This essay is about the discursive transformation of television and consequent identity of television as a medium. The intention is not to search for the essence of television in terms of its medium theory, but rather to demonstrate and analyse the variety and status of the numerous discourses about television. Basically, these can be divided into two main categories: one group of discourses focuses on the specific features of television as a medium, while the other constructs television more contextually as a part of some broader structure or institution. The search for the specific in style, ‘What is television?’ or ‘This is television’ was typical during the introductory phase of television, as the medium sought its identity as a new form of broadcasting. But this became and remains incorporated in television’s professional and managerial discourses and practices, assumed as a taken-for-granted dimension of our everyday understanding of television and of what in the 1980’s was identified as ‘television culture’.
Broadcasting as the historical combination of radio and television is one of the main contextual discourses about television. It is the discourse which connects the institutionalization of television with that of radio broadcasting, and in this sense it represents a basically intermedial approach to television. As the Finnish radio and television theorist Helge Miettunen points out in his classic work (1966: 63), technologically television is a form of radio, a signification which is strengthened by television’s institutional linking with radio broadcasting. In Miettunen’s interpretation, television was a visual radio which was as much based on talk, music and noise as on display and vision (op. cit.: 64). As the later research has shown (Silvo 1988, Kortti 2007), the notion of visual radio corresponded to the professional and public understanding of early television.

Broadcasting represents an aspect in the signification of television which Raymond Williams in his classic work (1974) on television calls a ‘cultural form’. His emphasis on the combination of technology and cultural form is beautifully expressed in a summary view of broadcast television formulated by Elihu Katz (2009: 7) in his introduction to a recent book discussing the forecasted end of television (Katz and Scannell 2009). According to Katz, ‘classic TV’ may be said to have been (1) a technology providing several audiovisual channels of over-the-air broadcasting, (2) publicly regulated as a near-monopoly operated by highly trained professionals, (3) charged ‘to inform, educate, and entertain’, and (4) characterized by national audiences dispersed in their homes.

The problem with this kind of universal definition of broadcast television is that it neglects the important cultural differences in the institutionalization of broadcasting. As Williams noted in his comparison (op. cit.) of the American commercial television and the European public service tradition, these two models of television were clearly distinct in values and programming traditions. According to Lunt (2009: 132), the ideals of social purpose have been the cornerstone of the traditional European public service, demonstrated by dissemination of knowledge to a mass audience through quality
programming with the purpose of social cohesion (cf. Hujanen and Lowe 2003: 20–21). Clearly this was never the case with American commercial television, for which the third of Katz’s four points is thus invalidated – and the stipulation of regulation as monopoly means the second fairs no better.

The development of national audiences confirmed television’s position as the dominant broadcast medium and created the basis for what was later identified as television culture. Television dominated the discourses about and became the symbol of broadcasting. Newspaper critique and reporting on radio and television presents impressive evidence on how drastic this change of discursive hierarchy was (Hujanen and Weibull 2010). In Finland and other Nordic countries in the late 1950s, television was a short appendix or curiosity in radio critique. Within ten years, towards the end of 1960s, radio pages turned to television pages, and radio became an appendix to the review of television.¹

To sum up, one can say that at first the tradition of broadcasting dominated the understanding of television, but later on television started dominating the signification of broadcasting. Historically, it is important to notice that the later technological innovations of television in the form of cable, satellite and video were not, any more, incorporated in the discourse about broadcasting. The change of discourse is demonstrated by the new title of the leading journal of broadcasting research, the former Journal of Broadcasting, which added the notion of electronic media to its identification in 1985 (cf. Schafer Gross 2010). ‘Narrowcasting’ is another signification of the same transformation and, as the name suggests, it is at least in a dialogical relationship with broadcasting. Such a dialogue between broadcasting and narrowcasting continues in the context of digitalisation, as Hirst and Harrison (2007) demonstrate in their book about communication and new media. Holmes (2005) is an example of recent analyses that combine newspaper press with radio and television in the same discourse about broadcasting.
About the paradox of audiovisualisation and the academic discourses on television

