RUSSOPHONE POPULATION IN FINLAND AND ESTONIA: REDEFINING THE CHARACTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION?
ABSTRACT

The main task of this research is to characterize the Baltic Sea region international society by analyzing the domestic discussions, which are capable of affecting the sectors as well as the institutions of this international society. These domestic discussions are situated around one certain issue: the presence of the Russophone population in Estonia and Finland. Conclusively, it will be probed how the approaches towards the Russophone population in result of such events as the Bronze Soldier riots in Estonia and the war in Georgia but also the Russian real estate acquisition in Finland enable to characterise the Baltic Sea region international society. This aim is accompanied by the claim that the way an issue is talked about domestically can have implications on the level of the international society which on its turn means that international societies can be created by words. In order to undertake the task of this research, the analytical concepts of the English School IR Theory will be used and the speech act method proposed by the Copenhagen School theorists applied as the analytic tool. The English School theorists bring out three possible arrangements at the international political realm: international system, international society and a world society. This study mostly touches upon the international society concept and its possible character as solidarist or pluralist. Barry Buzan’s elaboration of the primary and also secondary institutions of an international society provide a tool which enables to link the results of the analysis carried out according to the method proposed by the Copenhagen School theorists with the English School theorists’ arguments about an international society.

It is concluded that the international society in Baltic Sea region acquired numerous different characteristics in result of the aforementioned events and a tendency. These characteristics vary when it comes to different primary institutions and different geographical locations. In general terms, however, it is a pluralist international society with the main aim to maintain the order. The latter can be done by keeping the agreements, protecting the possessions and guarding the security. It is also important that the Baltic Sea region international society was largely formed upon the solidarist primary institutions but the existence of certain conflictual areas also gave it a baggage of pluralist primary institutions. The results of the analysis show that in case the presence of the Russophone population is securitized, the pluralist primary institutions may start challenging the solidarist primary institutions and in case it is desecuritized, the opposite would take place. When this happens, the international society in the Baltic Sea region might have to be redefined.

Keywords: Russophone population, Baltic Sea region, international society, international system, speech acts, securitization, desecuritization, English School, Copenhagen School.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## INTRODUCTION

Outline of Research 4

## 1. RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 6

1.1. Guiding Ideas 6

1.2. Methodical Application and Identification of Sources 14

1.3. Logic of Analysis 15

## 2. BACKGROUND STUDY 17

2.1. The aim of the Background Study 17

2.2. Baltic Sea Region 18

2.3. Finland 23

2.4. Estonia 34

## 3. ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 46

3.1. Introduction and meta-theory 46

3.2. Relations to other IR theories 50

3.3. Analytic concepts 52

3.3.1. International system, international society, and the world society 53

3.3.2. International system 53

3.3.3. International society 54

3.3.4. World society 56

3.4. International society concept and the Baltic Sea region 57

3.5. Relation of presumptions and concepts of the English School to research aim and method 61

## 4. SPEECH ACT THEORY AS A METHOD 67

4.1. Securitization and Desecuritization 67
4.2. The use of the speech acts

4.3. The “facilitating conditions”

4.4. Links to the English School theoretical framework

5. APPLICATION OF THE SPEECH ACT THEORY

5.1. Contemporary Public Discussions
   5.1.1. Bronze Soldier Riots in Estonia
   5.1.2. Russian Real Estate Acquisition in Finland
   5.1.3. Finnish Interpretations of the War in Georgia
   5.1.4. Estonian Interpretations of the War in Georgia

5.2. Findings from the speech acts
   5.2.1. Estonian approaches
   5.2.2. Finnish approaches

5.3. Fitting the results with the English School theoretical frameworks
   5.3.1. Implications of the securitization/desecuritization in military sector
   5.3.2. Implications of the securitization/desecuritization in political sector
   5.3.3. Implications of the securitization/desecuritization in a societal sector
   5.3.4. Implications of the securitization/desecuritization in economic sector

CONCLUSION: REDEFINING THE BALTIC SEA REGION INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY?

Recommendations for further study

REFERENCES

   Primary Sources
   Secondary Sources
INTRODUCTION

This research investigates the political dynamics that have been occurring in Baltic Sea Region since the end of the Cold War. More than that, it will show whether the dynamics occurring in certain fields – approaches towards minority populations - have levers to change the character of the whole Baltic Sea region international society. The starting point for such presumption is the argument that international societies are talked into existence. In other words – the international society in Baltic Sea region was constructed by words after the Cold War. During the Cold War there was however a mere international system between the states bordering the Baltic Sea\(^1\) which means that states only had some minimal interaction with one another and the relations were to a large part related to the Cold War power politics. In other words, the Baltic Sea area was to a large part rather characterized by divisions between states.

The study concentrates on two countries within that region – Estonia and Finland. Both countries are bordering Russia and have had various encounters with Russia. For that reason, they find Russia in the centre of their foreign policies – as a possible enemy or as an opportunity. The Baltic Sea region international society has partly emerged as a result of attempts to bind Russia and the Baltic States into the favorable frameworks guided by cooperation in economic affairs and soft security as well as sharing common understanding of justice and values. Recently, however, one issue has started receiving heightened attention due to some events and tendencies – the presence of Russophone population. Although the presence of Russophone population may firstly seem as a topic, which is acute in Estonia while not having much relevance in Finland, this research aims to show that Russians are also often addressed in Finnish public discussions. What is the nature of these discussions in

\(^{1}\) States bordering the Baltic Sea: Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia.
Estonia and Russia? More than that, what the discussions disclose about the character of the Baltic Sea Region international society?

In order to grasp the main directions of this research, I will now give a short introduction into Finland, Baltic Sea region and Estonia, although the Chapter 2 will give an in-depth background study on all three.

The interest into the Baltic Sea region and its member states Estonia and Finland was one of the impetuses for writing this research. It is of particular interest to analyse the character of the regional international society by way of a comparison between the Finnish and Estonian public discussions on the Russophones population.

Finland and Estonia are examples of states which have simultaneously numerous similarities and differences. As to Finland, the Cold War relationship with the eastern neighbour was dominated by the “special relationship.” It was associated with the presidencies of Juho Paasikivi² and Urho Kekkonen³ and revolved around attempts to maintain good relations with the USSR even if this involved making some concessions. In the post-Cold War period, Finland has been trying to involve Russia in the common projects initiated by the Nordic states and also to integrate it to the EU international society. For that purpose, various Finnish state officials have enhanced cross-border economic, social, educational, and cultural ties. In other words, it has been aiming towards desecuritizing⁴ most of the issues involved with Russia and Russians. Additionally, the anti-Russian and anti-Russians’ approaches, which arguably dominated Finnish-Russian relations during the interwar period, have faded away from the surface of discussions. Finland has thus aimed to avoid the persistence of the policies of exclusion amongst the states belonging to the Baltic Sea region.

Unlike Finland, in Estonia, the reactions from Russia and to Russia have often acquired negative characteristics despite the initially good intentions. In result of the Second World War, Estonia was compelled to be one of the Soviet Socialist Republics. Meanwhile, in result of the policies of the Soviet Union, the deportations of tens of thousands of Estonian people was committed in addition to the waves of migration of Russians into Estonia. After all, the

² President of Finland in 1946-1956.
³ President of Finland in 1956-1981.
⁴ Desecuritization – a situation where an issue, e.g. Russophone population, is not approached as an existential threat.
heritage of the Soviet occupation was the presence of 25.6 per cent Russian nationals in Estonia which is a considerable minority. During the Soviet occupation, they were not obliged to learn Estonian language; many were part of the Soviet military or otherwise represented the Soviet culture and ethos, which was considered alien to Estonian culture. That is one of the reasons why the politicians, who held the chair in re-established Estonian Republic since 1991, were quite focused on the “superiority” of the Estonian culture, nation and language. The eyes of the state officials were turned to the West while the cooperation with Russia was seen as secondary and the approaches towards the Russophone population thus became securitized.5

This shows that the Finnish and Estonian ways of dealing with the proximity of Russia in early 1990s were quite different. The focus of this research, nevertheless, is not the official foreign policy lines of Finland and Estonia vis-à-vis Russia. Instead, it probes how various public discussions inflicted the approaches towards Russophone population. After all, formation of the foreign policy lines is also the result of certain discussions. By knowing something about the foreign policy lines, the context within which certain approaches are forming becomes clearer.

It also shows what were the possible approaches towards Russian nationals in Finland and Estonia. Moreover, however, it shows what kind of challenges and complicities the goal of creating an international society in Baltic Sea Region came to face and may face in future.

To summarise, this study analyses Estonian and Finnish approaches towards the Russophone population in their countries. Secondly, it studies how the approaches towards Russophone populations in Estonia and Finland may have implications in the level of the international society. It is therefore presumed that by way of analyzing political statements and public discussions on the relations between different ethnic groups it is possible to characterize the regional international society in the Baltic Sea Region.

According to the English School International Relations (IR) Theory, which is the theoretical framework for this study, mutual cooperation based on shared norms and values acts as premises for the emergence of an international society. It is also argued that those premises

5 Securitization – opposite of desecuritization. An issue, e.g. the Russophone population is being approached as an existential threat.
are actualized and brought into existence by communication, in other words, they are talked into existence. This is why an analysis of political statements and public discussions on the Russophone population enables to make conclusions about the character of the international society in the region.

It is also presupposed that the character of the regional international society is not dictated by the states’ interpretation of their national interests. Various factors, events or circumstances define the political dynamics depending on the way they are being communicated. An analysis of such acts of communication makes it possible to characterize certain international societies as pluralist or solidarist. Moreover, in some cases we may even have to talk about the features of an international system or world society.

**Outline of Research**

_The first chapter_ consists mainly of heuristics. It introduces the origin of the ideas for this research and gives a short introduction into the theory and the research question. Additionally, the chapter presents the research aim, methodical application, identification of sources, logic of analysis and relations to previous research.

The background study on the Baltic Sea region, Finland and Estonia as well as the relation to previous research will be presented in the _second chapter_. In this study it is considered important to study the historical background of each object of analysis in order to better understand the context of the contemporary situation. In case of this research, studying the approaches towards Russia and the Russophone population in Estonia and Finland enables to identify what are the most likely political dynamics taking place in these countries. It also tells something about the identity of the respective countries. The study of the formation of the Baltic Sea region international society on the other hand helps to identify possible areas where it can be challenged or further developed.

The _third chapter_ will introduce the theoretical frameworks of this research, the English School IR Theory.
The method of this research – the desecuritization/securitization theory of the Copenhagen School will be introduced in fourth chapter while the fifth chapter shows how the method is applied in practice. More precisely, it will be presented how the minority related dynamics, which have been occurring in Finland and Estonia in result of specific events and a tendency, are analysed by using the desecuritization/securitization theory. The systematised results of analysis will also be drawn in this chapter.

The concluding chapter of the research summarises the conclusions made in fifth chapter but also in other chapters of this study. It also includes recommendations for further study.
1. RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

1.1. Guiding Ideas

The idea to study the aforementioned topics came to me in result of two events, which I had a chance to follow from close quarters: the Bronze Soldier riots in Tallinn, Estonia in April 2007 and the war in Georgia in August 2008. The first event reached its highpoint in April 2007 when most of the people in Estonia were elated by the riots between Russians and Estonians due to the removal of an old monument of the Soviet Union – the Bronze Soldier. The removal of the monument lead to interethnic unrest and brought the political role of the Russophone population to the surface of discussions.

Shortly after the Soviet occupation of Estonia in 1945, the Soviet authorities buried some fallen Red Army soldiers in the centre of Tallinn to commemorate those who gave their lives in Great Patriotic War but also during the “liberation” of Tallinn from fascism. However, it did not take long to understand that the burial place had controversial meanings anti-Soviet and pro-Soviet people. According to the chronology presented in the Baltic Horizon publication entitled “Bronze Soldier Removal,”6 some Estonian schoolgirls tore down the temporary wooden statue at the prospective place for the Bronze Soldier already in 1946 as revenge to the deeds of the soviets. Hence, already then there was plenty of Estonian enmity towards this monument. These feelings deepened during the years of Soviet occupation. The Bronze Soldier symbolised the pain involved with deportations and falling under the alien, Soviet rule.

For numerous Russians however, especially the immigrants and the Soviet veterans, the place was an important cultural anchor in addition to its meaning as a memorial to the fallen in Great Patriotic War. All of them gathered around the monument, especially on 9 May each year, in order to celebrate the “liberation”. This tradition, although in a less grand fashion,

6 Baltic Horizon, 10(109), 2008.
continued after 1990s as well. In 2006, however, serious talks were initiated amongst the representatives of some Estonian political parties to finally bring down the Bronze Soldier. This evoked respective moods amongst the Russians and Estonians. For example, on 9 May 2006, the open conflict took place in front of the Bronze Soldier between those holding the Russian flags and those with Estonian flags. Some 500 Estonian nationalists declared their willingness to remove the monument and held a rally on 20 May at the place where the Bronze Soldier stood. Meanwhile, the Russian nationalists established the Nochnoy Dozor (Night Watch) movement with Dmitri Linter as its head. Their aim was to keep the monument where it was.

On 15 June the Prime Minister of Estonia, Andrus Ansip\(^7\) declared the following:

> the monument is no longer a place for mourning – it had turned into a place of demonstrating the Soviet nostalgia, a place to express the desire to return to the Soviet time [...].\(^8\)

The following statements shows how the presence of the Bronze Soldier was politicized and securitized, resulting in strong statements from the side of both Estonian and Russian representatives. For example, Dmitri Klenski, the representative of “List of Klenski” warned in the name of 25 Russian organizations that “unpredictable consequences” would follow if the monument were removed.\(^9\) On the anniversary of Tartu Peace Treaty\(^10\), however, the President of Estonia, Toomas Hendik Ilves hinted that the presence of the Bronze Soldier is not an issue. Rather, the real problem stands somewhere else:

> In a situation, when many young people living in Estonia do not consider the Soviet Union to be an occupier but a liberator, our society is faced with a serious problem. The problem will not be solved simply by removing the Bronze Soldier, or leaving it in place.\(^11\)

Ilves’s statement is interesting from the point of view of the present research as it implicitly characterizes the presence of the Russophone population in Estonia as a problem to be solved. It can thus be interpreted as a securitization move.

---

\(^7\) Representative of the liberal Reform Party.


\(^9\) Ibid., p. 15.

\(^10\) Celebrated in Estonia on 2 February each year.

The situation achieved an especially alarming moment at the end of April. On 25 April, the Estonian media revealed that the Russian defenders of the Bronze Soldier had started sending SMS messages calling to resist the removal of the monument, having an hourly payment as a reward for resistance. From there, everything broke out. During the night of 26 April, the square around the Bronze Soldier was surrounded by a fence and the Soldier itself covered with a tent. The explanation for such surrounding was the archaeological excavation to identify the buried Soviet soldiers. At the night of 27 April, about 1000 Russians gathered near the square, starting to attack the police lines and trying to cross the surroundings around the monument. Police cleaned the square but the rioters continued their “protests” on the streets in a way of looting, rioting and attacking the government buildings as well as party offices. Part of the rioters were carrying Russian flags and shouting: “Russia! Russia!”

In result, 44 people were injured, one dead and around 300 detained. The monument, however, was secretly relocated. Additionally, there were cyber attacks to the websites of Estonian governmental institutions. The Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Urmas Paet stated that the threads lead to Russia.

Many Russians as well as the authorities of Russia blamed such behaviour from the side of the Estonian government as crude and vulgar. Besides the additional minor riots taking place in Ida Virumaa Estonia in coming days, the members of Russian youth movements Nashi and Molodaya Rossiya attacked the Estonian Embassy in Moscow on 30 April. Next day, the flag was torn off the embassy while the Russian authorities remained inactive throughout the whole process. The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a strong statement that “the EU is under attack because Russia is attacking Estonia.”

In response to the physical attacks against the Estonian Ambassador to Russia, Ilves however emphasizes that Estonia does not stand against its Russophone population:

An honest look will tell us that most of our Russian-speaking compatriots have been on Estonia’s side during the troubled nights and days of the past week. You were with all of us, on the side of order and public safety…[…]

---

13 Ibid., p.25.
14 Ibid.
16 North East Estonia; populated predominately by the Russophone population.
17 Baltic Horizon, 10(109), 2008, p.32.
That is, in addition to statements securitizing the presence of the Russophone population, it is possible to find statements issued by political agents that attempt to desecuritize this interpretation.

The reason why I explained the Bronze Soldier riots in such a detail is that during and after that event, I noticed a change in a way the presence of Russophone population in Estonia is approached by Estonians. This change was reflected most clearly in the online comments given to the newspaper articles addressing the issues related to the riots. Not to mention that the amount of respective articles had increased, the debates held between the representatives of different political parties or political movements were also numerous. For that reason, I found investigating the speeches, statements and discussions during the Bronze Soldier riots as an excellent way to study the way Russians are approached in Estonia and what this tells us about the regional international society.

The events also prompted debates in Finland. However, the newspaper headlines mostly indicated that the relocation of the Bronze Soldier was a domestic matter of Estonia and foreign states should not interfere in these questions. For that reason Finland should also keep its distance.

The next event – the war in Georgia in August 2008 – stands in my view as a continuation to the statements and opinions prompted by the Bronze Soldier riots. For example, some people are arguing that the gap between Estonians and Russians which had widened in result of the Bronze Soldier riots contributed to the formation of conflicting viewpoints and understandings during the war in Georgian. While Estonians stood firmly on the side of Georgia, Russians who had been following the Russian television and media releases supported the stances of Russia. Such situations seemingly lead many Estonians to argue that Russia can attack Estonia in the same way it had attacked Georgia. Such fears were once again reflecting from numerous newspaper articles, television broadcasts and of course, from the comments of the online commentators. For example, Postimees – the main Estonian daily newspaper – started issuing a special edition called “War in Georgia”.

Arguably, the war started on 7 August 2008 but it was prompted by the events, which were preceding it. The conflict has a complex background with both sides throwing allegations at
each other. The clear signs of the approaching conflict however became evident at the beginning of August when some shooting occurred in the Georgian region of South Ossetia. Conclusively, the president of the non-recognized South-Ossetia called for the evacuation of its civilians to Russia and claimed that Georgia plans to start a war. During the night of 7 August, the shots were launched from the Ossetian villages towards Georgian peacekeepers who were therefore forced to respond with fire. Although attempts were made to sign peace, the shooting continued and developed into a large-scale war by 9 August.

Russian Ministry of Defence claimed that at least 2000 people were killed in the capital of South Ossetia by Georgian forces. Due to the fact that 90 per cent of South Ossetians were the citizens of Russia, the president of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev, in result started to speak of the need to defend its compatriots and to punish Saakashvili, the president of Georgia. For that reason, Russia sent its 58th Army unit to South Ossetia. At the same time, the cyber attacks were also launched against the websites of the Georgian government.

These event created a fruitful background for the issue of Russian or Russophone population to become an object of more or less heated discussions both in Estonia and Finland. Many Estonian public actors and state officials who had witnessed the cyber attacks during the Bronze Soldier riots and argued that Russia stood behind these attacks, and linked the events in Georgia and Estonia. Another discussion in Estonia was related to the question who actually started the war?

Most of the Estonian Russians claimed that it was Georgia while Estonians were united in their opinion that it was South Ossetia and Russia who were the initiators. Protests were held in Tallinn to support Georgia with slogans “Stop Russia” while Russians had their own similar protest actions, which were opposing Georgia. Due to such conflicting viewpoints, during the night of 10 August, two windows of the Russian Embassy in Estonia were broken and the fight occurred between Estonian supporters of Georgia and the members of Nochnoy Dozor. Finally on 12 August, Medvedev ordered to stop war operations in Georgia. Meanwhile, the status quo ante bello was not restored. Russia from now on recognized Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent state. Hence, the Georgian territorial integrity suffered. This is a third point, which found ground for extensive discussions in Estonia. On numerous occasions it was openly stated that Estonia would be the next to face such challenges.
The aforementioned discussions - added to the ones, which followed the Bronze Soldier riots - inspired me to conduct an in-dept investigation of speech acts issued by a variety of political actors and to find out what they tell us about how Russians are approached in Estonia and Finland respectively. That is, in order to make any conclusions on the regional level, the scope of the research was widened to a comparative setting of Estonia and Finland both of which have Russia as a neighbour and where Russia has been approached both as a friend and as an enemy - depending on time. Next to Estonia, Finland seemed to be an excellent match for that investigation, especially due to the fact that the Russophone population in Finland experiences growth tendencies and the issue is politicized from time to time.

Browsing through Finnish discussions on the presence of Russians in the country I noticed that much public debate is today generated by Russian real estate acquisition in Finland. I thus decided to include these discussions in my research materials. The analysis embraces the period since 2005, but the main focus is on recent years.

Since 2005, the Russian real estate acquisition in Finland has been soaring. While before 2006, Russians committed around 100 land and houses acquisitions per year, in 2006 the figures were much higher. Most of the prospective owners came from St Petersburg with a wish to buy summer cottage, an apartment where to stay during business trips or even to develop a summer residence for the other Russians coming to Finland. The most tempting areas were the beaches of Saimaa lakes in Eastern Finland, Imatra, Lappeenranta as well as the city of Helsinki. For example, by 2006 the share of Russian real estate acquisition had increased 17 per cent in Imatra while in Lappeenranta, the 19 per cent increase was identified as early as in 2004. Preliminary reading suggested that despite the officially unproblematic relationship between Finland and Russia, rise in the number of Russian real estate acquisitions prompted securitizing speech acts. In media releases, it was for instance mentioned that Russians buy as much as there are offers – a statement which resonates with the archaic image of Russia as an inherently expansive unit.

Indeed, although the overall statistics show that out of 2.5 million registered real estates in Finland, Russians own just few thousands, the issue found considerable discussion ground in

---

Finland. Some of the discussion was clearly positive as illustrated by such headlines as “Russians are keen to spend their holidays in Finland” and “Russians are coming and that is good” which indicated that Russians are welcome to come to Finland, especially due to the economic reasons. Some comments, however, were clearly negative especially after it was revealed that a possible “Kremlin associate” and a suspect in money laundering - Denis Fokin of Russian origin - was also involved in far-extending real estate deals in Finland. Such headlines as “Russian real estate acquisition as a security risk” and ”Land trade in the name of security” started to emerge. The number of commentators in on-line discussions also increased and several were stating openly that Russians as “previous enemies” against whom their grandfathers had fought, should not be allowed to “buy-off” Finland or to “evade” Finland via their real estate acquisition. Initial reading thus reveals a tension in Finnish public discussions on Russian real estate acquisition suggesting that the topic is worth analyzing more in detail.

Broadcasting the war in Georgia also found wide ground in Finland both by the state officials, Finnish media and of course the online commentators. I tasked myself to trace whether the war had any implications in how Russians are approached in Finland. For example, was the Russian real estate acquisition approached in the same way as it was before the war in Georgia? Could it be that the discussions after the war in Georgia are a continuation to the heightened issue of Russians’ real estate acquisition in Finland as it was a continuation to the discussions in reaction to Bronze Soldier riots in Estonia?

To continue, the more general question of this research is how the discussions on Bronze Soldier riots, the war in Georgia and the Russian real estate acquisition in Finland enable to characterize the Baltic Sea region international society. In this thesis, I work on the presumption that the analysis of discussions on Russophone population allows making conclusions on the international society level. The presumption is grounded in the English School IR Theory which I use in order to further that investigation of possible dynamics within the Baltic Sea Region international society. The English School IR Theory has a specific way of understanding the international society.21 It allows me to argue that

---

21 Based on that theory, an international society can be viewed as a group of states, conscious of common interests, common values and “bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another (Bull, 1977,p.13.).
international societies (and also the international systems or world societies) can be constructed by the speech acts of all state officials and public actors.

The English School provides a set of analytical concepts with the help of which a scholar can characterize the international social structure being analysed. Addressing the issue of the international society’s character, most English School theorists believe that all international societies can be characterized as either solidarist or pluralist. Based on that assumption, it is possible to identify the type of an international society. In this study, it is presumed that the Baltic Sea region forms a pluralist international society. Within that international society, the most important aim is to maintain the order. After that, it is possible to achieve other goals. In Baltic Sea region such goals are cooperative frameworks to further economic contacts and tackle the soft security threats as well as some understanding of how the society should function and which values it should follow. Based on that, there is some common identity between the states in Baltic Sea region: shared background, problems and the willingness to solve these problems together by following certain minimum rules and values. However, the analysed incidents related to the presence of the Russophone population may bring out dynamics which are closer to the international system end of spectrum. The opposite is also considered, more precisely that some discussions might be positive and hence would bring out dynamics which lead closer to the solidarist international society.

Indeed, one step back from an international society is the international system, which the English School scholars describe as an arrangement where states have minimum interaction with one another and where international relations are characterized by the power politics. In this research, I will keep open the possibility that the analysed international society may in result of certain dynamics and speeches display the features of an international system. Recognizing that possibility is part of this study.

The English School theorists have been interested in how international systems develop into international societies and further into world societies. However, they have also kept open the possibility that international societies might relapse back into international systems. Accordingly, it is worth probing – in the context of this research – how the character of the Baltic Sea region international society alters in consequence of the securitization or desecuritization of minority issues. If the international societies can be talked into existence,
certain speech acts reflecting from the member states may bring about another kind of international arrangement?

The aim of this research is to probe how approaches towards Russophone populations in Estonia and Finland – reflected in speech acts – enable me to characterise the Baltic Sea region international society. In order to undertake this task, I will use the analytical concepts available in the English School IR Theory and refer to the speech act method proposed by the Copenhagen School as an analytic tool.

1.2. Methodical Application and Identification of Sources

As mentioned under Research Aim, the methodical application of this study is the speech act theory as understood by J.L. Austin in his *How to do things with words?* and further elaborated by the theorists of the Copenhagen School such as Ole Waever with his “Securitisation and Desecuritisation” but also in Buzan & Waever & de Wilde’s *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.

