan tensions in the Congress were running high. In the Armed Services, chairman Levin [D-MI] was strongly supportive of administration policy, and despite voting against the treaty, ranking member McCain [R-AZ] did not participate in the implementation hearings. Thus, the fact that so little debate was had in the Foreign Relations, and only one Republican participating in the debate over at the Armed Services, is consistent with the “ally principle” regarding congressional oversight.

Senator Sessions [R-AL] – based on the analysis in the overall thesis – would best fit in the Jacksonian school of thought. The implementation of the New START and Senator Sessions’ insistence of keeping the issue on agenda in the 112th Congress cannot be dismissed as pure partisan gamesmanship prior to 2012 midterm elections, for Sessions’ argument echoed the Jacksonian sentiments, especially prevalent in the American South. Although Jacksonians embody the self-reliant spirit of America and see national interest from a very specific American nationalistic perspective, Jacksonian honor requires that when the United States commits itself in an alliance, it is obligated to keep its word. (Mead, 2002. 251.) United States had made commitments to its European allies, and the Obama administration’s policy of nuclear disarmament was framed as a betrayal of American security guarantees. This reveals an interesting paradox in Jacksonian thought. One the one hand, for Jacksonians the European Union may “prefigure the kingdom of the Antichirst”
(Mead, 2002. 42), yet at the same time maintaining American commitments to its European allies demonstrate the highest of Jacksonian virtue. One explanation might explain such inconsistency. Jacksonians are slow to shift their attitudes towards certain established threats, were it the Communist China, Vietnam, or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. (Mead, 2002. 262). Jacksonian war doctrine yearns unconditional surrender from America’s adversaries, one not achieved at the end of Cold War. For this, Jacksonian thought never gave up its instinctive definition of Russia as an enemy. (Mead, 2002. 259), and thus extracting political support for policies such as Obama’s Russia reset from Jacksonians is faced with reluctance, especially when such policy would contradict U.S. commitments – consequently American honor and reputation. Framing U.S. nuclear policy as an appeasement to Russia hit a very specific Cold War themed nerve; “Politicians who advocated negotiated compromises with the Soviet enemy were labeled as ‘appeasers’ and paid a heavy political price.” (Mead, 2002. 222.)

6.5 European-based Missile Defense System

6.5.1 Armed Services Committee

The debate over American missile defense system in Europe continued the discussion which began in September 2009, when President Obama announced the cancellation of Bush administration’s planned ground-based missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic. Instead, the administration began to implement a new European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which per White House would provide “protection sooner and more comprehensively.” (White House, 2011.) The new plan would implement American missile defense system in NATO context (ibid), which was a considerable shift from the cancelled ground-based plan, which would have maintained American command and control over the system. The NATO context affected the debate, as the original debate over Obama’s decision had no significant NATO dimension to it. The debate over the implementation continued to be dominated by Russia, as Republicans continued to see Moscow’s role as negative, whereas Democrats saw cooperation with Russia a key element in implementing effective missile defense system against perceived regional threats posed predominantly by Iran. Notably, the salience of military/technical and transatlantic relations -framings identified in the previous chapter (see Figure 9) was lost in the 112th Congress. Considerably less debate was had in the 112th Congress compared to 111th (147 framings identified in 111th as opposed to 27 in 112th Congress, (compare figures 9 and 35), yet the framings identified followed similar
logic in both Congress\textsuperscript{203}. No hearing was devoted entirely on the issue of implementing President Obama’s EPAA missile defense system. The issue was debated as a part of EUCOM’s budget hearings both for FY12 and FY13, as well as in nomination hearings for European commanders.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure35}
\caption{Missile defense by party - Armed Services}
\end{figure}

As evident by the analysis of 112\textsuperscript{th} Congress’ missile defense-related debates, none of the framings were used in a bipartisan manner by both parties (see Figure 35). Most notably, the national security aspect visibly present in other transatlantic security debates had little significance when the Armed Services Committee debated Obama’s implementation of EPAA. From a Democratic perspective, Russia positive - framings were linked to Iran -framings, whereas for Republicans, Russia negative and partisan -framings walked hand in hand. Furthermore, Russia negative and Russia positive -framings constituted mutually exclusive, competitive framings of the issue, following a Russia vilifying or cooperation highlighting logic, like START and missile defense debates in the 111\textsuperscript{th} Congress. The only frequently identified, non-mutually

\begin{itemize}
\item Russia positive (7). Statements describing the decision to scrap static missile defense in Europe as a chance to better relations with Russia, and highlighting the importance of cooperation with Russia in regards to strengthening missile defense capabilities (especially against Iran and North Korea).
\item Russia negative (6). Statements describing the role of Russia in the process as negative and arguing that the Obama administration gave in to Russia. Per these statements Russia attempted to impose its will in Eastern Europe and made attempts to dictate U.S. policy on the issue. Administration’s decision was perceived as an appeasement to Russia.
\item Iran (7). Statements arguing that the whole rationale of deploying a missile defense system in Europe was to counter ballistic- and medium range missile threat presented by rogue states Iran and North Korea.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{203} Russia positive (7). Statements describing the decision to scrap static missile defense in Europe as a chance to better relations with Russia, and highlighting the importance of cooperation with Russia in regards to strengthening missile defense capabilities (especially against Iran and North Korea). Russia negative (6). Statements describing the role of Russia in the process as negative and arguing that the Obama administration gave in to Russia. Per these statements Russia attempted to impose its will in Eastern Europe and made attempts to dictate U.S. policy on the issue. Administration’s decision was perceived as an appeasement to Russia. Iran (7). Statements arguing that the whole rationale of deploying a missile defense system in Europe was to counter ballistic- and medium range missile threat presented by rogue states Iran and North Korea.
exclusive framing was the Iran-framing, identified in 41% of all the framings and in 70% of all the Democratic statements on the issue. Ipso facto, the Iran-framing was the only framing constituting a dominant framing of the issue.

6.5.1.1 Dominant Frames

Iran was the number one villain in the debates over European-based missile defense system in the 2009 debate, North Korean threat was already answered by deploying a system in Alaska and California, and not much was changed in the 2011 debates; Iran remained the threat against which any missile defense system would be deployed. As per the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, Iran posed primarily a “regional threat” against the United States and its allies. So, the approach administration had chosen, EPAA, was a direct and decisive response to the existing and agreed-upon threat posed by Iranian short- and medium-range missiles:

Chairman LEVIN. The regional threat is an existing threat, is that correct?

General KEHLER. The regional threat is an existing threat and growing.

Chairman LEVIN. Is it true that the PAA addresses an existing threat?

General KEHLER. It does, yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Unlike the previous approach, is that correct? Because is not the existing threat the short- and medium-range missiles?

General KEHLER. That’s right.

Chairman LEVIN. Particularly the Iranian missiles?

General KEHLER. Yes, and that includes Iranian missiles, that includes missiles from other actors as well.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. The advantage of the PAA as I understand it is that it addresses that existing threat? (Senator Levin [D-MI] S.Hrg. 112-80, 2010. 640.)

204”Regional actors, such as North Korea in Northeast Asia and Iran and Syria in the Middle East, have short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles that threaten U.S. forces, allies, and partners in regions where the United States deploys forces and maintains security relationships.” (DOD, 2010b. 5.)
The argumentative logic of the Iran-frame is evident from the above quote from chairman Levin during an EUCOM budget hearing in 2011. The existing threat is the one posed by Iran’s short- and medium-range missiles. Not Russian tactical or strategic nukes aimed at America’s NATO allies, but the so-called rogue states constituting a regional threat against American forces deployed overseas and America’s European allies. As such, the (European) Phased Adaptive Approach is a much better response - compared to the Bush administration’s plan - to the existing threat, and justified given the security context and American interests in the region. Furthermore, when the issue of American missile defense in Europe is framed as a military-technical response to a threat posed primarily by Iran, the opposition to Obama administration’s plan should also be based on EPAA’s military-technical merits in the Iranian threat context. This is further supported by the fact that no Republican senator was identified invoking the Iran-frame, and the one framing in the military-technical category was made by a Republican senator within the Iran framework. If Democrats were successful in framing the issue as a military-technically based decision to formulate the best possible response to an existing threat posed by Iranian missiles, the Republicans had limited ability to criticize administration policy as a national security issue. In fact, the use of Iran-frame by Democrats demonstrates the point made by George Lakoff in his 2004 pamphlet “Don’t Think of an Elephant”, warning against enforcing other side’s framing efforts: “If you keep their language and their framing and just argue against it, you lose because you are reinforcing their frame.” (Lakoff, 2004. 33). As such, and consistent with the argument by Lakoff, there was a significant lack of Republican opposition.

205 See for example: “What I’m talking about is the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block 2B, the long-range program. Right now we don’t have a date. It’s still a concept. My feeling is that the others, like the SM-3 Block 2A and other programs, are good, they’re coming along. We have the Aegis capability and all of that. For the record, since my time has expired, I’d like to have you share with me whether you share my concern over the fact that we would have had in my opinion that capability much sooner? When our intelligence gives us a range that Iran’s going to have this capability that we all dread thinking about, somewhere between 2015 and 2020, to me that’s what keeps me up at night. If you could for the record get into as much detail on that as possible, I would appreciate it. (Senator Inhofe [R-OK] S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 606.)

206 General Kehler’s added statement in the European Command’s budget hearings helped the administration and Senate Democrats to present EPAA as militarily appropriate response to Iran: "The European Phased Adaptive Approach is the right strategy for fielding an effective Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in Europe. Today’s Ground-based Midcourse Defense, as part of a layered defense is protecting our Homeland from a limited intercontinental ballistic missile attack. We have the ability to stay ahead of the North Korean and Iranian threat with our overall BMDS plan. Even so, we are working closely with Missile Defense Agency and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to ensure we have an adequate hedge strategy should our acquisition/deployment plan experience delays or emerging threat materializes sooner than predicted. (General Kehler, S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 606.)"
senators discussing the issue as a military response against Iranian threat, and many statements identified within the mutually exclusive Russia negative and Russia positive - framings.

6.5.1.2 Competing Frames

As stated before, two competing descriptions of missile defense -debate framed Russia’s role in mutually exclusive fashion. For the Republican side, Russia negative - framing constituted majority of the arguments, as 60% of all the Republican statements invoked this framing of the issue (22% of all the framings identified). Further, the partisan -framing supported the idea that administration’s action vis-à-vis missile defense was not criticized as much for its military merits, but rather for the perception that the Obama administration had made accommodations to its plan to appease Russia:

In yesterday’s Wall Street Journal, they talked about President Obama’s meeting with Russian President Medvedev yesterday, Monday, when President Obama said—and I assume he said this without knowing that the mic was on, but this needs to be in the record. I would ask the record to reflect this accurately. On all these issues, but particularly missile defense, this—this can be solved, but it is important for him, incoming Russian President Vladimir Putin, to give me space. “This is my last election, and after my election, I’ll have more flexibility.” (Senator Inhofe [R-OK] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 982.)

The above quote from Senator Inhofe [R-OK] addresses the perception that President Obama was willing to compromise American missile defense plans to appease Russia. The reference in Senator Inhofe’s statement was to an article in The Wall Street Journal published March 26th, 2012. The article describes a discussion between President Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on American missile defense plans in Europe, which was, as per the article, picked up by an open microphone.\textsuperscript{207} The conclusion of the discussion was that Obama’s message to both Medvedev and Putin was to give the Obama administration space on the missile defense issue, at least until he is done with the 2012 presidential elections. After that, as stated in the article, Obama would have more flexibility to reach an agreement

\textsuperscript{207} This incidence found its way all the way to Republican Party Platform of 2012: “In an embarrassing open microphone discussion with former Russian President Medvedev, the current President made clear that, if he wins a second term, he intends to exercise “more flexibility” to appease Russia, which means further undermining our missile defense capabilities. A Republican President will be honest and forthright with the American people about his policies and plans and not whisper promises to authoritarian leaders.” (Presidency, 2012.)
with Russia on the issue, suggesting that “agreement would be more likely in November.” (ibid.) Of course, the notion that President Obama was willing to subjugate such significant national security to electoral politics in the U.S. did not escape the Republican senators, who saw it as the United States conceding to Russia’s wishes at the expense of protecting both Americans and allies.\(^{208}\) Now, the appearance of appeasing Russia provided a powerful source of critique for the Republicans not only due to fact that The Wall Street Journal article presented Obama in a rather unflattering light - politicization of a significant national security issue for electoral-politics - but could also be seen in the long-term context of Russian hostility towards United States’ overall missile defense policy in Europe.\(^{209}\) President Medvedev followed the policy positions of President Putin on the issue, and warned the Obama administration that United States deploying new missile defense system in Europe would have consequences, and that the United States had failed to take into account Russian perspective on the issue. Medvedev went as far as making a reference to Congress’ anti-Russian sentiments as a source of concern, and further, despite American claims that the system was designed to prevent Iranian missile attacks, some in the U.S. saw it as a system aimed at Russia: “Legislators in some countries openly state […] ‘This is against you.’” (Quoted in Herszenhorn, 2011.) The Republican line of argumentation was openly defiant of any suggestions that United States ought to take Russian point-of-view into consideration. Quite the opposite, the Republican side of the debate highlighted the importance of going forward with the best possible missile defense system in Europe regardless of Russian objections, as evident by the question directed at Alan F. Estevez, nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness:

> Finally, do you agree that irrespective of Russian objectives, the United States should remain committed to the continued development and deployment of the U.S. missile defense systems worldwide, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems? (Senator Brown [R-MA] S.Hrg. 112-419, 2011. 528.)

