NELLI PIATTOEVA

Citizenship Education Policies and the State
Russia and Finland in a comparative perspective

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Education of the University of Tampere, for public discussion in the Auditorium Pinni B 1097 Kanslerinrinne 1, Tampere, on December 10th, 2010, at 12 o’clock.

UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE
NELLI PIATTOEVA

Citizenship Education Policies and the State
Russia and Finland in a comparative perspective
CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

Tiivistelmä

Summary

List of abbreviations

List of original publications

1 Introduction
  1.1 Research aims and research questions
  1.2 Organisation of the dissertation

2 Citizenship education policies in flux
  2.1 The upsurge of citizenship education as a political issue
  2.2 Citizenship education in Russia and Finland
  2.3 Citizenship education and supranational educational governance

3 Citizenship education and the state
  3.1 Citizenship education as a mode of political and national socialisation
  3.2 Globalisation and citizenship education
  3.3 Citizenship education, nation-state and globalisation in the light of previous research
  3.4 Toward revaluation or renouncement of citizenship education?

4 Citizenship education policy as a research subject
  4.1 Education policy texts
  4.2 Studying policy content and argumentation
  4.3 Supranational agenda – UNESCO and the COE – as a research target
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation is an outcome of a long journey, which presented me with possibilities to work in different national contexts among talented inspiring people. The work started in late 2002 with the initial research proposal written during my traineeship at the Education for Democratic Citizenship (EDC) unit of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. This experience provided me with the first clues on the rising supranational agenda on citizenship education and, as the work was primarily concentrated on the so-called newly democratised states, nourished further my interest in the link between education and political transformation.

I am most indebted to my supervisor, Professor Tuomas Takala, who has supported my research since 2003. Tuomas has been an encouraging guide and a wonderful colleague who has taken the ideas of a junior researcher with sincere interest and respect.

My deepest words of gratitude go to Professor Robert Cowen and Professor Ilkka Liikanen for kindly agreeing to pre-examine the doctoral dissertation. Their insightful feedback pinpointed both the strengths and weaknesses of the present study and provided invaluable thoughts for future work.

Throughout the research process, I have collaborated with several dedicated co-writers and editors. Dr. Jan Germen Janmaat was the first one to point to me the importance of the vast literature on nationalism and nation-building for studying citizenship. Our rewarding cooperation since 2004 resulted in two extensive articles, with one of them included in the dissertation. I am grateful to Professor Halla Holmarsdottir and Professor Mina O’Dowd for inviting my chapter to their edited volume on comparative education in the Nordic countries. The last article to be included in the dissertation was kindly accepted by Dr. Maria-Liisa Järvelä, Laura Ritola and Johanna Sitomaniemi-San from the Intercultural Teacher Education programme at the University of Oulu, Finland. Being an edited collection in honour of Professor Emerita Rauni Räsänen – my former teacher and Master’s thesis supervisor – this publication is of particular significance. Rauni’s broadmindedness and commitment to her students has brought inspiration to many, including myself. I thank Rauni and all of my former teachers in Oulu for lighting a research sparkle that has been burning inside me ever since.

The staff and students of the Department of Education at Tampere have provided a fine environment for research and teaching. Above all, I want to thank Jari Eskola, Juha Suoranta, Leena Pohjasmaki, Marjo Vuorikoski and Tuukka Tomperi for being much
more than just colleagues.

I have benefitted greatly from the comments of Professor Matti Alestalo, Dr. Eriikka Oinonen and all the participants of their doctoral seminar in comparative social sciences. Thank you all for your meticulous reading of my papers and for creating a truly multidisciplinary welcoming spirit in our meetings.

I owe thanks to the Finnish Graduate School for Russian and East European Studies at the Aleksanteri Institute and the Finnish National Graduate School in Education, Doctoral Programme for Educational Policy, Evaluation of Education and Comparative Educational Research for welcoming me into a diverse network of researchers and granting financial assistance for conferences and studies. For a number of years I took part in the intensive summer courses organised by the Erasmus/Socrates Network on Comparative Education. I am grateful to all the teachers and students whose insightful comments have helped me to improve the quality of the dissertation.

A generous scholarship from the Academy of Finland paid for the numerous research trips to Russia between 2004 and 2005. On these trips I was kindly hosted by friends and colleagues living and working in Moscow and Petrozavodsk. In particular I would like to thank Dr. Galina Posnova for her longstanding friendship and research cooperation. Galina’s extensive knowledge of various aspects of Russian education has proven invaluable on a dozen occasions.

I thank Liz Lemal for proofreading the dissertation and Sirpa Randell for preparing the final manuscript for publication. I am grateful to Alfred Kordelin Foundation for covering the costs of editing work.

The support and encouragement of my family and friends has, of course, been of utmost importance throughout these years. Riikka Nisonen, whom I luckily met through our common interest in Russia and Eastern Europe, has been a loyal friend and a great companion in all our conversations on the biggest questions in life. I also thank Pirjo-Liisa Heikkilä and Ksenia Glebova for our enduring friendship. Riitta and Pekka Sallinen – my Finnish host family since 1995 – are the chief reason why Finland has felt like home from the very first years of my life here. The faith, support and unconditional love of my dear Mama, Papa and Babushka cannot be described nor repaid in any way. Spasibo, dorogie moi! Finally, my biggest debt of gratitude goes to my husband Holger and my son Oskar who share the everyday life with me. Your warmth, your love, your smiles have been a constant reminder of all that is most precious in life.

This work is dedicated to my transnational family for whom the questions of citizenship and national identity have long lost their spurious obviousness.

8 October 2010, on a colourful autumn day in Pispala, Tampere, Finland.

Nelli Piattoeva


Euroopan Neuvoston ja UNESCO:n asiakirjojen analyysi osoittaa, etteivät nämä järjestöt noudattavat yhtä kansalaiskasvatuksen mallia. Perinteisestä kansallisen kansalaiskasvatuksen mallista poiketen ne edistävät kansalaisten kriittistä ajattelua, aktiivistaa osallistumista politiikkaan ja ihmisoikeuksien ensisijaisuutta. Järjestöt ottavat myös


Historiallisista ja yhteiskuntapolitiittisista eroistaan huolimatta sekä Suomi että Venäjä antavat edelleen suuren arvon kansalaissuudelle ja kansalliselle identiteetille. Venäjä on 1990-luvun lopulta lähtien lujittanut kansalaissuuden ja kansallisuuden suhdetta. Se on näin siirtynyt valtionationalismiin tielle. Samalla monitasoisen kansalaissuuden rakenta-
minen kansainvälisten järjestöjen mallin mukaisesti muutuu yhä mahdottomammaksi. Suomi on sen sijaan alkanut purkaa valtion ja kansakunnan vahva historiallista sidettä ja painottaa yhä selkeämmän kansallisen identiteetin kulttuurista ulottuvuutta eurooppalaistumisen rinnalla.
SUMMARY

This doctoral dissertation studies citizenship education policies in Finland and Russia in relation to the supranational citizenship education rhetoric shaped by two large intergovernmental organizations, the Council of Europe (COE) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). The research pursues two broad research aims. First, to understand the supranational agenda of citizenship education, and second, to analyse citizenship education policies in Russia and Finland since the mid 1980s up to 2007, and to compare them to the supranational agenda of citizenship education. The dissertation is concerned with the macro level and thus the research data comprises policy documents issued by the Russian and Finnish state authorities, and the two intergovernmental organisations. The analysis of policy content draws on the rhetorical and policy-as-discourse approaches in order to elucidate the objectives of citizenship education, as well as the arguments employed to justify the proposed objectives throughout the studied period. Individualising comparison enhances the interpretative task of the dissertation, as it increases the visibility of one national context by contrasting it with another, and therefore helps to find adequate explanations to particular policy outcomes. In selecting Russia and Finland as the two national case studies, the dissertation concentrates on countries embedded in different state models and citizenship traditions. The main motivation behind the selection of the COE and UNESCO is to acknowledge and analyse the rising supranational educational governance, which increasingly provides models for and restrictions on actions and policies at national level.

The study is particularly interested in the relationship between the state and citizenship education in public schooling at the time of state (re)formation and nation (re)building. Citizenship education is perceived as a means to legitimise and maintain state power unsettled in periods of political changes. Equally, citizenship education offers a prism through which to examine larger processes in a given society, in particular, changes in the relationship between the state, citizenship and nationality, and possible modifications in the meanings of these essential socio-political categories. For the national cases examined in the dissertation the period since the second half of the 1980s has been rich in political changes related to, and leaving their mark on, the state and the nation. Whereas since the collapse of the Soviet regime Russia has striven to find ways to regenerate national cohesion, rebuild statehood and reconsolidate its status in the
international arena, Finland has attempted to adjust its national identity and citizenship to European integration and increasing immigration.

The analysis of the COE and UNESCO reveals that there is no one modality of citizenship education embraced by the examined supranational actors. On one hand, in clear contrast to the traditional model of citizenship education, they advocate proactive political participation, critical scrutiny of state institutions and action against the state on the basis of universal human rights. They also promote diversity and perceive citizenship as a multilayered concept extending to the local, national, regional and global levels. Instead of linking rights and duties to membership in a territorially demarcated polity of the nation-state, the COE and UNESCO often advocate the notion of human rights and link rights and duties to the global humanity. In this manner, supranational organisations decouple citizenship from nationality and, by doing so, advance the post-nationalisation of citizenship. On the other hand, the intergovernmental character of the organisations and their origin embedded in the consolidation of the nation-state system lead to inconsistencies in the agenda and somewhat surprising repetition of the traditional citizenship rhetoric, for instance, in linking society narrowly to the territorially demarcated nation-state. The supranational agenda also continues to emphasise the key role of national governments in implementing citizenship education and therefore still posits the nation-state as a central player in education policy and practice.

The Russian case exemplified convergence with the post-national supranational citizenship education rhetoric only during the first half of the 1990s when the new country leaders did not pay serious attention to regenerating national cohesion and building an all-embracing national identity. In this period, preference was given to the de-legitimation of the Soviet type of political education, and slightly later to the development of citizenship education policies stressing citizens’ rights, knowledge of the legislation and lawful conduct for the purpose of building a constitutional state. In terms of national identity, the authorities advocated a vague category of universal human values and encouraged the re-consolidation of sub-state national identities. Toward the end of the 1990s, the contents of citizenship education policies shifted radically. The state has re-emphasised its leading role in defining citizenship education policies with the main objective to craft citizens’ loyalty to the Russian state. The programmes of patriotic education, which appeared in the beginning of the 2000s, prioritise subordination over active participation, consensus over pluralism, duties over rights and collective identity over an individual one.

Compared to the mid 1980s, when citizenship education in Finland was premised on the idea that the vitality of the Finnish nation is invariably linked to the sovereignty of the Finnish state, the latest curricula documents stress national culture as the prime source of national integrity. In its return to a predominantly cultural understanding of the nation, Finland exemplifies the debundling of the state and the nation, and nationality and citizenship. The transformation into a *Kulturnation* is a necessary step...
to secure Finland’s national being in a globalising world, which transforms and weakens state sovereignty, without putting the legitimacy of the Finnish nation into question. The decoupling of nationality and citizenship opens up the possibility for a multilayered conceptualisation of both citizenship and nationhood. However, the national still constitutes the core, with the sub- and supranational layers as additional ingredients of the emerging citizenship recipe.

Despite major differences in their historical and current socio-political contexts, Russia and Finland continue to attach strong value to national identity and national citizenship. However, whereas Russia, since the late 1990s, has moved in the direction of state nationalism and a closer bond between the nation and the state, which preclude any possibility for a multilayered conception of citizenship, Finland has forsaken a previously strong link between the state and the nation and seems to be strengthening its cultural identity in peaceful alliance with Europeanness.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>Education for Democratic Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>Finnish Council of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMJ</td>
<td>Finnish Ministry of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FME</td>
<td>Finnish Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNBE</td>
<td>Finnish National Board of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA</td>
<td>International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFG</td>
<td>Government of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RME</td>
<td>Russian Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR ME</td>
<td>Ministry of Education of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS

The dissertation is based on the following articles, referred to by their Roman numerals in the text.


These publications are reprinted with the kind permission of the publishers.
1 INTRODUCTION

In a multidisciplinary and comparative manner this doctoral dissertation explores *citizenship education* in the system of compulsory schooling. The general question posed throughout the dissertation is *Why is citizenship education policy what it is?* This question is studied in three different contexts: Russia, Finland and the supranational level as represented by the Council of Europe (hereafter COE) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (hereafter UNESCO). The research pursues a twofold analytical agenda:

1. To identify and interpret the supranational agenda of citizenship education.
2. To identify and interpret citizenship education policies in Russia and Finland since the mid 1980s up to 2007, and to compare them to the supranational agenda of citizenship education.

In particular, the dissertation examines the content and objectives of *political and national socialisation*, henceforth referred to as *citizenship education* (see Chapter 3). These state-initiated educational endeavours aim to consolidate the bond between the citizen and the state – the political apparatus and the cultural community. The dissertation is premised on the assumption that the objectives of citizenship education shed light on the principles of the state, whereas citizenship education cannot be properly analysed if the analysis is abstracted from the cultural, historical and political context. This is what the present study is essentially about: it examines the state through the prism of citizenship education and interprets citizenship education objectives in relation to the state.

The dissertation focuses on the relationship between citizenship education and the polity at the time of *political change*. More specifically, it explores the effects of state (re)formation and nation (re)building on the revision and redefinition of citizenship, national identity and education in Russia and Finland since the mid 1980s. In both countries this period has been rich in political changes related to and leaving their mark on the state and the nation. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia has striven to find ways to regenerate national cohesion and rebuild its statehood within reshuffled borders and consistent with the new political ideologies of liberal democracy and market economy, as well as a yet ambiguous idea of the new Russian national identity. However, the reconfiguration of national imaginary and the development of new political institutions occur amidst controversy as to their very meaning and substance. Finland, too, has
been affected by the fall of the Soviet regime. With the collapse of the bipolar world order, it had to reconsider its position vis-à-vis Russia and the Western political arena. As a result, Finland embarked upon the integration process with Europe. Consequently, Finland attempts to adjust its national identity and citizenship to European integration – a political process that undoubtedly impinges on the authority of the nation-state.

The Russian case provides an insight into the consequences of transitology, that is, the collapse, deconstruction and major metamorphosis of state apparatuses, social and economic stratification systems and political visions of the future which rely on education as symbolic and a practical means to destroy the past and redefine the future (Cowen 2000, 5). The moments of transitology unmask and undermine the taken-for-granted political assumptions and the political categories of state, society and culture. Consequently, novel discourses and instruments are needed to legitimise the exercise of power and the reconfigured bond between the citizen and the state. The Finnish case could not be classified as an example of Cowen’s transitology, for the end of the bipolar world has not given rise to such dramatic events as the collapse of the state system. Nonetheless, the partial cession of state powers to the European Union (hereafter EU) and the shift in Finland’s geopolitical position necessitated revisions in citizenship education. In this vein, the dissertation surveys the modifications in citizenship education and the interrelationship between citizenship education and its political context in two diverse socio-political settings.

While the dissertation focuses on the manifestations and effects of political and ideological reorientations on citizenship education, it also strives to capture the uncertainty, inconsistency and polyvocality intrinsic to the process. Citizenship education is perceived as a contentious area of education and a battlefield for political visions which compete for dominance over the future political direction and the loyalty of citizens-to-be. The rival stakeholders of citizenship education are, for instance, ministries of education and other state institutions, political agencies, parliaments and, increasingly so, supranational organisations like the COE, UNESCO and the EU (Dimitrov & Boyadjieva 2009). If politics is described as a struggle over legitimate power, then citizenship education, for its

1 The notions of transitology and transition could be criticised for their linear and teleological perception of development from point A to point B. The transition model only focuses on the outcomes of the supposedly evolutionary and unproblematic journey to a predetermined destination and ignores the very process of transition. Some scholars even argue that it constitutes a flawed modernisation theory in disguise (Kapustin 2001 in Silova 2009) or suggest that transitology is naïve in assuming a direct movement from socialism to capitalism (Verdery 1996 in Silova 2009). Alternative terms, e.g. transformation, retardation and mutation have been suggested to replace transition. These terms underline that various interpretations of the new ideas are possible and that the persistence of cultural and educational legacies inevitably contributes to the recontextualisation of Western ideologies. (Silova 2009.) However, Cowen’s definition of transitology is not concerned with the direction of the change. Its value lies with catching succinctly the complexity of the immediate effects of transitology on institutions and ideologies and, most importantly, the double role of education in this process as shaken by the immediate change and expected to contribute to the construction of the transitology itself (Cowen 1999; 2000 in Cowen 2009).
part, presents a means to legitimise and maintain power unsettled in periods of political change. As a result, citizenship education simultaneously reflects the controversial and even mutually inconsistent political views, as well as temporal crystallisations and ideological victories of one orientation over others. Consequently, citizenship education could be read as a legitimisation script that attempts to generate stability and certainty, and simultaneously suppress alternative political visions.

The study is concerned with the macro level, that is, how citizenship education is articulated in the policy documents on compulsory schooling produced by the state authorities, which means that the question of policy implementation remains a matter for a separate inquiry. Even though the dissertation does not focus on the implementation of the prescribed agenda, policies set up the general framework for the preparation of teaching materials, regional and school curricula, and the work of teachers in the classroom. This general framework shapes, both institutionally and discursively, local interpretations of citizenship education. Therefore the present study could serve as a foundation for the subsequent study at meso and micro levels.

The dissertation was written and published as a set of five articles. They constitute the basis of the dissertation and the summarising overview at hand. Article I discusses the general methodological and theoretical questions of comparative education research relevant for the topic of the dissertation. Article II analyses the supranational context of citizenship education and Articles III-V focus on the two national cases. The purpose of the present overview is twofold. First, it serves as a meta-narrative that sets the scene for the empirical study by elaborating on its conceptual, theoretical and methodological foundations. Second, the overview offers a synthesis and an evaluation of the separate publications and explains the relationship between them. Each article addresses the research topic from a particular angle, leading to diversity in the methods of analysis and theoretical underpinnings from article to article. The overview considers the research project as a whole and evaluates how the theoretical and methodological choices made in the articles have affected the final composition of the dissertation and its empirical findings.

My hope is that the study at hand will interest both sociologically and pedagogically oriented readers. For the former, the study can offer new perspectives on the relationship between the state and the system of education. Its findings reveal changes in the self-perception of states, investigated through the prism of citizenship education policy imperatives. The dissertation also seeks to gain relevance beyond the particular empirical cases examined. While the national empirical cases provide insights into the reconfiguration of citizenship and citizenship education in Russia and Finland, the findings of the study could be compared to those generated in other national settings. Moreover, as the study traces the intertwining of education and politics, and draws on multidisciplinary theoretical and methodological perspectives from comparative sociology, political philosophy, comparative politics, Russian studies, sociology of
education and others, it could be of interest to students in a wide range of disciplines preoccupied with the complex phenomena of political legitimacy and its reconstruction in very different historical and geopolitical contexts.²

For the more pedagogically oriented audience, the study attempts to contextualise and interpret the roots of educational objectives and prescribed policies. In this manner it seeks to empower educators by enhancing their understanding of the political and ideological linkage in pedagogical work. In addition, the study can tune educators and policy-makers to the complex and conflicting nature of citizenship education, which is commonly advocated as the prime cure for the political disengagement of the young generation. However, instead of asking what citizenship education can do for society and how it should best be realised, the study is guided by the question what does the very preoccupation with the subject matter tell about the current state of our societies and politics? The research places citizenship education in the context of the ongoing domestic political developments in Russia and Finland, many of which are embedded in the complex phenomenon of globalisation, and aspires to understand to what extent national and transnational changes affect these most national of institutions, namely the nation-state and its system of education.

1.1 Research aims and research questions

The following table depicts the aims of the research, the research questions that have guided the study and the data analysed in the course of the dissertation. The table also identifies which article or articles address each of the research aims.

² The concept of legitimacy is addressed in Article II.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research aims</th>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To identify and interpret the supranational agenda of citizenship education</td>
<td>What type of citizenship education is promoted by the COE and UNESCO? Does it correspond to or differ from the national model of citizenship education?</td>
<td>analysing the supranational policy content, comparing these findings to the national model of citizenship education as depicted in previous studies</td>
<td>policy documents authored by the COE and UNESCO</td>
<td>I, II, IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To identify and interpret citizenship education policies in Russia and Finland since the mid 1980s up to 2007, and to compare them to the supranational agenda of citizenship education</td>
<td>Which objectives have framed citizenship education in Russia and Finland since the mid 1980s and have there been changes in the substance and intensity of each of them? How are these objectives related to the processes of state (re)formation and nation (re)building in the respective countries? Do citizenship education policies continue to be perceived in traditional terms as contributing to national cohesion and state integrity, or has there been a change toward a post-national identity and a multilayered conception of citizenship? Can the citizenship education agenda promoted by the international organisations be observed in the citizenship education policies produced in Russia and Finland?</td>
<td>analysing the national policy content, tracing and interpreting policy changes and argumentation, i.e. justifications behind the changes, comparing the national policies of citizenship education to the supranational agenda</td>
<td>state-authored national level policy documents, research findings from the analysis of the supranational level documents</td>
<td>III, IV, V</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.2 Organisation of the dissertation

In the chapters that follow, the dissertation addresses citizenship education policies at both the nation-state and supranational level. In the next chapter, I introduce the contents of the present study and provide justifications for the research setting. Chapter 3 discusses the main concepts and the interpretative framework of the dissertation related to the impact of globalisation. A more detailed account of the data and data analysis is presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 focuses on the comparative approach employed in the study, which is followed by the comprehensive analyses of the national contexts in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 presents the contents of each article, and explains how the five separate publications are bound. Finally, Chapter 8 draws together the findings of the dissertation, offers an evaluation of the whole study and provides ideas for further inquiry. The primary data analysed in the research is listed in the Appendix, which also contains the complete texts of the five original publications (Articles I–V).
Interest in citizenship and youth development has been multiplying since the early 1990s (Torney-Purta 2000). Growing attention to the questions of citizenship, the apparent desire of states to re-emphasise citizenship and the role of citizenship education, all point to the revaluation of citizenship as a political institution and a focus of study (Kymlicka 2003a). In academic circles, increased attention to the topic could be illustrated by the burgeoning number of academic journals which have offered their readership special issues on citizenship education and the emergence of new journals which concentrate primarily on citizenship education.\(^1\) In this chapter, I explain why political developments on the global level and in the national contexts of Russia and Finland make the study of citizenship education an interesting and necessary analytical exercise. The main rationale behind the research setting is that school citizenship education both reflects and (re)produces the dominant version of citizenship and legitimises the contract between the citizen and the state. Consequently, the study of citizenship education at the macro level should draw primarily on the relationship between state, citizenship and education. In addition, it should take into account the challenges of globalisation to state, citizenship and education, so as to understand the changing dynamics of their reciprocal relationship. (cf. Reid, Gill & Sears 2010.) By focusing on citizenship education endeavours in Russia and Finland, I seek to examine two national cases previously underexplored in the citizenship education literature.\(^2\) The main motivation behind the selection of the

---


2. With respect to the recent studies of citizenship, nationality and education in Finland one should mention the project financed by the Finnish Academy ‘Gender and nationality: constructions of being Finnish’ and
COE and UNESCO as the representatives of the supranational agenda stems from their official linkages to the national cases and previously insufficient attention to their work in comparison to the EU policies, for instance.

2.1 The upsurge of citizenship education as a political issue

The need for citizenship education is often framed in terms of the so-called ‘political deficit’ and ‘threat to democracy’ backed by studies that show decline in voting rates, party membership and the overall falling interest in conventional politics. The ‘civic deficit’ is defined in terms of shortage in civic knowledge or, in a broader manner, as inadequate participation in political life (Kennedy 1997, 2). Decreased voting proportions are usually directly linked to low rates of participation – a hallmark feature of a healthy democracy (Van Deth et al. 1999 and Putman 2000 in Naval, Print & Veldhuis 2002, 107). In this context, citizenship education is commonly perceived as a panacea that is expected to divert the trend, in particular among the future generation of citizens. For old and new democracies alike, education for democratic citizenship is plied as capable
of (re)-establishing the legitimacy of representative democracy and civic engagement of citizens (e.g. Naval, Print & Veldhuis 2002). The so-called third wave of democratisation (the post Cold War period) has played a significant role in attracting more interest to citizenship education and education for democracy, as the newly democratised countries of the former Eastern bloc strive to find ways to promote democracy and build domestic and international legitimacy. These developments coincide with the rising worry of political disengagement in the Western countries. (Frazer 1999.)

At the same time, the need for better and more citizenship education is framed around reforms in the European political arena and more globally. It has been stated that as Europe moves toward greater unity, the EU is concerned by the slow pace of adaptation of the European citizenship concept (Naval, Print & Veldhuis 2002). Consequently, national systems of education are requested to accommodate the emerging supranational political structures and models of allegiance; in other words, to prepare future generations for a deeper feeling of European identity and their political duty as European (EU) citizens. Moreover, global environmental problems coupled with the intensified transnational movements of people require new forms of education to generate global awareness, responsibility, tolerance and skills of intercultural communication. In other words, the challenge lies in finding ways to nurture citizen competences to face the envisioned interconnectedness of the changing world (Soysal & Wong 2006). Finally, with the proliferation of transnational communities, national governments are concerned about the national identity and citizenship skills of immigrants, in other words their level of social integration. The Finnish Citizen Participation Programme, for instance, identified immigrants as one of the central target groups for citizenship education (FMJ 2006).

Frazer (1999, 2) has suggested that the history of citizenship education, at least in the UK, looks like a history of “a wave of moral panics”. At the heart of the recurring panics lies the falling legitimacy of the state, whether manifest in the decline of voting turnouts, signifying citizens’ low support for the political decision-making, or expressed in terms of insufficient national identification with the state. For instance, to counter the latter issue, the Crick report (1998), which forms the basis for the current English citizenship education curricula, declares

---

3 Some commentators challenge the prevailing negative image of young people, who are often described as apathetic, self-centred and uninterested in the needs of others (e.g. Roker, Player & Coleman 1999). The need for more effective citizenship education is justified by the argument that young people are alienated from political life and show little interest in social and political issues. However, contrary evidence suggests that young people are involved in new forms of politics, including volunteering, campaigns and single-issue politics; these activities could be summed under the notion of unconventional political activity (e.g. ibid). Torney-Purta’s (2002) conclusions drawn on the basis of the IEA study of civic attitudes and engagement among school pupils in 23 European countries show that there are major differences between countries with respect to political knowledge, engagement and attitudes. For Finland the research findings suggest that high levels of knowledge are not correlated with levels of political participation; there is also a widening gap between active and passive young people, which is greatly determined by students’ social status and family background (Suutarinen 2000, Brunell & Törmäkangas 2002; Tomperi & Piattoeva 2005).
to find or restore a sense of common citizenship, including a national identity that is secure enough to find a place in the plurality of nations, cultures, ethnic identities and religions long found in the United Kingdom. (in Osler & Starkey 2001, 293.)

In the analysis of citizenship education it is therefore essential to discern the political projects which impose and justify it. The principal function of citizenship education is to legitimise the nation-state and it is the legitimacy gap that engenders political and educational discussions on the role of and need for citizenship education. Curiously, in this regard, the national legitimacy boosting projects are increasingly confronted with similar endeavours of supranational nature, that is, to create a European identity or raise global citizens. In view of these parallel processes, it is important to ask how the projects of building supranational allegiance fit with the inner problems of legitimacy and accountability encountered by the nation-states, of which the growing civic disengagement is principally symptomatic.

2.2 Citizenship education in Russia and Finland

The comparative framework of the research is based on the idea that Russia and Finland have inherited two qualitatively different state models embedded in different socio-political, cultural and historical legacies. However, both countries are faced with a recurrent dilemma of similar nature, namely how to maintain national cohesion and state legitimacy unsettled by changes in the national and international contexts. The research setting is premised on the assumption that citizenship education is affected by and is expected to provide a means to resolve the dilemma. However, we can expect it to be resolved in different ways, due to differences in the starting points and the nature of the two national settings, so leading us from the shared recurrent dilemma to the particularity of the cases.4

It should be borne in mind that the scope of the dilemma is different, with the Russian situation further complicated by the socio-economic problems of post-Soviet reconstruction and the depth of the identity crisis. In the Russian case, the collapse of the USSR has led to a fully-fledged transitology, which completely undermined the basic categories of statehood and nationhood. Breslauer and Dale (1997, 303, 307) called this situation a “post-imperial trauma” which necessitated fundamental debates on

Who are ‘the people’ that Russia’s new-found ‘statehood’ is meant to serve, and what ideas might provide the normative glue for binding together the state and the citizenry in a relationship of legitimacy and accountability?

4 On the notion of recurrent dilemmas in comparative studies see Haydu (1998) and Chapter 5.
The Finnish case clearly lacks the drama of state collapse, and the deconstruction and reconstruction of Finnishness have taken place within secure state borders and institutions. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union marked a significant turning point for Finland, also. It obscured the entire Cold War cartography, the pillars of foreign and security policy established in the period, as well as the Communist neighbour which played a central role in the Finnish national identity project (Harle & Moisio 2000, 189–190).

The comparative argument of the study draws on the analytical categories of empire-state and nation-state to theorise about the state traditions of Russia and Finland respectively. When the state is classically defined as a polity with fixed boundaries, sovereignty over its territory, monopoly over legitimate violence within the state’s territory, and a bureaucratic and military apparatus, then the main difference between empire-states and nation-states lies in their opposite perceptions of integration of their constituent populations into a political community (Suny 1995; Parrott 1997). This qualitative difference is crucial for the understanding of the relationship between nationality and citizenship within an imperial as opposed to a national polity.

The Russian case represents an example of a serious divorce between citizenship and nationality which hinders the process of post-Soviet reconstruction. On the contrary, the Finnish case, already by looking at the etymology of the words *kansallisuus* (nationality) and *kansalaisuus* (citizenship), epitomises a nation-state where citizenship and nationality, state and nation have historically knitted together. The historical development and the current state of the relationship between nationality and citizenship constitute a focal explanatory variable in the ensuing analysis of citizenship education. Moreover, as the centrifugal processes of globalisation are claimed to decouple the state, the nation and consequently nationality and citizenship (e.g. Delanty 2000), then the study of citizenship education policies embedded in diverse state traditions reveals how or if the historically established relationships are reshuffled in consequence of globalisation.

2.3 Citizenship education and supranational educational governance

Major theoretical and methodological reorientations in contemporary social sciences following the explosion of interest in globalisation call for attention to the international trajectories and the global embeddedness of the national polity, that is, the intertwinment of the global and the national. The dissertation analyses the supranational citizenship education agenda at work and compares it with the national citizenship education policies.

The terms supranational, transnational and international are sometimes used interchangeably, whereas at other times they describe a qualitatively different set of relations. According to Lucas (2001, 805), supranationalism and supranational
organisations refer to “all organisations, institutions and political and social processes involving more than a single state or at least two non-state actors from different nation-states”. The most important of supranational organisations are intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) (ibid., 805). Supranational differs from the transnational in that the former implies policies and actions formed and implemented on the level beyond that of the nation-state, whereas transnational implies the intertwining of political activity and decision-making of more than one nation-state and/or non-state actor from different states and regions, therefore blurring the borders of the nation-state itself. Finally, international and, by the same token, intergovernmental, means a more conventional type of cross-border cooperation which does not bear consequences for the authority and legitimacy of the nation-state. Lucas’s definition above employs all of these terms to analyse the work of international organisations. In the dissertation, the three terms are employed interchangeably in order to underline the complex nature of international organisations which is simultaneously supranational, i.e. permits some form of sovereign agenda-setting; international and intergovernmental, i.e. dependent on the political interests and willingness of member states; as well as transnational, as it involves and relies on the movement of discourses and intellectuals across borders and in ways that are likely to escape the watchful eye of the state.

While acknowledging the fact that globalisation is a multifaceted process, both real and perceived, whose nature and effects on diverse societal settings are far from homogeneous, the research setting primarily focuses on and is framed by the consequences of globalisation for citizenship education, which can be expected to unfold in two distinctive ways. First is the debundling of the linkage between citizenship and nationality and their genealogical association with the nation-state. Second is the rise of supranational educational governance which undermines the sovereignty of nation-states in the field of education and intervenes in their national citizenship education policy-making (see sections 3.2 and 3.3).

The supranational agenda, examined through the documents of UNESCO and the COE, is perceived in the study as both a context and a reference point for the national level policy-making. By context I mean that national education policies are not developed in a vacuum, but due to the widening scope of activities of international organisations coexist and interplay with supranational agendas. Both Finland and Russia are member-states of UNESCO and the COE and references to their work can be found in the national education policy documents. Hence, the research concentrates on two organisations active in the field of citizenship education and linked to the national cases examined in the study. However, the limitation of the research lies in the fact that it offers a zoomed snapshot at the transnational educational agenda as represented by UNESCO and the COE and therefore does not take into consideration other actors, for instance, the EU relevant for Finland as an EU country; neither does it analyse possible interconnectedness between

NELLI PIATTOEVA
the international actors, though the overlap between the organisations is acknowledged briefly in Article II. In the dissertation, I focus primarily on the commonalities in the policies of the two actors and leave potential differences for further inquiry.

The study interprets the main tenets of the supranational agenda, analyses it in relation to the national model of citizenship education as it has been depicted in previous research and finally compares the supranational agenda to the citizenship education policies in Russia and Finland. By doing so, the dissertation explores whether the content of citizenship education as well as the role of the state as a regulator of education policies are changing under the pressure of globalisation, which is manifested in and channelled through the work of supranational organisations. As a result, the research attends to the question of whether citizenship education policies continue to be perceived in traditional terms as contributing to national cohesion and state legitimacy, or has there been a change toward a new understanding of identity and citizenship, perhaps post-national or multilayered? In this manner I also examine whether the state’s legitimation politics is changing.
The theoretical backbone of the dissertation lies with the profound dilemma intrinsic to modern citizenship, that is, the complex relationship between citizenship as a status and involvement in democratic institutions and citizenship as belonging to and affiliation with the national polity. Citizenship constitutes a package of liberal rights (e.g. freedom of association, freedom of speech and conscience and the general freedom to lead meaningful lives) and responsibilities (e.g. to exercise autonomous and critical reasoning in elections and surveillance of political leaders). In addition, citizenship is invariably defined in national terms and is bound by the national state and its institutions. Rights and responsibilities are protected by national constitutions, and it is by virtue of belonging to the national community that individuals are granted the privileges of citizenship. (e.g. Kymlicka 2003b, 47.) This being so, the identity aspect of citizenship is confined to the nation – a cultural community premised on the imaginary horizontal bond between its members (e.g. Anderson 1991).

In this manner the juridical and political dimensions of citizenship are complemented by the cultural and communal ones. In other words, by affiliating the nation with the political concept of citizenship, modern citizenship incorporates not only rights and duties but also a sense of tradition, community and identity (Heater 2002, 99). Some commentators have termed this process the nationalisation of citizenship, meaning that citizenship had become synonymous with membership in the nation (Isin & Turner 2007, 11). The affiliation of citizenship and nationality consolidated the dual character of citizenship as inclusion into a self-governing political community and into a specific national community marked by territorial boundaries and cultural practices. The dual nature also implies that by defining who is ‘in’, citizenship status simultaneously determines who constitutes an outsider. (Castles 2005, 689.)

In the following, I pursue the analysis of the association between citizenship and nationality in the educational context by introducing the concepts of political and national socialisation. These concepts shed light on the dual task of education as preparing students for participation in the political life of the state (citizenship) and rooting a feeling of common national identity (nationality). The ensuing sections explore the multifaceted effects of globalisation on citizenship education in different country contexts. Their main purpose is to point to the controversial impact of globalisation on the double logics intrinsic to citizenship education.
3.1 Citizenship education as a mode of political and national socialisation

In the dissertation, citizenship education is defined as a state-initiated process of political and national socialisation which aims at consolidating the bond between the citizen and the state. Political socialisation initiated and controlled by state schools is intrinsically linked to the political system and is expected to support and reinforce it; in other terms to provide system stability (Massialas 1977, 279). According to one definition, political socialisation is

*the process mediated through various agencies of society, by which an individual learns politically relevant attitudinal dispositions and behaviour patterns. These agencies include such environmental categories as the family, peer group, school, adult organisations and the mass media* (Langton 1969, 5 in Massialas 1977, 278).

Paasi’s (1998) term national socialisation enriches the above definition of political socialisation, as it highlights the role of national state institutions, such as the army and the system of compulsory education, in forging national identity. Institutionalised education communicates the selected symbols of common identification. Equally, it helps to mark the borders of national imagination, that is, the territory, the stereotypical images of fellow nationals, the common roots and the shared history of the nation. Thus states play a crucial role in the politics of naturalising the representation of the nation and its association with a particular geographical territory and political institutions, giving rise to the belief that a place equals a people equals a culture (Paasi 1998, 215; Gupta & Ferguson 1992). This national naturalism “presents associations of people and place as solid, commonsensical, and agreed – upon, when they are in fact contested, uncertain, and in flux” (Gupta & Ferguson 1992, 12).

National socialisation serves the purpose of and provides the means to the wider nation-building policies of the state essential to the daily preservation and reproduction of the bond between the people and the authority, and the nation itself. Kymlicka and Straehle (1999, 73; also Articles III–V) emphasise that nation-states are the product of nation-building policies, adopted by the state in order to diffuse and strengthen a sense of nationhood. For that reason the authors argue that it is analytically more fruitful to perceive nation-states as nation-building or nationalising states, meaning that national identity is a contingent and vulnerable accomplishment – an ongoing process, rather than an achieved fact (ibid.; also Kuzio 2001). While national socialisation relies on and is inherently related to the state ideology and the state’s ideological apparatus, it simultaneously constitutes a social exchange or a social contract with the state. In other words, national socialisation is not simply a product of carefully planned and executed policies from above. Identification is exchanged for and relies on the experience that it provides something in return, for example, a feeling of belongingness, ontological security, continuity and a guarantee of certain welfare (Paasi 1998). In this manner,
states and citizens mutually legitimise each other.

Roberta Sigel (1995) has elucidated five different understandings of political socialisation. It can be perceived as 1) the state of a person’s political knowledge and comprehension (henceforth K&C); 2) the developmental sequence by which such K&C are acquired; 3) continuity over time of K&C; 4) the process by which people acquire and internalise a given society’s norms and behaviour; and 5) synonymous to civic education or political education as it is practised in public schools. Despite the difference in focus, all the listed definitions share a preoccupation with the transmission of society’s norms and political principles, and as a result, with the maintenance of stability.¹

As the above definitions reveal, the process of political socialisation extends far beyond formal schooling. My aim in the dissertation is to expose and analyse the norms of society and the state’s political principles by looking at the objectives, contents and argumentation behind citizenship education policies in the system of compulsory schooling. The dissertation adopts the term citizenship education instead of political socialisation as it addresses exclusively “political education as it is practiced in public schools” (point (5) in Sigel’s list of definitions above). Since the term citizenship education has been exported by and turned into a political enterprise with a seemingly democratic and therefore overly positive connotation, I find it imperative to seek its deconstruction as being ideological and highly contentious.²

The uncritical usage of the term analogous to the current political vocabulary could easily conceal the incongruous nature of citizenship education per se. As the following quote from a survey conducted under the auspices of the European Commission reveals, citizenship education is regularly equated to critical thinking and active participation, while ignoring the fact that state schools, at least in the European context, have been founded on and continue to promote the ideology of the nation-state with the purpose of generating loyalty and national cohesion:

(…) school education for young people, which seeks to ensure that they become active and responsible citizens capable of contributing to the development and well-being of society in which they live. While its aims and content may be highly diversified, three key themes are of particular interest. Citizenship education is normally meant to guide pupils toward (a) political literacy, (b) critical thinking and the development of certain attitudes and values and (c) active participation (European Commission 2005, 10).³

¹ Research on political socialisation has been criticised for its treatment of the individual as a passive consumer of political education (e.g. Hahn 1998). Whereas I acknowledge the array of problems and potential distortions intrinsic to such a narrow perception, i.e. the unproblematised linearity of the transmission of knowledge and attitudes, inappropriate attention to the individual agency and the potential impact of the historical context on the outcomes of transmission etc., I do not explore this issue further, as the role of the individual is outside the scope of the research tasks posed in the dissertation.

² Who would resist the call that schools need more and better education for democratic citizenship?

