Cultures of Demarcation: Territory and National Identity in Finland

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Introduction

This chapter explores the significance of geographical scale in the negotiation of spatial identities, and especially attempts to understand the processes of nation-building in Finland, which stands out as an exceptional case among the several "successor states" born out of the European geopolitical turmoil in the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. I pay particular attention to the role of territory both as a political reality and an image or symbol in the shaping of the Finnish identity, and also discuss the different scales and sources of ethnic identity within the Finnish territory. By looking at two historically very different minority groups and their relationships to the Finnish majority culture, I wish to show that territorial identities should be studied as multilayered and complex phenomena, embedded in their particular historical contexts and material circumstances.

The contextual character of majority-minority relations is evident in the differences in how territoriality and the geographical scale are appropriated in ethnic groups' self-definition, as well as in the different paths along which the attitudes of minority groups develop toward the majority with which they reside territorially. For instance, a territorial emphasis in the group’s self-definition may turn into a positive and inclusive identification -- a ‘peaceful co-existence’ -- with the majority identity. On the other hand, cultural demarcations may come to express longstanding contradictions and ambiguity in the relationships between ethnic minority and majority (Kaplan 1994). In Finland the Swedish-speaking Finns exemplify the former case, while the Sámi minority has a history of more difficult relationships with the Finnish majority.

In highlighting the role of territory in nation-building I wish to put forward the concept of 'discursive landscape', which points at the several ways in which geography is involved in the evolution of national identities. As has become abundantly clear from the research on cultural landscapes, 'landscape' is a socially constructed relation to the natural and cultural environment -- a way of seeing, experiencing, and interpreting things and events irreducible to their objective qualities. Nevertheless, 'landscape' also has a more substantive nature as perception
and interpretation, which make up a landscape, always take place in some material and cultural context. Landscape is not only looked at, but also also lived in.

There are different kinds of social and personal identities which may give shape to, and be formed by cultural landscape. National identity is a particular case in that it is often formed in connection with political aspirations. Hence the term nation-building. It is possible to address the particular relation between national identity and cultural landscape by focusing on the structured aspects of 'landscape', that is, by looking at the ways in which things and events are systematically drawn to signify nationality, and nationhood. The fact that there are certain textual or text-like materials through which this can be done -- the result of reading and writing national space -- justifies the term 'discursive' in connection with 'landscape'. National landscape is not only read off from nature and culture, it is also written therein.

I argue that the concept of discursive landscape has the potential to make us better understand the intertwined nature of national identity and territory. However, it is a dubiously vague and abstract notion unless contextualized within particular social activities and processes of nation-building, e.g.

The focus here is not on the Finnish discursive landscape as a whole, which would entail the analysis of the entire network of ideas, symbols, and practices associated with Finnishness, and thus constitutive of the Finnish identity. Instead, my emphasis is on the particular role of territory in this landscape -- i.e. representations of the Finnish territory, and the concrete territorial settings which have given shape to the majority national and minority ethnic identities in Finland.

The chapter begins by exploring the larger European context of the Finnish national identity. Finland is analyzed as one of the "second generation" nation-states established after the First World War. When compared with other successor states, Finland stands out as a state with a relatively "stable" territorial shape and unified state apparatus long before the formal gaining of independence. This territorially stable foundation and the emerging discursive landscape is further scrutinized by looking at the development of the majority-minority relations in Finland, with a particular focus on two cases which reflect different cultures and histories of demarcation within the territorially hegemonic Finnish identity.

While pointing at the hegemonic position of the Finnish national culture in the present day Finland, and acknowledging some form and degree of unity in the Finnish identity, the concept of discursive landscape does not denote a closed, clearly defined and instrumentally applicable device of social control. The specific knowledges, images, and symbols giving shape to national identity can not be fully.
reduced to the direct motivations and aspirations of the elites who produced them. Rather, it should be noted that all collective identities are subject to historical transformation, and as arising from different social bases consist of various contestable and contradictory elements. Thus, while on some level national identity is something that unites the whole population, there are cleavages in it too, as the identity is differently appropriated and reproduced and sometimes contested by different groups (Johnston 1995). It is such cleavages in Finland that this chapter attempts to illuminate.

Finnish Nation-Building in European Context

The First World War brought about the complete collapse of three empires -- Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. The dismembering of these great multinational empires made possible the consolidation of national minorities, and resulted in the "new nations" of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia (Alapuro 1988: 7). As products of the second wave of the creation of distinct national states in Europe, the successor states were latecomers in the international political stage dominated by the already well established, large European national states (Engman 1989: 102).

Understandably, the statemaking processes in the successor states differed from the early substantial states like Germany, France, England, Spain, or Sweden. This makes it interesting to compare the role of territory in the early state-making to the less studied successor states, and Finland in particular. Research on the early state-making and nation-building processes has shown that an emerging congruence took place between established political and administrative control over a state territory on one hand, and the building of national homogeneity on the other (Gellner 1983, Giddens 1985, Häkli 1994a). The large national states, thus, emerged by winning out and producing territoriality, whereas the political and territorial structures of the latecomer states were heavily influenced, and sometimes fully imposed, by earlier metropolitan power or several states in some cases.