\(^{208}\) See also Senator Ayotte [R-NH]: "So I am really concerned about that statement that Senator Inhofe asked you about in the context of what it means in terms of what we would be conceding to the Russians going forward in protecting the United States of America and our allies.” (Senator Ayotte [R-NH] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 996.)

\(^{209}\) For example, in 2008 President Putin described U.S. missile defense plans in Europe as “a new arms race has been unleashed in the world”, and tied the American missile defense plans to overall American foreign policy towards Europe: “‘We drew down our bases in Cuba and in Vietnam. What did we get? […] New American bases in Romania, Bulgaria. A new third missile defense region in Poland.’” (Quoted in Finn, 2008.)
The Republican argumentation within the Russia negative-framing followed the argumentative logic set out in the above quote from Senator Brown, a Republican senator from Massachusetts. The United States, led by the Obama administration, ought to continue its plan to deploy a European-based missile defense system not only regardless of Russian objections, but with a specific emphasis on going forward to send a message; Russian Federation does not have a veto\(^\text{210}\) over American foreign policy in Europe:

I also believe the entire committee would be interested in an update on the initial phase of our deployment of the European-phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense, as well as the progress made in projections for meeting the timeline set forth by the President for phases 2 through 4. This is especially important in light of recent statements by Russian leaders rejecting stated U.S. policy of deploying all four phases of this critical missile defense program. (Senator McCain [R-AZ] S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 542.)

The missile defense in Europe - in this case the EPAA adopted by the Obama administration - became essentially an issue reflecting the administration’s stance in the face of Russian hostility towards U.S. plans. It became a test of Obama’s strength in national security policy in a context of Russia portraying open hostility to U.S. policy, pitting against each other both security and foreign policy concerns of America’s European allies and the Obama administration’s willingness to renegotiate U.S.-Russian relations. As such, the Republican argumentation portrayed American missile defense as an analogy of the Obama administrations national security prowess vis-à-vis Russian Federation. The more Russia objected, more strength was added to the argumentation that negotiating to accommodate Russian concerns was a sign of weakness. This is where the Russia negative and partisan-framings merge. Considering the timeline, partisan-framings were identified in the later debates, as the stage was already set for the logic exemplified by the quote from Senator McCain. The Wall Street Journal article was in a sense proof that Obama administration was not willing to go forward with the missile defense plan regardless of Russian objections, and as such, had failed the test set by the Republican framing of the issue.

\(^{210}\) Similar argumentation highlighted the debate in the 111th Congress: “I would reiterate my long-held view that any notion of a Russian veto power over decisions on our missile defense architecture is unacceptable, and we should oppose any attempts by any administration to do so.” (Senator McCain [R-AZ], S. Hrg. 111-779, 2010. 4.)
Russia positive -framing was directly tied to the Iran -framing, which constituted a dominant framing of the issue on the Democratic side. As stated before, the Democratic framing of the issue was a direct response to a threat posed by Iran, and the problem requiring a solution was to find the best possible response to an existing and agreed-upon threat. Russian Federation did not constitute a threat against which the system would be deployed, but the existing threat was that of Iranian origin. As such, a comprehensive response to the threat would include all actors willing to contribute to an anti-Iran missile defense system.\textsuperscript{211} Russia positive -framing specifically highlights the additive value of U.S.-Russian cooperation to the overall goal of American missile defense in Europe. The argumentative logic states, that missile defense ought to be included in those areas of interest wherein United States and Russia share common operational goals. Negotiating with Russia to achieve the overall goal of negating Iranian short- and medium-range missile threat is not a sign of weakness, but a common-sense approach to an issue affecting both U.S. and Russia with the goal of protecting Americans and its regional allies. If American missile defense system in Europe is truly focused on the specific issue of countering Iranian - and perhaps Syrian - missile threat, cooperation with Russia to achieve that goal is a valid foreign policy choice.\textsuperscript{212}

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO recognized the growing threat to Europe from ballistic missiles from the Middle East, and NATO decided to establish a missile defense of NATO’s population and territory. The United States will provide the core of that defense with its Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) on ballistic missile defense (BMD), the first phase of which is now deployed. This system is designed to protect our deployed forces, our allies, and our partners from Iran’s increasing missile inventory. NATO is seeking Russia’s cooperation with this regional system. Such cooperation would send a powerful signal to Iran of world unity against their developing long-range

\textsuperscript{211} See for example: “Now, in an advance policy question, Dr. Hicks, on whether you would support U.S. and NATO cooperation with Russia on missile defense, you said you supported such cooperation because it could, “strengthen common defenses against Iranian missiles and send an important signal to Iran that Russia and the United States are working together to counter the proliferation and use of ballistic missiles”. It is a position I very strongly support, I think you probably know.” (Senator Levin [R-MI] S.Hrg. 112-745, 2012. 461.)

\textsuperscript{212} John McCain of the Republican party conceded that some prospects of U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperation could be discussed: “I know that both our witnesses have been involved, to varying degrees, in the search for common ground on missile defense with Russia. We’d be eager to hear both of our witnesses’ assessment on the prospects of such cooperation ever occurring.” (Senator McCain [R-AZ] S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 542.) However, this line of argumentation suggested that any such cooperation should not compromise America’s ability to unilaterally, or together with its NATO allies, decide when, where and how to deploy missile defense systems. Russia could be added to the discussion, but the United States ought to set the tone, not the other way around.
missiles or their having nuclear weapons. We look forward to Admiral Stavridis’ views on the progress and the impact of missile defense.

The above quote from chairman Levin, who was responsible for all seven framings identified within the *Russia negative* framing, exemplifies the overall argumentative logic of the Democratic framing. But it does so with a NATO twist. It frames the issue not only in American terms, but as a process supported, even spearheaded by the NATO alliance as articulated in the Lisbon Summit declaration.\(^{213}\) This line of argumentation is consistent with the Democratic efforts during the Libya -debates to frame the intervention as a NATO -led operation. Such framing detaches the process from the long-term context stretching all the way to President Reagan and Strategic Defense Initiative, and places it within the NATO framework and away from Republican-led arguments over national missile defense systems. Bringing NATO into the issue also highlights the regional aspects of Iranian threat and places the decision-making process within a wider regional context. Within this context, cooperation with Russia is consistent with overall Democratic emphasis of including Russia into Euro-Asian security framework.

### 6.5.2 Individual Breakdown

Senator Levin led the debate in Armed Services on the European based missile defense system. Levin made eight statements altogether, whereas the other seven senators voicing opinions on the issue made nine statements altogether. (See Figure 36.) As such, Senator Levin was the only senator paying considerable attention to missile defense in the 112\(^{th}\) Congress.

---

\(^{213}\) The declaration by all Heads of State in the alliance stated that “[We have also] decided to develop a missile defence capability to protect all NATO European populations, territory and forces, and invited Russia to cooperate with us…” (NATO, 2010b.)
Levin’s argumentation was based on the same substantive basis in 112th Congress as it did in 111th; U.S. missile defense ought to be based on the regional threat presented by Iran and North Korea, and missile defense could benefit from further cooperation with Russian Federation. The main threat against United States was presented by the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and Russian cooperation regarding U.S. missile defense system would enhance U.S. security at home and abroad. Russia positive-framing was the defining argumentative tool used by Senator Levin to support Obama administration’s Russia reset policy, and missile defense in Europe was used as a prime example of U.S.-Russian security cooperation. Similar to 111th, Levin’s argumentation was based on the prevailing threat perception formed around Iran. As such, missile defense was approach from a very specific perspective, and Levin’s argumentation define him as a policy specialist in regard to U.S. missile defense in Europe.

6.5.3 Discussion

The debate over America’s missile defense system in Europe became a debate over the Obama administration’s Russia policy. Republican’s on the committee portrayed Obama as weak in his Russian policy by accommodating rather than confronting Russia vis-à-vis American European-based missile defense policy. As the Republicans lost the military issue, they made it a partisan and ideological issue. For
example, ranking member Senator McCain [R-AZ], who was vocal in 111th Congress on the issue, did not involve himself in the partisan side of the missile defense debates in 112th Congress. Fowler argues (2015, 102), that to safeguard its core principles of promoting spending priorities, Armed Services Committee has adopted “outward appearance of bipartisan cooperation.” Given Ranking Member McCain’s long tenure in the committee, his recusal from both START and missile defense hearings as they turned partisan, is consistent with Fowler’s notion. The insistence on operational details over which system to deploy exemplified the type of focus on operational details over policy guidance criticized by Rockman (2005, 31) and Senator Fulbright. But given McCain’s recusal from the debate, it is difficult to frame it as long-term strategic policy guidance, rather than as “partisan politics and sound bites.” (Rockman, 2005. 32). As Iran no longer functioned as a viable threat perception in critiquing the Obama administration, the Republican attention was focused into perceived mischievousness of President Obama, evidence of which the “open mic” incidence constituted, or, if we disregard the partisan notions, the Republicans in the committee represented the more extreme Republican, Bush-era stance on missile defense, postulating national missile defense (NMD) as the first step deterring rising Chinese nuclear capabilities, or even neutralizing Russian threat when coupled with land-, sea-, and space-based components. (Newhouse, 2001).

It is safe to say, that the American missile defense system in Europe presents considerably more salient issue for Putin’s Russia than for Armed Service members’ constituency. For Russia, the issue has considerable political consequences, most notably Putin’s sensitivity to the eroding Russian power in the European framework since the fall of the Soviet Union. But as Russia’s conventional military capabilities deteriorated, the Russian nuclear weapons capabilities gave some credibility to Russia’s Armed Forces. Furthermore, Russia has been highly critical of NATO’s expansion to its western borders, and given the high instability of Russia’s southern border, the last thing Russia would want is more instability in the West. (Cimbala, 2009. 440-441.) The Republican arguments critiquing the Obama administration did not include any significant argumentative logic based on the strategic aspects of American missile defense system in Europe, closest probably being Senator Sessions [R-Al], who argued that Russians had objected American missile defense plans “steadfastly for no good reason that I can see other than maybe domestic Russian politics or use leverage against the United States.” (Senator Sessions [R-Al] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 1007). By acknowledging no strategic justification for Russia’s concerns, no justification could be extended to Obama’s insistence on employing diplomacy over confronting Russia.
The issue for committee’s Republicans was, that President Obama attempted to prefer diplomacy over a very specific type of military deployment, namely, the ground-based missile defense system. The issue for Republicans was not military-technical. They did not argue the technical aspects of European Phased Adaptive Approach compare them to ground-based midcourse interceptors planned by the Bush administration. They argued, that the decision to replace military policy with diplomacy was a portrayal of weakness. Now, Fowler (2015) argues, the Armed Services Committee is more prone to responding in constituency needs and parochial, spending issues. Further, Milne (2015, 272) argues, that the president has more freedom in foreign policy when employing military means of statecraft compared to non-military ones, even though the use of non-military tools would be less expensive internationally and fiscally. As per Milner, non-military action often bears higher domestic policy cost than military action (ibid), supporting Fowler’s claim that these distributional factors affecting Pentagon’s budget and military personnel guide the Armed Services Committee.

Milner (2015, 57) describes ideology in foreign policy as “beliefs about the dispositions of foreign actors and the appropriate way to deploy government resources to deal with them.” The ideological diversity leads to different evaluations over foreign policy instruments needed to tackle individual issues and actors. Ideology “affects citizen evaluations of their leaders and hence the electoral prospects of both legislators and the president.” (ibid). Call it partisanship or not, Republican insistence on Obama’s back-door dealings and misguided attention to compromise over confrontation were consistent with general Republican framing of Russia throughout both Congresses, and with both Jeffersonian and Jacksonian suspicion of the elites they see as corrupt and untrustworthy. Backdoor deals with Russia beyond Congress’ view fights against the very values of Jeffersonian constitutionalism and Jacksonian honor. Ideological arguments regarding missile defense were further empowered with Russian insistence that future nuclear arms reductions were conditional on U.S. withdrawal from its plans to deploy European-based missile defense system. (Cimbala, 2014, 31). Given the linkage between missile defense and nuclear reductions, Republican fears over President Obama’s “world without nuclear weapons” were confirmed by the supposed willingness to compromise on missile defense to achieve his end-goal of further nuclear reductions. Although Senator McCain had already given up on the ground-based system, the insistence of other senators in the committee highlighted the deep partisan division on the issue of national missile defense, as further evident by the fact that the issue
found its way all the way to Republican Party Platform in the 2012 elections. (See Presidency, 2012).

