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THE EUROPEANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FINLAND

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It goes without saying, I am the sole responsible for the final result of this thesis.
Abstract
In this thesis I analyze the adaptation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (UM) to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) since Finnish membership in the EU in 1995. I conceive adaptation to the CFSP as one specific dimension of a broader process of change and adaptation to European integration in foreign ministries, i.e. Europeanization. I start from two crucial assumptions: first, I assume that foreign ministries are able to adapt to a changing ‘environment’; second, I assume that the CFSP might represent a sufficient trigger of Europeanization. This thesis is designed as a theory-oriented case study. Data derive from secondary and primary sources, as well as interview material.

The general independent variable for this study is CFSP membership, the dependent variables is change and adaptation in foreign ministries. I adopt two different complementary perspectives on the CFSP: first, I conceptualize the CFSP as a structure of opportunities. In this view, the CFSP is able to redistribute resources in the domestic political system. I hypothesize that a CFSP-triggered redistribution of resources might benefit foreign ministries in general and in particular those branches of a foreign ministry’s organization mostly involved with the policy. Second, I conceptualize the CFSP as a normative regime, as a system of norms, rules, identities and ideas. Following this perspective, the hypothesis is that the CFSP might transform the organization and the institutional culture of the ministry. The former view of the CFSP is rooted in a rationalist account of Europeanization; the second, in a constructivist approach.

The main finding is that the CFSP has indeed impacted on the UM. The CFSP as a structure of opportunities has benefited the Ministry. The policy has contributed to a partial reassertion of the UM’s role in the Finnish executive. There is also partial evidence that the CFSP has led to differential gains in the Ministry. Moreover, the CFSP has led to changes in the formal and informal organization of the UM. The Ministry has learned the value of supranational political cooperation. Yet, both bureaucratic adaptation and socialization, or norms internalization, appear as rather limited phenomena in the Finnish case.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
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<td>CWGs</td>
<td>Council Working Groups</td>
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<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>ENA</td>
<td>National School of Administration, France</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUE</td>
<td>Finnish Permanent Representation to the European Union</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
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<td>GLO</td>
<td>Department for Global Affairs, UM</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAVAKU</td>
<td>Training Course on International Affairs, UM</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>Northern Dimension Initiative</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PMO</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office</td>
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<td>POL</td>
<td>Political Department, UM</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>UM</td>
<td>Ulkoasiainministeriö / Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>VN</td>
<td>Valtioneuvosto / Finnish Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>YKE</td>
<td>Finnish Permanent Representation to the United Nations</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

How do foreign ministries adapt to European integration? In this thesis, I analyze the Europeanization of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (*Ulkoasiainministeriö*, UM). Generally, I define Europeanization as a process of domestic adaptation to Europe (Graziano & Vink 2007). In particular, I focus on how the Ministry has adapted to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). I apply to the Finnish case Michael Smith’s (2000) conceptual framework for the study of the domestic impact of the CFSP. The time frame of the study mainly covers the period of Finnish membership in the European Union (EU).

Finland became a Member State of the EU on the first of January 1995, following the result of a national consultative referendum on membership in October 1994. Joining the EU was ‘the logical and decisive step in Finland’s long standing policy of participation in European integration’ (Raunio & Tiilikainen 2003). The literature on the adaptation of Finland to European integration shows that the EU has altered the balance of power in the Finnish core executive (Raunio & Wiberg 2001). Membership in the EU has further increased the power of the Prime Minister, while contributing to limit the influence of the President on policy making, also in foreign affairs (ibid.). Arguably, EU membership has also socialized Finnish politicians and officials into EU norms, rules and identities. Yet, in the Finnish case, there exists far less knowledge on how domestic bureaucracy has adapted to Europe, despite recent contributions (Lægreid *et al.* 2004). In particular, relatively little has been written about the Europeanization of the UM.¹ This is particularly surprising taking into account the traditionally crucial and privileged position of the UM in the Finnish executive. In this thesis, I intend to present my contribution on the issue.

The central hypothesis of this thesis is that foreign ministries change in order to adapt to Europe in general, and in particular to CFSP membership. Hence, the main assumption is that ministries are indeed capable of reforming their organization, of adopting new ‘ways of doing things’, of redistributing and rationalizing their resources as to ‘fit’ into an evolving

¹Antola (2002) has written the unique article to my knowledge explicitly concerned with the impact of the EU on the Ministry, as a chapter in the edited volume by Hocking and Spence devoted to foreign ministries in the EU (Hocking & Spence 2002). Recently, in a still unpublished paper, Raunio (Raunio & Johansson, unpublished paper) has argued that the Finnish Prime Minister has used EU membership as a mean to enhance its powers vis-à-vis the UM and the President.
international environment. Surely, adaptation and institutional change is a possible not a necessary outcome. Europeanization is a hypothesis here. Several scholars argue that bureaucracies and foreign ministries in particular are conservative institutions characterized by institutional inertia (March & Olsen 1989). Yet, there is also evidence that the EU is actually altering how foreign ministries act and perceive their institutional role, their resources and organization. In other terms, the Europeanization hypothesis is plausible also in the case of the UM through induction, i.e. on the basis of secondary data and analyses of the adaptation of domestic bureaucracies to EU membership in other member states (Smith 2000; Allen & Oliver 2004; Hocking & Spence 2002; Pomorska 2007).

The Europeanization of foreign ministries is a topic of academic and practical importance, for the following reasons at least: first, foreign ministries and Member States’ diplomats are key actors in EU external relations and especially in the CFSP. On the one hand, foreign ministries do matter in explaining EU’s international activities. There are domestic organizational and bureaucratic sources of EU’s foreign policy. On the other hand, the literature argues that EU-level foreign policy activities and in particular the CFSP might trigger sympathetic changes at the domestic level. Thus, in order to improve our understanding of the EU foreign policy process, it is important to study how EU-level political integration interacts with domestic bureaucracies, the if and how of their Europeanization. Second, foreign ministries are usually part of Member States’ core executives. They play a major role in the domestic coordination of their international activities (Kassim et al. 2000; Kassim 2005). Traditionally, foreign ministries are ‘gatekeepers’ between foreign and domestic political developments. Thus, in order to enhance our knowledge of how the EU is altering the balance of power in Member States’ core executives, it is important to study how foreign ministries adapt to the requirements of EU policy coordination. Third, European integration seems to represent a major challenge to the very essence of foreign ministries, symbols of the Westphalian nation state (Bátora 2005): the EU is a political system where sovereignty is shared at different levels, where the division

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2 The standard definition of core executive in the literature is the following: ‘All those organizations and structures which primarily serve to pull together and integrate central government policies, or act as final arbiters within the executive of conflicts between different elements of the government machine’ (Dunleavy & Rhodes in Laffan 2006: 690).
between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ policy is increasingly meaningless. Yet, the EU might also represent a resource for national diplomatic systems. The approaching establishment of a European External Action Service (EEAS) will add further opportunities and challenges for national foreign ministries in the context of European integration. Hence, to comprehend better how the process of political integration is changing the nation-state in Europe, it also significant to study how foreign ministries are adapting to this development. In sum, I argue that the study of foreign ministries’ Europeanization is both theoretically relevant and timely.

**Europeanization: The ‘Concept’ of Reference for the Analysis**

This thesis is centered on the concept of Europeanization. Research on Europeanization is a booming field in European Studies. The concept generally refers to the process of domestic adaptation to European integration. The study of Europeanization aims at explaining how European integration influences the domestic level. Europeanization is the complementary effect of integration, its ‘second image reversed’ (Graziano & Vink 2007). The core finding of Europeanization research is that domestic political systems have responded in different ways to European level developments. The ‘impact’ of Europe is differential. This is explained by the role played by domestic formal and informal institutions in mediating the effect of European integration. As Olsen puts it: ‘adaptation has reflected institutional resources and traditions, the pre-existing balance of domestic institutional structures’ (Olsen 2002). Both Europe and ‘home’ matter. The task of the analyst is to explain how these two levels interact.

Research on the domestic adaptation to European integration presents several methodological challenges. First, concept formation is problematic: Europeanization as a process of domestic adaptation to European integration is clearly a very basic and extremely wide definition. What does European integration refer to? Which parts of the domestic political system adapt? How? Scholars agree that Europeanization, i.e. adaptation, shall represent the ‘dependent variable’. However, as Goetz has recently pointed out: ‘students of Europeanization rarely define

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3 It is interesting in this regard that the full name of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs is at present: ‘Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs’, as to indicate the essential difference between European and non-European diplomatic activity (French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, [http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/))

4 The crucial reference on the ‘second image reversed’ is however Gourevitch (1978).
explicitly what is meant by integration’ i.e. the independent variable (Goetz & Meyer-Sahling 2008: 18). Difficulties in concept formation of course lead also to problems in measuring Europeanization. Second, research on Europeanization has used several different theoretical frameworks. The concept *per se* is not a theory (Bulmer 2007: 47). There have been attempts at developing parsimonious models of Europeanization, as Caporaso’s three steps model (Caporaso *et al.* 2001). Usually, New Institutionalism serves the theoretical humus for the study of Europeanization. There is widespread agreement that domestic institutions matter in explaining how the domestic level adapts to European integration. Thus, scholars have used the sociological, historical and rational-actor version of institutionalism for investigating the phenomenon. However, as theory is always selective, the deployment of diverse frameworks has often produced incomparable results and led to consistent arbitrariness in the findings (Goetz & Meyer-Sahling 2008: 19). Third, research on Europeanization has quite expectedly tended to overemphasize the ‘European / EU factor’ in explaining change and adaptation of domestic political systems. Thus, as Olsen has pointed out, ‘the major challenge is to trace changes at the domestic level back to European-level institutions, policies and events. In practice it has been difficult to isolate European effects and to disentangle ‘net effects’ of European arrangements from global, national and sub-national sources of change’ (Olsen 2002: 937).

In front of such sensitive conceptual and theoretical hurdles, a thesis which aims at analyzing a process of Europeanization appears a bold enterprise. However, if I will be able: first, to specify carefully the concept, clarifying both the independent and the independent variable; second, to root my study of Europeanization into broader (meta-) theoretical frameworks in political science and to the relevant secondary literature; third, and most importantly, to fix limits to my analysis and to emphasize that CFSP-triggered Europeanization represents only one piece in the very complex mosaic of change and adaptation of domestic political systems to European integration, I hope that with this study I will contribute, albeit minimally, to the study of Europeanization.

The CFSP as Trigger of Europeanization in Foreign Ministries

In this thesis I specify the concept of Europeanization as foreign ministries’ adaptation to the CFSP. In other terms, the CFSP represents the independent variable for this study, the trigger
of Europeanization. In this section, I shortly present the policy. Generally, the CFSP can be defined as a structured, institutionalized framework for foreign and security policy coordination among EU Member States (Tonra 2003: 731). The Treaties have established the CFSP with the aim of safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union, to strengthen its security, to preserve peace and promote international cooperation, to develop and consolidate democracy and the rules of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Treaty on European Union 2008: Title V). The CFSP is mainly an intergovernmental policy (Smith 2004a): unanimity is the rule, the Commission does not have the right of policy initiative; policy outputs do not fall under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). However, national parliaments do play a role in holding their governments accountable in the process (Lord 2005), the Commission is ‘fully associated’ with the CFSP and the European Parliament overviews decision making. The CFSP offers three main policy instruments to member states: common strategies, joint actions and common positions (Treaty on European Union 2008: Title V). The CFSP is only one element in the system of EU external relations (Wong 2005). At present, the CFSP accounts for the 0.2 percent of the total EU budget (European Commission 2008).

In the literature, there are different theoretical views of the CFSP (Smith 2004c). In this study, I locate Smith’s conceptual framework (Smith 2000) for the analysis of the domestic impact of the CFSP into two complementary perspectives on the CFSP, the first based on a rationalist understanding, the second rooted in Constructivism. The basic starting point is that in order to comprehend complex phenomena as that of Europeanization, analysts shall be inclusive and ‘build bridges’ (Zürn & Checkel 2005) between theoretical positions rather than promote restrictive views of politics.

The CFSP establishes a new structure of opportunities for national foreign ministries. The ‘rationalist’ hypothesis is that foreign ministries gain from the CFSP: for instance, thanks to

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5 Yet, also non-Member States participate in the CFSP. For instance, CFSP Statements, an arguably soft output of the policy, are usually supported also by the Candidate Countries, the Countries of Association and Stabilization Process, and EFTA Countries. See for instance European Council (2008).

6 As Wong (Wong 2005: 141) puts it EU foreign policy (EUFP) comprises also first pillar trade and development policy as well as international cooperation under the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ), and arguably the sum of twenty seven (and more!) national foreign policies.

7 Author’s calculation on the basis of data from the ‘General budget of the European Union for the financial year 2008 - The figures’ (European Commission 2008).
EU-level political cooperation, foreign ministries may access more capabilities, information and expertise. CFSP membership might even enable foreign ministries to strengthen their role in the domestic political system. Eventually, using the opportunities the CFSP offers, they might react against a relative decline, the rise of Prime Ministers’ powers in foreign policy making, and competition from other branches of domestic bureaucracy.

Constructivism conceptualizes the CFSP as a set of norms, roles, rules, ideas and identities; as an institution in the sense of (sociological) New Institutionalism. The CFSP is a social construction which influences the Self-perception of the participants (Tonra 2003). The hypothesis here is that the CFSP State and in particular foreign ministries and national diplomats to CFSP membership; in other terms, participation in the CFSP triggers Europeanization as a process of socialization and bureaucratic adaptation (Jørgensen 1997; Tonra 1997; Smith 2000; Pomorska 2007).

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Foreign ministries are bureaucratic organizations. Bureaucracy is a rational and formalized organization based on hierarchy, specialization and impersonality (Max Weber quoted in Olsen 2005: 4). Bureaucracies are, in democratic political systems, instruments in the hands of elected politicians. Politicians, as principals, delegate specific tasks to civil servants, the agents, while the latter provide expertise and information to them. Bureaucracies are institutions: they express cultural values and traditions. Foreign ministries perform three main functions (Hill 2003): first, ministries prepare and implement a country’s foreign policy: they provide information and expertise to decision makers. Second, foreign ministries coordinate the international activities of the state, acting as ‘gatekeepers’ between the foreign and the domestic level. They attempt at controlling the formulation of a country’s foreign policy, and at keeping a privileged position at the domestic level (Hocking & Spence 2002). Third, foreign ministries structure and organize diplomacy, a system of rules and practices of behavior between sovereign states (Bátora 2005).

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8 As in Holsti’s definition ‘ideas or actions designed by policy makers to solve a problem or promote change in the policies, attitudes, or actions of another state or states, in non-state actors, in the international economy, or in the physical environment of the world’. Holsti quoted in Wong 2005, 140.
Foreign ministries perform a key role in the CFSP (Duke & Vanhoonaker 2006). Yet, there is limited theorizing on how national bureaucracies contribute to CFSP’s outcomes; more efforts have been put in investigating administrative adaptation to EU level developments, i.e. the Europeanization of foreign ministries. In this thesis, the specific ‘Europeanization’ question I attempt at answering is: how has the UM adapted to the CFSP? Michael Smith concluded his presentation of a conceptual framework for the analysis of CFSP-triggered domestic adaptation observing, in 2000, that: ‘although it is too early to assess the full impact of CFSP membership on the states which joined the EU most recently (Austria, Finland and Sweden), the experience of other EU states suggest that similar changes will occur in these cases as well’ (Smith 2000: 623). After almost eight years, Finnish adaptation to the CFSP is still largely unexplored. Below, I very shortly introduce the UM.

The Finnish UM ‘concentrates on foreign and security policy, trade policy and development policy as well as on significant foreign policy issues and international relations in general. The Ministry also assists other branches of government in the coordination of international affairs’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2008). The Ministry has five strategic objectives: 1) to ensure Finnish influence in international relations; 2) to promote an international community generating security; 3) a fair world; 4) a successful Finland; 5) an open and service-oriented Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2005).

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland is part of the Finnish executive (Valtioneuvosto, VN). The UM performs its duties ‘in accordance with the will expressed by the Government and Parliament’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2008). Its organization (ibid.) comprises the central offices in Helsinki as well as the network of Finnish representations abroad: embassies, permanent representations and consulates. In Helsinki, the Ministry is divided into twelve departments, two units and a group of rowing ambassadors under the direction of three members of the present Finnish government responsible for matters that fall under the administration of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs: the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Foreign Trade and the Minister of Housing and Nordic Cooperation (Finnish Government 2008a). The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the other ministries form, with the Secretary of State and four other Undersecretaries of State, the Steering Group (johtoryhmä) of the (Rules of Procedure of the UM 2005). At present, the II Vanhanen Government has also appointed a Political State Secretary in the Ministry (Finnish Government 2008b) to
assist the Minister for Foreign Affairs in ‘matter relating to political steering and preparatory work’ (ibid.). The UM is responsible for ninety six Finnish representations abroad (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2008). In 2007, the Ministry managed a budget of almost one billion euro and employed more than one thousand and six hundred people in its central offices (ibid.).

