Eeva Hurmalainen

Construction of National Identity in Political Communication
An Analysis on Discourses of Security in Finland during the Crisis of the Caucasus

Eeva Hurmalainen
MSc Programme on Political Communication
International Relations
International School of Social Sciences
University of Tampere
Master’s Thesis
This Master’s thesis contains a descriptive analysis of the features of public security discourses taken place in the public sphere during the Crisis of the Caucasus in fall 2008. This case study shows how discourses on security are intertwined with the social construction of national identity in discursive practices during an international crisis. Representations and renewal of Finnish national identity in the discursive practices of security are observed by using the theory of Finnish national identity project, as defined by Harle and Moisio, as the general framework of the study.

Seen as a part of contemporary, highly mediatized public society, political communication acts as the single most important public interface of competing discourses concerning national security and subsequently, national identity. In order to discuss on political stances and actions on a national level, a constant identification of the Self is unavoidable. This identification of the Self takes place also in the media by a construction of national identity in i.e. news discourses. With the help of a specific discourse analysis defined by Teun A. van Dijk, this study implements a descriptive analysis of data which consist of newspaper articles, all dealing with Finland role in relation to the events of the Caucasus, as represented here as an international crisis. By approaching the thematics of the study from a social constructionist perspective, the study introduces four different discourses of the security/identity puzzle observed in the research data. All the four discourses have a different position in regard to Finnish nationality and thus take part in forming the dimension of the country’s political scene. In addition to differences, a universal discourse can be observed from the research data. As national identity is often argued to have diminished from the accounts of social reality in the post-modern world, this thesis argues that the case is somewhat to the contrary. However, this statement owes to a perception which emphasizes the multi-dimensional nature of collective identities.

The theoretical framework of this study leans on the constructivist approach to IR, namely in the consistent constructivism articulated by Alexander Wendt shortly after the end of the Cold War. Deeper accounts of the security/identity puzzle are given by the Copenhagen School, as Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan have focused on the research on securitization in discourses and the construction of identities in the discipline of International Relations.

Keywords: Social construction of national identity, discourse analysis in political communication, securitization in discursive practices.
Textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and (...) describe, in specific contexts, the implications of this connection for the way we think and act in the contemporary world.”

(George 1994, p. 191)
# Table of Contents

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 6
   1.1. Research Questions and Setting the Case ................................................................. 8
   1.2. Idiosyncrasy of the Study ....................................................................................... 9
2. Identity in International Relations .................................................................................... 11
   2.1. Security and Identity ............................................................................................. 13
   2.2. What is the Identity of a Nation State Like? .......................................................... 15
   2.3. Foreign Policy, the Self and the Other(s) ............................................................... 16
   2.4. The Role of Political Communication in Construction of Identities ....................... 19
3. Constructivism – An Overview ........................................................................................ 22
   3.1. Constructivism in International Relations ............................................................... 22
   3.2. Alexander Wendt’s Consistent Constructivism ...................................................... 24
   3.3. Securitization in Discourse .................................................................................... 28
   3.4. Security as Social Learning ................................................................................... 30
   3.5. Constructivism in Sum ......................................................................................... 31
4. Westernizising Discourses in Finnish Foreign Policy ...................................................... 33
   4.1. Defining the Finnish National Identity Project ....................................................... 37
   4.2. Debate on the Finnish National Identity Project .................................................... 40
5. Research Frame, Methodology and Data Collection ....................................................... 46
   5.1. Research Frame ..................................................................................................... 47
   5.2. Discourse Analysis and Frame .............................................................................. 47
   5.3. Discourses and Discursive Practices ..................................................................... 50
   5.4. The Different Levels of Discourse ....................................................................... 51
   5.5. Discourse Analysis by Teun A. van Dijk ................................................................. 52
6. Hegemonic Discourses ..................................................................................................... 54
   6.1. News Discourses in the Research of Political Communication .......................... 55
   6.2. Method of Data Collection .................................................................................... 59
7. Implementation ................................................................................................................. 61
   7.1. Findings: National Identity in the Research Data .................................................. 62
   7.2. Traditionalists ...................................................................................................... 63
   7.3. Transformationalists ............................................................................................. 64
   7.4. Emancipationalists ............................................................................................... 66
   7.5. Moderationalists .................................................................................................. 68
   7.6. Validity of the Study ............................................................................................ 70
1. Introduction

Public discussions on national security often relate to the concept of national identity in a very fundamental way. However, it is not self-evident that these two concepts relate with each other in such an impugned fashion. As Wilson points out, choices of language in political acts are often carefully manipulated in order to achieve a specific political effect (2003, p. 410). Thus it is not irrelevant in political terms to pay attention to the means of constructing social reality by creating inclusions and exclusions in contemporary political communication. The task at hand is not at all simple, as it includes a variety of ontological and epistemological presuppositions about the scientific philosophy behind political reality in general. However, I will try to grab this task in this study, based upon an inspiration from recent events in international politics which seem to have had an explicit impact on the foreign policy discourses which took place in the public sphere in Finland. What needs to be noted here is that these debates often draw heavily from two aspects of political consideration. Firstly, matters of material interests play a key role in the discussion. Is Finland well off with its current material and social resources? Is Finland able to answer to the challenges posed by the new international order – namely to the threats emerged after the end of the Cold War, such as international terrorism, global pandemic etc.? Should we call for NATO or is mere cooperation with the military alliance enough? Secondly, there seems to be a never-ending collective need to revaluate the status of Finland as a nation. Where do we orientate ourselves in current international developments? Where do we stand as a nation, separate from other surrounding nations?

For quite a long time, the question of Finland’s possible NATO accession remained somewhat idle within the political discussion in Finland. Only a few scholars and journalists kept on writing about the possibility of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but the outcome of the discussion was still rather sluggish and somewhat marginal. Finnish officials preferred to keep silent about the theme, explaining that there is no ground for a discussion. The Russian ambassador to Finland from 1992 to 1996, Yuri Deryabin, writes that he remembers an occasion when he was asked about Russia’s reaction to Finland’s possible NATO accession by a newspaper journalist. He replied Russia would certainly not be a passive observer and called for an open discussion on the theme (Deryabin 2007, p. 70).
consequence was that he was invited to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland where he was told that discussion on that kind of ‘hypothetical’ issue was out of place.

When the Baltic States stated they wanted to join NATO, the discussion in Finland moved to a higher gear. Since then, the debate has been livelier and perhaps even more passionate than the discussion before Finland entered the EU in 1995. Even though the Russian threat is not always articulated as such, as only few believe it could materialize, the emphasis of the discussion is on the risks involved in a possible destabilization of Russia (Deryabin 2007, p. 70).

Since the end of the Cold War, there have been a few influential Finnish advocates of NATO accession. One of them, however, is former President of Finland and former UN Special Envoy to Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, who was also honored with the Nobel Peace Prize in 2008. Mr. Ahtisaari has publicly flagged for Finnish membership in both Western alliances, the EU and NATO, supporting his argument with the presumption that Finland should participate actively in the decision-making of both alliances and not to remain as a mere ‘observer’. Also the former speaker of the Finnish parliament and former head of the Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDPF), Paavo Lipponen, has taken the view that membership of NATO is basically a matter of time. On the other hand, many influential Finnish politicians have objected to the idea of entering NATO. Amongst them are the former social democratic President Mauno Koivisto (in office 1982-1994), whose opinions are still highly appreciated in Finland, and the former Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja (in office 2000-2007).

The NATO discussion in Finland is undoubtedly highly political in nature. With regard to the academic field of International Relations, an open political discussion helps scholars to analyze the ways we see ourselves and our national identity vis-à-vis other nation states. Even though Finland has sometimes been seen as quite an odd bird amongst some other, mostly Central European states, as it is military non-aligned and has its national defense force based on general military service, the electorate’s support for these arrangements seems to remain strong (Deryabin 2007 p. 72). By some observers, the Finnish defense system is characterized even as outdated, as it is seen as a ‘relic’ from Cold War times. However, unlike its predecessors, the governmental Security and Defense report in 2004 mentions military non-alignment as the official policy of the state, but is more definite on leaving open a possibility for Finland to access NATO in the future. Similar formulation remains in the new report from
January 2009, only articulated even a bit more clearly (VN 2009, p. 40). This so called ‘NATO option’ has had many nuances in political discussion within the media, albeit many critical, too. In short, the NATO option means that the possibility of military alignment of Finland can be redefined if such a need was seen to emerge.

For the Finns, the question of joining a powerful military alliance such as NATO is thus a delicate one. It is difficult to make any satisfactory conclusions out of the political debate that has taken place in the public media sphere. For a student of International Relations, it is also quite a challenge to draw any water-proof conclusions based on statements by individual actors available to the public. However, I will pursue the task by analyzing the underlying patterns of the recent discussion and similarly sketch out explanations that may shed light, not only on the NATO discussion, but moreover, on the general nature of the security/identity dimension of Finnish political communication. By doing this, I wish to increase and develop understanding of the interlaced relationship between political communication and the construction of national identity in the context of Finland.

1.1. Research Questions and Setting the Case

The Russian federation sent troops to Georgian territories in the Caucasus, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, on August 8th 2008. A few weeks later, newly elected Russian president Dmitri Medvedev recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, and so did the Russian parliament. The Conflict of the Caucasus was mediated by the Chairman-in-Office of OSCE at the moment, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Mr. Alexander Stubb. Stubb had started his work as foreign minister a few months earlier following the resignation of his fellow partisan, Mr. Ilkka Kanerva.

The Conflict of the Caucasus gave a new push to the public security discussion in Finland. Some actors within the Finnish political sphere wanted to raise the question of NATO accession to the political agenda once again. The most active political party in this respect was the Finnish National Coalition Party (kokoomus) which had moved from opposition to government in the latest parliamentary elections in March 2007. One of the actors is the head of the parliamentary committee for foreign affairs, Mr. Pertti Salolainen, well known for being a strong supporter of Finnish NATO membership. Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Stubb was also known as pro-NATO while being a member of the European Parliament, before he was
appointed as minister. However, after his inauguration he has publicly followed the official line of Finnish foreign policy – namely the NATO option.

As NATO is often framed as a security issue in many European nation states, it is shifted into a realm above political debate (Kuus 2007, p. 13). This claim relies on the assumption that day-to-day politics are overshadowed by matters of national security as they are seen as a playground for specialized experts who possess extra-ordinary knowledge about international affairs. Geopolitics is simultaneously handled as self-evident and mysterious. Kuus writes that voters are encouraged to form an opinion about geopolitics but simultaneously to leave the actual decisions to elite. Even though professionals’ views of security and identity are not at all homogenous within a specific society, they do establish the parameters of expertise to that debate (ibid.). Kuus emphasizes in her study that thus these ‘intellectuals’ have an important role in the making of contemporary geopolitics.

This study aims at outlining and revealing the parameters and dimensions of the particular political discussion that took place in Finland during the crisis of the Caucasus. The objective is to find clues to the construction of Finnish identity in the security and identity discourses emerging from that discussion. Therefore, it is of great concern to begin by providing relevant definitions to the framework of this thesis study. Thus I will now turn to review the concept of identity in the literature of International Relations in different contexts relevant to the study’s goals. I will first investigate how identity is discussed in the literature of IR in general and then turn to explicate how identity relates to the concepts of state and security. Finally, I will bring the concepts to the realm of political communication which is the overall framework of this study.

1.2. Idiosyncrasy of the Study

Scholars of IR, who use discourse theorizing in their research, are a rather fragmented community of researchers. Although the community lacks a paradigm of scientific criteria, there certainly are some similarities, too. As to theorizing and methodology, the members of the community assimilate particular features concerning the epistemology of Social Sciences’ philosophy as well as their approach to International Relations research. (Milliken 1999, p. 226)
Scholars working in the area of discourse theorizing aim at challenging the ‘scientism’ of mainstream International Relations – whether in the neopositivist (inductive) or the rationalist (deductive) sense of the word (Milliken 1999, p. 226). This statement, to a certain extent, is naturally a simplification of such a disparate scholarly work. However, in order to sketch the similarities within the community, as well as dismantling its reputation as ‘bad’ or ‘deviant’ science, certain generalizations are necessary. Regardless of the oppositional label surrounding social constructionist, poststructuralist or constructivist theorizing, in any case the community tries to reveal structures of power in the social practices of our daily lives.

The very same objective of revealing structures of power or hegemony applies to this thesis study. By revealing our ‘rules of thinking’, hegemonic structures become exposed and thus prone to further criticism. As for the underlying epistemology of social constructionism, there is no ‘truth’ beyond language. The ‘real world’ happens and constitutes itself in social practices, regardless of whether we are speaking of politics, gender, justice or sexuality etc. By examining the norms of what is seen as normal or deviant, the ways in which different speech acts are fundamentally constructed become uncovered and thus increase the general awareness of the intellectual architecture of certain discourses within a society.

The social constructionist, or constructivist (IR) approach of this study, lies in the assumption that identity is, above all, formed, renewed and modified in discursive acts. Burr reminds us that our identity does not itself originate from inside, but instead from social realm, where people “swim in the sea of language and other signs.” (Burr 1995, p. 53). However, identities are not randomly or arbitrarily determined by some essential ‘nature’. They are not accidental. This is the starting point of this study in line with other constructionist/(post)structuralist studies which aim at analyzing discourses as not simply abstract ideas, but as ways of representing reality. This is to acknowledge that discourses are intensively connected to the way society runs (ibid.).
2. Identity in International Relations

Not until the so-called constructivist turn in IR, the actual focus of interest was not on identities or norms of a nation state, but on more concrete undertakings within the political sphere of international affairs. However, the concept of identity has been accepted and used also by scholars who aim to situate their work in the neorealist tradition, whereas identity was earlier seen as a soft concept more suitable for novelists and sociologists (McSweeney 1999, p. 69). The real breakthrough of the concept of identity in security studies took place in the beginning of the 1990s by the so called Copenhagen School (CS), namely Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan. Wæver and Buzan started a significant turn in the study of security in general by turning the focus on identities instead of purely material matters. This change was grounded on the long academic history of the realist-liberal institutionalist paradigm which emphasized the role of the nation state as the most relevant actor in international politics. CS wanted to shift the general focus on identity by arguing that the most significant object of security is the identity of a society – instead of the material foundations which make the conditions of living acceptable in a specific society (Huru 2004, p. 33). Thus Wæver and Buzan wanted to enable an academic discussion between the social constructionist and neorealist scholars on security issues ‘at the same table’.

Identity has been a significant salient point in the study of geopolitics and security in international relations since the end of the Cold War, much due to the Copenhagen School. It is nowadays widely acknowledged at least amongst post-modern/constructivist scholars that both security and insecurity are aspects of the same ideal concept, as they are intertwined with the same culturally-driven predictions of identity. However, the exact relationship between identity and security is subjected to a considerable theoretical debate. (Kuus 2007, p. 11) Identity is often understood as everything that is intangible and ideational in our community, whereas security is traditionally treated under material considerations. I will focus on the epistemo-ontological problematics of securitization by the CS in more detail later in this study.

As mentioned above, for Waltz’s neorealists, states are the unit actors in the international system of which structure objective reality as such, independent of the individual actors. This structure is thus not an ideal one but a material one. The constructivist approach in IR, on the other hand, emphasizes the idea that the social order of international relations is, above all,
socially constituted. The institutions and concepts which construct our notion of the outside reality, owe to the practices of individual human beings as actors (McSweeney 1999, p. 104). This ‘social construction of reality’ is thus the starting point of all studies that examine the role of identity in international relations. This is to say that the object of the study is in the social order of reality rather than in material depictions.

Despite of the ‘revolutionist’ accomplishments of the constructivist approach in terms of studying identities in IR, several methodological problems arise when exploring the social order. Firstly, the social order is unstable in nature which makes it difficult to grab with any method in our reach. Unlike in natural sciences, no specific empirical measures can be used in order to draw airtight observations and conclusions out of identities – as all our observations about reality depend upon our senses.

One of the keenest critics of the work of CS is McSweeney (whose critic towards Wæver’s and Buzan’s premises is presented in more detail later in this chapter). The Copenhagen School insists that security is, above all, a matter of identity. It is the identity of a state which drives states to resort to aggression. Identity is also the main reason of developing security problems between international actors. This is something that McSweeney is not willing to accept, as he argues that even though security problems undoubtedly reflect to the level of identity and take part in their construction, security problems are not born because of identities. (Huru 2004, pp. 29-30) The main problem which McSweeney sees in the theorizing of CS is that it sees identity as a stable ideal which can be studied only on macro-level. McSweeney, on his behalf, persists that identity cannot be understood as a fixed variable. He sees rather that societies might have different identities because they have a security problem. (ibid. p. 37) What comes to this study, the disagreement between the origins of security problems are however remained as a secondary factor. The most important notion here is that according to the research on the security/identity puzzle, one needs to acknowledge the existence of identities as significant factors in international relations. As explained above, also the logic of differentiation within a society is multi-dimensional and thus multi-voiced and complex in nature. This notion takes us to review the different perceptions of security in regard to identity.
### 2.1. Security and Identity

As early as 1983, Buzan announced a revision of the concept of security in his work. He then introduced the concepts of society and identity into the analysis of international security by creating a transitional shift towards human subjects of security instead of material, state-driven ones (McSweeney 1999, p. 68). The main influence of Buzan’s re-conceptualization was that it had a focus on societal identity as the core value, fragile to threats and dangers and in need of security. Later in the 1990s, Wæver and Buzan wanted to maintain the societal dimension of identity as the key sector of the state, but similarly give it a new status as an object of security (ibid.), as explained earlier in this chapter. According to the CS, it is the security of a society, as distinct from that of the state that counts in exploring identities. By outlining this duality of security, state security is given sovereignty whereas societal security is held together by identity (Wæver et al. 1993, p. 25). Wæver et al. explain what they mean by societal security further by a definition that it is “[...] a clustering of institutions combined with a feeling of common identity.” (ibid. p. 6.) They go even further by stating that

> The key to society is that set of ideas and practices identify individuals as members of a social group. Society is about identity, about the self conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community. (Wæver et al. 1993, p. 6, emphasis added).

