FINNISH AND SPANISH FAMILIES
IN CONVERGING EUROPE
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IN CONVERGING EUROPE
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ORIGINAL ARTICLES

Article 1

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This work is the outcome of a long and eventful process that has been signposted by various research projects, each of them having shaped the research. The Scandinavian project *Dissoluting and Merging Societies – From Nordic Model to European Formula? Finland, Sweden and Norway on the Threshold of the 21st Century* coordinated by Professor Raimo Blom first introduced me to family issues and to the fine art of doing qualitative interviews. The project *Social Exclusion and Social Inclusion in Childhood* coordinated by docent Irmeli Järventie initiated me into multidisciplinary teamwork and into the European discussion on childhood and family matters. To all of you who were involved in these projects – many thanks for pleasurable collaboration.

The turning point of my research was the *Training and Mobility Programme for Young Researchers* (TMR) of the international comparative research project *Family and Welfare State in Europe* coordinated by Professor Peter Flora at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research and funded by the European Commission. The TMR programme brought together researchers from EU member countries and associate states. The programme offered an excellent opportunity for us researchers to make ourselves conversant with comparative methods and data. Furthermore, it gave us a chance to develop our own comparative studies with long-term research visits in the countries included in our studies, with regular discussions in workshops all over Europe and with the tutelage of senior researchers in workshops and in the host institutions. My host institution during the academic year 1998–99 was the Department of Sociology at the
Autonomous University of Barcelona. During that year, and with the support of Professor Lluís Flaquer, I was able to familiarize myself with Spanish social scientific research and to develop my research into its final form. Besides the scientific gain, the year in the TMR project and in Barcelona brought me new friends and unforgettable memories. My thanks to Lluís and to all of you who were involved in the TMR.

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In Tampere, 27th August 2004, on the morning my niece came into world.

Eriikka Oinonen
This thesis explores the family and its changes during the 20th century and, particularly, between the 1960s and 1990s by comparing Finland and Spain within the West European context. The examination of the family arises from the following questions: (i) How, to what degree and why are family institutions in Europe different or similar? (ii) What are the roles and significance of the family institution in contemporary societies? (iii) How is the family, along with its roles and obligations, defined and what social and cultural factors have affected the definitions in different countries?

These questions lead to the study of the family as a social institution. Family as institution is examined from the viewpoints of family ideology and family practices. In the former view, the interest lies in conceptions of the family, its roles and duties held by the society. First, ‘family ideology’ is studied by analysing how public and political institutions such as legislation and family policy define the family and how these definitions have changed during the 20th century. Second, family ideology is also examined by looking at the attitudes and values of people concerning intimate relations, the family and family practices. The aim of this approach is to review in which way the attitudes and values are in line with the institutionalised view of the family, on the one hand, and with actual practices, on the other.
In the latter view, the interest lies in family practices and their changes between the 1960s and 1990s. Family practices are studied by analysing and comparing socio-demographic statistics. The focus is on the formation of the first family and, therefore, such important issues like divorce, remarriage, reconstituted families and single-parent families are left out or just briefly mentioned. The reasons for concentrating on the formation of the first family when comparing Finland and Spain are many. First of all, the most interesting differences and similarities between Finland and Spain are found in patterns of first family formation and, furthermore, changes in patterns of first family formation are the ones that most affect fertility and marriage rates – the common concern of all West European societies. Second, leaving divorce, remarriage, reconstituted families, and single parenthood out of discussion is clearly justified for they are all marginal phenomena in Spain.

Because the study approaches the family as a social institution, cross-national differences and similarities concerning patterns of family formation as well as prevailing family ideologies must be studied in association with legislation, social policies, the labour market, housing policies, education, gender relations, and religion.

The cases of Finland and Spain are examined within the West European context, particularly where the family practices are concerned. Western Europe represents the framework in relation to which the Finnish and Spanish cases are viewed. The level of analysis is national, which does not take into account regional, ethnic and class-based differences in patterns of family formation or in attitudes and values connected to the family, family life and intimate relations.

The individual studies comprising the basis of the thesis approach the family from different but interrelated perspectives. The results of the studies are presented in the summarising article but in this connection it is in order to highlight the focuses of the original studies. The first article (Section II), *Nations’ Different Families? Contrasting Comparison of Finnish and Spanish ‘Ideological Families’*, examines the family
institution from the viewpoint of family ideology. The starting point of the study is the common understanding that, owing to the different types of welfare states in Europe, the family in Scandinavian countries is deinstitutionalised and modern and in South European countries the family is institutionalised and traditional. The starting point of the study is to test these stereotypic notions by analysing Finnish and Spanish cases. The cases are based on the analysis of laws and policies that are directly targeted at families, family formation and family life. The time span reaches from the early 20th century to the late 1990s. Laws and policies are examined to reveal the official discourses on the family and their change over time in the two countries. Second, the study examines the notions of Northern and Southern families and family ideologies by identifying basic sociological contradictions such as traditional/modern, collective/individual, religious/secular, private/public and seeks to show the relativity of difference and similarity. Both the analyses of laws and policies and dichotomies have been done in relation to Finnish and Spanish trajectories of modernisation.

The second article (Section III), Finnish and Spanish Family Institutions: Similarities and Differences, continues the analysis of the differences in family institutions in Northern and Southern Europe by looking at the trends in the family as institution and in family formation. Second, it adds viewpoints to the discussion concerning the family and family life by comparing the values and attitudes of Finns and Spaniards. The analysis is connected to the debates about the converging and diverging effects of globalisation, the individualisation of values and about the state of the family in contemporary Western societies.

The third article (Section IV), Starting the First Family. Changes in Patterns of Family Formation and Demographic Trends in Finland and Spain, examines the three generally accepted hypotheses for declining marriage and fertility rates, namely contraceptive use, premarital cohabitation and women’s labour force participation. The study demonstrates that these hypotheses are invalid as explanations for
differences between Finland and Spain and introduces issues relevant to understanding differences in changes in first family formation in the two countries, namely family policy, the labour market situation and policies and the labour market situation of young adults in particular.

The forth article (Section V), *Extended Present, Faltering Future. Family Formation in the Process of Attaining Adult Status in Finland and Spain*, examines the transition from youth to adulthood focusing on the role of family formation within the process of becoming an adult, and the circumstances underlying delayed family formation. The article moves from a general overview on a European scale to a more detailed analysis on a national scale starting from a historical analysis of the family. The theoretical framework comes from youth studies and it is used to study the differences in Finnish and Spanish paths to adulthood. The differences are examined from a socio-demographic point of view and the reasons for the differences are surveyed from the perspectives of the labour market, housing policies and the principles behind welfare state types.

This summarising article (Section I) is divided into three chapters. Chapter 1 starts with presenting the premises of the study by explaining the grounds for the choice of countries and by making the chosen method explicit. Second, it reviews the main lines of sociological discussion on the family and locates the present approach in the field. The chapter ends with a discussion of comparative methods and data. Chapter 2 starts with composing a historical context for understanding the differences and similarities concerning family ideologies, family practices, the role of the family and their changes in Finland and Spain. The sub-chapters 2.2.–2.4. discuss the most important differences and similarities in family institutions in Finland and Spain and survey the most focal aspects and themes of the study. In these chapters some aspects and themes are also updated and discussed in a more complex manner than has been possible in the original articles. Summarising discussions on the elements of the family ideology, on values and
attitudes concerning the family and family practices, and on major
demographic changes are also presented in these chapters. Chapter 3
puts forward the focal findings of the study and highlights some ideas
for further research and discussion.

1. To Compare Family Institutions

1.1. Premises of the Study

This chapter presents the premises of the study by explaining the basis
for choosing the countries and by outlining the starting points and
the theoretical and methodological bases of the study. The discussion
starts with a review of welfare-state typologies and the family types
and ideologies that different types of welfare states maintain and are
premised on. Second, the demographic trends and the focal research
questions arising from the variation in the welfare states and socio-
demographic trends are presented. The chapter ends with a discussion
of the theoretical and methodological roots of the study deriving from
Emile Durkheim’s views on the family and methods for studying the
family.

*The Choice of Countries:*
*Divergent Welfare States and the Status of the Family*

The choice of countries derives from the widely discussed classification
based on the analysis of the relations between the state, the market
and the family. Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) distinguishes three
types of welfare states: liberal, conservative-corporatist, and social
democratic.
TABLE 1. A Summary overview of regime characteristics

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<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Social democratic</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
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<td><strong>Role of:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Central</td>
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<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
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<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Subsidiary</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Welfare state:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominant mode of</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Universal</td>
<td>Kinship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>solidarity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Corporatism</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Etatism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant locus of</td>
<td>Market</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>solidarity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree of</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>High (for breadwinner)</td>
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<td>decommodification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Modal examples</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Italy, Germany</td>
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The core elements of liberal regimes are political commitment to minimise the state, to individualise risk and to promote market solutions. In other words, social guarantees are for those in ‘bad’ need like the poor, aged, single mothers and low-income families with children. Others are personally responsible for protecting themselves from risks such as old age and sickness and for providing themselves the services they need by buying them from the market.

The principled characteristics of the social democratic regime are universalism and the marginalisation of private welfare. Rights are attached to individuals and they are based on citizenship rather than attested need or employment. In addition, risk coverage is
comprehensive and levels of benefits are generous compared to liberal and conservative regimes.

The core elements of conservative regimes are subsidiarity, status segmentation and familialism. First, the state promotes only those tasks that cannot be performed effectively at a more immediate level like the family. Second, the best protected are those who are in ‘normal’ employment, generally and traditionally male breadwinners. Third, the family has the ultimate responsibility for its members’ welfare. The more familialistic the welfare state is, the less generous are family benefits. Furthermore, as the model assumes a male breadwinner family as the standard, provision for ‘atypical’ families tends to be residual. Due to the accent on compulsory social insurance and on the centrality of the family as a protector and provider of services, the role of the market has remained marginal (Esping-Andersen 1999).

According to the typology, Anglo-Saxon countries belong to the liberal regimes, Continental European countries to the conservative regimes and a social democratic regime is synonymous with Scandinavian countries. However, it is important to keep in mind that countries in these clusters are not identical nor are their welfare systems.¹

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¹ It has been argued that the Mediterranean countries should be considered distinct from Continental Europe (e.g. Ferrera 1996). Esping-Andersen agrees to an extent; in Mediterranean countries reluctance to upgrade social assistance is based on two assumptions: first, it is both assumed and legally prescribed that families are the locus of social aid and, second, it is assumed that families normally do not fail to provide, aid and protect. Strong stress on familialism exists in Mediterranean countries but it is not stronger than in Continental Europe in every respect. In Southern Europe, it is more typical that elderly people live with their children and mature children live longer with their parents and women do longer hours of domestic work than in Continental countries. But, Continental countries like Austria, Germany and the Netherlands are actively discouraging wives’ employment by reducing benefits and increasing taxes if a wife is employed whereas Southern European countries, like the Scandinavian countries, are virtually neutral in this respect (Esping-Andersen 1999: 60–67, 72, 90–94).
Esping-Andersen’s typology is widely used but also criticized, particularly by feminist scholars, because it leaves the family and gender perspective aside and focuses mainly on the relationship between the welfare state and the market, and on the degree to which people can live independently of market forces (de-commodification) (e.g., Leira 1999; Lewis 1993; Sainsbury 1996). However, it is not just the degree to which people can live independently of market forces that is relevant, but also the degree to which it is possible for people to live independently from their families (den Dulk 2001: 29). Thus feminists distinguish the gendered models of welfare states: the male breadwinner and the individual model. Different welfare states maintain and are premised on different family ideologies. Therefore, the relationship between the state, the family and the individual varies in different societies (den Dulk 2001; Sainsbury 1996).

Acknowledging the critique, Esping-Andersen introduced the concept of de-familialisation, referring to the degree to which the welfare state eases the burden of caring responsibilities of families. ‘De-familialised’ welfare states are characterized by an active public policy, including provisions such as childcare and services for the elderly. In a ‘familistic’ welfare state regime caring responsibilities are primarily seen as a responsibility of private households. According to Esping-Andersen, Scandinavian countries are the most ‘de-familialised’ ones and Southern European countries are the most ‘familistic’ with respect to the caring burden of families (Esping-Andersen 1999).

Regarding the relationship between the state and the family and prevailing family ideology, the differences appear to be the greatest between Scandinavian and Southern European nations. Finland as a Scandinavian nation belongs to the social-democratic, ‘de-familialised’ and individual model welfare states whereas Spain as a Southern European nation belongs to conservative-corporatist, ‘familistic’ and male breadwinner model welfare states. Therefore, following the lines of comparative studies on welfare states and public policies, the Finnish family appears modern, loose and marginal because of the individualistic, strong and developed welfare state that has taken over most of the tasks that traditionally belonged to the family. The Spanish
family, in contrast, appears traditional, firm and strong because the family has maintained its central role as welfare and care provider, and the welfare state is weak, its level of services is low and benefits are family-centred (Alestalo and Flora 1994; Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Iglesias de Ussel 1998; Kosonen 1995).

Although the focus of this study is not the welfare state but the family institution and its changes within a Western European context, the classification of countries provided by welfare state studies served as the selection criteria for country cases, particularly since the family is seen as a social institution. Regarding the relationship between the state and the family and the prevailing family ideologies, Finland and Spain offer interesting perspectives for analysing the family institution and changes in it. They serve as extreme cases of European societies and families.

However, notions of ‘similar’ and ‘different’ are relative. Two cases which from one perspective contrast sharply may from another perspective be alike. Comparing the ‘most different’ cases or as diverse cases as possible is justified because it enables us to trace similar processes of change but keeps us sensitive to the fact that similar processes do not always lead to similar outcomes nor do they always originate from same reasons (cf. Collier 1991).

Socio-Demographic Trends:
Convergence of the Different Families

In recent decades, marriage and fertility have declined, premarital cohabitation, divorce, single parenthood and women’s labour force participation have increased and the number of children born out of wedlock and the number of single people have been increasing all over Western Europe. The main concerns arising out of the socio-demographic trends are twofold: the formation of new families is delayed or even rejected and the existing families are increasingly
dissolving. Consequently, it appears that the family institution itself is in a state of decline in Western Europe (e.g. Becker 1981; Popenoe 1988). The current socio-demographic trends are also regarded as signs of cultural convergence, which is believed to lead to similitude in lifestyles, cultural symbols, individual attitudes, beliefs and ways of acting in areas such as family formation, intimate relationships and gender relations (Beck 1999a; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995; Bittman and Pixley 1997; Langlois et al. 1994).

Although West European societies have undergone parallel demographic and even cultural changes, the changes are not identical. A closer look at demographic statistics reveals surprising similarities and differences especially between societies that are considered to be different in several aspects. To mention one example, at the end of the 1990s, the marriage rate was equally low in Finland and Spain but the fertility rate was considerably lower in Spain than in Finland, and Spaniards delayed family formation further than Finns even though Spanish society and culture is considered familistic and Finnish society and culture are seen as individualistic.

Taking the variation in the welfare state and socio-demographic trends as the starting points, the following questions arise: what is the family that is claimed to be declining? Is it actual families or an idea of the family? How is the family defined in different social and cultural contexts and how have these definitions changed? Why is the formation of the first family delayed further in Spain than in Finland and why is fertility substantially lower in Spain than in Finland?

Theoretical and Methodological Roots:
Durkheim on the Family

The view of the family as a social and cultural institution has its origins in classical sociology. The societal changes entailed by industrialisation and urbanisation raised questions about the permanence of marriage,
the status of women and the future of personal and family relations in a society where the old bonds were vanishing. In the second half of the 19th century, fertility declined, divorce increased as did non-marital births and the age-old roles of men and women were about to change. Scholars and policymakers tried to understand these changes by applying the new scientific theory of evolution to social institutions. The basic idea of the evolutionary theory was that the family structure had gone through several stages of development until it reached the cultivated stage of monogamous marriage and nuclear family (Lamanna 2002; Marin 1994).

Durkheim’s writings on the family are not very well known but the family was one of his primary interests and his ideas on the family have had a significant, although often implicit influence in present-day family studies (Lamanna 2002)\(^2\). Similar to his contemporaries, Durkheim’s theory of the family is evolutionary but it also reflects the controversy over the family theories at the time.\(^3\) Durkheim agreed that the family had gradually evolved from complex, indistinct and unorganised clan-families to restricted, well-defined and specialised conjugal families. The conjugal family is qualitatively different from the earlier family types because it is the first to be based on personal attachment rather than on family property or interests. Structurally speaking, the conjugal family is reduced to its foundation; the married couple for, “the only permanent elements are the husband and wife, united to one another by a free and individual choice, forming an autonomous

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\(^2\) Mary Ann Lamanna’s book *Emile Durkheim on the Family* (2002) brings together Durkheim’s ideas on the family from diverse sources and scattered references, lectures and discussions, and presents his little known ‘family sociology’ systematically and comprehensively.

\(^3\) Influential studies on family and kinship at the time were, e.g., Henry Sumner Maine’s study *Ancient Law* published in 1861, Lewis Henry Morgan’s study *Ancient Society* published in 1877, Friedrich Engel’s study *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* published in 1884 and Edward Westermarck’s study *The History of Human Marriage* published in 1891.
family with the minor and unmarried children” (Durkheim 1921: 24 cited in Lamanna 2002: 51). Like Durkheim, present-day scholars emphasise the centrality of the couple relationship. Given the long childfree period, marriage is defined less as a parenting union and more as a personal relationship between two individuals (e.g. Beck and Beck- Gernsheim 1995; Jallinoja 2000).

The other new and most distinctive characteristic of the conjugal family is the ever-growing intervention of the state in the domestic life of the family. “When formerly it [the state] was a stranger to domestic life, more and more it regulates it and supervises its functioning” (Durkheim 1909: 262 cited in Lamanna 2002: 93). Durkheim anticipated the social division of labour in modern societies where the family collaborates with other specialized institutions like the church, the school system, the labour market and the welfare state.

Unlike most of his contemporaries, Durkheim rejected the biological and psychological explanations of the family and pointed out that the family is first and foremost a social association. Furthermore, although he placed the conjugal family at the end of evolution, he did not conclude that the evolution was completed. He argued strongly against Westermarck’s assumption of the conjugal family’s constancy and accentuated change. He stated, “If the family has varied up to this point, there is no reason to believe these variations must heretofore cease (…)” (Durkheim 1895: 622 cited in Lamanna 2002: 57) and “Since progress is a consequence of changes that occur in the social milieu, there is

no reason to suppose that it will ever be finished (…) (Durkheim [1893] (1978: 332) cited in Lamanna 2002: 57).

Durkheim conceptualised the family as a changing social institution and emphasised the connection between social organisations and family structures. He was interested in the formalised and stable aspects of family and kinship and, thus he placed particular weight on norms institutionalised in juridical code. He treated legal codes as a major source of data for the study of modern societies. For Durkheim the law represented established customs that are indicators of family forms and practices (Lamanna 2002: 75). However, defining the family only in terms of the legal model excludes atypical families and de facto families. Durkheim realised that and emphasised the other source of data – demographic statistics – in studying the family because it may grasp the empirical diversity of family life better than legal codes.

In Durkheim’s study on the family, statistical analysis is used to implement the comparative method by examining variations in social phenomena by time and place (Lamanna 2002: 77). Thus, in methodological terms, Durkheim advocated the comparative method to analyse the family as an institution in historical and cross-national perspectives. He argued that deductions about the relationship between social organisations and the family could be made on the basis of “a number of well-observed and well-studied cases that indicate covariance” (Durkheim 1908 236–237 cited in Lamanna 2002: 70).

Although Durkheim’s theory has its faults and it appears archaic, he touched on issues that are still under vivid discussion and his

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8 In addition to the legal and statistical data, Durkheim used a wide range of historical and ethnographic data in his study on the family (Lamanna 2002).
theory gives us important principles that are still valid today. First, agreement that the family can be studied scientifically regardless of the ‘natural attitude’ we hold toward it may be counted as Durkheim’s legacy. Second, Durkheim’s methodological stance, the use of the comparative method in analysing statistical, ethnographic and historical data, accentuates the close connection between the family and society. Third, Durkheim’s study on the family emphasised macro-social analysis and social change (Lamanna 2002).

These principles have become topical in studies of contemporary family and society after being in the background in the field of family-related research. Structural-functionalists, such as Parsons (1955), located the family in a larger social context but much of the sociology of the latter part of the 20th century treated the family as a thing apart, concentrating on family interaction and the family life cycle. Now the newly ensued ‘institutional approach’ analysing the family in relation to law, economy, the labour market, the welfare state etc. (e.g. Brining 2000; Gauthier 1996; Hakim 2000; McIntyre and Sussman 1995; Moss 1980) shares Durkheim’s interest in macro-level social change and the connections of the family to other social institutions.

This study may be considered Durkheimian in the sense that the family is viewed as a social institution. In other words, the interest does not lie in the internal life of the family or family interaction but in the macro-level social changes and in the interrelationship between the family and other social institutions such as the welfare state, the labour market, education, politics, legislation and religion. Secondly, the study is comparative, analysing the family institution in a cross-national, cross-cultural and historical perspective using legal, statistical and historical data. Furthermore, Durkheim’s view on the relevance of analysing legal codes in studying the family is shared. Legal codes represent established ideals of the given society and collectively accepted ways of acting. Examining family and social legislation from a historical perspective allows us to see how the family as a social
institution is conceptualised and how these conceptualisations have altered over time. Because legislation is not updated at the same pace as people change their attitudes and practices, relying only on legal codes in studying the family would give a distorted, stagnant and unrealistic picture of the family and its significance. Therefore, using various materials like socio-demographic statistics and studies of people’s attitudes and values helps us to draw a more comprehensive picture of the family. It is not only the use of different materials but also the different approaches to the subject that are important in analysing the family as a changing social institution.

1.2. Family in Sociology: From Unity to Diversity

To study the family is a challenging endeavour. First, family-related studies are wide-ranging and multi-disciplinary; there are a number of studies that do not specifically fall into the category of family sociology or family studies but approach the family indirectly. Second, there are many different and often conflicting views about the family among sociologists. Third, to analyse and theorize the family has proven to be difficult because of the familiarity of the subject; we all have our own understanding of the family and experiences of family life. Fourth, the contradiction between the idea of the family and empirical families and family life poses problems both in everyday life and in sociological theorising on the family in particular (cf. Bernardes 1985, Cheal 1991).

The aim of this chapter is not to present a comprehensive review of sociological theories on the family but to outline some of the major theoretical shifts that have occurred throughout the history of the field. Simplification of the theoretical developments begets a limited view of sociological discussion about the family. However, it is necessary because the discussion and theorising on the family is ample and
mixed with influences from various disciplines such as anthropology, psychology, history and economics and to go into it would be a study of its own. Within this context, it is sufficient to present some main lines of thought and those theoretical discussions that have influenced the study of the family in this work.

The chapter is divided into three parts. The first concentrates mainly on a Parsonian version of structural-functional theory and on its critique. The second discusses the paradigm shift largely generated by the feminist impact on family theorising and the diversification of views on the family. The third part locates this study in the field of family sociology and explicates the conceptualisation of the family in this study.

The Modern Family

Family and kinship were matters of intellectual and political interest already in the 19th century. The forefathers of sociology and anthropology debated the family and laid the foundation for sociological theorising on family life. In most of the classic works on this subject, discussion of the family was fragmented and appeared more as a side issue rather than as a main one and therefore, the theories on the family presented in the classics have continued to elude present-day researchers. Furthermore, their theories on the family were evolutionary, which, by the mid-20th century, came to be considered as an embarrassment among social scientists (Lamanna 2002; cf. also Marin 1994). Regardless of the limitations and archaic nature of the evolutionary theory (see Chapter 1.1.), it has value in the sociological study of the family and family life as it highlights and pays attention to socio-historical change. In addition, perhaps the most influential and much criticised theory on the modern family – structural-functional theory – is founded on evolutionists’ ideas (Collier et al. 1982; Lamanna 2002).
The best-known representative of the structural-functional theory of the family is Talcott Parsons. Regardless of the justified criticism of Parsons’ theory, his influence and importance in the study of the family is unquestioned, for he provided the major paradigm within which family sociology has been carried out (Morgan 1975: 26). Following Durkheim, the key in Parsons’ theory is structural differentiation. Accordingly, as modern industrial society evolved the family became a more separate and more specialised institution fulfilling more specialised tasks than in pre-modern and pre-industrial times. Simultaneously, other institutions developed and took over functions that earlier belonged to the family, such as economic production, education, and religion. Thus, the family has come to specialise in the functions of the socialisation of children and the emotional support of adult members of society (Parsons and Bales 1955).

According to Parsons, the conjugal nuclear family consisting of a husband, a wife and children (if any) is the type of family that is functional for the demands of modern industrial society: social and geographical mobility and individual achievement. First, the nuclear family is small enough to be highly mobile and second, it is relatively isolated from kin and kin-related economic commitments and thus

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10 The period between the 19th century evolutionists and the structural-functionalism of the 1950s was not void. In the 1920s, two influential ‘schools’ of social thought and research were established: one in the USA, the Chicago School and the other in Europe, the Frankfurt School. Although the family was not the core of their concerns, they did address it more or less indirectly. The Chicago School viewed the family in the context of urbanising social life and emphasised the isolation and rootlessness of the modern family, which, contrary to Parsons, was seen as negative. The importance of the Chicago School started to diminish after World War II and structural-functionalism gained ground in sociology (Berger and Berger 1983). The Frankfurt School developed the critical theory of society largely inspired by Marxian and Freudian analyses, stressing the inner ‘psychic’ dimension of exploitation under capitalism (Morgan 1975: 171). The direct impact of the Frankfurt School on family studies and theories is difficult to pinpoint but its influence in feminist and post-modern theorizing on the family is distinctive.
individuals are free from work-related kinship pressures. However, the nuclear family is not and never can be isolated from other systems, institutions and the society: the nucleus is emotionally attached to a kin group, a part of children’s socialisation takes place in schools and peer groups and the husband’s wage work connects the nuclear family to the society. The family outlined in structural-functional theory is characterised by the differentiation of the sex roles: the husband is the breadwinner (instrumental leader) and the wife is a homemaker and caretaker (expressive leader). In Parsons’ view this differentiation is necessary because the competition of occupational status would undermine the solidarity of the spouses and be detrimental to the marriage, which is seen as the basis of the family (see Parsons and Bales 1955, Parsons 1964; also Cheal 1991; Morgan 1975; 1996; cf. Becker 1981).

Parsons’ theory of the family is inseparable from his general theory of social evolution. According to Parsons, there is a universal evolutionary direction to social change and to superior forms of social existence, the highest stage being ‘modern’. Modern society is ‘better’ than the previous ones because specialisation of social units leads to coordination of specialised activities of different social units and increases efficiency and, as a result, the society as a whole functions ‘better’ than before. The same applies to the family; since economically productive activity has been removed from the home, adult family members are able to devote more time to the emotional quality of their relationship and to socialisation of their children. In Parsonian terms, this upgrading of the family makes the modern nuclear family superior to earlier or alternative family forms (Parsons 1966; see also Cheal 1991).

Although Parsons was seeking to outline a general theory of society and the part that family plays in it, factually, he was concerned with the North American white middle-class family of the 1950s. Furthermore, the theory does not do justice neither to the complexity
of the ‘outside’ society nor to complex patterns of mediation between family members within the nuclear family. First of all, the structural-functional theory does not pay attention to social, regional, religious, socio-historical, cultural or ethnic differences and characteristics neither within a society nor between societies. Such being the case, the theory is a-historical and unresponsive to context and to the potentiality for change (e.g. Cheal 1991; Morgan 1975, 1996). Furthermore, the theory does not recognise that the modernisation process proceeds differently and at a different pace in each society. Social historians and anthropologists have criticised structural-functional analysis in particular and family sociology in general for leaning on the contested suggestion that industrialisation is accompanied by a shift from rural extended families to isolated urban nuclear families (Goode 1963; for criticism see, e.g., Anderson 1994; Goody 2000; Laslett and Wall 1972; Miterrauer and Sieder 1982).

In addition, the family in structural-functional theory appears as an active social unit and a unified interest group. This ‘fallacy’ became an object of the critique of feminist theorists in particular. Furthermore, regardless of their theoretical approaches, the critics of structural-functional theory agree that the theory pays hardly any attention to the real diversity of family life and that its rigid view of sex roles exaggerates and oversimplifies the marital relationship in general and women’s experiences in particular (cf. Cheal 1991; Hartmann 1981; Oakley 1974; Stacey 1996).

David Morgan points out that there are grounds for doubting the account of the ‘modern family as a success story’ deriving from functional analysis (Morgan 1975: 92). Referring to the ‘radical psychoanalytic’ approach to the family deriving from the work of R.D. Laing and David Cooper, he argues that while the family (isolated conjugal nuclear family) may be functional for society as a whole, it can be and often is dysfunctional for the individual. The effective functioning of the family in society and the cohesion of the family as
a unit may have been achieved at the expense of family members. In addition, the family itself may be seen as dysfunctional for society as a whole (Morgan 1975).

However, Morgan prefers the term contradiction to dysfunction because ‘dysfunction’ alludes to the pathological or unusual. It has been quite common both in family studies and in public discussion to treat such forms of familial life as unusual or even pathological which do not fit into the expected ideal type (e.g. cohabitation, extramarital births, divorce, same-sex couples, etc.). The term dysfunction also includes the idea that the feature that is unfit to the ideal model may be removed or alleviated through remedial action (e.g. counselling, therapy, sanctions). The term contradiction, however, implies something that is built into the situation. It also includes a notion of change, meaning that the thing develops because of its internal, built-in contradictions. The contradictory nature of the family lies in the fact that it is simultaneously both a part of a wider system and a relatively bounded system (ibid. 96–97). To see the family as contradictory by definition makes it possible to describe divorce, domestic violence, and the ‘non-traditional’ forms of family life as predictable outcomes of mainstream or ‘normative’ family life (cf. Cheal 1991).

Although structural-functional theory leaves room for much and justifiable criticism, the positive effect of the theory is that it emphasises that micro-level processes must be studied in relation to macro-level structures and in the context of long-term historical changes (cf. the Durkheim discussion in Chapter 1.1.). Unlike many latter-day theoretical tendencies, Parsons’ theory recognises that the family is not an isolated system but is in relation to the wider society (Morgan 1975: 31; also Cheal 1991: 34).
Since the 1960s, a number of critics have engaged in rethinking the family and demystifying the ideal of the modern nuclear family as the only desirable and legitimate family form. The paradigm shift was largely generated by feminism, which has had a significant impact on sociological family theorising (Mann et al. 1997).

Feminist rethinking of the family starts with challenging three widespread assumptions: the ideology of the ‘monolithic family’, beliefs that the family is natural or biological, and analyses that reduce family ideals and family life into functions and roles (Thorne 1982). Feminist scholars primarily criticize modern family theorists/theories for accepting the family as a given natural unit and failing to problematise the very concept of the family (Tolkki-Nikkonen 1996). In brief, feminists have challenged the idea of the timelessness of any specific family arrangement. They introduced the idea of the analytic decomposition of the family, insisting that instead of studying the family, we should study the underlying structures of sex, gender and generation (e.g. Barrett and McIntosh 1982). Accordingly, it became apparent that female and male family members of different ages do not experience their families in the same way. Feminists gave voice to inequalities and conflicts between genders and generations both within and outside the family (e.g. Walby 1990). Furthermore, family boundaries came to be questioned and dichotomies such as private/public and family/society were challenged (cf. Thorne 1982; Tolkki-Nikkonen 1996).

The anthropologists Jane Collier, Michelle Rosaldo and Sylvia Yanagisako (1982) posed the question: Is There a Family? and challenged the long-prevailing conviction about the family
as a universal\textsuperscript{11} human institution which “maps the ‘function’ of ‘nurturance’ onto a collectivity of specific persons (presumably ‘nuclear’ relations) associated with specific spaces (‘the home’) and specific affective bonds (‘love’)” (Collier et al. 1982: 29). They made two important arguments. First, they demonstrated that a variety of structures could fulfil the functions assigned to the (nuclear) family (cf. also Douglas 1991) and, second, they insisted that we should not approach the family as a concrete institution designed to fulfil universal human needs, but as an ideological construct associated with the modern state. In criticising the functional theory of the family, they turned to the 19\textsuperscript{th} century evolutionists and claimed: “(…) the Victorians, not the functionalists (…) recognized that all human social ties have ‘cultural’ or ‘moral’ shapes, and more specifically, that the particular ‘morality’ of contemporary familial forms is rooted in a set of processes that link our intimate experiences and bonds to public politics” (Collier et al. 1982: 33). Collier et al. suggest that in order to understand families we need to adopt the perspective that the family as we understand it is not only a functional unit but also an ideological unit. Seeing the family also as an ideological unit or construct requires us to pay attention to other societal units or ‘public politics’ and to ask what kinds of ideas of the family they advocate and why.

The diversification of views on the family was inspired by several theoretical perspectives such as feminist theory, Marxist theory, system theory, symbolic interactionism, conflict theory and social

\textsuperscript{11} The major source for the debate about the universality of the nuclear family is George Murdock’s work \textit{Social Structure} (1965) [1945]. New York: Free Press. He studied data on 250 societies and concluded that the nuclear family exists as a distinct and strongly functional group in every known society either as the prevailing family form or as the basic unit of more complex family forms. The same types of arguments were made earlier by Bronislaw Malinowski (1913) in \textit{The Family Among the Australian Aborigines} (London: University of London Press) and by Edward Westermarck (1891) in \textit{The History of Human Marriage} (London: Macmillan and Co).
constructionism (Cheal 1991). In general terms, the strategic effects of the paradigm shift were, first, that family researchers started to pay increasing attention to interaction between intimate couples and human relations. Second, interest grew in such forms of living that were not circumscribed by the structural-functional or standard theory of the family, such as two-earner families, single-parenthood, cohabitation and reconstituted families. Third, stress on adaptation was replaced by stress on conflicts and contradictions both between the family and society and within families (Cheal 1991; Mann et al. 1997; Tolkki-Nikkonen 1996). All in all, the range of themes within family research expanded, including changing gender roles, women’s wage work, the relationship between the family and the welfare state, the reconciliation of work and family, fatherhood, children, youth, the elderly, ethnic groups, sexual behaviour, marriage, divorce, the life cycle and values, just to mention few. Since the 1970s, the theoretical discussion on family and family life has been extensive and eclectic and it is impossible to go into it in detail. The underlying point to be made here is that the shift from a more or less unified view on the family and family life to diverse views meant that the family itself became a problem (Berger and Berger 1983).

Not only the diversified sociological views on the family but also the indisputable empirical diversity of family life, family types, and socio-demographic changes provoked a vivid debate over the state of families in contemporary Western societies among sociologists with different outlooks on modernity or modernist culture.

First, according to the modernist outlook, the history of modern societies is viewed as a continuous process of progress, which justifies changing ways of life. The inevitable change and breaking out of tradition that occurs causes disintegration, which, however, is impeded by reconstructing more advantageous or ‘better’ ways of life by reconstituting and co-ordinating elements of the old and new ways. The outcome is a social form that is best adapted to new conditions and it is considered ‘normal’ for that developmental stage.
of the society. Correspondingly, those forms that do not fit into the category of normal are abnormal forms that need correction (cf. Cheal 1993). Thus, the contemporary diversity of family life is expected to normalise into new, functional forms adapted to a new social order.

In contrast to modernist beliefs of continuous progress, anti-modernists claim that underlying processes of modernisation have caused the weakening of families in modern societies. According to David Popenoe (1988), the aspiration of self-fulfilment and unsuppressed individualism that are inbuilt into the modernist idea of progress is the principal reason for the decline of the family in modern societies. The family is in decline because relationships between family members are becoming deinstitutionalised, the family is becoming less effective in carrying out its functions and it is losing power over its members particularly to the state. Besides, the size of families is decreasing and families have become increasingly unstable and the individual is now valued over the family. If this trend continues, families will lose their mediating role and function between the individual and society. From an anti-modernist point of view, the decline of the family contributes to the decline of community and generates a larger social crisis (Popenoe 1988: 8–9; cf. also Becker 1981). Anti-modernism is a reaction against the forces of change and its ideas tend to gain ground in public discussion especially in times of social stress. In fact, since the mid-19th century, at intervals there have been periods of fear that the family (the idealised image of the family) is in decline or in crisis (Lamanna 2002; Marin 1994).

Post-modern thought arises also from contemporary experience of pluralism, disorder and fragmentation but, unlike modernists, post-modernists are inclined to believe that those experiences are not a temporary phase of disorganisation but rather a permanent condition (Bauman 1996; Cheal 1993). Some post-modernists like Michel Maffesoli (1995) claim that modernist progress-oriented culture was a quirk in the history of Western societies and that disorder and ‘messy’ phenomena counted as post-modern are, in fact, a return to a ‘normal’
state of affairs. Post-modernists are sceptical about the relevance of the modern worldview according to which the collective action of a community based on social ties and social exchange gives rise to shared interests and produces regular social practices (e.g. Bauman 1996). This scepticism is expressed in Jean Baudrillard’s concept of ‘the end of the social’, the underlying idea being that the possibility of the social no longer exists (Cheal 1993). Former social facts such as ‘The Family’ have come to an end and are being replaced by ‘imagined communities’, which exist only as long as members of those communities believe in them and want to be part of them (Bauman 1996). If sociability, relationships and companionship have become temporary and dependent only or at least mainly on individual belief and free will, the consequence might be the end of the family (cf. Cheal 1993; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995; Stacey 1996).

However, ‘the end of the family’ does not mean that the social relationships referred to as the family have disappeared or lost their meaning and value either to individuals or to the society. Rather, it means that the family is no longer taken for granted as having one fixed form. The nuclear family consisting of a breadwinner husband, homemaker wife and their children living together in an emotionally secure environment does not represent the clear majority, neither in statistics nor in real life (Brining 2000; Stacey 1996; Hochschild 1997). According to Ulrich Beck (1999b), in the contemporary world, there exist ‘zombie’-institutions that are institutions that are alive even though they are dead and the family is one of them. In other words, we recognise the existence of a variety of family forms and arrangements but when we talk and think about the family we tend to refer to an idea of the ‘proper’ family. Thus, the term ‘zombie-family’ means that in reality the modern nuclear family has lost its supremacy but as an ideological ideal model it is very much alive and well. These dead institutions and categories are kept alive by the paradoxical situation that although we live in a post-modern time we operate with modern tools (cf. also Bauman 1996).
Consequently, ‘the family’ as a social fact is no longer useful for purposes of sociological analysis on the family (Bernardes 1985, 1993; Gubrium and Holstein 1990). Awareness of family pluralism has resulted in a tendency to talk about family and families instead of ‘the family’, and in recommendations to abandon the whole concept of the family by replacing it, e.g., with the concept of primary relationships (Scanzoni 1987). It is very difficult to talk about the family with surrogate phrases, though. Therefore, ‘the family’ still exists in sociological analysis although it is usually accompanied by specifications to make it clear that the writer is aware of the problems attached to the concept and of the diversity of families.

Approach to Finnish and Spanish Families

This study is a macro-sociological study that approaches the family as a system or an institution related to wider systems and institutions, and to socio-historical changes. The term family institution does not refer to an assumption of the one, universal and timeless unit fulfilling clearly defined functions but rather it is a term signifying the societal view on the family and family life as distinct from ‘real’ families and from individual experiences of family life.

Consequently, the study does not examine family ‘reality’ or family life in Finland and Spain as actually experienced by everyday actors. Instead, the study approaches the family by analysing what the conception of ‘the family’ is – the prevailing idea of what the family should be (family ideology) and how these conceptions or ideas have changed over time in the two societies in question. This conception or idea of the family that is upheld by social structures such as religion, legislation, public policies and the labour market is called family ideology.

Although family ideology as such does not bear any relation to family ‘reality’ and individuals do not live their familial lives
according to the ideology, individuals and families too are upholding the family ideology. Individuals possess both ‘general’ (or ideological) and ‘specific’ concepts of the family. Individuals are able to, first, assume that there is a single type of ‘family’; second, they are able to believe that their own family life is divergent from this model and third, they remain unaware that all families may differ from the single type of family, the ideological family (Bernardes 1985: 205; cf. Beck 1999b). According to Jon Bernardes (1985: 205), we must hold these two concepts in order to reconcile personal family reality and public family ideology and to control contradictions between the familial reality and ideology that we face in our daily lives. Bernardes’ views are in relation to David Morgan’s (1975) idea of the contradictory nature of the family, which enables us to see changes in family life as products of the ideology of the family.

Accordingly, changes in family life shown by socio-demographic statistics may be interpreted as a reaction to the existing contradiction between ideology and reality. On the one hand, phenomena such as increasing cohabitation, voluntary singleness and living apart together may be seen as counter-reactions to the prevailing family ideology that is conceived as outdated and unrealistic. On the other hand, changes in family life such as increasing divorces, which are often accounted for as signs of family decline, may also be interpreted as an attempt to achieve a family and family life consonant with the prevailing family ideology. People divorce when the union does not answer the expectations and the image engendered by the ideology and try again. Furthermore, the more common the anti-ideological or anti-normative ways of arranging private and familial lives become, the more likely it is that they are eventually officially recognised and legitimised. In other words, individuals do not just adapt to norms nor is the socially held ideology unchanging.

Approaching the family as a socially and culturally maintained ideological unit or construct is a valid theoretical perspective particularly in a comparative family study (cf. Collier et al. 1982). To analyse
what kinds of conceptions social institutions and structures have promoted and why and how they have changed connects the family to a socio-historical framework; to the social, cultural, political and economic circumstances within which people arrange their intimate and familial relations and lives. Anchoring the family in the socio-historical context and acknowledging the links between the family and other social institutions and structures creates a comprehensive and versatile background for understanding and interpreting changes in family forms and life within a society and between different societies.

1.3. Comparative Research: Considering Methods and Data

Thinking in comparative terms is inherent in social science because no social phenomenon can be studied in isolation from other social phenomena (Durkheim 1982 [1895]; Øyen 1990). Nevertheless, comparative research is its own genre within the social sciences. Generally speaking, comparison involves comparing more than one case, or many variables within a case. However, the most common and widely accepted definition of comparative social scientific research is that a study is comparative when it uses comparable data from at least two societies with the aim of investigating cross-societal or cross-cultural differences and similarities. Thus, comparative research may study global, aggregate or individual-level structure or processes providing that it involves more than one society (Bollen et al. 1993; Lee 1987; Ragin 1987, 2000; Smelser 2003; Tilly 1984; Øyen 1990). The study at hand falls into the definition of comparative research, as the cases compared are countries. Macro-sociological comparison in this study means the comparison of family institutions, or more specifically properties of social systems and patterns of family practices that describe the character of family institutions and their development over time.
Objectives of Comparative Research

The most distinguishing feature that differentiates comparative research from other social research is its tendency to use macro-social attributes in explanatory statements. This tendency is closely linked to the goals of comparative research: to explain and interpret macro-level social variation (Ragin 1987: 5–6).

In empirical social research making deductions is based on John Stuart Mill’s (1843) methods for finding and establishing causalities. Although these methods have problems and they are not applicable as such, they form the logical basis for testing hypotheses. Even though it is impossible to establish a cause for a phenomenon by using Mill’s methods, they become useful in eliminating factors that under no circumstances are causes of the phenomenon under investigation. Furthermore, Mill’s rules make important statements that are of importance in comparative research: causes cannot be directly detected but they must be deduced from relationships between observed facts. Therefore, in order to find causation we need to study more than one instance or case (see e.g. Eskola 1966; Ragin 1987; Toivonen 1999).

According to Charles Ragin (1987, 2000) and Charles Tilly (1984), comparative research should not only be interested in cataloguing and explaining cross-national differences and similarities but should direct its interest also to interpreting country-specific experiences and trajectories. Thus, comparative social research analyses variation in the properties of social systems. The social systems are not the objects of the comparison but the focus of interest is instead on the properties of the system, with the primary objective being explanation: how and why the properties of social systems differ and how and why they affect human behaviour (cf. Lee 1987: 61). As an example, the observation that cohabitation is common in Finland but rare in Spain has some descriptive value but explains nothing. Therefore, our goal is to offer an explanation of why cohabitation is common in Finland but rare
in Spain and in order to do so we need to study the properties of the societies in question.

Although the interpretation and explanation of important phenomena are the principal goals of comparative research, in reality, there are several different goals for and types of inquiry within comparative macro-sociological research. Some studies aim at making predictions, testing and refining theories and identifying general patterns, and others aim at interpreting important phenomena by exploring social diversity. Furthermore, the majority of the comparative research does not have one single goal but several goals at the same time, moving from one type of research to another in the course of the research process (Bollen et al. 1993; Collier 1991; Ragin 1987, 2000).

Types of Comparative Research

Research objectives and goals are intertwined with the number of units of comparison. Accordingly, comparative social scientific research can be divided into two main methodological approaches: variable-oriented (quantitative) research operating with a large number of cases and case-oriented (qualitative) research operating with a few cases (Ragin 1987; Goldthorpe 1997; Kautto 2001).

Variable-oriented researchers study one or a small number of variables across a large number of cases and seek generalised parsimonious explanations. They prioritise generality because they are interested in testing hypotheses derived from theory. Variable-oriented methods are used to identify broad, general patterns. Case-oriented comparative research studies several variables within a few cases. Their aim is to show how different aspects mutually constitute the whole case and then to compare and contrast the different cases. Case-oriented researchers give preference to complexity and usually do not test theories per se but apply them to cases in order to interpret
them. Thus, case-oriented methods are best suited to the in-depth investigation of culturally or historically specific phenomena (Ragin 1987: 54–55; 1996: 80–81; 2000: 23, 27).

Case-oriented or qualitative comparative research can be divided further into two types according to the number of cases: qualitative case-oriented comparison with few cases and qualitative comparative analysis with a small number of cases (Ragin 1987; see also Goldstone 1997). The basic difference between these two types of qualitative comparisons is that case studies involving few cases consider the cases to be unique, whereas qualitative comparative analyses with a small number of cases emphasise similarities among types of cases and sees the specification of types (e.g. welfare state types) as a means of understanding and explaining differences (Ragin 2000: 37, 74). These two types of qualitative comparison are also said to have different goals of research. Case studies are said to look for commonalities between cases and qualitative comparative analyses are said to be interested in diversity, that is, patterns of similarities and differences within a given set of cases (King et al. 1994).

The classification of comparative research types described above is a simplification that helps us to locate a single study in the field of comparative research but it should be regarded precisely as what it is – a simplification. For instance, distinguishing between the goals of the two types of qualitative comparison, as described above, is oversimplistic. As mentioned earlier, in reality, a study often has several goals and, therefore, a case study, for example, is seldom looking only for commonalities between cases but rather both similarities and differences between societies or of properties of social systems.

In the end, there is no agreement on ‘correct’ methods of doing comparative research. There are those who advocate variable-oriented methods because they produce generalised knowledge and there are those advocating case-oriented methods because they are better suited to producing in-depth knowledge. In reality, though, quantitative and qualitative approaches are complementary to each other. Quantitative
research is good in telling us what is happening and qualitative studies are better at determining why events occur (Collier 1991; Ragin 2000). If the goal of comparative research is to explain, we need to look for answers to both what and why questions. In fact, Smelser (2003: 648) states, that the best methodological strategy is “to gain a foothold wherever we can”, meaning that comparativists ought to rely on multiple kinds of data and methods – quantitative and qualitative, hard and soft – and use and weight all of them striving to improve our understanding and explanations.

In this volume, all the comparative studies are qualitative comparisons with few cases, making use of case-oriented methods. Having identified the type of comparisons employed in the studies presented here, it is worth considering qualitative case-oriented comparative research in greater detail.

Qualitative Case-Oriented Comparison with Few Cases

The qualitative case-oriented approach has consolidated its ground within comparative research along with a growing interest in comparative historical research, which studies countries over a long period of time and in interpretive social science, which is concerned with decoding the meaning of institutions and behaviour (Collier 1991). These influences have strengthened the justification for doing comparative research with only few cases, striving for “in-depth knowledge” or “thick description”, that is, to detect the underlying meaning of phenomena, structures or processes to see how they are rooted in a particular context (Geertz 1973).

In the same spirit, Charles Tilly (1984: 77) demands that social scientists should be interested in identifying the historical and spatial context of the structures and processes under investigation because they are usually shaped by a constellation of factors (see also Rueschmeyer
and Stephens 1997). Charles Ragin follows the same line of thinking as he suggests that social scientists should endeavour to understand how different conditions combine in each case to produce the outcome in question and to take into account the qualitative changes in specific contexts (Ragin 2000: 39–40). In order to meet these goals, it is best to concentrate on only a few cases simply because managing diverse and in-depth knowledge of multiple cases is practically impossible for one researcher (Collier 1991, Ragin 1996; Tilly 1984). Or, one may have only one case like Immanuel Wallerstein in his study *The Modern World System* (1980) when the comparison is carried out historically in the sequence of time and within the case.