6.6 Russia

Despite the shift in global dynamics after the fall of Soviet Union, Russia remained the defining issue in transatlantic security, as evident in the debates over Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and European-based missile defense. Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and the more assertive Russia seemed to put Russia more thoroughly back into focus when debating transatlantic security issue. Besides the implications of Georgian War and possible NATO enlargement in the Caucasus, Russian influence in the Ukraine, especially vis-à-vis European energy security, Russia’s human rights and rule of law issues, Obama administration’s Russia reset, as well as Russia’s role in the emerging Syrian conflict all affected the discussion in Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees. Framings analyzed here are Russia-related debates other than those already analyzed in START and missile defense -specific hearings.

6.6.1 Armed Services Committee

Altogether, 27 framings were identified in the Armed Services Committee (see Figure 37). Fourteen of the framings were identified in Democratic statements, twelve in Republican and one was made by an Independent. The overall frequency of Russia-framings had no significant deviation based on partisan lines. No specific Russia-related hearings were held regarding U.S.-Russian relations or Russia’s role in transatlantic security framework in general, and the statements were identified throughout a variety of hearings, including the bread and butter of Armed Services Committee; the appropriations hearings. Furthermore, the issue rose when senators were discussing issues related to U.S./NATO intervention in Libya and the wider implications of Arab Spring as the Syrian situation deteriorated rapidly, and U.S. senators were increasingly weary of the perceived negative role Russia in support of Bashar al-Assad’s crackdown of the Syrian opposition. This was especially evident in the statements made by Republicans, who were not identified invoking Russia positive -framing once during the hearings in 112th Congress. Russia positive -framings, on the other hand, were identified exclusively in Democratic statements, and to be more specific, in statements made by the committee’s chairman Carl Levin [D-MI]. Only two significant framings were identified in the Armed Services:
Russia positive (7). Statements framing Russia reset and prospects for U.S.-Russian cooperation in positive terms, highlighting areas of common interest.

Russia negative (16). Statements framing Russian influence in its near abroad or globally (Syria) in negative terms, questioning the Russia reset policy. Also included statements critical of Russia’s human rights abuses and rule-of-law issues.

Two other framings were identified in three statements, making them insignificant enough to be ignored in the qualitative analysis.

6.6.1.1 Dominant Frames

Russia negative constituted the dominant framing during the debates over Russia. Specifically, the senators presented Russian influence in Syria as overwhelmingly negative, with Republican senators taking the charge. Of the eleven (Figure 37) Russia negative -framings identified in statements made by Republican senators, eight involved critique of Russian action vis-à-vis Syria’s evolving civil war. On the Democratic side, two out of the five framing identified in Russia negative -framings referenced Russia’s role in Syria, exemplifying not only the overall difference in the frequency of Russia negative –framings by Republican and Democratic senators, but also the greater attention paid to Russia’s role in Syria. To highlight this point, 67% of all the Russia-specific statements made by Republican senators critiqued Russian
action in Syria, whereas only 14% of all the Democratic statements referred to Syria. Nevertheless, no senator agreed with Russia regarding its conduct, making the specific substantive argument within the Russia negative-framing the dominant framing in Russia-related discourse in the Armed Services. Argumentatively, however, Russia specific debate ought to be seen in the greater transatlantic context defined by the Obama administration’s Russia reset policy, New START, missile defense in Europe and NATO’s intervention in Libya.

Bashar Al-Assad and his top lieutenants appear to be accelerating their fight to the finish, and they’re doing so with the full support of Russia, China, and Iran. A steady supply of weapons, ammunition, and other assistance is flowing to Assad from Moscow and Teheran and, as the Washington Post reported on Sunday, Iranian military and intelligence operatives are likely working in Syria to support Assad. (Senator McCain [R-AZ] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 393.)

The above statement by ranking member John McCain [R-AZ] was made during a March 6th, 2012 appropriation hearing on U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command funding for fiscal year 2013. By the time of the hearing in question, Russia and China, in their capacity as two of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, had vetoed two separate U.S. and European backed U.N. resolutions attempting to curtail Syrian government’s action to suppress a popular uprising.214 (Lynch, 2012). Much of the critique against Russian action in Syria was based on two issues; its obstructionism in the United Nations and its arms sales to Bashar al-Assad’s government. Republican senators were notably more concerned over Russian arms sales and direct military support to Assad’s government, which to Republicans constituted a morally reprehensible policy, as concluded by Senator Cornyn [R-TX] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 544): “it strikes me that it is pretty clear that Russia has Syrian blood on its hands and is complicit in that effort.”215 Democrats based their criticism more notably on the fact that Russia had consistently obstructed U.N. action on the issue, and despite that “almost all nations” had expressed their condemnation over Assad regime’s handling of the emerging civil conflict; “China and Russia are preventing the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council from taking any effective action.” (Senator Levin [D-MI] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 544.)

---

214 Third veto by Russia and China took place in July 2012, before the end of 112th Congress. (ibid.)
215 For more see: “Yesterday we had the Chief of Staff and Secretary Panetta here and we talked about Syria. I don’t know if you are aware of the discussion we had, but let me be specific about it. This has to do with Russia’s role through its basically official arms-dealing entity known as Rosoboronexport, that is selling nearly $1 billion worth of arms to Syria, which Assad is using to kill innocent Syrians during the uprising going on now, reportedly as many as 750 people.” (Senator Cornyn [R-TX] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 544.)
As such, Republican argumentation presented Russian action in Syria in a more clandestine light, and was less eager to highlight the role of United Nations in the process.

Another key concept in the Russia negative-framing was the argumentative link created between Russia and Iran vis-à-vis Syria. Although McCain concludes that Assad’s troops fight with “the full support of Russia, China, and Iran”, China’s role is more passive and manifested primarily in the U.N. context, whereas Iran and Russia are actively working to support Assad’s crackdown of the Syrian people. As such, the argumentation followed the logic of missile defense debates, wherein all senators concluded that Iran was the primary threat against which both U.S. and NATO should prepare against, but differed on their perception of Russia’s role. Republicans showed a lot less eagerness to cooperate with Russia regarding missile defense, a sentiment echoed in debates over Syria, wherein Russia’s role was presented as overwhelmingly negative and its actions equal to unquestionably negative effects of the Iranian involvement. Thus, Republicans in the committee did not see Russia, at least as it were, an active part of the solution to the Syrian problem, but a critical and active component of the tragedy which continued to unfold. Senator Ayotte [R-NH] went on to make comparisons between Russian arms sales to Syria and Russian efforts to sell weapons in past to Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua, concluding that Russian action in Syria “is part of the pattern for Russia.” (Senator Ayotte [R-NH] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 649). Democrats, on the other hand, were more likely to see Russia as a force with great influence in the regional issues, and contrary to Republican sentiments, did not exclude the idea that Russia could play a positive role in solving the Syrian issue.216

6.6.1.2 Competing Frames

Following much of the same logic as other Russia related debates deconstructed in this study, Russia-specific debates revealed the juxtaposition between the Obama administrations Russia reset policy stressing cooperation in areas of common interest, and Republican-led argumentation highly suspicious constructive cooperation. As before, the role of being the administration’s soapbox fell onto

216 See for example: “One of the key actors in your region is Russia. There is an election. Can you give us your estimate of post-election—I think we can assume who is going to win—how effective they will be in terms of dealing with two of the critical issues we face which is the Iranian and Syrian situation since they do have some great leverage in both areas?” (Senator Reed [D-RI] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 359.)
chairman Carl Levin from Michigan. Most of the seven framings identified within the *Russia positive* -framing were Levin’s, and all the positive framings of Russia were made by Democratic senators. (see Figure 37.) Levin’s argumentation relied on the positive opportunities presented by U.S.-Russian cooperation in the field of anti-terrorism and the threat posed by Iran and North Korea.

I just had one additional question if I could of General Jacoby. That has to do with the anti-terrorism joint exercise with Russia that we conduct annually, I believe, called Vigilant Eagle. You indicated, General, that the benefits that we realized from this sort of exercise are invaluable. This is what your prepared statement tells us, and that you hope over time it will lead to even greater levels of openness and cooperation among our nations, referring to us and Russia. Are you hoping that we can enhance the cooperation militarily? For instance, do you plan to have direct interaction with your Russian counterpart as part of that effort? (Senator Levin [D-MI] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012, 661.)

The above statement made by Levin expressed not only the sentiments of Senator Levin himself, but the logic of Russia reset policy. In areas where U.S. and Russia share common goals, two nations ought to enhance their cooperation in the hopes that such cooperation would lead to further improvements in the bilateral relations with the former Cold War rivals. The foundation of this line of argumentation was presented by President Obama already in 2009, when he spoke for the reset in Moscow: “America wants a strong, peaceful and prosperous Russia … on the fundamental issues that will shape this century, Americans and Russians share common interests that form a basis for co-operation.” (Barack Obama, quoted in The Guardian, 2009b.) As such, Levin followed closely the policy preferences set by the Obama administration relative to such policy issues the administration felt were suitable for cooperation. Now, to be fair, Senator Levin made clear in his overall

---

217 This definition of U.S.-Russian relations was further defined in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review: “The United States is willing to undertake security cooperation with Russia, both in the bilateral context and in seeking solutions to regional challenges, when our interests align, including Syria, Iran, and post-2014 Afghanistan. At the same time, Russia’s multi-dimensional defense modernization and actions that violate the sovereignty of its neighbors present risks. We will engage Russia to increase transparency and reduce the risk of military miscalculation.” (QDR, 2010, 6.)
behavior in the hearings that Russia acted in negative manner in other policy matters; namely relative to Syria\textsuperscript{218} and the cyber-sphere\textsuperscript{219}.

Another interesting line of argumentation in statements made by Senator Levin involved the issue of threat perception. Levin’s argument was, that Russia did not present a threat against the United States:

But when you add the word, threat, at that point you’re getting into an area of intent. I would hope that you would always say, in terms of intent, you don’t see an intent on the part of either Russia or China to be a military threat to us. (Senator Levin [D-MI] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 67.)

High emphasis is added to the use of the word “threat” as it pertains to Russia. Levin’s assertion is, that for a nation to become a threat against the United States, certain level of intent ought to be involved. In other words, no intention of threatening the United States was evident in the behavior of Russian government, and as such, it did not constitute a national security threat against the United States. In that sense, North Korea and Iran were the two states with an intent to threaten the United States, whereas Russia and China certainly had the military capabilities to do so, but lacked in intent.\textsuperscript{220} This demarcation between intent and capabilities made the definition of threat a political issue, wherein the intent would be evaluated based on the perceived intent of another nation to threaten the United States. As such, the logic set forth within the Russia positive-framing is consistent with not only the Russia reset policy as articulated by the administration, but also with the framing of 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which did not categorize Russia as a threat in the transatlantic context. Instead, the Review stated regarding engaging Russia in Europe that the United States “will continue to work to achieve a Europe that is peaceful

\textsuperscript{218} See for example: “On Syria, the recent veto by Russia and China of the Arab League-drafted resolution at the United Nations Security Council has bolstered the Assad regime and has regrettably demonstrated the willingness of China and Russia to support regimes seeking to crush individuals who are seeking a better and a freer life.” (Senator Levin [D-MI] S.Hrg. 112-741, 2012. 4.)

\textsuperscript{219} See for example: “A recent report from the National Counterintelligence Executive stated that entities operating from within China and Russia are responsible for the massive and routine theft of U.S. commercial and military technology, and that could threaten our national security and our prosperity.” (ibid.)

\textsuperscript{220} See: “I was frankly surprised by your answer, Director Clapper. He asked a very direct question; who represents the greatest threat to the United States? Your first answer was Russia, and then you clarified it in terms of saying, ‘well, that’s in terms of capability, but they don’t have any intent to use that capability.’ But I still was kind of surprised by your answer. Then the next one was China, who also would have the capability, I guess, but, without the intent.” (Senator Levin [D-MI] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 65.)
and prosperous, and we will engage Russia constructively in support of that objective.” (QDR, 2012. 35.)