In the empirical part of this thesis, I focus on the following branches of the UM, whose organization I shortly introduce: a) the Political Department (POL); b) the Department for Global Affairs (GLO); c) the Finnish Permanent Representation to the EU (EUE); d) the Finnish Permanent Representation to the United Nations (YKE). The POL has been a major department since the establishment of the Ministry. The POL is crucial in the analysis as it represents the ‘key’ for the CFSP in the Ministry (interview, Senior Civil Servant 10.1.2008). The core task of the POL is the preparation of Finnish foreign and security policy, included Finnish participation to the CFSP. It is divided into five units: the Unit for Security Policy, the Unit for Arm Control, the Unit for the CFSP, the Unit for Human Rights and the Unit for Civilian Crisis Management (Rules of Procedure of the UM 2005). The GLO is a newcomer in the organization of the Ministry: it was created in 2005 to enhance the status of the Division for Global Affairs, established in 2003 (Helsingin Sanomat 24.5.2002). The GLO has been staffed with personnel from different previously existing departments, yet the bulk of its staff has been taken from the POL. The GLO is divided into five units: the Unit for General Global Affairs, the Unit for Economic and Social Development, the Unit for Development Cooperation Financing, the Unit for International Environmental Policy and the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance (Rules of Procedure of the UM 2005). The core task of the GLO is to deal with global matters as social and economic development, the environment and humanitarian assistance. The EUE is the largest Finnish representation abroad: ‘the Permanent Representation of Finland is an exceptionally large representation, and it has had to adapt to an unprecedented rate of growth’ (Finnish Permanent Representation to the EU 2008). It was established officially in 1996. The EUE deals with matters relating to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER I and II), the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC). The YKE is at present the second largest Finnish representation in terms of employees. It was established in 1956, after years of informal relations between Finland and the UN managed mainly through the Finnish General Consulate in New York (Finnish Permanent Representation to the UN 2008). The YKE
pursues the goals and interests of Finland and strengthens her image in the United Nations as well as in its Development Programs and Funds’ (ibid.).

The UM is an institution which has changed and reformed several times during its ninety years long history, following successive developments in Finnish foreign policy (Antola 2002). A decree of the Finnish Senate established a foreign affairs bureau with three departments and seventeen civil servants on the 28th of June 1918, few months after the Finnish legislature had declared independence from Russia on the 6th of December 1917 (ibid.). Since then, the UM has been a symbol of Finnish sovereignty, security and independence (Raunio & Johansson, unpublished paper); the UM played a particularly significant role during the Cold War, when Finland had to pursue a very cautious foreign policy centered around the principles of neutrality and special relationship with the Soviet Union (ibid.). During the Cold War era, the Ministry was in clearly privileged position in the Finnish core executive, as the ministry of the President, the main executive in the country. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the ‘external environment’ of the UM changed radically. The Ministry moved from ‘deep sovietology to more intense economic and political integration with the European Communities’ (interview, Department for Europe 16.11.2007). As the Finnish foreign policy’s focus shifted decisively towards Western Europe, also the UM was asked to adapt to the new context and tasks. At present, as the Ministry points out: ‘Finland's membership of the European Union serves as the key channel through which (the Ministry’s) goals are pursued’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2008). At the time of writing, the UM is preparing a new major reform which is expected to enter into force the first of September 2008 (UM Press Release 2008).

**Research Design and Data**

I design this thesis as a theory-oriented qualitative case study. I apply the concept of CFSP triggered Europeanization in the case of the UM, on the basis of Smith’s conceptual framework. Concepts, hypotheses and variables derived from a constructivist reading of European integration and of the CFSP in particular. In addition, I complement the insights provided by Constructivism with a rationalist view of the CFSP. The research question is: how has the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs adapted to the CFSP? This question can be divided into two sub-questions: first, has the Ministry gained from participation in the CFSP,
in other terms is the Ministry a winner of Finnish CFSP membership? Second, has the CFSP transformed the Ministry?

A theory-oriented qualitative case study promises to offer a more detailed and in depth analysis of a specific process of Europeanization. Case study represents the most widely employed research design in Europeanization research (Haverland 2007). Case studies permit reliable findings as it is assumed that researchers acquire deep familiarity with their topic (Haverland 2007: 61). Case studies present debatable external validity, i.e. the capacity of allowing for generalizations (Lijphart 1971). This is arguably their main flaw. Yet, a case study research has the advantage of contextualizing and fine-tuning theoretical ideas and variables to specific contexts, eventually leading to enhanced concept validity (ibid.). I select the case of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland for three reasons: first, it still largely unexplored from the perspective of Europeanization research; second, the case seems of highly empirical interest. Finland has since 1995 decisively taken a very active role in the CFSP, promoting its development and a stronger role for the EU in external relations. How has the UM been influenced by Finnish activism in EU foreign policy? The system for domestic EU policy coordination in the Finnish core executive has significantly changed since EU membership from foreign ministry-led to PM-led (Laffan 2006); in addition, other branches of the Finnish administrations have entered the international arena, breaking the monopoly of the UM in foreign affairs management. Has the Ministry however benefited from CFSP membership? Third, I select the case of the UM on the basis of pragmatic considerations of research economy.

The data for this thesis come from three main sources, allowing for an ‘empirical triangulation’ between interview material, official documents and secondary sources. The use of qualitative interviews is a debatable method of data collection as the validity and reliability of interviewing is questionable. In European Studies, interviewing is perceived as being a ‘soft method’ of data collection (Moravcsik 1998: 81). Yet, interviews are largely employed, in particular in studies of EU foreign policy (Pomorska 2007; Juncos & Pomorska 2008). I rely on interview material in order to improve the quality of the analysis based on documents and secondary sources by adding the opinions, commentaries and direct knowledge of informed participants in the event I study. The interviews can be categorized as élite interviews, as in Dexter’s definition: ‘élite interviews are those where the interviewees are encouraged to provide their views of the situation; where the interviewees are let free to
introduce their points of views on the matter, rather than to follow the script or the questionnaire of the interviewer’ (Dexter 2006 [1970]).

Elite interviewing has three core aims (Goldstein 2002): first, to collect information from a sample of interviewees in order to generalize from it; second, to discover particular pieces of information which cannot be retrieved employing other means; third, to provide ‘context’ to research which uses mainly other sources of data. In performing my research, I mainly focused on the last two objectives. I intended to give colour and context to more formal, statistical data describing my variables. Moreover, I was interested in improving my knowledge of the CFSP in the Ministry through participants and practitioners’ commentaries. I accessed a sample of diplomats and officials at the UM using a letter of presentation, sent via email, which I report in the appendix. I designed my letter of access on the model of Fenno (1978 in Isernia 2001). I sent it to a sample of fifteen diplomats and officers at the Ministry in the following four departments, which I considered crucial in order to understand the role of the Ministry in the CFSP or to acquire first hand information concerning bureaucratic adaptation and reorganization: the Department for Europe, the Political Department, the Administrative Department, the Department for Global Affairs. In addition, I contacted the senior civil servants in the Ministry. I assumed that interview material collected from the UM’s personnel in top administrative positions was highly salient when assessing if and how the CFSP had impacted on the institutional identity and norms of the Ministry.

In sum, I conducted eleven interviews with Finnish diplomats and officials at the UM between October 2007 and May 2008. The three core questions I asked were: a) How has Finnish EU membership influenced the work you do here in this unit / department and in the Ministry in general?; b) Does your unit perform any role in the domestic preparation of the CFSP and if yes what?; c) What is your opinion regarding the establishment of an External Action Service for the conduct of EU foreign policy, as envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty? As interviews are conversations which evolve often following their own logic, it is comprehensible that on a case basis I proposed other questions to the interviewees, concerning, among other topics, details on the UM’s organization and resources, ‘ways of doing things’ as agenda setting and schedule, more information on the role of the Ministry in policy coordination and foreign policy making. In short, my interviews were semi-structured conversations: I tried to listen attentively, very carefully interrupting the speech of my interlocutors if needed. I recorded nine of the eleven interviews I conducted. During the interviews, I attempted at keeping
record of the interviewees’ thoughts by taking notes. At the end of every interview, I wrote down an interview report: the full interview with notes and commentaries regarding the areas of observations relevant for the study.

I did not have any previous experience in interviewing and I have learnt much from my research. Interview material has been useful as a complement in analyzing the impact of the CFSP on the resources of the Ministry. It has been much more relevant when it came to addressing the impact of the CFSP in terms of ways of doing things and norms internalization. It has been a very positive surprise the overall high rate of response of the UM’s personnel to my interview request. This confirms the image of the UM as an ‘open and service oriented’ ministry (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2005).

Organization of the Thesis

After this first introductory chapter, I organize the thesis as follows: in the second chapter, I theorize the adaptation of foreign ministries to the CFSP. On the basis of the theoretical background I proceed to the empirical analysis in the third, fourth and fifth chapter. The third chapter discusses the role of the UM in the foreign policy process in Finland. In the fourth chapter I analyze Europeanization as redistribution of resources. In the fifth chapter, I analyze CFSP triggered Europeanization as organizational adaptation and socialization. Finally, I conclude summarizing the findings and the argument; I present the theoretical implications of the study and propose few questions for further research on the Europeanization of foreign ministries.
Chapter 2: Theorizing the Europeanization of Foreign Ministries

In this chapter, I locate Smith’s (2000) conceptual framework for the assessment of the domestic impact of the CFSP into two broader, complementary meta-theoretical perspectives on EU foreign policy cooperation, Rationalism and Constructivism. I aim at developing a simple theoretical tool for the investigation of CFSP-triggered Europeanization in the case of this study, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I organize the discussion as follows: first, I shortly introduce Smith’s framework; second, I locate it into a rationalist and a constructivist view of the CFSP and propose hypotheses and areas of investigation for research on change and adaptation in foreign ministries.

A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis

How do foreign ministries adapt to European integration? To date, there exists a specific yet limited literature addressing the matter (Jørgensen 1997; Tonra 2001; Allen & Oliver 2004; Hocking & Spence 2002; Pomorska 2007). There are two main perspectives on the issue: on the one hand, some analysts look at how national administrations for foreign policy management have ‘adjusted’ to working with the EU. The context of these studies is the investigation of national foreign policies Europeanization, whether and how EU membership has led to convergence in the international affairs of its Member States (Wong 2005). On the other hand, some researches focus on how foreign ministries have responded the need for the domestic coordination of EU policy (Kassim et al. 2000). The context of these analyses is generally a broader examination of core executives’ Europeanization, whether and how the emerging European administrative space is changing the way national executives are organized. Yet, despite the increasing number of studies in the field, there is still a lack of a consistent, systematic analytical framework for the assessment of foreign ministries’ Europeanization.

There is arguably one exception: I argue that Michael Smith’s conceptual framework ‘for measuring the ways political co-operation has encouraged corresponding changes in EU Member States’ (Smith 2000) represents to date the most comprehensive and clear analytical tool for the study of the Europeanization of foreign ministries conceived as adaptation to the
CFSP. In his article, Michael Smith attempts at answering two crucial questions here: first, what particular aspects of the CFSP cause sympathetic changes in national foreign policy structures; second, what are the specific indicators of these changes. Smith intends to develop an analytical instrument for the assessment of CFSP triggered Europeanization at the domestic level in four different main areas of change: elite socialization, bureaucratic adaptation, constitutional changes and politics (political cooperation and public opinion). The tasks of the framework are clearly stated: to organize empirical findings and to stimulate further research (ibid.: 614). In this thesis, I limit the scope of CFSP-triggered Europeanization to the dimensions that Smith calls ‘bureaucratic adaptation’ and ‘elite socialization’, as I focus solely on the foreign ministry and partly on national diplomats.

Smith’s core argument is that the progressive institutionalization of EU political cooperation ‘has gradually and pervasively penetrated into the domestic politics of EU Member States’ (ibid. 615). He points out that: ‘there is substantial evidence to show that EU membership in general and CFSP membership in particular influence the way individual Member States organize their pursuit of foreign policy’ (ibid.). The claim is not an original one when it comes to bureaucratic adaptation in foreign ministries. Focusing on foreign ministries and European Political Cooperation (EPC), already in the mid-nineties Christopher Hill and William Wallace claimed that:

‘From the perspective of a diplomat in a foreign ministry of a member state, styles of operating and communication have been transformed. The COREU telex network, EPC working groups, joint declarations, joint reporting, even the beginnings of staff exchanges among foreign ministries and shared embassies; all these have moved the conduct of national foreign policy away from the old nation-state national sovereignty model towards a collective endeavor, a form of high level networking with transformationalists effects and even more potential’ (Hill & Wallace 1996: 6).

Jørgensen (1997) exhorted analysts to focus on how participation in EU foreign policy was changing the organization of the domestic structures for foreign policy making and socializing practitioners, a point already made by Dehousee and Weiler (in Jørgensen 1997: 175), leading to a ‘diplomatic republic of Europe’. Simon Nuttall and Philippe de Schoutheete are other pioneers in the limited field of CFSP-triggered Europeanization in foreign ministries. Tonra (2001) in his study of the Europeanization of Danish, Irish and Dutch foreign policies explicitly devotes part of the analysis to investigating the adaptation of foreign ministries and
in general of the policy process to the CFSP, providing substantial empirical evidence of change. Recently, Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006), have pointed out that: ‘national administrations as well as Brussels-based administrators have a very close relationship (in the CFSP). There is a constant interaction which, in turn, shapes the decisions and instruments that are adopted. Under the EPC, the amount of penetration by Brussels of national foreign policy establishments was relatively limited, but with the rapid growth of the CFSP that penetration has increased perceptibly’ (Duke & Vanhoonaker 2006: 182).

Thus, the CFSP might Europeanize national foreign ministries. The main reason is that diplomats in foreign ministries perform a key role in the CFSP (Duke & Vanhoonaker 2006); the CFSP falls under the administrative responsibility of foreign ministries in the capitals of EU Member States. National bureaucrats contribute to all the different phases of the process: agenda shaping (especially while holding the Presidency, Smith 2000: 621); decision shaping, in particular through their representatives in the Council Working Groups (CWGs), the PSC and the COREPER II; implementation, in particular through the activities of embassies abroad.

Assumed then that the CFSP impacts on national foreign ministries, how to assess its effect if not to measure it? Smith’s main contribution lies in having provided an initial systematization of several scattered claims into a clearer conceptual framework, with clearly framed indicators. However, in his article Smith does not explicitly present the theoretical background of his framework. I argue that by embedding Smith’s insights into two broad meta-theoretical views of social reality, Rationalism and Constructivism, Smith’s framework becomes suitable as this thesis’s theoretical setting and fully accomplishes its tasks. In the following section, after a presentation of a rationalist and constructivist CFSP, I present in more details Smith’s areas of observation.

CFSP-triggered Europeanization in Foreign Ministries: (Differential) Gains for the Foreign Ministry?

Rationalism sees the CFSP essentially as a bargaining arena or an interest based regime (Tonra 2003). Cooperation takes place through an intergovernmentalist logic: states with different preferences conclude agreements with each other exploiting the beneficial effect of
institutional settings which promote cooperation (Smith 2004b: 23). How? Institutions provide opportunities, resources: institutions help states to reach a collectively superior outcome, reducing transaction costs and increasing states’ information about each other behavior; in addition, institutions create incentives for rules following and for avoiding non-compliance (Schimmelfennig 2004: 78). The institutionalization of foreign and security policy cooperation among the states of Europe (Smith 2004b) leads to mutual gains for the different participants: yet, preferences remain unaffected by interaction. Institutionalization creates an arena for bargaining rather than a common and shared identity or normative field.

Yet, how does the CFSP interact with the domestic level in this account? I argue that a rationalist CFSP might affect domestic politics as a ‘structure of opportunities’ (Hix & Goetz 2000), ‘which offers some actors additional resources to exert influence, while severely constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals’ (Börzel & Risse 2000: 6). The conceptualization of the domestic impact of Europe as a structure of opportunities provoking a redistribution of resources at the domestic level represents a major approach in the study of Europeanization. In this way, the study of CFSP-triggered Europeanization becomes linked closely with mainstream studies of domestic adaptation to European integration. Participation in the CFSP offers information, expertise, exit possibilities, financial and human capital as well as power and influence to the participants. As in Hix and Goetz (2000), EU foreign policy cooperation could ‘provide executive officials from different member states with an arena for sharing expertise and information, away from domestic interest groups, the media, parliament and courts’. Adaptation to the CFSP, i.e. Europeanization, proceeds following a ‘logic of consequentiality’ rather than a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Börzel & Risse 2000). Foreign ministries and their personnel use in other terms the windows of opportunity offered by the CFSP in order to reassert or rather further confirm their power position domestically. The CFSP works in this account through a mechanism of bureaucratization which mainly benefits the foreign ministries. Different policy areas, as shown in the literature, benefits rather diverse parts of domestic administration: for instance, participation in first pillar Commission led policy making mainly strengthens the ministries mostly involved with it (Goetz & Meyer-Sahling 2008). In sum, following a ‘rationalist’ account, CFSP Europeanization takes place as the policy, a structure of opportunities which offers to foreign ministries additional resources, triggers a redistribution of resources with benefits them, translating in gains for ministries.