As the title of this article indicates, the discursive transformation of television is characterized here in terms of the ‘paradox of audiovisualisation’. Thinking of television as a combination of sound and vision, it might appear odd to speak about audiovisualisation of television. As a technology, television has always been a part of what is a ‘discourse on audiovisuality’, or, of a field which Ellis (2000: 178) identifies as ‘the audiovisual’. However, audiovisuality has not always been a central dimension in public discourses and signification of broadcast television (as suggested by the above consideration of broadcasting). It was ‘broadcasting’ that headed the discursive hierarchy of television until the 1980’s, when the new (cable, satellite, etc.) technologies and the parallel de- and re-regulation of media markets began to challenge the dominance of broadcast television. In other words, when speaking about the paradox of audiovisualisation, the point is to say that in the course of the 1980s the former discursive hierarchy about television started to collapse, and television became dominantly signified in terms of audiovisuality and the audiovisual. That is the kind of discursive transformation which is analysed and discussed here, and positioned in relation to other discourses on television.

In the academic scholarship the dominant mass communication research including broadcasting research did not pay any particular attention to the audiovisuality of television (e.g. Dominick and Fletcher 1985), so the academic interest in audiovisuality grew mainly from the humanities. The above mentioned Finnish radio and television theorist Helge Miettunen ended up describing television’s form of expression as ‘audiovisual’. Television uses both sound and image as its means of expression, its composition is both auditive, based on hearing, and visual, appealing to sight (Miettunen 1966: 64). Miettunen’s interest in audiovisual expression came from his academic background in aesthetics and film theory. Unlike the typical discourse on broadcasting, he approached television, and to some extent even radio, as a form of art.
The interest in television as audiovisual expression was shared by other film scholars who later contributed to the discussion on televisual discourse in the circles of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham and of the British film journal Screen. Heath and Skirrow (1977) in particular were critical in the move towards dealing with television as language, in the style of semiotics of television. In their analysis of current affairs programming, the emphasis moved to the practices of production and representation that contributed to the ideological effect of televisual discourse, television as a window to the world. One of the main followers of this tradition has been John Ellis, whose book *Visible Fictions* (1982) concentrated on comparisons between television and film, which he considered not only divergent and complementary but increasingly interdependent. The book incorporated a semiotics of sound and image, but methodologically it represented a move from language to the textuality of television in terms of narrative structures and the psycho-semiotic constitution of the spectatorship, the viewer position (cf. Steinbock 1983, as a Finnish example).

Issues around the textuality of television change to a demonstration of intertextuality and polysemy of television in John Fiske’s classic *Television Culture* (1987). This work represents a culmination of optimism about television with its view of a television culture unrestricted to television alone but symbolized more broadly with the circulation of popular meanings in the so-called ‘post-modern’ society. It represented television as a medium whose codes and conventions were widely shared by media-literate audiences and whose producers and practitioners were highly conscious of its style and generic requirements. The post-modern image of television was playful and hybrid. Television had become everyday and was not considered such a serious issue as before. Through de- and re-regulation, the formal political and cultural control over television loosened, leading to an increased consumer orientation that shifted more power to audiences (for a review of post-modernism, see Harvey 1990). The highly trained professionals who operated television (see Katz’s definition of broadcast
television, above) did not lose their power, but they were forced to become more attentive to their audiences.

Television studies as an academic field represents another dimension of cultural optimism about television parallel to Fiske’s discussion on television culture. Developing under the notion of media studies, which in practice developed as the study of television, a lot of academic critique on television, including Fiske’s book, looked at the medium without paying very much attention to the academic institutionalization of the field (see, for example, Newcomb 1976, Allen 1987, Goodwin and Whannel 1990, Vande Berg et al. 1998, Corner 1999). However, as *The Television Studies Book* edited by Geraghty and Lusted (1998) shows, a constituency of scholars and students in the field did develop over the course of time which began to ponder an independent identity for the field.

A recent example of the continuing discussion about television studies is Toby Miller’s (2010) fresh text book. Like many other recent analyses, the book ends up by considering the numerous new forms of television which make it complicated to agree on a continuing identity for the medium (cf. Allen 2004, Katz 2009). The question is whether the new forms can be seen to represent television after television (Spigel and Olsson 2004) or whether they constitute a re-born television. Towards the end of the 1990s, it became impossible to speak about television without a reference to the Internet, as Miller (op. cit.: 177) points out in his story about the launch of an academic journal on television studies which the publisher wanted to market as ‘Television & New Media’.

