Katja Keisala

The European Union as an International Actor: Strengths of the European Civilian Power

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Tampere, for public discussion in lecture room B661, Yliopistonkatu 38, on December 11th, 2004, at 12 o’clock.

University of Tampere
Tampere 2004
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

More than the main product, my thesis is a by-product of my life during the last six years that has been full of events and new turns. I have had only a few academic contacts, and most of the people I wish to thank have been important to me other than for professional reasons, although they all have participated in this project by offering support and practical help.

First I wish to express my gratefulness to the reviewers, Iver B. Neumann and Hanna Ojanen, for the valuable comments that helped me to finish my thesis. I am deeply indebted also to my supervisor Jean Monet professor Jyrki Käkönen, who has not only offered professional and scientific guidance but also supported me in my choices in life that have been difficult to reconcile with the academic environment.

I am very grateful to my mother Riitta Lassila, who, over many years, has taken care of Monika my daughter offering me time to write and rest. Many thanks also to my sister, who took care of my children when I was making the final changes to my thesis. I am indebted also to my father and his wife for the same reason.

I am especially grateful to my “jeune fille au-pair” Miia Hänninen who has taken care of my daughter – and of me – both in Finland and France. She accompanied me through the darkest time of my life, for that I am indebted to her forever. I owe special thanks also to my very good friends Elina Penttinen and Niina Repo who have offered the shoulder that I have needed a lot during these years.

I am grateful to my husband Remberto Martínez for offering joy and hope. His existence strengthens my belief that compromises are not worth making. I wish to thank my three children for teaching me how to be a good human being and take care of others – it is the most difficult lesson of my life.

I owe special thanks to Roland Caldbeck for proof reading my thesis and to Aila Helin for the layout.

This research has been financially supported by the University of Turku, the University of Tampere and the city of Tampere. Part of the research has been made within the doctoral school for cultural interaction and integration.
# CONTENTS

1. Dwarf, adolescent or superpower?
   **European Union on the international field** ........................................7
   1.1. The EU in the system of states ..........................................................8
   1.2. A foreign policy actor ....................................................................13
   1.3. A civilian power ..........................................................................16
   1.4. More than a state .......................................................................20

2. **Agents and structures in the international system** ..........................23
   2.1. Social structures and agents .........................................................23
   2.2. The problem of agents and structures ............................................28
   2.3. The social system of international politics .....................................33
   2.4. Properties of a state ..................................................................38

3. The **international system – a system of states?** ...............................43
   3.1. The anarchic system of states ........................................................47
   3.2. Globalization overrules the Westphalian system ............................52
   3.3. An emerging common identity in Europe ....................................58

4. **The European Union in the international system: earlier approaches** ..............................................................................67
   4.1. From the debate between realism and liberalism to the debate
       between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism ....................70
   4.2. Concepts of actorness and the EU .................................................80
   4.3. Constructivism ............................................................................86
   4.4. The EU – an anomaly forever? ......................................................96

5. **The EU as a foreign policy actor** ..................................................105
   5.1. From political cooperation to the CFSP .......................................107
   5.2. The EU’s foreign policy capabilities .............................................114
   5.3. Case study: the EU’s enlargement policy towards
       Central and Eastern Europe .........................................................140
   5.4. Strengths and weaknesses of the EU
       as a foreign policy actor ............................................................154

6. **The European Union, more than a state** .......................................161
   6.1. The EU is compatible with the international system ....................162
   6.2. The EU is facing a challenge of democracy ..................................166

References ..........................................................................................171
1.

**DWARF, ADOLESCENT OR SUPERPOWER?**

**THE EUROPEAN UNION ON THE INTERNATIONAL FIELD**

It seems to be a part of common knowledge that the European Union\(^1\) is an economic giant but a political dwarf. Although none can claim that the EU does not possess significant resources, for some reason these resources do not seem to help the EU to have much influence in foreign policy matters. Despite its large network of diplomatic relations, and its position as one of the most significant aid donors and trading partners in the world, many suggest that it has not succeeded in its attempts to develop its economic influence also into a political one. The EU is often compared to the U.S. in foreign policy matters, and in this comparison the EU seems to be clearly the much weaker player; whereas the U.S. can reach the decision to solve an international dispute by using military force, the EU appears to be unable to reach a common understanding concerning such a situation and in particular ways to solve it.

There are certain theoretical assumptions behind the conclusion according to which the EU is a political dwarf. The first one clearly claims that economics can be isolated from politics. According to the second assumption, a foreign policy actor cannot be efficient without a military dimension – some even doubt if there could be a foreign policy actor without military resources. Although states without military resources exist, some kind of military dimension is often seen as a necessary element of a state, and statehood itself is considered to be a prerequisite for an international agency. Because the EU is not a state, and does not have the same capabilities that states have, or not at least all of them, it is seen as unable to act as a coherent and powerful foreign policy player. Still, economic issues affect foreign policy aims, and foreign policy is often executed by using economic means. The EU in particular connects its aid and trade policies with the larger aims of the Common

---

\(^{1}\) The European Union (EU), established by Article A of the Treaty of the EU (TEU, or Maastricht Treaty), is a new entity, which operates through its component parts, the European Communities, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs, and in some cases through member states (Bradley & Sutton 1994, 237). By the European Community (EC) I refer to the EU’s first pillar, which existed independently before the EU.
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by making aid and trade contracts conditional upon certain democratic and human rights standards. In addition, foreign policy is usually executed by non-military means; military power is actually used quite rarely, and mostly foreign policy is conducted through every-day practices between ministries. However, there seems to be a strong connection between a state, an actor and military resources. The connection is so strong, that being an influential economic actor created strong incentives to develop the military aspect to the “same” level as the economic one; this is seemingly in contradiction with the theoretical assumptions (also presented in this thesis) claiming that the significance of military resources is declining.

In my study I wish to examine if the EU is such an unfit actor on the international field. I will analyze how the international system (of states) defines the properties of actors, and how the definition is changing. There are two basic questions in this work: First, what position does the international system offer to the EU? Secondly, how does the EU utilize the position given to it? To find answers, I will examine a state as an actor, the international system of states, and the properties and actions of the EU.

1.1. The EU in the system of states

The EU has been compared to a state, but it is still unclear what a state is. Although a state is a central concept in the study of international relations (IR), scholars do not share one definition of it. States as historical units have changed, and so has the meaning of being a state. Scholars have used other concepts, such as sovereignty or autonomy, to clarify the state’s “essence”, but also the meaning of those is vague.² This has made Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach to argue that “[t]he state has so many different, competing, and loaded meanings that it is largely useless for theory-building”. I will not make an attempt to define a state, instead it will be analyzed how the international system constructs its agents, and how the state has retained its position as the main actor in the international field – or has it? There are also other entities that might be understood as international actors, such as multinational

² See Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach (1988), especially the chapter “The State as an Obstacle to International Theory”.
³ Ferguson & Mansbach 1996, 10.
corporations, and non-governmental organizations or international organizations, the latter being another option for organizing the EU. They are, however, secondary actors on the international field, since their power is dependent on states, and they must act in the framework of rules defined by states. States could, for example, decide to set more strict restrictions on trade, multinational corporations could not do much about this. In the case of international institutions, on the other hand, states decide how much power they have and what they use their power for. Hence, international politics is inter-national by definition.

Since the international system is a system of states, the position of a state as a primary actor seems to be universal and eternal. Indeed, concentrating on states and state power does not leave room for studying the change. Still, a state is only one form of a polity among many, and during the history many different polities have been dominant. As Ferguson and Mansbach put it, “there is no logical, historical, or empirical justification for universalizing the Westphalian polity”. They define a polity as a political organization that has, first, a distinct identity; secondly, a capacity to mobilize persons and their resources for political purposes; and thirdly, a degree of institutionalization and hierarchy (leaders and constituents). Their analysis corresponds to Alexander Wendt’s explanation concerning the requirements which a structure must fulfill to be an agent (presented in the chapter two). Whilst Wendt argues that an agent must have recognition of other actors (external sovereignty) to become an actor in the international field, Ferguson and Mansbach suggest that only a Westphalian polity is recognized as an actor.

The Westphalian state is only one polity type, distinguished less by criteria focusing on loyalties or resources than by legal claim to legitimacy and the formal recognition of other members of the “sovereign club” that is what it claims to be. Unfortunately, there is no official certification board comparable to the community of Westphalian states to provide formal recognition for other polities.

In this thesis it is claimed that the EU is a new kind of a polity challenging the position of a Westphalian state. If the EU succeeds in

---

4 Ferguson & Mansbach 1996, 16.
5 Ibid., 34.
6 Ibid., 401.
this, it will have consequences for the whole international system. Yet, to be able to act in the system, the EU must not only challenge the position of a state, but also adapt to the requirements of the actorness; the EU must resemble a state in some respects to get recognized as an actor.

It is necessary to define some of terms to be used. The term “polity” will be used here to refer to political organizations that fulfill certain requirements (defined above and more carefully in the chapter two). However, since the term “polity” lacks an external dimension, I will use the term “actor” to refer a polity (or an agent) that is recognized as an actor on the international political field, and who executes external policy – and most importantly, foreign policy – of its own. According to this definition, actors are always international, since they act on the international field, but sometimes I use also the concept “international actor” to emphasize the EU’s ability to make external policy in contradiction to internal one.

Why do sovereign and territorial states have a right to be the primary political actors? The answer lies partly in the historical conditions of the international system, and partly in the production of states. The origin and history of the concept of sovereignty, and of the world order based on it, are closely related to the nature and evolution of the state, and in particular to development of centralized authority in early-modern Europe. Most contemporary formulations of the concept are deeply indebted to the philosophical and theoretical positions advanced during that era. As Ferguson and Mansbach put it, “[t]he European conquest overwhelmed other forms of political organization and produced the antihistorical idea that the Westphalian polity is a universal form”. The meaning of sovereignty and the position it entitles are recreated in discourse.

[W]ays of speaking about state sovereignty reproduce certain assumptions and resolutions of philosophical and political questions that are constitutive of the principle of state sovereignty itself. To speak about state sovereignty is to engage in forms of political practice, to become caught up in immense powerful forms of political action that appear to be mere abstractions or ideologies.

---

8 Ferguson & Mansbach 1996, 22.
9 Walker 1990, 169.
Within the same discourse the properties of the EU are compared to those of states, with the consequence that the position of states is recreated and reinforced. It seems that the EU could enjoy the rights and powers of an international actor only if it became a state itself. There still is an ongoing test of statehood, and as long as the EU does not pass it, it is hard to consider it as an actor in its own right. Although changes in the domestic and external environment have restricted a state’s room for action, it does not necessarily mean that states are less sovereign. Even the constraints imposed by international law may be seen as fully compatible with the exercise of state sovereignty; the state’s right to enter into international engagements is itself an attribute of that sovereignty. Yet, the principle of state sovereignty can be seen to have emerged and developed under conditions that are fast disappearing. The position of a state is difficult to shake, but it seems that there is room for other types of actors too. Like Ferguson and Mansbach argue, “[n]o polity remains unchallenged or unchanged forever.”

The position of a state is connected to the development of the international system overall. The effects of globalization, modernization and democratization are creating new kinds of environments and cultures with new possibilities and threats. Increased interdependence between national economies and production added to the fact that all types of exchange are becoming ever more global restrict the ability of a state to act as fully sovereign. Globalisation includes many processes that affect the position of a state: while internationalization increases international exchange and interdependence, liberalization is removing government-imposed restrictions on movements between countries to create an open economy. Universalization is a process through which objects and experiences spread globally, when certain social structures spread within modernization, or westernization. In addition, deterritorialization refers to the social space that can less and less be mapped in terms of territorial places, distances and borders. Moreover, problems caused by modernization and globalization like pollution and economic instability, and new security threats like terrorism and the proliferation of arms of mass destruction generate incentives for common

10 Camilleri 1990, 24, 38.
11 Ferguson & Mansbach 1996, 403.
12 Hirst 1997.
13 Scholte 2000, 15-16.
action which may lead to common interests and in some cases even to the emergence of common identity. As Walker puts it, “all states are now caught up in processes of economic, technological, social, cultural, and political transformation that are likely to provide both the need and the opportunity for new forms of political practice”\textsuperscript{14}. The meaning of properties like sovereignty and military resources is changing, as well as a state’s position on the international field. Although a state was once able to become the dominant actor, it will not be able to win the competition again – at least with the same resources. Some claim that a state will lose its dominant position, and that the international system will not be a system of states anymore, but that there will be variety of functional agents alongside states\textsuperscript{15}. Change does not happen only inside a state and in its position, however, but also international structures change, affecting the way actors behave with each other. Some scholars even suggest that weakening state sovereignty together with democratization will lead to a more civilized international system and the end of wars.\textsuperscript{16} Yet, it could be argued that if states break down and people give their loyalties to competing polities, the international system may be even more unstable and prone to violence. In the end, what the international system and its actors will look like in the future, is determined by the polities best capable of utilizing and manipulating changing patterns of opportunities and constraints.\textsuperscript{17}

I claim that although the state is losing its position, it is still the dominant actor in international politics, and other polities hoping to get a position of an actor must be comparable with it: after all, structures do not change so quickly, and actors are constituted by them. The changing international context opens up the possibility to increase the importance of the EU. Sovereignty and military resources that once determined the state’s position as a dominant actor have partly lost their meaning; not having them should not prevent the EU from being an actor. Furthermore, the EU might have properties that make it better capable to manage in the globalizing and fragmenting world.

\textsuperscript{14} Walker 1988, 82.
\textsuperscript{15} Ferguson & Mansbach 1996, 410; Buzan & Little 2000, 360; Adler 1997, 250-252.
\textsuperscript{16} Wendt 1999, 360-363; Maull 1990/91, 106.
\textsuperscript{17} Cerny 2000, 441.
1.2. A foreign policy actor

Thus, within the contemporary system of sovereign states it is unclear what the position of the EU is or could be. On the one hand, the EU cannot be considered as merely an international organization; as Zürn suggests, the EU has features that separate it from international institutions:

First, the regulations issued in the different European sectors [...] are so closely related to each other that as a network they affect a number of political issue areas at once within a more or less clearly defined territory [...] The second distinctive feature of the EU multilevel system is that [...] some European institutions, such as the European Court of Justice and the European Commission, are indeed supranational. Supranational institutions develop rules that are considered superior to national law and employ servants that possess autonomy from national governments in that they have authoritative powers which directly affect national administrations and societies.18

Rather than an international organization, the EU is “a new type of political system, made up of national and European institutions that are constituted in relation to each other”. The national institutions of member states and the EU institutions are so closely interwoven that they cannot be conceived as separate political systems.19 On the other hand, the EU is not a state, and we have many reasons to assume that it will not be one (unless the definition of a state changes). While it has some capabilities states traditionally own, it lacks others. This appears to make it an actor in some issue-areas, but not in all of them. In particular, the “missing” foreign policy seems to serve as proof of the nature of the EU, that is, its intergovernmentality. Even though the TEU institutionalized and formalized the rules and practices governing foreign policy-making, and also created new measures, the foreign policy of the EU has been considered as declamatory and reactive. Failures in crisis situations, for example in Bosnia, and calls for the United States’ help, seem to demonstrate the same point: The EU cannot do it on its own. Something is missing: some claim that it is the military capability,

18 Zürn 2000, 185.
19 Ibid., 185.
whilst others argue that the foreign-policy missions challenge the process of interest formation and decision-making of the EU. Many believe that the problem lies in the level of coherence, which is seen to be too low.

Why is it so difficult to see the EU as a foreign policy actor even considering its CFSP? Foreign policy has traditionally been connected to a state, it is concerned with the relation of a state to other states in the international system; it is connected to the idea of national aims and interests, and involves mobilizing national resources. Although foreign policy in its most visible form is “high” politics concerning high diplomacy and war, in practice most of the time it is “low” politics including low-level diplomatic practices between ministries and also economic policy as a means of reaching foreign policy aims. Yet, foreign policy differs from foreign economic policy, since its objectives are always political or security-related. Foreign policy does not entail military force; as Karen Smith puts it, “the recourse to military instruments can indicate a failure of foreign policy.”

Since foreign policy has traditionally been considered as a “heart” of state sovereignty, it is reasonable to ask if only national governments can conduct foreign policy. In this work I will suggest that the reason why foreign policy is connected solely to states is not that making foreign policy is possible only for nation states and governments; rather it has to do with states’ position as primary actors in the international system. When certain conditions are met – concerning among others, a decision-making system – non-state actors are also able to conduct foreign policy. Like Karen Smith notices, policy can refer to two things, first, to an explicit plan of action or a strategy, and secondly, to a series of habitual responses to events in the international realm. Even if the EU was able only to react to events rather than initiating active policies – a criticism often made of it – the EU’s response would be foreign policy.

Hence, the EU is able to formulate and implement foreign policy; it is claimed in this work that it can even make foreign policy in a stronger meaning of the term than just reacting. Yet, there is no single EU foreign policy, but on some occasions member states agree on common interests and objectives, and mobilize national and collective resources to fulfill them: they conduct common foreign policy. For

---

20 Smith 1999, 3.
21 Ibid., 3-4.
22 Ibid.
the EU, foreign policy means that its member states and institutions, to use Smith's words, “have expressed a unified position in response to external events and/or formulated a plan of action directed towards the fulfillment of specified political/security objectives, and have agreed to use Community/CFSP instruments and/or instruments under national competence in a coordinated way to implement it.”

To argue that the EU executes foreign policy, the assumptions that there must be national interests defined by a government and that foreign policy needs military instruments to be effective have to be given up. Even then, both executing foreign policy and analyzing it face problems due to the EU's unitary way of making foreign policy: The common foreign policy is formulated within the intergovernmental framework where national governments define and put together their foreign policy interests to create common policy. Many instruments of foreign policy belong to the area of the EC, however, since it mostly carries the responsibility for external economic relations. Overall, decisions taken in the EU and the EC frameworks should be consistent, e.g. policies should not cancel each other out, or pursue incompatible objectives.

Even though the common foreign policy is important for the EU’s ability to act as an actor, it must be put into the larger context of external relations, otherwise we fail to see the EU’s importance on the international field. The division between political and economic matters has always been vague, but it is even more so at the time of globalization. It seems that those foreign policies connecting intergovernmental and community issue-areas, like the enlargement policy, have been among the most successful policies. The enlargement policy can be considered foreign and security policy because of its political and security-related aims, although the EU has applied the practices of the CFSP – common position and joint action – only a couple of times during many years of the enlargement policy.

Although the EU may appear as a weak actor in “high policy” areas, it is an effective negotiator of “low policy” matters, including trade and aid, that belong to the Community issue-area. The EU does not act like a traditional foreign policy player. But what usually is seen as its weakness, may turn out to be a strength. In the contemporary international system

---

23 Ibid., 4-5.
24 Smith 1999, 4.
it may be a benefit that an actor is able to take different forms in different situations, as the EU is forced to do due to its nature of lying between an international organization and a state.

1.3. A civilian power

There are certain requirements for an actor presented in the literature of IR, and usually these requirements do not include statehood or military resources. The fundamental requirements for actorness defined by Bretherton and Vogler\textsuperscript{26} include many of those aspects considered in this thesis. The first requirement is a commitment to shared values and principles; in the case of the EU these values and principles are defined in many documents, for example in the TEU. Furthermore, a polity must have an ability to formulate coherent policies and undertake international negotiations, the last one being a condition of entry to the system. The EU’s ability to formulate coherent policy varies according to the issue-area, and often appears to be weakest in the CFSP. The EU is also able to undertake international negotiations, and has turned out to be a rather efficient negotiator. Moreover, a polity must have access to policy instruments; this is not a problem for the EU, who can even use military instruments to execute the Petersberg tasks. The final requirement concerns the legitimacy of the decision-making process. In the literature many sources of legitimacy are mentioned: it can be, for example, that decisions are made according to rules agreed in basic treaties, or that European citizens support the EU and consider it as legitimate. It is unclear if the EU is legitimate in the last meaning of the term, but the relationship between legitimacy and actorness is also vague; it is hard to evaluate how the lack of legitimacy exactly affects actorness.

Bretherton’s and Vogler’s definition put emphasis on the polity’s own properties, but I wish to add that they do not determinate totally the entity’s position on the international field. Entry to the system is dependent on whether or not the other actors give recognition. It is claimed in this work that usually only states are recognized as actors, but even though the EU is not a state, it has at least partial recognition in practice, since it is accepted as a partner in negotiations, diplomatic

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 9.
relations, trade and aid. However, the EU has no legal personality until the Constitution is ratified by the member countries, and the EC has a personality only as an international organization. It is still states that make treaties and join international organizations, and only states have the full right to participate and are held responsible by other actors. Still it must be acknowledged that even though weak states have a legal personality, they might be rather insignificant actors, while the EU can fulfill many important functions. But the EU seems to suffer from a lack of credibility, or prestige that prevents it from having much of an influence especially in international crises, like in the Palestinian question. Still, by recognizing the EU as an actor in its own right – even partially – states decrease the significance of sovereignty, and weaken their own position as primary actors. Hence, the EU may change the structure of the international system, and make room for other polities too; or, it may become a state. Indeed, some see a state-building process going on within the EU. Particularly acquiring military resources and writing a Constitution are signs of an attempt to make a state out of the Union. Building a polity resembling a state seems to be the answer to many open questions. One of them concerns foreign policy and the EU’s external role, whilst another is about the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of its own citizens. Yet, through the state-building process the EU will not change the international field but rather strengthen the settled system. On the other hand, the EU might create new forms of power (not based on state sovereignty), if it develops in another direction.

One possible direction is to strengthen its image as a civilian power. According to Hans W. Maull, a civilian power accepts the necessity of cooperation with other actors when pursuing international objectives; utilizes non-military, primarily economic means to secure its goals; and is willing to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management. Maull does not reject a possibility of a civilian power having military resources, but argues that a civilian power leaves military power as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction. In this thesis the term civilian power refers to an actor who trusts in cooperation, respects

---

28 For example Smith 2000.
29 Maull 1990/91, 92.
and enforces international values and norms as defined by international institutions and treaties, and acts through diplomacy, economic means and international institutions. Yet, the difference between civilian power and military power is not clear. Maull considers states like Japan and Germany as civilian powers since after the Second World War their possibilities to use military power have been small. Since there are no clear examples of civilian power in international politics, I do not wish to close the definition of it; rather I wish to present some aspects of the EU and its actions as an example of using civilian power, and evaluate if there is room and the possibility for an actor who bases its policy on different principles and practices rather than traditional sovereign states. Still, it is not even clear if the EU can be considered a civilian power anymore, due to its attempts to build a military aspect.

The concept of civilian power was first introduced by Francois Duchêne, who used the concept to refer to a particular approach of the EC to international issues: that the EC aims to domesticate relations between states. Ten years after Duchêne’s articles Hedley Bull however claimed that the European civilian power is conditional upon the military power of states, and demanded that the EU (EC at the time) must acquire military resources to be an actor. Yet, Manners argues that Bull’s notion of military power shares common assumptions with Duchêne’s notion of civilian power: The focus of both Duchêne and Bull was strengthening the international society, and, thus, maintaining the status quo in international relations based on the Westphalian nation state. Secondly, they both preferred direct physical power – economic or military – in the form of actual empirical capacities. Finally, they both saw European interest as paramount. Manners suggests that the EU may be more important normatively than in an empirical way, since it sets normative world standards. He continues that due to its “power over opinion”, “idée force”, or “ideological power”, the EU would best be conceived as a normative power Europe. I agree with Manners in that normative power should not be underestimated, and we need to study the ideational impact of the EU’s international identity as representing normative power. Naturally, the EU is not promoting whatever values and norms, but those of its own: this way it constructs the international

31 Bull 1982, 151.
system in a way more suitable to itself. Manners goes further in his argument and suggests that the EU is not simply promoting its own norms in a similar manner to historical empires and contemporary global power; the EU is a special case due to its historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution.32

The EU’s normative power is a significant dimension of this thesis, but I will also examine other ways of using power including the Union’s foreign policy instruments. I agree with Manners that the EU’s ability to shape conceptions of normality in international relations is what makes it a normative power33, but I suggest that it is a part of its special nature as a civilian power – although also military powers may use and have used normative power. Like Manners I still consider the EU as a special case, since the constitutive norms of the EU represent crucial constitutive factors determining its international identity; the EU is committed to placing its internal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with the world.34 The broad normative basis of the EU has been built over the past 50 years through a series of declarations, treaties, policies, and criteria and conditions of membership. According to Manners, the EU has five core norms including centrality of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and human rights; and four minor norms including social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance; reinforcement and expansion of these norms allows the EU to present and legitimate itself as being more than the sum of its parts.35

The EU clearly attempts to gain legitimacy through expansion of democratic and human rights norms, but this is not the whole picture of the EU. It is difficult to evaluate in which direction the EU will develop; even more difficult is to describe the outcome of European integration36. The integration process and the EU itself include various tendencies, pulling the EU in different directions. Although we can see the state-building process going on, there exists also contradictory elements to

32 Manners 2002, 238-240.
33 Ibid., 239-240.
34 Ibid., 239-241.
35 Ibid., 242-244. For Manners, the EU’s norms are universal, but I do not wish to make such a statement here.
36 McGrew offers a good definition of integration as “processes of economic and political unification which prefigure a sense of community, common identity, shared fortunes and shared institutions of governance” (McGrew 1998, 302).
state-centricity. These elements include at least a multi-level system of governance through negotiations, respect of diversity and renouncing the aim of building a unified language and cultural environment. There exists also two tendencies contradictory to each other, namely building military power and cherishing the civilian power image of the EU. The military aspect is under construction, but European leaders and officials want to emphasize that this does not change the EU’s nature as a civilian power\(^\text{37}\); the military resources will be used for civilian purposes. Yet, even the existence of military structures will inevitable change the nature of policy planning and making.

1.4. More than a state

I will propose that the EU lacks some of the properties of a state – although I do not see that the difference is so remarkable in the end – but that it does not make the EU an unfit actor in the international system; quite the contrary, the European integration includes elements that may make the EU better suitable to the international system than the traditional sovereign state. Hence, it will be suggested that instead of being less than a state the EU is actually more than a state. Within changing structure of the international system, resources and properties of states – sovereignty, structure of hierarchy and military resources, among others – will not be so significant that they guarantee the state’s dominant position; quite the contrary, the strong actor have to be able to handle with global capitalism, regionalism, interdependence, and security threats raising from various sources. When the system has been increasingly perceived as interdependent, and states ability to govern has been deemed to be in question, an entity like the EU seems to be well placed to act on behalf of its members as a manager of the interdependence.\(^\text{38}\) Through European integration we also may find new answers to some of the problems caused by the nature of the international system itself. In this connection I will especially consider democracy and security issues, although there exists other similar issues too, for example minorities and refugees.


\(^{38}\) Bretherton & Vogler 1999, 7.
The EU might be – or it might become – the first truly post-modern polity, and it is impossible to explain its significance by concentrating only on its CFSP. The change of the international system is important in giving room for an actor like the EU, but structures do not totally create actorness; the development and action of the EU reflects the dynamic relationship between structures and agency. The EU is born from the combination of external demand and opportunities, and political will and imagination of its founders. Hence, the importance of the EU cannot be evaluated by studying either its internal capacities or external opportunities; they both together create the EU’s capacity to act and have an influence on the international field. Yet, internal factors associated with legitimacy and efficacy of policy processes influence the perceptions other actors have of the EU, and create expectations of the EU’s ability to act. Additionally, states must create new ways of acting in the changing international system, this suggests that our picture of an actor and its ways of having an influence and making policy may be at least partially out-dated. I wish to suggest that by studying the EU within an approach that takes both structures and internal capabilities into consideration we might get new ideas about actorness overall.

In short, this work proceeds in the following way: In chapter two I clarify the philosophical basis of the study. I lean on scientific realism which in my opinion offers a suitable basis for the constructivist approach. I also present a problem of agents and structures here, since it helps to understand the differences of theories presented in the third chapter. Chapter three deals with the international system of states and its change, which opens up room for actors like the EU. In chapter four I examine different theories concerning European integration and the position of the EU. The starting point is in realism and liberalism, but I move rather fast to examine varying institutionalist theories, since those are the ones concerning the EU directly. I finish the chapter by presenting constructivism and going some distance towards rationalist approaches. Chapter five clarifies the EU’s international position from the other viewpoint, i.e. by studying the necessary properties of actors of the international system (of states) and comparing those properties to ones of the EU. In this connection I will offer a brief look at the EU’s enlargement policy towards the Central and Eastern European states

---

39 Ibid., 1-29.
as an example of specific ways the EU is able to affect other actors and change its environment. The chapter is concluded by discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the EU as a foreign policy actor, and in this connection it transpires that the EU has some strength that the sovereign state cannot have. The conclusions are drawn in the chapter six.
2.

AGENTS AND STRUCTURES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Answering questions concerning how a state exists, or the nature of the EU, necessitates some kind of a view concerning ontological and epistemological questions. What is the nature of reality? What is the relationship between a knower and a known? Scholars in the social sciences have different answers, although they do not often explicate their views. This chapter deals with (i) the meaning of ideas in constructing reality; (ii) agents and structures, and their relationship; and (iii) the international field as a social system, and its prevailing agent, i.e. state. I aim, first, to justify why we can assume that social structures exist, and secondly, to clarify the concept of agent. Thirdly, how social structures constitute agents will be examined, and how their existence depends on the agents they constitute. Fourthly, I focus on the international system, its agents and the role of social power. Finally, I take a short look at the prevailing agent on the international field, i.e. the state.

2.1. Social structures and agents

Despite some problems in connecting scientific realism to constructivism\(^1\), many basic assumptions of this thesis rely on scientific realism. According to Friedrich Kratochwil, scientific realism includes rather disparate epistemological orientations. He continues that in Wendt’s meaning of the term, scientific realists share the following commitments: First, the world is independent of the mind and language of an individual observer. Second, mature scientific theories typically refer to this world, even when it is not directly observable.\(^2\) Hence, the first assumption I wish to make is that there is the world out there. Nature indeed exists outside the scientist, as objects of her study exist and act independently of her\(^3\). World is what it is whether we see it or

---

1 For example Kratochwil raises a question about compatibleness of realism and constructivism (Kratochwil 2000).
2 Ibid., 90-91.
3 Bhaskar 1986, 5.
not⁴; it exists independently of our knowledge of it⁵. It also follows that claims referring to real but unobservable entities are justifiable. Hence, this is connected to the question of what really exists in the world. We can think that only those things exist that we can observe, but still we would not be able to decide if, for example, structures really exist or if they are just our own buildings that make it easier for us to perceive the world⁶.

Although I argue that the world exists independently of our knowledge, I wish to point out that this does not mean that ideas can not participate in constructing reality. Constructivism has brought up the question of importance of ideas in relation to the material world. For example, according to Carl Boggs’ interpretation, scientific marxists do not consider ideas important, but stress the role of objective conditions; politics, ideology and culture are seen as reflections of the material base⁷. In addition, political realists emphasize material conditions and the objective reality they form, and consider all ideologies as means to legitimate promotion of national interests. Antonio Gramsci differs from scientific marxism⁸, since he gives the major role to reflective thinking and human will. According to him, material forces have meaning only through ideological mediations.⁹ Alexander Wendt claims that structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces. He further argues that relatively little of international life is a function of material forces as such, and that seemingly material

---

⁴ Wendt 1999, 52.
⁵ Sayer 1992, 5.
⁶ Anthony Giddens argues that in social analysis structure refers “to the structuring properties allowing the ‘binding’ of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them ‘systemic’ form [...] social systems, as reproduced social practices, do not have ‘structures’ but rather exhibit ‘structural properties’ [...] structure exists, as time-space presence, only in its instantiations in such practices and as memory traces orienting the conduct of knowledgeable human agents.” (Giddens 1984, 17).
⁷ Boggs 1984, 156.
⁸ Carl Boggs (1984, 2-6) makes a distinction between scientific and revolutionary marxism, the first stressing the primacy of material forces and structural determinacy, whilst the last emphases the power of human will and the openness of history. He states that it is Gramschi’s way of presenting ideological themes through his concept of hegemony that distinguishes his philosphy from scientific marxism (1984, 156).
⁹ Gramsci 1971, 360, 377.
conditions are actually a function of how agents think about them.\textsuperscript{10} Wendt proposes that a scientist may refer to an unobservable entity if it can produce observable effects or if its manipulation permits her to intervene with an effect in the observable world\textsuperscript{11}. Sayer agrees with Wendt by arguing that “[t]he world is differentiated and stratified, consisting not only of events, but objects, including structures, which have powers and liabilities capable of generating events,” and goes even further, “[t]hese structures may be present even where, as in the social world and much of the natural world, they do not generate patterns of events”\textsuperscript{12}.

Since scientific realism assumes that reality exists independently of an observer, taking it as a basis for the social study demands further clarification. The main problem is that social structures clearly do not exist independently of activities they govern, but are continually reproduced and transformed\textsuperscript{13}. I present here Wendt’s answer to this problem, since it is essential in understanding the construction of international actors. Here Wendt does not use the concept “social structure” though, since it is included in the larger term “social kinds”. He identifies four differences between social and natural kinds\textsuperscript{14} (three of them are first identified by Roy Bhaskar)\textsuperscript{15}:

1. The social kinds are more space-time specific than the natural kinds because reference to certain places and eras is often part of their definition.

2. Unlike the natural kinds, existence of the social kinds depends on interlocking beliefs, concepts, or theories held by agents.

\textsuperscript{10} Wendt 1999, 1, 16, 371.
\textsuperscript{11} Wendt 1987, 352.
\textsuperscript{12} Sayer 1992, 5-6.
\textsuperscript{13} Pursiainen 1998, 30.
\textsuperscript{14} By social kinds Wendt refers to all familiar objects of the scientific inquiry, including physical objects with a social function such as money; social structures such as the family, the state and the working class; institutions such as banks and business; offices such as the head of the state; and also more abstract kind of things like the language and other conventional systems like laws and customs. (Wendt 1999, 68.) In addition to the social kinds, there are also natural kinds that are “self-organizing, material entities whose causal powers are constituted by intrinsic, mind-independent structures rather than by human social convention” (ibid., 58).
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 69-71. Bhaskar (1986, 51) makes a distinction between intransitive and transitive objects of study.
3. Unlike the natural kinds, existence of the social kinds depends also on human practices that carry them from one location to another.