Finland makes no exception here. The state's legal and administrative systems were inheritance from the period of the Swedish rule, whereas the territorial shape and the state governmental structures were formed during Finland's autonomy as a Russian Grand Duchy. Formerly a collection of "the eastern provinces" of Sweden, Finland became a unified polity as a result of Sweden's defeat against Russia in the Napoleonic wars. In 1809 the Czar Alexander I assumed the title Grand Duke of Finland (Jutikkala 1962).

However, the Finnish case differs from the rest of the successor states in one interesting respect. None of the other states gained independence on a territory with such an evident historical continuity from the imperial period. Sometimes the new state territory was actually an agglomeration of regions that had belonged to different earlier states. This was the case with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and to a certain extent Romania, which all had been divided among various earlier states and empires, and thus inherited regionally varying political and legal

However, when Finland became the autonomous Grand Duchy of Russia, and the province of Viborg was attached to its territory three years later, the Finnish nation-building assumed a territorial framework that would remain virtually intact until 1940 (figure 1). This territorial continuity was accompanied by political and administrative one, as the Finns were also allowed to retain their old Swedish constitution. By the end of the 19th century the Grand Duchy of Finland had its own parliament, government, administration, law and courts, postal services, army (until 1904), and currency. To be sure, the Russian governor-general represented the supreme executive power in the country, but this could not considerably hinder the state-making efforts in Finland (Engman 1989, Jussila 1992). All in all, it can safely be asserted that the formative years of national identity in Finland took place in a stable geographical setting.

Figure 1. Major boundary changes for the Finnish state (after Kärkkäinen 1987).
Research on the history of territoriality has shown how the early national states rose both as fields of action and fields of knowledge, i.e. they were the territorial outcome of not only warmaking organizations, but also of placemaking endeavors where the knowledge and communication of territory were essential (e.g. Revel 1991, Häkli 1994a). The close interconnections between warmaking, military reconnaissance, and the popularization of the state's mapped image clearly indicate that the consolidation of territoriality was as much a concrete process of tightening the governmental control over the state's domain, as it was a matter of the conceptual production of space (Harley 1988, 1989, Ruggie 1993).

However, the role of territoriality in the late nation-building processes, and especially in Finland, was different from the 'old continuous nations’ of Europe. As Finland had already assumed its territorial shape during the metropolitan rule, it was more the imagined and social unity of the territory that had to emerge, rather than the territory as the state’s domain which, in fact, had already been established by the inherited state apparatus. This is why in Finland the territory produced in and through the nation-building process was more a symbolic unit (and community) than a result of political and military attempts to demarcate and control space. The task that the elites aspiring for national self-determination faced was the production of 'Finland' both as a field of knowledge tied to governmental activities, and as a symbolic landscape in the popular realm. The term 'discursive landscape' highlights the fact that these two spheres needed to be brought together to form and support the self-understanding of a coherent ethnic nation.

Of course it was only possible to produce the discursive landscape of Finland with reference to the territorially defined Finnish space. But as mentioned above, this territory, although belonging to the Russian empire, had already been established as a distinct unit both geographically and politically. The task remaining to the nationalists was to build a sense of "Finnishness" into the governmental activities, the particular lands, and the identity of the population. In short, in the case of Finland territoriality may have figured more importantly in the politico-administrative discourses of the government and the social memory of the population, than in the practices of the production of Finland’s territorial domain.

**Territory and the Discursive Landscape of Finland**

The discursive landscape of Finland emerged along with a broad range of cultural and political activities, events and projects producing the symbolic fabric linking the self-understanding of a people with a particular territory, concrete places, everyday practices and imagination. The geographical dimension of national identity it represents the webs and nets of 'Finnishness’ consisting of, among other things, the images of space and lands signified as Finnish, and experienced usually, albeit not necessarily, within the Finnish territory.

Here the shaping of the discursive landscape of Finland is treated periodically, so that different phases and degrees of national consciousness may be distinguished. The discussion focuses particularly on how the Finnish territory was brought into the emerging discursive landscape in different historical, cultural, and political
contexts: the pre-autonomy period (before 1809), the age of autonomy (from 1809 to 1917), and the age independence (since 1917). Of these the first two periods are interesting as far as the rise of national consciousness is concerned, whereas the last period will be approached from the point of view of the majority-minority relations in Finland.

The different periods show different degrees to which territory, its images and discourses have been vital constituents of the Finnish identity. This is especially clear with the pre-autonomy period, which witnessed little or none nationalist sentiments centered on the Finnish nation. Finland was the name of a geographical area, not a concept referring to a sovereign political unit (Jussila 1992). Furthermore, as the Finnish language or culture were not yet regarded as criteria of distinct nationality, there was little to be popularized within the vague territorial framework of Finland. Toward the end of the period peripheral nationalisms occurred, but there was not any concerted effort to build Finnish identity in the popular symbolic realm (Engman 1995).

Thus, it makes little sense to discuss the discursive landscape of Finland before the age of autonomy. There simply was not enough political will nor consciousness of a distinct nationality to give rise to the processes of nation-building. Of course, compared with other successor states, the Finnish case is not exceptional. Most of the nationalist fervor in these states, and in Europe overall, emerged first in the course of the 19th century, after the Napoleonic wars and the congress of Vienna in 1815 (Hobsbawm 1983, Hutchinson & Smith 1994).