As a side note, the Armed Services held a hearing on “Current and Future Worldwide Threats” on February 16th, 2012. Overall, 19 statements were made during the hearing to assess current threats against American national security, and four of them made a reference to Russia. None of the statements made in the hearing painted a picture of Russia as a direct military threat, but none were positive in nature either. The statements included already quoted statement by Carl Levin expressing concerns over Russia’s role in Syria and Russian cyber action, John McCain’s assertion of the negative role played by Russia in Syria, Senator Inhofe’s concerns over unilateral reductions by the administration vis-à-vis the START process, and Senator Shaheen’s question considering the demonstrations in Russia related to Putin’s election as the president in 2012. Of all the statements, only Senator Inhofe’s notion of what he considered “unilateral reductions” could be perceived as a recognition of the military threat presented by Russian nuclear arsenals. (S.Hrg. 112-741, 2012.) So, overall, in 2012 Russia was not a visible factor in Armed Services deliberations over threats against American national security, and in the similar hearing in 2011 (S.Hrg. 112-159) four Democratic senators brought up the issue of Russia, none of them defining it as a threat.221

If Democrats saw the overall role of Russia in more of a benign fashion - excluding Russian action in Syria - certain familiar names on the Republican side continued to push for a more aggressive stance towards Russia and its near abroad. For example, Senator McCain continued to keep the issue with Georgia on American foreign policy agenda, an issue rather contentious in the context of Obama administrations push for better bilateral relations. McCain argued, that “the United States needs to build a more normal defense relationship with Georgia, including defensive arms sales in coordination with our NATO allies.” (Senator McCain [R-AZ] S.Hrg. 112-590, 2012. 271). John McCain’s stance on Russia-Georgia situation was articulated in his 2010 opinion piece in the Washington Post, wherein he argued that as Obama administration was eager to reset its relationship with Russia which continued to stampede human rights, a better cause would be to better U.S. relations

221 See for example the following exchange between Senator Manchin [D-WV] and Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper: “Senator MANCHIN. Sir, maybe I can clarify. Which country represents to you, that has the intent to be our greatest adversary? Who has the capabilities—I know you’ve gone through it. But who has the intent? Mr. CLAPPER. Probably China. Senator MANCHIN. China? So, Donald Trump’s right.” (Senator Manchin [D-WV] S.Hrg. 112-159, 2011. 66.)
with Georgia: “if the Obama administration is looking for a relationship that really needs a "reset," it should look to Georgia.” (McCain, 2010.) Furthermore, the Obama administration had continued to undermine the support for “friendly Georgian democracy living under the long shadow of its aggressive neighbor” by refusing to arm it and failing to push Russia to withdraw from occupied areas. Selling arms would be the utmost priority to safeguard the American ally, and instead of Obama administration’s attempts to befriend Russia, United States ought to “remember who our real friends are.” (ibid.) McCain [R-AZ] continued to keep the pressure on the Obama administration on the issue of arming Georgia two years after his Washington Post piece, and four years after the actual Russo-Georgian War.

6.6.2 Foreign Relations Committee

Foreign Relations Committee held one specific hearing related to Russia, a hearing on the State of Human Rights in Russia, and two indirect hearings on Russia’s influence in its near abroad, as the committee held specific hearings attempting the evaluate the situation in both Belarus and Ukraine. Furthermore, the committee held its annual hearings on National Security Priorities and Priorities for Europe. The nature of debate in Foreign Relations was distinctly different in comparison to the Armed Services. For example, as the critique over Russia’s increasingly negative role in Syrian civil conflict was the defining factor in Armed Services, only one senator in the Foreign Relations - ranking member Richard Lugar [R-IN] – mentioned Syria in the Russia -specific statements identified. Instead, a clear focus in the Committee was directed at human rights, democracy, and rule of law both in Russia, and in countries with significant Russian influence, namely Ukraine and Belarus. As such, Russia negative -framing was predominantly defined by critique over human rights issues in Russia and countries with significant Russian influence.

Speaking in partisan terms, whereas in the Armed Services both Republican and Democratic senators spoke on the issue, in Foreign Relations the scale was tipped on the Democratic side. Of the 24 overall framings identified, 19 were made by
Democrats and only 5 by Republicans. (see Figure 38.) As such, the Russia-specific framings in the Foreign Relations represented one of the more uneven distribution of framings identified on the partisan scale. Further, whereas both chairman Levin [D-MI] and ranking member McCain [R-AZ] were highly vocal in the Armed Services, chairman Kerry [D-MA] was not identified once and ranking member Lugar [R-IN] only once during the hearings in the Foreign Relations.

6.6.2.1 Dominant Frames

*Russia negative* was by far the dominating framing in the Foreign Relations. Of the 24 overall statements identified, 21 were placed within the *Russia negative* -framing (88%) (Figure 38.) Human rights-related issues defined the substantive basis of the framing, as 16 out of 21 framings made a reference to human rights considerations, and of the 16 Democratic framings 14 included argumentation based on human rights. On the broader scale, the debate included considerations over Russian development in general, but also the prospects for U.S.-Russian bilateral relations based on three basic concepts; ideological, economic, and security. Ideological critique over Russia was apparent in framings arguing for continued emphasis on general human rights and rule of law considerations:

Over the last week the world really has been watching, I think, the growing protests in Russia and the courageous stand that thousands have taken by coming out into the streets to protest. You both mentioned that. I know we all agree that it’s critical for the United States to stand behind these protesters and it’s important that they know that we hear what they’re doing and support their right to demonstrate.

Obviously, the reports from the elections detail significant tampering, abuse, and fraud. In some areas turnout exceeded 140 percent. In Chechnya, reports suggest that United Russia was able to garner 99.5 percent of the vote. Nobody familiar with democracy believes that that’s a real number. (Senator Shaheen [D-NH] S.Hrg. 112-367, 2011. 18.)

---

222 It ought to be noted though, that all the framings identified within the *Russia negative* -framing were made by same senators who critiqued Russian human rights and rule of law record. Those statement, however, argued for the undoubtable benefits of the Obama administration’s Russia-reset policy to increase cooperation in areas of common interest. Due to the fact that senators who were identified using the *Russia positive* -framing were also the leading critiques of Russia’s human rights violations, those three framings (see Figure 27) do not in themselves constitute a competing framing of the issue.
The above quote from Senator Shaheen makes a reference to protests emerging in Russia after the 2011 Duma elections won by the United Russia. Reportedly, tens of thousands of Russians took the streets in protest of what they considered was an unfair election and de facto appointment of Putin as the next president of the Russian Federation, following the announced “swap” between Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev in the upcoming presidential elections. Protesters saw the Duma elections themselves as unfair, and characteristic of the rising corruption and diminishing political space smothered by the inevitable winner of 2012 presidential elections; then prime minister Vladimir Putin. (Englund & Lally, 2011.) Shaheen argues that the United States ought to actively encourage the freedom of Russians to voice their concerns over right to protest. She describes this as “critical for the United States”, making the ideological aspect of U.S.-Russian relations the key defining aspect of the U.S.-Russian relations. Further, Shaheen questions the validity of the election results due to apparent shortcomings relative to what the United States would consider fair and open elections, thus justifying the protests erupting all over Russia. The argumentative logic presented by Shaheen and other Democrats stressing the human rights and rule of law considerations were not out of line with the overall tone of the Obama administration. After the Duma elections in question, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared the election as “neither free nor fair” (quoted in Lally, 2011). This caused great anxiety in Russian leadership, as Putin argued that Clinton’s statements regarding the elections were the primary cause for protest erupting in Russia, and that the protests themselves were at least indirectly orchestrated by the State Department. (ibid). Given the apparent unease with which Putin observed domestic protests challenging his authority – especially since fraudulent elections were main catalysts in the color revolutions of Georgia and Ukraine - (see for example Crowley, 2017), the Democratic support for a right to protest and emphasis on rule of law might have wielded great influence in the Kremlin.

And I remember very vividly when China entered the WTO we said that would be an opportunity for America to advance human rights in China, and we, of course, enacted a mechanism, a commission that does meet, that has some impact. But I would hope that what we have learned from that experience is that we have to set the bar higher when we have opportunities to advance human rights.

Let me point out, I think we are in agreement on many of those issues. Where we will be talking during the next several months is how we provide a more permanent basis for these types of issues. Action by one administration can be forgotten by a second administration. So how do we institutionalize the standards for human rights, taking a look at this opportunity as we move
toward Russia’s integration in the WTO, it gives us a chance to advance institutional changes for human rights. We look forward to seeing how we can advance legislation that achieves that. (Senator Cardin [D-MD] S.Hrg. 112-367, 2011. 21.)

Senator Cardin’s [D-MD] policy suggestion combines the ideological emphasis on liberal human rights agenda and economic sphere, by presenting Russia’s integration into World Trade Organization (WTO) as the carrot to incentivize improvements in the field of human rights and rule of law. Cardin refers to the mechanism enacted as China was integrated into WTO. Despite Cardin’s rather subtle allusion to the success of said mechanism, the effect was hardly as strong as suggested by President Clinton in 2000 when he persuaded the Congress to approve China’s ascension by claiming that it would have “a profound impact on human rights and political liberty.” (quoted in The Economist, 2011.) Such change was certainly not evident in 2011. (see ibid.) Linking trade and human rights in U.S. economic relations with Russia is by no mean a novel suggestion. In 1974, Congress enacted the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which was an attempt to put pressure on Russia’s regarding human rights by making the benefits of normal trade dependent on certain requirements vis-à-vis human rights. (Ginsberg, 2009). Cardin’s argumentative logic thus continues this path, linking economic cooperation with Russia and its handling of human rights.

6.6.2.2 Competing Frames

Identifying competing framings from the debate was rather arduous. The dominance of human rights as the dominant framing both in argumentative substance and as the topic of Russia specific hearings was challenged once by Senator Bob Corker [R-TN], who made an argumentative effort to reveal what he perceived as hypocrisy in the insistence on linking human rights considerations and economic cooperation. In a statement, right after Cardin’s, wherein the Democratic senator argued that Russian WTO ascension ought to be used as an opportunity to promote human rights agenda, Corker contested “Russia sort of evokes different emotions in people than countries like China…and the Congo, Saudi Arabia, where a woman was beheaded yesterday.” (Senator Corker [R-TN] S.Hrg. 112-367, 2011. 24.) As such, the notion of heightened sensitivity to Russian human rights violation is presented as inconsistent with general human rights agenda. Arguably Corker’s argument made sense, as China, for example, had arguably far worse human rights record compared to Russia. What made the Russian case different was the fact that Russian entry into
WTO would have primarily positive consequence for U.S. economy, whereas China’s membership was a more complex issue overall. (CFR, 2011.) As such, Corker goes on to argue for the economic route rather than the humanitarian one, as he argued that “the best way for us to do that [pro-West Russia] is to have even greater ties to them as it relates to trade and other activities…” whereas by continuing to reauthorize Jackson-Vanik Amendment to force-feed human rights agenda to Russia “we’ll just shoot ourselves in the foot.” (Senator Corker [R-TN] S.Hrg. 112-367, 2011. 24.)

6.6.3 Individual Breakdown

The individual breakdown confirms once again the dominance of the committee leadership in leading the debate (Figure 39.) Both Senator McCain (23% of all the statements) and Levin (32% of all the statements) led the debate for their respective parties in Russia related (other than START or Missile Defense) discussions during the 112th Congress. But their approaches to the issues differed greatly. Senator Levin continued to function as the voice of the administration in the Armed Services Committee. Majority of his statements regarding Russia muted the perception of
Russia as a threat\textsuperscript{223} and instead highlighted the prospects for cooperation, not only regarding missile defense, but also in regard to Iran and anti-terrorism cooperation. As such, Levin’s standpoint – although being at times critical of Russian efforts in the cyber realm – was that of the defender of Obama administration’s Russia policy. Given the very direct focus on defending administration policy, it is very difficult to categorize Senator Levin to any other category than a policy specialist.

Senator McCain held a much grimmer perception of Russia’s influence on the world stage. In his remarks, Russia was seen as a thoroughly negative force in Syria, where Russian actions were amoral and counterproductive (at least from an American standpoint) the solving the emerging crisis in Syria. In the European specific context, Senator McCain held a negative view of Russia with regard to its actions in its near-abroad\textsuperscript{224}. As such, Senator McCain painted a very different picture of U.S.-Russian relations compared to Senator Levin. As per McCain, Russia was predominantly a negative actor in areas of importance for U.S. and its allies, and as such, U.S. policy needed to portray strength and resolve regarding missile defense, NATO enlargements, START, and Syria. Given the consistency of McCain’s approach across the different spectrums of U.S.-Russian relations, and based on the analysis of his statements, he ought to be categorized as a policy strategist.

Senator Shaheen substituted for the committee chairman John Kerry in the Foreign Relations Committee’s hearings on Russia’s human rights issues and on Russia’s influence in Ukraine. As such, Shaheen had the most opportunities to make her voice heard on discussion related to Russia during the 112\textsuperscript{th} Congress, and she

\textsuperscript{223} See for example the exchange taken place during a hearing on “Current and Future Worldwide Threats” on March 10\textsuperscript{th} 2011:

“Chairman LEVIN. Does Russia or China at this time represent a direct mortal threat to the United States?
Mr. CLAPPER. They have the capability because of their strategic nuclear weapons.
Chairman LEVIN. Right.
Mr. CLAPPER. I don't think, intent is low, but they certainly have the capability.
Chairman LEVIN. By that measure we represent a direct mortal threat to both of them, right? We have the capability of attack——
Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir. We do.
Chairman LEVIN. So that, you would say, as the DNI, that, you wouldn't mind a headline out there in Russian and China saying, the United States represents a direct mortal threat to Russia or China?
Mr. CLAPPER. Each of these countries certainly have the capability, and our strategic arsenals——
Chairman LEVIN. Vice versa?” (Senator Levin [D-MI] S.Hrg. 112-159, 2011. 66.)

\textsuperscript{224} See “It's hard for me to understand, since the Russians still occupy territory that is clearly Georgian territory and continue to threaten Georgia. Yet we're not even giving them weapons with which to defend themselves. It is not comprehensible.” (Senator McCain [R-AZ] S.Hrg. 112-80, 2011. 600.)
did so by being responsible for 42% of all the Russia related statements (other than START and Missile Defense) made in the Committee. Other than Shaheen, Republican John Barrasso from Wyoming was the most vocal Republican, and Senator Cardin, a Democrat from Maryland, was the third most active member of the Committee. (Figure 40.)

