Operational Code Analysis of Continuity and Change in German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Foreign and European Policy
ANNE NYKÄNEN

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ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
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UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE
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The originality of this thesis has been checked using the Turnitin OriginalityCheck service in accordance with the quality management system of the University of Tampere.
Writing a dissertation on Germany and foreign policy has long been a dream of mine ever since I graduated from the University of Turku in 2006. However, I wanted to first become acquainted with concrete foreign policy and the policy-making world. This took some years and after meeting prof. Dr. Tuomas Forsberg in autumn 2011, I felt that I was ready to write a dissertation on these issues. In early 2012, the University of Tampere, School of Management, admitted me to their doctoral student and the work, which I have really enjoyed throughout the project, began.

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Dear reader, although my work contains over 400 pages, I hope it will not keep you from reading my dissertation. Because the work includes three different case studies, it is possible to take short-cuts and read only selected parts. In this dissertation, I have tried to combine the theory and practice of foreign policy-making as far as it was possible in the academic framework. This is all I have got to say about Germany and foreign policy for now – learning and work shall continue.

Helsinki, 26 September 2016,

Anne Nykänen
Abstract

Since the reunification of Germany, the direction of German foreign and European policy has been highly debated. During the series of crises during the past several years, the role of Germany and Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel has increased. However, Germany’s policies have been somewhat inconsistent with its past positions, for example, as can be witnessed in the case of Libya, in euro crisis and during the Fukushima catastrophe. Thus, scientific research on German foreign and European policy under Federal Chancellor Merkel is necessary in order to be able to understand and explain the current changes in German foreign and European policy and to gain perspective on the wider the implications of these changes for both European and international politics.

This study views that structural or identity theories alone are not able to explain the complex nature of foreign and European policy-making. Further, on the individual level, the key decision-maker, should be included in the analysis. There are not many current studies on German foreign policy that concentrate on the key political decision maker, such as the Federal Chancellor, as the main subject of study. Therefore, this study will approach the study of German foreign policy from the perspective of Federal Chancellor Merkel and will try to understand and explain the current changes in German foreign and European policy through the possible changes in her political operational code beliefs.

Beliefs and their influence on policies and politics is widely studied in the field of international relations. However, the main research traditions view their role
differently. Realist and rationalist theories assign only a minor role for how beliefs affect policies, whereas cognitive and constructivist theories emphasise their causal or even constitutive effect. However, taken alone, beliefs lack mechanisms. This study will add international and national contexts around the study of Merkel’s beliefs in order to further develop understanding of beliefs and how they operate in the concrete policy-making environment.

Beliefs can be defined as what we hold to be true. This study will examine a leader’s operational code beliefs based on ten questions presented by Alexander George. George conceptualised a leader’s operational code as a political belief system with some elements, philosophical beliefs, guiding the diagnosis of the context for action and others as well as instrumental beliefs that prescribe the most effective strategy and tactics for achieving goals.

The aim of this study is, firstly, to examine and compare the political operational code beliefs of German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel between her two first periods of office, between 2005–2009 and 2009–2013. Secondly, the study also aims to link the operational code beliefs to gradually changing German foreign and European policy. It argues that beliefs affect both policy content and policy process. Thus, as the operational code beliefs of Chancellor Merkel gradually changed, the Chancellor also began to reframe German foreign and European policy, which also affected the German domestic power balance between the key executive and domestic institutions such as the Bundestag and Federal Constitutional Court. These possible changes might indicate that German foreign and European policy is in a gradual process of normalization.

The study uses a mixed method approach, which combines quantitative operational code research, qualitative longitudinal content analysis and process-tracing. It
maintains that a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is powerful in providing causal links between beliefs and policy, between causation, processes and outcome. The research material comprises public, not spontaneous, German speeches of Chancellor Merkel. The change of Merkel’s operational code beliefs and its implications for German foreign and European policy will be examined in three case studies: in foreign and security policy, in economic and European policy, and in environmental and energy policy.

On the basis of the three case studies, it is possible to draw some common key findings. The first finding relates to the changes in operational code beliefs. Merkel’s political beliefs have changed, either reversed or reinforced, between her two first terms in office. In all three cases, Merkel’s belief relating to the friendly and cooperative nature of the operational environment has reinforced between the two periods of office. Furthermore, the belief in the utility of different means available widened significantly to include even more ‘threat’ and ‘sanctions’ as well as ‘promise’ and ‘reward’ as foreign policy means, which in turn reduce the risk related to one single mean. This study views that these changes have taken place gradually over time. However, the learning of the key decision-maker, which is the most apparent in relation to the utility of different means, may gradually influence the redefinition of goals and also shape German national identity.

According to the findings, the outbreak of the international financial and economic crisis in 2008 reinforced the link between Merkel’s operational code beliefs and German foreign and European policy. Thus, the international crisis did not reverse the direction of beliefs towards a more hostile and protectionist view of the operational environment, rather in the aftermath of the financial crisis, Merkel’s beliefs on the friendly and cooperative nature of the political universe and cooperative strategies seemed to reinforce somewhat. It can be stated that the
analysis showed some of the independent effect of beliefs and ideas, both direct and indirect, on policy framing when tested against material reality.

The second common finding discusses the policy framing of Chancellor Merkel and the current direction of German foreign and European policy. Towards the second term, Merkel began to reframe cooperation, an important indicator of the German policy of continuation, in a more pragmatic way, which implies a more instrumental and goal-oriented approach to cooperation. As the international multilateral or EU level negotiations in the different fields of policy did not seem to progress, the cooperation was defined towards a direction that also allowed for smaller partnerships and alliances that advanced the same goals.

During the two first terms, Chancellor Merkel stressed the rise of the emerging economies and, especially in the aftermath of the international financial crisis, their increasing responsibility for international cooperation. Thus, reframing cooperation and cooperation structures is necessary. Germany has economic power and this might have led Germany to take in an increasing role in defining future cooperation structures in different issue areas. The possibly increase in responsibility and the role of Germany do not, however, imply that Chancellor Merkel is creating a super power Germany. On the contrary, the aim might be to define international cooperation structures in a way which relates better to the German way of thinking. Thus, it is important to take part in defining future international cooperation structures, their rules and procedures, because national structures must adapt to these rules over time.

The third and final key finding of this study suggests that in addition to power mechanisms, Chancellor Merkel used cognitive persuasion in her foreign and European policy-making. She used issue and policy linkages for controlling agendas
and persuading her audiences, both internationally and nationally. In the literature, issue linkages are often seen as a form of exercising international power. This study will not try question this argument. However, when beliefs change and the leader starts to reframe policies, there must always be a cognitive mechanism of persuasion involved including both international and domestic audiences. This relates to changing international and national understanding of an issue through reframing meaning and different concepts. In Merkel’s case, she persuaded with different ideational concepts that linked various policies and means such as Vernetzte Sicherheit, Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft and Nachhaltigkeit. Thus, as a third observation, this study argues that alongside power, there was also a mechanism of persuasion involved in these three cases, which might, in addition to the national understanding of German foreign and European policy and Germany’s international role, also gradually alter the German domestic institutional power balance.

The future research of German foreign and European policy should continue to study the interaction between continuity and change and future German leaders’ pragmatic redefinition and reframing of German foreign and European policy as it may be only be possible to state that there has been any permanent change in German policy in the upcoming decades. This study defined this pragmatic reframing of policies as the normalization in the development of German foreign and European policy. Furthermore, all levels of analysis (individual, international and national) should be included in future research in order to gain a comprehensive but still nuanced analysis of German foreign and European policy.

Tieteellinen tutkimus Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikasta liittokansleri Merkelin aikana onkin tarpeellista, jotta voidaan ymmärtää ja selittää nykyisiä muutoksia Saksan politiikassa ja arvioida niiden laajempia seurauksia eurooppalaiselle ja kansainväliselle politiikalle.

Saksan ulkopolitiikkaa on yleensä selitetty rakenne- ja identiteettiteorioiden näkökulmasta, mutta tämä tutkimus katsoo, että ne eivät yksinään pysty selittämään ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikan teon maailman kompleksisuutta. Myös yksilötaso, korkein päätöksentekijä, tulee sisällyttää analyysiin. Saksan ulkopolitiikan tutkimus kirjallisuudessa ei ole monia tutkimuksia, jotka asettaisivat korkeimman päätöksentekijän kuten liittokanslerin analyysin keskiöön. Tämä tutkimus lähestyykin Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikan tutkimusta liittokansleri Merkelin
näkökulmasta ja pyrkii ymmärtämään ja selittämään mahdollisia muutoksia Saksan politiikassa Merkelin poliittisten, operaatioalisen koodin, uskomusten muutoksen avulla.


Kolmen tapaustutkimuksen perusteella on mahdollista vetää joitakin yleisiä johtopäätöksiä. Ensimmäinen johtopäätös liittyy operaatioalisen koodin uskomusten muutokseen. Liittokansleri Merkelin poliittiset uskomukset muuttuivat, joko kääntyivät tai vahvistuivat, hänen kahden ensimmäisen kautensa
välillä. Jokaisessa tapaustutkimuksessa, Merkelin uskomus liittyen operationaalisen toimintaympäristön ystävällisyyteen tai yhteistyötä painottavaan luonteenon vahvistui kahden kauden välillä. Lisäksi uskomus eri keinojen hyödyllisyydestä laajentui käsittämään enemmän negatiivisia keinoja kuten ”uhkaus” ja ”sanktiot” sekä positiivisia keinoja kuten ”lupaus” ja ”palkitseminen”, mikä puolestaan vähensi yhteen keinoon liitettyä riskiä. Analyyssin perusteella uskomukset ovat muuttuneet vähitellen ajan myötä. Korkeimman päätöksentekijän ”oppiminen”, toisin sanoen uskomusten muutos, on tulosten mukaan kaikkein selvin liittyen laajentuneeseen keinovalikoimaan, mikä voi toimintaympäristön liittyvien uskomusten muutoksen ohella vaikuttaa ajan myötä päämäärien uudelleenmuotoiluun ja muokata Saksan kansallista ymmärrystä.


Tutkimuksen toinen yhtenäinen tulos liittyy liittokansleri Merkelin politiikan kehystämiseen ja Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppapolitiikan suuntaan. Toista kautta kohti Merkel alkoi kehystää yhteistyön käsitettä, Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppapolitiikan jatkuvuuden tärkeintä indikaattoria, pragmaattisella tavalla. Tämä tarkoittaa, että Merkel alkoi määritellä yhteistyön käsitettä instrumentaalismemmaksi ja
tavoiteorientoituvammaksi. Kun kansainvälisten multilateraali- tai EU-tason neuvottelut eivät etene, on yhteistyötä määriteltävä suuntaan, joka sallii kyseisellä aihealueella pienemmät koalitiot ja kumppanuudet, jotka edistävät samoja tavoitteita.


mukana kognitiivisen suostuttelun mekanismi, joka sisältää sekä kansainvälisten että kansallisen yleisön. Suostuttelu liittyy kansainvälisten ja kansallisen yhteisymmärryksen muuttamiseen kyseisessä asiakysymyksessä merkitysten ja konseptien uudelleenkehystämisen avulla. Kahden ensimmäisen kautensa aikana Merkel suostutetti erilaisilla ideationaalisilla käsitteillä kuten ”verkostoitunut turvallisuus”, ”sosiaalinen markkinatalous” ja ”kestävyys”. Viimeisenä huomiona voidaan nostaa esiin se, että vallankäytön lisäksi näissä kolmessa tapaustutkimuksessa, on myös mukana suostuttelun mekanismi. Tämä saattaa vähitellen muuttaa Saksan kansallista ymmärrystä liittyen Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikkaan ja kansainvälisten rooliin sekä kansallista institutionaalista voimatasapainoa.

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1. Introduction: Continuity and Change in German Foreign and European Policy

In recent years, the role of German Federal Chancellor Merkel has not only increased in European politics but also internationally. This ‘Quiet German’ has been ranked as the most powerful woman in the world¹ and her leadership in dealing with current crises, ranging from Ukraine to Europe’s migrant crisis, has also been appreciated by the great world leaders. Hence, the significance of Germany and understanding its foreign and European policy has also increased.

Although Chancellor Merkel’s terms in office have indicated continuity in many respects, there have also been some quite unexpected decisions that were somewhat inconsistent with Germany’s positions after reunification. Examples can be found in the following cases: Libya in 2011, where Germany did not vote with its main EU and NATO partners in the UN Security Council on Resolution 1973; in the case of Greece, where Germany in 2010 hastily made the decision to support financial assistance packages for Greece; as well as in the case of Fukushima in 2011, where Federal Chancellor Merkel suddenly changed her previous position of continuing the life spans of German nuclear power plants and decided to phase them out by 2022 all of which demonstrate some inconsistencies with past German policies. Thus, scientific research is necessary in order to be able to understand and explain the changes in German foreign and European policy under Federal Chancellor Merkel.

¹ See Packer 2014, New Yorker; Forbes magazine.
After reunification, German foreign policy has mainly been studied from the point of view of structural or identity theories. The scholars, who maintain that change is taking place in German foreign policy, emphasise German responsibility or even the return of Germany to ‘normality’, whereas the scholars taking the constructivist perspective rely on the continuity of German foreign policy and even view Germany’s role even as ‘civilian power’ (Zivilmacht) (Rittberger 2001, Kirste & Maull 1996). The current debate on German foreign and European policy is stuck between these approaches, which may have inhibited a fruitful discussion on their future direction. However, there is still room for nuanced analysis between these perspectives.

This study views that structural or identity theories alone are not capable of explaining the complex nature of German foreign and European policy-making. Further, the individual level, the key decision maker should be included in the analysis. Despite Chancellor Merkel’s increased role and the policy changes that have taken place during her era, there are not many current studies on German foreign and European policy that concentrate on the key political decision makers, such as the Federal Chancellor, as the main subject of study².

Therefore, this study will approach the study of German foreign and European policy from the perspective of Federal Chancellor Merkel and will try to understand and explain the current changes through possible changes in her political operational code beliefs. Operational code analysis is a classic approach to the study of foreign policy within the field of cognitive research. It aims to define a leader’s philosophical beliefs, including the nature of the operational environment,

² For one of the recent operational code studies on Federal Chancellor Merkel’s foreign and security policy, see Brummer 2011.
as well as instrumental beliefs, describing a leader’s approach to the best strategy and means available (George 1969).

Beliefs and their influence on policy and politics is widely studied in the field of international relations. The main research traditions, however, view their role differently. Realist and rationalist theories assign only a minor role for the manner in which beliefs affect policies, whereas cognitive and constructivist theories emphasise their causal or even constitutive effect. However, on their own, beliefs lack mechanisms. Therefore, this study will add international and national contexts to the study of Merkel’s beliefs in order to further develop understanding of how beliefs operate in a concrete policy-making environment.

The study will examine and compare Federal Chancellor Merkel’s political operational code beliefs during her two first terms of office in three different cases: foreign and security policy, economic and European policy, and environmental and energy policy. Furthermore, the influence of those operational code beliefs on German policy and politics will be studied in each individual case.

In the following chapters, I will discuss operational code beliefs, place them in a larger theoretical framework, present the research questions, hypotheses and methods, and finally conclude with the key findings of the research.
1.1. Beliefs and Operational Code Analysis

Before discussing the theoretical framework, it is crucial to define how my dissertation views beliefs and ideas. Beliefs can be defined as what we hold to be true (Renshon 2011, 171). This study maintains that ideas are based on the proposition of beliefs. They are ‘mental constructs held by individuals, “sets of distinct beliefs, principles and attitudes” that provide broad orientations for behavior and policy’, but they also have a strong social component. (Tannenwald 2005, 15; see also Hirschman 1961, 3.)

This study will examine a leader’s operational code beliefs, which can be referred to as political or substantive beliefs (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 285), based on the ten questions presented by Alexander George (1969). George conceptualised a leader’s operational code as a political belief system with some elements, philosophical beliefs, which guide the diagnosis of the context for action; while others, as well as instrumental beliefs, prescribe the most effective strategy and tactics for achieving goals. These beliefs take the study forward into an analytical dimension somewhere between deep philosophical beliefs and the more narrow instrumental beliefs, occupied by values and norms (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 285).

Although many of the previous operational code studies rely on cognitive consistency theory (Walker et al. 1998, 176), which mainly supports the continuity hypothesis, this study will use operational code analysis to examine the nuances of change in German foreign and European policy. The study will follow the latest research projects that apply perspectives from attribution theory and use quantitative methods in defining a leader’s operational code (George 1979, 98,
Renshon 2011, 172, Walker 2003, 267, Walker et al. 1998). These studies state that operational code beliefs are not always stable and that they may change over time and vary within the same individual according to issue area (Walker et al. 1998, 176).

Firstly, this study will examine whether the operational code beliefs of Chancellor Merkel have changed between her first (2005-2009) and second (2009-2013) term. In operational code analysis, it possible to differentiate three types of learning e.g. changes in beliefs: simple, diagnostic and complex (Tetlock 1991, Levy 1994). Simple learning means changes in instrumental beliefs about the best means to achieve goals, whereas diagnostic learning can be defined as changes in philosophical beliefs about the political universe. Complex learning occurs when a leader’s ‘key philosophical about political goals and key instrumental beliefs about the most effective means to achieve them are modified so as to alter a leader’s strategic preferences’. (Malici 2011, 159–160.) Thus, complex learning completely changes a leader’s operational code.

One should note that although the learning of the key executive means changes in beliefs, this does not automatically involve behavioural changes (Malici 2011, 160) or changes in policy. It is important to be able to define whether the change has actually taken place and how big that change is (Renshon 2011, 173). This study will take the quantitative operational code approach as its starting point, and one way to define change is to rely on the results of the significance tests. However, change cannot only be examined quantitatively, it can also be observed in qualitative analysis, where beliefs are approached as an independent variable in which their change is studied with longitudinal qualitative methods, and the possible link between beliefs and policy can be defined.
Therefore, it is also important to, secondly, define how this study views the influence of beliefs. Many studies on beliefs follow the principles of rationality. That approach analyses the proportion of variance explained by beliefs and ideas as opposed to other independent variables. (Tannenwald 2005, 18.) The thin rationality approach sees the agents to be acting on the basis of their beliefs and preferences, which likewise vary from actor to actor and from one issue area to another (Zürn and Checkel 2005, 1058). As in rationalist studies, the authors also mainly draw the same conclusion here that beliefs are not the only causal variables affecting foreign policy and the choices made.

Cognitive theories, by contrast, assume the principle of bounded rationality in which the decision-maker is steered by his beliefs in the identification of options, end/means, goals and instruments, and chooses from different actions. Cognitive theories take the viewpoint that beliefs act as causal mechanisms. They actively steer the decisions of leaders by shaping a leader’s perceptions of reality. (Schafer and Walker 2006a, 5-6.) According to my view, beliefs and ideas shape interests and people interpret the world and define their interests based on ideas, as both cognitive and sociological theories conclude (Tannenwald 2005, 18); but I also understand the more rationalist view in which beliefs should be placed in the real policy-making world where there are also other factors that should be considered.

My research views beliefs as an independent variable having autonomous, both causal and constitutive, effects on policy as acknowledged by conventional and some interpretative constructivists. In addition to causality, beliefs and ideas also provide a framework, and to some extent, shape the outcomes indirectly. They provide ‘possibility conditions for action’ (Laffey and Weldes 1997, 202).
However, taken alone, beliefs and ideas lack mechanisms and, therefore, they need to be connected to political processes and institutions both internationally and domestically (Tannenwald 2005, 13). As in Tannenwald’s (2005) analysis, this study also sees ‘life cycles’ in a leader’s beliefs before becoming institutionalised, e.g. how the learning and the change in beliefs of the key executive lead to policy change. According to my view, beliefs have to be implemented, be it as a law or as foreign policy practice and concrete behaviour, in order to be able to state the actual change in the country’s foreign policy. Thus, beliefs and their change create a platform for future change in practice and behaviour, but until this practice /behaviour changes and becomes repeated, there is no actual change in policy.

Thus, my dissertation mainly follows mainly cognitive and constructivist research traditions and stresses both the causal and constitutive effect of beliefs on policy and politics. It tries to map the ground between thin rationalists and conventional and interpretative constructivists. I see that explanations can be found using both the logic of consequences emphasised by rational approaches and sociological perspective motivated by the logic of appropriateness where beliefs and ideas play a more autonomous or substantive role in explaining outcomes (see Tannenwald 2005, 18).

To conclude, in addition to an examination of possible changes in beliefs of the German key executive, Federal Chancellor Merkel, and defining whether there are simple, diagnostic or complex changes in Chancellor Merkel’s operational code, the study also views beliefs as an independent variable and aims to define whether there is a link between beliefs and policy. However, if there is no change in the leader’s beliefs but the state’s policy seems to have changed or if beliefs seem to have reversed, reflecting e.g. a hostile view of the operational environment when tested against an international crisis, it would imply a minor role for beliefs in
affecting policy and provide a possibly stronger explanation capacity for realist assumptions. On the contrary, if beliefs reinforce, indicating a more cooperative view of the world and the link between beliefs and policy seem to strengthen — especially after an international crisis — it would indicate a strong causal effect of beliefs on policy.

1.2. Connecting Different Levels into a Theoretical Framework for Analysis

This study views that neither structural nor identity theories alone are able to explain the complex nature of foreign and European policy-making. Additionally, the individual level e.g. the key decision-maker, should be included in the analysis. However, the latest research on German foreign and European policy has not focused on the study of the key decision maker. However, the role of the Federal Chancellor Merkel has increased during the past years not only in European politics but also internationally. She has been viewed by many as the leader of Europe when she has operated as a manager of ideas e.g. as a ‘norm entrepreneur’, in dealing with different crises.

Therefore, this study will approach the study of German foreign and European policy from the perspective of Federal Chancellor Merkel. Although this study will concentrate on the examination of Chancellor Merkel’s political operational code beliefs and defining the link between her political beliefs and German foreign and European policy, I maintain that it is important to also describe the wider framework, both international and European, in which the leader operates. The
study views that in an interdependent world, the international and domestic levels are moving closer to each other and, therefore, it may open up possibilities for the individual leader to influence and shape policies on many levels. However, although the possible changes in German foreign and European policy under Chancellor Merkel may also have wider implications on the international and European levels, they are not at the centre of this research.

Thus, the study places agency, the first image (Waltz 1959), at the centre of the analysis and takes the view that it is important to understand micro-level developments in order to be able to explain the complexity of a state’s foreign policy making. In this study, these different levels are bound into a framework, which will follow the agent-structure logic, taking the agent as the starting point.

This study aims to bridge the study of the beliefs of the key decision maker to a rationalist theoretical framework and will show how beliefs could be understood as part of a rationalist explanation of foreign policy making. It will apply the theoretical framework of Moravcsik (1994) and the two-level game approach (Putnam 1988, Moravcsik 1993, 1994) as part of the analysis. Liberal theories emphasise leaders as rational actors, but as stated above, my study views leaders’ beliefs as the foundation of their interests. I maintain that beliefs and ideas thus shape interests and guide behaviour.

But the point is still the same: although constructivist logic is applied to understanding how beliefs and ideas operate by framing policy and constructing meaning, leaders may still be rational and play two-level-games. Many of the decisions at the international and/or European level may be based on how leaders are both trying to keep their domestic constituencies satisfied and balance their power vis-à-vis domestic institutions, not necessarily only with traditional power.
plays (logic of consequences) but through framing and persuasion (the logic of appropriateness). Although the following discussion relates mainly to the conduct of European policies, it can also be applied to the analysis of policy-making at the international level, which will be demonstrated in the following empirical case studies.

This study views the relationship between the EU and member states as an interactive one. Member states shape policies, institutions and processes, which they have to later adapt (Bomberg and Peterson 2000, 6-7). They have to adapt domestically to European pressures, which have significant return effects at the European level where member states seek to reduce the misfit between the European and domestic levels (Börzel 2005, 62, see also Dyson 2003, Jeffery 2003a, 2003b).

National executives hold the key position in linking the top-down and bottom-up dimensions of the relationship between the EU and member states. They are crucial in both decision-making and the implementation of European policies and can ‘influence the way in which member states shape European policies and institutions and adapt to them’. (Börzel 2005, 62, Bulmer and Lequesne 2005.) This study maintains that the head of state can become a ‘norm entrepreneur’, who is needed in facilitating domestic change. They frame and reframe policies and their actions may result in the differential empowerment of domestic actors and policy changes. In EU policy making, the heads of state need the EU level in order to be able to shape their own national policy content and process.

Therefore, in conducting their policies, leaders will effectively try to ‘upload’ European policy. This active and effective uploading of policies, (re)framed by beliefs and ideas, to the European level may minimise the costs of ‘downloading’
effects, which may, due to an institutional or policy misfit, lead to unwanted types of domestic change. The more European policy fits the domestic context, the lower the costs of adaptation in the implementation process are. (Börzel 2005, 63.) In rational choice, an institutionalist explanation, this downloading results in the process of redistribution of power among domestic actors, which I see as having more immediate effects. From a sociological institutionalist perspective, the misfit might lead to socialisation, through persuasion and social learning, which I consider as a more long-term effect of Europeanisation. (see Börzel 2005.)

Börzel (2005, 56) also adds a third way, institutional adaptation, to the discussion on how the domestic impact of Europeanisation can be viewed. This approach can be seen as a subcategory of the two main approaches, rational choice and sociological perspective, as these approaches should not be seen as exclusionary, but rather complementary, approaches to domestic impact. The institutional adaptation sees the process of structuring meanings as gradual but acknowledges that it can be sudden under special crisis circumstances. It is important to note Börzel’s (2005, 55) argument that while persuasion and social learning are mostly identified with processes of policy change, they can also have an effect on domestic institutions. I would argue that the change of beliefs and policy will inevitably lead to a change in domestic institutions, processes and politics over time. When the policy changes, the institutions coordinating and managing the policy must also undergo some type of change.

There are different views on the necessity of the misfit. Some studies disagree with the common understanding that there must be an institutional or policy misfit between European and domestic policies, processes and institutions before any Europeanisation may occur. There are also studies which show that the ‘goodness of fit’ explanation could be ‘a special case rather than a general explanation’.
Governments may use European policy to justify and legitimate change. They are already seeking reform and are utilising European policy as an opportunity rather than responding to a pressure. Thus, European policies may result in domestic reforms even if there is no adaptational pressure. The ‘policies can be exploited by national actors engaged in policy reforms even if European and national arrangements are compatible’. This means that ‘adaptational pressure is not a necessary condition for Europeanization to cause domestic change or that adaptational pressure is politically constructed’ (Bulmer and Radaelli 2005, 347; see also Héritier and Knill 2001.)

This study sees the latter argument that adaptational pressure may be politically constructed, as an important observation. By acting as a norm entrepreneur, Chancellor Merkel may disseminate German positions based on (re)formulated beliefs and reframed ideas to the European/international level in order to be able to intentionally create a political misfit with her own domestic institutions, mediating the created pressure and thereby indirectly facilitating the change of beliefs of domestic institutions as well as constituents. The more beliefs and practices at the European/international level come to match with German beliefs and interests, the more likely it will not result in inertia but rather change domestic institutions through framing, with the leader acting as an ideational entrepreneur on both levels. Thus, using the European/international level, leaders may seek to persuade other domestic actors to alter their beliefs and interests in response to European requirements.

But under which conditions can the persuasion mechanism become effective and can the leader become a norm entrepreneur? This study draws two inductive hypotheses of the circumstances that may make this possible. Firstly, the norm entrepreneur needs institutional power. As a head of state or the government, the
leader is placed between levels and holds the main seat at both national and international/EU negotiation tables. The Lisbon Treaty, ratified in 2009, confirmed the institutional status of the European Council. In the European Council, the heads of state, Prime Ministers and Chancellors, set overall guidelines for European policies. Thus, the leader’s influence over European policies increased with the ratification of the Treaty. At the international level, leaders’ influence was increased through the creation of e.g. the G20, as leaders were trying to tackle the financial crisis. The increased role of leaders in the negotiations tackling international climate challenges has also been visible.

The second condition relates to domestic politics; the norm entrepreneur needs political power. Before 2009, German Chancellor Merkel was bound to the Grand Coalition where her hands were tied because of the SPD and its strong role in formulating policies. In this period, Chancellor Merkel undertook some ‘ideas testing’, moving the CDU closer to the SPD and mixing the policies of the two major parties so that it was not that easy for the public to see the difference between the two parties. (see Höhner 2012). However, after 2009, as the CDU became the largest party in the coalition and were governing with a ‘like-minded’ junior partner, the FDP, the condition for the leader to become a norm entrepreneur was fulfilled. This study views that the amount of political power in the domestic setting is a crucial factor for the leader to become a norm entrepreneur.

The Europeanisation and the leader’s increased role in European politics may affect member states differently, by the redistribution of resources in favour of some institution or actor (maybe also a leader), through socialisation or by institutional adaptation. I see that in the case of a redistribution of power, domestic political institutions react, anti-EU movements or parties will rise and/or the
support for opposition parties will increase. Until now, anti-EU movements in German politics have been minor, and there is no considerable, populist anti-EU party (except for some opinions of the Die Linke and the new Alternative für Deutschland, which has not yet received enough supporters to be elected to the Bundestag) in the German parliamentary system. Thus, socialisation and the institutional adaptation explanations fit better with the German context where domestic institutions such as the Bundestag, Bundesrat and Federal Constitutional Court have been taking a more significant role in the making of European politics. This study will accept some aspects of the domestication theorisation of Harnisch (2006, 2009) but look at the situation from the opposite perspective, that of the executives. The goal of every leader is to keep their constituents satisfied and even increase the power of his/her party. However, the leader does not want to stand directly against the domestic institutions and, therefore, will use persuasion and the effects of Europeanisation in his/her favour.

This study follows Wolf (2000, 95) in hypothesising that in international cooperation the executives will try to find a middle way in order to preserve their internal autonomy for action while not relinquishing their external autonomy at the international level. This study does not argue that Chancellor Merkel would necessarily try to change the domestic power balance entirely in her favour. Rather, it maintains that by using the international / European level, she may try to balance power vis-à-vis domestic institutions in order to find a middle way and to avoid becoming too powerful, which may then result in the rise of domestic opposition movements and a decrease in support among constituents. Acting as a norm entrepreneur, Merkel may try to persuade and have the changed beliefs and reframed policies institutionalised and implemented by her own domestic institutions. This is a gradual, longer-term process because a change in beliefs and ideas will not easily result in policy change. However, with this manoeuvre, it is
possible for Chancellor Merkel to shape policies or create possibilities for future policy change, which may be difficult to stop by her successor.

The study argues that the political operational code beliefs of Chancellor Merkel have changed between her first and second term in office and through this learning, German foreign and European policy is also gradually becoming normalized. However, the learning of the German foreign policy elite does not provide enough evidence to be able to state how and to which degree this has changed German foreign and European policy. When the beliefs of the key decision-making elite change, both policy content and policy process must begin to change. Therefore, when studying German foreign and European policy from the perspective of the leader, it is important to study the interplay between ideational and institutional factors (see Harnisch and Wolf 2010). By this, I mean the interaction between individual learning, domestic institutions and Europeanisation as well as international processes. This study argues that Federal Chancellor Merkel uses international and European levels to persuade institutions, constituents and other actors domestically, and to shape German policies in different policy sectors.

Thus, if the German executive is trying to change the policy content and process and resist the increase of domestication development, one should be able to state when there is continuity and when it is possible to observe change. At the international level, Germany has always supported multilateral institutions, and the supranational EU has been in the heart of German European policy. If German foreign policy is undergoing change, one should be able to observe it in the definition of cooperation. In European policy, Chancellor Merkel should give greater support for intergovernmentalism, which means more power for national governments.
At the national level, the change of policy can be observed in the process, where the reformulated beliefs and reframed ideas of Chancellor Merkel become institutionalised. The more Chancellor Merkel’s interaction with domestic institutions shows signs of rational behaviour, emphasising the role of the executive in relation to four categories including: initiative, institutions, information and ideas, as presented in Moravcsik’s (1994) theoretical approach; the more the national political process is changing from domestication, presenting a form of ‘modified continuity’ (Harnisch 2006, 337) towards the internationalisation of domestic politics presented by Moravcsik (1994).

It is also important to discuss structures. This study views the relationship between the agent and structure as an interactive one. It does not consider ideational or material reality transcending one another. The study will take the agent approach as the starting point and try to define when the influence of cognitive and ideational elements might be the greatest. Therefore, the study tests different events, crises, e.g. movement in structure, against the ideational reality, and views that a crisis might create with regards to both ideational and institutional room for manoeuvre for the norm entrepreneur for the execution of ideas. This might also signify that structures were the third condition for the leader to become a norm entrepreneur.

The ideational elements of learning, framing and persuasion, are also tested against and connected to rationalist arguments emphasising power. The study will combine ideational elements as a two-stage process to the liberal institutionalist theoretical framework. The rationalist power elements are not questioned but rather it is important to show that persuasion works alongside power mechanisms. The norm entrepreneur learns, reframes and, therefore, also persuades, while the rational power framework will reflect the elements, which are also strategically important for the norm entrepreneur. Thus, the logic of appropriateness works alongside the
logic of consequences. In the most ideal case, the persuasion mechanism will turn out to be a crucial mechanism as power, and not ‘just there’.

This also has important implications for the normalisation argument, the continuity and change, of German foreign and European policy. This study holds that the normalization of German foreign and European policy depends on ideational material as well as institutional factors. The reconstructed beliefs of the chief executive, Chancellor Merkel, will, over time, gradually reframe and change German foreign and European policy content. The domestic institutional power balance is also affected by the changed beliefs. The gradual change in the German institutional setting can be examined by observing the amount of rationalist tendencies in executive-led foreign and European policy-making and the way through which the reformulated beliefs become institutionalised in the policy process over time.

1.3. Research Questions and Hypotheses

This study argues that there have been changes in German foreign and European policy. The study questions are: what is Chancellor Merkel’s operational code? Could the operational code of Chancellor Merkel explain German foreign and European policy? And, how can the operational code explain the observed changes?

This study takes the inconsistencies in recent German policies as a starting point and makes two arguments, which work as the hypotheses of the study. Firstly, the study argues that the political operational code beliefs of Chancellor Merkel have
changed between her first (2005-2009) and second term in office (2009-2013). This has taken place over time or because of a crisis in three different issue areas; foreign and security policy, economic and European policy, and environmental and energy policy. Here, the main objective is not to explain why the operational code beliefs have changed, although the question will be touched upon and reflected on to some extent in the qualitative analyses of the three cases.

Nevertheless, the causal and constitutive effect of beliefs on policy content and policy process is of great importance. This study secondly argues that a change in the political beliefs of Chancellor Merkel influences both policy content (framing) and process and the domestic institutional power balance. As the beliefs of Chancellor Merkel have changed, she may have started to reconstruct meaning and reframe German foreign and European policy in these above mentioned, three issue areas. However, the institutionalisation of those beliefs in policy is gradual and dependent on the domestic institutional process, which is also affected by the changed beliefs. Ultimately, because of the gradual change in the domestic institutional power balance, Chancellor Merkel might be better able to implement changes e.g. in policy practice and in law.

It may be too early to state that there has been any great change in German foreign and European policy. This study views change as a gradual process. Change depends on the role of Chancellor Merkel as a ‘norm entrepreneur’, who uses both power and persuasion mechanisms in order to be able to shape both the policy content and domestic institutional power balance. The more rational characteristics of Chancellor Merkel will be demonstrated in the shaping of the domestic policy process, the more change there will be possible to observe in German foreign and European policy-making.
1.4. Mixed Methods as a Power Tool for Analysing Causation, Processes and Outcome

The dissertation will use a mixed method approach, which combines quantitative operational code analysis, qualitative longitudinal content analysis and process-tracing. It argues that ‘the combination of quantitative and qualitative longitudinal data is potentially very powerful in providing links between causation, processes and outcomes’ (Corden and Millar 2007b, 590). The studies using only quantitative operational code analysis have not established a credible link between beliefs and policy, whereas the purely qualitative analyses might in some cases be inadequate with regards to verifying change.

Thus, the speech data of Federal Chancellor Merkel is studied with the aid of multiple methods in order to create linkages between changes of beliefs, processes of policy framing and domestic policy-making as well as being able to define the nuances of change in actual behaviour and policy (outcome). With the term ‘longitudinal’, I am referring to analysis over time, to an examination of both changes in beliefs and policy framing, and how change in the policy process is created over time.

Thus, the study will use three different methods in each case; foreign and security policy, economic and European policy, and environmental and energy policy. Firstly, it will apply quantitative operational code analysis, which examines and compares whether the political beliefs of Chancellor Merkel have changed over time, between her first, 2005-2009, and the second terms, 2009-2013, in office. The operational code beliefs will be examined in a small quantitative study by using VICS, Verbs in Context System (see Schafer & Walker 2006a), which uses the ten political beliefs related questions created by George (1969). By coding the direction
and scaling the intensity of transitive verbs in the subject’s rhetoric and then indexing the results, it is possible to create a broad picture of the way the leader, Chancellor Merkel, views the exercise of power in the political universe, by herself and others (Schafer & Walker 2006a).

However, the quantitative longitudinal analysis is only used to describe the change in Chancellor Merkel’s political beliefs. Thus, it provides only a ‘passive still picture’ of beliefs and their change. Therefore, it should be complemented with a comprehensive qualitative longitudinal analysis of how beliefs act in a social world of power and influence. Beliefs are not only passive; they are also actively used to influence others. The aim is to understand how Merkel’s political beliefs influence German policy framing (dissemination of policy positions) and shape policy (reception, implementation) as part of a gradual process in which beliefs and framing are tested against external international crisis as well as viewed as part of the domestic policy process.

Thus, a qualitative longitudinal content analysis is needed, secondly, in order to describe and understand how beliefs influence policy framing (content) and policy process over time. As Corden and Millar (2007a, 529) state, ‘qualitative longitudinal research seeks to uncover and understand processes of change over time’. The qualitative content analysis is used for analysing the cognitive framing process of meaning, concepts and policy content. It is important to describe the process of changes of beliefs relating to the ten political beliefs defined by George (1969) and to examine how the leader frames policy content with these changed beliefs and how meanings are then restructured. In this instance, the leader is interacting between the past, present and future. The policy-making is affected by past experience and German policy discourse, as well as future expectations, and these
both have an effect on how the policy is (re)framed at the present time. (see Corden and Millar 2007b.)

The dissertation holds that it is also important to understand the process of changes in beliefs within the dynamic international context. Therefore, it is crucial to test the changes of beliefs against an external event. Here, the timing of changes in material conditions and expressed beliefs and ideas as can be considered in testing. The context may have influence on changes in beliefs and thus shape the process of policy framing. Therefore, the change of beliefs over time is tested against the international financial and economic crisis and some smaller crises, depending on the case study in question, to be able to state how the crisis changes Merkel’s political beliefs in terms of direction and intensity and how this then influences policy framing.

If the political beliefs of Chancellor Merkel reinforce, indicating that her beliefs have become more cooperative after the crisis, this study may prove to be a strong test case for the independent, causal influence of beliefs and ideas on policy in international politics. On the contrary, if the beliefs seem to reverse, indicating a more hostile view of the operational environment, then the realist approach on change in beliefs, which allows only a minor role for a leader's beliefs in affecting policy, might turn out to be more valid.

Furthermore, this study also aims to explain, how and why there have been changes during Chancellor Merkel’s era. It hypothesises that Chancellor Merkel uses both power and persuasion mechanisms in order to be able to shape the domestic institutional power balance. In addition to political and constituents’ support, Chancellor Merkel is also dependent on domestic institutions because these institutions play a decisive role in institutionalising the changed beliefs and
reframed policies in habitualised foreign policy behaviour e.g. in implementing them into law.

Thus, a third method is necessary. The quantitative operational code analysis and qualitative longitudinal content analysis, the main methods of this study, are combined with additional methods of process tracing and counterfactual reasoning in order to draw conclusions as to whether there could also be a persuasion mechanism involved. The inferences are inductive. Furthermore, interpretation, as a thicker form of constructivist reasoning, based on a post-positivist methodological approach is needed, because the framing process leads to a changing in the meaning of different concepts and gradually to a change in national understanding on the issue in question. However, these findings remain somewhat hypothetical for further research in the upcoming decades, when it will be possible to state whether German foreign and European policy has actually changed.

Focusing on a leader, who is currently in office and leading national policies, sets boundaries on the selection of research material. When discussing Chancellor Merkel's policies and ways of doing politics, there is little information on her strategies or approach to means. Quite the contrary, people working close with her state that she does not discuss strategy or means. Thus, analysing Merkel’s beliefs purely qualitatively from biographies is not possible. However, biographies on Chancellor Merkel reveal that the speeches Chancellor Merkel gives are thought through carefully (see Kornelius 2014).

Therefore, the research material comprises the public, not spontaneous, German speeches of Chancellor Merkel. The operational codes of different issue areas are analysed by using theme-specific speeches on foreign and security policy, economic and European questions, and environmental and energy issues. The analysis is
conducted from a distance, which is based on the analysis of verbal behaviour. What and how things are said can tell a lot about what Chancellor Merkel is thinking and what her state of mind is. In addition, the public dissemination of her beliefs is also a way to influence others internationally and domestically.

The quantitative operational code analyses of the three cases consist of 87 public speeches altogether, whereas the qualitative analyses are conducted based on the readings of approximately 150 speeches from the whole study period, 2005-2013. The speech material includes Merkel’s speeches from diverse arenas directed at foreign policy audiences. The qualitative speech material is more comprehensive and not as exclusive as the material used for the quantitative part of the study as it aims to show how Chancellor Merkel’s operational code beliefs and their change, frame and reframe German foreign and European policy content and shape the domestic institutional power balance over time.

1.5. Key Findings

This dissertation studied the political operational code beliefs of German Federal Chancellor Merkel and compared them between Chancellor Merkel’s first (2005-2009) and second (2009-2013) terms in office. In addition, the study examined how these beliefs and their change influenced German policy framing (content) as well as domestic policy process. The mixed methods proved to be a powerful method in analysing change in political beliefs over time and their influence on both policy framing and persuasion as well as on creating a hypothetical argument of a changing domestic institutional power balance.
The dissertation applied operational code analysis and the ten questions provided by George (1969) in both the quantitative and qualitative sections of analysis in three different cases: foreign and security policy, economic and European policy, and environmental and energy policy. In order to be able to analyse nuances of the change of beliefs and the influence of beliefs on policy framing and persuasion in each case, the three operational codes were viewed as distinct, based only on a particular issue area. Although the cross-case comparison demonstrates many similarities between the cases, the research design, which viewed the operational codes as separate, was a justifiable choice, because there were differences on how the operational code beliefs affected real-world policy-making. The results of these analyses have been presented after each case.

Although the comparison of the three cases may show some slight differences on how significantly operational code beliefs have reinforced or reversed during the study period, it is also possible to draw some common, key findings. The first finding relates to the changes in operational code beliefs. Merkel’s political beliefs have changed, either reversed or reinforced, between her two first terms. In all three cases, Merkel’s belief, relating to the friendly and cooperative nature of the operational environment, have reinforced somewhat between her two terms in office. Furthermore, the belief in the utility of different means available widened significantly to include even more ‘threat’ and ‘sanctions’, as well as ‘promise’ and ‘reward’, as foreign policy means, which in turn reduce the risks related to one single mean.

This study views that these changes have taken place gradually over time. The results from the three cases’ comparison show that instrumental beliefs seem to change the most easily across cases. These findings support Tetlock’s (1991) argument that suggests that the beliefs relating to tactics seem to be more prone to
change. Thus, it is possible to emphasise the simple learning of the key executive. However, Merkel’s philosophical beliefs also have changed somewhat in some cases, which implies diagnostic learning. This may indicate that there are signs of complex learning of the key decision-maker and this learning may gradually influence the redefinition of goals and also shape German national identity.

The objective of the quantitative section of the study was to ascertain the direction of change in Chancellor Merkel’s beliefs. The quantitative operational code analysis discussed the direction and intensity of transitive verbs relating to self and others in the political universe and the variations in the direction and intensity also show as variation in operational code beliefs. The quantitative study used a speech as a unit of analysis and mean values in describing the direction of changes in beliefs between the two terms in office. However, the quantitative operational code analysis offers only a descriptive and passive ‘still picture of changes in beliefs and, therefore, the analysis should be complemented with a comprehensive qualitative analysis of how beliefs act as a basis for influence and power in international relations.

Therefore, it is of key importance to examine how the political beliefs of Chancellor Merkel influence policy framing and shape policy as part of a gradual process, where beliefs and framing are tested against external international crisis as well as viewed as part of the domestic policy process. This reframing process can be viewed as having both causal and constitutive effects. It is part of the causal chain where beliefs and ideas are disseminated and accepted, whereas the constitutive effect relates more to changing meaning and German national understanding, leading towards the institutionalisation of beliefs in policy practice over time. This study viewed qualitative longitudinal research and qualitative
content analysis as useful methods for analysing the reframing process of meaning, concepts and policy content.

Merkel’s political operational code beliefs were tested against international crisis in order to find out whether the crisis reinforced or reversed the direction of the operational code beliefs and how this change influenced the link between beliefs and policy framing. According to the findings, the outbreak of the international financial and economic crisis reinforced the link between Merkel’s operational code beliefs and German foreign and European policy. Thus, the crisis did not reverse the direction of beliefs towards a more hostile and protectionist view of the operational environment, rather in the aftermath of the financial crisis, Merkel’s beliefs on the friendly and cooperative nature of the political universe and cooperative strategies seemed to somewhat reinforce. It can be stated that the analysis demonstrated some independent effect of beliefs and ideas, both direct and indirect, on policy framing when tested against material reality.

The second common finding relates to the first observation on the change of operational code beliefs by discussing the policy framing of Chancellor Merkel and the current direction of German foreign and European policy. Through the gradual change in the political beliefs, particularly after the international financial crisis, the Chancellor started to gradually reframe the meaning of cooperation, an important indicator of the German policy of continuation, in a more pragmatic way, which implies a more instrumental and goal-oriented approach to cooperation.

This does not imply that Germany would not adhere to multilateral organisations in future and thereby, drastically change its policy. Rather, it is more about seeing cooperation as instrumental and goal-oriented and not as an end in and of itself. This pragmatic view of policy-making is often referred to as the ‘normalization’ of
German foreign and European policy. This study views normalization as a process of interaction between continuity and change in which German foreign policy is gradually becoming normalized. However, it is not possible to state the direction of this normalization process until what happens in upcoming decades comes to be.

The third common finding relates to both the first and the second observations. The study used longitudinal analysis, including quantitative operational code analysis, qualitative content analysis, as well as additional interpretative methods of process tracing and counterfactual inference to make this final conclusion, which remains somewhat hypothetical. As operational code beliefs begin to change, international learning leads the leader to frame and reframe meanings, concepts and policies. However, the most interesting observations here do not relate to any particular policy framing or position, but rather to the policy process, where the analysis of different mechanisms of power and persuasion is crucial.

The final key finding of this study suggests that in addition to power mechanisms, Chancellor Merkel used cognitive persuasion in her foreign and European policy-making. She used issue and policy linkages for controlling agendas and persuasion, both internationally and domestically. In the literature, issue linkages are often seen as a form of exercising international power. This study will not try to question this argument. However, when beliefs change and the leader starts to reframe ideas and policies, there must always be a cognitive mechanism of persuasion involved, which includes both international and domestic audiences. This relates to changing international and national understanding of an issue through reframing meaning and different concepts.

In the case of Merkel, she persuaded her audience with different ideational concepts that linked various policies and means from political, diplomatic and
economic to environmental, developmental, and social and military such as *Vernetzte Sicherheit*, *Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft* and *Nachhaltigkeit*. Between her two terms in office, relating to the concept of *Vernetzte Sicherheit*, Merkel began to widen German understanding of the utility of different means, also allowing for sanctions. Furthermore, Merkel viewed that *Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft*, the social market economy, was experiencing a renaissance and, after the financial and economic crisis in particular, she then used this concept to persuade audiences internationally as well as domestically.

During Merkel’s two terms in office, she also reframed the meaning of *Nachhaltigkeit* (sustainability). The economic and environmental aspects were linked together more closely and, during her second term in office, especially after the Fukushima catastrophe, the concept also consisted of the idea that growth should not be viewed only quantitatively but also qualitatively. Thus, as a third observation, because of the emergence of these persuasive concepts, this study suggests that alongside power, there was also a mechanism of persuasion involved in these three cases. This might also gradually alter the domestic institutional power balance in Germany.

Thus, if the conditions are right and the leader possesses both institutional and political power, it might be possible to hypothesise that during the second term, Federal Chancellor Merkel could have become a ‘norm entrepreneur’ who learned, framed and reframed and, as a consequence, also used persuasion on many different levels, from the international level to the EU and national levels. But the question is, why should the leader become a ‘norm entrepreneur’? The answer could be two-fold. It can be explained from both international and domestic perspectives. Firstly, this study takes the view that the answer could relate to the rise of emerging economies and change in the global balance of power as well as to
the financial crisis, through which this new balance of power became ever more apparent. In global transformations, empty ideational space will come to be that every state will aim to fill by trying to set the rules and procedures, which are based on their own values and institutions.

Secondly, and most importantly, this question relates to domestic politics and the leader’s role vis-à-vis domestic institutions. Harnisch (2006, 2009) has argued that relating to German European policy-making in particular, German domestic institutions such as the Bundestag, Bundesrat and Federal Constitutional Court, have increasingly taken power. This study maintains that as with power mechanisms (Moravcsik 1994), the leader might be able to shift the power balance in his/her favour, to gain more power in the domestic setting and to effectively ‘cut slack’. In the short-term, this might be a useful way of conducting politics, but in the longer-term, it might lead to confrontation with the domestic institutions and a loss of credibility in the eyes of the constituents.

However, as a more long-term approach, the mechanism of persuasion relates to both a changing domestic power balance and to change in the national understanding of an issue. The leader, who is a ‘norm entrepreneur’, possessing national political power, might be better able to act between ‘cutting slack’ and ‘tying hands’ and by cutting slack in order to create room for dissemination of his/her beliefs and ideas, framing and persuasion. In the end, persuading domestic constituents with reframed ideas is of utmost importance for the leader as they decide the winner of the next national election. However, a consensus-oriented political culture might be necessary to some extent in order for the persuasion mechanism to work. In conclusion, this study combined the study of beliefs into a rational theoretical framework as a two-stage process and views that persuasion
works alongside the elements of power. Thus, the leader becomes a ‘strategic norm entrepreneur’.

From the agent’s point of view, this study holds that different international crises may create ideational and institutional room for entrepreneurship where power works alongside persuasion. This also indicates that an eclectic approach to analysis of a state’s foreign policy, testing cognitive and ideational components against material and institutional ones, might be the best solution in order to be able to take the different nuances of the policy-making process into consideration.

The future research on German foreign and European policy should continue to study the interaction between continuity and change and the pragmatic redefinition and reframing of German foreign and European policy as it may only be possible to state whether there has been any permanent change in German policy in the coming decades. This study defined this pragmatic reframing of policies including ideational, material and institutional aspects as a normalization development in German foreign and European policy.

The beliefs and ideas may change incrementally over time as result of gradual learning but also as a consequence of a crisis, which may influence redefinition and the reframing of meaning, concepts and policy. The state’s identity is defined and redefined in a process where structures and actor interact. In this process, the first level and the role of the leader should not be neglected. Especially in times of crisis, the leader is the crucial link between the historical foreign policy discourse of the country concerned and the future as he/she strategically frames and reframes state policies in the present. Thus, all levels of analysis (individual, international and national) should be included in future research in order to gain a comprehensive, but nonetheless nuanced, analysis of German foreign and European policy.
2. Approaches to the Study of German Foreign and European Policy

2.1. Realists vs. Constructivists in Explaining Continuity and Change in German Foreign Policy

Ever since the reunification of Germany, the direction of new German foreign policy has interested many scholars. The unification activated realists as well as liberals and constructivists as it seemed an excellent test case for all schools of thought to demonstrate their theoretical viewpoints (Hellmann 2009, 257). In the discussion on German foreign policy after unification, there are distinct views on the future direction of said foreign policy. On the one hand, there are the supporters of the realist approach, which stresses self-confident foreign policy and the return of Germany to ‘normality’. On the other hand, the supporters of the constructivist/liberal approach rely on the continuity of German foreign policy after reunification and its role as a ‘civilian power’ (Zivilmacht). (Rittberger 2001, 11-30.)

Rittberger (2001, 12-19) divides the supporters of self-confident foreign policy into two groups, one based on more moderate, and the other on more radical, points of view. The supporters of moderate German foreign policy see integration with the West (Westbindung) as an important part of the foreign policy of the reunited Germany that should not be abandoned. They emphasise self-confidence and responsibility in German foreign policy and see Europe as important for Germany.
The supporters of the more radical view stress normal, national self-confidence as the corner stone of German foreign policy.

The scholars who emphasise continuity, also support the maintenance of the key principles of German foreign policy after reunification and see the European Union as the corner stone of the policy of continuity. The different forms of the European integration are in Germany’s interest and partnership with France is essential. In addition, German relations with NATO and the USA are seen as important. (Rittberger 2001, 20-30.) Some of the supporters of the policy of continuity emphasise Germany’s role as a ‘civilian power’, which aims at strengthening international organisations with multilateral cooperation, speaks about the importance of international norms and is sceptical about the use of military force. (see Kirste and Maull 1996.)

Rittberger and Wagner (2001, 323) have examined several cases in order to determine whether German foreign policy had changed as realists expected. Their goal was to examine the explanatory power of a set of theories of foreign policy, which they reconstructed from available realist, liberal and constructivist paradigms. The results showed strong evidence of continuity. Constructivism seemed to perform the best while neorealism performed the worst. Although the post-unification Germany has intensified its influence-seeking policy, which could be associated with the realist tradition, Germany often ‘adhered to the value-based expectations of appropriate behavior shared within the international and domestic society’.

Harnisch and Maull (2001, 2, 129) see the role of Germany somewhat differently. They hold the view that German foreign policy is best explained by the role model of the civilian power, although there have been situations where Germany has not
met the norm-based expectations of a civilian power. Harnisch and Maull argue that a set of ‘civilian power beliefs’ have affected German foreign policy elites and made them adhere to certain principles and instruments when facing change. This set of beliefs is regarded as a quite stable ‘role concept’ that has influenced Germany’s policies and behaviour after unification.

It is worth noting that although constructivist approaches were introduced as attempts to better account for change, in the case of German foreign policy, constructivism had become an advocate of continuity. ‘Social norms, political culture, national identity, or social roles were conceptualized as remarkably stable and almost resistant to any change’. Those aspects that could support change were interpreted in constructivist analyses as ‘a careful adaptation to a changing international environment’ without admitting change at the level of fundamental goals, political culture or identity. (Hellmann 2009, 265.)

Hellmann (2009, 268) highlights some of the more recent developments in German foreign policy that are not easy to analyse within established paradigmatic frames, especially not within frames supporting continuity. Firstly, ‘German unilateralism in the context of UN deliberations about the Bush administration’s Iraq campaign in 2002/2003 were incompatible with civilian power expectations (Maull 2004, 17, 20)’. Secondly, Germany’s violation of the Stability and Growth Pact also showed the limits of the action-guiding power of Germany’s assumed Europeanised identity. Thirdly, there are difficulties in explaining Germany’s active aspirations for a national permanent seat in the UN Security Council after 2004 as Chancellor Schröder discarded the diplomatic language of a common European seat (see Hellmann and Roos 2007).
Hellmann (2009, 268) states, however, that realism has not performed any better. Germany has not discarded its orientation toward multilateralism but it has ‘subliminally redefined multilateralism in a much more instrumental fashion’ (see also Baumann 2002, 2006). Moreover, Germany has not built up armed forces in order to gain hegemony over Eastern Europe, either, which had been expected by Mearsheimer (2001, 395) or how one might expect from a geopolitical point of view (see also Behnke 2006).

Hellmann (2009, 266-267) draws three conclusions from this paradigmatic fixation. Firstly, this fixation has prevented an open-minded approach to the study of German foreign policy that would succeed in creating inter-paradigmatic syntheses or ‘analytical eclecticism’ (Sil and Katzenstein 2010) crossing paradigmatic borderlines. Secondly, one effect of the fixation on paradigmatic competition is the “‘insensitivity vis-à-vis the possibility” that new things may happen to the ways in which German foreign policy is conducted’. This means that the ‘actions and interactions among states and people(s) may result in outcomes which do not fit within our paradigmatic frames of reference’. Hellmann states that if one assumes that one right answer should not be sought but rather, one should develop ‘an appropriate, possibly innovative description, explanation or solution for the problem’, one has to ‘accord contingency a systematic place’ in the theorising about German international relations and foreign policy.

The third negative effect of the paradigmatic fixation concerns the political consequences that ‘alarmist or starry-eyed’ perspectives on German foreign policy may produce. If a large number of people, who take part in shaping either German foreign policy or foreign policy vis-à-vis Germany, believe in realist or liberal/constructivist arguments, such beliefs can have counterproductive consequences. For example, if Europeans believe that Germany is aiming at
hegemony, this belief may get such states ‘to pursue self-defeating balancing strategies which may actually initiate power politics tactics on Germany’s part’. (Hellmann 2009, 268-269.)

I take the view that continuity and change are not either-or choices, but rather that the possible development of normalization in German foreign and European policy is a gradual process in which continuity and change interact as agent and structure interact with each another. Thus, this study aims at analytical eclecticism by testing different theoretical approaches against each other, combining them and finding the best solutions for understanding and explaining German foreign policy under Federal Chancellor Merkel.

2.2. A Pragmatist Interference to the Paradigmatic Fixation of Realists and Constructivists

This study considers the constructivist approach as a valid starting point for the study. This means that the aim is to find the nuances about how much and in which way German foreign and European policy have started to shift from continuity towards the process of normalization. According to constructivism, ‘the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place’ (Ruggie 1998, 33). Instead of leaning on the logic of consequences (March and Olsen 1998, 949-951), constructivism stresses the logic of appropriateness, which
holds that political decisions are not merely for the maximisation of interest but are also shaped by the more enduring normative frames of reference. ‘These normative frames are socially constructed, the product of debate, argument, learning, experience and socialization’. (Hyde-Price & Jeffery 2001, 692.)

Norms change slowly and gradually over time, as they are reinterpreted by leaders. According to Hyde-Price and Jeffery (2001, 693, 697), there are circumstances under which norms may change over the shorter term: critical junctures and entrepreneurs for change. Firstly, points of crisis or policy failure that are triggered by external events create a situation of novelty and uncertainty and challenge existing norms. These situations create a window of opportunity for change. Previous studies suggest that new constructions of meaning typically start to develop in situations of flux when old meanings no longer apply or have been proven invalid (see Berger 1998). The second circumstance relates to the entrepreneurs for change, who are able to articulate ‘a new or alternative sense of what is appropriate or what is not’. Entrepreneurs for change may have the potential to set new agendas and seek to persuade others in support of reformulated norms or generate new understandings. A combination of these two above mentioned circumstances may lead to the recalibration of normative frames over a shorter time frame.

2.2.1. Situated Creativity as the Basis of the Pragmatist Theory of Thought

Hellmann (2009, 257-259) presents an alternative pragmatist approach to foreign policy analysis that could provide a more nuanced description of the changes that
German foreign and European policy have undergone. It argues that Germany’s foreign policy is neither adequately explained with a realist ‘back to traditional great power politics’ argument nor is it easy to understand in ‘civilian power’ terms. Hellmann states that a more appropriate way to redescribe German foreign policy would be to concentrate on a ‘new generation of foreign policy elites repositioning a more ‘self-assertive’ Germany in an ever closing web of European integration as well as a global transformation which is shaped by both globalization and re-polarization’.

Agency lies at the heart of pragmatist theory. Pragmatism concentrates on how people think and how they ‘attain and change their opinions and beliefs (see Dewey 1991) and how they act based on these opinions and beliefs’. It can be viewed as a way to further develop Wendt’s constructivist model by concentrating on the agency side of the agency-structure model and by describing, conceptualising and operationalising agency. (Wagner et al 2006, 14.)

The pragmatist approach stresses situated creativity and the contingency of social action. According to Joas (1992b), situated creativity refers to a conception of action and distinguishes between routine situations and problematic situations. (see Dewey 1981, 1991.) Actors follow implicit rules without further reasoning and, in routine situations, actors resort to ‘an internalized repertoire for action which is based on a rich experience with similar situations in the past’. On the contrary, when actors perceive the situation as problematic or uncertain, ‘actors cannot fall back on known or tested rules for action, because these do not exist or are not considered available by actors’ (Wagner et al 2006, 15). The actor perceives the situation as problematic because there are no given ways of dealing with it. Therefore, the actor cannot resort to an internalised repertoire of actions. They might have doubts about how to manage the situation because their belief system
has been challenged. Thus, the actor has to search for a new belief that enables him to find an appropriate new way to manage the problem at hand. (Wagner et al 2006, 15; Hellmann 2009, 271.)

‘In order to get beyond the period of doubt, actors must reconstruct the “disrupted continuum of action”’ (Wagner et al 2006, 15). This reconstruction is the ‘creative achievement of the actor. If the actor can be reoriented by means of a changed perception, and if the actor can continue with this reoriented action, then something new has come into being: a new way of action that could be stabilized and, in turn, itself become an unreflected routine’. Pragmatists maintain that there is a constant tension between unreflected routines and creative achievements. Creativity is seen as an ‘achievement within situations that call for a solution rather than as the unconstrained creation of new things without any constitutive background of unreflected routines.’ (Wagner et al 2006, 15-16, see also Joas 1992b, 190.)

Pragmatists place the creativity of individuals and collective actors at the core of their understanding of social action (Hellmann 2009, 271). According to Wagner et al (2006, 18), ‘creativity is an achievement in specific situations in which the actors are looking for a solution.’ Problematic situations may not be threatening to the actor because they offer the actors the possibility to behave in new ways. If there are no self-evident rules about how to act appropriately or how to solve a given problem, the actor has the chance to pursue his own interests and aims, and to come up with new ways of problem solving and action. Here, when creativity comes into play; the actor starts to produce new forms of actions. (Wagner et al 2006, 16; see also Joas 1992b, 196-197.)
These new forms of action may then gradually ‘become habitualised and thus be stabilized if they contribute to problem-solving’. The actor consciously develops new forms of habits and action in order to further his/her own interests. Therefore, ‘the concept of action cannot be separated from the actors’ aims and the related means and instruments’ (Wagner et al. 2006, 16). Human action is always linked to its larger context of action. (Wagner et al. 2006, 16, see also Joas 1992b, 214-215, 218-236.)

Hawthorn (1991, 34) takes the view that ‘practical reasoning is done by particular agents in the light of their particular experiences and the particular circumstances in which they find themselves’. According to Dewey (see 1981, 1991), individuals live in a series of situations where the continuity of experience and the interaction with the environment of objects and other individuals create an integral whole. ‘The formulation of ends does not take place before a particular action in a strictly temporal or causal sense’ (Hellmann 2009, 271-272). Joas (1992b, 237) stresses that the concrete course of action has to be constructively created in every situation. In problem-solving, the actor’s motivations and beliefs come into play (Wagner et al 2006, 17). Therefore, one should understand the formulation of ends and the choice of appropriate means as ‘a complex interplay in a given problematic situation, rather than assuming that an actor’s goals are fixed, while the choice of the means of action will only be oriented to these ends’ (Hellmann 2009, 272). Thus, means broaden the scope of possible ends. (Wagner et al 2006, 17; Hellmann 2009, 271-272; see also Joas 1992b, 227.)

The new forms of action emphasise the actor’s creativity, the ability to reflect on his/her action as well as to calculate the possible consequences and the reaction of others. Actor’s ‘expectations in turn influence the definition of goals in the first place which […] may contribute to the solution of a given problem’. The future
can tell which new forms of actions have become habitualised as rules for actions. It is important to note that the better the actor can estimate others’ reactions and the effects of structure, the fewer unintended consequences the actor can expect. Creativity can, therefore, be viewed as a constitutive element of agency. The actor creatively develops new forms of habits and actions in his/her daily practice. And when these habits and actions prove to be useful rules for actions, they become established in stable structures, which ‘are uncontested and reproduced in routine situations’. (Wagner et al. 2006, 17.) In this study, this is called the institutionalisation of beliefs.

Thus, in addition to the agent perspective, structures should also be discussed. According to Wagner et al (2006, 18), in problematic situations, structures should not be treated as given, ‘because actors creatively reshape the current practices dependent on their experience and expectations’. They refer to Germany’s European policy and stress that problematic situations usually take place during intergovernmental negotiations about the basic rules for integration, but events outside the EU can also cause problematic situations. In routine situations, on the contrary, implicit practices and forms of habits and actions are important. The rules are created in problematic situations and through repeated use, they become habitualised and established as structure. In routine situations, structure can be treated as a given, ‘because the agency merely reproduces given habits’.

Wagner et al (2006, 20-21) describe the processes of European integration with the terms ‘summits’ and ‘valleys’. The summit ‘refers to periods during which the European structures of governance are malleable and entrepreneurial action by EU member states seems promising’. They can be brief periods of time and do not necessarily relate to real EU summits. The valleys, in turn, ‘refer to periods during which new rules of the European governance are put into practice’. Wagner et al
provide a reminder that member states at the European level do not simply implement rules that they have agreed to beforehand. ‘As any agreement remains necessarily incomplete, mere implementation is not possible because competing interpretations about the meaning of rules have to be sorted out.’ Wagner et al state that what might seem to be a ‘mere implementation’ is actually an effort to creatively cope with a changing environment. Valleys will normally cover a longer period of time ‘during which actors adapt to the new structures and new modes of behavior may be routinized and there is little entrepreneurial action.

Wagner et al (2006, 21) also present a third category, hills, which they consider to emphasise the points at which some European structures may be changed but in a less fundamental way than in summits. This study agrees with these arguments presented by Wagner et al except on the point concerning entrepreneurial action in the times of valleys. This study maintains that during valleys, norm entrepreneurs, such as key executives at the member state level, are important actors, who facilitate the adaptation of domestic institutions to the new structures of meaning and possible new modes of behaviour.

2.2.2. Pragmatism and German Foreign and European Policy Analysis

Although the problems being discussed in German foreign policy have not changed, the ends of German foreign policy might have altered if new means have become available. According to Hellmann (2009, 272, 275), this is clearly the case in reference to the fundamentally changed context of German foreign policy after
unification. He stresses the pragmatist view, in which the structure of any problem to be solved is complex because different actors and ‘bundles of motivations and beliefs come into play over a temporal continuum’.

The analysis of German foreign policy should concentrate on both context and action. Hellmann (2009, 275-276) suggests that ‘redescribing Germany’s post-unification foreign policy in terms of a creative repositioning under changing internal and external conditions which draws on both “realist” and “non-realist” thought’ would be a good direction for further study. Thus, more attention should be paid to the external situation in which Germany has found itself after reunification as well as to the internal decision-maker’s perspective on German foreign policy. The former relates to ‘paying attention to reconstructing structures of meaning at the international and domestic level’ whereas the latter concerns the agency-centred decision-making approaches.

However, the internal perspective of Germany’s foreign policy analysis has its detriments. Harnisch (2012, 81, 89) points out the theoretical deficiency of the cognitive perspective, which has been stated by many scholars: cognitive theories may often be spurious concerning the causal pathways by which a particular chancellor came to a specific decision. According to Harnisch, during the Cold War, Chancellors Adenauer and Brandt had a significant influence on West and East Policy. After unification, it has, however, become evident that ‘coalition governments and the domestication of executive autonomous decision authority have constrained major foreign policy changes’. Harnisch states that in order to change attitudes, policymakers need critical situations in which ‘their traditional beliefs are challenged and where key norms contradict each other’.
2.3. From Semisovereignty Towards Sovereignty – German European Policy After Unification

Since the end of Cold War and the reunification of Germany, there have been three perspectives on how Germany’s European policy would develop. The first group is characterised by continuity, emphasising integration as a German vocation in Europe. This approach holds that Germany continues to be characterised as a tamed power or semi-sovereign power in Europe (see Katzenstein 1997, 1987). The second approach stresses that Germany’s European policy would be characterised by ‘pragmatic evolution, with integration remaining important but no longer an end in its own right’. This perspective emphasises that Germany’s European policy has become ‘normalized’ and has adopted a more calculating approach. The third approach maintains that Germany’s European policy is undergoing a greater change, which might mean ‘an end to German’s principled commitment to integration, a shift towards the framing of policy in national-interest terms and the EU being utilized only when it was perceived as the most advantageous policy framework’. (Bulmer 2011, 52-53.)

This study can be placed between these approaches emphasising continuity and some form of change in Germany’s European policy as the key German decision-makers are calculating and also using deeper European integration instrumentally in shaping the Germans’ European policies. However, taking constructivism as the starting point, this study considers that it would be more valid to argue that German foreign and European policy is gradually becoming normalized through a process where the agency and structure interact with each other. In the following chapters, the above mentioned three approaches will be discussed in more detail.
2.3.1. Semisovereignty and Soft Power – Two Faces of a Tamed Power

Before discussing the approaches which emphasise changes in Germany’s European policy, it is important to outline the point of departure from which Germany’s European policy has been developed over the past two decades. In 1987, Katzenstein presented his concept of semisovereignty, which was an explanation of the politics and political style of the old Federal Republic. Katzenstein’s argument is not about Germany’s sovereignty deficit on the international arena, instead the emphasis of his work is almost exclusively on the internal constraints, ‘many of them self-imposed’, as Paterson (2005, 261) puts it, that limited the sovereignty of the West German state and by which ‘the power of the West German state has been tamed rather than broken’ (Katzenstein 1987, 10). According to Katzenstein (1987, 35), the internal constraints comprised the system of cooperative federalism and the role of parapublic institutions such as the Bundesbank.

The unification of Germany changed this picture. It was not clear in the beginning what the geopolitical impact of Germany’s changed position would be. Paterson (2005, 263) notes that Germany’s ‘significance would depend on the shape of the emerging European order and how Germany’s altered position would be perceived by German elites. Before unification, structural and systemic variables could explain Germany’s position, but after unification, constructivist explanations have been assigned a key role, which is reflected in Katzenstein’s tamed power argument (1997).

European integration has been the cornerstone of German foreign policy. Bulmer and Paterson (1987, 7) argue that during the period of the old Federal Republic,
‘without European integration as a political arena of cooperation West German economic performance would have been perceived as a threat’. Paterson (2005, 270) mentions two external aspects of the German foreign and European policy of the time that reflect the external conditions of Germany’s semisovereignty. The first of them is Germany’s attitude towards participation in multilateral institutions, ‘reflexive multilateralism’. According to Anderson and Goodman (1993, 23-25), the relationship with multilateral institutions was characterised by an ‘exaggerated’ reliance on institutions, and the view that ‘in the eyes of German political elites, institutional memberships were not merely instruments of policy but also normative frameworks for policy-making’.

The second external aspect relates to the Franco-German relationship, which has played a key role in Germany’s European policy-making. It can be seen as a privileged partnership. On the other hand, the role of this relationship also reflected ‘a perception that a unilateral assertion of German power resources was likely to be counterproductive’. Germany was only able to manifest a strategic leadership role in tandem with France. (Paterson 2005, 270-271.) Paterson (2005, 272) makes the assessment, however, that the future shape of the European Union will tend to reduce the exclusive reliance on this special relationship. The view of Germany turning to multiple bilateralism is based on the estimates that in future, the core will shrink and the periphery will enlarge. He also argues that ‘future German governments will have to devise more attractive incentives for other member states than simple prior Franco-German agreement’ and this suggests that German bilateral relationships will widen beyond the Franco-German case.

There were also internal developments taking place in Germany’s European policy process. During the old Federal Republic, European policy was loosely coordinated. This continued after reunification. The integrationist policy did not
require highly centralised machinery. According to Paterson (2005, 273-274), there were both additional structural and ideational barriers. ‘The German system is characterised by power sharing between partners, the Ressortprinzip and a relatively weak norm of information sharing between ministries’. The Maastricht Treaty engaged the EU extensively with the German polity. The coordination became more challenging by engaging more ministries as serious players in European policy. Moreover, the intervention of the EU more deeply in the internal polity encouraged the Länder to utilise the possibilities of Article 23 of the Basic Law and include itself in European policy formulation. The main consequence of this was that policy-making became more semi-sovereign. (Paterson 2005, 273-274.)

In addition to the engagement of the Länder more extensively in European policy coordination and formulation, there was also a second internal development taking place in Germany’s European policy conduct. The role of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) might have somewhat complicated the implementation. The FCC stresses its right to review EC law against the fundamental rights set out in the Grundgesetz (Maurer 2003, 137). (Paterson 2005, 275-276.) However, relating to the constraints of semisovereignty, Paterson (2005, 277) notes that Bulmer and Paterson (1987) only emphasised the constraining and disabling effects of semisovereignty in their analysis and did not stress the manner enough in which ‘semisovereignty strengthened rather than weakened the realization of German foreign policy goals’.

Reunification made Germany externally less semisovereign and less asymmetrically dependent on its Western allies. The increased competencies of the EU made Germany’s internal semisovereignty more important to European policy-making. (Paterson 2005, 274.) European policy-making became ‘an externalized reflection of the institutionally complex domestic policy process’ (Jeffery and Paterson 2001,
186). Katzenstein (1997, 33) notes that ‘the system of governance in the European polity is based on what one might call “associated sovereignty”, pooled competencies in overlapping domains of power and interest, which is also characteristic of Germany’s “semisovereign” state.’ Thus, there is interplay between the associated sovereignty at the European level and the semisovereignty at the German domestic level. This linkage has been viewed as mutually supportive. (Paterson 2005, 274.) As Katzenstein (1997, 44) views it as, ‘the product of material power, strategic bargaining and historical accident, the institutional practices of associated and semisovereignty in Germany and Europe have evolved in mutually supportive ways’.

Europeanisation was Germany’s European policy strategy during the time of the old Federal Republic. According to Paterson (2005, 276), it was not a substitute for the pursuit of state interests but the ‘only route for promotion of the nascent state interests of the Federal Republic that held out any prospect of achieving a level of international actorness for the new semi-state and for lifting the discriminatory provisions under which the economy still laboured. As Katzenstein (1997, 5) states ‘Germany is an ardent champion of a Europeanization process through which it seeks to promote German state interests’. Thus, German European policy has remained integrationist supporting the ‘tamed power’ argument of Katzenstein (1997), which rests on the view that since reunification, Germany has used mainly soft power expressed through multilateral institutions in conducting its policies (Bulmer 2011, 53). A similar view is offered by Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson (2000) who argue that ‘Germany shaped its regional milieu in particular through the exporting of institutional solutions to the EU level and thereby creating an arena of multilateral cooperation within which its interests could flourish’ (Bulmer 2011, 53).
There are also other ‘forces’, besides internal semisovereignty and Europeanisation, working in Germany’s European policy-making. The strong role of the Chancellor should also be considered. For example, Chancellor Kohl centralised policy-making around himself and the Chancellery by managing ideas and was able to deal with the constraints of semisovereignty. Under the Red-Green government, the role of the Chancellor and Chancellery was growing and European policy continued to be sectorised. According to Paterson, this sectorisation is compensated for by the growing role of the Chancellor, which increased under Chancellor Schröder, who used his Chancellor power in relation to historic decisions and in order to defend German interests. He also aimed to centralise European policy-making. (Paterson 2005, 274-275.) These are important points, because they highlight the core of this study; Chancellor Merkel may have taken up a role similar to her grand mentor Kohl, and now leads current German European policy-making according to her reformulated beliefs and reframed ideas and thereby the role of the Chancellor continues to increase.

Semisovereignty is only one side of the tamed power argument. The other relates to the power utilised by Germany in the post-unification era. After reunification, Germany has continued to use ideational or soft power instruments. In the past decade different aspects have been presented, some supporting continuity and some supporting different forms of change. The key influence possibilities have been conceptualised by Bulmer (1997), which include deliberate or realist power, institutional power, unintentional power and dyadic power, which means that German power may not be the product of forces emanating from Germany (as with the three first ones) but it may also be created by particular features of the international system with which Germany interacts.
The growth in German power resources in the late 1980’s pushed forward the question of whether Germany is heading from semisovereignty towards normality, in the sense of a ‘post-classical nation-state’ like France or the UK, or towards normality in a Europe of associated sovereignty. In the decade directly after reunification, ‘Germany’s institutional framework and the core values of the political elite inhibited the moves towards a post-classical nation-state model and the balance of adjustment was largely made by other member states which, by adopting Economic and Monetary Union, embraced associated semisovereignty’. (Paterson 2005, 279.)