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A ‘rationalist’ understanding of CFSP triggered Europeanization of foreign ministries might lead to the following question: *does the CFSP ‘benefit’ foreign ministries?* Thus, the ‘rationalist’ hypotheses for this thesis are the following:

\[ a) \text{ Participation in the CFSP translates in more resources for foreign ministries: the CFSP offers them the opportunity to reinforce their domestic position.} \]

The ancillary hypothesis is:

\[ b) \text{ Those branches of a foreign ministry’s organization mostly involved with the CFSP gain more than others.} \]

On the basis of Smith (2000) and Hill (in Jørgensen 1997: 177), I propose to assess the impact of the CFSP on the foreign ministry *via* redistribution of resources in two areas of observation:

**Resources of the Foreign Ministry**

As Smith points out: ‘there is little doubt that political cooperation prompted a common trend towards the expansion is size and finance of foreign ministries’ and ‘the expansion most directly related to political cooperation involves the growth of staffs and budgets in national foreign ministries’ (Smith 2000: 621). Thus, one of the most explicit types of evidence of CFSP-triggered Europeanization will be then an increase in the human and financial resources of the foreign ministry. Is a larger budget a ‘gain’? As in Karvonen and Sundelius (1990: 217), the assumption is that ministries with a larger share of the state’s budget exercise a greater degree of control over government’s policies. Hence, an increased budget might also confirm Smith’s claim that foreign ministries have ‘become better able to assert some central or strategic political control over external relations in their respective governments owing to the need to coordinate foreign policies’ (Smith 2000: 621).

**Comparison of Resources**

How does the CFSP influence the distribution of staff and finances among the diverse departments and representations abroad of a foreign ministry? According to the ancillary hypothesis, I expect that the CFSP increases the resources of those branches of the ministry mostly involved with it. What are these branches? Hill has argued that the CFSP mainly ‘revitalize’ the political departments of foreign ministries (Hill in Jørgensen 1997: 177). I will
also look at the resources of the Permanent Representation in Brussels, a part of the ministry which plays such an important role in EU policy (Kassim et al. 2000).

**CFSP-triggered Europeanization in Foreign Ministries: Transforming the Ministry?**

The basic tenets of Constructivism are: first, there is an ontological distinction between the natural and the social world. The former is made of facts, of materiality. The latter is composed of social reality, ‘construed by means of human conventions and intersubjective understandings’ (Aalbert 2004: 35). Second, social structures and agents are mutually constitutive. Neither agency nor structure prevails. The ontology of Constructivism stands in the middle between individualism and structuralism: ‘the social environment in which we find ourselves defines (constitutes) who we are, our identities as social beings. (…) At the same time, human agency creates, reproduces and changes the social environment through daily practices’ (Risse 2004). And as our environment changes, we also become different. Interests, preferences, identities are formed by interaction, not exogenous or determined by the structure. Third, politics is about creating a shared meaning through communication and discursive practices. Constructivism emphasizes the importance of language. Also in this case however, Constructivism occupies a middle ground between those perspectives which basically deny the relevance of linguistic utterances, perceived as completely dependent on material interests; and those views (Postmodernism) which tend to equate language and discourse with social reality *tout court*. Fourth, institutions are more than arenas or means to achieve gains from cooperation: they change social identities and the fundamental interests of actors (ibid.).

Constructivism asserts that EU membership matters in a much more deep sense that Rationalism. The EU is an institutional setting which changes the identities and the interests of those involved. European integration is a structure of meaning, a system of rules and norms which impacts on domestic actors changing their perception of their Self and their role. The impact is also in this case differential: domestic factors, intervening variables, mediate the impact of EU norms and rules. Europeanization is national adaptation in the sense of a real transformation of domestic interests; in addition, Europeanization promotes exchange of ideas and socialization, and the reconstruction of identity through dynamics of ‘cross-loading’ and
mutual influence leading to a shared definition of European and national interest (Wong 2005).

A constructivist conceptualization of the CFSP sees the policy as a cognitive regime, a set of principled and shared understandings of acceptable norms of social behavior (Tonra 2003). This characterization implies the following: first, the CFSP is an environment which alters the roles of the actors involved; second, the CFSP presents constitutive rules which lead to common understanding; third, the CFSP transforms foreign policy identity and move foreign policy making away from the traditional, sovereignty centered model; fourth, the CFSP creates and disseminates values and ideas. The CFSP is an environment where actors’ identities and interests evolve and change through interaction. Constructivism explains the ‘coordination reflex’, referring to the habit of policy makers involved in the CFSP settings to seek out the opinions of each other before making their mind on an issue (Tonra 2003: 739). The roles of national actors evolve to the point that ‘trust, shared interests and familiarity encourages further contact, further integration, an expansion of the number of topics appropriate for discussion, and the development of common definitions of problems and appropriate actions’ (March & Olsen in Tonra 2003: 740). Adopting the vocabulary of New Institutionalism, foreign policy makers in the CFSP develop a ‘logic of appropriateness’, whereby they play according to the role which is socially appropriate in the context. The CFSP is a rules based policy area. CFSP rules are however not only regulative but constitutive. Thus, they lead to the formation of an identity for collective action; they promote the internalization of common interests and expectations and are conducive to common actions based on mutual understanding. The CFSP in addition changes the foreign policy identity of the participants, spreading and reinforcing values and ideas. Values indeed are at the core of the policy area: the CFSP aims explicitly at ‘safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union’ (Treaty on European Union, Title V).

A constructivist understanding of CFSP triggered Europeanization of foreign ministries asks: do foreign ministries adapt to the CFSP ‘norms, roles, rules and identities’ using Tonra’s phrasing? In other terms, does the CFSP ‘transform’ foreign ministries? The hypotheses are the following:
c) Participation in the CFSP leads to bureaucratic adaptation in foreign ministries.

d) Participation in the CFSP adapts the institutional culture of the ministry to the norms of the CFSP and promotes diplomats’ socialization.

Following Constructivism, foreign ministries are expected to internalize the CFSP norms: the main rationale behind adaptation is ‘to link more effectively national foreign policies into the process and procedures of the collective foreign policy machine’ (Tonra 2003: 740). Smith refers to this process as bureaucratic adaptation. As changes are permanent and institutionalized into organizational reforms for instance, ‘political cooperation is enhanced’ (Smith 2000).

In addition to bureaucratic adaptation, a constructivist view of the CFSP emphasizes the socializing effects of CFSP norms on national diplomats and ministries’ institutional culture (Jørgensen 1997; Smith 2000; Pomorska 2007). The hypothesis is that national diplomats internalize the norms of CFSP policy making. Smith (2000) refers to elite socialization presenting two main indicators of change: increased familiarity with other participants’ positions, and a positive attitude towards the development of political cooperation perceived as a mean ‘to enhance national foreign policy capabilities’ (ibid. 619).

Smith (2000) identifies three main areas of observations for CFSP bureaucratic adaptation in foreign ministries: creation of new posts to deal with the CFSP, expansion of the national diplomatic service, reorientation and reorganization of administrative structures. Karolina Pomorska (2007) in her study of the Europeanization of the Polish Foreign Ministry essentially bases her analysis on Smith’s indicators. Yet, she also proposes to focus attention on changes in the informal organization, the ‘ways of doing things’, and the institutional culture of the ministry. Thus, following Smith and Pomorska, I propose to look at the following areas of observation in order to assess CFSP-triggered Europeanization as bureaucratic adaptation and socialization in foreign ministries:

**New Posts and Officials**

This is clear indicator of bureaucratic adaptation in the ministry and the first area of change indicated by Smith. The CFSP creates a ‘coordination reflex’, the idea that ‘the national
position is not clear until partners’ views have been considered’ (Tonra 2003: 740). The process triggers adaptation in the organization of national foreign ministries. Bureaucracies harmonize their administrative processes to the collective rhythm of the CFSP. Foreign ministries establish new posts for linking effectively national foreign policy with the CFSP (Smith 2000).

**Expansion of the Diplomatic Network**
A second area of investigation crucial for the assessment of bureaucratic adaptation is expansion in a country’s diplomatic network. Smith has argued the participation in the CFSP has increased the number of representations abroad: ‘political cooperation encourages the expansion of most national diplomatic services’, in order to face the increased workload brought by the CFSP (Smith 2000: 620). Foreign ministries staff and finance diplomatic networks abroad. An increased number of embassies therefore might further confirm a general expansion in the size and finance of the Ministry, as well as in its personnel. Yet, it might also be the case that the Ministry has opened more embassies while at the same time decreasing the number of personnel in them.

**Reorganization**
The CFSP might also lead to broader organizational reforms. In particular, the size of foreign ministries seems to play a role: the smaller the state, the more probable a reorganization (ibid.). The empirical challenge is to assess whether organizational reforms are triggered by the CFSP or by other reasons: it is plausible that foreign ministries periodically redesign their organization as a routine rather than explicitly to make their participation in the CFSP more efficient. Globalization and New Public Management doctrine represent relevant possible competing explanations. This indicator however refers exclusively to CFSP-triggered organizational reforms.

**Adaptation of ‘Ways of Doing Things’ to the CFSP**
This indicator aims at capturing whether the ministry has adapted its schedule, agenda and working ‘tempo’ to the CFSP. This area of observation provides a further indication of bureaucratic adaptation. Participants’ memories and interviews might shed light on the matter.

I will refer to the previous four areas of observations in order to assess CFSP-triggered bureaucratic adaptation, both formally and informally. Yet, how to account for CFSP socialization? As said, constructivists take socialization seriously. The concept refers to the
process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community (Checkel 2005). What are the CFSP ‘norms’ which are expected to influence national foreign ministries and diplomats? I propose to focus on how the CFSP as collective foreign policy making might have altered foreign policy tradition and the conception of state sovereignty. Constructivism sees sovereignty as a social identity which can change through interaction (Wendt 1994: 388). Agency and structure are mutually constitutive and ‘endogenous’. The content of sovereignty is open to change; it is indeterminate and based on shared understandings and interests (Aalberts 2004: 39).

Foreign ministries are symbols of a state centric, Westphalian conception of sovereignty centered on the idea of national interests. In an ideal typical Westphalian international system, sovereignty is ‘what links the international arena to the domestic by combining influence from outside interference (external sovereignty) with authority over jurisdiction (internal sovereignty). In terms of domestic versus foreign policy, this means that the former is organized through supremacy of the government (hierarchy) whereas the latter is based on foreign equality among governments (a lack of supremacy or ‘anarchy’)’ (ibid.: 24).

The CFSP challenges the Westphalian norms, promoting a ‘common’, collective, shared understanding of sovereignty. In other terms, the CFSP transforms sovereignty as it gives a value added to the national foreign policy; EU-level political cooperation leads indeed to an extension of national sovereignty through sharing capabilities based on common interests, values and principles. Hence, the CFSP might socialize foreign ministries changing their institutional culture: foreign ministries become EU ministries and national diplomats EU diplomats. The CFSP should lead in other terms to what Jørgensen calls the ‘diplomatic republic of Europe’ (Jørgensen 1997).

Focusing on the CFSP ‘norm’ of shared sovereignty, I propose to assess CFSP-triggered socialization in foreign ministries in the following area of observation:

**Ministry’s Views of the CFSP**

I argue that the way the ministry officially sees the CFSP might be indicative of how deeply EU foreign policy norms have been internalized by the institution. There is evidence of institutional socialization in the CFSP normative regime if ministries see the CFSP as ‘a way to enhance their own foreign policy capabilities’ (Smith 2000: 619). In addition, I propose to look at how foreign ministries perceive further developments in the EU foreign policy
cooperation and in particular the establishment of the EEAS and at how ministries have adapted their training programs as to accommodate the EU dimension, the CFSP in particular.
Chapter 3: The UM and Finnish Foreign Policy Management

In this chapter I begin the empirical analysis of CFSP-triggered Europeanization in the UM. Here, I aim specifically at presenting the foreign policy decision making process in Finland, the institutional context of the UM. There is agreement in the literature that Europeanization research needs to take into account the role of mediating domestic institutions (Graziano and Vink 2007). While in other areas of Europeanization research there exists an already fairly systematized account of how domestic factors ‘filter’ EU developments, this is not the case when the focus is on foreign ministries’ adaptation. The hypothesis is that CFSP membership is able to trigger change and adaptation in national foreign ministries; yet, there are at least three non EU-level intervening variables which might influence the outcome of adaptation in foreign ministries, facilitating or instead resisting Europeanization: first, the formal role of the Ministry in the foreign policy making process; second, the size of the ministry; third, the foreign policy tradition. The preliminary assessment of these factors is necessary for interpreting adaptation as well as contextualizing and comparing the results of the empirical analysis.

The UM in Foreign Policy Decision Making in Finland: From ‘Primus Inter Pares’ to ‘Normal’ Ministry

In this section, I present the position of the UM in the Finnish foreign policy decision making process. I focus on the UM and on two other actors: the Finnish President and the PM. Changes in the balance of power between the ‘two executives’ of the country might influence the adaptation of the UM to European integration in general and the CFSP in particular. (Temmes 1995). Foreign policy making in Finland is centered on a very small group of key decision makers: the President, the Prime Minister (PM) and the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Murto 2008). This is not surprising if, as Hill (2003: 57) puts it, ‘even in democracies the political structure is usually canted towards making foreign policy a special area, with maximum freedom for the key elite’. During Kekkonen’ presidency (1953-1982) in particular and until the new Constitution of 2000,9 the President had the lead in foreign policy decision

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9 The Constitution was drafted in 1999. It entered into force in March 2000 (Forsberg & Vogt 2008).
making, while the PM was somewhat sidelined. The UM administered the preparation and the implementation of foreign policy decisions. It was ‘the President’s ministry’ (Soikkanen 2003), a ‘primus inter pares’ among Finnish departments.

During the Cold War the Finnish executive was a dual one (Paloheimo 2003): the President was in charge of foreign policy, while the PM was the main decision maker in economic and financial matters. The challenging geopolitical context of Finland justified and required a distinction between foreign and domestic affairs. Foreign policy was a ‘question of life and death’ (Tiilikainen 2006: 76), especially the maintenance of ‘a good relationship’ with the Soviet Union. The UM was a tool in the hand of the President and acted as an almost ideal type gatekeeper: ‘The Finnish President leads the country’s foreign policy (...) All communications with foreign countries or to Finnish representatives abroad shall be processed through that ministry competent in foreign affairs’ (Finnish Constitution 1919, Art. 33). Evidence of the special relationship between the President and the UM is provided by the fact that, as Paloheimo (2003: 229) puts it: ‘from the 1940s to the early 1990s, the sections on foreign policy in the government program were written in the ministry of foreign affairs on the advice of the President’. In this formal institutional setting, the UM ‘enjoyed a privileged position among Finnish ministries’ (Raunio & Johansson, unpublished paper), ‘it was beyond the influence of the government and the Prime Minister’ and ‘considered as a particularly prestigious institution that safeguarded Finland’ interests in an uncertain world’ (ibid.). As one diplomat I have interviewed put it: ‘before EU membership foreign affairs were foreign affairs and other matters were somewhat less urgent’ (interview, Department for Global Affairs 19.11.2007). After the election to the Presidency of Mauno Koivisto in 1982, however, the domestic institutional context began to change (Murto 2008). Koivisto wished to move foreign policy decision making in the country towards ‘normalization’ (ibid.). The Finnish political system started to move from a semi-presidentialism to parliamentarism, also in foreign policy (Raunio & Wiberg 2001). Since then, the balance of power has progressively shifted in the direction of the PM and of the Parliament.

The ‘critical juncture’ which really altered foreign policy decision making in Finland was the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold war (Paloheimo 2003). The personalized conduct of foreign policy and therefore the influence of the president lost legitimacy. In addition, as I have mentioned, the Finnish political elite desired to secure a more balanced role for the Parliament and the PM. At the beginning of the nineties then, domestic and
external factors changed the position of the President and consequently of ‘his ministry’ in the Finnish political system: ‘when after the end of the Cold War we moved to a normalized situation, and there was no longer the Soviet factor, then the privileged position of the ministry was lost’ (Satuli 2002). Finnish EU membership in 1995 represented then a further factor of change for the all Finnish core executive and political system (Raunio & Saari 2006, Raunio & Johansson, unpublished paper). EU membership acted as a catalyst for a further shift of competences towards the PM and the Parliament in foreign policy decision making (Paloheimo 2003). The PM clearly further reinforced its role as EU affairs were deemed of his competence. The PM exploited strategically EU membership in an internal struggle for more executive power, at the expenses of the President and the UM (Raunio & Johansson, unpublished paper). Line ministries began to develop their own systems for EU policy coordination, bypassing the UM: ‘When the number of international players increased, the ministry lost its monopoly in international affairs’ (Satuli 2003). In March 2000, the entry into force of the new Finnish Constitution formalized the new division of power in foreign policy making: ‘the foreign policy of Finland is directed by the President of the Republic in cooperation with the Government’ (Finnish Constitution 2000, Section 93).