³ When educational objectives are measured internationally against such a pre-determined set of indicators, they not only provide information, but also simultaneously foster specific pedagogical objectives and practices and thus implicitly intervene in national education and its policy-making process. In the long run, these seemingly neutral comparative practices could contribute to the convergence of educational systems.
The appropriateness of and the relationship between different terms would certainly deserve a lengthier discussion. For one thing, we could question whether the term socialisation is appropriate in the context of transition societies, as this concept partially implies transmission of taken for granted values and beliefs (Harber 1991). In periods of rapid political and ideological transformation what has been taken for granted rapidly turns into a hotly debated political issue and the contents of socialisation are re-negotiated. The term political education could be perceived as an alternative to citizenship education, but, as Frazer (1999) has suggested, some educationists find this term simply oxymoronic, as education is by its very nature political and its objectives and contents are always a product of political contestations and power struggles. Equally, it could also mean education in politics including political science and political studies, in which case its meaning is narrower than the understanding of citizenship education employed in the dissertation.

The above discussions indicate that due to the almost symbiotic association between citizenship and nationality, citizenship education has been intimately related to and focused on the legitimacy of the nation-state. As argued in Article IV, the dual nature of citizenship as participation in democratic institutions and belonging to the collective ‘we’ of the nation leads to conflicting effects in the realm of education. In Article IV, we refer to these discourses as ‘citizenship education’ and ‘education for citizenship’ (cf. Forrester 2003). The dual task of citizenship education could also be described in terms of competing discourses with one revolving around “passive consumption of knowledge about citizenship with a strong historical focus” and the other one emphasising “critical and active participation”, often labelled active citizenship (Criddle, Vidovich & O’Neill 2004, 31). Consequently, the basic dilemma intrinsic to citizenship education is to strike a balance between allegiance and order, on the one hand, and critical appraisal, participation and even disobedience, on the other. With respect to the competing discourses of citizenship education, some researchers claim that governments are resistant to a form of teaching which might foster critical questioning, and instead encourages passivity, conformity and dependence (Heater 1990; Harber 1991). In this regard, it is important to ask how the emerging notion of active and critical citizenship, evident in the supranational citizenship education agenda (Articles II and IV), sits with the traditional nationalising task of state schools.

The concept of citizenship education is often used normatively and, when applied, prescribes specific pedagogical, moral and political objectives. As Tilly (1997, 599) argues, general discussions of citizenship also “necessarily proceed in a normative shadow”, as they “vindicate visions of the good civic life”. Consequently, researchers should distinguish carefully between descriptive, explanatory (analytical) and prescriptive (advocacy) studies of citizenship in order to avoid the risk of substituting “wishful thinking for mapping of the possible” (ibid., 602). This conclusion is also applicable to the studies of citizenship education, with the prescriptive position further strengthened
by the proximity between theory and praxis in educational research. The current work has adopted a descriptive and analytical approach with the main aim to understand the tenets of citizenship education policy in Russia and Finland and how the contents of this policy have been shaped by domestic and global political processes.

3.2 Globalisation and citizenship education

In the past few decades, the cluster between national education, national citizenship and the nation-state has encountered challenges emanating from the complex phenomenon of globalisation. Globalisation, according to David Held (1996, 340), denotes a “shift in the spatial form of human organisation and activity to transcontinental or inter-regional patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of power”. Globalisation implies at least two distinct phenomena. First, political, economic and social activity is ever more worldwide in its scope. Second, there has been an “intensification of levels of interaction and interconnectedness within and between states and societies” (ibid). In other words, globalisation internationalises domestic politics, fosters decision-making in international frameworks and consequently blurs the distinction between internal and external politics (Held 1996; Tønnesson 2004). However, globalisation neither leads to a singular condition nor could be perceived as a linear process of integration and convergence (Held 1996, 340). Moreover, globalisation operates and affects national policy through a variety of mechanisms, which in itself is a diversifying factor among countries (Dale 1999). Also, as each domain of state action, for example, political, economic or cultural, could be characterised by a distinctive pattern of relationships, power dynamics and activity, the effects of globalisation on these domains should be examined separately (Held 1996).

For instance, while states seek to promote global literacy and mobility of their workers, in order to enhance the state’s global competitiveness, workers are still expected to adhere to national values (Kennedy 2008). Patriotic global workers constitute a prerequisite for state competitiveness in the global markets, especially so because transition to knowledge economy has turned learning and intellectual capital into the core elements of economic growth and international competitiveness. Therefore, coming back to the theme of domains, transition from a national economy to a global economy is not necessarily replicated in the domain of education, least of all in citizenship education (ibid., 22).

With respect to citizenship and education, the effects of globalisation unfold in two distinctive but overlapping ways, as discussed in Articles I and II. First, the traditional notion of national citizenship is put into question. National citizenship is increasingly challenged by the establishment of transnational bodies claiming people’s allegiance (e.g. on the EU see Keating, Hinderliter Ortloff & Philippou 2009), the institutionalisation of human rights which assert, by definition, that rights emanate from the humanity itself as opposed to membership in an indentified polity (e.g. Kiwan 2005; Soysal 1994) and the
growing number of national societies in which ethnic communities nourish identities distinct from and sometimes in opposition to the national identity (Castles 2004). Accordingly, it has been argued that citizenship is no longer united by and limited to a “coherent national framework” (Delanty 2000, 126). The claim implies that the nation-state no longer constitutes the ultimate source of national identity nor does it hold an exclusive monopoly over the discourse of citizenship (e.g. Law 2004).

The integration of nation-states into larger political alliances means that an increasing number of political decisions are made by institutions lacking direct political mandate from the citizens. Even in the seemingly democratic-parliamentarian structure of the EU, final decisions are made by the Commission behind closed doors. It is likely that these developments weaken the domestic legitimacy of the nation-state and thus widen the gap between the citizens and the state. As people are distanced and alienated from the political decision-making on the state-wide level, they search for alternative identities to complement or replace nationality. (Bottery 2003, 110–111.) In addition to being threatened from ‘above’ the nation-state is said to encounter difficulties from ‘within’. With the increase in the numbers of immigrants, it is important to ask whether traditional and largely exclusive nation-state ideologies are capable of raising allegiance among these groups of people. Sassen (2003), for instance, discusses the ascendance of transnational identities evident among immigrants tied to transnational households, activists in globalised struggles for human rights and environment, and employees of international organisations and travelling businessmen, whose identities become increasingly denationalised. These groups of people, though still in a minority, demonstrate the debundling of citizenship and national identity.

The second manifestation of globalisation analysed in Articles I and II, concerns the sphere of education. National educational systems are gradually integrated into the complex web of supranational and transnational educational governance. As a result, education policy making is no longer an exclusive affair of the nation-state. The work of international actors is particularly concerned with a global or regional interpretation of shared educational needs and prescription of uniform supranational responses (Mundy & Murphy 2001, 85; also Dale 1999). Political supranationalism and economic supranationalism are the key features and drivers of globalisation, also in the area of education (Green 2003, 86). For Dale (1999), globalisation is carried out by supranational organisations, albeit dominated by the same group of states that were previously involved separately on bilateral terms. Supranational players, for example, organisations such as OECD, World Bank, UNESCO and the EU, represent the “competing imaginary” to that of the national educational system based on the assumption that national systems have reached their “use-by date” (Dale & Robertson 2009).  

4 The findings of the study with respect to the supranational agenda of citizenship education of UNESCO and the COE, documented in Article II, prove this vision overoptimistic, as the agenda is found to be inconsistent and partially repeats the traditional nation-state driven rhetoric.
International organisations function as “standard-setting instruments” for national education policies (McNeely 1995), but their modus operandi is not easy to disentangle. Moutsios (2009, 476), for example, concludes with respect to the work of the World Bank and IMF, the WTO and the OECD that transnational organisations function through “asymmetric, non-democratic and opaque procedures of decision making”. Dale (1999) cites Rosenau’s (1992) notion of “governance without government” to illuminate the globalisation effect of supranational organisations on national education. Governance without government relies on five mechanisms, i.e., harmonisation, dissemination, standardisation, installing interdependence and imposition, to bring about changes at the national level. That being so, the

*distinctiveness of globalization mechanisms lies in their extra-national locus of viability, their use of less ‘direct’ forms of power, the fact that they are externally rather than internally initiated and that their scope, as a result of the paradigm shift brought about by globalization, extends to policy goals as well as to policy processes* [as opposed to mere policy instruments NP] (ibid., 11–12).

For instance, Dimitrov and Boyadjieva (2009, 164) claim that in Bulgaria, Ukraine and other Black Sea countries international organisations “impute to the government the duty of incorporating CE [citizenship education NP] into the national curriculum”. At the same time in Spain the new curriculum ‘Education for citizenship and human rights’ originated from the COE’s recommendation (Engel & Hinderliter Ortloff 2009). The fact that citizenship education is turning into a persistent theme in supranational policy-making manifests a clear extension of supranational educational governance to goals and values in the area of national education fundamental for the survival of the state itself. The nexus of control over citizenship education curriculum still rests with the state (Keating, Hinderliter Ortloff & Philippou 2009). Nevertheless, the supranational agenda-setting interferes with the national government’s autonomous position in defining the terms of citizenship education. As such, it constitutes a significant departure from the principles of national sovereignty and undivided power to govern citizenship and education policies.

This crucial development could be termed a paradigm shift in policy-making assumptions vis-à-vis citizenship education, regarding the place of policy-making and its contents, values and goals. Ramirez, Suarez and Meyer (2006) argue that world standards advance a more universalised model of human rights education which penetrates both organisational links and discursive practices. (Article II.) This statement should be clearly identified with the neo-institutionalist or world culture theory which, due to its centrality in comparative education research, deserves further explication. Developed by John Meyer and his colleagues and students at Stanford University, world culture

---

5 Dimitrov and Boyadjieva apply the term in the sense of active, participatory and critical citizenship education.
theory posits that there is a real global isomorphism of curricular categories across the world irrespective of national economic, political and cultural differences (e.g. Meyer, Boli, Thomas & Ramirez 1997; Dale 2000; Arnove 2009). They rely on macro level data of curricular categories which they admit to being limited and superficial, but simultaneously permitting “an assessment of the range and spread of general curricular topics across countries over long periods of time” (Meyer & Kamens 1992, 168 in Dale 2000, 435). On the basis of this data the researchers claim that educational systems are converging due to and as a manifestation of both the institutionalisation of compulsory schooling around the world rooted in the ideas of Enlightenment and the homogenising impact of international organisations on nation-states perceived as the carriers of the world culture.

However, another group of researchers work at the opposite end of the continuum and draw on cultural anthropology and thick single-country studies to claim that convergence appears only on the level of catchwords and that global agendas are reinterpreted and adopted locally in a multiplicity of ways (see Steiner-Khamsi 2009, 51–52). They claim that

world culture theorists seem to have mistaken 'brand name policy' such as choice, outcomes-based education, student-centred learning, etc., hijacked from one corner of the world and catapulted to another, as heralds of an international convergence of education (ibid., 52).

The work undertaken in the current dissertation benefits from both positions and could be located somewhere between the two opposite poles. It follows the argument of world institutionalists concerning the worldwide consolidation of the nation-state and national compulsory education and in Article II draws on the world institutionalists’ studies to illustrate the convergence of curricula across countries with respect to citizenship education. These studies highlight the centrality of the specifically national model of citizenship education worldwide. Equally, the dissertation treats international organisations as carriers of uniform standards. The dissertation diverges from the world culture theory in that it explores the impact of the national socio-political conditions on citizenship policies. In contrast to the anthropological approach, the dissertation focuses exclusively on the normative political discourses and does not make claims about their reinterpretation and implementation on the micro level.
3.3 Citizenship education, nation-state and globalisation in the light of previous research

The observations described in the preceding section suggest that international actors have given rise to a new type of citizenship education which challenges the national model of citizenship education. With respect to the supranational citizenship education initiatives, Keating (2009) concludes that since the 1990s European (both EU and COE) citizenship education policies manifest a shift from a nationalist model of citizenship education stressing common European cultural roots and identity, and striving to construct a Nation-Europe akin to the nation-states, to a post-national model based primarily on rights, participation, civic principles and the individual. Moreover, there has been a clear departure from a mere ‘European dimension’ in national education toward a broader and stronger promotion of a ‘European citizenship’, though the substance of the European dimension to citizenship education is not always clear, even to the European policy actors themselves (Keating, Hinderliter Ortloff & Philippou 2009, 151).

According to Mary Rauner (1998), who works within the world institutionalist theoretical framework, there has been a worldwide shift from national civic education to global civic education manifest in the growing emphasis on global contents and global perspectives in civic education across countries. She perceives UNESCO as “a major influence in developing and disseminating the worldwide models of civic education”, especially in the areas of human rights, international understanding, the individual and the citizenship expansion (ibid., 21). Rauner’s findings show that linkages to UNESCO are significant predictors of the extent to which countries incorporate global orientation in civic curriculum (1998, also 1999). UNESCO represents an agent of a new post-national orientation toward citizenship studies, which differs from that of the nation-states.6

However, research findings with respect to the shift from the national to the post-national at the nation-state level are ambiguous. Soysal’s and Wong’s (2006) study is interesting in this respect as it compares changes in the education of citizens in European and Asian countries with very different socio-political and historical contexts. First, the researchers depict a general trend across countries to re-evaluate and re-emphasise citizenship education teaching. Second, their study suggests that the examined countries (Japan, China, France, Germany and the UK), despite their different political and societal contexts and modes of textbook and curricula regulation, are moving away from the traditional national model of citizenship education. The nation is still central to the citizenship educational programmes, but it is presented differently. It is located in a broader transnational framework with much less emphasis on wars, national heroes and aggression. Instead, the nation is presented in a more pluralistic (e.g. inclusion of immigrant populations, regional and linguistic diversity, and different societal groups)

6 In this respect, my interpretation of UNESCO’s agenda disagrees with Rauner’s conclusions (Article II).
and civic (rights and duties rather than tradition and culture) manner, adopting a social science approach. What is more, universalistic values, such as human rights, environment, democracy and gender equality are endorsed, which are detached from a strictly national environment. In other words, citizenship virtues and values abandon their national particularity and they are largely determined and advocated transnationally (also Soysal, Bertilotti & Mannitz 2005).

Yet it is too early to claim that there has been a fundamental shift from the national to the post-national citizenship education. Instead, the national and the global/post-national run in tandem (also Article II). For example, the term ‘global citizen’ does not enter the curriculum (Soysal & Wong 2006). Citizenship is still a national phenomenon, even though national citizens are increasingly expected to contribute to the transnational level:

*It is worth noting that, in all our case countries, teaching still emphasises national history, society and citizenship. No perception of a global or transnational citizen emerges as such, but the national is now subject to transnational reflections – this is where it obtains its legitimacy. Citizens are still constructed for a world of competitive nation-states, however, their competitiveness now comes from how much they contribute to what is held to be global, and thus worthy.* (ibid., 85–86.)

The claims that globalisation leads to the debundling of citizenship and nationality (e.g. Delanty 2000) or that the post-national model of citizenship education has outstripped the national one should be critically evaluated in different societies, with the so-called new or reconfigured states providing an interesting and important context for examination. Studies undertaken in political contexts which have experienced rapid and dramatic political changes – transitologies – provide clear counterexamples to any general hypotheses that the bond between citizenship and nationality is becoming obsolete. In Ukraine, for instance, universities and secondary schools are invested with the task of moulding the students into “pure Ukrainians”, whereas history textbooks can even be accused of “nationalism, ethnic intolerance, and chauvinism towards minorities” (Vyshnevs’ky 1996 and Verbitskaya 2003 in Koshmanova 2006, 109). Authoritarian textbooks of the Soviet period are rewritten in a way that replaces communist idols, models and statements with monocultural, ethnocentric Ukrainian models and statements (Sukhomlyns’ka, 2004 in Koshmanova 2006, 116). The European identity has become more popular only since the advent of the Orange Revolution, but it is primarily associated with economic aspects and European living standards, and ignores the political values such as democracy, tolerance, inclusion, human and minority rights, and the rule of law (Filippova 2005 in Koshmanova 2006, 111).

---

7 Kennedy’s (2008) conclusion that nation-states instil national values in global workers resonates with this statement (section 3.2).

8 For further discussion on the nation-building project in Ukraine and the uneasy balance between nation-building and democracy in citizenship education in the Ukrainian context see Article IV.
Studying post-Soviet Kazakhstan, Kissane (2005) points to the antithetical effects of the parallel projects of de-Sovietisation and re-Kazakhification and the development of a World History programme which allows for a multi-ethnic and balanced approach to national identity. These educational endeavours rest on contradictory visions of the meaning of the Kazakh national identity and its place in the world. In this manner, “Kazakhstan fluctuates between strong national determination and a more global view of its identity”, as well as between the contradictory visions of Kazakhstan as a Kazakhstani democratic, secular and inclusive state versus a Kazakh national state (ibid., 65). These controversies manifest profound disagreement and uncertainty as to the meaning of national identity and state ideology. They also reveal that new or reconfigured states are not immune to the global rhetoric stressing active citizenship and multicultural identities, but that these ideals are hard to reconcile with the simultaneous identity crisis and ambiguity with respect to the new pillars of societal unity. Concurrently, the very co-existence of contentious narratives demonstrates that alternative and complementary visions of identity and society are not silenced in the name of nation-building.

3.4 Toward revaluation or renouncement of citizenship education?

The sections above examined tensions inherent in the concept of citizenship and its genealogical link to nationality. They also introduced the contemporary reconfigurations of the relationship between citizenship and nationality, and the changing role of the nation-state as a regulator of education policy. These discussions lead to a set of important conclusions and further theoretical considerations, which frame the empirical study of citizenship education policy in Russia and Finland, and UNESCO and the COE. First, the study of citizenship education should take into account the multidimensionality of the concept of citizenship, that is, its historical development as linked to the formation of the modern nation-state and the ideology of nationalism, and the rights and responsibilities of citizens in a liberal-democratic polity. Second, citizenship education in any society represents a fragile balance of rights and duties, obedience and criticism, participation and individualism, and the balance is sensitive to and reflects changes in the larger socio-political context. For that reason, citizenship, despite claims to universality, is a profoundly historical and embedded concept inseparable from the meaning of the polity itself. Due to this, the analyses of citizenship and nationality and their interrelationship will continue in the ensuing parts of the dissertation (Chapter 6), which explore the recontextualisation of the general concepts in two specific national settings – Russia and Finland.

It is important to understand in what ways globalisation impinges on citizenship, national identity and national states and consequently the traditional rationale of citizenship education. With respect to the impact of globalisation on the state, three
schools of thought exist (Guibernau 2001 in Tønnesson 2004). The first posits that nation-states are undermined or superseded by transnational companies, supranational IGOs and NGOs. According to the second school of thought the state retains its centrality in controlling populations and as the main organisational principle of international society. Moreover, globalisation is likely to engender new waves of nationalism and cultural mobilisation. The third scenario argues that globalisation inevitably transforms the nation-state whose citizens fail to identify exclusively with the national polity (Tønnesson 2004, 180–181).

These broad interpretations are echoed in an array of alternatives depicted by researchers concerning the impact of globalisation on citizenship education. If the link between the citizen and the state is ruptured in the face of globalisation, and citizenship is perceived primarily as one among a myriad of other individual and group identities, then citizenship will be replaced by the freely floating market-oriented individuals. Consequently, states will be likely to relinquish citizenship education altogether, or exchange it for an individualistically oriented curriculum embracing interpersonal competition and enterprise as crucial moral virtues. (Bottery 2003; Law 2004.)

On the other hand, the forces of globalisation leading to the threat of estranging citizens from the realm of the nation-state might force states to adapt rigorous citizenship education programmes. These programmes will be geared to sustaining the legitimacy of the nation-state and stressing the responsibilities of citizens to the state, despite the failure of the latter to fulfil its own, and therefore legitimating the growing disparities caused by 'global forces'. According to this scenario, nation-states will remain the key site of identity, educational governance and political struggle of various groups. (Green 1997; Bottery 2003; Law 2004.) In this respect, it is essential to bear in mind that nation-states encounter crosscutting pressures of responding to transnational capital, global political structures, for example, international organisations and non-governmental agents, and the domestic need to preserve political legitimacy (Burbules & Torres 2000, 10). These intertwined national and supranational challenges inevitably change the nation-state from a sovereign agent to an arbiter balancing internal and external demands and constraints (ibid).

From this perspective, it is unlikely that the nation-state will be able to retain its traditional role and keep the relationship between the nation-state and citizenship intact. On the one hand, the challenge lies in accommodating the intensifying linkages to the global economy and supranational policy-making, and on the other hand, the weakening bond between the state and its citizenry. Consequently, in the third scenario, states will widen the scope of citizenship and add subnational, regional and global dimensions to the traditional national one (Law 2004). In this interpretation, neither is the state becoming redundant nor is citizenship education getting any less meaningful. However, the meaning and function of the two are altered.
4 CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION POLICY AS A RESEARCH SUBJECT

This Chapter introduces the textual data generated in the course of the dissertation and explains the routes to the interpretation of the data. The ensuing debates with respect to UNESCO and the COE illuminate the selection of the international actors and make visible the ways in which this decision shapes and limits the conclusions of the study.

4.1 Education policy texts

Citizenship education is said to refer to a multidisciplinary subject with contested and extremely varied curricula content (Arthur, Davies & Hahn 2008, 6). That being so a researcher of citizenship education is puzzled over the question of where to look for evidence of citizenship education in compulsory schooling. Contents serving the broader aims of political and national socialisation are integrated into the school curricula under different titles, for example, civics, social studies, personal and moral education, government, history, religion, geography, mother tongue, foreign languages and even biology, as well as themes that cut across different subjects (ibid; Steiner-Khamsi 2002; Aapola, Gordon & Lahelma 2003; European Commission 2005). Citizens are also constructed in everyday practices in schools (Gordon, Kumulainen & Lempääinen 2002; Aapola, Gordon & Lahelma 2003). The fact that the system of state-led mass schooling emerged parallel to the formation of the nation-state as an imperative mechanism of connecting individuals and states implies that the entire school system is invested with the duty of raising citizens (Meyer, Ramirez & Soysal 1992; Aapola, Gordon & Lahelma 2003).

This dissertation is essentially about the changing ways to uphold the bond between the citizen and the state in the context of domestic and global political change. Citizenship education provides the means to uphold state power by assuring, ideally, popular support of the citizens. Consequently, the objectives of citizenship education rely on and reflect the ideological and pragmatic concerns of the state as a key institution of educational provision and control. As I am primarily concerned with the relationship between the state and citizenship education, I anchor the analysis in the education policy documents issued by the Russian and Finnish state authorities when exploring the objectives of and
argumentation behind citizenship education policies.

The empirical analysis is based on a qualitative reading of 41 (approximately 480 pages) Russian education policy documents, 15 (approximately 590 pages) Finnish documents and 18 documents (approximately 180 pages) issued by UNESCO and the COE. All documents were read in their original languages and the citations used in the articles were translated by the author. Only a minority of the national documents carry the term ‘citizenship education’ in their title, as a school subject under this name does not exist in either Finland or Russia.¹ As a result, a larger group of documents belongs to the category of general documents which define the main objectives and standards of formal education, for example, laws, governmental programmes, curricula guidelines and committee reports. The latter type of document is only present in the Finnish case. Its nature differs from the Russian documents produced mainly by state bureaucrats in that they constitute a sort of intermediary institution between the governing bodies and the larger society. Nevertheless, state institutions set up the committees in order to articulate a predetermined socio-political problem and propose concrete ways to address it (Hovi et al. in Vuorikoski 1999, 65–66). I have not systematically considered the nature of the examined documents per se, that is, their mode of production and place in the documentary hierarchy. However, these factors undoubtedly influence the content of the documents. For one thing, the place of the document in the documentary hierarchy determines what rhetorical persuasive tools are used to mobilise the reader. The agenda can be presented as uncontested facts arranged as a list of bullet points which do not require further justification (as in laws, governmental programmes etc.). Alternatively, it can be embedded in the particular descriptions of and arguments about the current state of affairs domestically and internationally, which lead somewhat naturally to the concrete prescriptions advocated in the documents (cf. Atkinson & Coffey 1997).

Finally, I include documents which focus on history and social sciences teaching, geography and language teaching (the state-wide official languages) – the school subjects which are invested with the citizenship education task most clearly, and documents on political and moral education, which mainly refer to the Russian documents on upbringing (vospitanie). The document materials are predominantly limited to the realm of compulsory education, except the laws and governmental programmes that address the entire system of formal education.²

The criteria for the identification of the relevant data were based on the idea that the data should be representative of the historical period under examination and therefore

¹ In England, for instance, following the report of Citizenship Advisory Group (also known as the ‘Crick Report’), citizenship was introduced as a new statutory National Curriculum subject for all students age 11 to 16 in secondary schools since the academic year 2002. A non-statutory framework of citizenship and PSHE (Personal Social and Health Education) for primary schools (pupils age 5 to 11) was introduced already in 2000. (Council of Europe 2009.)

I have sought to include all state-authored education policy documents which address citizenship and national identity in this period. My interest in the contested nature of citizenship education as a battlefield for different political visions also required such a holistic approach. In order to understand the course of development in citizenship education – changes in the rationales and temporary political settlements since the 1990s – I wanted to understand the point of departure, that is, the state of affairs prior to the collapse of the bipolar world and the political processes it has set in motion. Therefore, I therefore analysed a set of education policy documents produced in the latter half of the 1980s in Finland and Russia. In the Russian case, the scarcity of documents available in the journal *Vestnik Obrazovania* (the Education Messenger), perhaps characteristic of the confusion inflicted by Mikhail Gorbachev’s *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (reconstruction) as to the role of education in the political transformation has made this endeavour rather cursive.

Most of the online documents were collected with the help of the official websites of the Russian and Finnish governments and education ministries. When I came across references to documents which were not available on the official websites, I searched for them by their titles in *Google* or a Russian search machine *Yandex*. The documents unavailable in an electronic format, that is, the Finnish committee reports and the curricular guidelines for 1985 and 1994, as well as the Russian documents of the late 1980s and the early and mid 1990s were collected in libraries. The Russian documents were copied from the ministerial periodical *Vestnik Obrazovania* which is the only official journal of the Russian Ministry of Education published in 12 to 24 issues annually for the purpose of publicising educational legislation. Despite many Russian documents being available online, I double-checked my pool of documents by going through all the issues of *Vestnik Obrazovania* published between 1989 and 2007. However, when going through the journal, I noticed that some documents available online and referred to in the documents which came to my possession earlier, were not cited in the journal. For that reason the journal is not a fully reliable source of document accumulation on its own. In this respect it is important to bear in mind that documents are not isolated from one another. Instead, they constitute a documentary space or a chain by referring to other documents. Therefore, one way to identify relevant documents is to look for the references they make to other existing legislation and programmes.

Overall, the documents analysed in the course of the research discuss matters related to citizenship, national identity and the role of the state in various forms. Laws do it in a very narrow and concise fashion by simply declaring the objectives of education and specifying the role of schooling in society. Curriculum materials and ministerial circulars identify objectives and contents for specific school subjects and they often explain the function of the subject in greater detail. In addition to articulating the main objectives of teaching and learning, they reveal the themes to be covered and the attitudes, skills and information to be transmitted to the students. Some documents, that is, the Russian
programmes of upbringing and patriotic education and the Finnish committee reports contextualise policy objectives by discussing broad societal and political changes and their impact on education.

The written sources – the state-produced policy documents – could be classified as data recorded without the intervention of the researcher (Silverman 2005, 119). The national documents analysed in the dissertation were produced by governments and ministries and are publicly available online or as hard copies. According to the classification of documents suggested by Scott (1990), who arranges sources along the dimensions of access and authorship, the documents employed in the dissertation belong to the category of open-published official state documents and they represent the largest class of documents available for research.

Despite the fact that documents are produced without influence on the part of the researcher, it is the researcher who decides which documents become the research data by generating criteria for their selection. Also, documents are products of complex political negotiations and manifestations of power balance in society. Consequently, it is important to understand why policy documents are produced and what they are expected to accomplish, whose positions they advocate and who they primarily address (Atkinson & Coffey 1997, 47; also Vuorikoski 1999; McCulloch 2004; Silverman 2005). As documents are bureaucratic records of the modern state, they are only capable of illuminating the official discourses of political elites (McCulloch 2004, 26).

Policy could be defined as any course of action or inaction relating to the selection of goals, the definition of values or the allocation of resources (Olssen, Codd & O’Neill 2004, 71). Consequently, policy is fundamentally about the exercise of political power, that is, regulation of social practices, and the language that is used to justify this process (Olssen, Codd & O’Neill 2004; Dunne, Pryor & Yates 2005). On a different level, policy can be understood as “being about conceptually ordering reality and by so doing helping to construct our identities”, in other words, what it means to be a social worker, teacher or citizen (Dunne, Pryor & Yates 2005, 111). Policy constitutes a discourse of the state, which is “by its very nature political and must be understood as part and parcel of the political structure of society and as a form of political action” (Olssen, Codd & O’Neill 2004, 71). Documents are therefore inseparable from the work of the nation-state and constitute its system of surveillance and social control (Scott 1990, 59). Also, the state represents unevenly the influence of different groups and sectors of society, and, as a result, state policy is inevitably ideological in its nature and effects (Olssen, Codd & O’Neill 2004, 71). Nation-states and their rising bureaucracies have generated records of their developments, encounters with interest groups and policies (McCulloch 2004, 12). In this manner, documents both transcribe the modern state and its constituent institutions, as well as symbolise the very existence of the state.

Policy analysis either provides information for policy production or it constitutes a critical examination of existing policies. The former has been termed analysis for policy,
and the latter is the analysis of policy (Gordon et al. 1977, 28 in Olssen, Codd & O’Neill 2004, 72). The analysis of policy can take two forms: 1) analysis of policy determination and effects which examines “the inputs and transformational processes operating upon the construction of public policy” and the effects of such policies on various groups; and 2) analysis of policy content, which examines the values, assumptions and ideologies underpinning the policy process. (Olssen, Codd & O’Neill 2004, 72.) The dissertation is concerned with the latter form of policy analysis, that is, it reads the policy content and the socio-political context within which these policies are produced. This approach could be termed deconstructive or transgressive, in that it attempts to go beyond the text and make present the ideological and political absences within the text (Dunne, Pryor & Yates 2005, 115, 125). It works within the text’s own system of beliefs and values and borrows devices from within the text to use them upon and against it (Parker 1997, 68 in ibid., 115).

4.2 Studying policy content and argumentation

My main interest in the objectives of and argumentation behind citizenship education and their change over time has led me to focus on ‘what is said’, that is, what are the stated objectives and contents of citizenship education and how they are justified. For that reason, I am not concerned with the usage of the linguistic strategies – the ‘how it is said’ question – when reading the documents. In addition to the ‘what’ question, the dissertation seeks to interpret the findings of the policy analysis and thus answer the ‘why it is said’ question, that is, why one policy objective was declared rather than another. It is the interpretative task of the dissertation that relies on the deep understanding of the case contexts enhanced by the comparative approach (see Chapter 5). The questions which have guided the document analysis are:

1) What are the objectives of citizenship education and whether these objectives change with time?
2) What arguments are employed to justify the proposed objectives?
3) What contents are attached to citizenship, national identity (nationality) and the nation-state in the documents more generally?

Preoccupation with the meaning of the texts does not imply that the dissertation is invested with the task of finding the authentic ‘true’ meaning of the text. The view of the nature of the text embraced in the dissertation draws on social constructivism, which perceives language as actively construing particular versions of reality, while silencing or invalidating others. Different discourses and systems of meaning compete with each other, consequently, educational problems and their solutions can be defined in
different and often contradictory ways. Accordingly, the purpose of the dissertation is not to evaluate the accuracy of policy statements, but to make visible and analyse the aims of citizenship education within the reality construed in the policy documents. In other words, the examined documents are perceived as particular hegemonic versions of reality within which the suggested political action appears natural and commonsensical. Thus, policy objectives are studied together and inseparably from the justifications and descriptions of the social context employed in the documents, where such articulations are present.

In this respect, the dissertation employs a strategy borrowed from the rhetorical analysis which studies the ways to persuade and influence in discursive or textual practices (Edwards, Nicoll, Solomon & Usher 2004, 3). I found particularly valuable the concept of exigence which signifies the problem that demands urgent response (ibid). Educational policies are usually produced as a response to a particular problem and the problem offers a legitimate context for the policy. Problems are often turned into “crisis narratives”, which “provide an imperative for policy action and therefore invest situations with political importance, almost regardless of the relative weight of evidence and analysis by all concerned” (ibid., 132). In other words, the ‘problems’ and ‘crises’ documented in the policy documents do not reflect or pass objective judgement on the state of affairs in society, but instead they reveal the means for the state to legitimise policy. As a result, documents provide means for understanding government rhetoric that legitimises particular change, constructs possibilities but simultaneously excludes other policy options (Ball 1990 in McCulloch 2004, 80).

Therefore, as Bacchi (2000, 48) argues, “it is inappropriate to view governments are responding to ‘problems’ that exist out there’ (…). Rather ‘problems’ are ‘created’ or ‘given shape’ in the very policy proposals that are offered as ‘responses’”. Such a conceptualisation of educational problems draws on the policy-as-discourse approach which perceives policy not as separate from and a response to the existing conditions, but as “a discourse in which both problems and solutions are created” (Goodwin 1996, 67 in ibid.). Consequently, the focus of policy-as-discourse theorists is not on problems, but on problematisations (Kritzman 1988, 257 in ibid.). The problematisations set limits on what can be said and thus become part of the resolution itself. In other words, “the form of a question may block us from seeing solutions to problems that become visible through a different question” (Postman 1992, 126 in ibid., 50). Thus, political battles occur not just at the level of resolution, but at the level of problematisations, too, if such a distinction is altogether plausible.

Documents, in contrast to interviews, preserve genuine historical insight (Hodder 1994, 393). They offer a significant medium to discover and understand how a given society has developed and where it continues to develop. Importantly, from the

---

3 Compare this view to the ‘moral panics’ described in section 2.1.
perspective of the dissertation, documents can equally reveal tensions between the past and the present. (McCulloch 2004.) Consequently, at best, document analysis may shed light on shifts in policy rationales. For instance, to refer to a concrete example from the dissertation, in the beginning of the 1990s national schools for ethnic communities were perceived as a key means to prevent the disintegration of the state, construct stability and cohesion, while from the end of the 1990s state unity and the existence of national schools are perceived as incompatible (Article V; Piattoeva 2010).

In the course of the research I conducted thematic interviews with education specialists and civil servants working in Russia and Finland. However, the policy documents constitute the primary data of the dissertation with the interviews playing a complementary role in the sense that they provided me with an initial entry into the field of citizenship education. These interviews, conducted at the early stage of the research, gave me an opportunity for interactive reflection about citizenship education policies with people involved in the policy process. However, I found the interviews problematic in that the interviewees reflected on the past on the basis of their current position. From early on it was clear that the study would not be concerned with what the interviewees would say about the subject matter in retrospect. Neither does the research focus on the process of policy production prior to the publication of any given document. Interviews could potentially be used to reveal what has happened behind the scenes, but I found it particularly hard to break the ‘power talk’ and compel the state civil servants to reveal the politics behind the policy. At the end, concentrating on one type of data clarified the empirical work, and the breadth of the documentary materials provided rich and multifaceted information to explore the questions posed in the dissertation.

The methods of working with the national level data (Articles III–V) share some common features but also exhibit differences from article to article. In all the articles, the analysis proceeds from the close reading of the documents and the identification of relevant instances to their categorisation under the general themes, such as democracy, nation-building and globalisation. The relevant instances were identified with the help of key words, i.e. citizenship, nation-state, national culture, national identity, national cohesion, rights, duties, national language etc. Also, in all the articles policy formulations were examined together with the discussions which seek to validate them. From there on, the means of working with the texts diverge. In Article III, relevant instances were grouped under the broad themes of nation-building and democratisation and the contents of the two categories were consequently compared to one another. This approach revealed that citizenship education is expected to serve both democratising and nation-building purposes, but the twin task engenders antithetical citizen ideals which coexist in the policy space. In Articles IV and V, documents were read specifically in a chronological order so as to identify the temporary policy settlements starting prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union up until recently. Summaries of the documents, containing brief outlines of educational objectives and argumentations behind them, helped to identify
how the task of citizenship education has changed and which arguments were employed to validate the changes.

4.3 Supranational agenda – UNESCO and the COE – as a research target

In the current study, the evolving supranational citizenship education agenda is perceived as a potential rival to the national citizenship education policies, and one of the aims of the research is to test the accuracy of this assumption (research task 1). I therefore concentrate on the main tenets of the national and supranational agendas to examine possible conflict and convergence between the two. In this way, I attempt to address one of the current methodological challenges of comparative education, that is, to transcend state-centric epistemologies without resorting to the state’s negation (Article I).

The study of the supranational context, documented in Article II, is concerned with UNESCO and the COE. The analysis is based on official documents, including programmes of action, declarations, recommendations and resolutions explicitly concerned with the matters of citizenship and human rights education. These materials represent the common agenda promoted by the organisations. I also studied citizenship and human rights education websites of UNESCO and the COE in order to get a general overview of the current and past activities, their objectives and arguments. Both Finland and Russia are member-states of the two organisations and references to their work can be found in national education policy documents.

The policies of UNESCO and the COE, with respect to citizenship, have been less examined compared to the ones produced by the EU. Perhaps the formal status of the EU citizenship and the educational repercussions that it is expected to generate explain why studies of the European (EU) citizenship education and its effects on national citizenship education have been more prevalent (e.g. Ollikainen 2000; Balibar 2005; Soysal & Schissler 2005; Engel & Hinderliter Ortloff 2009). However, the EU is not the only supranational agent aspiring to shape national citizenship education. The COE is a pan-European organisation encompassing 47 member states, from Portugal to Azerbaijan, with very diverse national, religious, linguistic and political composition. That being so its education policies are expected to influence a large and highly diverse geographical area. Although academics have generally acknowledged the COE’s citizenship education agenda and refer to it when discussing citizenship education in Europe and national citizenship education activities (e.g. Naval, Print & Veldhuis 2002; Osler & Starkey 2006; Starkey 2008), there has been little analysis of the main tenets of this agenda as such (with the exception of Forrester (2003), and the very recent publications by Keating (2009) and Keating, Hinderliter Ortloff & Philippou (2009)). This state of affairs signifies that from an analytical perspective, the COE’s supranational agenda is often ignored, perhaps due to its supposedly weak influence in comparison to the authority of the EU.
Keating (2009, 141) argues, referring to Corbett (2005), that by the late 1960s member states of the COE grew increasingly unhappy about the institutional inefficiencies of the organisation and started looking at the EU for new ways of educational cooperation. This institutional shift

opened the door for new modes of European educational cooperation, but it also marked the beginning of a new phase in European citizenship education policy. Developments in citizenship education policy were dominated by the European Union for the next 20 years (…) (Keating 2009, 141).

Thus it is the presumed ineffectiveness of the COE, together with the absence of the formal basis of a pan-European citizenship akin to the one established by the Treaty of European Union signed in Maastricht in 1992, that makes the study of the EU citizenship education policies more meaningful. However, it has been striking to observe that the term ‘education for democratic citizenship’, coined by the COE at the Heads of State and Government meeting in October 1997 and the title of the COE’s ongoing citizenship education project, has entered academic and education policy vocabulary far beyond the COE’s own activities.

UNESCO, with its extensive membership of 192 states, has played an important role in emphasising international education and fostering respect for the rule of law, human rights, dignity of the human person and fundamental freedoms (Rauner 1998, 74–75). The importance of education for democracy was acknowledged at the International Forum on Education for Democracy in Tunis in December 1992, and in the World Plan of Action on Education for Human Rights and Democracy adopted after an International Congress on Education for Human Rights and Democracy held in Montreal in March of 1993 (ibid., 83). Democracy was also an important topic in a conference on civic education for Central and East European countries in 1995 (ibid., 84). Rauner observes a significant change in the democracy education of UNESCO. Namely that in the first period (1949–1969) the proclaimed democratisation of education implied democratising access to schooling, in other words the equality of opportunity. Later, UNESCO began to emphasise democracy in terms of teaching it as a political system. (ibid., 84–85.)

UNESCO and the COE should be distinguished from other major international agencies in that their stated key mission is to promote a more just democratic world order. The extended membership and the aforementioned political agenda, along with their modest financial resources, distinguish UNESCO and the COE from other large-scale intergovernmental actors, for example, the EU, the World Bank and the OECD. Therefore it is essential to bear in mind that their educational philosophy is not necessarily shared by the entire spectrum of intergovernmental organisations. (Article II.) With respect to

---

4 Article IV contains an introduction to the Education for Democratic Citizenship (EDC) project of the COE, which is the reason why this section focuses primarily on the work of UNESCO in the field of citizenship education.
the IMF, the OECD, G7, the World Bank and regional organisations such as the EU, North American Free Trade Area and the Asia Development Bank, Dale (1999, 4) writes that while international organisations have “different, albeit often overlapping, missions, approaches and capacities”, they are all driven “by a broad set of ideological preferences that have developed as the ‘orthodox’ response to the problems posed to rich countries by changing global economic circumstances”. The common ideology pursued by these institutions has been given the label ‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson 1993 in ibid.).