This notion is thus somewhat similar with the one Browning later gives in his study of emancipation of the Finnish state to a nation (Browning in Lehti et al. 2003, pp. 101-127). Browning sees individuals (of a given society) as the main objects of security instead of the state. In that way, the construction of national identity relies in many ways on individual contributions to the discourses on them – i.e. foreign policy decision-making. Browning argues that by showing that meanings are never ‘fixed’, post-modern/constructivist approaches have empowered people to reconstruct their world (ibid. p. 112). By reclaiming individuals as the main actors of social construction, individuals become the leading subjects of security instead of states. This is remarkable, as the traditional status of states as the main focus in international relations thus would seem to be socially constructed itself. In this way, the linkage between nation and state becomes comparatively artificial. The post-modern turn in social sciences after the end of Cold War has contributed to this view especially in the level of epistemology: post-positivist means of obtaining impartial knowledge have left their footprint in the discipline of IR, too. One can detect such post-Cold War discourses of Finnish
national identity that have abandoned the modernist fusion of the nation and the state and lean on a more post-modernist approach (ibid. p. 103). By delinking the nation from the state, more diverse possibilities of interpreting Finnish identity, as well as the concepts of sovereignty and national security, open up (ibid.). Hackman even concludes that the national discourses of history are already losing their importance and will be, sooner or later, replaced by supra-ethnic and regional discourses (Hackman in Lehti et al. 2003, p. 93). Even though discourses of (European) history live strongly in a nation state framework, a question arises whether it is possible to create viable counter strategies to these discourses.

Another important notion in investigating the entangled relation between security and identity is that security and insecurity are both qualities of a relationship. Both reflect change or stability in the identity of a society (McSweeney 1999, p. 101). Security also fundamentally relates to the interests of societies which need to be secured. This, however, leads us to ask who defines the borders a collective identity in this sense and what kinds of implications do interests have in theorizing the security/identity puzzle. It is indeed problematic to identify one’s interests due to the human agents involved in decision-making of security policies. There is no fixed nature of humanity that determines the security choices made beforehand - which naturally makes fundamental conclusions difficult to draw. (McSweeney 1999, p. 101) When examining the relationship between security and identity, an unavoidable question arises: Whose identity is to be secured? Who speaks for the state? (Huru 2004, p. 35) The process of defining security problems is far from clear. There is often a vague practice in use when evaluating the legitimacy of someone speaking for the society or the state.

As we see identity as a subject of negotiation within a society, it incorporates a political process between different ‘legitimate’ actors. Wæver et al. offer a simple but somewhat inadequate answer to the dilemma: hindsight. They claim that hindsight is the only coherent way to evaluate the legitimacy of an actor trying to speak on the behalf of a society. Despite of the epistemo-ontological and methodological problematics rising from the offer of CS, the voices heard in a political debate offer some guideline to the problem. As mentioned earlier, the political realm is strongly mediatized in the sense that actors who appear on the public sphere (see chapter 2.3) inevitably receive more public awareness than those who do not appear. This way those visible to the electorate often receive more political legitimacy, as the nature of the public sphere is circle-like. Politicians who appear in the media are more likely to be asked for follow-up commentaries and interviews in the future than those who remain
silent or are left outside the public debate. This notion takes us to the question of the role of political communication in the construction, persuasion, and negotiation of state identity. While our consciousness of the political agenda is affected by selections of the media, political communication becomes more and more important in the analysis of foreign policy and international relations in general. This is why I will examine different dimensions of public opinion and the media in the making of foreign policy in this study before turning into the empirics.

2.2. What is the Identity of a Nation State Like?

The research of identity of a nation-state has been relatively fragmented. Saukkonen (1998, p.212) notes however, that the identity of a state is an especially important concept in political science because of its political dimension. According to Saukkonen, the key questions in defining the identity of a state are above all: ‘What is a nation?’ and ‘what is the identity of a nation-state like?’ He defines the identity of a nation-state as follows:

The field of the nation-state identity is constructed by distinguishing and combining the components of the notion of a nation (state, territory, genealogy, culture and identification) with the time-space dimensions of the notion of an identity (homogeneity, differentiation, continuity). (Saukkonen 1998, p. 212)

Saukkonen’s definition emphasizes the general characteristics of a state identity. State’s identity can however also be approached from inside outwards, instead of observing it from an outside-in angle. This means that by acknowledging the fragmented and unstable nature of a nation-state’s identity, we have to take a closer look at the internal struggle of identities that take place in a society in certain time-space dimension. By analyzing the political narratives of a state and by scrutinizing internal discourses on a certain political matter, a struggle of different voices can be revealed. Unlike often in neorealist studies, where the voice of a nation state on a certain political question is seen as cohesive and as a consistent entity, from a constructivist point of view society’s internal (political) communication can act as a playground for a genuinely multi-voiced struggle of varying identity narratives. Following the principles of constructivists, national identity is a discursive, socially constructed and symbolic entity that is constantly debated at different levels (Saukkonen 1998, p. 220). This
definition follows the consistent constructivist school of thought in the field of IR developed by Alexander Wendt et al. and is explained more profoundly in chapter 3.1.

Features of a state’s identity can be also seen as causal factors in the behavior of states. Each state, according to its understanding of its own identity, protects its internal identity from external threats (Kuus 2007, p.11). As Claus Offe puts it: “At the most fundamental level, a decision must be made as to who ‘we’ are, that is, a decision of identity, citizenship, and the territorial as well as social and cultural boundaries of the nation state.” (Offe cited in Kuus 2007, p. 11) Danger from the outside world is not thus only a threat but a precondition to a state’s construction of national identity.

I have now gone through a variety of explanations on the concepts of security and identity and explicated what they have to do with each other on the whole. However, an important notion in studying identities in IR is yet to be discussed. That is that discursive constructions of threat and security are salient in the research of identities. As explained in the following chapters, the construction of the Self often leans on the definition of the Other(s). Thus I will now turn to outline the characteristics of identity in terms of public formations of foreign policy. Both pairings are essential in making sense of the construction of national identity in political communication within a society, as without exploring the discursive constructions of threat and security, no airtight conclusions can be made from a state’s domestic or international identity at a theoretical level.

### 2.3. Foreign Policy, the Self and the Other(s)

Depictions on national identity are often used as a reference point in public political communication. Thus, understanding national identity is essential above all, according to the post-modernist/constructivist approach, because it has an impact on nation-state’s interpretation of the Self and the Others. Moreover, by characterizing oneself in regard to identity and security, a practical tool of foreign and security policy comes about. For that reason, I would first like to investigate earlier discourses on security and identity in order to provide a historical perspective to the questions of now and after.

Implications of international relations have evolved from the transition of Hobbes’s understanding of individuals within a state towards the domain of relations between states.
As presented by Hedley Bull, Hobbes’ innermost concern was that conflicts between states are integrally linked to relations between them. This notion is taken for granted by many scholars within the realist school of thought in IR. The strategies of otherness are indeed pivotal to *Leviathan* and integrally related to Hobbes’ understanding of international relations or international order. The consequence is that both the concept of ‘state’ as well as ‘international relations’ are mutually constitutive. (ibid. p. 60) “No one authors the other”, as Campbell puts it. The strategies of otherness give actoriness to identities “[...] that only exist in historically specific and spatially defined locations.” (ibid.) In other words, the strategies of otherness make foreign policy meaningful and, in fact, possible.

Hobbes understood foreign policy as something that is not external to the state itself but integral to its very constitution. According to Hobbes’ view, foreign policy is something that both divides and joins the inside with the outside – the state and the interstate system. (Campbell 1992, p. 60) Thus in the end, Campbell argues, the consequence of this argument is a fundamental reorientation of our understanding of foreign policy:

> Foreign policy shifts *from a concern of relations between* states that take place *across* ahistorical, frozen, and pregiven boundaries, *to a concern with the establishment of the boundaries* that constitute, at one and the same time, the ‘state’ and the ‘international system’. (Campbell 1992, p. 61)

By conceptualizing foreign policy this way, it is redefined as something that constitutes some acts as ‘foreign’ and others as ‘domestic’. In this sense, foreign policy can be understood as a *boundary-producing political performance* (Campbell 1992, p. 62). Foreign policy is thus a boundary-producing practice and tool, pivotal to the production (and reproduction) of the identity of whose name it operates (ibid. p. 68). This is to say that the identity of ‘the state’ is well connected to the practices of its foreign policy and can thus be interpreted through this viewpoint with the help of systematic scrutiny. However, by emphasizing only external practices of states, discourses of fear and danger can supersede identities based on shared values, ethnicity and/or political ideas. Thus it is often *the reproduction of an unstable identity at the level of the state* which is in the core of exploring discourses of state identity or national identity.
Alexander Wendt, whose work is studied in this thesis later, explains identities also as the social image of how states see themselves and reflect others. That image can be of different types, roughly put: friend or enemy. However, according to Wendt, these images can be converted through interaction. A widely used example of a converted self-image is that of Finland moving from a neutral Northern state into the ‘center’ of the EU. It has been argued that when Finland joined the EU in 1995, it wanted to be seen as a truly Western country from the outside world (see Harle and Moisio 2000). After the general referendum held in 1994, Finland intentionally identified itself as a part of the West, the intention deriving from the norms and interests of a hegemonic account of national identity.

It is important to make a clear divergence to the argument which claims that foreign policy constitutes identity *de novo*, as foreign policy does not ‘happen’ in a domain free of indoctrinated events. Whichever foreign policies are implemented within a state system, they always have to overcome or neutralize other practices that might manifest or instantiate alternative identities. (Campbell 1992, p. 71) Thus, representations of danger, enemy and threats play a crucial role in the contestation of internal and external construction of political activity. As Finnish scholar in Journalism, Heikki Luostarinen, wrote in his essay *Finnish Russophobia: The Story of an Enemy Image* (1989, pp. 123-137) that enemy images process our experiences of survival and existence (p. 125). Luostarinen’s view gain support from Kuus who argues that there has been a particular renaissance of geopolitics in post-Cold War discursive practices in Europe (2007, p. 5). She states that the everyday use of the term geopolitics still today addresses geography as something given and stable. To speak of geopolitics, she notes, is still to speak of geographical realities – i.e. security debates are based on assumptions about ‘natural’ borders, “whether physical or cultural ones” (ibid.). This is an important notion in regard to the Finnish debate on security/identity and even Finland’s relationship with NATO. We cannot get beyond certain geographical facts, even if we question their very existence. The social space of ‘we’ and ‘others’ emerges from the practices of state sovereignty in the Westphalian sense of the term and is thus derived from the realist paradigm’s approach to the scientific enquiry of international relations. In the same vein, Hopf asserts that systemic constructivists are right to think that a part of the identity of a state is produced through interaction between states in the international system and not solely within itself (2002, p. 83). He also argues that neorealists are partially right in asserting that the identity of a state is constructed by how the state witnesses itself from within. However, Hopf also notes that methodology can alert us to notice that sometimes domestic discourses are
insufficient to explain a state’s identity and interests. In those circumstances, he writes that we need to consider “the possibility of elaborating an account of how the international discourse of great power politics could fit with the domestic discourse [...]” (ibid.).

We cannot escape the logic of differentiation in the construction of identities. “Were there no borders, there would be no danger.” (Campbell 1992, p. 81) Danger and identity walk hand in hand as well when it comes to representations of threat in political discourses. Whether or not self-evident, threats are often constructed on the identified Other – something what ‘we’ are not. On the internal discursive level, a threatening Other can be represented as a contagious disease such as AIDS, or as a problem of immigration, race, sexual orientation etc. As Luostarinen puts it, a threatening Other can be manifested as a rather strong enemy image, labeled i.e. as Russophobia (1989). The logic of differentiation thus applies far beyond the traditional concept of security as mere absence of war.

2.4. The Role of Political Communication in Construction of Identities

The discipline of International Relations tends to pay little attention to public opinion and media (Robinson in Smith et al. 2008, p. 138). This notion is somewhat surprising in the first place as we live in a world surrounded by 24-hour satellite news services, real-time communication and narrowcasting technologies such as the internet. However, many scholars have been puzzled by the question whether public opinion in fact has an impact on the process of political decision-making. More lately, the role of media and public opinion have been more widely acknowledged to affect political decision-making, but only few tools within the discipline are introduced to investigate how and why media are key variables in analyzing foreign policies (ibid.). It is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to find out how public opinion or pressure from the media really affect decisions made by political elites.

When interviewed about choices made, politicians often give varying explanations to their actions. Not all of them emphasize the role of media in making certain decisions. After all, as often stated by political realists, the public is often ill-informed about the prevailing circumstances in international affairs and substantial information is in fact provided only within elites. As early as Machiavelli (1469 – 1527) acknowledged that a kind of ‘information management’ was of great importance in conducting successful statecraft - namely in obtaining and maintaining power.
Regardless of the methodological problems facing the research of impacts in Social Sciences in general, some scholars have persuasively tried to emphasize the significance of media and public opinion for foreign policy decision making. This assumption has been labeled as ‘the CNN effect’, originated from the American-based 24-hours cable news service. According to the CNN effect theory, media indeed have an important role in defining what we talk about. Cable News Network indeed appears to have widened the coverage on international events thereby pressuring policy makers to respond to issues raised by journalists (Robinson quoted in Smith et al. 2008, p. 143). Thus I would like to put forth an argument that the construction of societal and/or state identity and political communication has a specific and significant relationship in our mediatized society, as remarkable part of political persuasion takes place in the public sphere. Political elites, lobbying- and interests groups, citizens and other agents naturally meet in the public in order to engage and participate in discussion which, in the end, have a constructive implications on what we talk about and how. Thus it is now momentous to define what we mean when talking about political communication. As McNair notes that consequently, “all political communicators must gain access to the media by some means.” (2007, p.12)

McNair identifies a range of political actors involved in political communication (2007, p. 6, figure 1.1.). By exploring the communication between citizens, political organizations and media, the causality of public opinion might be revealed. Hence it is not only relevant, but essential that we do not exclude public opinion and media from academic scrutiny even in the discipline of IR. But is the reality which media reflect somehow more truthful of objective compared with that offered by government officials? Walter Lippmann once developed the famous theory of ‘manufacturing consent’. By manufacturing consent he meant that as early as in 1922, politicians had harnessed the techniques of social psychology with the immense reach of mass media (ibid. p. 26). Lippmann’s concern was about the possible failure of democratic theory: if the information on which political behavior is based on, or can be, artificially manufactured, the integrity of the public sphere is diminished. (ibid.) In practice this would mean that a public opinion could be orchestrated from above regardless of news media’s role as the ‘watchdog’ of the decision-makers.

What conclusion should we draw as to the two-folded significance of media and public opinion in international relations? First and foremost, we can only investigate politicians’ and
other actors’ discursive practices by the means available to us. We cannot dive into the human head to water-tightly expose the patterns of political logics preceding a certain policy decision, for instance. As McNair reminds us, all students of the effect of political communication are confronted by a fundamental epistemo-methodological problem. Principally, how can a cause and an effect be traced accurately only by examining a piece of text (communication) and the behavior of the public? Only implicit means can be used, and they are often subordinate to a researcher’s own position. (McNair 2007, p. 30) Research position is discussed and evaluated more in this study in chapter 7.7.

Despite the shortcomings of the methodologies in use, I believe that by scrutinizing discursive processes and practices used in the public sphere, it is be possible to trace systematic patterns or dimensions also in discourses of the security/identity puzzle. The outcome of all studies of political communication might however be contested, as contemporary means of investigation are all but precise or perfect. After all, one is wise to refrain from making strict hypotheses in Social Sciences as they seldom turn out to be watertight. Rather they are interpretations of the nature of reality and the relevant question remains to be: Which reading is closer to the ‘truth’?
3. Constructivism – An Overview

Social constructivism serves here as the theoretical path to discourse analysis of a political debate. In order to dive into the complexity of the political debate concerning the identity of Finland in regard to contemporary security discussion, a solid ground to the method has to be laid down. As mentioned earlier, the study of identity in IR has much to owe to the post-modern/constructivist theory developed by a number of scholars after the end of the Cold War. Unlike Francis Fukuyama famously predicted, the ‘End of History’ has not necessarily been the definitive pillar of the 1990s interpretation of post-Cold War world order, instead there have arisen competing theories in other contemporary IR research.

In the following chapter, I will dive into the ontology of social constructivism and articulate the main ideas of the constructivist IR theory. The aim of the chapter is to explain the general frame setting of this study in a brief form and define necessary means to translate those ideas into a more specific method. I will also discuss how the concepts defined earlier are implemented in the key literature of constructivism in IR and what will their place in the methodology of this study eventually be. I will also describe the input of the Copenhagen School to the constructivist approach. In the last subchapters I will inspect the contribution of the Finnish national identity project, a theory and method developed by Finnish scholars Harle and Moisio, in the search of explanations to the research questions of this study. Finally, before turning into empirics, the study describes the academic debate amongst Finnish IR scholars on the theory of Harle & Moisio. My aim is to illuminate and clarify how social constructivism resemblances with the contemporary study of political communication in the context of the Finnish national security debate.

3.1. Constructivism in International Relations

Constructivism is the application of social constructivist epistemology to the study of international politics. The core concepts of constructivism – discourses, norms, persuasion and identity – vary a little when employed in North American or European variations of the approach (Checkel in Smith et al. 1998, p. 72). Constructivists see reality as socially constructed as a counterpart to the neorealist tendency to emphasize the material dimension in international affairs. According to the constructivist approach, reality is constructed through processes of interaction between different actors on the international scene, such as states or
individuals. The European variant of constructivism, often also called post-positivist constructivism, investigates the linguistic means applied in constructing social reality. Consistent constructivism, on the other hand, is more concerned with examining factors that cause a state’s identity to change, whereas European/interpretive constructivists are deeply committed to an inductive (bottom-up) research methodology. (ibid. p. 73)

One of the founding fathers of the constructivist theory in IR is Alexander Wendt whose study *Social Theory of International Affairs* (1999) is considered as his most influential work in IR. Wendt and a few other IR scholars, such as Martha Finnemore, Michael Barnett, Nicholas Onuf, and Peter J. Katzenstein, developed constructivism in a relatively short period of time after the end of the Cold War. The idea of constructivism was to expand and challenge neorealist accounts in a time when the world seemed to go through a metamorphosis in the form of moving from strict bipolarity to a more complex international system. Constructivists see that neorealists failed to explain the change that happened almost overnight. Theories like Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ and Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ were, and somewhat remain to be, in the center of academic discussion. However, Alexander Wendt examined the nature of the international system from a rather revolutionary angle in his article *Anarchy is What States Make of it: the Social Construction of Power Politics* (1993). In the article he introduces an idea that anarchy between states in international relations is not something predestined but rather dynamic. These are the very same years the Copenhagen School started to develop their ideas on the relationship between identity and security. One could perhaps describe that ‘new winds blew’ in the field of IR at the time.

According to the sociological turn in IR, discourses have three different levels. The first is that of *textual* level which refers to the features of different texts and/or speeches. The second level is that of *discursive practice* which emphasizes the circumstances which surround the production of a particular text. The third level, which is that of *social practice*, is the combination of the social and historical context where the two latter discursive levels take place. (Stråth 2008)

The starting point in understanding and reading securitization in discourses is, as noted above, three-fold. A discourse is generally the use of language that inevitably leads to *discursive practices*. The use of discursive practices leads into reading *social practices* of them. It is also essential in this regard to note that discourses build and uphold a) identities, b) relations
between individuals, and c) ideologies. (2008) By becoming a leading ideology (c)), a 
hegemonic status of discourse can be eventually achieved. Thus, discourses are rarely or never 
power neutral but power structures are not necessarily visible or different discursive structures 
ideologically evident. Often the objective of a discursive study is to examine and reveal these 
power structures and/or power relations, and take a stand in the matter (especially Foucault’s 
notion of critical discourse analysis, ‘critical language awareness’).