Methodologically, television studies and media studies in general represented the critique of the information and social science orientation of mass communication research, including broadcasting research. Their emphasis on culture and intertextuality encouraged scholars and students to question the values and norms of broadcasting institutionalized in dichotomies like information vs. entertainment, serious vs. popular, masculine vs. feminine. This intertextuality, as Urrichio (2004: 26–30) concludes (in relation to film studies) enabled an ap-
preciation of the popular circulation of meanings and texts, and (thus) the perspective of an intermedial construction of media identities. This contributed to the growing awareness of the historicity of media forms and to their consideration as media history.

Where broadcasting research developed and institutionalized in a close connection with the managerial and professional practices of broadcasting (Hujanen 1997), television studies aimed at a broader social and cultural analysis of television. One of the consequences of this change of perspective was that the interest in television as such decreased, and the emphasis moved to a consideration of television as an aspect of a broader media culture and of the history of mediation. In this way, paradoxically, television studies contributed to the marginalization of television and the gradual loss of its hegemonic position in the study of broadcasting. So, although television studies were born in the wake of television’s cultural dominance, in the high time of television culture, it became later a part of the discourse on television’s marginalization. This is the point of interconnection where the discourses of television studies and audiovisualisation meet. That encounter is further considered below, as I concentrate on positioning audiovisualisation and the 1980 transformation of television.

Contrasting old and new television

According to the Finnish sociologist Heikki Kerkelä (2004), social change is typically framed in terms of a transition from old to new society. A lot of social theory is about the transition from traditional to modern society, Emile Durkheim’s work being a classic example. Kerkelä characterizes these kinds of conceptualisations as transition models consisting of 1) a hypothesis about clear demarcation lines between periods of social change, 2) a comparison of these periods, and 3) bipolar conceptualizations to identify the differences between periods. The study and analysis of media change is similarly rich in
transition models which concern a periodisation of media development and/or create a dichotomic contrast between periods, especially between present and past media (as in the discourse about digitalisation). Media theory in the style of Marshall McLuhan’s (1964) analysis of oral, literary and electronic cultures is an example of a long-term transition model. A more dichotomic view of transitions is offered by recent visions of media convergence which Jenkins (2006) characterizes as ‘convergence talk’ and Holmes (2005) as ‘new media discourse’.

In the conceptualisation of the 1980s structural changes of European television, it was typical to construct the transformation as a dichotomic contrast between the old national television and the new de-centralised, audience and consumption oriented television. One of the most influential dichotomies was Umberto Eco’s distinction between the old and the new as paleo television vs. neo-TV (Eco 1984a and b). Eco’s text was soon published in Finnish (in 1985), leading to Hellman’s (1988) book about the era of neo-television, (employing ‘uustelevisio’ for ‘neo television’) – and whose undermining question mark appended to neo television era title suggested, in fact, important continuities between the old and new television.

One of the classic figures of Finnish sociology, Erik Allardt, refers to Eco’s idea of paleo television in an article discussing the relationship between broadcasting and forms of society (Allardt 1989). Allardt related paleo television to the constitution of industrial society and its need for a common culture (op. cit.: 192–194): the introduction of television in the 1950s and its quick diffusion during the 1960s represented the same centralizing process. But already in the 1970s, internationalization and increased cultural pluralism had started challenging the common culture, a transition Allardt identified in terms of socio-cultural change as the constitution of an ‘information-technological society’, and which served to characterise the new values and norms of the 1980s. As to television, Allardt concluded that hardly anything symbolised the new society better than the plurality and ambivalence that people expressed in their relationship with television (op. cit.: 197).
Allardt’s contextualisation of paleo television and its collapse in the 1980s with deregulation and the consequent privatisation and commercialisation represents the typical Western European siting for the first loosening and breaking of centralised public service broadcasting. It is important to remember that similar a construction of distinctions between the eras of broadcasting and narrowcasting made the 1980s a symbol of new television also in the United States, despite its fundamentally different history of radio and television. The old television was there symbolized by national networks (network television) which encountered increasing competition from cable and satellite television. In contrast to Allardt’s sociological emphasis on social change, it was the cultural contrast between modern and post-modern that characterises analyses of the 1980 American television (see, for example, Feuer 1995). As demonstrated above in relation to John Fiske’s notion of television culture, the cultural transition from modern to post-modern was important also in the constitution of television studies more generally.