Figure 40. Russia by individual - Foreign Relations

All three senators most active on Russian related issues used similar framing (*Russia negative*) and approached the issue from a very similar human rights/rule-of-law perspective. The only considerable difference in the argumentation was Republican Barrasso’s critique of the Obama administration’s Russia reset policy, which he saw as an appeasement to Russia.\(^{225}\) The similarity of the approached can be explained not only by the very nature of Senate Foreign Relations Committee and its emphasis on humanitarian issues, but also on the nature of the hearings organized. The two hearings constituting the majority of Russia related debate were December

\(^{225}\) See “I perceive the reset as not successful and I believe it has simply amounted in a number of ways to a series of appeasements to Russia. Even in the few areas where the administration does claim progress, Russia has taken several steps back or even reversed course. I have serious concerns with the actions being taken by the Government of Russia. Some of these concerns include Russia’s attempt to undermine U.S. missile defense, Russia’s continued occupation and interference in the sovereign territory of the Republic of Georgia, Russia’s supplying of weapons to the Government of Syria as the Assad regime continues a violent crackdown against its own citizens, Russia’s extensive corruption throughout its government, Russia’s ongoing violations of human rights, Russia’s disregard for the rule of law, and Russia’s repression of the freedom of speech and expression.” (Senator Barrasso [R-WY] S.Hrg. 112-367, 2011. 2.)
2011 hearing “The State of Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Russia” (S.Hrg. 112-367) and a February 1\textsuperscript{st} hearing “Ukraine at a Crossroads: What’s at Stake for the U.S. and Europe?” (S.Hrg. 112-471.)

Going back to the most vocal senator in the Foreign Relations, Senator Shaheen of New Hampshire, she framed her fierce critique of Russian handling of its human rights and rule-of-law in tandem with her faith in Obama’s Russia reset: “So, even as we work with Russia on areas of mutual interest through the Obama administration’s “reset” policy, we still need new tools to press its leaders on areas where we disagree.” (Senator Shaheen [D-NH] S.Hrg. 112-367, 2011. 1.) After establishing her support for the Democratic administration, Shaheen continued her consistent critique of Russian President Medvedev and then-Prime Minister Putin, whom she was convinced would be more harmful for democratization and human rights regime than President Medvedev was. As such, Shaheen insisted on continued U.S. support for the protests emerging after the 2012 elections, and maintained that Ukraine ought to be integrated more thoroughly in the European Union framework in order to diminish the negative influence of Moscow. Given the very specific viewpoint adopted by Senator Shaheen, and the lack of considerations other than human rights/rule-of-law specific ones, she ought to be categorized as a \textit{policy specialist}.

\textbf{6.6.4 Discussion}

Three separate approaches to Russia dominated the debates across the two committees during the 112\textsuperscript{th} Congress. First, Senator Levin in the Armed Services carried the torch for the Obama administration’s Russia reset policy by highlighting prospects of cooperation. Second, Republicans in the Armed Services portrayed growing concerns over increasing negative influence of Russia in the emerging civil conflict in Syria. Third, Democrats in the Foreign Relations Committee brought up Russian shortcoming in areas of human rights and rule-of-law, painting a rather grim picture of Russian civil society and the role of Russian government in cracking down any progress in the two areas mentioned. Overall, the overarching tone regarding Russia was negative. If we combine the results from both committees (tables 37 and 38), altogether 10 statements were identified within \textit{Russia positive} -framing, whereas \textit{Russia negative} -framing was invoked 37 times.

Transatlantic relations played a negligible role as senators discussed Russia beyond the START or missile defense context. Given the lack of common threat
perception within NATO (see the Afghanistan related debates in 111th Congress) regarding both Russian threat and Syrian crisis, NATO was frustratingly unwilling to take part in either tackling the crisis in Syria or responding forcefully against Russia. (See Dempsey, 2015). Thus, the critique of Russian action vis-à-vis Russia in the Armed Services was focused on the arms exports by Russia to Assad regime, no direct pleads were made to form a response within the NATO context. Senate Foreign Relations, and specifically Democratic senators Shaheen and Cardin shared the European approach (see for example EEAS, 2016) to Russian human rights situation, stressing the importance of progress in the civil society realm and human rights as a precursor to further economic and security cooperation. Beyond that, common transatlantic strategy gained little to no attention in both committees, which, given the lack of common European Russia policy and differences in both U.S. and German Russia policy (Szabo, 2009. 23), is by no means surprising.

The harsh tone adopted by Republicans in the Armed Services, contrasted with the human rights focus of Foreign Relations Democrats highlighted not only the difference in the nature of the two committees, but also coincided with the conventional wisdom of Democratic doves and Republican hawks. Yet, neither Republicans nor Democrats called for direct action against Russia regarding Syria. In fact, Democrats pressuring Russia on human rights and rule-of-law were more straightforward in connecting rhetoric with legislative action (i.e. blocking Russia’s WTO ascension, maintaining Jackson-Vanik Amendment), whereas Republican Bob Corker stressed the economic cooperation as an incentive for a democratic change in Russia. Overall the partisan tone of the debate was rather muted in the Foreign Relations, as chairman Kerry was not as vocal defender of the Obama administration’s Russia reset policy as his colleague chairman Levin in the Armed Services. In the Armed Services, the partisan nature of the debate could be summed as Senator Levin defending the administration policy and highlighting prospects for cooperation, whereas the Republicans were highly critical of Russia’s role in Europe and the Middle East. All parties were internationalists in their approach, yet Democratic senators stressed the multilateral approach (human rights policy, security cooperation), whereas such efforts were not visible in the Republican argumentation vis-à-vis Russia. From a distributional vs. ideological perspective, the debate was focused on the ideological side, especially in the Foreign Relations. As noted by Senator Corker (Senator Corker [R-TN] S.Hrg. 112-367, 2011. 24), Russia invokes certain emotions compared to other nations equally, or more, neglecting of human rights or rule-of-law issues, a fact most evident in the Democratic concern over the
aforementioned issues, but also in Republican concerns over a proper Middle East policy.

Comparing the two committees reveals the human rights emphasis of the Foreign Relations Committee. The two Democratic senators constantly brought up rule-of-law and human rights issues in a legislative context, stressing the importance of Magnitsky Act and Jackson-Vanik Amendment as proper tools to maintain pressure on Russia. Republicans in the committee offered little opposition in this regard, other than the aforementioned economic/moralistic viewpoint brought up by Senator Corker. In the Armed Services, with its emphasis on military affairs and appropriations, no significant attention was paid to human rights issues as they related to U.S.-Russian relations. Instead, strategic implications of negative Russian influence in Syria dominated the debate. Overall the conclusion drawn from the Russia related debate saw limited debate on overall U.S.-Russian relations, as different actors focused on very different aspects of the bilateral relations, and especially with regard to Foreign Relations, committee leadership remained silent, thus diminishing the prestige of the committee’s Russia deliberations.

The ideological spectrum of especially the human rights dimension of U.S.-Russian relations was reminiscent of American foreign policy debates between Hamiltonians and Wilsonians on China, and the role of both commerce and principles in it:

Much of the contemporary [early 2000’s] fighting over foreign policy – as, for example, with respect to China – reflects a conflict between the Hamiltonian quest to build a global commercial order and the Wilsonian view that order must also be based on principles of democratic government and the promotion of human rights. (Mead, 2002. 139.)

Hamiltonians, presented here by the argument made by Senator Corker, are the commercial realists of American foreign policy thought. Stressing the importance of the free flow of global capital, evident in the Hamiltonian insistence of freedom of the seas. Advocating a global order based on free market economy, Hamiltonians (Mead, 2002. 105-106) would be less likely to risk Russian WTO ascension for humanitarian concerns.

Wilsonians represented the missionaries, Hamiltonians the merchants. Similarly, the Democratic liberal internationalists, or Wilsonians, Cardin and Shaheen stressed “the principles of democratic government and the promotion of human rights” (Mead, 2002. 139) as the foundation of U.S.-Russian relations, and Russian commitment to the principles promoted ought to be a precursor for further economic cooperation. U.S. foreign policy should prioritize the human rights agenda
(Mead, 2002. 148), even if it meant restrictions to free flow of capital. Morality is the key ingredient of idealist foreign policy advocated by Wilsonian school of thought (Deibel, 2005. 67), and Wilsonians cannot be described as cultural relativists, for they are eager to abandon cultural differences as a tool to legitimize nondemocratic forms of government. (Mead, 2002. 149). If one would argue that Russians are used to authoritarian rule very different from the ideals of the enlightenment, Wilsonians would refute the legitimacy of such notion as the basis of inaction. Wilsonian senators offered insisted on two different approaches to Russia; one of integrating it into European security framework through transnational organization (OECD or NATO-Russia council) in the spirit of Russia reset, and more traditionally Wilsonian insistence on maintaining strong U.S. pressure - economic if need be – on Russian human rights situation.

But besides morality, Wilsonian school of thought is not simply a naïve do-gooder. One of the core principles of Wilsonian advocacy of democracy lies in the belief that “democracies make better and more reliable partners than monarchies and tyrannies” (Mead, 2002. 162-163). In this sense, advocacy of democracy and rule-of-law is in the American interests; “millions who seek peace can control the thousands who want war.” (ibid.) Democracies are more stable, have the backing of a more comprehensive part of the society, and democracy helps prevent excess of violent ambition. Thus, nudging, sometimes pushing, potential allies and adversaries towards democracy has its strategic foundation in “rational concept of interest.” (ibid.) In Hamiltonian school, promotion of commercial ties - which would perhaps eventually lead to reforms in other areas – was the primary focus of active American foreign policy. Opening markets and keeping them open is the primary focus of Hamiltonian foreign policy, and like Senator Corker argued, Russia should be no special case in this regard. Although being close to Wilsonian thinking, Hamiltonian school, notes Mead (2002, 129-130), has a more self-interested view of American foreign policy exemplified by U.S. post-World War II grand strategy of dismantling the British Empire and place U.S. as the centerpiece of the new world order. This policy, describes Mead (ibid): “so neatly combined the values of Machiavelli and Saint Francis that one could scarcely discern the dividing line between the reptile and the bird of peace.”
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND MAIN FINDINGS

The grand question of this study was how transatlantic security issues were debated in the two influential foreign policy committees – Armed Services and Foreign Relations – in the United States Senate during the 111th and 112th Congresses. How did the senators define the issues under debate, and what interpretation of the reality was presented to the American public - or whatever audience the senators aimed their messages at? This question begot a wide array of sub questions to be answered. How does the Congress affect foreign policy in general? What role do the two committees play in the democratic process at the basis of American foreign policy formulation? Are some individual senators more entrepreneurial in foreign policy than others, and if so, what are the implications to deliberations on transatlantic security? How does polarization and partisanship affect congressional deliberations? In the time of special interests and partisan polarization, what role is there for ideology? And lastly, what does this all imply to transatlantic security? To operationalize our understanding of Congress’ influence on foreign policy, three questions regarding congressional foreign policy behavior were asked; 1) in what instances Congress acts cohesively, factionally, or on partisan basis (Fowler, 2015; Milner & Tingley, 2015); 2) how do distributional and ideological factors affect the behavior (Milner & Tingley, 2015; Gries, 2014; Mead, 2002); and 3) who are the more vocal actors in the Congress vis-à-vis transatlantic security policy (Mayhew, 2000; Carter & Scott, 2009 & 2010). At the end, the goal was to better understand transatlantic security from a congressional perspective.

The case by case analysis of the argumentation in hearings allowed me to answer the questions set at the beginning of this study. How are transatlantic security questions framed? First, the issue matters. In the case studies, six different policy issues were analyzed; NATO/European security, European military presence, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), European-based missile defense, Libyan operation, and Russia (separate from START and missile defense). Three of the issues were debated clearly against the backdrop of a specific administration policy. The Obama administration negotiated the START and requested a congressional ratification, the Obama administration made the decision to cancel Bush-era missile defense plans in Europe, and the Obama administration made the decision to
intervene in Libyan civil conflict. European military presence and NATO/European security were discussed in the context of ongoing operations in Afghanistan and mostly during the defense appropriations process. They were not a direct response to a specific policy decision, and neither was the debate regarding Russia. Now, if we look at the results of the analysis and specify on the partisan nature of debate, one conclusion becomes evident; in the debates which were a direct response to administration policy (Libya, START, missile defense), the debate was more partisan, or at least factional. The debate on Libya was highly partisan in the Foreign Relations, where Senator Lugar led the charge against the administration policy. The debate on START was highly partisan in the Armed Services, where the opposition was led by Senator McCain. The debate on missile defense was thoroughly partisan, as it was debated only in the Armed Services. Then again, the debate on European presence had no partisan tonality, and the debate on NATO and European security had little to no partisan tonality. Overall, the empirical analysis led me to conclude that congressional cohesiveness altered from almost fully cohesive on NATO and European military presence, to factional on START and Libya, to partisan on missile defense. (Figure 41.)