In order to examine the role of identities, norms, and interests in international relations and 
foreign policy, I will next provide a brief overview of the key ideas of Alexander Wendt’s 
constructivism. The next subchapter scrutinizes the central ideas of Wendt’s work and thereby 
explicates the contribution of the constructivist approach to this study. By examining national 
identity and security in the light of the constructivist theory, a more coherent basis to the final 
implementation of the study is developed and thus it is possible to proceed with the help of 
concrete methodological tools.

3.2. Alexander Wendt’s Consistent Constructivism

Alexander Wendt develops social constructivism above all by arguing that the Waltzian 
neorealism had significant shortcomings in explaining international politics through the 
anarchical nature of states alone. Wendt argues that there is no given reality in international 
relations that can be observed objectively as an underlying logic, but instead, international 
relations between states are in fact socially constructed. This, he notes, implies that 
international politics is conducted by shared understandings of values, meanings, norms, and 
identities. Wendt agrees with Waltz that states are indeed the main actors in international 
politics and that the state system is anarchical in nature. However, Wendt’s view on the 
ontology of the interests of states and identities differ from that of Waltz by defining them as 
socially constructed, inter-subjective entities, and thus not representations of an objective 
reality. He explains that “…structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces.” (Wendt 1999, p. 1) He also argues that “…the 
identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than 
given by nature.” (ibid.)

Consistent constructivists embrace a social ontology but accept an epistemology indebted to 
positivism that allows the use of hypothesis testing and explanation (Dunne et al. 2007,
Consistent constructivism claims an epistemological position that we cannot get behind language to compare it with what it describes. This is sometimes also called the linguistic turn in social sciences, as historians, sociologists, and political scientists increasingly turned their focus on questions of language, identity, and social constructions, leaving behind the measurable material explanations of the 1960s and the 1970s. (Stråth 2008)

One of the principal contributions of Wendt to IR is that he challenges scholars to look at how actors are socially constructed rather than to try to explain international politics at an individual (state) level. He claims that most objects in international relations exist only because of human acts and therefore they are only social facts. He develops a kind of systematic micro-level ontology of international systems by giving the neorealist approach more depth in terms of social order. However, Wendt goes even further by giving states ‘personality’ and argues that states actually have human qualities, such as intentionality and rationality, because of their socially constructed nature. Consistent constructivists concern themselves with the role of ideas in shaping the international system. By ideas constructivists refer especially to the goals, threats, fears, and identities of perceived reality which influence states and non-state actors within the international system.

According to Wendt’s consistent constructivism, states are subjected to structural changes as state identities are influenced by both domestic and international factors. Wendt argues that the international system based on anarchical acts of egocentric states is not a fundamental logic of international relations. Moreover, as states’ interests and identities are socially constructed and shared through interaction between actors (by which Wendt mainly refers to nation states), “anarchy is what states make of it”. To take an example, the concept of ‘sovereignty’ is merely a shared understanding of the term in a given group of socially connected individuals who see states as not being subject to any superior authority. Sovereignty itself is not taken for granted by the constructivists, or seen as the de facto nature, or logic, of state behavior. Rather, it is seen as a social construction of norms and values that are empowered in a given context. That is to say that the actors in international relations have shared understandings about legitimate state behavior and thus, social structures also constitute the identity of actors. In these terms, the behavior of agents is about “a logic of appropriateness” (Dunne et al. 2007, p. 179). There is no ‘truth’ out there to be found, but the truth is constructed within the ideal ‘layers’, structures of societies.
When first published, Wendt’s criticism was aimed especially towards Waltzian neorealism and its failure to explain *structural change* in the international system. From his point of view, neorealism in its material ontology was not able to explain i.e. the emergence of peace among independent democracies, or the end of Cold War. Wendt sees neorealism above all, as too underspecified to generate false hypotheses about international phenomena (1999, p. 15). He argues that the power-seeking nature of states is after all, constructed by human practice. Anarchy is cultural and ideational and “different cultures of anarchy are based on different kinds of roles in terms of which states represent Self and Other.” (ibid. p. 43) From this point of view, even the identity of influential international organizations, such as NATO or the OSCE, can be subjected to cultural and ideological change.

The consistent constructivists also see that the character of international life as determined by the beliefs and expectations that states have about each other. Those beliefs and expectations are constituted by social as opposed to material needs (Wendt 1999, p. 20). In the 1980s, the growth and emergence of influential international organizations begun to challenge the realist theory intensely amongst many IR scholars, as the neorealist school somewhat failed to explain the end of Cold War through its material-based, power politics approach. Wendt agrees with Waltz’s and other neorealists’ premise that states do indeed have material needs (such as biological needs), but refuses to acknowledge that striving for material needs is the only reason for states to interact or cooperate with each other. Wendt’s constructivism questions especially the neorealist IR theory by challenging the fundamental rationality of it in its very essence. Wendt’s constructivism sees the ontology of politico-philosophical reality from an up-down angle, instead of seeing the science of IR as an effort of explaining international systems from an individualist perspective. Wendt acknowledges that there are systemic and reductionist IR theories which all try to explain the systemic structure of the international system, and point out how structures relate to actors at different levels of analysis. However, he outlines a more causal and structural theory (where the focus is on structure) in *Social Theory of International Politics* rather than a unit-level reductionist theory (focus is on actors) in order to define different characteristics and interactions of actors (Wendt 1999, p. 12). He argues that in structural IR theory (‘states systemic project’) an object can be studied relatively separately from other similar objects or units (ibid. p. 14).

Wendt divides scholarly IR debate into four sociologies. He draws a four-field map where he locates all four sociologies by their tendency of being either materialist or idealist in nature.
The first highlights the material of states needs whereas the latter have an emphasis on the nature and structure of social consciousness (Wendt 1999, p. 29, Figure 1) \(^1\). He locates constructivism in the upper-right corner, where theory of the nature of international life is high in idealism as well as in holism (the belief in the difference that structures make). He locates neorealism to the upper left corner where holism is high but materialism is high as well. After sketching the four sociologies map he points out that despite of the four different ontologies, all theories of IR are only methods designed to answer certain questions about reality, but none of them can successfully answer all questions.

What is remarkable in Wendt’s work is that he developed a more coherent social theory, as the constructivist approach is foremost a way of studying social relations in general. He also accepted positivism to a certain degree, albeit his theory has been criticized for building a constructivist theory on a positivist epistemology which is seen as inconsistent because constructivism and positivism rely on different assumptions of the nature of reality (Dunne et al. 2007, p. 174). However, the most influential contribution of Wendt’s consistent constructivism to the theory of IR is that it offers the social dimension as an option to the material assumptions in the realist IR theory. By emphasizing the possibility of structural change in international system, Wendt moved IR theorizing in a new epistemological level, significant only by itself. Like any other social debate, Wendt’s social reality takes place in culturally and historically unique circumstances (ibid. p. 167), available to scrutinize by scientifically acceptable methods.

\(^1\) Wendt 1999, p. 29, Figure 1
3.3. Securitization in Discourse

What links Wendt’s consistent constructivism and the views of the Copenhagen School on security together? Internal political debates on any foreign policies in the post-modern society tend to echo political rhetoric and expert commentaries about international events conveyed via mass channels such as radio, television, and internet. ‘Security problems’ are everywhere and they are addressed in line with other matters such as interstate relations or even internal issues from immigration to fuel prices. In this vein, Kuus claims that geopolitical writing is not a neutral consideration of ‘geographical’ facts but a deeply ideological form of analysis (2007, p. 7). She writes that it is “a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics and represent it as a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas.” (ibid.) It is essential to acknowledge that even claims about ‘escaping’ geography and geopolitics are geopolitical insofar as “they assume a particular geographical configuration of power that is to be eluded.” (ibid.) It is within this frame that the concept of discourse needs to be addressed when analyzing geopolitical writings regarding the puzzle of security and identity. Securitization, in this sense, refers to all speech acts made in a society which are moved into the realm of the security (of the identity, as SC argue).

Why to try to perceive securitizing discourses in political communication then? As according to an argument posed by McSweeney, there is no single and objective ‘truth’ to be found on any social phenomena. The one that can be grasped, though, is discourse which is constructed by i.e. political elites, intellectuals and so forth (Huru 2004, p. 39). In discourse, these parties take part in the process of construction, manipulation, negotiation and persuasion in order to answer to the challenges by a particular collective image. Thus identity is not, even in times of crisis, anything more than an unstable mental picture of ourselves as we want it to be. (ibid.) Identity is changeable over time and space and very much subjected to the interests of the society per se (i.e. Huru 2004, p. 46). In the case of Finland, the Russian threat has played an important reference point identity-wise especially after the end of the Cold War. By identifying a common security and/or identity threat, a mutual reference point of significant Other, it becomes not only meaningful but imperative to define oneself in regard to those aspects. Thus the question to be posed is not to ask whether the Finns are fundamentally ‘Western’. The more relevant question is whether the Finns want to see themselves as ‘Western’. Related to this question, Joenniemi and Lehti (2006) have ambiguously studied the conceptualization of the West as an object of debate in International Relations. According to them, the West as an operative concept is much wider than usually thought. As a shared
symbol and code, the West has a lot to offer especially in terms of unifying societal groups. The view of oneself as a part of the Western camp can indeed act as an abstract foundation for many nation states (p. 5). This can also work the other way around, I believe. A nation state’s identity can also be strongly affected by a clear distinction to the Western world, as an opposing, even a balancing counter force.

In order to examine the role of norms, identities and interests in discursive practices of security and identity, the distinction between internal and external discourses becomes central. Wæver aims specifically to soften a strict division between internal and external discourses (in Lehti 2004, p. 58). He argues that by studying internal ‘we-discourses’, namely a state’s and its citizens’ discourses about themselves, we can come to understand foreign policies (Wæver 2002, p. 20) – and thus form opinions of others. Wæver writes that identity (of a nation state) should be seen as an entity which is structured only in social practices and thus it should be seen as an inescapably complex process. He emphasizes the significance of reading and interpreting political debates and internal discourses in order to reveal the meanings they convey (ibid. p. 27). Identity is thus, as Wæver insists, a discursive and symbolic structure in the need of security. McSweeney does not accept this view on the whole. He claims that identity is not the fundamental object of security but society with all its human individuals. This leads to an assumption that the ontological task of the state is, above all, to act as an instrument of security. (Huru 2004, p. 46)

Going back to Wæver, we should not focus only on how the concepts of nationality and state per se have changed over time, but we should focus on how the two are in relation to each other, and in what ways Europe has been written in different ‘we-discourses’. (Wæver in Lehti 2004, p. 58) One of the key particles in a Social Science methodology such as discourse analysis is the concept of ideology. According to Foucault, ideology constitutes identities and social statutes and gives meaning to discursive practices (FSD 2008). Thus, discursive practices, including political ones, are never powerless or ‘empty’ of ideology. Social institutions can thus be discussed as ideological systems. By the help of discourse analysis, we can refer to particular texts which can then be linked to certain ideological practices. Like the struggle of leading ideologies, discursive hegemony develops in social practices; it can also be traced in the ideologies readable in different discursive acts.
3.4. Security as Social Learning

As constructivists tend to highlight, identities, norms, and interests of different actors (also often called agents) in the international realm are products of intersubjective social structures such as culture, institutions, and social interaction. In this sense we can understand i.e. the expansion and survival of NATO as a process of international socialization. (Schimmelfenning in Dunne et al. 2007, p.179) According to the Waltzian tradition, NATO was to wither away after the end of the Cold War, as it was no longer needed. With Waltz’s own words, “NATO is a disappearing thing. It is a question of how long it is going to remain as a significant institution even though its name may linger on.” (cited in Katzenstein 1996, p. 363). However, as Risse-Kappen argues, NATO is alive and well, compared to other security institutions in Europe (namely the OSCE, the WEU and CFSP of the EU). Risse-Kappen offers a liberal constructivist approach to explain the survivability of the military alliance by stating that the fundamental actors in international relations are not states but rather individuals acting in a particular social context. He claims that ideas, values, norms and knowledge are causally consequential in international relations, as international institutions form the necessary social structure of international politics (ibid. p. 365). Risse-Kappen accepts the constructivist idea of social learning on the basis of the classic argument of Immanuel Kant that liberal democracies seldom go to war with each other. According to Kant, the necessary conditions for peace are above all, the respect of human rights, the rule of law, non-violent resolution of domestic conflicts and participatory opportunities for the citizens (ibid.). Risse-Kappen reminds us that even though exceptions emerge, when democratic governments deal with autocratic regimes, collectively held identities define not only who ‘we’ are, but they also distinct ‘us’ from ‘them’. (ibid. p. 367) He concludes that a sociological interpretation of this kind of liberal theory of international relations proves that the domestic identities of actors are crucial for their perceptions of one another in the international scene (ibid.). Thus, mere perceptions of threat are not adequate in order to hold domestic identities together, but they need to be reinforced by social learning through different individual actors. In this aspect, Risse-Kappen interprets the formation of identities more as an individual-driven process instead of seeing it straight-forwardly as a collective process of social learning.

Wendt explains identities more as something collective, even though they derive from individual sources. According to Wendt, identities of actors evolve through natural and cultural selection, the latter meaning mechanisms of imitations and social learning (Wendt
1999, p. 44). Thus, public opinion concerning i.e. Finland’s possible membership in NATO is in this vein social learning deriving from hegemonic accounts of national identity. Social learning is subjected to common interpretations about current status of the social order of a state in a specific time and space. Hypothetically, the public opinion of possible NATO membership within the boundaries of Finland or Ireland, for instance, is in fact subject to structural change in terms of identification – in other words by defining ‘we’ in terms of the norms, values and interests the hegemonic identity conveys. Public opinion about the security/identity puzzle is constituted through social interaction and human input, namely in the security discourses emerging from the media and public debate. Looking at the case of Finland through Wendt’s conclusion, change in public opinion possible through a change in social structures – the narratives and discourses about the role of NATO in the securitization of Finland as an (ideal) entity.

However, by the means available to social sciences, it is fairly impossible to verify whether a change in the minds and attitudes of the public could somehow be orchestrated from above, i.e. by the state’s government or by the media. Regardless of the absence of empirical means to test such a hypothesis, constructivism however emphasizes that structural change is possible. Even though we may not be able to obtain knowledge about the practical means of implementing such a reconstruction, from a constructivist angle it is evident that (re)constructing an identity through discursive practices is indeed possible. The identity of NATO is reflected through the media, and the media are not at all free of perceptions of external or internal, national and cultural identities. Vice versa, the public discussion is in fact influenced by Finland’s background as a ‘stand-alone’, neutral actor in international politics. The current public discussion thus often emphasizes the lack of any ‘credible’ threat in current international affairs which would alert a need for military alignment with NATO. The contemporary Russian Federation is often not seen as a relevant threat by the ‘against’ NATO camp. The ‘pro’ camp, on the other hand, points out that historically (referring often to experiences of the Second World War) the international position of Finland has rapidly changed in short periods of time.

3.5. Constructivism in Sum

According to the main premises of the social constructionist approach in Social Science, the social structures and social practices of our everyday life are encouraged by legislation and
other institutional controls. The discourses that constitute our identities are closely connected to those structures. It is in the interest of relatively powerful groups that certain discourses receive the status as ‘the truth’ (Burr 1999, p. 55). Identities, whether of the identity of an individual person or of a nation, are all constructed through language. It is in these discourses, seen as coherent systems of representations, that norms, identities and interests are produced (ibid.).

The approach of constructivism emerged in the discipline of IR in the beginning of the 1990s, shortly after the end of the Cold War. In 1992, Alexander Wendt laid out his groundwork which aimed to challenge both neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist paradigms in their belief in material forces in the analysis of international relations. By arguing that even such realist conceptualizations as power politics or balance of power are socially constructed accounts of international reality, Wendt created a general framework for the ‘consistent constructivist’ approach in IR. His core objective was to show that there was no such thing as ‘given’ or ‘natural’ in international relations but rather that everything is constructed by human practice, and thus is also transformable by human practice. However, Wendt did not abandon power as a concept altogether. Even though he saw that the international reality is more complex than the realist paradigm asserts, he acknowledged that productive and institutional power still play an essential role in the international politics of our time. One of the most important reformations of the constructivist approach in IR was that as contradistinction to (neo)realism, for constructivists, power goes beyond its coercive dimension. Institutional power, in its very essence is, above all, actors’ control of others in indirect ways (Checkel in Smith et al. 2008 p. 80).

The Copenhagen School developed social constructivism further by coming up with the term ‘securitization’ in terms of international politics. By securitization, The Copenhagen School refers specifically to different speech acts concerning security which all have varying consequences in the international context. Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, and Jaap de Wilde defined in their work Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998) that by talking security, a speech actor, intentionally or unintentionally, moves a topic into the field of security and thus legitimizes extraordinary means against a threat perceived at a specific time and space.
4. Westernization Discourses in Finnish Foreign Policy

Neutrality in international affairs had a positive echo in the USSR especially during Nikita Khrushchev’s ruling (Pursiainen 2001, p. 101). However, difficulties in including the mentioning of ‘neutrality’ in treaties between Finland and the USSR became troublesome at the latest in 1964. However, President Kekkonen managed to negotiate the phrase into common statements until 1971. After that, Finland had to make do with a reference to the traditional Paasikivi-Kekkonen policy in its foreign policy statements which emphasized the role of the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA). The Paasikivi-Kekkonen policy specifically aimed at mentioning Finland’s neutrality in international affairs by the Soviet side. Finland remained as a kind of special case, at least until president Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to Helsinki in 1989 when he insisted on “a public recognition of Finnish neutrality” in his statement (ibid.).

After the end of the Cold War, historical revisionism became popular in Finnish foreign policy. Today, a kind of tension between military non-alignment and Finland’s membership in the EU, not to mention close cooperation with NATO, can be seen as having similar features as the tension between different interpretations of the term ‘neutrality’ in Cold War time Finland. Heikka writes that instead of depicting Finnish history from the point of view of cautious neutrality policy as evidence of a change towards enthusiastic integration with the West, we should see that there is a clear element of continuity in Finnish strategic thinking (Heikka 2005, p. 91). This strategy Heikka calls ‘republican realism’, meaning that Finland has in fact followed a continuous policy of engaging both the EU the US to the Baltic region (ibid.). The statement can be, and undoubtedly has been contested. Be Heikka’s depiction veracious, the change from strict neutrality into enthusiastic Europeanization has dwelled academics for already almost two decades.