In Kallo’s (2009, 96) interviews with the OECD professionals and academics working in the field of supranational education policy, the COE, when compared to the work of the OECD, was perceived as “far less economically driven” and “far away from what the OECD is doing”. Concerning UNESCO, the OECD professionals stressed the difference in the operational culture of the two organisations, with UNESCO addressing a much more diverse audience and having a heavier bureaucracy. These comments suggest that international organisations pursue diverse agendas, though it is possible to group them according to ideological stances, geographical scope, membership and types of activities pursued. Kallo (2009) notes that globalisation fosters competition between international organisations; however, cooperation in overlapping areas of activity enhances their power and reinforces their authority.
This chapter discusses the comparative framework of the dissertation and thus construes the particular methodological and theoretical lenses for the national cases analysed in the next chapter.

The comparative dimension of the dissertation has often prompted questions from fellow researchers and readers of the early article manuscripts and conference presentations. For some, Russia would appear as a fascinating and complicated case in its own right, while for the others massive differences between the cases would preclude any possibility of meaningful comparison. These questions have forced me to revisit the comparative framework of the research time and again in order to refine its *tertium comparationis*, that is, generate, justify and apply the specific dimension against which the cases could be compared and interpreted (Steiner-Khamsi 2009, 53). In the following, I indicate which comparative strategy was employed in the research and explore its advantages and limitations.

### 5.1 Individualising comparison

In the dissertation, the attributes of macro-social units are employed in explanatory statements (cf. Ragin 1987). This means that instead of merely pointing to similarities and differences in citizenship education policies in the examined countries, the study attempts to explain them in terms of variations between macro elements, that is, the perceptions of state, nation, nationality, and citizenship in the Russian and Finnish political contexts. In this way, the dissertation adheres to the concept of comparative education synthesised, for instance, by Broadfoot (1999; also Article I). She writes that comparative education is *not*

(...) *descriptive accounts of 'what is', however carefully done. It is not de-contextualised comparisons of particular dimensions, [as] they lack the theoretical framework that is essential to justifying the drawing of any conclusions from the gathered data.* (ibid., 29.)

As Broadfoot (1999) emphasises, careful theoretisation of the context is the prerequisite of educational comparison. This understanding of comparative education stresses that
comparative education studies the interplay between education and society in different contexts, and that in order to interpret variation in the educational phenomenon we need to analyse the context within which it occurs. This line of thought is congruent with the classical logic of comparison based on the search for concomitant variation (Tilly 1984).

The comparative setting of the dissertation comes close to what has been termed ‘individualising comparison’ by Tilly (1984) and ‘contrast of contexts’ by Skocpol and Somers (1980). In this method, the point is “to contrast specific instances of a given phenomenon as a means of grasping the peculiarities of each case” (Tilly 1984, 82), as well as “to bring out the unique features of each particular case included in (...) discussions, and to show how these unique features affect the working–out of putatively general social processes” (Skocpol & Somers 1980, 178). The logic of the individualising comparison is well captured by the metaphor of the mirror: one national setting is treated as a reversing mirror that sheds light on the distinct characteristics of the other case (cf. Tilly 1984, 90).  

In this manner, the cases offer a commentary on one another’s character (Geertz 1971 in Skocpol & Somers 1980, 179) and therefore “increase the ‘visibility’ of one structure by contrasting it with another” (Bendix 1977, 16–17 in Skocpol & Somers 1980, 180). These qualities of the comparative approach have been highlighted also by comparative education researchers who claim, for instance, that cross-societal and cross-cultural comparison “makes the familiar strange” and functions as a “cultural critique of ourselves”, meaning that it reveals the taken for granted assumptions and practices in our home societies (Article I; Broadfoot 1999, 26; Sadler 1900 in Phillips 1999, 18; Fischer 1986 in Mason 2007, 192).

In the dissertation, the highly homogeneous nation-state with a strong historical bond between nationality and citizenship (Finland) is contrasted to a heterogeneous empire-state which fixed nationality and citizenship to different levels of the state system (Russia). The second dimension of reflection is attributed to the fact that Finland represents a stable nation-state which faces the need to redefine national identity and its relationship with the global system relatively secure with its state borders and the legitimacy of state institutions. Russia, on the other hand, is a recently reconfigured state which encounters globalisation simultaneously with the dramatic disintegration of the state, and uncertainty with respect to the new political ideology and the national idea that would resonate with the people.

The unit of analysis deployed in the study is the national state and the arguments and conclusions presented in the dissertation apply to the national level. This point should be borne in mind in the light of the political structure and educational administration in the studied countries. In both Russia and Finland, decision-making with respect

---

1 For the purpose of simplification of expression, I use the term ‘individualising comparison’ to encompass both Tilly’s ‘individualising comparison’ and Skocpol’s and Somers’s ‘contrast of contexts’ because their comparative logic is similar. Also, the authors refer to the same example – Richard Bendix’s Kings or People – when illustrating the application of this type of comparison.
to compulsory schooling is decentralised and we can expect variation between municipalities in Finland and regions and municipalities in Russia as to the interpretation and implementation of the state-authored policies.\(^2\)

The advantage of the individualising method lies in its integral treatment of cases as irreducible wholes with complex and unique sociohistorical configurations (Skocpol & Somers 1980, 178). The analytical return is maximised when as different cases as possible are chosen for comparison, giving most value to clearcut differences between the cases (ibid., 179). Attention to the integrity of cases means that research is often concerned with a small number of cases as opposed to a large number at high levels of abstraction. It is likely that familiarity with historical circumstances and particular characteristics of the cases will decline if research deals with many cases (Tilly 1984, 77). After all, comparative study is a labour-intensive research and only allows mastery of a handful of cases (Haydu 1998, 342).\(^3\) In comparative education research, the method of contrast has often led to ideologically driven and de-contextualised dichotomisation of cases, as well as to primary concern with and emphasis on difference (Steiner-Khamsi 2009).\(^4\) The individualising comparison method documented in this chapter, while drawing on the notions of difference and contrast, is careful to highlight the importance of understanding the context in its entirety to avoid de-contextualisation. Preoccupation with difference advocated by Skocpol and Somers (1980) could divert attention from

\(^2\) In Finland, the Basic Education Act regulates which subjects are included in the curriculum and student counselling. The Government decides on the curricula timeframe by defining the minimum number of lessons for core subjects in basic education. Concerning the national core curriculum and its relation to the local curriculum, the Finnish Board of Education states the following: “The national core curriculum is determined by the Finnish National Board of Education. It includes the objectives and core contents of different subjects, as well as the principles of pupil assessment, special-needs education, pupil welfare and educational guidance. The principles of a good learning environment, working approaches as well as the concept of learning are also addressed in the core curriculum. The present national core curriculum for basic education was confirmed in January 2004 and it was introduced in schools in August 2006. The education providers, usually the local education authorities and the schools themselves draw up their own curricula for pre-primary and basic education within the framework of the national core curriculum. These curricula may be prepared for individual municipalities or institutions or include both sections”. (FNBE 2009.) In Russia, the Law on Education (1997 [1992]) sealed the tripartite organisation of the curriculum dividing it into three distinct components: the federal one taking up to 75 per cent of the teaching time and compulsory for state accredited state, municipal and nonstate educational institutions, and the remaining 30 per cent divided between the regional and the school components. The latest amendment to the Article 7 of the Law on Education (2008 [1992]) abolished the tripartite education standard and replaced it with a single federal standard.

\(^3\) Comparative studies are also labour-intensive in terms of the linguistic and interpretation skills they often necessitate. They rely on data from different countries and cultures, whose collection and analysis requires much time and contextual sensitivity.

\(^4\) Steiner-Khamsi (2009) illustrates her point by drawing on the examples from the US comparative education research during the Cold War era. These studies often contrasted the US education model with that of the Soviet Union in order to understand the unprecedented technological success of the Soviets. Mainly for ideological reasons, the similarities between the cases were never addressed out loud.
similarities between the cases and therefore lead to abrupt binary positioning of cases.

One of the key limitations of the method lies in the fact that it does not aim at inferring general explanations. Skocpol and Somers (1980, 192) argue that comparative historians who apply this type of methodology pursue their research with a sort of “self-denying ordinance’ against endeavours to develop new explanations”. In other words, the descriptive holism characteristic of this method precludes the development of explanatory arguments (ibid., 193). In this respect one should bear in mind that Skocpol’s and Somers’s discussion is embedded in the discipline of history and its methodology. In comparative social sciences, which aim at explaining variation, a different stance is also possible. Haydu (1998, 342) asserts that while individualising comparisons discourage generalisation, they rely on descriptive accuracy in search of an adequate explanation of particular outcomes. Consequently, explanations arise not from the comparative practice per se, but from acquiring a deeper understanding of the cases by means of contrasting their various instances with one another. In the dissertation, the variation between the cases, made transparent by contrasting cases with each other, contributes to explaining differences in the phenomena under study, that is, the reconfigurations of citizenship education and the relationship between citizenship and nationality as expressed in the education policy documents.

In this respect, the logic of individualisation is combined with the logic of variation-finding. The latter seeks to “establish a principle of variation in the character or intensity of a phenomenon by examining systematic differences among instances” (Tilly 1984, 82). Often, variation-finding comparisons seek to infer causation, that is, establish which variation is crucial in causing variation in the outcome(s). The logic of variation strengthens the individualisation approach by drawing attention to variation in instances meaningful for the interpretation of the phenomenon. In the dissertation, the variation focuses on the relationship between nationality and citizenship and its consequence for and manifestations in citizenship education. The combination of several sets of comparative logic is not uncommon; Tilly suggests that almost all comparison would be variation-finding as the very logic of comparison rests with variation between cases (ibid., 116). However, a mixture of logics can lead to ambiguity in the ultimate message of the research (Skocpol & Somers 1980, 190).

With respect to the mixed comparative logic of the dissertation, we could express the ambiguity by asking whether the purpose of the research is to infer or at least suggest a causal generalisation that could be tested further across other types of cases or to highlight the individuality of each case. Adopting from Bendix (1976, 247 in ibid., 180), the present dissertation asks the same question of divergent materials, that is, different socio-political and school systems, leaving room for divergent answers. The aim is to make more explicit and understandable the ways in which diverse societies have responded to the common modern challenge of retaining legitimacy and unity. In this manner, generalisations take the form of recurrent dilemmas which are resolved
differently in different contexts and the aim of the research is to answer why one solution was pursued rather than another (Haydu 1998; Steiner-Khamsi 2009). This being so, explanations cannot be generalised beyond the studied cases. Nevertheless, they point to instances that should be considered but not automatically expected to carry explanatory power in a different time-space setting. In this manner, the inductive approach adopted in the dissertation could pave the way for a more deductive methodology and inclusion of new cases.

As has been argued in Article I, globalisation literature lacks a truly global perspective, as it often makes generalisations and far-reaching conclusions on the basis of limited empirical evidence, often focusing on Western countries (e.g. Tikly 2001). Also, the customary preoccupation with stable European states where the nation-state is easily taken for granted has turned the nation-state into an explanatory category rather than one in need of analysis and explanation itself (cf. Dale & Robertson 2009). These assumptions lose ground once the research setting is relocated to new or recently reconfigured states. Comparing a reconfigured state to a stable state allows for the probation of antithetical hypotheses in settings which represent qualitatively different state traditions and levels of stability. For instance, does citizenship education in a reconfigured state cater exclusively for the nation-state, whereas a stable nation-state loses interest in, and a need for, citizenship education altogether or allows subnational and supranational categories to dominate? This question is linked to a broader issue, namely does a reconfigured nation-state primarily attempt to reconcile nationality and citizenship and therefore strengthen the bond between the state and the nation, whereas a stable nation-state fosters divorce between the two? These dichotomous statements were at the background of the research as hypotheses to be explored through the education policy data. The analysis of the documents demonstrates whether the presumed dichotomy can be sustained.
In order to interpret the evolution of citizenship education policies in times of political change, it is necessary to understand and analytically designate the socio-political and historical contexts within which the change occurs. The aim of this chapter is to substantiate the comparative framework of the dissertation by analysing Russian and Finnish state traditions and current dilemmas faced by the two countries. The comparative framework of the research is based on the idea that contemporary Russia and Finland have inherited qualitatively different state models and therefore carry different socio-political, cultural and historical legacies. Both have had to find solutions to the task of forging stability, peace and legitimacy amidst internal heterogeneity, but have relied on different policies to handle the matter. In relation to globalisation, the cases of Russia and Finland present the researcher with an opportunity to study how disparate states address the challenges of global integration.

The specific qualities of the two states are briefly discussed and compared in Article V, as well as in Articles III and IV with respect to Russia, and some issues discussed in the following text replicate the articles. However, this chapter seeks to provide the reader with a more detailed and comprehensive comparative analysis of the state contexts crucial to the interpretation of citizenship education policies.

6.1 Empire-state and nation-state as contested categories

6.1.1 On the nation-state
Since the French and American revolutions, the nation-state emerged as the predominant and almost the only legitimate model of political organisation and a vehicle of collective identity (Smith 1998, 70). It came into being with the advent of the doctrine of nationalism with two major consequences. First, nationalism as a ‘civic religion’, to borrow Hobsbawm’s (1987) expression, served the interests of the emerging bureaucratic secular state. From this perspective, nationalism provided a means of connecting people to this modern institution. Second, nationalism asserted that nations should strive for more autonomy because the highest measure of national freedom is possession of an independent state (Habermas 1994).

Nationalism, therefore, emerged as both a form of homogenising and unifying policy
of the state, as well as a political movement striving to overtake, mould or withdraw from the state. In other words, the nation can be evoked as a legitimate justification for almost opposite political projects, that is, state-wide unifying policies and separatist claims. In this connection, it is necessary to discuss the meaning of the nation and its link with the ideology of nationalism because the key attribute of the nation-state is the state’s close affiliation to the nation. The definitions of the nation range from objective/normative to subjective/self-reflexive and from premordialist (realist) to modernist and constructivist. In the modernist perception, the nation is defined in terms of nationalism and the struggle for political autonomy, whereas in the premordialist view nations represent human collectives with distinct and rather permanent cultural features akin to ethnic communities. In the constructivist interpretation, the nation is perceived as an imagined community within which there is a general belief in the objective nature of the nation and a desire to attain self-governance (e.g. Anderson 1991). The perspective adopted in this study shares with the constructivist and modernist position the idea that nations are products of nationalism; they are created and maintained as an artefact of nationalism. As Levy (2004 in Norman 2006) has stated, the political programme of nationalism is built into the category of the nation to start with; nations and nationalism are inseparable and the former cannot be understood without the latter.

However, it is difficult to define nationalism per se. It could be described as a process of building and maintaining nations or nation-states, a mental consciousness and worldview, or a political ideology and a political movement which strives to realise the will of the nation (Smith 2001). Nationalism could also be identified with the rhetoric of forming and maintaining nations. In fact the rhetorical or discursive element is particularly important. Nationalism as discourse (Calhoun 1997; also Billig 2002) goes beyond the debate of whether nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds that the nation and the state should be congruent (Gellner 1983) or manifests an entire form of seeing and interpreting the world (Billig 2002). Rather, nationalism is a rhetoric that can be employed to justify very different political projects including, but not being limited to, the construction and maintenance of the modern territorial state. The usage of nationalistic arguments in very diverse political projects manifests their political and social credibility.

As has been noted by Smith (1998) and Breully (1993), nationalism plays an important role in maintaining nation-states and the political project to obtain and exercise state power. For Breully (1993), nationalism is principally a form of opposition politics, while the state-led governmental nationalism is more difficult to define. Nonetheless, the link between nationalist politics and the state has remained weak only for as long as the nation was not yet conceived as the basic source of political legitimacy of the state. The situation reversed once the nation itself became the main source of political legitimation. (ibid.) Anderson (1991, 86–87, 109–111) also stresses that official state nationalisms developed after and in reaction to the popular national movements. They “concealed a discrepancy
between nation and dynastic realm” (ibid., 110). Eventually, dynastic and imperial states were either relatively successfully transformed into nation-states (Britain, France) or disintegrated into a number of independent nation-states (the fate of the Hapsburg, Russian and Soviet empires). In the increasingly nationalistic political culture, imperial explosions and the following construction of nation-states were commonly perceived as natural and legitimate processes. This way, nationalism successfully disguises the artificial character of the nation-state itself.

The hegemony of the national(ist) state model is obvious (Castles 2005, 690). It suggests that genuine societies are only those where social, cultural and political dimensions coincide (McCrone & Kiely 2000, 23). As a result people claiming to constitute a nation strive to form an independent state and can be recognised as such by the international community. Moreover, states continue to assert that they are composed of and represent a unitary nation even when the multicultural composition of their citizenry is more than obvious. In this context, new states are likely to seek a stronger bond between nationality and citizenship, often at the expense of their ethnic minorities.

To recapitulate, nation-states, ideally, possess the following unique features: there is a common assumption that the political jurisdiction (the state) coincides with the cultural grouping (the nation) and correspondingly citizenship and nationality are perceived as two sides of the same coin. The government is just only when supported by popular will and when it can claim to serve the interests of ‘the people’ and ‘the nation’. And finally, individuals are perceived as integral constituents of the nation and in this manner equal to other citizens regardless of class, gender or ethnicity. Metaphorically speaking, nation-states are often described and imagined in terms of horizontal fraternity. The people are sovereign within the state just as the nation-state is sovereign in the world of other equal but mutually exclusive nation-states.

6.1.2 On the empire-state

Beissinger (2005) argues that the meaning of empire has shifted over time and it is now commonly perceived as an illegitimate form of domination. It is as if history has given its verdict against empire in favour of the nation-state. At the same time, empire has constituted a highly politically charged and polemical term, illustrated for instance, by the historical rivalry between the Soviet Union and its ‘Western enemies’ with both parties labelling each other imperialists (Lieven 2003, 3). Empires are regarded as illegitimate due to the fact that they are said to violate the principles of national self-determination and state sovereignty, which constitute the main and the sole legitimate pillars of the modern state system (Beissinger 2005, 42). The perception is closely related to the “rise of global norms of state sovereignty and national self-determination and the triumph of anti-colonial struggles” (ibid., 89). Accordingly, empires are believed to be doomed to disintegration (Lieven 2003, 330).
In fact, states are usually labelled as empires post factum. For instance, the Soviet Union has been described as an empire only after its collapse, thus sealing its illegitimate nature and failure to integrate heterogeneous peoples into a cohesive nation (Suny 1995, 187). Furthermore, in the world of nation-states, empires are perceived as the “nation-state’s alter ego and the significant other against which nations struggle” (Beissinger 2005, 90). In the context of this study, the empire-state is evoked as an analytical category which sheds light on and helps to theorise about the historical legacy and contemporary challenges of the Russian Federation, while I am aware of the conceptual, theoretical and empirical imprecision and ideological charge of the concept.¹

Empire-states and nation-states are characterised by almost opposite perceptions of integration of their constituent societies into a political community (Parrott 1997, 7). To start with, empires adhere to a different conception of legitimacy. Nation-states draw legitimacy from the nation; they are perceived as legitimate as long as the state can claim to serve and represent the nation. Empire-states, on the other hand, lack broad legitimation. In fact, we could ask whether the entire idea of legitimation was at all relevant to empires prior to the age of nationalism and the birth of mass politics in the 19th century.

Empires are usually characterised by absolute and autocratic rule, whose legitimation lies in divinity, hereditary right or a form of universalistic (as opposed to particularistic, as in nationalism) ideology. While the Romanov empire adhered to the divine rule of the emperor and proclaimed Orthodoxy the unifying identity for all those living on its territory, the Soviet state equally legitimised its rule in terms of the supra- or anti-national international and socialist ideology (Rowley 2000). Hence, in empires sovereignty and the right to rule do not reside with the nation, but with an individual or an institution, such as the Soviet Communist Party or the emperor. Moreover, the state is not in place to serve and represent the nation; the relationship between the two is reversed. In imperial Russia, for instance, people did not legitimise the tsar’s right to rule. The right was conferred by God, by conquest, by hereditary right or other equally non-nationalistic justifications. (Suny 2001.)

Empires expose people to unequal rule and simultaneously do not strive to constitute a cohesive and culturally homogenous nation (Doyle 1986 in Suny 1995, 197; Parrott 1997). As a result, non-integration occurs in two respects. Politically, people are subjected to authoritarian regime, as opposed to being equal citizens endowed with rights and duties. Consequently, the ruling and the ruled constitute a vertical and unequal relationship (Suny & Martin 2001, 9). Culturally, empires do not seek to create a culturally and linguistically homogenous nation equivalent to the state. Instead, modern empires are characterised by an existence of a metropolitan society – one powerful nation – that controls the sovereignty of subordinate nations (Parrott 1997). The centre is not necessarily defined ethnically or geographically. It could also be a ruling institution with a status or a class

---

¹ This statement is equally true of the category of the nation-state.
character, e.g. nobility, political class, imperial family or the Soviet nomenklatura. (Suny 2001, 25–26.) Empires are always constituted of a number of distinct nations, which is the reason why they cannot explicitly adhere to a nationalistic ideology privileging one nation over others at the expense of internal stability. Consequently, empires opt for supra- or anti-national ideologies (Rowley 2000) and are best described as multinational and differentiated entities of unequal power distribution.

In addition to the objective/normative differences, empires are perceived and imagined differently from nation-states. The subjective element is at least as important as the objective one, especially when considering reasons for imperial disintegration. Subjectively speaking, an important issue is whether state policies are accepted as ‘ours’ or resisted as ‘theirs’ (Beissinger 1995, 155). Imperial policies are commonly viewed as ‘theirs’ and therefore by definition illegitimate (ibid). From this perspective, one of the central innovative features of the nation-state lies in the realisation that state policies should be subjectively perceived as ‘ours’ by a broad spectrum of citizens, if stability of the state is to be preserved (also Article III).

In the following, Russian contemporary politics are analysed in the context of the effective conceptual and institutional post-imperial heritage that Russia strives to come to grips with in order to gain legitimacy among its constituent population and in the wider world of nation-states. The role of empire has been overwhelming and needs to be understood in the context of the ongoing redefinition of Russia’s identity and future (e.g. Lieven 2003). In addition to the actual institutional and conceptual legacy, it is equally important to acknowledge the mental and imaginary baggage left by the Soviet period. The accusations of empire are easily resurrected every time Russia’s internal or external political legitimacy starts to raise distrust (Beissinger 2005). This reveals that the imperial legacy is neither static nor objective. It is rather a moral judgement passed on the legitimacy of past and present policies. From this perspective, education policies related to national identity and citizenship could be interpreted as an arena that is both affected by and contributes to the re-evaluation of the imperial past and future. In moments of transitology, the past is destroyed, reinterpreted and harnessed to serve current and future political goals.

In addition to its centrality for Russia, the category of empire deserves attention in the context of the ongoing transformation of the nation-state. Just as former empires were accused of assimilation and, faced with a threat of disintegration, had to consent to the demands of cultural minorities and rising ethnonationalism, contemporary nation-states, too, are confronted with pending questions of a similar nature. With the nation-state under siege, we could ask what is the alternative, taken that our arsenal of state categories does not leave many options to choose from. For instance, Lieven (2003, 73) writes that “as the nation state weakens, the possibility grows that power will form and be legitimised according to different models in the twenty-first century”. Remarkably, the newly reconfigured states, such as Russia, encounter the paradox of striving for a nation-
state at the time of its recession. While Russia is currently seeking to strengthen its
statehood and reconsolidate the link between citizenship and nationality, the centrifugal
processes of globalisation are said to decouple the state, the nation and consequently
nationality and citizenship. Therefore in the Russian case there is a double challenge
to the state-building process, that is, to deal with the imperial legacy along with the
impinging global forces.

6.1.3 Empire-state and nation-state compared

The following table offers a comparative synthesis of the main ideal characteristics of the
empire-state and the nation-state discussed in sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Empire-state</th>
<th>Nation-state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimation</td>
<td>supranational and anti-national</td>
<td>nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion/Membership</td>
<td>habitation and/or conquest</td>
<td>ethnic descent and/or adherence to common political principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights and privileges</td>
<td>multiplicity of memberships, differentiated statuses, uneven distribution of rights (undemocratic)</td>
<td>single status, uniform and universal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2 Russia as a heterogeneous empire-state

For present day Russia, one of the key challenges is to forge a national identity, while
the Soviet imperial legacy is likely to intervene in the process of nation-state building.
However, the Soviet Union did not entirely fit into the ideal type of empire. Beissinger
(2005, 41) suggests that instead of perceiving the USSR as the last empire, it should be
examined as a new type of empire. The USSR differed from its historical predecessors in
two important ways: its denial of its imperial nature and the use of the main principles
of the nation-state – autonomy and sovereignty – to rule over a polyethnic population
which lacked consensus to being ruled (ibid.). As Brubaker (1996, 8) has succinctly stated,
the Soviet regime “institutionalised both territorial nationhood and ethnocultural
nationality as basic cognitive and social categories”. However, as will be discussed later
in the text (also Article V), the main principles of the nation-state were not effectively
attributed to the entire Soviet Union. Instead, the controversial and mutually antithetical
policies of Russification, nativisation (korenizatsia), ethnoterritorial federalism and
ascriptive nationality engendered and institutionalised nationhood on a sub-state level.
In other words, the Soviet regime attributed the ‘national’ to component parts of the state and its citizenry and thus codified ethnic heterogeneity as national heterogeneity (Brubaker 1994, 50; Brubaker 1996, 29).

Beissinger’s (2005, 94) perception of empire obscures any clearcut distinction between empire-state and nation-state and, theoretically and methodologically speaking, it allows for a new way to study empires beyond rigid classifications and definitions, but rather as a context instead of structure, and a problem instead of a diagnosis. Equally, Lieven’s (2003, xiv) broad definition of empire rests on the idea that empire is a very great power that has played a significant role in international politics; it is a polity that rules over wide territories and many peoples, and it is not a democracy. Though these criteria differentiate between empire-states and nation-states or multinational states, some states claiming to be nation-states would share a few of the above characteristics, for example, India, China, USA and Indonesia. Thus, we are alerted to the thought that the borderline between empires and nation-states is blurred and that the questions of nationalism and nation-building are central to the study of modern empires too.

In this manner, Beissinger (2005, 44–45) calls for the study of empires analogous to Brubaker’s institutionalist view of nationhood. Brubaker (1996, 16) argues that “we should not ask ‘what is a nation’ but rather: how is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalised within and among states”. Neither empires nor nation-states are natural categories of analysis or ‘things’ to be accurately described; rather they represent categories of practice which give rise to certain perceptions, and therefore are products of a socio-political process (Beissinger 2005, 44; Özkirimli 2000). Consequently, empires, akin to nations, are imagined in people’s minds and rely on popular identifications and perceptions.

The most controversial characteristic of the Soviet polity springs, on the one hand, from its simultaneous policy of nation-building on the sub-state level, and on the other hand, from the inculcation of a subjective perception of empire (Suny & Martin 2001). The USSR revealed its imperial character in the asymmetrical and hierarchical treatment of people based on, primarily, their nationality. In other words, in the Soviet Union entitlements to rights were not determined by citizenship, but by one’s national affiliation (ascribed by the authorities). At the same time, the friendship of peoples forged by the Russians served as a metaphor for the supranational imagined community of the Soviet people (Martin 2001, 81). This supranational political doctrine was supposed to function as a unifying ideology. In the long run, the Soviet Union did aim at constructing one nation, but not a Russian nation. The goal was the merger (слияние) of all ethnicities into one Soviet people who identify with common political principles.

As has been discussed already, the main difference between empires and nation-states lies in the unwillingness or inability of the former to create a culturally and linguistically homogeneous nation equivalent to the state (Article V). In the Russian (Soviet) case, the very conception of the nation was relegated from the state-wide to the sub-state
level – the level of the numerous republics, autonomous republics, national okrugs and other ethnically defined constituents of the state (Brubaker 1994, 52). The relegation of nationhood to the sub-state level constitutes an important feature of Russian political thinking, which has led to the emergence of nationality as separate from citizenship and statehood. Brubaker (1994) explains that the principle of nationality as distinct from citizenship was consolidated on two levels. First, the Soviet Union was structured on ethnic basis granting many nationalities their own territories with varying autonomies. Second, nationality was consolidated on the personal level by ascribing it to each individual. The latter was reinforced by the Soviet passport formalities, which required each citizen to specify his/her nationality in the personal identification papers (the so called ‘fifth entry’ in the internal passport). The nationality indicated in the official documents was inherited by blood from one’s parents, while the category of Soviet nationality did not even exist. (Article V; Brubaker 1994; Simonsen 1999.)

Ethnofederalism and the practice of the fifth entry only helped to further solidify the role played by the sub-state nationality. Brubaker has concluded that due to the institutionalisation of nationality it “became and remained a basic institutional building block of the avowedly internationalist, supranationalist, and anti-nationalist Soviet state (…)” (Brubaker 1994, 54, emphasis added). More so, the Soviet state “established nationhood and nationality as fundamental social categories sharply distinct from the overarching categories of statehood and citizenship. In doing so, it prepared the way for its own demise”. (Brubaker 1996, 23.)

However, despite the institutionalisation of nationality and its crucial role in the disintegration of the Soviet system, ethnic Russians lacked a sense of unified nationhood, a common understanding of what it means to be Russian, as opposed to Soviet. As Sakwa (2008, 39) argues, Russia has been “more subsumed” into the Soviet identity than other Soviet republics, leading to confusion between Russia and the Soviet Union. The position of the Russian republic (RSFSR) – the territorial predecessor of contemporary Russia – was different from the other national territories in not being defined as a homeland for ethnic Russians. Instead, it was the centre of the Soviet Union and a base for its fundamental political and cultural institutions. The RSFSR did not have its own Russian Communist Party or the Academy of Science. And the history of the USSR was in fact the history of Russia; Russia did not have a separate history from that of the USSR (Kuzio 2001, 111). Paradoxically, Russians did not feel privileged on the territory of RSFSR divided into autonomous republics and national formations to accommodate non-Russian nationalities. Also, the great majority of Soviet elites were either Russian by nationality or residents of the RSFSR. (Brubaker 1994.) Hence, the party elite were Russian in ethnicity, but Soviet in loyalty. They hardly distinguished between Russia and the Soviet Union, and they took pride in the Soviet empire that for them represented the most valuable aspect of the Russian history and culture. (Lieven 2003, 318.)

The high degree of overlap between the USSR and Russia explains why a survey
conducted in the late 1970s and the early 1980s found that 80 per cent of Georgians and
Uzbeks considered their titular republic as their homeland, whereas 70 per cent or more
Russians, regardless of where they lived, named the Soviet Union as their homeland
(Kolstø 2000). These findings reveal that there was no single Soviet identity shared by
all those residing in the territory of the USSR. Instead, the Soviet Union gave rise to two
forms of identification: one strongly linked to the sub-state nationhood, as in the case of
non-Russians, and a supranational identity of Russians and Russophones. Consequently,
the collapse of the Soviet Union was most difficult for the ethnic Russians, as it took
away their main reference point (e.g. Tishkov & Olcott 1999, 66; Payn 2004, 37). By the
same token, for a significant segment of Russian elites, whose self-understanding was
never embedded in the RSFSR, Russia did not constitute an adequate territorial and
institutional framework for the emerging Russian national statehood (Brubaker 1994,
70). Evidence suggests that Russian political leaders incorporate at least some segments
of the former Soviet citizens into the realm of the modern Russian nation (Tolz 1998a;
1998b; Shevel 2009).

In addition, the establishment of Russian statehood was accompanied by a conflict
between internal state-building and external withdrawal, giving rise to a feeling of defeat
and failure (Sakwa 2008, 39). From the perspective of power politics, Russia ended as the
biggest loser of the Cold War period, as it gave away a statehood crafted in the course
of millennium (ibid., 212). In this situation, neither the Russian political leaders nor
the public were ready to view the territory and the institutions of the new Russia as a
legitimate base for the Russian national statehood. Consequently, in Russia, the territorial
and institutional issues have been more vigorously contested than in other former Soviet
territories. (Brubaker 1994, 70.) This explains why the national-patriotic argument
claiming that Russia’s problems of state-building are to be blamed on its separation from
some of its historical territories and peoples has been popular throughout Russia’s recent
history (ibid).

The reconfigured Russia continues the Soviet legacy of decoupling citizenship
and nationality. As has been described by Tishkov and Olcott (1999, 64–67), Russia is
still a form of “institutionalized multiethnicity”. At present, the Russian Federation
consists of 83 autonomous formations (subjects of the federation), with 21 republics
being simultaneously federal units and proto-nation-states (Constitution of the Russian
Federation 1993). Another uncertainty lies in the existence of different visions of what

---

2 Shevel’s (2009) discussion shows how the elite’s perception that the Russian nation extends beyond the
territory of the Russian state plays a central role in the evolution of citizenship legislation, although it is
confronted by political realities and pragmatic concerns over Russia’s military and political stability and
material security. Also, the high frequency with which new citizenship laws and amendments to them
appeared, illustrates how uncertain and contested the issues of citizenship and national identity have been
since the dissolution of the USSR. The latest amendments attest to the view that the significance of the
identity overlap between Russia and the Soviet Union is getting weaker and citizenship legislation is mostly
guided by pragmatic concerns and a territorial definition of the Russian nation.
Russian nationhood and citizenship should constitute. Since the collapse of the Union, the executive branch has promoted three visions of the Russian nation. First is the nation in civic terms as *rossiiane*, a community of citizens regardless of their ethnic affiliation expressing loyalty to the new political institutions of the Russian Federation. Second is the understanding of Russia as a community of Russian speakers, which brings Russian speakers living in the newly independent states or the so-called ‘near abroad’ into the realm of the Russian nation. According to the third interpretation, the Russian nation extends to the borders of the former Soviet Union and often contains a Slavic bias, limiting itself to ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. (Tolz 2001; Article V.) The official understanding of nationhood is further coloured by the tension between ethnic and civic meanings of the term, with the ethnic conception deeply rooted in the Russian political culture (e.g. nationality inherited by blood from either parent).

Boris Yeltsin was the first Russian leader to abandon the imperial conception of Russia. He promoted Russia’s national independence from the Soviet Union just as the Baltic States or Armenia insisted on theirs. (Rowley 2000, 35–36.) Russia declared its sovereignty on 12 June 1990 and effectively seceded from the USSR on 8 December 1991. The declaration was greatly affected by the perception that the USSR was an empire and that Russia needed a clearly defined nation-state of its own in order to preserve and develop its unique identity. In this manner, the USSR was perceived as an economic burden for the Russians and a destroyer of the Russian culture and traditions (Tolz 2001, 206–207). However, Russia emerged as the “residual legatee of the Soviet state following the latter’s dissolution in December 1991” (Sakwa 2008, 36). Despite that, the reborn Russia had no precedents; neither in terms of geographical borders nor the principles of the polity (ibid).

In addition, Yeltsin was guided more by “imperatives of holding power than by the principles of civic nation building”, whereas political decisions were affected by the necessity to purge communism rather than to build new forms of political loyalty. (Tishkov & Olcott 1999, 71–73.)

Yeltsin’s administration had tried to promote a civic understanding of citizenship – a notion of *rossianin*, as a citizen of Russia, as opposed to *russki*, an ethnic Russian – immediately after Russia proclaimed its independence. However, Tolz (2001, 253–254)
claims that the idea of a civic nation was too new for Russians, whereas the understanding based on language and culture carries a longer historical legacy. In 1995 Yeltsin urged people, on the pages of the government-supported Rossiiskaia Gazeta, to search for the Russian national idea. Most proposals, published in the newspaper, resurrected the idea of state patriotism. This vision was earlier adopted by many Russian rulers, including the Communist Party, and is based on “pride in belonging to and serving a strong state”.

(Tolz 2001, 255–256; Article IV.)

Most tangible measures directed at rooting state patriotism were taken by Yeltsin’s successor, president Vladimir Putin. His stance was characterised by strengthening the central state and lessening the power of ethnically defined administrative territories. Putin created seven federal districts with administrators possessing powers to intervene in the work of Russia’s subjects (ibid., 261). For some, this measure represents a new form of Russian centralism, particularly evident in the top-down execution of the political reform, whereas others argue that Putin’s reassertion of central authority offers an opportunity to move away from asymmetrical federalism. With respect to citizenship this means, at least in theory, a more universal and homogeneous type of citizenship across Russia, which does not depend on one’s place of residence (Sakwa 2008, 228, 282):

*Universal citizenship sought to undermine not only segmented regionalism but also challenged the emergence of ethnocratic states in some of the republics, where the titular populations were privileged over the rest* (ibid., 228).

Another important measure was the ratification, only in 2001, of the Russian state symbols, the white-blue-red tricolour flag, the two-headed eagle coat of arms and the old Soviet hymn with new lyrics. Boris Yeltsin’s administration never succeeded in gaining parliamentary approval of the state symbols – another fact revealing the difficulty of finding consensus on the new national foundation. The symbols agreed upon in 2001 represent a mixture of the tsarist past (the flag and the coat of arms) and the Soviet legacy (the hymn). The army regained its Soviet red flag as a manifestation of its link to the victory of the Soviet army in the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945).

The programmes of state patriotism issued by Putin’s administration reveal that the authorities are deeply uncertain about the loyalty of the people to the state. This quote follows similar argument:

*The state continues to hang above society; it remains for the vast majority of inhabitants a distant and alien ‘significant other’ to be deceived and feared, simultaneously an object of distrust and of booty. In the Soviet period, the distinction between subject and citizen was thoroughly blurred; everyone was simultaneously cast into both roles. In post-Soviet times, the distinction remains clouded, if only because the population has yet to discern features in prevailing authority that would allow it to recognise it as ‘ours’.*

(Beissinger 1997, 177–178.)
Lieven (2003, 386) compares post-Soviet Russia to the Second Austrian republic which, in contrast to Russia, managed to win people’s loyalty after imperial collapse thanks to the economic prosperity it provided. In Russia, on the other hand, the economic hardship, which cumulated in the financial crisis of the late 1990s and the crash of the rouble in 1998, further helped to undermine public confidence in democracy and the westernising course. Economic collapse and disillusionment deepen public alienation and undermine loyalty to and confidence in the state. These events are generally associated with Russia’s loss of prestige and its subordination and vulnerability to the hegemony of the ‘West’ (Hedetoft & Blum 2008). Such public perceptions establish conditions to support the return to a more conservative model of governance and a nationalistic agenda based on claims of Russia’s uniqueness and a political path of its own (Piattoeva 2010).

Lastly, the institutionalisation of nationality on the sub-state level leads to questions such as how to strike a balance between subnational and all-state identities. These issues are further complicated by the fact that around 25 million ethnic Russians live outside Russia in the former Soviet republics. Nevertheless, Russian authorities continue to claim that these people are their responsibility, as the war in Georgia has recently demonstrated. Under these circumstances, defining the limits of Russia’s territory and finding a set of common cultural symbols present challenges to Russia’s state leaders (Sperling 2003, 239).

6.3 Finland as a homogeneous nation-state

In the dissertation, Finland is conceptualised as a nation-state, which has been politically constructed as a homogeneous monocultural polity. When the terms nation (kansa), nationhood (kansakunta) and citizenship (kansalaisuus) were translated into the Finnish language in the mid 19th century, they acquired a common root – kansa (nation). The choice of translation manifested the strong bond between nation, nationality and citizenship in the Finnish political culture (Pulkkinen 1999, 119). However, national cohesion and ethnic homogeneity constitute a long-term political project, and these perceptions have had to be anchored in the minds of the people living on a vast and scarcely populated territory (Lepola 2000). The system of education, the army and the media have played significant roles in this political endeavour. Finland has been perceived as ethnically homogeneous despite the fact that it is populated by a number of ethnic minorities and an indigenous population. In this respect, even Finland exemplifies the artificial nature of the nation, as ethnic homogeneity is primarily based on denial or even purposeful destruction of ethnic and cultural diversity. (Article V.)

The ideal of national unity emerged at the start of the Finnish nation-building project in the 19th century and was especially strong in the early independence period (1917) and after the world wars (Lepola 2000). After the 1905 general strike and especially after the
civil war, national unity was expected to override political differences. The usage of the national unity discourse in such a manner is typical of nationalism. National identity is expected to supersede all other identifications, including ethnic and political sentiments. (Article V.) Until the beginning of the 1990s, Finland remained a country with almost non-existent immigration and one of Europe’s tightest immigration legislations, therefore it could hold onto the myth of cultural homogeneity for longer than many other European states. Consequently, it entered the post-Berlin Wall era with a strong and rather exclusive or closed national identity (cf. Saukkonen 1999). That is why for Finland, both immigration and rising ethnic diversity require a deeper change in the mindset than in other European countries (cf. Lepola 2000, 21).