**Figure 41. Congressional behavior and dominance of distributional/ideological factor by issue**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Congressional behavior</th>
<th>Dominant factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cohesive</td>
<td>Factional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Defense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European presence</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the debates over START treaty, the minority party in more than one occasion implied that the institutional process itself was partisan by nature:

Mr. Chairman, we have sent a letter to you requesting a hearing on the New START. I just want to get this in the record. I also serve on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We’ve had, I think, about 12 hearings. We’ve had 25 witnesses. Although two of the witnesses were kind of open; they had some objections—that was Robert Joseph and Eric Edelman; we all know them—the other ones, there was not one witness who was opposed to the New START treaty. So the request I have—and that has been signed by some 11 members—is that we hold a hearing where we will have some of the witnesses, and we even made some suggestions. So I’m hoping we’ll be able to do that. (Senator Inhofe [R-OK], 2010. S. Hrg. 111-897, 137).

Limited by both institutional context and audience expectations, both sides of the debate defined the issue a bit differently. Those favoring administration policy (regarding missile defense and START) argued as if they had the advantage of “truth” (see Palonen, 2008). Their argumentative logic relied on the objective benefits of the policy they had chosen, as evident by the dominance of military/technical -framing during the debate on missile defense, and missile defense positive – and verification positive -framings during the debates on the new START. Institutional context is further consistent with framing choices of the opposition. As the opposition was in disadvantage when it came to invoking “truth” statements by questioning the witness, the argumentative logic took on ideology, as evident by the dominance of Russia negative -framing during the debate on missile defense, and missile defense negative -, partisan/administration -, and verification negative -framings.

226 See for example the following exchange during the Missile Defense -debates between Senator Inhofe [R-OK] and witness General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director of Missile Defense Agency: “What I want to do is, when we talk about the fact that we’re somehow going to do a better job for Western Europe and Eastern Europe by accelerating our activity and becoming more aggressive with the SM–3 and the THAAD, it’s interesting because this budget calls for the termination or at least no more THAADs and cuts the SM–3s down from 24 to 18. Just real quickly, for a yes or no question: Are you going to make an amended request in terms of the THAAD and the SM–3 in light of this new development that apparently happened since the budget request?

General O’REILLY. No, sir, we’re not, and the reason——

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Well, could he explain it? (Senator Inhofe [R-OK] S. Hrg. 111-289, 2009. 42-44.) As evident by the abrupt way Senator [R-OK] interrupted General O’Reilly mid-sentence, and by the ability of Chairman Levin to allow the witness to finish his statement, the minority party did not have the ability to control the debate as much as the majority party could.
Much like political, ideological is highly complex and contested concept (see for example Fagerholm, 2016) and the terms themselves had their place in the analyzed debates.\textsuperscript{227} The argument here is, that as the Democratic side of the debate framed the debate based on objectively military/technical –basis- and the issues ought to be evaluated on their objective, real-life merits on national defense infrastructure - the Republican side of the debate framed the issue as political in nature.\textsuperscript{228} This is most evident in the way Republican side of the debate conceptualized Russia as predominantly negative. Debating missile defense, Russia attempted unfairly\textsuperscript{229} to affect U.S. missile defense policy in Europe based on its geopolitical aspirations.\textsuperscript{230}

During the missile defense debate in the 112\textsuperscript{th} Congress, Republican opposition continued to base its strength on partisan notions, as alleged promises made by President Obama to President Medvedev helped define the Democratic administration in a highly unfavorable light. So, not only were Democrats in the administration willing to appease Russian regional aspirations, they were also willing to circumvent the democratic process in conducting shady backdoor deals with Russians behind the backs of both Congress and American people. During the START debates, the negative influence of Russia was evident, as the Russian government linked the U.S. missile defense infrastructure in Europe and ratification of START. Moreover, the very implementation of the START Treaty was based on its verification/monitoring regime. Efficiency of said regime was heavily questioned, as the opposition to the Treaty suspected that Russia would do its best - or worst - to cheat as much as they could.

Framing Russia negatively is consistent with the long-held Republican tradition on being tough on Russia (see for example Drezner, 2013). To say that the Republican opposition to administration policy was political in nature can be further explained by Carl Schmitt’s well-known friend-enemy distinction. As per Schmitt, the political decision regarding the identification of the enemy precedes the struggle (issue-based argumentation) itself. (Palonen, 2007. 71 & Schmitt, 1976.) Based on the decades of Republican foreign policy towards Russia and the dominance of negative framings of Russia during the debates analyzed, I would argue that the

\textsuperscript{227} See for example Senator Inhofe [R-OK]: “Forget about the politics, just the importance of the European site, from a military perspective.” (Senator Inhofe [R-OK], S. Hrg. 111-362, 2009. 741).

\textsuperscript{228} As argued by Michael O’Hanlon, “…the debate over missile defense is often mired in ideology more than it is grounded in real fact.” (O’Hanlon, 2009).

\textsuperscript{229} Referring to Republican argument that Russia linked American missile defense capabilities and Russian offensive weapons capabilities, thus affecting the strategic force structure balance in Europe.

\textsuperscript{230} This was doubly worrisome since the ground-based U.S. missile defense system would have been placed in Poland and Russia, two former Soviet satellites very vocal in their dislike of Russia.
Republican opposition was ideologically based on political identification of Russia as the enemy, thus making administration policy as it was presented by the opposition unacceptable.\textsuperscript{231} Thus, the \textit{a priori} identification of Russia as \textit{enemy} functions in many ways like the concept of national security; it defines the limits of argumentative freedom for individual members of Congress.

The argument here is not that the due to the abovementioned definition of Russia as a negative, no deals can be made with it in general. After all, previous START and SORT treaties were ratified by vast bipartisan support, only the 1999 CTBT being rejected by the Congress. The argument is, however, that due to the interpretation that the administration was appeasing Russia by yielding on missile defense and making secret, behind-the-doors deals with Russia at the expense of U.S. national security, and thus \textit{betraying} American allies in the Europe, the United States is capitulating to Russia and sacrificing its allies in the process. Following the binary logic of friend-enemy distinction, on the win-lose divide the administration is losing vis-à-vis Russia. The administration says the Russian bear is tame, the Republican opposition that it is vicious and dangerous.\textsuperscript{232} Thus, the Republicans opposing the ratification created a narrative very different from the administrations account of the story. Republicans in a sense \textit{implied} an imperial presidency, willing to circumvent or betray its allies and ignore the Congress to further some sort of idealistic, cosmopolitan ideal of a “world without nuclear weapons.”

This brings the analysis back to Europe and transatlantic relations. The deliberative tone was notably different when discussing Europe in the context of NATO compared to the Russia-context. The NATO debate was not tied to a single policy issue like missile defense or START, as it was discussed most notably during the appropriations and nomination hearings. The debate on Europe in the context of NATO and Afghanistan should be categorized as distributive politics-debate. (see. Milner & Tingley, 2015.) The debate pitted against the U.S. post financial crisis defense spending and the unwillingness of NATO allies to carry its weight militarily and financially in Afghanistan (burden-sharing). Yet, the direct distributional consequence is less evident in geopolitical aid (such as military aid to Afghanistan) than economic (i.e. IMF, World Bank) and humanitarian (USAID, development aid)

\textsuperscript{231} See for example:” I would reiterate my long-held view that any notion of a Russian veto power over decisions on our missile defense architecture is unacceptable, and we should oppose any attempts by any administration to do so.” (Senator McCain [R-AZ] S. Hrg. 111-897, 2010. 4.)

\textsuperscript{232} For the reference, see Ronald Reagans 1984 political ad” The Bear”: There is a bear in the woods. For some people, the bear is easy to see. Others don’t see it at all. Some people say the bear is tame. Others say it’s vicious and dangerous. Since no one can really be sure who’s right, is not it smart to be as strong as the bear? If there is a bear?” (NBC, n/a.)
aid. (Milner, 2015. 44-45). Thus lacking the significant ideological and (domestic) distributive factors, the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees were unanimous in their critique of its NATO allies’ unwillingness to carry the torch, and the same line of argumentation continued to dominate the argumentation regarding American military presence in Europe; the issue was not debated on its military or strategic merits, but on the basis on of fiscal responsibility and safeguarding the mainland United States from proposed Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. Interestingly, the issue of European military presence was the one administration policy the Congress managed to effectively alter. Creating a narrative around fiscal aspects of the transatlantic alliance creates a different outcome than one created on ideological postulations based on the values and goals shared by the transatlantic alliance, and the security implications of a strong European security infrastructure. This would support the conclusions reached by Fowler (2015), that the two committees were increasingly interested in the self-serving budgetary issues, compared debates involving significant foreign policy considerations or consequences.

When discussing Europe in the context of Russia, the tone changed from almost unanimously negative to overwhelmingly positive. Both sides of the debate attempted to convince that the policy they supported would also be beneficial to Europe. Defending the U.S. missile defense policy decision framed the issue as “strengthening” the U.S. missile defense infrastructure in Europe, as the opposition called it betrayal of American allies, specifically Poland and Czech Republic. No statements were made suggesting that Europe ought to be responsible for its own missile defense systems, as both sides maintained that such capabilities are to be deployed by United States. On the other hand, the issue of START treaty was notably devoid of argumentation based on European security. The agreement was seen as a bilateral agreement between Russia and the United States, with only two statements identified in the European security framing.

Ideology helps to explain the shift in framing Europe in a context defined by Russia. The Jacksonian school of thought is less intellectually inclined compared to the three other schools. It is rather an instinct based on beliefs and emotions, as opposed to intellectual postulations of great minds. (Mead, 2002. 245.) Honor, reputation and the need to live up to one’s code of conduct transform into nationalistic and proud

---

233 According to Milner, geopolitical aid falls into “low ideological divisions – low distributive politics” category. (Milner & Tingley, 2015. 70.)

234 Interestingly enough, both the Republicans and Democrats named Iran as the primary threat against European security, vehemently denying the strategic implications of American European based missile defense to Russia.
foreign policy. Jacksonians are not easily convinced by the elites they are highly suspicious of, but once they make up their mind, they will stick with what they believe in. During the Cold War, Jacksonians were convinced that the Soviet Union formed an existential threat against the American way of life. Once this idea was established, Jacksonians became the fiercest supporters of U.S. conduct of Cold War until an unconditional surrender by its great enemy. Reagan’s rhetoric played very well to Jacksonian beliefs. But for Jacksonian animosity towards an enemy to fade, an absolute victory is required. That’s why Jacksonians insisted on stronger American efforts in Vietnam, and the toppling of Saddam Hussein during and after the first Gulf War. Similarly, no unconditional surrender of the Soviet State occurred after the Cold War. Jacksonian animosity towards Russia never faded away, like it did when the Japanese and Germans surrendered at the end of World War II. The Cold War – as a belief system for a Jacksonian mind – never ended with the fall of the Soviet Union. (Mead, 2002. 245-262.) This has manifested in the post-Cold War world as a strong Jacksonian support for NATO’s eastern expansion. Taking Russia’s “feelings” into account when contemplating NATO cooperation in Ukraine or Georgia is appeasement and weakness to a Jacksonian. This ideological difference within the Republican party is nowhere more evident than in the difference of opinion on NATO expansion between senators like John McCain and libertarian Jeffersonian ideals expressed by senators such as Rand Paul [R-KY]. Once Jacksonians commit themselves fully into something, in this case the security pact with U.S. and its NATO allies in Europe, the Jacksonian America does not stand down in the face of a bully. Its honor requires it to stand by its reluctant allies against an enemy it never satisfactorily managed to defeat. Despite being probably the farthest thing from a Wilsonian western European ideology, senators expressing Jacksonian ideas - like John McCain - proved out to be the strongest supporters of transatlantic security framework.

The Libya debates took a somewhat different shape depending on the committee. Most obvious explanation – besides the nature of the two committees – was the fact that the highest-ranking Republican in Armed Services, Senator McCain, supported the operation itself. Yet, the Republicans in the Committee framed the issue differently from their Democratic colleagues, and the main difference was NATO. One of the questions in framing is what aspects of an issue one attempts to make salient, i.e.; which interpretation of the perceived reality is brought up. Libya and NATO formed a case in point. Whereas the Democrats framed the issue as the Obama administration finally managing to bring Europeans not only on board, but also to make considerable (military) contributions to the transatlantic alliance in
Libya (NATO positive and NATO-led framings). Republicans, on the other hand, used NATO negative and U.S.-led -framings to highlight the de facto leadership role of the U.S., and maintained the two-tiered alliance argumentation continued to stress the financial burden carried by the U.S. As such, Europeans were once again presented as unwilling to take the lead in their own security by pushing the fiscal costs of the security alliance onto American taxpayer. In essence, the question of NATO was debated in fiscal, not strategic terms.