In sum, during the Cold War the UM was the President’s Ministry and a privileged one among Finnish departments; after the end of the Cold War, its position started to be challenged as the President was losing power. Finnish EU membership acted as a ‘catalyst’: it further promoted the reorientation of Finnish foreign policy making towards an increased parliamentarization and a more assertive role for the PM (Raunio & Wiberg 2001). The UM is still the President’s ministry, ‘her ministry’, as one interviewee put it referring to Finnish President Tarja Halonen (interview, Senior Civil Servant 10.1.2008); yet ‘she’ is no longer as powerful as the President used to be during the Cold War. In addition, the increased international activism of traditionally purely domestic ministries have contributed to making the UM a ‘normal’ ministry: ‘after the end of the Cold War we moved to normality’ (Satuli 2002). However, despite its loss in the domestic balance of power, the UM has maintained a crucial role in foreign policy administration, as one interviewee explains:

‘(...) we are those preparing files and positions for the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister and the President. They have a small staff …we are the working hands of the system’ (Interview, Political Department 3.12.2007).
A Small ‘Big’ Ministry

The literature concerned with foreign policy Europeanization takes into account the effect of a country’s size on the process of foreign policy adaptation to EU level developments. Some scholars have argued that smaller Member States tend to convergence with EU foreign policy more decisively (Wong 2005). Arguably, the ministry’s size influences CFSP-triggered adaptation: the smaller the foreign ministry, the deeper the expected outcome of bureaucratic adaptation as EU-level political cooperation simply ‘matters’ more (Jørgensen 1997, Smith 2000).

The UM is a ‘big’ ministry in Finland, as the table below indicates. It is important to emphasize the UM comprises its offices in the capital as well as a rather wide network of more than ninety Finnish representations abroad, a unique organizational asset among Finnish ministries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2007 Data</th>
<th>Ministry’s Personnel</th>
<th>Operating Expenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Ministry</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>195,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>34,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>25,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>20,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data: Finnish Ministry of Finance 2008. Operating expenses are in millions of Euros)

Yet, Finland is indeed a small country (Tiilikainen 2006). Despite the huge expansion of the public sector in Finland since the fifties, the total number of personnel in the Finnish ministries in 2001 was of about six thousand employees (Murto 2008). This makes Finnish administration small in comparative terms. One interviewee clearly expressed the point saying: ‘Finland is so small and our administration is so small, people know each other’ (Interview, Department for Europe 9.11.2007). In addition, ‘smallness’ is part of the political identity of the country (Tiilikainen 2006). It is considered a positive aspect, promoting consensus and cooperation among different parts of the administration (Interview, Department for Europe 9.11.2007).

In comparative terms, the Finnish Foreign Service is actually a small one: for instance, in 1995, the extension of the Finnish diplomatic network and the number of Finnish diplomats abroad was smaller than in other Nordic countries, as the following table indicates (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 1996: 33):
The limited size of the Finnish diplomatic network in comparative terms has been perceived as a potential hindrance to full scale activism in an EU Finland (ibid.). One interviewee, in commenting the possible impact of the EEAS on the ministry, expressed the risk that more resourceful foreign ministries in other EU countries might take the lead in the incoming Service (Interview, Senior Civil Servant 10.1.2008).

**Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition: An Emphasis on Neutrality and Sovereignty**

Since independence, foreign policy has enjoyed a special status in Finland. For a small country with a big eastern neighbor, ‘if foreign and security policy is well managed, all the rest is fine’ (Paasikivi quoted in Torstila 2000a). State centrism and a ‘borderland’ geopolitical location inspired a political identity centered on sovereignty and territoriality (Tiilikainen 2006). This was reflected in the prestige attached to the institution of the Presidency and of the UM, perceived as the defender of Finnish sovereignty and independence (Raunio & Johansson, unpublished paper). For instance, according to a recent survey, the UM is the third most trusted public institution in Finland (Annual Report of the UM 2002: 35). The prestige of the UM is further confirmed by the comment of one interviewee:

> ‘Foreign policy has always been important thanks to our precarious situation. I’ve noticed a big difference between Sweden and Finland in this respect: think of it, Sweden has long been neutral; the last time they were in war was 1809. Also in the US after all the Department of State does not play such a big role? But

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10 The original quote in Finnish is: “Ulkopoliittinen turvallisuus on tärkeintä kaikille kansoille, mutta aivan erikoisesti se on sitä Suomelle. Jos meillä on se, kaikki muu kyllä järjestyy” (Paasikivi quoted in Torstila 2000a).
we do: in the Finnish society we are appreciated and valued. The average Finn looks at us admiring what we do. It is a ‘big thing’, foreign policy and diplomats’ (Interview, Senior Civil Servant 10.1.2008).

The UM and Finnish diplomacy have traditionally been particularly active in Nordic Cooperation, human rights, development policy and multilateral cooperation in the UN (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007). Nordic Cooperation has represented a major focus of Finnish post war ‘identity’ and security policy at least since membership in the Nordic Council in 1952. Neutrality, good relationship with the Soviet Union and sovereignty have represented the traditional cornerstones of Finnish foreign policy (Raunio & Tiilikainen 2003).

Neutrality was a key element of Finnish foreign policy until the beginning of the 90s (Raunio & Tiilikainen 2003; Tiilikainen 2006). Finland remained neutral during the period of ideological conflict between the ‘two blocs’. Finland’s neutrality was however of a special character (Ojanen 2003): formally, it was different from the military, ‘legalistic’ neutralities of Sweden or Switzerland, which for instance did not take part in the Second World War. Finland pursued a policy of neutrality, as pointed by Ojanen (ibid.), ‘differently from that of the other neutrals. With Moscow constantly on the alert and keen to remind Finland of Soviet expectations, it did not come naturally for Finland to maintain equal distance from the two protagonists of the Cold War. Finland often successfully anticipated Soviet reactions and proactively introduced initiatives designed to keep the potential menace at bay’. Since the beginning of the nineties, Finland has moved from neutrality to military non-alignment (Raunio & Tiilikainen 2003). At present, Finland is not a member of any military alliance, despite a clear commitment to EU peacekeeping and civilian crisis management.

During the Cold War, maintaining a good relationship with the Soviet Union was arguably the main rationale of Finnish diplomacy. The very existence of an independent Finland depended on the quality of that relationship. In 1948, Finland signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet Union. Finland became ‘linked’ with its eastern neighbor. As I have mentioned, the need of ensuring effectiveness and coordination when dealing with the Soviets legitimized the dual executive and the pre-eminence of the President in foreign policy making: in other terms, a ‘personalized’ foreign policy was considered the best solution when dealing with the Soviet Union.
Sovereignty has traditionally been another central element of Finnish foreign policy: it has emphasized the importance of territorial integrity and independence and inspired for a long period a ‘realist’ foreign policy, in which the key challenge for Finland was to survive in an anarchical world dominated by Great Powers: ‘only big players play a decisive role at the world stage’ (Paasikivi quoted in Tiilikainen 2006: 75).

**CFSP-Triggered Europeanization in the Finnish Foreign Ministry**

How do domestic formal and informal institutional factors influence foreign ministries’ adaptation to European integration? In the Finnish case, the UM emerges as a traditionally influential ministry in a small country where foreign and security policy has, since independence in 1917, traditionally occupied a crucial position. Formal and informal institutions have contributed in framing a privileged status for the UM, that part of state bureaucracy in charge of maintaining Finnish sovereignty and promoting the Finnish national interest: the Ministry was the President’s ministry (Soikkanen 2003) and it still performs a major role in the conduct of Finnish international relations, despite recent constitutional changes.

More precisely, the small size of Finnish administration is expected to facilitate bureaucratic adaptation to the CFSP in the UM. Finnish foreign policy tradition, with an emphasis on state centrism, sovereignty and independence, should hinder on the one hand elite socialization and changes in the institutional culture of the UM. On the other, the traditionally privileged position of the UM shall facilitate a CFSP-triggered redistribution of resources in the Finnish core executive, benefiting the Ministry.
Chapter 4: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and the CFSP: Gains for Ministry?

In Finland, EU membership has enhanced the powers of the PM while decreasing the influence of the President as I have mentioned (Raunio & Wiberg 2001). Yet, to a large extent, foreign policy management has remained a special domain of public policy. How has EU membership and CFSP participation in particular ‘impacted’ on the Finnish foreign policy process? The literature concerned with the Europeanization of the Finnish core executive considers the UM a ‘looser’ of integration: as the President has lost power, also the UM has been deprived of its traditional prestige and influence. Raunio has pointed out how the Finnish PM has strategically used Finnish EU membership in order to strengthen its position in particular vis-à-vis the Ministry (Raunio & Johansson, unpublished paper). Yet, has the UM reacted? Has Finnish participation in the CFSP ‘benefited’ the Ministry?

In this chapter I provide a partial contribution to the study of UM’s Europeanization. I focus on CFSP-triggered resources’ redistribution. I base the analysis on a ‘rationalist’ understanding of the CFSP as a structure of opportunities which (re)distribute gains and looses in the foreign ministry and the core executive. The hypotheses are the following:

\[ a) \text{ Participation in the CFSP translates in more resources for foreign ministries:} \]
\[ \text{the CFSP offers them the opportunity to reinforce their domestic position.} \]

\[ b) \text{ Those branches of a foreign ministry’s organization mostly involved with the} \]
\[ \text{CFSP gain more than others.} \]

The independent variable is CFSP membership. The resources framework of the UM represents the general dependent variable. Data regarding human and financial resources in the Ministry are the empirical indicators for gains and ‘resources’. Official sources of information, interview material and secondary sources provide the data for the analysis. The time frame of the study mainly covers the period of Finnish membership in the EU.

I divide the discussion as follows: first, I present the Europeanization of the UM’s coordinating function; second, I introduce the misfit between the CFSP and domestic
resources; third, the strategy of the Ministry; fourth, I assess whether there has actually been a CFSP-triggered redistribution of resources leading to a strengthened role for the UM in the Finnish core executive. Finally, I conclude summarizing the findings.

The Challenge of Coordinating EU Policy: Loses for the UM

Traditionally, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been a ‘winner’ in the Finnish domestic political system: ‘at the time of Kekkonen and the Soviet Union, nobody questioned the resources of the Ministry’ (Satuli 2002). As pointed by one interviewee, the Cold War was a ‘gold mine for the UM’ (interview, Senior Civil Servant 10.1.2008). The UM acted as an almost ideal typical gatekeeper between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ with a full monopoly in the coordination of Finland’s international affairs: ‘this Ministry was at the top of everything when the President’s role was strong’ (ibid.). The disappearance of the main point of reference of post Second World War Finnish foreign and security policy, i.e. the Soviet Union, changed Finnish foreign and security policy and the environment of the Ministry. In the beginning of the 90s Finland moved decisively ‘from Moscow to Brussels’ (Penttilä 1993). In March 1994, the government of Prime Minister Aho signed the Treaty of Maastricht. On the first of January 1995, following the result of consultative national referendum held in October 1994, Finland became a member of the EU.

In preparation of membership, Finland developed a new system for external policy coordination. The principle was that EU affairs did not represent a separated whole. Rather, different ministries dealt with EU affairs according to their field of responsibility (Temmes 1995). The CFSP became the ‘core’ EU competence of the UM. The Ministry was also in charge of following EC trade and development policy and of representing Finland in front of the ECJ. In addition, the UM was in charge of ‘every EU matter ‘which does not fall under the responsibility of other ministries’ (Annual Report of the UM 1996: 1) and of ‘supporting the competent ministries in the coordination of Finnish EU policy’ (ibid.). In its first annual report after EU membership the UM pointed out clearly that:

‘(EU) Membership has not altered the balance of power between ministries in Finland. The ministries are responsible for EU matters in their field of competence, according to the instructions of the Government’ (Annual Report of the UM 1996:1)
The UM maintained its traditionally privileged position during the negotiations between Finland and the EU. Personnel from the UM was in charge of the process (interview, Department for Europe 12.11.2007). In addition, the UM dominated the national coordination system and staff from the Ministry chaired all the coordinating bodies (Temmes 1995). Yet, after membership was finally achieved, the gate-keeping role of the UM was challenged. Internal affairs, financial, economic and monetary policy acquired an international, European dimension. EU membership allowed traditionally domestic ministries to ‘exit’ the domestic arena. This was arguably a major change: the Ministry was not used to competitors in the ‘foreign’ arena (on the limited internationalization of Finnish ministries, see Karvonen & Sundelius 1990).

Since membership, the key principle of the Finnish system for EU policy coordination has been departmental autonomy (Raunio & Wiberg 2001). This implies that decision making authority is fragmented and ‘each ministry enjoys much freedom of action both in the preparation of issues and in actual decision making’ (ibid.). Thus, in order to speak with one voice on all levels of decision shaping in Brussels, an aim particularly significant for a small country as Finland, it is essential to maintain coordination.

Initially, the UM was in charge of the task. The Ministry acted as the overall supervisor of Finnish EU policy coordination. The Ministry was responsible for ensuring its smooth functioning and effectiveness. The decree on the Finnish Foreign Service of February 1995 listed: ‘supporting the competent ministries in the coordination of Finnish positions in EU affairs’ as one of the seven key tasks of the UM (Decree on the Finnish Foreign Service 1995). The Ministry was the organizational locus of the EU Secretariat, a bureau located directly under the responsibility of the Foreign Minister. The Secretariat’s main duty was ‘to oversee the coordination of EU affairs’ and ‘to serve as the secretariat for the Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs and the chair and secretariat for the Committee for EU Affairs’ (Finnish Government 2008c). Moreover, a new ministerial post was established and located in the UM explicitly for EU policy coordination, the Minister of European Affairs (Raunio & Wiberg 2001). Between 1995 and 2000, the Finnish EU policy coordination system can be described as foreign ministry-led (see Kassim et al. 2000).

In 2000 however, the Prime Minister assumed the task of supervising Finnish EU policy coordination system (Laffan 2006). The EU Secretariat was moved then from the UM to the
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) while the government Lipponen II, in 1999, did not appoint a
Minister for European Affairs anymore. Probably, the decision to move the Secretariat has
been taken earlier, yet implemented later as not to interfere with the first Finnish EU
Presidency in the second half of 1999 (Raunio & Johansson, unpublished paper). In 2000, the
Finnish Parliament approved a new Decree on the Finnish Foreign Service where the task of
supporting other ministries in EU policy coordination was not mentioned anymore (Decree on
the Finnish Foreign Service 2000). Since 2000, the Finnish system can be then described as
PM-led (Laffan 2006). The current Vanhanen II government has appointed again a Minister
for European Affairs, Ms. Thors. Not surprisingly, she is located in the PMO (Finnish
Government 2008a).

The movement of the EU Secretariat raised some opposition and criticism in the UM in 2000
(interview, Administrative Department 3.12.2007; interview, Department for Europe
12.11.2007; interview, Senior Civil Servant 10.1.2008). However, only one of the UM
officials I have interviewed has explicitly questioned the decision. Pointing out that the
present PM-led system is not immune to conflict, the commentator emphasized the
importance of the EU sub-committees (see Finnish Government 2008c) in solving
controversies between ministries (interview, Department for Europe 12.5.2008). Moreover,
the interviewee said the option of bringing the EU Secretariat back in the UM ‘should not be
excluded a priori’ (ibid.). The majority of the interviewees, when asked to comment about the
movement of the EU Secretariat in 2000, seemed however satisfied with the performance of
the actual PM-led arrangement. Adopting a pragmatic stance, which the smallness of the
administration and the consensus-oriented administrative tradition of the country largely
explains, one commentator said:

‘I think that the most important thing is that things work well (...). It was a bad idea to have the Secretariat
here in the first place ... the movement was quite natural, as the PM is after all the head of EU issues’
(interview, Department for Europe 9.11.2007).

How then to account for the Europeanization of the Finnish core executive from the
perspective of the UM? First, the UM has lost power domestically as EU membership has
enhanced the power of the PM. Second, EU membership has allowed other ministries to ’exit’
the domestic arena. The UM is no longer a full gatekeeper. It is interesting to note that the
movement of the EU Secretariat from the UM to the PMO, the entry into force of the new
Constitution and the new decree fixing the tasks of the UM almost coincided. However, I
argue that the UM has reacted to the exhaustion of its coordinating function and the rise of PM’s powers: first, the UM has attempted at maintaining a relevant role in Finnish EU policy coordination, especially in EU’s external relations, enlargement, and institutional questions. In 2000, after the movement of the EU Secretariat to the PMO, a new Unit for the Coordination of General EU Affairs was established in the Ministry following the creation of a division for General EU Affairs (Annual Report of the UM 2001: 4). Second, the UM has presented itself as boundary spanner and coherence-provider: ‘when there are so many autonomous players, it is even more important how we assure coherence. A new, more extended role of the UM shall be in providing coherence in preparation and coordination’ as Secretary of State and Ambassador Antti Satuli (2002) put it. Finally and most importantly, the UM has strategically attempted at exploiting its ‘core’ EU competence, participation in EU level foreign and security policy, as a window of opportunity for readressing its relative domestic decline and regaining its traditional prestige and status.

The CFSP as a ‘Structure of Opportunities’

Finnish EU membership has profoundly Europeanized Finnish foreign and security policy. Tiilikainen has even talked of ‘complete makeover’ (Tiilikainen 2006). While there is some literature on the Europeanization of Finnish foreign policy (Forsberg & Vogt 2008; Tiilikainen in Raunio & Saari 2006), even less attention has been devoted to the adaptation of the main Finnish foreign policy manager, the UM, to European integration and in particular to the CFSP. Here, I argue that the UM has strategically attempted to use Finnish participation in the CFSP as a way to counterbalance the increase of PM’s power in the country and to react against a decline in resources, the ‘resource challenge’.

The achievement of EU membership in 1995 was ‘an essential change in the field of action of the Foreign Service’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001). The UM assumed new tasks: in particular it became in charge, since the first of January of 1995, of ‘developing and implementing the CFSP according to the procedures and for the achievement of the objectives set by the Treaty of Maastricht (Annual Report of the UM 1996: 2). The CFSP did not exhaust however the new EU-related functions of the Ministry, as previously said.