According to Austin’s speech act theory, things are done with words. Copenhagen School adds that with words, certain issues are securitized or desecuritized. These issues belong to five main sectors: economic, societal, political, environmental and military. In this research it will be studied whether certain events or tendencies, such as Bronze Soldier riots, war in Georgia or Russian real estate acquisition have prompted securitizing or desecuritizing speech acts which may have implications on the level of Baltic Sea region international society as well. More precisely, which sectors these securitizations or desecuritizations involve? It is possible for example that an issue is securitized in the military sector but desecuritized in the economic sector. To go further, the issues are desecuritized/securitiz ed differently within different sectors which on its turn can be related to Barry Buzan’s elaboration of the primary and secondary institutions of an international society.

Due to the specifics of the chosen methodical application a set of both primary and secondary sources will be analyzed in order to detect dynamics of securitization or desecuritization. The primary sources include the statements of the state officials as well as peoples’ comments to the newspaper articles. These sources are suitable for this research by way of giving an overview of the speech act which prevailed during and after certain events. The statements of
the state officials give an overview of the official stance while the comments to the newspaper articles enable me to analyse how something is interpreted by the regular people. Due to their anonymity they can express their real opinions which the journalists and state officials often cannot due. This aspect adds extra value to the on-line comments.

The newspaper articles from Finnish dailies such as *Helsingin Sanomat*, *Aamulehti* and *Karjalan Maa* as well as such Estonian dailies as *Postimees*, *Eesti Päevaleht* and *Eesti Ekspress* are also approached as primary sources in this study while the secondary sources include the scholarly literature.

### 1.3. Logic of Analysis

The main task of this research is to find out something about the Baltic Sea region international society by analyzing the domestic discussions with an aim to detect securitization or desecuritization. In other words, there is a claim that the way an issue is talked about domestically can have implications on the level of the international society which on its turn means that there has to be a link between domestic and international political dynamics. This link derives from the assumption that international societies also can be created by words or to put it differently – can be talked into existence.

In order to analyse the speech act appropriately it is also necessary to know about the background, e.g. the background that has provided the context for the emergence of certain kinds of speech acts. In other words, it is necessary to further explore the historical background of Estonian-Russian and Finnish-Russian relations as well as the formation of the Baltic Sea region international society. Information for the background will be derived from secondary sources – i.e. various researches conducted on history, immigration of Russians and statistics on the presence of Russians as well as the development and processes in the Baltic Sea region.

The information derived from the aforementioned sources will be analyzed by keeping the research aim and questions in mind. For example, the foreign policy directions (especially approaches towards Russia but also the rules and values that were followed at certain point in time) as well as the minority aspects (especially approaches towards Russians and the number
of Russians) of both countries will be periodised. The importance of such periodisation is that different periods seemed to have different foreign policy directions and approaches towards Russians.
2. BACKGROUND STUDY

2.1. The aim of the Background Study

The aim of this chapter is to introduce how the Baltic Sea region and two countries in that region – Finland and Estonia – have been approached and studied before. At this point, the study by Tuomas Forsberg entitled “Forgiveness, Post-Conflict Justice and the Finnish Civil War 1918: Reconciliation Without Truth?” stands out as a good example. Forsberg claims that it is only recently that the researches have started to recognise “the importance of the legacy of the past in societies that have suffered from violence and atrocities.”

Therefore, the valuable meaning of the past experiences when it comes to the possibilities in forming an international society, may have been neglected in previous studies.

Both the English School and Copenhagen School theorists deem it necessary to study the events and approaches of the past in order to understand the processes in the present. For example, Hedley Bull – one of the founding fathers of the English School - argues that the study of the past throws “light on the contemporary interstate politics […]” while O’Hagan claims that the experiences and events of the past can perform as obstacles or facilitators in interstate cooperation and trust.

Copenhagen School theorists on the other hand claim that that the speech acts about security must be related to the “broader discursive context” which is a certain kind of situation or context, which gives the speech acts their significance. For example, the broader discursive context refers to how Russophone population has been approached throughout time by Estonians and Finns. It also lays out the identity perceptions. Therefore, the broader discursive context is in this study outlaid within the frames of the Background Study as a

---

22 Forsberg, 2009, p. 4.
25 Ibid., p. 360.
26 Ibid., p. 367.
short study of the historical background and various interpretations of the Baltic Sea region, Finland and Estonia.

2.2. Baltic Sea Region

In this study it is claimed that regional international societies such as the Baltic Sea region international society can be constructed by the speech acts used by various political actors. Ene Must with her Bachelor Thesis “Baltic Sea Region and Northern Dimension -- Competing Region-Building Projects?” granted me with several important ideas for writing the current research. In other words, some points from Must’s research found ground in this research as well. For example, Must comments Hacker whose claim stands in congruence with the grounding ideas of this research:

\[
\text{the success of a region-building project depends largely on which term is used to define a new region. Words are more than terms; with words, we create and share views of reality; we use words to name things and evaluate them.}^{27}
\]

Therefore, regions and the characters of these regions can be constructed by words. This claim immediately brings the current research close to the Copenhagen School IR theory. As already mentioned, it is followed by the Copenhagen School theorists that with words, it is possible to bring about desecuritization or securitization. Similarly, it seems possible that with certain speech acts, an issue may become desecuritized/securitized within the region.

For this study, the ideas found from such secondary sources as Buzan & Waever & de Wilde’s, Security: A New Framework for Analysis and Wæver’s “Securitization and Desecuritization” in Ronnie D. Lipschutz’s (Ed.) On Security represent the basis for the analytical claims and pave the way for developing the methodology. Meanwhile, as read from Chapter 4 in this study, the theory presented in the aforementioned sources is not adopted to its fullest. While Buzan et al. analyze regions via the processes in certain sectors, this research uses the classical English School ideas about an international system, international society and the world society in order to analyse the processes and their implications. It is also important to point out that the five sectors of the Copenhagen School represent a valuable

---

27 Hacker cit Must, 2001, p.16.
tool, which facilitates the analysis of the processes within the English School theoretical frameworks.

The ideas and the main concepts of the English School IR theory are to my view best brought to the researchers in Hedley Bull’s *Anarchical Society* while numerous other scholarly works are used in order to ground the knowledge proposed by Bull. For example, Tim Dunne argues that international societies can be socially constructed but also that we can trace its contours by studying the respective speech acts. For that reason, Dunne’s starting points also play important roles in this study. Meanwhile, many classic English School scholars whose basic ideas guide this research, tend to pay more attention to the questions of the global scale such as dilemmas surrounding the human rights, international law, justice, and implications of secession on the global order. The attempt to view regions as international societies with special characteristics and political dynamics is quite unique as well as the idea that they are talked into existence.

Barry Buzan makes an important contribution for this study in his “From international Society to World Society?” Pami Aalto has applied Buzan’s ideas in his empirical case study “Russia’s Quest for International Society and the Prospects for Regional-Level International Societies” which is also important from the point of view of this study. Namely, these secondary sources are valuable as they guided me towards finding a fine linkage between the five sectors of the Copenhagen School and the primary/secondary institutions of an international society as understood by the English School theorists. Aalto claims that the institutions represent the “glue of international society.” He further elaborates on the ideas of Barry Buzan about the primary and secondary institutions of an international society. Based on that, the primary institutions such as diplomacy and democracy have evolved in time within the frames of certain specific practices while the secondary institutions such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States, derivate from primary institutions. What is even more important is however the knowledge that these institutions can be divided as pluralist and solidarist which brings Aalto’s theoretical arguments into congruence with the claims of the classic English School. Secondly, however it was mentioned that both Buzan’s as well as

29 In this research, it is believed that these practices are indeed certain speech acts which form a wider discursive context.
30 Ibid.
Aalto’s arguments provide the link between the five sectors and the processes within an international society.

In Baltic Sea region, I see eleven countries forming a society where certain unifying factors such as historical background, common cultural heritage, economic interests but also the soft security concerns stand as pillars. There is also value-base given to the region, which mostly consists of the shared values of the countries which speech acts were the first contributions towards the formation of the Baltic Sea region international society - the Nordic States, Germany, and the EU. Within the context of this study the highlighting of the Nordic international society is important because the Nordic States were amongst the most active actors who contributed towards the formation of the new international society in Baltic Sea region. In other words, the discussions of specific primary institutions of the Nordic States in the wider area enabled these primary institutions to come to characterise the Baltic Sea region international society as well. Some of these primary institutions are: common cultural heritage and common societal understanding; shared interpretations of history and shared understandings of justice; soft security and soft borders. As believed in this research, all of the aforementioned primary institutions can be divided as solidarist.

The answer why namely the aforementioned institutions were so extensively discussed throughout the region derives from Archer & Jones’s “The Security Policies and Concepts of the Baltic States” in Knudsen (ed.) *Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region* as well as Gänzle & Hubel’s “The Council of the Baltic Sea States and the EU: Dealing With Soft Security Risks in an European Subregion” in Hubel (ed.) *EU Enlargement and Beyond: The Baltic States and Russia*.

Hubel points out that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there existed a considerable potential for conflicts in the Baltic Sea region, which might have affected the stability in Baltic Sea region. Some of the fields where such conflicts could have occurred were the presence of former Soviet troops in Baltic States, the citizenship issue for the Russophone population in Baltic States, and the border disagreements between Russia and the Baltic States. For that reason, the Nordic States as well as Germany and the EU looked towards the

---

31 Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Germany and Russia.
33 Ibid.
measures which would increase security in Baltic Sea region. In order to smooth the situation, various discussions and debates were held in order to find ways to bind Russia and the Baltic States in cooperative projects and to divert their concentration away from predominately hard security issues. Conclusively, security (especially the soft security) was a driving force behind the region building in Baltic Sea region. Moreover, solving the inter-ethnic relations was mentioned as one aim which contributes towards binding Russia and the Baltic States into cooperative frameworks. This knowledge is important for the reason that inter-ethnic relations are analysed in this study as well.

Another important driving force in the formation of the Baltic Sea region international society was the economy which has lately received a specific approach in various studies, such as Browning and Joenniemi’s “Regionality Beyond Security”, Zielonka’s “Europe as a global actor: empire by example?” and Moisio’s “From Enmity to Rivalry?” It was often referred in the aforementioned studies that the economic sustainability is now the most important guarantor of security and that it is namely the free market which - according to contemporary understanding - contributes to the economic sustainability. Protectionist markets, hard security and the conclusive erection of hard borders only inhibit the cooperation in the field of economy.

The wide discussions and the proliferation of the aforementioned solidarist primary institutions after the Cold War did not mean that the Baltic Sea region has by now evolved into the solidarist international society. Solving disagreements at low level and peacefully turned out to be a considerable challenge, especially when viewed from the perspective of the complicated relations between Russia and Estonia (as well as other the Baltic States). As read from the Chapter 2 on the backgrounds of Estonia, there were numerous stings which Estonian state officials and people held against Russia. The reasons for that are in different

---

35 It is important to mention how security was approached by the states that contributed towards the formation of the Baltic Sea region international society. The general term “security” divides into “hard” and “soft” security. When approaching the Baltic Sea region, the focus was mostly on such areas of the soft security as the environmental security, societal security and economic security. In this study, the soft security is approached as a solidarist and the hard security as a pluralist primary institution.
36 A good example of the economy as the guarantor of the security is the presence of numerous economic subcouncils in most of the biggest secondary institutions in Baltic Sea region: Council of the Baltic Sea States with such subcouncils as the Business Advisory Council, Baltic Euroregional Network and Baltic Sea Labour Network Project; Barents Euro-Arctic Council with its Working Group on Economic Cooperation and the Northern Dimension with its Business Forum.
37 In this research, free markets are approached as solidarist while protectionist markets are viewed as pluralist primary institutions.
interpretations of their historical background. Browning and Joenniemi imply that perhaps because of that, they were skeptical about further opening up to Russia or responding to Russia’s demands.  

Russia, on the other hand, created negative images of Estonia (and other Baltic States) mostly for two reasons. Firstly, the Baltic States were still seen by Russia as breakaway states from its near abroad. Second point of condemnation was the situation of Russophone population in Estonia. Since early 1990s, Russia has been complaining consistently about the discriminative policies towards Russians in Estonia. In fact, Peeter Vares in his “Estonia and Russia” points out that in 1993, it was written in Russian military doctrine that “the situation with the interethnic relations might easily qualify Estonia as a threat to Russia’s security.” Such statements deepened the prejudices and uncertainty Estonians have when approaching Russia. Hence, easing the complications involved with the Estonians’ approaches towards Russians must have received considerable attention before an international society could emerge in Baltic Sea region.

The last paragraphs give a reason to infer that on the side of the solidarist primary institutions, the Baltic Sea region international society consisted of the abundance of the pluralist primary institutions as well. For that reason I argue that the solidarity in the Baltic Sea region has not yet achieved prevalence. The discrepancies between the Baltic States and Russia remain considerably deep. However, this does not mean that the attempt to talk the Baltic Sea region international society into existence has failed. I find numerous elements of an international society in Baltic Sea region. After familiarising oneself with the theoretical stances of the English School, it is possible to see that the Baltic Sea region international society represents the characteristics of the pluralist international society. The solidarist international society would have prescribed the primacy of common understanding and enforcement of justice as well as the predominance of such solidarist primary institutions as the common societal understanding, mutual identification and soft borders. The Baltic Sea region international society however is not so solid in these matters. Rather, it is essential to maintain order and reach the level where all states cooperate in the name of three common goals: security,  

---

40 Ibid., p.162.
keeping the agreements, and protecting possessions. The markets meanwhile can be protectionist and a considerable part of the security agenda purports the military issues.

An important agreement between the states in Baltic Sea region international society is the non-interference into the other member state’s domestic affairs. That agreement was threatened in result of the Bronze Soldier riots. However, the will to protect the non-interference agreement was well reflecting from the statements of the Finnish state officials where they condemned Russia’s interference into the domestic affairs of Estonia. Vanhanen claimed that Estonia has a right to relocate its monuments which can also be approached as possessions of Estonia. Kanerva meanwhile added that other members of the EU should support Estonia in its rights to do so.

Once the three basic principles are kept, the order is maintained. Within the context of order, the Baltic Sea region states can start working in the name of other goals such as effective cooperation in the spheres of soft security, economy, culture and education as well as erasing the Cold War dividing lines, contributing towards the uniform interpretation of history and the feelings of shared cultural heritage. Further development of these factors would enable the pluralist international society to develop towards the solidarist international society although there are currently numerous obstacles within the Baltic Sea region international society which do not yet allow the emergence of the more solidarist international society. The current study aims to identify whether the Baltic Sea region international society can be redefined because of the minority-related processes following the Bronze Soldier riots, the war in Georgia and the Russian real estate acquisition in Finland.

### 2.3. Finland

In this section, the main emphasis is put on findings about the presence of the Russophone in Finland as well as Finnish approaches towards the proximity of Russia at different times in history.

Finland embraces the territory which has throughout the time been squeezed between different great powers. Its geopolitical as well as geographical position is such that there have

---

been no possibilities to avoid influences whether from Sweden or Russia. At the end of the Finnish war in 1809 and the Treaty of Fredrikshamn, Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire. Baschmakoff & Leinonen in their comprehensive study entitled *Russian Life in Finland 1917/1939* give an excellent overview of the presence of the Russophone population in Finland both during the period of the Finnish Grand Duchy as well as the Finnish independence since December 1917.

The number of Russians in the Grand Duchy of Finland was quite small. Baschmakoff & Leinonen claim that there was about 12,000 Russian citizens who permanently lived in Finland in 1910 while there were also 6000 Russians who had Finnish citizenship. This number soared when Russian Empire started its fortification works in Finland for the First World War. By the time the Revolution started, there was 125,000 Russians (mostly the military personnel) in Finland.42

From the point of view of this research, the most noteworthy is the popularity of the so-called Russian “dacha industry” and land buying in Finland, especially in Karelia, which started to develop in early 19th century. For example, by 1913 the number of estates and dachas sold to foreigners was 775 and 10,000 correspondingly while most of these foreigners were Russian.”43 It is also pointed out in the same study that

> relations between the Russian summer residents and the local Finnish population – especially the peasants – were friendly. The Finnish peasants very often built dachas for the special purpose of renting them out to citizens of St Petersburg.44

Although Baschmakoff & Leinonen write that mostly, the Finns saw dacha industry as a way to boost the economy, politically, it came to pose a national threat.45 This was so due to the Russification policy of the Russian Empire which also affected Estonia in second half of the 19th century and had serious implications on identity formation. Knowing that, it would be interesting to study whether there were any speech acts which lead to the securitization of the Russophone population in political sector and desecuritization in economic sector due to the dacha industry. This is especially interesting because analyzing the approaches towards Russians in result of their real estate acquisition is one task of this research.

---

An event, which considerably changed the way Russia and the Russians were approached in Finland, was the Finnish Civil War starting in late January 1918 and lasting till late April 1918.\(^{46}\) For that reason, the further exploration of this particular conflict is necessary, especially when keeping in mind the words of Tuomas Forsberg in his “Forgiveness, Post-Conflict Justice and the Finnish Civil War 1918: Reconciliation Without Truth?” where he encourages that one should widen their “horizons” and find out what to learn from the past conflicts.

Although Finland was declared independent on 6 December 1917, its political parties were not able to agree on leadership. The war started between the Reds (leftist parties), who formed the Red Guards and who were also supported by the leftist forces in Russia, and the Whites (rightist parties), who formed the White Guards.\(^{47}\) The famous terms which are associated with this war are the “Red Terror” and the “White terror” which entitled the brutal executions carried out on both sides and lead to severe civilian as well as military casualties.\(^{48}\) For that reason, Forsberg claims that the Finnish Civil War was “one of the most brutal civil wars in modern European history: the number of casualties exceeded one per cent of the total population.”\(^{49}\) Hence, it is justifiable to infer that this war which lasted only about three months, left a very traumatic mark on the Finnish society.

The point of Forsberg is however to highlight that despite the widely divided society in pre-Civil War Finland, the post-conflict situation provided the seeds for long-lasting reconciliation. Moreover, it enabled the emergence of post-conflict justice and mutual identification in Finnish society.\(^{50}\) Although in this case the the latter involved the Finnish contradistinction with Russia and the Russians, the Forsberg’s claims are important to keep in mind when it comes to formation of an international society as well.

As a result of the Civil War, the Reds were defeated and a cooperative government created. In terms of Russophone population, the legacy was considerable. A high number of Russian soldiers (about 40 000) remained in Finland and were approached cautiously by the Finnish

\(^{46}\) Forsberg, 2009, p.8.
\(^{47}\) Ibid., pp.8-9.
\(^{48}\) The number of casualties was about 37 000 people (out of 3 000 000 in Finland), out of which about 10 000 were executed and 13 500 died in prison camps (Forsberg, 2009, p. 10).
\(^{49}\) Forsberg, 2009, p.2.
\(^{50}\) Ibid., p.3.
government. Baschmakoff & Leinonen write that “Finnish Senate ordered that all citizens of Russia and the Baltic provinces should leave Finnish territory.” Although such order was changed due to the large-scale protests which followed and in result came to apply only in relation to Russian military, 20 000 Russians were deported within few months. Within such contexts and approaches, it is also not surprising that the special policy was implemented with an aim “to keep the number of Russians as low as possible through many restrictions on entrance, residence and traveling […].” Still, a considerable number of Russian refugees were allowed to Finland.

When it comes to the Finnish approaches of the proximity of Russia, Max Jakobson in his *Finnish Neutrality: A Study of Finnish Foreign Policy Since the Second World War* answers this question by saying that Russia (the Soviet Union) was interpreted as “the natural enemy of the country’s freedom” and “the Finnish attitude to the Soviet Union, especially in opinion-making circles, was one of intense hostility.” A serious stumbling block between Finland and the Soviet Union after 1917 was the question about the status of the Eastern Karelia. In Eastern Karelia, there was a considerable Finnish population and culture but this territory had never belonged to Finland. The Finnish culture was so overwhelming there that the Russian population was regarded as foreign.

With the Tartu Peace Treaty in 1920 the Soviet Union “reaffirmed its recognition of an independent Finland within the borders of the former Grand Duchy […]” but the nationalist Finns continued to voice for the Eastern Karelia’s independence. This topic is widely addressed by Heikki Luostarinen in the article entitled “Finnish Russophobia: The Story of an Enemy Image.” Luostarinen writes that the movement in the name of the Eastern Karelia went so far as to result in “mass communication”. This meant the press and the literature that promoted “harder line in foreign policy issues” and which eventually evoked “a truly massive wave of Finnish Russophobia.” For example, such movements as *Vihan Veljet* (The sworn brotherhood of Enmity) had a goal “to promote Finnish animosity towards Russians.” The

53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., p.39.
56 Attitude to the Russian Population on Occupied Land, University of Turku.
59 Baschmakoff & Leinonen, 2001, p.75.
most prominent however was the Academic Karelia Society (AKS), which was established in 1922 and had “Russian hatred” as its ideology.\textsuperscript{60} Basically, the AKS was interested in establishing Greater Finland which includes the territory of Eastern Karelia. The founders of AKS had in fact, already fought for the Eastern Karelia in 1921. More precisely, there was an uprising in Eastern Karelia in 1921 against the Bolsheviks which was supported by the Finnish volunteers across the border. Although the uprising was suppressed, the AKS kept the idea about Greater Finland alive.\textsuperscript{61}

From 1929 to 1932, the Lapua movement was the most extreme right movement and it is under the pressure of Lapua that the Finnish parliament outlawed the Communism. However, Lapua members often used violence as their means and were banned themselves after their failed coup d’état in 1932.

To summarise, I would add Outi Karemaa’s citation in Baschmakoff & Leinonen where the background for the “Russian hatred” is explained:

\begin{quote}
the hate towards Russians had mythological grounds. The hate was not so much directed towards individuals as towards “Russianness”, the “mythological archenemy.”\textsuperscript{62}
\end{quote}

This contradiction based on mythological grounds can be approached as a Finnish identity, which formed after the Finnish Civil War. The reasons behind such hatred can be involved with the fear of Russianness as well as Russians, the bearers of Russianness, in result of the past experiences of Russification. In order to strengthen its identity (Finnishness), the young Finland had to secure and encapsulate itself against the Russian influences. Therefore, the number of the bearers of Russianness (Russians) had to be kept to the minimum.

On more general relations between the interwar Finland and the Soviet Union, Vehviläinen in his \textit{Finland in the Second World War} summarises that “in Finland, Soviet Russia was feared both as the heir to Czarist imperialism and the seat of Communism”\textsuperscript{63} and that “relations between Finland and its eastern neighbour continued to be strained by tensions and mutual hostility.”\textsuperscript{64}

\begin{flushright}
61 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
\end{flushright}
To summarise, there must have been numerous debates and discussions (in other words, the speech acts) in interwar Finland, which radically securitized the approaches towards Russians while there also must have been some softer speech acts. I presume the latter because Luostarinen for example claims that hard liners were “buffered” by the state whose officials wanted to “stir up a defensive spirit”. Conclusively it is questioned here up to what extent the official stances reflected the moods of the considerable anti-Russian and anti-Soviet attitudes in Finnish society.

At the doorstep of the Second World War, Finland was regarded by the Soviet Union as its sphere of interests and hence it was isolated in result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed on 23 August 1939 similarly to Estonia. As in other such states, the Soviet Union started to ask for access to its bases due to the alleged threat from Nazi-Germany. The stance of the Soviet Union was that without their bases, Finland would no be able to protect its independence and the Germans would force their way in.

Finland however chose not to accept the proposals of the Soviet Union which has later been approached as a heroic choice from the side of Finland. After all, this option resulted in two wars within the frames of the Second World War. Not only did Finnish state officials want to retain its independence, but also to fend off possible threats to its identity where the Soviet Union to the large part stood as an enemy. It therefore represented such a threat to the interwar Finland that Finland war ready to risk with the large scale war. Perhaps this fear in face of Soviet occupation and an influx of Russianness enabled Finland also to sign a transit agreement with Nazi Germany and risk the opposition of the “Western” allies.

After the wars, Stalin presented the President of Finland, Juho Paasikivi with his bilateral Finnish-Soviet agreement similar to the treaties signed with Romania and Hungary in 1948.

---

65 Luostarinen, 1989, pp.133-134.
67 a) Winter War: resulted in peace agreement with the USSR. The terms were claimed to be worse than the ones Finland had rejected before the war (Jakobson, 1980, p. 1036.) b) Continuation War: Finland signed a transit agreement with Nazi Germany and came to be dependent on German aid in order to counterweight Soviet pressure. This resulted in loss of Allied support and Britain’s declaration of war to Finland. However, Finland ended up fighting the Germans. This was because: 1) the main reason for war was the continuation of Winter War, not support to Germans; 2) Soviet Union quit requesting unconditional surrender from Finland and was ready to sign new Armistice Agreement with it (Jakobson, 1968, pp. 14-20.).
68 President of Finland in 1946-1956.
Good overview of the treaty signing is given by Max Jakobson in his *Finnish Neutrality: A Study of Finnish Foreign Policy Since the Second World War*. He explains that Paasikivi claimed the agreement to be unacceptable to Finland as it would make Finland an ally of the Soviet Union. Surprisingly, the Soviets agreed to negotiate according to the terms made by Finnish state officials and another kind of treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and Finland on 6 April 1948: Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid (FCMA).69

Although Paasikivi agreed much with Mannerheim’s line70 that it is a matter of fact that “Finland’s geographical position bound it to Russia”71 and that there is a need to find a way to establish trustworthy relations with the Soviet Union, Finland had to remain outside the “conflicting interests of the great powers”.72 In other words, Finland had to continue making some foreign policy concessions. For example, besides the obligation to fulfil the peace terms like the reparations to the Soviet Union and leasing the Porkkala peninsula,73 the Soviet Union was opposing Finnish participation in Marshall Plan and the Nordic Council. At the same time, there was a task to delete that enemy image of the Soviet Union and hence change the elements of the Finnish mutual identification. As Browning claims, both Paasikivi and the next President of Finland, Urho Kekkonen74 agreed that the Finnish Russophobic national identity during the interwar period was “responsible for Finland’s wars with the Soviet Union.”75 Hence, in accordance with the new line of thinking, the Finland’s “Eastern” past as well as elements of Russianness were approached rather as enrichments of the Finnish culture and the new aim was to replace the enemy image of the interwar Finland.76 From that, we can also infer something about possible approaches towards Russians in Finland during the Cold War period that numbered just 4890 in 1950.77 This is indeed a very small number compared to, for example, the Soviet Estonia which will be studied soon.