4. Unlike the natural kinds, the social kinds have not only an internal structure but also an external one, since they are constituted by social relations. This is why the social kinds cannot be studied solely in the ‘reductionist fashion’ the realists use to explain the natural kinds.

The first point is not a problem within scientific realism that emphasizes the description of causal mechanisms rather than the deduction from universal laws; for scientific realists, theories do not have to be trans-historical to be scientific.16 Wendt presents three responses to the second and third point concerning the relationship between agents and social kinds. One of them is to emphasize the role of material forces in constituting social kinds. For example, human beings are material kinds with certain material properties like large brains. The second response is to focus on the role of self-organization in the constitution of social kinds. The social kinds lie on a spectrum of varying combinations of internal (self-organisation) and external (social construction). According to the third response, social kinds are usually independent of minds and discourse of those individuals who want to explain them. Sayer also points out the same by arguing that “[a]lthough social phenomena cannot exist independently of actors or subjects, they usually do exist independently of the particular individual who is studying them”17. Regarding the fourth point, Wendt proposes that usually social kinds confront the members of relevant collectives as seemingly natural facts. When the social kinds are reified18 there is a clear distinction between a subject and an object. However, there are times when collectives become aware of the social kinds they constitute and move to change them.19

16 On the other hand, Wendt believes that theories of the international politics can be generalized across time and space, and argues that defining essential properties of a state or anarchy is not historically variable; I do not wish to make such a statement here.

17 Sayer 1992, 49.

18 By reification Wendt refers to the definition offered by Berger and Luckmann, according to which the products of human activity are seen as if they were not products of the human action at all, but for example facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of the divine will (Wendt 1999, 76).

19 Ibid., 69-77. The question concerning the possibility of social phenomena to be the objects of study is important for scientific realism. See Steve Smith’s article Wendt’s
We can consider a state and the EU as social kinds with both material and social dimensions. They are constituted partly internally and partly externally, so that even though they need material resources to become what they are, their existence is also dependent on interlocking beliefs concerning for example the nature of a state and international politics, and human practices, such as diplomacy. States, or the EU, are not only social kinds, however, but agents as well. In my interpretation of Wendt’s theory, social kinds need an internal structure with material forces and ability for self-organization to become agents. Since Wendt’s term includes things like money, business, working class etc., naturally not all social kinds become agents. Wendt himself argues that in order to become an agent, a structure (for Wendt it is a state) must have particular features. First, individuals’ shared knowledge reproduces an idea of a state as a corporate person or “a group Self”. Moreover, individuals must accept an obligation to act jointly on behalf of collective beliefs, whether or not they subscribe to them personally. Secondly, state actors must have an internal decision-structure that institutionalizes and authorizes collective action of their members. On the one hand, individuals must take it for granted that they will cooperate and the expectation of cooperation must be sufficiently deep that their collective action problem is solved; corporate structures achieve this by centralization and internalization, which includes hierarchical decision-making and individuals, who have internalized corporate norms in defining their identities and interests. On the other hand, the structure itself must be organized such that action of its members can be attributed to actions of a corporate body; there must be rules that specify relations of dependency, authority, and accountability among group’s members and that transfer the responsibility for individual actions to a collective, so that individuals act on behalf of it.20

Wendt’s theory concentrates on states, since he sees that they are, have been and will be the primary agents on the international field. Ferguson and Mansbach disagree with him by arguing that a state is only one polity among others, and that no polity is able to be dominant throughout history. Even though their aim is to overcome state-centricity,
in explaining necessary properties of a polity, Ferguson and Mansbach suggest similar kinds of properties to Wendt. First, a polity must have an identity that is distinct, and members of a polity must perceive that they share some qualities that distinguish them from others outside the polity. Thus, any identity presupposes existence of one or more alternate identities; the sense of “we-ness” is built on “other-ness(es)”. Secondly, a polity must be able to mobilize individuals and/or groups for political ends. Those persons who are associated with a polity must regard it as having authority over a specific domain. For Ferguson and Mansbach, authority is “the ability to exercise influence or control across space over persons, resources, and issue outcomes; in other words, it is the capacity to govern”. Finally, a polity must have an identifiable hierarchy with roles that provide institutional continuity. A polity needs to have structures and rules in addition to sufficient leadership and role differentiation.21

Wendt’s as well as Ferguson’s and Mansbach’s analysis is useful in studying what kind of properties a political entity needs to act as an agent. There is no agent without identity, the ability to mobilize individuals, authority, and a system of decision-making. A state fulfils all the requirements, but despite its dominant position in the contemporary international system, it is only one option of political organization. Next the relationship between agents and structures is examined more carefully.

2.2. The problem of agents and structures

The problem of agents and structures is significant in understanding the basis of my analysis about the international system and the requirements of subjectivity. The agent-structure problem concerns the ontological nature of an agent and a structure, and their relationship. Wendt suggests that the agent-structure problem has its origin in two truisms about social life. First, human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions reproduce or transform a society. Second, a society is made up of social relationships, which structure interactions between individuals and organizations. It follows that human agents and social structures are interdependent and mutually implicating entities. The

problem is that we lack a self-evident way to conceptualize these entities and their relationship.\textsuperscript{22}

The question is whether agents or structures determine history at the end of the day. Theories should answer the question by being able to build explanations about bureaucracies, states, and European integration and its result, the EU. The agent-structure problem is interrelated with the problem of levels-of-analysis.\textsuperscript{23} In the study of IR, there are four possible levels of explanation: individual, bureaucratic, state and international system level. Explanatory variables may be fetched from higher levels, the same level, or lower levels than the variable to be explained.\textsuperscript{24} Studying state action raises the question: at what level should the explanation be? As such, should, for example, the foreign policy of a state be explained by human nature, bureaucratic politics, preferences of a state or by the structure of the international system? Systemic theories explain states’ international action by referring to a structure of the international system, while reductionist theories explain international politics by referring to properties and interactions of states.\textsuperscript{25} Often the two viewpoints give very different explanations, since structuralist theories may turn human actors into “lifeless puppets” whose behaviour is regulated by impersonal social forces, whilst reductionalist theories generally presuppose that it is human beings who control events.\textsuperscript{26} So, both systemic and the reductionist theories explain behaviour of entities under examination.

Furthermore, no matter what level is considered to be the most important determinant of action, there is another question: how does a structure affect to agent? Moreover, how does an agent affect a structure?

\textsuperscript{22} Wendt 1987, 337-338.

\textsuperscript{23} Wendt argues with Hollis and Smith whether there are two problems, the agent-structure and the levels-of-analysis, or only one problem combining these two issues. Wendt claims that levels-of-analysis talk concerns what drives the behaviour of exogenously given actors, while the agent-structure talk concerns what constitutes properties of those actors in the first place. (Wendt 1992, 185). Hollis and Smith disagree with Wendt by arguing that both levels involve questions about the nature of agency; the levels-of-analysis problem is not only about how to explain behaviour, it is also about what it means to be an actor, and, thus, involves the agent-structure problem. (Hollis & Smith 1992, 188.)

\textsuperscript{24} Knudsen 1994, 204.

\textsuperscript{25} Wendt 1999, 12.

\textsuperscript{26} Buzan et al. 1993, 103.
Individualism holds that an international political system is reducible to properties or interactions of independently existing individuals. It is individuals who make the system, and system structures can be reduced to properties of its entities. According to individualistic theories, structures only constrain choices of agents. Holism, on the other hand, holds that effects of social structures cannot be reduced to independently existing agents and their interactions, and that these effects include construction of agents in both causal and constitutive senses. Holistic theories explain powers and interests of agents in terms of properties of a social structure; it is a social structure that determines not only interests, but also properties of agents. States have certain powers and interests because of the international system. Holism implies a top-down conception of social life in contrast to individualism’s bottom-up view. Thus, holistic and individualistic theories concentrate on explaining the properties of agents, and the central issue dividing them is whether the properties (identities, powers, interests) of actors can be explained by irreducible social forms.

Smith argues that the unresolved problem whether structures or agents determine action is a reason for a lack of cumulative progress in foreign policy analysis. In every level of analysis we can always look at the issue either from an individual or a structural viewpoint, and we cannot know, how independently an individual really makes her choices for action. The issue becomes even more complicated when taking into account what causes the properties of agents. However, the problem is not unresolvable. Walter Carlsnaes is among those who argue that human agents and social structures are in a fundamental sense dynamically interrelated empirical entities, and that one cannot fully account for one without the other. We cannot know – and we do not have to know – what is ontologically prior in this dynamic, reciprocal relationship: stories should not have been distinguished at the beginning.

27 Wendt 1987, 339-340. It follows that even structuralist theories of foreign policy can be individualistic; this is the case of the neorealism, which reduces systematic structures to properties of states (ibid., 342).
30 Wendt 1992, 182.
of Carlsnaes assumes that structures do not exist independently from human practise, but are socially constituted. Structures can constrain agents only if they perceive them and expect everybody to behave in a certain way confirmed by structures.\textsuperscript{33} Hence, structural factors are cognitively mediated by the agents in question, and, thus, they do not affect policy actions directly\textsuperscript{34}. This kind of solution is usually based on the structuration theory, which conceptualizes agents and structures as mutually constitutive and co-determined entities. In Giddens’ theory of structuration, they are social structures that give us a capacity to act as agents.\textsuperscript{35} According to Boggs, also Gramsci thought that human activity is determined both by social structures and by a subject as creator of new initiatives that challenge those same structures\textsuperscript{36}.

Social structures are the result of the intended and unintended consequences of human action, just as those actions presuppose or are mediated by an irreducible structural context.\textsuperscript{37}

Constructivism tends to rely on the view that agents maintain social structures, and are themselves constituted by them. Structures determine properties of agents, but their existence is, however, dependent on agents; agents create, recreate, and change structures. Structures are instantiated only in process, and, thus, they are ongoing effects of process. At the time social processes are always structured. To make the constructivist view more clear, I quote Thomas Risse.

[S]ocial constructivists insist on the mutual constitutiveness of (social) structures and agents. Constructivists claim against individualism that human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared system of meanings (“culture” in broad sense). At the same time, social

\textsuperscript{33} Waever 1994, 266.

\textsuperscript{34} Carlsnaes 1994, 284.


\textsuperscript{36} Boggs 1984, 139.

\textsuperscript{37} Wendt 1987, 360. Although this solution is quite similar to one of Carlsnaes, Wendt supports the possibility to separate unit and systemic levels of analysis, since he sees political authority as organized vertically within and horizontally between states (hierarchy and anarchy) (Wendt 1999, 13).
constructivists maintain that human agency creates, reproduces, and changes culture by way of daily practices.38

As Wendt argues, culture makes agents, and it depends on culture what kind of agents it produces. For Wendt, culture signifies a content of structures: beliefs, shared ideas, expectations and practices; in a broad sense, culture is a collectively shared system of meanings, as suggested by Risse39. I wish to emphasize that I do not claim that cultures make agents “all the way down”, to use Wendt’s term, but that they partly constitute agents, and, therefore, affect their identities and interests. At the same time, culture is what agents make of it, even as it constrains what they can do at any given moment. Because of this co-determination and mutual constitution, culture is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Since culture recreates itself, it may also change. Change can happen because any one of the different logics in any given culture (different norms, rules and institutions) may become dominant, or because agents are never perfectly socialized, or by revolution and innovation, or because of creativity and emerging new ideas.40 Wendt claims that change in cultural always implies structural change41.

Within social structures certain roles are associated with particular ‘positions’. The occupants of positions, although being distinct from positions themselves, reproduce structures and their own position within them42; it is typical of social structures that they endure.

The most durable social structures are those which lock their occupants into situations which they cannot unilaterally change and yet in which it is possible to change between existing positions. […] Hence, while certain actions are only possible within particular social structures, the existence of the latter depends upon the continued (contingent) execution of those actions.43

People reproduce structures often unintentionally. Bhaskar’s example is about marriage: people do not marry themselves to reproduce the

---

38 Risse 2000, 5.
39 Ibid., 5.
40 Wendt 1999, 186-188.
41 Ibid., 314.
42 Sayer 1992, 89-93.
43 Ibid., 96.
nuclear family, yet it is the unintended consequence\textsuperscript{44}. Still, actors are not “automata” themselves, they do not reproduce the same structures in every situation; social structures are historically specific. The activity and skills of actors cannot be ignored\textsuperscript{45}. According to Gramsci, people are able to overcome structures: people are first subordinated for the structure, but they can make themselves free by achieving a higher level of consciousness:

Structure ceases to be an external force which crushes man, assimilates him to itself and makes him passive, and is transformed into a means of freedom, an instrument to create a new ethico-political form and source of new initiatives.\textsuperscript{46}

Despite the constructivist solution to the problem of agents and structures, there is need for more careful explanation of how structures of the international system constitute agents, and how states carry on these structures. Answering these questions opens new possibilities to rethink and redefine the international system itself.

2.3. The social system of international politics

There is a social system on the international political field. I follow here especially Richard Ashley, who claims that within the international community a set of rules defines what kind of a polity has access to the field. Subjectivity is not open to all, but defined to belong to some polities only. The process of defining subjectivity is bound to history and to historical rules and practices. According to Ashley, strategies and procedures, through which the international society is produced, are excluded from active political discourse, and this silence normalizes, constitutes and empowers the international society and prevailing subjectivity.\textsuperscript{47} The prevailing mode of subjectivity (or agency or polity) on the international field is a state; the position of an actor is reserved

\textsuperscript{44} Bhaskar 1979, 44.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 96-97.
\textsuperscript{46} Gramsci 1971, 367.
\textsuperscript{47} Ashley (1987) criticises realists for believing that there is no international society worthy of the name community, and for assuming that a community must be timeless and have a universal identity or an autonomous and original social presence.
for states only. Wendt also proposes that in the international system the main actor is a state. There are also other positions on the international field, such as non-governmental or international organizations, and multi-national companies, but the system is dependent on state's position as an actor: as the international system produces and maintains the position of states, it is produced and maintained by practices of states. Although a state is not eternal, but has been historically constructed during hundreds of years, its position has been seen to be incontestable until recent years. Although some theoretical alternatives to the system of states have been presented, and the capabilities of states to deal with the effects of globalization have been suspected, a state has managed to maintain its position rather well. For example Stephen D. Krasner believes that the position of a sovereign state has became so powerful that it would be very difficult for any kind of a polity to challenge the ordering based on state sovereignty.

Formally the states are equal individuals in the international system; in practice, some of them are better capable of affecting prevailing conditions and their own position. The amount of material resources varies between states, naturally, but I claim that social power is at least as an important factor in defining a state's position in the system. According to Stephen Guzzini, social power is built by socially constructed knowledge, and that the groups, which have the power to offer an authoritative worldview, are in power. Hence, power is dependent on the social environment and on shared understanding. Emanuel Adler argues that power in the international system means authority to determine the common understanding that empowers identities, interests and practices of states, and also the conditions that allow or deny the access to commodities. For Adler, power is about including and excluding, and about defining the “rules of the game”. Thus, even science cannot be seen as value-free, since it participates in creating and maintaining certain social order; science and knowledge are part of the power system. One example of the meaning of knowledge

---

49 Krasner 1988, 87.
50 Caporaso 2000, 2.
51 Guzzini 2000, 170-172.
52 Adler 1997, 261.
in the international system is a democratic peace theory which claims that western democracies are more peaceful than other regimes, and thus legitimizes pressuring all states to imitate the model of western states. Even though empirical evidence does not unambiguously support the democratic peace theory, it has became a part of common knowledge – and at the same time demanding democratic reforms has became part of the normal discourse in international politics.

Since social reality is a result of imposing meanings and functions on physical objects that do not already have those meanings and functions, the ability to create the underlying rules of the game, to define what constitutes acceptable play, and to get other players to commit themselves to those rules, because these rules are now part of the self-understandings of the players, is, perhaps, the most subtle and most effective form of power […] In this reading power is primarily the institutional power to include and exclude, to legitimise and authorise.53

As Frost points out, dominant approaches to the study of international relations have all assumed a sharp distinction between facts and values54. Still, he notes that participating in a political practice requires that participants follow a certain set of rules; they know that they are bound by certain norms. Practice is always partially constituted by certain normative ideas that have emerged within a certain system of power.55 Also material and technological resources are needed to make some actors accept and internalize meanings and rules. Material resources help in re-producing institutional practices and offer incentives to those outside the system to select a particular identity. Economically or technologically weak states may associate material success together with successful states and regions.56 It is not clear what is the relationship between material resources and social power, but it seems that same actors who have lots of material resources have also social power. One example of how material resources and social power work together is the enlargement of the EU. On the one hand candidate states wish to become part of the Western world because it is expected to bring

53 Ibid., 261.
54 Frost 1996, 19.
55 Ibid., 60-66.
economic and political stability and prosperity, and on the other, the identity of a Western state is attractive, since other options are easily connected to nationalism, backwardness, failed communist experiments, poverty, or religious fundamentalism.

Hence, power cannot be understood only in materialistic terms but also as symbolic power\textsuperscript{57} or as social capital\textsuperscript{58}, i.e. as the capacity to utilize symbolic structures and one's own social position. Power emerges not only from the ability to speak the “right language”, but to do so in the context of having been accredited by structures which have power to confer its credibility\textsuperscript{59}. Thus, language itself may be right or wrong depending on the system. In the contemporary international system there are certain values – free market economy, democracy, human rights, and non-violence except when self-defence is in question – that define the normal way of behaving. Through creating knowledge emerges collective understanding concerning the nature of a particular situation and appropriate behaviour in it. Power structures are constructed at the same time as structures of legitimate knowledge, authority and activity. Thus, power is also about trust: who's interpretation of reality we can trust?\textsuperscript{60}

Whether an actor is acknowledged to have knowledge and to act in an appropriate way in a specific situation depends on its identity: identity is more important than material resources for an actor’s ability to utilise social power. As Williams and Neumann argue, legitimate identities are bound to roles, and to structures of power. They write that the “linking of certain kind of identity to a specific set of roles and its analogous forms of action is a fundamental structure of social power.”\textsuperscript{61} In chapter five the EU’s identity as a source of power will be analyzed, and the basic idea is that the EU has legitimate identity which brings it authority in the international system. I argue that the EU is constructing an identity as a peaceful and reliable civilian power, who respects democratic and human right values, bases its action on cooperation and on the international norms and institutions, and is not threatening anybody. According

\textsuperscript{57} Williams 1997.

\textsuperscript{58} Bourdieu 1977 and 1991.

\textsuperscript{59} Williams 1997, 298.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 290-294.

\textsuperscript{61} Williams & Neumann 2000, 364.
to Williams and Neumann, it is not enough merely to claim such an identity, however, since for the identity to be internally stable (not being subject constantly to challenge) and to be socially effective (enabling the actor to act socially in accordance with identity), the identity must be acknowledged as legitimate by others, and the adoption of the identity by a particular actor must be recognized by others. To reach this, the identity must be in accordance with the international values and norms: the legitimacy of a particular identity depends on the dominating values and norms of the system. Secondly, the identity must be in accordance with action: taking a particular action in a particular situation is a sign of being a certain kind of an actor: an actor who behaves in a peaceful way is a peaceful actor. If identity is internalized well, coherence between identity and action is not a problem, since perceptions of situations as well as appropriate options of action are constructed in the context of identity of an actor: how an actor sees the situation and possible ways of acting, depends on who she is. Moreover, to be appropriate certain action depends on whether the actor doing it is a legitimate actor and on the specific situation.62

The process of identity construction is always ongoing, but it is more apparent during periods of fundamental change, when new identities are being formed and old ones are pressured to transform. As will be argued in the next chapter, the international system is going through this kind of change, which makes it possible for the EU to build an identity as an actor, and which affects the identities of states too. Accepting that the process of change opens up questions prevailing to the identity of actors, it also changes the policy they should pursue in particular situations.

[A] period of transformation involves a struggle over the forms of identity and action which will be regarded as legitimate within the emerging order.63

Different actors with different identities possess unequal capacities to affect the legitimate identity and appropriate action, and to influence structures of social power.64 A basic question of this thesis is what capabilities the EU has to do this, and this is handled in the fifth

---

62 Ibid., 363-364.
63 Ibid., 364.
64 Ibid.
chapter. Ian Manners argues that due to developments of the 1990s we should rethink both notions of military power and civilian power, and consider the EU’s normative power in world politics. According to Manners, Europe’s attainment may be more normative than empirical, and to understand it we should focus on the ideational impact of the EU’s international identity/role as representing normative power.65 I agree with Manners that we should pay more attention to the EU’s ability to shape conceptions of normality in international relations, and I argue that due to its legitimate identity and material resources it is able to act as a normative power.

2.4. Properties of a state

A state is one possibility of organizing polity on the international field. In fact the state is such an essential part of the contemporary international system that its position as the prevailing actor appears to be everlasting. Although I will claim that the state’s position is diminishing, it is still so central, that it is impossible to outline the international system without considering it. For example, the EU’s position/role on the international field has usually been studied by comparing its properties and capabilities with those of states. Since states are the prevailing actors on the international field, their properties have been understood as necessary properties of an international actor. Still, states have many properties and not all of them have been studied in a systematic manner. Now I wish to briefly suggest some basic issues concerning states – states are considered more carefully in chapter four when they are compared to the EU – in order to build a basis for discussion on the international system in the next chapter.

I approach a state through the analysis of Caporaso and Wendt. For Caporaso, there are four central concepts defining the Westphalian order based on states: authority, sovereignty, territoriality, and citizenship66. Wendt argues that states have the following properties in common: institutional-legal order, monopoly on the legitimate use of violence,

---

65 Manners 2002, 238-239.
66 Caporaso 2000, 8.
sovereignty, society, and territory. Properties suggested by Caporaso and Wendt tie an international actor together with a state.

States are considered to have some common properties, one of the most important being sovereignty. Sovereignty and statehood are tied together, although many modern states lack many “state-like” qualities that are seen to characterise a sovereign state. As Walker argues, “[s]overeignty has become indispensable to our understanding of what a state, nation, or political identity can be.” Yet, the meaning of the term sovereignty is vague. In this thesis the term refers to two issues. First, sovereignty refers to the right to be an actor on the international field; the position of an actor is reserved for members of a sovereign group, to use the words of Ferguson and Mansbach. This includes also autonomy, i.e. the ultimate right to decide and a capacity to exclude external authority structures. Secondly, sovereignty refers to a state as the supreme locus of political authority in a society; a state must be recognised by its society as having authority. It is a state’s organizational structure of non-rival, unified authority that gives it sovereignty. In this meaning of the term, sovereignty is connected to terms “authority” and “legitimacy”. Wendt argues that authority requires legitimacy, since it can not be merely about influence or power. Ferguson and Mansbach write that “individuals rarely accept authority just to avoid punishment; rather, they expect benefit(s) in exchange, including the psychological satisfaction of group identity and ideology”. They claim that loyalty provides the only firm foundation for the exercise of authority, and that it is produced by belief in linked fates. For them, authority is “an exchange phenomenon in which loyalties and other resources are provided in return for value satisfaction (or relief from value deprivation)”. Caporaso also implies that a society should approve governance; according to his view, authority refers to a recognized right to rule, which is a claim about

68 Ferguson & Mansbach 1988, 123-124.
70 Ferguson & Mansbach 1996, 401.
71 Caporaso 2000, 10.
72 See Wendt’s definition of sovereignty (Wendt 1999, 182).
73 Ibid., 182.
74 Ferguson & Mansbach 1996, 35.
75 Ibid., 36.
both legitimacy and capacity to govern. Capacity to govern implies a structure of political authority according to which a society is governed and conflicts solved. A structure of political authority is constituted by norms, rules and principles, and it is institutionalized in law and official regulations.\footnote{Wendt 1999, 202-213.}

Other properties that all states have in common are society, citizenship based on a membership of certain state, and territory. Wendt claims that a state must have a society; a state is constituted by its relationship to a society, and a society is constituted by a state. Both a society and an individual's rights and obligations based on citizenship are limited by national boundaries. State is a territorial organization that implies “rule over a distinct space, the subjects in that space, and the economy within that space”, to use Caporaso’s words. Even when the territorial principle does not imply total control, a sovereign state can claim final right to rule when conflicts among authorities arise.\footnote{Caporaso 2000, 11.} As Wendt points out, even if a location of territorial boundaries is clear and constant, their social meaning can vary; states’ territorial nature does not preclude expanding their sense of the “self” to include other states, and thus defining their interests in more collective terms. Hence, although borders of states stay in place, their meaning may change. Finally, for Wendt states are organizations claiming a monopoly on legitimate use of organized violence.\footnote{Wendt 1999, 202-213.} The monopoly on the use of violence draws attention for two reasons. First, a state as a structure of power is able to control their own citizens by threatening to use violent measures – prison sentences, or even death penalties – if rules and regulations are not respected. Secondly, most states have military resources capable of waging war.

According to Wendt, a state as an actor refers to a real corporate being, to whom we can attribute human qualities such as identities and interests – it does not matter if those qualities are constructed. Wendt claims that states share essential properties by virtue of their identity as states, what generates universal national interests. Even though the content of national interests is affected by states’ identities, (which are constituted by international structures), these constructions are still constrained by the nature of corporate state-ness. Wendt identifies four

\footnote{Wendt 1999, 202-213.}
national interests: physical survival, autonomy, economic welfare and collective self-esteem (a group’s need to be respected by others).\textsuperscript{79}

The properties suggested here may be questioned, but they have still been significant for theoretical discussion concerning the EU’s position on the international field as well as for policy-makers’ understanding concerning international politics and the EU; properties of states have empirical consequences even if they do not correspond with reality. The EU seems to have a problem, because it does not seem to resemble a state in enough respects. Yet, the problem concerning the EU as an actor extends further and touches the very basis of being an agent: it is not clear that the EU can be separated from its member states, and it has been doubted if there even exists a coherent set of norms and rules that governs action within the structure of the EU. In chapter five I will argue, however, that the EU does not differ from a state so dramatically. Moreover, it will be claimed that the EU does not have to become a state in order to be an actor; it is enough that it is a polity capable of challenging the position of states in the international system. Since actors are constituted by the international system, and, thus, the EU’s international position also depends on it, the international system will be examined before progressing to the properties of the EU.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 233–238.
3.

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM – A SYSTEM OF STATES?

Let us think the unthinkable: that community exists at the international level, that security politics is profoundly shaped by it, and that those states dwelling within an international community might develop a pacific disposition.¹

In realist thinking the most important characteristic of the international system is its anarchic nature. The principal actors of the anarchic system are sovereign states, who compete for power in order to be able to promote their national interests, especially security. It is widely accepted that in the self-help system of anarchy an actor needs military resources to secure its existence; violence is understood as a property of the state system². In certain conditions states may co-operate to promote their national interests which have been defined before co-operation. To say it another way, co-operation is not seen to be affecting identities and interests of states. The anarchic system of individual states seems to be so self-evident, that neither statesmen nor scholars representing realist views believe that there could be any major changes. Indeed, political realism has often been accused of not being able to explain change in the system³. Realists have been rather unwilling to theorize change, because they see that there is no fundamental change happening: for them, the only thing that changes is the balance of power (if a system is bipolar or multi-polar), whilst the nature of the system remains the same. Realists do not believe, for example, in the possibility of world government that could be the vehicle for overcoming anarchy in the international relations. The balance of power together with war preserves a certain degree of order and the anarchic nature of the system.

Yet, it has been claimed that the international system has changed as a consequence of globalization and fragmentation. In such views, the perception and the reality of increased interdependency between national economies, with production and all types of exchange becoming

¹ Adler & Barnett 1996, 63.
³ Matlary 1997, 208.
ever more global, has led to the impression that states cannot any more act as fully sovereign entities, and hence determine their own destiny\(^4\). As McGrew argues, globalization denationalizes territorial space and thus challenges the modern institution of a sovereign state, which is based on the principle of exclusive territorial governance\(^5\). As a consequence of globalization, national governments become increasingly unable to control both international and domestic conditions, and thereby unable to fulfil demands of their own citizens\(^6\). A state has increasingly shared tasks of governance with autonomous local, provincial, regional and transworld agencies\(^7\). At the same affective underpinnings of sovereignty have been loosened, which has resulted in the emergence of various non-territorial identities and communities, as well as localized solidarities\(^8\).

Even if one does not fully share the view of those who predict nation states to be declining into ultimately powerless institutions, one has to admit that the meaning of sovereignty, understood as the capacity to control politics and development in a certain territory, is being eroded. Moreover, the term sovereignty no longer has such power in analysis compared to what it used to have. Ferguson and Mansbach even claim that sovereignty has always been merely an idea that was never reached, and that sovereignty as a normative or legal concept has only modest practical consequences\(^9\). The basic argument of this chapter is that the changing international context and analysis concerning sovereignty have contributed to increasing the possibility for the emergence of actors that are not defined in terms of statehood. Furthermore, the changing international context has increased the importance of the EU and its instruments of external policy\(^10\). It is the international system that gives the possibility for the EU to be a significant power in the world. In this chapter I will clarify how the international system evolved to be as it is, and what kind of agent it constitutes. The focus will be on changes happening in Europe challenging the Westphalian order, and transferring the system.

\(^4\) Hirst 1997.  
\(^6\) Hocking & Smith 1995, 81.  
\(^7\) Scholte 2000, 151.  
\(^8\) Ibid., 137.  
\(^9\) Ferguson & Mansbach 1996, 12, 14.  
First, I wish to clarify the basic properties of the international system. The above presented realist world view is not abandoned here totally, since its problems may be solved by making three moves proposed by Wendt\textsuperscript{11}: First, it must be re-conceptualized what constitutes the international structure, i.e. that it is social rather than material phenomenon. This leads to an idealistic view of the structure as the “distribution of knowledge”; the character of international life is determined by beliefs and expectations that states have about each other, and these are constituted largely by social structures. The second move is to emphasize that states’ identities and interests are more constructed by the international system than can be seen from the rationalist approach\textsuperscript{12}. From holist conceptualization of the structure we can see two aspects of state construction that the individualist approach ignores: ways in which states identities rather than only behaviour are affected by the international system, and ways in which those identities are constituted rather than just caused by the system. Finally, it must be understood that anarchy has no logic apart from process, and that interaction is structured. Thus, the difference between the rationalist and the constructivist model is that while the first one assumes that identities and interests of agents are given, and that what is at stake are behavioural choices only, the second model states that agents themselves are involved in the process when they interact: their properties rather than only behaviour are at stake. Hence, social process is an on-going production and reproduction of modes of subjectivity\textsuperscript{13}.

By making these three moves suggested by Wendt it can be seen that the international structures depend on what states do. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It”, as stands in the title of Wendt’s famous article\textsuperscript{14}. The constructivist approach is significant especially for understanding the position of the EU, and it has often been used to explain the EU’s integration and power which is difficult to explain within the rationalist framework. From constructivist point of view we may see, for example, that although the EU has empirical capabilities – most significantly its economic power – to act on the international field, it

\textsuperscript{11} Wendt 1999, 20-21.
\textsuperscript{12} As will be explained in the next chapter, rationalist approach includes both neorealism and neoliberalism.
\textsuperscript{13} Wendt 1999, 366-367.
\textsuperscript{14} Wendt 1992.
is not enough to concentrate on them in evaluating its position; if we think of international structures as a distribution of knowledge, the EU’s position suddenly seems much stronger, since it is able to affect structures of the international system by defining acceptable identities and normal behaviour. As Manners suggests, the EU is capable of acting in a normative way on the international field because it differs from states.\(^{15}\)

In this chapter I use Wendt’s analysis of the international system as a common framework. Wendt claims that the international system has fundamentally changed two times, and both times it has achieved qualitatively higher capacity for collective action, despite its continuing anarchic structure. The first change happened in the seventeenth century (from “Hobbesian” culture to “Lockean” one), and in the late twentieth century there has been another structural change going on, when European states are moving towards the (Kantian) culture of collective security.\(^{16}\) For Wendt, the international system is anarchic, but has still various meanings depending on dominating conceptions of “self” and “other”: “anarchy of friends is different from one of enemies”.\(^{17}\) Wendt argues that anarchy can have at least three kinds of structures, based on which role − enemy, rival or friend − dominates the system. Shared ideas concerning “self” and “other” make up political culture, which gives meaning to power and “content to interests”.\(^{18}\) Wendt’s position is not unique, and for example Risse argues that anarchy in international affairs may be considered as limited common life-world, or as the shared cultural background against which actors communicate in world politics.\(^{19}\) Political culture includes roles and norms, according to which actors behave − or if they do not, culture changes.

Wendt suggests three reasons why actors may observe cultural norms: because they are forced to, because it is in their self-interests, and because they perceive norms as legitimate.\(^{20}\) Wendt sees these reasons as

---

17 Wendt 1994, 388.
18 Wendt 1999, 247-250.
19 Risse 2000, 14.
20 Hedley Bull identifies similar reasons for states to obey international law (in Hocking & Smith 1995, 293): First there is a force of habit which refers to routines and
three different “degrees” in which a norm can be internalized, and, thus, as generating three different pathways (force, price, and legitimacy) along which the same structure can be produced. The more deeply shared ideas are internalized, the more difficult structural change becomes. Only when states obey a norm because they see it as legitimate does the norm really constitute an agent, whilst prior to this point their identities and interests are exogenous to it.21 This view about internalizing a norm is presented also by other theorists: among others Adler claims that states follow democratic norms not just because their people believe in democracy, but because the category “democratic state” defines, in part, their identity.22 Wendt emphasizes that there is no relationship between the extent of shared ideas or culture in the system and the extent of co-operation: culture may constitute conflict or co-operation. Which one it constitutes depends on dominating roles.23 Wendt presents three cultures with distinct logics and tendencies: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. All of these cultures are state-system centric. Wendt suggests that at the core of each kind of anarchy is just one subject position: in Hobbesian culture it is an enemy, in Lockean culture it is a rival, and in Kantian culture it is a friend. The structure of an anarchic system depends on which of the three roles dominates the systems – again, anarchy is what states make of it24 – and states are under pressure to internalize that role in their identities and interests.25

3.1. The anarchic system of states

In the early Middle Age there were no states in the Westphalian meaning of the term, but kings who tried to preserve some governmental apparatus expectations governing state action. Secondly, feeling of community helps states to understand that the law is their common interest. Thirdly, states may be forced to follow law by, for example, the UN. The final reason concerns reciprocity: states follow norms because they expect others to do so. States see that they all benefit for existence of norms and bargain to change them.