Focusing on the CFSP, there is evidence that the policy represented at the same time a major challenge and opportunity, in particular for a small, in comparative terms, administration.
First, EU level foreign and security policy cooperation offered to the UM and its officials access to EU decision making settings: UM bureaucrats became able to acquire highly valuable information and expertise. Second, all of Finland, as put by the UM, gained a ‘channel of global influence for the promotion of our important interests and values and for the reinforcement of the international status of Finland. The UM participates in the CFSP activities willing to influence its development’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001). The Northern Dimension Initiative is arguably the best example of Finnish foreign policy uploading to the EU-level (Ojanen 1999; Arter 2000). In the official documents of the Ministry, there are plenty of references to the CFSP as an opportunity: ‘as a member state of the EU, Finland is stronger and more capable than ever. As an EU member state Finland has the opportunity to promote its interests globally and to take part in international cooperation for the defense of human rights and peace’; or ‘the image of Finland as a responsible player (in international affairs) has been reinforced, especially through activism at the EU level’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001: 13). Third, Finnish diplomats could ‘exit’ the traditional and somewhat peripheral context of Finnish foreign and security policy. As pointed by one of the interviewee:

‘Being only Finland, we are a very small country. Yet now we are part of a larger player. Now we can really influence global politics. In the EU, also if we are a small country, if we have something to offer we can do it. We start at the experts’ level … I think that being a young diplomat in a EU Finland is more rewarding than it used to be’ (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007).

Yet, the CFSP has also brought major challenges to the UM. First, EU-level foreign policy cooperation has greatly expanded the traditional agenda of the UM: if on the one hand this has made the work of Finnish diplomats more interesting, the growth of the agenda has put pressures on the personnel, the organization and the finances of the Ministry. ‘The UM now needs to specialize in more issues and areas than before’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001). Expertise is needed in matters which, before EU membership, were not particularly relevant for Finnish foreign and security policy: for instance, the Mediterranean region or political aspects of development cooperation in Africa or the Middle East: ‘Finnish EU membership has brought more concrete political and security aspects in our relations with countries in the Middle East’, as a report of the Ministry points out (ibid.). Second, and of course logically related to the previous challenge, participation in the CFSP has provoked a ‘tremendous increase’ (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007) in the workload of the UM: ‘the number of issues about which Finland need to take a stance has increased’ (Ministry
for Foreign Affairs of Finland 1996: 2). Third, the CFSP has also increased the tasks of Finnish representations abroad:

‘Because of EU membership, the activities of Finnish representations have increased horizontally and in number. At the same time however the human resources of the diplomatic network have been reduced, because of a declining budget and pressures related to the opening of new embassies’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001:51).

The CFSP on the other hand contributed to enhance the importance of representations abroad. ‘EU membership has expanded the need for the promotion of Finnish interests (…).’ (ibid.). As pointed by one interviewee:

‘There was a debate in Finland before accession about the utility of bilateral embassies in EU countries after membership. Yet, everybody has now realized that our embassies are more important now than before: if you wish to influence EU decision making, you must begin to act in the capitals, well before issues are taken to Brussels’ (interview, Department for Europe 9.11.2007).

As the CFSP is mainly based on coordination among member states ‘influence of EU decision making requires active and intense participation in the capitals’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001: 17). Fourth, a major CFSP related challenge for the UM has been the Finnish Presidency of the EU Council. While holding the Presidency, a EU member state ‘shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy’ and ‘be responsible for the implementation of decisions’ taken in the CFSP (Treaty on European Union, Title V). In 1999 the UM played a crucial role in the organization of the first Finnish EU Presidency: ‘we were over prepared’, reminds one interviewee (interview, Department for Europe 9.11.2007). In 2006, at the time of the second Finnish EU Presidency, the UM played a less pivotal role, as it has to share the task with the PMO, a fact which brings further evidence to the thesis of the rise of PM powers as a result of Europeanization. Holding the Presidency has required more financial and human resources, as well as organizational posts to deal explicitly with it. As Secretary of State Torstila commented: ‘Finland has never experienced since its independence such a great diplomatic and international challenge as holding an EU Presidency’ (Torstila 2000b).

In sum, after a preliminary analysis the impact of the CFSP on foreign ministries seem controversial. It appears that in the Finnish case the CFSP has been at the same time an opportunity and a challenge: the CFSP clearly contributed in making the declining trend in Ministry’s resources increasingly unsustainable. Yet, paradoxically, it also offered more
opportunities and a powerful argument for claiming more resources as I will present in the next section.

The Strategy of the Ministry: ‘Voicing’ for More Resources

After the end of the Cold War and until EU membership, the resources of the Ministry drastically declined: its overall budget was reduced of almost thirty percent in real terms (data from Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001) and between 1992 and 1995 the UM did not recruit new diplomats (Annual Report of the UM 1996). Moreover, the number of diplomats sent to Finnish representations abroad diminished to the point that the UM warned that ‘we cannot reduce the number of personnel anymore without compromising the role and functions of our embassies’ (ibid.: 33).

EU membership impacted on the financial and human resources of the UM: ‘membership in the EU has not only meant an increase in the tasks of the Ministry, it has also led to a reorientation of resources, especially as those were decreasing in real terms’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001: 5). The need for activism and effectiveness in the CFSP emphasized since the accession the misfit between the UM’s ‘aims’ and ‘means’. The UM was in a paradoxical situation: following Finnish EU membership, expectations on the UM were increasing while its resources decreasing: ‘the normalization has forced also the UM under the same fiscal discipline of other ministries’ (Satuli 2002). The Ministry reacted to the resource challenge by rationalizing its organization and reorienting resources. Yet, the Ministry also voiced its need for more human and financial capabilities.

The UM attempted at readdressing the misfit between resources and tasks. It tried to exploit Finnish participation in the CFSP as a mean to acquire ‘more money, more posts and its traditional prestige’ (Helsingin Sanomat 12.6.2001). The Ministry voiced its dissatisfaction and paradoxical condition in front of the Finnish Parliament with the report: ‘The Challenges of the Finnish Foreign Affairs Administration in 2000’ in June 2001 (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001). With this report ‘for the first time in its history, the UM has reported on its expanding field of action and the resources needed in one single document’ (ibid.: 34). In addition, the Ministry promoted a wide debate on its role and functions among the general public. The report came after a series of crucial events taking place in the Finnish core executive: in 1999 (between June and December), Finland held for the first time the
Presidency of the EU Council; in the summer of 2000, the EU Secretariat was moved to the PMO; in 2000, the new Constitution reducing the power of the President entered into force and in 2000 a new Decree on the Finnish Foreign Service minimized the role of the Ministry in EU policy coordination.

The logic behind the UM’s ‘voice’ is understandable taking into account the traditional prestige of foreign policy in Finland, the state centric political tradition and a concern with the defense of Finnish national interests and security. First, in line with the high status of foreign and security policy in the country and the prestige of the UM, the Ministry faced the challenges of EU level foreign policy cooperation promoting a comprehensive and ambitious approach to the CFSP, irrespective of the relative small size of the Finnish administration:

‘Our representatives shall deal with every matter. There can be no issues in which Finland has not a position (…) Finland has not let the chair empty nor has renounced to its right, as EU member, to take a stance on every matter on the agenda’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001:17).

The ambition of Finnish contribution to the CFSP has not changed recently. As an interviewee put it:

‘We have never wanted to be a country with only two or three priorities. We have never thought about sitting in the room and then just wake up when Russia is mentioned. We have to follow everything. If we want that others care about our priorities, we must be aware of others’. (The CFSP) is a common EU policy that is why we need to be very active’ (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007).

In short, as pointed by the 2001 Report, ‘the level of expectations of Finnish foreign and security policy is high and its maintenance requires resources’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001a). Second, the UM emphasized state centrim:

‘Close international cooperation is needed, and yet - while integration proceeds and EU and NATO get more members, nation-states will still remain central to the conduct of international affairs. The state is still the key actor and the final guarantor in providing security to the nation and its citizens’ (Torstila 2001).

Third, the UM put the accent on the importance of diplomacy and the need for a robust and well staffed network of Finnish embassies and representations abroad, for the promotion of Finnish national interests, also in the EU: ‘the field of activities of the CFSP is expanding. Finland can not safeguard its own national interests in the EU without active participation’
As a top official in the Ministry put it: ‘Diplomacy is Finland’s first line of defense. It is in the interest of this nation to keep its diplomatic machinery in good shape’ (Torstila 2001). The UM rejected clearly in its report the possibility of letting other EU countries’ embassies or EU Commission’s representations promote Finnish interests:

‘Only Finnish representations can defend Finnish interests and rights abroad. The EU institutions, other EU countries and Nordic countries can not do that on our behalf’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001: 43).

In addition, the decision of the Ministry to ‘voice’ its difficulties is also understandable taking into account the smallness of Finnish administration which promotes cooperation and conflict avoidance. What has been the result of the strategy? After the presentation of the Report, The Ministry received the political support of the Finnish Parliament: ‘The Finnish Parliament regards the UM as the key Finnish player in international affairs (...) The Parliament has given a strong and unambiguous support to the UM and to its development’ (Tostila 2002) yet, did EU foreign policy cooperation also lead to more resources for the Ministry? Has the Ministry obtained what it asked for? Has the Ministry been ‘winner’ of the CFSP?

CFSP-triggered Europeanization: Gains for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland?

Resources of the Foreign Ministry: More Resources for the UM?

Has participation in the CFSP translated in more resources for the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs? Looking at figures on financial resources of the UM in the period 1993-2007, there is evidence that the total budget of the Ministry has actually increased from 580 millions of Euros in 1993 to almost one billion in 2007.

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>UM’s Total Budget</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>991</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage Change</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>+9,7</td>
<td>+13</td>
<td>+10,7</td>
<td>+9,1</td>
<td>+13,8</td>
<td>+8,4</td>
<td>+10,7</td>
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(Total budget in millions of Euros. Data for the period: 1993-1999: from Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001: 33. Original figures are in Finnish markka. I have converted them into Euros using the exchange rate: 5,9
markka = 1 Euro. Figures for the period 2001-2007: Finnish Ministry of Finance 2008; Change on a two year basis: author’s calculation)

It is very interesting to note that in the period 1996-2007 the Ministry’s overall budget always grew, almost year after year. Instead, declined on a yearly basis in the period 1990-1995, as the following graph (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001: 33) shows:

Despite the graph’s figures stop in 2001, UM’s finances, as the table above indicates, have continued to grow since then. Also the latest figures confirm the trend: in 2008, the UM has received 1,13 billions of Euros while the budgetary proposal (talousarvioesitys) of the UM for the next year (2009) is of 1,16 billions (Finnish Ministry of Finance 2008).

It really seems that Finnish EU membership has represented a turning point in the resource framework of the UM. Yet, the crucial question here is: has the CFSP triggered the rise of the Ministry’s budget? For instance, the CFSP has arguably contributed only marginally, if at all, to the very significant increase in the UM’s funds for development cooperation:

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11 The blue column (the tallest for each year) represents the overall budget of the Ministry. Figures are in millions of markka.
Asked to comment on the trend in the Ministry’s resources since EU membership, one interviewee pointed that the Ministry has obtained more funds almost only for development cooperation, while the ‘all machine is running with less and less money’ (interview, Senior Civil Servant 10.1.2008). If this were so, then the hypothesis of gains from the CFSP should be rejected. Yet, looking at the figures referring to the operating expenses of the Ministry, the impression is different:

<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Development Cooperation</strong></td>
<td>272</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
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</table>


The increase has been particularly significant in the period 2001-2005: this seems to provide evidence that the ‘voice’ of the Ministry, and more concertedly the 2001 Report (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001) has been successful in readdressing the misfit between aims and means in the Ministry. The CFSP is surely part of the explanation for the rise in the UM’s ‘operating expenses’, needed in order to face an increased workload, recruit new employees and experts, training and travelling, and to cover the expenses of more widespread representation and ‘presence’ abroad. As I have discussed in the previous section, the Ministry asked for more resources (also) because of the CFSP, in order to exploit its opportunities and face its challenges. The CFSP has also translated into more resources for the Ministry when it acquired a ‘defense dimension’ following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the military dimension of the CFSP much sought after by Finland, has required more capabilities for civilian and military crisis management. The UM, in charge of the task, has therefore obtained more funds.
for the deployment of Finnish personnel in EU missions, as it comes clear by looking at the
trend in the main line of expenditure ‘other expenses’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Other Expenses'</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>129</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Original figures are in Finnish markka. I have converted them into Euros using the exchange rate: 5,9 markka =

However, I consider that an uncontroversial confirmation of the hypothesis of the CFSP as
gains for the Ministry would require the deployment of more valid indicators than those I use
in this analysis. The CFSP has impacted widely on all the functions of the Ministry. As the
UM pointed out in 2001: ‘the external actions of the EU and the CFSP were (for Finland) a
crucial instrument for foreign policy making and touched almost all the sectors and issues of
Finnish foreign and security policy’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001: 14). The
current operative strategy of the Ministry (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2005)
considers the reinforcement of ‘EU’s external actions’ a mean for the achievement of ‘an
international community generating security’, one of the five main goals of the
administration. The main empirical problem is how to discriminate the ‘CFSP effect’ from
that of EU integration more generally, or of other factors. Thus, it is really challenging to
assess a direct effect of the EU political cooperation on the resources of the Ministry.

Also by looking at the trend in human resources in the UM, there is evidence that since 1995
the total amount of personnel employed in the central offices of the Ministry has actually
increased. In particular, it is interesting to note the very high figure in staff number in 1999,
the year of the first Finnish EU Presidency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UM’s Human Resources</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1548</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>1618</td>
<td>1587</td>
<td>1673</td>
<td>1723</td>
<td>1665</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data: number of employees of the Ministry. The figures do not locally hired staff or personnel for civilian or
military crisis management operations. Figures are from the UM Annual Reports.)
As Smith (2000: 621) points out: ‘the increasing demands on the EU Presidency (...) have also encouraged all EU states (especially the smaller ones) to increase their staff numbers and budgets at the national level when serving as President of the EU’. Also in 2006 staff numbers are well above the average of 1664 employees (own calculation), confirming the claim. Yet, budgetary figures, presented above, were not the highest in 1999 and 2006. The CFSP is surely part of the ‘Presidency effect’ as ‘the tasks connected to the CFSP require during the Presidency more emphasis and effort’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 1998).

As preliminary conclusion at this point of the discussion, I argue that the hypothesis of CFSP as gains for the Ministry is preliminarily confirmed: the main finding is that Ministry’s resources have increased since Finland has entered the EU. The CFSP is part of the explanation: there is evidence that it contributed to an increase in UM’s personnel, of its operating expenses, ‘other expenses’ and possibly also of other lines of expenditures of the UM’s budget; yet the problem of indicators’ validity remains. I propose now to look at the Ministry’s staff and budget figures in the context of the Finnish core executive.

There is evidence that the UM has maintained the largest share of the State’s budget, measured in terms of operating expenses, among those organizations which form the coordinating center of the Finnish core executive in its relations with the EU, the UM, the PMO and the Ministry of Finance (Kinnunen 2003: 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operating Expenses</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prime Minister’s Office</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Ministry</strong></td>
<td>154</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of Finance</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite the rise of PM’s powers and its influence as I have previously mentioned, the ‘operating’ resources of the PMO are still much less that those of the UM as the table above indicates. This reflects the big size of the Ministry in the Finnish administration. However, the increase in financial resources of the Finance Ministry and of the PMO since EU membership
relatively to that in the UM appears more consistent. For instance, the operating expenses of the Ministry of Finance in 1995 were one fourth of those of 2007. The increase has been almost fourfold. Yet, the UM still receives a much larger share of the state’s budget for its operations. This indicates that the Ministry still manages more personnel and may rely on more organizational resources than the PMO and the Ministry of Finance. It is interesting to note in particular that the movement of the EU Secretariat to the PMO from the UM in 2000 did not provoke any major alteration in the current expenses of these two branches of the Finnish core executive. Between 1999 and 2001, despite both the PMO’s and the UM’s operating expenses grew, the PMO’s line of expenditure rose of circa 11% while the UM’s of circa 2%. Between 2001 and 2003, the UM’s expenses rose of 13%, while those of the PMO of about 15%. In sum, despite the ‘loses’ of the UM in terms of overall coordination of EU policy, the Ministry has maintained a crucial position in the Finnish core executive. CFSP membership, contributing to an overall increase in the budget and personnel of the UM, has surely played a part in maintaining the UM’s status.

Comparison of Resources: Differential Gains in the Ministry?

Have those branches of a the UM’s organization mostly involved with the CFSP gained more than others? In order to test the hypothesis of differential gains in the Ministry, I propose: first, to compare the data regarding the Finnish Permanent Representation to the EU in Brussels (EUE) with those relative to the Finnish Permanent Representation to the UN in New York (YKE); second, to compare the data of the Political Department (POL) with those of the Department for Global Affairs (GLO), both located in the central offices of the Ministry in Helsinki. I consider the EUE and the POL as branches of the UM’s organizations mostly involved with the CFSP. The POL is the organizational locus of the only explicit ‘CFSP Unit’ in the Ministry, as I will present later in the next chapter; the EUE is instead where the ‘CFSP’ Counselors, diplomats specialized in the CFSP who represent Finland in the Political and Security Committee (Finnish Permanent Representation to the EU 2008), work. In addition, as the CFSP is increasingly Brussels-based, the EUE’s involvement in the policy has increased.