71 Apunen, 1977, p. 20.
73 Leased to the Soviet Union in 1944 for 50 years for a use as a naval base as one of the conditions. While these bases were on the Finnish territory, Finland could not ask for international recognition and respect of its neutrality because it did not control the whole of its territory. Soviets left the peninsula in 1956 (Jakobson, 1968, pp. 45-47.).
74 President of Finland in 1956-1981.
76 Luostarinen, 1989, p.132.
77 Baschmakoff & Leinonen, 2001, p. 56.
Finland was very certain about some of its values and goals such as being recognised as part of the Scandinavian states and hence the bearer of the Nordic identity, maintaining good relations with all countries and not to participate in Great Power conflicts.\footnote{For example, Finland did not recognise neither part of such divided countries as Vietnam, Germany or Koreas.}

The new Finnish identity was hence to the large part opposing the previous one. Luostarinen brings out three cornerstones of which Finnish people could take pride in. One of them was the national task to promote the policy of peace and act as a bridge builder.\footnote{Luostarinen, 1989, p. 132.} Luostarinen adds that

\begin{displayquote}
[t]he Finnish people had […] a meaning and goal in the international community. They no longer just lived there; they were really working to achieve something.\footnote{Ibid.}
\end{displayquote}

Apparently, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line meant to meet the aforementioned goal of the redefine Finnishness. It seems that only due to utilising the tactics of this line, Finland finally earned the trust of the Soviet Union in result of which the latter ceased interpreting Finland as a possible rebel. Meanwhile, Finland also attempted to emphasize that Finnishness does not mean ambiguity and pro-Soviet (pro-Russian), when reflecting the accusations on “Finlandization”. To go further, Ole Waever argues that “Nordicity” played an especially important role here as it presupposed the acceptance of special values such as “anti-militaristic society”.\footnote{Waever cit Browning, 2002, p. 50.} Browning in his “Coming Home or Moving Home: 'Westernizing' Narratives in Finnish Foreign Policy and the Reinterpretation of Past Identities” goes as far as to say that Norden was a “third way” between the East and the West, which was based on “humanitarian principles, peace, cooperation and disarmament […].”\footnote{Browning, 2002, p. 50.} Hence, there existed a considerable baggage of the solidarist primary institutions between the Nordic States. This orientation of “Nordic third way” seems to have given grounds to the formation of the new Finnish identity as well. This conclusively means that numerous solidarist primary institutions of the Nordic international society widened their scope to Finland as well.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, apologized in front of Finland for the aggression in 1939. The FCMA Treaty was also
cancelled. Meanwhile, Pekka Sutela in his “Finnish Relations with Russia 1961-2001: Better than Ever?” comments that even though the Soviet Union had collapsed and there was a weaker and “Western-oriented” Russian Federation in its place, Koivisto\textsuperscript{83} kept repeating that Russia “would soon regain its great power pose.” Hence, Russia’s neighbours must remain cautious.\textsuperscript{84} Was there any reason to worry that such cautiousness will not be retained? There were several worries amongst the Finns. Firstly, the questions related to the status of Karelia were still in the air.\textsuperscript{85} Another worry was the fear of an influx of negative influences from Russia, such as Russian criminals and illegal immigrants.\textsuperscript{86} The approaches towards the Russophone population might have therefore been cautious in Finland in early 1990s.

After joining the EU in 1995, Finland was more certain to become an active participant within the European and precisely the Nordic society as well as to promote openly such primary institutions as the open markets, human rights and soft security. Since that time, Russia was officially approached only within the context of the EU, in other words, in accordance with the common approaches of the EU. It meant for Russia to be “designed and executed as a part of the EU’s common foreign and security policy [...]”\textsuperscript{87} which is why Sutela claims that during that time

\begin{quote}
\textbf{[there could] be no Russian policy separate or contrary to EU policies; that Finland best pursues its interests by being active in the EU context [...] and the less talk there is of a special relation between Finland and Russia, the better.}\textsuperscript{88}
\end{quote}

Within these frameworks, Finland could promote “increased contacts and integration between Russia and the rest of the Europe [...]” which would include erasing the “normative gap” as well.\textsuperscript{89} Hence, although Finland was quite clear about its values and orientations, it was also interested in having Russia within the favourable international society, e.g. the “Western”, more precisely, the EU international society which embraces the Baltic Sea region international society as well. Finland found its new role in emphasising its importance as a border country and hence, having a mission to manage the border effectively. This gave an opportunity to promote integration by utilising the cross-border relations in result of which,

\textsuperscript{83} Mauno Koivito was the President of Finland in 1982-1994
\textsuperscript{84} Sutela, 2001, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., p.8.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., p.21.
\textsuperscript{87} Sutela, 2001, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p. 9.
Russia would no longer be excluded from the “West” as an enemy. Instead, Finland insisted that efforts should be taken to make Russia a stable country and drawn into the EU. Out of that thought emerged the Northern Dimension initiative in 1997 by Paavo Lipponen, the Finnish Prime Minister. \(^90\) The aims of the Nordic Dimension were to eliminate the dividing lines and the possibility of their new emergence but also to target cooperation in the spheres of culture, education and soft security issues. The outcome – interdependence – would be positive for both sides and a step closer towards the international stability\(^91\) in the area which Finland as well as other Nordic states voiced for.

Another exemplary initiative was the establishment of the Euroregion Karelia. The gap between the Finnish and Russian part of Karelia seemed insurmountable.\(^92\) Conclusively, in 1998 the idea to create the Euregion Karelia was presented by the Government of the Republic of Karelia and was supported by the leaders of the Regional Councils of Finland. In 2000, the foundation documents were signed.\(^93\) The main goal was to erase the divergences in Karelia via the extensive cross-border cooperation and people-to-people contacts in such fields as, for example, education, culture, economy and environment.

To summarise, the Northern Dimension and Euroregion Karelia illustrate how the mutual identification of the Finns and the Finnish interpretation of the proximity of Russia had changed since the Cold War and the interwar period. It seems that the above mentioned initiatives were all directed towards the cohesion in the field of Finnish-Russian relations via the proliferation of the solidarist primary institutions.

There have been however few problems in Finnish-Russian relations as well. Serious concerns (and some securitising speech acts where the Russophone population was securitized) followed the Russia’s announcements to impose new timber taxes in spring 2007. Secondly, there were concerns about the inexplicably long queues (tens of kilometres) on the border to Russia despite the soft borders initiatives and thirdly, the reactions to the war in Georgia. After the latter, Vanhanen, the current Prime Minister of Finland, criticized Russia. In addition to saying that the conflict would worsen the relations between Russia and the

\(^{90}\) Browning, 2002, p. 57.
\(^{91}\) Marin, 2006, pp. 37; 26-27.
\(^{92}\) Sutela goes as far as to bring an example of the gaps between the two Koreas when explaining the divergences Karelia (Sutela, 2001, p. 9).
\(^{93}\) Official Website of the Euroregio Karelia.
neighbouring countries, he also expressed his disappointment that Russia still utilises the militart force as part of the foreign policy.\textsuperscript{94} Such conduct was claimed to be outdated in contemporary international society.

Despite such statement, it is still presumed by most leading Finnish state officials that it is not wise to confront the interests of the big countries, as argued by Jarmo Virmavirta.\textsuperscript{95} Virmavirta refers to the realism, which is presumably a better guarantor of peace than idealism, which prevailed at the beginning of 1990s and during the interwar period. The realist approach towards Russia seems to be followed also by Tarja Halonen, the current President of Finland. Unlike the Baltic State, the Halonen said that she does not support imposing sanctions on Russia because of the war in Georgia. She also emphasised that Finland is not the Northernmost Baltic state but the Southernmost Scandinavian state\textsuperscript{96} which is a clear reference to the Finnish Nordic identity. It also touches upon locating Finland on the world map. More precisely, this statement affirms Finnish loyalty to the Nordic states international society and not so much to the Baltic Sea region. The director of Finnish Business and Policy Forum EVA, Risto E.J.Penttilä, however claims that whereas Finland chose a Western direction after joining the EU in 1995, now in a crisis situation, the westernization has stopped:

The identity and rhetoric originating from the times of old president Kekkonen is being reapplied once again. The Finnish neutrality is being reaffirmed as well as an important role as a middleman of the East-West relations […].\textsuperscript{97}

These statements refer to the fact that the traditional Finnish way of approaching Russia (Paasikivi-Kekkonen line) has not in fact disappeared or changed abruptly. How about the public discussions and approaches towards the Russophone population in Finland?

Adding together the presented overview of the Finnish post-Cold War approaches towards Russia and the population statistics, it is not surprising that based on the \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} gallup in February 2009, 77 per cent of the answerers thought that Russia is not a threat to Finland. Concerning the Russophone population in Finland, there was a similar \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} Gallup in September 2008, where the question was: “Voikoo venäläisvähemmistöstä

\textsuperscript{94} BNS, 2008.
\textsuperscript{95} Virmavirta, 2008.
\textsuperscript{96} Hõbemägi, 2008.
\textsuperscript{97} Paju, 2008.
tulla Suomelle turvallisuuspoliittinen ongelma?” (Do you think the Russophone population may represent a security problem to Finland?)\(^\text{98}\) Out of the answers, 74 per cent thought that Russophone population is not or will not become a security problem to Finland.

Meanwhile, does it mean that the enemy image has been erased? Is it forgotten how Russianness as well as Russia itself was interpreted during the interwar period and in result of two wars Finland waged? The answers to these questions are hopefully emerging from the analysis carried out in this study.

### 2.4. Estonia

The background of Estonia is very different from Finnish. As a contrast to the Helsingin Sanomat gallups, 80 per cent of Estonians considered Russia as a threat to Estonia’s independence in January 2000.\(^\text{99}\) Therefore, Estonia represents an opposite case to Finland where, according to Merje Kuus in her study entitled “European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia: A Quest for Security”, national identity of Estonia has been formed keeping the ethnic issues and threat perceptions in mind.\(^\text{100}\) Kuus therefore claims that Estonia today is using international integration in order to tackle the threat from Russia which also becomes part of its identity.\(^\text{101}\) The following historical overview will help to explain the background of such threat perceptions.

In result of the Uusikaupunki Treaty, Estonia became a part of the Russian Empire, rather than being an autonomous Grand Duchy as Finland after 1809. Whilst there exists in Finland a positive interpretation of the time when Finland formed part of the Russian Empire, in Estonia this was considered just another stage in what the Estonians refer to as seven hundred years of slavery.\(^\text{102}\) Meanwhile, the beginning of the 19\(^{th}\) century already paved the way towards national awakening, which eventually led to the independence.

The strength of the new cultural awareness of Estonians was tested at the end of the 19\(^{th}\) century with the Russification policy which was also applied to Finland at the same time. The

---

\(^{98}\) Räikkä, 2008; HS, 2008.


\(^{100}\) Ibid., p. 91.

\(^{101}\) Ibid.

\(^{102}\) Estonia has been occupied by various foreign countries from 1227 to 1918.
Russification however only strengthened the resistance of the culturally aware Estonians, the resistance to any foreign powers and the dominion of the Russians in particular, be it the authority of the tsar or the Bolsheviks. Hence, when there was a chance – namely, the power vacuum when the Russians retreated and before the Germans occupied Estonian territory, the Committee of Elders of the underground Maapäev declared the independence of the Republic of Estonia on 24 February 1918. The foundation for the republic was created and after the victory over Bolsheviks it was also affirmed with the Tartu Peace Treaty, which was signed between Estonia and the Soviet Russia on 2 February 1920. With that treaty, the Soviet Russia forever recognized the independence of Estonia and its established borders.

The introduction above helps to explain two aspects related to this study. Firstly, it indicates that the roots for possible securitization of the Russophone population are grounded in historical experiences: the Russification and slavery. Secondly, it shows why the continuity of Tartu Peace Treaty has been stressed over and over again by the Estonian state officials of the 20th and 21st century. More precisely, this date is used as one anchor in 1990s – the time when Estonia was trying to recover its subdued identity. I will now continue investigating how Russians developed into such a considerable minority or came to represent almost an equal ethnic group in Estonia in 1989.

Similarly to the Finnish case, there is also an excellent study of the Russophone population in Estonia during the interwar period - Sergey Issakov’s *Russians in Estonia, 1918-1940*. According to Issakov, most of the Russians in Estonia during the interwar period were either the Russian old-believers who migrated to Estonia in 17th century, the inhabitants in near-Narva or Pechory which became part of Estonia after the Tartu Peace Treaty or people who were living in towns and formed the so-called intelligentsia – previous authorities, teachers, and regular workers. Issakov also brings out the statistics by emphasizing that in 1919, about 50 000-60 000 Russian soldiers and refugees came to Estonia out of whom, considerable part died of camp fever, returned to the Soviet Union or went further to the West. In result of these processes, Russians came to represent about 8.2 per cent (91 000 individuals) of the inhabitants in Estonia in 1922 and about 80.2 per cent (73 000) of them

---

103 Vetik, 1999, pp. 33-34.
104 Estonians formed only 61.5 per cent of the total population by 1989.
were the citizens of Estonia. According to Aksel Kirch, the newly independent Estonia was “ethnically one of the most homogenous states in Europe where, according to 1934 census, Estonian’s formed 88.1 per cent of the population (~1 million people).” However, in comparison to Finland, the number of Russians in Estonia was about six times higher in 1922 than in Finland in 1919. Additionally, the Finnish Russians at that time were in a large part temporary refugees and military personnel. By 1930 the number of Russians in Finland was 8216, which is a very small figure compared to the Russians in Estonia.

Another contribution of Issakov’s work to this study is his revelation what the attitudes and approaches of the Estonian state officials were towards the Russians during the interwar period, especially early 1920s. At first, they were “worried and even looked at Russians coming from North-West with animosity.” Issakov adds that they “were quite afraid of the political activity of Russians and tried to subdue it from the very beginning.” There are numerous reasons for such approaches. First and foremost is of course the fact that it was not so long ago that Estonian forces had to beat Bolsheviks in order to become independent. Hence, the Soviet Union was viewed as a possible threat to Estonian independence and its identity-in-formation. However, the Soviet Union was also excluded from the wider international society, which emerged after the First World War – the League of Nations (LN). Estonia became the member of the LN in 1921 and wanted to show in every move that it belongs there (read: to the West), follows the common rules and values and participates actively in the work of the LN. The Soviet Union meanwhile was approached cautiously.

The attempted coup in Tallinn on 1 December 1924 reinforced the tendency to distance from the Soviet Union and was taken to prove that the latter wanted to retake the Estonian territory. The insurgents consisted of “Estonian Bolsheviks, the employees of the local Soviet factories and a score of underground rebels who had secretly crossed the border […].” They were “trained and armed” in the Soviet Union. The coup was subdued by Estonians in few hours but the Estonian relations with the Soviet Union suffered considerably in result.

Similarly to the uprising in Eastern Karelia in 1921, the December coup in Estonia seems to qualify as an event in result of which the presence of Russians in Estonia might have been

---

109 Ibid., p. 54.
110 The Story of the Estonian Republic — 1918–1940, Estonica.
securitized. Hence, for further research these two events stand out as good cases to be studied.

It would be interesting to know what kind of speech acts and discussions prevailed amongst the Estonian and Finnish people before, during and after the uprisings in Eastern Karelia in 1921 and in Tallinn in 1924. Moreover, what kind of implications did they have in terms of IR?

When studying the interwar Estonia and its Russophone population, it is also important to stop for a while on the topic of identity and values of Russians. In Estonian interpretations of the interwar period it is commonly argued that while Estonia took a clear orientation towards the “West” (Europe and the USA), Russians in Estonia did not follow suit due to their “differing cultural and civilisational background.”\(^{112}\) Some Russians arguably felt sympathy with Communism and the Soviet Union or they expected to stay in Estonia just temporarily or did not recognize its independence at all.\(^{113}\) However in his study, Issakov points out that Russians in Estonia were not united. Rather, there was disunity between them and they were not represented in the political life.\(^ {114}\) One reason for such inactivity may be that before the Estonian independence, Russians represented the leading nationality and were under protection of tsar’s administration in Estonia.\(^ {115}\)

After independence however, the Russians in Estonia found themselves to be a minority. Estonia, it is argued, now followed a strong “Western” orientation and development “in line with the democratic traditions [as] known elsewhere in Europe,”\(^ {116}\) which set it apart from the Soviet Union. The emphasis put on Estonian belongingness to the “West” was continued in early 1990s as well. Kuus argues that it enabled Estonia to emphasise that its identity has nothing in common with Russian (or Soviet) identity, the “big Other”. Nevertheless, it seems that during this time, the Russophone population in Estonia was not perceived as a threat. Otherwise, we may speculate, this would have at least partly been reflected from the legal documents concerning the minorities. However, the Basic Law of Estonia was one of the most liberal constitutions in whole Europe\(^ {117}\) and ethnic minorities “enjoyed some of the greatest

---

\(^{112}\) Kirch, 1997, p. 43.
\(^{113}\) Issakov, 1996, pp.11-12.
\(^{114}\) Ibid., p. 54.
\(^{115}\) Ibid., p. 8.
\(^{117}\) Siaroff, 1999, p. 110.
cultural autonomy in pre-war Europe.” Moreover, the bill of Cultural Autonomy of Minorities was set as a “model” for other European states.

Meanwhile, the situation changed considerably during and after the Second World War. As explained well by Lauristin and Heidmets, “Estonians found themselves once more in the position of being a repressed nation in their own country.” The first impact on demographic situation was the Stalin’s overtake of the predominantly Russian border towns such as Pechory and the villages behind Narva River in 1944. In result, Estonia lost most of its Russophone population as two thirds of the Russian population (more than 30 000 people) came to live outside Estonia. Simultaneously, the share of Estonians in Estonia at the beginning of 1945 rose to 95 per cent (~860 000) of the total population which is the highest number ever. Afterwards, a decrease followed which lead to the all-time low in 1989 when Estonians formed only 61.5 per cent of the total population while the rest were the Russians. To further illustrate, between 1945-1988 the number of non-Estonians increased 26 times. What might have lead to such a dramatic change?

First of all, it is claimed to be the result of the Soviet program or policy which aimed at massive immigration of Russian speaking people to the countries which represented different cultures. In other words, “Estonia had to be secured with large population of non-Estonians.” These masses were used in development of the heavy industry in Estonia and to collectivize the agriculture. The search for “kulaks” and mass deportations were also carried out to start up with collectivization. The first deportations were on 14 June 1941, in result of which 10 000 people (mostly women and children), were sent to Siberia in cattle cars. On 25-26 March 1949, about 8-12 per cent (20 000-80 000) of people was deported to labour camps.

---

119 The Story of the Estonian Republic — 1918–1940, Estonica.  
122 Ibid.  
124 Kirch, p. 15.  
126 Ibid.  
127 Ibid.  
128 Vetik, 1999, p. 35.
It is generally thought that these efforts formed part of the Soviet authorities’ attempt to eliminate Estonianness – a direct attack against Estonian identity. For example, Kirch argues that “the Soviet authorities introduced gradually the ‘Russification of Estonian lifestyles’ […] which meant replacing the habitual Estonian way of life with the Soviet one.129 The latter was crowned by collectives, heavy industry and huge apartment blocks (micro-rayons). These developments took a turn in 1970s within the frameworks of the environmental movements which eventually led to reforms in 1980s. In addition to general concerns about the poor environmental conditions resulting from the Soviet industrialization project, Vetik explains that the widest protest movements were actually focused against the planned phosphate mine in North-East Estonia. Although seemingly environmental, the protests touched upon the survival of Estonian identity. In other words, it was related to demographic issues, which – as argued by Kuus – was perceived as the “principal source of threat to Estonian identity”.130 More precisely, the mining project would have included the new immigration wave of about 30 000 Russians and this time, it would have pushed Estonians into a minority status in their own country.131 Additionally, in 1978 “an official Moscow policy sought to increase the role of the Russian language in non-Russian Soviet republics”132 which hinted at a new wave of Russification as well.

The expanding Singing Revolution paved way to Estonian independence which was restored on 20 August 1991. From that point onwards, Heidmets & Lauristin have provided their readers with a good periodisation of each period characterized by specific attitudes towards the Russophone population in Estonia.133 I have also added summaries on foreign policy directions and identity-related dilemmas because of their influence on the formation of certain approaches towards Russian minorities. I also added some periods at the end due to the reason that the study edited by Heidmets & Lauristin was issued in 2002 and hence it does not cover the periods from 2002 to 2007.

130 Kuus, 2002, p. 95.
132 Ibid., p. 37.
1. 1991-1995

During that period, Estonians wanted to restore their nation state which were expected to be “a culturally homogenous society consisting of Estonians.”¹³⁴ According to some studies, such an aim as well as the foreign policy of that time was strongly idealistic. It resulted in total exclusion of the Russophone population from that nation building project although many of them had lived in Estonia for decades.¹³⁵ Kuus argues that such policies were related to the new process of identity recovering, hence the reconstruction of Estonianness. Deriving from the arguments of numerous scholars, she has described this as a process where “state’s political practices do not flow naturally from a pre-given set of national interests, but are intimately involved in the construction of these interests.”¹³⁶ As mentioned above, the presence of large Russophone population as well as the history of Russian and Soviet occupation, contributed to the formation of the identity where primary concern was: how to secure Estonia against Russia?

The situation of Russians after the re-independence resembles the situation during the First Republic of Estonia when Russians who used to be the representatives of the leading nation (Russian Empire) found themselves a minority nationals. However, now the situation was clearly more dramatic. The share of Russians in Estonia was not comparable to the small number in 1920s. Still, the new Estonian state officials wanted to emphasize the legal continuity of Estonia and hence the laws of the First Republic were restored. Even though they may have not been properly applicable in new situation, their adoption can be approached as emphasizing the continuity of Estonia as a state with certain identity.

In result of that legal organization, two categories of Russian minorities were now identifiable, as pointed out by Heidmets & Lauristin: “citizens by birth who were inheritors of pre-war citizenship (about 80 000 people), and ‘aliens’ or post-war immigrants (about 420 000 people).”¹³⁷ In this situation, the Russophone population of Estonia became interpreted as a threat. According to Kuus, it was common in 1994 for the Estonian-language press to call Russians as “occupiers” and “colonizers”.¹³⁸ Klara Hallik comments that such processes lead to the consolidation of national forces and created “the most” dangerous

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 118.
situation in Estonia at that time. She goes as far as to call the main towns of the Eastern Estonia – Sillamäe and Narva – the “insurgent towns.” Besides Tallinn, these towns were the main industrial centers where the immigrants from elsewhere of the Soviet Union were settled. Most of the inhabitants were thus Russian speakers. Also, it is widely claimed that precisely in that region the interests of the Estonian and Russian authorities come into conflict. Hence, the foreign policy infiltrated into the internal affairs.

The conflict was argued to stretch so far as to pose a threat to the territorial integrity of Estonia in 1993 when the pro-Soviet forces there called for a referendum which opposed Estonian statehood and supported regional autonomy. It would be very interesting to study what kind of speech acts preceded and followed the developments in North-East Estonia. Although the limits of this study do not allow me to go so deep, I would still like to put special emphasis on the aforementioned developments for the reason that they were often referred to in speech acts which followed the Bronze Soldier riots and the war in Georgia.

2. 1995-1998

Heidmets & Lauristin write that during that period, there was “an adaption to the new situation on both sides.” In a way the hints of that were seen already at the end of 1993, when the roundtable between Estonians and the Russophone population was called by the Estonian President in order to overcome the inter-ethnic crisis”. Additionally, in May 1997, a new post was created in Estonian Government – a minister without portfolio on population and integration issues. However, Kuus claims that some rightist politicians such as the representative of the Fatherland Party, Mart Laar, stressed in 1997 that “changes in citizenship policy could have an ‘unpredictable’ impact on the ‘psychology of the indigenous people.’” Hence, loosening the strict citizenship regulations in order to further the integration, were disputed.

In terms of foreign policy directions, that period can be described as the cradle of the “positive encompassment” policy in relations with Russia. One reason for such a change was

---

139 Hallik, 2002, p. 66.
140 Ibid., p. 81.
141 Ibid.
143 Ibid., p. 83.
that Estonia applied for the EU and NATO membership which was represented as a proof of its adherence and dedication to the “Western” rules and values. Besides, the Estonian state officials and people were certain that once the country is accepted to the European Union, its future as an independent state is secured. This brings me again to the arguments of Kuus. More precisely, she claims that security against Russia was the key which is why the EU and NATO membership were actually approached as security guarantees “for the preservation of Estonia’s identity and independence.”\textsuperscript{146} However, in order to get these guarantees, Estonia had to prove that Estonia is ready to join. Part of this readiness necessitated a new direction in relations with Russia and improved policies towards the Russophone population, which was demanded by numerous “Western” organizations and institutions. Complying with the demands from the outside on such a delicate issue was seen as a threat to identity which is why, for example, half of Estonians voted against the EU membership.\textsuperscript{147} In any case, however, the “Western” integration contributed towards the gradual decrease of the “the exclusionist attitudes among Estonians”, as cited by Jüri Kruusvall.\textsuperscript{148} This, of course, does not mean that the previous problems ceased to exist. Estonian relations with Russia remained complicated. It should not however be underestimated that the Estonian state officials had openly declared the policy of “positive encompassment” which can be interpreted as an attempt to desecuritize the approaches towards Russia and the Russians in Estonia.