The opposition to administration policy, however, was based on both distributional and ideological factors. The main argumentation regarding the operation itself was dominated by ideological factors (see Figure 41), yet that line of argumentation was also based on fiscal calculations, i.e. United States should not involve itself in the civil conflicts of little consequence to U.S. national interests, especially given the fiscal costs of the operation and ongoing fiscal restraints experienced in the American budgetary context. Humanitarian concerns do not justify military intervention as a legitimate tool of American foreign policy, which ought to be based on calculations of American national security, and national interest. This Jeffersonian line of argumentation was most evident in the statements of Senator Lugar [R-IN] in the Foreign Relations. Jeffersonians see the defense of liberty in the United States as the core principle of American government. American liberty is not threatened by a humanitarian crisis or a civil conflict in a country of little consequence to the narrowly defined interests of the United States. What is seen as a threat against the United States is the unconstitutional process of conducting American foreign policy. (Mead, 2002. 216-217). President Obama’s decision to exclude the Congress from the decision-making process in regard to use of American military force is against the Jeffersonian ideal of a constitutional practice of foreign policy. For Jeffersonians - already wary of United States becoming a global superpower by inheriting the “crown of thorns” from the United Kingdom after the World War II (Mead, 2002. 204-205) – the “democracy they defend…” in the United States “…is more valuable than the opportunities they lose.” (Mead, 2002. 215). In a world ablaze, the United States must let some fires burn.

Ranking member McCain [R-AZ] offered another perspective. Although supportive of U.S. action, he argued that the administration made a mistake when it spent precious time negotiating with U.N. and NATO, whereas the operational (military) realities would have called for a unilateral action. Coalitions are good, but U.S. can, and should, act unilaterally if need be. But whereas the so-called Benghazi commissions had a clear partisan objective, the critique by McCain and Lugar was very much consistent with the long-term ideological positions within the Republican
party. McCain’s insistence of unilateral action if needed was evident in the Bush 43. administration, whereas Lugar’s argumentation followed the more traditional Republican foreign policy approach, as adopted by the George H. Bush administration. McCain’s insistence on pursuing the U.S. war efforts unilaterally if need be, pushing for a decisive victory fits Mead’s (2002, 251-259) definition of a Jacksonian war doctrine. Still, McCain’s support for the Libyan intervention demonstrates the complexity of assigning certain categories on individual senators. Per Mead (2002), Jacksonians were eager to support the first Gulf War because it was framed in terms highlighting U.S. oil interests. U.S. involvement in the Balkans, however, did not stir Jacksonian support for the American war efforts because that intervention was legitimized on Wilsonian humanitarian grounds. Yet, John McCain, whom we’ve attempted to categorize as a Jacksonian, was the most vocal Republican supporter of the Libyan intervention, and has since advocated an active American role in Syria.

START and Russia were two other issue besides Libya producing a factional congressional response. START debates formed around a unified Democratic support for the president, but the Republican response was divided into two camps; Armed Services, led by Senator McCain was dominantly opposed of the ratification, whereas Foreign Relations Republicans led by Senator Lugar were more supportive of the ratification.²³⁵ Although categorized as an ideological issue, the distributional aspects of the Treaty were made more salient in the Armed Services through its insistence on a pledge to modernize U.S. nuclear infrastructure. The opposition to the Treaty was based not only on national security considerations, but also on the ideological viewpoint that the Obama administration was determined to pursue an idealistic goal of “world-without-nuclear-weapons.” The inherent value of diminishing global nuclear arsenals was lost to some Republicans in the Armed Services. Democrats, and their Republican colleagues led by Senator Lugar, argued for the value of multilateral efforts to curtail the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Both the multilateral approach to arms control, as well as perceived weakness of the idealistic nuclear arms policy attributed to the Obama administration, drove some of the more unilateral and hawkish Republicans away from the treaty, whereas those with more internationalist inclinations gravitated towards Senator Lugar and argued for the ratification. Thus, the factionalism of the

²³⁵ The very strong positioning by ranking member Lugar in the Foreign Relations on the side of the administration in the START debates skewed the results towards factionalism, as opposed to partisanship. Overall, the START debate and vote was a much more partisan effort than its predecessors START I and START II.
Republican party in the START issue was consistent with the theory of ideological and distributional factors (Milner & Tingley, 2015), with the definition of key differences between the two committees (Fowler, 2015), and with the different ideological inclinations of the Republican party (Gries, 2014.)

Interestingly, only the debate on missile defense could be categorized dominantly partisan, meaning that the support and opposition to administration policy followed the partisan lines. (See Figure 41). There are several factors explaining this finding. First, the issue was debated only in the Armed Services Committee, both during the 111th and 112th Congress. This is important not only because it limited the debate, but also because the two ranking members of the Republican party, John McCain and Richard Lugar, disagreed on both major issues they were both vocal about, the START (supported by Lugar, opposed by McCain), and Libyan intervention (supported by Jacksonian McCain, opposed by Jeffersonian Lugar). Second, we expect, following Fowler (2015), that less partisanship ought to be present in the Armed Services due to its emphasis on appropriations. This was certainly the perceived outcome of the NATO and European military presence-related debates, which were debated on distributional basis and produced a cohesive congressional response. Third, missile defense was debated on ideological basis236, and the partisan nature of the debate became ever more evident in the 112th Congress, as the 2012 presidential elections were quickly approaching. Missile defense was also one of the few issues where the feelings of European nations, namely Poland and Czech Republic, were used as a tool to criticize administration policy. The administration was framed as abandoning Europe and appeasing Russia. The policy issue at hand was the long-standing Republican – and Jacksonian - insistence on national missile defense infrastructure (see chapter 4.2) and the Russia reset policy deplored by the Republicans. Positioning of the Republican senators was very much consistent with the idea of Jacksonian Republican hawks, preparing to take on the challenge of aggressive Russia. Whereas Jacksonian stance was to respond to Russian objections by (unilateral) aggressiveness (i.e. deploying the system regardless of opposition), the Jeffersonian doves appeared to bow down and attempted to appease the reflexively anti-American Russian government by incorporating it into European security framework (a multilateral approach). It was an opportunity to frame the Democratic administration as weak and soft on defense - a strategy put in place by Republican

236 This is not to say that missile defense had no distributional consequences. Missile defense infrastructure, as well research and development are multi-million, if not billion, dollar industry sure to rouse lobbying efforts from defense contractors and interest groups. (See Wingerter, 2011. 567-572.) What our results portray is that the issue was not debated on distributional, but on ideological basis.
Newt Gingrich already in 1994 (Wingerter, 2011. 564) - and the Republican argumentation on the issue could be seen as an attempt to define it as a question of principle, not of military technology.

Long-term ideology in Mead’s terms found itself in the debates. Jeffersonian Cold War heritage of advocating arms control efforts with the Soviet Union was evident in both the Obama administration and the Republican ranking member Richard Lugar [R-IN]. Even though the Jeffersonian thought is wary of an active foreign policy, prospects of a nuclear war or nuclear proliferation justify active and international foreign policy by the United States government. Jeffersonians see less government the better. Liberty is constantly threatened by the governmental overreach, especially the militarization of foreign policy and the power of large corporations in American political life. These ideals constituted a highly influential school of thought suspicious of Hamilton’s – and Hamiltonian – commercialism, Wilsonian interventionism based on humanitarian grounds, and Jacksonian patriotic militarism. (Mead, 2002.) Yet, the issue of nuclear weapons policy demonstrated the proper place of the government: it responded to the direct security of the American people – the very definition of libertarian government -, nuclear disarmament would save precious funds for domestic spending and curtail the power of the military-industrial complex, and if conducted properly, nuclear disarmament would prevent the risks of (nuclear) war.

Wilsonian and Jeffersonian minds disagreed vehemently on Libya, yet found themselves allied against Jacksonians on the issue of the New START. Democratic emphasis on global nonproliferation of nuclear weapons based on international agreements (Nonproliferation Treaty) demonstrated the Wilsonian belief in a global, Kantian global order based on international regimes respected by all, including the United States. Both Jeffersonians and Wilsonians agree on the overall goal of nuclear disarmament, yet the Wilsonians value the international framework itself valuable. What serves Jeffersonian thinking in functional terms, serves Wilsonians as a valuable demonstration of the power of international global order based on normative values.

The Jacksonians critiqued both the Wilsonian ideal of a “world without nuclear weapons” and Jeffersonian risk-aversion in the face of Russia. Framing the Obama administration’s nuclear weapons policy as idealistic and based on a leftist agenda – evidence of which was the supposed unilateral disarmament – and as opposed to Jeffersonian pacifism, United States ought to push its military advantage by abandoning the outdated nuclear philosophy of mutually assured destruction and the nuclear parity it envisions. Instead, the United States ought to outmaneuver its much
Weaker adversary and reclaim its rightful place as the one hegemonic military superpower. Negotiated parity in both Russian and American nuclear arsenal does not serve America's interests. Whereas the Soviet Union of Reagan's presidency might have justified negotiations, post-Cold War Russia ought not to play a role in American military strategy, were it regarding its nuclear forces or a static missile defense system in Europe. And even Reagan's nuclear arms negotiations were balanced by framing the Soviet Union as the “empire of evil” and the Star Wars initiative. The Obama administration's Russia policy, however, was framed by the Jacksonians as a sign of weakness.

Only issues debated on *distributional* basis produced a cohesive congressional response (Figure 41). Now, the debate of NATO/European security was not in response to a specific administration policy regarding NATO. But the debate on European military presence was. It was a direct response to administrations budget proposal which called for Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process to take place in mainland United States. This produced a cohesive response from both parties; before making any reductions in U.S. mainland military base structure, consolidation of U.S. military presence in the (wealthy) Western Europe must take place. To support such claims, some senators made an effort to frame European attitudes regarding their own security in negative terms as a continuation of the process wherein United States taxpayer has taken over the *de facto* security responsibilities of the rich Europe. This is not fair for the United States security, nor for the American taxpayer. Thus, the results of the analysis confirm Milner & Tingley’s (2015) understanding of *distributional* factors. The issue of European military presence was linked to the BRAC process, a domestic policy question of high distributional consequences, and thus of extreme importance for members of Congress responsible for “bringing home the bacon”. Constituency concerns took over ideological postulation of American military presence in the member states of its key military-political alliance in NATO. It became an issue of domestic military spending, an issue wherein the electoral connection transcends partisanship, as members of Congress are generally judged (by their constituencies) based on what they bring to their localities, rather than what the Congress does as national institution. Regarding domestic military spending, this fact of congressional life is especially salient, thus explaining cohesive congressional action on the issue, a result of which was the consolidation of American military presence in Europe.

Now, throughout the empirical analysis, four names come up more frequently than the others; Carl Levin [D-MI], John McCain [R-AZ], Richard Lugar [R-IN], and John Kerry [D-MA]. Of course, none of this came as a surprise, as many have
observed that committee chairs have more influence in the legislative process than their rank-and-file colleagues. (See for example Callaghan & Schnell, 2005). If we combine the results of the empirical section’s individual breakdowns, we see that these four made considerably more statements compared to their colleagues; Levin: 76, Lugar: 50, Kerry: 44, and McCain: 41. Three rank-and-file senators managed to contribute over 20 statements; Shaheen [D-NH]: 25, Sessions [R-AL]: 24, and Inhofe [R-OK].237 (Figures 42 & 43.) Overall, this study concludes that a small number of senators are responsible for a large majority of transatlantic security related policy debates in the two key foreign policy committees. This awakens two important questions; 1) what are the implications of such small number of active senators, and 2) how should we map the ideological inclinations of the four senators in question.

Figure 42. Statements by ten most active senators in Foreign Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senate Name</th>
<th>Number of Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lugar [R-IN]</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerry [D-MA]</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaheen [D-NH]</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corker [R-TN]</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardin [D-MD]</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risch [R-WI]</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeMint [R-SC]</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isakson [R-GA]</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casey [D-PA]</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaufman [D-CO]</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrasso [R-WY]</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

237 The fourth most active rank-and-file senators identified was Bob Corker [R-TN] (17 statements), who followed Richard Lugar to become first the ranking member of the Foreign Relations in 2013, and the chairman in 2015.
Beginning with the first question, what are the implications of such a small number of active participants\textsuperscript{238}, the first answer lies in the lack incentives. Transatlantic security issues offer little electoral incentives for individual members of Congress. Unlike the economic aspects of the transatlantic alliance, i.e. free trade agreements, the security issues involving the NATO context or bilateral relations with Russia (at least prior to 2014) are hardly campaign issues for individual senators. This was evident from the ease with which the senators on both sides critiqued NATO in Afghanistan and Libya, and demanded that European military presence ought to be consolidated. Prior to NATO’s re-emergence after the annexation of Crimea, critique of NATO in the U.S. Congress was a win-win situation; it pushed European to spend more on defense, while individual senators could go home

\textsuperscript{238} It ought to be noted though, that no similar research has been done on other foreign policy fields. As such, it is impossible to say whether the number of active participants is consistent with the committee dynamics in general, or unique to transatlantic issues.
arguing they defended American taxpayer in the face of wealthy Europeans unwilling to pay the price of their own defense. Beyond the partisan framing of START and missile defense - painting a picture of a weak and soft Democratic presidency appeasing the aggressive Russia - there were little electoral incentives for individual senators to hedge their bets on transatlantic security. Scoring political victories by pointing out the perceived weaknesses of the Democratic presidency is naturally a lot simpler process than advocating changes in policy, especially if the perception is that the electorate are not all that interested in the transatlantic security overall. In essence, transatlantic security as a topic of debate in itself does not appear to incentivize large scale foreign policy entrepreneurship per se. Taken conversely, a smaller number of senators have a disproportionately strong authority to, in Carter and Scott’s words (2010, 435); “…exert a broad range of influence, from problem definition and framing, to agenda-setting, to policy formulation and choice.”