The Finnish nation-state was originally built on two different and yet complementary ideologies. The first one springs from the heritage of the Fennoman movement, which proclaimed the Finnish culture and language the only legitimate foundation for the Finnish state and national unity. J.V. Snellman, whose ideas became the foundation of the Fennoman ideology, wrote that the Finnish state character lies in its linguistic and cultural distinctiveness and unity (Pulkkinen 1999). For Snellman, Finland constituted a state due to its linguistic and cultural distinctiveness, even though in juridical terms it still belonged to the Russian empire in the 19th century (ibid, 128-129). These ideas were crystallised in the Finnish political thinking in the following manner:

1) Nation as a political unit within which there is no division into rulers and ruled. Instead, all are united by the new concept of citizen

2) Nation as an ethnic concept which naturalises the political unit

3) A Hegelian idea of political unit as single mentality striving for self-governance. (Pulkkinen 1999, 127; Article V.)

The Fennoman movement put emphasis on language as a means of achieving national self-assertion and liberation from the Swedish cultural dominance, as well as to counterbalance the political dependence on Russia (Alapuro 1988, 95). In other words, for the Fennomans linguistic and cultural unity enabled Finland to resist Russian dominance (ibid., 96). The slogan ‘one language, one mind’ has had far-reaching consequences for

---

5 In the beginning of 1980 there were 12,063 foreigners in Finland constituting 0.3 per cent of the entire population. In 1992 the figure grew to 37,643 (0.7 per cent). The magnitude of the change could be illustrated by the fact that between 1989 and 1991 the number of foreigners residing in Finland increased as much as three times compared to the entire decade of the 1980s. (Lepola 2000, 18–19.) Finland rapidly turned from an emigration country to an immigration country with 143,256 foreign citizens (2.7 per cent) by the end of 2008. In addition, around 90,000 Finnish citizens have been born outside Finland. In linguistic terms, there are 4,844,047 (90.9 per cent) Finnish speakers, 289,951 (5.4 per cent) Swedish speakers and 1,778 (0.03 per cent) Saami speakers. Other than Finnish, Swedish or Saami speakers constitute 190,538 or 3.6 per cent of the entire population. (Statistics Finland 2009.)

6 Harle’s and Moisio’s (2000, 57–64) account of the development of Finnish cartography demonstrates the importance of drawing a clear borderline between Finland and Russia as a symbol of Finnish
the Finnish society. This vision is based on a primordial understanding of the nation and an assumption of historical continuity of distinct nations, which awaken to reach a sovereign state status. It resembles the ethnic type of nationalism, which asserts that nation-states are held together by virtue of common ethnicity and mentality. Such ethno-nationalistic arguments often arise before an independent state is established. They are typical of national groups who strive to reform or exit a state by politicising ethnicity. By the same token, a nation can reach absolute freedom only by acquiring a state of its own.

Finland also exhibits elements of a ‘civic religion’ type of nationalism, that is, nationalistic arguments developed and maintained by the state in order to foster in citizens a sense of obligation toward the state and simultaneously eliminate obligations toward other groups and centres within or outside the territory (Alapuro 1988, 87). These were already employed in the 19th century when Finland was increasingly perceived as a proto-state, prior to its independence in 1917. Finland’s status within the Russian empire was exceptional in that it allowed for a considerable amount of political autonomy in comparison to many other constituents of the empire. Especially since the second half of the 19th century, drawing on the Swedish constitutional tradition, Finland was perceived as an autonomous unit with its own administrative apparatus (ibid., 90). (Article V.)

At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century the elite increasingly envisioned Finland as separate from the tsarist empire and required a common national ideology to draw a clear line between Finland and Russia. In this respect, ethnic ideology was employed for state-building purposes. As Alapuro (1988, 98) writes, while Fennomans strove to create a unilingual Finnish national culture, the Swedish-speaking liberals stressed Finland’s position as a separate political unit and the importance of preserving the constitutional legacy and the political institutions established under the Swedish rule. Importantly, the two ideologies merged peacefully into a shared nationalistic political culture (ibid., 98, 198). This culture could be summarised in Matti Klinge’s words as ethnically, legally and religiously non-Russian Finland with a Finnish or Nordic style of administration and parliament (quoted in Harle & Moisio 2000, 80). National identification was also clear in the emerging working-class movement, which shared ideas developed by Snellman (Alapuro 1988, 147).

Though predominantly drawing upon ethnicity and culture, the homogenising project of the political elite had some important civic traits. By turning the Finnish language into the official language of the polity, the state provided opportunities for political participation of the Finnish speaking population and reduced the clearcut gap between the Finnish-speaking common people and the Swedish speaking elites (e.g. distinctiveness, both ethnically and institutionally, and as an intermediate stage in the process of Finnish state-formation and nation-building. Another goal of this project was to pave the way for Finland’s entry into the international community of nation-states as a sovereign nation in its own right. In this respect, the aim was to bring Finland closer to the Western Swedish frontier as part of the so-called Fenno-Scandia because Sweden was perceived as a carrier of more refined Nordic and European political and cultural traditions (ibid., 62, 92–93).
Pulkkinen 1999). Liikanen (1997) writes that the Fennoman notion of the ‘nation’s will’ was not a mere celebration of ethno-cultural unity and a call for citizen subordination in the name of the nation. He offers an alternative interpretation that the nation’s will stood as an important impetus for the development of civil society and a political notion of citizenship. By turning the nation into the highest source of power, it gave rise to the modern democratic idea of a hegemonic struggle for the right to represent the nation (ibid., 349).

In the Finnish case it is especially interesting to note that the very definition of democracy – *kansanvalta* (literary nation’s power) – shifted from the individual to the collective level. Around 1910, democracy was primarily linked to the liberation of the Finnish nation and its right to decide independently on its internal affairs rather than democratic participation of citizens in a parliamentary democracy. (Arola 2003, 15–16.) Therefore, the perception of Finnish *kansa* (nation) as *ethnos* has been more prominent than the demos interpretation. It is the predominantly ethno-cultural understanding of the nation that is common to the political vocabularies of Finland and Russia.

After the wars, the ethno-cultural and the civic-territorial and state-oriented discourses have existed side by side (Lepola 2000, 323). The ethno-cultural ideology developed by the Fennomans to underline Finnish distinctiveness and national character in a foreign body of the Russian empire was harnessed to serve state building and, in the aftermath of independence and the Finnish civil war, national reconciliation and national unity projects of the state, therefore giving rise to a reciprocal relationship between the state and the nation. Since then, the birth and development of the independent Finnish nation-state have constituted the core narrative of the Finnish history writing (Liikanen 2005, 223). This means that until recently, academic research has been mainly preoccupied with constructing a ‘true’ progressive history of the nation-state rather than studying the relationship between the state and the nation as an independent research question. (Article V.)

However, since the 1980s the perception of Finland as a homogeneous nation-state started to be questioned (Alasuutari & Ruuska 1999, 236). Keränen (1998, 9) suggests that the ‘opening’ of Finland, due to its entry into the EU, marked a deconstructive moment for the Finnish nation-state. In other words, the taken for granted national identity project started to crumble and was put under scrutiny. The integration process led to discussions, deconstruction and reconstruction of what Finland and Finnishness are. Even though Finnish key politicians have largely interpreted Finland’s entry into the EU as a natural manifestation and continuation of its cultural and institutional proximity to Europe, the fact that transnational institutions impinge on state autonomy and sovereignty remains. In the Finnish case, this is particularly interesting in the light of the historically developed fusion between the state and the nation, further solidified

---

7 See Harle and Moisio (2000) for direct citations from politicians asserting to the view that Finland is part of Europe.
by the policy of neutrality between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ since the end of the Second World War. The unity between the nation and the state, prior to the collapse of the bipolar world, was strengthened by the permanent threat of war, which called for national consensus and readiness for national defence. With the old threats losing credibility, the meaning of state sovereignty itself is put under question (Joenniemi 1993, 19).

An important issue is, therefore, how the Finnish nation is redefined following the end of the great power confrontation, Finland’s entry into the COE, the EU and due to a steady inflow of immigrants. In this respect, Finland is confronted with a similar task facing Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union – how to re-define its national unity in a reconfigured international and national context. As in the Russian case, Finland has several options in redefining Finnishness and the bond between citizenship and nationality. When the sovereignty of the state is weakened by supranational actors and globalised economy, one alternative lies in re-enforcing a purely cultural and ethnic definition of the nation-state. This argument is explored by, for example, Alasuutari & Ruuska (1999). However, the danger is that this discourse could pave the way for discrimination, exclusion and racism towards those not born to ethnically Finnish parents. Another option is to define Finland as a constitutional state, in a civic liberal manner, but this tradition is presumably much weaker in Finland (Stenius & Turunen 1995 in Lepola 2000, 325).

6.4 Russia and Finland compared

The following table synthesises comparatively the focal legacies and recurrent dilemmas of Russia and Finland analysed in sections 6.2 and 6.3.
Table 3. Finland and Russia compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation-state nexus</td>
<td>Reciprocal relationship between the state and the nation, i.e. the nation united by virtue of ethnic descent, shared language and common mentality requires a sovereign state, and the state realises the will of the nation.</td>
<td>The nation defined in ethnic and cultural terms is relegated from the state-wide level to the sub-state level, leading to a clear divorce between the state and the nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship-nationality nexus</td>
<td>Citizenship and nationality are synonymous, i.e. citizens share national identification with the Finnish nation by definition.</td>
<td>The emergence of nationality as separate from citizenship; citizenship resembles subjecthood and citizen rights depend on one’s nationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recurrent dilemma(s)</td>
<td>In the light of the historically consolidated bond between the state and the nation, nationality and citizenship, how to maintain the symbolic sovereignty of the nation-state and reconsolidate the bond between the citizen and the state in the international context which fosters their decoupling</td>
<td>In the light of the historical divorce between the state and the nation, nationality and citizenship, and the international context which fosters further decoupling between these entities, how to root the perception of the state as ‘ours’ and build a national identity shared by the entire population of the country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this chapter I elucidate the articles as the constitutive parts of the dissertation by providing brief summaries of the content of the articles and situating each of them in relation to the overall research setting. The dissertation consists of five independent publications bound by the general research setting and the research questions posed in the research. Each article has its specific place in the research. Article I is a general introduction to comparative education and the current methodological challenges in the field relevant for the topic of the dissertation; Article II analyses the emerging supranational citizenship agenda appraised from the perspective of the link between education and the nation-state; Articles III–V present and interpret the findings of the national cases.

7.1 Comparative education and the nation-state (Article I)

This article could be perceived as a prologue to the issues explored closely in the dissertation in Articles II–V, and it also points to questions for further inquiry untouched in the present dissertation. It introduces the discipline of comparative education, and emphasises the centrality of the nation-state and its national culture as the key interpretative lenses in comparative education research. The discussion reveals the genealogical association between the nation-state and public education from a disciplinary perspective, that is, how it has affected and is manifest in the main tenets of comparative education. As its main focus, the article explores how globalisation has reshaped the nation-state and its educational operations. These developments call for changes in the comparative study of education across national borders. The main argument is that we should no longer regard the nation-state as axiomatic, but turn it into a subject of analysis in its own right. In other words, we need to re-conceptualise and re-theorise the shift in the state from a static and relatively closed container of socio-political relations (including educational ones) to a plurilateral structure increasingly embedded in and contested by subnational and supranational interactions. Articles II–V address this analytical task in the context of citizenship education, studying the reconfiguration of the nation-state through citizenship education policies.

Globalisation is manifested in the rise of alternative cultures and cultural identities,
as well as cultural hybridity, which demystify national culture and its proclaimed homogeneous unity. As global forces endanger the uniformity of the nation, they also reveal its exclusionary nature. Thus conceived, the ‘national characteristics’, which used to provide an important explanatory framework in cross-country analyses of education systems, appear increasingly problematic. These developments equally impede on one of the key tasks of public schooling – to ensure national integration by transmitting the shared national culture to the new generations. As the substance of the national culture blurs, it becomes increasingly unclear what should be transmitted and whose definitions should count.

With respect to the theme of the dissertation, it should be borne in mind that there appears to be an extraordinary conflict between the emergence of the new configurations of territoriaility and the consequent fragmentation of the state, on the one hand, and the simultaneous strengthening of the nation-state as the only legitimate and desired form of socio-political organisation, on the other hand. This observation paves the way for the theoretical assumptions of the dissertation discussed in the article. First, the effects of globalisation on nation-states are not homogeneous, but engender diverse and even opposing reactions in different socio-political contexts. Second, this article points to the role of supranational organisations in the reconfiguration of the nation-state and the rise of transnational educational governance. The state is no longer solely responsible for the definition, provision and control of formal education. Moreover, national education policies are embedded in the emerging global policy rhetoric. Dale & Robertson (2009) claim that supranational players represent the “competing imaginary” to that of the national educational system, based on the assumption that national systems have reached their “use-by date”. Article II explores whether or not supranational and national agendas are truly incompatible, with particular focus on citizenship education.

7.2 Citizenship education and supranational actors (Article II)

This article analyses the supranational context of the dissertation by focusing on the historical evolution of citizenship education linked to the formation of the nation-state and the emerging preoccupation of supranational organisations – UNESCO and the COE – with citizenship education. In the article, I argue that we need to understand the complex relationship between the essentially national model of citizenship education as a basic function and symbol of the nation-state and the new agenda-setting of international actors. The strong linkage between citizenship, sovereignty and legitimacy explains why international actors have traditionally refrained from intervening in the matters of citizenship and citizenship education. From this viewpoint, it is reasonable to ask whether citizenship education projects of supranational actors undermine the established rationale. The main question posed in the article is whether citizenship
education programmes developed by international agents advocate a post-national ideology of citizenship which is at odds with the national model of citizenship education generated along the consolidation of the nation-state and public schooling.

The state controlled education assumed the primary responsibility for spreading the national language, forging a national identity, encouraging patriotic values, inculcating moral discipline and rooting citizenship in terms of justification of the state to the people and the duties of the people to the state (Green 1990). These objectives could be perceived as the central virtues of the citizen of the emerging nation-state as well as the main pillars of the national model of citizenship education. Numerous analyses of educational documents and curricula from the 1980s onwards prove that the nationalising task of education has remained largely intact. Simultaneously, references to universal principles, including world citizenship, tend to grow more strongly (Amadio, Gross, Ressler & Truong 2004). These results reveal both the consolidation of the national model of citizenship education and the simultaneous dispersion of a post-national agenda advocating universal principles. In the light of these findings, the article explores citizenship education agendas of UNESCO and the COE with the objective to map them in relation to the two citizenship education ideals.

In contrast to the national model, the agendas of UNESCO and the COE advocate a proactive political participation of the individual. They emphasise active participation, encourage critical scrutiny and legitimise action against the state, as opposed to advocating uncritical obedience and order. The centrality of human rights on the agenda implies that citizens are protected against their home governments and can initiate action against the state on the basis of universal human rights. The imperative of human rights illustrates that both organisations adhere and seek to promote the post-nationalisation of citizenship premised on universal personhood, instead of national and particularistic peoplehood. In addition, supranational agents strive to enhance a set of universal values, such as peace, tolerance, global solidarity, democracy and justice, as opposed to the particularistic values which emphasise the uniqueness of each nation.

Adherence to diversity and a multi-level conception of citizenship identity are the qualities which substantially distinguish the post-national model from its national(istic) rival. Nevertheless, the intergovernmental character of the organisations and their origin embedded in the consolidation of the nation-state system lead to the repetition of the traditional citizenship rhetoric and caution with respect to the definition of citizenship education. Therefore the article concludes that the supranational script appears inconsistent, as it adheres to and promotes both the principles of national sovereignty, by equating society with the territorially demarcated nation-state, and universal human rights which, by definition, transcend national borders and transform the very meaning of sovereignty. The inconsistency of the transnational context implies that nation-states construct their citizenship education policies in an increasingly complex and yet ambiguous environment. Whereas supranational actors could be perceived as carriers
of the post-national ideal of citizenship education, they are far from renouncing the national model.

7.3 Antithetical citizenship education policies and the problem of stateness in Russia (Article III)

This article is the first publication of the dissertation and reports on the empirical analysis still in progress then. It analyses Russian citizenship education documents collected up to that point (documents published in 1992–2003). Viewed from the general comparative setting of the research, this article highlights the specificities of the Russian context with particular attention to the simultaneous processes of nation and state building set in motion by the disintegration of the USSR. These processes have conflicting logics and encumber the consolidation of democracy (Linz & Stepan 1996). The discussion is framed around the problem of *stateness*, which arises when there are profound differences about the territorial boundaries of the political community’s state and profound differences as to who has the right of citizenship in the state, and, consequently, to constitute the political community which legitimises and oversees the state (ibid., 16). In other words, in Russia, the crisis of the non-democratic regime was intermixed with uncertainties as to the political community and the population who should be members of the community (ibid.).

As long as the Russian state refrained from nation-building, the objectives of citizenship education adhered to the logic of constructing a democratic constitutional state and did not contain clear antithetical definitions. Contentious notions of the ideal citizen arise with the development of patriotic education programmes embedded in the state’s effort to engender state cohesion and national integrity. Consequently, patriotism and patriotic education are in many respects antithetical to the liberal definitions of citizenship (and citizenship education). In patriotic education, subordination is prioritised over active participation, consensus is prioritised over pluralism, duties over rights and individual identity has to make space for a collective one.

The controversies apparent in the definitions of citizenship education are in line with the general arguments of Linz and Stepan (ibid., 25), namely that when a state starts to pursue what Rogers Brubaker has called ‘nationalising state policies’ with the objective to increase cultural homogeneity by privileging, for instance, the cultural symbols of the dominant nation (e.g. flag, anthem), the policies of nation-building and democracy become increasingly incompatible. This article continues the topic of the taken-for-grantedness of the nation-state discussed in Article I in relation to comparative education methodology. Article III, for its part, introduces criticism towards the place of the state in theories of democracy in general and democratic transition in particular (e.g. Linz & Stepan 1996; Canovan 1998). It has been argued that literature on democracy has
generally ignored the significance of a solid and unanimous nation-state in democratic consolidation and the complex relationship between democracy, state and nation. The reason for this lies in the fact that general conclusions are often drawn on the basis of the experience of stable Western states, where the processes of state and nation building were historically separated and the consolidation of democracy appeared within a relatively solid political community. Moreover, the proponents of democracy tend to forget that national identities are products of lengthy historical developments. Consequently, as Canovan (1998, 16) concludes, theories of democracy are developed on a tacit assumption about a stable nation-state.

These observations lead to similar general methodological conclusions as those drawn on the basis of the discussion in Article I. First, that the nation-state itself requires rigorous analysis, respecting the integrity and complexity of each case. And second, that we learn more about the perplexities of the recurrent dilemmas shared by a variety of states, such as that of democratic transition examined comparatively by Linz and Stepan (1996) or the reconstruction of the bond between the citizen and the state – the focus of this doctoral dissertation – if we study them in dissimilar socio-political contexts.

7.4 The three phases of Russian citizenship education policies (Article IV)

This article, written jointly with Dr. Jan Germen Janmaat, is a parallel comparison between the evolution of citizenship education policies in Russia and Ukraine since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The case of Ukraine is left outside the scope of the dissertation because in the joint publication Dr. Janmaat held sole responsibility for the collection and interpretation of the Ukrainian data, while I concentrated on the case of Russia.

Nevertheless, a parallel examination of Ukraine and Russia has undoubtedly contributed to the interpretative framework of the dissertation, as it enabled comparison between two former Soviet republics sharing the socialist past and the scale of the political and economic transformation catalysed by the disintegration of the Soviet empire. Both inherited educational legacies from the Soviet regime, proclaimed “aspiration to embrace Western educational values” (Silova 2009, 295) and share the “post-socialist education reform package” (e.g. student-centred learning, liberalisation of textbook publishing, democratisation of school management and teacher-student relationship, decentralisation of educational governance and finance) transferred to the post-socialist countries (Silova & Steiner-Khamsi 2008 in ibid., 313–314). With respect to the latter, the EDC (Education for Democratic Citizenship) project discussed in the article could be perceived as a common component of the package, which is supposed to enhance democratic transformation and simultaneously improve the legitimacy of the post-socialist countries in the international community of democratic states. A deeper
contextualisation of the cases, however, highlights the diversity of the Soviet and post-Soviet experiences, for example differences with respect to the position of the national language and culture in the USSR and the status of the two independent countries in international politics today. Overall, assessing Russia within the post-socialist framework sheds light on the particularities of the Russian case from a different angle than in the Russia-Finland comparison.

Article IV contributes to the overall dissertation in two ways. Based on an expanded set of policy documents (1990–2004), it claims that the development of citizenship education policies in Russia since the end of the 1980s could be divided into three intertwined periods distinct in emphasis. Between the last years of perestroika and the first years after the collapse of the USSR, preference was given to the de-legitimation of the Soviet experience, particularly the political and moral task of the school to nurture party-loyal virtuous citizens. In terms of national identity, the state openly encouraged the re-consolidation of subnational identities by fostering, at least in theory, education in national cultures and languages. The second period (1992–1999) could be termed an intermediate phase marked by ambiguities. In this phase, the development of citizenship education policies stressing knowledge of the legislation and lawful conduct, as well as the rights of citizens, was justified in terms of the need to build a constitutional state. The reappearance of a clear citizenship education policy agenda manifests the re-introduction of political teaching contents, this time in the name of democratisation. With regard to national identity, this period demonstrates both the continuation of the political line voiced in the previous phase and an emergence of a competing agenda which argues for the need to build a common all-Russian national identity.

In the third period, 1999–2005, the state has re-emphasised its leading role in defining citizenship education policies, with the main objective to craft loyalty to the Russian state as opposed to one’s subnational culture. I return to the issue of state patriotism in the final article (V). Here it would suffice to say that even though state patriotism co-exists with a more liberal notion of citizenship education, the administrative significance of the documents advocating patriotic education is considerably greater than those representing the latter agenda. Overall, the “temporary policy settlements” (Gale 2001) manifest in the three relatively distinct phases reveal that citizenship education policy is sensitive to the political climate of the period and could least be described as a consensual and evolutionary process.

Building on the theoretical discussion in Article III, that is, the tension attributed to the simultaneous processes of nation-building and democratisation, and on the more general philosophical debates on the contentious nature of citizenship education as nurturing both conformity and political activeness, Article IV explores the role of

---

1 On p. 545 of Article IV I write that the Programme of Democratic Citizenship Education is still awaiting approval. This document was never adopted (personal correspondence with a former project officer involved in the preparation of the programme).
the COE in promoting education for democratic citizenship in Russia (and Ukraine). In this respect, the question posed in the article is, can the COE’s critical, pluralist and active vision on citizenship education be observed in the educational policies of the two countries? Explicit attention to the possible convergence between the international agenda and the national citizenship education policies distinguishes this article from Article III, whereas contextualising the objectives and arguments of citizenship education policies against the antithetical political processes links it to the theoretical framework employed in the third (III) publication. It is argued that the international discourse on citizenship education privileges active and multicultural citizenship (also Article II), which is hard to reconcile with the domestic political pressure to ensure national unity and state cohesion. In this vein, the international discourse is visible in the national policy documents only when this agenda coincides with the national policy prerogatives.

7.5 Citizenship-nationality nexus in Finland and Russia (Article V)

This article describes and interprets comparatively citizenship education policies in Finland and Russia since the second half of the 1980s. The main task is to investigate how the relationship between citizenship and nationality is reshuffled in consequence of political changes, and whether the two concepts acquire new or modified meanings. With respect to Russia, the article draws mostly on the documents analysed for Articles III and IV, though it also includes several new documents published or identified later, for example, the second patriotic education programme and the Russian language programmes. The results of the study regarding Finland were not reported earlier. The interpretative frame of the article rests with the notions of nation-state and empire-state, in particular, the different associations between citizenship and nationality engendered in these state models.

In the case of Russia, this theoretical lens enables further interpretation of the documentary findings. For instance, it helps to understand that the primacy of subnational identities advocated in the first phase of citizenship education policy (Article IV) was rooted in and continued the legacy of the Soviet political thinking which institutionalised citizenship and nationality as distinct categories. In other words, this policy was not a product of the new era of democracy and externally imposed multiculturalism alone. From this perspective, the notion of state patriotism manifests a concrete political attempt to overcome the imperial heritage and, simultaneously, recentralise the Russian state itself. The closer that citizenship and nationality are tied together, the less possibility there is left for a multiple conception of nationality and citizenship advocated by international actors.

By incorporating the conceptual legacies into the interpretative framework, it is possible to observe that policy is, to a significant extent, an interplay between the de-
legitimation and re-legitimation of the existing conceptual and discursive frames. In the policy documents, the Soviet past constitutes one of the central reference points for the political decision-making in general and education policies in particular. The USSR is either depicted in negative terms as a faulty mentality to be dismantled, or it is regarded as a source of pride and past glory to be restored. In this way, the contested past of the nation is continuously renegotiated.

In the case of Finland, also, the conceptual heritage plays a significant role. Due to political changes which impinge on the sovereignty and authority of the state, and in the light of the symbiotic relationship between the nation and the state in the Finnish political tradition, it becomes important to find new sources of vitality for the nation. On the basis of the examined documents I conclude that Finland has returned to a cultural understanding of the nation which is not dependent on the sovereignty of the nation-state per se. In other words, the partial cession of the political decision-making powers to transnational actors does not put the legitimacy of the Finnish nation into question. The decoupling of nationality and citizenship opens up the possibility for a multilevel conceptualisation of both citizenship and nationhood. This means that students can be simultaneously cast into their roles as Finnish, European and global citizens without fear of loyalty conflicts. Yet the national element still remains the nucleus of the multilevel conception of citizenship. In terms of nationhood, this development enables the co-existence of multiple identities.

This article shows how two dissimilar socio-political settings deal with the task of reconstructing the means to maintain the bond between the citizen and the state. The comparison between Russia and Finland highlights the unique qualities of the post-imperial entity which differ in a considerable way from the nation-state model central to the Western political thinking and international relations.
Chapter 7 presented summaries of the individual articles, introduced the theoretical and methodological underpinnings in each of them and explained how the articles are bound. These overviews also summarised the results of the individual articles. In this chapter, I revisit the research findings documented in the five publications. As time has passed since the publication of the original articles, I have found new perspectives on the research findings and for that reason in the following I both recapitulate and expand the conclusions reported in the publications.

Identifying the final conclusions and their constraints inevitably goes hand in hand with considering the directions for future studies. Possibilities for further research are numerous, and the ones presented in this chapter constitute a small fraction of them, focusing deliberately on the research tasks embedded in comparative methodology.

8.1 Focal findings

8.1.1 Supranational citizenship agenda

In the present work national and supranational policy documents were analysed for the purpose of understanding the contents of citizenship education in modern Russia and Finland, as well as UNESCO and the COE. The agenda of the supranational actors parallel and intersect that developed in the national contexts, though with the rise of global educational governance separation between national and global is only plausible as a theoretical analytical exercise. Whereas national policies of education persist, they are construed in interaction with other players, among which the supranational organisations like OECD, EU, UNESCO, WTO and COE act as significant reference points. That being so I found it essential to incorporate supranational actors into the research setting, because to omit the global element and concentrate only on the national units would distort our understanding of the nature of education policy-making at present. After all, the rules and definitions of the global system increasingly provide models for and restrictions on actions and policies at the national level (Soysal 1994, 6). The dissertation argues that the emergence of supranational citizenship education policies which promote universal human rights, multilayered citizenship and critical appraisal of the state, and simultaneously condemn states for casting citizens into exclusive and prejudiced
roles, constitutes a paradigm shift and a clear extension of supranational educational governance to goals and values in the area of national education fundamental to the survival of the state itself. The meaning and potential implications of this development have been assessed in Article II, but a more systematic look into the motivations of national and non-national players remains a task for the future.

The picture that emerges from the analysis of the COE and UNESCO in Article II is neither tidy nor consistent. There is no one clear modality of citizenship education embraced by the supranational actors. The organisations are embedded in the main pillars of the international system based on the centrality of the nation-state and, by the same token, in the ideas of Western schooling, i.e., state formation, nation-building, identity, productivity and citizenship (Jones 2005). The histories of nation-states and supranational organisations are closely intertwined and both have expanded greatly since the Second World War (Meyer et al. 1997). The contentious discourses of citizenship education promoted by the examined organisations adhere to both the national and the post-national models of citizenship education. In the former, citizenship (status, rights and duties) and nationality (identity) are tightly bound together. More so, in the national model, the national state dictates the limits of citizenship and citizen duties in a top-down manner, emphasising order, obedience and unquestioned loyalty (cf. Green 1990). The post-national model, on the contrary, promotes diversity and multiculturalism, as well as a multi-level conception of citizenship. It decouples citizenship from nationality by positioning citizen rights within a wider global context and detaching them from the realm of the nation-state, while simultaneously assigning identities to national, subnational and supranational communities (Soysal 1994; Delanty 2007). The promotion of multi-level citizenship and identity is in stark contrast to the ideology of nationalism, which asserts that the nation-state supplies individuals with an exclusive and all-embracing identity.

8.1.2 Citizenship-nationality nexus in flux

The lenses applied to the research data have sought to capture changes in the objectives of and argumentation behind citizenship education in formal schooling from two intertwined vantage points:

1. the relationship between citizenship and nationality
2. the dual task of citizenship education to immerse into the nation and prepare for participation in democratic institutions

The competing discourses with one transmitting a passive internalisation of national identification and the other emphasising active and often critical participation for the sake of democracy manifest the profound dilemma implicit in citizenship education. This dual function stems from the historical merger between citizenship and nationality...
rooted in the ideology of the nation-state. Consequently, citizenship education balances between the two approaches and the swing of the pendulum from one side to the other reflects how citizenship and nationality are defined in a particular geopolitical context at any given historical moment. Temporary equilibrium is interrupted by domestic and international political reorientations, when these impinge on the notions of citizenship and nationality.

The two national cases examined in the dissertation live through turbulent times that demand and lead to the reformulations of citizenship, nationality and their interrelationship, and consequently the task of citizenship education itself. The complex phenomenon of globalisation is expected to put an end to the historically sealed union between nationality and citizenship by demystifying national culture, weakening the state and decoupling the state and the nation. As Delanty (2000, 132), for instance, claims:

*Rights have become embodied in discourses that extend far beyond the legal reach of the nation state; responsibility has shifted from a discourse of personal obligation focused on the state to a discourse of co-responsibility for nature and for future generations; participation is less focused on the national community than on others' spaces, which have been opened up as a result of subnational mobilization linked to globalization; and identity has become pluralized to the extent that citizenship must now contend with reconciling the pursuit of equality with the recognition of difference.*

The changes described by Delanty signify a new turn in the history of the nation-state. However, he seems to assume that the world, prior to the advent of globalisation, has constituted a perfect palette of nation-states within which nationality and citizenship were tightly bound. As the case of the Russian Federation shows, some states carry a very different legacy and, contrary to the above predictions, search for ways to bring citizenship and nationality together. Therefore the question of how states are affected by the destabilising impact of globalisation is a much broader one and should be examined from the perspective as to how globalisation and nation-building feed into each other in different contexts.

In the present work, this question was studied in two national contexts. As should be clear by now, at the heart of the theoretical framework of the dissertation was the relationship between nationality and citizenship, examined from different perspectives. Consequently, the comparative logic of the research and the selection of Russia and Finland as the comparative cases were based on their opposite conceptions of the relationship between nationality and citizenship. The study of citizenship education policies embedded in diverse state traditions revealed how the historically established relationships are reshuffled in consequence of domestic and international changes. Tønnesson (2004, 186) argues that the historical legacy of each nation will undoubtedly influence the way it copes with globalisation. Moreover, the various routes to nationhood have often overlapped within the same nation, and nations have followed one root in one period, and another in the next. Therefore, he concludes, “there is a complex roadmap
behind each nation, and today’s leaders may choose which of the available historical narratives they want to promote and build upon” (ibid.).

The dissertation illuminates precisely the interplay between past narratives and present and future political prerogatives. In a multi-national and multi-confessional Russia the nation remains highly contested, therefore it is more viable, politically, to articulate national identity as a state-oriented identity manifest in the notion of state patriotism. Russian patriotic education draws heavily on the Soviet tradition of political upbringing. It leads to the militarisation of citizenship both in terms of highlighting the role of military service as a fundamental citizen responsibility and reducing citizenship to a mere exercise of loyalty and self-sacrifice. In the documents on state patriotism, patriotism is perceived as the core spiritual component of Russia and the basis of the Russian nationhood. In the discourse of patriotism, a sub-state identity is superseded by a state-wide one. Moreover, patriotism is premised on the priority of social and state affairs over individual interests and constitutes the highest purpose of life and actions of individuals and social groups. Whereas in democracy freedom could only be guaranteed through political involvement – to avoid the arbitrary will of others – in the Russian discourse of patriotism freedom comes from the act of unquestioned loyalty itself (Piattoeva 2010). The centrality of loyalty is linked to and expressed in the distinct military character of state patriotism. As argued in Article V, the militarisation of patriotic education turns a citizen into a soldier with loyalty, duty and self-sacrifice to the state as the central citizen virtues.

The finding that the Finnish national identity is reverting from state to culture is significant in the context of the historically developed bond between citizenship and nationality and preoccupation with teaching national identity as state identity (Suutarinen 2004). Suutarinen’s conclusions are based on the examination of curricula and textbooks published in the mid 1990s. My conclusions support earlier findings in that they also discerned orientation toward the state, apparent in the topics such as state symbols, state sovereignty and independent Fatherland. This narrative equated the development of the nation to the development of the state and therefore codified national sovereignty as state sovereignty. From this perspective, the discussions observed in the committee reports and the latest curriculum guidelines, which stress the integrating role of the national culture, manifest the debundling of the state and the nation and therefore signify a remarkable shift in the perception of the relationship between the state and the nation and, consequently, nationality and citizenship. The transformation into a Kulturnation is a necessary step to secure Finland’s national being under the supranational umbrella of the EU, which transforms the meaning of state sovereignty.

In terms of the effect of globalisation on Russia, that is, the debundling of citizenship and nationality, the inherited divorce between nationality and citizenship could have fostered the materialisation of the effect of globalisation on Russia. In fact, this is what we generally witnessed in the beginning of the 1990s – that is, national identity being equated with ethnic identity and, continuing along the Soviet lines but in a much more
positive and rigorous fashion, relegated to the sub-state level. Whereas citizenship in its new form of Rossianin – the citizen of the Russian Federation – introduced by president Boris Yeltsin’s administration, turned into a civic and secular form of political identification with the state on the basis of shared political norms such as the rule of law.

These civic elements were combined with the ambiguous notion of universal human values, which do not rest with the peculiarity of the national society and culture. These values, though never identified, were treated as a ‘neutral’ alternative to the highly ideologicised value basis of the Soviet school. The category of the universal human values (obchechelovecheskiye cennosti) links Russian citizenship education to, and provides an entry point for, the citizenship education agenda promoted by the supranational actors, which is based on universal personhood instead of national and particularistic peoplehood. Education in human rights was perceived as a pressing obligation of the new Russian state which quickly signed a number of international declarations in order to affirm its commitment to respect and promote the principles of the international community (Antonov 1996, 50). Russia’s entry into the COE facilitated education in human rights, in line with the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on Teaching about Human Rights.

These principles, that is, adherence to human rights and universal human values, mark a breaking point (whether imagined or real) with the Soviet legacy, and link Russian citizenship education to the supranational agenda. As suggested in Article II, the sovereignty and legitimacy of the nation-state are no longer solely subjected to the scrutiny of the national citizenry, but are linked to the governments and citizens of other countries (Lucas 2001). This way, legitimacy increasingly takes a supranational form. In order to uphold international legitimacy, national governments are forced to adopt the language produced in the supranational arena.

Russia’s experience differs from the rest of the former Soviet republics that followed a classical path of ethnic nation-building from the very outset of independence (e.g. Ukraine in Article IV). The difference between Russia and other former republics in the nation-building strategies adopted by the state elites could be explained by the unique position of the RSFSR in the Soviet system. The ambiguous place of the RSFSR in the Soviet ethnofederal hierarchy precluded any possibility of the development of a proto nation-state thinking, as has happened in the rest of the Soviet territories, where a demarcated quasi-autonomous polity was associated with a group of people sharing a common national identification. Moreover, Russia as a successor of the Soviet Union found it much harder to relinquish its imperial identity in favour of a nation-state. In other words, the Soviet experience of the Russian Federation paved the way for the possibility to experience a new kind of citizenship-nationality nexus in line with the predicted effects of globalisation. However, following a clear change in the political stance of the power elites, the situation has reversed since the mid 1990s and the Russian authorities have embarked upon the process of bridging nationality and citizenship.
8.1.3 Arguments and justifications

In the 1990s, Finnish policy documents explicitly argued that the main task of the comprehensive school was to transmit national culture and strengthen the national identity of students (Article V). Even though Finland was not experiencing any major identity crisis, calls to rethink the task of education were framed around the threat of weak societal unity, stemming from the ongoing financial crisis, growing social disparities and multiculturalism. Another justification came from changes in the democratic decision-making, as the state was preparing grounds to relegate some of its decision-making powers to the supranational actors. From the arguments employed in the documents we can draw a conclusion that the nation-state model is not undermined. Rather, it is reformulated and updated in accordance with the perceived changes in the domestic and international context.

In Russia, even the nationalisation of education was reasoned in terms of the threat of state disintegration (Dneprov 1998). Whereas in the late 1980s and early 1990s national schools, whose task was to enhance the development of sub-state national identities, were recognised as crucial to the preservation of unity, since the second half of the 1990s they have been increasingly treated as having a harmful effect on inter-ethnic relations and state integrity. The category of the common national values (obchenatsional’nie cennosti), though not identified, is gaining in strength at the expense of universal human values and national cultural values. From early on, approximately from the mid 1990s, there have been calls for a solid system of common national values, whose absence was said to hinder the development of new curricula and textbooks. As an extension of this trend, vospitanie in general and patriotic upbringing in particular have been resurrected as the principal responsibility of the state.

The Soviet past constitutes one of the central reference points for the political decision-making in general and education policies in particular. The USSR is either depicted in negative terms as a faulty mentality to be dismantled, or it is regarded as past glory to be restored and taken great pride in. For instance, in the early 1990s, the very concern with constitutional culture and citizen rights was presented as entirely different from the Soviet regime’s preoccupation with patriotism and citizen duty, disregard for laws and ignorance of citizen rights expressed in the Constitution. The argumentation employed in the latest education documents, on the contrary, attests to the growing popularity of the discourse which takes pride in Soviet achievements. National security and aspirations to re-establish Russia as a superpower in world politics are used as legitimate claims for the construction of a patriotic vision of citizenship education which has little in common with the programmes of citizenship and human rights education advocated by the supranational agents. (Piattoeva 2010.)

The following table provides an overview of the study findings.
Table 4. Overview of research findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research aims</th>
<th>Research findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To identify and interpret the supranational agenda of citizenship education</td>
<td>The supranational agenda of UNESCO and the COE advocates proactive political participation, critical scrutiny of state institutions and action against the state on the basis of universal human rights, diversity and a multi-level conception of citizenship i.e. local, national, regional, global. Post-nationalisation of citizenship means that rights and duties emanate from belonging to the global community – the humanity, as opposed to membership in a territorially demarcated polity of the nation-state, and therefore decouples citizenship from nationality. Human rights education is expected to foster universal values, i.e. peace, tolerance, global solidarity, democracy and justice, which are believed to win universal recognition regardless of the socio-cultural context. Yet, the notion of world citizen is ambiguous and does not override the primacy of national citizenship. World citizenship is expected to develop from inter-national collaboration and thus does not erase the category of the national; also the definitions of citizenship evident in the supranational documents are vague and do not identify the polity to which the rights and duties are confined or where they should be practised. Supranational agenda emphasises the key role of national governments in implementing citizenship education and therefore still posits the nation-state as a central player in education policy and practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To identify and interpret citizenship education policies in Russia and Finland since the mid 1980s up to 2007, and to compare them to the supranational agenda of citizenship education</td>
<td>In Russia, the antithetical processes of nation-building and democratisation have led to two mutually contradictory citizen ideals, revealing inconsistency in citizenship policy and rivalry between different political ideologies. In Russia, post-Soviet citizenship education policies have undergone several transformations: from embracing subnational identities to a state-wide one and from promoting universal human values to all-national values. In Russia, as also in Finland, the need to review citizenship education has been justified in terms of centrifugal forces in society and fears of societal fragmentation. In Russia, in addition to the above, the argument of state disintegration has been applied to antithetical policy prerogatives, i.e. first promoting subnationalisation and later re-nationalisation. Russian documents remain silent about the promotion of critical skills; they are mostly concerned with ‘intra’ Russian rather than European or global citizenship matters. In Finland, the traditional understanding of the nation in terms of political sovereignty has been exchanged for a cultural one; national identity and national citizenship are no longer perceived as incompatible with other layers of identity and citizen participation. However, the national level is still perceived as the core. While Finland shows evidence of decoupling nationality and citizenship and turning citizenship into a multi-level concept, Russia strives to rebundle the two. Finnish citizenship education policies demonstrate higher convergence with the supranational agenda, whereas Russian policies demonstrate convergence only during the first decade after the collapse of the USSR. Yet it should be borne in mind that the supranational agenda itself is far from renouncing the national citizenship education model.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In retrospect, it should be noted that the comparative dimension of the dissertation turned out unbalanced in the sense that Russia constitutes the prime focus of analysis, at least if assessed by the number of articles which focus on Russia. In this respect the contents of the articles reflect the research process where the greatest challenge has proven to be in construing a meaningful comparative framework for the incorporation of the national cases examined in the dissertation. Only toward the end of the process (Article V) have I finally managed to crystallise the comparative dimension of the research. The overall composition of the dissertation also reflects the comprehensive logic employed in the research, as I have sought to examine the national cases in their entirety, as opposed to dismantling complex socio-political processes into variables at high levels of abstraction. In this respect, the articles unveil the search for appropriate theoretical and methodological tools that would enhance my understanding of the cases and therefore document in a genuine way the dialogues between the data and the theory undertaken at different stages of the research process.