3. 1998-2001

Heidmets & Lauristin comment that during that period, “active efforts of the state” were taken “to pursue integration as a political project […].”\textsuperscript{149} More precisely, it meant “a major turn from the separation of ethnic communities to their integration into one multicultural society with a common political identity.”\textsuperscript{150} The most important step was the integration policy document “The Bases of the Estonian State Integration Policy” adopted by the Riigikogu (Estonian parliament) in June 1998. Even bigger step forward was the implementation of the “State Integration Programme 2000-2007” which had an aim to significantly reduce the number of persons without citizenship, find better ways to teach Estonian language and to further the inclusion of non-Estonians in all levels.\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{146} Kuus, 2002, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., pp. 92; 99.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., p. 322.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{151} Estonia Today, May 2004.
The certainty in foreign policy directions – the EU and NATO membership – considerably influenced such developments in approaches towards the Russophone population.

I will now continue with my own periodisation of Estonian relations with Russia and approaches towards the Russophone population as an observer from the close quarters.

4. 2001-2004

During that period, the state officials’ attempts to integrate Russians continued as well as their pursuits towards better relations with Russia. For example, the government approved the action plans of the National Integration Programme for period of 2004-2007\textsuperscript{152} and it was now openly stated that

\begin{quote}
Estonia’s desire is to create an Estonian model of multi-cultural society characterised by cultural pluralism, a strong public sector, as well as the principles of the Estonian cultural space. Integration comprises the whole society and up to now, it has achieved good results at ensuring the participation of all nationalities residing in Estonia in social life.\textsuperscript{153}
\end{quote}

Despite the aforementioned steps however, Kuus comes to argue that “ethnic integrations has remained a controversial process that many consider a threat to the Estonian identity and security.”\textsuperscript{154}

In foreign policy field, Russian state officials showed in many ways their opposition to the most important goal of Estonia - the EU and NATO membership. Added to that, numerous Russian nationals in Estonia did not consider the NATO membership important either which the Estonian public actors and state officials interpreted as a sign of their disloyalty to Estonia.\textsuperscript{155}

Meanwhile, after 9/11 the approaches of Russia reached a new level. Namely, the Russian state officials started to cooperate more actively with the USA and to some extent, the opposition to Estonia’s goal to join NATO diminished.\textsuperscript{156} Additionally, the chances for signing the border treaty between Estonia and Russia took new turns. Estonian state officials no longer insisted on mentioning the Tartu Peace Treaty in that treaty and hence the possible restitution of the annexed territories was not a question. Another important factor was the

\textsuperscript{152} Estonia Today, May 2006.
\textsuperscript{153} Estonia Today, May 2004.
\textsuperscript{154} Kuus, 2002, p.96.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., p. 98.
\textsuperscript{156} Rannajõe, 2006, p. 15.
signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia on 27 April 2007. In result of that, the double tariffs between Estonia and Russia were liquidated, in addition to the implementation of the visa facilitation. All these aspects facilitated the tightening of mutual contacts during that period.

5. 2004-2007

In foreign policy terms, the beginning of this period marks an important achievement – Estonia joined both NATO (19 March) and the EU (1 May). Rannajõe draws attention to the fact that this happened before Estonia and Russia managed to sign the border treaty. Previously, the Estonian state officials had been sure that the unsigned border treaty poses as an obstacle to the EU and NATO membership as well as the ambiguities involved with Estonia’s minority policies. However, now that the main goal was reached and Estonia was the member of the EU and NATO, entitled to certain security guarantees, Rannajõe brings out an important aspect: Estonian state officials wanted to bring in the references towards the legal continuity of the Estonian state again. Conclusively, they still made references to Tartu Peace Treaty in the preamble of the border treaty, which can be interpreted as continuous encapsulating of the state-centered identity. In that step, Russian state officials saw possible territorial claims and therefore, they refused to ratify that border treaty. Added to that, there were other cases which gradually started to worsen the relations between Estonia and Russia, for example, the frequent violations of the Estonian air space from the side of Russia. Ever since the relations between the two countries have been on a downfall culminating with the Bronze soldier riots in April, 2007. The Estonian foreign policy actors have made continuous references towards their concerns over the slow-down of the democratization process in Russia and have been insisting that the relations between the EU and Russia must be based on common rules and values, not just short-time economic interests. On the other hand, Russia has been consistent in criticizing the Estonian way of interpreting the history as well as the situation of the Russophone population in Estonia.

However, when studying the integration processes of the Russophone population then the statistics show as if everything is pointing towards improvement or at least greater willingness to improve things. In 2006, work started on a new National Integration Programme and the

---

157 Rannajõe, 2006, p. 16.
State Integration Programme for 2008-2013 was adopted in April 2008. This consists of two parts: firstly, the strategy which sets the goals and secondly, the action plans.¹⁵⁹

Conclusively, according to statistics of March 2008, “the number of people with undetermined citizenship has decreased steadily […] In March 2008, there were 147 920 individuals who had become citizens through naturalization process since 1992.¹⁶⁰ Currently, there are about 8.1 per cent (110 000) individuals with undetermined citizenship while the percentage of Estonian citizens is 83.8 per cent. In total, the population of Estonia is 1.3 million people of which Estonians form 68.6 per cent and Russians 24.9 per cent. Additionally, the cost of the language courses is now reimbursed by the state if the person passes the citizenship exam and Estonia remains one of the only EU countries where “there is a multi-lingual publicly financed school system […]” in other words, the Russian-language education is still provided.¹⁶¹

Interestingly, these efforts did not prevent the deterioration in Estonian-Russian relations and relations between ethnic Estonians and Estonia’s Russophone population which culminated with the Bronze soldier riots. Each step closer to these riots seemed to be a step closer to the divided society in early 1990s.

As I mentioned in aforementioned section, Estonia’s identity reconstruction was strongly related to securing oneself against Russia and maintaining the independence within the established border. Was Estonia willing to open-up to the initiatives involved with constructing an international society in Baltic Sea region? The following study on Baltic Sea region will answer that question.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.
¹⁶¹ Ibid.
3. ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Introduction and meta-theory

This section starts with ontological points of departure that are guiding the current research. Largely in agreement with Cox,

ontology lies at the beginning of any enquiry. We cannot define a problem without presupposing a certain basic structure consisting of the significant kinds of entities involved and the form of significant relationships among them.¹⁶²

I will hence present this basic structure and presumptions, which form the English School International Relations (IR) theory and bring forward the main concepts it touches upon. With the help of the English School IR theory I shall articulate the basic structure and the kinds of entities which are involved in the research problem of this thesis.

As within numerous theories, there are different orientations within the English School IR theory as well. In this study, I have inferred the core ideas from the arguments by Tim Dunne and Barry Buzan. Meanwhile, these ideas remain grounded in the arguments of Hedley Bull. Dunne agrees with the claim that the international political realm is socially constructed whether discursively¹⁶³ or via other practices. Such constructions can be approached as certain international arrangements, which have come into being when they were faced with various events and situations at different points in time. Consequently, what these English School theorists observe in international relations are “historically constructed normative systems”, as claimed by Anderson and Hurrell.¹⁶⁴ Within the contexts of this study, these argumentations give good examples how in time, a normative system or society was constructed. Accordingly, the focus of this study is in on the historical construction of the normative international arrangement within the Baltic Sea region.

¹⁶² Cox cit. Bruchill et al., 2005, p. 20.
¹⁶³ Ibid.
¹⁶⁴ Buzan, 2005, p. 120.
More specifically I attempt to disclose what characteristics this international arrangement has. For this purpose the English School provides suitable theoretical frameworks. The classical English School theorists claim that the most basic arrangement – an international system – is indeed anarchic, consisted of states and according to newer representatives of the theory, also of non-state actors. In both cases, however, such anarchic system is also claimed to be orderly. Anarchy after all means that there is no central or higher power to guide the agents in international relations. On the other hand, order in an anarchic system entails that despite the absence of such higher entity, the relations between states are still characterised by order. Hence, it is possible to see two concepts which the English School theorists claim “to be” when trying to understand the international relations: anarchy and order. The immediate reaction is: how these two opposites can be reconciled? How the international political realm can be characterised by anarchy and also by order?

The emergence of order amidst anarchy has, indeed, motivated social scientists and philosophers to come up with different kinds of answers. One among the most famous ones is Adam Smith’s “invisible hand.”$^{165}$ The essence of Smith’s idea, which concerns liberal economy, is that markets have a self-regulatory quality (invisible hand) and this is because all people are interested in maximising their welfare.$^{166}$ Hence, this theory presupposes that people are rational actors who act based on their self-interests. It also means that their choices are always rational and hence give ground to a system, which self-regulates itself, more precisely, is orderly without an apparent regulative power.

An international system also does not have any regulative powers and it is true that states can be viewed as the agents interested in maximizing their interests. But the English School answer to the question of how order emerges from anarchy is fundamentally different from Smith’s individualistic and rational approach.

As argued by one of the English School gurus, Hedley Bull, all states have three primary goals: security, protecting possessions and ensuring that the agreements are kept.$^{167}$ Based on that, order in an anarchic society means that the aforementioned three goals are sustained by

---

$^{165}$ Smith, 1982.
$^{166}$ Ibid.
$^{167}$ Bull, 1977, pp. 53-55.
all states because they are of common interest of them all. To take a step further, order is also “the condition for realizing justice and other values”\(^\text{168}\) as emphasised by Terry Nardin.

The questions related to justice have received a lot of attention by the older generation English School theorists, mainly because of their numerous inquiries into the realm of normative issues. Within the frames of order, justice means that any additional goals and values adopted by an international society are properly enforceable. Hence, upon violation of these principles, the coercion is justified. However, there is still a lot of debate on boundaries and legality of such coercion, which is why some English School theorists say that justice might start threatening the international order. The order, however, should be of main concern. For example, Nardin points out that “we should refrain from imposing our own conceptions of the good on [others] and abstain from treating them as things we can use for our own purposes while ignoring theirs.”\(^\text{169}\) This dilemma is closely related to this research.\(^\text{170}\) I study the formation of identities, cooperative frameworks and regional structures, in which the member states have different understandings of justice and about its “justifiable” reach. This dilemma is also reflecting from Buzan’s elaboration and Aalto’s application of the arguments about the primary and secondary institutions of an international society. By claiming that some institutions contain pluralist values while others contain solidarist values, the preferences of either order or justice are also embedded into these claims.\(^\text{171}\) The considerations between justice and order are also dependant on the context: in some situations, it might be said that order is indeed a central issue while in other situations, principles of justice may override the bases which maintain order. Therefore, the pluralist and solidarist considerations within the institutions of an international society are challenging one another, which is also in agreement with the arguments of Aalto.\(^\text{172}\)

In summary, I can bring out four concepts which give basis to the English School’s ontology and according to which the current international political realm can be viewed as a “historically constructed normative system”: states and non-state actors, anarchy, order and

\(^{168}\) Nardin, 2005, p. 248.
\(^{169}\) Ibid., p. 251.
\(^{170}\) Although the relation becomes clearer later in this study when the characterisation of international societies as pluralist or solidarist is brought to readers, I introduce some of the main points of this characterisation already in this stage.
\(^{171}\) The international societies are divided into pluralist and solidarist international societies. Arguably, there is a common understanding of justice as well as the enforcement measures within the solidarist international society while within the pluralist international society, the concentration is on maintaining the order.
\(^{172}\) Aalto, 2007, p. 463.
justice. I will now move on to further study the characteristics of this international political realm. The English School theorists believe that there are three main categories in international relations: international system, international society, and the world society. All have been given precise definitions, which will receive more attention in following sections. At this point it is important to say that these categories are not “something you see”, but ideas in light of which it is possible accustomise oneself in the field of international relations. That is, they are tools with the help of which a researcher can characterise the current state of affairs.

The English School’s main focus is on international society and its characteristics. In ontological terms, the international society should be thought of as “a human construct which is produced and reproduced by the activities of states people and other representative institutions” as explained by Tim Dunne. Meanwhile, if the presence of order is explained by the need to protect some principal goals, how do we know that an international society really exists or has potentials to come into existence? Here, Bull claims that there must be some kind of pragmatic need for deeper coexistence. In some other interpretations however it is believed that factors such as shared culture or historical background are something that very often precede such pragmatic cooperation. Arguably, when some kind of pattern - for example an international society - emerges between states which have cultural ties, other instruments can be used in order to provide for its expansion or further development.

The English School theorists uphold that one way of knowing “what is” is to look back in history. In this research the importance of historical knowledge has been taken into account by way of providing the background study. Bull argues that the study of the past throws “light on the contemporary interstate politics […].” He goes further to say that the reason behind explaining the events is that they are all instances of something wider. Within the context of this study it is important to keep in mind that “the memories of the past can provide a powerful barrier to constructing the conditions of trust that may be necessary to the construction of alternative futures”. This argument needs to be considered when addressing

174 Dunne, 2005, p. 70.
175 Bruchill et al., p. 20.
177 Linklater & Suganami, 2006, p. 87.
178 Ibid.
the complexity involved with the Russophone population in Estonia and Finland. For example, the negative experiences of the past are often used when commenting Russia in the context of contemporary events. Hence, the events in the past indeed throw light on the present and there can be various interpretations of history by different states or even within a single state.

The ontological points of departure of the English School theorists often refer towards progressivism in international relations. A good example is their way of describing the shifts from an international system to international society or the shifts from pluralist to solidarist international society. This occurs due to certain processes in history. For example, certain events may lead the state officials to talk in a certain way, for example more about the need for mutually beneficial cooperation instead of enmity. They may start talking about the common cultural background, which leads to the emergence of common identity perceptions. In result, I may find an international arrangement, which stands at much higher levels of organization than an international system. More precisely, we may witness signs of the emergence or thickening of an international society. 180 Although an international system must always precede an international society, the latter is not guaranteed to last. Indeed, English School scholars have also been interested in the possibility of international societies “regressing” back into systemic arrangements. At one point in time, the state officials may again found themselves talking about the need for more protective in approaches towards their territorial borders and sovereignty. It is possible to analyse shifts towards one or the other at certain points in time by looking at certain events and reactions to these events.

3.2. Relations to other IR theories

The English School theorists do not quarrel infinitely with other theoretical frameworks, as for example the debate between realists and liberalists which was overwhelming in IR during the second half of the 20 century. Rather, the founding fathers of the English School, such as Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, tried to place themselves between realism and liberalism in the debates about international relations and hence being as the via media. 181 However, they did not automatically outlaw realism and liberalism. Rather, the English School theorists hold

180 The understanding of an international society by the English School theorists will be given later in this chapter.
that convictions of other IR theories can well describe the international political realm at various points in time. This is understandable when we agree with the ontological stances made on the progressivism of international arrangements and structures.

The classical English School theorists went as far as to create a framework for different theories, namely, they pointed out three traditions, or the so-called 3Rs, which are “in continuous coexistence and interplay”.\(^{182}\) Firstly, there is realism which corresponds to Hobbesian and Machiavellian tradition. It questions the existence of “cross-cultural moral truth”\(^{183}\) and corresponds to English School theorists’ understandings of an international system which will receive more attention later. In this research, it is believed that there is a possibility of an international system becoming an international society. The latter corresponds with the second “R” – rationalism or Groatian tradition. Here, attention is drawn “to the rules and norms that govern international society.”\(^{184}\) Hence, it is about deeper “institutionalisation of shared interest and identity amongst states,”\(^{185}\) as explained by Barry Buzan. Because Groatian tradition corresponds to English School theorists’ understandings of an international society and also stands as a via media between the international system (realism) and world society (revolutionism), it receives primary attention of the English School theorists. Thirdly, there is revolutionism or Kantian tradition which, according to Bellamy, “emphasises a global responsibility to protect people in peril wherever they may live.”\(^{186}\) This means that a big step has been taken from an international society towards the world society. In summary, we can agree with Buzan that by introducing rationalism and notions about an international society as a third element -- not only as a via media but also as the key concept – “the English School theory transcends the binary opposition between realism and liberalism that for long plagued the debates about IR theory in general.”\(^{187}\)

After bringing out the specifics of the English School IR theory is there after all a similarity with other IR theories or is the English School IR theory completely unique?

How is the English School IR Theory linked to other IR Theories? It is claimed by Tim Dunne that English School actually preceded the emergence of the Constructivist IR

\(^{182}\) Buzan, 2004, p. 10.

\(^{183}\) Bellamy, 2005, p. 284.

\(^{184}\) Ibid.

\(^{185}\) Buzan, 2004, p. 7.

\(^{186}\) Bellamy, 2005, p. 284.

\(^{187}\) Buzan, 2005, p. 117.
Reus-Smit adds that thereafter, the popularity of constructivism provided for the re-emergence of the English School IR Theory which took place after the Cold War which can be approached as took place. At that point, the English School theorists often bring an example from the Iraqi invasion at the beginning of 1990s. More precisely, the intervention to restore Kuwaiti government after the Iraqi invasion can be approached as an instance where the elements of justice (collective action to restore Kuwaiti government) outweighed the goals to maintain order (sovereignty). Linklater comments that conclusively, there were more possibilities for the discipline to open up and that finally, the IR Theory can overcome the endless debate between realists and liberals. This might be inferred to as a birth of constructivism and hence also the re-birth of the English School.

Bellamy comments the ties between the English School and constructivism by pointing out that the English School and constructivist writers share a belief that states form an international society, which is guided common and agreed-upon values, identities and norms. He also argues that the constructivists as well as the English School theorists believe that such international societies may require conscious will of the agents in order to be altered in any way. This argument is relevant for the research setting of this study. The construction of a regional international society, it presupposes, can be done with words. Another important similarity between the constructivists and English School theorists is that both put a lot of emphasis on culture as well as historical experience and its role at the international political realm.

### 3.3. Analytic concepts

I will now continue by introducing the analytic concepts which the English School scholars use in their study of international relations. As already mentioned, the main one out of these is the international society which receives special attention and which is related to this study in particular.

---

188 Bellamy, 2005, p. 6.
189 Reus_Smit, 2005, p. 94.
190 Bellamy, 2005, p. 9.
191 Ibid., p. 1.
192 Ibid., p 2
3.3.1. International system, international society, and the world society

As mentioned under the English School meta-theory, it is believed that there are three main analytic categories in world politics: international system, international society, and the world society. They are ideal-typical notions in the sense that the evolving international social structures can be analysed in the light of them.\textsuperscript{195} Moreover, the previous distinction between the 3Rs shows that shifts are possible between all three categories. Following is a study of each one of them. Given this, it is worth probing and analysing how features of these analytical categories are actualised in the context of a specific empirical reality, in this case in the context of discussions on the Russophone population in the Baltic Sea region international society.

3.3.2. International system

According to definition by Tilly, states form a system only based on their regular interaction which also affects the behaviour of other state.\textsuperscript{196} Hence, one state has to consider the moves of the other state when doing something. However, the common rules, cooperative frameworks and moreover, the common understanding of justice and common sense of identity, are missing. Much in resemblance with the convictions of realism, states within an international system interact on the basis of power politics.\textsuperscript{197} In contemporary world, international systems is a point of departure of numerous types of constellations. Based on English School understanding we can find features of international systems for example between the main great powers, such as China, USA, India and Russia, although in some sectors, there are also cooperative arrangements between these states. An international system may also exist between a great power and a smaller state, for example, USA and Georgia or Russia and Cuba, or between the international organisations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and NATO. Hence, an international society which will be studied next comes to an existence when certain kind of common identity is felt between states. We will try to explore it now.

\textsuperscript{195} Linklater & Suganami, 2006, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{196} Tilly cit Buzan, 2004, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{197} Buzan, 2004, p. 7.
3.3.3. International society

International society is the main focus of the English School thinking as well as of this study. That is why it receives more attention.

Although the term international society may have numerous meanings, in colloquial conversations, the term has a special meaning for the English School scholars. The following definition of international society by Hedley Bull is the most common for the English School theorists:

a group of states, conscious of common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the workings of common institutions.\(^{198}\)

Justin Morris adds that the values and goals, adapted over time, determine the criteria applied to membership of the society of states [=international society], the relationship between the collective and individual members and inter-member relations, and are reflected in the normative structures relating to recognition, collective intervention, and the uni-or multilateral use of force.\(^{199}\)

Within an international society, hence the whole new level of interaction is reached when compared to an international system. As mentioned above, an important step further is a sense of common identity.\(^{200}\) Therefore, when the common sense of identity is made manifest, the international system has developed into an international society.\(^{201}\) This knowledge enables to track when in history international systems became international societies.\(^{202}\)

One among the topics to which English School theorists have paid attention is the emergence of an international society in a multicultural world. This is interesting for the present research as its focus is on the treatment of an ethnic or cultural minority. For this, it is suggested to

\(^{199}\) Morris, 2005, p. 270.
\(^{200}\) In this study, it is believed that the common identity is the most important trait of an international society despite the fact that other orientations within the English School IR Theory (especially the newer representatives) have come up with other varieties of the international society as well, where common identity is not necessarily the main trait differentiating an international society from an international system.
\(^{201}\) Little, 2005, p. 49.
\(^{202}\) Ibid.
face the question about culture as well as history. Talking about certain shared elements in cultural as well as historical background are important factors contributing towards the formation of an international society. In case there are no such links, a certain amount of artificial construction might be necessary. This demanding task can be smoothed via the help of the institutions of international society which have a power to facilitate the discussions and exchanges of opinion. In other words, in case there are no shared elements between the states, an international society may be realised in the context of other institutions such as market, soft/hard security and nature conservation. This argument is in close connection with Buzan’s and Aalto’s argumentation about primary and secondary institutions of an international society. As mentioned previously, Aalto has pointed out the institutions as “the glue of the international society”203 and follows the idea that there are primary and secondary institutions within an international society. The primary institutions have evolved throughout the time, such as the diplomacy, market and sovereignty while the secondary institutions are purposely built out of the primary institutions.204 Within the Baltic Sea region, some primary institutions are such as common societal norms, soft security, democracy, nature conservation and open markets. The secondary institutions on its turn are the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Northern Dimension and numerous others. What is most noteworthy is however the fact that both primary and secondary institutions contain either pluralist or solidarist values. Based on the institutions it is hence possible to characterise and international society as pluralist or solidarist. It also provides me with the chance to link the aforementioned theoretical points with the Copenhagen School theory, where securitization or desecuritization in five sectors – environmental, economic, political, societal and military – may further or inhibit the emergence of an international society. By detecting which institutions of an international society are supporting or accompanying the desecuritization/securitization, the character of an international society can also be detected.

I will now explain the importance institutions have in the emergence of the Baltic Sea region international society. For a long time, there was no specific meaning given to the role of the states surrounding the Baltic Sea. During the Cold War the area resembled a “military theatre.” At the same time, an international society between the Nordic states as well as the EU international society had institutionalised much earlier, although the process for the emergence of such international societies was considerably long lasting.

204 Ibid., pp.462-463.
After the Cold War, the EU, Germany and especially the Nordic States, tried to thicken the societal features of the Baltic Sea region. For example, the Nordic States which form a regional international society in Northern Europe, were interested in the stability of the whole post-Cold War Baltic Sea area and worked towards finding ways to bind Russia and the Baltic States into cooperative projects.\(^{205}\) The need for stability and cooperation as important regional primary institutions is understandable because the Baltic States and Russia had complicated relations and this fact was regarded as a threat to regional security. Such secondary institutions as the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Northern Dimension provided discussion forums where the discrepancies could be overcome. Despite the deeper cooperation on a new level, numerous tensions however remained. The Bronze Soldier riots is a proof of that.\(^{206}\) Therefore, there might be the mutually challenging pluralist and solidarist values within the institutions of the Baltic Sea region international society which are unfolding in speech acts.

Conclusively, I wanted to emphasise the similarity between the English School arguments about the emergence of an international society and the processes, which lead to the formation of the Baltic Sea region international society. For that reason, English School theoretical framework and its claims about international societies fit this study as they help to understand in the best way the international political processes in the Baltic Sea region. The Baltic Sea region as an international society with certain specific characteristics can be viewed as a social construct.

### 3.3.4. World society

According to Weller cited by Buzan, the world society is the key linking English School to the debate about globalisation.\(^{207}\) Bull relates the concept about the world society to the English School’s ontological points which referred to international order. Namely, he says that

---

\(^{205}\) Archer & Jones, 1999, p. 173.

\(^{206}\) More about the formation and pillars of the Baltic Sea region international society can be read from the Third Chapter, the Background Study.

the global society of all human individuals must have as its elementary and primary goals those he has identified as the elementary and primary goals of any society, i.e. security against violence, observance of agreements and stability of property.208

When arguing about the world society, the English School theorists often touch upon the issues related to the status of the non-state actors or individuals and their possible primacy over the sovereign states. Here however I agree with Reus-Smit that it is not so much about the concern that in world society, the sovereign states cease to exist or loose their importance. Rather, it is about the influences the world society has on the “basic principles and dynamics” of different sovereign states.209 In the context of the topic of this study, the character of the Baltic Sea region international society may also have to be redefined due to certain influences coming from the level of the world society. Investigating this however will not be carried out within the limits of the research and will remain the task of the further research in the field.

The most precise understanding of the world society is given by Buzan in his *From International to World Society?* Buzan represents the newer tide of English School theorists – the structural orientation. His arguments about the emergence of the world society can be viewed as part of the innovations within the English School scholarship which are not fully settled into this research.

I will now leave the discussions about the emergence of the world society and return to the main concern of most English School theorists – international society and its characteristics. The next section will analyse this by relating it to the topic of the current study: the processes within the Baltic Sea Region (Baltic Sea region).

### 3.4. International society concept and the Baltic Sea region

This section outlays the further analysis of the international society as seen by the English School theorists and its relations to the research aims. To start with, the following questions will be answered in order to get a good picture of an international society and its characteristics:

---

1. Why and how the norms, interests and rules that underpin international societies change and sometimes erode and dissolve?\textsuperscript{210} This question posed by Alex Bellamy is associated to the nature of the international political realm and hence also the international societies which upon their emergence have to face the challenge of multiculturalism and different interpretations of history. More precisely, is an international society characterised as pluralist or solidarist and how this can change? In this research, the identification of dynamics that can redefine the character of the Baltic Sea region international society is the main task.