Although the strength of case studies is that they do justice to historical and contextual particularity, they may also raise problems of systematic comparison, causation and generalisation (cf. Goldthorpe 1997). These problems have been much discussed but no agreement has been reached on solutions. The problem of systematic comparison arises, at least, in two stages of the research process. First of all, one must decide the criteria for choosing cases. There are basically two standpoints on this issue. The one advocates choosing the ‘most similar’ cases in order to increase the capacity for generalisation and to maximize comparability (e.g. Stinchcombe 1978). Comparing few ‘most similar’ cases may lead, however, to over-determination and the study may turn out to be a regional description of a certain area (e.g. Scandinavia) rather than an in-depth comparative study (Collier 1991; Dogan and Kazancigil 1994). The other standpoint prefers a comparison of the ‘most different’ cases that aims at tracing similar processes of change. The logic is that a researcher filters out of diversity a set of common elements with great explanatory value and thereby increases the value of the generalisation from the research results. But if the cases are extremely different, there is a risk that one is unable to find any common denominator and, thus, loses all the capacity for generalisation (e.g. Prezeworski and Teune 1987; Keränen 2001).
However, we ought to recognise that notions of ‘similar’ and ‘different’ are relative. Two cases, which from one perspective are similar, may be very different from another perspective (Collier 1991).

After we have chosen the cases we must choose what aspects and features to study in order to describe and explain the phenomena of interest within a case. These choices are inevitably selective because it is practically impossible to take into account all the aspects of a whole case in all its complexity (Goldstone 1997). This raises questions whether we have chosen correctly and whether we have left something paramount out and casts doubts on the quality of our conclusions. Thomas Black (2002) states that even though a common desire of scientific investigation is to identify the causes of certain events or human conditions such as fertility decline, divorce, etc., not all relationships are necessarily causal. This is the case particularly in the social sciences, where the events and conditions tend to be so complex that it is difficult and often even impossible to identify definite cause-and-effect relationships. Therefore, it is often the case that we cannot establish causation but associations, that is, we can identify several factors that most likely together bring about the event or condition of interest. As Bollen et al. (1993) remind us, no research design is perfect and it is always possible to come up with alternative explanations for the results of an analysis.

One important issue in comparative research in general is the comparability and measurement of data. To find and collect comparable data from different countries often poses problems. Key definitions may vary across place and time, structural and cultural differences between countries result in variations in statistics, non-quantitative sources may be contradictory or incomplete, etc. Furthermore, it is not always possible or even desirable to use the same variables or qualitative sources of information for different countries. One challenge of comparative research is finding or constructing measures equally valid in different countries for, as an example, a survey question in one society may not have the same meaning in another society. There are
no ready-made solutions to these problems. One possible way is to use multiple indicators to ascertain that we are actually observing the same social structure or process in different countries. Another and essential strategy is to familiarize oneself with the different national contexts (Bollen et al. 1993; Hantrais 1996).

Comparing Finland and Spain: On Objectives, Methods and Data

In this volume, all the comparative studies are qualitative comparisons with few cases, namely Finland and Spain, making use of case-oriented methods combining both quantitative and qualitative approaches and data. The cases have been chosen following the idea of comparing the ‘most different’ cases (cf. Prezeworski and Teune 1987). Choosing the ‘most different’ cases within the West European context is justified since the two cases are examined as samples of West European societies with the aim of investigating in what way and to what degree families, their roles and their significance in different West European societies are converging or diverging.

Finland and Spain are culturally different; they represent different types of welfare states and their typical families are assumed to be very dissimilar but as cases they are not overtly different. The common denominator, which makes the cases comparable, is that they both belong to the same West European context.

The goals of the studies are to look for and explain differences and similarities between Finnish and Spanish family institutions and their change over a period of time. The analysis of the properties of the Finnish and Spanish social systems such as legislation, social policies, the labour market, housing policies, gender cultures and social and political histories form the context-specific framework that allows producing explanations and interpretations for the discovered differences and similarities in family institutions and family practices. In two studies the Finnish and Spanish cases are not only compared
to each other but also to the general West European (EU 15) situation in order to see to what degree Finland and Spain vary from the West European average and whether the variation is parallel or not. Although testing and refining theories have not been explicit goals of the studies, the process of analysing how different conditions combine in each case has led to critical accounts of theories and models connected with studies on the family.

The studies do not aim at offering generally applicable explanations and accounts nor are they able to establish causation. Instead, they establish associations by identifying several factors that most likely together cause the condition in the specific social, historical and cultural contexts. Nevertheless, the studies have general value as examples of what kinds of factors might influence also in other cases and what kinds of factors ought to be taken into account if we want to go behind general trends. Furthermore, the case studies are valuable in pointing out the weaknesses of theories and models applied in family studies.

As is customary in macro-comparative research, the data comes from secondary sources. The data used in the individual studies comprise both quantitative and qualitative data: statistics, legal codes, studies and reports. Codes of civil legislation and social policies targeted to families from the early 20th century to the end of 20th century are analysed to discover the formal and institutionalised idea of the family (family ideology) and its change (Articles 1 and 2). Value and attitude survey reports, barometers and studies are analysed first, in order to see whether and to what degree people’s views and conceptions of the family and family life are in line with the institutionalised view of the family and, second, to see to what degree people’s values and attitudes are congruent with their actual practices (Articles 2 and 3). Demographic statistics are an important source of data used to grasp the empirical diversity of family life. Demographic data collected from the 1960s to the end of 1990s was analysed in order to detect change in family practices (Articles 2, 3 and 4). As the institution of
the family and changes in family ideology and practices are shaped by a constellation of factors and particular historical trajectories, studies and statistical accounts of socio-economic developments, political developments, the labour market, education, gender culture and religious culture were examined in order to create a contextual explanatory framework.

The statistical data comprises mostly international statistics compiled by organisations such as Eurostat, the OECD, and the United Nations. This is because they tend to be standardised and, thus, their quality of comparability is usually higher than that of national statistics. The comparison of Finnish and Spanish national statistics has special problems. Due to the federal state system of Spain, versatile and detailed statistics are kept at the level of Autonomous Communities but the national-level statistics are often more limited. To collect and modify statistics of Autonomous Communities from the past thirty years into national-level accounts comparable to Finnish national-level statistics was unattainable with my resources. The time scale of the studies also posed problems concerning the data. First, national and community-level statistics would have contained data from farther back in history than international statistics but they were not comparable. Second, the further back in time the study goes the more likely it is that either of the countries in question is not included in international statistics or the data compiled in the statistics differ between the countries. Due to the above-mentioned problems, a lot of relevant and interesting statistical data had to be left out.

Another difficulty connected with data collection, analysis and comparability is differences in conceptual definitions. As an example, the term family in Finnish statistics and surveys usually refers to a nuclear family – a couple living with minor children, whereas in Spain, the term family may refer to a larger group of people related to each other but not necessarily living in the same household. For instance, unlike in Finland, mature children who do not live with their parents are often counted in the family unit. Thus, in terms of comparability,
one has to be perceptive and aware of the cultural differences when compiling and analysing data.

Nowadays, international and national surveys are numerous and valuable sources of data. By and large, international surveys are standardised and, thereby, more reliable in comparable terms than national surveys that often differ in emphasis, in the framing of questions and in the time sequences of the study. As an illustration, surveys on Finns’ values and attitudes tend to stress issues related to work, education, politics and the environment over issues related to family, family life, kin and friends, whereas the emphasis of surveys on Spaniards’ values and attitudes tends to be the reverse. Although these national differences complicate the comparative analysis, they are also an interesting source of knowledge. All in all, survey data ought to be analysed keeping in mind the case-specific contextual framework. This applies also to international surveys. Even though they are standardised and designed to be as universally applicable as possible, there is always the possibility that survey questions are not understood in the same way in different countries.

To be able to gather and select relevant and useful data, and to analyse the data in as reliable a manner as possible, one should start the research process by acquiring versatile background information concerning the countries under investigation.
2. Family and Modernisation in Finland and Spain

2.1. The Making of Modern Finland and Spain

In order to explain and understand the differences and similarities between contemporary Finland and Spain, we need to consider historical events and their long-term effects. As the core interests of this study lie in socially upheld conceptions of the family, its roles and duties, and in the relationship between the family and the state, it is pertinent to start with an historical overview of the state- and nation-building processes and socio-economic developments of Finland and Spain. These processes and developments compose a context for understanding the differences and similarities concerning family ideologies and family practices in the two countries.

Stein Rokkan’s general model of European state- and nation-building helps us to discern the underlying differences between Finland and Spain. According to Rokkan, the 16th century was an epoch-making time in the process of state formation and nation building in Europe. The Reformation, the printing press, the development of national literature, expeditions, colonialism and emerging world capitalism, the gradual decline of feudalism and the gradual emergence of the school system reinforced the emergence of nation states (Alestalo and Flora 1994; Flora et al. 1999).

Rokkan distinguishes four major preconditions that shaped the early processes of state formation and nation building: (1) variation in the relationship between the state and the Church, (2) variation between the state and economic organisations, (3) variation in the ethnic and linguistic homogeneity and heterogeneity and (4) variation in class structure with respect to the peasantry and working class. These preconditions not only shaped the early nation-state building process but they also had effects on the structural variations of the European welfare states and on the relationship between the state and the family (or individual) in the contemporary West European societies (ibids.).
From the Reformation to the Mid-20th Century

The Reformation in the first half of the 16th century split Western Europe into the Protestant north and the Catholic south. In the Protestant north and in Scandinavia, in particular, the relationship between the state and the Church was reorganised by fusing ecclesiastical and secular bureaucracies. Furthermore, the Protestant view of the construction of society assumed a complementary division of labour between the state and the Church: the state’s duty was to maintain peace and order and the Church’s duty was to educate and socialise the masses into a unified culture (Thorkildsen 1997: 138–139). The Protestant nationalisation of territorial culture favoured the mobilisation of voice ‘from below’, which was made possible by the early development of literacy and the standardisation of national languages. Thus, the rise of social awareness facilitated the public and societal involvement of the subject population (Flora et al. 1999).

Contrary to the Protestant north, the major European monarchies continued their alliances with the Roman Catholic Church, and orders such as the Jesuits played a central political and economic role especially in the Counter-Reformation territories like Spain. Due to the supra-territoriality of the Catholic Church, it did not become an agency for nation building to the same extent as the Church in the Protestant territories. Furthermore, the mobilisation of voice ‘from above’ was favoured in the domain of the Catholic Church, which kept literacy low, preserved great class differences, averted the development of popular movements and retarded the societal participation of the masses and the emergence of suffrage (Flora et al. 1999; Romero Salvadó 1999).

The early histories of Finland and Spain are very different. Spain was a seaward crusading empire with a network of old, strong and rich cities. The cities as well as the great landowners prospered due to the exploitation of the colonies and to Spain’s major role in the emerging world capitalism (Romero Salvadó 1999). In contrast, Finland was a
landward buffer, a province of Sweden until 1809 and a Grand Duchy of Russia until independence in 1917 with a predominantly small-farm agricultural economy. Finland was a peripheral region of the Swedish kingdom, of the Russian empire and of merchant city belt centre of central Europe (Alestalo and Kuhnle 1987).

The state of Spain was built up through a slow process of military-administrative unification. In the 15th century, the Spanish state grew out of a coalition of a number of Christian kingdoms fighting the same enemy, the Moors. However, the state-building process has not produced cultural integration on a mass level, first, because throughout Spanish history, the state-building process has taken place at the elite level and, second, Spain was and still is a state formed by different nations with diverse cultures, traditions and languages (Romero Salvadó 1999).

Until the early 19th century, Spain was one of the world’s largest colonial empires but its focal role in the world economy started to decline already in the 16th and 17th centuries when the core of the world’s economy shifted from southwest to northwest Europe (Wallerstein 1980). In 1898, the United States declared war on Spain following the sinking of the Battleship Maine in the Havana harbour. As a result of the Spanish-American War, Spain lost its last colonies and became a peripheral or a semi-peripheral region of Europe (ibid.). The image of a colonial empire and its power role had been the glue that held the nation together but along with The Disaster (1898), the growing demand for regional autonomy emerged especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country, the most prosperous and advanced regions of Spain. Furthermore, The Disaster led to economic decline, the growth of general popular discontent, aggravated regional and class-based inequalities, and, like elsewhere in Europe, the labour movement emerged. After 1898, Spain lived through periods of monarchy, dictatorship, short democracy, bitter civil war (1936–39) and another long dictatorship (1939–75) (Romero Salvadó 1999).

Finland first emerged as an autonomous territory in 1809, when
the Russian Tsar Alexander I established the Grand Duchy of Finland. The idea of a Finnish-speaking nation had grown during the 19th century and was finally crowned in 1906 with the introduction of universal suffrage. Only the peasantry had been Finnish-speaking and all the other estates: the clergy, the petty bourgeoisie and the exiguous aristocracy had been Swedish-speaking but now, the new democratically elected parliament was Finnish-speaking and the Swedish speakers were a minority. After the military defeat of Russia in World War I and the Bolshevik takeover, Finland declared itself independent in December 1917. Both the universal suffrage and independence resulted from the collapse of imperial authority, not from violent struggle. However, these changes led to a bitter civil war (1918) between leftist ‘Reds’ and rightist ‘Whites’. The dramatic political and class confrontation ended with the victory of the ‘Whites’ (Alapuro 1988; Østergård 1997).

The Depression between 1929 and 1933 raised societal instability, popular discontent and the rivalry between capitalism and socialism, which led to the emergence of right-wing extremism in Europe and fascist polities in several countries (Hobsbawm 1999). Right-wing extremism emerged also in Finland at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s but it did not lead to a fascist polity. The focal reason for that was the fact that instead of large estates, small farms dominated agriculture. Although the peasants first supported the right-wing extremist movement, they soon dissociated themselves from it. Small farmers benefited more from parliamentary democracy than corporatism and thus right-wing radicalism lost influence and co-operation between social democrats and the bourgeoisie started. Since the 1930s, the political and social consensus has been remarkable in Finland compared to many other West European societies (cf. Alapuro 1988).

In Spain, however, the social and economic disturbances led to a bitter civil war (1936–39), which ended in the victory of traditional Falangists and General Franco in 1939. Franco’s authoritarian regime aimed to stop the revolt of the lower classes and reformist
intelligentsia and to revive the great Spain. The means to achieve the aims were cultural standardisation, a policy of autarchy (economic self-sufficiency) and National Catholicism. Regional cultural differences were banned and ignored. The state declared the Catholic identity of Spain and the Church justified the existence of the authoritarian regime. Catholicism was declared as the official religion of the nation and legislation, education and the media were determined and largely controlled by the Church and Catholic orthodoxy. However, both the agenda of cultural standardisation and of self-sufficient economy failed; regional identities and cultures remained strong and the state was in bankruptcy by 1959 (Romero Salvadó 1999; Shubert 1992).

Returning to Rokkan’s model, there are several factors in the Finnish and Spanish histories that are reflected in the contemporary relationship between the state and the family (or individual) and in the prevailing types of welfare states. First of all, the early fusion of ecclesiastical and secular bureaucracies and Protestant nationalisation in Finland, and the fewness of ethnic differences explain the relatively high degree of cultural homogeneity. Furthermore, the fusion led to early ‘stateness’ in services such as education, child care, and health and welfare, which largely explains the universalism of the welfare state. The relative cultural and linguistic homogeneity also enforced the emergence of a unitary political system and social and political consensus (Alestalo and Flora 1994; Flora et al. 1999).

In Catholic Spain the Church played a central political and economic role for a long time (until the 1960s). The Church belonged to the elite and remained the property of the wealthy and, therefore, did not act as an agent integrating the masses into a unified culture (Shubert 1992). The Church also retained its control over services in education, health and welfare and, thus, retarded the development of public services. The great linguistic, cultural and regional differences in Spain have always been strong and have survived even the forced attempts at standardisation. This heterogeneity has led to a federal political system, which has contributed to the fragmented structure of
the welfare state (Alestalo and Flora 1994; Flora et al. 1999).

In Finland, the unitary state structure, relative religious and linguistic homogeneity, low concentration of landholdings, the absence of feudalistic structures and early emergence of the societal involvement of the masses were factors that helped equalise class differences. In Spain, however, the federal state structure, linguistic, cultural, economic and social regional heterogeneity, the high concentration of landholdings and late emergence of the societal involvement of the masses have upheld both class and regional differences (cf. Alestalo and Flora 1994; Shubert 1992).

In Spain, the tempestuous political and social history, the thirty-six years of continuous conservative and pervasive authoritarianism and the tradition of elitism and oligarchy resulted in deep distrust toward the state. The state has been conceived as an apparatus of the elite to control the people and, therefore, neither the relation between the state and the people nor the welfare state has developed in the same manner as in independent Finland, where the state has been conceived as the people’s ally, not its enemy.

At a Gallop to Modernization: From the 1960s to the end of the 1990s

While the ‘early’ histories of Finland and Spain have been very different, the more recent history shows some similarities; since the 1960s, processes of social change and modernisation have been remarkably fast in both countries. The development of their industrial structure has been almost identical. Until the 1960s, the majority of Finns and Spaniards earned their living in the agricultural sector but as Table 2 indicates, agriculture was quickly replaced by industry and the service sector, in particular. Characteristic of both Finland and Spain was that jobs in industry and services increased simultaneously and the shift to a service society was swift (Therborn 1995; Niemelä et al. 1998). The non-agricultural population grew fast and by 1970 in
Finland and by 1980 in Spain, the majority of all employees worked in the service sector (see Table 2).

Rapid changes in the industrial structure in Finland after the Second World War and particularly in the 1960s had partly to do with changes in agricultural policy; support for small farms ceased as the aim was to decrease their number and limit agricultural overproduction (Luokkaprojekti 1984). Second, the postwar reconstruction and war indemnities to the Soviet Union after the war boosted heavy industry and foreign trade, which fuelled economic growth and the development of public and private services in the 1960s. As a consequence, the countryside emptied as people moved to urban centres (see Table 2). However, industry and services could not take in all the new labour force, which is why Finns emigrated to Sweden. Stemming from the rapid structural change, the new working class and the new highly educated urban middle class, largely made up of those of rural origin, emerged (ibid.; Melin 1999).

In Spain, the state’s bankruptcy and the end of the Church’s alliance with the authoritarian regime at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s started the liberalisation process that led to extremely rapid but regionally unequal economic growth based on foreign investments, tourism and emigration. Until the 1960s government had supported the rural way of life but now urbanisation and industrialisation were encouraged. Simultaneously, agriculture was modernised and the need for the rural labour force in the *latifundios* declined, as did the number of small farms. This led to massive internal migration from the countryside to urban centres and to emigration to central Europe (see Table 2). A new urban middle-class emerged, as did the new working class made up of the excess rural population (Lannon 1995; Shubert 1992).

One important factor behind the changes in the class structure in both countries was the increased enrolment in education. Since the early 1960s, the number of students, particularly those studying in universities and colleges, has increased in both countries. However,
at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, the relative number of students was considerably higher in Finland than in Spain. Nowadays the difference has virtually disappeared (see Table 2). In addition to the increased numbers of students, female labour force participation has increased as well. In Spain, the increase has been considerable, as the female labour force has almost doubled since 1960. Nevertheless, it has still not reached the level that Finland had already in the 1960s (see Table 2).

During the period reviewed, the standard of living rose fast in both countries as the GDP per capita in the table indicates. The Finnish and Spanish economies boomed until the oil crisis in 1973. In Finland, the fast development from the 1950s to the early 1970s raised the economic level close to that of other Scandinavian countries. On average, however, the economic development in Finland has been more uneven than in most other Western countries (Alestalo and Kuhnle 1987). In Spain, the latter part of the 1970s was a time of instability due to the effects of the oil crisis but also due to the transition from dictatorship to democracy. Economic growth stopped and unemployment rose to an unparalleled level (see Table 2), largely owing to the dissolution of the Francoist system of secured jobs for men and the marriage bar for women (Niemelä et al. 1998; Romero Salvadó 1999).

In both countries, one of the main strategies for coping with the recession was to develop the public sector. The amount of public expenditure of the gross domestic product increased fast in the latter part of the 1970s as did social security transfers (Niemelä et al. 1998) (see Table 2). The growing public sector employed especially women, which increased women’s employment in the service sector. By the year 2000, around 80 percent of employed women both in Finland and Spain worked in services (OECD 2002).

In the 1980s the Finnish economy grew steadily, the public sector grew further and the level of social security and services were
### TABLE 2. Indicators of socio-economic change in Finland and Spain 1960–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian employment by sector (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultureª</td>
<td>35² 23 13 8 6</td>
<td>40² 30 19 12 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>32² 35 35 31 28</td>
<td>33² 37 36 33 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>33³ 42 52 61 66</td>
<td>27² 33 45 55 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 100 100 100</td>
<td>100 100 100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage earners and salaried employees as % of all activities:</td>
<td>66² 76 83 85 –</td>
<td>61² 64 69 73 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female labour force as % of total labour force</td>
<td>44 43³ 47⁶ 47 48</td>
<td>22 23³ 27⁶ 35 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed as % of total labour force</td>
<td>1.4 3.8 5.0 3.4 9.7</td>
<td>2.4 2.9 21.1 16.9 13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population as % of total populationb</td>
<td>– 58⁴ 60 61 67 –</td>
<td>– 69⁴ 73 75 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure on social protection as % of GDPd</td>
<td>– – – 30⁴ 25 –</td>
<td>– – – 21⁴ 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security transfers as % of GDPe</td>
<td>5 8³ 15⁶ 16 24⁴</td>
<td>2 8³ 16⁶ 16 17³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students per 100 000 habitantsf</td>
<td>240¹ 326³ 506⁵ 2577⁷ 3326⁹</td>
<td>144¹ 195³ 238⁶ 1818⁷ 3137⁹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


ª Includes forestry, hunting and fishing.

b Each country sets its own definitions of ‘urban agglomeration’ usually varying from a few hundred to more than 10 000 inhabitants. A wide range of definitions makes data comparability difficult. However, this indicator evinces how the population has shifted to the urban way of life (see United Nations 2001b).

c The Geary-Khamis method is the main methodology of purchasing power parity (PPP) calculations. It aims at securing transitivity in calculations of price ratios among countries. The PPP for each country is indicated as a ratio of the domestic price to the international price of the same product or service (see Maddison 2001).

d Social protection encompasses all action by public and private bodies to relieve households and individuals of the burden of risks and needs associated with old age, sickness, childbearing and family, disability, unemployment etc.

e Social security transfers consist of social security benefits for sickness, old age, family allowance, etc., social assistance grants and unfunded employee welfare benefits paid by the general government (see OECD 1997a).

f Students studying in universities and colleges.

intensely developed. But, in the early 1990s, Finnish society faced an unequalled economic recession. The decade was characterised by a banking crisis, the collapse of Soviet trade and mass unemployment (Melin 1998). As Table 2 shows, the unemployment rate in Finland was 3.4 per cent in 1990 but within three years it grew to almost 22 percent, which was very close to the unemployment rate of Spain. Even though Finland came through the recession in the mid-1990s, unemployment remained high and kept the public economy imbalanced and public expenditures growing. This and joining the EU in 1995 caused pressures to cut back public expenditure. As a consequence, Finnish social security systems became a bit more earnings-related and means-tested than before. However, the cutbacks did not change the foundation of the Finnish welfare state, based on the principle of universality (Niemelä et al. 1998).

Although liberalisation and modernisation in Spain started before Franco’s death in 1975, the explosion of societal changes there happened along with democratisation. The basis of the change was the new constitution of 1978 that was based on egalitarian principles and granted universal suffrage, freedom of ideology and religion and abolished the Church’s formal role in state affairs (Romero Salvadó 1999; see Article 1). The late 1970s and 1980s were first and foremost a time of institutional reformation and, thus, social and economic modernisation was left in the background. Unemployment remained high, which even the so-called ‘second economic miracle’ of the 1980s could not ease and the social security system and social services were not renewed, with the exception of the health care system. Spain was also not saved from the recession of the 1990s either. Therefore, the focus in the 1990s was the reformation of the economy, and the development of the welfare state was lagging behind. In the second half of the 1990s the aim of the economic modernisation was to modernise the industrial sector and to create a close linkage with the EU (Spain joined the EU in 1986). The aim of the social modernisation was to reach the West European social security level
and to move towards a universal system. However, like in Finland, the recession left behind high unemployment, an imbalanced public economy and a retrenchment policy (Niemelä et al. 1998).

The recession of the early 1990s caused growth in the total expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP both in Finland and Spain. The peak in both countries and in the EU region in general took place in 1993, when the total expenditure on social protection was around 35 percent of GDP in Finland, 24 percent in Spain and around 29 percent in EU countries on average. The rise was exceptionally large in Finland due to a slowdown in GDP growth and due to a voluminous increase in unemployment benefits, in particular. Similarly, the decline in the total expenditure on social protection since 1996 has been most marked in Finland (see Table 2) (Eurostat 2003). With regards to the allocation of social protection in Finland and Spain, the largest proportion is linked to old-age and survivor functions and to sickness and health care due to the ageing of the population. However, there is a clear difference concerning the social protection of families and children. Expenditure targeting families and children was ca. 13 percent of total social benefits in Finland in 2000 whereas the corresponding share in Spain was less than 3 percent (ca. 8% in the EU-15) (ibid.). Furthermore, the level of social services such as childcare services is considerably higher in Finland than in Spain.

Regardless of the existing differences, the resemblance between European countries and between Finland and Spain is much greater today than a century ago. Although the modernisation process started later in the peripheries like Finland and Spain, they caught up to the core countries remarkably fast. During the decades following the Second World War, differences in the economic and political structure, standard of living and educational level have declined between West European countries (cf. Alestalo and Flora 1994). Furthermore, parallel, although not identical, development has occurred also in the fields of civil legislation, social policy, gender roles, demographic
transformation and values and attitudes towards gender roles, intimate relationships and the family, as will be seen in the following chapters.

2.2. Understanding Family Ideology

One dimension of the family institution is that it is an ideological construct. In this study, family ideology is understood to be created and upheld by societal institutions such as legislation, public policies, religion, etc. In other words, family ideology does not necessarily correspond to the reality of family formation, family structure and family life but, rather, it represents the culturally and socially shared conception of what The Family is or ought to be.

First, Finnish and Spanish family ideologies are viewed by studying the laws on marriage and their main reforms within the period from the early 20th century to the present. Detailed analyses of developments in civil legislation are presented in Articles 1 and 2.

Second, public policies targeted to families are reviewed in order to see how public policy defines the family and how these definitions are related to the definitions found in the civil legislation. Public policies and their evolvement are analysed in Articles 1 and 3.

The exploration of the elements of family ideologies ends with the discussion of gender relations and how they have evolved during the 20th century in Finland and Spain. The role and status of women, in particular, has affected especially the development of public policies targeted on families and, thus, the conceptions of the family. Gender relations and the social status of women are themes that are discussed in all the original articles from varying perspectives. Here, however, the social status of women as one of the elements in understanding family ideology is discussed in more detail than has been possible in the original articles.

Legal codes are an important source of data for the study of modern societies because the development of legal codes reflects
the development of societies and social institutions: the relationship between the state and the Church, between secular and ecclesiastical bureaucracies, emergence of political rights, development of women’s rights, progression of secularisation and individualism, and changes in the family practices (cf. Durkheim 188812 cited in Lamanna 2002: 75). Emile Durkheim also pointed out that the analysis of law is an important method of studying the family because the law represents or comprises the established customs that are indicators of family forms and practices. Durkheim valued the objectivity of the legal codes and, therefore, regarded them as valuable documents in studying the family and family practices (Lamanna 2002: 75).

Following Durkheim, this study sees the analysis of legal codes as an important method of studying the family as an institution. The legislation on marriage and family reflects the idea of the family and intimate relations that prevail in the given society at a given time but it does not depict the real complexity of family forms and practices. Thus, it is important to recognize that legalistic definitions of the family have limitations. For example, everyday relationships between spouses or between parents and children may be very different than what is expected in stipulated codes. Furthermore, determining the family in terms of legal codes excludes all those family forms and living arrangements that do not exist in coded law.

The realm of the personal is also an arena of public policy. The state has impinged on the personal both intentionally and unintentionally (Castles 1998: 248–249). Thus public policies affect families both in ideological and practical terms. In this thesis Finnish and Spanish ‘family policies’ are studied from the viewpoint of what kinds of conceptions of family they reflected during the 20th century and how they have boosted these conceptions. However, neither in the past

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nor today does an explicit family policy exist in Finland or Spain. The measures that affect families are not exclusively dedicated to families but to social provision in general: taxation, health care, housing, childcare, etc. Thus, it is not a question of controlling the family *per se* but rather intervening in people’s everyday lives through the family. The critics of state interventionism claim that the welfare state and government have undermined the role and functioning of the family as the basic economic and social unit (ibid.). Although such critiques are deeply morally charged, undoubtedly, public policy has affected the family as an institution and moulded the ideology of the family both explicitly and implicitly.

*Civil Legislation on Marriage and the Family*

Until the 1920s and early 1930s, marriage and family were founded on Christian values and patriarchal principles in both countries. Religious marriage was the only legitimate form of a relationship between a man and a woman and the basis of the family. Marriage was a sacrament, practically indissoluble, and its prime purpose was procreation. The husband was the guardian of the children, the wife, other members of the household and the property (see Articles 1 and 2).

The secularisation and modernisation process of legislative principles concerning marriage and the family started gradually in the 1920s and 1930s both in Finland and Spain. The patriarchal tradition was disrupted by the idea of love marriage as the basis of the family and by the liberal voices demanding equality. Consequently, by the early 1930s, the legislation in Finland and Spain made spouses equal and granted juridical independence to married women. Civil marriage had become an option and divorce was legally possible, although rare (Alberdi 1995; Mahkonen 1978). In fact, family legislation in Spain during the short-lived Second Republic (1931–36) was the most liberal and egalitarian in Europe (Alberdi 1995) (see Synopsis 1 and Articles 1 and 2).
However, when General Franco came into power in 1939, the legislation on marriage and the family became subjected to the Catholic Church and turned back to the Christian and patriarchal principles (see Synopsis 1). Civil marriage for baptised Catholics became illegal as did divorce, abortion and the sale and use of contraception. Married women lost their juridical independence and custody of their children. This remained the state of affairs until the dawn of democracy in the mid-1970s. The reform of the Civil Code of 1975 established the equal rights of both husband and wife and eliminated the references on the authority of the husband with regard to the wife and on the necessity of licences or authorisations held by the husband concerning the wife for almost anything from a personal bank account to wage work (Piconó-Novales 1997). The 1978 Constitution that was based on equality and religious liberty brought along several reforms on civil legislation during the late 1970s and 1980s, such as civil marriage also for Catholics in 1979 and (re)legalisation of divorce in 1981. In Finland, the legislation has not undergone such dramatic changes as in Spain. The main change since the end of the 1920s has been the liberalization of the law on divorce (see Synopsis 1). The developments of Finnish and Spanish civil legislation on marriage and the family during the 20th century are discussed in more detail in Articles 1 and 2.

The principles of the contemporary legislation on marriage are similar in both countries. The general statutes on who may marry whom, on the absence of grounds for disqualification and the contract of marriage are the same. Both Finnish and Spanish law states that the spouses are equal, they should show mutual trust and act together for the best of the family. Unlike the Spanish law that states that the spouses are obliged to live together\(^\text{13}\), the Finnish law does not regulate the living arrangements of a married couple. However, the Finnish law distinctly states the individual right of spouses to make decision

\(^{13}\) Código Civil 1889: Libro I: Título IV, Capítulo V, Artículo 68
concerning wage work and other activities outside the family.\textsuperscript{14}

The main difference between Finnish and Spanish contemporary legislations is found in laws on divorce. The Finnish divorce law is one of the most liberal in Europe: marriage can be dissolved without the other party’s consent and without an announced reason after a six-month reconsideration period \citep{Avioliittolaki1929}. The Spanish divorce law, in contrast, is among the strictest in Europe. Divorce cannot be requested directly neither in the case of mutual agreement nor in the case of the fault of the other spouse. Before the divorce is granted, the spouses need to be officially separated for 1 to 5 years. Besides the actual divorce, the law also include the juridical systems of separation and nullity \citep{Piconto-Novales1997} (See Articles 1 and 2).

As equality, individuality and individual freedom have gained more emphasis, the society has become more permissive towards different lifestyles. Even though the traditional marriage has retained its dominance as a form of relationship, living together in a marriage-like relationship has increased in popularity and become more and more accepted. Similarly, same-sex couples have become more visible. Accordingly, the European parliament accepted a resolution on equal rights of homosexual and lesbian couples in the European Union in 1994. According to the European parliament, the EU member countries should abolish the legal obstacles of same-sex marriages or marriage-like legal measures\textsuperscript{17}.

As Synopsis 1 shows, some autonomous communities of Spain were ahead of Finland in the matter of formalising same-sex relationships. The law on the union of stable and unmarried couples was enacted in the Autonomous Community of Catalonia in 1998 and in Aragon in 1999. The corresponding law was enacted in Finland in 2001.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Avioliittolaki1929} Avioliittolaki 1929/234, I osa, 1.luku, 2§.
\bibitem{Avioliittolaki1929} Avioliittolaki 1929/234, I osa, 6. luku, 25–32§.
\bibitem{CódigoCivil1889} Código Civil 1889: Libro I: Título IV, Capítulos VI–VIII, Artículos 73–89.
\bibitem{Hallituksenesitys} Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laaksi virallistetusta parisuhteesta 15.12.2000.
\end{thebibliography}
difference is that in Spain the law applies to same-sex couples and to heterosexual couples whereas in Finland, the law applies only to same-sex couples. In fact, no specific law in Finnish legislation regulates heterosexual cohabitation. In both countries, the law on registered couples grants rights and obligations equal to married heterosexual couples concerning e.g. maintenance, inheritance, widow’s pension and the break-up of the union. However, in both countries, same-sex couples were denied the right to adopt children (ibid.).

Regulation of marriage has changed during the 20th century. In legal terms, the exigency of life-long marriage has been abandoned as divorce has become possible and, later, easier to attain. Fundamental and individual rights have become the core of civil legislation and thus, the authority of the state and the society over private life has diminished remarkably. The articulated function of intimate relationships and the family has changed too. While the primary function and purpose of marriage was procreation in the early 20th century (and even later in Spain), now the articulated function of marriage or a marriage-like relationship is to produce security, affection and emotional satisfaction, and a common household and economic community. Both heterosexual and same-sex partnerships fulfil these functions and, therefore, the law has to guarantee equal rights regardless of sexual orientation.

In spite of the amendments concerning the function and purpose of intimate relationships and the principled increase in permissiveness towards different relationships, the definition of the family is strongly based on the heterosexual married couple and their own or adopted children. The fact that same-sex couples were denied the right to adopt is one indication of this. The public and parliamentary discussions around the law on registered couples in Finland, Spain

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18 Laki virallistetusta parisuhteesta 2001/950.
19 Lakivaliokunnan mietintö 15/2001 vp.
# Synopsis 1. Main developments of legislation on marriage in Finland and Spain during the 20th century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finland</th>
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<td><strong>The early 20th century</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Religious marriage</td>
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<td>- Husband’s dominance</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Wife a juridical minor</td>
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<td>- Separation, annulment and divorce (rare) on Church’s decision</td>
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<td><strong>1917 Marriage Act</strong></td>
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<td>- Civil marriage</td>
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<td><strong>1929 Marriage Act</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Equality of spouses</td>
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<td>- Wife’s juridical independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Divorce: separation of min. one year, fault grounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Joint parental custody</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1987 Marriage Act</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Divorce without announced reason and consent after six months reconsideration period</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2001 Law on registered couples</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Same-sex couples</td>
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<td>- Right to register the relationship</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Rights and obligations equal to married couples concerning maintenance, inheritance, widow’s pension and break-up of the union</td>
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<td>- No right for adoption</td>
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<td>- Separation and annulment on Church’s decision</td>
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<td><strong>1931–1936 The Second Republic</strong></td>
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<td>- 1931 Constitution</td>
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<td>- Equality of spouses</td>
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<td>- Wife’s juridical independence</td>
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<td>- Civil marriage</td>
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<td>- Divorce by consent</td>
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<td><strong>1939–1975 Franco’s period</strong></td>
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<td>- 1889 Civil Code</td>
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<td>- Only religious marriage for Catholics</td>
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<td>- Husband’s dominance</td>
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<td>- Wife a juridical minor</td>
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<td>- Divorce illegal</td>
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<td><strong>Democracy 1975</strong></td>
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<td>- 1978 Constitution, Civil Code reforms 1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Equality of spouses</td>
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<td>- Wife’s juridical independence</td>
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<td>- Civil marriage</td>
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<td>- Joint parental custody</td>
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<td><strong>1981 Divorce law</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Divorce by mutual agreement or by fault grounds after a period of legal separation</td>
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<td><strong>1998 (Catalonia), 1999 (Aragon)</strong></td>
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and many other European societies demonstrated how sensitive issues marriage and the family are and how traditional our conceptions of the family are. As an example, in Finland, those who opposed the law on registered couples and many of them who were in favour of it, emphasised that heterosexual marriage is the cornerstone of the society and the foundation of the family, which is the basic unit of the society. Therefore, marriage between a man and a woman should be conceived as the fundamental form of living together (see footnote 15).

The legal definition of the family and the view on who constitutes the family differs between Finland and Spain when we consider the maintenance liability. According to the Finnish law on marriage, both spouses must participate to the best of their abilities in the family household and the maintenance of the spouse. The spousal maintenance includes meeting both the common and personal needs.\(^{20}\) Parents are accountable for their children’s maintenance until the child is 18 years old. However, parents should pay for the education of their major children, if considered reasonable\(^{21}\). According to the Spanish Civil Code, spouses are liable for the maintenance of each other and of their minor children. Parents are also accountable for paying for their major children’s education. Furthermore, major children are accountable for the maintenance of their parents if the need arises. Reciprocity between spouses, parents and children and major children and their parents includes subsistence, habitation, clothing and medical assistance (alimentos amplios, broad support). Siblings are also liable for providing the most basic necessities to each other (alimento restrigido, restricted support) if there is temporary and exceptional need\(^{22}\) (see Articles 1 and 2).

\(^{20}\) Avioliittolaki 1929/234, II osa, 4.luku, 46 §.
\(^{21}\) Laki lapsen elatuksesta 1975/704, 1. luku, 1–3 §.
\(^{22}\) Código Civil 1889: Libro I: TítuloVI, Artículos 142–143.
In legal terms, the family in Finland is clearly defined as a nuclear family where the maintenance liability goes from one spouse to another and from parents to their (minor) children. The Spanish definition of the family is broader, extending reciprocal legal responsibilities to siblings and to major children and their parents.

Public Policy and Definitions of the Family

In pre-modern, agrarian society the family, kin and the house were the source of social security. As the incipient industrialisation and urbanisation changed the social and economic structure and the communal safety nets gradually broke down in the latter part of the 19th and in the early 20th centuries, public debate related to the family started. At the same time, liberalism and the accent on individual responsibility of one’s maintenance displaced the traditional idea of joint liability and charity (cf. Lamanna 2002; Marin 1994; Mitterauer and Sieder 1982).

The social effects of the modernizing society raised concerns about morality and decency. As the family was seen as the bedrock of the society, the maintenance of morality and decency was entrusted to the family and to women especially. In Finland, as in many other European societies, these developments and circumstances made the personal a realm of state intervention. However, public policies at the time were a last resort to keep alive the poor who were not able to provide for themselves and their families (Takala 1992). In Spain, however, the social policy measures were directed to industrial workers with low incomes and the Catholic Church and private organizations were mainly responsible for the general poor relief (Guillén 1997). In both countries, the focus of the social policy was rather on material relief for the underprivileged than on the wellbeing and functioning of the family. According to the liberalist principle of personal liability, a person ought not start a family unless he was able to provide for it.
Thus, both men and women were relatively old when marrying for the first time (the European average for women was 23–24 years of age) and the number of bachelors and spinsters was high. This so-called West European marriage model applied to Finland, Spain and to most of the West European countries and had a negative effect on marital fertility in particular (Goody 2000; Mitterauer and Sieder 1982; cf. Article 4).

Accordingly, due to the decline of fertility, the family became the central topic of societal and political debate all over Western Europe in the first half of the 20th century. The so-called fertility transition is usually located in the period from the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries till the turn of the 1930s and 1940s. In Finland, the start of the transition on the national level is located in the year 1910 and in Spain in the year 1918. These were the years when marital fertility had decreased by ten percent (Notkola 1994).

This fertility decline was the impetus for public policies targeted to families. In between the World Wars, public concern in Europe focused on the function and reproductive abilities of the family. Nevertheless, the policy measures targeting families in Finland were in the character of poor relief until 1948, when the general child allowance was introduced, and until 1949, when all mothers started to receive the maternity grant regardless of their socio-economic position (Forssén 1998; see Synopsis 2). In Spain, the family programme was developed during Franco’s rule (1939–1975). The family programme was wide-ranging, consisting of a large number of different family benefits, was gender-specific, promoting motherhood, and was aimed at reinforcing the traditional patriarchal family and strengthening the solidarity between kin members (Naldini 2000). Most of the social policy programmes targeted to families were designed only for employees and civil servants and most of the Spaniards had to rely on the charity of the Church and private organizations in times of need (Valiente 1997). Historical developments in Finnish and Spanish policies targeted to families are analysed in more detail in Article 1.
During the 1930s and 1940s, ‘family policy’ reflected pro-natalist population politics both in Finland and Spain. People were encouraged to marry and have children. In Spain, the population politics also included a strong accent on antifeminism (see Synopsis 2). Francoist policies pressed women into motherhood and homemaking, accentuated the male breadwinner – female homemaker type of family and encouraged people to have large families (Meil 1994; Naldini 2000; Valiente 1997) (for more details see Article 1). An amendment to ‘family policies’ in 1966 combined the elements of previous family programmes into one package: monthly payments for each dependent child, for a dependent spouse and one-off payments for marriage and at the birth of each child (see Synopsis 2). The specific feature of Spanish family policy and the family allowance system, in particular, was the extension of benefits beyond the nuclear family to dependent grandchildren and siblings (Naldini 2000).  

In Finland, the period of pro-natalist population politics was not as long as in Spain and it did not include such an imposition of the male breadwinner – female homemaker – family model. However, similar to Spain, the public ambition was to boost the formation of new families by helping young and not yet self-sufficient people to settle down and produce new citizens and thus rebuild the nation battered by the War (see Synopsis 2 and Article 1 for more details).

At the turn of the 1940s and 1950s, the accent on population politics in public policies targeted at families started to cease in Finland and universalism gradually gained ground. The policy measures endeavoured to equalise the costs of raising children for each family and second, to ensure that the children would not lower the consumption ability of families. Furthermore, there was a move from

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23 The extension of family allowances beyond the dependent children and spouse was not unique to Spain. In Italy, too, the family allowances covered parents and in-laws with little or no income in addition to dependent spouses and children (Naldini 2000).
income-bound benefits to universal benefits and the accent on poor relief was, once and for all, replaced by an emphasis on social rights based on citizenship. The child allowance (1948) was the first measure that followed the new principles. However, from early 1950s to the early 1970s the average child allowance declined both in real value and in relation to wages due to the lack of index adjustment (Alestalo and Uusitalo 1986). Unlike in Spain and following the Scandinavian model, the child allowance in Finland rejected the familistic model in which the allowance is paid to the principal breadwinner along with his salary. Thus, the single (male) provider model was abandoned (Forssén 1998; Takala 1992).

In the course of the 1960s and, particularly, in the 1970s, the conception of the family that was characteristic of population politics gradually broke down in West European societies. The two-earner family increasingly replaced the breadwinner husband – homemaker wife type of family as married women’s labour force participation increased. Families became smaller in size and divorces, remarriages, premarital cohabitation and lone parenthood became more common. These changes affected public policies target families in varying ways and at a varying pace in different countries.

Since the 1970s, two salient changes in the emphasis of public policies in Finland took place: the activation of the role of the father and the reconciliation of wage work and the family (see Synopsis 2). Since then, Finnish public policy targeted at families has been characterized by strong efforts to secure women’s possibilities to work outside the home. It has also enabled parents to choose the form of day care for their children and granted the right to public day care.

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24 At first the allowance was paid for children under age 16 but since then there have been several amendments. In 1962, the allowance was staggered according to the number of children. An additional supplement for children under age 3 was included in 1973 and 16-year-olds were included in 1986. In 1994, the supplement for children under age 3 was discontinued (Forssén 1998).
The child home care allowance introduced in 1985 was the measure that recognized women’s roles both as wage workers and mothers and, at the same time, encouraged women to combine childbearing and a professional career. However, during the 1990s, the ‘family friendly’ policies suffered serious setbacks: tax deductions related to ‘family policy’ were discontinued, day-care payments rose, the child home care allowance was cut and the taxation on the allowance tightened in relation to income taxation. Even though the amount of the child allowance has since been raised significantly and a supplement for single parents has been established, the position of the family in public policies has deteriorated (cf. Hiilamo 2000). Finnish ‘family friendly’ policies of the latter part of the 20th century are discussed in Articles 1 and 3.

In Spain, the pro-natalist policies broke only in the emergence of democracy in the mid-1970s. After the fall of the authoritarian regime, no forms of policies targeted at families were developed. Most programmes inherited from Franco’s time remained unchanged until the mid-1980s. Their levels were seldom updated and therefore, due to inflation, by that time their economic importance had become irrelevant. In 1985, the most openly antifeminist and pro-natalist benefits were cancelled. (see Synopsis 2).

In Spain, family issues had been treated solely as labour policy connected to ‘worker status’ but in the 1990s, the family became an issue of social policy debate. Some modifications of policy measures targeting families took place but the reforms aimed at preventing poverty, not developing services for families or promoting the well-being of families in general. Contributory child allowances became means-tested and a non-contributory means-tested child allowance was established within the social security system. In addition, families became entitled to tax relief for each dependent child and for childcare expenses in certain circumstances (since 1992) (Guillén 1997; see Synopsis 2).
SYNOPSIS 2. Main developments of public policies targeting families in Finland and Spain during the 20th century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FINLAND</th>
<th>SPAIN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1930s–1940s: Period of pro-natalist population politics</strong></td>
<td><strong>1930s–1970s Period of pro-natalist population politics</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• 1937 Maternity grant (for poor mothers)</td>
<td>• 1938 Family allowance (Subsidio familiar, for employees and civil servants)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 1943 In-kind benefit to large, indigent families (discontinued 1974)</td>
<td>• 1941 Loans to married couples</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 1944 Home-making loans to young married couples (no longer in force)</td>
<td>• 1945 Bonus for dependent family members (Plus de cargas familiares, for employees)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 1947 Family wage to employees with dependent children (in effect only one year)</td>
<td>• 1948 One-off payment for marriage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Late 1940s–1960s: Shift to universal social rights</td>
<td>• 1954 Family allowance (Ayuda familiar, replaced family programmes for civil servants)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 1948 General child allowance (several later amendments)</td>
<td>• 1966 Unification of all past family programmes</td>
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<td>• 1949 Need assessment of maternity grant removed</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 1964 Maternity allowance</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1970s–1990s: Reconciliation of work and family</strong></td>
<td><strong>1980s–1990s: Separation from authoritarian policies and trend towards reconciliation of work and family</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1973 Public childcare</td>
<td>• 1985 Monthly payment for dependent spouse abolished</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 1978 Paternity leave</td>
<td>• 1985 One-off payment for marriage and at the birth of the child abolished</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 1980 Child home care support (1985 Child home care allowance-replaced by care allowance system 1997)</td>
<td>• 1989 Maternity leave extended</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 1985 Child home care leave</td>
<td>• 1989 Parental leave</td>
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<td>• 1985 Parental leave</td>
<td>• 1989 Public child care (pre-school) for children aged 3–6</td>
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<td>• 1988 Partial child care leave</td>
<td>• 1990 Means-tested contributory child allowance</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 1990 Day care a subjective right for all children under age 3</td>
<td>• 1990 Non-contributory means-tested child allowance</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 1991 The right to shorter workday during a child’s first school year</td>
<td>• 1992 Tax relief for dependent children and for child care expenses</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 1994 Tax deductions for children discontinued</td>
<td>• 1999 Dismissals related to use of family leaves, pregnancy and maternity became illegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1996 Day care a subjective right for all children under age 7</td>
<td>• 1999 The right of a mother to transfer 10 weeks out of the 16 weeks maternity leave to the father</td>
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Since democratization, most political and social actors in Spain have strongly avoided being active in the area of policies targeted to families as a rejection of the authoritarian past. Feminists in Spain, more so than in other countries, have also identified ‘family friendly’ policies as conservative and anti-feminist, intended to uphold the traditional family model. Furthermore, the economic crisis affected welfare state reform through the need to cut the costs of social security and services (Naldini 2000; Valiente 1997). The societal changes, e.g. the continually growing labour force participation of women and the increase of two-earner families, have forced policy-makers to pay attention especially to the reconciliation of family and work. Therefore, some reforms concerning leave arrangements in particular were adopted in the late 1980s and during the 1990s (see Synopsis 2). But, the fact that all the leaves (parental leave, family leave, reduced working time) except maternity leave are unpaid reduces the effectiveness of the leave schemes in reconciling family and work. Spanish public policies targeting families are discussed in Articles 1 and 3.