The semisovereignty argument shows that although internal and external constraints are important, analysis should not concentrate solely on only one of these but rather study the close connections between domestic and international affairs. There are arguments which show that congruence can be found between Germany’s semisovereignty and Europe’s associated sovereignty, and that semisovereignty and associated sovereignty are mutually supportive (Paterson 2005, 279, see also Katzenstein 1987, Bulmer et al 2000). Katzenstein (2005, 297, 306) states, however, that the congruence may not last forever. Political developments in Germany, Europe or in the world can break said congruence. Katzenstein maintains that ‘semisovereign politics does not preclude the possibility of large-scale institutional change and far-reaching political initiatives’. Although the German Chancellor is embedded in a semisovereign state, he/she can ‘at times take dramatic action with far-reaching consequences in response to the pressures of the international system’.

Related to the future of associated sovereignty, there are studies on the uploading of German preferences and institutions to the EU level, but the downloading effects of Europeanisation have not comprehensively been the focus of the
These processes are, however, not mutually exclusive. (Paterson 2005, 279.) Paterson (2005, 280) argues that in future, the ‘mutually supportive character of the European and German institutional system has now become more contested as European integration deepens’. He also takes the view that ‘Germany has few financial resources available to facilitate the uploading of German preferences’. Further, he maintains that downloading will continue, the effects of which will cause tensions between actors on both federal and Länder levels in a domestic system still characterised by semisovereignty.

2.3.2. From Tamed Power Towards Normalized Power

German foreign and European policy has shown some unusual characteristics of unilateral action since 2010, such as intense party political controversy and policy which is in contrast with public opinion. This study will follow Bulmer and Paterson (2010) who argue that there are now better materials for analysing German diplomacy and power within the EU than a decade ago, when the bulk of the analysis was conducted. Bulmer and Paterson argue that the ‘tamed power characterisation of Germany’s position in the EU no longer holds’. They see that Germany has become more assertive and will go at it alone when necessary rather than engage in exhaustive policy consultations. It may also search for alternative, intra-EU policy venues to advance its policy interests. Moreover, Germany’s economic power remains strong although vulnerable. These developments have led scholars to conceptualise of German power in a new way as ‘normalized’ power. (Bulmer and Paterson 2010, 1051-1052.)
The definition of the term ‘normalization’ has not been clear, although the debate on the direction of German foreign policy has been going on since the 1990s. For many, normalization means that Germany is becoming like France or the UK and ‘implicitly or explicitly conforming to the rationalist paradigms’. This view holds that ‘normality means Germany’s belated adoption of rational decision-making, unfettered by normative considerations’. (Hyde-Price and Jeffery 2001, 690.)

This study follows the view of Hyde-Price and Jeffery (2001, 691) who emphasise the importance of norms for understanding foreign policy behaviour. It sees that it is the German political elites who are engaged in constructing normality, which means rethinking some of the normative foundations of Germany’s European integration policy. According to Hyde-Price and Jeffery (2001, 691, 712), this does not mean that Germany would reject the old normative constraints or that it could purely be viewed as a rational power-maximising actor. Rather, it is more about a process of rethinking the normative foundations of Germany’s European policy and the reformulation of norms in a way that has opened up a more nuanced and more instrumental engagement of Germany with the EU. The shifts towards normality can be quite subtle, but because of Germany’s economic size and central geographical location, these shifts may have ‘far-reaching implications for the future direction of the European integration process’.

According to Bulmer and Paterson (2011), the normalization thesis rests on the following general arguments. Normalization may be characterised by greater willingness to take unilateral action in the EU rather than following Franco-German bilateralism or multilateralism. It may also become visible through making compelling demands on the EU or by keeping certain items off the EU agenda. It can also be observed in policy statements that stress national interest. In Germany, normalization ‘is reflected in a contestation of European policy in domestic
politics’. Bulmer and Paterson stress, however, that the normalization argument does not mean that bilateralism or the Union method were replaced or neglected. They argue that now there is ‘a more balanced approach that entails a more calculating approach to assessing the utility of alternative bilateral, multilateral or “core group” vehicles for policy’.

Bulmer and Paterson (2011) maintain that Germany has taken a more interest-oriented approach to Europe but this does not mean a clear shift toward a purely national interest oriented policy. However, the generation of ideological, pro-integration oriented speeches has now passed. Pro-Europeanism had no roots in Eastern Germany. There was some short-lived enthusiasm after reunification, but it faded quickly when the EU promises failed to live up to Eastern Germany’s hopes for economic and social security. Considering her background, this change in identity has become particularly evident in the European policy of Chancellor Merkel. Bulmer and Paterson state that since the Lisbon Treaty, it has been in German interest that there were no further plans for integration except for those that concern a sustainable Eurozone.

Franco-German cooperation has been at the core of Germany’s European policy since the beginning of European integration. Bulmer and Paterson (2011) argue that over time this engine has lost steam. The decline of Franco-German power cannot be explained as a consequence of the enlargement of the European Council, because the institution is less bound by rules and formal voting. The reason could lie more in the relationships of the two political leaders who could not agree on policy initiatives, which was the case in the Merkel-Sarkozy-tandem. This decreasing traction of the DE-FR relationship may encourage Germany to stay focused on its own position and to build up new ad hoc alliances.
German foreign and European policy can be characterised by complex ‘domestic politics’. In the coordination of the European policy, the Chancellor’s Office has taken an increasingly important role, which partly reflects the growing importance of the European Council. It oversees, for example: CFSP, Europe 2020 and Eurozone issues. Here, the Chancellor may use his/her power given by the constitution to set policy guidelines (Richtlinienkompetenz). Because the coordination of European policy usually takes place in Berlin between the Chancellery, Foreign Office and federal economics ministry, at the very later stage of the negotiation process, the predictability of the German position has decreased and has made Germany’s European policy unpredictable. Bulmer and Paterson argue that a more interest-driven policy may be less coherent in nature, less shielded by a pro-integrationist narrative, and possibly made more difficult by the multiple coordination points and different views of the ministries. (Bulmer and Paterson 2011.) This tendency of the increased role of the Prime Minister’s/Chancellor’s Office can be observed in many EU member states. It also means that the role of other Ministers and their ministries is decreasing and that power is centralising under the Prime Minister/Chancellor and his/her closest advisors.

The role of the German Länder and Federal Constitutional Court should not be undermined. Bulmer and Paterson (2011) also point out that the Länder have become more influential domestic actors in Germany’s European policy. In some circumstances they might even have veto powers but mainly they have other powers and preside over more routine policy and can, therefore, present further domestic contingency into Germany’s European policy. Although these powers are not new, Bulmer and Paterson stress that they are an integral part of the normalization of Germany’s European policy. Additionally, the Federal Constitutional Court has a role in the making of Germany’s European policy. ‘Its
rulings have an impact not only on German European policy but more widely as its veto power in the German system means that it cannot be ignored’.

Bulmer and Paterson also discuss developments in public opinion in relation to the normalization process. Until the 1960s, Germany was seen to possess a Europeanised identity (see Katzenstein 1997), which allowed the various German governments to proceed with integration. German interest and European interest were seen as co-extensive; Germany had a European vocation (Paterson 2010). According to Bulmer and Paterson (2011), since reunification, German public opinion has eroded while the foreign policy elite have held to their pro-European preferences. In the Eurozone crisis, the German media started to attack the European policy of supporting troubled economies, which was backed by public opinion, and later resulted in defeat for the coalition in the election in North Rhine Westphalia in May 2010. This visible erosion of consensus may lead Germany to use a sharper, more assertive policy-making style emphasising German interests. (Bulmer and Paterson 2011.)

Furthermore, the German political party consensus has been fractioned. Since 1960s there has been a broad consensus on Germany’s European policy. The only exceptions have been the Bavarian CSU and PDS, which later merged with Western Germany’s left to form Die Linke. Euroscepticism has remained marginal but the European identity of the main German political parties has been weakening. Bulmer and Paterson point out that in the 2009 federal election the European policy did not play a crucial role. (Bulmer and Paterson 2011.)

Bulmer and Paterson (2011) also argue that because of the absence of a pro-European narrative, German policy relating to the Eurozone may be stark and insistent on exporting fiscal restraints to member states. Berlin is trying to
constrain its financing of European integration (cf. cheque book diplomacy of the pre-unification period). This might mean a more abrasive German diplomacy.

The final normalization argument of Bulmer and Paterson (2011) outlines that German power in the EU has changed in three aspects. The discourse of interests has, firstly, changed the diplomatic language. In future, the language may become ever more robust and the diplomacy may become more abrasive. Secondly, the pro-integrationist pattern of institutional export has also declined on the rhetorical level; and thirdly, there is a greater tendency to launch initiatives without consultation instead of merely being the benign hegemom of the past. (see also Morisse-Schilbach 2011, 40.)

The normalization argument of Bulmer and Paterson (2011) can be summed up as follows. Firstly, Germany’s European policy has changed since unification; there is no pro-integration enthusiasm, which is also observable in rhetoric. Instead, we are likely to experience a different pattern of European diplomacy, which will be ‘less-predictable than in the past, less governed by an overall strategic vision for the EU’ and ‘more guided by venue-shopping to find the best forum for articulating German interests’. Independent from the arena, Germany will take a very strong position and it has a range of policy options and wide range of diplomatic tools. Secondly, Bulmer and Paterson (2011) also stress that ‘whether this new European policy has a joined-up strategic narrative or is a series of ad hoc tactical calculations seems to fall increasingly to Federal Chancellor’s Office and the personal orientation of the Chancellor’. Germany is no longer leading from behind: its policy has become highly visible. Thirdly, the less-predictable character of Germany’s European policy is likely to continue.
However, Bulmer and Paterson (2010, 1060, 1072-1073) stress that the normalization of Germany’s European policy, emphasising national interests and taking unilateral action, does not mean to imply a return to realist assumptions of balance of power politics. Neither does it mean a general abandonment of a multilateral approach. Rather, normalization may become apparent through a more calculated approach to bilateralism and to the optimal multilateral arenas.

Germany’s role in Europe is increasing. The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty strengthened the role of the European Council, which consists of the heads of 27\(^3\) member states. This increased role may suggest that one should look to member governments for leadership in the EU. If one takes a look at the big three in the EU, the UK is intentionally moving away from the EU core and France has lost some influence, especially in the Eurozone by backing the solidarity claim of the southern member states. While other states seem to lose leadership, the leadership of the Germans is increasing. This German leadership may, however, be more calculating than in the past - this is why Germany’s changed European policy matters. (see Bulmer and Paterson 2011.)

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\(^3\) Number of EU member states until July 2013.
2.3.3. Arguments for Change – Rationalist Tendencies Becoming More Apparent?

There are many scholars who see changes in German European policy. Wagner et al. (2006, 2) argue that the ‘analyses working with the concept of a stable Europeanized German identity or political culture have a hard time accounting for the changes in the German policy’, whereas the studies emphasising change in Germany’s European policy may overestimate the strategic calculus underlying this development.

Bulmer (2011, 47-48, 68) also argues that Germany’s European policy has changed after unification. He presents a venue-shopping argument, a more interest-based approach for analysing German policy. The venue-shopping approach aims to explain the policy change, especially in those areas that have been stable for longer periods of time before being punctuated by rapid change. Pralle (2003, 233) states that venue-shopping ‘refers to the activities of advocacy groups and policymakers who seek out a decision-setting where they can air their grievances with current policy and present alternative policy proposals’. Policymakers are looking for an institutional context that favours their own interests. Bulmer (2011, 43) argues that if this rationalist venue-shopping interpretation can manage to attach itself to German policy analysis, it could offer important evidence of a change in approach.

However, I would argue that turning German foreign policy analysis into pure rationalist analysis does not help us understand the complexity and the nuances on the whole. It is important to discuss how much and in which way German policy is departing from continuity and rationalist analyses do not provide comprehensive answers to these how-questions. Further, Bulmer (2011, 48-49) acknowledges this challenge and suggests a solution also given by Pralle (2003), according to whom
the venue-shopping approach is more complex than traditionally presented. Pralle introduces three qualifications to the rationalist venue-shopping approach. Firstly, venue-shopping could be seen as more experimental and less deliberate. Secondly, venue-shopping can also serve organisational needs and not only advance mere policy goals. And, thirdly, venue choice may be shaped by policy learning. Venues are not chosen only for short-term strategic reasons but also because policymakers may have developed a new understanding of the policy problem. (Pralle 2003, 233.)

The results of Bulmer’s (2011, 68) venue-shopping analysis point out that while Germany continues to shape the regional milieu as stated by Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson (2000), ‘it no longer does so in a relatively straight-forward manner via the EU’, as laid out in Katzenstein’s (1997) tamed power argument. Bulmer states that a ‘more strategic focus has been adopted and national interests are major considerations in German policy’. However, it is important to note that venue-shopping may not be solely interest-driven in a rationalist manner but, as stated above, it may be experimental and serve organisational needs and it may also be associated with policy learning (Bulmer 2011, 69, Pralle 2003). Therefore, Bulmer (2011, 69) argues that at the EU level, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ emerges alongside the predominant ‘logic of consequences’.

The results and thoughts of Bulmer’s (2011) rationalist analysis on German European policy are also important for the theoretical framework of this analysis. If the study aims at stating that German foreign and European policy is in a process of ‘normalization’ or aims at stating some deeper change in German foreign and European policy, it is important to analyse and compare German foreign policy against the rationalist theoretical framework. The point of departure is a constructivist analysis that in many studies presents continuity, which is tested against and combined with rationalist analysis so that it is plausible to state the
possible nuances of change, both in policy content and policy process. Chancellor Merkel is presented as an entrepreneur for change, as a ‘norm entrepreneur’, who may also use beliefs, ideas and reframed European policies instrumentally in aiming to shape and persuade German domestic actors and to conduct change in both German European policy content and process. However, the mechanisms may be rationalist (logic of consequences) or sociological (logic of appropriateness) in nature.

In the following chapter, I will discuss how the change of beliefs will also shape the domestic institutional power balance between executive and domestic institutions.

2.4. Domestication: International Politics vs. the Internationalisation of Domestic Politics in German Foreign and European Policy

2.4.1. Domestication Development Increasing the Power of Domestic Institutions

This study argues that the political operational code beliefs of Chancellor Merkel have changed between her first and the second terms in office and through this learning, German foreign and European policy is also gradually becoming normalized. However, the learning of German foreign policy elite does not provide enough evidence to be able to state how and to which degree the changes of beliefs
have changed German foreign and European policy content. Furthermore, the study of German domestic institutions participating in foreign and European policy making and their interplay, policy process, should be included in the analysis.

Relating to Germany’s European policy, Harnisch and Schieder (2006, 96-97) argue that German policy has become ‘weaker, leaner and meaner’. They base their argument on three developments. Firstly, they view that the German domestic institutional framework has changed. This development is leading to the ‘domestication’ of Germany’s European policy. Secondly, although Germany remains pro-integrationist, there are implications that ‘German notions of Europe’s role have undergone a marked change’. The domestic actors such as the Länder and Federal Constitutional Court have placed limits upon the content of European policy, which makes it more contingent. And thirdly, Germany’s European policy content has become less consensual domestically due to the two above mentioned changes and their encounter with structural constraints.

In the next chapters, I will discuss the changed role of German domestic institutions and then the discussion will be brought to a more theoretical level of the domestication approach presented by Harnisch (2006, 2009).

2.4.1.1. Bundesrat, Bundestag and Federal Constitutional Court Limiting Executive’s Powers

The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 furthered the emergence of domestic key players such as the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) and the Federal Council (Bundesrat). Additionally, the Federal Parliament’s (Bundestag) role was enhanced. (Bulmer and Paterson 2011.) The domestication argument of
German foreign policy presented by Harnisch (2009, 455-456) suggests that ‘domestic delegation mechanisms such as federalism, Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) and strict constitutional rules for executive powers to use repressive force have increasingly limited and shaped Germany’s ability to delegate authority internationally’. He takes the view that the domestication by the Länder, Bundestag and FCC has not only shaped Germany’s European policy, but also affected its security policy, thereby moulding the politics and policies of international institutions such as the EU and NATO.

As stated above, the Länder have become more influential domestic actors in Germany’s European policy. In some circumstances they might have veto powers but mainly they hold other powers over more routine policy and can, therefore, present further domestic contingency into Germany’s European policy. In addition, the Federal Constitutional Court has a role in the making of Germany’s European policy. ‘Its rulings have an impact not only on German European policy but more widely as its veto power in the German system means that it cannot be ignored’. (Bulmer and Paterson 2011.)

In addition, the Chancellor is dependent on the coalition government and coalition partner; the cooperation with the junior partner is important, because the foreign minister is usually appointed from the junior coalition party. (Smith 1994, 192.) In the past decades, when the Chancellors have not been strong, the junior coalition partners have had a major influence in shaping and implementing German foreign and security policy. (Kaarbo 1996, 505.)

Along with the German federalist system of government other factors also come about, which constrain the power of the Chancellor. The Ressortprinzip constrain the Chancellor’s power by bringing unanimity to cabinet voting. For example, the
Finance Minister has a veto in all questions of finance and this veto may delay decision-making as voting has to be repeated. (Sturm 1994, 89.)

Bulmer and Paterson (2010, 1064-1065) sum up some developments that have taken place in German domestic politics relating to its European policy. Firstly, the ‘federal government has tried to increase its effectiveness in representing the national interest, but within the constraint of Germany’s institutional pluralism’. Secondly, the Länder have become key players. This role has been enhanced in EU policy matters, where the Länder have domestic competence as well as in shaping the German position in the constitutional politics of the EU. Thirdly, the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaty judgments of the FCC place boundaries between the German and EU political systems in a way that must be acknowledged by German politicians. Fourthly, public opinion has become more cautious about integration; and fifthly, there is a significant erosion in the party political consensus, which emerged in the Eurozone crisis and is likely to continue.

2.4.1.2. Domestication as Theoretical Concept

According to Harnisch (2006, 28-30) domestication should be understood as a process through which domestic political actors (legislative, juridical, parties and societal groups) through the entrenchment of the right of participation (information and initiative); as well as through the creation of mandatory ideational guarantees of existence in political-administrative agreements and in regulations and the constitution in order to contain the growth of the executive’s autonomy for foreign policy action and to steer it normatively. This means that other political actors (by this I mean domestic institutions) will react to the increasing autonomy
for action of the executive by insisting on procedural containment and the ideational dependence of the executive’s foreign policy.

Harnisch (2006, 31, 37) views domestication as a three step process. In the first step, the changes in the political discourse show that the existing decision-making structures lose legitimacy under the impact of internationalisation and Europeanisation. This change can be gradual or happen suddenly, like a ‘shock’. The domestic actors then start to act against the increasing autonomy of the executive. According to Harnisch, this phase is verbal where domestic actors try to question existing ‘executive-friendly’ norms, demand participation rights and steer the executive normatively. In the second domestication step, the old norms are interpreted and weighted in a new way or new norms are institutionalised. And, in the third step, the most important question is, whether the political actors have internalised the norms and procedures and made the new norms the basis for their future political action. Harnisch takes the view that when examining and comparing the domestication phases of various domestic actors it is possible to state the different domestication ‘grades’ of those actors. In addition, which internal and international factors the domestication development could depend on can be examined.

In his study on domestication, Harnisch (2006, 38-39) presents hypotheses on how domestication works in practice. First, domestic actors (legislative, juridical and public) tie the strengthening of the executive’s foreign policy gradually (discursively, institutionally and habitually) to the existing domestic order of competence as they seek to bring about (herbeiführen) domestic order. Therefore, one should expect them to pursue rights for complete information and participation. The second hypothesis relates to the normboundedness of the domestication argument. According to the hypothesis, states do not only strive for
an international order that suits their internal order of competence. Additionally, states also strive to establish types of international orders that are compatible with their own domestic orders and, therefore, can also serve as a recognition and source of legitimation for their internal constitution (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Ikenberry 1998, 162-163). The second hypothesis proposes that domestic actors do not only want to preserve the existing competence structure, e.g. their position of power, but they also try to ensure the ideational core of their political system in the process of internationalisation and Europeanisation and, insofar as is possible, to transfer it to international institutions. After this, the international institutions cannot only be seen as legitimation sources for the new, independent action of the executive but rather also as a source of legitimation for the existing political systems. (Harnisch 2006, 39.)

2.4.2. Internationalisation of Domestic Politics Enhancing Autonomy of Executive

Domestication research has become dominant over the past few years, as it has been seen as a response of the domestic actors to the internationalisation of domestic politics conducted by the executive, or partly as an effect of the development of Europeanisation. The domestication argument does not propose the creation of a new international order; rather domestic actors attempt to keep their own national competencies in disputes with the chief executive. The domestic actors try to influence the detrimental effects of the internationalisation of the domestic politics or Europeanisation on the policy, polity and politics. (Harnisch 2006, 25.)
However, Harnisch (2012, 89) has recently stated that EU-level institutional changes increase the relative autonomy of the German executive vis-à-vis other branches of government. I take the view that the Lisbon Treaty, ratified in 2009, gave the European Council an institutional status and, therefore, also enhanced the role of the heads of the member state governments. The Treaty also emphasised the role of the national parliaments and created a situation where national political institutions stand against the executive in a struggle for power.

Thus, there are indications that the role of the chief executives might be increasing in the European Union. Furthermore, the significance of Germany and the role of Chancellor Merkel, in particular, have grown during the preceding years. The historical literature on German Chancellors is vast and there are also many biographies on the current Chancellor, however, there is little theoretically-driven research on these Chancellors.

Therefore, this study accepts this challenge and examines the recent changes in German foreign and European policy from the executive’s e.g. the Federal Chancellor’s, point of view. Could the recent changes in German foreign and European policy become apparent partly as a result of this institutional struggle between political institutions and the chief executive within Germany, in which the leader is resisting the development of domestication with the tools provided by the Lisbon Treaty; where the national executives are ‘sitting at two tables at the same time’, leading national policies as well as guiding EU policies? This would not be a unique development, if one also takes a closer look at the recent political developments in other EU member states.

The next chapter will look at the situation from the point of view of the Chancellor, followed by a more theoretical discussion on the internationalisation of
domestic politics, which can be seen as a development in opposition to the
domestication of German foreign policy by giving a larger role to the chief
executive of the state.

2.4.2.1. “Richtlinienkompetenz” as Guarantor and Constraint of the Chancellor’s Leadership

The Federal Chancellor is the key decision-maker in the German federal system.
He/she is chosen every four years from the strongest party in the German
Parliamentary election. The German Basic Law guarantees the Chancellor a
significant role in foreign and European policy decision-making according to three
principles: the ‘Chancellor Principle’ (Kanzlerprinzip), the ‘Minister
Principle/Departmental Principle’ (Ressortprinzip) and the ‘Cabinet
Principle/Collegiality Principle’ (Kabinettsprinzip). (Johnston 2011, 71-72.)

In the Chancellor Principle (Kanzlerprinzip), Article 65 of the Basic Law gives the
Chancellor the responsibility to determine the general policy guidelines of the
federal government, which is also called ‘Richtlinienkompetenz’. It gives the
Chancellor the possibility to set the agenda and to decide on which issues he/she
will take the leading role. The rules of procedure of the federal government
(Geschäftsordnung der Bundesregierung) stress that the Chancellor is responsible for the
effective management of the federal government (Leitungskompetenz). (Johnston
2011, 71, see also Tschentscher 2011, 54.)

According to Article 64, which concerns the Minister Principle/Departmental
Principle (Ressortprinzip), the Chancellor has the right to appoint and dismiss federal
ministers. However, the following Article, Article 65, stresses that federal ministers
conduct the affairs of their department independently. (Tschentscher 2011, 54.) This means that federal ministries are influential bureaucratic actors in their field of competence, however, in politically sensitive issues, the Chancellery takes the lead (Johnston 2011, 71-72).

The Chancellor and the federal ministers form a collective body, also referred to as the cabinet. The Cabinet Principle (Kabinettsprinzip) rests on Article 65, according to which it is the federal cabinet’s task to solve differences of opinion among ministers. The cabinet votes on all policy initiatives made by the government. The formal and informal rules require unanimity when making policy decisions, which means that possible policy conflicts are resolved in advance, before the issue is placed on the cabinet’s agenda. (Goetz 2003, 23, 25.) Thus, the Chancellor must show the ability to effectively operationalise his/her constitutional responsibility to set policy guidelines while coordinating the interests of different ministers. (Padgett 1994, 5.)

The key instrument of the Chancellor for managing his/her responsibilities is the Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt), the activity of which is not specified in the Basic Law (Müller-Rommel 1994, 108). The Chancellery consists of 6 departments/divisions, which include: Central Administration, Domestic and Legal Policy; Foreign, Security and Development Policy; Social Policy, Health Care, Labour, Social Welfare, Infrastructure; European Policy; Federal Security Council; and Intelligence Services. The policy divisions mirror the general structure of German ministries. In addition, the Office includes the Director of the Chancellery and three state ministers. (Bundesregierung 2013.) The main tasks of the Chancellery are to perform the operative planning and tactical coordination for the Chancellor’s policy guidelines (Goetz 2003, 33), to provide information, to coordinate inter-ministerial policy initiatives and to supervise selective areas of
government policy. The execution of these tasks depends on the style of the Chancellor as well as on the composition of the governing coalition. (Müller-Rommel 1994, 108.).

The Richtlinienkompetenz gives the Chancellor the right to determine general policy guidelines (Article 65) and allows the possibility for the Chancellor to take a leading role in a particular policy sector. The conduct of foreign policy has been the central focus of the Chancellor since the time of Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s leadership. In the Basic Law, the primary responsibility for the foreign policy is assigned to the Chancellor and to the key foreign policy actors, such as the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence. (Siwert-Probst 2001, 19-20.) In terms of legislation, foreign policy is not heavily constrained by the Bundestag or Bundesrat (except in the case of treaties and EC directives), which provides the Chancellor with room for manoeuvre. (Paterson 1994, 127-128, see also Johnston 2011, 76-77.)

When it comes to security policy, there is one additional institution: the Federal Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat). The Council is responsible for internal and external security and consists of ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, internal affairs, justice, finances, economy and the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr. The Chancellor sets the agenda and chairs the Council. It has had some amount of power in the past but its power has notably declined since the end of the Cold War. (Rühl 1998, 89-91.)
2.4.2.2. Towards the Internationalisation of German Domestic Politics

As discussed above, German foreign policy can be characterised by complex domestic politics. Since unification, and especially after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, domestication as a form of ‘modified continuity’ (Harnisch 2006, 337) has been the most studied development. However, over recent years, the role of the Chancellor has increased in the conduct of European policies. In the coordination of European policy, the Chancellor’s Office has played an increasingly important role, which partly reflects the strengthening significance of the European Council and the increased role of the heads of the state and government in conducting crisis policies in different international forums, such as at the G20.

This study follows Wolf (2000, 95) in hypothesising that in international cooperation, executives will try to find a middle way in order to maintain their internal autonomy for action while not giving up external autonomy at the international level, either. In international institutions, the executives have a joint interest in continuing this internal and external balance, which can influence the democratisation of international institutions. This means that the executives will only allow such self-commitment (Selbstbindung) mechanisms that ensure internal autonomy for their actions. Therefore, this study maintains that the domestication argument can also be viewed from the executive’s point of view in which the executive has begun to resist the development of domestication in German foreign and European policy making and has started to use the EU level instrumentally in order to balance power between the executive and domestic political institutions.

When the beliefs of the key decision-making elite change, policy content and process must also change. When studying German foreign and European policy
from the perspective of the decision-making elite, it is important to study the interplay between ideational and institutional factors (see Harnisch and Wolf 2010). By this, I mean the interaction between individual learning, domestic institutional and Europeanisation processes, as well as international developments. This study argues that key German decision-makers use the international level as well as European policies and Europeanisation processes instrumentally in order to shape German policies in different policy areas and to persuade institutional actors and constituents domestically. With this manoeuvre, it is possible for the key decision-maker to create room for persuading a target audience with reframed ideas, to shape policies and to create possibilities for future policy change, for more permanent change in German foreign policy behaviour.

The effect of the interplay between the changed beliefs of the key decision-maker and institutional setting may result in changes in the content of different policies as well as in the policy processes that also shape the development of domestication in Germany’s European policy towards the internationalisation of domestic politics. The theoretical basis of this thinking, presented by Moravcsik (1993, 1994) and Putnam (1988), will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters (esp. in Chapter 5).
3. Bringing the ‘First Image Back In’ – A Cognitive Approach to Foreign Policy Analysis

This study connects a cognitive approach to the study of foreign policy. The study places agency, the first image (Waltz 1959), at the centre of the analysis and maintains that it is important to understand micro-level developments in order to be able to explain the complexity of the state’s foreign policy making. Cognitive theories examine the beliefs of the political decision-maker. When these beliefs are brought to the centre of analysis, it is easier to understand different causal mechanisms and the interplay between the beliefs of the decision-maker and domestic and international politics.

3.1. How Does the Cognitive Approach Matter?

Scholars of foreign policy have developed various frameworks to explain foreign policy behaviour. One of the most influential is Waltz’s (1959) neorealist approach ‘levels-of-analysis framework’, which makes the distinction between three different images of war in international politics. In the first image, international action is a product of the conceptions and behaviour of individual leaders; in the second image, international action depends on the domestic characters of societies and states; and in the third image, international action depends on the nation’s relative position, in terms of power and geography within the anarchic international system. In his analysis, Waltz discarded the first image and concentrated on the
third one. (see Waltz 1959; Levy 2003, 253.) This study views that the first image approach is, however, important as it brings the key decision-maker to the centre of the study. As Snyder, Bruckner, Sapin (1962, 65) state, it is one of methodological choices ‘to define the state as its official decision-makers – those whose authoritative acts are […] the acts of the state. State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state.’

Although this study considers the beliefs and ideas of the decision-maker as the key independent variables explaining foreign policy, other variables should also be considered in order to understand how beliefs shape both policy content and process in the real, policy-making world. Beliefs and ideas interact with different (intervening) domestic and international variables, which are also crucial in explaining foreign policy decisions and actions (Levy 2003, 253). However, causality is not the only mechanism at work. The constitutive effects of beliefs should also be considered. This will be discussed comprehensively in the following chapters.

The cognitive approach to foreign policy decision-making has often been accused of a lack of relevance and its critics concentrate on theoretical parsimony and research economy. The claim that explanations centring on the cognitions and perceptions of even the highest ranking leaders are unlikely to increase understanding has been backed with the following three arguments. The first claim is that individual decision-makers are constrained by complex bureaucratic organisations. ‘Organizational memory, prior policy commitments, parochial vested interests, standard operating procedures and normal bureaucratic inertia’ restrict the impact on the policy output of the leader’s beliefs or other cognitive processes. Secondly, ‘foreign policy is the external manifestation of domestic institutions, ideologies, and other attributes of the polity’. Names and faces may change but the
interests and policies do not alter because ‘they are rooted in more or less permanent structural features of the polity’. (Holsti 1976a, 16-17.) Beliefs about politics are part of the sacred political culture of the elite that is systematically transmitted to new leaders. Change in the belief system does not simply happen because the top leadership changes. (George 1969, 217.)

One has to admit that when a new leader enters office, he/she is dependent on the organisation of his predecessors, its high officials and practices. The organisation has a memory and practices, which the officials also continue during the term of the new leader. From an organisational point of view, continuity may very well explain foreign policy making. Learned practices do not change overnight and, especially in the field of diplomacy and foreign policy making, change is even slower. With that being said, it would be pointless to argue that a new leader will immediately start to change foreign policy content or practices. He/she might change some high level officials and make some adjustments to the organisational chart as well as appoint advisors with the same political background. Studies have affirmed that leaders tend to surround themselves with people who are their ‘doubles’, people with similar stylistic preferences or complementary styles. The leader appoints people with whom he/she feels ‘comfortable and compatible’. (Hermann 1986, 175.) This may also imply that those advisors also share political beliefs that are compatible with their leader.

However, I view that as the new leader who represents a new generation of foreign policy makers becomes more experienced in the content and practices of foreign policy, his/her beliefs start to change foreign policy making, both in terms of policy and politics. This process, which may have already been put into practice during the term of the predecessor, is in many ways, highly dependent on the domestic political and institutional framework. For example, in the Grand
Coalition, the effect of beliefs of the leader is more heavily constrained than in a
government where the leader is the representative of a ruling party and governing
with a smaller and like-minded junior party. In addition, it is obvious that when a
leader receives a second term, he/she may be quite confident that public opinion
will support his/her policies. The leader may also become more aware of public
opinion and possible changes in the opinion of the wider masses.

Thus, the key decision-maker shaping the domestic institutional process with
reconstructed beliefs becomes a central question. Domestic institutions play a
central role in the ratification / implementation of international / EU agreements.
However, the leader may not have to confront these institutions in the beginning
of the decision-making process. When a government’s position is formed, the
leader is in many ways able to shape the national position according to his/her
beliefs, ideas and preferences. However, when negotiations at the international/EU
level conclude, domestic institutions are key players in the ratification and
implementation phase of decisions. Those institutions are also ready to use their
influence, if they do not consider that a decision represents the national position or
ideas well enough, or the institutions take the view that the negotiation process is
redistributing power in the favour of the executive.

The third argument against the use of a cognitive perspective in foreign policy
analysis is that ‘structural and other attributes of the international system shape and
constrain policy choices to such an extent that it is a logical starting point for most
analyses’ (Singer 1961, Holsti 1976a, 17). While this may be a valid argument, I am,
however, of the opinion that systemic variables alone cannot provide a satisfactory
explanation for the foreign policy behaviour of states. The variations in the beliefs
of decision-makers explain a ‘significant amount of the variation in foreign policy
behavior of states in the international system’ and ‘these variables are not endogenous to systemic structures or domestic interests’ (Levy 2003, 255).

In order to be able to state the validity of the cognitive perspective, it must be integrated into a theoretical framework of foreign policy that includes all three levels, both agency and structure perspectives. The framework will then present the world of foreign policy making as it is in the real policy-making world, including the key decision-maker, structures and institutions. The analysis may then be held in comparison against a realist theory (be it neorealist or mid-range realist, such as neoclassical realist theory) in order to be able to state the relevance of the analysis against the theory from which most of the studies of foreign policy begin their analysis. Thus, we may ask if material capabilities are the most decisive factor in explaining foreign policy or can cognitive and ideational factors be taken out of the ‘residual category’ and taken into account for more than just the unexplained variance (see Holsti 1976a, 17)? Furthermore, as stated above, it is crucial to determine what the explanation capacity of cognitive and ideational variables vis-à-vis rationalist power explanations and institutions are?

3.2. The Definition of Beliefs and Ideas in Relation to Other Cognitive Elements

Before proceeding with the analysis, it is important to define beliefs and their effect on policy. Furthermore, it is crucial to place operational code analysis in the larger context of the study of beliefs. Beliefs can be defined as what we hold to be true (Renshon 2011, 171). According to Fishbein (1967, 258), a strong dimension of probability is attached to the definition of beliefs. There are different degrees of
certainty in beliefs: individuals believe that some propositions are valid and are close to certain; while individuals might also regard some propositions as less valid but still, nonetheless, they hold them to be generally true. (see also Renshon 2011, 171.)

In some studies, definitions of attitudes, ideas and opinions may overlap and interweave with the definition of belief. Attitudes and opinions have a strong evaluative component (Jervis 2006, 642) when they are used in everyday language, whereas ideas are ‘mental constructs held by individuals, “sets of distinct beliefs, principles and attitudes” that provide broad orientations for behavior and policy’, but they also have a strong social component. (Tannenwald 2005, 15; see also Hirschman 1961, 3.)

I maintain that ideas are based on the proposition of beliefs and follow the categorisation of Tannenwald (2005, 14, 16), who divides ideas between policy prescriptions, norms, principled beliefs, cause-effect beliefs, ideologies, shared belief systems and broad worldviews. From the point of view of this study, cognitive and causal beliefs are of particular interest. Cognitive beliefs consist of ‘descriptions and theoretical analyses that specify cause-and-effect relationships’ (Campbell 1998, 384) and schemas, which define and frame categories. Causal beliefs are defined as ‘cognitive understandings of the world’ that ‘provide guidelines or strategies for individuals on how to achieve their objectives’.

Similar to cognitive and causal beliefs, the study will examine a leader’s operational code beliefs, which can be called political or ‘substantive beliefs’ (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 285). Operational code belief study is based on ten questions presented by Alexander George (1969), who conceptualised a leader’s operational code as a political belief system with some elements, philosophical beliefs, which
guide the diagnosis of the ‘other’ and the context of action, whereas the other elements, instrumental beliefs, prescribe the most effective strategy and tactics for achieving goals. These beliefs take the study to an analytical dimension between deep philosophical beliefs and more narrow instrumental beliefs occupied by values and norms (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 285).

It is also important to define belief systems. According to Rokeach (1960, 33), belief systems ‘represent all the beliefs, sets, expectancies, or hypotheses, conscious and unconscious, that a person at a given time accepts as true of the world he lives in’. In his early studies, George (1969, 197-199) defines a political belief system (operational code belief system) as a set of beliefs about political life, which includes philosophical beliefs about the nature of politics and instrumental beliefs about ends-means relationships in the context of political action.

Holsti (1976a, 20) states that a political system consists of a set of shared beliefs, but in a pluralistic polity, there may also be variations in beliefs. These differences may be important as they become operative in decision-making situations. This is one of the arguments about why the study should concentrate on an individual decision-maker rather than assuming a homogeneity of beliefs among policy-makers. It is possible to empirically define ‘the range of core beliefs that are widely shared, as well as those on which there may be substantial variation’.

Belief system constructs are very close to schemas, which also contain general information about the world. A schema could be defined as ‘a cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or a type of stimulus, including its attributes and relations among those attributes’ (Taylor and Fiske 1991, 98). According to George (1979, 97), the operational code belief system deals with schemata, but is limited to the set of generalised principles about political life.
George’s views will be discussed more comprehensively in the following chapter covering operational code analysis.

Larson (1994, 18-19) also takes the view that belief systems and schemas hold many similarities. They ‘both are structured, simplify information, and vary with expertise and involvement’. Schemas are, however, ‘more inclusive, individualistic and clearly linked to complex cognitive processes’. Both belief systems and schemas should be distinguished from attitudes. While attitudes consist of both cognitive and evaluative elements, schemas and belief systems are purely cognitive.

Beliefs can also form sets of beliefs, worldviews, which influence the way individuals interact with reality. ‘Beliefs set up expectations, and when an event occurs, we are likely to interpret the event in relation to our expectations’ (Voss and Dorsey 1992, 11). Worldviews can be inconsistent and sometimes also contradictory (Jervis 2006, 648). As Leites (1953, 17-18) stated in his analysis; the Bolshevik operational code beliefs were ambiguous, incomplete and inconsistent. However, it is important to note that worldviews are something different from a set of fundamentally distinct beliefs or ideas (Venesson 2007, 8, see also Lakoff 1995, 28).

Beliefs and ideas play significant roles in two ways. Firstly, they shape the identity of the actor. They define, what the actor wants to achieve in politics, internationally and domestically. They are designed to persuade others in both international and domestic arenas. Policymakers can be viewed as entrepreneurs of ideas; either they create new ideas or they invent new ways to use ideas. (see Venesson 2007, 9.) Foreign policy decision-makers are constantly looking for culturally resonant ideas for their own purposes, shifting ideas from one context to another and reconstructing meaning (Skowronek 2006, 148-156). Secondly, beliefs and ideas
have an impact on power in international politics. Decision-makers who articulate ideas possess a major asset in international relations. (see Venesson 2007, 9.)

3.3. Between Thin Rationalism and Constructivism

It is also important to define how this study views the influence of beliefs. Many studies on beliefs follow the principle of rationality. The pure rationalist approaches attribute some autonomy to beliefs and ideas. They see ‘the direct effect of ideas on outcomes and treat ideas as independent or intervening variables’. This approach analyses the ‘proportion of variance explained by ideas as opposed to other independent variables’. Ideas are viewed as a ‘residual variable that helps to explain what interests and power alone cannot explain’. This approach maintains that sometimes ideas matter and sometimes they do not. (Tannenwald 2005, 18.)

The thin rationality approach sees the agents as acting on the basis of their beliefs and preferences, which vary from actor to actor and from one issue area to another (Zürn and Checkel 2005, 1058). As in rationalist studies, the authors here also mainly conclude that beliefs are not the only causal variables affecting foreign policy and the choices made. They interact with other variables, such as domestic politics and institutions. My study adopts this view of thin rationality.

Cognitive theories assume the principle of bounded rationality in which the leader is steered by his beliefs in the identification of options, in the calculation of ends/means, goals and instruments, and in choosing different actions. Cognitive theories argue that beliefs act as causal mechanisms. ‘They actively steer the
decisions of leaders by shaping the leader’s perceptions of reality, acting as mechanisms of cognitive and motivated bias that distort, block, and recast incoming information from the environment’. (Schafer and Walker 2006a, 5-6.)

Beliefs and ideas can be seen as rules in which decision-makers are playing the game of foreign policy – the interests of a given state are formed within these rules (see Jackson 1993, 111). According to my view, beliefs and ideas shape interests, ‘people interpret the world and define their interests based on ideas’, as cognitive and sociological theories assume (Tannenwald 2005, 18), but I also understand the more rationalist view in which beliefs should be placed in the real policy-making world where there are also other factors that should be considered.

My research views beliefs as an independent variable having autonomous effects, both causal and constitutive, as acknowledged by conventional, and some interpretative, constructivists. In addition to a direct causal effect, ideas also provide a framework and to some extent shape outcomes indirectly. They provide ‘possibility conditions for action’ (Laffey and Weldes 1997, 202). However, taken alone, beliefs and ideas lack mechanisms and, therefore, they must be connected to political processes and institutions both internationally and domestically (Tannenwald 2005, 13). This notion will be discussed in the following chapters.

Thus, my dissertation mainly follows cognitive and constructivist research traditions and stresses both the causal and constitutive effects of beliefs. It tries to map out the ground between thin rationalists and conventional and interpretative constructivists. I see that explanations can be found using both the logic of consequences emphasised by rational approaches and the sociological perspective, which is motivated by the logic of appropriateness in which beliefs and ideas play a more autonomous or substantive role in explaining outcomes (see Tannenwald
The research agenda of rationalists and conventional constructivists is mainly based on positivism whereas interpretative grounds are based more on post-positivism. Empirically, there is middle ground to be found between all these three approaches, because all these approaches may be seen as an individual process, where, empirically different approaches follow each other at different stages of analysis and explanation.

3.4. Learning and Policy Change

Learning is important part of foreign policy making. Some view learning as equal with policy change. Others may fail to differentiate genuine learning from the rhetorical or strategic use of historical lessons. Alternatively, others do not differentiate learning from other sources of policy change such as structural adjustment, evolutionary selection and political change or do not specify what the interaction effects among these variables are. (Levy 1994, 282.)

In the literature, there are different definitions for learning. Levy (1994, 283) defines experiential learning as a ‘change of beliefs or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience’. According to this definition, learning does not require policy change. According to Jarosz and Nye (1993, 130), learning is the ‘acquisition of new knowledge or information that leads to a change in behavior. They maintain that learning that does not affect behaviour is not useful from the point of view of developing a general theory of foreign policy. (see also Breslauer 1991.)
In contrast, Levy (1994, 290) stresses that if only learning, which is followed by policy change, is examined, it is not possible to understand when individual learning becomes translated into policy and when the learning is inhibited by institutional or political constraints. Levy also states that learning may also reinforce a policymaker’s current beliefs and, therefore, prevent policy change. This enhances the confidence of the policymaker in his/her existing beliefs and also reinforces continuity in their behaviour. I hold the view that both reinforcement and reverse are changes of beliefs, one indicator for change being the result of the significance tests. Reinforcing beliefs may also change policy, because the policymaker may start to reframe the policy accordingly as a consequence of which the policy may gradually change.

It is also important to note Stein’s views on learning. Stein (1994, 170-171) sees learning as a subset of cognitive change. According to her, ‘not all change is learning, but all learning is change’. Learning is a normative concept that ‘measures cognitive change against some set of explicit criteria’. If there are no evaluative criteria, any cognitive change can be interpreted as learning, and the concept of learning thus becomes redundant. Stein states that not all change in cognitive content or structure is learning. An evaluation of the structure and content of cognitive change is ‘inescapably built into the concept of political learning’. Thus, defining the relation between learning and change is challenging as there is no unified theory of learning. ‘Until now psychology has not identified conditions or thresholds that predict when different forms of learning are likely to occur’.

This study will, in many respects, follow Levy’s (1994, 283, 287) definition of learning, which includes change of beliefs at the cognitive level of an individual. Furthermore, learning does not require ‘policy change, an improved understanding of the world or an increasingly complex cognitive structure’. It is worth noting that
states can change their policies e.g. because of changes in the external environment, a change in political leadership or because of a change in individual beliefs about goals or optimal means to achieve said goals. (Hermann 1990, 3-21.) According to Levy, only the last of the above mentioned changes constitutes learning.

As Levy states (1994, 283-284), learning is active in many respects; firstly, learning is an analytic construction in which people interpret historical experience through their own analytical assumptions and beliefs. Secondly, people actively search for the information they see necessary for a valid interpretation of historical experience. Policymakers might also test their assumptions by implementing small policy changes, observing the effects, learning through trial and error, and proceeding incrementally. Thirdly, interpretations of experience are taught and learned, and policymakers are always trying to influence how others interpret experience. They bring forward their ideas, ‘and through their statements and actions they try to influence how they are perceived by external adversaries’.

There are different types of learning. According to Stein (1994, 171), one can differentiate between simple and complex learning. Simple learning can be spoken of when means are better adjusted to ends, involving the adoption of new tactics (Jarosz and Nye 1993, 130). Complex learning can be spoken of when the actor develops a more differentiated schema, involving the pursuit of new goals, which may lead to new priorities and trade-offs (Jarosz and Nye 1993, 130).

Levy (1994, 285) suggests two types of learning; causal and diagnostic learning. Causal learning relates to ‘changing beliefs about the laws (hypotheses) of cause and effect, the consequences of actions, and the optimal strategies under various conditions’ whereas diagnostic learning can be defined as ‘changes in beliefs about
the definition of the situation or the preferences, intentions or relative capacity of others’.

Tetlock (1991, 40) adds important aspects to the concept of learning and maintains that learning in a cognitive structural sense, which means developing a more nuanced, differentiated and integrated view of the operational environment, enhances the ‘likelihood both of pursuing policies that lead to achieving important goals and of setting realistic goals’. This may happen when the operational environment is highly complex and rapidly changing. Tetlock stresses, however, that cognitive structural learning is no guarantee of success.

Tetlock (1991, 22, 35) presents an ‘efficiency definition of learning’, with which he suggests that learning involves developing the ability to match means and ends more effectively. Three elements are necessary for this type of learning: firstly, a change in the cognitive content of one’s beliefs which; secondly, moves in the direction of greater accuracy about the international environment and which; thirdly, facilitates the ability to achieve one’s goals. Levy’s definition of learning includes only the first element because ‘belief change is not always accurate, and knowledge does not always translate into skill’. (Levy 1994, 291-292.) However, the following analysis should also consider Tetlock’s views in order to create a comprehensive but still nuanced understanding of the learning of the key decision maker.

As mentioned above, the learning model suggests a causal relationship between ‘inferences from past events and current beliefs and between beliefs and policy preferences and decisions’ (Levy 1994, 306). Levy (1994, 287) stresses, however, that learning should not be equated with the ‘lessons of history’ or historical analogies. Although these are important forms of learning, learning can also
involve probability updating, learning new skills or procedures, or an incremental change of beliefs over time as a result of the gradual accumulation of experience.

However, it is possible that policymakers use history instrumentally instead of genuinely learning from experience. Leaders may select those cases from history that support their pre-existing policy preferences or they interpret a given case in a way that reinforces their views. Furthermore, it is possible that ‘preexisting belief systems, operational codes or interests shape both the interpretation of historical experience and current policy preferences’. In that case, learning would still take place and be correlated with policy preferences but ‘any inference of a causal relationship would be spurious’. These two points complicate the task of identifying when learning occurs and whether it has a causal impact on policy. This also places challenges on research designs, which should be able to ‘differentiate between genuine learning and instrumental use of history and to avoid spurious inferences of causality between historical learning and policy preferences and decisions’. (Levy 1994, 306-308, see also Moltz 1993.)

3.5. Learning in Domestic and International Politics

Individual learning cannot explain foreign policy change. Institutional and political processes are needed in order to build political support for transforming individual learning into changes in foreign policy behaviour. Therefore, an analysis of change in foreign policy behaviour also requires a systematic analysis of political and institutional variables. (Stein 1994, 180.) In addition to the study of domestic variables, analysis of the international context is also needed.
The key question is often not whether learning takes place but when it occurs. Furthermore, it is not enough to say that learning contributes to foreign policy change, one has to specify ‘where on the causal chain learning occurs and how it interacts with other variables’. According to Levy (1994, 300), ‘changes in political conditions that facilitate the implementation of policies based on learning are not exogenous’. Individual leaders promote their ideas to key governmental elites in order to ‘create a coalition around those ideas, so that policy entrepreneurship plays a key role in linking learning and policy change’. This includes both political manoeuvring and persuasion. (Levy 1994, 300, 304-305.) Moltz (1993, 325) also takes the position that the lessons ‘learned’ by the actor are influenced by their domestic political interests and the institutional context of the learning process.

These observations made by Levy and Moltz are important when justifying why it is central to study the changes of beliefs of one single leader who can be considered as the head of state. If the leader is able to persuade his/her party and cabinet with his/her beliefs, a study of more than one individual’s political beliefs in a given state will be unnecessary, although the results can be valid for analysis of policy change at the state level.

However, as stated above, political learning is not a necessary condition for policy change. Policy can also change as a consequence of changing domestic coalitions or new patterns of institutionalisation in the face of changing international conditions. Stein points out that the political learning of individuals always takes place in a certain context. Some leaders learn from failure or from crisis, others from past policy success. However, there is little knowledge of the political conditions (domestic or international) that motivate and provoke learning. According to Stein, ‘theories of social cognition have to build linkages between different kinds of political contexts and political learning’. (Stein 1994, 182.)
It is also important to try to explain the change in beliefs and to test beliefs and ideas against material conditions and study how this might affect the direction of policy. Ideas can change for various reasons. If one hypothesises that events disconfirm existing ideas, it is important to concentrate on how, when and under what circumstances that happens. If the change can be observed, it is important to show how events and their possible consequences for the actor’s interests are interpreted by the actor. Tannenwald points out that ideas can also change for other reasons such as internal contradictions in ideas, demographic changes that alter the mix of available ideas or the emergence of new paradigms that reframe perceptions and understandings of the world. (Tannenwald 2005, 25.)

This study aims to find out how the learning of Chancellor Merkel has shaped German foreign and European policy in three different cases. It will consider the above mentioned challenges and will strive to integrate the concept of learning into the theoretical discussion of German foreign policy change. Here, the domestic factors (institutional as well as political) and international environment affect and create possibilities for the learning of an individual decision-maker to gradually start to shape his/her policy. This study does not imply that this learning has already changed German foreign and European policy but explains, by using cognitive variables, how German foreign policy may currently be in a process of transformation.

The political and institutional conditions required for learning to shape policy became favourable during Merkel’s second term in office. After the victorious election of 2009, the CDU was the largest party in the CDU-FDP government coalition, which gave Merkel more room for manoeuvre. In the Grand Coalition, Chancellor Merkel was constrained by the other ruling party, the SPD. In this period Merkel might have undertaken ideas testing and moved her party closer to
the SPD thus confusing constituents about the real differences between these two parties, which played out well in the following federal elections (see Höhner 2012). However, ideas testing was no longer necessary during her second term in office. After gaining more experience over four years, Chancellor Merkel may have become confident in shaping German foreign policy with the beliefs and ideas that the new foreign policy elite currently holds.

3.6. The ‘Life Cycle’ of Beliefs and Ideas

On their own, beliefs lack mechanisms and, therefore, they need to be connected to political processes and institutions both internationally and domestically (Tannenwald 2005, 13). As in Tannenwald’s (2005) analysis, this study also sees ‘life cycles’ in a leader’s beliefs before becoming institutionalised, e.g. how learning leads to policy change. According to my view, beliefs have to be implemented, be it as a law or as foreign policy practice and concrete behaviour, in order to be able to state that there is actual change in the country’s foreign policy. Thus, beliefs and their change create a platform for future changes in practice and behaviour, but until this practice/behaviour changes and becomes repeated, there is no actual change in policy.

Tannenwald (2005, 30-31) links causal mechanisms to four specific stages in the ideas ‘life cycle’⁴: 1) the origins and production of ideas; 2) the transmission of ideas; 3) the reception of ideas and; 4) the implementation of ideas’. The origins

⁴ See also Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) views on the life cycle of norms.
and production of ideas relate to the emergence of ideas to the political arena. The origins can be ideational or material and following the cognitive models, the new ideas most likely ‘originate through learning and from personal and national political experience’. In addition, periods of crisis may favour ideational shifts. In these instances, the nature of new beliefs and ideas play a crucial role in determining whether change occurs.

The second causal mechanism, the transmission of ideas, includes both material factors and social processes. This dissemination phase requires i.e. political entrepreneurs, institutions, domestic structures or transnational networks. ‘Governmental structures can be a source of ideas, and they also shape how ideas are transmitted’. According to Tannenwald, in strong states such as the Soviet Union, leaders adopted new ideas that they could quickly translate into new policies. In weak states, leaders confront new ideas ‘but from a multitude of competing sources, and even if they adopt the ideas they have less power to implement them’. (Ibid.)

The reception (or acceptance) of ideas is the third causal mechanism in the ‘life cycle’ of ideas. This reception phase does not equate to the internalisation of ideas but still plays an important part in the causal process that leads to internalisation. According to Tannenwald (2005, 32), ‘power, political sponsorship, rhetorical entrapment and persuasion are important causal mechanisms in the acceptance of ideas’. The process of reception often requires special conditions. ‘Whether new ideas fir or do not fit with the existing ideational context is partly the matter of the ideas themselves and partly a matter of construction and interpretation by the relevant actors’. As Laffey and Weldes (1997, 203) state, ‘the fit between the new and existing ideas is actively constructed rather than simply there in the ideas themselves’.
This study argues that in this reception phase, entrepreneurship and persuasion in particular are needed because during this phase the causal and constitutive effects of beliefs become a ‘hybrid’. The new beliefs are effectively disseminated by using framing and persuasion mechanisms, where meanings, concepts and justifications are restructured. However, the new reframed ideas must ‘speak’ to the domestic audiences, which in this case are the domestic institutions taking part in foreign and European policy making as well as constituents providing their mandate for these ideas. Thus, this phase creates the possibility for future policy change, but until the relevant actors interpret these restructured beliefs and internalise them, the policy will not change.

The fourth and final phase of the causal mechanisms of beliefs and ideas is implementation. It mainly refers to the domestic policy making process. This phase concerns more than the rhetorical adoption of beliefs. Organisational factors, domestic institutional structures and domestic politics are major factors in ‘determining whether and how ideas get translated into specific policy prescriptions’. It is crucial to link the analysis to these four phases in order to gain an insight into the causal claims about the autonomy of ideas (Tannenwald 2005, 33).

This study takes the view that beliefs and ideas should be examined as part of the German foreign and European policy making process in the following way. After new ideas have emerged e.g. caused by crisis, by learning through experience or by political ambition, they need to be disseminated and accepted. First, reconstructed beliefs and reframed ideas need political support from the government in order to be disseminated internally as a government position through framing and persuasion mechanisms. This process may go back and forth, and the main aim of this entrepreneurship of the key decision-maker is to have the idea translated
effectively to international/EU decisions, be it European Council/Commission decisions or other international agreements. Here, other actors and states are persuaded internationally. At the same time, domestic institutions and constituents are also persuaded nationally. However, in the fourth and decisive phase, implementation, domestic institutions should be persuaded to implement the idea in policy. The more that the idea presented in international / EU agreements corresponds with German ideas and national understandings, the easier it will be for the ideas to be implemented in the domestic policy making process and to become internalised as future German policy.

In this case, it is also important to discuss the constitutive role of beliefs and how I view this role in relation to their causal role. This study sees some middle ground between conventional constructivists, who emphasise the causal role of beliefs, and interpretative constructivists, who stress the constitutive role of beliefs. I see the constitutive theorising of beliefs as a part of the causal analysis. Here again, this study will follow Tannenwald (2005, 36), who states that causal theorising answers ‘why’ questions and concentrates on ‘explaining changes in the state of some variable or system’ whereas constitutive theories answer ‘how’ and ‘how possible’ questions and set out the properties of a system by ‘referring to the structures that give these properties meaning’ (see also Wendt 1998, 104-105).

In this study, these different perspectives are presented as a two-stage process following each other. The causal analysis of beliefs and other variables affecting policy-making will be presented as a discussion between thin rationalists and conventional constructivists, but the core analysis, how changes in beliefs shape both policy content and process, as well as how possibilities for future policy change are created through the restructuring of meaning, will be provided with a more constitutive analysis of beliefs and ideas. In this way, it is possible to examine
the whole range of effects that the beliefs and ideas have in the real policy-making world.
4. Operational Code Belief System Analysis

4.1. The Operational Code Construct as an Analytical Tool

Operational code analysis is a classic and well-known approach to foreign policy and international relations within the general field of cognitivist research of world politics. The cognitive approach maintains that beliefs as ‘subjective representations of reality’ matter in the explanation of world politics. Especially when dealing with complexity and uncertainty, leaders see the world though simplified images that they create from the operational environment. (Tetlock 1998, 876; Schafer and Walker 2006a, 4).

The operational code construct is a complex set of elements initially defined by Nathan Leites (1951, 1953), whose work concentrated on the conceptions of political strategy in Bolshevik ideology. Leites’ analysis of the Bolshevik operational code formed the hard core of operational code study, which incorporated the following five assumptions. Firstly, individuals are primary actors in international politics; and secondly, the personalities of individuals are coherent systems. Thirdly, ‘individuals make political decisions under the constraints of “bounded rationality” imposed by environmental uncertainty’. Fourthly, individuals learn from making political decisions and monitoring the consequences; ‘the content and complexity of both their behavior and the beliefs in their personality systems are reinforced or altered as a result of experiential or vicarious knowledge of the
environment’. And fifthly, ‘political outcomes are the product of the exercise of power by individuals in different political domains’. (Walker 2003, 248.)

The operational code belief system is defined by many scholars following the definition of Converse (1964, 207) who argued that a belief system is ‘a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence’. Walker et al (1998, 176) state that this has led to hypotheses that operational code beliefs were internally coherent, stable over time and they extended across issue domains for an individual leader (see also George 1969; Holsti 1977). There are many studies that have supported these hypotheses deduced from cognitive consistency theory but contradicting results have been obtained from some leaders.

Alexander George (1969) conceptualised a leader’s operational code as a political belief system with some elements, philosophical beliefs, guiding the diagnosis of the context for action, operational environment and others; and other elements, instrumental beliefs, prescribing the most effective strategy and tactics for achieving goals. The philosophical beliefs refer to a leader’s assumptions regarding the fundamental nature of the political environment, political conflict and the image of ‘other’, the general prospects for achieving one’s fundamental political values, the predictability of the political universe, the leaders’ ability to influence historical developments as well as the role of chance. The instrumental beliefs in George’s operational code construct include questions such as the best approach for choosing strategies and tactics, the best approach for calculation, control, and acceptance of risks of political action, the issue of timing of action as well as the utility and role of different means for achieving one’s goals.
Various authors see the role and importance of operational code beliefs differently, mainly due to different research designs. Some view the leader’s image of the political universe (P-1), the belief in the ability to control historical development (P-4) and the leader’s belief regarding the most effective strategy for achieving political goals (I-1) as key (core) beliefs. Thus, these beliefs relate to the power relationship (P-4) and the cooperative and conflictual orientations between self (I-1) and other (P-1). (Malici 2011, 160.) Schafer and Crichlow (2000, 560) hypothesise in their study that the indices P-4 (control over historical development), P-5 (role of chance) and I-3 (risk orientation) describe the underlying personal characteristics.

According to the results received in the first operational code studies, the internal interconnectedness of beliefs is apparent e.g. in the case of change in the central or dominant idea-elements, especially with regards to the first philosophical belief concerning the nature of political life and related to it, the image of the opponent (P-1). A change in this belief seems to ‘require some compensating change in the status of other beliefs within the configuration’. Relating to these results, George viewed the first philosophical belief as the ‘master’ belief. (George 1979, 100-101.)
George (1969, 221) noted, however, that the image of the opponent may also play a less crucial and somehow different role in the belief systems of elites ‘who do not

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<th>Philosophical Beliefs</th>
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<tr>
<td>P-1. What is the ‘essential’ nature of political life? Is</td>
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<td>the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict?</td>
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<td>What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?</td>
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<td>P-2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of</td>
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<td>one’s fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one</td>
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<td>be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and</td>
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<td>in what respects the one and/or the other?</td>
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<td>P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and</td>
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<td>to what extent?</td>
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<td>P-4. How much ‘control’ or ‘mastery’ can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in ‘moving’ and ‘shaping’ history in the desired direction?</td>
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<td>P-5. What is the role of ‘chance’ in human affairs and in historical development?</td>
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<th>Instrumental Beliefs</th>
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<tr>
<td>I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?</td>
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<td>I-2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?</td>
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<td>I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-4. What is the best ‘timing’ of action to advance one’s interest?</td>
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<td>I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?</td>
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Table 1   Operational Code Beliefs by George (1969)

George (1969, 221) noted, however, that the image of the opponent may also play a less crucial and somehow different role in the belief systems of elites ‘who do not
attribute an irreconcilable hostility to their political enemies’. When political opponents are viewed as temporary adversaries, ‘important consequences may be expected to follow for other elements in the belief system’. He stated that in these cases, the leader’s image of the opponent could be complemented with observations about his orientation towards political friends and followers.

4.2. Cognitive Revolution and Operational Code Analysis

The implicit psychological explanation of the first operational code studies, including the work of Leites (1953) and early studies of George (1969), was based on the theory of cognitive consistency. According to cognitive consistency theory, an individual's beliefs construct an ‘interdependent and hierarchical system whose elements are consistent with one another and resistant to change’. Furthermore, it premises that the more interdependent and hierarchically organised the belief system is, the more that the individual is likely to ‘discount’ new information that is inconsistent with already existing beliefs, central beliefs in particular, as the basis for decisions. Interdependence and hierarchy influence the belief system in a way in which a change in one belief causes a change in others, ‘especially if the initial change is in a belief near or at the center of the hierarchy’. In addition, the cognitive consistency theory assumes that the more interdependent and hierarchically organised the belief system is, the greater the consistency between the individual’s beliefs and decisions also is. (Walker 2003, 251-252, see also George 1969, Holsti 1977.)

A major paradigm shift, also referred to as a cognitive revolution, moved many subfields of psychology closer toward a common information-processing
framework, which pledged to produce more fruitful synthesis of psychological theories that are relevant to the study of decision-making (George 1979, 98). According to Walker (2003, 266), the cognitive revolution also influenced George’s (1979) view of cognitive consistency, the two assumptions of which provide a reference point for operational code research: firstly, beliefs are consistent with one another, and secondly, beliefs are consistent with behaviour. George retained a loose version of these assumptions by suggesting that ‘beliefs are subject to change, both in their contents and in their application as decision-making guides in the face of the new information from the environment’. This means that beliefs are more like schemata, ‘cold’ cognitions that represent working hypotheses about the environment and cannot be seen as attitudes, which are ‘hot’ cognitions that express needs embedded in the character of the believer.

George (1979, 97, 99) views schemata as appropriate and important in studying the role of cognitive variables in the decision-making behaviour of political leaders. In cognitive psychology, schemata are defined as ‘an individual’s generalized principles about social life. These principles exist on a subjective and relatively private level and enable the individual to order his relationship to the social environment.’ George argues that the operational code belief system is schemata, which refer particularly to ‘the set of generalized principles about political life that an individual acquires and applies in information processing for the purpose of exercising judgment and choice in decision-making’. He also differentiates schemata from attitudes. He views attitudes as generally having more specific referents than schemata and operational code beliefs. Operational code beliefs have centrality but ‘unlike attitudes, they are concerned with fundamental, unchanging issues of politics and political action’.
The cognitive revolution also changed two important aspects, which should be discussed further. Firstly, there was a shift away from the conception of the individual as a passive agent responding to environmental stimuli towards a conception of the individual who actively and selectively responds to and shapes his/her environment. Secondly, there was a shift away from the cognitive balance theories, which saw the individual as a ‘consistency-seeker’, who is motivated to reduce discrepancies in their beliefs, to a different premise of attribution theory which viewed the individual as a ‘problem-solver’. Attribution theorists see the individual as a naïve scientist who seeks as best he/she can ‘to infer the causes of social events in everyday life, to discern the attributes of other actors and social phenomena, to predict historical trends and the behavior of other persons’ in order to have control over the outcome of social situations. (George 1979, 98; see also Renshon 2011, 172.)

4.2.1. The Motivational Foundations of Operational Code Beliefs

When studying operational code beliefs, motivational aspects should also be considered. Motivational theorists such as Winter and Stewart (1977, 44), suggest that the three important human motives for behaviour are achievement, affiliation and power. The identification of motivational imagery in a decision maker’s belief system proposes an interpretation of the relationship between needs, beliefs and behaviour with the following propositions. Firstly, ‘as a result of early childhood socialization experiences, an individual acquires the dominant motives in his personality prior to adopting a political belief system’. Secondly, ‘an individual tends to adopt a political belief system that is compatible with his/her constellation of needs for power, affiliation and achievement’. Thirdly, ‘although an individual’s
belief system may develop a consistency that is independent from random fluctuations in immediate personal needs [...], the activation of these beliefs by environmental stimuli may arouse personal needs embedded in the belief system as the individual uses the various elements of his belief system to interpret a decision-making situation’. And fourthly, ‘once aroused, these motives may contribute to the cognitive rigidity of an individual’s beliefs and account for the intensity of cognitive dissonance and behavioral intransigence in the face of new information or other stimuli from the environment’. (Walker 1983, 189.)

The model of decision-making that is implicit in these propositions presents the following relationship between motives, beliefs and behaviour: 1) ‘motives account for variations in the development of belief systems’; 2) ‘belief systems account for the arousal of motives in a decision-making situation’; 3) ‘once aroused, the dominant motives reinforce the stability of the belief system against dissonant information from the environment and account for the persistence of some aspects of decision-making behavior’. Accordingly, this model suggests that motives increase the impact of beliefs upon behaviour and they are not seen as competing with beliefs for influence on behaviour. This means that motives and beliefs cause’ each other and their joint impacts on behaviour are ‘mutually reinforcing instead of one constraining the other’. (Walker 1983, 189.)

Thus, the lack of an explanatory capacity in cognitive consistency theory led to the reformulation of the operational code model, linking needs and beliefs. As presented above, the original model of operational code analysis assigned ‘primacy to cognition in the form of a highly structured and consistent set of beliefs which activated motivations prior to decision’. On the contrary, the revised model stresses the co-equal status of ‘motivations as relatively autonomous sources of behavior that can activate beliefs prior to decision’. Walker (1995, 702) notes that
this change in logic is also compatible with research that presents two processing systems, affective and cognitive, in the human brain. (Walker 1995, 702.) The interrelationships between these two systems in human decision-making have not yet been mapped but there is some empirical evidence that feelings are activated prior to perceptions (Walker 1995, 702, see also Zajonc 1980).

The revised model of operational code makes it possible that needs may activate beliefs and that a leader may have more than one set of beliefs in accordance with the Holsti typology (see Holsti 1977, Walker 1983, O'Reilly 2012). Walker (1995, 702-703) stresses that belief systems should now be understood as schemata that are not always collectively consistent with each other, although they may be consistent individually with concomitant behaviour in a decision-making episode. Referring to the Holsti typology, this implies that belief systems can now be seen as the alternative ‘states of mind’ of one individual leader rather than of different decision-makers (Walker 2003, 263).

According to Walker (2003, 263), the formulation of ‘alternative states of mind’ for the same decision-maker in different contexts steered an amendment to cognitive consistency theory in the form of a ‘framing effect’, which links beliefs, motivations and actions (see also Walker 1995, 703). This allows the leader to shift between different ideal types in one situation or between different situations. This theoretical amendment makes the Holsti typology of belief systems dynamic. According to Walker, the ‘re-conceptualization also accounts for the presence of compartmentalized and inconsistent beliefs within the same leader, which become a schemata employed under different circumstances and varying degrees of motivational arousal.’ It also allows research to focus on particular beliefs aroused by the immediate situation or the issue area in which the state is taking action. (see also Walker 2003, 263.)
Supporting the views presented by Walker (1995, 2003), O'Reilly (2012, 7) also suggests that rather than having a monolithic world view, leaders may now hold a dynamic belief system. In this belief system, ‘opposing beliefs about the relative utility of different strategies and tactics may coexist in the same leader and become aroused differentially, depending on the domain in which the s/he is engaged and the cues from the environment’ (Schafer and Walker 2006b, 566, see also Walker, Schafer, Young 1998).

4.2.2. Valenced Attribution Theory in Guiding Current Operational Code Analysis

This study will follow the current operational code research that is guided by valenced attribution theory, in which ‘schemata attributed to self and other are tagged with valences of positive and negative affect rather than linked consistently to one another’. There is a clear shift in the study of operational code toward ‘identifying the attributions of leaders and simply coding them with affective tags in constructing indices of the leader’s philosophical and instrumental beliefs’. (Walker 2003, 267; see Walker, Schafer, Young 1998, 1999.)

Using these indices, the leader’s image of self and other can be mapped onto the Holstti typology and define the leader’s operational code. These attributions are no longer considered to be organised by the assumption of internal consistency between philosophical and instrumental beliefs; the ‘type of philosophical beliefs attributed to others may be different from the type of instrumental beliefs attributed to self’. (Walker 2003, 267-268, see also Walker 2004.)
In contrast to earlier operational code studies, which viewed a leader’s operational code beliefs as internally coherent, stable over time and extending across issue domains supported by cognitive consistency theory, this study will consider operational code beliefs as set of alternative ‘states of mind’. As Walker et al (1998, 176) state, this conceptualisation allows the possibility of 1) incoherence among beliefs within an individual, 2) the compartmentalisation of beliefs within the same leader as schemata, which differ by issue or actor domains, 3) learning, which is defined as change in a leader’s beliefs over time, and 4) ‘an idealized, default state of mind that defines the self-identity of the decision-maker in the absence of environmental stimuli that arouse another set of schemata’.

4.3. Belief Change and Operational Code Analysis

In the early operational code studies, beliefs were mainly seen as stable but not entirely unchanging. With his analysis, George (1969, 219-220) already demonstrated that beliefs can change as a result of the impact of historical development. Scholars began to suggest that not all leaders have a single, well-defined set of operational code beliefs and that leaders can change their beliefs over time (Schafer and Walker 2006b, 566). As a result, Walker et al (1998, 176) theorised and started to describe operational code beliefs as alternative ‘states of mind’ that allow for the possibility changes in beliefs.

In operational code analysis, it is possible to distinguish three levels of experiential learning, which are consistent with the levels of learning presented above: simple, diagnostic and complex (Tetlock 1991, Levy 1994). Simple learning can be defined as changes in instrumental beliefs about the best means to achieve goals, whereas
diagnostic learning is viewed as changes in philosophical beliefs about the operational environment. It is possible to speak about complex learning when a leader’s ‘key philosophical about political goals and key instrumental beliefs about the most effective means to achieve them are modified so as to alter a leader’s strategic preferences’. (Malici 2011, 159–160.)

One should note that learning means changes in beliefs but this does not automatically include behavioural changes (Malici 2011, 160) or changes in policy. When studying a change of beliefs, one should be able to define whether change has occurred and how significant that change is. There is also a third relevant dimension, which is often overlooked: the type of change. Beliefs can change in two ways; they can be either reinforced or reversed. Prior beliefs are reinforced in the following way: The sentence the ‘world is friendly’ can be reinforced by stating, ‘the world is very friendly’, whereas beliefs can be reversed ‘before I thought the world was friendly, now I believe it to be more hostile’. (Renshon 2011, 173.)

According to Renshon (2008, 827), the results of the empirical studies on the operational code have pointed out that philosophical beliefs change more easily, while instrumental beliefs are more often proven to be more permanent. Renshon also states that if instrumental beliefs changed along with philosophical beliefs, the change was ‘of a very low magnitude’. This is a very interesting result because it is contradictory to the results received from social psychology, which also studies changes in belief. According to Tetlock (1991, 28-31), foreign policy belief systems are organised hierarchically. At the top of this hierarchy, there are fundamental assumptions, below of which there are e.g. strategic policy beliefs and tactical beliefs. Tetlock argues that most learning takes place at the level of tactical beliefs and that higher level beliefs are not often prone to change. Tetlock takes the view that decision-makers ‘reconsider their basic strategic approach to a problem only
after repeated failures to come up with a tactical solution’. Renshon (2008, 827–828) maintains that if this were correct, one would ‘expect change in beliefs to be relatively less likely in philosophical beliefs than in instrumental beliefs’. However, exactly the opposite results have been received so far.

It is possible to differentiate two approaches in operational code research. The top-down aspect suggests that the leader has one operational code which is consistent across issue areas. However, over the past years, a bottom-up approach, which studies operational codes relating to a certain issue area, has gained more supporters. In this approach, the general operational code is a combination of separate operational codes. (Brummer 2011, 148.) As stated above, the same leader may have opposing beliefs about the relative utility of different strategies and tactics and these may arise differentially, depending on the issue area and situation in question (Schafer and Walker 2006b, 566, see also Walker 1995; Walker, Schafer and Young 1998, 1999). According to this perspective, ‘the empirical task of mapping a leader’s operational code beliefs should proceed from the “bottom up”, aggregating targeted beliefs about particular issues in different domains of political action, rather than from the “top down” as deductions from an idealized typology of operational code belief systems’ (see also Larson 1994, 28-29). In this case, as Schafer and Walker (2006b, 566) state, generalisations about a leader’s general operational code depend on whether and to what extent the beliefs of the key decision-maker relating to self and others are consistent across issue areas and over time. If one aims to predict a leader’s behaviour on the basis of these operational code beliefs, it requires ‘careful attention to scope conditions that specify the level of generalization on which the prediction is based’.
5. Creating a Theoretical Framework for Analysis

In addition to the examination of the political operational code beliefs of Chancellor Merkel between her two first terms, this study also aims to develop understanding of those beliefs and to demonstrate how they operate in a concrete policy-making environment. Here, it is important to discuss how beliefs and their role in influencing policy are viewed from the different theoretical perspectives.

The following subchapter will approach beliefs, firstly, from material and ideational points of view. This study views the relationship between agency and structure as an interactive one and will adopt the agency point of view in which the beliefs of the leader are central to the study. To tackle the challenge of studying the relationship between ideational and material factors, this study identifies the international financial and economic crisis as a ‘switching point’ between periods of identity formation in order to describe the independent influence of beliefs on policy.

In the second subchapter, the constructivist perspective and its understanding of beliefs and ideas will be discussed against rationalist arguments emphasising power. The following case analyses will connect the ideational elements of learning, framing and persuasion as a two-stage process to a liberal institutionalist theoretical framework. Here, the theoretical framework of Moravcsik (1993, 1994) and the two-level game approach of Putnam (1988), discussed in the third subchapter, become important as they place the leader between the international and domestic levels in their theorisation. Thus, rationalist power elements are not questioned.
With this integrated framework, this study aims, however, to show that the leader’s beliefs, framing and persuasion, work alongside power mechanisms in explaining German foreign and European policy under Chancellor Merkel.

In these regards, Europeanisation, the influence of the European Union on the member states, is discussed in the fourth subchapter. It is important to understand the role played by the leader between the EU and member states and how the leader may politically construct misfit between the EU and national level and use the effects of Europeanisation instrumentally in order to shape the national understanding of a particular issue. This is particularly crucial in the case of Germany, considering Germany’s close relationship with the Union in the past, and its current powerful role in influencing European policies.

This leads the discussion to the final subchapter, which presents the integrated theoretical framework applied in the case analyses and reflects on the role of Federal Chancellor Merkel as a ‘strategic norm entrepreneur’ operating between two levels, Germany on one level and the other, on the EU/international level. It proposes that in conducting her policies, the Chancellor uses both power and persuasion mechanisms and discusses the conditions for the leader to become an entrepreneur for change.