22 Adler 1997, 264.
and public authority. Political power was seen to be personal, and as such it was difficult to execute at a distance or through agents. As a result, local representatives of a king became independent rulers. Individuals and families together with the Church were targets of loyalty, and the Church set standards and goals for European societies. The process of state building started after the eleventh century as a result of the popular demand for law and order. Naturally, kings wanted to increase their power and satisfying the demand seemed to be the best way to do it. Hence, they developed a system of law and functioning courts, and created corps of judges and administration entirely dependent on them. Stable and enduring institutions built up in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries became the core around which states were formed. At the same time universities began to appear and the theory of state based on Roman law together with the idea of sovereignty started to develop. The idea of external sovereignty was easily accepted, since it was coherent with the international reality that constituted many independent states. Setting the idea of internal sovereignty was more difficult, but by the fourteenth century it had become common knowledge that an individual should be ready to sacrifice everything for a state – in practice for a king, where ultimate authority in the state resided. When people gave their loyalty to a state, habits of obedience to secular governments were established and a certain attachment to the laws of a country and the person who ruled it was developed. However, kings did not have the authority, nor the administrative machinery needed to fully establish their claim of internal sovereignty; only in the sixteenth century were the most advanced states largely able to assert sovereignty in internal affairs.26

Alongside the emergence of nation states the international system became state-centric; after a state managed to depose the Church, there were no entities able to challenge the power of a state at the international level. Wendt argues that the culture of this system of states was Hobbesian, in which the dominating role is an enemy. An enemy does not recognize the right of a “self” to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore will not willingly limit its violence towards a “self”. States facing an enemy must engage in no-holds-barred power politics, which includes an attempt to destroy or conquer an enemy. If the logic of enmity prevails states will become threats to each other; if actors think

that enemies are real, they are real in their consequences. Wendt argues that as more and more states begin to represent each other as enemies, eventually these representations take over the logic of the system: actors start to think of enmity as a property of the system rather than of individual actors, and feel compelled to represent all “others” as enemies because they are parts of the system. Hence, Hobbesian culture leads to endemic and unlimited warfare that eliminates unfit actors, i.e. those who are militarily too weak.27

The Hobbesian culture has not dominated – at least in Europe – after seventeenth century, even though there are times it has occurred. When the Westphalian system of states was created in 1648, the Lockean culture – as Wendt calls it – was born. Since then, international politics has been dominated by the idea of a Westphalian state, i.e. territorially rejected state possessing both internal and external sovereignty. There are various estimations about when a state started to resemble a Westphalian state, i.e. a state as we know it28, since it got its properties little by little: for example the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence is estimated to have occurred as late as the middle of the nineteenth century. The basic idea of the Westphalian system is that territorial states operate in an anarchic environment as legal equals. States are constitutionally independent (sovereign) and have exclusive authority to rule within their own borders.29 The Westphalian conception of sovereignty legitimized a state and imposed limits to interference with other states; it also implied the ability to negotiate and ratify international treaties binding states30. Hence, the idea of sovereignty provided justification for ultimate control within a specific territory as well as a basis for recognition from other states. Caporaso describes politics after the Westphalian moment in the following way:

Sovereigns made treaties with other sovereigns, forged policies to rule inside the territory, attempted to exclude other authorities from interfering in “domestic politics,” developed stronger controls over their own borders, and actively participated in the construction of

27 Wendt 1999, 261-266.
28 Caporaso 2000.
29 Ibid., 2.
citizenship and nationalism. In short, the politics of “inside-outside” began their active construction.31

Within the Westphalian system only states are accepted as actors. States institutionalize their position by making empirical sovereignty the criterion for entry into the international society. Agents that fail the test are not recognized by the international system as actors, which make it harder for them to promote their interests. In this way the institutions of sovereignty exercise structural powers that keeps certain players out of the game.32 However, being a state is not enough to be a legitimate actor: only certain forms of a state (civilised, hierarchical, bureaucratic, Christian, monarchical authority, etc.) are seen as legitimate. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is the nation state, that has the institutions of a “modern” state, refrains from genocide and increasingly the capitalist and democratic state, that is considered legitimate.33

As Ferguson and Mansbach notice, ideology helps to legitimate authority and reinforce identity34. States have found the necessary ideology in nationalism. The rise of nationalism changed both what states were internally and many aspects of how they related to each other. Nationalism overrode more extensive and cosmopolitan forms of shared identity such as religion, and also generated a whole set of conflict issues within and between states, and created new problems for stateless minorities.35 The strong claim to sovereignty together with nationalism made the international system as prone to war. On the other hand, it was exactly because of its superior ability to exclude other competing sources of authority and make war that a modern state managed to take a position as a dominant unit in the global area. An obedient army with a clear order of hierarchy was an efficient instrument of policy, which established a superior level of public peace within all principal European states. European power and wealth increased when public peace created by the army allowed agriculture, commerce and industry to develop, and enhanced taxable wealth — that supported armed forces.36 Moreover, war

31 Caporaso 2000, 1.
32 Wendt 1999, 290-292.
33 Ibid., 292-297.
34 Ferguson & Mansbach 1996, 388.
35 Buzan & Little 2000, 253-255, 274.
36 Ferguson & Mansbach 1996, 22.
was the most important justification for a state. As Desch argues, the functions of a state have been predominantly military and international rather than economic and domestic.\(^\text{37}\)

Although war still remained a basic property of the Westphalian system, Wendt argues that the system had moved away from enmity towards rivalry. In the Lockean culture, rivalry is constrained by the structure of sovereign rights recognized by international law, and thus it is based on the rule of law. States expect each state to recognize each other’s sovereignty as a right, and therefore not to try to dominate other states; as a result, regarding sovereignty, states behave in such a way so as to maintain the status quo. This means that they do not have to worry so much about security matters, and that they can make more long term decisions. In the Lockean culture military power means less than in the Hobbesian one, but it is still important, since states may solve disputes by using military means. If disputes lead to war, however, rivals limit their own violence; warfare is simultaneously accepted and constrained, and the state system has a relatively stable membership. Even though states may comply to sovereignty norms because they are forced, or because they think it will advance their interests, most states comply with norms because they want to: states have identified with norms and accept them as legitimate. Wendt argues that the Lockean assumptions have dominated Westphalian politics for the past three centuries, and although Hobbesianism has occasionally reared its head, it has each time been beaten back down by the status quo states.\(^\text{38}\)

The Third Degree Lockean culture is the basis for what we today take to be “common sense” about international politics: that a certain type of state is the main actor in the system, that these actors are self-interested individualists, that the international system is therefore in part a self-help system – but that states also recognize each other’s sovereignty and so are rivals rather than enemies, that they have status quo interests which induce them to constrain their own behaviour and cooperate when threatened from outside, and that the system is therefore in part an other-help system qualitatively different in its fundamental logic than the Hobbesian world of sauve qui peut.\(^\text{39}\)

---


\(^{38}\) Wendt 1999, 286-297.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 296.
There are still international disputes, but they “tend to confront one another within the context of a well-established practice”, as Frost writes. He continues that disputes are situated within a common state centric domain of discourse, and participants share an understanding of actions which can be undertaken within the context. Indeed, that the system is anarchy does not rule out the possibility of international norms and the international law; quite the contrary, sources of international law are deep rooted in the state system. The general principles of international law concern the primacy of a sovereign state as an organization, a competitive struggle for power and influence between states, and an attempt to achieve limited order between states in the anarchical society. Much of the substance of the international law relates both to interstate affairs and to areas of high politics that are closely linked to statehood – sovereignty, recognition, national security as well as war and peace, and diplomacy. According to Frost, the set of settled international norms (i.e. norms which do not need any justification) includes norms of sovereignty, peace and international law, as well as norms of desirability of modernisation, capitalism and economic co-operation, democracy and protection of human rights. Since all interaction happens in the framework of common values, norms and rules, the ability to affect the process of defining them is a considerable source of power.

3.2. Globalization overrules the Westphalian system

The emergence of a liberal-democratic state as the dominant actor on the international field did not kill history. There are various on going processes that have challenged the position of a liberal-democratic state. The rise of supraterritoriality breaks the division between domestic and international, and blurs the picture of the world divided into nation states. The roots of supra-territoriality are deep in the modern world, since it has resulted mainly from a combination of the emergence of global consciousness as a product of rationalist knowledge, the development of capitalism, technological innovations especially in

40 Frost 1996, 82.
42 Ibid., 292.
communications and data processing, and the construction of enabling regulatory frameworks, especially through states and suprastate institutions. The growth of supraterritorial spaces has led to various processes of globalization, including the growth of international exchange and interdependence, the liberalisation of the economy, the global spreading of objects and experiences, westernization and modernization, and deterritorialization. These processes have affected a state in many ways: forms and functions of a state have changed.

Globalization has changed the meaning of sovereignty; we could even claim that sovereignty as a determining principle of the international system has been overcome. As Buzan and Little argue, boundaries and sovereignty as declared defining elements of nation states and relationships between them have eroded and have been replaced by “a negotiated arrangement of permeable boundaries, layered sovereignty, and common international and trans-national ‘spaces’ (cyberspace, civic space, commercial space, legal space, civilizational space)”. In many cases – for example trade and finance, communication, tourism and human rights – boundaries are not only permeable, but are “shot through with large holes”. In the globalizing world, states are unable to act as principal governing agents, and governance has become more multilayered. Authority is increasingly diffused across substate (municipal and provincial) and suprastate (regional and transworld) agencies as well as state organs. At the suprastate-level, the most important agents include UN organs, the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO and the OECD. Globalization has also introduced problems in which substate and suprastate agencies may hold a comparative advantage over states, or at least a complementary role. Consequently, international organizations have developed into global governance agencies with a certain amount of autonomy from states. Global firms and global civil society actors have become instrumental in various regulatory processes. Coordination of activities on a large regional scale have been made possible by technologies of supraterritorial transportation and communication. Moreover, the deteritoriating territorial line between inside and outside has affected tasks states have taken: instead of promoting domestic interests against those of foreigners, post-sovereign states have tended

44 Scholte 2000, 3, 15-16.
45 Buzan & Little 2000, 359.
to become arenas of collaboration and competition between a complex array of territorial and supraterritorial interests.\textsuperscript{46}

The extension of supraterritorial interests has reduced incentives for interstate war, particularly in countries where globalization has proceeded the furthest\textsuperscript{47}. Also the end of the cold war and resulting declining of the external threat environment demolished the foundation of a state, whose legitimacy is partly based on the external threat\textsuperscript{48}. On the other hand, superior ability to wage war is not so significant in the world where most security threats cannot be solved by military means alone. As a result, both a state and its position are changing. A state is evolving into something new, and there will emerge new polities challenging its position as the dominant unit of the international system\textsuperscript{49}. Buzan and Little argue that there is a combined move away from the dominance of military-political units towards a situation where there is a variety of dominant units. They continue that the forthcoming situation will resemble medieval arrangements where there were multiple types of units which were functionally and sectorally differentiated.\textsuperscript{50} Adler argues that changes in technology, economic relations, social epistemes and institutions cause globalizing and localizing pressures that are squeezing a nation-state from above and below; as a result, state authority in realms of security, economic welfare, and human justice (human rights) is increasingly being distributed across international functional cognitive spaces.\textsuperscript{51} It seems that the state’s authority and control is disappearing and distributed for many, sectoral and functional units.

According to Ferguson and Mansbach, there is a rich variety of polity types interacting across global and regional issues. These polities may be grounded on ethnicity, economic status, territorial continuity, language, gender etc., and they compete for loyalties of people. Normally conflicts among different polities are avoided, because there is an understanding about the role of each one, but sometimes tensions arise when authorities start to compete with one another.\textsuperscript{52} There have always been polities

\textsuperscript{46} Scholte 2000, 22, 139-148.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 142.
\textsuperscript{48} Desch 1996, 237.
\textsuperscript{49} Ferguson & Mansbach 1996, 410.
\textsuperscript{50} Buzan & Little 2000, 360.
\textsuperscript{51} Adler 1997, 250-252.
\textsuperscript{52} Ferguson & Mansbach 1996, 36-37, 46, 394.
that challenge authority of a state in some matters, but now it seems that a state’s authority is challenged in so many areas that it has partly lost the property that makes it a state – its sovereignty. Globalization has loosened the affective underpinnings of sovereignty, and various nonterritorial identities and communities, as well as localized solidarities have emerged\textsuperscript{53}. The expansion of transworld spaces has facilitated the development of various nonterritorial communities, for example connected to class, gender or religion. A state is challenged also from below by growth of substate identity politics like ethno-nationalism and indigenous peoples’ movements\textsuperscript{54}.

Although a state is challenged, it is hard for a polity to become recognized as an actor on the international field if it is not a state. States might have lost part of their power, but they have not given up their position as states. States do not give up their power voluntarily, but it is deteriorating in spite of – or due to – those means they use in their attempt to keep their position, including for example creating free market zones and international institutions. Yet, globalization involves the growth of international cooperation and a one-world community, which may lead to the emergence of post-modern states\textsuperscript{55}. Post-modern states differ from Westphalian states in their identities, preferences and competencies; this affects the whole system. Many argue that the system of post-modern states will be less prone to war. According to Scholte, war is unthinkable for post-modern states, while Maull claims that the transfer of sovereignty allows the development of the rule of law in international relations, and hence helps to push forward the process of civilising international politics\textsuperscript{56}. Buzan and Little see a connection between a regime type and an international structure, and claim that when states change, the structure of the international system changes too: the way in which dominant units are internally structured makes a difference to what kind of influence they project onto the system. This leads Buzan and Little to ask if spreading democracy amongst states is causing a sharp move away from war\textsuperscript{57}.

\textsuperscript{53} Scholte 2000, 137.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 5, 23.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 26.
\textsuperscript{56} Maull 1990/91, 106.
\textsuperscript{57} Buzan & Little 2000, 274, 376-377.
war was declining, the whole system may not become more peaceful, however; globalization may also lead to global disorder, ultranationalism, racism, religious fundamentalism and terrorism. Furthermore, the declining position of a state has already resulted to civil wars among others in Afghanistan, Angola, Indonesia, Russia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and the former Yugoslavia.\(^{58}\)

Hans W. Maull argued already at the beginning of the 90s that the dynamics of international relations have shifted from the military-political sphere to economic and social developments. He continues that this shift favours economically dynamic and socially cohesive countries like Germany. Consequently, the meaning of power has changed: hard power, an ability to command others, has increasingly been replaced by soft, persuasive power.\(^{59}\) Even if military strength is one of the most important issues making a modern state into a dominant actor in the global arena, and security is one of the main objectives of states, military resources are not so significant anymore. The meaning of security has widened to include issues like pollution, diseases and management of resources, and these demand collective action.\(^{60}\) The meaning of security has also deepened, e.g. moved down to take individuals into consideration. Maull claims that risks for the future will largely come from economic, social and cultural dislocations and their potential for producing political crises and turmoil. Social changes foster new security problems such as migration, drugs and international terrorism. Military power has become a residual element in international politics, since it is largely irrelevant in confronting these new challenges.\(^{61}\)

International relations are undergoing a profound transformation that offers an opportunity to take history beyond the world of the nation-state, with its inherent security dilemmas and its tendency to adjust to change through war.\(^{62}\)

Both international actors and international relations are changing, but what will be the result? According to Cerny’s scenario, the system may

---


\(^{59}\) Maull 1990/91, 92.

\(^{60}\) Hocking & Smith 1995, 134-135.

\(^{61}\) Maull 1990/91, 102-103.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., 93.
be weakened without that other clearly determined system to replace it. In this case, there would be a variety of actors and competing and overlapping institutions. The possibility of the emergence of this kind of 'neo-medievalism' has been presented by many other theorists too.

Exogenous pressures on the nation-state/states system could simply exacerbate the tensions within that system, causing the system as such to erode and weaken – but without providing enough in the way of structural resources to any single category of agents or combination of categories to effectively shape the transnational structuration process in a strategic or entrepreneurial fashion. In other words, no groups or groups of groups would be, as such, at the steering wheel of change in the international system, and endemic competition between different groups would in turn undermine the capacity of any one of them to exercise such control. In such circumstances, the outcome might well resemble what has been called ‘neomedievalism’ – a fluid, multilayered structure of overlapping and competing institutions, cultural flux, multiple and shifting identities and loyalties, with different ‘niches’ at different levels (social issues, economic sectors, etc.) for groups to focus their energies on.63

Although it is difficult to predict what the international system will be like in future, certain trends exist. Sovereignty, territoriality and nationalism have eroded and security is understood in a different manner than in the Westphalian system. There no longer exists a strict line between internal and external spaces in the international system, and authority is increasingly divided between actors of various levels. This all refers to the emergence of a ‘neo-medieval’ system. Scholte argues that although a state will not be the centre of governance anymore, governance still involves organizations that are: "large (i.e. involving a substantial number of persons); permanent (i.e. long-running, with established procedures); formal (i.e. officially and explicitly constituted, with specifically defined positions and departments); impersonal (i.e. run primarily on technical grounds); and hierarchical (i.e. with rank-ordered offices under central supervision)". Supraterritorial relations have proved as amenable to bureaucratized administration as the previous territorialist geography.64

---

63 Cerny 2000, 458.
64 Scholte 2000, 157.
It must be remembered that change is neither easy nor fast. It is hard to believe that Cerny’s scenario presented above could become reality for centuries. Rather there will be more and less sovereign units together with emerging competing and overlapping institutions using a variety of ways of influencing. Possible forms of international actor will still be determined by international structures which do not change rapidly. Although an international actor does not need to be a state anymore, it must still be somehow comparable to states: it needs, first, to get recognized as an actor, and certain properties to be able to act as such. Finally, what the international system will look like in the future, will be determined by the actors who are best able to “manipulate, utilize and steer changing patterns of opportunities and constrains”, to use Cerny’s words. In their attempts to do this states’ traditional resources, from sovereignty to the army, will not necessarily bring victory anymore.

3.3. An emerging common identity in Europe

European integration and the motives of integrating states has been difficult to explain within the realist framework. What is happening in Europe, however, is neither unsuitable in the international system, nor as unique as it seems at first sight: the change is more pervasive and universal. The meaning of sovereignty in principle and in practice is deteriorating everywhere, and, as a result, the position of a state is changing. Scholars have moved away from viewing the Westphalian polity as a universal, dominant and unchanging unit of analysis, and at the same time governments are facing challenges that involve traditional and novel claims to loyalty. Consequently, state boundaries and sovereignty have partly lost their meaning. Although the Westphalian order has its beginning in Europe, it is European integration that challenges its norms most fundamentally. The EU has broken the division between domestic and international, and is also demanding the position of an actor at the international field. At the same time, Europe has moved away from the classical concept of external sovereignty as the EU has started to

65 Cerny 2000, 441.
66 Buzan & Little 2000.
67 Ferguson & Mansbach 1996, 413.
institutionalize a conception of limited and pooled sovereignty: The classic concept of external sovereignty prevents the delegation of powers over a state to an external authority, i.e. governments cannot commit to processes that may result in decisions over which they do not have a veto. Yet, within the EU, in many areas states’ legal authority is transferred to the Union, and individual member states cannot control its decisions.68

Whitman proposes that three inter-related dimensions of contemporary international relations contribute to the increased international significance of the EU: the changing balance of power in the international system, the increasing institutionalization of international relations, and the changing international political economy. After the Second World War, the international system has been characterised by the term “bipolarity”, when two superpowers, and the distribution of other states to the two camps, exemplified the balance of power of the international system. This system seemed to be relatively stable since there were no wars between the two superpowers. The end of the Cold War, however, raised many questions about the nature of the international system. Some suggest that the international system has moved into a state of multi-polarity – for example Whitman himself sees that there is a new concert of “Great Powers” encompassing the U.S., Russia, the EU, Japan and China – and that economic resources have become more important than military ones. Whitman claims that in addition to the end of the Cold War, there has been a substantial increase in regionalism with intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations.69 The end of the Cold War made possible the European external policy with regions before considered as the sphere of superpowers as well as politicization of external relations. It also started the era of neoliberal ideas and economic policy, which has made individual states to seem inadequate as regulators of the activities of globally oriented economic actors. Economic globalization has created pressures to move the tasks of economic governance from the state to the Union level.70

Scholars tend to disagree to what extent the structure of the international system and state behaviour have been modified by

---

68 Keohane 2002, 743-748.
70 Bretherton & Vogler 1999, 7-8, 27.
increasing international inter-dependence, but many have reached the conclusion that the position of states is not what is used to be. From this point of view, the EU’s position is strengthened due to its economic power, its ability to handle regionalism, and its multilevel style of policy-making based on cooperation and persuasion. That the EU lacks some characteristics of states – most of all, a clear order of political authority and military resources – is not necessarily a disadvantage in the contemporary international system, but rather makes possible new styles of policy-making better suited to the system of nowadays. I claim that structural factors make it possible for the EU to play the role of an international actor, and that the rest depends on the EU’s capacity to exploit the opportunity. According to Bretherton and Vogler, the role of the EU is to provide a model of an “island of peace, and to contribut[e] to overall Western policy including progress, liberal democracy, [and a] capitalist economic system”.71

Wendt explains the changing international field by arguing that in the West there has been change away from the Lockean culture towards the new international political culture. Within the new culture – which Wendt names Kantian culture – non-violence and team-play are norms, and a dominant role is a friend. Friendship is a role structure within which states expect each other to observe two rules: first, disputes will be settled without war or threat of war (the rule of non-violence), and second, they will fight as a team if the security of anyone of them is threatened by a third party (the rule of mutual aid).72 Within the Kantian culture there emerge security communities, in which there is a real assurance that members of the same community will not fight against each other physically, but will settle their disputes in other ways. This assurance comes from shared knowledge of each other’s peaceful intentions and behaviour. In a pluralistic security community war is no more legitimate way of settling disputes, and, therefore, military power has no meaning in relationships between friends (or it has meaning as a mutual asset).73

States may follow norms of friendship for self-interest; it is a strategy states may choose in order to obtain certain benefits for themselves.

71 Ibid., 32-35.
73 Wendt 1999, 299-301.
In such a case there is no identification of the “self” with the “other”, no equating national interests with international interests, and no sacrifice for the group except when necessary for realising their own exogenous interests. Instead, states behave as if they were friends and come to each other’s help when their security is threatened. When Kantian culture is internalized more deeply, however, states accept claims on their behaviour as legitimate, identify with each other, and see the others’ security literally as their own. The cognitive boundaries of the “self” are extended to include the “other”, and a “cognitive region” is formed. There are many terms in the literature that describe this phenomenon – for example we-feeling, solidarity, and loyalty – that all refer to shared identity that has legitimate claims on separate bodily identities. This identity creates collective interests, and makes international interests a part of national ones. This, in turn, helps to create other-help or altruistic behaviour, which is often claimed to be crucial for explaining the success of collective action. Of course identification with an other is rarely total, but since actors are capable of having multiple group identifications at once, shared identity is possible.\footnote{Ibid., 303-306.}

But why would states in the Lockean world engage in common security policies in the first place, and thereby spur collective identity formation? Wendt’s answer includes the impact of interdependency, common fate, homogeneity, and self-control. First, in the case of interdependency, i.e. when the outcome of interaction for each depends on the choices of others, actors may start to act as if they were friends, and expect each other to respond in a similar way; if all begin to act like friends, new identities will be reinforced that lead to further co-operation and internalization of collective identity on both sides. The new constitutive norms for new identities are created through this complex learning process.\footnote{Ibid., 344-346.} Secondly, common fate may foster collective identity. The actors have a common fate when their survival or welfare depends on what happens to the group as a whole. Wendt argues that by “taking a collective identity on an at least ‘as if’ basis, repeated cooperation leads to habits of thought which motivate actors to cooperate even if the objective source of common fate disappears”. Thirdly, increasing homogeneity makes actors re-categorise others as being like themselves,
and this fosters identification. As interdependence, common fate and homogeneity increase, actors have more incentives to engage in prosocial behaviour, which erodes egoistic boundaries of the “self” and expands them to include the “other”. This process may proceed only if actors can be sure that their basic needs (national interests in the case of states) are respected, and that their individuality will not be wholly submerged by, or sacrificed to, the group. The traditional solution to this problem of trust is external constraint by the third party, for example a hegemonic state or an international institution (internalized only to the first or second degree). The relevant norms to be followed are those of a security community, i.e. respect of sovereignty and non-violent dispute resolution. But with only external constrains states cannot be trusted to respect needs of the “other”, and as a result, identification with others is difficult. This is why self-control is needed: the “self” must believe that the “other” will constrain itself in demands it makes on the “self”.

Shared knowledge helps actors to make correct interpretations about each other’s intentions. States acquire this kind of knowledge by internalizing the institution of the pluralistic security community through repeated compliance. As a result, external constrains become internal, and social control is achieved primarily through self-control. It is clear that collective identity formation among states takes place against cultural backgrounds, in which egoistic identities and interests are initially dominant, and that there will be resistance to the process all the way down. However, egoistic identities are themselves sustained only by particular kinds of interaction. The structure of the international system is produced, reproduced, and sometimes transformed only through the interaction of states, and the logic of interaction reflects characteristics of states and systemic structures.

Since the structure of the international system is made of shared knowledge (culture), structural change is possible, although it is not easy. Wendt claims that in the area of Europe there is a process that is leading to an emergence of a common identity. Even though the member states of the EU followed the norm of friendship for selfish reasons, it would result in internalizing the norm, and so the common European identity and interests. In the Kantian culture, the legitimate identity

---

76 Ibid., 349-359.
77 Ibid., 364-366.
reminds one in the Lockean culture: an actor should be modernized, capitalist, democratic, and hierarchical, and it should respect international norms that still include peace, sovereignty, respecting human rights, and promoting economic cooperation. However, in Europe the principle of cooperation is getting stronger and is, at least in some cases, in contradiction with the principle of national sovereignty; in many issues, national governments are not the ultimate authorities anymore. Moreover, the EU is demanding the position of an actor at the international field, even though it is not a sovereign state. Thus, what has changed is the meaning of sovereignty. At the same time also military resources are loosing their significance, when in the Kantian culture conflicts are expected to be solved without violence and threat of violence. Whereas in the Lockean culture states should restrict their violence, in the Kantian one states should not use violence at all.

In Wendt’s terms, friendship might have been a strategy for managing in the globalising world. Modernization, capitalism, and various modes of interdependency of the Lockean world have created pressures for a state, as well as new risks and security threats that are unsolvable by individual states. When capital, ideas, or security threats are less and less controlled by heads of states, they have – for selfish reasons – started to cooperate to maintain state power. In the global competition for resources European states have realized that they are interdependent and have a common fate. In addition, even though European states seem to be different at the European level, at the global level they appear more similar sharing common values and norms. Wendt’s analysis suggests that these phenomena lead to a common identity, and to a new culture that overcomes state sovereignty.78

Wendt claims that democracies are strongly predisposed by their internal constitutive structure to limit the set of instruments they use in their disputes with each other to peaceful means.79 Moreover, the culture of friendship may affect the European foreign policy overall; it has often been proposed that states tend to externalize domestic ways of doing things in their foreign policy behaviour80. Instead of using military

78 European integration will be explained more carefully in the next chapter, where integration theories are studied.
80 Buzan & Little 2000, among others.
instruments, the EU and its member states are expected to use economic means, cooperation and negotiation when dealing with third states. In practice the EU has done this so well that it has been proposed that it is a civilian power: a civilian power uses economic power to achieve national goals, prefers diplomatic power in solving international problems, and is willing to use legally-binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress. As is expressed in the European Security Strategy approved by the European Council in Brussels December 2003, “European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions.”

We can ask how deep the EU has internalized its identity as a civilian power, since it has not decided to avoid using military power, but has not fully built a military aspect yet. In any case, the changing structures affect the views of the European heads of the state, and make them see their interests differently. After a direct physical threat has receded, people are able to think about security issues in the longer term and the meaning of security may change. When changes in structures happen at the same time with emerging understanding of negative by-products of modernization (environmental problems, among others) and of globalization (for example economic problems and poverty), security threats are re-defined in a way that demands non-military resources for solving them. According to the European Security Strategy, large-scale aggression against any member state is improbable, but instead the EU’s security threats include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime. To solve these threats the EU aims at developing, as the civilian power does by definition, a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions, and rule-based international order. On the other hand, broad approach to security and stability in Europe emphasizes the significance of the EU’s civilian role.

Even when threats are similar, the EU offers a different solution to for example the U.S.A., against which it is often compared. While the U.S.

81 Manners 2002, 237.
82 European Security Strategy 2003, 1.
83 Ibid., 5.
84 Ibid., 9.
85 Bretherton & Vogler 1999, 198.
responded to the terrorist attack on 11 September by starting wars, the EU has based its policy on cooperation and strengthening international society, and has stuck to its strategy even after the terrorist attack in Madrid in 2004. It has, among others, adopted a European Arrest Warrant and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the U.S., continued pursuing policies against proliferation and the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency, aimed at achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, helped to deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, and helped to restore good governance and to foster democracy, enabling the authorities to tackle organized crime.\textsuperscript{86} Hence, the EU’s way of solving security threats demands the ability for collective action, which is easier within Kantian culture where actors know the others’ intentions and trust each other. Moreover, within Kantian culture the ability for collective action may become so important that it rules out the norm of sovereignty, as is happening in the EU where the possibility for states to use the right of veto is restricted to facilitate common policy.

Thus, although the change is happening everywhere in the international system, the development is most obvious within Europe, where the Westphalian order has been dissolved, and states are facing new challengers.

Today’s European polities are in the midst of an awkward transition. Europeans are experimenting with alternative ways of organizing political space, and tensions exist as Westphalian polities [states] compete with other polities for the loyalties and resources of citizens. No Westphalian polity in Europe is fully responsible for its own defence; some vital economic functions have been “EU-ized,” and others effectively surrendered to multinational firms and worldwide financial markets—not to mention the challenges of coping with a more organized and demanding citizenry.\textsuperscript{87}

Development in Europe is resulting in the emergence of a new kind of polity, the EU. As Buzan and Little argue, the EU does not seem to be becoming simply another large federal state, but is instead an experiment “with a new form of both unit and subsystem structure, where the sharp

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 396.
inside/outside features of the modernist era are blurring into a mixture of the domestic and the international”88. I claim that those who see the EU for one reason or another as an inadequate actor in the international system are wrong. Development of the EU corresponds with the development of the international system; what we see in the EU is a “post-sovereign” political unit which has the abilities and instruments needed in the international system.

88 Buzan & Little 2000, 359.
In this chapter the international position of the EU is examined within various theoretical approaches. The aim is to present earlier studies dealing with the EU, and the development of the research towards taking the EU better into account. The position of the EU has been evaluated in different ways depending on the theoretical approach within which it is studied; there is no theory-neutral base where the world could be objectively observed, since theory strongly influences on what is observed\(^1\). This view stresses the importance of a framework that determines significant problems, key concepts used to describe them, and methods for studying and solving them\(^2\). In the study of IR, there is no definitive or agreed way of comparing different theoretical approaches and theories, but it is up to the scholar herself to create justifiable principles of how to handle pluralism\(^3\). It seems that some kind of paradigm change happens from time to time, when scholars start working within a new research program and evaluate empiria from a different angle to before. In the study of IR, study based on the principles of political realism has been replaced by a new approach offered by constructivism. Still, constructivism cannot be considered as totally separate from realism, as it was been born within the study and is based on the principles of realism, even when it denies them. During the development of constructivist thinking the theoretical framework has changed, this has affected ways the research is made. The European case demonstrates how knowledge and practice are tied from the start: Creating knowledge starts from a problem and develops through scientific practice. Knowledge affects an object of study and creates new

\(^1\) This view rejects positivism with empirism, and the inductive method of making research, by putting ontology prior to epistemology and by agreeing with Popper that “it is we who always formulate the questions to be put to nature” (Popper 1968, 280). It is a widely shared view in the social sciences today that creating knowledge needs theoretical guidance (Feyerabend in Pursiainen 1998, 12) and that theories come prior to facts (Pursiainen 1998, 12).


\(^3\) Hollis & Smith 1990, 67.
problems to be solved. European integration has proceeded together with theories concerning among others peace, democracy, the nature of international politics, and integration. European reality has created new questions to be solved, and the answers are opening up new possibilities and challenges.

Indeed, European integration and particularly evolving European foreign policy have brought up many problems – or should we call them challenges – in the discipline of international relations and its major sub-field, foreign policy analysis (FPA)\(^4\). Although these problems are old ones, and have been discussed before, it is the evolvement of the European foreign policy that has challenged the scholars of IR to make increasing efforts to find new answers. One could say that the problems of theorizing the European external policy mirror much wider ones in the international relations theory\(^5\), and that they are related to fundamental questions of analysis. Marjorie Lister is among those who have a negative view not only of European foreign policy but also of the possibilities of FPA to explain it (or anything else). She is right in her argument about the absence of a general theory of foreign policy\(^6\); attempts to create a theory explaining the foreign policy behaviour of all states and in every situation have been too ambitious, as the work done in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrates\(^7\). According to Lister, another shortcoming of FPA is that there is no agreement on methodology or a theoretical paradigm\(^8\). This does not have to be taken as a problem, however, since pluralism may be a profitable basis for science. Although theories have not been able to explain the European foreign policy, scholars have done excellent work when formulating new approaches and theories, and at least conceptual knowledge has increased\(^9\).