According to the definitions of pro-natalist policies, the family was composed of a breadwinner husband, a homemaker wife and their children and the duty and function of the family was to produce and socialise new citizens and maintain morality and decency. In both countries, the aim of increasing population was connected to bolstering economy and, above all, to reviving the nation. In Finland, encouraging people to marry and have children by policy measures was related to the recuperation from the War and, in Spain, the Franco regime used public policies as one of the means to recreate the great Spain (see chapter 2.1.). Thus, in both countries, getting married, giving birth and rearing children were patriotic duties especially to women. Besides the duration of the period of pro-natalist politics, the main difference between the pro-natalist population politics was that the emphasis on the strict sexual division of labour was stronger in Spain than in Finland.
Although men had the formal authority within the family, the conception of the family that prevailed during the period of pro-natalist policies both in Spain and Finland made the home women’s domain and reduced men’s role to that of provider. In Finland, the male provider model started to dissolve in the late 1940s when the principle of universal social rights was adopted as the basis of the welfare state. Following the Scandinavian model, since 1948, the child allowance was not paid along with the salary of the male provider and consequently, the new child allowance system weakened the familistic emphasis by rejecting the one-provider model. The weakening of the male breadwinner family model took place in Spain only in the 1990s along with the withdrawal of state support to fathers for the costs of raising children (Naldini 2000: 74–75). The more recent efforts to encourage men to take a more active role in childcare are an attempt to draw men back into the private realm and to consolidate the egalitarian family ideology and model.

Policy-makers in North European countries as well as in South European ones consider the role of the family important. Even in Scandinavian countries, where adults gain most of the entitlements on an individual basis, an explicit commitment to support the family exists. However, in Southern Europe, the role of the family is different, which affects policies targeted at families (Ferrera 1997). For example in Spain, families play a more critical role in both care and material provision than in Finland. Even though the family plays a central role in welfare provision in Spain and in other South European countries, policies and services designed to support families are poorly developed. The boundaries between the public and private are clearer in Spain than in Finland largely owing to the memory of explicit pro-natalist and familistic policies during the Franco regime. Thus, the family is primarily responsible for the wellbeing of its members and the state should intervene into private life only when the family unit cannot fulfil its tasks (cf. Lewis 1997). In Finland, the public impinges on the private more explicitly than in Spain with the intent to support the
family in order to maintain its capacities to fulfil its tasks.

There is also a difference between Finland and Spain regarding the definition of the family in the social sector. A Spanish policy oriented to families defines the family in accordance with the civil legislation as a conjugal family (cf. Picontó-Novales 1997). Unlike the civil legislation, the social policy in Finland treats married and cohabiting couples in the same way. Social benefits and services are determined by the mutual income of cohabiting partners even though they are not obliged to support one another according to the civil legislation (cf. Gottberg 1996; Jaakkola 2000). Consequently, the actual cohabitating has replaced the marriage-based definition of the family in the social sector in Finland.

**Social Status of Women**

Family ideology is closely connected to the understanding of what the proper place and role for women and men are. In the early 20th century, the dominant ideology of separate spheres upheld by religion, law, education and the state proposed complementary but hierarchically fashioned roles for men and women in the public and private spheres (Crompton 1999). The proper place and role for genders in both Finland and Spain was determined by the ideologies of separate spheres and maternalism. Nationalism, medical discourse, the decline in fertility and population politics all consolidated the cult of motherhood by making mothering the social duty of women. Thus, women’s societal role was defined through maternalism, which allowed also childless women to dedicate their ‘natural’ maternal resources and services to the best of the society and nation. A woman should take interest in public affairs in order to fulfil her duty as a mother of the people by acting in the fields ‘intrinsic’ to femininity such as taking care of the poor and sick and educating children and young women. However, ideally, mothering should shift from the public to the
private home and family after marriage. For many women, however, this was not a realistic option (Jallinoja 1983; Morcillo 2000; Nash 1999; Ollila 1993).

Although maternalism maintained the ideology of separate spheres, it also opened up new avenues for women. First, the educational level of women rose along with the pedagogical aim of improving their mothering and housekeeping skills and abilities. The rise of women’s general educational level was especially marked in Spain, where the illiteracy rate among women aged 15 and over dropped from 28.5 percent to 11.8 percent between 1940 and 1970. In Finland, only 0.8 percent of women were illiterate in 1930 (Unesco 2002; United Nations 1949). Second, the idea of social motherhood created new wage work opportunities for (middle class) women in the fields of education, counselling, health care and welfare provision. Furthermore, maternalism was the launching pad for the development of social policies that, especially in Finland, provided a basis for women to establish themselves in policy-making 25 (Anttonen 1994; Floquera 1993).

25 Women’s possibilities to take part in public life and affairs have been quite different in Finland and Spain during most of the 20th century. Women’s suffrage in Finland (1906) and Spain (1931) was achieved together with the emergence of universal suffrage, which was connected to profound political changes and reformations. In Finland, the reformation of the parliament and the universal suffrage were direct reflections of the deterioration of the autocracy of the Russian tsar and the establishment of the Russian parliament (Alapuro 1988; Ylikangas 1986). In Spain, the universal suffrage was connected to the change of politics: by the time the military dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera (1923–1931) failed, the democratic and liberal Second Republic had emerged. However, already in 1939, the nationalist forces led by Franco revoked all the progressive changes of the liberal republic and it was only in the late 1970s when Spain again adopted the norm of basic equality and women regained their full civil rights (Keene 1999; Romero Salvadó 1999). Since the attainment of suffrage, Finnish women have gradually entrenched themselves in formal social and political arenas. In Spain, the first period of women’s participation in politics and social affairs was too short for women to
However, perceptions about the right place and proper role of women were contradictory amongst women themselves. In Finland, the right-wing and middle-class women demanded educational and professional opportunities to upper and middle class women equal with men and endeavoured to instil the enlightened homemaker role among common women. Social democrats and working class women saw women’s wage work as a precondition for emancipation but they also insisted on working women’s right to motherhood and on the state’s duty to help working mothers to combine wage work and mothering (Anttonen 1994; Sulkunen 1989). In Spain, conservative as well as socialist and anarchist women demanded respect for civil and social rights in education and work and their own active and independent role in these areas. They did not accept the separation of public and private spheres but they did not challenge motherhood as the core of female identity and the feminine mission either (Nash 1999). Consequently, women in both countries acted as advocates of the ‘mother citizen’ and conservatives, in particular, tried to embed the male breadwinner – female homemaker model in the working class and peasant populations (cf. Anttonen 1994; Nash 1999).

The male breadwinner – female homemaker model never became predominant in Finland. The absence of a large urban middle class, material austerity, low wages, the scantiness of livelihood of small farms and wars forced most families into the two-earner model. Besides, Finnish women have always been characterized by special independence; they have never been under patriarchal control to the same extent as women in Central and Southern Europe and the

establish themselves (Shubert 1992). Nonetheless women were never totally kept out of politics and social action: they have been active, e.g., in political, cultural, and religious organizations, in women’s movements and in organizing riots, boycotts and demonstrations. But, even after the re-attainment of full civil rights, Spanish women have been more active in civil society than in formal politics (see Enders and Radcliff 1999; Morcillo 2000; Nash 1995).
legislation has never prohibited their political organization (Haavio-Mannila 1968; Julkunen 1994).

However, the above-mentioned socio-economic conditions are not especially unique to Finland. For example, Spain was also a predominantly agrarian society until the 1960s and although the wealthy upper and middle classes were significant, most of the Spaniards lived in material austerity and with a scant livelihood and low salaries. Yet, women were under patriarchal control, although to varying degrees in different classes, and the sexual division of labour seemingly corresponded to the male breadwinner model. However, according to Luís Flaquer (2000), the Spanish family was and is different from the classic male breadwinner model because the family is seen as a larger unit of income and resources to which everyone contributes according to his or her opportunities.

Thus, not only historical, social, economic and political factors but also cultural factors are of importance when we consider gender relations, conceptions of the family and the relationship between the family and the state. There are several cultural elements that are of importance here but perhaps the most fundamental is the difference in the degree of individuality. Scandinavian as well as Finnish tradition has promoted equality and most importantly the idea that individual identity is not given but chosen. In other words, birth and family do not determine the essence of a person but individual will, skills and determination. This concept has implied individuality, subjectivity and self-discipline (Thorkildsen 1997). In Spain, as in South European societies in general, the degree of individuality has traditionally been low (Flaquer 2000). In the Catholic tradition, the society is seen as a set of ordered relationships that are natural and, correspondingly, birth, family background and social class determine the essence of a person. A person is first and foremost seen as a member of a social network, family and kin, rather than as an independent individual whose fate is in his or her own hands (Greely 1989). These cultural differences have been reflected in the structure of the society, social
mobility, gender relations, the family institution, and the type of welfare state and relationship between the family and the state (see Articles 1 and 4).

In the course of the 1960s and 1970s, the position of women in both countries changed. Women’s participation in education has risen since the early 1960s but in Spain the increase has been remarkable and thus, a huge gap between the educational levels of women belonging to different generations exists. Only around 10 percent of women born in the late 1930s and early 1940s completed at least the upper secondary education whereas over 60 percent of women born in the late 1960s and early 1970s have done so. A similar development has taken place also in Finland, although the generation gap is not as great as in Spain. Around 50 percent of Finnish women belonging to the older age group have at least an upper secondary education and over 86 percent of women belonging to the younger age group have done so (Eurostat 2000; Instituto de la Mujer 2000; Statistics Finland 2000). In both countries today female students outnumber male students at all educational levels. University-level education was clearly men’s territory as late as the 1970s and early 1980s but by the mid-1990s women bypassed men in Finland as well as in Spain; over half of university students in both countries were women by the mid-1990s (Havén 1998) (see Article 4).

In addition to the increase of women’s participation in education, the number of women in the labour market in both Finland and Spain has grown since the 1960s. Again, the change has been greater in Spain than in Finland. In the early 1970s, 1.5 million Spanish women who had never worked before entered employment but the actual increase took place in the 1980s and 1990s (Montero 1995, 382). In 1960, 26 percent of the Spanish female population aged 15 to 64 was in the labour force whereas the figure in 1995 was 45 percent. Although the number is still under the EU (57%, 1995) and OECD (59%, 1995) averages, the increase has been remarkable and continuous. In Finland, the female labour force participation rate has
traditionally been higher than in most other Western societies but in the 1960s married women, in particular, entered into working life in large numbers. In 1960, around 65 percent of women aged 15 to 64 were in the labour force and by 1995 the figure had risen to 70 percent (OECD 1997b) (see Article 3).

These changes were interlinked with larger social and cultural changes in the 1960s and early 1970s, like economic growth, the demand for an educated labour force in new occupational branches, individualization, changes in the attitudinal climate in relation to moral issues in particular, and changes in family life (Jallinoja 1983; Shubert 1991). Along with these changes, ideas concerning the proper places of women and men changed as well. The demand for equality strengthened and changed in nature. First, besides equal rights to education and wage work, women were to be visible and active in all the same places, positions and roles as men. Furthermore, views on the conditions of women’s personal independence changed. Earlier, the state of being unmarried had been the only way for women to be independent individuals but now, according to the new view, a woman could pursue her personal goals and be an active member of the society also in a marriage and with a family. Thus, demands for equality moved from the public sphere also to the private one: marriage and the family. Accordingly, female identity was no longer determined only by the roles of a wife and a mother, not even for those women with families. Instead, and especially in Finland, a self-sufficient wage worker became the ideal. Second, men’s role within the family was no longer that of just a provider. Instead, they should play an active role in taking care of and bringing up their children and in sharing the housework with their spouses. Thus, gender ideology altered from an emphasis on differences to an emphasis on likeness between the genders (Anttonen 1994; Brooksbank Jones 1995; see also Articles 1 and 3).

These demands and ideas, the fact that an ever-growing number of married women and mothers entered working life, and women’s
active role in policy-making initiated the development of ‘family friendly’ social policies in Finland. Following the Scandinavian model, the ideal was the woman-friendly state where women can combine employment, motherhood and caring and maintain a social and economic position equal to men. Thus, the relationship between women and the state is seen as symbiotic; women need the state to secure their position as mothers and wage workers and the state needs women for production and reproduction (cf. Anttonen 1994).

If the state has been a ‘friend’ of women in Finland, until recently, Spanish women have considered the state more like an ‘enemy’. After the dictatorship, most Spaniards and especially women were suspicious of the political system and all relevant post-authoritarian political and social actors wanted to disassociate themselves from the legacy of the pro-natalist and anti-feminist Francoist policies. Following Anglo-American mainstream feminism, the objective of Spanish feminist groups as well as of women in political parties was to establish gender-equal policies in order to reduce the difference between male and female citizens, e.g. in terms of education and employment, and to avoid any sort of ‘family friendly’ policies, which were seen as repressing women by defining them through the family and not as individuals. These principles became preponderant within the whole post-authoritarian political and social culture and discourse (Valiente 1997; see Articles 1 and 3).

Women’s entrance into the public sphere in Spain was encouraged and emphasized in public discussion. Paid work became conceptualised as a choice but the welfare system remained grounded in the care provided by women in the family. Thus, until very recently, the reconciliation of work and the family has been considered a woman’s personal rather than a public problem. In the course of the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, demands for equality also within the family and couple relationship grew in the Spanish discourse. While women have been encouraged to take their stand in the public sphere, men have been enticed to take an active part in domestic work and
parenting (cf. Tobío 2000 and Articles 1 and 3).

Ideals of equality and individuality have shaped the conceptions of gender roles and the family. Gender ideology has changed from emphasising differences to emphasising likeness between the genders and family ideology has moved from separate spheres to shared spheres. Although these tendencies are not only Western but global, they vary in timing and degree and according to cultural, social and political background and developments, as the cases of Finland and Spain clearly indicate.

Summary of Family Ideologies

Concerning the family ideology in Finland and Spain during the 20th century, both parallel trends and distinct features are detectable. Starting with the parallel trends, the nature of marriage has changed. First of all, it has become legally recognized that marriage may not be a lifelong commitment. Second, we may say that, earlier, marriage and family were inseparable from each other whereas, nowadays, they are separate institutions. Marriage used to be the only legal way for a man and a woman to live together and have an intimate relationship and the ultimate purpose of the marriage was procreation. Thus, getting married meant family formation. Although, in legal terms, marriage still is the best-protected form of relationship, other forms of intimate relationships are not sanctioned. As the articulated function of marriage is no longer procreation but the production of security, affection and emotional satisfaction, it has become necessary to grant that any kind of long-term and intimate relationship can fulfil these functions. Consequently, a couple is not determined to be a family; a family requires children. Denying same-sex couples the right to adopt children has recently been an explicit expression of the endurance of the idea that The Family is composed of a heterosexual couple and their children.
Third, family ideology has shifted from emphasising patriarchal and hierarchical couples and family relationships to emphasising equality between the genders (and generations). As the gender ideology moved from the emphasis on difference to the emphasis on likeness between genders both in society and in the family, similarly the family ideology moved from separate spheres to shared spheres.

Considering the distinct features or tones of the Finnish and Spanish conceptions of the family, the Spanish view on the family appears to be more collective than the Finnish one. First, the contemporary Spanish law obliges the spouses to live together in the same household whereas the Finnish law makes no such obligation, and the codes on maintenance liability employ a more extensive definition of the family in Spain than in Finland. In terms of civil legislation on marriage and the family, the family in Finland is determined as a nuclear family composed of a heterosexual couple and their children. In Spain too, the core of the family is the nuclear family but parents and siblings of the core couple are also included under certain circumstances.

Generally speaking, the civil legislative conception of the family is based on biological ties in both countries. In Spain, the definition of the family in public legislation and policy is congruent with the one in civil law. In Finland, however, the public legislation and policy defines the family in broader terms than civil law, including also unmarried couples as cores of families and, unlike in civil law, as liable for each other’s maintenance.

Regardless of the distinct features, the basic culturally and socially shared conception of The Family appears to be very similar both in Finland and Spain: the ideal or ‘ideological’ family both in Finland and Spain is composed of a heterosexual married couple and their children. The Finnish idea may at first appear to be up-to-date as public policy’s definition of the family is corresponding to actual practices, but the fact that heterosexual cohabitation is not recognized in civil legislation promotes the ‘traditional’ ideology of the family.
2.3. Family Values and Attitudes

Values and attitudes concerning the family, in particular, are difficult to study from a cross-societal perspective because questionnaires are different and the stress on topics and line of questioning tend to differ in different countries. Furthermore, questionnaires of both international and national values surveys are inclined to contain very strong preconceptions of what matters to people and, therefore, it is likely that value and attitude surveys offer a biased and partial picture of the values and attitudes of the respondents. Regardless of these problems and limitations, this chapter reviews the values and attitudes that Finns and Spaniards hold regarding the family, assessing whether the values and attitudes are congruent with the above discussed. Again values comprise a topic that runs through all the original articles. However, in Article 2, values and attitudes are discussed more explicitly.

According to studies on European values, traditional values—respect for authorities, a hierarchical picture of society, and subordination of the individual to the group—show a general decline to the benefit of universal individualism—valuing the primacy of an individual’s freedom of choice, equal rights, and the questioning of traditional centres of power and authority. This gradual shift characterises the attitudes concerning work, politics, religion as well as the family (Michalski and Tallberg 1999).

There seems to be a converging European trend in family values as they have become more tolerant and accepting with respect to non-traditional family behaviour. However, despite the general trend, differences in actual practices continue to exist especially between Northern and Southern Europe. Similar to the demographic statistics, value studies indicate that northern Europeans and Scandinavians in particular are more inclined to engage in non-traditional family behaviour than people in southern Europe (ibid.).
During the past four decades, in Western Europe, marriage and fertility rates have declined while divorces and the number of single people have been increasing and parenthood and family formation are postponed to older age. These demographical facts are often seen as signs of the decline of the family institution, which is considered to be connected to the shift in values (e.g. Popenoe 1988). However, although the number of single people (other than the widowed) and childless couples has increased while the number of families with children has decreased, most of the population in European societies still live in households composed of couples with children. As for Finland and Spain, in 1995, half of Finns living in private households lived in households composed of a couple with children and the corresponding number in Spain was 61 percent (OECD 2001). Furthermore, in both countries, the great majority of the households composed of a couple with children are based on a married couple (Meil 1999; Yearbook of Population Research in Finland 1998–1999).

Even though the predominant family or household type in both countries is ‘traditional’, the non-traditional family behaviour appears to be more common in Finland than in Spain. As an example, in Finland, in 1995, childless couples constituted 21 percent of private households whereas in Spain the proportion was 11 percent. One-person households were very common in Finland, comprising 15 percent of private households, while the corresponding share in Spain was 4 percent. However, the proportion of single-parent families of all households was quite similar in both countries: 8 percent in Spain and 9 percent in Finland. But, on the other hand, 17 percent of Spanish private households were composed of three or more adults with or without dependent children whereas the corresponding figure in Finland was only 5 percent. This difference reflects the fact that three-generation households are more common in Spain than in Finland (OECD 2001).
Although ‘alternative’ lifestyles have become more common and socially accepted, marital status still determines the conception of the family, as the study reported in Article 2 shows. When Finns were asked what the family in their opinion is, the most popular answer was a married couple and their children (98%). Regardless of the fact that consensual unions are very common in Finland, only 55 percent of respondents perceived them as families. However, consensual unions are accepted as families when the couple has children (86%) (Reuna 1997). When Spaniards were asked what kind of relationship they would establish themselves, the overwhelming majority (59%) chose marriage with a religious ceremony and 9 percent chose civil marriage. Only 10 percent favoured cohabitation without future plans to marry and 9 percent would cohabit before marriage (Orizo 1996). Furthermore, marriage is regarded as an important institution in both countries, for around 75 percent of Finns and Spaniards disagree with the claim that marriage is an out-of-date institution (CIS 1997; Paajanen 2002).

In spite of the fact that having and rearing children is no longer considered the ultimate purpose of marriage, studies indicate that the majority of Europeans agree that those who want to have children should get married (cf. CIS 1994). Marriage is a mode of cultural behaviour and reasons for marrying are quite similar in both countries in question. First of all, getting married is what should be done in a long-term relationship. Second, it is believed that marriage creates security and permanency and that in the long run it is better for children if their parents are married. As a case in point, although almost 40 percent of children in Finland are born to unmarried parents, most of them marry after the birth of the child. The third most frequently stated reason for getting married is the decision to have children. The decision or desire to have children ranks higher on the Spaniards’ list of reasons for marriage than on the Finns’, which indicates that in Spain having children outside marriage is not as socially acceptable as it is in Finland (Reuna 1997; CIS 1999; Articles 2 and 4).
Although fertility and family size have declined, the great majority of Finnish and Spanish childless women and men aged 18 to 39 plans to have children sometime in the future. In fact, the study conducted in Finland shows how remaining childless is very seldom a conscious and unchanging decision. Rather, it is a consequence of several successive decisions not to have a child right now (Paajanen 2002: 13). As discussed in Articles 3 and 4, on the basis of attitude and value studies it seems that in Finland the reasons given for postponing forming a family or hesitating to have children in the first place or to have more than one child are more of a personal nature and, in Spain, the reasons stated are rather structural. In Finland, the major reasons given by those under 30 years of age are unfinished studies, financial insecurity, a lack of ‘broody’, a desire to do other interesting things first before having children and not feeling ready to take responsibility for a child. The most common reason reported by those over 30 is the absence of the desire for a child (broody) followed by the demands of one’s working life and career, the preference to have a break between the first and second child, the lack of a suitable partner and financial insecurity (Paajanen 2002). In Spain, economic reasons are at the top of the list both among those under and over 30 years of age. Pessimism towards one’s future economic and social situation, not feeling ready to take the responsibility for a child, women’s employment and a lack of suitable housing are the other reasons given by Spaniards under and over 30 (CIS 1998, 1999).

Postponement of and hesitation in family formation is in sociological discussions often connected to extended youth and the youth-glamorising culture (cf. Allan and Crow 2001). It is claimed that the freedom that is associated with youth is regarded as more appealing than family life but, as we have seen above and as Article 4 evinces, attitude and value studies clearly indicate that establishing a stable partnership, mostly in marriage, and having children are future plans for most of the people.
Generally speaking, younger generations tend to be more permissive in their values and attitudes than older generations\textsuperscript{26}. In fact, the differences in values are more significant between generations than between nations (Michalski and Tallberg 1999). Ronald Inglehart (1997) suggests that younger generations are more inclined to permissiveness (post-modern values) than older generations because as a generation they have not experienced the kind of material and physical insecurity as the older generations have. In other words, insecurity enhances the need for predictability and absolute norms whereas a sense of security is conducive to relatively permissive and flexible norms. Therefore, as the younger birth cohorts replace the older cohorts in the adult population, it is expected that the values and attitudes of the society will become more permissive or post-modern.

Analyses of the two waves of World Values surveys in 1981 and 1990 confirm this hypothesis as far as respect for authorities, religious norms and attitudes towards abortion, divorce, homosexuality, and same-sex relationships are concerned. However, family-related values and attitudes were not congruent with the general trend. The share of those who agreed with the claim that a child needs a home with both a father and a mother in order to grow up happily increased in almost all of the countries included in the data. The proportion in Spain increased from 85 percent to 95 percent and, in Finland, the corresponding percentages were 55 and 85. In addition, contrary to the prediction, the number of those agreeing that a woman needs to have children to be fulfilled grew in most of the countries studied. This was the case in Finland whereas, in Spain, there was hardly any change. Approval of a woman having a child as a single parent increased in countries like Spain and Italy and decreased in countries

\textsuperscript{26}Likewise, educated people and those who live in urban areas tend to be more permissive than less educated people and those living in rural areas (cf. Inglehart 1997; Michalski and Tallberg 1999).
like Finland, Sweden and Norway, where single parenthood has been quite common for a long time compared to Southern Europe (Inglehart 1997: 285–290). The findings concerning family-related values allude to two things. First, family values and attitudes are in line with the prevailing family ideologies both in the Finnish and Spanish societies, signalling that the family is perceived as the nuclear family based on a heterosexual, and preferably married, couple. Second, it seems that those countries that are defined as the most post-modern in Europe, namely the Scandinavian countries, have reached a kind of plateau in the progression of individualism and post-modern values whereas, e.g., South European countries are still in the process of shifting from modern to post-modern values and attitudes (cf. Michalski and Tallberg 1999).

While the questions in the World Values and European Values surveys may be criticised and it is likely that not all the questions or claims are understood in the same way in different countries, the results of the studies seem to confirm the broader idea that we are living in the ‘renaissance’ of the family or in times of the ‘new familism’, and that the values concerning the family and family life tend to be quite enduring (Jallinoja 2003; Kumar 1997). Familial sentiments appeared to be stronger in the 1990s than in the 1980s. The new familism and inclination towards traditional and conservative values and attitudes seemed to be strong among younger generations, in particular. The studies indicate that young people in the 1970s and 1980s were clearly more liberal than young people in the 1990s (e.g. Orizo 1996). One reason for the new familism often mentioned is the economic recession of the 1990s, which led to dismantling the welfare state, to the political and ideological elevation of the family, to the fact that people have increasingly become dependent on the family regardless of the type of welfare state and to the profound change in the structure of the labour market (cf. Beck 1999b; see Article 2).

Despite the fact that individualisation and individualistic values are by now deeply rooted in contemporary societies, the need to
rest on traditions and long-standing values persists even among younger generations. Although younger birth cohorts do not share the same insecurities as the older ones did, they face different kinds of insecurities and hazards that reinforce valuing such spheres of life that are learned to be conceived of as secure and familiar. In reality, people do recognize that marriage, the family and family life are not necessarily secure and lasting and, in fact, a growing number of people do not live according to the predominant family values and ideology, at least not permanently. Nevertheless, the idea or the ideological model of the family has not lost its strength and attraction because the expectations and hopes for the relationship, family and family life do not change relative to the changes in the circumstances (cf. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995, 2002; Bittman and Pixley 1997; see Articles 2, 3 and 4). Accordingly, the next chapter examines the discrepancy between the values and the ideal of the family and family practices by discussing the demographic transition, trends in Finnish and Spanish patterns of family formation and the circumstances behind these trends and patterns.

2.4. On Family Formation

The direction of Western family changes since the early 1960s is well known and much discussed. In the following, demographic changes and trends are examined by looking at the demographic statistics of Finland, Spain and the EU 15 from 1960 to the end of 1990s. To start the examination of family practices from 1960 is well-justified for it is the point in time that is considered as the start of the latest and ongoing transition in family practices, patterns of family formation and fertility. The demographic statistics are viewed in connection with theories of demographic transition. After a more general discussion of elements of and reasons for the demographic transition, the Finnish and Spanish cases are discussed in more detail, looking for the case-
specific explanations for changes in patterns of family formation. This discussion is based on studies published in Articles 3 and 4.

Demographic Transition

Since the 1960s, patterns of family formation and practices have changed following the same general trend in all Western countries: marriage and fertility rates have declined while cohabitation, divorces, extramarital births, and mean ages of first marriage and first birth have increased. These changes are referred to as the ‘second demographic transition’\(^\text{27}\), which is divided into three phases (Lesthaeghe 1995; Van de Kaa 1987).

The first phase, roughly between 1955 and 1970, involved three major components of change: divorce accelerated considerably, the baby boom came to an end and the decline in the age of marriage stopped. In addition, several countries experienced a temporary increase in shotgun marriages near the end of the 1960s.

During the second phase, roughly between 1970 and 1985, premarital cohabitation spread from Scandinavian countries to other parts of Europe. This led, first, to an increase in extramarital births among all births. However, it is important to note that the increase in births outside marriage did not entail a rise in fertility prior to age 25. Second, the nature of cohabitation shifted from a period of courtship to more of a ‘paperless marriage’.

The third phase that has occurred from the mid 1980s onward is characterised by a stabilisation of divorce rates in those countries where divorce rates were high earlier. At the same time, remarriages

\(^\text{27}\) The ‘first demographic transition’ in Europe was connected to industrialisation, urbanisation and secularisation. Between 1880 and 1920 ages at marriage and parenthood started to decline and high natality and mortality levels stabilised at low levels (cf. Solsona 1998).
of both divorced and widowed persons have declined since the 1960s, being replaced by post-marital cohabitation and ‘living apart together’ relationships. Moreover, there has been a recuperation of fertility among those over age 30 (ibid.).

The consequences of these developments have included a rise in the number of one-parent households (usually female-headed), an increase in one-person households and changes in patterns of leaving home among young adults. However, not all Western nations have followed these phases synchronously. In Europe, generally speaking, the leads and lags follow a North-South axis (Lesthaeghe 1995).

Let us look at the demographic statistics concerning Finland and Spain (Table 3) in relation to the outlined three-phase model of the second demographic transition. In Finland, during the first phase until 1970, divorce accelerated and fertility declined sharply between 1960 and 1970. However, the decline in the age at first marriage did not stop at that time, nor did the marriage rate decline. The number of marriages rose remarkably by 1970 because the post-war baby boom generation reached marriageable age in the second part of the 1960s. At that time, cohabitation had not yet become socially accepted and, thus, the decline of the mean age at first marriage between 1960 and 1970 may reflect the increase in shotgun marriages. Spain does not conform to the model in any respect. First of all, divorces were illegal until 1981 and therefore, no increase took place in the period in question. The mean age at marriage has been slightly higher in Spain than in Finland and in the EU countries on average during the whole period reviewed. But, like in Finland, the mean age decreased slightly between 1960 and 1980.

As for the second phase of the demographic transition, again Finland conforms better to the model than Spain. Extramarital births among all births have increased remarkably since 1970, which also indicates the increase in premarital cohabitation. Spain has followed the same trend but very moderately; births outside marriage as well as cohabitation are uncommon compared to Finland and the EU average.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of demographic transition</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>EU 15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Marriages/1000</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Divorces/1000</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Mean age at first marriage:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Remarriages (% of total marraiges):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Cohabiting couples %:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-30s</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI Total fertility rate</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII Births outside marriage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% of all live births)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII Mean age of women at first birth</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Figure from 1997.
2 EU 12.
3 Figure from 1975.
4 Figure from 1995.
– No available data.
* Divorce not legal.

even in the end of the 1990s and among young people. What comes to the nature of cohabitation in Finland, it has not become a paperless marriage even though it has become a common and a legitimate way to start a family. Most of the cohabiting couples in Finland marry after the birth of the child. Thus, unlike in Sweden and Denmark, cohabitation in Finland is, generally speaking, better described as a transitional phase preceding marriage, not as an established ‘paperless marriage’ (Kiernan and Estaugh 1993; Reuna 1997).

In accordance with the characteristics of the third phase of the demographic transition, divorce rates in Finland stabilised in the 1990s. In Spain there has been an upward trend but all in all the divorce rate is extremely low in the European context. Since the considerable decline of fertility in the 1960s, the fertility rate in Finland has been quite stable. In Spain, however, the fertility rate has collapsed, being now (together with that of Italy) the lowest in the Western countries. However, in both countries, the recuperation of fertility has taken place among those over age 30 and births among younger age groups are constantly decreasing (see Article 3).

What comes to remarriages, Table 3 indicates that contrary to the model of the second demographic transition, remarriages both among women and men in Finland, Spain and in the EU region increased on average, at least during the 1980s and 1990s. Again, the Spanish figures are very low and Finns seem to enter into second marriages more than West Europeans on average. Demographic trends from 1960 to the end of the 1990s are analysed and discussed in more detail in Article 3.

Overall, Finland has followed the three-phase model of the second demographic transition whereas, in Spain, the transition is behind ‘schedule’ and the changes have been less radical and slower with the exception of fertility. The Scandinavian countries have been the forerunners as far as the changes in family and household formation are concerned. Sweden and Denmark have been the pacesetters.
and, compared to them, Finland has lagged behind regarding all the indicators (Lesthaeghe 1995).

Looking at the demographic statistics of Finland and Spain (Table 3) from the viewpoint of patterns of first-family formation, marriage rates in the end of the 1990s were almost equally low in Finland and Spain, being lower than in the EU region on average. As for the mean age at first marriage, in the 1960s and 1970s, Spaniards tended to be older than Europeans in general when marrying for the first time but in the end of the 1990s they were slightly younger when getting married. Accordingly, one could expect that Spaniards would also enter into parenthood at a younger age but the opposite seems to be true. The mean age of women at first birth is higher in Spain than in Finland and the EU region on average. As Table 3 shows, Spanish women seem to live in a childless marriage for a few years whereas Finnish women tend to become wives and mothers at the same age. This reflects the fact that Finns move from cohabiting partnership to marriage just prior to or after the child is born. As for cohabitation, it is the most common way to start life as a couple among Finns under age 30 whereas in Spain cohabitation is still very uncommon among all age groups. Correspondingly, extramarital births of all births are more infrequent in Spain than in EU countries in general, not to mention Finland. With regard to fertility, Spain is the forerunner of the fertility decline. In Finland, on the other hand, the fertility rate in the late 1990s was relatively high compared to the EU average, not to mention Spain. Thus, thinking in terms of patterns of family formation, the statistics indicate that Finns start their lives as a couple in a cohabiting union and marry as they have children, whereas Spaniards do not cohabit but get married straight away and have children after a few years of marriage (see Articles 1–4).

Regardless of the differences, the demographic changes in both countries have followed the general trend. Reasons for this trend are widely discussed and debated not only by demographers but also by sociologists, economists, political scientists and historians. Before
we go into the Finnish and Spanish patterns of family formation in more detail, let us take a brief look at the lines of discussion around the issue of demographic transition and changing patterns of family formation.

*Perspectives on the Demographic Transition Since 1960*

Although some demographers like Cliquet (1991) disagree with the idea of a ‘second’ demographic transition, arguing that the demographic changes of recent decades are only a lineal continuation of the transition that started in Europe along with the industrial revolution, the changes in patterns of family formation, fertility and living arrangements since 1960 have been substantial enough to justify using the concept of a ‘second demographic transition’ (Lesthaeghe 1995; Van de Kaa 1987).

Thus, there is a distinction between demographic changes prior to and after the early 1960s. From a political perspective, both the first and second demographic transitions were strongly influenced by the growing importance of individual freedom of choice and the non-acceptance of external authority such as the Church, the state, kin and family. The difference, however, is that during the first transition the manifestation of individuality occurred in privacy whereas in the 1960s, in particular, manifestations were public: reactions to the authority structures of the Catholic Church, the student revolts, and the ‘second feminist movement’ all were highly visible and political (Lesthaeghe 1995).

Furthermore, two distinct sexual revolutions may be identified. The first one, prior to 1960, changed the determinants of partner choice from parental involvement to personal choice based on attraction and companionship. The second sexual revolution emphasised the sexual aspects of partner selection and sexual gratification in unions (Shorter 1975). It was associated with the contraceptive revolution
that introduced new and efficient intrauterine methods. As pointed out in Article 3, the major effects of the contraceptive revolution are: (1) it enables women to control the timing and spacing of childbirth and thus improve combining extra-familial life with family life. (2) It allows women to avoid unwanted pregnancies and births and to choose the number of children they have and, (3) it gives sexually active women the option of being childless. The availability and use of modern contraceptives have also wider social implications: sexual activity has become separated from marriage and reproduction, creating new lifestyle choices such as informal partnerships, cohabitation and voluntarily childless marriages (cf. Hakim 2000).

The social historian Philippe Ariés (1980) detects two distinct motivations for the historical and the recent demographic transitions, particularly fertility declines. The former decline in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was inspired by parental investment in the child, which was interlinked with the barging of the bourgeois family model into the lifestyles of all social classes and the emergence of the cult of motherhood. The latter began a period when the quality of the partner relationship is emphasised. Children continue to be important but the core of the family is the couple and marriage is defined less as a parenting union and more as a personal relationship between spouses (cf. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995). The fact that the divorce rate increased early on in the second demographic transition indicates that individuals had started to evaluate the quality of their personal relationships according to different standards than before. Those early divorcees were socialised in the conviction that marriage was a lifelong commitment, which stresses the fact that the status of the spousal relationship had surpassed the status of the parenting relationship and, consequently, the minimal standards of the quality of the couple relationship rose. As the quality standards rise, fulfilment is more difficult to achieve and thus, on the one hand, marriages are more likely to end and, on the other hand, it is more difficult to find a suitable partner in the first place. Thus, the changed nature of the
couple relationship and raised quality requirements do not only make existing marriages more fragile but they also evoke the postponement of marriage and an increase in cohabitation (e.g. Harding et al. 1986; Oppenheimer 1988).

Economists too have recognised the distinctiveness of the two periods before and after 1960. They stress that the trend of rising real earnings of men roughly between the 1880s and 1960 led to earlier marriage and parenthood in most Western countries. The ‘second transition’, however, has been influenced by the increase of female employment and female wages, which led to reductions in gains to marriage and to rising opportunity costs for women. As a result, marriages are postponed and fertility declines (Becker 1981; see Article 3). According to Easterlin et al. (1990), the recent fertility decline is the result of deteriorating intergenerational income ratios and harder labour market conditions, which forces younger generations to change their demographic behaviour by remaining single, by having fewer children, and by delaying marriage and parenthood (see Article 4). From the economic point of view, increased consumerism is one of the basic reasons for the latest demographic transition as well. As long as the consumption aspirations do not level off or men’s labour market situation does not improve and their income levels rise, there is no realistic reason to expect a reversal of the current demographic patterns (see Lesthaeghe 1995). This theory assumes that women would be willing to give up their lot in the labour market and their own resources if men’s income would be enough to guarantee the desired standard of living and level of consumption. However, studies reported in Articles 3 and 4 indicate that there is no realistic reason to assume a going-back to the old gendered division of labour because women’s economic activity is perceived as a precondition for forming a household of one’s own and having children (cf. Solsona 1998; Paajanen 2002; Tobió 2001).

As discussed in Article 3, the problem with many economists’ theories is that they are based on a conception of the family that
does not correspond to the present reality. First of all, nowadays, breadwinner/homemaker types of families are increasingly infrequent and, second, with regard to a husband’s providing capacity, today as well as in the past, two incomes are often necessary for the family economy (cf. Brining 2000).

It is noteworthy that none of the above theories alone explain the process of the second demographic transition. Instead, they should be seen as complementary and, furthermore, they should be examined within the cultural, social and historical background and context (cf. Letshaeghe 1995). Accordingly, the cases of Finland and Spain allow us to see whether and how well these theories explain changes in patterns of family formation.

**Finnish and Spanish Patterns of Family Formation: Interpretations of Similarities and Differences**

As the statistics show (Table 3), marriage rates are practically equally low in Finland and Spain but the fertility rate is substantially lower in Spain than in Finland. In both countries, people enter into their first marriage and parenthood at an older age than a few decades ago although Finns tend to become parents at a slightly younger age than Spaniards. These trends are usually explained by the availability and accessibility of modern contraceptive methods, cohabitation and women’s increased labour force participation. However, the analysis done in Article 3 demonstrates that these explanations and reasons are not valid in the cases of Finland and Spain.

To start with *contraception*, effective contraceptives became increasingly available in the 1960s and 1970s and today modern methods of contraception are widely accepted and practiced. However, there are marked differences in the availability and accessibility of contraceptive methods between countries largely owing to differences in legislation and attitudes toward sexuality and birth control. In
Spain, the contraceptive revolution was delayed largely due to the negative attitude of the Catholic Church towards premarital sex, contraception and abortion. In Finland, information concerning birth control and contraceptive methods and sex education has been more open compared to Spain (for further discussion see Article 3). Although the new effective contraceptives have changed sexual and reproductive behaviour, no causal link between the use of modern contraceptives and fertility levels exists (Coleman 1996). The cases of Finland and Spain confirm this; despite the widespread use of modern methods of birth control among Finnish women, the fertility rate is high by Western standards and, in Spain, the fertility rate has collapsed although traditional and unreliable methods are still widely practiced (see Article 3).

As for the decline and delay of marriage and parenthood, several studies demonstrate that the decline in first marriage rates is mostly caused by the *increase in cohabitation*. That is because cohabitation delays marriages, since people tend to have several short-lived cohabiting unions before marrying. Second, the increased popularity of cohabitation as the form of the first partnership and the fact that the significant first partnership is formed at an older age are considered responsible for the delay in motherhood (e.g. Ermisch and Francesconi 2000; Ressler and Waters 1995). However, as the demographic indicators in Table 3 and the analysis in Article 3 indicate, in Spain, cohabitation offers no explanation for the declining marriage rate or for the delay in marriage and motherhood because cohabitation is very uncommon and Spaniards tend to start their lives as couples through formal marriage and live a few years in a childfree marriage. In Finland, however, cohabitation is common and delays marriage but the prevalence of cohabitation as the first partnership does not explain the declining marriage rate, for most cohabiting couples contract a formal marriage when they have the first child. The high number of extramarital births and the fact that Finnish women tend to become mothers at a younger age than Spaniards indicates that cohabitation
The recent demographic transition has also been related to the increase in women’s employment. Although fertility (and marriage rates) in Europe has generally decreased as female labour force participation has increased, labour force activity does not necessarily impact on fertility. At present, the highest rates of female employment are in countries where the fertility rates are also the highest. The lowest fertility rates, on the other hand, are in countries where women’s employment rates are the lowest. In Finland, in 1999, the female employment rate among women aged 15–64 was 65 percent, which is considerably higher than the Spanish figure (37%) and the average female employment rate in the EU region (53%) (Franco 2000). Correspondingly, the fertility rate in Finland in the end of the 1990s was higher than in Spain and in the EU countries on average (see Table 3). The relationship between fertility and marriage decline and increasing female employment is analysed and discussed in Article 3.

The reasons for the cross-national variation of patterns of family formation should be looked at by focusing on the differences in the frameworks within which people make their life choices, such as the labour market and public policies. To start with the labour market, differences and similarities between Finland and Spain exist. The greatest difference is found in the frequency and the levels of female employment. The proportion of women of the total labour force in Finland was at the same level already in 1960 as it was in Spain in 2000 (see Table 2 in Chapter 2.1.). Accordingly, Finnish women have been engaged in employment in large numbers for a long time and, nowadays, women and men occupy positions in working life quite evenly and a dual-earner family is the norm. In Spain, the labour market has remained heavily masculine in spite of the fact that women’s labour force participation has increased constantly (see Table 2). Consequently, the male breadwinner/female homemaker ideology does not necessarily cause the delay of motherhood either (see Table 3; Article 3).
is still reflected in the labour market, where middle-aged men are in the advantaged position.

High unemployment and temporary contracts have for long been characteristic of the Spanish labour market. The already high unemployment rose during the economic recession of the 1990s. In Finland too the recession led to record-breaking high unemployment and to changes in the labour market structure, leading to an increase in atypical work and fixed-term contracts. As the economy recovered, unemployment among women and young people in both countries did not come down at the same rate as men's. Furthermore, atypical work and fixed-term contracts are more common among women and young people than among men both in Finland and Spain. However, women's part-time work is rare in both countries. In Finland, full-time employment of women and men is the norm and, in Spain, those women who work do so full-time. Studies indicate that neither Finnish nor Spanish women wish to work part-time, nor are there attractive options for part-time work. For more detailed discussion on the labour market situation, see Article 3 and Article 4 concerning the employment of young adults.

Since the end of the authoritarian period, Spanish women have been free to work and pursue a career but taking care of family responsibilities has not become a matter of choice, as the Spanish welfare state remains grounded on the family and care provided by women. Although, in the 1990s, some public measures were taken to ease the reconciliation of work and family, the effect of the reforms has been limited because the employment insecurity has not diminished. In Finland, public policies are designed to facilitate reconciling work and family and to encourage women and mothers to work outside the home. But, when the mass-entry of women into the labour market started in the 1960s, it was not facilitated by public services. In fact, most of the family-friendly services were developed only in the 1980s. However, in the course of the 1990s, public resources targeted to
families were retrenched. Nevertheless, the level of family-friendly policies and services in particular remains high compared to Spain (see Article 3).

The combination of a low female employment rate and extremely low fertility in Spain is often explained by the lack of public support for families, which encourages neither women’s wage work nor childbearing. In contrast, the high employment rate of Finnish women and relatively high fertility are explained by family-friendly policies that encourage women to go into wage work and start childbearing. Yet the correlation between the level of ‘family policies’ and the level of female employment is not obvious: the lack of services does not prevent Spanish women from entering into working life nor did it prevent Finnish women in the 1960s and 1970s. However, the Finnish and Spanish cases indicate that public policies may have either a positive or a negative effect on the family and fertility. Taking the constant increase of Spanish women’s labour force participation into account, the underdevelopment of benefits and services for families with children might be one of the causes of the decline in fertility and family size. In Finland, the fertility rate rose in the heyday of family-friendly services and benefits in the 1980s and it started to fall again at the time of retrenchment policies in the 1990s. Regardless of the differences between Finnish and Spanish public policies targeting families with children, both Finns and Spaniards regard public support for families as inadequate (Article 3). Studies indicate that in both countries the experienced inadequacy of family services and benefits is not the determining factor in the decision whether to have children at all but it does affect the decision about the number of children (Orizo 1996; Meil 1999; Paajanen 2002).

The study reported in Article 3 evinces that one of the most important factors behind changes in patterns of family formation in both countries is the precarious labour market situation of young people, which causes uncertain living conditions. The lack or scantiness of financial resources and unclear future prospects cause an
inability to plan for the future and an indisposition to commitments such as to children and a family of one’s own. Although precarious employment is a central factor of the postponement and even rejection of family formation, there are other important factors such as prolonged education, housing policy and situation, social policy and cultural differences in the processes of gaining independence and in the transition from youth to adulthood. Following the study reported in Article 4, the next chapter discusses the role of family formation within the process of transition from youth to adulthood and the circumstances underlying the phenomenon of delayed family formation.

Postponement of Family Formation

Not so long ago marriage was the key indicator of adulthood and the passage away from the childhood home and dependence on parents. This is shown in Article 4, where conceptual definitions of youth and adulthood and patterns of transition are analysed and discussed from a historical perspective. Nowadays, marriage as the most important qualifier of adulthood has given way to financial independence, which is a necessary precondition for most other qualities like establishing a household, having children and forming a family. However, the attainment of financial independence is hindered by the prolongation of education and the instability of the labour market. Consequently, most West European young adults aged 20–29, who are in the prime of their reproductive years, are single and childless. Besides, many of them continue to live with their parents and have not yet attained independence (Eurostat 1997). Regardless of parallel trends, there are variations in the process of attaining independence particularly between Northern and Southern Europe.

As demonstrated in Article 4, Finnish young adults move out in their early 20s whereas Spaniards reside with their parents until their
late 20s and early 30s (see Table 1 in Article 4). In both countries women tend to marry at age 28 and men at age 30 but Finns have children sooner than Spaniards. Basically, Finnish women tend to have their first child at age 28 and Spanish women tend to be closer to age 31. The reason for this is that in Finland it is common for people to have their first child while they are still cohabiting and only then to get married, whereas in Spain people get married first and have children after a few years of childfree marriage. In fact, marriage is still the single-most important reason for moving out of the parental home and starting an independent life in Spain whereas, in Finland, marriage does not play a central role in the process of attaining independence and adult status; studies and work are the principal reasons for moving out (see Article 4).

