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Truth and Another Truth

- Being a Moderate Modest Witness of International Relations

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This thesis discusses epistemological questions of international relations. It is a post-modern analysis on different ways of knowing, of mythical figures and powerful myths. International relations is one of the spaces where certain mythical figures operate, influence and encounter. Even though stories and figures are fictitious they have consequences, which matter. This study introduces two main figures, which are still present in the discussions of present day international relations, especially in the foreign policy of the United States: the King, the representative of sovereignty, and the Rational Man, the autonomous subject of knowledge of modern science.

The objective is, with analytical tools offered by Michel Foucault, to understand the fictitious nature of international relations, and to reflect on how to cope with the complexity and changes of international relations; how to handle the indefiniteness of international relations without clinging to highly problematic myths of the King and the Rational Man. Accordingly, the study addresses the question, how to be a moderate modest witness of international relations, that is, a situated subject of knowledge.

The study maintains it is not the King or the Rational Man, who governs the world of international relations. What orders the subjects and the objects of international relations are the manifold networks of power relations, which different stories bring into live. A prerequisite for moderate modest witnessing of international relations is to understand stories are never neutral but deploy complex power relations. Thus, telling stories of international relations is not an innocent enterprise but a process, which makes a difference. To tell new stories is to challenge prevailing power relations.
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1. Introduction

This thesis discusses epistemological questions of international relations. It is a study/story of different ways of knowing, of mythical figures and powerful myths. The underlying assumption of the work is that the world is full of stories. As witnesses of international relations, we are surrounded by myriad of stories. Stories are the means to share experience and discuss matters; moreover, we understand through stories. International relations is one of the spaces where certain mythical figures operate, influence and encounter. Even though these encounters may be fictitious they have consequences, which matter. My objective is, with analytical tools offered by Michel Foucault, to understand the fictitious nature of international relations and to learn how to deal with it. I wish to find out why stories we tell are so powerful and why they are still easily taken for Real.

In the first part of the study/story, we will enter the world of Western political thought. We will meet the King, the representative of sovereignty, who has governed Western political thought for centuries. The object of the first part is to outline the problems of the myth of the King, that is, of power concept based on sovereignty and, accordingly, to argue on behalf of a non-sovereign power-concept. In Foucauldian analysis power is inextricably linked with knowledge, or, more accurately, they are constitutive of each other. Foucault stated we needed to cut off the King’s head, that is, to move from analysis on power/sovereignty to analysis in terms of power/knowledge. Developing a non-sovereign power concept is necessary in order to be able to examine international relations’ conceptions of knowledge and truth.

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1 The term study/story, an adaptation of Foucault’s term power/knowledge, implies the interrelated nature of these two concepts.
In the second part I will explore the world of Enlightenment and its descendant, modern science. Among other discussions, we will get to know the head figure of Enlightenment’s world, namely, the Rational Man. The legacy of Enlightenment has been of great importance for International Relations. Due to the influence of traditional realism, one of the projects of the Rational Man, myths of the Rational Man, the Truth and objective knowledge have been constantly present in discussions of international relations. I will explore how myths of modern science have been put to use in the present day international relations, and outline the problems inherent in these conceptions.

Finally, in the third part we will enter the post-modern world of knowing. On the basis of analysis on Foucauldian worldview, his conceptions of power, truth and knowledge, I will lay foundations for overcoming the binary thinking characteristic of Enlightenment, and dispel the illusion of innocence inherent in modern thinking. I will also introduce a new figure, which, I believe, could be able to challenge the Enlightenment’s Rational Man. He/she is a moderate modest witness, the hero/heroine of the post-modern world of knowing. Moderate modest witnessing is a term quoted from Donna J. Haraway, implying an opposite to an idea of moderate witnessing, that is, ahistorical, apolitical, context-free observing of the Reality conducted by the Rational Man, the superior master of modern science.

The underlying objective of my study is to find out, how to cope with the complexity and changeability of international relations, in other words, how to handle the indefiniteness of international relations, without clinging to highly problematic myths of the King and the Rational Man. Accordingly, I want to address the question, how to be a moderate modest witness of international relations as opposite to alleged modest witnessing characteristic of modern science. I wish to find out, does Foucault provide a basis for a moderate modest witnessing of international relations.
With the example of the United States I wish to demonstrate the influence stories and mythical figures have in current international relations and, thus, to illustrate the importance of my project. Myths of the King and the Rational Man are still present in the U.S. foreign policy. Reflections on the politics of U.S. government will hopefully help to understand the significance, the problems and possibilities of telling stories and to bring together the theoretical and the practical aspects of international relations.

So, let the study/story begin.

2. My Magicians

As this is a study about different ways of knowing, I would like to set forth my point of departure. Hence, I will start by discussing briefly my own path of international relations. Fortunately, I am not wandering alone, that is, I am not writing this study alone. Along the way, I have especially two leaders guiding my way. In what follows, I would like to introduce my magicians, the co-writers of the story, namely Michel Foucault and Donna J. Haraway.²

2.1. The Point of Departure

I do admit; I have always had a problem with mainstream International Relations. Regardless how hard I tried we never connected. Slightly exaggerating, the realist doctrine seemed to haunt me. It felt like it was lurking behind the screen of my computer, as if saying there was no way I could possible escape its power. More up-to-date versions of realism, such as neo-realism, nor critical theories

² In her brilliant book *Reading Lolita in Tehran*, Azar Nafisi calls a close friend of her and her advisor “her magician”.

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or any other did not make it better. My passion to international relations remained, but so did the strangeness towards its mainstream theories. As so often, strangeness and fears translate into anger. My strangeness with especially the realist doctrine and its successors manifested itself as hostile attacks on realist doctrine, and at the same time, however, as disbelief on my own ideas.

Isn’t it oddly interesting, how our “opponents” are, at the same time, the source of both our strength and weaknesses? They make one believe something is wrong and something else is needed, though, at times, their influence and dominance appear insuperable. I found myself writing angry attacks on realism, only to catch myself displaying the same uncompromising and inflexible attitude that was exactly what I disliked and found most problematic in mainstream theories.

It took quite some time to realize what was the cause of my detestation. Finally, I realized the reason the realist doctrine remained distant was not so much its lack of explanatory power, but its lack of discretion and subtlety. As the realist doctrine remained distant to the world it was inspecting, I remained distant to its set of beliefs. Simply put, realist doctrine did not provide means to encounter international relations the way I would have found appropriate. Things I found most important were out of realism’s reach. I was eager to find something or someone to help me to answer the question, “how to encounter international relations with discretion”.

In the beginning of my search I came across feminist texts. Feminist writers discussed issues I also found particularly important. During last decades feminists have brought up questions, which have earlier gone unnoticed or which have not been considered to belong to the political sphere, let alone to International Relations. However, even though I felt I was going the right direction, I felt uneasy with the feminist accent. As regards to questions I had in mind, it was not
justified to give preference to one gender or any other specific quality over other, which is not, of course, to deny the importance of gender. I wanted to lay analytical foundation without giving preference to any human quality. That is when I turned to a man behind many post-modern feminists, to Foucault. I came to notice things that interested me most in feminist literature seemed to trace back to Foucault.

Then, a little later I first came by with Haraway’s text, which seemed to open my eyes also to Foucault’s thinking in a new way. I was excited! Had I finally found my masters, my magicians? Would these two writers provide me with answers; would they hand me practical and theoretical tools, and arm me with confidence to find out how to be a moderate modest witness of international relations? I was hopeful, but remained still a little hesitant. However, I was ready to leave the safe ground of mainstream theories. This is how I decided to turn my sometimes highly obscure impressions, vague feelings, yearning for something yet undefined, my stubborn images and intuitions into my Master’s thesis.

Hence, there are two writers I would like to introduce to the reader: a French philosopher Michel Foucault and an American feminist writer Donna J. Haraway. These two have had the greatest influence on my thinking and, accordingly, on this study. But does a philosopher scrutinizing the history of Westerns’ sexuality and prisons and a feminist writer contemplating on technoscience and genes have anything in common? Furthermore, would these two offer me something useful as regards to the questions I had in mind? The answer is clear: yes, a great deal. They have helped me to build a post-modern world of knowing and encounter the world of international relations in a way unknown to mainstream theories.
2.2. **Foucault: Maverick of Political Analysis**

The impact and importance of Foucault has been widely recognized. Foucault was a legend already in his own time, and even more so after his death in 1984. With good reason Hindes notes Foucault’s account on power challenges prominently most of the contemporary social and political theory (1996, p.135). I was surprised when getting to know Foucault better, that is, of course, getting acquainted with his thinking through his texts and public activities. Words I would use to describe him would be hard-working, truthful and warm. (See e.g. Didier Eribon 1993) That was quite opposite to the common idea of Foucault as a prototype of an arrogant, cold, and indifferent post-modernist. My purpose is not, of course, to analyze or speculate Foucault’s “true nature”, his obscure personality, or concealed secrets and interests. I want to express my bewilderment only as an example of glaring contradictions and confusions concerning both Foucault as a person and his thinking as well. This kind of ambiguousness is perfectly understandable taking into account complexities and, in course of years, prominent changes in his thinking. However, it also makes one think how acquainted his opponents, when stating such a hard critics, have actually been with his oeuvre.

Instead of overall rejection, it needs a great deal more to really read and understand those relatively newly written and mainly hard read texts, which in their ambiguity give up the shelter of accuracy, objectivity, evidences and other characteristics of modern science. If Foucault’s approach is sometimes highly problematic it certainly is not a reason to abandon him. In the obituary of another post-modernist Kandell cites the late Jacques Derrida, “Why don't you ask a physicist or mathematician about difficulty?” (Kandell 2004). Making science is a challenging and never-ending process. However, we are on right track if we realize we need to know more, or as Derrida, according to Kandell, put it, we “understand enough to understand more” (ibidem).
As regards to Foucault’s thinking it is of major importance to remark on the relevance of differentiating between several conceptions of post-modernism. Misconceptions of for example Foucauldian analysis have led to unfortunate misunderstandings and prejudices towards post-modernism and post-modernists. I am well aware Foucault himself disliked any categorization. Instead of being pigeonholed, he eagerly wanted to escape any fixed categorizations,

“No not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write.” (Foucault 1972, p.19)

Therefore, I do apologize Foucault and hope I will make myself clear enough and clarify the need to connect him with post-modernism in order to do justice to his thinking and the kind of post-modernism his thinking is a representative of. The important thing is to keep in mind that the central objective of Foucault and many other post-modernists has been to work on an alternative knowledge and truth concepts opposite to those of modernism. This is where the label post-modernism derives from.

In spite of post-modernists’ efforts to create alternative truth concepts, the supporters of modern science and opponents of post-modernism have been apt to claim post-modernism rejects the existence of any truth claims, and accordingly (when it comes to Foucault, for instance) denies subjects their active agency. Due to overwhelming misunderstandings and prejudices, the underlying problem of present international relations seems to be the fact that we, meaning the supporters of modern science on the other side and post-modernists on the other, have not been able to participate in a constructive dialogue, which, again, is another juxtaposition typical of modern thinking. I wish to be able to correct at least some of these misunderstandings.
Depicting his previous work Foucault stated,

“these [his studies] were only trails to be followed, it mattered little where they led; indeed, it was important that they did not have a predetermined starting point and destination” (Foucault 1980, p.79).

This is exactly where Foucault and his understanding of the function of conceptual framework stand out from the earlier ones and which I found applicable. It is very important to note that Foucault’s thinking does not form a coherent and comprehensive theory. Moreover, he refuses to create a total theory. This is not to say Foucault denies the usefulness of different theoretical tools. What he considers as problematic, however, are theories that claim themselves to be totalitarian. (Foucault 1980, p.81) Instead of a fixed framework, Foucault gives us freedom of action, yet provides us with toolbox full of logical and interrelated concepts as useful tools. Foucault is a magician: an advisor, who does not offer ready-made answers or demand full obedience. Instead, he urges one to understand and tell the story with one’s own words. Our magicians do revive our potentials (Nafisi 2004, p.337).

These notions have had two consequences concerning my actual research process. First, many of the writings I have used as my material have been Foucault’s later lectures and interviews. These texts differ from his central and well-known books in that in these Foucault expresses himself, his interests, thinking and statements, more explicitly. In addition, another advantage of these later works is that in those Foucault has had more time to contemplate on critics his works had aroused. This has given him a change to reflect on changing contexts, redirect mislead attention and correct possible misunderstandings. In that manner, his later writings seem to be more reflective, kind of a dialogue, which he has had with himself when commenting, in retrospect, on books of his own.
Second, I have also wanted to include some direct quotations of Foucault. Thus, I have wanted to let Foucault to speak with his own words. My task has been to bring up certain points that have been whether purposely ignored, undervalued or due to misconceptions went unnoticed despite their major importance. If there is a bias in my analysis and if I have been, which I frankly speaking have been, selective on which of his remarks I want to take up, I wish to consider it not as a shortcoming, but as a balancing effect. Foucault himself was a very industrious writer, but the amount of other writers’ analyses on his texts amounts to enormity. All works are more or less biased. However, this should be considered not as a flaw but as differing points of view. My purpose is to emphasize the humane side of Foucault’s thinking.

2.3. Haraway: Story-Teller in a Post-Modern World of Knowing

Notwithstanding her notions on biopower, Haraway’s references to Foucault are few in number. However, it seemed these two writers were a perfect match and complemented each other. They approach the same ideas only from different directions. Only after reading Haraway’s amazing book, *Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium: FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouse™*, I came to better understand Foucault. In a way Haraway gave his thoughts insight, practical relevance, and a human touch. If Foucault was preoccupied with analytical tools and building the surroundings of post-modern world of knowing, Haraway brings in the missing inhabitant. Haraway introduced me to a new figure, the post-modern subject of knowledge, that is, a moderate modest witness, whom we will meet later in the Part III.