2. Where can we find international societies in contemporary world and how they are characterized? This involves the search for international societies in contemporary world and identifying their characteristics. In this research I make a contribution as I attempt to characterise the international society in the Baltic Sea area.

3. What kind of dynamics may redefine the international society in Baltic Sea region? Under that question, a specific issue is pointed out as it may change the character of the discussions and values within the institutions of the Baltic Sea region international society. Conclusively, this issue may change the dynamics in the Baltic Sea region and in result, to redefine the characteristics of this international society.

Bull’s differentiation between pluralist and solidarist international society is taken as the point of departure in an attempt to characterize the regional international societies. It seems here that such duality resembles and illustrates well the “struggle between three different moral and political codes” (3Rs) which also have influences upon state leaders\textsuperscript{211} and other political actors. The comments of these political actors can be located on the spectrum of maintaining order (pluralist international society) or achieving common understandings of justice as their ultimate goal (solidarist international society).\textsuperscript{212} The presumptions are reflected in their speech acts which conclusively have a power to redefine the character of the respective international society.\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{210} Bellamy, 2005, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid., p. 284.
\textsuperscript{212} Within the solidarist international society, its characters such as the common values, rules and cooperative frameworks are enforced. In other words, if some state breaches the commonly agreed upon regulations, the resulting sanctions or other variety of punishment is justified.
\textsuperscript{213} The speech acts of other actors, such as scholars, journalists, observers and regular people are also of importance when deciding between pluralism and solidarism, order and justice.
I work in a thought that in a pluralist international society, “the sovereignty and non-intervention principles restrict international society to fairly minimal rules of coexistence”\textsuperscript{214}. In other words, the states are presumed to agree to focus on maintaining the order: security, keeping the agreements, and protecting possessions. This allows them promote their interests with no interference into their domestic affairs\textsuperscript{215} and develop the limited amount of common identity. Conclusively, if interests instead of justice are emphasised as the priority of state actors it seems legitimate to refer to a pluralist international society. The pluralist international society thus stands closer to an international system than the solidarist international society.

Within the solidarist international society, on the other hand, the development of wide-ranging norms is possible and these norms would cover both coexistence issues and cooperation enforcement.\textsuperscript{216} Features of a solidarist international society can be identified in statements to cooperation in pursuit of shared interests\textsuperscript{217} and to purposive rather than mere practical association between the states.\textsuperscript{218} Consequently, the differences between the pluralist and solidarist international societies can already be seen by asking how much emphasis statements to be analysed put on the perseverance of common rules and values. Furthermore, one of the characteristics of the solidarist international society is that diverse communities can and do reach agreement about substantive moral standards.\textsuperscript{219}

Regional international societies such as the Baltic Sea region international society, have not received much attention by the classical English School writers who have mostly been involved in studying the United Nations, hence the global issues. The regional approach has often been viewed as “threatening to the global level because different centers would clash for control of the global level,”\textsuperscript{220} as claimed by Buzan. However, in his own view he states that the “sub-global international society could become a vanguard leading the way for the rest.”\textsuperscript{221} Besides, at the global level “the international society is most likely to be thinnest and pluralist. At the sub-global level, the possibilities for solidarism are greater, as demonstrated

\textsuperscript{214} Buzan, 2004, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{215} Bellamy, 2005, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{216} Buzan, 2004, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{218} Reus-Smit, 2005, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{219} Bellamy, 2005, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{220} Buzan, 2005, pp. 124.
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid.
by the EU.” Richard Falk goes as far as to make claims about “regional globalization” which implies:

the possibility that global governance may in the future be partially, or even best, conceived by reference to a world of regions. The basic perspective is to view European regionalism as an explanatory venture [...].

Hence, the investigation of a certain regional international society in this study is justified.

I am interested in identifying the possible character of the Baltic Sea region international society by way of analysing certain dynamics. The presence of the Russophone population in the Baltic Sea Region, more precisely, in Estonia and Finland, is taken as an example. This is due to the fact, that lately, the question of the Russophone population has received considerable attention, especially in result of such as events as Bronze Soldier riots in Estonia, war in Georgia as well as the extensive Russian real estate acquisition in Finland. A number of publications have posed the questions whether the Russophone population can become a security threat or could it be used as the extended hand of Russia? That is, it seems that in the context of recent events Russophone population in Finland and Estonia has brought some systemic features to the surface of political discussions. The emergence of such questions after certain events inspired me to write this research and to probe the question more in detail. This, I believe, can be done by studying how securitization and desecuritization of the Russophone population may challenge the existing institutions of the Baltic Sea region international society and conclusively, to redefine its character.

In this research it is believed that such primary institutions as the shared norms, mutual identification, open market and common understandings of justice are the most important characteristics which give the necessary basement for even deeper cooperation and cohesion within an international society. Within the Baltic Sea region, these primary institutions drive the orientations towards the solidarist international society. However, one aim of this section was to point out that the primary institutions of the Baltic Sea region also contain numerous pluralist preferences. Therefore, it is yet unknown how exactly this international society unfolds in result of desecuritization/securitization of the Russophone population. At this point it is possible to agree with Buzan that the pluralist international society may evolve over time.

---

into a more solidarist one, depending on circumstances and situations at certain points in time. Additionally, an international society is not guaranteed to last and may disintegrate when circumstances and the attitudes of different states change. Hence, even when an international society is to be found in the Baltic Sea region, there are no guarantees that it will last. To detect and possibly redefine the character of the cooperative construct in Baltic Sea region is one of the tasks of this research.

3.5. Relation of presumptions and concepts of the English School to research aim and method

The methodology of this study consists of firstly studying the historical processes in the Baltic Sea region and the Russophone population’s presence in Estonia and Finland. Only after that is it possible to infer something out of the main analysis. The main analysis consists of studying various speech acts to detect dynamics of securitization and desecuritization of Russophone population in Estonia and Finland.

There is a close link between this methodology and the English School theory. First of all, the English School emphasises the importance of history or historical knowledge. As mentioned under ontology and explained well by such English School writers as Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami,

> a study of the past can throw light on contemporary inter-state politics most obviously by providing historical background in the context of which current inter-state politics are conducted.

This argument shows that for instance the political actors may evoke certain historical experiences in their statements and speeches. Additionally, the policy implications of the research have to do with the relationship between culture and international society which bring to the fore the key tension involved in formation of pluralist and solidarist international societies. Jacinta O’Hagan has explained that on one hand there is a desire to construct better and universal moral order [solidarist international society] while on the other hand, sustaining certain cultural and political differences should remain beyond interference [pluralist

---

225 Linklater & Suganami, 2006, p.84.
226 Ibid., p. 88.
international society]. This tension, in my view, is crucial when I discuss the possibilities of the peaceful development of the Baltic Sea region international society.

Indeed the question of how to smooth the cultural and identity-related differences of those multicultural states which surround the Baltic Sea is of utmost importance. For example, attempts to desecuritize the Russophone population may involve their deeper integration which according to the policies of Estonian government would entail “reduction of regional isolation of non-Estonians” and barriers to their equal opportunities. This illustrates the tension between the universalism and diversity, between the values of cohesion and multiculturalism.

Now I will investigate how the main methodological tool of this study – the speech act method proposed by the Copenhagen School theorists – fits into the English School theoretical framework. It is difficult to figure out what are the methods of the English School theorists due to the reason that they have not systematically provided any rules of evidence. The best way is to bind the research carried out within the English School theoretical frameworks to a method which helps to solve the research problem. The speech act method proposed by the Copenhagen School is an excellent tool to detect changes and shifts in the character of regional arrangements such as the international society in the Baltic Sea region. Firstly, security falls within the interest of the English School writers as one of Bull’s elementary or primary goals of social life is security. In other words, without security against violence there can be no order and no society. Besides, the English School writers support that it is possible to “trace contours of the international society by studying the language that political actor use.” In other words, international societies can be “detected” when studying the speeches. Moreover, the international societies can also be constructed by speeches. This comes to agreement with the arguments of the John Austin whose main argument is that with words, something is done.

If international societies are talked into existence they may also be disintegrated by the speech acts. It is namely this relation which allows using the speech act theory as the analytical tool

---

228 Vetik, 1999, p. 70.
229 Linklater & Suganami, 2006, p. 81.
232 Austin, 1962
in the study within the frameworks of the English School IR theory. Analysing different speech acts fits well with the task to define the character of the Baltic Sea region international society in result of certain processes, in our case – the approaches towards the Russophone population. In other words, the more securitization there is, the more the social structure of the international arrangement in Baltic Sea region corresponds to the English School theorists’ definition of an international system.

Meanwhile, it is also possible to find additional relations between the Copenhagen School and the English School. The Copenhagen School theorists name five sectors, which might be involved with securitization or desecuritization: economic, political, military, societal, and environmental sectors. The analysed issue (Russophone population) can become securitized or desecuritized in any of them. By fitting the speech acts under the aforementioned sectors, it is possible to characterize the international society in a sector-centered way. This can be done by using the Buzan’s and Aalto’s understanding of primary and secondary institutions of an international society.

Out of the characteristics of an international society, Aalto pointed out the primary and secondary institutions as the main landmarks.233 In other words, there are some institutions which orientate towards the solidarist international society and some which orientate towards the pluralist international society. Inferring from the background study on the Baltic Sea region, both pluralist and solidarist preferences can be recognised. It is also interesting to point out that some political actors, such as the Nordic States, Germany and the EU, were voicing more for the solidarist primary institutions while the Baltic States, Poland and Russia voiced more for the pluralist institutions.

Let us illustrate that the identity (societal sector) is an issue, which is being securitised by country X. Let us presume that there is a trend of pointing out the insiders and outsiders in the speech acts of the political actors, which qualifies as securitization if the identity of the outsiders is approached as a threat to the identity of the insiders. If the speech acts are successful, the result is the creation of division lines within or between the societies. Let us imagine a situation where Estonian political agents talk widely about weakly developed Estonian identity, which is threatened by the negative factors emerging from the neighbouring

countries, such as broadcasts of the Russian television. The claims are made that Russian television influences Russian nationals in Estonia so that they start identifying themselves rather with Russia. Whilst this issue could just as well be treated as a positive sign of multiculturalism, the fact that it is perceived as a threat to Estonian identity is taken a sign of securitization. Conclusively, there is a lack of mutual identification within the societal sector, which gives the international society a pluralist character. The solidarist features are meanwhile weakened because Estonia wishes or is forced to encapsulate its identity. The division lines within the Baltic Sea region are therefore re-emerging and the feelings of the common Baltic Sea region identity are also diminishing. The aforementioned international society is conclusively taking on features of an international system.

The following Table 3.5. lays out the most important primary and secondary institutions within the Baltic Sea region by locating them under the five sectors of the Copenhagen School theorists.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Primary Institutions</th>
<th>Pluralist Preferences</th>
<th>Solidarist Preferences</th>
<th>Secondary Institutions in BSR&lt;sup&gt;234&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Protectionist</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>CBSS (includes such subunits as BASREC, BAC, BEN, TF-OC, CPN and others)&lt;sup&gt;235&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BEAC&lt;sup&gt;236&lt;/sup&gt;,ND&lt;sup&gt;237&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weaker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shared norms</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hard</td>
<td>Soft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interference</td>
<td>Non-interference</td>
<td>Justified interference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understandings of history</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultural heritage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>societal understanding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identifications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Nature conservation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>234</sup> BSR: Baltic Sea region.
<sup>236</sup> BEAC: Barents Euro Arctic Council.
<sup>237</sup> ND: Northern Dimension.
In summary, the methods of the Copenhagen School fit into the English School theoretical frameworks. Due to the argument that international societies are talked into existence, this method helps to detect the social structure of this international arrangement by using the speech act theory as a method. Additionally, the Copenhagen School’s arguments about the securitization and desecuritization in five sectors are relevant for this study. More precisely, they are in congruence with the arguments of the English school that the formation of an international society can be furthered via the discussions taking place in certain institutions such as market and cultural heritage.
4. SPEECH ACT THEORY AS A METHOD

4.1. Securitization and Desecuritization

The possibility of using the speech act theory as presented in the securitization approach for methodological purposes of this research stood out for its applicability when thinking how to best answer the questions posed in current research. To specify, it bases on the arguments of such theorists of the Copenhagen School (Copenhagen School) as Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. These arguments are best presented in their “Security: A New Framework for Analysis”.

The Copenhagen School belongs amongst the so-called “wideners” of the concept of security in the field of the Security Studies. According to their definition, the wideners want to construct a more radical view of security studies by exploring threats to referents objects, and the securitization of those threats, that are non-military as well as military. 238

Hence, they question the views of the “traditionalists” who claim that the military and state elements have primacy. 239 Rather, they emphasise the importance of other issues as well, such as the ideologies and identities240 which may be represented as threats. These issues do not have to be necessarily military and defence related but may also include elements from sectors other than military. This leads us to the next important part of the securitization theory: the Copenhagen School theorists explain the diversified security agenda by means of dividing the issues under certain sectors which are economic, environmental, political, societal and military sectors. This is based on the type of activities which take place within them.241 More precisely, the Copenhagen School scholars claim that it has become common in international relations to define the identity of systems in terms of particular sectors of

238 Buzan et al.,1998, p. 4.
239 Ibid., p. 1.
240 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
241 Buzan et al.,1998, pp. 7-8.
activity within them, as in “international economic system” or “international political system”. The Copenhagen School scholars identify five sectors which can be distinguished from one another besides the military sector: environmental, societal, political, and economic sectors. In economic sector, for example, the types of activities that take place within it are transit, financial exchange and mutual trade. The issues which might become securitized or desecuritized are mostly related to economic sustainability, welfare and survival which are guaranteed by the access to natural resources, electrical energy, food products, and so forth. In societal sector, the types of activities which take place within it can be integration and disintegration, community formation and religious movements. The issues which can become securitized or desecuritized in societal sector are mostly identity related: race, language, nationality and also the ethnicity. This understanding of security also applies to supranational levels as the international society may be spoken about as being “existentially threatened by situations that undermine [its] rules, norms and institutions […].” My research task in this Thesis is to inquire into whether and how the Russophone population is securitized or desecuritised in Finnish and Estonian public discussions. I will also probe into whether there is a difference between the way in which the dynamics of securitization/desecuritization takes place within different sectors. I will then connect these findings to my English School inspired analysis of the character of the regional international society.

4.2. The use of the speech acts

The Copenhagen School theorists refute the claim of the traditionalists that “security is a reality prior to language, is out there.” Rather, security is a speech act and via the process called “securitization”, security is being socially constructed. Hence, it is not amongst the aims of the Copenhagen School to determine whether there is an explicit threat but how it is nourished in speech acts. In this case, there must be somebody who speaks of something as a threat (securitizes). The following explanation by Buzan, de Wilde and Waever shows exactly what is needed to detect securitization or desecuritization:

---

243 Ibid., p. 22.
244 Weaver, 1995, p. 46.
245 Ibid., p. 55.
246 Buzan et al., 1998, p. 31.
securitization studies aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions [...].

In the present study, I use these insights to analyse the way in which Russophone population is spoken about in Finland and Estonia. More precisely, how the participants in public discussion - the state officials, scholars, observers and the people - speak about it and potentially securitize or desecuritize it? Precise analytical tools are necessary in order to answer to this question. Therefore, the answer will be given in the next chapter which constitutes the technical part of this study. At this point it seems important to further explain what exactly is meant by the speech acts.

Kent Bach, a professor of philosophy who focuses on the philosophy of language and linguistics, emphasizes that communication means expressing certain meanings. Hence, besides the linguistic meaning, it is also possible to say that something is done with words in order to give a message. This is also in accordance with the John Austin’s concept of performative utterances. More precisely, Austin claims that performative utterances are not just describing the way things are, but rather, have a potentiality to create a reality. Part of this reality-creation could be for example a new state of affairs, as explained by Bach.

Hence it follows that the primary attention of the analysis is to study how something is done with words. In our context, this means questioning how the Russophone population is spoken about. Is the Russophone population approached as a threat (securitization) or the opposite, e.g. not as a threat (desecuritization)? Furthermore, I am interested in whether there is a difference between the way in which the Russophone population is securitized or desecuritized within specific sectors of security in Finland and Estonia respectively. Conclusively, I will integrate the results of the analysis conducted with the help of the speech act theory to the kinds of questions that the English School of IR poses: I will discuss how the speech acts create a reality and also how they may create international societies, systems and world societies.

---

247 Buzan et al., 1998, p.32.
248 Bach in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry.
249 Austin, 1962.
250 Ibid.
251 Bach in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry.
4.3. The “facilitating conditions”

This section addresses the features which can considerably improve the ability to track securitization/desecuritization. The Copenhagen School theorists have defined them as “facilitating conditions”, which they have defined as the “features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization.” 252 Under these features are the speech acts, the securitizing actors and the audience253 – the importance of which will be explained further as I move on. At this point the study will lean towards the claims of Holger Stritzel on facilitating conditions which are found in his article “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond”. Stritzel draws more attention to the facilitating conditions than other Copenhagen School theorists. For example, he argues that the claims or statements about security must be related to the “broader discursive context.” 254 The latter, however, is considered very important for this study. For example, it is a certain kind of situation or context, which makes the speech acts as well as the political actors and events significant. 255 For these vital reasons pointed out by Stritzel, the broader discursive context is outlaid in this study as a Background Study. In this case, the broader discursive context is expected to emerge in result of conducting a short background study of the historical background of the Baltic Sea region international society, Finnish-Russian and Estonian-Russian relations under a separate chapter. Additionally, the selection of three events or cases from contemporary time-reach which would provide a situation that prompts certain speech acts.

Like it was mentioned above, the background study is expected to provide a broader discursive context. This study argues that in new situations, previous knowledge and experiences always matter. Hence, I do not presume that securitization or desecuritization speech acts emerge suddenly out of a bomb blast. It is inescapable to go back in history to really understand why, for example, the Russians are approached differently by Estonian and Finnish state officials. Hence, the broader discursive context refers to how Russophone population has been approached throughout time by Estonians and Finns. In this study, the investigation of historical facts aboutRussophone population in Finland and Estonia starts from the 18th century and stretches to the beginning of the 20th century. Though that chapter

252 Buzan et al., 1998, p.33.
254 Ibid., p. 360.
255 Ibid., p. 367.
carries mainly a descriptive character it is expected to associate the past with the contemporary processes and provide references for contemporary speech acts in result.

Once this is done, it is possible to move to the events/cases which illustrate contemporary discussions around the Russophone population in Estonia and Finland. The events and cases are important because something has to prompt certain speech acts. This could be a process that takes place at the given time in certain context, e.g. migration, aggression or protests. In this study, three sets of events/cases from 21st century were selected and are presumed to have prompted certain speech acts due to the special situations they created: Russian real estate acquisition in Finland, the Bronze Soldier riots in Estonia (April 2007) and the war in Georgia (August 2008). It must be kept in mind that these events or cases do not introduce changes on their own; it is the speech that does it. Conclusively, the speech acts, prompted by certain events or changes in circumstances introduce changes into the wider discursive context and into the prevailing approaches. Additionally, the speech acts may prompts changes on the level of international society as well. The task of this study is to sport in analysed situations the potential for change and to characterise the outcome.

4.4. Links to the English School theoretical framework

In this study, however, the focus is on the international society/societies as understood by the English School (English School) theorists, instead of the security complexes towards which the Copenhagen School theorists widen their theory. 256

The English School theory is primarily interested in tracing the contours of the international society by studying the language which the political actors use. 257 In this research this has taken to mean that international societies can be constructed by words. These words include both the speeches of the state officials as well as public actors and regular people. Within such context, the method proposed by the Copenhagen School theorists seems highly relevant. Besides, the dynamics of international societies which supposedly overlap in Baltic Sea

256 At this study, the Copenhagen School provides a technique (securitization) and contributes to the methodological part. The general conclusions will be suited within the frameworks of another IR Theory – the English School.
257 Dunne et al., 2006
region\textsuperscript{258} can be characterised via the help of dynamics in five sectors provided by the Copenhagen School. Hence to make any conclusions about the Baltic Sea region international society, the concentration has to falls on the dynamics of securitization/desecuritization within any of these five sectors (or all of them).

Conclusively, one of the ways to track the changing character of the Baltic Sea region international society is to analyse securitization/desecuritization in one or more of its sectors. To be more precise, the desecuritization/securitization which concerns the minority issues may unfold in all sectors. Even though this study focuses on discussions on minorities which are most likely spoken about in societal and political sectors, I will keep an eye on the way in which the military, economic and environmental issues may also play important roles or be influenced if any securitization/desecuritization takes place.

It was mentioned in Chapter 3 that the dynamics of desecuritization/securitization may unfold differently within the sectors. The Copenhagen School theorists also emphasise that

the patterns within the different sectors sometimes [do] line up in layer-cake complexes (i.e. with regional patterns in different sectors fitting into the same geographical space) but in general there is too much overlap and interplay among the sectors to warrant them in isolation.\textsuperscript{259}

Based on the above-presented argument and the elaboration by Buzan in his “From International Society to World Society?” it is believed in this research that in case an issue is desecuritized in one sector but securitized within the other, the values accompanying the solidarist primary institutions within the desecuritized sector may start challenging the values of the pluralist primary institutions within the securitized sector.

To conclude, the speech act theory and the securitization/desecuritization prism proposed by the Copenhagen School theorists, helps to answer the questions which in study are asked within the English School theoretical frameworks.

\textsuperscript{258} The explanations and characterizations of those International societies are available under the Chapter on Theory.

\textsuperscript{259} Buzan et al., 1998, p.196.
5. Application of the speech act theory

At this section, it is shown how to analyze the speech acts using the method proposed by the Copenhagen School theorists. The main sources will be various press releases and news article which contain statements, opinions and comments on Russophone population in Estonia and Finland. The materials are expected to demonstrate how the Russophone population is approached – are they securitized or desecuritised? Spoken about as a threat or as an asset?

The Copenhagen School suggests that in order to detect hints of securitization/desecuritization from the texts or speeches, it is necessary to distinguish what types of units are involved in security analysis:260

Firstly, the referent objects which are the issues that are claimed to be essentially threatened.261 In societal sector, such issue can be the identity, e.g. the Estonianess or Finnishness. In political sector it is very often the sovereignty and in military sector, the territory.264

Secondly, there are securitizing actors who securitize issues by saying that the referent object is existentially threatened. In our case, the securitizing actors are the state officials, scholars and observers.

Thirdly, the functional actors who have implications on the processes within the certain sector and who influence the changes taken in security matters.266 In our case, the functional actor

---

261 Ibid.
262 Ibid., pp.120-124.
263 Ibid., pp.140-149.
264 Ibid., p.53.
265 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
266 Buzan et al., 1998, pp.35-36.
can be the EU,\textsuperscript{267} the conflicts in a partner country (e.g. Georgia), the utterances of the president of Russia and so forth.

At this point, it seems essential to emphasise a fourth important unit which the Copenhagen School scholars do no categorize here but which I would nonetheless add - the audience. By following what is said about the audience in the “New Framework”, it seems justified to list it as a “unit involved in security analysis” because only if the audience accepts the securitization moves may the issue be securitized.\textsuperscript{268} In our case, the audience is the Estonian and Finnish people whose “acceptance” or “non-acceptance” is assumed to unfold in their comments to what the securitizing actors say.

To summarize, the above was the characterization of the units which are involved in security analysis. Based on that, some excerpts of analysis both when analyzing the background and the contemporary discussions are shown below.

\textbf{5.1. Contemporary Public Discussions}

It was explained under “Facilitating conditions” why the discursive context matters in our case. Below is an example how I intend to use the securitization approach for my analytical purposes.

It is presumed in this study that changing circumstances prompt certain speech acts and possibly, changes in approaches towards Russians in Finland and Estonia respectively and may, consequently, create conditions for alterations in the character of the regional international society. In this study, three events have been chosen which might have evoked changes in how the Russians are talked about in contemporary Estonia and Finland:

1) The discussions prompted by the Bronze soldier riots in Estonia in April, 2007;
2) The surge in Russian real estate acquisition in Finland;
3) The discussions prompted in Estonia and Finland by the war in Georgia in August 2008.

\textsuperscript{267} The pursuit to join the EU motivated Estonia to soften its approach towards Russia and Russians and brought about the policies of positive encompassment.

\textsuperscript{268} Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25.
The general question in all cases remains: how is the Russophone population securitized or desecuritized? By analysing the ways in which such securitization and desecuritization takes place it is possible to make conclusions about the character of the regional social structure – i.e. of the international society.

5.1.1. Bronze Soldier Riots in Estonia

I will now present a few examples of how Estonian state officials and media (securitizing actors) commented the Bronze Soldier riots which took place in Estonia on 26 and 27 April in 2007. First are the excerpts from the statement given by the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Urmas Paet (Reform Party) on 1 May, 2007:

Russian television channels, whose “freedom” is well known throughout the world, do not show clips of rioters in the streets, but rather of “innocent” citizens of Russian descent being “terrorised” by police officers. They also broadcast news of Estonian police killing detainees and that the Estonian Defence Forces have been given the command to shoot Russians. These are gross lies. […]

This all clearly shows that the future of people of Russian descent in the Estonian Republic is only being used as a rhetorical pretext for “active measures” and our compatriots are being used for greater political gains.  

It reads from this excerpt that according to Paet, the reins of turning Russophone population into a threat are in the hands of Russian officials. Paet does not securitize the Russophone population as such but gives a warning that the Russophone population might be used as a political tool. What is interesting about the words of Paet is that he desecuritizes the Russian speaking minority within the societal sector by way of expressing his sympathies towards these “compatriots”. Conclusively, this speech act was interesting for the reason that Paet was securitizing within the political sector while simultaneously desecuritizing in the societal sector.