The EUE was officially established in 1996. Since then, its ‘net expenses’ (nettokaytto) have always grown significantly until 2006, when Finland held its second EU Presidency, before declining quite significantly in the year 2007, as the table above shows:
In addition, since its establishment, EUE’s expenses have been the highest among those of Finnish representations or embassies (see data contained in the Annual Reports of the UM). Also the personnel of the EUE have grown since 1996. It is very interesting to note that the highest figures were reached in 1999 and 2006, while Finland was holding the Presidency:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net Expenses</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>5,7</td>
<td>6,3</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>7,8</td>
<td>8,5</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td>15,5</td>
<td>11,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(In millions of Euros. Data are from the Annual Reports of the UM.)

Comparing the expenses of the EUE with those of the YKE, at present and since EU membership the second biggest Finnish representation abroad, it is possible to better appreciate how significant the growth of EUE’s resources has been since 1996:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YKE</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net Expenses</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,8</td>
<td>3,5</td>
<td>4,1</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4,1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(In millions of Euros. Data from UM annual reports)

While the expenses of the EUE have more than doubled, those of the YKE have increased of a little more than one third, from 2,8 to 4,4 millions since membership in 1995. Interestingly enough, also in the case of the YKE the growth in resources might have been triggered partly the CFSP: EU member states implement in New York the CFSP. The member states attempt at finding common positions in coordination meetings, after which the EU can negotiate as one with other UN countries’ (Finnish Permanent Representation to the UN 2008).

Yet, what has happened in the central offices of the Ministry in Helsinki? The table above shows the evolution in the expenses of the Political Department and the Department for Global Affairs. I have chosen to compare the expenses of the POL, the ‘key’ of the CFSP in
the Ministry (interview, Senior Civil Servant 10.1.2008), with those of the GLO, created in 2003 to deal explicitly with matters related to globalization and the UN, in order to compare, with a rough indicator admittedly, the impact of CFSP Europeanization with that of globalization on the resources of the Ministry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenses</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19,8</td>
<td>19,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLO</td>
<td>248,1</td>
<td>258,6</td>
<td>312,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(In millions of Euros. Data from Annual Report of the UM 2008)

As the table above shows, the expenses of the POL have been minimal when compared with those of the GLO in the period 2005-2007. As the ‘distribution of budgetary resources indicate the salience of various policy areas’ (Karvonen & Sundelius 1990: 218), in my view it is fair to claim that in the Finnish case ‘globalization’ has been, since 2005 at least, much more emphasized than EU political cooperation and the CFSP properly.

In addition, as it comes clear from the table below, the number of personnel in the POL has declined hugely since 2003 when the GLO was established and staff transferred there mainly from the Political Department and the Department for Development Cooperation. Apparently, the GLO was literally established at the expenses of the POL. Yet, since 2005, the human resources of the POL have started to increase again.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data from Annual Report of the UM 2008)

In sum, the hypothesis of differential gains in the Ministry is confirmed when looking at Finnish Permanent Representations, while clearly rejected when observing what has happened in the central offices of the Ministry. In Helsinki, there is not evidence that the CFSP has led to more resources for those parts of the organization which deal with it. Rather differently, the POL has lost personnel and financial resources too since the budgetary year 2003 at least. The CFSP Unit, established in 2005 to substitute the Unit for the European Correspondent in the
POL, is a small unit with expenses of circa four hundred thousand euro. In 2006, an indication of the effect of the Presidency, its share of the budget almost doubled, reaching seven hundred thousand euro. Yet, when compared with the expenses of the GLO, the ‘revitalization’ of the POL à la Hill appears as a very limited phenomenon indeed.

**Chapter Conclusions: Gains for the UM?**

Have the ‘rationalist’ hypotheses found confirmation in the Finnish case? This short section aims at recollecting the findings of the previous discussion. First, has the CFSP led to an increase of resources for the UM? As I have tried to show, the CFSP has presented both opportunities and challenges to the UM. The Ministry has used the CFSP as a powerful rationale for voicing its need for more resources. In other terms, the Ministry has strategically used the structure of opportunities offered by EU level foreign policy cooperation as a mean for reasserting its role as the key foreign policy manager in the country, readdressing its loses in coordinating Finnish international affairs. In short:

‘The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is still the lead institution for the conduct of Finnish diplomacy and the owner of the global net of Finland’s diplomatic missions; Finland’s 101 antennas in the world’ (Torstila 2001).

The PM has not challenged the Ministry is its field of expertise; rather it has relied on it for preparing foreign policy decisions (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007). The foreign policy tradition of the country and the prestige of the Ministry have supported the Ministry’s strategy. There is evidence that the overall resources, the operating expenses and the funds for development cooperation allocated to the Ministry have increased since EU membership. The UM’s strategy has been successful. I argue that the CFSP has contributed to the ‘gains’ of the Ministry. Yet, it is really hard to disentangle the CFSP from other dimensions of the process of Europeanization: therefore, the hypothesis can be only preliminarily confirmed at this point. Further, detailed analyses based on more accurate empirical indicators are in order. In addition, the UM’s operating expenses and its personnel have remained ‘big’ on a Finnish scale: the UM has in conclusion maintained a crucial position in the Finnish core executive, despite the ‘normalization’ of its position in the Finnish balance of power.

Second, has CFSP-triggered Europeanization been differential in the UM? Have in other terms some parts of the Ministry ‘gained’ more than others? This seems the case when
comparing the expenses of the EUE with those of the YKE. Yet, focusing on the distribution of budgetary and human resources in the central offices of the Ministry, there is not evidence that the CFSP has led to a ‘revitalization’ of the Political Department, at least in terms of resources. The Department for Global Affairs has since its establishment in 2003 obtained much more funds than the POL. In sum, the hypothesis of differential gains can be only partially confirmed.

In this chapter, I have tried to look at the Europeanization of the UM in terms of CFSP-triggered redistribution of resources. How has the Ministry adapted to the CFSP as ‘structure of opportunities’? Evidence is preliminary and partial. Perhaps, the most significant finding has been one of ‘method’: while scholars have quite straightforwardly claimed that the CFSP translate in more resources, in ‘gains’, for foreign ministries, the development of valid empirical indicators to discriminate the CFSP effect from that of other factors is hard and challenging. More research is surely needed to know more about the impact of the CFSP on the human and financial resources of foreign ministries in EU countries.
Chapter 5: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and the CFSP: A Transformed Ministry?

At least since Hill and Wallace’ contribution (1996), a central claim of the ‘reflexive’ literature on the CFSP (see also Jørgensen 1997; Tonra 2001 and 2003) is that EU level foreign policy cooperation might ‘transform’ foreign ministries in EU countries. In this chapter, I analyze CFSP-triggered bureaucratic adaptation and socialization in the UM. I aim at assessing whether and how the Ministry has internalized the ‘norms’ of the CFSP: in its organization and ‘ways of doing things’ (Pomorska 2007); in its institutional identity and culture. The chapter complements the previous discussion on the impact of the CFSP ‘structure of opportunities’ on the UM.

In this chapter, the hypotheses, based on a constructivist understanding of Europeanization, are the following:

a) Participation in the CFSP leads to bureaucratic adaptation in foreign ministries.

b) Participation in the CFSP adapts the institutional culture of the ministry to the norms of the CFSP and promotes diplomats’ socialization

The Finnish case appears particularly interesting. On the one hand, the Ministry is a relatively small organization where CFSP bureaucratic adaptation appears more probable. On the other hand, however, as I have shortly remarked in my presentation of Finnish foreign policy management, traditionally the UM has been perceived as a symbol of Finnish sovereignty and independence (Raunio & Johansson 2008, unpublished paper). Hence, the country foreign policy tradition might hinder CFSP socialization.

CFSP membership represents the independent variable for the analysis. In this chapter, I study the impact of the CFSP on organizational variables and the institutional identity of the Ministry. Interview material, speeches and other official sources of information provide the data for the assessment of CFSP-triggered bureaucratic adaptation and socialization. Assuming a constructivist standpoint on social reality, language and speech acts assume a fundamental relevance for the investigation. I divide the discussion into two main parts, the
first concerned with bureaucratic adaptation and the second with socialization. Finally, I conclude summarizing the findings.

**CFSP- triggered Bureaucratic Adaptation in the Finnish Foreign Ministry**

**New CFSP Posts and Officials**
The establishment of new posts to deal explicitly with the CFSP is part of a broader process of coordination reflex between member states cooperating at the EU-level (Tonra 2003). As Smith put it: ‘political cooperation requires the establishment of new officials to serve it. These institutional roles persist behind the appointment of specific individuals and provide a key source of continuity in national attention to CFSP affairs’ (Smith 2000: 619). Finnish participation to the CFSP has since 1995 led to the establishment of one totally new position in the central offices of the UM in Helsinki, that of European Correspondent (EC, in Finnish *Eurokirjeenvaihtaja* or Eurocorrespondent between 1995 and 1998, later *Eurooppakirjeenvaihtaja* or European Correspondent properly). As one interviewee recalled:

> ‘When we joined the EU we created the function of European Correspondent. Despite the fact that after structural changes more and more CFSP is done in Brussels, the post still exists. (…) That was practically the only new position that was set up’ (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007).

The European Correspondent (see Rules of Procedure of the UM 1995; 1998; 2000; 2003) was needed according to the requirements of the Copenhagen Report of 1973. The UM had already at the time of accession a Political Director. Instead, for instance, the Swedish Foreign Ministry had to establish *ex novo* this position when Sweden joined the EU in 1995 (interview, Senior Civil Servant 10.1.2008). In the Finnish Permanent Representation in Brussels new posts have been established after the creation of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), set by the Treaty of Nice with the task of ‘monitoring the international situation in areas covered by the CFSP’ and ‘contribute to policy definition’ (Treaty on European Union, Title V). At present, there are four officials or ‘CFSP Counselors’ in charge of representing Finland in the PSC (Finnish Permanent Representation to the EU 2008).

**Expansion of the Diplomatic Network**
As pointed by Smith (2000), participation in the CFSP leads to an expansion in the diplomatic network of a country. This seems to be the case in Finland as the table above indicates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The expansion of the Finnish diplomatic network since 1995 is very remarkable, especially when compared with what has taken place in other Nordic Countries in the same period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change 1995-2008</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions, 2008)</td>
<td>9,1</td>
<td>4,7</td>
<td>5,4</td>
<td>5,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassies</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>+19 (!)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perm. Rep.</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The expansion of the Finnish diplomatic network is surely explained largely by Finnish EU membership:

‘If we wish that Finland is able as an EU country to influence decision making in third countries and multilateral forums, we have to be there, represented and present. Finnish representations in all the EU member countries ensure that our views are heard in EU policy making. We need to collect understanding and support for Finnish positions in every capital of the EU member states before decisive meetings’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001: 8)

The CFSP is part of the explanation; yet it is hard to disentangle its effect from that of EU membership more generally. I claim that considering the expansion in the diplomatic network as a direct consequence of a country’s participation in the CFSP might be an exaggeration. Embassies and permanent representations deal not only with the CFSP: ‘the EU ‘dimensions’ is a new factor which influences all the functions and tasks of our representations’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001: 44). Enlargement, to which however the CFSP is clearly linked however, is part of the explanation:
‘As the Union is enlarging, the establishment of representations in those EU countries where Finland still does not have one is a crucial issue’ (ibid.: 43)

Thus, Finland had in 2007 embassies in every EU Member State, except Malta (interview, Administrative Department 3.12.2007).

It is also interesting to note how in the Finnish case the expansion of the diplomatic network, the establishment of more embassies and representations, has not been accompanied by an increase in the number of diplomatic staff sent abroad. In 2001 (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001: 51) the situation was the following, including also consulates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Diplomats in Finnish Representations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 staff sent from Helsinki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative personnel only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 diplomats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 diplomats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 diplomats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least 11 diplomats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Ministry (ibid.: 51) pointed also how, in contrast with an increase in the personnel of the Permanent Representation in Brussels, the staff in Finnish embassies in EU countries had actually declined since the beginning of the 90s as the figures above (ibid.) indicate:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reorganization**

Has the UM internalized the CFSP? In other terms, has the logic of EU-level foreign policy cooperation transformed the UM’s organization? Formal organizations matter, as New Institutionalism indicates. Even names and organizational denominations might be important and telling of how different policies are valued. A constructivist view of the CFSP assumes
that participation in the CFSP might also lead to broader organizational reforms in foreign ministries. Focusing on this area of observation, a crucial domestic intervening variable is the size of the Foreign Service. In the Finnish case, the UM is ‘big’ domestically, vis-à-vis other departments of Finnish administration, yet small in international comparison. Thus, the expectation is that the CFSP should matter more in the case of a small country as Finland (Smith 2000). Hence, CFSP-triggered reorganizations are more probable.

The main empirical challenge is to assess whether organizational reforms are caused by the CFSP or by other reasons: it is plausible that foreign ministries periodically redesign their organization as a routine rather than explicitly to make their participation in the CFSP and in EU policy making in general more efficient. When asked to comment on whether EU membership had caused major reorganizations in the UM, one interviewee pointed that: ‘All the foreign services, all the time make reforms and copy each other, especially those of neighboring countries’ (interview, Department for Europe 12.11.2007). Reforms can also take place for ‘political’ reasons: ‘sometimes you need to put somebody in a high position and you create one’ (interview, Administrative Department 3.12.2007). In addition, the EU does not prescribe any model regarding how foreign services should be organized: ‘When we joined the EU, we had to make some reforms (…) but there is not an ‘EU model’ for foreign services. Some of us work on a regional basis, some on a functional basis. Some have a mixed system’ (interview, Senior Civil Servant 10.1.2008). Nonetheless, I assume that the CFSP arguably might contribute to organizational reforms (Smith 2000; Pomorska 2007). Thus, in this section I am only interested in assessing whether the CFSP has triggered organizational reforms in the UM. I focus mainly on the basic organization of the UM (organisaation perusrakenne) and on the organization of the ‘key’ department in the CFSP, the Political Department (POL).

Between 1990 and 2002, the basic organization of the Ministry was formed by seven departments: the Political Department, the Department for External Economic Relations, the Department for Development Cooperation, the Administrative Department, the Legal Affairs Department, the Protocol Department and the Department for the Press and Culture (see Decree on the Finnish Foreign Service 1990; Rules of Procedure of the UN 1995, 1998, 2000). Until 1998, the impact of EU political cooperation on basic the organization of the Ministry was minimal. Before membership, European integration was mainly an economic matter also for the UM (Temmes 1995). The need to negotiate further economic integration
with the EC affected the Ministry: in the Department for External Economic Relations the first post to deal explicitly with EC matters was established in mid 80s (ibid.). However, there is evidence that EU membership in general represented an important stimulus for some organizational changes in 1995: then, the EU Secretariat in charge of overall domestic EU policy coordination was established in the Ministry (Rules of Procedure of the UM 1995); in the same year, several other units were set in the Ministry to deal explicitly with EU matters (ibid.). In addition, a Minister for EU Affairs was appointed in the UM. Membership in the CFSP led to the establishment of the post of European Correspondent, as said. The latter was located into the Political Department, in the division (linja) for the European Union, Western Countries and Security Policy. However, in the first half of the 90s, the basic organization of the Ministry did not change much. Europeanization took place at a lower level: in the Political Department for instance, the Office for the Soviet Union and the Central and Eastern European Countries was renamed Division for Eastern Europe and Neighboring Cooperation; the Office for the Nordic Countries and other Western countries became the Division for the European Union, Western Countries and Security Policy: thus, the ‘European Union’ entered the UM’s formal organization (see Rules of Procedure of the UM 1995).

In 1998, an important organizational reform was implemented. The main innovation was the creation of common, shared ‘regional divisions’ (aluelinjat) among the Political Department, the Department for External Economic Relations and that for Development Cooperation (Rules of Procedure of the UM 1998). The aim was to enhance the coherence of UM’s actions, merging the political, economic and development dimension of ‘foreign policy’. The reform aimed at allowing the formulation of a comprehensive, multidimensional approach to different geographical areas. As pointed by one interviewee, ‘this was a novelty of EU membership. We have been a long time on a purely functional basis. Now we have a matrix model, a mélange of functional and regional departments’ (interview, Senior Civil Servant 10.1.2008). Does the 1998 reorganization provide evidence of CFSP-triggered bureaucratic adaptation? This might be the case. As pointed by Smith, ‘political cooperation leads to a clear reorientation of national foreign ministries towards Europe in order to improve their handling of European affairs, particularly as the EC and CFSP activities are expected to function in a coherent manner’ (Smith 2000). Some of the interviewees said that EU membership and in particular the requirement of holding the EU Presidency motivated the reform. As also pointed by a UM’s report in 2001:
‘The organizational reform of 1998 was implemented mainly in order to face the challenge of holding the EU Presidency. Reforming the organization we moved to a better use of our resources in conditions altered by EU membership and other factors’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001: 31).