As the overview sketched here suggests, these changes might equally well be characterised in terms of economics (in the case of Europe) and technology (for the USA) – or, the economic and technological might be equally emphasised with the social in fashioning the idea of ‘cultural’ (and its aesthetic). Thus Caldwell (1995) characterises the value transformation of American television in the 1980’s as televisuality which, on the level of production, was grounded on a practice he characterised as a ‘post-production culture’, fuelled by continuous technological innovation. The new technology behind this transformation was the computerization of production which contributed to a new televizual aesthetics based on copying and versioning. An interesting consequence of this digital aesthetics was that, through computer programming, it increased the standard and (thus) audience credibility of low-cost productions – and thereby contributing, for example, to the success of local news channels. In this way, televisuality contributed to the assault on the dominant position of network television.
What makes Caldwell’s analysis of televisuality particularly useful for my positioning of audiovisualisation is his overall approach in combining the aesthetics and technology of television with an analysis of production cultures and practices as well as the economy of production. The development of televisuality required a new combination of competencies which Caldwell identifies as an alliance of aestheticians and engineers, symbolizing the move from the contents to aesthetics of television. One may conclude that this combination of competencies remained relevant in the later digitalisation of television, complemented by informatics and market-oriented managerism. The economic rationality of televisuality was grounded on the need to reduce the costs of production in a situation which combined a continuous growth of output with stagnated budgets for production.

Although televisuality offered a solution to the credibility of low-cost programming, it was not enough to guarantee the visibility of programming in the increasingly competitive market. That is why, according to Caldwell, a clear division between low-cost programming and boutique programming developed. The latter category was important in the branding of channels and production companies. In boutique programming, the traditional industrial authority of commercial television was re-negotiated for the purposes of branding, and the identity of individual producers, writers, and actors received renewed relevance. Overall, the need for marketing competencies in the management of television increased, including customisation and individualisation in audience orientation. The lowest common denominator programming for mass audiences based on the principle of least objectionable programming (LOP) was replaced by a more targeted orientation which tailored programming with an emphasis on plurality of tastes and life styles (cf. Ytreberg 2002). All this fits well with the development that Allardt connected to, or envisioned as the constitution of information-technological society (above).

However, when trying to understand a similar change in Finnish television in the 1980s and early 90s, I prefer to speak of the audiovisualisation of television and media culture in general than to stick to
Caldwell’s notion of televisuality. This is not to say that televisuality is not relevant in the context of Finnish or European television. It certainly became relevant, for example, through the imported American programming. And as an aesthetics, televisuality was connected with a number of changes in programming and production practices as well as in television economy that date back to the 1980s. But it was still not that relevant then, or even in the early 1990s.

My argument is that in Finland – as in other European countries, although not necessarily to the same extent – televisuality is first of all a feature of digital television rather than the old analog context. Essentially, in the pre-digital 1980s the commercialisation and industrialisation of television were new phenomena in the European context, whereas in the United States televisuality represented re-negotiation of values and norms of a long established commercial system; or, where the commercial-industrial systems and values were in place and even well-ensconced in Europe, still the state-sponsored cultural aesthetic played the dominant role in determining the broadcasting landscape.³

There is also an important difference of research interest between my identification of audiovisualisation and Caldwell’s discussion on televisuality. Caldwell’s view can be understood as a theory of changes in American television. In contrast with this type of overall theory, my focus is on tracing the variety of discourses on television and considering the changes in their (discursive) hierarchy. So my point about audiovisualisation is that during the course of the 1980s it started dominating the signification of television (in Finland, at least) and, accordingly, affected the public image of television and the construction of its identity.