Paet’s speech act is typical amongst those which followed the Bronze Soldier riots. The following speech acts are examples of other types. The first is uttered by Kristiina Ojuland in Kai Kalamees’s article entitled “Poliitikud kutsuvad rahvast säilitama rahu” (Politicians call people to maintain peace) in Postimees on 28 April, 2007:


First Vice-President of the Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament), representative of the Reform Party.
The inflamed feelings must not burst. Estonian youngsters can demonstrate their supremacy in these matters by not being subjected to the provocative appeals. Russia waits eagerly to organize a fight between Estonian and Russian youngsters.\textsuperscript{271}

Ojuland warns that Russia waits for an opportunity to provoke conflict between Estonians and Russians. Hence, Estonians should be cautious and not to react to the provocations of Russians in Estonians. Although this speech act may seem as desecuritization of Russians within the societal sector, the fact that Ojuland maintains a conflictual distinction between Estonian and Russian youngsters makes it a securitizing speech act. In other words, the Russophone population is securitized in a societal sector.

The second comment is by the former Prime Minister and current Minister of Economic Affairs and Communications, Juhan Parts, who refers to the fact that it is not the Estonian Russians who are the real threat but rather, the influences from neighbouring Russia:

The main obstacles of integration have been the developments in Russia, the Kremlin propaganda and a clear counteraction. Moscow wishes for Russians over here to form the fifth column and not to grow up as Estonian citizens.\textsuperscript{272}

Parts’s message is similar to Ojuland’s. He also securitizes the Russophone population in Estonia in societal sector by explaining what to his opinion are the real causes behind the failed integration. To hint that the Russophone population in Estonia is manipulated, he creates a threat to Estonianness. Moreover, by calling them the “fifth column” he also securitizes the Russophone population in military sector.

The mentioning of a “fifth column” is noteworthy at this point. The discussion on the fifth column\textsuperscript{273} in the Estonian territories has been going on for years. In Estonian case, fifth column is seen as an anti-state force, which is loyal to Russia and is represented by Russians.\textsuperscript{274}

\textsuperscript{271}Kalamees, 2007.
\textsuperscript{272}Koch, 2007.
\textsuperscript{273}The Thesaurus explains the “fifth column” as: 1) a group of people who act traitorously and subversively out of a secret sympathy with an enemy of their country. Originally, it refers to Franco sympathizers in Madrid during the Spanish Civil War: statement in 1936 that the insurgents had four columns marching on Madrid and a fifth column of sympathizers in the city ready to rise and betray it.
\textsuperscript{274}Some examples: Toomepuu, 2006; \textit{PM Online}, 2007.
A considerable part of the online commentators interpreted the situation in a similar way although numerous were also securitizing the Russophone population. The following comment originates from the online discussion given to the Mart Arop’s article “Lumpeni pale” (The face of Lumpen) in Postimees on 28 April, 2007:

What happened on the streets of Tallinn is just a prelude to the bigger opera. Watch who is soon-soon marching towards Estonia. Their technique is old and tested. First they will smuggle their compatriots to the near abroad, then the mass-riots will be organized there, with the bit of bloodletting being of good use. Well then there is enough reason to start a war and save their compatriots.  

This can be taken as an example of securitization of Russophone population in Estonia. By way of envisaging their presence in Estonia as a prelude to an invasion and occupation, the presence of Russophone population is securitized within the military sector.

The following speech acts are good examples of firstly, desecuritization and secondly, securitization of Russophone population. The first one is interesting for the reason that it was told by Rein Raud, the rector of Tallinn’s University, in Eesti Päevaleht on 28 April:

I hope from my whole heart that both Estonian and Russian nationals will have enough nerve and dignity and what most important – the strength to see one another and continue talking with each other in a humane way. That Estonians would understand that amongst their Russian compatriots there is a tiny bit of those who vandalize and riots by hiding behind the political slogans, and that Estonian Russians would not see dedicated nationalist in every Estonian; the author of anonymous and poisonous online comments.

The second one is a typical online comment which was given to “Lumpeni pale”:

It is naïve to think that certain groups will ever recognise or respect the Estonian state. Endless negotiations and integration calls are just a topic with what the other side manipulates and fools. Such contingent, which publicly mocks Estonian state and destroys its flag, must be treated with the severest methods, starting from depriving their residence permits.

Raud’s speech act is a good example of an attempt to desecuritize the Russophone population. It calls for recognition that there is no base for mutual enmity between Estonians and

---

Russians and emphasizes that they are compatriots with one another. In other words, he wants to emphasize that it is normal to keep the approaches towards compatriots desecuritized both from the side of Estonians and Russians. Neither one represents threats to the other side. Hence, Estonianness is actually not threatened by the presence of Russians in Estonia, and it is only a small group whose members outlive their rage by hiding behind political slogans.

The second comment, however, is a good example how the Russophone population is securitized in a political sector. Certain Russians are disrespectful towards the symbols of the Estonian state and hence, they threaten the symbols that constitute the sovereign Estonian state.

To conclude, it seems that the Bronze Soldier riots lead to the securitization of the presence of Russophone population in numerous sectors, such as political, military and societal. Simultaneously however, the attempts were made to desecuritize the issue in a societal sector. Further conclusions will be drawn in a following chapter.

5.1.2. Russian Real Estate Acquisition in Finland

I will now move to my next point of interest: how the surge in Russian real estate acquisition in Finland has influenced the speech acts in Finnish public discussions? What kind of securitization or desecuritization of Russians in Finland has prompted and what does this tell us about the character of the regional international society? I will analyse a set of articles published in Finnish newspapers as well as on-line discussions on the topic. The first example is from an article published in *Karjalan Maa* newspaper on 27 of November, 2005 entitled “Venäläiset innostuneet lomaileman Suomessa” (Russians are enthusiastic to spend their holidays in Finland). The following quotation by Esko Venejärvi, a project manager at UPM-Kymmene interviewed in the article, is a speech act which has as its topic the Russian real estate acquisition:

This autumn there has been more demand than ever before, but we have not had suitable places. Russians are enthusiastic about larger sizes where it is possible to build more holiday houses.\(^{278}\)

\(^{278}\) Ignatius, 2005.
The article makes several references to “wealthy Russians”, to the fact that properties they are interested in must be “high-level” and “large-size properties”. Therefore, the article refers towards new profitable business opportunities involved with increasing demand of the Russian real estate acquirers: they want to buy more in Finland, they have a lot of money and they want to buy large properties. Russian property buying in Finland is thus treated as an economic opportunity. The article on the whole develops into an argument which calls to open the economic sector to the Russian real estate acquirers.

The next speech act is from an article entitled “Venäläiset ostavat yhä enemmän kiinteistöjä Kaakkois-Suomesta” (Russians buy even more real estate from South-East Finland) published in Helsingin Sanomat on 10 December, 2006. The message is very similar to the previous one in that it approaches Russian property buying in Finland as an economic matter. Its author Juhani Saarinen argues that

more and more often, the real estate or apartment buyers in South East Finland are Russians. According to the municipality representatives, land owners, and real estate brokers, the Russian enthusiasm about land and domicile is growing.279

Juhani Saarinen also cites the chief of land use of the city of Imatra, Hannu Ojala who does not think that Russian real estate acquisition may cause any trouble:

According to [Ojala] Russian enthusiasm to buy [properties] does not cause any problems. “It adds activities to the district. Every time a house is built, it brings jobs.”

Ojala’s words can thus be thought of as a desecuritizing speech act whereby securitization is reversed and the issue of Russian property buying is moved out of the threat–defence sequence and into the ordinary sphere of economic activity.

Heikki Sopanen in his article in Helsingin Sanomat on 2 February, 2007 entitled “Kunnissa odotetaan venäläisten tonttikaupoista muutakin bisnestä” (Municipalities expect more than just business from Russian land trade), brings forward a set of speech acts which can also be interpreted as instances of desecuritization. Firstly, he cites Harri Anttila, Rautjärvi mayor:

---

279 Saarinen, 2006.
280 Ibid.
Harri Anttila sees more possibilities, not threats, in Russian real estate acquisition.\textsuperscript{281} 

Harri Anttila’s speech act explains the aforementioned statement:

The ten-years-old threat perceptions do not fit into today’s world, although I can understand the feelings of some people related to certain phenomena.\textsuperscript{282}

Secondly, Sopanen refers to Jari Willman (mayor of Taipalsaari) and Vesa Jäppinen (mayor of Ruokolahti) who agree with Anttila that

it is not necessary to criticize Russians who buy land in Finland

and precisely Willman believes that

negative generalisations about Russians are dangerous and not rational.\textsuperscript{283}

A column by Riikka Happonen from \textit{Hämeen Sanomat} newspaper follows essentially the same logic. It can be analysed as a speech act whereby Russian real estate buying in Finland is desecuritised by way of examining it within the economic sector:

Why there is such a fuss about the real estate buying by brother Russians? It seems that hate towards Russians is carried forward from generation to generation. The concerns of the war generation are understood: they think that it is wrong when the “enemy” buys land, which they have fought for Finland. However, the wartime is over and contemporary land buyers from across the border will not come with hostile aims. They bring abundant amount of money to the real estate brokers in addition to the shopping centres of the municipalities. Or is this all about jealously?\textsuperscript{284}

This speech act is best analysed as a response to numerous securitization moves by people who consider it dangerous or embarrassing that the land for what Finnish soldiers fought, is being sold. Happonen desecuritizes the issue, firstly, by reminding the readers of the fact that today, less than 0,1 percent of Finnish territory is in Russian possession and that according to official statistics, the interest is declining. She argues that most Russians willing to buy real estate in Finland are “normal families” instead of “mafia bosses willing to launder money”. Also, Happonen suggests that today it is the economy and economic profit that matters the

\textsuperscript{281} Sopanen, 2007.
\textsuperscript{282} Sopanen, 2007.
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{284} Happonen, 2008.
most. Russian real estate acquiring is profitable to Finland. In order to gain that profit, the approaches towards Russians must be desecuritized not only in economic sector but in other sectors as well.

The common trait between the aforementioned speech acts is that they all emphasise that the growing Russian real estate acquisition is something positive namely because of the economic benefits it may bring. In other words, when the presence of Russians in Finland is approached from within the economic sector, the issue is frequently desecuritized – or not securitized to start with, as was the case in the article of *Karjalan Maa*. On this basis the agents also argue for the necessity to desecuritize the old-established approaches towards Russians. For example, the fact that Ojala, Willman and Jäppinen do not see any problems in rising Russian real estate acquisition can be read as an attempt to desecuritise such approaches towards Russians that could potentially securitize their presence in Finland.

Indeed, the very attempt of the above cited agents to desecuritize Russian property buying in Finland can be taken to suggest that the issue has previously been securitized. Some illustrations of it can be found in a parallel online discussion going on at SYNTY net’s discussion forum under the name “Venäläisten maanosto Suomessa” (Russian land acquisition in Finland). The discussion lasted for 1.5 years since 4 February, 2007 and received some 115 comments by various people who are analysed as potential securitizing actors. At the beginning of 2007, many comments were similar to the following ones:

> Is it right that Finland is being sold piece-by-piece?

> My heart would bleed if Finland were sold.

> We can testify that soon we will have a noticeable Russophone population who start to claim their rights via the Finnish legislature.

> All such bad things as methanol, Eastern mafia, prostitution etc come from *Russia*.

> The fact that we sell the land which the veterans freed for us is a sad phenomenon.

> I admit: I fear Russians. I have sucked it [this fear] from my mother’s milk and received it as the legacy of my father.\(^{285}\)

---

\(^{285}\) Synty net’s discussion forum.
First and foremost, such comments securitize Russian property buying by way of arguing that Russians will slowly buy *all* the Finnish territory. These speech acts operate on the basis of previous experiences of war and Russian conquest which I have introduced under the background study. Due to some historical reasons, Russians can be easily approached as foreign intruders who want to dominate over the smaller states like the Finland and who necessarily bring with them many bad habits which do not fit with the Finnish life-style. In the latter case, the growing number of Russians is argued to cause threats to Finnishness which means that Russians are being securitized in the societal sector as is the case when the growing number of Russophone population within Finland is discussed in threat terms. However, the securitization also involves military sector: Russian real estate acquisition is approached as a territorial threat – an argument to which reference to the veterans adds further momentum.

Amongst the commentators, there were also the speech acts of the “desecuritizers”. The following ones, for example, are some examples whereby the Russians are desecuritized in the economic and military sector:

Land selling to a foreigner does not mean that Finnish territory will shrink in result. This land continues to belong to Finland. If a Finn buys land abroad, it does not become a Finnish territory but is still the territory of that country.

If I had land which I wanted to sell, I would sell it to the one who offers more money. Here, the nationality does not matter. Everybody does this way.

Is it not so that those rich people from St Petersburg already have had their residences at Saimaa beaches [in past]?286

In the first comment, the commentator is desecuritizing Russophone population in military sector by denying the logic which suggest that property buying amounts to an invasion and conquest. This example is intended to encourage people to wake up from their fears that Finnish territory will disappear in result of Russian real estate acquisition. The second commentator desecuritizises Russians in the economic sector while the third one relates present to the past which should show that although the Russian real estate acquisition was

286 Synty net’s discussion forum.
proliferating in Saimaa already in 19 century, this has not brought with it any essential threats to Finland.

Another article published in *Helsingin Sanomat* on 15 January, 2008 (edited by Irina Vähäsarja and Juhani Saarinen) - “Imatran omakotialueille nousee venäläisten datšoja” (Russians datchas rise at Imatra’s residential areas) which received 98 comments. From that on-line discussion, the following speech acts are noteworthy when trying to track securitization or desecuritization:

Now Russians are buying Finland, which they could not get in war. Children and grandchildren of those who defended Finland are selling away the fatherland due to their greed for money. […] Will there soon be a risk to internal and external security?

In ten years, more than half of Finnish beaches will be under Russian ownership. We will lose even the little bit that is left of Karelia.

Renting real estate and land to any foreigner is ok but not selling. Especially not when it results in a formation of a strong Russian society. When this escalates sufficiently enough, the difficulties will follow.287

All the aforementioned speech acts can be analysed as securitizing approaches towards Russian property buying. The first and second arguments do securitize property buying by way of examining it within the military sector. The first comment is interesting for the reason that it takes issue with the type of argumentation that I analysed above – i.e. it desecuritized property buying by way of examining it within the economic sector. Here, however, search for economic profit is characterised as “greed for money”. It is argued that money making should never be more important than the fact that Finnish territory is owned by Finns.

Economic profit (here: “greed for money”) should never be more important than the fact that Finnish territory is owned by Finns. If this is ignored, Finnish security is at stake. The third comment securitizes Russophone population in a societal or political sector. It suggests that formation of a strong Russian society can become both a political and a societal threat.

As amongst the previous discussion, here also some commentators tried to desecuritize the issue. There was a considerable number of the desecuritizing speech acts similar to the following one:

287 Vähäsarja & Saarinen, 2008.
The more ordinary Russians have to deal with Finnish people, the less Nashi’s or other’s groundless propaganda infects us. And perhaps it is even profitable for Finns to deal with Russians, maybe the useless prejudices start crumbling a little […] Russia is and will remain the neighbour of Finland. Shouldn’t we then strive towards normal and diversified relations between the neighbours?288

The speech act desecuritizes Russians by way of examining the issue within several sectors. Firstly, concerning the societal sector, it points out that there will be less ethnicity- and nation-based accusations from the Russian side if Russians and Finns interact more. In other words, there will be fewer threats to Finnishness. Secondly, the desecuritization involves political sector in the sense of pointing out that in any case, it is better for Finland to have good relations with Russia and that normal relations between Finns and Russians are a road to this. In result, the desecuritization also involves the economic sector: when Russians and Finns interact, Finland and Russia have good-neighbourly relations and Finns get rid of their prejudices, it gives profit to Finland.

Next I will present excerpts from the discussion that followed after an article entitled “Soini lopettaisi maan myynnin venäläisille” (Soini would stop selling land to Russians) was published in Helsingin Sanomat on 25 February, 2008. The article forwards the statements of Timo Soini who leader of the nationalistic-conservative True Finns party.289 The article prompted a set of interesting speech acts amongst the on-line commentators:

What if there will be a crisis between Russia and Finland. Is it possible that these lands owned by Russians will be used as a political instrument? Imagine a scenario where Russia incorporates lands owned by Russians into Russia.290

This is yet another example how the Russian property buying may become securitized. By way of arguing that the Russian property buying can become a military threat, the commentator securitizes an activity which unfolds within the economic sector.

The next bit of information is the broadcast “45 Minuuttia” (45 Minutes) in television channel MTV3 on 19 November, 2008.291 This broadcast and the following media releases prompted more securitizing speech acts than I had seen previously when reading other materials since

289 True Finns Party is the most nationalistic party in Finland. It is also an anti-EU party.
290 HS, 2008.
291 Malin & Eronen, 2008.
2005. The information is related to a Russian businessman in Finland, Denis Fokin, who also made abundant real estate business in Finland. The broadcast revealed that he also had close contacts in the Kremlin and was suspected of money laundering. More on that case can be found under “Heuristics” and “Results of Analysis”. Here, I will present some speech acts from the articles on the topic. First article is edited by Tuula Malin and Jussi Eronen at MTV 3.fi and entitled: “Kenraali: Venäläisten maanhankinta turvallisuusriski” (General: Russian real estate acquisition is a security risk). The article cites General Hannu Luotola,

it is a serious security threat when Russians buy land near strategically important places for example, close to information antennas.\textsuperscript{292}

Luoutola adds that in case of crisis, the fact that Russians own land in Finland can easily become a security threat. Meanwhile, the same article reveals the stances of the Finnish Ministry of Defence. According to the ministry’s official stance, there are no security risks involved with Russian real estate acquisition and one should not be concerned about it. Hence, this official stance aims to encourage desecuritization of Russian real estate acquisition in military sector.

The 292 comments to “Tonttikauppa turvallisuuden kustannuksella” (Land trade in the name of security) at Jussi Eronen’s MTV-3 blog are overwhelmingly securitizing when it comes to the real estate acquisition of Russians but the comments also touch upon the issue of Russophone population more generally. Before 19 November, 2008 I could not find so many securitizing comments in one single on-line discussion. Now, most of the comments were securitizing and some of them very radical. Here are some comments to the article in Jussi Eronen’s blog:

For a long time, it has been on the news how Russians will buy Finland, piece-by-piece. Now, quickly, we must throw the monkey wrench in the works and the Finnish government must awake. What grand-daddies fought for us, we will give away for money!

The increasing Russophone population means that they start demanding rights and Putin is willing to defend these rights. Sudeten-Germans may tell which the traditional means of war are.

\textsuperscript{292} Malin & Eronen, 2008.
Finns cannot be so dumb as to let this [land selling] continue! Whenever we have to deal with Russia, it must be known from history how things are! […] Shall we sacrifice another generation?!?!?!

Finns are so greedy for money that they keep on selling to the point where there is danger that all land and sites are sold to Russians. It does not take long till Finland will be filled with Russians and Finns are chased away. 293

All four speech acts securitize the presence of Russians within Finland within the military sector, they see territorial threats in Russian real estate acquisition or in Russophone population. First comment also emphasizes that the Finnish state officials must do something in order to “save” the state from the bad plans Russia with Finland. Hence, the securitizing actor tries to securitize the Russian real estate acquisition by way of examining it within a political sector. The second comment also involves political sector because it claims that it is Putin who threatens Finland as a state by using the methods described (similar to the methods Hitler used to occupy of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939). The fourth speech act, however, securitizes the approaches towards Russian real estate acquisition in military and political sectors.

5.1.3. Finnish Interpretations of the War in Georgia

Finally, I will give a short example what kind of speech acts the war in Georgia prompted amongst Finnish people and state officials. In first order, I will bring an example from the same Hanna Kaarto’s article which I also used in my introductory part, “Katainen: Nyt tarvitaan Venäjä-realismia” (Katainen: Now we need realism in relations with Russia), published in Helsingin Sanomat on 19 August, 2008. The article contains two speech acts by the Minister of Finance Jyrki Katainen’s speech acts which are particularly interesting for the purposes of this analysis:

Russian arguments about the rights to defend its citizens by using the military force in the territory of another country are chilling. In quite a few of neighbouring countries, there is a large Russophone population. 294

This speech act stands out as a warning about the possible military threat to the countries with the considerable Russophone population. The next sentence, however, eliminates the

293 Eronen, 2009.
294 Kaarto, 2008.
possibility that such threat perception concerns Finland. Firstly, the journalist Hanna Kaarto argues that

according to Katainen, the assessment according to which Finland will not become a target of Russia’s military attack, is still valid.\(^{295}\)

In his own words, Katainen explains that

[first and foremost, the Georgian crisis influences Finland externally. It tests the foundations of the EU-Russian cooperation and strains the already chill relations between the USA and Russia.\(^ {296}\)]

Although in this speech act there are no direct references to the Russophone population, such references were made in a previous speech act. Hence, Katainen attempts to desecuritize the Russophone population within the military sector. This is evident when he says that “Finland will not become a target” and that “Georgian crisis influences Finland externally”.

Meanwhile, the on-line comments to the same article suggest that not everybody agrees with the desecuritizing logic of Katainen:

The danger is not at all solely an external matter to Finland but also an internal matter. The presence and continued growth of the Russian speaking and cultural minority has to be taken as what it is, a button which Russia pushes in order to gain benefit from something.\(^ {297}\)

With this speech act, the commentator securitizes the Russophone population within the political sector. S/he suggests that the Russian state has levers (Russophone population in Finland) which enable it to bargain with Finland concerning the matters of Russia’s interests. If Finland does not comply, it may result in Russia’s military attack (‘pushing the button’).

An important aspect is that the reactions to the war in Georgia are also reflected from in the comments made in response to the Russian real estate acquisition. For example, in 2005 increase of Russian real estate acquisition in Finland was at times approached as a territorial threat in a number of speech acts. However, amongst the 292 comments to the blog

\(^{295}\) Kaarto, 2008.Ibid.
\(^{296}\) Ibid.
\(^{297}\) Ibid.
“Tonttikauppaa turvallisuuden kustannuksella” in 2009, several commentators link these two issues - Russian real estate buying in Finland and the events in Georgia:

We will be in the same situation with Georgia if the land selling to Russians continues and their number increases. Behind somebody’s fabricated accusations they may do whatever they want to protect their compatriots.

We must understand how things went in Georgia related to South Ossetia. Russians bought plenty of their [Georgian] land but their aim was not to become [Georgian] citizens but to keep Russian passports purposefully. When Russia and Georgia came into conflict, Russia intentionally announced that it has a right and a duty to defend its citizens so it could hide behind that explanation [its] attack against an independent country and shifting of its borders.

This way slowly leads to the problems similar to the ones in South-Ossetia. Russians are blindly gathered to Finland. I know some Russians in Finland and most part of them do not understand Finnish and do not even want to learn it, never follow Finnish news and do not know anything about Finland. They follow only Moscow’s mass communication or are on the Russian lead. Just remind what Putin said in autumn 2008: Russia has a right to send tanks to where Russians are, for example to Southern Karelia if they feel like it.298

These comments show how, after the war in Georgia, the Russian real estate acquisition took new turns towards more vocal securitization of the Russian speaking population which happened within various sectors of security. To further explain, the war in Georgia facilitated securitization. After that, it was easier to argue that the presence of Russophone population is a serious threat to the Finnish territory. Hence, such speech acts securitized Russophone population in the military sector but up to some extent also in the political sector. The fact that Russians are buying land and property in Finland is described as a pretext for Russian aggression.

Real estate acquisition and events in Georgia were also linked in the discussion “Millaisena naapurimaana sinä pidät Venäjää Kaukasian sodan ja Euroopan kaasukiistan jälkeen?” (What kind of neighbour you think Russia is after war in Caucasia and the European gas dispute?) which was initiated by Suomen Kuvalehti on 12 January, 2009, and which has received about 70 comments:

298 Eronen, 2009.
There are rumours in Russia that Russia plans to occupy Finland and that is why it supports real estate buyers. Because then their number grows and the accessibility will close when Russia starts to rule. Why they do not speak of that in Finland?299

In addition to that comment, a similar but more radical one was found within the comments to the article entitled “Katainen: Nyt tarvitaan Venäjä-realismia” which has been used in several places in this study. There was an example where the war in Georgia and the Russian real estate acquisition were linked in the securitizing speech act:

Imagine a situation, similar to the crisis in Georgia happening in Finland, where Russia decides to defend for example its citizens in Southern Karelia by using force, because Finland requires the real estate and other taxes from them and approaches them accordingly. Additionally, Russophone population has tolerated the constant picking at them as “Russkies” (“ryssä”) and anger on their shoulders. Russia decides to send from Nuijamaa border station, across the rented area of the canal, the armoured columns to Lappenranta. The air forces bomb the city […] The above-presented picture seems entirely possible in the light of recent happenings. […]

In this comment, it is possible to see explicit relations between Russian real estate acquiring and the possible territorial threats it, according to this commentator, involves. The speech act follows the same logic as the previous ones. The first one suggests that Russian authorities are behind the acquisitions which would be in congruence with the speech acts where Russophone population was referred to as a ‘button’ which Russia chooses to push when it wants. The second comment, however, suggests that a large-scale war could follow if Finland does something Russia does not like, for example, the enforcement of additional taxes.

Nevertheless, all on-line discussions also included desecuritizing speech acts, such as the following ones, given to “Katainen: Nyt tarvitaan Venäjä-realismia”:

The fact that there is a large Russophone population in Finland, does not make the threat relevant, because Finland hardly wants to attack this minority with the army in order to advance some kind of foreign policy agenda.

When it comes to freezing, I can console Katainen. Russia has no intents to start defending its citizens in a Finnish territory, if Finland does not have any intent to use military force against those Russians living in Finland.

299 SKnetin Toimitus, 2009.
In Finland, there is no ground for worrying about Russia because we do not have a large Russophone population colonizing an insurgent district, which wants to secede from the main territory. It is no possible to compare the Finnish and Georgian situations, they are so different. Russia has so many interests to protect in Finland [...]. As we have read from the pages of Hesari, the only Russia’s European neighbours which do have a considerable Russophone population are Estonia, Latvia, Byelorussia and Ukraine. The old wisdom of Paasikivi ended with the conclusion that for the sake of the success of Finland, it is necessary to maintain good relations with Russia.