Similar depiction of the strategic change in Finnish policy is provided by Browning in his article Coming Home or Moving Home? ‘Westernizing’ Discourses in Finnish Foreign Policy and the Reinterpretation of Past Identities (2002, pp. 47-72) Browning argues that instead of ‘moving home’ towards other European states, Finland has actually ‘come home’ to “assume its rightful and natural place in the Western European family” (ibid. p. 47). Browning
rationalizes that the most concrete symbolic manifestation of this development has been Finland’s membership in the European Union (ibid.). Browning’s argument obtains support at least from some Finnish civil servants who worked in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the 1970s. For instance Pekka Säälä (Kilpi 23/1/2009) recalls that when Finland joined the NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency) in the 1970s, the political élite intentionally drew the state toward the West. Säälä even evaluates now that if the USSR knew how much Finland would benefit from this relationship and in how many levels the cooperation took actually place, the course of history might be a lot different that it eventually turned out.

Browning’s argument has many similarities with the theory of Harle and Moisio on the Finnish national identity project which is explained more in depth in the next chapter of this study. One of the most important similarities between Browning’s article and the theory of Harle and Moisio is that in cultural and political discourses, Finland has always belonged to the West (reference group) and is now returning to its original roots (Browning 2002, p. 48). Browning describes these kinds of depicts as ‘Westernizing’ narratives in current debates about Finnish identity and foreign policy (ibid.). According to this view, the Cold War years are understood as an inspiring and sagacious period of time when the Finns managed to establish favorable relations with their great Eastern neighbor under the unequivocal statesmanship of President Urho Kekkonen. (ibid.) Even though it has been described that President Kekkonen made a Faustian deal with the Soviets (Majander 1999, p. 89), Finland managed to carve out an identity as a neutral and moral actor in international affairs during the Cold War years.

Browning underlines that Westernizing narratives have political efficacy especially because they do not only shape our understanding of past events, but also show us the directions of future developments by shaping what kind of actions are acceptable to us in relation to others (Browning 2002, p. 48). By doing so, it is possible to delegitimize the continuation of past policies and to attempt to break out of the post-war identity in favor of a reconstructed Western identity (ibid. p. 49). What is especially important in the representations of identities is that they are not simply out there to be found but they are “[..]...constructed in our discursive attempts to create an historical framework within which our present experiences will come intelligible to us.” (Browning 2002, p. 49) Thus the stories told and discourses implemented in given society can alter the understanding and interpretation of the nature of political reality around us as well as the conception of ourselves as actors in that reality.
Kuus has utilized the metaphor of moving/returning to Europe (the West) in her work *Geopolitics Reframed: Security and Identity in Europe’s Eastern Enlargement* (2007). The metaphor is meant to specify the depictions of otherness and insecurity that characterize contemporary geopolitics (ibid. p. 27). In Kuus’s work, the metaphor the return to Europe is used especially in the context of westernizing Eastern European states such as Poland and the Baltic states. As to NATO, Kuus says, one of its most important contributions to security is that “it serves as an incentive to Westernize” (ibid. p. 30). In a Baltic context (i.e. Estonia), a deeply-rooted mistrust of Russia and the Russians has also led to tight relations with the military alliance in security terms, in addition to, or because of, the discursive practices of 'returning to the West'.

Kuus argues that regardless of whether we talk about Eastern European or Central European states, narratives of national identity frame the eastern border of that particular state as the eastern border of Europe (Kuus 2007, p. 32). This East-West dichotomy is crucial in understanding the metaphor of moving/returning home to the West. ‘West’ is seen as a set of Western values such as democratization and free market economy, thus a state moving from East to West is in the middle of a constant process of westernizing. In the case of Finland, the process was rather dissimilar to those of the Baltic States. The Finnish Cold War status of neutrality has given the process of returning to the West a particular twist which has not been seen in the Baltic States. Finland is an active member of both the EU and the OSCE but not a member state of NATO, whereas i.e. Estonia applied for membership in the military alliance as soon it had the standards for it. However, while NATO membership was always a dominant vision in Estonia, according to Kuus, there was also a possibility to discuss a form of neutrality in the Finnish/Swedish way (ibid. p. 53). Regardless of that possibility, by the mid 1990s, neutrality became evaluated as a dangerous foreign policy that would make the Baltic States more vulnerable towards foreign influence, namely the newly born Russian Federation. Despite the fact that the political debate in Estonia was never monolithic, it was always a dominant view in public discussion that the problematic aspects of the EU and/or NATO memberships must be put aside because of the Russian threat (ibid. p. 57).

Finnish identity during the Cold War was often described as ‘a physician rather than a judge’, as President Kekkonen’s famous quote in his speech in the United Nations in 1961 spells out. In a historical sense, the West and its institutions, NATO in particular, were seen as
destabilizing forces and a threat to the world and Finnish security (Forsberg 1999, p. 112). However, coming to date, the wording is quite the opposite in the newest governmental report on National Security and Foreign Policy (VN 2009, p. 40). It is specifically stated that NATO brings stability.² This characterization takes us far away from the contradictory term of “Finlandization” (suomettuminen) which was first articulated in 1966 as “a certain type of domination of a small state by a larger one” (McDuff 1996). The term was developed to describe the conduct of foreign policy based on political and military neutrality vis-à-vis a more powerful neighboring state, simultaneously maintaining sovereignty.

There has also been a depiction of Finnish history that describes Finland as a piece of ‘driftwood’ in the middle of hostile plans of great states’ power politics during the Second World War in 1939-45³. This famous theory is nowadays being extensively debated and questioned by other views. What is the key notion here is that it was the social discourse of that particular period of time that had the key role in shaping and re-evaluating Finnish identity. It is thus important to assort and categorize hegemonic and ideological discourses on foreign policy. As explained in these pages, it is methodologically reasonable to approach national identity/security discourses by analyzing the discursive practices in use by focusing on the social interpretation of them instead of trying to figure out which allegations are closest to the ‘truth’. This gives us an opportunity to sketch out a theoretical map of different voices heard in those discursive practices and to make conclusions about which of them are hegemonic or ideologically saturated. In other words, the constructivist assumption that action becomes meaningful only in the process of narrating a constitutive story of the Self, becomes alive. The constructivist approach to studying identities is fruitful especially when the focus is on subjectivity and when it is based on the assumption that identity is never pre-given, something that the realist paradigm often conjecture.

I will now turn to explain and examine the theory of the Finnish national identity project. The project forms the specific theoretical framework to this study and is also used as the starting point of the methodology of this study. In the empirical part of the study, the theory is used as a reference point of analysis.

² “Natolla on turvallisuutta ja vakautta edistävää vaikutus.” (VN/09 p. 40)
4.1. Defining the Finnish National Identity Project

The political discussion of foreign and security policy is an essential part of the general discussion on national identity in contemporary Finland. Through time, the exclusion of Russian influence has been seen as the cornerstone of rhetorical action that has been called the Finnish national identity project (Aalto et al. 2006, p. 87). Harle and Moisio develop a geopolitical perspective on national identity in their study Missä on Suomi? (2000) entitled the Finnish national identity project. The Finnish national identity project is simultaneously the result, the construct of concepts and the theory behind the study of Harle and Moisio (Aalto et al. 2006, p. 87). It has been debated quite a lot amongst Finnish IR scholars and continues to be a subject of academic discussion.

Harle and Moisio argue that the Finnish national identity project has been conducted to enforce and construct Finnish identity on a national level by discursively constructing Russia as the enemy and the ultimate ‘Other’ and at the same time, identifying Finland with other truly European nations (2000, p. 281). As explained in previous passages, recognition of neutrality became the leading policy in the conduct of international affairs in Finland during the Cold War years. The Paasikivi-Kekkonen policy indeed grew strong roots to the Finnish foreign policy. For a long time that policy was officially undisputed.

The authors of the Finnish national identity project argue that the project defines the place of the Finns amongst other Western nations, “amongst our western brothers and sisters” (Harle & Moisio 2000, p. 17). They argue that the project is thus constructed and based on building conceptual boundaries (ibid.). Even though the Finns still occupy the same territorial space in the Finnish peninsula, the national identity project is in constant change and evolves with time. That motion originates in the political will of searching and justifying the right place of the Finns. In a way, the project is about explaining Finland’s raison d’être, justifying the existence of the nation as it is, separate from others.

Another important argument that Harle and Moisio make in their research of the Finnish national identity project is that the project itself is highly political in nature. The construction of national identity is a political action in itself, as it is made through conscious decisions, by inclusions and exclusions (Saukkonen 1998, p. 220). The identity project can be found in
discourses that build up the practices we use in order to make sense of political reality. The national identity project is thus socially constructed in speech acts and is not, as often thought, ‘how things are’.

Maantieteellisyyys ei ole etäisyyskä tai merenpoukamien muotoja vaan turvallisuus- ja ulkopolitiikan peruskartta, jonka alati muuttuvalla ja kiistellyllä pinnalla toimijat hahmottavat sijaintiaan.⁴ (Harle & Moisio 2000, p. 15)

As mentioned earlier, the key argument of Harle & Moisio in their geopolitical study of the Finnish national identity project is that the project is rhetorically constructed especially upon a mental separation between Finland and Russia (2000, p. 56). Harle and Moisio suggest that Finland as a nation has been searching for its national identity by either investigating cultural, linguistic or other characteristics that are typical for it or by comparing those characteristics with other nations (ibid. p. 53). According to the authors, defining Russia as the enemy and the defining Other has a long history in Finland.

As the theory of Harle & Moisio is based on the rhetorical separation between East and West, it also owes to the will of identifying Finland with the West, amongst other ‘truly European nations’. Thus, the question of “what Finns are” has largely been answered by the discursive distinction of what the Finns are not – they are not Russians. This essential argument also entails the exclusion of Slavonic, Mongolian and Saami peoples, so that Finland could be located “to its right place” (Aalto et al. 2006, p. 87). This aspiration has its roots in the era that is known in Finnish as ‘Isviha’ – namely the period of time when the Finns took over the Swedish-driven anti-Russian war propaganda as a tool of their own identity policy in approximately 1713–1721. However, the dispute of where and when that distinction first took place remains unsolved (Harle & Moisio 2000, p. 67).

Moisio clarifies that the Finnish national identity project consists of three main elements: 1) geopolitical experience that has been influenced by Finland’s geographical position between East and West, 2) self-image that refers to those narratives constructed by political elites in

⁴ “Geography is not a matter of distances or forms of sea bays but a basic map of security and foreign policy, on which ever changing and disputable platform different actors define their positions” (Harle & Moisio 2000, p.)
certain historical frames and 3) recognition of how Finland is seen by others (2003, pp. 153-154). Moisio also identifies three different ways of defining Finland’s position within a changing Europe; westernization, traditionalism, and prudence. However, Moisio lays the emphasis on Otherness in contrast to emphasizing narratives as the constructive power behind national identities.

Harle & Moisio’s Finnish national identity project is not a strict teleological theory of Finland’s way out of the Russian empire and the obligations of the Agreement of FCMA, and the policy of neutrality (Harle & Moisio 2000, p. 67). The authors argue that this path has not been based on national consensus at all, but often debated and discussed, for example associated with the discussion before Finland joined the European Union in 1995. According to Harle & Moisio, Finland broke loose from the compelling USSR/Russia relation and became a Western European nation by joining the European Union in 1995, as it was aiming to do so. By belonging to the same reference group i.e. with the Germans, the national identity project reached, in a way, its climax. Although the project began several hundreds of years ago (Harle & Moisio 2000, p. 67), it still goes on today, as we continuously reshape and evaluate our place amongst other nations in order to define ourselves. As Stuart Hall often reminds us (i.e. Hall 1999), national identity still plays a strong role in our definition of social reality.

Harle and Moisio see that the Finnish national identity project was born in a world where nation states played a dominant role. However, today there is a growing need of new substance to national identity that “does not set identity-political boundaries and thus make it more difficult for Finland to fully participate in the development of the globalized world and especially the dismantling of the bipartition of Europe (Harle & Moisio 2006, p. 8). Harle and Moisio emphasize that there is a need for parallel identities. According to the authors, as a counter-balance to political, nation-state-based identities, simultaneous identities based on culture are thus necessary. What Harle & Moisio do not address in their theory is that national identity is not necessarily directly proportional to the existence nation states. Even though the construction of national identity does require a nation to which identify, the role of nation states is everything but withering away (see i.e. Khazanov 2005). The effects of the ‘Age of Globalization’ might be welcomed just too keenly in terms of identity formation and maintenance. Even though it is easy to agree with Harle & Moisio on the need of boundless
identities, it is simply too early to declare the nation state to wither away – if only in need of parallel and multilayered identities.

I will now turn to make a summary of the academic debate on the Finnish national identity project which has taken place amongst Finnish IR scholars since Harle & Moisio released their book in its full length in 2000. The theory is still all but uncontested and subject to various competing views on the issue. The work of Harle and Moisio has raised a lot of emotions as well as academic enthusiasm for its bold premises. The aim of the following brief review is to build a durable foundation for the empirical part of this study. Moreover, by mapping the academic discussion on the Finnish national identity project, it becomes possible to define one’s own research position within that debate.

### 4.2. Debate on the Finnish National Identity Project

The underlying aim of the study of Harle & Moisio was, above all, to show the connection between Finnish identity politics and the discourses of foreign and security policy (Majander 2001, p. 52). The study insists that the exclusions and inclusions of foreign policy decisions cannot be validly explained without referring to the national identity project. At the same time, the national identity projects is being produced and developed further by speech acts regarding security, identity and threats. (ibid.)

One of the most rejecting evaluations of the study of Harle & Moisio is that of Tarkka. He even describes their work as ‘zero research’ which suggests that the study does not have relevance at all (Tarkka 2000). He criticizes the authors of their disapproval towards the contemporary Finnish national self-image based on the polarity between the West and the East. Tarkka claims that Harle and Moisio escape the fact that an extensive distinction between the Byzantine and Roman Europe has evolved during 1500 years. He urges that it is not only a theological or political dogmatism but it concerns also the way the nature of human beings and society are understood. (ibid.) Tarkka gives his final disfavors to the authors of the Finnish national identity project by saying that:
Majander (2001) is neither fully pleased with the results of the study. He points out that it reveals only a little, but remains quite empty conclusion-wise. He admits that as Harle and Moisio claim, when Finland joined the EU in 1995, Finnish integrationist politicians tried to persuade voters by referring to security issues and the threat of Russia. Despite of that, he argues, security issues were not the decisive factors in the 1994 referendum (Majander 2001, p. 53). He claims also that if it were so, the willingness of the Finnish electorate to secure the nation would have been visible also in the opinion polls measuring the will to join NATO (ibid.). He also argues that Harle and Moisio are so much fond of the main premise of their study that other important factors and nuances are left aside (ibid. p. 54).

Majander does not believe in ‘the menace of the East’ being the only factor on which Finnish voters based their voting behavior on when joining the EU. He reminds that the Finnish electorate might as well have been influenced by the times of the Cold War and the notion that the influence of the Soviet Union had restricted Finland’s sovereignty as an independent actor in international politics for decades. Thus, joining the EU meant that an era of condescension in Finnish history was over and the Finns could finally take part in all Western forms of cooperation as equal and competent counterparts to other Western and Central European nation states. (ibid.) It could also be added that agricultural pressure groups played a centric role in the debate preceding the referendum. It cannot be altogether overruled that the pro vs. contra EU struggle was not purely ideological, but it undoubtedly had economic interests, as well - even though Finland was already a member of EFTA at the time. Altogether, economic viewpoints remain mostly outside the scrutiny of the study, presumably due to the constructivist nature of it – but it still remains limited in macro- and micro economic presumptions. As the former Prime Minister and Speaker of the Finnish Parliament Paavo Lipponen has stated, the rationalist factors cannot be underestimated when talking about

5 “It can be called cultural vandalism to insist a global identity which would fade the cultural differences between the East and the West, as Harle and Moisio seem to do - if one can even guess the idea behind the torrent of their words.” Translation: E.H.
Finland’s integration process in general (quoted in Lehti 2004, p. 51). Lipponen often points out that integration with the West has always been in the interest of Finland.

Majander also criticizes the way Harle and Moisio see Sweden as the ultimate ‘positive Other’ in reference to the Finnish national identity project. He notes that the west was not identity-politically a firm entity but rather a changing relationship which followed different political situations during different times (Majander 2001, p. 56). It is indeed noteworthy that a position in the same reference group with Sweden was not something evident but a conscious goal and that it was born from the European political geography of the 1930s. After all, the Finnish-Swedish neutrality became “the central branch where Finland’s international status was intended to hang.” (ibid.)

Majander’s argument that the Finns did not vote solely on security issues in the referendum of 1994, obtains support from Virkkunen (2001, pp 218-219). According to Virkkunen, the strict Otherness of Russia should not be seen as narrowly as Harle and Moisio present it. Nor does he agree with them in seeing the possibility of a more global, culture-based identity as a relevant outcome for future developments. He also attacks the theory of Harle & Moisio by questioning the conclusions of the study in general. According to him, it is important to acknowledge that the project is only a single frame among many in approaching Finnish foreign policy. Regardless of the disagreements with Harle and Moisio, in the end Virkkunen acknowledges that the authors’ approach to political processes which emphasize critical geopolitics and constructivist view of identity, is a welcome addition to the academic discussion of IR in general (Virkkunen 2001, p.219).

Joenniemi’s contribution to the debate on the role of Finland in European integration is that after the end of the Cold War, security became a less state-centered issue and that Finland’s membership in the EU is more a project of expressing certain Western values - such as a free market economy system (in Lehti 2004, p. 54). Joenniemi points out that Finland has moved from a state-centered discourse towards a more nation-centered discourse. Joenniemi sees that this transition is due to the historical nature of the Finnish identity (ibid.). This shows that there is no single and coherent constructivist definition of identity but several ones. His view is supported by other actors taking part in the debate (i.e. Browning 2003). Joenniemi introduces the idea that at the same time as the significance of both East and West as definers
of the European identity narrative diminished, a new narrative of the Northern dimension emerged. (ibid.).

Joenniemi also criticizes the study of the Finnish national identity project for its incapability to explain the change of the world order since the events of September 11, 2001 (2002, p. 369). Harle and Moisio claim that the identity project offers a kind of status quo in the Finnish discourse of foreign policy is rejected by Joenniemi. He writes that this kind of mindset is more a reflection of its composers own starting-point than the state of “the project called Finland” (ibid.). Joenniemi also claims that ontology and epistemology do not meet in the theory of Harle & Moisio. According to him, the constructivist approach of their study remains as a mere ‘glazing’ when the actual premise of it understands the Finnish narrative as “a closed system of signs” which is atypical to the constructivist approach in IR (ibid.).