The comparative axis of the dissertation has provided the research with a solid backbone, as it has helped to train my analytical gaze on the crucial variation between the cases. In this manner, it has narrowed down and sharpened the theoretical framework of the dissertation, and eventually provided logic to the present overview. In any case, the analytical lenses applied to the Russian data remain more versatile. In particular, the perspective taken in Article III, that is, the focus on the incongruous character implicit in citizenship education, was not applied to the Finnish documents. This was due to the actual theoretical framework employed at this stage of the research, which focused on the effects of nation and state building in a reconfigured state and the problem of stateness inflicted by their simultaneous appearance.

One theme briefly explored in Article I but untouched in the overall research focused on the political usage of comparative education studies. Researchers (e.g. Nóvoa & Yariv-Mashal 2003) claim that comparison, particularly cross-national studies of educational achievement, has turned into a means of soft regulation aiming at convergence of national education systems. Though this topic was left outside the scope of the dissertation, evidence of the role of international comparisons surfaced in the examined documents. For instance, the gap between civic knowledge, civic participation and attitudes, highlighted by international studies, provided legitimation for the Civic Participation Policy Programme adopted by the Finnish Government in 2004 (FMJ 2007). International comparisons are embedded in uniform indicators and benchmarks applied to very different contextual settings. As a result, they should be seen as political interventions that might lead to gradual homogenisation of national policies. Further research on citizenship education should explore possible intersections between international studies and national policies, as well as the usage of the study
findings in policy-making. With the first findings of the latest International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) already published, it would be important to ask why states engage in these comparisons in the first place.

Further studies could refine the research setting in order to gain a comprehensive grasp of the entire spectrum of non-national policy actors – both IGOs and NGOs – active in the field of citizenship education policy and practice. This approach would allow for the identification of differences and similarities between the supranational scripts unexamined in the present dissertation. My focus on the COE and UNESCO derived from the supposition that the research is more consistent if it concentrates on the group of players relevant for all the examined cases, even though my intention has not extended to the assessment and comparison of the occurring policy transfer between the organisations and the national units. In this regard it should be borne in mind that each nation-state is embedded in its own transnational web composed of both strong and weak strings, and national policies can be expected to combine elements from the different constituents of the web. This assumption leads to a further question as to when and how strings weaken and strengthen, new strands occur and the old ones get re-tied or unravelled.

This research setting could prepare grounds to study holistically how supranational players interact with national policies. Recent studies on policy transfer and recontextualisation of global policy rhetoric focus predominantly on the effects of just one or two supranational actors, lacking such an all-embracing perspective. A holistic approach would make possible to examine ‘whose policies get most say’, whether in terms of concrete effects or as reference points and international justifications in the national policy framing. In one of my interviews, the respondent explained that in Russia, citizenship education in subnational units reflects the constellations of international players working in this particular region and their relations with the local authorities. In this vein, there is a possibility that transnational actors, both intergovernmental and NGOs, bypass the national level, therefore significantly rescaling the entire process of education policy formation.
REFERENCES


---

**CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION POLICIES AND THE STATE**


APPENDIX

Russian documents examined in the dissertation


1 The number of pages shown after each document indicates the number of pages examined in the given document and does not necessarily correspond to the entire length of the document.


Finnish documents examined in the dissertation


International documents examined in the dissertation


ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS
Comparative Education in Global Times

Nelli Piattoeva
Department of Education, University of Tampere

Abstract

This chapter concentrates on recent reorientations in comparative education as a field of research and an academic discipline in relation to the overarching theme of globalisation. My first aim is to synthesise and reflect on the methodological and theoretical debates that point to the necessity to re-think the scales of analysis, conceptions and categories employed in the research. I argue that comparative education researchers need to re-conceptualise and re-theorise the shift in the state from a static and relatively closed container of socio-political relations (including educational ones) to a plurilateral structure increasingly embedded in and contested by sub-national and supra-national interactions. Second, I shortly raise the impact of globalisation on the ethical dimension of the research, more precisely its political usage and links to policy-making. In this respect I concentrate on the fact that globalisation is simultaneously a political buzz-word and a “paradigmatic intellectual supercomplexity” (Cowen 2006). Moreover, comparison itself has become a mode of governance and a political tool which is used to foster integration and convergence among educational systems without resorting to changes in legislation and traditional politics (Nôvoa & Yariv-Mashal 2003).

Introduction

In this chapter my aim is to discuss to what extent and in which ways globalisation is changing the principles of comparative education as a research field and an academic discipline. In particular, I will explore the consequences of globalisation for the analytical units and theoretical lenses commonly employed by comparative education researchers. The
“globalisation thesis” can be used to explain almost anything and is widely employed in policy documents and analysis (Ball 1998). The chapter is premised on the assumption that “globalisation has never been an objective historical reality, but simply a term that we use to interpret rapid changes in the world, caused by the shifting patterns of social and economic relations” (Rizvi 2004, 169). Thus globalisation is a set of interacting, overlapping and uneven processes, as opposed to a single condition (Tikly 2001). In the following, I am not concerned with unfolding the full complexity of the processes related to globalisation. My primary emphasis is on the globalisation-driven and globalisation-reasoned reconfigurations of the state as a key institution of educational provision and control, and as a central interpretative lens in comparative education. I attempt to reflect on and offer a synthesis of the ongoing academic debates with respect to the changing character of the nation-state and its consequences for the “doing of comparative education”.

I will also briefly explore the political aspect of comparative education. Since its birth, comparative education has been expected to contribute to education policy making by supplying the so-called successful “lessons from abroad”, i.e. information on the educational systems of foreign countries that could be transferred to one’s own (e.g. Cowen 2006). Globalisation has changed the political posture of comparative education, as comparison itself has been turned into the means of soft regulation that aims at the convergence of national systems. Moreover, central research concepts are simultaneously widely employed political slogans and justifications of political action or inaction. While the political nature of comparative education is hardly new to researchers in the field, we should reflect on the changes it has undergone in the name of globalisation.

I will start with a brief definition of the field of research that this chapter is concerned with.
Comparative Education

Generally speaking, comparative social sciences involve comparing times and places, i.e. different historical periods and societies. Comparison helps to establish whether generalisations hold across cases or it highlights crucial differences in the examined cases (such an approach is also called contrast or juxtaposition). At the same time, cross-societal and cross-cultural comparison “makes the familiar strange” and functions as a “cultural critique of ourselves”, meaning that it reveals the taken for granted assumptions and practices in our home societies (Sadler 1900 in Phillips 1999, 18; Fischer 1986 in Mason 2007, 192; Broadfoot 1999, 26). Thus the main purpose of comparative studies is not limited to describing differences and similarities of the examined cases. The overall aim is to understand and explain macro-social variation (e.g. Sartori 1994; Ragin 1987). However, as the following statements demonstrate, the main tenets of comparative education are far from unequivocal or unanimous.

Steiner-Khamsi (2002a, 179) cites Noah (1985) to identify the four major uses of comparative education, with the comparative defined in terms of data from one or more country or region. Comparative studies attend to all or just one of the following tasks. Firstly, they concentrate on the description of educational systems, processes and outcomes. Secondly, they assist in the development of educational institutions and practices. Thirdly, they interpret the relationship between education and society. And finally, comparative education establishes generalized statements about education that are valid for more than one country. Broadfoot (1999), on the other hand, adheres to a narrower definition of the research field. She writes that comparative education is not “(...) descriptive accounts of ‘what is’, however carefully done. It is not de-contextualised comparisons of particular dimensions, [as] they lack the theoretical framework that is essential to justifying the drawing of any conclusions from the gathered data” (ibid.,
29). Therefore for Broadfoot (1999), careful theorisation of the context is the prerequisite of educational comparison. Due to the importance of both understanding the context and constructing a theoretically sound framework which explains variation between cases, the main challenge for comparative research lies in striking the balance between the integrity and historicity of cases, and their theorisation, operationalisation and abstraction for comparative purposes.

Although there is a general consensus that comparison relies on data from different societies, there are diverse views as to the unit of analysis, i.e. the definition of society and thus the context of the educational phenomenon under study. Most commonly, the interpretative lens of comparative research is premised on and limited to the national scale (see discussion in the ensuing section). However, Bray and Thomas (1995, 488) argue that “(...) much, and perhaps most, research requires multilevel comparative analysis in order to achieve a full and balanced understanding of its subjects”. Noah & Eckstein (1998) write that the most appropriate kinds of units for investigation lie not at the national, but at the sub-national level, since the amount of variation in any particular educational phenomenon is often greater within nation states rather than between them.

In terms of its academic tribe, comparative education could be located under the umbrella of the sociology of education, for it studies education, society and the relationship between the two in different national, sub-national and supra-national contexts (Noah 1985 in Steiner-Khamsi 2002a). Thus conceived, comparative education is primarily about comparing macrosocial and intrasocial relationships, or, in other words, establishing relations between relationships across different cultural settings (Schriewer 1999)². Comparative studies focus

---

² The notion of relations between relationships should not be equated with any form of linear causality. On the contrary, it alerts the researcher to the complexity of causal networks and the impact of the intra-social context which, in most cases, cannot be abstracted into clear-cut social variables (see Schriewer 1999).
on the embeddedness of educational phenomena, i.e. its relation to and interaction between education and the context (e.g. Cowen 2006). Therefore, the question of the unit of analysis is not merely about choosing the most appropriate one or studying educational phenomena on different levels, but it is rather about exploring changing relationships between levels and their inter-penetration (cf. Ball 1998). These relationships are embedded in and mediated by cultural and institutional arrangements.

As will be discussed later, debates that concern the appropriate level of analysis are not merely related to the professional query regarding which (and whose) research counts as comparative. They are linked to the major theoretical and methodological reorientations in contemporary social science following the “explosion of interest in globalisation studies” (Brenner 1999, 40). The advent of globalisation as a socio-political reality and an analytical lens in social sciences has made these debates indispensable, as globalisation unfolds and further unsettles the ambivalent and yet frequently taken for granted scales of analysis, objects of study and terms and concepts employed in comparative research (e.g. Dale & Robertson 2009), whose nature as politically and socially constructed fluid entities has come to the surface. Thus globalisation has not simply challenged the previously relevant analytical lenses of research. It has rather unmasked the shortcomings and the unproblematic theorising of comparative studies “prior globalisation”, so to say. (cf. ibid.).

In the above, I briefly outlined the main tenets of comparative education and also pointed to the fluidity of the field. In the next section I will unfold the “global” challenges in methodological and theoretical terms.
Roger Dale has provocatively argued that “globalisation implies a clear threat to comparative education” (2000, 87). First and foremost, the “threat” springs from the changing nature of the nation-state in terms of its internal and external functions. The state has traditionally lied at the centre of comparative research as the ultimate supplier and definer of education (Carnoy 2006, 4). Even in the private sphere, the state usually gets to decide the very meaning of the private and controls the mechanisms of licensing and funding private institutions. As Carnoy has put it, “the ways changes take place in educational systems is largely defined by the political relationship of the nation’s citizenry to the state and the ways that the state has organised the educational system politically” (2006, 4-5). In fact, in his presidential address at the Comparative and International Education Society (CIES) on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary, Carnoy stated that comparativists should be primarily concerned with the state, when it comes to analysing educational matters (ibid., 5).

The state has been the key explanatory factor in understanding the workings of educational systems (e.g. Welch 1993). The field of comparative education is genealogically related to the state, as it developed parallel to the rise of national education systems coined by nation-states (Noah & Eckstein 1969 in Green 2003, 83). The role of national education system was conceived of as a “massive engine of integration, assimilating the local to the national and the particular to the general” (Green 2003, 85). As the state constituted the primary regulator of the educational enterprise, scientific explanations, too, relied on the analysis of macro national variables. The nation-state was widely perceived as the container of society, which meant that “societies” became associated with nation-states (Dale & Robertson 2009). This conception locked social scientists in the so-called “territorial trap” in which states represent “the self-enclosed
geographical containers of socioeconomic and politico-cultural relations” (Brenner 1999, 40). Consequently, early comparative education studies sought to address variations between systems mainly in terms of national characteristics (Green 2003, 85).

Recent developments in domestic and international politics have often been described in terms of the reconfiguration of the state and even its gradual disappearance due to the changing relationship between states and supranational forces (Dale 2000, 87-88). Political supranationalism together with economic supranationalism, are the key features and drivers of globalisation, also in the area of education (ibid., 99; Green 2003, 86). Supranational players, e.g. organisations like the OECD, World Bank, UNESCO, European Union etc., represent the “competing imaginary” to that of the national educational system based on the assumption that national systems have reached their “use-by date” (Dale & Robertson 2009)⁴. However, we should bear in mind that there never was a golden age of absolute state autonomy. For centuries, states have been, to various extents, incorporated in and affected by the international economic system. Second, national educational systems were not constructed in isolation from one another. The central ideas of modernization transcended national borders and gave rise to educational systems which demonstrate impressive similarity in terms of form and content (Dale 2000, 88-89).

Globalisation has given rise to social processes that “appear to operate below, above, beyond or between entrenched geopolitical

---

³ For instance, the total number of international governmental organisations has grown from 37 in 1909 to nearly 300 in 1989 (Zacher 1993 cf. Held 2002, 346).

⁴ Based on my analysis of citizenship education agenda of UNESCO and the Council of Europe I argue that supranational organisations adhere to a dual agenda which simultaneously reinforces the national world order and promotes transnational educational governance and citizenship agenda that undermines the traditional role of the nation-state. Thus the supranational imaginary cannot be conceptualized as opposite to the national one. It is better to perceive it as incoherent and intrinsically contradictory (Piattoeva 2009 forthcoming).
boundaries” (Brenner 1999, 40). Social relations have thus surpassed the static geographical container of a bounded nation-state. Brenner argues that it is the “wide-ranging effort to transcend state-centric epistemologies” that constitutes the “unifying theme of contemporary globalisation research” (ibid.). At the same time, globalisation has made the existing relationships between national education systems, national states and supranational forces more explicit (Dale 2000, 89). Moreover, “the relationships between nation states, the institutions that comprise them, including their educational systems, and their citizens are changed” and new relationships and networks are constantly emerging (ibid., 91).

The cultural context of the nation-state, whether defined in terms of “national culture” or “minority cultures” or “individual identities” have also been altered by globalisation. For the founding fathers of comparative education, education was an expression of “national life and character” (Sadler as quoted in Green 2003, 85). Comparativists rarely explored cultural minorities or intra-state cultural differences (Green 2003). Lately, comparativists have re-emphasised the significance of culture and context (e.g. Grant 2000; Broadfoot 1999; Welch 1993) which have either been overshadowed by a focus on the institutional environment or, as is often the case in the cross-national studies, reduced to variables at a high level of abstraction. Welch, writing in 1993, suggested that it is the explicit focus on culture and cultural relations that should distinguish comparativists from their colleagues in other disciplines. However, those who take culture seriously do not share a common understanding of the term. It is either perceived as a neutral integrative force, and as a fixed and unitary tradition that encompasses and is shared by all; or, alternatively, it represents a contested arena of conflicting interests and struggle for dominance. In this view, culture is not neutral; it is selective and exclusionary, and it represents the culture of the dominant group. (Welch 1993.)
The role of culture in the analysis and the very ambiguity of the term are issues we are bound to confront in the context of globalisation which manifests itself in the complex processes of transnationalism and cultural hybridisation. These processes are said to lead to the fragmentation of (national) culture. Simultaneously, there are ongoing discussions on the gradual homogenisation of culture, due to the asymmetrical cultural flows between nations, i.e. from the “West” to the “Rest”, as well as the commodification and commercialisation of identity markers (Rizvi 2004). On the one hand, cross-cultural comparisons encounter similar challenges as those drawing on the state and society, as culture has often been implicitly equated with the nation-state and perceived in terms of a shared state-wide cultural identity (cf. Mason 2007). Cultural globalisation is manifested in the rise of alternative cultures and cultural identities, as well as cultural hybridity which demystify national culture and its proclaimed homogeneous unity. As global forces endanger the uniformity of the nation, they also reveal its exclusionary nature. Thus conceived, the “national characteristics” which used to provide an important explanatory framework in cross-country analyses of educational systems cease to exist or, at the very least, appear highly dubious. Consequently, the first approach indicated by Welch (1993), which treats culture as a neutral integrative force, is increasingly inadequate. 

However, cross-cultural analyses are not necessarily cross-national. Due to the difficulty of identifying the cultural unit, which, to mention just one simple aspect, lacks clear geographical borders, researchers in cross-cultural settings are perhaps better equipped to question the units of analysis they apply, as well as to analytically cope with the consequences of simultaneous fragmentation and integration.

---

5 This does not imply that states have given up on the myth of national culture and the institutions and discursive practices which seek to promote it. But we are now better equipped to deconstruct the largely taken for granted idea of national culture and to understand the heterogeneity and resistance which lie within and without the national layer.
However, they, too, should move from an anthropological definition of culture as something that “is” to that which perceives it in sociological terms, as something constructed both discursively and in interaction (Mason 2007). In this respect and regarding the reconfiguration of both the state and (its) national culture, research should re-focus on the relationship between the state and (national) culture, in view of their historical interdependency and ongoing reshuffling. As Green argues, a strong national identity will still be in demand to unite the heterogenic communities within states, as well as to legitimate the growing disparities caused by the global forces (Green 1997, 169-179).

In addition to the manifestations of globalisation in relation to the state and culture, there is a third way to conceive of the phenomenon. From a discursive perspective, “globalisation” is becoming a new kind of *das Internationale Argument* employed by policy-makers when it comes to constructing favourable environment for implementation of educational reforms (on Jürgen Schriewer’s original concept see Steiner-Khamsi 2002b). In this manner, globalisation is not a mere uncontrollable force of nature which inevitably impinges on the nation-state and the national culture. It is a productive instrument and an assertive figure of speech that national players can activate for various purposes. Thus the discourse of globalisation is shaped and fostered by national players, as it is harnessed to serve national prerogatives. The discursive view of globalisation underlines that nation-states are not just passive recipients or victims of globalisation. And it also points to the fact that globalisation cannot be deconstructed into a set of objective social, political and cultural processes. The discourse of globalisation can serve very different interests, both cosmopolite and nationalistic.

The difference to the earlier “lessons learned from abroad” type of argument, which drew external reference points from foreign systems, lies in the fact that national actors increasingly refer to supranational agents and players whose agency cannot be identified with any single nation-state. Perhaps, the persuasive power and legitimacy of
the “globalisation” argument lies precisely in the fact that it is not reducible to a single nation. When something is happening “globally”, i.e. everywhere, there is not much that can be said against it or done to counteract the “inevitable”. I have no intention to deny that there are problems of global nature, e.g. global warming or transnational terrorism that no country can sufficiently address on its own. However, globalisation is manifested in the prescription of global needs and universal responses to specific and context-bound political, cultural and educational matters. The pool of potential “problems” is perhaps bottomless. Thus comparativists should ask themselves how and which matters become constituted as global problems deserving a uniform supranational response.

Reconceptualising the State

While the rise of “global architecture of education” bounds education with global dynamics, ideologies, norms and structures (Jones 2007), it has not eroded national control over education per se (Green 2003, 86). Human skills remain immobile, while it is the skills and the intellectual and innovate potential of the human mind that governments rely upon to ensure their competitiveness in the global knowledge economy (ibid., 86-97). Thus we could argue that education remains crucial to the nation-state, and perhaps even more so than ever. What needs to be understood is the loss of some of the state’s activities to both supranational bodies and sub-national or non-state actors (Dale 1997, 274). In other words, the state is no longer solely responsible for the definition, provision and control of the educational sphere. Nevertheless, the state continues to be in the “driving seat”, as it coordinates where and who carries the educational work (ibid.).

The emergence of supranational educational governance with its proclaimed homogenising effects on national educational systems has not yet resulted in the convergence of educational systems. For instance,
Green’s studies have revealed that while the global policy rhetoric is emerging, it is adopted very differently in accordance with the local context (2003, 87). For Dale, globalisation is a “states-driven process” capable of re-strengthening the states, as they transfer activities to other players and re-join forces to fulfil their central functions in a more efficient manner (1997, 2002). States have fostered globalisation by dismantling national forms of economic and socio-political organisation and replacing these with new political and institutional forms in order to attract foreign capital, innovation and flexibility (Brenner 1999, 65). Moreover, these are not simply defensive measures in the face of fierce economic competition, but rather “concerted strategy to create new scales of state regulation to facilitate and coordinate the globalisation process” (ibid., 65-66). Thus, changes in state power cannot be conceptualised in terms of de-regulation. It is through the process of re-regulation that states have promoted the globalisation process. Globalisation inevitably forces comparative researchers to re-think their methodological and theoretical toolboxes. What should be answered is how the context around the nation-state has been re-shaped due to and in the name of globalisation and how the nation-state has accommodated itself to the reconfigured context.

However, we should be careful not to overemphasise the proactive role of the nation-state in the face of globalisation. Tickly (2001) questions the relevance of “Western” accounts of globalisation in post-colonial low-income countries. He argues that it is important to specify the context within which different theorisations of globalisation are applicable, as there is no “one superior vantage point from which global forces can best be understood” (Tikly 2001, 151-152). Thus we could argue that a paradox and a serious limitation of the extensive theoretical literature on globalisation is its lack of a truly global perspective, as it often makes generalisations and far-reaching conclusions on the basis of limited empirical evidence, often focused on the Western countries. Countries located in the periphery of global
economy and politics have a very different starting point in mediating the influence of globalisation, compared to the dominant ones (ibid., 155).

Thus an important challenge lies in creating a new conceptualisation of the state without resorting to the state’s conceptual negation. As Brenner (1999) argues, the strand of globalisation research which proclaims the state obsolete and turns to the de-territorialised notions of “global culture” and “borderless world”, ironically, operates within the same conceptual discourse that it claims to undermine. Empirically, we are confronted with an extraordinary conflict between the emergence of new configurations of territoriality and the consequent fragmentation of the state, on the one hand, and the simultaneous strengthening of the nation-state as the only legitimate and desired form of socio-political organisation. Schriewer (1999, 45) writes that attempts at supra-national integration go hand-in-hand with the strengthening of the nation-state. Simultaneously, supranational integration engenders linguistic, ethnical or cultural diversification on the sub-national level (ibid.). These contradictory processes give rise to new scales of territoriality, socio-political relationships and power, as well as new relationships between and within the scales (cf. Brenner 1999). As the political developments since the fall of Yugoslavia and the USSR illustrate, the nation-state, perceived as a bundle of culture, language and politics within a demarcated territory, continues to preoccupy the political imagination of state elites, particularly so in the so-called new or developing states. With this context in mind, the nation-state should be regarded as in need of explanation and re-theoretisation rather than as a part of explanation itself (Dale & Robertson 2009).

One explanation of the taken-for-grantedness of the nation-state lies in the country cases chosen by researchers. Perhaps, comparativists have been too often concerned with the so-called stable nation-states. However, this model has not been the reality for a great number of
places outside the “West”. Moreover, the general economic and political stability in Europe since the Second World War did not offer researchers empirical cases of what Cowen has accurately termed “transitologies” (2000). Cowen visualises transitologies as “lightning storms” on “dark days” which “reveal to us, behind their drama and their rhetoric, the educational patterns that are ordinarily, in ordinary daylight as it were, difficult to see” (2000, 6). Transitologies – the moments of collapse, deconstruction and major metamorphosis of state apparatuses, social and economic stratification systems and political visions of the future rely on education as symbolic and practical means to destroy the past and redefine the future. These crucial moments reveal that equilibrium is “an unusual condition”. In moments of transitology, theoretically and empirically speaking, it is simply impossible to take the notions of state, society and culture as given. What is of particular interest here is the interplay between reconstruction and metamorphosis, as well as deconstruction, discrediting and even destruction of the past (ibid. 5).

In addition to spotting the moments of transitology, which throw temporary empirical and conceptual equilibrium in the air, it is important to deconstruct the activities that constitute educational governance and the levels or scales of activity (Dale & Robertson 2009). There is a functional and scalar re-division of educational activities along sub-national, national and supranational lines and between institutions of coordination, including the state, market, community and household (ibid.). The state is not eroded in this process, but it is decentred “both as a self-enclosed container of socio-economic relations and as an organisational interface between sub- and supranational scales” (Brenner 1999, 52). In this respect, we require novel categories that are capable of describing and analysing emerging relationships and consequently re-conceptualising the embeddedness of the educational phenomena. For instance, Cowen (2000) argues that the supra-national and international categories of regions and rims should replace the nation-state as a powerful unit of analysis. Another new category has been suggested
by Hoogvelt (1997 in Tikly 2001) and refers to different postcolonial formations, such as sub-Saharan Africa, militant Islam, East Asia and Latin America.

However, we would be mistaken to think that new categories have only become relevant since the reshuffle of the relationship between the nation-state and supranational and sub-national forces. Nor is it an ultimately new perspective. Belkanov (2001, 82-83) in his discussion of the Western studies of, Soviet pedagogy and schooling argues that the analytical category of “Eastern Europe” was widely employed in comparative education research prior to the collapse of the Berlin Wall. It was perceived not as much in territorial terms but as a zone of Soviet influence. Thus it was the shared ideological platform, the ideological block, as opposed to clear-cut state borders that determined the choice of the scale of analysis. These categories of analysis overlapped with the political vocabulary of the antagonistic period, thus indicating the proximity of politics and comparative research. Globalisation discourse appeared after the collapse of the Berlin Wall which dismantled the established balance of power, old borders and the polarised ideological camps and thus gave rise to anticipations of the borderless world (Rizvi 2004). However, national borders are, in fact, getting re-strengthened, when perceived in terms of the growing emphasis on national security and intensifying control over people’s cross-border movements (ibid.). New ideological camps are emerging, such as? the “West” and the “Muslim World”. These new political categories are often perceived in antagonistic terms and thus remind us of the earlier historical confrontations.

The emerging “pluri-lateral” forms of state power lead to the decoupling of sovereignty and territory. To quote Burawoy (2000 in Nóvoa & Yariv-Mashal 2003, 434): “The dense ties that once connected civil society to the state are being detached and redirected across national boundaries to form a thickening global public sphere. Yet these connections and flows are not autonomous, are not arbitrary patterns
crossing in the sky, but are shaped by the strong magnetic fields of nation states”. However, we should also bear in mind that the central role of the state as an interface and mediator between supra-national (inter-national, high) and sub-national (local, low) levels is being considerably re-shaped and there is a chance that the state level will lose its grip on the movements between the “high” and “low” levels (Anderson 1996 in Brenner 1999, 67).

The Political Posture of Comparative Education

In the above, I explored the relationship between the state and comparative education in methodological and theoretical terms with respect to the challenge of globalisation. I also briefly described the historical connection of the state and the discipline of comparative education, which developed simultaneously with the rise of state-led schooling and the nation-state itself. In relation to and as a continuation of this discussion, I shortly turn the political link between comparative education and the state. From its birth, comparative education was not exercised in ivory towers to satisfy the intellectual appetite of academics. Comparative research has been invested with the task of improving educational policy and practice by searching for and introducing valuable lessons from abroad to the policy-makers and the general public (Carnoy 2006; Cowen 2000, 2006, Green 2003). Thus, comparative research has aspired to be useful in a very practical-political understanding of the term. Adopting Cowen’s (2006, 562) terminology, we should understand how comparative education is expected to act upon the world. And, I would add, how the world impinges upon comparative education. I emphasise these questions in terms of research ethics, i.e. what and for whom comparative research is, and what is its role, once it leaves the trembling hands of a comparative researcher. In addition, the political context around comparative education inevitably has a bearing on the topics chosen, the
concepts and categories employed and the conclusions derived.

Two developments could be mentioned as we review the ethical question of comparative education research in the context of globalisation. Both point to the epistemological diversification of the field, on the one hand, and its re-politisation. By the latter, I particularly refer to the rising importance of comparative education for and in educational policy-making. First, many new concepts and categories applied by researchers, e.g. globalisation, life-long learning, Europeanisation, international development etc., are salient policy topics and discourses. Thus researchers should be aware of the potential consequences of the vocabulary overlap. As argued earlier, globalisation is not only an assemblage of distinct processes, globalisation is “tamed” and re-constructed in discursive practices. An overview of recent debates on the theoretical and methodological reorientations in comparative education research points to the catalysing role of globalisation. As academics take part in the debates, they simultaneously feed the discourse of globalisation and consequently the phenomenon itself. Thus it is not all the same how we come to grips with the concept.

Second, the field of comparative education have come to be populated by cross-national large scale studies. Perhaps, the most publicly known are the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA by OECD) and those conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA and its studies in mathematics and science TIMSS, civic education CIVIC and ISSC, and PIRLS in literacy). These studies mainly aim at providing information about educational achievement of students in various school subjects, i.e. they measure educational outcomes. It is the ability of students to apply school knowledge in real-life situations that is the primary focus of the studies. Thus only skills and knowledge perceived as having practical relevance are worth the measurement. The aim is to present “objective” numbers on the educational achievement and,
importantly, to rank participant-countries on the basis of their scores. Thus Green (2003, 86) has ironically called it a kind of cross-national Olympics. As education is increasingly perceived in terms of its contribution to economic competitiveness on the global market, measurements of educational efficiency, quality and individual potential are treated as reflections of the overall economic well-being, investment attractiveness and innovative potential of nation-states. The international nature of these studies coupled with their growing popularity could be taken for clear manifestations of globalisation, as they reveal the emergence of educational surveillance which transcends national borders and is managed by organisations of supranational nature. This development exposes the establishment of the so-called mutual accountability (Nóvoa & Yariv-Mashal 2003) which positions national systems against one another thus feeds the common incentive for endless development and improvement of quality. However, ironically, these studies also re-strengthen the nation-state as they take the state as their primary unit of measurement (Green 2003, 86).

It is not only the growing prevalence of the cross-national comparisons per se that is of primary interest here. It is also and perhaps more importantly, the generation of uniform indicators and benchmarks applied to very different contextual settings and their potential implications that we should be concerned with. As Nóvoa and Yariv-Mashal (2003, 428) demonstrate, the European Union employs systematic comparison between countries using indicators, outcomes, benchmarks and guidelines. By doing so, it engages in political intervention in the educational system which, in the EU regulation, is otherwise left to the authority of the member-states. The authors assert that “the construction of comparable indicators serves as a ‘reference point’ that will eventually lead the various national institutions to adopt freely the same kind of actions and perspectives within the educational field” (ibid.). Nóvoa and Yariv-Mashal call comparison the new mode of governance which relies on the educational researchers to develop its
conceptual and methodological basis. Thus the method of comparison itself, in addition to the knowledge it generates, is increasingly applied in and for politics.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I discussed recent reorientations in comparative education as a field of research and an academic discipline in relation to the overarching theme of globalisation. My first aim was to synthesise and reflect on the methodological and theoretical debates that point to the necessity to re-think the scales of analysis, conceptions and categories employed in research. Comparative education researchers need to re-conceptualise and re-theorise the shift in the state from a static and relatively closed container of socio-political relations (including educational ones) to a plurilateral structure increasingly embedded in and contested by sub-national and supra-national interactions. This theoretical and methodological reorientation should avoid the negation of the state, but instead acknowledge the importance of its contextualisation.

As Cowen (2003, 16) argues, the reactions and consequences to the processes assembled under the fuzzy term of globalisation are not equal. States adopt various strategies and ideologies in the face of the phenomena, depending on their economic, political and institutional capacities. The concepts of power, hegemony, fragmentation, core and periphery enter the discussion, as we try to map states in relation to globalisation. There should be conceptual plasticity and sensitivity to the homogenising effects of globalisation, on the one hand, as well as modifications and resistance they endanger, on the other. Thus conceived, the research agenda could re-orient itself toward a critical examination of the globalisation processes and their claims to universality and homogeneity. The overall consequences and challenges endangered by the paradigmatic shift are intriguing. For one thing, it
becomes ever more complicated to identify the appropriate scale(s) of analysis and their interrelationships.

Second, I shortly raised the impact of globalisation on the ethical dimension of the research, more precisely its political usage and links to policy-making. Comparison has historically provided policy-makers with ideas and practices that could ameliorate national schools and arguments necessary to legitimise national policies. Recently, comparison has turned into a mode of governance (Nóvoa & Yariv-Mashal 2003) as a way to foster integration and convergence among educational systems without resorting to changes in legislation and traditional politics. This tendency is linked to the overarching theme of the chapter, i.e. globalisation and the nation-state, as it manifests new means of global educational governance which undermine the authority of the state as the regulator of the educational sector. Thus, the challenge of globalisation is not merely related to the methodological and theoretical reorientations, but equally to the ethical dimension of the research. In other words, the choices we make with respect to the methodological and theoretical aspects reveal the political position of the research and its relation to the educational policy-making. Lastly, we need to realise that there is a general vocabulary overlap between politics and comparative education. Globalisation is simultaneously a political buzz-word and a “paradigmatic intellectual supercomplexity” (Cowen 2006, 562). Thus researchers are faced with a challenge of employing the vocabulary without falling into the trap of its unreflective replication.
References


NELLI PIATTOEVA

5. CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

Contrasting the national model to the emerging post-national agenda

INTRODUCTION

The worldwide legitimacy of the nation-state is increasingly challenged by the complex phenomenon of globalisation. Global economic competition has raised the stakes for nation-states and has attached states to supranational trade agreements and financial markets which limit the scope of national independence and make states ever more vulnerable to economic instability beyond national borders. The cutbacks of welfare schemes are often justified in terms of fierce economic competition which leads to rising disparities within societies. The integration of nation-states into supranational political alliances means that decisions shaping lives of individual people are made by institutions lacking direct political mandate from the people (Bottery, 2003). Simultaneously, the institutionalization of human rights regimes and instruments, safeguarding cultural rights of minorities, enable individuals and groups to make claims against the state on the basis of international declarations and commitments. The so-called global civil society and transnational advocacy networks make political activity that transpasses the state level ever more viable (Munday & Murphy, 2001).

Nation-states also encounter challenges from within, as separatist or autonomy seeking movements expose the artificial nature of the nation. Furthermore, it is becoming evident that the traditional nation-state ideology, based on an exclusive notion of a homogeneous national culture, is not sufficient to raise allegiance among cultural “minorities”. These complex set of conditions, merely sketched here, undermine the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its constituent citizenries. As people are distanced and alienated from the political decision-making on the state-wide level, they search for alternative identities to complement or replace nationality. Moreover, the bond between the state and the citizen has weakened, due to the ongoing renouncement of the state’s responsibilities towards its citizens (Bottery, 2003).

These circumstances have led to the revaluation of citizenship, contrary to globalists’ claims that the concept loses importance in the emerging socio-political reality, characterized by the detachment of citizenship from the state (Kymlicka, 2003; Isin & Turner, 2007). The ongoing debates on the nature of citizenship education across diverse national societies confirm the persistence of citizenship.
In fact, numerous studies of citizenship education attest to the intensifying interest toward citizenship education on the national level. Governments around the world re-evaluate national educational policies and curricula regarding citizenship education, introduce new schools subjects or cross-curricular themes to enhance citizenship and consequently engage in measuring students’ citizenship competences. This kind of surveys rank young people on scales of activity/passivity and generate quantified and comparative information on their loyalty to and knowledge about national and international institutions.

Globalisation is also manifested in a deep qualitative change in the involvement of international actors, such as formal intergovernmental organisations and nongovernmental agencies in national educational policies. We are witnessing a gradual shift from viewing education in national terms to post-national imaginaries, along with new ambiguous ways of educational governance nested in networks, peer review, agreements, cross-national statistics and benchmarking (Nóvoa, 2002). The work of international actors is particularly concerned with a global or regional interpretation of shared educational “needs” and prescription of uniform “responças” (Mundy & Murphy, 2001: 85). International organisations increasingly function as “standard-setting instruments” for national educational policies (McNeely, 1995). Citizenship education, too, has become a matter of concern for international actors. For instance, the world standards advance a more universalised model of human rights education, which penetrates through both organisational links and discursive practices (Ramirez, Suarez & Meyer, 2006).

In the following I attempt to position citizenship education as the foundation stone of the education system and national societies against the on-going shift from national to supranational educational governance. As Ramirez, Suarez and Meyer (2006) have already suggested in their discussion on the rise of human rights education as a form of global post-national educational paradigm, it would be important to contrast human rights education with other more traditional models. In other words, there is a pressing need to understand the complex relationship between the essentially national model of citizenship education as a basic function and symbol of the nation-state and the new agenda-setting of international actors. The ongoing revaluation of citizenship across states makes this research agenda particularly interesting.

I focus on the work of two formal intergovernmental organisations, UNESCO and the Council of Europe (COE). The influence of these actors extends over a large geographical area diverse in its political and social character. The organisations share key political and moral ideals of developing a more just democratic world order, and recognise the crucial role of education in these pursuits. The extended membership and the aforementioned political agenda along with their modest financial resources distinguish UNESCO and the COE from other large scale intergovernmental actors, e.g. the European Union, the World Bank and the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). Thus it should be borne in mind that their educational philosophy is not automatically shared by the entire spectrum of intergovernmental organisations.

My aims in this chapter are twofold. First I present a general historical account of the emergence of state schooling and the traditional model of citizenship
education closely associated with the rise of the nation-state. Second, I analyse a set of documents issued by UNESCO and the COE in an attempt to interpret the main tenets of their citizenship education agenda. The empirical materials analysed in the course of the study are limited to the official documents and project descriptions issued by UNESCO and the COE. Thus I am only concerned with the general discursive agenda-setting and leave its influence on domestic education policies for other researchers to pursue. I offer a provisional analysis of this agenda in light of the traditional citizenship education rationale and discuss potential implications of the emerging supranational discourses for the nation-state. The main research question is whether citizenship education programmes developed by international agents advocate a post-national ideology of citizenship with significant consequences for the nation-state.

EDUCATION AND THE NATION-STATE

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The rise of the nation-state model

The linkage between citizenship and education should be examined in relation to the nation-state as a political principle radically different from its predecessors, i.e., the feudal state and the absolutist state. The nation-state emerged in the historical context of the spread of nationalism, which asserted that the nation and the state should be congruent (Gellner, 1983). Nationalism turned the nation, defined in cultural and linguistic terms, into the main source of political legitimation of the state. It extended state monopoly to the cultural sphere, as a high degree of political and cultural integration was crucial to the survival of the nation-state.

The term nation-state, strictly speaking, could only be applied to polities where “a single ethnic and cultural population inhibits the boundaries of the state, the boundaries of that state are coextensive with the boundaries of that ethnic and cultural population” (Smith, 1995: 86). Thus only few contemporary world states could be described as genuine nation-states (Connor, 1994; McCrone & Kiely, 2000). Nevertheless, the nation-state has become a hegemonic state model (Castles, 2005). It is both a national model, legitimising the state in terms of common nationhood, and an international model, conceptualizing the world as divided into coherent, homogenous but mutually exclusive national units. The artificial nature of nation-states relies on the “careful nation-building policies, adopted by the state in order to diffuse and strengthen a sense of nationhood” among its heterogeneous population (Kymlicka & Straehle, 1999: 73). Nation-building is a process through which a dominant culture tends to become a hegemonic culture of conversion and assimilation claiming a universalistic effect within the territory of the state (Zambeta, 2005). It depends on the effectiveness of various institutions and discourses that promote and legitimise common nationhood (Kymlicka & Straehle, 1999).

The modern concept of citizenship developed in the 18th and 19th centuries as a crucial precondition for the existence of the nation-state. Citizenship incorporated rights and mutual obligations binding state agents, and defined persons exclusively by their legal attachment to the state (Tilly, 1997: 7). It became a symbol of and a
prerequisite for the political and cultural integration of the nation-state. Individuals are accorded the rights and duties of citizenship only through membership of the people—the nation. Only those who share in the public culture of the people and adhere to the ‘civic religion’ of the national state are entitled to citizenship (Heater, 1990; Smith, 1995; Castles, 2005). In other words, the nationalization of citizenship made citizenship synonymous to nationality defined as attachment to and identification with the nation (Isin & Turner, 2007: 11).