Haraway is one of the story-tellers of the post-modern world, one of the writers celebrating the narrative turn of science, the revolution of stories. Stories of post-modern writers are filling the empty spaces left
by Enlightenment’s binary thinking (see e.g. Haraway 1997, Penttinen 2004). They break the boundaries of fixed categories and multiply realities. They set the previously passive objects of knowledge of modern science into motion. (On narrative turn see Penttinen 2004, p.51-57) In addition, these writers have realized the subject of knowledge is herself/himself deeply involved in the process of making science. Needless to say, this study/story has been a very personal project to me. I had to re-think and re-value my personal thoughts, values, believes, aims and expectations. I have experienced myself telling a story is to throw yourself into it.

At the heart of the narrative turn has been the notion that all the time and everywhere, science included, we are surrounded by myriad of powerful stories (Haraway 1997, p.45). Accordingly, our thinking is filled with myths and metaphors (ibid., p.21). However, stories are not “only” stories, but extremely influential ways of constructing knowledge and transmitting thoughts (ibid., p.68-69). Stories are devices for knowing, understanding and experiencing. As such they must be taken seriously. As Haraway asserts,

“Stories are not ‘fictions’ in the sense of being ‘made up’. Rather, narratives are devices to produce certain kinds of meaning” (ibid., p.64).

Hindes expresses the problem of Western political thought aptly stating,

“it would be misleading to suggest… that Western political thought has failed to acknowledge the fictional character of that world. Far from it. The problem is, rather, that while acknowledging it as a fiction, Western political thought nevertheless continues to make use of that world: both as a surrogate for the present, and as a model of what ought to, but does not, exist.” (Hindes 1996, p.157)

This is exactly the problem I wish to bring up in following discussions. There is an enormous difference between taking stories seriously and taking them for real. Even though in the realm of international relations the fictitious nature of theoretical constructions has been acknowledged, the myths old stories, such as traditional
realism, have created are still alive. Even at the present time stories of the King and the Rational Man have been turned into Reality. Regardless changes in theoretical scenes, recent events in world politics have again strengthened old stories.

Story-telling contains both serious problems and possibilities. In the following chapters my objective is to call attention to problems the myths of the King and the Rational Man entail. In the third part of my thesis I wish to be able to provide answers how to live in a fictitious world and cope with its stories. Imagined encounters with different figures and realities open up new ways of knowing and, accordingly, new ways of being, new ways of experiencing and new ways of making science: new ways of encountering the world of international relations.
PART I: POWER – Cutting off the King’s Head

3. Problems of Power/Sovereignty: Myth of the King

The first episode of my study/story takes place in the world of Western political thought, which is the locale for my discussions. It is a world where we will meet the King, one of the mythical figures in this study/story. The main purpose of this chapter is to bring forth problems inherent in theoretical constructions based on sovereignty. I will also detect how the United States has preempted the myth of the King. The myth of the King, that is, the conception of power/sovereignty has brought about serious problems and misunderstandings. Finally, I will outline alternative conception offered by Foucault.

Already nearly three decades ago Foucault observed,

“Political theory has never ceased to be obsessed with the person of sovereign. Such theories still continue today to busy themselves with the problem of sovereignty” (Foucault 1980, p.121).

The person of sovereign, the head figure of the Western political thought, namely the King, has governed Western political thinking for centuries. Accordingly, in the Western political thought the concept of power has been firmly tied with the concept of sovereignty. Respectively, in the political theory of international relations, especially in traditional realism, questions of sovereignty and power have been inextricably intertwined.

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3 Foucault used the term power/knowledge for expressing the inseparable union between the conceptions of power and knowledge. I use the term power/sovereignty, in the same way, to embody the interrelated relationship of power and sovereignty characteristic of Western political thought.
3.1. Power/Sovereignty and International Relations

The influence of traditional realism has been thoroughly remarkable. From the Second World War on and up towards the end of the 20th century, traditional realism appeared as the main theory of International Relations defining the conceptual framework and, correspondingly, the substance and the reality of the field. Realist doctrine has had a strong hold on international relations as a discipline as well as in practice, particularly in the U.S. foreign policy (Gerges 1999, p.4-6). The traditional realism has offered the theoretical framework the U.S. government has traditionally acted upon.

The idea of the King, the conception of sovereignty has been at the heart of traditional realism. According to the fundamental assumptions of the doctrine of traditional realism there are sovereign states acting in an anarchical international arena, namely without any higher authority such as world government. The sovereignty and its mutual respect has been the prerequisite for the existence of the modern state system. (Morgenthau 2006, p.317-318) Respectively, the traditional realist concept of power has been strictly tied with the presumption of legitimacy of state’s sovereignty. The power of the state has been based on its right as a sovereign. Thus, sovereignty has provided the state with right and legitimacy; the actual and conceptual state sovereignty has been dependent on power concept as defined by traditional realism.

The power has been altogether central to issues concerning interaction between sovereign states. Morgenthau stated international politics were fundamentally a “struggle for power” (ibid., p.29). More accurately, Morgenthau defined power solely in terms of national

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4 The conceptions of traditional realism used here are based on the accounts of Hans J. Morgenthau and his major work, Politics among Nations, which is the main representative of traditional realism and commonly held as the magnum opus of international politics. On the close relationship between the realist doctrine and the foreign policy of the United States see e.g. Kennan 1984, American Diplomacy and Kissinger 1969, American Foreign Policy.
interest. Sovereign states were merely pursuing their own interests in order to secure the survival of the state. (Ibid., p.5). According to Morgenthau, the will to power was inherent in the human nature and attributed to biological drives (ibid., p.36). The natural evil human nature was, thus, the fundamental determinant behind relations between states. Accordingly, war was imminent and the state of order achieved only through a fragile balance of power (ibid., p.19).

Traditional realism, thus, maintains, the security of the state and, more accurately, its entire existence are dependent on and guaranteed by power. Regardless of the immediate interests of states, such as economical profits, the underlying driving force is always the desire for power. The power is to be understood as power of a man over another man, in other words, power is equal to control. (Ibid., p.30-33). Power is, thus, something state could and should seek to possess (Ibid., p.50). Acquiring power has been considered the prerequisite for the survival of the sovereign state. In other words, possessing power is the condition for the existence of the state, or vice versa, losing power would mean the state would lose its sovereignty, that is, to cease existing. Hence, the power has been equal to the existence of the sovereign state and comparable to its functional abilities.

Not only theories have busied themselves with the King, but nowadays practitioners of international relations even more so. As mentioned above, the doctrine of the traditional realism has traditionally been the theoretical framework behind the U.S. foreign policy. In what follows, I will outline how the myth of the King is still alive in stories of the current U.S. government.

The United States has absorbed the idea of the King into its own stories. Despite changes, adjustments and moderations in theoretical frameworks (also in the realist tradition, for example the neo-realism), so far, the King, the idea of sovereignty, has maintained its value in
Due to its “war on terror” the U.S. government has emphatically highlighted its status as a sovereign state. Consequently, while acting upon these premises, it is claiming its legitimacy based on its alleged right as a sovereign state to guard its national interests (Bush 2002). Thus, the story of international relations as told by traditional realists still offers the operational framework and is again the source of required legitimacy for decisions and actions of the U.S. government. In addition, U.S. officials have asserted they will help Iraq to gain its sovereignty, to attain its freedom and strengthen its democracy (Bush 2004).

Following the doctrine of traditional realism, the United States gives preference to its sovereignty and, accordingly, aims to guard its national interests. Consequently the U.S. government has begun to emphasize the importance of military power as it did during the Cold War and before. Under the pretext of sovereignty the U.S. government has overridden the international law, which it treats as secondary to its national interests (Bush 2003).

As regards to the so-called Iraq-situation, the U.S. government tried hard, but failed to get the approval of international community. Overriding the Security Council, and disobeying the international law, was considered the greatest sin of the United States. Observing the central tenet of traditional realism, international law has still a central role to play in the realm of international relations and it is treated, as the major limitation for states’ actions. (On traditional realist accounts on international law see Morgenthau 2006, part six)

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5 The King, the right of the sovereignty is frequently present in statements of U.S. officials. I will refer here to central Iraq-related speeches of president George W. Bush.

6 As an example, after the terrorist attacks on September 11th in 2001 the military expenditures of the United States have increased remarkably, the United States Department of Defence 2005.
The problem is, that the sovereignty as well as the state at the center of international political theory and a theory based on interrelated conceptions of power and sovereignty turn out to be problematic and indefensible for several reasons. The unquestionable adaptation and application of the power conceptions of traditional realism is highly misleading and poses serious problems. In what follows I wish to show it is not the King that rules the world, and it cannot be the sovereign power that is in charge of international relations. I will start by outlining the problems of power/sovereignty.

3.2. Misconceptions of Power: Power as Right

According to Foucault, the sovereignty of the King has expressed itself in two ways. On the one hand, sovereignty appears as a legitimate right given from the outside; on the other hand it comprises the obligation to obey the sovereign, to submit to the power of the King. (Foucault 1980, p.95) For realists the sovereignty was a natural part of relations between states, a natural law. As the traditional realism maintains the King is an autonomous actor of international relations. Morgenthau stated even the international law, as the only normative construction outside the sovereign, was, actually, the manifestation of sovereignty (Morgenthau 2006, p.319). Power, in turn, has been both the manifestation as well as the indication of the right based on sovereignty. (Foucault 1980, p.103) The centrality of power manifested the universal law of international relations: the all-encompassing struggle for power.

Foucault observed that from the medieval time on Right was personated with the King, with the royal right, and the power of monarchy. In other words, the conceptions of power and sovereignty have accompanied those of right and legitimacy. Along with development of modern state system the right was passed onwards and
assigned to the state, whom it is still considered to belong to. In both of these cases, the foundation and legitimacy of right were based on the right of the sovereign, first represented by the King, then by the state. (Foucault 1980, p.94) The power concept based on sovereignty has, thus, made it through changes from the royal monarchy to parliamentary democracy.

Foucault labeled this type of theorizing as “economic analysis of power”. Economic analysis of power understood power as a right, as a commodity-like “thing”, an idea dating back to the philosophies of eighteenth century, to Hobbes and Rousseau for example. It was believed that out of necessity individuals had to hand power over to the sovereign. The relationships between individuals and the sovereignty were managed, regulated and legitimated by contract, which had oppression as its limits. (Ibid., p.88-92) As for example Morgenthau has noted, power was indeed a “thing”, something someone is able to possess, to acquire or to lose (2006, p.50).

These conceptions of power have dealt with questions of law and legitimacy, in other words the legitimate versus the illegitimate. In the Western world the question of power has been firmly seized on juridical issues, the centrality of law as its manifestation. As regards to international relations, this certainly holds true. The international law has been, at least on paper, the backbone of international relations.

### 3.3. Problematic State Sovereignty

Even though the human nature was the ultimate mover of sovereign states, for traditional realists the state was the analytical entity (Morgenthau 2006). As regards to state, Foucault noted,

“to pose the problem [of power] in terms of the state means to continue posing it in terms of the King, in terms of sovereign and sovereignty, that is to say in terms of law”(Foucault 1980, p.122).
Foucault found state in the center of power analysis extremely problematic. He pointed out there were two notable reasons to detach state from power analysis. First, the state is capable of explaining only part of the vast networks of power. Second, to exist the state needs already existing power relations. Foucault goes on,

“this meta-power [the state] with its prohibitions can only take hold and secure its footing where it is rooted in a whole series of multiple and indefinite power relations that supply the necessary basis for the great negative forms of power.” (Ibidem)

Foucault wanted to show the political theory did not deal with “real” entities and facts concerning relations between states as conceived by realism. Instead, the purpose of the political theory was to formulate and guarantee the legitimacy of power of the state by using the myth of the King.

In addition, Foucault writes,

“The analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only terminal forms power takes.” (Foucault 1978, p.92)

The sovereign state is not the origin of power, but using politically or for example economically micro-techniques of power. These micro-techniques of power further strengthen the existence of the state and satisfy its needs (Foucault 1980, p.101).

Foucault gives two explanations for the survival and success of sovereignty even, or better, especially in the age of the modern state system. First, the state has been the counterforce and central argument against the power of monarchy. It was believed the modern state saved and protected its citizens from the power of the King. (Ibid, p.105-106)

Second, it has been in fact exactly the mechanisms of the disciplinary power masqueraded as juridical systems that have enabled sovereignty
to appear as democratic manifestation of the alleged collective sovereignty and public right. In the modern society, the state sovereignty needed both the political theory and the legal apparatus to legitimate its existence. The social body became the intersection of the articulation of the legislation of modern society and coercions of the disciplinary power it exploits. These two were inextricably intertwined and constituted the arena for operations of power. (Ibidem)

Foucault required that, instead of considering right as the source of the legitimacy of the sovereign, it should be unveiled as a method of subjugation. In other words, the legitimate right of the sovereign was actually the domination in disguise. Thus, it was not the natural manifestation of any ultimate and legitimate right. Instead, the alleged right of the sovereign comprises a treacherous and hidden network of power relations. (Foucault 1980, p.95-96) Furthermore, Foucault highlighted domination is not power as such but one formation of power relations. As Hindes notes, the notion of sovereign power is only a one formation of the influential rationalities of government (1996, p.98).