Compared to young adults in previous decades, people are spending more time in education: around 40 percent of Finnish and Spanish young adults under 30 are full-time students. Better qualifications have become an indispensable asset when competing for vacancies in the erratic labour market. Due to prolonged studies, young people today are entering the labour market later than young people in the 1970s and 1980s, and they are having more difficulties in doing so. Finding stable employment is problematic for young adults in both countries. Unemployment, fixed-term contracts and part-time jobs are common particularly among young people and even more so among young women than men. In the second part of the 1990s, after the recession, approximately half of the young adults both in Spain and Finland got their first job only after a period of unemployment. However, periods of unemployment tend to be longer in Spain than in Finland. The transition from education to working life is also more gradual than it used to be before. Periods of study, unemployment and employment are often mixed. This is the case especially in Finland, where working while studying and studying while working is more common than in Spain (see Article 4; also Eurostat 1997).
Instability in the labour market, ever-increasing competition and low or irregular income are major obstacles to becoming independent and starting a family in both countries but attaining independence and making the decision to start a family are also dependent on the prevailing housing situation and policy. Both Finland and Spain are among those European countries with the highest home-ownership rates (Winther 1997). In Spain, housing production is mainly private and social housing production and availability is scant. Apart from subsidies of mortgage loan interest and tax relief, there is no system of housing allowances. In addition, housing costs have increased dramatically during the past few decades. Thus, one important reason for the late emancipation of Spaniards and postponement of family formation is the inability to acquire one’s own first home, be it rented or owned. In addition, acquiring a flat in order to be married is characteristic of Spanish courtship (cf. Alberdi 1999; Flaquer 1997). Although in Finland too, home ownership is promoted and endorsed, publicly owned rented housing, in particular, is more available than in Spain. Furthermore, student housing and the system of housing allowance facilitate Finnish young people in setting up their own households without taking out a mortgage and even with low incomes (see Article 4).

Interdependence between parents and their adult children is institutionalised in the Spanish family-centred welfare state whereas in the Finnish welfare state, individual independence and self-sufficiency is publicly and officially endorsed (cf. Articles 4 and 1). The public policies that favour individual independence tend to ease cutting the cord to the parents by offering unemployment benefits for new entrants in the labour market, housing allowances, student grants and loans, and social and student housing (Flaquer 1997; Raitanen 2001; see Article 4).

The welfare state not only influences the process of leaving home but also patterns of family formation. Even though the welfare state
and its policies have an influence on family size rather than on the decision to have children in the first place, it is probable that public policies and available services for families play a role in the process of starting a family especially when gender roles and relations are changing, the dual-earner family is becoming the norm and the labour market is insecure both for young men and women. Studies attest to the fact that financial dependence on one’s spouse is considered a risk that ever fewer women (and men) are willing to take but, in both countries in question (and also elsewhere), the majority of young adults wish to be able to combine a professional career with a family (Juventud española 2000; Melkas 1999). Under these circumstances, policies that ease the reconciliation of work and family may function as an incentive to have children (see Article 4).

The prolonged time spent in education and the precarious labour market lead to late entrance into the labour market and to insecure income. Simultaneously with the changes in education, in qualification requirements and in the structure of the labour market, living and housing costs have increased, as has the expected standard of living. Furthermore, when the possibility of divorce and separation is recognized from the outset, the personal ability to provide for oneself becomes an important value and a necessity especially for women. All these factors emphasise the importance of financial independence and usually of two incomes as the precondition for family formation. When financial independence and a sufficient and secure income are difficult to achieve, it is quite understandable that the formation of the first family is delayed further into the future (see Article 4).

Summary of the Patterns of Family Formation

The cases of Finland and Spain do not confirm the common hypotheses of changes in the family. Accordingly, taking the high female employment, the widespread use of modern contraceptives
and the frequency of cohabitation into account, fertility and marriage rates should be extremely low in Finland. In Spain, where the female employment rate is low, traditional methods of contraception are widely practiced and cohabitation is rare, fertility and marriage rates ought to be high. Yet, in reality, marriage rates are equally low in both countries and fertility is relatively high in Finland and extremely low in Spain. In this regard, however, it is important to recognise that although female employment rate is lower in Spain than in Finland, it is constantly increasing.

As the interest in this study lies especially in the formation of the first family, the patterns of family formation should be considered together with the patterns of attaining independence and adult status. Compared to previous generations of young adults, the life stages today have become blurred, maybe more so in Finland than in Spain, where young adults still take the more ‘traditional’ route. To put it simply, Spaniards enter working life after studies which, however, does not necessarily mean leaving the parental home and gaining independence. Establishing a home of one’s own is usually connected to marriage and having children takes place after a few years of marriage. Finns tend to move out of the parental home when starting their studies. This, however, does not mean that they would be entirely independent of their parents. Entrance into working life takes place after studies although working while studying is common. Many students cohabit with a partner but in any case Finns tend to cohabit before marriage and they also tend to have their first child while cohabiting and marry after.

As demonstrated in Articles 3 and 4, patterns of family formation characteristic of each country are affected by public policies and especially by the labour market. These are by no means the only factors but they appear to be of importance in the cases of Finland and Spain. Although the effect of public policies on fertility has been found to be minor (e.g. Gauthier 2000), policies may influence it either positively or negatively. Taking into account the ever-increasing
employment rate of Spanish women, the underdevelopment of benefits and services for families might be one important reason for the considerable and fast decline in the fertility rate and average family size in Spain. In Finland, on the other hand, the positive development of fertility coexisted with the development of ‘family friendly’ services and benefits but along with the retrenchment of social expenditure on families, fertility started to decline again.

The working situation and steady income seem to have a crucial impact on family formation and fertility. Increasing female employment is often accused of causing changes in family and fertility but both the Finnish and Spanish cases indicate that the connection is not obvious. In fact, nowadays two incomes are the precondition for family formation. Unemployment and the precarious employment of both men and women appear to have a negative effect on the family. A particularly crucial factor is the employment situation of young adults. In both countries, the postponement of family formation (marriage and childbearing) and increasing singleness and voluntary childlessness are largely due to young adults’ difficulties in entrenching themselves in the labour market and in acquiring a sufficient and stable income. This insecurity forces people to concentrate on the present and to push such commitments as marriage and children into the undetermined future. Therefore, remaining childless is seldom a conscious decision but rather a consequence of a series of decisions not to have children right now (cf. Paajanen 2002).

Although establishing oneself in the labour market is equally difficult in both countries, it is somewhat easier to establish a household of one’s own and start the first family in Finland than in Spain. The system of student loans and student housing, housing allowances, and unemployment benefits for those looking for their first jobs and the culture that endorses an individual’s independence are important factors that ease the process of becoming independent and enable young people to have a home and even a family of their own with low incomes and limited means. In Spain, the family-centred welfare state
and culture seem to hinder the formation of new families. The labour market that favours middle-aged breadwinner males, the scantiness of affordable rental housing, the lack of individual social assistance to young people, and the social acceptance of late emancipation are all factors that demur family formation.

3. Family in Converging Europe

3.1. Family in Finland and Spain: The Focal Findings

The analysis of Finnish and Spanish families demonstrates that parallel social changes have resulted in congruent family ideologies on the one hand, and different patterns of family formation and fertility on the other. To start with the family ideology, the basic socially shared and upheld definition of the family is analogous in Finland and Spain and it has evolved in the same direction although at different paces. As demonstrated in Articles 1 and 2, in the early 20th century and before, the ideal family was based on an indissoluble marriage and the purpose of the marriage was procreation and socialising offspring. Thus marriage and family were inseparable. The family ideology endorsed the hierarchical male breadwinner-female homemaker family model although more vigorously and longer in Spain than in Finland. In the course of the latter part of the 20th century, egalitarianism between the genders (and generations) and the notion of shared spheres became the leading principles.

Considering the present-day ideas of what the family is or ought to be, the family ideologies in both countries are ambiguous. On the one hand, the family ideology prescribed and maintained by civil and social legislation and policies is inclined towards family pluralism: divorces are granted in both countries, in Finland social legislation and policies treat married and non-married couples equally and, in parts
of Spain heterosexual cohabiting couples have a legal status similar to that of married ones even though cohabitation is rare. On the other hand, the family composed of a heterosexual married couple and their children is still considered to be the ‘normal’ and ‘proper’ family, which is the bedrock of the society. In legal terms, marriage is the best-protected form of couple relationship in both countries. The societal endorsement of the heterosexual conjugal nuclear family as the family in both societies in question is reflected in the laws on registered couples, which in neither of the countries give adoption rights to same-sex couples. Furthermore, in Finland, there is no specific law in civil legislation that regulates heterosexual cohabitation even though it is common.

Something has changed though in the ‘conservative’ conception of the family. Unlike before, marriage and family are separate institutions, as the definition of the functions and purpose of marriage has changed from procreation to the production of security, affection and emotional satisfaction. Nowadays, the couple relationship is an intrinsic value in itself. The elevation of the couple as well as the legal and social recognition of divorce, cohabitation and same-sex unions undermines the supremacy of marriage as a form of intimate relationship. But, although it is accepted to live in an intimate relationship outside marriage, being a family is still very much related to marriage; people tend to marry when having children is topical or, like often in Finland, when the child is born. According to people’s opinions and to public discourses in both countries, children are considered the qualifiers of the family; a couple is not considered to be a complete family without a child.

The considerably similar social developments in Finland and Spain during the period from the early 1960s onwards have resulted in both parallel changes in the family and different patterns of family formation and fertility. First, both countries have followed the trend referred to as the second demographic transition although Spain has
lagged behind the ‘schedule’. Both Finns and Spaniards postpone the first marriage and childbearing longer than before. Marriage rates in both countries have fallen practically at the same pace, coming to an equally low level. Consequently, one would expect that cohabitation and, thus, births outside marriage must be common. The expectation holds true in the case of Finland but not in the case of Spain. The most striking difference between the countries is that fertility in Spain has collapsed whereas, in Finland, the fertility rate has actually risen since the slump at the turn of the 1970s and 80s. Second, the analysis reveals that regardless of the congruent socio-demographic changes, the patterns of first family formation differ in the respective countries. Finns move out of their parental homes at a relatively young age and they tend to live in a cohabiting union before marrying, and they often have their first child while still cohabiting. Spaniards tend to take the more traditional route and move out of their parental homes when marrying and have a child after a few years of marriage.

Individualisation and the emergence of post-modern values are often taken as starting points when explaining recent changes in the family. The decline in fertility and marriage rates and the delay of marriage and childbearing are often explained by the increased availability and use of modern contraceptives, and the increase in cohabitation and in women’s labour force participation, which are seen both as causes and consequences of individualisation and the value shift. However, this study evinces that these explanations are not valid in these particular cases. In Finland, the use of modern contraceptives is common, as is (premarital) cohabitation and women’s labour force participation and, yet, fertility is relatively high and the marriage rate is practically at the same level as it is in Spain. In Spain, the use of traditional methods of contraception is still common, cohabitation is exceptional and, regardless of the constant rise, female labour force participation is low compared to most Western countries and, yet, the marriage rate is almost as low as it is in Finland and the fertility rate is the lowest in the Western world.
The combination of a low female employment rate and low fertility in Spain is often explained by the lack of public support for families whereas the high employment rate among Finnish women and relatively high fertility are explained by the existence of family-friendly policies. But as this study attests, the correlation between the extent of family-friendly policies and female employment is not obvious. The lack of services does not prevent Spanish women from entering into working life nor did it prevent Finnish women in the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, the cases also indicate that public policies may have either a positive or a negative effect on the family and fertility. Considering the constant increase of Spanish women’s labour force participation, the underdevelopment of benefits and services for families with children might be one of the causes of declining fertility and family size. In Finland, on the other hand, fertility rose in the course of the 1980s when ‘family policy’ was intensely developed and it started to fall again along with the retrenchment policies. However, in neither of the countries does the level of benefits and services determine whether people decide to have children or not but rather it most likely affects family size.

Although public policies may provide incentives to form a family and especially to increase family size, this study indicates that the labour market plays a crucial role in people’s decisions about the family. Since the recession in the 1990s, women’s labour market position has not improved similar to men’s in neither of the countries; unemployment and sporadic employment affects women more than men. However, the Spanish labour market is more heavily masculine than the Finnish one, which makes it more difficult for Spanish women to establish themselves and to advance their careers. This and the underdevelopment of public measures to ease the reconciliation of work and family together with younger women’s growing reluctance to devote themselves only to family and children are factors that might force women to choose childlessness, or to limit the size of the family and to postpone childbearing further than in Finland. On the other
hand, when the state does little to support families in their coping with professional and family obligations, two incomes are necessary to buy the services needed. Furthermore and regardless of the type of welfare state, living expenses and the expected standard of living in Spain, Finland and Western countries in general have risen and, thus, two incomes are often necessary for the family economy.

Several studies, including this one, show that even though marriage and fertility rates are declining, most men and women say that having a stable partnership (mostly marriage) and children are their aims in life. Thus, the focal question to be asked is why the young people of today ‘fail’ to achieve this aim more often than the previous generations (cf. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002). This comparative study of Finland and Spain shows that in both countries, the major reason for the changes in patterns of family formation is young people’s difficulties in establishing themselves in the labour market and gaining financial independence, which is a precondition for household and family formation. According to the individualisation thesis, the weakening of traditional forms of authority as directors of our biographies and the increased valuing of and seeking personal gratification has paved the way for lifestyles competing with the family and family life (cf. ibid; Giddens 1995, 1999). Although it is undeniable that individuals increasingly negotiate their own moral stance, their relationships and biographies, the decisions concerning one’s life such as marriage, remaining single, having children, remaining childless, becoming independent, etc. are never totally up to an individual. They are made in particular social contexts, with significant others and with the influence of social and individual resources (cf. Edgar 2004).

As demonstrated in analyses reported in Articles 3 and 4, prolonged studies, the instability of the labour market and low or irregular income are major factors that postpone family formation in both countries. However, owing largely to the welfare state types, differences exist between the countries. In Spain, the lack of individual public support for young adults, the lack of affordable housing, and
the cultural tradition of leaving home when marrying are factors that postpone gaining independence and family formation even longer than in Finland, where individual social security, the availability of publicly owned rented housing, housing allowances, student housing, the system of student loans and grants and the tradition of early emancipation make establishing one's own household and having children possible (although not desired) even without regular income, wealth or affluent parents. It appears that public support for young people might further the formation of new families but enhancing young people’s entrance into the labour market and limiting fixed term contracts and periodic employment might make a more substantive difference in forming new families with children.

The instability of employment and low or sporadic income creates insecurity and the inability to plan for the future, despite the measures of public support. The postponement of such commitments as family and children are not only a matter of adopting post-modern and individualistic values and attitudes but also represents a means of risk control or a strategy to cope with uncertainty. As the expectations of couple relationships increase, so does the chance of a break-up and, therefore, being dependent on a partner is a risk that fewer women, in particular, are willing to take and this emphasises the importance of personal income. Furthermore, forming a family and having children before one has attained sufficient financial and material security is considered a major risk, especially for successful parenting and for the welfare of the children.

According to Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (2002), individualisation – the historical process that increasingly questions and tends to break up the traditional or normal life history, paving the way to the do-it-yourself life history – is the reference point for explaining changes in the family. What counted in the pre-industrial family was not the individual person but common goals and purposes. In this respect, the family in pre-industrial times could be defined as a ‘community of need’ held together by an ‘obligation of solidarity’.
Modernisation, particularly the emergence of the wage work society and the development of the welfare state, paved the way and enforced the logic of individually designed lives first for men and later also for women. The development of the welfare state played a focal role in the process of individualisation. By reducing economic dependence on the family, the state increases the scope of individual action. Thus, the contemporary family of individual times could be described as elective affinities which, unlike the pre-industrial family, are based on emotional ties rather than economic and material ones (ibid; see also Giddens 1995, 1999).

This thesis is undoubtedly correct but there are some remarks to be made on the basis of the findings of this comparative study regarding the meaning and role of the family. Although emotional ‘need’ is nowadays more emphasised than ‘economic’ need, the family may still be described as a ‘community of need’. The family remains an important source of economic and material support for its members especially when the labour market is erratic and the welfare state tightens its belt. Besides, as the Spanish case in particular demonstrates, the family is still held together not only by emotional ties but also by an ‘obligation of solidarity’. Spanish legislation, like the Finnish legislation, obliges parents to be liable for providing maintenance to their minor children but it also obliges major children to be liable for their parents’ maintenance and siblings to be liable for helping each other (under certain circumstances). In Finland, this kind of broad liability between parents and their grown children and between siblings is a moral obligation rather than a legal one. Considering the definition of the family in terms of the legal maintenance liability, the Finnish family is clearly defined as a nuclear family whereas the definition of the Spanish family is broader.

In Finland, the welfare state has supported individuality and the individual’s independence from the family particularly in the case of women and young people. In Spain, there is a long history of public emphasis on the family, its role as the principal provider of welfare
and on women’s caretaker role within the family. Owing to this, the
democratic state has, until recently, deemed the family to be a private
matter. Generally speaking, the Finnish welfare state has reduced the
individual’s economic dependence on the family but the Spanish
one has not. This difference is reflected in the possibilities for and
patterns of forming new families. Paradoxically, the family-centred
society makes it more difficult to establish new families than the more
individualistic one.

In addition to reducing the individual’s dependence on the family,
the welfare state also ought to reduce the individual’s dependence
on market forces (cf. Esping-Andersen 1990). However, the recent
retrenchment policies have turned the course of the Finnish welfare
state in the opposite direction and brought the Spanish one to a
standstill. As has become apparent, the choices of life, family lives
and the well-being of both Spaniards and Finns are more dependent
on the labour market and earnings than on the welfare state even if
it is the type of welfare state that has policies designed to mitigate
dependency on market forces, like the Finnish one.

Social change not only influences the conception of the family
in society but also in research. Considering the conceptual shift
regarding the family in research, basically, three views on the family
prevail among social scientists. First, there are those who perceive a
massive change in the family, even the end of the traditional family.
Others criticise the talk of crisis and predict the revival of the family.
The third group, lying somewhere in between, prefers to speak of
tendencies towards pluralism. All these standpoints are based on
empirical data and especially on demographic statistics.

The analysis of Finnish and Spanish families indicates that the
traditional or conservative idea of the family is in crisis if the family
is defined as a conjugal male breadwinner-female homemaker family.
It fits well neither to egalitarian values nor to the reality within
which people live in contemporary societies. A life-long marriage – a
prerequisite of the traditional definition of the family – has remained
the ideal most people hope to pursue in both countries regardless of the differences in divorce law and the frequency of divorce.

If the ‘normal’ family is defined as a conjugal, nuclear family where both spouses are in employment most of the time during the family cycle, then the family is going strong both in ideological and practical terms. Most Finns and Spaniards hope to live and end up living in this sort of a family although not always permanently and some more than once.

Family pluralism is a reality in both societies although ‘alternative’ family forms such as families based on cohabiting couples, single parent families, and reconstituted families are still more common in Finland than in Spain. However, the two latter ones are not usually consciously chosen from the outset but rather are consequences of failed marriages (and/or relationships). Families based on a cohabiting couple, on the other hand, often lead to a family based on a married couple. Furthermore, there are families that are based on a couple but composed of three generations living in the same household. These types of families are more common in Spain than in Finland, so far.

3.2. Family in Converging Europe: Discussion

The analysis of the Finnish and Spanish cases as representatives of different European societies demonstrates that although global forces push social changes in the same direction in each society, the specific contexts moulded by political, economic, religious and cultural developments and characteristics create and maintain differences. The historical and in-depth analysis of the two cases demonstrates how the family is very closely and in a real way connected to macro-level changes and circumstances. Furthermore, viewing the family as a social institution and as an ideological construct held up by laws and policies reveals that the family is political and not only in the sense of a ‘battleground’ of the sexes and generations or as a locus of
negotiations of power and resources. The analysis of family institutions and ideologies over the 20th century shows that the family has been harnessed to the purposes of the ruling power and of the state in various ways either explicitly or implicitly at different times. Although explicit interference in individuals’ private lives and in family lives is no longer politically correct, public policies, legislation and the labour market shape the frameworks within which individuals live and make their choices. Therefore, individualisation is very much ‘institutionalised individuality’, to use Parsons’ (1978) term, implying that increased freedom of choice does not equal a breakdown of order or limits. Besides, in the world of accelerating globalisation, it is not only the national frameworks shaping people’s lives but also the international ones, like the European Union and European integration.

Finland and Spain can both be considered as peripheries of Europe. Studying peripheral regions or regions aside from the core of Western Europe enables us to evaluate the impact of global processes such as European integration. Within the frame of this study, we may ask, has the process of European integration and joining the European Union had a converging impact on the Finnish and Spanish welfare states and on the family? Or, is it rather so that the convergence of different European societies has occurred despite the European integration process? This study has demonstrated that the structural and economic development of Finland and Spain, societies that in many respects have been and are different, has been remarkably alike since the 1960s. This suggests that convergence occurred before the countries joined the European Union. Besides, Spain joined the European Community a decade earlier than Finland and this did not seem to cause a distinction between the modernisation paths of the countries. During the past century or so and particularly since the Second World War, West European societies have begun to resemble each other more and more in terms of economy, production structure, political organisation and of degree of secularisation and they have undergone a similar gender revolution and demographic shift, etc.
In fact, this ‘pre-EU’ convergence may have been the factor that has facilitated the process of European integration (cf. Alestalo 1992; Kuhnle and Alestalo 2000).

Studies indicate that the process of convergence, particularly its economic dimension, has been faster and more notable among EU members than among other societies but the EU membership as such is not the reason for the accelerated economic convergence. Rather, the poorer member states benefit from the growth created by the EU policy of transfer payments (Bornschier et al. 2004). The ‘community logic’ on which the European Union is based seems to have other effects besides ‘pure’ or direct economic equalisation. Studies, this one included, indicate that during the past decade or so the ‘less developed’ welfare states in Europe have been under pressure to improve their level of social security and services and, on the other hand, all types of welfare states have been under pressure to cut back public expenditure (e.g. Kuhnle 2000; Social protection in Europe 1999; Taylor-Gooby 2004). Consequently, the Finnish social security system has become a bit more earnings-related and means-tested than before and Spain has attempted to develop its welfare state, which has resulted in some improvements, e.g. in the reconciliation of family and work and health care provision in particular. Speaking in terms of welfare state types, the Finnish and Spanish welfare states appear to be converging as they are slowly moving towards the middle ground. Generally speaking, owing to economic globalisation and the Maastricht commitment to ‘open markets’, the capacity of European welfare states to reduce the individual’s dependence on markets and, consequently, on the family has diminished. Welfare systems are changing according to market values by expanding private provision and modifying services to minimise conflicts with national economic competition, etc. (Taylor-Gooby 2004: 29–48). Consequently, people’s decisions about their private lives and biographies are increasingly directed by market values and the labour market. As we have seen, difficulties in establishing oneself in the labour market affect family formation and fertility
negatively. Furthermore, the dependence on the family as a provider of welfare increases and, on the other hand, the possibilities to form new families decrease.

On the other hand, the aging of the population and declining fertility have for long been recognised as problems even at the level of the European Council. Already in the late 1980s, the European Commission stressed the reproductive and economic significance of the family for Europe’s political, economic and cultural position in the world. Despite the stress on the family as the bedrock of Europe and its competitiveness, no common policies to support families exist in the European Union. The principle of subsidiary leaves social and family policy the responsibility of the member states. The lack of common social protection is explained by different attitudes of very dissimilar governments, by political diversion within the EU and by the existence of fully developed and different welfare states. The exclusion of the family as a political issue on the community level is explained by the very different cultures and traditions of member states (Weiss 2000).

However, the cases of Finland and Spain indicate that there are signs that may be interpreted as a process towards the convergence of different welfare states. The study also shows that regardless of different cultures and traditions, the socially held idea of the family has converged. Furthermore, it has become evident that regardless of differences in patterns of family formation, generally speaking, family life is converging in different countries. The figures representing the European Union average in the tables illustrating the socio-demographic changes presented in Article 3 indicate that, besides Finland and Spain, similar processes of convergence apply also to other European Union countries.  

28 The European Union in this study does not include the accession states that are joining the EU on May 1st, 2004.
Parallel socio-demographic trends and indication of convergence of welfare states, family ideologies and family lives suggest that a basis for developing common social protection in the EU may exist after all. If and when economic globalisation and economic and monetary unification in Europe is changing different welfare states towards a parallel model and making individuals increasingly dependent both on market forces and on the family, perhaps the Community should also take common action to better enable the formation of new families and to ensure the functioning of the existing ones. Observations that differences in patterns of family formation and fertility largely come from structural factors, and that the existence of family-friendly policies and services may have a positive effect on the formation of families, on fertility and especially on family size, suggest that the development of a common support system for families in Europe might assist with balancing the disproportion of age groups in the member states and, thus, ensure the welfare of people in Europe and Europe’s position in the world. However, as the study indicates, the welfare of families and individuals neither on the national nor on the European Union level is ensured only by the development of public policies and services, but also by employment policies.

It has been acknowledged that such processes as rapid progress towards economic and monetary union and Union enlargement have an impact on social protection and make it a common matter of Member States and a matter of cooperation at the European level. Consequently, the European Commission made a proposal for a concerted strategy of social protection in 1999, which exhorts the Member States to develop pension, health care, wage work and the promotion of social inclusion. The message of the proposal is in line with market values and economic competition. In a simplified manner, it states that labour markets ought to be developed so that work pays and provides a secure income, which in turn is the principal, although not the only means to prevent social exclusion. Equally, the social protection of families ought to be developed so as to better reconcile
wage work and the family in the forms of benefits or allowances, leave schemes and care services so that European women in particular and men are able to work and be economically productive (cf. Social protection in Europe 1999). On the basis of this, we may ask what kind of family ideology the European Union and its bodies, records and recommendations are upholding? Are the economic and political goals of the EU bolstering the family as a ‘community of need’? How free are we to choose a kind of family life in which to live?

Methodologically speaking, this study evinces that although a case-oriented comparison with few cases cannot offer generally applicable explanations and accounts, it is a method that has value also over the particular cases. First, historical and in-depth analysis of few cases enhances the qualitative understanding of different societies and their institutions, and in so doing, questions the stereotypical notions we tend to have of other societies and also of our own. Second, going into few cases enables us to get acquainted with the multiplicity of factors that are associated with the phenomenon of interest and reveals the kinds of factors that might be of importance also in other cases if we want to go behind general trends. Thinking in terms of European studies, which comprise a growing and increasingly demanded branch in social research, the kind of in-depth knowledge that is achievable through case-oriented studies is of focal importance for the future development of Europe.

The ‘institutional’ approach and view on the family is only one of endless possibilities and even this view could have been expanded to include the historical analysis of laws, regulations and policies on taxation, inheritance, children’s rights, custody regulations, the care of the elderly and disabled, adoption, foster parenting, reproduction technologies, the reunification of family members of refugees and asylum seekers and on immigration, just to mention few. In addition, including regional, class-based and ethnic differences would expand upon the understanding of family institutions in Finland and Spain. However, the strength of this study is that it clearly demonstrates how
micro-level processes are in a very real way connected with macro-level structures and with long-term historical changes. Considering the family (whatever its form) from a macro-level perspective and as a social institution among other institutions, its importance is not diminishing on the individual, national or European levels. In fact, it seems that the opposite is true, especially if the view on the dwindling capacity of the welfare state to decrease dependency both on market forces and on the family is accurate. When wellbeing is increasingly dependent on the erratic labour market and the private provision of services and security, the family’s role as a ‘community of need’ based on obligation, morality and the necessity of circumstances is bound to increase rather than decrease.

It is important to recognise that although for many the family is an important and positive resource, the dependence on the family may also have negative effects. Studies on the negative sides of family life at the individual and family levels are many but the negative effects of dependency on the family on the societal level, not to mention the global level, are still few. The image of the family as a self-evident and inherently positive and comfortable bedrock of the society still holds fast in sociology.
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II

NATIONS’ DIFFERENT FAMILIES?
CONTRASTING COMPARISON OF FINNISH AND SPANISH ‘IDEOLOGICAL FAMILIES’

Article 1

1. Introduction

Are Northern and Southern families as different as usually assumed, and if so, in what ways and why? These questions are the inspiration for the present study. The aim of this study is to provide some answers to these questions and to justify the doubts by formulating and analysing Finnish and Spanish cases as representatives of Northern and Southern families. The cases are built of selected sets of Finnish and Spanish laws and policies which are directly focused on and targeted at families, family formation and family life. Another selection criterion has been that the laws and policies are nationally applied. This is very important for comparative purposes because unlike in Finland where laws and policies are national, in Spain laws and policies may be either national or regional.

Accordingly, the main problem of comparing Finland and Spain is the fact that Spain is very heterogeneous in cultural, social and economic terms, whereas Finland is clearly more homogeneous. For this reason, it is risky or even erroneous to talk about the (uniform)
Spanish culture, although it is risky also in the case of Finland, but perhaps less so.

Therefore, I want to stress that this study is not about real Finnish and Spanish families and their lives nor is it about laws and policies as such. It is about ideologies of families that laws and policies reflect. But why ideologies? Because the conceptions of Northern and Southern family types arise out of ideologies and stereotypical notions which affect our comprehension. Ideologies and stereotypical notions function as standardising forces that provide mythical and universal representations of social structures and systems of social relations (Thompson 1986). They operate like stamps which label the families of different nations according to dichotomies such as modern/traditional, individual/collective, secular/religious, public/private.

Ideologies do not just hang in the air. They are historical, social and cultural creations which do have links with material circumstances. Ideologies have been imposed on us through political power, education, social policy and religion, among other things. They influence and determine the ways in which laws and policies are formulated and implemented, and consequently influence people’s behaviour and lives. Family ideologies do not actually dictate our lives but they do give us hints about how a proper, normal and respectable life should be lived (cf. Gittins 1985). But since ideologies are historical they must alter to correspond to the prevailing circumstances.

In consequence, shedding light on the historical, social and cultural dimensions leads to discussions about the modernisation process in connection with the family institution, the modernisation processes of Finnish and Spanish societies, the development of family legislation and policies, and the transformation of values. Therefore, the historical time span of the study reaches from the early decades of the 20th century to the present day, although the stress is on the past few decades.

The sources are comprised of sociological, anthropological, cultural, historical, political, social political and legal studies and
publications. However, I have stressed studies by Finnish and Spanish scholars in order to highlight the national viewpoints and characteristics. In order to find answers to my underlying questions I will look for both differences and similarities that are related to Finnish and Spanish family ideologies. To accomplish this I use a contrasting comparative perspective which is based on the understanding that discovering and giving attention to similarities among apparently ‘disparate phenomena’ helps to place differences in proper perspective (see Rappaport 1999).

2. Family and Modernisation: Myth and Ideology

Family is a historical and ideological institution with cultural symbolic value. To have a family, to be a member of a family, has traditionally been an indicator of normality, respectability and social acceptability. Family is also a very complex concept due to its multiple forms. A family is not just a collection of individual members but a social, cultural and historical construct and as such it is a part of the larger constructs (Camps and Hernández 1997; Segalen 1997; Vosler 1996). Family, like all other structures and organisations, changes over time. In other words, the changes that occur in the society affect families and families, in turn, affect the society.

It has become necessary to admit that family is endlessly varying because it is not a thing but a process both in historical terms and in terms of the individual life-course (see Bernardes 1987; Hareven 1994). Yet, myths about ‘The Family’ are persistent both in common and in scientific conceptions. The myth produced by theorists has underpinned most social scientific writings about family from the mid-19th century to the 1960s and even further. According to this myth, industrialisation or its associate, modernisation, changed the family in an inevitable and dramatic manner. In particular, the sociological argument has been that in pre-modern societies the dominant family
(household) form was an extended family, often involving three co-resident generations. It was assumed that age of marriage as well as age of childbirth was low, pregnancies were unlimited and the sense of collectivity was strong. Then in the course of industrialisation the familial harmony and community life was destroyed and the new creation was the modern nuclear family living their private lives in isolation from kin and other meaningful social relationships (Anderson 1994; Hareven 1994; Häggman 1996; Jallinoja 1984; Takala 1992).

Recent family historical studies have been tearing down this myth piece by piece. Extended families were indeed more common in the past, but in Western Europe the most dominant family form was the nuclear family (see Hareven 1994; Laslett and Wall 1972; Takala 1992). Even though most households were nuclear they differed considerably from the nuclear family that we know. Families were larger and included more children as well as non-relatives like servants, boarders and lodgers. They also contained different age configurations because of later marriage, later childbearing (cf. above), higher fertility, and lower life expectancy. Furthermore, second marriages, reconstituted families and lone-parent families were common because of high mortality. And rather than being isolated, nuclear families or households had close kin ties to those relatives who did not share the same house and household (Anderson 1994; Gittins 1985; Hareven 1994).

In short, industrialisation did not have such a dramatic impact on family forms as has long been assumed. The kind of nuclear family described above existed long before industrialisation took off. And, on the other hand, in the post-industrial era as reconstituted families become more common, the family circle widens again somewhat resembling the enlarged family circle of pre-industrial times. However, in contrast to its pre-modern counterpart, the contemporary enlarged family circle is not clearly based on blood and working relationships and on belonging to the same household. Instead, spouses, their relatives and their possible mutual children, their children from
previous unions as well as ex-spouses and their relatives and their possible new families constitute a large and complex social network. Furthermore, even though the emotional importance of the family has gained emphasis, the family has not lost its economic significance. Grownup children depend on their parents’ economic support, e.g. because of youth unemployment, long periods of study and lack of housing facilities. Parents’ economic and material support seems to be quite important also to adult children with their own families and own small children (see Hareven 1994; Oinonen 1998b; Segalen 1997).

Modernisation did not change the family by creating family forms that did not exist before, but rather created an ideology of the family. Thus, the ideology of the family is an historical creation. In fact, the very concept of family, as we understand it now, was not used until the late 18th century. Development of the concept of the family as well as the ideology of the family is inseparably linked with the modernisation process: the rise of industrialisation, the bourgeoisie, science, secularisation and the increasing role of the state, particularly the welfare state (Gittins 1985). Therefore, as we are investigating family ideology from a comparative perspective, it is particularly important to shed some light on the paths of modernisation of the countries in comparison.

3. Finnish and Spanish Paths to Modern Societies

Finland and Spain are regarded as belonging to different families of nations, and the nations’ typical families are assumed to be different. Indeed, both the popular and academic understanding of differences between the Northern and Southern European welfare states are focused on the family. Finland represents the Nordic welfare states with allegedly modern and/or de-institutionalised family structure. Spain belongs to the Southern group of welfare states where the family structure is institutionalised and/or traditional (Martin 1997). Due to
these characteristics, it is also assumed that the family is less important in Finland than in Spain because of the more developed welfare state and stronger stress on individuality (see Alestalo and Flora 1994; Castles 1993; Cousins 1995; Esping-Andersen 1990; Ferrera 1996; Kosonen 1992, 1994, 1995; Lewis 1997; Tyrkkö 1997).

Southern and Nordic, whether they refer to welfare state or family types, refer to different histories, cultures, systems and structures. These qualifying terms highlight the great differences generally assumed between countries representing different families of nations (see Castles 1993). However, despite these differences, there might also be some similarities. From this point of view, the selected countries Finland and Spain provide a possibility to see how accurate the stereotypical notions of Southern and Northern families are.

3.1. Socio-Economic Modernisation

There is hardly any specifically European form of modernity, but the modernisation processes do differ between central and peripheral areas in Europe. In central areas (e.g. the United Kingdom, Germany and also Sweden) the modernisation process developed from agrarian to industrial and further to a service society. The mode of development in peripheral areas did not follow a similar path (Sapelli 1995; Therborn 1995). Both Finland and Spain are late-bloomers where modernisation is concerned, but when they set off they developed at enormous speed. The industrialisation process was late and weak, and agriculture remained strong until the 1950s and the 1960s. In the course of the 1960s and 1970s the Finnish and Spanish societies experienced rapid and profound changes transforming them from more or less backward agrarian societies into fully industrialised ones (Niemelä et al. 1996, 1998).

The take-off of industrialisation, growth of the service sector and modernisation in agriculture all happened simultaneously, which
increased population mobility. As a result the countryside emptied, urban areas filled, and as well as moving to urban areas, Finns moved to Sweden and Spaniards to Central Europe (Niemelä et al. 1996, 1998; Riquer y Permanier 1995). Suburbs were built and public services had to be developed, a new urban, highly-educated middle class emerged as did a new working class largely made up of those of rural origin, and women entered the labour market to an increasing degree. The oil crisis slowed economic growth in the mid-1970s. Spain’s economic development was interrupted also by the transition period from Franco’s dictatorship to democracy, and thus the late 1970s and 1980s were times of political uncertainty, economic crisis and growing unemployment. From the end of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s Finland experienced a period of stable economic and employment growth, but in the early 1990s Finnish society faced a banking crisis, collapse of Soviet trade and mass unemployment. The recession also hit Spain and in fact Finland and Spain have had the questionable honour of leading the European unemployment rates in the 1990s (see Carr 1980; Niemelä et al. 1996; Riquer y Permanier 1995; Sapelli 1995; Shubert 1992; Taskinen 1998).

From the socio-economic point of view, perhaps the greatest difference between the countries has to do with the degree of wage work. Compared to Spain, Finland is more clearly a wage-work society where a larger part of the population works in an official economy. As we compare the figures representing the share of total labour force from total population aged 15–64, in Finland it has been from 70 to 80% during the whole period in question (1960–1990), whereas in Spain the percentage has changed from slightly over 60% in 1960 to around 58% in 1990 (Niemelä et al. 1996: 11). However, in Spain part of the population works in the unofficial sector and therefore does not show up in statistics (see Cousins 1995; Guillén 1997).

The Finnish peculiarity is the high percentage of women’s labour force participation, and their engagement in full-time employment. The share of women in the labour force has risen continuously
between 1960 and 1990 and is still rising. Between 1960 and 1990 the share of women in the total labour force has been between 40–50%, whereas in democratic Spain it has grown from 20 to 30%, remaining below the OECD average. One explanation given for these differences is historical. During the Second World War there was a labour shortage in Finland since men were at the war and thus were replaced by women. When the war ended, there were widows who had to support themselves, and also the struggle to pay reparations to the Soviet Union needed both men and women. In Spain the Second World War did not cause such need because Spain managed to keep out of the war (Niemelä et al. 1996: 11–12). However, even though the Second World War did not affect Spaniards directly, their Civil War (1936–39) did. The Civil War meant that Spanish women were needed to keep the society going while the men were fighting. Perhaps the main difference was that in Spain it was strongly stressed that women’s work in the public sphere during wartime was an exception, and their wartime contribution aimed at re-establishing traditional norms and values according to which women’s real duties lay in the domestic sphere (see Graham 1995: 109–11). So the historical reason for the different levels of women’s labour force participation in Finland and Spain may not be derived from war histories but e.g. from legislation and from family and gender ideologies.

Economic growth together with the safety net of the modern welfare state has produced higher levels of economic security than ever before in history. Along with this general prosperity and security people’s behaviour and attitudes have changed, which has influenced the structures of families. Children are not needed to support the family financially, at least not to the same extent as before, while on the other hand, the modern way of life is expensive and thus one source of income in a family is seldom enough. Moreover, social status is not based on family relations as it used to be, but on education and professional career.
3.2. Demographic Modernisation

What then happened to family structures and behaviours? Despite the pro-natalism of the Franco regime, fertility and marriage rates fell in Spain, and only when the economy started to recover and general living standards improved did the rates begin to rise in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Cousins 1995). In the Northern countries, Finland included, the decline of fertility rates started in the 1960s, but a decade later Southern countries followed the same path and actually overtook the North. Virtually the lowest rates nowadays are found in Spain and Italy, whereas the highest rates are in Northern European countries, namely Finland, Denmark and Ireland (Ditch et al. 1998b: 5–7).

Like procreation, marriage does not seem to attract Europeans to the same extent as it used to. In all countries marriage rates are declining, as are remarriages. The fact that the age at which people marry has increased is often given as an explanation for falling marriage rates, but it seems that fewer people are marrying overall (Ditch et al. 1998b: 10). Yet there are differences between countries in behaviour of family formation and dissolution. Now the marriage rate in Finland is lower than in Spain, but this was not the case in 1970 nor was the difference very marked in 1980, either. Greater differences are found when we look at the divorce rates and the amount of births outside marriage. Even though divorce rates have risen in almost all Western European countries, there is a clear south–north division. In Southern European countries divorces are still quite rare. In fact, the lowest rates are in Italy and Spain, while the highest rates are found in Belgium, the UK, Sweden and Finland (ibid.: 13).

The same pattern is repeated in the case of births outside marriage. Again Sweden, Denmark, France, the UK and Finland hold the top positions, while the lowest rates are found in Southern countries (ibid.: 15), though the rates have been increasing in every country. High numbers of births outside marriage in Finland indicate that
cohabitation is common and a widely-accepted way to start a family, whereas in Spain the foundation for family formation is marriage. Again it should be noted that most of the cohabiting couples in Finland do marry after a child is born (Taskinen 1998). According to Kiernan and Estaugh (1993), there are three groups of countries in relation to the prevalence of cohabitation. Countries such as Sweden and Denmark where cohabitation is an established relationship form belong to the first group. The second group is composed of countries where cohabitation is a transitional phase preceding marriage, such as Finland, Austria, France, Germany, The Netherlands and the UK. The Southern European countries together with Ireland form the third group where cohabitation is relatively uncommon altogether.

Thus with respect to demographic data on family formation and dissolution Finland and Spain seem to belong to different groups. There are some features worth pointing out. Regarding fertility, the rates in Spain started to fall at the same time when recovery took place in Finland. The Finnish rates were lowest during the 1980s when the economy and consumption were growing. A similar kind of growth took place in the Spanish society in the second half of the 1990s. Marriage attracts Finns less than Spaniards. The Spanish rates are around the Western European average and the Finnish rates are under the average. The most remarkable differences are in divorce rates. The difference may be explained by divorce legislation, the influence of the Catholic Church in Spain and by the fact that Spanish women are not as economically independent as Finnish women, as the percentages of women’s labour force participation indicate.

The welfare state is often accused of causing these demographic changes in the modern, industrialised countries because it has taken over familial tasks. In the following I will take a brief look at the Finnish and Spanish welfare states and their development and emphases.
3.3. Welfare State as an Element of Modernisation

Being fully aware that it is debatable whether the use of welfare state typologies is valid or accurate in comparing different countries, I will refer to Nordic and Southern welfare state types when I describe and compare the Finnish and Spanish welfare states. Finland and the other Scandinavian countries are at the top of the hierarchy when it comes to total social expenditure as a proportion of GDP, and Spain and the other Southern countries are low on the ladder. When we look at who pays for social protection, employers are the principal payers in Spain, while in Finland the costs are almost equally divided between the public sector and employers (Abrahamson 1997: 156–9). Personal social services in Finland are mainly public and thus provided by the public sector. In Spain public social services are financed through general taxation and through social security contributions, but there are also other service providers financed privately. On the whole the service sector in Finland is the core of social policy, whereas in Spain it is poorly developed even though the public supply of personal social services has increased during the last decade (Guillén 1997; Sipilä 1997).

When we consider at whom social security and services are targeted, there appears to be a very clear ideological difference. The most important principles of the Finnish system are universalism and egalitarianism. Everybody regardless of income and social status is entitled to social security and services, though several benefits are means-tested. According to Martin (1997: 327), social welfare systems in Southern Europe in general give hardly any protection at all to those who lack money or status. Therefore, access to rights is neither universal nor egalitarian, but based on personal connections, selection and ‘patronage’. So, in contrast with Finland, social security and services in Spain are targeted to workers and to those in special need (with the exception of universal health care). As in all Southern
countries the aged and those who are or have been employed in the formal sector are well protected, but those working in the irregular or informal economy and the unemployed are weakly protected (Abrahamson 1997; Ferrera 1997; Guillén 1997; Nygren et al. 1997).

These differences are explained by economic, political and cultural factors. Ingelhart (1995) has studied cross-national variations in the values emphasised in different societies, and his analysis indicates that the clearest cultural differences exist between Northern and Southern Europe. The important factor here is the role played by religion. Finland is a purely secular state, where religion and the Church have no influence in politics or government, neither explicitly nor formally (Rauhala et al. 1997). But in Spain religion and the Catholic Church do play an influential role, although the Constitution of 1978 abolished the Church’s formal role in state affairs (Cousins 1995). Southern and Catholic countries are still very traditional and less individualised compared to Northern and Protestant countries. For example, families in Spain have a more critical role both in care and material provision than in Finland. In Spain family solidarity promoted by the ideology of the Catholic Church (Social Catholicism) means more than just a commitment to help each other. That is, generations are more likely to belong to the same household or at least live close to each other, and family members of different generations are dependent on each other in a very real way (Flaquer 1998; Guillén 1997; Lewis 1997).

The Northern countries are more affluent than their Southern counterparts and their welfare systems have been developed in a way that enables people to be less dependent on family and community (see Halman 1995; Ingelhart 1995). The level of affluence is at least partly connected to the employment structure. As noted earlier, Finland is clearly a wage-work society where people are engaged in the formal labour market and thus the state’s tax revenues are assured. In Spain the black market economy as well as seasonal work is much more common and therefore the state’s loss of income from taxes is greater.
Also the absence of a tradition of public services and of administrative culture has hindered the development of the Spanish welfare state. Further, the timing of welfare state development in Spain coincided with the economic crisis in the mid-1980s, whereas in Finland the developmental phase in the late 1970s and the 1980s occurred at time of steady economic growth (Guillén 1997; Sipilä 1997; Rauhala et al. 1997; Valiente 1997).

From a political point of view, stability has been greater in the North than in the South, and the greater stability has presented more solid ground for the modernisation process in all its manifestations. In Spain the long history of political instability and repressive authoritarian rule have left a legacy of distrust towards the state (Cousins 1995). By contrast, Finns have a very positive attitude towards the state, largely due to the extraordinarily stable political conditions during the past decades (Sipilä 1997). Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Spanish welfare state regime is that the period of dictatorship delayed the (re)gaining of civil rights. It was as late as 1978 when both men and women gained equal rights. In particular the late (re)entry of women into policy-making and public life in general has meant that the establishment of civil rights has been the first priority, and social rights are lagging behind (see Cousins 1995). This has affected the development of family policy in particular as will be seen later on in the paper. In Finland equal civil and political rights for both sexes date back to the early decades of the 20th century. Finnish women gained access to policy-making in 1906, earlier than anywhere else in Europe. Since then social policy and particularly family policy and social services have been women’s arena as they have been creating them, developing them, using them and being employed by them (Rauhala et al. 1997; Sulkunen 1989).

The Scandinavian states have been characterised as woman-friendly whereas the Southern counterparts are said to be deeply influenced by ‘machismo’, which sees women mainly as dependent wives and mothers instead of independent individuals (Jones 1995; Montero
1995). Indeed, there is a strong woman-friendly element in Finnish society, for strategies of social policy are targeted to further women’s efforts to connect private and public spheres, family and paid work (and to choose between them). In other words, women have gained a chance at individualisation, and men’s burden as breadwinners has been relieved. On the other hand, the Scandinavian welfare state model can also be described as a reorganised patriarchy, where male dominance has moved from the private sphere of marriage and family to public institutions. From this point of view the welfare state is an established machinery to control female sexuality, reproductive capacity and labour force. And instead of freeing women, the welfare state has increased women’s dependence on the state by making them welfare employees, clients and service recipients (Rauhala et al. 1997).

As this short and very limited review shows, Finnish and Spanish welfare states are different, although a certain degree of institutional convergence can be detected as the South is inspired by the North and vice versa (Abrahamson 1997). The recession in the 1990s aroused economic and ideological debate on and criticism of the Finnish welfare state, and in practical terms, social policy expenditures, particularly those targeted to families with children, have been cut considerably (Forssén 1998). The 1990s recession also affected Spain. According to Cousins (1995: 194) the deep recession brought an economic and ideological reaction against the expansion of social rights and further development of Spanish welfare state in a more universal and egalitarian direction.

Regardless of the type of welfare state and the underlying principles, and whether they are converging or not, women are those who are primarily responsible for taking care of dependent family members. Furthermore, with respect to the similarities and differences between Northern and Southern welfare states (read Finnish and Spanish), the family has remained the most important provider of welfare.
4. Marriage and Family in the Light of Legislation

According to traditional Christian doctrine, the prime purpose of marriage was procreation and the rearing of children. Parents might limit the size of their families but the only acceptable way was periodic abstinence for married couples (and absolute abstinence for the unmarried). Furthermore, marriage was a sacrament indissoluble except by church annulment, and any expression of sexuality outside marriage was a grave sin. With regard to gender roles, women were to remain at home and men were given the authority over their wives, children and other dependants in the household. These principles remained the doctrines of Protestant churches up until the 1920s and of the Roman Catholic Church until the 1960s. Protestant churches did loosen their principles in the 1920s when the Conference of Protestant Churches declared that contraception was a legitimate option for married couples, and acknowledged and accepted divorce and women’s right to work outside the home. The response of the Catholic Church to the secularising principles of Protestants was the Casti Connubii (on Christian marriage) which consolidated the traditional Christian doctrines concerning marriage and the family (D’Antonio and Aldous 1983).