The above change of discourses is effectively demonstrated by the creation of several Finnish university programmes in audiovisual culture and the turn to audiovisual policy in the regulation of television; the latter an impact of the EU’s audiovisual policy as symbolised by the Television Without Frontiers directive from 1989. In her analysis of European media policy and governance, Michalis (2007) links the 1980s on the one hand to the introduction of industrial policy and,
on the other, to liberalisation and re-regulation. In Finland, the notion and development of the audiovisual field became a central dimension of a task force (the Viestintäkulttuuritoimikunta) which the Ministry of Education set up to investigate the structures and funding of audiovisual production and education and training for the field. During the years 1987–1991, the group produced six reports in total, one of them including a proposal for a national audiovisual archive (which was eventually implemented, in the new millennium).

In the context of broadcasting history, audiovisualisation constructed a strong contrast between the informational, content-oriented television of the late 1960s and 70s, and the new television with its emphasis on subjective experience and aesthetic values, reminiscent of Caldwell’s description of televisuality. In an analysis of the interrelationships between politicians and journalists, Aula (1991) noted that the political identification of broadcast journalists diminished in the 1980s, and that their new orientation emphasised a professional independence from politics. Similar distancing from the political past is strongly demonstrated by my own data from the early 1990s on current affairs producers and journalists in the Finnish Broadcasting Company, YLE (Hujanen 2007). Instead of political balance and the abstract idea of truth, these professionals now emphasised personal responsibility for their work in orientation towards audiences.

Structurally an important reform in Finnish television was the introduction in 1987 of the first totally commercial television network (Kolmostelevisio, translated to ‘TV3’); before that, the only commercial operator acted as a programming company inside the two networks of public service television (YLE). The new television network had no in-house production facilities, which was supposed to encourage the creation of a sector for independent production (Soramäki 2007). This trend was strengthened in the 1990s, as the oldest commercial operator, since named MTV3, outsourced its entertainment production; and through introduction of new commercial operators as well as the launch of producer choice inside public service television (Hujanen 2002 and 2004).
To summarise, not only did the audience orientation to television change in the 1980s, as demonstrated by Allardt’s reference to pluralism and ambivalence (above), but also important structural changes in television acted to take the medium in the same direction. As in Europe generally, the 1980s witnessed the introduction of an industrial approach to media production and policy as well as liberalisation and re-regulation of structures of broadcasting and the audiovisual field (as described).

In the next section, I move on to positioning the audiovisualisation of television as part of a major discursive formation which the German film scholar Siegfried Zielinski (1999) identifies as ‘audiovisual discourse’. Cinema and television represent the dominant media in the constitution of that discourse, but as a historical continuity the discourse on audiovisuality dates back to much earlier efforts to produce illusions of motion in space and time. After this historical positioning of audiovisuality, I concentrate on making conclusions about the consequences of audiovisualisation as a dominant discourse on television, and how it relates to the latest major discourse about this medium, digitalisation.

Television in the discourse on audiovisuality

The historical constitution of audiovisuality is the theme of the 1989 work by the German media theorist Siegfried Zielinski published in English ten years later (1999) as Audiovisions: cinema and television as entr’actes in history. As the title suggests, audiovisual mediations like cinema and television are considered as intermissions in the longer continuum of audiovisuality, a reference to changing hierarchies of the discourse. The audiovisual discourse is characterized by Zielinski as follows:
In a condensed form and without evoking the intellectual ancestors that have all shared in influencing it, my conceptual starting point is: over the past hundred and fifty years, in the history of industrially advanced countries, a specialised, tending to become ever more standardised, institutionalised area of expression and activity has become established. I call it the audiovisual discourse. It encompasses the entire range of praxes in which, with the aid of technical systems and artefacts, the illusion of the perception of movements – as a rule, accompanied by sound – is planned, produced, commented on, and appreciated. (Zielinski 1999: 18, emphasis added)

One should not confuse Zielinski’s notion of audiovisual discourse with the discussion on languages of audiovisual expression, the semiotics of film and television, or the later debate on the textuality of television as televisual discourse (see the paragraph on academic discourses, above). The point here is that audiovisual discourse is a specialised, an ever more standardised, institutionalised area of expression and activity through which individuals and their collectives make sense of the audiovisual. According to Zielinski, this special discourse is both embedded in and defined by the superordinate process of an ongoing attempt at culture-industrial modelling and subjugation of subjects – those who are (supposed) to use the artefacts and the messages appropriated by these. Which is to say that if one considers audiovisuality as a changing hierarchy of discourses in time and space, the culture-industrial dimension remains the driving force of the process.