It is interesting to note that the UM attempted at ‘uploading’, that is at establishing also at the EU level a more coherent, comprehensive approach to external actions: while holding the EU Presidency, Finland merged different CFSP working groups:

‘We underlined the coherence of foreign affairs, a comprehensive foreign policy also in Brussels. We need to have one desk in charge of all the elements that are visible in certain areas. At the time of our first Presidency, we merged different working groups dealing with political and economic aspects. That is what we were and are trying to do here’ (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007).

In 2003, the UM further emphasized the importance of geography. The regional divisions were upgraded to the status of departments: the reform of 2003 greatly altered the basic organization of the UM bringing the total number of departments to twelve, specialized on a geographical or functional basis: the Political Department, the Department for External Economic Relations, the Department for Europe, the Eastern Department, the Department for America and Asia, the Department for Development Cooperation, the Department for Africa and the Middle East, the Department for Global Affairs, the Administrative Department, the Legal Affairs Department, the Protocol Department and the Department for Communication and Culture (Rules of Procedure of the UM 2003).

Focusing on the ‘key’ of CFSP in the Ministry, the Political Department, there is evidence that EU-level political cooperation has led to significant changes. The most important has been the establishment of a ‘Unit for the EU Common foreign and security policy’ or, shortly put, ‘CFSP Unit’ (EU:n yhteisen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan yksikkö). The CFSP Unit was formally introduced with a decree of the Ministry in February 2005 (see Rules of Procedure of the UM 2005). It is a recent development, taking place ten years after Finland entered the EU and began to work in the framework of the CFSP. Organizational denominations matter: the establishment of an explicit CFSP Unit clearly marks the internalization and emergence of the policy in the formal structure of the Ministry. The time of its establishment suggests that the reform was planned in preparation of the second Finnish EU Presidency of 2006. The Unit can be seen as an evolution of the Unit for the European Correspondent: at present, the Unit performs the following tasks: coordination of the preparation of the EU’s Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP); tasks of the European Correspondent; supervision and development of the COREU communication network; departmental staff functions. The Unit ensures the flow of communication between the Ministry and the CFSP Counsellors in Brussels and Finnish representatives in the COREPER II; it contributes to the preparation of the GAERC in CFSP matters (Rules of Procedure of the UM 2005).

In sum, there is evidence that EU membership has impacted on the organization of the UM. Yet, the CFSP properly provides only a partial explanation of Europeanization. It seems that the need of coordinating EU policy, of ensuring coherence in the whole field of EU external actions and the emergence (through EU membership yet) of globalization as a major issue have also played an important role. For instance, as the preparatory document for the new reform of the UM has pointed out: ‘EU membership has concretely affected the organization of the Ministry as the UM had to ensure interministerial coordination’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2007: 7). However, the emergence of geography first through the establishment of regional divisions in 1998 and later, since 2003, through the ‘upgrading’ of these divisions to the status of departments, could be seen, I argue, as a CFSP triggered development. The CFSP expanded the ‘world’ of the UM: ‘It was a consequence of EU membership the fact that the UM was required to focus much more in details upon issues and regions which used to be, from the point of view of Finland, far and marginal’ (ibid.).

At present, the UM is planning a new reform which is expected to enter into force the first of September 2008. As the Ministry puts it: ‘the purpose of the reform is to intensify handling of the Ministry’s core functions while simultaneously responding to the savings objectives of the productivity program for the State administration’ (UM Press Release 2008). The reform will have an impact on the basic organization of the Ministry as: ‘tasks carried out by the Global Department will be distributed among the Political Department, the Department for External Economic Relations and the Department for Development Cooperation. A specific aim is to intensify coordination of EU affairs and activities in international organizations, and to improve coherence in the handling of various issue in different forums’ (ibid.). The reform will apparently be a major one. However, it is still to early to assess how it will interact with the handling of the CFSP in the Ministry.
Adaptation of ‘Ways of Doing Things’ to the CFSP

Has CFSP membership changed the informal organization, the ‘ways of doing things’ of the UM? Evidence in this area of observation arguably can not derive from the study of organizational charts, precious source of information when looking at changes in the formal organization of the Ministry. I base the presentation here mainly on interview material, supported by information from official reports of the UM.


‘Membership in the EU requires from the UM more activism in order to promote actively Finnish interests in international politics and cooperation (…) Activism and initiative in the CFSP has demanded more readiness in all the Finnish Foreign Service. The number of issues about which Finland has to form a position has increased, as expected.’

In addition to more readiness, the report refers to changes in schedule and agenda:

‘EU membership has brought a real change in the environment of the Ministry. In particular, a great challenge is adaptation to the EU schedule and the loss of independence in agenda setting.’ (ibid.)

According to the interviewees, the most significant changes have been in terms of agenda and in the ‘speed’ of policy making:

‘The major changes have been in the agenda (…) There are issues that are on the agenda of the EU and come up regularly (…) we have to keep permanent hands on these. For instance, political issues in some African states emerged as a main matter. Only as Finland we would not focus in the same way on them. (…) There has been a great change in the working time. Now we work at a higher speed’ (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007).

The rhythm of working has been particularly high while Finland was holding the Presidency (interview, Department for Europe 10.12.2007). Other major changes have taken place in the overall workload for the UM’s personnel, a ‘tremendous increase’ as put by one official at the Ministry (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007). Moreover, since 1995, the quantity of information received by the Ministry has greatly increased:

‘Now we have a better knowledge. Being part of this family we share information. And in particular being abroad is very useful. We have regular meetings between bilateral embassies, it is easier to gather information and it is now possible to test a bit our analysis comparing each other’s point of view’ (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007).
The introduction of the COREU system in the Ministry in 1995 and of the Courtesy system in 1996 led to an explosion in the number of CFSP related messages. The COREU telex network ensures that information concerning the CFSP is shared among participants. The COREU is the only official channel of communication in CFSP matters between the UM and other foreign ministries, the Commission and the Council Secretariat (interview, Department for Europe 24.4.2008). A potentially powerful tool for socialization, it has been designed to improve coordination among foreign ministries in CFSP matters. As one diplomat recalled, the number of messages received through the network was impressive and ‘when I realized that you do not actually have to read them all, it was a big release’ (interview, Administrative Department 3.12.2007). Yet, according to another informant (interview, Department for Europe 24.4.2008), the daily number of COREU messages in the CFSP Unit is rather low at present. During the last Presidency, the number of COREU messages increased significantly, however (ibid.).

After accession to the EU, personnel of the Ministry were required to travel more. The main destination was Brussels in 1995 and 1996 with 1070 and 1307 trips respectively (Annual Report of the UM 1996 and 1997). In those years, the CFSP activity helps to explain the increase in the number of travels to Brussels, as staff from the Political Department traveled the most. It is also interesting to note how the CFSP has impacted on the policy shaping process: one interviewee reported that the CFSP has enhanced the capabilities of foreign ministries’ officials to actually ‘do’ EU level foreign policy: decision shaping (if not making) takes place at a ‘low’ level, at the expert level, that of the Council Working Groups (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007), where mostly foreign ministries’ staff are represented, albeit not exclusively.

**CFSP-triggered Socialization in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland**

The end of the Cold War marked a ‘critical juncture’ in the environment of the Finnish foreign ministry. Under the political direction of the Finnish government, the UM contributed to re-locate Finland on the map of Europe. The Ministry was in charge of negotiating Finnish accession to the European Economic Area first and then, since 1992, to the EU. Diplomats from the UM, as Antti Satuli, Veli Sundback and Eikka Kosonen, were those defining the details of the accession process of Finland to the organizations of European integration.
Finnish EU membership in 1995 represented the logical conclusion of Finnish aspirations to participate in the process of European integration, a possibility which became real after the fall of the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding the importance of economic reasons for membership, Finland joined the EU mainly for security reasons:

‘For the first time in our history we became part of a western political club. Until 1995, we were sailing in strange waters. Although a free country we did not became a satellite, yet always with this feeling of being left alone with our eastern neighbor. The sense of security brought by EU membership was real’ (interview, Senior Civil Servant 10.1.2008).

Finland accepted without reservations the commitment to the CFSP (Tiilikainen 2006; Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003; Raunio and Wiberg 2001). As Tiilikainen (2006) put it: ‘Finland changed, smoothly and pragmatically, its Cold War policy of neutrality into a policy of firm commitment to European integration’. Finland moved from neutrality to military non-alignment, already in 1992. How has the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland adapted to the country’s full engagement with the CFSP? Has the institution ‘internalized’ the norms, rules, roles and identities of the CFSP, moving from old nation-state sovereignty to collective decision making in foreign policy?

A promising area of observation which might present evidence of institutional socialization, i.e. norms internalization, is how the UM defines the CFSP. Has the Ministry, in its view of the CFSP, moved from an ‘old nation state sovereignty model towards a collective endeavor’ (Hill and Wallace 1996 quoted in Smith 2000: 618)? Smith (2000) points that a clear indicator of socialization is whether elites have learned to value political co-operation as a way to enhance their foreign policy capabilities. Is it so in the Finnish case? An empirical challenge is to find an indicator of the UM’s socialization. I argue that official speeches of foreign ministers and high officials, as well as official documents, provide valid material for the assessment of the Ministry’s Europeanization. I am interested in assessing how through its official language the UM ‘sees’ the CFSP. In case the evidence suggests that the UM actually perceives EU level political cooperation as a way to ‘enhance their foreign policy capabilities’ (Smith 2000: 619) the socialization hypothesis is confirmed.

Since the achievement of membership, the Finnish political leadership has clearly adopted a full commitment to the development of the CFSP and the ESDP. Finland has been active in promoting more coherence, efficiency and visibility for EU’s external actions as a whole.
Finland has supported the extension of qualified majority voting in EU level foreign policy and the development of an EU ‘diplomatic service’. In several speeches and reports, there is plenty of evidence that the UM has dutifully adapted to the political direction. Since the first years of involvement in the CFSP, the UM has developed a very positive if not even enthusiastic view of the CFSP as a mean to enhance Finnish foreign and security policy and to promote Finnish interests. If, as Smith points out, ‘to value political co-operation as a way to enhance their foreign policy capabilities’ is an indicator of socialization in foreign ministries, then the hypothesis seems to be largely confirmed in the Finnish case. With a caveat: a constructivist picture of the CFSP argues for the development of a collective identity, based on shared interests and values. The UM however has not renounced to stress that the CFSP shall be seen as a mean, a collective, EU tool, for the achievement of Finnish ends. The latter can be equated, as are, with EU interests: yet, it is the Finnish interest (Suomen etu) which guides the actions of the Ministry and represents the pivotal concept of its operational strategy: ‘Finland’ interest- Global responsibility’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2005).

In 1996, Jukka Valtasaari (1996), then the Ministry’s Secretary of State, pointed out that it was unthinkable to ‘promote efficiently Finnish interests with one leg in the EU and one outside’. He clearly affirmed that the EU is a mean to achieve Finnish interests, and that Finland has to gain from an effective and strong Union. The EU is an opportunity for Finnish foreign policy, not a ‘menace’. The CFSP is not perceived then as a reduction of sovereignty, rather as strengthening Finnish capabilities:

‘The objective of Finnish foreign policy is to secure the future of the Finns in a world of increased interdependence by promoting peace, cooperation and welfare and by contrasting menaces to these values. Membership in the European Union has enhanced the opportunities of acting for the achievement of these aims in Europe as well as globally’ (Valtasari 1996).

Ten years later, the view of the CFSP as ‘a mean to Finnish ends’ has not changed. The Strategy of the Ministry is clear in this regard:

‘Finland's membership of the European Union provides a wealth of opportunities for pursuing its (of Finland) fundamental goals. It plays an essential role in how Finland can meet its political and economic challenges. The EU is also the main channel through which foreign-policy making and strategic objectives are pursued’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2005: 7)
In the same document, one of the main objectives of Finland, i.e. an influential Finland in the international community, is actually achieved through ‘promoting effectively Finnish interests in the EU’. In other terms, the CFSP is ‘instrumental’ to Finland’s welfare. The same point is emphasized also in the Ministry’s ‘Future Plan’ of 2003 (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2003):

‘From the point of view of Finland, it is important that the EU became a strong actor in foreign policy, because as a small and ‘open’ country Finland is particularly dependent on developments taking place in its environment, which influence our country’s security and welfare. The EU offers with its values and with its objectives a favorable framework for the promotion of Finnish interests and for strengthening Finnish international position.’

As pointed by one interviewee, the CFSP is the ‘framework of our foreign and security policy’. Yet, despite being in the same ‘club’ (interview, Department for Europe 12.11.2007) or ‘family’ (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007), the UM is aware that Finland as a small country shall be particularly active and aware in order to make its voice heard in the CFSP. The CFSP is mean to enhance Finnish interests only if Finland is adequately represented to do it: Finnish inputs in the CFSP are essential in order to make the CFSP a ‘value added’ for the country. The UM aims at developing the CFSP according to Finnish preferences. The UM has contributed to the formulation and implementation of at least two major Finnish CFSP initiatives: the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) and the promotion of the ESDP, of civilian and military crisis management, as an integral part of the CFSP:

‘We have to strengthen the role of the EU by developing the CFSP, also in terms of crisis management through the ESDP (...) Finland wants to make the ESDP stronger so that also the CFSP as a whole is reinforced’ (Tuomioja 2003).

The UM played a major role in 1999 at the time of the first Finnish EU Council Presidency, when the NDI was launched. The Presidency represented the greatest challenge ever for Finnish diplomacy (Torstila 2000). The UM not only was in charge of organizing most of the events of the Presidency: Finnish diplomats became ‘EU diplomats’. Holding the Presidency arguably represented a major occasion for socialization and learning:

‘During the Presidency, we learned that it is hard to accomplish a project in the CFSP in six month. (...) We also learned that national plans have to be carefully advanced (...) The Presidency taught us that the crucial interest for Finland is an effective Union in the CFSP. From the perspective of the member states, it is absolutely crucial that the Union is a global, strong player (...) Now that we are back ‘in line’ we are
no longer the same peripheral country of the Union as we used to be before the Presidency. Now we can offer more and more can be asked from us’ (Torstila 2000).

The NDI demonstrates concertedly how Finland and the UM attempted at enhancing their capabilities ‘uploading’ Finnish projects at the EU level. The NDI supports the image of the Europeanization of foreign policy as a multidimensional process in which the domestic and the supranational level constantly interact: EU and Finland share a community of views, a common identity, if Finland is actually able to give its contribution to the definition of this collective interest. Sovereignty in the CFSP is not a zero sum game, in which national interests exclude supranational ones. Rather, the Finnish interest, which however represents the rationale of all the actions of the UM, can be enhanced, obtained a value added through EU membership. In other terms, Finnish identity is mirrored in the EU, if the EU assumes a Northern Dimension. In the second half of 2006, Finland held again the EU Council Presidency. One of the main priorities of the Presidency was the enhancement of the EU’s external capabilities as this might give ‘value added’ to the foreign policies of individual Member States.

In a very recent speech delivered in the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the Ministry, Foreign Minister Stubb (2008) declared:

‘By joining the EU, Finland has not come out of the blue rather she took the place which was for her natural and self evident: Finland has always been in Europe. Therefore, I begin my speech with a request: I hope that we can finally together agree on the fact that there is no more room for a debate on Finnish EU membership. Finland is an EU member, and that’s it. (…) Finland has not to fear a strong EU President or ‘foreign minister’: the stronger they are the better is for us’.

In sum, from the beginning of its engagement with the CFSP to present, Finland has clearly committed itself to the development of all of EU’s external relations, not only the CFSP: the EU shall become a global player, and a strong one. Thus, as this short presentation hopefully indicates, there is evidence supporting the hypothesis of CFSP triggered socialization in the case of the UM. The CFSP is a value added, a mean to enhance Finnish interests; not a reduction of Finnish sovereignty, rather its enhancement. There is not a ‘we’ versus ‘them’ discourse: as Stubb put it, ‘Finland is an EU member and that’s it’ (Stubb 2008). The Ministry is the foreign policy instrument of the government to which is accountable. In its rhetoric yet also in its Strategy, the UM has followed the political direction of the country. Yet, the crucial rationale is always the promotion of Finnish interests: this is fully understandable taking into
account the foreign and security policy tradition of the country: ‘in spite of all the changes in economic and political structures during the post Cold War era, the state system and state interests and power are still of great importance in Finnish political tradition’ (Tiilikainen 2006: 85). Moving from the rhetoric of speeches to a comment by one of the interviewee, the shadow of Finnish interest looms much larger:

‘I saw from inside how the Union works, how every country is defending its national interest in an institution which calls itself a Union yet it is still so far from that. Also we Finns have started to understand the reality of the Union, and the faith in the security guarantee has eroded. There are no security guarantees in the EU. Let’s not be naive. These are things we have learned. We have become more similar to the old Member States’ (interview, Senior Civil Servant 10.1.2008).

The question is then: has the UM really transformed itself into an EU foreign ministry? This would appear a bold conclusion. What if the Finnish interest stopped being equivalent to the EU one? Will Finland and its foreign ministry still maintain the rhetoric of Euro-enthusiasm or rather turn back to political realism?

The assessment of Finnish diplomats’ attitudes towards the establishment of a European External Action Service (EEAS) might provide further evidence of CFSP-triggered socialization in the case of the UM. Is the EEAS perceived as a further opportunity to enhance Finnish foreign policy capabilities? A positive view of the EEAS contributes to confirm the hypothesis of CFSP-triggered socialization as adaptation to EU level norms, roles, ideas and identities in the case under study. The EEAS represents arguably a major step forward in the development of the CFSP: it would institutionalize further collective policy preparation and implementation, creating an organizational basis for a ‘diplomatic republic of Europe’. The assessment is based on interview material and the official position of Finland on the matter (Torstila 2008).