When Sweden had to cede Finland to Russia in 1809, the conditions for the Finnish nation-building changed dramatically because now Finland was first defined unambiguously as a territorial and political unit. I would argue that in consequence, territory assumed a vital place in the emerging self-conception of the Finnish elites. A factor that also greatly contributed to this was the particular socio-economic structure of the Finnish society. No strong and politically independent landed aristocracy existed as the peasants formed a broad and disperse but nonetheless central group in the possession of land. Therefore, the elite status was reproducible practically only through the professional system and high offices provided by the state apparatus (Alapuro & Stenius 1987: 12). Simply put, the upper classes were attached to and dependent of the newly born state's continuing autonomy.

The territorial state provided a relatively stable and undisputed ground for several sections of the Finnish elites interested mostly in securing the autonomy of the state apparatus on which their own position so clearly depended. The state-dependent aristocracy was not a local extension of the Russian metropolitan power like, for instance, the German nobility in Estonia and Latvia (Kionka 1992, Smith 1992, Engman 1995). The elites were mostly Swedish-speaking or bilingual (Swedish- and Finnish-speaking), usually not of Russian origin, and seldom loyal to the Russian empire as a whole. Although separated from the subject population of Finns by language and status, the aristocracy came to define itself as Finnish, not Russian nor Swedish. Of course, the elite was loyal to the emperor as it was expected to be. But this loyalty was based on the elite's own interests, and indeed, so well did the Finnish aristocracy perform that when it came to the "public temper"
and calmness, the Czar Nicholas I regarded the Grand Duchy of Finland as an exemplary case among the empire's foreign territories (Jutikkala 1962: 197-200).

In the shelter of these mutually good relations between the metropolitan power and the local Finnish elite, patriotic sentiments grew stronger in Finland. Although this was detected in St. Petersburg, it was quite well tolerated, thanks to the Finns' unwavering loyalty to the throne (Jutikkala 1962). Interesting in the rise of nationalism in Finland is the fact that, in distinction from most other successor states where nationalism took shape as the masses' struggle against its elite oppressors and the repressive state apparatus, in the Finnish case nationalism was broadly supported by the state-minded aristocracy (e.g. Smith 1992: 56). This may explain why in Finland the nationalistic movement consolidated with a relative ease, meeting only few contradictions. Nationalism was the project of those in power (Hroch 1985, Alapuro & Stenius 1987).

In all, the discursive landscape of Finland began to emerge during the first half of the 19th century. First the most active group were the intellectuals, among whom there grew an urge to promote the use of Finnish language in official as well as cultural activities (Wilson 1976, Vuorela 1977). This was in accord with the ideals of the early 19th century romantic nationalism, which had made language one of the most significant markers of a distinct national culture (see, for example Hobsbawm 1990: 102).

With the asserted importance of the vernacular language and the folk culture, the Finnish territory began to gain both explicit visibility and implicit weight in the imagination of the Finnish nation. On one hand, through books and articles published since roughly 1835, a growing reading public became aware of the particularity of the land they inhabited. Among the most significant contributions to the Finnish discursive landscape was *Kalevala*, an epic collection of rural folk poetry masterfully compiled and partly created by the physician Elias Lönnrot while practicing medicine in the eastern frontier region. This book soon became an admired work all over the Europe, and an evidence of a vital culture expressing a definite "national history" (Wilson 1976, 1985). Importantly, it established Karelia, the eastern frontier region (figure 2), as an authentic core of the historical Finnishness, thus providing the emergent discursive landscape with a distinct regional base (Sihvo 1996).

Another important work was Zacharis Topelius' *Maamme kirja* (The Book of Our Land), which describes Finland and its landscape in an idealistic, stereotypical, and easily accessible way. Published in 1875, it quickly became popular reading and a standard bookshelf item both in schools and at home (Lehtonen 1983, Paasi 1992). In territorial terms the book is significant not only in that it described a land and a landscape which the ordinary people could identify with, but also in that it popularized a poetic representation of the Finnish territory as a person. The "Maiden of Finland", portrayed against the landscape "of the thousand lakes", soon became the symbol of Finnish nature and nation, and an image of the Finnish territory as a human figure (Tiitta 1982: 22, Reitala 1983: 59).

On the other hand, as it was only through extensive "field trips" that the protagonists of Finnish folklore were able to collect their materials, the discourses
of Finnish cultural originality also took an implicit territorial tone. In addition to the fact that symbols and discourses of Finnish lands and nationhood were disseminated over the Finnish territory via newspapers, books, and school education, all ethnographic knowledge implicitly reflected and recognized the territorial extensions of Finland (see, for example Vuorela 1977, R. Räsänen 1989, Pentikäinen 1995). The fact that folklore was collected and recorded from both sides of the Russian border only strengthened the territorial consciousness among the nationalistic intellectuals. After independence this consciousness took shape in the ideas of "Greater Finland" covering large areas of the Russian side of the eastern border (Paasi 1990, 1996).

The different ethnographic endeavors and the rise of ethnology as a science can also be understood as an expression of the discursive development I have elsewhere termed 'the invention of region' (Häkli 1994b, 1998). By the 19th century in many fields of social activity and knowledge regions came to be conceived of as unified wholes, consisting of social, cultural (linguistic), economic or political relations. Thus, within attempts to make visible the European national cultures, there also was present an implicit geographical, or rather territorial conception of the principles of organization of the social world.