The interrelated concepts of state legitimacy and sovereignty acquired particular meanings with the advent of nationalism. Legitimacy came to be perceived exclusively in the framework of the national polity, united by common myths and a homogenised and standardised culture of the nation. The state is legitimate only if it corresponds to the will of the nation and translates the national will into credible policies. In other words, the professional bureaucratic state strives to become our state, whereas political institutions assert to belong to and express the people (Canovan, 1998 emphasis original).

Sovereignty, too, acquired a national connotation and came to be defined in terms of the nation’s supreme political control over a given territory (Encyclopedia of Nationalism, 2001). Sovereignty incorporates an internal and an external dimension with both of them strongly related to the notion of the self-determination of the nation—the right of the nation to exercise political control over itself (Encyclopedia of Nationalism, 2001). Domestically, a nation possesses an absolute right to undertake decisions concerning its fate within the realm of the national state in line with the principle of popular sovereignty (Mayall, 1990). Sovereignty resides with the people on the basis of national self-determination, which is increasingly viewed as a fundamental human right (Encyclopedia of Nationalism, 2001; Soysal, 1994). Externally, sovereignty is related to the representative rights of the nation in the international arena of sovereign and autonomous nation-states. As Mayall (1990: 19) put it: there is only a “single source of authority within the state and not beyond it”. Thus in the national world order, it is the nation that possesses legitimate political power and acts sovereignly in international society. At the same time, the national world order relies on the international society for supporting, promoting and maintaining the hegemony of the nation-state.

Citizenship both symbolises and constitutes means to sovereignty and legitimacy of the nation-state as a status imposed on the individual by the state. The state has retained monopoly over the definition of citizenship and the terms of acquiring and practicing citizenship. Only recently have nation-states begun to change their national legislation to accommodate double or multiple citizenship (Urry, 1999). However, national governments continue to regard multiple citizenship as a threat to loyalty and national security (Isin & Turner, 2007: 11). Historically sub-national identities were deliberately eliminated or made subservient to the state-wide national identity (Urry, 1999). The state authority over citizenship and nationality manifests the sovereignty of the state both nationally and internationally. Only citizens constitute the nation which legitimises the state, and the state has traditionally been accountable to its legal citizens only. The linkage between citizenship, sovereignty and legitimacy explains why international actors have traditionally refrained from intervening in the matters of citizenship. The principle of national
sovereignty equally extended to the realm of national education. From this viewpoint, it is reasonable to ask whether citizenship education projects of supranational actors undermine the established rationale. Before that, we should understand how the nation-state and education grew together.

**State education and citizenship**

Andy Green’s already classical study of education and state formation in a number of European countries starts with a claim that “schooling itself became a fundamental feature of the state” (Green, 1990: 1). Mass schooling developed into an imperative mechanism, connecting individuals and states, and it appeared precisely where the nation-state model emerged (Meyer, Ramirez & Soysal, 1992). Since the 19th century, control over school education in Europe passed from the Church to the State. Educational participation was expanded from the tiny elite to the ever more heterogeneous masses, followed by the emergence of compulsory school laws. The standardisation of curricula, the introduction of entrance requirements, the inspection and licensing of schools and the certification of teachers by state authorities manifested the growing role of education in the political sphere and the transformation of the relationship between schooling, society and the state (Green, 1990). Green’s central argument is that these modern developments, though unfolding across Europe at different points of time, should be interpreted in relation to the process of state formation.

The process of state formation included the construction of the political and administrative apparatus of government and all other government-controlled agencies comprising the public realm. Importantly, state-making was complemented by the process of nation-building, focusing on the formation of collective beliefs and the legitimisation of the emerging state power in terms of shared nationhood and national character. Green criticises earlier theories for explaining the rise of public education as resulting from economic reorganisation, changing social conditions or political democratisation. In relation to the latter, he convincingly shows that, despite the popularity of the idea of education as a vehicle of human freedom and educational development, dominant educational ideologies were mostly preoccupied with social control, moral conformity and political acquiescence (Green, 1990).

More so, the spread of democratic ideas and institutions appeared to be poorly connected to the consolidation of state-led mass schooling. In fact, the authoritarian and absolutist monarchies of Prussia and Austria undertook educational expansion among the first states in Europe (Green, 1990). Even in the more liberal England the Education Act of 1870, establishing a quasi-national system of education, resulted from elite’s desire to control the effects of the extension of franchise in 1867 (Green, 1990). A similar line of argument could be detected in Finland—the first European country to grant universal suffrage in 1906. The political reform led to serious discussions concerning, among other issues, the introduction of compulsory education. The debates were premised on the assumption that the newly enfranchised citizens needed more education in order to use the powers invested in them wisely and to put the good of the Motherland ahead of personal
interests (Kivinen, 1988). Accordingly, the first standardised basic education curriculum in Finland—the Rural School Curriculum—argued that civic education should refrain from encouraging young people to examine controversial issues related to society and the state. Instead, it should concentrate on explaining the laws and the order of society (Council of State, 1925).

The main purpose of state controlled mass system of education was to become an integral part of the state apparatus and a vital means of promoting the new social order (Green, 1990). It was increasingly recognised that education constitutes a potentially powerful instrument in raising political loyalty and creating a cohesive national culture, as it was envisioned by the political elite. The new system of education assumed the primary responsibility for spreading the national language, forging a national identity, encouraging patriotic values, inculcating moral discipline and rooting citizenship in terms of justification of the state to the people and the duties of the people to the state (Green, 1990). These objectives could be perceived as the central virtues of the citizen of the emerging nation-state as well as the main pillars of the essentially national model of citizenship education.

CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA

The general democratisation of European societies in the post-war period added a more democratic orientation to the conception of citizenship education. However, de-colonisation and the disintegration of the multinational states of USSR and Yugoslavia further consolidated the world-wide legitimacy of the nation-state model, as a myriad of new states strove to create coherent nations within demarcated state borders (Lucas, 2001). Due to the universality of the nation-state principle and the continuing justification of state power in terms of shared nationhood, the nationalising task of education has remained largely intact.

The universalisation of the nation-state model accounts for the striking similarities in the expansion of mass schooling across varying national contexts, intensifying in the post-World War II period (Meyer, Ramirez & Soysal, 1992). A set of data analysed in the course of a comparative study of the general aims of education across world regions in the 1950s and the 1970s has shown an increase in the number of countries expressing loyalty and patriotism as the aims of education. Democracy has also shown up as a central issue, whereas world citizenship has spread to a more modest extent (Fiala & Lanford, 1987). Another study conducted in the 1980s and the 2000s indicated a general consensus on the aims of education identified as equality, national identity, citizenship and democracy, whereas world citizenship appears to a lesser extent (Amadio, Gross, Ressler & Truong, 2004). The category of national ideals, which embraces national citizenship, national identity and religion, is consistently more prevalent in both the 1980s and the 2000s. However, references to the universal principles, including world citizenship, tend to grow more strongly (Amadio, Gross, Ressler & Truong, 2004).

The findings of the two comparative studies presented above reveal that the dispersion of the nation-state model across the world has led to the consolidation of citizenship education, based on national ideals and attachment to the nation.
However, the results also demonstrate that the national and the post-national run in tandem, with the latter growing rapidly in recent years. The emergence of a more universal conception of citizenship education does not seem to weaken the position of the national model, but the latter is increasingly complemented with new elements, such as diversity and multiculturalism (Amadio, Gross, Ressler & Truong, 2004). We could attribute the increasing reference to the universal principles to the ever more prominent influence of the post-national education agenda spreading through the work of intergovernmental organisations.

CITIZENSHIP AGENDA OF UNESCO AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

Supranationalism

The terms supranationalism and supranational organisations refer to “all organisations, institutions and political and social processes involving more than a single state or at least two non-state actors from different nation-states” (Lucas, 2001: 805). The most important supranational organisations are intergovernmental organisations (IGO) and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) (Lucas, 2001). This chapter focuses on the work of two large-scale IGOS, UNESCO and the COE.

UNESCO and the COE originated in the post-World War II era (1945 and 1949 respectively). Their agenda and activities are strongly embedded in the ideology of human rights, rule of law, justice and democracy. The organisations strive to realise these goals on universal (UNESCO, 192 member states) and regional (COE, 47 member states) levels. Written in 1945, the constitution of UNESCO promotes four principles of education: world citizenship and international collaboration, equality and democracy (McNeely, 1995). Its work is premised on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The work of the COE is equally founded on the legal instruments initiated to guard and promote human rights in Europe – the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) and its judicial institution, the Court of Human Rights. Whereas UNESCO’s activities focus on promoting these virtues through the realm of culture, science and education, the COE has a broader scope of activities, albeit limited to the European region. However, the COE has acknowledged the central role of education in the achievement of its key political objectives (COE, 1997).

The strong commitment of the two organisations to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, which are also assumed to be shared by all their member states, has a strong directing effect on the types of arguments, which can be advanced by the organisations and their members (Macmullen, 2004). The initiation and promotion of a particular type of discourse constitutes the main working mechanism of international organisations. Thus we could say that IGOS largely operate through discursive power. This is due to the fact that, even though national governments are obliged to adopt policies formally agreed upon within an IGO, organisations generally lack monitoring mechanism and the means to discipline and penalise violators (except for suspension of membership or complete expulsion) (Lucas, 2001). In sharp contrast to confederations and federations, IGOS do not exercise genuine sovereignty and authority over important decisions. The authority remains
with the constituent member states, whom need to approve proposals (Lucas, 2001; Macmullen, 2004 on the COE).

The strong connection between nation-states and international agents is apparent, when the historical development of IGOs is examined. They assumed an important historical role, only with the rise and consolidation of the nation-state in international politics. Due to the centrality of the nation-state, IGOs continue to struggle to reconcile the prerogatives of national sovereignty with the collective supranational dimension (Lucas, 2001). More so, the sovereignty of states over matters of national development policy has been held as non-negotiable, leading to accusations of statism (Jones, 1999). At the same time, it would be misleading to treat intergovernmental organizations as mere extensions of foreign policy. Jones (2007) and Kymlicka (2007) argue that international agendas are shaped by a complex web of policy professionals, bureaucrats, academics and advocacy groups. As international organizations have gradually established expertise, legitimacy and authority of their own, they are able to develop unique policies which do not necessarily reflect the political desires of member states.

Studying supranationalism

The ambiguity of supranational governance, which operates through multiple and intangible ways, makes it hard to pin down the agenda of IGOs. That is why the study of supranationalism and its regulatory ideals requires a particular methodological sensitivity to the discursive practices employed by the IGOs. This chapter attempts to unfold the discursive agenda of UNESCO and the COE by means of textual analysis. UNESCO and the COE have published extensively on different aspects of education. The following analysis is based on the official documents, such as declarations, recommendations and resolutions, which are explicitly concerned with the matters of citizenship and human rights education. These materials represent the common agenda promoted by the organisations. In addition, I studied citizenship and human rights education web-sites of UNESCO and the COE, in order to get a general overview of the current and past activities, their objectives and arguments. The data spans across the period from 1974–2007 for UNESCO and 1978–2007 in the case of the COE. The publication year and the titles of the oldest documents illustrate that both organisations have a long history of working with human rights education, whereas their adoption of the term citizenship education is a fairly recent endeavour.

By focusing on discourses embedded in citizenship education programmes of the COE and UNESCO, I adhere to the view that “discourse is as consequential as organisational mechanisms in facilitating new understandings of citizenship” (Soysal, 1994: 6). Discursive modes or scripts form a cultural framework for the meaning and actions of national actors. On the supranational level, this discursive frame both provides models and restricts actions and policies of the nation-state. By acting upon these principles, nation-states reproduce them and the definitions of the global system (Soysal, 1994). In other words, they “articulate their interests and mobilise new policies and strategies according to what is “acceptable” and
Discourse advances international organisations and is promoted, sharpened and standardised in conferences, declarations and frames of actions, produced in the context of international activities (Chabbott, 2003).

UNESCO and the COE develop their citizenship education programmes separately and through joint actions. It is remarkable that IGOs join forces on issues which overlap or are complementary in their work, presumably fostering the efficiency of their supranational regulatory power. In this way, they also help to form and maintain the so-called epistemic communities with abilities to transcend conventional inter-state authority and structures, thus consolidating and promoting the agenda of international actors (Jones, 2005). The website of the COE provides numerous examples of inter-organisational cooperation in the field of citizenship and human rights education. For instance, the COE monitors on the European level the implementation of the UN’s World Programme for Human Rights Education, which started in 2005. A European Year of Citizenship through Education was launched in cooperation with a number of international institutions including UNESCO, OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights), OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and the European Commission. Hence the work of the two agents is in many respects complementary. In the following I present the main findings of the analysis of the official documents of UNESCO and the COE which frame their citizenship education initiatives.

If compared to the pillars of modern education indicated by Green (1990), citizenship promoted by the COE and UNESCO is striking in its primary focus on proactive political participation of the individual. The massification of politics in the 19th century linked citizenship to its political dimension, especially the political rights of citizens to monitor national leaders. However, the supranational definition of political participation is somewhat different. It emphasises active participation, encourages critical scrutiny and legitimises action against the state, as opposed to advocating uncritical obedience and order. More so, the crucial role of human rights means that citizens are protected against their home governments and can initiate action against the state on the basis of universal human rights (e.g. COE, 1997).

In its guidelines for history teaching, the COE clearly states that governments have used history in a biased manner for political purposes and ideological propaganda. Furthermore, every citizen has a right to learn history that has not been manipulated. In other words the document stipulates that history teaching should encourage a critical approach to information which does not exempt criticism about governmental institutions and political leadership (COE, 1996). The following quite clearly demonstrates how the traditional top-down relationship between the state and the individual is called into question:

…it is not the role of a democratic state to dictate rules for every aspect of human behaviour, since moral and ethical attitudes must remain an area in which the individual has freedom of choice, but always respecting the rights of others (COE, 1999: article 8).
The increased attention of international actors to citizenship and human rights education springs from their declared concern about growing political apathy, racist violence, xenophobia, nationalism and intolerance. All of these developments endanger the fulfilment of human rights and make education indispensable as means to combat societal ills (UNESCO, 1995; COE, 2002). Human rights are in the centre of citizenship education (COE, 2000; UNESCO, 2007a; 2007b). Moreover, education about human rights has become an indispensable part of the very right to education (OHCHR, 2005). This is evident from the numerous references to human rights education in all of the examined documents, as well as in the fact that citizenship education projects of the late 1990s are rooted in the earlier projects concerned with human rights education.

The imperative of human rights illustrates that both organisations adhere to and seek to promote the post-nationalisation of citizenship premised on universal personhood, instead of national and particularistic peoplehood. For instance, UNESCO urges to renounce national patriotism and proclaims universal human rights as the core of citizenship education:

Civic education programmes have become an increasingly important means for countries to educate citizens about their rights and responsibilities. Increasing pluralism within states has encouraged the development of civic education programmes that go beyond simple ‘patriotic’ models of citizenship requiring uncritical loyalty to the nation state. By defining ‘citizenship’ in terms of human rights and civic responsibilities, civic education programmes attempt to avoid concepts of ‘citizenship’ that define nationality in terms of ethnic, religious or cultural identity. (UNESCO, 2007b: online)

Human rights education is expected to foster universal values, such as peace, tolerance, global solidarity, democracy and justice, which are believed to win universal recognition regardless of the socio-cultural context (UNESCO, 1995). This statement implies that supranational agents strive to construct and enhance a set of universal values, as opposed to the particularistic values restricted to the realm of the nation. However, the situation appears to be more complicated than that. UNESCO’s central role within young nation-states has meant that the organisation inevitably aligned itself with the main pillars of western schooling, i.e., state formation, nation-building, identity, productivity and citizenship (Jones, 2005). More so, despite clear references to the notion of world citizenship in UNESCO’s core documents, its ambiguous definition does not seem to contradict or override the primacy of the national in the individual identities of citizens. World citizenship and global education are primarily related to inter-national collaboration and solidarity, world integration, progress of civilisation and appreciation and understanding of international community (UNESCO, 1974; cf. McNeely, 1995).

In the case of the COE, citizenship also remains a vague concept, perhaps due to the sensitivity of the topic (Forrester, 2003). For example, the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member states (COE, 2002) — one of the core documents of the Education for Democratic Citizenship project — discusses practical,
rather than conceptual or ideological issues of citizenship education. It seems that
the organisation tries to strike a balance between national sovereignty and the
promotion of a common supranational agenda of citizenship. While all documents
commonly make use of the language of “rights” and “responsibilities”, they do not
define the polity to which the rights and the responsibilities are confined. It is,
however, the definition of the polity which delineates the geopolitical scope of
citizenship — whether national (limited to the nation-state) or post-national
(extended to sub- and supra-national levels).

Overall, the textual analysis has revealed that there is no consistency in the
supranational agenda. While some documents express a post-national agenda of
human rights, others, like the aforementioned Recommendation (COE, 2002),
underline that national governments decide on the adaptation of the supranational
agenda to the local context. Such conceptual eclecticism makes it premature to talk
of a coherent post-national agenda. On the one hand, both UNESCO and the
COE put strong emphasis on the promotion of and respect for diversity and
multiculturalism, as well as the multi-level conception of citizenship. The latter is
premised on the understanding of citizenship as simultaneously confined to local,
national and supranational (i.e. European and global) dimensions (e.g. COE, 2000: 5;
COE, 2001: 4). Already in 1983 the COE’s Committee of Ministers recommended
that Europeans should “see themselves not only as citizens of their own regions
and countries, but also as citizens of Europe and of the wider world” (COE, 1983: 2).
A text on the web-site of UNESCO assures that “a day will come when we shall
speak of world citizenship as we now do of national citizenship” (UNESCO, 2007a:
online). Concerning the European dimension, the COE’s Parliamentary Assembly,
anticipating the geopolitical changes on the European continent at the end of
the 1980’s, stated that the European dimension, in the educational sphere, extends
to the entire continent and is not synonymous with membership in any European
organisation (COE, 1989). Adherence to diversity and a multi-level conception of
citizenship identity are the new qualities which substantially distinguish the post-
national model from its national (istic) rival.

On the other hand, while stating that citizenship as regards the national context
can no longer be identified or exercised solely in the context of globalization,
civics education is defined as “educating children, from early childhood, to become
clear-thinking and enlightened citizens who participate in decisions concerning
society” (UNESCO, 2007a: online). Society is explicitly understood “in the special
sense of a nation with a circumscribed territory which is recognized as a state”
(UNESCO, 2007a: online). Thus citizenship is still often confined to the national
state. The co-existence of the national discourse of citizenship and the post-
national discourse of universal human rights indicates that the supranational script
of citizenship education is far from renouncing the traditional notion of national
citizenship.
DISCUSSION: EVALUATING THE EMERGING CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AGENDA

Citizenship education is perhaps the most politically sensitive and controversial part of compulsory education, because it plays a key role in forging and maintaining national citizenship, loyalty and identity. It is particularly interesting that citizenship education has become the subject of supranational concern, despite the strong link between national sovereignty, citizenship and education and the fact that education used to lie under the indisputable control of the nation-state (cf. Ramirez, Suarez & Meyer, 2006). Thus the educational activities of UNESCO and the COE could be interpreted in a much wider manner – as evidence pointing to the transformation of the national state in the international arena and the extending sphere of influence of intergovernmental actors. Should the initiatives of international organisations to dictate the terms of citizenship education be perceived as interference with national sovereignty, a threat to national legitimacy and even a gradual closure of the traditional national polity? As the analysis above has demonstrated, the supranational agenda of citizenship education displays post-national features, which manifest changes in the perceptions of national sovereignty and legitimacy of the nation-state. Nevertheless, the intergovernmental character of the organisations also leads to the repetition of the traditional citizenship rhetoric. The conceptual inconsistency arises from the dual position of UNESCO and the COE as autonomous supranational actors constrained by the geopolitical realities and their institutional organization.

The methodology of contrasting the objectives of citizenship education established in the process of nation-state formation to the recent supranational agenda of UNESCO and the COE was premised on an understanding that the two represent antithetical scripts. In the national model citizenship (status, rights and duties) and nationality (identity) were tightly bound together. More so, in the national model, the national state dictated the limits of citizenship and citizen duties in a top-down manner, emphasising order, obedience and unquestioned loyalty (cf. Green, 1990). The post-national model of citizenship decouples citizenship from nationality, as it posits citizen rights within a wider global context, while simultaneously assigning identities to national, sub- and supranational communities (Soysal, 1994; Delanty, 2007). In the post-national discourse, the traditional emphasis on responsibilities is replaced by the notion of rights guaranteed by the state and, increasingly so, by the supranational human rights instruments.

However, it is also evident that the rise of the post-national ideology neither signals the closure of the national polity nor completely replaces the traditional models of citizenship education. Moreover, international agents could not be simplistically positioned against nation-states, with the former epitomising the advent of the post-national era and the latter manifesting the fading power of nationalism. The analysis has clearly shown that supranational discourses are not consistent. In line with the Soysal’s (1994) conclusion, my findings, too, demonstrate that the global script simultaneously adheres to and promotes both the principles of national sovereignty and universal human rights which, by definition, transcend national borders and transform the very meaning of sovereignty. Whereas the
principle of sovereignty reinforces the ultimate autonomy of the nation-state, strengthens state borders and links citizenship rights to the national collectivity, the human rights discourse attributes rights to persons regardless of their citizenship (Soysal, 1994).

UNESCO and the COE follow a double agenda of guarding the principle of national sovereignty and simultaneously promoting the discourse of human rights. In the framework of intergovernmental organisations, like UNESCO and the COE, the state continues to play a central role, as the implementation of the post-national agenda is greatly dependent on the will and the institutional capacity of national governments (cf. UNESCO, 1993). However, its sovereignty and legitimacy are no longer solely subjected to the scrutiny of the national citizenry. They are also linked to the governments and citizens of other countries (Lucas, 2001). In this way, legitimacy increasingly takes a supranational form. In order to uphold international legitimacy, national governments are forced to adopt the language produced in the supranational arena.

Instead of proclaiming a clear shift from the national to the post-national, recent developments in the field of citizenship education attest to the growing complexity of the social-educational reality, characterised by the co-existence of the national and the post-national. This complexity has to be taken into consideration by researchers, politicians and educational practitioners seeking to either analytically examine or practically influence citizenship education.

NOTES

1 The renewed interest in citizenship and citizenship education is reflected in the growing number of studies on the topic. To mention a few which all point to the revaluation of citizenship education: Janmaat and Piattoeva (2007), Grossman, Lee and Kennedy (2008), Osler and Starkey (2006), Piattoeva (forthcoming), Soysal and Schissler (2005). International organisations, too, have studied citizenship education policies, practices and attitudes of young people: All-European Study on Education for Democratic Citizenship Policies (COE, 2004), the IEA Civic Study (e.g. Torney-Purta, 2002) and Education and Active Citizenship in the European Union (European Commission, 1998).

2 My ongoing doctoral research focuses on citizenship education policies in Finland and Russia, but locates national policies within the supranational citizenship education agenda shaped by the COE and UNESCO.

3 The aim of this chapter is not to trace the dispersion of the new citizenship education model in the nation-states. I analyse whether the model of citizenship education developed by intergovernmental organizations is different from the traditional national ideal. A study by Mary Rauner (1999) has shown that linkages to UNESCO are significant predictors of the extent to which countries incorporate global orientation in civic curriculum. However, contrary to Rauner’s conclusion that there has been a worldwide shift from national civic education to global civic education, other studies confirm that the national and the global run in tandem, or the national model still prevails (Janmaat & Piattoeva, 2007; Piattoeva forthcoming; Soysal & Schissler, 2005; Grossman, Lee & Kennedy, 2008). In this respect it seems that the conclusion of Soysal and Wong is most accurate: “Teaching still emphasises national history, society and citizenship. No perception of a global or transnational citizen emerges as such, but the national is now subject to transnational reflections—this is where it obtains its legitimacy. Citizens are still constructed for a world of competitive nation-states, however their competitiveness now comes from how much they contribute to what is held to be global, and thus worthy.” (Soysal & Wong, 2006.)
Information on the history of the organisations is available on their web-sites: www.unesco.org and www.coe.int.

REFERENCES


COE. (1983). Recommendation R (83) 4 of the committee of ministers to member states concerning the promotion of an awareness of Europe in secondary schools. Strasbourg: COE.


CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS


PIATTOEVA


AFFILIATION

Nelli Piattoeva
Department of Education,
University Tampere
Citizenship education in Ukraine and Russia: reconciling nation-building and active citizenship

Jan Germen Janmaat\textsuperscript{a} and Nelli Piattoeva\textsuperscript{b,*}
\textsuperscript{a}Institute of Education, University of London, UK; \textsuperscript{b}University of Tampere, Finland

This paper examines the discourses framing citizenship education in Ukraine and Russia from \textit{pere-stroika} to the present and assesses the role of the Council of Europe in promoting democratic citizenship in both countries. We argue that there is a tension between the discourses of active citizenship, strongly disseminated by international agencies (the Council of Europe in our case), and national consolidation, pursued by Ukraine and Russia since the fall of the Soviet regime. While the beginning of the 1990s was marked by democratization and individualization, from the mid-1990s the emphasis on state cohesion became more prominent in both states. From the end of the 1990s, however, citizenship education aims started to diverge, despite a similar approach of the Council of Europe to the two countries. In Russia the government reinforced the state cohesion agenda, which led to the patriotic education discourse gaining strength. In Ukraine, nation-building was made secondary to bringing the education system in line with international standards in order to improve the country’s competitiveness. The nature of citizenship education in the two countries therefore seems to be more a reflection of domestic political developments than the product of international policy agenda.

Introduction

The relationship between citizenship education and authority has been hotly debated by scholars from a range of disciplines. Central to this debate is the question of whether citizenship education should nurture loyal law-abiding citizens aware of their duties and responsibilities to state and society, or produce citizens who stand up for their rights, question state authority and are open to other views and cultures (McCowan, 2004). This paper will not touch on the normative dimension of this debate. Rather, it seeks to explore how two new states arising from the ashes of the Soviet Union—Ukraine and the Russian Federation—have

*Corresponding author. Department of Education, 33014 University of Tampere, Finland. Email: nelli.piattoeva@uta.fi

ISSN 0305-0068 (print)/ISSN 1360-0486 (online)/07/040527-26
© 2007 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/03050060701611920
come to terms with this dilemma in their citizenship education policies following independence.

New states are an interesting arena in which to examine citizenship education, as these states tend to give priority to nation-building policies in the first decades of their existence—i.e. to policies promoting cultural unity and unconditional loyalty to the state (Coulby, 1997; Green, 1997). Moreover, it seems particularly relevant to examine post-communist new states as it has been noted that a history of communist rule has not been conducive to civic attitudes, pluralism and tolerance. Schöpflin (2000), for instance, contends that communism destroyed civil society and the social fabric of communities, leaving people isolated and distrustful of the state and of their fellow citizens. After the Soviet break-up, he argues, intolerant ethno-national identities filled the vacuum that the communists had left behind. Assuming this view to be valid, balanced citizenship education policies aimed at both conformity and active citizenship are not necessarily at all possible in the transition states.

Among the post-communist states, Ukraine and Russia provide fascinating case studies because they have different points of departure. Whereas Russia considers itself to be the successor state of the Soviet Union and therefore has to come to terms with a loss of territory and a declining status as superpower, Ukraine is a new state insecure about the loyalty of its citizens. While Russia is still a powerful state possessing nuclear arms and an abundance of natural resources, Ukraine relies on conventional weaponry for its defence and is dependent on other countries for its gas and oil consumption. This situation makes Ukraine much more concerned about its external security than Russia. Whereas Russians can be confident about the continuing strength and appeal of their language and culture, Ukrainians are struggling to gain acceptance for their cultural heritage, which has often patronizingly been identified as Malorussian (little Russian)—i.e. a simple peasant offshoot of Russian culture. We assume that these different starting points and the national political developments emanating from them affect the discourses of citizenship education.

Lastly, both countries are embedded in numerous global networks that seek to influence their domestic policies including citizenship education. The involvement of the Council of Europe (COE) is interesting in this regard. From the mid-1990s this intergovernmental organization has developed a range of activities to promote the idea of active and critical citizenship in its member states. Thus the COE fosters the very side of citizenship education that is difficult to reconcile with the objective of achieving unconditional loyalty to and identification with the state and the nation. In the ensuing analysis we aim to explore whether elements of the COE’s vision on citizenship, which is critical, multicultural and post-national, are included in the national policy documents. We will interpret a complete absence of these elements in the policy documents as a sign that nation-building issues are (still) of overriding importance to the national authorities.

The comparative dimension employed in this paper is both horizontal and vertical. Horizontally, we compare Russia and Ukraine in the realm of citizenship education policies, taking into consideration their similarities and differences in socio-political and educational contexts. Vertically, we seek to ‘read the global’ (Cowen, 2000)—i.e.
to understand the complexities of the global context in which national citizenship education policies are developed and often contested. In view of the tendency of international actors to offer universalized policy programmes for all contexts, we want to examine the ‘blockages’ and ‘permeabilities’ (Cowen, 2000) of Russian and Ukrainian citizenship education policies regarding the citizenship education ideology of the Council of Europe. Briefly recapitulating, our study is guided by the following questions:

1. Which discourses have framed citizenship education in Russia and Ukraine since the late 1980s and have there been changes in the intensity of each of them?
2. To what extent can possible differences between Russia and Ukraine in the nature and timing of these discourses be attributed to differential points of departure and national political developments?
3. Can the COE’s critical, pluralist and active vision on citizenship education be observed in the educational policies of the two countries?

As our focus is on the discourses framing citizenship education, we examine the subject through curricula, policy documents and articles in the educational press. We are primarily concerned with the ideas these texts convey rather than with the implementation of citizenship education policies. The paper starts with the introduction of the tensions inherent in citizenship education. It is then followed by a brief discussion on the Council of Europe’s citizenship education initiative. Subsequently, we examine the educational developments in Ukraine and Russia.

We argue that the discourses of active democratic citizenship and nation-building do not easily coexist in the citizenship education policies of both countries following the break-up of the Soviet Union. An increased salience of one tends to coincide with a diminishing importance of the other. Particularly in times of turmoil and separatist confrontations, nationalizing programmes emphasizing unity, conformity and loyalty quickly overshadow initiatives promoting democratization, individual autonomy and respect for diversity. In recent years, Ukraine and Russia seem to have drifted apart, as Ukraine embraces democratic citizenship principles in an effort to partake in European trends, while Russia prioritizes patriotic education. However, given the unsettled nature of post-communist politics, it would be premature to interpret these developments as signs of permanently diverging trajectories.

Citizenship education

Citizenship is membership in a political and national community, which requires knowledge and skills to act in the community, as well as a sense of identification with this community. By citizenship education, we understand all those educational norms and practices that seek to socialize future generations into the realm of the state and the nation. From this perspective, citizenship education is always a future-oriented process guided by visions of the desirable society. As these visions are multiple and change with time and within different segments of the society, citizenship education is always a political endeavour, both in terms of agreement and implementation, as
well as its consequences for the future. The contested and deeply political nature of citizenship education explains why there are shifts in the content and relative strength of various discourses depending on the political and societal contexts.

Philosophers and political thinkers have for a long time debated on the nature of citizenship and citizenship education. Aristotle, for example, argued that citizenship education should serve the requirements of the state. That is why he admired the Spartan model of civic training, which turned young boys into obedient soldiers (Heater, 1990, pp. 7–8). A later tradition, rooted in the writings of Locke, advocated citizenry critical and ready to change the existing societal and political structures. In line with these views Paolo Freire, for example, argued for citizenship education that helps to uncover the unjust nature of society and to encourage deliberate action. The first view can be rightfully criticized for treating people as mere objects of citizenship indoctrination, whereas the latter might easily promote centrifugal forces and thus endanger societal stability.

Adding to the complexity of this debate is the fact that citizenship in the modern times has been linked to the ideology of nationalism and nationality. Affiliating the political concept of citizenship with the nation meant that modern citizenship had to incorporate not only rights and duties, but also a sense of tradition, community and identity (Heater, 2002, p. 99). In Ancient Greece citizenship meant participation in the political affairs of the city-state, the polis. But already then Aristotle claimed that ‘the citizens of the state must know one another’s characters’ (quoted in Heater, 1990, p. 3). In the modern state, the required intimacy was replaced by the myth of belonging to one nation, the ‘imagined community’. The nation was supposed to turn a mere bureaucratic state into our state, which expressed the will of the people and captured their loyalty (Canovan, 1998, p. 23).

Thus, the dilemma regarding the allegiance to the state versus critical evaluation of its institutions is further deepened by the fact that citizenship education should create and strengthen the bond between the citizen and the nation. Among others, the creation and maintenance of nations involves the invention of tradition, the rewriting and even falsification of history and assimilation of ethnic groups. In order to maintain the nation, the future generations are not supposed to question the inherited cultural norms and myths. Otherwise an independent critical mind could easily put the fate of the nation at danger. Even older nation-states, such as the UK or France, continue to inculcate the feeling of belonging to the nationhood. The Crick Report of 1998, which forms the basis for the English citizenship education curriculum, declares the main aim ‘to find or restore a sense of common citizenship, including a national identity that is secure enough to find a place in the plurality of nations, cultures, ethnic identities and religions long found in the United Kingdom’ (quoted in Osler & Starkey, 2001, p. 293). The French programmes also stress national identity and nationality in all grades (Osler & Starkey, 2001).

If these tensions continue to haunt citizenship education in the established nation-states, how do they influence the emerging nation-states, such as Ukraine and the Russian Federation? The recent history of these countries has shown that the task of forming a state and identifying who belongs to the nation are not easily fulfilled. The
situation in these countries is further complicated by the fact that they are embedded in the global networks, which seek to influence national processes including the ideology of citizenship education.

**Council of Europe and the programme of active citizenship**

The Council of Europe represents an important European agent promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the societies of its member states (46 by October 2004). Having been established immediately after the Second World War, the organization initially drew its members mainly from western Europe. More than half of the current member states, including Ukraine and Russia, joined the institution only after the collapse of the Iron Curtain (1995 and 1996 respectively).

At the summit meeting of the Heads of State and Government held, in Strasbourg, in October 1997, it was decided to launch an initiative for Education for Democratic Citizenship (EDC). The year 2002 played a crucial role in the further development of the project, as the Committee of Ministers adopted the Recommendation to member states on education for democratic citizenship (Rec (2002)12). As a result, the year 2005 became a European Year of Citizenship through Education. Among the multiple objectives of this initiative the one that has captured our attention seeks ‘to strengthen the capacity of member states to make the EDC a priority objective of educational policy-making and implement sustainable reform at all levels of the education system’ (Council of Europe, 2004). Such statements prove that the Council’s citizenship work has grown into an ambitious project, which is expected to have a tangible effect on both policy level and grassroots activity in all member states.

In the context of the paper, it is important to note that the COE’s understanding of citizenship is largely based on the notion of active participation, tolerance and critical evaluation of institutional arrangements. Lucas (2001, p. 820) has noted that the supranational post-modernist (i.e. post-national) dynamics essentially pressure states to recognize the multicultural composition of their populations. This pressure, he explains, is likely to conflict with the ‘modernist’ approach to nationhood in the newly independent states:

In ex-Communist, newly independent states, national governments are confronted with the task of designing policies and development paths that forge a compromise between modernist and postmodernist, supranational projects. This is not easy due to the fact that these two approaches are at odds with each other. States that prioritise the modernist, ideologically dominant traits of nation-statehood to the exclusion of multicultural openness and pluralist political culture will tend to exclude themselves from the rapidly evolving ‘glocalised’ environment in which all nation-states increasingly find themselves. But the modern nation-state cannot truly open itself to its postmodern social and cultural environment without becoming self-critical of its traditional historical heritage and its own history of discrimination against ‘foreign’ and minority cultures. (Lucas, 2001, p. 821)

What Lucas points at is the conflicting logic of national and post-national projects, the latter being increasingly promoted by supranational agents, such as the Council of Europe. In order to concur with the post-national transition, states should permit
a multiplicity of identifications among their populations, as well as an atmosphere of pluralism and critical questioning regarding the state, the nation and their historical legacy.

In the educational context these contradictory objectives could be described in terms of ‘citizenship education’ and ‘education for citizenship’ (Forrester, 2003). Whereas the former promotes democratization, individual autonomy, respect for diversity, challenging authority and standing up for one’s rights, the latter emphasizes responsibility, conformity, national loyalty and service to the community. Obviously, the Council of Europe’s critical and multicultural initiative can be equated with ‘citizenship education’, while a traditional nation-building project is more in line with ‘education for citizenship’. It is precisely the latter that is likely to be prioritized in the former communist states, as they are reconstructing their national statehood. As members of the COE, does this mean that Ukraine and Russia will contest the COE’s policy on EDC? These issues, along with the tensions inherent in the notion of citizenship, provide the background to the following discussion of educational developments in Ukraine and Russia.

Ukraine

Since the late 1980s, several discourses have been competing for primacy in the broad area of citizenship education. There have been clear shifts in the relative strength of each of these discourses over time. We can roughly distinguish three periods. The first period finds its origins in the late Glasnost era and is characterized by the uneasy coexistence of the discourses of democratization (‘citizenship education’) and nation-building (‘education for citizenship’). The second period, starting with the presidential elections of 1994, is marked by a continuation of state and nation-building rhetoric and a marginalization of issues relating to school autonomy, democracy and pupil-centred pedagogy. From the end of the 1990s nation-building concerns have gradually moved to the background and the notions of democratization and active citizenship have reappeared as part of a desire to link Ukrainian education to European trends. The discussion of the three periods will highlight the tension between the discourses of nation-building on the one hand, and democratization and active citizenship on the other hand. It will also point to the significance of domestic political factors in shaping the educational agenda.


Democratization and nation-building issues have dominated much educational thought in Ukraine from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, when oppositional movements enabled by Glasnost and Perestroika first began to challenge the communist monopoly on power. These discourses were directly related to the breakdown of communism as the central state ideology. Democratization, for instance, was expressed by sharp condemnations of the monolithic Soviet pedagogy and by appeals for pupil-centred pedagogy and grassroots involvement in education. Thus, one
observer noted that: ‘unfortunately, the bureaucratization and over-regulation of all aspects of school education and the command-administrative style of leadership have given rise to such formalism and humbug that high-quality secondary education truly remains an ideological myth if these obstacles are not overcome’ (Goncharenko, 1991, p. 2).

The Communist Party was also heavily criticized for its cultural policies. Dissidents and Ukrainian intellectuals accused the Soviet government of pursuing a policy of gradual cultural attrition of the Ukrainian nation by Russifying all sectors of public life. Towards the close of the 1980s, they established the oppositional movement Rukh, which began to mobilize public sentiment on the Ukrainian national revival issue (Hrycak, 2004). Education was identified as the key domain to reinvigorate the Ukrainian language and culture.

The Law on Languages of 1989 marked an early victory for these nation-building activists. Passed by a still-communist Supreme Soviet, which increasingly felt beleaguered by Rukh, it proclaimed Ukrainian the sole state language of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic (Arel, 1995). To the present day, this law regulates the use of Ukrainian in education and in other public domains. As a vital instrument for later governments to base their language policies on, the law marked the onset of a cultural nation-building project that sought to redress Russification and to (re)affirm Ukrainian distinctiveness vis-à-vis Russia.

The years prior to independence also saw the first attempts to reform the education system in a democratic direction. Amid unstoppable centrifugal processes at the Union level, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet passed the 1991 Education Act. Surrounded by ever-louder calls for democratization and a humanitarian orientation of the curriculum (e.g. Krasna et al., 1991; Yakymenko, 1991), this law marked the beginning of a process to dismantle the rigid, centralized Soviet education system. It stated that the key objectives of the new educational policy were to establish ideologically neutral school curricula, to develop the personal talents and skills of youngsters and to raise them as multifaceted individuals on their way to become invaluable contributors to society. It further noted that ‘Education in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic is based on the principles of humanism, democracy, national self-consciousness and mutual respect between nations’ (Education Act 1991, p. 276). As a complete novelty, it offered schools autonomy in the planning of the teaching process, in the employment of teaching staff, in financial and administrative matters and in commercial activities.