The preceding speech acts try to assure that Russians in Finland are not a threat within the military sector. Finland treats its Russophone population well and follows the advice of Paasikivi to maintain good relations Russia. Therefore, there are no reasons for military aggression on Finnish soil due to the presence of Russian nationals. The Georgian case is totally different from Finnish. The third comment points out that the Russophone population in Finland is not even large enough to pose any threats. In case of Georgia’s South Ossetia, Russian citizens comprised 90 per cent and the territory itself had had several bloody conflicts with Georgia before. In other words, Georgian rule was not welcomed by South Ossetia. As for Estonia, Russians comprise 24.9 per cent while in Finland, this number is only 0.5 per cent.

5.1.4. Estonian Interpretations of the War in Georgia

I will now move to analyzing the speech acts which were prompted by the war in Georgia in Estonia. The focus is again on the public discussions and the utterances of the Estonian state officials. First is the statement of Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Urmas Paet, on 9 August, 2008:

If military aggression [on the part of Russia] is being justified by the need to protect Russian citizens, then this should cause concern for all countries with Russian nationals living within their borders.  

The second was issued by the chair member of the Noor-Isamaaliit (Young Fatherland Union) Veiko Lukmann, in “IRLi noored kutsuvad Gruusia sõja tõttu astuma Kaitseliitu” (Young IRL members call to join the Defence League because of the war in Georgia), published in Postimees also on 9 August, 2008:

---

300 Paet, 2008.
301 Youth organization of the Fatherland and Res Publica Party (IRL).
Under the label to protect its citizens, Russia may attack whichever state. The example that Russia has created in Georgia is alarming to all bordering countries.\textsuperscript{302}

Both statements were given shortly after the war in Georgia had started. They can be treated as securitizing speech acts as they both issue a warning to all countries that have Russian nationals living within their borders. They turn Russophone population into a threat by way of suggesting that the presence of Russian nationals may cause intervention from the side of Russia. Russians are thus characterised as a threat to the sovereignty and territory of the host country. In other words, securitization here takes place within the political and military sectors. Therefore, the war in Georgia intensified speech acts which are inclined towards securitization.

The next comments to the article “Kohalikud venelased peavad konflikti ainupõhjustajaks Gruusiat” (Local Russians think that Georgia is the sole force who caused the conflict) demonstrates what kinds of securitizing speech acts the war prompted amongst the audience, i.e. public discussions:

Some Russians would have declared with gratitude that it is Estonia’s fault. They are waiting for Russian forces to come and “punish” Estonia.

Isn’t it time to send away all the Russian citizens from here, so the Russian “peacekeepers” wouldn’t have any arguments to come and defend them here?

There are extremely many red passport holders [i.e. Russian citizens] living in Ida-Virumaa [North-East Estonia]. One day they decide they want independence and Russia will support them. And will send them weaponry and will give the red passports to the rest of them. And what shall Estonia do? Of course it should respond. And then Russia will be at the doorstep and it will once again protect its citizens and steps freely over the Narva River and starts to bomb the inhabitants of our Tapa, Rakvere and Maardu.

So this is what the brotherly help to the USSR states means…Russian hordes were smuggled into all 15 republics in order to teach literacy and establish heavy industry. These days, trains full of Russians came to Estonia, they inhabited the whole districts. They ate Estonian meat and drunk Estonian milk but despite that, remained in disgrace of the local nation […] They came to the foreign country and immediately, this corner became theirs! Now they are fussing in Georgia and it must also become theirs.\textsuperscript{303}

\textsuperscript{302} Sulbi, 2008.

\textsuperscript{303} Sulbi, 2008.
All three speech acts are similar by way of securitizing the Russophone population within the military sector. It is suggested by the securitizing actors that some Russians in Estonia (i.e. the Russian citizens in Estonia) necessarily wait for the entrance of the Russian forces to Estonia. Hence, they are threat to Estonia’s territorial integrity. The second comment, put together with the third, is a clear example of the way the Russophone population (especially the Russian citizens in Estonia) was securitized amongst the Estonians who commented the news articles during and after the war in Georgia. They are well understood within the context of Estonian history, which was introduced under the background study and which the commentators referred to very often. More specifically, it was common to relate the historical background, Bronze soldier riots and the war in Georgia.

The following speech acts are good examples of this, taken from the on-line discussion to “Vähi: soovitaksin Eesti politikutel natuke vait olla” (Vähi: I would recommend Estonian politicians to shut up for a while) and “Kagan: Gruusia süü oli olla Venemaa naaber” (Kagan: Georgia’s fault was to be the neighbour of Russia) published in Postimees on 11 August, 2008:

Let’s not be stupid as Georgians, let’s give Sillamäe and Narva and Kohtla-Järve (South Ossetia) to Russians right away and Pechory in addition (Abkhazia). Think a little, isn’t Estonia a bit like Georgia? A short forecast for the next half-year: FSB tells Linter and his nightmen to organize another disarray. The FSB men themselves hide behind the corner and kill Linter\(^{304}\) with their own hands in order to have a new martyr. Estonia does not protect those fighting for freedom and guess what’s gonna come out of it?\(^{305}\)

The Baltic States will be next if Russia won’t be stopped now! We even don’t have to do anything – Estonia has plenty of Linter-like provocators. 20 men will make noise for two weeks based on fabricated accusations and the Russian tanks will already come across the Narva bridge.\(^{306}\)

Both speech acts evidently securitizing the Russophone population within the military and political sectors. In other words, Linter who is claimed to be the “extended hand of Russia” in Estonia presumably agitates others to come up with a protest in order to give a pretext for

\(^{304}\) A presumed contriver of the Bronze soldier riots.

\(^{305}\) Henno, 2008.

\(^{306}\) Kase, 2008.
Russia to attack Estonia. Hence, the commentators claim there is an existential threat to Estonian territory.

In more general terms, the last four speech acts imply that what happened in Georgia is an example of how things may develop in Estonia. The speech acts are intensified by the discursive context created by the Bronze Soldier riots, which were already seen as a warning what happens if Russia does not like something that Estonia does. The referent object is Estonia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as the Russophone population within its borders may be used as a pretext by Russia to launch a military attack against Estonia. The Russophone population is securitized both within the political sector (Estonia is not sovereign in its decisions) and military sector (it plays with the thought of a Russian military aggression). This way of thinking resonates with the discussion on the “fifth column” in the Estonian territories, which was highlighted earlier when I was analyzing the speech acts during the Bronze Soldier riots in Estonia.

Not all the speech acts were however securitizing. Amongst the comments to “Kohalikud venelased peavad konflikti ainupõhjustajaks Gruusiat”, there were few people who tried to desecuritize the Russophone population in Estonia:

The “news” title is churlish and incites hostility. Based on an inadequate poll, the whole Russian community is being banged on the basis of the national distinctiveness.

The article should be entitled “some Russians” or “part of Russians.” One should never label the whole population. Why, after all, the local Russians blame Georgia? The answer is easy: because Russia’s propaganda machine works to its fullest. I have watched Russian TV channels out of personal interest […].

We should ban the transmittance of the deceitful Russian TV Channels in Estonian territory – this is where all the problems originate.

All three speech acts desecuritize the Russophone population within the societal sector. The message is firstly, to stop labelling the whole Russophone population. Secondly, a solution is given how to avoid the alienation of the Russophone population: an end to Russian TV Channels which are claimed to be littered by the Russian propaganda. In general, the commentators want to emphasise that Russians are not a threat to Estonia or Estonianness.
Rather, it is the Russian propaganda machine which is a threat and which hence is compromising the Russians in Estonia.

The next statement by Minister Urmas Paet published on 23 September 2008 is also an instance of desecuritisation:

> I deny categorically that Russians in Estonia are Russia’s fifth column. We do not have any kind of fifth column and the one, who tells such stories, causes unnecessary stress in society.307

There is a time difference which may explain the change in rhetoric (Paet’s first statement was given on 9 August). Furthermore, the message is part of his interview given to the Russian-language newspaper Molodjož Estonii. Paet seems to take note of the fact that right when the war in Georgia broke out, the Estonian audience accepted the securitization moves of the securitizing actors and the Russophone population became heavily securitized.

Such intensive securitization arguably prompted Paet to desecuritize the approach towards the Russophone population in Estonia. Instead of the Russophone population, he sees as a threat the expansion of a gap between Estonians and Russians which involves the societal sector. In the contexts of this research, the existence of such gap between the nationals of two Baltic Sea region member states (Estonia and Russia) means there are disagreements in the sphere of common identity, culture and interpretations of history. In other words, the cohesion of the Baltic Sea region international society might be compromised in result of certain events, which lead to oppositions in the society of any member state.

### 5.2. Findings from the speech acts

#### 5.2.1. Estonian approaches

The official statements of the Prime Minister of Estonia, Andrus Ansip, the President of Estonia, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, Urmas Paet on the Bronze soldier riots and the war in Georgia were read and analysed following the way shown under *Speech Act Theory As a Method*. This analysis also included 100 newspaper

---

articles from such Estonian daily newspapers as Postimees, Eesti Päevaleht, Õhtuleht and Eesti Ekspress. All newspapers have their on-line versions where people can comment the respective articles. During the crisis situations such as the Bronze Soldier riots, one article can receive approximately 70 comments from on-line commentators or even more. Special editions may also be issued. For example, during the war in Georgia, Postimees issued “War in Georgia” included to the regular newspaper. Its articles were also available on-line and the number of comments they received was at times very high due to the heightened interest in the events in Georgia.

The commentators represented variety of social classes. In case of Estonian-version, they were mostly of Estonian nationality although some of Russians were also present. They also had a right to stay anonymous which means that they could express their thoughts considerably freely.

The aim of analysis was to identify whether the Russophone population in Estonia was securitized or desecuritized in result of the Bronze Soldier riots and the war in Georgia. Additionally, the task was to identify in which sector such securitization or desecuritization occurs.

I will start interpreting the results with the findings from the reflections of the Bronze Soldier events. This will be followed by the findings from the statements, comments and articles reflecting the war in Georgia.

The editors of the articles were frequently bringing forward direct allegations that in fact, the authorities of the Russian Federation were the main organizers of the riots. They claimed that the Russophone population was stirred up by Russia via the messages given through the Russian TV broadcasts as well as by certain individuals who were allegedly “bought off” by Russia: Dmitri Klensky, Dmitri Linter and Mark Siryk. Although such claims do not call for Russian-antipathy, the regular people often interpreted it in such way, which means that these messages indeed had securitizing effects. For example, such claims that it is impermissible from the side of Russia to interfere into the decisions of the sovereign Estonia were often interpreted as if the Russophone population also represented Russia in Estonia. These arguments received more justification when Estonian Embassy in Russia as well as the Estonian Ambassador to Russia were attacked by the members of the Nashi youth movement.
and the Russian authorities did nothing to stop it (claimed as violation of Geneva Convention). Due to perceiving Russia as a threat and the Russophone population as the representatives of Russia’s positions, the Russophone population was consequently securitized in political sector.

The Russophone population was also securitized in the military sector, especially by the online commentators. At this point, the historical examples were very often facilitating the securitization. More precisely, they were interpreted as precedents, which are prone to repetition in other contexts. The most frequent case brought out by the on-line commentators was the Russian representatives’ struggle for the autonomy in the mostly Russophone Ida Virumaa in 1993 which can be interpreted as a threat to territorial integrity of Estonia. Allegedly, the struggle was then also supported by the authorities of the Russian Federation. Out of that rose another claim of the commentators: Russophone population (especially Russian citizens in Estonia) is as if the “fifth column” of Russia. Conclusively, they argued that for the reason that this “fifth column” within Estonian borders threatens the territorial integrity of Estonia, it is better if they leave now. For example, some comments did not include more than two words: “Russians out!” Hence, siding current events with the “precedents” from the past was a good example how the Russophone population was securitized in military sector amongst considerable part of the on-line commentators. For the reason that Russophone population’s presence in Estonia threatens the territorial integrity of Estonia, they are being perceived as an existential threat.

I also found speech acts where the Russophone population was securitized in the societal sector. With these speech acts it was often claimed that there is no hope that Russians in Estonia will ever integrate into the Estonian society. They also referred that Russians continue to be the foreign element in Estonian society and hence come to represent the threat to Estonianness.

Some on-line commentators were however not securitizing the presence of Russian minority in Estonia. A considerable part of them agreed with the article editors and state officials that Russia stands behind the riots and their compatriots – the Russophone population in Estonia– is just being used by Russia. For that reason, a considerable part of the

308 Meanwhile, the deseucritizing attempts remained in minority when compared to the number of securitizing speech acts.
commentators as well as newspaper editors and state officials saw a solution in even deeper integration efforts which would increase the loyalty of Russophone population to Estonian state and in result of which, the whole society would benefit. Numerous commentators blamed the Estonian state officials for not doing enough in this matter. Although such comments, statements and articles securitized the approaches towards Russia, the Russophone population was desecuritized. Everybody in Estonia should struggle more to appreciate the presence of these people in order to win their loyalty instead of the Russian Federation.

I will now draw conclusions from the analysis of the speech acts which reflects the war in Georgia. The editors of the articles as well as the state officials did not hesitate to claim that what happened in Georgia, was a Russian aggression against the sovereign state. Although there is a difference between Georgia and Estonia for the reason that Estonia is a member of NATO, this aspect was often forgotten or named as not a certain guarantee in case of threats from Russia. Therefore, they claimed, Estonia is very likely to also become a victim of Russian aggression especially due to the fact that Russia has attacked and occupied the Estonian state before. The memories of that seem to be too recent and the Russian dominion still very well remembered.

The event of Georgia was perceived as a justification that the same may happen again in some other place, not to mention that it is part of Estonian identity to perceive Russia as a threat.

The securitization of the presence of Russophone population in Estonia also achieved new levels of urgency in result of the war in Georgia. The reason behind it is that the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev explained Russia’s military involvement in Georgia with the need to protect its fellow citizens (90 per cent of the population in South-Ossetia are Russian citizens). Consequently, the newspaper editors and the state officials - but especially the online commentators - were warning against the dangerous aspects involved with the presence of Russophone population in any state. Once again, the comparison with the events in Estonia’s Ida Virumaa in 1993 as well as the Bronze Soldier riots and the allegations about the “fifth column” received acuteness in various the speech acts. However, the situation was different than in case the Bronze Soldier riots. Then, numerous commentators or the public actors tended to securitize the Russophone population via securitizing Russia. In other words, they claimed that the presence of the Russophone population as such is not a threat. Rather,
the threat comes from Russia which uses Estonia’s Russophone population as means to its own end.

By concluding from the war in Georgia, the presence of Russian citizens as such was enough to start the war. In order to understand how Estonian public actors and the commentators interpreted that important issue, it is necessary to remember that Russian authorities have accused Estonia for years for the alleged discrimination of the Russophone population there. The public actors and commentators hence perceived that Russia can really talk Estonian Russophone population into “discriminated people” in order to justify thereafter its own right to come with the military power in order to protect the compatriots. Based on that logic, the mere presence of Russophone population (especially the Russian citizens) in Estonia was approached as being dangerous which is why it was securitized in military sector.

Especially amongst the on-line comments, there were numerous radical examples where the Russophone population was securitized in a political sector. In other words, the commentators claimed that Russians are loyal to Russian Federation and do not respect the symbols of the Estonian state. Due such different kind of political loyalty, the sovereignty of the Estonian state was often claimed to be threatened.

For an outlay of the results, it is possible to refer to Table 5.3.

5.2.2. Finnish approaches

In case of Finland, the analysed statements included the ones by the Prime Minister of Finland, Matti Vanhanen, the President of Finland, Tarja Halonen and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Alexander Stubb. In addition to that, about 50 daily newspaper articles mostly from Helsingin Sanomat and Aamulehti were read and analysed. As in case of Estonian dailies, the articles were also accessible online and there was a discussion board for on-line commentators which I could read.

I will firstly bring forward the results of analysis concerning the Russian real estate acquisition in Finland. I will then smoothly continue with the kind of speech acts prompted by the war in Georgia.
When approaching the Russian real estate acquisition in Finland, the most frequent securitizing speech acts of the on-line commentators were closely related to the historical background of Finland. More precisely, they were discouraging the Russian real estate acquisition for the reason that the Finnish territory – land for which their grandfathers had fought for in the war – is now being sold by money to this very nation, which they were fighting against. The number and a more radical character of similar speech acts increased after the broadcast, which revealed the Denis Fokin’s affair in November 2008. The latter also increased the number of those securitizers who claimed that the Russophone population indeed brings bad influences to Finnish society, such as prostitution, mendacity and varieties of illegal activity. Although the reactions to Fokin’s affair are not comparable to Estonians’ reactions to Bronze Soldier Riots and the War in Georgia, considerable presence of the securitizing speech acts shows that the Russian land buying and the ensuing presence of the Russophone population in Finland was indeed securitized in military as well as societal sectors.

Most of the desecuritizing speech acts involved the economic sector but also the societal sector. In other words, it was often claimed that this new tendency – Russian real estate acquisition – is profitable to Finnish economy. After all, it is the economic sustainability that matters and guarantees the security of the state. If Russians contribute towards that sustainability, the Finns should be thankful for the incoming money brought by rich Russians.

Estonian speech acts commenting the Bronze Soldier riots or the war in Georgia were rarely referring towards the Russophone population as the possible guarantor of the economic sustainability or otherwise of benefit to the state. Rather, it was hinted that Russians cannot be trusted in these matters due to their disloyalty to the Estonian state. In Finland, however, the outdated perceptions of the possible enemy in the East and the necessarily alien influences of the Russophone population to Finnish identity were claimed to be as no longer applicable and hence should be desecuritized.

Such logic of argumentation was also supported by the facts from the historical background. As written in Finnish background study, the “dacha industry” of the Russophone population in Finland was popular already in 19th century without resulting in any threats to the Finnish identity or territory. Rather, it brought wealth to local people.
The revelations about Fokin left these desecuritizers intact. After all, there are criminals in any society. Most of the Russophone population which acquires real estate in Finland were claimed to be just regular representatives of the Russian higher class, often times friendly families. Conclusively, these comments desecuritized the presence of Russophone population in economic as well as societal sector by claiming that the economic sustainability is now the guaranty of security and the Finnish identity no longer consists of the outdated opposition to Russia and Russians.

The war in Georgia prompted certain securitization of the presence of Russophone population in Finland. Most often, the securitization involved the military sector. In this case, the on-line commentators were expressing their concern about the proliferating Russian real estate acquisition due to the possibility that Russia may smuggle its citizens to Finland similarly to the way done in South Ossetia where Russian citizens comprise 90 per cent of the population and can presumably be used as the political button of Russia. The commentators and newspaper editors also argued that Russia is not trustworthy neighbour and is increasing its military might which is why Finland should join NATO.

More often, however, the commentators and editors seemed to be oriented towards emphasizing the difference between the Georgian and Finnish situations. Namely, they claimed that nothing similar to the war in Georgia can happen in Finland simply because Finland does not provide any contexts within which such conflict can emerge. Firstly, the number of the Russophone population in Finland is fractional when compared to South Ossetia. In this sense, it was understood that Estonia and Latvia should be alarmed about the Russia’s willingness to defend its compatriots in Georgia by using the military means. This however does not apply to Finland. Secondly, Finland has different kind of relations with Russia than Georgia and the Baltic States do. Consequently, the war in Georgia prompted considerable desecuritization of the presence of Russophone population in military sector. Their real estate acquisition was also approached as not a threat to Finnish territory after the war in Georgia.

There was a part of commentators who voiced for the cautious approach towards Russia - similar to the president Mauno Koivisto and other respective post-Second World War Finnish leaders - by claiming that Russia will not interfere into Finnish affairs for as long as Finland does not irritate Russia. Such statements cannot be interpreted as desecuritizing. By claiming
that “one should not irritate Russia, or otherwise…” many commentators were warning about the possible threat in the East. For that reason, perceiving Russia as a possible threat to Finnish independence can be interpreted as securitization of Russia in the political sector. In other words, if Finland does not behave in a certain way, Russia may interfere by using the Finnish Russophone population as a political button. For that reason, the presence of Russoophone population in Finland was also up to some extent securitized in political sector.

As opposed to the Estonian case, the Finnish state officials were hesitant to take sides when commenting the war in Georgia. From the perspective of this research, such considerable cautiousness was related to the economic sector. In other words, benefiting from Russians was worth that Finnish state officials and newspaper editors maintain a modest and cautious approach when addressing Russians. Estonia is an opposite in this matter: the state officials can be quite straightforward and acute when addressing matters involved with Russia. For Estonians, expressing all stances in such way often outweighed the possible economic benefits from Russians and general trade relations with Russia.

The reasons behind different ways of approaching Russia and the Russians also has historical origins. After the interwar period, the Finnish state officials redefined their approaches towards Russia as well as Russians during the Cold War. The new approach was referred to as the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line and it involved the aspect of taking the best from the East as well as the West. In other words, neither side should be approached as a possible threat as long as Finland maintains this cautious approach in a political sector.

Estonia on the other hand has a history of approaching Russia as well as Russians as a threat to Estonia in various sectors: threat to economic sustainability (heritage of the collectivization and other Soviet projects), environment (damage done by the Soviet heavy industry), territorial integrity (Russia has occupied and may again occupy Estonia), politics (Russia tries to interfere into Estonian matters) and society (threat to Estonianness due to the mere presence of Russophone minority in Estonia). Due to this overwhelming fear and suspicion toward Russia and the considerable Russophone population, Estonian representatives prefer to rid itself from all “Russian” even when it could bring some economic benefits to have a desecuritized approach similar to Finland.
In case of the war in Georgia, the Finnish state officials showed less emotion than Estonian state officials when commenting the events. Although they condemned Russia’s activity in Georgia and in this case, Vanhanen and Stubb came out with sharper statements than for example Halonen, these statements did not have securitizing implications on the Russophone population in Finland.

As I showed earlier however, this is not to say that Finns have rid themselves from any suspicion towards the Russians and that the war in Georgia did not prompt any securitization speech acts. Besides the officially cautious stance, which is often kept in bounds, the regular people frequently expressed their fear when approaching Russians in result of the war in Georgia. Although these speech acts were simultaneously occurring with those expressing the need to get over the outdated past experiences (especially the Winter War and the Continuation War), a considerable part of the on-line commentators were referring especially to these two wars as predominant reasons why the approaches towards Russians cannot be equalized with the approaches towards the citizens of other states. In other words, I encountered almost an equal amount of securitization and desecuritization of the Russophone population in political sector. Better overview is the presented in Table 6.1.

Below is the conclusive table where the results of analysis are outlaid. It is possible to see that in case of Estonia, the securitization in societal sector outweighed the desecuritization attempts. A similar case applies to Finland where securitization of the Russian real estate acquisition prevailed in military sector while in all other sectors, the securitization was outweighed by desecuritization.
What do the aforementioned findings tell about the character of the international society in Baltic Sea region? The next section will fit the results of analysis within the English School theoretical frameworks.

5.3. Fitting the results with the English School theoretical frameworks

As claimed under the Background Study and the English School Theoretical Framework, the international society in the Baltic Sea region is a pluralist international society. Within that international society, states have presumably agreed to focus on maintaining the order and to follow the three basic principles: security, keeping the agreements, and protecting possessions. From these basic principles derives the principle of non-interference which is a
pluralist primary institution. Therefore, interference into the domestic affairs of the member states is not of interest because the common understanding of justice does not have an overwhelming reach as in case of the solidarist international societies where one state’s violation of the common principles of justice results in sanctions from the side of other members.

The background study on the Baltic Sea region showed in which spheres there is less pluralism and where more solidarism is possible: cooperation in the spheres of soft security, within the frames of free markets, common cultural heritage and cross-border cooperation. However, it was also shown in which areas the most probable threats to the cohesion of the Baltic Sea region are residing: relations between Russia and the Baltic States. This brings into play numerous pluralist primary institutions, such as hard security and hard borders.

In previous section, I identified in which sectors the Russophone population in Estonia and in Finland was desecuritized/securitized in result of the Bronze Soldier riots, the war in Georgia and the Russian real estate acquisition. How does this knowledge enable to make conclusions about the character of the international society in Baltic Sea region?

Buzan’s elaboration of the primary (and also secondary) institutions of an international society provide me with the first instrument which links the results of the analysis carried out in the frames of the Copenhagen School with the English School. More precisely, if an issue is desecuritized in one sector but securitized within the other, the values accompanying the solidarist primary institutions within the desecuritized sector may start challenging the values of the pluralist primary institutions within the securitized sector. Therefore, any desecuritization/securitization of an issue is prone to have implications in the level of the whole international society. Conclusively, by knowing in which sectors an issue is desecuritized/securitized, it is possible to characterize an international society.

The desecuritization/securitization of the Russophone population proved to be a good exemplary case. Not only may the character of the approaches towards the presence of another member state’s ethnic minority inhibit or enhance the regional cohesion. Different considerations which accompany the discussions about the presence of the Russophone population, have reached a new level, especially after the war in Georgia.
This brings me to numerous crucial questions. What relation does the aforementioned knowledge have to defining an international society as pluralist or solidarist? May the approaches towards the ethnic minority prompt the disintegration of an international society into an international system? The findings in preceding sections help answering these questions. The sections are divided according to the securitization or desecuritization in four sectors of the Copenhagen School\(^{309}\): military, political, societal and economic sectors. It will hence be answered what implications does the securitization of the Russophone population for example in societal sector have on the Baltic Sea region international society?

5.3.1. Implications of the securitization/desecuritization in military sector

Inferring from the findings, the public actors and state officials in Estonia experienced insecurity due to the large number of the Russophone population present within Estonian borders. Such perceptions became especially well observable after the war in Georgia although the Bronze Soldier riots also provided several cases of securitization of the Russophone population in military sector.

To numerous on-line commentators in Finland it came as a surprise how many Russians have actually started acquiring the real estate in Finland. Especially after the war in Georgia, there were concerns that in case the Russian real estate acquisition continues with the same speed, such war may also threaten Finland.