### 3.4. Power as Domination versus Repression

In addition to problems of treating power as right, Foucault brought up another weakness of the Western political thought. One of the main problems of its analysis on power has been the concentration on power as domination versus repression. This applies also to the traditional realism. Giving preference to power and defining it as a disproportionate relationship, the traditional realism was concentrating on questions concerning domination. According to Morgenthau, the objective of international relations was to find out, how to restrict the use and possession of power, how to control the desire for power, the
otherwise limitless aspiration for domination, that is, how to achieve and maintain the balance of power. (Morgenthau 2006, part four)

Foucault discussed the notion of power as repression in one of his major works concerning the question of power, in *The History of Sexuality* (Foucault 1978, part two). In connection with sexuality, Foucault concluded that power was not to be confused with repression as such. Thinking of power only in terms of what Foucault called a 'repressive hypothesis’ has been characteristic of the Western thought. By ‘repressive hypothesis’ Foucault referred to that commonly held idea that our sexuality has been subjugated for centuries and only now that we are finally able to speak about it we are liberated.

Where the conceptions of power as right, dealt with law and legitimacy, conceptions of domination and repression deal with questions of struggle and submission (Foucault 1980, p.92). According to this widespread idea, a dominant group holds the power and uses it against those in subordinate positions. Marxist stated that bourgeoisies had the power over proletariat. Feminists argued men hold the power over women.

Foucault highlighted this was to understand power as a continuation of war (ibid., p.91-92). He clarified his point by reversing the well-known Clausewitzian phrase “war is a continuation of politics by other means”. Foucault stated that to understand power as domination versus repression is to understand power as a continuation of war. In this way he wanted to raise the question, if power is mainly to be understood as domination aren’t we then doomed to an eternal state of war? In that case, peace would only mean a temporarily fixed war between those dominating and those been dominated.

This is exactly what traditional realists thought; peace and war where always tied to each other (Morgenthau 2006, p.25-26). Due to the evil human nature the possibility of war was always present and order
maintained only by the balance of power and the international law, which were, thus, the sole limits for power. For traditional realists the reality of international relations is indeed one with a never-ending war. As sovereign states are endlessly striving for power, peace remains a temporarily settled war, an interlude in an eternal struggle for power.

The general misunderstanding has been that also Foucault treated power as domination. This can be due to the fact that in his earlier investigations of power Foucault concentrated on questions concerning domination and repression. However, later, as Hindes notes, the emphasis of Foucault’s treatment of power became more complex and nuanced (ibid., p.130-131). In his later work Foucault found conceptions of power as analogous to domination versus repression misleading and limited.

In any case, it is important to note that these observations are not to underestimate the injustice suffered by subjugated groups, neither it is to claim domination does not exist. Instead it is to say domination is only one formation of power, not power by definition. Domination and repression may seem occasionally self-evident. However, even if in a specific situation it may look like it, Foucault wanted to point out it is not the power itself that is used to benefit certain people at other’s expense. Instead, it is the abuse of the techniques of power enabled by certain circumstances.

4. On the Nature of Foucauldian Power Concept

As we have seen, in Western political analyses on power there have been serious limitations. As regards to traditional realism, the interrelated conceptions of power and sovereignty narrow the point of view remarkably. When concentrating on the question of power/sovereignty other more profound analyses on mechanisms and
effects of power have for long been left in the dark. When guarding and relying on the myth of the King, on the right of the sovereignty, the U.S. government confines and directs attention away from countless other relations of power.

The problem is that even though the traditional realist doctrine does offer valuable accounts of international relations, its conceptions concerning power are highly limited. By now, there are, of course, many alternative and more moderate interpretations of traditional realism, such as neo-realism and realist constructivism, and my definition of realism given above is highly simplified and tightened up. Anyhow, in spite of all the efforts to save the old man of International Relations I do not see adding more actors, structures or any other asides as a solution. The fundamental shortcomings still remain. The main problem is that the realist doctrine is already by definition attached to the idea of sovereignty and power concept based on right. Due to these problems, the objective of my analysis is to extend the analysis of power from questions surrounding sovereignty to more comprehensive analysis on power.

4.1. The Need to Cut off the King’s Head

Foucault pursued to assure we needed to extend analyses of power beyond the limits of sovereign state. He concluded,

“What we need… is a political philosophy that isn’t erected around the problem of sovereignty… We need to cut off the King’s head: in political theory that has still to be done.” (Foucault 1980, p.121-122)

This analytical execution applies to modern state sovereignty as well. Sovereignty of the King became democratized when the modern state adapted and absorbed the idea of sovereignty. Regardless of the ostensible unanimity, equality and liberation of modern state, or better precisely because of it, the underlying reasoning with its deceiving nature, however, remained the same. Individuals remained trapped in
complex networks of power, which the modern state has used to catch its goals, which serve its own interests.

When stating, we have to cut the King’s head off, Foucault expressed the need to extract the idea of right and sovereignty from the analysis of power. His interest was in investigating the possibilities for and in developing a both non-economic and non-sovereign concept of power. Because power was not to be conceived as a right (commodity), we should strive for non-economic analysis of power. In addition, because power is not based on right (resulting in legitimacy and obligation to obey) we should strive for non-sovereign analysis of power.

Thus far, I have contemplated on the problem of the mythical King, that is, I have discussed how power has been misleadingly understood as legitimate right of the sovereign and only implicitly referred to Foucault’s conceptions of power. Next I will examine more closely Foucault’s accounts of the nature of power. This will be one step towards the epistemological questions and more comprehensive understanding of questions concerning power, which are the objective of this study/story.

4.2. Power as Technique

The key idea of Foucault is that, instead of arguing who has the power and what power as “a thing” is, we should preoccupy ourselves with techniques of power. Foucault deplored the Westerns have made an all-out effort constructing a political theory of power. However, instead of theories of power, Foucault maintained we should concentrate on analysis of power. (Foucault 1978, p.82; I will discuss the problems of total theories more closely in Part II)

According to Foucault, the object of analysis should shift from power as an absolute to power in terms of power relations. Foucault stresses
that when analysing power we should concentrate on strategies, networks, mechanisms and other techniques of power (Foucault 1988, p.104). Thus, we are not dealing with the intentions of power, but its direct effects (Foucault 1980, p.97). Morgenthau though as well we should concentrate on the implementations of power, not to tackle with the motivations of statesmen for instance. However, he directed the analysis on power in a completely different direction than Foucault did, namely in the analysis of power as related to sovereignty (Morgenthau, p.5-6). This was exactly what Foucault stood against.

Foucault maintained, instead of being possessed, power is exercised: power is a technique. Accordingly, power is neither institutional nor structural. That is why it should also be understood as plural and ubiquitous. Relations of power are not stable, but continuously circulating and thus impossible to capture. (Foucault 1978, p.92-95) Before asking, “who exercises power”, we should find out “how does it happen” (Foucault 1980, p.103). Only then we can explore further “how it is that it hurts a particular category of person” (ibid, p.104), take women as an example. Thus, what is at stake are the “strategies of power”, not any solid or homogenous quantity or a structure.

Furthermore, power is at the same time intentional and nonsubjective (ibid, p.121-220). As Barrett observes, Foucault does not locate power in agencies, not in individuals nor in states, but directs the attention to micro operations of power (1991, p.135-136). This is why Foucault insists we should conduct ascending not descending analysis of power (Foucault 1980, p.99-101). We should direct our attention where power and knowledge have been less obvious or generally considered as invaluable; as Foucault put it, where power operates at its extremities, (ibid p.96).

According to Hindes, Foucault wanted to highlight that for example repression, as a clear-cut matter as it may look like, is actually only one indication of complicated and multitudinous operations of
techniques of power. In addition, he stressed that power cannot be considered exclusively as domination, from top to bottom- like suppressing relationship, rather domination is the struggle “around systems of power” (Hindes 1996, p130-131).

In addition, Foucault wanted to highlight that if power was to be able to operate, obeying it must have some positive effects on people. This, according to Foucault, works on the micro levels of human behavior and self-control, which in turn is the result of the mechanics of power. Power must be incorporated into human bodies in order to take over the control of individuals, of their behavior and thoughts. (Foucault 1980, p.125) Thus, power must be seen as multi-layered and multidimensional net of power relations. Instead of prohibitions, power is tactics.

Even though the results of power may turn out to be negative or repressive, power itself must be seen as rather positive and above all productive. (Ibid, p.119) For example, for the state it was not profitable anymore to maintain the military power as it previously was. It was more profitable to develop new techniques of power, which controlled the behavior of its citizens and proved to be more economical and effective.

Accordingly, Foucault concluded, power techniques must be somehow related to pleasure and, more accurately, to knowledge formation. Thus, tools offered by Foucault enable to analyse the operations and networks of power, which extend beyond state power and, instead, touches upon the epistemological questions concerning power and knowledge formation. It is the knowledge, not the power of the King that orders subjects and objects of international relations.
4.3. From Power/Sovereignty towards Power/Knowledge

In this first part I have focused on examining questions concerning power, the other constituent part of Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge. Accordingly, I have outlined the reasons to direct analysis on power from power/sovereignty towards questions concerning relations between power and knowledge. Foucault insisted that instead of theories evolving around power in relation to sovereignty we should focus on techniques of power, which derive from its intertwined relations to knowledge and truth. The essence of Foucault’s analysis is that power is always in unity with knowledge and truth. Accordingly, knowledge is never neutral, but deploys particular power relations. Therefore, instead of exhausting ourselves with questions concerning power/sovereignty, we should direct our attention to questions concerning knowledge formation.

In political analysis, there are important reasons to emigrate the sovereign state. As I have stated, the myth of the King is highly problematic and has serious consequences. I have brought up the concern the idea of sovereignty has still strong hold on international relations. It is not only a theoretical problem, but deeply practical as well: stories do matter. Hence, I have outlined reasons to push the King out of our way. On our way to post-modern world of knowing, there is, however, another figure we need to get rid of, namely the Rational Man. He is another figure, which has entangled in the story of the U.S. government. We will meet him next in the second part of my study/story.
PART II: KNOWLEDGE – Getting Rid of the Rational Man

5. Enlightenment’s Legacy: Illusion of Innocence

The study/story goes on in a new locale. We have now entered the world of Enlightenment and its descendant modern science, where will meet its head figure, namely the Rational Man. In what follows I will explore the worldview and conceptions of knowledge in the mythical times of modern science. In addition, I will reflect on how the U.S. government has been effected by the inheritance of Enlightenment and put its myths to use.

5.1. Home of the Rational Man: The World of Enlightenment

The story of the Rational Man began some centuries ago. From 17th century onwards, the scientific revolution and novel understandings of human nature and society inspired and led to new political theories and epistemologies. Enlightenment’s thinking reformed people’s relationship to the surrounding reality and renewed the Western worldview. The human being was himself to be the master of that world. (Bordo & Jaggar 1989, p.2-3)

In the World of Enlightenment it was believed there exists a Reality, which is objective and, thus, independent of human understanding and the context of knowing. This world was governed by natural laws, which were universal, determining and stable. Because the reality was one, undisputable and unchanging all notions concerning its nature and functioning were to be treated universally valid as well. In that sense, Enlightenment represented foundationalist and essentialist thinking. Furthermore, it took in the idea of history as a coherent, logical and homogenous progress. (Ibidem)
5.2.  *The Almighty Rational Man*

The Rational Man was born as a child of Enlightenment. He was the one who inhabited and was in charge of the Enlightenment’s world of knowing. After hundreds of years’ monopole, God had to move backstage to give him way; the Rational Man came to conquer the world of knowing. The trust was not on God anymore as much as it was on the Rational Man. Rational Man’s trust on his own potential became superior. Since the world of Enlightenment was a “kingdom of rationality”, the Rational Man became its head figure (Haraway 1997, p.136).

The foundation for the success of the Rational Man was laid on the seventeenth century when, among others, the French philosopher René Descartes outlined the new grounding for knowing (Bordo & Jaggar 1989, p.2-3). This way of thinking became known as a Cartesian framework. Descartes came to conclude the Reason was the key to the Truth. Back then, the Scientific Revolution and its genius’ such as Isaac Newton had made it easy to believe in human abilities and unlimited possibilities of the Reason.

Thanks to the masterful Reason, a rational individual had an access to know the reality as it really was. The task of the Reason was to unveil dis-coverable laws of Reality. (Flax 1992, p.448) As this was to be considered as the highest objective of the Rational Man, the Reason became the highest and the most valuable quality of human being. In Western culture the central representative of the Rational Man was a philosopher as an independent and superior user of his reason (ibid., p.451).

The Rational Man as the head figure and representative of modernity was a child of the mind, not of a body (Haraway 1997, p.83). He was well-ordered and capable of coherent thinking (an easy task considering he was “only” observing the coherent world and its
coherent laws). As a selfless knower he was conceived of as imperial, but at the same time benevolent and well-intentioned. (Flax 1992, p.454) Furthermore, it was considered of being of great importance the Rational Man did not confuse his private life and inner feelings with his public duties. Thus, an important thing to note is that in addition to the objectivity and independence of the Reality, due to his distance from the world the Rational Man observed, also knowledge was conceived as independent and thus dispensed with private interests, including desire for power. (Ibid., p. 446-447)

As a descendant of Enlightenment’s thinking, modern science became the institutionalized and highest form of knowledge, the new home of the Rational Man. For years it has had a perfect command of the use of the Reason and, accordingly, the Reason mastered the field of knowledge. The task of the philosopher as the representative of the Rational Man was designated to a scientist, in the course of time to a social scientist as well. It was believed, science possessed methods for dis-covering, that is, not constructing, the Truth concerning the Real. (Ibid., p.449)

However, as Haraway’s telling remarks highlight,

“(e)xperimental philosophy –science –could only spread as its materialized practices spread. This was a question not of ideas but of the apparatus of production of what could count as knowledge” (Haraway 1997, p.24).