This was the case with Finnish folklore studies, too. Toward the end of the period of autonomy, extensive "mappings" of the ways of Finns had been recorded and preserved in museums and archives (Vuorela 1977). Thus, the territory established during the early political autonomy came to be tightly knit into the discursive landscape of Finland (for the significance of museums, see Anderson 1991: 163-185). This process had two dimensions which can only be distinguished analytically. On one hand, representations of the Finnish culture, nature, and nation made increasingly visible the lands which the Finnish territory consisted of, and also provided symbolic infrastructures for the various discourses of Finnishness within which the Finnish identity was being constructed. On the other hand, these symbolisms and discourses, produced mostly by the educated elites, were disseminated over the Finnish territory via newspapers, books and primary education, as well as via material items such as monuments, museums and public buildings. In all, the resulting discursive landscape of Finland emerged as a "fixed picture of the Finnish cultural 'semiosphere', its symbols and boundaries" (cf. Paasi 1992: 94).

From Language Strife to Collective Identity

The rising Finnish vernacular culture gradually changed the position of the Swedish-speaking Finns. This is evident when looking at the language situation in the 19th century Grand Duchy of Finland. As mentioned above, the aristocracy was mostly Swedish-speaking so that with few exceptions the distinguishing boundary between social classes ran along linguistic lines (Lönnqvist 1981, Engman 1995). Furthermore, the language of secondary and higher education was exclusively Swedish, until the establishment of the first school with Finnish as the language of instruction in 1858. Also the official language was Swedish, both at the central
bureaucracy and in the minutes kept of the local self-governing agencies' meetings. Even much of the literary work promoting the Finnish nationalist cause was done in Swedish because of its strong position among the learned elite.

Thus, one of the most urgent nationalist goals was to replace Swedish as the language of the educated class, and introduce Finnish into official as well as cultural use. No particular attention was paid at this point to the position of the small Swedish-speaking rustic population, settled mostly along the coastal areas of the Finnish territory (Jutikkala 1962: 201). Despite the hegemony of the Swedish language a Finnish-speaking elite was built surprisingly rapidly -- and educated class capable of integrating ideologically and practically the Finnish-speaking masses with the state. By the end of the 19th century many Swedish-speaking families had adopted the Finnish language, and some even changed their family names from Swedish into Finnish ones (Jutikkala 1962: 206, Alapuro & Stenius 1987: 14-18).

However, a reaction to the victorious advance of the Finnish language from some members of the Swedish-speaking side of the educated elite gave rise to a movement which sought to compete with the Finnish nationalism. It was suggested that the Swedish language and culture were a vital part of the Swedish heritage in Finland and should not be dismissed in favor of the "rustic" Finnish culture. Furthermore, it was held that the Swedish-speaking elite and common people living mostly along the western and southern coasts of Finland formed a separate nation, which should not be betrayed by forsaking the Swedish language (Lönnqvist 1995, Engman 1995).

A few hostile bursts of opinion notwithstanding, the Swedish-speaking nationalism did not cause too much disturbance in the steady nation-building process which gradually established the hegemony of Finnish culture and language in Finland. There were two reasons for this. On one hand, the language question never surpassed in importance the goal of forming an independent nation-state, accepted both by the Swedish and the Finnish-speaking elite (Engman 1989). Thus, the dispute was rather on the means and forms of the process than its ultimate aims. On the other hand, the Swedish-speaking elite experienced no linguistic difficulties in school any more than in public life. The Swedish movement, therefore, was more concerned with language as a practical instrument of social activity than as a mystic source of culture, and they mostly contended to securing the position of the Swedish language in a bilingual Finland (Jutikkala 1962: 210). These practical goals also set the tone for much of the Swedish-speaking politics in the independent Finland.

By the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries the foundation of the Finnish identity was already well established. It had been negotiated in a "counter-cultural" spirit first inspired by romantic nationalism, but from 1890 onwards as a response to direct policies of Russification (Jutikkala 1962, R. Räisänen 1989). The two peculiarities which distinguish the Finnish nation-building from the other successor states, that is, the "ready made" territorial frame, together with the state-dependent upper classes, had important effect on the Finnish identity. Firstly, in their attempts to make the ordinary masses, and especially the peasants, loyal toward the state, the
Swedish-speaking or bilingual upper classes were encouraged to adopt the language and culture of the Finnish-speaking (quantitative) majority. A passage from Topelius’ *Maamme kirja* illustrates this willingness to identify with a common nation and destiny:

"This is my fatherland. Whether I call it 'Suomenmaa' in Finnish, or 'Finland' in Swedish makes no difference, it is always the same country. All its sons and daughters belong to the same nation, no matter what language they speak" (Topelius 1945; my translation).

Secondly, because of the central role of peasants in the national romantic historiography, the ideals and cultural elements of the Finnish identity could most unambiguously be found in the agrarian "free peasant life". This was reflected in the discursive landscape of Finland, which up until the 1960's was largely constructed around the symbols of rural lands and lifestyles (Rääsänen 1989). Finnishness was held to be rooted in the rustic folk culture embedded in a distinctive natural landscape, which from early on were brought into the discourses of national identity through ethnographic activities. In addition to several distinguished ethnologists and learned societies, student nations at the University of Helsinki voluntarily participated in the "recording and preservation of the Finnish peasant culture" (Vuorela 1977). The "nationally coded" items of folk culture were then distributed across the country by means of temporary displays, permanent national and local museums, and printed works like Topelius' *Maamme kirja* (Smeds 1987, Korhonen 1989). Agrarian motives and the landscapes of wilderness were also dominant in the Finnish poetry, music, painting, and literature, which by the end of the 19th century had eagerly adopted the great national mission (Tiitta 1982).

Yet another important medium in the Finnish nation-building was the breakthrough of mass organization after 1870. Leaders of the Finnish nationalist movement had founded *Kansanvalistusseura* (the Society of Popular Education) and made it into a house organ for the movement’s ideals and organizational activities. Thus, the Finnish movement gained an organization whose network of representatives extended into all areas of the country (Liikanen 1995). Soon after, a temperance movement followed with even more effective means of encouraging local organization (Sulkunen & Alapuro 1987). Mass movements were instrumental in the building of the Finnish identity and cultural hegemony both in that they popularized and disseminated political consciousness of Finland, and in that they introduced modern principles of public life to cities and countryside alike (Alapuro & Stenius 1987). This rapidly gave rise to a modern political field in Finland, which already by 1918 had come to experience two dramatic events: a declaration of independence from Russia, and a civil war.

The bloody civil war was a traumatic experience to the Finnish society at large. It was only after the Second World War that the wounds would really start to heal and the legacy of hatred separating the 'whites' and the 'reds' grow into a unified political culture. However, on the perhaps less conscious level of territorial identity, the national unity had survived the dramatic changes and turns of the Finnish political life. Numerous important social (and socializing) practices continued to
produce the image of Finland as a unified whole. After all, it was largely in and through school education and mass mobilization that Finns had become aware of their distinct history, culture, and nationality. This discursive landscape had consistently been built on the idea of a larger territorial unity rising above, but not suppressing, regional identities. Also the meaning of linguistic, social, and ethnic differences was continually downplayed (Paasi 1992, Liikanen 1995). Thus, from the point of view of the increasingly hegemonic Finnish identity, the Swedish-speakers and 'Lapps' were just as important “elements” in the Finnishness as were the Finns themselves.

It is, therefore, possible to argue that the political cleavages and instability in the young Republic were not mirrored in the territorially stable discursive landscape of Finland as such. Rather it was the new, culturally and politically less secure position in which the Swedish-speaking Finns found themselves after the independence, which brought about a will to a "smaller scale" political territorialization.

Lines of Demarcation: the Swedish-Speaking Finns

With the independence, the formative years of the Finnish discursive landscape were over. I therefore approach the third period, the age of independence, first from the point of view of the Swedish-speaking Finns and then the Sámi people, and focus on their different responses to changing minority position. This is not to say that the Finnish identity and its reflections in the national discursive landscape had somehow reached a stage of finality in 1917. Quite the contrary, the post-independence time has been characterized as a continuous "search for national identity" (e.g. Räsänen 1989). For instance, the dramatic changes in the Finnish territory after the Second World War necessarily affected the Finnish self-image, as the mythic lands of Karelia, which only recently had figured in aspirations toward "Greater Finland", had to be ceded to the Soviet Union (Kärkkäinen 1987). During the Cold War era which followed, Finland was imagined as part of the Scandinavian family of nations, largely for the official neutrality policy reasons. More recently the Baltic sea region and the European Union have again become foci of larger scale identity building.

There is no doubt that rapid urbanization, globalization and cultural changes have shifted the emphases in the expressions of Finnish identity. However, it is equally possible to argue that the discursive foundation created and canonized by the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries has continued to guide the "search" as one of its fundamental layers (Tiitta 1982, Reitala 1983). It is here that the comfortable and secure images of the Finnish nature, lands, tradition and territory have been cherished and preserved, although not without internal cleavages.

Mobilization based on ethnic identity had began among the Swedish-speaking people during the latter part of the 19th century as new questions and problems emerged. The group became increasingly politicized through participation in various mass organizations and the Swedish People's Party (Lönnqvist 1981, Stenius 1987). This was largely a response to the strengthening position of Finnish as an official language on one hand, and to the increasing migration of Finnish-
speaking people to the predominantly Swedish-speaking coastal areas on the other hand. The balance between the political importance of these two areas of “confrontation” with the hegemonic Finnish culture have changed over the 20th century (Lönnqvist 1981).

The Swedish-speaking 'cultures of demarcation’ can be described in terms of development by which the emphasis in the group's identity and political goals have changed from territorial to ethno-linguistic. In the beginning of the 20th century most of the Swedish-speaking people lived in the southern and western coasts of Finland, and in the Åland island (figure 2). As many as 80-100 % of the people living in these regions spoke Swedish (Klövekorn 1960). This concentration of the "Swedish nation" was the foundation upon which first in 1910's claims were made of territorially based Swedish-speaking self-government, even autonomy.