Another central notion Joenniemi makes in his writing is that the ideas of East and West have not stayed the same throughout European history. In fact, he claims, the Western reference group Harle & Moisio refer to in their study, has developed into its contemporary form during the course of centuries – both rhetorically and geopolitically. Joenniemi wants to point out that the West did not carry the same conceptual implications in Finland before the Cold War. If identity is then formed by placing oneself in a reference relation to others, the construction of identity has to be a continuous process and in a process of change.

Lehti sees that the discipline of IR needs new tools in order to understand the complexity of identities within states (2004, p. 52). He does not commit himself on the national identity project itself, but introduces a concept called the landscape of the mind as a possible tool in specifying and opening up the significance of identities in international relations (ibid. p. 68). Lehti argues that landscape of the mind not only outlines the concept of identity but at the same time, expands it in relation to nationalism, understanding of otherness, actions and practice (ibid.). He emphasizes that identity in its national context cannot be understood only through interest, but that identity defines one’s mission and perception of future even more widely. He argues that with the help of "the landscape of the mind", it becomes possible to combine different elements that have an impact on national identity – such as socio-cultural discussions and debates, trends, and discourses. (ibid. p. 68) Lehti offers this concept as a new tool in understanding how Europe was 'rewritten' as a part of the Finnish national narrative in association with Finland joining the EU. He asks in a rather constructivist sense whether it is possible for the Finnish narrative to move from a perception of security in
military terms towards a perception of security which highlights the importance of the global economy and shifts from a border-centered Europe toward a borderless Europe (ibid. p. 69). However, to achieve such a redefinition of terminology as it is hegemonically interpreted in contemporary foreign policy decision-making would require the research to redefine Finland’s relationship with the new Russia and on the other hand, to take the prospects of economic interests more into account.

One of the most recent contributions to the debate on the Finnish national identity project is that of Aalto et al. (2006, pp. 85-98). The authors introduce a Q methodological study in order to analyze the debate on the book. Aalto et al. execute their study by moving away from the dichotomic setting suggested in the academic debate (ibid. p. 85). The study finds four different attitudinal groups relating to the debate. According to their conclusions, these attitudinal groups are 1) modern realist geopolitics, 2) critique of the ‘othering’ of Russia, 3) bordered Finland and 4) an image of constructed places and flexible identities (ibid.). Aalto et al. thus want to question the dichotomic setting of the debate through a set of in-depth interviews with some of the key actors in Finnish foreign policy research.

What is significant in the results of the Q methodological study is that despite of quite apparent disagreements between the parties taking part in the debate on the Finnish national identity project, there are also visible points of convergence (Aalto et al. 2006, p. 95). The study implies that despite of different ontological and epistemological standpoints, there are in fact more resemblance than one would assume. This kind of ‘nuclear information’ about the issue is traced and showed that most of the parties of the debate share that information despite of their varying epistemological statuses. The conclusions are that the foreign policy and identity context of Finland has lost its Northern/Scandinavian label and has moved towards a more EU-centered label. At the same time, the geographical status of Finland has remained the same; as a bordering state west of Russia. (ibid.)

The conclusion of Aalto et al. leads us to an assumption implying that academic debate between different epistemological standpoints is not, in fact, impossible. However, I believe that at the same time it implies that in the case of the political discussion on the Finnish security/identity puzzle, the debate is likely to have similar nuclear information – something all the parties share. It is thus something ‘universal’ that can be seen in the different dimensions of the debate and its parties. This binding factor is later called the universal level
of discourse, as it emerges on all the dimensions of the politically tuned discursive playground where different conceptions of ‘where is Finland’ struggle.
5. Research Frame, Methodology and Data Collection

Studies involving the theorizing of discourses have been relatively frequent in International Relations during the last two decades. In the post-Cold War world of few political ideologies and mixed cultures, this is fairly understandable. During the last chapters, I have been drawing a general image of the ontological and epistemological platforms of the philosophy of social constructionism in order to serve the purposes of this study. Now it is time to move further towards the practical means of operationalizing the theoretical frame behind specific research questions. As noted before, the reason behind selecting this particular methodology is in the objective of revealing the underlying structures and/or dimensions of a public debate in question.

In order to shed more light on the empirical part of this thesis comes the point where the frame of research and the methods of collection of research data are to be introduced in detail. This means that in the next chapters of this study, I aim to discover and analyze the kinds of discourses concerning national identity which emerge from the public discussion on the security/identity puzzle during the crisis of the Caucasus. Policy proposals emanating from the notions of them are also taken into scrutiny. As explained in the introductory part of the study, this is done by examining relevant newspaper articles collected from Finnish mainstream media and by analyzing them with the help of the discourse analysis method laid out in detail by Teun A. van Dijk. The specific measures of how it is done are explained within this chapter.

To make some general observations on the research data, I have mapped the political communication on the security/identity puzzle as widely as possible within the limitations of this study. In practice, this means that all articles treating either the Finland-NATO relationship or the crisis of the Caucasus are taken into consideration. Altogether, very few restrictions have been made with regard to the data. The result is that in all, eleven articles appear in the research data. They are all reviewed according to the method mentioned above. However, before moving to the specific measurements of this research, I will introduce the general research frame of discourse analysis (called here also by abbreviation DA) as a tool of analysis within the constructivist approach in International Relations and political communication.
5.1. Research Frame

In evaluating how research data explicates a specific theory in question, the question of research frame comes into the picture. In this case, the characteristics of the study are explained through the inductive nature of the case-setting. As this study primarily aims to describe various aspects and qualities of a narrowed down political discussion, the research frame in question can be described principally as a non-hypothetical, descriptive content study, where the independent variable is a geopolitical project (the Finnish national identity project), the dependent variable being representations of national identity. The correlation between these variables lies in the core of the general research design. However, due to the post-positivist epistemology of the study’s general approach, only interpretations, or ‘enlightened inferences’, can be provided (see King et al. 1994). My aim is to be as open as possible in all phases of scientific inference within this study, since social sciences rarely offer any ‘grand theories’ which cannot be falsified. It is rather the duty of a researcher in social sciences to admit the limited nature of all social theories. My aim is nevertheless, provide scientific, descriptive inference by explaining as much as possible with as little as possible (ibid. p. 104).

Studying politics is a political act in itself. Due to this particularity, a study of political science always has a moral aspect (George 1994, p. 24). Thus it is essential to acknowledge that a study is merely an interpretation of the research topic and that it has consequences and obligations. By rejecting the positivist epistemology and by moving to the post-positivist sphere of social science, one similarly accepts the obligation of the principles of providing not only correct, but also morally durable research. Studies are observed by scholars and experts but also by anyone interested in the topic. After all, academic research aims at producing comprehensive knowledge of different phenomena surrounding us, phenomena we all share in one way or the other. This means that by stepping into the role of a researcher, the obligation of refraining from advancing one’s own goals, should lead the path forward.

5.2. Discourse Analysis and Frame

Discourse analysis (DA) is a loose methodological frame used in several disciplines. In fact, discourse analysis has been utilized in i.e. structuralistic semiotic analysis, sociolinguistics and ethnography of speech, discussion research, text linguistics and cognitive psychology (Hoikkala in Mäkelä et al. 1990, p. 143-145). DA is more an approach than a strict method. It
is based upon the principles of the epistemology of social constructionism and it has several different traditions and emphases, contingent upon the research focus in question.

The general aim of the discourse analysis is to specifically analyze how social reality is constructed in different social practices (i.e. Jokinen & Juhila & Suoninen 1993a, pp. 9-10). This means also that speech and acts are not unconnected or counterparts but rather they both sustain and modify our understanding of social reality (as defined in chapter 1.2.). Discourse analysis can be roughly divided into four different categories. According to Jokinen and Juhila (1999, pp. 54-66) these ‘matched pairs’ in the map of DA are:

- conditionality – cultural continuum
- meanings – formation of meanings
- rhetoricity – responsivity
- criticality – analyticality

These pairs should be understood as dimensions situating within the studies of discourse analysis. A study using discourse analysis can utilize elements from both ends of the dichotomies presented in these four categories. Focus can also be set on either end or it can even change within a single study.

The map of DA offers a variety of possibilities to approach research data. However, there are some similarities in all types of discourse analyses. Jokinen, Juhila, and Suoninen (1993a, pp. 17-18) reduce the theoretical principles in all discourse analyses into another four points. Firstly, language is seen as the only factor which constructs social reality and produces social causality. Secondly, there are competitive account systems which exist similarly. Thirdly, actions which construct meanings are contextual in nature. And fourthly, all actors are bound to different account systems. Account systems refer to the complex system of language that includes several entangled elements. Account systems are constructed by social practices but they are not merely words or sentences. Body language, images and actions have also an important role in analyzing account systems. (Jokinen et al. 1993a, p. 27)

---

Before moving to the level of statements made by individual scholars, it is noteworthy to acknowledge that discourses do not exist in research data as such but they are rather readings or interpretations of social reality. In other words, account systems are not constant entities that can be captured as such, instead they are part of the socially constructed reality which is represented to us in complex and diverse depictions. The role of a scientist is thus to make compact readings of different manifestations of the linguistic processes and actions that take place in the complex space of speech and text communication. (Jokinen et al. 1993a, p. 24)

When doing research with the help of discourse analysis, one should not name the causes to different phenomena but focus on the ways in which actors describe those phenomena and try to find reasons to explain them (Suoninen in Jokinen et al. 1999, p. 18). The focus of discourse analysis is thus in exploring speech acts as practices, instead of merely looking into single paraphrases (ibid. p.19).

It is the main challenge of a discourse analyst to bring together different account systems into meaningful compositions, readable for an outside audience. As social reality is elaborate, parallel accounts coexist and compete with each other at the same time. However, by compiling those accounts into meaningful discourses, scientifically useful interpretations emerge, as they help us reveal the underlying logic of how and what we speak of. Put simply: A discourse analysis can help us to understand what we really speak about. Thus it has similarities with classification by type or theme, but instead of focusing on thematic substance, it aims at describing how language is used to reflect and construct reality.

The term 'frame’ is a metaphorical term when using it in the context of discourse (Ensink & Sauer 2003, p. 2). A frame gives an object a place and space and separates it from its environment. A discourse can be thought as a painting, and a frame as the concrete frame of the painting. Everything within the frame is the painting. When something is being related to something, it is framed, because it is then seen in a cognitive space (‘somewhere’) (ibid.). One’s capability to set up these frames is of high importance when analyzing political discourses and the practices of them. A matter can be framed as a matter of foreign policy or national security. Then it is similarly lifted ‘upon’ certain political conventionalities where different ‘rules of being’ apply. By this I refer to the conventional practices where certain policy matters are handled with a circle of ‘mysticism’. In other words, as Kuus noted earlier,
framing an issue as geopolitical, it becomes a matter of restricted elite. In Finland this means that for example the National Report on Defense Policy\textsuperscript{7} is being prepared in secrecy, and the meetings of the Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security Policy\textsuperscript{8} are closed. This does not mean, however, that by opening these documents or meetings, the issues would imminently become matters of ‘everyday’ politics.

5.3. Discourses and Discursive Practices
Discourses create both objective and subjective realities (i.e. Berger & Luckman 1994). Discourses are actions that have consequences and different functions. Interpretations of discourses can differ greatly, as implications are constructed in a process of social interaction. Also the cultural conventions in a given society have an impact on the readings of speech acts. There are numerous unwritten norms which we unconsciously obey in everyday life. These are also sometimes called ‘the rules of being’.

Texts under scrutiny in discourse analysis are called accounts. This is in order to make a clear difference between methods which explore texts as simple representations of reality and texts which are scrutinized as interpretations of it. By making accounts, people explain their own understanding of reality by giving supporting arguments to their personal view. That personal view has been constructed within a certain culture and is thus interlaced with social practices used in that particular culture.

Some analysts define the political so widely that almost any discourse can be considered political. However, in this study it is considered that discourses of mutual matters which are handled in the public sphere (see chapter 2.3. about the dimensions of political communication) by either politicians or the media are seen as political. This is due to the evident restrictions of the methodology in use; only recorded material can be considered here as valid research data which naturally excludes the so-called ‘over-a-cup-of-coffee discussions’, even though they were highly political in nature.

\textsuperscript{7} Puolustusselonteko. Translation: EH.

\textsuperscript{8} Ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiitin ministerivaliokunta (UTVA). Translation: EH.
5.4. The Different Levels of Discourse

In studying accounts of reality, three different levels of discourse need to be taken into consideration. One can study a) what kinds of meanings can be used in accounts in general, b) how those meanings are (re)presented in real life interaction and c) how accounts take part in the construction of a social culture (Suoninen in Jokinen et al. 1999, p. 23). Figure 2 explicates the relationship of these three elements by graphical means (ibid. p. 21, Figure 1). It illustrates the general orientation of discourse analysis following the baselines of social constructionism in general.

Accounts of reality appear on three different discursive levels. Firstly, accounts sustain conventional structures. Secondly, accounts sustain discourses to which they refer in order to persuade an audience. Finally, they produce different material and symbolic consequences. (Suoninen in Jokinen et al. 1999, p. 22). How is this to be understood with reference to political communication? First of all, sustaining discourses does not necessarily mean that a certain account is a conscious selection or choice of signifiers. Nevertheless, selections of wordings etc. maintain certain discourses as morally right and normal, and at the same time exclude those that are unacceptable or abnormal. These kind of hegemonic discourses are discussed more in depth in chapter 6. Yet, competitive discourses emerge in political communication for the purpose of persuasion. An actor can obtain extra value to his/her social status by skillful accounts or feedback which ‘tempt’ competitive actors into follow-up accounts (Suoninen in Jokinen et al. 1999, p. 30). The process of persuasion is therefore a
more complex process than merely representing other acts as normal and valuable, and others as unacceptable.

5.5. Discourse Analysis by Teun A. van Dijk

Utilizing discourse analysis in political analysis is especially beneficial when trying to decipher how a certain political discourse is engaged in the construction of identities and the hegemonization of such. In other words, accounts of nationality can be used as an instrument of sustaining certain perceptions as normal and acceptable. A writer of a text always has to consider his/her public by including and excluding matters that s/he believes the public understands. By doing this, the norm of ‘normality’ or ‘natural’ is enforced. Van Dijk’s version of discourse analysis provides a useful tool in order to analyze both the text itself as well as the context of it. In the end, written text is written communication which parties take part in constructing the social reality (Hoikkala 1990, p. 145).

Discourse analysis by Teun A. van Dijk introduces a method that moves beyond analyzing single propositions or simple sentences at the textual level. In his discourse analysis method, sentences and speech acts are analyzed as patterns that convey certain semantic entities. By revealing these super- and macrostructures, the local and universal levels of a discourse can be separated and sorted out. The aim of van Dijk’s discourse analysis is, above all, to reveal how these two levels are related to each other (Hoikkala 1990, p. 142).

In order to understand van Dijk’s discourse analysis in its cognitive dimension, the concept of macrostructure needs to be introduced. Macrostructures, in their very essence, are simple representations of social reality (ibid. p. 145). Macrostructures can also be labeled global or universal structures. In other words, the focus of van Dijk’s analysis is in revealing systematic relations between texts and their contexts. What is essential here is that discourses are interpreted by a mental process which takes awareness of the dynamics of information structures (van Dijk 1988a, p. 29; 1987b, p. 179; van Dijk & Kintsch 1983, p. 333). A person utilizes global or macro analysis in his/her life all the time without necessarily becoming conscious of it. Schemes of reality give us references to understand reality around us by including, excluding, generalizing, and so on. Van Dijk’s discourse analysis is specifically interested in entities, not only in simple sentences and their ‘meanings’. One has to find the hegemonic themes from the texts under surveillance in order to reveal what they really say to
us. However, a thematic entity is not merely a matter of substance. A superstructure is needed in order to describe the overall form of the set of selected discourses. (Hoikkala 1990, p. 147)

The superstructure is composed of certain conventionalities such as headlines in news articles. The superstructure is filled by the substance of discourses which is condensed into semantic macrostructures (Hoikkala 1990, p. 148). Put differently, how do we understand threats as threats, or a security dilemma as a security dilemma? When we understand the macrostructures of a discourse, it becomes possible to comprehend the superstructure of it.

As explained above, schemes or themes take their form in the level of macrostructures. Macrostructures, in their part, are abstracted from microstructures. (Hoikkala 1990, p. 148) In texts, microstructures refer normally to the meanings of simple sentences or words. Here van Dijk defines the concepts *proposition* and *fact*. A proposition is the smallest textual unit of a single discourse. A proposition can either be *true* or *false*, but nothing in between. (ibid.) A fact is thus a reference to a proposition. A proposition has to point to an imaginable fact, whereas macrostructures are systemic patterns of propositions. Thus a statement like “Finland is secure” cannot be a proposition because it can neither be true nor false. Despite of this, the criteria of the truthfulness of a statement is not the so called historical ‘real world’, but it can also be an imaginable reality, such as ideological or utopian reality (ibid.).

Westernizing discourses within the first weeks of the crisis of the Caucasus can be traced from the research data with the help of van Dijk’s *macro rules*. In practice this means that the data articles are analyzed by using macro rules as van Dijk advises; every simple sentence is coded into singular micro propositions M1, M2, M3, etc. by its reference to an imaginable fact that is either true or false (as explained before). A single macro proposition is then sorted into one of six macro rules: deletion, selection, generalization, construction, zero, or evaluation (Hoikkala 1990, p. 149). These macro rules follow the coding process until there are single superstructures left. After that, the superstructures (propositions that representing different accounts of the state of security in Finland) are analyzed by differentiation and resemblance. This way the field of political discourses is generated and macrostructures of the data can be placed into ‘a map’ of discourses on a security/identity scale.
6. Hegemonic Discourses

Foreign policy is first and foremost made in *rhetorical choices* rather than through power politics in the realist sense of the term. As Harle and Moisio argue, Finland is geopolitically placed in a certain context, not irrelevant to its surroundings, by using these very rhetorical choices. Harle and Moisio study political texts about Finnishness made by members of the Finnish elite, assuming that they appear in the public and have an impact on their readers – not taking a stance whether that impact is what was desired. The authors thus claim that discourses of foreign policy do not stand without effect or significance. In the end, discursive choices are interpretations of what we are and thus have *constitutive power* in them. As constructivists see the matter, international relations are born in texts and speech acts - a lot before politics end up to the level of using brutal force.