5.1. Discussing the Relationship Between Ideational and Material Approaches

The creation of the larger theoretical framework, within which the beliefs and ideas of the leader operate, should begin with the discussion on how I view cognitive
and ideational elements in relation to realist and rationalist considerations. As stated above, this study maintains that the beliefs and ideas of the leader are not the only causal factors; they interact with other explanations of policy change such as material structures, domestic politics and institutions (Tannenwald 2005, 13).

If realists see ideas as ontologically different entities from power and interest, and rationalists view that ideas may shape some aspects of power and interest, the constructivist approach emphasises that ideas and material factors should not be seen as separate entities but rather as mutually constitutive. Therefore, ‘it is insufficient to test ideas as causal factors against realist variables like power and interest without exploring the degree to which these “material” variables are really constituted by ideational processes’. (Tannenwald 2005: 20, see also Wendt 1999.)

The relationship between material factors and ideas is a challenging one and, therefore, it should be discussed. This study follows Tannenwald (2005, 20-21) by arguing that ideas can shape material factors. Tannenwald holds that ‘ideas give material factors causal effect by defining what matters to actors and, therefore, whether material capabilities will get others to do what they would not otherwise do’ (see also Wohlfforth 1994). The more constitutive effect of ideas can be viewed as how ideas give meaning to material factors or shape preferences, identities and the behaviour of actors. Beliefs and ideas can influence policy choices by operating through mechanisms such as learning and persuasion.

Tannenwald (2005, 21-22) reminds us that material factors may also shape ideas. The realist approach concentrates on how material incentives shape interests and identities. Here, ‘the material circumstances -structures and power- limit or shape the ideas that can be realized’. These structures are, for example, the state system or governmental, organisational and economic structures and ‘the distribution of
power within them’. Realists maintain that ideas are a function of underlying power structures and that they act as ‘hooks’ in order to legitimise policy after the fact or to justify interests. ‘If material factors are highly constraining, there is little room for the independent role of ideas’. On the other hand, if material factors are not too constraining, there might be more room for ideas to shape the perception of material conditions.

This study views the relationship between agent and structure as an interactive one. The agency, beliefs and ideas of a leader, will all be taken as the starting point of the study. As Tannenwald (2005, 23-24) states, whether ideas or material factors are prior determinants, depends on both the theoretical assumptions and on how one approaches the problem. Ideas that arise out of material conditions at one point in time, e.g. as a result of changing economic context, may continue to become goals in and of themselves or gain a life of their own.

To tackle this challenge and to study the relationship between ideational and material factors, this study will try to identify a ‘switching point’ between periods of identity formation in order to be able describe the independent influence of beliefs on policy. It suggests that the outbreak of the international financial and economic crisis could be seen as a turning point, which may have increased the possibility that an ideational entrepreneur, such as the key executive Chancellor Merkel, could have risen up in order to shape both international and national ideational contexts before the structures were about to shape the agent(s). The aim of the analysis is to demonstrate how, despite the international crisis, the link between Chancellor Merkel’s political operational code beliefs and German foreign and European policy continued to reinforce and the change in beliefs of Chancellor Merkel started to increasingly shape ideas and reframe German policy content as well as domestic policy process. (see Tannenwald 2005, 25-26.)
In order to be able to establish the influence of the leader’s beliefs on policy, this study will conduct two longitudinal tests. The first one studies timing relative to events or crisis, whether the material changes precede the changes in beliefs and ideas (materialist explanation); or whether changes of beliefs and ideas precede changes in behaviour and precede or contravene material trends (ideational explanation). The second test concerns timing relative to policy. It tries to assess whether beliefs and ideas can be viewed as the backbone of policy or as a mere justification for it. This requires process-tracing, which shows that policymakers framed the policy problem and their interests in terms of their beliefs and ideas. (see Tannenwald 2005, 26-27.)

To conclude, this study will take Chancellor Merkel’s operational code beliefs and ideas as a starting point and then take the perspective that changing international material circumstances in the form of international financial and economic crisis may have created room for the autonomous—both causal and possibly constitutive—effects of beliefs and ideas. Thus, this study rests mainly on the views of cognitive and constructivist approaches toward the role of beliefs and ideas while also considering the realist view of power and interest.

5.2. **Norm Entrepreneurs Blurring Divisions between Ideational and Rationalist Approaches**

In addition to an examination of change in Chancellor Merkel’s operational code beliefs, this dissertation will focus on the operating mechanisms of beliefs, such as framing (dissemination) and persuasion (reception) in studying how change in Merkel’s beliefs may have affected German foreign and European policy content.
However, it is important to note that in order to study mechanisms, beliefs and ideas should be linked to political processes and institutions both nationally and internationally (Tannenwald 2005, 13). Here, the role of the national norm entrepreneur as well as the institutional context should be discussed. Thus, ideational, cognitive and constructivist argumentation should be contrasted with an institutional/rationalist explanation. The study will not question rationalist power elements. With the integrated framework, combining ideational and rationalist elements as a two-stage process, this study rather aims to show that the leader’s beliefs, framing and persuasion work alongside power mechanisms in explaining German foreign and European policy under Chancellor Merkel.

The divide between rationalists and constructivists is untenable both theoretically and methodologically. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 910, 913) state, rational choice does not necessarily require material ontology. Thus, the utilities of actors can be defined as social or ideational as they can be material. They view that the debate between the logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998) has not been over ‘which logic applies to what kinds of actors under what circumstances’ but rather, whether the logic of appropriateness exists at all.

This study will seize this challenge and tries to discover whether a certain type of turning point event, e.g. an international crisis, could open an ‘ideational space’ for entrepreneurial action, in which the influence of beliefs and ideas might reach their highest point and could be observed through the emergence of certain ideational mechanisms such as framing and persuasion. Here, the relationship between rationalist mechanisms of power and the constructivist mechanism of persuasion could also be discussed following Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner (1998, 681-682), who view a two-stage process between rational choice and constructivists,
where constructivists’ preference formation precedes the exercise of instrumental rationality.

Relating to the constructivist approach, there are different causal mechanisms through which beliefs operate. Causal mechanisms refer to intermediate processes that link specified initial conditions and a specific outcome (Checkel 2005, 808). In this study, these mechanisms include e.g. learning, framing and persuasion. Learning explains how beliefs change whereas persuasion explains how beliefs are disseminated and how people accept them (see Tannenwald 2005). According to Finnemore (1996, 141), ‘normative claims become powerful and prevail by being persuasive’. There is also a psychological aspect to persuasion that emphasises that cognition and affect have synergies in producing changes in beliefs and preferences (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 915). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 914) view persuasion as a ‘process by which agent action becomes social structure, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes the intersubjective’.

One condition for persuasion to be effective is that the leader needs to begin to act as a ‘norm entrepreneur’. When new beliefs emerge, they will be disseminated by norm entrepreneurs. Some scholars call these agents who actively construct and shape meaning as ‘meaning managers’ or ‘meaning architects’ (see Lessig 1995, 1008). Norm entrepreneurs are important for belief emergence because they reinterpret and rename issues, also referred to as ‘framing’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897), which can be viewed as a key element of successful persuasion (Payne 2001, 39). As Barnett (1999, 25) states, a frame is used to ‘fix meanings, organize experience’.

Norm entrepreneurs are able to frame ideas in a way that resonates with relevant audiences (Payne 2001, 39). Norm entrepreneurs speak to aspects of a belief
system that ‘transcends a specific cultural or political context’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 907). This study will follow Finnemore and Sikkink’s definition on the link between norm entrepreneurs, framing and persuasion. According to the authors, ‘the construction of cognitive frames is an essential component of norm entrepreneurs’ political strategies, as, when they are successful, the new frames resonate with broader public understandings and are adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding issues. In constructing their frames, norm entrepreneurs face firmly embedded alternative norms and frames that create alternative perceptions of both appropriateness and interest.’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897.)

Two characteristics of frames should be discussed. Firstly, according to Barnett (1999, 15), ‘actors compete to frame the event because how the event is understood will have important consequences for mobilizing action and furthering interest’. Political actors will resort to cultural symbols, which are selected from a cultural toolkit and creatively transformed into frames for action. Secondly, Barnett reports that the importance of frames is reinforced at historical moments, which are defined by cultural contradictions and competing visions of the future. He points out that ‘at such moments political entrepreneurs must construct frames that are able to reconcile these contradictions, to situate these events in ways that mesh with the cultural terrain, or to recast the relationship between the cultural foundations, the costs and benefits of particular policies and the circumstances at hand’. (Barnett 1999, 15.)

Institutional context may be crucial in defining whether the framing will be influential. If the analysis focuses only on the ideational and fails to pay attention to the institutional, it ignores ‘the political context in which actors strategize and are potentially organized across a political space and toward a policy outcome’ (Barnett
Zürn and Checkel (2005, 1049) argue that persuasion as a causal mechanism can be initiated by an appropriate institutional design, which then can lead to a change in interests or behaviour.

Furthermore, rational choice theories can increase understanding on e.g. how normative contexts shape the actions of agents and how norm entrepreneurs can be extremely rational in their means-ends calculations about how to achieve their goals. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 910) state, norm entrepreneurs engage in ‘strategic social construction’ and make detailed means-ends calculations to maximise their utilities. However, the ‘utilities they want to maximize involve changing the other players’ utility function in ways that reflect the normative commitments of the norm entrepreneurs’. (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 910.)

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 893, 895) also discuss the role of norm entrepreneurs in developing international norms and present their ‘norm’s life cycle’ in this respect. They connect international and domestic levels by stressing the role of domestic norm entrepreneurs, who use international norms to strengthen their position in domestic debates, and argue that the international and domestic norm tables are increasingly linked (see also Putnam 1988). Finnermore and Sikkink view, however, that the domestic influences of the norm concerned are the strongest at the early stage of the norm’s life cycle. This means that when the norm has become institutionalised in the international system, domestic influences then decrease.

This study views a norm entrepreneur as a national actor, such as the key executive of a state, someone like Federal Chancellor Merkel, who is also placed between national and international levels. Therefore, the norm entrepreneur cannot be seen solely to be furthering mere international norm development but also shaping
domestic policies and understandings at the same time, through framing and persuasion. The norm entrepreneur must be viewed as a strategic actor who acts within both national and international institutional contexts and also uses power alongside persuasion to influence audiences. This study views that changes in international material structures may create ideational and institutional room for manoeuvre for the norm entrepreneur. The international crisis might be the best time for the norm entrepreneur to influence and shape policies both internationally, but especially domestically, because once these structures start to stabilise then they are about to begin shaping the actors.

Thus, the study agrees with Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) on the point that constructivist and rationalist approaches should be linked theoretically, in order to be able to create a framework for ‘strategic social construction’, to be able to analyse the different nuances of policymaking and in order to understand how learning, domestic institutions and international structures interact with each other. In the empirical part, the study will show how the cognitive, constructivist and rationalist approaches can be tested against and combined in a common framework. In this two-staged framework, the norm entrepreneur is seen as an actor who may exercise instrumental rationality and whose actions are intentional and can show rationalist tendencies. However, cognitive and constructivist logic is used to view how the normative context is shaped as well as to understand learning, the production of ideas e.g. how they (re)construct meaning, reframe policy and shape interests.
5.3. Integrating Domestic and International Explanations of Foreign Policy

This study maintains that cognitive theories alone cannot provide comprehensive explanations for foreign policy change because it is important to define under what conditions and through which mechanisms learning contributes to policy change. The learning approach should be integrated into a more comprehensive theory of foreign policy that emphasises ‘interactions between learning and domestic politics and how those relationships are affected by external events and processes’. (Levy 1994, 312.)

The following case analyses will connect Merkel’s beliefs, framing and persuasion to the liberal institutionalist theoretical framework of Moravcsik (1993, 1994) and the two-level game approach of Putnam (1988), because they place the leader between the international and domestic levels in their theorisation. The discussion presented in the subchapters will open up some key features of their thinking in view of the following empirical analyses. Furthermore, these theories will add the necessary domestic and international context around Chancellor Merkel’s beliefs and have validity for understanding how beliefs may operate in a concrete policy-making environment.

This study will apply the two-level games approach as the basis of the theoretical framework. The two-level game approach concerns all three levels of analysis; international, domestic and individual levels. In the original metaphor of a ‘two-level-game’ created by Robert Putnam (1988), the statesmen are strategically positioned between two tables, one situated in the domestic sphere and the other in international negotiation. Diplomatic strategies and tactics are in simultaneous interplay between what other states will accept internationally and what
constituents (i.e. domestic institutions) will ratify domestically. The statesman seeks to increase the international influence of the state within the limits and pressure of domestic ratification. (Moravcsik 1993, 4.)

Systemic explanations alone cannot explain variation in the foreign policies of states. Domestic explanations see the determinants of foreign policy and international relations within the nation state as state behaviour constitutes the international system. (Moravcsik 1993, 5-6.) However, many international relations theorists maintain that priority should be given to international explanation - theories of domestic politics are only needed to explain some anomalies. Thus, domestic politics is mainly seen as an intervening variable, as residual variance, as a ‘transmission belt’ through which international imperatives are translated to state policies. This means that the causes of international outcomes are found in the international environment, although the mechanisms by which these causes affect state policy are domestic. Thus, foreign policy behaviour is seen as a national response to the perceptions of decision-makers and a rational adaptation with stable preferences to the external environment. (Moravcsik 1993, 7, 9.)

Some theorists accept that domestic factors can account for more than just residual variance. These ‘second-image reversed’ theorists see domestic politics as more than a transmission belt for international impulses. There have also been attempts to combine purely domestic theories of state preferences with systemic theories of international bargaining. These theories are more radical as they argue that ‘the variance in state preferences is almost entirely due to differences in domestic arrangements’. (Moravcsik 1993, 11-12.)

Moravcsik (1993, 14-15) states that the sequential use of theories that come from different paradigms and combine domestic and international theories is useful for
solving a problem but there are some criticisms as well. Firstly, according to critics, beginning the analysis with systemic theories is ‘arbitrary’ because systemic theories are not more powerful or precise than domestic ones. Quite the contrary, ‘domestic politics provides the analytical basis for analyzing international factors’. Secondly, if domestic theories are only included in the analysis as needed, it encourages ‘ad hoc explanations rather than explicit theories about the interaction between international and domestic politics’. Moreover, ‘without a broader theoretical framework, the analyst is left without guidance about which domestic influence to emphasize and the result may be a haphazard checklist of possibly relevant domestic “factors”’. Thirdly, although some analyses using domestic and international theories sequentially see domestic factors as prior to systemic ones, they are incomplete, as such explanations have ignored the influence of domestic factors on international bargaining. Thus, the two-level-games approach tries to fill in this gap and outline ‘a framework for analyzing the combined impact of domestic and international factors on international bargaining’. (Moravcsik 1993, 11-15.)

This study will use the arguments of the two-level-games approach as the basis of its integrated theoretical framework. It will seize the challenge discussed by Moravcsik (1993, 33) that there is a need for more complex syntheses of domestic and international explanations. I also maintain that we need more empirical study on the different mechanisms through which power and ideas operate as the examination of these mechanisms may also increase our understanding on how to approach different paradigms and theoretical perspectives, not viewing them as opposite, but rather complementing each other in the real policy-making world.
5.3.1. The Two-Level-Games Approach Viewing Statesmen as Agents
Manipulating both Domestic and International Politics

Two-level games as a rational approach assumes that statesmen are trying to manipulate domestic and international politics simultaneously. Their strategies and tactics are constrained ‘by what other states will accept and by what domestic constituencies will ratify’. According to Moravcsik, ‘the outcome of international negotiations may depend on the strategy a statesman chooses to influence his own and his counterpart’s domestic polities’. The statesman can, firstly, ‘exploit control over information, resources and agenda-setting in respect to his own domestic polity’ and thereby open possibilities internationally. Secondly, the statesman can, conversely, apply international strategies in order to alter the character of domestic constraints. Thirdly, the statesman can target policies at domestic groups in other countries. (Moravcsik 1993, 15.)

The two-level games is compatible with existing approaches such as the liberal interdependence school with the insight that the achievement of domestic policy goals requires interstate bargaining, from a ‘second-image-reversed’ approach that comes with the notion that ‘national interest is defined in terms of the differential impact of international agreements on specific domestic actors, and from classical realism comes the view that the ‘statesman mobilizes domestic society in order to achieve international objectives’. (Moravcsik 1993, 16.)

The two-level-game approach deviates from previous theories in three respects. Firstly, many attempts to integrate domestic variables into systemic theory have concentrated on the formation of national preferences. It worth noting that complex patterns of interdependence do not merely constrain statesmen but also create new possibilities for the statesmen. Secondly, the two-level games approach focuses on the statesman as the key strategic actor. The statesman’s choice of
strategy is an important factor in international negotiations. The two-level games approach seeks to guide analysts as to which domestic factors are likely to be the most important. The approach examines within a single framework the ‘implications of different specifications of the principal-agent relation between the polity and the statesman, and different specifications of a statesman’s interest’. The statesman confronts domestic constraints on mobilisation, tries to maximise domestic political support and strives for realising personal goals, which opens the floor to the ‘first image’ explanations from individual psychology. Thirdly, the most significant difference from the previous theories is that the statesman’s strategies ‘reflect a simultaneous “double-edged” calculation of constraints and opportunities on both domestic and international boards’. The approach acknowledges that domestic policies can be used to influence the outcomes of international bargaining and that international action may only be targeted at achieving domestic goals. (Moravcsik 1993, 16-17.)

The advantage of the two-level approach with respect to this study is that it views the relationship between international and national politics through the eyes of the statesman. Putnam (1988) sees the process of negotiation in two phases: the bargaining stage where the statesmen negotiate the international agreement; and the ratification stage in which domestic constituents (in this case domestic political institutions) decide whether to ratify and implement the agreement. Ratification is seen as the crucial link between international and domestic politics. The state is assumed to ‘have a “win-set” defined as the set of potential agreements that would be ratified by the domestic constituencies in a straight up-or-down vote against the status-quo of “no agreement”’. Moravcsik points out that the statesman is ‘the agent of the polity, but is constrained only by the win-set […], by the nature of the agreements that the domestic polity would ratify’. (Moravcsik 1993, 23.)
In order to be able to make some empirical hypotheses on state behaviour, it is important to define the preferences of, and constraints on, the major actors. One should determine three theoretical building blocks: domestic politics, the international negotiation environment and the statesman’s preferences. When these are specified, inductive hypotheses and possible generalisations can be made. In the next chapters, I will discuss hypotheses that can be made based on these three theoretical concerns: domestic constraints, international constraints and the statesman’s preferences presented by Moravcsik (1993) and Putnam (1988). (see Moravcsik 1993, 23-24.)

Regarding the manipulation of domestic constraints, Moravcsik (1993, 24-25) stresses that the most essential constraint on the statesman is the size of the win-set, which depends on the number of the domestic factors such as distribution of domestic coalitions and domestic strategies employed by the statesman. Domestic constraints ‘depend not only on the group calculations of interests but also on their political influence’. The primary way for the statesman to gain influence is by utilising his/her freedom to act autonomously within the domestic win-set. ‘As long as the statesman remains within the win-set, he or she can manipulate the precise terms of the agreement toward a personally preferred outcome’.

On the contrary, the statesman has the sole power to negotiate internationally and to submit issues for ratification and, thereby, he/she has veto power over any agreement. The statesman can also attempt to get ‘approval for an important domestic measure by linking it to an attractive international agreement’. Furthermore, the statesman may also adopt strategies to reshape the domestic win-set. He/she may try to influence or alter the ratification procedure or to change the domestic balance through side-payments, the selective mobilisation of political groups or the manipulation of information about the agreement. According to
Moravcsik, the most fundamental of these powers lies in the implementation of social or institutional reform. (Moravcsik 1993, 24-25.)

One very important phenomenon of the two-level-games approach is termed by Putnam (1988) as synergy, where ‘international actions are employed to alter outcomes otherwise expected in the domestic arena’. By using power to set the international agenda or linking issues to international negotiations, the statesman has the power to shape the way in which issues are approached, framed and decided domestically. (Moravcsik 1993, 26-27.)

The uncertainty of an agreement can enhance the statesman’s ability to manipulate public opinion. Here, the statesman can utilise his/her power by selectively providing information on the negotiated agreement. The statesman may also have a major influence on the initiation of negotiations and setting the agenda. However, he/she may have ‘less control over the domestic conditions under which the ratification vote is taken’ and ‘no direct control over the final vote itself’. Moravcsik argues that over the course of negotiations, the autonomy of the statesman tends to decrease because of the strengthening domestic mobilisation around the issue in question. Furthermore, the flexibility of the domestic institutions that ratify the agreement can be crucial. (Moravcsik 1993, 27.)

The second theoretical concern relates to domestic politics and international bargaining. Putnam’s (1988) analysis is based on the proposition that ‘the outcome of the international negotiations reflects the size of the domestic win-sets’. Putnam makes two hypotheses on the relationship between domestic constraints and international bargaining power. According to the first proposition, ‘larger win-sets increase the number of potential agreements and decrease the probability that nations will defect from those they make’. The second proposition is that the
‘relative size of the respective domestic win-sets will affect the distribution of the joint gains from the international bargain’. If one assumes that both parties want to reach an agreement, ‘a differential in the relative size of the win-sets shifts the distribution of costs and benefits in the favour of the player with a more constrained win-set’. Thus, the point of view according to which internal divisions weaken the state’s bargaining position can be also seen from the two-level game approach’s perspective, which stresses that ‘divisions may under some circumstances strengthen it’. (Moravcsik 1993, 27-28; see also Putnam 1988.)

The statesman will try to shape domestic constraints in order to be able to advance his/her favoured policies by either constricting or expanding the win-set. One strategy is called ‘tying hands’ where the statesman tries to constrict the domestic win-set. The statesman can also choose a strategy of ‘cutting slack’ in which he/she tries to expand the domestic win-set to ‘accommodate to international agreement that might otherwise be rejected’. Here again, the statesman may attempt to exploit asymmetrical information by ‘deliberately exaggerating to opposing negotiators the tightness and inflexibility of domestic constraints’. There are also other strategies for the statesman to use. The statesman can ‘raise the costs of no-agreement to key constituents on the other side’ or use different persuasion tactics towards another country. (Moravcsik 1993, 28-29.) In this study, Chancellor Merkel is expected to direct her persuasion towards other countries on the international and European level as well as towards her own domestic institutions on the national level.

The third theoretical concern is about preferences of the statesman. The two-level-games approach assumes the partial autonomy of the statesman. The analysis must, therefore, define a statesman’s preferences. ‘A rational statesman will employ available “double-edged” strategies only if they further his or her own aims’. The preferences may include the statesman’s interest in strengthening his/her domestic
position, ‘an effort to mobilize an optimal response to international imperatives, regardless of domestic factors’, or individual policy preferences about the issues in question, possibly originating from past political history or personal views. (Moravcsik 1993, 30.)

Many rational analyses consider the preferences of the statesman as given. This study, however, does not view preferences as given but rather argues that they are influenced by a leader’s beliefs. The aim of the study is to develop an understanding of how a leader’s political beliefs operate in a concrete policy-making world and the views of Moravcsik on interaction between the domestic and international levels are of key importance here.

5.3.2. The Two-Level-Games Approach Applied to Conduct of Foreign Policy

It is important to pay attention to how international negotiations and institutions influence domestic politics. Reflecting on the above discussed views on the two-level approach, Moravcsik (1994) offers a theory of conditions about, ‘when and how international cooperation redistributes domestic power resources between state and society’. It is generally believed that redistribution empowers national executives, which allows them to loosen constraints imposed by legislatures, interest groups and societal actors, and this has also consequences for the nature of international cooperation.

Here as well, the leader is placed at the centre of attention. This study considers this rational model created by Moravcsik as an important contribution in
understanding how international and EU politics redistribute power between the national executive and domestic institutions. Especially in the German case, Moravcsik’s views are of importance because they can contribute to the domestication discussion of German foreign and European policy by taking the opposite, the leader’s perspective, as a starting point. Moreover, the following empirical analyses will study an operating mechanism, the leader’s political beliefs, more carefully and try to demonstrate how, in addition to using power, the decision-maker actually tries to persuade domestic institutions by utilising cooperation at the international and EU level.

Moravcsik (1994, 1) bases his argument on three theses. First, ‘international negotiations and institutions reallocate political resources by changing the domestic institutional, informational and ideological context in which domestic policy is made’. Here, domestic political benefits are not distributed evenly. Moravcsik suggests four ‘causal mechanisms by which international cooperation redistributes domestic political resources: shifting control over domestic agendas (initiative), altering decision-making procedures (institutions), magnifying informational asymmetries in their favour (information) and multiplying the potential domestic ideological justifications for policies (ideas)’.

Foreign policy making differs from domestic policy making by the enhanced agenda control, which the executive possesses. Executive power in the policy initiative phase has domestic and international roots. Domestic in a sense that national executives are often considered as the sole representatives in international negotiations and international in the sense that international agreements are not formally decided on in domestic parliaments until they have been accomplished internationally and submitted for ratification. The control over agendas also relates to the ‘gatekeeping’ power to veto proposals, the ability to choose among policies
and the possibility to strategically manipulate the form, timing and circumstances of executive policy initiation. Executives are able to express their ‘preferred outcome by structuring the choices facing domestic ratifying or implementing bodies’. Thus, according to Moravcsik, ‘the more complete the executive’s monopoly over policy initiation’ is, the greater ‘his or her influence over the form, timing and substance of the decisions’ also is. (Moravcsik 1994, 8-9.)

After the executive has set a proposal on the domestic agenda, legal incorporation takes place according to the domestic procedures prescribed by the national constitution. Foreign policy procedures often limit the possibilities for meaningful opposition, because it is costly for parliamentarians to reject, amend or block ratification of the decisions reached at the international level. If domestic procedures generate direct opposition, opponents of international proposals must invoke ‘threats to punish government, electorally or coalitionally, or to repudiate an international institution altogether’. (Moravcsik 1994, 10-11.)

Executives can also strengthen their power by creating domestic informational asymmetries in their favour. International negotiations and institutions give national governments privileged access to two types of information, technical and political. Technical information relates to the consequences of alternative policies, knowledge of policy problems and their possible solutions, whereas political information is about ‘the liti constraints imposed by the preferences and power of other governments or supranational actors’. International negotiations give national governments precise information about the preferences and power of other governments as well as the institutional limitations on national policy. This asymmetry of information favours national executives, who participate in negotiations, and create opportunity for the executive to manipulate domestic perceptions. The access to the technical and political information also enhances the
domestic influence of the executive. The executive is thus able to hide information and, therefore, cut slack effectively. According to Moravcsik, ‘the greater the informational asymmetry between governments and potential domestic opponents, the greater the opportunity for the governments to manipulate or mobilize elite or public opinion by selectively releasing vital information’. (Moravcsik 1994, 12-13.)

Three aspects determine how international agreements are perceived domestically: their salience, consequences and causality. The executive is able to depoliticise issues by keeping the public ignorant or to mobilise citizens through publicity. If the executive chooses to manipulate information about the consequences of the agreement, executives may be able to reshape domestic consensus. And, by ‘shifting domestic perceptions about the technical and political constraints under which states act, executives shift domestic expectations about responsibility for and alternatives to government policy’. (Moravcsik 1994, 12-13.)

According to Moravcsik (1994, 14), the domestic power of executives can also be strengthened by additional sources of ideological legitimation. ‘Ideas link particular policies to their broader economic, political, strategic or philosophical implications; justify policies with reference to the realization of common abstract values rather than self-regarding, material interests; and shape calculations about the weighting of various consequences.’ Moravcsik maintains that ideas may have a strong influence when ‘the consequences of materially self-interested behavior are uncertain’. It is easier for the executive to make persuasive ideological justifications in foreign policy issues as they have a privileged position to influence the ideas that are presented in domestic debates. The executive can thus utilise his/her agenda control to structure an initial ideological frame on an issue. Moravcsik also stresses that when the executives of the major participating states in
a particular forum, ‘agree on a particular ideological justification for a policy, it is extremely difficult for domestic groups to challenge it’.

The study views all the above mentioned mechanisms as important when analysing German foreign and European policy. However, they work simultaneously rather than separately. In this study, I will mainly concentrate on the fourth mechanisms of Moravcsik’s theory, ideas. Ideas operate through framing and persuasion and work simultaneously with the other three mechanisms, which will also be covered somewhat by the analysis. The more that rationalist mechanisms vis-à-vis beliefs and ideas seem to dominate the foreign and European policy making of Chancellor Merkel, the more changes that are taking place in the German foreign and European policy making process.

The second thesis of Moravcsik (1994, 1-2) concerns the reallocation of control over domestic political resources, which mainly favours national executives who take part in international negotiations. National executives are often granted privileges by their national constitution, which are thus strengthened by diplomatic practices and international institutions. This study follows Moravcsik’s amendment to two-level games theory that questions the incentives of the national executives to ‘tie their hands’, which means encouraging tighter domestic constraints in order to enhance their international bargaining power. On the contrary, Moravcsik’s amendment favours the incentive of the executives to ‘cut slack’ in order to decrease binding domestic constraints.

Moravcsik’s (1994, 2) third thesis stresses that the ‘shift in domestic power resources toward executives feeds back into international bargaining often facilitating international cooperation’. Thus, if the national executive is able to ‘cut slack’, it adds incentive for the executive to search for international cooperation.
With cooperation the executives may be ‘better able to circumvent opposition from particularistic interests’. According to Moravcsik, in extreme cases, national ‘executives may welcome multilateral restrictions on national sovereignty in place of unilateral action’, but only if it enhances their autonomy domestically.

The EU has previously been studied as a ‘critical case’ for testing general propositions about the domestic consequences of international cooperation. Some neofunctionalist theorists such as Ernst Haas argue that the EU is ‘domesticating’ international politics. However, Moravcsik’s (1994) findings suggest the contrary; the EU ‘does not diffuse the domestic influence of the executive; it centralizes it’. Thus, the EU internationalises domestic politics. International cooperation may limit some of the external flexibility of the executive, but at the same time it accords greater domestic influence, which is key for the national decision-maker to stay in power. (Moravcsik 1994, 2-3.) The formal institutional status of the European Council since 2009 as the key EU institution where policy guidelines are drawn has increased the power of the national executives. Thus, the ‘democratic deficit’ has become an integral part of the EU’s institutional design and it strengthens the state (Moravcsik 1994, 3).

Like Moravcsik (1994), this study also follows the agent-principal model of domestic policy-making, which divides domestic actors in two categories: the executive (single actor) and societal groups (multiple principals). In this study, the executive is meant to be the head of the government, Chancellor Merkel, and the societal groups mean domestic political institutions (Bundestag, Bundesrat and the Federal Constitutional Court) whose support is critical in the policy implementation and ratification phase. In addition, the executive is constantly dependent on the support of domestic constituents i.e. public opinion is important for the executive.
The domestic groups have two types of barriers: procedural and cognitive. They must have ‘access to procedural instruments necessary to block or punish executive’s actions’. In addition, they must be able to monitor the actions of politicians and their true constraints. If they do not possess the information and ideas required to observe and evaluate actions, societal control may be compromised. The above mentioned mechanisms relate to these two types of barriers; two of them (initiative and institutions) are procedural, whereas two of them (information and ideas) relate to cognitive or persuasive resources. (Moravcsik 1994, 5.)

International cooperation, in the form of negotiations or institutions, increases the power of the executive in relation to domestic opposition groups. Domestic political resources are redistributed towards the executive because in foreign policy, ‘issues are channeled through a combination of national and international institutions favorable to them’. In many states, constitutional foreign policy privileges provide greater initiative and autonomy to the executive than in purely domestic issues. Viewed internationally, executives are the preeminent national representatives, who ‘initiate, conduct and conclude negotiations’. They are generally able to ‘choose policy goals and bargaining strategies, select the form of legal obligations on domestic actors, distribute political and technical information, and establish the legitimacy of policies’. Thus, executives engage in international cooperation if it enhances their domestic autonomy. (Moravcsik 1994, 6-8)
5.4. Europeanisation as a Policy-Making Instrument

As discussed above, some scholars take the view that the effects of Europeanisation are important for Germany because Germany has long been able to further its interests through Europeanisation processes (Katzenstein 1997, 5). It is important here to understand the role of the leader between the EU and member states, and how the leader may utilise European policies and the EU instrumentally in order to shape the national understanding of a particular issue. This is of special interest in the case of Germany because of Germany’s close relationship with the Union in the past as well as the current powerful position of Chancellor Merkel in defining European policies.

Europeanisation can generally be defined as the impact of integration upon the member states. According to Bulmer and Lequesne (2005, 10-11), there are three developments in the literature that provide an important context for Europeanisation. Firstly, ‘integration has strengthened the state’, secondly, ‘integration creates a new multilevel politics thereby recalibrating how domestic actors respond to integration’, and thirdly, ‘the EU has transformed governance’. (see also Moravcsik 1994, Sandholtz 1996.)

This study follows Bulmer and Radaelli’s (2005, 341) definition of Europeanisation, in which ‘Europeanization consists of processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things”, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures, and public policies’. This definition emphasises some important aspects of Europeanisation not captured in all previous definitions. Firstly, Europeanisation
can derive from different stages and forms of the policy process. Secondly, this
definition of Europeanisation relates not only to formal policy rules but also to
beliefs and values; thirdly, the concept of Europeanisation concerns the impact of
European policy within the member states, which consists of two steps; adoption
at the EU level and incorporation at the domestic level. ‘The former step alone is
only part of the story. That is why Europeanization and EU policy-making are
distinct from each other conceptually’.

To briefly summarise: ‘Europeanization denotes a complex interactive top-down
and bottom-up process in which domestic polities, politics and public policies are
shaped by European integration and in which domestic actors use European
integration to shape the domestic arena. It may produce either continuity or change
and potentially variable and contingent outcomes’. (Dyson and Goetz 2003, 20.)

5.4.1. The Different Causal Mechanisms of Domestic Change

Before it is possible to discuss the role of the national executives in the
Europeanisation processes, it is important to understand the different types of
domestic change caused by Europeanisation. There are different causal
mechanisms of domestic change that can be roughly grouped around two
theoretical approaches: rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism.
I will also discuss the third category presented by Börzel (2005), institutional
adaptation, which is also relevant for this study and can be subsumed under these
main approaches. All these approaches share following assumptions: firstly, ‘the
impact of Europe on the member states is differential and varies across member
states and policy areas’; secondly ‘the differential impact of Europe is explained by
the “goodness of the fit” between European and national policies, institutions, and processes, on the one hand, and the existence of “mediating factors” or intervening variables that filter the domestic impact of Europe, on the other hand.’ (Börzel 2005, 50.)

According to many scholars, before it is possible to study Europeanisation, there must be a ‘misfit’ between European and domestic policies, processes and institutions. The goodness of the fit can be defined as the congruence between the European and the domestic level, which ‘determines the degree of pressure for adaptation generated by Europeanization on the member states’. According to Börzel, ‘the lower the compatibility between European and domestic processes, policies and institutions, the higher is the adaptational pressure Europe exerts on the member states’. (Börzel 2005, 50.)

There are two types of misfit; policy and institutional misfit. Policy misfit is comparable to compliance problems where European policies challenge e.g. national political goals and the instruments utilised to achieve policy goals. The policy misfit can also set adaptational pressure on underlying institutions and political processes. The institutional misfit challenges ‘domestic rules and procedures and the collective understandings attached to them’. European rules and procedures allow national governments privileged decision powers in relation to other domestic actors and this may conflict with the territorial institutions of highly decentralised member states. In many studies, the misfit is only taken as a necessary condition of domestic change These studies determine intervening variables or mediating factors, which mediate between European pressures for adaptation and member state responses. (Börzel 2005, 50-52.)
Different approaches view the outcomes of the misfit differently. The rationalist institutionalism approach expects that actors are rational and goal-oriented and that the actors follow the logic of consequentiality (see March and Olsen 1989; 1998). The EU is seen as a political opportunity structure, as an external constraint on the behaviour of actors who have given identities and preferences. According to Börzel, ‘changes in the political opportunities and constraints for domestic actors can result in a redistribution of resources among them, empowering some over others. The differential empowerment may not only alter domestic institutions but also change domestic policies and political processes.’ (Börzel 2005, 52.)

Börzel (2005, 53) notes that the misfit, which provides the actors with new opportunities and constraints, is only the first condition for the European political opportunity structure to lead to a redistribution of resources and differential empowerment at the domestic level. Secondly, mediating factors are also needed; multiple veto players and facilitating formal institutions, which influence the capacities of domestic actors to utilise the new opportunities and avoid constraints with opposite effects. Börzel points out, however, that ‘the more power is dispersed across the political system […], the more difficult it is to foster a domestic winning coalition necessary to introduce changes in response to Europeanization pressures. A large number of institutional and factual veto players thus impinges on the capacity of domestic actors to achieve policy changes […].’ The existence of facilitating formal institutions can support actors with material and/or ideational resources, which are necessary in order to be able to utilise European opportunities and advance domestic adaptation (Risse, Cowles, Caporaso 2001, 9-10).

Here, Cowles, Caporaso and Risse (2001, 11) add one mediating factor relating to agency: the differential empowerment of actors. This amendment also refers to the
theoretical argument made by Moravcsik (1994) presented above in which national executives have powerful resources (initiatives, institutions, information and ideas) that allow them to change the domestic balance of power in their favour. ‘By transferring policies from the domestic to the European arena, executives acquire some home-turf advantages. Although autonomy is diminished with regard to their foreign counterparts, it widens the autonomy of executives in relation to other domestic actors.’ According to Börzel (2005, 54), ‘a low number of veto points and the existence of facilitating formal institutions determine whether policy and institutional misfit lead to redistribution of resources and the differential empowerment of domestic actors as a result of which domestic processes, policies, and institutions get changed.’

Sociological institutionalists base their approach on the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989; 1998), according to which actors are guided by collectively shared understandings of what constitutes socially accepted behaviour in a given rule structure. ‘Collective understandings and intersubjective meaning structures strongly influence the way actors define their goals and what they perceive as rational action.’ This perspective takes the view of European institutions as more than pure political opportunity structures. They consist of new rules, norms, practices and structures of meaning. ‘Domestic actors are socialized into European norms and rules of appropriateness through processes of persuasion and social learning and redefine their interests and identities accordingly.’ The misfit can be viewed as the starting condition for the socialisation processes. ‘The more European norms, ideas, structures of meaning, or practices resonate (fit) with those at the domestic level, the more likely they will be incorporated into existing domestic institutions […] and it is not likely that they will contribute domestic change.’ However, in the case of the misfit, the change is unlikely, as Börzel notes, ‘cognitive or normative misfit does not necessarily result in domestic change.'
Domestic actors and institutions often resist change despite significant pressure for adaptation.’ (Börzel 2005, 54.)

Here as well, there are mediating factors operating to ‘account for the degree to which misfit leads to processes of socialization by which actors internalize new norms and develop new identities: norm entrepreneurs and cooperative informal institutions’. As discussed above, norm entrepreneurs are actors who operate at the domestic level and ‘persuade actors to redefine their interests and identities according to new norms and rules by engaging them in processes of social learning’. According to Börzel, there are two types of norm- and idea promoting agents: epistemic communities and advocacy or principled issue networks. (Börzel 2005, 54-55.)

However, I would also add the key decision-maker to this categorisation, which I will discuss later in this chapter. The learning of the key decision-maker in particular constitutes an agency-centred mechanism for causing transformations in an actor’s interests or identities. It leads actors to change goals and preferences. Learning that makes actors change interests or identities occurs rarely. (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001, 12.)

The second mediating factors presented by Börzel (2005, 54-55) are cooperative informal institutions such as cooperative political culture. A consensus-oriented or cooperative decision-making culture facilitates the overcoming of multiple veto points ‘by rendering their use for actors inappropriate’. It enables the sharing of adaptational costs, which helps the accommodation of pressure for adaptation. However, some recent studies on the impact of Europe on the German parliament argue that cooperative informal institutions may hinder, and not facilitate domestic change. According to Börzel (2005, 56), ‘the existence of norm entrepreneurs and
cooperative formal institutions affects whether European ideas, norms and collective understandings, which do not resonate with those at the domestic level, are internalized by domestic actors giving rise to domestic change’.

In addition to rationalist and sociological institutionalism, Börzel (2005, 56) presents a third category, institutional adaptation, which can be seen as a subcategory of the two previous ones and is of importance considering the empirical analyses of this study. Institutional adaptation ‘refers to the long-term substitution of existing practices and structures with new ones’ (Olsen 1997, 159). This approach can draw on either a rationalist approach or a sociological approach. It sees the different processes or mechanisms of domestic change, be they rationalist or sociological institutionalist, as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Institutional adaptation adopts a sociological institutionalist understanding of actors’ behaviour and the nature of institutions but the explanations follow more rationalist reasoning, emphasising institutional isomorphism. Institutions are relatively resistant towards change. ‘Existing institutions are not simply to be replaced or harmonized with new rules, norms, and practices’. A transformation, which would replace established meanings and practices can only be expected to take place under special circumstances. Furthermore, the more that rules, norms and practices are institutionalised and associate with those of the already existing institutions, the more likely it is that institutions will incorporate these new rules, norms and practices. (Börzel 2005, 56-58.)

The institutional adaptation approach sees European institutions as new norms, rules, practices and structures of meaning, which are diffused to member states. It stresses four diffusion mechanisms that can result in domestic change: coercion, imitation and normative pressure, competitive selection and framing. (Börzel 2005,
This study views framing as the most important mechanism through which national actors may also start to act as ideational entrepreneurs, who try to change beliefs, ideas and expectations of domestic actors by disseminating new, reframed ideas and concepts both at the European level and nationally (cf. Börzel 2005, 57).

5.4.2. Different Outcomes of Domestic Change

If the chapter above presented the causal mechanisms of different approaches, it is also important to discuss the different outcomes of domestic change in order to create a whole picture of how domestic and EU level developments interact. Börzel (2005, 58-59) defines five different outcomes of domestic change: inertia, retrenchment, absorption, accommodation and transformation. Inertia means the absence of change that is not the result of a fit. On the contrary, in this case, ‘Member States resist the adaptations necessary to meet European requirements’, which might lead to non-compliance. By retrenchment, Börzel refers to a situation of negative change, where resistance to change may increase misfits between the European and domestic level. The absorption means that ‘member states incorporate European requirements into their domestic institutions and policies without substantial modifications of existing structures and the logic of political behaviour’ and, therefore, the degree of change is low. The accommodation refers to a situation in which ‘member states accommodate European pressure by adapting existing processes, policies and institutions in their periphery without changing core features and the underlying understandings attached to them’ (Börzel 2005, 59, see also Knill 2001).
Finally, transformation means that the ‘member states replace existing policies, processes, and institutions by new, substantially different ones or alter existing ones to the extent that their core features and/or the underlying collective understandings are fundamentally changed’. The degree of domestic change is high, which influences the core political, economic and social structures (Risse, Cowles, Caporaso 2001, 15), such as the ‘constitutional balance of power between domestic institutions, the political culture of a country or macroeconomic policies and the currencies of the member states’. (Börzel 2005, 59.) Although it is impossible to confirm this type of change in the time frame of this research, it does not exclude that the results may show some nuances of a change taking place in both the content of German European policy and policy process.

In all of these theoretical approaches, the misfit is the necessary condition for domestic change, and all approaches agree that ‘the lower the misfit, the smaller the pressure for adaptation and thus the lower the degree of domestic change’. The approaches can be separated by their views on the effect of the misfit. According to the rationalist approach, ‘the higher the misfit, the more likely domestic reform coalition will be empowered’. The possible transformation / accommodation is dependent on the number of veto points and the existence of supporting institutions. The other two theoretical approaches maintain that the ‘high misfit challenging core features of domestic policies and institutions to result in inertia since domestic actors will refuse to simply replace norms, rules and practices by new ones’ (Börzel 2005, 59, see also Knill 2001). Actors are more receptive to learning and persuasion if new norms and practices fit with the ones they are already acquainted with (Börzel 2005, 59, see also Checkel 1999).

Finally, it is important to note that Europe is not making member states similar. ‘The effect of European policies, institutions and processes is filtered through
existing domestic institutions, policies, and interests.’ Additionally, the type and number of mediating factors has an impact on the outcome of the domestic change. (Börzel 2005, 61.) There might be some ‘clustered convergence’ among member states that confront similar pressures for adaptation because we can expect actors to learn from each other in seeking ways to respond to those pressures (Börzel 1999, 592-593). It is also important to understand that Europe is not always a driving force for change. Rather it complements and strengthens trends that are already influencing member states, such as globalisation. (Börzel 2005, 61.)

5.5. Chancellor Merkel as a European Norm Entrepreneur

The role of Federal Chancellor Merkel has increased during the past several years not only in European politics but also internationally. She has been viewed by many as the leader of Europe when she has operated as a manager of ideas, as a ‘norm entrepreneur’, in dealing with different crises.

Therefore, this study will approach the study of German foreign and European policy from the perspective of Federal Chancellor Merkel. Although this study will concentrate on the examination of Chancellor Merkel’s political operational code beliefs and defining the link between her political beliefs and German foreign and European policy, I see that it is important to also describe both the wider international and European framework in which Chancellor Merkel operates. The study takes the view that in the interdependent world, the international and domestic levels are moving closer to each other and, therefore, it may open up
possibilities for the individual leader to influence and shape policies on many levels.

In this study, these different levels are bound into a framework, which will follow the agent-structure logic, taking the agent as the starting point. As the above presented discussion has shown, the study will reflect on the ideational elements in relation to material and rationalist institutional considerations. This chapter will now apply this entire discussion and create a framework for analysis, and demonstrate how the German ‘norm entrepreneur’, Chancellor Merkel, operates between the national and EU/international contexts.

This study aims to bridge the study of the beliefs of the key decision maker to the rationalist theoretical framework and will show how beliefs could be understood as a part of a rationalist explanation of foreign policy making. It will apply the theoretical framework of Moravcsik (1994) and the two-level game approach (Putnam 1988, Moravcsik 1993, 1994) as part of the analysis. Liberal theories emphasise leaders as rational actors, but as stated above, my study views leaders’ beliefs as the foundation of their interests. Beliefs and ideas shape interests and guide behaviour.

But the point is still the same: although constructivist logic is applied to understand how beliefs and ideas operate, frame policy and construct meaning, the leaders may still be rational and play two-level-games. Many of the decisions at the international and/or European level may be based on how leaders are both trying to keep their domestic constituencies satisfied and balance their power vis-à-vis domestic institutions, not necessarily only with traditional power (logic of consequences) play but through framing and persuasion (logic of appropriateness). Although the following discussion mainly relates to the conduct of European policies, it can also
be applied to the analysis of policy-making at the international level, which will be shown in the following empirical case studies.

This study views the relationship between the EU and member states as an interactive one. Member states shape policies, institutions and processes, which they have to later adapt (Bomberg and Peterson 2000, 6-7). They have to adapt domestically to European pressures that have significant return effects at the European level, where member states seek to reduce the misfit between European and domestic levels (Börzel 2005, 62, see also Dyson 2003, Jeffery 2003).

National executives hold the key position in linking the top-down and bottom-up dimensions of the relationship between the EU and member states. They are crucial in both decision-making and the implementation of European policies and can ‘influence the way in which Member States shape European policies and institutions and adapt to them’. (Börzel 2005, 62, Bulmer and Lequesne 2005.) This study maintains that the head of the state can become a ‘norm entrepreneur’, who is needed in facilitating domestic change. They frame and reframe policies and their actions may result in the differential empowerment of domestic actors and changes in policies. In EU policy making, the heads of the state need the EU level in order to be able to shape their own national policy content and process.

Therefore, in conducting their policies, leaders will effectively try to ‘upload’ their European policy. This active and effective uploading of policies (re)framed by beliefs and ideas to the European level may minimise the costs of ‘downloading’ effects, which may, because of the institutional or policy misfit, lead to unwanted types of domestic change. The more that European policy fits the domestic context, the lower the costs of adaptation in the implementation process are. (Börzel 2005, 63.) In the rational choice institutionalist explanation, this
downloading results in the process of redistribution of power among domestic actors, which I see as one of the more immediate effects. From the sociological institutionalist perspective, the misfit might lead to socialisation, through persuasion and social learning, which I consider as a more long-term effect of Europeanisation. (see Börzel 2005.)

Börzel (2005, 56) also adds a third way, institutional adaptation, to the discussion of how the domestic impact of Europeanisation can be viewed. This approach can be seen as a subcategory of the two main approaches, rational choice and sociological perspectives, as these approaches should not be seen as exclusionary but complementary approaches to domestic impact. The institutional adaptation sees the process of structuring meanings as gradual but it can be sudden under special crisis circumstances. It is important to note Börzel’s (2005, 55) argument that while persuasion and social learning are mostly identified with processes of policy change, they can also have an effect on domestic institutions. I would argue that a change in beliefs and policy will inevitably lead to a change in domestic institutions, processes and politics over time. When the policy changes, the institutions coordinating and managing the policy must also undergo some type of change.

There are different views on the necessity of misfit. Some studies disagree with the common understanding that there must be an institutional or policy misfit between European and domestic policies, processes and institutions before any Europeanisation may occur. There are also studies which show that the ‘goodness of fit’ explanation could be ‘a special case rather than a general explanation’. Governments may use European policy to justify and legitimate change. They are already seeking reform and are utilising European policy as an opportunity rather than responding to a pressure. Thus, European policies may result in domestic
reforms even if there is no adaptational pressure. The ‘policies can be exploited by national actors engaged in policy reforms even if European and national arrangements are compatible’. This means that ‘adaptational pressure is not a necessary condition for Europeanization to cause domestic change or that adaptational pressure is politically constructed’ (Bulmer and Radaelli 2005, 347; see also Héritier and Knill 2001.)

This study holds that the latter argument that adaptational pressure may be politically constructed as an important observation. By acting as a norm entrepreneur, Chancellor Merkel may disseminate German positions based on (re)formulated beliefs and reframed ideas to the European/international level in order to be able to intentionally create a political misfit with her own domestic institutions, mediating the created pressure and thereby facilitating the change of beliefs in domestic institutions as well as constituents, indirectly. The more that beliefs and practices at the European/international level will match with German beliefs and interests, the more likely it will not result in inertia but rather change domestic institutions through framing with the leader acting as an ideational entrepreneur on both levels. Thus, using the European/international level, the leaders may seek to persuade other domestic actors to alter their beliefs and interests in response to European requirements.

But under which conditions can the persuasion mechanism become effective and can the leader become a norm entrepreneur? This study draws two inductive hypotheses of the circumstances, which may make this possible. Firstly, the norm entrepreneur needs institutional power. As a head of state or government, the leader is placed between levels and receives the main seat at both national and international/EU negotiation tables. The Lisbon Treaty, ratified in 2009, confirmed the institutional status of the European Council. In the European Council, the
heads of state, Prime Ministers and Chancellors, set overall guidelines for European policies. Thus, the leader’s influence over European policies increased along with the ratification of the Treaty. At the international level, the influence of leaders was increased through the creation of e.g. the G20 as leaders attempted to tackle the financial crisis. The increased role of leaders in negotiations tackling international climate challenges has also been visible.

The second condition relates to domestic politics; the norm entrepreneur needs political power. Before 2009, German Chancellor Merkel was bound to the Grand Coalition where her hands were tied because of the SPD and its strong role in formulating policies. In this period, Chancellor Merkel undertook some ‘ideas testing’, moving the CDU closer to SPD and mixing the policies of the two major parties so that it was not that easy for the public to see the difference between the two parties (see Höhner 2012). However, after 2009, as the CDU became the largest party in the coalition and they began governing with a ‘like-minded’ junior partner, the FDP, the condition for the leader to become a norm entrepreneur was fulfilled. This study maintains that the amount of political power in the domestic setting is a crucial factor in order for the leader to become a norm entrepreneur.

Europeanisation and the leader’s increased role in European politics may affect member states differently, by the redistribution of resources in favour of some institution or actor (maybe also a leader), by socialisation or by institutional adaptation. I argue that in the case of the redistribution of power, domestic political institutions react and anti-EU movements or parties will rise or the support for the opposition parties will increase. In German politics anti-EU movements have until now been minor, and there is no considerable populist anti-EU party (except for some opinions of the Die Linke and the new Alternative für Deutschland, which has not yet received enough supporters to be elected to the
Bundestag) in the German parliamentary system. Thus, the socialisation and the institutional adaptation explanations fit better to the German context where the domestic institutions such as Bundestag, Bundesrat and the Federal Constitutional Court have been taking a more active role in the affecting European politics. This study will accept some aspects of the domestication theorisation of Harnisch (2006, 2009) but will look at the situation from the opposite perspective i.e. that of the executive. The goal of every leader is to keep their constituents satisfied and even increase the power of his/her party. However, the leader does not want stand directly against domestic institutions and will, therefore, use persuasion and the effects of Europeanisation in his/her favour.

This study follows Wolf (2000, 95) in hypothesising that in international cooperation executives will try to find a middle way in order to keep their internal autonomy for action while not sacrificing their external autonomy at the international level. This study does not argue that Chancellor Merkel would necessarily try to change the domestic power balance entirely in her favour. By exploiting the international / European level she may try to balance power vis-à-vis domestic institutions in order to find a middle way and avoid becoming too powerful, which may then result in the rise of domestic opposition movements and a decrease in support among constituents. Acting as a norm entrepreneur, Merkel may try to persuade and attempt to have changed beliefs and reframed policies institutionalised and implemented by her own domestic institutions. This is a gradual, longer-term process because a change in beliefs and ideas will not easily result in policy change. However, with this manoeuvre, it is possible for Chancellor Merkel to shape policies or create possibilities for future policy change, which may be difficult to halt by her successor.
The study argues that the political operational code beliefs of Chancellor Merkel have changed between her first and the second term in office and, through this learning, Germany’s foreign and European policy is also gradually becoming normalized. However, the learning of Germany’s foreign policy elite does not provide enough evidence for this study to be able to state how and to which degree this has changed German foreign and European policy. When the beliefs of the key decision-maker change, policy content and policy process must both begin to change. Therefore, when studying German foreign and European policy from the perspective of the leader, it is also important to study the interplay between ideational and institutional factors (see Harnisch and Wolf 2010). By this, I mean the interaction between individual learning, domestic institutions and Europeanisation as well as between international processes. This study argues that Federal Chancellor Merkel uses international and European levels to persuade institutions, constituents and other actors domestically and to shape German policies in different policy sectors.

Thus, if the German executive attempts to change policy content and process and resist the increase of the development of domestication, one should be able to state when there is continuity and when change is observable. At the international level, Germany has long supported multilateral institutions, and the supranational EU has been at the heart of German European policy. If German foreign policy is actually undergoing change, one should be able to observe this change in how cooperation is defined. In European policy, Chancellor Merkel should give greater support for intergovernmentalism, which means more power for national governments.

At the national level, change of policy can be observed in the process, where the reformulated beliefs and reframed ideas of Chancellor Merkel have become
institutionalised. The more that Chancellor Merkel’s interaction with the domestic institutions shows signs of rational behaviour, emphasising the role of the executive in relation to four categories including initiative, institutions, information and ideas presented by Moravcsik’s (1994) theoretical approach, the more that we can assume that the national political process is changing from domestication presented in the form of ‘modified continuity’ (Harnisch 2006, 337) towards the internationalisation of domestic politics presented by Moravcsik (1994).

As discussed in the preceding chapters above, it is also important to discuss structures. This study maintains that the relationship between the agent and structure is an interactive one. It does not consider ideational or material reality to be transcending one other. The study will take the agent approach as the starting point and try to define when the influence of cognitive and ideational elements might be the greatest. Therefore, the study tests different events, crises, e.g. movement in structure, against the ideational reality, and holds that a crisis might create both ideational and institutional room for manoeuvre on behalf of the norm entrepreneur for the execution of ideas. This might also mean that structures were the third condition for the leader to become a norm entrepreneur.

The ideational elements of learning, framing and persuasion are also tested against, and connected to, rationalist arguments emphasising power. The study will combine ideational elements as a two-stage process to the liberal institutionalist theoretical framework. The rationalist power elements are not questioned, rather this study argues that it is important to demonstrate that persuasion operates alongside power mechanisms. The norm entrepreneur learns, reframes and, therefore, also persuades, but the rational power framework reflects the elements that are also strategically important for the norm entrepreneur. Thus, the logic of appropriateness works alongside the logic of consequences. In the most ideal case,
the persuasion mechanism will turn out to be just as crucial of a mechanism as power, and not ‘just there’.

This also has important implications for the normalization argument about the continuity and change of German foreign and European policy. This study maintains that the normalization of German foreign and European policy depends on ideational, material as well as institutional factors. The reconstructed beliefs of the chief executive, Chancellor Merkel, will reframe and change German foreign and European policy content gradually over time. The domestic institutional power balance is also affected by changed beliefs. The gradual change in the German institutional setting can be examined by observing the amount of rationalist tendencies in executive-led foreign and European policy-making and the way through which the reformulated beliefs become institutionalised in policy process over time.
6. Material, Methods, Research Questions and Hypotheses

6.1. Mixed Methods as a Powerful Tool for Analysing Causation, Processes and Outcome

This dissertation will use a mixed method approach that combines quantitative operational code analysis, qualitative longitudinal content analysis and process-tracing. It takes the view that ‘the combination of quantitative and qualitative longitudinal data is potentially very powerful in providing links between causation, processes and outcomes’ (Corden and Millar 2007b, 590). The studies using only quantitative operational code analysis lack the ability to establish a credible link between beliefs and policy, whereas the purely qualitative analyses might, in some cases, be inadequate in the verification of change.

The speech data of Federal Chancellor Merkel is studied with the aid of multiple methods in order to create linkages between changes in belief, the processes of policy framing and domestic policy-making, as well as being able to explain the nuances of change in actual behaviour and policy (outcome) over time. The term ‘longitudinal’ refers to analysis over time, to the analysis of both changes in beliefs and the effects that changes in beliefs have in influencing policy framing as well as how change in policy process is created over time.

Thus, the study will use three different methods in each case study of foreign and security policy, economic and European policy, and environmental and energy policy. Firstly, it will apply quantitative operational code analysis in all three of the aforementioned cases. This operational code analysis examines whether the
political beliefs of Chancellor Merkel have changed over time, between her first term, 2005-2009, and her second term, 2009-2013, in office.

Secondly, a qualitative longitudinal content analysis is needed in order to describe and understand how beliefs influence policy framing (content) and policy process over time. Qualitative content analysis is used for analysing the cognitive framing process of meaning, concepts and policy content over time. As Corden and Millar (2007a, 529) state, ‘qualitative longitudinal research seeks to uncover and understand processes of change over time’. It is important to describe the process of changes in beliefs relating to the ten political beliefs defined by George (1969) and to examine how the leader frames policy content with his/her changed beliefs as well as how meanings are restructured.

Thirdly, this study also aims to explain, how and why there have been changes during the era of Chancellor Merkel. It is argued that Chancellor Merkel has used and uses both power and persuasion mechanisms in order to be able to shape the domestic institutional power balance. In addition to political and constituents’ support, Chancellor Merkel is also dependent on domestic institutions as these institutions play a decisive role in institutionalising her changed beliefs and reframed policies in habitualised foreign policy behaviour as well as in implementing them in policy. Quantitative and qualitative longitudinal methods, combined with the additional methods of process-tracing and counter-factual reasoning, are used in order to draw inferences about how persuasion works alongside power in the concrete policy-making environment.

Choosing a leader, who is currently in office and leading national policies, sets boundaries on the choice of research material. When discussing Chancellor Merkel’s policies and ways of doing politics, there is not a significant amount of
information about her strategies or approach to means. Quite the contrary, people working close to Merkel state that she does not discuss strategy or means. Therefore, analysing Merkel’s beliefs qualitatively from only biographies is not possible. However, biographies on Chancellor Merkel reveal, nonetheless, that the speeches Chancellor Merkel gives are thought through carefully. (see Kornelius 2014.) Therefore, the research material comprises public, not the spontaneous, German-language speeches of Chancellor Merkel.

6.2. An Examination of Merkel’s Political Beliefs with Quantitative Operational Code Analysis

In the first part of this chapter, operational code beliefs will be examined in a small quantitative study by using the Verbs in Context System (VICS) (see Schafer & Walker 2006a), which uses the ten questions related to the political beliefs created by George (1969). By coding the direction and scaling the intensity of transitive verbs in the subject’s rhetoric and then indexing the results, one will end up with a broad picture of the way in which the actor sees the exercise of power in the political universe, by themselves and others (Schafer & Walker 2006a).5

The main objective of the quantitative section of this study is to describe Chancellor Merkel’s operational code belief system in relation to the ten questions6 provided by George (1969). The quantitative operational code analysis discusses the direction and intensity of transitive verbs relating to self and others in the

5 See examples and formulas of coding for each operational code belief index in Appendix 1 and 2.
6 See Table 1.
political universe and these variations in the direction and intensity also shows as variation in Merkel’s operational code beliefs. The study will compare Merkel’s political beliefs between her first (2005-2009) and second terms in office (2009-2013).

The quantitative analysis is conducted from a distance, which is based on the analysis of the leader’s verbal behaviour. What and how things are said can tell a lot about what Chancellor Merkel is thinking and what her state of mind is. For the quantitative study, 87 German-language speeches of Chancellor Merkel from the study period 2005-2013 have, altogether, been coded by hand. Because the coding process is executed by hand, it is possible to take the wider context around the coded verbs, as well as the nuances of intensity, under better consideration. The speech material comprises only the public, not spontaneous, German-language speeches of Chancellor Merkel, because the aim of the study is to also show that leaders try to influence others with their beliefs both internationally and nationally.

This dissertation defines Merkel’s operational code in three different issue areas. In the interdependent world issue areas, policies and agendas overlap, but relating to operational code beliefs’ analysis, the issue areas are kept separate in order to find the nuances in the political beliefs of Chancellor Merkel between different issue areas. This might also explain the differences in the Merkel’s policy-making in these policy areas, differences in processes and outcomes, and underline the importance of also including other factors relating international and domestic politics into the analysis.

Thus, the speech material is also divided according to the different cases. Foreign and security policy speeches include speeches that have been given in foreign policy arenas, such as at the Munich Security Conference or NATO conference,
and where the main focus of the speech is on foreign and security affairs, development policy or foreign trade. Accordingly, in the cases relating to Merkel’s economic and European policy, the speech material includes e.g. speeches on European policy held in different capitals and in Brussels as well as speeches on financial and economic matters held in international areas e.g. the World Economic Forum in Davos. Finally, her energy policy speeches include speeches where the content of the speeches relates to energy, climate and environmental questions.

Furthermore, for this study’s quantitative analysis, the speech material had to fulfil two conditions. Firstly, the speech length must be more than 1500 words. Secondly, the analysis included speeches held for international and EU audiences. However, creating national understanding is also a key element, and, therefore, some speeches held for national audiences, but closely followed by international ones, have been included in the material. Thus, the division between international and domestic levels is gradually blurring. Furthermore, the speeches must be held for audiences with strategically decisive level positions e.g. at the UN, NATO, the European Parliament and Commission, the German Bundestag and federal government as well as heads of different associations.

This study views a speech as a unit of analysis. This choice relates to viewing every speech act as a separate possibility for influencing a specific audience. The speeches must fulfil the above mentioned two conditions. After the coding, there must be at least around $10^7$ coded verbs, otherwise the speech will be discarded at this stage of coding process. After all speeches that have fulfilled the conditions and have passed the final check, have been coded and there are index values for

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7 There are a couple of exceptions in every issue area; the importance of the speech and the audience were in these cases decisive factors.
each speech, statistical analyses for comparing mean scores of Merkel’s two terms in office (2005-2009 and 2009-2013) can be made.

This study will avoid circular reasoning by using a mixed methods approach. Firstly, the quantitative analysis is conducted based on the analysis of transitive verbs by VICS. This analysis examines the operational code beliefs related to the ten questions provided by George (1969) and provides a generalised picture of Chancellor Merkel’s belief system in the issue area in question. The second part of analysis done by using longitudinal qualitative content analysis that will define how changes in Merkel’s beliefs influence policy framing and gradually change German policy content and process. Thus, here the operational code beliefs are viewed as independent variables, which influence policy framing (dissemination of beliefs) and consequently, over time, cause changes in German policy (implementation and institutionalisation of beliefs), in outcome, which can be seen over time as changes in policy content as well as repeated (in frequency and sequence) change in foreign policy behaviour. Thus, change is seen as a gradual process.

In order to view the explanatory capacity of different IR approaches, Merkel’s political beliefs are tested against international crisis to find out whether the crisis reinforces or reverses the direction of the beliefs and how this change influences the link between beliefs and framing. If beliefs reinforce to a more cooperative direction after the economic and financial crisis, this could be seen as increased independent influence of those beliefs on policy framing. However, if the beliefs reverse after the outbreak of the crisis, it will allow us to assume that the assumptions of the realist paradigm are stronger. The comparison of Merkel’s beliefs between her two terms in office will include domestic politics, the composition of the government and domestic power balance, into the analysis. Thus, Merkel’s operational code beliefs are placed in the real-world policy-making
environment including international and domestic factors in order to be able to define their role in influencing policy vis-à-vis independent influence of beliefs.

6.3. Qualitative Content Analysis for Study of the Influence of Beliefs on Policy Framing

The quantitative longitudinal analysis is only used to examine the possible change (and their direction) in Chancellor Merkel’s political beliefs. Thus, it provides only a ‘passive still picture’ of beliefs and their change, and, therefore, it should be complemented with a comprehensive qualitative longitudinal analysis of how beliefs act in a social world of power and influence. Beliefs are not only passive but they are also used actively to influence others. It is of key importance to understand how Merkel’s beliefs influence German policy framing (dissemination of policy positions) and shape policy (reception, institutionalisation) as part of a gradual process, where beliefs and framing are tested against external international crisis as well as viewed as part of the domestic policy process.

The qualitative content analysis is used for analysing the cognitive framing process of meaning, concepts and policy content over time. It is important to describe the process of changes in beliefs relating to the ten political operational code beliefs defined by George (1969) and to examine how the leader frames policy content with these changed beliefs and how meanings are restructured. Further, the emergence of reframed ideas can be observed. Here, the leader is interacting between past, present and future. Policy making is affected by past experience and German policy discourse, as well as future anticipations, and they both have an
effect on how a policy is framed at the present time. (see Corden and Millar 2007b.)

The study maintains that it is important to understand the process of beliefs change within the changing international environment. Therefore, it is crucial to test the changes in beliefs against an external event. Here as well, the timing of changes in material conditions and expressed beliefs and ideas can be considered. The context may have influence on change in beliefs and shape the process of policy framing. Therefore, the change in beliefs over time is tested against the international financial and economic crises and some smaller crisis, depending on the case study in question, in order to be able to state how the crisis changes Merkel’s political beliefs in terms of direction and intensity and how this influences her policy framing.

If the political operational code beliefs of Chancellor Merkel reinforce, indicating that her beliefs become more cooperative after the crisis, this study may prove to be a strong test case for the independent causal influence of beliefs and ideas on policy in international politics. On the contrary, if the beliefs seem to reverse to indicate a more hostile view of the political environment, then the realist approach on change in beliefs, which gives only a minor role for leader’s beliefs in affecting policy, might turn out to be more valid.

Thus, this study asserts that the change of the political beliefs of Chancellor Merkel influences both German policy framing (content) and domestic policy process. However, it must be noted that an actual change in policy can only be confirmed after foreign policy behaviour becomes repeated over time and, therefore, the change can only be verified in the upcoming decades. The study views the change
as a process that is gradually created by Chancellor Merkel, which might be impossible to halt by her future successor.

The qualitative analysis is carried out based on the readings of around 150 public speeches from the entire study period, 2005-2013. The speech material includes Merkel’s speeches from diverse arenas also directed at foreign policy audiences. This set of speech material will be more comprehensive and not as exclusive as the material used for the quantitative section of the study (87 speeches), because it aims to show how Merkel’s operational code beliefs and their change, frame and reframe German foreign policy positions and shape the domestic institutional power balance over time.

6.4. Power and Persuasion in Foreign Policy-Making

If the quantitative and qualitative longitudinal methods of operational code analysis and content analysis aim at examining change in Merkel’s political beliefs, and how these cognitive beliefs influence the cognitive framing and reframing process over time, it could be hypothesised that there is also processes of persuasion, also viewed as a cognitive process, involving separate international and national processes. Therefore, the analysis of persuasion in conjunction with power is crucial.

Here, the theoretical framework of Moravcsik (1994) becomes crucial. Moravcsik’s institutionalist approach applies the rationalist two-level thematic of Putnam (1998). In his analysis, Moravcsik argues that international/EU level cooperation (intergovernmental approach) increases the power of the leader in the domestic
setting. He divides the causal mechanisms the leader can use into four categories: agenda control, institutions, information and ideas. Although Moravcsik accepts ideas (beliefs) as causal mechanism, he concentrates on the power analyses provided by rationalist traditions.

As part of the analysis, this study examines whether in her speeches or actions, Chancellor Merkel refers to these categories internationally in order to use power (tie hands or cut slack) nationally. Here, the role of cognitive beliefs and ideas, as well as cognitive framing and reframing processes, are of importance. It is hypothesised that after the financial and economic crises, the main audience was not only international but also domestic, such as German institutions and the general public. Thus, cognitive persuasion operates alongside power.

Therefore, cognitive/constructivist and rationalist approaches should be seen methodologically, following each other as a two-stage process. The policy position formation includes analysis of beliefs and framing, while the explanatory part e.g. how (and why important) these beliefs influence domestic policy process will be done with the help of the rationalist theoretical perspectives offered by Moravcsik. Thus, in an ideal case, Chancellor Merkel is presented as a 'strategic norm entrepreneur', who uses both persuasion and power when operating between international and national levels.

The quantitative and qualitative longitudinal analyses are the main methods used in this research. They are combined with additional methods of process tracing and counterfactual reasoning in order to draw conclusions about whether there could also be a persuasion mechanism involved. This section of the analysis will use all material available from Merkel's speeches and government declarations as well as additional news and event material. The inferences made are inductive.
Furthermore, interpretation, as a thicker form of constructivist reasoning based on post-positivist methodological approaches is needed, because the framing process leads to a changing meaning of different concepts and, gradually, to a changing national understanding of the issue in question. However, these findings remain somewhat hypothetical for further research in the upcoming decades, when it will be possible to state whether German foreign and European policy has actually changed.

6.5. Research Questions and Hypotheses

This study takes the view that there have been changes in the German foreign and European policy. The first study question is: what is Chancellor Merkel’s operational code? This question aims at mapping Chancellor Merkel’s operational code beliefs quantitatively in the three different issue areas: foreign and security policy, economic and European policy, and environmental and energy policy, and comparing them between her two first terms in office.

The second and third study questions ascertain whether the operational code of Chancellor Merkel could explain German foreign and European policy and how it can explain the changes observed? The analysis connects Merkel’s operational code beliefs to a larger national and international context and studies whether and how Merkel’s operational code beliefs influence German policy. It applies Tannenwald’s (2005) theorisation on the life cycle of ideas and examines Merkel’s policy framing and dissemination, reception and implementation. Furthermore, the analysis hypothesises that in addition to a power mechanism, there is also a persuasion mechanism involved, and hence reflects upon Merkel’s beliefs within the German
domestic institutional context, where the Chancellor balances the power vis-á-vis domestic institutions such as the Bundestag and Federal Constitutional Court. Here, the theoretical framework of Moravcsik (1994) will be applied.

This study takes the inconsistencies in recent German policies as a starting point and makes two arguments that work as the hypotheses of the study. Firstly, the study argues that the political operational code beliefs of Chancellor Merkel have changed between her first (2005-2009) and second terms in office (2009-2013). This has taken place over time or because of a crisis. Moreover, the causal and constitutive effect of beliefs on policy content and policy process is of great importance.

This study argues, secondly, that a change in political beliefs of Chancellor Merkel influences both policy content (framing) and process, the domestic institutional power balance. As the beliefs of Chancellor Merkel have changed, she may have started to reconstruct meaning and to reframe German foreign and European policy in these above mentioned three issue areas. However, the institutionalisation of those beliefs in policy is gradual and dependent on the domestic institutional process, which is also affected by the changed beliefs. Ultimately, because of the gradual change in the domestic institutional power balance, Chancellor Merkel might be better able to implement changes e.g. in policy practice and in law.

It may be too early to declare any great change in German foreign and European policy. This study views change as a gradual process. It depends on the role of Chancellor Merkel as a ‘norm entrepreneur’, who uses both power and persuasion mechanisms in order to be able to shape both the policy content and domestic institutional power balance. The more that the rational characteristics of Chancellor Merkel are demonstrated in the shaping of domestic policy process, the
more change that will be possible to observe in German foreign and European policy-making.
7. Chancellor Merkel’s Foreign and Security Policy

7.1. Quantitative Operational Code Analysis of Chancellor Merkel’s Beliefs

This chapter will discuss the operational code of Federal Chancellor Merkel between the study period 2005-2009 and 2009-2013, and compare the two terms in office. The findings are presented in Table 2 and 3, including significance tests and explanation for values.

*Analysis of Chancellor Merkel’s philosophical beliefs*

During the first term in office, from 2005 until 2009, Chancellor Merkel saw the political universe (P-1) as mixed (+0.327), also containing some hostility, but towards the second term, Merkel has started to see the nature of the political universe as friendly. According to findings, this belief has been reinforced (+0.59) between the two terms in office, however, not significantly. From a historical perspective, seeing the universe as cooperative and friendly is typical for a German foreign policy leader, whose political culture has traditionally been based on multilateral cooperation, ‘never alone’, as the cornerstone of German foreign policy. However, this belief relates more to how the leader views other actors in the political universe, their policies and actions as well as political conflict.
Table 2  Chancellor Merkel’s operational code in foreign and security policy, philosophical beliefs.  
A comparison of Federal Chancellor Merkel’s two terms in office

Towards her second term in office, Chancellor Merkel has become increasingly optimistic in the realisation of her fundamental political values (P-2). According to the comparison, this belief has reinforced from (+0,128) to (+0,222). This belief could relate to the P-1 belief: if Merkel sees that the international environment is becoming friendlier, it is also easier for her to realise her fundamental values and make value-based foreign policy, of which Germany has always been a great supporter. However, this index also relates to the intensity of words and deeds of others and how the leader sees his/her ability to realise the values in relation to them.

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8 The operational code analysis and significance tests were conducted as in Walker, Schafer and Young (1998). For more specific coding procedure, see App. 1 and 2.
Merkel sees that the political universe has become more predictable (P-3) between the first (+0,295) and second term in office (+0,504). The predictability index is also connected to how Merkel sees others. Merkel still sees a variety of actions related to others and, therefore, does not see their actions as fully predictable. As the belief in the nature of political universe has developed in a friendlier and more cooperative direction, the predictability of the political universe has also reinforced. Increasing interdependence and cooperation between states may increase predictability but the new different threats growing inside of some states and their unpredictable character might keep this belief stable, which can also be observed in the qualitative findings.

Relating to belief P-4, Merkel’s belief in the control over historical development is relatively high (+0,811): she sees herself in control. In this index, how much the ‘self’ is taking action is measured; if the subject’s rhetoric indicates that the self is taking most of the action, then the self sees itself as more in control. The comparison of the two terms shows that this belief has been reinforced very slightly (+0,817) between the two terms, however, not significantly. Although the value of this belief is already relatively high, without Germany’s historical burden, this belief could also be higher in value. Merkel often stresses German history, her background in the former GDR and lessons learned from that period of time, domestically and internationally.

During her first term in office, Merkel assigns quite a large role for chance (P-5), (+0,778). The comparison of her two terms in office indicates that this belief has reversed significantly (+0,578), and Chancellor Merkel has started to see a decreasing role for chance. This belief relates to the belief P-3 (predictability of political future) and P-4 (power belief). The more predictable the political universe and the more the self has control over the events, the lower the role of chance is.
This implies that although Merkel sees herself as relatively in control of the events, the changing predictability of the political future may have changed Merkel’s belief in how much role she assigns to chance.

*Analysis on Chancellor Merkel’s instrumental beliefs*

The belief in the direction of strategy (I-1) describes a leader’s beliefs about the best strategic direction for actions. This belief relates to the self and the self in groups and how cooperatively the subject defines his/her strategy. According to the findings, Chancellor Merkel sees cooperative strategy as the most useful through the whole study period, from (+0.862) to (+0.865). This seems reasonable considering Germany’s past experiences and political culture.