The "Swedish regional policy" (bygdesvenskhet) emphasized the Swedish settlement areas and their culture in sustaining the lines of demarcation against the Finns (Engman 1995). Among the first concrete signs of a territorialized Swedish policy was the adoption of the term "Swedish-Finland" as the name of the Swedish settlement region (Lönnqvist 1995). This was soon followed by plans for self-government, which aimed at comprehensive regional self-government, either for the Swedish-speaking provinces separately, or for a union of provinces under one governor. Further demands included cultural autonomy in church and education, and a separate military unit (Engman 1995).

[Figure 2. omitted]

**Figure 2.** Swedish-speaking areas in Finland and the spread of Sámi settlement in Northern Scandinavia.

These plans were never realized, however, partly because the Swedish opinion remained divided in the issue, and partly because a limited Swedish cultural autonomy was already being prepared through institutional arrangements and legislation. For example, a Swedish diocese was established including all Swedish congregations in the country, and a separate Swedish department was instituted at the government Board of Education. Furthermore, the demands of linguistic and cultural equality were realized in the 1919 constitution which decreed that both Finnish and Swedish were the national languages of the Republic, and that the needs of both language groups were to be satisfied on the same basis. In addition to this the language law of 1922 secured the rights of citizens to use their mother tongue in their business with the authorities (Lönnqvist 1991).

Thus, the favorable institutional arrangements and legislation should perhaps be regarded as a success of the "Swedish cultural policy" (kultursvenskhet), rather than the territorial faction of the Swedish movement. Whatever the case, the achievements of the Swedish nationalists were hardly considered a great victory within the movement. A measure of the advantageous political position of the Swedish-speakers was their little interest in the treaties on protection of minorities drawn up at the Paris Peace Conference after the First World War. They were
considered inadequate and in all ways unsuitable for the situation of the Swedish-speaking population in Finland (Engman 1989, 1995).

Territorial strategy was more successful in the case of Åland islands, which had strong historical and cultural ties to Sweden, and a population that spoke Swedish with the exception of small groups of Finnish immigrant workers. At the end of 1917 the so called Åland Movement arose requesting association with Sweden. This was said to embody an ancient wish for "reunion with the motherland", but its has been suggested that the real reasons were the fear of Russian anarchy, the strong Finnish nationalism, and the uncertain political future of an independent Finland (Engman 1995).

In distinction from the mainland Swedish regional policy, which remained an internal question, the Åland Movement became an international issue because of the goal of union with Sweden. In 1921 the League of Nations stated that Åland should go to Finland and recommended that Finland and Sweden together should seek to guarantee the position of Swedish-Speaking Finns, as well as a neutral status for the islands (Lönnqvist 1981). However, the Finnish Government had already, under international pressure, granted Åland autonomy by law in 1920, and two years later new guarantees were incorporated into a law on the islands’ self-government (Tiihonen 1986, Engman 1995).

The solution fully satisfied none of the parties involved. Having lost the battle of Åland, the Swedes were disappointed, the Finns had made the decision of autonomy under pressure, and the Ålanders had not achieved their maximum goals. The situation quickly stabilized, however, and none of the parties made complaints to the League of Nations (Engman 1995).

After the most vital minority interests of the Swedish-speaking group had become protected, and the Åland question solved, the Swedish nationalism dismissed much of its territorial policies. Also the language question, which had occasionally turned into open political conflicts, gradually waned as the Swedish-speaking minority found its position secured (Lönnqvist 1995: 58). The Second World War and the wartime unity further contributed to the stabilization of the language issue, so that after the war the Finns saw themselves as a nation that spoke two languages (Engman 1995). The Swedish-speaking minority has managed to establish or maintain a political party (the Swedish People's Party), primary and secondary schools, several institutions of higher education, newspapers, television and radio programming, a multitude of cultural organizations, institutions and foundations, and most importantly, a lively although proportionally shrinking Swedish-speaking community. In 1967 Swedish also became a compulsory language in the comprehensive school (Lönnqvist 1981).

Hence, it may be justified to say that the lines of demarcation by the Swedish-speaking minority have in the course of this century been turned from territorial into cultural -- that is, the Swedish regional policy has largely been rejected in favor of the more ethno-linguistically oriented Swedish cultural policy. At the same time the tone of the Swedish nationalism has turned from aggressive to more diplomatic with the goal of the Swedish-speakers being equally represented in the centers of power and cultural life, and the aim of supporting bilingualism (Engman 1995).
The Sámi Movement Emerges

If the development of the Swedish-speaking minority has led from a strong political "awakening" toward a more moderate cultural presence, for the Sámi minority almost the opposite is the case. Although there had been waves of political mobilization before, caused by the consolidation of the state power in the northern periphery, it was really only the Second World War that gave rise to Sámi ethnic revival in Finland (Aikio 1994). The differences in the groups’ reactions to the rising Finnishness derive from their different histories as national minorities.

The Sámi have been living in Northern Scandinavia before it was settled and colonized by Norwegians, Swedes, Finns and Russians. Over their history the Sámi have faced problems and challenges similar to many other indigenous groups. Among the most critical issues have been the preservation of Sámi culture and language, as well as its material foundation, the land title rights. The focus here is on the Sámi people living in the northern Finland where three groups can be distinguished on linguistic grounds: the North Sámi, the Inari Sámi, and the Skolts (East Sámi). The division also earlier corresponded relatively well to differences in sources of livelihood (Aikio 1994). However, as the "Sámi question" has often concerned the three groups alike, in the following a collective term the Finnish Sámi will be employed.