In the historically different arrangements, writes Zielinski, the audiovisual overlaps with other specialist discourses and partial praxes of society, such as architecture, transport, science and technology, organisation of work and time, traditional plebeian and bourgeois culture, or the avant-garde. The particular constellations that arise in this way under the hegemony of the culture industry, structure the process historically. According to Zielinski, four different arrangements, each possessing the characteristic features of a dispositif, can be distinguished in the history of the audiovisual thus far. The first
category is identified as early audiovisions, the second is the cinema and the third television; the fourth arrangement is that of ‘advanced audiovision’ which Zielinski characterises as a complex construction kit of machines, storage devices and programmes for the reproduction, simulation and blending of what can be seen and heard, where the trend is toward their capacity to be connected together in a network (op. cit.: 19). This last category connects Zielinski’s view of the audiovisual with the process considered below as ‘digitalisation’.

These four arrangements, warns Zielinski, should not be reconstructed chronologically; in history they interlock, overlap and periodically attract and repel each other. To understand them as historically distinguishable dispositifs means, according to Zielinski, first and foremost, to characterise the socio- and techno-culturally dominant arrangement of a particular time and, at the same time, to bring out the social and private relations that have led to this type of hegemony, including how it came to establish itself (op. cit.: 19–20). This is the idea behind the title of Zielinski’s book, the characterisation of cinema and television as entr’actes (intermissions) in history – both arrangements, cinema and television, had their golden period as the dominant discourse of the audiovisual. For cinema that was between the world wars, and for television in the 1960s and 70s.

If one agrees with Zielinki’s argument about the change of television’s position in the discursive hierarchy of audiovisual discourse, one can say that by the 1980s television had lost its hegemonic role in the construction of the audiovisual. One might conclude in relation to the earlier discussion on the contrast between paleo television and new television that in the era of nationally broadcast television it was this that dominated the discourse on audiovisuality. In addition, because of its dominance in the discursive hierarchy, it also had considerable power to define its own signification. When reviewing the postmodern discourses on television (above), I have noted how the emphasis on the intertextuality of television contributed to a marginalization of the specific in the context of new television of the 1980s. The increasingly hybrid nature of television as a medium of
popular culture caused people to experience it less as a medium itself and more as a forum for sharing and consuming popular pleasures and expressing identities.

The above kind of image of television as a playful and hybrid forum of popular culture fits well with the transformation that I characterise as the audiovisualisation of television. The point is that television is considered less as a medium itself and increasingly in terms of and in relationship to something else. That something else in my interpretation is the audiovisual, or what Zielinski constructs as audiovisual discourse. With reference to Zielinski’s articulation of audiovisual discourse, my point is to argue that through the process of audiovisualisation television started losing its dominance in the construction of the audiovisual and, parallel to that, audiovisual discourse more generally started to dominate the signification of television. Or, to put it in another way: audiovisualisation started constructing television more in the context of the general audiovisual discourse than in terms of its own specificity. This conclusion opens up an interesting paradox in the history of television. As soon as the medium and its users became aware of its nature and character as a medium, it started losing its hegemony and the control over its own meanings through audiovisualisation, or through hybridisation and popularisation as represented in the idea of post-modern television.

In the context of the present book and its focus on intermediality, one of the important consequences of audiovisualisation is that it increases the relevance of intermedial references in the construction of television. John Ellis’ book on visible fictions, discussed above, is an illuminating example of this. With reference to Urrichio’s (2004: 31) description of media evolution, one could say that these kinds of intermedial redefinitions of media are typical in times of transition and turbulence. As Ellis’ book demonstrates, audiovisualisation constructed television through its interrelationships with other audiovisual media, first of all cinema, secondarily video. But through culture-industrialization, television became integrated in the broader construction of
the audiovisual field and electronic media. Overall, that is the most important and long lasting consequence of audiovisualisation.