Hegemonic discursive practices are especially influential because they produce certain claims as meaningful and true. Hegemonic discourses constitute some themes as normal and natural and thereby remove others from political debate (Kuus 2007, p. 9). Thus, security debates represent neither an objective reality nor a subjective fear. Vice versa, security debates are practices of discourse in which “the meaning of security is constructed by statements made in its name.” (ibid.) Studying these practices does not mean the revealing of Machiavellian ‘secret maneuvers’ but rather the *exposing of the parameters of a public debate*. It is to say that security is not something entirely intangible or a mere state of mind but that it cannot be addressed or discussed without understanding the practices used to define security threats as such. (ibid.) This particular notion is especially evident in discussing the relation between security and identity. Both terms define each other by inclusion and exclusion, by definitions and practices of ‘us’ and ‘them’.

What is the relationship between hegemonic discourses and identity and security? Some remarks about cultural geopolitics lean on the assumption that (in)security has changed into something that is based on identity and culture rather than on a tangible threat (Kuus 2007, p. 60). Kuus notes that this ‘Huntingtonian logic’ does not necessarily mean that there is influential anti-Russian elite amongst national decision-makers or electorates in the Baltic States which consciously enforce a perception of the Russian threat. Moreover, Kuus suggests that security and geopolitics are deeply linked to the construction of culture and identity. Even
more so, the Hungtintonian ‘Clash of Civilizations’ maintains security issues still in the center of political debate. The gravity of a threat can easily be debated in a society, but the underlying assumption of tensions between cultures is rarely contested. (ibid.) This applies also to Northern European states such as Finland. What Kuus tries to say here is that threats are more cultural in nature than straightforwardly material or military. Cultural threats, on the other hand, are those which threaten our very existence on the level of identity and state’s own raison d’être. Thus securitization (as the School of Copenhagen labels it) is tightly tied to a reified concept of identity (ibid. p. 61).

Within the discipline of IR, the constructivist debate has centered on Wendt’s premise of state-driven identities. There are suggestions that the time-relatedness of identity should be taken more into account due to the fact that “the complexity of identity narratives and the contingent nature of them are otherwise easily bypassed.” (Lehti 2004, p.51). Questions of identity and otherness play a key role also in the construction of national identity linked to the geopolitical conditions of a certain political atmosphere. It is thus impossible to unheed the complex nature of news discourses as research subjects. It is also often irrevocable to combine several scientific methods to be able to grasp all the features of political communication at hand. However, I will next explain the base lines of the research of news discourses that have relevance especially in terms of political communication.

6.1. News Discourses in the Research of Political Communication

The public sphere sometimes seems to be a field of constant debate and power-play. However, there are certain limitations to those debates which are often not seen by bare eyes. On of the most famous descriptions of politics and public theories is undoubtedly that of Jürgen Habermas (1962). Habermas explains the idea of publicity in European bourgeoisie societies of the 17th and 19th centuries. He describes that the political motive of public discussion at the time was above all, common interest in promoting the liberation of economics, trade and politics (Heikkilä 2001, p. 25). Nationality was thus mostly standing up for the rights of the citizens of a specific society. This, on the other hand, happened through (a public) rational argumentation and discussion.

It has become more relevant, if not unavoidable, to examine news discourses as the main frame of political communication because the majority of public political discussion in a
liberal democracy takes place in the media sphere. According to McNair (1999, p.14), political communication in a liberal democracy is actually mediated politics, consumed by the public.

Modern politics are largely mediated politics, experienced by the great majority of citizens at one remove, through their print and broadcast media of choice. Any study of democracy in contemporary conditions is therefore also a study of how the media report and interpret political events and issues; of how they facilitate the efforts of politicians to persuade their electorates of the correctness of policies and programmes; of how they themselves (...) influence the political process and shape public opinion. The political process, in its public manifestation, reaches citizens as the product of a set of journalistic codes and practices (...), which interact with and are shaped by politicians and their professional communication advisors as they negotiate access to, or otherwise seek to influence the output of, political media in ways favourable to themselves. (McNair 1999, p. 14)

Newspaper discourses have been studied quite widely within media and journalism studies. There are also some studies from the field of history research and linguistics which have focused on tracing different rhetoric elements used in news discourses. In International Relations, studying discourses is nowadays common especially due to the growing interest in poststructuralist and constructivist research which highlight the affect of discursive acts in the political reality. The emphasis is then on the framing aspect of i.e. public policy-making. Scholars of IR and Journalism & Communication studies have become increasingly conscious of the active role the media play in framing public issues at hand. Framing analysis has indeed many similarities with discourse analysis, as both approaches have their primary focus on conceptualizing news texts into empirically operative structures. When it comes to political communication, the significance of news discourses in political analysis becomes self-evident. By scrutinizing news discourses, accounts of political reality can be systematically trailed.

Nationality is rarely expressed publicly, so we need to read and interpret the representations of it from news texts (Heikkilä 2001, p. 24). However, to perceive journalists as actors in political processes, we need to impose some restrictions on the conduct of analysis. This is because a connection between the writers of a news text to the viewpoints expressed in it, is
explicitly forbidden in news journalism. As opposed to this dilemma, editorials or columns embrace different (professional) norms, as they can express official lines or definitions of policies of a certain medium (Alasuutari 1996, pp. 29-30). Simple news articles are however more problematic in terms of reading as they writer of a text makes an inventory of a public discussion surrounding specific thematic (Heikkilä 2001, p. 89). The main principle in analyzing news discourses is nevertheless that news texts follow certain journalistic conventions. In practice, this means that the voice of the journalist always echoes in his/her texts. Only the ways we can isolate that voice in order to inspect the text in scientific terms, are undoubtedly problematic.

In general, studying news texts is accepting the conventional form of them. By accepting the fact that the voice of a writer is indeed hidden and not obviously readable from the text, the ways of implementing an analysis concretizes. Some scholars of Journalism and Mass Communication have introduced a concept of the category of news narrator in order to make it easier to analyze news texts. With the help of this category, it becomes possible to grasp the power structures binding journalism and the sources behind it (Ridell & Puhakka 1996, p. 187). In this study the category of news narrator is also noticed within the method applied to the research data. The discourse analysis applied in this thesis is founded on the assumption that the discourses emerging from the data include the category of news narrator in themselves. This is to say that no individual conclusions can be made based on singular news texts, but a wider reference group is needed in order to form a solid ground for further generalizations. If the starting point of the analysis is indeed that the voice of the news narrator ‘lives its own life’ within the news texts, there is no other possibility than to accept it by acknowledging its very existence and to include this general notion in the conclusions of the completed analysis.

As to the research of political communication, it seems that Journalism and Media Studies are in the lead in the field of IR. For example, the NATO debate in Finland has inspired several studies only amongst the students and scholars of my own home university. Rahkonen examined the Finnish NATO discussion during 2003 - 2004 in his PhD. dissertation by combining agenda-setting and articulation theories, well-known particularly in Journalism
studies\textsuperscript{9}. The NATO discussion has been a starting point in several IR theses, too. However, the substantive sources, such as political documents or official speeches, are then often used as the main sources, and relevant news articles are used as additional sources. This might be because of the difficulty of isolating a single voice in news texts, as specified above. There are no guarantees that what has been stated as the wordings of a specific person in a news text, still applies when examining the structures of the text in detail.

News discourses are often studied by a methodology which combines different elements of content analysis. In the light of the post-positivist or constructivist approach, this is the path to follow. In the end, according to the principles of social constructionism in general, social reality is constructed in speech acts, rhetoric, and discourses. As a study leaning toward post-positivist epistemology refrains from making implicit notifications of ‘the objective reality’ as such, it relies on against the notion that by observing and scrutinizing the underlying structures of linguistic acts, we can make sense of our understanding of the nature of reality. Milliken notes that using discourse analysis as a method in International Relations has been rather non-systematic (Milliken 1999, pp. 235-236). Milliken notes that discourse theorizing “crosses over and mixes divisions” between social constructivists, post-structuralists, post-modernists and some feminists scholars (ibid.). In fact, there is no common understanding within the discipline of IR about the ‘right’ way to study discourses. Regardless of the irregular use of discourse analysis as a key method in IR, Milliken recommends it by saying that it can indeed improve the quality of an analysis. Discourse analysis in IR is, however, more a loose methodological frame or general approach than an explicit method in the positivist sense of the concept.

The data of this study is collected from the largest daily newspaper in Finland and Scandinavia, Helsingin sanomat (HS). One has to remember that HS is not only the largest newspaper in Scandinavia by scale of circulation, but it has also been seen to be the trend-setter of Finnish journalism alongside with the Finnish national broadcasting corporation Yle (Suhonen quoted in Heikkilä 2001, p. 83). In the search of representations of national identity, HS seems to be the most well-argumented choice. Looking for regional or local identities, the

choice would not necessarily have been the same (i.e. the leading newspaper amongst the Swedish speaking minority by far is Hufvudstadsbladet). After all, the current status of Helsingin sanomat is all but undisputed in the academic discussion of journalism.

6.2. Method of Data Collection

In order to minimize the degree of selection bias of the study (see i.e. King et al. 19994, p. 133), the data of this study is collected from the largest daily newspaper in Finland, Helsingin sanomat (HS). Helsingin sanomat is not only the most widely circulated daily paper in the country, but it is being referred to also as the most ‘influential’ national newspaper. The readers of HS are not only citizens of the Helsinki metropolitan area but the paper is published widely outside the capital city area. Thus, the data collection has been made by using intentional selection of observations (ibid. p. 139) which implies that a researcher knows in advance some values of at least some of the relevant variables used. In order to outline mediatized political communication a relatively small state as Finland, HS cannot be excluded from scrutiny when talking about political communication in regard to the country.

Helsingin sanomat has profiled itself as a pro-NATO newspaper in several editorials over the years. The highest journalistic management of the newspaper (HS editor-in-chief, Janne Virkkunen) maintains that the paper remains neutral and unbiased with regard to the NATO question and applies purely journalistic consideration in its journalistic work10. However, more research would be needed in order to examine this argument.


The data of this study are mainly qualitative in nature. However, I will provide a compact table of the actors mentioned and/or used as a source in the data texts. This aims at providing a general frame in order to reveal the compliance to political institutions and existing structures of the security/identity discourses taking place in current political communication in Finland. This is done according to the guidelines defined by Heikkilä (2001, p. 96-99, tables 4.1. - 4.3.).

The crisis of the Caucasus can be considered to have started on August 8th 2008. The data of the study includes all the newspaper articles, whether reportive or analytic in nature, published in HS during the first month of the crisis. The objective of the study is not to provide an extensive analysis of the consequences of the crisis, but rather to sketch out what kind of discourses emerged during the events in the sphere of political communication in Finland. As mentioned above, the research data consist of eleven different newspaper articles that directly handle the crisis of the Caucasus within the domestic news pages of HS. The data does not include foreign news at all because the aim is to analyze discussions of Finnish identity and the NATO question in particular at the national level. Thus, some articles that also handle the crisis of the Caucasus are consciously excluded since they are not relevant for the objectives of this study.

The collection of research data has been conducted in an automated manner. By utilizing the digital archive service of HS, a specific time frame can effortlessly be applied to the data available. However, all the articles embrace the words ‘NATO’ and ‘Georgia’ or ‘security’ and ‘Georgia’. Thereby it has become possible to sort out relevant articles amongst all the news articles that mention the word ‘NATO’ or ‘security’ and discover those that deal with the NATO question in regard to the crisis of the Caucasus. It is important to emphasize also that all of the eleven articles that appear in the final research when the data collection is completed, treat either the crisis of the Caucasus itself or its implications for Finland, instant or prospective. Most of the actors found in the articles are either Finnish politicians (one Swedish politician is mentioned) or Finnish journalists. The authors of the articles are mostly stated in the text with one article as an exception.
7. Implementation

News texts are of essential importance both to the decision-makers and the electorate in a democratic state system. The role of the media as ‘the watchdog’ of those in power obligates media to follow, scrutinize and question decisions made and implemented in the society. The relationship between politicians and the media can be seen as symbiotic or parasitic – depending on the view angle. Either way, politicians need the media in order to communicate their intentions and actions to the electorate, and similarly the media needs the politicians in order to conduct the task as the watchdog of power successfully.

Foreign policy in Finland has moved from the closed cabinets of the Cold War times to a subject of open debates in the public of the EU time. The decision-makers need to address the electorate in regard to foreign policy issues such as the NATO question. It is perhaps the media who want to keep the NATO question on the agenda. However, politicians no longer have the option to ignore such themes. Politicians are more and more exposed to public criticism due to the heavily grown media coverage on politics during the last decades which submits them to locate themselves in the tensioned field of foreign policy discourses.

Actors of political communication appearing in news texts often refer to the idea of national identity, whether consciously or unconsciously. The political elite has a need to geopolitically locate ‘us’ and ‘them’ in an ideational map of identities. The consequences of identity construction might not be evident but the implications of it can be exposed through careful scrutiny.

The emphasis of observation in this study is in identity-political situating of Finland in the field of discourses taking place in political communication about the NATO question in regard to the crisis of the Caucasus. By analyzing the research data according to the principles of van Dijk’s discourse analysis, four different categories of identity-political loci of Finland arise. Before turning to presenting the findings of those loci in detail, I will make a few general notes about the representations of Finnish identity soared from the research data. By referring to the Finnish national identity project, I will investigate how or if the theory of Harle and Moisio is salient in the analysis. After sketching out the four identity-political loci found in
the research data, I will finally turn to discuss the contribution of the Finnish national identity project to the NATO debate.

7.1. Findings: National Identity in the Research Data

The concept of national identity, as defined in chapter 2, can be traced from the research data in several different dimensions by using the discourse analysis by Teun A. van Dijk. Firstly, the research data were transferred into a Microsoft Excel table as a whole, sentence by sentence. This made the coding of the research data into micro- and macro structures possible, in order to sketch out the underlying structure of selected texts. In the coding phase of three to four coding phases, four different dimensions were revealed. By careful inspection following the guidelines defined in chapter 5, the underpinnings of the discourses were located in a four-field map of discourse (see appendix 1). After sketching the four-field map by a systematic manner into its final form, several differences and similarities to the Finnish national identity project became visible.

All dimensions of the identity-geopolitical loci emerged in this study are labeled according to the rallying points they manifest in themselves. The first locus I have labeled as traditionalists. The second locus is called emancipationalists, the third trasformationalists and the fourth locus moderationalists. The disparities of the four loci are defined in the next four subchapters in detail where I will describe the special characteristics of each locus within the security debate emerged in the data. After that I will draw some general conclusions of the findings and evaluate their contribution to the premises of the Finnish national identity project.

The division between all four identity-political dimensions was not always unambiguous. Nevertheless, after analyzing the data several times the four-field map of discursive dimensions begun to take form. The greatest challenge for an analyst using discourse analysis as the main research tool is to refrain from making hasty conclusions about the findings in the first rounds of coding, as that would entail the danger of misleading or flawed implications. In order to avoid that, I have coded the Excel-based data into microstructures labeled M1, M2, M3 etc. in several rounds (see chapter 5.2.3.). After coding, I have placed the findings in the microstructural level into the four-field map designed to illustrate the dimensions of the
'attuned' discourse field in a more descriptive manner. With the help of the four-field map I intend to trace the Finnish national identity project from the data as systematically as possible.

7.2. Traditionalists
The traditionalist locus of the four-field map involves a discourse which emphasizes Finland’s status as a neutral state actor in international politics. The discourse in this locus sees Georgia as the initiative actor to the Crisis of the Caucasus and tends to give understanding to Russia for its protective actions. The traditionalist group believes that the present foreign policy line in Finland is adequate and needs no alterations. Traditionalists also see the geopolitical status of Finland as the bordering state between East and West. It thus represents the Finnish realpolitik tradition well known from the Cold War times. This means specifically that the traditionalist are concerned with the geopolitical status of Finland as a bordering state in Europe. The traditionalists thus resemble factor 3 (Bordered Finland) in the Q methodological study by Aalto et al. However, as distinct from the members of factor 3, the members in this locus do not see particular threats coming from the EU. According to them, the power status of Russia needs to be taken into careful consideration when making foreign policy decisions in Finland.

What is noteworthy in the traditionalist group is that on contrary to common expectations, the actors which were located in this locus do not all represent the left wing of political forces in Finland. As presented in the data, the traditionalist dimension involves discourses backed by a conservative defense minister, amongst others. The key notion in the traditionalist locus is that in an identity-political sense, Finland is seen as a kind of mediator between the East (Russia) and the West (the EU). Thus Finland belongs in its very own reference group, sharing it with Sweden, as both are militarily non-aligned.

Traditionalists see Finland as a part of the Northern hemisphere rather than as a part of ‘truly European’ nation-states as defined by Harle and Moisio. The discourse within the traditionalists emphasizes the importance of bilateral relations between Finland and Russia. Russia is not seen as the definitive Other of Finland but more as an important trade companion and essential in international collaboration in an economic sense. Nevertheless, this group does not exclude the EU as an actor as a whole in this relation. The traditionalists believe that
the EU is indeed a central factor in Finnish foreign policy but it should not be so at the expense of Russia.

As to the question of NATO, the study showed that the traditionalist discourse unambiguously rejects the idea of Finland being a member in the military alliance. The traditionalists see the membership neither necessary nor wise, as it might inspire Russia to take proactive measures in order to forestall NATO enlargement towards its Northwest border. The traditionalist group underlines the importance of ‘normalizing’ the relationship between Finland and Russia in regard to the NATO question. According to the traditionalists, ‘normalizing’ refers specifically going back to the foreign policy line which emphasizes the bilateral dimension of the Finnish-Russian relation. The traditionalist paradigm does not deny the significant role of the EU in Finnish foreign policy, but it is not willing to lean entirely on EU-Russian relations. Lessons from the Cold War era play an important role in the traditionalist discourse. That is the realist paradigm’s premise of ego-centric power play in international relations which stresses the material needs of a nation-state. In the end, traditionalists see that Russia looks after its own interests in the Caucasus, as other state actors do as well. Therefore, the traditionalist group is not willing to condemn Russia for its actions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. For the traditionalists, Russia still is a great power in the international scene and should thus be handled with extra care and consideration.

To make a brief conclusion, the traditionalist discourse rejects both a re-evaluation of Finnish foreign policy and the idea of full membership in NATO. The discourse sees Finnish national identity as neutral, unbiased and independent of the power play between forces in the East and West. For traditionalists, it is important to maintain present policy line in international relations especially between Russia and Finland. In this sense, the traditionalist discourse holistically rejects renewals of any kind seeing them as a prospective threat for the present status quo.

7.3. Transformationalists

The transformationalists are the second largest discourse found in the research data. The transformationalists emphasize the need of re-evaluation of Finnish foreign policy because of the events taken place in the Caucasus. This group sees Russia as a growing threat and a clear Other, in an identity-political sense very similar to the Finnish national identity project.
The transformationalist discourse considers the present foreign policy line as insufficient and inactive. There are several mentions in the research data which refer to current Finnish-Russian relations being worse than ever. This serves as an indicator for an argument visible in the discourse which emphasizes the necessity of more discussion on the Finnish foreign policy. Otherwise things develop in a wrong direction – backwards.