The secularisation and modernisation of legislative principles started gradually in the late 1920s and the early 1930s both in Finland and in Spain. However, the remarkable difference is that in Finland the process has continued steadily up to the present, whereas in Spain political changes rudely interrupted the modernisation process. Besides religion, the most important factors that have shaped Spanish culture and society and thus the family ideology are the dictatorship, which was supported by the Catholic Church, and extremely rapid social and cultural changes that took place after General Franco’s death in 1975. The political circumstances in Finland have been fairly stable compared to Spain. Besides political developments, very important
factors that influence both the family and the social legislation are
gender and civil rights. In this respect, Finland and Spain stand in
clear contrast to each other. In the Spanish case authoritarian rule
meant that civil rights and egalitarian principles (re)emerged very late,
in the second half of the 1970s. In Finland both men and women
gained full and equal civil rights in 1906.

4.1. The Finnish Case

Finnish legislation on marriage was founded in Christianity and in fact,
the laws contracting marriage have changed surprisingly little since the
Middle Ages. The rules on who may marry have not changed, with
the exception of the minimum age of marriage, which was lowered
from 21 to 18 years of age in 1756. Further, only monogamous and
heterosexual marriages are accepted and marriages between close
relatives are forbidden. Until 1917 religious ceremonies were obligatory
because marriage and thus the family were seen as institutions of divine
origin. The 1917 Marriage Act made civil ceremonies an option. The
law also legitimised dominance of the husband. He managed common
property and the wife could not use or decide on her own property
without her husband’s permission. In addition, the wife was expected
to be obedient and humble in every respect (Mahkonen 1978). The
legislation from 1756 to the early 20th century could be characterised
by subordination. As humans were subordinate to God’s will, so wife,
children and other household members were subordinate to the male
head of the household. The family or household and relationships
within it were like a miniature copy of the divine world order; sexual
behaviour, division of labour, hierarchy, economic power, etc., within
the household were all legitimised and justified by religious teachings
and the Bible.

The legislation concerning marriage and the family was strongly
patriarchal even though the social and legal position of Finnish women
had started to change in the 1860s when they were granted limited proprietorship and entrepreneurial rights and a right to represent themselves in legal matters. Also education and lower public posts e.g. as teachers became available for (some) women. Since then single middle-class women were able to live and function outside the family and free from the patriarchal power of father or husband (Ollila 1998). However, women had to wait for their full civil rights until 1906. Women’s movements started to get organised in the 1870s basing their ideology on egalitarian liberalism which argued that social life and social development had to be founded on individual freedom. Every person must be able to realise his or her own abilities, skills and potential as fully as possible, and to that end all the restricting elements and circumstances had to be abolished from the society and from the state (Helén 1997: 147).

By the 1920s a fraction of these demands for individual freedom was reflected also in the legislation concerning marriage and family. Also science, political and cultural independence movements, equal civil and political rights, independence in 1917 and the building of the nation-state as well as diversifying lifestyles caused by gradually emerging industrialisation and urbanisation, and the ideas of love and equality as the basis of marriage and the family all influenced the conceptions of and the roles given to the family (cf. Aalto 1991; Häggman 1996; Räisänen 1995).

The new Marriage Act in 1929 made spouses equal and gave married women juridical independence. Thus husbands’ legal dominance over mutual and wives’ property and within the marital relationship was abolished. However, the law was based on the idea of a breadwinner husband and homemaker housewife who were expected to live together and be sexually faithful to each other (Gottberg 1996; Helén 1997; Mahkonen 1978). As far as divorce is concerned, it was recorded already in the 1734 Marriage Act but in a very strict form. Divorce was allowed mainly on the basis of proven adultery (Mahkonen 1978). In 1929 a separation of at least one year become
an acceptable reason for divorce in addition to fault grounds (Aarnio et al. 1985; Gottberg 1996).

Legalisation of abortion was a subject of fierce debate from the beginning of the century until the 1970s. Pro-natalism was the prevailing ideology in Finnish society particularly between the world wars and therefore abortion was legalised only in 1950. According to this law, a pregnant woman could apply for abortion. If the application was accepted by two doctors, the abortion could be performed in certain hospitals approved by the Ministry of Health. Abortion remained a heated issue until 1970 when the new abortion law came into force. Unlike the previous law, the new one acknowledged a woman’s right to decide about her own body and life (Helén 1997).

As we come to the present day, the scope of juridical regulation of marital and familial life has changed remarkably. According to the Marriage Act of 1987, marriage, from the juridical point of view, is now merely an economic contract which can be dissolved without the other party’s consent and without an announced reason after a six-month reconsideration period. Personal matters concerning e.g. fidelity, living arrangements and intimate relationships are considered private matters of the family (Gottberg 1996).

The nature of marriage as an economic contract between two individuals becomes apparent also in the case of divorce. After division of mutual property both parties are expected to be financially independent after divorce which means that spousal alimonies are rare. With regard to children’s maintenance, both parents continue to be responsible for the maintenance of their mutual children, and the parent (usually the father) who does not live with the child has to pay child support (Aarnio et al. 1985).

The marriage institution has defined children’s legal position, too. The principle has been that all children have a right to maintenance regardless of the circumstances of their birth. According to the law of 1734, a child had a right to be maintained by his/her parents until he/she was able to support him/herself. Inheritance rights, however,
differed between children born in or out of wedlock. Only children born within marriage were rightful inheritors up to 1878 and it was as late as 1984 when all inequalities between children born in and out of wedlock were removed (Forssén 1998; Mahkonen 1978).

This improvement in children’s rights was connected with increasing cohabitation and thus with increasing non-marital births. Even though cohabitation has increased steadily from the 1960s and become a commonly accepted way of life, it is not comparable with marriage in Finnish civil legislation. Unlike in the other Scandinavian countries, separate statutes do not regulate the mutual relationship of men and women living together without being legally married. Therefore, those who live in consensual unions lack the right to inheritance, family property and family pension as well as economic protection in case the relationship ends (Gottberg 1996).

The emphasis on religious and ethical grounds of marriage has remained strong even though the marriage institution has been secularised, attitudes towards alternative lifestyles have become more permissive and the forms of couple unions and families have diversified. For instance, religious marriage ceremonies have remained popular. Only 5–7 % of those who can choose either religious or civil marriage ceremonies have chosen civil marriage (Suhonen 1997). Moreover, when the public discussion started in the mid-1990s about whether homosexual unions should be legally recognised and whether homosexual couples should have a right to adopt children, the argumentation revolved very much around the unethical and unnatural nature of homosexual unions and around fears for the institution of heterosexual marriage. Partly arising out of the general emphasis on religious and ethical grounds of marriage as the basis of the ‘proper family’, neither homosexual unions nor consensual unions have been granted equal status with the marriage institution.

Consequently, the marriage-based definition of the family is still very persistent in Finland. The most common family form still is the conjugal family with children. According to Statistics Finland,
in 1997 69.4% of all Finnish families were based on marriage and 68% of all families with children were composed of married couples and their children. Nevertheless, the changes have been remarkable in recent decades. In the 1960s marriage was the only acceptable way for a man and a woman to live together; in the 1990s the majority of first unions were consensual unions. Nowadays Finns start their life as a couple earlier but marry later than before. At the same time the age of women at the birth of the first child has risen. As a result of these changes, childless cohabitation has become a very common and quite long period in the life cycle. Despite these changes, most children are born within unions but increasingly within consensual unions. In 1975 around 10% of children were born out of wedlock, whereas the corresponding figure in the mid-1990s was around 30%. However, many of these cohabiting couples do marry after a child is born (Gottberg 1996; Statistics Finland 1998).

By the 1980s the nature of marriage as legal foundation of the family had changed from holy matrimony to a business contract. The modern values of individualism, personal freedom and freedom of choice and modern society’s demand for free agents are reflected in the legislation. Family formation is no longer based on a contract with God or even with society but on a contract between individuals, and in consequence, laws cannot regulate the inner life and relationships of the family (cf. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995; Jallinoja 1997).

4.2. The Spanish Case

Until the 1931 Constitution, the matrimonial system was conditioned by Catholicism which was the state religion. According to canon law, only canonical marriage was allowed. Monogamous and heterosexual Christian marriage was a sacrament and indissoluble. The only exception was that the Church could grant an annulment if the marriage was not consummated, or a separation if a married woman...
committed adultery. As the purpose of marriage was procreation, it was presumed that all children born to a married woman were always legitimate and consequently, a husband was responsible for the children even if he had doubts concerning his fatherhood. Children and wives were subordinate to the patria potestad, that is, absolute patriarchal power. The Civil Code (Código Civil) of 1889 stated that the father had legal authority over his legitimate children, and children had the obligation to obey him. Similarly, a wife was a legal minor and she, too, was obliged to obey her husband; the husband’s duty was to protect his wife and children (see Alberdi 1995; Flaquer 1998; Iglesias de Ussel 1998; Shubert 1992).

The short period of The Second Republic (1931–36) made a great difference and produced a progressive set of legislation. According to the 1931 Constitution (Constitución), Church and state were separate and women were legal equals with men. The legal majority for both sexes became 23 years of age and for the first time women were able to vote, stand for parliament, act as witnesses and guardians, sign contracts and administer estates. Furthermore, women could not be dismissed from paid work because they had married (1932). The constitution also produced the most innovative and liberal laws of the time, such as divorce by consent, regulation of abortion and equality between legitimate and illegitimate children. The marriage institution was secularised and civil marriage became an option also for Catholics (see Alberdi 1995; Cousins 1995; Graham 1995). However, the formal equality and liberalism did not have great effects on everyday life mainly because of its short existence.

When General Franco and his authoritarian regime came into power in 1939 this progress was replaced by regression which lasted until Franco’s death in 1975. After the Civil War the Church demanded the abolition of divorce and family law returned to the Church. Religious marriage for baptised Catholics was made obligatory, the Church was given the right to pronounce a decision of matrimonial separation and annulment, and divorce was no longer an option. Equality between
illegitimate and legitimate children was removed, and adultery and the use of contraceptives were penalised (Cousins 1995: 184). Legally speaking, there was a return to the 1889 Civil Code that once again made women juridical inferiors and married women minors before the law. The Franco regime and its ally, the Catholic Church, made the patriarchal family an image of the state. It also promoted an ‘ideal’ image of womanhood. The ‘Perfecta Casada’, the dedicated, submissive and self-sacrificing spouse and mother was the model woman, and motherhood was considered a duty to the fatherland. Thus, women were to stay at home and identify themselves with the family, not as individuals. The husband regained his full patriarchal powers over the wife and children. A married woman could not open a bank account, apply for a passport or even take a paying job without her husband’s approval. And if the husband allowed her to work, he had the right to claim her salary (Cousins 1995; Graham 1995; Montero 1995; Shubert 1992).

At the dawn of democracy the Civil Code was reformed in 1975 giving women equal rights with men. The total change started along with the 1978 Constitution which was based on egalitarian principles and granted freedom of ideology and religion. Sexual discrimination as well as discrimination based on descent were abolished. In other words husband and wife became juridical equals and the authority of patria potestad changed into parents’ authority over and responsibility for their children. Furthermore, all children regardless of their descent gained equal status and rights. And the law also enabled paternity tests. Adultery and the sale of contraceptives were decriminalised but legalisation of divorce and abortion met with great opposition from the Church and from right-wing politicians. After a fierce debate, the new divorce law finally came into force in 1981 and abortion was legalised in 1985. The Constitution also guarantees the social, economic and juridical protection of the family (Alberdi 1995; Cousins 1995; Flaquer 1998; Montero 1995: 381–2; Picontó-Novales 1997).
The 1981 law reintroduced divorce but it also included the juridical systems of separation, nullity and dissolution. The actual divorce has two stages in the sense that divorce cannot be requested directly, neither in the case of mutual agreement nor in the case of fault by the other spouse. Before divorce is granted the spouses need to be officially separated for 1 to 5 years (Picontó-Novales 1997: 113). The fierce debate concerning the divorce law revolved around the fear that the possibility of divorce would make the divorce rate rise like a rocket and destroy the Spanish family institution. But this fear was needless since the divorce rates are still the lowest in Europe. Picontó-Novales (1997) points out that one explanation for these low rates is the fact that it is not possible to apply for divorce directly. In fact, most of those whose marriages have broken down are separated, which means that they cannot remarry (Alberdi 1995: 204; Flaquer 1998: 160–1.) The ‘popularity’ of separation instead of divorce is one notable factor that explains the relative rarity of reconstituted families in Spain. In consequence, the (re)legalisation of divorce did not reflect the increased desire of people to get out of their marriages, as Alberdi (1995: 206) notes, but it showed that society accepts and acknowledges the individual’s right and freedom to search for personal happiness and well-being.

The modern legislation has focused much on children and their rights. As noted earlier, all children are equal and have equal rights before the law. According to the Constitution and to the principles of ‘modern’ patria potestad, parents are obliged to maintain and take care of all their children, whether born within or outside marriage, until they reach maturity at age 18. However, parents are obliged to pay for the education also of those children who are no longer minors (Flaquer 1998: 138–9; Picontó-Novales 1997: 113). In the case of separation and divorce parents’ duties towards their children do not change and both parents must continue to contribute to the costs of the children according to their economic capacities. Children also
have a say in decisions about their custody or guardianship, and have
the right to visit and be in regular contact with the parent with whom
they do not live (Alberdi 1995: 394). Custody is almost always given
to the mother and so far shared custody is not legally admitted. As a
result, the courts are gradually starting to favour fathers concerning
parental authority and visiting rights. In addition to the lack of shared
custody, another problem that divorced or separated women face is
the lack of set maintenance allowances paid by separated or divorced
men (Fernández Cordón 1998: 82).

In this context a few more words about maintenance liability are
in order. In countries like Spain where the legislative system is based
on Roman law, the maintenance liability is more extensive than in
countries with an Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. In the latter, in legal
terms the course of liability goes from parents to their minor children.
This is the case also in Finland. In Spain, however, family/kin members
have a legal obligation to support each other financially (la obligación
de alimentos). In addition to parents’ liability towards their minor (and
sometimes mature) children, children are liable to take care of their
parents if the need arises. These alimentos amplios (broad support)
means that parents and adult children must provide each other all the
necessary support to maintain their living standards. Furthermore,
siblings have an obligation to provide each other ‘restricted support’
alimento restrigidos), that is, basic needs if there is a temporary
and exceptional need. Failure to fulfil these obligations may actually
lead to criminal prosecution (Alberdi 1995; Flaquer 1998). On the
whole, we may say that parents are responsible for their children and
family members are responsible for each other, and the state’s right to
intervene in the private life of the family occurs when the family is
dysfunctional and children’s economic, moral, mental and/or physical
well-being is in jeopardy (Picontó-Novales 1997).

Even though the political and legislative changes started in the late
1970s, the family as an institution began to change during the 1960s
when the authority of the official orthodoxy and traditional values as basis of the family started to be replaced by personal values (Flecha Andrés 1998). As Iglesias De Ussel (1998: 23) notes, the behaviour and attitudes of the majority of the people transformed the Spanish family before the transformations were acknowledged by legislators. While family forms have been and are diversifying, Spanish families are still quite traditional compared to most other Western countries. Marriage is the principal foundation of the family, divorce rates are among the lowest in Europe, and single-parent families, reconstituted families and cohabitation are still relatively rare.

The special feature of Spanish heterosexual cohabitation is that it is not particularly young people’s way of life or a pre-matrimonial phase. Instead, most cohabiting partners have one marriage behind them. In Spain cohabitation is not a mode of family formation since the vast majority of children is born within marriage (Flaquer 1998: 84–6; Iglesias de Ussel 1998: 54–5). The legal status of cohabitation has been much debated and the majority of Spaniards would grant the same rights to cohabiting couples as married couples. Legally speaking, there are no precise nation-wide regulations concerning the mutual relationship of men and women who live together without being married other than that children’s rights are secured by the law whether their parents are married or not (Alberdi 1995: 432–6).

However, recent legislation and jurisprudence tend to give cohabiting (heterosexual) couples the same rights as married couples, and cohabiting heterosexual and homosexual couples can register their unions in municipalities. The debate over the law regulating the rights of cohabiting couples has surprisingly focused on very controversial issues, namely the treatment of homosexual couples, especially their right to adopt children (Fernández Cordón 1998: 83; Guerrero and Naldini 1996: 12). The new law (La ley de parejas de hecho), which treats heterosexual and homosexual couples the same concerning their rights to inheritance, pension and compensation in the case of the

4.3. Family Law and Family Ideologies

Until the late 1920s and the early 1930s the family in both countries was conceptualised according to Christian doctrines. As structural changes swept over the societies and the new ‘social issues’ emerged from e.g. industrialisation, urbanisation, secularisation as well as the changing class positions and demand for women’s rights, the new ideology of the family overtook both the upper-class and peasant family ideologies. The idea of marrying for love, the demand for egalitarianism and new scientific and political ideas changed the conceptions of the family and backed up the new ideological creation of the middle-class nuclear family based on intimacy and emotional ties. Even though the ‘old’ family types existed long after the new family ideology emerged, it became a model for everyone to strive for, which was also reflected in legislation (Gittins 1985; Räisänen 1995).

The idea of love marriage as the basis of the family, together with the liberal voices demanding equality, disrupted the patriarchal tradition and created the idea of home and the family as an emotional rather than economic unit. In fact, in this respect, the Spanish family law during the Second Republic (1930–36) was the most liberal and egalitarian in Europe, but it was soon brutally swept away by authoritarian rule which turned back to the repressive and extremely patriarchal ancient family ideology. In Finland, legislative development has been more constant, moving from a patriarchal family ideology towards an egalitarian one. Perhaps it is possible to say that Finnish legislation concerning marriage and family has gradually changed to correspond to the demands of the people and the society. In Spain,
however, the long authoritarian period used marriage and family institutions as political weapons and means of control.

Despite the stereotypical claims of the great differences between families in contemporary Finland and Spain, I would say that from a legal perspective the contemporary conceptions are more similar than different. In both countries marriage is still the principal basis of the family. The rights of family members are egalitarian, emphasising individuality. The divorce procedure is simpler in Finland, which is reflected in the higher divorce rate. As the statistics show, the actual divorce rate in Spain is low, but statistics do not take into account the peculiarity of Spanish divorce law and therefore hide the amount of separations. The greatest ideological difference is reflected in the statutes regarding maintenance liability. From that perspective and officially speaking, the Finnish family is clearly defined as a nuclear family composed of parents and their children, particularly minor children, as mature children do not belong to the family if they live in a separate household. The definition of the Spanish family is broader, consisting of parents, children and siblings even if they live in separate households. The modern conception of the Spanish family does not, however, correspond to the enlarged family because fewer and fewer families actually are composed of three generations living in the same household. Instead, it is more like a network, as Flaquer (1998) points out.

Comparing modern Finnish family ideology to the traditional Spanish one, there is a very surprising legal detail. In Spain where cohabitation is a rare phenomenon, cohabiting couples (and even homosexual ones) are, at least to a certain extent, taken into account in the legislation. Conversely, Finnish civil legislation does not yet recognise cohabiting couples (not to mention homosexual ones) even though cohabitation is common. From this point of view it seems that in Spain the development of modern legislation is ahead of people’s actual behaviour, whereas in Finland the actual behavioural patterns are eventually taken into account in the legislation.
5. Family in the Light of Family Policy

In the following I will continue the historical look at Finnish and Spanish families and family ideologies but now from the point of view of family policies. Family policy, as it is understood here, is a collection of various laws, statutes, services and ideologies that are targeted at families or, better yet, at people’s everyday lives through the family.

5.1. The Finnish Case

In pre-modern, agrarian society, the family, kin and the house were the main providers. The master of the house was obliged to provide and secure maintenance for his own family and kin members as well as for his servants and tenants and their families. This obligation towards servants and tenants extended also to times of sickness and old age. General poor relief was also the duty of the village community. The well-off houses of each village were supposed to take care of the poor of the community (Jaakkola 1991; Takala 1992).

Stronger emphasis on personal responsibility for one’s own maintenance emerged at the beginning of the 20th century. The Poor Relief Order (1922) obliged every man and woman who was fit to work to maintain him/herself and his/her children. Furthermore, a person was not to set up a family if he/she was not able to take care of it. The aim of the public poor relief and other measures targeted to families was to keep the poor alive rather than to support the family in fulfilling its obligations. According to the 1920 Income and Property Tax Act, only poor families were entitled to child deductions although in 1924 this right was extended to all taxpayers. Unlike the state, the private religious and upper-class women’s charity organisations saw the family and family life as social issues and problems. Material deprivation was considered to originate from asocial behaviour that
could only be tackled by teaching new civic virtues, housekeeping, and hygiene and by improving education (Takala 1992).

In the 1930s the family and its reproductive capacities became an issue due to the concern over declining birth rates. The Finn Gunnar Modeen and Swedes Alva and Gunnar Myrdal started the public discussion about society’s responsibility to support families in their reproductive duties. According to them, the structural change in society caused by industrialisation created a hostile environment for families and now the society should be made family-friendly again. The measure was a social policy programme that included housing allowances, free school meals, day care centres, various instruction, advice and education services and family income benefits for indigent families with children. This kind of programme did not gain much support in Finland at that time, for it was considered too expensive and inadequate. What was really needed was training of attitudes to create ‘willingness to procreate’ (ibid.).

Even though the social policy programme was not supported, some new legal measures were enacted that were also targeted to the poor. In 1933 Rural Allotment Parcels were instituted to give social aid to poor rural families to increase their self-sufficiency. These agricultural parcels expanded in 1937 allowing also child support. The National Pension Act came into force in the same year and in addition to old age and invalidity pensions (based on compulsory savings), it also included a pension for poor people with dependent children. The most important new laws launched in the 1930s were the Maternity Grant Act (1937) and the Law on Municipal Midwives (1937). The former was the first step towards equalising family expenses even though it was first targeted only to poor mothers. However, from 1949 onwards all mothers received the grant regardless of their socio-economic position. The latter law was important for public health and was the predecessor of the public health programme as it gave poor mothers a right to free aid at childbirth (Forssén 1998).
Family policy at that time was clearly population politics. Apart from increasing population growth, the aim was to improve the health and educational level of the population. The Population and Family Welfare Federation, founded in 1941, underlined the family’s and especially mothers’ roles in creating socially acceptable new citizens, a healthy and decent home environment and preventing social ills such as divorce. Marital guidance centres and sex education campaigns were designed by the Federation to give support and guidance to mothers to meet their duties. Also legislation was enacted to reduce child mortality and thus the Municipal Maternity and Child Care Guidance Centre Act was established in 1944. These Guidance Centres became part of the public health care centres’ services in 1972 when the law was replaced by the Public Health Act. As mentioned above, the need-assessment of the Maternity Grant was removed in 1949, and as it also made all pregnant women undergo physical examination, the reform was important particularly for public health. Perhaps the most important reform at the time was the 1943 Family Benefit Act granting benefits to indigent families with at least five children. This was an in-kind benefit including e.g. furniture, household articles, livestock, and children’s clothes. The benefit was abolished in 1974. The 1940s were also a time of promoting marriage and family formation since in 1944 the Act on Home-Making Loans for Young Married Couples was introduced. The original grounds for eligibility were that the man served a minimum of one year in active military service and that both spouses were under 35 years of age. The conditions were changed already in 1945: the couple had to be under 30 years of age, without means, and their banns had to have been announced (see Forssén 1998; Gauthier 1996; Karisto et al. 1985; Takala 1992).

The ideology of population politics was that the family was the basic cell of organised society. As long as the family was well it would naturally fulfil its tasks and produce well-socialised and adaptable citizens. Nevertheless, the dominant view seemed to be that everyone should master his (or her) own life and his (or her) own family, as the
family policy reforms adopted in the 1930s and the 1940s were still targeted only to those families without adequate means. At that time, the idea of the family was extremely familistic. The aspirations of family members were subordinate to the family’s stability and functional abilities as a unit. Even though family welfare was promoted, the family did not play the leading role. Instead, it played a supportive part in pursuing interests of the society.

By the 1950s and the 1960s the actual welfare of the family became the main reason and justification for family and social policy reforms. The principles of social rights and universalism emerged, that is, the benefits and services were not only for those with limited means but for all. The Child Allowance Act (1948) serves as a good example of this change. The idea behind the law was that costs of raising children should be equal for each family. Or, in other words, the purpose of family policy in general was to ensure that the consumption level of families with children would correspond to that of childless families. Following the Scandinavian model, child benefits were not paid along with the salary of the principal provider of the family, that is, the man. Consequently, the new child allowance system weakened the familistic emphasis by rejecting the one-provider model. The ideological change concerning women’s roles in the society was reflected also in Municipal Home Help (1951) which offered municipal home-helper’s assistance in regular household tasks primarily to poor families with children. With the reform in 1966 home-help services became available for all families in times of illness or birth. The legislation of the 1960s included Maternity Allowance (1964) which was first paid for 54 days, and the Special Child Allowance (1960) which was paid mostly to single parents but also on the basis of a child’s illness. This allowance was abolished in 1974 when survivor’s pensions were included in occupational pension schemes (Forssén 1998; Karisto et al. 1985; Kuusi 1961; Takala 1992).

The 1970s were a time of changes both in society and in the family. The greatest single change was the increasing labour force
participation of married women. At the same time families became smaller, divorces and reconstituted families became more common, the number of single parents increased and consensual unions became acceptable. The idea of the modern nuclear family was in crisis. Thus, by establishing child guidance and family counselling centres experts were called on to support and further positive development of families (The Child Guidance Centre Act 1972). These changes in family forms and family life had inevitable effects on family policy. Policy-makers were forced to take into account the multiplicity of family forms and family situations. The ‘social issues’ were the questions of gender equality and of fathers’ role in family life in general, and in children’s lives in particular.

Arising out of this, fathers also gained the right to stay home with a small child and receive paternity grants (Paternity Leave since 1978 and Parental Leave since 1985). The Children’s Day-Care Act (1973) and Children’s Home-Care Support Act (1980, 1985) also reflected the changes in society. According to the former, all children may receive day care. Since 1990 it has been a subjective right for all children under 3 years of age, and since 1996 day care is a subjective right for all children under age 7. The latter law is intended to support children’s home care after the parental allowance period; between 1985 and 1990 it extended to all children under 3 years of age. From the beginning of 1997, the home care support was replaced by a municipal care allowance system. The period from the mid-1970s to the present has been devoted to reconciling family and wage work. Besides these statutes, the Child Home Care Leave (1985) grants one parent the right to stay at home to take care of a child until the child is 3 years of age without leaving her/his job. Parents are also entitled to Partial Child Care Leave (since 1988) which allows for a shorter work day for a parent of an at-home child under 4 years of age or when the child is just starting school. From 1991 onwards a parent has also had the right to a shorter work day during the child’s first school year. Finnish
family policy is characterised by the strong efforts to secure women’s possibilities to work outside the home. It has also enabled parents to choose the form of day care for their children and granted the right to public day care (see Forssén 1998).

The changing conceptions of the family are very clearly pronounced in the development of the family pension system. In the 1960s the family pension system was based on the idea of the modern nuclear family. Only children and widows could receive family pension, whereas men could not be recipients because their income level was not in jeopardy if their wife died. Twenty years later the family pension reform (1989) was built on equality, which means that besides children now beneficiaries are all surviving spouses regardless of their sex (Karisto et al. 1985; Takala 1992).

Unlike the civil legislation, the social legislation treats cohabiting and married couples in the same way. For example, social benefits and services are determined by the mutual income of cohabiting partners even if they do not have mutual children and even though they are not obliged to support one another according to civil legislation. The social legislation assumes that people who live together also share their economic resources. Consequently, the actual cohabiting has replaced the marriage-based definitions of the family in the social sector. The main principle behind this view is that people living in consensual unions should not be in a more advantageous position than married people (Gottberg 1996; Mahkonen 1984).

With regard to taxation, both married and cohabiting couples are taxed individually. From the 1980s, tax deductions to families with children included municipal tax deductions for children, single-parent deduction and child-care and child maintenance deductions in state taxation. Also additional child allowance for mortgage loan interest deduction, additional child allowance for health care expense deductions, child maintenance deduction and spouse deduction were tax measures until 1994 when all deductions related to family policy
were discontinued. However, the amount of child allowances was raised significantly and a supplement for single-parents was established (Forssén 1998).

Nowadays egalitarian individual rights are probably the most important factors behind the Finnish family ideology. This individualisation process is particularly obvious when we glance at children’s position within the family and the development of their rights. The traditional subordinate relation between a child and his/her parents has been replaced by equality, at least in principle. The Law on Child Custody and Visiting Rights of 1984 started to treat children as persons with their own rights and not as parents’ property. For instance, according to the law, a child has the right to be guaranteed opportunity for balanced development and well-being according to his/her individual needs and desires. Further, a child must be treated as an independent individual whose needs and desires have to be taken into account when custody decisions are made. Therefore, a child has a right to participate in decision-making that concerns him/herself. In other words, children have gained principal autonomy and hence, the idea of the autonomy of the family is crumbling away (see Alanen and Bardy 1990; Forssén 1998; Takala 1992).

According to the Law on Child Maintenance (1976), the child has a right to adequate maintenance and parents have the duty to support their minor child according to their ability. When parents are unable to meet their support obligations, the municipality must pay the maintenance of the child (see Takala 1992). Parents are not liable to maintain their mature children (18 years of age and older). However, they are obliged to cover the educational expenses of their mature children to a reasonable extent. Students are entitled to receive student loans guaranteed by the state and monthly student grants, which are larger if the student lives by him/herself. A municipal maintenance allowance which guarantees the minimum income is available mainly for unemployed young people, and housing allowance is granted if the person lives away from the parental home (Korkeimman hallinto-
oikeuden muistio 16.6.1997). However, in reality young people have become increasingly dependent on their parents’ support during this decade. Due to the recession, the municipalities have tightened their grounds for granting allowances, youth unemployment rates are high, etc. Therefore young people stay longer in the parental home and are financially dependent on their parents whether they still live at home or on their own (see Oinonen 1999).

Egalitarian civil and social rights were initially men’s prerogatives. Then they gradually became women’s rights too and finally they have been granted also to children. Curiously enough, at the same time when these rights ceased to exist only for men, the state’s role and responsibilities as guarantor and distributor of resources and welfare have increased. Nonetheless, the primary producer and distributor of welfare in Finland is the family.

5.2. The Spanish Case

Most family programmes in Spain were created and developed during Franco’s rule and not before. Family policy was an inseparable part of the propaganda and official discourse of the authoritarian regime. Welfare rights including family policy programmes were used as a means of social control. All benefits were paid to the husband, a deliberate strategy to promote the cult of masculinity and reinforce male authority in the family (Cousins 1995: 178–9; Valiente 1997).

Family allowance (Subsidio Familiar) was first introduced in 1938 and affected most employed people and civil servants. It was financed by the state, employers and workers and the amount was same for all families (except large ones), varying according to the number of children. From 1941 onwards married couples were rewarded with marriage loans. The amount of the loan was doubled if the working woman gave up her job after marriage and became a housewife as long as her husband did not become unemployed or disabled for work. The
repayment was also reduced when children were born. The loan was converted into a one-time marriage bonus in 1948. During the same period, Spanish families with the largest amounts of children were awarded annual prizes. Large families were defined as having four or more dependent children. Large families had other remissions, too. Their family allowances were higher and taxation was lower. They also received preferential treatment on public transportation, loans, public housing, school fees and admissions, etc. (Valiente 1997: 366–7).

The 1945 Family Bonuses (Plus de Cargas Familiares), which were financed by employers, were paid to most employed people as a supplementary wage included in the paycheque. The amount of the bonus varied from 5% to 25% of the wage depending on the number of children. If beneficiaries also supported a dependent spouse, the bonus was higher. In 1954 another type of family allowance (Ayuda Familiar) replaced the existing family programmes for civil servants. It was a monthly payment that varied according to the number of dependent children and if the beneficiary had a dependent spouse. In 1968 the payment amount was standardised (ibid.: 366–8).

In 1966 family allowances and bonuses were replaced for most beneficiaries by contributory benefits, which meant that the receivers were employed taxpayers who contributed to the social security system. This new benefit was a monthly payment for each dependent child and for a dependent spouse. The benefit also included one-off bonuses at marriage and at the birth of each child (ibid.: 368).

The level of all these benefits was the same for all families regardless of their income level, with the exception of large families. They were paid to the breadwinner who usually was the father/husband; if both spouses worked, only one of them (usually the man) received benefits. The only exception to this was the one-off marriage bonus which was paid to both spouses. In addition to these benefits, there were also tax exemptions. Taxpayers could reduce their taxes if they had dependent children and/or a dependent spouse. Several of these exemptions increased along with the income level (ibid.: 368).
The family programmes clearly reflected the main object of Francoist family policies, namely pro-natalism. Marriage was encouraged and most of the benefits for children were only for legitimate ones. Large families were prized and, as a rule, the benefit recipient was the father/husband. Family programmes explicitly favoured one-earner families, as the benefits were higher if the other spouse (wife) stayed at home. Consequently, family policies during the first decades of the Francoist regime were in line with the other measures against married women’s labour market participation such as marriage bars (prohibitions from working in some companies or sectors of the economy after marriage) (Cousins 1995; Valiente 1997).

The economic importance of family programmes was considerable because actual wages were low. However, by the 1960s and the early 1970s the value of these benefits fell due to inflation and to the fact that the programmes were seldom updated. Most of the programmes of Franco’s time remained practically unreformed until 1985 and by that time their economic importance was almost nil. In 1985 the most obvious antifeminist benefits which were paid for a dependent spouse were cancelled; the argument behind this was that the state should neither extol the status of housewives nor discourage women’s labour market participation. Further, the one-time bonuses at marriage and the birth of each child were abolished. Subsequently, the monthly payment for dependent children became the main family benefit for employed people, while other family allowances, e.g. for lone parents or at childbirth, ceased to exist (Valiente 1997: 370).

Family benefits were modified in 1990 to make child allowances a means of protection against poverty. Thus, a means-tested contributory benefit for each dependent child was introduced. In addition, there is now a means-tested system of non-contributory benefits for family allowances, health care, pensions and invalidity benefits. According to the 1990 law, child allowance is granted for dependent children under age 18 if they are economically dependent on their parents and live in the same household with them, and for disabled children. Benefits for
large families remained practically untouched except that now large families are defined as those with at least three children (or two if one of them is disabled) under 21 years of age or under 25 if they are still studying. The economic importance of the benefits for large families has decreased since 1975 for two reasons: there are fewer and fewer large families, and inflation has done its job (Cousins 1995: 193–4; Fernández Cordón 1998: 85; Valiente 1997: 371).

As for taxation, the regressive Francoist system was replaced by the new and progressive income tax (Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas). This new system granted tax reliefs to families if the couple was married (until 1987), for each dependent child and for child-care expenses (since 1992) (Valiente 1997: 371). Tax reliefs are also granted if there are dependent grandparents and/or legally incapacitated dependants over 18 years of age in the family unit (since 1997). Until 1989 married couples were taxed jointly but since then they have had the right to choose either individual or joint taxation. The joint declaration must include all members of the family unit, defined as married spouses (not legally separated) and their minor children, or a lone parent and minor children. A cohabiting couple does not meet the definition of a family unit (Fernández Cordón 1998: 84–5).

In short, the present measures of family policy in Spain are tax reliefs, benefits for large families and non-contributory and contributory child allowances for those with low or no income. Valiente (1997: 372) describes the Spanish family policy as low-level in terms of spending and institutionally invisible. But the absence of family policy is family policy, as Iglesias de Ussel (1998: 58) aptly points out. Political powers tend to see the family and family-related issues as citizens’ private matters, and they fulfil their legal duties by offering a minimal level of protection to families. However, family policy also has great symbolic value in creating a family-friendly climate in the society corresponding to the present needs (see Flaquer 1998: 147). While women’s social role continues to change, and
more and more women no longer see home as their natural base but are participating in the labour market, need and demand for family policies and services rises.

Compatibility between family and work has only recently been considered a social problem; consequently, one of the most important objectives nowadays is to reconcile family with wage employment (Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales 1997). The 1989 legislation extended maternity leave, established parental leave and developed publicly-provided child care for children from 3 to 6 years of age. Both mother and father can take parental leave if they both work. The maximum duration is three years and the leave is unpaid. Parental leave is considered ‘forced leave’ (excedencia forzosa), which means that one cannot lose one’s job (since 1994). The unpaid parental leave is taken into account in the old-age pension of the person who took the leave. Furthermore, a short leave to take care of a small child at home e.g. in case of illness is possible but this child-care leave is also unpaid. Until 1989 the paid maternity leave was six weeks before and eight weeks after childbirth. Now maternity leave (which can partly be taken by fathers) is 16 weeks; during that time the mother is entitled to an allowance (Cousins 1995; Fernández Cordón 1998).

The fact that parental leave is unpaid reduces its effectiveness in reconciling family and work, but this is not the only difficulty that working parents with small children have to face. The provision of public preschool/nursery services for children over 3 years of age is quite high, but the supply of child-care facilities for children under 3 years of age remains insufficient (Cousins 1995). Today’s grandmothers still belong to the generation of housewives and are very important providers of child-care services. But in the future grandmothers will also be working women without possibilities or even the desire to take care of their grandchildren. Public services targeted to families, in general, are an exclusive domain of Comunidades Autónomos (Autonomous Regions) and therefore vary widely between regions. The programme of Minimum Guaranteed Income (Renta Mínima de
Inserción Social), which is very important especially for lone-parent families is, however, implemented in most regions (Fernández Cordón 1998: 86–7; also Naldini 1998).

5.3. Family Policies and Family Ideologies

In the course of the 1930s and 1940s concern over declining birth rates placed the family in the centre of societal and political debate all over the Western world. Family policy at that time was population politics in both Finland and Spain. The simple aim of population politics was to increase population and, therefore, the public measures encouraged marriage and family formation. The family, particularly in the form of housewife, breadwinner father and their children, was put on a pedestal. Women’s mothering role was no longer solely a self-evident natural truth but also their patriotic duty.

The ideology behind the Finnish population/family policy was to protect mothers and children from societal and domestic hazards, and the female politicians had a very important role in developing the policies. Irrespective of their political outlooks, they all emphasised motherhood, but the ideas about its essence separated the right wing and social democrat groups. For the right-wing women the only foundation for motherhood was marriage and harmonious and private family. According to social democrats, the essence of motherhood was the inseparable bond between a mother and a child. Their aim was to provide protection for both married and unmarried mothers and for all children born in or out of wedlock. Right-wing women also demanded protection, but only for ‘legitimate’ mothers. According to them, the state should not secure the position of ‘illegitimate’ mothers for it would encourage immoral behaviour. Even though both parties agreed that woman’s proper place was at home, the reality was that many married women and mothers had to work. Therefore, the social democrats also demanded that the state help working women by
providing a maternity welfare programme including maternity leave, allowance, health care and child care (Sulkunen 1989). Consequently, the development of family policy led to the deterioration of patriarchal family ideology and strengthened the division between public and private spheres and gender roles within the family. The family and home became very matriarchal, and the benefits such as child allowances were not paid to fathers but to mothers. The fathers’ role as the master of the house was reduced to that of provider.

In contrast, the Spanish population/family policy was designed to strengthen the patriarchal family ideology. Men’s mastering role was promoted in many ways; the allowances and benefits were paid to the breadwinner of the family (the man), married women’s labour force participation was discouraged and even prohibited in some sectors, and the amount of benefits was reduced if the wife worked. Due to the general lack of civil rights, men’s possibilities to act in the public sphere were limited, but they had absolute authority in the private sphere although women’s roles as mothers and amas de casa (housewives) were highly valued. Getting married and having as many children as possible were rewarded. Due to the cult of housewives no services were developed even though some women had to work outside the home. Child care and other services that working women needed were expected to be provided by other female family members, kin or neighbours.

Spanish family policy remained practically unchanged until the mid-1980s when the most antifeminist features were removed, and still today the level of benefits and services is low. Nevertheless, the family ideology continues to change. The patriarch has lost his power and family members are supposed to be equal. Women increasingly have a life also outside the home, and men are expected to do their share of domestic duties. The Spanish family is also moving away from the one-earner family ideology. However, Spanish family policy regards family as a conjugal family, whereas Finnish policy treats married and cohabiting couples and their families in the same way.
There is a paradox concerning family policy in Spain. The family is considered to be the most important thing both by the Constitution and by the people and yet family policy is still relatively underdeveloped even though there have been advances during the past decades. Why is this? According to Flaquer (1998: 146), no political force, syndicate or social movement has demanded family policy. The reason is the strong force of familism in Spanish society which, in practical terms, means that those functions that are state’s responsibilities in the more advanced welfare states are family responsibilities in Spain. Amas de casa have provided services and care, but this is changing as the women of younger generations are working outside the home and their identities are not anchored to home and to providing services for other family members.

Valiente (1997) points out that the most crucial reasons for the underdevelopment of Spanish family policies today can be traced to the political history. During the authoritarian regime family policy was a means of political propaganda and, consequently, post-authoritarian policy-makers have wanted to distance themselves from the policies of the former regime, which is why family issues have been taboo or at least touchy issues. Spanish feminists have also been accused for the state of family policy. Their lack of interest in developing or even demanding family policy is an often-mentioned reason for the underdeveloped family policies. But feminists, like the post-Francoist politicians, rejected the system of beliefs that had inspired Francoist policy-makers and for that reason, most Spanish feminists considered a non-policy as the best family policy. Their argument was that the state should not promote such a social unit as the family, in which inequality between sexes exists (Valiente 1997). In the Spanish context, it is quite understandable why family policy has not been the first issue on feminists’ agenda. The late timing of the (re)gaining of citizenship rights and especially the late (re)entry of women into policy-making has meant that the first task of female politicians has
been to establish civil rights, and that is why social rights and social services including family policies have lagged behind.

6. An Interpretation of Nations’ Families: Questioning Dichotomies

Certain ideas force themselves onto the intellectual landscape and establish themselves as fixed ideas or self-evident things. They seem to resolve the fundamental problems and clarify obscurities. They are like the ‘open sesame’, the conceptual cornerstone on which a comprehensive analytical construction can be built. Such grande idées are due to the fact that everyone attempts to exploit them: trying them in every connection, for every purpose, using them for generalisations (Geertz 1973). Forceful ideas often turn into ideologies, as did the idea of the modern nuclear family which eventually developed into an all-Western family ideology. However, after we have become familiar with the new idea, when it has become one tool in our toolbox of theoretical concepts, our expectations concerning its usefulness become more realistic and its excessive popularity starts to fade, but it remains a permanent part of our intellectual armoury and still explains something. Instead of being all-promising, it becomes a seed giving rise to new ideas (ibid.). The grandiose Western family ideology based on the idea of the modern nuclear family has become a tool among other tools and a seed for new ideas. While it has become evident that the model of the modern nuclear family (in its structural functional form) does not clarify obscurities in different social and cultural contexts, new ideas have emerged such as Northern and Southern families in Northern and Southern families of nations. These new ideas may not (yet) be ideologies but stereotypical notions; nevertheless, they can also produce new views if they are analysed using a critical gaze and thick description.
The stereotypical notions of Finnish and Spanish families do hold some truth but they are based on thin descriptions of statistics, laws and policies. In this chapter, however, I try to go deeper and formulate thicker descriptions of Finnish and Spanish families by questioning and contextualising implications.

There are several dualistic notions behind the ‘typical Finnish and Spanish families’. As noted earlier, the Spanish family is considered traditional, familistic, tight and based on religious (Catholic) values. The Finnish family, by contrast, is supposed to be modern, individualistic, loose and secular. The stereotypic notions of Southern and Northern families indicate that the family ideology in Spain may be described as traditional and the Finnish one as modern. These characterisations allude to dualistic counterparts as components of these ideologies. At least the following dichotomies are present: traditional/modern, collective/individual, religious/secular, private/public. In the following I will analyse Spanish and Finnish family ideologies through these dichotomies.

6.1. From Traditional/Modern...

Traditional/modern is an umbrella pair of concepts under which all the other dichotomies mentioned above belong. In sociological vocabulary, tradition is used to refer to pre-modern societies, and modern is a concept to describe societies that have evolved through industrialisation, urbanisation and capitalism. Apart from these structural changes, modern also means a change in attitudes and beliefs and, correspondingly, tradition is also used to refer to those elements of the past that are important and kept alive in the present (Tonkiss 1998: 47). The latter meanings of traditional/modern are relevant here, for surely nobody can claim that Finland and Spain are anything but modern societies.
Traditional and modern contain ideas of continuity and change. Continuity refers to the idea that there are certain things in the society that we can rely on from one day to the next, and change refers to the idea of discontinuity between historical moments (ibid.). When we think about the family institution from this perspective, it appears ambiguous in its nature, for it represents both continuity and change. In other words, if modern equals change, we can say that family has always been modern in its nature, since it has never been a static institution. And, if tradition equals continuity, we can say that family has always been traditional too, since it is an institution that has always been and will continue to be there in one form or another.

When we look at ‘official’ Finnish and Spanish ideologies of the family, they are very much in accordance with the model of the modern nuclear family composed of a married couple and their children. This type of family is best protected by the law in both countries. The centrality of the modern nuclear family ideology is manifested in the fact that neither cohabiting heterosexual couples nor homosexual couples have the same rights as married couples in the eyes of the law. However, in this respect we may say that Spain is more ‘modern’ than Finland since the Spanish legislation has started to grant rights also to these ‘unconventional’ living arrangements, whereas the Finnish civil legislation does not yet recognise them at all. Nevertheless, in Finland cohabitation is a common way to start a family while in Spain it is not. From that perspective the Finnish family seems to be more modern than the Spanish one.

Children are central qualifiers of the family in all Western societies (Gittins 1985). Both Spaniards and Finns tend to think that it is a child or children who make the family. A childless married couple is not regarded as a ‘real family’ since they are frequently confronted with the question of ‘when will you start a family?’ (Alberdi 1999; Iglesias de Ussel 1998; Reuna 1997). But when we glance at the patterns of family formation, it is possible to say that in Spain the family is couple-
(marriage-) centred since very few people have children before they are married. In Finland, however, many people tend to have a child before they marry, and from that perspective the Finnish family may be called child-centred (cf. Segalen 1997; Schultheis 1997). Nevertheless, most of the Finnish couples do marry and therefore it is accurate to say that marriage has not lost its position as a central social and cultural institution. The couple- and child-centred gravity of family formation and the conception of the family is visible in the family policies. In Finland, even though the civil legislation puts emphasis on marriage, the social legislation acknowledges ‘unofficial’ living arrangements as families, especially if there are children involved. The Spanish social legislation rests more clearly upon the idea of marriage as a foundation of the family.

The most striking difference in the legal definitions of the family has to do with the maintenance liability, that is, who is liable to provide for whom. As noted previously, in Finland the liability goes from parents to their minor children, whereas in Spain the liability relationships stretch further: from parents to children, from children to parents and even from one sibling to another. From this perspective we may say that the official definition of the family in Finland corresponds to that of the nuclear family and the Spanish definition of the family is ‘enlarged’. In reality, however, the liability is not based only on legal obligations but also on moral ones. That is, in Finland parents continue to provide maintenance also for their mature children, especially if they still live in their parents’ house. The studies also show that adult children with their own families receive financial and material, not to mention emotional, support and services especially from their parents, but also from their siblings and vice versa. However, actual financial help is asked from family/kin members only in very acute circumstances, in the form of a loan which is usually paid back (Oinonen 1999; Segalen 1997). The greatest practical difference between the countries in question is that in Spain this extended liability is prescribed by the law and in Finland
it is a matter of morals. But no matter what the law says, the feelings of responsibility and care do not vanish when the children leave the nest and have their own families (see Oinonen 1998b).

To return to the structural functional interpretation of the family, the most functional family form in modern society is claimed to be the modern nuclear family because it is small and unattached to a larger kin group. Therefore, it is geographically mobile, which in practice means that the family can easily move to where the jobs are (e.g. Goldthorpe 1989). Flaquer (1998) claims that in this respect the Spanish family is dysfunctional (traditional) because the adult children tend to establish their own households near those of their parents and siblings, due to the multiple obligations they have to each other and to their strong sense of togetherness. In contrast, families in Northern Europe, for example Finland, are functional (modern), as the individual households of kin members are often scattered all over the country; this is possible because of the stronger stress on individual values over collective ones and of the loose family and kin relations in contrast with the tight ones in Spain and in other Mediterranean countries.