As to television as a cultural industry, the most relevant aspect of Zielinski’s argument is the way he links the history of audiovisual discourse with what he calls ‘the superordinate process of an ongoing attempt at culture-industrial modelling and subjugation of the subjects.’ Such a culture-industrial modelling and subjugation is, as Zielinski interprets it, the driving force in the historical constitution of audiovisuality. Although it connects all dispositifs of the audiovisual, it has been less relevant in the constitution of television than of cinema. As Zielinski (op. cit.: 19) points out, the culture-industrial element came to dominate cinema from the beginning. Television, on the other hand, became institutionalized as a broadcast flow, less affected by culture-industrialisation. So, as indicated in relation to the introduction of television (above), for a long time broadcasting dominated the discourse about television.

The marginalization of broadcast television and the loss of its cultural dominance changed television’s position in the discursive hierarchy of audiovisuality. My interpretation of the consequences of this change is that television was now less defined as television and more as an aspect of the audiovisual. That is the historical condition which opens up television, as an institutionalised area of expression and activity, for increased and intensified culture-industrial modelling and subjugation. In other words, the subjectivities typical of broadcasting are altered to more culture-industrial identifications. In the literature on broadcasting, this transformation is most often described as a move from citizenship to consumer orientation (Scannell 1989, Dahlgren 1995, Tracey 1998). In the context of European broadcasting history, this means that the identity of public service television as a social and cultural institution of enlightenment and citizenship is weakened, and is challenged by the discourse on television as a cultural industry.
Following Zielinski’s model, one could conclude that culture-industrialisation as the driving force of audiovisual discourse connects the transformation of television with the latest discursive formation of the model, named ‘advanced audiovision’. This is the least developed but at the same time most visionary section of Zielinski’s analysis, because at the time of his writing computerisation and the consequent networking of media and communication were still rather new phenomena. As mentioned in relation to Miller’s new text book on television studies (above), by the end of the 1990s it seemed impossible to speak about television without a reference to the so-called new media (cf. Gunter 2010). ‘Television and the Internet’ is the characterisation which Gripsrud (2010: 87–89) uses as a label for this development, which he identifies as the fourth phase of television. With reference to my analysis of audiovisualisation, it is worth of noting that Gripsrud characterises the 1980s and 90s as two decades of ‘commercialism and diversification’.

In more policy-oriented analyses of television, the recent change in the medium is discussed in terms of digitalisation (Papathanassopoulos 2002, Brown and Picard 2005; cf. Søndergaard 1998, Jääsaari 2007). As a discursive formation, digitalisation and digital television refer, first of all, to the digitalisation of television’s distribution networks and the consequent changes in reception. As demonstrated earlier with reference to Caldwell’s discussion on televisuality, the digitalisation of production had had an impact in the form of computerization of production in the 1980s. As the earlier cited book by Katz and Scannel (2009) demonstrates, the academic discourse on television and the Internet has often led to pessimism in respect of television’s future. Against this, the early visions of digital television especially had represented optimism about the future of television as a kind of the multimedia centre of individual homes (Kangaspunta 2006: 15–36). Reminiscent of television’s former cultural dominance, television was
supposed to lead the development towards the new Information Super Highway.

The crisis of broadcasting economy created by the equation of continuously growing content supply and stagnated funding is one of the main reasons why broadcasters have been forced to look for solutions to increased cost-effectiveness (cf. Caldwell’s analysis of televisuality above). That was a promise which made digitalisation an urgent issue for public service broadcasters in particular. Naturally, a part of the promise was that if taking a leading role in this transformation, the PSB organisations would be guaranteed a major role in the constitution of the new information society. That is the background to why many European governments and broadcasters were eager to start digitalising even their terrestrial networks, even though the feasibility and availability of required technology was insecure and the process seemed to demand a high investment rate (for a general review, see Papathanassopoulos 2002, Brown and Picard 2005). The Finnish government was one of the early birds; the principal decision on the digitalisation of broadcasting networks was made in spring, 1996.