The transformationalists group acknowledges that there is a clear necessity of re-evaluating the Finnish foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia and the West. However, this should not be done by using the so called NATO option. Transformationalists see that the best way of securing Finland as a sovereign nation is by leaning on our own defense system – the Finnish national army, in addition to traditional diplomacy. Despite of that, there are no suggestions within the transformationalist discourse about deepening international cooperation at a humanitarian level. This is somewhat surprising, as the discourse recommends a new role for Finland in foreign and security policy. There is an agreement in an institutionalist sense within the discourse that a transformation should be seen in the activity with which Finland takes part on the international scene. The discourse suggests that Finland should in fact move from an observer towards a more active actor in international affairs.

According the transformationalist discourse, NATO was the initiator of the Crisis of the Caucasus. The discourse sees this as somewhat worrying as it regards Russia as the main threat in the international scene. From the identity-political point of view, the transformationalists understand Finnish identity as the traditionalists see it: through Northern reference. The discourse believes in the special status of Finland as a Nordic welfare state between Russia and the West. Even though a transformation is needed, no clear direction is pointed out. Thus, the transformationalist discourse is the most passive of all the four loci. It has difficulties in articulating clear measure which should be taken in leading Finnish foreign policy to a new track.

To make a short summary of the transformationalist discourse, it leans on the assumption that NATO has played an initiative role in the culmination of the crisis in the Caucasus, as it believes NATO should not interfere in the affairs of Russia for the threat of international collision. According to the transformationalist, Russia has the right to protect its citizens in diaspora. However, the discourse pays little or no attention to the interpretation which implies that Russia meddled itself with the policies of a sovereign state, as South Ossetia and
Abkhazia are part of Georgia. Thus, the transformationalist discourse resembles the neorealist paradigm in its very essence. It leans on a hypothesis which highlights nation states as a priori actors in international relations. In its very most pessimism, the members of the transformationalist locus give sympathy to military actions in international affairs when they are based on national interests. They do not see any relevant change in the fundamental ‘rules of the game’ happened, but emphasize that there is anarchy between states.

What comes to the national identity project, the transformationalist locus takes after the key arguments of the project. By othering Russia, a Finnish national identity is reproduced in the discursive practices of everyday life. Finnishness is thus seen as something very different from Russian or Eastern identity and similar to Western culture.

### 7.4. Emancipationalists

The emancipationalist discourse is the most visible and the strongest discourse within the four-field discourse map of the Finnish security/identity puzzle. It has quantitatively the largest representation in the research data. The main argument in this discourse is that the foreign policy line in Finland should be re-evaluated because of the crisis of the Caucasus and that Finland’s membership in NATO should be re-considered in regard to that context. There are implicit references to the need of either re-evaluating the necessity of a membership or even imminent applying for a membership. When comparing the findings of this discourse with some of the existing studies of the Finland-NATO question\(^\text{11}\), a visible audacity in making this kind of statements has become remarkably more frequent. Politicians who are active in everyday parliamentary politics have formerly not been keen to make such statements, presumably because polls still continuously indicate that the Finnish electorate mostly rejects NATO membership. An imminent question arises: Why, the , there are so many outcomes on this topic during the crisis of the Caucasus then? The answer might consist of several varying factors. However, it can be seen in the research data that the current governmental composition seems to promote the emancipationalist discourse, the premise basing on both quantitative and qualitative observations on the topic. Both, the foreign

minister’s and the prime minister’s portfolios, belong to the centrist-conservative coalition, which makes emancipationalist openings not to seem extraordinary. Nevertheless, the fact that Helsingin sanomat profiles itself as a pro-NATO newspaper might indeed have an impact on the research results. This should not be intentionally neglected when evaluating the results of the study as a whole.

The emancipationalist discourse emphasizes the outcomes of the crisis of the Caucasus especially security-wise in the realist sense of the word. The discourse puts the center of gravity on the significance of the events in the Caucasia in the contemporary security and foreign policy agenda. The discourse includes arguments which underline the stabilizing effect of NATO particularly in Russian-West (US allies) relations. In general, the discourse centers on “realizing the facts” in the current international situation, reminding us of the well-known quote of President Paasikivi: “Wisdom is facing the facts.” By arguing that Russia’s foreign policy has become ‘harder’ and that it is based more and more on military threat than on other (softer) means of power, the emancipationalist discourse draws the attention more towards the hard end of the security/identity scale of the four-field map than the other three discourses.

Perhaps the most central observation in analyzing the emancipationalist discourse is that it highlights the need of transformation from the role of passive observer to an active actor. Thus the emancipationalists contain a similar dimension with the transformationalist discourse. However, the emancipationalist discourse sees the solution of security problematics in the possibility of aligning military, contrary to the transformationalist one which underlines the importance of bilateral relations eastwards. According to the emancipationalist discourse, membership in NATO would bring equilibrium to the international scene where Finland seeks for its possibilities of securing its sovereignty and independency. Therefore it is perhaps the most opportunistic discourse of the four as it seeks security amongst the strongest – much in


13 ”Katainen uskoo, että niin Georgia kuin Venäjäkin olisivat toimineet toisin, jos Georgia olisi Naton jäsen. Kansainväliseen yhteisöön kuuluminen lisää rauhaa, hän arvioi.” (ibid.)
contrast to the connotation of Finland during the Cold War era when ‘neutral’ foreign policy\textsuperscript{14} emphasized the hard facts of balance of power in the world.

In order to wrap up the emancipationalist discourse, it is rather surprising how strong representation of it there is in the research data. Whether the reason for it being the official pro-NATO policy line of Helsingin sanomat or merely the personal views of the interviewees in question, the emancipationalists seem to obtain quantitatively more attention compared to the other three discourses. Especially after analyzing the weakest discourse observed in the study which is explained in next subchapter, it becomes more clear which discourses gained most support within the political communication about Finland’s security questions during the crisis of the Caucasus. It will be interesting to see if these discourses reflect the goals of the Finnish national identity project. And if they do so, how is this displayed at the macro structural level of the research data.

\textbf{7.5. Moderationalists}

The moderationalist discourse of the four-field map is perhaps the most peculiar for it is almost absent. Regardless of the quantitative exiguity of its representation in the research data, there are some hints of it visible in the macrostructural level of the data. Firstly, the moderationalist discourse tends to lean towards an idea of Finland as something of an outsider when talking about the Caucasus. The discourse does not provide suggestions or guidelines of any kind in order to discuss Finland’s security during the crisis. Nevertheless, it is interested in the bilateral relations between the East and the West especially between Finland and Russia. The moderationalist discourse emphasizes the need of \textit{normalizing} Finnish-Russian relations and does not see a necessity of re-evaluating them in regard to the Russian-

\textsuperscript{14} The term neutral/neutrality refers to the Finnish policy term ‘puolueettomuus’ which has to be separated from the term non-aligned = ‘liittoutumattomuus’. There is a significant difference between the official usage of these terms in Finnish foreign policy, as Finland changed the adjective describing its international status after joining the EU in 1995 from neutral to non-aligned. The vague usage of the terminology raises a lot of public discussion even today.
Georgian crisis. The moderationalist discourse is thus a supporter of the current status quo\textsuperscript{15} (compare with the traditionalist locus presented in chapter 7.2).

Not much more can be said about the moderationalist discourse based on the research data because of the overall lack of material at both micro and macro structural levels. It is however somewhat surprising that this discourse has very little representation within the data as a whole, as it underlines satisfaction with Finland’s security as it is. On the other hand, identity-politically, the moderationalist discourse is not necessarily very ‘useful’. Thus, in accepting the current security status quo, no extra resources or attention towards further securitization is seen necessary. In the long run, this would undoubtedly lead to a kind of identity crisis, as accounts of national identity need to be reaffirmed, maintained and adopted to new internal and external circumstances. It raises the question of the general consequences of these kinds of security/identity discourses. Can a discourse in a way become ‘extinct’ if it is not ‘needed’ identity-wise? Can it be replaced with a more ‘useful’ discourse in political communication? Can this be done intentionally? What kinds of consequences does it bring up if replacing a discourse with another (more useful) discourse were in fact possible?

Explicit answers to these questions are hardly obtainable within the frames of this particular study. However, it is worth noting that an ‘almost-absence’ of a discourse is undoubtedly meaningful in terms of the outcome of this study. Put in a Foucaultian sentence: “Power in post-modern society operates through free subjects by tempting them to act according to certain conventional practices.” (Michel Foucault 1982, p. 220) I believe Foucault, as quoted, tried to illustrate the tempting nature of hegemonic discourses for the power they convey, as contrary to the ‘absent’ discourses which often need to struggle for their significance or persuasiveness and even existence. Absent or minor discourses do not convey the same amount of power as hegemonic ones because they are not as widely shared and thus not as widely accepted as societal norms. I will later analyze how the four discourses found in the

research data reflect the theory of Finnish national identity project, as designed and used to explain and give meaning to the Finnish identity security-wise.

I will now turn to evaluate the validity of this study in terms of the methodology and research data implemented. It is of high importance to acknowledge the pros and cons of the different elements of the study in order to be able to pull any final conclusions. However, it is highlighted throughout the text that because of the constructivist approach of the study, the findings have to be evaluated through the position of the researcher. Thus it is considered in the next two chapters how the validity of the study can be evaluated in terms of the research position this kind of approach demands for its post-positivist epistemology.

7.6. Validity of the Study

The salient point of a discourse analysis is that no research data is ‘better’ than another in the sense that no data gives more an objective image of reality. Different data is examined in varying contexts, but the validity of a study relies on the way it is analyzed. (2008) Therefore there is no single ‘right’ way of studying qualitative data through discourse analysis. The validity of a study is examined from the angle of argumentation. There are thus no limitations to the form of the research data (Jokinen & Juhila 1991, pp. 56-57).

As Potter & Wetherell (1987, pp. 169-172) determine, there are four different criteria to evaluate validity of a study. The first criteria is that of coherence. The validity of this particular study, for example, is composed of the way the interpretations, discourses and used methods form a coherent entity. The second criteria is that of viewpoint. I have tried to present as many viewpoints of the participants/actors in the study as possible. The meanings which soar from a research data are more interesting in a scientific sense than the abstract definitions they represent. The third criteria of validity is to evaluate if there are new problems that arise from the study. By raising new questions I have explicitly tried to fill this criteria (see i.e. chapters 7.2. – 7.5.). The final criterion is the fruitfulness of the study as a whole. How was the study able to create new standpoint to the theme? How was it able to bring about new explanations of the topic in question? (2008). I have aimed at revealing the underlying structures of a piece of political communication taking place in Finland at the moment. If no new explanations to the topic were emerged, at least there are four new standpoints to scrutinize the political discussion on the Finnish identity/security issue. I find the results of
this particular study relevant to the general study of political communication in IR in all their limited capacity, as they bring up systematic interpretations about the current shortages and deficiencies on the political communication of the security/identity puzzle.

According to Fairclough, the coherence of an interpretation is based on the *solidity* of it. One needs to evaluate the relevancy of the results of an analysis to the different actors within the study *per se* (i.e. Fairclough 1997). If an interpretation or analysis raises new questions and opens new viewpoints to the topic, it has usually been fruitful. I believe that a successful scientific interpretation provides us with a coherent and useful analysis of a certain, strictly limited topic and brings up new structuring to similar thematics of the field. As the study investigates the role of discursive acts as social practices, the emphasis is inevitably in the strategies, resources and processes behind those practices.

In order to evaluate the validity of a qualitative study as this one, it is necessary to refrain from making direct hypotheses and to try to demonstrate the researcher’s own position or orientation in regard to the research questions applied. Especially when talking about discourse analysis as the main method, there is only one possible interpretation available at a time. As noted before, the researcher’s task is mainly to explain his/her own interpretation of the research topic through a systematic recording of the method and experiments applied in the study.

Due to the inductive nature of the research data used in this study, it is highly data-emanated in nature. This means that within the frame of this particular study, no deductive causality can be reached without evident criticism. However, as explained before, the aim of this study is not to offer extensive theoretical explanations to wider areas of international relations, but to provide an analysis of specific, narrowly selected representations of the social reality. By accepting this epistemology, the conduct of the study becomes valid in contrast to pursuing a grasp of certain elements of reality ‘as they are’, independent of the researcher.

Studies using discourse analysis as their method are often criticized also for coming up with ‘tendentialist’ premises. Some scholars see that the main problem in discourse analysis is that it has no means of showing that the analysis actually handles aspects that are meaningful for the actors appearing in the study. On the other hand, no study in social sciences steers clear from subjective interpretations or illusions of usefulness for its actors. Thus it is vitally
important to take the researcher’s own position into account. This leads us to an examination of the research position of this study. It will be done by analyzing briefly the illusion of objectivity in social sciences. It relates to this study in particular at the grass root level, as this study gains its relevance from the constructivist epistemology of International Relations.

7.7. Research Position

A researcher cannot escape his/her role as a cultural actor. That is to say that no-one can write an academic study without a research position (ibid. p. 202). Juhila reminds us that a researcher’s own research position can be understood as a discursively constructed category that has various manifestations (in Jokinen et al. 1999, p. 201). A study of discourses is similar in nature to the acts under its scrutiny (Edwards 1997, p. 46; 53-61 quoted in Jokinen et al. p. 201), as a researcher him/herself also speaks and writes. Studying discourses is an interactive process, as researcher discusses with his/her research data. Other interactive characteristic of discourse analysis comes from the intertextual dimension of academic writing. The writer has a relationship to his/her fellow researchers by referring to preexisting texts on the same topic. He/she also addresses the study to a particular audience, i.e. scholars already familiar with the topic.

No objective interpretation is attained in implementing discourse analysis as the main methodology. Thus it is important to define and understand what kind of a position one takes when doing research. Juhila separates four different research positions: a) analyst, b) advocate, c) interpreter or d) conversationist (in Jokinen et al. 1999, pp. 203-226). All positions mentioned above are subordinated to the first one: analyst position. Analyst position refers to a researcher who aims to keep his/her own involvement in the data analysis as limited and controlled as possible. The researcher ‘merely’ examines human linguistic interaction using specifically defined methods. It is of high importance to outline only those frames which the actors in the research data themselves have defined as relevant. (ibid. p. 203.) Thus, the research data have to be confronted with a disciplined and analytical approach in order to avoid a more profound impact on the study’s results.

My own position as the researcher behind this study is that of analyst and interpreter. I aim at providing as specific and wide an account of the topic as possible by the means available to me in the time of implementing the study. It is however challenging to refrain entirely from
making non-analytic presumptions of any kind, but the mere consciousness of that possibility increases the transparency of the study, as it is brought directly to the reader as an underpinning feature in it. Moreover, my aim is not that of an advocate due to the descriptive nature of this study in general – my objective is merely to provide an in-depth analysis of the ‘electrified’ field of Finnish security discourses during an international crisis. It is important when implementing this kind of an analysis that one distances oneself from the discussion per se especially when it moves to a higher gear, as usually happens during crises. However, one cannot avoid acting as a cultural actor in terms of a political discussion even as a researcher.
8. **Discussion: Where is Finland?**

The outcomes of this study have been two-fold. Firstly, I have intended to reveal signs of the Finnish national identity project from the research data which consist of eleven newspaper articles all handling security in Finland in a way or another, by a systemic approach to the linguistic qualities of them. At the same time, I have noticed that the in data used here reflect only a small fragment of the contemporary political discussion of security taking place between different actors in the political sphere of Finland. Secondly, I have introduced four different dimensions of discourses which were found from the research data. All of them have some similarities, but they have also great differences. This is especially relevant in analyzing the outcome of the findings, as it is still open whether there is a universal code found from all the four discourses.

Harle and Moisio ask in the title of their research of the Finnish national identity project, the key question of all geopolitical thinking: ‘Where is Finland?’ This question reveals not only the basic setting of the contemporary geopolitical agenda in Finland, but it also gives us an idea of the frame of reference to which we see the objectives of geopolitical thinking in general. The objective of foreign policy is of course not merely the construction of national identity. However, texts of and about foreign policy issues can be interpreted as representations of that construction. The main emphasis during the study has thus been in asking whether there is any rhetoric clues of a kind of systematic project of a Finnish national identity found in the data. And on the other hand, what kinds of hegemonic discourses of security/identity there are in order to serve this purpose?

As explained before, Harle and Moisio claim that the project called Finland relies profoundly on the otherness of Russia and on the other hand, on Finland’s orientation towards Western European nation-states. By inspecting the four-field map constructed by a systematic discourse analysis, I have divided the data into micro- and macrostructural levels in order to be able to see more clearly what they stand for from a political point of view. However, the answer does not reveal itself imminently. Thus, I would firstly like to look more closely to the kind of strategies of hegemonization of national identity discourses, as it will hopefully shed

16 ‘In Finnish: Missä on Suomi? (Harle & Moisio 2000)
more light on the question whether or how Finnish national identity manifests itself in the context of security in newspaper texts.

8.1. Hegemonization of National Identity Discourse

The concept of hegemonic discourse was firstly introduced in chapter 5.2.4. It was explained that a hegemonic discourse is born at a specific time and place when it obtains a status of being ‘normal’ and ‘true’. In a way, hegemonic discourses are official accounts which try to naturalize the current state of affairs, to make current power relations appear to be inalterable facts of nature (Mumbe 1988 quoted in Linde 2003, p. 531). However, hegemonic discourse may transform and modify through time. A hegemonic discourse can be rather dynamic in nature but it needs a certain degree of weight gained from the authority behind it. Thus, some actors in a nation-state, internal or external, have more relevance in terms of construction of hegemonic discourses than others.

Hegemonic discourses are especially meaningful for this study because they play a central role in the social construction of national identity. The hegemonization of national identity discourses is not necessarily a straightforward process which can be orchestrated from ‘above’, but it is something that can be traced in discourses representing the political atmosphere of a certain (political) time and space. Research data, when consisting of discursive practices representing a certain spatial reality, can offer some interesting observations of phenomena which seem objective at the first glance. When scrutinized more in depth, hegemonic discourses are often revealed by the qualitative features of their conquering space within the frame in which we speak, act and thus construct societal norms, values and identities.

From the data of this study, the emancipationalist discourse seems to stand out as the hegemonic discourse on Finland’s security. It is not only the most common discourse quantitatively, but it also has the most constitutive power - because of its hegemony. This may seem like a circular argument at first, but seen in the context of the Finnish national identity project, it becomes logical: Hegemonic discourses become and maintain their hegemony ironically by being hegemonic already. To put it simply, a hegemonic discourse describes its normative origins by its frequency of social practice. As Michel Foucault’s quotation cited before, power in post-modern society indeed operates through free subjects by tempting them...
to act according to certain conventional practices (1982, p. 220). This is the explanation behind the notion why the emancipationalist discourse is the strongest of the four discourses found in the research data.