The debates on European security related issues in the Senate Armed Services Committee 111th Congress ought to be seen in post 2008 financial crisis and pre-Tea Party context. Looking at the policy issues from a strict roll-call vote -perspective is consistent with the idea of rising partisan polarization. After all, previous START and SORT treaties had nearly unanimous support, while the 2010 vote saw only 13 Republicans siding with the Democratic administration. Yet, if we look at the policy debates themselves, the issues were debated from traditional ideology based positions, and the opposition to administration policy had roots in political definition of U.S. Russia policy. At his end-of-the-year press conference December 16th, 2016, President Obama said: “…everything that happens in this town, everything that's said is seen through the lens of does this help or hurt us relative to Democrats or relative to President Obama?” (Politico, 2016). Based on the analysis of transatlantic security policy debates during the 111th and 112th Congresses, partisan polarization did not define the debate, but coupled with the emergence of the Tea Party -movement in 2010 midterm elections, it could be seen as a turning point in the argument that “increased partisanship may lead to a declining internationalist orientation.” (Milner & Tingley, 2015. 274).

This study further added to existing literature considering the role of Congress and congressional committees in American foreign policy decision-making, and added dimensionality to ideological viewpoint regarding transatlantic security issues by conducting a domestic-politics focused reading of American foreign policy ideology. Mead’s (2002) categorization of expands the ideological focus from conservative-liberal divide to a more dynamic and organic understanding of differing views of foreign policy. This work demonstrates the viability of Mead’s theory not
as a method to categorize individual senators, but as a method to understand the domestic roots of congressional foreign policy debates in a long-term historical context, yet tying them to the partisan realities of U.S. politics. Mead’s categorization works as a method to contextualize the ideological nature of American foreign policy debates from a substantive perspective at a time when partisan polarization seems like the obvious and only answer. Thus, this study expanded the use of Mead’s theory from quantitative analysis and more often used meta-analysis of foreign policy ideology and American grand strategy to congressional debates. The issue-specific hearings demonstrated how members of Congress argue their visions of America’s place in the world and the methods it ought to use in conducting foreign policy with distinct correlation to Mead’s categorization.

Using Mead’s theory, this study added to Milner & Tingley’s (2015) quantitative theory of the interconnectedness of foreign and domestic politics. Issue-specific approach adopted here expanded Milner and Tingley’s argumentation regarding the pivotal role of foreign policy instrument to congressional response. Qualitative approach based on substantive argumentation demonstrated the variance in congressional response depending on a foreign policy issue, and as opposed to liberal-conservative explanation to ideological differences, this study demonstrated not only a simple ideological divide based on an issue, but the prevalence of partisan factionalism based on the specific nature of an issue at hand, i.e. although liberals tend to support arms control, the Meadian reading of START and missile defense debates demonstrated the factional drift in the Republican Party. Finally, this study tested Fowler’s (2015) theory of the two committees. Whereas Fowler’s study was based on long-term trends in the difference of the two committees since World War II, this study focused on the substantive argumentation a relatively short span of time, 2009-2012. The apparent partisanship prevalent in the Armed Services on issues such as START and missile defense demonstrated that the distributional nature of SASC did not mute ideology, as Fowler concluded. The contextual difference in this study and Fowler’s would be the surge of Republican Jacksonian ideology to the Congress in mid-1990’s. The analysis of substantive argumentation revealed the Jacksonian ideology as the major force driving partisanship in SASC. Thus, the study further supported Milner and Tingley’s issue-specific – or rather policy instrument-specific – theory, as the issues dominated by distributional consequences produced cohesive congressional response, whereas ideological debates produces either factional or partisan. (See figure 41). The issue-specific nature of the debate – not the committee itself - proved to be the defining factor in
determining congressional response vis-à-vis partisanship, cohesion and factionalism.

The results were also somewhat encouraging when compared to the more cynical and parochial views of partisan conflict and ideology. For example, Lee (2009) argued that legislative opposition against president merely demonstrates reflexive partisanship and competing political interests, rather than ideological considerations based on individual ideals or ideologies. Based on the results in this study, ideals and ideologies do push individual senators to take stands against reflexive partisanship. Senator Lugar’s strong support for the New START against partisan attacks from his Republican colleagues were a prime example. Of all the issues examined, only missile defense produced a dominantly partisan response (see figure 41.), although it should be note that missile defense was debated only in the Armed Services. I would argue that the overall results in this study do challenge some of the more cynical views of partisan conflict and parochial nature of congressional behavior.

Regarding transatlantic security, the first and foremost issue requiring further scholarly attention would be the effect of Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 to congressional framing of NATO and European security. As we saw, senators’ attitudes towards NATO and European security shifted considerably when debates turned from budgetary measures and NATO’s operational performance to more ideologically charged discussion about Russia. Thus, as the external context defining transatlantic security was clearly altered by Russian activity, one should assume a shift in congressional behavior post-2014, especially since the issue of U.S.-Russian relations were debated on a more consistently ideological basis - Wilsonian Democrats arguing for the primacy of human rights agenda, Hamiltonian Republicans arguing for the primacy of trade liberation. Another comparative study of interest would be comparing transatlantic security policy with transatlantic economic policy. Economic issues – referring to trade agreements etc. – were excluded from this study. Moving from transatlantic security to study of deliberative politics, I would suggest future scholarly work to pay more attention to quality of debate. If we are to value deliberative nature of congressional politics, the quality of debate and argumentation across variety of policy issues would help better understand whether Senator Fulbright’s dreams of a reflective, rather than reactive, Congress vis-à-vis foreign policy have come to tuition. From congressional perspective, the results presented could be analyzed from divided-unified government perspective. A wide-ranging literature exists on the effects of divided and unified government to congressional behavior, and the results here demonstrated that as Republicans won the House in the 2010 midterms, the
discourse in 112th Congress focused on the credibility of the Obama administration. An analytical study of this shift from a unified-divided government perspective would shed light on the effects of unified and divided government on congressional discourse. Finally, as this study focused on partisan and ideological aspects of the debate, it neglected the distributional motivations of individual senators. For example, would a parochial explanation considering domestic military spending or nuclear modernization better explain individual behavior than ideological or partisan considerations? The methodological approach in this study describes how the issues were debated, understanding individual motivations could better explain why individual senators behaved the way they did. Could we make a distinction between taking advantage of ideology and holding deeply ideological views on an issue? For a more comprehensive understanding of congressional behavior, both aspects affecting members of Congress ought to be further studied and contextualized.

Overall, the limiting features of this study might lead some to argue that the methodological approach adopted is not enough to form any meaningful generalization of transatlantic security issues. On the other hand, one might argue that a nuanced approach adopted by this study is not nuanced enough. Perhaps it should have taken just a single issue to examine to better contextualize the policy implications and congressional incentives defining the institutional context. Neither critique would be unfair, and perhaps more scholarly attention ought to be paid to both individual transatlantic security issues, as well as a more generalized study spanning across decades of transatlantic security debates. Given the limited scope of the research, it is difficult to estimate, for example, how much strategy-related debate took place compared to some type of general norm. Yet, this study did succeed in painting a picture of transatlantic security debate in the post-9/11 context, spanning across Barack Obama’s first presidency. From a congressional perspective, it examined how much transatlantic security debate fits in a single congressional two-year term in the two most relevant foreign policy committees. It identified the prevailing substantive arguments in the two committees, as well as the defining voices framing the debate. It managed to examine American foreign policy thinking in a multidimensional way by employing a rather underused methodological approach to study congressional behavior.

The results of this would lead me to conclude, that regarding transatlantic security the “domestic-politics model” clearly triumphed over the “systemic realist model”, as the two were understood by Souva (2005) (see chapter 3.2). Implications of empirical results on transatlantic security were one of the underlying, if not articulated questions embedded in the motivations behind this study. Of specific
interests was the framing of NATO’s Article 5. As we saw in chapters 5.2. and 6.2., the dominating deliberative outcome was the deteriorating value of NATO’s Article 5. Of course, this was due to European unwillingness to contribute both in external context (NATO/Libya) and internally by ignoring the 2% of GDP rule set by domestic defense spending. Now, given the seeming unwillingness of NATO to contribute, why should the United States risk its blood and treasure to function as a security guarantor in wealthy Western Europe? None of the senators outright questioned - like Donald Trump during his presidential campaign - whether United States would fulfill its Article 5 commitments. Yet, from an ideological perspective, the more isolationist Jeffersonianism expressed by senators such as Lugar (in Libya), DeMint (NATO/European security), and Sessions (European presence) were a potent force arguing for preferring domestic spending instead of expensive global engagement, and it would be naïve to think Europe would form a uniquely principled exception in the Jeffersonian line of thinking.

Framing was understood to function as a tool to make sense of complex foreign policy issues by highlighting one’s own interpretation of reality, the dominantly negative framing of NATO - which was not exclusively the handiwork of Jeffersonian voices – certainly made it less risky a policy choice for Donald Trump to campaign on a negative perception of the transatlantic alliance. Simply based on the weight given to transatlantic security matters and the argumentation used to debate it, I could not argue, - again, based on the results - that the transatlantic alliance formed a unique policy sphere immune to domestic policy struggles defined by partisan polarization and ideological postulations of American foreign policy. The study began as an attempt to identify narratives defining the complexity of U.S. relationship with its European allies. No coherent narrative - based on the principle that foreign politics should stop at the water’s edge - considering proper U.S. foreign policy in Europe could be identified. Instead - with the exception of John McCain, - transatlantic relations were defined much like domestic policy, on issue-by-issue basis defined by contingency and partisan context, and lacking a type of “grand belief system” about U.S. transatlantic security strategy as its foundation.

Finally, what lessons can we draw to inform our understanding of contemporary foreign policy decision-making in the United States? Two defining aspects of American foreign policy formulation on both congressional and presidential level are contingency and polarization. Hardly could there be a better demonstration of contingency of democratic politics than the result of 2016 presidential election. Hillary Clinton won the popular election by approximately 3 million votes. Based on her campaign and her record as Secretary of State, she would have steered American
foreign policy closer to his Bill Clintons Wilsonian foreign policy, defined by internationalism and globalism. Due to America’s electoral system, Donald Trump won the election with a mix of Jacksonian tribalism and a hint Jeffersonian isolationism mixed with Jacksonian support for unilateralism and neglect of universalism. His campaign was waged against the Hamiltonian and Wilsonian foreign policy elites that had dominated post-World War II foreign policy establishment, relevant agencies and organizations. Less than 100 000 votes in three key states took America’s foreign policy –based on the foreign policy agenda expressed by both campaigns – to a remarkably different direction. Polarization has seemingly limited the ability of individual senators to engage in foreign policy entrepreneurship against their respective political parties. For example, Senator Corker [R-TN] was the fourth most active senator in the SFRC and Senator McCain [R-AZ] the second most active in the SASC. (See figures 42. & 43.) After the election of Donald Trump, Corker – Chairman of SFRC in 115th Congress (2017-2018) - has been openly defiant against President Trump, leading to a strong pushback from the President and his allies, resulting, at least in part, to Corker’s decision to retire at the end of his term. Senator McCain has been under several attacks from both President Trump and his allies. Could individual senators act like Richard Lugar [R-IN] regarding the START debate, arguing strongly against the partisan reaction by his Republican colleagues directed at Democratic president? Given the polarized context of contemporary primaries, the us-them nature of the Jacksonian school and a president who appeals to the extreme of the Republican party, can we see ideology-based foreign policy entrepreneurship demonstrated by Senators like Richard Lugar and John McCain, as Republicans who were vocal against Russia in the debates analyzed have since shifted their position on the issue to fit contemporary political climate. Whatever the future holds, a comprehensive understanding of differing and competing ideas of America’s place in the world and methods to conduct U.S. foreign policy is required. The United States Congress continues to hold a crucial institutional position as a check against uncontested executive power. The question for the future studies of congressional power cannot exclude the issue of partisan polarization and its effects on the ability of individual senators to act independently. This study demonstrated that senators do not act in a reflexively partisan manner (see figure 41.), and do engage in meaningful debates over American foreign policy warranting attention as individuals expressing independent ideas. Yet the contingencies of contemporary American politics may greatly undermine the encouraging main-findings of this study.
PRIMARY SOURCES

Armed Services – 111th Congress


Foreign Relations – 111th Congress
S.Hrg. 111-270 (2009) Foreign Policy Priorities in the President’s FY10 International Affairs Budget.

Armed Services – 112th Congress
Foreign Relations – 112th Congress
S.Hrg. 112-58 (2011) Perspectives on the Crisis in Libya.
S.Hrg. 112-611 (2011) Assessing the Situation in Libya.
S.Hrg. 112-84 (2011) Administration Priorities for Europe in the 112th Congress.
S.Hrg. 112-471 (2012) Ukraine at a Crossroads: What’s at Stake for the U.S. and Europe?


Crawford, Neta (2016) What is war good for? Background ideas and assumptions about the legitimacy, utility, and costs of offensive war. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 18:2, 282-299.


Schomaker, Miriam (2009) America, the EU and strategic culture: renegotiating the transatlantic bargain. European Security, 18:3, 375-376


398