The development of digital television has shown that digitalisation produced first of all more television in terms of output and channels, while the wild visions of new interactive, enhanced television have not materialised (as an example of these visions, see Van Tassel 1996). Once again, and similarly to the 1980s and 90s, the market for television became increasingly competitive with continuous problems of economy. Against this kind of continuity between analog and digital television, I would prefer to characterise digitalisation as a new phase of the cultural industrialisation of television. Accordingly, one could conclude that the cultural industrialisation of television has taken place in two consecutive phases; first, as audiovisualisation, and since late the 1990s, as digitalisation. As Deuze’s recent (2011) book about media work demonstrates, the latter kind of cultural industrialisation is increasingly signified under the label of ‘creative work and industries’ (see also Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010).
In fact, on the basis of Zielinski’s reconstruction of the history of audiovisions, one could argue that culture-industrial dimension has always been part of broadcasting and television. In Europe, that primarily concerns the technological aspects of broadcasting. My point, however, is to emphasise that cultural industrial logic and practices were widely adopted and applied by European public service broadcasters as they responded to the 1980s crisis created by the loss of their monopoly and the consequent challenges of increased competition. And further on down the line, a similar development manifested in the context of digitalisation. I acknowledge the relevance of periodisations which characterise differences between the 1980s television and the later digital television (in style of Gripsrud’s third and fourth phase, above). But basically they represent phases in the same process which can be labelled the ‘cultural industrialisation of television’.

Looking back to the most optimistic visions for television as the multimedia platform of digitalised homes, one can now conclude that television did not reach that role. On the contrary, television is increasingly re-constructed in terms of what Zielinski identifies as ‘advanced audiovision’. However, if one compares that new field with what Caldwell said about the potentials of digitalisation for post-production and cost-effectiveness, one can say that digital dreams have come fully true. And by the same token, the network character of the new field has opened up forms of co-production and now, social media, which challenge the professional tradition and practices of broadcasting (see, for example, Mäntymäki 2010). Organisationally, the present public service media institutions are clearly structured according to the logic of content producing industries and less according to the old media divisions (Küng-Shankleman 2000, Küng 2008). The present challenge is to combine the tradition of programme production and distribution with the role of partner and facilitator of communication in the context of networked communication and social media (Bardoel and Lowe 2007, Aalto 2010, and Mäntymäki in this book).
References


Gunter, B. (2010) *Television Versus the Internet. Will TV prosper or perish as the world moves online?* Oxford: Chandos Publishing.


Endnotes

1. In other European countries similarly. In Britain, for example, and demonstrating institutional interrelationship as much as discursive weight, the (top-selling) BBC magazine listing of program details for its radio channels, the Radio Times, incorporated BBC television listings from the early 1960s, which within a few years had expanded to include photos, feature-boxes, etc. and totally dominate the publication, relegating radio to a small, dull, purely functional back-section in the process.
2. The article was published in a book (Heikkinen 1989) where a group of sociologists and cultural analysts discussed the changes of life style and everyday life of Finnish people and the consequent changes in broadcasting, this work itself part of a project initiated by the Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE and whose first collection of articles (Heikkinen 1986) was published to mark the 60th anniversary of the Company.

3. In the UK, for example, the private network (ITV) had been in operation since the 1955 and with national coverage since the early 60s; but still, it was closely regulated by American standards and defined from its establishment by reference to the state BBC, to which it played the role of inferior (in all senses) until the 1980s, when its greater income gave it a competitive edge in purchase rights to events coverage, ‘new’ films, etc. (thus, for example, the key American imports – mostly crime and drama series formats – of the 1970s almost all went to the main state channel, not the private network).

4. Commercial radio had been introduced two years earlier in 1985.

5. Zielinski uses the singular forms ‘culture industry’ and ‘culture-industrialisation’ when referring to the industrialization of culture. His use of language reflects the Frankfurt school tradition of culture industry, as opposed to the emphasis on cultural industries in the political economy of media and communication. For example, Hesmondhalgh (2007: 16–17) follows the views of cultural sociologists who consider cultural industries as a contested area where the struggle over commodification continues and adopts new directions and innovations. As Hesmondhalgh points out in his summary view of cultural industries, the tension between creativity and commerce is not resolved but remains a characteristic feature of the area (op. cit.: 18). I share Hesmondhalgh’s view of cultural industries and prefer to use the plural notion in relation to the transformation of television, but when referring to Zielinski continue to speak of ‘culture industry’.

6. Zielinski uses the term ‘dispositif’ in the Foucauldian sense of reference to the various institutional, physical and administrative mechanisms and knowledge structures that enhance and maintain the exercise of power in society and culture.