Based on the Cartesian framework, modern science outlined its own criteria for controlling and regulating what was considered as Truth. In Haraway’s terms modern science established its own “conventions of modest truth-telling” (ibid., p.31).
5.3. **The Rational Man: A Modest Witness**

The crucial link between the Rational Man and his surrounding Reality was objectivity. Objectivity was both the epistemological premise and the right method. It was at the heart of modest truth-telling. In other words, on the other hand, the Rational Man believed there existed an objective Reality. On the other hand, his internally coherent mind had universally valid, fixed *a priori* categories at its disposal. This enabled the objective observation of the Real and assured the Rational Man was able to obtain the Truth. (Flax 1992, p.452)

Consequently, objectivity guaranteed the innocence of the Rational Man. The head figure of Enlightenment, the Rational Man declared he was “only” a neutral and independent knower: he was a *modest witness*. Because knowledge reflected objectively the Reality as it actually was, the Rational Man himself was to remain invisible. He was an inhabitant of the “unmarked category”. (Haraway 1997, p.23). By the unmarked category Haraway refers to Sharon Traweek, who suggests that such a man must live in a “culture of no culture” (ibidem). The Rational Man was, thus, a man of no culture and no society. Furthermore, he was asexual, he had no gender, and he was ahistorical, unemotional (namely, precisely rational), and apolitical. The Rational Man was an impersonal and invisible, a moderate witness of the world.

Haraway goes on to state the subjectivity of Rational Men became their objectivity, “Inhabiting the culture of no culture, these modest witnesses were transparent spokesmen” (ibid., p.42). Rational Men merely transmitted objective facts. Haraway stated it was the differentiation between the subjects and the objects of knowledge that made modest witnessing possible. In the similar vein, the credibility of science was warranted, because modest men were not “polluted by the body and, thus, able to report credibly on others bodies” (ibid., p.32).
All in all, it is crucial to bear in mind all these qualities were, without question, considered as positive, essential and necessary for any honourable and trustworthy user of the Reason.

Thus, in the mythical time of modern science its subject of knowledge, the scientist as a Rational Man was innocent. He was not responsible for his knowledge claims, because he did not have any personal relationship to the object of his knowledge nor to the formation of the knowledge. In case of accusations of misuse he had the possibility to plead for his innocence as an “outsider” reflecting and reporting on an independent Reality. Only instead of God, the Rational Man had the Reality and the Reason as his highest authorities and protectors of his innocence.

5.4. Chasing the Truth

The Rational Man was excited about the idea of his own potential to really find out the Truth concerning the Reality surrounding him. His knowledge did not rely solely on his trust on God anymore. He did not have to wait for the hopefully forthcoming afterlife. Instead, the Truth was lurking right there before his eyes. “The will to truth” was to fill up people’s minds and load scientific theories with ontological, methodological, normative and moral claims, which were to be followed and observed in order to obtain the Truth, which became the highest objective of the Rational Man.

Flax outlines the underlying assumptions of Rational Man’s chase after the Truth, that is, the main premises of modern thinking as follows. First, we must be confident it is possible to differentiate the Truth from any disturbing and dependent variables. That means the Truth is always neutral and value-free. Second, by means of language we are able to transmit the Truth for others. Third, neither subject nor the object of study interferes the discovery of Truth. Fourth, science
will ultimately correct possible mistakes it has made. Fifth, because the social world is governed and constructed by natural laws it must also itself be unchangeable and homogenous. Finally, the Truth is never harmful but benefits all. (Flax 1992, p.450)

Flax goes on this assured the science was at the same time neutral and emancipatory, that is, the accumulation of knowledge automatically guaranteed positive results. As a selfless knower, the Rational Man could use the knowledge only for good of all. The promise of progress was due to natural emancipatory effects of knowledge. The more one had knowledge, the freer one was. Thus, the amount of knowledge correlated with freedom. (Ibid., p.446-447) Men were to be set free: free from the monopoly of the church, free from submission. The accumulation of knowledge reinforced the progress of human history and guaranteed the freedom of both human race and individuals. Modern conception of knowledge comprised a normative assertion: the “better” we are able to know the better we can and we will make the world.

6. Misguided Present: Molding the Changing ‘Reality’

The myth of the Rational Man, the stories of Enlightenment and modern science have been extremely influential in the realm of international relations. The traditional realism has been one of the projects of modern science. Correspondingly the traditional realist was the Rational Man, a modest witness of International Relations, who defined the Reality of international relations. Even if the “landscape of international politics” (a citation from Morgenthau 2006, p.5), has changed dramatically, myths of traditional realism and modern science, the will to the Truth and the spirit of the Rational Man, have endured in the U.S. foreign policy.
6.1. Traditional Realism and the ‘Reality’ of International Relations

The story of International Relations as an independent discipline began in the beginning of the 20th century Europe. The suffering had marked the beginning of the new century as Europe met with the two World Wars. After the first one, international community was determined to do everything to prevent such an horror happening again. The League of Nations, an accomplishment of the idealist approach, displayed the shared will and commitment to root war out of international relations. However, the League proved weak and powerless to prevent unavoidable crises ahead

As a result, hopes of a peaceful international community were wiped out and idealism as a theoretical and practical approach to international relations was condemned as unrealistic and naïve. Supporters of traditional realism asserted the League was impotent to handle the Reality of international relations. The outbreak of the Second World War appeared as undisputable evidence and paved the way to the triumph of realist doctrine as an unbeatable theory of International Relations for a long period of time. (See e.g. Tickner 1992, p.9-11).

Traditional realists stated, in order to handle the reality, we needed to find out what it is like and how it functions. In the beginning of Politics Among Nations Morgenthau maintains the task of theoreticians of international relations is “to detect and understand the forces that determine political relations among nations” (Morgenthau 2006, p.17). Without dis-covering the fundamentals it is impossible, Morgenthau asserted, to find a steady ground for making any knowledge claims concerning relations between states (ibid., p.18).

7 See E.H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, a classical work discussing international relations between World Wars and respectively the so-called “first debate” between realism and idealism.
Even if the world does not always function rationally, a political theoretician must pick up the rational elements of political life, which Morgenthau defines as “good”. For Morgenthau, rationality was equal to objectivity. He stated the theory of international relations must concentrate on rational elements. (Ibid., p. 7-8). Moreover, as it was a political theory, it should not tackle on economic, moral or religious issues (ibid., p.15).

Morgenthau stated, the theory of international relations was like a map, which described relations between sovereign states and accordingly helped to get oriented in the political reality. A theory should reflect the facts and correspond to the Reality of international relations as they actually were. (Ibid., p.3-5) In the spirit of Enlightenment this was considered possible. Regardless changing circumstances the struggle for power was, according to Morgenthau, “universal in time and space and… an undeniable fact of experience” (ibid., p.36). The theory of international relations should reflect the Reality and unveil its unchanging laws. Even though traditional realists have not denied the historical changes and construction of a nation-state, which is their analytical entity, and even though, as Morgenthau had admitted, the point of view of traditional realist is of necessity a limited one, traditional realism still believed there existed objective dis-coverable laws of international relations (ibid., p.48-49).

Even though Morgenthau did not share, due to the unchanging human nature, the confidence in progress and the possibilities to resolve problems with Reason as idealists did, his epistemological attitude was that of a Rational Man. From the post-modern point of view Morgenthau certainly was a Rational Man believing we were able to dis-cover the laws, which directed international politics and determined actions of states. Tellis notes, Morgenthau’s stance was a philosophically conditioned empiricism (Tellis 2006, p.613). Modest witnessing, empirical observation of the Reality presupposes the Rational Man was an autonomous subject of knowledge.
Again, objectivism was in key position guaranteeing the innocence of the Rational Man. Morgenthau maintained the task of a theoretician of international relations was to find out “what is true objectively and rationally” (Morgenthau 2006, p.4). Power, nation-state and other theoretical units were to be treated as objective categories. Morgenthau maintained the aim of the theoretician of international relations was to form a “rational theory of international politics” (ibid., p.10). This, in turn, would lead to a greater understanding of the function of international relations, that is, relations between states, and, further, help political leaders to a successful conduct of foreign policy. Thus, a traditional realist was a modest witness of international relations, an objective observer of its Reality. As such, his innocence was guaranteed: he was only witnessing the never-ending struggle for power.

The story of traditional realism has built the worldview of the United States. Accordingly, its conceptions of knowledge comply the rules and criteria of modern science. The politicians in the United States have stressed the importance of objective knowledge and sound abilities necessary and essential for leading superpower to maintain its power. For example according to Kennan, Hunt writes, for political leaders, it was crucial to ignore disturbing and uncivilized notions of citizens in order to serve the interests of the state. (Hunt 1987, p.5-6)

6.2. Fighting On the Battlefield of Absolute Truths

The United States’ “war against terror” and its invasion into Iraq captured the attention of the whole world. When the U.S. government provided arguments for its attack on Iraq the myth of the Rational Man was again in full swing. The situation seemed to be an illustrative example of U.S. government’s “will to truth”. In case of this so-called Iraq-situation the “will to truth” appeared to be the driving force
number one. In the beginning and on the early stage of the war it seemed overwhelming.

The U.S. government’s chase after truth in Iraq started with its assertions Iraq was possessing infrastructure needed to develop weapons of mass destruction. Iraq was considered to be a threat for the United States and for the whole civilized world. (Bush 2002) After the beginning of the war it soon became clear that the threat had been greatly exaggerated and intelligence on WMD in Iraq were inaccurate. Among other things, the superb truth factory of the United States, the intelligence service, had failed. In addition, the Truth of the U.S. government did not always agree with the information CIA had acquired from Iraq (see e.g. Perkovich 2004). Afterwards much of effort has been made to convince people the government did not want to mislead people on purpose, and affirm the U.S. government really was determinate to find out the Truth; they were devoted to the Truth.

As regards to this highly complex situation in Iraq, what I found most interesting was the controversy between U.S. government and the TV-network Al-Jazeera8. Above all, the conspicuous shouting match between these two drew my attention. The U.S. government’s evident hostility towards this TV-network appeared to be especially revealing. The controversy between the U.S. government and Al-Jazeera

8 Al-Jazeera is a Qatari TV-network established in 1996 with an Arabian personnel previously worked at BBC. Both the specialty and the controversy of the network have been widely acknowledged and Al-Jazeera has attracted wide international interest, appreciation as well as opposition. Chan expresses its importance and uniqueness stating, “The previously hidden and sanitized deaths of thousands of non-combatants are now broadcast on stations such as Al-Jazeera, and the world can see what a just death or a moral death entails”, Chan 2005, p.92. The TV-network is mainly financed by emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani. Since the outbreak of the war in Iraq, Al-Jazeera has constantly been a target of U.S. government’s harsh critics. The U.S. officials have tried to put pressure on Qatar government in order to deny its financial assistance for the network. The U.S. embassy in Qatar has given a formal diplomatic complaint and Qatari ruler Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani have admitted U.S. officials have asked him to use his influence on Al-Jazeera. Al-Jazeera’s agencies have also been targets of U.S. military operations. Many observers have suggested these were attempts to prevent the network from operating. All in all, this is considered to be surprising as Al-Jazeera is an unordinary example of free press in Arab world and as such should contribute to the United States’ democratic endeavours in the Middle East. See e.g. Campagna 2001.
displayed and brought up the epistemological assumptions inherent in their way of thinking, in the stories they told.

Fairly soon after the outbreak of war, a Qatari TV-Network Al-Jazeera became one of the main targets of U.S. government’s critics. U.S. officials were accusing it for distorting and misrepresenting the truth about what was going on in Iraq. Al-Jazeera responded to their critics by introducing its “Code of Ethics” to assure and ensure its objectivity and its aspiration and commitment to obtain the truth. What Al-Jazeera stated as its main principles, were, again, objectivity, accuracy and a passion for truth. (Al-Jazeera 2004) In addition, it assured, “Truth will be the force that will drive us to raise thorny issues” (Al-Jazeera 2005). Thus, both U.S. government and Al-Jazeera have used the same vocabulary common to modern science. U.S. officials judged the TV-network using tenets of modern science and Al-Jazeera spoke up for itself with the same language.

U.S. government’s story comprises various components of the Rational Man’s will to truth. The U.S. government maintained it had dedicated itself for obtaining the Truth. To ‘know’ for the U.S. government was to own factual evidences, which also meant to give preference to objectivity. The U.S. government has again and again assured they knew Saddam Hussein was after nuclear weapons. (Bartlett 2003) Their “will to truth” has been about evidences and fact-finding. Facts were considered to be equal to the Truth and fact-finding formed the basis for ‘knowing’. When U.S. officials have spoken about “telling the truth” they have relied on the information received. They have assumed objectivity would have warranted their knowledge was free from any personal motives and believes, which in turn would have guaranteed their innocence.

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9 U.S. government’s accusations against Al-Jazeera have been disproved on several occasions, see e.g. Ampuja 2005.
Finding “enough” evidence was U.S. government’s rationale to go to war. Respectively, it expected the international community would have counted on its evidences like the Rational Man has counted on them for centuries. It believed evidences would have verified the Truth. Accordingly, the Truth would have legitimized U.S. government’s decision to wage war against Saddam. As long as the U.S. government would have based its decisions on the Truth, it would have been acting in good will and its innocence would have been guaranteed. However, as the Truth seemed to be out of the United States’ reach, it needed to draw on other myths of modern science.

Terrorist attacks to the United States in 2001 had changed the course of international relations dramatically. Since then, the United States’ (and its allies’) “war against terror” has filled the international agenda of the new millennium, and especially the U.S. foreign policy. The so-called war on terrorism has brought the United States and alongside international politics back to traditional debates encircling for example questions of state sovereignty and power.

The dominant presence of the “war against terrorism” in U.S. government’s politics has been evident (see e.g. Bush 2002). However, despite its key position in U.S. politics the conception and content of “terrorism” in itself is a highly problematic and obscure matter. In fact, its essence seems to be exactly its indefinite nature. (More on terrorism see e.g. Juergensmeyer 2003, *Terror in the Mind of God: Global Rise of Religious Violence*) In its obscurity, terrorism has appeared conveniently mouldable to suit U.S government’s story. Although the evil was a vague “terrorism”, the U.S. government has been trying to associate it with certain states. Thus the U.S. government has tried to control the complexity of international relations and mould it compatible to the realist doctrine.
This has clearly been the case with Iraq. One of the main justifications to wage war against Iraq was the alleged connection of Hussein administration to terrorist network Al-Qaeda. It was told Iraq with its hostile government, which had close relations to terrorists, posed an imminent danger for the United States and the whole civilized world, and hence, required countermeasures. Allegedly terrorist-friendly government of Iraq was against national interests of the United State. (Bush 2003) This kind of argumentation draws from the doctrine of traditional realism. The United States is striving for a rational and controllable view of a chaotic world of present day international relations. It is trying to pick up the rational elements of international relations, those, which would be compatible with the story of traditional realism.

In addition, as the Rational Man could only imagine of one world, one Reality, same goes for the United States; the only imaginable world of it has been one of a struggle between good and bad, another binary opposition of modern science. The U.S. government has purported Iraq and naturally terrorists were the evil, which the “good guy”, the United States had to fight against. As an example of binary thinking characteristic of Enlightenment, Flax mentions terrorists and fundamentalists (Flax 1992, p.458). The insistent truth is on one’s side has been common when legitimising dubious and contradictory actions. No question terrorists but as well U.S. government has tried to base its actions and legitimacy on the Truth.

It must be noted here the myths of modern science used by the United States has not confined to traditional realism. There is also a strong idealistic element, which thus does go against the traditional realist doctrine, but which, however, is based on central tenet of modern science: the idea of progress. As it turned out there was no nuclear

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10 I am discussing here myths deriving from Enlightenment’s thinking, modern science and traditional realism. Naturally there are also other mythical figures, God for instance, wandering about in stories of U.S. officials. But that would be another study/story.
weapons found in Iraq as U.S. officials had stated, they needed to divert attention from their misconduct. As idealists wanted a century ago to save world from new disasters, in the same vein the U.S. administration asserted, even without WMD, Iraq and consequently the whole world needed to be saved from terrorists (see e.g. Bush 2003).

Like the Rational Man, an inhabitant of no culture, the U.S. government has made universally valid claims on what is best for people. It has reserved the right to decide what is best for everyone and everywhere; its “good” is to be for everyone’s best. Accordingly, the U.S. government has repeatedly proclaimed the superiority of Western democracy. U.S. officials have maintained their policies have “brought positive results” around the world (Powell 2004). The U.S. government has asserted it is providing the seeds of democratic endeavours for Iraqi people and helping to bring back their freedom.

As Tickner puts it, traditional realism seems to receive growing support at the time of crises (1992, p.12). As mentioned above, this happened after the outbreak of the Second World War. It also happened at the time of oil crises in the seventieth. As far as the present situation is concerned, it seems that, again, at the time of at least ostensibly sudden uncertainty, unpredictability and abrupt change in the international reality, the story of traditional realism has recovered and regained its explanatory power. Dramatic events of the beginning of the new millennium have once again made the explanations and the worldview of traditional realism appear as credible, valid and accurate. Regardless changing circumstances, the Reality of international relations seems again to correspond the doctrine of traditional realism. Consequently, the Rational man of international relations would be able to say, “See, I told you”. However, in what follows I wish to show, why the assertions, the myths U.S. government uses fall short.
6.3. The United States: A Blind Censor of International Relations

Azar Nafisi tells about a film censor in the Islamic Republic of Iran, who was practically blind (2004, p.24-25). In spite of his disability, he was responsible for deciding what was appropriate for Iranians to see. As a henchman of the Islamic government he was defining the Reality for Iranians. As he could not really see, he saw what he wanted to see; or better, he saw what the government wanted him to see; he saw what served the interests of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The United States has used the myth of the Rational Man, the modest witness of international relations. However, whom the U.S. government, on the basis of contradictions and changes in its statements and actions, rather reminds of is actually a blind censor. It is blind, that is, indifferent towards divergent realities around it. In a similar vein as the blind censor in the Islamic Republic of Iran, even if aware of what was going on, the U.S. government has, in order to reach its own goals, blinded itself to other truths. Moreover, it is not only the U.S. government, but the Western culture on the whole, which seems to be more willing to encourage “a dangerously blind innocence rather than to prepare the ways for freedom or justice” (Flax 1992, p.458).

If witnesses of international relations have come to realize there are divergent realities, not everyone is ready to give them credit. The blind censor may well be aware of varying realities and knowledges surrounding him. However, he only sees what he wants to see and what is useful for him. In the foreword to the seventh edition of Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations Thompson and Clinton assert the conceptions of traditional realism are still relevant (Morgenthau 2006). Yes, they are. In the closeness of modernism and its powerful myths the blind censor has managed to keep these myths alive. However, they are not relevant in the sense they were accurate. They
are relevant in the present day international relations because the blind censor still (mis)uses them.

As I have demonstrated above, the legacy of Enlightenment is still present in stories U.S. government tells; it still speaks in terms of binary oppositions and wields the superiority of its own knowledge. The world it is willing to see is highly limited and monotonous, one with colorless landscapes. When moulding the reality and forcing the world to look rational, there is little place left for differing views. Moreover, the illusion of innocence and objective knowledge has serious consequences.

Morgenthau was right when stating we cannot impose our ideals on Reality. However, what Morgenthau misapprehended, was it is not due to any immutable evil human nature or universal laws. The reason we cannot impose our ideals on Reality is because the obsession to our ideals destroys whether the ideals themselves or ourselves (Nafisi 2004, p.144) As the right to choose is at the heart of democracy, it would be paradoxical and absurd to force someone to choose it.

The problem is that the stories blind censors tell and act upon are consequential. Even though many Iranians could not respect their blind censor and did not believe in his stories, they needed to submit to his authority. They where effected by his decisions. Even though one did not trust on blind censor, his decisions mattered. In a similar vein, the stories U.S. government tells and bases its action on do matter. They have consequences, even though if we, or even the U.S. officials themselves would not really believe in stories they tell. However, as Nafisi notes, blind censors do not posses their objects, the victims of their censorship (2004, p.74). That is why new realities can emerge, or better, do emerge. There are those who can imagine of different worlds.
The reason why it is possible to imagine of new worlds is that in addition to the internal complexity of a reality there are myriad of divergent realities existing at the same time. Both the Rational Man and the blind censor have not been able to acknowledge this. The problem with both of them has been exactly their lack of imagination. They have been able to imagine of only one world. However, there is not only one world, no transcendental Reality “out there”, but multitude of realities we inhabit. Furthermore, the irrational world does not function rationally. We may produce rationality on it, but rationality is not \textit{a priori} quality of the world. Not to realize the plurality of realities was the enormous mistake the Rational Man had made and an insight the blind censor has not been ready to bring up. The world is much more complicated than the Rational Man had ever thought or the blind censor is willing to acknowledge. As there is no stable Reality to reflect on, there can be no objective knowledge either to guarantee the innocence of the Rational Man.

Someone might ask has it been necessary to dwell on modern science, traditional realism and their myths for so long? Yes, it has. Even though, for someone it might appear as a prolonged introduction, for me it is an essential part of the study/story. Going first back to 17\textsuperscript{th} century and to the beginning of last century when International Relations as an academic discipline became institutionalized is not only to put the development of International Relations into a broader perspective but also to demonstrate the power traditional realism still has in today’s world politics. The day I do not feel the need to refer to traditional realism, I can be confident something in international relations has changed for good. By then, the once so powerful and influential way of thinking has become a legend, “Grandfather, tell me that exciting story about the King and the Rational Man, who once ruled the whole world”.

Meanwhile, my study/story goes on. I have myriad of questions in my mind. How to cope with endlessly changing and unruly international
relations, without clinging on deluding myths of the Rational Man and the King? How to be a moderate modest witness of international relations? These are questions I wish to find answers to in the last part of my study/story.
PART III: POWER/KNOWLEDGE – Being a Moderate Modest Witness

7. The Post-Modern World of Knowing

We have now left the world of Enlightenment and modern science and entered the post-modern world of knowing, which is the final destination of our journey and the home of a moderate modest witness. I will start by discussing the problems inherent in the myth of the Truth, which, as demonstrated in the previous chapter has still strong hold for example of the U.S. foreign policy. I will also reflect on developments in International Relations and outline post-modern conceptions of the problem of total theories. Finally, I will move on to scrutinize more closely the Foucauldian worldview, that is, Foucauldian notions on the nature of world of knowing, and the interrelated relations between power, truth and knowledge.

7.1. Foucault’s Attack on the “Will to Truth”

Foucault attacked fiercely on what he called “will to truth”. By that he referred to the obsession of modern science with the idea of discovering the Truth concerning the allegedly real and objective world, which existed “out there”. All down the line, Foucault objected the Enlightenment’s idea of fixed Reality, its binary thinking, and its trust on the Rational Man as the autonomous master of knowledge.

By rejecting any transcendental Real, Foucault consequently rejects the existence of any transcendental Truth. Foucault finds problematic any aspirations to truth as an objective, verifiable and eternal value and rejects any effort for claiming unchanging, universally valid and objective truth claims. Due to the plural world we ought to have plural definition of truth instead of Enlightenment’s unitary one. (Foucault
1984, p.12) Foucault acknowledged it was hazardous to remain indifferent in relation to questions concerning truth. However, it was even more dangerous to maintain one possessed the Truth (ibid., p.23).

In addition, Foucault directs our attention elsewhere by asking why the Rational Man has been so attached to truth. In his opinion the eager “will to truth” implies the fundamental problems of Western thought. Foucault posed crucial questions,

“Why the truth rather than the lies? Why the truth rather than the myth? Why the truth rather than the illusion? And I think that, instead of trying to find out what truth, as opposite to error, is, it might be more interesting to take up the problem posed by Nietzsche: how is it that, in our societies, “the truth” has been given this value, thus placing us absolutely under its thrall?” (Foucault 1988, p.107)

There are many reasons why we are still attached to the idea of the Truth, and fascinated and confused by the mythical figure of the Rational Man. I will briefly outline some of them. These are some of the main reasons, why I found relevant and crucial to reflect on and think through the epistemological questions concerning witnessing of international relations.

First, seizing the Truth and Reason can be seen as an aspiration to control the uncontrollable. If one was not able to cope with uncertainties and indefiniteness of international relations, one clings to the myth of the Truth. Second, it indicates not everyone is ready to take the risk of not being taken seriously; the Truth provides credibility. As regards to the so-called Iraq-situation, Al-Jazeera deserves some praise as it is going the right direction with its well-grounded and open coverage. Its slogan, “opinion and another opinion”, crystallizes its message; they have promised to tell more than one side of the story (Al-Jazeera 2005). However, as fighting in the battlefield of modern Truth claims, they have not had the courage to give up fully the shelter the modern truth conception offers and acknowledge openly there are not only differing opinions, but a truth and another truth as well. A constructive dialogue appears as a useless
enterprise if one keeps arguing about Facts, Truths and Lies. As
Perkovich remarks referring to the U.S. government, “It’s much
simpler and more entertaining to play the who-lied game, but the
world’s greatest power should demand more from itself” (2004).

Third, clinging to the Truth goes to show there has not been no serious
alternatives until recently. The Rational Man is still influential as we
have only now came to realize and value the wide spectrum of
different ways of knowing. Compared to long history of the Rational
Man, few decades is “only now”. The well-known and often used
division of International Relations divides the development of the
discipline into three debates. The first debate took place in the early
decades of 20th century when realists and idealists argued about the
content of international relations, that is, about ontological questions
of the discipline. Thus, the first debate was also the beginning for the
success of the Rational Man of the international relations, namely the
traditional realist. The second debate followed along the second half
of the century. At this time, methodological questions were considered
most crucial. (See e.g. Booth and Smith 1995, Sylvester 1994) Only
towards the end of the last century epistemological questions began to
attract more academic attention. Post-modern thinkers were at the
head of this third debate.

As a result, the problems concerning the nature and effects of
scientific knowledge or knowledge in general where considered not as
philosophical nonsense anymore but found to be of primary
importance. Post-modernists have asserted epistemological questions
should be the starting point for every scientific study. We should ask,
right at the outset, what we are able to know in the first place. Who is
able to know? How are we able to know? I realized I was not ready or
capable to move on to study anything else before considering and
exploring epistemological questions of international relations first.
That is not to say there were not a number of other extremely
interesting and appealing issues concerning international relations.
Nor it is to say I am after some clear and definitive answers before passing on to “real” problems. Instead, it is about being aware. It is about being aware of one’s abilities to know. In other words, it is about being aware of conditions of human knowing, its limits and its possibilities as well. This is one of the underlying reason why I am writing my Master’s thesis on epistemology of international relations. What is at stake is not so much the balance of power but balancing between limits and opportunities of human knowing.

The third debate challenged the Truth. In the realm of international relations it posed a challenge especially to the realist doctrine. The aspiration to form a total and ahistorical theory of international relations was placed under question. (Tickner 1992, p.21) Quite contrary to the realist aspirations, the objective of post-modernists was not to make a theory of the world, but make a difference in the world. This is one of the central differences between the subject of knowledge of modern science and the post-modern subject of knowledge. In other words, it is one of the essential differences between the Rational Man and a moderate modest witness.

7.2. Objection of a Total Theory: Analyzing Instead of Theorizing

Morgenthau drew a comparison between a photograph and a painting of a certain landscape (Morgenthau 2006, p.9). He maintained the theory was a painting of the world of international relations, which could not perfectly duplicate the world as a photograph could. It could not describe the Reality as the naked eye saw it, as it actually was. However, it could capture its essence, the never-ending struggle for power. Even though the illustrativeness of the example clarifies his point, Morgenthau’s analogy does fall a bit short. The photograph does not show what a naked eye sees. There are plenty of different factors affecting the end result, demarcation and the point of view, for
instance. Both the photos and paintings of Morgenthau differ remarkably from those of post-modernism.

As we have learned, modern science assumed we needed knowledge and theories in order to expose the Real, which was to be understood as unquestionable and universal substance. As Morgenthau maintained, forming a theory of the world of international relations as it actually was, was to be the objective of International Relations. Post-modernism on the contrary rejected the totality of these coherent theoretical constructions, that is, metanarratives. The objection applies both to the existence of an actual dis-coverable Reality claimed by modern science and, consequently, the practical and theoretical use of total theories. (Foucault 1980, p.80-81) Respectively, Foucault’s stance differed from modern science in that he was more interested in inventing tools to analyze rather than theorize and form a total theory. Foucault wanted to stress we needed theoretical tools as instruments of our analyses, but should not set a total theory as the main objective of our investigations. (Foucault 1978, p.82)

In the absence of the coherent and stable Reality, also a total theory becomes impossibility; we cannot have a fixed and closed theory on changing world. It is the post-modernism’s plural worldview that challenges traditional epistemological assumptions of modern science. It is impossible with total theories to capture the constantly changing reality. It is like trying to capture the wind: it ceases to exist if captured. Accordingly, the complex and changing reality of international relations will not obediently comply with the tenets of traditional realism, despite the U.S. government’s efforts.

Post-modernists drew attention to the artificiality of the union between the sign and the referent (Haraway 1997, p.74). Post-modernists have wanted to disprove the existence of an objective reality and the usefulness of total theories by stating these were “only” social constructions, not natural and given nor necessarily progressive either.
As such, they were considered as rather unnecessary and undesirable. The denial of metanarratives was a post-modern attack on Enlightenment’s treasury: an attack on reason, history, science, self, knowledge, power, and the superiority of Western culture. (Flax 1992, p.450)

Due to the complexity and changeability of social phenomena and their context, an ambition, or rather obsession, to strive for a formation of a total theory has appeared problematic for several reasons. First problem was the ignorance of the importance of history. This applied to the history of the subject of knowledge himself, namely the Rational Man, as well as the historicity of theoretical constructions at his disposal. As Haraway puts it, “Western intellectuals… have historically been particularly likely to take their cultural stories for universal realities.” (Ibid., p.60) In other words, the Westerns have been inclined to stay unaware or ignore their own descent and conceive their knowledge as automatically rational. Haraway called modern science aptly a “naked way of writing” and maintained it was a place where,

“both the facts and the witnesses inhabit the privileged zones of ‘objective’ reality... Only through such naked writing could the facts shine through, unclouded by the flourishes of any human author.” (Ibid., p.26).

The second remarkable problem was the alleged stability of the real world enabling the formation of stable categories. Haraway expressed this by diagnosing Western knowledge suffered from epistemological arteriosclerosis, the “hardening of the categories” (quoting Watson-Verran Haraway 1990, p.139). Here Haraway goes to the same direction as Foucault. All the line, Foucault rejected any structure or category that would claim its universal validity. The objection to metanarratives at the heart of Foucault’s writings implies the post-modern and post-structural orientation of his thought.
In hopes of post-modernists was to avoid another serious consequence of metanarratives. According to post-modernists, a central drawback of modern science has been to reduce the variability and diversity of realities to coercive totality of closed theories. Simplifying and artificial binary oppositions and fixed categories as its main instruments, modern science has tried to capture and govern the incoherent complexity of divergent realities. Mainstream theories have also tended to absorb and integrate new challengers into their own canon, thus aiming to protect their dominance by making uprising voices harmless (see e.g. Penttinen 2004).

In addition, post-modernists have wanted to alert us the Western philosophy and science have misleadingly made us believe there existed a unitary and universally stable Reality, which we ought to discover in order to better our lives and the well-being of the whole humanity. However, instead of revealing the Real, the underlying interest of Western subjects of knowledge has been to constitute and legitimate metanarratives in order to serve political interests of ruling elites. (Flax 1992, p.451)

It is important to keep in mind the cautiousness and avoidance of any total theory is not to escape the responsibility but to acknowledge the imperfection inherent in human knowing. The ‘imperfection’ of human knowing is not a negative quality; rather it is a challenging one. Even if Foucault has been occasionally accused of building up yet another theory, that of power, he is not striving to construct a comprehensive and unstable theory of power. Instead of a total theory, he is offering analytical tools to study operations and techniques of power, which are changeable, unstable, and undetermined.

The post-modern world of knowing differs remarkably of that of modern science. In what follows, I will discuss more closely the Foucauldian worldview and lay the foundation for the home of our third figure, that is, for a moderate modest witness. In the following
discussions I will examine the analytical tools that Foucault has to offer to deal with changing realities, starting from discourses.

7.3. **Defining Discourse**

According to Foucault, the post-modern world of knowing was based on discourses. However, rather than structures discourses were a set of practises. Foucault’s interest was not in exploring the laws by which discourses were constructed. Instead, Foucault wanted to find out under what conditions discourses came to exist. (Foucault 1980, p.118) Discourses did not testify the existence of an autonomous and independent subject, nor expressed his rational thinking and knowing (Foucault 1972, p.55). As Barrett notes, Foucault wanted to highlight certain discourse was not directly related to the mind or subject who displayed it (1991, p.161). Instead, discourses operate under discursive fields, which consist of diverse practises regulating and directing their existence. The point was in seeing discourses as fluctuating techniques, not as any stable and determinate quantity or structure.

Hence, Foucault differed from certain other post-modernists, such as Derrida, in that he did not relate discourses to textuality. Instead, Foucault’s concept of discourse related it to contextuality: to history and context of “how is that one particular statement appeared rather than another?” (Foucault 1972, p.27). Accordingly, he stated discourses were closely tied to relations of power (ibidem). As a result, analyses on discourses should be directed towards those specific historical conditions of existence, which enable certain discourses to appear, others to disappear and some not to exist at all. This in its turn is important in order to understand the artificial nature of discourses, that is, to understand they are not natural or direct reflection of the Reality. Instead, every discourse, every story of different worlds and realities, has their own history. Taking discourses
for natural and neutral language has been one of the main misunderstandings of Western world and prominent misconducts of modern science, which has been used to justify the status quo (Haraway 1997, p.108).

Foucault’s notions on discursive nature of reality have encountered harsh critics. For example Nash has noted that within discursive frameworks reason and experience would lose their existence. As Nash complained they would be, “no more than discursive construction legitimating certain statements and denying others authority” (Nash 1994, p.66). This has been one of the main misunderstandings of Foucault’s ideas and those of post-modernism in general. I would like to ask Nash why to say “no more than”? Entrusting discourses a prominent and relatively independent role is not to underestimate nor deny active agents their right to “real” and meaningful, personal or shared experiences. Rather, discourses are exactly what allow us the most “real” experiences: discourses are the condition for dealing with and understanding human experiences, giving them meaning. Even though they are inescapable and limiting, at the very same moment, they are necessary and enabling. Discourses provide the settings for social existence. They are the building blocks of stories we tell to experience and make sense of the world.

Thus, supporting the Foucauldian concept of discourse is not to take world only for fiction. Entrusting discourses a relatively independent role is not to say these were the only real things in the world, that outside discourses nothing really exists. To state discourses do not reflect the Reality is not to say they were arbitrary or haphazard (Haraway 1997, p.231). As Haraway notes,

“Discourses are not just ‘words’; they are material-semiotic practices through which objects of attention and knowing subjects are both constituted.” (Ibid., p.218)
Accordingly, Foucault did not deny the existence of truth either. As he rather strongly put it, “all those who say truth does not exist for me are simple minded.” (Foucault 1984, p.23) What he wanted to highlight, was that truth was always in connection to discourse. In other words, truth is the product of discourse. It is not to say truth did not exist but that truth is always dependent on discourse. At the same time, discourses both limit and enable the existence of certain truths and realities. Varying rules govern every discursive realm determining what counts as truth and who has access to knowledge. (Flax 1992, p.452)

As a result, Foucault found discourses essential when tracing historical networks of knowledge and power. The core of the matter for Foucault was that discursive practices did not define the “dumb existence of reality… but the ordering of objects.” (Foucault 1972, p.49.) Therefore, discourses take the analysis back to power and connect the analysis on truth to that of power. Instead of the power of the King or the natural laws, which the Rational Man had unveiled, in post-modern world of knowing it is discourses and, further, relations of power, which order the subjects and objects of knowledge. This is what I will discuss next.

7.4. **Truth and Power**

Foucault was very clear on his notions on truth in its relation to power when he stated:

"The important thing here, I believe, is that truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power… truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint." (Foucault 1980, p.131)

Foucault wanted to highlight truth certainly was a form of power and that a change in power relations changes conceptions of truth as well. (Foucault 1988, p.107) Accordingly, truth is always conditioned and
no neutral uncovering of truth is possible. In addition, as mentioned earlier, it would be even more useful and relevant to ask, why the Western world has been so obsessed with its “will to truth” as opposite to lies, stories, myths and illusion for instance. The apparatus of truth production has been central to Western societies. Different institutions of Western society, take university and governments as an example have always been highly respected. These are institutions, which have been involved in epistemological, and normative negotiations concerning, what counts as truth and what are the criteria for making and justifying truth claims.

Instead of trying to dis-cover the Truth, Foucault asserted we needed to redirect our attention in order to understand the prevailing rules and conventions (that is, not universal laws) of making truth claims and probe why the Truth has been given such a high value and an important role in our societies. (Foucault 1980, p.132) As in the case of the U.S. government, as demonstrated earlier, after all, it did not seem to matter whether the United States would have found the Truth or not. The myth of the Truth was used as means for other ends.

Foucault stated that every society had its own conventions of truth-telling, which he labeled as régimes of truth. Foucault defined these as follows:

"Each society has its régime of truth, its ‘general polities’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.” (Ibid., p.131)

Foucault wanted to highlight that when discussing questions of truth, it is of prominent importance to take into account its complexity. There are no finite destinations to arrive at, no limited sources of truths. (Ibid.) Our task is more complex and challenging than simple dis-covering of truths. Foucault maintained the task was to trace, “ the history of the relations which thought maintains with truth; the history
of thought insofar as it is the thought of truth.” (Foucault, 1988, p.107?) Instead of an obsessive “will to truth”, Foucault asserted we should aim at “seeing historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false” (Foucault 1980, p.118).

As a major possessor of means and methods needed to obtain the truth, the university has been one of the most important producers of knowledge. Scientific discourse has dominated the production of knowledge and mastered the rules, which instructed and regulated the making of truth claims. In other words, as an institutionalized form of knowledge making, science has been treated as a superior and highly reliable master of knowing.

As I mentioned in the second part of this study/story, one of the central features of modern science has been its reliance on Cartesian dualism. Binary oppositions have characterized modern scientific thought, the lived experience and scientific objectification as one of the most remarkable. (Haraway 1997, p.174-175) Respectively, overcoming dualism is a central feature of post-modern way of thinking and, accordingly, a prerequisite for moderate modest witnessing. I will turn to this issue next.

7.5. Overcoming Dualism: Surpassing Relativism

Accusations of relativism have been one of the major weapons of the Rational Man against post-modernism. Opponents of post-modernism have asserted in the absence of absolute truths everything must be relative. (Flax 1992, p.452-453) If there is no grounding for definite knowledge claims, there can be no knowledge at all or anything can count as knowledge. However, Foucauldian analysis on the nature of social world and knowledge provide us tools to answer the critics concerning relativism. It is exactly the pluralism of both Foucault’s,
and Haraway’s thinking as well, that facilitates new moderate approaches to knowledge.

Hekman notes quite correctly the challenge of post-modernism has been to balance between Enlightenment’s absolutism and the accusations of relativism. (1990, p.129) In one extreme there have been those who have stated only personal is real. For example standpoint feminists assert due to their special point of view, their knowledge is privileged and superior, only they have access to understanding (see e.g. Hartsock 1990, p.166-172). On the other extreme there are those who stated nothing is real. For example, when discussing the Gulf War in beginning of 90’s, Baudrillard maintained, there was no war. The Gulf War was a dead war; regardless of deaths and wounds, it was a “derisory fantasy” (Baudrillard 1997, p.167). Post-modernists have wanted to point out we have myriad of other options at hand, not only those offered by modern science. Because realities and truths are more complex than modern science purports, we need not and we should not confine our thinking to fixed binary oppositions. (Haraway 1997, p.68) We do not have to rely solely on extremes. In the post-modern world of knowing ostensibly contracting truths become possible.