Does the physical and geographical closeness or distance of family and kin members really correspond to close or distant relations or to the level of attachment? Studies on Scandinavian families show that relations between nuclear kin members (parents, children and siblings) have remained close even though they often live far from each other. These relations are characterised by ‘intimacy at a distance’ (Gaunt 1997). My own study on Finnish families with children also revealed that relations to family and kin are the most important and closest social relations. Family and close kin members provide friendship, company, roots and a sense of belonging (Oinonen 1999). In his study on Swedish families, Gaunt (1997) points out that vacations and especially summer homes are the opposite of ‘intimacy at a distance’. As in Sweden, in Finland summer homes are often owned and maintained collectively by relatives. These can be a farm
or another type of childhood home in the country or an inherited summer house or cottage. As free time and vacations have become longer, people have more time and possibilities to use summer houses which are often distant, and kin from all over can gather there. Several generations may live there sharing the house, food and time. To avoid lapsing into too much romanticism, it is also true that as the summer place is often the most valued and the only form of common property, it may also lead to disputes and problems between the owners.

Aside from this ‘collective summer life’, valued principles are freedom and intimacy of an individual and a nuclear family in relation to the kin/family. However, many studies show that services are exchanged, and when it comes to caring for the aged, relatives and especially daughters do most of the caring (Gaunt 1997; Sipilä 1997). This ‘intimacy at a distance’ is possible because the public welfare programmes (e.g. child care and old-age care) relieve families of the burden and tension of care and economic support within the nuclear kin group. Thus, the welfare society gives greater space for friendship within the family/kin group (cf. Gaunt 1997).

For this reason, it is possible to say that in Finland emotional solidarity has replaced the duty of filial solidarity; further, we may assume that the sense of togetherness in the Spanish family is based more on filial solidarity. Yet, in real life the sense of togetherness is a mixture of both sorts of solidarity regardless of the actual space of intimacy. However, the study conducted by Camps and Hernández (1997) concerning the modern ‘pairalism’ (stem family) in urban Catalonia indicates that the idyllic picture of close Spanish families has another side, too. That is, that when ‘personal realisation’ becomes more important than ‘family life’ there is a severe contradiction between kinship/family obligations and personal freedom. When ‘intimacy at a close distance’ is expected and when family and kin members are in many ways (economically, materially, and for services) truly dependent on each other, the family, from the individual’s point of view, may represent support and/or oppression. One may feel that
interventions of the other family members into one’s life are excessive and the obligations towards others are overwhelming.

6.2. ...To Collective/Individual...

Previous paragraphs have hinted at the collective/individual dichotomy. In family studies collectivism is in most cases associated with the traditional way of life and with enlarged families of the pre-modern era. It has somewhat romantic overtones, like a longing for the good old days. Collective also refers to both emotional and economic attachment. Individualism, on the other hand, is considered to be a modern phenomenon which has both negative and positive connotations. On the one hand, it is connected with selfish, consumerist, egoistic and narcissistic behaviour that undermines the solidarity in society. On the other hand, individualism is also associated with freedom which is a fundamental, positive value (see Bauman 1996; Giddens 1991). Individualism, according to Turner (1991), is the doctrine of individual rights which may be expressed in a variety of religious, political, economic and legal forms. It is associated with Protestantism, which emphasises individual responsibility of action. Collectivism is often associated with Catholicism, whose doctrines emphasise collective obligations between individuals and collective responsibility of individual’s actions.

Comparisons between different families and family lives provide several indicators of collectivism and individualism. High divorce rates, frequency of cohabitation and singleness, low birth rates, leaving the parental home at a relatively young age and children’s self reliance as the main objective of family upbringing are associated with a higher level of individualism. In turn, low divorce rates, low levels of cohabitation and singleness, high fertility, leaving the parental home at higher ages and lack of emphasis on self-reliance in bringing up children are connected with culturally prevailing collectivism. Le
Bras (1997) criticises the use of birth rates as indicators of different trends of family values and practices. According to him, family systems that are over-exacting and demanding (collective) have the effect of restraining fertility, which may offer one explanation for the spectacular fall of birth rates in Mediterranean countries, Spain included. In contrast, in Finland which is regarded as individualistic, the birth rates are among the highest in Western Europe together with such countries as Denmark, Sweden and the UK which are regarded as overtly individualistic (see Ditch et al. 1998b).

Cohabitation is much more common in Finland than in Spain, but does it really indicate individualism? The relationships are often very long, many of them end in marriage and cohabitation is a way to start a family, so how could it be a more individual way of living than marriage? To be sure, it is more easily dissolved than marriage, but break-up is emotionally as difficult as divorce and financially even harder. Both cohabitation and marriage demand devotion and willingness to make a commitment. I would say that the all-Western phenomena of increasing cohabitation, singleness and divorce are not a question of individualism as such, nor are they a question of immorality or deterioration of collective values, but rather a question of the changing nature of communities and the sense of community. According to Bauman (1996), today’s communities can be characterised as ‘imagined communities’ because instead of institutionalised rules, norms and laws, they are principally based on a strong emotional desire to commit to a community. Therefore, imagined communities, families among others, exist as long as their members believe in them and are devoted to them. In fact, the ‘imaginativeness’ is becoming and has become formally recognised as, for example, divorce has become more easily attainable than before and modern legislation grants children the same status and rights whether they are born in or out of wedlock.

When it comes to raising children, self-reliance, ‘being oneself’, finding oneself and creating one’s own identity are central values in
the Northern countries. Further, we may say that they are common values in Protestant countries (Gullestad 1997; Schultheis 1997). By contrast, in the Southern and Catholic countries individuality is not a stressed educational value and overall the degree of individualisation of the family members is low (Flaquer 1994; Reher 1996). Schultheis (1997) suggests that valuing children’s self reliance is directly reflected in the habit of leaving home relatively young. Following his argument, we may assume that the reason Spanish young people stay at home longer than Finnish ones is that self-reliance is not a core value of their upbringing. This may very well be part, though not all, of the truth. First of all, historically speaking, in the northern parts of Europe, such as Finland, young people left the parental home to work, whereas in Spain and in other Southern European countries they left only for marriage. Thus in Finland it has been customary to lead an independent life before marriage. This difference is still prevalent today. The fact that Spanish young people leave the parental home later is due to extended studies, unemployment and shortage of housing. These factors hinder both marriage and other ways of gaining independence and forming a household of one’s own. Furthermore, this sort of dependency is not questioned (Alberdi 1999; Reher 1996). Secondly, the tendency to leave the parental home as early or as late as possible has to do with the possibilities offered by the state. In Finland everyone who has reached the age of 18 is entitled to receive the basic living resources, and students are granted student loans and grants; in Spain the state does not offer similar possibilities.

Arising out of this, it is true that the educational and socialising values are more individual in Finland and more collective in Spain. It is also true that the ideology behind the Finnish welfare state and legislation, in general, is individualistic. But Spanish legislation is also moving away from family-centred rights towards individual rights (see Iglesias de Ussel 1998). This, as we know, is the common development in all Western societies. In that sense, the individual has replaced the family as the basic cell of the society both in Finland and in Spain.
But this does not mean that in either of these countries the family and sense of collectivity no longer matter. Neither does individualism mean that values and morality have changed so that ‘anything goes’.

The emphasis on personal autonomy has reduced the significance of all sorts of institutions in the Western world. The individual is less guided by tradition and traditional institutions such as church and the family, and these institutions no longer legitimate individual moral choices to the same extent. The moral guidance of the Church, in particular, has been challenged especially in the realm of sexual morality. In issues like marriage, divorce, homosexuality, contraception and abortion people increasingly rely on their own judgements and prescriptions, and legislation is increasingly allowing it (Flecha Andrés 1998; Halman 1995).

It seems reasonable to think that there is a distinction between traditional or institutional morality and personal morality. Therefore, it is likely that the frequently discussed moral decline in contemporary Western societies does not exist as such. What may have declined, instead, is the traditional morality based mainly on religion. Traditional morality has focused especially on issues concerning sexual behaviour and reproduction, which nowadays are considered private matters, and therefore they have become questions of personal morality. This shift has required a growth in permissiveness, which in turn is based on increasing levels of education, mobility, mass media, etc. Permissiveness denotes an attitude according to which everyone is free to live as they see fit as long as their way of life and choices do not harm anybody else. Thus permissiveness does not mean a lack of moral standards, but indicates that people are willing to accept the fact that others may have a different set of values (Halman 1995). Permissiveness comes very near to Bauman’s idea of the post-modern mentality as one that accepts ambivalence and teaches people to live with it. Because the forms of culture are multiple and intertwined, the modern dualism that pursues clarity, ‘purity’ and all-encompassiveness
is not equivalent to the ambiguous reality. In order to function in modern society people need to develop a post-modern mentality that is accepting, permissive, flexible, and tolerates imbalance, unsteadiness and rapid change (see Bauman 1996; Jallinoja 1997).

It seems that contemporary morals are affected by two contradictory trends. On the one hand, people’s actions are increasingly regulated by various rules and laws, but on the other hand growing liberalism and permissiveness have extinguished the authorities dictating what is right and wrong. These simultaneous trends lead to a situation where some moral issues are administratively regulated, and others remain under individual consideration (cf. Jallinoja 1997). This schizophrenia is apparent when we consider the Finnish and Spanish regulations and people’s actual behaviour in relation to cohabitation. In Finland people cohabit without legal recognition, and in Spain cohabitation is administratively recognised but people seldom live in that way.

In a word, people nowadays are freer to choose how to live their lives and what to believe than in previous times. But this kind of freedom can also become a burden. As Giddens (1991: 81) has said, people in modern societies ‘have no choice but to choose’. Individual freedom is also relative. There are many constraints within cultural and social systems. People are social beings and one person’s actions and choices have some kind of an impact on the lives of others. Therefore, people, especially those who are close to each other, have to take others’ expectations, values and preferences into account, at least to some extent. Besides, in addition to other people, individual freedom is also restricted by legislation and common principles of decency. Consequently, it is correct to say that increasing individualism does not mean that ‘anything goes’. In addition, freedom connected to individualism brings responsibilities, particularly to be ‘decent’ while making individual choices, that is, making choices within commonly accepted ground rules which can be understood as the moral consensus in the given society.
People in modern societies live on a razor’s edge: at the same time as they have multiple options they are also historical and cultural beings and therefore carry the traditions inherent in their culture. This inheritance influences people’s choices both consciously and unconsciously. One important source of cultural heritage is religion. From a religious point of view Finland and Spain are similar in the sense that they are both Christian and different in the sense that one is Protestant and the other is Catholic.

The common trend in all Western societies is that more and more people are leaving the Church, they do not practise religion actively e.g. by going to church regularly, they doubt religious teachings, values, ethics and world view, etc. This sort of modern development has been particularly rapid in Spain. According to the Spanish studies, in 1970 two out of three Spaniards regarded themselves as ‘good and practising Catholics’, whereas twenty years later less than half did so. The studies also show that religious doctrines and the Church’s authority are increasingly questioned (Díaz-Salazar 1993; Montero 1993). Nevertheless, several studies have also shown that when we glance at the weight put on children’s religious upbringing and at the attention given to the Church on family matters, people in Southern and Catholic societies are more religious than people in Northern and Protestant ones (e.g. Guerrero and Naldini 1996).

However, the general secular trend does not in itself indicate that modern people do not have ‘faith’ or that they do not ‘believe’. Turner (1991: 143) points out that the secular trend has been exaggerated because, firstly, the focus has been on the relationship between people and the ‘official’ Church: the Evangelic Lutheran Church in Finland and the Roman Catholic Church in Spain. And, secondly, the popularity and prevalence of different cults in modern societies clearly demonstrates that neither modern societies nor the behaviour of modern people is dominated by technical and scientific rationality.
(also Díaz-Salazar 1993). The need for religious purpose in life is a permanent feature of human existence. Therefore, secularisation does not mark the disappearance of the meaning and significance of religion, but the transformation of the modes of religiosity. Religion is very alive in norms, values, morals, in family celebrations and in the ‘rites of passage’ (Parker 1998; Rappaport 1999). Because I do not have comparable data on Finns’ and Spaniards’ actual religious behaviour, and because that type of an approach to issues concerning religiosity and secularity is very common, I will concentrate on celebrations and rites of passage and on the values they reflect.

Why do Finnish and Spanish families get together and celebrate Christmas and Easter? One answer is because people have holidays then. But why do we have holidays just then and not a month or a week before or after? The answer is religion. Christmas and Easter are religious holidays. Many of us do not attend religious services then or even clearly recall the religious traditions behind these holidays, but the holidays are important. They give us a break from our daily routines, and they provide us time and opportunity (and obligation) to be with family. Moreover, every family, religious or not, has their Christmas and Easter traditions. In some families Christmas is not Christmas before the manger scene with Mary, Joseph and Baby Jesus is in its place. We give each other gifts, some paint Easter eggs, the flowers we put on the Christmas and Easter dinner table are particular flowers and even meals consist of particular foods, etc. All these traditions and symbols that make Christmas and Easter what they are have a religious origin. Some are Christian and some date back even further.

Another connection between contemporary Finnish and Spanish families and family lives and religion is found in the rites of passage, namely christening, confirmation and first communion, marriage and funerals (Parker 1998). Most children in both countries are christened in church even if their parents do not consider themselves religious. Adolescents go through the ceremonies of confirmation and
first communion even if they are not believers. Most people choose the religious marriage ceremonies instead of the civil ones and most people are buried in ‘holy ground’. When we go through these rites it is doubtful that we think about our changing position and status in the congregation. Instead, they are markers of the stages of our personal lives and of our new statuses within the family and kin and also in the society (ibid.). Furthermore, these rituals are usually followed by celebrations among the family, kin and the closest friends. So, like holidays, they also provide the time to be together in an atmosphere which is not marked by the everyday reciprocal obligations.

When people are asked why they marry, have children and thus form families, their answers are usually quite vague—because they are normal or proper things to do. When we add here the common opinion that family is not family without children, it becomes quite obvious that the notions of normality and propriety have much in common with the old Christian doctrines concerning sexual behaviour. According to Christian doctrines, (heterosexual and monogamous) marriage is the only legitimate forum for sexual relations, and the sex drive should be harnessed to procreation (cf. D’Antonio and Aldous 1983; Gittins 1985). Furthermore, infidelity is regarded as morally wrong, the most valued things in life and the most important elements for the good life for Finns and Spaniards alike are family and good and close relations with family members (Alberdi 1999; Flaquer 1998; Iglesias de Ussel 1998; Melkas 1996; Puohiniemi 1996; Reuna 1997). So, regardless of the permissiveness towards others’ different ways of life, people themselves tend to act quite traditionally. And further, these familial values outstrip such values as work and leisure even in Finland where the Protestant work ethic and value of self-reliance are strong. As we have seen, many of the contemporary values and practices, and especially those connected to family and family life, have a religious background. Religion, particularly Christianity, has shaped the cultural heritage of both Finland and Spain. From this perspective it may not be too bold to claim that Finns and Spaniards
and, particularly, their family ideologies and lives are equally religious and secular.

The issue of secularisation divides sociologists into two camps. There are those who treat secularisation as a loss of faith connected to the loss of community and moral coherence, and those who regard secularisation as a gain in personal freedom and autonomy. As has been discussed earlier, the views of both of these camps are not beyond doubt. The basic notion, however, is that secularisation involves diminished social significance of religious institutions. That is, the Church’s control e.g. of education and provision of ‘poor relief’ have been taken over by the state and the Church does not have an explicit role in states’ affairs (e.g. legislation) (Beyer 1998; Turner 1991). In consequence, we can assume that religious then means the opposite. From this point of view, it is obvious that today both Finland and Spain are secular, although the ‘secular tradition’ is longer in Finland than in Spain due to Franco’s alliance with the Catholic Church.

In a modern society, religion is supposed to belong to the private sphere and not interfere in the public sphere. But as Riis (1998) points out, the civil religion has political associations to such an extent that the values underlying a political ideology are either directly or indirectly related to a religious world view. The religious-political dealings can lead to the situation where a ruling power gets its legitimisation from religion, which puts the ruler beyond discussion and critique. This is what happened in Spain when General Franco and the Catholic Church allied with each other. The Church regained its powers and Franco got the confirmation for his status from the Church, and thereby from God. As Catholics tend to be more authoritarian than Protestants, and as Catholic teachings and values were (and are) an inseparable part of the world view and identities of Spanish people, religion and religious doctrines worked as a means of control and a tool for the authoritarian regime in its battle against modernisation and outside influences and in its attempt to regain the lost sense of Spanish nationalism (see Linz 1993; Riis 1998). Francoist
family policy and legislation were powerful means to maintain the hierarchical social order.

On the other hand, the association of religion and politics is reflected also in the ideology behind the welfare states. The whole idea of the welfare state and thus family policy in modern capitalist societies derives from the religious ethic of compensation and from the belief in the passage from precariousness to well-being, from disease to health, and from inadequate living conditions to a higher standard of living (Parker 1998). The actual developments and outcomes of policies in different countries are affected by the religious-cultural stress put on individual and collective values as shown in the chapter dealing with Finnish and Spanish family policies.

As this short discussion has shown, the secularisation process is by no means uniform or linear. It is quite in order to ask whether such a process even exists (see Turner 1991: 145). From the macro-level point of view, both Finland and Spain can be said to be secular as the State and the Church are separate institutions with their separate tasks. But then again, religion and politics are intertwined at least at the ideological level. At the micro-level, religion dictates neither Finns’ nor Spaniards’ behaviour but it certainly influences it. The point is that nowadays religion and religiosity are not something that one has to or even needs to be involved in but rather are a question of wants. Wants are closely bound up with the values of particular communities, but judging them is an individual matter. Needs, in turn, are not matters of individual choice for they arise when authorities tell us what is necessary for a human life in society (Slater 1998a).

6.4. ...To Private/Public

Like religion, getting married and forming a family come down to the question about needs and wants. The private realm, usually associated with the family, is defined as the realm of social life which is most
intimate and based on free will (wants). The public realm, commonly associated with the state, is that part of life that is shared, visible and governed by common norms and rules (needs) (Slater 1998b). It is arguable, however, to what degree marriage, family and family life are based on free will. Gittins (1985) remarks that sociologists have been so overtaken by the idea of and emphasis on love and romance as the basis for contemporary marriage and the family that they have overlooked other less voluntary reasons to get married and start a family.

Regardless of the increased permissiveness, a pregnant woman without a husband is considered socially and morally suspicious and therefore unplanned pregnancy is one reason to end up married and have a family. Furthermore, in spite of changing gender roles, marriage continues to be an important vehicle, especially for women, to gain financial security and improve their social status. It is quite common for nurses to marry doctors and secretaries to marry their bosses. Thus it seems that women need marriage more than men (see e.g. Gittins 1985; Jallinoja 1997). Due to cultural, social and economic (public) circumstances, for many women and men alike, marriage is the way to become independent and gain the status of a true adult. This, as discussed earlier, is the case in Spain, but in Finland the importance of marriage for becoming an independent adult or starting a family of one’s own is not so marked.

The relation between private and public is often seen as one of subordination: the private sphere and its inhabitants are subordinated to the public sphere (Slater 1998b). That is, even though the private represents the locus of free will and sovereignty, the organisation of private life is regulated by laws and norms. But it is also true that the public (the state) cannot survive without the private (the family) because its reproducing, socialising and economic functions are essential to the state’s existence. Due to this symbiotic relationship, the family is not only a retreat from the outside world but very political, and the line between public and private is anything but clear.
The private/public dichotomy, as we now understand it, is the creation of modernity since the structural changes accelerated ‘the division of labour’ between the family and the state. Subsequently, the idealisation and defence of the private sphere are modern phenomena. The middle-class private life came to denote a ‘haven’ from the public world and the proper way of living (one-earner nuclear family composed of a married couple and their children). In the process, the requirements of private life became defined by transforming the mores of middle-class private life into public norms. As a consequence, the privacy of those (e.g. single mothers, working mothers, cohabiting couples, ‘fallen’ women, poor and/or dysfunctional families) whose way of life did not fit into the modern, middle-class norms, became objects of public concern and intervention (Gauthier 1996; Goldthorpe 1989; Sulkunen 1989).

When these middle-class mores became the norms, childhood and housewifery started to be idealised. Child labour became unacceptable and children’s proper place moved from the public to the private sphere, i.e. home, and later on to the school, which is a public place designed precisely for children. Similarly, the idealisation of housewives confined women to the private sphere and excluded them from the public one (e.g. Alanen and Bardy 1990; Goldthorpe 1989; Gittins 1985). As the development of Finnish and Spanish legislation and policies has shown, these trends were very much stressed in both countries from the early decades of the 20th century up until the 1950s and 1960s, and even later in Spain. Before and after the Second Republic until the late 1970s, Spanish women, particularly the married ones, were actually forced to remain in the private sphere since legislation indeed restrained women from acting in the public sphere. In addition, the Francoist family policies rewarded women for staying at home and punished them if they did not. In Finland the ideology took a different direction mainly because women were not excluded from the public sphere, and because they had means, that is civil and political rights, to act there. The conviction that woman’s
proper place is at home and that it actually would be for her own and her family's benefit served as a launching pad for the development of the welfare state, particularly the family policies.

Nowadays the bedrock under the modern democratic societies is egalitarianism and thus neither civil legislation nor family policies are supposed to raise any obstacles to citizens’ activities in the public or private spheres. Since the late 1970s onwards one of the main objectives of Finnish family policy has been to ease women’s efforts in particular to combine family and work. Furthermore, it has started to encourage men to participate more actively in the chores in the private sphere. Similar trends have emerged more recently in Spanish family policy, and the matching benefits and services are still very much in the developmental phase. The stress on egalitarianism has also provided the justification for enlarging the state’s ‘surveillance’ of all, not only those who do not meet the standards of ‘normality’.

Despite these egalitarian trends and principles, the traditional gender roles are very much alive within the family and within the cultures of the respective countries. The essence of masculinity still lies in the role of provider and of actor in public arenas. Equally, femininity remains connected to the caretaker role, presiding over the private sphere. However, the gender roles have changed. Today’s Finnish and Spanish women do not identify themselves only as mothers, wives, caretakers and homemakers but are increasingly winning their place in the public sphere. Nonetheless, the traditional gender roles and values persist in reflecting the ideology of the modern nuclear family with a male breadwinner and female home-maker, as men still earn more than women and women continue to be the principal caretakers and service providers in both the private and public spheres. The ‘novelty’ is that in the public sphere they are paid for it and in the private sphere they are not (cf. Rauhala et al. 1997).

In any case, the changing gender roles are important motivators for developing family policies, but these policies are not disinterested good deeds of public powers. First of all, to support wage work is
to guarantee state tax revenues to maintain and develop the society. Secondly, the family policies are entrances to the private and means of social control. For example, having children is a private matter but socialising and educating them is also a public matter. And then, if parents (parent) fail to meet their parenting duties and a child is abused, mistreated or lacks adequate provision and protection, the public steps in and makes a private into a public concern.

Families in Northern Europe are often described as public because the state is very involved in those tasks that have traditionally belonged to the family, such as taking care of children, the sick and elderly and providing maintenance. The families of Southern Europe are considered private since the caretaking and providing duties have largely remained in the family. From this perspective it is valid to say that, yes, Finnish families and family life are more public than Spanish ones. But we have a different kind of picture when we think of this public/private issue in the context of family legislation. Finnish civil legislation provides very little regulation of the relationships and duties between family members, and thus the Finnish family can be characterised as private. By contrast, Spanish civil legislation regulates the relationships and duties of the family members much more specifically (e.g. maintenance liability) and therefore the Spanish family can be regarded as more public than the Finnish one. In reality, contemporary families and family lives in the modern Western societies are both private and public. Numerous studies of Western families and welfare states have proved that regardless of the extent to which the welfare state (public) shares familial tasks and duties, the family (private) remains the principal provider for welfare and the family/kin members are the ones to turn to when support in all its forms is needed.
7. Concluding Remarks

Ideology and stereotypes have their basis in reality, for if they did not have some relation to people’s actual existence they would be totally irrelevant. As a result, the problem with ideology and stereotypes is that they bestow an aura of naturalness. Even though neither family ideology nor stereotypes tell us how people actually organise and live their lives or what the family means to people, they influence the ways people interpret their lives, the ways legislators and policy-makers interpret families, and the ways scholars interpret people’s lives, legislation and policies. And furthermore, ideology is a powerful tool for reproducing the social order. For that reason family is very much a political issue. Family causes most concern whenever the society is undergoing some kind of change, e.g. periods of structural changes, economic recession, political unrest or when there is a change in the population growth. During these times family ideology tends to be emphasised and used as social cement (cf. Gittins 1985; Thompson 1986).

In this paper I have argued that instead of actually changing the family, modernisation produced the Western family ideology, which is very prevalent in both of the societies in question. Fundamentally the Finnish and Spanish ‘official’ ideologies are the same: the family is a nuclear family composed of a married (heterosexual) couple and their children. This is the case even though cohabitation, single-parent and reconstituted families, and homosexual unions are more and more common and/or accepted, and even though public powers do recognise them in varying degrees. Why is this ideology so persistent? And why is it dominant in both societies even though they differ in many ways?

Its power lies in the fact that it is built on the very pillars of the Western world view. First of all it is founded in Christian theology and in the Western form of patriarchy which support one another.
Christian theology has been formed on the concept of a single male God who is the source of authority, and man has become interpreted as an image of God. Even though the term ‘man’ could refer to human beings in general, it was translated to refer only to males, and women became a lesser form of being. Therefore, the justification for male authority had a divine origin and family became construed as a microcosm of the divine world order (D’Antonio and Aldous 1983).

Secondly, although the development of science started the process of secularisation, its interpretation of the world was founded on religiously-based beliefs about authority and gender. The difference was that male authority and gender roles became expressed in terms of ‘nature’ rather than divinity. Men were seen as ‘naturally’ stronger, active and intelligent whereas women were ‘naturally’ weak, passive and intuitive. Therefore, men got the capacity to govern and direct others, namely women and children (Gittins 1985; Helén 1997). Thus the middle-class family ideology idealising the conjugal and private nuclear family was influenced by patriarchal notions and notions of gender which were legitimised by science and religion. As the middle classes gained political power these notions became an integral part of the ways in which legislation and policies were formulated, as has become clear in the chapters dealing with Finnish and Spanish legislation and policies.

Because the ideology is related to reality, it is not static and therefore has been moulded to better correspond to the prevailing circumstances. Egalitarian principles and individual rights have gained emphasis in both Finnish and Spanish family legislation and family policies. Thus, family ideology has gradually changed from being patriarchal to being more egalitarian, from a one-earner model towards a two-earner one, although the speed of this change has been different in Finland and Spain. The Finnish development has been smoother and steadier whereas the Spanish development has resembled a roller-coaster largely due to the political circumstances and, hence, to the emergence of civil and political rights.
Even though I have claimed that the basic ideology of the family is the same in Finland and Spain, I do not deny the existence of culturally-specific characteristics of family ideologies and conceptions of the family and family life. The central difference seems to be the importance put on the value of self-reliance. The Finnish culture is marked by individualism originating from a Protestant set of values, while the Spanish culture is more collective by its nature due to Catholic values. In other words, Finns value self-reliance more than Spaniards. This difference has become visible in what is stressed in education, in the issue of who is legally responsible to provide maintenance for whom, and in relations between generations and family members, etc.

For this reason, the difference in valuing self-reliance seems to be the foundation of the stereotypical conceptions of Finnish and Spanish families representing the Northern and Southern family types. Moreover, the labelling of Finnish families as individual, secular, and therefore modern, and Spanish families as collective, religious, and thus traditional has influenced the characterisation of the Finnish (Northern) and Spanish (Southern) welfare state types and the legitimations behind them. The argumentation is that because Spanish families are collective and mutual dependency between family members is not questioned, the state has not been forced to take over the familial tasks and therefore the family has remained a private matter and the most important safety net. By contrast, the Finnish state has entered into the private sphere to secure the possibility of individual independence, and in so doing it lessens the importance of the family as safety net. All this is true but only to a certain extent as I have attempted to demonstrate by questioning the dichotomies.

When we compare countries that are distinctly different in several dimensions, the differences are easily detected and for that reason they have a tendency to be comprehended as all-encompassing, unquestioned facts, leading to the risk of exaggeration and oversimplification. In this connection, there are some problems connected to family studies
in general and to comparative ones in particular which need to be pointed out.

First of all, the problem with family studies in general is that they tend to focus on changes rather than on those features that are enduring and, therefore exaggerate the crisis of the family. Comparative family studies in particular tend to stress only the differences and neglect the possible similarities, which leads to oversimplifications.

The second problem has to do with the methodological orientations. Most comparative studies dealing with families are quantitative ones based on statistics. They tell us more about the family forms and clearly show the differences between them, but they are not able to provide knowledge about the meanings of the families. If we want to strive towards more comprehensive knowledge about different families of different nations, it is useful and even necessary to combine and compare qualitative and quantitative methods and data. The use of various methods and data allows for a richer and more complex approach which makes it possible to move from one level of analysis to another and to avoid the risks of exaggeration and oversimplification (see Elliott 1996; Oinonen 1998a; Schmink 1984).

The third problem with unidimensional comparisons is that in addition to reproducing the dualistic notions of families of different nations, they also imply the universality of the family. But in reality there is no such thing as ‘The Finnish Family’ or ‘The Spanish Family’. Historians, anthropologists and feminists have proven that meanings and conceptions of the family differ for men and women, for different generations, social classes and ethnic groups. Further, they vary during a person’s life course and between rural and urban settings.

This study has not conquered these problems nor was this the aim. My intention has been to question the stereotypical notions of Northern and Southern families and to cause a rift in the apparently flawless picture of different nations’ different families. The use of this rift is twofold: to open an exit out of simplistic notions and analysis of Finnish (or Northern) and Spanish (or Southern) families,
and to open an entrance into a more comprehensive understanding of the differences and similarities between the families and their surroundings.

So, have I found answers to my questions: are Finnish and Spanish families as different as usually assumed and if so, in what ways and why? The upshot is that yes, Finnish and Spanish families are different but not immensely so. The ideologies of nations’ families arise from the same source, and the evolution of family ideologies has moved in the same direction. From the viewpoint of the dichotomies, it has become clear that Finnish and Spanish societies and thus families are simultaneously modern and traditional, individual and collective, secular and religious, public and private. The ways these qualities have been shaped and the reasons for it lie in historical, social and political developments.
References


III
FINNISH AND SPANISH FAMILY INSTITUTIONS: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Article 2

1. Introduction

Family structure in Northern Europe is described as modern, whereas the Southern European family structure is traditional. These notions indicate that conceptions of families are different in North and South. Simultaneously with the assumed differences between different parts of Europe there is a debate going on about the standardizing and integrating forces of globalization.

There is a global revolution going on in how we think of marriage, the family, relationships, and sexuality (Giddens 1999). An intense discussion about the future of the family is going on in Europe and elsewhere in the West. New family forms, the growing number of divorces, separations, single people, and the declining number of marriages and births are trends found almost everywhere, varying only in degree and by cultural context. These trends are often claimed to signal the end of the family institution as we know it.

The aim of this article is, first, to examine differences and similarities, divergence and convergence between Northern and Southern European family institutions using Finland and Spain as the
representatives. Second, the article contributes to the discussion of the state of the family institution in Europe.

The underlying idea behind the analysis is that a family institution is a historical and cultural construct. Culture is defined here as the complex of general ideas consisting of knowledge, tradition, ideology, and values (cf. Pfau-Effinger 1999). Culture is not only about the past, but is dynamic, and people use it to adapt to changing social conditions (Collier 1997). Thus, tradition, which is a part of culture, is not static either but changes over time, preserving the old and adapting the new.

Besides being a historical and cultural construct, family is also an ideological construct which reflects the basic values of a given society and provides an idea of what the family is and should be. Thus, ideology is a part of culture and carrier of tradition, but like culture it is not static either. Here (family) ideology is understood to be created and upheld by societal institutions such as religion, legislation, and the educational system.

Values, in turn, are seen both as collective ideas of what is preferable or what ‘ought’ to be desired and as expressions of personal goals or ideals which are preferred or desired. The difference between values and attitudes is that values are more global and abstract than attitudes, which refer to specific situations, objects, or persons. Attitudes also tend to change quicker and more frequently than values. However, both attitudes and values reflect how people feel about something (Harding et al. 1986).

In the first section of this article Finnish and Spanish family ideologies and their evolution are studied by formulating Finnish and Spanish cases as representatives of Northern and Southern families. The cases are built of selected sets of Finnish and Spanish family laws. Looking at family institutions from the point of view of ideologies offers an interesting way to study differences and similarities. In the second section differences and similarities are first briefly examined by
looking at some statistical trends concerning the family institution and family formation and, second, by comparing the values and attitudes of Finns and Spaniards concerning the family and family life.

2. Marriage and Family in the Light of Legislation

According to traditional Christian doctrine, the primary purpose of marriage is procreation and the rearing of children. Parents might limit the size of their families but the only acceptable way to do so was periodic abstinence. Furthermore, marriage is a sacrament, indissoluble except by church annulment, and any expression of sexuality outside marriage is a grave sin. With regard to gender roles, women were to remain at home and men were given the authority over their wives, children and other dependants in the household. These principles remained the doctrines of Protestant churches up until the 1920s and of the Roman Catholic Church until the 1960s (D’Antonio and Aldous 1983).

The secularization and modernization of legislative principles regarding the family started gradually in the late 1920s and the early 1930s in both Finland and Spain. However, the remarkable difference is that in Finland this process has continued steadily up to the present, whereas in Spain political changes, particularly the Civil War and General Franco’s authoritarian rule, rudely interrupted the modernization process. The political circumstances in Finland have been fairly stable compared to Spain. Besides political developments, very important factors that influence both the family and the social legislation are gender and civil rights. In this respect, Finland and Spain stand in clear contrast to each other. In the Spanish case authoritarian rule meant that civil rights and egalitarian principles (re-)emerged very late, in the second half of the 1970s. In Finland both men and women gained full and equal civil rights in 1906.
2.1. The Finnish Case

Finnish legislation on marriage was founded in Christianity, and in fact the laws on marriage have changed surprisingly little since the Middle Ages. The rules about who may marry have not changed, with the exception of the minimum age of marriage, which was lowered from 21 to 18 years of age in 1756. Further, only monogamous and heterosexual marriages are accepted, and marriages between close relatives are forbidden. Until 1917 religious ceremonies were obligatory because marriage and thus the family were seen as institutions of divine origin. The 1917 Marriage Act made civil ceremonies an option. The law also legitimized dominance of the husband. He managed the common property, and the wife could not use or decide on her own property without her husband’s permission. In addition, the wife was expected to be obedient and humble in every respect (Mahkonen 1978). The legislation from 1756 to the early twentieth century could be characterized by subordination. As humans were subordinate to God’s will, so wife, children, and other household members were subordinate to the male head of the household. The family or household and relationships within it were a microcosm of the divine world order; sexual behaviour, division of labour, hierarchy, economic power, and so on within the household were all legitimized and justified by religious teachings and the Bible.

The legislation concerning marriage and the family was strongly patriarchal even though the social and legal position of Finnish women had started to change in the 1860s when they were granted limited proprietorship and entrepreneurial rights and a right to represent themselves in legal matters. Also education and lower-level public posts, for example as teachers, became available to (some) women. After that, single middle-class women were able to live and function outside the family and free from the patriarchal power of father or husband (Ollila 1998). However, women had to wait for their full civil rights until 1906. Women’s movements started organizing in
the 1870s basing their ideology on egalitarian liberalism which argued that social life and social development had to be founded on individual freedom. Every person must be able to realize his or her own abilities, skills, and potential as fully as possible, and to that end all the restricting elements and circumstances had to be abolished from the society and from the state (Helén 1997: 147).

By the 1920s a fraction of these demands for individual freedom was reflected also in the legislation concerning marriage and family. The new Marriage Act in 1929 made spouses equal and gave married women juridical independence. Thus husbands’ legal dominance over mutual and wives’ property and within the marital relationship was abolished. However, the law was based on the idea of a breadwinner husband and homemaker housewife who were expected to live together and be sexually faithful to each other (Gottberg 1996; Helén 1997; Mahkonen 1978). As far as divorce is concerned, it was permitted already in the 1734 Marriage Act but only under very limited conditions, mainly on the basis of proven adultery (Mahkonen 1978). In 1929 a separation of at least one year become an acceptable reason for divorce in addition to fault grounds (Aarnio et al. 1985; Gottberg 1996).

Legalization of abortion was a subject of fierce debate from the beginning of the century until the 1970s. Pro-natalism was the prevailing ideology in Finnish society particularly between the world wars and therefore abortion was legalized only in 1950. According to this law, a pregnant woman could apply for abortion; if the application was approved by two doctors, the abortion could be performed in certain hospitals approved by the Ministry of Health. Abortion remained a heated issue until 1970 when the new abortion law came into force. Unlike the previous law, the new one gave women the right to decide whether to have an abortion or not during the first three months of pregnancy (Helén 1997).

As we come to the present day, the scope of juridical regulation of marital and familial life has changed remarkably. According to the
Marriage Act of 1987, marriage, from the juridical point of view, is now merely an economic contract which can be dissolved without the other party’s consent and without an announced reason after a six-month reconsideration period. Personal matters concerning e.g. fidelity, living arrangements, and intimate relationships are considered private matters of the family (Gottberg 1996).

The nature of marriage as an economic contract between two individuals becomes apparent also in the case of divorce. After dividing the mutual property both parties are expected to be financially independent after divorce, which means that spousal alimonies are rare. With regard to children’s maintenance, both parents continue to be responsible for the maintenance of their mutual children, and the parent (usually the father) who does not live with the child has to pay child support (Aarnio et al. 1985).

The marriage institution has defined children’s legal position, too. The principle has been that all children have a right to maintenance regardless of the circumstances of their birth. According to the law of 1734, a child had a right to be maintained by his/her parents until he/she was able to support him/herself. Inheritance rights, however, differed between children born in and out of wedlock. Up to 1878, only children born within marriage were rightful heirs, and it was as late as 1984 when all inequalities between children born in and out of wedlock were removed (Forssén 1998; Mahkonen 1978).

This improvement in children’s rights was connected with increasing cohabitation and thus with increasing non-marital births. Even though cohabitation has increased steadily from the 1960s and become a commonly accepted way of life, it is not comparable with marriage in Finnish civil legislation. Unlike the other Scandinavian countries, in Finland there are no statutes regulating the relationships of men and women living together without being legally married. Therefore, those who live in consensual unions lack the right to inheritance, family property, and family pensions as well as economic protection in case the relationship ends (Gottberg 1996).
The emphasis on religious and ethical grounds of marriage has remained strong even though the marriage institution has been secularized, attitudes towards alternative lifestyles have become more permissive, and the forms of couple unions and families have diversified. Moreover, when the public discussion started in the mid-1990s about whether homosexual unions should be legally recognized and whether homosexual couples should have the right to adopt children, the argumentation revolved very much around the unethical and unnatural character of homosexual unions and around fears for the institution of heterosexual marriage. Partly arising out of the general emphasis on religious and ethical grounds of marriage as the basis of the ‘proper family’, neither homosexual unions nor consensual unions have been granted equal status with the marriage institution.

Consequently, the marriage-based definition of the family is still very persistent in Finland. The most common family form is still the conjugal family with children. Nevertheless, the changes have been remarkable in recent decades. In the 1960s marriage was the only acceptable way for a man and a woman to live together; in the 1990s the majority of first unions were consensual unions. Nowadays Finns start their life as a couple earlier but marry later than before. At the same time the age of women at the birth of the first child has risen. As a result of these changes, childless cohabitation has become a very common and quite long period in the life cycle. Despite these changes, most children are born within unions, though these are increasingly consensual unions. However, many of these cohabiting couples do marry after a child is born (Gottberg 1996).

By the 1980s the modern values of individualism, personal freedom, and freedom of choice and modern society’s demand for free agents were reflected in legislation. Family formation is no longer based on a contract with God or even with society but on a contract between individuals; as a result, laws no longer regulate the inner life and relationships of the family (cf. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995; Jallinoja 1997).
2.2. The Spanish Case

Until the 1931 Constitution, marriage was conditioned by Catholicism, the state religion. According to canon law, only canonical marriage was allowed. Monogamous and heterosexual Christian marriage was a sacrament and indissoluble. The only exception was that the Church could grant an annulment if the marriage was not consummated, or a separation if a married woman committed adultery. As the purpose of marriage was procreation, it was presumed that all children born to a married woman were always legitimate; consequently, a husband was responsible for the children even if he had doubts concerning his fatherhood. Children and wives were subordinate to the patria potestad, that is, absolute patriarchal power. The Civil Code (Códico Civil) of 1889 stated that the father had legal authority over his legitimate children, and children had the obligation to obey him. Similarly, a wife was a legal minor and she, too, was obliged to obey her husband; the husband’s duty was to protect his wife and children (see Alberdi 1995; Flaquer 1998; Iglesias de Ussel 1998; Shubert 1992).

The short period of the Second Republic (1931–36) made a great difference and produced a progressive set of legislation. According to the 1931 Constitution (Constitución), Church and State were separate and women were legal equals with men. The legal majority for both sexes was set at 23 years of age, and for the first time women were able to vote, stand for parliament, act as witnesses and guardians, sign contracts, and administer estates. Furthermore, women could not be dismissed from paid work because they had married (1932). The constitution also produced the most innovative and liberal laws of the time, such as divorce by consent, regulation of abortion, and equality between legitimate and illegitimate children. The marriage institution was secularized and civil marriage became an option also for Catholics (see Alberdi 1995; Cousins 1995; Graham 1995). However, the
formal equality and liberalism did not have great effects on everyday life mainly because of its short existence.

When General Franco and his authoritarian regime came into power in 1939 this progress was replaced by regression which lasted until Franco’s death in 1975. After the Civil War the Church demanded the abolition of divorce and family law again became the responsibility of the Church. Religious marriage for baptized Catholics was made obligatory, the Church was given the right to pronounce a decision of matrimonial separation and annulment, and divorce was no longer an option. Equality between illegitimate and legitimate children was removed, and adultery and the use of contraceptives were penalized (Cousins 1995: 184). Legally speaking, there was a return to the 1889 Civil Code that once again made women juridical inferiors and married women minors before the law. The Franco regime and its ally, the Catholic Church, made the patriarchal family an image of the state. It also promoted an ‘ideal’ image of womanhood. The ‘Perfecta Casada’, the dedicated, submissive, and self-sacrificing spouse and mother was the model woman, and motherhood was considered a duty to the fatherland. Thus, women were to stay at home and identify themselves with the family, not as individuals. The husband regained his full patriarchal powers over the wife and children. A married woman could not open a bank account, apply for a passport, or even take a paying job without her husband’s approval. And if the husband allowed her to work, he had the right to claim her salary (Cousins 1995; Graham 1995; Montero 1995; Shubert 1992).

At the dawn of democracy the Civil Code was reformed in 1975 giving women equal rights with men. The total change started along with the 1978 Constitution which was based on egalitarian principles and granted freedom of thought and religion. Sexual discrimination as well as discrimination based on descent were abolished. In other words husband and wife became juridical equals and the authority of patria potestad changed into parents’ authority over and responsibility
for their children. Furthermore, all children regardless of their descent gained equal status and rights. And the law also enabled paternity tests. Adultery and the sale of contraceptives were decriminalized but legalization of divorce and abortion met with great opposition from the Church and from right-wing politicians. After a fierce debate, the new divorce law finally came into force in 1981 and abortion was legalized in 1985. The Constitution also guarantees the social, economic, and juridical protection of the family (Alberdi 1995; Cousins 1995; Flaquer 1998; Montero 1995: 381–2; Picontó-Novales 1997).

The 1981 law reintroduced divorce but it also included the juridical systems of separation, nullity, and dissolution. The actual divorce procedure has two stages in the sense that divorce cannot be requested directly, neither in the case of mutual agreement nor in the case of fault by a spouse. Before divorce is granted the spouses have to have been officially separated for 1 to 5 years (Picontó-Novales 1997: 113). The fierce debate concerning the divorce law revolved around the fear that the possibility of divorce would make the divorce rate skyrocket and destroy the Spanish family institution. But this fear was groundless since the divorce rates are still the lowest in Europe. Picontó-Novales (1997) points out that one explanation for these low rates is the fact that it is not possible to apply for divorce directly. In fact, most of those whose marriages have broken down are separated, which means that they cannot remarry (Alberdi 1995: 204; Flaquer 1998: 160–1.) The ‘popularity’ of separation instead of divorce is one notable factor that explains the relative rarity of reconstituted families in Spain. In consequence, the (re)legalization of divorce did not reflect the increased desire of people to get out of their marriages, as Alberdi (1995: 206) notes, but it showed that society accepts and acknowledges the individual’s right and freedom to seek personal happiness and well-being.

The modern legislation has focused much on children and their rights. As noted earlier, all children are equal and have equal rights before the law. According to the Constitution and to the principles
of ‘modern’ patria potestad, parents are obliged to maintain and take care of all their children, whether born within or outside marriage, until they reach maturity at age 18. However, parents are obliged to pay for the education also of those children who are no longer minors (Flaquer 1998: 138–9; Picontó-Novales 1997: 113). In the case of separation and divorce parents’ duties towards their children do not change, and both parents must continue to contribute to the costs of the children according to their economic capacities. Children also have a say in decisions about their custody or guardianship, and have the right to visit and be in regular contact with the non-custodial parent (Alberdi 1995: 394). Custody is almost always given to the mother, and so far shared custody is not legally allowed. As a result, the courts are gradually starting to favour fathers concerning parental authority and visiting rights. In addition to the lack of shared custody, another problem that divorced or separated women face is the lack of set maintenance allowances paid by separated or divorced men (Fernández Cordón 1998: 82).

In this context a few more words about maintenance liability are in order. In countries like Spain where the legislative system is based on Roman law, the maintenance liability is more extensive than in countries with an Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. In the latter, in legal terms liability extends from parents to their minor children. This is the case also in Finland. In Spain, however, family/kin members have a legal obligation to support each other financially (la obligación de alimentos). In addition to parents’ liability towards their minor (and sometimes mature) children, children are liable to take care of their parents if the need arises. This broad support (alimentos amplios) means that parents and adult children must provide each other all the necessary support to maintain their living standards. Furthermore, siblings have an obligation to provide each other ‘restricted support’ (alimento restrigidos), that is, basic needs if there is a temporary and exceptional need. Failure to fulfil these obligations may actually lead to criminal prosecution (Alberdi 1995; Flaquer 1998). On the
whole, we may say that parents are responsible for their children, and family members are responsible for each other, and the state’s right to intervene in the private life of the family occurs when the family is dysfunctional and children’s economic, moral, mental, and/or physical well-being is in jeopardy (Picontó-Novales 1997).

Even though the political and legislative changes started in the late 1970s, the family as an institution began to change during the 1960s when the authority of the official orthodoxy and traditional values as basis of the family started to be replaced by personal values (Flecha Andrés 1998). As Iglesias de Ussel (1998: 23) notes, the behaviour and attitudes of the majority of the people transformed the Spanish family before the transformations were acknowledged by legislators. While family forms continue to diversify, Spanish families are still quite traditional compared to most other Western countries. Marriage is the principal foundation of the family, divorce rates are among the lowest in Europe, and single-parent families, reconstituted families, and cohabitation are still relatively rare.

The special feature of Spanish heterosexual cohabitation is that it is not particularly a pre-matrimonial phase nor is it a mode of family formation since the vast majority of children is born within marriage (Alberdi 1999; Flaquer 1998: 84–6; Iglesias de Ussel 1998: 54–5). The legal status of cohabitation has been much debated, and the majority of Spaniards would grant the same rights to cohabiting couples as married couples. Legally speaking, there are no precise nation-wide regulations concerning the relationship of men and women who live together without being married other than that children’s rights are ensured by law whether their parents are married or not (Alberdi 1995: 432–6).

However, recent legislation and jurisprudence tend to give cohabiting (heterosexual) couples the same rights as married couples, and cohabiting heterosexual and homosexual couples can register their unions in municipalities. The debate over the law regulating the rights of cohabiting couples has surprisingly focused on very controversial
issues, namely the treatment of homosexual couples, especially their right to adopt children (Fernández Cordón 1998: 83; Guerrero and Naldini 1996: 12). The new law (La ley de parejas de hecho), which treats heterosexual and homosexual couples the same concerning their rights to inheritance, pensions, and compensation in the case of the breakup of the relationship, came into power in Catalonia in late 1998 and in Aragon in 1999. Yet homosexual couples still lack the right to adopt children (El País 11.11.1998 and 13.3.1999).