The period from 1850 to the Second World War has been called the century of Sámi assimilation policies in Scandinavia (Aikio 1994, Salvesen 1995). Yet, few explicitly political responses arose from the Sámi minority in Finland. The first concrete step toward Sámi mobilization was taken as late as in 1932 when Lapin Sivistysseura (Society for the Promotion of Lapp Culture) was formed in Helsinki (Siuruainen 1976). A number of Sámi participated but most of the members were non-Sámi. The society was active primarily in publishing books and a newspaper in the Sámi language, as well as increasing awareness of (and within) the Sámi people. Some attention was also directed at concrete "social questions" (Sillanpää 1994).

The Second World War was a crucial watershed in the Sámi mobilization in Scandinavia, and especially in Finland. The war marked the politicization of the Sámi culture, a period during which the Sámi identity was first given a discursive form, and later territorialized when taken into use in claiming rights to cultural autonomy and the land title (Asp 1993). The Sámi mobilization was largely a response to the hardships experienced during and after the war. Firstly, as the German army withdrew from Finland through Lapland and Norway, many Finnish Sámi lost their homes and were evacuated to more southerly regions of Finland until accommodation could be found. The reconstruction of the northernmost Sámi areas took many years. Secondly, some 650 Skolt Sámi were displaced from their native homeland in the Petsamo area when it was ceded to the USSR in 1944. The Skolt Sámi were resettled by the Finnish government in the northeastern part of Inari (Sillanpää 1994).

Each of these events served in accentuating the situation of the Sámi in the eyes of the Finnish authorities. The Sámi themselves first began to organize in 1945
when Sámii Litto (Sámi Union) was founded. However the political weight of this organization never reached the level of its Swedish and Norwegian counterparts. More successful in this respect was the Sámi Delegation organized by the Finnish state as a committee for advisory purposes. The delegation was juridically a state authority, but it soon also became a permanent institution representing the Sámi people; an elected body which the Sámi renamed the "Sámi Parliament" (Jones 1982). The chosen term points to the committee’s position as the first truly national Sámi federation capable of setting its own agenda and priorities. However, despite its popular designation as a parliament, the Delegation was not able to make decisions in matters concerning the Sámi people, only recommendations, or it could respond to proposals by the Finnish state (Aikio 1994).

However, it was through the Sámi Parliament that the Sámi first were able to voice their demands for a recognition as a national minority, as well as for a greater cultural autonomy and, perhaps most importantly, for the Sámi land title rights (Jones 1982, Sillanpää 1994, Pentikäinen 1995). The last of these demands has given the traditional Sámi conception of territory a more consciously political tone, while also allowing for non-territorial solutions to be sought (Asp 1993). As the Finnish legislation does not grant the Sámi a legal monopoly to their traditional livelihood of reindeer herding, the Sámi activists have wished to promote a form of cultural autonomy in which the rights to land and water are strongly emphasized (Pääkkönen 1995). In this way the practically unattainable goal of Sámi regional autonomy has been moderated, while maintaining a political conception of the territorial rights of the Sámi people in Finland.

The most recent Sámi legislation has been aimed at further improving and protecting the Sámi cultural self-government. Effective from the beginning of 1996, it changed the Sámi Delegation into Sámi Assembly which no longer is a state authority, but a self-governmental body in the Sámi homeland with 21 representatives elected every four years (Hallituksen esitys 1994). In addition to advisory tasks, the Assembly has some decision-making power which even in its limited form is a step toward more territorially based Sámi politics, and along with that, the territorialization of the Sámi identity.

Also the definition of who are counted as ethnic Sámi, and thus have the right to vote in the Sámi elections, was broadened in the new legislation. Now in addition to Sámi-speakers, and the people whose parents or grandparents were Sámi-speakers, the descendants of the practitioners of traditional Sámi sources of livelihood can register as Sámi (Hallituksen esitys 1994). This has caused severe disputes between the Sámi and the Finns living in Lapland, as the former are afraid of being outnumbered by the latter in the voting registers. In a heated debate terms like ‘racism’ and ‘cultural genocide’ have been wield, even though the legislation was actually intended to do justice to those Sámi who have lost their native language under the pressures of the Finnish state’s assimilation policies. According to some estimates as many as tens of thousands of Finns could register as Sámi. Even though this would increase the political weight of Sámi, the identity of a small minority would be compromised. It is not a surprise then that the Ministry of
Justice recently promised to the reestablish the definition of Sámi ethnicity on purely linguistic grounds (Tahkolahäti 1997a, 1997b).

The Finnish Sámi minority has been able to compensate its small size (about 6400 persons in 1992) through participation in the Nordic Sámi Council which is an inter-Nordic pan-Sámi organization, as well as by resorting to international human rights organizations (Aikio 1994). In this respect the Sámi minority has had to adopt policies that differ from the Swedish-speaking minority's largely internal channels of influence. This reflects tellingly the fact that within the discursive landscape of Finland these two minority groups occupy very unequal positions, the one being a relatively large group with a history of cultural and political affluence in Finland, the other being a small "Fourth World" nation with a history of struggles against cultural assimilation and subjugation.