Finland considers the EEAS as a positive, ‘important innovation’, envisaged to support a more coherent, visible and efficient global role for the EU, and ‘crucial’ for the High Representative and possibly the President of the European Council, who will need this Service in order to fully assume their responsibilities’ (ibid.). The UM has been in charge of preparing the Finnish view on the EEAS. Finland’s position is therefore to a large extent the result of UM’s officials’ work. Finland sees the EEAS as one of the ‘big innovations’ of the Treaty of Lisbon. Finland considers the EEAS as an instrument for enhancing the global role of the Union. The Service shall assist the High Representative in his/ her tasks, in particular in
ensuring the coherence of the Union’s external actions widely conceived, not the CFSP only. The EEAS is expected to have an impact on national foreign ministries, as ‘they aim at sending officials to rotate in Brussels and in the EU Delegations. This has very concrete implications for budgetary and personnel planning in national services’:

‘Finland aims at sending its “brightest and best” officials to the European External Action Service, to serve on a temporary basis in tasks which fit with our interests’ (ibid.)

Finland points clearly that it expects the EEAS’s personnel to be selected on the basis of merit and that ‘member states will send their most competent diplomats to serve, on a temporary basis, in the new Service’ (ibid.). The major risk involved in the designing of the EEAS is that of duplication with existing structures for the EU’s external relations. Does this official, overall positive view of the EEAS correspond to those expressed by the interviewees?

All the interviewees seemed to agree that the EEAS is still ‘works in progress. Thus, comments were generally cautious and ‘diplomatic’. Most of the commentators viewed the EEAS as a positive advancement in adding more coherence and efficiency to the EU external role. As put by one diplomat:

‘The EEAS is a good thing and necessary if you consider the expectations there will be on the High Representative as he or she will be replacing the actual role of the Presidency in implementation. The EAS will give more continuity and effectiveness. It will conduct negotiations and represent the EU in international for a, it’ll be everywhere’ (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007).

The same diplomat emphasized that the EEAS will not be taking decisions and that member states, and national foreign ministries, will still play a major role:

‘The EEAS is not a decision making body. Decision making will remain in the Council. It is important that the Council remains strong! We smaller member states are going to be there as part of it. In external policies, we do not shift to the Community method, member states are still there’ (ibid.).

Yet, some interviewees were particularly skeptical, emphasizing the need for maintaining a very careful look on the designing process of the new instrument. In particular, the issue of ‘who’ shall be part of the Service seemed the most relevant. One interviewee dismissed the EEAS as a possible further complication in an already very much complex system:

‘There is already a very complicated system for dealing with the EU external relations. In my opinion, it is difficult to see how this mismatch will be solved or put to function by the EEAS in a certain way that the best will be maintained and the worst eliminated’ (interview, Department for Europe 16.11.2007).
Some interviewees were even more pessimistic:

‘EU representations will not defend Finnish interests abroad. Not in my life time. The Ministry of Finance will be just saying ‘come on, close the embassies!’ We are not going to do that. Of course, if things go well we might be winners as well. Through Union’s representations we could be present in countries where we cannot afford to be. But in any case, people will be taken away from our resources. We will keep a good face, saying we want a more efficient EEAS, but there are many doubts. Not only in Finland. There is increasing skepticism (…) if the EU fails also as provider of security; we will be left alone again. Solidarity…does it really have a meaning? Look at how Estonia was treated!? Has the Union united behind Estonia!?’ (Interview, Senior Civil Servant 10.1.2008).

Pessimism seemed to be in particular associated with the risk that Finnish trade interests might be jeopardized if not adequately defended by Finnish diplomats: ‘it is difficult for me to see an Italian diplomat promoting Finnish companies abroad…if a were an Italian diplomat, I would rather promote Italian companies’ (interview, Administrative Department 1); or: ‘How will the EEAS affect our diplomatic service? (…) The Commission has not sold any Nokia. Are we actually ready to give up our interests?’(interview, Department for Europe 10.12.2007).

Further evidence of CFSP-triggered socialization might derive from an assessment of whether and how the Ministry has adapted its training programs for diplomats to EU level political cooperation. As training provides arguably the first phase in the socialization of the Ministry’s personnel, information about the content of training programs organized by the UM is relevant in assessing how much the Ministry has adapted to the EU. From the interview material I have collected, it is clear that the UM has organized and managed EU formation for its personnel; in particular before the 1999 Presidency when a ‘huge training program’ (interview, Department for Europe 10.12.2007) was organized, not only in the UM but in all Finnish administration. The KAVAKU (Kansainvälisten asioiden valmennuskurssi), the training course in international affairs for new diplomats organized by the Ministry, has become more EU oriented (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007). Yet, as pointed by one interviewee: ‘it is still very short when compared with what takes place in other ministries of EU member states as France, with the ENA’ (ibid.). EU expertise has became a much valued resource in the UM. One diplomat said the Ministry now gives more points to those applicants who demonstrated to have performed stages in the EU institutions or a specific EU knowledge in their application for entering the diplomatic career (interview, Administrative Department
3.12.2007). However, EU expertise is still not a general asset of the all Ministry, despite thirteen years of membership:

‘We are in a more difficult situation than other ministries, as our system is based on permanent rotation. We still have several years after membership colleagues coming from abroad with not a good knowledge of the EU. Our colleagues which have served in Brussels have the best knowledge available (…) yet, it is not always the case that we can combine expertise about specific issues with knowledge of the EU’ (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007).

In particular, one interviewee pointed to the lack of expertise in EU law: ‘We have very few ‘top minds’ in EU legal affairs and if they are away, we can really notice it’ (interview, Administrative Department 3.12.2007).

Despite evidence that the EU and EU expertise have clearly penetrated the Ministry, the UM has not developed any specific training program for the CFSP explicitly: diplomats have to learn ‘by doing’ (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007). And it does not seem to be such easy; as one official put it: ‘it takes years to be really an expert’ (ibid.).

**Chapter Conclusions: A Transformed UM?**

As it has emerged from the previous short presentation of bureaucratic adaptation in the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, there is evidence of CFSP-triggered Europeanization: EU level political cooperation has promoted the emergence of geography in the Ministry and the movement towards regional specialization. It is also fair to claim that EU membership has indeed affected the organization of the Ministry, its ways of doing things and led to several new posts. CFSP membership has clearly impacted on the agenda, the speed, the workload, the quantity of information and the policy process in general. Yet, few posts have been established as a direct consequence of the CFSP. In sum, I consider that the **CFSP effect on UM’s organization has been limited and shall be located into the context of a broader phenomenon of Europeanization**: the need for domestic coordination of EU policy, the willingness to promote coherence in the all field of EU external relations and the emergence of globalization all contribute in explaining the Ministry’s reorganization. Holding the Presidency has clearly impacted on the formal and informal organization of the Ministry. The CFSP is a major part of the task, yet it does not exhaust it. Therefore, Presidency triggered Europeanization can not be equated straightforwardly with CFSP Europeanization.
In the case of the Political Department, the evidence of CFSP triggered bureaucratic adaptation is clearer. This is rather obvious, considering that it is this department which represents the core of the policy. It is possible to argue that CFSP triggered Europeanization in foreign ministries is then differential between departments: this is fully in line with what already in the eighties Hill and others observed: ‘the CFSP (and the EPC then) has been a tool to revitalize the political functions (and sections) of member states’ foreign ministries and to regain the terrain lost to other ministries as a consequence of EC economic integration’ (Jørgensen 1997: 177). As one interviewee put by it: ‘The CFSP is a very clear policy area: it is separated from the rest of EC policies, it has different structures and there is no room for overlapping’ (interview, Political Department 3.12.2007).

CFSP membership has not radically transformed the institutional culture of the Ministry. The Ministry has remained ‘faithful’ to its core task: promote Finnish national interests abroad. The institutional history of the Ministry as a defender of Finnish sovereignty and independence; the foreign policy tradition of the country as well as the emphasis on state centrism have mediated the impact of Europe. Yet, there is evidence of socialization: the UM has learnt the value of EU political cooperation. UM diplomats consider the EU the natural framework for action, the EU is not a menace, rather a value added for Finland, a channel for global influence. The UM supports a more coherent, ambitious and comprehensive CFSP and its diplomats work for it on an everyday basis not only in Helsinki but in all the representations of Finland abroad. The EU is not something else, rather the family, a club for the UM.

However, moving from the rhetoric of speeches to the comments of some interviewees, more emphasis has been put on the national interest. The CFSP is a mean to Finnish ends. In particular, diplomats working with the CFSP explicitly tended to emphasize its intergovernmental nature. Small states can ensure that their voice is heard if the current system is maintained (Interview, Political Department 3.12.2007). Yet, this position appears in contrast with the official line of Finland, which intended to extend qualified majority voting in CFSP decision making. This might be revealing of bureaucratic politics in the Finnish foreign policy system. Also in the case of the Finnish Ministry, a small one in international comparison, the CFSP is mainly a matter for the Political Department. In sum, the socializing effect of the CFSP might have been over-emphasized. I conclude that the constructivist
hypothesis, when it comes to socialization, is only partially confirmed: the Ministry has not been transformed by the CFSP.

Chapter 6: Conclusions

In this thesis I have analyzed the adaptation of the UM to the CFSP. I have employed an expanded version of Smith’s (2000) conceptual framework for the assessment of the domestic impact of the CFSP on domestic political systems to the Finnish case, focusing on bureaucratic adaptation, socialization and redistribution of resources in the UM. I have proposed to locate the conceptual framework for the analysis into two major meta-theoretical perspectives in political science, Rationalism and Constructivism. In this way, I have been able to frame different questions on the phenomenon I intended to investigate, expanding the scope of the analysis.

In this concluding chapter, I firstly summarize the findings of the analysis; second, I discuss the theoretical implications of the thesis; third, I propose some suggestions for further research on the Europeanization of national foreign ministries.

Thesis’s Main Findings

The empirical analysis in this thesis leads to the main following conclusion: the CFSP has contributed to change and adaptation in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. In other terms, there is evidence to support the claim of CFSP-triggered Europeanization; the CFSP has Europeanized the UM. Yet, I need to qualify how and to what extent the CFSP has impacted on the Ministry. First, the CFSP as ‘structure of opportunities’ has contributed to readdress the relative decline of the UM in resources and influence which followed the end of the Cold War. Since EU membership, the resources of the UM have increased. The CFSP is part of the explanation. The CFSP has contributed to make the misfit between the declining resources of the Ministry and the need for more activism and more participation unsustainable. In line with an ambitious foreign policy tradition and the prestige of the UM, the Ministry has ‘voiced’ for more resources to be fully effective also in a EU Finland. The strategy has been largely successful: the Ministry has reconfirmed its role in the Finnish core executive, using the window of opportunity offered by the CFSP to readdress its loses in coordination, and to react to an increased role of the PM and of other branches of domestic
bureaucracy in international affairs. In sum, the CFSP has benefited the Ministry and the hypothesis of gains for the Ministry can be confirmed. However, it is important to stress that, despite the CFSP gains, the Ministry has not been able to regain fully its traditional status as primus inter pares among Finnish ministries. The UM is an influential yet a ‘normal’ ministry, no longer the privileged President’s Ministry. The CFSP has ‘benefited’ some parts of the Ministry’s organizations more than others: it has led to more resources for the EUE. Yet, the POL, which might have been considered at the onset as the logical winner of the CFSP in the Ministry, has actually experienced a major decline in its share of funds. Thus, the hypothesis of differential gains in the Ministry shall be partially confirmed. Third, the CFSP has contributed to changing the organization of the Ministry. Its main impact has been the progressive emergence of ‘geography’ on the UM’s organization that is the movement towards regional specialization: first in 1998, with the establishment of geographical divisions, then in 2003, when geographical divisions became full fledged Departments. The CFSP has also contributed to the major expansion of the Finnish network of embassies abroad. However, only few new posts have been created to deal explicitly with the policy. A major CFSP change has taken place in terms of ‘ways of doing things’: agenda setting, schedule, amount of information have been altered by CFSP membership. In sum, there is evidence to confirm the hypothesis of CFSP-triggered bureaucratic adaptation. In particular, this seems to hold in the case of the POL, the Department mostly involved with the policy. Fourth, there is evidence to support the claim of CFSP-triggered socialization: the UM has internalized the value of cooperation and collective action in the CFSP framework. The CFSP is a valued added for the Ministry. Yet, the institutional identity of the Ministry has not been transformed: the CFSP is a mean to Finnish ends, a tool for the promotion of the Finnish national interest. Thus, the Ministry has not been transformed by the CFSP; yet, it has changed and adapted to EU political cooperation.

Domestic factors have mediated the impact of the CFSP, in particular the foreign policy tradition and the prestige of the institution. The small size of the Ministry has also facilitated major organizational reforms to cope with the CFSP workload, as well as the expansion of the diplomatic network. A major difficulty in this analysis has been how to clearly discriminate the CFSP effect from that of other EU level independent variables, as the impact of enlargement, of holding the Presidency and of EU membership in general. In some cases, as in the POL, this has been easier. However, CFSP triggered change and adaptation is only one
dimension of a broader process of Europeanization which, for reasons of space and time, I have not been able to fully assess in this thesis.

**Theoretical Implications**

I argue that the choice of adopting a comprehensive approach, based on a rationalist and constructivist understanding of the CFSP, to the study of Europeanization in the UM has been a useful proposal as I have been able to ask ‘different sorts of questions’ (Tonra 2003: 750) about how foreign ministries are changing in the European Union. There is not to my knowledge a clear, readymade theoretical framework for the study of foreign ministries’ Europeanization explicitly: I have decided to use Smith’s (2000) conceptual framework for the study of the impact of the CFSP on national political systems, supported with ideas from the article by Pomorska (2007) on the impact of enlargement on the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as it provides clear indicators for assessing CFSP-triggered changes in terms of bureaucratic adaptation and socialization. However, as I have experienced in doing my analysis, there is still a lack of clear empirical indicators of CFSP-triggered change and adaptation in foreign ministries. For instance, the budget of foreign ministries are complex documents, where it is challenging to identify and limit any CFSP effect specifically. Therefore, findings are preliminary rather than definitive.

Constructivism offers the most promising theoretical avenue for the study of the transformative effects of the CFSP. However, I argue that its hypotheses have over-emphasized the independent variable. In the case of the UM, there is evidence of socialization and internalization of CFSP norms by the institution and diplomats: yet, the core value of the Ministry remains the promotion of Finnish national interest. The crucial question is: what would happen in case the ‘collective enterprise’ went radically against it?

A rationalist, ‘structure of opportunities’, approach in my view has represented an effective complement to a constructivist perspective on CFSP-triggered Europeanization. In the literature, there is the argument that supranational political cooperation might reinforce the government and enhance its independence from domestic control (König-Archibugi 2004). Yet, has this effect been differential in the government? In this thesis, I have investigated if the CFSP has translated in more gains for the foreign ministry explicitly.
Suggestions for Further Research

In my view, there are at least two proposals which might stimulate further research on the Europeanization of foreign ministries: first, I would invite students of foreign ministries to develop clearer, comprehensive theoretical framework for the study of how this branch of domestic bureaucracy is changing and adapting. It might be also the case that a purely CFSP centered approach is not the best solution: foreign ministries are active in many more fields than that. Thus, an analytical framework able to take into account several EU level independent variables, EU foreign policy in general, might be more rewarding. Second, I would propose to move in the direction of comparative analyses, as in Tonra (2001) rather than case-studies (Pomorska 2007; Allen & Oliver 2004). It would be very interesting to study for instance how foreign ministries sharing a similar administrative tradition, as those of the Nordic countries, are evolving. In this thesis, I have tried to develop my case study on the basis of an established framework, using the same areas of observation in order to facilitate the comparison of my findings with those of other analyses.

At the time of writing, there is an ongoing discussion in the national foreign ministries of EU Member States regarding the EEAS, a major innovation of the Treaty of Lisbon, when (and if) it will finally enter into force, with major implications for national administrations; moreover, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland is right in the middle of a new major organizational reform. It really seems therefore that the next future will still reserve much ‘food for thought’ for those interested in how EU foreign ministries are adapting to the still open-ended process of European integration.
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**UM Official Speeches, News and Press Releases**


**Newspaper Articles**


Appendix

Letter of Access

Dear Mr. / Ms,

I contact you to ask whether it would be possible to arrange a short interview to discuss with you the Europeanization of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

My name is Savino Ruà, MA student of European Studies at the University of Tampere, Faculty of Social Sciences. I am writing my thesis on the impact of the CFSP on the Finnish Foreign Ministry from an institutionalist perspective.

I am planning to conduct several interviews with Finnish diplomats and officers working at the Finnish MFA to collect the relevant qualitative data needed for supporting my hypotheses.

It goes without saying that I will extremely pleased to have the opportunity to hear your comments on the issue.

Of course, I am the most flexible concerning the data and schedule of the eventual interview. However, my preference would be to keep it before the end of the year.

Looking forward for your reply, I thank you beforehand for the attention you will concede to my request.

Best regards,

Savino Ruà

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