2.3. Finnish and Spanish Family Ideologies in the Light of Legislation

In both countries, until the late 1920s and early 1930s the family was conceptualized according to Christian doctrines. As structural changes swept over the societies and the new ‘social issues’ emerged from industrialization, urbanization, and secularization, among others, as well as the changing class positions and demand for women’s rights, the new ideology of the family overtook both the upper-class and peasant family ideologies. The idea of marrying for love, the demand for egalitarianism, and new scientific and political ideas changed the conceptions of the family and backed up the new ideological creation of the middle-class nuclear family based on intimacy and emotional ties. Even though the ‘old’ family types existed long after the new family ideology emerged, it became a model for everyone to strive for, which was also reflected in legislation (Gittins 1985; Räisänen 1995).

The idea of love marriage as the basis of the family, together with the liberal voices demanding equality, disrupted the patriarchal tradition and created the idea of home and the family as an emotional rather than economic unit. In fact, in this respect, the Spanish family law during the Second Republic (1930–36) was the most liberal and egalitarian in Europe, but it was soon brutally swept away by authoritarian rule which turned back to the repressive and extremely
patriarchal ancient family ideology. In Finland, legislative development has been more constant, moving from a patriarchal family ideology towards an egalitarian one. Perhaps it is possible to say that Finnish legislation concerning marriage and family has gradually changed to correspond to the demands of the people and the society. In Spain, however, the long authoritarian period used marriage and family institutions as political weapons and means of control.

Despite the stereotypical claims of the great differences between families in contemporary Finland and Spain, I would say that from a legal perspective the contemporary conceptions are more similar than different. In both countries marriage is still the principal basis of the family. The rights of family members are egalitarian, emphasizing individuality. The divorce procedure is simpler in Finland, which is reflected in the higher divorce rate. As the statistics show, the actual divorce rate in Spain is low, but statistics do not take into account the peculiarity of Spanish divorce law and therefore hide the number of separations. The greatest ideological difference is reflected in the statutes regarding maintenance liability. From that perspective and officially speaking, the Finnish family is clearly defined as a nuclear family composed of parents and their children, particularly minor children, as mature children do not belong to the family if they live in a separate household. The definition of the Spanish family is broader, consisting of parents, children, and siblings even if they live in separate households. The modern conception of the Spanish family does not, however, correspond to the extended family because fewer and fewer families actually are composed of three generations living in the same household. Instead, it is more like a network, as Flaquer (1998) points out.

Comparing modern Finnish family law to the traditional Spanish law, there is a very surprising legal detail. In Spain where cohabitation is rare, cohabiting couples (and even homosexual ones) are, at least to a certain extent, taken into account in the legislation. Conversely,
Finnish civil legislation does not yet recognize cohabiting couples (not to mention homosexual ones) even though cohabitation is common. From this point of view it seems that in Spain the development of modern legislation is ahead of people’s actual behaviour, whereas in Finland the actual behavioural patterns are eventually taken into account in the legislation.

Because the ideology is related to everyday reality, it is not static and therefore has been moulded to better correspond to the prevailing circumstances. Egalitarian principles and individual rights have gained emphasis in both Finnish and Spanish family legislation and family policies. Thus, family ideology has gradually changed from being patriarchal to being more egalitarian although the speed of this change has been different in Finland and Spain. The Finnish development has been smoother and steadier whereas the Spanish development resembles a roller-coaster largely due to the political circumstances and, hence, to the emergence of civil and political rights.

Finnish and Spanish societies have accepted and acknowledged the individual’s right and freedom to seek personal happiness and well-being. The emphasis on personal autonomy has reduced the significance of all sorts of institutions. The individual is less guided by traditional institutions such as church and the family, and these institutions no longer legitimate individual moral choices to the same extent. The moral guidance of the Church, in particular, has been challenged especially in the realm of sexual morality. On issues such as marriage, divorce, homosexuality, contraception, and abortion people increasingly rely on their own judgement, and legislation is increasingly allowing it (Flecha Andrés 1998; Halman 1995). This is a global process although it advances at a different rate in different countries, as we have seen above.

Even though there are culturally-specific characteristics of family ideologies the conceptions of the family have followed the path created by the modernization process in both Finland and Spain. The nuclear
family based on a heterosexual relationship and love and composed of a married couple and their mutual children is a product of the modernization process.

3. The Family: An Arena for the Struggle between Tradition and Modernity

The term ‘tradition’ as it is used nowadays is actually a product of the past two hundred years in Europe, as is the concept of the nuclear family. The idea of tradition, then, is a creation of modernity (Giddens 1999). Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) talk about invented traditions, which means that some of our traditions are intentionally created, rather than arising spontaneously. They are used as a means of power and they have not existed since time immemorial. Giddens (1999) goes a step further by claiming that all traditions are invented because the conscious construction of tradition is not found only in the modern period of time. No traditional societies were totally traditional, and traditions and customs have always been invented for different reasons.

The distinctive feature of tradition is that it defines a kind of truth. No matter how much it may change over time, it provides a framework for action which is socially acceptable, for traditions are always properties of groups or communities (ibid.). Similarly, the family ideology also provides a framework for action that can go largely unquestioned and is socially acceptable.

Theorists claim that today’s society is living after the end of tradition. However, the end of tradition does not mean that traditions disappear. They continue to flourish but in different versions. Traditions are less and less lived in a traditional way. They are no longer blindly obeyed but considered, reflected upon, and questioned (see Bauman 1996; Beck 1999a; Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1995; Castells 1997; Giddens 1999; Hall 1999; Maffesoli 1995).
‘Traditionally’ it was expected and self-evident that people marry, have children, and stay married until ‘death do them part’. For men and women alike marriage was defined as a natural stage of life that the great majority was expected to go through. Two or three generations ago people knew what they were doing and what was expected from them when they got married. But when traditional ways of doing things dissolve, people do not know exactly what they are getting into when marrying or forming relationships. Because the institutions of marriage and the family have changed, and the society around them and its demands have changed and continue to change, people have to confront personal futures that are much more open than in the past (Beck 1999a; Giddens 1999).

The meaning of marriage has changed even though it is still very much a normal condition in all Western countries, Finland and Spain included. However, marriage is no longer the only acceptable basis of cohabitation and family, nor is procreation the principal goal of being a couple. In principle, marriage and family institutions can be called into question. ‘Traditionally’ the main tasks of marriage and family were procreation and raising children. However, taking care of these tasks does not require a family institution based on marriage. First of all, procreation does not require marriage, neither legally nor, in varying degrees, morally. Nowadays it is not extraordinary to have children outside marriage, and these children have the same legal rights as those born to married parents. Nor is it so extraordinary that a woman has a child/children without any intention of living together with the father/s of the child/children. Thanks to modern technology, procreation does not even require a sexual relationship because insemination can be done artificially. Even the tasks of raising and socializing children are increasingly in the hands of other institutions than families. All these changes, whether they are concrete or more like possibilities, together with changing gender roles, have led to claims of the crisis or even the end of the family as we know it.
3.1. Statistical View of Finnish and Spanish Families

Both Spaniards and Finns question the ‘traditional’ way of arranging their lives. In line with the general Western trend, marriage does not attract Spaniards and Finns to the same extent it used to. The evolution of marriage rates has been very similar in both countries (see Table 1). The difference is greater when we look at divorce rates, although both countries follow the global trend of increasing divorces (see Table 1). At the moment, Spanish divorce rates are among the lowest in the Western countries, whereas the Finnish rates are among the highest (Statistics in Focus 1999: 7). The difference in the two countries is partly explained by the differences in divorce legislation and particularly by the procedure of filing for and granting divorce.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Crude marriage rate</th>
<th>Crude divorce rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Per 1,000 population.  
*Divorce was not legal at that time.


The total fertility rate is below replacement level (about 2.1) in all EU countries, Spain and Finland included. However, the decline in the birth rate has been particularly dramatic in Spain, which now has the lowest rate in the Western world (Table 2). Correspondingly, the
The proportion of births outside marriage has increased and continues to do so everywhere in the EU. This reflects the growing popularity of cohabitation and the decline in the incidence of marriage (see Table 3). With respect to births outside marriage, the Finnish figure is three times that of Spain. In fact, cohabitation in Finland is a common phenomenon and a common way to start a family, whereas in Spain people still marry first and have children later.

### TABLE 2. Crude birth rates and total fertility rates, Finland and Spain 1980 and 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Crude birth rate&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Total fertility rate&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Per 1,000 population.  
<sup>b</sup> Children per woman.  

### TABLE 3. Live births outside marriage, Finland and Spain 1960–1997  
(as % of total live births)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Together with the declining birth and marriage rates and increasing divorces and cohabitation, the number of lone-parent families has increased in almost all European countries. Before, lone parenthood was mainly caused by death of the spouse, but today the main reason is divorce or separation. In line with the frequency of divorce, lone parenthood is more common in Finland than in Spain (Table 4).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Finland Families by type</th>
<th>Spain Households by type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married couple, no children</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married couple with children</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabiting couple, no children</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabiting couple with children</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lone parent with children</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other unified&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One person</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Includes households with and without children.  
<sup>b</sup>Not included in Finnish sample.

*Sources: Eurostat 1996; initial results from ECHP in Ditch et al. 1998: 16; Statistics Finland 2000.*

Along with these demographic trends women’s and especially mothers’ increasing labour force participation is one of the factors changing the family institution. Even though women’s wage work continues to increase all over Europe, there are significant differences between countries due to e.g. historical, political, economic, and
legislative developments and to the type of welfare state. One of the main goals of the Finnish welfare state has been to guarantee mothers’ possibilities for full-time wage work. In Spain, however, this has only recently become an issue. These differences are reflected in the statistics.

| TABLE 5. Employment situation of women with children under 17 years of age, Finland and Spain 1995 (in %) |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                             | Working full-time | Working part-time | On leave | Total active | Unemployed | Inactive | Total |
| Finland                    |                 |                 |          |              |             |          |       |
| 0–16                       | 52              | 8               | 3        | 63           | 12          | 25       | 100   |
| 0–2                        | 27              | 4               | 9        | 40           | 8           | 52       | 100   |
| 3–9                        | 60              | 11              | 1        | 72           | 16          | 12       | 100   |
| 10–16                      | 71              | 9               | 0        | 79           | 11          | 10       | 100   |
| Spain                      |                 |                 |          |              |             |          |       |
| 0–16                       | 29              | 6               |          | 36           | 15          | 50       | 100   |
| 0–2                        | 26              | 5               | 2        | 33           | 15          | 52       | 100   |
| 3–9                        | 30              | 7               |          | 37           | 17          | 46       | 100   |
| 10–16                      | 29              | 7               | 0        | 35           | 12          | 52       | 100   |

*Less than 0.5%


As Table 5 shows, Finnish women with children are clearly much more integrated in the labour market than Spanish mothers. However, regardless of the difference, there is one common feature: Finnish and Spanish working mothers are engaged in full-time jobs rather than part-time ones.
3.2. Family Attitudes and Values

It is often claimed that the statistical trends are symptoms of growing individualism, as a result of which people’s willingness to bond to other people and to commit themselves to these social bonds has, if not disappeared, at least been diluted. There is no denying that modern society promotes individualism and personal freedom and that family is more fragile now than before due to the fact that it is based on free will and not on social and moral pressure, and legislation allows this freedom.

However, the rise of individualism and freedom does not necessarily mean the end of sociability and collectivity, and the structural fragility of the family does not indicate that the family does not matter anymore. Even though it has become easier to get out of unsatisfying couple relationships than before, people are quite willing to form new relationships, and most young people do expect and hope to have a steady relationship and family of their own.

When Spaniards were asked what kind of couple relationship they would establish themselves, the overwhelming majority (59%) chose marriage with a religious ceremony. Only 9% chose civil marriage, 10% favoured cohabitation without future plans to marry, and 9% would cohabit before marriage (cf. Cruz Cantero 1994; Orizo 1996; Pino Artacho and Bericat Alastuey 1998). Correspondingly, when Finns were asked what in their opinion is a family, the most popular answer was a married couple and their children (98%). Furthermore, only 5–7% of Finnish couples choose civil marriage over a religious ceremony, and even though almost 20% of all unions are consensual ones and around 14% of all families with children under eighteen years of age are based on couples living in consensual unions, most of them do marry eventually, usually after the birth of the first child (Reuna 1997; Suhonen 1997; Yearbook of Population Research in Finland 1998–1999).
Even though consensual unions, lone parenthood, and other ‘alternative’ family forms are more and more common and accepted ways of life, the concept of ‘The Family’ is still very much based on marriage in both countries. People marry for love and because it is the correct thing to do in a long-term relationship. The idea of romantic love has become such a central aspect of Western cultures that nowadays love is considered the main foundation for a happy couple relationship and a family. Marriage is a mode of cultural behaviour. It is something that one should do in a long-term relationship. It is normal, proper, and respectable. Regardless of growing divorce rates, both Finns and Spaniards believe that marriage creates security and permanency and that it is better for children if their parents are married. Consequently, children are the most important reason for marriage. People marry when the time to have children has come or a child has already been born (Cruz Cantero 1994; Reuna 1997).

The expectations of marriage and married life are high and clearly targeted to family formation. Different questionnaires in Finland and Spain give very similar answers to what people expect out of marriage: family and home of one’s own, love, support, and security. Family and family life, in turn, are expected to provide a strong feeling of belonging, a shelter from the outside world, economic security, emotional support, and maintenance of values and traditions (Meil 1999; Orizo 1996; Reuna 1997 and 1998).

Values have remained quite ‘traditional’ although both Finns and Spaniards increasingly arrange their personal lives in ‘alternative’ ways, and their attitudes towards different lifestyles are more permissive than before. In practice, though, permissiveness and tolerance tend to be greater towards others, but when it comes to one’s own behavioural preferences and to those of one’s closest friends and family, tolerance and permissive attitudes tend to diminish.

Although, or perhaps because, people today are forced to choose from several options, they tend to look for security. Finns and
Spaniards alike believe that the family institution is the best provider of security, as family and family life are the most important and valued spheres of life, and their prestige has grown throughout the 1990s. Family and home are regarded as the most important sources of personal satisfaction and identity. Work, which is also highly valued and an important factor of security, ranks behind family and home in both countries (Orizo 1996; Reuna 1998). Thus, it is claimed that the family institution is experiencing a ‘renaissance’ (Kumar 1997).

There are several reasons for the ‘renaissance’ of the family. According to Beck (1999b), the most important reason is the economic recession of the 1990s which led to the dismantling of the welfare state, to the political and ideological elevation of the family institution and its role, and to the fact that people have increasingly become dependent on the family regardless of the type of welfare state they live in (see Oinonen, 1999). Another reason might be the spread of HIV and AIDS which have changed people’s sexual behaviour and tightened their attitudes, norms, and values concerning sex and morals. Long-term, steady relationships and marriage are highly valued, and attitudes towards affairs and promiscuity have become stricter compared to the 1970s and 1980s (see e.g. Harding et al. 1986; Orizo 1996).

Secondly, parenthood has become an increasingly demanding task and, therefore, most people do not want to get into it without careful planning. Curiously enough, low birth rates are the outcome of or reason for our child-centred culture. The fewer children there are, the more important they are and the more is expected from parents. They are supposed to provide the optimal conditions for their children emotionally, mentally, and materially by offering the best possible: loving family and home, quality time together, safe environment, own room, toys, computers, pocket money, stimulating hobbies, vacations, and good education, among others. These increased demands lead to a situation in which those who would like to have children want steady
jobs, own home, savings, etc. first (Oinonen 2000b). Furthermore, those who already have a child and would like to have more often decide to settle for one because children are so costly. For Spaniards, the ideal number of children per family is 2.4 and for Finns 2.5, but in reality an increasing number of families has only one child (Pino Artacho and Bericat Alastuey 1998; Reuna 1997).

Today the ideal family in both Spain and Finland has two children and a mother and a father who both work outside the home and share domestic duties (Orizo 1996; Reuna 1997). Equality and democracy within the family and couple relationship are the central values. However, traditional gender roles are still strong. A large proportion of Spaniards, men and women alike, agree that men’s principal duty is to provide, and that care-taking duties belong to women. Finns share the same opinion, although Finnish men stress their duties as providers more than women do (e.g. Alberdi 1999; Harding et al. 1986). The attitudes towards gender roles do, of course, vary between age groups and according to educational level and place of residence. Younger and more educated people who live in cities are more egalitarian than those over 40, less educated, and living in rural areas or small towns (Meil 1999; Reuna 1998).

When it comes to married women’s and mothers’ employment, Spaniards are more ‘traditional’ than Finns. The majority of Spaniards think that women should work full-time before having children and after children have started school, or even have left their parental home (Cruz Cantero 1994; Orizo 1996). In Finland women’s and mothers’ full-time employment has long been so common that it is not an issue to the same extent as in Spain. In Finland the issue is whether and how well the state can guarantee women’s and, especially, mothers’ possibilities to work full-time outside the home. However, the economic recession in the 1990s led to suggestions that mothers should stay at home.
4. Conclusions

The demographic statistics seem to support the claim of the crisis of the family. Attitudes and values, on the other hand, indicate the opposite. Attitudes and values of Finns and Spaniards are very much in accordance with the principles of the family ideology: the family is composed of a heterosexual couple, preferably a married one, and of their child/children. In addition, a man ought to be the principal provider and a woman the principal caretaker.

Although attitudes, values, and also the actual behaviour of Finns and Spaniards clearly indicate that the family institution is neither dead nor has lost its meaning, several theorists (e.g. Bernardes 1993; Cheal 1993) claim that there is no family in our post-modern or global era. This claim does not refer to the actual death of the family but to the fact that ‘The Family’ as a concept is not adequate or tenable because it implicitly refers to the modern nuclear family and, thus, ignores the multiplicity of reality. The multiplicity is nothing new, for different types of families have always existed. What is new is that there is no new mode of ‘The Normal Family’ such as ‘The Modern Nuclear Family’ arising out of the multiplicity.

According to Beck (1999b), in reality, the modern nuclear family has lost its supremacy as a living arrangement, but as an ideological model it is very much alive. As has become evident also in this article, in principle people today are quite free to choose how to live their lives and how to define the family. Most of us notice and accept the different family forms and lifestyles, but when we think and talk about family we often refer to the modern nuclear family.

Indeed, most families in both Finland and Spain, and in all Western countries for that matter, are nuclear families composed of a married couple and their children, but something has changed. The concept of the nuclear family contains an idea of lasting marriage and of the married couple’s mutual children. The fact is, however, that
marriages might not last and that nuclear families are multiple; they can be composed of a married couple as well as of a cohabiting couple and their mutual and/or his and her children. Thus, the nuclear family no longer refers only to being a biological but also a social parent and child. Furthermore, the ‘traditional’ model of the nuclear family in which the man is a breadwinner and the woman a housewife has become (Finland) and is becoming (Spain) rare as an ever increasing number of families have two earners.

The central feature of the ‘ideological’ nuclear family is that it has not lost its attraction. The mystique of the nuclear family is based on the fact that the expectations of a couple relationship, family, and family life do not change even though the circumstances do (cf. Bittman and Pixley 1997; Oinonen 2000a).

Spanish and Finnish families have converged as family legislation and family ideology, demographic trends, and values and attitudes have followed the same path but at different speeds. Nevertheless, there are specific features that have to do with historical, cultural, economic, and societal developments: for example, Spanish society is designed to rest on the family institution whereas Finnish society is built more on an individual basis. This, as we have seen, is manifested in family laws, particularly in the form of maintenance liability. However, convergence is not a new phenomenon. In fact, convergence has been going on as long as the modernization process, as we have seen in the developments of family legislation. What is new is that nowadays the process is accelerated (cf. Beck 1999a; Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1995; Castells 1997; Giddens 1999; Hall 1999).

In the light of this article, it seems that globalization has opened up the legal, social, moral, and behavioural codes and offered possibilities for alternative lifestyles; at the same time, however, it creates a need for rules, security, and constancy. Thus, the idea of the nuclear family represents the ‘sacred’ tradition. In other words, the Western family ideology still guides the majority’s values, judgements, and behaviour in both Finland and in Spain.
References


IV

STARTING THE FIRST FAMILY.
CHANGES IN PATTERNS OF FAMILY FORMATION
AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
IN FINLAND AND SPAIN

Article 3

1. Introduction

Marriage rates have fallen, fertility has declined and marriage and parenthood have been postponed in recent decades throughout the advanced West. The reasons for these common demographic trends are usually found in other current trends, namely the increased availability and use of modern contraceptives, the increased prevalence of premarital cohabitation and increased female employment.

This article focuses on the Finnish and Spanish patterns of starting the first family within the time period that reaches from the 1960s till the end of the 1990s. The demographic trends are parallel in the two countries but obvious differences and interesting similarities exist: the marriage rate is almost equally low in Finland and Spain but premarital cohabitation is rare in Spain yet common in Finland. The fertility rate is substantially lower in Spain than in Finland and Spaniards delay childbearing longer than Finns. These Finnish and Spanish characteristics challenge the reasons attributed to demographic trends, prompting the question; how well do the generally evinced reasons for
demographic changes and changes in the patterns of family formation apply to the cases of Finland and Spain? And, how else could the differences and similarities in patterns of family formation between Finland and Spain be explained and understood?

The selection of countries is based on the assumption that comparing two extreme cases will shed light on the specific features as well as general trends and help to show why similar trends do not necessarily create similar results (Ragin 2000). Spain and Finland serve as examples of Southern and Scandinavian welfare states, defined as disparate societies within Europe in terms of the family, gender relations, class structure, culture, religion, etc. (Castles 1993; Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Inglehart 1997).

Spain and Finland are examined within the European Union context. The European Union represents the general trends in relation to which the Spanish and Finnish cases are viewed. The level of analysis is on a general national level, which does not take into account regional and class based differences in the demographic trends and patterns of family formation. The analysis is based on statistical data, reports and studies.

A presentation of demographic trends in Spain, Finland and the EU is followed by three sections on the applicability of the commonly evinced explanations for the demographic trends: the effect of modern contraceptives on fertility, the role of premarital cohabitation in the delay and decline of marriage and childbearing and the relation between women’s increased labour force participation and trends in marriage and childbearing. The outcome is that none of these factors alone offer plausible explanations for patterns of family formation and the demographic trends in Spain and Finland. Rather, modern contraceptives have separated sexual activity from formal marriage and reproduction, enabling new life-style choices such as premarital cohabitation. Furthermore, contraceptives together with equal opportunity policies have improved women’s access to education and employment. However, despite increased freedom of life-style
choices, the framework within which the choices are made varies between countries. The labour market and public policies targeted at families are both elements of the framework within which lifestyle choices are made and indicators of how society responds to the changes in demography, gender relations and the family. Thus, section five examines the framework by looking at the relation between the labour market, public support for families and family formation in Spain and Finland.

2. Demographic Trends

Patterns of family formation have changed in West European countries in recent decades as witnessed by the selected indicators of demographic transition in Finland, Spain and West Europe compiled in Table 1. Despite parallel demographic trends in West European societies, a closer look at demographic indicators reveals interesting differences and similarities especially on the south–north axis.

The marriage rate has declined overall in the EU region since 1960. In Finland, however, the number of marriages rose remarkably by 1970 as the post-war baby boom generation reached marriageable age in the late 1960s. The 1970s saw the most notable decline of marriage in all West European countries. The decline was mostly connected to increased participation in education, premarital cohabitation and modern contraception, which reduced the number of shotgun marriages (Lindgren and Ritamies 1994). In Spain, however, the primary reason for the 1970s decline in marriage was rather the economic crisis and severe youth unemployment (Fernández Cordón 1997). Since the 1970s, marriage rates have declined further and by the second half of the 1990s, the marriage rates in Finland and Spain were almost equally low and below the EU average.

Cohabitation first emerged in Scandinavian countries in the 1960s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of demographic transition</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>EU 15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Marriages/1000</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Mean age at first marriage:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Cohabiting couples %:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-30s</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Total fertility rate</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Births outside marriage (% of all live births)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI Mean age of women at first birth</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Figure from 1997.
² EU 12.
³ Figure from 1975.
⁴ Figure from 1995.
– No data available.

Sources:
but later spread to Europe (United Nations 2000b). However, there are noticeable disparities particularly between North and South. Almost 60 percent of Finns under 30 who live as couples are cohabitators. The Finnish figure is twice the EU average. In Spain, however, only 8 percent of under-30s living as a couple live in cohabiting unions. In all EU countries, the percentage of cohabitators of the total population is considerably lower than among young adults.

Fertility has declined below replacement level in West Europe, meaning that the population does not reproduce itself. In order to reproduce the population, each woman ought to have at least two children. Compared with most other EU countries the fertility decline started a decade earlier in Finland. However, in the 1990s the Finnish fertility rate recuperated and is now one of the highest in the EU, although a new decline has been discernible since 2000 (Statistics Finland 2002; United Nations 2000b). In Spain, the decline started more slowly and accelerated in the late 1970s and 1980s, when fertility declines in other countries had already begun to level off (Perez and Livi-Bacci 1992). During the 1990s, the Spanish fertility rate continued to decline and today is the lowest in the western world together with that of Italy (United Nations 2000b: 94). Although fertility has declined, births outside marriage have increased. There has been an almost five-fold increase in extramarital births in the EU region since 1960. However, there are clear differences with the Finnish figure considerably above the EU average, whereas the Spanish figure is below.

The age-specific live birth rates presented in Table 2 confirm the drastic decline of births in all age groups in Spain between 1974 and 1997. The table also shows that in the 1970s childbearing in Spain was divided evenly between women aged 20 to 34 whereas at the end of the 1990s most babies were born to women aged 25 to 34 and the highest birth rate was among women aged 30 to 34.

In Finland, the changes between 1974 and 1997 were less radical. In the late 1990s, most babies were still born to women aged 25–29,
although the number of births among women over 30 years of age increased. The common trend in Finland and Spain is a constant decrease in births among younger age groups with an increase among women over 30.

Consequently, Europeans enter into their first marriage at an ever older age: women at 28 and men at 30. Spaniards tend to be somewhat younger than Finns and other West Europeans when marrying for the first time. The timing of motherhood has also been delayed. Nowadays West European women tend to be close to their 30s when having their first child. The average age at first birth in EU is 29 years of age. Spanish women are even older, at 30 and Finnish women somewhat younger, at 28 when having their first child (Table 1).

The parallel changes in family models and demographic trends that have occurred in western societies during the past decades have formed the distinct profiles of family formation in different countries. In Spain, moderate trends in cohabitation have emerged together with a marked decline in the marriage rate and a sharp decline in the fertility rate. In Finland, however, the frequency of cohabitation and the low marriage rate are accompanied by high fertility by Western standards. In the following sections, the Finnish and Spanish patterns

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**TABLE 2. Age-specific live birth rates in Finland and Spain, 1974 and 1997 (per 1000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Age groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of family formation are compared in more detail and the validity of the reasons usually evinced for declining fertility and marriage rates, modern contraceptives, cohabitation and women’s increased labour force participation, are considered.

3. The Contraceptive Revolution and Fertility Decline

Although today contraception is widely accepted and practised, there are marked differences in contraceptive availability and accessibility between countries. Studies show that sex education and use of modern contraceptives are more widespread in the North and West than in the South and East Europe (Spinelli et al. 2000).

These differences are due to differences in legislation and attitudes towards sexuality and birth control. In Spain, the contraceptive revolution was delayed largely due to the influence of the Roman Catholic Church and its negative attitude to premarital sex, contraception and abortion. The ban on the sale and use of contraceptives was removed only in 1978. Abortion was legalised in 1985 but in a strict form; being permitted only if the health of the mother is endangered, if the pregnancy is the result of rape or if the foetus is seriously malformed. Due to the strict law, the number of legal abortions has remained low but illegal abortions occur and their actual number and impact on fertility trends are difficult to estimate (Perez and Livi-Bacci 1992). As for the use of contraceptives, less than half of sexually active women use modern contraceptives (Spinelli et al. 2000) yet fertility has declined sharply. Thus, as Margarita Perez and Massimo Livi-Bacci (1992) point out, neither the use of modern and effective contraceptive methods nor the availability of legal abortion explains the extremely low level of fertility in Spain.

In Finland, sex education and family planning entered the comprehensive school curriculum in the 1970s. At the same time family planning clinics were established in connection with the
municipal health care centres. Family planning clinics played a central role in advancing the contraceptive revolution in Finland, for a visit to the clinic and the first contraceptive method, e.g. the pill for 3–6 months became available to all at no charge (Rimpelä et al. 1998).

The new liberal abortion law of 1970 permitting abortion not only on medical and eugenic but also on socio-economic grounds, raised much debate and fear of increasing abortions. However, no real increase in the total number of abortions took place and the previously common illegal abortions soon ceased. However, in the course of the 1990s the number of abortions increased slightly, especially among younger age groups (Rimpelä et al. 1998; Women and Men in Finland 1999).

The contraceptive revolution has given women a chance to control their lives and make conscious choices in a manner that has not been possible before. According to Catherine Hakim, the contraceptive revolution has three main effects. First, it enables women to control the timing and spacing of childbirth, and thus to better reconcile employment and education with family life. Second, it allows women to avoid unwanted births and to choose how many children they want. Third, it gives sexually active women the option to remain childless. The development and availability of reliable birth control methods also have wider social implications: sexual activity has become separated from reproduction and thus from marriage and family formation. As sexual activity has increasingly become pleasure-seeking, premarital sex has become acceptable, creating new lifestyles such as informal partnerships, cohabitation and voluntarily childless marriages (Hakim 2000: 45).

Although the contraceptive revolution caused a remarkable change in sexual and reproductive behaviour, there is no causal link between the use of modern contraceptives and fertility levels (Coleman 1996). As an example, despite the widespread use of the modern and reliable contraception among Finnish women today, the fertility rate is high
by Western standards and, in Spain, the fertility rate has dropped despite widespread traditional and unreliable contraception.

4. The Role of Cohabitation in the Decline and Delay of Marriage and Parenthood

The data for Western countries indicate that most of the decline in first marriage rates is due to increased cohabitation because cohabitation delays marriages, as cohabiting unions are typically of short duration and people who cohabit tend to have more than one cohabiting union before marrying. In addition, tendencies to replace marriage with cohabitation as the form of the first partnership and to delay the first marriage are considered jointly responsible for delayed motherhood (Ermisch and Francesconi 2000; Ressler and Waters 1995).

However, the demographic indicators presented in Table 1 indicate that in the Spanish case, cohabitation offers no explanation for the declining marriage rate nor for the delay in marriage and motherhood. Cohabitation is rare even among young adults. Spaniards still start their lives as couples through formal marriage and, unlike in Finland, they tend to live in a childfree marriage for some years as the age gap between women’s age at first marriage and first birth indicates (see Table 1).

In Finland, cohabitation has replaced marriage as a route to the first partnership and is therefore, a major reason for delayed marriage. However, the prevalence of cohabitation as the first partnership is not a satisfactory explanation for the declining marriage rate. Most cohabiting couples contract formal marriage at some point, usually just prior to or after the birth of the first child as the very small time gap between entry into marriage and motherhood among Finnish women indicates (see Table 1). The high extramarital birth rate and the fact that Finnish women tend to become mothers at a younger age
than Spanish and other European women on average indicates that cohabitation does not necessarily delay motherhood.

5. Women’s Employment: A Cause of Changes in the Patterns of Family Formation?

Besides the increased popularity of cohabitation and developed contraceptive techniques, the recent demographic trends and changes in the family institution have also been related to the changes in gender relations and to the increase in women’s employment in particular (e.g. Becker 1981; Crouch 1999).

Female labour force participation increased between 1960 and the mid-1990s in all West European societies. In the present EU countries, the percentage of female labour force of total labour force increased from 32 percent in 1960 to 42 percent in 1995. Likewise, the proportion of women aged 15–64 in the labour force grew substantially. In 1960, 42 percent of women aged 15–64 in present-day EU countries were in the labour force, whereas the corresponding figure in 1995 was 57 percent (OECD 1997: 39, 41). Although women work increasingly outside the home their responsibility for the major share of domestic work has not diminished (Eurostat 1997). This double burden is seen as one of the factors causing changes in family formation, family life and instability of relationships.

According to the influential home economic theory (Becker 1981), the trend of declining marriage and fertility, increasing cohabitation and instability of marriage and family arise from the loosening of the specialised marriage and family model, which is a consequence of increased female labour force participation. Women are not financially or socially as dependent on their husbands as they used to be, and due to the unequal division of domestic labour between women and men, women gain less from marriage than men. Reduced benefit from marriage increases the numbers of single people, cohabiting couples
and extramarital births, increases divorce and raises the numbers of female-headed single parent families. Furthermore, as women no longer identify themselves mainly as mothers and wives, the importance and benefit of children is reduced, causing a decline in fertility.

Rationalizing the demographic trends and changes of the family with changes in women’s social position is problematic, especially if the theory is based on an outdated conception of marriage and the family. As Margaret Brining (2000: 87–91) points out, theories such as Becker’s are based on the specialised marriage and family model based on a strict sexual division of labour between male breadwinner and female full-time homemaker. Such a model may be efficient as long as the spouses remain together for life but, nowadays, marriages are no longer indissoluble, grounds for getting a divorce have been facilitated and breadwinner/homemaker types of nuclear families are increasingly infrequent.

The theory also assumes that married couples always have or plan to have children, and that a husband can earn enough money to support the family. As for children, most but not all married couples have or plan to have children: some choose to be childless and others suffer from it. Furthermore, husband’s single-handed providing capacity is not always adequate. In the past as well as today, two incomes are often necessary for the family economy (Ahn and Mira 1999; Brining 2000). Thus, as Montserrat Solsona (1998) points out, women’s greater (financial) independence is not a cause for declining marriage and fertility but rather a precondition for young couples to form a household of their own and have children (also Paajanen 2002).

Although, the fertility rate in Europe has generally decreased as female labour force participation has increased, labour force activity as such does not necessarily impact on fertility. At present, the highest rates of female employment are in the Scandinavian countries (e.g. Finland) where fertility rates are also the highest. The lowest fertility rates, on the other hand, are in southern Europe (e.g. Spain) where women’s employment rates are the lowest (Bareksten et al. 2002; Bettio...
and Villa 1998). Furthermore, even though women of childbearing age are now better educated and economically and professionally more active than ever before, this does not cause aversion to family formation and family life. Attitude and value surveys clearly show that a partnership and the family are highly valued as the essence of life, and most women and men hope for a steady relationship and expect to have children of their own (Inglehart 1997; Lewis et al. 1999; Melkas 1997; Orizo 1996). Besides, although women today have access to education and professional life, they are not a homogenous group with similar preferences.

According to Catherine Hakim, the work-lifestyle preferences of contemporary Western women can be classified into three main groups: home-centred, work-oriented and adaptive. Home-centred women prefer not to work, accept the sexual division of labour at home and prioritise children and family throughout their lives. Some home-centred women never work for pay and others have a job until marriage or childbirth. They may return to work after marriage if it is necessary for the family economy. At the other end, there are the work-centred or career-centred women. They prefer some other activity in life than motherhood and family life and invest in qualifications and training for their chosen activity. Although most childless women belong to this group, career-centeredness does not require single status or childlessness. A career-centred person fits family life around the career, in other words, she follows the stereotypical ‘male’ work and family history (Hakim 2000: 159–165).

The largest and most diverse group of women is the so-called adaptive women who, coping with the double burden, trying to reconcile family and work are therefore, often but mistakenly considered representatives of all modern women. Some women in this group consciously opt for employment and a family without either taking a clear priority and others have successful careers not by their own design but rather because of the opportunities emerging.
In addition, some adaptive women can be characterized as drifters with no definite life plan, quickly modifying their goals in response to changes in society, economy and in their personal life situation (Hakim 2000: 165–168).

Changes in family formation are an outcome of several distinct but concurrent factors. The development and availability of effective contraception have influenced people’s sexual behaviour and their attitudes towards relationships. Sexual activity has become separated from reproduction and formal marriage and, thus, being sexually active but single, living in a childfree marriage or living in a cohabiting union with or without children is possible and socially acceptable. Equal opportunity policies together with contraceptives have advanced women’s access to education and exercise of an occupation with chances of advancement similar to those of men. However, despite improved options to make conscious life style choices, the framework within which the choices are made varies from one society to another.

6. Frameworks of Family Formation: The Labour Market and Family Policy

The reasons for the cross-national variation of patterns of family formation do not lie so much at the level of female labour force participation per se because it is growing everywhere. Rather, the difference is in how the state, social organisations, individuals and families respond to the fact of the increasing labour force participation of women (Tobío 2001). The labour market and public policies targeted at families are indicators revealing at least partly how society responds to the changing societal role of women and of the attitude society adopts to the family. In the following, the connections between the labour market, family policy and family formation in Spain and Finland are examined.
6.1. The Labour Market, Family Policy and Family Formation in Spain

Spanish women’s labour force participation has increased considerably in recent decades. In 1960, the proportion of women in the labour force was 26 percent and by 1995 the figure had risen to 45 percent (OECD 1997). Nevertheless, the labour force in Spain remains more heavily masculine than in most other European countries (de Miguel 1998) and thus the female employment rate remains below the EU average (see Table 3). One reason for this is the legacy of the authoritarian period (1939–1975). The Franco regime and the Roman Catholic Church advocated a strict division between public and private spheres and women were discouraged from interests other than motherhood. Furthermore, the joint taxation penalised two-earner families until the end of the 1980s (Fernández Cordón 1998; Radcliff 2001).

The male breadwinner/female homemaker ideology is still reflected in the segmented labour market: middle-aged men enjoy job security, higher wages and protection against unemployment, whereas women and young people have severe difficulties in landing secure jobs and protection schemes. The broadly accepted idea behind the segmentation of the labour market is that when employment is scarce, jobs should be reserved for male heads of families (Flaquer 2000).

Unemployment has long been a severe problem in Spain and worsened in the economic recession of the early 1990s (de Miguel 1998). As the economy recovered, the general unemployment rate fell but women’s unemployment has remained considerably higher than men’s. In 1999, female unemployment was 23 percent whereas male unemployment had dropped to 11 percent (Table 3). Youth unemployment is considerably higher in Spain than in the European Union countries on average. Besides unemployment, employment on fixed term contracts is clearly more common in Spain than elsewhere in the EU region (Table 3). Although temporary contracts are common among women and men alike, they affect women and young people
in particular (Table 3) leading to occupational and financial insecurity (Fernández Cordón 1997; Flaquer 2000).

The precarious employment situation of young adults is closely linked to delayed and declining marriage and fertility. Unemployment and precarious employment cause uncertain living conditions and future prospects, leading to postponement of leaving the parental home, marriage and childbearing (Ahn and Mira 1999; Solsona 1998). In fact, Namkee Ahn and Pedro Mira (1999:30) suggest that the recuperation of fertility in Spain requires job creation and improved confidence among young people about their future employment prospects.

The male breadwinner ideology prevalent especially on the labour market collides with the ‘anti-authoritarian’ ideas accompanying democratisation. The private sphere, that is family, housewifery and motherhood acquired a negative image because of the key role of family and motherhood in the Franco regime. Consequently, women’s entrance into the public sphere was encouraged and emphasised in public discussion (Radcliff 2001). At the same time, the family disappeared from the political agenda as the backlash against the Francoist wide-ranging and gender specific pro-natalist family policy that promoted motherhood and reinforced masculine authority and power within the family (Naldini 2000: 71–72). Consequently, equal opportunity policies of women were considered progressive while family policy was regarded as regressive. Even feminists have prioritised legal reforms guaranteeing equal opportunities in education and the labour market over services and benefits targeted at women and families with children (Radcliff 2001; Tobío 2001).

Thus, paid work became conceptualised as a choice: women are ‘free’ to work and pursue a career if they want. However, family responsibilities are not a matter of choice (Tobío 2001: 344). In fact, the Spanish welfare system is grounded on the family and care provided by women. This contradiction between freedom to choose whether to work for pay or not and the obligation of family responsibilities
irrespective of one’s occupational choice leads to a situation where the reconciliation of work and the family is considered a personal problem of women, not a public problem. It is assumed that those women who choose to work can cope with childcare and domestic tasks as well.

The fact that the female labour force activity rate is constantly increasing in the absence of comprehensive ‘family-friendly’ policy indicates that women are coping in one way or another. In many cases women’s part-time work is a strategy for combining work and family (Hakim 2000), but in Spain women’s part-time work is rare compared with the EU average (see Table 3). Furthermore, in contrast to the EU in general, where the most common reason for working part-time is family responsibilities, the reasons of Spanish women are inability to find a full-time job or not wanting a full-time job for one reason or the other. On the other hand, the single most often evinced reason for not being in the labour market is homemaking. Compared with the EU average, a significantly larger proportion of Spanish women with children under 17 years of age are non-employed but those who are employed, work full-time (Meil 1999: 56). Apparently those Spanish women working for pay prefer to work full-time or lack attractive part-time options.

According to Constanza Tobío’s study (2001) on Spanish women’s strategies for reconciling work and family, the main strategy is to have another woman, a grandmother or hired domestic help, to take care of the children and home. So far the other woman has usually been the grandmother because she is available, trusted, reliable and flexible, and her services are free. A ‘substitute mother’ at home is also a perfect solution for society because women are taking care of their problem by themselves, requiring no response from society to their new social and economic position.

Some legal reforms and initiatives to promote the reconciliation of work and family life have recently been made. There have been major investments in education and, consequently, the capacity of
pre-schools for children aged 3–6 now meets the demand. However, child care services for children under 3 is scarce and mostly private and expensive. This and the lack of co-ordination between school hours and working hours poses problems (Bertelsmann Foundation 2002a; Tobío 2001).

Nevertheless, no forceful demands for public measures were made until very recently. A new law of 1999 with the major objective of improving the reconciliation of work and family life forbids dismissals related to use of family leave arrangements, pregnancy and maternity leave. Second, fathers are encouraged to take part in child care as a mother can transfer ten weeks of her 16 weeks of paid maternity leave to the father and the parents can use these weeks concurrently. Parental leave and entitlement to reduced working time remain unpaid although they have been extended to take care not only of children but also of a relative in need of care. This family leave is restricted to a maximum of one year, whereas the maximum for parental leave is three years. Although the new law brought some improvements, it expends no resources on extending paid leave schemes nor on care services for children and the elderly. Furthermore, the reformed legislation does not include measures to reduce employment insecurity, which severely limits the attractiveness and use of family-related leave entitlements (Bertelsmann Foundation 2000: 23).

One of the strategies for coping with the difficulties of reconciling work and family is delaying and reducing the number of children. Children are not explicitly said to be an obstacle to employment but delay in having children and reducing family size are reportedly done for economic and professional reasons. On the other hand, children are nowadays considered to cost so much that first, two incomes are needed and second, most can only have one or two children even though they may want more (Bettio and Villa 1998; Orizo 1996). According to Constanza Tobío (2001), the way in which people argue their decisions concerning childbearing and the number of children desired reveals that there is no going back to the old gendered division
of labour because women’s economic activity is seen as a precondition for having children in the first place.

6.2. The Labour Market, Family Policy and Family Formation in Finland

In Finland, women have long been engaged in employment in large numbers. The proportion of women in the labour force was already 44 percent in 1960 (OECD 1997). Since the early 1960s, women of all age groups and especially mothers with small children have been entering the labour market at the same rate as men and, thus, by the 1970s a dual-earner family was a norm (Alestalo et al., forthcoming). Finnish women and men occupy work life quite evenly compared with women and men in Spain or EU countries in general and the female employment rate is high by EU standards (see Table 3).

However, changes on the labour market and the economic recession in the 1990s had an adverse effect on the labour market situation of women and young people. Women’s unemployment has traditionally been lower than men’s (Yearbook of Population Research in Finland xxxv 1998–1999) but since the recession the decrease in women’s unemployment has not been as fast as men’s, mainly because women are more often employed by the public sector where the effects of economic growth since the mid-1990s are not as visible as in the private sector (Alestalo et al., forthcoming). Youth unemployment is almost as high in Finland as in Spain (Table 3). It rose sharply due to the recession in the early 1990s and has not come down as much as unemployment overall (Laaksonen 2000). Similarly, atypical work and fixed-term contracts in particular affect young people and women more than men. However, long-term unemployment is not as great a problem in Finland as it is in Spain and in the EU countries on average (Table 3).

Given the connections between the labour market and family formation, the labour market situation of young adults is of special
importance. Young people's difficulties in achieving financial independence is responsible for the postponement or even the rejection of childbearing (Paajanen 2002) but, unlike in Spain, the precarious employment situation and low income level has not prevented young people from leaving home to live either alone or with a partner. This is largely due to the individual social security system, the financial aid system for students, student housing and housing allowances (Laaksonen 2000).

The low figure of women's part-time work is often mentioned as a Finnish peculiarity, but as we have seen above, women's part-time work is also rare in Spain (see Table 3). In Finland, the most common reasons for part-time employment among women and men are inability to find a full time job (41% women, 35% men) and education and training (25% women, 42% men) (see Table 3). This indicates that part-time workers in Finland are often students. Education and training among women and men alike are the most common reasons for not being in the labour force. Only 20 percent of Finnish women give homemaking as a reason for not being in the labour force, which is substantially lower than the corresponding EU figure, not to mention Spain (Table 3).

Part-time work is not an option for Finnish women because of the normative nature of full-time work and because no attractive options for work part time exist (Salmi 1996). The majority of Finnish mothers with children under age 17 are employed and working full-time. The number of non-employed mothers is high only among women with very small children (aged 0–2), which indicates that most under 3 year olds are taken care of at home by their mothers. However, the statistics are misleading here: women on maternity leave are counted as employed, whereas women who are on parental leave or on the child home care allowance are counted as non-employed even though they have a job to return to (Meil 1999: 55).

The high female employment rate and the norm of working full-time are usually connected with the availability of social services
However, the post-war mass entry of women into the labour market was not facilitated by social services targeted at families with children. In fact, the development of institutional child care services started only in the 1970s in response to the problems resulting from increased female employment (Anttonen 1999). On the other hand, the expansion of the public sector favoured the growth of female employment, as the majority of workers in social services, education and public administration are women (Women and Men in Finland 1999).

Services for families with children and paid leave schemes are not only considered to facilitate women’s employment but also to increase fertility (Anttonen 1999). As for leave schemes, Finnish as well as Spanish maternity and parental leave schemes are among the most generous in the EU region in terms of duration. However, the difference is that in Finland the leaves are paid whereas in Spain, most of the leaves are not (Gauthier 2000). The total length of maternity and parental leave in Finland is 263 weekdays. The first 105 weekdays are the maternity leave period and the next 158 weekdays are the parental leave period when the allowance is granted either to a mother or a father or to both parents by turns. Fathers are entitled to a paternity allowance for 18 weekdays during either the maternity leave period or the parental leave period. The allowances are determined by the recipient’s taxable income. Furthermore, parents are entitled to unpaid care leave until a child turns 3, and when the leave expires, they have the right to return to their old jobs. In addition, a parent of a child under 3 who wishes to reduce her/his working hours is entitled to a partial care allowance (Bertelsmann Foundation 2002b). However, this is not much used, largely because of the negative attitude of employers (STM 2002).

In the 1990s, the focus of the policy measures targeted at families with children was to develop the care system for small children and to offer various opportunities for families to arrange child care. Since 1996, all pre-school children (under age 7) have been entitled to
municipal day-care. In 2000, 62 percent of children aged 3–6 and 32 percent of children under age 3 were in municipal day-care. Almost 60 percent of children aged 1–2 were taken care of at home or by other arrangements than municipal day-care. In most cases, mothers stay at home receiving the child home care allowance. In addition, the allowance for private child care is available for families who want to arrange child-care by themselves e.g. in private day-care (STM 2002). Moreover, since August 2000, every child has been entitled free preschool education for a year before the start of compulsory education at age 7. Regardless of the investments in child care facilities, privations and shortages persist. Due to the changes in work life such as extended opening hours of shops and increased overtime, the need for child care in the evenings, at nights and during weekends has increased. There is also a shortage of after-school care for children (Anttonen 1999; STM 2002).

The introduction of the child home care allowance in 1985 facilitated the reconciliation of family and work, and seems to have had a positive effect on the fertility rate, which has risen since the introduction of the child home care allowance (see Table 1). The system appears to encourage having children in succession because it offers an affordable way to arrange child care for several pre-school children. When the child home care allowance was launched, there was a shortage of labour force and the use of the allowance offered a substitute for the non-existent option of part-time work for over-employed mothers. However, in the recession in the early 1990s job insecurity grew and the periods of child home care allowance shortened (Rissanen 2002).