The direction in belief in strategy also relates to the second instrumental belief: intensity of tactics (I-2). Merkel sees cooperative tactics as the most useful. This belief has reinforced from (+0.357) to (+0.393) over the study period.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Code Beliefs (George 1969)</th>
<th>Mean value 2005-2009 *</th>
<th>Mean value 2009-2013 **</th>
<th>F (1, 34)</th>
<th>p ***</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Instrumental beliefs</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I-1. Approach to goals</td>
<td>0.862</td>
<td>0.865</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>Cooperative-mixed-conflictual. Higher scores indicate that cooperative strategy is more useful. Variation between -1 and +1.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-2. Intensity of tactics</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>1.162</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>Higher scores indicate a belief in the utility of cooperative tactics. Variation between -1 and +1.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-3. Risk orientation</td>
<td>0.559</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>2.623</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>Higher scores indicate less diversity and therefore higher levels of risk acceptance. Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-4. Importance of timing of action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The higher values, the greater flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Cooperation-conflict shift</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>Higher values indicate the more diversity in cooperation/conflict in rhetoric. Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Words-deeds shift</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>1.771</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>Lower scores indicate lower diversity in tactics. Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5. Utility of means</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower scores indicate less utility and higher more utility of this type of power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Reward</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.904</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Promise</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>2.109</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Support</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td>4.575</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Oppose</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Threaten</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.045</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Punish</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>1.259</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* n=20 (Chancellor Merkel’s first term in office); ** n=16 (Chancellor Merkel’s second term in office); *** One-Way ANOVA test

Table 3  Chancellor Merkel’s operational code in foreign and security policy, instrumental beliefs. A comparison of Federal Chancellor Merkel’s two terms in office. 9

9 The operational code analysis and significance tests were conducted as in Walker, Schafer and Young (1998). For more specific coding procedure, see App. 1 and 2.
It is said that Chancellor Merkel avoids taking any risks. The belief relating to risk orientation (I-3) shows how risk averse/acceptant the leader is. Here, higher levels of diversity in action mean that the risk associated with any one action is diminished. Towards her second term, Chancellor Merkel’s risk acceptance has diminished from (+0,559) and reversed (+0,467). This may relate to Merkel’s acceptance of many different forms of means when dealing with international challenges, ranging from political and economic to military means. She does not want to put all of her eggs in one basket and, therefore, the more options she has to choose from, the less risk is related to one single mean.

The belief in the importance of the timing of action (I-4) has been divided in two. One (I-4 a) examines the diversity of a leader’s choices in terms of cooperation and conflict. Some slight changes can be observed in this belief; i.e. the diversity in cooperation/conflict has reversed somewhat in Merkel’s rhetoric between the two terms from (+0,138) to (+0,135), indicating quite low diversity. The other index (I-4 b), measures the diversity of the leader’s actions in terms of the distribution of words and deeds. This belief has reinforced from her first term in office (+0,138) towards her second term in office (+0,204). Lower scores indicate a lower diversity in tactics. The Chancellor shows quite low diversity and low flexibility in tactics and continues to prefer words instead of deeds.

Utility of means (I-5) shows the leader’s belief about the utility of different tactics that mark the exercise of political power. Merkel is demonstrated to use supportive tactics the most through the whole study period. However, during Merkel’s second term in office, the belief in the utility of mere supportive means has reversed significantly from (+0,733) to (+0,693). Furthermore, there have been changes of different degrees in every belief relating to both positive and negative means. Thus,
the balance between the different means has shifted to include different means more evenly.

It is important to take note that towards her second term in office, Merkel seems to also accept more conflictual means such as sanctions. However, this does not mean that Merkel has started to support the use of military means more, but rather this demonstrates that military means are a part of the foreign policy instruments alongside economic, diplomatic or other means. The integrated German security policy concept of “Vernetzte Sicherheit”, which will be discussed in the following qualitative chapter, supports this interpretation. The results also relate to the instrumental belief I-3, risk orientation, which includes the idea of widening the policy instruments and, therefore, reducing the risk assigned to one single mean. These beliefs could, however, also be qualitatively linked to the power belief (P-4). As Germany’s power gradually increases, the readiness to take international responsibility may also increase, which could be observed in the widening of means to include both rewarding and sanctions policies.

On the basis of this quantitative study it can be stated that there have been significant changes in Merkel’s beliefs relating to both self and others. In the qualitative analysis, it is important to define the other, describe the operational environment and to show how this perception might have changed over time. Additionally, the use of cooperative strategies and different means relating to self should be discussed further. The main problem in quantitative analysis is that it does not consider the social character of the world. Some beliefs may be more qualitative in nature and, therefore, in the quantitative analysis, they indicate spurious results about how the world is actually perceived. The quantitative analysis does not show how power can be exercised internationally and nationally through
cognitive framing and persuasion by restructuring meanings and also by interlinking different policy areas and means.

7.2. Cooperation Reframed – Qualitative Longitudinal Analysis on Merkel’s Foreign and Security Policy

In this chapter, I will now discuss how the changes in the philosophical beliefs relating to the nature of the international operational environment and the changes in the instrumental beliefs relating to strategies, tactics and means, frame German foreign and security policy during Chancellor Merkel’s first and second terms in office.

7.2.1. Beliefs Framing Policy During First Term in Office: the Launching of the Concept of Vernetzte Sicherheit

Vernetzte Sicherheit – a New Security Concept for Guiding German Action

In the beginning of her first term Chancellor Merkel already started to diagnose and reflect on how she saw the nature of the operational environment. Merkel stated that completely new challenges had emerged after the end of the Cold War. One of the biggest of which was the globalisation, which Germany and the European Union had to face. She saw globalisation as a difficult process, and, therefore, it was important to discuss how competition was seen:

Merkel acknowledged that globalisation did not only require new thinking but also a new type of action (Merkel 5 Feb 2007). The Chancellor also stressed that the security situation had changed since the Cold War. There were completely new security threats, too, which could not be limited geographically. These asymmetrical threats included international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, regional conflicts and unstable states. (Merkel 25 Oct 2006.)

One of these new asymmetrical threats was terrorism. Merkel took the view that combating terrorism was even more difficult than the dispute of the Cold War, which was constant, but she assured that it would not let Germany, the USA or others down. (Merkel 12 Jan 2006.) She stressed that the fight against terrorism demanded the use of military means but only as last resort and under the UN umbrella:

‘Der Kampf gegen Terrorismus verlangt den Einsatz aller politischer, wirtschaftlicher und – wenn nötig – auch militärischer Mittel als ultima ratio unter dem Dach der Vereinten Nationen.’ (Merkel 1 Feb 2006.)

Chancellor Merkel emphasised four conditions that were critical in order to be able to face the challenges successfully. Firstly, Germany must develop economically because economic strength was also connected to room for manoeuvre in the field of security policy. Secondly, it was important to contribute so that NATO faced up and adapted to the changed circumstances. Thirdly, a strengthened Europe e.g. a strengthened EU, was needed. And fourthly, activities should be pooled in relation
to common international regulatory policy. (Merkel 4 Feb 2006.) Thus, multilateralism was of key importance for Germany in order to be able to exercise power and face the new challenges of the 21st century.

According to Merkel, it was possible to learn from the wide spectrum of causes of threats and that the security situation was characterised by high complexity. She maintained that for most of the situations that complex situations could be combated with one-dimensional measures: complex security problems required complex measures. (Merkel 10 Nov 2006.) During the first years in office, Merkel pointed out that Germany was, because of its domestic political and economic strength, able to take responsibility in the foreign policy field. She showed willingness to shape and develop a concept relating to Germany’s own security policy as well as the strategic concept relating to NATO. She also highlighted the cooperation between Germany and France in contributing to the European Security Strategy. (Merkel 4 Feb 2006.)

In order to be better able to combat the asymmetrical threats, the German federal government adopted a White Paper in autumn 2006, in which a new integrated security concept “Vernetzte Sicherheit” was presented, which also considered new threats. According to Merkel, the core of the concept was to guarantee the security of Germany, preserve its welfare and protect German values. Merkel stated that the concept could be defined as a combination of hard and soft power, a construction of structures, which included a broad spectrum of political, diplomatic, military, civil, economic and developmental instruments. The military component was enclosed in the concept, while the political instruments, civil law, non-governmental organisations and the build-up of institutions were also included, when they concerned e.g. asymmetrical threats such as terrorism, nuclear
proliferation, unstable states and regional conflicts. (Merkel 4 Feb 2006, 10 Nov 2006, 10 Feb 2007.)

According to Merkel, in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, for example, this concept guided German action; only in connection with civil efforts was it possible to attempt a reasonable reconstruction (Merkel 4 Feb 2006, 25 Oct 2006, 10 Nov 2006, 10 Feb 2007). Merkel already seemed to have started to widen the understanding of foreign policy instruments available (I-5) to Germany in her first term, when the integrated concept of “Vernetzte Sicherheit” was created. According to Merkel’s argument, one of the reasons was the rise of the new asymmetrical threats and their complex character: responding policies must reflect the complex character of the problems.

Merkel also discussed the role of the German armed forces, the Bundeswehr. She saw it as important to explain to the public in which direction things were heading. The Chancellor stressed that she adhered to a conscript army (Wehrpflichtarmee). She pointed out that the tasks of the Bundeswehr would change in the upcoming years and the transformation of the Bundeswehr for the requirements of the missions abroad was in progress. Merkel took the view that political requirements and expected responsibility should be brought into line with the structure of the Bundeswehr. (Merkel 20 Sep 2006a, 8 Jun 2006.)
‘Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik Ist Immer Auch Partnerschaftliche Politik. Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik Kann Nicht Als Nationale Politik Gedacht Werden’

In her first term in office, Chancellor Merkel spoke about cooperation in a way considered traditional for a German foreign policy leader:

‘[…] ist deutsche Sicherheitspolitik immer auch partnerschaftliche Politik. Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik kann nicht als nationale Politik gedacht werden. […]’ (Merkel 10 Nov 2006.)

According to Merkel, German security policy was always based on partnerships and German security policy could not be thought of as national policy (Merkel 10 Nov 2006). However, Merkel stressed that after reunification, Germany had more possibilities politically but also more obligations and responsibilities to take in the world. Merkel argued that this was related to the fact that Germany wanted to protect its own security. Merkel stated that this meant that Germany acted out of national interest. (Merkel 20 Sep 2006a.)

Chancellor Merkel maintained that one could respond to threats only with multilateral cooperation. She emphasised that Germany would master all challenges together with its partners and would rely on its alliances. For Merkel, European unification and transatlantic cooperation were the main cornerstones of German foreign and security policy. She also saw NATO as a transatlantic interest and value community and as the strongest anchor of common security. Germany would increasingly take responsibility in these frameworks, also outside of the area of the alliance. (Merkel 1 Feb 2006, 4 Feb 2006, 25 Oct 2006.)

In the first months in office, Merkel already started to discuss the role of NATO. According to Merkel, NATO was perceived in Germany as a guaranty of peace, security and stability, which was based on freedom and democracy, human rights
Merkel argued that NATO was more than a military alliance. It was a value community and, therefore, also a political alliance. (Merkel 12 Jan 2006, 4 Feb 2006, 10 Nov 2006.) According to the Chancellor, NATO must be the central consultation and coordination forum for permanent joint analyses, where political consultations on new centres of conflict were conducted and where political and military actions were coordinated (Merkel 1 Feb 2006). Relating to the means available to NATO, Merkel supported linking civil and military means and saw NATO’s self-conception as part of an overall civil-military profile (Merkel 10 Feb 2007).

On many occasions, Merkel invited all leaders to discuss the future role of NATO and the consequences one should draw from the changed security environment at a coming NATO summit in Riga (Merkel 1 Feb 2006). She urged that there should be a decision as to whether NATO should be reduced to military actions only, or whether it should be seen as place for security and strategic political discussions (Merkel 12 Jan 2006). Merkel also stated that although the variety of NATO’s field of action was impressive, the resources were scarce and, therefore, the tasks of NATO should be clearly defined. She also proposed that in the upcoming years, NATO member states would discuss how strategic concepts should be developed further. (Merkel 4 Feb 2006.)

At the European level, Merkel stated that European Constitutional Treaty process would create a basis for the further development of the CFSP in the framework of the European Security Strategy (Merkel 1 Feb 2006), in the appointment of which Germany, together with France, contributed significantly (Merkel 4 Feb 2006). From the first term onwards, it was important for the Chancellor that the European Union could speak with one voice (Merkel 5 Feb 2007). She stressed that Europe could take more responsibility in the Balkans through integration. In
that way it could also be possible to reduce the military presence in the region. (Merkel 12 Jan 2006.)

Merkel saw NATO as the most important guarantor of common security. She pointed out that European security structures should be strengthened further, not as a counterbalance to NATO, but as European structures with a complementary character. Merkel also discussed what Europe could bring to the transatlantic dialogue. According to her, this could be a combination of civil and military competencies, because none of these components could be excluded and a combination of these aspects was very important. (Merkel 10 Nov 2006.)

According to Merkel, on the practical level, the cooperation between NATO and the European Union should be improved. For example, in the case of Afghanistan, solid cooperation between the EU and NATO was necessary. (Ibid.) These examples on the security questions and the role of NATO clearly indicate that the instrumental beliefs supporting more cooperation as an end and cooperative tactics as the best means were framing Merkel's policy.

Merkel also discussed NATO enlargement by emphasising that the enlargement process had strengthened security and stability in Europe. In addition, it had also created important incentives for democratisation as well as economic and societal reforms in other membership-seeking countries. According to Merkel, this process should be continued. (Merkel 25 Oct 2006.)

Merkel saw NATO and the EU as one of the most successful value and security alliances in contemporary history. However, powerful alliances also needed security partners in other regions of the world. According Merkel, it was important that NATO created a close network of partnerships with countries and international
organisations with quite different points of emphasis and goals. (Merkel 4 Feb 2006.)

Alongside EU-NATO cooperation, Merkel emphasised the increased involvement of Russia in order to develop relations with Russia; the NATO-Russia Council should be utilised more intensively for building trust and for the preparation of joint operations as well as for cooperation in protection against threats (Merkel 25 Oct 2006).

The Chancellor also spoke about EU-USA relations. She was confident that a strong USA was in the interest of the EU, and a strong EU, with active political willingness to shape current challenges, was in the interest of the USA. Given the new challenges, it was necessary to combine forces. Here, Merkel stressed that the fight against terrorism, which was the main task of these partners, would not be won only with military means. Instead, it was important to win the ‘hearts and minds of people’; it was necessary to strengthen values including education, freedom, the rule of law, democracy and human rights. (Ibid.)

The Chancellor also gave her support for close cooperation with regional and international organisations such as the African Union and the UN. Considering the role of the UN, Merkel stressed that it was a common task to strengthen the UN’s role. She took the view that everything should be done so that international organisations could, when possible, provide legitimisation for specific behaviour and courses of action. According to Merkel, if this was not the case, then one should seek a value community, in which this aim was easier to achieve. (Merkel 12 Jan 2006, 1 Feb 2006, 4 Feb 2006.)
Merkel aimed at making the UN more capable of acting. Therefore, the reform of the UN would be of importance. Additionally, the security policy forums of the UN should be strengthened, including the Security Council, mechanisms of disarmament and arms control. She called for making conflict prevention and conflict resolution more efficient. According to Merkel, this meant that German interests would be defined in future on even more strongly based partnerships. (Merkel 1 Feb 2006, 4 Feb 2006, 10 Nov 2006.)

Merkel actively disseminated the German way of thinking internationally in different partnerships, alliances and international organisations in order to influence those organisations, their rules and procedures. Influencing others with German and Western values and emphasising the value of multilateralism and softer means were typical features of German foreign policy-making that reflected continuity. ‘Never again’ and ‘never alone’ were important cornerstones of German foreign policy discourse and shaping those cornerstones would require a national consensus. In order to gain international room for manoeuvre, Merkel had to tie her hands domestically, which could be seen in how she interacted with the German Parliament, Bundestag, and Bundesrat during her first term.

The Search for Compromise with the Bundestag and Bundesrat as Essential Parts of German Security Policy Decision-Making

The use of military means and taking responsibility internationally was, in this respect, not an easy task for Germany. The significance of the German institutional context was also reflected in Merkel’s statements as she stated relating to security policy that in the federal state of Germany, it was typical to spend time over slow negotiations with Bundestag and Bundesrat. She was, however, confident that
searches for compromise were worthwhile if in the end everybody backed the
decision made. There were things to learn relating to the speed of the decision-
making, but according to Merkel, the search for compromise was an essential part
of the security policy efforts in Germany. (Merkel 10 Nov 2006.)

Relating to military contribution, Merkel stressed that since 1949, German foreign
policy was not neutral:

‘Ich sage ganz deutlich: Ja, wir sind nicht neutral und wir wollen auch gar nicht
neutral sein. Deutschlands Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik seit 1949 war nie neutral.
Sie war, ist und bleibt wertgebunden. Wertgebundenheit ist das Gegenteil von
Neutralität. Deshalb engagieren wir uns seit Jahrzehnten in der Europäischen
Union. Deshalb engagieren wir uns in der Nato. Deshalb wollen wir eine starke
UNO. Deshalb engagieren wir uns für eine weltweite Durchsetzung des
internationalen Rechts für Frieden, für die Wahrung der Menschenrechte und für
Teilhabe. Deutschland ist nicht neutral. […] muss auch Deutschland einen Teil der
Verantwortung übernehmen, und zwar auch den militärischen.’ (Merkel 20 Sep
2006b.)

German foreign policy was value-bound; which Merkel saw as the opposite of
neutrality. Therefore, Germany engaged in the EU and NATO, urged a strong UN
and engaged in implementing international laws for peace and human rights.
However, according to Merkel, Germany should take responsibility, also militarily.
(Merkel 20 Sep 2006b.) Despite the rhetoric of taking responsibility, the signs of
continuity in German foreign policy were strong at the beginning of Merkel’s first
term.

Merkel continued to refer to history as she explained one of the key pillars in
German foreign policy:

‘Deutschland hat nach 1945 erfahren: Nicht alleine, sondern nur in der Gesellschaft
mit anderen kann man den eigenen Interessen am besten dienen. Europa als
Friedens- und Wertegemeinschaft war die bahnbrechende Idee des letzten
Jahrhunderts […]. Der Impuls dieser Idee leitet uns auch heute bei allen aussen-
und sicherheitspolitischen Entscheidungen. Deutschlands Sicherheit hängt auch von
der Sicherheit in anderen Regionen ab.’ (Merkel 20 Sep 2006b.)
According to Merkel, what Germany had experienced after 1945 was that not alone, but only with others was it possible to best advance one’s interests. Europe as a peace and value community was a pioneering idea of the past century and the impulse of this idea guided German decision-making in foreign and security policy. Merkel took the view that German security depended on the security of other regions. (Merkel 20 Sep 2006b.)

The Chancellor continued to explain why Germany and the EU were taking responsibility in different conflicts:

‘[…] Heute ist es die überwiegende Mehrheit der Menschen selbstverständlich geworden, dass wir hier Verantwortung übernehmen. […] Wir haben als Europäische Union im Quartett eine ganz wichtige Rolle im palästinensischen Konflikt übernommen. Das Engagement im Kongo bei der Absicherung der Wahlen reicht sich in die Verantwortlichkeiten ein. […] Europa kann seinen Anspruch, ein Wertesystem zu haben, nicht mehr allein bei sich durchsetzen, wenn wir es mit diesem Wertesystem ernst meinen, dann müssen wir vielmehr da helfen, wo andere allein nicht klarkommen. Das ist die Konsequenz aus dem von uns erhobenen Anspruch. […] Wir sind als Partner gewünscht, gefragt. […]’ (Merkel 11 May 2006.)

She pointed out that Europe was a desired partner and the consequence of the raised demands was that Europe should be there, where help was needed (Merkel 11 May 2006).

Merkel also reasoned how responsibility and German economic strength were related to one another:

‘[…] Aber ich sage es ganz bewusst: Wenn wir unsere Art, zu leben und zu wirtschaften, zu einer Art machen wollen, mit der wir uns auch in der Welt Anerkennung und Durchsetzung verschaffen, dann werden wir uns vor den Verantwortungen und Herausforderungen in der Welt nicht drücken können. Deshalb müssen wir auch wirtschaftlich stark sein. Wenn wir die Politik gestalten wollen – die Angst der Menschen ist, dass Politik nicht mehr die gestaltende Kraft hat, dann müssen wir das durchsetzen und dann dürfen wir uns nicht drücken. Wenn wir uns drücken, dann wird das so verstanden, als wenn wir vor den
Herausforderungen kapitulieren, und das wäre genau das Falsche.’ (Merkel 11 May 2006.)

According to Merkel, if Germany was to make its way of living and operating in a manner with which Germany could gain recognition in the world, then Germany could not lose the courage to confront challenges in the world. Therefore, Germany should be economically strong. If Germany wanted to shape politics, then Germany must, according to Merkel, carry on and not shirk. She stressed that in order for Germany to be able to manage these tasks, Europe must be capable of acting. (Merkel 11 May 2006.)

In 2006, the Middle East and Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) was at the centre of international affairs. Relating to Israel, Merkel stressed consistently that because of its history, Germany had a responsibility for Israel’s right to exist. Here, Germany supported a two-state solution. The military contribution for the stabilisation of Lebanon was a difficult decision for Germany. According to Merkel, it was a new step for Germany, to be engaged in the region, which had implications for German history. Merkel justified the engagement by stating that participation in the UNIFIL also meant engagement in the political process. She stressed that military stabilisation alone would not be enough, political processes were also necessary. (Merkel 1 Feb 2006, 20 Sep 2006b, 25 Oct 2006.)

If Merkel saw relations with the Arab-Islamic world as a central point of interest for Europe and Germany, she also viewed relations with Africa as a central interest of Europe (Merkel 10 Nov 2006). According to the Chancellor, the Bundeswehr securing the elections in Congo was, however, a difficult decision for the German government and Bundestag. Nevertheless, they concluded that a military engagement could be seen as responsible (Merkel 8 Jun 2006).
Iran was not an easy case for Germany, either. Merkel stressed a solution for the conflict and pointed out that the development of nuclear weapons should be prevented. She emphasised the role of the UN Security Council as a legitimate place for discussing conflicts internationally. According to Merkel, the cooperation between the EU, USA and Russia would be of significance with regards to Iran. She also viewed the role of Russia as strategic partner of Germany, as important. (Merkel 4 Feb 2006.)

In December 2006, shortly before Germany’s European Union and G8 Presidencies, Chancellor Merkel explained future German policies and courses of action during those Presidencies. She explained that Germany would look beyond the half year of its Presidency as well as beyond the European continent. She stated that Germany would link the EU Presidency programme with the work to be done within the G8 framework. This meant that the partnerships with Russia, Central Asia, China and India would be developed. The Chancellor took the view that the regions of Central Asia and North Africa would be of central interest for the future of the European Union. (Merkel 14 Dec 2006.) Thus, Merkel’s beliefs relating to the nature of the universe (P-1) were reinforcing and becoming more cooperative.

In reference to the German EU and G8 Presidencies, Merkel asked for support from the Bundestag and Bundesrat and stressed that the Presidencies should be made a national priority:

‘[…] Die Regierung alleine kann das nicht schaffen. Es kommt deshalb auf die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung, Bundestag, sowohl mit den Koalitionsfraktionen als auch mit den Oppositionsfaktionen, und auf die Zusammenarbeit mit den Ländern an. Machen wir diese Präsidentschaften zu einem gemeinsamen nationalen Anliegen.’ (Merkel 14 Dec 2006.)

This demonstrates how during the first term, Chancellor Merkel was dependent on a wider institutional consensus with the German parliament in agreeing on policies
and their content. She was ready to ‘tie her hands’ domestically and search for support and common ground with the parliament in order to be able to conduct both Presidencies successfully.

*A New Global Balance of Power Emerges; the Mutual Understanding and Political Responsibility Required for Combating Threats in Security Partnerships and Alliances*

In 2007, Chancellor Merkel assessed that the operational environment was marked by globalisation, technical revolution such as electronic information processing and increased competition:

‘[…] Das Ende des Kalten Krieges ging zunehmend mit dem einher, was wir heute Globalisierung nennen – hervorgerufen durch technische Revolutionen wie die elektronische Datenverarbeitung und das Internet. Informationen sind heute weltweit verfügbar. Der Wettbewerb verstärkt sich. […]’ (Merkel 19 Nov 2007.)

According to Merkel, an increasing number of countries took part in the economic growth, such as the emerging economies of China and India, which showed rapid growth rates (Merkel 19 Nov 2007). Merkel saw that a new global balance of power was emerging, the positive side of which was that the economic potential of the world rested on more shoulders than had ten years ago (Merkel 24 Jan 2007).

Relating to security policy, the bipolar system and deterrence had disappeared after the Cold War (Merkel 10 Feb 2007). Merkel maintained that instead of well-defined interest zones, the world was now marked by many centres of power: one superpower being the United States of the America, one being an even stronger, integrating Europe and the growing continents around them:

‘Der Abschreckung im Kalten Krieg mit klar definierten Interessenzonen folgt eine Welt vieler Kraftzentren – mit einer Supermacht, den Vereinten Staaten von
Amerika, einem sich immer starker integrierenden Europa und wachsenden Kontinenten um uns herum.[…]’ (Merkel 19 Nov 2007.)

There were, however, many threats; new conflicts, the increased number of nuclear states, asymmetrical threats such as terrorism and regional conflicts. Furthermore, Merkel pointed out that alongside classical threats there were also ecological-economic threats. The Chancellor urged a new understanding of security:

‘Ich glaube, globale Krisen in globaler Verantwortung anzunehmen, das verlangt ein neues, umfassendes Verständnis von Sicherheit. Weder beginnt noch endet unsere Sicherheitspolitik mit militärischen Einsätzen innerhalb der Nato oder der Europäischen Union oder mit finanziellen und personellen Beiträgen zu UN-Friedenstruppen. […]’ (Merkel 10 Feb 2007)

She held the view that security policy did not start or end with military operations within NATO or the EU or with financial contributions to UN troops (Merkel 10 Feb 2007).

According to Merkel, one could not act alone if one wanted to overcome crises. She held that nobody alone could master the threats: mastery could only succeed in security partnerships and alliances:


Merkel emphasised that new threats required new efforts and every state should begin at home. She assured that Germany would be prepared in accordance with its capacities and possibilities to accept these challenges. (Merkel 10 Feb 2007.)

It can be observed that Merkel’s beliefs relating to cooperative strategies (I-1) were prevailing as she stressed that all threats could be combated with joint action:
According to Merkel, if one wanted to act against threats, one must move closer together and be able to understand each other, which was also the philosophy behind the international agreements (Merkel 10 Feb 2007). Merkel viewed international agreements as a form of stating mutual understanding. It was not only about agreeing on joint rules and procedures but coming closer and starting to understand each other. Therefore, the international dissemination of beliefs and ideas was important because, over time, these beliefs may become a part of both international and domestic thinking worldwide. However, increasing international cooperation and relinquishing national competencies to international institutions might diminish the international room for manoeuvre but increase the domestic influence of the leader as he/she was the key person connecting the two levels.

The motto of the German EU Presidency was ‘Europe succeeds together’. Merkel saw that Europe’s responsibility had increased after the end of the Cold War (Merkel 10 Feb 2007). The Union, being one of the cornerstones of the German foreign policy, Merkel stressed that Germany would take responsibility as the largest national economy within the EU. Chancellor Merkel was confident that if Europe could speak with one voice, it would make it stronger. (Merkel 1 Feb 2007, 5 Feb 2007.) Cooperative beliefs relating to strategies and tactics (I-1, I-2) guided the Chancellor’s views on Europe as she stated that what the countries in Europe have experienced from history was that their own interests could only be furthered, if the interests of others are taken into consideration:
Wir haben in Europa nach Jahrhunderten schrecklichster Kriege und fürchterlichster Auseinandersetzungen irgendwann die Erfahrung gemacht, dass die eigenen Interessen besser durchzusetzen sind, wenn man auch die Interessen des anderen ein Stück weit mit bedenkt. […]’ (Merkel 1 Feb 2007.)

According to Merkel, the main emphasis of the German EU Presidency was on CFSP, which Germany was going to develop further during its Presidency. Here as well, Germany would be guided with the concept of ‘Vernetzte Sicherheit’. For example, crisis management could only be successful with a combination of military and civil efforts. According to Merkel, military force was also needed in extreme cases but in order to create a secure situation, civil efforts were also needed. They were crucial alongside economic reconstruction and development aid. Merkel emphasised that the comprehensive concept could be established only when Europe spoke with one voice. (Merkel 5 Feb 2007, 10 Feb 2007.) This meant that the concept agreed on the year before, was now being introduced operatively at the EU level. Furthermore, the concept was increasingly considering the linkages between security and stability and economic growth as well as development questions.

Merkel gave her support for the strengthening of the ESDP. However, she maintained that the structures of the ESDP should be compatible with NATO. It was important that there was no competition between ESDP and NATO. The current situation in the missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan showed some disagreements between the member states of the alliance relating to the police mission of the European Union and the military capacity of the NATO. According to Merkel, the ESDP did not need a theoretical superstructure but rather an implementation and the execution of intended actions. (Merkel 19 Nov 2007.)

Merkel saw that NATO’s overall profile in the 21st century was civil-military. It was a political-military alliance, which rested on a joint concept of values.
However, the tasks of NATO had changed since the Cold War. The two pillars of the German security policy, NATO and European integration, were, according to Merkel, two sides of the same coin. (Merkel 10 Feb 2007, 19 Nov 2007.)

According to Merkel, a joint security space, which went beyond North America and Europe, was needed. Therefore, the relations with Mediterranean countries would be strengthened. There was also willingness to develop relations with the East, especially with Russia. Merkel emphasised the importance of Russia in the solution of MEPP and agreements on the resolutions on Iran as well as with regard to the Balkans: together with Russia it was possible to achieve very much. (Merkel 10 Feb 2007.)

The Chancellor saw it as crucial that NATO would develop cooperation with Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Further, China and India should also be considered. According to Merkel, China in particular had an increasing role in the world economy and, therefore, it should also take more political responsibility. This aspiration also concerned other rising nations and Merkel argued that they should be encouraged to take a bit more political responsibility. Merkel pointed out that involvement, not exclusion, was the right approach to China. Here, one should be able to discuss all questions including human rights questions and development policy. (Ibid.) As Merkel’s beliefs relating to the nature of the political universe (P-1) reinforced, Merkel’s strategies also seemed to become increasingly cooperative (I-1).
**Cooperation and Sanctions: Reinforcing Cooperative Beliefs and Widening the Utility of Means**

In relation to the Middle East Peace Process, Merkel’s cooperative approach could be seen in how the vision of two state solution was advanced. Merkel stressed that although the region itself should want a solution, it should never be left alone:

‘Aber wir wissen doch: Letztlich muss eine Lösung auch von der Region selbst gewollt werden. Genauso wissen wir: Wir dürfen diese Region niemals alleine lassen. Genau deshalb war es für mich und für viele andere so wichtig, dass vor etwas mehr als seiner Wochen nach langer Zeit zum ersten Mal wieder das Nahost-Quartett getagt hat […]. […] Der Charakter des Quartetts, das sich aus Vertretern der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, der Europäischen Union, Russlands und der UNO zusammengesetzt, zeigt natürlich wieder das, was aus meiner Sicht so wichtig ist: Wir rücken zusammen, wir gehen die Dinge gemeinsam an, wir geben kohärente, gemeinsame Signale. Dies verzahnen wir mit Aktivitäten vor Ort.’ (Merkel 10 Feb 2007.)

Therefore, the role of the Middle East Quartet (United Nations, Russian Federation, United States and European Union) was important. Merkel held the view that this composition again showed that the world was moving together and that questions were tackled cooperatively. This approach was reinforced locally with different activities. (Merkel 10 Feb 2007.)

In the case of the nuclear program of Iran as well, the international community had made Iran a cooperation proposal, the aim of which was a diplomatic solution. According to Merkel, it was a sign of global responsibility to state that the UN Security Council had decided to prevent the threat caused by an Iranian nuclear weapons program. Merkel wanted, together with Russia and China as veto powers, to ensure that Iran fulfilled its commitments and that the sanction process would proceed if the conditions were not met. (Merkel 10 Feb 2007, 19 Nov 2007.)
Concerning Afghanistan, Merkel stressed that the ISAF-mission should be made successful. For this to happen, new thinking was required. According to Merkel, the German government saw that success could only be reached with the integrated approach of *Vernetzte Sicherheit*. Merkel maintained that NATO required assertiveness and persuasiveness in Afghanistan. Therefore, it was a good place to implement this strategic approach of civil and military elements. (Merkel 10 Feb 2007.)

By stressing the value of *Vernetzte Sicherheit* and comprehensive integrated security, Merkel also implied that softer and harder elements of power should be seen as complementary. Results could not be achieved only with harder means, softer means were also necessary. This concept might have been a step forward for shaping German understanding on the use of harder means e.g. sanctions and the use of military means as part of the German foreign policy toolbox (I-5). The use of sanctions would show that common rules have been broken, but the softer ones, political and diplomatic ones, would increase the possibility of finding common understanding and increase cooperation, which can be seen as a longer term approach. Thus, Merkel was gradually shaping the deeply grounded German foreign policy discourse towards viewing cooperation as a means in order to reach a goal, not as an end of itself, and foreign policy instruments as a way to enforce rules in the world.
The German G8 Presidency: the Operational Environment Becoming More Cooperative, Issue Linkages Emerge

In 2007, Germany took over the G8 Presidency under the theme ‘Growth and Responsibility’. During the German Presidency, the German government wanted to show its willingness to shape globalisation politically. According to Merkel, along with economic success also came responsibility, which reached well beyond one’s own region. Merkel pointed out that Germany wanted to take this responsibility in terms of the European Union. (Merkel 5 Feb 2007.) Merkel viewed open world markets as a precondition for global growth. She stressed that according to World Bank, there was significant growth in those countries that were actively taking part in globalisation. This referred both to industrialised and developing countries. (Merkel 24 Jan 2007.)

Referring to an old African saying, Merkel stated that ‘if one wanted to go fast, one should go alone; but if one wanted to go far, one should go together’. She took the view that there was a joint interest in concluding the Doha-Round. However, Merkel stressed that complementary to the multilateral approach, transatlantic economic relations should also be intensified. The USA was the largest trading partner of the EU and the potential had not yet been fully exploited. (Ibid.) She pointed out that strengthening transatlantic trade was not addressed against any third party (Merkel 19 Nov 2007). The multilateral approach in the trade policy, concluding with the Doha-Round, was of key importance but gradually bilateral and regional considerations also started to appear in Merkel’s statements. This might indicate that some form of pragmatic redefinition of cooperation was starting to take place in German foreign policy discourse.
According to Merkel, world trade was in the middle of a rapid change, which gave many new regions the possibility to take part in the growth (Merkel 5 Feb 2007). From all of the regions, the main emphasis of the German G8 Presidency was on Africa. Africa was at the centre of the German development policy. Merkel stressed that new thinking was needed for Africa. She maintained that Germany also valued Africa as a foreign policy partner. In connection with Africa, Merkel also pointed out the economic and trade aspects of the cooperation. (Merkel 4 Oct 2007.)

According to Merkel, the G8 states had intensified their engagement in Africa. The relationship between the G8 and Africa was, according to Merkel, a reform partnership:

‘[…] die G8 haben über Jahre ihr Engagement für Afrika intensiviert und zum international erstärkten Interesse an Afrika beigetragen. […] Wir haben dabei Wert darauf gelegt, festzuhalten, dass die Partnerschaft zwischen den G8 und Afrika eine Reformpartnerschaft ist. […]’ (Merkel 4 Oct 2007.)

Relating to African countries, it was important for the Chancellor to support and strengthen their own structures and regional organisations, especially the African Union, (Merkel 10 Feb 2007) the role of which was significant for international cooperation (Merkel 4 Oct 2007). The AU was as an important partner for the EU. The EU supported the AU with peacekeeping missions and financial contribution. In reference to development aid, the Chancellor spoke on behalf of politics between the EU and Africa that would go some way beyond classical development aid. (Merkel 4 Oct 2007.)

Chancellor Merkel emphasised Africa’s own responsibility with ‘Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe’ (Merkel 10 Feb 2007). She argued that development aid and the support of the western countries were not enough. It was important that Africa was willing to make reforms and take part in the global partnership of sustainable development in
order to reach political progress, economic growth and to overcome poverty. (Merkel 4 Oct 2007.)

During the first term, Merkel also started to call for a strong partnership with the states around the Mediterranean Sea and stressed the responsibility of the European Union for the political stability of the region. In addition to Africa, relations with the Arab world were also, according to Merkel, a special concern for Germany, not only because of close economic relations, but also because of their common value conceptions. (Merkel 18 Feb 2008.)

The emerging powers, which Merkel first termed as the O5 e.g. China, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa and India, were increasingly taken more into consideration by Merkel:

‘[…] Ich will darauf hingewiesen, dass wir qualitative einen riesigen Schritt gemacht haben, der seine Wirkung während der G8-Präsidentschaft Deutschlands noch nicht richtig entfaltet hat. Das ist ein permanenter strukturierter Dialog, der von der OECD mit den O5-Ländern – also von den Schwellenländern Indien, China, Mexico, Südafrika und Brasilien – geführt wird. Er wird eine neue Form der Kooperation auf internationaler Ebene ermöglichen, wenn er gut geführt wird.’ (Merkel 19 Nov 2007.)

Germany, during its G8 Presidency, initiated a permanent structured dialogue of the OECD with the O5. Merkel saw that this dialogue would facilitate a new form of cooperation on the international level. (Merkel 19 Nov 2007.) According to Merkel, in the framework of this dialogue, the ‘Heiligendamm Process’, conditions for investments, the support and protection of innovations, development cooperation, energy efficiency and technologies could be discussed. These were the first themes with which a new qualitative step had been reached. (Merkel 28 Aug 2007.) Furthermore, Merkel pointed out that it should be discussed in the G8 format, which should be the relationship between the WTO, UN, WB and IMF (Merkel 19 Nov 2007).
The increasing role of the emerging powers, new regions and regional organisations became apparent in Merkel’s statements as she held many of her foreign policy speeches on these continents, particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Gradually, issue linkages also began to appear in Merkel’s foreign policy speeches. Especially during the German G8 Presidency, the Chancellor started to control the international agenda and use her power by linking different issue areas such as the economy, energy and climate more closely together.

Merkel held the view that climate protection and welfare belonged together in which there was also link between economic and climate policies. Therefore, it was economically reasonable to act in the right way from an ecological perspective. If not, the economic impact of non-action would have dramatic consequences. (Merkel 31 Aug 2007.)

The Chancellor saw it as important to keep the consumption of energy separate from economic growth. However, energy was a prerequisite for economic development. Therefore, according to Merkel, a new dialogue was necessary between those who consume and those who produce. Merkel took the view that the energy issue, as an exciting field of cooperation, linked with climate change, should be discussed internationally. (Merkel 5 Feb 2007.)

Trade aspects and the German role as an export nation was also linked to climate policies. Merkel maintained that reducing CO2 emissions provided the opportunity for Germany to conquer new markets with climate friendly technologies. She maintained that it was intelligent to practice climate protection and, at the same time, make climate protection attractive for companies. (Merkel 31 Aug 2007.)
‘Development Policy Has Crucial Role in Shaping Globalisation Fairly’

Chancellor Merkel discussed her views on development policy in shaping globalisation at a CDU/CSU parliamentary group’s conference. According to her, development policy was not the only political factor at play, but played a crucial role in shaping of fair globalisation:

‘Wir wissen, dass bei der gerechten Gestaltung der Globalisierung die Entwicklungspolitik eine Schlüsselrolle spielt. Sie ist nicht der einzige politische Faktor, aber sie spielt eine Schlüsselrolle. Wir verstehen Entwicklungspolitik als internationale Strukturpolitik. Wir können damit notwendige wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Veränderungen in den Entwicklungsländern partnerschaftlich mit diesen Ländern und den Menschen dort gestalten. […]’ (Merkel 31 Jan 2007.)

Merkel viewed development policy as an international structural policy. According to her, necessary economic and societal changes in the developing countries could be shaped with a partnership-based approach. Merkel pointed out that in a globalised world, a problem that was not solved elsewhere, would one day reach other parts of the world. (Merkel 31 Jan 2007.)

Merkel argued that development policy was both value and interest-bound:

‘Ich glaube erstens, dass gute Entwicklungspolitik werte- und zugleich interessengebundene ist. Die Globalisierung wir auf Dauer nur Früchte tragen, wenn es zwischen den Ländern dieser Erde wenigstens einen kleinen gemeinsamen Nenner an Werteverständnis gibt. […] wir dürfen auch über Interessen sprechen. […] Das heißt also, Entwicklungspolitik ist Politik im eigenen Interesse und eine Politik, die den Interessenausgleich fördert. […] wir können unsere eigenen Interessen dann am besten durchsetzen, wenn wir uns um die Interessen der anderen möglichst wenig kümmern. Dieser Ansatz ist dramatisch gescheitert. […]’ (Merkel 31 Jan 2007.)

According to her, globalisation would only be successful if there was at least a small common denominator on understanding the values between the world’s countries. However, it was also acceptable to speak about interests. This meant that development policy was interest-led and a policy that promoted a balance of
interests. Merkel stated that the approach, according to which it was possible to establish one’s own interests the best when the interests of others were taken into consideration as little as possible, had failed dramatically. (Merkel 31 Jan 2007.) Thus, the implications for continuity and civilian power rhetoric still prevailed in German foreign policy, only now it was complemented with the promotion of interests.

Merkel took the European Union as an example case where the interests of others were taken into consideration and thereby one’s own interests were simultaneously furthered:

‘[…] Wir haben auch erlebt – und das ist eines der Erfolgskomponenten der Europäischen Union –, dass die Mitberücksichtigung der Interessen des anderen den eigenen Interessen zum Schluss mehr dient. Und dieses Denken muss ein globales Denken werden. Ohne Ausgleich von Interessen können wir weder die Zukunft erfolgreich gestalten, noch die Kräfte der Globalisierung menschlich formen.’ (Merkel 31 Jan 2007.)

She argued that this thinking should become global. She emphasised that without the balancing of interests, neither could the future nor the forces of the globalisation be shaped in a humane way. (Merkel 31 Jan 2007.)

Merkel also argued that good development policy was more than well drilling:

‘[…] Gute Entwicklungspolitik ist eben mehr als einfach nur Brunnenbohren. Das heißt, Entwicklungspolitik ist Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe, partnerschaftliche Zusammenarbeit an Lösungen für die unterschiedlichen Regionen […].’ (Merkel 31 Jan 2007.)

Good Development policy was assistance in helping oneself ‘Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe’, based on cooperation between partners on solutions for different regions (Merkel 31 Jan 2007). Merkel stressed that good development policy was problem- and partner- oriented providing different channels of cooperation. Good development policy also had clear goals and was based on trust in order to create a common
guiding principle. Therefore, it should take a win-win situation as a starting point. It was about mutual interest. In that way, it was possible to find a common principle:


Merkel also stated that good development policy was strategic: it needed interaction with other fields of policy such as foreign policy, finance policy, trade policy, agricultural policy and security and defence policy:

‘Gute Entwicklungspolitik ist strategisch aufgestellt, das heißt sie braucht das Zusammenwirken mit anderen Politikfeldern – das ist die Außenpolitik, das ist die Finanzpolitik, das ist die Handelspolitik, das ist die Agrarpolitik, und zum Teil eben auch die Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. […] Wir haben als Bundesregierung hier einen sehr umfassenden Ansatz. Das Parlament fordert uns als Regierung auch immer wieder auf, diesen vernetzten Ansatz, der auf verschiedenen Säulen gleichrangig ruht, voranzutreiben.’ (Merkel 31 Jan 2007.)

Merkel stated that the German government had a comprehensive approach and the parliament demanded the government proceeded with this integrated approach (Merkel 31 Jan 2007).

In questions relating to globalisation, Merkel pointed out that acceptance for state policies were needed, not only in the world community but also domestically. She took the view that if the people did not have an impression that politics had the entitlement to shape things, to serve people back home as well as worldwide, then there would be a significant problem of acceptance for politics altogether (Merkel 22 Nov 2006). This showed how important the general public, both domestically
and internationally, was for Merkel. Therefore, international policies were to be influential both internationally and domestically.

‘Wir Haben Es Gemeinsam Geschafft, Die Ziele zu Erreichen’ – ‘Tying Hands’ Brought Merkel International Room for Manoeuvre During German Presidencies

At the end of the year, the Chancellor listed the achievements of the German EU and G8 Presidency to the German Parliament. She stressed that Europe would be the future: nation states could not manage global trade, environmental protection, illegal migration and international security questions alone (Merkel 1 Mar 2007). She emphasised that the summits with third countries such as the USA, Russia, Canada and Japan, demonstrated that together, Europe could assert its objectives in the world and set a foreign policy course (Merkel 14 Jun 2007).

Merkel pondered the future role of the European Union after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. She saw it as important that Europe could then turn to the design of its future role in the global world. Europe’s interests must be focused and they must also be carried through. In order to be able to represent security interests effectively, political will as well as capabilities and means were necessary. According to Merkel, it was an advantage for the EU that it possessed an equal share of military and civil means. However, they must be brought in a right balance; for example, the instrument of crisis prevention must be strengthened. (Merkel 12 Dec 2007.)

Merkel showed her gratitude to the German Parliament by stating that goals had been achieved together, including with the German Bundestag.

The Chancellor tied her hands by connecting the German Bundestag closely to the conduct of the Presidencies. However, it may have been the only option she had in order to gain some international room for manoeuvre. The German concept of Vernetzte Sicherheit, which was gradually also introduced to NATO and EU discussions, needed to be justified along with the international policies in the domestic arena as well, in front of the German Parliament.

The German Presidencies were marked by couple of characteristics. The responsibility brought about by the dual Presidencies was used as an effective power base. Firstly, Merkel enhanced the cooperative image of German foreign policy by searching for possibilities for cooperation from among different organisations and continents. Here, she often engaged in actively discussing Europe’s future foreign policy role and instruments. During its Presidencies, Germany took responsibility in showing the desired direction for future European foreign policy as well.

Secondly, the G8 Presidency gave Merkel the possibility to gradually link different policies and means from economic policy to environmental, energy, security and development policies together. The Presidency holder has an important role e.g. in agenda setting, framing different questions and in interlinking them as well as in discussing how these questions should be approached internationally.

The responsibility taken during the Presidencies led Chancellor Merkel to justify to the Bundestag that German foreign policy was still value-based: Germany’s economic interests and democracy and human rights were two sides of the same
coin (Merkel 12 Dec 2007). As head of the Grand Coalition, Merkel had tied her hands and, therefore, she had to explain German’s policies to the Bundestag and justify that despite international responsibility, Germany would hold to its value-based policies.

*Globalisation Should be Shaped Politically and International Agreements are Important*

In 2008, Chancellor Merkel pointed out that enhancing interdependence between states also increased one’s responsibility for the problems of others. Merkel saw that the globalisation could be shaped politically. Therefore, the international agreements were very important:


Merkel maintained that it was Germany’s task to be ready to resolve the problems of others as that was in the spirit of international cooperation (Merkel 18 Feb 2008).

Overall, Merkel saw the world as going through a transformation process from the Cold War progressing towards a new world, which could be defined by multipolarity. According to the Chancellor, the United States of America also had an essential role in this world but there would no longer be a one single superpower that could resolve the conflicts of the world against others. (Merkel 26
May 2008.) Gradually, the emerging economies were starting to gain ground in Merkel’s philosophical and theoretical deliberations about how current world politics should be viewed. Now the world was marked by multipolarity, which also had implications for the function of the international organisations. The best place for shaping globalisation was, according to Merkel, at the UN. However, she highlighted that the UN should be reformed in order to be better able to adapt to the changed power conditions. (Merkel 18 Feb 2008.)

Merkel emphasised that the aim of German foreign and security policy was to contribute to a peaceful and free world and to stability and welfare, not only for Germany, but also all over the world. She argued that German foreign policy was value-bound and that the best policy was to look after Germany’s interests and that interest-led and value-bound policies belonged together. According to Merkel, the guiding principles of German action were freedom, the rule of law and human dignity. (Merkel 10 Mar 2008.) Thus, the values guiding Germany’s international policies had remained unchanged, indicating a strong continuity approach to the conduct of foreign policy.

Merkel emphasised that this value-bound policy should be internationally coordinated as broadly as possible and that discussions with allies and partners were especially important, as the solutions offered by single nation states only helped in rare cases:

Hereby, Merkel reinforced the view that her aim was to persuade partners with the German way of thinking, with its values and beliefs. She viewed partnerships as the essential factors for success for international cooperation:


Security policy partnerships in particular were of key importance. The Chancellor maintained that the transatlantic value and defence community, alongside a strong NATO was the foundation of German foreign policy, as guarantor for security in Germany and Europe. (Merkel 18 Feb 2008.) Here as well, multipolarity would change the former state of play. The USA as one of the world superpowers would be forced to discuss its conflicts with others. (Merkel 26 May 2008.)

According to Merkel, alliances that went beyond the transatlantic partnership were also necessary. Merkel argued that one of the most significant future questions within NATO would be how the transatlantic alliance would act in relation to other partners. She also saw that the theoretical discussions within NATO were good but that practical realisation was something else altogether. Therefore, it was important that if one wanted to discuss issues, one should also take responsibility in practice. (Ibid.)

As in previous years, Merkel highlighted that the ESDP should not be seen as against NATO, but they should be rather viewed as intertwined. Thus, they were not in competition and should take joint responsibility in providing more security. The security architecture needed both NATO’s and the EU’s capabilities. Therefore, cooperation between those two was necessary. However, there were
some pitfalls that caused some concerns e.g. the situation between Cyprus and Turkey. It was also important for Merkel that the practical execution of the European Security Strategy was put forward during the French EU Presidency. (Merkel 18 Feb 2008, 10 Mar 2008, 26 May 2008.)

Merkel also stressed cooperation within the European Union, OSCE and the UN. She pointed out that the best way for the EU to persuade others and show that its value base was the correct one was that the EU member states would act together. In this way, the EU and also NATO could develop the power to persuade others with their beliefs. (Merkel 26 Aug 2008.) Thus, the development of influential international soft power for the EU and NATO was dependent on effective cooperation within and between these organisations. In traditional German foreign policy discourse reflecting continuity, Germany mainly aimed at influencing through international organisations. During her first term, this was also reflected in Chancellor Merkel’s statements. Multilateral cooperation was crucial for Germany as an end of itself, although cooperation was gradually also seen as a way to influence.

*German Value-bound Foreign Policy in Action: ‘Value Base Should Be Discussed with Russia’*

The Chancellor also raised values to the centre of action in reference to the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008. She argued that Russia did not comply with the Six-Point Peace Plan. In addition, Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which, according to Merkel, contradicted the principles of territorial integrity and was, therefore, unacceptable. Merkel maintained that the war in
Georgia did not only change the South Caucasus, it changed the circumstances of world politics:


Merkel stressed that she supported talks and dialogue. However, this only made sense, when there was a joint value base. Therefore, this value base should be discussed with Russia in future. (Merkel 26 Aug 2008.) This statement shows how values guided German foreign thinking and created the basis for interests. Highlighting values also had another purpose: it was an influential soft power base with which others could be persuaded internationally: it was crucial to get others, like Russia and other rising economies, to the same value community as the rest of the Western world, otherwise they would form a significant ‘other’, which might result in undesirable future prospects. One way to manage the conflict of beliefs, ideas and values was to frame policies and create issue linkages that best suited the German way of thinking and which, over time, would help to coordinate and adjust differences in the views between Western countries and the rest of the world.

According to Merkel, a genuine partnership between the EU and Russia required orientation towards values and principles such as human rights, democracy and international law. Without a common value base, said cooperation was difficult:

‘[…] Wenn wir eine echte Partnerschaft zwischen der Europäischen Union und Russland wollen, dann verlangt das, dass wir uns an gemeinsamen Werten und Grundprinzipien orientieren. […] Zu den unveräußerlichen Werten und Grundprinzipien gehört die Achtung von Menschenrechten, demokratischen Prinzipien und internationalem Recht. Wenn das nicht mehr eine gemeinsame Basis ist, dann ist Kooperation natürlich schwierig. Das sind auch die Voraussetzungen, auf denen unsere eigenen Bündnisse beruhen – Voraussetzungen für den Aufbau
von Partnerrchaften der Europäischen Union mit Staaten und Regionen in aller Welt. [...]’ (Merkel 26 Aug 2008.)

In relation to the partnership and cooperation agreement between the EU and Russia, the Chancellor pointed out that the future of the dialogue depended on how committed the parties were to the guidelines of cooperation. She reminded everyone that not only specific relations with the EU member states rested on these guidelines, but all the foreign relations of the EU were based on them. Further, this related to all international cooperation, including with NATO. (Merkel 26 Aug 2008.)

Chancellor Merkel took the view that there was a fundamental interest in intensifying NATO-Russia cooperation. She pointed out that there should be NATO-Russia Summits scheduled more closely in relation to each other. In this forum, it would also be possible discuss mutual interests and threats, such as Iran. Additionally, questions such as missile defence might require a regular dialogue between NATO and Russia. (Merkel 26 May 2008.) In addition, Merkel stressed the proposal of a real partnership between NATO and Russia, which was reflected in the NATO-Russia Council. The aim of the Council was to create joint security and stability region in Europe. Here as well, Merkel stressed that the cooperation also required trust and joint values. (Merkel 26 Aug 2008.)

Merkel emphasised both Germany’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods. In the east, the strategic partnership with Russia would be developed. The stability in the Western Balkans could be reached only when there was a close connection to the European Union. She also called upon a strong partnership with the states around the Mediterranean Sea and stressed the responsibility of the European Union for the political stability in the region. (Merkel 18 Feb 2008.)
Merkel maintained that Africa was of utmost importance to the EU because of its location in the neighbourhood. She was pleased that self-commitment was increasing in the African countries. She spoke for modern development cooperation, which also included institution building and this was firmly established in the partnership programme with the African Union. (Ibid.)

Other regions were also considered by Merkel. The relations with the Arab world were, according to Merkel, a special concern for Germany, not only because of their close economic relations, but also because of their common value conceptions. Merkel also pledged improvement and increasing partnerships with the states in Latin America. Furthermore, partnerships with the Asian countries could be served in shaping the global system. Of special important were relations with China. (Ibid.)

*The Increased Linkages of Policies and Means for Furthering Interests and Persuading Others Internationally*

In the era of globalisation, not only states are interdependent, different issue areas are also more closely linked to each other. As Merkel described, many of the global challenges that states faced were intertwined:

‘Ich glaube, die Herausforderungen, vor denen wir alle stehen, sind vergleichbar, wenn es um Herausforderungen des Terrorismus, der Gefahren, die sich aus der Weiterverbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen ergeben, und Herausforderungen des Handels geht, der fair und frei sein muss. Wir streben wirtschaftliches Wachstum an. Wir müssen uns um die Zukunft unseres Planeten kümmern. Hierzu gehört vor allen Dingen der Klimaschutz, genauso auch die Schonung von Ressourcen, die Sicherung der Energieversorgung, die Voraussetzung dafür ist, dass Wachstum möglich ist, nicht zuletzt auch die Bekämpfung von Armut und Hunger sowie Entwicklung des Bildungs- und Gesundheitswesens in unseren Ländern […]’. (Merkel 18 Feb 2008.)
It might have been Merkel’s perception that issues were linked to each other more than before. However, it is also possible to create political linkages between issues and policies in order to further one’s interests or persuade others. The German G8 Presidency created such a platform in which Chancellor Merkel could bring forward different questions from economic development, energy, climate and security issues closer together and promote the German way of thinking.

On the policy level, Merkel viewed that security and reconstruction were interrelated: “ohne Sicherheit kein Wiederaufbau, aber ohne Wiederaufbau auch keine Sicherheit“. She explained that military measures were necessary from time to time but they could only bring about sustainable success when there were also developmental measures involved and these measures went hand in hand. This was the leading idea in both Afghanistan and within the NATO alliance. (Merkel 18 Feb 2008.)

The dimension of the security challenges also included climate protection. In 2009, in Copenhagen, Merkel proposed that there should be a follow-up agreement to Kyoto-Protocol, which would be developed under the UN umbrella. Merkel stressed that the industrialised nations knew their responsibility. Therefore, Germany had also set ambitious goals for decreasing CO2 emissions. Merkel viewed this as a qualitative step that required technological efforts, which in turn might increase German economic power and increase export possibilities. She acknowledged that there were commitments to developing countries to employ technological capabilities in order to also help others achieve economic growth and climate protection together. (Ibid.)

If the challenges faced by the states were complex, more integrated responses were also required. Merkel stressed that the security architecture must be further
interconnected on the international level and that the instruments of crisis management should be better coordinated. She highlighted that the UN, EU and NATO were the main forums where these connections should be carried out. She pointed to the Vernetzte Sicherheit as a comprehensive political concept that should also be reflected on in the everyday work of the NATO. (Merkel 10 Mar 2008.)

Chancellor Merkel explained the new integrated German security concept that with the change of challenges after the Cold War states must now also face even more complex challenges, which should be combated with completely new means. Merkel stressed that societies also had to be asked to back up the use of these means:


The Chancellor needed to disseminate the new concept internationally but she also wanted to gain wide support for the use of these new means domestically. The support of the Bundestag and ‘tying hands’ domestically was crucial in order to get international room for manoeuvre, in order to be able to disseminate this new thinking on the international level and ensure that the concept was also accepted as part of the thinking within NATO and the ESDP.

Merkel also pondered if there would always be military tasks. According to her, not all problems could be resolved with civil societal means and political dialogue. It was, therefore, not possible to disconnect military components from other efforts. The new thinking had already caused some changes within government practice and the parliamentary field in Germany. It had led to consultations between
NGOs, the Bundeswehr, police force and foreign policy officials. According to the Chancellor, it was good that NGOs negotiated with military staff, because it would lead to a changed way of thinking. (Merkel 26 May 2008.)

According to Merkel, the tasks of the Bundeswehr had also changed after the Cold War and these tasks should be redefined. She stated that the Bundeswehr had become a recognised part of society. She stressed that she had always spoken on behalf of maintaining compulsory military service, which was supported by the German public. She stated that redefinition of the tasks would require difficult decisions from the government and parliament. Merkel explained that concerning the Bundeswehr and its foreign assignments, wide support was desired and there was solid cooperation with the German Bundestag. (Merkel 10 Mar 2008.) Here as well, Merkel admitted that she was ready to ‘tie her hands’ with regards to the German parliament and aimed at a wide consensus with parliament in military-related matters.

7.2.2. The Outbreak of the Financial Crisis Triggers Demands for Goal-Oriented Cooperation

The outbreak of the financial crisis in the autumn of 2008 raised the question of interdependence and different forms of cooperation on the international agenda. Chancellor Merkel stressed the importance of finding the architecture of the world in the form of international cooperation as follows:

‘Ich sage, wir haben noch nicht die Architektur der Welt in Form von internationaler Kooperation, wie wir sie brauchen, um Antworten auf die Fragen zu finden, die sich uns stellen – von den sicherheitspolitischen Fragen, sprich: Stärkung der UNO und des UN-Sicherheitsrates, bis zu finanzpolitischen Fragen, sprich: neue Rolle des IWF und Finanzmarktrechteln. Diese Architektur müssen wir finden;
The awareness of the financial crisis led Chancellor Merkel to repeatedly underline the importance of cooperation and how the new challenges could only be overcome together. She outlined the progress that should be made in creating global institutions and agreements so that everybody could be satisfied and live peacefully with globalisation. (Merkel 7 Feb 2009.)

More recently, the financial crisis heightened the importance of the different G-groupings. Merkel argued that the financial crisis and worldwide economic crisis showed how essential it was to combine forces. These questions could not be resolved at the European level alone. The G8 states could not do it on their own anymore either. Merkel started to see the ‘Heiligendamm Process’, an initiative of Germany during its G8 Presidency, as a basis on which future cooperation could be developed:

‘Wir können auch auf der europäischen Ebene die Dinge nicht allein lösen. Auch die G8-Staaten können das nicht mehr. Deutschland hatte deshalb während seiner G8-Präsidentschaft 2007 einen so genannten Heiligendamm-Prozess angestoßen, bei dem die großen Schwellenländer Indien, China, Mexico, Brasilien und Südafrika mit der G8 auf der Plattform der OECD zusammenarbeiten. Dieser Dialog ist inzwischen sehr substanziell und permanent. Ich glaube, dass wir darauf aufbauen können, um die Architektur der zukünftigen Zusammenarbeit weiterzuentwickeln.’ (Merkel 9 Feb 2009.)

She stressed that there was a need for decisions to be made in an international framework and saw the G20 meeting in November 2008, in the form of heads of the state, as a genuine milestone in reaching international decisions. She also initiated more long-term thinking about whether, in addition to G8, G8+G5 and G20, there should be an economic council, similar to Security Council, within the UN, which would address economic questions. Thus, according to Merkel, building a global architecture, where all states would have the possibility to be
included, was critically important. (Merkel 9 Feb 2009.) In her speech to the diplomatic corps in February 2009, Merkel went through all the points and cooperation settings from Africa, Asia and Latin America to the cooperation with the United States, the EU and Russia. By this she may have reflected on the necessity of getting all nations from different regions behind her initiatives.

Chancellor Merkel was confident that there must be global regulations in order to be able to make globalisation serve the needs of the individual, but this could only be accomplished by states. This also acted as a further justification for the necessity of UN reform: the UN should become more important, something that also related to development cooperation. First, development cooperation should be strengthened or at least it should be prevented as that the crisis would not reduce it. Second, Merkel argued that the means of development cooperation should be made more goal-oriented and effective. Here, she emphasised the responsibility of African states in supporting transparency and good governance. Furthermore, the role of the African Union in setting standards and benchmarks was also essential. Merkel also stressed the partnership with Asian countries in developing global regulation. She saw that because of their experience from the late 90’s, it was possible to learn from the Asian countries about how to combat financial crisis. (Merkel 9 Feb 2009.)

Thus, Chancellor Merkel stressed that the cooperation structures within the multilateral institutions should be developed strategically and that they should be made a bit more binding and not predetermined from case to case:

‘[…] Das heißt, diese Formen der Kooperation mit multilateralen Institutionen müssen fixiert werden, strategisch ausgearbeitet und ein Stück weit auch verbindlich werden und nicht von Fall zu Fall, mehr oder weniger fällig entschieden werden. Das heißt also, die Nato muss sich als Garant für unsere kollektive Sicherheit begreifen und damit einen festen und beschriebenen Platz im Konzept der vernetzten Sicherheit einnehmen.’ (Merkel 10 Nov 2008.)
According to Merkel, this meant that NATO should understand itself as guarantor of collective security and occupy a stable place in concept of the *Vernetzte Sicherheit* (Merkel 10 Nov 2008). She urged proposals for a new strategic concept for NATO where how far NATO can be seen as a political alliance would be defined, in which the concept of “*Vernetzte Sicherheit*” could apply:

‘[…] Die Antwort, die das neue strategische Konzept geben muss, muss die Antwort auf die Frage sein, inwieweit sich die Nato als politisches Bündnis versteht, das eine vernetzte Sicherheit auch als ihre Aufgabe betrachtet – immer auch in Kooperation mit Entwicklungshilfe, mit politischem Gestaltungsauftrag und natürlich vertraglichen Regelungen weit über das Militärische hinaus. […]’ (Merkel 10 Nov 2008.)

Merkel maintained that the concept of *Vernetzte Sicherheit* was the right answer for the challenges of the 21st century. According to her, this strategic concept should include how the military capacities of NATO could be paired with the concept of the *Vernetzte Sicherheit.* (Merkel 7 Feb 2009.)

Merkel stressed that NATO must be a place for political discussions. She argued that it was not possible to call for *Vernetzte Sicherheit* and see NATO as solely a military alliance:

‘[…] Die Nato muss ein Ort politischer Diskussionen sein. Man kann nicht Vernetzte Sicherheit fördern und anschließend die Nato nur als militärisches Bündnis begreifen. Das wir schief gehen, die wesentlichen transatlantischen Diskussionen werden dann woanders ablaufen.’ (Merkel 7 Feb 2009.)

She spoke about NATO as a central anchor of the transatlantic alliance, where common interests, based on common values, were combined. She also welcomed France back to the NATO structures and stressed that the Article 5 would stay as the core of this alliance:

‘[…] Artikel 5 als Bestandsartikel bleibt der Kern der Allianz. Die transatlantische Achse ist die Grundlage unserer Sicherheitsarchitektur. […] Die Nato ist ein militärisches Bündnis. Das heißt, wir müssen Wege finden – das muss Teil dieses neuen strategischen Konzepts sein -, wie wir die militärischen Fähigkeiten der Nato
Merkel was redefining NATO’s focus slightly towards a military alliance with a traditional hard core: collective defence. However, this did not mean that the policy instruments could not adhere to those of concept of ‘Vernetzte Sicherheit’ with military and political instruments being combined. In this case, it was more about defining NATO’s ‘Raison d’Être’, purpose and future goals.

The reasons for the urge to start to redefine NATO in 2008 and 2009 can be seen as manifold. It may be that the outbreak of the financial crisis may have sped up the need to also reframe security policy. The financial and economic crisis was also a blow to national defence budgets, which may have led Merkel to seek more synergies with NATO. In addition, the German Bundeswehr was under pressure to be restructured in the coming years. Therefore, it was necessary to also start to emphasise the traditional core of the alliance, Article 5, collective defence. The second reason is a purely speculative one and relates to Moravcsik’s (1994) theoretical framework, the two-level-game approach and the interdependence of states. According to Moravcsik, the interdependence of states can also be seen in how the policy of one state can affect the policy in another state and it is, therefore, possible that the decision-makers in one country deliberately try to persuade another country’s constituents to get behind a particular policy. Getting France to re-enter NATO structures must have been in the interest of Germany. However, France’s position towards NATO was clear; it supported the definition of NATO as purely a military alliance. Thus, Chancellor Merkel might have tried to get France to re-enter NATO structures by trying to persuade not only the French
President but also the French parliament, responsible for the decisive vote, by reminding the French of NATO’s military core.

Furthermore, Chancellor Merkel took a stand on how the ESDP should be seen in relation to NATO. As she has already emphasised earlier, they should be seen as ‘with each other’ instead of ‘next to each other’:

‘[…] Mir ist absolut wichtig, dass es kein Nebeneinander, sondern ein Miteinander gibt. […] dass wir vielleicht Jahrzehnte gebraucht haben, um ein vernünftiges, ineinander verzahntes Konzept von Nato und Europäischer Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik auszuarbeiten. […] Hier muss etwas passieren, damit dieses Verzahnen reibungsloser und nicht wieder nur von Fall zu Fall, jedes Mal mühselig verhandelt, geschafft wird. […] Deutschland will auch dazu beitragen.’ (Merkel 10 Nov 2008.)

She was critical towards the military capacity of the ESDP because it was not focused enough, especially in relation to the battle groups, in which she saw NATO as far ahead. Merkel viewed ESDP as a new form of cooperation with NATO, thereby making NATO stronger. She did not see the relationship as a competition but rather as an opportunity to make case-to-case joint analyses and common decision-making on which form of mission was appropriate. Therefore, cooperation within NATO could be made stronger through ESDP. (Merkel 7 Feb 2009.)

Merkel maintained that it was important to think about how Russia could be integrated in the security architecture:

Merkel emphasised that Russia was also a part of Europe and, therefore, relations with Russia were of utmost importance. According to her, one of the mechanisms for maintaining these relations was the NATO-Russia Council, which should be intensified, as well as to deepen cooperation between the EU, ESDP and Russia. Merkel argued that it was in everybody’s interest for Russia to be included to the future security architecture and that this should be undertaken jointly with NATO and the ESDP. (Merkel 7 Feb 2009.) Merkel also spoke about the need for intensifying EU-Russia relations, including energy policy and, through the Eastern Partnership, providing new cooperation possibilities for e.g. Ukraine and Moldova (Merkel 9 Feb 2009).

Although Merkel saw the German-Russian strategic partnership as the central element in shaping their cooperation and urged an intensification in contacts between the European Union and Russia, the Chancellor stressed that the precondition for the success was trust. She also highlighted the importance of Russian civil society, because without the engagement of civil society, it was not possible to build viable and powerful societies. (Merkel 16 Jul 2009.)

In the case of Iran, Merkel supported a diplomatic solution and negotiations with Iran, as she had also done in the previous years:

However, now Merkel began to widen the cooperative strategy (I-1) to the hard core of security policy and to speak about a world without nuclear weapons. The premise of Iran possessing a nuclear weapon also appeared in her reasoning, which also gave her justification to start to speak about harder sanctions (I-5) in order to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear capabilities. (Merkel 7 Feb 2009.)

The cooperative approach (I-1, I-2) could also be seen in out-of-area operations. Merkel repeatedly emphasised that no country alone could resolve international conflicts in today’s world, not matter how big that country was. Therefore, the cooperative approach should be perceived as the basis of action. (Ibid.) The Chancellor stressed that it should be noted that the Arab and Asian countries fulfilled their responsibility together with Western countries in Afghanistan. Merkel saw this as a new experience for NATO’s alliances that was not known of before. (Merkel 10 Nov 2008.)

Merkel pointed out that the new strategic concept of NATO should be in line with, and come close to, the concept of *Vernetzte Sicherheit*. She also stated that in reference to Afghanistan, NATO had come close to the goal of this concept. However, alongside this concept, a regional approach was also of importance in dealing with international conflicts. In the case of Afghanistan, this meant that the situation in Pakistan should also be considered. (Merkel 7 Feb 2009.)

Thus, after the outbreak of the financial crisis, Merkel’s beliefs relating to the nature of the political universe and her approach to strategy and tactics were reinforcing and becoming increasingly cooperative. Furthermore, Merkel’s definition of cooperation was becoming ever more instrumental and goal-oriented, where, in addition to a multilateral approach, indicating continuity, regional and bilateral approaches were also considered according to each case. Thus, the
international crisis did not reverse Merkel’s beliefs as they also continued to reinforce after the crisis. Furthermore, Merkel’s beliefs started increasingly to guide her policies relating to foreign and security policies.

**The Inefficiency Problem of Multilateral Organisations – A Regional Approach and Country-Oriented Thinking Needed**

Merkel stressed that there was a need for new thinking in many respects:

‘Ich glaube, dass wir in verschiedener Hinsicht lernen müssen, neu zu denken. Es ist eine wesentliche Aufgabe unserer politischen Generation und vielleicht noch der nächsten, Globalisierung menschlich zu gestalten und auch institutionell zu gestalten. […]’ (Merkel 17 Jun 2009.)

She viewed that an essential task of the current and next political generation was to shape globalisation both in a humane way and institutionally. She presented her view on the differences in approach between foreign policy and development cooperation as follows:

‘[…] Ich bin nicht dafür, dass man das mit auswärtiger Politik vermischt, weil ich glaube, dass Außenpolitik eine sehr interessengeleitete Politik ist und aus dem Blickwinkel des eigenen Landes heraus gestaltet wird, während Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in stärkerem Masse auch die Interessen der anderen mit ins Kalkül ziehen sollte. […]’ (Merkel 17 Jun 2009.)

Merkel saw foreign policy as a type interest-driven policy, whereas development cooperation should take the interests of others in consideration (Merkel 17 Jun 2009).

Merkel maintained that there were problems with multilateral organisations: many of them were extremely inefficient. Merkel urged regional and country-oriented thinking:
‘Es gibt aber Schwierigkeiten mit den multilateralen Organisationen. Viele sind extrem ineffizient. […] Wir müssen gebiets- oder länderorientiert denken. Man kann nicht Schulbildung vorantreiben, aber sich nicht um Gesundheit kümmern. Das heißt, man muss im Grunde einen Entwicklungsplan für eine bestimmte Region entwickeln und sich dann Organisationen suchen, die das umsetzen.’ (Merkel 17 Jun 2009.)

She discussed the possible differences in the points of emphasis between various development policy actors and pointed out that development plans should be developed regionally and then the right organisations should be found in order to implement the plan (Merkel 17 Jun 2009).

Furthermore, Merkel pointed out that the German domestic coordination procedures of development aid did not make it easy to reach UN millennium development goals:

‘[…] Wir haben die Millenniumsentwicklungsziele, die wir umsetzen müssen, aber wir haben in Deutschland eine Entwicklungshilfestruktur, die Koordination der Vorgehensweisen, wie wir nun zu diesen Zielen kommen, nicht einfach macht. Das Parlament, die Bundestagsfraktionen sagen in großen Teilen: Wenn wir schon Entwicklungszusammenarbeit machen, möchten wir sie bilateral gestalten und von Deutschlands Seite aus wissen: Was geschieht jetzt mit unserem Geld?’ (Merkel 17 Jun 2009.)

According to her, the German parliament and parliamentary groups were of the opinion that development cooperation should also be shaped bilaterally and they wanted to know what happened with the financing of the cooperation:

‘[…] das Gelingen von Globalisierung und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, auch die Akzeptanz von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, wird damit zusammenhängen, ob es uns gelingt, in unseren eigenen Parlamenten, in unserer eigenen politischen Öffentlichkeit Entwicklungszusammenarbeit eine bisschen aus der Niche herauszubringen […].’ (Merkel 17 Jun 2009.)

The Chancellor argued that the success of globalisation and development cooperation, as well as the acceptance of development cooperation, were dependent on whether one succeeded in bringing development cooperation out
from the niche of one’s own parliament and before one’s own general public (Merkel 17 Jun 2009).

*Peace, Constitutional Means and Partnerships; ‘The Task of Political Leadership Is to Assert These Principles Consistently Again in Concrete Historical Reality’*

Although there had been changes in the operational environment, the Chancellor’s political operational code beliefs had gradually changed and her policies had been reframed, in her government declaration, Merkel stood for the three principles that have guided German foreign policy since the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany:

‘[…] Wie im einem Brennglas werden uns die drei Grundprinzipien vor Augen geführt, die deutsche Außenpolitik seit der Gründung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland leiten: Deutschland ist dem Dienst für den Frieden in der Welt verpflichtet; so steht es in der Präambel unseres Grundgesetzes. Deutschland ist eine wehrhafte Demokratie; wir schützen unsere Bürger, ihr Leben und ihre Unversehrtheit mit den zu Gebote stehenden rechtsstaatlichen Mitteln. Deutschland steht in dieser Welt in festen Bündnissen und Partnerschaften; deutsche Sonderwege sind grundsätzlich keine Alternative deutscher Außenpolitik.’ (Merkel 8 Sep 2009.)

Firstly, Germany was committed to serving peace throughout the world. Secondly, Germany was a protective democracy; it protected its citizens, their lives and integrity with the constitutional means at its disposal. Thirdly, in the wider world, Germany stood in close alliances and partnerships: the German *Sonderweg* was strictly not an option for German foreign policy. (Merkel 8 Sep 2009.)
Although these three principles implied continuity in German foreign policy, Merkel pointed to what the task of its political leadership in conducting German foreign policy in future was:

‘Es ist Aufgabe jeder politischer Führung, diese drei Prinzipien in der konkreten geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit immer wieder neu zur Geltung zu bringen. Das gehört mit zu den schwersten Aufgaben. […]’ (Merkel 8 Sep 2009.)

The task of political leadership was to again assert the principles of peace, constitutional means and partnerships consistently in the concrete historical reality. Merkel stated that it would be one of the most difficult tasks to accomplish. (Merkel 8 Sep 2009.) Although Merkel’s statement on the three principles of German foreign policy was a strong indication for continuity, the latest international developments should also be considered. In the changing international environment, the principles of German foreign policy also had to be updated and adjusted accordingly. Merkel’s beliefs relating to the operational environment and the utility of means available had gradually changed, and already in the first term, policies and principles had been somewhat reframed.