\(^4\) The relationship between IR and FPA is vague, since all approaches of IR contain statements about the foreign policy and have taken a state as a central actor in the international relations. FPA is a sub-field of IR, it is not distinctive, but an intrinsic part of the study.

\(^5\) See Ginsberg 1999, 433.

\(^6\) Lister 1997, 7.

\(^7\) Steve Smith's article provides an historical overview of theories of foreign policy. Smith claims that the approaches of IR have never got beyond a pre-theoretical phase from which one can only lead unambiguous findings (Smith 1986, 22-23).

\(^8\) Lister 1997, 7.

\(^9\) Ginsberg 1999, 433.
The major questions of this chapter are: Why has the international position of the EU been so problematic to study? And, why has it been so difficult to conceptualize the foreign policy of the EU? As Steve Smith proposes, silence of theories tells us something about a subject\textsuperscript{10}. The EU is a complex set of institutions and actors from different levels, and European foreign policy consists of many pieces. Furthermore, although the EU is a state-like entity, it does not formally have statehood, and it lacks a monopoly on, and a clear leadership of, foreign policy-making\textsuperscript{11}. However, it is not only the EU’s vague nature which is to be blamed for the fact that “the attempt to fit European realities into the theory of foreign policy analysis has dismally failed”\textsuperscript{12}; there might be something wrong with our glasses too. The theoretical framework affects our way of perceiving and thinking: it brings up some issues and prevents us from seeing others. As Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan put it, “as long as our lens and images seem to “work”, we keep them and build on them”\textsuperscript{13}. As I presented earlier, a scholar cannot see the world objectively, but through a theory. The constructivist analysis lights up some aspects of the EU that political realism has kept in the shadow.

The chapter proceeds in the following way: at the beginning I study approaches used to explain the international position of the EU, starting from realism and ending up to different variants of institutionalism. The debate in the 1990s has mainly been between the institutionalist variants of neofunctionalism and of realist/liberalist approach. In this debate the basic question has been if the EU is supranational or intergovernmental; the assumption has been that as a supranational entity it could be an actor on the international field while as an intergovernmental organization it serves as an instrument of nation states. Secondly, I examine another approach of FPA to the EU: the analysis concerning actoriness. After examining the necessary properties of an international actor it can be seen that they are mainly properties of a state, and that the EU does not have all of them: the EU is not a state. Next, I present the constructivist approach and its criticism towards rationalist approaches. It seems that constructivism has overcome some problems of traditional

\textsuperscript{10} Smith 1994, 14.
\textsuperscript{11} Allen 1998, 42-43.
\textsuperscript{12} Lister 1997, 7.
\textsuperscript{13} Peterson & Runyan 1993, 2.
approaches in conceptualizing the EU. Finally, I summarise problems of these theoretical approaches in the case of the EU and its foreign policy.

4.1. From the debate between realism and liberalism to the debate between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism

John A. Vasquez defines realism as a set of theories that share the following fundamental assumptions: First, nation states are the most important actors in international relations. Second, there is a sharp distinction between domestic and international politics. Third, international relations consist of the struggle for war and peace. Kenneth Waltz, the man who formulated neorealism in his book *Theory of International Politics*, clarifies core assumptions of neorealism in the following way: Survival is the goal of states and power is one of the means to that end. States form the structure by their interactions and are strongly affected by the structure. States tend to become like units as they try to coexist in the self-help system of anarchy, with behaviours and outcomes explained by differences in the positions of states as well as by their internal characteristics. Hence, realists picture the world as an anarchic place where sovereign states compete for power in order to be able to promote their national interests. A state is viewed as a rational and unitary actor: It is rational since it sets objectives, considers all feasible alternatives, evaluates benefits and costs associated with each alternative, and selects an alternative which maximises utility (or at least the one which seems to maximise utility at the moment). It is unitary since it has one voice and policy at any given time on any particular issue. The foreign policy goals of states are limited to the pursuit of national interests, and national security is on the top of the hierarchy.

---

14 As Steve Smith (1986, 2-3) puts it, realism includes surprisingly dissimilar conclusions, but that at the same time similarities within approach are noticeable enough to justify considering them as a coherent school. See also Michael Smith (1986) concerning realism.
15 Vasquez 1997, 899.
16 Waltz 1979, 913.
17 Viotti & Kauppi 1993, 6, 35.
of international issues. In the anarchic system, cooperation is difficult to achieve: States must calculate, if others gain more from cooperation, and evaluate, how others will use their increased abilities. Moreover, states have to aim to maintain their independence and autonomy, and, if possible, widen the scope of their control, and strive for greater self-sufficiency. Two institutions of international relations preserve a certain degree of order and security: the balance of power and inter-state war. Rational states want to maintain the balance of power in order to avoid triumph of the dominant power. Disruptions of the balance of power are created by arms races, alliance policies or a combination of the two, and the balance may be restored through war.

Neoliberals have accepted the realist assumptions of a state as the most important international actor, and of anarchy as the general principle ordering international relations. However, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye claim that states have to operate increasingly in the world where other types of actors are important. Their theory of complex interdependence challenges realist claims about the central role of force and security matters: It suggests that economical statecraft has became the major foreign policy instrument, and that the separation between foreign and domestic policies, and between high and low politics, has eroded. Moreover, when foreign policy is understood as an outcome of bureaucratic politics and organisational outputs, states are not seen as unitary actors. Although neoliberals also recognize that cooperation

---

18 Pursiainen 1998, 144-145.
19 The term balance of power refers to how power (or a set of abilities) is distributed among states. The balance of power can be either bipolar (two states with relative equal power) or multi-polar (three or more states engaging in checks and balances). The term is vague and has many meanings. (Viotti & Kauppi 1993, 50, 64.)
20 Ibid, 50.
21 Brown 1997, 100-106.
22 Within the liberal tradition there has been views recognizing that states are neither sole nor unified actors in the international system (for example Forster 1997, 298). It has been claimed, however, that neorealism and neoliberalism have become so close to each other that it is hard to make a distinction between their basic assumptions. There are also different definitions about which theories belong to the realist and which to the liberalist side.
23 Keohane & Nye 1977, 24-29; See also Soetendorp (1994, 110) and Brown (1997, 40-44).
under anarchy is always fragile\textsuperscript{24}, Axelrod and Keohane propose that international regimes\textsuperscript{25} enhance possibilities for cooperation; they stress that cooperation is possible even under anarchy and between egoist states. Scholars working with regime theories have accepted some realists and some liberal assumptions. They agree with realists that states are major actors in the world politics, that states are unitary actors, and that anarchy is a major shaping force for state preferences and actions.\textsuperscript{26} However, they disagree fundamentally with realists and rejoin forces with liberals over the possibility of international cooperation and the ability of international institutions to help states to work together and even to formulate interests and strategies of states.\textsuperscript{27}

It has been difficult to conceptualize the EU as an actor within the realist and the liberalist tradition\textsuperscript{28}. In these attempts, the essential question has usually been whether the EU is becoming a state or an international organization\textsuperscript{29}; if the EU is becoming a state, the argument goes, it should be more centralized and supranational than it is, while as an international organization it could remain an arrangement between national governments. The EU can also be viewed as a regime which

\textsuperscript{24} So how does the neorealist view differ from the neoliberal one in the case of cooperation? John Grieco proposes that the key difference concerns absolute as opposed to relative gains from cooperation. According to this view, neoliberals assume that states are concerned with absolute gains they make from cooperation, and do not care about how other states are doing. Neorealists, on the other hand, assume that each state is concerned not only with its own position, but also with relative gains from cooperation, which is how much it gets compared to how much others get. (In Brown 1997, 50-51.)

\textsuperscript{25} According to the generally accepted definition, the regime is a set “of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner in Brown 1997, 170-171). Also Axelrod and Keohane (1985, 249) use this definition of regimes. The definition does not imply that expectations have to be the same, or that rules are always obeyed; it suggests that most of the time actors have similar expectations, and that they usually obey rules (Brown 1997, 173).

\textsuperscript{26} Axelrod & Keohane 1985, 226. See also other papers in volume (38) of World Politics.

\textsuperscript{27} Kirchner 1992, 26; Soetendorp 1994, 111-112.

\textsuperscript{28} See for example Ginsberg 1999 and White 1999.

\textsuperscript{29} This is expressed in the debate between intergovernmentalism (for example Moravcsik 1991 and 1995) and supranationalism (for example Sandholtz & Zysman 1994, and Sweet & Sandholtz 1997).
facilitates inter-governmental action in some areas, without having its own powers and capabilities\textsuperscript{30}. According to the realist view, the EU cannot be considered as an actor, since it is not a state\textsuperscript{31}. Although the existence of multinational corporations and international institutions is recognized in the realist analysis, their position is always secondary; it is sovereign states who make history. Furthermore, international institutions are merely components of sovereign, independent and autonomic states, which define the meaning and tasks of organizations.\textsuperscript{32} Hence, realists emphasize the position of a state as an international actor whilst simply dismissing the role of the EU in the international sphere.

Defence identity and military resources are significant determinants of an actor in the realist account. It is often claimed that the EU cannot be a power in world politics without creating a defence identity separate from the US. On the other hand, even if that kind of identity were created it might be a source of weakness rather than strength, since only states are viewed as the locus of citizens’ loyalty and the units that wage war, and thus as the real sources of power.\textsuperscript{33} The assumption that the EU is not an actor because it lacks military resources substantially under-emphasizes the importance of economic factors. However, even within the neorealist analysis which often concentrates more on economic factors than is traditional in political realism, the EU is considered to conform to a system of intergovernmental negotiations. It is viewed as a forum where governments meet and negotiate to strengthen their power and secure their interests\textsuperscript{34}. Andrew Moravcsik is among those who approach the EU within the state-centric framework, and define the EU as a regime that makes negotiations between states more efficient by offering a common framework, one which reduces insecurity and costs involved in inter-state interaction. The EU’s institutions and norms are not seen to have their own capacities or effects on identities and interests of states.\textsuperscript{35} In Moravcsik’s theory supranationalism is regarded only as a controlled measure of implementing intergovernmental bargains.

\textsuperscript{30} Kirchner 1992, 26; Soetendorp 1994; Jachtenfuchs 1997; Ginsberg 1999.
\textsuperscript{31} Ginsberg 1999; White 1999.
\textsuperscript{32} Concerning realism, Vasquez 1997; Viotti & Kauppi 1993; Pursiainen 1998; Brown 1997; Buzan et all. 1993.
\textsuperscript{33} Hill 1994.
\textsuperscript{34} Ginsberg 1999.
\textsuperscript{35} Moravcsik 1991 and 1995; Wind 1997.
Each government views the EU through the lens of its own policy, and EU politics is a continuation of national policies by other means. In this case the common policy of the EU faces difficulties due to various interests among the member states. As Hedley Bull argues, the EU is not a real international actor, and does not seem to be becoming one; rather it is a combination of nation states that is based on the common interests of its biggest member states. Within the EU, the member states make all the major decisions, and supranational institutions (the Parliament, the Court of Justice and the Commission) have only a limited role.

Alongside the realist approach there has been another one which opens up the possibility for a change. Its roots are in idealist and liberal traditions, and it has led to different theories explaining the integration processes and the emerging new political community. The idea of a unified Europe could not have been proposed within the realist framework, but it was first developed by so called Europe-movements and resistance movements that in 1944 made a declaration according to which Europe should have its own government, army and court of justice. The background of these suggestions lies in the idealist tradition of thinking, which emphasizes the possibility of cooperation between states, and that the international system does not necessarily have to be based on violence. The process of European integration started within the federalist framework, which paid more attention to the result of integration – a federation – than to the process itself. European integration was seen as a process which transforms a group of states into one state. In the integration process states make arrangements for finding solutions to common problems and for executing a common policy to solve problems. The result of the integration process would be the United States of Europe. Although federalism as a theory and a policy-program was too radical for the member states of the EC after the 1950s, it has still relevance when the process of integration has lead Europe towards more federalist arrangements. While most of theories about integration leave the future of the EC/EU open, federalism offers a picture of the European federation with constitution and

---

37 Bull 1982, 151.
38 Antola & Tuusvuori 1983, 8-10.
39 Ibid., 22-23.
relations of authority divided between municipalities, states and central government. Yet, in the middle of the 20th century, functionalism was raised as a dominant theoretical framework for studying – and making – integration.

Functionalism was developed from the writings of David Mitrany, whose study *A Working Peace System* examines the possibility of governance that is not based on territoriality. According to Mitrany, the traditional link between an authority and a territory should be broken down by creating functional and supranational institutions that would have authority in the specific area they govern: those tasks that cannot be done well at the national level, should be taken care of at the supranational level, that demands pooling as much sovereignty as needed to the supranational institutions. This would lead to transferring sovereignty gradually to the supranational level in order to make functional cooperation and to maintain peace. Indeed, functional cooperation promotes peace by expanding “positive and constructive common work”, and “common habits and interests”, and making the “frontier line meaningless by overlaying them with a natural growth of common activities and common administrative agencies.” According to Mitrany, adopting the functional approach would imply the transition from power politics to functional, non-political order maintained by technical personnel who concentrate on practical issues.

Mitrany’s functionalism affected greatly two men designing the European Coal and Steel Community, i.e. Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. Jean Monnet drew on the functionalism of Mitrany, and argued that nations should adopt common rules governing their behaviour and create common institutions to apply these rules. He believed that by establishing the common market of Europe, the foundation was laid for the political union; within the union behaviour of states and human beings would change and give room for more

---

40 Tiilikainen & Raunio 1999.
42 Ibid., 163.
43 Ibid., 31-32.
44 Ibid., 62.
45 Ibid., 77-79.
civilized policy. The idea of social learning was a significant part also in the studies of Karl Deutsch, who represents the transactionalist or communications tradition, and argues that the historical process of social learning leads to the building of the community. Whether integration will succeed or fail, depends in part on the background conditions prevailing within and among the political units to be integrated. According to Deutsch, conditions of integration include the mutual relevance of units to one another; compatibility of values and some actual joint rewards; mutual responsiveness; and some degree of generalized common identity or loyalty.

Functionalism was followed by neofunctionalism, which focuses on the question why states are willing to give part of their sovereignty to regionally larger community. Although Haas criticized neofunctionalism, it is often associated with him and especially with his study *The Uniting of Europe*. In Haas’ work, the links between federalist and communications schools are clear. Haas defines integration as a process within which national actors move the target of their loyalties, expectations and political action from the national level to the supranational centre, whose institutions claim (or already have) power of legislation over nation states. Integration proceeds through spill-over, which refers to the situation where the initial task can be realized only if it is expanded to include the issues connected to it. Haas identified background conditions for integration, which include the homogeneity of social structures and basic values as well as a similar level of economic and industrial development. He argues that “integration fares best in situations controlled by social groupings representing the rational interests of urban-industrial society, groups seeking to maximize their economic benefits and dividing along regionally homogenous ideological-political lines.” For Haas, the end of European integration is a political community at the European level.

---

49 Deutsch 1968, 192.
52 Ibid., 347.
53 Ibid., 378.
54 Ibid., 389.
Generally, neofunctionalists assume that integration begins when governments perceive that certain economic policy problems cannot be solved by national means alone, and agree to joint policy-making in supranational institutions. Integration proceeds through the process of spill-over within which integration in one sector of the economy leads necessarily to wider economic and political integration. Spill-over presupposes growing socialization of actors involved, and their commitment to the enterprise of cooperation in principle, and to the style of cooperation based on mutual compromise and accommodation. Process of political integration encompasses not only the change in the focus of loyalties of the political elite but also in the focus of their expectations and political activities. Some consider spill-over itself as evidence of progress towards a political community. Neofunctionalism assumes that integration happens above a state, and emphasizes the role of national and multinational actors, and the significance of communal institutions.

Hence, in contrary to realist views, neofunctionalism assumes that international norms affect both the behaviour of states and the way in which they define their identities and interests. This perspective imbues the EU and its institutions with a more significant role in international politics. Young defines institutions as “sets of rules of the game or codes of conduct that serve to define social practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and guide the interactions among occupants of these roles.” According to March and Olsen, institutions are not merely arenas of political action, but rather autonomous actors themselves, with their own interests and resources. The supranational

---

57 Cram 1997, 15.
58 Ohrgard 1997, 15.
60 Sandholtz 1996.
61 Young 1984, 3.
62 Most of the institutionalist theories build on the theory of March & Olsen (1984 and 1989). One of the basic assumptions of their theory is that institutions follow rules, and that most of their behaviour is based on certain practices. This is also true in the case of political institutions: a significant part of the behaviour within them reflects the way in which people do what they are supposed to do. Rules may be made and reinforced by political or organizational authority, or they may be part
institutionalism of Sandholtz aims to explain particularly European integration and policy-making within the EU. According to Sandholtz, the EU is not only an arena of negotiations, but has power of its own. Sandholtz argues that “[i]nstitutions with genuine autonomy can act in ways that the Member States do not foresee, control, or even approve of”. Member states may have created the EU for the purpose of strengthening their sovereignty and power, but after creating it “they have brought to life a creature that is, because it possesses autonomy, not entirely under their control”. Once empowered, international bodies can interpret their mandates and target their actions in ways that entrench or even expand their prerogatives. Sandholtz suggests that supranational institutions of the EU – the Court of Justice, the Commission and the Parliament – may formulate interests and define instruments of political action, and also participate in policy-making. European institutions are able to affect political behaviour in at least three ways: by becoming autonomic political actors, by creating alternatives for local actors when they choose alliances and arenas of action (i.e. by creating multi-level politics), and by causing changes in domestic politics and institutions. Sandholtz adds that when different groups of the society begin to exploit political channels that bypass national governments, they open the door to multi-level politics. Also national governments become involved in multi-level politics when they have to act in the context of the EU, when they cannot veto common policies and when EU institutions work, not with the heads of governments, but with policy-specific segments of governments. In multilevel politics, both domestic groups and elements of national governments can become potential coalition partners for EU actors like the Commission.

Marks, Hooghe and Blank also claim that national governments are even collectively unable to control the European institutions they have created. They see that the EU creates “processes, in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government – subnational, national and supranational”. Although states participate in policy-making in the EU, supranational actors have taken control.

---

64 Ibid., 403-425.
States have lost part of their former authority in their own territory, and their sovereignty is limited by intergovernmental decision-making and the autonomic role of the European Parliament, the Commission and the ECJ.\textsuperscript{65} However, the result of the shift of power is not supranational but rather multi-level governance, because decision-making power is delegated to many levels. Integration does not have to result in the emergence of a new state, or in the traditional mode of a political community; instead of being arranged hierarchically, governance works through a network of various actors where states, supranational organizations, and the representatives of interests groups and local governance negotiate with each other and maintain governance.

The strength of neofunctionalist theories and their variants is in their ability to explain the process of learning and redefining national interests. From this point of view, the intergovernmental account of integration appears insufficient. Even though many of the decisions of the EU seem to result from negotiations between governments, it does not explain how the institutional environment of the EU affects preferences and the decision-making of member states. Still, integration and the existence of the Union institutions affects the way states see their interests and make their strategies.\textsuperscript{66} Integration is connected to the very-day politics, and it cannot be studied without it. In addition, the making of a common policy has unifying effects which lead to institutional development at the supranational level. Indeed, integration proceeds often in an informal way rather than through major negotiations, which may actually been seen as formalizing the practice. Moreover, the old divisions between politics inside a state and outside it are problematic within the EU because of the erosion of state capacity, increased interdependence, and institutional development between states.\textsuperscript{67} Furthermore, one of the strengths of supranational institutionalism lies in its ability to take external development into consideration: changes in the international system opened up the possibility for integration, which interest groups, the European Parliament, ECJ, and especially the Commission utilized\textsuperscript{68}.

\textsuperscript{65} Marks & Hooghe & Blank 1996, 342-355.
\textsuperscript{66} Sandholtz 1996, 404-407.
\textsuperscript{67} Hurrell & Menon 1996, 389-399.
\textsuperscript{68} Sandholtz 1996; Sandholtz & Zysman 1994; Sweet & Sandholtz 1997.
However, the realist and liberal traditions, including functionalism and neofunctionalism, focus more on the qualities of the EU than international structures of power. Within the structural and holistic analysis, structures have been more significant, and economic structures have often been viewed as constitutive for political relations. From this perspective, the EU can be viewed as attempting to displace the U.S. as the most important actor in the capitalist world system, and to construct a euro-centric world and a European superpower. The strength of the emerging European superpower may be derived from the resource capacity of the EU, which is comparable with that of other superpowers; whilst its structural power permeates structures that are advanced by the EU, and which, conversely, serve as instruments of this structural power. When comparing resources of the EU with those of other superstates, we should note that in many areas it compares quite favourably. Structural analysis does nonetheless have its problems, especially concerning the relationship between a structure and an actor. Structural theories are insufficient in explaining actions and positions of the EU. I still wish to emphasize that it is the system that defines necessary qualities of an actor. This approach is included in the constructivist analysis presented below.

4.2. Concepts of actorness and the EU

It is not surprising that the need to overcome a state has provoked debate within the field of European studies, since the EU’s significance has been difficult to understand within the state-centric analysis. The notion of actorhood, and the analysis of qualities of an actor, has been used in attempts to surpass a state. In the 1990s the discussion about the international position of the EU was caught in the point of whether the EU was an intergovernmental organization or supranational one. There were some attempts to overcome this “either-or” position. For

---

69 The most famous example is Wallerstein’s theory of the world system, according to which the modern world is divided between core states, peripheral states and half-peripheral regions (in Waters 1994, 316).
70 Whitman 1998, 114.
71 White 1999.
example, David Allen and Michael Smith attempted to define Western Europe as a collective presence in the international arena, with its own forms of international behaviour and influence. The concept “presence” aims to describe the EU as a changing and multi-level entity that affects expectations and behaviour of participants through various networks of politics, and that has its own forms and effects of international behaviour.\footnote{Allen & Smith 1990, 20-21; Smith 1996, 247.} For sure the mere existence of the EU affects third actors at the international level, but the term “presence” is not appropriate to describe the EU’s significance as an actor, since it is a precondition for actorness.

Within FPA there has been extensive discussion about the EC/EU as an external actor. The idea surrounding actorness is an effort to overcome state-centricity and the debate concerning the nature of the EU (intergovernmental or supranational). The concept of an external actor and qualities of actorness were first introduced by Sjöstedt (1977) and then revisited among others by Hill (1994) and by Jupille and Caporaso (1998). According to Christopher Hill, the concept of actorness is useful since it provides a theoretical perspective which can incorporate internal dynamics of CFSP’s institutional development and changing nature of international environment in which it has to operate\footnote{Hill 1994, 107.}.

Sjöstedt argues that being an external actor requires autonomy and actor capability. Autonomy follows from two things: a unit has to be separate from its external environment, and it has to have a certain degree of internal cohesion. Actor capability is based on structural prerequisites that include a) common interests, objectives, resources and system of mobilisation for them; b) systems of decision-making and monitoring which prepare and control activities toward third countries; and c) measures to execute foreign policy, that refers to diplomacy, finance, cooperation, sanctions and also military means. Sjöstedt still adds one indicator, which tells us if a unit is really using its capability to act like an international actor: actor behaviour measures activity of a unit as a coherent actor. All activity within a unit which is coherent with aims of a unit, is actor behaviour.\footnote{Sjöstedt 1977, 20-24, 75, 117.}
The requirements of an actor presented by Sjöstedt are basic ones, and more or less near in other theories of actoriness. Jupille and Caporaso, however, emphasize more the meaning of other actors and less policy instruments. According to Jupille and Caporaso, there are three ways to see the EU in the world: First, the EU can be seen as a collection of states or as a structure making cooperation between states easier and more efficient. Under this “realistic” or “intergovernmentalist” view, the EU’s status as a “collective actor” is due to the convergence of states’ interests and the resulting common policy. The second approach is the opposite to the first one and sees the EU as a polity or evolving polity. This “federalist” view assumes that political transition from a system of nation states to the polity has been made, and ignores the process of system transformation itself. According to the third approach, the EU can be understood as an evolving entity, “composed of numerous issue areas and policy networks, neither a full-blown polity nor a system of sovereign states, which displays varying degrees of “actorhood” across issues and time.” Jupille and Caporaso focus on a third approach when they posit four components of actor capacity in global politics: the first one concerns “recognition understood as acceptance of and interaction with the entity by others”. Second there is authority, which refers to the legal competence to act. The third component is autonomy, which is “conceived as institutional distinctiveness and independence from other actors”. Finally, there is cohesion or “the degree to which an entity is able to formulate and articulate internally consistent policy preferences”. Although these components of actor capacity are reasonable, it is still not clear that the EU possesses them in all issue-areas. Especially the CFSP is an area where the EU cannot fulfill the third component due to its decision-making system based on intergovernmentality and a major role for the heads-of-state. Moreover, meeting the fourth component might be difficult for the EU as a whole, since combining among others the CFSP, external trade policy and development cooperation policy to the coherent whole is problematic because of the pillar structure of the EU.

The first component, recognition, is a minimum condition, which registers an entity on the international field. To be recognized by others means that an entity is allowed to be present in global politics.

---

77 Ibid., 214.
Robert Jackson has demonstrated that often this recognition ("negative sovereignty") alone is a sufficient condition for international actorness. In the case of the EU, Jupille and Caporaso emphasize *de facto* recognition, which may result from interaction with third states: by deciding to interact with the EU they implicitly recognize it. This creates a dynamic which has driven the emergence of the EU in global politics. The EU is represented in various international meetings, and it has diplomatic relations with many countries; it has been accepted as a negotiating partner in bilateral and multilateral bargains, and, thus, it is recognized by other international actors. However, it does not necessarily imply that the EU is also a foreign political actor, since to be recognized as an actor in the area of foreign policy the EU, rather than its member states, should be chosen by third parties in interaction concerning foreign policy affairs. This is not always the case, but has happened only sometimes, for example in the relations between the EU and the Central and Eastern European states. The area of recognition has recently widened even towards military-related issues, like peace-keeping forces or prevention of conflict escalation. We could assume that when the EU interacts with third parties, a process of socialization occurs and the EU’s actions become accepted and even expected, which changes the identity of the EU and of other parties.

The EU’s authority to act externally refers to its legal competence, which is derived from its member states. Legal authority or competence to act is given by contracts, which define and constrain the power of EU institutions and of member states. The legal authority of the EU varies across issue-areas, but still covers most issues. The first pillar of the EU – the EC – has a legal personality as an international organization, but this leaves out the CFSP until the Constitution of the EU is ratified by member states, and the whole EU has a legal personality. However, the TEU and the Amsterdam Treaty provide the EU with the competence to act in CFSP matters, and if decisions made in this area follow decision-making rules, the EU has the competence to act. The third component of actor capacity, authority of an entity in question, depends on two issues, which are institutional distinctiveness and independence. Institutional distinctiveness means that an international organization should have a distinctive institutional apparatus, even if it is grounded in, or mixed

---

78 Ibid., 215-216.
up with, domestic political institutions. Independence means that these institutions should make a difference. Turning to the EU again, what matters is whether it is an entity, which has, or at least could have, causal importance that is more than the sum of its constituent parts.\footnote{Ibid., 216-217.} In the area of the first pillar, supranational institutions have a significant role in policy-making; again, the CFSP is a tough case. Intergovernmental approach claims that the EU is nothing more than the sum of its parts, whilst in the framework of supranational institutionalism the EU seems to be much more than that. According to Jupillo and Caporaso, part of the difficulty in assessing autonomy of the EU with regards to its member states lies in the pervasive intermingling of levels of political authority.

Jupillo and Caporaso state that it is cohesion that determinates if an entity is an actor or merely a presence, since “[t]o be an actor implies a minimal level of cohesion”. The EU can act with varying degrees of cohesion, one extreme being an organization, which merely aggregates policy preferences of its member states, and another a unitary international organization whose member states display high levels of consensus; it is very typical for the EU that in one situation it acts like an international organization, and in another like a state actor. Since cohesion is a vague concept Jupillo and Caporaso clarify it by identifying four separate dimensions of the term. First there is value cohesion, which refers to the similarity or compatibility of basic goals. Secondly, if goals are different but can be made to fit with one another, the form of cohesion is tactical cohesion. Thirdly, procedural cohesion implies some consensus on rules and procedures used to process those issues where conflict arises and, thus, agreement on basic rules by which policies are made. Fourthly, there is “output cohesion” which refers to the situation where member states succeed in formulating policies regardless of the level of substantive or procedural agreement.\footnote{Ibid., 219-220.} Again, the degree of cohesion of the EU policy-making depends on the issue-area and on the particular situation. In the CFSP, the most visible lack of cohesion concerns “output cohesion”, since in recent crisis situations the EU has been unable to make any policy due to the different views of member states.
Although these efforts to surpass a state by studying actorliness have been valuable, since they have inspired new questions, I wish to argue that we certainly cannot yet consider a state to have been thus ‘surpassed’: it is still those qualities possessed by states that are considered necessary qualities of an actor\textsuperscript{81}. The conclusion has been that although the EU has many qualities and capacities traditionally (or in the ‘ideal’ case) the preserve of states, it still lacks many qualities necessary to be an actor on the international field. So the reason for the difficulty in figuring out the EU as a foreign policy actor is that the prerequisites of actorliness are understood to be those of states; and, thus, the conversation concerning the EU’s international position has tended to fall back to state-centricity. As the EU does not have the capacities states traditionally own, it is (too) easy to jump into the conclusion that it is not an external actor\textsuperscript{82}. The realist framework still strongly affects what we consider significant in the political system and its actors. We need new theories to illuminate the EU so as to be able to explain its position in the world. These theories should include a better understanding of the various ways of using power and making a difference in the social system, and illustrate new types of actors.

Despite all the problems of analysis – or rather because of them – there has emerged new ideas about the international system and the position of the EU within it. Traditional approaches of realism and liberalism have given room for constructivism that tries to solve many problems involved especially in the study of the EU. These problems are, however, part of a bigger entity and concern, for example, questions about sovereignty, territoriality, borders and the meaning of security. As I see it, constructivism follows the neofunctionalist tradition and critical theories, among others postmodernism and the feminist analysis; these theories are mainly holistic in their nature, emphasizing formation of identities and interests of actors. Similar to neofunctionalist models, constructivist explanations give the EU institutions a significant role in shaping European integration, and similar to postmodernism, constructivist theories criticize materialism and rationalism of political realism. Some of constructionist theories have also tried to explain, why the EU should be considered an international actor.

\textsuperscript{81} Gaining recognition as an actor, authority, autonomy, unity and the instruments of foreign policy (of the state), among others.

\textsuperscript{82} Hill 1994.
4.3. Constructivism

Since neoliberalism and neorealism have came to be so close to each other, it is more and more meaningless to emphasize differences rather than obvious similarities between them. They both belong to a rationalist camp and work from individualist assumptions. The constructivist approach has emerged as the opposite to the rationalist approach, and follows the ideas of neofunctionalism and various institutionalist theories. Constructivism has it origins in critical theories of social sciences, and it tries to fill the gaps that the rationalist approach leaves unexplained, by adding the role of ideas and identity to the agenda. According to Pursiainen, constructivism may be considered in Lakatosian terms as offering more comprehensive theories than realism or liberalism of the same phenomena. However, the constructivist accounts of the international system, cooperation, institutions and their significance, regimes and compliance with agreed norms and rules differ significantly from those of rationalism. As Alexander Wendt suggests, the rationalist approach makes sense in some cases, but not in all.

Constructivism does not form one united school of social science, but includes various scholars like John Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwil, and schools from the English school to feminist theories. The English school treats the international system as a society governed by shared norms, and is a forerunner of the contemporary constructivist approach. The World Society School emphasizes the importance of the role of global culture in constructing states, whilst postmodernists introduced the contemporary constructivist social theory to the study of international relations, and criticize materialism and rationalism. Feminist theories

---

84 Constructivism is an approach that does not include only a variety of theories, but also differing ontological assumptions and claims about the theory of science. (Jørgensen 1997.)
86 Wendt 1994, 384-385. Wendt was one of the first significant scholars developing the approach of constructivism, and he wrote a famous article Anarchy is what states make of it. The social construction of power politics (1992). Still he approaches political realism in his latest book Social Theory of International Politics (1999), being criticised by many of his colleagues. Although constructivism was created as an opposite to rationalism, Wendt has succeeded in utilising also realist explanations within the constructivist framework.
have illuminated the ways state identities are constructed by studying
gendered structures in the construction process at both national and
global levels. Consequently, constructivism became the approach that
evaluates the way actors are socially constructed; it
does not tell which actors to study, and before being constructivist, a
scholar must choose units and structures of her study.

When within rationalist approaches institutional structures tend
to be seen as constraining an actor rather than constituting it, scholars
within constructivism consider how structures define and formulate an
actor itself. By emphasizing the role of international institutions, and
by attempting to overcome a state as the main analytical concept of IR
theory, constructivist theories follow the ideas of (neo)functionalism
and historical institutionalism. Similar to historical institutionalism,
constructivist theories put stress on historicity, and include a supposition
that all social phenomena, including concepts and practices as well
as structures of the international system, are historically produced.
However, theories within constructivism differ from historical
institutionalism in that they tend to focus more on two issues. First, they
clarify more clearly the relationship between an agent and a structure,
and connect individualist and holist approaches. While “[f]or March
and Olsen the political process is conceived of as an integrative process,
producing a common purpose, shared values, shaping and providing
opportunities for individual development”, constructivist theories
are not purely holistic, since they study also how actors and structures
are interrelated, and how actors intermediate structures. This kind of
solution is based on Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration. Second,
constructivist theories pay more attention to the formation of identities
and interests. Although historical institutionalist theories also imply that
the interests of states change when promoted within the context of the
EU, constructivist theories try to explain, how and why states’ identities

87 Wendt 1999, 31-32.
88 Ibid., 7.
89 Historical institutionalism refers here to the sociological line of new institutionalism,
including for example the theories of March and Olsen, and Sandholtz, Zysman and
Sweet.
90 Wind 1997, 16; Jachtenfuchs 1997, 43.
91 Mulé 1999, 148.
92 Jachtenfuchs 1997, 43.
and interests change, and what are the implications for policy-making. This idea of structures affecting a state is not new though, but has been presented from time to time even within the rationalist framework – for example by Kenneth Waltz in his *Theory of International Politics* (1979) – and draws particularly on early theories of integration.