The 1990s, saw serious setbacks in reconciling work and family: day-care fees rose, the child home care allowance was cut and the taxation of the allowance tightened in relation to income taxation. Therefore, the care of children at home is no longer an inviting or economic option for the majority of families. In fact there is a danger that the child home care allowance will become an option for
**TABLE 3. Selected indicators of the labour market situation of women and men aged 15–64 and young people aged under 25 in Finland, Spain and the European Union, 1998–1999.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected labour market indicators</th>
<th>FINLAND</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th>SPAIN</th>
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<th></th>
<th>EU15</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Employment rate (%), 1999 ¹</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees working part-time (%), 1999²</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees with fixed term contracts (%), 1999 ³</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%), 1999 ⁴</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed 12 months or more (%), 1999</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Part-time workers by reason for working part-time (%), 1998 ⁵</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education or training</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>Family responsibilities</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not able to find a full time job</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reasons given for not being in the labour force, 1998 ⁵</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education or training</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>–</td>
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<td>Receiving income</td>
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<td>–</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

– No data available.

¹ Employment rate represents women and men in employment as a percentage of the population aged 15–64 and as a percentage of population aged under 25.

² Percentages of employed women and men aged 15–64 and percentage of young people aged under 25 who are in part-time employment.

³ Percentages of employed women and men aged 15–64 and percentage of young people aged under 25 working on fixed term contracts.

⁴ Unemployment rate represents women and men as a percentage of the active population aged 15–64 and as a percentage of those under 25 years old who, during the reference week, (a) had no employment, (b) were available to start work within the next two weeks, (c) had actively sought employment during the previous four weeks and (d) who had already found a job to start later. (The active population is defined as the sum of persons in employment and unemployed persons).

⁵ Aged 15+

only the very wealthy or for low-income families (Hiilamo 2000). Furthermore, re-entry to the labour market after a period of home care has become more difficult in spite of the recuperation of the labour market. Although no substantial evidence exists, there are signs that employers avoid hiring women because they are likely to use leave schemes and because employers are obliged to hold their jobs for them during the leaves. Difficulties in mothers’ re-entry to the labour market and employers’ reservations about employing women in the first place may signal growing female discrimination in the labour market and a strengthening of male breadwinner ideology (Rissanen 2002).

6.3. Deductions about the Spanish and Finnish Cases

The low female employment rate and extremely low fertility in Spain are often explained by the lack of public support for families, which encourages neither women’s wage work nor childbearing. In contrast, the Finnish characteristic of high female employment rate and relatively high fertility is explained by the family-friendly public policy that aims at a reconciliation of family and work and encourages both women’s wage work and childbearing. But both the Finnish and the Spanish cases indicate no obvious correlation between the level of policies targeted at families with children and the level of female employment. First, Finnish women’s and mothers’ mass entry into the labour market took place before public policies and services targeted at families were developed and second, the Spanish case indicates that lack of services and benefits does not prevent women and mothers from being professionally active. Unlike their mothers, who were mostly full-time homemakers, the majority of the present generation of Spanish women in the prime of their reproductive years are in paid work, even without radical developments in ‘family-friendly’ policy (Tobío 2001).
However, although the effect of public policy on fertility has been found to be minor (Gauthier 2000), the two cases indicate that policies may have either positive or negative effects. Taking the new activity pattern of Spanish women into account, the inadequacy of benefits and services for families with children might be one of the causes for the decline in the fertility rate and family size. At least, according to Spaniards, the insufficiency of public support for families is a main reason for the low fertility and diminishing family size (Orizo 1996; Meil, 1999). In Finland, the fertility rate rose in the course of the 1980s when ‘family-friendly’ services and benefits were developed and, on the other hand, the recent downward trend in the fertility rate may reflect the 1990s retrenchments of resources targeted at families. According to a recent study, Finns consider public support for families inadequate and one of the major reasons for hesitations about having children or, rather, about having several children (Paajanen 2002). Thus, the public support for families seems to affect the decision about the number of children but not so much the decision whether to have children at all.

What seems to have a crucial impact on fertility and formation of the first family is the working situation and steady income. Lack of stable employment has made a substantial contribution to the decrease of marriage and fertility in Spain. Historical and more recent observations in several Western societies suggest that the precarious employment situation of men, in particular, has a negative effect on fertility and marriage rates (Ahn and Mira 1999). This correlation is, perhaps, more pronounced in Spain than in Finland because of the social persistence of the male breadwinner/female full-time homemaker ideology. Given the deterioration in women’s labour market situation and the fact that men tend to earn more than women, it is likely that in Finland, too, men’s financial insecurity has a greater negative effect on family formation and childbearing than women’s.

More than the labour market situation in general, the labour market situation of young people in particular seems to be the focal
factor for low fertility and changes in the patterns of family formation in Spain and Finland. In the 1990s and for even longer in Spain, fixed term contracts and unemployment among young people have been more endemic in Spain and Finland than in the EU region on average (Table 3). In both countries, the precarious labour market situation and the financial insecurity of young people causes inability to plan for the future and fear of committing oneself to children and to a family of one’s own. The fact that the declining fertility among women aged 20–29 shows no sign of reversal in either of the countries while a recuperation of the fertility is discernible among women aged 30–39 (Table 2) reflects the importance of financial stability (Instituto de la Mujer 2001; Paajanen 2002). In both countries, people want and need to secure their financial situation before forming a family, as sufficient income is the precondition for household formation and having children.

The responses of Spanish and Finnish societies to the changing role of women and to the family, indicate ambivalences. In contemporary Spanish society, the public discourse emphasises the new role of women and gender equality but social structures continue to maintain the traditional family and sexual division of labour. The labour market favours middle-aged men at the expense of women and young people. In public policy, reluctance to develop paid leave schemes and care services for children reflect the idea that women are expected either to fall into the category of home-centred women or to manage as best they can after becoming mothers.

In Finland, public discourse endeavours to uphold the image of an egalitarian and even gender-neutral society. The underlying idea of Finnish (gender) equality is that every adult ought to have an occupation and income of her/his own (Salmi 1996). In quantitative terms, the labour market is fairly gender equal, but the weakening of women’s and young people’s labour market position since the 1990s recession could be interpreted as a sign of increasing male breadwinner ideology. In accordance with the Finnish ideal of equality, public
policy encourages mothers’ full-time wage work, although it has also endeavoured to enable the care of small children at home. However, the recent setbacks in the reconciliation of family and work confirm the necessity of two incomes. This, together with the normative nature of the two-earner family and full-time employment, makes home-centeredness a life-style option for only few.

7. Summary

Long-term demographic trends have been parallel in Finland and Spain in recent decades: marriage rates have fallen, fertility rates have declined and marriage and parenthood have been delayed. Regardless of these parallel trends, the profiles of family formation are distinct in the two countries. The greatest differences in family formation between the countries are that the fertility rate is relatively high in Finland and extremely low in Spain and that parenthood is delayed even longer in Spain than in Finland.

The most commonly evinced explanations for the recent demographic changes are the development and availability of modern contraceptives, the increased popularity of premarital cohabitation and the increased labour force participation of women. However, the cases of Finland and Spain challenge the validity of these explanations.

Even though the contraceptive revolution occasioned a remarkable change in reproductive practices, there is no causal link between the use of modern contraceptives and fertility levels (Coleman 1996). Modern contraceptives are available in Spain and Finland alike but their use is more widespread in Finland than in Spain and fertility in Spain is still considerably lower than in Finland.

The Finnish and Spanish cases also question the role of premarital cohabitation in the delay and decline of marriage and childbearing. The marriage rate is practically as low in Spain as it is in Finland although cohabitation is common in Finland but rare in Spain.
Furthermore, births outside marriage are uncommon in Spain. Consequently, cohabitation does not explain the decline or delay of marriage and childbearing in Spain. In Finland, however, premarital cohabitation delays marriage but not parenthood. Finnish women tend to become mothers prior to marriage and cohabiting couples marry as their families grow.

Furthermore, the causality between women’s increased labour market activity and changes in fertility is also doubtful. In Finland, both women’s employment rate and fertility rate are high by European standards, whereas in Spain both the fertility rate and female employment rate are low. The gender equal labour market and family-friendly public policies in Finland and segregated labour market and underdeveloped family support in Spain are common explanations for these differences. However, the Spanish case shows that although a segregated labour market and inadequate public support for families may complicate women’s entry into work life they do not prevent it. The female employment rate in Spain is constantly rising, the majority of the younger women are in employment and two-earner families are the norm among younger generations. The Finnish case confirms this finding: women’s mass-entry into the labour market in the 1960s and 1970s was not facilitated by family-friendly public policy and services; these were developed afterwards. The Finnish case also suggests the effect of public policies on fertility may be either positive or negative: without a decrease in the number of employed women, the fertility rate rose at a time when family-friendly policies were actively developed in the 1980s and, conversely, the rise of fertility ceased in the 1990s when the resources targeted at families were pared down.

In the cases of Finland and Spain, the precarious employment situation and financial insecurity of young people seem to be the focal factor affecting fertility and patterns of starting the first family. The effect of young adults’ precarious employment situation on fertility and family formation may be more pronounced in Spain and Finland than in other EU countries due to higher unemployment and incidence of
fixed term employment than in the EU region on average during the 1990s and for even longer in Spain. In both countries, unemployment and precarious employment cause insecurity, inability to plan for the future and postponement and even rejection of such commitments as marriage and childbearing. Employment and income are important for men and women alike because two incomes ensure a realistic possibility of establishing a common household and a family.

Nevertheless, the unstable labour market and low and unsteady income of young people as well as ever-longer time spent in education has a stronger negative effect on family formation in Spain than in Finland. The uncertain living conditions of young people and extended studying postpone leaving the parental home, life as a couple (married or cohabiting) and parenthood longer in Spain than in Finland. Due to the more extensive social support system in Finland, independent living and family formation are possible without a steady income and capital. The scarcity of subsidies in Spain accentuates the absolute necessity of financial stability as a precondition for family formation.
References


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Rissanen, Tapio (2002) ’Suomalaisen naisen ansiotyömalli ja sen muutokset 1990-luvulla (Models of and changes in Finnish women’s gainful employment in the 1990s)’, Unpublished seminar paper presented on 24th April 2002, Department of Sociology and Social Psychology, University of Tampere.


1. Introduction

The transition from youth and dependence to adulthood and independence has become an increasingly prolonged process in recent decades, suggesting that the importance of family formation as an indicator of adult social status has diminished. This article examines the transition from youth to adulthood from a family-centred point of view; its focus is on (1) the role of family formation within the process of becoming an adult, and (2) the circumstances underlying the phenomenon of delayed family formation. Because the concept of family can be understood in several different ways and because in real life families are diverse, family formation refers here not only to having children but also to a stable partnership, be it marriage or a marriage-like relationship.

Reflecting European trends, the main concern here is with young adults aged 20–29. Traditionally the upper age limit for the period of youth has been set at age 25, but this has now been drifting towards age 29 or 30 (Eurostat 1997). Even though the prolonged transition from youth to adulthood and the postponement of family formation are pan-European trends, there still remain marked national and
regional differences particularly between northern and southern Europe. The article moves from general overviews on a European scale to more detailed analysis on a nation scale. The discussion in this article considers the cases of Finland and Spain, which represent two opposite models of transition from youth to adulthood in Europe, and therefore enable us to analyse the differences behind the universal trend.

Within the scope of this article, Finnish and Spanish paths to adulthood are examined from a socio-demographic point of view and the reasons for the differences are surveyed from the perspectives of labour market, housing policies and the principles behind the welfare state types. Thus, I address only few of the reasons behind the differences in attaining independence in Finland and Spain and omit such important aspects as Finnish and Spanish youth cultures, traditions in children’s upbringing and intergenerational relationships.

I start by considering the concept of adulthood and the preceding phase of youth and look into how conceptions of youth have changed over time. I then move on to examine the role of family formation in the process of attaining the social status of an adult. The analysis is based on statistical materials. The third section proceeds to discuss the key factors behind the postponement or even rejection of family formation and parenthood. Finally, I offer some interpretations and conclusions with regard to the relationship between family formation and adulthood, the meaning of the family, and the causes and consequences of postponed parenthood.

2. Youth and Adulthood: Conceptual Definitions

The transition from youth to adulthood has traditionally comprised three phases: (1) the transition from economic dependence to economic independence and, later, from schooling and training to work; (2) the transition from childhood home to marital home; and
(3) the transition from the role of child to the role of parent (Jones 1995). However, the timing and pattern of these transitions has varied with time and place, as has the conception of youth.

In pre-industrial Europe, a person was considered a youth or was not a fully-fledged adult as long as he or she was unmarried, did not earn his or her own living, had no assets, and did not have a household and a family of his or her own. Youth was thus defined in terms of dependence: it was not about age but about social position (Berggren 1997; Gillis 1981). The concepts of youth and young people, as we understand them, began to take shape in the 19th and 20th centuries along with industrialisation, modernisation, political democratisation, the increase in schooling and change in family strategy.

As for family strategy, until the end of the 19th century fertility was high but so was child mortality. Consequently, a large number of children was needed for the survival of the family. Children were an important source of labour, they represented the parents’ the old age pension and insurance and, for families with land and property, an heir guaranteed the survival of the family name, property and social standing (Gillis 1981). Usually it was the eldest son who was the main heir but he rarely inherited his parents’ estate until his late 20s, which meant that marriage and family formation took place late. Daughters usually got their inheritances in the form of dowry, which often was a precondition for marriage. However, the amount and even the possibility of dowry were related to class. In many cases, with the exception of the rich, both daughters and younger brothers had to go out to work and save up in order to get married. Therefore, the age at marriage was high and, on the other hand, the number of those who never married was also high, particularly among the lower classes (Gillis 1981; Goody 2000).

Patterns of transition from childhood home to marital home and the age of marriage varied between northern and southern Europe in the 19th century. It was customary in the north that boys and girls alike moved out from the parental home at an early age for work and,
hence, the age of marriage was late for both sexes. Due to the tradition of going into service and the ability to save money, northern men and women were more free to choose their partners and able to set up their own households when they married. In the south, brides tended to be considerably younger than grooms and it was more common that women left home for marriage rather than to go into service. Arranged marriages were more common than in the north and the bride moved to the husband’s parental home until the couple was able to set up a household of their own. However, considerable regional and class-based variation in the patterns of transition existed both in southern and northern parts of Europe (Goody 2000: 102–108).

At the end of the 19th century, child mortality dropped, first among the middle classes. Furthermore, the change in the mode of production separated production and reproduction. Consequently, children’s labour was no longer needed to the same extent as before. Instead, a large number of children became a financial burden rather than an asset, especially after the ban on child labour and increase in schooling. Although these changes took place at a different pace in different countries, the outcome was that gradually fertility dropped and the small nuclear family became an increasingly common family form. The change in family strategy together with the growth of schooling and day schools, in particular, meant that parents and their children now lived more closely with each other and for longer periods than before (Gillis 1981). In addition, emerging principles of children’s upbringing and the growth of individualism shaped the notion of youth that originated from the middle class. The young became understood as a group of people who needed guidance, control and instruction. The rise of the concept of youth is thus interwoven with the creation of the modern individual, whose personality was based on his or her internal and personal qualities. Youth became a stage of life during which one seeks and cultivates one’s own identity in order to become an autonomous adult individual (Berggren 1997; Gillis 1981).
Due to population growth and socio-economic changes, by the end of the 19th century, there were more families with neither land nor possessions or trades to pass on to their children. Hence, the importance of inheritance and dowry diminished in the process of becoming independent and the north-south difference diminished. It became a widespread practice across Europe that children left their parental home at an early age. They did not establish households of their own but became servants and apprentices and lived in the master’s household. Some moved to towns in order to attend school and lived with their relatives or as lodgers. Many spent long periods of time in these ‘half-way households’ before getting married and setting up their own family and household. Marriage took place relatively late because, unlike leaving the parental home, getting married required sufficient economic resources. In those days leaving the parental home did not mean that the person had attained adult status: the actual transition to adulthood only took place with marriage and on forming a family of one’s own (Berggren 1997; Jones 1995).

By the 1950s and 1960s the number of servants and housemaids was declining sharply, the old apprentice system was disappearing and participation in education increasing. The new socially accepted norm was that young adults left their parental home when they got married. This meant that all the transitional phases – going into working life, leaving home, getting married and having children – were now crammed into a very short period of time. This was made possible by rising standards of living and the high employment rate. In the 1950s and 1960s people got married at a younger age than previous generations had done, although the 1970s saw the average age at first marriage and first childbirth rise again because of the growing popularity of consensual unions, longer periods spent in education, the availability of effective contraceptives and the change in women’s position and roles (Crouch 1999; Gillis 1981; Goody 2000).

Today, the transition from youth to adulthood bears a greater resemblance to the pre-industrial model than it does to the model
of the 1950s and 1960s: the transition period has become longer again and falls into different phases. According to Jones (1995), we have witnessed the return of ‘half-way systems’, albeit in new forms. Nowadays young people leave their parental home in order to live independently before getting married and starting a family. Usually, they live either alone or together with their peers, often with fellow students. However, living alone is not necessarily a ‘half-way’ living arrangement in that a growing number of people choose to live on their own permanently. Many leave their parental home to live in a cohabiting relationship. Cohabitation may be regarded as a ‘half-way’ period in the sense that people may live in several cohabiting relationships before they find an eligible partner. Nonetheless many cohabiting couples eventually decide to get married, some decide to stay together without ever officially ‘tying the knot’. It is important to recognise, of course, that leaving the parental home is not necessarily permanent, nor does it necessarily mark the attainment of independence. Young adults living away from their parents’ household often depend on financial support from their parents or return to their parental home, for example, because of unemployment or a broken relationship (Ermisch and Francesconi 2000).

Even though leaving the parental home is an important step in the process of attaining adult status, it is not the only or the most important indicator of adulthood. The normative measure of adulthood is the age of legal maturity, which in most Western countries is 18 years. The age of legal maturity makes a person a fully-fledged citizen with all the responsibilities and almost all the accompanying rights. Once they are 18, people are expected to manage by themselves, at least in principle. In Finland and Spain, for example, parents are required by law to provide for their children only up to the age of 18, although other legally defined dependencies between parents and their children extend beyond the age of legal maturity. In Spain parents are obliged to provide for their children as long as they are studying, regardless
of their age and educational level (Oinonen 2000: 14). In Finland, too, parents are obliged to pay for the education of their mature children, but only insofar as this is considered reasonable (Suomen Säädöskokoelma, SK 704/1975). It should be noted, however, that the situation of young people in Finland and Spain is very different: in Finland, students are entitled to student grants, loans and housing benefits, whereas in Spain the support system is far less comprehensive. Therefore, students in Spain are much more dependent on their parents than students in Finland.

Perhaps the most important qualifier of adulthood is financial independence, which is a necessary precondition for many other qualifiers like establishing a home, a household and a family. In particular, having children is closely linked to financial situation: people rarely want to have children before they have a steady job, a sound financial situation and suitable housing (CIS 1999; Conde 1985; Lewis et al. 1999; Saarela 2000). However, the attainment of financial independence now takes longer than before and is also more difficult to achieve. The process of gaining independence is hampered by the prolongation of education and the instability of the labour market.

The attainment of the status of a ‘fully-fledged adult’ requires first of all financial self-sufficiency and independent housing. Living in a steady partnership and having children also remain qualifiers of ‘true’ adulthood, even though the number of self-sufficient singles and voluntarily childless people is increasing throughout the Western world. A steady partnership and children are seen as signs of maturation, a willingness to accept responsibility for other people, not just for oneself.
3. Southern and Northern Paths to Adulthood

Most West European young adults aged 20–29, who are in the prime of their reproductive years, are single and childless, and many of them continue to live with their parents and have not yet attained independence (Eurostat 1997). Although there are some parallel trends, the process of attaining independence and the status of an adult varies in different parts of Europe. A rough distinction can be made between two paths to adulthood – southern and northern (Jones 1995). In southern Europe, most unmarried young adults live in their parental home, regardless of whether they are studying or working. It follows that the proportion of young adults living alone or in consensual unions is very small and the age of gaining independence is accordingly high (Juventud Española 2000; Martín Serrano and Valarda Hermida 2001.) The majority of Spanish young adults continue to live in their parents’ household into their late 20s and even early 30s (Table 1). On average, women live with their parents until the age of 27, men until they are 30 years of age (Martín Serrano and Valarda Hermida 2001). Marriage is the single most important reason for moving out and an avenue to independence. However, marriage does not always lead to setting up a household of one’s own and to independence from parents, as around 10 percent of 25–29 year old Spaniards living with their parents are married (Jurado Guerrero 1997: 18).

In northern Europe young adults leave their parental home at a relatively early age. In Finland 62 percent of those aged 20–24 and 86 percent of those aged 25–29 live independently (Table 1). The proportion of young adults living independently has risen considerably during the past decade, particularly in the younger age group (20–24). The main reason for this is the legislative change that allows students to register as residents of the town where they are studying. Studies and work are thus the principal reasons for moving out. However, it is quite common that young people return to live with their parents before they finally gain independence (Raitanen 2001).
In both countries the vast majority of young adults under 30 are single (Table 2). The number of married people is increasing among those aged 25–29 in both Spain and Finland, but the increase is greater in Spain due to the fact that it is not customary there to cohabit before marriage.

**TABLE 1. Living arrangements of young people aged 15–29 in Finland (1998) and Spain (1996) (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Living arrangements</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15–19 20–24 25–29 All</td>
<td>15–19 20–24 25–29 All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in parents’ household</td>
<td>89 36 12 47</td>
<td>95 81 53 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living independently</td>
<td>10 62 86 52</td>
<td>3 12 42 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>– – – –</td>
<td>2 7 5 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Living outside parents’ household, but not alone nor with spouse or partner.
- Data not available

Sources: Instituto de la Juventud 2001; Nuorten elinloindikaattorit 2001.

**TABLE 2. Marital status of young people aged 15–29 in Finland (1999) and Spain (1995) (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>94.7 92.5 69.1</td>
<td>99.2 92.3 62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.3 7.2 28.3</td>
<td>0.8 7.3 36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>0.0 0.4 2.6</td>
<td>0.0 0.3 1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>0.0 0.0 0.1</td>
<td>0.0 0.0 0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Instituto de la Juventud 2001; Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 2000.
On the subject of marital status, it is important to remember that being single does not necessarily mean that young adults actually live alone or do not have steady relationships. For example, 48 percent of Spanish young people aged 15–29 are in a steady relationship (Instituto de la Juventud 2001), and in Finland cohabitation is very common but does not show up in the statistics on marital status. Over half of Finns under 30 who live in a partnership live in consensual unions (Table 3). In fact, over the past few decades cohabitation has become the mainstream route to first partnership, family formation and also to parenthood (Nuorten elinoloindikaattorit 2001). Among Spanish young adults cohabitation is rare, although the number of consensual unions is growing. Only 8 percent of Spaniards under 30 who live in partnerships live in consensual unions, and cohabiting couples with children are exceptional (Table 3).

People are getting married at an ever older age. Today, both Finnish and Spanish men marry for the first time at around 30 and the average age of a Finnish and a Spanish bride is 28 (Table 3). Cohabitation is often quoted as the principal reason for the rising average age at first marriage and parenthood in western societies. Long-term cohabiting unions are quite rare, and people who choose to cohabit tend to live in several cohabiting relationships, which is why entering into marriage is postponed (Ermisch and Francesconi 2000: 30). The popularity of cohabitation is the major reason for the postponement of marriage among Finns, but cohabitation does not provide an adequate explanation in the Spanish case.

In both countries the average age at which women give birth to their first child has risen, in Finland to 28 and in Spain to 31 years (Table 3). The fact that marriage is nowadays preceded by long periods of courtship or cohabitation is a common reason for the delay in motherhood (Ermisch and Francesconi 2000: 32–34). However, it is somewhat problematic to suggest a direct causal link between delayed marriage and delayed parenthood. In countries like Finland, where cohabitation is common, a growing number of children are born
outside marriage to cohabiting parents. In other words cohabitation does not in itself adequately explain why parenthood starts later. In Spain cohabitation and births outside marriage are rare, and therefore it may be assumed that pregnancy is one of the major reasons for marriage. However, when we compare the mean age of Spanish women at first marriage and at first birth, we notice that many of them have their first child only after a few years of marriage. In Finland, by contrast, it seems that women become mothers and wives at the same age (Table 3). The cases of Finland and Spain indicate that marriage and parenthood are no longer as closely intertwined as they used to be, and that the reasons why people are getting married and beginning to have children at a later age are not necessarily the same in different countries.

The number of divorcees in the age group 25–30 is twice as high in Finland as in Spain (Table 2). The number of young single parents is therefore also higher in Finland than in Spain. In general the number of single parents is quite low in Spain compared to many other countries, and the number of young single parents is even smaller, although the figures are now showing some increase (Ruiz Becerril 1999). Only around 7 percent of minor children in Spain live in a single parent household, whereas the corresponding figure in Finland is around 19 percent (Eurostat 1999; Tilastokeskus 2000). There are several reasons for the rarity of single parenthood in Spain. First, divorces and legal separations are far less common in Spain than they are in Finland. Second, only comparatively few children are born outside marriage in Spain, which moreover, together with Italy, has the lowest fertility rate in the whole of the western world (Table 3).

Among Finnish young adults the proportion of single parents has increased slightly during the past decade. This indicates, on the one hand, that some marriages and/or consensual unions with children have broken down, but on the other hand it also shows that the proportion of children born outside marriage has been rising. When a child is born to unmarried parents, only the mother has custody
## TABLE 3. Selected family indicators, Finland and Spain *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family indicators</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household types %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One person households</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couple households</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-parent households</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family types %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married and cohabiting couples, children</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married and cohabiting couples, no children</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two parent families of all families</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One parent families of all families</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried living in a partnership % (1999)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under age 30</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriages (per 1000)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorces (per 1000)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age at first marriage (Finland 1998 / Spain 1996)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age of women at birth of first child (1998)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Births</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children / woman (1998)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children born within marriage % (Finland 1998 / Spain 1997)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children born outside marriage % (Finland 1998 / Spain 1997)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Finnish data are from the year 1998 and the Spanish data from the year 1995 unless mentioned otherwise.


of the child and will appear in the statistics as a single parent, unless the parents have made an express agreement regarding joint custody (Litmala 2000: 321). Therefore, the statistics may exaggerate the actual number of single parents, particularly in the case of young adults.
4. Extended Present, Faltering Future: Reasons for Later Family Formation

Young adults appear to live in an extended present where the focus is on current priorities and where it is exceedingly difficult to plan for the future (Lewis et al. 1999). This sort of a ‘here and now’ life is often connected with individualism and its downsides: egocentricity and a self-serving attitude. However, individualisation, no matter how it is manifested, is not only about individual free choice but also about a need to create new living strategies because the old models are no longer adequate (Beck 1996: 27–31). Following Giddens (1999), we are doomed to direct, stage, act and produce our own biographies in accordance with the prevailing conditions in society, such as the educational system, the labour market, housing policy and market and the welfare state. Such being the case, young adults do not live in an extended present simply out of choice; rather it is more a matter of necessity.

4.1 Ever More Time Spent in Education

Throughout Europe young people are spending more time than ever in education. In 1996, 37 percent of Finnish people under 30 were studying full time; the corresponding figure in Spain in 1997 was 42 percent (Instituto de la Juventud 2000; Nuorisosaiain neuvottelukunta 1997). The number of female students, particularly in higher education, has risen sharply during the past few decades all over Europe. In the academic year 1994–95 over half of all university students were women both in Finland and Spain (Havén 1998: 77). The reason why the number of students is growing and why people are spending more time in education is not that education as such has become more valued; these trends can rather be explained by the job-queue effect. When unemployment is high and jobs are in short
supply, the competition for vacancies will intensify. The best way to jump the queue is to get better qualifications (Laaksonen 2000). In the old days education was a privilege of the chosen few but nowadays it is those who find a job who are privileged.

4.2. The Precarious Labour Market

Youth unemployment and the proliferation of short-term and part-time contracts is another reason for the tendency to live in an extended present. Compared to young people of the 1970s and 80s, the young people of today are entering the labour market later and having more difficulty in doing so. The transition from education to working life is also more gradual and periods of study, unemployment and employment are more often mixed (Eurostat 1997). Although these trends apply to all of Europe, national differences exist. As an example, working while studying or studying while working is more common in Finland than in Spain. In 1995, 29 percent of 18-year-old and 19 percent of 24-year-old Finns and only 6 percent of 18-year-old and 10 percent of 24-year-old Spaniards were working (usually part-time) while studying (Eurostat 1997). On the whole, working while studying or studying while working are typical in northern Europe, where young people tend to enter working life before the age of 18, either to receive training (apprenticeship contract) or to earn pocket money. In addition, further training organised by employers or educational institutes is better developed in the north of Europe than in the south (Aho 2000; Eurostat 1997; Havén 1998).

Youth unemployment rose in the European Union during the recession in the first half of the 1990s, especially among those under 25, increasing from 16 percent in 1991 to 22 percent in 1995. However, Finland and Spain had the highest youth unemployment rates in the EU rising to 42 percent in Spain and 38 percent in Finland in 1995 (Eurostat 1997: 47). Although the employment situation in Finland
and Spain has improved since the recession, youth unemployment has remained higher than overall unemployment rates. Women have been affected more than men in that the employment situation has recovered faster in male-dominated industries. The reality is that approximately half of young adults both in Spain and Finland find their first job only after a period of unemployment. However, long-term unemployment is more common in Spain than in Finland (Eurostat 1997).

Apart from unemployment, other obstacles to attaining financial security include part-time jobs and fixed-term contracts, which are common among young people. In Spain, 74 percent of employees aged 20–24 and 52 percent of employees aged 25–29 were working on fixed term contracts in 1995. In Finland, 46 percent of employees belonging to the younger age group and 29 percent belonging to the older age group had fixed-term contracts in 1995 and since then the trend has been upward. In addition, non-voluntary part-time jobs have increased among all employees, but especially among the younger age groups (Eurostat 1997). Difficulties in entering the labour market, insecure jobs and, thus, lack of experience and length of service are responsible for the fact that, generally speaking, young people earn less than older employees even though they are better qualified (Laaksonen 2000). Instability in the labour market, ever increasing competition and low or irregular income are major obstacles to becoming independent and starting a family.

4.3. Housing Situation and Policy

Attaining independence and making the decision to start a family are also dependent on the prevailing housing situation and housing policy. In Spain, changes in housing policy show a clear connection to the decline in marriage and fertility rates. During Franco’s rule (1939-75) the housing market was under public control and rents as well as mortgages were affordable. In the 1980s housing was released from
public control, causing housing costs to increase dramatically. This coincided with a sharp decline in marriage and fertility rates (Miret-Gamundi 1997).

Today housing production is mainly in private hands and social housing production and availability are scant. Apart from subsidies of mortgage loan interests and tax relief, there is no system of housing allowances (Winther 1997). Spain has one of the highest home-ownership rates and least rented housing available in Europe. Around 76 percent of homes are owner-occupied, some 16 percent privately rented and only some 5 percent socially rented, and the upward trend in home-ownership seems to be continuing regardless of the rising property prices (Winther 1997). However, there are considerable regional differences in housing supply and housing costs, in particular. Generally speaking, property prices and rents are lower in less industrialised and developed regions and highest in the most developed regions. Such being the case, employment opportunities and supply of affordable housing do not coincide (Jurado Guerrero 1997).

In Spain, national, regional and local housing policies promote property owning rather than renting, which poses problems for young adults in acquiring their first own home irrespective of the region. Most young people are unable to pay the rent, much less to buy their own apartment or house, which leads to late independence and postponement of marriage and family formation (Jurado Guerrero 1997). Thus, acquiring a flat in order to be able to marry is characteristic of Spanish courtship (Alberdi 1999; Flaquer 1997).

There is also a strong tradition of home ownership in Finland. Like Spain, Finland is among those European countries with the highest home-ownership rates. Around 72 percent of homes are owner-occupied, some 11 percent privately rented and some 14 percent socially rented (Winther 1997). Home saving schemes established to help young people to buy their own homes and the mortgage interest tax relief promote home ownership. Nevertheless, home ownership
among young adults, in particular, has declined during the 1990s owing largely to the difficult financial situation and precarious labour market. Even though rented housing has grown in popularity, the culture of home ownership persists, as the vast majority of young Finns aim to be homeowners by the age of 35 (Raitanen 2001).

However, the availability of publicly owned rented housing, student housing and the system of housing allowances make it easier for young people to set up their own household and home without having to take out a mortgage (Laaksonen 2000). Student housing is an important route to a first own home in Finland. A third of all students, that is nearly 80,000 people, live in apartments offered by student housing foundations and corporations (Raitanen 2001). Nevertheless, there is a shortage of rented housing and great regional variation in rents and property prices, which causes regional differences in the timing of leaving home. The highest housing costs and most severe shortage of rented housing are in the metropolitan area and other major towns. Therefore, young people from big towns tend to stay in their parental home longer because they cannot afford to move out and, on the other hand, they do not need to move out because the colleges and universities are near. Those who are from smaller towns or rural areas leave home earlier because housing is more affordable in their place of origin or because they have to move to another locality in order to study or work (Raitanen 2001).

4.4. The Welfare State and Social Policy

The type of welfare state is one factor with a major impact on how easy or difficult it is to gain independence. The Finnish welfare state is based on principles that endorse individual independence. The basic principle is that every person who has reached the age of majority is entitled to individual social security (Esping-Andersen 1999). In other words, the individual’s well-being should not be dependent

EXTENDED PRESENT, FALTERING FUTURE
on his or her family or descent. At the centre of the Spanish welfare state, in contrast, is the family, which is responsible for the well-being of its members. Public basic security is for those who do not have a family (parents, siblings, spouse, children) or whose families are incapable of offering support (Esping-Andersen 1999). It seems then that interdependence between parents and their adult children is institutionalised in Spain whereas in Finland individual independence and self-sufficiency is publicly and officially endorsed.

Regardless of the type of welfare state, leaving home usually causes a decline in living standards. Moreover, the socio-economic position of the parents influences the decision to leave home, and also attitudes towards dependency. Young adults from working-class and lower middle-class families cannot depend on their parents’ financial assistance in the same manner as young adults from upper and upper middle-class families and, therefore, they tend to become independent earlier. The offspring of the well-to-do families, however, may choose to stay in their parental home longer in order to maintain the living standard they are used to, or they may move out and maintain their living standards because their parents are able to help them with housing and living costs (Conde 1985).

According to Conde (1985), the influence of social class in young people’s process of becoming independent is decisive in Spain. Social background also has an influence in Finland, but it may be less pronounced due to smaller class differences and to the type of welfare state. The public policies that favour young people’s independence, for example, unemployment benefits for those who are looking for their first job, housing allowances, student grants and loans, social and student housing ease cutting the cord from the parents (Flaquer 1997; Raitanen 2001).

The welfare state does not only influence the process of leaving home but also of starting a family of one’s own. When young people are thinking of having children, one of the key issues they have to consider is the reconciliation of family and work. Social policy appears to be a
discreet public means for boosting family formation and fertility, for the fertility rate is the highest in countries like Finland, which have extensive mechanisms of public assistance for families with children. This means that the decision whether or not to have children does not have to hinge upon considerations of reconciling family and work or loss of income while taking care of small children (Reuna 1999). In Finnish society it is the norm that both fathers and mothers go out to work. Furthermore, social policy encourages this by guaranteeing day care services in public day care centres or in subsidised day care for all children under seven (the age of starting school) and by offering parental leaves for working mothers and fathers so that they can take care of their children at home without fear for losing their jobs or the lion’s share of their income (International Reform Monitor 2000a).

Spanish social policy is based on the breadwinner husband and caretaker housewife model, which means that public services for families with children are scarce. The pre-school system for children aged 3–6 is extensive, but day care for children under 3 is scant. Maternity and paternity leaves are paid, but parental and nursing leaves are not. Child benefits are not universal and independent of incomes as they are in Finland. Spanish social policy measures targeted at families are designed to support large and low-income families (International Reform Monitor 2000b).

Labour market participation among Spanish mothers is low compared to most other European countries, but the situation is rapidly changing among younger generations and the reconciliation of work and family has become a topic of social debate (Meil 1999). Even so, wage work for married women is conceptualised as a choice, not as a norm. The implicit idea is that the reconciliation of work and family is a private matter for individual women, not a public one. Social policy does not, in this sense, promote two-earner families, even though this is now becoming the typical family form among younger generations (Meil 1999). As a result, one of the most important reasons mentioned by Spaniards for their record-breaking low fertility
is the scarcity of support and services targeted at families with children (CIS 1999).

The accent on the reconciliation of work and family reflects the changes that are taking place in gender relations and particularly in women’s roles and positions. Young women want and increasingly need an education, occupation and a personal income. The ability to earn one’s own living is highly valued among young people and especially among young women (Alberdi 1999; Lewis et al. 1999; Melkas 1999). Although the vast majority of young women (and men) would ideally like to live in a steady partnership, usually marriage, and to have children at some stage of their lives, financial dependence on the spouse is considered a risk that ever fewer women (and men) are willing to take. For example, only 10 percent of young Spanish women want to devote themselves to the home and children. The majority would like to combine a professional career with the family, and work full-time (Juventud española 2000).

4.5. Living in an Extended Present: Means of Risk Control

The more difficult it is and the longer it takes to attain independence, the more difficult it is to plan ahead; therefore it seems to make most sense to concentrate on the present. It appears that along with life in an extended present, the way in which life is divided into stages has completely changed. In the past, adult life was based on a strict separation of work and family, but now it seems that young people are dividing adult life into stages before and after settling down, which in most cases means a steady relationship and, usually, children. Young adults want to do their ‘own thing’ before entering into a meaningful partnership and/or parenthood (Lewis et al. 1999).

It is, on the one hand, quite understandable that as they become capable of providing for themselves, young people want to do their ‘own thing’ and spend money on themselves before taking on the
responsibility of providing for others as well. On the other hand, the emphasis on doing one’s own thing can also be interpreted as a strategy employed with a view to coping with uncertainty. Contemporary life is characterised by the presence of various risks and hazards that are actively assessed in relation to the future (Giddens 1999: 28). In days gone by, people believed their life was dictated by fate, whereas today we are more inclined to think it is up to ourselves what will happen in the future. This belief in one’s own abilities to forge one’s future has done away with the former division of life into clearly demarcated stages (studies, work, marriage and children), and has reordered and rescheduled them. When conventional ways of doing things dissolve, people start to think more and more in terms of risk, calculating the pros and cons of their decisions and actions, and trying to maximise risk control (Giddens 1999: 20–29).

Today, given the wider choice of socially and morally approved options of how to live our lives, even partnerships are contemplated in relation to risk. Committing oneself to another person involves all kinds of risks. Partnership usually restricts one’s personal freedom, it may oppress and it may dissolve and create emotional pain, as well as practical and financial hardships. Furthermore, forming a family and having children before one has attained sufficient economic and material security is considered a major risk, especially for successful parenting and for the welfare of the child (CIS 1999; Lewis et al. 1999; Melkas 1999). The pros and cons related to starting a family and having children are also very much gender-related. For instance, fatherhood has no major impact on a man’s career, financial independence or social position. Motherhood, by contrast, may interrupt a woman’s professional career for quite a long while and jeopardise both her financial independence and her personal social standing, regardless of the type of welfare state she lives in and its social policy (Crouch 1999; Goody 2000).

Despite the risks involved in family formation and parenthood, the majority of Finnish and Spanish young adults today are ready and
willing to take that risk because the obverse is certainty, sustainability and security. Marriage is perceived as more stable and secure than consensual union, even though the risk of divorce is considerable. In fact, the statistics show that marriages do not break up as frequently as consensual unions. Not only marriage but also children represent security, even though they no longer represent security for old age, at least in the same sense as they did traditionally. Nevertheless, children do stabilise the relationship and lives of their parents. Consequently, married couples with children do not break up as frequently as married couples without children (Eurostat 1999).

5. Interpretations and Conclusions

Not so long ago marriage was the key indicator of adulthood and the passage away from the childhood home and dependence on parents. For women, in particular, marriage and motherhood were the most important indicators of adulthood. Along with women’s increased participation in education and wage work, it is now their position on the labour market rather than on the marriage market that counts in the process of attaining the status of an adult.

Stiffening competition in the labour market today means that people have to spend more and more time in education to acquire the skills and qualifications they need. This, in turn, means they are entering the labour market ever later, which adversely affects their chances of earning their own living. In a situation of stiff competition on the labour market and rising living costs and expected standards of living, the ability to earn one’s own living becomes a precondition for other things in adult life, such as having a home and a family. Another reason why financial independence is emphasised in the process of attaining adult status is that attitudes towards partnerships and the family have been changing. When being single, divorced or living in a cohabiting partnership is socially and morally accepted, and when the
The possibility of divorce and separation is recognised from the outset, the personal ability to provide for oneself becomes an important value, especially for women, who have traditionally been dependent on their husband’s earnings.

Both Finland and Spain have seen the same trend of people starting a family and having children at a later age than before, but on the other hand there are clear differences between the two countries in the processes of growing into adulthood. In Finland people move out of their parents’ household at an earlier stage than in Spain. In both countries people tend to marry at around the same age, but Finns have children sooner than Spaniards. The reason for this is that it is common in Finland for people to have their first child while they are still cohabiting and only then to get married, whereas in Spain young people take the more traditional route of getting married first and having children later. In both countries, marriage and parenthood as the principal indicators of adulthood have been replaced by financial independence, but in principle a steady relationship (usually marriage) and parenthood are still seen as indicators of the final stage of maturation. In reality, however, marriage plays a much more central role in the process of attaining independence and adult status in Spain than it does in Finland.

There are several reasons underlying the differences in attaining independence in Spain and Finland, but within the scope of this article, explanations for the fact that attaining independence is prolonged further in Spain than in Finland are found in the situation of the respective labour markets, housing policies and the fundamental principles of the types of welfare state.

Although entering the labour market is difficult for young adults in both countries, achieving economic independence seems to be even more difficult for Spaniards because the periods of unemployment tend to be longer and fixed-term contracts are more common than in Finland. Furthermore, in contrast to young Finns, young Spaniards looking for their first job are not entitled to unemployment benefits
TABLE 4. Summary: Processes of becoming an adult in Finland and Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I  Becoming independent</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaving parental home</td>
<td>Early</td>
<td>Late</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for leaving parental home</td>
<td>Studies/work</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II  Living arrangements</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Living with parents</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living independently</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living alone</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Few</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>III  Family formation/parenthood</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consensual unions</td>
<td>Common</td>
<td>Uncommon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at first marriage</td>
<td>W/28 M/30</td>
<td>W/28 M/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age at first birth</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Births outside marriage</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Few</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Flaquer 1997). Moreover, in Finland, the opportunities to combine studying and working are better than in Spain, which may be one factor that facilitates young peoples’ path to independence: experience of working life is an asset in the competitive labour market, and one’s own earnings, however modest, while studying promote independence from parents.

Lack of income or sporadic income leads to inability to have a home of one’s own, especially in Spain, where housing policy promotes property ownership, and rented housing and affordable social housing, in particular, is scarce. Therefore, even those young adults who have a job and an income find it difficult to establish their own household. In Finland, the availability of social housing and rental housing in general, as well as student housing and existing housing allowances make it easier for even young people with low incomes to have a home of their own. Differences in housing policies also explain why the number of young adults living alone is substantially lower in Spain.
than in Finland. Only around 1 percent of Spanish young adults aged 20–29 live alone, whereas the corresponding proportion in Finland is around 23 percent and on the increase (Eurostat 1997). Furthermore, a housing policy that promotes home ownership over rented housing favours marriage over cohabitation as a form of relationship and as a basis for family formation, and offers one plausible explanation for the rarity of cohabitation among Spanish young adults.

For reasons that have to do with cultural and social differences, the salience of the family institution as a provider of well-being and of family formation as a signifier of adulthood varies between Finland and Spain. These distinctions are reflected not only in the different paths to adulthood in these countries, but also in studies on young people. Spanish youth studies pay more attention to family-related themes concerning young people’s attitudes, values and conceptions of their childhood family as well as their future families than do Finnish youth studies. In Finland, the accent is more on topics such as education, work and politics (Conde 1985; Juventud española 2000; Saarela 2000, 2001). This difference can be traced back to the notion in Finnish society that a person’s identity and social position are based upon education and work, whereas in Spanish society the building blocks of family, education and work are all considered equally important. However, the emphasis on individual self-sufficiency and independence in the Finnish discourse conceals the fact that young people in Finland are more heavily dependent on their parents than is commonly believed or admitted, and that the public systems in place to support independent living may after all be insufficient or incorrectly targeted (Laaksonen 2000).

Ironically, it is more difficult in the Spanish family-centred society to set up a home and a family than it is in the Finnish, more individualistically oriented society. Furthermore, the fertility rate in Spain is lower than in Finland. The situation where well-being is based on the family institution and on collective family responsibility leads to greater dependence between grown-up children and their parents.
than the situation where well-being is based on personal responsibility and on the relationship between the individual and society.

In a society (like Spain) where the welfare state and individual well-being is based on the family institution and the mutual responsibility between family members, the state has had no need (so far) to develop societal systems to support young people’s independence (e.g. study grants, housing allowances or student housing), family formation and reconciliation of family and work (child care facilities, social policy measures targeted at families with children, etc.). It is taken for granted that the family, not the state, takes care of the individual. In a so-called individualistic society (like Finland) where the welfare state as well as individual well-being is based on the relationship between individual and society, society has to develop systems to support the individual in the different situations in life. Unlike Spain, in Finland it is taken for granted that an individual takes care of him/herself with the assistance of society.

Nevertheless, a common reason for the postponement or even the rejection of family formation and parenthood is the experience of uncertainty, particularly financial insecurity and instability. When the standard of living rises, so too do the quality requirements placed upon education, work, housing, partnership, family life, etc. The rise in quality requirements and the uncertainty of attaining the expected quality of life and standard of living are closely linked to the postponement or rejection of family formation and parenthood. Rising quality requirements also increase the risk of failure and consequently family formation and having children are postponed until one expects to attain the necessary resources and the risk of failure can be minimised.

Although the decision to delay or not to have a family or children at all no longer prevent the attainment of the social status of an adult, they do have various other consequences. First, the postponement of parenthood and motherhood in particular involves health hazards. The risk of complications related to pregnancy, labour and to the
health of a mother and a child increases in direct proportion to the mother's age.

Second, people who do not to have a family also lack the most important safety net in society: in every society the family and the nuclear family (partner and children) represent the most important source of support and safety. Although research has stressed the supportive role of friends, the types of support offered by friends and the family are based on different principles. Family members are bound together by moral responsibility, whereas friendships are voluntary relationships. In particular, relationships between parents and children are durable even if the family breaks up for one reason or other (Conde 1985).

Seen from the point of view of society at large, the postponement of family formation and parenthood has the effect of reducing the fertility rate. That is, the older people are when they start to have children, the fewer children they will have. The decline in fertility also accelerates the ageing of the population, with the dwindling at-work population having to take care of the growing non-active population. As well as representing a significant drain on the resources of the welfare state, this also means that more and more of the remaining resources have to be allocated to the ageing population. That, finally, presents a threat to the existing mechanisms of public support and services for young people and families with children, possibly further complicating the task of reconciling work and family and of having a family and children in the first place.

Furthermore, the smaller the families become in size, the greater is the caring responsibility of one individual. A growing number of European families have only one child, which means that in the future those only children will have sole responsibility for taking care of their ageing parents. Particularly in societies like Spain, where well-being is based on the family institution, declining family size and the tendency to have just one child prompt some awkward questions: What will happen to those old people whose only child is unable to take care of
them for one reason or another? Who will those people whose parents are no longer alive but who have no family of their own or siblings turn to for support?

The decline in marriage and fertility rates is by no means a novel phenomenon in Western countries but was a consistent trend throughout the 20th century. This trend is set to continue in the future, even though there may be cyclic fluctuations. History has taught us that major societal upheavals such as wars and economic recessions and periods of strong economic growth push the fertility rate either upwards or downwards. Likewise, changes such as the growth of gender equality within society as a whole and within partnerships may have a positive effect on family formation and fertility. Besides, traditions tend to rally at times of rapid social change. The family is one of the most important traditions we have and the value of partnership, family and parenthood has by no means diminished among young people, even though family formation is no longer the most important qualifier for adulthood.
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