However, the domestic setting, composition of the government and domestic policy process were to be crucial in active framing and the conduct of policies in future. Towards the end of her first term, Merkel discussed the foreign policy decision-making structure in Germany including the government and Bundestag, and reminded the audience that the decisions were made based on international law and the mandate of the UN as well as on the foundation of the Basic Law and the Parliamentary Participation Act:

‘[…] und deshalb ist es auch so wichtig, dass nicht nur die Bundesregierung diese Strukturen hat, sondern dass auch jeder Auslandseinsatz von Bundesregierung und Bundestag mit größter Sorgfalt vorbereitet wird. Entscheidungen werden auf der Basis des Völkerrechts und der Mandatierung der Vereinten Nationen, auf der Grundlage des Grundgesetzes und des Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetzes getroffen.’ (Merkel 4 Jun 2008.)
However, Merkel admitted that in the times of a comprehensive security concept, the German decision-making structure was not the fastest:

‘Naturally are our decision-structures – also one must say – in the times of a comprehensive security concept not the fastest on the world. But this applies also to Germany overall. The federalism with its liabilities has set its own challenges, and comprehensive procedures to reach decisions. Merkel understood, however, that it had also brought stability to the polity. (Merkel 4 Jun 2008.)

The slow decision-making structures concerned Germany altogether. According to Merkel, federalism, with its liabilities, was setting its own challenges, and comprehensive procedures to reach decisions. Merkel understood, however, that it had also brought stability to the polity. (Merkel 4 Jun 2008.)

During her first term in office, Merkel was tying her hands domestically and conducted her policies accordingly in order to receive room for manoeuvre internationally. Therefore, she also thanked the representatives of the parliamentary groups from the government as well as those in the opposition, because they had constructively taken part in the decision-making:

‘Therefore I will not only say to the representatives of the parliamentary groups from the government, but also to the opposition, who have been involved constructively in the decisions and hopefully will also be involved, a heartfelt thanks. […] We have from the federal government also always attached a lot of value to get the widest parliamentary majority possible. […]’ (Merkel 4 Jun 2008.)

She pointed out that the government had attached importance to as wide a group of the parliamentary majorities as was possible (Merkel 4 Jun 2008). In German political culture, parliamentary majority was of importance. Therefore, domestic politics could not be neglected when conducting foreign policies. Wide domestic
understanding, including public opinion, was crucial and necessary for the German leader to be able to conduct policies.

Towards end of her first term in office, Merkel spoke to the German *Bundestag* about how she saw future security:

‘Unsere zukünftige Sicherheit und unser Leben in Frieden und Freiheit werden deshalb in ganz entscheidendem Masse von zweierlei abhängen: zum ersten davon, wie eng wir Europäer unseren Zusammenhalt mit den Nordamerikanern gestalten, und zum zweiten davon, ob wir die grossen Zukunftsthemen der globalen Wirtschaft, der Sicherheit und der Umwelt gemeinsam gestalten können.’ (Merkel 26 Mar 2009.)

She maintained that future security would be dependent on two different issues: firstly, how tightly the Europeans would shape cohesion with the North Americans; and secondly, whether they would be able to shape the future themes of the global economy, security and environment together (Merkel 26 Mar 2009).

During her first term, the Chancellor had already started to reframe and redefine cooperation, one of the key principles of German foreign policy, in a more instrumental and goal-oriented way. In addition, the big themes and their interlinkages, which in future could have security implications for issues such as the global economy, security and the environment, had been raised to international agendas as Merkel was influencing and disseminating the German way of thinking internationally. Towards her second term in office, Merkel’s political beliefs were increasingly guiding German policies, which reinforced already observed tendencies in the reframing processes.
7.2.3. Beliefs Reframing Policy During the Second Term in Office: Utility of Different Means Widens

*Reframing Cooperation and the Widening Utility of Different Means*

Chancellor Merkel’s second term as the head of the CDU-FDP government started in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Merkel stated that the different faces of the globalisation were now becoming even more observable and that the world was growing together even more tightly (Merkel 25 Jan 2010). She saw globalisation as a world-wide scale chance, because it forced everybody to act together with others. The alternative would be isolation, however, the thinking in alliances and partnerships would lead to a good future. (Merkel 3 Nov 2009.) Thus, Merkel’s views were the opposite of the realist approach emphasising competition and protectionist behaviour among states.

Chancellor Merkel urged a new way of thinking (Merkel 25 Jan 2010). Instead of asking, what the states should do with globalisation, in the second term Merkel was confident that the political entitlement of the German government was to shape globalisation, but not alone rather in concert with others:

‘Wenn ich das für die deutsche Bundesregierung sagen darf: Unser politischer Anspruch ist, dass wir Globalisierung mit gestalten wollen. [...] Wir wissen, dass wir das als ein Land allein überhaupt nicht können, sondern dass das nur möglich ist, wenn wir unsere Gestaltungskraft mit anderen bündeln – ob es nun um die großen Herausforderungen des Klimaschutzes, um die Bewältigung der Folgen der internationalen Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise oder um Sicherheit und Stabilität geht.’ (Merkel 24 Jan 2011.)

The financial crisis became an essential part of the foreign policy speeches during her second term in office. Merkel held the view that the world was standing before a challenge to create a system that combined freedom, solidarity and worldwide
partnerships. Although the G8 was playing a large role, it was not enough. Rising nations such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa were needed. (Merkel 15 Apr 2010.)

Merkel saw the G20, also including rising powers, as the key forum in the cooperation between the most important industries and emerging nations. She argued that the crisis was the result of short-term thinking and, therefore, international economic policy should be made more sustainable. Merkel saw that the lessons learned from the financial crisis were that the global economy also needed a global regulatory framework. She stressed that right strategies should be developed. Internationally coordinated behaviour and internationally coordinated measures would prevent many of the bad consequences. The purpose of the G20 was not to discuss single rules, but in the form of a charter, to formulate a foundation, goals and the principles of the cooperation. (Merkel 3 Nov 2009, 25 Jan 2010, 12 Jul 2011, 26 Jan 2012.)

Merkel maintained that the world could cooperate only when states were ready to sacrifice a part of their own sovereignty when it came to internationally binding commitments. Merkel saw national commitments as good, however, international binding cooperation was, according to her, a necessary condition. She viewed the UN as the right framework for binding commitments: the UN remained the central forum of the world community. However, the willingness to make compromises was required. She pointed out that the UN reform was not an example of rapid international cooperation. (Merkel 25 Jan 2010.)

If the term cooperation had been defined more broadly to include different continents (such as Africa, Asia, Latin America) and connecting different states and arenas of cooperation (UN, NATO, ESDP, Russia, G-groupings) in her first term
in office; in her second term, Chancellor Merkel started to place more emphasis on content and strategic thinking and setting goals for this cooperation. Merkel’s view on the different linkages and interdependencies between regions was reflected in various strategies of the government.

The purpose of the Africa-strategy of the German government, the preparation of which commenced in 2010, was to demonstrate the diverse chances of cooperation between Germany and Africa and to incorporate them in the EU-Africa strategy. Merkel also promoted the intensification of cooperation with Asian countries such as Japan, Vietnam, China and India. According to her, closer cooperation was of mutual interest. She stressed that the increasing economic strength of Asia would be linked with more responsibility for climate change, the sustainable use of resources and financial and economic questions. (Merkel 25 Jan 2010.)

Binding Germany in different international agreements and increasing Germany’s cooperation in various groupings aiming for more dictated goals and strategies could be interpreted as the framework, where Chancellor Merkel could have started acting as a norm entrepreneur. After the victorious elections in autumn 2009, Merkel, as the head of the CDU-FDP ‘Wunschkoalition’, could have started to better realise fundamental values, to reframe German foreign and security policy according to her changed beliefs and ideas, and to persuade German domestic institutions. By binding Germany more tightly to international cooperation, now being gradually redefined as a more strategic way of reaching goals, Chancellor Merkel could also increase her room for manoeuvre in the domestic setting. German reframed ideas and policy being disseminated internationally, domestic institutions persuaded nationally and satisfied constituents also supporting Merkel for a third term.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, Merkel started to link different issue areas and policies closely together. She argued that in addition to security and financial questions, climate protection was the third most significant challenge. She pointed out that climate and energy policies, in their broad definition, were also peace policies. She stressed the creation of partnerships in the different world regions in order to be able to prevent the problems from becoming one’s own. (Merkel 15 Apr 2010.) Although the issues that Merkel was promoting internationally strongly referred to the continuity of German foreign policy and even Germany as a civilian power, the issue linkages and goal-oriented way of viewing cooperation suggested some form of change taking place in German foreign policy discourse. Merkel was using persuasion as well as power in conducting her policies. Thus, Merkel’s power belief (P-4) was slightly reinforcing.

Although Merkel perceived the world as being increasingly cooperative, asymmetrical threats made her point out that the world was still threatened:


In addition to a redefinition of cooperation, the broader spectrum of different foreign policy means (I-5) started to become more evident in the second term as well. Chancellor Merkel started to use harder language, using the word ‘threat’, in particular, when referring to international terrorism. This was also reflected in the means available. Concerning Iran, Merkel stressed that in order to fulfil the foundations of international cooperation, the international community had tried to reach out to Iran. She emphasised the importance of finding a political solution, but she was ready to take joint steps towards harder sanctions if there was no progress. (Merkel 7 Feb 2009, 3 Nov 2009, 25 Jan 2010.)
Although Merkel’s applied beliefs relating to the nature of the operational environment (P-1) and strategies (I-1) had become more cooperative after the financial crisis, Merkel’s beliefs in the utility of different means (I-5) started to widen to also emphasise threats and sanctions. This may suggest increasing German international power and refer to the process in which German foreign and security policy is gradually becoming normalized. However, in order to be able to confirm any permanent change in German foreign and security policy, the increased use of sanctions should also include the use of military force and Merkel’s changed beliefs should be institutionalised and habitualised and be repeated in the changed behaviour in German foreign and security policy-making.

The Restructuring of the Bundeswehr – A German Internal Response to a Changed Operational Environment

If the increasingly interdependent operational environment in the age of globalisation and the rise of asymmetrical threats changed the overall ideational approach of how to view and respond to external threats, as well as affected the development of the concept of Vernetzte Sicherheit, the financial crisis hit security policy in a more material way by reducing the resources spent on security policy. This might also have affected how policies and concepts were reframed. The restructuring of the Bundeswehr was a German response to both of these changed challenges. According to Merkel, through restructuring, Germany would be capable of acting as a reliable alliance partner. She positively viewed that Germany took an essential step in the question on how the Bundeswehr should look like at the same time as with the phase of reorientation and specification of NATO. (Merkel 22 Nov 2010.)
According to Merkel, the *Bundeswehr* had transformed from an army of unity into an army of action. Merkel stressed that the future of the *Bundeswehr* could not be adjusted to the example of Afghanistan because of the transfer of responsibility to the Afghans in 2014. However, international operations continued to play a role in conflict prevention, post-conflict work and in urgent tasks such as combating piracy. Thus, it was essential that the *Bundeswehr* adjust to the special requirements of these future duties. Although Merkel saw it as an emotional decision, she viewed that abandoning compulsory military service was the right decision. However, conscription would stay in the German constitution as it was not possible to foresee what the world situation would be like in 15 to 30 years. (Ibid.)

Merkel justified the restructuring of the *Bundeswehr* and its transformation into an army of volunteers by stating that Germany would be better able to response to current security challenges. She saw that the ‘Bürger in Uniform’ had been a trademark of the German Democracy since the Second World War. (Merkel 9 Sep 2011.)

*‘Because of Their Economic Strength, More Responsibility for Rising Nations in Security Questions as Well’*

Chancellor Merkel pointed out that the financial and economic crises shuffled the card decks of the world in a new way and that new forces and balances would emerge (Merkel 1 Feb 2011). In the multipolar world, NATO or the transatlantic partnership would not resolve all the large conflicts. Thus, partners were needed. Merkel viewed that if measured by economic strength, the emerging nations had become stronger after the financial crisis and their importance was to increase:
‘[…] Ich habe immer gesagt: Diese international Wirtschaftskrise wird dazu führen, dass die Karten auf der Welt neu gemischt werden. Genauso ist es gekommen. Wenn wir die ökonomische Stärke betrachten, dann sind Schwellenländer heute deutlich stärker, als sie es vorher waren. Ihre Bedeutung wird zunehmen. Das heißt auf der anderen Seite, dass die Schwellenländer, die eine stark wachsende ökonomische Bedeutung haben, nach meiner festen Überzeugung auch Schritt für Schritt in mehr Sicherheitsverantwortung und außenpolitische Verantwortung hineingehen müssen. […]’ (Merkel 5 Feb 2011.)

She stressed that because of their economic strength, the emerging nations should also ‘Schritt für Schritt’ take more responsibility in foreign and security policy (Merkel 5 Feb 2011). Furthermore, the emerging nations should also take responsibility in regional conflicts. The task of the Western world, the EU and USA, was to deepen the relations with the emerging nations and regional organisations and to support them in their efforts. (Merkel 9 Sep 2011.)

She also highlighted the value of cooperation with the Arab states such as Saudi-Arabia, Yemen and Egypt, in combating international terrorism and valued cooperation with the African Union in many of the conflicts in Northern and Eastern Africa. The increasing cooperation with Africa could also be seen in the Africa-strategy adopted by the German federal government in 2011. (Merkel 25 Jan 2010, 24 Jan 2011, 5 Feb 2011, 9 Sep 2011.)

Merkel appointed regional organisations, such as the African Union, ECOWAS, SADC and East African Community, to a central role in bringing peace to different conflicts and supporting democratic development. Merkel also maintained that the determination of African states for joint action had increased. The Chancellor expressed Germany’s and the EU’s support for the African Union in preventing and overcoming conflicts. She stressed the importance of cooperation with the African Union and raised issues such as combating piracy and terrorism as examples of joint actions. (Merkel 12 Jul 2011.)
Merkel expressed her appreciation towards the cooperation carried out in different, smaller settings. She emphasised that in Afghanistan there were many other allies working towards common goals. With regard to Iran, there were E3+3 talks and on the question of North Korea, Six-Party Talks. The Chancellor was pleased that Russia and China supported sanctions against Iran and concerning North Korea, that China was playing an important role in the Six-Party talks. Concerning the Middle East Peace Process, there was the Quartet in which the UN and Russia played an important role. (Merkel 5 Feb 2011.) Furthermore, she stressed that she supported the preparation of proposals to strengthen ESDP within the Weimar Triangle composed of Germany, France and Poland (Merkel 9 Sep 2011).

Although there were changes in the international operational environment, including new threats and the financial crisis, Merkel’s beliefs relating to the nature of the political universe had become more cooperative. The rise of the emerging nations was also a contributor to change in the international cooperation structures in many issue areas ranging from the economy and security, to the climate and energy sectors. Merkel stated that during change, it was important to start to actively influence and represent interests. She maintained that it was important to disseminate German beliefs and ideas and frame policies, such as a social market economy or Vernetzte Sicherheit, and influence international cooperation structures. Hence, over time the rules and practices agreed on in international institutions would affect policies and politics, both policy content and process, in all member states.

The reframed, goal-oriented view of the cooperation can be seen in how Merkel started to place more emphasis on the security cooperation conducted in smaller settings, including regional-level organisations. This can be seen as a bottom-up approach to security. It complements multilateral efforts, and in some issues, it
might also be the more rapid approach to cooperation. At the same time, it pools the capabilities in the times of financial insecurity.

**Vernetzte Sicherheit Included in the New NATO Strategic Concept: Combating Challenges with a Combination of Military Strength and Political Action**

After the NATO strategic concept was adopted in November 2010, Merkel expressed her support for the definition of the current form of NATO and the challenges the organisation was facing in the 21st century. She stressed that NATO could only combat current challenges with a combination of military strength and political action:

‘All die neuen Herausforderungen können nur in einer Kombination von militärischer Stärke und politischer Aktion bewältigt werden. Wir in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland haben sehr früh am Beispiel Afghanistans über den Ansatz der Vernetzten Sicherheit eine Schneise für ein solches Denken geschlagen. […] Wenn die Nato weiterhin ein Bündnis wäre, in dem man zwar über die eigentliche militärische Aktion diskutieren darf, aber nicht über den Zusammenhang von Krisenprävention, Sicherheitsstrategien und politischen Herausforderungen, dann würde die Nato ihren Herausforderungen nicht gerecht werden können. Das neue strategische Konzept ist ein sehr politisches Konzept, in dem natürlich die militärische Stärke und die militärische Handlungsfähigkeit wichtige Größen sind, aber in ein gesamtstaatliches Verständnis des gesamten Bündnisses eingebettet sind.’
(Merkel 22 Nov 2010.)

Merkel saw the new strategic concept of NATO as a very political concept, in which military strength and military capacity were important but embedded in the joint understanding of all NATO member states. Merkel saw the German integrated concept of *Vernetzte Sicherheit* as an appropriate approach for this new concept of NATO. (Merkel 22 Nov 2010.) Merkel wanted to develop this concept because she felt that lessons had been learned from the past ten years that military attacks alone did not augur any final satisfaction. However, according to Merkel,
the military actions of the 21st century showed that it should be included in this integrated concept. (Merkel 5 Feb 2011.)

Merkel also discussed which type of elements the new strategic concept would include:


According to Merkel, NATO was reacting against the new threats. One reaction was NATO’s missile defence system. In the build-up of launching the system, Merkel urged closer cooperation with Russia. The alliance also cooperated with many other partners in combating security challenges. One example was found in disarmament and arms control. (Merkel 14 Apr 2011.) Cyber-attacks also, according to Merkel, required careful attention:


According to Merkel, the new challenge of cyber-attacks, the military and technological interplay, had raised the need for a new international agreement on how to deal with these attacks (Merkel 5 Feb 2011). In combating challenges,
Merkel urged NATO to also cooperate with states outside the alliance (Merkel 24 Jan 2011).

Relating to new security policy questions, Merkel urged on more cooperation and highlighted the need for international agreements in order to create a common framework for policies. She also started to discuss the possibilities for NATO to cooperate outside of the alliance. The reason for this may be manifold; on the one hand, the global character of the new threats may have required new common approaches, including wider cooperation between states, on the other hand, resources were also scarce in NATO member states and, therefore, widening NATO cooperation to states outside of the alliance was necessary.

Merkel maintained that NATO could not resolve all conflicts on its own. As she had previously urged the emerging nations and regional organisations to take more responsibility, she also argued that the alliance should agree on joint policies concerning arms exports. In her view, exports should and would be restrictive and brought in line with a foreign policy that respected human rights, otherwise, value driven policy was not possible. (Merkel 9 Sep 2011.)

The Chancellor also assigned more of a role to the European Union in concert with NATO in crisis management (Ibid). She argued that it was important that Europe, with a similar foundation of values and visions of the future, could engage internationally. Therefore, the EU took steps by creating EEAS to be able to mutually shape foreign policy. (Merkel 24 Jan 2011.) The EU’s role could be seen in Georgia, Kosovo and in the ATALANTA operation off the Horn of Africa. However, Merkel saw that the development of the ESDP and European External Action Service (EEAS) were lagging behind her expectations. According to her, more concrete and practical engagement at the local level would be more
important than continuous institutional disputes between the Council, Commission and Parliament. Merkel maintained that European politics could only succeed when the member states, their governments, parliaments and public, were involved and their interests were taken into account. She stressed that this applied to foreign and security policy especially, which was located at the core field of national sovereignty. (Merkel 9 Sep 2011.) Thus, Europe was at the heart of Germany’s foreign policy thinking but Merkel started to involve and redefine the role of member states. Continuity interacted with the nuances of change.

*Merkel During the Libya Crisis: ‘German Abstention in the UN Security Council Vote Did Not Mean Neutrality’*

As Germany became a non-permanent member in the UN Security Council for a two-year period in 2011, Chancellor Merkel emphasised that Germany would also take responsibility in security policy issues. She took the view that the EU, NATO and the UN were, and remained to be, the most important international organisations for Germany. (Merkel 9 Sep 2011.) Merkel pointed out that the most important framework for the cooperation was the United Nations (Merkel 24 Jan 2011). She stated that Germany would be ready for temporary solutions concerning the reform of the UN Security Council and supported all efforts to allow the EU representation to the UN more rights (Merkel 9 Sep 2011).

The list of international security challenges facing Germany during its two-year term in the Security Council was extensive: Africa, Iran, MEPP and Afghanistan (Merkel 24 Jan 2011). The Chancellor saw that alongside the classical territorial threats, the global order currently faced new asymmetrical threats such as
terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, piracy and cyber threats. There were also threats that conflicts over water or resources would increase. (Merkel 9 Sep 2011.)

Merkel urged peaceful developments in North-African countries. In order to be able to assist in shaping the change, the European Union aimed at a new partnership as a neighbour of the North African coast. Merkel also spoke of engaging the USA in this cooperation. She saw the engagement of the EU and USA as a duty. Relating to the Arab Spring developments in Tunisia and Egypt, Merkel discussed the Western values being exported to the North African countries. She pointed out the export of ‘Westminster Democracy’ would not succeed in every part of the world. Therefore, Western countries were faced with a twofold task: on the one hand, to assist and provide stability and security; and on the other hand, to be clear about what they expected from their model in other places of the world e.g. those who had their own cultures and own developments that could not and should not be intervened in. Merkel saw the UN convention on human rights as the red line that could not be compromised. She also maintained that the negotiations on cooperation e.g. relating to the Union for the Mediterranean or European Neighbourhood Policy were always difficult discussions on the principles of the cooperation. She pointed out that in reference to financial support, attention should be paid so that these principles were adhered to. (Merkel 5 Feb 2011.)

In reference to the crisis in Libya, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 in March 2011. The Resolution called on Libya to enact an immediate cease-fire and an end to violence, though Germany abstained from the vote. Chancellor Merkel pointed out that everybody shared the goals of Resolution 1973
unconditionally, independent from abstention or approval. She stressed that international community would stand together:


Merkel stressed that German abstention in UN Security Council vote did not mean neutrality:


She believed that the NATO operation in Libya contributed decisively to the end to the Gaddafi regime (Merkel 9 Sep 2011) and pointed out that everyone contributed militarily and non-militarily in order to enforce Resolution 1973. Merkel urged a political solution for Libya and highlighted the importance of politically supporting new political forces. (Merkel 14 Apr 2011.) She offered support also in building up democratic structures and institutions and for the maintenance of infrastructure (Merkel 9 Sep 2011). In addition, economic assistance was necessary in the whole region, which meant that companies should invest and jobs should be created (Merkel 14 Apr 2011).

As in previous years, Merkel held that military means as ultima ratio could and would not be excluded from the toolbox of different foreign policy instruments, while still maintaining that current conflicts could not only be resolved with military instruments, either:

‘[...] Der Einsatz militärischer Mittel als ultima ratio kann und darf nicht ausgeschlossen werden, aber kein Konflikt, mit dem wir heute konfrontiert sind,
She pointed out that Germany contributed militarily in many regions of the world but stressed the necessity of civil means as well as the value of economic sanctions, especially targeted sanctions (Merkel 9 Sep 2011).

A further international challenge concerned the nuclear programme of Iran. According to Merkel, it was up to Iran to clear the doubt about their nuclear programme. Further, the sanctions set by the international community, including China and Russia, aimed at this same goal. Merkel stressed, as in the previous years, that a hand had been offered to Iran and positive development was expected from it. (Merkel 24 Jan 2011.) However, she still viewed Iran as a threat (Merkel 1 Feb 2011) and saw that the cooperation between the presidents of Syria and Iran spoke volumes and, therefore, the international community should target further sanctions against Iran (Merkel 9 Sep 2011). Thus, Merkel’s belief in the utility of sanctions (I-5) was further reinforcing.

Germany also sought to contribute to the Middle East Peace Process. The goal-orientated view of cooperation and cooperative beliefs relating to strategies were now reflected in how Germany viewed the continuation of the talks. As in previous years, Merkel urged a two-state solution. (Merkel 24 Jan 2011.) Merkel saw that the solution included security, borders and final status negotiations. She stressed that not all of the questions had to be resolved in the first step and suggested that security and border questions could be discussed in the beginning. Merkel stressed achieving goals; she saw that if the end-result would be a peaceful and secure
existence for Israel, then the goal outweighed the difficult compromises. (Merkel 1 Feb 2011.)

A further challenge for the international community continued to be Afghanistan. Here as well, the cooperative and goal-orientated approach was gradually applied. Merkel maintained that the central challenge facing Germany in Afghanistan was the Bundeswehr operation. As the new Afghanistan-mandate was discussed in the German parliament, Merkel justified the operation by stating that the German concept of Vernetzte Sicherheit, with different ministries working together, was the correct approach and that the international community was already applying it. She stressed that German engagement was to be continued in Afghanistan with the goal that security responsibility was transferred to the Afghans in 2014 as the necessary steps had been agreed upon. (Merkel 24 Jan 2011.) The basis for the transfer was the training of Afghan security forces in the framework of ‘partnering’ and ‘mentoring’. Merkel argued that after 2014, the development cooperation needed to be stabilised in order to reach the goals set. Further, the political process of reconciliation was to be brought forward in the same manner with the economic construction of Afghanistan. (Merkel 5 Dec 2011.)

Merkel also reminded her audience about what the goals of the operation in Afghanistan were in the first place. Firstly, the interest of the international community was that Afghanistan would become a stable state from which terrorist threats would never originate. Secondly, the international community wanted to assist the Afghans in helping themselves ‘Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe’. Merkel stated that in Afghanistan, the international community had learned that security and development were interdependent and its strategy was developed from both of these aspects. Merkel spoke about how peace and development in Afghanistan could bring a thriving stimulus to the whole region. The private sector’s
engagement was, according to Merkel, of great importance. She stated that the European mining industry had decided to develop partnership in the spirit of ‘Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe’: Afghanistan should profit from its resources and develop itself, something that Merkel saw as a great goal. (Ibid.)

The cases of Iran, Belarus and Myanmar reflected how Merkel’s beliefs in the utility of different means had widened between her two terms in office. According to Merkel, targeted sanctions on those who had violated human rights, should be deployed more often in order to be able to force dictators to resign. Merkel viewed that sanctions belonged to value-driven foreign policy. She also argued that in spite of the increasing importance of political and economic cooperation with China and Russia, an important part of value-driven foreign policy involved addressing questions such as human rights and deficiencies in the legal systems of these countries. (Merkel 9 Sep 2011.)

Although Merkel emphasised the importance of international institutions reflecting continuity in German foreign policy, the goal-oriented approach to cooperation increased in Merkel’s positions towards different regions and areas of conflict. Furthermore, the means available were gradually widening, which might imply increasing German responsibility and an increasing role in international foreign and security policy questions in future.

Emphasising the Importance of the UN; More Efficiency to Development Policy Instruments

Chancellor Merkel was convinced that the new German government would maintain development cooperation as an essential part of the government’s work
and she began to stress that development goals should be transformed. (Merkel 25 Jan 2010.) Merkel highlighted the goal-orientation of her policies by stating that Germany hoped that the development policy efforts would lead to results in a more effective way (Merkel 30 Jan 2013).

She raised the issue of the efficiency of development policy instruments and pointed out that they should be improved and made more results-oriented. This also meant results-oriented funding. Merkel wanted the development funding to be as profitable as possible. She stressed that the development policy could be successful when the process was managed and implemented nationally. (Merkel 21 Sep 2010.)

The Chancellor linked the good governance of the developing countries to economic success. Economic growth was the way out from poverty and famine:

‘[…] Ohne eigenes, sich selbst getragenes Wirtschaftswachstum wird für die Entwicklungsländer jedenfalls der Weg aus Armut und Hunger viel zu steil bleiben. Ohne nachhaltiges Wirtschaftswachstum können die Entwicklungsziele nicht erreicht werden oder nicht einmal bisher erreichte Entwicklungs niveaus gehalten werden.’ (Merkel 21 Sep 2010.)

Merkel stated that without sustainable economic growth, the development goals could not be reached. She saw that in order for the Millennium goals of the UN to be reached, the world was dependent on international organisations that should be capable of acting. For the UN to be better able to confront the challenges of the 21st century, Merkel supported the reform of the UN. (Merkel 21 Sep 2010.)

Further, development cooperation should evolve towards goal-oriented cooperation. According to Merkel, the main principle of German development cooperation would continue to be that Germany still contributed to economic, social as well as political development. (Merkel 3 Mar 2011.) She stressed that in
spite of the financial crisis, Germany, as the third biggest donor country, would continue engaging in development cooperation (Merkel 24 Jan 2011).

Concerning development cooperation, Merkel stressed the importance that the German Federal Government thought together; she pleaded that the duplication of work would be avoided. Moreover, in her view, it was important to exchange experiences between the different ministries conducting development work. She reminded that they all had a joint goal and that this goal should be implemented together. This thinking was especially important e.g. in Afghanistan where German action followed the integrated concept of ‘Vernetzte Sicherheit’. (Merkel 3 Mar 2011.)

Merkel pointed out that Germany understood development aid as ‘Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe’ and there should be more emphasis on this type of approach in the future (Merkel 24 Jan 2011):

’[…] wenn wir über dynamische Entwicklungsländer sprechen, dann geht es auch um eine ganz enge Kooperation der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und der Förderung der Wirtschaftsdynamik. Ich habe hier mit Interesse gesehen, dass dieser Bereich in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit an Bedeutung gewinnt. […] Als wir in Deutschland uns auf das Treffen hinsichtlich der Millenniumsentwicklungsziele in New York vorbereitet haben, war zum Beispiel Kofi Annan hier und hat darüber berichtet, dass man jetzt immer mehr kleinere Unternehmen fördern wolle, damit die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in Gang kommt. […]’ (Merkel 3 Mar 2011.)

According to Merkel, there should be close cooperation between development cooperation and support for the economy. She was pleased that there was close cooperation with the private sector. (Merkel 3 Mar 2011.) It was important that the receiving countries moved ahead in building up and supporting SMEs (Merkel 21 Sep 2010). Merkel maintain that it was crucial that local people took their destiny into their own hands and felt the success and utility of their actions (Merkel 30 Jan 2013).
Although multilateralism was still of key importance to Germany and the role of the UN was repeatedly emphasised under Chancellor Merkel, German development policy had also been reframed. As seen above in the analysis, Merkel started to take a bottom-up approach, including local and regional aspects, in order to complement the top-down perspective taken by the UN. Merkel also linked different political, economic, trade, development and security instruments together. These two aspects combined would increase German influence and the German way of thinking in the receiving countries and might, over time, contribute to the discovery of common ground for policies at the multilateral level.

According to Merkel, this also highlighted how important it was to link foreign policy with development cooperation. She pointed out that one task of development cooperation was to ensure that prosperity was fairly distributed. Social equity was important because otherwise one had to combat social disruptions in the future. Thus, in political speeches, social equity and distribution of income should be also called upon. Merkel further discussed the political developments in the Maghreb states and stressed that the themes of freedom, development possibilities, corruption and political freedom of speech should be increasingly incorporated into development cooperation. (Merkel 3 Mar 2011.)

In addition, the need for development cooperation had changed in the receiving countries. Merkel stated that two decades ago there was a coherent group of states that had joint goals towards developing countries. However, this situation has turned into different interests, and, therefore, the development policy should also react. Merkel stressed that the Millennium development goals of the UN were real goals. She pointed out that there were countries, ‘Schwellenländer’, which had used the possibilities for development well. Merkel viewed that the emerging nations, China, India, Brazil and South Africa, were, on the one hand, objects of the
development cooperation but, on the other hand, they were also competitors. Therefore, justifying development cooperation to Germany’s domestic parliament was becoming harder. Merkel stressed that the cooperation with the emerging nations should be clearly concentrated and the points of emphasis should be set apart from the themes of classical development cooperation. (Ibid.)

In reference to Africa, Chancellor Merkel was pleased that Germany had concentrated its development cooperation. Merkel urged for concentration and international agreement on the division of labour and similar execution possibilities, because otherwise the receiver countries would spend their time in coordinating all offers of assistance. She also raised the question of cooperation between public development cooperation and private foundations. She stressed that it should be internationally discussed how to deal with different types development cooperation, with those that were easier to perform and with those that were more difficult to measure such as education. Here again, Merkel promoted the utility of a joint approach. (Ibid.)

The Chancellor held the view that cooperation with Africa exceeded the more traditional forms of combating crises or conducting development cooperation and Germany continually focused on the possibilities of the African continent. According to Merkel, the successful development of Africa was dependent on the question of to what extent Africa was integrated into the world market. She saw the chances for economic growth as important and that they should be used, but this was only one side of the coin; the other side was a commitment to reforms, more democracy and national unity. A productive economy was important as the backbone of a strong nation but sustainable progress and prosperity were possible only on the foundation of economic, societal and political participation, understanding and reconciliation. Merkel maintained that with more growth and
progress, the worldwide political importance of Africa would also increase. (Merkel 12 Jul 2011.)

Merkel also linked climate issues to political, security, economic and developmental considerations. She pointed out that Europe and Africa were aiming at creating a new binding climate agreement. She stated that industrial nations had contributed, for their part, to most of the climate change. Therefore, they should also contribute the most in the conversion of their industry. However, rethinking was also needed on the part of developing countries and rising nations. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities for industrialised, developing countries and emerging nations was of importance. Therefore, according to Merkel, Germany aimed at a legally binding agreement. She saw the problems that lay ahead as China and India did not want an agreement. However, Germany wanted to proceed with climate protection and aimed at close cooperation related to renewable energy and energy efficiency with some African countries. (Ibid.)

During her second term, Merkel continued linking policies. During her first term, she linked economic growth to internal strength and taking external responsibility while at the same time creating a linkage between security and development cooperation: ‘without security, no reconstruction - without reconstruction, no security’. These links were reinforced with Germany’s contribution to economic, social and political development. However, after the financial crisis, justifying development cooperation and funding to the public might have become more challenging. Therefore, it was necessary to link development cooperation to efficiency, results and economic growth, which would, in time, decrease their financial dependence of the receiving state, and the emphasis was placed more on ‘Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe’, supporting the establishment of small businesses in order to obtain a self-sustaining recovery.
Germany’s Security Policy Role as ‘Anlehnungspartner’

Towards the end of her second term in office, the amount of Merkel’s foreign policy speeches decreased. This was an obvious development; towards the elections, leaders might become more careful in giving speeches on foreign policy guidelines as careless comments on foreign affairs might affect the outcome of the domestic election. Moreover, during her two terms in office, by using power and persuasion, Chancellor Merkel had already gradually created the possibility conditions for future continuity and change in German foreign policy behaviour.

As a norm entrepreneur, there was a possibility for Chancellor Merkel to shape foreign policy content and process both internationally and domestically. During the first years of office she linked issues and policies, which can be considered a form of using power internationally in order to influence other states and their institutions as, according to some literature, issue linkage may over time lead to institutional isomorphism and institutional adaptation. ‘Institutions that frequently interact, are exposed to each other or are located in a similar environment, develop similarities over time in formal organizational structures, principles of resource allocation, practices, meaning structures, and reform patterns’ (Börzel 2005, 56). This may facilitate international cooperation over the long run. However, the gap between those countries that do not share the same beliefs and ideas may in time at least, become more apparent and may lead to conflicts. Therefore, influencing with beliefs and ideas on different levels, using both top-down and bottom-up approaches, is crucial as it may in time lead to finding common understanding between states and regions in different international and regional organisations.

During her second term in office, the international aspect might have been complemented with the domestic perspective: Merkel’s use of power and
persuasion might also be directed to the domestic institutional processes, meanings and policy. Towards the beginning of her second term in office, Chancellor Merkel’s beliefs had gradually, through experience and affected by the financial crisis, changed and primarily reinforced. During her second term, Merkel had better chances to start to change her policy, with regards to both content and process. The international conditions had improved to her advantage as international negotiation processes in the aftermath of the financial crisis were concentrated on the participation of the heads of the state. More importantly, since 2009, Chancellor Merkel was heading a CDU-FDP government, which might have made the redefinition of policies slightly easier than during the Grosse Koalition of the CDU and SPD in 2005-2009. However, now it was ever more important to Merkel to start persuading her own institutions behind the reframed policies. Here, the international level, ongoing negotiations processes and their strategic use, became of utmost important for the Chancellor in managing the domestic reframing and redefinition process of policies.

Merkel expressed her support for different international cooperation structures. She continued to emphasise the importance of partnerships and acting together in alliances:

‘[…] Deutschland kann wie jedes andere Land in einer eng vernetzten Welt Konflikte nicht alleine lösen. Wir sind wie alle unsere Partner – auch die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika - angewiesen auf Partner und Bündnisse. […]’ (Merkel 22 Oct 2012.)

Merkel stressed that Germany, like every other country, was dependent on partners and alliances and that NATO and Germany’s close relations to the USA would remain as the central anchor of Germany’s security policy. Merkel stressed that Germany had, in the preceding years, been a significant influence on the fact that the alliance was modern and powerful. She pointed out that Germany was the third
biggest troop provider in the ISAF mission and biggest provider for KFOR. (Merkel 22 Oct 2012.)

However, as seen during her second term of office, Merkel maintained that in order for NATO to reach the goals it had set, the EU and NATO partners were, in future, dependent on other states, especially on those who had become economically more important. According to Merkel, these states should take more responsibility. Along these lines she continued to allocate more responsibility to emerging nations. She anticipated that the importance of these states would continue to increase and that new security policy actors were searching their place in the world. Furthermore, there were many regional organisations, such as the Arab League, the African Union as well as sub organisations e.g. ECOWAS. Merkel thought that they should not only be allocated more responsibility but they should also be encouraged to engage, according to their economic and political importance, in building security and peace worldwide. (Ibid.)

Germany had influenced NATO with Merkel’s beliefs and ideas that were transforming the cooperation into a more goal-oriented approach. Merkel’s beliefs relating to the operational environment, approach to strategies and the utility of different means started to reframe German policies on how NATO’s Raison d’Etre should be seen in future, on more strategic approach to missions, on a cooperative security approach and on the introduction the concept of Vernetzte Sicherheit as the key guideline for action.

Merkel started to stress Germany’s role as ‘Anlehnungspartner’, a role, which intensified existing partnerships and aimed at binding more states to the increased cooperation (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2012). She also welcomed NATO’s Smart Defence initiative to which Germany also contributed and supported NATO’s
‘Pooling and Sharing’ as a practicable possibility in order to obtain joint capabilities with NATO in times when states were under the pressure to cut spending and might otherwise lose these capabilities. The complementary role of the ESDP was reflected in her statement as she pointed out that Germany would like to discuss the measures to support peace and security with NATO and its EU partners, with the aim of agreeing on common ground for policies. (Merkel 22 Oct 2012.)

Merkel maintained that the ESDP was characterised by close linkages between military and civil means. She stressed that Germany would speak on behalf of shaping these linkages more effectively and especially for strengthening the civil side of the ESDP. However, according to Merkel, the basis for this further development of the ESDP must be a joint understanding of challenges, interests and courses of action. She pointed out that as far as considering changes in the security environment, Germany was open to updating the European Security Strategy agreed on in 2003. (Ibid.) The strategic approach to cooperation was now also reflected in Merkel views on the ESDP and its development in order to address current challenges.

Merkel’s belief in the utility of different means (I-5) widened through her two terms in office. During her second term in office, the use of threat and sanctions were used more frequently and military means were included as an integral part of the concept of the Vernetzte Sicherheit. Merkel stressed that Germany operated with all security policy instruments at hand, with the integrated approach of economic-political, diplomatic, developmental and military means. She pointed out that the integrated approach Germany applied in its operations viewed the Bundeswehr as only one of the security policy instruments. (Ibid.)
Merkel continued to view the role of the *Bundeswehr* as an important pillar of German security policy. She stressed that the *Bundeswehr* had become an ‘Armee im Einsatz’, army in operation. The goal of the restructuring of the *Bundeswehr* was to make Germany capable of acting in terms of security policy and as a reliable alliance partner in future as well. The restructuring was a logical consequence of the experiences in operations, worldwide changes in the security policy and changes in the alliances Germany was a member of. Merkel stressed that it was important to have the courage to adopt new ways of conducting affairs when necessary, because only then was it possible to represent values and interests successfully. The current operations included a wide spectrum from combating piracy to stabilising operations and training missions. (Ibid.)

Merkel also continued to highlight the importance of the UN. She pointed out that as a non-permanent member of the Security Council during 2011-2012, Germany had tried to contribute to conflict resolution. She discussed German goals while on the UN Human Rights Council from 2013-2015, which included further developing the UN Millennium goals. The goal-orientation of the work done in the UN was also apparent in Germany’s objective to participate actively in the discussion on a new framework for achieving the UN’s Millennium goals. (Merkel 30 Jan 2013.)

Merkel also looked to Germany’s Eastern and Southern neighbours. She stressed that the cooperation of the European Union, and especially between Germany and Russia, would remain a top priority. (Merkel 26 Jan 2012.) She also stressed the importance of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a new dimension for promoting cooperation. She took the view that the accession processes and association agreements, all of which were instruments of the ENP, could help to
advance reforms, overcome old conflicts, secure peace and promote economic cooperation. (Merkel 25 Oct 2012.)

Merkel also promised Germany’s support for the countries in the Southern neighbourhood in the advancement of their development. She also continued to see the partnership between the European Union and African Union as important. Additionally, she supported the work done by the Arab League in Syria in regard to human rights. (Merkel 26 Jan 2012.) In the case of Syria, Germany relied on a political solution and political dialogue (Merkel 30 Jan 2013).

In reference to different conflicts in the Middle East region, Merkel started to discuss their meaning for the stability of the whole region. This regional aspect was reflected in Merkel’s position towards MEPP and Iran. Relating to MEPP, Merkel repeated Germany’s position on the two-state solution. She believed that solid economic and democratic development was only possible in the whole region when one was able to proceed with a two-state solution. Regional stability in the Middle East was a major concern for Merkel when she discussed the nuclear programme of Iran. She hoped that the talks with Iran would be successful. She also pointed out that that transparency was essential and that the programme was not used for military purposes. (Merkel 30 Jan 2013.)

Regarding Afghanistan, Merkel maintained that military means, acting in concert with civil means, was still necessary. She argued that the goal of the operation was to stabilise the country and that the operation served the security of Germany and its allies. Merkel also justified German participation by stating that in future, no terrorist should be born in the world. Therefore, the stabilisation of the country must undoubtedly be continued to be secured militarily. (Merkel 22 Oct 2012.)
Merkel stressed that the aim was to transfer the security responsibility in the foreseeable future, by the end of 2014. Towards this goal, Germany trained the Afghan forces and supported the reconciliation process so that it would be able to stand on its own feet in future. (Merkel 26 Jan 2012.) According to Merkel, it was important to achieve progress in bringing peace to Afghanistan and in solving problems among the Afghans (Merkel 30 Jan 2013). Towards the end of the Afghanistan operation, the German integrated views on the ‘Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe’ became more evident. In the Afghan case, this might have been related to the strengthening of society and governance. As in the case of MEPP, the German position might increasingly have relied on economic ideas and their positive influence on the internal strength of the nations and the overall stability in the region.

In the beginning of the year 2013, the situation in Mali worsened. Merkel stated that terrorist and extremist attacks had increased. According to her, Germany contributed to the close cooperation with Africa, in this case by the deployment logistic support for the transportation of ECOWAS troops to the capital of Mali. Merkel also expressed her support for the French army, whose contribution aimed at creating conditions for a peace process and a political solution. (Merkel 30 Jan 2013.)

Apart from security policy, Merkel also viewed transatlantic relations important in another way. She was pleased that Great Britain, during its Presidency of the G8, would work for a free trade agreement between the EU and USA. Merkel was interested in taking that step towards intensified cooperation and maintained that it would develop transatlantic relations even further beyond the cooperation achieved in different foreign and security policy issues. (Ibid.)
7.3. Conclusions: Chancellor Merkel’s Foreign and Security Policy

According to Chancellor Merkel, the world has changed. There are new asymmetrical threats facing states such as international terrorism, cyber threats and piracy. Chancellor Merkel stresses the rise of ‘Schwellenländer’, emerging economies, and during her second term in office she also started to emphasise their increasing role and responsibility in foreign and security policy questions in the aftermath of the financial crisis. This puts pressure on the states and their different forms of cooperation. The highly industrialised states of the western world may have to think about their cooperation again with regards to how to respond to the threats and how to include emerging states in the cooperation structures. New structures are created and the old ones must be redefined.

As is seen in the analysis, some operational code beliefs of Chancellor Merkel have changed between her first and the second terms in office. The analysis discussed the key findings and how changes in philosophical beliefs, relating to the operational environment; and instrumental beliefs, relating to the use of means, have reframed German foreign and security policy in different ways. It is worth noting, however, that the quantitative analysis has been conducted based on limited data (<40 speeches), which also affects the inferences made. Furthermore, the quantitative analysis does not consider the social character of the world; beliefs and ideas play an important role as part of power and influence. Thus, the qualitative analysis, which concentrates on the framing process, e.g. how the beliefs and ideas frame and reframe policies, is equally important in the analysis of complex policy-making processes.
According to the findings, Chancellor Merkel’s beliefs relating to the operational environment have reinforced between her two term in office: the world, the ‘political universe’, has become more cooperative in relation to the ‘other’. At the same time, this may have led Chancellor Merkel to define cooperation in a slightly different way. Before and after unification, cooperation had been seen as an end in and of itself in German foreign policy discourse. However, during the era of Chancellor Merkel, cooperation has been defined, reframed, gradually in a more instrumental way. This type of cooperation is more goal-oriented; foreign policy goals are crucial in determining how cooperation is seen and who the main partners are in the issue area in question. This may be how different alliances are seen in future; if the goals and purpose of the alliance are well-defined, smaller ad hoc based coalitions or partnerships in a particular issue area may also be possible. However, this does not mean that Germany would give up its adherence to multilateral organisations. Instead, the analysis shows that Merkel aimed to define the rules of cooperation with binding agreements and to apply more strategic thinking, also in relation to the instruments used within those organisations.

The need for a redefinition of cooperation may also relate to the widening spectrum of foreign policy instruments. When the goal is set, then one must choose from among different policy instruments. The more policy instruments that there are from military, economic to diplomatic, from civil to developmental instruments, the less risk there is of not reaching the goal. Furthermore, one is not forced to put all their eggs in one basket, which reduces the risk associated with only a single mean. Further, by interlinking means, one is better able to justify one’s chosen policies from a different perspective. This widening of foreign policy means and the redefinition of cooperation can be viewed as a more pragmatic approach towards policy-making; one is not bound to certain policy instruments beforehand, but rather by diagnosing the environment carefully, forming possible coalitions and
then choosing the appropriate policy instruments. This approach may be more rapid and, therefore, successful in times of uncertainty, when information is transmitted quickly and decisions often have to be made with incomplete information and tight time schedules.

As presented in the analysis above, there are some indications that the economic and financial crisis that started in autumn 2008 may have begun to show in Chancellor Merkel’s perceptions and also led her to change her beliefs in reference to foreign and security policy. The crisis accelerated the reframing process. This implies that it is important to include the external material reality and its influence on the leader’s beliefs in the analysis. Furthermore, since the financial crisis states have begun to cut spending and pay attention to the foreign policy resources they possess in order to be more efficient but still influential foreign policy actors. In Germany, this can be seen in how the Bundeswehr was restructured and how synergies with NATO’s Smart Defence were being utilised. This means that cooperation has become ever more important to states. It is not only the way to combat asymmetrical security threats with joint operations, but it also may be a way to complement the lack of resources and to pool capabilities.

Thus, redefining cooperation and (re)framing different cooperation structures is necessary. This may also have led Germany to take more responsibility in different policy areas; Germany possesses economic power and wants to be a leading power in the defining of future cooperation structures that better suit the German way of thinking about policy that emphasises partnerships, while also keeping ‘never again’ and ‘never alone’ as the guiding phrases of German foreign policy, in the back of ones’s mind.
German economic power may have also led Chancellor Merkel to link different issue areas, and policies and means together. As we have seen in the analysis, Chancellor Merkel maintained the belief that economic power leads to internal strength, which should, in turn, lead to taking on more responsibility in security policy. This view was increasingly emphasised during the second term in relation to emerging nations and other new partners. She held the view that in the era of globalisation, one’s responsibility for the problems of others increases. She linked security and development policies by stressing the concept of ‘without security, no reconstruction - without reconstruction, no security’. The integrated concept of ‘Vernetzte Sicherheit’ was based on this thinking. During the aftermath of the financial crisis, Merkel started increasingly to connect trade and economic growth with development policy by emphasising ‘Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe’. This was necessary in the times of crisis as it was harder to justify development aid domestically and, therefore, this issue linkage had to be created. Thus, by linking policies in this manner, it was easier to justify different policies and use of means. In the long-term, issue linkages may lead to institutional isomorphism and institutional adaptation among states, which may also facilitate cooperation between states. However, it is important to include as many states as possible in the cooperation structures because those left out from these structures increase the possibility of conflict, where the use of military means cannot be ruled out.

This new responsibility in reframing cooperation, policies and widening the means can be viewed as a process of the normalization of German foreign and security policy. This study argues that the normalization development of German foreign and security policy has material, ideational and institutional aspects. Above, I have discussed material and ideational aspects of this normalization development e.g. how beliefs affect policy content. This study maintains that this normalization development also has institutional aspects e.g. how beliefs affect policy process.
Here, the theoretical framework of Moravcsik (1994) becomes crucial. The key point of this institutional examination is how the leader uses international cooperation in order to gain ‘Handlungsspielraum’ or room for manoeuvre, domestically. It can be argued that in her second term in office, Chancellor Merkel increasingly tried to enter to different international agreements and to support closer international cooperation and institutions in order to be able to ‘cut slack’ domestically. In this analysis, we have seen, how during her second term Chancellor Merkel, aimed to enter into different binding agreements internationally. This is crucial because in this way she might receive more room domestically for framing policies according to her beliefs internationally and, at the same time, persuade her own institutions domestically. However, the institutionalisation of beliefs and new ideas and creating change in foreign policy practice requires that domestic institutions also being persuaded to get behind the change.

This does not mean that Chancellor Merkel would want to create a superpower Germany. Quite the contrary, the aim may be to define international cooperation structures and policies so that they resemble the German way of thinking. It is important to define rules and practices of international cooperation structures because over time, domestic institutions must adapt to these rules. Further, widening means to include sanctions can be viewed from this same perspective; those who break the rules should be sanctioned. However, in the shorter term, from Merkel’s point of view, influencing international cooperation structures with German views was the way by which she could keep her constituents satisfied and stay in power domestically.

Thus, relating to Moravcsik’s theorisation, the aim of this study is to examine how German Chancellor Merkel became a ‘norm entrepreneur’ during her second term
in office. It argues that there are certain conditions under which mechanisms of persuasion begin to operate and the leader becomes a norm entrepreneur. The first condition relates to the position of power that the leader gets at international negotiation tables. As we have also seen in this study, the heads of the state actively strove to take the seat from the financial ministers in order to be able to conduct international economic policies at the G20. At the EU level, this resulted in the institutional status of the European Council in 2009. However, this study maintains that the most important of these conditions is the amount of political power the leader holds in the domestic setting. The main target of persuasion is the domestic institutions that will implement new ideas and policies in practice. However, to be successful, these persuasion tactics may require a political culture that is as consensus oriented as Germany’s. If these conditions do not apply, the best strategy for the decision-maker may be to ‘tie hands’ and agree on the different policies domestically with a wide consensus and operate with their beliefs and ideas accordingly. This better resembles the domestication argument made by Harnisch (2006, 2009), who argues that the German domestic institutions, Bundestag, Bundesrat and Federal Constitutional Court, have increasingly gained power in German EU politics.

When considering the above presented results, Moravcsik’s theoretical implications on how international cooperation and agreements increase the power of the executive in the domestic sphere seem to provide a valid theoretical framework that will be discussed further in the following results relating more to the conduct of economic and European policy, where the importance of the EU aspect increases. Here, one might be better able to use outcome-based counter reasoning in order to be able to analyse whether change in beliefs could also have affected the domestic policy process e.g. whether German domestic institutions and constituents were thus persuaded. Thus, if they had not been persuaded by
Merkel’s policy, had the SPD received more votes in the election in autumn 2013, had German anti-EU parties been elected to the German *Bundestag*, and most importantly, had Chancellor Merkel, as a consequence, ultimately lost the election and not been able to stay in office for the third term.
8. Federal Chancellor Merkel’s Economic and European Policy

8.1. Quantitative Operational Code Analysis of Chancellor Merkel’s Beliefs

This chapter will discuss the operational code of Federal Chancellor Merkel between the study periods of 2005-2009 and 2009-2013, and compare Merkel’s two terms in office. The findings are presented in Tables 4 and 5, including significance tests and an explanation of values.

*Analysis of Chancellor Merkel’s philosophical beliefs*

Chancellor Merkel sees the political universe (P-1) as cooperative throughout the whole study period of 2005-2009. However, towards her second term in office, this belief has been reinforced from +0.412 to +0.5, although not significantly, and the Chancellor has started to view the nature of the political universe as friendlier than during her first term. Germany, as the giant of the European economy has, for decades, been dependent on export and good trade relations and, therefore, being able to view the political universe as cooperative from the economic point of view is quite an expected result. However, this belief relates more to how the leader views other actors in the political universe as well as their policies and actions. Therefore, the rise of emerging economies and the effect of the financial and...
economic crisis on this particular belief should be discussed further in the qualitative section of the analysis.

As her second term in office approached, Chancellor Merkel’s belief in the realisation of fundamental political values (P-2) has reinforced from +0,239 to +0,281. This belief could relate to the P-1 belief: if Merkel sees that the international operational environment is becoming friendlier, it is also easier for her to realise fundamental values that could relate to the values and principles of the German *Soziale Marktwirtschaft*. However, this belief has remained quite moderate in value considering the Germany’s presumptive economic power in Europe and worldwide. It is noteworthy that this index relates to the intensity of words and deeds of others and how the leader sees his/her ability to realise the values in relation to others. This question will be discussed further in the following chapter because the rise of the emerging economies might also affect the value of this belief as these economies influence the international system and organisations with their (sometimes contrasting) values and principles.

During her second term, Chancellor Merkel viewed the political universe as a bit more predictable (P-3) (+0,378) than during her first term in office (+0,341). The predictability index is also connected to how Merkel sees others. Merkel observes some variety in actions related to others and sees them as quite predictable. In reference to direction, this belief seems to be reinforcing as the nature of the political universe has become friendlier.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Code Beliefs (George 1969)</th>
<th>Mean value 2005-2009 *</th>
<th>Mean value 2009-2013 **</th>
<th>F (1, 33)</th>
<th>p ***</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philosophical beliefs</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-1. Nature of the political universe</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>Hostile-mixed-friendly. Higher scores indicate the leader sees other as more friendly. Variation between -1 and +1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-2. Realization of fundamental political values</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>Higher scores indicate optimism, lower pessimism towards realization of fundamental pol. values. Variation between -1 and +1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3. Predictability of political future</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>Lower scores indicate that subject sees less predictability in the political universe. Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-4. Control over historical development</td>
<td>0.911</td>
<td>0.908</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>Higher scores indicate that the subject sees self as having more control. Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5. Role of chance</td>
<td>0.699</td>
<td>0.668</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>Higher scores indicate a higher role assigned to chance. Relates to P3 and P4 beliefs. Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* n=17 (Chancellor Merkel's first term in office); ** n=18 (Chancellor Merkel's second term in office); *** One-Way ANOVA test

Table 4  Chancellor Merkel’s operational code in economic and European policy, philosophical beliefs. A Comparison of Federal Chancellor Merkel’s two terms in office.\(^\text{10}\)

During her first term, Chancellor Merkel’s belief in the control over historical development (P-4), the power belief, is relatively high (+0.911). In this index, it is measured how much the ‘self’ is taking action; if the subject’s rhetoric indicates

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\(^{10}\) The operational code analysis and significance tests were conducted as in Walker, Schafer and Young (1998). For more specific coding procedure, see App. 1. and 2.
that the self is preforming most of the action, then the subject sees itself as more in control. The comparison of Merkel’s two terms demonstrates that this belief is quite stable, although it has reversed somewhat (+0,908), a tendency that might continue in future. The results indicate that towards her second term Merkel, might have begun to see German economic power as gradually decreasing in relation to others. The rise of the ‘Schwellenländer’, the emerging economies, might have started to appear in Merkel’s beliefs, while the relative economic power of Germany may have decreased in the eyes of Chancellor Merkel. In the qualitative section it is important to analyse how this has affected Germany’s willingness and ability to act and shape international economic policy.

Merkel assigns quite a high role to chance (P-5). This belief has also reversed from +0,699 to +0,668 over the study period. This belief is related to belief P-3 (predictability of political future) and P-4 (power belief). The more predictable the political universe and the more the self has control over the events, the lower the role of chance then is. Although the political universe has, in economic terms, become more predictable, the decreasing German power in relation to others may have affected how much of a role that Merkel assigns to chance.

*Analysis of Chancellor Merkel’s instrumental beliefs*

The belief in the direction of strategy (I-1) describes a leader’s beliefs about the best strategic direction for actions. This belief relates to the self and how cooperatively the subject defines his/her strategy. According to the findings, Chancellor Merkel sees cooperative strategy as the most useful throughout the whole study period and this belief has reinforced from +0,836 to +0,86 between
the two terms. The emergence of the G20 and the dissemination of the principles of *Soziale Marktwirtschaft*, stressing the role of states as the guardians of regulation, might have reinforced this belief towards the second term.

The belief in the direction of strategy relates to the second instrumental belief: the intensity of tactics (I-2). This belief has reinforced significantly from +0.346 to +0.409 between her two terms in office, and Chancellor Merkel increasingly views cooperative tactics as the most useful approach to action. This belief should be discussed further in the qualitative sections of the analysis, especially relating to actions taken during the euro crisis.

It has been said before that Chancellor Merkel avoids taking any risks (Packer 2014). The belief relating to risk orientation (I-3) shows how risk averse/acceptant the leader is. Here, higher levels of diversity in action mean that the risk associated with one particular action is diminished. Towards her second term in office, this belief has clearly reversed from +0.546 to +0.452 and Chancellor Merkel’s risk acceptance has diminished. Merkel has become more acceptant of many different forms of means when dealing with economic challenges. As in the previous case, the more options and more different types of means that Merkel has to choose from, from positive to negative means, the less risk is related to one single mean. In the analysis, it is important discuss how this can be done also through interlinking different types of means.
Operational Code Beliefs (George 1969) | Mean value 2005-2009 * | Mean value 2009-2013 ** | F (1, 33) | p *** | Explanation
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Instrumental beliefs

I-1. Approach to goals | 0.836 | 0.86 | 0.153 | 0.35 | Cooperative-mixed-conflictual. Higher scores indicate that cooperative strategy is more useful. Variation between -1 and +1.

I-2. Intensity of tactics | 0.346 | 0.409 | 3.116 | 0.04 | Higher scores indicate a belief in the utility of cooperative tactics. Variation -1 and +1.

I-3. Risk orientation | 0.546 | 0.452 | 1.807 | 0.09 | Higher scores indicate less diversity and therefore higher levels of risk acceptance. Variation between 0 and 1.

I-4. Importance of timing of action

a. Cooperation-conflict shift | 0.164 | 0.14 | 0.153 | 0.35 | Higher values indicate the more diversity in cooperation/conflict in rhetoric. Variation between 0 and 1.

b. Words-deeds shift | 0.11 | 0.318 | 9.773 | 0 | Lower scores indicate lower diversity in tactics. Variation between 0 and 1.

I-5. Utility of means

a. Reward | 0.051 | 0.145 | 9.12 | 0 | Variation between 0 and 1.

b. Promise | 0.122 | 0.112 | 0.051 | 0.41 | Variation between 0 and 1.

c. Support | 0.745 | 0.673 | 1.82 | 0.09 | Variation between 0 and 1.

d. Oppose | 0.063 | 0.049 | 0.316 | 0.29 | Variation between 0 and 1.

e. Threaten | 0.015 | 0.007 | 0.422 | 0.26 | Variation between 0 and 1.

f. Punish | 0.004 | 0.014 | 1.537 | 0.11 | Variation between 0 and 1.

* n=17 (Chancellor Merkel's first term in office); ** n=18 (Chancellor Merkel's second term in office); *** One-Way ANOVA test

Table 5 Chancellor Merkel’s operational code in economic and European policy, instrumental beliefs. A comparison of Federal Chancellor Merkel’s two terms in office.¹¹

¹¹ The operational code analysis and significance tests were conducted as in Walker, Schafer and Young (1998). For more specific coding procedure, see App. 1. and 2.
In this case as well, the belief in the importance of the timing of action (I-4) has been divided in two. The first (I-4 a) examines the diversity of the leader’s choices in terms of cooperation and conflict. This belief has reversed between the two terms from +0,164 to +0,140 i.e. the diversity of Merkel’s cooperation-conflict rhetoric has diminished somewhat between the two terms. The other index (I-4 b) that measures the diversity of the leader’s actions in terms of the distribution of words and deeds has reinforced significantly from +0,11 to +0,318 during the study period. The Chancellor has begun to show more of a diversity in tactics and has started to accept more deeds, and not only words, as part of her tactics. In the aftermath of the financial and economic crises, European states have, in particular, been under international pressure to show trust-building measures in the conduct of their economic policies, which might be demonstrated in this belief. More analysis is, however, required on the nature of the deeds in the following qualitative chapter.

Utility of means (I-5) displays the leader’s belief in the utility of different tactics that mark the exercise of political power. Merkel uses supportive tactics the most often throughout the whole study period. However, during her second term in office, her belief in the utility of different means has changed and Merkel has begun to widen the repertoire of positive means, especially relating to ‘reward’ (from +0,051 to +0,145), as well as to also accept more conflictual means. As in the previous case, these results also relate also to the instrumental belief I-3, risk orientation, which includes the idea of widening the policy means and, therefore, reducing the risk assigned to one single mean.

The results presented above demonstrate that there have been changes in both the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of Chancellor Merkel’s operational code belief system. In the qualitative analysis, it is important to discuss the changes in
the operational environment, which may have also affected the predictability rate and decreased Merkel’s perception of German economic power as well as increased cooperative strategies and tactics, in addition, widening her toolkit of different means. As many of the operational code beliefs have changed, although not significantly, between her two terms in office, one could hypothesise that beliefs might change as a consequence of a particular event or crisis, which will be tested as part of the following qualitative analysis.

8.2. Qualitative Longitudinal Analysis on Merkel’s Economic and European Policy

This chapter will discuss how the changes in operational code beliefs frame German economic and European policy during Chancellor Merkel’s two terms. The purpose of this analysis is not to discuss every statement, policy initiative or action taken in detail, but rather to draw a picture of how change in economic operational code beliefs reframes meanings and concepts and has gradually also changed the domestic institutional balance. In this process, German economic and European policy has gradually started to become ‘normalized’.
Global Challenges Require Extensive International Cooperation

In the beginning of her first term, Chancellor Merkel, as the head of the CDU-SPD government, already started to describe the process of change that the operational environment, namely in the world economy, was undergoing. According to Merkel, a completely new global balance of power was emerging. The positive side of this development was that the world's economic potential rested on more shoulders than before, which benefited all of the industrialised countries as well as emerging economies and the developing world. The challenge in this development was that old habits and inherited rights were no longer a guarantee for success. Merkel held the view that old hierarchies were being flattened. (Merkel 24 Jan 2007.)

Merkel believed that the aim of the politics was to shape globalisation in political terms. She was convinced that globalisation offered more chances than risks: people had the opportunity for more peace, freedom and prosperity. However, according to Merkel, if these positive forces of globalisation were to benefit everyone, a new balance of power had to be created — a world economy, which complied with the rules of a fair regulatory framework. (Ibid.)

Merkel maintained that through information technology, the world of work and production were growing closer together. She saw that structural change was noticeable in Europe and Germany:
Merkel argued that there were different possibilities for reacting to the new situation. She raised *Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft*, the social market economy, as an example that had succeeded in resolving the contradiction between capital and work in a way in which both employees and entrepreneurs were satisfied:


(Merkel 22 Nov 2006.)

Merkel stated in Davos that in Germany, the social market economy was not just left as an idea but was translated into reality, leading to the so-called ‘Wirtschaftswunder, (economic miracle) (Merkel 25 Jan 2006). This shows how the social market economy had a strong traditional basis and enjoyed wide support across the party boundaries in Germany.

Merkel stated that in 2006, Germany had again become the economic engine in Europe. The basis for this economic growth should be strengthened by all actors:

‘[…] Wir müssen daher […] die Grundlagen des Aufschwungs stärken, […]. Dazu müssen wieder alle Akteure ihren Beitrag leisten. Denn die Struktur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist so, dass zum Beispiel auch die Tarifvertragsparteien eine sehr große Verantwortung in unserem Land haben: Politik, Arbeitgeber und
Arbeitnehmer wirken zusammen, wenn es um Wachstum, um Innovation und um Beschäftigung geht.’ (Merkel 21 Sep 2007.)

These actors were political actors, employers and employees. During her first term, the Chancellor was ready to work with wide national consensus in order to move a bit towards the SPD in government and to ‘tie her hands’ in order to able to create a firm basis for Germany’s international influence and actions.

Merkel urged the social market economy to move on, calling it a ‘new social market economy’ – a new stage aimed in two directions, which considered both the international dimension and the density of the global network as a whole. This was not an abandonment of the principles of the social market economy, but the entrance into a new era in which states must face the challenge of defining which form globalisation takes. Merkel stressed that this required that Germany’s national policy should be changed and that as the largest European economy, Germany should, therefore, take responsibility in Europe. According to Merkel, this could be put forward during the German EU and G8 Presidencies. (Merkel 25 Jan 2006.)

Germany took over both Presidencies during the year 2007, which may have increased the belief that Germany was a power in defining world politics. Chancellor Merkel stressed that she knew that as the EU's largest economy, Germany had great responsibility, and maintained that Europe could prosper only if Germany was economically strong (Merkel 24 Jan 2007).

The motto of the German G8 Presidency was ‘Growth and Responsibility’. According to Merkel, growth was for all countries and the precondition for achieving higher employment, better standards of living and resource productivity. However, growth was not an end in and of itself. According to Merkel, it should be created fairly and, therefore, global competition had to take place within an
international framework. Here again, politics came into play, because politics had the responsibility for this framework. (Ibid.)

Merkel argued that within the next ten years, Germany should be among the top three countries in Europe in terms of growth, jobs and innovation. She was confident that Germany could succeed, but also noted that it would be vitally important for Europe for Germany to succeed:

‘[…] Ich glaube daran, dass wir es schaffen können, aber ich sage auch, dass es von entscheidender Bedeutung für Europa sein wird, ob Deutschland dies schaffen kann. Ideen in der Tat umzusetzen, hört sich gut an, aber zur Wahrheit gehört bei einer klaren Analyse natürlich auch, dass es bei uns an vielen Stellen eine selbstverschuldete Lähmung gibt […].’ (Merkel 25 Jan 2006.)

She also pointed out that translating ideas into reality sounded good, but many fields suffered from self-imposed paralysis. Merkel stressed that in the contemporary world those who succeed in the competition of ideas would be able to shape their own future:

‘[…] Ich glaube, von Ideen allein können wir nicht leben, sondern wir müssen auch zeigen, dass wir diese Ideen andschliessend in der Tat umsetzen können – jeder an seinem Platz, in Deutschland, in Europa und in der Welt.’ (Merkel 25 Jan 2006.)

However, she saw that it was not possible to live on ideas alone and that ideas should be translated into deeds both in Germany and Europe, and in the wider world (Merkel 25 Jan 2006).

These statements in the beginning of Chancellor Merkel’s first term already show that the worldwide challenge of globalisation and rising economies would be tackled with the influencing with ideas. It required the active dissemination of ideas on the international level, influencing in international organisations and defining their rules and practices in a way that corresponded with the German way of thinking.
The Chancellor was convinced that the inevitable precondition for the global growth was open world-markets. She also argued that economic success would bring more responsibility to share peace, prosperity and development with other regions of the world. Moreover, global challenges could only be managed through broad international cooperation. (Merkel 24 Jan 2007.)

Chancellor Merkel’s aim was to place special emphasis on new forms of dialogue with the major emerging economies, i.e. Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa. According to her, the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm should initiate a dialogue and pass it on to other international organisations because a coherent joint approach was needed in many of the international bodies. Merkel also stressed that Europe should ‘look beyond its own nose’ as otherwise globalisation could not be shaped. Therefore, one of the priorities of the German G8 Presidency was to discuss how to integrate Africa into the world economy. (Ibid.)

Through intensive cooperation it was easier for Merkel and Germany to influence others with the ideas and values, while the creation of permanent structures would facilitate the spread of national ideas internationally. This might gradually increase the belief of Chancellor Merkel of being better able to realise her values, while at the same time, the permanent structures of international cooperation might, in future, diminish Germany’s absolute and relative economic power as emerging economies started to stabilise their position within these structures.

During the German Presidencies in 2007, the Chancellor had already begun to link issue areas. She maintained that economy and ecology should be combined intelligently. However, emerging economies and developing countries should decouple economic growth from the consumption of resources and CO2 emissions. She also urged on an increase in international cooperation relating to
climate protection and energy. (Merkel 24 Jan 2007.) She viewed that sustainability and climate questions should be brought together with questions relating to energy (Merkel 15 May 2008). The EU would face the special task of combining energy with climate protection (Merkel 14 May 2007).

*Germany and the EU – Two Sides of the Same Coin*

During the first term, Merkel discussed the EU using the words of former Chancellor Helmut Kohl on how the relation between Germany and the European Union should be seen:

‘Wir in Deutschland sind uns einig, dass die friedliche Wiedervereinigung unseres Landes ohne die europäische Einigung nicht möglich gewesen wäre. Helmut Kohl hat als Bundeskanzler oft gesagt: Die deutsche Wiedervereinigung und die europäische Einigung sind zwei Seiten einer Medaille. Deshalb ist die Europäische Union in Deutschland so etwas wie ein Teil unserer Staatsräson. […]’ (Merkel 14 Apr 2008.)

She stressed that the reunification of Germany and European integration were two sides of the same coin and, therefore, the European Union was a part of German *Staatsräson* (Merkel 14 Apr 2008). During her first term, Merkel spoke of the Union mainly as a peace project that secured freedom and welfare:


The Chancellor also urged Europe to become explicit about what its values were. Europe was based on common values that everybody shared, such as freedom,
democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Therefore, the policies of Europe should also be value-based. (Merkel 22 Sep 2006.)

According to Merkel, all of the challenges facing Europe could be tackled if their strengths were pooled in Europe (Merkel 24 Jan 2007, 14 May 2007). A coherent foreign policy and ‘speaking with one voice’ had become ever more important for Europe (Merkel 27 Jun 2007). She emphasised the point that if the EU member states could find common positions, then those views could not be disregarded by the world (Merkel 24 Apr 2008). According to Merkel, the idea behind European integration could be summarised by an African proverb: ‘if you want to go quickly, go alone. If you want to go far, go together.’ (Merkel 27 Jun 2007). Merkel maintained that this was the way in which she wanted to meet Germany's and the EU's responsibility in the world (Merkel 24 Jan 2007). Thus, Germany could increase its influence through a strong Europe and, therefore, it was of utmost importance for the Chancellor that the EU would be successful and strong from both the inside and outside.

The Chancellor was confident that a slow, bureaucratic and disunited Europe could not meet any of the global challenges relating to security, climate or energy, which required joint action:


Merkel argued that what Europe was aiming at with the Lisbon Treaty in the field of foreign policy, had already been achieved in reference to the monetary union.
She stressed that the euro was not only an economic success story; it also had an effect beyond monetary policy. It constructed identity, mainly European identity:


Therefore, the euro was a symbol and engine for European integration. According to Merkel, the euro stood for a strong Europe, whose voice carried weight in the world. (Merkel 2 Jun 2008.) Merkel’s belief in the euro and Europe was strong; her operational code beliefs relating to both the operational environment and strategy were cooperative and it would be unlikely that these beliefs would reverse as integration further deepened.

Merkel was convinced that the European integration process needed to be intensified in a way that was directed at new, rather than the old, challenges. She held to the view that the EU could enlarge if the status quo was maintained. Therefore, it was important to restart the constitutional process. (Merkel 24 Jan 2007.) During its EU Presidency in 2007, Germany was active and showed initiative in furthering the process of the Intergovernmental Conference ahead of the Lisbon Treaty. In the discussions on the Lisbon Treaty, Chancellor Merkel expressed her satisfaction with the acceptance that the Treaty process had received nationally. Almost all the fractions in the German Bundestag supported the idea that the Treaty was good for Europe:

Merkel also discussed the values upon which the Union was built on. The EU was not merely a Union of peace, freedom and security anymore, and it would make clear with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights that it would be committed to a European economic and social model where economic success and social responsibility were combined:


The German domestic consensus on the values and principles of the social market economy was wide. In the negotiation process of the Lisbon Treaty, Chancellor Merkel was able to attach the German *Soziale Marktwirtschaft*, as an economic and social model, into the Treaty. This was an important step for Germany in influencing European policies, because now the main ideas of the social market economy, its rules and principles, would inevitably be, to some extent, put into practice in every member state. On the other hand, as Merkel stated, the EU could now shape and influence others globally with German ideas and values.

A sign of domestication, the power of German institutions on German European policy, was visible in the wide consensus through which the concept of *Soziale Marktwirtschaft* was defined as part of the Lisbon Treaty. Another sign could be interpreted in Merkel’s following statement, as she discussed the role of national parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty came into force:
Ich glaube, dass wir gemeinsam – Bundesregierung, Bundestag und Bundesrat – sehr gut daran gearbeitet haben, dass sie Parlamentsrechte von Anfang an wirkungsvoll angewandt werden können. […] Lassen wir uns darauf ein, die Subsidiaritätskultur in Europa wirklich weiterzuentwickeln! Deutschland hat mit seinem föderalen System sehr gute Erfahrungen gemacht, und das sollten wir auch in Europa zeigen.’ (Merkel 24 Apr 2008.)

Merkel acknowledged the cooperative work of the government, the Bundestag and Bundesrat and stated that subsidiarity culture should be further developed. She pointed out that Germany had good experiences with its federal system and this should also be presented to Europe. (Merkel 24 Apr 2008.) This statement could also be interpreted as a signal that during her first term, Chancellor Merkel was moving the EU gradually in the direction of a more federal state, the model of which could have originated from the German political system. Hence, it would be quite evident that Germany, with its distinctive federal structure, would be ready to share its experiences in developing subsidiarity principles at the EU level.

The Chancellor argued that the Lisbon Treaty would bring considerable progress in many regards. Firstly, it would secure member states’ decision-making and ability to act: after the entry into force of the Treaty, the voting in the Council would be made according to a qualified majority system. Merkel stated that this might mean that it would be difficult for Germany to carry through its own interests:


According to Merkel, after the entry into force of the Treaty and introduction of the qualified majority system, it would be ever more important to influence the Commission, Parliament and member states at an early stage. (Merkel 24 Apr
2008. This meant that importance of the tactics of persuasion would increase both at the EU level, and also in the capitals of other member states.

Secondly, there would be a redistribution of voting weights between the member states in the Council based on the population sizes of the member states. Merkel considered this important. Thirdly, the European Union would receive a clearer division of competencies in which categories of competencies between the member states and the Union were defined. Merkel stressed that this had, for a long time, been a demand of the German government and Länder. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty would introduce a principle according to which the competencies could be transferred back for example to the member states. (Ibid.)