Moreover, in order to extend our ideas we should as well transgress the bounds of different parts of speeches, that is, of differentiations between verbs, subjects and adjectives. Mary Daily captures the idea perfectly when she asks, “Why ‘god’ was a substantive? Why not a verb… the most active and dynamic of all?" (Daily 1992, see the introduction). I think this was exactly what Foucault had in mind when he broke down the idea of power as a ‘thing’ or discourses solely as texts or structures, and claimed these were rather techniques and relations. Respectively, nor categories are not naturally equivalent to real ontological entities. For instance, gender, as any other category,
is always a relationship, one of diverse and numerous power relations. (Haraway 1997, p.28) Indeed, categorizations are effects of certain rules of knowing and, thus, effects of certain power relations.

Interesting enough, the critics of the Rational Man against post-modern conceptions of knowledge use the same strictly classifying language, which avoid any confusion or overlapping. Consequently, critics on post-modernism do not comment on post-modern ideas in its own terms. As if the Rational Man was eating an apple cake and complaining it did not taste like a blackberry cake. Of course it does not and it should not. However, the Rational Man has not realized we have already eaten enough apple cake and now it is time to try something new and get used to new flavours.

Among others, also Jane Flax objects the common claim that post-modernism was relativist by pointing out,

“relativism only takes on meaning as the partner of its binary opposite – universalism…If the hankering for an absolute universal standard were absent, ‘relativism’ would lose its meaning and force.” (Flax 1992, p.452-453)

As regards to the truth, the insistence of modernity, which is based on the binary thinking, again forces one to recognize either the possibility or impossibility of the Truth (ibid., p.446) However, there are no stable and unchanging truths available, because, as Flax goes on,

“Sense data, ideas, intentions, or perceptions are already conditioned. Such experiences only occur in and reflect a variety of discursively and socially determined practices…(T)he categories or concepts by and through which we structure experience are themselves historically and culturally variable.” (Ibid., p.452)

What Foucault, according to Hekman, encourages us to do, is to proceed away from limits of polarity to thinking in terms of plurality and multiplicity (1990, p.142). This is possible, indeed, because, as we have seen, discourses as the bearers of truth, are social and historical, not universal. (Ibid., p.150) Therefore, what we should do is to let concepts float free (Flax 1992, p.457). Scientific discourses and their
categories are not prethought, not in the head of the God, nor in the mind of the Rational Man. The Rational Man does not possess sole rights of the Truth or Knowledge. As power, truths and knowledges are not to be possessed.

7.6. **Locating Knowledges: Situated Knowledges**

The knowledge of the Rational Man, of the modern science, has been knowledge of no culture. For example, Tarja Väyrynen dissertated only few years ago the importance of culture in conflict studies, which is a revealing example how long International Relations have also been science of no culture (Väyrynen 2001). Thus, instead of science of no culture, or view from nowhere, it is a view from everywhere and in this sense partial and particular; every view has its own specificity. Situated knowledge is particular and specific as opposed to value-free, general and a-historical knowledge (Flax 1992, p.451). As Haraway puts it, it is “of being for some worlds and not others.” (1997, p.37)

To locate knowledges is another prerequisite for moderate modest witnessing. It is not to tie it up on any detached Reality but anchor it to its own context. This is a project, which has not been possible without acknowledging the impossibility of total theories. In Foucault’s terms realizing the embeddedness of knowledge and power, and in Haraway’s terms realization of the necessity and value of situating knowledges has not been possible before acknowledging illusion of omnipotence of total theories. (Foucault 1980, p.83, Haraway 1997, p.45) Locating knowledges does not confine ‘local’ merely to spatial locality. Instead, it refers to partiality and particularity. (Haraway 1997, p.121)

In its Code of Ethics Al-Jazeera expressed its aim was to “(p)resent diverse points of view and opinions without bias or partiality” (Al-Jazeera 2004). In the contemporary world, qualities such as ‘biased’,
‘partial’, are still considered as negative and avoidable. Not as the actual source of knowledge. These features are still considered as shortcomings that should and could be avoided by following certain methodological rules. This in turn implies there were means to strip truth of biases, of subjective suppositions, values and feelings. When Al-Jazeera broadcasted video-messages of Osama Bin Laden the U.S. government accused it was working in concert with terrorists and asserted its coverage was value-laden (Boucher 2004). Indeed, its news about Bin Laden was value-laden. However, biased, unbalanced and partial should be understood as situated, not necessarily false.

Also Foucault notes, “the work we have done could be justified by the claim that it is adequate to a restricted period” (Foucault 1980, p.79). Thus, the situated knowledge is adequate and valuable at certain moment as such. It has done its part when capturing something important even if it, or better, when it does not aspire to give universal and eternal explanations. Situated knowledge does not insist on its right due to its superiority in relation to something else. It is not knowledge in some trajectory from worse to better. It only claims its right in its own terms, within its own historical and discursive framework, not under any stable, everlasting Reality.

Accordingly, at the same time situated knowledges both capture and produce meanings and truths, that is, “located, embodied, contingent, and therefore real truth[s].” (Haraway 1997, p.230) Situated knowledges do not claim their natural belonging to a certain universally valid category. They are a “way of forming ties across wide distances” (ibid., Haraway quotes Porter, p.199). Accordingly, International Relations is about forming ties and coding connections between long distances.

For Foucault to locate knowledge was to adopt a genealogical approach. Genealogy investigates how, that is, under what kind of rules objects and subjects has been ordered. It helps to clarify current
relations of power/knowledge, which govern the world. It is a struggle against the effects of power of discourses. Foucault was not so much interested in or worried about the substance nor the methodological questions, but the effects of centralized scientific discourses that (ab)use the power of especially scientific and other dominant discourses. (Foucault 1980, p.84-85) To adopt a genealogical approach is to strain your ears and open your eyes to local knowledges in order to challenge the dominant ways of thinking, that is, dominant discourses and power relations inherent in them. It is to tell new stories and to challenge powerful myths.

7.7. Science-in-Making

Because knowledge is always in connection to relations of power, ordering of objects and subjects, and locating knowledges, science is always a process. That is, it is not science-as-given or science-as-taken, but science-in-making. Moreover, it is a political process, it is choosing between different possibilities (Stanley & Wise 1995, p.192). Making science is to challenge the prevailing knowledge claims and, accordingly, the prevailing power relations. (Haraway 1997, p.115) To make science is to rearrange networks of power.

To participate in the processes of science-in-making is to get your hands dirty, not to watch from the distance. It is to make oneself visible, not to hide behind the walls of alleged neutrality and artificial innocence, or to lurk in the shelter of fixed categories. (Ibid., p.36) Situated knowledges call for more open, comprehensive and diverse processes of science-in-making (ibid., p.11). Situated knowledges and moderate modest witnessing enable us to partake in such knowledge-in-making processes, which facilitate making truth claims on divergent realities. Haraway reminds us, only then “a more culturally alert, reliable, scientific knowledge can emerge” (ibid., p.121).
Haraway goes on to conclude,

“To see scientific knowledge as located and heterogeneous practice, which might (or might not) be ‘global’ and ‘universal’ in specific ways rooted in ongoing articulatory activities that are always potentially open to critical scrutiny from disparate perspectives, is to adopt the worldly stance of situated knowledges.”
(Ibid., p.137-138)

One of the main objects of my study/story is to contribute to the projects of science-in-making that establish foundation for analysis on international relations, which do not undermine the multitudinous, complex, exiting, and mysterious world nor subjective experiences and subjective knowledges. I wish to be part of science making, which does not remain distant, ignorant, or speechless, but does make a difference.

8. Inhabiting the Post-Modern World of Knowing

The post-modern world of knowing has now been built up and it is waiting for someone to move in. Thus, the task of the following chapters is to inhabit the post-modern world of knowing. I will begun by discussing how post-modernists have dealt with the accusations of denying the subject his active agency. Then, I will introduce the moderate modest witness, my ideal of a post-modern story-teller. I wish to find out, what it means to be a moderate modest witness, not a blind censor, in the mythical times of post-modernism

8.1. The Post-Modern Subject: A Living Creature

Among other post-modernists, Foucault has been accused of anti-humanism, that is, to deny the existence of an active agency. With his

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12 Instead of the Truth, the Rational Man, the Reality, inhabitants of the post-modern world of knowing are aware the world is plural and there are myriad of realities, moreover everything and everyone is in constant change. That is why I do not use capital letters. Unlike the Rational Man, the post-modern subject of knowledge, the moderate modest witness is unstable and chancing. Therefore her/his name is written in small instead of capital letters.
notions on relative independence of discourses and power networks he has been accused of slaying the human being and defying his existence. Indeed, Foucault shakes the bedrock of liberal humanist thinking, which places its trust on the autonomous Rational Man and his omnipotent ability with the Reason to discover the underlying Truth concerning the Real. (Flax 1992, p.446)

Even though it certainly is true Foucault objects the humanistic framework, this goes only as far as it supports the sovereignty of the Rational Man. (Hekman 1990, p.73) Rather than undervaluing or even destroying the human being, Foucault wants to destroy the unitary subject of Enlightenment, namely the Rational Man. Foucault criticised the subject, which was the accomplishment, the necessity and the outcome, of modern discourse. It was the sovereign subject of humanist discourse who Foucault uncompromisingly stood against, not the human being himself. (Hekman 1990, p.68)

Accordingly, Foucault stated,

“[we need to] dispense with the constituent subject [of modern scientific discourse], to get rid of the subject itself, that’s to say to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework.” (Foucault 1980, p.177)

As Barrett notes, the post-modern subject should not be taken as given, but understood as constituted by discourses (1991, p.146-147). The subject of knowledge is not autonomous, sovereign or self-supporting, as the humanist thinking of modern science wrongly assumed. The social subject is constructed under certain but varying discursive conditions, that is, historically varying discursive frameworks. Consequently, the Foucauldian subject is always within the sphere of influence of certain power relations, which order not only the objects of knowledge but subjects of knowledge as well.

Thus, it has been one of the prominent misunderstandings of Foucault’s thinking to assume he is against thinking, feeling and
experiencing human being. Instead, what Foucault wants to do is to remind us, we are not independent of certain discursive conditions. Even if Foucault argues on behalf of the relative independence of discourses, it is not to say human beings did not exist or they exist only in discourses. The post-modern subject is not a marionette of discourses but a living creature.

To sum up Foucauldian idea of post-modern subject, I want to present one of the most illuminative and apt notions of Foucault. Foucault stated a subject is neither “transcendental in the relation to the field of events… [nor] runs through its empty sameness throughout the course of history” (Foucault 1980, p.177).

8.2. Being a Moderate Modest Witness

The Rational Man has been incapable of understanding realities other than his own. Moreover, his field of vision has been notably limited, and, consequently, he has not recognized divergent realities surrounding him. He has been unable to encounter, understand, and communicate with figures from different realities as he speaks only his own language. As Nafisi notes, the “incapacity for true dialogue implies an incapacity for tolerance, self-reflection and empathy” (2004, p.268-269). Blind censor in turn misuses the myth of the Rational Man and masquerades stories to count as Real.

How, then, to describe a moderate modest witness, the figure of the post-modern world of knowing? Quite simply, he/she is an opposite to the Rational Man and to a blind censor. The mythical figure of post-modern world of knowing, the moderate modest witness realizes he/she is a part of the story as well as telling her/his own stories. Thus, he/she encounters the world in totally different way than the Rational Man or the blind censor. He/she is able to cope with different realities
and is highly committed to her/his task, to her/his particular process of making science.

As discussed earlier, detaching the subject of knowledge from the object of knowledge was the prerequisite for modest witnessing. (Haraway 1997, p.42) It allowed the subject of knowledge, the Rational Man his freedom and guaranteed his innocence. It detached the Rational Man from time and place (Stanley & Wise 1995, p.163). This authorization was exactly one of the main reasons, which made the modest witnessing possible. Respectively, disqualifying the artificial distinction modern science has forced between the subjects and objects of knowledge, enables us to overcome the very same distinction, and, thus, is a prerequisite for moderate modest witnessing.

The clear and unquestioned division of modern science, which separated the subject from the object of knowledge, has been one of the main misconceptions post-modernists, especially feminist post-modernists, have brought into question (see e.g. Penttinen 2004). Post-modern feminists have stressed that instead of being considered as a shortcoming of knowledge making, the situatedness should be considered as the basis as well as a source for making science (Stanley & Wise 1995, p.163). It needs to be acknowledged the moderate modern witness is always in connection with his/her object of knowledge and this union deserves a key position in the process of science-in-making.

The moderate modest witness is not a relativist, nor ahistorical or anti-political (Flax 1992, p.446). He/she is a situated knower. As Haraway notes, the moderate modest witness is a “historically specific, located in a particular time, place, and body: she(/he) is therefore a figure for… global consciousness” (Haraway 1997, p.20). Global for Haraway means multifaceted, complex and widely distributed. It does not refer to universal validity. (Ibid., p.29) The moderate modest
witness is not doomed to centralized thinking and is not attached to an idea of an omnipotent autonomous subject of knowledge. Her/his thinking is not dependent on any existing great theory, but free to evolve. Unlike the autonomous Rational Man, the moderate modest witness realizes he/she is operating under certain discursive conditions.