Hence, constructivist theories emphasize the role of ideas and culture in making policy. They are concerned with the relationship between institutions and ideas. Institutions create theories about themselves, which have, in turn, consequences for the interaction between actors. The role of ideas, with regards to political institutions, can be conceptualized in different ways. System theory regards them as theories in (and not of) a political system, in other words, as political semantics in which a political system describes itself. Discourse theory conceives them as a discourse universe and attributes to them logic of their own, which is different from the logic of political institutions. For example Markus Jachtenfuchs writes about worldviews, that he assigns to the type of ideas which exist in a political system, and which contain a description of this very system. Worldviews are stable patterns of perceiving and interpreting the world, or a “way of selecting, organizing, interpreting and making sense of a complex reality so as to provide guidepost for knowing, analyzing, persuading and acting.” Worldviews are social phenomena which individuals share. They are real myths produced by institutions and used by actors. However, they are not only products of social interaction but they also affect it. As reality is accessible for actors only via cognition, cognitive pre-structuring of interpretation of reality gains decisive importance. Actors construct their identity and their reality with reference to a worldview. Different worldviews lead to different problem definitions and to different interests of actors. Thus, a worldview is comparable with the theoretical framework which organizes empiria.

Constructivist theories utilise new terms created within the development of social sciences, which also resulted in the emergence of constructivism itself. Terms like “network” or “negotiation system”, and “governance” open up the possibility of studying the EU without state-

---

93 Ibid., 46-47.
94 Jachtenfuchs (ibid., 48) quotes Ghein & Schon.
95 Ibid., 47-49.
centricity. Within a network, or a negotiation system, governance is not dependent on a hierarchy of different actors (i.e. member states and institutions of the EU), but can as well proceed through negotiations among actors from different levels. If governance through negotiations is possible, the notion of governance is no longer linked exclusively to a state. This gives a possibility for multilevel-governance that is not necessarily territorially rejected. The term “governance” creates an important conceptual bridge between a domestic and an international sphere. By using this term we can shift our attention away from states and reconciliation of their interests in the international arena, and concentrate on the kind of forms of government that form a new European political whole. Governance includes all social, political, and governmental acts that are used in an attempt to direct and control events of societies. It refers to the non-hierarchical system of political negotiation, regulation and governance which co-ordinates various actors in the complex system of interdependence. This system connects domestic actors, governments of member states and European institutions that are the basis of multilevel governance. This kind of governance system is an institution that is specialized to make collective decisions on subjects that are common to all members of a relevant group.

Constructivist criticism towards the rational approach concerns every central assumption of it: the international system as anarchy, a nation state as a central unit of analysis, institutions with minor importance, minor interests in socialization and in interests and identity formation, and inability (or unwillingness) to explain system transformation. I will now clarify the criticism and present some suggestions for making better theories, and also present some examples of constructivist analysis significant in studying the EU.

---

96 Ibid., 46.
98 Matlary 1997, 207.
100 Christiansen 1997, 65.
101 Young 1984, 26.
Anarchy, states and institutions

Within constructivism, the structure of the international system cannot be considered as “given”, but as a product of specific historical development. It is not an unchangeable entity but constantly recreated. States reproduce the international system by their actions and are reproduced themselves as states by this very system. The way anarchy and power dependence affects state behaviour depends on inter-subjective understandings and expectations among actors. Moreover, scholars within constructivism argue that the assumption of a state as a primary political actor is so entrenched, that a state runs the risk of being reified and considered as something given. However, states’ existence is dependent upon the norms on which it rests and on the extent of acceptance of these norms. Constructivist theories, on the other hand, make efforts to go beyond a state as the analytical category.

Furthermore, constructivists claim that the rationalist approach does not take institutions seriously enough. Studies based on realistic assumptions give a wrong picture of the EU as a traditional international organization or a regime which helps otherwise self-regarding states to obtain strategically defined national goals by reducing transaction costs. Like Caporaso argues, rational institutionalism is state-centred and a methodologically individualist approach that “does not explain cooperation or institution-building as emanations of ‘community goodwill’, common values, shared loyalties, or collective identities”, but explains outcomes as products of self-interested calculations. However, institutions “more often than not develop a life of their own which can be extremely difficult for its architects to control”. Many theorists emphasize the role of rules, but some also warn that although institutions and rules structure the set of possibilities, they must not be considered as determining outcomes: the individual chooses whether or not to follow rules. However, most of us follow socially defined rules most of

102 Jachtenfuchs 1997, 42-43.
103 Pursiainen 1998, 175.
104 Matlary 1995, 106.
the time, even when doing so may not be directly in our self-interest\textsuperscript{109}; rules are internalized through socialization\textsuperscript{110}. States also follow rules because it is in their long-term interests to maintain the legally based international community, and because a sense of justice and morality plays an important part. Even law is not based only on sanctions, but also on shared rules, common values and patterned expectations.\textsuperscript{111}

**Identities and preferences**

The next set of criticism concerns formation of interests and preferences. For example, Moravcsik has been criticized for assuming that interests and preferences can be kept exogenous to social interaction process. As a result, “important institutional elements – such as the evolution and change of norms, ideas and historically produced codes of conduct – discursive as well as behavioural, are completely expelled from analysis”.\textsuperscript{112} Contrary to rational institutionalism, scholars within constructivism claim that interests and preferences are formed through involvement in political activity, which institutional arrangements structure\textsuperscript{113}. Hence, to understand interest and preference formation one must take the institutional context – norms and practices governing action – into consideration. As Thomas Risse puts it, “[r]ule-guided behavior differs from instrumentally rational behavior in that actors try to ‘do the right thing’ rather than maximizing or optimizing their given preferences”\textsuperscript{114}. Moreover, because rules also define social identities (“good people do x”)\textsuperscript{115}, actors do not change only their perceptions of their interests within institutions, but also the general outlook on their role and identity. Institutionalized cultural rules both constitute an identity of individuals and define patterns of appropriate activity. The social construction of identity is a process that takes place simultaneously at both the national and European level. It has been claimed that there is a significant change

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 23.
\item \textsuperscript{110} Krasner 1988, 73.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Pursiainen 1998, 184-185.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Wind 1997, 28.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Krasner 1988, 73.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Risse 2000, 4.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 5.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
in culture and in the sense of commonness within the process of the development of European political cooperation.116

Thomas Risse (2000) and Jeffrey T. Checkel (1999) criticize constructivist theories for being often too structural and losing an agency. Although social constructivism emphasizes learning and socialization processes in order to link social structure to agents117, it generally fails to provide an explanation about how exactly rules and norms affect identities and interests of agents. Both Risse and Checkel make an attempt to comprise the constructivist account. Checkel focuses on how international norms reach the domestic arena and its actors. He uses the model of diffusion mechanism to develop a causal argument about how norms are transmitted to states and have constitutive effects. By diffusion he refers to “transfer or transmission of objects, processes, ideas and information from one population or region to another.”118 Two developments in diffusion research help constructivists to make better analysis about norm diffusion: First, adding cultural and social elements to diffusion models, and seeing that the degree of “cultural match” between international norms and domestic practise is the key determining the pattern and the degree of diffusion119. Second, addressing the role of agency within adopter populations, and noting that specific features of adopters affect the probability of successful diffusion. Increasing attention must be paid to adopter’s experience, norms, values and intentions. Checkel argues that to have effects predicted by constructivists, international norms must be empowered on a national arena. International norms must change interests and preferences of some domestic agents.

I define empowerment as occurring when the prescriptions embodied in a norm become, through changes in discourse or behavior, a focus of domestic political attention or debate […] Empowerment involves elite decisionmakers and possibly other societal actors as well. Put more carefully, actions by state policymakers, be it changes in their

---

117 Risse 2000, 34.
118 Checkel (1999, 85) quotes Hugill & Dickson.
119 Checkel (ibid., 87) defines the “cultural match” as “a situation where the prescriptions embodied in an international norm are convergent with domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, the legal system (constitutions, juridical codes, laws), and bureaucratic agencies (organisational ethos and administrative procedures)”.

92
discourse or behavior [...] are a necessary but not always sufficient condition for empowerment to occur. This reflects the fact that elites are the gatekeepers who ultimately control the political arena [...]  

There are two different diffusion mechanisms that empower norms domestically. Within the bottom-up process, non-state actors and policy-networks support international norms, and mobilize and coerce decision-makers to change state policy. Within the top-down process, it is social learning rather than political pressure that leads agents (decision-makers) to adopt prescriptions embodied in international norms. In this case, norms become internalized and constitute a set of shared understandings that make behavioural claims.

Thomas Risse suggests that apart from utility-maximizing action (of rational choice approach) and rule-guided behaviour (of sociological constructivism) “human actors engage in truth seeking with the aim of reaching a mutual understanding based on a reasoned consensus [...] challenging the validity claims involved in any communication”. According to Risse, focusing on arguing helps us to understand how actors develop common knowledge concerning both a definition of a situation, and an agreement about rules of the game that enable actors to engage in strategic bargaining in the first place. Further, argumentative rationality is crucially linked to the constitutive role of identities and norms by providing a mode of interaction in which identities and norms are challenged. Risse distinguishes between two settings in world politics where arguing might be expected: diplomatic negotiations and public debates among various actors. In the international negotiation arguing matters first in agenda setting and in establishing common knowledge, including a collective definition of a situation and of underlying principles and norms guiding interaction (rules of the game). After common knowledge is established and negotiations have really begun, arguing has a role in searching for better overall solutions. This requires creativity, effective communication, and mutual trust. Debates in the international public sphere differ from diplomatic negotiation in various respects. First, access is not open to state actors alone.

120 Ibid., 87-88.
121 Ibid., 85-88.
Second, debates are more likely to touch on normative issues that are directly linked to the social identities of the actors. (Risse mentions the debate about human rights as an example). Third, public discourse has civilizing effects on actors, since justifying selfish interests on the basis of egoistic reasons seems to be illegitimate in the public sphere. Fourth, also materially less privileged actors have access to the discourse and by putting the best argument they may have great influence. Moreover, those having moral power or authority may convince the public better than representatives of private interests. Risse’s study may help us to understand better how the EU can arguably utilize normative power in international relations to change identities and preferences of third party actors, and to promote its own values and principles.

Change and integration

Constructivists claim that the rationalist approach cannot explain change; being unable to conceive structural transformation in the international system, rationalist theories expect a territorial state to live on forever. Constructivism, which is much more historical and process-oriented than rationalism, gives an account of transformation. For example Janne Haaland Matlary believes that the role of a state as a dominant agent has decreased in Europe, and that new forms of governance have emerged. She argues that it is no longer reasonable to simply assume a state to be a coherent or national actor on the European field. State borders, which are mainly imagined divisions between states, have increasingly less empirical importance. According to Matlary, the declining importance of a state has been caused by two processes: regionalization within a state and raising national policies to the European level. The EU represents a second arena for national and local policy-making, and its existence may strengthen some groups whilst weakening national governments. When local groups or regions shift their attention to the EU level, they reinforce its position over and above the national level. One result of the internationalization process is that national experts increasingly participate in collegial, international groups that may foster common identities to emerge. Regionalization both at

123 Ibid., 20-22.
the local and the European level may be a counteract to globalisation; at
the local level, regionalization may aim to protect local identities, while
at the European level it may be an attempt to govern various processes of
globalisation better.

Markus Jachtenfuchs argues that European governance is moving
towards a political organization which can no longer be described by
using the concept of a sovereign state. He claims that this results from
globalization and the differentiation of societies. Internationalization of
functional systems, for example an economic sphere, decreases options
and possibilities for state action, and leads to demands for international
governance. In the course of a societal functional-differentiation, all
different types of states within the hierarchy are loosing complete
control over domestic issues, since functional systems develop their
inner mechanisms to an extent that they are more and more immune
to demands and actions of states. As a result, it becomes impossible
that one system, e.g. political, dominates another, e.g. economic, and a
focus on hierarchy as the basic principle of governance is replaced by a
de-centralized coordination of governance. Jachtenfuchs's viewpoint is
clearly a functionalist one, and could be criticized with the same terms:
Why are states still in their place?

Ohrgaard claims that the sub-processes of socialization, cooperation,
and formalization constitute an overall process of integration. He
suggests that although support of key national actors, such as interest
groups and national bureaucracies, is crucial for the advancement of
the integration process, the integration process is not at the mercy of
such support. Instead, convergence of views among national elites could
be expected to emerge naturally as the result of their participation in
the process. This socialization is based on the growing intensity of
interactions. Another, more institutionally based form of socialization is
provided by what Haas termed “engagement”. According to Ohrgaard,
this means that “having accepted in principle to cooperate on given
terms, the participants would on occasion be willing to accept the
sacrifice of their own specific interests to the general interest of
cooperation.” Ohrgaard considers a mode of cooperation adopted
to solve conflicts between interests as a defining aspect of integration.

126 Jachtenfuchs 1997.
He follows Ernst Haas, who distinguishes between three modes of cooperation in international institutions: First is a minimum common denominator accommodation, which is a characteristic of traditional diplomacy, with the least cooperative state determining the overall level of accommodation. Other modes of cooperation, splitting the difference and upgrading of common interests, are modes implying varying degrees of compromise in national positions. While splitting the difference involves compromising on areas of disagreement, upgrading of common interests implies that areas of disagreement are left aside in the hope that by concentrating on areas of agreement, disagreements would wane in the long term. Haas argues that using splitting the difference and upgrading of common interests are the best ways to achieve integration. Autonomous supranational institutions are prerequisites for both of them, since they are perceived as independent of national interests, and they possess legitimacy to speak for the common interest. Institutional spill-over refers to the strengthening of the commitment to cooperate by further formalizing and institutionalizing decision-making procedures. The highest level of institutional spill-over is an agreement to give permanent control over a certain policy area to the autonomous supranational body. Yet, within the EU, decision-making is not clearly supranational in any issue-area. However, it is not clear why there should be autonomous supranational institutions, since splitting the difference and the upgrading common interests may be used – and have been used – to proceed the European integration even when decisions are made mostly intergovernmentally.

4.4. The EU – an anomaly forever?

It is clear that realist and neorealist theories as well as theories within the liberal tradition have many shortcomings. Neorealism has been accused, for example, of having an inability to explain properties and causal powers of states, which are, however, their primary units of analysis. Neofunctionalists, in turn, have been reminded that although networks

---

129 Ibid., 16-18.
130 Wendt 1987, 337.
of international institutions have emerged, the system of sovereign states remains in place\textsuperscript{131}. My aim here is not to study weaknesses of different theories, but to clarify why the EU’s international action has been such a challenge for established approaches. The major challenge of analysis has been that we do not know what the EU is. Ginsberg argues that “[t]he EU is neither a state nor a non-state actor, and neither a conventional international organisation nor an international regime”\textsuperscript{132}, but does not suggest, what is it then. Indeed, it is easier to propose what the EU is not than what it is. Only a few seem to believe that the EU is a state or becoming one. The EU is rather something “different”, “less”, or “more” than entities scholars are used to, it is somewhere “between”. For example, the famous description of William Wallace states that the EC is not a fully developed political system but it is still more than just an international regime\textsuperscript{133}. Hill wonders that if the EC is less than a state, how it can be termed an independent international actor, and answers that “Community is a genuine international actor in some respects but not all”. According to Hill, possible international functions challenge the actual capability of the EC, in terms of its ability to agree, its resources and its instruments. As he sees it, “defence is the key to the development of the Community’s place in the world”.\textsuperscript{134} The EU is even more complex issue than the EC, since in addition to the EC it includes other issues-areas like the CFSP; in comparison with the CFSP, the EC’s policy-making and position appears rather simple.

Although it is not clear what it means to be a state (or what “stateness” means), states have been viewed as similar to each other\textsuperscript{135}. A state is usually considered to be a collection of intertwined qualities – e.g. sovereign, coherent, nationalist and legitimate – and an entity with certain capacities, like the ability to make domestic and foreign policy decisions, and to exercise them even by using military resources if necessary. A state is seen as a territorial unit, with an identity, interests and a clear structure of authority. A state has also been viewed as being based on a

\textsuperscript{131} Brown 1997, 130-133.
\textsuperscript{132} Ginsberg 1999, 432.
\textsuperscript{133} Wallace in Chryssochoou 1997, 523.
\textsuperscript{134} Hill 1994, 107-116. See also his other writings in which he modifies his view; for example in \textit{A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?} (1998)
\textsuperscript{135} Tickner 1992, ix.
national history and culture, which are constructed as a national myth. Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach suggest that also in the case of a state it is easier to tell what it is not than what are its attributes. They further present that historically efforts to define a state have combined views of what it is with what it ought to be. Even though presented similarly, states are quite different. Even assumptions about states’ unity and coherence are questionable. Peterson suggests that action within a state resembles pluralist and decision-making perspectives that acknowledge bureaucratic politics and personal perceptions in making foreign policy; in actuality there is no unity, but “domination is met with opposition; tension, resistance, and contradictions are as present as ‘smooth functioning’”. Moreover, taking a state as a self-evident fact covers its historical and cultural roots and the process it is: “states are not static objects but continuing projects that must be understood in spatial, temporal, and cultural context.”

Hence, the definition of a state is historically specific: states are projects that take different forms depending on time and place. The EU may also be considered as a continuing project, which is oriented towards the future, and which can “collect and reinterpret national history as time goes by”. After all, the EU does not differ so dramatically from a state; however, differences between the two are often underlined to maintain the picture of a state as a coherent actor, and to legitimate the power and position of the state. When we utilize the static picture of a state, we see the EU as a non-state, this causes a problem for EU actorness. In this analysis, the EU cannot be an actor for the following reasons: Within the geographical territory of the EU there is neither one nation nor a single national identity, nor is there a common history, culture or myth. Due to these failings the EU has often been considered incapable of defining its national interest and, therefore, its foreign policy aims. For the same reasons its legitimacy and support for its policies, amongst Europeans, is

---

136 Ferguson & Mansbach 1988, 112, 114.
137 Tickner 1992, ix.
139 Howe 1995, 32.
141 For example, Smith (1992) writes about the importance of the common myth or memory.
presumed to be weak. It has been thought that pluralism weakens not only legitimacy, but also the coherence of the EU and its ability to make politics. Thus, since there are many nations and cultures with various values and practices inside the EU, decision-making based on common action becomes more difficult. Additionally, making a common policy is hard because of the lack of a clear order of authority and (foreign) policy leadership. In particular, making quick decisions in crisis situations is believed to be difficult – even impossible – when decision-making is based on unanimity and compromises, and when actors from many levels participate in deliberations. If the EU, despite all its failings, is able to define its foreign policy interests and decide on a common policy, its set of foreign policy instruments is incomplete: it lacks the possibility to use military power. In short, the EU lacks a nation and a national interest, a government, a foreign minister, and also perhaps the most important foreign policy instrument – an army – and that is why it is also hard to see it having a foreign policy, or to perceive it as being a foreign policy actor. Furthermore, it is composed of sovereign states that want to maintain their sovereignty in foreign policy, and which hence prevent the EU from becoming a decisive and coherent power in international relations.

In the modern system of states, actorness has belonged to states, particularly in the case of foreign policy; it seems that what prevents the EU acting as an actor, is the lack of some abilities, which a state (in an ideal case) has. Although it is clear that to be an actor an entity needs to have certain capacities, it is difficult to compare the different capacities of the different actors, and evaluate which of these are most important. This holds even more true now when the international field has changed along concurrent processes of regionalization and globalization that have many effects on states. Michael Smith suggests that the ideology of state dominance in the international system becomes questionable when states seem to be “more or less” states, and a state system contain “states” which do not possess the required attributes; this approach would also make the EU appear more similar to states. The same attributes that are problematic for the EU, are problematic for states too; these include

---

142 Soetendorp 1994, 104.
143 Holland 1996, 2.
144 Smith, M. 1994, 30.
among others sovereignty, national culture and interest\textsuperscript{145}, and nation. For example sovereignty is a concept with many definitions\textsuperscript{146}. Wendt considers sovereignty as exclusive authority over a territory\textsuperscript{147}, and, thus, it is legally eroded when displaced by forms of “higher” or independent juridical authority, which limits the rightful basis of decision-making within the national polity\textsuperscript{148}. According to this definition, member states of the EU are no longer sovereign. On the other hand, sovereignty is about possessing certain capacities\textsuperscript{149}, which make a sovereign entity capable of deciding independently its own destiny. In many studies, for example those concerning actorness, it has been examined if the EU has at least partial sovereignty. It seems that in the case of the EU, neither European institutions nor member states can be considered to have sovereignty in a strong meaning of the term; sovereignty is shared between them.

Even though sovereignty and national interest are vague concepts, they are essential for understanding what foreign policy is about, and why credible foreign policy is considered so important for actorness. In the globalizing world there could be reasons for demanding an actor position on the base of economic strength only; however, the EU has followed a state model, and divided policy to low (economic) policy and high (foreign and security) policy. While the meaning of external policy overall is to promote national interests – however they are constructed – foreign and security policy is about securing the ultimate national interest, sovereignty, and guaranteeing existence of the state. Thus, high policy is a matter of peace and war, and it is about the ability to defend a state and a nation: “defence is the key to the development of the Community’s place in the world”, says Hill\textsuperscript{150}. It is difficult to see the EU as an actor, because foreign policy is seen as the most important part of actorness, and because foreign policy appears to be the weakest point of the EU: it lacks both efficient decision-making and military resources. Moreover, the EU does not have a state and a (European)

\textsuperscript{145} See Smith’s analysis (1986).
\textsuperscript{146} For example, Ferguson & Mansbach 1988, 134.
\textsuperscript{147} Wendt 1999, 182. The presented definition is Wendt’s definition of internal sovereignty.
\textsuperscript{148} McGrew 1998, 316.
\textsuperscript{149} Brown 1997, 125-126.
\textsuperscript{150} Hill 1994, 107-116.
nation to be protected. However, this reasoning is based on the realist picture of world. As security threats have become more various, so have the means to defend people. As is argued in the previous chapter, an actor needs different abilities than before, and the EU might have more suitable abilities in the contemporary international system than the traditional nation state. Furthermore, the picture of an object of protection has changed as the understanding of security has deepened to take individuals into account.

If the EU is a foreign policy actor, it has a foreign policy of its own; if it does not have a foreign policy of its own, it is not a foreign policy actor. Hence, to find out if the EU is such an actor, one could study its foreign policy. If there really is European foreign policy, one may with good reason claim that it is an actor too, since there cannot be foreign policy without an actor making it. This actor may be powerful or weak, and it may reach its foreign political aims more or less efficiently, but at least it is an actor on the international field.151 Studying European foreign policy empirically is not a simple task, however, since it consists of three parts152: First, there are the national foreign policies of member states. Second, there is the external economic policy of the Community, which provides the longest and most highly developed form of the EU policy process in the international sphere. The EC governs economical foreign policy instruments and has a right to negotiate and conclude international agreements, but although it focuses on commercial policy, decisions concerning traditional foreign policy matters cannot be made within it. The third aspect of European foreign policy, EU policy-making, is generated by the interaction of the member governments and European institutions in the context of the TEU and the Treaty of Amsterdam. This policy process includes intensive and continuous coordination of national policies, which makes it intergovernmental.153 It is the CFSP that is the core of European foreign policy and at the same time the most disputed part of it. In the context of traditional IR approaches, European foreign policy-making is often reduced to the bare

151 This is a method used by Martin Holland in his study of the policy of the EC towards South-Africa in 1977-1993. He considers an ability of the EC to exercise policy as a test of its maturity in foreign-policy making and of its actorness. The test demonstrates the maturity of European foreign policy. (Holland 1996.)

152 White 1999, 44.

co-ordination of national foreign policies; from this approach, the EU appears more a regime than an actor.

Keohane and Hoffman suggest that the EU does not fit into state-centric approaches since it is organized as a network, including distributing sovereignty rather than shifting it to higher ground. The EU is maintained by complex processes of policy-making, in which formal and informal institutions of different levels are connected with each other through many networks.\footnote{Keohane & Hoffmann 1994, 242-243.} It follows that the EU is not a supranational institution, but a multilevel one: its decision-making includes both supranational and intergovernmental elements, and national governments affect the EU policy while institutions and norms of the EU affect governments.\footnote{Wind 1997, 29.} The multilevel nature of the EU has been taken into account within neofunctionalism and its variants. In addition to varying institutionalist theories, Philip Schmitter has, for example, in his more recent work outlined the outcome of the EU. He suggests that the EU represents a new form of political governance, where various territorial institutions act independently to solve common problems and produce public benefits. Schmitter argues that EU policy-making will in the future include the following elements: first, there will be no dominant style of policy-making, but instead a selection of forms of collective activity. Secondly, whatever the EU becomes, it will not resemble a nation state. Thirdly, local and national governments will execute laws and regulations of the EU, whose impact on citizens will depend on the effectiveness of their enactment by these levels of governance. Furthermore, continual negotiations inside the committees of different levels will impact upon the policy-making of the EU. Lastly, conflicts will not occur within EU institutions but between them, which will make it harder to combine and coordinate relevant policies from different departmental sources.\footnote{Schmitter 1996, 34-36.}

Hence, at the same time as governance by and within the EU is developing towards a model which cannot be adequately described by the concept of an externally and internally sovereign state, study has changed to take new forms of governance into account. This is a move away from state-centricity, which makes it possible to avoid giving privileges
to a state in the framework of analysis, and equating governance with co-ordination of state interests. Surpassing a state is particularly significant for European studies, since the EU fits less and less into classical conceptions of sovereignty and international cooperation. As Wind suggests, the EU is a new kind of governance system, which brings into question the Westphalian view of international relations\(^{157}\).

For constructivists, the EU is not a playfield for national governments, but the multi-level system of negotiation or governance, which is based on a network of common rules. Even the CFSP, which is based on intergovernmental decision-making, should be considered an element of the EU’s governance. Jørgensen gives the following reasons for this: in addition to formal rules, governmental decision-making is directed by unofficial norms in “the spirit of game”, a process of socialization and an institutional dynamic. Practice often precedes official regulation, which later formalizes practice; the development of the EU foreign policy, in particular, has been substantially led by practice. Moreover, even when the ECJ cannot enforce decisions made within the framework of the CFSP, this does not mean that there would not be political enforcement. Finally, the national and European levels of formal and informal decision-making constitute an entity that might be considered a source of EU governance in foreign policy, and that is part of a wider system of EU governance.\(^{158}\)

But why should the EU have its own foreign policy at all? If the significance of economic and normative power has increased, should the EU not be content with its position as an economical giant capable of participating in defining norms and values of international politics? First, the areas of high policy and low policy, and foreign policy and economic policy, are not separable, after all; the objects and instruments of policy of both areas are connected. Since the EU is aiming to be a significant – if not a major – power in international relations, it needs to act in both areas. What is more, achieving the stance of an actor in international politics requires that an agent has sufficient properties of an actor; only after fulfilling the requirements of actorness of the international system is an agent able to fully participate in the system. Even if the meaning of properties and powers of a state is changing, an entity must somehow

\(^{157}\) Wind 1997, 32.

\(^{158}\) Jørgensen 1997, 167, 175.
be comparable to a state to be recognized as an actor. Foreign policy is considered as the heart of sovereignty, and sovereignty has been defined as a necessary requirement of an international actor. Thus, foreign policy is the key to actorness. Furthermore, foreign policy is an area of high policy and essential to obtain necessary credibility: even if the common foreign policy had been too strongly emphasized when scrutinizing the actor position of the EU, we must acknowledge that perceptions are important in politics, and that by not having a foreign policy the EU would give out the signal of a weak player.

In the next chapter the focus is on if the EU has the requisite abilities to be a foreign policy actor, and if so, how well it has used them so far. By studying various characteristics of the EU it is evaluated if the EU is such an unfit actor on the international field as have often been claimed.
THE EU AS A FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR

In the international system actors have been sovereign states. Sovereignty has referred to two things: first, a state is the highest authority in its own territory; second, a state has a legal standing at the international level, and it is formally equal with other states. The core of sovereignty is foreign policy, since it concerns a state’s survival, which is the most important national interest. In the anarchic system, and within the culture where war is a possible way to promote one’s interest, military resources are needed as an instrument of foreign policy. In addition, military resources have ensured internal order as well. Foreign policy and military resources are also crucial for actorness because through them an agent gets prestige and a position as a player on the international field.

Although the EU is not a state, it has a foreign policy. Yet, there is no single EU foreign policy, but on some occasions member states agree on common foreign policies: they agree on common interests and objectives, and mobilize national and collective resources to fulfil them. Thus, European foreign policy consists of national foreign policies of member states as well as of the first pillar of the EU, especially external economic matters and development cooperation; and of the second pillar of the EU, the CFSP. National foreign policies differ from each other, and when member states have reacted differently in crisis situations, it has been taken as a sign of weakness of the EU. While the external commercial and development policy is the most coherent part of European foreign policy, the most disputed part of it is the CFSP: it is concerned with the matter of traditional “high policy” and, thus, important for the EU’s credibility as an actor, but it is also the weakest point of European foreign policy due to an inability of the member states to make a common policy, the lack of military resources and unitary leadership; or, at least, this is how the situation seems to be.

In this chapter it will be examined if the EU is such a weak foreign policy player after all. I will study properties of the EU – among others sovereignty, identity, the decision-making structure, and the instruments of policy-making – and ask what is the situation of the EU

1 Smith 1999, 3–4.
when it is scrutinised through these concepts? These properties arise from the analysis in which the EU has been compared to a state, and seen inadequate as an international actor. Requirements of actoriness are also usually seen as similar to these properties. I attempt to make some suggestions about the EU’s weaknesses and strengths as a foreign policy actor, and to describe how in practice the EU is building its actoriness on the international field. In my attempt to do this I utilize the case of enlargement to the Central and Eastern European states as an example of EU foreign policy. Although the enlargement policy does not belong to the CFSP by definition, foreign and security policy aims of the EU have been promoted by using a conditional policy in which membership of the EU is conditioned upon fulfilment of principles of liberal democracy, a market economy and good governance. Since the late 1980s, the EU has conducted common and consistent foreign policy toward the CEECs. It has used various policy instruments from trade agreements to offering membership to reach the aims of policy. Hence, the enlargement policy of the EU demonstrates how different aspects of EU action are connected, how economic power may be used to promote values and interests of the EU, and how the EU succeeds in acting as a coherent actor despite its weaknesses in the area of CFSP. Moreover, enlargement of the EU is one of the most significant acts that have been done to promote security in the whole area of Europe. The process of enlargement also demonstrates how the EU is able to behave as a normative power, defining concepts of normal in the European context. Clearly, the policy toward the CEECs is unique, since the result is the incorporation of former objects of foreign policy into the EU as member states. Furthermore, offering membership as a tool of foreign policy cannot be used forever. The prospect of membership has been a very powerful policy instrument, however: because the CEECs have been able to obtain membership only if certain conditions are met, the EU has been able to influence their internal and external policies. Before progressing on to characteristics of the EU and its politics, the history of the CFSP is presented.

2 Ibid., 1-2.
5.1. From political cooperation to the CFSP

A foreign policy aspect was included in the EC right from the beginning; the purpose of economic integration was to make war between France and Germany impossible. Leaders of member states have coordinated and cooperated in the area of foreign policy throughout the history of European integration, but it was not until the Maastricht Treaty when the common foreign and security policy was created — pointing to how important the question of foreign policy is for states. The CFSP was preceded by the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which was established with the Luxemburg Report in 1970; before that it existed as informal practice. There were two previous failures to establish a framework for foreign policy cooperation in the EC, which were the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1950 and Fouchet plan of the early 1960s. The EDC aimed at the creation of a European army, but failed and replaced by the Western European Union (WEU), which represented merely cooperation in the defence field. Fouchet proposed a European political union and the common foreign policy, but these ideas were not promoted until the Maastricht Treaty. The Luxemburg Report produced by foreign ministers of EC countries set the objectives of the EPC: the aim of the common policy was changing information, mutual consultation, and creating common understanding and solidarity through harmonizing opinions and making cooperation. The Report also created a framework for meetings of ministers to discuss foreign policy matters (the so called Davignon Procedure), and set up the Political Committee of senior foreign ministry officials. The Copenhagen Report in 1973 proposed that meetings between foreign ministers and the Political Committee were to be more regular, and a telegram system called COREU was established. Intergovernmental cooperation was not part of the Community institutions, although it was emphasized that both the EC and political cooperation were directed towards European unification. In the Paris Summit of 1974 the European Council was established consisting of meetings between EC heads of state and government; the European Council would deal with both EC and political cooperation matters. Although the institutional framework of the EC and the EPC remained separate, the same ministers were
meeting under the title of the Council of Ministers of the EC and of the EPC.

Ohrgaard evaluates that by the end of the 70s coordination contributed to the creation of a significant aqcuis politque, emanating from the accumulation of public declarations and the increasing amount of common positions adopted. This aqcuis politque may have significantly enhanced the sense of engagement among participants: if a common position had previously been agreed on a particular issue, it would be very difficult for a member-state to change its position without seriously jeopardizing its credibility with its partners. Furthermore, expectations would not only operate within the EPC, but also increasingly in its relations with third countries. Socialization of ministers and diplomats to the process of the EPC, building trust, searching consensus, and emerging aqcuis politque transformed the EPC into an inter-diplomatic mobilization process with an increasingly binding character.

In the 1980s there were many attempts to reform the mechanisms of the EPC. The most ambitious proposal for institutional reform of the EPC was the Genscher-Colombo initiative made by German and Italian foreign ministers in 1981. The initiative urged the establishment of a fully-fledged institutional structure and a revision of the consensus principle: the EPC should be underwritten in a treaty, the European Council should be the highest form of decision-making in the EC, the Council of Ministers should be able to make decisions by majority voting, and security issues should be included in the EPC. In 1981 the approved London Report started the process for unifying the EPC. The important role of the Council of Ministers was acknowledged, the Troika was created, and the Report even allowed the discussion of important foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security. The Genscher-Colombo initiative led to the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart in 1983, which, however, had little practical importance for the EPC.

With the adoption of the SEA in 1986 (entered into force in 1987), the EPC was for the first time given a treaty base, but under separate provisions of Title III, which amounted to little more than a codification of existing EPC procedures and practices; Title I, however, linked the

---

4 Ohrgaard 1997, 21, 27.
EC and the EPC together with the common aim of progressing towards European unity. The original commitment in the Luxemburg Report to exchange information and consult regularly was left largely unchanged in the SEA. In the SEA, member states agreed on cooperation in the area of security (Article 3.6), and promised to act in unity and solidarity to protect common interests and participate in guaranteeing international peace and stability. The SEA introduced limited institutional reform by establishing the EPC Secretariat, and formally associating the Commission and the European Parliament with certain aspects of the EPC. It also formalized the increased use of sanctions as an instrument for implementing EPC common positions. The Presidency of the EPC – the same country as presiding over the EC – would be responsible for initiating action and representing EPC positions to third countries. In the name of the EPC, member states would endeavour to adopt common positions at international conferences and towards third countries, to intensify cooperation between diplomatic representation of such countries (Articles 30.7; 30.8; 30.9), and to execute joint actions. The EPC was still separate from the EC and its institutions: the roles of the Parliament and the Commission were limited, and the ECJ was excluded.⁶

On February 1992 the Treaty of the European Union was signed in Maastricht. The Maastricht Treaty established the EU, which was founded on the European Communities and supplemented by new policies and forms of cooperation. One of the objectives of the EU was “to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy” (TEU, Title I, Common Provisions, Article B). The EU was separated into three pillars; the second pillar consists of the CFSP, which includes all issues related to security of the EU, including framing of a common defence policy, which might in time result in common defence. The TEU aims to facilitate common action in the EU without rejecting veto-right in the decision-making process; to connect different aspects of external policies by weakening the division between EC matters and foreign policy; and to weaken the division between economic, political and military aspects of security. The TEU set five objectives for the CFSP (Title V, Article J.1.2.): to safeguard values, interests and the independence of the EU; to

strengthen the security of the Union and its member states; to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the UN Charter and the CSCE’s Paris Charter; to promote international cooperation; and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.7

The CFSP remains intergovernmental in character and the jurisdiction of the ECJ is not extended to it. The Commission together with member states gained the right to make proposals to the Council of Ministers on CFSP matters. The presidency of the Council represents the EU on CFSP matters and in international organizations and conferences, and is assisted when need arise by the Troika. The treaty merges the EPC Secretariat with the general Secretariat of the Council. Although ministers deal with foreign policy issues and EC issues indistinguishably in the same setting, the questions themselves are prepared in separate frameworks. Foreign policy issues are submitted by the Political Committee according to intergovernmental procedures, and the EC questions by COREPER according to Community procedures. Consistency between the CFSP and the EC should flow from the fact that at the heads of government and ministerial levels the same bodies (the European Council and the General Affairs Council, the latter has since adopted the title of the Council of the Union) deal with questions regardless of the pillar from which they originate. In addition, specific provision is made to ensure consistency through Article C, which provides that “the Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies”; responsibility for ensuring such consistency lies with the Council and the Commission.8

The CFSP pursues its objectives through common positions and joint actions. Article J.2. allows the Council to define a common position, and member states must ensure that their national policies conform to common positions, which are upheld in international forums and conferences. One example of a common position concerns attempts to prevent the illegal trade of diamonds in order to promote conflict resolution in countries like Liberia, Sierra Leon and Angola. Article J.3 allows the adoption of a joint action in foreign and security policy.

---

Joint actions commit member states “in the positions they adopt and in conduct of their activity”. Joint actions may be implemented in areas in which the member states have important interests in common; on the basis of guidelines from the European Council, the Council decides by unanimity that a matter should be the subject of joint action. The Council also decides those items which can be covered by qualified majority. The EU has, for example, supported the Palestinian government in its attempts to suppress terrorist action coming from the area under its supervision. To give more examples, common positions have been taken on embargoes of military exports to a number of countries, in the execution of economic sanctions against among others Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, and the detailing of relations with countries like Albania and Cuba. In 1993 the Brussels European Council adopted five joint actions in preparation for the CFSP; the joint actions dealt with Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, South Africa, Yugoslavia, and Russia, and all were more or less concerned with promoting peace and democracy. Since then the EU has executed joint actions covering, for example, issues like the appointment of the High Representative in the former Yugoslavia and engagement in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Renewal Conference. In the TEU issues with defence implications were not subject to joint action procedures; the WEU was defined as the temporary vehicle for decisions and actions with defence implications (J.4.2). In 1993, the European Council presented, however, that all aspects of security were involved in the CFSP, which resulted in the moving of the WEU Secretariat from London to Brussels to be in closer contact with the EU and NATO. In addition to using CFSP measures, the EU can have an effect by making decisions, establishing international treaties, giving declarations and creating relations with third countries. It also can utilize community instruments like commercial and development cooperation; the Council has the right to use economic sanctions for political purposes.9

The Amsterdam Treaty was signed in 1997 (came into force in 1999), and according to it an object of the CFSP is strengthening the security of the EU in all ways. The Amsterdam Treaty aims to simplify the implementation of policy and to bring defence policy into the EU. Article

---

J.3. sets down that the European Council defines principles and general guidelines for the CFSC, including matters of defence implications, and that it decides on common strategies to be implemented in areas where member states have important interests in common. The concept of common strategy is a new one, and refers to a framework for actions executed under the CFSP. A common strategy defines the aims, duration and measures that the EU and the member states must use. The Council executes common strategies by accepting common positions and joint actions in majority voting. The Council can also propose common strategies to the European Council; it has done so for example in the case of Russia in 1998, that resulted in defining a common strategy concerning Russia six months later. Article J.4. defines that joint actions should “address specific situations where operational action” is required. Common positions (Article J.5) are to “define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature”. The President continues to represent the EU in CFSP matters and is responsible for the implementation of common measures; the Commission is “fully associated” with these tasks. The Presidency is assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council exercising the function of High Representative for the CFSP (Article J.8). In 1999, Javier Solana was appointed to the post of “Mr. CFSP”, and also as Secretary General of the WEU; he also helps the Council in preparation and formulation of the CFSP (Article J.16), and is included into the Troika, which consists of, in addition to him, the Presidency of the Council and of the Commission. According to Article J.12, both the Commission and member states can refer CFSP matters to the Council, and the Presidency can call an extraordinary Council meeting at short notice in an emergency. The opportunity to use qualified majority voting is increased, when the Council is able to adopt decisions on the basis of a common strategy, or decisions to implement a joint action or common position (J.13.2).

In the case of defence, the responsibility to frame a common defence was given to the European Council (Article J.7.1). The WEU was defined as an integral part of the development of the EU, providing the EU with access to an operational capability and supporting the EU in framing defence aspects of the CFSP. The possibility of merging the WEU into the EU was presented, “should the European Council so decide”. Moreover, progressive framing of a common defence policy
In support of cooperation in the field of armaments (J.7.1). The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was established under the High Representative for the CFSP. The tasks of this Unit include monitoring and analyzing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP; providing assessment of the CFSP interests and identifying future areas of focus; providing timely assessments and early warning of events that could have significant repercussions for the CFSP; and producing option papers containing analyses, recommendations and strategies for the CFSP. In 1999 the Cologne European Council decided that there would be regular meetings of the General Affairs Council to be held with defence ministers present; EU military staff with a situation centre would be established; a Political and Security Committee would be formed; an EU Military Committee would be set up consisting of military representatives, making recommendations to the Political and Security Committee; and other resources, such as a Satellite Centre and an Institute for Security Studies, were to be founded. During the same year, the Helsinki European Council set goals whereby 2003 member states would be able to deploy military forces up to 60,000 personnel within 60 days to undertake the Petersberg tasks: crisis management and civilian crisis management. In 2000, the Feira European Council set out plans for members to have up to 5000 police officers for international civilian crisis management by 2003. In 2001 the Gothenburg summit defined preventing conflicts as one of the main aims of external relations of the EU. In practice the EU is executing peacekeeping operations. This year the EU is taking over the NATO peacekeeping SFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is the EU’s third and most demanding peacekeeping operation: whereas the operation in Macedonia required 300 troops, and the operation in Congo 1300 troops, the Bosnian operation will require the deployment of 7,000 troops.

The European Council in Laeken 2001 convened the European Convention on the future of Europe. The Convention was asked to draw up a proposal for a European Constitution. The result is the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which has now been accepted by the European Council, but is not yet ratified by member states. The treaty proposes establishing the position of a Union minister for

---

foreign affairs; the Union minister would be appointed by the European Council, and should conduct the Union’s common foreign and security policy as well as the common security and defence policy. The Union Minister would be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission, and responsible there for handling external relations and coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action. Moreover, the treaty calls for civil and military assets to be used “on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter”, and states that “common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy” which will lead to “common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides”. Member states of the EU are defined as responsible for making civilian and military capabilities available to the EU, and it is also possible to establish multinational forces. The treaty proposes establishing European armaments, research and military capabilities agency as well as closer cooperation with regards to mutual defence. The treaty also includes so called solidarity clauses: First, if a member state participating in defence cooperation is a victim of armed aggression on its territory, other participating states shall give it aid and assistance by all means in their power, military or other. Furthermore, the EU and its member states “shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including military resources made available by the Member States.”

5.2. The EU’s foreign policy capabilities

Foreign policy instruments

In recent years the EU has placed emphasis on developing the CFSP with a defence aspect. Although the EU has had various instruments

---

13 Ibid., 33.
14 Ibid., 33-34.
15 Ibid., 35.
16 Ibid., 36.
to promote its interests in the world, its attempt to gain a stronger international position has led it to acquire capacities that have before belonged only to states. The capabilities the EU needs to execute its foreign policy depend on the nature of the system and on the values and objectives of the EU itself. The question is if the EU is able to realize its objects, values and interests on the international field, and if it can do it in a way that corresponds to its own values. Capacities have traditionally been understood as a set of certain properties of a state, including for example geographical location, natural resources, level of technology, features of a population, military strength, and quality of diplomacy\textsuperscript{17}. Christopher Hill divides capacities into three groups that are resources, instruments, and coherence. Especially in the case of resources, Hill notices that the position of the EU has strengthened during the 1990s, since enlargement has increased its population from 325 to 370 million persons, and its Gross National Product has raised from 5,523 to 5,909 billion ECU. (Hill notices that this is ten percent more than the GNP of the United States, and 64 percent more than the GNP of Japan.) Its geographical area has increased 42 percent, making it the most significant area in Europe. The enlargement in 2004 – when the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia joined the EU – increased the population of the Union to 450 million persons, and its GNP by 5%\textsuperscript{18}. Even before the latest enlargement, the EU was the biggest trader and aid donor in the world, and continues to be so.\textsuperscript{19}

However, the amount and the quality of capacities cannot tell alone what an actor is able to do, since capacities have to be mobilized to support a certain policy.\textsuperscript{20} For example, merely counting military strength does not inform about power or affluence but the basis of it. Capacity is always the capacity to do something, and thus related to aims of a policy\textsuperscript{21}. Available policy instruments depend on a set of capacities and the ability to mobilize them. Instruments of foreign policy are varying,

\textsuperscript{17} Antola et. all 1981, 64-69.
\textsuperscript{19} Hill 1998, 24-27.
\textsuperscript{20} Rosenau 1980, 276.
\textsuperscript{21} Holsti 1967, 199.
including everything between diplomacy, economic warfare, and military war. Actors negotiate to reconcile their interests, and use different sanctions to pressure others to act in a way they want them to. Sanctions may be divided to positive and negative ones, rewards and punishments, and they vary from giving economic, development or other kind of assistance to public disapproval, declarations, restricting for example trade relations, and using military strength.

Brian Hocking and Michael Smith\(^\text{22}\) classify different foreign policy instruments into four categories. They suggest that the availability, legitimacy and utility of instruments belong to different categories depending on the actor, the historical period, the situation and the aims. Diplomacy belongs to the first category of foreign policy instruments. By developing the channels of communication, diplomacy seeks to attain goals by means of compromise, persuasion and conciliation. Diplomacy has a key role in world politics since all actors possess some resources of communication, and since it is seen as a legitimate instrument and has a high level of utility. Communication and negotiation can be used in a wide variety of circumstances and in combination with other power strategies. Another category includes subversion that seeks to achieve policy objectives by destabilising other regimes or changing attitudes within societies. Within technological changes, particularly in the realm of international broadcasting, subversion has reached a higher degree of significance. Attitudes vary whether subversion is a legitimate instrument, since some see it as undermining the sovereignty of states. Thirdly, there are economic strategies. When societies become more sensitive to international economic forces, they become more vulnerable to modes of economic influence, whether these are negative instruments (for example economic embargoes or boycotts) or positive instruments (for example foreign aid). On the other hand, when the international economy is highly interdependent, there are more opportunities to avoid economic pressures. The legitimacy of economic strategies varies: they may be regarded as interference to internal affairs of other states, but as alternatives to military force they may have considerable support. The final category consists of military strategies. It has been argued that military strategies are nowadays less significant than they once were. First, costs of war are very high in the nuclear era, and secondly,\[^{22}\) Hocking & Smith 1995, 205-210.\]
the primary objectives of military force – acquisition and control of a territory – have been superseded by economic objectives. Hocking and Smith notice, however, that military forms of influence can be used in variety of ways and that one must recognize the significance of “non-use” of military forces as well as their direct use. Military power may be used to create a “demonstration effect” by which objectives are achieved due to knowledge of the possibility of using military forces. The legitimacy of military means varies according to a situation.

Hocking and Smith bring out important issues in choosing a proper instrument. Of course, an actor uses those instruments it has, but the choice depends also on the legitimacy of different instruments, that in turn depends not only on the situation but also on the dominating norms and rules of the international system. According to Mervyn Frost, the norms of the modern state system restrict circumstances under which states may resort to war, and also include an understanding concerning circumstances where economic sanctions may be used. Moreover, military resources have lost part of their meaning for many reasons as the international system has changed. However, military resources still have a role as signifying an actor. Available military resources may affect an actor’s position in negotiations both by being used as a demonstration effect, and by giving credibility to an actor. Another important task of military resources is defence. Defence is seen as a common good without which a modern society with efficient economic markets would not have been able to exist. Furthermore, in the anarchic world, populated by potentially hostile states, territorial defence takes an even more important role. However, as the nature of the international system has changed, so has the relative importance of military power decreased.

The EU can use most of the foreign policy instruments classified by Hocking and Smith. First, there are numerous foreign embassies in Brussels, and the Commission has over 120 of its own delegations in third countries. The EU holds regular summit meetings with its main partners like the United States, Japan, Canada, Russia and India as well as regional dialogues with countries in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. It participates in international organizations and negotiations being represented either by the Commission or the

---

24 Goverde et al. 2000, 16.
Presidency. Moreover, the EC can negotiate and conclude international agreement, and the EU holds political dialogue through its member states, composing of discussing in a positive manner about values and practices with countries of different traditions. The policy-instruments that member states have agreed to use in EPC/CFSP are primarily diplomatic ones, including declarations, confidential demarches to foreign governments, high-level visits, diplomatic sanctions, political dialogue with third countries and other regional groupings, making peace proposals and sending special envoys.

Diplomacy has often been connected to other non-military instruments including financial aid, various modes of cooperation, and sanctions which still remain the most efficient and commonly used instruments. In the 1980s, the EC’s economic instruments were increasingly used to reinforce EPC decisions. The Community/EPC first imposed trade sanctions with respect to the 1981 Polish crisis, and after that it became common practice to regard sanctions as being defined within the EPC and implemented by the EC. EC aid also started to be extended or increased following EPC discussions. Through the conditional policy – making aid and trade relations and various cooperation conditional upon certain democracy and human rights norms – the EU can have an impact on the behaviour of other actors. The basis of the conditional policy lies in the EU’s strong economical position: it is the world’s biggest trader and it spends a billion euro a month on assistance projects in all five continents. Together with its member states, the EU provides about 55% of all international official development assistance. Efficient use of diplomacy and economic strategies, however, requires combining competencies and instruments of the Community and the CFSP. Since external trade and development co-operation policies are important elements of the EU foreign and security policy, European foreign policy must combine the two pillars; this is made possible by the TEU, which institutionalized the conditional policy, which has been part of the EU’s development policy since the 1980s. The TEU gives a legal basis for a

---

26 Smith 1999, 10-11.
27 Holland 1995, 128.
28 Smith 1999, 11.
29 Activities of the European Union. External relations.
sanction policy and creates a bridge between the first and second pillar by allowing the Council action (by the initiative of the Commission) for executing sanctions (Article 228A).\textsuperscript{30}

It is due to the lack of a military aspect that the EU has been considered a civilian power rather than a superpower\textsuperscript{31}, and according to some evaluations even the development of military resources does not have to destroy its image as a civilian power\textsuperscript{32}. Both the EU’s objectives and its means of reaching them are said to be those of a civilian power. The objectives of the EU’s external action include among others the promotion of human rights and democratic principles, support for regional cooperation, conflict prevention and settlement. As a civilian power the EU accepts negotiation and cooperation to be the major tools in its attempts to realize its values and interests, and does not use military resources to make others adjust. Some of the EU’s most successful international actions and policies have been civilian, including the Pact for Stability in Europe and, arguably, the enlargement project.\textsuperscript{33} According to Duchêne, it is a characteristic value of a civilian power that it tries to domesticate relations between states, including its own members and states outside its frontiers. A civilian power tries to bring to international problems a sense of common responsibility.\textsuperscript{34} The line between a civilian power and a superpower is a vague one, especially if we agree with Maull that a civilian power may have military resources too. A civilian power is willing to develop supranational institutions to address critical issues of international management\textsuperscript{35}, but even this does not mark a clear distinction from a military power, since not only a civilian power could do this. However, if we look at international politics in practice, the EU has promoted projects like the establishment of the international criminal court, or respect for the Kyoto agreement just as it would be expected to as a civilian power. If we compare its behaviour with the action of the U.S., the difference becomes clearer than in theory. In addition, although some member states of the EU participated in

\textsuperscript{30} Hill 1998, 24-27.
\textsuperscript{31} For example Hill 1998.
\textsuperscript{32} Larsen 2002.
\textsuperscript{33} Smith 2000, 16. Smith uses Maull’s definition of a civilian power (Maull 1990/91, 92).
\textsuperscript{34} Duchêne in Whitman 1998, 12.
\textsuperscript{35} Maull 1990/91, 92.
the war in Iraq with the U.S. in 2003, the EU as a whole has responded to terrorist attacks entirely by non-military politics. In the European Commission action paper in response to the terrorist attacks on Madrid, the Commission proposes, among others, that member states should better implement the existing legislative instruments relevant to the fight against terrorism, and adopt draft measures already on the Council table; these instruments and measures include for example creating a better exchange of information, preventing money laundering and promoting joint investigation teams. The EU should strengthen the fight against terrorist finance, that includes establishing a European Register on convictions and disqualifications for individuals and corporate bodies, establishing a database of persons, groups and entities covered by restrictive measures for the fight against terrorism or under criminal proceedings for terrorist offences, and establishing legal instruments that allow freezing the funds of individuals, groups and entities involved in terrorism. Moreover, the EU should enhance operational coordination and cooperation, which includes, for example, putting in place a new coordination mechanism for the exchange of information under the third pillar. In addition, the EU needs to better target its dialogue with third countries on terrorism, and add and follow up anti-terrorism clauses in agreements with third countries.\footnote{European Commission action paper in response to the terrorist attacks in Madrid.} Hence, we could argue that even though a civilian power may have military resources, it wages a war only as the last resort when its very existence is threatened.

Images of a civilian power and a superpower are both appealing: in all its peacefulness a civilian power is a reliable partner, while a military power must be taken more seriously in international negotiations because it may use military force, and because the military aspect gives credibility as an actor; indeed, Henrik Larsen notices that in the EU’s documents there can be seen both an attempt to construct the EU as a civilian power, and to emphasize the central meaning of military power in international relations\footnote{Larsen 2002, 289-290.}. The EU tries to solve the puzzle by creating military forces mainly for crisis management and securing peace. It could achieve some of the prestige of a military power or a superpower by accepting the tasks of international peace keeping. In addition, the
Amsterdam Treaty opens up the possibility that building a military aspect may lead to common defence; this means that the EU would be able to militarily defend its own area. However, it is hard to see in what situation, if any, common military defence would be necessary. Moreover, there is a danger that by acquiring a military aspect the EU may change the international political environment and the political culture and take it in a direction where military resources are needed more often.\(^\text{38}\) The classic security dilemma proposes that military arming of one actor may lead to the arming of others, and the end result is decreasing security in the whole area.

Thus, the EU has many instruments to influence other actors and its environment. According to Hocking and Smith, influence may be seen as a product of power.\(^\text{39}\) Within the rational — as opposite to the constructivist — analysis, and particularly in the foreign policy analysis, power has been understood as a state’s capacity to control the behaviour of other states. Success as doing this has usually been seen as being dependent on the capacities of the target states and on their ability to mobilize these, as well as on the credibility of promises and threats made, and also on the level of interdependence of the states in question. On the other hand, states have been understood to have all power in their own territories. Also in this view, power is seen as being under the possession of a state. When power has been analyzed from the rationalist point of view, the social construction of meanings (knowledge) has not been taken into consideration. When power is understood as belonging to actors — what we can do to others and what others can do to us — some important aspects of power are left out of the analysis.\(^\text{40}\) Now we turn to the other aspect of power, namely, to normative power, that the EU presumably has.

### The EU as a normative power

Having an influence is not always about empirical capacities, but may also lean on an ability to affect other’s values, identities and conceptions of normality. This aspect of power is connected to the Hocking and

\(^{38}\) Smith 2000, 11-15.

\(^{39}\) Hocking & Smith 1995, 198-199.

\(^{40}\) Guzzini 2000, 170-172.
Smith’s idea of subversion, but goes further to emphasize ideological contents rather than just an actor’s ability to manipulate people’s minds. Naturally this kind of normative power is more difficult to measure than empirical capacities. It is hard to know exactly how and through which mechanisms it affects, and with which results. Having normative power in the social system means that an actor possesses symbolic power\textsuperscript{41} or social capital\textsuperscript{42}; and that an actor is able to utilize symbolic structures and one’s own social position.

Manners suggests that the EU may be more important in a normative than in an empirical way, since it sets normative world standards. He continues that due to its “power over opinion”, “idée force”, or “ideological power”, the EU would best be conceived as a normative power.\textsuperscript{43} Naturally, the EU is not promoting whatever values and norms, but those of its own; by affecting the conceptions of normal in international relations the EU uses normative power to construct the international system more suitable to itself. Although military powers may also use and have used normative power, the EU’s image as a civilian power puts it in a better position to do so, since the EU is built on a normative basis\textsuperscript{44}. Even though suffering from a lack of prestige due to the lack of military power, the EU gains normative power by being able to legitimate itself as overcoming the power policy created by the state-centred system, and by promoting norms and values that are internationally recognized as valuable – they are written in international law, and even the states that do not respect them, present excuses for not doing so. Hence, the normative power of the EU is due to its international identity determined by values of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights.

Identity is more important than material resources for an actor’s ability to utilize social or normative power; as Williams and Neumann argue, the “linking of certain kind of identity to a specific set of roles and its analogous forms of action is a fundamental structure of social power”\textsuperscript{45}. The EU has a legitimate identity which brings it authority

\textsuperscript{41} Williams 1997.
\textsuperscript{42} Bourdieu 1977 and 1991.
\textsuperscript{43} Manners 2002, 238-240.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 239-241.
\textsuperscript{45} Williams & Neumann 2000, 364.
in the international system; the EU constructs an identity as a civilian power that respects international values and norms, bases its action on cooperation and on international institutions, and is militarily not threatening anybody. Moreover, the EU changes the meaning of borders, and, in some cases like in the enlargement process it overcomes borders at least partially; this corresponds to the development of the international system overall. Equating international development and international values and norms with European development and the values and norms the EU is (at least claimed to be) founded on, makes the position of the EU stronger. The identity of the EU may be linked to the role of an expert in various issues of globalization and especially democracy, human rights and good governance. The EU is trying to tell the world that it has special knowledge concerning these issues and that the world should follow it.

Actors have different abilities to affect the international system. For an actor with normative power it is easier to raise issues into common knowledge and set agendas for negotiations, which may result in the transformation of the existing system. The EU has brought out human rights and democracy issues in negotiations of enlargement or various cooperation agreements, and globally it may have been the most significant actor advancing negotiations of global environmental issues. Although not always recognized, the capacity to affect an agenda is a central dimension of power; Brian Hocking and Michael Smith claim that “the ability to project items into the arena of international concern and debate is a prerequisite for achieving key policy objectives.”

Furthermore, although not being a state, the EU governs diplomatic norms and practices according to which inter-state negotiations proceed; these norms and rules are, after all, formulated in the context of Europe for European states. This is why the EU is probably better equipped to utilize international norms and procedures than most states in the world. By utilizing international norms, practices and institutions the EU is able to raise issues and promote those values and practices that are as favourable to the actor as it is itself. At the same time it may make the world a bit more peaceful if it succeeds in moving the centre of conflict resolution from military means to early arbitration and consolidation of interests.

\[46\] Hocking & Smith 1995, 125.
Constructing the identity of the EU also affects identities of its member states. The member states have internalized the identity of a western, liberal, democratic and capitalist state profoundly. However, the EU supports also an identity based more on friendship or partnership than on competition. Decreasing the meaning of borders and state sovereignty is necessary for functioning of the EU. The member states have agreed to give up their power in certain issues belonging to the area of Community, and are negotiating on moving power from the national to the European level in others, concerning for example the social service sector. These processes of constructing the identities of the EU and its member states will affect the structure of the whole international system, and have consequences for ordinary citizens as well.

Decision-making structures

The EU has been blamed for its inability to make decisions. Especially in a crisis situation its decision-making capacity is seen to be too weak. This is because decision-making on foreign and security policy issues is intergovernmental, and also because of the large number of participants. Moreover, since participants represent different states and cultures, finding common understanding and common interests is suspected to be difficult. It does not make things any easier that the external action of the EU is divided into Community and EU matters. It is self-evident that an actor, especially one who looks for a strong position in the world, needs a working system of decision-making, including the capacity to plan and evaluate policies. It is not so clear what kind of a system meets the requirements.

As Sjostedt as well as Jupille and Caporaso suggest, a capacity to formulate interests and policy preferences is a precondition for actorness. It is connected to identity formation and to the level of cohesion among different actors inside an entity – I want to emphasize that there are different actors inside states too. Furthermore, an actor needs to have the ability to make decisions, which refers both to a working decision-making system, and, again, to the level of cohesion. On the one hand, decisions should reflect interests of all relevant actors within the system; on the other, a right to veto and a demand of unanimity make it harder to make any decisions. At least the structure of decision-making should
be based on the legal right to make decisions about the issue in question.

According to the Treaty of Rome, the Community may act on those issues in which treaties give it power to act. Further, the EU may act in issues which concern interests of many member states, in which member states cannot individually act as efficiently as the Community or the Community policy is needed to complement policies of member states, and in issues linked to political or economical sides of security.\footnote{Brewin 1985, 2.}

The foundation of the CFSP was laid down in the TEU, which created an official decision-making structure for CFSP matters. Hence, the decision-making structure differs between areas of Community and CFSP policy. The Community policy is the most developed mode of the external policy of the EU. It includes the common trade policy and the establishment of international treaties, in which the EU is represented by the Commission. The procedures of decision-making are based on the Treaty of Rome and changes presented in the Single European Act (SEA), the TEU, the Amsterdam and the Nice Treaty. Until the SEA, Community decision-making was governed by the Commission and the Council of Ministers, while the Parliament tried to increase its influence, and decisions were made by unanimity. The SEA presented simple majority voting to be applied to some issues, and the TEU strengthened the role of the Parliament by creating a co-decision-making procedure, which gave the Parliament the right of veto over certain issues. However, the Council is still the most significant actor in the decision-making process, especially concerning important issues and laws.\footnote{Andersen & Eliassen 1993, 24-25.}

In the area of the CFSP, the leading position is granted to the European Council, which makes common strategies and takes decisions necessary to implement the CFSP, and is responsible for unity, consistency and effectiveness of action. However, the central role in decision-making belongs to the Council of Ministers, which bases its decisions regarding the defining and executing of the CFSP on the views of the European Council. The Commission has the right to refer any question related to the CFSP to the Council. In order to meet new challenges of the CFSP, the Commission established a new Directorate-General for the External Political Relations, which lies under the authority of a Commissioner.
with special responsibility in matters of the CFSP.\textsuperscript{49} Briefly, the role of the EU actors in the decision-making process in the CFSP matters is as follows: The European Council defines general outlines, the Commission, the Parliament, and member states make suggestions, questions and recommendations. The Council of Ministers makes decisions either unanimously or by majority, depending on the issue.

Within the framework of the second pillar, the EU pursues the objectives of the CFSP mainly in two ways presented above: through systematic co-operation between member states in the conduct of policy and through the gradual implementation of joint action in the areas where member states have important interests in common. In the framework of systematic co-operation, member states inform and consult each other within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest. The Council may define common positions and statements. Common statements take a stance on international events and are often used in conflicts and human rights violations. Common positions define an approach of the EU toward a certain question, and they mean co-operation and concern mainly economic sanctions and other political use of trade. Member states must ensure that their national policies conform to common positions. They must co-ordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences, and also uphold common positions if necessary. In 2002 the Council decided on the common position towards, among others, Somalia: the common position forbids selling any kind of armament, or instruments and vehicles related to armaments, to Somalia.\textsuperscript{50}

The concept of joint action, on the other hand, implies consistent foreign policy measures by the EU and by its member states. On the basis of general guidelines from the European Council, the Council decides that a matter should be the subject of joint action and lays down its specific scope and objectives, means and procedures, conditions, and, if necessary, duration of its implementation. The Council acts unanimously on matters requiring joint action. When adopting such an action, or at any stage during its development, the Council can unanimously define matters on which decisions can be taken by a qualified majority. Joint

\textsuperscript{49} Tietje 1997, 220.

\textsuperscript{50} Yleiset asiat ja ulkosuhteet. Neuvoston 2474 istunto. 10.12 2002. 15182/02 (Presse 382)(OR.en).
actions require greater discipline among member states who may digress from it only for special reasons. Member states must refrain from the kind of acts which are opposite to the EU’s interests and which decrease its unity and efficiency on the international field. Member states may refrain from participating in common activity, and to formulate a national policy for legitimate reasons concerning important national interests, if their policy is not contrary to aims of the EU. For example, in 2001 the Council decided on the joint action concerning the foundation of the satellite centre of the EU.

The lack of cohesion of the EU’s foreign policy is a problem that has been talked about a lot lately. Although the concept of cohesion has been used to refer to many different features of the decision-making process of the EU, one thing is clear: a level of cohesion is significant for an actor. As Jupillo and Caporaso argue, it is cohesion which determinates if an entity is an actor or a presence. The low level of cohesion hampers formulating common interests and ends, and makes it harder to reach decisions. The level of cohesion is connected to identity building. The well-developed sense of a common identity and we-feeling makes people see the world similarly, and to realize that they have common interests. Jupillo’s and Caporaso’s clarification of the term cohesion is helpful in realizing many aspects it may contain. They identify four separate dimensions of the term: Value cohesion refers to similarity or compatibility of basic goals. The TEU defines the objectives of the CFSP as follows: defending common values, basic interests and independence; strengthening the security of the EU and its member states; safeguarding peace and reinforcing international security; promoting international co-operation; developing and fortifying democracy and civil state; and, promoting respect of human rights and basic freedoms. Even if all member states share the objects, they are rather vague and leave room for many interpretations and policies when applied in some particular case. However, operations of the EU and its member states are regulated by the acquis communautaire, or the Community patrimony of rules, practices and opinions accepted by the EU institutions and covering not

---

52 Euroopan unionin yleiskertomus 2001, Yhteinen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikka.
only EU law but also fundamental objectives accepted in the course of institutional evolution.\textsuperscript{54}

If goals are different but can be made to fit with one another, the form of cohesion is tactical cohesion. In the EU, tactical cohesion may be achieved through the continuing negotiation process between various agents from different levels of governance. Co-ordination is a way to produce common policy among actors who have legal or formal competence to act in a certain area of politics. Actors agree on certain politics and define a plan of action for maximising mutual benefit.\textsuperscript{55} For example, Community and CFSP matters are co-ordinated in COREPER (and else where), which has its own personal for foreign policy matters: CFSP Counsellors meet every week in order to discuss the implications that the CFSP activities have on economical and juridical issues of pillar I.\textsuperscript{56} As a consequence, national policies have became more consistent with each other and the foreign policies of member states have “Europeanized”.\textsuperscript{57} The amount of co-operation has increased both in international organizations and at diplomatic levels.\textsuperscript{58} European foreign policy can be considered to be a result of the regular contact of the diplomatic elite. Through these contacts member states consult and co-operate on CFSP issues in order to produce co-ordinated approaches and common action.\textsuperscript{59}

When goals can not be made to fit together, there must be procedural cohesion that implies some consensus on rules and procedures used to process those issues where conflicts arise, and an agreement on basic rules according to which policies are made. In the EU, treaties set up basic rules and practices of policy-making, and clarify how decisions and policies must be made. As described above, the decision-making structures vary according to the area concerned. In matters belonging to the competence of the Community, there are varying mechanisms for reaching consensus, whilst in the area of the CFSP decision-making

\textsuperscript{54} Lane & Ersson 1996, 80.
\textsuperscript{55} Taylor 1990, 29.
\textsuperscript{56} Allen 1998, 53.
\textsuperscript{57} The process of Europeanization refers here to reorienting politics to the degree that EC political dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making (Wessels & Rometsch 1996, 75).
\textsuperscript{58} Stavridis 1997, 104-105.
\textsuperscript{59} Schneider & Seybold 1997, 369.
relies mainly on the existence of common interests and decision-making by unanimity; if goals cannot be made to fit together, there will be hardly any decisions and resulting common policy. In the Community issues, there is also a juridical enforcement mechanism to make member states adjust to common decisions and policies: If a member state has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty, the Commission shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the state concerned an opportunity to submit its observations. If the state does not comply with the opinion within a period laid down by the Commission, the Commission may bring the matter before the Court of Justice.\(^{60}\)

The final form of cohesion defined by Jupillo and Caporaso, “output cohesion”, refers to the situation where member states succeed in formulating policies regardless of the level of substantive or procedural agreement. Since 1993, the Council of Ministers has adapted some 70 common positions, which have been defended in the UN and other international organisations by the Presidency. During the same time, 50 joint actions have been adopted.\(^{61}\) For example during 1998, the Council of Ministers gave over 100 declarations, defined 22 common positions and adopted 20 joint actions. In addition, the European Council agreed on four common strategies concerning Russia, relations with Ukraine, the western Balkans, and the Mediterranean. Among other things the EU adopted a code of conduct for exporting arms from the EU, and opened negotiations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries for a new agreement to replace the Lomé Convention.\(^{62}\) In 2001 the amount of joint actions and common positions were smaller, but the amount of declarations increased\(^{63}\): 196 declarations, 20 common positions and 12 joint actions.

The EU is often accused of not being able to make coherent foreign policy; for example Soetendorp argues that it is the wish of some member states to retain national sovereignty in the field of foreign policy that is a major hindrance for the EU’s ability to act as a decisive and cohesive force in international relations\(^{64}\). Allen also claims that the

---

\(^{60}\) Bradley & Sutton 1994, 246.

\(^{61}\) The European Union and the World, 8.


\(^{63}\) Euroopan unionin yleiskertomus 2001.

\(^{64}\) Soetendorp 1994, 104.
EU has failed in its attempts to develop coherent foreign policy\textsuperscript{65}. This criticism seems to have a case, but even if decision-making in the CFSP matters belongs to national governments, we can expect that within time there will emerge a sense of ‘we-ness,’ and governments will see their interests more similarly, which increases coherence. For example, Paul Howe argues that after institutional structures are put in place, the sense of being European emerges\textsuperscript{66}. Moreover, there are pressures to release decision-making rules and widen the area of majority voting in order to facilitate decision-making. Especially the requirement of unanimity is criticized for making quick reaction and efficient intervention in international events impossible.

One thing that reduces coherence is that there are so many entities participating in interest formation, the decision-making process and policy execution. Of course, first are the member states, whose amount has recently increased from 15 to 25 countries. Secondly, there is the division between the Community and the CFSP matters, which causes various problems for EU policy-making\textsuperscript{67}. Peterson claims that this distinction reflects national policy-making, but that issues of foreign policy have became more complicated even within states and spread to areas where foreign ministries have no authority. In order to increase coherence, the TEU made the Commission, the Council of General Affairs, and the COREPER responsible for the decisions made under the first and the second pillar\textsuperscript{68}. Furthermore, even within the CFSP there are two competing institutions: the first one is the Commission, whose foreign political role has developed since the 1980s. The problem inside the Commission is that no one there governs all issues of external relations. One result of this has been that the Commission has not used its right to give initiatives, and it has been argued that it has not found its place in the process of decision-making\textsuperscript{69}. The second institution is the Council, including its General Secretariat, which is a kind of European foreign ministry, officially subordinate to member states, but still capable of doing more than just co-ordinate national politics\textsuperscript{70}. Furthermore,

\textsuperscript{65} Allen 1998, 47.
\textsuperscript{66} Howe 1995, 27-33.
\textsuperscript{67} Look for example Stavridis 1997, 93-97.
\textsuperscript{68} Peterson 1998, 7-8.
\textsuperscript{69} Hill 1998, 27-28.
\textsuperscript{70} Allen 1998, 48.
the relationship between the Permanent Representatives and Political Directors (the officials of national ministries) has remained unclear even though it is institutionalized in the TEU.

The TEU narrowed the division between foreign and security policy by making the WEU an essential part of the EU. The secretary of the WEU was moved from London to Brussels, and its presidency was shortened to a half a year to correlate with the presidency of the Council.71

The Treaty of Nice amalgamated the tasks of the Political Committee to those of the Political and Security Committee, and in order to unite the CFSP with the European Security and Defence Policy, the Nice European Council founded two other permanent political and military bodies: the EU military committee and the EU Military staff, which assist the Political and Security Committee especially in crisis situations. Yet, because of many entities involved in the CFSP and the vagueness of their roles, the EU arguably lacks an authoritative leadership. Although the Amsterdam Treaty created the position of monsieur PESC, a high representative of the CFSP, it defined his tasks to be rather assisting than leading CFSP making. The Amsterdam Treaty also created the Policy planning and early warning unit under the subordination of monsieur PESC. This new unit may increase coherence by bringing together the Council, the WEU, officials from member states and the Commission, and by facilitating decision-making. Moreover, the Treaty formalized the practice in budgetary matters by creating a link between the CFSP and the Community budget, which should make operations of conflict prevention easier.72

Coherence is a matter of degree. As Tietje argues, a system is incoherent only if it consists of arbitrary elements73; if the CFSP does not contain arbitrary elements, it fulfils at least a minimum level of prerequisites of coherence. Taking coherence into account in all policy-making is clearly one of the main constitutional values of the EU. However, all this discussion about coherence reflects the power of a state-model, and discloses an effort to build a structure of decision-making that is as simply as possible and that resembles the structures of states. Because foreign policy issues have became more complicated and

---

72 Ibid., 9-10.
73 Tietje 1997, 211.
complex, this effort is not necessarily as meaningful as it seems to be at first sight. Moreover, democracy and respect for the views of minorities always make decision-making more complex. It is not necessarily a bad thing that many actors can participate in the process of decision-making. If the EU succeeded in its policy of preventing conflicts and crisis situations, there would be enough time for decision-making even if there were many actors participating in the process.

Sovereignty and “statehood”

The concept of sovereignty is often used to refer to the ability of states to decide about the conditions of life in their own territories; in this meaning of the term it is not self-evident that the EU has less sovereignty than most nation states. If the term sovereignty refers to an absence of any external authority that exceeds state authority – or in this case, the authority of the EU – the EU is as much sovereign as states overall. However, in many meaning of the term, sovereignty of the EU may be contested, since it clearly does not have the society’s recognition (does it even have a society?) and its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens is questionable. However, as important as it is for a state to be recognized as legitimate by its citizens, at least in the long term, states may have the status of an actor on the international field without having the full acceptance of its citizens. The aspect of internal sovereignty is dealt with below when discussing the identity and legitimacy of the EU.

Often sovereignty is understood in terms of autonomy and independency. Kenneth Waltz argues, however, that “[s]overeign states may be hardpressed all around, constrained to act in ways they would like to avoid, and able to do hardly anything just as they would like to”74. Here I would like to use the term sovereignty in its external meaning. Externally, sovereignty is a right constituted by mutual recognition. Thus, the existence of states cannot be explained by their capabilities only, but by the institutional framework or the system of states, in which they are embodied. Hence, the most important thing about actorness or subjectivity is not a tax base, a population, or an army, but rather the juridical sovereignty that is accorded by the international community. Willingness of other states to endorse a state’s existence, and the absence

---

74 In Ferguson & Mansbach 1988, 134.
of any alternative legitimate form for organizing political life are the most important determining issues of subjectivity on the international field.\textsuperscript{75} For a long time, only states may have had the recognition as actors in the eyes of the international community. Because states benefit from the international community based on states, it is to their own advantage not to recognize “non-state” actors. Indeed, contrary to realist views, states have common interests, common rules and common institutions\textsuperscript{76}, which help securing their position. The position of a sovereign state explains why there has been the continuous test of “statehood” going on in the case of the EU, as the literature concerning the EU reflects: is it a state, or an international institution? Many characteristics of a state have been proposed, and conclusions have been made that the EU has some properties of a state, but not all of them. So far the EU has failed in the test of a sovereign state. As a consequence, the EU as not-a-state could have more difficulties in promoting its aims in the world than as a state actor.

However, the system of states has changed, and the EU is challenging the state's position as the only legitimate form of organizing political life. Furthermore, states seem to be willing to endorse the EU’s existence as an actor: the EU has gained recognition as a partner; this is demonstrated by the breadth of its relationships with other actors. Besides its diplomatic relations, the EU has a wide network of trade and aid ties across the whole world. The EU is represented in five international organizations, and in some of them the Community speaks in the name of, and in the place of, its member states. Clearly it would be hard for states not to recognize the EU, since it acts in many roles significant for third states: the EU is a trading partner, the biggest trading area and most significant aid donor in the world. Hence, the EU has in practice gained recognition as an actor in the eyes of the international community; it has been accepted as a negotiating partner and a partner of cooperation. Yet, the EU seems to suffer from a lack of prestige or credibility due to its special nature as an actor.

\textsuperscript{75} Krasner 1988, 89.
\textsuperscript{76} Samhat 1997, 352.
Identity and internal legitimacy

Only a few would claim that the EU does not have material base for its presence and influence on the international field. Still, many theorists believe that the EU does not have a sufficient sense of identity; that is an obstacle to making an efficient international policy. For example Peterson argues that the lack of identity and common interests make it impossible for the EU to make a common foreign policy. He sees that the lack of identity follows from the diversity of European peoples. About common interests he writes that if there had been common interests, they would have existed during the cold war; after the cold war, national interests have only differentiated. Many see that common interests and the resulting foreign policy must be based on a national identity, which includes understanding the place of a nation and a people in the world, recognizing its friends and enemies, and formulating its interests and objects. This kind of understanding is based on a national history, which can be changed only slowly by the environment and by reinterpretation made by political decision-makers.

No doubt, nations and nationalism have had a big role in building states. Buzan and Little define nationalism as a political ideology that locates the right of self-government in a people who share a common culture. According to them, nationalism has helped to transform people from subjects into citizens. It has been nationalism that has made sovereignty become diffused throughout a society rather than being concentrated in the ruling elite, that has welded a government and a society together into a mutually supportive framework, and that has strengthened the bond between a state and a particular expanse of territory. As much as people still believe in nations and nationalism, the mere existence of the EU is evidence of a possibility of political ordering based on something else. After disastrous wars and violence executed in the name of nations and nationalism we may argue that even if believing in the special nature of nations has made possible international order, the price is high. As Tuija Pulkkinen presents, as long as identities go along modern lines, assuming that there is a hidden nature – clearly definable “x-ness” – lying underneath each political group, the politics

---

of identity keeps turning into the destructive battles of inclusion and exclusion. Identities as a basis of politics could also be understood to be constructed; a constructed identity is no less an identity. Pulkkinen claims that to understand that identity can be constructed would change the nature of politics based on an identity by making it more flexible, nuanced, and probably more effective and less self-destructive.80

"Hidden nature" has, however, legitimated a process of state building. Many have believed that they belong to a certain group (a nation) that has (spontaneously) formed a state because it wanted to and because that is how it should be: one nation, one state. In practice the idea of a nation state has never been realized. Moreover, it is not an accurate picture of a state building process. Rather we could suggest that the emergence of a modern state as a social form is “rooted in the ability of particular individuals and groups such as post-feudal monarchs and their followers and underlings to force people to acquiesce in the power of the state through battles, beheadings and brutality as well as through forced taxation, military service and the like”81. Still, if we lose the picture of a connection between a nation and a state structure, and of the bottom-up nature of the state-building process, we have to find (or create) a new basis for (state) authority. I do not claim that the basis cannot be found (or created), but suggest only that it might be possible for the EU to do this. The EU cannot build one nation by force or violence used against its own people, since international values and norms have changed, and violence against civilians would be accepted neither by the international community nor by the European people. Indeed, in the case of the EU, even more discreet measures of nation building might be counterproductive. The question for the EU is that if it does not have a nation, what can connect the people to the European power structures?

Paul Howe does not see that the European people’s lack of support is a big problem for the EU. Howe argues that the social cement of a liberal community consists primarily of individuals’ belief that others are part of the same community. He continues that the development of the European community is not inconsistent with the maintenance of ethnic enclaves, cultural distinctiveness, and other elements of diversity in daily affairs, since homogeneity is not a requisite underpinning for

---

80 Pulkkinen 1996, 150.
81 Goverde et all. 2000, 15.
the European community. According to Howe, the people of the EU are poised to become a community of Europeans despite their differences. Hence, it does not matter if the EU does not have a long ethnic or cultural history, since it may begin as a project oriented towards the future, and collect and reinterpret national history as time goes by.\footnote{Howe 1995, 27-33.}

As the European Union acquires some important trappings of statehood – in particular, as it starts to confer rights that define people as European citizens – there gradually will develop a more dominant sense of Europeanness and a concomitant willingness on the part of average Europeans to make sacrifices for the sake of that community. The argument, then, is not that the people of Europe are ready to will themselves to be part of a new nation, but simply that they will acquiesce as the political structures that typically precede such a development are put in place, after which the more organic phase of community-building will naturally run its course.\footnote{Ibid., 34.}

Thus, Howe claims that even if citizens did not feel themselves as Europeans, they will feel that way as the process of integration goes on. Adler agrees with him by arguing that the development of common norms, rules, and institutions must eventually generate a common identity.\footnote{Adler 1997, 265.} Hence, the common and shared European identity might be constructed as well as national identities have been constructed. The European identity should, however, be constructed on a different basis to national ones. First, it is easy to understand that the leaders of the EU would not win anything by trying to unify European languages and cultures. Secondly, the European identity should be based on something else than “Europeanness” that can be found deep in people’s hearts and in different cultures in the area of Europe.

There is a lot of theorization about how the common and shared European identity may emerge, like Howe’s study presented above. In Wendt’s terms, when the Kantian culture based on a friendship is internalized, cognitive boundaries of the “self” are extended to include the “other”, and, as a result, a single “cognitive region” emerges. Yet, the change is difficult since collective identity formation occurs against a cultural background. However, when identities are understood to be in a process
anyway, they also change when agents engage in new arrangements. The emerging shared and super-ordinate identity has legitimate claims on separate bodily identities, and creates collective interests.\footnote{Wendt 1999, 218-219, 305-306, 340-342.} We can see the influence of Karl Deutch in Wendt's theorization. Also, Emanuel Adler utilises Deutch's ideas, especially his concept of pluralistic security communities. Adler argues that “such communities are socially constructed ‘cognitive regions’ or ‘community-regions’ whose people imagine that, with respect to their own security and economic well-being, borders run, more or less, where shared understandings and common identities end”. He thinks that people who are territorially and politically organized into states and act on their behalf, are also able to take their identity cues from the community region as these communities become more tightly integrated.\footnote{Adler 1997, 250.} People begin perceiving their home to be in a trans-national region, which is believed to share a common destiny and identity.

The issue if the people living in the area of the EU feel themselves Europeans is important because it is connected to internal sovereignty and the legitimacy of the EU. If not the European nation, there should be something to legitimize the existence and function of the EU. EU institutions could be considered to have procedural legitimacy derived form the respective treaties, but the EU still needs an increasing level of substantive or direct legitimacy\footnote{Beetham & Lord 1998, 19.}. Beetham and Lord distinguish three levels of political legitimation. The first level concerns identity: Is there a European political identity? The second level includes authorization and accountability of EU institutions: Can EU institutions be directly authorized and accountable to the public? The third level is about performance: How might European integration be justified in terms of superior economic and political performance?\footnote{Ibid., 20.}

The political identity of the EU could be constructed by making clear distinctions between itself and the “other”\footnote{Neumann 1999, 4.}. There are different opinions about who or what could be the “other” against which the EU could build its identity; it could be Islamic fundamentalism, Russia, or
Europe’s own past that no one wants to repeat again. Thus, the other may not have to be a certain state or group of people, but could also consist of security threats the EU is trying to cope with. Candidate states for future enlargement may also be considered as “others”, since clearly the EU separates itself from them: by defining what kind of states candidate countries should and should not be, the EU builds its own identity. However, the EU constructs its identity by claiming that it is a process that aims to overcome the distinctions; it is decreasing the meaning of borders and even moving borders during the enlargement process. Moreover, the EU is building its identity on the basis of human rights, human dignity, democracy and a market economy. Internationally, it tries to enforce its image as a peace-loving and fair actor. That the EU promotes certain ideological constructions may help to reinforce its identity. An appealing ideology is a necessary resource for durable polities, and it can provide foundations for a polity like the EU.

As the EU acts, it constructs its identity. The identity must be in accordance with action: taking a particular action in a particular situation is a sign of being a certain type of actor: an actor who behaves in a peaceful way is a peaceful actor. If the action of the EU corresponds to its declared values, it will probably not be difficult for people in the EU to identify themselves as Europeans: the EU may come to be understood as an island of peace, stability and justice in the anarchic and violent world system. Even though Europeans might not feel that they belong to the European people, they could still support the political identity of the EU, if they see it is worthy of their support. If identity is internalized well, coherence between identity and action is not a problem, since perceptions of situations as well as appropriate options of action are constructed in the context of the identity of an actor: how an actor sees the situation and possible ways of acting, depends on who she is. Moreover, certain action to be appropriate depends on the actor – if it is a legitimate actor doing it – and on the specific situation. Does the action of the EU correspond to the identity it is constructing?

As the EU claims to be founded on the principles of democracy and human rights, its policies require some measures of democratic

---

90 Williams & Neumann 2000, 365.
92 Ibid., 363-364.
legitimation. The development of democratic institutions and procedures is an aspect of legitimation that could potentially link elite and popular opinion. Yet, many institutional and procedural reforms have not been successful in generating possibilities for active popular involvement; neither have they generated increased popular interests towards the EU. Apart from European Parliament elections every five years, there are no direct ways to participate in European politics. Citizens do not have an opportunity to play a role in agenda setting or directly influence decision-making. The indirect and informal points of access in the political system require a lot of activity on behalf of the citizens. Furthermore, the Commission favours contacts with highly organized interests, that is, with special interest groups, especially with transnational associations. Nentwich evaluates that “the political system of the EU not only falls short of standards in terms of a representative democracy, but is also comparatively closed to direct participation of its citizens”.

The lack of accountability and transparency are partly causing the EU’s democratic deficit. The Council of Ministers is answerable to no one and it meets in secret; the Commission lacks legitimacy to provide a political direction for the Community, and the European Parliament lacks adequate powers to make laws, to set budgets, raise taxes or control the Commission. As a result, the citizens feel the EU remote and they feel themselves unable to affect or become involved. However, liberal democracy includes some democratic limitations also concerning states, and there are also questions of citizenship, and underrated issues of economic control, and if the control of economic activities should take place to guarantee political equality and social justice. Yet, in the case of the EU, the democratic deficit is also due to the gap between power transferred by national parliaments to the Union level and the ability of democracy elected representatives to use them.

The third level of political legitimation defined by Beetham and Lord concerns whether the EU is able to serve some benefits in terms of performance. Could the EU be legitimated because it can do something

93 Bretherton & Vogler 1999, 225.
94 Nentwich 1998, 133-134.
95 Ibid., 134.
that nation states cannot? Regionalization may sometimes be a reaction against globalization; globalisation might be better governed in the European framework. Yet, the EU has not protected its citizens from the economic threats of globalization, quite the contrary: the EU has chosen a path of further economic liberalisation, and there is evidence that the economic benefits of market liberalization have been unevenly distributed. As a consequence, across the EU those whose situations have got worse perceive integration more as a threat than an opportunity. However, citizens of the EU support the EU action in areas where national policy systems are failing: maintaining peace and security, tackling unemployment, fighting international crime, terrorism and drugs, and protecting the environment. Strong public support has been evident since 1990 especially for the development of a common foreign and security policy of the EU, and the Union’s defence dimension. High levels of support have consistently been recorded also for other aspects of EU external policy.97

5.3. Case study: the EU’s enlargement policy towards Central and Eastern Europe

Enlargement is a win-win game, in which the re-unification of Europe will extend the area of peace, prosperity and security throughout the continent.98

The enlargement process and the CFSP

The EU’s enlargement policy may be approached from the perspective of the CFSP, and considered as an example of a subject area where the EU is able to make coherent policy to advance the interests seen as common to all member states of the EU. Through the enlargement process the EU advances its foreign policy aims as they are defined in the TEU. Although those aims are rather general in nature, in this case the EU has succeeded in defining its interests and more detailed aims. The enlargement process needs also to be looked at from a wider perspective than the CFSP. The

97 Bretherton & Vogler 1999, 229-334.
Roma Treaty left open the possibility of other European nations to join the EC/EU, and the EU needs to fulfil its promises, since its authority on the international field relies a lot on its reliability as a civilian power. The enlargement process serves the EU’s desire to be seen as a stronger power internationally, and to have a louder voice in international matters, by making the EU a more significant actor representing more people, nations and areas of the world.\(^9^9\) In addition, enlargement offers substantial economic opportunities for the EU and its member states. By possessing larger internal markets and a greater share of world trade the EU has a larger voice in international commercial and economic affairs. It is also more influential in intergovernmental organizations.\(^1^0^0\)

The primary actors in the enlargement process have been member states and the Commission. Despite of the significant role of member states the enlargement policy has been common; it reflects a sense of an identity and interests that transcends boundaries between member states. The policy has not been led by one or two member states, but many of them have played an important role. The Commission has also been a significant player in its role of mediator. Overall, it has been evaluated that the emphasis put on regional cooperation, democratization and minority rights reflects the EU’s common concerns and a vision, that is based on its own experience of how to prevent conflicts and ensure security in the region.\(^1^0^1\)

It is generally perceived that enlargement makes the EU more secure by spreading prosperity and stability.\(^1^0^2\) Security issues are more complex, however. A wider EU places the EU in a better position to contribute to international efforts to address issues like migration, environmental pollution, illegal trafficking and organized crime – all of the items seen as security threats to the EU and its member states. It has been evaluated that enlargement increases effective cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs, helping to fight crime and the menace of drugs. It also brings higher environmental standards to the Central

---

\(^9^9\) Ibid., 5.
\(^1^0^0\) Baun 2000, 9.
\(^1^0^1\) Smith 1999, 165-174.
\(^1^0^2\) This kind of statement can be found in many EU documents, for example Presidency conclusions, such as those of the Luxembourg European Council 12 and 13 December 1997; and also speeches of decision-makers, like Prodi, speech/02/463, Brussels, 9 October 2002.
and Eastern Europe, benefiting the whole of Europe by reducing cross-
border and global pollution. Moreover, the EU enforces security and
stability also by binding the CEECs into Western European political
and economic structures.\textsuperscript{103} The political and security-related aims make
the enlargement process a part of the CFSP.

Although enlargement to the East costs the EU a lot of money, we
may suspect that non-enlargement would cost even more\textsuperscript{104}. Security
is definitely the area where the costs of non-enlargement might have
become very high. As Baun claims, the security benefits to the EU and
its member states from enlargement are largely preventative and can
be calculated in terms of prospective costs of non-enlargement. Baun
argues that without enlargement of the EU, “instability in Eastern and
Southeastern Europe could generate such security problems for the
EU as increased inflows of refugees and asylum seekers, transborder
environmental pollution, and increased international criminal activity
and political terrorism”. Furthermore, instability in Central and Eastern
Europe could require military intervention by the West, which is always
expensive. Unstable Eastern Europe could also become a security vacuum
that invites a future reassertion of power by a resurgent Russia.\textsuperscript{105} To
prevent security threats from arising from Central and Eastern Europe
the EU must handle the sources of insecurity, which can be divided
into internal and external sources. Internal sources include economic
and political instability resulting from the failure of reforms, the risk
that a population disillusioned with reforms could elect authoritarian
and/or nationalist rulers, and disputes between ethnic groups. External
sources on the other hand include Soviet foreign policy intentions, inter-
state disputes over ethnic minorities and boundaries, and the treatment
of ethnic minorities in neighbouring states. The EU’s policy for
reducing the internal and external sources of insecurity in the CEECs
is composed mainly of a conditional policy to foster democratization
and respect of human and minority rights, providing aid specifically for
democratization, and encouraging regional cooperation.\textsuperscript{106} The EU has
managed to spread security and stability in the CEECs. Its assistance

\textsuperscript{103} Burghardt & Cameron 1997, 15.
\textsuperscript{104} As noticed by Prodi, speech/02/463, Brussels, 9 October 2002.
\textsuperscript{105} Baun 2000, 8-9.
\textsuperscript{106} Smith 1999, 136-137.
programmes have helped the CEECs to carry out economic and political reforms, and it has pressured the CEECs into economic and political reforms and good neighbourly behaviour.\textsuperscript{107}

The enlargement process can be considered an example of how a civilian power can use power and have an effect without military resources. The enlargement policy of the EU is composed of many elements, including stabilising the market economies of former communist countries as well as promoting the western view of democracy and human rights, and reinforcing civilian society and political stability. Thus, both aims and means are clearly civilian. Characteristically a civilian power tries to prevent crises by using diplomacy and economical means. The EU has been more proactive than reactive in preventing crises in the CEECs; it is also much better equipped to prevent conflicts from erupting in the first place than to deal with violent conflicts.\textsuperscript{108} As a civilian power the EU is able to reduce the meaning of borders, or even move its borders peacefully; the ability to move borders and reduce their meaning is connected to security. The faltering nature of the EU borders\textsuperscript{109} and a resulting possibility to decrease their meaning gives the EU an option of expanding its governance to include the CEE-countries. Furthermore, weakening the meaning of borders increases common action and may promote evolvement of common understanding. That way the EU is able to incorporate the CEECs into its system of power, and partly define their identity and interests. Thus, moving boundaries is the EU’s way to control its environment, and especially the CEECs. Here, a border must not be understood only as an official border between two states, but it may have different aspects. For example, culture and political values may serve as a boundary between insiders and outsiders; the attraction of the EU as a community of political values creates incentives to seek membership. Another example might be a transactional boundary, which regulates access to the market for goods, services, capital and persons. This boundary may be eroded by increasing traffic across EU borders.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 163.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 135.
\textsuperscript{109} Smith identifies four different types of borders that are of special importance to the system of the EU: geographical, institutional, transactional and cultural (Friis & Murphy 1999, 216).
and opening the EU market to outsiders\textsuperscript{110}; in addition, it can be moved in the case of states that are clearly outside of Europe.

I suggest that through the enlargement policy the EU uses normative power to define both conditions of subjectivity and dominating values and norms within its system, and within the international system more generally. At the same time, the EU represents its basic values and strengthens its unity and coherence. The EU has taken the right to define what a European state must be. The definition includes many aspects, many of them connected at a general level to the basic principles of the EU, and also of the international society of states. The EU’s enlargement strategy includes requirements the CEECs must fulfil and economical aid for making improvements. Except for money and administrative advices, the EU exports to the CEECs worldviews, cultures, practices, norms, values and ideas. Moreover, by deciding the criteria for membership, the EU told something about itself. The process of enlargement has served as a means of expressing European values both to citizens of the EU and third countries, and constructing and strengthening the identity of the EU. Although democracy, peace and human rights are values that the EU wants to represent, it clearly wishes to emphasize itself as an area of market economy too. Yet, if the EU wants to be the international power alongside the U.S., it must make a distinction between the two. Romani Prodi solves this puzzle in his speech by emphasizing that the EU is creating a model for mastering globalization, and that there is a specific kind of globalization, European globalization, that is “a democratic globalisation with a human dimension, a globalisation where all citizens play their part”.\textsuperscript{111} The substance and function of the European model of governing globalization is left to be seen, as well as if the EU manages to assure its citizens – and the world – about its capability to solve global problems and create a new kind of culture.

**Policy instruments**

In its enlargement policy the EU has used policy instruments from diplomacy to aid and trade policy. However, the official instruments of the CFSP – common position and joint action – have been too

\textsuperscript{110} Friis & Murphy 1999.

\textsuperscript{111} Prodi, speech/02/463, Brussels, 9 October 2002.
limited, and not widely used\textsuperscript{112}. Through making aid and trade ties, and then later association agreements conditional, the EU has attempted to promote democratization and market liberalization processes and good neighbourly relations, and to consolidate the borders of the CEECs and resolve the problems of national minorities\textsuperscript{113}. To reach its policy aims, and to associate the CEECs, the EU has created a large set of instruments.

The beginning of the European conditional policy toward the CEECs was the Paris G-7 summit meeting in 1989 where the EC Commission promised to take over responsibility for a coordinated effort to provide economic assistance to Poland and Hungary; this multilateral aid programme was later extended to other CEECs as they introduced political and economic reforms. In addition to economic aid, the EC agreed to search for further measures to support reform in CEECs, including the founding of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), whose main objective was to promote investment and market oriented economic reform. The Trans-European Mobility Program for University Students and the European Training Foundation opened up Community programmes in education, training and technology to the East. The EC also decided to provide loans to the CEECs through the European Investment Bank. The PHARE programme was established as the main tool for providing EC aid to the CEECs. (However, the EU’s financial assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States is channelled through the TACIS programme.) PHARE assistance was initially used for a sole purpose of promoting market oriented economic reforms, until in 1990 the Council declared that PHARE would be extended only to the countries which make commitments to respect the rule of law, human rights, political pluralism, free and fair elections and a market economy; as a result, PHARE was extended to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and East Germany, but not to Romania, which had suppressed demonstrations violently. In 1992, the special PHARE democracy programme was put in place, providing support for difficult or unpopular areas of political reform, like training of the independent media, strengthening of non-governmental

\textsuperscript{112} Smith 1999, 10-11.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 143-144, 157.
organizations, and promotion of education and analysis. The aid given through PHARE binds financial resources of the CEECs, since they are expected to participate in financing investment projects.

In addition to financial assistance, the EC wanted to establish stronger trade relations with some of the CEECs, and negotiations resulted in the signing of agreements on trade and economic cooperation between the EC and Hungary (1988), Poland (1989), Czechoslovakia (1990), Bulgaria (1990), Romania (1990), Albania and the Baltic states (1992). After the agreements with Hungary and Poland, agreements were made conditional upon human rights. However, the idea of offering associated status to the CEECs had emerged already in 1989. The idea resulted in association agreements – that were called Europe agreements – and they committed the CEECs to bringing their laws into line with EC legislation and to adopting EC rules in certain areas, including particularly legislation favouring competition. The Europe Agreements provided also a framework for political relations between the EC and the CEECs: the political dialogue institutionalized bilateral meetings at various governmental levels, and included the establishment of common institutions, notably the Association Council, Association Committee and the Association Parliamentary Committee (which was later called the Joint Parliamentary Committee). The framework made possible increased cultural cooperation, and cooperation on foreign policy issues. The preambles to the Europe Agreements contained more extensive references to human rights, pluralist democracy and market economy than the agreements on trade and economic cooperation. Europe Agreements gave also more possibilities for the Commission to raise a wider range of issues under the auspices of the Association

116 Association Councils are bilateral meetings at the ministerial level between the EU and an associated country, at which all areas of approximation towards the EU are discussed, whilst Association Committees are meetings at the senior official level which review in more detail all areas covered by the Europe Agreements. They are complemented by a series of sub-committees, which provide for regular in-depth technical discussions on all areas covered by the Agreements. Joint Parliamentary Committees bring together members of national parliaments of associated countries and members of the European Parliament. (http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/europe_agr.htm. (21.3.2003))
Council, established to administer the Agreement. The commitment to pluralist democracy, human rights, a multiparty system and a market economy was described in the Agreement as the basis for association. The Commission wanted to establish clearly that respect for human rights was at the centre of relationships between the Community and the CEECs. It also wanted to ensure that in the event of human rights violations it could restrict the operation of the Agreements or even suspend them.\footnote{King 1996, 101-107.}

The Commission’s report \textit{Towards a Closer Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe} (1992) proposed that the EC accepts membership as a goal of the CEECs once they satisfy the conditions required. In 1993 the Commission recommended that the associated CEECs become eligible for accession after they meet certain economic and political conditions. The European Council meeting in Copenhagen in 1993 announced that the CEECs shall become members of the EU after being able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required. These conditions included the achievement of stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for, and protection of minorities, and existence of a functioning market economy as well as a capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Community. Membership requires also that a candidate is committed to aims of political, economic and monetary union.\footnote{Baun 2000, 43-45.}

In 1994, the first formal applications for membership were made by Hungary and Poland, followed by Slovakia, among others. In Essen 1994, EU leaders approved a comprehensive pre-accession strategy, which included the Europe Agreements, the enhanced structured relationship, increased EU financial and technical assistance for the CEECs, and later a White Paper (approved in June 1995 by Cannes European Council). The aim of the enhanced structured relationship was to integrate the CEECs politically into the EU, and to promote cooperation between the EU and associated countries in addressing problems of common interests. It also aimed at socializing the CEECs into the complex process of EU policy formation and decision-making. The White Paper prepared by the Commission set out “a programme for
meeting the obligations of the internal market which can be followed by each associated country and monitored by the Union”\textsuperscript{120}, and provides guidance on necessary regulatory and administrative structures for the CEECs to act in the Single Market\textsuperscript{121}. The White Paper expresses the need for the CEECs to develop their structures to better correspond with the structures of the EU.

An important part of the pre-accession strategy has been the emphasis on good neighbourly relations, which were declared as a basic precondition for accession; new member states should not bring new conflicts and instability into the EU. The EU wanted to minimize security risks by encouraging the CEECs to resolve outstanding conflicts with neighbouring countries over borders and over rights of ethnic minorities. The EU sponsored negotiations for the Pact on Stability in Europe was an attempt to use preventive diplomacy to encourage the CEECs to resolve potentially dangerous disputes among themselves, with assistance from the EU and other international actors. In addition to the pact, ninety-two good neighbourliness and cooperation agreements and arrangement were signed, and all participants agreed on using peaceful means to solve disputes.\textsuperscript{122} Associated countries also took other major initiatives to cooperate, such as creation of the Central European Free Trade Area, the Baltic free trade area agreement, various bilateral trade agreements and the regional cooperation initiatives.

The Madrid European Council in 1995 asked the Commission to prepare opinions on the membership applications of all applicant countries, and in those opinions it is defined what the above mentioned method for harmonious integration – the Copenhagen conditions – means in reality. The main purposes of the opinions were to evaluate the capacity of individual applicants to assume the obligations of EU membership, and to offer advice to the Council of Ministers on whether to open negotiations for accession with an applicant country.\textsuperscript{123} During 1996 the Commission prepared opinions on the membership applications of associated countries. The opinions assessed mainly compatibility of laws, regulations, and policies of applicant countries.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{121} Baun 2000, 56-58; Mayhew 1998, 119; Burghardt & Cameron 1997, 18.
\textsuperscript{122} Baun 2000, 61-63.
\textsuperscript{123} Baun 2000, 78; Mayhew 1998, 121; Burghardt & Cameron 1997, 12.
with the EU’s acquis communautaire – e.g. EU’s rules and regulations – as well as their administrative and legal capacities to apply EU legislation. The Commission also took into account the political and economic conditions defined at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. The Commission identified problems in all applicant countries with establishing the rule of law and human and minority rights, but only Slovakia received an overall negative evaluation concerning the political criteria. The Commission proposed that negotiations should be opened with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia. For the remaining five applicants (Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria), the Commission recommended an annual review of economic and political progress, and the provision of special financial assistance to help with their reforms.124

At the Luxembourg summit in 1997 the European Council decided to begin the accession process for all ten CEECs and Cyprus, starting on March 1998. However, accession negotiations would be initiated only with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, who all were seen to meet the Copenhagen criteria. The Council decided to make decisions about opening the negotiations with the rest of the applicants in late 1998 on the basis of annual reports made by the Commission on the progress of each applicant towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria and adopting the acquis communautaire. The European Council also decided that the Accession Partnerships would be the key feature of the enhanced pre-accession strategy, and instructed the Commission to prepare bilateral Accession Partnerships for each country by March 1998. The implementation of the Accession Partnerships and progress in adopting the acquis would be examined in the Europe Agreement bodies. Hence, candidates that failed to fulfil the criteria of accession were put under strengthened guidance. In addition, the European Council wished to support the internalization of common norms and values by establishing the European Conference, a multilateral forum for discussing issues of common interest and connected with the accession process. The purpose of the European Conference was to integrate member states and candidate states of the EU into the common framework. Furthermore, the European Conference aims to broaden and

124 Europe’s Agenda 2000; Baun 2000, 80-83; Mayhew 1998, 122.
deepen cooperation on foreign and security policy, and justice and home affairs.\textsuperscript{125}

The accession process for the CEECs (and Cyprus) began in accordance with the Luxembourg decision and was launched on March 1998 by a meeting of the ministers for foreign affairs of the member states of the EU, the ten Central and East European applicant states and Cyprus. The EU presented to the CEECs their individual Accession Partnerships. The objectives listed in the Accession Partnerships reflect various issues of the acquis communautaire, and cover political criteria, economic reform, reinforcement of institutional and administrative capacity, preparation for membership of the internal market, justice and home affairs, agriculture, environment, transport, employment and social affairs, regional policy and cohesion. Each Accession Partnerships also specifies the main instruments for the EU financial and technical aid, and emphasizes the conditionality of future assistance. They also include recommendations, and identify short- and medium-term sector priorities for the adoption of the acquis. Furthermore, the Accession Partnerships set out the procedures for monitoring and reviewing the implementation of the Accession Partnerships, mainly through Association Councils and Committees established by the Europe Agreements.\textsuperscript{126}

The meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of member states and applicant states on March 1998 started the Accession Conferences between the EU and the first-group countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus); five other applicants (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria) were assured that they would have the opportunity to begin accession negotiations once the EU decided that they were sufficiently prepared. The first phase of the accession process was an analytical examination (screening) of the acquis communautaire. This involved a chapter-by chapter examination of the acquis, first multilaterally between the Commission and all applicants together, and then bilaterally between the Commission and each applicant country; the aim was to determine the extent to which an applicant was in compliance with EU laws and regulations, and what

\textsuperscript{125} Baun 2000, 91-94; Preston 1999, 109; Presidency conclusions. Luxembourg European council 12 and 13 December 1997; Europe’s Agenda 2000.

adjustments were necessary. In early 1999, the screening process for the first-group countries was concluded, and bilateral meetings between the Commission and second-group countries began. Already before concluding the screening process for first-group countries, the EU launched the negotiation process with them. On November, the EU’s common positions concerning the negotiations were formally approved by the Council. The Council also received the Commission’s first Regular Reports on the progress of applicant countries in preparing for accession.

The process of twinning administrations and agencies was launched in 1998 to help candidate countries to strengthen their administrative capacity to implement and enforce the acquis. As the Commission expresses, through twinning the “vast body of Member States expertise is now being made available to the candidate countries, in particular through the long-term secondment of civil servants.” Twinning involves bringing together administrations in candidate countries with a counterpart from EU member states to work on special projects. Through twinning the administrative practices of the EU were brought to the CEECs.

In 1999, Prodi declared that the Commission recommends to the European Council that it opens accession negotiations in 2000 with all applicants that have met the Copenhagen political criteria and have proved ready to take the necessary measures to comply with the economic criteria. In the Helsinki summit of December 1999, the EU made a decision to expand negotiations to include all applicant countries. In the Presidency Conclusions it is stressed that applicants must follow the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and resolve any outstanding border disputes, or bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice.

In 2002 the Commission prepared together with each negotiating country an Action Plan to reinforce their administrative and juridical

---

130 Europe’s Agenda 2000 1999, 18.
131 Baun 2000, 126.
capacity. The Action Plan identifies the concrete measures that each country must take to achieve an adequate level of administrative capacity by the time of accession. In 2002 the Commission presented its report on the progress towards accession, and stated that the EU’s pre-accession strategy had proved a success, and that the transformation process in the candidate countries has been considerably accelerated by the prospect of enlargement. According to the report, the EU was determined to conclude negotiations with Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia by the end of 2002. The objective – now already reached – was that these countries could participate in the elections for the European Parliament in 2004 as full members.\textsuperscript{133}

The benefits of enlargement are already visible. Stable democracies have emerged in central and eastern Europe. Systemically, they are already so robust that there need be no risk of a relapse into authoritarianism. The credit for this success belongs mainly to the people of those countries themselves. They alone took the decision to follow the difficult path and build open societies, modern democracies and functioning market economies. The speed with which they have accomplished this is a tribute to their own political far-sightedness and their courage.\textsuperscript{134}

Although the situation in CEECs is not necessarily as positive as that described above, the enlargement policy of the EU has been successful. Member states of the EU have been able to define common interests and execute common policy by utilizing various instruments possible within the EU. The EU has defined very carefully the way of developing the CEECs in the Commission’s opinions, Regular Reports and accession partnerships, among others. As a result of the EU’s policy, eight CEECs – Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia – joined the EU with Cyprus and Malta on 1st May 2004. During the association process these countries have changed both politically and economically towards the direction preferred by the EU: its Commission and “old” member states. Romania and Albania that

\textsuperscript{133} Towards the Enlarged Union. Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the progress towards accession by each of the candidate countries, 6-10.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 5.
have applied for membership – as well as Turkey – are left outside the Union since they have not been able to fulfil the Copenhagen conditions. Within the enlargement process the EU has followed its vision according to which human rights, democracy and a market economy together with decreasing meaning of borders secure peace and stability in Europe. It has used various strategies and instruments to promote human and minority rights, democracy, principles and practices of good governance, and market liberalization.

In addition to its material resources, the EU has also utilized its normative power. By using normative power the EU affects values, norms and practices of the CEECs, and enhances its own international identity and position. Among the objectives of the enlargement policy of the EU have been socializing the CEECs into the processes of EU policy-making, and making them internalize “European” values and norms. By regulating the conditions of its membership the EU defines what a European state must be; after all, it is said in the Treaty of Rome that membership of the EU is open to all European states. The EU has been able to project its values and practices as universal and common sense, which is complementary to its economic and political power. Through making the specific ideology natural, its practices may become dissociated from the particular social base and particular interests which generated them, and come to be seen as commonsensical and based on the nature of things or people. Naturalized ideologies and practices thereby become part of the knowledge base which is activated in interaction, and hence the ‘orderliness’ of interaction may depend upon them.

The EU bases its enlargement policy on liberal democracy and neo-liberal economic policy, and does not question if realizing these ideologies really promotes peace, stability and security. The political identity of the EU is founded on ideologies that are not challenged at the international level, and this promotes its position as a normative power.

---

135 Fairclough 2001, 27.
136 Ibid., 1995, 35.
5.4. **Strengths and weaknesses of the EU as a foreign policy actor**

There are some properties that are usually thought to be essential for a foreign policy actor, and those properties dominate the discussion concerning the EU as an actor on the international field. The EU seems to be a weak foreign policy player particularly because it is lacking a military aspect and leadership, and has a weak system of decision-making especially in the area of CFSP. That the EU does not possess other properties of a state – national identity and, in some respect, sovereignty – does not improve its situation. Yet, one hears often that the international system has changed in a way that makes the economic means of policy more significant and legitimate than military ones, and leaves states unable to govern global processes that change dramatically their position and living situation of their citizens. These kinds of processes – globalization and increasing importance of international institutions – must affect the subject and form of foreign policies; however, the EU is expected to build a foreign policy aspect reminding one of states. In the social system – as in the international system – an actor needs the recognition of others to be able to participate, and it seems that the EU does not have the full recognition as an actor if it does not have the properties of a state; a military and an efficient system of decision-making give prestige to an actor, even though it never uses its army.

In this chapter various properties have been studied that are important to a foreign policy actor. If we look at the EU’s set of foreign policy instruments, we notice that it does not differ so much from those of a nation state. The EU is using diplomacy as the primary tool of foreign policy, as well as states. In addition, the EU gives declarations, expresses its approval and disapproval, gives warnings, participates in international conferences and organizations, and promotes its values and norms by diplomatic means. The economic means, however, are the muscle of the EU. First, in the area of trade the EU has been able to act like a consistent actor\(^\text{137}\); the system of decision-making gives more opportunities for making common policy, and interests of various member states are easier to put together. Secondly, the resources of the

\(^{137}\) Bretherton & Vogler 1999, 78.
EU form a solid base for the economic means of foreign policy: The EU is the world’s largest trading entity and has a lot influence due to its single market and common commercial policy, and its strong position in agricultural markets and multilateral negotiations. Moreover, it is the most significant aid donor in the world; in the late 1990s, the EC together with its member states accounted for 60 percent of world aid. Overall, in its relations with developing countries the EU is more proactive than reactive, and has increasingly complex relationships with them across the world.

Emphasizing the meaning of diplomacy and economic means makes the EU a civilian power. As a civilian power it attempts to enforce the international community and the respect of its norms and values. At the same time as the EU strengthens the international community, it also strengthens its own international position, since it bases its influence on the community’s values and norms. It is constructing its identity on the dominating values of the international system – a market economy, democracy, and respect for human rights – which make it a legitimate actor. In addition, the EU is a normative power, which means that it is able to define common values, norms and standards. When acknowledging that actor’s possibilities of using power are connected to the social system and its values and norms, and especially to its position in the social system, we may see more variations of power. Practice is always partially constituted by certain normative ideas that have emerged within a certain system of power. Having normative power – or being a normative power – means that an actor is able to define the political practices of the system and normative ideas they are based on.

Yet, it is often suggested that it is the lack of military power that makes the EU a political dwarf. Being an actor is still connected to owning a military aspect. Traditionally, military power has been one of the most important properties of a state, guaranteeing its sovereignty. Although the international system is moving in a direction where war between two nations is less likely to happen, military resources have not lost – and probably will not lose – their meaning totally. Even if most security threats could not be solved by military means, some of them still

138 Ibid., 48.
139 Ibid., 109.
140 Ibid., 60-66.
demand them. Still, focusing on the military aspect and claiming that the EU cannot be a significant international player without it is to lean upon the realist picture of the world system which is not valid anymore. Even without a military dimension the EU has the foreign policy instruments that are most commonly used. The EU has also begun to build the military aspect, whilst emphasizing that it will not give up its nature as a civilian power. However, by acquiring the military aspect the EU may change the international political environment and the political culture in a direction where the military resources are needed more often141.

Within the context of the Iraq-crisis and the war the U.S. and the Great Britain waged against Iraq the media has during the spring of 2003 presented that the EU tries to turn the solutions of international crisis to diplomatic ones, because that is all it can do; the EU is able to use diplomacy and economic means, but does not have military strength. In the realist viewpoint the lack of military strength is a significant weakness for an actor, but keeping in mind the structural change of the international system we could also think that this weakness is becoming less and less significant. Even if militarily strong states (many of them being not so good at solving conflicts in peaceful ways) prefer to use military power to reach their aims, using military power is loosing its acceptance in the eyes of the international community; after all, the U.S. had a lot of problems obtaining acceptance for its military action in Iraq by the international community. When an actor’s position is dependent on the international community’s acceptance, an actor certainly loses part of its credibility and legitimacy by behaving in an inappropriate way. In the long term, this weakens its abilities to use power. Still, the action of the U.S. in the Iraq-crisis could suggest that military power has not lost its significance, and that the militarily strong state actor(s) govern international politics, which is contradictory to Hans W. Maull’s assumptions. Many states still act according to the realist principles of international relations. However, during the autumn of 2003 even the U.S. had to consent to ask for cooperation from the United Nations, and for the help of the international community in rebuilding Iraq. During the year 2004 it has become more and more clear that the situation in Iraq was not solved by military means at all.

Another evident problem for the EU’s actorness lies in its structure of decision-making. The order of authority, particularly in international issues, is unclear – there is no clear leader, but the common policy rests on the will of many actors – and various actors from different levels participate in the process of decision-making. Even if one admitted the existence of difference, and different identities and views inside a modern state, there seem to be many more differences within the EU. Yet, other actors on the international field seem to expect a clear leadership and “a phone number”. Moreover, if the structure of decision-making is vague, so is the structure of executing decisions. The system of EU governance has often been considered inefficient due to its complex and multilateral nature. The governance of the EU has been described as a multilevel system of negotiation or governance, in which governance is not clearly hierarchical, and no traditional political community has resulted from the integration: rather there is a network of various actors, where the EU’s institutions, the states and the representatives of interest groups and local governance negotiate and sustain governance. The organization of the EU differs from the organization of a state, in that sovereignty is shared rather than centred at the highest possible level. Hence, the EU is not a supranational but a multilevel institution, where decision-making includes both supranational and intergovernmental elements. One result of the EU’s structure of governance is that the EU is able to act like a different actor in different circumstances on the international field; sometimes it is more like an international organization, and sometimes like a state. Although decision-making is slow and governance non-hierarchic, this kind of possibility of taking various forms may increase the efficiency of policy-making in the long run.

It is not clear if democratic deficit is a problem for international actorness; after all there are many actors on the international field that are not democratic. The democratic deficit of the EU is often seen as due to the lack of transparency of decision-making and to its intergovernmental nature: as a result, the European people cannot participate in policy-making even in the way they have been able to do in liberal democracies of nation states. Moreover, the EU suffers from the weaknesses of liberal democracy itself. Although many actors participate in the EU’s

---

142 Keohane & Hoffmann 1994.
143 Wind 1997, 29.
governance, a facet which usually strengthens democracy – whilst making governance less efficient – the EU clearly does not give enough opportunities for its citizens to participate in decision-making and governance. A democratic deficit is also a weakness of other communities (e.g. states), and it makes citizens all over the world cynical, suspicious and unwilling to participate in governance within the framework where participation has been possible in the modern state. Since the EU is not a modern state, new forms of democratic participation could be developed within its territory, forms with which its citizens might be more satisfied. For example, the EU could take seriously the concept of a multilateral system of dialogue and negotiation, which already characterizes its system of governance, and expand the right to participate in dialogue and negotiations to include civil society.

Democracy is an important issue for the EU because it is connected to its internal sovereignty and credibility as an actor. As noticed in this chapter, the EU can be considered as having external sovereignty – a recognition from other actors – at least in some respect, but it has problems in legitimizing itself in the eyes of the European people. Since democracy is one of the most important “European” values, the European people probably do not accept an undemocratic Union. Moreover, the EU will not be able to construct a strong identity by basing it on the values of democracy, if its action does not correspond to this reality; the identity must be credible in order to be effective. If the EU does not develop the possibilities for citizen participation, the basis of its normative power will weaken. Furthermore, if the EU does not obtain legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, in the long run it is in danger of losing its cohesion and breaking down.

The case of the Eastern enlargement demonstrates that the EU is able to make decisions; member states are able to find common interests, define common aims and decide about a policy. In the enlargement policy the EU utilizes various instruments to reach the aims. However, the measures of the CFSP – common strategy, joint action and common position – seem to be too restrictive. The case of enlargement clarifies the concept of a civilian power by unveiling one aspect that separates it from the traditional military power; for widening their territory military powers have occupied neighbouring states militarily and joined areas by force, whilst for the EU moving its boundaries by military means is unthinkable. Instead, it aims to widen its cultural sphere and decrease
the meaning of state borders by diplomatic and economic means. Yet, the case of enlargement is one of the rare cases – maybe even the only one – where the EU has managed to execute detailed and continuing policy with results. One of the reasons for this may be that instability and violence in the Central and Eastern Europe would affect the whole area of the EU, so the motivation to do something is high in every member state. Secondly, the EU is good at low level diplomacy and its multilateral way of making policy suits non-crisis situations; a crisis situation would have demanded other kinds of resources and a different culture of policy making. Moreover, policy instruments have been diplomatic and economic, while member states have more problems in deciding on the use of military instruments.

If it succeeds, the EU’s action for making the international field more stable and preventing crises from escalating strengthens its position in the world. Even if the member states wanted to keep authority to decide on war and peace, the EU could decrease the meaning of that authority by succeeding in making the “high” policy unnecessary. Clearly, this would demand a major change in the culture of the international system; however, the theories presented above suggest that this kind of change is happening already.

As a conclusion, despite the lack of military resources, the EU has many characteristics that make it an increasingly influential actor in the international system. In this work it has been claimed that some of the EU’s characteristics are better suited to the contemporary international system than the corresponding characteristics of states; the EU is not less than a state, but more. In many ways the EU is a positive example for the rest of the world, and this is the position it utilizes for changing the system to be even more suitable to itself. The EU has normative power, power to define, which is enforced by its economical power. This power it uses through its diplomatic relations as well as through trade and aid cooperation, and it has not hesitated to tell the rules of the game and affect the identities of other actors. Normative power enforced by economic means is also power that the EU uses through the enlargement process to change identities and societies of the CEECs, and, in that way, to make Europe more stable. In the case of enlargement, both social power and the material resources of the EU and its member states have acted as incentives to the CEECs applying for membership of the EU.
6. THE EUROPEAN UNION, MORE THAN A STATE

In this work I wished to clarify what is the position of the EU in the international system. The question of the international position of the EU is at the centre of the discussion concerning the changing international system of states, and the position of states; the question concerns very basic concepts of the study of IR, for example globalization, regionalization, sovereignty, nation, security, borders, war and peace. The starting point of this thesis is that the international system exists. The international system determines the properties of the polities having subjectivity in the system. Still, it is a polity itself that must acquire these properties to have subjectivity. Polities having subjectivity are called actors. Traditionally, actors have been states, and the required properties have been those of states. States are constructed as states in the system, but they also reproduce the system by their actions. Furthermore, after becoming actors polities affect conditions of subjectivity. When states begin to act differently to before, these conditions may change together with the system.

Often the international position of the EU has been approached by examining to what degree the EU possesses the properties of a state. I presented in the introduction that the EU has been under examination, which I called the test of statehood. The EU with its various aspects has been compared to an ideal state, e.g. to a state as it is presented in the theories. In this comparison the EU seems only partially to be an actor. I suggest that looking at the EU through the state-centric view of the international system does not give a proper picture of it. This is nothing new though since there have been various constructivist analyses of the EU that have attempted to overcome the state-centric picture of the world; in these analyses the EU has been given a bigger role both internally and internationally. Actually the whole national-international division has been challenged. The EU does not fit into state-centric approaches since it is organized as a network, including distributing sovereignty rather than shifting it to higher ground. The theoretical move that the constructivist theories make away from state-centricity makes it possible to avoid giving privileges to a state in the framework of
analysis. Hence, surpassing a state is particularly significant for European studies, since the EU is a new kind of governance system, which brings into question the Westphalian view of international relations\textsuperscript{1}.

I have started my analysis from state-centric theories and asked if the EU is such an unfit actor on the international field. I have analyzed how does the international system (of states) determine the properties of actors, and how have the requirements changed. There are two basic questions in this work: First, what position does the international system offer to the EU? Secondly, how does the EU utilize the position given to it? I have made an attempt to overcome the state-centric worldview by analyzing the international system and the way it determines the properties of actors. It has been acknowledged that the international system is produced and re-produced, and it is changing. As the system changes, so do the requirements of subjectivity. In a different kind of system different properties become valuable to an actor; properties may acquire new meanings.

6.1. The EU is compatible with the international system

The international system is changing alongside the processes of globalization. Globalization has transformed social geography by growing supra-territorial spaces, what has encouraged the emergence of new forms of capitalist production, multilayered and diffused governance, greater pluralism in construction of a community, and increased questioning of rationalist knowledge. Globalization affects a state’s position through many processes\textsuperscript{2}: it changes the nature, scope and capacity of a modern state as well as the nature and dynamics of national political systems brought about by regional and global interconnectedness which links states and their citizens in chains of interlocking political decisions and outcomes. Governance has become more multilayered, and authority has been increasingly diffused across sub-state (municipal and provincial) and supra-state (regional and transworld) agencies as well as state organs. At the same time, new multilateralism has arisen and a growing amount of global governance agencies, companies and civil

\textsuperscript{1} Wind 1997, 32.
\textsuperscript{2} Guibernau 1999, 5-6.
society actors have become more independent from states. Moreover, cultural and political identities are going through transformations that have led many local and regional groups and nationalist movements to question a nation-state’s legitimacy.³

Thus, global processes have weakened a state’s possibilities to control many areas of its society⁴, and changes in the international system have decreased the meaning of many traditional properties of a state. The decreasing meaning of sovereignty is especially significant, since it has been the strong desire for sovereignty that has made the international system prone to war. Furthermore, a nation state’s superior ability to make war raised it to the position of the dominant unit.⁵ Additionally, state boundaries have partly lost their meaning when international action at all levels has become more significant. Moreover, the importance of military power is decreasing at the same time as the whole meaning of the term power has changed: hard power, an ability to command others, has increasingly been replaced by soft, persuasive power. Military power is largely irrelevant in confronting new challenges for security that now include risks coming from economic, social and cultural dislocations and their potential for producing political crises and turmoil. It has been suggested that the dynamics of international relations have shifted from the military-political sphere to economic and social developments, and that this shift favours economically dynamic and socially cohesive countries.⁶ Within this process, there is a combined move away from the dominance of military-political units, and towards a situation where there is a variety of dominant units⁷. For example Cerny sees that in the future international system sovereignty, territoriality and nationalism is eroded, and security will be understood in a different manner than in the Westphalian system. There will not exist a strict line between internal and external spaces in the international system, and authority will increasingly be divided between actors at various levels.⁸ Although the structural change is global, in the area of the EU it has been most obvious and formal. For example Alexander Wendt suggests that

³ Scholte 2000, 5,8, 22.
⁴ Guibernau 1999, 175.
⁵ Buzan & Little 2000, 253-255, 274.
⁶ Maull 1990/91, 92, 102-103.
⁷ Buzan & Little 2000, 360.
European states are moving toward the (Kantian) culture of collective security, where military power has no meaning among “friends”.

The EU is more capable of confronting the new security challenges than traditional military threats. It promotes security in various ways, focusing on utilizing economic instruments and strengthening international society; it favours persuasive power contradictory to hard, military power. Through the enlargement policy the EU has succeeded in promoting democracy, peace and stability in Europe. The potential of the EU to provide a security community model for Europe as a whole, and actively project stability beyond its borders makes it significant for the whole world9. In the area of CFSP, the EU executes common policy whenever member states are able to agree on common aims and ways to reach them; this does not happen in every possible case and often not in emergency situations, but when it happens, the EU has a large set of foreign policy instruments from economic means to military forces. In the Community issues the EU has a better capacity to act; it has been evaluated that in the field of trade relations, the EU is an actor rivaling the United States10. Since the EU uses economic incentives to affect third actors by making its trade and aid agreements conditional, and since it wants to promote its values and principles by negotiating at the international level, the EU’s economic power is also politically significant. Moreover, in the contemporary world system of multilayered and diffused governance and multilateralism the EU gains advantage by being a multi-faceted actor; it can appear to be several different actors in some situations and in some a single one, it is able to change its character, or persona it presents to third parties, and whilst in some circumstances it appears to be the international organization, in some it has state-like characteristics.11 Hence, the EU’s system of decision-making and governance based on multilateralism and negotiations does not need to be seen as a source of problems, since it may be a source of strength too; in any case, that is the direction in which governance is developing. In the best case, the EU is able to utilize the changes globalization causes in state sovereignty and functions, and construct a more efficient system of governance. Thus, the EU participates also in producing globalization by

9 Bretherton & Vogler 1999, 214.
10 ibid., 78.
11 Ibid., 31.
undermining the position of a state; within the EU the many functions of a state have been moved to a sub-state or a supra-state level. Moreover, many sub-state governments have developed direct trans-border contacts with each other, and a Committee of the Regions (established under the 1992 TEU) has formalized direct consultation between supra-state institutions and sub-state tiers of government in member states\textsuperscript{12}.

The development of the EU corresponds to the development of the international system and the requirements it sets to an actor. The existence and development of the EU demonstrates that the meaning of sovereignty is decreasing, and, as a result, an international actor does not need to be a state anymore. Yet, it must still be somehow comparable to a state, since a totally different entity would not be recognized as an actor. Even though the system is changing, Wendt’s analysis of how the concept and meaning of an individual is constructed in the (Lockean) system is still valid. The (Lockean) system individualizes actors, both human beings and states, by defining what type of individuals have the position of a power, and who can therefore participate in distributing interests; in the system of states, only states have been constructed as individuals with a right to participate in international politics.\textsuperscript{13} Because of the importance of having a recognized status on the international field the EU faces problems due to its vague “nature”. The EU is not a state, and it is not clear what is it; other concepts used to describe the EU, like civilian power or normative power, are not clearly defined, but their definition is developing within the EU. As a consequence, the EU has problems in passing the test of sovereignty, which affects its position as an actor: although it has a system of decision-making with a large set of external policy instruments, and despite its wide diplomatic, trade and aid relations across the world, it lacks the credibility, or prestige, necessary for a powerful actor. Just as states are seen to be a certain kind of polity whether or not they fulfil all the aspects of the definition of a state, the EU is seen to lack some essential properties, independently of how important these properties are in the contemporary world; in a social system it matters a lot how a subject is seen by others. That is why the meaning of strong leadership and military resources are emphasized over and over again. According to many definitions of an actor presented

\textsuperscript{12} Scholte 2000, 144-145.
\textsuperscript{13} Wendt 1999, 279-297.
in this thesis, these properties are not necessary requirements for an actor, but they still affect other actors’ evaluation of the EU.

The EU is making some improvements, however: in July 2004 the European Council approved the Constitution of the EU which attempts to make the EU a stronger actor by appointing a President of the European Council and a foreign minister for the EU, thus giving the EU a legal personality and facilitating decision-making in intergovernmental matters. Furthermore, the EU has already the possibility of using military resources for the Petersberg tasks. Clearly, strengthening the CFSP is important to the picture the EU gives to others of itself. Yet, it would be in a strong position even without the CFSP because of its other policy aspects; the EU’s significance cannot be evaluated on the base of its CFSP only. Moreover, acquiring military resources is not necessarily a good strategy for the EU to get greater prestige, at least in the long term; as Karen Smith has warned, by building a military aspect the EU may change the international political environment and the political culture to a direction where military resources are needed more often\textsuperscript{14}, and in this type of system the meaning of the EU’s typical ways of using influence would decrease.

6.2. The EU is facing a challenge of democracy

Globalization has not only affected the requirements of actor capabilities, but also the possibilities of democratic governance. At the same time as democratic governance has become an international norm, democracy has become more difficult to put into practice. Alongside globalization and the increased significance of global institutions and norms there has happened a third wave of democratization, and, as a result, most countries of the world now hold regular, competitive and multiparty elections. Yet, many newly installed liberal mechanisms have run only skin-deep, and multiparty elections have not led to wider democratic consolidation. In turn, it has become clearer that a territorial democracy cannot adequately cover transborder flows. Globalization has undermined the democratic capacities of national governments: a territorial mechanism cannot ensure democratic governance of supra-

\textsuperscript{14} Smith 2000, 11-15.
territorial phenomena such as global communications and global ecological problems.\textsuperscript{15} Furthermore, liberal democracy has its limits: it can achieve only low-intensity democracy that does not mobilize the majority. Liberal democracy cannot generate levels and types of participation, consultation, transparency and public accountability that constitute a veritable democracy. When local, regional, and transworld governance mechanism have acquired autonomy from states, democratic deficits cannot be corrected through a state alone: additional forms of participation, consultation, transparency and accountability are needed.\textsuperscript{16}

The demand for democracy and the democratic deficit have led both international organizations and citizens to push for further democratization. International organizations have preached democracy to others, but have inadequately applied the norm of democracy to themselves. Instead they have tended to present themselves as objective and apolitical technocracies where public interventions are neither needed nor possible.\textsuperscript{17} Citizens and citizens' movements have tried to re-define the boundaries of political; those politically on the right wish to claim that the economy does not belong to this sphere, whilst the new social movements have tried to broaden both what counts as political and the legitimate arenas through which political aims can be pursued. Within these movements liberal democracy is criticized for limited access to the political process, and democracy is understood more as a process than as a set of formal institutions.\textsuperscript{18} Ulrich Beck claims that these attempts prove that there is a reflexive phase of democratization, in which the legitimacy of the non-political and undemocratic sphere – consisting mainly of economy and science – becomes suspected, which results in a creation of new political cultures and heterogeneous centres of policy-making. Although the willingness of citizens to participate in politics in non-parliamentary ways seems to be based on resistance to state authority, it may also be seen as a logical step that follows from the creation of democratic rights and leads towards genuine democracy.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{15} Scholte 2000, 32.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 263-267.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 272.
\textsuperscript{18} Kuper 1998, 146-147.
\textsuperscript{19} Beck 1992, 184-203.
Yet, thus far we have lacked a mechanism to ensure that post-sovereign governance is adequately participatory, consultative, transparent and publicly accountable. Although democracy generally emphasizes decentralization, checks on power, pluralism and participation, in practice decentralized, multilayered governance induced by globalization is not inherently more democratic than national self-development through a sovereign state.20 Alongside globalization, the limits of liberal democracy have become clearer in every part of the world, but the EU has more incentives than other actors to solve its problem of a democratic deficit, since it is decreasing the power of states while at the same time emphasizing the significance of democracy. This far, it has tried to solve the problem mainly by giving the European Parliament more power and aiming to make its system of governance clearer – the European Constitution is one step further on this road. However, the problem is less about making the Commission and the Council accountable to the EP than about changing the nature of the political process itself and bringing citizens directly into politics.21 Democracy demands more ways for citizens to participate in governance, and also the widening of the sphere of democratic decision-making; as Kuper argues, “[t]he greatest democratic deficit of all is encapsulated in the peoples of Europe lacking effective political control of either the economies of their own states or the economy of the EU as a whole”22.

Democracy is an important issue for the EU, since it is considered a necessary part of the European model for guaranteeing lasting peace, and this is the model it aims to export to the outside world. If an authority of the EU is leaning on international institutions and international law as well as on its normative power, the EU would lose part of its authority if it were not democratic; after all, democracy is one of the most important international principles also supported by the EU itself. Moreover, since citizens of the EU support democratic governance, democratization through regionalization would give the EU a more legitimate position in their eyes. It is not clear what the relationship between actorness and legitimacy is, but they still seem to be somehow connected. First, the democratic deficit takes away a fundamental of European external policy,

22 Ibid., 150.
which is in many ways based on promoting democratic governance. Secondly, legitimacy promotes internal coherence of a community, and citizens more probably accept or support a policy of a legitimate polity; internal strength also makes a polity stronger internationally. Thirdly, citizens’ support is also needed because the EU has not yet established its position, and is competing with states. As a social system the EU needs to be supported from below, otherwise it will not last very long; at the moment European leaders are worried that citizens will reject the EU when voting about its Constitution. Again, the international system has offered the EU the possibility to strengthen its power: alongside globalization, democratic governance has become a norm that is more and more difficult to put into practice; the EU could be a way to further democratization. Conditions in the EU can provide for further separation of various functions of states and simultaneous democratization. There may be possibilities to challenge authorities and exercise our rights and duties in more than one arena.23 Democracy is a demanding process however, and further democratization requires new visions and probably radical alternatives to state governance. Yet, without visions the EU would not exist; visions have given substance to the integration process, and should still do so.

23 Ibid., 154.
REFERENCES


**Documents of the EU**

Activities of the European Union. External Relations.  
(http://www.europe.eu.int/pol/ext/overview_en.htm. (26.5.2004))


(http://www.europe.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=MEMO/04/66/0/RAID&lg=EN&display=. (26.5.2004))


Others

Prodi, speech/02/463, Brussels, 9 October 2002.