The Chancellor also discussed the possibility of rethinking competencies between the EU and the member states as a response to the worries of the constituents about the possible ‘super state’ of Europe:


Merkel stated that she would respect the concerns of the citizens and emphasised that the transfer of competencies to the EU level was not a one-way street and that the competencies could be transferred back to member states if necessary (Merkel 27 Jun 2007).
Merkel maintained that the Lisbon Treaty would increase democracy in Europe, because it would strengthen both the European Parliament and national parliaments. The national parliaments would deal with European questions more intensively:

‘[…] bekommen die nationalen Parlamente das Recht, Vorschläge aus Brüssel und Straßburg frühzeitig zu prüfen. Sie müssen also nicht mehr warten, bis sie vor nahezu vollendete Tatsachen gestellt werden, sondern sie können, wenn sie es für nötig erachten, die Vorschläge rechtzeitig einer Kritik unterziehen oder dagegen die so genannten Subsidiaritätsklage einreichen. […] die Parlamente werden sich intensiver als bisher mit europäischen Fragen befassen.’ (Merkel 14 Apr 2008)

In addition to stressing the possible transfer of competencies back to member states and the role of national parliaments in European questions, Merkel also discussed subsidiarity principle and saw the member states as ‘masters of the Treaties’, by which she meant that the German government and Bundestag could decide when a task was on the European level and when it should stay at the national level:

‘Nun kommt ein wichtiger Punkt: Der Vertrag macht klar: Die Mitgliedstaaten sind Herren der Verträge. Das heißt, wir, die Bundesregierung und der Deutsche Bundestag, entscheiden, wann wir eine Aufgabe der europäischen Ebene geben und wann sie besser in der nationalen Verantwortung bleibt. Hierfür ist in Deutschland der Maßstab gesetzt, nämlich der Maßstab der Anwendung des Subsidiaritätsprinzips, was nichts anderes heißt, als dass die untere Ebene den Vorrang vor der oberen hat, wann immer sie die Aufgabe richtig erledigen kann.’ (Merkel 24 Apr 2008)

She took the view that over the past decades, the European Union had been on a road that had led to more joint actions. However, in future, Germany would face the task of deciding how the right balance between national and European tasks was to be shaped. (Merkel 24 Apr 2008.) According to Merkel, those tasks that the member states could execute faster and better, should remain at the national level:

‘Ich möchte nochmals ohne Wenn und Aber unterstreichen: Was die Nationalstaaten selbst schneller, besser und angemessener tun können, das müssen sie auch weiterhin selbst tun. Das muss nicht nach Europa gegeben werden.'
Deshalb liegt mir sehr viel daran, dass wir in Europa das Subsidiaritätsprinzip, das genau dies ausdrückt, wirklich verinnerlichen und konsequent anwenden [...]. [...] Das heißt: Politik muss genau dort ansetzen, wo eine Frage am besten gelöst werden kann. In Bezug auf viele Fragen ist das direkt vor Ort. Zu dem, was wir zu Hause tun, müssen dann geeignete Maßnahmen der Europäischen Union hinzukommen – nicht als Ersatz, sondern als Ergänzung und, wo notwendig, als Stärkung nationaler politischer Möglichkeiten.’ (Merkel 14 Apr 2008.)

She argued that many questions could be resolved nationally. Additionally, appropriate measures must then come from the European Union, not as a substitution for solving issues but as complementary measures, which would strengthen political possibilities nationally. (Merkel 14 Apr 2008.)

Merkel also discussed the possibility of enhanced cooperation, which would be made possible by the Lisbon Treaty:


Merkel pointed out that the approval of all member states was necessary in order for one group to be able to use the instrument of enhanced cooperation. She maintained, however, that in important questions, this should not be the normal way of conducting business and joint positions should be striven for. (Merkel 24 Apr 2008.)

According to Merkel, there were some examples of the intensified cooperation (vertiefte Zusammenarbeit) such as with European common currency and Schengen cooperation. However, she was sceptical about building cooperation structures such as the Union for the Mediterranean as she argued that cooperation should be developed in a way in which it would be open to all. Furthermore, this type of
cooperation that took place between some member states should be approved by all. (Merkel 5 Dec 2007.) This implies that during her first term, Merkel viewed the operational environment of cooperation more traditionally, emphasising the right of all member states to be included and excluding the possibility of further differentiation.

It is worth noting that in all these points that Merkel made, she stressed either the role of the member states or national institutions and constituents. The reasons for this are perhaps manifold. The failure of the Constitutional Treaty in the ratification stage in some member states in 2005 may have increased the need for the leaders to persuade their own institutions and constituents to get behind the new Lisbon Treaty after it was signed in December 2007. The leaders were also aware of the rising anti-EU attitude and its influences nationally, if national voices would not be heard on the EU level. Merkel’s points made clear that the member states and their domestic institutions also had a role in the EU decision-making system after Treaty entered into force. Furthermore, the importance of effective persuasion, both on the EU level and in the capitals of member states would increase and might even be decisive for successful policy-making in future.
8.2.2. The Financial Crisis and Its Consequences: *Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft* to Become International?

*The Principles of Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft to Become a Basis for Building Trust*

The outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 raised the issues about the lack of a global architecture of regulating institutions as well as about the differing values and principles of the global economy on the international agenda. Merkel saw that lessons had been learned from the financial crisis. Globalisation had brought about many chances but the financial crisis had shown what could happen when globalisation knew no regulation:

‘[…] Die Globalisierung hat unendlich viele Chancen gebracht. Im Augenblick sind wir gerade in der Phase, in der wir bitter lernen, dass dann, wenn Globalisierung an bestimmten Stellen keine Regeln kennt, großes Versagen weltweit stattfinden kann. […]’ (Merkel 20 Nov 2008.)

According to Merkel, it was important to build trust. She viewed trust as the cornerstone of the economy. Without trust there would be no investments, banks would not grant loans and the consumers would not consume. Without trust there would be no return to the path of growth. (Merkel 30 Jan 2009.)

Merkel saw a new financial market constitution at the end of the process:

She stressed that the issue was not only about crisis management or new international financial market regulation. It was about building trust, which was, according to Merkel, the foundation of a well-functioning economy. (Merkel 29 Oct 2008.)

The Chancellor was confident that the principles of German *Soziale Marktwirtschaft* should now be advocated internationally:

‘Ich möchte Sie bitten, dass wir gemeinsam auch international für die bei uns so erfolgreichen Prinzipien der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft eintreten. Wir haben keine globale Architektur von Institutionen, in denen wir ein Regelwerk entwickeln können, das mit dem der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft vergleichbar ist. […]’ (Merkel 19 Jan 2009.)

She considered the Federal Republic of Germany as evidence that the social market economy as an economic and society model had proved itself. The world had, however, changed and, therefore, the international dimension of the success model of the social market economy should be further shaped and developed. According to Merkel, Germany would actively contribute in this process:

‘[… ] Die Tatsache, dass die Bundesrepublik Deutschland heute in der Welt da steht, wo sie steht, zeigt, dass sich das wirtschafts- und gesellschaftspolitische Modell der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft bewährt hat. […] vieles auf unserer Welt verändert hat und dass es deshalb eine international Dimension der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft gibt, die, so glaube ich, nicht ausreichend ausgestaltet ist, die weiterentwickelt werden muss, wobei gerade wir in Deutschland mit unserer Erfahrung, der gelebten Erfahrung des Erfolgmodells Soziale Marktwirtschaft, aktiv gestaltend mitwirken sollten und auch mitwirken werden.’ (Merkel 29 Oct 2008.)

Merkel noted that social market economy was a combination of responsibility and values. It meant regulated competition and was morally grounded and, therefore, responsibility was also included. Thus, the financial crisis was a reminder that politics and economy should together make an effort to again strengthen the trust of the people in this economic and social model. This task could only be accomplished in concert with others and not alone. (Merkel 29 Oct 2008.)
The Chancellor maintained that the goal should be a human market economy, which maintained the balance between economic performance and social justice, a balance between freedom and regulation, which were, according to the Chancellor, not on opposite ends: the one necessitated the other:


The social market economy viewed the state as a ‘Hüter der Ordnung’, the guardian of regulation. According to Merkel, the principles were very clear. The state was the guardian of economic and social regulation. Competition was essential, but it required social responsibility. Merkel described this as a ‘third way’ between capitalism and socialism. (Merkel 30 Jan 2009, 29 Oct 2008.) She repeated that the roots of the social market economy were in the ideas of ordoliberalism, which were combined with the ideas of the Christian social ethics of Ludwid Erhard, who had made a theoretical concept out of them (Merkel 23 Feb 2011).

Merkel stressed that shaping the ideas of the social market economy could be seen as an opportunity in the crisis. She argued that the social market economy should be made ‘fit’ for globalisation:

‘Deshalb ist es unter der Maxime „Freiheit und Verantwortung“ unsere gemeinsame Aufgabe, die Soziale Marktwirtschaft fit für die Globalisierung zu machen. […]’ (Merkel 29 Oct 2008.)

She believed that Germany and Europe were well equipped with the social model of Soziale Marktwirtschaft. She stressed that as the supporters of Soziale Marktwirtschaft, Germany and Europe would promote, in competition with other
ideas, their principles of economic activities and living in order for these ideas to become a successful model of sustainable economic management:

‘[…]


The financial crisis created a solid foundation for the dissemination of the ideas of the social market economy. Those who felt that globalisation did not consider the needs of one human being might be willing to view the social market economy, combining capital and work while also emphasising the sides of humanity and the individual, as the right answer to the crisis. Therefore, Merkel believed that the social market economy was experiencing a renaissance and should be given an international dimension in the ever more interdependent world (Merkel 19 Jan 2009), but she still recognised that in the multipolar world these ideas had to compete with other ideas e.g. those of the emerging economies.

An Internationally Interconnected Financial System with Corresponding Institutions Needed

The financial crisis highlighted the lack of a global financial architecture. Chancellor Merkel discussed the German initiatives made during its G8 Presidency in 2007 concerning regulation and widening cooperation. Germany had promoted stronger regulation of the financial markets. Furthermore, Germany began the Heiligendamm Process, a permanent forum of cooperation between G8 states and important emerging nations. This was crucial, because the G8 members alone could no longer establish economic and financial regulation. (Merkel 29 Oct 2008.)
During her first term in office, Merkel’s belief relating to the operational environment already started to reinforce gradually towards a more cooperative direction. The financial crisis seemed to have strengthened this gradual change.

Merkel spoke strongly about a stable and internationally interconnected financial system with institutions, which could take responsibility accordingly. She pondered, however, whether nation states were willing to give responsibility to an international organisation in order to make global action possible:


According to Merkel, the G8 states alone could not resolve problems in future. Therefore, the Chancellor viewed the G20 at the level of heads of the state and government as a very good format for resolving issues. She was confident that through the G20 it was possible to create trust in international cooperation with those actors who were ready to take responsibility:

‘[…] Wie sieht eigentlich die zukünftige Architektur der Zusammenarbeit aus? Klar ist, dass die G8-Staaten allein die Probleme in Zukunft nicht lösen werden. Deshalb halte ich das G20-Format, das es bislang nur auf der Finanzministerebene gab, auch auf der Ebene der Staats- und Regierungschefs für ein sehr gutes Format. Ich glaube, dass dadurch in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit neues Vertrauen geschaffen werden kann und auch Akteure gefunden werden, die gemeinsam Verantwortung für die Zukunft übernehmen.’ (Merkel 30 Jan 2009.)

After this crisis, Merkel maintained that it was time to make institutional decisions and to cooperate internationally. She argued that this should lead to cooperation, especially within the UN. She also took the view that cooperation between international organisations was not sufficient. (Merkel 30 Jan 2009.) She pointed
out that along with the UN that the World Bank, IMF, WTO and ILO should also be strengthened in order to create a group, not a world government, but a ‘nucleus’, a centre with a global dimension:

‘[…] Und wir müssen dann die multilateralen Institutionen – die Weltbank, heute hier anwesend, die IWF, die Welthandelsorganisation, die Internationale Arbeitsorganisation und natürlich die Vereinten Nationen – stärken, um daraus eine Gruppe der Verantwortlichen zu konstruieren, die keine Weltregierung ist – das wäre falsch –, die aber Impulse setzt, in Netzwerken sozusagen ein Nukleus ist und die globale Dimension all unseres Tuns abbildet […]’ (Merkel 20 Nov 2008.)

Merkel also discussed the responsibilities that industrialised and emerging nations should take. She pointed out that only when Europe and Asia faced the challenges of the future together would it be possible to make progress. It was also important for the industrialised countries to keep their commitments concerning the Millennium goals and development aid and to be forerunners in climate protection, because in this way it would be possible to get others to take responsibility:

‘[…] Nur wenn Asien und Europa gemeinsam den Herausforderungen der Zukunft ins Auge sehen, werden wir eine Chance haben voranzukommen. […] Ob dies gelingt, hängt von der Glaubwürdigkeit der entwickelten, der klassischen Industrieländer ab. Das heißt, wenn wir unsere Verpflichtungen bezüglich der Millenniumsziele nicht einhalten, das heißt, wenn wir unsere Verpflichtungen bezüglich der Entwicklungshilfe nicht einhalten, das heißt, wenn wir nicht Vorreiter im Klimaschutz sind, werden wir es nicht schaffen, dass andere dazu bereit sind, Verantwortung zu übernehmen.’ (Merkel 20 Nov 2008.)

This meant, according to Merkel, that the increased responsibility of the emerging nations should not lead to a situation in which industrialised countries reduced their efforts for a just world. The Schwellenländer should take responsibility for e.g. issues relating to climate change:

‘[…] Es wird für das Nach-Kyoto-Abkommen am Ende des nächsten Jahres auch notwendig sein, Schwellenländer in die Verpflichtungen mit einzubeziehen. […] Das heißt, wenn wir das Problem lösen wollen, brauchen wir eine globale Herangehensweise.’ (Merkel 20 Nov 2008.)
The emergence of the *Schwellenländer* may gradually have started to influence Merkel’s power belief (P-4). Although she was taking international initiative in reframing policies and redefining concepts such as *Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft*, which may have started to reinforce Merkel’s belief in the importance of realising German values (P-2) internationally, the world was gradually shifting towards multipolarity where Germany was losing some of its relative economic power to the emerging economies.

The international dissemination of the principles of the social market economy offered Merkel the possibility to start influencing others by interlinking different policies and means. According to her, it was important to find principles based on which it would be possible to agree on long-term, international joint action. Thus, the values and principles of the social market economy were the essential starting point. Merkel argued that the value linkages promoted by the social market economy were an opportunity that the on-going crisis had created. She linked freedom with social balance and growth with sustainability. As discussed above, Merkel started to see them as the basis for the global institutional architecture. She also linked them to free trade and advancing the Doha Round. Economy and trade were linked to the sustainable use of resources, which included issues such as climate protection. And, finally, all these questions were connected with global problems such as poverty as well as development cooperation and aid.

According to Merkel, all the principles marked by the social market economy should be made internationally binding, for example, in the form of the Global Charter for Sustainable Economic Activity (*Charta des nachhaltigen Wirtschaftens*). Merkel maintained that these principles could also be agreed on in the G20 or lead to a world economic council, similar to the UN Security Council, within the UN. (Merkel 30 Jan 2009.)
Germany was not only taking initiative internationally and calling for increased international economic cooperation. Instead of only disseminating German views of the social market economy, Merkel’s Germany was also taking action. Merkel’s reinforcing belief relating to the division between words and deeds was starting to show in Germany’s behaviour. According to Chancellor Merkel, Germany would take a two-way approach to the crisis. Firstly, as an ‘export master’, Germany would contribute nationally in order to get the German economy back on track. The German government adopted a package of measures of over 80 billion euros for long-term programs in order to overcome the crisis. Secondly, Germany also contributed internationally to growth in order to win back the trust of its citizens. (Ibid.) It had adopted internationally coordinated but nationally adjusted packages of measures and driven forth a “Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz”. (Financial Market Stabilisation Act), which entered into force in October 2008:

‘Vor zwei Wochen haben wir international abgestimmte, aber doch auf die jeweilige nationale Situation ausgerichtete Maßnahmenpakete verabschiedet. In Deutschland haben wir das „Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz” auf den Weg gebracht, eine Woche später ist es in Kraft getreten. Es war ein großer Kraftakt in großer gemeinsamer Verantwortung von Bundestag, Bundesrat und Bundesregierung.’ (Merkel 29 Oct 2008.)

Merkel saw this action as a major effort of joint the responsibility of the Bundestag, Bundesrat and German government (Merkel 29 Oct 2008). In conducting these internationally agreed measures, Merkel agreed on a national package of measures with wide consensus between the government, Bundestag and Bundesrat. Thus, the role of German domestic institutions was crucial in the implementation phase of internationally agreed policies.

The Chancellor also highlighted the importance of the common efforts of different national actors ranging from political actors to companies and employees, which
demonstrated that she was ready to make use of the wide consensus that *Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft* had in Germany:

> „Wir erleben auch immer wieder, dass es heute wichtig ist, ein Land umfassend und nicht nur politisch zu repräsentieren, nicht nur als Wirtschaftsuntemehmen oder als Vertreter der Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer aufzutreten, sondern auch die Gemeinsamkeit der Anstrengungen deutlich zu machen. Das ist auch das, was uns in diesem Jahr, das ja das 60. Jahr der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist, das Jahr, in dem auch die Soziale Marktwirtschaft auf nunmehr 61 Jahre Erfolg zurückblicken kann, gemeinsam umtreibt.’ (Merkel 19 Jan 2009.)

According to the Chancellor, the German package of measures served to guarantee the refinancing of the financial institutions, facilitating the acquisition of capital and, eventually, giving the institutions the possibility of relieving risky positions. Merkel stated, however, *‘keine Leistung ohne Gegenleistung’* and stressed that the banks should adhere to their responsibility and comply with certain rules. (Merkel 29 Oct 2008.)

According to Merkel, these measures took significant effort on behalf of Germany and there was discussion on its debt. Over recent years, Germany had increased taxes, executed structural measures and, therefore, won *Handlungsspielraum*. However, Merkel stressed that Germany needed a plausible perspective for limiting the new debt as well as for cutting down on the already existing debts. Merkel foresaw that one of the measures would be to attach a ‘Schuldenbremse’, a debt brake, to the German constitution as well as to acknowledge the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. (Merkel 30 Jan 2009.)

The Chancellor was confident that it was necessary to agree on international guidelines and one should not leave things to crisis management. According to her, it was a positive thing that states were acting in a coordinated manner in rescuing banks. She pointed out that lessons should be learned from the crisis. The financial market had a service function towards the economy, which it had abandoned for
some time. The task of preventing future crises could only be resolved internationally. (Ibid.)

‘Europapolitik Ist Innenpolitik Geworden’

After the outbreak of the financial crisis and in the few months before the German Bundestag election in 2009, Merkel shared her views on Europe and Germany’s role in the Union. She argued that European policies had become a natural part of its domestic policies:


Merkel saw that European level policies were a crucial part of the work of the government as well as of the Bundestag and its Committees (Merkel 27 May 2009). Linking these two levels might, however, have many other reasons, which include different types of nuances. The financial crisis had pushed states to increase their cooperation in the economic field and to seek a global architecture with regulating institutions. The crisis also had consequences at the European level, where it started to lead to further integration, which had an impact on the member states. Merkel’s statement could, thus, also include the idea that now it had become possible to make domestic politics and influence the domestic policy process through the European level policy dissemination and, at the same, to influence the domestic policies and politics of other member states. The audience for European
policies was not only at the European level, the audiences at the national level should increasingly be considered.

Merkel stated that there were four principles that guided her in her political work in the European Union. These principles revolved around advocating German interests, deepening the European Union, discussing member states and a division of competencies, and using the values of the EU as a compass in tackling new challenges. (Merkel 27 May 2009.) With these principles she began the gradual process of redefining German European policy based on continuity but still adding aspects that could be seen as a process of change.

Merkel emphasised that advocating German interests in Europe and a ‘view of the whole’ were among her main principles and were two sides of the same coin:


Although Chancellor Merkel spoke about Germany’s European self-understanding, and the fact that the German constitution could have earlier already allowed the deepening of integration in the field of security and defence policy, Merkel also presented the other side of the argument, which was about the representation of German interests in Europe:
‘Deutschland gehört als einer der wirtschaftsstärksten Mitgliedstaaten natürlich zu den Nettozahlern der Europäischen Union. Aber richtig ist auch: Deutschland profitiert mit Blick auf unsere Exportmöglichkeiten auch überdurchschnittlich von EU-Binnenmarkt. […] Damit wird immer wieder suggeriert, dass Deutschland keine oder jedenfalls zu wenige eigene Interessen in Europa vertritt. Ich brauche sicher nicht zu betonen, dass das, was wir täglich tun, eigentlich das Gegenteil ist. […] Schon aus unserer geografischen Mittellage, unserer Wirtschaftskraft und aus unseren geschichtlichen Erfahrungen resultiert eine Rolle in Europa, die es uns ermöglicht, das Ganze relativ gut im Blick zu haben und dabei automatisch unsere eigenen Interessen zu vertreten. […]’ (Merkel 27 May 2009.)

Merkel pointed out that although it had been suggested that Germany was not advocating its own interests, the reality was quite the opposite: Germany’s central location, economic strength and German experiences had already resulted in a role in Europe, which enabled Germany to see the whole picture and, therefore, represent its own interests. (Merkel 27 May 2009.)

Merkel raised the question of cooperation between Germany and France and saw the DE-FR initiatives as the best guarantee that Europe could agree on progress. If they worked against each other, decisions would hardly be made. Therefore, Merkel saw this cooperation as especially important. (Ibid.) This demonstrates that the Chancellor still saw German-French cooperation, reflecting continuity, as one of the key elements in the European integration process.

As a second principle, the ability to act (Handlungsfähigkeit) and the deepening of European cooperation was based on many arguments. Merkel held the view that the deepening of the European Union should not be given an alternative and she ranked it higher than quick enlargement:

‘[…] Zur Vertiefung der Europäischen Union der 27 Mitgliedstaaten sollte es keine Alternative geben; ich gehe so weit zu sagen: sie hat Vorrang vor einer schnellen Erweiterung. Es geht […] schlicht und einfach um die Handlungsfähigkeit der Europäischen Union. […]’ (Merkel 27 May 2009.)
She also believed that the Lisbon Treaty would offer more continuity to the work of the European Council. The Treaty would further strengthen the role of the European Parliament as well as national parliaments. Merkel stressed that the Lisbon Treaty would better balance the roles between those two:


The Chancellor was not ready to create divisions in Europe. She stressed that it was the reason why she opposed strengthened coordination in the euro area. She viewed the internal market as the basis of the Union for all of the member states and felt that the ECOFIN Council should be given a decisive role in coordinating economic policies:


Merkel also took a stand on the question of a multi-speed Europe. She pointed out that the enhanced cooperation of some of the member states always required approval from all member states and again based her argument on the Union’s better ability to act:

‘Im Übrigen wird im Zusammenhang mit Europa auch von mehreren Geschwindigkeiten gesprochen und so getan, als sei das ganz einfach möglich. Eine stärkere Zusammenarbeit von einigen Mitgliedstaaten bedarf immer der Zustimmung aller Mitgliedstaaten. […]’ (Merkel 27 May 2009.)
Merkel’s third principle relating to her political work in the European Union was to have the competencies between the EU and member states clearly defined. The member states were, according to Merkel, masters of the Treaties:

‘Deshalb liegt mein Hauptaugenmerk bei der Frage, was die Europäische Union ist, darauf, dass klar definiert ist, wie sie sich zu den Nationalstaaten verhält, dass die Nationalstaaten die Herren der Verträge sind, dass die Kompetenzübertragung eindeutig geregelt ist, dass wir alles vermeiden, was Kompetenzübertragung durch die Hintertür bedeutet […]’. (Merkel 27 May 2009.)

The fourth principle was to use common values as a compass for tackling new challenges. According to Merkel, the common values held the Union together. The common values gave the Europe the strength to act according to the principle of solidarity. She spoke about tolerance as the soul of Europe. Merkel saw foreign and security policy as one form of spreading and anchoring values in the world. Merkel also discussed how much influence Europe, with its 500 million people, could have in the world. She argued that if Europe could represent certain common goals, backed by economic power, it could have the chance to shape globalisation and the world. (Merkel 27 May 2009.)

According to the Chancellor, the crisis demonstrated that the world economy needed a common value base. She highlighted the German social market economy and its principles, which were also drafted into the Lisbon Treaty and maintained that they could be seen as a foundation on which international regulation should be built on. Merkel viewed the social market economy as a successful model compared to other power and economic centres of the world. According to her, Europe would either champion these principles and also try to have them accepted in other parts of the world, or it would lose the basis of its existence. However, Merkel stressed that the point was not to work against others but rather to cooperate with partners worldwide and, thereby, open up cooperation towards the east and south of Europe. (Ibid.)
8.2.3. Beliefs Framing Policy During Merkel’s Second Term: Cooperation Reframed Externally and Internally

‘Scheitert der Euro, scheitert Europa’ – the Euro Crisis as a Turning Point in Reframing Cooperation at the EU Level

After a victorious election in the autumn 2009, Merkel became the head of the CDU-FDP government. Gradually, the financial crisis led to the euro crisis and to measures for the stabilisation of the Eurozone. Chancellor Merkel stated that in the past years there had been a series of crises. One being the financial crisis in which the banks collapsed, which made state intervention necessary. This was followed by an economic crisis where state intervention was also necessary, this time in the form of economic stimulus packages, which then led to a debt crisis, which, according to Merkel, was to be expected as the banks were rescued and economic stimulus packages were agreed on and was, ultimately, followed by the critical reaction of the markets. (Merkel 20 May 2010.)

Cooperative beliefs relating to strategies and tactics guided the Chancellor’s policy framing as the rescue package on Greece was agreed on in May 2010 in opposition to German public opinion:

Merkel stressed that she believed in Europe and, therefore, she had proposed that the German *Bundestag* would support Greece and secure the stability of the Eurozone. Her motivation was based on the principles of the European project. Therefore, she had decided to implement a euro rescue package, ambitious reforms and austerity programmes for Greece and other countries. She pointed out that if the euro fails, Europe also fails. This was the reason why it was important that the stability of the monetary union was secured for the long-term. (Merkel 2 Nov 2010.) Merkel's beliefs relating to strategies were becoming more cooperative during her second term. The Greek rescue package supported the overall cooperative goal of not allowing Europe to fail. However, during the second term, the means available were widened and Merkel began to accept the use of more conflictual means relating to e.g. austerity measures.

Merkel pointed out that stabilising the euro was an existential decision, where the weaknesses of the monetary union were apparent and conclusions should be drawn for future:

‘[…] Wir haben sozusagen eine Gesamtaufgabe zur Stabilisierung unserer gemeinsamen Währung zu leisten, die natürlich keine einfache, sondern eine existentielle Entscheidung ist, bei der wir die Schwächen der gemeinsamen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion deutlich vor Augen haben, aus denen wir natürlich Schlussfolgerungen für die Zukunft ziehen müssen.’ (Merkel 20 May 2010.)

During her first term in office, Merkel stressed that she did not want there to be any divisions in Europe. Therefore, she was sceptical about the increased coordination within the Euro-group. The euro crisis may have been a turning point in which rethinking was needed. In agreeing on the rescue measures, the cooperative beliefs relating to a view of the operational environment, as well as the strategies and tactics, which at the international level had already started to reframe
policies and redefine Germany’s view of cooperation in more pragmatic terms, were now also gradually becoming operative at the European level.

Merkel stressed that the European Union could only be strong when the crisis was understood as a commitment and as an opportunity. She argued that these problems should not be swept under the table. Harmony was not a value in and of itself for Europe. She maintained that it was more about building Europe on strong foundations. Therefore, a stability culture and common values were necessary:

‘[…] Ich persönlich bin aber der Meinung: Man darf die Probleme nicht unter den Tisch kehren. Harmonie alleine ist kein wert an sich für Europa. Es geht vielmehr darum, dass Europa auf starken Fundamenten gebaut wird. Deshalb brauchen wir eine Stabilitätskultur und deshalb brauchen wir gemeinsame Werte. Deshalb haben wir uns am Freitag auf dem Europäischen Rat auf wesentliche neue Wege verständigt, die auch Sanktionen im Umgang mit dem Stabilitätpakt beinhalten, die Wirtschaftspolitik sehr viel stärker koordinieren und die den Mitgliedstaaten aufgeben, nicht einfach Schulden zu machen, sondern sich um wirtschaftliche Stärke und finanzielle Stabilität zu bemühen.’ (Merkel 2 Nov 2010.)

According to Merkel, Germany would promote the idea of a stability culture (Merkel 25 Nov 2010). In order to reach this end, the European Council had come to an agreement of new ways, which also included sanctions, for dealing with the stability pact and increasingly coordinated economic policy (Merkel 2 Nov 2010). In dealing with the euro crisis, Merkel set the goal for basing Europe on a stability culture in which the use of means was widened to also include sanctions.

Merkel also started to discuss the controversy between solidarity and solidity (Merkel 20 May 2010). She maintained that to a large extent, solidarity has been manifested in Europe for some time. She stressed that Germany was one of the countries that profited from the most from the euro and, therefore, Germany was ready to support solidarity. However, it was in Germany’s interest that the euro
was a strong, stable and accepted currency in the markets. Therefore, the question of a strong euro was inevitably linked to a stability culture and economic strength. Thus, in the question of Greece, a stability culture was promoted, in order to show solidarity, by enforcing strict conditions. (Merkel 25 Nov 2010.)

According to the Chancellor, over the past months Europe had not only managed Greece but also shown that there was the willingness to strengthen and concretise the Stability and Growth Pact, which included e.g. an early warning system by the Commission before the 3 per cent deficit was reached by a member state. Furthermore, the debt situation in a member state could lead to sanctions. Additionally, the macro economic data of member states would be examined more closely in future. In addition, Merkel stressed that all member states were ready to state that a permanent crisis mechanism was needed to secure the euro. The temporary mechanism, effective until 2013, should remain as it was agreed upon, but this question was more about creating a permanent mechanism for future. (Ibid.)

Merkel also spoke about growth and measures leading to growth. The series of crises from the banking and economic crises, to economic stimulus packages followed by the debt crisis, led the focus to shift towards structures and the competitiveness of those structures:


Merkel stressed that the EU should engage in this discussion, because the structures were not as efficient as hoped. Therefore, the European Council would
work on a growth strategy towards 2020. A fiscal policy without willingness to undertake actual reforms would not bring Europe forward. (Merkel 20 May 2010.) Merkel was confident that growth and budget consolidation could both be advanced and that they were not opposing moves. She stressed that the reason for the crisis was unsustainable growth. However, the budget consolidation alone could not fix all of the problems and, therefore, structural reforms were also needed e.g. investments in education and development. Merkel saw that the task of Europe was to become more competitive and should not be orientated towards the weakest but rather set the benchmark for those who had made the best of their experiences and were able to lead. (Merkel 11 Nov 2010.) From the beginning of her second term, Chancellor Merkel also took action in Germany. She actively took the initiative in introducing strategies aiming for growth and presented actions that should be taken for reducing new debts. Merkel presented a goal-oriented growth package for the new government, which included elements relating to credit supply, taxation, supporting education and research, and fiscal consolidation. (Merkel 20 Nov 2009.) According to Merkel, three elements should be combined: reaching social peace, making solid fiscal policy and setting growth impulses. Merkel viewed e.g. cutting red tape, investing in education and innovation and tax relief as successful types of growth impulses. (Merkel 18 Jan 2010.) Merkel was content with the Schuldenbremse that Germany had included in its constitution in the middle of the crisis of 2009, which had not been made by any other country in the world: ‘Nun hat aber die Bundesrepublik Deutschland etwas gemacht, was mir von keinem anderen Land auf der Welt bekannt ist. Wir haben im vergangenen Jahr mitten in der Krise unser Grundgesetz geändert und eine Schuldenbremse in dieses
Merkel pointed out the sustainability could only be permanently successful in times of demographic change, when a balanced budget was reached. According to her, this had been attempted since the last Grand Coalition and it had not been successful. Therefore, it was now written into the constitution so that the federal state was not allowed to run new debt of more than 0.35 percent of the GDP from 2016 onwards and the Länder were not allowed to run new debt at all starting from the year 2020. (Merkel 18 Jan 2010.) In the aftermath of the financial crisis, using the European level crisis, Chancellor Merkel was able to have the idea of debt reduction institutionalised in the German constitution, which would affect its actions in future.

In the middle of the crisis, Merkel also gave a statement concerning the interaction between domestic constitutional bodies:

‘Das Zusammenspiel der Verfassungsorgane Bundesregierung, Bundespräsident, Bundesverfassungsgericht und Bundesrat – ich habe sie nicht in der protokollarischen Reihenfolge aufgezählt; das gebe ich zu – bildet so etwas wie ein fein gesponnenes Netz von Stabilität auf der Basis unseres Grundgesetzes. […]’
(Merkel 14 May 2010.)

In her speech she did not include the constitutional bodies in their protocollar order and started her list from the government continuing with the Federal President, the Federal Constitutional Court and the Bundesrat. She maintained that cooperation between these bodies constituted a network of stability based on the Grundgesetz aufgenommen. Denn wir wissen, dass uns Nachhaltigkeit gerade auch in Zeiten des demografischen Wandels auf Dauer nur gelingen wird, wenn wir endlich zu ausgeglichenen Haushalte comeinkommen. Weil wir seit der letzten Großen Koalition in den 60er Jahren zwar versucht haben, das zu schaffen, aber nie geschafft haben, haben wir jetzt bindend ins Grundgesetz geschrieben, dass sich der Bund ab 2016 nicht mehr als mit 0,35 Prozent des Bruttoinlandsprodukts neu verschulden darf […] und dass die Länder ab dem Jahr 2020 in wirtschaftlich normalen Zeiten überhaupt keine Neuverschuldung mehr haben dürfen.’ (Merkel 18 Jan 2010.)
German constitution. Merkel was confident that future cooperation was characterised by good and constructive cooperation:

‘[…] ich bin mir sicher, dass auch zukünftig die Beziehungen zwischen dem Bundesverfassungsgericht und der Bundesregierung von gutem und konstruktivem Miteinander geprägt sein werden. Es ist absehbar […], dass die Aufgaben, die vor uns liegen, nicht einfacher werden. Es wird nicht einfach sein, im 21. Jahrhundert in einem schärferen Wettbewerb in einer globalisierten Welt die Rolle Deutschlands als ein wichtiges Land, als ein demokratisches Land und als ein Land des Wohlstands weiterzuentwickeln. Wir können das schaffen, und dafür wollen wir als Bundesregierung ein konstruktives Miteinander mit allen anderen Verfassungsorganen, insbesondere mit dem Bundesverfassungsgericht.’ (Merkel 14 May 2010.)

However, she reminded her audience that it was foreseeable that future tasks would not become any easier. It would not be easier in the 21st century to further develop the role of Germany as an important and democratic country in the midst of more intense competition in the globalised world. Therefore, the cooperation of all constitutional bodies was needed. (Merkel 14 May 2010.) Merkel’s beliefs increasingly influenced the crisis policies of the CDU-FDP government. However, now she was no longer ‘tying her hands’ domestically, but rather effectively ‘cutting slack’, which increased her power to formulate policies in the domestic setting according to her international beliefs. However, she had to persuade the other constitutional bodies to get behind her policies in order to be able to shape the German national understanding of economic and European affairs that had been shaken by the series of crises.
Merkel’s Visions of the EU Externally and Internally: Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft and the Union Method

In 2010, the Chancellor presented visions that could be viewed as including external and internal aspects for Europe. One of these concepts was Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft, which could be seen to be directed more towards international audiences in stressing movement away from protectionism; and the second was Merkel’s concept of the ‘Union method’, the audience of which may have been found more at the national level, where the questions of national interest and sovereignty might arise due to the long period of crisis and related measures resulting from the crisis.

Merkel highlighted that Germany had a special responsibility in Europe. Her vision of Europe was one, which combined competitiveness, that is, economic strength, and social responsibility. These were the principles of Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft that were also included in the Lisbon Treaty. Merkel’s vision of Europe was of a Union, which represented its interests and values persuasively and united in the world:

‘Was sind diese Visionen? Es ist die Vision von einer Union, die mit ihrem Lebens- und Sozialmodell, das Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, also wirtschaftliche Stärke und soziale Verantwortung vereint, erfolgreich ist. […] Die Vision von Europa ist die Vision einer Union, die ihre Interessen und Ihre Werte entschlossen, geeint und damit überzeugend in der Welt vertritt. […] Das heißt, wir brauchen die Glaubwürdigkeit unserer gelebten Werte und müssen gleichermaßen unsere wirtschaftliche Stärke einbringen.’ (Merkel 2 Nov 2010.)

This vision also included the protection of human rights, securing peace and stability as well as climate protection and energy supply. This meant that Europe needed reliability for the values it presented as well as economic strength. (Merkel 2 Nov 2010.) During her second term, Merkel’s vision of Europe included representing interests and values. The EU was not only viewed as a peace project and value community, but also as means for representing interests. Merkel also saw
economic strength working in concert with values. Thus, power worked alongside persuasion.

Chancellor Merkel gave a speech on Europe in Bruges in late 2010, where she defined the new pragmatic concept known as the ‘Union method’. She discussed how cooperation between the institutions could be better shaped. According to Merkel, the financial and economic crisis showed how closely interdependent the economies and societies of Europe were. She maintained that the division of labour between the Union and its member states had worked for the most part. However, sometimes the Commission and the Parliament viewed themselves as the only defenders of the community method and saw themselves as adversaries of the intergovernmental method. The representatives of the intergovernmental method were the member states, the European Council and Council, while the Commission and Parliament were the guardians of the community method. (Ibid.)

Merkel was, however, skeptical of this type of argumentation because it did not capture the nature of European cooperation. Therefore, she laid down four arguments. According to Merkel, the community method was the method of the European legislation and the Commission made initiatives. However, firstly, the Parliament and the Council consisting of member states were also included in the work. Secondly, the European Council was part of the European Union and had institutional status. The member states were not, as constitutive parts of the EU, included as adversaries. According to Merkel, the member states, the Commission and the Parliament should all be understood as part of Europe. (Ibid.)

Thirdly, Merkel maintained that a solution was not automatically better just because EU institutions performed it. Rather, from the inception of the European Union, the subsidiarity principle had played an important role. Merkel highlighted
that Europe should deal with the problems that were better resolved together, and member states should deal with the problems that they could better resolve alone. (Ibid.)

Fourthly, the community method could only be used there where the European Union had competencies. It was stated in the Lisbon Treaty that the member states were the masters of the Treaty, which meant that the member states decided on whether something was included in European competence. Merkel argued that the community method did not work for transferring competencies to the European level, rather it was a method of carrying through competencies efficiently and meaningfully. (Ibid.)

Merkel stressed that a coordinated position could not only be reached through the community method but also through the intergovernmental method. What mattered was a common position. According to Merkel, when all the important actors acted in a coordinated manner and were complementary in their responsibility, then it would be possible to approach Europe’s challenges successfully:

‘[…] Wenn alle wichtigen Akteure – die Organe der Union, die Mitgliedstaaten und ihren Parlamente – abgestimmt und komplementär in ihrer Verantwortung handeln, dann wird es gelingen, die großen Herausforderungen Europas erfolgreich anzugehen. […]’ (Merkel 2 Nov 2010.)

The division of competencies was clear: a confident Parliament was desired as one of the legislators alongside the Council. The Commission should be full of ideas and act as the guardian of the Treaty. The European Council and the permanent President were also agreed on in the Lisbon Treaty in order to provide guidelines for the development of the EU together with the President of the Commission. Merkel stressed that in reference to these newly distributed responsibilities, there should not be different ‘camps’:
Wir müssen das Lagerdenken angesichts dieser neu verteilten Zuständigkeiten überwinden, wir müssen uns gemeinsame Ziele setzen und gemeinsame Strategien festlegen. [...] Abgestimmtes solidarisches Handeln – jeder in seiner Zuständigkeit, alle für das gleiche Ziel. Das ist für mich die neue „Unionmethode“. […] (Merkel 2 Nov 2010.)

Thus, it was important to set common goals and common strategies: coordinated solidary action in which everybody had their own responsibility, but aimed at the same goal. For Merkel, this was a new ‘Union method’. (Merkel 2 Nov 2010.)

Creating a new ‘Union method’ between intergovernmentalism and the supranational community method might have been a way to speak to constituents and anti-EU movements nationally as well as to other EU member states where the support for the EU might have decreased e.g. Merkel might be balancing between different member states. Thus, with the pragmatic concept of the ‘Union method’ Merkel drafted intergovernmentalism, a member state perspective, back in. This may be seen as a gradual process that already started during Merkel’s first term, followed by the change in Merkel’s political beliefs and then in how cooperation was gradually reframed in a more goal-oriented way. Germany had long been a supporter of deepening European integration and strong institutions, however, this middle-way concept now represented some continuity as well as aspects of change in Germany’s European policy.

‘Die Karten Werden Neu Gemischt’ – Heading Towards Internationally Binding Cooperation Structures?

Throughout the financial and economic crises, Chancellor Merkel stressed that ‘die Karten werden neu gemischt’, the cards were reshuffled:

Merkel maintained that emerging economies were entering the international arena with self-confidence and partly with no debts, whereas Europe and the USA were indebted and, therefore, they had limited their ability to act (Merkel 27 Sep 2011). The emerging economies could, therefore, escape from the crisis strengthened, which related both to political possibilities to influence as well as to economic strength (Merkel 25 Nov 2010). Through the series of crises, Merkel’s power belief (P-4) had also reversed and the Chancellor saw that Germany’s relative power had diminished vis-à-vis emerging powers, one of the reasons being the indebtedness of the Western world.

According to Chancellor Merkel, Germany would come out of the crisis stronger than it was before crisis. She stressed that Germany could not defend its interests alone. For Germany, Europe was not only a question of war and peace anymore, but rather a question of assertiveness regarding societal foundations and economic prosperity:

‘[…] Deutschland weiß, dass es seine Interessen weltweit nicht mehr allein verteidigen kann. Europa ist für uns nicht nur eine Frage von Krieg und Frieden, sondern Europa ist für uns auch eine Frage der Selbstbehauptung unserer gesellschaftlichen Grundlagen und unseres wirtschaftlichen Wohlstands. […]’ (Merkel 27 Sep 2011.)
Merkel’s definition of the Union had gradually transformed from a question of war and peace, as it was in the times of Chancellor Kohl, to a Union representing German interests.

Additionally, the demographic developments in Europe started to justify Merkel’s cooperative views. Merkel pointed out that the relative number of Europeans would decrease in future. She believed that if Europe wanted to contribute with ideas, cooperation was the way to bring them forward. (Merkel 9 Nov 2009.) Urging Europe to cooperate with others and forming cooperation structures to institutionalise this cooperation may have started to be demonstrated in Merkel’s belief in the ability to realise the fundamental values (P-2) embedded in the social market economy.

Merkel saw that it was important that the G20 states had taken the initiative and leadership and that the G20 had gradually become institutionalised as a body that followed economic development worldwide in future as well. Furthermore, Merkel raised the question of governance, which had also been disputed within the G20, namely, in how much the states wanted to govern intergovernmentally and how much multilateral structures could be accepted i.e. structures where the member states relinquished some of their autonomy. (Merkel 20 May 2010.)

Merkel took the view that creating a global framework for regulation required cooperation, where, on the global level, there were common, binding rules between different nation states. According to her, this meant that the national economy should be developed for the global economy, preferably with worldwide-recognised principles. (Merkel 23 Feb 2011.) Merkel assessed that it might be easier for EU member states to give up their sovereignty to a supranational institution because of their experience with the EU. However, emerging powers, such as
China and India, might be more hesitant in this respect. The USA was not a forerunner, either. (Merkel 20 May 2010.)

Merkel argued that the IMF and the Financial Stability Board should be strengthened (Merkel 20 May 2010). However, she was concerned about whether the USA, China or India were ready to give up their veto power in the IMF and give more power to an institution (Merkel 20 Nov 2009). She took the view that there was also a good example where the nation states were ready to share their competencies with a multilateral organisation. In the WTO, trade questions were negotiated without any veto powers and the organisation was also able to agree on sanction mechanisms. (Merkel 9 Nov 2009.)

Merkel gave her support for the aspects set out in the agenda put forward during France’s G20 Presidency. Firstly, she viewed that the questions of the monetary system were important. According to her, the monetary system must be robust and the emergence of imbalances should be prevented. Imbalances emerged when there were differences in competitiveness. Secondly, there were questions relating to raw materials such as the volatility of prices, the exploitation of raw materials and questions of fair access. Thirdly, Merkel was also concerned about rising protectionism. She viewed free trade as the simplest way of promoting worldwide growth. (Merkel 28 Jan 2011.) Here, the completion of the Doha Round was of importance:

‘Deutschland hat sich immer für einen freien Welthandel eingesetzt. Leider sind die Verhandlungen im Rahmen der Doha-Runde bei der Welthandelsorganisation sehr ins Stocken geraten. Deshalb muss man der Wahlfreiheit ins Auge schauen und sagen: Wir müssen uns in der nächsten Zeit wahrscheinlich verstärkt auf bilaterale Handelsabkommen beschränken. […]’ (Merkel 12 Oct 2011.)

Merkel pointed out that Germany had always supported free world trade. The negotiations in the WTO Doha Round framework had come to a standstill and,
therefore, bilateral trade agreements should be strengthened in the near future. (Merkel 12 Oct 2011.) Thus, Merkel stated that the trend was moving towards bilateral trade agreements, which she, in this context, saw as the second best solution (Merkel 17 Nov 2011).

Merkel’s belief in deeds instead of words (I-4b) reinforced significantly towards the Chancellor’s second term. In addition to the EU and the Eurogroup, one reason for this could have been the emergence of the G20, which sped up the actions taken internationally. The Chancellor pointed out that considerable improvements in law had been carried out in Europe related to market regulation, financial supervision and hedge funds. Merkel stressed that this did not yet apply to every financial centre nor to every financial product or every actor:

‘[…] Wir haben im europäischen Bereich erhebliche Rechtsverbesserungen vorgenommen, was die Regulierung der Märkte, die Finanzaufsicht, die Hedgefonds und die Zukunft auch die Derivate anbelangt. Das gilt noch nicht für jeden Finanzplatz auf der Welt, für jedes Finanzprodukt und für jeden Akteur. […]’ (Merkel 20 Oct 2010.)

There were also signs of improvement in the Basel III negotiations: Merkel argued that the Basel II negotiations, for example, took many years, whereas the Basel III agreement could be reached in less than two years. She felt that there were many additional questions about process, such as international procedures for the ‘too big to fail’ question, what happens to systemically important banks when they fail. In Germany, there was a proposal for a national ‘Restrukturierungsgesetz’ (restructuring law) of banks and for a similar one that would be made at the European level as well. (Merkel 25 Nov 2010.)

During her second term, Merkel continued to link different issue areas through different agendas. For example, the G20 agenda offered the possibility to present the values and principles of the social market economy at international negotiation
tables where all major economies were included. At the beginning of her second term, Merkel already linked economic efficiency and ecological thinking when discussing the principles of the social market economy. She pointed out that Germany was a forerunner in developing renewable energies, environmental technologies and energy efficiency. (Merkel 3 Oct 2009.) In the G20 context, this was coupled with the themes of climate change, development cooperation as well as the trade and economy of the developing countries (Merkel 11 Nov 2010).

In every issue area, from the economy and trade, to climate issues, Merkel spoke about the utility of binding agreements. Linking issue areas was, therefore, an instrument of power where the agendas of different international institutions or other cooperation structures were controlled, because bindingness in one issue area automatically created pressures for intensifying cooperation in another issue area. Thus, through issue linkages, it was possible to influence the countries of the world at the international level but also, over time, at the national level by shaping the rules and principles according to which these institutions worked.

‘More Europe, More Bindingness’ as well as More Intergovernmentalism?

During the second term, Merkel’s increasingly cooperative beliefs relating to strategies, tactics and means available became ever more apparent in her dealings with financial and economic policy at the European level. The belief emphasising deeds instead of words was becoming clear as Merkel aimed at establishing more binding international agreements, which then would be implemented nationally with related measures.
Gradually, Merkel started to speak about ‘more Europe’:

‘[…] Wir brauchen mehr Europa und mehr Verbindlichkeit, was Innovationskraft, fiskalische Konsolidierung und Ähnliches anbelangt. Ich sage einerseits, dass wir künftig wahrscheinlich nicht um Vertragsänderungen herumkommen werden, um mehr Rechte Europas zu manifestieren. Anderseits sage ich: Auch in Europa darf der acquis communitaire nicht für alle Zeiten sakrosankt sein. Da, wo man zu viel Bürokratie, zu viel Beschwerens hat, muss man sich überlegen, ob man das im globalen Wettbewerb noch zeitgemäß ist. Beides muss stattfinden: Europa dort abbauen, wo zu viel Bürokratie ist, und Europa dort aufbauen, wo mehr Zusammenarbeit gefordert ist.’ (Merkel 27 Sep 2011.)

She saw that more Europe and more bindingness were necessary (Merkel 27 Sep 2011). She also understood that in the coming years, the Union would move closer together in respect to the coherence of economic policies and innovation initiatives and, here, Germany would also engage actively (Merkel 2 Feb 2012). In these instances, treaty changes might be unavoidable. She further stressed that Europe should be reduced in situations where there was too much bureaucracy, and alternatively increased in other questions where more cooperation was needed. (Merkel 27 Sep 2011.)

Merkel stated that ‘more Europe’ and more bindingness were being created in the European Council, together with the President of the European Central Bank, the President of the European Commission and the President of the Eurogroup:


The euro crisis may have affected the tendency that the heads of the Member State governments in the European Council as well as Eurogroup members were actively
engaged in dealing with the issues related to European economic governance. Merkel discussed the questions of more Europe and bindingness on many occasions e.g. which states will participate in the deepening of European integration and how said integration should be seen in terms of intergovernmetalism and the community method:


Merkel admitted that there was division between the euro member states and those member states not participating in the common currency. According to her, it was important to see the single market, the Europe of 27, as the common Europe, although some member states were more interlinked. (Merkel 25 Jan 2012.) She also discussed how bindingness should be seen:


Merkel pointed out that bindingness could be seen in e.g. rescue packages, in ‘more Europe’, in the readiness to be proceeded against by the European institutions as well as in the increasing cooperation in the fields that were not very communitised (Merkel 25 Jan 2012).

Merkel also cited the President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, when she stated that often it was not about the choice between the community
method and the intergovernmental method, but rather about a choice between a coordinated European position and nothing:

‘Der Präsident des Europäischen Rates, Herman van Rompuy, hat einmal gesagt – ich zitiere ihn: „Oft geht es nicht um die Wahl zwischen Gemeinschaftsmethode und zwischenstaatlichem Vorgehen, sondern um die Wahl zwischen einem koordinierten europäischen Standpunkt und dem Nichts.” […]’ (Merkel 7 Feb 2012.)

The Chancellor also stressed that the European economies were so closely interdependent due to the single market and the euro that the economic developments and political decisions of one member state also affected other member states:


According to Merkel, this meant that European policy would, step by step, become more domestic policy (Merkel 7 Feb 2012). She urged for closer and more binding cooperation if there was the will to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union. This meant that more competencies would be given to Europe:

‘Das heißt, wir müssen enger und verbindlicher zusammenarbeiten, wenn wir die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion stärken wollen. Das wird dazu führen, dass wir auch immer wieder Zuständigkeiten an Europa abgeben werden. […] Keinem Land, auch Deutschland nicht, fällt es leicht, zu akzeptieren, dass die allermeisten Dinge heute in der Europäischen Union nach dem Mehrheitsprinzip entschieden werden, ein einzelnes Land also nicht mehr blockieren kann. Das ist manchmal nicht ganz einfach, wenn man eine andere Meinung hat. Aber damit das Ganze funktioniert, muss das in vielen Fragen so geschehen.’ (Merkel 7 Feb 2012.)
Merkel argued that it was not easy for any member state, including Germany, that the European Union had settled on the qualified majority system, in which no member state could block a decision (Merkel 7 Feb 2012). Merkel stressed that in three fields there was readiness to engage on behalf of ‘more Europe’: in budget discipline; sustainability and growth; and competitiveness and solidarity (Merkel 25 Jan 2012). She viewed consolidation and growth and structural reforms and competitiveness as two sides of the same coin (Merkel 24 Jan 2013).

Merkel listed the three structural reasons why Europe was in crisis: the indebtedness of some euro member states, differences in competitiveness, and deficiencies in the construction of the European Economic and Monetary Union (Merkel 7 Feb 2012). She pointed out that the euro was much more than a currency; it was in fact the Europe of today. Therefore, she had stressed that if the euro fails, Europe also fails:


Merkel believed that Europe was not only a peace process but it was also a possible platform for pooling interests and, therefore, the euro should be defended (Merkel 28 Jan 2011).

Merkel maintained that solidarity should be combined with solidity, stability and better competitiveness in Europe. According to her, indebtedness was the biggest danger for prosperity in Europe:

‘[…] Deshalb war für mich immer wichtig, dass Solidarität nur eine Seite der Medaille ist: Solidarität ist wichtig, deshalb haben wir sie gezeigt, aber Solidarität
muss gepaart sein mit Solidität, Stabilität und besserer Wettbewerbsfähigkeit in Europa. [...] Verschuldung ist die größte Gefahr für die Prosperität, für den Wohlstand auf unserem Kontinent. Deshalb muss der Verschuldung etwas entgegengesetzt werden. Das muss aber etwas sein, das auch eine Verbesserung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit mit sich bringt. [...]’ (Merkel 28 Jan 2011.)

She pointed out that indebtedness should be opposed with those measures that improve competitiveness (Merkel 28 Jan 2011).

Merkel viewed the permanent stability mechanism, the rescue package of Greece, the temporary rescue mechanism EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility) and the permanent rescue mechanism ESM (European Stability Mechanism) as means of solidarity (Merkel 23 Mar 2011, 25 Sep 2012). She explained the process and the contractual principles of the permanent mechanism ESM:

‘Es ist damals nur übersehen worden, dass es zu Situationen kommen kann, in denen durch Probleme in einem Land die Stabilität des Euro insgesamt gefährdet werden und damit jeder betroffen sein kann. Auf eine solche Situation mussten wir eine Antwort finden. Das tun wir jetzt durch eine begrenzte Vertragsveränderung und indem wir den Sachverhalt benennen, dass also der Euro als Ganzes in Gefahr geraten kann und dass es dann die solidarische Aufgabe aller ist, dem entgegenzutreten. Und das tun wir durch die Ausgestaltung des ESM. Dabei ist für uns wichtig – das ist sicherlich nicht immer aus der Sicht der Zentralbank oder derer, die in Finanzinstitutionen arbeiten, die optimale Lösung -, dass dies intergouvernemental geschieht. Dass dies einstimmig entschieden wird, weil das Haushaltsrecht als Königsrecht des jeweiligen nationalen Parlaments nicht in Gefahr geraten darf. Das hat uns das Bundesverfassungsgericht beim Urteil zum Lissabonvertrag auch noch einmal aufgeschrieben.’ (Merkel 23 Mar 2011.)

The Chancellor also stressed that it was important that the ESM would be an intergovernmental mechanism and that it would be decided on unanimously as the budget law of the national parliament must not be jeopardised. The Federal Constitutional Court had noted this in its verdict on the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, Merkel pointed out that solidarity was not possible without the principle of ‘no performance without counterperformance’ (Keine Leistung ohne
Gegenleistung) by which she meant that stabilisation efforts as a counterperformance were expected of the member states concerned. (Merkel 23 Mar 2011.)

Merkel did not view Eurobonds as the best path for solidarity:

‘[… ] sogenannte Eurobonds […]. Ich bin Jean-Claude Trichet sehr dankbar, dass er deutlich gemacht hat, dass dies ein Weg wäre, aber nicht der beste, weil damit verklei- erstet würde, dass die Fähigkeiten zu wirtschaftlicher Kraft in Europa sehr unterschiedlich ausgeprägt sind. Dann hätten wir Solidarität, aber eine Form von Solidarität, bei der nicht ausgeschlossen wäre, dass wir gemeinsam auf eine schiefe Ebene geraten. Die Frage ist ja nicht nur, ob wir solidarisch sind, jedenfalls für mich als Bundeskanzlerin, sondern die Frage ist ja auch, wo unsere Solidarität endet, ob wir als Europäische Union zum Schluss noch ein interessanter Wettbewerbsfaktor auf den Weltmärkten sind oder ob wir ins Mittelmaß und in untere Kategorien ableiten. […]’ (Merkel 23 Mar 2011.)

She pointed out that it was not about being solidary, but rather about where solidarity ended and whether the EU was competitive, not second-rate, in world markets (Merkel 23 Mar 2011).

The Euro Plus Pact and Fiscal Compact to Bring More Intergovernmental Cooperation at the European Level

Relating to competitiveness, the Euro Plus Pact, with closer policy coordination, was adopted in 2011. Participating states would engage in intergovernmental cooperation in questions of competitiveness, employment, public finances and financial stability. This pact was agreed on in order to make participating states economically more coherent. Concerning coherence, Merkel did not mean to adjust the average of member states, rather she thought that the best performers would set the benchmark. (Merkel 31 Mar 2011.)
Merkel maintained that common currency would be permanently stable only when there was coordination of economic policies in the monetary area (Merkel 12 Nov 2012). She foresaw that in the coming years, political unity e.g. the foundations of the monetary union, should be worked on (Merkel 2 Feb 2012), which was not done sufficiently in the adoption phase of the euro:

‘[…]. Deshalb ist der Schutz des Euro auch mit neuen Wegen verbunden, die wir gehen müssen. Für uns, die wir Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union sind, die den Euro als gemeinsame Währung haben, heißt das: Wir müssen ein Stück von den nachholen, was wir bei der Einführung des Euro nicht ausreichend gemacht haben, nämlich politische Zusammenarbeit und politische Koordinierung. […] Aber wir sind entschlossen […] und zwar nicht nur im Bereich des Abbaus der Schulden, sondern auch in Bereichen, sie eine Verbesserung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit mit sich bringen – und politisch enger zu koordinieren. Das ist unsere Lehre.’ (Merkel 28 Jan 2011)

According to Merkel, safeguarding the euro should be combined with the new ways that Europe would go, by which she meant Europe’s political cooperation and political coordination. She promoted coordination not only in reducing debts but also in improving competitiveness. (Merkel 28 Jan 2011.)

Merkel also stated that the Stability and Growth Pact had not been complied with in the past (Merkel 23 Feb 2011). Therefore, she maintained that sharpening the Stability and Growth Pact was an important measure that should be undertaken (Merkel 23 Mar 2011). Thus, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, the Fiscal Compact, was signed in March 2012 by all member states of the European Union (except by the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom). It was an intergovernmental treaty, which sharpened the previous one and can, thus, be viewed as a new stricter version of the Stability and Growth Pact (EASPD). One of the features of the pact was that the member states introduced a debt brake in their constitutions.
Merkel pointed out that the pact should be implemented, *Schritt für Schritt*, combined with coordinated political and economic cooperation:

‘[…] Wir haben den Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt geschärft – jetzt müssen wir natürlich zeigen, dass wir ihn auch einhalten – und wir haben ihn auch an makroökonomischen Größen ausgerichtet. Wir werden all das jetzt Schritt für Schritt umsetzen, gekoppelt an eine koordinierte politische und wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit. […]’ (Merkel 28 Jan 2011.)

The Chancellor stressed that responsibility should be linked with control (Merkel 25 Sep 2012). She argued that the sanction for non-compliance with the criteria of the Pact, a cash settlement, was inappropriate or inefficient and asserted that the right of action before the European Court of Justice should be allowed. This would, however, require a limited treaty change. (Merkel 17 Nov 2011.)

Merkel also gave her support for a banking union and banking supervision for the euro area (Merkel 21 Jun 2013,) which would enter into force in 2014:

‘[…] Ich bin dafür, dass im Euroraum eine stärkere Bankenaufsicht stattfindet. […] Aber: Eine europäische Aufsicht muss auch eine Mehr in Verbindlichkeit mit sich bringen. […] Das heißt Schritt für Schritt und in der richtigen Reihenfolge – und nicht schnell und mit dem Motto „Hauptsache, wir haben etwas“, weil genau das nicht das schafft, was wir so dringend brauchen: Glaubwürdigkeit. […]’ (Merkel 25 Sep 2012.)

However, she stressed that European banking supervision should gradually bring more bindingness and not adopt the motto ‘the main thing is that we have something’, because what Europe urgently needed was credibility (Merkel 25 Sep 2012).
8.3. Conclusions: Chancellor Merkel’s Economic and European Policy

According to Chancellor Merkel, the financial and economic crisis made clear how interdependent the national economies of Europe are. As her second term approached, Chancellor Merkel started to emphasise the role of emerging powers and the need for a global financial architecture. The Chancellor promoted the need for binding agreements and giving responsibility to international institutions. The financial crisis did not only increase the power of the emerging states, it also spread the fear of protectionism and gave rise to the voices advocating national sovereignty. The leader was thus stuck between two levels: one required international action and the dissemination of ideas and principles that could compete with those of the emerging economies; and the other, was equally important as the constituents, nationally, were suffering the consequences of the crisis. Therefore, action was necessary.

Chancellor Merkel’s operational code beliefs relating to economic policy have changed between her first and the second terms in office. The analysis discussed the key findings, e.g. how changes in operational code philosophical beliefs relating to the nature of the operational environment and German power, as well as in instrumental beliefs relating to strategies and means available, have reframed German economic and European policy in different ways. As in the previous analysis that discussed Chancellor Merkel’s foreign and security policy, here as well, it is important to note that the quantitative analysis has been conducted based on only a small quantitative study (<40 speeches), which affects the inferences made. Thus, the qualitative analysis, which concentrates on the framing process, e.g. how
the beliefs and ideas frame and reframe policies, is equally important in the analysis of Chancellor Merkel’s policy-making.

According to the findings of this case study, towards her second term in office, Chancellor Merkel started to see the operational environment as more cooperative (P-1). However, following the rise of the emerging powers, the belief relating to German power (P-4) started to reverse. The instrumental beliefs relating to strategies (I-1) and tactics (I-2) became increasingly cooperative and Merkel’s beliefs in deeds instead of words (I-4b) reinforced significantly. Furthermore, the Chancellor started to widen the use of different means and also included rewarding and punishing means in her range of the policy instruments (I-5).

As it could be seen in the previous analysis relating to Merkel’s foreign and security policy, this analysis also indicates that towards her second term in office Merkel may have started to define cooperation in a slightly different way. Before and after unification, cooperation has been seen, in German foreign and European policy discourse, as an end in and of itself. However, in the era of Chancellor Merkel, cooperation may be defined gradually in a more instrumental way; policy goals and strategies are crucial in determining how cooperation is seen and who the main partners are in the issue area in question.

The need for a redefinition of cooperation may also relate to the widening spectrum of policy instruments. When the goal is set, one must then choose from among different policy instruments. The more policy instruments that there are, from different cooperative means to sanctions, the less risk there is in not reaching the goal. Furthermore, the risk associated with one single mean is reduced. Further, by thus interlinking means, one is better able to justify chosen policies from a different perspective. The widening toolkit of different means and reframing
cooperation can be viewed as a more pragmatic approach towards policy-making; one that is not bound to certain policy instruments beforehand, but rather diagnoses the environment carefully, forming possible coalitions and then choosing the appropriate policy instruments. This approach may be more rapid and, therefore, successful in times of uncertainty, when information is transmitted quickly, while decisions often have to be made with incomplete information and tight time-schedules.

This study argues that during her second term, because of Merkel’s changed operational code beliefs, the Chancellor began to reframe policies and redefine meanings and concepts. This can be viewed as a complex process where the leader interacts with structures and institutions. When Merkel was elected in 2005, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty indicated that there was scepticism in some member states about the direction that the Union was heading. Before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, Chancellor Merkel actively defined member state power, emphasised the subsidiarity principle and discussed how competencies between the EU and member states could be reimagined if necessary. However, this seems not to have changed German’s traditional relationship and views of the EU: Germany and the Union were still two sides of the same coin. Although Merkel’s operational code beliefs did not have any significance in this process, it is crucial to understand this as a part of a process where the operational code beliefs start to gradually reframe Merkel’s policies and change Germany’s relationship with the Union.

The financial crisis affected Merkel’s beliefs, which started to change in an ever more cooperative direction in reference to economic policy. As mentioned above, new powers emerged, the G20 was created, and Germany’s relative power may have gradually started to decrease. The Chancellor began to redefine cooperation in
a more pragmatic way through goals and strategies. Merkel understood that in creating global financial architecture in an ever more interdependent world, influencing others with ideas, values and principles was important. She argued that the German Soziale Marktwirtschaft was experiencing a renaissance and should be given an international dimension. Through the dissemination of the values of freedom and regulation, competition and social responsibility, and the linkages between different policies from economic to climate and development policies, all of which the concept of social market economy entailed, Merkel’s belief in the possibility of realising her own values in the interdependent world may have reinforced.

At the EU level, the financial crisis did not seem to have changed Merkel’s views and she continued to see the deepening of European integration, in which all member states were included, as an important part of the idea of integration. Merkel opposed the idea of creating divisions in the EU e.g. in the form of intensifying coordination within the Eurogroup. Although, at the international level, cooperation had been reframed in a more pragmatic and instrumental way, at this stage, however, this cannot be observed at the European level. Nonetheless, Merkel started to redefine the EU not only as a peace project but also as a way to represent interests in the world.

Thus, up until 2010, Merkel’s Germany viewed the EU as a peace project where no divisions should be created. However, this perspective started gradually to change in 2010 following the debt crisis as the euro states were forced to start to coordinate their euro rescue measures more intensively. Thus, Merkel’s operational code beliefs relating to economic policy were also starting to frame Germany’s European policy. As can be seen in the analysis, Merkel’s beliefs relating to strategies and tactics were reinforcing and becoming more cooperative. Therefore,
the rescue packages and following rescue mechanisms were seen as cooperative. The means were widened to include rewarding means as well as sanctions.

During her second term in office, from 2010 onwards, Merkel began to reframe the relationship between the EU and its member states through the concept of ‘Union method’, which stressed that the community method and intergovernmentalism should be seen as complementary rather than opposing aspects of the EU system. Merkel’s Union method can be seen as a more goal-oriented and strategic approach to the EU, as a hybrid of supranational and intergovernmental elements.

With this redefinition of the EU, Chancellor Merkel was creating distance from former Chancellor Kohl’s definition of Europe. It can be viewed as a gradual normalization process of Germany’s European policy or, in Katzenstein’s (1987) terms, Germany was transforming from a semisovereign to sovereign European state. The more that process continues towards emphasising the power of member states, be it in the form of more intergovernmental perspectives on cooperation, or possibly returning competencies back to member states, the more that Germany’s European policy has changed since reunification.

Merkel’s view of cooperation in relation to Europe, externally and internally, has also become more instrumental. Externally, the EU was a way to represent interests internationally. Internally, although deepening European integration and the transferring of competencies to the European level in some issues areas may still be at the heart of Germany’s European policy, the relationship between Germany and Europe has gradually transformed and become more pragmatic. The change of political operational code beliefs relating to the operational environment and means available has changed the view of cooperation in two respects; which
countries further integration shall include and how cooperation at the European level in terms of competencies should be viewed. As seen in the analysis, the euro crisis made Merkel’s views on European cooperation more pragmatic, which might also allow for divisions, whereas a long process, since the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, led to a redefinition of the Union with the concept of the ‘Union method’, which supported the use of both the community method and intergovernmentalism in a pragmatic way, depending on the issue area and situation.

Framing German economic and European policy with the concepts of the social market economy and the ‘Union method’ cannot be taken out of the context. They can be viewed as responses to two developments, both ultimately triggered by the series of crises: increasing protectionist tendencies internationally and demands for the defence of national sovereignty. One reason why the principles of the social market economy should, according to Merkel, be disseminated internationally was to tackle protectionism. Therefore, increased cooperation and the international dimension of this German economic and society model were necessary. The euro crisis may have started the framing process, leading to definition of the ‘Union Method’. Speaking of the competencies between the EU and member states, as well as emphasising the subsidiarity principle, may have no longer been a mere balancing act between different member states, rather it could be viewed as the persuasion of domestic institutions and constituents in Germany.

As seen in the analysis, the normalization process of Germany’ European policy has material, ideational and institutional aspects. Above, I have discussed the material and ideational elements. This study maintains that the changes in beliefs also have domestic institutional implications. Here, the theoretical framework of Moravcsik (1994) becomes crucial. The key point of this institutional examination
is on how the leader uses international and EU level cooperation in order to gain ‘Handlungsspielraum’, room for manoeuvre, domestically. It can be argued that during her second term in office, after the outbreak of the financial and economic crises, Chancellor Merkel increasingly supported the binding of international economic cooperation and institutions in order to be able to ‘cut slack’ domestically. This was crucial because, in this way, she might receive more room domestically for framing policies according to her beliefs internationally and, at the same time, persuade German institutions domestically.

This does not mean that Chancellor Merkel sought to create a superpower Germany. Quite the contrary, her aim may have been to define the international financial architecture and different cooperation structures so that they might resemble the German way of thinking. It is important to define the rules and practices of international/EU cooperation structures because, over time, the domestic institutions of different member states must adapt to these rules. However, from the Merkel’s point of view, in the shorter term, influencing the structures of international cooperation with German views was the way by which she could keep her constituents satisfied and stay in power domestically.

This study argues that during the second period of office, German Chancellor Merkel may have become a ‘norm entrepreneur’, who reframes policies and redefines concepts. It argues that there are certain conditions under which the mechanisms of persuasion start to operate and the leader becomes a norm entrepreneur. The first one relates to the power position the leader receives at international negotiation tables. As we have also seen in this study, the heads of the state strove actively to take the seat from the financial ministers in order to be able to conduct international economic policies at the G20. At the EU level in 2009, this resulted in the institutional status of the European Council. However, this
study supports the view that the most important of these conditions is the amount of political power that the leader receives in his/her domestic setting. The main target of the persuasion is the domestic institutions that will implement beliefs, new ideas and policies in practice. Thus, political power and the institutional setting may be prerequisites for persuasion to successfully operate.

If these conditions do not apply, the best strategy for the decision-maker may be to ‘tie hands’ and agree on the different policies domestically with wide consensus and play with beliefs and ideas accordingly. This more resembles the domestication argument made by Harnisch (2006, 2009), who argues that the German domestic institutions the Bundestag, Bundesrat and the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) have increasingly taken power in Germany’s EU politics. In this analysis, we saw how Chancellor Merkel, during her first term, used the wide national consensus to create the social market economy an international dimension that included German values and principles, as well as drafting Schuldenbremse, the debt brake, into Germany’s national constitution. In her second term, both concepts were disseminated internationally and the Schuldenbremse was introduced as a norm in the EU Treaty of Fiscal Compact, influencing the budget discipline in every member state.

The international and national level developments in the aftermath of the financial crisis increased the importance of the national level in foreign and European policy-making. This study sees the framing process i.e. the active construction of meaning and persuasion, as important forms of disseminating ideas. It is crucial for the member states to affect the negotiation processes and EU level framing because, in time, it will appear in the Council decisions, Commission initiatives as well as in the form of how the EU Parliament discusses EU affairs. Thus, member states influence others by uploading their own beliefs, ideas and principles, because
they have to adapt to those rules and practices and implement them later in the downloading phase.

As we can see in the analysis, influencing other member states as well as a country’s own domestic processes can take place in the form of linking issues, which can be observed as a form of agenda control (see Moravcsik 1994). The issue linkages e.g. agenda control (power) and ideas (framing, persuasion) can be used to influence, both internationally and nationally. As a more long-term consequence, linking issues and framing policies internationally may, in time at least, lead to institutional isomorphism or adaptation in other states. Furthermore, the issue linkages may also relate to connecting EU and national levels and, as a consequence, lead to shaping the domestic institutional power balance and persuading institutions and constituents nationally.

Therefore, it is important to analyse some domestic developments in Germany relating to the emergence of anti-EU parties, Bundestag behaviour and how the constituents voted in elections. These developments are indications of how well power and persuasion work nationally. The use of pure power would ultimately lead to the rise of anti-EU parties in the national parliament who offer an alternative to government policies, offensive behaviour from the Bundestag, and ultimately to a lost election from the leader’s perspective. All these developments can also be observed in Germany. However, Germany’s anti-EU party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has not yet been able to gain any seats in the German parliament. The themes of the party were taken into consideration in Merkel’s policy framing long before the party emerged in 2013, and, therefore, it has not yet been able to gain enough supporters.
The clear dissemination of German principles and framed policies internationally, and to the EU level, seemed to have kept the German constituents satisfied and, as a consequence, opposition parties such as the SPD have not really been able to challenge Merkel’s policy. The national consensus on the importance of the EU cannot easily be challenged in Germany. However, following the euro crisis, Merkel started to reframe policies and cooperation in a more pragmatic way at the EU level as well, i.e. which states are participating in the deepening cooperation and how the cooperation is seen in reference to the community method/intergovernmental approach, which started to affect Germany’s relationship with the EU. The complaint to FCC in 2012, relating to the rescue mechanism of the ESM made by some members of the German Bundestag and citizens, can be viewed as a reaction to Merkel’s redefined cooperation and cooperative strategies. Thus, Merkel was redefining German European policy and the German relationship with the EU, which can also be seen from the opposing reactions. However, in 2014, the FCC rejected the complaint, and Merkel’s policy of using both power and persuasion shall continue. The constituents seem to give their support for Merkel’s redefined policies as she continues to win elections with great majorities, such as in the most recent German parliament election in 2013.

The normalization development of German European policy and Germany’s transforming relationship with the Union may become a hindrance for the EU. The pragmatic view of cooperation and divisions in Europe may, in future, block the way for the EU to becoming a recognised actor in world politics. Germany is trapped, on one side, between deepening European integration and Europe’s responsibility in the world, and its own normalization process and transforming relationship with the Union on the other.
Germany’s transforming relationship with the EU has its implications for the future study of the EU as well. The member states are constantly framing their policies, defining their identities and their relationship with the EU. Therefore, a longer-term perspective on how the EU will develop is not possible without simultaneously studying the member state perspective. As presented in this case study, perspectives on how different member states define the EU and their relationship with the EU over time, especially before and after the crisis, would be of particular importance.
9. Chancellor Merkel’s Environmental (Climate) and Energy Policy

9.1. The Quantitative Operational Code Analysis of Chancellor Merkel’s Beliefs

This chapter will discuss the operational code of Federal Chancellor Merkel in environmental (climate) and energy policy between 2005-2013, and compare her two terms in office (2005-2009 and 2009-2013). The findings are presented in Table 6 and 7, including significance tests and an explanation of values.

Analysis on Chancellor Merkel’s philosophical beliefs

During her first term, Chancellor Merkel sees the political universe (P-1) as mixed (+0,313), containing both conflictual and cooperative elements. Towards her second term in office, this belief has been clearly reinforced (+0,625), however, not significantly, and the Chancellor has increasingly started to see the nature of the political universe as friendly. As in the previous cases, this belief relates to how the leader views other actors in the political universe and their policies and actions. The challenges in the environmental sector are global, which may have started to reinforce this belief. During her two terms in office, there have been ongoing negotiations on an international climate agreement and efforts to agree on a Post-
Kyoto settlement. The rising economies and their effect on this particular belief should be discussed further in the qualitative part of the analysis.

Towards the beginning of her second term in office, Chancellor Merkel’s belief in the realisation of fundamental political values (P-2) has reinforced from +0,16 to +0,358. Further, in environmental and energy policy, this belief could relate to the P-1 belief: if Merkel sees that the international operational environment is becoming friendlier, it is also easier to realise fundamental values. Here, it is important to note that this index relates to how the leader sees his/her ability to realise their values in relation to others. In environment and energy policy, this could relate to the concept of Nachhaltigkeit, sustainability, which brings different environmental, energy, economic and developmental aspects under one concept, which also creates the foundations for policies and, thereby, facilitating the leader’s ability to influence other actors internationally as well as nationally.

During her second term, Chancellor Merkel sees the political universe as more predictable (P-3) (+0,375) than during her first term in office (+0,246). The predictability belief is also linked to how Merkel sees others. Merkel only observes some variety in means and actions related to others and sees them as quite predictable. In reference to direction, this belief seems to be reinforcing as the political universe has become friendlier. The international climate agreement negotiation may have affected this belief as Merkel has become more aware of the positions, policies and actions of other actors. Furthermore, Merkel links the use of renewables to making the operational environment more predictable. This might relate to aspects such as energy independence and the security of supply and, therefore, the changes in this belief should be discussed in more detail in the following qualitative chapter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Code Beliefs (George 1969)</th>
<th>Mean value 2005-2009 *</th>
<th>Mean value 2009-2013 **</th>
<th>F (1, 14)</th>
<th>p ***</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophical beliefs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-1. Nature of the political universe</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>1.636</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>Hostile-mixed-friendly. Higher scores indicate the leader sees other(s) as more friendly. Variation between -1 and +1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-2. Realization of fundamental political values</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>1.606</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>Higher scores indicate optimism, lower pessimism towards realization of fundamental pol. values. Variation between -1 and +1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3. Predictability of political future</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>Lower scores indicate that subject sees less predictability in the political universe. Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-4. Control over historical development</td>
<td>0.898</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>Higher scores indicate that subject sees self as having more control. Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5. Role of chance</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>Higher scores indicate a higher role assigned to chance. Relates to P3 and P4 beliefs. Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* n=8 (Chancellor Merkel’s first term in office); ** n=8 (Chancellor Merkel’s second term in office); *** One-Way ANOVA test

Table 6  Chancellor Merkel’s operational code in environmental (climate) and energy policy, philosophical beliefs. A comparison of Federal Chancellor Merkel’s two terms in office.