The difference between the Swedish-speaking and the Sámi minority is also reflected in the ways in which their relationships to the Finnish-speaking majority have developed in the course of the 20th century. It can roughly be asserted that the stronger group started with a more aggressive and territorialized emphasis, and ended up with a relatively diplomatic "Swedish cultural policy". The Sámi movement, on the other hand, began largely as an attempt to make the group's culture more visible, and only after that adopted more territorial emphasis in its policies.

Conclusion: Some Theoretical Considerations

Since the 1970's nationalism and national identities have attracted increasing attention among social theorists. Much of this revival of interest has been a reflection of the upsurge of ethnic protest in the United States and the emergence of peripheral nationalisms in Europe since the 1960's. When theoretically oriented, the research has sought to explain the origin as well as the revival of ethnic and nationalist sentiments, and thus deepen our historical understanding of these phenomena.

Along with an increased understanding of the history of nationalism and its associated social phenomena, nationalism has been portrayed in a number of different variants and in association of a large number of contexts. The sheer number of different nationalisms depicted in the proliferating literature has made it difficult to appreciate whatever these have in common, or what is it in the late-modern world that has made national or ethnic identities such a powerful field of political legitimation, contestation and rivalry.

This is not to claim that attempts have not been made to extract the root causes of nationalism and thus reduce its empirical and explanatory diversity. Any broader review of the research on nationalism soon reveals a tendency to argue for causality in the emergence of the ideologies, languages and politics of nationalism, as coupled with the rise of national identities, democracy, and the principle of national self-determination (e.g. Deuch 1966, Tilly 1975, Breuilly 1982, Smith 1991).

Social, economic and political transformations in the European societies, their historical and geographical contexts, the French and American revolutions, mass
education, and the development of the means of communication have all figured in attempts to explain why national phenomena gained such a powerful impetus both politically and in the realm of the "civil society" at the turn of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. However, each assertion of causality has also been contested when approached from a different point of view, or with a different set of questions. In fact, often the phenomena which are portrayed in causal relation seem both to presuppose one another, and follow from each other, depending on the particular case or aspect under scrutiny.

In this paper it is suggested that the focus on territory in relation to nationalism and national identity may in a useful way lead us to think about the "common ground" on which these phenomena -- nationalisms, nations, self-determination and democracy -- have flourished. As encompassing both symbolic formations of nationhood, and the landscapes situated within the physical state territory, the term discursive landscape may be helpful in the theoretical reflection of this common ground.

Two deeply rooted imaginations have made nations perhaps the most pervasive discursive landscapes of the modern age: the rise of historical consciousness in the beginning of the 19th century, and the invention of "region" as a field of knowledge tied to governmentality (Häkli 1994b, 1998). As pervasive models of world perception and knowledge production they both have molded the overwhelming reality of the 20th century international relations and territorial politics. They also have made claims to nationhood and ethnic cultural autonomy rational in themselves. The consciousness of 'history' and 'region' come together in the emergence of national discursive landscapes, giving them both legitimacy and territorial extension on different geographical scales.

Territories form the "geographical backcloth" against which both students of nationalism and the nations themselves often view the national landscapes of the modern world. Independent of whether nations overlap territorially with a particular state, or if there is a discrepancy between the state and nation, the territorial imagery is, thus, part and parcel of the historical negotiation of national identities. It may be possible to imagine a community in almost aspatial terms as an extended family rooted in history (e.g. the Jewish identity), but it is always the territorial mosaic of the world map against which such images are cast.

Yet, despite the significance of territory in nation-building, in much of the literature on nationalism territory has been viewed as a relatively fixed and immutable reality over a given period of time. Although justified with respect to some essential traits of state power, this conception has tended to lead scholars to underestimate the dynamic and active character of territory. In reality, territory is a multidimensional social construct continually reproduced in different social practices. Therefore, instead of "taking territory apart", it was here viewed as part and parcel of the cultural, social and political practices involved in the rise of national consciousness and its political mobilization. In order to maintain in sight the constructed nature of modern territoriality, territory was here conceptualized as ideas and their discourses, as much as the physical and political realities of land, movement and demarcation.
The territory of Finland was fundamental both to the growing spatial extension of national identity and to the imagination of nation as such. The process in and through which a region called 'Finland' was invented -- first by the educated elite and later by the masses -- involved an extraction from the people’s everyday practice of certain cultural traits, their association with the 'Finland-object', and the elevation of the resulting object into the status of enduring, unified, historical entity -- a political subject.

The discursive landscape thus produced gradually made the Finnish culture and language hegemonic in Finland. It also provoked reactions from the Swedish-speaking and Sámi minorities, the responses reflecting the groups’ particular, and very different, histories. The historically dominant position and larger size of the Swedish-speaking population has tended to bias the Finnish minority policy so that only until recently the authorities really saw only one minority in the country. The situation is being corrected now, and for the benefit of the Sámi people. These omissions notwithstanding, the Finnish case is usually not considered a bad example of minority-majority relations (Tägil 1995). An especially encouraging fact is that in Finland the inter-ethnic relations have been settled with relatively little conflict, and in any case, non-violently.

References