After the sudden advent of independence in August 1991 and the election of communist turned nationalist Kravchuk as Ukraine’s first president, a new Rukh-dominated government was appointed, which energetically took up the twin tasks of nation-building and educational reform. It laid down its vision in the State National Programme ‘Education’ (Ukraine of the twenty-first century), a strategic policy document prepared by a group of scientists and teachers. This document took the new spirit of the Education Act 1991 one step further by condemning Soviet educational practices in particularly harsh terms and by proposing radical reforms. It, for instance, lamented ‘the authoritarian pedagogy instituted by a totalitarian state which led to a levelling of natural talents, skills and engagement of all educational
practitioners’. This was meant to be replaced by a system offering a wide range of educational methods, approaches and orientations to accommodate the varying talents and preferences of individual pupils. It also called for ‘a radical restructuring of the administration of education through democratization, decentralization and the institution of a regional system of educational authorities’ (State National Programme ‘Education’, 1994, pp. 7–8).

Parallel to the emphasis on democratization and pupil-centred pedagogy, the document advocated the education of national traditions. It accused the Soviet regime of having given rise to ‘a devaluation of general humanistic values, national nihilism and a disconnection of education from national origins’. The programme thus saw values formation, national consciousness and education in national traditions as closely linked phenomena. Consequently, to undo the Soviet legacy and restore moral standards, the new education system was urged to exhibit: ‘a national orientation which proceeds from the indivisibility of education from national foundations, the organic unity with national history and folk traditions, the preservation and enrichment of the culture of the Ukrainian people and […] harmonious interethnic relations’ (pp. 7, 9). The programme thus expected public education to reflect and cultivate a national identity that is grounded in history and culture.

The dual objectives of democratization and cultural nation-building held each other in an uneasy balance, however. The tension between the two concepts surfaced in an ambivalent official statement by education minister Talanchuk: ‘We must overcome the former overemphasis on collectivism, which caused an underestimation of individuality, but we have no right to foster unrestrained domination of individualism which contradicts our people’s collectivist traditions originated in the customs of Cossack communities’ (quoted in Stepanenko, 1999, p. 102). In terms of actual policy, it was soon evident that the government gave priority to nation-building, as it mobilized all levels of the state apparatus to Ukrainianize primary, secondary and higher education (Janmaat, 1999). In cases where the two objectives conflicted, nation-building overruled democratization, as happened when education minister Talanchuk prohibited students in higher education to vote on the language of instruction at the beginning of the 1993/94 academic year (Janmaat, 2000a).

The reform of history education in schools also testified to the priority given to identity construction. The Ministry of Education endorsed a narrative that interpreted the history of Ukraine as an age-long struggle of Ukrainians to free themselves from foreign domination, and presented this narrative as the unquestionable historical reality. The new nationalist inspired account was formalized in a separate History of Ukraine course, which reinforced history as a marker of national identity. According to Wanner (1995, p. 3): ‘This “restructuring” of historical interpretation, exchanging a communist ideology for a nationalist one, did little to reduce the oppressive politicization of history. Once again, historical interpretation is made a slave to the political machine.’ Stepanenko (1999) expresses a similar concern by noting that both the Ukrainian and the Soviet variants of history aim to affirm their own version, suppressing other historical perspectives. Because of this, he argues, there is a genealogical relatedness of the Ukrainian nationalist mentality to its communist predecessor.3
Interestingly, the re-institutionalization of a single narrative can be seen as a step backwards in comparison to the *Perestroika* period, as the Soviet authorities in 1990 formally permitted the teaching of history from various perspectives (Wanner, 1998).

1994–9: consolidated state and nation-building

Political developments in the mid-1990s underlined that democratization had been more token than real. A desire to give local stakeholders more say in policy matters, including in education, quickly lost out to concerns about state unity and integrity among the political elite in Kyiv. This elite was alarmed by the separatist movements in the Russian-speaking Donbass and the Crimea, which had gained considerably in strength during the Kravchuk presidency. For the new president Leonid Kuchma, elected in July 1994, curbing these secessionist tendencies and enhancing state unity was the key policy objective (Kuzio, 2002). The logical consequence of this agenda was a resumption of central state control. The Constitution of Ukraine, adopted in June 1996, clearly reflected the renewed centralization, as it established Ukraine as a unitary state with a single state language and a strong presidency (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996). The status of the Crimea as an Autonomous Republic was confirmed, but the powers offered to the republic were restricted to the domains of agriculture, infrastructure and culture, and did not include education.

Recentralization also manifested itself in the 1996 Education Act. This law established the State Standards of Education, requirements as to the content, level and volume of education that were mandatory for both state and private schools (1996 Education Act). It divided the curriculum for schools into a compulsory state and a facultative school component with the latter claiming up to 24% of the teaching time. For Stepanenko (1999, p. 104) the school component is an indication that some progress has been made regarding the democratization of the educational process, as it ‘presupposes choice and an initiative from below’. Others, however, are more sceptical. Wanner (1998, pp. 119–120), for instance, notes that ‘the monolithic educational bureaucracy and the structures and practices of Soviet schools remain virtually in place despite decrees and announced reforms [the aforementioned State National Programme] that suggest otherwise’. In similar vein, Stepanyshyn (1997) maintains that school education in Ukraine in the second half of the 1990s has, by and large, retained Soviet features. He advocates the right for schools and regions to modify the mandatory components of the curriculum and argues that school councils should be given a greater role in contracting new staff.

To the surprise of many western observers and Ukrainian nationalists, President Kuchma, whose native language was Russian and who had promised to make Russian the second state language in the run-up to the elections, continued the nation-building project of his predecessor after he assumed office. The new Education Minister Zgurovsky, though a dull functionary replacing the inspiring intellectual Talanchuk in the eyes of one observer (Ryabchuk, 2002), proceeded with the Ukrainianization of the education system. This was most of all reflected in policy results and administrative
measures rather than in sweeping visions, as no new strategic documents appeared during his term of office.

Parallel to Ukrainianization, the educational authorities consolidated the cultivation of the Ukrainian national idea as laid down in history, geography and literature courses by preparing new programmes of study, textbooks and central exams. They further ensured that these materials were disseminated and used in all corners of the country, overruling regions (notably the Crimea) that had appropriatted considerable autonomy in educational matters in the early 1990s (Janmaat, 2000b). As the central programmes and textbooks were mandatory for all schools irrespective of status or language of instruction, national minorities and regional groups had little opportunity to familiarize their children with alternative ideological or national perspectives (Koshmanova, 2006).

According to Kolstoe (2000), Kuchma’s decision to continue the cultural policies of his predecessor reflects the conviction among Ukraine’s ruling elite that language, national identity and loyalty to the state are intimately related. He postulates that this elite, although Russian-speaking, thinks that Ukrainian statehood can only be secured in the long run if it is supported by a cultural identity distinct from that of Russia. Kolstoe’s argument in fact seems to be supported by the shift in rationales underpinning the nation-building project. Whereas cultural concerns relating to the ethnocultural survival of the Ukrainian nation and the legacy of Russification had been characteristic of the early 1990s, a political motivation seeing the Ukrainian language as a necessary component of Ukrainian statehood prevailed in the second half of the 1990s. As Wilson (2002, p. 195) put it: ‘Ukrainianization was quietly forgotten, but not reversed—even promoted in some areas if it coincided with Kuchma’s vision of raison d’état.’ The central elite thus considered the cultural nation-building project a convenient tool to enhance state cohesion.

The emphasis on state consolidation, however, did not preclude international exchanges on history and citizenship education. From 1996 the Council of Europe, in cooperation with the Ukrainian Ministry of Education, organized a series of seminars and conferences in Ukraine on reforming the teaching of history and on the COE’s Education for Democratic Citizenship initiative (Poliansky, 1998; Duerr, 1999). Remarkably, the Ukrainian participants of these seminars (civil servants, teachers and textbook writers) did not recoil from being highly critical of history education in Ukraine. One civil servant, for instance, denounced the current textbooks for presenting ‘black and white, uncompromising pictures of the past’ and ascribing intentions to historical leaders that they could not have possessed (Poliansky, 1998, p. 13). In the overall conclusions and recommendations emanating from the seminars, textbook authors were urged to write books that encourage student creativity and critical thinking and present multiple vantage points including those of minorities. These recommendations, according to the paper reporting on the seminars, would be taken into account by the Ministry of Education in drafting new policies and revising existing curriculum guidelines.
Kuchma’s second term of office announced yet another change in discourses affecting citizenship education. The change can best be characterized as a gradual decline in nation-building priorities and a re-emergence of educational reform, this time going hand in hand with a discourse of internationalization and competitiveness. As before, internal political developments lay at the root of this change. Having alienated the communists by his policy of (limited) economic reform, state consolidation and Ukrainian nation-building, Kuchma depended on the support of a motley crew of oligarchs, centrist, nationalists and reformers to win the 1999 elections (Kuzio, 2005). After assuming his second term of office, he rewarded his supporters by appointing the reformer Viktor Yushchenko, the former head of the national bank, as prime minister. Under the latter’s leadership Vasyl Kremen’, an academic who chaired the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, succeeded Zgurovski as education minister. Identifying globalization and individualization as global trends that necessitate educational reform, the new minister established three policy priorities for the Ukrainian education system: lifelong education, education fine-tuned to the needs and talents of individuals and skills-oriented teaching in vocational education and the humanities to enhance the social capital of individuals (Kremen’, 2006, pp. 1, 2). His key policy objective was to bring the education system in line with European and international standards in order to improve Ukraine’s competitiveness. Once in office, he immediately launched an ambitious school reform which aimed at transforming the Soviet inherited system of 10 years’ all-through comprehensive schooling into a 12-year system of elementary, lower secondary and upper secondary education (Kremen’, 2004). In higher education all efforts were geared at participating in the Bologna process.4

The shift in priorities was noticeable both on paper and in practice. While, for instance, the periodicals *Osvita* and *Osvita Ukrainy* had regularly reported on nation-building issues until the close of the decade, they increasingly published articles on the Bologna process and on other themes relating Ukrainian education to international trends from 2000 onward. The decline in relative importance of nation-building was also reflected in the steady reduction of the number of hours devoted to the mandatory disciplines of History of Ukraine and Ukrainian Culture in higher education, a development that was much deplored by the advocates of Ukrainian revivalism. These intellectuals were equally disturbed by the Ukrainian-Russian agreement on the streamlining of the content of school history textbooks in the two countries. According to the National Association of Ukrainian Writers (NSPU), these policies reflected the ‘anticultural, immoral posture and snobbish attitude towards the titular nation [the ethnic Ukrainians], which is openly supported by the highest echelons of power, including the president and the patriarch of the Moscow-based Orthodox Church’ (NSPU, 2002, p. 1). Further, in relation to language issues, the government pursued a more pragmatic course by ratifying the Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, which commit states to the protection and endorsement of minority languages in a limited number of public domains, including education.
Finally, the change could also be detected in the National Doctrine for the Development of Education (NDDE), a strategic document replacing the aforementioned State National Programme and outlining the government’s long-term vision for education. It stated that: ‘Education is a strategic resource for improving people’s well-being, assuring the national interests, and strengthening the authority and competitiveness of the Ukrainian state on the international scene’ (NDDE, 2002, p. 4). A close reading of this quotation reveals that it includes some elements referring to state consolidation (‘assuring the national interests’; ‘strengthening the authority [...] of the state’). The idea of state unity is further underlined by the stipulation on language education saying that the state will guarantee the mandatory command of the state language (i.e. Ukrainian) by all citizens. Elsewhere, the document repeatedly states that the aim of education is to enhance patriotism. None the less, the stress on state consolidation did not preclude elements of citizenship education promoted by the Council of Europe from entering the text. On the contrary, references to democracy, civic attitudes and self-rule outnumber remarks pointing to unity and cohesion. Thus, the document calls on education to develop people with ‘a democratic state of mind, adhering to civic rights and freedoms’ and capable of making ‘an independent judgement and a reasoned choice’ and pursuing ‘civic activities’ (2002, p. 4). It further promised local authorities and parents a greater say in educational matters.

The reformist government was short-lived, however. In April 2001, Yushchenko was removed from office by a parliamentary vote of no confidence (Kuzio, 2005). Thereafter Kuchma’s regime steadily became more defensive and authoritarian. It acquired an increasingly bad reputation in the west for corruption, abuse of state power and muzzling the press. Feeling ever more isolated internationally, Kuchma allied with Putin’s Russia to find support for his unpopular regime.

Surprisingly, this change seems not to have affected educational policies much. Kremen’ continued his school reform and internationalization agenda. The citizenship education elements from the National Doctrine were translated into state standards prepared for the new school system. The new standard for the theme ‘Knowledge of Society’, for instance, mentions the cultivation of tolerance and respect for other nations, critical thinking, responsibility, independent judgement and the ability to make a conscious choice as key assignments for school education (Government of Ukraine, 2004, p. 3). To meet the requirements of this standard, the Ministry of Education devised a series of new courses (philosophy, ‘Man and World’, law and economics) for upper secondary education under the heading Civic Education (Hromadians’ka osvita) (Ministry of Education, 2004, p. 11). This meant that, for the first time since independence, citizenship education was given a formal place in the school curriculum.

After the turbulent events of the Orange Revolution and the election of Yushchenko as president in December 2004, many members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia expected the new national democratic government to reinvigorate the Ukrainian renaissance project. So far, however, these expectations have not been met. The new Education Minister Stanislav Nikolaenko largely continued the pragmatic, competitiveness-driven course of Kremen’. Among the five policy priorities that he established
for his term of office (European quality and accessibility of education; teacher salaries; democratization; overcoming the moral and spiritual crisis; and close cooperation between education, science and industry), nation-building concerns are conspicuously absent (Zhovta, 2005, p. 2). Moreover, on the 17 May he made the dream of his predecessor come true by organizing Ukraine’s formal accession to the Bologna process. According to one observer, the Orange Revolution has even transformed Ukrainian national identity itself, bringing in notions of tolerance, inclusion, openness and democracy that will inspire future educational reform (Koshmanova, 2006).

Russia

Here we will briefly introduce the changes in the education of citizens in the USSR and the Russian Federation. As in the Ukrainian part, the time to be discussed in the following could be roughly divided into three periods during which three discourses have competed for primacy in the education of citizens. During the Perestroika reforms and the first years after the establishment of the sovereign Russia, education was expected to revive the sub-national identification of various ethnic groups (1985–1992). The second period is concerned with Boris Yeltsin’s time in the president’s office (until 1999). In educational terms, this period emphasized citizenship education for the establishment of a democratic state based on the rule of law. At the same time, since the mid-1990s we have witnessed the return of the Russian national ideology. The third period covers the presidency of Vladimir Putin until summer 2005 and is characterized by coexistence of the democratic and patriotic citizenship education discourses in which the latter dominates.

1985–1992: regionalization and education in the ethnic spirit

The dissolution of the Soviet Union was preceded by some fundamental changes in the political visions of the elites. Within the frame of the communist ideology, Mikhail Gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost aimed at making Russian society more open, more plural and more critical to the authority of the state and the Communist Party. The developments in the wider society were echoed in the educational sphere, though not without considerable resistance on behalf of the conservative party leaders and some members of the teaching profession. But in 1989, Gorbachev himself referred to education as ‘his overall promotion of Perestroika’ (quoted in Webber, 1999, p. 25). Among the main aims of the educational restructuring was the democratization of the educational relations and management, which meant more say in educational matters for regional authorities and parents. In addition, the nationalization of education was expected to transform schools into cultural institutions reviving and passing on the traditions and languages of various local cultures. At the same time, the humanization of education emphasized the primacy of the individual in the educational process, whereas the de-ideologization was expected to empty the school of the over-politicized (communist) contents (Dneprov, 1998; Long & Long, 1999; Webber, 1999).
According to the reform goals, the educational system was expected to raise an individual, who is strongly attached to his/her ethnic group, but who paradoxically lacks a connection to the whole state and the nation. Isak Froumin (2004a, p. 280) has written that the emphasis on ethnic education was one of the most important features of Russian education in the early 1990s. In addition, he identified a growing emphasis on the ‘universal human values’ illustrated, for instance, by the Ministry’s recommendation to introduce an interdisciplinary course titled ‘Mankind and Society’ in the upper secondary school (p. 282).

To use the metaphor cited by Eduard Dneprov, the Russian Minister of Education in 1990–1992, the country was supposed to grow into a garden where all flowers bloom. Whereas Dneprov’s predecessor, Gennadi Yagodin, mainly believed that education in the local languages must be expanded, Dneprov insisted on each nationality and region to develop an educational platform in accordance with the local conditions. He stated that ‘the mission of the Ministry must be, above all, not to unify, but rather to stimulate in all possible ways the expeditious development of such programmes’ (Long & Long, 1999, pp. 89–91). Eduard Dneprov contrasted this initiative with the Soviet times, when the school played a crucial role in the denationalization of the people and constituted one of the main instruments in Russifying the non-Russians and de-Russifying the ethnic Russians (Dneprov, 1998, pp. 47–8).

In line with the reform agenda, the document entitled The conception of the national school of the RSFSR and the scientific and organizational mechanisms of its implementation, adopted in 1990, argued that the system of compulsory education, which affects the entire population of the country, should be redirected at the revival and satisfaction of people’s national and cultural demands. The document emphasized that: ‘the school will turn into the real agency of cultural revival of the Russian nations only if it will be restructured as national in the true meaning of the word, if the national dimension in schooling and up-bringing will form its fundamental core’ (Dneprov, 1998, p. 26).

The growing interest in the system of national schools is closely linked to the political context of those years. In 1988, after years of misapprehension or denial, Gorbachev finally identified the nationality policy as ‘the most fundamental vital issue of our society’ (quoted in Lapidus, 1992, p. 46). Amid increasing critique with regard to the Soviet nationality policies, ethnic conflicts and threats of disintegration, Gorbachev was forced to assert that ‘we cannot permit even the smallest people to disappear, the language of even the smallest people to be lost; we cannot permit nihilism with regard to the culture, traditions and history of peoples, be they big or small’ (Gorbachev, 1989, quoted in Lapidus, 1992, p. 60).

Remarkably, in 1989 Uchitel’skaya Gazeta, the teachers’ newspaper and one of the leading professional publications for educators, introduced a column titled ‘Ethnos’ to mark the importance of education in the ethnic spirit. In the time of political struggles and uncertainty, it was believed that inter-ethnic tensions and disintegration could be prevented with the help of national schools (Dneprov, 1998, p. 48). For the sovereign Russian Federation the nationalization and regionalization of education were also the instruments of building a federal state. The political leaders assumed
that stronger national identifications of the regions will help them to achieve firm positions in the political and economic fields. On the societal level, the nationalization was expected to pave the way for the establishment of a democratic civil society (interview in Moscow with Eduard Dneprov, 27.5.2005; Srarovoitova, 1989, quoted in Ossipov, 1999, p. 191).

At the same time, while stating that the school is the cradle of democracy and humanism, the implementation of democratization was more focused on educational management (shifting the decision-making process from the federal to the regional and municipal levels and from there to the schools) and on the teacher–student–parents relations (more influence on the educational process for all stakeholders). However, on the federal level less attention was paid to equipping children with the necessary knowledge and skills to build a democratic society and to encourage them to take an active role in it. Instead, as a reaction to the over-politicized nature of the Soviet vospitanie (political and moral education) and the unpredictable situation in the society at large, the educational authorities wanted schools to preserve peace and stability and prevent any political movement or ideology from entering the school (On the democratization of upbringing work in comprehensive schools of the RSFSR, 1991).


The Yeltsin period (1992–1999) was marked by ambiguities. On the one hand, the reform agenda of Perestroika was carried over and formalized in various legislative acts arranging the introduction of human rights and legal education in the school curriculum. On the other hand, and increasingly so from the mid-1990s, we see a return to a discourse stressing unity and loyalty to the state, running in an uneasy manner parallel to the democratic reform agenda in the remainder of the 1990s.

The 1992 Law on Education, which was hailed as the first legislative act of the sovereign Russian Federation, clearly reflected the spirit of reform. The Act declared the humanitarian character and the priority of universal human values as the first principles of the state policy in education (Article 2). It also confirmed the right to receive comprehensive education in other than the Russian language (Article 6, point 2). At the same time, the law stated that Russian should be studied in all state-licensed schools, except pre-schools, according to the federal educational standards (Article 6, point 5). The federal curricula, published in 1993, declared that Russian, being the official language of the Russian Federation, should be taught in all schools, but in varying amounts depending on the linguistic situation in the region and the school. However, such statements do not necessarily imply that all federal authorities were aiming at the purposeful consolidation of the Russian nation. In fact, already in 1992 a group of civil servants from the Ministries of Education and Defence drafted a programme of patriotic education, which was rejected by the Ministry of Finances due to the lack of funds, only to be modified and adopted in 2001.9

During the second period in the development of Russian citizenship education, the contents of history and the social sciences were revised. More so, the importance of a well-organized citizenship education programme was explicitly stated. The
ministerial circular, *On citizenship education and the study of the Constitution of the Russian Federation* (1995) claimed that: ‘the establishment of the legal state and the civil society in Russia will in many ways depend on the progress in citizenship education.’ The emphasis on law studies is evident in the ministerial materials published between 1994 and 1999 (see also Morozova, 2000; Vaillant, 2001). The issued documents discussed the implementation of constitutional studies, studies in the electoral process and human rights. For example, the circular, *On citizenship and legal education of students in comprehensive schools of the Russian Federation* (1996), highlights the need for legal knowledge. It referred to Boris Yeltsin’s speech on 6 March 1996, in which he argued that one of the prerequisites in the transition to a legal state is the legal education of citizens.

The first references to the Council of Europe’s activities are found in a document that urged comprehensive schools to teach about human rights (*On the study of human rights in the comprehensive schools of the Russian Federation in the academic year 1998/99*). The document claimed that since Russia’s entry into the COE, the country has been adopting the organization’s instructions in the field of citizenship education—i.e. the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on teaching about human rights. The section on human rights was incorporated into the compulsory syllabuses for social studies in the secondary school. During these years, also witnessed was the emergence of innovative courses like ‘The Basics of Law Studies’, ‘Citizenship Education’, ‘To Schoolchildren about the Law’, and others—many of which were developed in cooperation with foreign partners. However, these courses were not part of the federal (compulsory) curricula and their implementation depended, and still depends, on the regional authorities and the school (the regional and the school curricula). The first federal standards of higher education also contained courses related to citizenship education. The federal standard for primary teacher education (1995) introduced courses in political and law studies and, remarkably, exchanged the course of homeland history for the ‘The History of World Civilizations’.

Nevertheless, this period is also marked by a slow return to the unifying national ideology. In line with the ideas of the early 1990s, *The development strategy of historical and social science education in comprehensive schools*, published in 1994, acknowledged the importance of teaching about ethnic, Russian and universal values, but assigned primacy to the national Russian ones. The following quote illustrates it well: ‘When working on the content of school history education, it is necessary to guarantee the balance of political, cultural, ethno-national and other values but the national ones should prevail’ (p. 2 of aforementioned document).

The reading of the document leads one to think that the aim of education was converted into strengthening the national Russian identity and lessening the role of the local ethnic ones. And indeed, the above-quoted document expressed worries about the uneven illustration of national versus ethnic aspects in the regionally published textbooks. It claimed that such an imbalance may lead to the ‘deformation’ of inter-ethnic relations. These changes closely followed the general political atmosphere in the centre. As has been well documented, in 1996, Boris Yeltsin appealed to the entire society to search for a new ‘Russian idea’. Most suggestions, published
in Rossiyskaya Gazeta—the official periodical of the Russian government—supported state patriotism (Tolz, 2001, p. 256; emphasis added).

The renewed drive to inculcate collectivist loyalties must be seen in the political context of the mid-1990s, characterized by intense political rivalries in the centre and by movements for more autonomy in the peripheral regions. The elite in Moscow watched the nation-building attempts of the ethnic minorities in these regions with great concern, fearing that they ‘moved from cultural revival to well-organized political movements’ (Tishkov, 1997, p. 241). This concern was not unjustified. Whereas the secessionist actions of the political elite of the republic of Tatarstan were still kept under control and were finally resolved in a peaceful agreement, the separatist tendencies in Chechnya have had much gloomier consequences (Tishkov, 1997, pp. 242–243). At the same time, the amount of votes received by Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s party and the communists, whose primary election slogans referred to the restoration of the Soviet Union, patriotism and the inferior position of the ethnic Russians, forced liberal politicians to pay more attention to the questions of national identity (Tishkov, 1997; Tolz, 1998; Simonsen, 2001).

1999–2005: the rise of patriotic education

In the context of political struggles and fears of national disintegration, the new administration chose to focus on patriotic education of the Russian citizens. One indication of such a trend lies in the growing emphasis on vospitaniye (political and moral education), as one of the central responsibilities of the state educational system. In 1999 the Ministry of Education, for the first time since the break-up of the USSR, adopted The upbringing development programme, 1999–2001, followed by another programme for 2002–2004. The key message of the programmes is the reconsolidation of the people: social, ethnic, cultural, generational and political. According to the programmes, citizenship and patriotic upbringing are among the main goals of state educational policies. In the institutions of higher education we witness the return of homeland history in the second generation of the educational standards adopted in 2000. The federal curricula for the comprehensive school published in 2004 contain more hours of Russian language and introduce Russian in the upper secondary school. But at the same time, foreign language is now to be taught from the second grade of the primary school, which indicates a greater importance assigned to learning international communication competences.

On the basis of the documents produced in 2001, especially The state programme of patriotic upbringing, it could be suggested that Vladimir Putin and the current administration adhere to the idea of state patriotism, which first appeared under Yeltsin’s presidency. Without doubt, there is a growing tendency to stress a uniform national identity in educational policies. This is demonstrated by the fact that, in 2001, the Ministry of Education issued a circular entitled, On the official rituals related to the use of the state symbols in comprehensive schools, and in 2002 the Ministry distributed another circular that aimed at improving teaching about the national symbols (About the organization of upbringing activities aimed at familiarization with the history and
implication of official state symbols of the Russian Federation and their popularization). The Ministry of Education classifies this activity as an important element of patriotic and citizenship education, which is expected to guarantee generational continuity and to ensure societal unity. The students are expected to develop a strong bond and understanding of the state symbols, while the educational institutions should ensure that the state heraldry is rightfully exhibited.

More so, in 2003 the Ministry established a Coordinative Council on the patriotic upbringing of young people. The work of the Council is directly related to The state programme of patriotic upbringing (2001). Patriotic upbringing is defined as a systematic activity of state authorities and other organizations aiming at the development of patriotic consciousness, sense of loyalty to the Fatherland, willingness to fulfil one’s civic duty, and constitutional responsibilities to defend the interests of the homeland (Piattoeva, 2005, 45; emphasis added). The programme and The concept of patriotic upbringing (2003) both focus on the development of love and devotion to the Motherland of Russia. It is stated that patriotism originates from love of the ‘minor Motherland’ and matures up to the point of state patriotic consciousness and love of the Fatherland (The concept of patriotic education, 2003, p. 3). Thus, Russian patriotism, as an expression of national identity, is superior to any other identification, including that with one’s home region or ethnic group. Other researchers have also noticed that, in contrast with the 1980s, contemporary history textbooks have become more like books about ‘the Russian people, Russian statehood and Russian culture’, thus eliminating sections on different ethnic groups living in Russia (Bogolubov et al., 1999, p. 540). Such discourses are common among politicians who criticize Russia’s ethnic federalism and want to establish a more centralized state (Ossipov, 1999, p. 191). In order to diminish the influence of ethnically defined regions, the federal government has already instituted seven federal districts, which do not respect the established ethnic borders (Tolz, 2001, p. 261).

The promotion of state patriotism could imply that Russia is on its way to build a civic national ideology as opposed to the ethno-cultural conception of the nation promoted during the final years of Perestroika. Some minor steps in this direction were taken earlier by Yeltsin’s administration, when they adopted the civic term Rossiyanin (Russian citizen) as opposed to Russki (ethnic Russian) and declared the importance of building a legal state. However, the recent conception of state patriotism contains a few dangerous elements. It narrowly equates the state to the administrative apparatus in charge; it puts an explicit emphasis on servitude and it has a distinctive militaristic character.

Nevertheless, we should not mistakenly think that the attempts to introduce a democratic citizenship education have completely faded away. The ministerial circular, On citizenship education of comprehensive school students of the Russian Federation (2003), takes citizenship education away from the bare realm of legal studies. Citizenship education as a means of educating politically literate active participants of societal life should be achieved through a multifaceted combination of interdisciplinary approach, democratic school ethos and active teaching methods throughout all school grades. In this document we also observe the importance of patriotism, but in a more delicate
phrasing. It argues that students’ upbringing should be based on socio-cultural and historical achievements of the multinational Russian nation, accomplishments of other countries, and cultural and historical traditions of the home area. In line with other educational documents (i.e. *The national doctrine of education of the Russian Federation, 2000*), it expresses concern about the harmonization of national and ethno-cultural relations and the preservation of and support for languages and cultures of all nations of the Russian Federation. These documents combine two important components of democratic citizenship education—i.e. the development of a civic multinational Russian identity and education of politically active citizens.

Despite the apparent development in the understanding of democratic citizenship education—its progress from legal studies to a multifaceted interdisciplinary concept—patriotism has been given clear priority at the governmental level. Such a conclusion can be drawn when comparing the relative significance of the published documents. The state-supported federal programme gives a clear sign of where the government’s priorities lie. Furthermore, in summer 2005 the government approved a new programme of patriotic upbringing for the years 2002–2010 with extensive financial backing. At the same time, scholars and politicians advocating democratic citizenship education in line with the ideology of the Council of Europe have prepared a preliminary proposal for a federal programme of democratic citizenship education for 2005–2010 which is still awaiting approval.

**Conclusion**

Our discussion of discourses framing citizenship education in Russia and Ukraine has revealed interesting parallels and differences between the two countries. During *Glasnost* and *Perestroika*, both republics witnessed ever-louder calls for the democratization and humanization of the education system. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of Ukraine and the Russian Federation as independent states, this discourse soon gave way to anxieties about state integrity. In both countries these anxieties were fuelled by ethno-culturally based separatist movements that had gained considerably in strength in the early 1990s when central power was at its weakest. From the mid-1990s concerns about state cohesion increasingly found their expression in recentralizing policies and patriotic education programmes.

By the same logic, circumstances in which the two countries differed have given rise to diverging policies. In Ukraine anxiety and indignation about the vulnerable position of Ukrainian *vis-à-vis* Russian led to the adoption of an early cultural nation-building programme that sought to redefine Ukrainian language and culture in opposition to the Soviet past. Given the dominant position of the Russian language and culture, a similar cultural anxiety was not expressed in Russia in the late 1980s. Instead of initiating a Russian identity project, reformist education ministers promoted a policy aimed at the resuscitation of minority cultures within the Russian Federation. Only well into the 1990s was this policy overshadowed by the state cohesion discourse.

The rather different trajectories in citizenship discourses that Ukraine and Russia have followed from the end of the 1990s also have their roots in diverging
J. G. Janmaat and N. Piattoeva
domestic political developments. In Russia, President Putin reinforced the centralization and state cohesion agenda that his predecessor Yeltsin had pursued with a varying measure of success. Respect and understanding of state symbols and unconditional love and devotion to the Motherland are the key objectives this policy was designed to achieve. Some initiatives in democratic citizenship were incorporated into the curricula and the ministerial documents, but they were not given the same urgency as the patriotic education programme promoted at the federal level.

In Ukraine, on the other hand, the Education Minister Kremen’ was primarily motivated by a desire to bring the education system in line with international standards in order to improve the country’s competitiveness. Nation-building was made secondary to a comprehensive school reform and participation in the Bologna process. As part of the effort to keep up with international trends, the government integrated EDC ideas advocated by the Council of Europe in the National Doctrine of Education and in central curriculum guidelines. None the less, some of the nation-building rhetoric was retained in these documents.

It is tempting to interpret these recent differences between Ukraine and Russia as evidence of the two countries showing diverging trends. We would argue, however, that it is still too early to state this conclusion with certainty. The political situation in the post-Soviet world is still volatile, as witnessed by the recent revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, and policies may change abruptly when a new regime comes to power. Until now these turbulent developments have all been moving in the direction of democracy and the rule of law, but there is no guarantee that these trends are irreversible. Seen in this light, the recent relaxation of the nation-building project in Ukraine may well be only a temporary phenomenon.

Interestingly, a report commissioned by the Council of Europe expresses doubts about the willingness of the post-Soviet states to support education for democratic citizenship (EDC), noting that most of them do not have explicit EDC policies. It further observes that EDC is challenged by ‘patriotic forces, which criticise democratic citizenship education for promoting simplistic universal values’ (Froumin, 2004b, p. 104). These forces, it argues, are more compatible with the traditional culture of an authoritarian society than the ideas promoted by EDC, and as a result, EDC is relegated to the margins of citizenship education. The Council of Europe thus realizes that its EDC recommendations are not welcomed in all regional contexts, particularly when they conflict with nation-building projects.

In sum, an education agenda promoting active citizenship and independent thinking faces considerable obstacles in new states emerging from totalitarianism such as Ukraine and Russia. In these states the adoption or rejection of the democratic citizenship principles is very much dictated by the whims of domestic political events and will depend in large measure on the confidence of the authorities in the national loyalties of their citizenries. In times of instability and challenges to central state authority, a discourse stressing pluralism, democracy and autonomy is easily exchanged for a programme sanctioning conformity, loyalty and patriotism in the broad area of citizenship education.
Acknowledgement

Jan Germen Janmaat wishes to thank the European Union for supporting the research for this paper with a Marie Curie Intra-European fellowship grant.

Notes

1. For a brief history of the Council of Europe see: http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coe
2. For more information on the EC project see: http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Co-operation/education/E.D.C/
3. It must be noted here that Ukraine is by no means an exception in the post-Soviet world for exchanging a communist for a nationalist-inspired account of history. Kissane (2005) has observed that the very same transformation has occurred in Kazakhstan. She argues that the Kazakh government is struggling to find a balance between a Kazakhified history curriculum, serving identity construction purposes, and a more internationally orientated history programme.
4. The Bologna process seeks to establish a European Higher Education Area in which the participating institutions issue comparable degrees, recognize each other’s diplomas and operate a system of accumulation and transfer of credits with the aim of increasing student and staff mobility.
5. These are independent professional journals called Education and Education of Ukraine respectively.
6. All institutes of higher education have to teach these courses, regardless of their profile or status (public or private). The courses replaced a number of core disciplines from the Soviet era designed to impart communist ideology.
7. National and ethnic are often expressed with the same word ‘natsional’nii’. The synonymous usage of the two terms often causes confusion when translated into the English language.
9. Nelli Piattoeva’s interview with Igor Melnichenko, 27.5.2005, specialist in patriotic education, Deputy Director, Department of Youth Affairs, Federal Agency of Education.
10. The Law on Education introduced a decentralized form of curriculum consisting of the compulsory federal component taking 75% of the overall curriculum and a combination of the regional and school components filling the rest of the curriculum. The regional and the school components gave local stakeholders a chance to enrich the curriculum with subjects and contents meaningful for their local environment—e.g. local languages, history, geography, etc.
11. Previously, the last two grades of the upper secondary school offered lessons in literature and none in linguistic proficiency.
12. Russia is a federal state; continuing the legacy of the Soviet Union, many of the constituent parts of the Federation are formed on the ethnic principle—i.e. they are seen as a homeland for one titular nationality.

Notes on contributors

Jan Germen Janmaat is a postdoctoral fellow at the Institute of Education in London and a Researcher at the Free University of Amsterdam. His research interests concern identity construction, citizenship education and the formation of values and identities among youngsters with a specific focus on the post-Soviet world and Ukraine in particular. He has published in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Nationalities Papers and European Education. In his PhD thesis he
explored the nation-building policies in Ukraine’s education system and the reception of these policies by the Russian-speaking population.

Nelli Piattoeva (MEd) is researcher at the University of Tampere, Finland, studying citizenship education in a comparative perspective. Her research interests lie in examining how education is affected by the processes of democratization and nation-building and the growing influence of the post-national ideology promoted by various international agents. She is currently completing her doctoral thesis on citizenship education in Russia and Finland.

References


Froumin, I. D. (2004b) Eastern Europe regional synthesis, in: C. Birzėa et al. (Eds.) *All-European study on education for democratic citizenship policies* (Strasbourg, Council of Europe), 101–110.


Citizenship education in Ukraine and Russia


Yakymenko, A. (1991) Yakomu Bohovi molytysia [Which God to pray to], Osvita, 16 April, 8.


Documentary sources (in chronological order)

Russian:

O konsepciyi natsional’noi shkoli RSFSR, nauchnyh i organizatsionnyh mehanizmah eye realizatsiyi [The conception of the national school of the RSFSR and the scientific and organizational mechanisms of its implementation]. Collegium’s decision, 29 December 1990.


Bazisnyi uchebniy plan obcheobrazovatel’nyh uchrezhdeniy Rossiyskoi Federacii [The basis curricula for the comprehensive schools of the Russia Federation]. Ministry of Education decree, dated 7 June 1993, No. 237.

Strategiya razvitiya istoricheskogo i obchestvoovedeshchogo obrazovaniya v obcheobrazovatel’nyh uchrezhdeniyakh [The development strategy of historical and social science education in comprehensive schools]. Collegium’s decision, 28 December 1994, No. 24/1.


O grazhdansko-pravovom obrazovanii uchashchikhsvia v obcheobrazovatel’nikh uchrezhdeniakh Rossiiskoi Federacii [On citizenship and legal education of students in...
Citizenship education in Ukraine and Russia


Ob rekomendatsiiakh ‘Ob organizatsii vospitatel’noi deiatel’nosti po oznakomleniiu s istoriei i znacheniiem ofitsial’nikh gosudarstvennykh simvolov Rossiiskoi Federatsii i ikh popularizatsii [On recommendations ‘about the organization of upbringing activities aimed at familiarization with the history and implication of official state symbols of the Russian Federation and their popularization’]. Ministry of Education circular, dated 1 March 2002, No. 30-51-131/16.


Ukrainian:


Citizenship and nationality in changing Europe: a comparative study of the aims of citizenship education in Russian and Finnish national education policy texts

NELLI PIATTOEVA

The paper analyses how the formal aims of citizenship education, as declared in legislation and policy documents, have changed since the end of the 1980s in response to the transformation of the political scenery in Finland and the Russian Federation. One central question framing the analysis of Finnish citizenship education is whether nationally-based citizenship is becoming obsolete because of Finland’s latest involvement in the European integration process. In the Russian case, the aim is to investigate whether nationality has become more strongly linked to the Russian state since the breakdown of the Soviet empire. The study also examines whether nationality has acquired new meanings because of the political transformations of the last two decades in Finland and Russia. The study’s findings illustrate that Finland is both forsaking the strong link between the state and the nation, and returning to the pre-independence cultural concept of the nation. These changes allow Finland to move in the direction of a multi-level conception of citizenship. Nevertheless, for Finland national citizenship remains the nucleus of other citizenship and identity layers. In contrast to the recent developments in Finland, the discourses of state integrity and national unity have become more prominent in Russia. Russia seeks to attach citizenship to the state-wide national space by encouraging state patriotism and strengthening the position of the Russian language.

Keywords: citizenship education; Finland; nationality; nation-state; Russia; social education

In Europe, the end of the 20th century is characterized by two conflicting geopolitical processes. On the one hand, the breakdown of the multinational states of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union (USSR) has resulted in the emergence or re-emergence of new states that use nationalizing policies to strengthen their internal cohesion and the loyalty of their citizens towards the newly-formed state institutions. On the other hand, the process of European integration has in many respects abolished the internal borders of ‘Old Europe’. The European Union (EU) has grown rapidly, and citizens of its member states have acquired EU citizenship. Moreover, the organization is seeking to forge a European identity based on a set of common values (EU 2005: 4). Thus, while in some parts of Europe the idea of a sovereign nation-state with absolute control over national identity and citizenship is gradually fading away, in other European countries the nation-state seeks to (re)-assume its traditional tasks.
Drawing on recent developments in the European political arena, I examine how past structures and new political challenges interplay in countries with almost opposed socio-political contexts, Finland and the Russian Federation. I analyse, with particular reference to the notions of citizenship and nationality, how the aims of citizenship education, as declared in legislation and policy documents, have changed since the end of the 1980s. Policy documents constitute the main source of information, and it should be borne in mind that the implementation of policies may offer a different picture. However, the question of implementation is left outside the scope of this paper.

Finland has been deeply involved in the process of European integration since the beginning of the 1990s. Russia, a successor state of the former Soviet empire, has been fundamentally reconfigured as a result of the USSR’s demise. As part of these socio-political processes, both countries have sought to redefine the inter-relationship between nationality and citizenship as well as the meaning attached to both terms. Because of their contrasting political histories and different geopolitical positions they make a useful case for examining converging and diverging political trends through the prism of the system of education.

The paper is premised on the assumption that the aims of citizenship education largely reflect the self-perception of the state. In many respects, formal education was both a product of and a major determinant in the political principle of nationalism which holds that the nation and the state should be congruent (Gellner 1983). Education has remained one of the central institutions legitimizing the power of the state and connecting succeeding generations to the imagined community of the nation. Thus, when approached from a larger societal perspective, the objectives of education unravel a fascinating story of social and political transformations and the interplay between education, citizenship, and the state.