During her first term, Chancellor Merkel’s belief in the control over historical development (P-4), the power belief, was very high (+0.898). As in the previous cases, in this index how much the ‘self’ takes action is measured; if the subject’s rhetoric indicates that the self is taking most of the action, then the subject sees the self as more in control. The comparison of the two periods shows that this belief has only somewhat been reinforced (from +0.898 to +0.9) between Merkel’s two terms. In spite of the rising economies, challenging international climate negotiations and energy questions, Chancellor Merkel seems to view herself as being in control.

12 The operational code analysis and significance tests were conducted as in Walker, Schafer and Young (1998). For more specific coding procedure, see App. 1. and 2.
During her first term, Merkel assigned quite a high role to chance \((P-5) (+0,81)\). However, this belief has reversed \((+0,68)\) over the study period. It is related to belief \(P-3\) (predictability of political future) and \(P-4\) (power belief). The more predictable that the political universe is and the more that the self has control over events, the lower the role of chance is. Therefore, as the political universe in environmental and energy policy has become more predictable and Merkel’s power belief has remained very high, this belief has, in turn reversed, although it may be due to the common environmental challenges of the future and open negotiations on i.e. international climate policies, for which Merkel still assigns quite a high role to chance.

**Analysis of Chancellor Merkel’s instrumental beliefs**

As in the other cases, belief \((I-1)\) describes a leader’s beliefs about the best strategic direction for actions. This belief relates to the self and how cooperatively the subject, Chancellor Merkel, defines her strategy. According to the findings, Chancellor Merkel sees cooperative strategy as the most useful through the whole study period. This belief has been even reinforcing slightly \((+888)\) to \((+0,898)\) towards her second term. The global climate negotiations, the emergence of the G20 and the dissemination of the principles of Nachhaltigkeit, internationally as well as to partner countries, stressing the links between economy, environment and energy, might have reinforced this belief towards the second term.

The second instrumental belief: intensity of tactics \((I-2)\) has remained stable and only reinforced from \(+0,42\) to \(+0,423\), during the study period, guiding Merkel to use quite cooperative tactics as a more useful approach for action. The future will
show whether overcoming barriers between different groups of countries in climate negotiations will be demonstrated as possible changes in this belief.

As in the previous cases, the belief relating to risk orientation (I-3) shows how risk averse/acceptant the leader is. Towards her second period of office, this belief has reversed from +0.492 and Chancellor Merkel's risk acceptance has decreased to +0.473. This study argues that this belief relates to Merkel taking risks internationally: her ability to take international risks has decreased. As a consequence of the international climate negotiations and challenging reduction targets, Merkel launched a new national energy plan during her second term in office and made, thereby, nuclear energy a bridge energy source towards the era of renewable energies. However, in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe, she cancelled the ‘Austieg aus dem Austieg’ and expedited the phase-out of Germany’s nuclear plants. Thus, she showed that she was ready to take national political risks relating to environmental and energy policy. These shifts, their causes and consequences, including justifications, should be discussed in more detail in the qualitative part of the analysis.

In this case as well, the belief in the importance of the timing of action (I-4) has been divided in two. The one (I-4 a) examines the diversity of the leader’s choices in terms of cooperation and conflict. This belief has been reversed from +0.112 to +0.102 between Merkel’s two, terms indicating less diversity in her cooperation-conflict rhetoric.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Code Beliefs (George 1969)</th>
<th>Mean value 2005-2009 *</th>
<th>Mean value 2009-2013 **</th>
<th>F (1, 14)</th>
<th>p ***</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental beliefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-1. Approach to goals</td>
<td>0.888</td>
<td>0.898</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>Cooperative-mixed-conflictual. Higher scores indicate that cooperative strategy is more useful. Variation between -1 and +1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-2. Intensity of tactics</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>Higher scores indicate a belief in the utility of cooperative tactics. Variation between -1 and +1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-3. Risk orientation</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>Higher scores indicate less diversity and therefore higher levels of risk acceptance. Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-4. Importance of timing of action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The higher values, the greater flexibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Cooperation-conflict shift</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>Higher values indicate more diversity in cooperation / conflict in rhetoric. Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Words-deeds shift</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Lower scores indicate lower diversity in tactics. Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5. Utility of means</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower scores indicate less utility and higher more utility of this type of power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Reward</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Promise</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Support</td>
<td>0.701</td>
<td>0.711</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Oppose</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Threaten</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>2.325</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Punish</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Variation between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* n=8 (Chancellor Merkel’s first term in office); ** n=8 (Chancellor Merkel’s second term in office); *** One-Way ANOVA test

Table 7  Chancellor Merkel’s operational code in environmental (climate) and energy policy, instrumental beliefs. A Comparison of Federal Chancellor Merkel’s two terms in office.  

The operational code analysis and significance tests were conducted as in Walker, Schafer and Young (1998). For more specific coding procedure, see App. 1. and 2.
The other index (I-4 b), measures the diversity of the leader’s actions in terms of the distribution of words and deeds. According to the findings, this belief is quite low in value but has, nonetheless, reinforced slightly from +0.256 to +0.282 between Merkel’s two terms. This can be observed i.e. in the state of environmental negotiations, where states have been negotiating for years but have not yet been able to finalise a climate agreement and, therefore, the index for deeds is very low. However, during her second term, Merkel started to stress concrete national and regional projects, alongside climate negotiations, as well as presented a new national energy concept and laws supporting the concept, which might be observable as a reinforcement in the I-4 b belief.

Utility of means (I-5) shows the leader’s belief in the utility of different tactics that mark the exercise of political power. Merkel is demonstrated to use supportive tactics through most of the entire study period. However, during her second term in office, the balance between different means has shifted and Merkel has begun to widen the repertoire of positive means and to also accept more conflictual means. Especially during her second term in office, Merkel has started to use conflictual mean marked as ‘threaten’, which has reinforced from 0 to +0.01. This might imply that Germany’s power might gradually also be increasing in climate and energy issues. Furthermore, as in the previous analysis, the widening of means indicates that less risk is related to one single mean. In the analysis, it is important discuss how Merkel uses the German concept of Nachhaltigkeit in linking different policies and means, both nationally and internationally, in influencing other states.
9.2. Qualitative Longitudinal Analysis of Merkel’s Environmental and Energy Policy

This chapter will discuss how the changes in operational code beliefs frame Germany’s environmental and energy policy during Chancellor Merkel’s two terms. The purpose of this analysis is not to analyse every statement, policy initiative or action taken in detail, but rather to draw a picture of how change in Merkel’s operational code beliefs relating to environmental and energy policy has (re)framed meanings, concepts and policy, and gradually, also shaped Germany’s domestic understanding of this issue. In this process of interaction between continuity and change, German environmental and energy policy has gradually started to become ‘normalized’.

9.2.1. Beliefs Framing Policy During Merkel’s First Term: Nachhaltigkeit Should Be Translated into Reality

‘Nachhaltigkeit’ vs. Fossil Fuels – Environmental Sustainability vs. Profitability

At the beginning of her first term, Merkel already began to discuss the dependence on energy imports in relation to environmental sustainability vis-à-vis profitability. She took the view that the dependence on the energy imports should be reduced and that a reliable energy policy should be promoted. Merkel maintained that energy policy had been a field of ideological disputes and urged Germany to return to a pragmatic course. Though Merkel was committed to a diverse energy mix, she did not, however, see Germany becoming independent from fossil fuels in the
foreseeable future. Germany had e.g. with their lignite resources, a considerable amount of competitive energy sources. According to Merkel, Germany could not become independent with hydro energy alone and, therefore, other sources should be found, which would make Germany more independent. (Merkel 8 Sep 2006.)

Merkel maintained, however, that the energy supply should be environmentally sustainable as well as reliable and economic. This triangle also made energy policy-making, according to Merkel, difficult. If one of the pillars was strained, for example, sustainability, it would not secure profitability, Germany as an industrial location would suffer. Merkel stressed that Germany would raise the issue of energy policy to the European agenda during its EU Presidency in order to secure the future of the European Union. (Ibid.)

Chancellor Merkel also started to discuss the concept of Nachhaltigkeit14:

‘Natürlich ist es oft so, dass, auch wenn wir als Politiker auf langfristige Wirkungen hinweisen, die Wählerinnen und Wähler, die Bürger geneigt sind, sich mehr ums das Kurzfristige zu kümmern. […] Dazu brauchen wir natürlich Orientierungen, die gesamtgesellschaftlich diskutiert und akzeptiert sind. Deshalb ist der Begriff der Nachhaltigkeit sicherlich einer, der sozusagen als Leitbild tief verankert und immer wieder auch übersetzt werden muss. […] Für viele ist es ein abstrakter Begriff. Wir müssen immer wieder versuchen, ihn in die Realität zu übersetzen.’ (Merkel 26 Sep 2006.)

Merkel argued that as politicians discussed the long-term impacts of exploiting energy sources the public was more concerned about short-term consequences. For this purpose, orientations, which were societally discussed and accepted, were necessary. Therefore, the concept of Nachhaltigkeit, sustainability, was something that should be embedded and, again, translated as a guiding principle. Nachhaltigkeit was, according to Merkel, an abstract concept and, therefore, it should be

14 Sustainability.
translated into reality. (Merkel 26 Sep 2006.) Yet, Merkel viewed that Nachhaltigkeit was an already accepted concept in German society yet still too abstract and without enough reference points for current realities. If it was to fulfil many expectations, it should provide answers about how sustainability and profitability should be seen in relation to one another in future.

‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ for International Environmental Policy – Cooperative Beliefs Guiding Policy

Early during her first term, Chancellor Merkel already started to discuss different policy sectors that were inseparably linked to the internationally established concept of sustainable development. She maintained that the Rio Summit in 1992 and the agreements made there were an acknowledgement of sustainable development and one of the big breakthroughs, leading to a type of thinking that took social and economic, as well as environmental elements into consideration. It resulted in the comprehensive UN-process of sustainable development, combining these three elements:

‘Es ist insgesamt ein umfassender UN-Prozess der so genannten nachhaltigen Entwicklung entstanden, in dem wir uns unter den Staaten der Welt vorgenommen haben, zu sagen: Umweltentwicklung, wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und soziale Entwicklung können Hand in Hand gehen, Umweltschutz und Sozialstandards sind also keine Gegensätze.’ (Merkel 25 Sep 2007b.)

Merkel stressed that the emergence of the UN-process of sustainable development led states to maintain that environmental, economic and social development could go hand in hand. Thus, environmental protection and social standards were not in opposition to each other. (Merkel 25 Sep 2007b.)
Merkel stated that in the Kyoto Protocol, which was linked to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the content of the convention was translated into quantifiable targets. The Kyoto Protocol was agreed on but not ratified by all states, including the United States. Merkel stressed that the targets agreed to in the Protocol were difficult to achieve. She took the view that the European Union was on its way to meeting these targets, but success in reaching the targets was not guaranteed. According to Merkel, for its part Germany would contribute almost ¾ of the EU’s 8 per cent reduction commitment. However, the EU’s overall reduction would lie under 2 per cent because the economic growth in some member states was not decoupled, but rather linked to the high CO2 emissions. (Ibid.)

Merkel also discussed the importance of identifying the difference between ‘doing something’ and ‘doing nothing’:

‘[…] Wir reden also nicht über “zusätzliche Kosten” gegenüber „gar nichts machen“. Vielmehr müssen wir abwägen, was „nichts machen“ kostet und was „etwas tun“ kostet. […] Die Wissenschaftler sagen uns: Eine Obergrenze von 2 Grad Erhöhung könnt ihr mit einigermaßen überschaubarem Einsatz einhalten; wenn aber die Erhöhung der durchschnittlichen Erdtemperatur höher ist, dann wird es euch sehr viel mehr kosten. Deshalb ist es nicht als vernünftig zu betrachten, eine stärkere Erhöhung zuzulassen.’ (Merkel 25 Sep 2007b.)

She argued that it should be weighed against the cost doing nothing. An increase in surface temperature of more than two degrees would cost significantly more and, therefore, allowing a greater increase would not be reasonable. (Merkel 25 Sep 2007b.)

Merkel stressed that if the upper limit of two degrees were to be adhered to, then worldwide CO2 emissions would be cut in half by 2050 (Merkel 25 Sep 2007b). She argued that if more than two degrees was allowed that it would then result in economic damages with considerable costs (Merkel 6 Nov 2007). Merkel
emphasised the point that there was an understanding that the reductions would be carried out under the UN umbrella and that a mid-term goal was needed:

‘[…] Ich denke, wir haben jetzt auch eine Übereinkunft, dass wir alles unter dem Schirm der UN machen wollen. Wir haben eine Übereinkunft, dass wir ein mittelfristiges Ziel brauchen […]’. (Merkel 25 Sep 2007b.)

According to Merkel, there was a principle of common, but differentiated responsibilities, for industrialised and developing countries. She stressed that the task was to find a way after Kyoto where not only the industrialised countries defined quantifiable reduction goals but rising nations would also take responsibility:

‘Daher besteht eine gemeinsame, aber unterschiedliche Verantwortung der Industrieländer und der Entwicklungsländer. Die Aufgabe wird sein, dass wir in der Periode nach Kyoto einen Weg finden, auf dem nicht nur die Industrieländer auf quantifizierbare Reduktionsziele festgelegt werden, sondern auf dem natürlich auch die so genannten Schwellenländer ihren Anteil übernehmen müssen. […] Das heißt, die Schwellenländer müssen Verantwortung übernehmen.’ (Merkel 25 Sep 2007b.)

Merkel stated that the question was about on which basis rising nations should take responsibility. She maintained that over the long-term, rising nations might be ready to join if industrialised nations stated that every human being was allowed to emit equally as much. (Merkel 25 Sep 2007b.) Merkel’s reinforcing cooperative beliefs relating to the operational environment, as well as her strategies, affected German policies that aimed at including developing countries and rising nations more closely in an international multilateral framework.

According to Merkel, two things were needed, which could also be seen as alternatives or, alternatively, they could both be adopted: regional reduction targets and instruments for reaching the targets economically efficiently:

‘Ich sage daher, wir brauchen zwei Dinge, die eventuell sogar alternative sein könnten oder beide angewandt werden müssen: Wir brauchen regionale Reduktionsziele und wir brauchen Instrumente für ein möglichst ökonomisch
Merkel explained that one should not take the most expensive route. Rather, she argued that reaching goals should be done economically efficiently. This might be accomplished by developing a CO2 certification system. (Merkel 25 Sep 2007b.) She was confident that a CO2 trading system and certification were, in principle, the correct instruments (Merkel 6 Nov 2007). Certificates should be sold in developing countries through which these countries would be forced to implement these technologies. Doing so would bring the technological change forth in the most economical way. Merkel stated that if all parties could come to an understanding, there would be no need for regional targets. However, in that case, a worldwide trading system would be needed and before then, regional targets should be agreed on. (Merkel 25 Sep 2007b.)

Merkel argued that using and further developing technologies could have enormous potential in the reduction of emissions. For example, electricity could be generated by wind parks and solar energy. However, investments in climate friendly technologies had one condition: they needed reliable framework conditions. According to Merkel, industrialised countries should be forerunners in this respect. They had to set ambitious reduction goals and they should describe how they intended to achieve those goals. (Merkel 24 Sep 2007.)

Therefore, the European Union had decided on an integrated climate and energy policy strategy under the German Presidency. It should achieve the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 20 per cent by 2020 compared with the level of 1990. According to Merkel, the rising and emerging nations should aim at strong economic growth, however, emissions should increasingly be decoupled from
growth. Sustainable development should be supported with climate compatible technologies. (Ibid.)

**Linking Climate, Energy and Security Policies – the German Energy Mix and an Integrated Energy Concept**

Merkel took the view that in future, climate and energy policies would be closely interlinked with each other:

‘[…] Deshalb werden Klima- und Energiepolitik […] in Zukunft eher enger als weniger eng miteinander verzahnt sein.’ (Merkel 6 Nov 2007.)

She stressed the importance of an energy policy for Germany also taking into account different opinions relating to it:

‘[…] Die Bundesregierung misst einer berechenbaren Energiepolitik eine große Bedeutung bei. Allerdings ist auf die Meinungsunterschiede bezüglich einer Form der Energiepolitik schon eingegangen worden.’ (Merkel 6 Nov 2007.)

Merkel discussed the different forms of energy production, from coal to nuclear energy. She spoke about nuclear energy by linking it with the climate protection goals:


According to Merkel, in reference to the nuclear energy, the course had already been set out in a way that would cause problems in reaching the ambitious climate protection targets. Merkel maintained that regardless of German views on nuclear
energy, the world would not follow Germany’s position. Therefore, future possibilities should also be reflected upon. (Merkel 6 Nov 2007.)

Merkel made some positive remarks on the ongoing German energy dialogue. According to her, the energy dialogue had furthered the calculation of scenarios for different CO2 reduction possibilities:

‘[…] Wir haben in unserem großen Energiedialog sicherlich eines erreicht, nämlich dass wir Szenarien für die verschiedenen CO2-Reduktionsmöglichkeiten durchrechnen konnten. Wir haben dabei auch erkannt, dass es uns ohne den Ausstieg aus der Kernenergie natürlich leichter fallen würde, die ambitionierten Ziele zu erreichen. […] Aber wir müssen jetzt, was die Energieerzeuger anbelangt, vor allen Dingen einen Gesprächsfaden suchen, indem wir rational miteinander Argumente austauschen […]’ (Merkel 6 Nov 2007.)

She stated that with the target of a 20 per cent reduction by 2012, Germany had an enormous contribution to make and, therefore, she saw that without the phasing-out of nuclear energy, it would be easier to reach these ambitious targets. The Chancellor pointed out that Germany and Europe could not solve the problem of climate protection alone and other international ‘players’ should also participate. (Merkel 6 Nov 2007.)

Merkel viewed an energy mix as the future. She stressed that energy efficiency and climate protection should be seen as an overall system and an overall task:


Merkel started increasingly to view climate and energy as interconnected, which may indicate that the international climate goals were starting to also influence decisions made on energy policy.
However, during her first term in office, Merkel argued that German energy policy needed diversification, including both fossil energy and the development of renewable energy sources. Although climate protection and emissions targets seemed to gradually have begun to also influence Merkel’s energy policy, Germany was still a large industrialised country and location, which was dependent on the security of supply. Merkel maintained that energy supply was one of the central questions for Germany as an industrial location. She pointed out that the security of supply was a requirement for Germany to remain an industrial location. (Merkel 29 Aug 2008.)

This can be observed in the statement of the minister of the Chancellery, Thomas de Maizière, as he presented the integrated German energy policy approach. According to de Maizière, only with an integrated approach would it be possible to increase the security of energy supply. The concept included diversification and cooperation, which were seen as key aspects of the strategic approach. The security of the energy supply had become a central field of economic, domestic, as well as foreign and security policy, in Germany and Europe with new facets and challenges. Here, diversification was assigned a key role that referred to an energy mix, supply areas, routes as well as transit countries. At the same time, cooperative energy security structures were strengthened by creating the mutual dependence of consumers and producers, an energy partnership as a win-win situation, which increased energy security. For example, Europe’s demand for oil and gas and the need for capital and know-how in supplier countries could complement each other. (de Maizière 12 Oct 2006.) Thus, Chancellor Merkel’s beliefs relating to cooperative strategy were also guiding German energy policy. However, questions of energy dependence and the security of supply were to be reframed in the upcoming years.
The concept of sustainability, ‘Nachhaltigkeit’, was gradually being defined by Merkel during her first term in office. According to Merkel, the German government understood ‘Nachhaltigkeit’ on the one hand as a vision and, on the other hand, as a concrete mandate for action:

‘Die Bundesregierung versteht Nachhaltigkeit so, dass sie auf der einen Seite Vision und auf der anderen Seite konkreter Handlungsauftrag ist. [...] Nachhaltigkeit ist in den letzten Jahren zum Leitprinzip geworden, und zwar nicht nur in den klassischen Umweltschutzdebatten, sondern in vielen anderen Debatten zu anderen Themen. […]’ (Merkel 27 Nov 2007.)

She stressed that this concept had become a guiding principle over the past years, not only in environmental debates, but also in other fields. For example, during Germany’s G8 and EU Presidency, Nachhaltigkeit guided German policies. (Merkel 27 Nov 2007.)

Merkel emphasised the point that Germany would contribute, both at national and international levels, to the framework of sustainable work, sustainable legislation and sustainable political action:

‘Wir werden mit Intensität und mit Ehrgeiz weiterhin daran arbeiten, uns auf nationaler und auf internationaler Ebene im Rahmen des nachhaltigen Arbeitens, der nachhaltigen Gesetzgebung und des nachhaltigen politischen Handelns einzubringen. […]’ (Merkel 27 Nov 2007.)

Merkel stressed, however, that Nachhaltigkeit-orientated policy needed to be embedded in society. She maintained that in reference to Nachhaltigkeit, the question was about hard facts such as future sustainability and justice in society. (Merkel 27 Nov 2007.)
Merkel also discussed how Nachhaltigkeit related to security policy. She envisioned a link between the security of the world and a policy that was based on sustainability and equity. Furthermore, Merkel promoted that environmental protection, economic performance and social responsibility should be combined globally. She took the view that it all started as a question of definition. The concept of Nachhaltigkeit was often used misleadingly. (Merkel 27 Nov 2007.)

Merkel listed the three most common misunderstandings relating to Nachhaltigkeit. Firstly, she held the view that Nachhaltigkeit was not a panacea, with which the conflicts of interest between environment, economy and social questions would be resolved by themselves. Nachhaltigkeit was the guiding principle for resolving this conflict of interest. Secondly, sustainable development did not reduce the need for decisions on goals and priorities. These political decisions should be made based on values and beliefs. Thirdly, according to Merkel, there was no ‘more of the same’ in industrialised countries. There was a search for a new quality of life, for new until-now un-proven economic chances. (Ibid.)

In addition, Merkel maintained that it was important to make the supply of sustainable raw materials as a main topic in the upcoming sustainability report. She argued that raw materials policy was a classical cross-sectional task and, therefore, an interministerial committee consisting of representatives from the ministries of economy, finance, foreign affairs, development and agriculture would be established. Merkel also pointed out that the government supported the German economy in their raw materials projects abroad. She viewed, however, that there should be fair framework conditions in foreign trade, both for the German economy and for those countries from whom Germany received the raw materials. Therefore, Germany supported fair world trade and the furthering of the Doha Round. (Merkel 20 Mar 2007.)
9.2.2. The Financial Crisis and Its Effects: Cooperation in Climate Policy Needed, Diversification of Energy Policy Important

_Cooperative Beliefs Reinforce in Environmental Policy, the Diversification of Energy Policy Needed to Include Renewables – And Nuclear Energy as Well?_

The outbreak of the financial crisis raised the topic of change to the international agenda. Chancellor Merkel maintained that after this crisis the cards were reshuffled. The crisis tended to accelerate change processes:

‘[…] Denn eines ist klar: Nach dieser Krise werden die Karten auf der Welt noch einmal neu gemischt. […] Krisen haben die Eigenschaft, Veränderungsprozesse zu beschleunigen. Wir haben die Chance, stärker aus dieser Krise herauszukommen, als wir hineingegangen sind. Aber darauf haben wir keinen Rechtsanspruch, sondern das müssen wir uns erarbeiten.’ (Merkel 24 Mar 2009.)

She pointed out that now there was a possibility to come out of the crisis stronger than before. However, that would require hard work. (Merkel 24 Mar 2009.)

According to Merkel, the challenges of climate change did not become smaller due to the outbreak of the financial crisis, on the contrary, the lesson learned was that there was a need for global action:

Merkel pointed out that according to her firm beliefs, there was no alternative for solving global problems anyway other than cooperating under the UN umbrella (Merkel 28 Jan 2009). In the aftermath of the financial crisis, Merkel’s beliefs relating to the operational environment (P-1) were reinforcing, indicating emphasis on more international cooperation in the environmental sector. Further, the direction of strategy (I-1) remained very highly cooperative.

Merkel argued that the way that climate protection was shaped, should become a model of how global challenges should be managed:

‘Das, was wir beim Klimaschutz schon seit etlichen Jahren erleben, durchleben und zum Teil auch erfolgreich gestalten, wird auch das Muster werden, nach dem wir andere globale Herausforderungen bewältigen können. Deshalb bin ich zutiefst davon überzeugt, dass auch die internationale Finanzmarkt- und Wirtschaftskrise uns dazu zwingen wird, sehr viel mehr global zusammenarbeiten. […] Keiner kann die Probleme der Welt allein lösen. Dieses Gedankengut ist im Bereich des Klimaschutzes und im Bereich der Freunde der erneuerbaren Energien weit verbreitet. […]’ (Merkel 28 Jan 2009.)

She was confident that the international financial and economic crisis would force states to cooperate much more globally, as ‘nobody can solve the problems of the world alone’. According to Merkel, this idea was widely spread in climate protection as well as in the renewable energy sector. (Merkel 28 Jan 2009.)

Additionally, energy considerations also increased. Merkel took the view that in the upcoming decades, given population and economic growth, the world would deal more with a scarcity of energy production than with too many resources. In many states, this had led to a rethinking of nuclear energy. (Merkel 1 Jul 2009.) The linkages between the environmental and energy policy became more evident in the aftermath of the crisis. Merkel also linked economic aspects to these policies, creating a hybrid that would justify the increase in new forms of energy production
and possibly the revival an old, very disputed one e.g. nuclear energy, by combining it with the international environmental and economic learning.

Relating to different forms of energy production, Merkel pointed out that it was important to increase understanding within the population and that it was not possible to secure Germany’s welfare without a consistent energy policy. Energy policy was, for Germany, like the ‘bloodstream in an organism’. Germany needed, according to Merkel, an energy policy that relied on diversification. It was not possible to make energy policy solely with nuclear energy:


Merkel stated that in the coming years, many coal and nuclear power plants would be closed down. She stressed that it was not possible to phase-out all energy sources, which seemed to be somehow no longer accepted. Although renewable energies would cover a major share of energy production, according to Merkel, a consistent energy policy also included the construction of new power plants, not only gas power stations, as well as electricity grids and pipelines. (Merkel 17 Feb 2009.)

Although Merkel’s energy policy seemed to be conducted according to international environmental policies and their cooperative tendencies, Merkel’s position on the dependence for importing electricity was strict:

‘[…] Lassen Sie uns gemeinsam bei der Bevölkerung dafür werben, dass Deutschland nicht zu einer Nation werden darf, die Strom importiert und von

She stressed that Germany should not become a nation that was dependent on others and on the import of electricity. Instead, the idea should be promoted that Germany, as an industrialised country, should produce and export its electricity and exporting electricity to neighbouring countries would be a part of the export economy. Germany had the know-how, experience and the most efficient technologies. (Merkel 17 Feb 2009.) The energy policy with regards to being an export country followed cooperative strategies, however, Germany should not, according to Merkel, become too dependent on the import of electricity. One way to increase energy independence and the security of supply was to invest more in diversification and renewable energies.

**Production of Renewable Energies with a Long Tradition in Germany**

Early in 2009, Chancellor Merkel started to comprehensively discuss the 18-year path that Germany had taken with the renewables since 1991 as the *Stromeinspeisungsgesetz* (a law on feeding electricity from renewable resources into the public grid), the antecedent of the *Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz* (Renewable Energies Act, since 2000), entered into force:

‘[…] Vor 18 Jahren wurde nämlich das Stromeinspeisungsgesetz verabschiedet. Die Sache mit den erneuerbaren Energien ist jetzt volljährig, voll zurechnungsfähig und damit natürlich auch mündig und selbstständiger, als das in der vergangenen Zeit der Fall war. Auf den Weg gebracht hat es damals eine ganz große Koalition, denn
Merkel stated that the law was now of age, legally sane and, therefore, more autonomous than it had been in the past. In the 90s, the *Stromeinspeisungsgesetz* was driven forward by a real Grand Coalition as all the factions in the German *Bundestag* agreed on it. (Merkel 28 Jan 2009.) Thus, Merkel provided a reminder that there had been a wide consensus on renewable energy sources in the past, which should also support the future path taken.

According to Merkel, the *Stromeinspeisungsgesetz* led one realise that renewables could be a central element of German energy policy:

‘[…] Und es reifte die Erkenntnis, dass erneuerbare Energien ein zentraler Baustein für unsere Energieversorgung der Zukunft sein können. Wind, Sonne und Wasser zusammen mit Geothermie und Biomasse stellen ein wesentliches Element unseres Energiesystems dar. […] in all unseren Szenarien ist das auch so dargestellt.’ (Merkel 28 Jan 2009.)

She stressed that wind, sun, water, geothermal energy and biomass were all an essential part of the German energy system and that in every scenario it had also been presented that way (Merkel 28 Jan 2009).

Merkel stated that in the time she was Federal Minister for Environment from 1994–1998, Germany had already advocated covering half of its energy demand with renewable energy sources by 2050. Since then, the federal government had repeatedly reaffirmed this goal. According to Merkel, it was time after time a good and right thing to formulate binding targets:

‘Ich glaube, dass es immer wieder gut und richtig war, verbindliche Zielvorgaben zu formulieren, an denen wir dann auch bestimmte Dinge ausrichten konnten. Deshalb haben wir auch alles darangesetzt, solche Zielvorgaben nicht nur für Deutschland zu haben, sondern während unserer EU-Ratspräsidentschaft im Jahre 2007 auch für die gesamte Europäische Union verbindlich zu machen. Wir erinnern uns noch alle
Germany had not only set out during its EU Presidency in 2007 a commitment to targets at the national level but also to make these commitments binding at the EU level. According to Merkel, the political process developed in this sector very fast. Therefore, the minister for the environment had to fight hard so that Germany could continue on its path of the Renewable Energies Act. She argued that this had succeeded well. (Merkel 28 Jan 2009.)

Merkel listed Germany’s reduction goals, which were that 30 per cent of electricity and 14 per cent of heating demand, should be covered with renewables by 2020, which were also expressed in the EEG, German Renewable Energies Act, and in the Renewable Energies Heat Act:


This required bringing forth the expansion of energy grids. However, Merkel maintained that there were many positive outcomes. The renewables would diminish fuel imports such as oil, gas, coal and uranium, e.g. sectors that were subjected to heavy price fluctuations. Renewable energies followed the reliable underlying conditions in respect to the independence of energy supply:

‘Wir sparen natürlich Brennstoffimporte ein; Öl, Gas, Kohle, Uran – Märkte, die starken Preisschwankungen unterworfen sind. […] dann merkt man, dass Menschen inzwischen zu rechnen beginnen und die verlässlichen Rahmenbedingungen, die sie im Bereich der erneuerbaren Energien haben, auch schätzen. Ich denke, auch die jüngsten Querelen um Erdgaslieferungen haben uns wieder nachdenklich werden lassen und zumindest den Wunsch nach einer größeren Unabhängigkeit bei der Energieversorgung deutlich gemacht.’ (Merkel 28 Jan 2009.)
Merkel also saw renewables as an excellent export factor (Merkel 17 Feb 2009). She viewed the renewables industry as an engine for jobs. Furthermore, with renewable energy it was possible to set up investments in Germany and abroad. According to Merkel, renewables were, because of the secure underlying conditions in Germany, a sector that should make investments possible, also during the financial crisis. Therefore, even in a crisis, the growth sector should be given a chance:

‘[…] Der Bereich der erneuerbaren sind ein Jobmotor. […] Wir können durch erneuerbare Energien Investitionen auslösen. […] Die erneuerbaren sind gerade durch die sicheren Rahmenbedingungen in Deutschland in der derzeitigen wirtschaftlichen Krise eigentlich ein Feld, das Investitionen weiter möglich machen müsste, verlässlich möglich machen müsste. […] Deshalb werden wir alles, was in unserer Macht ist, unternehmen, um hier eine Brücke zu bauen, dass wir eine Wachstumsbranche nicht abwürfen, sondern einer Wachstumsbranche gerade in der Krise eine Chance geben.’ (Merkel 28 Jan 2009.)

Merkel stressed that the federal government wanted to strengthen and secure employment in economically difficult times. Therefore, the German government adopted a package of measures. As a part of the package, the renovation of federal buildings would be advanced. By 2020, 14 per cent of heating was aimed to be covered with renewables. Merkel spoke about a ‘sleeping giant’, the incredible potential embedded in this sector. (Merkel 28 Jan 2009.)

According to Merkel, the federal government had a set of future plans, for example, E-Energy, cooperation between the ministry for the economy and ministry for environment. Merkel saw the establishment of the International Renewable Energy Agency, IRENA, as a milestone:

IRENA was an expression of Germany’s support for renewables and how Germany could carry the idea of renewable energy sources to the wider world (Merkel 28 Jan 2009).

However, Merkel stressed that although the renewable energies would play a central role in diminishing CO2 emissions, one should not take too drastic of measures. According to her, Germany benefited from taking part in the CCS (the Carbon Capture & Storage) market and in having the most efficient power plants at its disposal. (Merkel 28 Jan 2009.)

Merkel also discussed energy issues from the international perspective. She stated that in some countries, such as in the rising nations and developing countries, there was a cycle between energy subvention and energy consumption. This cycle should, according to Merkel, be broken, because otherwise the incentives for lower energy consumption would not be effective. It would also create markets in those countries. (Ibid.)

Renewables seemed to also be connected to German international power and it might have contributed to the gradual reinforcement of Merkel’s power belief (P-4). Merkel maintained that renewable energy was a sector in which Germany had an international profile (Merkel 24 Mar 2009) and that Germany was a leader in implementing European climate decisions (Merkel 21 Apr 2009). Merkel saw the political framework conditions as very favourable. The EU member states had agreed that renewable energies would cover 20 per cent of the energy demand by 2020. This meant that Germany would need to reach its share of 18 per cent by 2020. (Merkel 24 Mar 2009.)
According to Merkel, in the renewable energy sector, it was possible to rely on a predictable and very clear future. She believed that such explicit political framework conditions were uncommon. (Merkel 21 Apr 2009.) The international developments in the climate sector and the ongoing climate negotiations also had their effect on German energy policy. Germany was increasingly investing in renewables and in the aftermath of the financial crisis, this might help Germany to reduce its dependence on energy imports and, therefore, to also contribute to security of supply. Through these developments the operational environment might have gradually become more predictable (P-3). However, there was another energy source, the future of which was still unclear, but the use of which might also support the overall international climate goals, namely nuclear energy.

‘Ich will, dass Deutschland ein zukunftfähiges Land bleibt’ – A Pragmatic Approach to Nuclear Energy Strengthens

Towards the end of her first term, shortly before the Bundestag election in 2009, Merkel raised the question of nuclear energy to the public agenda. She stressed that she took a pragmatic approach to speaking on nuclear energy. According to Merkel, this pragmatic approach was necessary because industrialised societies also needed an energy supply:

‘[…] Wenn ich heute vor Ihnen stehe und über die Glückwünsche hinaus über die Frage der Energieversorgung und der Kernenergie spreche, dann tue ich das aus einer eher pragmatischen Herangehensweise heraus […]. Es ist eine pragmatische Sichtweise, wenn man weiß, dass Industriegesellschaften und Industriestandorte Energieversorgung brauchen.’ (Merkel 1 Jul 2009.)

Chancellor Merkel stated that the current state of German nuclear energy policy, based on the decision of the ‘Rot-Grün’, SPD- Green government back in 1998, when the parties agreed that Germany would phase-out nuclear energy. Merkel
pointed out that the sources of the energy supply changed over time. She viewed that nuclear energy had the prospect of a reasonable time period:

‘Die Quellen der Energieversorgung werden sich im Laufe der Zeit verändern. Aber ich glaube, besonders wenn ich sie mir weltweit anschaue, dass die Kernenergie für eine überschaubare Zeit lang eine Perspektive hat. Deutschland steht es gut an, bei dieser technisch außerordentlich anspruchsvollen Energieerzeugung einen Beitrag zu dieser Entwicklung auch für die absehbare Zukunft zu leisten. […]’ (Merkel 1 Jul 2009.)

According to Merkel, it also fit well for Germany to contribute to the development of technically challenging energy production in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, she argued that the security of the existing nuclear power plants had been mastered well in Germany. However, if someday there would be other possibilities for producing energy, nuclear energy should not then be cherished for ideological reasons:

‘[…] Was die Sicherheit der Kernkraftwerke anbelangt, so wird die Energieversorgung von Deutschland sehr gut gemeistert. Doch wenn wir eines Tages ganz andere Möglichkeiten haben, Energie zu erzeugen, müssen wir wiederum nicht aus ideologischen Gründen an der Kernenergie festhalten. […] In unserer Zeit halte ich sie für einen wichtigen Beitrag für Energieversorgung.’ (Merkel 1 Jul 2009.)

Thus, at that moment, Merkel saw nuclear energy as an important contribution to the German energy supply. She supported the work of the German ‘Atomforum’ in persuading constituents with factual arguments, which, according to Merkel, were a totally alternative version in the emotionally charged conflict:

‘Ich glaube, man darf dem Deutschen Atomforum zu seinem 50. Jubiläum sagen, dass Sie sich natürlich für die Förderung der Kernenergie stark gemacht haben […]. Sie haben versucht, mit sachlichen Argumenten zu überzeugen, was natürlich in der Austragung emotionsgeladener Konflikte oft eine ganz andere Spielart ist. […]’ (Merkel 1 Jul 2009.)
The international-level developments were included in the justifications as well. Merkel pointed out that many countries were rethinking their nuclear energy positions, which was reflected in their energy planning and energy scenarios:

‘[…] In vielen Ländern findet daher ein Umdenken in Bezug auf die Kernenergie statt […]. Wir sehen ein Umdenken, wir sehen in der Energieplanung und den Energieszenarien vieler Länder auch die Nutzung der Kernenergie.’ (Merkel 1 Jul 2009.)

Merkel stressed that she did not want to phase-out nuclear energy; she wanted instead to extend nuclear power plants’ lifespans at the best technical level:

‘Ich persönlich mache mir große Sorgen, was passiert, wenn Deutschland eines Tages aus diesem Bereich ausgestiegen sein sollte, was ich nicht will; ich will die Verlängerung der Laufzeiten der Kernkraftwerke, und zwar auf dem besten technischen Niveau. Ich mache mir allergrößte Sorgen, dass eine wichtige Stimme für mehr Sicherheit bei der Produktion von Kernenergie in der Welt entfallen würde.’ (Merkel 1 Jul 2009.)

Merkel also saw that with the exit of nuclear energy in Germany, the world would lose an important voice advocating more security in the production of nuclear energy (Merkel 1 Jul 2009).

Merkel linked energy policy decisions with the international challenge of climate protection and safety aspects. She maintained that by supporting climate protection, Germany had achieved a great deal. She admitted that Germany could not affect everything. However, with France, Germany could contribute to the safety culture:

‘Wir haben durch unser Eintreten für den Klimaschutz vieles erreicht. Ich weiß, dass Deutschland nicht alles bewegen kann. Deutschland kann aber zum Beispiel zusammen mit Frankreich vieles bewegen und so auch einen wesentlichen Beitrag für eine Sicherheitskultur leisten. […] Wenn die Antwort auf den Klimaschutz jetzt heißt, dass wir weder Kohlekraftwerke noch Kernkraftwerke haben dürfen, dann wird es so sein, dass wir uns bei der Energieversorgung auch auf unseren guten Nachbarn Frankreich verlassen müssen. Dadurch ist unsere Sicherheit allerdings auch nicht besser garantiert. Denn was einen eventuellen Unfall anbelangt, würde es
Merkel stated that if the answer to climate protection was that neither coal nor nuclear power plants were allowed, then it would mean that Germany should rely on France for its energy supply. Merkel stressed that, as a result, Germany’s safety would not be better guaranteed. In the case of an accident, it would not make a difference whether the power plant was located in Germany or France. (Merkel 1 Jul 2009.) Thus, Merkel stated implicitly that exiting coal and nuclear power would gradually lead to higher energy dependence. Furthermore, Germany could not gain international recognition for contributing to the safety culture of the energy sector.

Merkel advocated an energy mix. She pointed out that nuclear energy and renewables should not exclude each other; one must not stand for nuclear energy and, therefore, be against renewables, but rather she saw energy savings and energy efficiency as the most exciting paths:

‘Nun hat sich ja gezeigt […], dass man nicht nur für die Kernenergie und deshalb gegen die erneuerbaren Energien sein muss, sondern ich halte bei uns ohnehin Energiesparen und Energieeffizienz für den spannendsten Pfad. Wir haben hierbei im Wärmebereich noch erheblich Möglichkeiten. Aber im Strombereich können und sollten wir auf kurze Frist nicht auf Kernenergie verzichten. […]’ (Merkel 1 Jul 2009.)

In the heating sector, there were yet, according to Merkel, considerable possibilities, however, in the electricity sector, Germany could and should not abandon nuclear energy. Merkel reiterated that every type of energy production had its disadvantages. Therefore, Germany had always advocated an energy mix and not only one type of energy production. Merkel stressed that electricity generation should gradually be covered with renewables by up to 30 per cent by 2020. However, there was still 70 per cent to cover:

Merkel stated that currently, Germany was succeeding by not changing its energy mix suddenly and, thereby, not ruining its export chances. As an industrialised state, Germany was making balanced politics. (Merkel 1 Jul 2009.) Thus, economic and trade considerations also influenced Merkel’s view on how the energy mix should be created in the most beneficial way for Germany.

Merkel urged on rational energy policy, which would not ignore risks and that would consider all the necessary aspects, such as permanent disposal and real costs, which included e.g. the costs for permanent disposal, new power plants and renewable energies:

‘Wir müssen also dafür sorgen, dass wir die Dinge auch zeitmäßig vernünftig hinbekommen und eine rationale Energiepolitik verfolgen, die Risiken nicht ausblendet und die notwendigen Dinge in Betracht zieht. Dazu gehören für mich die Endlagerung und die Berücksichtigung der realen Kosten, die natürlich die Endlagerkosten implizieren und angesichts der CO2-Zertifizierung und des Zertifikathandels auch die Kosten neuer Kraftwerke und natürlich auch die Gesamtkosten bei erneuerbaren Energien.’ (Merkel 1 Jul 2009.)

With these arguments and justifications, Merkel wanted to stress that she wanted Germany to stay ‘fit for the future’. Nuclear energy was part of the view of the foreseeable future, from both the point of views, as an export and as a bridge energy source:

‘Ich will, dass Deutschland ein zukunftsfähiges Land bleibt. Dazu gehört für mich auf absehbare Zeit auch Kernenergie – sowohl im Hinblick auf den Export als auch als Brückenenergieträger in die Zukunft. Deshalb kann ich an dieser Stelle sagen,’
According to Merkel, the current CDU-SPD government did not look to the future in a unified way (Merkel 1 Jul 2009). In her first term, Merkel was forced to ‘tie her hands’ and agree on the energy policy, which did not quite correspond with her own views e.g. relating to nuclear energy. If renewables had, as Merkel stated, the effect of increasing the predictability of the political universe (P-3), nuclear energy might also serve the same goal, as ‘Brückenenergieträger’ in future. The political universe would, thus, become more predictable through increased diversification and energy independence. The energy question might also be linked to how Merkel might have wanted to gradually expand the utility of different means (I-5). The energy mix would serve international climate goals, increase independence and the security of supply as well as support the German export industry. Thus, in addition to environmental considerations, energy security and economic aspects would also be covered.
9.2.3. Beliefs Framing Policy During Merkel’s Second Term: An Increased Emphasis on Deeds and Complementary Bottom-up Processes

G20 and the Charter for Sustainable Economic Activity; Top-down and Bottom-up Processes Needed

From the beginning of her second term, Chancellor Merkel already started to set the course by making the international financial and economic crisis be seen as an opportunity:

‘[…] Die Weichenstellung ist vielleicht deshalb so gut möglich, weil wir versuchen müssen, aus der internationalen Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise eine Chance zu machen. […] Wir müssen jetzt in einem entschlossenen Marsch durch die Ebene die G20-Beschlüsse umsetzen. Wir müssen schauen, dass wir in einer zusammenhängenden Welt auch zusammenhängende Regeln bekommen, denn die globale Kooperation, auch mit globalen Institutionen, ist aus meiner Sicht alternativlos. Ich glaube, da haben wir Europäer einen kleinen Wettbewerbsvorteil, weil wir durch die Europäische Union daran gewöhnt sind, nationale Kompetenzen an eine multilaterale Organisation abzugeben. […]’ (Merkel 23 Nov 2009.)

Merkel stressed that the G20 decisions should be implemented. She viewed that in the interdependent world, there should be interrelated rules, because there was no alternative to global cooperation with global institutions. Here, the member states of the European Union had a small advantage, because they were used to providing competencies to a multilateral organisation. (Merkel 23 Nov 2009.) Thus, Merkel’s belief that the international operational environment was becoming increasingly cooperative seemed to continue to reinforce.

Merkel viewed that the reasons for the crisis were the acceptance of incredible risks and short-term thinking. The concept of Nachhaltigkeit, sustainability, was an alternative way of thinking. Therefore, the G20 process should, according to
Merkel, apart from crisis management also develop a Charter for Sustainable Economic Activity:


Merkel was pleased that the G20 in Pittsburgh succeeded in commissioning the preparation of a Charter. She stressed that the developing countries were hesitant because of the common understanding in those countries that their growth perspectives would be cut by the Charter. (Merkel 23 Nov 2009.)

Merkel viewed that achievements could be accomplished either with top-down or bottom-up processes:


She pointed out that one should approach issues from two sides, firstly by anchoring the G20 decisions in the different economic regions and then, secondly, by trying to turn the approach into a common understanding within the UN. After all, global legitimacy could only lie within the UN. (Merkel 23 Nov 2009.)

In addition, Merkel appreciated the cooperation with the international organisations such as the IMF, WTO, ILO, the World Bank and the OECD, and
was pleased with the fact that they now could take part in the G20-process. However, a UN environmental organisation, which would combine all of the different activities, would be necessary. (Ibid.)

Before the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in 2009, where over 100 heads of state and government participated, Merkel anticipated that the conference would be a prominent touchstone on whether the world would be able to pursue the path of global development and take the course of Nachhaltigkeit. In her government declaration to the German Bundestag, she discussed issues of importance for Germany. Merkel stressed that for all states, applicable commitments were needed in order to adhere to the two-degree target:

‘[…] brauchen wir erstens eine für alle Staaten geltende Verpflichtung zur Einhaltung des 2-Grad-Ziels […]. […] Die Verpflichtung auf das 2-Grad-Ziel bedeutet konkret, dass die Emissionen von Treibhausgasen bis 2050 im Vergleich zu 1990 mindestens halbiert werden müssen. […]’ (Merkel 17 Dec 2009a.)

Merkel stressed that the commitment to the two-degree target meant that the greenhouse gas emissions must concretely be at least cut in half by 2050 in comparison with the 1990 level. Merkel pointed out that mid-term goals were necessary by which she meant binding and quantitative goals for 2020. The present commitments of the industrialised states were not sufficient. (Merkel 17 Dec 2009a.) Merkel emphasised that the contribution of the industrialised countries should be brought forward. According to her, the EU had defined its contribution: reducing at least 80 per cent of the CO2 emissions by 2050 and the mid-term goal was a reduction of 20 per cent by 2020 compared to the level of 1990. Furthermore, if other countries would make similar efforts, the EU’s reduction target could rise up to 30 per cent. (Merkel 17 Dec 2009b.) During her second term, Merkel’s belief in the use of cooperative strategies and tactics (I-2) was high, which can also be observed in her statements on reduction targets and the EU
being ready to even increase its target value if all states would agree and cooperate towards a common goal.

Merkel continued to view that the possible agreement in Copenhagen should also comprise climate protection measures for the rising nations. Merkel maintained that industrialised countries had a special responsibility and emphasised that it was possible to achieve a 40 per cent reduction by 2020. She stressed that industrialised countries would like to fulfil their special responsibility as the main perpetrator of the climate change during the whole time period of industrialisation:


However, the balance of the world economy had shifted considerably, and therefore, the annual emissions of the rising nations should be limited. According to Merkel, this became clear in the commitments of those countries in increasing energy efficiency. However, by 2020 at the latest, the rising nations would also need to set reduction targets. Otherwise, the overall goal would not be reached. Furthermore, Merkel argued that alongside financing mechanisms, the transfer of technology was also needed in order to manage climate change. (Merkel 17 Dec 2009a.)

The Chancellor also pointed out that a mandate and timetable for a legally binding agreement should be agreed on in Copenhagen (Ibid). She stated that the climate
agreement was a global agreement as climate change could only be managed globally:


However, people should, according to Merkel, be ready to change their lifestyles. Hence, technologies and renewable energies were important. It was important to have a common understanding on the possibility of acting together: alone, it was not possible to tackle climate change. (Merkel 17 Dec 2009b.)

The Chancellor maintained that the 40 per cent commitment that was set for 2020 was an ambitious target for Germany. She argued that Germany must prepare its energy and economic policy, as well as its private sector, for the future accordingly:


Merkel viewed that there was a controversy in energy policy and that controversy surrounded nuclear energy. It was, therefore, also important to set a concrete goal to make the renewable energies future sources of energy supply. In this respect, there were, according to Merkel, many problems ahead. (Merkel 23 Nov 2009.) She viewed German nuclear policy to be controversial with regards to the goals and commitments agreed on for the climate sector. Furthermore, the economic aspects played an increasing role. The problems and challenges relating to this complex
equation of environmental, economic and security considerations may have affected Merkel’s belief in accepting risks (1-3): internationally, linked to the climate negotiations, she was not ready to take risks and wanted, rather, to reduce them i.e. by increasing the share of renewable energies. However, nationally she may have started to gradually become more aware of risks she would have to take in terms of the economy, German constituents, as well as environmental organisations, in order to be able to pursue rational energy policy.

*The Concept of ‘Nachhaltigkeit’ Guiding German Policy-making*

After the Copenhagen Climate Conference, Merkel stated that the results were not satisfactory:

‘Wir wissen einerseits: Kopenhagen und seine Ergebnisse waren nicht zufriedenstellend. Auf der anderen Seite haben wir ein Ergebnis, das hoffen lässt: 120 Staaten haben sich inzwischen mit dem so genannten Kopenhagen-Accord assoziiert. Diese 120 Staaten repräsentieren 80 Prozent der weltweiten CO2-Emissionen. Wir haben dadurch zum ersten Mal einen Überblick, was im Rahmen der verpflichtenden und der freiwilligen Maßnahmen bis zum Jahr 2050 möglich zu sein scheint.’ (Merkel 2 May 2010.)

However, there was a result which, according to Merkel, indicated some hope: 120 states, representing 80 per cent of the worldwide CO2 emissions associated themselves with the so-called Copenhagen Accord, and, thereby, there was an overview about what could be possible to achieve in the framework of binding and voluntary measures by 2050. However, the two-degree target was still quite far away:

‘[…] wir von der Erfüllung des Zwei-Grad-Ziels, dem sich ja sehr, sehr viele verpflichtet fühlen, also des Ziels, nicht mehr als zwei Grad Klimaerwärmung bis 2050 zu haben, doch noch ein ganzes Stück entfernt sind. […] wird die Aufgabe darin bestehen, bei dem jetzt Erreichten immer wieder zu überlegen, wie wir unsere
Merkel underlined the importance of sharpening and shaping the goal to be more efficient and ambitious. According to her, industrialised countries were ready to undertake new and ambitious commitments. She also discussed whether all of these countries had the same measuring methods and urged everyone to learn how it would be possible to quantify improvements made in energy efficiency. (Merkel 2 May 2010.)

Merkel stressed that the two-degree target was her goal for the new climate agreement. However, she viewed that there was no point in discussing theory the whole time without starting to act:


Therefore, alongside the top-down process of a two-degree target, bottom-up projects should begin to emerge, which could give others confidence that climate protection could be translated into action (Merkel 2 May 2010). During her second term office, after the financial crisis, Merkel started to emphasise deeds. As the multilateral climate negotiations did not seem to advance, Merkel started to reframe cooperation to be understood in a more pragmatic way by emphasising bottom-up processes and creating the possibility for regional projects, which could further the finding of common understanding and reaching an agreement on climate issues on a multilateral level. Thus, although the main goal was to reach a multilateral agreement and to start to act globally, national and regional projects,
including bilateral and groups of countries working for the same goal in a region, also became ever more desirable.

Merkel discussed how to move from short-term approaches towards a more long-term view. She saw the year 2050 as important in respect to Nachhaltigkeit, especially in climate policy, and stressed that the sooner the course was set correctly, the easier it would be to carry through with necessary changes. However, Nachhaltigkeit did not only refer to environmental policy, it had also become a permanent idea in finance and social policy:

‘[…] Das Thema Nachhaltigkeit durchzieht inzwischen nicht nur den Bereich der Umweltpolitik, […] Nachhaltigkeit ist von der Finanzpolitik bis zur Sozialpolitik ein durchgehender Gedanke geworden […]’ (Merkel 27 Sep 2010.)

Merkel maintained that Nachhaltigkeit, sustainability, could be seen as a synonym for top technological performances and the model of Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft, which did not rely on short-term successes:

‘Nun aber zurück zu den nationalen Herausforderungen und zur “Nachhaltigkeit made in Germany” – das gilt natürlich auch als Synonym für technologische Spitzenleistungen, das gilt für das Modell der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft, das immer ein Modell ist, das nicht nur auf kurzfristige Erfolge setzt […] Viele Jahre lang war Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft als gesellschaftliches Modell international nicht besonders anerkannt, weil sie als langsam, als träge und als schwierig durchzusetzen galt, was die gesamten Partnerschaften zwischen Arbeitnehmern und Arbeitgebern betrifft […] Inzwischen reüssiert sie in der internationalen Diskussion; und ich glaube, wir deutschen können stolz darauf sein.’ (Merkel 23 Nov 2009.)

Merkel explained that for many years, Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft as society model, did not receive special recognition internationally as it was seen as slow, stagnant and hard to establish in reference to partnerships between employees and employers. However, in the current international discussions, the social market economy was successful, and, according to Merkel, the Germans could be proud of it. (Merkel 23 Nov 2009.)
For Merkel, *Nachhaltigkeit* also related to finance policies. Therefore, Germany had introduced ‘Schuldenbremse’, a debt brake, into the German constitution of 2016:

‘[…] Beispiel für angewandte Nachhaltigkeitspolitik ist die Finanzpolitik. Wir haben dadurch, dass wir die Schuldenbremse in unserem Grundgesetz verankert haben, das verfassungsrechtliche Gebot, ab dem Jahr 2016 als Bund nur noch in einem sehr kleinen Maße Neuverschuldung zu haben. […] Das ist angesichts unserer demografischen Probleme notwendig, aber es wird von uns noch sehr viel Kraftanstrengung verlangen, dies auch wirklich umzusetzen.’ (Merkel 27 Sep 2010.)

Considering Germany’s demographic problems, the introduction of the debt brake was necessary, but it would, according to Merkel, require a lot of effort in order to implement it. Merkel spoke about the sustainable economy and also linked *Nachhaltigkeit* to welfare:


According to Merkel, sustainability and welfare were seen as absolute opposites in many countries. She pointed out that the task was to define welfare as a result of the sustainable economy and to make clear that welfare was the goal. Here, she saw *Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft* as an excellent fundamental. Merkel stressed that the sustainable economy did not only mean resource efficiency. It also had much to do with demographic change:


Merkel argued that it was important to see education, participation, incl. migration, as ‘big themes’ in order to be able to conduct future economic activities in a
sustainable manner. Merkel saw that business should also take social responsibility: to this end, there was a national Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy. (Merkel 27 Sep 2010.)

The idea of Nachhaltigkeit was also included in German development policy. Merkel emphasised ‘Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe’, assistance for helping oneself, as the guiding principle in order to get people in the developing countries to learn independent economic management and to produce foodstuff:

‘[…] Aber es geht vor allem um Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe. Deshalb hat Nachhaltigkeit global etwas damit zu tun, dass wir uns darum kümmern, dass Menschen sozusagen nicht immer in Hilfsbedürftigkeit gehalten werden, sondern eigenständiges Wirtschaften und das Erzeugen von Nahrungsmitteln erlernen. […]’ (Merkel 27 Sep 2010.)

According to Merkel, it was also important to link economic development and climate protection. She viewed that with the transfer of technology, it was possible to achieve a great deal:

‘Immer wieder ist es wichtig, dass wir Wirtschaftsentwicklung und Klimaschutz zusammen sehen […]. […] Ich glaube, dass wir durch Technologietransfer viel erreichen können. Ich glaube, dass wir über die Finanzierungszusagen sprechen müssen. […] Wir müssen konkrete Projekte entwickeln. […]’ (Merkel 2 May 2010.)

Merkel stressed that here, financial commitments should be discussed and concrete projects should be developed in order to manage economic and environmental linkages. Merkel pointed out that states facing poverty saw linkages between combating poverty and climate protection. Therefore, Germany would take measures and participate with projects in those fields:

‘[…] gerade die Länder, die Armut als wesentliches Problem ihrer täglichen Arbeit haben, sehen, dass Armutskämpfung und Klimaschutz durchaus Hand in Hand gehen können. Ich glaube, das ist auch ein ganz wichtiger Punkt. Deutschland ergreift viele praktische Maßnahmen und ist bei vielen Projekten dabei. […]’ (Merkel 2 May 2010.)
Merkel also wanted to take these linkages to a level of strategy. She argued that it was important to incorporate energy and financial policies, as well as global challenges such as food security, into a strategy of Nachhaltigkeit:

‘Ob Energie-, Finanzpolitik oder globale Herausforderungen wie die Ernährungssicherung – ich glaube, dass es wichtig ist, dass wir all das in einer Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie verankern. Deshalb werden wir auch Schritt für Schritt unsere fortgeschriebene Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie umsetzen. […]’ (Merkel 27 Sep 2010.)

The updated strategy of the Nachhaltigkeit would be gradually, ‘Schritt für Schritt’, implemented. Merkel viewed that the approach to quantifying and defining, by which indicators Nachhaltigkeit could be measured, made it possible to incorporate the idea of Nachhaltigkeit more concretely into society:

‘[…] Aber ich glaube, dass der Versuch der Quantifizierung und auch der Festlegung an welchen Indikatoren man Nachhaltigkeit messen kann, dazu beiträgt, dass der Nachhaltigkeitsgedanke, in der Gesellschaft auch konkreter verankert werden kann. […] Deshalb finde ich es gut, dass wir eine breite gesellschaftliche Diskussion haben. […] Wir wollen natürlich zeigen, welche Fortschritte wir erreicht haben und wie wir ein umfassendes Nachhaltigkeitsbild entstehen lassen. […] Nachhaltigkeit kann nicht nur auf Bundesebene erzeugt und erreicht werden, sondern das ist eine Aufgabe, die sich an alle richtet. Unser Ziel ist es, insbesondere mit den Ländern die Zusammenarbeit weiter auszubauen. […]’ (Merkel 27 Sep 2010.)

Thus, Merkel saw it as a good thing that there was a wide societal discussion. She stressed that Germany wanted to show what kind of progress it had achieved and how this comprehensive image of Nachhaltigkeit had emerged. She pointed out, however, that Nachhaltigkeit could not be created and carried out at the federal level only: the goal was to develop cooperation with the Länder as well. (Merkel 27 Sep 2010.)

Thus, during her second term, Merkel’s belief in realising the fundamental values (P-2) as well as exercising power internationally (P-4) reinforced. The concept of Nachhaltigkeit was created as a tool to disseminate German ideas and values
internationally. However, Merkel also emphasised the need to disseminate and implement the internationally spreading German concept of Nachhaltigkeit at the national level as well. After all, it was the domestic institutions, as well as the wider German public, which had to be persuaded, because with their support, she would be able to implement the reframed ideas more concretely into society and to create change.

Internationally, Merkel’s belief in the utility of cooperative strategies continued to remain high: she started to disseminate the idea of a global sustainable structure. She saw the Rio+20 Conference in 2012, at the level of heads of state and government, as a big opportunity to take an important step towards a world with a sustainable structure:


Therefore, Merkel proposed that a roadmap should be agreed on for the UN to be able to assist some states on the path towards a sustainable economy. In view of the rising economies and developing countries, the chances relating to resource and emissions saving developments in their own economy should be worked on. (Merkel 27 Sep 2010.)

Merkel also pointed out that the institutions within the UN, where sustainable policies were formulated, should be reconsidered and reorganized. According to her, here, reform was overdue. She stressed that the institutions should be adjusted to meet the requirements of the 21st century:
Merkel underlined that within the UN, international environmental protection should be raised to the same rank with other policy sectors. She viewed that a powerful environmental organisation, placed in Africa, would meet this requirement. (Merkel 27 Sep 2010.)

Towards the Era of Renewables: New German Energy Concept Launched

In September 2010, Merkel launched the new German energy concept. The concept would describe how the era of renewable energies could be reached in Germany:

‘[…] Wir werden beschreiben, wie wir das Zeitalter der erneuerbaren Energien in Deutschland erreichen können. Es geht jetzt von der Vision zu einer realen Perspektive über, die Schritt für Schritt erobert wird. Das erfordert Umdenken […] In diesem Zusammenhang haben wir alles darangesetzt, ein rationales Energiekonzept aufzulegen, das von den heute vorhandenen Energieträgern ausgeht und darauf ausgerichtet ist, die erneuerbaren Energien zielstrebig zum zentralen Baustein der Energieversorgung der Zukunft zu machen.’ (Merkel 27 Sep 2010.)

The new energy concept would contribute to maintaining Germany’s status as an industrial base. Merkel described that it was about proceeding ‘Schritt für Schritt’ from a vision to a real perspective but this required rethinking. Merkel stressed that everything had been set out to formulate a rational energy concept, which
proceeded from the currently existing energy sources by making renewables a goal-oriented cornerstone of the German future energy supply. (Merkel 27 Sep 2010.)

Merkel stated that the reduction targets of the energy concept would include a 40 per cent national reduction of the CO2 emissions by 2020. With this target, Germany would also be a forerunner in the EU. The target of reducing 80 per cent of CO2 emissions by 2050 was viewed by Merkel as ambitious. It required rethinking and new technologies. She stated the conventional energy sources were assigned a bridge function:

‘Wir glauben, dass wir bei den konventionellen Energieträgern eine Brückenfunktion haben. Wir beschreiben diese Brückenfunktion für die Kernenergie in diesem Energiekonzept sehr klar. Es wird auch eine Brückenfunktion für die Energieträger Kohle und Gas auf lange Zeit geben. Ich glaube, dass wir diese Energieträger noch eine geraume Weile brauchen werden; auch das gehört zur Realität. […]’ (Merkel 27 Sep 2010.)

Merkel stated that the bridge function of nuclear energy had been clearly described in the concept. Further, coal and gas would be ascribed this role for the long term, because the reality was that these energy sources would still be needed for some time. (Merkel 27 Sep 2010.)

The energy concept also included investments as new infrastructure and storage technologies were needed. According to Merkel, investments should also be made in the research sector:

‘[…] Wir brauchen neue Infrastrukturen. Wir brauchen neue Speichertechnologien; auch das ist nicht trivial. Da muss viel in Forschung investiert werden. […] Wir müssen auch die Gefühle und die Herzen der Menschen erreichen. Aber ohne neue Infrastruktur, ohne neue Hochspannungsleitungen wird es nicht geben. […]’ (Merkel 27 Sep 2010.)
Persuasion was also needed and from Merkel’s point of view, the emotions and hearts of people should be reached. But not at any cost: infrastructure and power lines were necessary. (Merkel 27 Sep 2010.)

9.2.4. Fukushima Nuclear Catastrophe and Its Consequences: The Accelerated Transition to Renewables

Transition to Renewables Should Be Accelerated, Societal Consensus Important

The Fukushima nuclear catastrophe in March 2011 caused shock all over world and raised mixed emotions, which Merkel described as horror, bewilderment, compassion and sorrow. During the crisis, Merkel assured the victims that Germany would support Japan and its people:

‘Was uns angesichts all dieser Berichte und Bilder, die wir seit letztem Freitag sehen und zu verstehen versuchen, erfüllt, das sind Entsetzen, Fassungslosigkeit, Mitgefühl und Trauer. […] In dieser Stunde schwerster Prüfung steht Deutschland an der Seite Japans. Was immer wir tun können, um den Menschen in Japan bei der Bewältigung dieser schier unfassbaren Katastrophe zu helfen, das werden wir weiter tun. […]’ (Merkel 17 Mar 2011.)

Until Fukushima, Merkel spoke about conducting rational energy policy on which the new energy concept was also based on. The Fukushima catastrophe and the emotions it raised were increasing the likelihood that there would be consequences in the near future, this for an issue which has always been assessed on an emotional basis in Germany, namely nuclear energy.
Merkel explained that the Fukushima catastrophe changed the view about which risks could be accepted in energy production. Therefore, the implementation of the new German energy concept, agreed on in autumn 2010, would be expedited: the era of renewables should be reached faster:

‘Es hat sich in der Tat die Frage, welche Risiken wir im Zusammenhang mit der Energiegewinnung eingehen wollen, durch die Vorgänge in Fukushima noch einmal gewandelt. Wir werden deshalb unser Energiekonzept beschleunigt umsetzen. […]’
(Merkel 2 May 2011.)

Merkel underlined the importance of an energy mix. She proposed that renewable energies would be promoted and that other forms of energy production were needed as bridge sources as Germany’s nuclear phase-out was accelerated decisively:

‘Wir werden weiter einen Energiemix brauchen. Es wird jetzt darauf ankommen, sehr klug die erneuerbaren Energien voranzubringen, aber nicht zu vergessen, dass wir andere Formen der Energieerzeugung für eine Überbrückungszeit brauchen, wenngleich der Ausstieg aus der Kernenergie […] deutlich beschleunigt werden soll. […] Wir werden auch noch lernen müssen, wie wir die verschiedenen Arten der erneuerbaren Energien sinnvoll und intelligent miteinander verquicken um damit eine Annäherung an die Grundlastfähigkeit zu erreichen.’
(Merkel 2 May 2011.)

She stressed that it was important to learn to combine different forms of renewable energy sources in order to reach an approximation of the base load capacity. In Germany’s energy concept, energy efficiency would remain important. Storage technologies were also necessary for this undertaking. (Merkel 2 May 2011.)

Merkel stated that there were problems that had to be accepted such as the production and expansion of the grids. She pointed out that there was a need for a mentality in Germany, which could carry out the Energiewende and stressed the importance of everybody’s contribution and overall societal consensus for the Energiewende.
She held the view that there was the readiness across party lines to take this path:

‘[…] Es gibt eine Bereitschaft, über Parteigrenzen hinweg diesen Weg zu gehen und alles Notwendige dafür zu tun. Dazu gehört immer wieder die Akzeptanz der Bürgerinnen und Bürger […] Lassen Sie uns, wenn wir dieses Neuland betreten, miteinander als Gesellschaft lernen. […]’ (Merkel 2 May 2011.)

This also included the acceptance of German citizens. Merkel appealed to the German public by asking society to learn as a whole from this new path (Merkel 2 May 2011). Merkel knew that in the aftermath of the Fukushima catastrophe, the wider German public and the parties were quite easily persuaded behind the Energiewende by appealing to the emotions of the public.

Merkel maintained that the question of how German society would organise its energy supply, had alongside the material, economic and environmental dimension, an ethical dimension as well:

‘[…] Ich glaube nämlich, dass die Frage, wie wir in unserer Gesellschaft die Energieversorgung organisieren, neben der materiellen Dimension, der wirtschaftlichen Dimension und der Dimension der Umweltverträglichkeit auch eine ethische Dimension hat. […] es geht um die Frage, wie wir mit einem elementaren Bereich einer Industriegesellschaft umgehen, nämlich der Energieversorgung, und was das für den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt bedeuten kann.’ (Merkel 24 May 2011.)

According to Merkel, there were now two questions involved: how can an industrialised country manage its energy supply and what does this mean for societal cohesion (Merkel 24 May 2011). The real challenge for Merkel was to find justifications vis-à-vis economic viewpoints and to rally the German economy and
industry behind the Energiewende. Finding justifications after a hard-hitting financial crisis was of importance, because it would be decisive for whether Germany would be able to maintain its position as a successful industrialised country.

For this purpose, Merkel used issue linkages. She linked growth and welfare and discussed their quantitative and qualitative measurement:

‘[…] Die Frage von Wachstum und Wohlstand bedarf einer neuen Messung. […] Eine neue, alternative Wohlstandsmessung zu entwickeln, das ist […] ein nicht ausreichend gelöstes Thema. […] wenn wir über zukünftiges Wachstum sprechen. Das hat qualitative Anteile, und diese qualitativen Anteile müssen viel stärker herausgearbeitet werden. […]’ (Merkel 24 May 2011.)

According to Merkel, questions of growth and welfare needed new measurements. The development of a new, alternative measurement of welfare was not a sufficiently resolved issue. Future growth should include qualitative parts, which should increasingly be put into practice. (Merkel 24 May 2011.)

Merkel continued using linkages as she persuaded with the concept of Nachhaltigkeit, its future orientation and how people had ‘Schritt für Schritt’ started to understand its deeper meaning:

‘Nachhaltigkeit als Leitbild führt uns aus der reinen Fixierung auf die Gegenwart heraus. Es verlangt von uns eine aktive Auseinandersetzung mit möglichen Chancen oder auch Gefahren, die vor uns liegen. […]’ (Merkel 24 May 2011.)

She viewed Nachhaltigkeit as a guiding principle that would lead people away from sheer fixation to the present. It required an active dispute with the possible chances and also dangers, which might lie ahead. (Merkel 24 May 2011.) Merkel viewed there was the need for finding a balance between environmental protection, economic performance and social responsibility with which the guiding principle of Nachhaltigkeit was composed:

‘[…] Das bedarf eines tragfähigen Gleichgewichts zwischen Umweltschutz, wirtschaftlicher Leistungsfähigkeit und sozialer Verantwortung. Das sind die drei
Punkte, die wir miteinander in Einklang bringen müssen. Das Leitbild der Nachhaltigkeit setzt sich daraus zusammen.’ (Merkel 24 May 2011.)

_Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft_ also combined these three ideas, and Merkel viewed that it had a major role to play in reference to energy policy:

‘[…]

Das ist ja genau das, was in unser Denken einfließen muss, nämlich dass so, wie Soziales und Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft zusammengehören, eben auch Umweltschutz und Wirtschaftlichkeit gemeinsam gedacht werden können. Dieser Gedanke spielt jetzt auch gerade im Zusammenhang mit der Energiepolitik eine große Rolle.’ (Merkel 24 May 2011.)

Merkel pointed out that there was a sector in which the minister for environment must fight: energy efficiency:

‘[…]


According to Merkel, it might be hard and conflictual to establish the better use of energy efficiency because of the dominating anxieties. Therefore, the chances were not seen enough. However, Merkel continued pointing out that the society could act environmentally appropriately and friendly as well as resource-efficiently, however, it should get involved with these issues. (Merkel 24 May 2011.)

_‘Fukushima hat meine Haltung zur Kernenergie verändert’ – An Industrialised Country’s ‘Sonderweg’ toward Future Energy Production?_

Three months after the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe, Chancellor Merkel presented a new architecture for German energy supply. She described the
Fukushima catastrophe as a turning point internationally, as well as personally, for the Chancellor:

‘Ohne Zweifel, die dramatischen Ereignisse in Japan sind ein Einschnitt für die Welt. Sie waren ein Einschnitt auch für mich ganz persönlich. […] Wer das erkennt, muss die notwendigen Konsequenzen ziehen. Wer das erkennt, muss eine neue Bewertung vornehmen. Deshalb sage ich für mich: Ich habe eine neue Bewertung vorgenommen; denn das Restrisiko der Kernenergie kann nur der akzeptieren, der überzeugt ist, dass es nach menschlichem Ermessen nicht eintritt. […]’ (Merkel 9 Jun 2011.)

According to Merkel, if one experienced this type of a turning point, one should make a new assessment and take action. Further, Merkel made this new assessment: the remaining risk of nuclear energy could only be accepted when one was confident that those risks would not be realised. (Merkel 9 Jun 2011.) Merkel maintained that if nuclear risks were realised, then the spatial and temporal consequences would be so devastating and far-reaching that they would have exceeded the risks of all other energy sources:

‘[…] Wenn es aber eintritt, dann sind die Folgen sowohl räumlicher als auch in zeitlicher Dimension so verheerend und so weitreichend, dass sie die Risiken aller anderen Energieträger bei weitem übertreffen. Das Restrisiko der Kernenergie habe ich vor Fukushima akzeptiert, weil ich überzeugt war, dass in einem Hochtechnologieland mit hohen Sicherheitsstandards nach menschlichem Ermessen nicht eintritt. […]’ (Merkel 9 Jun 2011.)

Merkel explained that before Fukushima catastrophe, she was ready to accept the remaining risks of nuclear energy, because she was confident that in a high technology country with high security standards, those risks would not be realised (Merkel 9 Jun 2011).

Although the reactions to Fukushima catastrophe were very emotional, Merkel stressed the rationality behind the energy policy decisions: the political decisions were based on risk assessments and probability analyses:
‘[…] Es geht um die Verlässlichkeit von Risikoannahmen und um die Verlässlichkeit von Wahrscheinlichkeitsanalysen. Denn diese Analysen bilden die Grundlage, auf der die Politik Entscheidungen treffen muss, Entscheidungen für eine zuverlässige, bezahlbare, umweltverträgliche, also sichere Energieversorgung in Deutschland. […] So sehr ich mich im Herbst letzten Jahres im Rahmen unseres umfassenden Energiekonzepts auch für die Verlängerung der Laufzeiten der deutschen Kernkraftwerke eingesetzt habe, so unmissverständlich stelle ich heute vor diesem Haus fest, Fukushima hat meine Haltung zur Kernenergie verändert.’ (Merkel 9 Jun 2011.)

In extending the lifespans of nuclear power plants as part of the new German energy concept agreed on in 2010, Merkel emphasised the importance of making rational energy policy decisions. Less than a year after, Merkel again referred to the rationality of phasing-out Germany’s nuclear power plants and highlighted that these decisions would contribute to a reliable, affordable and environmentally sound energy supply in Germany. ‘Fukushima changed my position on nuclear energy’, Merkel stated and referred to the safety aspects of nuclear energy:

‘Vor diesem Hintergrund hat die Bundesregierung die Reaktor-Sicherheitskommission beauftragt, in den vergangenen drei Monaten alle deutschen Kernkraftwerke einer umfassenden Sicherheitsprüfung zu unterziehen. Darüber hinaus hat die Bundesregierung eine Ethik-Kommission zur sicheren Energieversorgung ins Leben gerufen. […]’ (Merkel 9 Jun 2011.)

The Chancellor explained that in the past three months, the federal government had mandated a Reactor Safety Commission (Reaktor-Sicherheitskommission) to make a comprehensive safety inspection of all German nuclear power plants. Furthermore, the federal government had initiated an Ethics Commission (Ethik-Kommission) for secure energy supply. (Merkel 9 Jun 2011.)

Thus, Merkel justified the phasing-out of nuclear energy with safety risks and rational energy policy decision-making. During her second term in office, Merkel’s belief in taking international risks (I-3) was gradually reducing. However, nationally, Merkel was taking political risks relating to changing German energy policies. As
the energy concept was agreed on in 2010, nuclear energy was seen as a bridge energy source, as a means, for reaching the era of renewables. German commitments in reference to international climate goals could be retained. The use of nuclear power was also justified from the security and economic aspects of supporting German industry and increasing the exports of different types of German technology. On the other hand, the wider German public, had historically already been against the use of nuclear energy and now, after the Fukushima accident, was emotionally exhausted and supported the decisions made on the phase-out. Thus, Merkel was taking a national political risk, one way or the other: by extending the lifespans of the nuclear power plants or by phasing them out.

Merkel underlined that the federal government’s decisions on eight draft laws and regulations were based on the work of the Reactor Safety Commission and Ethics Commission. Thereby, the federal government was taking action and driving forth the future architecture of the German energy supply:


Although the laws and regulations were in the drafting phase, it seemed that Merkel started gradually to believe in deeds instead of mere words (I-4b).

Merkel presented the future architecture of German energy supply with five points. Firstly, the nuclear law would be revised, which would end the use of nuclear energy in Germany by 2022:

‘[… ] Das Atomgesetz wird novelliert. Damit wird bis 2022 die Nutzung der Kernenergie in Deutschland beendet. Die während des dreimonatigen Moratoriums abgeschalteten sieben ältesten deutschen Kernkraftwerke und das seit längerem stillstehende Kraftwerk Krümmel werden nicht wieder ans Netz gehen. Für die
Stilllegung der weiteren Kernkraftwerke haben wir einen Stufenplan beschlossen. […]’ (Merkel 9 Jun 2011.)