However, the previously introduced securitizing speech acts were outweighed by the desecuritizing speech acts where it was generally claimed that it is outlawed that Russians can buy-off Finnish territory. The repetition of the similar conflict in Finland is not possible due to the reason that Finland and Georgia represent two totally different scenarios.

For the Baltic Sea region international society, any securitization in the military sector would mean countering the primary institutions or more generally - the agreements - on which basis the states united into an international society. To specify, an important agreement between the member states of the Baltic Sea region international society is not to interfere into the domestic affairs of another member state. Another agreement is the cooperation in in the field

\(^{309}\) The environmental sector is excluded due to the reason that no securitization or desecuritization of the Russophone population in the environmental sector was identified.
Another aim of the Baltic Sea region international society was to erase the Cold War dividing lines and to promote the idea about soft borders, which facilitates cooperation and deepens mutual contacts whether in the field of economy, education or soft security issues. Any securitization in the military sector would result in new erection of hard borders as well as concentration on hard security issues, military alliances with other states and procurement of the additional military technique. This however threatens to disintegrate the whole international society into an international system. In other words, Waever in Ene Must’s *Baltic Sea Region and Northern Dimension -- Competing Region-Building Projects?* cites that “a region should not be internationally in conflict with other regions and […] with other important identity formations.”

As I mentioned under the background study on Estonia, part of Estonia’s identity construction involves opposing itself to Russia and Russians. A new tendency is Estonia’s active support of the states which are also attempting to form their identities by differentiating themselves from Russia: Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and in some instances, Byelorussia. Especially after the war in Georgia, Estonian state officials and public actors expressed their disbelief that cooperation and trust is possible with Russia and that the latter knows only one way of relating: power. In other words, it was believed in Estonia that what Russia once had - the Estonian territory – must be regained. Russophone population is being used as an asset to achieve this power and the occupation of the Estonian territory. Therefore, Estonia has talked its relations with the Russophone population into “power relations.”

In military sector hence the Baltic Sea region international society is eroding in the area of Estonia and Russia due to the reason that Estonia has securitized its approaches towards the Russophone population in military sector. The speeches contained numerous hints towards closed borders, military deterrence and power relations which can all be viewed as strictly pluralist primary institutions. Such securitization has been quite severe and has its reaches beyond the Estonian borders (cooperation with other “willing” post-Soviet states, military

---

310 Although the soft security is a solidarist primary institution, states within the pluralist international society can still agree to cooperate in this field and not in the field of hard security. This does not mean that state-centric military realm has ceased to exist within the pluralist international society. Within the solidarist international society, states may also agree to protect human rights (or justice) by using the military means against the violator.

311 Waever cit Must, 2001, p.17; Must, 2001, p.32.

312 Estonia has supported the rights of the opposition in Byelorussia which have often times been violated by the leading powers. This can be interpreted as an instance of enforcing the justice.
involvement in various missions), which is why there is an international system between Russia and Estonia in the Baltic Sea region. Similar erosion has had only very minimal indications in Finland when compared to Estonian case.

5.3.2. Implications of the securitization/deseccuritization in political sector

In Estonian case, the Russophone population was securitized in political sector. According to the speech acts, the Russian state officials use the Russophone population in Estonia to achieve its interests. This again can be interpreted as interference into the Estonian domestic affairs. The interference into domestic affairs however is not justified and not agreed upon within the pluralist international society. Additionally, the relocation of the monument, which is the possession of the Estonian state, is also Estonia’s own right under the principle of “protection of possessions.” In other words, the abovementioned actions were interpreted as challenges to the order within the pluralist international society in Baltic Sea region. The consequential power relations between Estonia and Russia are rather intrinsic to an international system than to an international society. Conclusively, the international society may become unbalanced for the reason that the pillars upon which the order in the pluralist international society stands upon (keeping the agreements and protecting the possessions), are stumbling. Therefore, the securitization of the Russophone population in political sector may lead to partial disintegration of the international society into an international system, at least in the area of Russia and Estonia. Did this really happen in result of Bronze Soldier riots and the war in Georgia?

Based on the analysis, it is possible to witness that the securitizing speech acts of the Estonian state officials as well as the public actors were indeed broadcasted beyond the borders of Estonia and hence were also commented internationally. However, it is also important to mention that the Russophone population was not securitized without Russia, in other words it was hinted that Russia was behind the political disloyalty of the Russophone population by way of influencing them via the Russian TV and media as well as using other means which is why the Russophone population in any state is indeed of concern. How was it all reflected in Finland?

Indeed, the Finnish state officials, public actors as well as regular people commented the statements of Estonia’s representatives. As illustrated in the background study on the Baltic
Sea region, the firm argument was that the relocation of the Bronze Soldier is Estonia’s internal matter, that Russia should not interfere in this question and Finland supports Estonia in this matter. The attacks at the Estonian Embassy were also discouraged. Some reaction was also reflecting from the discussions after the war in Georgia as well as the Russian real estate acquisition. Additionally, it was inferred in the previous section that the Finnish approaches towards the Russophone population were to some extent securitized in the political sector. For example, by mentioning that Finns should be cautious when approaching Russians, it was not outlawed that Russia may interfere into the Finnish affairs as well by using the Russophone population over there as a political button.

Conclusively, the order in the Baltic Sea region international society started to erode in the area of Estonia and Russia and its implications were felt in the area of Finland and Russia as well which means that there, the maintenance of the order in the Baltic Sea region international society was also to some extent challenged in the political sector.

5.3.3. Implications of the securitization/desecuritization in a societal sector

Some securitizing speech acts in Estonia emphasised the fact that there are two different societies which frontline runs through Estonia: Western and Eastern. Russia represents the latter, which is also referred to as being “wild” and has “civilized” as the opposite (the “Western” international society). Merje Kuus claims that this differentiating logic as well as perceiving everything “Russian” as a possible threat is part of Estonian identity construction and seemingly, has to be continued in order to maintain Estonianness. For that reason, the Bronze Soldier riots as well as the war in Georgia resulted in abundant securitization of the Russophone population in the societal sector. The possibilities of integration and mutual identification between Estonians and Russians seemed to be sensless in this context.

313 It must be mentioned at this point that the other member states of the Baltic Sea region did not want to interfere either. The only issue which they could really discourage without being blamed in interference into Estonian domestic affairs themselves, was the attacking of the Estonian Embassy. This was countering the agreements (Geneva Convention) upon which all member states had agreed. Hence, such attacks and Russia’s passivity was threatening the order in Baltic Sea region international society.


315 The similar identity construction can be recognised from interwar Finland.
In case of Finland, the findings also show that Russophone population was to some extent securitized in a societal sector. This securitization also involved definitions about Finnishness which was related to the remembrance of the Finnish heroism in the Winter War and to the lesser extent, the Continuation War. Both wars were fought against Russia and therefore, numerous people expressed their pity when approaching Russian real estate acquisition in Finland and the ensuing presence of the Russophone population in Finland. This means that at least up to some extent, the primary institutions, which gave a basis to Finnish society, were Finnish-oriented and anti-Russian similarly to the interwar period.

One of the reasons why the Baltic Sea region formed was the wish to erase the dividing lines of the Cold War and the ambiguous interpretations of history. At this point it is important to remind that in case of Finland the findings showed that there was almost an equal number of those speech acts where the presence of the Russophone population in Finland was desecuritized in a societal sector. In other words, the attempt to erase the dividing lines created by the history of approaching Russia as an enemy had been effective at least to some extent. After all, Finland has been the main promoter of the effective cross-border cooperation since joining the EU. Although Karelia cannot be taken back, people can be united via other means as well, for example via the solidarist primary institutions. Additionally, the inertia of such cooperation is stronger than the new wave of securitization of the Russophone population in result of the surge in Russian real estate acquisition or the war in Georgia. In Estonia, however, the cooperative projects have never achieved such levels and therefore, securitization of the Russophone population can incur easily. The Bronze Soldier riots and the war in Georgia only increased this division in the Estonian society.

The further development of the Baltic Sea region international society towards the solidarist international society depends largely on the levels of cohesion achieved in the field of erasing the Cold War dividing lines. If no improvement is achieved, the international society remains pluralist. If however, the securitization in the societal sector becomes so overwhelming that it is not possible to close the resulting gap by using the set of the primary

---

316 It is because of these dividing lines that the pluralist primary institutions continue to prevail over the solidarist ones.
institutions upon which the states have agreed, the international society may erode in this sector.

To conclude, the Baltic Sea region international society is eroding in the area of Estonia and Russia in the societal sector. However, it has not yet achieved the level at which this gap is not closable using the set of the primary institutions which the states of the Baltic Sea region international society have agreed upon. Although some securitization in this sector is also observable in the area of Finland and Russia, it is outweighed by the desecuritization there.

5.3.4. Implications of the securitization/desecuritization in economic sector

The desecuritization of the Russophone population in economic sector is best observable in case of Finland. This desecuritization was talked into existence largely through the free markets institution which was supported by numerous states in the Baltic Sea region. According to this logic, it is the economic sustainability and combating soft security threats, which matter the most in contemporary world. This can be achieved when states cooperate in free markets and across the soft borders. By talking about the economic sustainability as the main guarantor of security, numerous Finnish speech acts emphasized the importance of forgetting the out-dated threat perceptions related to Russia and Russians. Instead, it is time to cooperate on the basis of equality and to promote rather than inhibit the Russian real estate acquisition. The aforementioned stance was so strong that it therefore challenged the institutions of the military and societal sectors as well.

In Estonia, the possible economic benefits from Russia and from the integration of the Russophone population were not assessed so highly as to outweigh the current identity perceptions. In other words, the possible economic benefits from Russia and Russians did not challenge the primary institutions as well as the securitization in a societal sector. Rather, Russia was often spoken about as an economic competitor and a threat to economic sustainability of Estonia – the speech acts which were prompted for example in result of the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in January, 2009.

317 In Baltic Sea region international society, the set of means for maintaining order and enhancing cohesion cannot cross the sphere of the soft security. When for example military means are used, this can be interpreted as the breach of agreements which on its turn would threatens the order in Baltic Sea region international society.
In this study however it is not analysed why good economic relations with Russia or the Russophone population were not achieved in Estonia or how they were inhibited. The only claim at this point is that in Estonia the processes within the established primary institutions did not manage to enhance Estonia’s economic contacts with Russia and the Russophone population to the extent recommended within the Baltic Sea region international society.

The Russophone population was however quite effectively desecuritized in economic sector in the Finnish speech acts and as we know, this desecuritization affected other sectors as well. By explaining that economic sustainability with the help of Russia and Russians is important for maintaining Finnishness, the desecuritization in economic sector also lead to desecuritizaion in societal sector.

In summary, it is possible to locate all the results of analysis into the following Table 5.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Character of speech acts</th>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Implications in the area</th>
<th>Character of the international society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia and Russia</td>
<td>Securitization</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>International system in military, political and societal sectors.</td>
<td>Predominantly pluralist but close to an international system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Societal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland and Russia</td>
<td>Securitization</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Pluralist international society (in the solidarist end of spectrum in economic sector).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Securitization</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Desecuritization</td>
<td>Societal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Desecuritization</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To explicate the table, in the area of Estonia and Russia numerous solidarist primary institutions of the Baltic Sea region international society did not have so much reach as was recommended. Rather, the identity related concerns outweighed possible economic benefits. Such protective approach hints that instead of an international society, there is an international system in the area of Estonia and Russia. This however does not apply to Finnish case.
Although numerous speech acts were securitizing the Russophone population in Finland in different sectors, the securitization in general did not outweigh the desecuritizations in economic sector. Both Russia and the presence of the Russophone population in Finland seem to be well desecuritized in economic sector. In this sector the Baltic Sea region international society in the area of Finland and Russia qualifies largely as a pluralist international society in the solidarist end of spectrum.

After the analysis, what conclusions can be drawn about the character of the Baltic Sea region international society? Secondly, are there any justifications to the claim that the approaches towards an ethnic minority can have implications on the level of international society? If yes, to what extent can such implications be observable in case of Estonia and Finland?
CONCLUSION: REDEFINING THE BALTIC SEA REGION INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY?

Based on the preceding analysis, the Bronze Soldier riots, war in Georgia and the Russian real estate acquisition have changed the way the Russophone population is talked about in Estonia and Finland. The character of the speech acts as well as their content could have been predicted by studying the information attained from the background discourses. Meanwhile, the analysis of the speech acts gave a justification to the real existence of such speech acts. Besides, it showed accurately in which sectors the securitization or desecuritization occurred. The latter is important when trying to characterize the international society in the Baltic Sea region.

Although the Baltic Sea region international society is a pluralist international society, it is still vulnerable to securitization of an ethnic minority which challenges the existing primary institutions as well as its basic principles. On the other hand, desecutization of an ethnic minority may bring the international society closer to its solidarist primary institutions and principles of justice which would give it a solidarist-leaning character.

For that reason, the character of the speech acts addressing the Russophone population can and in the current case, did have implications on the level of the international society. The reason is that some intra-state speech acts may start reconstructing the international society in a similar way it was constructed upon certain primary institutions and basic principles. In case of this study, it is possible to see that such reconstruction may occur via the changes in such primary institutions as the economic cooperation, mutual identification, common interpretation of history, non-interference, sovereignty, borders and security. Any change on its turn redefines the order in an international society hence threatening the existing order. For example, it was shown in previous section what follows if an issue is securitized in the military sector - it comes into conflict with the row of agreements, common goals and values of the Baltic Sea region.
By examining side by side the results of analysis presented in Table 5.4. and the knowledge provided in Table 3.5, it is possible to see that in result of securitizations and desecuritizations of the Russophone population in Estonia and Finland, changes have emerged in some sectors of the Baltic Sea region international society which would not leave the respective primary institutions intact. In case of Finland, the securitization in some sectors was balanced by the desecuritization in other sectors. Conclusively, the international society in the area of Finland and Russia remained the way it was: pluralist. Furthermore, in economic sector I found inclinations to develop into a more solidarist international society.

In the area of Estonia and Russia however the situation is opposite. Predominantly the securitization followed the Bronze Soldier riots and the war in Georgia with no desecuritization to balance it out. Conclusively, the pluralist international society in this area eroded and became into an international system guided by such pluralist primary institutions as hard power, hard borders, protectionist economy and conflicting interpretations of history.

When analysing side by side the examples of Finland and Estonia, it is possible to say that in general, the pluralist international society Baltic Sea region has eroded and has come closer to being an international system. In fact, in the area of Estonia and Russia, there is already an international system. Meanwhile, in the area of Estonia and Finland or Finland and Russia there is still a pluralist international society. Therefore, the two opposing members – Russia and Estonia – are currently still the members of the Baltic Sea region international society but via different partnerships.

As believed in this research in general, numerous inter-state processes may have implications on the level of the international society. Therefore, it is possible that the wave of securitization of the Russophone population in Estonia followed by the Bronze Soldier riots and the war in Georgia will cool off at some point in time and there will be an international society between Estonia and Russia as well. The conclusive words are hence that further attempts should be made to characterize the international society in the Baltic Sea region for the reason that this area is prone to numerous changes, which can be detected at different points in time by studying both the intra-state as well as internationally mediated statements.
**Recommendations for further study**

As mentioned at the end of the last section, it is recommended to further study the processes in Baltic Sea region involving also other states and issues. The results of the analysis showed that there is a variety of speech acts within just two Baltic Sea region member states and all have different implications on the international society level. Within the Baltic Sea region in general there is an abundance of states where the history of approaching certain issues varies from securitization to desecuritization and involves several sectors. Therefore, the Baltic Sea region international society is as a maze waiting to be studied continuously.

Meanwhile, I also discovered some more specific possibilities for further research. For example, the current research would benefit enormously if the approaches of the Russophone population towards Estonia and Finland were also be observed by using the speech act theory. This would enable to make further conclusions how the speech acts of all sides – Finns, Estonians and Russians - are in fact all together reconstructing the state of affairs by being in continuous interaction.

Other fields, which might be interesting for further research are certain events which may provide the researcher with the abundance of interesting speech acts. Firstly, the uprising in Eastern Karelia in 1921 and the December coup in Estonia in 1924 seem to qualify as events during which the Russophone population both in Estonia and Finland might have received special attention. Hence, for further research these two events stand out as good cases to be studied. It would be interesting to know what kind of speech acts and discussions prevailed amongst the Estonian and Finnish people and state officials before, during and after the uprisings in Eastern Karelia in 1921 and in Tallinn in 1924. By thinking about it now, it seems that during the interwar period, the Russophone population in Finland was much more securitized than in Estonia. Today however, the situation is opposite. Therefore, the society of the interwar Finnish should provide the researcher with numerous speech acts which radically securitized the approaches towards Russians while there also must have been some softer speech acts. I presume the latter because, for example, of the Luostarinen’s who says that hard
liners were “buffered” by the state who officials wanted to “stir up a defencive spirit”.

The conclusive question would be: what kind of implications did these approaches in interwar period and in contemporary contexts have in terms of IR?

Secondly, it would also be interesting to study how the Estonian Russophone population was approached in 1993. The conflict between the Estonian and Russophone population arguably stretched so far as to pose a threat to the territorial integrity of Estonia. It would be very interesting to study what kind of speech acts preceded and followed the developments in Ida Virumaa and in what way this influenced the formation of the Baltic Sea region which was in early stages at that time. Although the limits of this study do not allow me to go so deep, I would still like to put special emphasis on the aforementioned developments for the reason that they were referred to in speech acts which followed the Bronze soldier riots and the war in Georgia. Hence, the current study would be much more coherent if the speech acts during the situation in Estonia in 1993 were also analysed.

Thirdly, the sections analysing the Russian real estate acquisition would benefit in content if the speech acts accompanying this tendency in 19th-century-Finland were also analysed. Baschmakoff & Leinonen write that mostly, the Finns saw dacha industry as a way to boost the economy while politically, it came to pose a national threat. This was so due to the Russification policy of the Russian Empire, which also affected Estonia in second half of the 19th century. Knowing that, it would be interesting to study what kind of speech acts lead to the securitization of the Russophone population in political sector and desecuritization in economic sector due to the dacha industry.

Finally, it is worth to further analyse the possible implications of the world society in Baltic Sea region international society. When arguing about the world society, the English School theorists often touch upon the issues related to the status of the non-state actors or individuals as well as their possible primacy over the sovereign states. Here however I agree with Reus-Smit that it is not so much about the concern that in world society, the sovereign states cease to exist or loose their importance. Rather, it is about the influences the world society has on the “basic principles and dynamics” of different sovereign states. In the contexts this study,
the character of the Baltic Sea region international society may also have to be redefined due to certain influences coming from the level of the world society. Investigating this possibility remains one more task for further research in the field.
REFERENCES

Primary Sources

Official Statements and publications
Ilves, Toomas-Hendrik: “We can agree upon a common future”, 02.05.2007

Estonia Today, Press and Information Department, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
“1 December 1924”, December 2004
“Integration Framework Estonia”, May 2004
“Integration Framework Estonia”, May 2006
“Integration Framework Estonia”, May 2008
“Population by Nationality, May 2008
“Paet: Russia must stop its Aggression in Georgia Immediately and Unconditionally”,
Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 09.08.2008
“Statement by the Foreign Minister”, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 01.05.2007

The President of the Republic On the Anniversary of the Tartu Peace Treaty, 2 February 2007
Estonia Concert Hall

Information Agency Broadcasts
BNS: “Vanhanen kritiseeris Venemaad”, 25.08.2008
BNS: „Eesti on avatud sõbralikele suhetele Venemaaga”, Urmas Paet, 24.09
BNS: „Savisaar ei kiirusta Venemaad hukka mõistma”, 11.08.2008:
STT: „Suomalaisasiantuntija: Viron hallitus toiminut epäviisaasti”, 27.04

Newspaper and journal articles
Eronen, Jussi: “Tonttikauppa turvallisuuden kustannuksella”, Jussi Erosen blogi, 25.02.09
Happonen, Riikka: „Alle promille Suomesta venäläisten hallussa”, Hämeen Sanomat, 26.11.2008
Hautamäki, Jaakko: “Kanerva haluaa EU:n osoittavan solidaarisuutta”, Helsingin Sanomat, 30.04.2007
Henno, Erik: “Vähi: soovitaksin Eesti poliitikutel natuke vait olla”, Postimees, 11.08.2008

„HS-raati: Voiko venäläisvähemmistöstä tulla Suomelle turvallisuuspoliititse ongela?”, Helsingin Sanomat, 04.09.2008

Hõbemägi, Priit: „Kompass on katki“, Eesti Ekspress, 12.09.2008

Ignatius, Heikki: “Venäläiset innostuneet lomailemaan Suomessa”, Karjalan Maa, 27.11.2005


Kalamees, Kai: „Poliitikud kutsuvad rahvast säilitama rahu“, Postimees, 28.04


Koch, Tuuli: “Siinsete vähemuste Eestiga sidumisel on hiljaks jäädud”, Postimees, 30.04.2007


Malin, Tuula & Eronen, Jussi: “Kremlin kytkeytynyt liikemies halbii maata Suomesta”, MTV3,19.11.08

Malin, Tuula & Eronen, Jussi: “Kenraali: Venäläisten maanhankinta turvallisuusriski”, MTV3, 25.02.09

”Mida teha, et rahutused enam ei korduks?”, Eesti Päevaleht, 28.04.2007


Pors, Terje: „Helme: Venemaa järgmine katsetusobjekt võib olla Eesti“, Postimees, 27.08.2008

Ranta, Mika: „Soini lopettaisi maan myynnin venäläisille“, Helsingin Sanomat, 25.02.2008

Räikkä, Jyrki: „HS-raati: Suomen venäläisvähemmistö ei ole riski”, Helsingin Sanomat, 04.09.2008

Rütman, Tanel: “Eesti rahvastikukadu on üks maailma suurimaid”, Postimees, 07.10.98


Salovaara, Outi: “Venäläisten tonttiakuppa kiihtyi viime vuonna Imatralla”, Etelä-Saimaa Artikkelitietokanta, 29.01.2008:
“Soini lopettaisi maan myynnin venäläisille”, *Helsingin Sanomat*, 25.02.08:

Sopanen, Heikki: “Kunnissa odotetaan venäläisten tonttikaupoista muutakin bisnestä” *Helsingin Sanomat*, 02.02.07

Sulbi, Raul: “IRLi noored kutsuvad Gruusia sõja tõttu astuma Kaitseliitu”, Postimees, 09.08.2008

Sulbi, Raul: „TV3: kohalikud venelased peavad konflikti ainupõhjustajaks Gruusiat”, *Postimees*, 10.08.2008

Toompeuu, Jüri: „Eesti lähiala põhiprobleemid”, 3/2006 *Kultuur ja Elu*

„Vene saatkond eitab kavatsust tekitada Eestis «viies kolonn»”, *PM Online*, 22.05.2007

Virmavirta, Jarmo: ”Realism tagab rahu paremini kui ideoloogia“, *Postimees*, 25.08.08

Vähäsarja, Irina & Saarinen, Juhani: “Imatran omakotionaloille nousee venäläisten datšoja”, *Helsingin Sanomat*, 15.01.08


On-line resources

Attitude to the Russian Population on Occupied Land, University of Turku:  
http://www.soc.utu.fi/laitokset/poliittinenhistoria/opiskelu/LectureVI-5.ppt#3

Estonica, The Story of the Estonian Republic — 1918–1940:  

Euroregio Karelia:  
http://euregio.karelia.ru/site/?lang=eng

Finnish Immigration Services:  
http://www.migri.fi/netcomm/content.asp?article=1945&language=EN

Finland, CIA World Factbook:  

Estonia, CIA World Factbook:  

SKnetin Toimitus: “Millainen naapurimaa Venäjä on nyt?”, 12.01.2009:  
http://suomenkuvalehti.fi/blogit/viikon-puheenaihe/millainen-naapurimaa-venaja-on-nyt?kommenttitisivu=1#kommentit

The Establishment of Finnish Democracy:  
http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-4578.html
Thesaurus:
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/fifth+column

“Venäläisten maanosto Suomessa”, SYNTY.net, 04.0207-21.10.08:
http://www.synty.net/keskustelu/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=2427

Secondary Sources

Academic Sources


Apunen, Osmo: “Geographical and political factors in Finland’s relations with the Soviet Union” (1977), Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy


Bellamy, Alex J.(ed.): “International Society and its Critics” (2005), Oxford University Press, New York


Browning, Christopher: “Coming Home or Moving Home: 'Westernizing' Narratives in Finnish Foreign Policy and the Reinterpretation of Past Identities” (2002), 37/1 Cooperation and Conflict


121


Dunne, Tim & Kurki, Milya & Smith, Steve (ed.): “International Relations Theory, Discipline and Diversity” (2006), Oxford University Press, United Kingdom


Heikka, Henrikki: “Russia and Europe: A Finnish View” (2004), Russia’s European Choice Conference, Helsinki

Heikka, Henrikki: “Republican Realism: Finnish Strategic Culture in Historical Perspective” (2005), 40/1 Cooperation and Conflict


Jakobson, Max: “Substance and Appearance: Finland” (1980), 58/5 Foreign Affairs

Karsh, Efraim: Finland: “Adaption and Conflict” (1986), 62/2 International Affairs


Lanko, Dmitri A.: “Russian Debate on the Northern Dimension Concept” (2007), Presentation at the 6th Pan-European International Relations Conference “Making Sense of a Pluralist World” in Torino, Italy


Must, Ene: “Baltic Sea Region and Northern Dimension -- Competing Region-Building Projects?” (2001), University of Tartu, Department of Social Sciences


Vehviläinen, Olli: “Finland in the Second World War” (2002), Palgrave Macmillan

Vetik, Raivo: “Inter-Ethnic Relations in Estonia 1988-1998” (1999), University of Tampere, Tampere

Vetik, Raivo: “The Cultural and Social Makeup of Estonia”(2002), Pål Kolsto

On-line materials
Bach, Kent in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry:
http://online.sfsu.edu/~kbach/spchacts.html

Marin, Anaïs: “Russia’s ‘Baltic’ Regions within the Northern Dimension: Challenges and Prospects for the Future” (2002), European Documentation Centre: