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Europeanization of Youth Policy:

Case Study of Finland and Norway

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Youth policy is a relatively young topic for International Relations. Nevertheless, it becomes more relevant at the European level. There is an evolution and growing quantity of youth related strategies, programmes, acts and policies both at the European and domestic levels. For Europe, the youth can be a resource to support cooperation, smart economy and sustainable development. This Master’s Thesis argues that the European youth dimension has particular impact on domestic youth policies. This thesis inquires how European integration appears in the youth policy, and discovers causal relations between European and domestic policy changes. The object of this research is youth policy, and the subject is its evolution and changes due to European integration.

It is possible to look at the youth dimension through the lens of Europeanization theory, and its narrower type – EU-ization. This thesis traces Europeanization in two cases – Finland and Norway. Both cases, on the one hand, have similar features of belonging to the Nordic states. On the other hand, they have different experiences of European integration. Process tracing and analytical narratives are the tools used in this research.

The empirical research conducted in the Thesis discovered interconnections between European and domestic youth policies: consequences of policy changes, parallels in youth policy agendas. However, in both cases domestic youth policies have specific priorities. European integration has had different impact in the case of Norway and in the case of Finland. These differences seem to be caused by Europeanization and, in Finland, by EU-ization. Despite the fact that the youth dimension is young and not on the top list of European policies, European states introduce changes at domestic levels.

This research shows how Europeanization and EU-ization appear in youth policy. It means that in order to design a more effective European youth policy, policy makers should identify which common recommendations and strategies are relevant for each particular state. Further unification of youth policy standards at the European level may cause domestic changes which are not objectively required, and thus would appear only under the “goodness of fit” notion. Instead, it might be more efficient to diversify the youth policy agenda and leave more initiative for domestic youth policies.

Key words: youth policy, Europeanization, EU-ization, process tracing, analytical narratives.
## Contents

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 4

1. Is there a European Youth Policy? ........................................................................... 6

   1.1. Youth dimension in European policies ................................................................. 6

      1.1.1. Understanding ‘the youth’ ........................................................................... 6

      1.1.2. Youth Policy or something different? ............................................................ 8

      1.1.3. Youth, integration and globalization ............................................................ 10

   1.2. Youth in Nordic Welfare states ........................................................................... 11

Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 15

2. What Europeanization studies can contribute to the International Relations ...... 17

   2.1. General trends of Europeanization studies ......................................................... 17

   2.2. Adaptational pressure in youth policy and outcomes ......................................... 21

   2.3. Mechanisms of Europeanization ........................................................................ 22

Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 24

3. Youth Policy Tracing ............................................................................................... 25

   3.1. Case selection ..................................................................................................... 25

      3.1.1. Nature of the cases ...................................................................................... 27

   3.2. How to conduct a within-case analysis .............................................................. 28

   3.3. Usability of analytic narratives .......................................................................... 29

   3.4. Limitations of the methodology ........................................................................ 33

Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 35
4. Europeanization of Youth Policy in Nordic States ........................................... 36

4.1. Collecting primary sources ........................................................................ 37

4.2. Changing boundaries: does the European youth think it is European? .......... 38

4.2.1. Evaluation of the youth agenda analysis .............................................. 43

4.3. Instruments of youth policy change ............................................................ 45

4.3.1. Evaluation about changes of institutions and politics ............................. 51

Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 55

Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 59

References ............................................................................................................ 64
Introduction

Youth policy is not a very popular topic for International Relations research. At the same time, there is a growing interest towards the youth at European level. This is due to a changed perception of the youth as resource; while this perception has for a long time existed in the Nordic States, it has relatively recently become emerged in European discourse. Consequently, this provokes ideas about investment in youth in order to support European cooperation, smart European economy and sustainable development. I am sure that European youth strategy and youth programmes should not focus only at cooperation and serve only an instrument of European integration. Instead, they should be effective and comprehensive, take into account diversity of European states and their domestic policies as well as different youth policy agendas. That is my statement why this research is topical. The first chapter discusses the background of my thesis in more details. It provides the reader with meaning of the term “youth”, gives a notion of modern European youth environment and challenges, and argues whether there is a European youth policy, or it is only a number of strategic initiatives. Besides, the first chapter offers an overview of Nordic youth agenda, essential for further empirical evaluations.

The research questions can be thus formulated as “how European integration appears in the youth policy”, “are there causal relations between European and domestic policy changes?” and finally, “what are these causal relations for each of two cases?”. For the purposes of manageability, I took two cases – Finland and Norway. They, on the one hand, have similar features of belonging to the Nordic states, with dominating universalistic models of policy, demographical similarities. On the other hand, they have different experience of European integration. Finland has joined the EU, and
Norway is only a partner. The object of my research is youth policy and the subject of the research is its evolution and changes due to European integration.

In order to conduct this research, I have chosen Europeanization as a framework of study. European political studies have witnessed a growing popularity of the Europeanization theory. It is a transition from studies of European integration at the European level and within its institutions to studies of effects on domestic policies. Applicability of this theory is wide, and in the second chapter, I present a literature analysis of Europeanization, existing approaches and debates about their applicability.

As I have mentioned above, the empirical part for my research is performed by two cases. Case studies are widely spread in international relations academic literature. It is reasonable because of case study is reality-bended and has potential to operate with many variables. Process tracing and reconstructed narratives are the tools for identifying causal relations and answering my research questions. The third chapter of this thesis describes the methodological framework of my research. It applies to contemporary tendencies of international relations studies and combination of various methods for a more complex analysis.

Finally, the empirical chapter includes the results of my analysis of primary sources. The sources are European youth dimension’s official documents, as well as domestic ones of Finland and Norway. The analysis predominantly traces “top-down” Europeanization, which is a limitation chosen to make the research manageable. The analysis compares reconstructed narratives of the European, Finnish and Norwegian youth dimension (accordingly, independent and two dependent variables). It also accounts time and sequence of events. Such an approach helps me to discover what effects of Europeanization are fare for each case: both in conceptualizing “youth” and in policy performance.
1. Is there a European Youth Policy?

The question, which is also the name of this chapter, is not a rhetoric one, and at the same time, it has no true answer. Further, I will recall arguments for different points of view on European understanding of youth dimension. Besides, I will present youth policy approaches of member states. Finally, there will be overview of youth dimension in context of Nordic welfare states, which is closely tight with two cases of my research.

1.1. Youth dimension in European policies

1.1.1. Understanding ‘the youth’

Youth policy is a quite young field of study, the fact supported even by lack of consistency in conceptualizing youth. As an independent policy, youth policy is rarely seen in national states. Consequently, it is rare that we see Ministries of Youth, youth legislation, etc.. Among the EU member states, it is more often a part of some other social area (education, sports, social care, health care and others). My attention to youth policy is determined by a personal belief that the European youth strategy can work more effectively if it takes into account national and local youth problems and is more cautious in the standardization and formalization of national youth policies. On the other hand, there are obviously positive effects: transmitting of best practices, more opportunities (including resources and expertise) for the most challenged (economically and socially) states.

According to a report on the Council of Europe national youth policy review, “most countries have dramatically expanded their youth policy in recent years, both in
conception and operation” (Williamson 2002, 36). This fact, together with new challenges offered by modern globalized and integrated world, requires further and updated youth researches. However, there is still no general concept of “youth”. It is defined through generation (age-related definitions), phase of life or social categories. European statistics shows that young people and children are almost 30% of European population (Eurostat). However defining youth I face a lack of consistency among countries. Age-related definition of “youth” is the most common; although it varies from country to country and the frames are extremely open. In some Nordic countries (f.i. Norway and Sweden) young people are not clearly distinguished from children (referring to policy). On the contrary, in Spain and Bulgaria a person of 30-35 years old can be still considered “youth”. The “traditional” age boundaries of youth – 15-24 years – are necessarily blurred and extended (Siurala, n.d., 9). In order to avoid defining youth through age categories some researchers appeal to youth as a “social status” and meaning a period of material dependence (fully or partly) on the others (Tyyska 2005). Heterogeneity of the youth creates various understandings of this concept. It is reasonable to achieve a common definition of youth related concepts when speak about European youth dimension. This includes also clarifying the concepts when compare several countries.

In the context of youth policy research it is interesting that scholars mark out four levels of youth research: individual, interaction, institutions and society. Renate Nestvogel offered to add a fifth level – “global system” (Hornstein, W. 2008, 45). National societal forms of interaction with young people include internships abroad, volunteer experiences, student and youth exchanges and trainings. All these are essential to enter the globalized market, and these experiences strengthen desire of young people for autonomy (which according to the above stated is lower in the modern world). Thus, youth relations at the regional and global level should be a subject of
research. This Master Thesis aims to go beyond national society level; similarly, it aims to avoid comparing the countries with each other only. The objective is to investigate an interaction at European-EU-domestic levels in terms of youth policy.

1.1.2. Youth Policy or something different?

As I have written, European youth researches came from reviews of national youth policies. In 2001 “European Commission White Paper: A New Impetus for European Youth” was published. It is also my starting point. Then another international organization for European integration – the Council of Europe (COE) – published its own standards for youth policies development and implementation (Williamson 2002, 12). It composes a basis of theoretical and empirical data about youth policy of the EU and other European states, offers standards for Europe regarding youth policy. There is already the term ‘youth policy’, however only with regard of domestic youth policies of states.

Meanwhile there is no common European youth policy itself as there is. Neither at the EU level (unlike, for example, CFSP or Migration or Environmental Policy), not at regional European level. In the field of youth relations Europe rather offers a general overview of national policies, distributes best practices and plays an advisory role. In COE international reviews on national youth policies the following goals are mentioned: to advise on national youth policy and to identify components of youth policy and form an approach to it across Europe (ibid.). Answering the lack of holistic approach COE recommendations help to structure the tasks and fields of national youth policy. Focus on youth is needed in different dimensions of social and public policies: education, childcare, health, employment, culture, social inclusion, etc. Structural organization of youth involvement includes all of these dimensions and is aimed finally
at building and developing a civil society. Several of them are considered essentially important in all youth national policies: education and lifelong learning, health and mental health, combating youth unemployment.

The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) handles youth policy related issues and supervises ‘Erasmus Plus Programme’ (which since 2014 follows “Youth in Action Programme”). Out of this programme, many local and international youth projects are being financed not only in the EU states, but also in other neighboring countries. There is no doubt that the EU is widely involved in advancing youth policy in the states in many fields (Williamson 2002, 30-31).

However recently, more researchers and, moreover, documents of COE, witness that youth dimension of the EU is called ‘youth policy’ (Williamson 2002; Helve et al. 2011; Hornstein 2008; Siurala; Wallace et al. 2011). I suppose there are several arguments for it. I also suppose that the results of empirical research will reveal some more argumentation (for or against it). Nevertheless, now framing European youth dimension relies on so-called Open Method of Coordination. The latter meaning that targets and actions are set by European policy makers in forms of recommendations to the domestic youth policies. Then participating states (which are both the EU member states and non-members like, in my case, Norway) voluntarily report about implementation of the European models. The OMC adds value to youth policy researches, as it is one of only few where this method plays a leading role. Besides, the OMC (i.e. annual reports by states to the EU, and “Youth in Action Programme” evaluations) is becoming a wider and stronger mechanism of Europeanization. There are complex youth policy reviews made by European teams of scholars and voluntarily financed by states (Wolf et al. 2004; “Child and Youth Participation in Finland” 2011).
1.1.3. Youth, integration and globalization

Recent youth studies intend to take into account the latest problems and realities of social and economic environment. In the globalized world the market plays the central role and is a regulating instance in society (Bendit 2008). Interdependence of economies, various social interactions and exchanges create one highly competitive world where individuals feel unconfident facing these changes. Many scholars note that the market requires deeper educational and training background but offers less opportunities for employment (Olofsson and Wadensjo 2012). It causes changes in transitions of young people to work. The model of the past – a linear one – was relatively predictable. Education was a kind of guarantee that a young person will have a job upon graduation. The linear way supposed as well a transparent government strategy and allowed at every stage offering a required government action.

In the modern world, this is less and less predictable. Transitions become more differentiated and even unique for a young person. Getting education does not mean that on the market a person will be competitive enough to get a desired gob. Education period is prolonged and obtaining an adult status requires more time, and often supposes a partial achieving when a young person remains partially dependent from the others. Usually it means dependent materially, including also so-called “protracted home stayers”. Probably young people themselves cannot maintain those high standards of living, which a family provides for them. Independence and emancipation do not frequently occur as they used to – outside the family. Instead, emancipation within the family is a new trend of modern developed countries (Bendit, 2008, p. 34). The negative effect of it appears in incapability of young people for autonomy, and in further prolongation of their “youth” status.
Changing patterns and concepts of youth claim an updated social and youth policy. If earlier in the past youth policy used to be concentrated at local level, then now it moves from local to the EU and then European level (and probably further to the global). I can suggest the opposite influence: the one of global and European / the EU levels on the national states. This two-directional nature of Europeanization should not be ignored; and existing researches more often focus on tracing it.

1.2. Youth in Nordic Welfare states

The Nordic countries are on the one hand a part of Europe and some of them also a part of the European Union. On the other hand, they are often taken as a unity due to language similarities, cultural heritage and social values. Such concepts as “the Scandinavian welfare states” and “the Nordic model” may be repeatedly seen in publications and studies (Hummeluhr, N. 1997; Kidal N., Kuhlne S. 2002; Olofsson J., Wadensjö E. 2012). The similarities also exist in youth policy (social inclusion, youth guarantees and key focuses). The relevance of youth research in the context of European youth dimension, and the features common for the region (and making this region) explain my interest towards the topic.

Similarity of the objectives of youth policy in Nordic Countries is a consequence of their common features as welfare states. There are active gender studies of Nordic youth researchers as a consequence of growing employment among women in Nordic countries in 1960s; many researches were made within a Birmingham school (which included feminists, post-modern, constructivists’ studies, etc.) (Helve et al. 2011, 52). A Nordic Model of youth research is characterized as a separate formal youth research structure. Starting with the first Nordic Youth Research Symposium in 1987 Nordic Youth Research Institute (NYRI) set a range of networking actions financed by the
Nordic Council of Ministers. It has also connections with the EU and COE youth researches. The present framework was established in 1992, and since that time researches were particularly focused on different spheres and invited scholars from many countries (thus, for example, research on living conditions of young people in the Nordic periphery (2001) involved scholars from Russia and Baltic States) (ibid., 64).

There is a well-known repeated cliché that “young people are a resource and not a problem” (Williamson 2002, 17). As it is marked by some studies, for Nordic countries young generation is a resource rather than a problem. It is a significant “factor of social modernization and economic progress” (Bendit 2008, 36). Investment in youth policy creates opportunities for the whole society to improve the social and economic environment. According to the EU standard of youth policy development, states are to find “policy gaps” – shortfalls and weaknesses – and design their policy to cope with these gaps (Siurala, n.d.). Whether best practices offered within European integration can be (or are) applied by Nordic Countries is a question which I expect to answer in my Master Thesis.

One of other differences between the general European youth situation and the Nordic one falls into relevance of youth unemployment. In Nordic countries, comparing with many other European ones, the percentage of young people involved in extensive education and further successfully entering the labor market is high. The proportion of inactive among 15-24 years old is low, which means a low percentage of young people outside the education system and labor market (Olofsson and Wadensjö 2012, 3). In relation to that, is combating unemployment a key focus of the youth policy in the Nordic states?

Characterizing welfare states Nanna Kidahl and Stein Kuhnle speak about universalism as a main principle of welfare policy. This principle (whether it is good or bad) provides relatively equal social guarantees for every citizen (or resident in some
countries). The authors still name unemployment on the agenda of Nordic States, however they describe a trend towards active measures to reduce it, “negative sanctions rather than incentives, duties rather than rights” (2002, 25). These countries are traditionally considered as “work societies”; stricter qualifying conditions for sickness insurance, disability, unemployment insurance, single parents’ support demonstrate this “work approach”. The following quote of Lawrence Mead regarding Western welfare policies reflects their main trend: “… the needy should receive aid, but only in return for some contribution to the society.” (ibid., 27).

Meanwhile a concept of a youth guarantee is an important element of Nordic countries’ youth policy and it creates a basis for further progress (Hummelhuhr, N. 1997, 7). They include guarantees of access to secondary and high education, decreasing an unemployment period, guidance of young people not participating in training programs. One of the findings of the fight with unemployment was a distinction between the groups of young people and different kinds of guarantees for them. For teenagers the accent is made on education and training, whereas for young people in their 20s “the most important is to prevent an exclusion from the labor market or an early marginalization” (ibid., 25).

Universalistic principles provided a universalistic youth policy regime. Wallace and Bendit in their article “Trends towards Europeanization of Policy” define three principles of classification, which can be applied to create a typology of youth policies. These principles are philosophies of intervention, target groups and the organization of the youth sector as a part of a social policy (Wallace C., Bendit R. 2011, 149). The first – philosophy of intervention – refers to mentioned earlier dichotomy “youth as a problem vs. youth as a resource”. The Nordic Countries are the example of the latter and often are taken as a role model at this point. However there are still aims common for both Nordic and southern European states. Promotion of youth autonomy as one of
the major ones also unites the Nordic states into one group. Relative independence of young people there is achieved due to welfare state support. Phenomenon of independence within the family is particularly common for the south then, where age of achieving autonomy is higher. Among the other common aims is integration of youth and political and social participation (which is higher for Nordic countries but still is a key focus as to turn youth into active citizens). Here for Nordic states there can be added a question of the youth phase extension as welfare model of the north transfers family support and guarantees of education and training into sphere of state responsibility (ibid., 150).

The second principle – targeting youth – has already been discussed above. A narrower frame for defining youth age groups is applied. Finally, according to C. Wallace and R. Bendit, the typology is based on whether a state has major or minor youth sector (p. 152). Here Nordic countries are reported to have a minor sector (dispersed as well among educational sector, employment and social ones). In Sweden, Norway and Finland, one ministry is responsible for youth policy. Iceland, with no special youth center and has no youth directorate, stands apart from the general picture.

The universalistic model of youth policy is distinguished from the other existing ones. In the table (Figure 2.2.) one can check the criteria of such statement. In the universalistic model, rights and benefits are distributed to all young people and are effective welfare state support. One of the features of this model is strong state directed form of policy involving also non-governmental organizations and society ones.
Conclusion

As literature review witnesses, youth policy is a new and relevant topic. It is contradictory that there is no youth policy at European level: some scholars and documents nowadays call European youth dimension “youth policy”; but it relies on the OMC and thus is advisory with high share of voluntary actions of the states. The OMC, however, is helping more tight connection of European and domestic choices, wider introduction of practices. The last chapter of my thesis will help to argue to what extent European recommendations on youth policies are the ‘European youth policy’.

Conceptualizing ‘youth’ is so far heterogeneous. Probably it is due to high degree of domestic independency. It is one of aspects where Nordic states differ from the European thinking. In general, the Nordic states can perform as one unity with a common ‘welfare states’ label. Existing particular studies of the Nordic states compare
models and policies within this unity of countries. At the same time, close cooperation between the European states (and especially – EU-Members) in terms of policies, actions and programs, and the common strategies of future development make Nordic countries a part of a bigger unity.

Existing studies report that the countries practice similar models of youth policy and face similar problems. Literature review shows that, although relatively new, many European youth studies report about unemployment, problems of youth transitions in the modern world and general overview of ‘youth policy’ of the EU and COE. The Nordic Countries themselves were the object of various researches including the ones about welfare state feature, particular practices, economical and historical retrospection of the region statement. It means that Europeanization of the youth policy (and such cases as Finland and Norway) offer rich and almost untouched research field.

In conclusion of their research C. Wallace and R. Bendit resume that “…European youth policy remains unspecific and ineffectual” (Wallace and Bendit 2011, 158). This should serve a stimulus for future research in order to enrich the knowledge and change the situation. This year the new initiative has been launched to follow up a previously existing one called “Youth in Action”. The new “Erasmus Plus Programme” is supposed to improve the “ineffectual” gaps of its predecessor and continue the positive actions. Remarkable that one of the new actions, which appeared in the Programme, is aimed at involving business to participate in the youth policy (i.e. giving it the right to apply for EU grants for youth projects). Is it a sign of growing economic and financial supplement of the youth dimension?
As this thesis is concerned with the influence of European integration on the youth policies of Finland and Norway, it is theoretically framed with the help of scholarly literature on Europeanization. Featherstone and Radaelli in the Preface to their volume wrote about “the fashionable nature of this term” meaning, of course, the term “Europeanization” (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003). In the same volume, the editors present tendencies of articles devoted to this topic: while in the early 1980s from 1 to 3 articles were devoted to the topic, by 2001 this number increased significantly (ibid, 5). Indeed, recent European studies more and more often mention Europeanization, try to conceptualize it and find its useful applications (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009; Boerzel and Risse 2003; Olsen 2002). However many of these very scholars also mention low awareness of research design, lack of focus on variables and too much attention to mechanisms. Is there any difference between European Studies and Europeanization? Why the “fashionable” trend becomes as such? In this chapter, I will try to give an overview of Europeanization studies, different approaches to them, main trends in research design, and explicate applicability of Europeanization studies to my research.

2.1. General trends of Europeanization studies

Evolution of European Studies shows soft transition from questions of how European integration is working to how it affects national policies. This is the core feature of Europeanization studies, which focuses on the domestic changes caused (or
supposedly caused) by European integration processes. “Europeanization can be characterized as different forms of diffusion processes of European ideas and practices across time and space” (Flockhart 2010, 788). In fact, there are quite many attempts to define this phenomenon (Olsen 2002), and from constructivists view “Europeanization is ‘what political actors make of it’” (Radaelli and Pasquier 2015). In this research I will apply Radaelli’s justification of Europeanization’s utility for IR researches: ‘Europeanization provides a theoretical lens on the effects of integration on domestic political structures’ (Radaelli 2006, 58). I must admit, that Radaelli speaks about more EU-centric Europeanization: “…the rules, procedures and policy paradigms are defined in the making of EU decisions and only afterwards incorporated into domestic discourses, identities and political structures” (Flockhart 2010, 789).

Most of researches in the field of Europeanization strive to understand its nature and outcomes, as well as impact on domestic politics and policies (Boerzel and Risse 2003; Olsen 2002; Radaelli 2003; Exadaktylos 2009). There are also studies of Europeanization effects in new EU member and candidate states (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Sedelmeier 2006). It broadens the field of theorizing and forms a new branch of research. Focus of Europeanization is on social learning processes, adaptation and lesson-drawing (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005) The latter statement advocates the choice of cases of my research – whereas Finland is a member state of the EU, Norway is only a co-operative neighbor and voluntary participant of European policies.

As I have said above, the conceptualization of Europeanization is broad and covers wide range of phenomena. Olsen names five applications of the term, which depend on the focus of changes they cause. They are changes of external boundaries (often related to expansion of the EU), development of European institutions (with connection to collective actions, co-ordination), central penetration of national
governance (witnessed by division of powers and adapting national governance), export of forms of political organization (and this one covers relations with non-European countries) and a political unification project (Olsen 2002, 923–24). The latter one—a political unification project—is best applicable to my thesis. It represents not only a top-down perspective, but also leaves way to study how national states influence on European politics and policies.

Another useful typology of Europeanization is connected to the institutionalization of politics. Europeanization is defined as “the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance” (Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse-Kappen 2001, 3). This idea focuses on cross-level interactions, i.e. Europeanization here takes place at European, national and global levels. There might be possible interpretations, however. I believe it is relevant for the research that both within-EU and EU-non-member states interactions are taken into consideration. This is also two-dimensional approach and allows downside-up perspective.

There can be other different approaches to Europeanization: researches of ‘cause-of-effects’ and ‘effects-of-causes’ (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009, 507), different notion of temporality, etc.

At the same time, youth policies do not belong to urgent European and national agendas. I cannot ignore the fact that this a very ‘liberal’ topic where national states are only advised to follow the recommendations of the EU. Despite the fact that in youth studies researches speak about “European Youth Policy” (for example, Siurala; Wallace C., Bendit R. 2011), there is still no coherent policy at the European level (and illustrates this comparison to CFSP or Environmental policy). One may then question the topicality of this research. Nevertheless, I state that tracing Europeanization in the field of youth is an extremely interesting example of ‘soft’ domestic changes. When the national states are not obliged to adapt their policies, but only *advised*, it will let me see
how Europeanization appears to them. Do the states voluntarily follow the recommendations? Are there signs of Europeanization at all? What are the interests of states when they co-operate in this field?

These questions explain why among different conceptualizations of Europeanization I stayed at those allowing two dimensions of process. The object of the research (youth policy) required consideration of its framework. Like widespread practice, my research examines ‘the goodness of fit’ (i.e. degree of institutional compatibility) between European, national and sub-national processes and institutions (Radaelli 2003, 40). Then, in order to understand the outcomes and institutional changes, it is useful to apply the notion of ‘goodness of fit’ (Boerzel and Risse 2003). It combines the following two ideas: The first one seems to reflect constructivist ideas. Study of internalizing domestic norms and states’ commitment to the EU institutions (even identity fit); it touches upon how active the actors are, who sets the norms, how the political environment is at particular time. Second, referred to as rationalist institutionalism, is the study of opportunities that actors get within institutions, how the power and resources are distributed (Boerzel and Risse 2003, 58). In addition, I would like to stress that Europeanization here is different from “EU-ization” (which is only an important part of a broader phenomenon) (Flockhart 2010, 790). In methodological and conceptual aspect, Europeanization is about constitutive rules to create common space, and EU-ization – about regulative rules inside society. In other words, I will differ common rhetoric and behavior (Europeanization) and particular changes of structures, rules and norms (EU-ization focus).

Interest of my research is, consequently, in two dimensions of changes. One is how youth dimension is conceptualized: it focuses on the growing common vision and purposes of youth policy, and changing identities of youth. The other one is in the evolution of the political organization of policies: how co-operative action capacity
develops, what are its financial and institutional resources and governance, who are its actors (ibid., 788).

2.2. Adaptational pressure in youth policy and outcomes

Which policies are always on the agenda notwithstanding whether it shall be European or national level? Defense and Security, Economics, External and Military, Environmental... Of course, the order can be different, and probably it is quite subjective. However, youth policy never gets into the top-list. I have mentioned in the previous paragraph that it is a very rare, and thus interesting, case of Europeanization in the ‘liberal’ field of youth. This requires paying more attention towards adaptational pressure it creates.

The impact of European policies can be noticed through the soft mechanisms. Youth strategy of the EU, for example, does not itself create an adaptational pressure. It rather sets a general model that can be adapted by states partly or completely. At the same time, it prepares basis for further shifts in domestic policies.

Adaptational pressure takes into account the level of misfit between domestic and European institutional settings. The bigger the gap is, the more adaptational pressure a state feels. This is a part of ‘goodness of fit’ notion, which considers cases when there is a European model ready for implementation by the states. Youth policy is a way to trace how the European models are transmitted into domestic ones in case when there is a very low adaptational pressure.

Radaelli analyzes existing studies and presents a general map of probable outcomes (Radaelli 2003, 37–38). Europeanization, he claims, can flow into inertia in cases when the EU directives lay too far from the domestic practices. Signs of this outcome are delays and lags of domestic changes, resistance to EU-offered choices. A
different outcome is absorption. It is merely an adaptation which save a state’s native policy ‘core’ but shows flexibility states. It is accommodation of policy without fundamental re-structuration. The latter one, as it shows, differs from transformation. Transformation leads to paradigmatic changes, new conceptual thinking of an actor. Finally, the most curious effect of Europeanization is retrenchment. This is an opposite effect, when European norms turned a state into a less ‘European’ one. Which policy outcomes appear in this research is still a question, and I will try to answer it further.

2.3. Mechanisms of Europeanization

I have already argued that the youth dimension of European politics has its relevant features. There is thus a particular mechanism of Europeanization typical for this research object. I will again apply to Radaelli’s arguments. He finds two types of mechanisms: vertical and horizontal (2003, 41). At vertical level, adaptational pressure descends European norms to the national level and further. In opposite, at horizontal level, the domestic choices are whether to follow or not European choices. This includes framing states’ policies to newly conceptualized best practices and models. On the scheme (Figure 1.3.) Radaelli illustrates various mechanisms of Europeanization in relation to public policies, including vertical and horizontal typology.

As it is demonstrated, when there are European models, there is adaptational pressure. It means that if there is a European model of youth policy, states will feel pressure to adapt their national policies to it. At the same time, there might not be such a pressure, and thus there should be other reasons for the states to change youth policies according to the EU choices. In case when there is no model, domestic choices are taken often without correspondence or account of the European ones.
In case of youth policy, it seems that the third – framing mechanisms – is the most attractive. The Open Method of Coordination is one of the major instruments of European youth strategy. In the last chapter, I will come back to this typology. It is interesting, among all, whether framing mechanisms really provide convergence around policy paradigms.

Figure 1.3. Mechanisms of Europeanization (Radaelli 2003, 41)
Conclusion

While Europeanization is a fashionable term, it is also a way to theorize domestic outcomes of European integration. There is a growing number of researches and studies, each trying to test applicability of Europeanization studies. Literature review witnesses Europeanization researches not only within member states, but also including candidate and neighboring ones. Although most studies focus on the EU impacts (and it can be a limitation of theorizing), Europeanization is wider, not only within the EU. It proves relevance of two chosen cases and broadens opportunities of researchers. Distinction between Europeanization and EU-ization helps to approach two interesting matters. The first one is conceptualization of youth (how much European youth agenda is similar to domestic ones), this is Europeanization level, and in my analysis, I refer on documents of COE (as a different from the EU institution with 47 members). The second one is institutional, normative and political changes; it is a narrower empirical focus on the EU actions.

The diversity of approaches, which exist in the literature, I believe, is an advantage. It allows choosing the best one. I will refer on a political unification project, which helps my interests towards institutional and other domestic changes, and towards new conceptual thinking of states.

I supposed in this chapter, that there is either a low or none adaptational pressure in relation to youth policy. It draws me to alternative Europeanization mechanisms. One of them that catches attention is framing mechanism and its outcomes. The further chapter will add more to understanding the methodology that I used and lead to the empirical chapter of the thesis.
3. Youth Policy Tracing

In the XXI century, trends in methodology have changed. Nowadays “combining the different approaches at different stages of research offers the best prospect for improving our understanding of international politics” (Sprinz and Wolinsky 2004, 26). Popularity of descriptive methods is decreasing whereas quantitative ones are still on the surge. At the same time, the nature of social science often limits researcher with empirical data. Ideas of combining methods and solving new research tasks have become more and more popular (Kloz and Prakash 2008). Though quantitative and statistical methods are nowadays still relevant, and advantages of statistical methods are not underappreciated, qualitative methods are being developed in combination with others or as such.

In frames of this research, qualitative methods help me reveal how Europeanization appears to the states, and how national youth policies develop close to the EU. In this chapter, I will describe the methodological approach to the matter.

3.1. Case selection

The hypothesis of this research brings us to study of contemporary youth policy making in the Nordic states. I have chosen case study method due to its more empirical and reality-bended nature (King 1994; George 2005; Sprinz and Wolinsky 2004). It compensates limitations of statistics in terms of identifying omitted variables through examining intervening ones in individual cases, and thus uncovers new causal mechanisms. Interesting is that case study is different from statistics where completeness of any given case is not strictly required; statistics relies on probabilistic associations. Case study is a way of explaining historical chains with high levels of
construct validity, and making generalizations of two and more variables (George 2005, 21).

Reading methodology literature, one may think that case study is the most popular method for international relations researches. However, case study method itself is rather a frame for several ways of within case analysis. Advantages of case studies include their ability to accommodate complex causal relations. Otherwise, conducting the case study, I can process qualitative data massifs and find complex causal relations between dependent, independent and intervening variables (George 2005, 22).

As any other research method, case study should rely on theory. Without theoretical frame, main questions cannot be answered: which cases are selected and why, why they are representative and independent, how they are comparable. This research is aimed at uncovering the relations between the EU youth policy and national youth policies, otherwise it test theories of Europeanization. It explains why this research follows the logic of confirmation (unlike the logic of discovery which allows find new hypothesis) (Sprinz and Wolinsky 2004, 253).

Case selection is explained by the nature of cases. They are intentionally taken similar between themselves (Nordic identity as basic feature) and contrast in relation to the EU. In this research Finnish and Norwegian youth policies serve as cases of the EU – Member state – Non-Member state relations in the field of youth policy. I hypothesize that there may be probable outcomes of this research: a) policy-taking (Finland and Norway mainly adopt their youth policies to the youth strategy of the EU); b) policy-making (Finland and Norway mainly integrate their youth policy practices to the EU youth strategy and benchmark their best practices); c) mediocre (Finland and Norway combine the above two types, but both countries act more or less in the same “stream” within European youth agenda); d) unique way (Finland and Norway build their youth policy in different ways and these ways depend on (non)membership in the EU).
last proposition adds to the answer why exactly these two cases are taken. I would like to dedicate some more words to that point.

3.1.1. Nature of the cases

The background of this research and hypothesis refers to the Nordic states. It is puzzling how one policy/strategy (in my research – European youth dimension and the EU youth strategy) can be realized by the member states, especially so different in internal social care mechanisms. The Nordic welfare states are considered almost the most successful in social guarantees, and many problems that are actual for Southern Europe are not that urgent for the Nordic states. There can be a concern that when the European standards are set in a way that all member states are able to meet the minimum requirements, the wealthier ones may feel encouraged to “freeze”, or even reduce, their standards and stay in line. A higher level of social guarantees and protection is allowed but is not required. It seems that European standards are aimed to set all member states equally developed, whereas this optimal level is lower than in some of the member states. It raises a question of how Europeanization is appreciated – as a positive or negative trend. And in that circumstances, what is the influence of it on the national youth policies?

Otherwise there are the following variables: European youth dimension and the EU youth strategy, and national youth policies (two cases). Identifying types of variables for this case study was not a simple question. At the starting point, the hypothesis claims that national youth policies of the Nordic states are dependent variables, and the European level is an independent one (Bennett and George 1997). However when I have written about the hypothesized outcomes, there are possible cases when these variable are vice versa. Similarly, there can be intervening variables (such as
national identity and European identity, for example), that was discussed in Europeanization literature in nuances.

In the case of Finland and its youth policy, Finland is a member state of the EU, and thus does feel the influence of the Europeanization and particularly EU-ization. The second case is Norway. Though it is not an EU member state, Norway is a member of COE and takes part in sharing its best practices of youth policy through Open Method of Coordination (OMC). It participates in strategy implementation and EU youth programs. The latter three evidences, besides the Nordic identity, unite these cases and create an interest towards them as to both Nordic states representatives and independent cases of European-domestic relations.

3.2. How to conduct a within-case analysis

Once the cases are chosen, it is time to understand which empirical evidences, data and presuppositions we have. Distinction of nature of qualitative and quantitative data leads to different methodological approaches them. This research of Europeanization uses qualitative data. Primary sources are official reports, acts, laws and youth strategy documents. I analyze them in order to answer my research questions. Secondary sources add more points of view on the object; they are other scholars’ studies and researches, reviews, acts of other policies, etc.

In order to conduct a within-case analysis one may find extremely useful process tracing as the main method within method. Process tracing is one of fundamental tools of qualitative research. It is a way to look deeply in the case uncovering not only causal mechanisms, but also their sequence and results at stages. This method is defined as “systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier 2011, 823).
Process tracing can do both – test and generate theories (Bennett and George 1997). Moreover, it can test either theories or causal mechanisms, where latter is the third application of process tracing. If the method reveals a systematic mechanism, then it can be brought to similar cases. Researcher can also make inferences about presence or absence of such mechanisms.

The use of process tracing method for current research adds uncovering the stimuli of youth policy actors, tracing the connections between decision process and its effects, as well as describing the actual point of state. For me it is essential to understand how national youth policy decisions are influenced by European models and the EU youth strategy. Advantage of the process tracing is in the description of cases sensitive to the order of events. It “provides the how-we-come-to-know nuts and bolts for mechanism-based accounts of social change” (Checkel 2008, 115).

In the beginning of this research, I planned to use process tracing as the main method of within-case analysis. Further, I found out that, in its turn, it allows combining different tools. Process tracing draws our attention to description and narrative. Narrative lies in the beginning of the case study, and the next paragraph explains how political narratives are analyzed in this research.

3.3. Usability of analytic narratives

In this chapter, I have mentioned several times narratives as one of the tools, and I believe that my cases can be interpreted with the help of “analytic narratives” (Sprinz and Wolinsky 2004, 255). Barbara Czarniawska brings an example of Alasdair MacIntyre’s philosophy: that social life is a narrative (Czarniawska 2004, 3). Following the tradition of hermeneutics, narrative analysis is a way to detach among huge massifs
of texts the major terms, trace how the discourse (and the reality) is being created. Narratives, in other words, help to structure the reality (Clandinin et al. 2007).

Narrative is defined by Levi as “the story being told but as a detailed and textured account of context and process, with concern for both sequence and temporality” (Levi 2002, 5). The two notions – of sequence and temporality – are important for process tracing within cases. This tool of process tracing finds out which inferences exist between variables at time and certain political environment.

In my thesis, narratives are interpreted from constructivist point of view. Czarniawska relates such approach with the reader-response theory. (Czarniawska 2004, 68). The stories (implotted narratives) create a reality to fit these stories. What matters is how an author interprets the reality, and whether a reader believes this interpretation or not. It does not take the world as a collection of subjectively told stories. In every narrative the author is not unique. Positioning in conversation defines whether it is accepted or modified, or rejected by the other participants of conversation. This postmodernists’ idea seems especially interesting if the task includes, as in this thesis, analysis of reports about actions and strategies. The language and terminology, the forms of speech and features of the narrative reveal the most topical zones. An example of such constructivism in narration can be perception of youth as a problem or as a resource. Depending on the chosen position, the whole youth policy is built in a different way.

One of important dimensions of the narratives is the audience (Eco 1995, Andrews et al 2013, 6). Narratives are produced for someone to percept them. I would like to underline this phrase, because in the third part of this thesis I analyze the Youth Policy Reports of Finland and Norway for the EU. The narratives of those reports, I believe, represent how important the recipient of the narrative is. Similarly, when the
EU calls for the national youth reports, the narrated by states reality is structured in correspondence with the supposed recipient.

Narratives from constructivists’ point of view are the constructs of discourse. This case study of the youth policy can hold three discourses in one – the European one (including the EU level), the Finnish one and the Norwegian one. I do not conduct discourse analysis in this research, however narratives that I construct for each case lean on empirical data and primary sources.

After statement about the nature of narrative in my research, I would like to explicate the stages of narrative analysis. I will apply to Czarniawska (2004) typology of narrative analysis: structuralist, post-structuralist and dramatist. The typology I take lies between post-structuralist and dramatist approaches. Post-structuralist analysis allows avoiding typical roles and structures. Instead, I find it more useful to define authors and readers of narratives, and their unique roles in each case. From dramatist approach comes again importance of temporality and political environment. Used a tool of process-tracing, narrative analysis for me essentially has to take these two categories into consideration. Such combined approach to narrative analysis helps me to contextualize facts and steps of the process, and at the same time connects theory and methods with the reality.

I believe it is necessary to indicate that narratives always include intentions of the reader, intentions of the author, and intentions of the text (time and environment). Notably that not only individuals use narratives-stories to interpret and reflect the reality. Youth policies and strategies can be conducted by groups, institutions and nations. They interpret political and social environment and agenda. Interpretations in forms of narratives affect perceptions of the others. Since Europeanization can be also viewed as representation of political reality, narratives are tools both for European integration bodies (to affect and distribute European values, policies, etc.), for the
Member States (f.i. when lobbying their interests) and for non-Member States (who have to deal both with national states, the EU with its organizations, COE). All these actors make narratives, and percept the narratives of each other. The negotiations between them result in diverse levels and degrees of interpretation (or analysis), with the best solution to keep a balance between over-interpretation and basic semantic level. It is essential to notice that the text is a written work of discourse, which endows it with particular characteristics such as being distanced and linear. These characteristics allow research the written texts by methods not applicable to speech (Eco 1995).

Together with classical interpretations, I will try to follow constructivists’ logic too. The question ‘what does a text say?’ is now in pair with ‘how does a text say it?”. Analysis sources draws attention to the terminology and key concepts. I believe it also brings surprising results and ground for further research (the basic example speaks for itself: the EU Member states and Non-Member ones conceptualize “the youth” differently – starting from the age frames, and finishing with governmental institutes responsible for youth affairs).

As I argue above, political narrative analysis is a tool for process tracing. Narratives serve for two purposes of this research. On the one hand, the primary sources are narratives that I analyze. On the other hand, narratives are the form to represent the results of my primary sources analysis. They describe how particular youth policies and strategies are structured. I will try to trace Europeanization with the help of political narrative analysis. The term “political narratives” here means that the analysis is based on particular primary sources – officially produced by the EU institutions and COE, or by national states with relation to the youth policy. In other words, for each of the cases there are its narratives. As well as for Europe there are also particular narratives of the youth agenda. How different (or how similar) these narratives are? This question will be answered in the third chapter.
3.4. Limitations of the methodology

Applying a certain methodology, I cannot ignore its limitations. The first one is about the direction of Europeanization and defining variables. Consciously I have to limit the research and take the two cases as dependent variables, whereas European youth dimension and the EU youth strategy is an independent one. In other words, there is only one direction of Europeanization in my focus. Probably, the wider setting of Europeanization should be taken as a topic of future research. Here it is worth to say, that there would also be a potential of applying process tracing – it helps uncovering feedback loops (Beach 2011). The latter is when changes in dependent variable at a particular point in time result in changes of independent variable, and later it affects the dependent variable again. Such feedback loops are inevitable in political science and international relations. I can expect that the same happen with my variables. The European youth dimension requires certain changes from the national youth policies, which then report their practices and adaptations in order to change the initial European strategy itself.

Another limitation comes from the chosen within-case analysis method. Process tracing reveals a complex of causal relations for each case. Causality is often connected with inability of researcher to exclude all but one explanation. To measure causal weight of phenomena is a big task. If the same result is reached by different means, then what are the causes? I hope that narrative is the way to minimize equifinality due to sequence of relevant for the case events (Bates et al. 1998). Another essential element for adequate causal inferences is background knowledge. Process tracing helps me to build a theoretical explanation from empirical evidence of the cases. Small number of cases is justified if a researcher is theoretically informed about the “environment” of the
cases. The same importance refers to heuristics and the way one treats the evidence. Researcher can make assumptions and interpretations, which are strong if exclude coincidence. Sufficient attention this research draws to uncovering “silent zones”. When the narrative comparison shows what kind of causal relations exist between the EU and national youth policies, then I can theorize when actions or policies of the EU are silent (i.e. do not cause changes or reactions) for the youth policies of Finland and Norway, and vice versa. These theorized inferences can be further extrapolated on the other cases and tested.

Finally, there is a limitation of narrative analysis. The narratives do not represent the absolute “truth” or reality as such. In this research, they are conceptualized as a tool used by both their creators, and those whom they are presented. One possible way to deal with such subjectivity is to compare multiple narratives. Another – to mark out that from constructivists prospective it matters more whether narratives in national states do strive to structure the reality similarly to the European vision.
Conclusion

The research question requires a reality-bended methodology with ability to test hypothesis and conduct analysis of politics. In order to provide it, I have chosen case study as the best way to look deeply into the matter. Case study helps to answer a research question and offers the logics and tools to the research. The methodology includes process tracing as a method of within-case analysis. Its advantages, firstly, help reveal causal inferences and, secondly, test whether there is an interconnection between the cases and the EU actions. Narrative analysis is a major tool of process tracing. It makes possible to work with field material and variety of data. I believe that such combination of methods helps compensate possible limitations. The case study is justified from the points of case selection, representativeness, defining variables and tools. This methodology is to produce sequence patterns, narrated and described based on empirical data. The next chapter represents the process and results of methodology and theory application to the primary sources. It finally provides with an answer to the research question: how Europeanization affects the national youth policies?
4. Europeanization of Youth Policy in Nordic States

In the first chapter, I advocated the utility of Europeanization as a theoretical lens, which uncovers domestic effects of European integration. Scholars offer different applications of Europeanization, and in many approaches, it is a two-directional process. This research focuses only on the top-down direction – from the European level towards the national youth policy. This assumption is determined by the volume of this research, and by the chosen methodology. I believe that downside-up direction is definitely not least important; however, it is a ground for continuation of this research in future.

Thus, with Europeanization as a framework, I focus on the national states as the objects, and youth policy evolution as a subject. This chapter puts together the development of the EU youth strategy with the development of Finnish and Norwegian youth policies at the same period. European processes, key choices and cognitive models will serve me a “role model” of European youth field. Nevertheless, my task is to answer the question: how Europeanization appears in each case, whether it changes the way in which ‘youth’ is defined in national contexts and enables domestic political and institutional changes. I also expect to come up with choice of particular mechanism of Europeanization available in my cases and add to argumentation about the reasonability of the term “European Youth Policy”.

I will examine the cases with the help of process tracing and analytical narratives. Comparing narratives embedded in certain political environment, I hope to find causal mechanisms that draw domestic changes.

Results of my analysis consists of two parts. The first one represents several core narratives reconstructed from the European youth dimension, and these are followed by the national ones. Each narrative has a time scale attached to it, so that a
reader can trace the consequences of changes. The second part consists of my
evaluations after the analysis within theoretical framework of this research.

4.1. Collecting primary sources

Primary sources for this empirical analysis are official documents, the EU
youth-related documents and the countries’ official reports on their youth policy, and
policy reviews by the COE. The sources can be roughly divided into three groups: the
ones about the European youth dimension, and apparently, the ones about the Finnish
and Norwegian youth policies. The European level documents are taken from the
official web pages:

Official website of the European Union (http://europa.eu)
Access to the European Law (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)
European Commission: Youth (http://ec.europa.eu/youth)
European Commission: Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency
(EACEA) (http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/youth)
Council of Europe (http://coe.int)

Official country reports on youth policy (which are part of OMC and Youth in
Action appraisal) are also available from the indicated resources.

In Finland youth related issues are part of the Ministry of Education and
Culture control, thus, the main documents are available at its web page
(http://www.minedu.fi). Youth Guarantee (http://www.nuorisotakuu.fi) is another
resource for monitoring changes in youth work of the country.

Data about Norwegian youth policy is performed at the European Commission
web page (in Country Youth Reports) and at the official country web page ‘Mission to
EU’ (http://www.eu-norway.org/). In the documents found at these two sources there
are references to the official web pages of Ministries, legislation acts and communications, however most of them are not translated into English and either will be used in this analysis in their brief English versions included in youth reports, or will not be referred to if English translation is not available.

Finally, some data was found at the Global Evidence-Base for Youth Policy (http://www.youthpolicy.org).

4.2. Changing boundaries: does the European youth think it is European?


Figure 3.1. Revisions of the youth agenda in the EU

Once upon a time the European Union appeared. It was young and inhabited by serious economists and politicians; it lived among European States. The Union was
growing, and soon children and adults started wondering where the states borders were disappearing. They looked for the borders: in the North and in the South, on the earth and in deep waters, looked in cabinets and institutions, papers and numbers. Nevertheless, they saw that all traditional borders were melting; and only people could create the new ones. Finally, people though: “the EU must take shape with the people of Europe”. They decided to teach young generation of 15-25 years old with this wisdom: democracy, closer links between peoples, and participation of all. It was hard, because relations grew complex, and gap between generations enlarged. Europe needed citizens, and the youth needed motivation to participate in public affairs at all levels, better learn about the Union and its European neighbors, trust its work and have more autonomy. Almost five years passed, young people grew up, and the Union saw that the youth was very vulnerable: it learnt to be Europeans, but it lacked skills and training to achieve prosperous European future. Then the Union decided to help the youth get better work, live in society and family, study and learn. Many other policies decided to join, and help the youth, too. Europe did not forget about teaching young people how to live together in diversity and cooperate.

Suddenly economic crisis hit Europe; it was scary and damaging. The Union was brave and defeated itself, and many dimensions of the Union offered their support to Economy (who was the main hero that time). The youth was offered to study and train abroad; Europe decided to invest in it and modernize youth work. Especially needed help those with fewer opportunities. To sum it up, when the European youth has good jobs and mobility, education is modernized, young people with fewer opportunities are socially included, Europe will become sustainable and welfare.

This European level narrative demonstrates a visible evolution of priorities. European integration here is very EU-centric in the beginning (although youth
dimension first appeared in European discourse in 70s. Starting point here – “the EU must take shape with the people of Europe” (“European Commission White Paper. A New Impetus for European Youth” 2001) – became the key message of the first complex document in this field. It explained why objectives covered a wide range of issues: from co-operation of the states to prevention of “citizenship deficit”. I believe it was an experimental period, when youth mobility, voluntary service and other areas were recognized at the EU level. Consequently, transparency and access to information were also on the list. Then focus was drawn to youth training and education. The European Youth Pact of 2005 openly speaks about a “better coherence across all policy areas that concern young people”. Of course, in 2009 the crisis and economic challenges enhanced a “youth as a resource” conceptualization. More such terms as ‘investment’, ‘smart’, ‘sustainable’ appeared in the youth discourse. Combating youth unemployment for many European states became a key task. Interestingly, at that time only the representatives of Slovakia and Czech Republic in the Barroso Commission were from youth-related sectors.

I found a different story in Finnish materials. Analysis and the construction of the narrative was based on youth policy documents: “Youth Work Act 235/1995 (Amendments up to 663/2002)”; "Youth work in Finland" 2004; “Finland Youth Policy Decree.” 2006; “Child and Youth Participation in Finland” 2011; “Youth Act 72/2006”.

Figure 3.2. Revisions of the youth agenda in Finland

In the year 1995, Finland joined the European Union. It was an important and responsible step, both for the authorities and for citizens. It was a year for revision of
the Youth Act, too. The Finnish youth needed better living conditions and inspiration for civic activities. Finland also wanted them to learn ‘equality between generations, genders and Finnish regions, tolerance and cultural diversity and to ensure sustainable exploitation of nature’. Seven years passed, and some of youth workers decided to ask Finnish young people about their wellbeing. It appeared that social status, entrepreneurship and political engagement were not important for the majority of young people. Who were those young people? Little kids, children and young people under 29 years old. Almost one third of the Finnish population! There were just few immigrants, and the population was dispersed in that Nordic country. Meanwhile youth unemployment reduced almost three times, young people wanted not just careers, but self-expression. They wanted more diverse education and training.

In 2005 another ten years passed since the last Youth Act, and Finland had to update the document. It though what the youth needed, and created youth policy. It had to provide young people’s growth and better living conditions. No young person was to be excluded from any sphere of society and policy. Even children – as a child’s rights were very important. Youth (children and teenagers, and people under 29 years old) had opportunities to participate more.

Time passed, there was a crisis in Europe, and also in Finland, but the youth still had support. It was sad that with such dispersed population still many young people did not get more than basic education. School satisfaction rate was one of the lowest in Europe. What will be the measures of future youth work? Participation, non-discrimination and life management – these are the needs of the youth and objectives of youth policy makers nowadays.

The final narrative in this paragraph comes from the Norwegian youth agenda. The following documents led the analysis and narrative reconstruction (noticeably, three


Figure 3.3. Revisions of the youth agenda in Norway

In the North of Europe there lived the prosperous and co-operative Norwegians. They cared about their children: taught parents to complete their duties and functions towards children under 18 years old, provided secure environment for children and young people with all essential services, provided education. When children reached 18, measures for them could change, but young persons received social guarantees until they were 23 years old. What children needed was ‘safe and meaningful everyday life’, and advancement of the rights of children. There was another important objective – to involve children, young people and their parents in the non-governmental sector (because many citizens lived in far regions and NGOs could report about local needs).

When COE offered youth policy review, Norway decided to invite foreign experts. It asked them to check whether children and young people participated at local and national level in activities; how effective criminal justice was; life of immigrant communities. Finally, Norwegians thought that integration of different policies was essential to evaluate. When the experts came, they received a ‘cold’ welcome. Autonomy
and welfare state tradition, decentralization of policies, and weather, too, played their role. Nevertheless, the country was thankful for the work of experts. It thought that for young people (especially for those with fewer opportunities) in Norway would be useful to know and participate in European programmes: strengthen civil engagement, international understanding and solidarity, European co-operation.

To sum up, Norway is very inclusive society. Any deviation is a problem, including youth margins.

4.2.1. Evaluation of the youth agenda analysis

The three narratives reconstructed from policy documents witness several parallels in the youth agendas, as well as core differences in the conceptualization of ‘the youth’, objectives of youth policy and consequent action choices.

First thing, which I noticed immediately, is that ‘the youth’ is defined differently. Let me give a very simple fact: the age of ‘the youth’ in every country of Europe can be different. In Italy, for example, a person of 34 years old belongs to the youth, whereas in Norway it is always ‘children and young people’ who are in the center of youth policy (in some sense united with childcare). Following the analyzed documents, at European level the youth was defined as 15-29 years old people. Finland has taken a way of changes: in the beginning, there was not a clear border between a baby, a child and a youngster in policies; on the contrary, at the moment, the Finnish definition of who “the youth” is corresponds with the European one. Interesting, that in Finnish case there are more references on the EU as particular level of European integration; accordingly, more references at the EU youth strategy.

The story of Norway is very different: it still pays more attention to childcare. I believe that the expert team’s evaluation of Norway is fare: “…youth in Norway is
firmly conceptualised as a bridge between childhood and adulthood. […] There is a particular understanding in Norway of young people as a resource, which is especially strong” (Wolf et al. 2004, 19). In Norwegian documents, on the contrary, there are more references on European integration without specifying whether it is the EU, COE or others. Moreover, Norway explicitly mentions European dimension of youth and state’s active support of these debates and policies at European level.

Then come the relevant objectives of the youth policies (Figure 3.4.). I have bolded those objectives in Finnish and Norwegian cases, which are close to the European ones for particular time. In order to make as rigorous an interpretation as possible, I examined the texts in terms of their openly stated ‘purposes’, ‘objectives’, ‘priorities’. Results of their comparison is interesting. Whereas in Europe, youth employment seems to keep its ‘top-list’ positions, it hardly has the same importance for the two Nordic states. Youth wellbeing and environment are mentioned by both Finland and Norway. It includes, probably, employment, too, but not so explicitly. Instead, the two Nordic states keep traditional priorities and, unavoidably, add new ones. Social involvement and participation, training and education seem to be quite common. Also in both cases, children’s rights are mentioned. There are typical national priorities like criminal justice and health in Norway (very unusual for the other states in context of youth policy).

When I analyze narratives within time, I see a tendency towards more “correspondence” between the European and domestic policies. Again, in the case of European youth strategy co-operation appeared among the priorities. Similarly, Norway defines national priority in European cooperation. It explains, I think, Norway’s participation in all programmes.

To sum up, the youth policy agendas of Norway and Finland seem to be very similar in the beginning, perhaps due to a common Nordic identity and the welfare state
background, but then, in the middle of the research period, Finland turned more toward the EU choices. The economic crisis does not seem to change domestic youth policies significantly (unlike at European level); there is no great shifts in priorities, no new strategies and actions appeared. The period of 2008-2010 seems to be witnessing the biggest gap between youth policy priorities of European youth dimension and the domestic ones in my cases. Nevertheless, approaching to the year 2014, the differences decrease. A kind of agreement in agendas emerges.

4.3. Instruments of youth policy change

I chose to focus the second narrative on ‘actions’. It is based on the stories of how actors plan to develop youth strategy / policy, which decisions they make, which mechanisms and institutions involve. This paragraph will include three stories, as the previous one; each story is accompanied with time line with the key dates when documents containing plan of actions appeared. Before passing to my cases, I start with story about the EU youth dimension.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time periods</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 2001</td>
<td>n/a in this research</td>
<td>Living conditions, equality, tolerance, civic activities</td>
<td>Child rights, child welfare (living conditions, health), education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 - 2005</td>
<td>Participation, information, voluntary activities, a greater understanding and knowledge of youth, access to information in all Member States</td>
<td>Education and training covering dispersed population, youth employment</td>
<td>Children’s rights, education, participation and influence, involvement in NGOs’ work to cover local level, criminal justice and healthy life styles, integration of immigrant communities, cohesion of childhood, youth and family policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 – 2008</td>
<td>Training and education, employment, integration, social advancement, solidarity, tolerance, social cohesion, European cooperation</td>
<td>Active citizenship, independence, living conditions, growth</td>
<td>Secure living conditions, safe environment, criminal justice, healthy life style, tolerance, information about European programmes, participation, crisis management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 – 2010</td>
<td>Youth employment, training and education, equal opportunities, social inclusion</td>
<td>Children’s rights</td>
<td>N/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 – 2014</td>
<td>Youth employment, social inclusion (particularly for those young people with fewer opportunities), health and wellbeing</td>
<td>Social guarantees for wellbeing, participation, non-discrimination and everyday life management</td>
<td>Women’s rights, ethnic equality, training, active citizenship, European cooperation, inclusion of youth with fewer opportunities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.4. ‘Key words’ of youth policy / strategy in the EU, Finland and Norway
Once, when the European youth dimension had just appeared, someone asked: “How can the European Union tell its ideas to other countries? What if countries have better ideas and will not need ours?” The Union went thinking. The European Identity was very young, and there was a need to study youth agendas in different states better in order to understand who were European young people. Then the Open Method of Coordination was offered. Voluntarily, many states started to share their best practices and communicate. The Union thought again, and invented better information exchange. It also invited other policies through which to communicate about their youth policy ideas. Nevertheless, again, it was not enough; not all states participated, and few best practices were adopted. “Maybe I could add financial support for states?” – The Union thought, and started various youth programmes. The EU continued telling states about the actions and financial opportunities they could have. Meanwhile, the EU monitored domestic youth policy changes.

When, after crisis, the Strategy Europe 2020 appeared, youth dimension also got attention. The Union decided to invest in the youth and included it in its programmes. The European youth could use more grants for learning, training and studying. At that time, more countries every year wanted to submit their national youth policy reports. The COE even offered to send its scholars to review domestic youth policy; and a few states agreed and financed the researches. In their turn, researchers offered recommendations for how to improve states’ youth policies. No need to say, that more knowledge about the youth in Europe was accumulated. The Union had Youth Strategy; COE helped to form a collection of the best practices, and finally decided to
unite all youth programmes into a big one. They left and expanded opportunities for grants and support for Member States; narrowed, but still left actions where non-member states could apply; and even invited socially responsible business. Then, the youth had more learning mobility, and states – more co-operation.

This narrative actually discusses instruments of the European level. They are the Open Method of Coordination with two directions of information flow; organizing youth information access for states; and financial support through the EU youth programmes.

The way the OMC operates in the youth dimension changes within time; it becomes more complex, with several parallel information flows. By that, I mean four basic types of youth policy communications:

- ‘the EU to all states’ direction (which presents common European Youth strategies, programmes’ priorities and actions),
- ‘volunteering states to the EU’ direction (states submitting annually youth policy reports),
- ‘states to the EU research teams to the EU’ direction (meaning complex youth policy reviews which are offered by the EU, financed by states, and also used by the Union),
- ‘the EU to particular states’ (recommendations of the EU research teams to participating states).

The second instrument that I found is organizing information access for the states. It might be a part of the OMC communications, but it is also a part of general information environment of the EU. It includes Internet resources, financing conferences and non-governmental sector, involvement of other policies. The third instrument that I determined is financial stimulation. Those actions, which are the
priority of the EU, are supported by grants (basically) through youth programmes: academic (“Leonardo”, “Erasmus”, etc.), sportive, educational and training (“Youth in Action” (2007-2013)), providing experience (“Youth on the Move” (2010)), finally, uniting the majority of them, “Erasmus Plus Programme” (2014-2020).

Further, I move to the Finnish youth policy.


Figure 3.6. Accepting youth ‘action plans’ in Finland

In the Nordic lands, there was a state of Finland. Its citizens lived in big cities and tiny villages; they inherited different Nordic ethnicities and lived in a close neighborhood with the other Nordic states. Local authorities, provinces and municipalities had much autonomy and cared about their children and youth. Regularly the government asked at local levels, consulted with NGOs, and renewed its Youth Work Act. In it, Government assigned funds to support youth work. In addition, to know better what their youth wanted, people started asking young Finns about their needs and concerns. At that time, there was no ministry or institution responsible for the youth policy, maybe there was not even youth policy as a term.

Finland was a good welfare state, but it also was a member of the EU and European state. When the EU asked, Finland among the first agreed to tell about its achievements in youth work to the other states and financed (among the very few) a Finnish youth policy review by COE. At the same time, it developed work on children’s rights, hosted a UN conference. Cooperation with the European Union became stronger, Finland started taking part in the European programmes, submitted annually reports to the Union where told about European youth dimension. Finland was thankful
for recommendations, and it tried to follow European advice in youth policy. Thus, it worked out the social guarantee measures for youth employment. Traditional decentralization and autonomy stayed, but “Youth Policy” appeared officially (right as the Union advised) and Ministry of Education became responsible for it. It coordinated efforts of other ministries and introduced democratic mechanisms into youth work at local levels.

Before making evaluations about causality and dependency of Finnish youth policy on the European one, I would like to introduce the third narrative of the Norwegian case.


Figure 3.7. Accepting youth ‘action plans’ in Norway

In the Nordic lands, there was the Kingdom of Norway. Its citizens lived in big cities and tiny villages in severe environment. Nearby, in the similar environment, there lived their neighbors from the other Nordic states. Children especially needed protection and care, so the Kingdom controlled their parents, developed children’s rights, cared about children’s health and development at governmental and local levels. People in the Kingdom lived well, and it was important that no deviations appeared. To that end, Legislation Acts were passed and followed. Government cared about children from their birth until they became adults. Besides, as people lived through the large territory, the Kingdom asked NGOs to help and provide children and youth policy at the local level. Nevertheless, there were still problems!
When Europeans started talking about the youth in 1972, Norway immediately became a partner, contributor and driving force. In 2001, Norway thought about domestic changes of child welfare system. “Maybe we should let the state, for example, ‘taking over responsibility for institutional provision and the 27 local teams to work across municipalities’”, - thought the Kingdom. Problems required solutions, deviations threatened to people’s and Kingdom’s welfare. To check the new action plans, Norway decided to listen to recommendation of European experts and invited them. Finally, action plans and strategies were launched, and they applied to working life and public services. Children and youth had long been one of priorities for Norway. For them there was infrastructure, protection and support. They also needed to know about European programmes, and Norway launched information portals and platforms about youth opportunities. Especially to build ‘universal design’ for youth with fewer opportunities, Norway supported 68% of the operating costs of ‘Youth in Action Programme’. A responsible ministry appeared for youth, and youth policy was still supported by governmental funds.

4.3.1. Evaluation about changes of institutions and politics

During the analysis, I understood that the period of my research is quite short. On this time scale, there is an average one-year delay and consequence between European actions and domestic reaction (Figure 3.8). I will try to explicate it and prove whether the European actions serve as causal mechanisms, or whether there are other intervening variables that cause most domestic changes.

The OMC defined the character of relations between states within European youth dimension. Both Finland and Norway voluntarily participate, submit reports, and finance youth policy reviews. As European researchers themselves say, among 46 (that
member states of COE there were few countries that “consider policy on children and youth a priority for the whole government” (Wolf et al. 2004, 5). It is true, that initially child and youth policy is important in both analyzed cases. This can be a feature of the Nordic welfare state model, characterized by a high degree of universalism, thus, considering deviations a problem, and trying to prevent margins since early age.

At the same time, there is a different vision of European youth dimension and state’s role in it. In Finland, there is a consideration of the EU choices (such as introducing social guarantees in accordance to the EU priority of combating youth unemployment). There seems to be a dependence between the EU Youth Pact, Finnish Youth Policy Development Programme 2007-2011 and Finnish revision of its Youth Act. The latter changed the terminology (“youth policy”, for example, appeared as a term). There is a direct reference to the European Youth Strategy in the Child and Youth Policy Programme in Finland for 2012–2015.

Norway associates its actions to the European advice more modestly, and less refers to the EU particularly. There is rather a sense of an opposite direction – that Norway introduces more actively its own practices to the European level including the EU. The fact that since 1972, when the youth field has just appeared in European discourse, Norway was a partner of initiatives and discussions, leader of ideas. One of the examples of Norway’s practices adopted at the EU level is the institute of Child Ombudsman. There is an almost simultaneous reaction of Norway on the European White Paper on youth in 2001. Two significant reports to Stoerting (Norwegian parliament) raised children and youth questions and were followed by new action plans. In the rest of the analyzed Norwegian documents, I have not met direct or partially explicit references to the EU actions, except the national priorities of the EU youth programmes (“Youth in Action”). There is another thing that makes me state that Europeanization has another domestic effect on Norway: “Norway should reduce
protection and prevention over the young people, so that they can build capacities themselves” – this is a conclusion of COE youth policy review for Norway. It witnesses a highly positive youth policy situation (especially comparing with the other COE and EU member states!). It must be even too positive, if the recommendation is to reduce efforts in youth policy. It proofs for me, that Norway’s role should be a leading one regarding youth policy. At the same time I ask myself, whether Finland is so different. It seems it is not. Then the fact that in Finland there are much more illustrations of youth policy changes closely after European acts or strategies appeared, witnesses the EU-ization phenomenon. At the same time, there no such signs for Norway. It participated in ‘Youth in Action’ and many other European programmes. However, it defined national priorities of such participation as: better information of youth about opportunities, quality of training (“Country Sheet on Youth Policy in Norway.” 2008), “inclusion of young people with fewer opportunities who are: youth with disabilities, school “drop-outs” and unemployed youth, youth at risk because of drug abuse, psychological problems, socio-economic deprivation, and youth with a minority background” (“Country Sheet on Youth Policy in Norway.” 2012). These are priorities, which are very typical for universalistic models. The EU initiatives then complete domestic youth priorities and do not make great changes in youth agenda.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(2001-2002) Open Method of Coordination: states’ annual reports and states youth policy reviews</td>
<td>2002 UN meeting of youth experts and researches in Finland</td>
<td>Government’s report to the Storting No. 39 The child welfare white paper (Report No. 40 (2001-02))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2003) n/a</td>
<td>Performance agreements for provincial youth services Project of cross-sectorial youth policy development and youth Ombudsman</td>
<td>Action Plans for child and youth policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2004) Youth Portal (information about European youth programmes)</td>
<td>Report about Youth Work in Finland within OMC The Finnish Youth Research Network took part in an EU youth research project</td>
<td>A council of Europe Policy review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2005) European Youth Pact</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2006) n/a</td>
<td>Finland Youth Act (‘Youth Policy’ officially appeared), Youth Policy Decree, Youth Policy Development Programme</td>
<td>New bodies established to provide youth policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2008) n/a</td>
<td>UN Youth Conference in Finland 2 projects financed by EYF</td>
<td>Youth Policy Report within OMC 1 project financed by EYF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2010) ‘Youth on the Move’ Programme started</td>
<td>A council of Europe Policy review (Child and youth participation) 4 projects financed by EYF</td>
<td>Action Plan for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality 2 projects financed by EYF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2011) n/a</td>
<td>Child and Youth Policy Programme for 2012-2015 3 projects financed by EYF</td>
<td>Focusing on Children and Youth: The Government’s goals and focus areas in state budget for 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2014) ‘Erasmus Plus Programme’ (‘Erasmus for All’) started, finance of actions for: 1) individual mobility and 2) modernizing the education sector</td>
<td>All actions available</td>
<td>Actions available for Norway: Mobility: EVS, Youth Exchanges, Mobility for Youth Workers Partnerships: Strategic Partnerships, Transnational Youth Initiatives Policy: Meetings between young people and decision-makers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.8. Mechanisms and instruments of youth strategy / policy
It is remarkable, that Norway financed 68% of the operating costs for “Youth in Action Programme”. I would rather explain it again by the fact that such common programmes become a good instrument not only to complete domestic youth policy tasks, but also to develop co-operation with other states within Europe and outside it.

Both Finland and Norway supported the development of information exchange about opportunities of youth programmes. The Finnish Youth Research Network took part in an EU youth research project the same year when Youth Portal was launched in Europe. Norway, in its turn, created its own web resource, where it defined the EU’s and national priorities of youth work. In addition, both countries have co-operation in youth field with other actors. There is a strong cooperation within Nordic Youth Committee, where youth research takes great role. Then both states mention a priority cooperation with other adjacent areas: Russia, Estonia, the Baltic Sea Countries and Barents region. This line stayed within the Nordic Dimension of the EU, too. The aims of the EU youth strategy there are similar: cross-sectorial cooperation for the youth aspects and taking youth into account in decision-making.

Conclusion

In the first chapter to this research, I hypothesized that the Europeanization of youth policy happens through framing mechanisms, and convergence around policy paradigms is reached via the OMC. The results of my analysis, nevertheless, witness a convergence in ‘tools’ and rather divergence in ‘contents’.

Europeanization as a theoretical framework allowed me to approach domestic policy changes in two states caused, as I supposed, by the process of European integration. I also stated applicability of distinction between Europeanization and EU-ization. Europeanization focuses more on new conceptual thinking, sharing and
communication. EU-ization is a part of it; however, it is a narrower focus on instruments, policymaking and institutional impact. The European youth dimension was treated as an independent variable, and the two cases (Finnish and Norwegian youth policies) as dependent ones. For purposes of manageability, I reduced the analysis to only one direction – top-down. However, in the process of data processing there were proofs of relevant downside-up effects as well. This is only mentioned here, and such phenomena offer a stimulus for future work in this field.

Based on empirical material I defined two narratives: conceptualization of ‘youth’ and its needs, and instruments of youth policy change. I constructed each narrative for European level first, then for each of the two cases. Time and “scene” became important dimensions of narratives. This link to dates and sequences as well as to major changes in the environment (like economic crisis) helped to include intervening variables into analysis.

The first narrative comparison showed core differences in the conceptualization of “the youth”. At European level, it is a person aged 15-30, in Finland – from 0 to 30, in Norway – from 0 to 18 and 18-23. There is a strong tradition of connecting children and youth in Nordic states, then, the youth policy for these cases means a wider range of actions (legislation and criminal justice, childcare, health, school education, etc.), which are also parts of domestic youth policy priorities. It is also worth saying, that Finland has changed its “youth” age frames (probably for the purposes of operational ability within the EU initiatives). Norway still refers on more traditional “youth” age, and often - on “children and young people” rhetoric. In the “youth” definition, thus, Europeanization (or EU-ization) is visible in case of Finland more.

Speaking about the objectives, youth unemployment became a leitmotif of European youth strategy, especially after the crisis. Two Nordic states do not pay it that
much attention. Their rhetoric is more education-oriented, although it is almost about the same matters (training and education, experience, mobility). Instead, for Finland and Norway concept of youth environment and children environment has an important role. They support European initiatives and take active part not exclusively because the EU recommended practices and actions are required at domestic level. Rather, it is European and international co-operation, and additional financial support for prioritized youth with fewer opportunities.

Looking at the ‘content’ of youth dimension, I can evaluate different objectives, ‘key needs’ of youth at European level and Nordic states. Let me now make some inferences about ‘forms’ of youth policy making. I have written that both Norway and Finland take part in the European youth field and EU initiatives. Why is it, if understanding of ‘youth’ and its needs are not alike?

For the EU relations with other states in youth field are defined by the OMC. This is the EU instrument for communication, sharing, control and introducing domestic changes. Finland and Norway participate even more than majority of other states, including financial support of youth policy researches. But there are unclear expectations of these states from the OMC. Finland, apparently, tries to implement changes recommended by the EU, even if there might be different prioritizing. It refers to the EU choices in domestic documents, adopts new terminology. Norway leaves an impression of prosperous state where youth leaves ‘too great’. It seems not paying much attention to the EU advice. Instead, tries to solve domestic youth problems, but supports significantly European programmes explicating for them its national focuses.

What is my conclusion? The examined two cases belong to the welfare, historical models, which presumably has an influence on youth policy thinking as well. There is a mixture of Nordic identity, European identity and European Union identity (which I would like to set different from the preceding one). There are traditions of
childcare, which ‘welcome’ a youngest citizen and brings a child up trying to avoid any marginalization (in family, at school, at social life, etc.). Youth is a state of transition from child to adult; the youth is a resource for wellbeing of country. Of course, with such a background, the Nordic states look more advanced in youth work than average European countries. Their priorities in youth policy are different from the European general choices, and it is fare. I would argue that in both cases upside-down Europeanization is very natural. Best practices, already working in analyzed states, can be useful to the other actors (although not always applicable). Moreover, the analysis of instruments proved such cases.

Despite the two cases are similar, they witness there is a difference between Europeanization and EU-ization. In case of Finland, there are more parallels with the EU youth strategy: from adopting terminology, naming a youth-responsible ministry up to several direct references on European priorities in domestic strategies. It lets me conclude that the EU membership creates ‘goodness of fit’ pressure for Finland, and it is less (or none) for Norway which is the EU non-member. There might be a state’s perception of rationality of the EU choices, growing European identity, foreseeing political benefits of co-operation, etc. In any case, the EU-ization process takes place within Europeanization and provokes domestic policy changes.

These two cases are also interesting for the reason that one sees that the same EU instruments cause different reactions in states. This reaction in one case (Norway) is modest and makes me suppose more active state’s role in shaping European actions. In another case, that of Finland, Europeanization stimulates both a different conceptual thinking and introduces new political choices.
Conclusion

Youth policy is not a new topic for European discourse. It appeared in 70s and existed as youth dimension in various political contexts. However, since 2001 it is gaining a certain relevance, especially within the “youth as a resource” rhetoric. Moreover, some scholars and documents nowadays call the European youth dimension a “youth policy”. It is not a policy as a formal European model with high adaptational pressure on states. It is still a “liberal” field of European interests, which relies on the OMC and thus is advisory with high share of voluntary actions of the states. The OMC, on the one hand, provides better understanding of domestic youth policies and strategies. On the other, it is a framing instrument, which, as I will discuss further, helps to introduce the EU choices into domestic youth policies. European youth dimension, with the help of OMC, various financially supported youth programs and youth researches, prepares ground for further integrated European youth policy. At the same time, it is closely connected with economic, demographic, political European agendas. I believe that effectiveness of European youth strategies and actions, primarily, considers positive changes in the most problematic areas. Meanwhile, states with more effective youth policy performing either should prioritize their domestic aims of European youth dimension, or be more active in influencing it with their best practices. If not, adaptation to standards of European youth policy may cause less effective domestic policy.

The areas of European youth dimension that I discuss include the concept of “youth” and the most relevant European youth needs. The Nordic states, traditionally viewed as welfare, universalistic states, define “the youth” as a part of childcare agenda. The age, social status, and apparently, the needs of youth differed from the European ones. Europeanization creates certain common interests and perceptions, and such aims of domestic youth policies as European cooperation and information exchange, youth
mobility, youth education and training are now included in states’ youth work. European integration and globalization, too, affect the environment of young people and add new challenges. In this light, the European youth strategies and EU youth programmes are reflections of those new needs of young people in such context. However, the context is still different within states; there is a different background, models. It is natural that domestic youth policies had different focuses, and probably, different institutions.

Existing youth studies witness that the Nordic countries themselves were the objects of various researches including the ones about welfare state feature, particular practices, economical and historical retrospection of the region statement. It means that there is an interest towards Nordic model, including the youth policy. Probably, it is due to youth researchers’ opinion that “…European youth policy remains unspecific and ineffectual” (Wallace and Bendit 2011, 158). My research lets me say that youth policy priorities of European level and domestic ones of course cross at some points connected with European integration. But they are different in relation to what exactly the youth needs, and especially youth employment has different relevance for European and domestic levels.

Europeanization framework is very popular nowadays among international relations studies. In its nature, it is a way to theorize domestic outcomes of European integration. Applicability of Europeanization studies varies, and among modern trends, there are researches of two dimensions of it – both top-down and downside-up. Besides, I applied the concept of “EU-ization”. It is done to show the difference between European level and its narrower focus – the EU level. Utility of such approach revealed when empirical evaluations were performed. In Finnish case, there are more evident causal mechanisms of youth policy changes after the EU recommendations. At the same time, Finnish youth policy nature was long time similar to that of Norway. Why then
one state changes its youth policy slightly, while the other one keeps more traditional domestic way? I believe that division of Europeanization (focused on identity shifts, common concepts, communication and best practices sharing) and EU-ization (normative, institutional, political changes) is fare in relation to my research.

Thus, EU-ization creates “goodness of fit” notion, which has provoked changes in Finnish youth policy. Europeanization, on the contrary, does not make adaptational pressure and is rather “liberal”. In other words, framing mechanism of Europeanization is more valid for EU-ization. There is a convergence of policies is case of Finland, achieved through OMC, probably. In the case of Norway there is less convergence. Again, there are tools of the youth policy like EU youth programmes. These tools completely rely on European level’s image of European youth. In both my cases, states actively take part in those, Norway – as a non-EU-member state. In the case of Norway the priorities of participation seem very coherent and linked with domestic youth policy. To illustrate this, priority of participation of youth with fewer opportunities from Norway (it is a part of state’s determination to prevent any deviations and keep universalistic model of social care).

Europeanisation effects, primarily, witness initiatives to share best practices, participate in OMC and offer policy review for European judgement. EU-ization effects are institutional changes (for example, identifying a ministry responsible for youth policy, defining that there is a national youth policy in Finland, social guarantee, taking over the youth policy tasks to local levels), as well as normative changes (terminology, age of “youth”) and other policy changes.

My research revealed the presence of upside-down effects of Europeanization, particularly for Norway, but also for Finland. They are in participation in European youth dimension, researches, hosting conferences. At the same time, it is not possible now to evaluate whether states affect European youth strategies within both
Europeanization and EU-ization focus. It is a future researches task to take into account another direction of Europeanization and make certain inferences.

The research questions I asked in the Introduction were “how European integration appears in the youth policy”, “are there causal relations between European and domestic policy changes?” and finally, “what are these causal relations for each of two cases?”. I believe that my research lets me now provide answers. Europeanization and EU-ization as its part are the framework of tracing European integration effects. These effects are different, though, for each case. Norway is more modest in changing its youth policy. Nevertheless, it is very cooperative in European youth dimension from the very beginning in 70s. I presume that in this case, top-down effects on domestic policy are few, but there is probably more activity in downside-up direction. Those changes of youth policy that I see in the analysis refer on a within-state changing agenda. Sometimes they correspond with the European ones, sometimes not. European youth strategy and programmes are complementary instruments for national youth policy priorities. European cooperation is an important issue for Norway.

In Finland, Europeanization is in the form of EU-ization. The EU standards, norms and strategies are considered when domestic youth policy is implemented. There are causal relations of policy changes, and there is a top-down direction of Europeanization. Although OMC is a framing instrument, there might be an adaptational pressure and “goodness to fit” pressure.

To conclude, I would like to add again that Finland and Norway have different experience of European integration. My research proved that for an effective and coherent European youth “policy” top-down Europeanization might be ineffective. When the gap between states’ policies is great, an “average” standard may encourage welfare states to reduce their efforts. In order this does not happen, there should be domestic priorities of youth policy, which take into account local and national
environment. These two cases witnessed that “European youth” is now an essential part of European integration discourse and further research of this field are relevant.
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