Merkel reported that altogether eight nuclear power plants would no longer be brought on stream and that there was a step-by-step plan for the shutdown of the other power plants (Merkel 9 Jun 2011).

Merkel’s second point concerned the permanent disposal of nuclear waste. She stated that by the end of the year, there would be a legal proposition for a regulation. In order to secure the energy supply, especially the stability of the electricity grids, according to Merkel’s third point, adequate fossil reserve capacities of the power plant parks should be available. (Merkel 9 Jun 2011.)

In her fourth point, Merkel repeated the goals of the German energy concept agreed on in autumn 2010:


She pointed out that with this energy concept Germany wanted to reach the era of the renewable energies and, to this end, it formulated ambitious goals. The renewables should be made the central pillar of the future energy supply. She stressed that the concept, as well as its implementation, would remain valid:

‘[…] Dieses Konzept bleibt gültig, genauso wie die Umsetzung dieses Konzepts. Aber erreichen können wir diese Ziele nur durch einen tiefgreifenden Um-bau unserer Energieversorgung, durch neue Strukturen und den Einsatz modernster Technologie, denn die Leistungsfähigkeit unserer Industrie in Deutschland ist ein hohes Gut. […] Deshalb steigen wir nicht einfach aus der Kernkraft aus, sondern
Merkel maintained that the goals of the energy concept could only be reached by a profound transformation of the energy supply, with new structures and the use of the most modern technology. The productivity of the German industry was important. Therefore, Germany was not only phasing-out nuclear energy, but rather creating preconditions for future energy supply. (Merkel 9 Jun 2011.)

For Merkel, the logic behind the phase-out was clear: ‘Wer A sagt, muss auch B sagen’, one could not have the one without the other:

‘[…] “Wer A sagt, muss auch B sagen”, wissen wir auch dass das eine, nämlich der Ausstieg, ohne das andere, nämlich den Umstieg, nicht zu haben ist. […] Es führt daher kein Weg daran vorbei, die Stromnetze in ganz Deutschland zu modernisieren und auszubauen. […] Hier müssen wir eine erhebliche Beschleunigung und gleichzeitig mehr Akzeptanz erreichen. Es kann nicht angehen, auf der einen Seite den Ausstieg aus der Kernenergie gar nicht schnell genug bekommen zu wollen, auf der anderen Seite aber eine Protestaktion nach der anderen gegen den Netzausbau zu starten, ohne den der Umstieg in die erneuerbaren Energien aber schlichtweg nicht funktionieren wird. […]’ (Merkel 9 Jun 2011.)

Merkel stressed that electricity grids should be modernised and developed faster and they should gain more acceptance. She stated that it was not possible to support the phase-out and protest against the expansion of the grids, without which the transition to the renewables would not succeed. (Merkel 9 Jun 2011.)

Merkel underlined the action taken by the federal government in this respect by presenting the draft of a law ‘Netzausbaubeschleunigungsgesetz’, to advance extra high tension power lines and the amendment of a law, ‘Energiewirtschaftsgesetz’, which would include regulation for the accelerated expansion of the grids. Merkel pointed out that new electricity generation capacities, such as wind, sun and biomass, were also needed. The guiding principles here were cost efficiency and market orientation. Merkel argued that the amendment of the law ‘Erneuerbare-Energien-
Gesetz would serve those goals. (Ibid.) By emphasising different laws, Merkel could demonstrate that the reframed ideas and policy positions were now gradually taken to the level of action (I-4b).

Merkel also viewed that the influencing of others at the EU level with Germany’s reframed ideas was of importance. She stressed that German companies and citizens should be provided with affordable electricity. Therefore, renewables should be made ready for the market. Merkel stressed that in reference to businesses with high-energy consumption, subsidies were needed to compensate for the emissions trading conditioned price increase of electricity. Here, according to Merkel, the federal government would do everything possible to maintain fair competition conditions for German companies. (Merkel 9 Jun 2011.)

Merkel saw that measures for increasing renewable energies and expanding the grids were inadequate if energy efficiency was not increased. Thereby, the construction sector was of importance:

‘[…] Alle noch so ehrgeizigen Maßnahmen für den Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien und der dafür erforderlichen Netze werden nicht ausreichen, wenn es nicht gelingt, die Energieeffizienz in unserem Land zu steigern. Im Zentrum steht dabei der Gebäudebereich. […] Auf europäischer Ebene werden wir uns für anspruchsvolle Produktstandards im Rahmen eines sogenannten Top-Runner-Ansatzes einsetzen. Energieeffizienz soll nicht nur in Deutschland, sondern auch in Europa ein neues Markenzeichen werden.’ (Merkel 9 Jun 2011.)

Merkel promoted the so-called ‘Top-Runner’ approach at the European level and pointed out that energy efficiency should become a trademark not only in Germany but also in the whole of Europe (Merkel 9 Jun 2011).

Merkel also stressed that if Germany wanted to phase-out nuclear energy and enter the era of renewables faster, fossil power plants were necessary for the transition period:
According to Merkel, a framework for high efficient coal and gas power plants would be further developed. She pointed out that with a draft of an amendment to a law ‘Kraft-Wärme-Kopplungs-Gesetz’ (German Combined Heat and Power Act), Germany would contribute to the security of supply and efficiency of generating electricity. Furthermore, power plant capacities would be further developed with the law ‘Planungsbeschleunigungsgesetz’ (Planning Acceleration Act). (Merkel 9 Jun 2011.)

Merkel’s fifth and final point discussed the establishment of a complete monitoring process. Thereby, it was possible to control, whether the goals had been achieved and what could be done further, if these goals seemed to fail. Therefore, the federal government would, according to Merkel, undertake an annual review and present it to the German Bundestag. (Ibid.) It was important for Merkel to also persuade domestic institutions such as the Bundestag and create a wide, national understanding, because, otherwise, opposition movements to Merkel’s policy change may start to emerge and the larger opposition parties might use those opposing voices to their own advantage.

Merkel viewed the ‘Energiewende’ as a Herculean task:

She stressed that the federal government and the opposition, the *Bund* and the *Länder*, as well as society as a whole, could together combine ethical responsibility with economic success. This was a joint German responsibility. (Merkel 9 Jun 2011.) This shows how important Merkel believed that the overall societal consensus on the energy policy was; alongside the federal level, including the opposition parties, the *Länder* and wider public should be persuaded to get behind the actions taken.

‘Nachhaltigkeit’ Becomes Intelligible Both Internationally and Nationally; The German Strategy of ‘Nachhaltigkeit’ in Four Central Concepts

In 2011, Chancellor Merkel again discussed the concept of *Nachhaltigkeit* comprehensively. She was pleased that it had gradually become intelligible in society, both internationally and nationally:

‘[…] Nachhaltigkeit […]. […] Das Wort beginnt sich in der Gesellschaft langsam verständlich zu machen […]. […] Es ist erfreulich, dass das Verständnis und das Interesse gewachsen sind, aber es ist natürlich immer noch eine riesige Aufgabe, denn wir werden dem Gebot der Nachhaltigkeit weltweit, aber auch bei uns zu Hause längst nicht an allen Orten und zu allen Zeiten gerecht. Nachhaltigkeit und die Ausfüllung dieses Begriffs bedeuten mit Sicherheit, dass wir über den Tellerrand blicken und uns heute bereits mit den Fragen von morgen beschäftigen müssen. […]’ (Merkel 20 Jun 2011.)

However, there was work to be done and Merkel maintained that the concept and meaning of *Nachhaltigkeit* implied that one should see the bigger picture and discuss the questions of the future. Merkel was confident that there was a chance to embed the strategy of *Nachhaltigkeit* among young people and to encounter a new type of thinking. The point was to frequently develop new goals and visions of the future:

‘[…] Ich glaube, gerade in der jungen Generation haben wir viele, viele Chancen, die Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie breit zu verankern und unter den jungen Leuten auf neues
Merkel stressed that Germany should contribute, with its skills and capabilities, in order to continue to be one of the forerunners in the sustainability sector:


Merkel pointed out that Germany was economically one of the most capable countries in the world. Germany also belonged to the leading industrialised countries. According to Merkel, Germany was able to overcome the international financial and economic crisis because of its societal cohesion. She saw Germany as a country of ideas. (Merkel 20 Jun 2011.) This indicates how the Chancellor was constantly reframing the concept of Nachhaltigkeit according to her own learning and, as a consequence of external events, disseminating it both internationally and nationally.

The progress report on the strategy on Nachhaltigkeit displayed by the federal government, aimed at agreeing on further steps. The report listed four key concepts relating to the concept of Nachhaltigkeit: intergenerational justice, quality of living, social cohesion and international responsibility:

‘Deshalb dient der Fortschrittsbericht zur Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie, den die Bundesregierung aufliegt, dazu, weitere Schritte zu vereinbaren. […] Der Fortschrittsbericht enthält im Grunde vier Leitbegriffe. Der erste ist der Begriff der Generationengerechtigkeit, der zweite der Lebensqualität, der dritte der des sozialen Zusammenhalts und der vierte der internationalen Verantwortung. […]’ (Merkel 20 Jun 2011.)
Intergenerational justice, according to Merkel, related to solid fiscal policy. Merkel stressed that it was important to make sure that fiscal policy was sustainable. She took the view that in this respect, placing the *Schuldenbremse* into the German constitution was the right course of action to take. In addition, intergenerational justice referred to the use of resources: no generation should consume more than they could regenerate. Merkel viewed that this meant that there was a lot of work to be done in combining ecology and economy as well as economy and social balance. She also discussed the use of resources in reference to energy policy:

‘Wir […] werden die erneuerbaren Energien zu einer tragenden Säule unserer Gesamtenergieversorgung machen. Das erfordert Speichermöglichkeiten, das erfordert eine Kombination von erneuerbaren Energieversorgungseinrichtungen, das erfordert auch das Nachdenken über Effizienz, das erfordert vor allen Dingen einen schnelleren Ausbau einer erneuerten Infrastruktur. […] Ich hoffe, dass angesichts dieser Tatsachen auch ein Konsens über das Wie der neuen Energieerzeugung erreicht werden kann […] und nicht nur über die Tatsache, was wir alles nicht wollen. […]’ (Merkel 20 Jun 2011.)

Merkel stated that Germany would make renewables the fundamental pillar of its overall energy supply. It required storage facilities, a combination of renewable energies, the considering of efficiency and rebuilding infrastructure. She urged for a consensus on how the new energy supply could be reached and not on the questions that were not wanted. (Merkel 20 Jun 2011.)

The second concept of the German strategy of *Nachhaltigkeit* discussed the quality of life. Merkel cited Ludwig Erhard, the father of the concept of *Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft*, who viewed that welfare was a basis but not a guiding principle of the way of life as such:

‘[…] Ich beginne mit einem erstaunlichen Zitat von Ludwig Erhard, der geschrieben hat, „dass der Wohlstand wohl eine Grundlage, nicht aber das Leitbild unserer Lebensgestaltung schlechthin ist.“ […] Ich glaube, dass wir heute in der Phase der Entwicklung sind, in der der Wachstumsbegriff auch der Nachhaltigkeitsbegriff in sich aufnehmen muss, in dem wir dem klassischen Bruttolandprodukt oder Bruttosozialprodukt andere Indikatoren hinzufügen. […]’ (Merkel 20 Jun 2011.)
Merkel argued that in the current state of development, the concept of growth should include the concept of Nachhaltigkeit. Thus, alongside the GDP, growth should also be measured along with other indicators. (Merkel 20 Jun 2011.) Thus, Merkel continued linking economic and sustainability questions more strongly together and was creating the demand to also view growth from the qualitative point of view.

The third concept of the strategy of Nachhaltigkeit related to social cohesion. Merkel stressed that the concept of ‘Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft’ should include the concept of Nachhaltigkeit. She discussed the international financial and economic crisis and described how politics had built up bridges during that time. According to Merkel, the Germans had got it right. (Merkel 20 Jun 2011.)

The fourth and final concept included in the strategy of Nachhaltigkeit concerned international responsibility. Merkel maintained that development policy had a lot to do with the Nachhaltigkeit. She pointed out that the international goals relating to development aid’s share of the national GDP had not yet been reached:

‘[…]) Deshalb ist das Thema Entwicklungszusammenarbeit eines, das viel mit Nachhaltigkeit zu tun hat. Ich rede gar nicht darum herum: Die Ziele, die wir international eingegangen sind, was den Anteil der Entwicklungshilfe am Bruttoinlandsprodukt anbelangt, erreichen wir noch nicht. […] Aber ich glaube anderseits, dass unsere Art der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, wie wir sie auch immer wieder gestaltet haben, wirklich Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe ist und dass der Schwerpunkt einer vernünftigen Regierungsführung in den Ländern, denen wir Entwicklungszusammenarbeit anbieten, in den nächsten Jahren noch an Bedeutung gewinnen wird.’ (Merkel 20 Jun 2011.)

Merkel stressed that the German way of conducting development cooperation was ‘Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe’, aid for helping oneself. Over the coming years, the focus on reasonable governance would become more important in the countries, where development cooperation was conducted. (Merkel 20 Jun 2011.)
The strategy of *Nachhaltigkeit* was an important mean for Merkel in binding international developments relating to finance, economy, environment and development and German national concepts such as *Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft* and *Nachhaltigkeit* into a one strategy. This strategy was not only about listing guiding principles on how to act in the changed international circumstances but also persuading the German public with concepts, ideas and values they were familiar with and creating the grounds for a common societal understanding which would support Merkel’s reframed policy.

*Between Cancún and Durban – Deeds Necessary, Reframed Cooperation Becomes Visible in ‘Anpassungspartnerschaften’*

Merkel saw that there were still many challenges in the world: the financial and economic crisis had not yet been overcome and in Europe, some EU member states were indebted. However, according to Merkel, this did not mean that the threats of the climate change would have become unimportant. On the contrary, Merkel saw that the financial and economic crisis taught Germany that other sectors of politics should also be paid attention to. This meant that sustainable work was needed and the issues should be viewed in the long-term. Merkel discussed the difference between action and non-action:

‘[…] Es mag viele Gründe geben, warum Handeln sehr teuer und sehr mühselig zu sein scheint, aber es gibt noch mehr Gründe zu sagen: Nicht zu handeln kommt uns mit Sicherheit teurer. […]’ (Merkel 3 Jul 2011.)

She was certain that although action seemed to be expensive and cumbersome, non-action would be even more expensive (Merkel 3 Jul 2011). Thus, Merkel
continued to emphasise the need for action as it was lacking at the international level.

As Germany became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2011-2012, Merkel stated that during its one-month Presidency in July 2011, Germany would raise the risks of climate change onto the Council’s agenda. She also continued to emphasise the importance of a binding agreement:

‘[…] Klimawandel kennt keine Grenzen, er betrifft jedes Land. Deshalb bleibt das Ziel ein rechtlich verbindliches Abkommen, auch wenn wir wissen, wie schwer dieses Ziel zu erreichen ist.’ (Merkel 3 Jul 2011.)

Merkel pointed out that the two-degree target was ambitious, but the industrialised countries should provide an example. However, she repeated the position that the industrialised countries could not reach the two-degree target alone; the rising nations should also contribute according to the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. She viewed that Cancún was a good example of the first steps that have been taken in order to translate the responsibility into joint action. (Merkel 3 Jul 2011.)

Merkel continued to link different policies and to persuade internationally. She argued that economic development and climate protection should not be seen as oppositional. Therefore, the rising nations should simultaneously learn how to grow economically and develop sustainably. The industrialised countries, on the other hand, should learn to be able to ensure the level of the welfare with less use of resources and with goals formulated in terms of sustainability. (Ibid.) The linkages of different policies can be seen as a way of controlling international agendas and of persuading with ideas. Especially, as Germany took the seat as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, the Chancellor had the opportunity to start to show initiative, to set the international agenda and to
persuade with German ideas, linking different policies that were favourable for Germany.

Merkel argued that on the one hand, environmental, climate and resource protection set boundaries for economic intentions; but on the other hand, it made economic activities more future oriented:


According to Merkel, Fukushima led to a wider energy discussion and a real change in German energy supply. Germany wanted to show that it was possible to make things work without nuclear energy. She pointed out that above all, as an industrialised country, it was also about preserving welfare in the times of renewable energies. Merkel was confident that Germany could succeed at the ‘Energiewende’. However, it should be supported by the whole society: by the economy, environmental associations as well as by the population:

‘[…] Wir sind uns sicher, dass wir das schaffen können. Aber wir wissen auch, dass wir dafür noch viele Anstrengungen unternehmen müssen und dass dies nicht nur ein paar Politiker machen können, sondern dass dies eine Entwicklung sein muss, die von allen in der Gesellschaft getragen wird – von der Wirtschaft, von den Umweltverbänden, von der Bevölkerung. Deshalb gilt: Strom muss bezahlbar sein, Energie muss ausreichend verfügbar sein, die Energieversorgung muss umweltfreundlich gestaltet sein.’ (Merkel 3 Jul 2011.)

According to Merkel, the means for achieving the support were the following: electricity should be affordable, energy should be available and energy supply should be shaped by environmentally sound policy (Merkel 3 Jul 2011). This shows
that Merkel did not only link economic, environmental, energy and security aspects so that she would obtain more power for persuading other states internationally but also for persuading German society, the German economy in particular, to get behind her policies, which was crucial for creating a real change in German energy policy.

Merkel anticipated that no understanding could be reached at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Durban but she hoped that there could still be progress on some questions. Firstly, she stressed that there should be concrete reduction targets and everybody should engage more. Secondly, the institutions and instruments created in Cancún should be activated. Thirdly, there should be more transparency in the implementation of the commitments and a common measurement system. And fourthly, she called for a clear vision of the form and goal of the continuing negotiations. (Merkel 3 Jul 2011.)

The Chancellor repeated that Germany and the EU aimed for a legally binding agreement. She admitted that the German and European goals were ambitious. The share of renewable energies should be increased up to 60 per cent of the whole energy consumption and up to 80 per cent of electricity consumption by 2050. Furthermore, Merkel stated that Germany wanted to cut primary energy consumption in half. According to her, a new approach was necessary to achieve this goal because Germany wanted to remain an industrialised country. (Ibid.)

Merkel also expressed Germany’s target of cutting 40 per cent of its greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 compared to 1990. She stressed that this meant major efforts, both nationally and internationally, in strengthening bilateral cooperation in the low-carbon sector with partners from industrialised and developing countries as well as from the rising nations. Merkel pointed out that Germany was also
participating in the ‘Anpassungspartnerschaften’ of other cooperating groups of nations. Furthermore, Germany was forming global partnerships. According to Merkel, Germany would support projects on innovative energy technologies, energy efficiency as well as climate and environmental measures both internationally and nationally. (Ibid.) Gradually, the goal-oriented and pragmatic view of cooperation started to show in concrete partnerships, both bilateral and regional, all working towards the same goal.

International ‘Rohstoffpartnerschaften’ and Cooperation Between the Political and Economic Sectors

At the CDU conference in 2012, Merkel continued to promote her national persuasion agenda, now within her own party, by discussing sustainable finance policy:

‘[…] die Ressourcen- und Rohstoffpolitik natürlich einen Beitrag dazu leisten kann, Wachstum zu generieren. Wir sind ja in Europa im Augenblick aufgefordert, die Staatsschuldenkrise und die Folgen der internationalen Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise zu überwinden. Das kann man auf der einen Seite durch nachhaltige Finanzpolitik schaffen […]. […] Wir brauchen genauso Wachstum. […] Aber wir werden […] unsere Wachstumserspektiven in Europa und Deutschland nur dann entwickeln können, wenn wir auch Industrienationen bleiben. […] Europa und auch die Bundesrepublik Deutschland müssen Industriestandort bleiben. Dazu gehört eine vernünftige Energiepolitik; und dazu gehört eine ausreichende Versorgung mit Rohstoffen und Ressourcen. […]’ (Merkel 25 Apr 2012.)

According to Merkel, politics on resources and raw materials could contribute to growth. On the one hand, sustainable finance policies could help to overcome the financial and economic crisis. On the other hand, growth was also necessary and growth perspectives could be developed in Europe and Germany as long as they
remain industrial bases and formulate reasonable energy policies with sufficient raw materials supply. (Merkel 25 Apr 2012.)

However, Merkel admitted that the issue of raw materials supply was an international question, in which Germany and Europe were in competition with other states that practiced a very strategic political planning:

‘[…] Wir wissen, dass die Frage nach der Rohstoffversorgung eine internationale Frage ist. Hierbei stehen wir im Wettbewerb mit Staaten, die eine sehr strategische rohstoffpolittische Planung betreiben. Deshalb müssen die deutsche Wirtschaft, die Bundesregierung, die Politik und deshalb ja auch das Parlament Antworten in Bezug darauf geben, wie wir bei allem Bekenntnis zur Sozialen Marktwirtschaft und bei allem Bekenntnis zur Unabhängigkeit der wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten ein kohärentes, gemeinsames Handeln erreichen und uns gegenseitig, sozusagen im nationalen Interesse, stützen können.’ (Merkel 25 Apr 2012)

Therefore, German business, the federal government, as well as the Bundestag, should be able to provide answers as to how Germany, with its dedication to the social market economy, and first and foremost, to the independence of economic activities, could achieve coherent joint action and could support each other in the name of national interest. (Merkel 25 Apr 2012.)

Merkel pointed out that there was not only a scarcity of raw materials and a readiness to indicate to the rising economies to politically take care of the raw materials market but there were also price fluctuations, which might lead to major uncertainties in countries that viewed raw materials as a possession:

‘Wir haben nicht nur eine Knappheit von Rohstoffen und auch eine durchaus große Bereitschaft der aufkommenden Schwellenländer zu verzeichnen, sich politisch um Rohstoffmärkte zu kümmern, sondern es gibt auch erhebliche Preisschwankungen auf den Rohstoffmärkten, die auch zu großen Unsicherheiten in den Ländern führen, die Rohstoffe beherbergen beziehungsweise sozusagen Rohstoffe als Eigentum besitzen. […] Auch wir in Deutschland brauchen einen verlässlichen und nachhaltigen Zugang zu Rohstoffen auch weil wir als Exportnation natürlich auch eine große Verantwortung für die Weltwirtschaft tragen.’ (Merkel 25 Apr 2011.)
Merkel stressed that Germany needed reliable and sustainable access to raw materials because, as an export nation, Germany took responsibility for the world economy (Merkel 25 Apr 2012).

According to Merkel, the issue of resources would not lose its importance in future, quite the opposite. She stated that 85 percent of the world population lived in the rising nations or developing countries, and their demand for raw materials would grow further. The Chancellor discussed the importance of cooperation between politics and the economy:


She stressed that at the political level, there were different ways to take action. She referred to the new German ‘Rohstoffpartnerschaften’, raw material partnerships, with states such as Mongolia and Kazakhstan. According to Merkel, through these partnerships, it had been possible to set priorities, such as to increase efficiency of raw materials and resources:


In these countries, it was not only about having access to raw materials. According to Merkel, it was also about environmental and social standards in the production
of raw materials, about developing industry clusters and improving investment and
the innovation environment. (Merkel 25 Apr 2012.) Towards her second term,
Merkel’s belief in realising political values and exercising German power was
reinforcing. In reference to energy policy, the German ideas of \textit{Die Soziale
Marktwirtschaft} and \textit{Nachhaltigkeit} were now, alongside the multilateral level,
disseminated to all of Germany’s partnership countries. Through this type of
cooperation Merkel was promoting the understanding of German ideas bilaterally
and regionally as well.

Merkel also discussed Germany’s advantages and disadvantages in respect to these
partnerships. She viewed that Germany was excellent on the theoretical level of
processing a task, however, when it came to taking practical steps, considering
Germany’s thorough preparations, other countries were faster:

‘[…] Der Ruf Deutschlands ist sozusagen in Bezug auf die theoretische Bearbeitung
einer Aufgabe immer exzellent, aber wenn es dann um die praktischen Schritte geht,
[…] dann erleben wir sehr oft, dass andere Länder unter Bezugnahme auf unsere
wunderbaren Vorarbeiten fast ein bisschen schneller sind. […]’ (Merkel 25 Apr
2012.)

Furthermore, Merkel discussed national inputs. She argued that different
ministries, embassies of the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs (AA), the Federal
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, especially through GIZ
(\textit{Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit}), as well as the Chancellery and
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, could support bilateral
cooperation committees for e.g. building trust:

‘[…] Wir können seitens des Auswärtigen Amtes durch unsere Botschaften, seitens
des Ministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, hier
insbesondere durch die GIZ, sowie seitens des Kanzleramts und des
Wirtschaftsministeriums die bilateralen Kommissionen der Zusammenarbeit
fördern. Wir können Vertrauen aufbauen. […] unsere Unternehmen brauchen […]
verlässliche rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen. Diese sind unverzichtbar für eine
langfristige, gedeihliche Zusammenarbeit. Ich sage es auch den Vertretern aus
She pointed out that German business needed reliable legal conditions, which were indispensable for long-term fruitful cooperation between all parties (Merkel 25 Apr 2012).

Merkel also discussed the efficient application of raw materials. She saw it as challenge for business, which could be only flanked politically:

‘[...] ist die Frage des effizienten Einsatzes von Rohstoffen. Das ist vor allen Dingen eine Herausforderung für die Wirtschaft; politisch können wir das nur flankieren. Wir haben uns als Bundesregierung das Ziel gesetzt, die gesamtwirtschaftliche Rohstoffproduktivität in Deutschland bis zum Jahr 2020 gegenüber 1994 zu verdoppeln. [...] Ich denke Deutschland ist mit seiner Kreislaufwirtschaft und einer effizienten Ressourcenverwendung durchaus in vielen Bereichen weltweit vorbildlich. [...] Wir können Wirtschaftswachstum und Ressourcenverbrauch voneinander entkoppeln.’ (Merkel 25 Apr 2012.)

To tackle this question, the federal government had set the goal to double the overall productivity of raw materials by 2020 compared to the year 1994. Merkel saw this as an opportunity to give an example of circular economy and the efficient use of resources in many sectors worldwide. She also gave her support for the European raw materials strategy:

‘[...] wir eine gemeinsame europäische Vorgehensweise, eine gemeinsame europäische Rohstoffstrategie sehr begrüßen. Diese fußt auf drei Säulen: dem gesicherten Zugang zu Rohstoffvorkommen in Drittländern, einer nachhaltigen Förderung von Rohstoffen aus europäischen Quellen und eben auch auf dem, das wir in Deutschland zu einem Markenzeichen gemacht haben, nämlich Ressourceneffizienz und Kreislaufwirtschaft.’ (Merkel 25 Apr 2012.)

She explained that the European strategy would be based on three pillars: on secured access to raw material resources, on the sustainable delivery of raw materials from European sources and on German trademark, namely resource efficiency and circular economy (Merkel 25 Apr 2012). Thus, the structure of these
three pillars show that German ideas were again effectively disseminated to be part of a whole European strategy affecting, to some extent, the policies of all member states.

Rethinking Growth Internationally: ‘Sustainability Is Not Only Quantitative’

After the 2011 UN Climate Change Conference in Durban, Merkel believed that the world was changing towards the direction that the Kyoto and Rio processes were leading to, namely, towards common but differentiated responsibility:

‘[…] Die Welt verändert sich also; und sie verändert sich in diesem Fall dahin, wo uns der Kyoto- und auch der Rio-Prozess hingeführt haben, nämlich zu einer gemeinsamen und dennoch auch unterschiedlichen Verantwortung.’ (Merkel 16 Jul 2012)

However, Merkel saw that follow-up to Durban consisted of both good and bad news. The good news was that there was still a chance to agree on a binding climate agreement:


The bad news was that states were not able to reach a post-Kyoto agreement. The Chancellor stressed that the difficulty in the matter was that climate protection necessitated changes, which then provoked anxiety:

‘Das Schwierige an der Sache ist, dass Klimaschutz von uns immer Veränderungen erfordert. Veränderung löst aber manchmal auch Angst aus. […] wenn wir so
Merkel warned that non-action would have terrible consequences. Therefore, she was confident that it was better to change something rather than not to act and to charge everyone with disastrous side effects. Thus, Merkel spoke strongly on behalf of taking action:

‘[…] habe ich keine Lust, meine Zeit damit zu verbringen, jeden Fehler in den Voraussagen hundertmal länger zu diskutieren als jede Aktion, die wir eigentlich unternehmen müssen, um mit dem Klimawandel klarzukommen.’ (Merkel 16 Jul 2012.)

She reported that she had ‘run out of steam’ to spend her time discussing every error in the prognosis for hundred times longer than discussing every action that should be taken in order to tackle climate change (Merkel 16 Jul 2012). Although over the past couple of years Merkel was stressing deeds (I-4b), it shows up in her operational code beliefs as only minor changes. The reason might be that things should start to move internationally, e.g. in the form of reaching a multilateral agreement, in order for states to start acting seriously (ratification, implementation) and show results observed as deeds (I-4b).

Thus, Merkel underlined that the open questions concerning the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol should be resolved:

‘Es ist so, dass wir offene Fragen zur zweiten Verpflichtungsperiode des Kyoto-Protokolls klären müssen. Die Europäische Union tritt hierbei für ambitionierte Regelungen ein. Aber wir wissen, dass uns nicht alle folgen, die beim Kyoto-Protokoll mitgemacht haben. “Kyoto II” wird natürlich so etwas wie eine Bewährungsprobe sein; da sollten sich die Industriestaaten keine falschen Gedanken machen. Wenn wir seitens der Industriestaaten jetzt nichts mehr tun und sagen würden: ““Kyoto I” ist ausgelaufen, die Zwischenphase interessiert uns nicht, jetzt warten wir einmal ab, was 2020 passiert”, - dann werden die Schwellenländer mit Recht sagen: “Wer seitens Industrieländer so wenig ernsthaft in diese
According to Merkel, in this instance, the European Union advocated ambitious regulations. She also knew that not all of those who had taken part in the Kyoto Protocol, would follow through. She saw Kyoto II as a test for the industrialised countries. If they would not show interest in acting, the rising nations would not be ready to change their positions. (Merkel 16 Jul 2012.)

The Chancellor urged a rethinking, especially on how growth was understood:

‘[…] brauchen wir ein konsequentes Umdenken, insbesondere auch in dem Verständnis von dem, was wir unter „Wachstum“ verstehen. Wir haben großes Verständnis dafür, dass sich Wachstum auch in einer Zunahme des Bruttoinlandsprodukts ausdrücken muss. […] Wir sprechen natürlich immer noch auch über quantitatives Wachstum. Aber wir werden die Aufgabe nur schaffen, wenn wir Wachstum mehr als nur als quantitatives Wachstum betrachten.’ (Merkel 16 Jul 2012.)

She saw that there was a common understanding that growth should be expressed as growth in GDP, as quantitative growth. Merkel spoke for a more sustainable growth by disagreeing with the traditional view of quantitative growth:


She linked the concept of Nachhaltigkeit closely to the idea of growth. She maintained that if the new concept of growth, including qualitative aspects, would be carried out in every political sector, then it would be easier to persuade people to see the necessity of climate protection, because their thinking would be changed altogether. (Merkel 16 Jul 2012.) This shows that for Merkel, issue linkages were not only a way to exercise power and to control agendas, they were also a way to
influence thinking and persuade people to get behind her ideas and policies, internationally and nationally.

Merkel continued to speak for a bottom-up understanding, alongside the top-down approach, in furthering the completion of the negotiations on the international climate agreement:

‘[…] Immer wenn man 180 Länder zu irgendetwas Gemeinsames bewegen will, ist das recht schwierig. Aber je mehr jeder Einzelne leistet und je mehr jede Region der Welt auf ihre Art und Weise schon Vorreiter ist, in Aktion tritt und sich Beiträge überlegt, umso grösser wird dann das gemeinsame Verständnis dafür sein, diese große Aufgabe eines internationalen Abkommen auch wirklich zu schaffen und erfolgreich abzuschließen.’ (Merkel 16 Jul 2012)

She underlined that the more that every single actor contributed and more that every region was a forerunner in taking action, the wider the common understanding would be that an international agreement should be reached (Merkel 16 Jul 2012). Merkel seemed to view that in respect to environmental policy, persuasion did not only go ‘top-down’ but that national and regional ‘bottom-up’ processes were also needed in order to reach global understanding and finalise the climate agreement. This resulted in a more pragmatic view of cooperation and in the dissemination of German ideas through bilateral and other forms of partnerships.

However, top-down processes were still necessary. Merkel stressed that it was important to take the 'Green Economy’, discussed in the previous G20 meeting, seriously and to succeed in decoupling growth from energy consumption:

‘[…] ist es sehr wichtig, dass wir das, was unter dem Schlagwort „Green Economy“ sowohl beim G20-Gipfel in Los Gabos als auch bei der Konferenz Rio+20 diskutiert wurde, erst meinen und dass wir es schaffen, unsere wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsdaten vom Ressourcenverbrauch zu entkoppeln. […] Wir in Deutschland leisten unseren Beitrag zur Green Economy auch, indem wir unsere Energieversorgung auf völlig neue Füsse stellen. Wir erleben allerdings im Augenblick auch, dass das Einhalten des Zieldreiecks – Versorgungssicherheit,
Merkel stressed that Germany was contributing to Green Economy by resetting its energy supply on a new foundation. She argued that the three cornerstones of energy policy, security of supply, affordability and environmental friendliness, were not on an easy path to take: according to the idea of Nachhaltigkeit, those three elements should be taken into consideration simultaneously, because social, economic and ecological elements belonged together, and the Energiewende should be shaped accordingly. (Merkel 16 Jul 2012.)

Merkel justified the path Germany had taken in its energy policy. She was of the view that if Germany could succeed in changing its energy supply, first by phasing-out nuclear energy, and then by reducing the fossil fuel energy sources in the upcoming decades and increasing renewable energies, other countries could learn and profit from German experiences:


Merkel pointed out that Germany had brought forth its industrialisation at the expense of the environment and, therefore, Germany now had a responsibility to shape the learning process towards a renewable and sustainable energy supply.
According to her, the price had to be paid but she was confident that this was the right path to take. (Merkel 16 Jul 2012.)

**Persuading With ‘Nachhaltigkeit’ Internationally And Nationally**

The end of Merkel’s second term was marked by disseminating and embedding the German ideas of *Nachhaltigkeit* as part of European and international understanding, and by finding societal consensus around the energy policy decisions that were made. Merkel spoke about the importance of international agreements and international cooperation:

‘Natürlich sind die internationalen Abkommen und auch die internationale Kooperation ausgesprochen hilfreich. Auch da gibt es eine ganze Reihe von Fortschritten, und zwar nicht nur, dass in Durban ein Zeitplan entwickelt wurde, nicht nur, dass wir ganz neue Konstellationen auf der Welt haben, wie Kooperation erfolgt.’ (Merkel 9 May 2012.)

She maintained that there had been progress e.g. relating to the Durban climate conference and relating to new constellations in which international cooperation took place (Merkel 9 May 2012). In Durban, it was possible to reach an agreement on the timetable: a legally binding climate agreement should be adopted by 2015 and be implemented by 2020:

‘[…] war es aus meiner Sicht ein ganz wichtiger Schritt, dass es in Durban, in Südafrika, gelungen ist, uns darauf zu verstündigen – das konnte ja dann letztes Jahr in Katar noch weiter bearbeitet werden –, dass wir bis 2020 ein für alle verbindliches Abkommen abschließen wollen. […]’ (Merkel 6 May 2013.)

Merkel repeated the known position that binding commitments were not only necessary from industrialised countries:

‘[…] wir brauchen nicht nur bindende Verpflichtungen von Industrieländern. […] Deshalb muss ich ganz ehrlich sagen: Wir sollten in Europa ambitioniert sein, ja,
She believed that Europe should be ambitious but should also pay attention to, and not decouple itself, from the rest of the world. Merkel stressed that a global agreement for facing a global phenomenon was very important. (Merkel 13 May 2013.)

Merkel pointed out that the concept of Nachhaltigkeit was traced back to Germany and had a 300-year history. Towards the end of her second term, Merkel was using this concept as an exercise of power and persuasion, both internationally and nationally. She underlined that Germany would take a stand for the international sustainability agenda and work for the new millennium development goals, which should take the ideas of Nachhaltigkeit more strongly into consideration:

‘Auch international ist die Nachhaltigkeitsagenda etwas, für das wir uns sehr stark einsetzen. Wir werden […] an neuen Millennium-Entwicklungszielen arbeiten. […] Die nächste Runde der Millennium-Entwicklungsziele soll dann Ziele beinhalten, die noch stärker den Gedanken der Nachhaltigkeit in sich tragen. […]’ (Merkel 13 May 2013.)

Formulating international millennium development goals on the basis of this German concept would increase the power of German ideas internationally, which in the long-term, might lead to changing ideas and institutions gradually not only at the multilateral level but also nationally among agreeing parties and in the receiving countries.

Merkel declared that Europe was not alone in the world: all decisions depended on e.g. how the competitiveness of the other countries developed around Europe. This meant that Europe could not define competitiveness in the world but rather it
should adjust itself to others. Therefore, taking a stand for *Nachhaltigkeit* was important:

‘[…] wir sind in der Entscheidung, was wir in Europa tun, nicht frei. Denn diese Entscheidung hängt davon ab, wie sich die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und die Befähigung der Länder der Welt um uns herum entwickeln. Das heißt, Europa kann natürlich nicht die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der Welt definieren, sondern wir müssen uns sozusagen auch daran ausrichten, wie in anderen Teilen der Welt gearbeitet und gelebt wird. Wir müssen uns auch […] weltweit für Nachhaltigkeit einsetzen […]. Wir müssen also versuchen, die Rahmenbedingungen so zu ändern und zu verändern, dass sie nachhaltiger werden. Das ist die Aufgabe für Europa.’ (Merkel 13 May 2013.)

Merkel viewed that the task for Europe was to try to change the framework conditions into something more sustainable (Merkel 13 May 2013). Thus, *Nachhaltigkeit* had become a concept by which both Germany and Europe could exercise power and persuade internationally.

However, as seen in the analysis, persuasion with *Nachhaltigkeit* still continued to have also a domestic purpose. Merkel continued to speak for linking *Nachhaltigkeit* and growth, where quantitative growth should be complemented with qualitative growth. (Merkel 13 May 2013.) She pled for environmental associations to give their support to the financial aspect of the concept:

‘Ich bitte die Umwelt-Community auch einfach um ein bisschen Unterstützung, wenn es jetzt um die finanzielle Nachhaltigkeit geht. […] Nachhaltigkeit ist etwas, was in allen Lebensbereichen zur Selbstverständlichkeit werden muss. Deshalb werden solides Wachstum und solider Wohlstand auch nicht auf Schulden, auf mehr Ressourcenverbrauch und auf anderen Verschwendungen beruhen können.’ (Merkel 9 May 2012.)

She viewed sustainability as something that should cover all sectors of life and, therefore, solid growth and solid welfare could not rest on debts or the increased use of resources (Merkel 9 May 2012).
Merkel started to also frame \textit{Nachhaltigkeit} with demographic arguments. She stated that through demographic change, the problem of sustainability would increasingly be confronted in future:

‘Dieses Prinzip ist für uns von großer Bedeutung, denn durch den demografischen Wandel, durch die Veränderung des Altersaufbaus, werden wir in Zukunft noch viel stärker mit dem Problem der Nachhaltigkeit konfrontiert werden. […]’ (Merkel 13 May 2013.)

Merkel also continued to view \textit{Nachhaltigkeit} as an overall societal task (Merkel 13 May 2013). According to her, the German public was not always as ready for change, as one might hope for:

‘[…] Wir haben unsere Energiepolitik seitens der Bundesregierung angesichts dessen, was im letzten Jahr in Fukushima passiert ist, noch einmal verändert. Das hat zu einem gesamtgesellschaftlichen Konsens beigetragen, was den Ausstieg aus bestimmten Energieformen wie zum Beispiel der Kernenergie anbelangt. Es hat noch nicht zu einem gesamtgesellschaftlichen Konsens beigetragen, was die Veränderungen und die notwendigen Infrastrukturmaßnahmen dazu angeht. […]’ (Merkel 9 May 2012.)

Merkel saw that the change in German energy policy after Fukushima contributed to an overall societal consensus as far as the phasing-out of nuclear energy was concerned, but it did not contribute to the societal consensus as far as the necessary infrastructure measures were concerned (Merkel 9 May 2012).

\textbf{Emphasis on Deeds Continues to Increase – German Renewable Energies Act to Be Reformed}

Towards the end of her second term, Merkel’s belief (I-4b) emphasising the role of deeds continued to reinforce. She underlined the need to proceed on the practical side as the ongoing climate negotiations were advancing slowly:
Merkel argued that doing nothing did not mean that nothing would happen but rather it would become far more expensive (Merkel 6 May 2013).

Merkel urged the EU to reach an emission target by 2030. She stressed that it was important as the economy and industry should know about the framework conditions to which they must adjust themselves:

‘Europa muss zu einem Emissionsziel für 2030 kommen. Das ist dringend – die Bundesregierung wird sich dem auch nicht verschließen –, weil die Wirtschaft planen, investieren und daher wissen muss, auf welche Rahmenbedingungen sie sich einzustellen hat. [...] Das heißt, wenn wir auf dem Weg der CO2-Reduktionen weitergehen wollen – und wir wollen weitergehen –, dann ist es nur recht und billig, dass die Industrie von uns weiß – sie hat ein Anrecht darauf –, wie die ganze Sache bis 2030 weitergehen wird.’ (Merkel 6 May 2013.)

She spoke about the importance of energy independence and the security of supply, but in the question of energy markets, the 27 member states should build trust and start to think in a European way in order to create a Single Energy Market:

‘Es wird die nächste große Aufgabe für Europa sein, eine Vertrauensbasis zu schaffen, damit wir nicht 27 einzelne Energiemarkte haben. [...] Wir müssen [...] aus 27 nationalen Energimärkten wirklich einen Energiebinnenmarkt machen. Das heißt, wir müssen europäisch denken lernen. [...]’ (Merkel 6 May 2013.)

Merkel maintained that through the Single Energy Market there would be more coordination in supporting renewable energies (Merkel 12 Jun 2013).

Merkel believed that national energy policy should be better adjusted to European energy policy. On the national level, Merkel called for intertwining single elements of the energy system and urged people not to think of the support of renewable
energies, the expansion of the grids and base load capacity as separate boxes but rather as intertwined:

‘[…] Das heißt, wir müssen eine Verzahnung der einzelnen Elemente des Energiesystems erreichen, […] Das heißt, dass wir nicht mehr in getrennten Schubladen denken können – hier die Förderung der erneuerbaren Energien, hier der Netzausbau und hier die Grundlastversorgung –, sondern dass wir das alles mehr und mehr miteinander verzahnen müssen. Das heißt, es muss gelingen, das Tempo des Ausbaus der erneuerbaren Energien mit dem Tempo des Ausbaus der Netze zu harmonisieren. […]’ (Merkel 12 Jun 2013.)

This meant that the speed of developing renewables should be harmonised with the speed of expanding the grids (Merkel 12 Jun 2013).

In addition, Merkel called for a comprehensive federal-level understanding of the energy policy, which meant that the Länder would not make their own energy policies:


Merkel viewed that the readiness for the reform of the German Renewable Energies Act was the key to reaching a national understanding. According to her, the reform would ensure further development of renewable energies, building storages and grids:

‘Eines ist klar: Wir müssen in Deutschland die Erzeugung erneuerbarer Energien auf der rechtlichen Grundlage des sogenannten Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetzes reformieren, um einen harmonischen Weiterausbau der erneuerbaren Energien, einen besseren Ausbau der Speicher und vor allen Dingen einen dazu passenden Ausbau der Leitungssysteme gewährleisten zu können. […]’ (Merkel 6 May 2013.)
Merkel admitted that reforming the EEG would be difficult (Merkel 6 May 2013). She viewed, however, that the share of the renewables had been increased in the energy supply, which in and of itself was a contribution to climate protection:

‘[…] Allein die Tatsache, dass der Anteil erneuerbarer Energien an der Energieversorgung stark gestiegen ist, ist ein Beitrag zum Klimaschutz. Dennoch müssen wir im gesamten Bereich der Energieversorgung auch die Einheit der drei Begriffe Versorgungssicherheit, Bezahlbarkeit und Umweltfreundlichkeit im Blick haben. Da haben wir seit dem Beschluss zur Energiewende einiges erreicht, aber entscheidende Bausteine stehen noch aus.’ (Merkel 12 Jun 2013.)

The Chancellor saw that in the energy supply sector, the unity of three concepts should be considered: the security of supply, affordability and environmental friendliness. In respect to these concepts, something had been achieved with the Energiewende but the crucial building blocks remained to be completed. (Merkel 12 Jun 2013.)

9.3. Conclusions: Chancellor Merkel’s Environmental and Energy Policy

The final operational code analysis discussed Germany’s environmental, primarily climate, and energy policy. The operational environment was turbulent during Chancellor Merkel’s two terms in office. The financial and economic crisis was followed by the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe and, during these crises, states were negotiating the new multilateral climate agreement that would also take the changed power balance of the world and the ‘Schwellenländer’ into consideration in reference to the responsibilities of reducing CO2 emissions.
The operational code beliefs of Chancellor Merkel have changed between her first and second terms. During the first term, Merkel viewed the operational environment as mixed (P-1), however, between her two terms in office and during different conferences on climate, this belief reinforced and the operational environment was seen as increasingly friendly and cooperative. Towards her second term, after the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis, Merkel held the view that it was easier for her to realise fundamental German values (P-2) and exercise power internationally (P-4). Between her two terms in office, her belief in the predictability of the political universe reinforced (P-3), which might result from the international developments relating to climate and energy policy. As Merkel stated, in the renewable energies sector, it was possible to rely on a predictable future. This may also have reversed Merkel’s belief about how much of a role should be assigned to chance (P-5).

During the negotiations on common reduction targets, Merkel’s belief in cooperative strategies and tactics reinforced slightly between the two terms, indicating very cooperative strategies (I-1) and cooperative tactics (I-2). Between the two terms, Merkel’s belief in accepting risks reversed (I-3), and during the second term, international learning in environmental policy and external events may have resulted in her readiness to change German energy policy; firstly, in the aftermath of financial and economic crisis, she had made the decision to extend nuclear power plants’ lifespans and make them a bridge energy source to the era of renewable energy, and then, after the Fukushima catastrophe, when she eventually decided to phase them out.

During her second term, especially after Fukushima catastrophe, Merkel started to place more emphasis on deeds along with words (I-4b), both internationally and nationally and there was not very much diversity in the cooperation/conflict of her
rhetoric (I-4a). Towards her second term in office, Merkel’s belief in the utility of different means (I-5) widened somewhat, which can be observed in the international and national use of the concept of Nachhaltigkeit, justifying both environmental and energy policy choices.

It important to note that there was not enough speech data available to conduct a larger quantitative study. Therefore, this analysis has been made based on only a small sample. As in other operational code studies relating to foreign and security policy, and economic and European policy, the quantitative analysis conducted in this study only had a descriptive value. The quantitative analysis does not consider the social character of the world and it leaves room for bias e.g. arising from the selection of the speeches. The qualitative analysis, which concentrates on the framing process, e.g. how the beliefs and ideas frame and reframe policies, is, therefore, equally important in the analysis of complex policy-making processes.

The international negotiations on a climate agreement dominated the international agenda in environmental policy during Merkel's two terms in office. Merkel’s mixed view on the operational environment was apparent as she stated that it was more important to do something than to do nothing in reference to international climate policies. She sought an international agreement that would adhere to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities between industrialised and developing countries, where the responsibilities of rising nations would also be considered.

The international climate targets and increasing international cooperation may have also led to a re-evaluation of Germany’s national energy policy. Merkel argued that in future, climate and energy policies would be closely interlinked with each other. The increased use of renewables was a natural consequence of the international
negotiations discussing commitments for reducing CO2 emissions. When discussing German policies, the Chancellor also linked environmental and energy policies with security aspects, as the Chancellery presented an integrated energy concept including all of these elements.

The outbreak of the financial and economic crisis also had an effect on German environmental and energy policy. Relating to environmental policy and ongoing negotiations, Merkel pointed out that the challenges of climate change did not become smaller by the outbreak of the crisis. Quite the opposite, the lessons learned were that there was a need for global action and Merkel started to increasingly emphasise the importance of global cooperation. She was confident that the international financial and economic crisis would drive states to cooperate much more globally, as ‘nobody can solve the problems of the world alone’. According to Merkel, this idea was widely spread in climate protection as well as in the renewable energy sector Thus, Merkel’s belief in the cooperative nature of the operational environment (P-1) had begun to reinforce.

The financial and economic crisis was not only seen as a chance, as Merkel wanted it to be viewed, but nationally, the crisis was seen more as a challenge about how to cope in a changed economic situation and may have led some to question environmental viewpoints altogether. Therefore, the role of the domestic audience increased after the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis; alongside the international level, persuasion on the national level was also necessary.

The crisis also raised economic aspects to the energy agenda. Merkel had long been a supporter of an energy mix, but in the aftermath of the crisis, she promoted a diversification of energy policy, which included, alongside renewables, other energy sources as well. Although Merkel discussed the long tradition Germany had with
renewables, she hoped that Germany would stay ‘fit for the future’ and shortly before the Bundestag election in 2009, she raised the question of the use of nuclear energy to the national agenda, emphasising her own favourable position.

Merkel promoted rational energy policy and started to frame nuclear energy (and also other energy sources such as coal and gas) as bridge energy sources, as means, by which it would be easier to e.g. reach the era of renewables and also to achieve international climate targets. If the renewables had, as Merkel stated, the effect of increasing the predictability of the political universe (P-3), nuclear energy might also serve the same goal, as ‘Brückenenergieträger’ for the future. The political universe would, thus, become more predictable through increased diversification and energy independence. The energy question might also be linked to how Merkel might have wanted gradually to expand the utility of different means (I-5). The energy mix would serve international climate goals, increase the security of supply as well as support the German export industry. Thus, in addition to environmental considerations, energy security and economic aspects would also be covered.

In the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis, Merkel’s belief in the usefulness of cooperative strategies reinforced. Therefore, Merkel also called for climate protection measures for the rising nations. She justified this view with the new balance of the world economy. She viewed that otherwise the overall targets would not be reached. Merkel also urged states to agree on a mandate and timetable for a legally binding climate agreement. In this framework of negotiating on a multilateral climate agreement, the Chancellor could have also gradually started to shift the power balance nationally vis-á-vis domestic institutions by using power mechanisms. At this point in time, she may have rather chosen to ‘tie hands’ e.g. in reference to energy policy, where the government parties CDU and SPD did not ‘look unified to the future’. However, in order to create a position as a ‘norm
entrepreneur’, to ‘cut slack’ effectively and to start to shape international as well as national policies, Merkel would, alongside institutional status, also need a clearer political mandate.

After the victorious election in 2009, Merkel became the Chancellor and head of the CDU-FDP government, the so-called ‘Wunschkoalition’. Internationally, in reference to international climate negotiations, Merkel viewed that alongside the top-down process of UN negotiations on responsibilities and reduction commitments, bottom-up processes, including bilateral and regional environmental projects, should also begin to emerge. It would give confidence that climate protection could also be translated into action. Thus, already in the beginning of her second term, Merkel started to reframe international cooperation gradually in a more pragmatic and goal-oriented way. Although the main goal was to reach a multilateral agreement, national and regional climate projects working for the same goal in a region also became ever more desirable and increasing global understanding for the necessity of reaching a global agreement. In addition, by underlining the need for action, Merkel began to emphasise deeds alongside with words (I-4b).

Merkel also started to set the international agenda by emphasising that one of the reasons for the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis was short-term thinking. She viewed that the concept Nachhaltigkeit, sustainability, could be seen as an alternative type of thinking, which emphasised a more long-term approach. Merkel also started to discuss the internationally established concept of Nachhaltigkeit in reference to German policies in order to reframe German understanding. Merkel viewed that Nachhaltigkeit did not only concern environmental policy, it had also become a permanent idea in financial and social policy. In addition, she viewed sustainability as something that could be seen as a
synonym for the German model of *Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft*, which did not rely on short-term successes.

If Merkel linked different policies for the exercise of international power during her first term, during her second term, these issue linkages also had another objective. As the head of the CDU-FDP government, possessing both institutional and political power in Germany, Merkel did not have to ‘tie her hands’ vis-à-vis domestic institutions. Thus, she was able to ‘cut slack’ and begin to reframe policies according to her own beliefs and ideas. By reframing and linking different policies as a ‘norm entrepreneur’, Merkel could be able to both control international as well as national agendas and persuade others to get behind her way of thinking. In conducting international politics, international audiences are important but the persuasion in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis might have had more of a national purpose.

This was particularly crucial in view of energy policy. Merkel’s belief in taking international risks was reversing (I-3) during her second term, and a year after her re-election, in autumn 2010, the Chancellor presented the new German energy concept, which was about reaching the era of renewables in Germany. The concept made nuclear energy a bridge energy source and extended the lifespans of the nuclear power plants. Thus, she had to start to persuade the wider German public, historically against nuclear energy, to get behind the newly agreed concept. Here, the concept of *Nachhaltigkeit* was needed in order to shape national understanding and to create links between environmental, energy, economic and social policies.

However, less than a year after the decision on the new energy concept, the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe took place in Japan in 2011. The event can be seen as a turning point in many respects. Merkel stressed that the era of the renewables
should be reached faster: renewables would increase predictability and reduce risks. Her position towards nuclear energy changed and, therefore, she decided to phase-out nuclear energy in Germany by 2022. Thus, Merkel took a national political risk. It was not difficult to persuade the wider German public to get behind this ‘Energiewende’, especially in the emotional aftermath of the Fukushima catastrophe. However, now, Merkel really had to start to persuade, especially the German economy and industry, as well as environmental associations, about this special path, a ‘Sonderweg’, of a large industrialised country and explain e.g. how the environmental aspects, in the form of reaching international climate targets, and the economic aspects, in the form of Germany being able to stay a competitive export nation, could be combined in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis.

For this purpose, Merkel once again used issue linkages included in the concept of Nachhaltigkeit. She started to increasingly stress that growth should not only be seen as quantitative, as growth in GDP, but also qualitative aspects should be included in the future concept of growth. Growth should include the idea of Nachhaltigkeit. Merkel stressed that the threats of the climate change had not become unimportant. On the contrary, Merkel saw that the financial and economic crisis taught that other sectors of politics should also be paid attention to. She viewed that on the one hand, environmental and climate protection set boundaries for economic intentions, but on the other hand, it also made economic activities more future-oriented.

According to Merkel, Germany wanted to show that it was possible to make things work without nuclear energy; it was about also preserving welfare in the times of renewable energies. She saw that Germany could succeed in the Energiewende but it should be supported by the whole society: by the economy, by environmental
associations as well as by the population. According to Merkel, the means for achieving the support were: affordability, reliability and being environmentally sound. Thus, economic, the security of supply and environmental aspects were all linked. Further, the updated German strategy of Nachhaltigkeit can be viewed as an act of persuasion: the aim was to create cohesion in German society among the constituents.

However, Merkel stressed that if Germany wanted to phase-out nuclear energy and enter the era of renewables faster, fossil fuel power plants were necessary for the transition period and grids should also be expanded. She justified the expansion of the grids with the phrase ‘Wer A sagt, muss auch B sagen’, one could not have the one without the other, towards those sceptics who supported the overall goal of reaching the era of renewables faster but did not support the means of reaching it.

For Merkel, energy efficiency was also of importance: the measures for increasing renewable energies and the expansion of the grids would be inadequate if energy efficiency was not increased. Merkel viewed that influencing at the EU level with German reframed ideas was essential. She pointed out that energy efficiency should become a trademark not only in Germany but in the whole of Europe. It was of utmost importance for Merkel that reframed German ideas and changed policies would be disseminated to the European level in order to be able to shape European policies to support the German special path.

Merkel also discussed the question of taking action both internationally and nationally. Her belief in deeds (I-4b) was starting to reinforce. She was certain that although acting seemed to be expensive, taking no action would be more expensive. She also warned that non-action would have terrible consequences.
Therefore, she was confident that it was better to change something than to not act and to charge everyone with disastrous side effects.

Merkel viewed that at the political level, there were different ways to take action. She started to refer to so-called ‘Rohstoffpartnerschaften, raw material partnerships, through which it was possible to set priorities such as increasing efficiency. In these partner countries, it was not only about having access to raw materials, it was also about environmental and social standards in the production of raw materials, about developing industry clusters and improving the investment and innovation environment. All of these policies were included in the concepts of Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft and Nachhaltigkeit. With respect to energy policymaking, these German ideas were disseminated to all of Germany’s partnership countries: through cooperation, creating an understanding of German ideas.

As the multilateral climate negotiations did not seem to advance, Merkel started to reframe cooperation in a more pragmatic way, first by discussing bottom-up processes and creating the possibility for regional projects, which could further a common understanding on climate change at a multilateral level. Gradually, the goal-oriented and pragmatic view of cooperation started to show in concrete partnerships, bilateral and regional, such as ‘Anpassungspartnerschaften’ in the environmental sector and ‘Rohstoffpartnerschaften’ in the energy sector.

The final point of the analysis relates to why persuasion, alongside power, is crucial in international politics. As also stated in the previous analyses, states and their leaders are able to influence internationally through persuasion. Thus, leaders disseminate their framed and reframed ideas to the international level in order to be able to influence the rules and practices of different international institutions, which as a longer-term consequence, will have an effect on every state’s ideas and
institutions. However, in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis (and here also Fukushima), as states increased their cooperation, persuasion may have been directed more at domestic audiences because the consequences of the crisis may have started to become visible nationally. Therefore, crisis also opens up possibilities for a leader to take initiative and start to reframe ideas and also to influence and to shape the national understanding of an issue by using the international/EU level. As seen in the analysis, Merkel used the concept of Nachhaltigkeit as the different points of time, both internationally and nationally, in persuading domestic institutions, the German economy and industry, and the German public. In this type of argumentation, the reform of different laws, such as the reform of the EEG, can be interpreted as an attempt to institutionalise beliefs and reframed ideas in the national legal system. Thus, the national policy is changing gradually.
10. Conclusions: Different Level Interaction and Processes of Normalization - Continuity of Change in German Foreign and European Policy

This dissertation studied the political operational code beliefs of German Federal Chancellor Merkel and compared them between Chancellor Merkel’s first (2005-2009) and second (2009-2013) terms in office. In addition, the study examined how these beliefs and their change influenced German policy framing (content) as well as domestic policy process. These mixed methods proved to be a powerful method in analysing change in political beliefs over time and their influence on both policy framing and persuasion as well as on creating a hypothetical argument on the changing domestic institutional power balance.

The dissertation applied the operational code analysis and the ten questions provided by George (1969) in both the quantitative and qualitative sections of analysis in three different cases: in foreign and security policy, economic and European policy, and environmental and energy policy. In order to be able to analyse the nuances of the change of beliefs and the influence of beliefs on policy framing and persuasion in each case, the three operational codes were viewed as distinct and based on a particular issue area. Although the cross-case comparison shows many similarities between cases, the research design, which viewed the operational codes as separate was a justified choice, because there were differences in how the operational code beliefs affected real-world policymaking. The results of these analyses have been presented after each case.
Although the comparison of the three cases may show some slight differences in how much operational code beliefs have reinforced or reversed during the study period, it is also possible to draw some common key findings. The first finding relates to the changes in the operational code beliefs. Merkel’s political beliefs have changed, either reversed or reinforced, between her two first terms. In all three cases, Merkel’s belief relating to the friendly and cooperative nature of the operational environment has reinforced somewhat between her two terms in office. Furthermore, the belief in the utility of different means available widened significantly to include even more ‘threat’ and ‘sanctions’ as well as ‘promise’ and ‘reward’ as foreign policy means, which in turn reduces the risk related to one single mean.

This study maintains the view that these changes have taken place gradually over time. The results from the three cases’ comparison show that beliefs relating to instrumental beliefs seem to change the most easily across cases. These findings support Tetlock’s (1991) argument, which suggests that the beliefs relating to tactics seem to be more prone to change. Thus, it is possible to prove the simple learning of the key executive. However, Merkel’s beliefs relating to philosophical beliefs also changed somewhat in some cases, which implies diagnostic learning. This may indicate that there are signs of complex learning of the key decision-maker and this learning may gradually influence the redefinition of goals and also shape German national identity.

The objective of the quantitative section of the study was to find out the direction of the change in Chancellor Merkel’s beliefs. The quantitative operational code analysis discussed the direction and intensity of transitive verbs relating to self and others in the political universe and the variations in the direction and intensity also show as variation in the operational code beliefs. The quantitative study used a
speech as a unit of analysis and mean values in describing the direction of change in beliefs between the two terms in office. However, the quantitative operational code analysis offers only a descriptive and passive ‘still picture’ of change in beliefs and, therefore, the analysis should be complemented with a comprehensive qualitative analysis on how beliefs act as a basis for influence and power in international relations.

Therefore, it is of key importance to examine how the political beliefs of Chancellor Merkel influence policy framing and shape policy as part of a gradual process, where beliefs and framing are tested against external international crisis as well as viewed as part of the domestic policy process. This reframing process can be viewed as having both causal and constitutive effects. It is part of the causal chain where beliefs and ideas are disseminated and accepted, whereas the constitutive effect relates more to changing meaning and the German national understanding leading towards the institutionalisation of beliefs in policy practice over time. This study viewed qualitative longitudinal research and qualitative content analysis as useful methods for analysing the reframing process of meaning, concepts and policy content.

Merkel’s political operational code beliefs were tested against international crises in order to find out whether a crisis reinforced or reversed the direction of her operational code beliefs and how this change influenced the link between beliefs and policy framing. According to the findings, the outbreak of the international financial and economic crisis reinforced the link between Merkel’s operational code beliefs and German foreign and European policy. Thus, the crisis did not reverse the direction of beliefs towards a more hostile and protectionist view of the operational environment, but rather in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis, Merkel’s beliefs on the friendly and cooperative nature of the political
universe and cooperative strategies seemed to reinforce somewhat. It can be stated that the analysis showed some independent effect of beliefs and ideas, both direct and indirect, on policy framing when tested against material reality.

The second common finding relates to the first observation on the change of operational code beliefs by discussing the policy framing of Chancellor Merkel and the current direction of German foreign and European policy. Through the gradual change in the political beliefs, especially after the international financial and economic crisis, the Chancellor started gradually to reframe the meaning of cooperation, an important indicator of the German policy of continuation, in a more pragmatic way, which implies a more instrumental and goal-oriented approach to cooperation.

This does not imply that Germany would not adhere to multilateral organisations in future and, thereby, change its policy drastically. It is more about seeing cooperation as instrumental and goal-oriented and not as an end in and of itself. This pragmatic view of policy-making is often referred to as the ‘normalization’ of German foreign and European policy. This study views normalization as a process of interaction between continuity and change in which German foreign policy is gradually becoming normalized. However, it will not be possible to state the direction of this normalization process, any permanent change, until in the coming decades.

The third common finding relates both to the first and the second observations. The study used longitudinal analysis, including quantitative operational code analysis, qualitative content analysis, as well as additional interpretative methods of process tracing and counterfactual inference, to make this last conclusion, which remains somewhat hypothetical. As the operational code beliefs start to change,
international learning leads the leader to frame and reframe meanings, concepts and policies. However, the most interesting observations here do not relate to any particular policy framing or position, but rather to the policy process, where the analysis of different mechanisms of power and persuasion is crucial.

The final key finding of this study suggests that in addition to power mechanisms, Chancellor Merkel used cognitive persuasion in her foreign and European policy-making. She used issue and policy linkages for controlling agendas and persuading, both internationally and nationally. In the literature, issue linkages are often seen as a form of exercising international power. This study will not try to question this argument. However, when beliefs change and the leader starts to reframe ideas and policies, there must always be a cognitive mechanism of persuasion involved, which includes both international and domestic audiences. This relates to changing the international and national understanding of an issue through reframing meaning and different concepts.

In Merkel’s case, she persuaded with different ideational concepts that linked various policies and means from political, diplomatic and economic, to environmental, developmental, social and military such as Vernetzte Sicherheit, Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft and Nachhaltigkeit. Relating to the concept of Vernetzte Sicherheit, Merkel started to widen German understanding on the utility of different means, also allowing sanctions, between her two terms in office. Furthermore, Merkel viewed that Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft, the social market economy, was experiencing a renaissance and, especially after the financial and economic crisis, she used this concept to persuade audiences internationally as well as nationally.

During her two terms in office, she also reframed the meaning of Nachhaltigkeit, sustainability. The economic and environmental aspects were linked together more
closely and, during her second term in office, especially after the Fukushima catastrophe, the concept also consisted of the idea that growth should not be viewed only quantitatively but also qualitatively. Thus, as a third observation, because of the emergence of these persuading concepts, this study suggests that alongside power, there was also a mechanism of persuasion involved in these three cases. This might also gradually alter the German domestic institutional power balance.

Thus, if the conditions are right, the leader possesses both institutional and political power, it might be possible to hypothesise that during her second term, Federal Chancellor Merkel could have become a ‘norm entrepreneur’ who learns, frames and reframes and, as a consequence, also persuades on many different levels from the international level to the EU and national levels.

But the question is, why should the leader become a ‘norm entrepreneur’? The answer could be two-fold. It can be explained from both international and domestic perspectives. Firstly, this study maintains that the answer could relate to the rise of the emerging economies and a change in the global balance of power as well as to the financial and economic crisis through which this new balance of power became ever more apparent. In global transformations, there will be empty ideational space, which every state will aim to fill by trying to set the rules and procedures, which are based on their own values and institutions.

Secondly, and most importantly, this question relates to domestic politics and the leader’s role vis-à-vis domestic institutions. Harnisch (2006, 2009) has argued that relating to Germany’s European policy-making in particular, German domestic institutions such as the Bundestag, Bundesrat and Federal Constitutional Court have increasingly taken power. This study views that with power mechanisms
(Moravcsik 1994) the leader might be able to shift the power balance in his/her favour in order to acquire more power in the domestic setting and to effectively ‘cut slack’. In the short-term, this might be a useful way of conducting politics, but in the longer-term, it might lead to a confrontation with domestic institutions and a loss of credibility in the eyes of the constituents.

However, as a more long-term approach, the mechanism of persuasion relates both to the changing domestic power balance and to changing the national understanding of an issue. The leader, who is a ‘norm entrepreneur’, possessing national political power, might be better able to play between ‘cutting slack’ and ‘tying hands’ and by cutting slack in order create room for dissemination of his/her beliefs and ideas, framing and persuasion. In the end, persuading domestic constituents with reframed ideas is of utmost importance for the leader because they can decide who is the winner of the next national election. However, a consensus-oriented political culture might be necessary to some extent for the persuasion mechanism to work. To conclude, this study combined the study of beliefs into a rational theoretical framework as a two-stage process and views that persuasion works alongside power elements such as agenda control. Thus, the leader becomes a ‘strategic norm entrepreneur’.

This may not be that straightforward as structures are also involved. This study maintains that the relationship between the agent and structure is an interactive one. To be able to study this relationship, the researcher should be able to define, when and under which conditions the actor is more likely to shape the structure and when the structure is more likely to shape the actor. Thus, the international structures may enable or retain the possibility for the leader to become a norm entrepreneur.
An international crisis is often seen as negative, leading to something worse, but as Chancellor Merkel stated many times during her two terms, crisis should also be seen as an opportunity. She was using this phrase politically, but if one brings the phrase to a more analytical level, there is a point. During an international crisis, it is very likely that the structures are on the move. It might then open a window of opportunity for the leader not only to take initiative and influence international structures but also to shape national understanding and identity, possibly over a relatively short time frame, because the changed structures are about to shape the actor(s), the consequences of which are unknown. However, this does not exclude the idea that the actor and the structure are in constant interaction, rather it relates more to the question about when the power of the actor might reach its maximum.

Thus, from the agent’s point of view, this study argues that different international crises may create ideational and institutional room for entrepreneurship where power works alongside persuasion. This also indicates that an eclectic approach to analysis of a state’s foreign policy, testing cognitive and ideational components against material and institutional ones, might be the best solution in order to be able to take the different nuances of policy-making into consideration and to understand how a ‘norm entrepreneur’ operates.

The future research on German foreign and European policy should continue to study the interaction between continuity and change and the pragmatic redefinition and reframing of German foreign and European policy, as it may only be possible to identify any permanent change in German policy in the upcoming decades. This study defined this pragmatic reframing of policies including ideational, material and institutional aspects as a normalization development of German foreign and European policy.
The institutionalisation of Merkel’s political beliefs in policy and the changing national understanding of German foreign and European policy can be inferred from some of the developments in German foreign policy in 2014 and 2015. As a result of the victorious federal election in 2013, Merkel stayed on as the Federal Chancellor, again heading the CDU-SPD Grand Coalition. However, although the domestic balance had yet again changed and gives us reminders from Merkel’s first term in office, Merkel’s beliefs relating to widening means to also include sanctions and increasing military responsibility seem to continue. It is interesting to observe, whether the toolbox of different means will widen towards the increased use of ‘promise’ and ‘reward’ on the one hand, and ‘threaten’ and ‘punish’ on the other. It is important to continue to pay attention to this development as widening the means may imply that Germany’s international and EU level influence is increasing.

It is also crucial to note how the possible sanctions backed by Germany will be justified in future. Is it possible that Germany could gradually start to also support military sanctions? In this case, it is necessary that the political operational code beliefs are clearly widened towards deeds instead of mere words, that they are institutionalised as policy practice and that the use of military means has wide public support.

The changing national understanding of German foreign and European policy can be stated in other policy areas, as well. Although the Ukraine crisis may have put an end to a principled emphasis on the importance of cooperation in the world, the cooperative view of the operational environment, especially the pragmatic view of cooperation, still continues to influence German policy-making e.g. as the importance of concluding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations highlights. Moreover, in 2015, the interplay between continuity
and change can also be observed in Germany’s migration policy and how Germany and Chancellor Merkel are approaching Europe’s migrant crisis.

The beliefs and ideas may change incrementally over time as a result of gradual learning but also as a consequence of a crisis, which may influence the redefinition and reframing of meaning, concepts and policy. The state’s identity is defined and redefined in a process in which structures and actors interact. In this process, the first level and the role of the leader should not be neglected. Especially in times of crisis, the leader provides the crucial link between the historical foreign policy discourse of the country concerned and the future as he/she strategically frames and reframes state policies in the present. Thus, all levels of analysis (individual, international and national) should be included in future research in order to gain a comprehensive, but still nuanced, analysis of German foreign and European policy.
Appendix 1

Steps in the Verbs In Context System (VICS) for coding verbs (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998)

1. Identify the subject as
   a. self
   b. other

2. Identify the tense of the transitive verbs:
   a. past
   b. present
   c. future

3. Identify category of the verb
   a. positive (+) or negative (-)
   b. between words and deeds:
      i. words (-1, -2, +1+2)
      ii. deeds (-3, +3)
   c. between six categories: reward (+3), promise (+2), support (+1), oppose (-1), threaten (-2) and punish (-3)

4. Additional information: identify target and context
Example:

Deutschland unterstützt Afghanistan.

1. Subject: Deutschland (Germany)
2. Tense and Category: Verb phrase “unterstützt” (supports), present tense, positive, word, coded as support (+1)
3. Object of the verb is Afghanistan, Germany as part of the NATO ISAF operation, use of *Vernetzte Sicherheit*
4. The complete data line is: self, positive, present, +1, word, Afghanistan
Appendix 2

The VICS Indices (Schafer and Walker 2006a)

Philosophical Beliefs (George 1969)

P-1 The Nature of the Political Universe: Friendly, Mixed, Hostile

This index captures the balance of the leader’s views of other actors in the political universe. It is assumed that the leader’s images of other actors’ policies and actions reflect the leader’s beliefs about politics, political conflict, and the nature of other actors. Here, ‘a simple ratio of the frequency of positive to negative utterances the leader makes when talking about others in the political universe’ is computed. The index varies between -1 and +1.

The formula for the P1 index is the percentage of positive utterances about others minus the percentage of negative utterances about others.
P-2 Prospects for Realising Fundamental Values: Optimism versus Pessimism

With this index the analysis went ‘beyond the balance of cooperative and conflictual utterances to include the way the subject perceives the intensity of others’ actions’. The index varies between -1 and +1.

The formula for the P-2 index: the mean intensity of utterances about others divided by three.

P-3 Predictability of the Political Universe: Low to High

The predictability is assessed by using a dispersion measure that calculates the variation in the distribution of observations across our scale of six verb categories when the subject is talking about other actors. The wider variety of actions the subject attributes to others, the less predictable are their actions.

The dispersion measure is IQV (Index of Qualitative Variation) (Watson and McGaw 1980, 88): the index of qualitative variation ‘is a ratio of the number of different pairs of observations in a distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N and same number of variable classifications’.

The formula for P-3 index: one minus the IQV. The index varies between 0 and +1.
P-4: Control Over Historical Development: Low to High

‘This index is the only one that includes utterances the subject makes about both self and other’ and assesses how much he/she sees as being in control. Here, ‘a simple ratio of the number of self attributions to the number of actions that self attributes to others’ is computed. The index varies between 0 and +1.

The formula for the P-4 index: number of self utterances divided by the sum of self utterances plus other utterances.

P-5 Role of Chance: Low to High

The role of chance is related to P-3 and P-4 indexes. ‘The more predictable the political universe and the more self has control over events in the political universe, the lower is the role of chance’. The index ranges between 0 and +1.

The formula for the P-5 index: one minus the product of the Predictability Index (P-3) times the Control Index (P-4).
Instrumental beliefs (George 1969)

I-1 Direction of Strategy: Cooperative, Mixed, Conflictual

This index assesses the leader’s beliefs about the best strategic direction for actions. The index aggregates utterances when subject is speaking about self and self’s in groups. ‘The more self talks about taking cooperative action, the more cooperatively he or she defines the direction of his or her strategy, and vice versa’. The index varies between -1 and +1.

The formula for I-1 index: the percentage of cooperative (+) utterances made when talking about self minus the percentage of conflictual (-) utterances regarding self.

I-2 Intensity of Tactics

This index concerns the leader’s beliefs about intensity when pursuing tactics. The index ranges between -1 and +1.

The formula for I-2 index: the mean intensity of utterances made when talking about self divided by three.
I-3 Risk Orientation: Averse to Acceptant

Here, the point of interest is how risk averse or risk acceptant the subject is. ‘Higher levels of diversity in action mean that the risk associated with any one action is diminished’. Here as well, the dispersion of the subject’s utterances regarding the self across the six different verb categories is taken into consideration. Here I will also use IQV, the index of qualitative variation as Watson and McGaw (1980, 88).

The formula for I-3 index: one minus the IQV. The index varies between 0 and +1.

I-4 Importance of Timing of Actions: Low to High Flexibility

This belief relates to timing of action and uses two indices, which investigate the diversity of actions in leader’s rhetoric. The first index (I-4a) investigates the diversity of the leader’s choices in terms of cooperation and conflict actions, whereas the second index (I-4b) measures the diversity of the leader’s actions in terms of the distribution of words and deeds. Both indices range between 0 and 1.

The formula for I-4a index: one minus the absolute value of [the percentage of cooperative self utterances minus the percentage of conflictual self utterances].

The formula for I-4b index: one minus the absolute value of [the percentage of world self utterances minus the percentage of deed self utterances].
I-5 Utility of Means: Low to High

This index concerns the leader’s beliefs about the utility of different tactics that mark the exercise of political power. Here, ‘the use of each separate verb category as a percentage of total verbs coded when the subject is talking about self’ is computed. Each index varies between 0 and +1.

The formula for each indexes:

I-5 Punish: The sum of all self utterances coded as ‘Punish’ divided by the sum of all self utterances.

I-5 Threaten: The sum of all self utterances coded as ‘Threaten’ divided by the sum of all self utterances.

I-5 Oppose: The sum of all self utterances coded as ‘Oppose’ divided by the sum of all self utterances.

I-5 Support: The sum of all self utterances coded as ‘Support’ divided by the sum of all self utterances.

I-5 Promise: The sum of all self utterances coded as ‘Promise’ divided by the sum of all self utterances.

I-5 Reward: The sum of all self utterances coded as ‘Reward’ divided by the sum of all self utterances.
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