As compared to the Rational Man, the moderate modest witness is more sensitive to the world. However, he/she realized the great wisdom of Eastern martial arts; one must turn one’s weaknesses and the adversary’s strength into one's own strength. Moreover, as a Finnish singer Aki Sirkessalo sings, when you give up of the fight you will win\textsuperscript{13} (Sirkessalo 2005). All in all, in the end her/his ingenuousness is not his weakness but his strength. He/she does not participate in the never-ending game of modern science, where there are only winners and losers.

The moderate modest witness is a self-aware, accountable, anti-racist FemaleMan (Haraway 1997, p.35). To call the moderate modest witness a FemaleMan, as Haraway does, brings up yet another aspect, which the Rational Man failed to acknowledge, but which is essential for the moderate modest witness. In modern times, trustworthiness was granted mainly to men; their use of their reason guaranteed their neutrality. The Rational Man believed women were too attached to nature and body, and could not control their emotions. It was believed their knowledge would not have been free from personal factors and influences, which naturally were conceived as disturbing the scientific, that is, objective, enterprise to unveil the independent Reality. (Ibid., p.30) This is one of the reasons there existed only Rational Men, no Rational Women. However, on the contrary to the world of modern science, inhabitants of post-modern world speak up for and represent both genders, and different races and classes as well.

\textsuperscript{13} “Voitan sodan, jos luovun taistelusta.” Translated by the author.
The moderate modest witness is aware of her/his involvement in ordering the objects of the world. Also Foucault discussed the important question what it means to speak with the voice of science, the voice assigned to those mastering scientific discourse and academic protocol with its conventions and procedures (Foucault 1980, p.85). According to Foucault, this relatively homogeneous voice is a representative of a certain kind of experience at the same time excluding other types of experience and knowledge. In order to avoid the monotonous voice of science we should break the fetters of coercive power of unitary discourses of science. Instead of only one, there are myriad of stories to tell.

The moderate modest witness watches world through the eyes of a child: not so much giving ready-made answers but asking questions and questioning. She is asking questions that did not occur to the Rational Man, or the questions blind censor has been scared to ask. To ask different questions is to see the world in a different light. The moderate modest witness sees a world the Rational Man was unaware of and the blind censor did not dare to watch.

8.3. Involvement Instead of Innocence

One major misconception of the modern science has been the alleged neutrality of the Rational Man, his presumed innocence, which is a quality the blind censor has taken advantage of. It has been believed,

“(a)ction grounded in scientific/expert knowledge is hence an innocent form of power whose operations and effects are transparent and universally accessible as the scientific enterprise.” (Flax 1992, p.450)

This misconception has not only been a secondary shortcoming, but one with serious consequences. As Haraway puts it, “nostalgia for ‘pure research’ in mythical ivory towers is worse than ahistorical and ideological.” (Haraway 1997, p.95) To masquerade the mastering of
knowledge as innocent enterprise in order to cover power relations it contains is anything else but not innocent. (Flax 1992, p.451)

Post-modernism placed under question any innocent form of knowledge (ibid., p.447). Expressing the very same concern, only with slightly different words, Haraway was concerned of the alleged innocence of modest witnessing, where Foucault, in his turn, stated knowledge was inseparable of relations of power. All in all, the very same objective of both of them was to resist the illusion of a neural, selfless Rational Man. Foucault wanted us to,

“recognize the inherent danger of the assumption that knowledge is only a disinterested reflection of reality and that the use of reason will lead to progress” (Foucault 1980, p.102).

Far from being neutral, knowledge is always in relation to certain context and certain relations of power. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind, this applies equally to the subject of knowledge; both knowledge and the knower are firmly tied to their relations to both power and discourses. There is no way the subject of knowledge could insist on its neutrality. As a result, the subject of knowledge can never be innocent and indifferent in relation to the object of knowledge. This is a condition for the process of science-in-making, not its hindrance, which could be avoided by following certain methodological instructions, as the Rational Man falsely assumed.

To sum up, the epistemologies of modern science and post-modernism have, thus, carried out completely different tasks. The ontological and epistemological assumptions of modern science were to protect the subject of knowledge, to guarantee the innocence of Enlightenment’s Rational Man. (Flax 1992, p.452) Quite contrary, epistemological notions of post-modernism bring up and openly acknowledge the restrictions of human knowing. The kind of post-modernism Foucault and the moderate modest witness are representatives of does not try to
conceal but exposes its involvement in science-in-making, in scientific story-telling.

8.4. Discovering Realities: Broadening Scientific Horizons

What actually was at stake in the last decades of 20th century was the question concerning new tools of analyses and new borders of science. Challengers of traditional conceptions were “restructuring” the space of science (Haraway 1997, p.26). Post-modernists have been at the head of the heated discussion of what should count as knowledge and how to approach the constantly changing reality. Post-modernists stated what applies for categories inside scientific discourse goes for the borderlines of science itself as well. Namely, what counts as knowledge, is a result of multitudinous relations of power and ongoing negotiations. (Ibid., p.67) The rules are not given from the outside, as the Rational Man had believed.

In the post-modern world of knowing epistemological frameworks and analytical tools are like maps, which help to orient in different worlds of knowing (Haraway 1997, p.11). In Enlightenment’s world of knowing there were unambiguous guideposts along the roads. The world was precisely governed and its people self-disciplined. Inhabitants, that is, the objects of knowledge, observed the law, that is, natural laws, which governed the Reality. The Rational Man, the leader of modern science used aged old maps and walked through the very same highways, which were built years ago. In order to avoid taking any risks, he safely followed in his forefathers’ footsteps. For example the map of international relations that Morgenthau used was all the way one and the same. Consequently, it confined multifarious...

14As one of my teachers Elina Penttinen once pointed out, breaking traditional boundaries of International Relations (which seemed to be the main interest of her own feminist research on corporeal globalization, see Penttinen 2004) is not same as breaking the rules of scientific study and academic writing. The main thing to remember in the process of writing, she said, was to be clear whose knowledge was at stake.
landscapes of international relations into a monotonous portrayal. Respectively, the misleading black-and-white picture of the world, which the U.S. government uses, does not facilitate to understand the nuanced world of present day international relations either.

Fortunately the moderate modest witness, a globetrotter in the post-modern world of knowing has realized he/she is surrounded by myriad of cultural maps encompassing divergent epistemological paths, which help her/him to situate herself/himself and make her/his way in this dense jungle of diverse realities. He/she is fond of smaller, meandering and winding roads and is eager to track new ones. This has been a welcome change. After living in an ostensibly well-ordered and well-controlled world of Enlightenment, we definitely need to break new paths, we need to broaden our horizons, and to re-map the world of knowing. In other words, it is time to invent new ways of knowing and to find new sources of knowledge. The task of the moderate modest witness is to read these maps with comprehension (ibid., p.11). It is a challenging task as here and there new maps might be difficult to read. There are also many only recently discovered and plenty of uncharted areas. In spite of all the difficulties, he/she must not give up hope to finally find her/his way there, that is, to better understand realities surrounding her/him.

In the beginning of the third millennium sources of knowledge have multiplied. As for example Al-Jazeera has showed, the media have an important and influential role to play. During the last decades the division of labor in the international arena has chanced. This applies also for the ability of different actors to possess and acquire knowledge. In the beginning of 21st century and at the age of fast developing ICT the state has lost its monopoly to cover and control information concerning also wartime events and transmitting information to broader audience. At the same time satellite channels have become more common. This has mainly taken place in the western world, but the same goes increasingly for Arab audience as
well. (Schleifer 2004, p.223-225) Nowadays there are myriad of different stories and story-tellers.

Among other only recently discovered and yet mostly uncharted sources of knowledge is fiction. Fiction holds great wisdom; novels take the reader to new worlds, songs crystallize ideas and touch with their melody, poems dig into to essence of politics as Bellow, according to Nafisi, has once mentioned (Nafisi 2004, p.315). Tales of indigenous people introduce new ways of understanding and approaching world. Fiction is a shortcut to an experience of another world and the prerequisite of empathy (ibid., p.111). It is an inexhaustible source of knowledge.

Post-modernists have also encouraged to listen and to hear new voices (see e.g. Foucault 1980, p.86-87). Foucault speaks of an insurrection of subjugated knowledges, feminists listening to the voices previously silenced. Those are the voices previously considered neither as valuable nor scientific. Foucault refers to what our culture labels mad, prisoners, homosexual and feminist for their part have directed attention to colored women, poor women, women in general, and emotions for instance. Foucault regarded such knowledge first of all as valuable knowledge, like feminists do also. In addition, both characterize it as particular, local and unable to be generalized. Foucault acknowledges the difficulty to “protect” this kind of knowledge, which easily can be misused or disregarded if detached from its original context. The moderate modest witness of international relations listens to and appreciates the knowledge all those involved, not only the knowledge of experts.

Considering previous examples of new sources of knowledges and all the other ideas post-modernists have suggested, it is strange post-modernists still have been criticized for having no alternative solutions for making science. This makes one think could the problem after all be the difficulties the opponents of post-modernism have had
to really understand post-modern conceptions, not in the post-modern conceptions themselves? I wish that also this study/story would offer practical guidelines, practical suggestions for research of international relations. Thus, my analysis on the nature of knowledge and knowing should not be understood only as abstract theoretical mutter or critical nagging, but as practical, epistemological and methodological, suggestions for more specific and elaborate researches. Even though my project has been mainly theoretical, I hope among other the notions of the U.S. foreign policy have proved it is extremely closely related to practise. Stories of international relations touch everyone.

When contemplating on his role Foucault maintained,

“... My role - and that is too emphatic a word - is to show people that they are much freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called evidence can be criticized and destroyed. To change something in the minds of people - that's the role of an intellectual.” (Foucault 1980)

Stories the moderate modest witness tells both reflect old and current, and create new ways of knowing. One of the most important tasks of a moderate modest witness is to free other subjects and objects of knowledge from the gaze of a blind censor. Her/his task is to challenge dominant discourses, and give value to ways of knowing, which has been previously or currently ignored and introduce new ones, that is, to renew relations of power.

9. Conclusions: Being a Moderate Modest Witness of International Relations

With analytical tools offered by Michel Foucault I have pursued to understand the fictitious nature of international relations. I have realized it is neither the King nor the Rational Man, who governs the world of international relations. What instead orders subjects and objects are the manifold networks of power relations, which different
stories bring into live. In other words, stories we tell contain certain relations of power/knowledge, which order both the subjects and the objects of international relations. A prerequisite for being a moderate modest witness is to understand stories are never neutral but deploy complex power relations. Telling stories of international relations is not an innocent enterprise but a process of science-in-making, which matters.

Being a moderate modest witness of international relations, where powerful stories and figures and different realities meet each other is a demanding challenge. Moderate modest witness of international relations is a witness of some of the most tragic events of human life, which often have both far-reaching and long-lasting consequences. Thus, moderate modest witnessing is a fragile and sensitive activity, which demands committed involvement. As a subject of knowledge moderate modest witness is involved in constructing realities of international relations. Therefore, it is of immense importance he/she carries out her/his task with discretion, and above all, without illusion of innocence. As an inhabitant of post-modern world of knowing, the moderate modest witness of international relations has realized, instead of having only one Truth or no truth at all, there is a truth and another truth.

Powerful myths of modern science and traditional realism, phantoms of the King and the Rational Man, and blind censors of present day pose a challenge for a moderate modest witness. However, with analytical tools offered by Foucault and with the guidance of Haraway the moderate modest witness is ready to encounter the complex and multidimensional world. Even if the moderate modest witness is living in the world of sudden changes and insecurity, which make people to call for certainty and definite answers, unlike the Rational Man or the blind censor, the moderate modest witness does not seize the Truth, or close her/his eyes from surrounding realities and other truths. Without getting confused by its complexity, ambivalence, and its
contradictions, the moderate modest witness is able to endure the indefiniteness of international relations.

Naturally the moderate modest witness is not able to detach herself/himself entirely from the legacy of Enlightenment and modern science. Enlightenment’s stories, its myths of the Rational Man, of the Truth and objectivity still may confuse her/him. However, the moderate modest witness is neither doomed to their power and influence. He/she has her/his own reason, mind, emotions; body, history and the discursive framework of the present time and place guiding her/his way. Above all, he/she has her/his imagination. To be able to imagine, to tell new stories is to be able to chance prevailing relations of power/knowledge. To imagine is to make difference.

Imagination has been my way of writing this study/story. It has been my method to bring up both problems and solutions, which I find extremely important in international relations. By telling a story of imagined figures, the King, the Rational Man, a blind censor and a moderate modest witness, I have wanted to bring abstract concepts and theoretical statements back to life, I have wanted to give them a human touch.

Azar Nafisi rounds off her book by writing,

“I have a recurring fantasy that one more article has been added to the Bill of Rights: the right to free access to imagination. I have come to believe that genuine democracy cannot exist without the freedom to imagine and the right to use imaginative worlds without any restrictions. To have a whole life, one must have the possibility of publicly shaping and expressing private worlds, dreams, thoughts and desires, of constantly having access between the public and private worlds. How else do we know that we have existed, felt, desired, hated, feared?” (Nafisi 2004, p.338-339)

I share her wish. The freedom of imagination is indeed what the present day international relations need. As a moderate modest witnesses of that world, we need, as Jewel sings, to “lend our voices only to sounds of freedom. No longer lend our strength to that which we wish to be free from.” (Jewel 1998).
This is the end of this study/story. However, it is a beginning of another story, a story of one moderate modest witness of international relations, namely that of mine.
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