One central question framing the analysis of Finnish citizenship education is whether a nationally-based citizenship is becoming obsolete as an outcome of Finland’s involvement in European integration. In the Russian case, the aim is to investigate whether nationality has become more strongly linked to the Russian state since the breakdown of the Soviet empire. I also examine whether nationality has acquired new meanings as a result of the political transformations in the last two decades in Finland and Russia.

I begin with an introduction to the conceptual framework of the study and the relationship between education, citizenship, and the nation-state. The political legacies and the comparative choice are then surveyed. In the empirical section I examine, through the prism of educational policy documents, changes in the perceptions of nationality since the end of the 1980s in Finland and Russia, as well as the inter-relationship between citizenship and nationality in both countries.

Education, citizenship, and two state models

Two concepts, nation-state and empire-state, are central to analysing the political legacies of Finland and Russia and interpreting the findings of the
textual analysis of citizenship education. The former term designates the state model of modern Finland; the latter describes the state model of the USSR, the political and symbolical predecessor of contemporary Russia. The conceptual division into empire-state and nation-state is applied here as an analytical tool that helps to highlight major differences between Finland and Russia and to interpret empirical findings. However, it is important to bear in mind that both nation-state and empire-state are ideal constructs. Connor (1994) has asserted that only ~10% of the world’s states could be termed nation-states. Even though Finland is still often considered highly homogeneous, with immigrants constituting only ~2% of the population, traditional ethnic and linguistic groups of Roma, Sami, Jews, and Swedish-speakers have lived on its territory for centuries. Thus, ‘nation’ is more an ideological construct and a political slogan rather than an objective feature of a territorially bounded community.

In relation to ‘empire’ it is equally important to note that its definition remains highly contested. According to Suny (1995: 187), only states that failed successful transformation into nation-states have been termed empires, *post factum*. Thus, ‘empire’ has acquired a negative, almost pejorative, connotation in contrast to the nation-state (Beissinger 1995: 157n14). Empire-states and nation-states are historically and conceptually interrelated, as numerous contemporary nation-states are either former imperial centres or their peripheries. However, only the nation-state is perceived as natural and morally justifiable.

After the French and American revolutions, the nation-state emerged as the predominant model of political organization and a vehicle of collective identity (Smith 1998). I follow the argument of modernists that the nation-state is a modern phenomenon produced by nationalism. The nation, for its part, was created and maintained as an artefact of nationalism. It was invented to confront emerging mass (at times oppositional) politics and to advance the development of the modern bureaucratic territorially-bound secular state in the 18th and 19th centuries. The age of nationalism merged the nation and the state, and turned the nation into the main source of political legitimation of the state. As nations came to be defined in cultural terms, citizen’s rights and duties were increasingly available only for those sharing the cultural bond of the ethnic majority, speaking the national language and possessing a sense of loyalty to the nation-state. As Castles (2005: 689) has put it, ‘the democratic state appears in the guise of the nation-state, whose citizen is also a national’.

Nationalism is not only a political principle equating state with a nation, but it also constitutes a discourse:

> the production of a cultural understanding and rhetoric which leads people throughout the world to think and frame their aspirations in terms of the idea of nation and national identity, and the production of particular versions of nationalist thought and language in particular settings and traditions. (Calhoun 1997: 6)

In other words, nationalism is a cognitive phenomenon shaping how people see and structure their entire world (Özkirimli 2005: 30). Nationalistic discourse largely operates through institutions, and national identity has to
be learned through socialization (p. 33). As Hobsbawm’s (1987: 149–150) analysis of the formation of the nation-state has shown, nothing compares with the possibilities of the classroom to pursue the propaganda of a homogeneous nation, with teachers as patriotic agents of the state. Historically, the spread of compulsory standardized elementary education ensured that all new cohorts underwent the process of political socialization. The purpose of education, whose ownership was gradually transferred from the Church to the State, was to advance the usage of national language, to spread a standardized form of culture, and to create citizenry loyal to the emerging nation-state. Through various pedagogical instruments the school brought the abstract notions of citizenship and nation-state directly to each individual, thus playing a crucial role in the political integration of the national society.

If state is defined as a polity with fixed boundaries and sovereignty over its demarcated territory, the central difference between nation-state and empire-state lies in the state’s legitimation principle. Empire-states and nation-states are characterized by almost opposite perceptions of integration of their constituent societies into a political community (Parrott 1997: 7). Empire-states do not legitimize themselves in terms of shared nationhood and do not seek national homogeneity and cohesion. In empire-states, the state and the nation, nationality and citizenship, are perceived as distinct, and are often related to different levels of the state system. These crucial differences will be demonstrated in the following analysis of Finnish and Russian state models.

The political legacies and current challenges in the Finnish and Russian state systems

The Finnish nation-state

Finland has been politically constructed and represented as an homogeneous nation-state. When the terms nation, nationhood, and citizenship were translated into Finnish in the mid-19th century, they all acquired a common root—\textit{kansa}. The choice of translation manifested a strong bond between nation, nationality, and citizenship in the emerging Finnish political culture (Pulkkinen 1999: 119).

The Finnish nation-state was originally built on two ideologies. The first one springs from the heritage of the Fennoman movement which proclaimed the Finnish culture, embodied in the uniqueness of the Finnish language, as the only legitimate basis for the Finnish state. The philosopher and Finnish statesman Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1800–1881) wrote that Finnish state character lies in its linguistic and cultural particularity (Pulkkinen 1999). For Snellman and his followers language especially expresses the common national mentality of people. Cultural unity is thus a pre-condition and a legitimate claim for political and national sovereignty. Snellman’s ideas were crystallized in Finnish political thinking in the following manner:

- nation as a political unit within which there is no division into rulers and ruled. Instead, all are united by the new concept of citizen;
nation is an ethnic concept and naturalizes the political unit; and
- the political unit is also a mental unit and is striving to achieve self-governance. (Pulkkinen 1999: 127)

The ethno-cultural form of nationalism from below was complemented by elements of a civic-territorial type of nationalism from above. The latter arguments were already employed in the 19th century when Finland was increasingly perceived as a proto-state, prior to its independence in 1917. Finland’s status within the Russian empire was exceptional in that it allowed for a considerable amount of political autonomy, in comparison to many other constituents of the Romanov Empire. This, together with the Swedish constitutional tradition, led to a growing perception of Finland as an autonomous polity. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century the elite envisioned Finland as separate from the tsarist rule and argued for a common national ideology to draw a clear line between Finland and Russia. In this respect, an ethno-cultural ideology was an essential condition for state-building (Lepola 2000: 317–327).

Since 1945 both the cultural and the political discourse have existed simultaneously (Lepola 2000). It is fair to say that throughout its existence the Finnish state has been imagined as an homogeneous coherent nation united by virtue of ethnic descent and loyalty to the national state institutions. According to Liikanen (2005: 223), the birth and development of the independent Finnish nation-state has constituted the core narrative of Finnish history-writing. This means that for decades academic research was preoccupied with constructing a linear history of the development of the Finnish nation-state rather than turning the relationship between the state and the nation into a research question per se.

Beginning in the 1980s, the perception of Finland as an homogeneous nation-state started to be questioned (Alasuutari and Ruuska 1999: 236). Keränen (1998: 9) suggests that the very ‘opening’ of Finland because of its entry into the EU marks a deconstructive moment for the Finnish nation-state. The integration process led to discussions, deconstruction, and reconstruction of what ‘Finland’ is (Keränen 1998). Therefore, an important question is how Finnishness is redefined following the country’s entry to the Council of Europe (1989) and the EU (1995), and a steady inflow of foreigners. In this respect, Finland is confronted with a task similar to the one Russia is facing since the collapse of the USSR: how to re-define its national self-image in a reconfigured international and national context. The fundamental question faced by both countries is similar, even though for Russia the dilemma is further complicated by the rapidity of the political change and several other fundamental economic and social problems that emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet state.

Russia as a successor of the former empire-state

In contrast to Finland, the predecessor of the Russian Federation—the USSR—was never organized as a Russian or Soviet nation-state (Brubaker
The doctrine of the ‘Soviet people’, promoted since the 1960s, was based on political and ideological rather than national sentiments. At the same time, although Russians were the dominant nationality and Russian the lingua franca of the entire USSR, the state was never perceived as a Russian polity by the political elite (Brubaker 1996: 28–29). Instead, the Soviet system institutionalized multinationality. In this respect its structure resembled that of an empire-state more than a nation-state. In the Russian (Soviet) case, the very conception of the nation was relegated to the sub-state level of numerous republics, national okrugs (districts), and other ethnically defined constituents of the state (Brubaker 1994: 52).

The relegation of nationhood to the sub-state level represents an important feature of Russian political thinking that was institutionalized during the Soviet regime (Brubaker 1994). Institutionalization means that it became embedded in the structures, political thinking, and the daily life of people. It led to the emergence of nationality as distinct from citizenship and statehood. Brubaker (1994) explains that the principle of nationality as distinct from citizenship was consolidated on two levels. On the one hand, the USSR was structured as an ethno-federation granting many nationalities their own territories, with varying autonomies. At the same time, nationality was consolidated on the personal level by ascribing it to each individual from birth. The latter was reinforced by the Soviet passport formalities, which required citizens to specify their nationality in personal identification papers. The nationality indicated in the official documents was inherited by ‘blood’ from either parent. At the same time Soviet nationality was never an option (Brubaker 1994, 1996, Simonsen 1999).

Ethno-federalism and the practice of ascribed nationality helped to solidify further the role played by the sub-state nationality. Brubaker (1994: 54) has concluded that because of the institutionalization of nationality it ironically ‘became and remained a basic institutional building block of the avowedly internationalist, supra-nationalist, and anti-nationalist Soviet state.’ In addition, the Soviet state ‘established nationhood and nationality as fundamental social categories sharply distinct from the overarching categories of statehood and citizenship’ (Brubaker 1996: 23). One could go a step further and suggest that nationality and ethnic consciousness became more meaningful to the Soviet people, as authorities paid lip service to the political rights and responsibilities emanating from citizenship. Especially with the collapse of the USSR and its ideological foundation, ethnic consciousness and ethnic politics easily filled the ideological vacuum.

To add complexity to the controversial relationship between nationality and citizenship in the USSR, it should be noted that the Russian Republic (RSFSR) was not defined as a Russian proto-nation-state in comparison to other republics bearing the name of their titular nationality. In addition, it hosted the central Soviet political and cultural institutions, but lacked the key national institutions found in other Soviet republics. Ethnic Russians were scattered across the USSR, and tended to perceive the entire USSR as their homeland. Because of these factors, neither Russian political leaders nor the public were prepared to view the territory and the institutions of the new shrunken Russia as a legitimate base for
the Russian national statehood. Consequently, territorial and institutional issues have been more vigorously contested in Russia than in the other former republics of the USSR, which are now independent states (Brubaker 1994, 1996).

The reconfigured Russia continues the Soviet legacy of decoupling citizenship and nationality. As demonstrated by Tishkov and Olcott (1999: 64–67), Russia is still a form of ‘institutionalized multiethnicity’. At present, the Russian Federation consists of 83 autonomous formations (subjects of the federation), with 21 republics being simultaneously federal units and proto-nation-states (Constitution of the Russian Federation 1993). Another problem for Russia lies in the existence of different visions of what Russian nationhood and citizenship should constitute. Since the collapse of the USSR, the executive branch has almost simultaneously adhered to three visions of the Russian nation. According to the civic conception of rossitiane, Russians constitute a community of citizens, regardless of their ethnic affiliation, expressing loyalty to the new political institutions of the Russian Federation. The linguistic notion brings Russian speakers living in the newly independent states or the so-called ‘near abroad’ into the realm of the Russian nation. In the imperialistic ethno-cultural perception, the Russian nation expands to the borders of the former USSR, but often contains a Slavic bias, limiting itself to ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians (Tolz 2001). The official understanding of nationhood is often coloured by tensions between ethnic and civic meanings of the term, with the ethnic conception bearing deep historical roots (e.g. nationality inherited by blood from either parent).

Thus contemporary Russia is haunted by its imperial legacy and the discrepancy between nation and state, nationality and citizenship. Also, because of the peculiar position of the RSFSR—its function as the centre of the USSR—the territorial and institutional parameters of the reconfigured Russian statehood cause heated disputes. Russia cannot be defined as an entirely new nation-state akin to the other states established in the aftermath of the collapse of the Union. It has a long history of statehood, whereas its national statehood is still emerging.

The comparative choice

A parallel and comparative examination of Finland and Russia is interesting in several respects. Both countries have encountered serious geopolitical changes that have put into question the very foundation of their statehood. Russia experienced the demise of its empire and seeks to find new ways to maintain national cohesion. Finland has also been affected by the collapse of the USSR, being its close neighbour and a long-term political and economic partner. It had to reconsider its position vis-à-vis Russia and the European political arena. As a result, Finland embarked upon the integration process with Europe. For Finland, the challenge thus lies in adjusting its national identity and citizenship to Europe. As Finland and Russia represent two different state models, they may be expected to react differently to the emerging challenges.
In many respects, Russia and Finland could be juxtaposed. For instance, whereas Finland has an over 100-year history of equating state with the nation, contemporary Russia, because of its imperial past, has inherited a tradition of separating state and nation. And, whereas Finland has gradually entered a process of decoupling nationality and citizenship, Russia is searching for ways to reconcile the two. Juxtaposition and comparison help to demonstrate major changes that have taken place in both countries. I apply attributes of macro-social units in explanatory statements (Ragin 1987). This means that instead of merely pointing to similarities and differences in citizenship education in the examined countries, the study attempts to explain them in terms of variations between macro elements, such as the perceptions of state, nation, nationality, and citizenship in the Russian and Finnish political contexts. Furthermore, it is in the framework of the aforementioned political transformations that I interpret changes in the objectives of state-led political socialization as it is performed by the system of compulsory education.

The data sources of the study

The objectives of education related to the political society and citizenship are generally referred to as citizenship education and political socialization, and the terms are treated as synonyms. Given the strong affiliation between citizenship, state, and education, it is to be expected that changes in the notions of state, citizenship, and nationhood affect the aims of school citizenship education. Therefore, citizenship education represents an effective medium to examine changes in the self-perception of states.

The paper is based on decrees, committee reports, programmes, curriculum guidelines, and circulars outlining objectives for the system of education in general, and citizenship education, social studies, and history teaching in compulsory education in particular. The period since the end of the 1980s coincides with major political changes in both Finland and Russia, consequently affecting the nature of citizenship education in both countries. I employ textual analysis of Russian and Finnish state-produced educational policy documents in order to reconstruct the official discourses on citizenship and national identity.

Citizenship and national identity in Finland and Russia

Finland: ‘Kulturnation’ replaces the ‘Staatsnation’

The Basic School Act issued in 1983 stated that, in addition to providing students with diverse opportunities for personal development and enhancing skills necessary for society and working life, the choice of profession and further education, protection of the environment and nature, and international co-operation and peace, the school should be arranged in the way that it promotes skills required for the consolidation of national culture and national values (Finland, Ministry of Education [FME] 1983). The curriculum guidelines, for their part, stated explicitly that:
One of the most important tasks of education is to secure the continuity of the basic functions of society related to the transmission of culture to the members of society. (Finland, National Board of Education [FNBE] 1985: 11)

Moreover:

From the perspective of developing skills important for the national culture and national values, the aim is to protect and strengthen national identity. School education aims to guide a student to realize that as an individual he or she is part of the nationhood united by the common cultural heritage and the environment of the independent fatherland. (p. 12)

Both the School Act and the curriculum guidelines express firm beliefs in the existence of universally shared national values that should be protected and communicated to the young generation. Even though the documents of this period devoted greater attention to international education expressed in terms of international solidarity, human rights, peace, and disarmament, they also stated that these aims are not in conflict with the objective of nurturing national culture. On the contrary, the appreciation of one’s national culture is the prerequisite of internationalization (p. 13).

In 1998 a new Basic Education Act (FME 1998) came into force; the content, significantly, omitted any reference to promoting national culture and national identity as a basic function of education. Section 2 of the act, entitled ‘Objectives of education’, referred to the purpose of education as growth into humanity and ethically responsible membership in society, and knowledge and skills necessary in life. In light of these changes, I explore whether the Finnish state has diminished efforts to preserve the unity of the nation by means of compulsory education.

Two extensive committee reports published in 1993 may be viewed as reactions to the changing external and internal conditions in Finland. Both documents provided a general appraisal of the societal context before proceeding to the examination of the education system and further recommendations. The National Education Strategy (FME 1993a) portrayed social changes in terms of the decline of social cohesion and the possibility of conflicts. It stated that unity is threatened by the national economic crisis and the widening gap between the rich and the poor, on the one hand, and the growing cultural diversity of Finnish society, on the other (p. 8). It is due to these changes that the objectives and contents of education have to be re-evaluated. The document argued that in the transformed societal context Finland should understand and appreciate its national traditions and create new ones, but should also turn into a cultural community with respect for diversity and vivid international co-operation (p. 2). Moreover, Finland should free itself from an image of a monocultural country and demolish the cultural hegemony embedded in institutions (p. 14). Nevertheless, Finnish culture shall remain the foundation of Finland’s national being, whereas multiculturalism is accepted as a force necessary for the further development of society (p. 32).

The arguments and recommendations expressed in the National Education Strategy affirm that internal and external changes make it impossible to proceed with the national project as before. However, they do not proclaim the project obsolete. Instead, the authors of the report search for
ways to re-emphasize the national element, because of the perceived erosion of national unity, but also to reconcile it with the rise of cultural diversity and the growing need for international collaboration. Thus, emphasis on the national aspect has not disappeared. Even though the usage of the term ‘national’ has decreased, national identity is camouflaged in the language of culture and cultural identity. At the same time the national is now perceived with greater flexibility. It is acknowledged that individuals develop their identities in multiple cultural environments, with the national element as one among others. This change reflects the multicultural turn in educational policies, which are now increasingly based on the assumption that societies are inhabited by numerous different cultures not necessarily adhering to a common set of national values. Thus, instead of enhancing one national cultural identity for all, education documents recognize cultural diversity and individual identity. Identity construction is perceived as a personal development project comprised of various building blocks instead of one pre-determined national component.

As a manifestation of this important change, the latest National Core Curriculum (FNBE 2004) introduced a new interdisciplinary theme entitled ‘Cultural identity and internationalization’, with the aim of helping the student understand the essence of Finnish and European cultural identity, find his or her own cultural identity, and develop skills of intercultural communication and internationalization (pp. 38–39). In the previous core curriculum (FNBE 1994) it was indicated that cultural distinctiveness and the ability to act as an interpreter of one’s culture are appreciated in an internationalizing world. For the majority of students in basic education, Finnish culture and its close ties with other Nordic countries form the basis of cultural identity. However, those coming from other cultural backgrounds are equally entitled to secure membership in their cultural communities and become active members of the Finnish society (pp. 13–14).

The National Committee Report on Humanities and Social Science Education (FME 1993b) maintained that European integration has increased the need to protect cultural diversity in general and the cultural identities of local communities in particular. It also stated that familiarization with one’s cultural heritage becomes valuable in a new way. Significantly, ‘culture partially replaces the state as a cohesive force holding the society together, mother tongue surpasses the fatherland’ (p. 31). This phrase captures perfectly a significant change. The traditional understanding of the nation in terms of political sovereignty has been exchanged for a cultural one. The importance of culture is rising because globalization, European integration, and migration perforate and weaken national state borders. In addition, the state is losing its decision-making powers to the transnational actors. Thus, the very definitions of independence and sovereignty are bound to change.

In relation to state sovereignty and independence, a textual analysis has revealed that earlier topics prescribed for grades 1 and 2 in primary school included fatherland and Independence Day, familiarization with the Finnish flag and the national hymn, clarification of the notions of independent nationhood and state, and discussions on the significance of independence and fatherland (FNBE 1985: 103–105). In the latest curriculum guidelines
neither state independence nor state symbols nor the language of the fatherland could be found among the aims and contents of school subjects. Even though this observation does not automatically mean that state symbols and the promotion of patriotism have disappeared from classrooms, it demonstrates that state educational authorities do not find it necessary to emphasize their place in teaching.

An important survival strategy for a state is continuous promotion of the practices and discourses of nation and national identity (Paasi 1997: 41). The Finnish authorities seem to be less concerned with the political sovereignty of the nation, but they have increased attention to its cultural vitality. Since the end of the Cold War, Finland needed to re-define itself internationally. The process of Europeanization challenged the traditional notions of sovereignty and called into question the relationship between the state and the nation. Some researchers who examined changes in the Finnish national identity since the end of the 1980s have pointed to the ever-stronger emphasis on culture inflicted by these changes. For instance, Joenniemi (2002) contends that Finland’s entry into the EU signified a new position vis-à-vis European integration, and depended on the successful re-definition of the Finnish nation-state. Joenniemi infers that Finland managed to avoid major anxieties concerning its integration with the EU because of its effective re-articulation as *Kultumnation*. The Herderian non-statist discourse embraced by the Finnish elites (the Fennomans) prior to Finland’s independence and once again since the end of World War II substituted the Hegelian notion of *Staatsnation*. By so doing, the integration process was not perceived as a threat to the independent Finnish nationhood. The ‘cultural (re)-turn’ permitted Finland to open up and enter international alliances, thus making it more inclusive in terms of its approach towards Europe and the world.

Recent debates about the effect of globalization on the nation-state have raised questions about the relationship between the state and the nation. Nationalism and the ideology of the nation-state have traditionally given preference to national identity and national citizenship. Consequently, the influence of local identities was demolished and the acquisition of double/multiple citizenship prevented, lest loyalty conflicts emerge (Urry 1999). It is argued that globalization interrupts the peaceful alliance between the nation and the state (Delanty 2000, Sassen 2002). Both citizenship and nationality diverge, shifting rights, responsibilities, and identities to sub-national and supra-national levels. As I will demonstrate below, the Finnish state has recently launched a process of constructing what may be termed a multiple conception of citizenship.

In 1985, the central objective of school history and social studies in the curriculum was to clarify national identity (FNBE 1985: 133). Similarly, biology and geography aimed at developing attachment to the home area, one’s homeland, and belonging to the Finnish nation (p. 165). However, already in this period the curriculum referred to global solidarity in the aims
of international education. Nevertheless, this objective did not embrace global identity; instead, the document asserted that a clear cultural identity is the foundation of independent international collaboration (FNBE 1988: 18). In the document published in 1993 there are references to the European identity, although it suggested that such a European identity cannot develop without a sound national identification (FME 1993b: 19). Significantly, educators from primary to upper-secondary levels were expected to approach educational content by asking themselves: ‘To what extent does the teaching content acknowledge national, European and world-wide dimensions, as they enable the expansion of one’s personal identity?’ (pp. 32–33, 57, 71).

At the same time, the curriculum guidelines published in 1994 recommended strengthening the national identity, while advocating familiarity with the history of neighbouring areas and Europe—thus signifying ambiguity about identity matters (FNBE 1994: 95).

In April 2004 the Finnish Council of State adopted the Citizen Participation Policy Programme for the duration of the cabinet’s term in office (until spring 2007) with the aim to ‘improve the prerequisites for citizens’ activities and democracy’ (Finland, Ministry of Justice 2006: 5). Citizenship education has acquired one of the central places in the programme. Its first principle asserts that:

Schools and other educational institutions will promote growth to active and democratic citizenship in accordance with the principle of lifelong learning. Alongside Finnish citizenship, EU and world citizenship should also be taken into consideration in education. (pp. 4–5)

The director of the programme, Seppo Niemelä (2004), discussed the objectives of the project at greater length. He noted that according to the Maastricht Treaty (1992) nationals of the EU member states became citizens of the EU. In addition, many feel that they are citizens of the world and simultaneously possess strong local identities. That is why, Niemelä suggested, there is a need for a new multi-level citizenship, whose nucleus remains with the national citizenship but is complemented by local, EU, and world citizenship. Niemelä (2004: 3) asserted that it is necessary to construct a new national narrative that places Finland in the broader context of global economy and ecology, and brings it to the realm of the European community. These ideas reveal that national citizenship, and in this respect national identity, are no longer perceived as incompatible with local or transnational identifications.

The latest curriculum guidelines were issued in 2004, the same year as the Policy Programme, but they were developed much earlier. Perhaps the time-lag explains why European and world dimensions are not emphasized to the extent suggested by the Policy Programme. The curriculum states that the Finnish culture, which has developed in interplay with indigenous, Nordic, and European cultures, is the foundation of education (FNBE 2004: 14). In addition, Finnish culture is perceived as increasingly diverse because of the inflow of immigrants. However, there are no direct references to raising European or global identities. The multicultural identity referred to in the document is entirely associated with immigrants and cultural minorities. Only minority groups are expected to develop multicultural identity and
bilingualism, which means that they can preserve bonds with their respective ethnic groups and become incorporated into the national society. Even though Finnish documents do not embrace European identity to any great extent, neither do they express any form of Euro-scepticism. Europeanness as such is not perceived as a threat to the Finnish norms, political structures, or ways of living.

The Finnish educational documents reveal a minor change in the direction of multiple citizenship which combines national level with sub-national and supra-national ones. However, the national still constitutes the core, with the sub- and supra-national as additional ingredients of the emerging citizenship recipe.

**Russia: strengthening identification with the Russian state**

Many educational reforms implemented by the educational authorities of the new Russia in the beginning of the 1990s were initiated prior to the collapse of the USSR in the liberating climate of perestroika. The nationalization of education, which was expected to transform schools into cultural institutions reviving and passing on the traditions and languages of local cultures, was among the main aims of the restructuring. Given that nationality was widely understood as a sub-state category, nationalization of education was above all expected to cater to the demands of ethnic groups.

In line with the reform agenda, a ministerial document—adopted in 1990 and entitled ‘On the conception of the national school of the RSFSR and the scientific and organizational mechanisms of its implementation’—suggested that the system of compulsory education, which affects the entire population of the country, should be re-directed at the revival and satisfaction of people’s national and cultural demands (RSFSR Ministry of Education 1990). It was declared that schools will turn into real agents of cultural revival of Russian nations only if restructured as national in the true meaning of the word, if a national dimension in schooling and upbringing becomes fundamental (p. 26). The document declared that the number of hours allocated for teaching native languages should be increased in vocational schools and in extracurricular activities. It defined the truly national school as one connecting children and young people to their ethno-cultural traditions. The aim of the national school was to educate younger generations to carry on ethnic traditions and possess full command of their native languages.

The document also paid attention to the position of the Russian culture and language. It stated that an independent sub-programme for the Russian national school is required (ethnic Russians constituted 81.5% of the population of the republic). The development of such a school was seen as important as a stimulus for the national and cultural development of all nations of Russia; Russian culture was perceived as the means of connecting these nations to modern, worldwide developments. In addition, Russian culture and languages are seen as important because all higher education institutions function in Russian, and Russian is the only means of mutual communication for the non-Russian intelligentsia (p. 28).
This document clearly reflected the central Soviet assumption that nations are ethnic and primordial, and reproduced the idea that Russian language and culture hold the multinational country together. Russian was seen as the prerequisite for intercultural communication and educational opportunities, constituting a bridge connecting the under-developed nations to the developed world. Significantly non-Russian nationalities were not expected to identify with Russia and the Russian nation per se. Their primary identity, further solidified by means of national school, lay with the sub-state ethnicity. Ethnic groups were increasingly viewed as victims of the Soviet regime. In order to dissociate from the Soviet system, which allowed for some non-Russian schooling under the strict control of the Communist Party, all ethnic groups were encouraged to establish national schools on the basis of local needs and traditions. The neglect of the state-wide identity was thus, on the one hand, a manifestation of the persistence of the Soviet conception of nationality—viewing distinct, ethnic and primordial nations as the constituents of the state—and, on the other hand, a policy to break with the past—aiming to abolish the Soviet nationalities hierarchy and to ensure country-wide support for the political leaders in charge of reforms. In addition, the Soviet formula ‘national in form, socialist in content’ was replaced by the ‘national in form and content’ ideology, as educational authorities allowed the teaching of national history and literature, especially with the advent of decentralization and differentiation as the central goals of the reform agenda in education since the beginning of the 1990s.9

The absence of a unifying national ideology was complemented by emphasis on universal human values. Universal human values, though never defined, were to replace the highly ideology-driven educational content of the Soviet school. It was commonly believed that they offered a ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ substitute to the centralized communist-driven curriculum. The document entitled ‘On democratization of upbringing work of comprehensive educational institutions of the RSFSR’ (RSFSR Ministry of Education 1991: 90) stated that the upbringing of children and young people is based on universal human values and friendship among nations. Later, the Law on Education (1992)—the first legislative act of the new sovereign Russian Federation—echoed these objectives. The act declared the humanistic character and the priority of universal human values as the first principles of the state policy in education (Article 2). It also confirmed the right to receive comprehensive education in other than the Russian language (Article 6, para. 2).

Nevertheless it would be inaccurate to suggest that the principles of unity and state integrity were altogether absent from the political discourse of the period. On the contrary, as the then Minister of Education Eduard Dneprov (1990–1992; Dneprov 1998: 48) argued, inter-ethnic tensions and disintegration could be prevented with the help of national schools during periods of political struggle and uncertainty. In other words, the idea of national schools and the nationalization of education was in a sense a political manoeuvre addressing the threat of state disintegration.

I contend that the ideas encouraging sub-state ethnic identities on the one hand, and universal human values on the other, have had to make space
for a state-wide ideology of patriotism. This transformation is manifested in three major findings of the analysis of Russian educational documents. First, Russian state authorities have revived interest in upbringing (воспитание), which used to constitute an integral part of the Soviet school and could be translated as character, moral, and political education. Secondly, since the official adoption of the Russian state symbols by the Russian parliament (2001), the Ministry of Education has issued several recommendations on teaching about the Russian flag, the national anthem, and the coat of arms. Finally, and most importantly, since the end of the 1990s the state has adopted two federal programmes of patriotic education and two programmes emphasizing the importance of the Russian language. These documents aim at building state cohesion and identification with Russia. In the Russian language programmes the motivation is not only premised on the necessity of cultural revival and the role of the Russian language as lingua franca, akin to the ideas of the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the Russian language is perceived as an indispensable component of Russian statehood.

The first signs of change in the direction of citizenship education that stresses loyalty and national cohesion are evident in the growing emphasis on upbringing as the central responsibility of the state. In 1999 the Ministry of Education adopted ‘The upbringing development programme for 1999–2001,’ followed by another programme for 2002–2004 (Russia, Ministry of Education [RME] 1999, 2002a). Both programmes focus on the social, ethnic, cultural, generational, and political re-consolidation of the Russian people. According to the documents, citizenship and patriotic upbringing lie at the centre of state educational policies. In fact, the documents aim to persuade the reader that the state should resume its primary role in defining and implementing the upbringing of the younger generation. The earlier programme, revealing a growing suspicion toward ethnic elements in education, stated that:

the ethnic factor has acquired considerable position in the societal development. On the one hand, it reveals the socializing potential of ethnic environment. But on the other hand, it also gives rise to ethnic tensions. (RME 1999: 3)

In 2001, after the Russian parliament agreed on the new state symbols, the Ministry of Education issued circulars on the teaching of state symbols in schools. The objectives and measures proposed in the documents are expected to guarantee generational continuity and to ensure societal unity. In a symbolic manner the circular distributed in 2001 recommended that when the Russian flag is used together with regional or other flags, the state flag should be positioned on the left side of other flags or, in the case of an odd number, in the middle. In addition, the sizes of other flags cannot exceed the size of the Russian flag (RME 2001). National iconography—the visual image of the nation—is an important element of any national ideology. Its role is to concretize the abstract notion of the nation and to promote emotional attachment to it. Thus, by dictating how the space of the school should be organized, and by locating the Russian flag at the centre of the school’s physical environment, the Russian state aspires to establish the supremacy of, and loyalty to, the common Russian nationhood.
In 2003 the Ministry of Education established a Co-ordinating Council on the patriotic upbringing of young people. The work of the Council is directly related to the ‘State programme of patriotic upbringing’ (Russia 2001). This programme and ‘The concept of patriotic education’ (RME 2003) focus on the development of love and devotion to the ‘Motherland’ Russia. It is stated that patriotism originates from love toward the ‘minor Motherland’ and matures up to the point of state patriotic consciousness and love toward the ‘Fatherland’ (p. 3). In this context ‘Motherland’ constitutes a sub-state territory, whereas the state is described in the paternalistic language of the ‘Fatherland’. Russian patriotism, as an expression of national identity, should occupy a superior position in comparison to the sub-state identifications.

Patriotism is defined as love and loyalty to one’s homeland, a determination to serve its interests, as well as a readiness to protect the Fatherland up to the point of self-sacrifice. Patriotic upbringing is described as a systematic activity of state authorities and other organizations aiming at the development of patriotic consciousness, a sense of loyalty to the Fatherland, a willingness to fulfil one’s civic duty, and constitutional responsibilities to defend the interests of the homeland (Russia 2001). Patriotism should also become the main quality of each individual, as well as the entire Russian society (RME 2003). In fact, the latest ‘Programme of patriotic upbringing’, adopted in the summer of 2005, states that the aim is to develop patriotism into the core spiritual component of Russia (Russia 2005a: 4).

The ‘Concept of patriotic upbringing’ elaborates on the personal meaning of patriotism: ‘On the personal level patriotism represents the main secure feature of the human being, which is expressed in his or her worldview, moral ideals and norms of behaviour’ (RME 2003: 2). In addition, it is argued that the priority of the social and the statist does not embody a limitation. On the contrary, their primacy is the prerequisite and the stimulus of individual freedom (pp. 3–4). The nature of these claims resembles general nationalistic rhetoric. It is often argued by nationalists that only through the nation people can find true freedom and lead meaningful lives (Kymlicka and Straehle 1999).

Another important aspect of the programme is its strong connection to the army and conscription. The militaristic nature of state patriotism is apparent in the key role played by the Ministry of Defence in drafting and lobbying the project, as well as in the concrete measures of patriotic education recommended to schools. These include ‘lessons of courage’, which involve participation of war veterans in school discussions, immortalization of soldiers who died defending the Fatherland, and essays and other student work that should help to (re)-discover Russia’s heroic past. Even though the programme was arguably intended to raise prestige of the Russian army, there is another important reason why ‘soldier’ constitutes the central subject of the document. Putin (2006), in his address to the Federal Assembly, announced the following: the ‘army is part of us, our society. Service in the army is very necessary for our country and for the Russian people’. Putin also quoted a famous Russian thinker Ivan Il’in (1883–1954) that the soldier represents the national unity, state will, power, and honour of Russia. Thus, the army and the soldier symbolize
Russia’s unity. The discourse of national security, apparent in the documents on patriotic upbringing, justifies the necessity of national unity and sacrifice to the state. Metaphorically speaking, ‘soldier’ symbolizes the ideal Russian citizen, with loyalty, duty, and self-sacrifice to the state as the primary citizen virtues.

The arguments of national consolidation also legitimize the federal programme ‘Russian language 2006–2010’ (Russia 2005b), whose aim is to improve command of the Russian language among the Russian population, immigrants in Russia, Russians and non-Russians living in the former Soviet republics, and the Russian diaspora abroad. The dissemination of the Russian language is perceived as an important means of consolidating Russian society and ensuring state integrity and national security of Russia (pp. 8–9). Even though state consolidation seems to be the primary objective of the programme, the document also reveals tensions in defining who belongs to the Russian nation. Because the programme incorporates Russians and non-Russians residing abroad, it adheres to both ethnic and cultural definitions of Russianness which surpass the present borders of the Russian state.

While listing the unwanted consequences of poor command of the Russian language, the document warns against the weakening of the national identity of the Russian citizens and low patriotism of younger generations, as well as against ethnic separation among the Russian population and those in the member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Russia 2005b: 12–13). Thus, the role of the Russian language is perceived in two ways. Continuing the lingua franca intentions of the Soviet system, it constitutes a unifying factor among Russians and non-Russian in Russia and abroad. At the same time, Russian language has become more strongly linked to Russian statehood, and is expected to foster identification with and loyalty to Russia.

By elevating nationality to the state-wide level, the Russian state attempts to strengthen the connection between nationality and citizenship and simultaneously limit the scope of citizenship. In other words, Russian authorities are searching for ways to break from the Soviet legacy of decoupling nationality and citizenship and bring the state and the nation into a closer alliance. It must be emphasized that, apart from references to the universal human values, there are no mentions of European or global identities akin to those found in the Finnish documents. Thus, for Russia, the primary concern lies with adjusting the balance between sub-state and state-wide identifications.

**Conclusion**

This analysis of documents from Finland and Russia has demonstrated that geopolitical transformations lead to the revision of the socialization task of school—as state authorities adjust their national identities, and the relationship between nationality and citizenship, to the new socio-political contexts. However, political contexts and historical legacies greatly influence how nation-states adapt to the new ‘reality’.
Finland is both forsaking the strong link between the state and the nation, and returning to the pre-independence cultural conception of the nation. These changes allow Finland to move in the direction of a multi-level conception of citizenship. Nevertheless, for Finland, national citizenship remains the nucleus of other citizenship and identity layers. The new narratives of Finland-in-Europe do not make the notion of Finnishness completely redundant. The transformation into a *Kulturnation* is only a necessary step to secure Finland’s national being under the supranational umbrella of the EU, which arguably weakens the sovereignty of the nation-state. Finland seems to be strengthening its cultural identity in peaceful alliance with Europeanness.

In Russia, the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent redefinition of the country’s borders, national composition, and state institutions led to the transformation of the relationship between nationality and citizenship. Russia seeks to attach citizenship to the state-wide national space by encouraging state patriotism and strengthening the position of the Russian language. In this way contemporary Russia dissociates itself from the imperial legacy of the USSR and moves towards state nationalism, integrating the nation and the state. In contrast to the recent developments in Finland, the discourses of state integrity and national unity have become more prominent.

Is the binary conception of Finland and Russia justified? Are educators witnessing a true divide in Europe, with some countries abandoning the traditional notions of citizenship and nationality and others urgently seeking to re-establish the glory of the nation-state? On the basis of the analysis of Finland and Russia such a conclusion is clearly premature. Both countries attach strong value to national identity and citizenship. Even Finland, often called the best student of the EU and a pioneer of post-modern information and communication technology, emphasizes its national identity and adjusts it to the changing political scenery.

Notes

1. I thank anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to the fact that tension between the forces of nation-building and globalization undoubtedly exists within every state. Thus, it is empirically impossible to divide states into two categories. However, states that have recently undergone considerable transformations of borders, national composition, and political regime are arguably keener to revive and hold on to the traditional role of the nation-state than the so-called stable or old states. New states can hardly escape the effects of globalization, but they often prioritize nation-building. On the tension between nation-building and globalization in Ukrainian and Russian citizenship education, see Janmaat and Piattoeva (2007).

2. See e.g. Anderson (2003) and Breully (1993).

3. The Finnish word *kansa* could be translated as nation, people, or rabble. Citizenship is translated as *kansalaisuus*, nationality as *kansallisuus*, and nationhood as *kansakunta*.

4. Snellman drew from the writings of Hegel on *Geist*. However, he deviated from the original in linking the Spirit to the national being (Oittinen 2006: 14–15). Snellman emphasized the cultural aspect of nationhood as he argued that the history and essence of nations are culturally determined (Pulkkinen 1999: 128, Oittinen 2006: 17fn5). In this respect, Snellman’s ideas come close to the philosophy of Herder. Interpreting the notion of *Geist*, Snellman argued that every nation, including Finns, has its own spirit or
mentality, which is manifested in common values, beliefs, and traditions. The spirit of the nation could only be rightfully expressed in the national language.

5. That is, the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, the territorial predecessor of the modern Russian Federation.

6. The documents were collected through library and on-line searches in 2003–2006. The time span for the Russian documents is 1990–2005 and the Finnish documents 1983–2006. In the Finnish case, the Basic School Act (1983) and the National Curriculum Guidelines (1985) were taken into consideration because they determined educational objectives into the 1990s. All documents analysed were adopted and disseminated by state authorities and thus reflect the intentions of the state regarding education and citizenship. Documents in Finnish and Russian have been translated by the author.


8. The Russian adjectives russkii and rossiskii can only be rendered with the English word ‘Russian’. This translation overlooks an important difference in connotation: russkii refers exclusively to Russian ethnicity, whereas rossiskii is a civic term related to the state-wide level. I bore this important nuance in mind while examining and interpreting Russian educational documents.


10. These circulars are entitled ‘On official rituals related to the use of the state symbols in comprehensive schools’ (RME 2001) and ‘About the organization of upbringing activities aimed at familiarization with and popularization of the history and meaning of official state symbols of the Russian Federation’ (RME 2002b).


12. This confusion also proves that Russia is uncertain about its place in the world. See also Maier (2005).

References