The emancipationalist discourse is mostly in line with the main premise of Harle and Moisio’s Finnish national identity project. The discourse emphasized Russia’s role as the ultimate threat, as the significant Other. Dichotomies between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are made in regard to the Russian threat which manifests itself through the events taking place in the Caucasus. By identifying Russia as the Other, the national identity project is enforced by rhetorical choices made in its name. Russia’s acts in the Caucasus represent the irrational nature of the Other and similarly a need to be aware of the threats it might convey.

The Other in the emancipationalist discourse is seen as undemocratic, old-fashioned and unable to play by the rules of the rest of the (Western) international community. By recognizing ‘the facts’ taking place in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia has again showed its true nature, careless of norms binding its neighboring democracies. The threat of Russia is seen as ‘realism’ whereas neglecting it would be idealism or even dangerous carelessness. It is seen that the Caucasian crisis has dropped us to the ground again with regard to the Russian threat. Russian identity has therefore not changed after the end of the Cold War but it has been only ‘sleeping’ instead.

According to the emancipationalist discourse, NATO membership has a securitizing effect on its member states. That is why Finland should also consider joining the military alliance, as the intentions of Russia cannot be seen in advance – and even if they could be seen, they cannot be trusted. The security dilemma for the Finnish national identity project is more about maintaining and renewing the state’s own identity, as separate from the Other. However, it lacks in explaining other dimensions of security. According to the data observed in this study,  

---

the hegemonic discourse of Finland’s security status during the first month of the Caucasian crisis is mostly in line with Helsingin sanomat’s official NATO policy. This was not the actual surprise. The Finnish identity project seems to have a strong role in the construction of the hegemony of the emancipationalist discourse, regardless of the shortcomings of the project. Firstly, the Finnish national identity project does not put a lot of weight on the material aspects of security reasoning in the speech acts concerning Finland’s geopolitical status. However, there were references in the research data to both material numerals and straightforward military reasons behind Finland’s security concerns. The Finnish national identity project is so much concerned about the identity dimension of the security dilemma that it tends to fall short of other explanatory factors, such as economic and military reasoning. Emphasized traditionally by the neorealist school in IR, the state system in its anarchical nature is based on the assumption that states can never be certain of the intentions of other states. So states have to prepare themselves for everything, even for a military threat. In this sense the traditionalist discourse shows similarities with the material ontology of the realist paradigm in evaluating security by material facts.

Politico-philosophically, actors located in the upper-left corner discourse of the four field map (see Figure 1. in appendices) are strong both in individual ontology and holism. On the contrary, actors representing the emancipationalist discourse in the bottom-right corner are low both in individual ontology and holism. That is to say that the emancipationalist discourse leans on the societal dimension of security whereas the traditionalists are based on the capability of individual actors (such as states) to answer emerging security threats. Why has the emancipationalist discourse obtained a hegemonic status? And moreover, if such a project can be orchestrated or conducted, does Russia have its own national identity project? Harle and Moisio claim in their research that the way we see ourselves as representatives of our own nationalities, is no coincidence. They argue that the national identity project, reflected from various rhetoric acts in the name of Finland’s official (or unofficial) foreign policy, most people construct their notion of where they belong identically. In the case of Finland, Harle

and Moisio continue, the direction has been clear for hundreds of years already. Regardless of the geographical fact which locates Finland more eastwards than many Eastern European countries, the nation itself belongs to the West, “among our Western brothers and sisters”.

After becoming hegemonic, a discourse does not necessarily stay that way. Hegemony requires constant renewal, maintenance and enforcement. This is the main task and reason behind the national identity project. The Finnish project lives and modifies with time in slightly different forms. However, an incentive is needed in order to keep an identity project rhetorically alive. Whether it is done in a systematic manner or not, it will not replace the strategic necessity for an identity project in the construction of national identity. A social construction of national identity does not take on a certain form and remain that way by itself. As Harle and Moisio claim, the identity project has to be ministered – consciously from above or unconsciously by sustaining hegemonic discursive practices. But how should this be done? Is the identity project a big ‘conspiracy theory’ then? That is hardly the answer. In terms of identity-politico evolution, a hegemonization of discursive practices develops in terms of social practice. When a discourse becomes hegemonic, it captivates social space from older discourses, and so forth. As to political communication, reconstruction and transformation of political discourses is inevitable - even when a certain discourse were to sustain its hegemony. The data of this study showed that there are congruencies between the Finnish national identity project and the hegemonic security discourses. Regardless of which of the four discourses is in question, the identification of the Other remains Russia. Only the means of answering to the threat possibly posed by that Other divides the discourses significantly.

The division is founded on both on history and culture. It conveys differently interpreted accounts of national identity, but the Otherness of Russia makes them especially interesting in an identity-political sense. If NATO were to attack i.e. Georgia by military means, would there emerge Finnish accounts as worried of security deficits as when Russia is in question? According to the Finnish national identity project, the answer is no - as long as NATO is identically closer to the rhetoric reference group of the Finns than Russians are.

### 8.2. Strategies of National Identity Construction

I have raised the question of the possible existence of national identity construction strategies several times within these pages. According to the many critics of the Finnish national
identity project, Harle and Moisio do not provide a water-tight model of operationalizing the project in their study, and it is not on the agenda of their research, either. However, the question may be asked whether there is a constant strategy seen in the data collected for this study which would give us directions where to look for the development of identity construction in the future. After puzzling on the security/identity and the internal/external dimensions of the discourses represented within Helsingin sanomat, it becomes relevant to observe a glimpse of the ‘big picture’.

Anthony Smith writes that a collective identity is built on common myths and history (Smith 1992, p. 57). However, historical implementations of collective identity often rely on re-imagining and reconstructing the nation as such (ibid.). There can be no collective identity without collective memories, as they construct a common destiny to a specific social group. According to Smith, successful differentiation leads to a process of identification. In the post-modern era, national identification has become the political norm, more overcoming other sources of group identification (gender, age, socio-economic status etc.). This is largely due to the fact that even though individual members of a society often have multiple identities and thus identify themselves with several dimensions of the social and cultural reality, collective identities tend to be more pervasive and persistent. That is because they are less dynamic and more durable and because national identities can outlast the apathy of large numbers of individuals. (ibid. p. 59)

The Finnish national identity project is empowered by national sources of common identification. Nationhood is undoubtedly quite a vague concept, challenging to define into a narrow dimension. However, according to this study, there are a few strategies visible in the data which offer some help in the definition of what ‘Finnishness’ actually seems like in our social practices. First, there are shared myths or narratives of common origins and history in the discourses of Finnishness. Second, there is the territorial consensus about the borders of a common nation. Third, there is a standardized culture of norms and values which are seen as ‘right’ or ‘moral’. Fourth, there is a common understanding in the discourses of the reference group the Finns belong to. That is the reference group of the West, on the contrary to that of the East which plays the role of the defining Other in the identification of the Self.

These similarities bind all four discourses found in the data together to a rhetoric project which may as well be called the national identity project. They are not necessarily directly
proportional to the premises provided by Harle and Moisio. Nevertheless, they are additional dimensions in the search of Finnish (geo)political identity, manifested in internal and external discourses on the Self and the Other in contemporary political communication. The significance and societal effect of these dimensions is left to be evaluated by further research. However, as Harle and Moisio suggest at the end of their study, there is a necessity of multidimensional identities in addition to national identity. In a world of multi-lingual, multi-national and interdependent international reality, nationhood cannot be the only definitive dimension in the security discourses of the post-modern society. On the other hand, national identity is not ‘withering away’ in the Age of Globalization, but on the contrary (see for example Khazanov 2005). The authors of the Finnish national identity project claim that other dimensions will be needed in the future, as the world has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War. Territorial integration, economic interdependence, real time communication networks and global environmental threats are all factors that can, and eventually perhaps will, influence the hegemonic security discourses familiar to us today. Yet, there are no signs of an extinction of national identity from our social discursive practices. Vice versa, national identity seems likely to dominate the construction of our social identity for a long time ahead.
9. Conclusions

The perennial question of what ‘Finnishness’ is, as a representation of a set of ideas of the characteristics of national identity of certain group of individuals, seems to be an object of continuous debate. According to the implications of the Finnish national identity project, there is a growing need for more a parallel conceptualization of Finnish national identity, instead of reading and decoding it merely within the continuum of East and West. However, the political debate that took place in the Finnish public sphere during the crisis of the Caucasus once again arose various questions about the relationship between national identity in regard to security questions. Conceptions of threat, fear and insecurity were discernibly read in the public discussion on the crisis which, in many aspects, seemed to extend its impact over the borders of European nation states.

Once again it was time to determine the underlying raison d’être of a geopolitical entity called Finland. It was indeed not the first, and doubtless not the last time when such a discussion moves to a high gear. After all, national ‘soul-searching’ is undoubtedly one of the key activities behind political opinion building on the questions of identity. The general need to assure and convince nation’s raison d’être as an institutional structure (such as a nation or a state) plays a central role to the typologies of nationalism (Browning & Lehti 2007, p. 693).

I have approached the question of Finnish national identity from a constructivist angle in this study. I have done so par excellence because I believe the constructivist approach is especially useful in approaching problematic of identity construction in IR especially in regard to political communication. Questions of nationhood are pivotal in being addressed by actors in political communication in order to reconstruct and re-imagine our common understanding of ‘what we are’. That, again, gives us tools in forming concrete policies at state level.

In our post-modern society, political communication is undoubtedly one of the most important, if not the most important ‘battle field’ where accounts of identities compete and struggle. According to the finding of this study, it can be argued that political parties in a society which have access to the construction of the national identity (the political elite, the media) indeed show a variety of discursive differences between them in the identification process of the Self and the Other. However, some similarities emerge as well. Nationhood still remains as the definitive dimension of identity within the security discourses in Finnish
political communication. This happened also during the crisis of the Caucasus. That is to say that coming as far as year 2009, national identity has not yet been outlived by other, possibly more cross-cultural perceptions of identity when it comes to security questions treated in the public. On the other hand, security issues remain in the strict domain of foreign policy as reconstructed by the accounts of common identification in political communication. When international events are framed as crises, threats etc. they become a matter of foreign policy in political communication. This leads to a situation where fewer actors are able to enter that domain. In regards to the research data in this study, only a few non-parliamentarian voices were actually detectable in the material texts. In practice, I believe the majority of accounts of the security/identity puzzle never enter the public sphere.

I have gone through key writings related to the debate on the Finnish national identity project and traced the main arguments raised within that debate. In terms of debating on certain reasoning behind specific foreign policies, the debaters naturally base their arguments basing upon narratives from which they gain the most support. In that respect, a study of discourses or narratives is often also a study of political persuasion. It is thus relevant to analyze and try to lay bare the underlying structures of the narratives and rhetoric constructions on which they rely, as these will in fact be of significance to that debate.

Framing Finnish national identity within the East-West continuum is indeed historically eminent (Browning & Lehti 2007, p. 691). The tendency to portray Finnish history in terms of a series of Westernizating political activities, as Browning and Lehti argue, this framing is not only politicized but also rather simplified (ibid.). Although I have traced various elements recognizable to the Finnish national identity project, a few cases of the premises of the project remain somewhat puzzling. There are at least two problems in the science-philosophical level I would like to express here. First, even though construction of national identity in geopolitics is undoubtedly an important factor in the task of (re-)imagining ourselves as members in a given (political) society, I believe purely material, such as economic factors, cannot altogether be excluded from the scrutiny when identity is at issue. Secondly, I believe that a significant danger of ‘over reading’ exists when analyzing texts of the past. I will now turn to explicate this criticism.

The Finnish national identity project seems not to be theoretically as coherent as Harle and Moisio imply. I agree with the authors that new, global identities would be welcome in the
future of the debate on national identity. A change both within the parties of the debate on the variety of identities, as within the Finnish national identity project itself, can be hopefully expected. The constructivist approach to IR, applied by Harle and Moisio in their study, gives tools of political theorizing on whether there is a change possible in the international order in general. However, as scarcely any paradigm of IR, the constructivist approach does not alone explain the complexity of internal and external identities of states as a whole. Wendt’s consistent constructivism was once a counter strike towards Waltz’s neorealism and its restricted potential to explain structural change in international system imminently after the end of the Cold War – and has to be seen in that context. Nevertheless, in analyzing states’ internal debates and security discourses through the lens of political communication, a more flexible approach seems to be needed in order to identify the central elements and signifiers of identity construction *per se*. If a debate takes place within the boundaries of certain national narratives, those narratives are not something entirely stable and constant but rather vague and disputable. Thus, a more important question is to ask who has the possibility and access to construct those narratives and thus identities, and moreover, which are the voices heard in them.

Together with the shortcomings of the consistent constructivist approach in studying the construction of identities in political communication, another politico-philosophical problem leaves me somewhat puzzled. That is, when reading and decoding the texts of the past, one should not forget that moral *perceptions of truth and falsity* are equally inherited. I.e. Philp argues (2008, pp. 136-149) that the more we understand about the characteristics of the tools and materials we work with, the better it can contribute to our self-awareness to what we really talk about when talking about theoretical problems and concepts. This however leads to the question whether ‘history’ itself and political theorizing are (or should be) one and a same thing. According to my view, political theorizing cannot and should not be merely writing history, but rather questioning, re-evaluating and modifying it in its very essence. Philp noteworthy writes that the past has evidently set us certain standards, presuppositions and hypotheses about what is the nature of political reality. It should thus not be treated as something pre-given but as something subordinate to structural change within certain time and space. This gives us the possibility to evolve and develop political theorizing in a more independent manner which, in the long run, hopefully leads to a gradual evolution of political theorizing in general.
Developing an understanding of the past does not mean, however, that one becomes a historian in the way, but a researcher of political theory rather draws insights from history keeping (political) activities similarly in the essence of scrutiny. In practice, this leads to a form of analysis which emphasizes the understanding of contemporary political rules, societal order and the parameters of political possibilities (Philp 2008, ibid.). Philp notes that researchers interested in political theory, the commitments of choosing particular approaches or subjects should be consciously scrutinized and definitely approached with a critical grasp. This is due to the notion that standards and ‘facts’ should be open to question and interrogation (p. 148), for the embedded distinction between history and political theorizing lies in this very politico-philosophical momentum.

One is set to perceive political theorizing in a certain way – through certain eye glasses. Skinner also points out in his essay that when a frame of reference is successfully established, “we unavoidably organize and adjust our perceptions and thoughts will themselves tend to act as determinants of what we think or perceive.” (Skinner 1988, p. 31). The danger which lies beneath the theory of Harle and Moisio, is the presupposition that texts of the past convey ‘timeless elements’ in the form of ‘universal ideas’ (ibid. p. 30). Skinner calls these universal ideas even a ‘dateless wisdom’ with ‘universal application’ (ibid.). The underlying idea here is that by adopting a certain view on the question of how to best obtain a profound understanding of i.e. classics, a researcher has already committed him/herself to a historically coloured interpretation. For if the whole aim of interpreting political classics is to point out their timeless relevance and universal validity, one needs to pre-eminently concentrate on what is actually said – and not merely to make (perhaps misguided or even fallacious) interpretations based on the ‘historicalness’ of such texts (ibid. p. 31). Therefore, the aim of political theorizing has to be to develop a re-appraisal of such classical texts, contrary to the perception that it should be in finding these timeless truths from them.

The temptation to over read and interpret political texts is equally often high. It would be, and indeed has many times been, tempting to read and decode i.e. pieces of art in a way appropriate to our own objectives. However, as Skinner argues, political, religious or other ideas should not be contaminated by an unconscious application of different paradigms as the familiarity of them disguises an essential inapplicability to the past (p. 32). By this he refers to the danger in which many historians or analysts find themselves in: mythodologizing up to the level of historical absurdity (p. 33). Skinner also points out noteworthy enough that there
is also the danger of decoding certain ‘doctrines’ too keenly in the texts of individual writer, since those doctrines might not be conveyed as they were not perhaps available to the original writer at the time.

When it all comes around, are we indisputably able to trace the origins of an idea and unarguably point out when and where an idea was firstly emerged? It is perhaps even more disputable to aim to show what an individual writer has in fact meant to say when stating an idea which we so readily wish to decode in a certain way in a specific context, time and space. Skinner felicitously marks that a methodology of doctrines in historical texts may be argued to consist of “mistaking some scattered or incidental remarks by one of the classical theorists for his ‘doctrine’ on one of the themes which the historian is set to expect.” (p. 36). This could be labelled as a classical mistake by a researcher interpreting texts of the past, according to Skinner. However, it is also an undertaking not to trace any patterns of systematic doctrine from historical material. I believe it is in fact possible, and even desirable, to expose certain pattern and/or similarities from past texts, since they are not merely arbitrary or random perceptions of the nature of political reality in a certain dimension of time and space.

To develop the thoughts of the relationship between historical perspective and political theorizing expressed here a bit further, I would like to come up with a final conclusion drawn by Philp and Skinner. The temptation to over read historical classics or simply past texts poses a threat of ending to fallacious and misleading interpretations. The challenge of a researcher is simultaneously to keep his/her focus on what is actually said and whether there is a relevant patter or a system of ideas to be actually seen. However, I believe that the first objective, to keep the focus on what is said, comes always before. After understanding the context and activity behind an individual text we can draw any water-tight conclusions or interpretations out of past texts. The danger is that one is likely to perceive these timeless ideas or doctrines in texts when the mind-setting is convenient for the objective. To put it into an aggravated form, one can even interpret a phonebook and find imminent (political) doctrines as a platform of political theorizing there with a mind-setting supportive to that kind of a goal. Thus it is of high importance to distance oneself from the hypotheses made beforehand in political theorizing and consciously try to question and clarify the standards behind our thinking of the political.
Bibliography


Deryabin, Yuri (2007), Finland and NATO. *International Affairs* 53:5, pp. 68-76.


Leopold, David & Stears, Marc (ed.), *Political Theory: Methods and Approaches*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


**Web Sources**


Appendix

Figure 3: Four-field map on the dimensions of security/identity discourses in Helsingin Sanomat Aug. 2008 – Sept. 2008, executed through discourse analysis by Teun A. van Dijk.

Table of Figures

Figure 1, p. 27: The four sociologies of International Relations by Alexander Wendt (1999, p. 29) Formula by E.H.

Figure 2, p. 51: The interrelation between human-made accounts and reality. Formula by E.H.

Figure 3, p. 95: Research Data: The four-field map on the dimensions of security/identity discourses in Helsingin Sanomat Aug. 2008 – Sept. 2008, executed through discourse analysis by Teun A. van Dijk.